Drug Traffic

- Marijuana
- Cocaine
The kick-off ceremonies for DEA's 20th Anniversary on May 5, 1993, brought together DEA's agents, administrators, friends and family—from the past and the present—to celebrate our accomplishments during two decades of fighting against illegal drugs.

Twenty years ago, on July 1, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon decreed that one agency—the Drug Enforcement Administration—would enforce the drug laws of our nation. The agents who joined DEA in those early days came from a variety of law enforcement backgrounds, and their combined talents ushered in a new, more focused era of drug law enforcement.

It was that history of dedication to a single purpose, as well as our readiness to meet the enormous challenges of the drug problem that enabled DEA to mature into the premier drug law enforcement agency in the world.

Our position as an international leader in the drug-fighting arena was demonstrated in Operation Green Ice, the first systematic effort to attack the financial empire of the Cali Cartel. By reaching out to our state and local law enforcement colleagues, other Federal law enforcement agencies, and to our international colleagues, we have shared our decades of drug-fighting expertise and proven how effective a "united front" against drug traffickers can be.

The evolution of the DEA's expertise over the past two decades was evident in the anniversary displays on view in the Headquarters' lobby. As an historical backdrop, a video of the continually changing drug trafficking routes showed how enormously complex drug trafficking has become in 20 years. Other exhibits, such as an actual cocaine lab and examples of seized trafficker assets, offered us a chance to look back on our distinguished history with pride and to look toward our future with an increased determination to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in America.

This magazine captures the spirit of DEA's 20th Anniversary celebration. When the exhibits are gone and the speeches are but a memory, this issue of Drug Enforcement will be a keepsake, as well as a reminder of the complexity, vitality, and professionalism of this agency.

The In Memoriam section of this publication is a tribute to those who have given their lives in the service of DEA's mission. This book is dedicated to their memory.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT

Drug Trafficking Routes 1973  
1

Family Tree  
5

DEA Administrators  
11

The Badge  
14-15

Enrique “Kiki” Camarena  
17

Demand Reduction  
20

Did You Know?  
23

In Memoriam  
24

Drug Trafficking Routes 1983  
34

20th Anniversary Celebration  
36

Ill-Gotten Gains  
43

Drugs and the Movies  
47

Rogues  
53

Administrator’s Forum  
62

Operation Green Ice  
69

Drug Trafficking Routes 1993  
72

On the Cover:
The Many Roles of DEA

Top Left: Undercover—Undercover DEA Agent meets with suspect.

Top Right: Interdiction—DEA Agents in Operation Woodpecker in Tampa, Florida remove 7,303 pounds of cocaine contained in cypress wood boards from Brazil.

Bottom Left: Asset Seizure—This ocean front property in Key Biscayne, Florida, seized by the Miami Field Division, had been used as the “Winter White House” by President Nixon before it was sold. It was bought by drug trafficker Roberto Striedenger, and subsequently was seized by DEA.

Bottom Right: Financial Investigations—DEA displayed its leadership in the international drug law enforcement arena when seven top-ranking Cali Cartel money managers were captured worldwide. Operation Green Ice involved the cooperation of eight nations.

Drug Enforcement Administration  
Washington, D.C. 20537

William F. Alden  
Chief, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs

Paul E. Fitzgerald  
Chief, Communication Services Staff

Carol Gibson—Editor  
John Boyle—Photographer  
Jackie Choi—Illustrator

The Attorney General has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of the Department of Justice.
Because the Greek physician Hippocrates left records describing its therapeutic powers, we know for certain that opium was used as early as the 5th century B.C. Marijuana, derived from the hemp plant, was used in ancient China as an anesthetic. The coca leaf has been used as a drug in South America since 1500 B.C. when Indians living in the Andes mountains began chewing the coca leaf to stave off hunger, cold and fatigue.

Drugs were undoubtedly used even longer than recorded history asserts. In prehistoric times, the medicine men or women, often called witch doctors or shaman, were thought to have magic powers. These early healers had merely learned of curative powers of herbs, roots and barks.

In experimenting with medicine, man discovered a darker, toxic, addictive side of drugs. In the mountainous regions of Peru, where coca plants grow abundantly, the addictive qualities of the coca leaf became apparent. Messengers whose job it was to run from village to village at the highest altitudes in the Andes were given cocaine in order that they might run faster for longer distances with little food and less sleep. They were then paid in cocaine to assure their addiction and “loyalty” to their jobs. The Chinese recognized the potential for addiction, and banned opium in 1729.

The growing conditions in Europe were not as favorable as those in Asia or South America for cultivating opium, coca or cannabis. Only as trade routes opened up was the West introduced to the drug culture.

Drugs reached the shores of the New World as medicines brought by settlers. For over 100 years, we legally imported opium. By 1805 we were refining morphine from opium, and hailing it as a “miracle drug.” Many soldiers on both sides of the Civil War who were given morphine for their wounds became addicted to it. Ironically, cocaine was prescribed as a cure for morphine addiction in the 1880s.

As the 20th century began, drugs were both plentiful and cheap. Dr. Agnew’s Catarrah Powder, a cure for the common chest cold, contained 10 grams of pure cocaine to the ounce. Adamson’s Botanic Cough Balsam contained the new and allegedly non-addictive drug heroin. Dr. Brutus Shiloh’s ‘Cure for Consumption’ contained heroin in combination with chloroform. Sears-Roebuck catalogues advertised two-ounce bottles of laudanum, a mixture of alcohol and opium, for 18 cents or a one and a half pint bottle for $2.00.

In 1906 Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act which prohibited interstate shipment of food or soda water containing cocaine. Just prior to the enactment of this law, Coca-Cola took the coca out of its popular soft drink and substituted caffeine.

Domestic drug law enforcement came about because of U.S. foreign affairs. After the Spanish American War, President Theodore Roosevelt called for an international conference to take steps to control opium traffic, particularly in the Far East. At a conference in Shanghai, 13 nations discussed the narcotic problem. At a second conference, held at The Hague, the first international opium agreement, which restricted distribution, was
signed. The U.S. then found itself in the embarrassing situation of restricting the use of opium overseas while doing nothing to control it at home. As a result, the first piece of drug legislation, the Harrison Narcotic Act, was enacted in 1914.

The Harrison Act provided for the registration and taxation of those who manufactured or distributed opium, morphine, heroin, or coca products. No one outside the medical profession could obtain a registration to deal in narcotics. Furthermore, under this act, doctors could be arrested for prescribing drugs rather than other treatment for addicts. The Harrison Act laid the foundation for all future Federal drug policy. Because the Harrison Act was primarily a tax law, the Bureau of Internal Revenue Service in the Department of Treasury was given responsibility for enforcing it.

When Prohibition became the law of the land in 1920, narcotics agents became part of the Prohibition Unit within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury. As such, they were fighting both drug smugglers and bootleggers. Headed by former pharmacist Levi Nurt, the Narcotic Division consisted of 170 narcotic agents working out of 13 district offices with a combined budget of over $1 million.

The Roaring Twenties were an age of revolt and freedom. Of concern to Federal agents during the period was the degree of organization among criminals and their wholesale use of high-powered automobiles, machine guns, and explosives. Small-time smugglers were overtaken by large organizations such as Al Capone in Chicago and Dutch Schultz in New York. Although alcohol and illegal gambling were their mainstays, organized crime was not ignorant of the profits to be made from narcotics.

The escalating crime rate of the 1920s was viewed as a logical consequence of the escalating use of narcotics. Avid anti-narcotics crusader, Richmond P. Hobson said in a nationwide radio broadcast on March 1, 1928:

"Drug addiction is more communicable and less curable than leprosy. Drug addicts are the principal carriers of vice diseases, and with their lowered resistance are incubators and carriers of the streptococcus, pneumococcus, the germ of flu, of tuberculosis, and other diseases."
He closed by saying,

"Upon this issue hangs the perpetuation of civilization, the destiny of the world, and the future of the human race."

Lawmakers debated over who should be responsible for alcohol and narcotics law enforcement. Representative Stephen G. Porter, a long-time advocate of narcotics control, wanted the enforcement of narcotics and whiskey laws separated. In 1927 the Bureau of Prohibition, separated from the Internal Revenue Service in the Treasury Department, worked closely with state and local law enforcement agencies to control drug smuggling.

The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was established on July 1, 1930. President Herbert Hoover appointed Harry T. Ainslinger FBN’s first Commissioner of Narcotics, a position he held under four U.S. presidents for more than three decades.

Commissioner Ainslinger believed that narcotics control in the U.S. was most effectively dealt with at the source. He assigned FBN agents to various ports of entry, and personally reached agreements with the heads of 20 law enforcement agencies around the world to exchange intelligence. His international efforts resulted in a dramatic rise in drug seizures in 1930. Ainslinger’s agents were pursuing only cocaine and opiate cases in those days. To pursue marijuana, amphetamine and barbiturate cases would spread the agency too thin.

The Thirties were marked with depression, labor strikes, wholesale unemployment and foreclosures. Adolph Hitler ascended to power in Germany, and in 1939, German troops invaded Poland. As the gloom of the Thirties spread throughout the United States, so did the use of marijuana. Politicians from states along the Mexican border warned of a marijuana epidemic. Newspapers printed stories of crime and insanity brought on by marijuana use, and it was seen as a serious national problem. By 1936, all 48 states had legislation to control the cultivation of cannabis, but its production and use was not prohibited by federal law. In 1937 Congress placed marijuana and hashish in the category of illegal, federally controlled drugs when it passed the Marijuana Tax Act.

As World War II spread across Europe, it effectively closed the Mediterranean Sea to the narcotics traffic. International narcotics traffic was suppressed to the point that heroin on the streets of the U.S. in 1940 was only about 5% pure, and many addicts were reported to be in search of paragoric, an anti-diarrheal containing powdered opium. The heroin shortage resulted in a rise of thefts from pharmacies, hospitals and other sources of legitimate drugs. And for the first time, barbiturates became recognizable as a potential drug abuse problem.

1941: Undercover agent Joshua Taylor (right) known on the streets as Cyclone Thompson, walks along Market Street in Martinsburg, West Virginia with defendant Julius Eisenberg just before Eisenberg sells Taylor five ounces of heroin. Taylor was one of the first three black agents hired by the FBN.
After World War II, the U.S. faced a surplus of opium. In addition, synthetic drugs began to appear on U.S. streets. Cocaine had been virtually non-existent since 1930, but began showing up at U.S. Ports of Entry, and was traced to clandestine factories in Peru. Until 1946, each new drug that came along required separate legislation before it could be controlled. Finally, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was given blanket jurisdiction over synthetic drugs.

In the 1950s, Mexican opium made its way to New York where it was refined into heroin, and from there distributed to major cities throughout the U.S. FBN Agents began to see a rise in addiction in major metropolitan areas during this time, as well as a fall in the median age of drug offenders. Both the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 imposed harsher penalties as well as mandatory prison sentences for narcotics violations.

The 1960s and early 1970s saw an explosion of civil unrest, political upheaval, and recreational drug use. Alarming increasing numbers of young people—perhaps feeling that the problems of the day were too overwhelming to be solved—took the advice of drug guru Timothy Leary to “Turn On and Tune Out.” Drug use was not only tolerated, but fashionable. And very profitable. Organized crime was ready to supply the great demand for drugs. The flower children demanded cocaine, heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, and hallucinogens—anything that promised “better living through chemistry.”

In 1966 a brand new federal enforcement unit, the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC), directed by John Finlator, was created within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Its responsibility was to control stimulants such as methamphetamines and various hallucinogens. In 1968, however, the Johnson Administration consolidated the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) by implementing Reorganization Plan Number 1 to establish, under the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). The name of the agency was lengthened to emphasize the new breadth of its jurisdiction. John Ingersoll was appointed Director of BNDD on August 1, 1968. Before the new bureau could be modern or efficient, there were rifts to close and wounds to heal. Also, new fields of battle. Brown heroin was coming in from Mexico, and the country was witnessing an explosion of hallucinogens. If that weren’t enough to keep the new agency busy, 1968 was an election year and the public was crying for law and order. Richard M. Nixon was elected president, partly on his promise to restore law and order to the nation. On July 14, 1969, in a message to Congress, President Nixon said:

"Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a local police problem into a serious threat to the personal health and safety of millions of Americans."
Nixon then sent forth proposed legislation which would “make a clean sweep” of all previously existing statutes.

On October 27, 1970, Congress passed the comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which replaced more than 50 pieces of drug legislation. Title II of the Act, known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) gave Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce for drugs. It also established five schedules, which classify controlled substances according to their potential for abuse. Drugs are placed into categories according to how dangerous they are, how great their potential for abuse, and whether they have any legitimate medical value.

The President next issued an executive order establishing within the Executive Office a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) to oversee all facets of treatment, rehabilitation, education and research for the next three years. The strategy, according to the director, was to make health care for addicts “so available that no one could say he committed a crime because he couldn’t get treatment.”

Since its inception, BNDD was growing stronger. Its budget more than quadrupled; its agent force had grown to 1,361 by February 1972; and its foreign and domestic arrests had doubled. Seizures had increased dramatically. The Bureau now had regulatory control over more than a half million registrants licensed to distribute licit drugs. It had six of the most complete forensic laboratories in the world.

BNDD was not alone in fighting drugs. The U.S. Customs Service had a special Drug Investigations Unit to deal with drug smuggling. The FBI was being drawn deeper into the drug fight as organized crime became more involved in illicit drug trafficking.

Yet there was clamoring for the government to do more to attack crime in the streets. In January, 1972, the President signed another executive order creating the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE). ODALE soon established nine regional offices to thwart street pushers through special grand juries and to pool intelligence for Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. But as each new agency entered the fray, there was further fragmentation by multiple authority, competing priorities, and lack of communication. In response to the need to
coordinate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of drug intelligence, President Nixon created another independent unit in the Justice Department under the direction of a former FBI chief, William C. Sullivan. The Office of National Narcotic Intelligence (ONNI) was established to pool case-related enforcement information for Federal, state and local agencies. In the absence of any data base of its own, ONNI found itself left in the dark.

Eventually, President Nixon submitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 2, which consolidated all Federal anti-drug forces under a single unified command. Placed under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department, the new organization—the Drug Enforcement Administration—came into being on July 1, 1973. An executive order abolished BNDD, ODALÉ and ONNI and placed their functions under the new DEA. The drug enforcement functions of the Customs Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), and the White House Office of Science and Technology were also transferred to DEA. All aspects of Federal drug law enforcement were thus combined under DEA's leadership, and the modern era of drug law enforcement began.

For the next 20 years, DEA would be shaped not only by the events of history, but by those who led the agency, and by the men and women who were, and are, the agency.
The men who have led the Drug Enforcement Administration during the past two decades have contributed, each from his own strengths, to the effectiveness and the personality of the agency. From John Bartels, appointed at age 38 to blend the rival factions of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), Office of National Narcotic Intelligence (ONNI), and elements of the U.S. Customs Service into the Drug Enforcement Administration, to Robert Bonner, most recent administrator of the preeminent drug law enforcement agency in the world, each has left his mark.

John R. Bartels, Jr.

Served as Administrator: October 4, 1973-May 30, 1975


Significant changes in drug law enforcement during tenure: "In 1973, the agency was formed by merging Customs, BNDD, and other intelligence functions into the Drug Enforcement Administration. The largest issue facing us was stopping the importation of heroin from Mexico. DEA worked closely with treatment, intelligence and other local law enforcement agencies, and established local task forces with Federal and local input."

Personal views on the future of drug law enforcement: "Federal drug law enforcement must work hand-in-hand with local police and international governments to reduce the availability of dangerous drugs, and with medical treatment facilities to discourage experimentation. Only then can we hope to change society's attitudes as we are starting to do with alcohol and tobacco.

"...DEA agents and employees can be proud of the sacrifices they have made and the job they have done over the past 20 years—steady courage, often in the face of danger and public indifference. That consistency is now being rewarded as the American people come to recognize the danger and tragic consequences of drug abuse."
Peter Bensinger

Now: President of Bensinger, DuPont, & Associates, a consulting firm in Chicago, which offers services related to alcohol and drug abuse.

Significant changes in drug law enforcement during tenure: “In the mid-1970s, the U.S. had not recognized drugs as a top priority. Public and political attention were not forthcoming, and thus, neither was funding. DEA worked to develop credibility on Capitol Hill and strived to form close alliances with state and local law enforcement and other federal agencies.”

Personal Views of the Future of Drug Law Enforcement: “Drug enforcement and prevention must be strongly supported. The President and the country cannot afford to choose one at the expense of the other; both are needed.

“Drug law enforcement should also devote resources to community policing where drug dealing is pervasive, so agents can work with city, county, and federal agencies to remove crack houses, vacant buildings, improper security, and other conditions which breed drug crime and intimidate neighborhoods.”

Francis “Bud” Mullen, Jr.


Significant changes in drug law enforcement during tenure: “During my tenure, the public’s opinion changed concerning drug use and with that, the laws changed. The public became much less tolerant of drug abuse and the laws became more stringent.”

Personal Views on the Future of Drug Law Enforcement: “Theories abound concerning the best way to deter substance abuse, whether they involve enforcement, eradication, education, prevention, interdiction, rehabilitation, and even legalization. In the ongoing political and social cycles, one or the other of the foregoing moves to the forefront and then fades from the picture. The constants in drug abuse control seem to be enforcement, education, and rehabilitation, and these are programs which can be fully implemented in the United States.”

Francis M. “Bud” Mullen, Jr.
John C. Lawn

Served as Administrator: March 1985 to March 1990.
Now: Vice President and Chief of Operations for the New York Yankees.

Significant changes in drug law enforcement during tenure: "The pendulum of tacit acceptance of illicit drug use in the 1970s swung (back) to strong support from legislators and parents for drug education and prevention programs. This change has resulted in decreased drug use among our school age children and young adults."

Personal Views on the Future of Drug Law Enforcement: "Protect and defend...against all enemies...foreign and domestic" summarizes our law enforcement oath. There is no expiration date—there is no sunset clause. Our role is the backbone of our society. Drug enforcement is neither transitory nor transitional. So long as illicit drugs exist, the greed, violence, corruption, lawlessness engendered by illicit drugs will require selfless, courageous, well-trained men and women to answer the call....

“Our future demands that we have a strong commitment to drug law enforcement.”

Robert C. Bonner

Sworn-in as Administrator: August 1990.

Significant changes in drug law enforcement during tenure: "The drug problem, which had been gaining momentum since the late 1960s, literally exploded in the early 1980s with the cocaine epidemic, followed by the emergence of "crack" in the mid-1980s. More and more federal agencies were given—or grasped for—roles in the "drug war." ....It was and still is imperative that DEA lead by example—our ideas and strategies must act as a magnet so that other agencies involved in drug law enforcement will be drawn to us."

Personal Views on the Future of Drug Law Enforcement: "Any serious, comprehensive effort against the drug problem requires that we reduce ready availability of drugs. Part of the strategy for achieving this goal requires a focused effort at dismantling the drug trafficking organizations that produce significant quantities of illegal drugs and distribute them in the U.S.

"To be successful, we will need to apply the resources of both our domestic and overseas offices against the international trafficking organizations that are inundating our country with cocaine and heroin."
The badge pictured at left and in the bottom right corner of this page is the one proudly carried today by the Special Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The 29 other badges pictured here reflect both the evolution of the badge and the evolution of specialized drug law enforcement that took place during the nation's development and growth.

The ongoing refinement and combining of expertise in drug law enforcement and drug intelligence reflects the achievements and heritage of DEA's predecessor organizations and their agents who carried the badges shown here.
For DEA and the American public the death of Special Agent Enrique S. Camarena in 1985 marked a turning point in the war on drugs.

Known as "Kiki" to his friends, Camarena had a reputation as a fighter who believed that the actions of one man could make a difference in the drug war. He was assigned to DEA's Guadalajara Resident Office in Mexico and had been working to identify drug trafficking kingpins when he was kidnapped in February, 1985, tortured and murdered.

Camarena’s death brought the American public face-to-face with the vicious brutality of drug trafficking. The circumstances leading to his death clearly showed how drug-related corruption and intimidation had spread to the highest levels of the Mexican Government. “His death served to further the great cause for which he gave his life,” recalled former Assistant Attorney General Jimmy Gurule. “Kiki’s death served as a catalyst to ignite within the American people a firm resolve and renewed commitment to stop the flow and use of drugs in America. The publicity his death received, both national and international, transformed public awareness regarding drug use and drug trafficking in America.

“...the public realized—for the first time—the nature and massive scope of the drug problem in America, and how drug-related corruption had spread to the highest levels of some foreign governments,” said Gurule.

The death of Agent Camarena was a tragic blow to DEA. The brutality of his murder, the month-long delay in recovering his body, and the collusion between government officials and drug traffickers to impede DEA’s investigation of Camarena’s death, not only magnified the tragedy, but strengthened DEA’s commitment to discover the truth.

In March, 1985 DEA agents found the bodies of Camarena and his pilot along the side of a county road some 60 miles from Guadalajara. For DEA, the discovery of the bodies marked a tangible milestone in the case. At last DEA could bring Kiki home and bury him with the respect and honor he deserved. It also marked the start of Operation Leyenda, the investigation, now in its eighth year, to track down and bring to justice those responsible for his murder.

“...the Camarena tragedy and its production as a television series was a turning point in the drug war in America.”

Bill Alden
Chief, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
“It was the most complex and difficult investigation in the history of DEA, said a DEA agent. “We were trying to gather evidence in a country where we had no authority and where the killers and their government protectors blatantly impeded our efforts.”

“Operation Leyenda has been DEA’s finest hour,” recalled Administrator Robert C. Bonner at an awards ceremony for those who participated in the investigation. “DEA’s commitment has been firm and unwavering. That was a tribute to former DEA Administrator Jack Lawn. He would not allow Leyenda to be quashed; he stood firm. The resolve of Mr. Lawn was vitally important to the long-term safety of all DEA and federal personnel in all posts of duty.”

**Red Ribbon Campaign**

Special Agent Camarena’s death touched the nation deeply. Americans felt outraged and frustrated that more could not be done to end the brutal violence of the drug war. They felt that Camarena’s sacrifice should not be forgotten. To show their respect for his courage and their commitment to take a stand against drug abuse, millions of Americans began to wear red ribbons.

As this red ribbon tribute began to spread across the nation in 1985, the Virginia Federation of Parents and the Illinois Drug Education Alliance called on members of grassroots organizations across the country to wear a red ribbon during the last week of October as a symbol of their commitment to make America drug free.

“Kiki’s death served as a catalyst to ignite within the American people a firm resolve and renewed commitment to stop the flow and use of drugs in America,” observed Gurule. “Kiki’s death caused Congress to take action to enact tough legislation to...hold drug users
DEA's Demand Reduction Section was created in response to a nationwide concern for the nation's increasing drug problem during the 1980s.

By 1987 drug seizures and trafficker arrests/convictions reached record-high levels. Across the nation concerned citizens called on their leaders to take more effective action against the nation's drug problems and to use additional resources to control demand. The nation's concerns were most clearly stated by then DEA Administrator John Lawn:

"Despite law enforcement successes in cutting into the supply of illicit drugs in the United States, the ultimate answer in solving the problem lies in reducing demand." In announcing the creation of the Demand Reduction Section in 1987, Lawn stated, "Until we can convince our citizens, particularly our young people, of what drug abuse is doing to their minds and bodies, the demand for drugs will always be there."

Therefore, said Lawn, to reduce demand, DEA's drug education and prevention efforts must reach children and adults who do not use drugs but are exposed to the peer pressure, violence and social problems associated with drug use.

Today DEA's Demand Reduction Program provides leadership, coordination and resources for drug prevention and education in each of DEA's domestic field divisions. These programs are run by Special Agents, known as Demand Reduction Coordinators (DRC), who have a broad range of experience in dealing with law enforcement, community groups, and youth.

As it developed a national strategy for demand reduction, DEA and its DRCs identified six national priority programs: sports and drug awareness; user accountability programs; demand reduction training for law enforcement; development of community-based coalitions; workplace programs; and minority/high-risk programs.

**Sports and drug awareness**

The Sports Drug Awareness Program, initiated in 1984, uses high school athletes as positive role leaders to combat substance abuse among their peers and younger athletes. Based on an idea suggested by Frank Parks, a high school coach in Washington, D.C., the program trains high school coaches to encourage their teams to resist the peer pressure of drug users who might try to recruit them for other games that could only lead to trouble.

DEA has also recruited and trained professional athletes to work
with the Sports Drug Awareness Program, usually at personal appearances with DEA Demand Reduction Coordinators. DEA also makes anti-drug presentations to professional athletic teams and encourages them to assist individual schools with drug education and stay-in-school programs.

With the enactment of the Anabolic Steroids Control Act in February, 1991, DEA began a new educational campaign aimed at young athletes, coaches and trainers. Together DEA and the Sports Drug Awareness Program warned that athletes who thought they could gain a competitive edge by using anabolic steroids to enhance their performance or appearance faced a serious risk of imprisonment and a lifetime of health problems.

User accountability

The nation’s best known user accountability program is the highly successful “Do Drugs—Do time.” It was initiated in 1989 by DEA and law enforcement agencies in Phoenix and surrounding Maricopa County, Arizona to make it very clear that use of illicit drugs in this county always leads to certain punishment. Anyone arrested on a drug charge in Maricopa County will spend a night in jail and be offered the opportunity to spend up to a year in a rehabilitation program. It’s their choice. If they refuse rehabilitation, they face prosecution and may spend more time in jail.

Training for law enforcement

Training law enforcement officers to use their unique knowledge and credibility to support demand reduction is another priority in DEA’s demand reduction effort. DEA’s leadership in encouraging law enforcement agencies nationwide to start demand reduction programs has made its Demand Reduction Coordinators highly credible role models for law enforcement officers who are experiencing demand reduction training for the first time. A DRC’s personal account of experiences with DEA’s demand reduction programs can have a significant impact, because each DRC has seen firsthand the benefits demand reduction can bring to a community when used in coordination with drug enforcement programs.

Community-based coalitions

DEA has worked closely with communities across the nation to help them coordinate their own anti-drug coalitions. A community-based coalition may bring together schools, law enforcement, religious institutions, neighborhoods, government, business, an entire state or a region. DEA’s New England Field Division, for example, has been instrumental in the development of the New England Community-Police Crime Prevention Partnership. The Partnership hopes to encourage the implementation of practical initiatives that will lead to the elimination of fear, reduction of crime and improved quality of life for the community and the police officer.

Workplace programs

Keeping drugs out of the workplace because of their detrimental

“Until we can convince our citizens, particularly our young people, of what drug abuse is doing to their minds and bodies, the demand for drugs will always be there.”

Jack Lawn
Former DEA Administrator
effects on safety, quality and productivity is another goal of DEA’s demand reduction program. An estimated 70 percent of drug abusers hold jobs, and employers are beginning to realize that drug abuse is costing $50 billion to $150 billion per year due to drug abuse-related complications such as absences and accidents.

As employers became increasingly aware of the job-related costs of drug abuse and the impact of new laws which require contractors to maintain a drug-free workplace if they wish to sell goods and services to the Federal government, they began to realize that a drug-free workplace was a cost-effective concept. DEA has become a major resource for employers seeking information, resources and support for a drug-free workplace.

**Minority, high-risk programs**

Because minority and high-risk youth, ages 10 to 17, have traditionally been difficult to reach with drug abuse prevention messages, DEA has focused special efforts on reaching this target audience.

Working with community organizations that serve these youth, DEA Special Agents and Demand Reduction Coordinators communicate with them in a positive and highly effective manner. In Dallas, for example, where gangs have become a serious community concern, DEA Special Agents know how to grab the attention of 12 to 16 year-old streetwise minority youth who haven’t listened to authority for most of their lives, and who are already in serious trouble with the law. Special Agent Stephen M. Laird of the Dallas Field Division holds an intensive three-day camp as part of a community effort to reach kids in trouble and show them some of the positive choices they can make.

Special Agent Thomas E. Childers, one of DEA’s first Demand Reduction Coordinators, has seen the Demand Reduction Program in the Phoenix Field Division grow from a few drug awareness presentations to a nationwide effort that is changing attitudes about drugs in sports, schools, and communities.

“They told me demand reduction was about changing attitudes,” recalled Childers. “In the beginning I had doubts about whether the program could have an effective impact on the drug war. Today, for the first time, I can honestly say that I see a light at the end of the tunnel as far as drugs are concerned,” he said.

“Speaking to kids, parents and community leaders, I can now see the impact we are making. There is some hope that through drug awareness education and prevention programs we can reduce demand.”
Did You Know?

- The American Bald Eagle in the DEA seal represents surveillance, with the green grass and the blue sky representing the eagle's domain.

- People who have not used alcohol and other drugs before their 20th birthday are less likely to develop a drinking problem or use illicit drugs later in life.

- Anabolic steroids are dangerous because they may result in development of female characteristics in males; development of male characteristics in females; stunted growth; damage to the liver and cardiovascular system; and aggressive behavior.

- The first female DEA Special Agent was Heather Campbell. Presently stationed in San Francisco, Heather came to DEA from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

- Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), is the chemical found in cannabis that gives marijuana users a "high." In the 1960s, the THC content of marijuana was between 1.5 and 3 percent. Today, the THC content of domestically grown marijuana ranges from 8 to 20 percent, and has been measured at almost 30 percent, making it much more potent.
In Memoriam

Emir Benitez
Nickolas Fragos
Mary Keenan
Charles Mann
Anna Mounger
Anna Pope
Martha Skeels
Mary Sullivan
Larry D. Wallace
James T. Lunn
Ralph L. Shaw
Octavio Gonzales
Francis J. Miller
Robert C. Lightfoot

Twenty-eight DEA Special Agents and employees have died in the line of duty since DEA was established in July, 1973.

On the Wall of Honor at Headquarters are plaques commemorating each employee who died defending our nation from drug traffickers. Those who died within the last twenty years are vivid memories to their coworkers at DEA. All these names are proudly remembered for their courage, dedication to drug law enforcement and ultimate sacrifice.

To help the public and future generations keep their memories alive and share our pride in their accomplishments, we have prepared a brief description of who they were and how they died. They came from every kind of background, with a great diversity of skills and interests.

We remember:

Special Agent Emir Benitez, 28, died August 9, 1973 at Broward County General Hospital from a gunshot wound he received during an undercover cocaine investigation in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Prior to joining DEA, SA Benitez had been an army paratrooper in Korea, worked as an operations crash fireman at a Key West Naval Air Station, and since 1969 screened foreign mail for illegal drugs at the Bureau of Customs in Miami. He was so successful at finding marijuana that he received three awards for superior performance. In 1971 he was promoted to a Customs Patrol Officer and in 1973 he was detailed to the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and then assigned to the Miami DEA Task Force after the July 1, 1973 merger which created DEA. In recognition of having performed the duties of a DEA Agent in "an above average...manner," Benitez was converted to a DEA Special Agent with the then Miami Regional Office.
accountable (for their actions). Kiki was a victim of the drug war and his heinous murder...has put to rest once and for all the myth that drug use is a victimless crime.”

Today millions of Americans across the nation and around the world proudly wear a red ribbon during October to declare their commitment to suffer no more the loss of even one of our citizens—not a youngster, or a loved one, or another Enrique Camarena—to drug-related violence.

The Red Ribbon Campaign has also become a symbol of support for DEA’s efforts to reduce demand for drugs through prevention and education programs. Each October DEA distributes thousands of red ribbons and posters to remind Americans to live a drug-free life, not to tolerate illegal drug use in any form, and to remember Enrique Camarena.

**Drug Wars: The Camarena Story**

In March 1990, NBC Television broadcast the Emmy-winning miniseries *Drug Wars: The Camarena Story*. The series was produced with the support of DEA to increase public awareness about the war on drugs.

“It was important for the American public to see *The Camarena Story* because it showed how threatening and intimidating these narco-terrorists could be,” recalled Special Agent John M. Marcello, who was a DEA Technical Advisor for the miniseries.

“When a DEA Special Agent is killed in the line of duty, we mobilize all of DEA to find the killer. That’s our protection for the future. We let the drug traffickers know if they kill a DEA agent, they will pay a much higher price. That is why our institutions in this country are free from the type of threat and intimidation that occurred (in Mexico).”

“For me personally,” said Marcello, “I saw this film as a tribute to Camarena. I knew him. I felt this man made a tremendous sacrifice and that the miniseries about his death would help validate what he was fighting for, who he was fighting against, and why he died.”

“When *Drug Wars: The Camarena Story* first appeared on television, it was so dramatic and contemporary and controversial that a lot of people underestimated its impact,” recalled William F. Alden, DEA’s Chief of Public Affairs.

“I think history will show that the Camarena tragedy and its production as a television series was a turning point in the drug war in America,” said Alden.
Special Agent Nickolas Fragos, 29, died on August 5, 1974 in the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Prior to joining DEA Special Agent Fragos had served three years as a medic in Vietnam where he had won a Silver Star, two Bronze Stars, a Purple Heart and two Army Commendation medals. He then earned two bachelors degrees in police science and psychology at Wayne State University and served as a medical assistant with the Wayne County Sheriff's Office. He was appointed a Special Agent at the Detroit Regional Office in March 1974 and after completing basic agent training in Washington, D.C., was assigned to the Miami Regional Office on July 21, 1974. He was killed on his first day at work as a Special Agent.

Ms. Mary M. Keehan, 27, Secretary to the Acting Regional Director of DEA's Miami Regional Office, died August 5, 1974 when the then Regional Office building collapsed.

She began working for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in June 1968 as a clerk-stenographer for the Office of Chief Counsel in Washington, D.C. She worked for the Office of Enforcement, Office of Administration, and Office of the Deputy Director for Support Programs until 1974 when she became a secretary in the Domestic Investigations Division, State and Local Section. In March 1974 she received an outstanding rating for her work during the past year. In July 1974 she transferred to the Miami Regional Office.

Special Agent Charles H. Mann, 31, died on August 5, 1974 in the collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.

Prior to joining the Miami Regional Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as a Special Agent in April 1971, Mann had earned a bachelor's degree in police science at Florida State University, completed a student internship as a criminal investigator with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, served with the U.S. Navy as a submarine quartermaster and submarine school instructor. In May 1974, Mann was transferred to DEA's Ankara Regional Office in Turkey. He was reassigned to the Miami Regional Office on August 4 and returned to work on the day the building collapsed.
When the roof collapsed on the Miami Field Division building on August 5, 1974, a clock on the wall stopped at the moment of the collapse—10:24. Over the years, the minute hand has shifted somewhat.

Ms. Anna Y. Mounger, 24, a secretary at DEA's Miami Regional Office, died August 5, 1974 when the Miami Regional Office building collapsed.

Ms. Mounger graduated from the University of Houston in Houston, Texas in 1972 with a B.S. degree in physical education. She then worked as a secretary for the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement in Miami from February to June 1973, when she joined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Miami Regional office. She was planning to leave DEA at the end of the week to marry a Marine officer two weeks later.

Mrs. Anna J. Pope, 54, a fiscal assistant at DEA's Miami Regional Office, died on August 5, 1974 when the Miami Regional Office building collapsed.

Ms. Pope began working for the Federal Government as a clerk typist, personnel clerk and supply clerk at various military bases in New Jersey from 1958 to 1968. She received Sustained Superior Performance Awards in 1962 and 1966. She began working for the Internal Revenue Service as a temporary taxpayer service clerk in Miami in January 1969, and was a full-time clerk-typist when she transferred to BNDD. She began working at BNDD in April 1970 as a fiscal clerk at the Miami Regional Office. In April 1971, she was promoted to fiscal assistant, and by 1974 she had become a cashier in the disbursement office.

Ms. Martha D. Skeels, 50, a supervisory clerk-typist at the Miami Regional Office, died on August 5, 1974 when the Regional Office building collapsed.

Ms. Skeels began working for the Miami Regional Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in November 1972 as a supervisory word processor. Prior to joining BNDD, she had been an accountant at a Veterans Administration Hospital in Montrose, New York for two years, a contract accountant with the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C. for 14 years, and a secretary with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Coral Gables, Florida for two years. She attended Duke University and the University of Virginia.
Ms. Mary P. Sullivan, 56, a clerk-typist at DEA's Miami Regional Office, died on August 5, 1974 when the regional office building collapsed.

Ms. Sullivan began working for DEA in March 1974 as a dictating machine transcriber clerk. An experienced secretary, she had worked at various offices in New York City for nearly 30 years prior to moving to Miami in 1970. She had worked for the Miami Local Board of the Selective Service System for three years, when her job was canceled following a reduction in force.

Special Agent Larry D. Wallace, 31, of the Tokyo District Office, died December 19, 1975 at the Naval Regional Medical Center in Guam from gunshot wounds received in Guam during an undercover drug investigation.

SA Wallace joined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in October 1970 as a Special Agent with the Seattle Regional Office. In 1974 he was assigned to the Tokyo District Office in Japan. He was in Guam to assist with the arrest of nine suspects in a seven-month heroin investigation when he was shot. Before joining DEA, Wallace ran a ship-board public affairs office in the Navy and taught English in Tokyo. Wallace is among those honored on a Guam police memorial dedicated in 1992 to all law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty on Guam.

Special Agent/Pilot James T. Lunn, 34, assigned to the Office of Enforcement at DEA Headquarters, died on May 14, 1976 in a plane crash north of Acapulco during an operations flight in support of Mexico's opium eradication program. Special Agent Ralph N. Shaw, a passenger in the plane, was also killed in the crash.

SA Lunn, who was a Special Agent for four years, had been assigned to the Kansas City Regional Office since joining the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in April 1972. He was transferred to the Office of Enforcement in April 1975 and assigned to the Domestic Investigations Division, Special Enforcement Programs. An experienced pilot, he had been a civilian flight instructor for the U.S. Air Force and a commercial pilot. He graduated from Central Missouri State College with a bachelor's degree in aviation technology and was a U.S. Air Force veteran.

I am stilled—and yet
time moves on
I am stilled—and life
breathes life
I am stilled—and all becomes
memories
And the roar is silenced...
And the time is ceased...
...and
I am stilled.

The poem written by SA David Westrate and several other employees of the Miami Division at the time of the building collapse uses the imagery of the stopped clock to commemorate those who were killed.
Special Agent Ralph N. Shaw, 40, of the Calexico District Office, died May 14, 1976 in a plane crash north of Acapulco during an operations flight in support of Mexico’s opium eradication program. Special Agent James T. Lunn, who piloted the plane, was also killed in the crash.

Prior to becoming a Special Agent, Shaw was a deputy sheriff in San Bernardino County, California and in 1962 became a border patrol inspector on the Mexican border with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In 1968 he transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs where he served in the San Diego, San Francisco and Calexico District Offices. He also served as an instructor in firearms and physical education at the Border Patrol Academy and as a class counselor for DEA Basic Agent Class 5.

Country Attache Octavio Gonzalez, 38, Special Agent in Charge of DEA’s office in Bogota, Colombia, was killed on December 13, 1976 when an informant shot him at DEA’s Bogota office.

Gonzalez, assigned to the Bogota office since March 1972, had been a Special Agent since January 1969 when he joined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Previously he had been a police officer in both Miami and Kansas City, Missouri. A five-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force, Gonzalez graduated from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton in 1968. A Miami Herald editorial about Gonzalez’s death described him as “a highly competent law enforcement officer with a worldwide reputation.”
Special Agent Francis J. Miller, a Group Supervisor at the Newark Division Office, died on March 5, 1977 in a late-night car accident in New York on his way home from work. He was 43.

SA Miller began working for the Federal government in 1964 as a Customs investigator at the Port of New York. In 1966 he transferred to the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, which became part of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 1968. In late 1969, he served briefly with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and then returned to BNDD in 1970. He was promoted to Group Supervisor with DEA’s New York Field Division in 1973 and assigned to the Newark Field Division Office later that year.

Special Agent Robert C. Lightfoot, 34, died as a result of a firearms accident on November 23, 1977 in Bangkok, Thailand.

Prior to joining DEA in 1974, SA Lightfoot had earned a bachelor’s degree in international relations at Tulane University and become fluent in Thai while serving in Vietnam and Bangkok with U.S. military intelligence, and working with the Thai Border Patrol Police for the Agency for International Development. During 1974 he served in DEA’s Chiang Mai Resident Office in northern Thailand. In the fall of 1975, upon completion of DEA basic training, he was assigned to the Los Angeles Field Division Office where he worked with DEA’s first Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Group. In August, 1977 he transferred back to the Bangkok Country Office.

Special Agent Thomas J. Devine, a Group Supervisor at the Newark Field Division Office, died on September 25, 1982, in Passaic, New Jersey of complications from gunshot wounds he received on October 12, 1972, during an undercover investigation in New York City. He was 40. Special Agent Frank Turnillo was killed on October 12, 1972 in the same investigation.

Prior to joining DEA, SA Devine served with the Marine Corps military police, and then worked in the New York City area as a security officer for diamond merchants and an investigator for major law firms and corporations. In 1967, Devine joined the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) as a Treasury Agent and became a Special Agent in 1968 when FBN merged with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Devine was promoted to Group Supervisor at the New York Regional Office in April 1972.

Confined to a wheelchair by his injury, he continued to work for the next 10 years despite several illnesses and operations. In October 1974 he was promoted to Group Supervisor for Intelligence/Tactical Support at the New York Regional Office. He transferred to the Northeastern Regional Office in Newark in October 1978, and remained on active duty until the day he died.
"I’ll never forget...the personal sacrifice and sometimes the personal suffering that goes with this fight against drugs."

George Bush
June 29, 1992

Special Agent Larry N. Carwell, 39, of the Houston District Office, died as a result of a January 9, 1984 helicopter crash during a operations flight near the Bahamas.

SA Carwell joined DEA as a Special Agent in May 1974. During his 10 years with the Houston District Office, he was very active in drug prevention programs and had worked closely with Houston area sports teams. He received the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association’s Medal of Valor “for having performed his duty...at a personal risk of life” in October 1984.

Larry N. Carwell
January 9, 1984

Special Agent Enrique S. Camarena, of the Guadalajara, Mexico Resident Office, was kidnapped, tortured and murdered by Mexican drug traffickers between February 7 and March 5, 1985. He was 37.

SA Camarena joined DEA in June 1974 as a Special Agent with the Calexico, California District Office. He was assigned to the Fresno District Office in September 1977, and transferred to the Guadalajara District Office in July 1981. During his 11 years with DEA, he received two Sustained Superior Performance Awards, a Special Achievement Award and, posthumously, the Administrator’s Award of Honor, the highest award granted by DEA.

Enrique S. Camarena
March 5, 1985

Prior to joining DEA, Camarena served two years in the U.S. Marine Corps. He worked in Calexico as a fireman and then as a police investigator, and was a narcotics investigator for the Imperial County Sheriff-Coroner.

Ms. Susan M. Hoefler, an Office Assistant at the Guadalajara Resident Office, died on August 16, 1986 from injuries suffered in an accident when her car hit a utility pole in Guadalajara. She was 32.

Ms. Hoefler began working at Headquarters in May 1973 as a contract data analyst, and transferred to the DEA Regional Office in Mexico City in 1974 as a temporary clerk. She returned to Headquarters briefly in the summer of 1974 as a clerk-typist. When a full-time position became available in the Mexico City office, she returned to Mexico and quickly advanced from clerk-typist to file and mail clerk. In 1984 she became the secretary at the Guadalajara Office.

Ms. Hoefler lived through the difficult times brought on by the kidnapping and murder of Special Agent Enrique Camarena in February 1985, and the abduction/torture of Special Agent Victor Cortez in August 1986, three days before her death.

Ms. Susan M. Hoefler
August 16, 1986

PHOTO NOT AVAILABLE
Special Agent William Ramos, 30, of the McAllen District Office, was shot and killed on December 31, 1986 by a drug trafficking suspect while trying to make an arrest during an undercover investigation at Las Milpas, Texas, near the Mexican border.

SA Ramos was a border patrol agent before joining DEA as a Special Agent in mid-1985. He also served as an assistant prosecutor in Mohave, Arizona and had a law degree from the University of Arizona. He received the International Narcotics Enforcement Officer Association’s Medal of Valor posthumously in 1988.

Special Agent Raymond J. Stastny, 30, of the Atlanta Field Division Office, died on January 26, 1987 from gunshot wounds he received six days earlier during an undercover operation in Atlanta.

SA Stastny joined DEA in July 1980 as a compliance (diversion) investigator at the New York District Office. He became a Special Agent in November 1983 and transferred to the Atlanta Field Division Office. In September 1986 he earned a Sustained Superior Performance Award. He received the International Narcotics Enforcement Officers Association’s Medal of Honor posthumously. He was a graduate of the State University of New York where he majored in criminal justice.

Special Agent Arthur L. Cash, 39, Special Agent in charge of the Sierra Vista Post of Duty in Arizona, was killed in a traffic accident on August 25, 1987 while transporting three prisoners to Tucson.

SA Cash was a Border Patrol Agent for nearly four years with the Immigration and Naturalization Service after graduating from West Virginia University with a Bachelor of Science degree in 1969. He became a DEA Special Agent in August 1974 at the San Luis District Office in Arizona. In 1982 he was reassigned to the Miami Field Division where he served with Enforcement Group I which received an Administrator’s Award for Outstanding Group Achievement in 1986. He returned to Arizona in March 1987 to open the Sierra Vista Post of Duty under the Tucson Resident Office. In May 1987 he received a Special Achievement Award for his work on a major methamphetamine conspiracy case.

Special Agent George M. Montoya, 34, of the Los Angeles Field Division Office, was killed on February 5, 1988 when he was shot during an undercover operation in Los Angeles. Special Agent Paul S. Seema, who was shot during the same investigation, died the next day.

SA Montoya joined the Immigration and Naturalization Service in January 1979 and worked as a border patrol agent in Campo, California, until August 1983 when he became a criminal investigator in Los Angeles. He became a Special Agent with DEA in September 1987 and was assigned to the Los Angeles Field Division Office. He received a BS degree in criminal justice from California State University, Long Beach, in 1976. In 1988 SA Montoya was awarded posthumously the International Narcotics Enforcement Officers Association’s Medal of Valor.
Special Agent Paul S. Seema, 51, of the Los Angeles Field Division Office, died on February 6, 1988 of gunshot wounds he received the day before during an undercover operation in Los Angeles. Special Agent George M. Montoya was killed on February 5, in the same undercover operation.

Special Agent Seema, a native of Thailand, joined DEA as Special Agent in May 1974, serving 13 months in Washington, D.C., and then spent 13 months with the New York Field Division. In July 1976 he transferred to Thailand where he spent four years with the Songkhla Resident Office and then seven years with the Bangkok Country Office. He was assigned to the Los Angeles Field Division Office in July 1987. Prior to joining DEA, he had worked for U.S. military and civilian intelligence in Bangkok. His wife, Joy, was a former DEA secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. In 1988 Agent Seema was awarded posthumously the International Narcotics Enforcement Officers Association's Medal of Valor.

Special Agent Everett E. Hatcher, 46, of the New York Field Division Office, was shot and killed on February 28, 1989 during an undercover investigation in New York City on Staten Island.

SA Hatcher became a DEA Special Agent in January 1977 at the New York Regional Office. During his 12 years with DEA, he worked on a variety of investigative assignments throughout the New York Division for which he received Special Achievement Awards in 1982 and 1983. He also served as a firearms instructor and a recruiting officer. In 1987 he received a third Special Achievement Award for his efforts with DEA's agent recruiting program.

Prior to joining DEA, Hatcher spent six years in Germany as an Army Deputy Provost Marshal and physical education teacher at a U.S. military dependent's high school. He returned to New York in 1975 to teach in New York City schools. He was working for the New York District Attorney as an investigator when he was accepted as a Special Agent. An experienced teacher, Hatcher earned a B.S. degree in physical education from Hampton Institute in Virginia in 1968, an M.Ed. degree from Boston College with high honors in 1974, and had completed advanced graduate studies at Boston College and John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York.

Special Agent Rickie C. Finley was killed on May 20, 1989 in a plane crash as he was returning from a jungle operation to a base camp in Lima, Peru. He was 37.

During his five years with DEA, Special Agent Finley received two Sustained Superior Performance Awards, in July 1987 for his work with the Detroit Field Division and again in August 1988 for his work with Operation Snowcap, a cocaine eradication program in Peru. Prior to joining DEA, he was an undercover narcotics officer with the North Little Rock Police Department for nearly seven years. He became a Special Agent with DEA's Little Rock Resident Office in May 1984. After basic agent training, he was assigned to the Detroit Field Division. He volunteered for Operation Snowcap in 1988 and again in 1989. Finley earned a B.S. degree in business administration in 1975 and an M.S. degree in criminal justice, both from Arkansas State University.

This memorial to Rickie Finley stands in a park in Detroit, Michigan.
Special Agent/Pilot Eugene T. McCarthy, 35, was killed February 2, 1991 in a helicopter accident in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War.

SA McCarthy was a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, a veteran of 11 years in the Marine Corps, with extensive experience as both an instructor and helicopter pilot, and a major in the Marine Reserves when he joined DEA in August 1988. He graduated first in his basic agent training class and was voted “outstanding student” by the training staff. His first assignment was with the Narcotics Task Force at the San Diego Field Division office. Most of his time in DEA was with Snowcap, beginning in April 1990. He was on a second Snowcap tour in November 1990 when he was called to active duty in the Gulf War.

Special Agent/Pilot Alan H. Winn, 37, was killed August 13, 1991 in a helicopter crash during an operations flight over the island of Hawaii.

SA Winn graduated from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in 1977 with a B.S. degree in communications. He then trained as a helicopter pilot in the Marine Corps. In 1985 Winn joined the San Diego Police Department as a patrolman and also earned an M.S. degree in forensic science from National University in San Diego. He joined DEA in February 1987 and was Class Representative of Basic Agent Training Class 48. His was assigned to the San Diego Field Division and in July 1987 was transferred to the Task Force with the Phoenix Field Division. In April 1988, Winn received a Sustained Superior Performance Award. He was transferred to the Phoenix Aviation Section in July 1990, and reassigned to the Aviation Section at Hilo, Hawaii, under the Honolulu Resident Office in April 1991.

Special Agent G. Douglas Althouse, 28, was killed on May 28, 1992 during an apparent car theft in Shelby County, Alabama.

After graduating from Middle Tennessee State University in May 1988 with a bachelors degree in business administration, SA Althouse worked as a police officer for the Williamson County Sheriff’s Department in Franklin, Tennessee until February 1990. He was named “Rookie of the Year” by the Sheriff’s Department in 1988. Following graduation, from DEA’s Basic Agent Class 73 in 1990, he was assigned to the Nashville Resident Office and in November 1990 was transferred to the Birmingham Resident Office. Althouse was an aggressive investigator and an effective leader during his 18 months in Birmingham. He was named a team leader of Birmingham’s new Provisional Task Force and was training state and local police in Federal law enforcement procedures.
Working Together for a Drug-Free Nation
A .45 caliber pistol was recovered from... 

The assault rifle was located... The murder of DEA operative "KIKI" Camarena.

The diamond-studded gun was valued over $121,000.00.
This 1948 Tucker was one of only 51 ever made. DEA seized it from the head of a methamphetamine organization in California.

Asset forfeiture is one of America’s most effective law enforcement weapons against drug trafficking and organized crime because it takes the profit out of crime. It is also one of the few Federal programs that is self-supporting. Since 1985, almost $2.6 billion in illegal cash and proceeds from the sale of seized property have been deposited in the Department of Justice’s Forfeiture Fund.

Financial Aspects of Drug Investigations

When the Drug Enforcement Administration conducts a drug investigation, it concentrates on three areas—drugs, people and money.

For many years, DEA investigations focused primarily on taking the trafficker and his drugs out of circulation. It soon became apparent, however, that to have the greatest impact we had to attack the sole motive for drug traffickers—their money and assets.

Drug money is the lifeblood of drug trafficking organizations. Without it, the traffickers cannot finance the manufacture and distribution that are essential to their illegal trade.

Congress has passed three laws that have aided DEA in attacking drug organizations and in tracing and seizing assets which can be linked to drug trafficking activities:

- Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
- Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Law in Title 21, and
- Civil Forfeiture Section of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970.

The CSA expanded DEA’s enforcement approach to include the seizure of virtually all types of assets belonging to drug violators. Previously, only assets used in carrying out drug transactions, such as automobiles, were forfeitable.
In 1990, President Bush signed a bill giving law enforcement unlimited authority to administratively forfeit cash and certificates of deposit. In addition, the new law raised the ceiling for administrative forfeitures from $100,000 to $500,000 on all other items, except real estate.

In the past, the risks associated with the financial aspects of drug trafficking had been minimal, since the individuals involved generally did not come into direct contact with either the drugs or law enforcement authorities. Since the enactment of the seizure laws, however, the risks have greatly increased, as have the chances that these individuals will be discovered.

**Operation Polar Cap**

Operation Polar Cap was the largest money laundering investigation in the United States, involving the handling of more than $1 billion in Medellin Cartel drug profits. As a result of this operation, over 100 persons were arrested, and more than $105 million in assets, including currency, bank accounts, real estate, jewelry, gold and vehicles were seized.

Operation Polar Cap involved two international organizations that were laundering the proceeds of cocaine sales by using false gold sales and wholesale jewelry businesses as cover. Between 1988 and 1990, these organizations laundered almost $1.2 billion in drug proceeds.

This investigation led to the first conviction of a foreign financial institution, Banco de Occidente/Panama, for violating U.S. money laundering laws. In addition, money forfeited by this bank became the first assets shared with other governments—Canada and Switzerland each received $1 million.

**International Cooperation with Seizures**

The realization that asset removal is both an income producer for law enforcement as well as an effective measure to disrupt the operations of drug networks has spread to the international community.

In recent years, several countries, such as Colombia, Luxembourg, and Australia, have enacted both asset removal and money laundering laws.

In October 1989, the Colombian Government provided DEA with financial documents that permitted authorities in Switzerland, Luxembourg, England, Austria, Panama, and the U.S. to freeze over $88 million belonging to Medellin Cartel kingpin Jose Rodriguez-Gacha. Each country moved swiftly, using all legal mechanisms available, and seized Rodriguez-Gacha’s money before it could be transferred.

The seizure of these assets put such a financial strain on the Rodriguez-Gacha organization that it forced him to leave his protective lair in Colombia in search of money. Ultimately, he was killed in a shootout with Colombian police in December 1989, while participating in a hastily organized cocaine deal.
Operation Green Ice

In 1992, Operation Green Ice, which involved the United States and seven other nations, was the first international attack on the financial network of the Cali Cartel, and it severely disrupted their cash flow. As a result of Operation Green Ice, more than $57 million was seized worldwide and over 160 people were arrested, including seven of Cali's top financial managers.

Interesting Ill-gotten Gains

Through its asset forfeiture program, DEA has seized some unusual properties, including race horses, rare coins and valuable gems, airplanes, boats, and vintage automobiles.

By far the most lucrative seizure was the Bicycle Club, a gambling establishment in Bell Gardens, California, conservatively valued at $150 million. In April 1990, after a club partner was convicted of smuggling marijuana, the Government seized the club, believed to be the world's largest card casino.

The U.S. Government assumed 30 percent ownership in the club and receives approximately $600,000 a month in profits.

DEA also became the owner of a 1948 Tucker automobile used in the movie Tucker: The Man and His Dream. DEA's San Diego Field Division seized the Tucker from Edwin Scott Monroe, head of a methamphetamine organization that manufactured and distributed 1,000 pounds of methamphetamine in San Diego County, California, from 1983 to 1986.

Monroe had bought the car from an Oregon farmer with $50,000 in drug proceeds. The car is valued at between $250,000 and $450,000. Only 51 Tucker automobiles were made. During this 3 1/2 year investigation, 30 persons were arrested and $3.5 million in assets were seized.

DEA agents have also seized four-legged assets, such as the 14 Paso Fino horses, which were seized in South Florida in December 1987, along with a 40-acre horse farm, the Criadero Del Ocho, and other Florida properties worth $20 million.

The farm and high-stepping Spanish show horses branded with the distinctive "8" were owned by the Ochoa family of Colombia. Ocho means "eight" in Spanish, and is taken from the Ochoa family name. Criadero means breeding farm.

The Ochoa organization, part of the Medellin Cartel, was responsible for moving over 58 tons of cocaine into the United States from 1978 until 1986. At the time of this seizure, it was the most significant strike to date against the Medellin Cartel.

Ensuring that "crime does not pay" has long been a goal of law enforcement. Since money is the lifeblood of drug trafficking organizations, asset forfeiture acts as an effective "tourniquet" to stop the flow of cash necessary to operate these criminal organizations.
Movies provide a unique insight into the lives and culture of the era that produces them. From Thomas Edison’s 1894 *Opium Smokers*, a half-minute film of people casually smoking in an opium den, to the 1992 movie *Deep Cover*, which graphically depicts the violence of drug trafficking, America’s changing attitudes about drugs and drug use have been reflected in stories on the silver screen.

For a time, cocaine was considered a miracle drug and a medical cure for many ills. The *Journal of the American Medical Association*, in 1923, described a disorder it called “cocainomania,” which was common among motion picture actors. According to the *Journal*, silent film actors routinely used the drug to dilate their pupils to give them an expression of “astonishment, depth, brilliance, and boldness.” But the dangers of cocaine abuse were explored in film as early as 1911, when director D. W. Griffith produced the movie, *For His Son*. The story told of an ambitious physician who invents a soft drink called “Dopokoke,” which is spiked with cocaine. The doctor’s invention makes him a wealthy man, but his son dies as a result of drinking his concoction.

In 1923, a promising young movie star named Wallace Reid died of a morphine overdose while working on a movie set. As a tribute to her husband, the actor’s distraught wife made an anti-drug film, *Human Wreckage*, which begins with this introduction:

> Dope is the gravest menace which today confronts the United States.

From the 1920s anti-drug film, *Human Wreckage*

When sound revolutionized the motion picture industry in 1929, drug use on screen was censored. Drugs were attacked as the tools of the Devil and were only shown being used for evil purposes.

By 1930, public sentiment about the dangers of marijuana increased. Hollywood responded with *Reefer Madness*, the classic 1936 anti-marijuana film. This film tells the story of upstanding young
men and women who become irreversibly corrupt after smoking marijuana. Due to its melodramatic message, \textit{Reefer Madness} is considered a camp comedy at colleges and universities today.

Public attitudes also drove cocaine use underground. Concern about the drug inspired Hollywood to make a feature film called \textit{Cocaine Fiends} in 1939. The film, a remake of the 1928 \textit{The Pace That Kills}, began with a serious warning about the dangers of using cocaine: One dose and you're hooked!

During the height of film censorship (1934-1948), Hollywood did not produce a single film on heroin and featured only a few minor characters as heroin addicts. There were obscure references to the drug, however. In the 1939 children's classic \textit{The Wizard of Oz}, the Wicked Witch of the West uses her evil power to make Dorothy, Toto, and the Cowardly Lion fall asleep in a poppy field on their way to the Emerald City. As she casts her spell, she says: "And now my beauties, something with poison in it, soothing to the mind...Poppies, poppies will put them to sleep." It is interesting to note that in the 1978 Black musical version, \textit{The Wiz}, the poppy fields are replaced by an opium den.

With World War II raging in Europe, films of the Forties predominately focused on patriotic themes and musicals. \textit{The Fall Guy} (1947), based on the short story, "Cocaine," was the first postwar film to defy the motion picture production code's ban on drug themes.

The first modern portrayal of drug addiction was \textit{Man With the Golden Arm} (1955). This film featured Frank Sinatra as a heroin addict who beats his addiction in prison, only to go back to the needle after his release.

\textit{The Tingler} (1959) is thought to be the first film on LSD. Although the movie does not mention LSD by name, Vincent Price plays a mad scientist who experiments with a drug with hallucinogenic properties very similar to those of LSD. The censorship on drug themes had begun to weaken and drugs were once again a subject to be explored in the movies.
By the Sixties, drugs—on screen and off—had become a symbol of the rebellion and unrest in society. Use of drugs, especially marijuana, became commonplace in society, and in films drug use was once again casually accepted.

Many films of the Sixties showed footage of marijuana smoking, addicts injecting heroin, and simulated LSD trips. The mood of the time was that marijuana was not harmful, that cocaine was not addictive, and that drug use was a recreational activity.

The 1968 Beatles animated film, Yellow Submarine, is often regarded as the cinematic monument to LSD. Its music, with the song “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds,” and the dreamy, surrealistic sequences in the film, celebrate the psychedelic nature of LSD.

The casual attitude toward drug use was vividly portrayed in Easy Rider (1969), the classic film of the Sixties in which drugs are presented as an integral part of the characters’ lives. The main characters, played by Peter Fonda and Dennis Hopper, begin the film by smuggling drugs over the Mexican border. Headed for the consummate party—Mardi Gras in New Orleans—the actors ride their motorcycles across the Southwest, their trip financed by the money they received from drug smuggling. Along the way, they use LSD in a cemetery with two prostitutes and smoke marijuana with almost everyone they meet, including with an alcoholic lawyer, played by Jack Nicholson.

Valley of the Dolls (1967) explored another kind of drug addiction, the abuse of legally purchased prescription drugs. The film offers a depressing study of women who cope with the stresses of their professional lives with “dolls,” a slang term for barbiturates.

In the Seventies, old taboos were gone, and drugs were used openly. The film Woodstock (1970), made from actual footage taken at the rock concert in Woodstock, New York, shows the rampant drug use and rebellious lifestyle that was prevalent in the early Seventies.

Movies like The Panic in Needle Park (1971) concerned the sordid realism of the situation that occurred when heroin was in short supply in Manhattan’s Upper West Side. And, actual drug addicts starred in the explicitly detailed portrayal of drug use in Dusty and Sweets McGee (1971).

One of the most compelling fact-based films about drug law enforcement of the Seventies was The French Connection, the story of how law enforcement officials busted an international heroin smuggling ring.

Super Fly (1972), told from the dealer’s point of view, became the first modern film to portray the life of a cocaine dealer. It focuses attention on the debate about the physical consequences of cocaine versus heroin; in the end, it shows the dealer as victorious and successful. Black Americans strongly criticized the film and picketed theaters because they believed it glorified drugs and the “hustler” lifestyle. In the 1990 sequel, The Return of Super Fly, the main character, Priest, returns to Harlem, this time in a positive role—to strike back against gangs and drug dealers.

“Cocaine is a serious problem in Hollywood because there is no social pressure against it.”

Hollywood Director 1985
This era also produced a plethora of comedies featuring drugs, such as *Annie Hall* (1977) where Woody Allen sneezes at a party and blows cocaine everywhere. The most blatant, however, were the “Cheech and Chong” drug comedies. The plots, jokes, and entire substance of these movies revolved around the growing, selling and smoking of marijuana and hashish, with only one goal in life: to get as high as possible.

Even the advertisements of Cheech and Chong films, such as *Up in Smoke*, encouraged drug use with such slogans as:

“Don’t go straight to see this movie;”

“You can always smell the excitement in the air;”

“They’ll have you rolling in your seats;” and

“Just what we all need—a really good hit.”

In the late Seventies, films began to look at the destructive nature of drugs. In *Looking for Mr. Goodbar* (1977), drugs contributed to the tragedy when a young girl snorts cocaine before she is murdered. In *Cocaine Cowboys* (1979) a rock group smuggles dope to help pay expenses and runs into trouble with organized crime. Even in *The Godfather*, Marlon Brando, as the Mafia kingpin, is shot because he regards the narcotics trade as “a dirty business” and refuses to finance it.

Drug use reached its peak in the Eighties. By 1985—for the second time in this century there were an estimated 23 million regular users of illegal drugs. Not since the 1920s had America experienced drug use in such epidemic proportions.

How tolerant society—and the film industry—had become of drug use was perhaps best stated by a movie director who observed: “Cocaine is a serious problem in Hollywood because there’s no social pressure against it.”

It was into this environment that crack cocaine first appeared in late 1985, making the dark side of cocaine strikingly visible. By the mid-eighties, the Reagan administration launched a war against the depiction of drugs in film, saying that movies made drug abuse look “kind of attractive and funny, not dangerous and sad.”

Movies eventually began to turn away from glamorous depiction of drugs and instead began to show the actual effects of drugs on society. Even Tommy Chong, who had blatantly abused drugs both on and off the screen, told “Rolling Stone” magazine in 1986 that drug use was “just not funny anymore.”

The dangers and degradation associated with drug use were illustrated in *Jo Jo Dancer, Your Life is Calling* (1986). This movie traces the life and cocaine addiction of comedian Richard Pryor, who almost died from burns received when he accidentally set himself on fire while freebasing cocaine.

As Americans became increasingly health conscious in the Nineties, there was a clear backlash against the use of illegal drugs. Nationwide anti-drug campaigns, coupled with tough law enforcement efforts, succeeded in significantly reducing the number of
ment efforts, succeeded in significantly reducing the number of Americans taking illegal drugs. By 1992, the number of regular drugs users had decreased to 12.8 million, from the 23 million in 1985. The number of regular cocaine users had fallen from 5.8 million in 1985 to under 2 million in 1992.

Videos, studio movies and prime-time television (Miami Vice, Top Cops, and Hunter) began to focus on the real life drama of law enforcement, especially drug law enforcement, and showed efforts to contain the spread of illegal drugs. The 1990 film Drug Wars: The Camarena Story about the 1985 murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique (Kiki) Camarena drew the nation’s attention to the efforts of DEA.

Other films began to show the dark side of drug use. Drugstore Cowboy (1989) depicts the depths to which young addicts sink to support their addiction. Crack House (1990) vividly tells the story of crack addiction, LA gangs, and police undercover work.

Rush (1991), based on a loosely autobiographical novel by Kim Wozencraft, a former narcotics officer, tells the story of two police officers who infiltrate the local drug scene in an East Texas town. The film’s graphic portrayal of drug use of every kind—heroin, marijuana, cocaine, and speed—shows the devastating and destructive nature of drugs when both officers become hooked on their own stash. It also shows the perilously thin line between success and survival for narcotics agents.

Deep Cover (1992) also explores the fine line law enforcement officers walk when they go undercover. In this movie, an officer goes undercover and becomes a street dealer. Eventually, by infiltrating the upper echelons of the drug organization, he helps to bring down a major Colombian drug supplier.

American philosopher George Santayana once said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” It has been almost 100 years since Thomas Edison made the Opium Smokers, which may have been the very first film about drugs. Since that time, American attitudes about drugs have changed, as have their portrayal in the movies. As we approach the beginning of a new century, we hope future generations will learn from our nation’s past experiences with drugs—from the films available and from history.
Griselda Blanco

Griselda used multiple sources of supply for her cocaine, which kept the drug flowing onto the streets of New York. Like Carlos Lehder, she advocated the idea of pooling trafficker resources and sharing risks. From these then-innovative tactics sprang the concept of the cartel.

Griselda Blanco eluded capture in Operation Banshee's round-up, and was not heard from again for nearly nine years. In 1984, some Colombian youths in Miami bragged to DEA informants that they were distributing vast amounts of cocaine; three of them were the sons of Griselda Blanco.

By this time, Griselda Blanco was the head of a large and increasingly violent organization in Miami. She loved the power that being the matriarch of a cocaine "family" brought her, and modeled her organization on the Mafia family portrayed in the movie The Godfather. She even gave the name Michael Corleone to the son born to her and henchman Dario Sepulveda, and was herself known as La Madrina, the Godmother.

Griselda loved killings. Bodies lined the streets of Miami as a result of her feuds. She gathered around her a group of henchmen known as the Pisteleros. Initiation into the group was earned by killing someone and cutting off a body part as proof of the deed. It is said that one of the Pisteleros assassinated a rival by riding up to him on a motorcycle and shooting him point blank. This manner of death was so admired by Griselda and other Medellin traffickers that it became the preferred method of murder and a trademark of the Medellin cartel. Griselda made great use of assassination. Angered that Dario Sepulveda took their young son Michael Corleone to Colombia against her will, Griselda contracted to have Sepulveda murdered. He was executed in front of the boy. She not only killed rivals and wayward lovers, but used murder as a means of canceling debts she didn't want to pay. A particularly bloody massacre that took place in July 1979 in a Miami shopping center became known as the Dadeland Massacre and was traced to Griselda Blanco.

As competition among drug traffickers grew in Miami, Blanco moved her organization to California where increasing demand for cocaine promised larger profits. There she lived a life of opulence, surrounded by her sons whom she encouraged to be as vicious and corrupt as she. It is said that son Osvaldo amassed huge florist bills for his habit of having fresh orchids strewn daily in the family swimming pool, perhaps to remind mother of her roots in Medellin, the City of Orchids.

DEA found Griselda Blanco in California, and, through a confidential informant, eventually gathered enough evidence to have her convicted. She was sentenced in New York to 15 years for conspiracy to import cocaine. In a Miami trial she was sentenced to 10 years for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Today, at age 50, Griselda Blanco de Trujillo has served seven of her 25 year sentence.
One of the first major violators that DEA tackled when the agency was formed in 1973 was Leroy “Nicky” Barnes. Black criminal groups had controlled some portion of the heroin traffic in New York City since the 1940s. Their influence increased significantly after the French Connection in the early 70s.

While growing up in Harlem, Barnes saw that the men on the streets with power were those who controlled the drug trade. While in his 20s, Barnes became a mid-level narcotics dealer until he was eventually sent to prison in 1965. There, he teamed up with gangster “Crazy Joey” Gallo who taught Barnes the workings of the organization. Gallo had wanted to be a major force in the Harlem narcotics trade, but he lacked the personnel. He urged Barnes to recruit blacks into the business. With the help of a lawyer supplied by Gallo, Barnes’ conviction was reversed. When he was released from prison, Barnes went directly back to the streets of New York, and began establishing his own trafficking network.

Nicky Barnes began taking over the street operations. His organization was one of the first of a new trend of black and Hispanic traffickers would take over from long-entrenched Italian organizations. Heroin was the drug of the day, and there was enough demand to keep several organizations in business. Barnes’ organization took bulk heroin, often of poor purity, and cut it, packaged it, and made unbelievable profits from it. Barnes’ organization controlled heroin sales and manufacture throughout New York State and into Canada and Pennsylvania. By 1976 he had at least seven major lieutenants working for him, each of whom controlled a dozen mid-level distributors, who in turn supplied up to 40 street-level retailers.

As Barnes built his empire, he patterned it on some of the more successful organized crime families, and built administrative layers between himself and his crimes. Police found it difficult to nail Barnes because of all the insulation between him and the actual perpetrators of the crime. As a result, few charges against Barnes himself were able to stick. The narcotics charge against him that had brought him to prison in 1965 was reversed. He was later charged with murder and acquitted. Charged then with bribery; he was once again acquitted. And he was acquitted on still other narcotics and gun charges. All of these legal successes for Barnes earned him the nickname of “Mr. Untouchable”.

Barnes reveled in his nickname. He developed an aggressive style when dealing with police, often leading surveillance teams on hundred-mile-an-hour car rides into New York City and then back again with no apparent purpose. Or, he would make hundreds of pointless stops, just to aggravate his surveillance.

Like most violators, Barnes lived in the fast lane. He owned five homes, wore expensive, custom made clothing, and surrounded himself
with luxury cars. In 1976 he estimated his trafficking income was at least several million dollars. A 1977 *New York Times* article indicated that Barnes owned 300 suits, 100 pairs of shoes and 50 leather coats. His fleet of cars included at least one, and probably more, Mercedes-Benz, a Citroen-Macerate, and quite a few Thunderbirds, Lincoln Continentals and Cadillacs.

Lest his cars be seized and forfeited, Barnes set up phony leasing companies to try to prove that the cars he drove were not owned by him, merely rented. Eventually Federal agents were able to unravel his scheme and prove his front companies were phony.

DEA agents were able to prove more than that. Working closely with the U.S. Attorney in New York, DEA agents were able to infiltrate the Barnes syndicate and put together a case that led to his conviction. On January 19, 1978, in the Federal District Court in Manhattan, Leroy "Nicky" Barnes was sentenced to life in prison on a Federal charge that he headed, in the words of the prosecutor, "the largest, most profitable and venal drug ring in New York City."

Nicky Barnes was no longer Mr. Untouchable. He has traded his 300 suits for a prison uniform.

Carlos Lehder

Carlos Enrique Lehder-Rivas conceived the idea of “pooling” loads of cocaine and founded the Medellin Cartel. Born in Colombia, Carlos Enrique Lehder-Rivas was the son of a Colombian woman and a German engineer. His parents divorced when he was four, and Lehder’s mother took him to New York when he was 15. In New York he learned English and street ways. At 18 he was arrested in Detroit for interstate transport of stolen vehicles. Lehder skipped bail and fled to Miami where he became a courier in a marijuana ring. Arrested in Miami, he spent two years in an American prison. When he was released in 1975, he was sent to Bogota.

In the 1970’s there were approximately 90-100 cocaine-producing groups or families in Colombia. Each trafficking organization produced, transported and then sold its own cocaine. Loads rarely exceeded 100 kilograms because a loss of such proportions would ruin an organization. In 1976, Carlos Lehder conceived the idea of transporting loads of cocaine from Colombia to the United States for the traffickers. He also convinced the Medellin area traffickers that, if they “pooled” their loads, they could share in losses, and no group would be ruined if a load was seized.

Lehder would receive one kilogram in payment for every four kilograms he transported. He invested his earnings in the purchase of high-performance aircraft that were used in the operation. Lehder envisioned the use of a way station between Colombia and the United States for refueling and staging prior to the smuggling run into the United States. He created an island fortress on Normans Cay, Bahamas, protected by attack dogs, guards carrying machine guns,
and corrupt officials. There Lehder lived in high-style as he ran his lucrative transportation business.

Lehder’s idea of “pooling” cocaine brought traffickers profits beyond any of their dreams as cocaine use in the United States expanded. Jorge Ochoa, Pablo Escobar, Griselda Blanco, the Herrera brothers (Gustavo and Benjamin), and later Jose Rodriguez-Gacha and others joined Lehder in what came to be known as the Medellin Cartel. The Medellin Cartel was responsible for 80 percent of the cocaine that flooded the United States in the 1980’s.

From 1977 through 1982 Lehder’s operation flourished with few setbacks. In 1981 Lehder was indicted in Jacksonville, Florida. In August 1983 an extradition request was presented to Colombian authorities asking for Lehder’s return to the United States. Several extradition requests for other Colombian smugglers had been presented to Colombian authorities—and extradition was being hotly debated in Colombia—but none had been authorized by the Colombian Supreme Court or signed and approved by the Colombian President.

By this time, Lehder had returned to live in Colombia and was a brash but charismatic young millionaire who publicly compared himself to the Kennedy family in the United States. Lehder admitted that he had made money illegally and announced that he wanted to enter politics. He founded a political party with candidates at all levels and a platform centered around nationalism and efforts to nullify the extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia. Lehder railed against U.S. imperialism and stated that he hoped cocaine would bring the downfall of the United States. He was seen as a threat not only in Colombia, but throughout Latin America as he attempted to expand his political party into a pan Latin American movement.

A public debate in Colombia raged over extradition. The two central characters were Lehder and Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. When the Minister of Justice was murdered, the Extraditables—as Lehder, Ochoa, Escobar, and other traffickers were known—were suspected. In reaction to this, the President of Colombia publicly signed Lehder’s extradition, the first ever approved. Lehder became a fugitive until his capture and return to the United States in February 1987.
After approval of Lehder’s extradition, the Extraditables waged a war with Colombian authorities that is still ongoing. Anyone in Colombia who sympathizes with the U.S. position on extradition has been targeted. Even the Colombian Supreme Court was attacked to destroy records and to murder and intimidate judges. The Medellin Cartel was the most violent criminal organization in the world. Over 4,000 people have been murdered by them, including informants, policemen, prosecutors, judges, and newsmen.

The extradition and conviction of Carlos Lehder is the most powerful blow ever dealt by U.S. law enforcement to the Medellin Cartel. Lehder was sentenced in Jacksonville, Florida to life without parole plus 135 years.

Akbar (Wayne Pray)

During his six-month trial that ended in September 1989, with his conviction on charges of being the principal administrator of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), Wayne Pray, more commonly known by his Muslim name of Akbar, contended that he was a civic-minded businessman. To law enforcement officers, however, he was the Nicky Barnes of New Jersey.

Wayne Pray, son of a high school custodian, described himself as a high school dropout who later earned a high school equivalency diploma. He went on to open a chain of businesses including a hair salon, car dealership and fight promotions agency. While in his teens, Pray became a disciple of Malcolm X and was given the Muslim name of Akbar, which means “the greatest.” Akbar claimed that it was his role as an outspoken black nationalist leader in northern New Jersey that made him a target of criminal prosecution by law enforcement officers. As evidence of his civic-mindedness, Akbar claimed under oath that he was given a letter of appreciation from a local chapter of the NAACP. Law enforcement officials maintained that it was his position as head of a drug trafficking organization that brought him to trial, and that the businesses he owned were fronts for his drug trafficking operation. Prosecutors pointed out that the letter of appreciation he produced was from a local chapter headquartered in a New Jersey state prison; his “award” had been issued to him one month after he was arrested for drug trafficking.

According to DEA Special Agent Frank Palumbo, Akbar was “...very soft spoken. He gave the impression of being very well educated and refined.” The facts indicated otherwise. For over 20 years, Akbar was head of a New Jersey trafficking organization that reached into California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada and Texas. In spite of his soft spoken demeanor, Akbar was violent. One drug dealer who had stopped using Akbar
as a distributor after a dispute was found beheaded. After Akbar was arrested, a variety of weapons were found in his homes, including a holstered shotgun that could be worn under a raincoat, fired at a victim, and lowered out of sight while the gunman disappeared into a crowd.

Akbar cemented his ties to South American drug cartels by supplying them with original, blank birth certificates, social security cards and drivers licenses. But he so skillfully distanced himself from the day-to-day operations of the drug trafficking organization, that he was dubbed “untouchable” by law enforcement agents. When Akbar was finally arrested, SA Larry McElynn, then deputy head of DEA’s Newark office remarked, “I don’t think he has ever spent a night in jail until last night.”

Because he was so removed from the drugs that reached the streets of northern New Jersey, Akbar was charged as a principal administrator of a continuing criminal enterprise. Using this statute, prosecutors were able to prove Akbar’s guilt, even though he was not caught in possession of drugs. Under the terms of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), prosecutors had only to prove that he had five people working for him, and to connect him to 300 kilos of cocaine and $1.5 million.

SA Larry McElynn once said that Akbar was “the most important drug dealer in Essex County (New Jersey), and one of the top 10 narcotics traffickers” in the state. He had over 400 people working as members in the organization he called his “Family,” including real family members. (Akbar’s 21 year old daughter, Sakeena Archibald, was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana at the same time he was.) Akbar had been responsible for supplying cocaine and marijuana throughout northern New Jersey for two decades, and had close ties to the cocaine cartels of South America.

Like Nicky Barnes, Akbar lived flamboyantly, spending his money on furs, jewelry, luxury cars and real estate. He owned a $1 million estate for his family, as well as a plush condo for his mistress. He was with her when he was arrested in Boca Raton, Florida, allegedly on his way to close a $650,000 real estate deal there. Special Agent Palumbo remembers that Akbar was wearing a “$600 sport coat and $200 tie when he was picked up. He had over $1,000 ‘spending money’ in his pocket and was wearing a $10,000 watch.” Agents searching his house even found a bow tie made from diamonds that Akbar wore with his tuxedo.

Akbar’s fleet of luxury cars, which included a Rolls Royce, a Porsche, and a Mercedes Benz, also drew attention, especially the cream-colored Rolls Royce Silver Cloud valued at over $100,000 that was displayed outside the Newark Federal building after being seized by authorities.

At Akbar’s sentencing, then Assistant U. S. Attorney Joseph Greenaway, Jr., rejected Akbar’s self-appraisal as a civic-minded businessman. Greenaway, who is black, said of Akbar: “There is no way he was an uplifting influence in the black community. He was a pariah who raped the black community of its most important aspect, its youth.”
Had he used his talents for good, as the saying goes, he might have won a Nobel Prize for Chemistry or found a cure for cancer. Instead, George Marquardt, 47, faces up to 30 years in prison for conspiracy to manufacture fentanyl. Marquardt is the self-taught chemist who manufactured fentanyl, a narcotic so deadly it was dubbed a "serial killer drug" and was responsible for at least 126 deaths.

George V. Marquardt was born in 1946 in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Throughout his life his gift for science has been counteracted by his equally strong gift for getting into trouble. In 1964, for example, he won the Wisconsin State Science Fair but was expelled from school the same day for unspecified reasons. Marquardt claims that he began using LSD at age 12 after seeing a junior high school anti-drug film in which a mouse given LSD began chasing a cat. Inspired by hallucinogenic guru Timothy Leary, Marquardt made his first batch of LSD at age 17, and has been steadily involved in the manufacture of illicit substances ever since.

After an arrest in 1978, Marquardt told an interviewer from the Tulsa World newspaper that he had been working on a new drug: "It was going to be the hallucinogen of the future. It combined the best features of amphetamines, but acted more like LSD. The effects were spectacular, beyond the realm of anything I experienced with LSD."

Largely self-taught, Marquardt's knowledge of chemistry was phenomenal. With no formal education beyond high school, either from lack of interest or lack of self-discipline, Marquardt had no credentials. Consequently, he was banned from several mid-west campuses when he was found impersonating a professor and holding organic chemistry seminars. In an interview with the intelligence chief of the Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics, Marquardt once described how he intuitively understood chemistry. He explained that he could "see himself as the nucleus of a molecule and could understand what chemical process would produce the reactions he wanted."

Unfortunately, his knowledge of chemistry lead to 126 deaths when he began manufacturing fentanyl. Fentanyl is a synthetic heroin that acts on the nervous system and produces a rush of euphoria when injected. It is legitimately used as an anesthetic. The chemicals needed to make fentanyl are legally available, and the illegal manufacture of fentanyl can be quite lucrative. Two thousand dollars worth of raw materials can yield $200,000 on the street.

The fentanyl that Marquardt produced was between 80 and 400 times more potent than pure heroin. A quantity the size of a grain of salt could be instantly lethal when ingested. According to Administrator Bonner, fentanyl is "...by far the most potent and deadly designer drug we've ever seen." Many of the bodies of the fentanyl overdose victims were found with syringes still hanging from their arms. Marquardt once told reporters that he himself was so inured from the vapors associated with illicit drug manufacture, that he
couldn’t “... smell anything anymore. I could probably breathe atmosphere that would kill normal persons.” Once, he said, while working in one of his clandestine labs, he happened to look over in time to see his pet dog drop dead from fumes.

It was another collapse that eventually led to Marquardt’s capture. Beginning in February 1991, DEA and state and local law enforcement agents were baffled by a rash of fentanyl overdoses which were occurring in clusters along the east coast. Thinking they were buying heroin, addicts were injecting lethal doses of fentanyl. Twenty-eight persons died from fentanyl in Baltimore in 1992; 21 died in Pittsburgh in August alone; 35 fentanyl deaths were reported in Philadelphia in several months. Boston and New York also saw a cluster of fentanyl deaths, and there were frighteningly large numbers of non-fatal overdoses of the drug as well.

Then in December of 1992, a Boston drug dealer named Christopher Moscatello let it slip to undercover agents that his supplier had nearly died in Wichita the previous summer from inhaling fentanyl vapors. DEA Agents in Boston relayed that information to agents in Wichita who checked emergency calls and hospital admissions for such a case. Their questioning produced the name of Pittsburgh native Joseph Martier, who, according to rescue workers, collapsed from vapors he inhaled at a Prairielabs, makeshift laboratory registered to George Marquardt in an industrial park.

Evidence at Prairielabs led to searches of the homes of Marquardt and his partner, Phillip “Sam” Houston. In Prairielabs and the residences of Marquardt and Houston, agents found the clandestine fentanyl labs responsible for producing the “serial killer drug.” Marquardt was the brains behind the operation. Barry Jamison, Resident Agent in Charge of the DEA Wichita Office, acknowledged that “Marquardt had to be an accomplished chemist to run the labs.” But other occupants of the industrial park where Prairielabs was located were surprised to learn what Marquardt did. According to one man, the 300-pound Marquardt “looked like some ol’ bum drug in off the street. He drove an old junky Chevy truck. Junk. Manual shift. Seat worn out from him setting in it.”

When he was brought before the judge for arraignment, Marquardt was wearing his trademark pair of bibbed overalls and scuffed boots. When asked his occupation, Marquardt replied, “Drug manufacturer.”

“What kind of drug manufacturing?” asked the judge

“Clandestine.”

“Sir?”

Marquardt responded “... I don’t know that I’ve had an occupation outside of being a career drug manufacturer.”

Despite his apparent genius and his good old boy homespun style, he was in fact the manufacturer of the drug responsible for 126 deaths. One Pittsburgh agent puts it this way: “To make this stuff you have to be a cold-hearted son of a bitch.”

DRUG ENFORCEMENT 61
Administrators’ Forum

As part of DEA's 20th Anniversary celebration, Administrator Robert C. Bonner and his three immediate predecessors, John C. Lawn, Francis “Bud” Mullen and Peter Bensinger, participated in an Administrators’ Forum at DEA Headquarters on May 5, 1993. The four came together for the first time, shared their views on the Future of Drug Law Enforcement, and responded to several questions from the audience. The forum was chaired by Warren L. Cikens, a senior staff member of the Brookings Institution’s Center for Public Policy Education.

Warren Cikens: ...My experience has shown that the problem of drug addiction/drug involvement has been a serious issue in stopping the potential for citizens to function effectively. ...Over these years there has been a sort of change in societal attitudes back and forth. And we must continue that pressure to ensure that society will support the kind of standards of conduct that will enable us to succeed in this major effort.

Bonner: ...I think we have learned some important lessons in the past number of years. ...And these are lessons...that we ought to look to, to define the future of our drug law enforcement efforts.

...I think that those people that are going to be making decisions about the future course of our national drug control strategy need to know that...there is a direct correlation between availability of drugs and our consumption and usage. And ultimately the consequences of consumption and usage of illegal drugs...[are] some very serious social problems: increased costs to our health care system, increased burdens on our educational system, a decrease in the productivity of American workers, not to mention the quality of life issues that are related to increased drug use and consumption in connection with drug-related crime and violence in our cities. ...

Part of the strategy for achieving [measures to reduce the availability of drugs in the United States]...requires a very highly focused effort at dismantling the drug-trafficking organizations. ...We can't afford to ignore the inter-relationship between our anti-drug efforts overseas and our efforts here at home.

To be successful...we need to apply the resources...of our domestic and our overseas offices, against these international trafficking organizations that continue to inundate our country with cocaine and heroin. Destroying these organizations is...the greatest challenge facing drug law enforcement, and the greatest challenge facing DEA. But it is a challenge I think DEA can meet.

Lawn: ...I have been interviewed several times recently for some forthcoming books about the single mission concept, about changes and resources, reductions in resources, and clearly, that can be done without denigrating the mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

There are too many agencies playing the role of drug law enforcement...there are some 30 agencies involved, and...that effort could be much better coordinated by giving the resources to the agency—that, not for 20 years, but the agency that has been getting the job done for so many years.
In the next 20 years the international scene will be critically important. International training is imperative. No one is better skilled than a Drug Enforcement Administration to do that. We are the future success of an international strategy that talks about drug reduction and training, because it was here in this organization that law enforcement took up the mantle, recognizing the importance of enforcement without training would not do anything to change the situation in the country.

Mullen: ...I came to DEA after a 20-year FBI career. ...and I thought that we were the only investigative agency in the world doing important work. Along the way I began to notice that people were robbing banks to get money to buy drugs. ...

I've been convinced over the years [that] the way to do business is through a cooperative effort...I always looked upon it as getting these agencies involved to work from the position of their strength. What's wrong with arresting a drug trafficker or drug dealer for violation of a bank robbery statute, or stealing a car, or for gun violation, or for some financial investigation? That's what I had in mind when I said cooperation. But what I found was everybody wanted to do DEA's job, and that is, I believe, where the problem lies. ...

When we started to talk about establishing the position of a drug czar, I said "I thought I was the drug czar."...I have long believed that if we are going to have a drug czar, they should have elevated the position of the DEA Administrator to be the drug czar and have a dual role as does the Director of CIA directing the intelligence community.

And I think that is what we are going to see in the future. We have got to redefine and emphasize the mission of DEA,...and bring these agencies together, yes, working with us but contributing from their strength and not doing the job DEA was formed to do. [Applause]

Bensinger: ...Drugs do limit individual potential. I think every time the DEA and its family speaks about whatever it's doing, it must remind that audience of the harm and the horror and the addiction created by these illegal drugs. ...

We need to be smart politically. We need to be able to deliver the message of drug law enforcement in its broadest sense. We need to have allies at the state and local level; that's where most drug enforcement is done.

I think we need to anticipate change. There is going to be a lot of community policing in the years ahead. DEA should be training the trainers; be setting up programs to share our expertise; maybe provide some monitoring of the asset forfeiture and money in these communities to help state and local law enforcement better implement that. ...

DEA arrests will continue to be Kingpin networks, major trafficking organizations. But within the scheme of drug law enforcement, not everybody is going to end up going to jail. I do believe in a certainty of punishment and a swift—more important than a severe—sentence. ...

When polio was a crisis 40 years ago, 3,500 people died a year, and it was a major public health issue. Today crime and handgun crime and drug crime kills 5,000 youths between 15 and 21. We need to treat it as a public health, as well as a law enforcement problem and menace.

“Destroying these [drug trafficking] organizations is...the greatest challenge facing drug law enforcement, and the greatest challenge facing DEA. But it is a challenge I think DEA can meet.”

Robert C. Bonner
Administrator
I do believe the single mission agency is right. ...Other agencies...need to be given a coordination and direction from one source, not from three or five different Cabinet Secretaries, and not from different competing constituencies in Congress. And I think that we need to get back our allies who understand our role and mission, and recognize that the military and the Treasury Department and other agencies can contribute to this mission, but there needs to be one conductor. And that’s the Administrator of the DEA.

Finally, I would say the asset forfeiture and state and local linkage needs to be maintained and augmented. I think your training mission is a vital link with the well being of this organization both internationally and domestically. So are the other elements we haven’t heard about—the diversion investigation, the pharmacy oversight, diversion control.

Cikens: How [do you] see the future...and...what [can] this new administration ...do to help continue the momentum of the effort you’ve all been engaged in?

Bonner: ...All of the former administrators have eloquently spoken to the need for our country to maintain a single mission agency in the area of fighting the drug problem and in the area of enforcing the Federal drug laws....

DEA...has demonstrated that there are some effective investigative techniques...and abilities that can be effective in affecting the drug problem and availability of drugs. ...No matter what kind of restructuring might be done in the Federal government,...[remember] that for our own country, for the well being of our kids, it’s going to be important that we have one agency whose sole and exclusive mission is working the drug problem, and drug law enforcement, and, of course, that is, and should be, DEA....

With over 30 other agencies of the Federal government receiving some of the so-called supply side funding of drug law enforcement funding, and in an era in which I think the new administration...is trying to do something about overall budget deficit, we are going into a period of tightening budgets. And the question is...how do we maintain and continue a vigorous, at the Federal level, drug enforcement effort, and at the same time impose reductions, particularly on the drug enforcement or the supply side agencies receiving this funding. ...

It is time now to take a look at some of these 30 other agencies that are receiving funding. I think it’s time to take a look at consolidating this effort...for a very fundamental reason that goes beyond budget, and that is, to establish responsibility and accountability again in one agency....I’m hopeful that that is the direction of the future of this administration, and the future direction that we will be taking at the Federal level.

Jack Lawn: ...Several years ago I did a survey of homicides in various countries, and the statistics were startling: Britain—9 homicides over the course of a year, Sweden—16, Canada—21; the United States—8,920.

I read recently and was reminded recently in reading about the famous St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in 1929, where seven people were gunned down in Kansas City. And that is in all the history books. ...We have seven teenagers a day killed in the Bronx, adjacent to Yankee Stadium. Every day! Violence is something that we are going to have to get our hands around. And violence, in my view, is fueled by the drug problem....

In particular, I am very concerned about the glut of heroin in the world, and the problem of heroin, the purity of heroin....Something else that I see on the horizon....is some tacit acceptance to the idea of greater tolerance for marijuana use. That’s something that we must be most concerned about. At a recent speech...I was told by a government official that in talking about the dangers of marijuana, that Jack Lawn was an anachronism. That people of his era are using scare tactics to talk about marijuana where in today’s political environment in Washington D.C., those people who were the products of the 60’s don’t see that to be the problem that old war-horses like me see it to be. So that’s something else that we must be particularly concerned with.

Mullen: I believe that we are going to see happen what we want to happen, that we will see a more cohesive drug enforcement effort in the future....I think that finances...are going to dictate that that happen....It seems that when I first came to DEA, and I was making my rounds of other
agencies, they all wanted to show me their new intelligence center, or their new operations center. And one of these days we are going to wake up and realize that it's all window dressing, and many of those are unnecessary. I believe that the intelligence center being constructed up in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, is one of the biggest political boondoggles in the history of this country.

And I cite the El Paso Intelligence Center as the model. That's the way we ought to be working. There, it's done with each agency contributing with its strength, with its knowledge, what it has to contribute to the effort. ... I think you're going to see some agencies have functions merged, and more clearly defined missions of the various Federal agencies because it has to happen. We can't afford to go on as we have been.

Bensinger: ... Finances will be compelling for consolidation, or at least leadership redesignation. ... And we've got to recognize that this won't happen just because the four of us stand up here... and say this is what makes sense. It will take some budget cutting at OMB. ... I hope we get close to Hillary Clinton's Task Force on Health, and that people point out the billions of dollars that are just crunching America's medical benefit costs because of illegal drugs and legal drugs. And that I think that DEA's role is to make sure those audiences hear us, and we have advocates. And not just to propagate the mission of this agency, but because it's the right thing to do. It'll be the most effective way to deliver this deterrence.

Pat Tarr, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Planning and Policy Analysis: ... Do you believe that the Federal efforts to interdict drugs, and by that I mean our efforts to look at the drugs and the conveyances rather than the people, do you believe that those efforts have been effective? And whatever your answer, why do you think that part of the strategy enjoys so much political support?

Mullen: I do not believe it has been effective. Talking about boondoggles, I think the balloons out on the desert [are] a boondoggle, also. I think it's been a terrible waste of many, many millions of dollars. ... I believe you have to have a level of interdiction, especially at our ports of entry. There has to be some inhibition. Visitors to this country have to know that you can't bring drugs into this country with abandon.

I believe we have every right as a nation to control our borders. But when it comes to controlling our airspace and those long stretches of our border it should be a military mission, and that we ought to concentrate our civilian law enforcement agencies at the ports of entries where they can be most effective. ... I do not believe (interdiction) has been effective because we have civilian law enforcement trying to perform a military mission, and I think that has to change.

Tarr: Why does it enjoy such political support? ...

Mullen: Because it's cops and robbers. It attracts attention. It attracts headlines. ... I think it's popular because it is the stuff that movies and books are made of, and it is a path to getting political recognition, and so forth. But as the most effective way to control drug trafficking, it is not.
Bonner: ...We do need to have some presence at our borders, after all we’re a sovereign nation. ...But we could put...every active duty personnel of the U.S. Army, and every other service, on the border with Mexico, and we could not significantly impact the flow of cocaine and other drugs across that border into the United States. It just is not going to happen.

So we need to maintain a presence, ...have a strategy that goes after the sources of production, and those are the major organizations in Colombia. ...We have been somewhat misguided...by pursuing what essentially is ...an interdiction strategy...The fact is, the Colombian cartels are well financed enough that they can... and do, simply increase their production, adopt different and more expedient ways to move drugs into the United States. We’ve got to get the cartels, and we’ve got to bring them down. And then we’ve got to do the same thing with respect to the major heroin trafficking organizations in the world.

Cikens: ...How we can find a proper balance between the focuses on enforcement and treatment. ...

Bensinger: ...Individuals that do have drug problems commit an incredible number of crimes in a short period of time. And if they’re not in treatment, they’ll be committing those crimes. So I’d say there’s some incentive for drug law enforcement for treatment. ...The program that was put on today demonstrated DEA’s commitment to prevention. That Network 3 and that prevention program that the Attorney General made reference to in New York and other locations is work that we ought to be embracing, and expanding, and recognizing, and paying for, and doing.

I think the Federal Government needs to bite the bullet on treatment and invest in it. ...Because individuals that do have drug and alcohol problems cost a fortune...So I would say DEA’s role would be to recognize the need for treatment, and to recognize our role in supporting it and mounting...efforts for prevention and education. ...

Mullen: To DEA’s credit, I think it has a very substantial prevention and education program, which I think falls within its role. As for proper balance between rehabilitation and enforcement, I don’t know if you can put a number on it, but in the early days of drug enforcement...I would hear about the treatment centers out there— I believe they’re in Kentucky—and how effective they were. But they were eventually closed down. ...I’m often asked...if you could have one area of enforcement, or of a drug program, be it interdiction, eradication, enforcement, rehabilitation, I’d go with education and prevention. Try to prevent those individuals, especially young people,...from abusing drugs in the first place. ...

Lawn: ...I think it’s imperative that the law enforcement community be able to enunciate what they need to get their part of the job done. ...Our role is simply to present what we feel is necessary, and then if we were to have a single mission concept, then be accountable for what it is we could do with the resources for which we testified. And then, I think ultimately you would see a greater share of the resources going into education and to treatment and to prevention.

Bensinger: ...I don’t see today a spokesperson, a leader of the education and prevention field. Since Bill Bennett left, there has been a void of addressing this. I don’t see in NIDA, I don’t see in HHS, I don’t see in other agencies, the Department of Education. Where’s this voice? And it bothers me.

Lawn: Peter is absolutely right. I can recall Congressman Charlie Rangel, saying at one point, “God bless DEA for getting into drug education, but what are Agents doing in education? Where are the other people who should have stepped forward and taken responsibility?” We did it because we felt it was part of our mission. But clearly, what you said is accurate. There is no one out there, or nobody out there saying, “This is what we need to get our part of the formula solved.”

Bonner: ...I’m not aware of any treatment program that’s been particularly effective yet in terms of treating
cocaine and crack addiction. But I think we need to spend additional funding there to find good treatment regimens. I also think that I'd like to see some more funding for education and prevention at the Federal level, and frankly, I think that DEA could perform a significant role in providing and filling the vacuum that's been alluded to in that area at the Federal level.

But, let me say that I don't think that enhanced funding for education, prevention and treatment should be at the expense of law enforcement efforts. ...Because I think if we do that...we're...going to repeat history. ...And we also know that unless you have a strong drug law enforcement effort—I think it has to be led at the Federal level—we are going to drop back into the abyss more quickly than anybody believes.

Dave Meloick, Congressional Staff Assistant, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs: ...Over the last 30 years, it appears that all the major resource commitments to drug law enforcement and the enactment of legislation, was in great part due to the Congress and the Administration reacting to public pressure. Recent polls show that the public concern regarding drugs is quite removed from the top of the list. Do you think that drug abuse and drug trafficking have sufficiently abated to serve the public need? Or what do you think it is going to take for this Administration, and the public, and the Congress to again bring [the drug issue] back to the forefront?

Bensinger: ...This country, sadly, reacts to tragedies, to train wrecks. The reason many of you in this room are being random-tested for drugs...is probably because Ricky Gates drove a locomotive out of Virginia and crashed into a Metroliner. Or Len Bias died from an overdose [while on] a high hit of cocaine. ...I think it's terrible, Dave, that it isn't a Top Ten Priority in the country...The economy has been what most people are focused on. ...

We had an epidemic of heroin, brown heroin, in the 70s. Or crack, or PCP, and then the public reacts. The parents see their kids getting in trouble. And Congress responds.

But I'm not overly optimistic, having lost some power bases in Congress, no Select Committee, and this not being on the top items of the current administration. ...Maybe it'll get there without a tragedy. Experience has been that something bad has to happen first.

Mullen: I think the whole drug problem is cyclical. It comes around and around, it seems. ...And I sense out there...that the public feels that the problem has abated.

Now it may have in those suburban communities where the education/prevention programs have taken hold, but as I understand it...it remains a serious problem in the inner-city where there are many dropouts. And you do not have the education/prevention programs working as well. And it seems we have these lulls, or periods when the problem does abate just a bit. All of the legalizers or the decriminalizers come out of the woodwork and say it's time to try another approach. I think our approach has worked, because the public senses that the drug abuse situation has improved. ... Politicians recognize that right away, and that's why I think you see less emphasis in the political arena.

“There are too many agencies playing the role of drug law enforcement...that effort could be better coordinated by giving the resources to...the agency that has gotten the job done for so many years.”

Jack Lawn
Former DEA Administrator
Lawn: I think after the strong support for Desert Storm, the country then sat back and saw that people were losing their jobs. That the cost of education was escalating. The cost of health care was escalating. And the immediacy of food on the table and taking care of one's family, the personal problem overwhelmed the community problem. And an administration began building a platform urging that something be done about the immediacy of that problem. But I certainly share Mr. Bensinger's view that something is going to happen, hopefully not a tragedy, that is going to refocus our members of Congress on the reality that we have a most severe drug problem. That violence is not decreasing, but increasing. ... But I believe that the problem certainly is there. It's a major problem. But just our being overwhelmed with the problem of the economy was one that forced the drug issue into second position.

Bonner: ... In a way, the drug problem in America has improved when you consider what it was back not that many years ago, the mid 80s when there were estimated to be something over six million regular cocaine users. ... And we now can say, at least according to estimates, that that figure has dropped under two million. There is some improvement.... On the other hand, the levels of drug use and consumption and drug related crime in America are still at... unacceptably high levels. And that is why we can't let up our guard....

I know that institutionally the Drug Enforcement Administration, if no other agency of our government, and no other group of people is going to remain concerned, is going to be taking some strong and vigorous actions to do anything and everything we possibly can to correct, control, contain and reduce the level of drug abuse, drug consumption, and drug related crime in America.

Catherine Shaw, Chief, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs: ... As you know, during a transition period there always seems to be rumors of a merger between the FBI and DEA. I'd like to ask... if you think these are serious rumors, and second, what can DEA do to take advantage of these transition times to stop rumors such as this, which, as you probably can imagine, are fairly demoralizing to DEA.

Mullen: I was part of the study group in 1981 and '82 that actually studied the possibility of merging the DEA and the FBI. And I think, based on that study and a prior study that had been conducted... it will never happen.

And the reasons for that: We did a skills study and found that DEA had many strengths in areas—intelligence gathering, language abilities, and so forth. ... You have, for example, and I found this to be a very serious bar to merging agencies, those overseas operations. I found, for example, that while the one agency is doing battle over the years with the East bloc and the Soviets, DEA Agents are going in and out of Eastern Europe and conducting drug investigations. Had there been a merger, that would have ceased immediately. ... I can recall traveling around the world with Attorney General Smith... and he commented to me at one of the Embassy gatherings. He said, “It's funny, the FBI Agents are standing in the background here, and the DEA Agents seem to know everybody.

And I said, “General, it's the nature of the mission. They're out there on the street. They're mixing it up. They're making arrests.” (Whether we were supposed to be or not, I think we were). [Laughter] I said, “It's the nature of the mission.” And that had quite an impression on him.

So, I can say the best way to surface the issue and face it head on is to ask the question, just as you just asked it, and get a straight answer. Which I think you're getting now. I do not believe it will ever happen.
DEA’s successful international financial investigation operation points the way to drug law enforcement of the future.

**Kingpin Strategy Attacks Cartel Finances**

After 20 years of experience investigating drug traffickers, DEA knows that the greatest impact on the drug trade comes when kingpin organizations are disrupted, weakened and destroyed, root and branch. With this objective in mind, DEA is targeting kingpin organizations or “TKOs.”

A kingpin is defined as the head of a drug trafficking organization that DEA has determined is responsible for producing and/or distributing substantial illegal drugs reaching the U.S., principally cocaine and heroin.

To qualify as a TKO, the organization’s drug production or distribution must be such that the destruction of the kingpin and his organization will result in a substantial and measurable decrease in cocaine, heroin, or other illegal drugs available in the U.S.

“Pursuing TKOs is not just a strategy to remove the kingpin himself; rather it is an approach designed to destroy his entire organizational infrastructure, and with it, the organization’s capacity to finance, produce, and distribute massive amounts of illegal drugs,” said DEA Administrator Robert C. Bonner. “Street dealers are easily replaced; the organizations are not.”

Using this strategy, DEA’s first priority is cocaine and the second—to be pursued simultaneously—is heroin. A key component of the strategy includes multiple attacks against all the vulnerabilities of the kingpin organization, including:

- their means of production: removing their supply organizations, destroying labs and shutting off access to essential chemicals needed to turn raw materials into marketable drugs;
- their means of transport: removing their transport organizations by attacking their use of general aviation aircraft and their use of maritime vessels to transport bulk quantities of drugs to the U.S.
"Street dealers are easily replaced; the organizations are not."

Robert C. Bonner

- their finances: undermining drug traffickers' money laundering methods, seizing their bank accounts and assets, and removing the source of their immense power;
- their means of communication: exploiting their communications networks with greater use of court-authorized wiretaps in the U.S. and by electronic surveillance overseas with host nation law enforcement counterparts.

"The Kingpin Strategy represents a new direction for DEA—a new focus. It provides DEA with a framework to analyze the major trafficking organizations, target them, devise comprehensive plans of attack and marshal DEA's resources against them," said Bonner.

But in some ways, the Kingpin Strategy is a natural evolution of what DEA has been doing—and doing well—for two decades. It is a product of DEA's vast intelligence and knowledge of the kingpin organizations acquired over the years through effective domestic investigations—and from overseas offices through intelligence gathering and investigations.

Putting Up a "Front"

An undercover financial investigation begun in southern California in 1990, code name Operation Green Ice, illustrates how the Kingpin Strategy works.

When DEA Special Agents launched Operation Green Ice, they had a clear objective: infiltrate the money laundering enterprises operated by the leaders of the major Colombian cocaine cartels, principally the Cali Cartel.

The first step in the operation was to make contact with the major drug money brokers in Colombia. These brokers act as middlemen between the cartel leaders in Colombia and money laundering organizations in the United States.

DEA undercover agents, posing as money laundering facilitators, used informants to identify the brokers in Colombia. Over time, they met and won the confidence of seven of the cartels' top-ranking financial managers. And then the plan was set in action.

Using money provided by the brokers, the DEA undercover agents opened up leather good shops in Houston, Fort Lauderdale, Miami, Chicago, and New York. The purpose of the stores was to create "paper" revenues from non-existent leather sales that could conceal the actual laundering of drug money generated by cocaine sales in the United States by exporting those monies to banks in Colombia.

The setup appeared convincing. Colombia is a leading cattle-producing country and the export and sale of leather goods was the perfect ruse. The agents had already received several shipments of quality leather goods and the transaction had moved smoothly.

Phony invoices were prepared to cover alleged sales of goods, but in reality, funds were transmitted to accountants per instructions. The funds were not for goods but were proceeds of cocaine sales. And cash pickups—large volumes of cash—occurred throughout the United States.
**International Expansion**

The plan was so successful in the U.S. that the cartel operatives asked the undercover agents to provide money laundering services in Europe, Canada, and the Caribbean. With this request, Green Ice turned into an international operation, requiring DEA's Special Agents to call on their law enforcement counterparts in Colombia, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Cayman Islands in order to help carry off the plan.

The negotiations continued, and on one fateful weekend in September 1992, the seven cartel financial managers went to meetings set up outside Colombia. They were to rendezvous with their “operatives” from the United States, Italy, Spain, and Costa Rica to discuss plans for their criminal enterprise. Instead, they were arrested.

When the tally was taken at the end of that September weekend, the scorecard showed 167 arrests and the seizure of more than $54 million in cash and property worldwide. In one of the most significant seizures, the Colombian National Police conducted a raid on the financial offices of the Cali Cartel in Cali itself, specifically the offices of drug kingpin Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, seizing financial books and records, as well as computer hard drives and discs containing transactions and bank account information.

The operation delivered a serious blow to the Cali Cartel.

“Cash is the lifeblood of the cartels,” Bonner said, “and they must have it in order to finance the production and distribution of drugs, and in order to corrupt and intimidate. By disrupting their financial operations, we diminish their very capacity to do evil.”

Operation Green Ice is a perfect example of how effective the Kingpin Strategy can be when the international community joins together to attack the major vulnerabilities of the Colombian cocaine cartels.

After the conclusion of this investigation, and in combination with other law enforcement efforts in the United States and abroad, the wholesale cocaine prices rose sharply in the four major U.S. gateway cities. This is only the second time the price of cocaine has increased since the cocaine epidemic began in the late 1970s.

These higher prices indicate less available cocaine in the United States. The success of investigations, such as Green Ice, aimed at the vulnerabilities of the kingpin organizations lead our nation closer to one of the most important goals of drug law enforcement—to make drugs more expensive and less available in the United States.
Cultivation Sites