Youth Gangs: Problem and Response

Irving Spergel

with the assistance of
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ABSTRACT

This draft report represents the result of an extensive review of the research literature available on the youth-gang phenomenon conducted by a team of researchers at the University of Chicago, headed by Irving Spergel and sponsored by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice. The report explores the research on such topics as definitions of youth gang and related terms, the nature and causes of the gang phenomenon, and the effectiveness of various responses from law enforcement, the judicial system, social welfare agencies, schools, and communities. It concludes with a summary and conclusions regarding the nature of the problem, the responses offering the most hope, and the possible courses for further research. An extensive bibliography is also provided. With bibliography, the report numbers 301 pages.
PREFACE

No region of the United States is without youth gangs. Gangs exist in many large and middle-size cities and are spreading to suburban and smaller communities. Youth gangs increasingly create problems in correctional and school settings. Compared with nongang offenders, gang members are responsible for a disproportionate percentage of serious and violent offenses and are more likely to engage in the sale and distribution of drugs. Race or ethnicity and social isolation, interacting with poverty and community disorganization account for much of the gang problem. Gangs take different shape and character in the same or different communities over time. The gang is an important social institution for low-income male youths and young adults from newcomer and residual populations because it often serves social, cultural, and economic functions no longer adequately performed by family, school, and the local market. Four major policy emphases for dealing with gangs have evolved: local community mobilization, youth outreach, social opportunities, and gang suppression. Improved policies require the integration of these approaches with special emphasis on community mobilization and targeted social opportunities.

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PART A: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION

Youth gangs are not unique to contemporary urban America. They have existed across time and cultures. Youth gangs tend to develop during times of rapid social change and political instability. They function as a residual social institution in different ways in different communities when other institutions fail, and they provide a certain degree of order, solidarity, and sometimes economic gain for their members.

Youth gangs have existed in Western and Eastern societies for centuries. As early as the 1600's, London was "terrorized by a series of organized gangs calling themselves the Mims, Hectors, Bugles, Dead Boys . . . who found amusement in breaking windows, demolishing taverns, assaulting the watch. . . . The gangs also fought pitched battles among themselves dressed with colored ribbons to distinguish the different factions" (Pearson 1983, p. 188). In the 17th and 18th centuries, English gangs wore belts and metal pins with designs of serpents, hearts pierced with arrows, animals, and stars. Possibly the oldest structured pattern of criminal gang organization is the Hong Kong-based triads, which evolved from secret societies organized during the 17th century to overthrow the Manchu Ching Dynasty (General Accounting Office 1989, p. 3).

Youth gangs in urban centers of the United States existed before the 19th century (Hyman 1984). A historian of gangs in New York City writes, "By 1855 it was estimated that the metropolis contained at least 30,000 men who owed allegiance to gang leaders and through them to the political leaders of Tammany Hall and the Know Nothing or Native American Party" (Asbury 1971, p. 105). The New York City Civil War draft riots were said to have been precipitated by young Irish street gangs (Asbury 1971, p. 105). Prison gangs existed in Illinois as early as the 1920's. The crimes of many of these early prison groups were similar to those practiced today and included "intimidation, extortion, homosexual prostitution, and other illegitimate business. Riots and killings were numerous" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 57). The gang tradition has been particularly strong in America's Southwest in recent decades. Some gangs in Los Angeles date back 60 or more years—at least in terms of name and tradition (Pitchess 1979). Philibosian estimates that gangs are active in 70 of the 84 incorporated cities in Los Angeles County (1989, p.7). One writer reports that "today a Hispanic in Los Angeles may be a fourth generation gang member" (Donovan 1988, p. 14).

Outside the United States, youth gangs and gang problems have been reported in most countries of Europe, the Soviet Union, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China (Oschlies 1979; Specht 1988). Youth gangs apparently are present in both socialist and free-market societies and in both developing and developed countries.
The Japanese Yakuza (De Vos, Wagatsuma, Caudill, and Mizushima 1973), the Chinese Triads (Morgan 1960; President's Commission on Organized Crime 1985), and the Italian Mafia (Arlacchi 1986) are organized criminal adult gangs that have youth street-gang affiliates or aspirants.

The Japanese Ministry of Justice reports that 52,275 gangsters were arrested in 1983 (excluding those arrested for relatively minor crimes; Ministry of Justice 1984a). The number of juveniles identified as members of gangster organizations who entered Japanese reformatory schools in 1983 was 713, or 12.3 percent of the total of 5,787 juveniles (Ministry of Justice 1984b).

Sir Clinton Roper observes that "ethnic gangs" are a major problem in New Zealand prisons. "They behave as a cohesive group . . . are in conflict among themselves . . . and present a real danger to prison staff . . . a predominant gang can virtually run a wing of a prison . . . they adopt stand-over tactics against nongang members, which results in many inmates seeking protective segregation where there is little available. . . . the active recruitment of new members in the institution is a strong impediment to reintegrating inmates into a law-abiding life on release" (Roper 1988).

There were and continue to be different views about the nature, scope, and severity of youth gang activities. In earlier times, the American boy gang was often regarded as spirited, venturesome, and funloving—mainly a problem of unsupervised lower-class youth from immigrant families situated in transitional inner-city areas (Puffer 1912; Thrasher 1936). Just before and after World War II, certain researchers (Whyte 1943; Suttles 1968) emphasized the stable, organized, functionally constructive, nonaggressive, and community-integrated character of many youth gangs or street-corner groups.

Close connections between delinquent and adult criminal groups or gangs were noted in the early research of Thrasher (1936) and Shaw and McKay (1943) but somehow disappeared in much of the theoretical speculation and research of gangs in the 1950's and early 1960's (Cohen 1955; Miller 1958; Short and Strodttbeck 1964; however, see Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Spergel 1964). These connections were reemphasized in the 1970's and 1980's (Moore 1978; Spergel 1984; Needle and Stapleton 1983; Maxson, Gordon, and Klein 1985; G. Camp and C. Camp 1985; C. Camp and G. Camp 1988).

How much youth gangs in the United States have changed over the years, especially in the last two or three decades, is unclear. According to Miller (1975, p. 75), the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), and the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1976), "youth gangs are not now or [sic] should not become a major object of concern. . . . Youth gang violence is not a major crime problem in the United States. . . . what gang violence does exist can fairly readily be diverted into 'constructive' channels especially through the provision of services by community agencies." Miller's study (1975, p. 75), based on a national
survey, however, concludes that the youth gang problem of the mid-
1970's was then of "the utmost seriousness."

Walter B. Miller's 1975 report, Violence by Youth Gangs and
Youth Groups as a Crime Problem in Major American Cities, was the
first nationwide study of the nature and extent of gang violence.
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
U.S. Department of Justice, supported this pilot study by
Dr. Miller to determine whether there was "enough substance to
claims of increasing gang problems in major cities" (p. 2). He
gathered national-level information based on a variety of local
data sources, mainly through site visits to 12 of the Nation's
largest cities and use of an interview guide to gather information
from expert informants from at least 18 types of organizations—
including criminal justice, youth-based, grassroots, and planning
agencies.

Dr. Miller's data sources were handicapped by lack of reliable
data on gangs and lack of a single agency "which takes as a
continuing responsibility the collection of information based on
explicit and uniformly applied data collection categories which
would permit comparability from city to city and between different
periods of time" (p. 3). To this day, this basic methodological
problem continues to handicap national estimates of the scope and
seriousness of the gang problem and the effectiveness of efforts to
address it.

Dr. Miller's major contributions to the research on gangs were
to begin to assess the problems of violence by youth gangs and
delinquent groups as separate entities and to provide preliminary
rough estimates of the scope of the problem. He concluded his study
with the statement that "Youth gang violence is more lethal today
than ever before [and] ... represents a crime problem of the
first magnitude which shows little prospect of early abatement" (p.
76).

Since publication of Miller's 1975 study, a number of local
studies and media reports have continued to demonstrate the spread
and increase in severity of the gang problem in many cities. For
example, Tracy's study (1982), based on findings from the
Philadelphia cohort studies (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972),
demonstrates that youth gangs account for a substantial share of
serious and violent crime in the city. High levels of fear of gang
crime in or about schools are reported in several recent studies
(Chicago Board of Education 1981; Miller 1982; Rosenbaum and Grant

In the late 1980's, gang problems received national attention,
much of it stimulated by reports from California—especially Los
Angeles. The executive director of the Office of California
Criminal Justice Planning claims in a recent newsletter that "gangs
are a violent and insidious new form of organized crime. Heavily
armed with sophisticated weapons, they are involved in drug
trafficking, witness intimidation, extortion, and bloody
territorial wars. In some cases they are travelling out of State to
spread their violence and crime" (Howenstein 1988, p. 1).
Some recent reports indicate the variability and complexity of gang problems: white-power gang activities have increased somewhat in various cities (Coplon 1988); the school busing of youth from inner-city to other neighborhoods and the suburbs has brought more gang problems, at least temporarily, to some communities (Hagedorn 1988); Hispanic and black gangs continue to be largely responsible for drive-by shootings; white gangs tend to be a major source of graffiti, vandalism, theft, and burglary; undocumented Latin American youth are now present in some established gangs or are forming their own gangs; many of the recent arrivals from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia have become suppliers of drugs; conflicts between some black gangs over drug turf have escalated in some communities; the drug problem within and among black and Hispanic gangs across communities appears to be different in terms of sale and use patterns; a variety of Asian and Pacific Island ethnic-group gang problems is spreading (Duran 1987).

Youth gangs may be both an endemic and acute feature of urban culture that varies over time in form, social meaning, and antisocial character. The late 1980's and early 1990's in the United States may be a time in which—especially in some cities and communities—youth gangs have taken especially disturbing form and character.

Objectives of the Study

This survey of the literature is part of the first stage of a four-stage research and development program to develop and test promising approaches to the youth gang problem. The stages include: assessment, model development, creation of technical assistance manuals, and field testing. The review has three objectives: to describe what is known about youth gangs in the United States; to explain gang phenomena, mainly within social disorganization and poverty perspectives; and to describe and assess, where possible, organized responses to the problem.

The study is organized into two parts. Part A, Nature of the Problem, includes chapters I through VI. Chapter I examines definitional issues and data sources. Chapter II considers the scope and seriousness of the gang problem. Chapters III through V consider, respectively, the group character of youth gangs, membership demographics, and membership experience. Chapter VI discusses the social contexts of youth gang development.

Part B, Response to the Problem, focuses on organized responses to the gang problem with special attention given to existing and evolving strategies, policies, and programs of youth service, criminal justice, community-based (including local school and grassroots) organizations; and Federal and State legislative initiatives. Chapter VII deals with historical roots, and development, of key antigang strategies. Chapter VIII discusses social intervention strategies with special attention to evaluation. Chapter IX begins a discussion of criminal justice system, in particular, police suppression strategies. Chapter X examines the approaches of prosecutor, defense, and judges in
addressing the gang problem. Chapter XI focuses on current and emerging probation, parole, and corrections strategies. Chapter XII emphasizes the importance of social opportunities, especially improved educational and employment opportunities, targeted to gang youth. Chapter XIII is concerned with issues of community organizing and mobilizing both agencies and neighborhood residents. Finally, Chapter XIV summarizes key findings of the study and provides policy recommendations.
CHAPTER I: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

Society needs to better understand youth gangs. The sources of knowledge concerning youth gangs are diverse and provide little consistency, and basic research and program evaluation findings are scant. However, recent media, justice system, and academic interest has resulted in a sharp increase in attention as well as information available. I have drawn selectively upon government documents, agency and conference reports, the mass media, practitioner or "expert" experience, and, as fully as possible, academic and research literature. Some news reports, agency data, and various analyses of youth gang problems—not consistently of the best quality—have been used when more reliable research sources were not available.

Accurate national assessments of the scope of the gang problem do not yet exist. The nature of the "migration" of gang members and the possible related spread of drug-related phenomena across States, cities, and neighborhoods is unclear despite extensive police and media attention. Fairly good general estimates, however, can be made about certain types of gang-related violence within some large cities for particular periods.

Various reasons exist for the lack of "good" data on gangs. The most immediate or direct data source, the gang member, is unreliable. Gang members tend to conceal and exaggerate information and, in fact, may not know the scope of the gang's activities (Klein 1971; Miller 1982; Spergel 1984). The news media do not consistently or regularly report gang events and often exaggerate or sensationalize the subject (Downes 1966; Cohen 1972; Patrick 1973; Gold and Mattick 1974). Miller suggests that the national media, centered in New York City, ignored the gang problem in other cities in the 1970's. For example, about 300 gang killings in 1979 and 350 in 1980 in Los Angeles went largely unreported nationally (Miller 1982; however, see Klein and Maxson 1989).
There is no national center or agency for reporting gang data. Neither the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Health and Human Services, the National Institute of Mental Health, nor the U.S. Department of Education collect or compile national-level data on youth gangs. However, in the past year or two, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the General Accounting Office have begun to report on the drug-related scope and character of the youth gang or street-gang problem nationwide.

There has been some progress in the development of reliable statistics on gang crime in a growing number of large and medium size cities. However, only gross estimates of gang violence are available in most cities. Some police gang units collect gang crime data, mainly on homicide and sometimes on felony assault and robbery; other index and nonindex gang crime data tend to be sporadically collected (see Needle and Stapleton 1983). Data on gang crime are collected mainly on an incident rather than on an individual-offender basis. Consequently, it is difficult to target repeat offenders or to determine the extent of solo offending or nongang companionate crime committed by gang members (Reiss 1987). Considerable interest has developed recently in the creation of information systems at city, county, and State levels and in correctional institutions at different jurisdictional levels (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988). Law enforcement officials have cited the need for a nationwide tracking and identification methodology, specifically for those gang members and criminal groups that appear to carry on illegal activities with other gangs and expand into areas outside their neighborhoods (General Accounting Office 1989, p. 57).

Local values and traditions, political considerations, public pressures, organizational predispositions, news media pressures, academic influences, and statutory language all influence how law enforcement authorities and community-based agencies establish their definitions of gangs, gang members, and gang incidents. There are striking differences between cities' and States' definitions (Overend 1988).

In a recent sample survey, over three-quarters of the police departments surveyed responded that violent behavior was the key criterion for distinguishing groups as gangs (Needle and Stapleton 1983). The Los Angeles Police Department defines "gang-related crime" as homicide, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, kidnapping, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, or arson in which the suspect or victim is identified in police files as a gang member or associate member (usually on the basis of a prior arrest or identification as a gang member). In Chicago, a wider range of crimes may be classified as gang related but only if the incident grows out of a gang function, gang motivation, or particular circumstances. Any robbery involving a gang member is gang related in Los Angeles, but a "gang-related robbery" in Chicago must be due mainly to gang purpose or grow directly out of gang structure and interest. Philadelphia, Boston, New York City, and other cities (even within the State of California) have different criteria for
identifying and classifying an incident as gang related (Miller 1975, 1982).

A variety of theoretical and methodological problems have hindered the development of adequate knowledge about gangs. The approach to the study of gangs has been categorical rather than variable (Kornhauser 1978). Categories and concepts have not been clearly defined or distinguished. There has often been a failure to distinguish norms from behaviors, subcultures from gangs, gangs from delinquent groups, different ethnic gang patterns, variability in gang problems in different cities, and gang patterns within the same city over time.

Researchers have tended to employ nonrepresentative or age-truncated samples and limited data-gathering technologies. Small nonrandom samples of gangs served and supplied through local police, youth agencies, or correctional agencies have been studied, usually without control or comparison groups. Adolescent gangs, until recently, have been almost the exclusive focus of research or program evaluation, to the exclusion of preadolescent and young adult gangs. Observational studies have been time limited—usually 1 to 3 years with no long-term systematic followup. Conspicuously absent have been studies of the socialization of gang youths compared with other nongang youths and studies of the socialization of different subgroups of youths in the same gang, of those who use or sell drugs and those who do not, and of those who are extremely violent and those who are not. Longitudinal studies that examine the stability and changing character of these structures and processes over time have not been conducted. Participant observation has been the favored mode of study, at times resulting in very limited perspectives and sometimes researcher overidentification with subjects. Also, insufficient use has been made of official statistics, systematic self-reports, or surveys of youths or adults in high-crime or gang-crime areas, although each of these have their methodological limitations as well. Variations among gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and countries and across schools, prisons, and other institutional contexts often have been disregarded (however, see Spergel 1964; Downes 1966; Patrick 1973; McGahey 1986; Fagan 1989; Sullivan 1989).

Definitions

The term "gang" can mean many things. Definitions in use have varied according to the concerns and interests of law enforcement, policymakers, media, community residents; academic fashions; and the changing social realities of the gangs. Definitions in the 1950's and 1960's were often related to issues of etiology and were based on liberal, optimistic, social-reform values. Definitions in the 1970's and 1980's were more descriptive, emphasized violent and criminal characteristics, and may have reflected more conservative social philosophies (Klein and Maxson 1987).

Gang definitions evoke "intense and emotional discussions" (Miller 1977, p. 1) and can become the basis for quite varied policies, laws, and strategies. Definitions determine whether we
have a large, small, or even no problem; whether more or fewer gangs and gang members exist; and which agencies will receive most of the funds to address the problem.

Some of the more benign conceptions of the gang—used by gang members, agency personnel, and a few academics—stress the gang’s residual communal or social-support function. According to one gang member, "Being in a gang means if I didn’t have no family, I’ll think that’s where I’ll be. If I didn’t have no job that’s where I’d be. To me it’s community help without all the community. They’ll understand better than my mother and father" (Hagedorn 1988, p. 131).

A former gang member, later a staff member of a local community organization, says: "A gang is what you make it. A gang is people who hang out; they don’t have to be negative or positive" (Allen 1981, p. 74). Sister Falaka Fattah, director and founder of the House of Umoja, a model residential and community-based program deeply committed to the social support and development of gang youth, observes: "A traditional Philadelphia black street gang was composed of friends who lived in the same neighborhood and usually had kinship links developed over generations with ties to the South. Many of these traditional gangs were founded by families, since recruitment took place at funerals where families and friends gathered in mourning" (Fattah 1988, p. 5).

The gang may be viewed, in this perspective, as performing significant social functions. It is an interstitial group, integrated or organized through conflict. While its opposition may include other baseball teams, parents, storekeepers, and gangs on the next street (Thrasher 1936), the "gang is not organized to commit delinquent acts. . . . The gang is a form of collective behavior, spontaneous and unplanned in origin" (Kornhauser 1978, p. 52). Morash observes that "gang-likeness is not a necessary condition to stimulate members’ delinquency" (1983, p. 35; see also Savitz, Rosen, and Lalli 1980).

Miller observes that there are at least two ways to perceive gang activity as constructive or benign. Some community groups, agencies, and gangs may perceive gang behaviors as "normal and expectable" so long as such behavior is relatively unserious or infrequent (Miller 1977, p. 11). Gang members may be perceived as protecting their respective communities by attacking and driving out "unwanted" elements, including drug dealers or members of other races or ethnic groups (Miller 1977, pp. 13-14; see also Suttles 1968). Recently, gangs have been regarded as collectives or organizations integrated into local community—even bringing in local commerce and resources (for example, through drug dealing).

Some veteran gang researchers have recently changed their minds as to gang character, in large measure because gang behavior has probably changed. Earlier, Miller viewed the gang as a stable primary group, neither especially aggressive nor violent, that prepared the young male for an adult role in lower-class society (1958, 1962, 1976b). More recently, because of increased levels of violent or otherwise illegal behavior, Miller concludes that "contemporary youth gangs pose a greater threat to public order and
a greater danger to the safety of the citizenry than at any time during the past" (1975, p. 44; see also Miller 1982).

Similarly, Klein initially characterized the gang as an adolescent group perceived by both themselves and others as involved in delinquencies, but not of a serious or lethal nature (1968, 1971). In recent years, Klein and his associates report that gangs commit a large number of homicides and participate in extensive narcotics trafficking, although perhaps not as much as is commonly believed (Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham 1988; Klein 1989).

Yablonsky, by contrast, has consistently portrayed gang boys—particularly leaders and core members—as law-breakers trading in violence and primarily organized to carry out illegal acts (Yablonsky 1962; Haskell and Yablonsky 1982).

The principal criterion currently used to define a "gang" may be the group's participation in illegal activity. Miller suggests that the term can be applied broadly or narrowly by the key definers of the phenomena, law enforcement officers. Police departments may apply the term quite narrowly in large cities, but more broadly in small cities to cover more types of offenses (Miller 1980). Needle and Stapleton (1983, p. 13) suggest that perception of youth gang activities as major, moderate, or minor problems varies with the number and size of youth gangs, the problems they are believed to cause, and the prevalence of youth gang activity as a proportion of total crime. The media, distressed local citizens, and outreach community agencies tend to use the term more broadly than do the police to cover more categories of youth behavior.

The most widely used definition was developed by Klein almost 20 years ago: a gang refers "to any denotable adolescent group of youngsters who (a) are generally perceived as a distinct aggregation by others in the neighborhood, (b) recognize themselves as a denotable group (almost invariably with a group name), and (c) have been involved in a sufficient number of delinquent incidents to call forth a consistent negative response from neighborhood residents and/or law enforcement agencies" (Klein 1971, p. 111).

Miller differentiates among 20 different categories and subcategories of law-violating youth groups of which "turf gangs," "fighting gangs," and "gain-oriented gangs" are three subtypes (1982, chapter 1). He provides a definition of a youth gang that emphasizes organization and control of turf or criminal enterprise:

A youth gang is a self-formed association of peers united by mutual interests with identifiable leadership and internal organization who act collectively or as individuals to achieve specific purposes, including the conduct of illegal activity and control of a particular territory, facility, or enterprise (Miller 1982, p. 61).

According to the California Penal Code, section 186.22, a "criminal street gang" is defined as "any organization, association, or group of three or more persons whether formal or informal . . . which has a common name or common identifying sign
or symbol, where members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal activity." These criminal acts are identified as follows: assault with a deadly weapon; robbery; unlawful homicide or manslaughter; and the sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances.

We find also that certain problem youth groups, such as racist "skinheads" and neo-Nazi groups, may be identified distinctively by their dress and codes of behavior. They engage in violent and criminal activities for ideological—including political and religious—ends and are increasingly under the purview of gang units of the police and probation departments, as well as legislative commissions studying youth gang problems. These changes suggest a further extension and specification of the concept of the youth gang (Reddick 1987).

Delinquent Group versus Gang

Much juvenile crime is committed by groups of young people (Erickson and Jensen 1977, Zimring 1981). Is the "gang" simply equivalent to the concept of "delinquent group?" Shaw and McKay were interested in the companionate character of the delinquent acts for which 8 out of 10 youths were brought to juvenile court, but they used the terms "gang" and "delinquent group" interchangeably (Shaw and McKay 1931).

Thrasher (1936) implicitly recognized the difference between the gang and the delinquent group. Whyte's (1943) and Suttle's (1968) gangs or street-corner groups were not particularly delinquent, and certainly were not violent. The major theorists and researchers of gangs in the 1950's and 1960's generally viewed the delinquent gang and delinquent group as equivalent or synonymous, although reference was made to core delinquent cliques in gangs (Cohen 1955; Cohen and Short 1958; Miller 1958, 1962; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Klein 1968, 1971). More recently, a researcher in Scandinavia conducted a series of sophisticated network analyses on the assumption that the term "gangs . . . simply signifies groups" (Sarnecki 1986, p. 11). However, an academic informant recently stated that Sarnecki has changed his mind. Sarnecki now believes that Scandinavian delinquent groups are not gangs, at least not in the sense the term is used in the United States (Klein 1989). Gangs and delinquent groups are more likely to be viewed as equivalent in the study of juveniles than of older adolescents and young adults.

A number of theorists and researchers have tried to distinguish between gangs and delinquent groups (Kornhauser 1978; Morash 1983; Cohen 1969a, 1969b). Bernard Cohen insists that "gang and group delinquency are different forms of juvenile deviance and should be approached etiologically, as well as for purposes of treatment and prevention, from different starting points" (1969a, p. 108). Based on police data, he found that gang offenders were a little older and more homogenous with respect to age, race, sex, and residence patterns than nongang group offenders.
Curry and Spergel provide an extended definition that attempts to distinguish delinquent groups from gangs with some attention to the variability and complexity of gang structure and behavior. Group delinquency is defined as law-violating behavior committed by juveniles in relatively small groups that tend to be ephemeral—that is, loosely organized with shifting leadership. The delinquent group is engaged in various forms of minor or serious crime. A current variant or subcategory of delinquent group or youthful criminal organization, particularly popular in Eastern States is the "crew" or "passe." It can be diffuse or well organized directed primarily to illegal gain activity, especially drug trafficking.

We define gang delinquency or crime as law-violating behavior committed by both juveniles and adults in or related to groups that are complexly (although sometimes diffusely) organized and are sometimes cohesive with established leadership and rules. The gang also engages in a wide range of crime—but significantly more violence—within a framework of communal values in respect to mutual support; conflict relations with other gangs; and often a tradition of turf, colors, signs, and symbols. Subgroups of the gang may be differentially committed to various delinquent or criminal patterns, such as drug trafficking, gang fighting, or burglary. The concepts of the delinquent group and the youth gang are not exclusive of each other but represent distinctive social phenomena. (Curry and Spergel 1988, p. 382)

Maxson and Klein's recent work on gang homicides has indicated also that "gang violence is substantially different in character from nongang violence. . . . the character of reported gang violence is primarily a function of the setting and participant characteristics of the violent event and the investigative and reporting procedures of the police . . . The character of 'big city' gang violence is quite similar to that found in smaller cities with more recent development of street gangs" (Maxson and Klein 1989, p. 18).

It is also possible to argue, based on recent survey data (Spergel et al. 1989), that nondelinquent and delinquent groups in some cities can be converted or organized into youth gangs. Much depends on population change, particularly the movement of families with gang members to nongang areas, the entrepreneurial efforts of gang drug traffickers, and the gang socialization of delinquent or criminal youths that takes place in prisons. Youth gangs, in turn, may be changed or co-opted into criminal organizations of various forms. Some youth gangs, gang members, and cliques—or their current equivalent—may no longer fit traditional images of youth with identifiable clothing, colors, or signs concerned primarily with intimidation, protecting turf, or developing reputation, but are now directed toward making money through a variety of, or even shifting, criminal activities.

In the pages that follow, the term "youth gang" is used generally to refer to groups and behaviors that represent an important subset of delinquent and sometimes criminal groups and their behaviors. Although the more inclusive term "delinquent group" is useful for some purposes, the purpose here is to examine
gang phenomena of contemporary interest to researchers, policymakers, and program personnel; for this purpose it is "gangs," not "delinquent groups," that is our focus.
CHAPTER II: SCOPE, SERIOUSNESS, AND CHARACTER OF THE GANG PROBLEM

In this chapter, we provide evidence on numbers of gangs and gang members, gang members' participation in serious crime, and, particularly, gang violence and the relation between drug trafficking by gangs and violence associated with the drug trade. Although data sources are diverse and of varying reliability, some substantive information is available that provides a possible basis for forming conclusions about magnitudes and trends.

Youth gangs today are found in almost all 50 States, including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and other American territories, with possible exceptions in a few Northeastern States and North Central Mountain States. Miller (1982, chapter 3) estimated that in the late 1970's, gangs were present in almost 300 U.S. cities, or 13 percent of all cities with populations of 10,000 or more. Miller (1982, chapter 2) also found that 5 out of 6, or 83 percent, of the largest cities had gang problems, as did 41 out of 150 cities with a population of 100,000 or more. Needle and Stapleton (1983) report a somewhat similar proportion: 39 percent of cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999 have gang problems. Gangs now exist in smaller cities and suburban communities but do not necessarily exhibit the same degree or intensity of criminality and violence. Sometimes these gangs share names and loose ties with gangs in nearby large cities (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983).

The reason gangs are present or a more serious problem in certain cities and regions of the country than others is not clear. Although no region is without youth gangs, gangs seem to be concentrated and problematic in certain Western, Midwestern, and Southeastern States. A substantial number of smaller cities and communities in these States now have gang problems. At the same time, however, there appear to be many more cities with delinquent youth groups than with specific gang problems (Miller 1982; Needle and Stapleton 1983). Some cities do not have gang problems even though they are in regions with high concentrations of youth gang problems.

The existence of gangs in certain areas has waxed and waned over the past several years. Cities that reported gang problems in the 1970's or early 1980's are without these problems in the late 1980's (Spergel et al. 1989), and some cities with current youth gang problems did not have or were not aware of these problems in the 1960's and 1970's. The terms "emerging," "chronic," and even "reemerging," should be regarded as variables and are now used to describe the different and changing nature of gang problems experienced in a variety of cities and jurisdictions.

Gangs are present in State and Federal correctional systems and in many school systems. In a 1981 study, Caltabriano calculated that 53 percent of State prisons had gangs. G. Camp and C. Camp (1985) found that 32 out of 48, or 67 percent, of the State prison systems studied had gangs present, as did the Federal system. Youth and young adult gangs were identified in State prisons on the West
Coast as early as the 1950's and 1960's and in Midwestern States in the 1960's and 1970's. In Chicago, all public and some parochial high schools, and many suburban high schools reported the presence of gangs or gang members and gang problems. (Chicago Board of Education 1981; Spergel 1985). Gangs or gang problems are increasingly present in inner-city school systems in Midwestern and Western States. However, the number of gang members in most schools may be quite small.

Estimates of Numbers of Youth Gangs and Youth gang Membership

It is not possible to devise meaningful estimates of the number of youth gangs in the United States, partly because there is no standard or national definition for the term "gang." Often gangs and delinquent groups and/or criminal youth organizations are confused. Also sometimes a number of different gangs that share the same or similar names are considered one gang, and sometimes factions of a fairly small gang are reported as separate gangs. National estimates have been made primarily for rhetorical purposes. Dolan and Finney (1984, p. 12) claim that "since the close of World War II, the number of youth gangs has grown astonishingly, with a recent study revealing that there are now far more than 100,000 in the country." The estimate is sufficiently exciting that the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, used it in the introduction to a recent public request for proposals on gang research (Federal Register 1987).

It is difficult to determine the consistency or meaning of the following estimates: 760 to 2,700 gangs in the 8 largest cities of the United States (Miller 1975, p. 18); 2,200 gangs in approximately 300 U.S. cities and towns (Miller 1982, chapter 4, pp. 30-31); 1,130 gangs in the 10 largest gang-problem cities between 1970 and 1980 (Miller 1982). Furthermore, how would these estimates compare—or can they be compared—to Thrasher's (1936) estimates of 1,313 gangs in Chicago in the 1920's?

A somewhat more meaningful estimate may be that law-violating delinquent youth groups other than gangs far exceed the number of gangs, perhaps by 50 times. Miller (1975, 1982) suggests that the number of police-recognized gangs has remained fairly constant over the past 2 decades in some cities. More recent observations suggest a sharp increase in some cities and a sharp decline in others (Spergel et al. 1989).

Increases in numbers of gangs, gang members, or gang incidents have been reported in the following cities in recent years. In Dade County, Florida, there are reported to have been 4 gangs in 1980, 25 gangs in 1983, 47 gangs in 1985, and 80 in 1988 (Reddick 1987; Silbert, Christiano, and Nunez-Cuenca 1988). In Los Angeles County, California, there were 239 gangs reported in 1985, and 400 to possibly 800 gangs in 1988 (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department 1985; Gott 1988; Knapp 1988; see also Philibosian 1989). In Santa Ana, Orange County, the number of cases assigned to the gang detail jumped from 286 cases in 1986 to 396 cases in 1987, including 8
gang-related homicides—the highest number since 1979, when there were 13 (Schwartz 1988).

In San Diego County there were 3 gangs and fewer than 300 street gang members in 1975, but 19 to 35 gangs, if factions are included, and 2,100 street gang members in 1987 (Davidson 1987). In Phoenix, reports of numbers of gangs have seesawed: 34 in 1974, 74 in 1982, and down to 31 gangs in 1986. In the past year, a surge of gang drug activity has been blamed on an influx of black young adults from Los Angeles (Frazier 1988).

In other cities over the same period, there were reports of sharp declines in gangs, membership, and gang activity. In New York City, there were 315 gangs and 20,000 members reported in 1974, 130 gangs and 10,300 members in 1982, and 66 gangs and 2,500 members in 1987 (New York State Assembly 1974a; Galea 1982; Kowski 1988). In Fort Wayne, Indiana, there were 6 gangs with over 2,000 members reported in 1985-86, but only 3 gangs and 50 members in 1988 (Hinshaw 1988). El Monte, in Los Angeles County, reported 10 to 12 gangs and 1,000 gang members in the mid 1970's, but noted only 4 gangs and about 50 active gang members in 1988 (Hollopeter 1988). The police department in Louisville, Kentucky, reported 15 gangs and 40 to 50 gang incidents per month in 1985, but only 5 gangs and 1 gang incident per month as recently as July 1988 (Beavers 1988).

It is not clear what accounts for these shifts in different cities over similar time periods. We do not know if overall juvenile or young-adult crime rates or patterns of crime have changed in each of the cities. Gangs may affect the form and process of delinquent or criminal activity rather than its incidence or prevalence over time. It is possible that, if the members of gangs age in a particular community, if patterns of violent behavior are constrained, if opportunities for legitimate jobs increase, or if more rational income-producing illegal activity such as drug trafficking, rises, then group activity may no longer be conducted through traditional turf structures.

Estimates from law enforcement or police agencies may be slightly more useful, particularly if such figures are based on arrests or focus on clearly defined "high profile" gangs. Police prevalence figures tend to be on the conservative side, and those of news reporters, academics, and community agency informants are often higher. For example, in the 1940's, the police estimated that there were 60 to 200 gangs in New York City, but a contemporary observer reported that there were then at least 250 gangs in Harlem alone (Campbell 1984b). One police commander estimates that there were 127 active gangs in New York City in the 1970's, with another 144 gangs that were less active. (Hargrove 1981, p. 90). Another claims that there were 130 "delinquent" gangs in the early 1980's and an additional 113 gangs under investigation (Galea 1982), but an academic researcher estimates that there were 400 gangs in New York City in 1979 (Campbell 1984b). The New York City Police Department reports there were 37 gangs (23 delinquent, 14 marginal, and 51 other youth gangs) under investigation in 1988 (Galea 1989).

Miller (1975, p. 13) states there were 1,000 gangs in Chicago in the 1960's but that the number dropped to 700 by 1974. In his
1982 report, Miller claims the number of Chicago gangs was only 250 between 1970 and 1980. Chicago Police Department estimates of the number of gangs were 110 in 1985, and 135 in both 1986 and 1987.

Estimates of the number of prison gangs may also be meaningless unless the character, size, frequency, and seriousness of criminal behavior are indicated. Estimates have varied from 47 gangs in 24 prisons in a 1981 report by Caltabriano, to 114 gangs in 33 prisons in a 1985 report (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Camp and Camp also indicate that the figure could go as high as 219 gangs if gangs with the same names in different California State prisons are counted. Thus a gang such as the CRIPS in the California prison system is counted once in reports but a different set of CRIPS gang may exist in many different California institutions. CRIPS is made up of at least 180 street gangs whose membership is reported to be in the thousands (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985).

Estimates of gangs in public schools have also been made for some of the large cities. Spergel estimated that there were 53 male and 7 female gangs in 60 public high schools in Chicago in 1985. These were school gangs with names of high-profile street gangs. The number represented 211 male factions in the 60 public high schools. Furthermore, based on police data, 19 male and 4 female major youth gang factions were also found in the city’s Catholic high schools (Spergel 1985). One witness testifying before a Senate subcommittee hearing estimated that there were 207 gangs operating on public school campuses of the Los Angeles Unified School District in 1983 (Philibosian 1983, p. 4). We need to know, however, how many gang-related or nongang delinquency problems were caused by gang members on school property. It is quite possible that schools with many gangs, but with small numbers in each of them, may experience fewer problems of social disorder or deviance, particularly if such schools are well run and have reasonably high academic standards, than poorly managed schools with one or two gangs (Spergel 1985).

Membership numbers for youth gangs have also been estimated with little attention to such critical factors as membership statuses or roles or the extent and degree of members' participation in delinquent behavior. Miller estimates that there were 96,000 gang members in 300 American cities and towns in the 1970's, with an average of 48 members per gang. Gangs are larger on average than are other law-violating youth groups. Although there are 50 times more law-violating youth groups than youth gangs, members of law-violating youth groups are only 15 times as numerous as gang members (Miller 1982).

The proportion of a youth population in a particular city or locality estimated to be gang members may range over time. Thrasher (1936, p. 412) reported that "one tenth of Chicago’s 350,000 boys between the ages of 10 and 20 are subject to the demoralizing influence of gangs." But Klein (1968) estimated that the census tract with the highest known number of gang members in Los Angeles in 1960 had only 6 percent of 10- to 17-year-olds affiliated with gangs. A Pennsylvania civic commission report of 1969 reported that only 6.4 percent of all juvenile arrests in 1968 were of known gang
members (Klein 1971, p. 115). Vigil (1988) recently estimated that only 3 to 10 percent of boys in the Mexican barrios of Los Angeles are gang members.

A variety of self-report studies has been conducted, and the proportion of youths declaring they are gang members does not seem to have changed radically over the past two decades, with a few exceptions. Savitz, Rosen, and Lalli (1980) determined that 12 percent of black and 14 percent of white youths in Philadelphia who claimed to be gang affiliated members had Philadelphia Police Department records. Another self-report study found that 10.3 percent of black youths in suburban Cook County said they were gang members (Johnstone 1981). In a self-report study in Seattle, 13 percent of youth said they belonged to gangs (Sampson 1986). In an as-yet-unpublished study of several very poor inner-city neighborhoods of Chicago, the following percentages of adult males 18 to 45 years old reported they "had belonged" to gangs: Mexican/Mexican-Americans, 3.5 percent; Puerto Ricans, 12.7 percent; white, 10.7 percent; and blacks, 13.8 percent (Testa 1988). In another recent self-report study of four inner-city neighborhoods in three large cities across the country, one male in three reported gang membership; however, this sample may have been preselected for gang membership (Fagan, Piper, and Moore 1986).

Recent informant or "expert" estimates of the percentage of gang youth in large cities have ranged from 0.7 percent in San Antonio to 7.3 percent in New York City (Miller 1982). A California State task-force report estimates that there were 50,000 gang members in Los Angeles County (California Council on Criminal Justice 1986). However, a later estimate places membership at 70,000 in Los Angeles County (Gott 1988). A Los Angeles newspaper reports "there are 25,000 CRIPS and Blood gang members or 'associates' in Los Angeles County—an estimate based on arrests and field interrogation of persons stopped but not arrested. That represents 25 percent of the county's estimated 100,000 black men between the ages of 15 and 24" (Baker 1988a). Another estimate is that there are 70,000 CRIPS and Bloods alone in Los Angeles County (O'Connell 1988). Estimates of gang membership in Chicago have ranged from "12,000 to as many as 120,000 persons" (Bobrowski 1988, p. 40). Spergel estimates that 5 percent of students in elementary school, 10 percent in high school, 20 percent in special school programs, and 35 percent of school-age dropouts between age 16 and 19 are gang members in Chicago. This produces a figure of 38,000 public school-age students who were gang members in Chicago (1985).

The estimated figures for gang members as a proportion of population necessarily are higher in criminal justice settings. They range from 0 to 90 percent or more. G. Camp and C. Camp (1985) estimated that 34 percent, or 5,300, of Illinois prison inmates were active gang members as of January 1984 and, not quite consistently, that 90 percent of Illinois prison inmates "are, were, or will be gang members" (p. 134). A family court worker reported that 20 percent of children going before the Queens County, New York, Family Court were involved in gang-related activities (New York State Assembly 1974b). One study of Cook
County juvenile court probationers indicated that 22.7 percent were gang members (Utne and McIntyre 1982). Orange County's probation department reports that it currently provides services to approximately 520 active gang members or 17 percent of the total juveniles supervised by probation (Orange County 1989, pp. 7-8). A California Youth Authority study found that 40 to 45 percent of the wards could be identified as gang members in 1979, but the estimates had increased to between 70 and 80 percent in 1982 and 1983 (Hayes 1983). However, an official in the California Youth Authority more recently estimated that approximately a third of its 13,152 wards were "gang identified" (Lockwood 1988).

These estimates, variable and unreliable as they may be, indicate that gangs are present in significant numbers in a variety of social contexts. Furthermore, gang membership may have reached critical proportions in certain cities, schools, and prison systems. However, the data are not clear as to the relationship between numbers and proportion of gang members to problems of social disorder or criminality. Certain gangs and gang members may be only peripherally involved in delinquency or gang crime or not at all. It is likely that the larger and more concentrated the number of gang members from different gangs in a relatively small area, such as a prison, the more likely serious gang-related disorder and crime are to occur (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988).
Youth Gang Violence

Reasonably adequate data have begun to be available on the current nature and scope of violence committed by gang members. There is good evidence of an increase in gang-related violence and that gang members, at least those with arrest records, are responsible for a disproportionate amount of violent crime. This, however, tends to be concentrated in particular areas. The proportion of serious gang-related violence may be very high in a certain neighborhood, school, or correctional institution at a particular time. However, the proportion of serious, including violent, crime by youth gang members tends to be small on a city, school system, or prison system basis. Bobrowski, who uses a definition of "gang incident" based on gang-related function or motivation rather than individual gang membership, indicates that for Chicago "Part I street gang offenses measured less than 0.8 percent of comparable city-wide gang crime [between January 1986 and July 1988] . . . The seriousness of the problem lies not in the extent of street gang activity but in its violent character and relative concentration in certain of Chicago's community areas" (1988, p. 41). Property crime is still the major type of offense committed by gang members, often in a nongang capacity.

The classic research on types of offenses by juveniles, youths, or young adults in delinquent groups or gangs suggests that violent crime was less common in earlier periods than it is now (Thrasher 1936; Shaw and McKay 1943). Whyte (1943) stressed that street gangs in Boston did not typically engage in brawls or gang fights that resulted in serious injury. Miller (1962) and Klein (1968, 1971) insisted that the gangs they evaluated in the 1950's and 1960's were not particularly violent. Miller's (1962, 1976a) Boston gangs rarely used firearms, and their gang fights seldom resulted in serious injury. Klein (1971, p. 115) noted the relative rarity of the "truly violent act" among East Los Angeles Hispanic gangs in his project areas over a 4-year period. Bernstein (1964) and Short and Strodtbeck (1965) reported that delinquency and violence by juvenile gangs were relatively mild. More fighting took place within the gang than against opposing gangs. The most common form of offense appeared to be "creating a disturbance," noisy roughhousing, or impeding public passage (Miller 1976a). Yablonsky (1962) and, to a lesser extent, Spergel (1964) were in the minority of observers when they reported that New York gangs of the 1950's frequently could be violent, with homicides occurring.

Gangs were different, however, in the 1970's and 1980's: "the weight of evidence would seem to support the conclusion that the consequences of assaultive activities by contemporary gangs are markedly more lethal than during any previous period" (Miller 1975, p. 41); "the cycles of gang homicide now seem to end higher and retreat to higher plateaus before surging forward again. If homicide is any indicator, gang violence has become a far more serious problem during the most recent decade" (Klein and Maxson 1987, p. 4). Miller (1975, pp. 75-76) makes stark claims: violent crime by gang members in some cities was as much as one-third of
all violent crime by juveniles. Juvenile gang homicides were about 25 percent of all juvenile homicides in approximately 65 major cities in the United States. Block's study (1985, p. 5) more recently finds, based on police data, that gang homicide accounted for 25 percent of teenage homicides in Chicago between 1965 and 1981 and 50 percent of all Hispanic teenage homicides. In the last few years, Los Angeles may have supplanted Chicago as the country's worst gang-violence city. There were 387 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles County in 1987, 452 in 1988, and 554 in 1989.

On the other hand, we note that some smaller cities may have higher gang homicide rates than either Chicago or Los Angeles City or County. Ponce, the second largest city in Puerto Rico, with a population of about 200,000 recorded 21 gang homicides for the first half of 1989, a rate far higher than Chicago or Los Angeles (Office of the Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989).

We are not convinced that these statistics portend an inexorable upward spiral of gang violence, even though Los Angeles and Chicago may currently be recording the highest level of gang homicides in their respective histories. There are peaks and valleys in the number of gang homicides over fairly long time periods. Gang homicides averaged about 70 per year in Chicago between 1981 and 1986, 63 per year in the next highest period of 1969 to 1971, but only 25 gang homicides were noted per year in the period between 1973 and 1978. Furthermore, gang homicides based on official statistics have sharply declined in New York City and Philadelphia in the past 15 years. Gang homicides in Chicago as a percent of total homicides have ranged from 1.71 percent in 1975 to 11 percent in 1990. During the recent 1990 peak year in Chicago, 101 gang homicides occurred.

Bob Baker, a Los Angeles Times reporter, adds critical qualitative meaning to analysis of the gang homicide problem. He argues that these less organized attacks, in which one or two members shoot somebody because they are trying to settle their own score, should not be called "gang killings." "In most of Los Angeles, gang members contend that for all the publicity about killings, the gangs themselves are pretty quiet . . . Assaults by one group of gang members on another are far less frequent than they were at the turn of the decade when turf lines were less hardened and incursions tended to be more explosive. . . . For all the attention being paid to spectacular violence committed over soured drug deals and arguments over territory, the largest number of gang killings still occur in this haphazard chaotic way" (Baker 1988b).

Again, depending on how one reports and interprets these homicides, the basic youth violence situation in Los Angeles may be little different than it is in Chicago or New York. Although the New York Police Department claims a very low level of gang crime, youth violence and drug violence currently "may be at an all time high" (Galea 1988). The rate of youth violence generally may be higher in Detroit than in Chicago, although Detroit police claim a very low level of youth gang activity.
The puzzles of gang-crime statistics and what they mean are not easy to resolve. The proportion of violent crime attributed to gang members is relatively higher than the proportion of violent crime committed by nongang members in most social contexts. Yet we are not clear about the relationship of gang to nongang violent crime in seemingly similar cities. In 1987, gang homicides were 25.2 percent of the total number of homicides in Los Angeles City, but 6.9 percent of the total number of homicides in Chicago. Gang felonious assaults were 11.2 percent in Los Angeles, but 4.3 percent in Chicago. Gang-related robberies were 6.6 percent of the total robberies in Los Angeles, but only 0.8 percent of the total robberies in Chicago. These differences may reflect not only different definitions but also different police practices, different local situations, and fluctuations over short-term periods.

The increase in gang violence in some cities in the past 8 to 10 years has been attributed to several factors. Gangs have more weapons (Miller 1975; Spergel 1983) than they have had in the past. Guns are used more often from a moving car (drive-by shooting). The ready availability of improved weaponry (.22's, .38's, .45's, .357 magnums, AK 47's, Uzis, and sawed-off shotguns) is associated with the changing pattern of gang conflict. The "tradition," "report," or myth of intergang rumbles based on large assemblages of youth arriving for battle on foot, which may be easily interdicted, has been supplanted by smaller, mobile groups of two or three youths, usually in a vehicle, prowling for opposing gang members. Although shootings are sometimes planned, spur-of-the-moment decisions to attack targets of opportunity are common (see also Horowitz 1983). Klein and Maxson suggest that increased gang violence may not reflect "greater levels of violence among and between gangs [but] . . . a growth in the number of gangs or gang members . . . or an increasingly violent society [or perhaps] . . . more sophisticated gang intelligence [and law enforcement]" (1989, p. 218).

The older ages of gang members may also be responsible for greater use of sophisticated weaponry and consequent violence. More and better weaponry may be available to older teenagers and young adults than to juveniles. For the past 10 years, the median gang homicide offender in Chicago has been 19 years old with a 20-year-old victim. (Spergel 1986). Los Angeles data (Maxson, Gordon, and Klein 1985) and San Diego police statistics (San Diego Association of Governments 1982) also indicate that older adolescents and young adults are mainly involved in gang homicides. Motorcycle and prison gangs also appear to have become more lethal. Motorcycle gangs are no longer simply "free-wheeling riders" but now may engage in struggles over domination of a prison or a territory's lucrative vice or narcotics trade, prostitution, extortion, protection, and murder for hire (Davis 1982a, 1982b). These somewhat older gangs are still only partially disciplined and engage in internecine combat and brutality (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Half of all prison homicides are estimated to result from gang activity. Some State prisons are particularly violent. Of 20
gang killings in prisons in 1983, 9 occurred in the California system. Between 1975 and 1984, there were 372 gang-related homicides in California prisons, "a record unsurpassed by any other organized crime group in California" (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, p. 2).

Gang and Nongang Member Studies: Violence and Serious Crime

The relationship between gangs and violence is most evident when patterns of behavior by gang members and nonmembers are compared. Gang youths engage in more violent crime than do nongang but delinquent youths. Klein and Myerhoff (1967, pp. 1-2) observed that "the urban gang delinquent is different in kind from the urban nongang delinquent . . . Gang members have higher police contact rates . . . and become involved in more serious delinquencies than nonmembers." Most recently a Swedish researcher found that delinquents who were group or "network" related committed more frequent and serious offenses that were nongroup or non-network delinquents (Sarnecki 1986). Orange County probation statistics indicate that gang-affiliated minors had significantly higher technical and new law-violation rates (55.1 percent) than nongang affiliated minors (26.4 percent) in 1987 (Orange County 1988).

The most consistent and impressive differences between gang and nongang offense patterns of delinquents arise from findings by different researchers in Philadelphia over a 20-year period. Bernard Cohen (1969a, pp. 77-79), using data collected by the Philadelphia Police Department’s gang unit, found evidence that "gangs engage in more violent behavior than do delinquent nongang groups," as 66.4 percent of gang events but only 52.6 percent of delinquent-group events fell into violent offense categories. Only 1.4 percent of gang events, but 13.7 percent of group events, were property crimes. Gang members' offenses were more serious and more often involved display or use of a weapon.

Friedman, Mann, and Friedman (1975) sought to distinguish gang, nongang delinquents, and nondelinquents in the early 1970's. They found that violent behavior differentiated street-gang members from nongang members better than all the other legal, socioeconomic, and psychological factors studied. Gang members were also characterized by the attributes of more police arrests for nonviolent crime, more truancy, and more alcohol and drug abuse (Friedman, Mann, and Friedman 1975, pp. 599-600).

Based on a sample of the 1945 Philadelphia cohort study (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972), Rand (1987, pp. 155-56) found support for her hypothesis that "boys who join a gang are more delinquent than those who do not. The 31 boys who reported gang affiliation represented 29 percent of the total offender sample and were responsible for 50 percent of the offenses."

Tracy (1987, p. 14) is currently analyzing criminal characteristics of gang and nongang members, using the 1945 and 1958 Philadelphia birth cohort studies, based on official police records and juvenile and adult self-reports. Official offense data of the 1945 cohort show that juvenile gang membership is associated
with significantly higher levels of delinquency. The offenses of gang members have higher average seriousness scores.

For nonwhites, the rate of nonviolent offenses is about 1.7 times as high for gang members as for nongang delinquents; the rate for violent offenses is almost twice as high; and, for aggravated assault, it is three times as high. The pattern for whites is less consistent. Analysis of the 1958 cohort, not yet complete, suggests a quite similar pattern (Tracy 1982, 1987). The self-report components of Tracy's 1945 cohort study are consistent with the official data findings.

Gang influence on criminality does not stop at the end of the juvenile period. When offense frequency and seriousness based on official and unofficial records are examined for the adult period, 18 to 26 years of age, gang members equal, if not exceed, the magnitude of differences observed for the juvenile period. Thus, gang membership appears "to prolong the extent and seriousness of the criminal career" (Tracy 1987, p. 19). These conclusions are consistent with those of a Philadelphia researcher, who more than 20 years earlier noted that a "large portion of 'persistent and dangerous' juvenile gang offenders become 'even more serious' adult offenders" (Robin 1967, p. 24).

Finally, a California Department of Justice study (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, p. 108) found that gang members who have been released from prison commit many serious crimes. Two hundred and fifty gang members were randomly selected from California prison gangs (Nuestra Familia, Mexican Mafia, Black Guerilla Family, and Aryan Brotherhood Gangs), and their careers were tracked. Between 1978 and 1981, 195 of the 250 gang members were arrested, often repeatedly, for the following crimes: 65 misdemeanors and 350 felonies, including 24 arrests for murder, 57 arrests for robbery, 46 arrests for burglary, 31 arrests for narcotics offenses, 44 arrests for weapons offenses, and 28 arrests for assault with a deadly weapon.

Drugs and Violence

The relationship between gangs, drug use, and drug trafficking has not been clear and has received only passing attention in the classic street-gang literature (however, see Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Alcohol and drug use usually have been addressed in tandem or not distinguished (Klein 1971). The relation between drug use and drug selling also was not systematically explored. Chein and his associates (1964) found little drug use or selling by youth gangs contacted by New York City Youth Board workers. The existence of drug using and selling by gangs was not clearly demonstrated in the 1950's and 1960's (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Spergel (1964) found a close relationship between drug use and limited drug dealing by older youth gang members making a transition out of the gang.

The relationship among gangs, drug use, and trafficking has been found most consistently in criminal justice system populations. Of 276 documented gang members on probation in San
Diego County, 207 (or 75 percent) had drug convictions (Davidson 1987). The Orange County Probation Department found that 71 percent of gang members under supervision by its Gang Violence Suppression Unit displayed occasional or frequent drug and/or alcohol use (Orange County 1989). Moore (1978) found an integral relationship between Hispanic imprisoned gang members and drug trafficking; and a close relationship between prison gangs and drug trafficking has been observed in certain State prisons over the past two decades (C. Camp and G. Camp 1985; C. Camp and G. Camp 1988). A recent study of 589 property offenders from three prison intake centers in Ohio found that drugs, unemployment, alcohol, and gangs, respectively, were the most important factors in property crime (Dinitz and Huff 1988). Recently, a great deal of media attention has been directed to the relationship between gangs and major drug trafficking, especially rock cocaine in Los Angeles and increasingly in other cities.

Earlier gang studies indicated a certain ambivalence or even negative reaction by gang members to drug use or sale in the local area. Reports of core gang members forcing drug-abusing members out of the gang, particularly those using or "shooting up" heroin, and threatening neighborhood drug dealers to stop trafficking were not uncommon (Spergel 1964; Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Many gangs, however, traditionally tolerated use of marijuana. Street workers, who work with community-based programs, reported that 42.5 percent of black gang members and 33.6 percent of white gang members used "pot" in the late 1950's or early 1960's. However, such drug use then had very low legitimacy among these youths (Short and Strodtbeck 1965, p. 82).

In the early 1970's, New York City officials believed that most youth gangs were not extensively involved in the sale of narcotics (Collins 1979). A New York State Assembly report (1974a, p. 5) indicated that "many gangs engage in shakedowns of area merchants, residents, and others trafficking in soft drugs, such as marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine." By the late 1970's, however, there was evidence that gangs, particularly those containing older members with prison experience, were significantly engaged in drug dealing. The Blackstone Rangers, now the El Rukns, were a continuing target of the Chicago Police Department for drug dealing, shady property investments, and other organized criminal activities.

By the middle 1980's, there were reports of extensive drug use and selling by gang members in both small and large cities. Hagedorn indicates a very heavy use of drugs by gang leaders in Milwaukee. "Less than 5 percent of those interviewed said that at this time they never used drugs . . . 60 percent . . . admitted they used drugs (mainly marijuana) most or all of the time" (1988, p. 142). A recent Florida legislative report indicates that 92 percent of gang members admitted experimenting with narcotics, mainly marijuana and cocaine (Reddick 1987). Fagan, Piper, and Moore (1986) report that individual prevalence rates for both drug use and delinquency were higher for gang youth in several inner-
city neighborhoods than for general adolescent populations in the same area.

Limited drug dealing has long been a means by which gang members support their individual drug use or habits. Drug selling has increasingly become a means of making a living. Nearly half of the 47 gang "founders" interviewed by Hagedorn said they sold drugs regularly: "over two-thirds said that members of the main group of their gang sold drugs ‘regularly’ and nearly all said someone in the main group sold at least ‘now and then’" (1988, p. 105).

Recently, the County of Los Angeles Probation Department reports that "gang members are now rarely addicts. Traditionally drug dealers were addicts selling to support their own habit . . . Typical monthly data from specialized drug pusher/seller intensive . . . caseload reveals that only 2 of 39 probationers had positive or ‘dirty’ narcotic test results. Current gang drug dealers are not habitual drug users" (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 2).

With media reports of extensive drug trafficking by gang members has come the belief that drug selling by gang members is now closely associated with an increase in urban violence. Law enforcement officials and the media in many parts of the country, but especially in the Los Angeles area, have voiced extreme alarm (Los Angeles City News Service 1988). All 300 black street gangs within the city are blamed for selling rock cocaine. "These gangs have a hierarchy of drug selling, with young teens at the bottom who start as lookouts or runners and later move into selling at the top of the hierarchy . . . city-wide police blame gangs for 387 homicides in 1987, almost all of it drug-related" (Washington 1988). Another newspaper reporter indicates that young neighborhood males seeking to make "fast money through drugs [must] pledge at least surface loyalty to a neighborhood gang if they wanted a piece of the action" (Baker 1988b).

The claims of the General Accounting Office in a recent report are a little less dramatic and inclusive. It concludes that "10 percent of all gang-related murders involve narcotics [and that] . . . more than half of gang-related homicides involve individuals who are not associated with gangs." On the other hand, the report states that within the past 3 to 4 years the CRIPS and the Bloods "have gained control of 30 percent of the crack cocaine market in the United States." Los Angeles street gangs are viewed as a nontraditional "sophisticated criminal organization" (GAO 1989, pp. 3, 19).

Criminal justice agencies are apparently deeply concerned. The Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (1988) claims that Los Angeles street gangs, especially older former members of CRIPS, have been identified with selling drugs in 46 States. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has recently recommended that judges take drastic action in responding to a presumed drug-gang crisis: "Beginning in the mid-1980’s, some youth gangs with origins in the large urban centers of Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, and New York became major criminal entrepreneurs in the supply of illicit drugs. In a very short time,
many of the gangs have developed intrastate and interstate networks for the purpose of expanding . . . in the . . . national drug sales market . . . Ominously these gangs are even more committed to the use of violence than the most notorious old-line criminal organizations" (Metropolitan Court Judges’ Committee 1988, pp. 27, 30).

A range of contrasting views accounts for the gang/drug crisis. The origin of the problem in many cities is often claimed to be the transportation of drugs from some other city. "Los Angeles is now the main port of entry for cocaine nationwide as well as the home of 30,000 black gang members" (Donovan 1988, p. 2). Yet the explanation or blame for the current state of affairs is laid to the "1982 Federal crackdown on cocaine smugglers in Miami . . . The movers of dope decided it might be better for them to move their important drugs to another location [Los Angeles]" (Washington 1988). However, officials in Miami claim that the connection between gangs and drugs is now bigger than ever. A key problem is the trafficking of drugs by gang members traveling from cities in the Northeast to Miami.

Law enforcement officials in many cities, for example, Denver; Boston; Washington, D.C.; Columbus; Fort Wayne; Seattle; Milwaukee; Minneapolis; and Jackson, Mississippi, claim that the "crack" problem and the gang violence problem were developed in the course of an incursion of black drug gang-related entrepreneurs from the central cities of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Often violence was reputed to have been associated with a deliberate plot to takeover and transform local traditional turf-based black youth gangs into drug market criminal gang-related organizations. The spread of the "crack" gang-related problem, however, is increasingly attributed more to market forces and normal migration patterns of individuals and families seeking economic opportunities than to a centralized, bureaucratic franchising campaign.

Available research, however, suggests neither strong nor clear inter-relationships among street-gang membership, drug use, drug selling, and violence. Fagan (1988) found both violent and nonviolent black and Hispanic youth gangs in inner-city communities of Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Diego, whether the gang engaged in drug trafficking or not. Gang involvement in violent activity is neither cause nor consequence of drug use or drug dealing: "while some incidents no doubt are precipitated by disputes over drug sales or selling territories, the majority of violent incidents do not appear to involve drug sales. Rather they continue to be part of the status, territorial, and other gang conflicts that historically have fueled gang violence" (Fagan 1988, p. 20).

Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham (1988) recently explored the relationship between gangs, drug dealing, and violence in Los Angeles. Basing their study on analysis of police records for 1984 and 1985, they found that rock cocaine dealing and its increase were principally a product of normal neighborhood drug-selling activity, often unattributable to gang activity. The occurrence of violence during cocaine sale arrest incidents was quite low; the
explosion of drug homicide incidents was more characteristic of nongang than gang involvement (pp. 6, 10-11).

The diversity of views about the relation between gang membership, drug dealing, and violence at the street level can be partly explained by such factors as city size and drug supplies, organizational development phase of the gang and its involvement in drugs, and the stability of the drug market. The traditional gang structure seems to dissolve under the impact of drug use and selling. This is particularly evident in the large northeastern cities and increasingly in midwestern large and small cities. Traditional turf-related gang violence and gang crisis inspired cohesion are not directly functional to drug use, selling, and associated criminal enterprise, which requires more rational kinds of organization, communication, and distribution.

However, the broadness or narrowness of the definition of "gang incident" and whether the unit of analysis is the gang or gang member also accounts for much of the sharp variation. A broad definition of "gang incident" is likely to find strong and frequent connection among gangs, drugs, and violence. Bobrowski (1988) states that of 62 street gangs or major factions responsible for street gang crime in Chicago between January 1987 and July 1988, 90 percent, or all but 6, showed some involvement by its membership in vice activity. Of vice offenses reported, 91 percent were drug-related.

However, the relationship between arrests for drug dealing, possession, use, and violence by gang members is quite tenuous in Chicago. Bobrowski (1988, p. 25) also reports, based on Chicago Police Department statistics, that vice activity was discovered at the gang-incident level in "only 2 of 82 homicides, 3 of 362 robberies, and 18 of the 4,052 street gang-related batteries and assaults" in the year-and-a-half study period. He concludes that the suggestion that "street gangs have been enmeshed in some web of violence and contentious criminality pursuant to, or in consequence of, their interests in vice [mainly drug trafficking or use], appears to be unsupported by the available data" (1988, pp. 44-47). However, the Chicago Police Department definition of a gang-related incident is much narrower than that of the Los Angeles Police Department. Still, McBride (1988) of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department states that only 10 percent of gang homicides have been related to drugs.

Evidence exists in several cities at the present time of a pattern in which Hispanic gangs may be relatively more involved in traditional turf gang-related activities, and black gangs or their members may be more relatively involved in drug trafficking. In Chicago, where the total population is approximately 41 percent black and 16 percent Hispanic, there were 77 Hispanic male offender suspects and 66 black male suspects identified by police case reports in 82 gang-related homicides between January 1987 and July 1988. The vast majority of black and Hispanic gang homicides, 78.7 percent, were within racial or ethnic offender-victim groups. Although 45.2 percent of all serious gang-related assaults (N = 2,890) city-wide involved black suspects, 43.8 percent involved
Hispanic suspects. However, 65.7 percent of vice (mainly drug) gang-related suspects \( N = 4,115 \) were blacks, but only 27.6 percent were Hispanics. Hispanic gang members may be less entrepreneurial (or less obvious at the street level) than black gangs, at least in Chicago, when it comes to drug trafficking (Bobrowski 1988, table 18A).

Reports suggest that members of different ethnic or racial gangs may be differentially involved in the trafficking of different types of drugs. For example, in Los Angeles, "crack cocaine seems to be associated primarily with black youth. There seems little disagreement about the lack of involvement by Chicano youth in the crack cocaine trade" (Skolnick et al. 1988, p. 17). White motorcycle gangs "continue to produce and traffic in methamphetamine" (Philibosian 1989, p. 6), Hispanic gangs seem to be a significant problem in their use and sale of PCP and marijuana (Philibosian 1989), and Chinese youth gang leaders in New York City are reported to be active in the heroin trade (Chin 1989). However, increasing participation of gang members in drug trafficking does not mean that the relationship between drugs and gangs is interdependent and that a causal relationship necessarily exists between the development of gangs and drug dealing. Skolnick observes that the traditional turf-based Mexican-American gang in Southern California has not formed for the purpose of selling drugs, but some gangs in various parts of the State have organized primarily for the purpose of distributing drugs, and the "gang" or "mob" represents a "strict 'business' operation" (1988, pp. 2-3). It is likely that black, white, and Chinese gangs are less tied to traditional gang or neighborhood norms.

Finally, the relation between drugs and gangs, as well as with violence, particularly as it bears on the socialization process, appears to be variable. There is evidence of an indirect and sequential relationship between gangs and violence and drug trafficking. Johnson et al. (1989, pp. 63, 78) report, using New York City evidence, that drug-selling organizations frequently recruit persons who have previous histories of violence. Such persons, in turn, may seek out drug-selling groups. Gangs provide members with a sense of group identification and solidarity that may prove a useful qualification and readily transferred to a drug organization. This may be the case in Los Angeles as well.

A closer interrelationship of fighting and drug-selling patterns may be developing with Hispanic gangs. The introduction of younger males to the drug business often serves to meet membership criteria and respect in the traditional but changing Mexican-American gang in Southern California. "An individual may prove that he is worthy of respect and trust if he can show that he can sell for one of the 'homeboys' and be trusted with the merchandise" (Skolnick et al. 1988, p. 4).
CHAPTER III: GANGS AS ORGANIZATIONS

Gangs have been viewed as both loosely knit and well organized. It is possible that the loosely knit characterization refers to process, while the well-organized characterization refers to gang structure, form, or longevity. Thrasher (1936, p. 35) originally conceived of the ganging process "as a continuous flux and flow, and there is little permanence in most of the groups. New nuclei are constantly appearing, and the business of coalescing and recoalescing is going on everywhere in the congested area." Yablonsky (1962, p. 286) called the gang a "near-group" characterized by (1) diffuse role definition, (2) limited cohesion, (3) impermanence, (4) minimal consensus of norms, (5) shifting membership, (6) disturbed leadership, and (7) limited definitions of membership expectations. The traditional gang, according to Klein (1968), is an amorphous mass; group goals are usually minimal, membership unstable; group norms not distinguishable from those of the surrounding neighborhood. Short and Strodtbeck noted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of drawing up lists of gangs from which probability samples could be drawn in their research, "so shifting in membership and identity are these groups" (1965, p. 10). Gold and Mattick concluded that gangs in Chicago are "loosely structured sets of companions" (1974, p. 335), less stable than other groups of adolescents (p. 37). Torres observed that Hispanic gangs in the barrios of East Los Angeles are "always in a state of flux" (1980, p. 1). By contrast, however, some of these same analysts have viewed gangs as complex organizational structures, referring to them in bureaucratic terms or even as "supergangs" (Sherman 1970; Short 1976).

The New York City Youth Board (1960) proposed a scheme for describing the varied, purposeful structures of gangs that includes such categorization as vertical, horizontal, and autonomous or self-contained. The vertical gang is structured along age lines and comprises youngsters living on the same block or in the same immediate neighborhood. There may be a younger "tots" group 11 to 13 years old . . . a "junior" division 13 to 15 years old . . . a group of "tims" 15 to 17 years old . . . and the "seniors" 17 to 20 years old and older. The age lines are not hard and fast. This type of structure occurs where there is a long history of group existence and activity dating back 10 or more years. Group morale and fighting traditions are informally handed down. This kind of group tends to be ingrown, with cousins and brothers belonging to the respective divisions (New York City Youth Board 1960, p. 22).

A later description of the vertical gang structure in New York City in the 1970's suggested a wider spread of these age-based subunits with "Baby Spades," 9 to 12 years old; "Young Spades," 12 to 15 years old; and "Black Spades," 16 to 30 years old (Collins 1979). More recently, in Philadelphia, the police department describes three general age-related gang divisions: bottom-level "midgets," 12 to 14 years old; middle-level young boys, 14 to 17 years old; and upper-level "old-heads," 18 to 23 years old.
(Philadelphia Police Department 1987). On the West Coast and elsewhere the very young aspirants to gang membership, usually 8 to 12 years old, are labeled as "wannabes."

The New York City Youth Board (1960) described horizontal gangs as follows: "The horizontally organized group is more likely to include divisions or groupings from different blocks or neighborhoods comprising youngsters of middle or late teens with little differentiation as to age. The horizontal group may, and usually does, develop out of the vertical or self-contained group structure" (pp. 23-24). The horizontal youth gang structure has become the most common type of structure when gangs with the same name spread across neighborhoods, cities, States, and countries. These structures have evolved into coalitions, confederations, "supergangs," and nations—often originating in, or developing more sophisticated structures on, the basis of prison experience. They are particularly prevalent among black and Hispanic youth in California and Illinois. Variations of these structures, especially by ethnicity or race, are discussed below.

The terms "clique" or "Klika" have also been used for black or Mexican-American gangs, respectively, to refer to a specific age group "jumped" into the gang or forming a separately identified cohort of the gang in Los Angeles (Klein 1971; Moore 1978). The term "set," however, seems to have a slightly different meaning and is used currently to refer to a specific black gang unit of a larger gang confederation of the same name in California, but not restricted to an age grouping. In the Mexican-American community, an age cohort is given a name—usually a variation of the general gang name—that remains identified with that cohort throughout its life history. Whether the clique or Klika is large or small, it represents a larger group than a small clique or subgroup of a particular gang or group. These youth may be "jumped" into a gang that is the only active gang in the community (see Vigil 1988; Harris 1988).

Gang Alliances

Thrasher (1936, p. 323) noted the possibility of complex affiliated gang structures decades ago: "In some cases federations of friendly gangs are formed for the promotion of common interests or protection against common enemies. These may be nothing more than loose alliances." In several cities, gangs or sets of gangs have been paired as enemies with "enmity brief, sometimes lasting" (Miller 1975). The terms "nation" and later "supergang" were coined in Chicago in the late 1960's to describe a particular large gang reportedly numbering in the thousands with units spread throughout the city. The term "nation" is still commonly used, particularly by gang members rather than by police or youth agency personnel. Some of these gangs have hierarchies, board structures, elders, and elites (Sherman 1970). Two major multiethnic gang coalitions (somewhat distinct from a gang nation or supergang), "the People" and "the Folk," developed in Chicago and Illinois prisons in the middle 1970's. These "nations," supergangs" or gang alliances
contain older members, are more criminalized, and are probably more sophisticated and somewhat better organized than the gangs of the 1950's and early 1960's (Short 1976).

The origins of the People and the Folk as super-alliances of other named gangs took place in prison, according to Chicago Police Department information, when the predominantly white Simon City Royals agreed to provide narcotics in exchange for protection by inmates belonging to the Black Disciples, a loose constellation of street gangs (Folks). Shortly thereafter and in response to the super-alliance, members of the Latin Kings, a constellation of gangs of mainly Hispanic ethnic origin (Mexican-American and Puerto Rican), aligned with the Vice Lords, a "nation" of black gangs or factions (People). These super-alliances spread to the streets of Chicago and other Midwestern and Southern cities.

According to a recent report, there are currently about 31 street gangs in Chicago that identify with the Folks and about 27 that identify with the People. A few particular gangs in certain neighborhoods are known only as Folks or People with no other identifiers. About 19 street gangs remain independent. In addition, there are factions of gangs and gangs with unknown affiliations. Membership is about evenly divided between Folk and People. Seventy (70) percent of the gangs identifying with the Folks are Hispanic, 19 percent are black, and 10 percent are white; 56 percent of the gangs identifying with the People are Hispanic, 22 percent are black, and 19 percent are white (Bobrowski 1988). It is not clear how many gangs or gang members outside of prison are related to these larger gang entities. Most are more closely identified with particular gangs or gang factions. There is "no centralized organization and chain of command ... and no clear leadership has emerged ... In fact, local disputes, power struggles, or ignorance often result in conflict among ... affiliates" (Bobrowski 1988, pp. 30-31).

Gang coalitions are also common in the Los Angeles area, throughout California and adjoining States, and in correctional institutions in several States. Black gangs are reported to be divided into two main aggregations in California: "CRIPS" and "Bloods," with the CRIPS containing more units or sets and members. There is some recent evidence of a few white, Asian, Pacific Island, and Hispanic members in these gangs and of multiethnic or racial aggregations of these black gangs with Hispanic, Asian, Pacific Island, and white gangs. Crips tend to be more aggressive; members of Blood sets rarely fight each other. Fights between CRIP gangs are reported to have accounted for one-third to one-half of all gang-versus-gang incidents in various Los Angeles jurisdictions (Baker 1988b).

The competition between the Bloods and the CRIPS has assumed almost legendary status. Members of the CRIPS—which may consist of a whole series of organizations, not necessarily with close relations with each other—have been arrested for a variety of crimes, mainly drug trafficking, in most States of the United States. The California Department of Corrections reportedly has acknowledged the "existence of an emerging umbrella CRIP
organization known as the Consolidated CRIP Organization (CCO) and a similar Blood gang organization known as the United Blood Nation (UBN) . . . . The California Youth Authority (CYA) has an estimated black street gang member population [comprising mainly these two gang constellations] of 5,000 inside CYA facilities and 7,000 on active parole" (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 1985, p. 8).

Gang typologies and organizational classifications suggest a bewildering array, complexity, and variability of structures. Gangs may not be simply cohesive, loosely knit, or bureaucratic but at times variable small networks or parts of larger networks across neighborhoods, cities, States, and even countries (Collins 1979). These networks may be more or less cohesive or clearly structured at various periods in their development. Gang tradition and these networks develop independent of particular youths, leaders, cliques, and gang organizational forms (see also Sarnecki 1986; Reiss 1987).

Cliquies and Gang Size

The small clique is the basic building block of the gang. The violent character of the gang is often determined by the membership interests of the key clique, but the size of the delinquent gang or clique has been a source of controversy among researchers over the years.

Thrasher (1936, pp. 320-321) defined the gang clique as a "spontaneous interest group usually of the conflict type which forms itself within some larger social structure such as a gang . . . In a certain sense a well-developed clique is an embryonic gang." The idea of "delinquent group" is often congruent with that of gang clique. Shaw and McKay (1931) noted that the most frequent type of delinquent group, in which juvenile offenses are committed, is the small companionship group consisting of two or three boys. Downes (1966), a British researcher, observed that small cliques were responsible for the bulk of delinquency, however, be made a distinction between them and more "organized" gang behavior. Klein (1971) refers to a "speciality clique" that may be part of the larger gang structure but sometimes exists as an independent unit. It consists of three to a dozen boys. It can maintain or stimulate distinctive patterned behavior, criminal behavior, conflict, and drug use.

1 A great variety of gang dimensions, as a basis for classifying or typing youth gangs by academics, law-enforcement personnel, and others, has emerged in recent years. They include (1) age; (2) race/ethnicity; (3) gender composition (all male, all female, or mixed); (4) setting (street, prison, or motorcycle (C. Camp and C. Camp 1985; C. Camp and G. Camp 1988)); type of activity (social, delinquent, or violent (Yablonsky 1962; Haskell and Yablonsky 1982; Jackson and McBride 1985)); (6) purpose of gang activity (defensive or aggressive (New York City Youth Board 1960; Collins 1979), turf, retaliation, prestige, or representation (Bobrowski 1988)); (7) degree of criminality (serious, minor, or mixed (Pleines 1987)); (5) level of organization (simple or corporate (Taylor 1988), vertical or horizontal, spontaneous specialty clique, horizontal alliance, or violent gang (Klein and Maxson 1989)); (9) stage of group formation or development (early, marginal, or well-established (Collins 1979; New York State Assembly 1974b)); (10) degree of activity (active, sporadic, or inactive (Philadelphia Police Department 1987)); (11) nature or level of personality development or disturbance of group members (Scott 1956; Klein 1971; Jackson and McBride 1985); (12) group function (social/cultural and instrumental (Bernstein 1979; Huff 1988; Skolnick et al. 1983)); (3) drug use/selling (Fagan 1988); (14) cultural development (traditional, nontraditional, or transitional (Vigil 1983, McBride 1983); (15) new types, (heavy metal, punk rock, satanic, or skinhead (Baca 1988; Coplon 1988)).
The clique and the gang may be viewed as parts of a network. Cliques may operate outside of gang structures and even across other opposing gang structures. Theft or robbery subgroup or cliques—and more recently, drug-trafficking cliques—may identify with the gang for socialization and conflict purposes but may recruit members from outside the gang for particular "jobs," or ally themselves with similar interest cliques in so-called opposition gangs. The pattern of activity of the gang may be determined by the leader or the influential clique. The particular activity—intergang tension or hostility, for example—may cause the membership of the gang to expand rapidly (Gold and Mattick 1974).

Competition between cliques may be a central dynamic leading to the gang splitting into factions or into separate gangs. The gang is seldom cohesive and at maximum strength and may be viewed as a series of loosely knit cliques, except during times of conflict (Thrasher 1936; New York City Youth Board 1960). Even this statement needs to be qualified since actual combat between gangs is usually carried out by a small group of two or three youths, although a great deal of milling about and a higher rate of interaction between members of rival gangs may be observed on these occasions—more for purposes of communication, gesturing, and mutual excitement than directed hostility.

The relation and significance of clique or gang size to clique or gang influence may be difficult to establish. It is possible to assess clique size in terms of the number of arrests or participants per gang incident. However, the use of official data undoubtedly underestimates the number of offenders or suspects (although it overestimates the number of crimes committed by juveniles; see Zimring 1981). The co-offenders or participants may be viewed as roughly equivalent to a clique in a specific gang-related offensive event. In one Chicago study of reported violent gang incidents, Spergel (1986) found that approximately three offenders were arrested per gang incident. An earlier Chicago study had revealed that slightly less than two offenders were arrested per gang homicide incident (Spergel 1983). In a more inclusive Los Angeles gang and nongang homicide study, Klein, Maxson, and Gordon (1987) found approximately four suspects—as opposed to arrested offenders—per gang homicide incident. They also found that gang homicide incidents produced about twice as many suspects as nongang homicide incidents (1987).

The average size of the gang or clique has been a source of disagreement among researchers and observers. Some have emphasized that gangs are generally small—hardly larger than a clique—ranging from 4 or 5 to 25, with 8 to 12 members most common (Gold and Mattick 1974). Others have viewed the size of the gang as generally ranging from 25 to 75 members (Collins 1979), 25 to 200 (Philadelphia Police Department 1987), and from about 30 to 500 (Torres 1980). Since the late 1960's and to this day, some analysts believe the size of some gangs—whether "supergangs" or coalitions—may range into the thousands (Spergel 1972; Miller 1975, 1982; Short 1976). These numbers may include peripheral and associate
members as well as core members, both active and inactive members, and "wannabe" members and are usually based upon sightings of large groups of youth at a particular event—such as a dance; mass meeting; or during "declarations" by gang members that a particular school, housing project, or prison is "theirs"—or upon estimates by law enforcement or prison officials, based on interviews, arrests, or informant observations.

There is some evidence that gang size grows during periods of crisis—especially with threats of strikes or retaliations or competition for drug markets—and decreases in the absence of conflict and in the presence of "peace." Gang size may also vary for students during different school seasons or transitional periods—larger in the fall when school starts, again during school holidays, and especially at the start of the spring or summer break. Recruitment efforts in the fall of the first year of high school also may produce an increase in gang ranks (see Klein 1971).

Many questions remain regarding the relation between numbers of gang members, gang problems, and gang size. Is the number of gangs in an area or setting related to the number of gang members? Are there more gangs in newly settled communities but not necessarily more gang members compared to the settled area? We know, for example, there are more Hispanic than black gangs in Chicago but not necessarily more Hispanic gang members (Bobrowski 1988). There may be more gangs represented in a magnet or citywide high school than in a neighborhood high school, but does this mean there are more gang members or gang problems present (Spergel 1985)? Similarly, gang membership and problems may or may not vary with the numbers of gangs in a particular prison (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985).

Types of Gang Members

The structure of the gang is based on needs for group maintenance or development. It requires that certain roles be performed and includes a variety of membership types—core members, including leaders and regulars; peripheral or fringe members; and "wannabes," or recruits. The core may be regarded as an inner clique that is actively engaged in the everyday functioning of the gang. Core members interact frequently and relate easily to each other. They have been described as "those few who need and thrive on the totality of the gang’s activity. The gang’s level of violence is determined by the hardcore" (Pitchess 1979, p. 2). Core members may make key decisions, set standards, and provide support and sanction for the action of leaders. They are also the key recruiters (Sarnecki 1986; Reiss 1987).

Peripheral members and those who associate with the gang but who do not recognize or are not recognized by others as members of the gang may be regular or irregular in their attendance at particular gang events or gatherings. Their relationships may also be primarily to particular core members. They may not be seen as part of the gang by all core members or the entire group. Some
associates may have higher status and respect than peripheral members.

"Floaters" may exist in and across gangs. They are special kinds of associates with high status, yet are not clearly identified as gang members. They are often brokers across gangs with access to special resources, or they may exhibit special talents needed by the gang. For example, they may possess information about the activities of other gangs and serve as communication links and negotiators in times of tension or intergang conflict. They may arrange deals for weapons, drugs, or stolen property between gangs and with others outside the gang. They tend to be entrepreneurial, well respected, and articulate, with many community connections.

Wannabes or recruits are the younger, aspiring or potential members. They are the targets of efforts by core or regular members to increase the size of the gang.

Law-enforcement agencies have special strategic and tactical reasons for identifying different types of gang members. Most police departments want to arrest or neutralize gang leadership. But also they usually must be concerned with not exaggerating the numbers of gang members. Law-enforcement agencies distinguish among gang members, for example, as "verified" or "alleged" (New York State Assembly 1974b, p. 3), "known," "suspected," or "associated" (Baca 1988). The verified hardcore or known members are viewed as making up 10 to 15 percent of the gang and are the target for most law-enforcement interventions (Collins 1979).

Whether and under what circumstances gang members develop particular types of, or maintain, career roles is unclear. At one extreme, membership and gang roles are vague and shifting. Some members join for a short time—days or weeks. Gang members may "graduate" from a lower- to a higher-status gang role or even gang, particularly as they grow older. However, they may also shift from core to peripheral roles and back again. A youth may switch membership from one friendly gang to another and even to a formerly hostile gang—particularly when gang membership requires little in the way of formal identification or investment of time or energy or, more often, when the gang member's family moves or the youth must adopt membership in a dominant gang at a new school or in a correctional agency. It is not always clear to gang members who is a recognized gang member and who is not, although the status, rank, or respect of a core gang member may be more readily established. Relationships among gang members may be weak and tenuous (Yablonsky 1962; Klein 1971), although not always or necessarily so (Horowitz 1983). Leadership and core-member roles, particularly in established gangs, may be viewed as long-term. Such roles assume greater stability and articulation in certain stable low-income ghetto communities and in prison (Jacobs 1977).

There appears to be general agreement, however, that core members are more involved in delinquent or criminal activities than peripheral or fringe members. Klein (1968, p. 74) reports that during the 4 years of the Los Angeles Group Guidance Project, "core members were charged with 70 percent more offenses than fringe..."
members." Core members committed their first offenses at an earlier age, committed subsequent offenses at a more rapid rate, and committed their last juvenile offenses at a later age than fringe members (1968, p. 274). Sarnecki's (1986) findings in Sweden are similar. Juveniles affiliated with the network were considerably more actively delinquent while they belonged to it and faced a greater risk of persisting in their delinquent activity, which often led to drug addiction or imprisonment. The more central the roles played by the juveniles, the greater their likelihood of continuing in a delinquent career. Those who were accomplices of the central characters in the network also ran greater risks than the average participant (Sarnecki 1986, p. 128). Conversely, Fagan (1988, p. 22) reports no significant differences between leaders and other kinds of members in self-reported involvement in drug and delinquent activities. His findings, however, are not clearly developed and are opposed to all other research findings on this question.

Debate has also raged over whether core or fringe members are more or less socially adjusted or psychologically troubled. Yablonsky (1962) claimed that core members are often psychologically disturbed or sociopathic, and fringe members are more likely to be "normal." Short and Strodtbeck (1965), Klein (1971), and Gold and Mattick (1974) take an opposing position; they say that leadership and core members are likely to be more socially capable, perhaps more intelligent. Fringe members or "crazies" are likely to have low status or to be ostracized by the group—except when used for certain aggressive purposes (Horowitz 1983). The extensive set of case vignettes in the descriptive and program report of the New York City Youth Board (1960) suggests that core and fringe members come with all sorts of personality makeups, capabilities, and disabilities and that it is extremely difficult to relate gang role to personality type.

Leadership

The notion of leadership is not usually clearly defined by gang members or by researchers. Some gangs have formal leadership positions such as a president and vice president. More recently, gangs in ghettoes, barrios, and prisons have referred to their leaders as king, prince, prime minister, general, ambassador, don, or chief. Some highly violent gang leaders or influentials may have no formal designation or flamboyant title and are simply called "shot callers" or "shooters" by gang members or police. There is a tendency for leaders to be more clearly or "officially" identified in black than in Hispanic gangs.

Gang researchers' disagreements center around whether leadership is a position or a function and may be only partially related to the issue of whether the gang leader is a psychopath and sociopath or relatively normal and socially capable. Klein has taken two views. He has stated that gang leadership is best defined as a "collection of functions that may be undertaken at various times by a number of members" (1971, p. 92). He has also stated
that leadership may reside within "relatively stable, 'cool' youngsters who have earned their fighting status through a variety of abilities, fighting prowess, cool-headedness, verbal facility, athletic abilities, or inheritance from older brothers" (1969, p. 1432). Short (1963, p. 38) suggests that the "ability to get along with people is one of the basic skills associated with gang leadership."

These researchers and others have generally agreed that leaders are usually capable people and have special traits that others look up to (Thrasher 1936, pp. 345-349). Yablonsky's (1962, p. 156) view of gang leadership is at the other extreme: "Leaders are characterized by megalomania"; they are profoundly disturbed and were very insecure and unhappy as children and try to compensate through their "contemporary 'power' role of gang leader."

Territoriality

The gang is often defined and organized in terms of the territory in which it is located or claims to be its own. The notion of territoriality or turf is integral to the defensive character of the traditional gang. Degree of commitment to turf may vary by particular cultural tradition, age of the gang's members, and by the changing interests or purposes of the gang. "Gang warfare is usually organized on a territorial basis. Each group becomes attached to a local area which it regards as peculiarly its own and through which it is dangerous for members from another group to pass" (Thrasher 1936, p. 175). The identification of gang with territory is nowhere better illustrated than in many Hispanic areas of Los Angeles where the terms "gang" and "barrio" are traditionally synonymous with the concept of neighborhood and the two terms are used interchangeably (Moore 1978) or in many Puerto Rican and Mexican-American communities of Chicago (Horowitz 1983; Spergel 1986).

Proximity emerges as a critical factor in motivations for gang conflict. Of 188 gang incidents among 32 gangs in Philadelphia between 1966 and 1970 (homicides, stabbings, shootings, and gang fights), 60 percent occurred between gangs who shared a common boundary, and another 23 percent between gangs whose territories were 2 blocks or less apart. Only two incidents occurred between groups whose turfs were separated by more than 10 blocks (Ley 1975, pp. 262-63). Certain inner-city groups experience not only an economic but also a social and cultural marginality. Their marginalization may provide the mandate for a "territorial imperative . . . for the establishment of a small secure area where group control can be maximized against the flux and uncertainty of . . . the city" (Ley 1975, pp. 252-53). Graffiti becomes the visible manifestation of a gang's control of social space. Gang graffiti becomes denser with increasing proximity to the core of a territory. Graffiti is a clue to both the extent and intensity of "ownership" of a territory by a gang, which often varies inversely.
with the strength of adult community organization in the exercise of control over the particular area.

Gang territoriality may expand when gang members and their families move from one neighborhood to another, to the suburbs, or even to other cities; gangs with the same names suddenly seem to appear. Gang names and symbols of territoriality may develop through the influence of the media. A copy-cat phenomenon directly or indirectly is encouraged. Gangs most often seek to expand the perimeter of their territory into adjoining streets. A battle of gang markings and countermarkings occurs when the perimeters of two gangs' territories are unstable. Sometimes gangs expand by absorbing smaller, lower-status gangs nearby (Moore, Vigil, and Garcia 1983). Conflict over gang turf may result from tensions and competition over who "owns" or controls schools, parks, jails, prison areas, illegitimate enterprises or rackets, and even political institutions of neighborhoods (Thrasher 1936; Asbury 1971; Spergel 1972; Kornblum 1974).

At the heart of the concept of territoriality or turf are two component ideas: control and identification. Control is the stronger imperative or driving force for gangs. Collins (1979, pp. 68-69) observes that "street gangs have been known to actually control the activity and events of certain streets and blocks. They attempt to control playgrounds, parks, and recreation centers . . . to the exclusion of all other gangsters . . . Other gangs have been known to march in front of a witness' residence, exhibiting guns and weapons, inferring 'keep your mouth shut.'"

Miller (1977, pp. 23-25) suggests that three categories of turf rights: (1) ownership rights, where gangs "own" the entire area or property and control all access, departure, and activities within it; (2) occupancy rights, where gangs share or tolerate each other's use and control of a site under certain conditions (for example, deference, time, and the nature and the amount of usage of the space); and (3) enterprise monopoly, where gangs claim exclusive right to commit certain kinds of crimes. Miller gives examples of "enterprise monopoly rights." A Boston gang claimed the exclusive rights to steal from stores in a claimed territory and forcefully thwarted others who attempted a store robbery in the area. Chinese gangs in a few cities, especially in San Francisco, have a history of violence resulting from challenges to exclusive extortion rights of certain businesses.

Much of the violence among black gangs or subgroups in recent years apparently results from competition over drug markets. Gang entrepreneurs or former gang members may seek to develop or expand their business operations by recruiting or converting existing street groups—often in different neighborhoods or cities—to sell, deliver, store, protect, or aid in the marketing of drugs. Conflicts develop when these new entrepreneurs enter an area controlled by another gang or criminal organization engaged in drug trafficking.

The traditional concept of physical turf or territory has probably assumed less significance in recent years. Physical, social, and economic concepts of turf have become increasingly
complex over time. A particular gang may hang out, socialize, or do business in different parts of the neighborhood, city, or county. It may no longer need a specific or the same center or building as a point of identification or control for each of these purposes. It may engage in criminal activities or socialize in different parts of towns, cities, or States as opportunities presents themselves—more often fortuitous than planned.

Miller (1977) also notes that certain cities have a less developed tradition of locality-based gangs. In the older cities or those with established gangs—such as in New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago—they are more sophisticated and criminalized and are often less identified with physical locations. Increasingly important are the availability of criminal opportunities or markets as gangs have become highly mobile. A law-enforcement officer in New York City observes that criminal youth no longer hang out and now commonly move from corner to corner and neighborhood to neighborhood to join with others for a burglary, robbery, drug deal, or whatever criminal opportunity arises that day (Galea 1988). Under such circumstances, the notion of gang changes or becomes more closely associated with that of delinquent or crime group; in the process, gang turf, colors, symbols, jackets, caps, signs, names, and traditions may weaken change, or come to serve either traditional territorial or evolving criminal gang purposes, and sometimes both in varying patterns and sequences.
CHAPTER IV: MEMBERSHIP DEMOGRAPHICS

This chapter is concerned with ecological, socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic characteristics of gang members. Included are class, culture, race or ethnicity, age, gender, and female participation as components of youth gang structure. Interaction between these components and gang membership, group processes, and individual personality are discussed in chapter V.

Class, Culture, and Race/Ethnicity

Contemporary youth gangs are located primarily in lower-class, slum, ghetto, barrio, or changing communities; but it is not clear that class, culture, race, or ethnicity per se primarily account for gang problems. More likely, these variables interact with other community characteristics such as poverty, social instability, racism, ethnic insecurities, social isolation, and failures of social policy and interagency coordination.

The gangs of the early part of the century in urban areas like Chicago were mainly first generation youths born of Irish and German, and later Polish and Italian, parents who lived in areas of transition or first settlement (Thrasher 1936). To what extent they represented lower-class elements or the lowest-income sectors in their communities or in the city as a whole is not clear. We know that middle-class gangs—regardless of race, ethnicity or location—are less prevalent and certainly different in character than lower-class gangs (Myerhoff and Myerhoff 1976; see also Muehlbauer and Dodder 1983). But it is still not clear that the gang problem, at least its violent manifestations, is most severe in the poorest urban neighborhoods (Spergel 1984) or that gang members necessarily are the poorest youths or come from the poorest families in low-income communities. Delinquency and crime are generally closely associated with poverty, but the poverty relationship cannot be as strongly demonstrated for gang-related crime as for nongang crime.

The assumption that poverty, low socioeconomic status, or lower-class lifestyle is related to the prevalence of delinquent or violent youth gangs has been questioned. The communities in which black gangs flourished in the early 1960's were generally below city averages in housing standards and employment rates but not below city average unemployment rates (Cartwright and Howard 1966). Gang members often come from low median family-income census tracts in Philadelphia, but not from the lowest (Cohen 1969a). The members of conflict groups in New York City were not drawn necessarily from the poorest families of the slum town areas (Spergel 1964). Many of the street gangs of New York City in the 1970's "emerged from a lower-middle-class lifestyle" (Collins 1979). Hispanic fighting gangs in East Los Angeles were not limited to the lowest-income areas of the city (Klein 1971). The spread of gangs in Los Angeles County reportedly is due in part to the upwardly mobile families with gang youth to middle-class areas (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department 1985). Violent and criminal motorcycle gangs are
reportedly composed of mainly lower-middle-class, white, older youth, and young adults (Davis 1982a, 1982b). Recently identified white gangs in suburban communities, "Punks," "Stoners," "White Supremacists," "Satanics," and others, seem to come from lower-middle-class and middle-class communities (Deukmajian 1981; Dolan and Finney 1984). The class identity of the newly developing Asian gangs is not clearly established, but gang members often come from two working parent families.

In some cities, authorities claim that media attention has influenced the development of ephemeral middle-class street gangs composed of younger adolescents who have adopted some of the attributes of traditional gangs (wearing colors), as well as of instrumental gangs (making money). They may function as roving bands engaged in criminal activity, including narcotics use and vandalism, for profit or for thrills. They have been dubbed "mutant gangs" in Orange County and "Stoner gangs" in Los Angeles County. The Mexican-American Stoner gangs of East Los Angeles of the early 1980's have been integrated into the reemerging turf gangs, accompanied by a sharp rise in intergang violence.

Youth gang problems in the United States continue to involve mainly blacks and Hispanics, with indications of increasing Asian gang participation and a more differentiated white youth gang problem. The largest variety of youth gang types may occur on the West Coast, particularly in Southern California, and increasingly in Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, and Florida. Asian and Pacific Island youth gangs are reported in many States, particularly in the Western part of the United States. American Indian gangs have been active in Minneapolis. Mixed race and ethnic gang membership patterns are not uncommon in many States, although black gangs tend to be all black. The relation of black American gangs to Jamaican gangs ("Posses") is unclear; ethnicity may be a stronger bond than race. Hispanic gangs tend to be predominantly Mexican-American or Puerto Rican, with increasing numbers of Central and South Americans. Asian and Pacific Island youth gangs tend to be Korean; Thai; Laotian; Cambodian; Hmong; Japanese; Samoan; Tongan; Filipino; and Chinese, with origins in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Vietnam. White gangs, depending on location, can be predominantly of second- and third-generation mixed Italian, Irish, Polish, or Central-European origin in inner-city "defensive" enclaves, suburban areas, or small towns. Some of the more entrepreneurial white gangs tend to have weak territorial identifications. Motorcycle gangs roam widely.

Race and ethnicity play a role in the development of the gang problem, but in more complex ways than is ordinarily conceived. Blacks and Hispanics clearly constitute the largest numbers of youths arrested for gang offenses at the present time. In his first national survey, Miller (1975) estimated that 47.6 percent of gang members in the six largest cities were black, 36.1 percent Hispanic, 8.8 percent white, and 7.5 percent Asian. In a more extensive survey of all gang members in 9 of the largest cities, Miller (1982) found that 44.4 percent were Hispanic, 42.9 percent black, 9 percent white, and 4.0 percent Asian. Miller (1982,
chapter 9) speculates that illegal Hispanic immigrants, especially from Mexico, may have played a large role in the increasing numbers of gangs in California and in their spread to smaller cities and communities in that State. Curry and Spergel (1988) report a distinctive pattern for black and Hispanic gangs in Chicago in recent years. There was a relative and absolute increase in black-gang homicides and a relative and absolute decline in Hispanic gang homicides for the 1982-85 period compared with the 1978-81 period. Black (non-Hispanic) gang homicides increased from 61 to 160. Hispanic gang homicides decreased from 125 to 83. White (non-Hispanic) gang homicides decreased from 23 to 12. The Hispanic gang homicide rate, relative to the population, was the highest during the entire period (Curry and Spergel 1988). In 1986 and 1987, the black-gang homicide rate began to decrease again.

By contrast, in recent years gang homicides in the Los Angeles Sheriff's jurisdiction have been disproportionately black (67 percent). Hispanic-gang homicides have been significantly fewer (29.1 percent), although Hispanics make up a larger proportion of the population and constitute more gangs. According to law-enforcement officials, high rates of black-gang violence is related to narcotics dealing, primarily crack. But this contrast in pattern may be, in part, a result of differences in definitions of a gang incident in Chicago and Los Angeles. The Chicago definition serves to exclude more black crime and the Los Angeles definition to include more black crime as gang related. In both cases, overall crime rates are higher for blacks than for Hispanics.

Some Latin street gangs in Southern California have existed within particular localities for two or more generations. "Parents and in some cases even grandparents were members of the same gang. There is a sense of continuity of family identity" (Jackson and McBride 1985, p. 42). Donovan (1988, pp. 14-15) writes, "Today an Hispanic in Los Angeles may be a fourth generation gang member, and gangs comprise a distinct Hispanic subculture with their own stylized dress, language, writing, and rituals. They possess the same extended kinship structure and tight group-cohesiveness found in larger Hispanic culture . . . Their intense identification with the barrio or 'turf' translates into gang members' considering themselves closer to soldiers who defend it than to criminals who victimize it."

Bobrowski (1988) notes differences among Hispanic, white, and black gangs in Chicago. Symbolic property crimes are more common among Hispanic than black gang members (Bobrowski 1988, p. 19). The ratios of personal crime to property crime (mainly graffiti) for Hispanics and whites are 3 to 1 and 4 to 1, respectively, while for blacks it is 8 to 1 (Bobrowski 1988, p. 21).

Duran (1987, p. 2) recently observed that traditional Chicano gangs in certain parts of East Los Angeles have declined in membership but that membership in immigrant gangs from Mexico and Central and South America is on the increase. However, the traditional Hispanic gangs that fight, kill, and risk their lives for turf and "respect" remain dominant.
In general, gang violence tends to be intraracial or intraethnic. Exceptions occur during periods of racial conflict (Thrasher 1936) and rapid community population change. Local gangs may be organized to defend against newcomers. However, the most serious and long-term gang conflicts arise from patterns of traditional animosity across adjacent neighborhoods with quite similar populations.

Not all low-income Hispanic or black communities necessarily or consistently produce violent gangs. Although there was a history of gang formation and gang violence in Philadelphia's inner-city neighborhoods in the 1970's, that did not happen in Puerto Rican enclaves. Relatively little criminal or violent gang activity occurred in Chicago's low-income black communities in the middle and late 1970's, and violent gang activity at that time was particularly high in Hispanic communities.

Gang activity appears to vary by race and ethnicity, although this may be primarily a function of acculturation, access to criminal opportunities, and community stability factors. White gangs, of a somewhat higher class-level than black gangs, were reported to be rowdier; more rebellious; more openly at odds with adults; and more into drinking, drug use and sexual delinquency than black gangs in Chicago in the late 1950's and early 1960's (Short and Strodtbeck 1965). White gangs in Philadelphia in the middle 1970's were less territorially bound, less structured, and therefore more difficult to identify than black gangs (Friedman, Mann, and Adelman 1976). There were more white than black gangs in Boston in the 1950's and 1960's, and there was more violence among white gangs than among black gangs—but the level of violence among Boston gangs was and probably still is lower than in other cities (Miller 1976b).

White gangs—although there are relatively few of them today—come in many varieties, particularly on the West Coast: Stoners, freaks, heavy-metal groups, satanic worshipers, bikers, and fighting gangs. "Stoners" originally were groups made up of persistent drug or alcohol abusers; heavy-metal rock music was a common bond. One of the special traits of these original Stoner groups was practice of satanism, including grave-robbing and the desecration of human remains and churches. Stoner groups have been known to mark off territory with graffiti. They also may adopt peculiar dress styles (Jackson and McBride 1985, pp. 42-45).

Many, but not all, Skinhead groups are neo-Nazi gangs who model themselves after punk rockers and Skinheads in England. They may have ties with adult racist groups—such as the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi Party, and the National Socialist White Workers Party. The SWP (Supreme White Pride) name has recently spread from the prisons to the streets. The racist and violent Skinheads have been identified in major cities on the West Coast, in the Midwest, and in the South. Law-enforcement officials in parts of Southern California believe the Skinhead movement may be a reaction by white youth in certain middle-class neighborhoods to a sudden increase in the number of black, Hispanic, and Asian residents. Skinhead group-structure and style fit the gang pattern: a gang name, colors,
tattooing, distinctive dress, drug use, and criminal behavior. "American Skinheads are as likely to be middle class as working poor. But in other respects they are typical gang members" (Coplon 1988, p. 56; see also Jackson and McBride 1985; Anti-Defamation League 1986, 1987; and Donovan 1988).

A recent report of the Florida State legislature (Reddick 1987) noted that the Skinheads started in Jacksonville and are now uniformly found in major urban areas all over the State. They profess to "being anti-black, anti-Jew, and anti-homosexual, while promoting their pro-God, pro-white American ideology." Their activities in Florida have been "primarily harassment, violence, fighting, and provoking riots and racial incidents." Often, parents of these youths are either unaware of their activities or support them (Reddick 1987, p. 9). Coplon (1988, p. 56) claims Skinhead ranks have swelled throughout the United States from 300 in 1986 to 3,500 in 1988.

Another type of predominantly white gang is the motorcycle gang—although Hispanic and black motorcycle gangs and groups exist. Most have set the minimum age requirement at 18 or 21 years old. They may have elaborate rituals, signs, symbols, and tattoos and complex organizational structures—including written constitutions—with chapters of the larger gangs in Canada and Europe, as well as in many States. They consist mostly of working-class young adults, sometimes from rural areas, with limited education. They have engaged in a wide range of illegal activity, including the sale and use of drugs, extortion, disorderly conduct, vandalism, theft, prostitution, white slavery, and hijacking (Commission de Police du Quebec 1980). Ties have been reported to major criminal organizations and syndicates, particularly in the transport or sale of drugs.

Increasing numbers of criminal and violent Asian-youth gangs were reported in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Miller (1982) estimated the number of Asian youth gangs then almost equaled the number of white gangs on the West Coast. Asian gangs may now be almost twice as numerous as white gangs (Duran 1987). They have also spread from the West and East coasts to inland American cities. They tend to be more secretive than non-Asian gangs; they are less interested in status, honor, or reputation; but they are more involved in criminal-gain activities, such as extortion, burglary, and narcotics selling. However, a few Vietnamese, Cambodian, and other Asian youth gangs are reputed to be acting like typical street gangs: dressing alike, taking gang names, using graffiti, and having affiliated girl groups. Asian youth gang members are sometimes used by adult criminal organizations as "enforcers" (Breen and Allen 1983). They tend to be highly mobile and are usually not closely identified with a particular turf. They are particularly difficult to detect because most police units lack Asian-language facility or the confidence of Asian communities.

The different ethnic Asian gangs may be quite distinctive. There is some evidence that Japanese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong gangs may be the best organized, perhaps the most secretive, and very well-disciplined. Vietnamese street gangs may be particularly
mobile and have—on occasion—affiliated with black gangs, CRIPS, and Bloods. Samoan gangs are also reported to have been assimilated into black gangs, to wear tattoos and distinctive gang dress, to use graffiti, and to have reputations for violence. Filipino gangs in California are apparently older (members range in age from 20 to 40 years old), at times adopt black or Hispanic gang characteristics, and engage in a range of criminal activities (auto theft, extortion, burglary, drug trafficking) (Donovan 1988). However, Filipino youth gangs, with members age 14 to 21 years old, along with Samoan gangs, are reported to predominate in Hawaii, especially in Oahu (Office of the Governor, State of Hawaii 1989).

Age

In recent decades, gang activity was perceived as primarily or exclusively a teenage, if not a juvenile, phenomenon. Researchers and analysts partially based this perception on youth samples they examined in street work programs in the 1950’s and 1960’s. This widespread perception was also probably based in reality, and may be the reason why—until recently—mainly juvenile or youth units of police departments dealt with youth gang problems. Many of these units have now been transformed into gang or street-gang units or sections.

The age composition of gangs undoubtedly varies by city, race/ethnicity or culture, social setting, i.e., prison, school or the streets, and historical period. Nonetheless, there is again a growing recognition that gang membership presently extends into young adulthood—certainly into the early and mid-twenties, and less frequently into the 40’s and 50’s. Thrasher’s (1936) gang members—as they do today—ranged in age from 6 to 50 years old, but were concentrated in two groups: "earlier adolescent," 11 to 17 years old, and "later adolescent," 16 to 25 years old. Whyte’s (1943) street-gang members were in their twenties. Much of the theory and the limited research on gangs in the 1950’s and 1960’s, however, was based on early and middle teenage samples. While the literature of this period focused on teenage gangs, there also must have been young-adult street gangs and even significant numbers of young adults in teenage gangs. Many case histories (New York City Youth Board 1960; Yablonsky 1962; Spiegel 1964; Klein 1971) provide ample evidence of the presence and influence of young adults in street gangs of that era. There may, however, have been relatively fewer older teenagers and young adults associated with gangs of the 1950’s and 1960’s than appears to be the case today.

It was already clear, however—at least in New York City by the early 1970’s—that the age range of gang members was broader "at the top and the bottom than in the fighting gangs of the 1950’s. The age range in some gangs starts at 9 years old and elevates as high as 30 years old" (Collins 1979, pp. 30-40). A recent report on San Diego’s gang problem indicates that the age range of gang members was 12 to 31 years old and that the median age was 19 years old (San Diego Association of Governments 1982).
Some analysts continue to insist that the "traditional" age range of gang members is 8 to 21 or 22 years, with only minor exceptions (Miller 1975, 1982). Based on a small data sample (N=121), Miller (1982), for example, found no gang offenders or victims in Chicago who were 23 years of age or older. However, based on 1982-84 police data on 1,699 offenders and 1,557 victims, Spergel (1986) found that the age range for offenders was 8 to 51 years old, and for victims was 3 to 76 years old. Miller's mean age categories were 16 and 17 years old; Spergel's mean age for offenders was 17.9 years old and for victims was 20.1 years old. Based on Chicago Police Department case reports for 1987 and the first half of 1988, Bobrowski (1988) finds that the average age of the male offender was 19.4 years old and of the female offender was 15 years old. For victims, the average age was 22.1 years old, although the modal or most frequently arrested group were the 17 year olds (p. 40).

Some researchers and law-enforcement officials continue to assume, without adequate or sufficiently relevant data, that gang "violence appears largely in early adolescence" (Moore 1978, p. 38) or that "very young offenders commit such accomplice offenses as . . . gang fighting" (Reiss 1987, p. 265). A related confusion appears to be that older gang members tend to use juveniles or younger adolescents to carry out violent attacks, or "hits," against members of opposing gangs. Data on gang homicides and aggravated assaults do not support these conclusions, although juveniles may frequently be used by older gang members to commit certain property crimes and carry out certain drug-trafficking activities.

The age locus of gang homicides, the most violent gang activity, is late adolescence and young adulthood. The average age of the gang homicide offender in Los Angeles city and county in the 1980's was 19 and 20 years old respectively (Maxson, Gordon, and Klein 1985; see also Torres 1980; and Horowitz 1983). Spergel's (1983) gang homicide offender data in Chicago for 1978-81 indicate major age category percentages as follows: 14 years old and under, 2.2 percent; 15 to 16 years old, 17.6 percent; 17 to 18 years old, 32.4 percent; 19 to 20 years old, 21.7 percent; 21 years old and older, 25.9 percent. These percentages for these categories are approximately the same for a later 1982-85 analysis of gang homicides in Chicago (Spergel 1986).

Three interdependent factors may account for the apparently increased age of gang youth. First, a "real" aging of the youth gang population may have occurred along with that of the general population over the last three decades. A second explanation may be the changing structure of the economy and the loss of desirable unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, so that it has become increasingly difficult for dropout and unskilled gang youths to leave the gang and graduate to legitimate job opportunities that offer even a modicum of social respect and income. Third, increased illegitimate opportunities, particularly in the drug market, may have induced older youths and younger adults to remain in gangs, but give up
strictly status-related gang activity, and modify the gang structure to more effectively distribute drugs.

The age at which offenders are involved in gang violence is extremely important for theory and policy. If the early- or middle-adolescent period accounts for most gang violence and serious gang crime, one set of theories and policy strategies may be appropriate. If it is the late-adolescent and young-adult period, an entirely different set of explanatory theories, policy priorities and program interventions may be required.

Females and Gangs

Most gang members are males, and it is mainly males who commit gang related crimes—particularly violent offenses. Data on the number and distribution of females in gangs are extremely sparse. The older literature on gangs almost never refers to "gang girls" or their characteristics (Thrasher 1936). Bernard Cohen (1969a, p. 85) indicates that 6.3 percent of delinquent group members arrested in the early 1960's were females but that only 1.4 percent of juvenile-gang arrests were females. Tracy, (1982, pp. 10-11) found that 17 percent of violent delinquents in the 1958 Philadelphia cohort study were females but that most were arrested for nongang offenses.

Despite occasional media reports and social agency warnings, the current situation appears to be unchanged. In a study of 4 police districts in Chicago between 1982 and 1984 which produced 1,504 reported gang incidents, Spergel (1986) found that 95 to 98 percent of the offenders in each district were males. In a study of 345 gang-homicide offenders in Chicago in the 4 year period 1978-81, only 1 was female. Of 204 gang homicide victims for this period, 6 were female (Spergel 1983).

In a more recent Chicago police study, Bobrowski (1988) reports 12,502 male offenders; females were only 2 percent of the total over a year-and-a-half period (January 1987 to July 1988). The most frequent index category of gang offenses was serious assault. Of 2,984 offenders, only 94, or 3.2 percent, were females. The pattern varies little for other gang-related offenses (Bobrowski 1988). Thus, it appears that the participation of females in gang-related offenses has changed little over the past several decades.

Focusing on females as gang members rather than as gang offenders, Collins (1979, p. 51) estimated that males outnumbered females by a margin of 20 to 1 in New York City gangs of the 1970's. He also reported that half of all street gangs in New York City had female chapters or auxiliaries. Miller (1975) reported that females made up 10 percent of gang members.

Females are most likely to be members of auxiliaries to male youth gangs, occasionally to be members of mixed-sex gangs, and least likely to be members of independent or unaffiliated female gangs. As members, Campbell (1984a) observes, females function as "partial and pale facsimiles" of male gang structures, processes, and behaviors. The female affiliate may develop a conventionally
positive and distinctive solidarity and set of "sisterhood" relationships, female members still define gang-related achievement largely in male terms (Campbell 1984a). Female gang members have the same basic need for status as the males, although the criteria for its achievement are defined somewhat differently. Female gangs appear to have a higher turnover, a shorter life span, less effective organization and leadership, and a "more pervasive sense of purposelessness" than male gangs and members (Campbell 1984a).

In a recent publication, Harris (1988) indicates that female gang members are relatively closely identified with the male gang-member role. They emulate the males, dress like "homeboys," and consider themselves as tough as the males are; they are motivated to participate in a "subculture of violence" based on "honor, local turf-defence, control, and gain." (Harris 1988, pp. 173-174).

As with males, however, it is not clear whether the most delinquent and aggressive offenses of affiliated female gang members are gang- or nongang-motivated. "Gang girls" are more likely to develop police records when they are with the delinquent group or gang than when they are not. Also, the more delinquent the male group, the more delinquent the affiliated females. Nevertheless, the larger proportion of delinquent females appears to be unaffiliated (Sarnecki 1986), and the most delinquent females are not gang affiliated.

The active gang female, like the active gang male, is part of a highly turbulent and violent social world. But according to one set of observers, violence patterns of female gang members seem to be quite different. While violence occasionally occurs from being a perpetrator of a fight or in a dispute over leadership in the female auxiliary, more often it results from resistance to becoming a victim in a robbery, rape, a domestic quarrel with a male gang member, or as "defense against slights to public reputation, such as accusation of cuckolding, promiscuity" by other female gang members (Campbell 1984b). Much female violence results from intragroup female auxiliary tensions and disputes over affections for the same male; only rarely do females develop a reputation for use of knives or guns or for being vicious fighters (Brown 1977).

On the other hand, Harris states that Latino gang girls in the San Fernando Valley, California, have been engaged in a similar range of offenses --some extremely serious--"vandalism, narcotics, assault, battery, rape, burglary, extortions, and murder" (Harris, 1988, p. 1). One of the "homegirls" Harris interviewed reports that she had "a couple of guys up against the wall with a hammer . . . here . . . The girls run with the guys. They do like whatever comes down" (Harris 1988, p. 128). Of the 21 homegirls studied, "only two reported no drug use . . . all others reported heavy drug use—especially PCP. Three of the girls had been drug dealers, one was a heroin addict who had spent the major part of her years between ages 13 and 18 in detention centers for drug abuse, and three others were or are heroin users" (Harris 1988, pp. 132-133).

Females have been viewed in the past as both the cause and the cure of much male delinquency. Evidence for these assertions has
not been systematically gathered. The general assumption is that females achieve status and excitement through provocation of fights between members of rival gangs, carrying messages, spying, and carrying concealed weapons. Sarnecki (1986) claims the presence of females may incite males to commit delinquent acts. Some observers, however, suggest the female affiliate operates on its own to socialize as well as to produce or stimulate deviant behavior (Giordano 1978; Quicker 1983; Campbell 1984a). The most important approval or sanction for female gang members’ deviant behavior may come from interactions with other females and on the basis of norms of the auxiliary, rather than from the male gang. There is also some evidence that females may be instrumental in persuading boyfriends to leave the gang and settle down. They can be instrumental in preventing males from engaging in situational gang delinquencies. Males will tend to avoid gang delinquencies in the presence of females (Klein 1971; Bowker, Gross, and Klein 1980).

A similar set of contradictory notions exists regarding the social and psychological character of the female gang member. On the one hand, female gang members are reported to have low self-esteem, to do poorly in school, to be rebellious, and to use their affiliation with auxiliary or male gangs to shock parents or other peers (Campbell 1984a; Harris 1988). Women in motorcycle gangs are reported to be especially disturbed and abused. They join because of "the excitement gang life offers" (Davis 1982a, 1982b) but soon may be held involuntarily or continue to stay because of fear. The motorcycle woman—often older than her street-gang equivalent—may develop strong dependency needs, plays the role of servant or prostitute, and often becomes a "battered woman" (Ibid.).

On the other hand, some researchers argue that female gangs or auxiliaries are socially adaptive to life opportunities in the ghetto or barrio. Females who join the gang are not severe deviants or misfits. They use the gang for a variety of "normal" or typical adolescent purposes: to learn about grooming and keeping secrets from the adult world (Campbell 1984a), how to meet prospective mates, and how to get along in the harsh world of the ghetto (Bowker, Gross, and Klein 1980; Quicker 1983).

The particular geographic-historical-cultural context may define the gang role of the female. In Ponce, Puerto Rico, "sexes are seldom mixed, but there is a phenomenon in which female leaders may take over male gangs temporarily while their partners are in prison. Gangs in Ponce are often family-based where members have close blood relationships" (Office of the Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989, p. 10). Leadership is maintained in a single family, gang roles are inherited, and there are training and initiation patterns for youth (Office of the Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 1989, p. 10).

The patterns of entry and departure from the gang or auxiliary seem to differ for females and males. Females are rarely drafted into the gang. They join and leave even more casually than males do. The age range of females entering the gang appears to be a little younger than for males, about 12 to 14 years old. Most females cease their membership between the ages of 16 and 18, at an
earlier age than males. Hagedorn (1988, p. 5) reports that almost all members of the four female gangs he studied in Milwaukee matured out of the female gang when they turned 18 (also see Harris 1988).

A variety of reasons have been set forth for why females do not seem to form gangs as readily as males, to participate as extensively, or to be as substantially affected by them. Thrasher (1936, p. 228) suggests that females have been conditioned to be less aggressive and violent than men. "The behavior of girls, powerfully backed by the great weight of . . . custom, is contrary to the gang and its activities . . . Girls, even in urban disorganized areas, are more closely supervised and guarded than boys and are usually well incorporated into the family group or some other social structure." Brown offers these reasons for why females in Philadelphia's black ghettos seem less attached to gangs than boys: "First, it is common practice in the lower-class black family to assign the females the task of supervising younger siblings . . . and practicing domestic chores . . . this . . . limits the amount of exposure the female will have to street life and gang interaction. Second, lower-class black females have more exposure to mainstream ideals . . . [they] move [more] freely . . . between the ghetto . . . and mainstream life style than do black males . . . Third and most important . . . females are not pressured into joining gangs [or] . . . to aid in territorial defense" (1977. pp. 222-23).

In any case, a variety of questions and issues remain with respect to who the female gang member is and why and how she participates in gang activities. We know much less about the characteristics and performance of gang females than gang males.
CHAPTER V: MEMBERSHIP EXPERIENCES

The youth gang is temporarily adaptive to the interests and needs of the youth in terms of his mainly adolescent stage of development within particular contexts. It provides psychological, social, cultural, economic, and even political benefits when other institutions, such as family, school, and employment, fail. The individual grows and develops and learns to survive through his gang experience. But, as a rule, the gang serves the youth poorly in preparing him for a legitimate career or for a personally satisfying long-term life experience.

Entering and Leaving the Gang

Most of the discussion has been at the individual or social-psychological level, with the social or economic environment as a background. There has been little systematic research on why, how, and especially under what circumstances a youth joins a gang and even less research on why, how, or under what circumstances a youth leaves a gang. Beginning efforts are being made to specify risk factors for entry into a gang, for example: known association with gang members; presence of neighborhood gangs; having a relative in a gang; failure at school; prior delinquency record, particularly for aggressive acts; and drug abuse (see Nidorf 1988; Spergel and Curry 1987). Probation officers in Orange County, California, identify minors "at-risk for gang involvement," if they display one or more of the following characteristics: self-identification with a gang, wearing colors, writings about a gang (such as plaque, or graffiti), association with a gang members, as well as having gang members in the family (Orange County Probation 1989).

Some recent reports refer to social situations or contextual events that account for the development of gangs, or the conversion of street groups to gangs, and for those circumstances that are associated specifically with the breakup of gangs. The development of gangs in Los Angeles city and suburban communities has apparently occurred under various circumstances. Gang violence developed first in the city and was followed much later by drug dealing. In the suburbs, drug dealing came first, followed by gang recruitment and gang development (Valdivia 1988). In Milwaukee, two analysts recently observed that group social events can trigger gang formation: "The emergence of some of the gangs was associated with . . . youth . . . breakdancing and drill teams [that] swept the black communities. In some cases, the transition from dance groups to gangs came about when fights broke out after dance competitions. But there were also a number of traditional corner boy-groups already in existence at the time. As fighting between groups became more common, the corner boys, like the dance groups, began to define themselves as gangs" (Moore 1988, p. 12).

Gang socialization processes vary by age, context, situation, and access to alternative roles. A great many reasons for joining a gang have been identified. Some youths join a gang because of
needs or wishes for recognition or status, safety or security, power, excitement and new experiences—particularly under conditions of social deprivation (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Ley 1975). The youths seek identity and self-esteem they cannot find elsewhere (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975).

Joining a gang may be viewed as normal and respectable even when the inevitable consequence is a series of delinquent and violent acts. Stealing, aggression, and vandalism may be secondary to the excitement of interacting with other peers of similar class, interest, need, and persuasion (Sannecki 1986). The consequences of joining a gang and participating in delinquent acts may not be recognized by adolescents or even young adults (Deukmajian 1981; Rosenbaum and Grant 1983).

Joining a gang has been viewed by some as a desirable and expected process in certain communities. Honor, loyalty, and fellowship are viewed as the reasons youths join gangs at a certain age, particularly in lower-class white ethnic and Hispanic communities with extended family systems and strong traditional identification of the residents with each other and the neighborhood. The gang is seen as a vehicle for "preserving the barrio and protecting its honor" (Torres 1980; see also Horowitz 1983). The gang serves as an extension of the family and the development of the clan. Older brothers, relatives, friends, and friends of friends have belonged to the gang. Multigeneration gang families identified with the same gang are not uncommon (Deukmajian 1981).

Joining a gang may also result from a rational calculation to achieve personal security—particularly by males in certain neighborhoods. The youth may be harassed or attacked on the street or in school if he is unaffiliated, belongs to the wrong gang, or comes from the wrong neighborhood. Ironically, although the gang member may feel safer, there is evidence that a gang member is more likely than a nongang member to be attacked, at least by another gang member (Savitz, Rosen, and Lalli 1980). This problem may assume an ingroup, out-group, inter-ethnic, or interracial conflict character. Youth from Hispanic, Asian, or black populations new to a school or community dominated by another ethnic or racial populations—whether white, Hispanic, or black—may be constrained or persuaded to join a gang for the purpose of protection.

Joining a gang may meet social and psychological developmental needs of troubled and deprived youth. It provides a way of achieving status and self-importance. The gang member can "control" turf, schools, parks, and prisons often when he cannot perform adequately in these settings and achieve respect for himself through legitimate means (New York City Youth Board 1960; Yablonsky 1962).

Some youths indicate that they join and stay in gangs for financial reasons. The gang provides sanction, contacts, and preparation for a variety of criminal gain efforts. Historically, the gang member has been able to attract the special attention of adults in organized crime (Spergel 1964; Ianni 1974). In recent years, the gang has become a place to make contact with drug
dealers and prepare for a career as a drug dealer, enforcer, or hit man for a drug entrepreneur (Miller 1975).

Joining a gang may not be difficult. It most often occurs as a youth hangs around and comes to be accepted by certain key members: "You come to the square, you belonged to the group" (Berntsen 1979, p. 92). Forcible recruitment is not common and intimidation is more indirect than direct. The threat of intimidation is seldom carried out, although on occasion a youth who refuses to join can be severely beaten.

Initiation requirements have become part of the tradition of gang life (New York City Youth Board 1960; Yablonsky 1962; Jansyn 1966; Patrick 1973). These requirements, which may be in large part mythology or at least inconsistently applied, are said to range from drinking, using drugs, fighting other members, and running a gauntlet to stealing, shooting a member of an opposing gang, and even a police officer.

There is little research on the process of a youths leaving gangs, but there is growing evidence that substantial numbers of gang members do not cease affiliation at the end of adolescence, usually in the late teens. Youths leave gangs for a variety of reasons—including the influence of a girlfriend, interested adults, and of concerned parents. Often battle fatigue sets in. Frequent arrests and incarcerations take a toll on the youth emotionally and on his family’s finances. The family, including the gang youth, may move out of the neighborhood to avoid gangs or seek better job opportunities. The gang may splinter or dissipate. As the youth reaches the end of adolescence, he may feel he is ready for the role of adult, find a job and settle down—if alternate roles are open to him (New York City Youth Board 1960; Spergel 1966).

A youth may wish to leave the gang but be unable to, particularly if he remains in close physical proximity to other gang youths in the neighborhood or prison. The threat of violence from opposing gangs or his own gang may also induce him to remain. The murder of core gang members or leaders planning to leave their gang has been reported (Collins 1979, p. 35).

There is now ample evidence of the presence of young adults in gangs. Gangs composed mainly of young adults, even with middle-aged gang members, have been acknowledged. Horowitz (1983) makes the following observations in respect to Chicano gangs in Chicago:

Only a few core members turn away from street status once they reach 18. Some become politically conscious, others turn to families, and a few become drug addicts. [p. 181]

Once a reputation has been publicly confirmed, it does not fade away overnight. It becomes difficult for a former gang member to refrain from fighting when a breach of etiquette against him was meant as a challenge to his claim to precedence. [p. 183]
Many gangs on 32nd Street have senior organizations or previous members now in their twenties, thirties and even forties. If asked, they still identify themselves as gang members and claim other members as their best friends. [p. 184]

Hagedorn, Macon, and Moore, referring mainly to black gangs in Milwaukee, indicate that: "More than 70 percent of the 260 who founded the gangs were reported as still being involved with the gang today, more than 5 years after the gang was founded" (1986, p. 5).

Gang members who worked in community-action programs, supported by foundation grants in the late 1960's, were typically in their twenties (Spergel et al. 1969; Poston 1971). Motorcycle gangs consist mainly of young adults. Prison gangs are composed largely of young men in their twenties and thirties (Jacobs 1974, 1977; Moore 1978; G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Some observers have come to view gang membership in recent years as "permanent and lifelong" (Moore, Vigil, and Garcia 1983) and as "a way of life, a cause" (Daley 1985).

**Individual Status and Gang Cohesion**

A need for recognition or reputation or status is the most common explanation for why individuals participate in gangs. This recognition can be achieved through delinquent or violent activity which involves group support or cohesion, which in turn creates a further need by the individual to maintain or augment status in the gang and stimulates even more delinquent and violent activity. These relationships may be nonrecursive (see fig. 1).

Status-seeking is a central concept in the explanation of the behavior of the violent youth gang (see Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Spergel 1964; Short and Strodtebeck 1965; Klein 1969, 1971; Moore 1978; Horowitz 1983). The process of achieving status is sometimes interpreted by psychologically oriented analysts as a way of resolving a variety of personal and social problems.

Relationships among gang members may be viewed as a continuing struggle to manage status as defined and redefined by the gang (Thrasher 1936, pp. 275-76). Each gang member seeks status through certain types of aggressive or defensive behavior meaningful in the eyes of members of his gang, members of opposing gangs, peers, or adults in the community (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975). The achievement of gang status may signify power, influence, or access to illegal opportunity or markets. The drive for status can be all-compelling and the behavior required to achieve it may result in arrest and imprisonment which becomes a further means to elevate one's status—particularly for younger members. The gang status system thus creates special problems for traditional law-enforcement.

Short and Strodtebeck observe that the "existence of the gang is crucial to an understanding of the manner in which status
management is carried out by gang boys regardless of whether the threat originated from within or outside the group. The gang provides the audience for much of the acting out which occurs . . . It's the most immediate system of rewards and punishments to which members are responsive much of the time" (1965, p. 215). A situation may "arise when a gang leader acts to reduce threats to his status by instigating outgroup aggression . . . leaders resort to this action because of the limited resources they have for internal control of their group—particularly when their status is attacked" (Short and Strotbeck 1965, p. 185). The strong need for status comes fundamentally from the lack of resources and the weakness of controls internal and external to the group. The constant competition for honor and reputation, the precarious ranking system, and hierarchical structure that "depends on continuous confirmation by others of one's placement" results in a constant state of flux, highly unstable relationships, and a continual forming and reforming of the group (Horowitz 1983, p. 89; see also Patrick 1973). Unstable and frustrating as the gang status system is, it nevertheless assumes special importance in poor or changing neighborhoods, in schools with extremely high failure rates, and increasingly for minority youth and gang adults in prisons.

Over time, however, a gang may stabilize. There may be less competition for positions of honor and less turnover among leaders and core members. Researchers disagree about the conditions under which status striving is reduced or enhanced in its contribution to delinquency and violence—particularly through the process of group cohesion.

Two different sets of arguments regarding the relation between cohesion and delinquency, including violence, have arisen. The first question has to do with whether gangs are cohesive or not. Are gangs loosely or closely knit, stable or unstable? A current argument is that youth gangs are less cohesive than media and police reports suggest. Law enforcement agencies and the media often speak of organized criminal gangs. However, many gang-type groups, particularly in Eastern cities, e.g., New York City in the 1980's, have been regarded as so loosely knit that they are essentially "pick-up groups" (Galea 1988). The members or participants hardly know each other and may associate only for a few hours or days. Some of these groupings are not even classified as gangs but rather as delinquent groups which participate either spontaneously or with some purpose and limited plan in violent and/or non-violent crimes.

The alternate argument is that gangs may be more cohesive and stable than is traditionally recognized. In some communities, particular gangs persist over time, members interact as friends, and mutual support develops and persists. Gang members trust and depend on each other and create strong bonds over the years. "There are few culturally accepted forms of affiliation in which they can maintain close relationships and remain tough warriors—an identity for which there are few alternatives" (Horowitz 1983, p. 179). Young-adult gangs involved in a good deal of criminal activity may
also require bonds of trust and mutual dependency. Jacobs emphasizes the important attitudinal dimension of gang attractiveness in prison: "By far the most important function the gang provides their members at Stateville is psychological support . . . the organizations give to the members a sense of identification, a feeling of belonging, an air of importance. According to the Chief of the Vice-Lords, 'It's just like a religion. Once a Lord always a Lord. People would die for it . . . The Lords allows you to feel like a man . . . it is a family with which you can identify'" (1977, pp. 152-53; see also Moore 1978).

A further argument is that gangs can be both cohesive and loosely knit, stable and unstable in the same settings or communities. The same gang may go through various phases. In his study of an Italian gang in a stable community, Jansyn observes that gangs go through periods of high and low cohesion and that phases of organization and disorganization increase or decrease solidarity (1966).

The second set of questions has to do with the relationship between gang cohesion and delinquent behavior. There may be a connection between the gang member's need for status and the connection or interactions between gang cohesion or solidarity and delinquency. Jansyn (1966) argues that when gangs go through a phase of disorganization, a burst of activity—often delinquent—occurs to mobilize and cohere the group once again. Klein and Crawford (1967), by contrast, argue that group cohesion precedes delinquent behavior and that the highly cohesive gang is likelier to engage in gang activity than is the diffuse or weakly organized gang. Klein (1971) later modified this view and proposed that delinquent behavior and gang cohesiveness were interactive, although the predominant direction was from cohesion to delinquent activity.

Several writers argue that delinquency and gang membership are not only important and interactive but also depend on the kind of delinquency engaged in and the measures of cohesion used (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975; see also Morash 1983; Stafford 1984). Other researchers suggest the key element may be the need for status by persons vying for, or exercising, leadership. When a member aspires for leadership or an established leader feels threatened, gang activity—of a delinquent or more often a violent character—and increased cohesion follow (Yablonsky 1962; Short and Strodtebeck 1965). The implication, therefore, is that delinquency, violence, or at least some individual's provocative activity may occur even prior to group interaction and feelings of solidarity (see also Thrasher 1936; Kornhauser 1978).

Klein's (1971) Ladino Hills experiment in Los Angeles was an effort to test the notion that gang cohesion causes delinquency and that a reduction in group cohesion would be followed by a reduction in delinquent behavior. This first, theoretically conceptualized, quasi-experiment in gang intervention was partially successful. Attempts at de-cohering the gang were successful. Gang size and the group delinquency rates were reduced. However, the rate of mutual
interactions of those who remained, or were part of the gang system, was not reduced. Fewer delinquent gang events occurred, but individual delinquency rates did not significantly change during the two-year test period (1 1/2 years of program and a subsequent six-month followup period). Klein (1971) claims he was most successful in limiting the recruitment of new members and the development of a new klika to the gang, at least over the short term.

**Intellectual/Personal Disability**

We know little about the intellectual and personal disabilities of gang delinquents that distinguish them from nongang delinquents, or about the differences among different types of gang youth. There has been speculation that core members are more troubled or troublesome than fringe members (Yablonsky 1962; Klein 1971).

We have little systematic knowledge about gang members' intelligence or physical and mental health. The weight of opinion is that gang members' intelligence may be somewhat below normal (Klein 1971) and that they tend to be more than normally "hostile, disruptive, defiant, aloof, distant, arrogant, and defensive" (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, p. 12). Yet the bases for these judgements are not clear. A variety of demographic, socio-economic, and community conditions have not been adequately specified.

On purportedly culture-bias-free measures of arithmetic, vocabulary, memory, and information, gang members tested lower than other lower-class nongang boys (Short and Strodtbeck 1965). Based on performance on a standardized intelligence test where a normal score is 100, Klein reports that in a sample of 243 gang members that the median score was 84, and only 8 youth tested above 100. "One-third of the boys have scores that would dictate their placement in special education classes" (1971, p. 85). Farrington, Berkowitz, and West (1982, p. 331) indicate that "frequent group fighters" tended to have low vocabulary scores at ages 10 and 14. However, in a recent survey of prison gangs, officials estimated that gang members were of average intelligence. In fact, their education level was perceived as above average (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). Taylor (1988) recently reported that youths in corporate drug dealing gangs in Detroit did well in school and some came from middle-class families.

More attention has been paid to the socio-emotional than to the intellectual disabilities of gang members. A wide range of views exists, but it tends to emphasize the troubled and defective character of the gang member's development. Almost all of the research is observational with few, if any, scientific controls.

At one extreme are claims that core members tend to be pathological and gang leaders tend to be sociopaths or megalomaniacs. The gang is a useful channel for expression of hostility and striving for power (Yablonsky 1962; see also Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975). Certain gang members show a preference for aggression based on their feelings of inferiority.
and their fear of being rejected or ignored by others (Gerrard 1964). Peter Scott, a British psychiatrist, concludes that the "gang proper" is an atypical form springing from pathological rather than social pressures (Scott 1956; see also Downes 1966). An observer of gangs in Glasgow, Scotland notes that it was not the "strongest nor the fittest, the tallest nor the brightest boys who became leaders of lieutenants in gangs, but the most psychologically disturbed, those with lowest impulse control" (Patrick 1973, pp. 100-101).

Other analysts tend to characterize gang members as troubled, perceptually disoriented, or emotionally disturbed—but not in such fearsome terms. The gang boy is viewed as an emotionally unstable individual who has difficulty making satisfactory interpersonal relationships and has "poor impulse control." The gang is an aggregate of individuals with "shared incapacities"; aggression is a "coping mechanism that receives constant reinforcement within the gang" (Klein 1971, pp. 81-85). Gang members have "worse relationships than boys who do not have a criminal record . . . those boys appeared to be anxious to be accepted by their mates" (Sarnecki 1986, p. 20). The motorcycle gang member is a "free spirit who has very little loyalty to others. His essential commitment is to himself . . . he has difficulty keeping close friends. He has no remorse about his behavior" (Davis 1982a, p. 22). Gang boys are "inferior in their general powers of concentration and in their perceptual ability to integrate meaningful wholes out of partial information (Cartwright, Tomson, and Schwartz 1975, p. 11).

A number of writers have observed that leaders of gangs who are considerably older than the average age of members are often very personally troubled. In one gang where the average age was 16, the core members were 26, 24, 23, and 19, and the leader was especially violent (New York City Youth Board 1960, p. 16).

In some contrast, other writers see gangs as composed of youths with social liabilities, but who also have certain social strengths and who find positive values in the gang. "Gang boys are less assertive. They are more reactive to false signals . . . they tend to be neurotic and anxious, less gregarious and more narcissistic." However, the gang member is not characterized by "desperation in search of stable human relationships, nurturance and security. He seems, rather, to have worked out a reasonably realistic solution to problems. The gang boy, in many respects, is a pragmatist" (Short and Strodtebeck 1965, pp. 231-33). Gordon considers gang behavior "not merely an expression of individual psychological disturbances or of group norms, but also as a complex of techniques through which boys in a group strive to elicit nurturant, accepting, and highly dependable responses from each other—perhaps to compensate for deprivation in their family backgrounds or other institutional contexts" (1967, p. 48).

The gang member's disturbance is seen by some as functional to survival in his environment through the gang's status system. Krisberg states that the theme of survival permeates many of the explanations of why youths join gangs and do the "crazy things"
they do. Few of these youths have experienced anything but severe economic deprivation. They find themselves on the brink of adulthood without education or training to compete successfully in the labor market. "Survival through 'hustling' or 'fighting' is a functional adaptation to an uncompromising social environment" (Krisberg 1974, p. 116).

Furthermore, the breakdown or weakness of a series of social institutions is often cited as an explanation of a gang member's disturbance and of his desire for gang membership. In one type of explanation, gang members come from "stressful family situations, especially the disproportionate female-centered or transient-male adult models" (Vigil 1988, pp. 5-8). The identity crisis for the male adolescent Chicano is resolved by his joining the gang "which stresses male survival traits on the streets" (Vigil 1988, pp. 5-8). Vigil suggests that the gang institution serves the same function as male initiation rites in other cultures (Vigil 1988, pp. 5-8; see also A. Cohen 1955; Bloch and Niederhoffer 1958; Miller 1958). Vigil has also developed the notion of "multiple marginality" to explain the role of the gang member in adapting to street life in the inner city. The youth gang—especially in the Mexican-American community in southern California—is viewed as a collective resolution to problems associated with "territory, age-grading, and gender socialization."

A more positive view of gang-boy personality is taken by other researchers who reject the idea that most gang members are psychopathic, sociopathic, or even that they are significantly socially or personally disabled. This rejection is implicit in Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) assumption that gang boys are not alienated from conventional institutions or middle-class values. Since they cannot make it in these systems or through established means, they simply find alternate ways to achieve their desired objectives (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; see also Short and Strodtbeck 1965).

The most sanguine view of the personalities of gang members is that of Walter Miller—at least in his earlier writings: "They are not psychopaths, nor physically or mentally 'defective'; in fact, since the cornerboy supports and enforces a rigorous set of standards which demand a high degree of fitness and personal competence, the gang tends to recruit from the most able members of the community" (1958, p. 17). Some gang leaders complete high school, a few go on to college, or even graduate school and settle down to middle-class business or professional lives.

While there is considerable disagreement as over whether gang youths are emotionally disturbed and to what degree, there appears to be some consensus about the dynamics of gang violence and crime and the status and control purposes that such behavior serves in the group context. For certain youths, violence in the gang context is "highly valued as a means for the achievement of reputation or 'rep'" (Yablonsky 1962, pp. 194-292). The social disabilities of gang youths "contribute to the status dilemmas of these youngsters and in this way contribute to involvement in delinquency" (Short and Strodtbeck 1965, p. 243). The need for status is pronounced.
among gang members and should be viewed as "compensatory over-assertion" (New York City Youth Board 1960, p. 58; see also Cartwright, Howard, and Reuterman 1970). The gang fulfills "status needs that would otherwise go unmet" (Friedman, Mann, and Friedman 1975, pp. 600-601). Gang violence, minor or major, may be viewed as an effort to establish and maintain power, whether exercised democratically or autocratically (New York City Youth Board 1960).
CHAPTER VI: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF GANG DEVELOPMENT

Social disorganization, often brought on by rapid and/or large scale population movement, and poverty interact to weaken institutions of socialization, social support, and social control and create the need for alternative social roles and career routes through residual organizations, such as youth gangs. This chapter examines the contexts and institutional conditions—family, school, politics, and organized crime—that encourage or support gang development.

Insight to the development of gangs has often been sought through theories of ecological and social disorganization. Ecological theories attempt to relate characteristics of a population to those of its surrounding space and material conditions. Social disorganization refers to the disarray of norms, values, and social and organizational relationships or the lack of social integration at system rather than subsystem levels. In other words: families, groups, and organizations may seem to function well on their own terms but not as part of a coherent, complex informal and formal system committed to dominant cultural norms and values.

More than 60 years ago, Thrasher wrote that "gangland" occupies the "poverty belt" and "interstitial areas" of the city and is characterized by "deteriorating neighborhoods, shifting populations, and the mobility and disorganization of the slum . . . It is to a large extent isolated from the wider culture of the larger community by the processes of competition and conflict which have resulted in the selections of its population. Gangland is a phenomenon of human ecology" (Thrasher 1936 [also 1929 edition], pp. 22-23; see also Shaw and McKay 1943).

Urban ecologists and criminologists have speculated that different kinds or degrees of social organization may exist in low-income communities. The disorganized low-income community is characterized by more extensive deterioration, more pronounced social disorder, and greater violence than are other communities (Kobrin 1951; Gold 1987). Gangs arise and develop in both more stable and less stable slum areas, but assume a different character when social institutions fail to function as agencies of social control (Shaw and McKay 1931, pp. 107-8).

The growth and development of cities may be characterized by a succession of different racial, ethnic, and income groups, with "a corresponding succession of gangs, although gang names and traditions may persist in spite of changes in nationalities" (Thrasher 1936, p. 198). This process may occur in small or large, suburban or inner-city areas where poor immigrant communities are settling. It may also develop where social institutions are in the process of rapid change and where community organization is weak.

Short observed that the most unstable or disorganized local communities produced conflict subcultures of violent gangs in Chicago in the early 1960’s: "Areas which have undergone very rapid transition from white to Negro, such as the West Side . . . Here
was found the fullest development of the conflict subculture . . . and areas on the fringe of expansion of the 'Black Belt' . . . in such areas, conflict most often occurred for the purpose of 'keeping the niggers out'" (Short 1963, p. 32).

The 1960's through the 1980's saw the exodus of higher-status whites and nonwhites from many central city areas, a consequent increase in proportions of lower-status minorities in certain areas, and the development of segregated barrios or ghettos—often in low-income public housing projects. The recruitment pool from which members of youth gangs and law-violating youth groups are drawn increased (Miller 1975). Some note that in the newer of the changing ghetto areas, children, adolescents, clubs, developing gangs, and established gangs team and engage in conflict with each other because so many groups of different backgrounds and orientations come together at school, community centers, or on the streets (New York City Youth Board 1960; Breen and Allen 1983; Hagedorn 1988).

Gang violence may be less virulent in the stabilized low-income ghetto. Internecine conflict may subside as smaller gangs are integrated into larger, better-organized gangs and into the general community. Competition and conflict may be rationalized and focused on criminal gain, not simply on turf and status. Still, some of these less unstable but very poor areas with lower rates of gang conflict may have higher overall rates of delinquency and crime than do high gang-crime areas.

Systematic tests of these ideas have only begun to be carried out. Cartwright and Howard (1966) performed an ecological analysis of the prevalence of gangs in Chicago in the 1960's using community area data. They did not find support for Thrasher's (1936) notion that delinquent gangs were concentrated in Chicago's "poverty belt"; gangs in the 1960's were found in all parts of Chicago. In the 1980's, gang incidents were reported in all of the Chicago Police Department's 25 districts, although incidents were concentrated in certain districts. Cartwright and Howard (1966, pp. 357-58) found that high-crime-rate gang areas were coterminous with only about half of the high-crime-rate delinquency areas. In other words, high rates of gangs and gang activity were also found in lower-delinquency-rate areas.

Bernard Cohen (1969a, 1969b) found in the 1960's that gangs, mainly black, were located not simply in poor communities but in those segregated sections of the city that were culturally and socially isolated. He reasoned that certain populations—whether first-generation European immigrants in the 1920's and 1930's; blacks in the post-World War II era; or, most recently, Hispanic groups—may be "set apart, stereotyped and placed in a ghetto culture." The entire life experience of youth may be confined to a particular area or social context and result in intense identification with the territory (Cohen 1969a, 1969b). Social and cultural isolation may interact with social disorganization, poverty, and low income to produce different gang problem rates.

Curry and Spergel (1988) performed an ecological analysis of the relation of gang homicide, robbery, and burglary to poverty
level, unemployment rate, and mortgage investment on a community-area basis in Chicago in the 1970's and early 1980's. Gang homicide and serious delinquency rates were differentially distributed in Chicago's 77 highly racially segregated community areas. The best predictors of delinquency rate were economic variables; however, the best predictors of gang homicides were a combination of social-disorganization factors that are identified with recently settled Hispanics and income variations.

In a recent study, Shannon observes that "different types of delinquency and crime are generated in different social milieus . . . ." He adds that "to the extent that a relationship exists between juvenile and adult behavior, it may be explained by the operation of the juvenile and adult justice systems, as well as by continuities in the behavior of juveniles and young adults" (1988, p. 213). He also found that more serious offenses—such as assault, burglary, theft, and robbery—had significantly increased within the three age cohorts in Racine, Wisconsin, from 1942 to 1955—particularly for the age group between 18 to 20 years old (Shannon 1988, p. 214). Furthermore, "crime rates were highest in the inner-city and interstitial areas whose residents were employed at lower-level jobs and were frequently unemployed" (Shannon 1988, p. 214).

Shannon and his associates attribute the changing rates and growing severity of the crime problem to the city's rapid growth during the 1950's and 1960's, which was accompanied by increasing individual mobility. "Delinquency and crime have become part of a cyclical pattern of change which—while it involved decline and deterioration in the inner city and interstitial areas—was likewise an outgrowth of population movement to and commercial and recreational development in peripheral areas that were readily accessible by auto or bus" (p. 215).

The interaction of social disorganization and lack of legitimate resources or availability of illegitimate resources may largely account for the development of deviant-group and subcultural phenomena in a variety of contexts. The family, school, politics, organized crime, and prison may contribute in special ways to the formation and development of gang patterns and individual gang-member behavior. Very limited direct attention has been paid to the relation of gangs to these institutional contexts. What we do know about the relationships is usually a product of studies designed for other purposes—such as the relation between family and delinquency, between school and delinquent peer group, the assessment of safe schools, the nature of participation in grassroots or "machine" politics, the patterns of recruitment to organized crime, or the pattern of general correctional system change. Some exceptions exist: Thrasher's (1936) chapter on "The Gang in Politics," Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) formulation of the "criminal subculture," Spiegel's (1964) discussions of "Racketville" and "Haulburg," Jacobs (1977) description of the development of the gang problem in a correctional institution, and—most recently—Sullivan's (1989) discussion of differential work opportunities and youth crime in three inner-city neighborhoods.
Family

A large school of theory and research finds the origins of delinquency, youth affiliation with delinquent groups, and related individual personal and social disorders primarily in the defects of family relationships, parental character, and early childrearing practices (Rutter and Giller 1983), though little research has been done specifically on the relationship between family variables and participation in delinquent gangs.

Vigil states that gang members in southern California generally are "raised in poorer homes, in disproportionate mother-centered family situations, with more siblings, and under problematic impoverished economic pressures, such as unemployment and welfare . . . In large part, [there are] early childhood indications of deviant activities, such as running away from home, petty shoplifting, and street fighting" (1988, p. 3). He argues that the process of becoming a gang member occurs through an accumulation of parental physical and emotional neglect by parents, abuse from older street-children, punitive educational incidents, and poor role models.

Disruption or disorganization of the family may lead youths to seek compensatory values in gang membership (Sherif and Sherif 1965, 1975). Research observers and gang members have indicated that the gang is like a family in many ways. The gang can be very appealing to immigrant or newcomer youths in urban areas, who are cut off culturally, socially, and economically from their families. The gang leader often adopts a paternal, or even a maternal, role—somewhat passive, yet controlling; providing guidance, warmth, and affection (New York City Youth Board 1960).

Some researchers downplay the importance of family variables in determining gang involvement. Among delinquents, gang and nongang youths do not vary significantly in such characteristics as broken homes, having parents with criminal histories, level of intelligence, or the highest school grade achieved (Friedman, Mann, and Friedmann 1975). Earlier studies by Shaw and McKay (1931) and Tennyson (1967) suggest that equal numbers of nongang boys seem to come from the same types of family structure and low socioeconomic backgrounds as gang boys. In a recent cohort study of sixth through eighth graders in four inner-city schools in Chicago, Spergel and Curry (1988) found that the absence of a father was a fairly strong predictor of arrests for Hispanic youth, but was a weak predictor of arrests for black youth. Family structure did not enter into a second series of regression equations to explain gang-related activities. Instead, the presence of a gang-member sibling or parent in the home was the best predictor of gang activity, particularly for Hispanic youth (Spergel and Curry 1987).

Miller (1976b) suggests that the family and the gang may play complementary socialization roles for gang members, teaching them different survival skills. Sager (1988) sees the gang as complementary to the family in the lower-class Mexican-American barrio culture in Los Angeles; the women perform dominant roles in the home and the men perform their warrior roles on the street. Yet
the family, school, and gang exist in distinctive and parallel social and cultural subsystems. Furthermore, while there may be an adequate relationship between the youth and his family, the family may be unable "to affect ties with other societal institutions—educational, cultural and social" (Harris 1988, p. 153). There may be little interpenetration or interdependency among these societal institutions. Thus, in the two-or three-generation gang family—while there may be little explicit support or encouragement for gang membership—a functional cultural relationship may still exist.

There seems to be a consensus that other variables interact with family variables to produce gang-problem youths (Rutter and Giller 1983). Thrasher (1936) saw the lack of adequate parental or family supervision as contributing to the likelihood that a youth would become a gang member in a poor, disorganized community. Based on a series of recent studies, Reiss’s study concludes that "it is the territorial concentration of young males who lack firm controls of parental authority that leads them into a peer-control system that supports co-offending and simplifies the search for accomplices" (1987, p. 251).

School

Considerable attention has been paid to delinquency in the school (Toby 1983; Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton 1985; and Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1985). There has, however, been little examination of the relation of gang problems to schools. Thrasher (1936), for example, paid scant attention to gangs in schools. Albert Cohen (1955) noted that delinquent subcultures were often in opposition to the norms of the school's middle-class culture. Hargreaves (1967) and Rutter et al. (1979) have described delinquent groups and subcultures in public schools in Great Britain that developed not so much in opposition to the school's system or norms and values, but as alternatives to it.

Concern with gangs and schools arose in the mid-1970's. National surveys, however, scarcely addressed group-related delinquency in or around the school or differentiated between delinquent-group and gang-related problems (National Institute of Education 1978; Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1985). The few studies that specifically address the school and gang problem are based often on nonrandom informants, nonsystematic data collection, and subjective or perceptual data sources. Statistics usually are not provided or are open to question. Issues of reliability, validity, and especially consistency of operational definitions can be raised.

In six large cities, informants reported "the presence of identified gangs operating in the schools, stabblings, beatings, and other kinds of assaults on teachers," and that the schools in Philadelphia are "citadels of fear" with "gang fighting in the halls" (Miller 1975, p. 46). In Chicago, 50 percent of public school students believe that "identifiable gangs are operating in and around the majority of schools, both elementary and secondary."
One in 10 students reports that street-gang members make them afraid when they are in school, have either attacked or threatened them, and have solicited them for membership—although mainly when they are not at school. Gangs are present in all 20 districts of the Chicago school system (Chicago Board of Education 1981, pp. 182-84, 189).

Kyle (1984) reports that 45 percent of the males and 22 percent of the females in two public high schools in probably the most gang-ridden community of Chicago were asked to join gangs in or around the school (p. 10). Twenty-five percent of the dropouts interviewed said that their major reason for dropping out of school was "fear of gangs" (Kyle 1984, p. 10). Kyle also claims the "the authority within the schools ultimately belonged to the gangs, rather than to the school administrators" (1984, p. 10).

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A report on the Evanston, Illinois school system provides a somewhat similar picture. Ninety-one percent of the high-school students "personally know one or more students who are gang members" and "almost half (47 percent) of the students describe the gang problem as a big problem" (Rosenbaum and Grant 1983, p. 16). In an evaluation of alternate education programs in 50 schools around the county in 1982, 13 percent of males and 5.2 percent of females reported they had been involved in a gang fight (Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and Cook 1983).

Ley (1975) observes that the majority of school transfers in Philadelphia's inner-city schools—particularly at the high-school level—were related to the students' fear of gangs or to their desire and need of high-school officials to move students—either to protect them or to get rid of key "gang bangers." Two law-enforcement officers from Los Angeles claim the "student-opportunity transfers and busing programs" served to "spread gang violence" into the immediate area of the school as well as back to the original neighborhoods and express the hope that "these programs will not be prolonged any longer than is necessary" (Jackson and McBride 1985, p. 28).

The school-related gang problem appears different in character from the street-level gang problem. It is generally less serious and involves younger youths. Self-report and police-arrest data appear to tap different dimensions of the gang problem. The Chicago Board of Education study reports that younger students, aged 12 or 13, are as likely as students aged 18 or older to be solicited for gang membership (1981, pp. 184-87). However, a substantial majority of youths arrested for gang-related crimes are over 14 years of age (Spergel 1986). Teachers and principals perceive gangs to be considerably less of a problem in and around schools than do students (Chicago Board of Education 1981, p. 189).

Police data generally indicate a more limited school gang-problem than do other reports. Chicago Police Department statistics show that 10 to 11 percent of reported gang incidents in 1985 and 1986 occurred on school property generally. Only 3.3 percent of the reported gang incidents took place on public high-school property in 1985. Chicago public-school discipline reports for the same period show that only 2 percent of discipline code violations were
gang-related, but that gang incidents were disproportionately serious—accounting for 12 percent of weapons violations, 26 percent of robberies, and 20 percent of aggravated batteries (Spergel 1985).

Participant-observation studies over three decades consistently indicate that gang members are typically behind in their studies or are school dropouts (Klein 1968). All of the 47 gang "founders" interviewed in Milwaukee had dropped out or been kicked out of school; most had been suspended (Hagedorn, Macon, and Moore 1986). School is regarded as alien ground by many gang members, and they seek to leave as quickly as possible (Horowitz 1983). The school is a place where gang members' weaknesses and inadequacies are made public (New York City Youth Board 1960). In one recent study, 80 percent of gang members were high-school dropouts (Reddick 1987). In another study, less than a third of gang members graduated from high school or later returned for a general equivalency diploma (Hagedorn 1988). However, gang members do not necessarily devalue school and do not criticize gang members or others for doing well (Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Horowitz 1983). But most gang members believe that formal public education has little to offer them: "In an environment where education is meaningless, the gang-barrio fulfills the young man's needs . . . It is not the school . . . but in the neighborhood gang is the stuff of living as he knows it" (Pineda 1974, p. 15).

Gang researchers have observed that gang behavior may result as much from school deficits as from problems and pressures at home (Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Joe and Robinson 1978). School variables are apparently highly predictive of later criminal adaptations and careers of delinquent-group or gang youths (Gold and Mattick 1974; Sarnecki 1986).

Politics

Youth gangs have often been linked to urban political systems in times of rapid change and social turmoil. Gangs in some cities (particularly Chicago) and in some contexts (notably prisons) have provided a means of communication between political leaders and alienated or isolated low-income populations. The short-term costs of such linkage are low but the long-term costs are high if the gang becomes legitimized and begins to control information and sanctions affecting local residents or prison inmates. Gang organizational strength increases, and opportunities for illegal behavior are enhanced.

According to one analyst, in the middle of the 19th century:

... gangs were the medium through which the grassroots and City Hall communicated. Politicians relied on the gangs for contact and stability, while residents used the gangs to acquire and distribute services and jobs. The gang imposed a social conscience on local businessmen by policing the neighborhoods; periodically sacking the homes, hotels, warehouses, and factories of the rich; and
instantly redistributing scarce goods to the needy. From the 1850's through the dismemberment of the Tweed Ring in the 1870's, New York's political machine was largely run from below" (Stark 1981, p. 441).

During times of social unrest and political crisis, the gang may be recognized as an instrument of power and influence and comes to control resources. A symbiotic relationship develops between urban politicians and gangs. In Chicago in the first third of this century, Thrasher (1936) observed:

the political boss . . . provides uniforms, camping funds, and children's picnics to 'get him in good' with the parents and friends of the gang boys . . . To repay the politician for putting gang members on official payrolls and providing subsidies, protections, and immunities . . . the gang often splits . . . the proceeds of its illegal activities, controls for him the votes of its members . . . and performs for him various types of work at the polls—such as slugging, intimidation, . . . vandalism (such as tearing down signs), ballot-fixing, repeating repeat voting, stealing ballot boxes" (pp. 452, 477).

Kornblum observed the continuity of this pattern in Chicago in the early 1970's:

A second group of neighborhood influentials which joined the opposing 10th ward faction was a small group of superannuated Mexican street-fighters. Men with nicknames such as 'The Rat' and 'The Hawk' with reputations in the Mexican precincts to match . . . were in ward politics . . . When a campaign becomes heated . . . a challenging faction may see fit to call upon its 'heavies' for various strategies for intimidation—including the systematic removal of the opposition's streetsigns and lamp posters" (1974, p. 166).

Use of the gang members was evident in recent elections in Chicago. The primary elections of 1986 in the 26th Ward—containing mainly newcomer, low-income Puerto Ricans—involved fierce competition between Hispanic Alderman Torres, supported by the Democratic machine; and his challenger, Gutierrez, supported by reform Mayor Harold Washington—who was attempting to consolidate his newly gained power. Both candidates used gang members to perform a variety of tasks—getting out the vote, hanging election posters, and persuading or intimidating voters who favored the opposition. Members of one gang supported one candidate, and the opposing gang supported another. One candidate's coordinator of precinct captains was the former leader of a major Hispanic gang renowned for its violence and drug-dealing activities.
Participation of gangs in urban-community affairs took different forms during the turbulent 1960's. Gangs were not an essential component or a precipitant of urban riots or civil-rights-related disorders, but peripheral and opportunistic participants (Knopf 1960; Skolnick 1969). Gangs are not ordinarily committed to social or political causes or ideology (however, see Anti-Defamation League 1986, 1987). Gangs were, nevertheless, enlisted in Chicago and elsewhere during the riot period to "cool" and control local residents. They were used by the police as an auxiliary force to maintain order; sometimes they were organized into youth patrols with identifying hard hats and arm bands to patrol riot-torn streets. Some gangs "protected" storekeepers against riot damage for a fee.

Gangs in the 1960's were also solicited by frightened government departments, private foundations, social agencies, and community organizations to participate—as partners or recipients of funds—in a variety of community-development and social-service projects. Gangs were viewed as one of the few viable organizations that could stabilize the disordered ghettoes. The fact that gangs could represent criminal interests and contain disoriented and incapable members was usually overlooked or misunderstood.

In this period, gangs were sometimes asked to participate in political campaigns and support candidates. Gang members, themselves, ran for political offices—including alderman and model cities representative in Chicago. Major controversies arose among politicians, community organizations, and units of government over the participation of gangs in community and political affairs (see Spergel 1960, 1972; Spergel et al. 1969; Poston 1971; Short 1976). Such gang involvement subsided in the 1970's; however, there have continued to be occasional efforts by black gangs in Chicago's West and South sides to charter and establish separate political parties.

It can be argued that gangs continue to serve the interests of a variety of organizations and officials concerned with urban problems. The media, law-enforcement agencies, youth-serving organizations, and local political administrations use the gang problem as a means to obtain resources. Moral indignation, various community campaigns, and social-intervention programs seem to have more often benefitted criminal justice, youth-serving, and local community organizations, and political administrations in a variety of ways, but not necessarily in controlling or reducing gang problems.

Law enforcement agencies are particularly prone to citing gang activities as a rationale in requesting resources for increased manpower, specialized equipment, and the development of gang units and special task forces. The police have also tended to politicize the gang problem—using it to protect "police turf" and their competing suppression philosophy against other competing organizations—such as probation departments, youth agencies, and community organizations—and more moderate or prevention approaches. The police may initially claim victory in their "fight" against gangs, until it becomes clear that the problem is worsening.
and more complex approaches are required (see Miller, Baum, and McNeil 1968; Sherman 1970).

**Organized Crime**

Some case studies (Spergel 1964; Ianni 1974) and theoretical speculations (Cloward and Ohlin 1960) portray certain youth gangs as stepping-stones to roles in adult organized crime. Although a significant number of gang youths become adult criminals, it is unclear what proportion move into organized crime. Much depends on how organized crime is defined. This narrow definition is offered by the President's Commission on Organized Crime: "Groups that engage in a variety of criminal activities are [classified as] organized crime when they have the capacity to corrupt governments" (1985, p. 181). Ianni claims, more broadly, that "any gang or group of criminals organized formally or informally to extort money, shoplift, steal automobiles, or rob banks is part of organized crime—regardless of its size or whether it operates locally or nationally" (1974, pp.14-15). If burglary, the selling of weapons, and drug selling are added, most criminally oriented youth gangs or youth segments of adult-controlled criminal gangs would be considered as organized crime.

Thrasher noted more than 50 years ago that there is "no hard and fast dividing line between predatory gang boys and criminal groups of younger and older adults. They merge into each other by imperceptible gradations, and the latter have their real explanations for the most part in the former. Many delinquent gangs contain both adolescents and adults" (1936, p. 406). Scholars in the 1950's and 1960's possibly exaggerated the distinctiveness of youth gang subcultures in different types of lower-class neighborhoods (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; but see Short and Strodbeck 1965). Certain minority groups, for example, African-Americans, in certain lower-class communities across the country, no longer seem blocked off from significant access to criminal opportunity systems, particularly drug trafficking.

Youth gangs and adult criminal subcultures probably became more integrated with one another in the 1970's and 1980's than they were in the 1950's and 1960's with the increased entry of newer minority groups into organized crime, greater competition among nascent criminal organizations, the relative increase in older youth and adults in street gangs, and expanded street-level drug markets.

It is also no longer possible to claim a sharp distinction between conflict and criminal gang subcultures. Gangs, drug trafficking, and violence are related, but in contradictory and unclear ways. The recent increase of gang violence and homicide in some black communities in Los Angeles and on the southside of Chicago has been attributed to competition over drug markets. By contrast, the reduction of gang violence in certain inner-city black communities on the westside of Chicago has been attributed to control and domination of the drug market by black gangs. Furthermore, the decline of gang problems in other cities—such as
New York and Detroit—has been attributed to increased opportunities for drug trafficking and the ready transfer of street-gang knowledge and skills to street-level drug distribution groups.

The development of motorcycle gangs and especially prison gangs with close ties to street gangs has further weakened the distinction between violent gangs and criminal enterprises. Motorcycle gangs may have characteristics similar to those of street gangs: they seek to control and protect territory and illegal markets, and they "will resort to bloody violence if the threats and acts of intimidation fail" (Daley 1985, p. 2).

Planning and organization characterize at least some of the actions of street gangs and their subgroups—particularly those engaged in drug trafficking. The penetration of gangs into legitimate businesses (albeit under questionable circumstances) such as store ownership and slum management appears to have occurred in Chicago (Pleines 1987). Members of one street gang in Chicago have recently been convicted of conspiracy to acquire and sell illegal weapons and to commit terrorist acts for Libya (Sly 1987a, 1987b).

Law-enforcement officials claim that some of the older and more successful black street-gang members in the Los Angeles County area "have purchased legitimate businesses in order to launder money. Some of the businesses are carwashes, auto-painting and fender shops, motels, auto dealerships, and liquor stores. The next step could be the added respectability for these subjects in the community as business leaders or through politics" (National Law Enforcement Institute 1990, p. 24).

Ianni (1974) suggests a close relationship between youth gangs and adult organized-crime. In New York City, he reports that "black and Hispanic crime activists follow the street 'rep' of youngsters just as carefully as the Italians did, and use the same process of gradual involvement to draw youngsters into the networks" (1974, p. 124). The youth gang and the prison are the two major institutions that prepare youths for participation in criminal networks.

Ianni predicted the transformation of "what is now a scattered and loosely organized pattern of emerging black control in organized crime" into a "Black Mafia" and into a future Hispanic Mafia (1974, p. 11). Youth gangs and organized crime may serve social functions of integrating deprived minority groups into the larger American culture—in effect serving as early and middle stages in America's complex social-mobility system (Ianni 1974, p.15; see also Bell 1953).

It has been said that gangs are undergoing an evolution from "fighting and relatively disorganized criminality to the level of organized criminal activity with adult participation ... the transition from 'protecting' a streetcorner to the utilization of the gang as a 'power base' to control narcotics flow on those same streetcorners should not be an unexpected one" (Sampson 1984, pp. 7-8). However, it is possible to exaggerate the organized character of this relationship; it remains fragmentary and ad hoc even as
gang members move up to mid-levels of street-level drug trafficking.

Our own recent observations of gangs in a lower-class Puerto Rican community in Chicago suggest that a variety of pressures and opportunities exist for youths in violent gangs to participate sporadically in organized criminal behaviors. Gang youths 14 or 15 years of age may engage in part-time drug peddling—often to augment family income. One gang leader led younger gang members in violent intergang rivalries and shootings while simultaneously engaging in burglary, receiving stolen goods, and selling cocaine. In another instance, a local drug-dealer employed a gang leader on a contract of $4,000 to kill a rival drug-dealer. The youth shot and killed the wrong person, however.

Gang members and drug dealers have developed symbiotic relationships in some inner-city slum neighborhoods where drug selling is rampant. Gang members provide protection for drug dealers and, in return, are paid well for running errands and performing other favors. Antagonisms between drug dealers and youth gang members may no longer be as serious as reported in the earlier literature; youth gangs may no longer chase dealers out of the neighborhood (New York City Youth Board 1960; Spergel 1964; see also Moore 1978).

Furthermore, there is some recent evidence that the symbiosis between youth gangs and drug dealers has grown stronger, more pervasive, and may not be confined simply to inner-city or ghetto area low-income residents. Taylor speaks of a small sophisticated group of "organized corporate gang members" 13 to 19 years of age (1988, p. 27). Some attend school regularly, a few may do better than average academic work (Taylor 1988, p. 27). He estimates that 30 percent come from middle-class and 2 percent from upper-class homes. The predominant majority, 80 percent, said it did not use drugs, but all said their main objective in joining gangs was money. Their primary criminal operation was drug sales (Ibid.).

There is recent but spotty evidence that Asian youth gangs may be more directly linked to organized crime than are black or Hispanic youth gangs. Chin states that "the emergence of Chinese street gangs is closely related to the Tongs [i.e, certain businessmen's or community benevolent associations] . . . when members dropped out of schools and began to hang around streetcorners in the community, Tong leaders hired them to run errands for gamblers and to protect the gambling places from outsiders and the police" (1989, pp. 83-84). He traces the historical socialization sequence as follows:

In 1964, the first foreign-born Chinese gang known as Wah Ching (Youth of China) was organized by young immigrants to protect themselves from American-born Chinese . . . A year later, when the immigration laws were changed, the Wah Ching rapidly evolved into a powerful gang by recruiting members from the influx of new arrivals . . . Later, Wah Ching members became the soldiers of the Hip Sing Tong. The gang converted itself
from an ordinary street gang into the youth branch of a
well-established adult organization" (1989, pp. 87-88).

A police official in California indicates that the Bamboo gang
from Taipei "invited some of our young street-gang members in, and
they organized and established [a local faction] of the Bamboo
gang . . . They remained in our city . . . laying out an
organizational structure, areas of responsibility for all the
crimes, and—in effect—took control over certain types of
racketeer activities in our city and in the surrounding cities"
(President’s Commission on Organized Crime 1985, p. 188).

An official in the Miami Police Department reported that black
and Hispanic street-gang leaders from Chicago and New York recently
arrived to hold a business convention with major South Ameri can
drug suppliers and to "have a good time" (Wade 1987 personal
communication). Relationships among youth gangs in New York, Ohio,
Florida, Illinois, and elsewhere were cemented, and discussions
centered upon drug distribution, increased contact with main
suppliers, and avoiding middle-level dealers to maximize profits
(Wade 1987).

Johnson et al. suggest that New York City youth gangs have
replaced existing basic institutions no longer able to perform
legitimate socialization functions and are channeling youth into
roles in a criminal underclass economy:

The power of the crew lies in being highly structured at
a time when other structures, once taken for granted
(schools, family, traditional work), are either weak or
transient. The crew recruits naturally aggressive
youngsters, channels their energy into productive
moneymaking work, accepts them into a group, and provides
a foundation where loyalty and honesty are rewarded
(1988, p. 54).

One may speculate that a rough sequence of stages develops in
the relationships among law-violating youth groups, youth gangs,
and criminal organizations. Deviant youths in lower-class
communities often find their way into law-violating youth groups or
cliques that may develop into youth gangs under conditions of
population change, intense poverty, racism, social isolation, and
consequent community disorganization. In due course, youth gangs as
such may splinter and dissolve or lose their violent character when
criminal opportunities, such as drug trafficking, and adult
criminal organizational controls are imposed. If such controls are
partial, the levels of individual violence may rise as gang
violence decreases.

Prisons

Prison gangs and street gangs may be components of the same
gang. In most States, prison gangs are outgrowths of street gangs,
but there is some evidence that gangs formed in prison may also
immigrate to the streets. The prison gang has been defined as a "close-knit and disruptive group of inmates organized around common affiliation for the purpose of mutual caretaking, solidarity, and profitmaking criminal activity" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 71). Of 33 State correctional systems reporting the presence of gangs, 21 indicated counterpart organizations in the streets of cities within the same States (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). The leaders of the inmate gangs are usually individuals who held high reputations and still have influence on the streets.

The prison gangs of the 1970’s may not be quite like the prison gangs of an earlier period. The earlier tradition of accommodation between inmate culture and prison administration no longer appears to be functioning well. Many of the prison gangs exist as a response, not to the prison, but to the streets. The power of prison gangs in recent decades appears to result from both urban social and economic breakdown and from changes in the prison control system (Jacobs 1977).

Gang problems on Chicago’s streets increased in the 1960’s during a period of rapid social change and political instability. Mass jailing of gang leaders and members followed. The Chicago gangs gained a foothold in the Illinois prisons in the early 1970’s. Some observers attribute contemporary gang problems in the Illinois prisons to a mistaken approach in the 1970’s when certain prison administrators acknowledged the gangs as organizations and tried to work with them to maintain inmate control. Leaders were expected to keep order and, in return, were rewarded with special privileges and prestige. The result was "increasing gang power and control, as well as gang rivalries and violence" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, pp. 57-58).

The rise of prison gangs and disorders in Washington State prisons has been attributed to the development of "the drug subculture and civil disobedience—as a result of the Vietnam War, black nationalism, and the civil-rights movement; increasing prison numbers; changes in political power; changes in State corrections systems; and rehabilitative prison reforms . . . Unprecedented latitude was given to the prisoner population . . . organizations occupied physical space that was off-limits to staff" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, pp. 59-60).

When prison officials recognize, legitimize, and collaborate formally with gangs, the result may be a short-term improvement in housekeeping routines but a long-term struggle among staff, administration, and gang leaders for power (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985). As on the street, the gang can serve as a residual source of quasi-control and stability, but with negative consequences for legitimate order and the long-term conventional adaptation of individuals or gang members.

The criminal activities of gangs in prison have a more organized character than on the streets. Money, drugs, and property represent important symbols of the gang’s ability to control and exercise influence. The sense of ganghood is reflected in macho images, tatoos, special attire (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985), official titles, and sometimes even religious symbolism. The activities of
prison gangs include "extortion, intimidation, drugs, gambling, strong-arm robbery and homosexual prostitution . . . Violence has centered around the enforcement of threats, discipline of members, and gang rivalry over turf. Gangs infiltrate strategic assignments; bribe weak officers; and abuse visitation privileges, money and drugs" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 57).

The special problems that confront prison administrators and staff include intimidation of weaker inmates; extortion that results from strong-arming; requests for protective custody; violence associated with gang activity; occasional conflict (usually racial) between gangs that creates disturbance; and contracted inmate-murders (G. Camp and C. Camp 1985, pp.46-55; see also Smith 1987). Discipline problems are far more severe among gang members than nongang members. Jacobs observes that disciplinary tickets were considerably higher for gang members, whether in segregated cells or not. Most depredations of gangs generally are not directed against prison officials but are related to "taking care of gang business" (1977, pp. 138-174).

Intergang conflict has assumed serious proportions not only in State prisons but in local jails where individuals may not yet be sentenced. According to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, "In 1984, CRIPS were responsible for 25 percent of all robberies and 54 percent of all felonious assaults reported in the men's central jail. In just the first 6 months of 1985, the CRIPS and the Bloods were responsible for 40 percent of the robberies and 61 percent of all felony cases there" (1985, p. 7). The situation had become so serious that a special unit of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department gang squad was on duty within the jail as well as on the streets.
PART B: RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM
CHAPTER VII: ORGANIZED RESPONSES TO GANGS

Recent decades have produced four basic strategies for dealing with youth gangs. Each of the strategies has assumed some dominance in different historical periods, and each is related to different assumptions about cause and effect and what to do to reduce and control the gang problem. The strategies, in order of historical sequence, have included (1) local community organization and mobilization; (2) social intervention, including youth outreach or street-gang work; (3) social and economic opportunities provision; (4) gang suppression and incarceration; and (5) organizational change and development. This fifth strategy usually modifies or elaborates the four primary strategies.

The strategies or approaches are usually mixed and implemented through an array of evolving policies, organizational and program arrangements, and services and procedures. Youth agencies, criminal justice agencies, local community organizations and schools, and increasingly city, State, and Federal policies appear to have been the means of development and implementation of these strategies. There has been extremely little systematic evaluation of these approaches. Program research has been carried out mainly in relation to the youth-agency social intervention strategy of the 1950's and 1960's. Almost no evaluation research has taken place on the effectiveness of the law enforcement suppression approach. The following discussion examines the nature of these organized responses to the youth gang problem with special attention to promising policy and program arrangements.

Community organization/mobilization

This early strategy, based on the idea of social disorganization, focused on the rapid population and institutional changes that were regarded as contributing to gang formation at the local community level. Urban ecologists of the 1920s and 1930s observed that great waves of immigration, mainly from Europe, were associated with problems of cultural and social adaptation (Thomas and Znaniecki 1918; Park and Burgess 1921; Shaw and McKay 1943). Family ties were weakened and new community institutions were not strong in the transition to social patterns acceptable to the larger society. Adjustment was particularly difficult for first generation males. Delinquent groups and gangs grew and developed as residual or interstitial socialization structures in the inner-city areas where these populations usually settled (Shaw and McKay 1943; Thrasher 1936). The gangs were products of insufficient supervision or social control by existing institutions, such as the family, church, school, or youth agency.

The organized response to youth gangs prior to World War II involved local community groups taking more responsibility to deal with immediate neighborhood or local community conditions presumed to have influenced the creation of youth gangs and delinquent groups. The Chicago Area Project and its community committees and
later decentralized local welfare councils attempted to bind elements of local citizenry, local organizations, and the criminal justice system into collaborative responses to address the delinquent group problem—probably relatively mild compared to current youth gang problem (Kobrin 1959; Schlossman, Zellman, Shavelson 1984). Emphasis was on community mobilization and coordination of available local resources, with special emphasis on utilizing indigenous leadership, even ex-delinquent group members or ex-convicts. A key idea was to restore a sense of community—to use local leaders to provide support and to stimulate citizen involvement that would directly and indirectly lead to more acceptable youth behavior.

The development of the youth gang problem in the 1940’s and 1950’s brought with it more complex efforts to better coordinate agency and community efforts. Citywide or even statewide special projects evolved. Outreach social services were sponsored by welfare councils or coalitions of agencies as well as youth authorities (Crawford, Malamud, and Dumpson 1970; New York City Youth Board 1960) and probation departments (Klein 1968). Citywide social welfare or youth-service programs were introduced into local communities to deal with gang problems. The earlier base of local white ethnic organization did not exist in the weaker, more recently arrived or expanded black and Hispanic communities in the northern urban centers. Specialized non-community-based organizations were established, and the strategies and interests of various agencies, particularly police and youth agencies, at times clashed or went their separate ways (Spriegel 1969).

The pattern of separate, specialized approaches was intensified in the late 1950’s and throughout the 1960’s with the introduction of private foundation and Federal resources to deal with race, economic, inner-city youth, and delinquency problems. The civil rights movement, the growth of local community-action organizations stimulated by the Office of Economic Opportunity, and established agency and political interests created an increasingly diverse and clashing set of values for addressing social problems. Also, changing labor markets no longer provided easy access to unskilled jobs and opportunities or inducements for youth to leave the gangs. Youth gangs probably grew larger and more complex due to changes in the labor market structure as well as conflicting philosophies, policies, and uncoordinated agency programs in response to the evolving gang problem (Moore 1978; Poston 1971). On occasion, gang members were viewed as local community leaders and involved in programs of urban development and even citizen patrols; more often, they were considered hoodlums and budding racketeers who had to be suppressed and incarcerated. With the development of a broader public welfare set of approaches in the 1960’s, community organization and urban development efforts no longer clearly targeted delinquent or gang youth. Focus shifted to larger problems of housing, education, jobs, and empowerment for the mass of citizens in low income areas, most of whom were not delinquent or gang members.
The strategy of community mobilization to deal with delinquency and youth gang problems did not disappear in the 1970's and the 1980's. It took a variety of forms, increasingly focusing on the interests of the "good" local citizenry against the interests of the "bad" local citizenry, mainly the youth delinquents. Crime prevention and crime control efforts were more and more closely aligned with suppression approaches in an attack on crime (Roehl and Cook 1984; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Attention turned to the control of violence on school grounds—school staffs, parents, and students were mobilized to preserve safety and maintain security (Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1985; Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and Cook 1983).

In its most recent evolution in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the idea of community organization or mobilization indicates the development of coalitions of agencies, schools, criminal justice agencies, community groups, and even former gang members (as workers or mentors) in efforts to deal collectively and consensually with the problem of gangs, especially gang violence and drug trafficking. The idea incorporates notions developed in prior historical periods, including local community agency responsibility, interagency coordination, grassroots citizen participation, community or problem-oriented policing (including law enforcement prevention activities), as well as youth involvement. A recent 1989 initiative of the Office of Human Services, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Federal Register, April 14, 1989), to deal with the problem of juvenile drug gangs illustrates this newer approach.

Social Intervention/Youth Outreach/Street Work

Beginning in the 1940's, a stream of social science theory and empirical findings served as a basis for social agency interest in the 1950's and later in outreach services for deviant youth. The assumption was that lower-class communities, lower-class culture, and deviant youth groups were coherent and functional systems. Certain lower-class communities and youth gangs were not disorganized, but stable, even positive phenomena (Whyte 1943; Kobrin 1951; Miller 1958; Suttles 1968). Gangs were viewed as serving a variety of adaptive needs of lower-class male youth in coping with status frustration, alienation, or social isolation in a middle-class dominated world (A. Cohen 1955). Norms and behavior pertaining to group rivalries, insults, retaliations, colors, signs, symbols, and identification with turf did not, in the 1940's and 1950's, apparently result in as deadly street-gang wars as those currently in certain cities.

The assumption of youth-agency programs was that youth gangs were viable or adaptive and could be redirected to fit in with the expectations and needs of the larger society. Youth gang norms and values could be changed with the aid of outreach supportive services. Counseling and group activities could be used to persuade youth gang members to give up unlawful behavior. The gang itself was to be the vehicle of its own transformation. The small gang or
subgroup was to be the unit of attention of the street worker. The manipulation of gang structure through group meetings, recreation, group counseling, and referral of individual members for services was at the heart of the efforts to co-opt or redirect gang values and behaviors.

Street-gang programs, including outreach efforts, special peer counseling and group development activities, and crisis intervention or mediation, were the means for the transformation of the gang and its member behaviors. A principal assumption was that the gang had positive potential and that only selected negative structural and process elements required modification. Workers who understood group dynamics, were sensitive to the distinctive norms and patterns of gangs, and able to establish positive relationships with aggressive and troubled youth could serve as mediators of youth gangs in conflict with each other and with the conventional world. An important goal was to de-isolate youth; but first youth gangs had to be "reached" and worked with in their own setting and to some extent on their own terms (Spergel 1966).

The youth outreach approach targeted specific gangs and gang youth. It was often not part of other existing youth service programs. Close relationships were established with gang youth and some of the workers were viewed as overly identified with gang members. The police began to argue that youth or street workers served to cohere gangs and contributed indirectly to an increase in gang crime. Klein’s research found that gang crime was reduced when street workers were withdrawn from service to youths on street corners, and when gang members were dispersed (1968). This view was not necessarily shared by other researchers (Gold and Mattick 1974).

Youth-outreach approaches were sharply curtailed, if not abandoned, in the late 1960’s and 1970’s as gang conflict problems seemed to subside in a number of cities, as youth agencies turned their attention to other forms of youth deviancy, such as status offenses, and especially when it became evident that older youth and young adults were now part of gangs that had become criminalized and were not amenable to traditional street-work counseling or recreational strategies. A few programs remained, but social intervention and value transformation gave way to limited social control or mixed social intervention and suppression approaches in the form of city or area-wide crisis network intervention programs in close collaboration with criminal justice agencies.

By the late 1980’s, youth agencies began to target younger youth in efforts to prevent serious gang violence and criminal behavior, especially drug trafficking. Street workers increasingly emphasized mediation of intergang disputes and more frequently attempted to coordinate efforts with law enforcement and probation. Involvement of local citizens and former gang members in these control efforts characterized newer modified youth outreach approaches. The schools slowly became a context for preventive efforts. An implicit or explicit division of responsibility developed with law enforcement taking primary responsibility for dealing with older, hardened core gang members, now increasingly
involved in drug trafficking, and youth agencies responsible for work with at-risk younger youth.

The social intervention strategy has been slowly modified and become increasingly varied in its implementation. The strategy has now been incorporated into a range of social agencies, treatment organizations, criminal justice agencies, schools, and grassroots groups, including churches. The strategy now includes crisis intervention, outreach, diversion, counseling, role modeling, group work, casework, drug prevention and treatment, pre- and post-sentence services, tattoo removal, conflict resolution, intergang mediation, leadership development, referral for services, job training and development, temporary shelter, case management, and attempts at religious conversion.

Opportunities Provision

Concern with the rising rates of delinquency, unemployment, and school failure by inner-city youths in the late 1950's and 1960's led to a series of large-scale resource infusions and efforts to change social institutions, including schools, and establish new types of training institutions directed to inner-city youth. These efforts included, also increased, opportunities for political participation for local citizens and a new relationship between the Federal Government and local neighborhoods in the solution not only of delinquency, but poverty itself. Conventional youth-work strategies based on notions of changing the individual or youth gang were regarded as insufficient. Structural strain, lack of resources, and relative deprivation were the key ideas that explained delinquency, including youth gang behavior. Social and economic institutions, or the lack of sufficient legitimate means rather than the criminal behavior of gangs and individual youth, had to be primarily addressed (Merton 1957; Cloward and Ohlin 1960).

The opportunities provision strategy in the 1960's, however, did not specifically address the youth gang problem. Existing agencies and institutions serving low-income and minority populations were the principal targets of the newer policies and programs supported mainly by Federal initiatives in the late 1960's and early 1970's, often on a city- or statewide basis. The Ford Foundation, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Labor Department, and local foundations stimulated the development of new programs through the schools, neighborhood organizations, special training programs, job projects, business, and industry toward the social and economic advancement of people, including youth, in disadvantaged inner-city and rural areas.

Broad-scale multi-service agency programs were established and directed to alleviating problems of poverty through provision of increased social opportunities or access to them. Distinctions between social intervention and social opportunity strategies and objectives were not clearly made. Grassroots and client groups were involved in the development, but more often in the delivery of
these opportunity-related services. Youth gangs were not often
targeted specifically, but when they were, the programs sometimes
enhanced rather than reduced the development of gang and criminal
behavior (Poston 1971; Spergel 1972).

Nevertheless, delinquents and gang members were sometimes
participants in marches and demonstrations by civil rights and
cultural movement organizations to increase opportunities in the
black and Hispanic communities. It was not clear, however, that
these social movements or reform social policies substantially
benefitted or served the social development interests of delin-
quents or gang members. On the other hand, there is evidence that
programs such as Head Start and Job Corps were generally
successful, at least over the short term, in the socialization,
avademic development, and retraining of inner-city minority young
people, and even in reducing delinquency. We are less clear how
well these programs targeted actual or potential gang members.

There is some evidence that the idea of opportunities
provision has narrowed in recent years. A variety of services are
still viewed as a way of providing access to opportunities, but
counseling and various personal development activities per se are
not in fact equivalent to basic social opportunities for youth.
Focus now appears to be more sharply on the idea that opportunities
must directly contribute to improved social status and personal
achievement. Therefore, jobs, job preparation, job placement, job
development, and various training, educational, remedial, tutoring,
apprenticeship and competency building activities are more directly
regarded as opportunities. Moreover, social opportunities are
increased primarily by societal reallocation of resources rather
than through organizational changes or community reorganization.

Gang Suppression

A philosophy of major institutional change was replaced by
growing conservatism. With the decline of community and youth-
outreach efforts, the inability or insufficiency of opportunity
provision approaches to target or modify gang structures, and
increased criminalization of gangs in the late 1970's and 1980's,
commmunity alarm stimulated the development of a dominant police
suppression approach. The gang was increasingly viewed as dangerous
and evil, a collecting place for sociopaths who were beyond the
reach of most community-based institutions to influence or
rehabilitate. Vigorous law enforcement to protect the community
became a key goal. Gang members were to be arrested, prosecuted,
and removed from society for long prison sentences.

Police and prosecutors came to play the primary response
roles. Information systems, surveillance, and tactical patrols by
specialized police units were developed. Hard-core gang member
prosecution, intensive supervision and vertical case management by
probation departments were the new organizational mechanisms
established to meet the gang threat. State legislation was passed
to enhance sentences for participants in serious gang incidents.
Interagency task forces evolved and increasingly targeted older,
hard-core youth, particularly to assist law enforcement with intelligence gathering and support for large-scale sweeps and arrests. The schools and youth agencies also directed services to so called "at-risk" younger youth, often with the involvement of law enforcement and probation officials.

The suppression strategy has been associated not only with more arrests, convictions, and longer stays in prison for gang members, but with continued growth and spread of gangs within and across many cities. The suppression strategy has at times been associated with a decline of traditional gang-related criminal activity, but it has also been associated with a rise in gang member-related drug trafficking. A massive influx and concentration of gang-youths in prison has created problems of custody, and increased organization and criminalization of gang youths in some States. The strategy of suppression, in itself, like youth outreach, local community coordination/mobilization, or opportunities provision, has not proved sufficient to reduce the gang problem and return "control of the streets" to local citizens. At the close of the 1980's, many localities, States, and the Federal Government were seeking effective ways to deal with an increasingly complex and intractable youth gang problem.

Organizational Change and Development

Focus on general or abstract strategies may overlook the variability and complexity of individual agency or local community responses to the gang problem. Strategies and programs of specific community-based social agencies, criminal justice organizations, school, grassroots groups, and State and Federal agencies are often mixed, change over time, and may have distinctive characteristics. Some of these responses may have been more successful than others in a given time and place. Elements of actual programs, such as specific patterns, procedures, objectives, and organizational arrangements, need to be carefully described and analyzed to better understand traditional and evolving policy and program models.

Often organizational values have tended to emphasize narrowly focused program interests. Agency policy has been based often on separate and unrelated program goals, such as family preservation, community protection, youth development, as well as safeguarding existing institutional boundaries and organizational interests. Professional methodologies and bureaucratic procedures have contributed to limited or segmented perspectives and programs. Formulations for dealing with gangs have not depended on careful assessment and comprehensive data collection, nor analysis and the development of complex, interrelated approaches to the problem. The existence of a youth gang problem has been denied, distorted in its character and scope, and even used as a basis for protecting or augmenting unrelated program objectives.

Presently evolving policies and programs may be viewed as more comprehensive and community-based and with a firmer foundation in gang research. They may emphasize the integration of suppression, social intervention, opportunities provision, and community
development strategies. The gang is now more clearly recognized as a residual institution that develops when family, school, and job market do not function satisfactorily. Evolving policies and programs assume that institutions such as schools, law enforcement, and social services must adopt new social support and control functions, while greater efforts are made to strengthen families and family values and to provide jobs for at-risk youths.

The notions of conventional and evolving strategies, policies, and programs may be useful as frames of reference to examine and evaluate what organizations have done and what they may do in the future to more effectively deal with the gang problem. Although particular organizations within law enforcement, probation, corrections, youth work, local community organizations, schools, or government may be identified with either a traditional or evolving model for dealing with the youth gang problem, the models in reality are distinctive, rather than each being categorically different. Although we propose that an evolving comprehensive and community-based model is preferred for future policy and program development, it must also be sensitive to the interests and needs of a particular agency or community in specific time and place and respectful of the critical role for the family in socializing youth. The best we can do in the analyses that follow is to emphasize the findings of policies and programs that have been tested to some extent in the past, and propose promising approaches for the future, based on theoretical and experiential criteria.
CHAPTER VIII: SOCIAL INTERVENTION

The social intervention strategy, specifically street-gang work, has probably been subjected to more evaluation than any other approach to date. Klein (1971) has described and analyzed conventional youth-work programs. He attributes their continuing failure to a variety of program defects, including confusion over goal priorities. Program designs usually are not clear as to whether the central goal is control of gang fighting, treatment of individual problems, providing access to opportunities, altering basic values, or prevention of delinquency (see also Spergel 1966). Gang programs tend to be process-oriented, atheoretical or "blandly eclectic," producing "inconsistency, random or uncoordinated programming and uncertainty" (Klein 1971, p. 53), making it difficult to determine what approach has been employed and indeed what constitutes success. Agencies and their workers seem to find value in activities for their moral imperatives and fiscal accounting purposes—with little or no relation to delinquency, gang control, or prevention (Klein 1971, p. 53). This state of inadequate and disorganized program intervention has produced "extreme flexibility with respect to client targets, intervention techniques, and theoretical" positions (Klein 1971, p. 150); extreme reliance on generalized counseling techniques and group programming with emphasis on club meetings, sports, dances, and camping trips. Klein observes that the continued use of these approaches that consist mainly of value transformation, attitude change, and worker-client identification—despite repeated evaluations "which prove them worthless—is enigmatic and suggests that a major function of control and prevention programs continues to be to sustain rather than to solve the problems" (1971, p. 150).

Others have asserted the positive value of street-work approaches, generally without supporting data. For example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) referred to two "successful" street-work projects—the New York City Youth Board Project and the Roxbury Project in Massachusetts: "The advent of the street-gang worker symbolized the end of social rejection and the beginning of social accommodation" (Cloward and Ohlin 1960, p. 176). They also observed that "a successful street-gang program . . . is one in which detached workers can create channels to legitimate opportunity; where such channels cannot be opened up, the gang will temporize with violence only as long as a street worker maintains liaison with them" (1960, p. 177). In fact, the New York City Youth Board Project—the largest in the country, which endured for at least a dozen years—was never evaluated. Despite initial claims for the Roxbury Project's success, Miller (1962) concluded in his full assessment that delinquency was not reduced.

Short and Strodtbeck, observing the work of YMCA-detached workers, speculated that the presence of workers "makes less frequent the need for status-maintaining aggression by [gang] leaders . . . the gang also recognizes its obligation to the worker as a quid pro quo for services performed by the worker and the
additional status within the gang world that accrues to a gang by virtue of their having a worker" (1965, p. 197). They do not provide any data to support these claims. Later—with some contradiction—they note, "Whatever the effectiveness of the detached worker . . . it seems to arise from his monitoring of the flow of events, rather than his effectiveness in changing personality or values of gang boys" (1965, p. 270). The quid-pro-quo notion (in terms of the idea of the "tightness" of the worker/youth gang member relationship) was tested a few years later with negative results (Gold and Mattick 1974).

The Roxbury street-work project, begun in the late 1950's and early 1960's, included a comprehensive set of intervention components: community organization, family casework, detached work with gangs, organized group work, recreation, and job referral. An evaluation, using comparison groups and a variety of data sources, indicated no reduction in immoral, law-violating behavior or in court appearances; the project's impact was determined to be negligible (Miller 1962).

The Chicago Youth Development Project of the Chicago Boys' Club, conducted between 1960 and 1966, was based on the same assumptions as the New York City Youth Board (1960), Roxbury street-work (Miller 1962), and Chicago YMCA-detached worker (Short and Strodbeck 1965) projects. The Chicago Youth Development project emphasized "aggressive street work and community organization" (Gold and Mattick 1974, p. 257) and worked with groups rather than with individuals. Results indicated that the target areas continued to account for "more than" or "at least their share" of delinquency (Gold and Mattick 1974, p. 257) and failed to support a key expectation that an intensive (or "tight") worker-youth relationship was positively related to effective outcome. Rather, those youths who said they were closest to their workers were most often in trouble with the police (Gold and Mattick 1974, p. 189). It was concluded that recreational programs accomplish little.

One bright spot of the project was that it seemed to raise youths' educational aspirations significantly; there was measurable reduction in delinquency among those who were helped with their school adjustment (Gold and Mattick 1974, pp. 205, 265). Overall, however, the evaluators had a negative and pessimistic view:

Despite the successful efforts of the staff in finding jobs, returning school dropouts, and intervening in formal legal processes, the youth unemployment rate remained at about the same level. The school drop-out rate increased slightly and the arrests of youngsters in the CYDP areas increased over time, with a lesser proportion of them being disposed of as station adjustments . . . . On balance, and in the final analysis, the 'experimental' population resident in the action areas of the CYDP seemed to be slightly worse off than the 'control' population resident in a similar area.
selected for comparative purposes" (Gold and Mattick 1974, pp. 296-97).

Yablonsky's (1962) project in the Morningside Heights area of New York City was established at about the same time to control delinquency and gang activities; it was never formally evaluated. But Yablonsky's observations are consistent with the findings of the analysts of other projects: "to direct the gang's energies into constructive channels such as baseball did not seem necessarily to change the Balkans and their patterns . . . working with them . . . to play baseball resulted mainly in bringing some additional 'baseball players' into the gang" (1962, p. 53).

The Wincroft Youth Project in the United Kingdom also used an outreach approach; a variety of group and casework services were supplied by a large volunteer staff (Smith, Farrant, and Marchant 1972). While there was no overall reduction in delinquency rates, the younger youths (aged 14 years and under) with low maladjustment scores who had never been convicted before appeared to fare the best—possibly contrary to findings of some other projects (Smith, Farrant, and Marchant 1972).

The Los Angeles Group Guidance Project, a four-year detached-worker effort under the auspices of the Los Angeles County Probation Department between 1961 and 1965, was similar to the Roxbury Project and emphasized group programming, including use of parent clubs. A "transformational approach"—that is, change of gang-member values, attitudes, and perceptions through counseling and group activities—was the key strategy. Klein concluded that the "project was clearly associated with a significant increase in delinquency among gang members" (1968, pp. 291-92). The gangs served most intensively did the worst and the delinquency increase was greatest at the lower age levels. He attributed much of the rise in delinquency to an increase in programming, especially group activities that may have increased gang cohesion and commitment (especially in younger youths) to delinquent patterns (Klein 1968).

Klein (1971) conducted a followup project to test the idea that reducing gang cohesion by reducing group programming and providing alternative individualized services would reduce delinquency. The project lasted 18 months with a six-month followup period. Klein found that the overall amount of gang delinquency was reduced, but the delinquency rate of individual gang members remained unchanged. The size of the gang was reduced by completely stopping the entry of new members. Group cohesion was partially reduced. Klein viewed his project as promising, but concluded that cohesion reduction was not sufficiently achieved—and, therefore, the hypothesis was not adequately tested (1971, pp. 301-307).

Other analysts have endorsed the strategy of attacking gang cohesion as a means to control and prevent gang delinquency. Yablonsky, for example, notes that sometimes the street worker can unintentionally provide services that give "a formerly amorphous collectivity structure and purpose," thereby increasing cohesion and delinquency (1962, p. 290). Lo, a Hong Kong social worker and researcher, recently suggested that gang subgroups should be kept
apart and worked with as independent systems, especially avoiding communication and cooperation between younger and older members (1986). "Some older gangsters . . . likely to grow out of delinquency" should be "accelerated" out of the gang and "fringe gangsters, isolated members, scapegoats, outcasts, and new members weaned away" (Lo 1986, pp. 94-97).

Group-work and value-transformation approaches have persisted nevertheless. The California Youth Authority mounted a three-year gang-violence reduction project in the late 1970's which was evaluated through 1981, and again for a three-year followup period from 1982 to 1984 (Torres 1985). The project negotiated antagonisms between gangs to resolve feuds, provided positive group activities—particularly sports and recreation, and employed gang consultants who were generally influential members of the gangs (Torres 1980). More recently, emphasis has shifted to preventing youngsters from joining gangs and promoting their involvement in community improvement activities (Torres 1985, p. 1).

The reported results from the California Youth Authority project have been positive, but ambiguous and controversial. Claimed reductions in gang homicides, for example, may result from a decision to exclude offenders and victims whose gang affiliations were unclear from the analysis (Torres 1985, p. 8). There is also some dispute over whether incidents of gang violence began to decline prior to the start of the project. The use of violent gang-leaders as workers in the project and the nature of their performance have been continuing sources of controversy (Bernstein 1980).

The most extreme case of using the gang structure itself to prevent and control gang crime—particularly violence—was the Youth Manpower Project of the Woodlawn Organization in Chicago. The project employed a considerably modified social intervention approach and limited social opportunity strategy and was conducted for one year from 1967 to 1968.

This highly controversial million-dollar project was conceived by the Community Action Program of the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity and was developed by The Woodlawn Organization, a militant grassroots organization in conflict with Mayor Daley's office. Its goals were manpower development—including job training and job referral, reduction of gang violence, and reduction of the risk of riots. The project was staffed, in part, by leaders of two major gangs: the East Side Disciples and the Blackstone Rangers. Each gang was to control and staff two training centers. The professional supervising staff of four was too small to deal with both a gang staff of approximately 30 young adults and 600 program participant youths, 16 to 19 years old and older. The implicit objective (or possible assumption) of change of criminal values did not occur or was not present.

The project stirred great community and political controversy. The police, local and national legislators, community agencies, and the newsmedia took sides in praising or condemning the project. Finally, the program was shut down, because the Office of Economic Opportunity refused to provide funding for a second year. Key
leaders of one of the gangs were charged and successfully prosecuted for fraud by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The available aggregate outcome data indicated that there was an overall decline in crime in the community during the project period, but a rise in aggravated battery and gang homicides. There was no evidence of abatement of gang conflict or success in job training or placement (Spergel et al. 1969; Spergel 1972). The two gangs served by the project have survived and continue to thrive 20 years later—participating in more violent, criminal, and notorious behavior than ever.

Gang-staffed community development projects in the late 1960's and early 1970's were part of a national grassroots movement. Especially noteworthy were programs established in New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Gang leaders or ex-convicts with gang backgrounds were involved in social agency programs, manpower development, housing rehabilitation, and even community planning and economic development. In these projects, conventional youth-work programming shifted in focus from juveniles to older adolescents and young adults. They also attempted to develop a national association of youth gang organizations called Youth Organizations United (Poston 1971). No systematic evaluation or comparative analysis of these programs exists. A variety of anecdotal reports indicate that they all eventually foundered. The programs were not conceptually well-developed; they were poorly administered, and malfeasance occurred (Poston 1971). Kahn and Zinn report that ex-convict gang members even took over some of the programs. "Gangs, especially Mexican Mafia, have infiltrated drug treatment and other social programs, [and] committed bank robberies in Los Angeles, starting in the early 1970's" (1978, pp. 59-63).

G. Camp and C. Camp (1985) describe a 1976 government-funded project that relied heavily on gang structure to carry out a service and community development program. A key objective was to help ex-convicts, mainly gang members "to readjust to living in society" (1985, p. 98). Funds apparently were misappropriated for vehicles used in gang homicides and in the purchase of heroin before the project was finally investigated and shut down.

Interest and faith in generalized outreach and social services for gang youth did not die easily. Just prior to the prototype Crisis Intervention Network program in Philadelphia, a series of outreach social service efforts was attempted in that city. Youths—many of them from gangs—were recruited from the streets and enrolled in or referred to counseling, educational, and employment programs. The premise of one of these programs in Philadelphia was that adequate delivery of services would be sufficient to curtail violent gang disruption by providing alternative incentives and activities (Royster 1974). Evaluators concluded, however, that such highly individualized service referral programs were not effective. Rates of gang homicides rose. Services to youth did not improve. The failure of the program was attributed to "poor management techniques, lack of visibility in the community, [and] lack of ability on the part of workers to deliver services" (Royster 1974, pp. 4-17).
Unique to the Crisis Intervention Network, as it evolved in Philadelphia, was the integration of a probation unit into the street-work program to provide control and supervision of older influential gang members. A suppression or surveillance strategy was now integrated into a social intervention or youth-outreach approach. Street workers and probation officers cooperated in this landmark approach. A variety of mothers’ groups and grassroots organizations were also closely involved in crisis intervention, mediation, and community education activities. While a formal evaluation was not conducted, police data suggest a substantial reduction in gang incidents and especially gang homicides between 1974 and the 1980’s (Needle and Stapleton 1983, p. 81). Some questions remain, however, about whether the decline may have begun prior to the initiation of the program and the adequacy of gang-incident reporting by the Philadelphia police since 1973 and 1974 has been questioned. A significant decline of the gang problem in Philadelphia was also apparently correlated with other community organization activities.

A unique program in Philadelphia coexisting with the Crisis Intervention Network was the House of UMOJA (a "Swahili" word for "unity"), a resident and nonresident program for gang and other delinquent youth that created "a sanctuary, a sheltered environment" (Fattah 1987, p. 4). The program required adherence to strict house rules and a signed contract. Individual counseling and assistance with educational development, job development, and personal problems were provided to each youth. The program was comprehensive and addressed health and recreational needs. It was based on the assumption of the importance of the interrelated notions of "the extended family" and a "modern adaptation of African culture" (Fattah 1987, p. 38).

Earlier, the House of UMOJA had been successful in its employment of a gang-mediation or gang-summit strategy, particularly as it mobilized and involved all sectors of the community. "UMOJA... called for a summit meeting on gang matters... 75 percent of the gangs responded. Over 500 members... were in attendance, along with social workers, ministers, police, teachers, and other interested persons. The meeting produced a 60-day truce in which no one died from gang warfare" (Fattah 1987, p. 39). Organizers solicited the support of gang members in prisons throughout the entire State before the summit was called. A "No gang war" poster became the symbol of a city-wide campaign in which State and city authorities and businesses participated. Continued peace meetings were held in schools, police stations, and campsites throughout the year 1974. Young people apparently responded massively and positively (Fattah 1988, p. 9).

While these anecdotal and newsmedia reports indicate a high degree of success in this comprehensive program, no systematic evaluation of UMOJA was available as of 1988. A replication, however, was planned in Wilmington, Delaware, through the Juvenile Education Awareness Program. UMOJA was also operating a similar program in Portland, Oregon as of 1991.
Gang summits or mediation meetings continue to be tried on a more limited basis in a variety of contexts with mixed results. Sometimes they appear to succeed for a brief period. One knowledgeable law-enforcement gang expert states, "From time to time, these 'accords' have averted intergang turmoil, but there hasn't been a peace treaty to date that can prohibit the disorder that breaks out when a gang leader summons his 'boys' to retaliate against any foe who offends him, or dishonors the gang" (Collins 1979, p. 64). Furthermore, many gang analysts and practitioners subscribe to Haskell and Yablonsky's statement that "violent gangs should not be treated by any official community program as a 'legitimate' societal structure" (1982, p. 457). Giving credence to an illegitimate structure feeds gang-leader megalomania and legitimizes the possibility of further violence.

Whether the activities of the Crisis Intervention Network, the efforts of other community organizations or agencies, special police task forces, or indeed, the availability of alternative criminal opportunities such as drug trafficking were primarily responsible for the reduction in gang violence in Philadelphia remains unclear. A major decline in gang activity occurred in New York City at about the same time it did in Philadelphia without benefit of special crisis intervention programs or community efforts.

Support for a mixed social-intervention or crisis-intervention approach, with strong deterrent and community-involvement characteristics, however, was also obtained from a recent brief nine-month field experiment in Humboldt Park, an extremely violent gang-ridden community of Chicago. Ecological and individual-level analyses indicated that the program exercised significant control over violent gang activity in comparison with three other similar parts of the city, but had little effect on nongang crime. The effectiveness of the program appeared more evident for juveniles than young adults (Spergel 1986). Other contemporary crisis-intervention programs in Los Angeles and Chicago apparently have not fared as well as the early Philadelphia Program, possibly because they deemphasized or even replaced the combined community-involvement and crisis-intervention strategy with a generalized social-services gang prevention, value transformation, or group work model (see Klein and Maxson 1987). A more recent emphasis on local-community citizen-involvement seems to be occurring in the Los Angeles Crisis Intervention project, California Youth Group Services (CYGS) with some apparently positive results.

A recent street-work program in San Diego that emphasized counseling, job referral, acceptance, and work through existing gang structures was not clearly successful. Gang-related felonies decreased by 39 percent in the target area over two one-year periods, but such crimes were also reduced by 38 percent in the control area during the same periods. Furthermore, it should be noted that while the street-work program was in operation, the probation department and the district attorney's office were also concentrating on gang crime. It is not known what the separate effects of the detached-worker program were in comparison to the
effects of law enforcement. The gang problem appeared to abate in San Diego in the early 1980's (Pennell 1983), but the gang and drug problem grew more serious again in the middle and late 1980's, and stronger deterrent approaches are now being implemented in this city.

With increased concern about youth gang problems in many parts of the country, there remains a strong focus on group and individual counseling with younger youth, coupled with stronger deterrent emphasis by law enforcement, probation, and parole agencies in dealing with older youths. These differential approaches may reflect a traditional division of labor in which community-based youth service agencies serve younger, peripheral gang youths while established control agencies focus on older, core gang members. This duality is apparent in the current strategies of the Los Angeles and especially the Chicago crisis-intervention programs. The effectiveness of such a division of labor in the face of an organic social problem that involves older and younger youth in interactive, if not interdependent, relationships, remains to be demonstrated.

Gottfredson (1987) recently reviewed the results of a series of experiments on peer group or peer counseling approaches in schools and community agencies. He concluded that they lend "no support to any claim of benefit of treatment, with the possible exception that the treatment may enhance internal control for elementary school students. For the high school student, the effects appear predominantly harmful" (1987, p. 710). Furthermore, he suggested that "it may be useful to avoid delinquent peer-interaction entirely rather than to attempt to modify its nature" (Gottfredson 1987, p. 710). Community-based peer-group experiences seem to be somewhat successful when small group activities integrate a limited number of delinquent or predelinquent youth into small groups that are dominated by conventional youth and guided by conventional youth leaders (Feldman, Caplinger, and Wodarski 1983).

Individual counseling approaches with gang youths, where evaluated, have also produced poor results. The individual gang member seems to be more strongly influenced by gang norms and gang pressures in what he does, rather than in what he says he will do or promises to do during individual counseling sessions (Short and Strodbeck 1965). Caplan reported that "over time, individual subjects repeatedly demonstrate a tendency to nearly succeed in adopting final change behaviors advocated by the treatment plan... remotivation remains a major hurdle to overcome in reorienting the activities of urban [gang] youth" (1968, pp. 84-85).

In sum, social intervention programs—whether agency-based, outreach or street-work, or crisis intervention programs—continue to emphasize conventional approaches that show little effect or even may worsen the youth gang problem. They seem to be slightly more effective and produce some positive results when they are designed as part of a comprehensive or mixed approach. Multiple-agency service approaches—including value-transformation, deterrent, or supervisory as well as opportunity provision
strategies, which are closely integrated with local citizen involvement and targeted at younger gang youth—may be promising.
CHAPTER IX: CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Typically, a review of this topic often describes rather than analyzes the nature and influence of a variety of suppression and alternate justice-system strategies and programs for dealing with the youth gang problem. Very little research or evaluation has been conducted on the specific nature and effectiveness of these various policies and programs. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the dominant approach for addressing the youth gang problem has shifted from social intervention to suppression, although there is currently a growing awareness by seasoned officials that the recent tradition of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration may be insufficient. Other approaches, usually not clearly defined, may also be required.

Justice units are relatively more interdependent than other systems that deal with gang youth, and it is difficult to address them separately because they respond to and sometimes shape the gang problem. Nevertheless, the police require primary attention because they are usually first on the scene of a gang incident and the key definers of the nature and scope of the gang problem for the justice system and the community. The police report data about gang involvement, usually orienting other units of the justice system to the problem—and expecting certain behaviors from them. The police directly determine community and justice system perceptions and often legislative responses to the gang problem.
Police approaches are surprisingly complex, variable, and not easily categorized because they may represent certain emphases or central tendencies in a given city or state at a particular time. Furthermore, certain assumptions, strategies, and tactics characterize traditional and evolving approaches. Specialized or clearly articulated strategies have begun to be developed in certain police departments in recent years, but there is still little systematic description and analysis of law-enforcement strategies for youth gangs. (However, see Needle and Stapleton 1983; Collins 1979; Jackson and McBride 1985). No research evaluations of police antigang programs exist as they do in the youth-work field, particularly in respect to outreach or street-work programs and social intervention strategies. At this time, therefore, any analysis of criminal justice systems—especially of police or law-enforcement programs—must be largely descriptive and tentative.

A law enforcement suppression strategy specifically directed against youth gang crime has been developing mainly since the 1960’s. It has become increasingly sophisticated, resulting in more arrests and case clearances. The approach until about 1990 has been based on a "war model" in most cities, especially in California, requiring use of special equipment and procedures, such as: battering rams, helicopters, task forces, sweeps, sophisticated intelligence, tracking systems, and specialist training. At the same time, where the technology of "the war against gangs" is most advanced, the scope and severity of the problem often have increased; some critics believe that there is a causal relationship between these two developments:

In 1963, when Gang Control [of Philadelphia] was able to monitor 27 violent gangs, there were 4 gang homicides. Repeated violence mainly took the form of rumbles, of which there were 46. There were only 13 shootings . . . By the 1970’s, all 105 [gangs] were being watched . . . The number of shootings rose drastically and the number of rumbles plummeted. In 1973, there were 43 gang deaths, 159 shootings, and only 7 rumbles. A gang shooting is fast, low-visibility violence. It requires one gunman and a moment under cover of night . . . (Lieber 1975, p. 47).

The correlation between traditional police strategy, increased police organization, and their use of sophisticated technology and weaponry; and the rise in rates of gang violence is probably spurious. It is not uncommon to blame—directly or indirectly—a worsening gang problem on law enforcement. For example, the rise of gang crime in Chicago in the late 1960’s was attributed, by some, to the activities of the newly formed Gang Intelligence Unit of the Chicago Police Department (Sherman 1970). Gold and Mattick claimed that, because of media publicity generated by the Gang Intelligence
Unit, the Blackstone Rangers' gang name became widely known to many street groups of Chicago's black neighborhoods. Furthermore, the Chicago Police Department (and more recently Federal law-enforcement authorities) have made periodic claims to the destruction of this gang, since the late 1960's (Gold and Mattick 1974, pp. 335-36).

These claims appear to have limited or temporary foundation in fact. The Blackstone Rangers and their successor organizations, the Blackstone Ranger Nation and the El Rukns, have survived, developed in jail, and continue today to be one of the significant black gangs in Chicago. On the other hand, the police—whether a gang unit or some other unit—cannot be held responsible for the rise and development of gang organization. The police cannot be held responsible for the failures of socialization, social and economic development by families, schools, neighborhoods, employment, and for the systematic racism and social isolation which appear to be highly correlated with, if not causative of, the gang problem.

The police and the media are sometimes responsible for a deviancy-amplification process. Stanley Cohen observes that the gang problem in England seemed to worsen when the police and media began to view certain street groups as "warring gangs." The police "tightened social control efforts" and expanded the definition of delinquency; the increased publicity and tension "prepared [the youths] more for potential conflict, for example, by carrying weapons. Such actions increased potential for serious violence" (quoted in Morash 1983, p. 328). The media (newspapers, television, the record industry, and most significantly the movies in their portrayal of gang incidents based largely on police reports) have been responsible for the spread of gang phenomena (e.g., emerging and middle-class "copy-cat gangs"). We do not consider the police or the media responsible for, but rather interactively facilitative of the problem at times.

Police, along with delinquents or criminals, occupy the same no man's land that respectable society refuses to see or do much about. The police have been known to refer to themselves facetiously as "gangs." Furthermore, there is an old urban tradition of police taunting and attacking gangs, and vice versa (Asbury 1971). Our own recent field observations indicate that police may cross out or mar rather than expunge gang graffiti and sometimes trigger a turf battle. They may deliberately release gang youths in opposing gang territory to see what happens. Occasionally, a supervisory police officer will admit that his men commit such provocative actions, but also imply efforts to control such behavior:

We have problems like police officers acting like another gang . . . Cops were snatching hats, urinating in them, stealing jackets . . . a clubhouse was burned down . . . shortly after two police officers left the building (Reported by Sergeant Hargrove, New York City Police Department in Woodson 1981, p. 89).
The frequency of these police provocations and the seriousness of their consequences are unknown. On the other hand, there is ample evidence of effective intervention by well-trained police officers in the prevention and breakup of specific gang situations and the solving of gang crimes. In fact, there is an extremely high rate of clearances of serious gang cases—as high as 90 percent—especially in cases involving homicide in Chicago and Los Angeles. Violent gang crimes tend to be very visible public-street displays, with offenders often flaunting colors or gang paraphernalia and, at times, shouting their own gang slogans. Witnesses are often present and the offenders are not difficult to identify.

The key issue, however, is that the ideology of traditional, "hard-nosed" police suppression is often developed without reference to the value of other strategies. "Soft," "preventive," or community problem-solving strategies are downgraded or ignored. The police approach is also often expressed in both moralistic and organizational-interest terms; for example, through an attack on sociological or juvenile-court rehabilitative models.

There is no reason any citizen . . . [should] be literally held hostage in his home by fear, afraid to walk his neighborhood. The solution is simply to take the streets back from the young thugs. As they make war on the citizens, we must virtually make war on them. We have waited on the great enlightened solutions from the sociological world and they have failed to materialize. It is now time to take control of our streets and place the blame squarely where it has always belonged—on the gang member and on his parents for allowing him to be what he has become—a street hoodlum (Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Testimony 1985, p. 6).

Another major problem with the juvenile system response to the gang member who engages in narcotic offenses is due to the parens patria reason in the juvenile court . . . These offenders . . . have learned how to manipulate the system and avoid proper consequences for their actions . . . Law enforcement continually expresses frustration when an arrested juvenile drug offender is almost immediately released back into the community pending adjudication (Davidson 1987, p. 6).

In the hard-nosed deterrent approach, police have blamed the social reform movement of the 1970’s for current problems that result in lack of adequate attention to "gangbangers." According to the police, the problem began with the deinstitutionalization of status offenders or runaways. The courts were "prohibited . . . from taking action against juvenile status offenders . . . These laws . . . caused us to abandon those children who need intervention . . . " (Commander Lorne Kramer in Mckinney 1988, p. 3). Our own research on status offenders, however, reveals that only about 2 percent of status offenders who
came to the attention of the Chicago Police Department in fact have histories as gang offenders (Spergel and Hartnett 1990).

In the traditional suppression approach, law enforcement represents itself as an organization of courageous individuals doing personal battle against the "bad guys" who should get their just desserts (Pillsbury 1988). If the gang cannot be wiped out or destroyed, it must be at least neutralized, made illegal, or swept up and placed behind bars, out of sight. Furthermore, a policy of extreme suppression may emanate from legislative mandate. The police may be required to increase "the number of individuals identified as gang members and the number arrested for violent gang-related crimes [and] improve the clearance rate of reported crimes targeted as gang-related" (Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, pp. 10-11). The police in California tend to operate under a broad inclusive definition of gang member and gang incident. Law enforcement agencies may come to be not only more specialized and centralized, but suppressive as well.

Needle and Stapleton have identified three specialized police forms that deal with the gang problem: the Youth Service Program, the Gang Detail, and the Gang Unit. These different organizational arrangements are, in part, a function of differences in the perceived scope and seriousness of the gang problem, department size, and available resources. In the Youth Service, juvenile division, or community-relations form, personnel usually are not assigned gang-control responsibilities on a full-time basis, but retain other duties. In the Gang Detail, one or more officers are assigned responsibility to deal exclusively with gang control. In the Gang Unit, a separate and elite structure may be developed to deal solely with gang problems. Sometimes both gang and narcotics-control functions are assigned to the same specialized unit. In a few of the large cities, specialized gang-units may encompass comprehensive intelligence, investigation, enforcement, prevention, community relations, followup, and liaison responsibilities (Needle and Stapleton 1983, pp. 19ff). More recently in the Los Angeles police department, the narcotics unit was assigned responsibility for dealing with gang-related drug crimes.

The various types of organization may comprise anywhere from 1 to 400 or more personnel. The gang unit may be centralized in one location, or decentralized in several—assigned as part of local-precinct or district operations. The units do not evolve necessarily from less to more specialized structures. Nor do the very large cities have necessarily the most specialized, centralized, or largest gang units. Currently, the New York City and Philadelphia police departments do not consider the youth gang problem to be generally a large or serious one. Only two officers until recently were assigned full-time responsibility in the juvenile division in the New York City Police Department, and youth officers in the various city precincts deal part-time with the problem. Approximately eight officers in 1988, assigned to the Preventive Patrol Unit in the Philadelphia Police Department, have responsibility for gang youth as well as runaways, sexually abused children, and other special youth problems. On the other hand, the
Los Angeles Police and Sheriff's Department have specialized gang units each with about 200 gang unit officers each. Chicago's Gang Unit in 1991 contained over 400 specialized police gang officers, carrying out a variety of functions.

The conventional police suppression strategy is clear and simple. It is to quickly and effectively arrest, investigate, track, and assist in the prosecution and sentencing of gang members, especially hard-core members or leaders, and to keep them in jail as long as possible. The strategy is achieved through such tactics as surveillance, stakeout, aggressive patrol and enforcement, followup investigation, the development of extensive intelligence, and infiltration of gangs or contexts in which gangs are found—such as schools (Davidson 1987, p. 1). Close coordination, exchange of information, development of information systems, and education of prosecutors, judges, probation, parole, and corrections officers are also key elements of this strategy. Gangs are to be broken up and harassed. Periodically, saturation patrol and sweeps are employed. Often, it is the aim of the police to acquire increased firepower, so that they can deal with "drug gangs" armed with sophisticated weapons and vehicles.

A recent concern has been the lack of sufficient coordination among law-enforcement or supervisory units, especially in relation to drug trafficking. This has lead to innovative interorganizational arrangements with State and Federal law-enforcement units to improve crime-analysis, surveillance, communication, investigation, and other techniques to monitor gang drug-trafficking. In certain communities, however, a variety of impediments such as language barriers and distrust of law enforcement reduce the value of investigative tools and technology (e.g., wiretaps, informants, undercover operatives) (General Accounting Office 1989).

Increasing amounts of information are needed to discover who is a gang member and what criminal activities are carried out or being planned by the gang. In consequence, extensive departmental and interagency computer information and gang tracking systems have been developed or are planned in certain counties and States. Increases in arrests and long-term reduction of gang-related crime are expected to be the payoffs of these information systems (Guccione 1987). Many computerized gang files, however, are outdated or contain erroneous information (Burrell 1990). Consequently, one recommendation has been that information on alleged gang members about alleged crimes be made available to the youth or guardian (under appropriate circumstances), so that it can be challenged and, if appropriate, deleted. Occasionally, gossip about gang affiliation which had been kept previously in the police officer's head or in personal files, has been incorporated indiscriminately into a computer data base (Guccione 1987).

There appears to be increased attention to expunging files of persons listed as gang members 3 to 5 years after the last listing, if no repeat arrest takes place. The time period varies with police jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, informal files of these originally listed members are still kept. Moreover, the expunging
of the names of gang members in prosecution and probation files after a particular time appears even less likely to occur, making it extremely difficult to de-label gang members or former gang members.

Also, because information from these data systems is not purged frequently, an artificial aging of active or inactive gang members occurs which can lead to erroneous conclusions about the disproportionate number of adults involved in gang crime. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that improved data systems and coordination of information across different justice-system agencies will lead to more gang members being removed from the streets, more rapidly prosecuted, and put into prisons. For example:

Law-enforcement officers with information that the drunk suspect is on probation will generally be able to arrest the suspect . . . All of a sudden, a simple drunkenness arrest can land a suspect in State prison rather than an early-morning release on bail . . . Probation violations are also easier to prosecute . . . there is no trial and the prosecutors don’t have to prove the suspect is guilty within a reasonable doubt unless he is charged with a separate crime . . . the procedure is cost-effective . . . and by breaking up a group of drunken gang members with probation violation arrests, the law-enforcement officer often stops potential crimes . . . [since] . . . most gang-related crime sprees begin with an innocent gathering of members (McBride 1988).

One defense attorney observes, however, that there may be constitutional impediments to such suppression and tactics if the primary basis for stopping or arresting an individual or group of individuals is their identification as gang members or associating with gang members:

Detentions are sometimes premised on the officer’s belief that the detained is subject to a probation condition prohibiting association with gang members, wearing colors, or being present in certain parts of the city. The validity of such court-imposed conditions has not yet been determined in published decisions. Conditions addressing association, or free travel, may well be unreasonable restrictions on protected liberties (Burrell 1990, pp. 26-27).

We have no data that clearly indicates a suppression approach is effective over the short or long term in controlling or lowering youth gang crime. There is some evidence that gang sweeps—particularly if not targeted—are ineffective. In one recent gang sweep by a Los Angeles Police Department Task Force, "so many people were arrested that police were forced to set up a mobile
booking unit at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum" (Burrell 1990, p. 7) and about half of the weekend's cases were rejected for insufficient evidence. The Los Angeles Police arrested 1,453 people, including 794 gang members. Charges were filed in "32 of 60 felony cases . . . many of those arrested [were] back on the streets in 24 hours" (S. Gibbons 1988).

Uninformed, proactive, police gang-fighting activity can result in outrage by community residents, parents, and civil-rights organizations such as the NAACP and ACLU. One such community protest occurred when the Los Angeles authorities questioned and photographed students who wore blue bandannas (blue being the color of the CRIPS gang) which turned out to be a prank. "In another campaign, Los Angeles police made random street stops of young people believed to be gang members, and photographed them for police files . . . In many instances, these youngsters had committed no crimes, and . . . were not even gang members" (Burrell 1990, p. 6).

On the other hand, there is anecdotal information that an early suppression approach may be effective in eliminating, delaying, or stopping for a period of time the threat of gang formation, violence, and possibly drug trafficking (particularly in smaller- or middle-sized cities such as Flint, Michigan; Louisville, Kentucky; Fort Wayne, Indiana; and Tallahassee, Florida) where gangs have not yet established a firm foothold. Some police officials claim that a proactive approach of arresting and harassing small gang formations—especially gang leaders—can successfully "nip the problem in the bud." To what extent community cohesion, interagency collaboration, and community group involvement have also played a role in these situations, is not clear. In addition, when traditional turf-based gang violence is suppressed or regarded as successfully controlled, it is often replaced by covert drug-related gang activity, which is much more difficult to deal with.

Finally, we observe that the effectiveness of specialized police in dealing with the gang problem in large or small cities has not been clearly demonstrated. The cities with the largest and most specialized gang units, Chicago and Los Angeles, appear to have much larger reported gang crime problems than New York and Philadelphia, which have very small and less specialized units and where procedures for dealing with youth gangs are more circumscribed. Gang forms, gang behaviors, and the reporting of gang incidents may not be readily comparable across these cities, although youth crime and violence rates generally may be comparable. In addition, it is not clear to determine to what extent gang crime per se contributes to high levels of violence or serious crime.

Whether a high level of specialized police activity is or should be directed to street gangs in smaller communities with an emerging gang problem is also unclear. While it is possible to identify gangs in smaller cities in terms somewhat comparable to those in larger cities, a recent study suggests there is still little reason to think specialized gang training and gang units
will make a practical difference. To deal with the gang problem in highly specialized or bureaucratic terms in a smaller community where the problem has not crystallized has not been demonstrated to be an efficient police strategy (Klein, Maxson, and Gordon 1987, especially pp. 37-38).

**Emerging Strategy**

A community policing or problem-oriented approach to the youth gang problem appears to be slowly emerging. This more complex, multidimensional police approach is not as widely accepted as the conventional suppression approach. The newer strategy assumes that the gang problem may be only partially amenable to police suppression. Gang causes and interventions are defined in broader terms. The suppression strategy is incorporated as a component of a larger interagency, community-collaborative approach which also gives due attention to prevention and social-intervention strategies that must directly involve the police.

The evolving police strategy is a social-control approach that strives for the prevention and management of the gang problem through careful analysis of community and situational factors. It is no longer based on a "cowboy" or "war" mentality. This newer approach assumes that local-community groups and other agencies, as well as gang members themselves, must bear responsibility for control of gang violence and criminal behavior. Successful policing results, in large measure, from "consent and holding the trust of the public" (Clarke 1987, p. 399). The role of the gang-crime officer becomes one of maintaining order as well as controlling the excesses of gang activity. A process of joint involvement with key community organizations and established agency representatives is required, based on intimate knowledge of local neighborhood and gang patterns. When a gang-related crime occurs, it must be put into context. The police officer should know who might be involved and what the basis of the crime might have been. This approach presumes a strong day-to-day working relationship with key community elements (Pillsbury 1988).

Herelman Goldstein's recent work (1990) on problem-oriented policing is consistent with a community problem-solving approach to youth gangs. Goldstein notes that the "majority of changes that have been advocated in policing over the past several decades reflect a continuing preoccupation with means over ends; with operating methods, process, and efficiency over effectiveness in dealing with substantive problems" (p. 15). He advises that "the police must do more than they have done in the past to engage the citizenry in the overall task of policing" (Goldstein 1990, p. 21). He also notes that "conveying sound, accurate information is currently one of the least used, but potentially most effective means that the police have for responding to a wide range of problems" (Goldstein 1990, p. 14).

In recent years, the Federal Government has been concerned particularly with issues of improved coordination and communication across juvenile justice units in dealing with serious habitual
offenders. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has embarked on a series of programs to prevent serious juvenile offenders from falling through the cracks and avoiding appropriate justice-system processing. Cooperation, the sharing of information (including rosters and profiles of targeted youth), and case management involving police, prosecutors, schools, probation, corrections, and social and community aftercare services have been key goals of the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program and Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (National Crime Prevention Institute 1987; American Institute for Research 1988).

Increasingly, the notions of community involvement, interagency coordination, and information development and sharing have guided the efforts of law-enforcement agencies (especially the police) in addressing the gang problem. The assumption that youth gangs can be eliminated and that the gang problem should be resolved by simply jailing all gang members may not be valid. Jackson and McBride, gang-police experts, observe that "experience and studies have yet to show an instance in which a street gang was dissolved or put out of action because of suppressive police action. When police pressure is intensified on a street gang, its members typically go underground and become secretive" (1985, p. 108).

It is instructive to contrast the styles, if not the approaches of gang policing by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and the Los Angeles Police Department. The Sheriff’s Department has a tradition of close association and interaction with local-community groups in dealing with the gang problem. The city police department is more distant and somewhat distrustful of local-community groups, which tend to be regarded as unstable and ephemeral. Further differences in the approach of the two departments are described as follows:

The Sheriff’s Department OSS (Office of Safe Streets) program targets the most violent gangs and emphasizes developing rapport. The members work in plain clothes, are more informal, talk often with gang members, and have many more positive contacts. Their program includes an extensive training program and the group experiences very little turnover.

In contrast, LAPD’s CRASH program aims at total suppression and frequent harassment of gang members. They work in more formidable uniforms, are more confrontational and hostile, and in many instances, have alienated themselves from possible sources of information. They provide very little training and there is very frequent turnover (Harris 1988, p. 196).

Despite these claimed differences, there are similarities in the high degree of saliency attributed to the gang problem and to a variety of means for dealing with it by both departments. There is a good deal of cooperation between the two departments as city
gang-problems spill over to the county and vice versa. Both departments have been attacked by community groups and the media in recent years for harsh and punitive police practices against minority members, including gang youth. Also, we do not yet have evidence that the sheriff’s approach is more effective than the city police’s approach in the control or reduction of the youth gang problem.

Police structures for dealing with youth gangs may be quite variable—including youth divisions, community relations, homicide, violence, patrol, and detective units, or task forces. Such units tend to state their objectives in somewhat broader terms than do specialized gang units. For example, Philadelphia’s Preventive Patrol Unit aims to "render assistance and guidance to the youth of the community as well as the investigation and containment of acts of juvenile crimes in the area of organized crime" (Philadelphia Preventive Patrol Unit 1987, p. 1); the basic responsibility is law enforcement (apprehension and arresting violators), but emphasis is on "selective enforcement concomitant with community need" (Philadelphia Preventive Patrol Unit 1987, p. 1). Effective enforcement not only serves the criminal justice system and the community, but also aids in the prevention and containment of the gang problem (Collins 1979, pp. 155-56).

This broader, more complex approach involves surveillance of gangs; patrol of designated areas where gang activity has been in evidence; ascertaining the identity, size, and location of gangs and gang members; developing information concerning pending gang fights or criminal activities; counteracting gang warfare through confiscation of weapons; investigating to conclusion all outbreaks of violence and criminal action by gang members; and using all forms of cooperative effort with interested and participating citizen organizations and governmental agencies toward eliminating particular youth gang problems (Philadelphia Preventive Patrol Unit 1987, p. 3).

A great variety of community-based, preventive, and developmental strategies may be incorporated into this model, including school-based lecture programs; school and probation liaisons; broad scale information dissemination about gang problems; recreation; job programs; counseling; referral of youth to social and community agencies; working with parents and community organizations in preventive and control efforts; training teachers, and agency and community representatives how to recognize and deal with gang members and gang problems (see Needle and Stapleton 1983).

Special coordination mechanisms may be created within and outside of police units to assist troubled youngsters, including gang members. For example, a Gang Event Response Team was established in San Francisco to insure a coordinated intradepartmental response to gang-related incidents. Representatives of the Narcotics, Gang Intelligence, Community Services, and Patrol Units or Divisions jointly investigate gang-related shootings. These resources are additional to normal liaison with homicide and other police units as well as with district.
attorneys, probation officers, judges, parole and correctional officials, and still other law-enforcement agencies in overlapping jurisdictions to facilitate gang suppression and justice and correctional-system processing activities.

Local and national concern over the narcotics problem has stimulated the development of a variety of cooperative programs involving the police and educational or human service agencies. School Programs to Educate and Control Drug Abuse (SPECDA) is a cooperative program of the New York City Board of Education and the police department. It operates in schools, serving students and their parents from kindergarten through grade 12. SPECDA has two aims: education and enforcement. Police help provide classes and presentations on drug abuse in the schools. At the same time, they concentrate enforcement efforts, including undercover surveillance within a two-block radius of schools to create a drug-free corridor for students. Drug dealing "crews" or youth gang members have undoubtedly been subject to these enforcement activities. Hundreds of schools are targeted for these educational and control efforts (President's Child Safety Partnership 1987, pp. 71, 88).

There is no easy, precise set of responsibilities for law-enforcement agencies dealing with the gang problem. It can be an overwhelming set of tasks if approached in a rigid, exclusive way that is focused only on suppression. However, there is ample evidence of considerable creativity and innovation by police departments in coping with the youth gang problem in broad, evolving, multidimensional terms. For example, the Phoenix police sponsor many community programs that target at-risk youth. Through a Police Activities League, members of the police force take young people on shopping trips; organize recreational, social, and educational programs; and arrange job opportunities. The police also sponsor a Boys' Scout Explorer Post, with police officers volunteering as Scout masters or leaders (McKinney 1988). In Pasadena, California, a Youth Services Coordination and Intensive Care Unit was established with specially trained police officers to work on a one-to-one basis with juveniles who had gotten into trouble with the law. The police acted simultaneously as informal probation officers, counselors, and "Big Brothers." Some police officers even obtained teaching certificates and were assigned to counsel and teach students in class (Oleisky 1981).

In Oakland, California, the Transit Authority joined with local civic leaders to simultaneously attack graffiti and unemployment problems. Gang leaders were offered jobs and encouraged to locate other potential youths to clean buses. As a result, the buses were cleaned, young people got jobs, and the word got out that marking up buses was not "cool" because cleaning them was tough work. Furthermore, an organization encompassing many youth gangs in the area, Bay Area United Youth, was established as part of the Community Values Program, Inc. In New York City, a somewhat similar effort, Inner City Round Table on Youth (ICRY), was encouraged by the police to bring representatives of gangs together "in terms of talking about training for the future . . . for a vocation" (Galea 1982, p. 228). In El Monte,
California, the collaboration of the police and the Boys' Club resulted in a special job-development and referral project for gang members. The police were influential in prevailing upon local employers to hire gang leaders (Amandes 1979; Clayton 1983).

The Los Angeles City Police Department inaugurated a "Jeopardy Program," which identifies young children who are at risk of becoming involved in gangs and "provides contact, information, and alternatives for the parents . . . to deter gang association or membership" (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 9). The Seattle Police Department elaborated upon this program, adding direct referrals (with parental permission) to various social agencies that provide case-management and counseling services. In addition, there are other preventive programs in the schools such as the Los Angeles Police Department's Drug Awareness Resistance Education Program (DARE), which secondarily deals with gang-membership avoidance. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department has also developed a school gang-prevention program through Substance Abuse Narcotics Education (SANE) (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988).

The DARE and SANE programs are being replicated nationwide. The DARE program is currently being evaluated by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. These programs are broad-scale educational efforts that reach many children, however, who may not necessarily be substantially at-risk of becoming gang members or abusing drugs. In Los Angeles County, specially trained deputies work closely with schools and community organizations to "teach children that there are positive alternatives to substance abuse" (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 9). Students in 4th, 5th, and 6th grades are targeted. In some cities such as San Francisco, drug- and gang-prevention curriculum materials are introduced as early as kindergarten. Over a period of 10 to 15 weeks, students are taught coping skills for dealing with peer pressure, decisionmaking skills, enhanced self-esteem, accurate information about drugs and alcohol, and how to stay out of gangs and avoid confrontation with gang members. A variety of evaluations on the effectiveness of these programs is now in progress.

Thus, under the newer, evolving community-oriented approach, the police officer can perform a variety of roles, including helping a youth obtain a job, counseling for school and social service referral of youth with personal and family problems, mediating gang fights, training other human service personnel and neighborhood residents in how to deal with gangs as well as arresting and contributing to the prosecution of law-violating gang youth. For example, Sergeant Galea of the New York City Police Department has performed as a social intervenor:

Galea, a police officer in the Gang Intelligence Unit in Brooklyn [developed a] curiously friendly relationship [with street clubs, i.e., gangs] . . . . He listened to their problems, tried to effect reconciliation with other clubs, [and] played softball with them. They pumped him
for gossip on other clubs' activities, expected him to get criminal charges against them dropped, even demanded that he visit them in prison or write them job references" (Campbell 1984b, pp. 1-2).

Sergeant Galea's view of his own work was a little more complex:

I have two roles. I am their [gang members'] friend, but also their foe . . . I personally am responsible for many of them being locked up [but] they always come to me to help them . . . getting them jobs . . . back in school, we have got a couple into the armed forces . . . They know that if they commit a crime they are going to be arrested. But they also know that they can come and talk about it to us (Galea 1982, pp. 223-25).

The police officer in this newer approach emphasizes the importance of both suppression and social intervention in arresting a gang youth, obtaining information that will assure proper prosecution and conviction, preventing youth gang crime and gang membership, and involving gang youth—directly or through referral—in improved social functioning:

He has the responsibility of becoming knowledgeable as quickly as possible with the gang and its members; particularly the leadership of the gang . . . In meeting or 'rapping' with the gang, it will be his function to establish a trustful or quasi-friendly relationship that will elicit information and intelligence that can be utilized and still allow him to return and speak with the gang from time to time. The success or failure of a Gang Intelligence Unit [GIU] is dependent on the ability of a GIU officer to make inroads with the gang or its members by his ability to relate, identify with, and listen to the real or imaginary problems they present (Collins 1979, p. 140).

Again, we do not know whether this newer multidimensional, community- and gang-targeted approach is effective. No hard evaluative data is yet available on police strategies that include prevention or social intervention. In one limited evaluation of an effort by police to assist gang youth with job referrals, the results were mixed. A gang member on his own did as well as a gang member processed through a special job-referral program developed by the police in successfully finding and holding a job (Williams and Snortum 1982). It is possible that the success of both conventional and newer police models varies under different conditions in the community, including the scope and severity of gang problems, State law, the availability of strong police leadership, and especially appropriate resources to support and
develop alternate strategies such as good school remedial-programs and job opportunities. Obviously, a great deal of descriptive and evaluative research is required to determine the specific nature and effectiveness of these various police strategies and related implementation activities.
CHAPTER X: PROSECUTION, DEFENSE, AND THE JUDGE

Prosecution attorneys and judges are the criminal justice officials most likely to view the gang problem in strict suppression terms. The prosecutor sees his job as processing and convicting gang youths on maximum charges as quickly as possible and winning long sentences. The judge, particularly the juvenile court judge, may believe that the youth gang problem should be outside the jurisdiction of his court. Gangs are considered a serious threat to society, and judges often believe that youths who commit gang crimes do not deserve the special protection and services of the juvenile court or the opportunity for rehabilitation in the community. To some extent, the defense attorney and probation may be able to counter these extreme views when they are present.

Prosecution traditionally has been concerned with process or procedure and almost exclusively with establishing the guilt of defendants, particularly in reference to adult offenders. The prosecutor represents the State as guardian of the community's interests—in particular, the maintenance of the integrity of the justice system through the vigorous enforcement of its laws. The prosecutor in the juvenile court, in addition, has the duty of maintaining the "community's and the legal system's commitment to the integrity of the family" (Fink 1987, p. 282) and the reciprocal rights and responsibilities of parents and children to each other.

Nevertheless, the prosecutor's overarching ethical responsibility is to promote justice in its broadest sense—not simply to convict individuals or win legal battles. The lawyer's code of professional responsibility explains that the responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate. His duty is to seek justice—not merely to convict. Because the prosecutor "represents the sovereign" and makes decisions affecting the public interest, he should "use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers," such as the selection of cases to prosecute (Fink 1987, p. 282).

Gang cases pose special problems for prosecutors: they tend to involve juveniles and adults; both offenders and victims are usually gang members; the offenses are group-motivated; the acts committed are often extremely violent; prosecution of gang cases may have immediate consequences for the safety of witnesses and even for the intimidation of jurors; gang defendants often are not deterred by prison sentences; and the cases require specialized knowledge about gangs and the community contexts in which they occur.

According to Genelin and Naimen:

Gang cases are not easy to prosecute. Ten years ago, the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office was losing a large percentage of them because gang members did not want to testify against rival gang members. Instead they preferred street payback. Furthermore, if nongang
witnesses were at the scene, they were either too frightened to cooperate or soon became so because of threats, actual physical intimidation, or murder. There was another factor: gang members talked a language unique to their culture. Attorneys did not maximize results because they did not know what questions to ask or how to ask them (Genelin and Naimen 1988, p. 1).

The problems inherent in gang cases have lead to new approaches and the use of new organizational forms by prosecutors for improving efficiency and maximizing convictions and sentences. Defense attorneys are also developing tactics and procedures in response to the newer "harder" prosecutorial techniques. According to one defense attorney, the label "gang-related" has "far-reaching ramifications in a criminal case. Gang cases are singled out for investigation and prosecution by special units. At trial, gang affiliation may raise a host of evidentiary problems. At sentencing, evidence of gang membership is sure to affect the court's exercise of discretion" (Burrell 1990, p. 1).

In past decades, a few large and medium-size cities with the stimulus of Federal initiative and funds have created hard-core gang or vertical-prosecution units, which pay special attention to gang crime suspects. This development is probably most advanced in California and is based also on State legislation and special funding. The prosecutor traditionally ignored the gang-related circumstances of a case for several reasons. He usually believed that the identification of a crime as gang-related "tend[ed] to divert the jury's focus from the actual crime to the question of gang affiliation. This distraction [was] viewed by many prosecutors as being counterproductive and . . . therefore [to be] avoided" (B. Kahn 1974, p. 33). Furthermore, a prosecutor, not in a vertical-prosecution unit, had incomplete information from the police or sheriff about gang-situational characteristics and was not able to determine whether gang affiliation signified a greater or lesser threat to community safety.

The evolving system of vertical prosecution represents a rational, specialized, but mainly deterrent outreach strategy by district or States attorneys. It assumes that gangs can be controlled best through an efficient and community-based approach that is fully informed about gang events. It emphasizes vigorous, proactive prosecution—particularly for the most serious, violent, and drug-related gang cases involving gang leaders or core gang members. A premise is that "a few gang members commit a significant proportion of the crimes and negatively influence the behavior of other gang members. Effective deterrence is to incapacitate offenders through incarceration, particularly those leading other gang members in illegal, violent activities" (California Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, p. 4).

Under vertical prosecution, usually one prosecutor—rather than a shifting array of prosecutors—handles a case from its "inception until its disposition in the criminal justice system" (Daley 1985, p. 18). One assistant State's attorney or district
attorney participates in the "full range of prosecutorial functions for any given case investigation, use of the grand jury, arrest, filing of charges, preliminary hearing, pretrial motions, plea conferences, trial, and sentencing" (Daley 1985, p. 18). When both juveniles and adults are involved, the same prosecutor is used (often with the same police officers) to deal with the various cases. If selection of the more serious case is required, the adult participant is more likely to receive special attention. Recent elaborations of the vertical-prosecution approach are special units directed to gang-related narcotics cases in Los Angeles (Los Angeles County Probation 1988, p. 10) and to juvenile drug-gang cases in San Diego (Davidson 1987).

Vertical-prosecution organizations vary in size, ranging up to 35 or more deputy prosecutors in Los Angeles County. Highly qualified prosecutors and special investigators are selected. Reduced caseloads and special coordinating relations with law-enforcement agencies are established to develop the most effective evidence for prosecution and also to provide protection to cooperating witnesses by preventing intimidation or retaliation by the defendant's gang associates (California Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, p. 4). The district attorney has been accorded a leadership role in the community's war against gangs in California. By California State law, the vertical-prosecution attorney or senior attorney also acts as chairman of an interagency gang task force in each county. The task force serves as a coordinating body not only for other law-enforcement and supervisory authorities such as police and probation, but also for school and community-based agencies concerned with gang problems. The task force is a communications mechanism, a policymaking organization, and a project-generating group. In Los Angeles County, this body has stimulated the development of an interagency gang-information system GREAT (Gang Reporting Evaluation and Tracking) as well as programs funded by "Youth At Risk" throughout the city.

In recent years, California law has been concerned primarily with law enforcement, prosecution, and probation efforts in dealing with problems of gang crime. Gang suppression has aimed at providing broad, clear, and strong procedures for bringing suspects and offenders to justice. The inclusion of community-based organizations such as schools and youth service agencies has served mainly to extend and strengthen the investigative and information-gathering capacities of law enforcement. The provisions for special-school curricula and services for youth at risk of gang membership have thus far received secondary attention and limited funding.

Susan Burrell of the Youth Law Center, San Francisco, writes:

The Street Terrorism Act of 1988 makes it a crime to engage in criminal gang-activity, subjects persons to sentence enhancements for criminal activity, creates a nuisance [abatement] provision around buildings in which criminal activity takes place, and permits the prosecution of parents
under a parental responsibility theory. Legislation has also been proposed to require that children found to have committed graffiti offenses lose their driver's licenses for a year . . . (Burrell 1990, pp. 10-11).

The new prosecutorial strategy has been accompanied by a "growing panoply" of "gang law" to address difficult evidentiary and logistical problems which characterize the collective nature of gang offenses (Daley 1985, p. 2). Of special interest is the development of the law of accountability or accessoryship in which a gang member can be held responsible for the crimes of another committed outside his presence where it can be proved that he "advised, encouraged, aided, or abetted the perpetration of the crime" (Daley 1985, p. 2). The law of conspiracy has been associated with the law of accountability so that "it is not necessary to show a formal agreement between the parties . . . it is sufficient to show a mutual understanding of the parties which may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence or combination thereof" (Daley 1985, pp. 5-6). Innovative strategies and tactics have been developed by prosecutors and defense attorneys to implement and to challenge, respectively, these laws or prosecutorial procedures.
Prosecutorial and Defense Guidelines

Genelin and Naimen (1988) have developed a set of guidelines for more effective prosecution of gang cases. They emphasize special techniques in case filing, based on the use of trained investigators, the education and selection of the jury, the use of the police as expert witness, widening the scope of the search warrant, setting bail, witness protection, countering courtroom intimidation by gang members, dealing with recalcitrant witnesses and informants, and how to establish gang intent.

Genelin and Naimen emphasize the importance of a well-trained gang-investigating officer who can read placa (gang graffiti) and testify to its meaning in court. The investigator must be aware of gang processes and the current state of gang and intergang activities and relationships in the community. It is important not only that the investigating officer meaningfully interview witnesses, but also that the prosecutor himself personally interview gang witnesses and record testimony on videotape (whenever possible), which can be played later before the jury. One or more witnesses often will recant his testimony because of preference for personal payback, because he was intimidated, or because there is a general feeling that the police are their real enemies. The video or tape recording then becomes important as a backup.

A special warrant is needed to obtain evidence. Gang members often retain items that can be of special value to gang prosecution such as whether weapons, photos, or gang paraphernalia. "Gang members are proud of the fact they are in a gang . . . . They will paint their rooms with gang placa, have banners . . . books of photographs of themselves and other gang members flashing signs and displaying weapons." These items are viewed as good material for trial and the "critical task is to obtain it" (Genelin and Naimen, p. 3) through an expanded search warrant justified (for example, searching for evidence of motivation for a crime) by an experienced investigator.

The prosecutor should educate the jury about the distinctive characteristics of a gang case. Customs such as payback, gang signs, graffiti, and intimidation must be stressed. The prosecutor needs to be alert to certain prejudices in jurors that will hurt his case. For example, if a juror lives in the area of the gang member on trial, he may be too frightened to render a "people’s verdict." Other factors that influence jurors’ perceptions include: whether the juror is related to gang members, the juror’s prior membership in a gang, and his attitudes toward police (Genelin and Naimen 1988, p. 6).

An expert witness can be used to establish not only that the defendant is a gang member, but also that a gang conspiracy to commit a crime exists. Case law holds that gang membership can be considered as circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. A qualified expert can testify about membership in gangs, rivalry between gangs, common practices of gangs and gang members, gang terminology, street codes of conduct, and even specific and
identifiable types of gangs. "Interlinking gang evidence with the crime is a force for conviction, and explaining a witness’s demeanor by way of gang affiliation can go a long way toward winning a case" (Genelin and Naimen 1988, pp. 5-7).

According to Genelin and Naimen, bail often should be set as high as possible to avoid inappropriate releases, develop additional information, and persuade reluctant witnesses to testify. Gang offenses may be very serious, and the defendant often has a long prior record. The defendant may attempt to flee; the victim may die; the defendant himself may be at risk of a payback. The solution, according to Genelin and Naimen, may be to re-categorize the offense as a more serious crime, which allows a pre-review, no-bail hold. There is also an additional process that may be used if the funds for the bail were obtained through illegal means: "no bail bond shall be accepted unless the judge or magistrate is convinced that no portion of the security pledged was feloniously obtained by the defendant" (pp. 12-13).

Furthermore, if a defendant is in jail, it may allow for the development of additional evidence "by way of jailhouse informants, seizure of incriminating communications with codefendants, or by simple observation of the defendant in a social milieu with other members of his gang" (p. 5). Genelin and Naimen also elaborate the uses of bail or custody in California to persuade recalcitrant witnesses for the prosecution to testify against the defendant. "A magistrate may exact from each witness who testifies at the preliminary hearing a written promise that he will appear and testify or else forfeit the sum of $500" (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp. 11-12). The judge may also issue a "body attachment for the defaulting witness . . . . One night in custody is usually enough to ensure cooperation from a witness, or at least his appearance in court . . . ." (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp. 11-12).

Special attention may be required to protect not only witnesses for the prosecution but the defendant. Witnesses, as suggested above, may be exposed to intimidation or undue influence from members of the opposing gang. Furthermore, defendants or sometimes witnesses as members of opposing gangs should not be housed in the same module or section of the jail or court-holding cell. If the witness is released, the investigators should keep track of him and what is occurring in the community—since the subject may be under great community pressure not to testify. "Careful consideration should be given to removing witnesses from the area and relocating them in safer neighborhoods" (Genelin and Naimen undated, p. 9).

A variety of techniques have been devised to prevent or limit courtroom intimidation by gang members who may be present for the proceedings, including using additional investigators, police, or bailiffs; identifying gang members to the judge and jury; frisking and removing gang members from court; police officers requesting gang members to pose for a Polaroid picture to be placed in the gang book; and arresting gang members in court (if they are
discovered to be on probation or parole) for violation of provisions of nonassociation with gang members.

Most importantly, the prosecutor is concerned with the issue of how to establish group intent and "how to attach criminal liability to the members of the group," (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp. 15-16) even if they were not present at the scene of the crime. California law makes it possible to prove an abettor guilty of a crime if the defendant "(1) acted with knowledge of the criminal purposes of the perpetrator, (2) acted with the intent or purpose of ... committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, or (3) by act or advice promoted, encouraged, or instigated the commission of the offense . . . . The conspirator . . . is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aides or abets" (Genelin and Naimen undated, pp. 15-16).

Defense Attorney

Defense attorneys have begun to develop techniques and procedures for countering the efforts of prosecution. The major objectives of the defense are to dissociate the defendant from identification as a gang member and to prevent the crime he is accused of committing from being classified as gang-related. Questions raised by the defense attorney include: the adequacy of the identification of the accused as a gang member; the practice of stopping or arresting youths on suspicion of being gang members and, therefore, of having committed a crime; the nature of gang evidence admitted in court and its relevance to the crime committed; the qualifications of the gang expert-witness; and the constitutionality of the provision of the law (for example, California's Street Terrorism Act).

Susan Burrell emphasizes the importance of the discovery of police records of gang affiliation. Mistakes are sometimes made in official information that attributes gang membership or affiliation to the accused. The counsel must find out what the police think, what they know about the defendant, the source of information, and especially the standards used for the entry of information into gang files, including procedures for updating and purging files (Burrell 1990, pp. 19-20). To avoid identifying a youth as a gang member merely because of the clothes he wears, his demeanor, or other characteristics and then arresting or detaining him, there must be "specific and articulable facts leading the officer to believe that (1) some activity relating to a crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur, and (2) the person the officer intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity" (Burrell 1990, p. 25).

Burrell is particularly concerned with the use of evidence that is irrelevant to the case at trial. The defense needs to shield the defendant from any gang reference to the extent possible. Furthermore, membership in an organization does not lead reasonably to any inference as to the conduct of a member on a
given occasion. It is important to analyze carefully the prosecutor's theory of relevance, and object if it is spurious or goes beyond the purported theory. Even if gang evidence is relevant, it may be inadmissible if outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. "The term 'gang' could take on a sinister meaning when associated with group activities" (Burrell 1990, pp. 27-38).

Finally, Burrell would counter the prosecutor's use of police officers as expert witnesses. She states that according to the California code the expert must have "special knowledge, experience, training or education in the subject. Repeated observations by a police officer without inquiry, analysis, or experiment does not turn the observer into an 'expert'" (1990, p. 47).

One interesting prosecutorial development in the city of Los Angeles has been the use of State nuisance abatement laws, based on Civil Code Section 3479 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 731. "The abatement action takes an offensive approach and attacks the gang or gang action by limiting all of its activities that contribute to a public nuisance. A civil injunction is sought to ban, for example, loitering, the wearing of gang clothing, possession of dangerous weapons or paint, approaching potential drug customers in motor vehicles . . . " (Hahn 1987, pp. 2-3).

Bruce Coplen, supervisor of the gang unit in the Los Angeles city attorney's office, claims a 33-percent reduction in gang crime in the Cadillac Corning neighborhood, as compared to other areas of Los Angeles, after aggressive use of nuisance abatement laws (Coplen 1988). However, the strategy apparently has not been extended to other neighborhoods, and the number of gang incidents and homicides has continued to climb throughout the city.

There is little doubt about the short-term effectiveness of the vertical prosecution of gang cases. An evaluation of the Los Angeles County vertical-prosecution unit found that, in cases involving gang-related murders, the conviction rate increased to 95 percent compared to a preprogram period when it was 71 percent and to contemporaneous nonvertical prosecution which was 78 percent (Dahmann 1983, chapter 6, p. 26). A substantial increase in trial conviction and incarceration rates also occurred (Dahmann 1983, chapter 6, p. 33). Comparable achievements have been described in Cook County, Chicago (Daley 1985). On the other hand, it should be noted that a relatively small number of gang offenders are subjected to vertical prosecution. While over 71,000 gang members were arrested in California counties with a prosecution unit in fiscal year 1986-1987, only 546 defendants were vertically prosecuted (California Office of Juvenile Justice Planning 1987, pp. 17-18). The large majority of gang arrestees were probably accused of minor offenses (California Office of Juvenile Justice Planning 1987, pp. 17-18).

Recent law used by vertical prosecutors has come under challenge, at least at the trial-court level. The claim is that legislation such as the California Street Terrorism Act "poses serious constitutional problems" (Burrell 1990, pp. 54-55). Terms in the law that are essential to its application and enforcement
are vague, particularly in regard to the imposition of civil or criminal penalties for mere association with others. Restrictions on associational freedom, unless drawn to meet some compelling government need, may be an intrusion in violation of constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Burrell 1990, pp. 54-57).

Critics of vertical prosecution suggest that prosecutors still have insufficient understanding of barrio or ghetto life and its peer pressures that lead a youngster to accompany a group of youths in a drive-by shooting. Extreme sentences may be requested for and sometimes accorded to naive, impressionable juveniles who are simply present on such occasions (Hicks 1988). It is also possible that the district or States attorney's approach should be broadened to include preventive, social-intervention, social-advocacy, and community-mobilization strategies, if he is to target younger offenders as well as older, more serious offenders. In some communities, support groups, educational campaigns, and 24-hour hotline reporting and advice services about the gang problem have been established by vertical-prosecution units. In Los Angeles County, a community-agency referral service was planned for persons concerned with or implicated in a variety of gang-related problems.

Finally, we note that despite the increased efficiency of vertical prosecution, it has not been accompanied by a general decline in gang activity or a reduction in gang crime or gang-crime arrests in the community. The deterrent effects of vertical prosecution, if they exist, probably have been overwhelmed by community changes and urban conditions facilitating gang activity—including immigration, population movement, poverty, and drug trafficking—over which prosecutors have no control. Vertical prosecution does not necessarily address the consequences of long-term sentences and prison overcrowding for the gang offender or for the community when the offender returns.

**Judiciary**

Judges have paid considerably less explicit and systematic attention to the gang problem than have police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or probation. Judges seek to be as objective as possible in judging cases. Thus, there is a tendency for judges in jurisdictions where gang cases frequently come to court to deny or avoid recognition of the problem in order not to bias consideration of cases. Judges may prefer that information about gang-relatedness of the offense or offender not be considered to prevent prejudices in jury deliberations. Some judges will rule such information out of order, unless specifically germane to the facts of the case at hand. Furthermore, some judges believe that gangs are merely facilitative and are blamed for problems that lie more fundamentally at home, at school, and with defective community structures—and therefore need not be directly addressed in court.

However, information about gang-related characteristics and pressures (often from other sectors of the criminal justice system) does intrude and probably influences judges' general attitudes
toward gangs and gang crime. Probation reports of the social circumstances of youth, including gang affiliation and prior gang offense history, are viewed as quite appropriate in presentencing consideration. Police in Chicago have urged the judiciary to establish gang courts so that more severe sentences can be imposed on gang offenders. The Los Angeles County Sheriff has urged that judges hold gang youths more accountable for their crimes than nongang youth (Gott 1988). The superintendent of schools in Portland, Oregon, expects judges to identify gang incidents "without bias," but says they should recognize the serious nature of gang offenses and respond with "quick dramatic intervention" (1988, p. 4). The State of California has mandated that many types of gang-related crimes require enhanced sentences.

Although some judges have been active in extramural or community efforts to deal with the gang problem, it is not clear what the actual practice of judges has been in respect to gang cases in the court. With few exceptions, juvenile and adult courts have not developed special programs of counseling or control specifically addressed to the gang youths coming before them. Nor have court orders been formulated about gang cases or situations specifically addressed to schools or public or nonprofit agencies. Court efforts to deal specifically with gangs have been developed primarily by probation units (see below).

The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and its Metropolitan Judges Committee recently expressed its views about how judges should deal with youth gangs. Judges traditionally prefer to take a conservative stance. Its first reactions appear to be strongly suppressive. The National Council essentially recommends a set of punitive options based on the untested assumption that youth gangs generally are involved heavily in sophisticated and organized drug trafficking: "These gangs have become interstate, regional and national organizations commanding economic resources and able to bypass collaboration with or challenge more traditional organized criminal networks" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 29). Judges are urged to "mandate severance of the gang affiliation as part of its sanctions and remedies" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 30).

The Metropolitan Court Judges Committee regards the youth gang situation as "appalling and [recommends that] such gang youths should not be handled in juvenile court . . . when services and programs available to the juvenile court are not sufficient to protect the community or rehabilitate the serious juvenile offenders" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 30). The waiver of gang youth to adult court is urged. Nevertheless, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, recognizing somewhat its limited factual base, recommends that "judges and court-services personnel should develop their knowledge and understanding of gang and gang-like organizations and their appeal to youth" (1987, p. 22).

The judges' approach to nongang juvenile cases is quite different, particularly in respect to dependent, neglected, abused,
and other kinds of delinquent children and youth, including those who are physically or sexually abused, exploited, runaway, and incorrigible, as well as truants and school dropouts. Recommended for nongang juveniles in juvenile court has been "the establishment of a working and effective partnership of courts and public agencies with the full involvement of businesses, labor, private foundations and agencies, and citizen volunteers. Also regarded as essential is an emphasis on prevention and sensitivity to the rights of the individual child, the family, and the rights and responsibilities of the parent as well as those of the courts, agencies, and legislators" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1986). How different gang and nongang juveniles are, and why gang youths should be treated differently from other types of deprived, problematic, or troublesome youth, and what the consequences of such different court treatment for gang and nongang juveniles are in terms of protecting the juvenile and the security and welfare of the community, are issues not yet explicitly addressed by the juvenile court.

There are individual judges who are attempting to take a broad view of the problem. Their decisions are guided by their understanding of the many negative influences of the ghetto or barrio contributing to a youth's resort to a gang for protection and support which often leads to criminal association and violent behavior. A suppression strategy is not automatically accepted. "Placing [gang] youth in large correctional institutions is bad;" instead, gang youth should receive "training and placement" (Oleisky 1981, pp. 32-33). At the same time, many judges believe that they are handicapped in sentencing decisions because of lack of adequate information about the youth's gang involvement and especially about the community gang situation to which he must return, as well as the lack of adequate community resources available to deal with the youth's problem.

One judge with years of experience with gang cases states that he considers several gang-related factors in his sentencing decisions. He assumes that most gang youth have very low self-esteem and are attracted to or dependent on the gang for the little social support and sense of personal achievement that is available to them. Some of the gang youth are extremely destructive—both to themselves and to the community. If a particular offense is probationable on its merits, certain gang-related factors enter his decision. These include not only how to protect the community and the youth from opposing gang members, but also how to assist the youth to deal with his needs and develop alternate opportunities and satisfactions. Otherwise, the youth will return to gang affiliation and most likely to gang-related criminal behavior (Schiller 1988).

According to Judge Schiller of the Cook County Adult Criminal Court, if the offense is not probationable and he must sentence the youth to an institution, certain questions arise. Can the youth survive in an institution? If so, in which kind of institution? It is important not to sentence the youth to a particular correctional institution that, for one reason or another, will provide an
inimical environment. There are special gang, racial/ethnic, and behavioral characteristics of institutions which can be harmful to particular youths. Furthermore, a correctional environment should reduce gang-related opportunities for the youth. However, in Illinois, as in California and elsewhere, it is not uncommon for certain institutions to be identified with a particular, dominant gang. Certain juvenile institutions serve as recruiting grounds for gangs, sometimes under the influence of gang members in adult prisons. The juvenile correctional institution may serve as a vehicle to recruit or solidify juvenile ties to gangs.

Under ideal conditions—particularly if a youth can be placed on probation—specific community arrangements should be made which will provide alternate legitimate opportunities for peer affiliation, social status, and support which the gang provides to the youth. Not only training and job opportunities should be provided, but also links to local organizations, social agencies, fraternal groups, and even political clubs that are neighborhood-based and easily accessible. Such ties could induce gang youths to stay away from former gang peers and constrain them from becoming involved in crime-generating situations. Local precinct police, in conjunction with probation, could also be assigned to fulfill support as well as surveillance functions for gang offenders in order to reintegrate them into conventional patterns within the community (Schiller 1988).
CHAPTER XI: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND CORRECTIONS

Some probation and parole agencies have long histories of experience dealing with youth gangs, particularly in California. Interest in the gang problem has been variable in most States and jurisdictions, with occasional concerns voiced and limited programs developed by probation or parole officials and aftercare personnel. Juvenile probation departments in communities or counties with traditional gang problems (Chicago and Cook County in Illinois, or Brooklyn and Kings County in New York) have still not developed special gang-service or gang-control programs, although they have created special intensive probation programs for property offenders. Only California appears to have addressed the problem systematically across the youth or young adult offender age range over a sustained period of time—at least in Los Angeles County. Certain States, including California, Illinois, and Washington, have also had extensive experience dealing with prison gangs.

California probably has inaugurated and developed more pioneering efforts directed to the youth gang problem since World War II than all other States combined. In recent years, these programs have emphasized a suppression strategy, although in increasingly complex and sophisticated ways. The earliest of these programs began in the 1940's, during World War II, when the Zoot Suit Riots precipitated probation interest in gangs that later evolved into the Los Angeles Group Guidance Project, a special outreach probation youth-work program. The approach was community-based and sought to integrate youth into nongang, socially productive life. It used social-group work with youths and their parents as a major intervention method and emphasized counseling and recreational activities. It lacked a comprehensive community-based character as well as effective collaboration with law-enforcement and was evaluated negatively. It suffered programmatic and public crises and was eventually terminated (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL INTERVENTION).

Probation

In more recent years, the Los Angeles Probation Department has deemphasized its rehabilitation approach in favor of not only a stronger deterrence strategy and closer integration with law enforcement, but also closer relations with community-based agencies and schools. In October 1980, the Los Angeles Probation Department's Board of Supervisors approved a Specialized Gang-Supervision Program "to provide a more even administration of justice, to rehabilitate offenders, and to reduce gang violence with emphasis on preventing gang-related homicides" (Duran undated, pp. 1-2). Improved probation control and surveillance and the return of offenders or probation violators to court for appropriate disposition were the key objectives.

The Los Angeles Specialized Gang-Supervision Program is a very large one, serving 2,000 probationers 14 to 25 years of age. Strict
juvenile and adult jurisdictional distinctions are avoided so that the gang problem can be treated on its own as well as age-related terms. The program has 40 probation officers in 5 units, with each unit dealing with 400 gang offenders. No more than 50 cases are prescribed per officer, in contrast to a normal caseload of 100 to 150 for the regular probation officers. However, even the caseload of 50 is regarded as much too large for the varied tasks required with difficult gang offenders. The specialist gang-probation officers are expected to be on duty in the evening and on weekends, and to make their presence known in the community and in schools. They participate in "ride-alongs" with police agencies, are present at and on patrol during special community events, and interact with members of the County District Attorney's hard-core units as well as the City Attorney's gang prosecutors (Nidorf 1980's, undated).

While specialized gang-probation officers are also expected to participate in a range of court duties, community-based activities, drug-prevention classes, presentations at schools, and interagency coordination and networking, primary emphasis is on strict supervision of, visitation to, and search of the homes of youths, as necessary. Traditional counseling, job referral, and the conduction of truce meetings between gangs are now apparently minimized (see Duran 1987). Funding has been requested but apparently is not yet available for leadership-training and social-development programs directed at probationers.

The actual operational nature of this project and its effects, however, remain somewhat unclear. Despite the fact that serious gang violence was relatively more characteristic of older teenagers and young adults, the Specialized Gang Probation Unit's caseload was 70-percent juvenile. A large proportion of the youth it served were peripheral gang members who did not get involved in violent activity but were "typically . . . unmotivated youth . . . [who were] into drug use, graffiti writing, truancy, and [had] low social achievement. Much of the efforts of the unit were in the prosecution of technical violations and petty offenses" (Duran 1987, p. 25). This "Specialized Gang-Suppression Program" progress report concludes with a recommendation for a change in policy to target more "hard-core violent youth" similar to the youth served by the Los Angeles Police and Sheriff's gang units (Duran 1987).

Currently, the Los Angeles Probation Department is pursuing a variety of new initiatives. An Early Gang-Intervention Program was established "to focus preventive resources on first-time youthful offenders with limited peripheral gang involvement" (Los Angeles County Probation 1988, p. 7). In some Los Angeles County programs, on the one hand, emphasis seems to be on early contact with schools and community agencies to identify youth at risk of gang membership and the provision of special counseling, referral, and parent contact services. On the other hand, the San Pedro Project is a cooperative program between probation and local law enforcement which "provides coordination of probation to law-enforcement agencies to enable easy pickup by police of those violating conditions of their probation and serves as a means of removing gang members from the streets" (Ibid.).
For more serious and sophisticated criminal offenders, the Gang Drug-Pushers and Sellers Program of the Los Angeles Probation Department "provides for increased sanctions, restrictions, and electronic surveillance of the activities of adult gang members known to be involved in the use and sale of drugs and narcotics" (Ibid., p. 8). A very recent project is a "reclamation program" in Los Angeles County. The probation department received funding for a pilot project from the U.S. Department of Justice to assist in the development of a combined justice-system and community-organization effort for the coordination and development of programs dealing with gangs in an "emerging gang-problem city" (Los Angeles County Probation 1988, pp. 5-11). The latter effort seemed to have clear potential for addressing the gang problem through a comprehensive approach but was funded for only an 18-month period.

Another proposed innovative project by an experienced probation department was that of the California Orange County Probation Department. Strategies of social intervention, opportunities provision, and community mobilization were to be integrated with a deterrent approach for younger gang members. The goals of a proposed specialized intensive probation supervision program include: the diversion of 11- to 14-year-old juvenile gang offenders from detention and incarceration experiences to community-based alternatives; the use of a comprehensive case-management approach to deal with families and youth who are at risk of gang involvement; the provision of special opportunities to encourage at-risk youth to remain in school and dropouts to return to school; the linkage of current and potential youth gang members with conventional types of organizations or activities within the county; and the involvement of parents, families, and organizations in community activities designed to change environmental factors that promote youth gang involvement" (Orange County 1989, pp. 18-19).

A continuum of supervision levels has already been established, dependent on the assessed risk of the youth engaging in further delinquent or gang-related behavior: field supervision, intensive field supervision, house arrest, electronic monitoring, mandatory substance-abuse treatment, detention, and incarceration in a juvenile institution. Specific indicators of gang membership are explicitly identified, including: a gang member's self-admission; the wearing of gang colors and tattoos; the writing of gang graffiti (placa); having a family member who is in a gang; having a photograph of a minor with a gang member; knowing that a minor associates with a gang member; or having a minor identified as a gang member by others.

On the other hand, a recent plan proposes an opportunities approach to undermine the recruitment process for gangs. It suggests that a separate gang school be established to provide remedial education, job readiness, and job placement experiences. It also recommends an intensive academic program, with a focus on bringing minors up to grade level and an emphasis on language skills. The special-school program would focus on classroom social-skills development and teach the minor how to gain positive
attention in the classroom, how to ask questions comfortably, and how to obtain extra help when needed so that he does not need to avoid class or fail to complete assignments.

Each of the young gang-probationers would remain in the special-school setting for approximately one semester. The minor's transition back into his neighborhood school would be carefully planned by establishing ongoing relationships with the minor's teacher, guidance counselor, and principal so that progress begun in the special school could be continued.

A consortium of support agencies and organizations would be formed to target problems within the gang-youth's family and to mobilize key business, community agency, and governmental units to deal with issues of education, jobs, and other matters specifically affecting conditions closely associated with gang development. The provision of child care for the minor's younger siblings would also be included in this proposed Orange County Project; child care would be provided adjacent to the special-school site to enable parents to participate in counseling and skill development for the family. In addition, the consortium of agencies would provide adult education and vocational training for parents to improve their overall ability to cope with problems through links with local community-college programs (Orange County 1989).

Another probation program that emphasized a highly coordinated, but primarily suppressive approach was the Intensive Juvenile-Gang Supervision Program of the Santa Clara Probation Department. The purpose of the project was "to reduce the impact of youth gang violence in Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Monterey counties by enhancing Probation/Parole services, coordinating with other justice agencies, and promoting public protection and providing assistance to victims and witnesses" (Santa Clara Probation Department 1984, p. 1). A key assumption was that inadequate justice-system processing of gang offenders was due to a lack of coordination between criminal justice agencies—especially law enforcement, district attorney, probation, and parole. Another program assumption was that the coordination of these agencies is essential to cope with the mobility of gangs and the failure of justice agencies to share resources and intelligence information. Prior to this approach, these conditions resulted in a lack of continuity in case handling through the different phases of justice-system processing of the youth.

The Santa Clara Probation Department's activities to achieve the goal of reducing recidivism have included: vertical case management, or the assignment of one officer to pursue a case through all stages of the probation or parole process; intensive investigation and supervision of gang cases; imposition of special court orders; commitment to rehabilitation facilities; and services to victims and witnesses including referral to community resources and maintenance of secure court waiting areas (DeWitt 1983).

Sufficient time has elapsed since the start of this project to permit some evaluation. After five years, local officials claim that the number of gangs has decreased from 50 to 20, with only 10 to 12 active on a regular basis. However, there has also been a
shift from Hispanic gang violence to black gang drug trafficking and Vietnamese youth gang crime involving residential burglaries and robberies, commercial robberies, and vehicle thefts. The relative shift from extreme violence to serious property crime is viewed as an improvement (Creamer 1988).

The Philadelphia Crisis Intervention Network was probably the most community-based probation and parole program that addressed the youth gang homicide problem in a major urban area. This network included mainly social intervention and community organization but also a closely integrated probation/parole component. Relationships with schools, police, and other agencies were developed. The probation/parole component focused on the control of older youth or young adults likely to influence younger gang members and worked with street workers on a daily basis. This program apparently produced or was correlated with a sharp reduction in gang homicides. Its positive results were sustained for over a decade (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL INTERVENTION).

Parole

There appear to be extremely few community-based, supervised-offender projects directed to the gang problem that are sponsored by youth or adult correctional authorities. Probably the most radical program is the Gang Violence Reduction Project of the California Youth Authority. In many respects it is a highly community-participation youth-outreach program, assessed earlier in this study (see chapter VIII, SOCIAL INTERVENTION). The project, a special parole program in East Los Angeles, assumes that certain elements of the gang could make a legitimate and positive contribution to prevention and control of the gang problem. The primary methodology of the project has consisted of mediation and community development, mainly by consultants such as former gang leaders or influential members of the warring gangs to which they are assigned. Conflict resolution procedures tailored to the culture of the barrio are employed to find alternatives to gang violence. A variety of community-oriented program activities are employed, such as trips, athletics, neighborhood meetings, gang- and drug-prevention discussions and lectures in elementary schools, referral of drug abusers for treatment, and involvement of local businesses and parent groups. The project is supervised by professional parole agents and has received a positive evaluation by some researchers and justice-system personnel, but not by others. While the project is closely identified with community groups and some social agencies, it remains a source of controversy because of its close, unique involvement with gangs that are still engaged in serious violent activity.

Another more conventionally suppression-oriented project of the California Youth Authority is the Gang Service Project, a specialized parole unit located in Compton. The parole agents specialize in the direct supervision of—
known, sophisticated, hard-core gang members on parole. Each ward assigned to an officer has a history of gang violence and a special parole condition regarding nongang association. The condition is aggressively enforced. Parole agents work flexible schedules—conducting surveillance as well as monitoring parole behavior, often with the assistance of local law enforcement. The goal of the unit is to be highly visible in the community and hold gang members accountable (Lockwood 1988, p. 4).

The California Youth Authority has also created a "Transitional Group Home" as a "safe house" in San Diego County for wards who have made the decision to leave the gang lifestyle. The program serves older parolees, 17 to 24 years old, who "desire to get away from the negative gang environment" (Lockwood 1988, p. 4). Parolees in this residential program receive weekly therapy and drug counseling. They are also provided with the resources of a local employment specialist to assess their training needs and assist in job development. The minimum stay in the house is three to four months. Parolees are not allowed to move out of the facility until they have gained steady employment. Approximately 37 percent of the house residents are estimated to have completed the program (Lockwood 1988, p. 5).

Finally, an attempt has been made by the California Youth Authority, through its Information Parole Coordinators, "to collect gang information whenever Youth Authority parolees are involved within their respective jurisdictions . . . The designated agents attend local law-enforcement gang meetings, compile records on the activities of gang members, and exchange information with local authorities" (Lockwood 1988, p. 4). The California Youth Authority, like the Los Angeles Probation Department, appears to have a variety of programs directed to youth gang members. The nature of the relationship and the degree of coordination between these two major gang-offender community supervisory agencies in California is not clearly known. Recent State legislation does not appear to accord a key or integral role to parole—as it does to probation and law enforcement—in the development of comprehensive local systems to deal with the gang problem.

**Corrections**

More than other criminal justice agencies, prisons and training institutions can be both a context for the development of the gang problem and a societal response to it. In recent decades, prison populations have been seen as helping create sophisticated criminal street-gang organizations in the streets (Jacobs 1977). Prisons are thought to have an interactive deviancy-amplifying effect both within the prison and on the streets. Furthermore, the prison-gang problem, in interaction with the street-gang problem, has spread across communities and States. The prison has provided a source of continuity for gang members who go to prison and yet are able to maintain gang membership that began in the streets.
Moore 1978). Imprisonment or incapacitation, though a simple short-term solution, has clearly contributed to increased gang cohesion and membership recruitment (Reiss 1987).

The problem is clearly more serious in adult than in youth corrections, and different responses are necessary, but the distinctions can be overdrawn, particularly since the majority of inmate gang-members are probably still in their twenties, at least in most States. In any case, comprehensive and balanced suppression and treatment or social-opportunity approaches are probably more likely to develop in youth or juvenile facilities than in adult correctional systems.

Prison issues of what to do about gangs and which approaches to use are similar to those faced by other justice-system and community-based representatives, but the issues are more sharply posed. Gangs in prisons cannot easily be ignored, and the consequences of wrong decisions are more severe. Unlike their position in other criminal justice agencies, gang members must be considered a full-time participating member of the structure and organization of the prison or training school. The operational problem of defining membership is immediately raised for the entering inmate: what should be administrative policy? "One school of thought proposes that gang membership, in and of itself, is not sufficient to warrant official sanction. As long as individual gang members do not violate the rules of institutional conduct they may participate in activities available to other inmates and move about the institution as do other inmates" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 9).

Another perspective, increasingly dominant, is that the presence of gangs or any unauthorized criminal-oriented organization in prison or youth correctional institutions constitutes a threat and a challenge to the administration. A policy is usually formulated that—

any inmate identified as a gang member will be segregated from the general population. This policy requires provision for enough segregation cells . . . a plan for how segregation units . . . are to be operated, including contingency plans for gang warfare . . . .This strategy puts great emphasis on screening for gang membership upon admission and the development of detailed official criteria for establishing gang identification (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 13).

The issues of gang identification and recognition and the related development of information systems are critically important for control of the gang problem, both internal and external to the institution. Is it desirable, for example, to distinguish between the "acknowledgement and [the] recognition of prison gangs" (Camp and Camp 1988, p. 12)? Acknowledging the presence of gangs as illegitimate organizations but not formally acknowledging their existence as legitimate organizations minimizes the risk of providing credibility to the gang and their manipulation of the
institution's control system. Camp and Camp's recommendation is that detailed information on gang-membership and gang-activity characteristics (inside and outside of the institution) be placed on computer systems. Such information should be shared with a variety of other justice-system representatives to enhance control and prevent violence and other gang crime (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 21).

However, issues of prisoner rights and due process also arise. Labeling an inmate as a gang member for the purpose of singling him out for special attention, deprivation, or punishment in the absence of observed criminal behavior may be unlawful. Inmates cannot be excluded from prison activities or deprived of regular privileges because they are gang members without due process. Another dilemma is that the prison administration must protect a prisoner who is not a gang member, or a gang member who seeks to leave a gang, from harm by "predatory gang prisoners" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 19).

A variety of incentives and deterrents have been considered in order to limit criminal gang behavior in the institution. The California Department of Corrections has considered awarding "good time" to inmates including gang members, leading to early release. However, police in Chicago claim that the early release of gang members without alerting the police led to a renewal and escalation of the black-gang problem in Chicago public housing projects in the early 1980's. Prison administrators are more likely to use deterrents such as vigorous criminal prosecution for crimes by prisoners, use of technology to reduce introduction of drugs through visiting areas, inmate drug-testing, strengthening controls over inmate funds, stricter restrictions for inmates confined in segregation units, and making gang membership an aggravating factor when sanctions are applied for rule violations (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, pp. 56).

An alternative and more socially oriented strategy, recently encouraged by administration, staff, and inmates, is well-designed housing that "may not only deter gang violence but also reinforce constructive behavior" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 27). The key to the improved ability of the staff to supervise inmate activity and improved inmate satisfaction is smaller housing units. They provide "more options for housing assignments [and] reduce gang-member contacts . . . " (Camp and Camp 1988, p. 27). The use of smaller units and dispersing both the general and the gang inmate population "reduces the likelihood of housing units being labelled as one particular gang's 'turf' and . . . makes communication within the gang more difficult" (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 27).

In institutions, particularly in adult correctional institutions with a critical mass of inmates who are gang members or where there has been a tradition of gang violence, the critical factor according to Camp and Camp has been the efficient implementation of a suppression approach. Adequate numbers of staff are necessary, and experienced, professional line staff must be available to enforce prison rules in a professional manner. Guards must avoid implicit or explicit pressures not to enforce rules for gang
members in exchange for helping to keep the peace as a quid pro quo. Gang inmates—especially gang leaders—should not be given any notoriety within the system or in public, and they should not be combatted with any strategy that acknowledges gang structure or values. It is not considered wise to allow inmate clubs or organizations to meet privately. It is important never to abdicate control of any room or area to a gang. It is recommended that prison staff and administration not speak through gang leaders to their memberships (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 45).

Finally, the ultimate control weapon may be the transfer of negative gang leadership out of one institution to another, where his ties and patterns of influence may be reduced. "Separating and isolating gang leaders interrupts communication and can serve to fragment and cripple a gang operation" (Camp and Camp 1988, p. 49). On the other hand, the interinstitutional transfers of hard-core gang members may in fact spread the gang problem without necessarily alleviating a current gang problem, particularly where a line of secondary leadership in the gang has already been developed (C. Camp and G. Camp 1988, p. 47). To what extent these various elements of a supposedly efficient suppression strategy have been implemented, and how successful they have been in dealing with the prison-gang problem, is not clearly known.

In essence, a traditional corrections strategy is based on effective control. It includes swift reaction to and forceful prevention of forceful acts when necessary, special lockup arrangements for gang members, moving gang leaders or members from one location to another within the State correctional system or to another system across State lines, and isolation of gang leaders by almost any means possible. While this traditional approach assumes the presence of actual or threatened violence in a prison, another approach argues that prison violence may not always be a direct result of intergang friction, but rather of other problems. The presence of gangs may be a convenient rationale for frequent, erratic lockdowns and shakedowns (Caponpon and Tagatac 1985).

An evolving approach, slowly developing in a few youth correctional institutions, is based on notions of effective coordination with a variety of law-enforcement officials outside the institution; effective communication between correctional officials and inmates; social intervention, especially values-change programs; provision of internal institutional opportunities, such as education, training, and jobs for positive inmate change and development; and external community-based involvement and support programs. Good communication and rapport with inmates are carefully nurtured within a framework of effective supervision of inmate activities and sound organizational and community relationships.

A variety of techniques have been developed to facilitate coordination and communication with external system and community representatives. For example, victims of gang violence or parents of victims may be brought into the institution for discussion with inmates (Terhune 1988). Youth agencies and community organizations may be invited to provide a variety of services, including education, training, and preparation for social reintegration into
the community. The process of adjustment back to the community may commence before the youth leaves the correctional facility.

An experimental social services approach directed at gang youth has been developed by the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Corrections. A special program for hard-core gang offenders in their late teens (many of whom have been drug traffickers) has been established at the Ethan Allen Boys School in Wales, Wisconsin. A particular cottage, Draper Hall, containing these youths is the locus of the experiment. The assumption of the program is that "youth can eliminate delinquent behavior and disassociate themselves from gangism as a means of socialization . . . . The program within Draper Hall is individually designed while utilizing the power of group dynamics" (Shade 1988, p. 4).

The program addresses four general categories of intervention: psychosocial, educational/vocational, family/community functioning, and program evaluation. The treatment plan is designed for a maximum of 26 youths in a seven-month program involving intensive counseling, monitoring, and group participation. The staff anticipate some problems, as well as a few benefits, in the concentration of youth from different gangs in the same residential location. On one hand, it creates risk and generates some management challenges, but on the other hand, "the very design keeps the gang behavior from going underground and undetected, which then enables the staff to directly confront the resident in his activities, its purpose, and its negative results—creating the opportunity to challenge the gang values and participation" (Shade 1988, p. 18).

Another aspect of the program is individual and group counseling based on "the application of the Behavioral Error in Thinking" procedure which requires the youths to keep logs, identify behavior resulting from an error in thinking, and develop an alternative strategy that would be successful. The program also uses group training sessions to encourage successful communication and values clarification. The Draper Hall experiment is in sharp contrast to other youth institutional systems where officials either are not aware of gang problems, deny their existence, or simply emphasize the maintenance of orderly institutional routines rather than gang-related rehabilitation. The Wisconsin program appears to be a genuine attempt to change attitude and behavioral patterns and prepare the gang youth for outside living and social development in the community. Program processes and their outcomes in this experiment are to be systematically researched.
CHAPTER XII: SOCIAL OPPORTUNITIES: SCHOOLS AND JOBS

We believe it is important to define the policy or program strategy of social opportunities in somewhat restrictive terms to focus specifically on issues of education, training, and jobs. In part, this is to avoid confusion of the primary strategy of opportunities-provision with those of social-intervention and even, at times, deterrence. In practice, these strategies are often mixed or interrelated, but strategy emphasis is critical for policy and practice, as well as for analysis. Human services tend to equate social opportunities with social intervention and to overemphasize the value of personal counseling and various support services per se without reference to their linking or enabling function to basic institutional opportunities. Thus, youth services have been mistakenly viewed as functionally equivalent to educational and job opportunities. Juvenile detention and child-welfare placement can sometimes be regarded as a social opportunity, since they place youths in a stable environment and enable them to catch up on their schooling and get "cleaned-up," at least physically.

In the short and long term, school and job opportunities must be closely interrelated targeted to a range of types of gang youth, younger and older, at-risk and hard-core. A social-opportunities approach (in the highly specific and strategic sense in which we define it) requires that other strategies and programs of social intervention and deterrence also are provided on school or employment premises, or are closely connected with them. Finally, a social opportunities approach to dealing with the gang problem must be conceptualized and structured in such a way as to avoid labeling and social isolation of gang youth from mainstream developmental opportunities. It is critical to interrelate various mainstream and specially gang-focused educational, training, job development, and competency building programs to the optimal extent possible.

Local School Programs

Local community schools should be the primary locus for the development of early intervention programs for the gang problem. Local schools, along with parents and other institutions, bear principal responsibility for socializing and resocializing youth. Schools, especially elementary and middle schools, are identified with local communities and are an integral part of the life of families with children. The gang problem usually manifests itself on the streets, often around a school in a local community. A youth's joining a gang engaged in delinquent activity is a key indicator of defective socialization. The schools are an excellent locus for gang-related social change and development for the youth, since schools maintain both academic and social responsibility for youths six hours a day.

When a gang problem is present in a community, it may be manifested directly in the school. The schools often become a base
for gang recruitment and sometimes drug selling and drug use by gang youth. As suggested above, while gang fights are more likely to occur outside than inside the school, gang activities—including fights—are likely to be planned at school. Gang graffiti and related trespasses onto school property are not uncommon in gang-problem neighborhoods. While the gang problem can occur in more serious form at the high-school level, it usually involves relatively fewer youth, since an extremely high proportion of gang youth drop out after the ninth grade in many urban jurisdictions. The local elementary schools would appear to be the preferred location to develop school-based gang prevention and the middle schools a principal focus for early intervention programs.

The nature and extent of the schools’ response to the gang problem has been highly variable. Most school systems would probably prefer to ignore the problem, which, if recognized and dealt with, would involve a complex and expensive process of organizational change and development. School administrators often claim that there are other serious social problems such as teenage pregnancy, drug abuse, and dropouts, which afflict their schools, and that there are insufficient resources, including teacher and staff skills, to deal with the gang problem. When the school system does recognize the existence of gangs and reacts, the problem is dealt with as a school security problem. Special security arrangements may involve recruiting school-employed personnel, stationing youth- or juvenile-division police officers in selected schools, or employing outside security firms to provide services to safeguard school employees and students and protect property. Few of the security efforts are directed at the gang problem per se but rather at general problems of school crime, violence, and disorder, which, in many cases, are closely associated with specific gang situations.

This situation often results in an elaborate suppression strategy that brings in outside criminal justice agencies. For example, the School Crime-Suppression Program, recently approved by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, calls for "a 40 percent reduction in gang crime, with a primary emphasis on gang activities on school campuses. Probation officers assigned to the program are present on campus everyday" (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 17). Probation officers are expected not only to supervise minors who are gang members known to the court, but also to "engage in prevention of gang activities on the campus as a whole" (Los Angeles County Probation Department 1988, p. 17).

The Portland school system has developed a systemwide approach which—while focused on deterrence—has developed programs for youth-at-risk and their parents. The Portland school policy includes provisions for "closely monitoring school campuses for signs of gang behavior . . . searching lockers or students whenever there was any indication of weapons or drugs . . . [recognizing] the display of certain clothing or adornments that indicated gang membership . . . [and] strictly monitoring visitors to school campuses" (McKinney 1988, p. 7). Portland has also developed in-
school support groups and counseling programs for students who
display characteristics that may lead to gang battles, and also for
their parents (McKinney 1988, p. 7). At the high-school level,
programs stress helping high-risk students find something other
than minimum-wage employment. Portland schools work with private
industry councils to provide special job-related programs for high-
risk students.

The Portland school system is also proactive, with apparently
sufficient resources to deal with the youth gang problem on a
citywide basis, often beyond school boundaries. In addition to its
other school-centered responsibilities, the Portland school system
"is providing leadership and full cooperation with community, city,
county, State, and Federal agencies to thwart gang activities and
criminal behavior" (Prophet 1988, p. 3). Furthermore, school police
officers have developed "expertise to become Portland’s major
resource for information and intelligence on youth gang activities—
not just activities affecting the schools, but activities
affecting the entire community" (Prophet 1988, p. 3).

Some schools are beginning to experiment with special
counseling programs for the parents of students in the schools. The
Los Angeles Unified School District has recently inaugurated a
program that focuses on the development of self-esteem in parents
and teachers, rather than focusing directly on gang youths. The
program differs from the usual DARE (Drug Awareness Resistance
Education) or SANE (Substance Abuse Narcotics Education) school
prevention programs, which focus on youths at risk of gang
membership. This program aims rather at building self-awareness and
competencies among parents and school staff "for the purpose of
passing the attributes on to students, who may be potential gang
members and drug abusers" (Los Angeles Unified School District
1989, p. 7). The School District also has a special interest in
"enhancing the self-esteem of girls and women" (Ibid.).

Some school systems are experimenting with a variety of
broadly based programs that include social-intervention and
preventive-education efforts. The National School Safety Center
describes school programs around the country that have established
behavior codes, graffiti-removal activities, conflict-prevention
strategies, and crisis-management procedures to prevent and address
gang emergencies when they occur (National School Safety Center
1988). Social agencies, community organizations, recreation groups,
and police and sheriff’s departments are often invited to conduct
these educational and social-intervention programs.

Many of the preventive programs focus on elementary-grade
students, pointing out the dangers of gang activity and urging
students not to join them. "The Alternatives to Gang Membership"
curriculum of the city of Paramount in Los Angeles County, not only
provides comic books, posters, and discussion opportunities for
students that address the gang problem, but also sponsors
neighborhood meetings led by bilingual leaders. The program also
sponsors the informal counseling of individual youth who appear to
be at increased risk of gang involvement. The fifth-grade antigang

At least 15 other cities in California have developed school-gang diversion programs modeled after the Paramount plan. The Santa Ana City Council recently approved a school antigang program "aimed at students in the fourth, fifth, or sixth grades. Students will receive weekly one-hour lessons on gangs intended to counteract the 'glamorizing' they may be offered by older students already in gangs" (Schwartz 1988, p. 45). The Los Angeles Unified School District also has inaugurated an ambitious Gang-Resistance Education and Training curriculum in grades 3 through 9, with the capability to expand the range to kindergarten through grade 12 by changing the vocabulary and some of the activities. The program is designed so that the "classroom teacher can further enhance students' self-esteem and their ability to solve problems without violence or negative behavior. Topics for lessons include resisting pressure to join a gang, alternatives to gang activity . . . how to recognize and manage stress in school . . . and communication skills in situations where the student must be assertive with peers and adults" (Los Angeles County Probation 1988, p. 11).

Chicago developed an innovative proactive early intervention program for a short period of time. A model project in two middle schools in a high-gang-crime, inner-city community provided not only a curriculum to counter gang influence and special security arrangements to deal with school disorder and maintain school discipline, but also a crisis outreach program. The intervention program called for a unconventional staffing pattern. Paraprofessional school-employed outreach workers, specialist teachers, and counselors targeted 40 gang youths in sixth, seventh, and eighth grade who were already having serious academic and behavioral difficulties in each of the two schools. Many of the youths were known to the police, some with official records (up to 30 percent in one school). They were provided with remedial academic assistance and special counseling and service referral help, which was also extended to their parents. Crisis intervention at school and in the immediate neighborhood was provided during actual or potential gang fighting situations. Gang youths were not suspended from school but were required to complete classwork and were subjected to special tasks, surveillance, and discipline within the school. The development of a community advisory-group and parent meetings, as well as special recreational activities and visits by the targeted youth to jails and drug clinics, were also part of the program (Spergel and Curry 1988).

Most of the school antigang, gang-prevention, or gang-rehabilitation programs have been undertaken only recently. How the programs will evolve over time is not yet known. Suppression strategies appear to predominate and pressures exist in some States to make the schools a place where law-enforcement and other criminal-justice agencies can focus on the early targeting and surveillance of gang offenders. However, this outlook may not pay adequate attention to the need for the academic, vocational, and
social development of these vulnerable youth (California Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987).

Some youth agencies work closely with schools in prevention and social-intervention programs. The San Diego Youth and Community Services' Neighborhood Outreach Program employs a two-pronged intervention approach for middle-school youth-at-risk. This particular program is sustained through high school. The approach has a youth-specific component which includes the formation of a cohesive peer or club-type group that engages in consistent ongoing recreation, provides role-modeling, and assistance with educational goals, job development, and job placement.

The family-specific component of the San Diego community program includes work with "parents or parental figures, other siblings, and members of the household to provide a support base for youth to remain gang- and drug-free and in school" (San Diego Youth and Community Services 1989, p. 1). The program also emphasizes case management and intensive intervention across generations.

Few evaluations of school antigang programs have been conducted and the results, thus far, are ambiguous—mainly because of the incompleteness or inadequacy of the research. Most programs are not directed primarily to current gang members but to "wannabes" (marginal or peripheral younger youth). The results of evaluations of Paramount's "Alternative to Gangs Program" indicate that the attitudes of elementary and middle-school children about gangs can be changed positively after exposure to the curriculum—at least based on questionnaire responses. According to one set of news accounts, the number of active gang-members in Paramount has dropped from 1,000 to 200 since 1981 (Schwartz 1988). According to other reports, there has been an increase in gang cases known to the police from 286 in 1986 to 396 in 1987 (Donovan 1988).

In some cases, greater community involvement may be required. George McKenna, the former principal of George Washington Preparatory High School in Los Angeles and superintendent of the Inglewood Unified School District in Inglewood, California, modified many student- and parent-involvement activities to deal with the gang problem. Gangs had controlled the playgrounds, but under McKenna's leadership, parents became more active in school affairs—they even helped monitor hallways and restrooms. He not only urged parent participation in daily classroom activities but pushed for the location of probation, medical, and human services directly on school premises (President's Child Safety Partnership 1987, pp. 69, 107; McKenna 1990, pp. 23-29).

One controversial report by the Quality Education for Minorities Project (1990) recommended massive restructuring of the Nation's educational system, resulting in increased dependence upon Federal and State governments for the care and education of children. This report recommended an approach to providing educational opportunities to gang youth aimed not at changing the attitudes, values, and even behaviors of gang or at-risk youth directly, but at restructuring the schools by making "fundamental
changes in the rules, roles, and relationships in schools." (Quality Education for Minorities Project 1990, p. 46). Using this approach, the school becomes a base or a center to coordinate the social, health, and vocational services that children and families need, including health care, literacy training, day care, and employment and training (Quality Education for Minorities Project 1990, p. 54).

The building of systematic career vocational bridges between school and work is of special relevance to committed gang youth who generally are in their middle or older teen years. Few American schools have developed these links for youth who are neither prepared nor desirous of pursuing further academic education after graduation from high school. The development of school-business-industry agreements that establish links and mutual responsibilities is needed critically. The schools would make sure that such students meet attendance and achievement standards and business and industry employers would agree to hire preferentially the students so accredited.

In this system of school-work linkage, business and industry would make clear and precise the nature of qualifications needed by inner-city youth, with special attention to gang youth, for jobs. Schools would relate school performance to the job, and both schools and industry would structure attitudinal, classroom, and worksite training around cooperative learning and preapprentice or apprentice opportunities for hands-on learning (Quality Education for Minorities Project 1990, p. 74).

Employment Strategy

Job opportunities for older youth and young adults are critical to the reduction of the gang problem. Older adolescent and young adults tend to remain in gangs probably long after they are ready to leave them because adequate job opportunities and linkages to employment are not available. Many older gang-youth could be considered at "positive risk" of leaving gangs under appropriate conditions of employment and career-development opportunity. A recent national gang conference warned that youth are becoming more active in gangs largely "due to competition for the lucrative drug trade" (McKinney 1988, p. 1). Furthermore, intensive prevention programs (including increased training and job opportunities) are necessary to keep at-risk youth from joining gangs and older hardcore gang youth from using them as vehicles for developing the drug trade (McKinney 1988, p. 5).

In a recent article, Levitan and Gallo review the history of governmental policy geared towards improving the skills of and providing opportunities for the workforce, particularly for those who are socially handicapped. The Federal Government's interest dates back to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which authorized land grants to establish schools, and the Morrill Act of 1791, which established land grants for agricultural and mechanical colleges. Congress did not enact a general vocational rehabilitation program for the handicapped, however, until 1921.
The Roosevelt Administration inaugurated several massive public employment programs in the 1930's targeted at low-income or socially handicapped youth. This Federal commitment continued after World War II. "[T]he Federal Government has assumed [and continues to assume] primary responsibility for employment and training assistance" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 1).

Poor, jobless, and deficiently educated youth (including a large majority of gang members and offenders) have been, only to a limited and variable extent, targets of Federal employment and training efforts. The diverse characteristics of this socially disadvantaged youth group have required different strategies to "improve their employability, productivity, and earnings" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 4). Even youth who have mastered reading, writing, and arithmetic, but have little labor-market experience may "benefit from learning basic job-search skills" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 4). Disadvantaged youth, especially gang youth without adequate skills, can profit from programs providing a high-school equivalency degree or vocational training. Levitan and Gallo suggest that job opportunities for minority youth may be increased by "partially subsidizing employers for on-the-job training costs and by vigorous enforcement of equal-opportunity laws" (1989, p. 4).

At the same time, the implementation of Federal initiatives such as the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) has resulted in inadequate targeting and insufficient inclusion of socially deficient and handicapped youth in many of the available skills and employment programs. The "introduction of cost and job-placement performance standards, severe restrictions on stipends and support services, reduced funding, and an expanded business role have made creaming [or selection of the most qualified and employable youth] common under JTPA" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 15).

Remedial education is extremely important to the career development of these youth. Only limited interest exists in most programs, however, in the development of remedial education connected with skill or job training, sometimes because of lack of funds. Furthermore, many programs reject candidates without basic educational achievement. The Job Corps program, on the other hand, has been remarkably successful in providing an "equal share of educational and occupational training" for socially disadvantaged youth (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 15). Levitan and Gallo remind us that "quality classroom training has a proven track record for cost [control and] effectively improving participants' long-term job prospects," as indicated by analyses of CETA (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) and the impact of the Job Corps (1989, pp. 15-16). We observe, however, that Job Corps at the present time does not accept known gang youth with records of violence or youth currently on probation into their program.

It is important to focus job-training programs on those who need it most. Recent research concludes that "training programs can make the greatest impact by aiding individuals who are relatively more disadvantaged" (Levitan and Gallo 1989, p. 16). Levitan and Gallo believe that more disadvantaged youth—including gang youth—
should be targeted for and screened into rather than weeded out of programs such as JTPA (Job Training Partnership Act). In this way, the effectiveness of the Federal investment will be increased (1989).

Furthermore, the social and economic complexity of job-training and placement opportunities requires a comprehensive focus—not only on the youth himself, but also on his family. Social-intervention and social-opportunity strategies must be more integrated. Levitan and Gallo suggest that a case manager could guide the youth’s family to appropriate support services to facilitate the use of available job-program opportunities for both the youth and the family (1989, pp. 21-23).

The U.S. Department of Labor has recently initiated a Youth Opportunities Unlimited Challenge Program, which attempts to avoid the pitfalls of conventional, fragmented job-training programs through comprehensive community-based demonstration efforts. According to the Federal RFP’s (Requests for Proposals) statements, the local demonstration programs "must generate an integrated series of initiatives—including school-based and second-chance services—which are designed to address the various needs of each and every young person in a target area" (U.S. Department of Labor 1990, p. 1). The challenge grants are to have the following principal features:

1. Measurable and attainable community goals, with positive community impacts, including "reduced school dropout rate, decreased teenage pregnancy, increased young-adult employment rates, reduced drug abuse, increased school attendance, increased enrollment in post-secondary education, decreased juvenile delinquency and gang activity, and reduced criminal activity in the neighborhood . . . ." (U.S. Department of Labor 1990, p. 1).

2. Focus on a small neighborhood. The idea is to select "a small enough area so that all youth in the community will be significantly and positively affected" (Ibid.).

3. Visible center of activity. "The demonstration is to have a physical site . . . for example, a newly established alternative school, a community learning-center, or a youth construction-corps center . . . .Services must include assessment, individual and family counseling, mentorship, drug prevention, recreation activities, health services, education, housing . . . . job training, and employment assistance" (Ibid., p. 2).

4. Emphases on integrated multiple services, including concepts of core programs such as alternative schools, community learning-centers, youth construction corps, and regional work/study colleges; and complementary programs such as school-to-apprenticeship programs, teen-parent centers, summer remediation and employment programs, middle colleges, and community youth-centers.

5. Strong State, local, and community roles, including links with existing programs (such as JTPA); commitment to extra police protection; restructured junior and senior high
schools; drug-prevention, sports, and cultural programs; local advisory groups; and key organizational participation (Ibid.).

Local Employment

In addition to large-scale, Federal and State training and employment programs such as Neighborhood Youth Corps, Job Corps, and JTPA, which have thus far only peripherally addressed the employment needs and problems of gang youth, there have been locally generated and developed job programs. The widespread assumption is still that most gang youths would like to be employed when they reach a certain age (Reddick 1987). In fact, even many of those gang youths who are currently involved in drug dealing would "prefer decent-paying jobs to the gang life, but they lack the skills and the attitudes to get and hold them" (Insight 1988, p. 17). There is also some evidence that gang youths who obtain jobs are less likely to remain in the gang (Klein 1971; Hagedorn 1988). Even part-time jobs are viewed as helpful for many gang youths who are still in school (Williams and Kornblum 1985).

One locally generated effort that is specifically addressed to the gang problem is the planned Dane County Juvenile Court Prevention Program in Wisconsin. This project is funded with the aid of the recent U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Juvenile drug-gang initiative. Under the aegis of the juvenile court, but in cooperation with the Dane County Youth Conservation Corps, the project will generate different levels of paid conservation jobs for gang youths aged 14 to 18 years.

This program, targeted at both core gang members and youth-at-risk, will involve not only skills training but also alcohol- and drug-abuse education. Youth will be matched with job opportunities and mentors in the private sector (including small businesses and homeowners in the Madison County area) and organized into small groups. Career awareness and skills training also will be part of the experience. Court programs will be related to this particular gang-oriented employment and training project and will include a variety of housing and camping services as well as justice system deterrents, including shelter care, home detention, adventure challenge, and youth restitution (County of Dane 1989).

A very few locally sponsored programs and small businesses have addressed the specific interests and needs of gang youth for jobs. A handful of these have even provided social support and controls for the youths to allow them to adjust satisfactorily to the job. In the 1960’s, the YMCA in Chicago established a special job-support component for gang youth as part of its detached-worker youth program. Once the youth was on the job, the program provided job placement with sustained counseling and support. The outcome of this federally sponsored project was not entirely clear (Caplan 1968), but apparently its success was quite modest. Another approach was a New York City court’s employment program that formed a "self-sufficient but supervised company manned by ex-offenders and gang members. The company’s construction contracts—most of
them with the city of New York—exceed $1 million" (Sampson III 1984, p. 23).

Ad hoc employment programs of youth agencies or local businesses have been less ambitious, such as special youth-agency cleanup or painting projects (Pearl 1988). Also, the owner of a gas-pipeline construction business in Los Angeles claims to have employed gang members successfully over long periods of time. His approach is based on a combination of outreach, personal support, and strong authoritative counseling (Baker 1988b). A labor-contracting company in Chicago has recently begun to match low-skilled, unemployed, inner-city workers (including some gang or former gang members) with manufacturing jobs in the suburbs. The contractor provides onsite training, group transportation, and steady work for pay of $5.00 an hour (Casuso 1989).

None of these local programs has been fully or carefully evaluated over the long term. One job-development program reported that more than 1,000 jobs were provided to gang members, delinquents, and others through the efforts of the El Monte, California, police community-relations unit and the Boys’ Club of San Gabriel Valley in collaboration with over 100 local businesses and community organizations. Some factory employers even have come to depend on the pool of gang youth (Spergel and Chance 1990).

Another promising local-community youth-employment project is the San Jose Youth Conservation Corps in California. The program, related to the juvenile court and funded by State and private-sector grants, provides employment to justice-system-connected youth aged 18 to 22 who want a job. Many gang youths have been involved. The program has a current capacity of 50 job slots; about 100 youths have already participated. The court’s program participants are required to be periodically drug-tested and the few program failures have been drug-related. Local informants report that good workers in the program quickly advance to supervisory positions and then leave for jobs in the regular job market. Plans are underway to expand the number of job slots and to include not only youths who are on probation but also youths who are graduating from local correctional ranch-programs. Much more involvement and cooperation by private businesses, however, is still required and large-scale experimentation with such approaches is obviously highly desirable.
CHAPTER XIII: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND MOBILIZATION

The ideas of community organization, coordination, and mobilization can be conceptualized on two or three interconnected levels: governmental (Federal, State, county, and city government, involving mainly public agencies), with a further division of national and local; and grassroots (local-community or neighborhood efforts involving mainly citizen or consumer groups and nonprofit or sectarian agencies, and sometimes representatives of city government). In this particular discussion, we exclude networking at the individual client service level, which is indeed closely connected to and interactive with the interorganizational or community-mobilization approach we recommend. Our focus is at the aggregate client level with reference to policy and practice.

Different organizations and agencies within and across governmental and neighborhood grassroots levels often address the youth gang problem in separate, particularistic, and sometimes contradictory ways. Mobilized and coordinated approaches can develop when the various levels of organization have similar perceptions of the problem and establish closely related or interdependent policies, programs, and activities. Agreement needs to occur within the various levels and across them; for example, State and Federal agencies, such as Justice, Health and Human Services, Labor and Education could do a better job coordinating their programs within and across departments that bear directly on gang youth. Local interagency governmental task forces, including law-enforcement and local-community agencies and groups, might coalesce to join, plan, and operate gang prevention or gang intervention programs. Local citizen groups need to interact and coalesce with each other and local government in the development of antigang programs.

In this section, we deal first with recent State legislation and policy that attempts to mobilize mainly public-agency resources and direction; second, we address traditional local-community organization efforts and those that are currently evolving. In a separate volume (Spergel and Chance 1990), we also describe the processes and assess the results of local efforts at the mobilization and coordination of antigang control and intervention programs. Finally, we examine and cite beginning initiatives by two Federal agencies to mobilize local community efforts through local consortia of various types of criminal justice and community-based agencies as well as grassroots organizations.

Governmental Mobilization

Councils or legislatures in various cities and States (including California, Illinois, Florida, Washington, Minnesota, and Ohio) have recently completed reports and passed ordinances or laws related to the gang problem. Concerns have been expressed over the increase in gang membership, narcotics selling near or in schools, the use of beepers by students to distribute drugs, increased gang-
related violence and graffiti, the inadequacy of information on
gangs and gang members within and across jurisdictions, and the
need for more effective law enforcement and punishment of gang
offenders. Most legislatures have been compelled to respond to
pressures from the media, prosecutors, police, and some community
agencies; but, thus far, they have been reactive, fragmentary, and
suppressive in dealing with the gang problem. Most States have
already enacted legislation that limits dispositional alternatives
for repeat, serious, or violent juvenile offenders—especially
through the automatic transfer of juveniles to adult court. But the
development of legislation directed specifically to the distinctive
problems created by gang offenders is still in an early stage—
except, perhaps, in California where the most comprehensive
suppression approach in the nation has evolved.

The stages of action of State legislatures and executive and
judicial bodies have been varied. The Florida House of Represent­
atives’ Committee on Youth reported that "in 1981, Miami had 4
gangs with a total membership of 32. It now has an estimated 60
gangs with 1800 members. Gangs are spreading from South Florida to
other parts of the State" (Reddick 1987, p. 1). The committee
recommended the development of "a comprehensive delinquency-
prevention act . . . funding of a multicounty model gang-prevention
and intervention program in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach coun­
ties . . . [the development of a feasibility study for a] statewide
gang information-system and clearinghouse, [and the segregation] of
gang members in commitment programs" (Reddick 1987, p. 1).

The Florida State Legislature created a program that began to
target gang youth and gang problems in 1988. A proposed amendment
to the State penal code would "allow for sharing confidential
information with school superintendents regarding juvenile criminal
activity" and "restrictions on the sale, possession, and display of
spraypaint cans to individuals under the age of 18" (Stokes 1988,
p. 1). The legislation also would "relate to the establishment and
funding of School Resource Officers (SRO) in secondary and high
schools" throughout Florida to prevent and control gang problems
(Stokes 1988, p. 2).

Governmental concern with the gang problem is greatest in
California, particularly Los Angeles County. As yet, considerable
governmental action does not appear to have brought significant
positive results. Speaker Willie Brown of the California House of
Representatives recently noted that "gangs are increasingly violent
despite more than 80 bills passed by the legislature in recent
years directed at them . . . " (Sample 1988, p. A3). The Los
Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn considered requesting the
assistance of the National Guard to patrol neighborhoods affected
by gang violence, and California Governor George Deukmajian offered
to authorize a $10,000 reward to encourage victims and witnesses of
gang violence to come forward to press charges and testify against
gang offenders. He also successfully promoted the passage of
legislative bills to increase the severity of sentences for such
offenders.
Two States, California and Illinois, appear to have been most active until recently in pioneering legislation to deal with the gang problem. California, the State with the most severe and diverse gang problems, has probably produced more gang legislation than all the other States in the country combined. Its recent approach may be characterized as an innovative, proactive, and comprehensive community-oriented suppression approach with some secondary interest in educational and social-service strategies. The Illinois approach is more fragmented and is still largely unimplemented, but its intention until recently was to pursue social-support and social-development as well as suppression strategies.

The California approach was initiated and continues to be driven by the interests of prosecution and law-enforcement agencies seeking tough remedies to the gang problem. The California legislature acted in 1981 to improve the ability of district attorneys to address gang activity (California Penal Code, Ch. 35, Sec. 13826, et. seq). Between 1982 and 1986, the law was amended to classify law enforcement, probation departments, school jurisdictions, and community organizations as eligible for funding, with a clear mandate to implement a suppression approach.

The California legislature established a Gang Violence Suppression Program to be administered by the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning:

The purpose of this program is to reduce the level of gang violence in the community and to divert potentially dangerous gang activity into more positive and constructive behavior. The program also strives to keep open lines of communication between law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ offices, community-based organizations, probation departments, schools, the community and family members of gang or potential gang members. This is accomplished by swiftly identifying, prosecuting, and removing perpetrators from the community and by preventing incidents of gang violence. This approach works to incapacitate gang members already involved in violence and deter other young people who may be under criminal influence (Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, p. 2).

The legislation directs the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning to administer all State and Federal funds for these purposes and delineates the criteria to be met by each type of agency or organizational unit receiving funds. A unique effort, both by the legislature and by the office administering the programs, is to define what a gang is, who gang members are, and what a gang incident is. These definitions, however, are in the process of ongoing study, interpretation, and possible redefinition. At present, the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning has formulated its definitions as follows:
A known member of a gang is one who, on the basis of evidence adequate to support the reasonable exercise of a prosecutor's discretion, is identified as a part of a group of associating individuals, which:

a. Has an identifiable leadership and organizational structure; and

b. Either claims control over particular territory in the community or exercises control over an illegal enterprise; and

c. Enjoys collectively as individuals in acts of violence or serious criminal behavior (Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1987, pp. 3-4).

At a minimum, these crimes and criminal behaviors include homicide, robbery, arson, theft, burglary, major drug offenses, drive-by shootings, and extortion. In late 1988, the legislature found that "the State of California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods" (California Penal Code 1988, Part 1, Title 7, Chapter II, Section 186.20, p. 3183). A Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1988 was passed (California Penal Code 186.20). It specified the gang as a criminal organization:

A "criminal street-gang" means any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated . . . [assault with a deadly weapon; robbery; unlawful homicide or manslaughter; sale, possession, transportation and manufacture of controlled substances; shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle; arson; and intimidation of witnesses and victims] which has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity" (California Penal Code 1988, 186.22, p. 3184).

The California legislation also requires that criminal justice agencies, schools, and community organizations work together in planning and coordinating efforts (especially through local task forces) under the supervision or guidance of the prosecutor's office. The roles of the Department of Corrections and California Youth Authority, as well as the role of judges and defense attorneys, are absent from the legislation and are touched upon only briefly in the guidelines of the Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Nevertheless, close collaboration between and among parole, corrections, probation, and law enforcement appears to occur and is close in several local jurisdictions.
Finally, we observe that the amended legislation of 1985 and 1986 and other recent bills suggest the possibility of a broader and even more comprehensive approach providing a significant role for social intervention and especially prevention through school programs, beginning at an early age. For example, the legislature finds, among other things, that:

There is an increasing percentage of school-age pupils involved in gang activity . . . . There is no statewide funded educational program developed to implement programs designed to prevent youth from becoming involved in gang activities . . . . There is evidence that the parents of gang members lack appropriate parenting skills . . . . There is evidence that gang members have no contact with positive role models . . . . There is evidence that most gang members lack basic educational skills" (California Penal Code 1988, 13826.1, Chap. 3.5).

Thus, the California legislation, its implementing structure, and its funding arrangements indicate some recognition, but less than full understanding, of the need for a policy that emphasizes social intervention and social opportunities—and even prevention other than for purposes of suppression. The California model, unless balanced with strategies other than suppression, may already be contributing to a costly process of criminalizing young offenders and ultimately increasing gang activity—exactly the opposite of what the legislation fundamentally intended.

Illinois' legislative approach to dealing with the gang problem appears, at least initially, to have been quite different. The approach seems to be directed to the provision of social opportunities and social intervention as well as suppression efforts. Unfortunately, the legislation did not provide funding or an implementing structure for the programs envisioned. The legislation, passed in 1985, called for the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs to make "grants to community groups in order to improve the quality of life in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods . . . " (Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 127, Paragraph 3301 et. seq.). Qualified recipients of funds were required to provide alternatives to juvenile participation in gangs in one of the following ways: by creating permanent jobs; stimulating neighborhood business activity; providing job-training services; implementing youth recreation and athletic activities; and by strengthening community-based organizations whose objectives are similar to those listed above.

Additional legislation directed the Department of Children and Family Services to "conduct meetings in each service region between local youth-service, police, probation and parole workers to develop interagency plans to combat gang crime . . . [and] . . . develop a model policy for local interagency cooperation in dealing with gangs" (Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 23, Paragraph 5034.2). These actions have not yet been taken, however. One year later, the legislature broadened its
efforts to combat gangs by adding gang-related responsibilities to two other State agencies. The State Board of Education was called on to "... enter into contracts for the establishment of three social group-work demonstration projects in school districts .... " (Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 122, Paragraph 2-3.72). In selecting sites for the projects, the board was required to consider the need for reductions in gang crime activity. Companion legislation called on the Department of State Police to create an Office of Coordination of Gang Prevention to "consult with units of local government and school districts to assist them in control activities and to administer a system of grants to units of local government and school districts which, upon application, have demonstrated a workable plan to reduce gang activity in their area .... " The department was also required to "establish mobile units of trained personnel to respond to gang activities" (Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 127, Paragraph 55 a-3,9-4, p. 1926).

Funds for the above programs have not yet been provided, but a small gang-unit was established within the Department of State Police, and the State Board of Education did make a small grant to the Chicago school system for a study of the city's gang problem. This latter effort predated the actual legislation by more than a year (Spergel 1985).

We also note a law that has received much local publicity in Chicago: the automatic transfer of a minor defendant charged with unlawful use of a handgun on school grounds from juvenile court to adult court. The law creates "safe school zones in and around school property and deals severely with the bringing of firearms, the selling of ... hard drugs in and around schools [and] with adults trying to recruit juveniles into ... gangs" (People [Illinois] v. M.A. [A Minor Appellee] 1988, p. 143). In a court challenge, the statute was held to be constitutional because it did not deprive the defendant of "due process" and "equal protection" (Ibid., pp. 135-147). To what extent the law has been used by the Chicago Police Department is not yet clear.

Since the mid-1980's, the Illinois legislature has also passed legislation that has "whittled at the jurisdiction of juvenile courts." The Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld a law approved by the legislature that requires "judges to allow a 15- or 16-year-old suspect to be brought to trial as an adult if prosecutors show a prior finding of delinquency in Juvenile Court and providing that the new charges are gang-related" (Grady 1991, pp. 1, 20).

The legislative response to gangs in Illinois has become increasingly harsh. The Illinois approach is relatively fragmented, without clear sense of direction, coordination, or implementing structure across executive departments. The California approach is more deliberate and comprehensive, but highly suppressive and unbalanced. In general, California has been more successful in mobilizing a variety of institutions and governmental agencies to deal with the gang problem, but the youth gang problem continues to escalate and spread there until recently at a faster pace than in Illinois.
Finally, we observe that various calls for legislation at state and Federal levels to address the gang problem generally support a suppression strategy. The Metropolitan Court Judges Committee of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges recently requested additional Federal law to deal with the juvenile gang problem and interstate drug trafficking. The committee recommended that the judiciary and law enforcement "coordinate their efforts to address youth gang activities, including definition by law that they are organized crime operating on an interstate scale" (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 31). The judges were especially concerned that Federal legislation should center attention on adults who recruit juveniles in such interstate drug-trafficking activities (Metropolitan Court Judges Committee 1988, p. 31).

Local Community Mobilization

In recent decades, a variety of ad hoc community efforts (sometimes ephemeral and weakly organized) —have developed to deal with gang problems. They are in the classic American tradition of local organization and community mobilization to deal with a whole range of human problems and experience (Tocqueville 1954). In the current era relevant to the gang situation, they represent spontaneous citizen efforts to "take back the streets" from gangs and to meet some of the youths' social needs so they will not become gang members. These efforts may be sponsored by or closely associated with established community-based organizations. They may also be led by charismatic individuals or serve the particular interests of a few local community or aspiring political leaders. Sometimes these efforts become the basis for the later development of formal community-organization or social-agency programs that elaborate initial antigang tactics, whether directed to suppression or social development of gang youth. Sometimes these initial antigang mobilization efforts veer off or come to focus in due course on other social or community concerns.

Many of these local efforts arise out of a sense of fear, anger, or desperation by local citizens and often result in limited, ephemeral programs and organization. They may develop in response to a perceived failure in the missions or programs of police and social agencies. Representatives of these sometimes spontaneously formed local groups may take a militant stand against established agencies for not providing appropriate services addressing the gang problem. These local groups may set up alternate patrol, surveillance, or recreational activities for youth. At times, they evolve into broad-scale approaches to dealing with youth gangs. Almost none of these local-community efforts has been subjected to systematic evaluation, so evidence for their success or failure is largely anecdotal.

Such local mobilization efforts, however, may be regarded to some extent as variations of a more general citizen crime-control and prevention movement, usually directed at crimes against property and of personal annoyance. A good deal of recent theory and
research exists about such programs, particularly where there has been outside stimulus and resource input. The key objective is to implant more effective systems of local crime-control. This "implant hypothesis" has been tested in "Neighborhood Watch" and other community crime-programs, and the results are not positive. The focus of many of these programs is a reduction in the fear of crime rather than in crime per se.

The evidence indicates that in most high-crime, usually low-income, mixed racial and ethnic neighborhoods, local citizens do not participate substantially in community crime-control activities planned or carried out for them. In fact, when mobilization is somewhat successful or when awareness and participation in dealing with the problem increases, fear of crime may rise rather than decrease. The effects on the rates of crime either are unclear or are not available (Rosenbaum 1987, 1988). The problems of mobilizing citizen participation against gangs are considerably greater when serious violence and crime such as drug trafficking are the sources of concern. Intimidation and attacks against local citizens by gang members are not uncommon. Consequently, one major program response by law enforcement in cities with serious gang problems is witness or defendant protection.

While the risks for citizens' participation in the fight against gang crime are higher than in most community crime-programs, the costs of inaction may be commensurately higher. There are examples of local groups of mothers, fathers, neighbors, and even gang or former gang members mobilizing by themselves or with the aid of established agencies to control or reduce gang situations or problems. These groups are especially aroused when their own property, family members, or they themselves are attacked or threatened. Local schools and streets in the neighborhood are usually the scene of activity of these local groups.

In large cities such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles and in smaller cities and suburban communities, local groups may patrol streets and supervise social events such as house parties, street festivals, and dances to prevent gang disorders. The local police sometimes regard these citizens as their "eyes and ears" (Insight 1988, p. 9). Local groups have taken credit for "driving gangsters" out of the neighborhood, but some of these activities have a vigilante character, involving the destruction of property belonging to presumed gang members and shooting them "defensively" (Insight 1988, p. 11). Local-citizen group activities may include the patrol of, or intrusion into, school buildings, the observation and intimidation of teachers and students suspected of using or selling marijuana, and the destruction of businesses suspected of selling weapons to gang members. Some organizations such as the Guardian Angels and the Black Muslims may not "shrink from interrupting drug deals, throwing dealers and buyers up against the wall, and searching them or surrounding and detaining them while the police are called" (Insight 1988, p. 12).

Fagan documents other, less militant, forms of local-citizen involvement:
Residents in one neighborhood formed an emergency information-network that served as an early-warning system when gang conflicts were about to erupt in violence. Relaying news that one group was about to set on another, the residents intervened through mediation and involvement of law enforcement to diffuse conflict situations... In another neighborhood, residents arranged truces and sponsored events where gang members turned in their weapons and pledged nonviolence for specific periods during which turf conflicts and other disputes could be resolved through negotiation and conciliation. The authority and neutrality of the neighborhood organization made possible the trust and cooperation of gangs who were bitter enemies (1987, pp. 59-60).

Mothers' groups also have been active in the local battles against gangs. During 1973 and 1974, the mothers of gang members in Philadelphia are reported to have been effective in intervening by literally interposing their bodies between groups of youths about to attack and shoot each other. Mrs. Frances Sandoval recently organized a group in Chicago, Mothers Against Gangs (MAG), patterned after Mothers Against Drunk Driving, which now has chapters in several neighborhoods of Chicago and other Illinois cities. Ms. Sandoval, a mother whose son was killed in a gang fight, has mobilized citizens and other mothers in the largely Mexican-American Pilsen area of Chicago to volunteer and provide support to those mothers whose children have been victimized by gangs. Visits to court to testify against gang members are encouraged. Lectures and discussions with teachers and students at local schools are conducted. Advocacy efforts include campaigning for gun-restriction laws, improving safety at school, and pressuring police and special antigang youth-programs to be more active. Parents Against Gangs, an offshoot of MAG, is also a chapter of Parents Against Murdered Children which was recently established in Chicago. Another organized group is Mothers Against Gangs in Communities (MAGIC) in Los Angeles. It "hopes to overcome community fear of gangs and even reach the parents of gang members to turn in their own children [to the police] to save lives" (Crust 1988, p. A3).

The East Los Angeles Concerned Parents Group, formed in the early 1970's, is probably the longest-running organization at the grassroots level that confronts the youth gang problem. The organization started as a support group for the parents of young men who had been killed in gang-related violence. Brother Modesto Leon, a monk of the Claretian Order, encouraged the group to become proactive and communicate with each other across gang turfs to deal with impending gang fights and to better control their own children. The Concerned Parents Group learned to trust the authorities to call the police when necessary, to work closely with probation officers and, if necessary, to have their own children placed in jail to protect them. These parents have been involved in
mediation meetings to bring about peace between warring gangs and have organized mutual support activities to prevent and control drug-trafficking activities by their own children and those of their neighbors. This group has recently inaugurated a program of visitation to and discussion groups with youths in correctional institutions, as well as with their parents.

For a period of 10 or more years, these efforts, along with those of other organizations and community groups, appeared to contribute to a significant reduction in gang homicides in the East Los Angeles community (Spergel and Chance 1990). The area has recently reverted to a pattern of extremely serious gang violence, setting all-time gang homicide records. The return to gang violence may result from several factors including the presence of a new generation of immigrants and a renewed fragmentation of local institutional relationships as well as increase in local poverty problems.

More common, perhaps, are the efforts of local-neighborhood organizations concerned with multiple community issues and development problems. Periodically, these organizations turn their attention to youth-crime and gang problems. Their interest is usually of a broader, preventive nature. For example, a Neighborhood Watch Group in Long Beach, California, (a community with a mix of blacks, Hispanics, whites, Samoans, and others, each with its own youth gangs) organized "against gangs, crime, apathy, and illiteracy" and against "activities from graffiti to homicide" (Strassman 1988, p. A1). The organization deals with gangs and associated problems through block-watch, tutoring, and family-development activities. It is especially interested in motivating parents to better support and encourage the proper development of children (Strassman 1988).

Fagan observes that it is difficult to "motivate families to participate in the lengthy developmental process of forming and sustaining an effective organization against gangs and crime," especially when parents are faced with "more immediate, concrete issues: housing, clothing, and child care" (Fagan 1987, p. 60). Many of these groups, if they survive, tend to move on to other activities that are less threatening, more feasible, and more generally acceptable to various elements in the broader community such as recreation and tutorials for younger children, especially those who are less delinquent.

It is extremely difficult for a neighborhood group or citizens organization to deal with an established or chronic gang problem simply because the youth gang is usually better organized and better able to sustain gang interests, e.g., drug marketing and activities related to turf control. Adequate, long-term citizen efforts to fight gang activities are extremely difficult to maintain. For example, several years ago, two neighborhood parks were built with Federal grants in Pomona, California, to provide young people with alternatives to gang membership. They evolved into:
Neighborhood Youth Organizations

Local youth organizations, including youth gangs, themselves, have sometimes expressed an interest in and attempted to control or reduce the level of gang violence and certain types of gang crime in neighborhoods. They have attempted to control fights and vandalism, and especially to prevent disorders at public events such as festivals, dances, and block parties, and before, during, and after riots. Sometimes these youth-patrol efforts have been organized by local youth agencies, businessmen, or citizen groups. Youth organization antigang and anticrime crime efforts occasionally have had the support—and even the sponsorship—of law-enforcement representatives. One such federation of youth organizations is the Inner City Roundtable on Youth (ICRY) in New York City, which has now been in existence for over 15 years. It sought to bring "all the gangs in the city of New York together under one umbrella—together in terms of talking about training for the future" (Galea 1982, p. 228). ICRY became a means of obtaining funding from various sources for small-business development opportunities, as well. Prominent public officials and business leaders sat on its board and apparently both supervised and facilitated the work of the organization (Galea 1982).

The Federacion de Barrios Unidos, a federation of gangs or barrios, was formed in East Los Angeles in 1971. Its purpose was to control gang violence and to combat drugs. It used former gang-influentials as the basis for organizing community-improvement associations which involved gang members in such activities as repairing and painting old buildings, sponsoring a boxing program, and opening up "opportunities to do something in the community which met the basic psychology and needs of the gang-barrio member (care, acceptance, love, achievement, recognition, responsibility, self-esteem, and self-actualization)" (Pineda 1974, p. 42). Reportedly, the federation was successful in its mediation efforts between warring gangs, and the California Youth Authority’s Gang Violence Reduction Project modeled itself after it.

As discussed earlier in chapter VIII, SOCIAL INTERVENTION, a variety of projects in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s attempted to use the gang structure as a basis both for gang-violence...
reduction and gang-member rehabilitation, in addition to community improvement and manpower development. Apparently, none of these projects was notably successful in achieving its objectives—in part because they provoked very considerable community and particularly police opposition (Poston 1971; Spergel 1972; Perkins 1987). Youth patrols, sometimes involving gang members under police supervision, also received a mixed review during the urban riots of the 1960’s. They were not particularly well-organized, sustaining, or effective, although they were not necessarily a base for criminal activity (Knopf 1969).

New Federal Mobilization

The Office of Human Development Services, Administration for Children, Youth, and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has developed a Youth gang Drug-Prevention Program. The agency found that "concerted and comprehensive efforts are needed at the community and grassroots levels to prevent and reduce further the recruitment and involvement of at-risk youth in gangs" (Federal Register 1989, p. 15108). Emphasis in this program is based on the "coordination of city, county, and State services and systems with those of community-based organizations" (Federal Register 1989, p. 15108).

The anticipated benefits of this initiative are expected to be the establishment of "new, improved, or expanded services or methods of service delivery. For example, innovative cooperation and information sharing between law-enforcement and community-based agencies . . . The role of employers and businesses . . . as full partners in the proposed activities . . . to increase the self-sufficiency of at-risk youth . . . [and] the institutionalization of these activities (Federal Register, p. 15109).

Recipients of the initial awards have included State, county, and city government offices (including manpower, departments of human resources, school systems, housing authorities, and recreation departments) as well as a range of nonprofit agencies such as settlement houses and family- and youth-service projects. The Federal share of project costs for the larger groups of government and community consortia ranges between $700,000 and $800,000 for the first year, and the possibility of more than a single year’s funding also exists.

Coordinated public-, voluntary-, and nonprofit-agency programs may be evolving, although it seems that little direct grassroots involvement has occurred, at least at the sponsoring level. In this particular set of programs, the police, probation, court, and correctional agencies appear to be involved only secondarily. The focus is on prevention and early intervention, parent education and counseling, and various forms of youth-outreach counseling and referral such as drug- and gang-awareness counseling, pre-apprenticeship programs, and limited job experiences. The extent to which programs will reach youth at higher risk levels is not clear. A great variety of existing socialization programs, emphasizing recreation and athletics, will undoubtedly be strengthened.
Purchase of service and case-management techniques are apparently favored in the projects selected for funding.

To what extent these programs will be adequately monitored or evaluated also is not clear, although a certain amount of in-house research evaluation may occur in some cases, and a national evaluation has recently been initiated. Systematic prospective model-testing has not yet evolved. Nevertheless, various criteria of successful process, impact, and effectiveness have been identified by some of the agencies receiving funds. Whether these programs will be generally or meaningfully assessed is uncertain; and we may learn little from any assessments that are completed. However, the programs do appear to represent a positive step in the development of more organic, cross-agency approaches to combat the youth gang problem in distinctive local community ways by Federal agencies.

It is possible that a more comprehensive, systematic, and sustained set of model interventions and evaluation efforts may result from the current research and development efforts of the U.S. Department of Justice such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP’s) National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, of which the present study is a part. The design stages of this effort include assessment, model development, technical assistance, and field testing. The program appears to be broadly focused on the justice system, youth-service agencies, grassroots organizations, schools, and employment. The focus is on younger as well as older youth-gang members at individual as well as at organizational and community levels of intervention and involvement. In recent years, the Federal Government has established several programs to aid the development and sponsorship of governmental and community broad-scale mobilization efforts. These include the National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention program, the newly formed OJJDP National Youth Gang Information Center, recently initiated law-enforcement-oriented programs of the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice, and still other programs of the Department of Health and Human Services. It remains to be seen whether these programs will lead to further steps in the Federal Government’s gang efforts, possibly including the Departments of Labor and Education and other Federal agencies.

We observe that the three primary objectives of OJJDP’s planned National Youth Gang Information Center program will be (1) gathering and disseminating current statistical and descriptive information on violent youth gangs; (2) gathering and disseminating information on model programs; and (3) assisting in the coordination of Federal, State, and local gang program development and technical assistance. If these objectives are achieved, significant data gathering as well as community mobilization at least at the Federal level will have occurred.
CHAPTER XIV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Youth gangs have been a problem in both Western and Eastern societies for a long time. They exist currently in socialist as well as free-market economies, and in developing as well as developed countries, although they vary in prevalence, organization, character, and degree of criminality. Youth gangs were prevalent in urban centers in the United States prior to the 19th century and in the early decades of this century. Nonetheless, various national commissions in the late 1960's and early 1970's considered youth gangs to be only a limited aspect of the crime and delinquency problem. Until very recently, youth gangs were thought to be a serious problem confined to a few large urban areas.

Description, analysis, and policy development in reference to the gang problem have been impeded because of a lack of adequate data and diverse definitions about what a gang or a gang incident is. Information about gangs also tends to be politicized or serve particular organization or ideological interests. Scholars have employed varying definitions of the gang, often without adequate empirical basis for broad generalization or utility for policy formulation. Definitions may determine whether we have a large or a small problem, whether more or fewer arrests are made, which agencies receive funds to deal with the problem, and which methods of confronting the gang problem are endorsed.

Some of the earlier definitions emphasized benign, communal, or social-support aspects of gangs. A few academics still perceive youth gangs to perform important economic and political functions. They view the gang as mischievous, committing mainly minor infractions, and a way that male youths adapt to a socially deprived urban environment. Recently, observers have begun to perceive the gang as participating in more serious, violent, and criminal behavior, including drug trafficking. Law-enforcement definitions of gang incidents focus on high-profile serious crime and therefore tend to be more narrowly focused than community-agency or citizen definitions. However, law-enforcement definitions range from almost any illegal act committed by a group of youths to a set of specific criminal activities by juveniles that grow out of gang motivation or specific gang circumstances. The issue of whether a gang is simply any delinquent group or a more specialized entity has not been resolved. But the definition of the gang appears to refer increasingly to juvenile and young adults associating together for serious, especially violent, criminal behavior with special concerns for turf and criminal-enterprise interests.
Scope and Seriousness

Despite extensive media attention, and perhaps also because of limited research and lack of consensus on what a gang or gang incident is, the national scope and seriousness of the gang problem is not clearly or reliably known. Based on law-enforcement and media reports, criminal youth gangs or gang-members are to be found in almost all 50 States. No region of the country is without youth gangs. They are present in certain large- and middle-sized cities, and even in smaller communities, but may be absent or comprise a less serious problem in other seemingly similar cities and communities. Gangs are present in city, State, and Federal correctional institutions as well as in various public school systems. Recent studies indicate that gangs or gang members are present in 67 percent of the State correctional institutions. All the public high schools of Chicago report the presence of gangs or gang members, although not necessarily gang problems.

It is not possible at the present time to estimate meaningfully the number of youth gangs or gang members in most cities, schools, prisons, or other social contexts. While it is clear that gang and gang problems have spread to many localities and various parts of the country, and the numbers of gangs and gang members have increased in many of those places, there are also reports of a decline in the number of gangs, gang members, and gang problems in some cities immediately adjacent to others with serious problems. Sharp fluctuations may also occur in estimated numbers of gangs and gang members in a particular city during a relatively short period of time.

Nonetheless, there is reasonably good evidence of a general increase in gang-related violence in several cities, particularly on the West Coast and in other rapidly changing and economically depressed urban areas. Gang members (at least those with arrest records) are responsible for a disproportionate amount of violent crime. At the same time, the proportion of total serious crime committed by gang members is very low; in a city like Chicago, it is less than 1 percent, at least based on its narrow motivational definition. However, the gang problem lies in its concentration in certain categories of violent crime such as homicide and aggravated assault and in its prevalence in certain neighborhoods. In recent years, reports of gang homicides (using a broad or inclusive definition) have ranged from 25 percent to 30 percent as a proportion of all homicides in the city of Los Angeles. Moreover, the rate of gang homicides per population may be even higher in Ponce, Puerto Rico, and in certain California cities other than Los Angeles. In part, such variability depends on the nature of the definition of gang incident employed.

The close relationship between gangs, violence, and crime is most evident, however, when delinquent and criminal patterns of gang and nongang delinquents and their careers are examined. Juvenile gang membership is associated with significantly higher levels of official prevalence and incidence of delinquency. Based on official statistics, the rate of violent offenses for gang
members may be three times as high as for nongang delinquents. Self-report data also indicate that gang members have a higher adjusted frequency of hidden delinquency than do nongang delinquents. Gang membership also appears to prolong the extent and seriousness of criminal careers.

**Drugs and Violence**

The relationship of gangs to drug use and drug trafficking was usually a source of only passing interest in the early gang literature. Gang members were cited as ambivalent in their attitudes to drug use and often as demonstrating hostility toward drug dealing—especially involving hard drugs. In recent years, there has been evidence that more gang youth are using and selling drugs. Currently, some youth gangs (more likely gang cliques or former gang members) are heavily engaged in the street sale of drugs, if not also mid-level distribution. However, the growth of drug dealing by gang or former gang members is insufficient to account for the greatly increased sale and use of drugs in many inner-city communities. Furthermore, while individual gang members may be involved in violent activities that are related to drug use or sale, the existence of a causal relationship between gang-related violence and drug use and sale is less clear. High levels of competition for drug markets increase the likelihood of conflict, but most gang homicides still appear to be based on traditional turf conflicts.

**Character of Youth Gangs**

Gangs appear to be more highly structured than delinquent groups, but generally they are viewed as loosely organized. Gangs are also structured in a variety of different ways. Some gangs in a particular locality are based on age divisions (vertical structure); other gangs located in different parts of the community, city, or across States have the same or a similar name (horizontal structure). Coalitions of different gangs, called "nations" or "supergangs," exist, but it is important not to exaggerate the degree of cohesion or peaceful relationship among gang organizations in these associations. The size of the gang has been a source of disagreement. Estimates have ranged from four or five into the thousands.

The gang consists of different types of members: core members, including leaders, regulars, and associates; peripheral or fringe members; and "wannabes" or recruits. The core may be regarded as an inner clique that determines the basic nature and level of gang activity. The extent to which gang members maintain long-term gang roles and specific positions is unclear. Some members join for a short period of time. A youth also may switch membership from one gang to another for various reasons. In general, core members are more involved in delinquent or criminal activities than fringe members. Leadership may be viewed as either a group function or a specific position—sometimes shifting, at times relatively stable.
At the heart of the concept of the gang is the idea of territoriality or turf—originally control of physical space but also increasingly of illegitimate enterprise. In some cities, gangs have a less well-developed sense of physical territoriality. In addition, as the gang members and the gang mature, there tends to be a certain variable shift to the idea of criminal enterprise, at least in the current era. Protection or control of space becomes less important than controlling access to illegitimate income sources, often drug markets. A distinctive character of the gang or gang affiliation remains its commitment to the use or threat of violence in achieving objectives, whatever they may be.

Demographics

Variables of class, culture, race, and ethnicity interact with local-community factors of poverty, social instability, and social isolation to account for the variety of gangs and gang problems that exist. Youth gang problems in the United States currently appear to be found largely in black and Hispanic (particularly Mexican-American and Puerto Rican) low-income populations where they are concentrated primarily in urban areas. The rate of increase in Asian gangs (especially Chinese, Vietnamese, and Korean) appears to be high, particularly in California, New York, and the Southwest. White youth gang or gang type problems, proportionately the lowest, are increasingly differentiated, including such groups as Stoners, Skinheads, motorcycle gangs, and satanic groups. There are significant differences within and across racial/ethnic or cultural groups in terms of structure, criminality, violence, and drug trafficking. Variations exist by region of the country. There is also some evidence that black gangs, especially older youth or young adults related to these gangs, are relatively more involved in drug trafficking; Hispanic gangs in physical, turf-related battling; Asian gangs in a variety of property crimes; and white gangs in organized property crimes, vandalism, and racism. In general, violence between gangs remains largely intraethnic or intraracial.

The age range of gang members appears to have expanded in recent decades—particularly at the upper end. Members remain in gangs longer for increasingly serious criminal-gain oriented purposes. Extreme gang violence is concentrated in the older-teen and young-adult age range. The average age of the gang homicide offender is 19 or 20 years old and the victim a year or two older; the average age of the arrested gang offender is 17 or 18 years years old. The aging of the youth gang population may be due to many factors—especially the changing structure of the economy, the loss of desirable unskilled jobs, and increased access to street-level drug dealing opportunities requiring gang background and skills.

The evidence is overwhelming that males are almost exclusively responsible for gang-related crime, especially violent offenses. About 5 percent or less of reported gang crime appears to be committed by females. Male gang members are estimated to outnumber
females by 20 to 1, but half or more of the street gangs may have female auxiliaries or chapters. Some gangs are mixed-gender groups; a very small number are unaffiliated or independent female gangs. Females are likely to join gangs at a younger age and leave earlier. Female involvement in gangs is less substantial; their criminal gang behavior appears to be related directly or indirectly to that of the dominant male pattern. Furthermore, despite myths to the contrary, females are more likely to make a positive contribution toward conventionalizing male gang behavior than to inciting male gang members to violent or criminal activity.

Membership Experience

The gang experience is increasingly important for low-income youth from unstable and sometimes even stable social environments. The gang provides certain psychological, social, cultural, and economic functions no longer adequately carried out by family, school, and legal employment. Four sets of precipitating factors have been used to explain gang-related delinquency and violence: (1) individual-member need for status or reputation; (2) group cohesion or solidarity; (3) personality disturbance or social disability; and (4) economic advantage. Relationships among gang members may be viewed as a continuous struggle to manage status and security needs, as defined and redefined by the gang over time, in relation to community opportunities and constraints.

Under what conditions status-striving is reduced or enhanced in its contribution to delinquency and violence, particularly through group activities and cohesion or solidarity, has been at issue among researchers. A key unresolved question is whether gang cohesion or solidarity leads to delinquency and violence or whether delinquency or violence precede the development of cohesion. The time sequence is important for purposes of policy and programming. Focus can be on preventing the gang from forming or cohering, or on controlling specific delinquent situations or acts per se after the gang is established, through, for example, individual counseling, family treatment, supervision, suppression, or environmental "target hardening" (e.g., property surfaces that cannot be marred by graffiti). Suppression seems to be the dominant approach at the present time.

Social/Personal Disability

We know little about the social and personal disabilities of delinquent gang youth that distinguish them from nongang delinquents or differences in personality types among gang youth. There is some speculation that core members are more troubled than fringe members. The notions of megalomania, weak ego, and anxiety are often introduced in explanations of gang-member personality. Also, we are not sure how intelligent the gang member is compared to other nongang members from the same environment. Gang members have an exceedingly high rate of school dropout. Some researchers view the gang member's so-called personality disturbance and social
handicap as functional to survival in his environment and to the gang's status system. A distinctive character trait of the gang member may be his excessive need, drive, or interest in wielding power, exercising control over others, and mastering his social environment through whatever means available.

Social Context

The factors of rapid population change, social disorganization, racism, increasing poverty, and social isolation contribute to institutional failures and the consequent development of youth gangs. The interaction of social disorganization and lack of access to legitimate resources most significantly accounts for the development of serious deviant groups and subcultural phenomena in a variety of contexts. The family, school, politics, and organized crime may contribute in a variety of ways to the formation and development of individual gang-member behavior and gang patterns.

Family

Family disorganization such as single parent families or parental conflict does not predict gang membership per se. A variety of other variables must be associated with weak family structure to produce a problem gang youth, including the availability of a peer group that does not support family, school, and other normative values. Gang members, however, appear not to be generally rebellious or hostile to parents or family members—except, perhaps, among white gang members. While youth gang membership may not be explicitly acceptable, it may be traditional among many inner-city families. The extent to which some families of gang members condone or implicitly approve participation in the gang—particularly if the youth thereby helps to support the family economically—also may be a contributing factor.

Schools

Few schools directly address gang-related problems. Gang problems are perceived as present in many inner-city schools, more so by students than by faculty. Police data indicate that the gang problem is generally more serious outside than inside the school. However, gang conflicts may be planned or started in school and carried out after class is dismissed. A key problem is that students who do not adapt well at school and who do not like school are likely to be attracted to gangs. Nevertheless, certain schools—even in the worst gang- and crime-ridden communities—appear to do a better job than others in sustaining low rates of gang involvement and problems by students.
Politics

A symbiotic relationship has been observed between politicians and gangs in certain low-income urban communities, particularly those in process of considerable demographic or political change. Political aspirants with a weak or shifting base of support and shortage of manpower may call on gangs and gang members to perform a variety of tasks needed to compete in local politics, such as obtaining signatures on petitions, putting up or tearing down election posters, intimidating voters, and getting voters out to the polling place. Gangs and gang problems also serve as an important means for a variety of organizations to achieve ends not directly related to the problem, such as increasing newspaper circulation or media influence, election of "law and order" officials, expanding youth-serving programs, and augmenting police personnel and equipment to fight crime generally. Gangs have been used by a variety of organizations at times of urban or organizational disorder to try to control or stimulate disruption or riot potential, and thus to stabilize or destabilize social situations.

Organized Crime

So-called violent and criminal subcultures have probably become more integrated in the 1970's and 1980's than they were in the 1950's and 1960's, as newer minority groups are entering organized crime. Greater competition among nascent criminal organizations, the relative increase of older youth and adults in street gangs, and the expanded street-level drug market probably have further contributed to the integration of violence and criminal-gain activity. Several observers suggest a close relationship between youth gang members, street or corner youth, and organized adult crime. Adult criminals may follow the street reputations of youngsters and use a process of gradual involvement to draw youngsters into criminal networks. Youth gang structures, or cliques within gangs, increasingly may be considered as subunits of organized crime for purposes not only of drug distribution, but also of car theft, extortion, and burglary.

Strategic Response

Four basic strategies have evolved in dealing with youth gangs: (1) community organization or neighborhood mobilization; (2) social intervention, especially youth outreach or street work; (3) social and economic opportunities provision; and (4) gang suppression and incarceration. Since these strategies are often mixed, it is possible further to incorporate them into two general organizational approaches or ideal types: a conventional, limited bureaucratic or unidimensional professional approach and a comprehensive, community-centered approach. The strategies can be examined in terms of historical development and from the
perspective of specific institutional or organizational policies and programs.

The local-community or neighborhood approach of the 1920's and 1930's was an early attempt to bind elements of local citizenry, social institutions, and the criminal justice system together in a variety of informal, and later, formal ways. The approach often did not clearly target delinquent or gang youth, but focused on neighborhood-group involvement and led to greater socialization activity by youth agencies and early development of social intervention efforts. The assumption of the more sophisticated social intervention strategy, i.e., outreach or street-work approach of the late 1940's and 1950's, was that gangs were relatively "normal" or adaptive and could be redirected through counseling and group activities and that the values and norms of gang members could be changed in the process. This strategy, while it targeted gang youth better than the local-community approach, was also unidimensional and not adequately integrated with other approaches, such as the suppression of criminal behavior or the provision of job and educational opportunities.

Natural concern with the rising rates of delinquency, unemployment, and school failure of inner-city youth in the late 1950's led to a series of large-scale social resource infusions and efforts to change institutional structures in the 1960's. This opportunities-provision strategy did not specifically target the youth gang problem. While such programs as Head Start and Job Corps appeared to have a positive effect on the reduction of delinquency, it is not clear to what extent the gang problem was either addressed or modified by these programs. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, there was, in fact, evidence of a rise in the scope and seriousness of the problem in several cities, such as New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. A new strategy emerged: police suppression and enhanced incarceration of core gang-offenders; to some extent, this is still the dominant strategy, although evidence of a more complex evolving strategy is also present.

Social Intervention

A variety of youth-agency programs to deal with the delinquency or youth gang problem have been developed and assessed. The outreach or street-work "value change" model has persisted over several decades, but almost all evaluations indicate its lack of success in delinquency reduction. Outreach approaches can contribute to increased cohesion and criminalization of the gang. Furthermore, if unrelated to law-enforcement approaches, they can contribute to the polarization of a community. Recent street-work crisis-intervention efforts, which are integrated with suppression and neighborhood mobilization strategies, have given some promise of success but have not been evaluated. For the most part, youth-service agencies with the support of public officials still continue to emphasize conventional and limited strategies of social intervention such as counseling and recreation without adequate relation to other strategies.
Police

Law enforcement has pursued, with certain exceptions, a conventional approach to gangs that is focused almost exclusively on suppression. Law-enforcement agencies continue to use such tactics as: surveillance, aggressive patrol and arrest, followup investigation, intelligence gathering, and some prevention and community-relations work. Police have also recently created sophisticated data or information systems and improved coordination with other law enforcement. However, none of the varied police program activities has been subjected to outcome evaluation. While a "nip it in the bud" suppression strategy may be successful in reducing the number of gangs and violent gang-incidents in smaller communities or emerging gang cities, for a limited period of time, an exclusive suppression approach seems not to be effective and rather is associated with an increase in gang-related drug trafficking as well, whether in a large or small, chronic or emerging gang-problem city.

A modified police suppression approach incorporated into a community-collaborative set of strategies, which gives increased attention to prevention and social-intervention roles may be promising. A variety of programs and tactics have been developed by police departments in pursuit of this more complex approach. Some gang-specialist officers have directly engaged in counseling, job referral, school lectures, and community-organization activities and reported some positive results. But we still do not know whether this set of modified suppression and more community-oriented strategies is any better than a conventional suppression approach. Some observers claim that the development of the drug problem may have reduced the gang-violence problem in some cities. Others claim that cities with greater access to social opportunities, whether legitimate or illegitimate, seem to have less serious gang problems.

Prosecution

The primary mission of prosecution continues to be the successful prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of gang offenders. In many respects, the recent innovation of vertical or hard-core gang prosecution, witness protection, and community-information programs are steps towards, not only a more specialized but also, a more comprehensive approach. The evidence is fairly clear that vertical prosecution has improved the rate of conviction and incarceration of gang members. Vertical prosecution focuses on serious hard-core gang offenders. It is possible to argue that the effectiveness of the vertical-prosecution approach could be broadened to include preventive and social-intervention strategies, particularly for younger offenders. In addition, constitutional questions have been raised about the increased scope of the law and the prosecution of youth simply because they are members of gangs which are defined as criminal organizations.
Judiciary

The judiciary has paid relatively little systematic attention to special approaches for dealing with gang problems or gang offenders. Judges attempt to be as objective as possible in dealing with gang cases, but the tendency for them has been to emphasize a "get tough" strategy and to remove the serious juvenile-gang offender from the jurisdiction of the juvenile and family courts. While many judges pursue a broader social and community-based approach for deprived children and minor offenders, there has been little consideration of adapting such an approach in dealing with juvenile-gang offenders. Increasingly, however, some judges are becoming concerned that a policy of stiff sentences contributes to a worsening of the gang problem in prison as well as in the community when inmates re-enter society. Some judges try to sentence gang youth to the few available correctional institutions and community-agency contexts that provide opportunities for social support, training, and jobs, as well as strong supervision.

Probation/Parole

While a few States and counties have paid special attention to the youth gang problem, most supervisory agencies do not target gang members or make special arrangements to deal with them. Los Angeles County, San Jose, San Diego, and Orange are some of the few counties to have developed specialized probation programs that emphasize enhanced supervision of gang youth often in collaboration with law enforcement agencies. A few probation and parole units, however, have experimented with combining counseling, social-service, community-involvement, and increased surveillance strategies. Philadelphia several years ago developed a clear-cut probation-community integrated approach, apparently with positive results, and the Gang Violence Reduction Program, a parole project of the California Youth Authority, successfully combined the use of former gang members as outreach workers and a strong community-involvement strategy. The integration of a variety of justice-system strategies (including supervision, counseling, community involvement as well as work opportunities for probationers and parolees) appears to be particularly promising.

Corrections

The prison or training school may be regarded as both a response to but also a facilitator of the gang problem. Incarceration or incapacitation, while a simple, short-term, and often necessary response, has led to increased gang cohesion and membership recruitment in many institutions and may indirectly worsen the problem in the streets. The development of gangs in prisons has been attributed, in part, to the mistaken approach of certain officials who gave recognition to gangs as organizations and tried to work with them to maintain institutional control. In most prisons, a conventional suppression approach still predomin-
ates, including such techniques as swift reaction to and forceful prevention of gang activities, special lockup arrangements, and moving gang leaders from one prison or prison system to another.

A community-based, comprehensive approach is more likely to be developed in a youth-correctional institution. It provides for close coordination with a variety of law-enforcement officials outside the institution, effective communication between correctional officers and inmates, and increased social opportunities for positive inmate development and change, including training and work programs. Evidence for the beginning development of more comprehensive and promising long-term approaches exists in some programs developed by the California Youth Authority and Wisconsin's Ethan Allen School for Boys.

Local School Programs

Schools can be regarded as the best community resource for the prevention and early intervention of gang problems, although most schools—overwhelmed by other concerns—would prefer to ignore the problem. After the denial subsides, the first step taken to respond to the gang problem is often to bring youth-serving organizations, the police, or probation authorities onto the school campus. Sometimes probation officers have established special outreach or school/gang programs that involve parent education, counseling, and referral. The development of special antigang curricula for children in the early grades, taught by representatives of these outside agencies, has been of particular prevention interest in recent years. While there is some evidence that these curricular efforts are successful in changing youths' attitudes about gangs, it is not clear that the behavior of youths who are already gang members is also changed. In California and Oregon, a variety of school antidrug programs that address some gang issues are currently being tested.

Pilot efforts are presently under way in which the school proactively reaches out to the community to involve parent groups, a variety of community-based agencies, local business as well as criminal justice agencies in dealing with the youth gang problem. Agencies may be located in the school and interact with the school and parent groups, as part of a team, take responsibility for services to youth and control of the problem. Special remedial education and apprentice programs targeted to gang youth have also been attempted.

Local Community Organizations

In recent years, local-community efforts (sometimes ad hoc, ephemeral, or social movement-oriented) have developed to deal with the gang problem. Some of these projects are variations of more general citizen crime-control and prevention programs. It is questionable whether such citizen-participation programs alone can be effective when the risks of intimidation by gang members are high and the community is insufficiently mobilized. Nevertheless,
a variety of proactive and angry—if not militant—local-citizen groups have formed to deal with gang problems, sometimes with the aid and supervision of the local police. Such groups patrol streets, supervise social events, and monitor students in school buildings. Some of the groups have taken on a vigilante character and have been known to interrupt drug deals, restrain offenders until the police are called, and directly retaliate against gang members. On the other hand, resident groups have attempted to mediate gang disputes; for example, mothers' groups in Philadelphia were active in preventing gang conflict. Recently, in various cities, mothers' and parents' groups have organized to press existing law-enforcement or social-service agencies to take a more active stand against gangs. Such community groups may supply support services to victims or general recreational or tutorial services to youth-at-risk.

A variety of youth-organization structures, including gangs and coalitions of gangs and former gang members, also have been established to control gang violence or to assist in controlling more general types of urban disruption. Some of these projects have been sponsored by social agencies, public and voluntary, and sanctioned by the police. Some youth-organization efforts have been opposed by the police, especially when they appear to represent criminal interests. These efforts to involve gang members in gang-control and sometimes community development efforts usually have not been well developed or well supervised, and often have resulted in community controversy. There have been some promising results in East Los Angeles, where local-community group and youth-organization activities were integrated as part of social-intervention, suppression, and social-opportunity provision strategies.

**Employment**

Large-scale training and employment projects have not yet targeted gang youth adequately, although there is evidence that gang youth would prefer a decent-paying job to the gang life. Full-time and part-time jobs are viewed as useful in dealing with the gang problem. However, gang members generally lack the skills and attitudes to hold jobs. A variety of social support, remedial-education, and supervision strategies appear to be required to make job- and training-programs directed at gang youth successful. Some local job-development projects have been promising such as the San Jose Youth Conservation Corps experiment, which is closely connected with the juvenile court. In the program, gang members are provided with jobs, closely supervised, and subjected to regular drug testing. A high rate of success is reported, thus far, in this program. Another program in El Monte, California is also viewed as successful; it involves the Boys' Club, the police, and business and industry in extensive job-development and placement efforts for gang youth. Recent U.S. Labor Department efforts to develop comprehensive community-based job training and placement programs
targeted at a variety of socially deprived youth—including gang youth—may be promising.

Legislative Response

Legislatures in various States have conducted investigations and passed laws that have addressed gang problems. California has been the most active, with scores of bills passed in recent years. It has also developed the most comprehensive suppression approach. Legislation in Illinois appears to be broader in scope, but fragmentary and largely unimplemented. It promotes improved educational and job opportunities, child-welfare agency responsibility, and better police organization to deal with the gang problem. Other States, including Indiana, Ohio, Florida, Texas, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and Minnesota, have recently considered or actually passed special gang-related legislation, mainly of a suppressive nature.

In 1981, California legislation was concerned initially with improving the ability of district attorneys to address gang activity. Between 1982 and 1986, the laws were amended to include law enforcement, probation departments, school jurisdictions, and local-community organizations. A Gang Violence Suppression Program was established in the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning to administer all State and Federal funds allocated for specified gang-related purposes. In 1989, new legislation created definitions of a gang, a gang member, and a gang incident based on the idea of "street terrorism." California guidelines require that criminal-justice agencies, schools, and community organizations work together under the supervision of the local prosecutor’s office to plan and coordinate community-wide approaches. However, the main emphasis appears to be on enhanced supervision and longer sentences for offenders.

Policy Implications

A variety of intervention strategies have evolved, often without adequate integration. "Softer" social-intervention youth-development approaches have alternated with and "harder" law-enforcement suppression, as predominant, strategies; at times, these two approaches have clashed. Informed perspectives, clear definitions, and articulated intervention models have not yet been adequately developed or integrated, and certainly not systematically tested, in most chronic or high-rate gang problem cities. Prevention or early intervention strategies, targeted at youths beginning gang careers, have also not been adequately conceptualized in emerging cities and social contexts.

A comprehensive approach, under the sponsorship of some authoritative agency (such as the probation department), or directly out of the mayor’s or county supervisor’s office, involving cooperation between public and voluntary agencies and community groups, should be created and systematically tested—particularly in cities where the youth gang problem is chronic,
serious, and entrenched. An early intervention approach based in the public schools, in collaboration with community-based youth agencies, the police and community groups should also be tested, particularly in emerging gang problem cities or neighborhoods. The following general policies therefore are recommended:

1. To avoid excessive labeling, the definition of a gang should be restricted to high-profile youth gangs engaged in serious violence and crime whose primary purpose for existence is symbolic or communal in nature, rather than economic. Primary drug-trafficking or criminal-gain organizations should not be considered youth gangs. The definition of a gang incident should be any illegal act that arises out of gang motivation or gang-related circumstances. Nevertheless, information systems should be developed to track those serious repeat gang offenders when they also engage in gang-related serious crime as well.

2. Youths who give clear indication of gang involvement should be the primary targets of early intervention and comprehensive gang-control programs. Using this strategy, we assume that a small number of youths can be targeted for special remedial and supervisory attention. The tendency to identify at-risk youth without clear criteria of potential gang membership should be avoided.

3. A special comprehensive approach should be established in chronic gang-problem cities. Leadership of such efforts should be assigned to an official agency—such as probation, or possibly parole or law-enforcement. Alternatively, a special unit in the mayor or county board’s office could be established to coordinate the program. All criminal-justice agencies—including police, probation, parole, judiciary, prosecution, and corrections—should be part of the new authority or coordination mechanism, supported by key voluntary agencies, schools, business and industry, and local-community groups. Multiple strategies of social-intervention and suppression, with emphasis on social opportunities and community mobilization, should guide the development of program activities and the roles of various personnel. While priority should be given to early intervention programs, special education and training programs for juveniles and younger adolescent gang members, programs should also be targeted to hard-core older gang adolescents and young adults. A new training and job-development structure should be established as part of the authority, concerned primarily with the special needs of older adolescent and young adult gang members who comprise the more serious component of the problem.
4. In emerging and, in some instances, chronic gang-problem cities or contexts, a local educational administrative unit should take responsibility for the development of special programs in collaboration with youth agencies, law enforcement, family or juvenile court, other social agencies, community groups, and local business. These programs should be directed towards the social education and social control of targeted gang youths, especially those between 11 to 15 years old in the middle grades who are beginning to take on gang roles and are already engaged in law-violating behaviors. Efforts should be made to improve the academic performance and social adjustment of such youths, and provide them and their parents with outreach counseling, referral, and opportunity-provision programs. General antigang-crime curricula, crisis intervention, and school and community advisory groups should be established directly by the special school unit for the development and implementation of early, school-based, gang-control programs.
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