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# EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS PROJECT THROUGH THE SYSTEM RATES METHODOLOGY

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# EVALUATION OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS PROJECT THROUGH THE SYSTEM RATES METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction: Some Comments on the Justice System

Some years ago, researchers at the University of Southern California observed that a perspective of the criminal justice system <u>as a system</u> is a view which contains elements of reality and fantasy. They observed:

The reality is that the community, the police, the courts and the correctional agencies do combine to attack the problem of crime and process the criminal offender. The fantasy lies in the speculation that the various agencies approach these processes in a coordinated and rational fashion (Klein, et al., 1971).

Although there is considerable discussion and writing by academicians, administrators, practitioners and researchers about the "system" of criminal and/or juvenile justice, the United States does not have a single system of justice. Each level of government, indeed each jurisdiction, has its own unique way of doing things. These many "systems" -- all established to enforce the standards of conduct believed necessary for the protection of individuals and preservation of the community -- are a collectivity of thousands of law enforcement agencies and a multiplicity of courts, prosecution and defense agencies, probation and parole departments, correctional institutions and related community-based organizations. It is clear that the "system" of criminal and juvenile justice sacrifices much in the way of efficiency and effectiveness in order to protect the individual and to preserve local autonomy.

The many systems of justice now in existence in the United States are not the same as those which emerged following the American Revolution. Although American legal arrangements have traditionally tried to insure justice for all citizens, the systems have not developed or evolved uniformly or consistently or, for that matter, always in the same direction. Parts of our system, such as trial by jury and the principle of bail, are relatively old and date back to our European heritage in general and the English Common Law in particular. Probation and parole began in the nineteenth century and the juvenile court is a twentieth century innovation. Some of the innovations and changes in our systems have been generated by judicial decisions and legislative enactments. Many have evolved more by chance than by design.

Coupled with the numerous criminal and juvenile justice systems in the United States and their uneven development is the separation of functions within the systems. There are similar components in all systems starting with police at input, through prosecution and courts, and finally, to corrections. Although these major components and subcomponents are interwoven and interdependent one with the other, they typically function independently and autonomously. This separateness of function, which on one hand prevents the possibility of a "police state," on the other hand leads to some extra-ordinarily complex problems. Not the least of these is that the systems of justice are not really systems -integrated, coordinated, and effective entities -- but rather are collections of agencies tied together by the processing of an increasing number of adult and juvenile offenders. They are marked by an unequal quality of justice, inadequate funding, and lack of relevant research and evaluation to provide some measure of effectiveness. And, until recently, they were regarded with a general indifference and apathy on the part of the public which they were designed to serve.

That set of institutional arrangements, activities and processes known as the criminal justice system is also referred to as the "non-system" of criminal justice. But the "non" aspect must be related to such notions as efficiency, agreement as to goals and objectives, and the like. The justice "system" does exist, even if all of its activities are not systematic, orderly and smooth-flowing. The dictionary definition of a system -- a set or arrangement of things so related or connected as to form a unity or organic whole -- is an

- 2 -

appropriate target, but that definition is not strictly applicable to the current criminal and juvenile justice systems.

Introduction: The System Rates Methodology (Klein et. al., 1971; Carter; et. al., 1974)

Perhaps the best known model of the criminal justice system is that which was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). That model or flow chart portrayed generally ties movement of cases -- felony, misdemeanor, petty and juvenile -- through the justice system. The flow chart generically is a basic tool of the system rate methodology and is involved in its first three steps. These steps include:

- 1) Construction of an explicit justice system flow chart portraying the decision points in the system
- 2) Insertion of justice system data -- the "numbers of \_\_\_\_\_" --- into the flow chart
- 3) Calculation of input and decision-point system rates or percentages

The following pages provide a brief commentary on each of these three steps -construction of flow charts, insertion of data and computation of system rates.

<u>Construction of Flow Charts</u>. The Criminal Justice Training Center at the University of Southern California explains the system rates methodology in a training module on criminal justice planning. For illustrative and explanatory purposes, the following materials are extracted from that planning module (Criminal Justice Training Center, 1977). Figure 1 is a flow chart representing the criminal justice system in a greatly abbrevated and simplified form.




FIGURE 1: A MODEL OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Note that the model presents "crime" in an irregular shape -- an amoeba of sorts -to signify the absence of precise data on the amount of crime, as well as to suggest that its nature and definition change over time and by political jurisdiction. The amoeba also serves to remind us of the imprecision generated by the exercise of discretion by law enforcement agencies and their personnel. Also amoeba-shaped are crimes "not observed-not reported" and "observed-not reported;" again, the amoeba suggests the uncertainty of the level of crime which falls into either of these two categories. At this point in the system flow chart, the amoeba is replaced by a rectangle, suggesting some certainty as to both flow of cases and offenders through the system as well as their numbers. But even here, there is less certainty than might be suggested. For example, the rectangle marked "arrest" suggests that definitions of arrest are commonly shared; such is not the case operationally, particularly in the juvenile justice system. Then too, there are significant gaps in data about some of these rectangles. For example, we may know the total number of arrests for various crimes, but not the number of different individuals arrested for these crimes

over a given time frame, even though the use of a rectangle rather than an amoeba suggests some certainty about the data. Ten arrests may represent ten separate individuals <u>or</u> one individual arrested five times and five individuals each arrested once.

We must also mention the fact that flow charts may be misleading in that they suggest that offenders move through the justice system in an orderly fashion. It is to be emphasized that disruptions frequently occur, that blockages are not uncommon, and that cases and offenders are occasionally processed as though part of a tide -- with a significant ebb and flow. Some offenders leave the justice system for reasons such as insanity or certification as to addict status, others enter the system at a midpoint such as the juvenile offender certified to adult court, while others, after winning an appeal, may leave the system totally or "backtrack" in the system to a new trial or resentencing.

A final observation about flow charts as used in the system rates methodology: the charts, unless clearly identified otherwise, represent system processes, and only indirectly reflect the activities of specific agencies. In Figure 1, for example, "arrest" represents the process of arrest, not the agency or agencies which do the arresting. As will be shown later, it is possible and generally advantageous to portray both process and agency concurrently.

Vertical lines in a flow chart represent decision points in the justice system at which some individual, group of individuals or agency makes a decision, e.g., chooses from among the alternatives available. Thus, the vertical line following conviction indicates a decision point; here, the court must select a sentencing alternative from those available -- probation, jail or prison in the illustration. The vertical line following arrest suggests that the prosecuting attorney must choose from the alternatives available to him -- to prosecute or

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not. The observation that vertical lines represent decisions does not suggest that the decisions are simple -- they frequently are not -- but rather that decision-makers and the choices available to them may be portrayed with some precision. A caution must issue: there are many informal processes in the justice system which are not reflected or revealed by vertical lines on system flow charts.

<u>Insertion of Data</u>. We have noted earlier that the step which follows construction of a system flow chart is the insertion of justice system data onto the charts and that these data represent the "numbers of \_\_\_\_\_" being processed by or moving through the system. As relates to "numbers of \_\_\_\_\_," it is important to observe that the agencies which comprise the justice system keep data on both "cases" and "offenders," but that cases and offenders are indeed different. Thus, one case may involve two or more crime-partner offenders, or one offender may be the subject of two or more cases. But even apart from that issue, the numerical data used by the system rates methodology are of two types. One type of numbers is of the "cohort" variety; the second is of an "inventory" nature. A cohort follows the same offenders or cases through the system; the inventory records the number of offenders or cases appearing at points in the justice system over a given time frame.

Figure 2 is a cohort portrait showing the flow of offenders over time through the criminal justice system. It indicates that of the 20,000 arrests reported, there were 15,000 prosecutions and 5,000 non-prosecutions. Of the 15,000 prosecutions, 10,000 resulted in conviction, 5,000 in non-conviction. And of the 10,000 convictions, there were 6,000 probation dispositions, 3,000 commitments to jail and 1,000 to prison. In short, cohorts follow individuals through the system over time.

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



FIGURE 2: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT DATA

Note that in the cohort flow chart, there is balance -- the parts all equal the whole suggesting that every case/offender is accounted for. Thus, in Figure 2, the 15,000 prosecutions and 5,000 non-prosecutions equal the 20,000 arrests reported; the 6,000 cases to probation, 3,000 to jail and 1,000 to prison equal the 10,000 convictions. A simple rule may be constructed for the cohort data: the numbers to the right of any vertical, decision-point line should equal the number to the left of that line. Where there is not a balance between the two sides of the vertical line, the number to the left of the line will almost inevitably be larger suggesting that there is an option available to the decision-maker -- perhaps an informal, partially hidden option -- which is not portrayed to the right of the vertical line and which accounts for the missing cases/offenders. A search to discover the missing decision alternative(s) is important.

Figure 3 is a reproduction of the same basic flow chart with inventory data appended thereto. The inventory data are gathered over some precise point in time as, for example, a specific day (July 14), or for a certain month (June 1975), or perhaps for an entire year (1977). There is no tracking of

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individuals as in the cohort approach, but rather a counting of cases/offenders in the various parts of the system. Indeed, numbers to the right of a vertical decision-point line may be greater or lesser than the number to the left; balance is not required. The inventory approach provides a portrait which may be compared with other portraits, e.g., June with July, 1976 with 1977, and so on.



## FIGURE 3: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH INVENTORY DATA

<u>Computing System Rates</u>. System rates mathematically are percentages -nothing more, nothing less. But in the complex world of criminal justice, these simple mathematical expressions take on special meaning. Klein, Kobrin, McEachern and Sigurdson described system rates in the following way:

System rates are statements, in simple mathematical form, expressing the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the criminal justice system at its various levels of functioning. They differ from traditional crime statistics, which, at best, measure limited outcomes of unknown or unmeasured processes. System rates tell us not only what has happened but how well we have done. The clearance rate used by police agencies is one kind of system rate, stating a ratio of crimes solved to crimes known to the police -- a function of the level of criminal activity, the reporting system, and the efficiency of police investigative practices.

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Similarly, a plea-bargaining rate, if available, would represent a useful statement on interagency accommodation to the exigencies of both legal statutes and administrative pressures. To a lesser extent, this would be true of juvenile detention rates and delinquency reporting rates from such community agencies as the schools and halfway houses for juveniles and narcotic addicts.

In brief, the examination of the criminal justice system in terms of such rates offers an opportunity to raise detailed and searching questions respecting the system's accomplishments and failures. Most immediately, these rates can provide answers to the more mundane questions of the degree to which formal and official organizations in the system perform their routine functions. But perhaps more important, rate assessment may also be used to measure the extent to which the system as a whole fulfills its fundamental tasks (Klein, et al., 1971).


Klein and colleagues see system rates as providing data about criminal justice system accomplishments and failures and argue for a series of such indices or system rates portraying the major decision points in the justice system.

Rut even apart from the broad criminal justice perspective which speaks for the use of system rates, there are some practical reasons for conversion of data to percentages, i.e., system rates. Percentages permit comparison between similar types of organizations and activities such as the clearance rates of various police departments. Then too, criminal justice agency personnel are familiar with the rate statistic; they have utilized a variety of rates -clearance rates, success rates, conviction rates, and so on. The use of percentages, of course, also minimizes some of the difficulties in interpreting the magnitude of a number. Thus, while it is difficult to determine whether 83,199 is a small or large number (it obviously depends on the magnitude relative to a base), there can be more rapid consensus that 96 percent is large, 11 percent small.

There are two types of system rates: input rates and decision-point rates. Input rates/percentages are calculated using as a denominator some number representing input into the justice system. Figure 4, for example, provides input system rates (for cohort data) based upon an input number of

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100,000 crimes reported. The 20,000 arrests measured against the 100,000 crimes reported yields a system rate of 20 percent. The 15,000 prosecutions against the 100,000 crimes reported is a 15 percent prosecution system rate; the 10,000 convictions against the 100,000 crimes reported is a 10 percent conviction system rate. In this example, the number of crimes reported served as the input number, but the 20,000 arrests could have been used in the same way. Had that been done, the system rate for prosecution would have been 75 percent (15,000 prosecutions for the 20,000 arrests), the conviction rate would have been 50 percent (10,000 convictions for the 20,000 arrests), and so on.




#### FIGURE 4: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT INPUT SYSTEM RATES

Decision-point system rates/percentages are calculated using as a denominator the total number of cases/offenders available at any decision point in the system. Figure 5 is an illustration of decision-point system rates for cohort data. The data at the judicial decision-point of sentencing reveals 10,000 convictions disposed of with 6,000 cases to probation (60 percent), 3,000 to jail (30 percent) and 1,000 to prison (10 percent). Similarly, using


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the 6,000 cases/cffenders to probation as the denominator, note that probation has a success system rate of 83 percent, 5,000 of the 6,000 cases, a failure system rate of 17 percent, 1,000 of the 6,000 cases.




#### FIGURE 5: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHART WITH COHORT DECISION-POINT SYSTEM RATES

Additional Data for Flow Charts. An examination of justice system flow charts will quickly reveal that some of the "boxes" represent specific events such as arrest or conviction, while others represent status or location of cases/ offenders such as in jail or on probation. Accordingly, other data may be appended to these charts to better portray justice system behavior: these other data may include the average (or other statistic) length of stay in a "box" or between "boxes," the numbers of cases/offenders moving into, through and out of different boxes for given periods of time, and the like. Figure 6 illustrates the portrayal of additional data for a given time frame, e.g., for the year ending December 31, 1977 (this latter date being important because of "current population" data on the chart). FIGURE 6: USING THE FLOW CHART TO HIGHLIGHT OTHER INFORMATION



It has been noted above that justice system flow charts normally represent process, rather than <u>agency</u> data. It is true that if only one agency does the process (the parole board, for example), the process and agency data are the same. Thus, when it is observed in Figure 2 representing cohort data that of 1,000 offenders in prison, 900 were paroled and 100 were not, we have both parole process <u>and</u> the paroling authority data; they are one and the same. However, where multiple agencies are involved, as for example in the process of arrest, there may be a requirement to separate the behavior of one agency from that of another. Using the 20,000 arrests from Figure 2, as an example, it is clear that a particular process box may be exploded to portray individual agency performance as in Figure 7.

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#### FIGURE 7: PORTRAYAL OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCY PERFORMANCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FLOW CHARTS

The posting of individual agency performance on justice system flow charts permits the portrait to be both specific as to agency and general as to process.

#### Summary on System Rates

As a methodology, system rates provides mathematical statements about justice system behavior; indeed, the methodology calls for a series of indices constructed at decision points in the justice system. Basically, system rates are portraits and although the simplified illustrations provided in text have been for the system as a whole, the process has application for detailed examination of specific parts of the overall system such as corrections or law enforcement or even an individual agency. The method may be crime specific, e.g., tracking the robber or rapist through the system. Or the approach may track specific types of offenders through the system: the old, the young, the black, the white. And by using identical system formats, it is possible to contrast this year with last, or March with July for specific kinds of offenders such as auto thieves or forgers. Then too, as programs are added or modified or deleted to, within and from the system, the basic portrait will change. Thus, the introduction of one or more diversion programs to a system chart should permit comparison of the "new" system with the old one.

#### The National Evaluation Design: DSO and System Rates


The instructions provided site evaluators of Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) Programs as relates to the system rates assessment were at once both simple and complex: we requested that a flow chart portraying the juvenile justice system be prepared and that inventory data be obtained on both delinquent youth and status offenders for two distinct time frames, before and at least six months after programmatic DSO activities were initiated. These four charts -- a before and after on delinquents and a before and after on status offenders -- would serve as the basis for our analysis.

A series of general communications and site-specific follow-up correspondence and telephone calls also requested that the evaluators be as comprehensive as possible and exhaustive of all processes and agencies which comprise the juvenile justice system. Finally, recognizing that changes in system rates might be impacted as much by system capacity changes (such as the opening or closing of institutions or the addition or deletion of probation officers and juvenile court judges) as by philosophical or process changes, we asked that there be monitoring and recording of events which would effect justice system capacity.

To facilitate this total process, a sample juvenile justice system flow chart was developed and given each site. That chart appears as Figure 8. Note particularly the level of detail desired at the front end of the system -- that dealing with system entry by police, parents, school, self, and "other."

There emerged, almost immediately, a common set of problems at the evaluation sites. The first difficulty focused upon the system portrait itself;

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# FIGURE 8: System rates flow chart

the second, closely but not totally interwoven with the first, centered upon data collection. As relates to the charts, the most common question was the degree of resolution or detail desired or required. Indeed, the range of processes/ agencies identified by the site evaluators was from 15 to about 150. The second problem, data collection, had two subsets. First, detailed data were not available for the many processes/agencies which were identified in the more detailed system charts. Aggregate data for major processes were almost always available, but as the level of detail of the charts increased, there was a parallel decrease in specific data availability. Also surfacing with the initial data collection effort was the absence or poor quality of data maintained by the juvenile justice agencies. Some agencies had historical and current data available; others had no historical (before) data whatsoever. In some jurisdictions it was possible to track a juvenile through the system from one process or agency to another; in other jurisdictions, there was no such capability. Even the most fundamental types of data such as age, gender, race, or offense often were unrecorded and unavailable. The range of data availability and retrieval varied from computer tape to search-of-individual-files and "stubby pencils." And in no jurisdiction was there justice system entry data at the level of detail desired.

These two basic challenges to flow chart construction and data collection drove a series of compromises and trade-offs, including sampling of cases at one or more sites. Clearly, less detailed flow charts than could have been constructed were drawn and aggregated data were appended to them. But, also contributing significantly to the system chart and data dilemma was the fact that the portrayal, in most instances, is of <u>cases</u>, not individuals. Thus, site evaluators reporting four juveniles detained usually did not (indeed, could not) distinguish between one individual detained four times, four individuals each detained on one occasion, or the other possible combinations


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of cases and individuals that four detentions could represent. In fact, the numbers describe system workload and, without some type of offender behavior transaction system or file (OBTS/OBTF as they have become known), individual juvenile tracking at these evaluation sites is at best difficult, and at worst, impossible.

One other significant data problem must be addressed, although it is common in this type of temporal analysis. The data represent an "inventory" of cases in the juvenile system rather than the tracking of a cohort through the system. Thus, the number of cases at various points in the justice system during a given time frame (say April, May and June) includes cases which started <u>prior</u> to the time frame (perhaps in March), or exit the system <u>after</u> the time frame (July, for example), as well as those which enter and exit the system <u>during</u> the time frame (such as enter in April, exit in June). The system charts, accordingly, do not always "balance." Thus, on occasion, the number of cases which emerge from a decision point in the system may exceed (as illustrated in Figure 9) or be less than (as in Figure 10) the number of cases at the decision point.

FIGURE 9


FIGURE 10



When these patterns were found within site data, the decision-point system rate charts were calculated with the "80 plus 30" (110) or "60 plus 30" (90) as the denominator rather than the input number of 100.

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A final problem -- gaps in the data. On some occasions, there were data gaps of the variety which appear in Figures 11 and 12.



Although sensitive to the potential error of filling in these "?s" by simple arithmetic, we did so. Thus, the "?" in Figure 11 was assumed to be 30, in Figure 12 to be 100.

#### System Impact at DSO Sites: An Overview

These difficulties notwithstanding, we turn now to the DSO system rates data. Inasmuch as the reader is provided with full system charts as part of this text, as well as the decision-point system rate calculations, the commentary here is based upon changes in the juvenile systems "before" and "after" introduction of DSO activities at the evaluation sites. We are interested collectively in the overall number of cases at intake, as well as law enforcement referrals to the juvenile justice system, detention following court appearance, and cases placed on probation and institutionalized. Five basic tables for the 14 sites and sub-sites summarize the overall portraits. Note that there are data on 14 sites as well as cumulative data for the states of Connecticut and Delaware. The before and after are always the months of April-May-June, but there are different years involved at the various sites -- this is a product of varying program start-up dates at the sites. The years are:

Arizona	1975 and 1977
California	1976 and 1977
Connecticut (all sites)	1976 and 1977
Delaware (all sites)	1975 and 1977
Illinois (both sites)	1976 and 1977
South Carolina (both sites)	1976 and 1977
Washington (both sites)	1975 and 1977

Except for the portrayal of intake data, the "cumulative" charts reflect the number and percent of delinquent and status offenders before and at least six months after the initiation of DSO activities. The data reflect the number of offenders who entered the juvenile justice system by law enforcement action, were detained after court hearing, and were placed on probation or institutionalized by the juvenile court. We would caution the reader against assuming that the before and after data represent trends; these data are only statements as to direction and intensity of change and may or may not be indicative of long range trends at either a specific site or nationwide. The reader should note that the small numbers at some sites may produce distorted percentage changes in the before and after portraits.

A more fundamental caution should be raised at this point. At best these data are only suggestive of the possible short-run impact made by the introduction of a DSO program on case flow in its jurisdiction. However, such short-run changes are indistinguishable from longer and more durable trends. Consequently, the system rates data presented here are useful only as a description of the flow of cases during the period bracketing the introduction of the DSO programs. The extent to which changes in system rates may be attributed to the advent of efforts to deinstitutionalize status offenders, or any other policy change, must await the development of comprehensive, uniform, and economically retrievable juvenile justice data. The system rate changes

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presented here are best seen primarily as exemplifying a model approach to the task of tracking the consequences of one kind of change in juvenile justice policy.

#### Court Intake.

Table 1 provides data on the numbers of cases at intake, the juvenile court, before and after the initiation of DSO activities.

Even with the caution about changes in small numbers possibly generating large percentage changes, the percentage data collectively reveal the following balanced pattern:

Sites with a percentage increase in delinquent and status offenders	3
Sites with a percentage increase in delinquent, and decrease in status offenders	3
Sites with a percentage decrease in delinquent, and increase in status offenders	3
Sites with a decrease in delinquent and status offenders	3
Data not available	_2
	14

With the four possible outcomes evenly divided among the 12 sites providing data, we are hard pressed to interpret the findings although we note some consistency within states. Thus, Connecticut's three sites experienced decreases in delinquent and increases in status offenders, the two sites in Washington had the pattern of increases in the numbers of delinquents and reductions in status offenders, and Delaware had two of its three sites report increases in both delinquent and status offenders with the third site reporting an increase in delinquent and decline in status offenders. At best, the data suggest some consistency within states with two or more sites and diversity between states as to patterns of intake of TABLE 1

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#### NUMBER OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS AT COURT INTAKE BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

- 21 -

CTTE .	NUMBER OF	DIRECTION	
SITE	BEFORE	AFTER	AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE
ARIZONA - Pima Co.			
Delinquent Status	1650 775	1453 471	- 11.9 - 39.2
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co.			
Delinquent Status	3061 736	2968 582	- 3.0 - 20.9
CONNECTICUT - Statewide			
Delinquent Status	3452 585	3127 629	- 9.4 + 7.5
CONNECTICUT - District I			
Delinquent Status	1078 135	1000 142	- 7.2 + 5.2
CONNECTICUT - District II			
Delinquent Status	1268 240	1117 269	- 11.9 + 12.1
CONNECTICUT - District III			
Delinquent Status	1106 210	1010 218	- 8.7 + 3.8
DELAWARE - Statewide			
Delinquent Status	782 140	934 255	+ 19.4 + 32.1
DELAWARE - Kent Co.			
Delinquent Status	163 36	172 55	+ 5.5 + 52.8
DELAWARE - New Castle Co.			
Delinquent Status	443 33	545 143	+ 23.0 +333.0
DELAWARE - Sussex Co.			
Delinquent Status	176 71	217 57	+ 23.3 - 19.7
ILLINOIS - Cook Co.			
Delinquent Status	5170 1054	5651 1225 .	+ 9.3 + 16.2
ILLINOIS - Macon Co.			
Delinquent Status	393 118	377 79	- 4.1 - 33.1
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co.			
Delinquent Status	N/A*	N/A	
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co.			
Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	
WASHINGTON - Clark Co.			
Delinquent Status	589 259	750 240	+ 27.3 - 7.3
WASHINGTON - Spokane			
Delinquent Status	851 183	1025 118	+ 20.4 - 35.5
* DATA NOT AVAILABLE			

delinquent and status offenders. There may be a more important observation the system data analysis should examine individual DSO sites and their justice systems.

#### Referral to the Juvenile Justice System.

The reader will recall from Figure 8 that the data collection plan included the collection of data not only at entry into the juvenile justice system by major categories including law enforcement, schools, parents and others, but also requested detailed information on the sources of referral <u>to</u> law enforcement <u>by</u> parents, schools, and others, as well as by law enforcement action itself. The general data on sources of referrals were available; the specific source of referral to law enforcement generally was not.

As would be expected and as portrayed in Table 2, law enforcement, including both local police agencies and sheriff's departments, is the source of entry into the juvenile justice system for the majority of delinquents. The range for this phenomenon was from a high of 98.2 percent in Pima County, Arizona to a low of 52.8 percent in New Castle, Delaware before DSO to a range of 98.5 in Pima County to 60.5 in Kent County, Delaware after DSO.

The agencies of law enforcement were responsible for a lesser number and proportion of status offender referrals to the justice system than was the case with delinquent offenders. The range for the eight sites where such data were available was from a high of 83.0 percent in Pima County to a low of 27.8 percent in Kent County, Delaware before DSO and from 91.2 percent in Pima County to 33.5 percent in District III, Connecticut after DSO.

As was the case in the summary of intake data nationwide by direction and percentage of change, clear patterns in the percentage of law enforcement referrals to the juvenile justice system before and after DSO are TABLE 2

#### NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS REFERRED TO JUVENILE SYSTEM BY LAW ENFORCEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

······································	1		1		DIRECTION
BEFORE		AFTER		AND	
SITE	NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
ARIZONA - Pima Co.					
Delinquent Status	1621 643	98.2 83.0	1430 429	98.5 91.2	- 11.8 - 33.3
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	2553 546	83.4 74.2	2516 423	84.8 72.7	- 1.4 - 22,5
CONNECTICUT - Statewide Delinquent Status	3326 295	96.3 50.4	2958 333	94.6 52.9	- 11.1 + 12.9 ·
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	1028 70	95.4 51.9	955 93	95.5 65.5	- 7.1 + 32.9
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	1231 147	97.1 61.3	1053 167	94.3 62.1	- 14.5 † 13.6
CONNECTICUT - District III Delinquent Status	1067 78	96.5 37.1	950 73	94.1 33.5	- 11.0 - 6.4
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	477 12	61.0 50.0	588 125	63.0 49.0	+ 23.3
DELAWARE – Kent Co. Delinquent Status	135 10	82.8 27.8	104 23	60.5 41.8	- 23.0
DELAWARE - New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	234 12	52.8 36.4	345 66	63.3 46.1	+ 47.4
DELAWARE – Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	108 48	61.4 67.6	139 36	64.1 63.2	+ 28.7 - 25.0
ILLINOIS - Cook Co. Delinquent Status	N/A**	N/A	N/A	N/A	
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	· · · · · · · · ·
SOUTH CAROLINA – Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
WASHINGTON – Clark Co. Delinquent Status	503 125	85.4 48.3	609 N/A	81.2 N/A	+ 21.1
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

\* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

\*\* NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE

absent. At one of the eight sites on which data are available, there was an increase in the percentages of law enforcement referrals of both status and delinquent offenders, at three sites there were decreases in the percentages of law enforcement referrals, while at the remaining four sites, three reported a decrease in the proportion of delinquent and an increase in status offender referrals, and one site reported the reverse. Contrary to the intake findings, there were not even consistencies within states on these referral data.

#### Detention.

Table 3 presents detention data following entry into the juvenile justice system for 12 of the 14 DSO sites. Using percentage of change in detention of delinquent and status offenders before and after DSO programming, the overall patterns are again diverse. At three sites, the percentages of delinquent and status offenders detained increased; at five sites, the percentages for delinquent and status offenders decreased; and, at the remaining four sites, there were two with increases in the percentages of delinquents and decreases for status offenders and two with the opposite pattern.

The ranges of percent of delinquent and status offenders detained before and after DSO programming may be summarized. The high percentage for delinquent detention before DSO was 64.9 in Alameda County, California followed by the two Washington State sites and the low percentage of delinquent detention was 1.4 percent in District III, Connecticut. After the DSO projects were initiated, the high percentage of delinquent detention was still Alameda County at 55.1 percent, the low was 2.5 percent in Macon County, Illinois.

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TABLE 3

#### NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS DETAINED FOLLOWING COURT APPEARANCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

	BEFORE AFTER		TER	DIRECTION	
SITE		PERCENT	1	PERCENT	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
ARIZONA - Pima Co. Delinquent Status	266 197	16.1 25.4	265 60	18.2 12.7	- 0.4 - 69.5
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	1988 486	64.9 66.0	1635 0	55.1 0.0	- 17.8 -100.0
CONNECTICUT – Statewide Delinquent Status	221 147	6.4 25.1	320 177	10.2	+ 44.8 + 20.4
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	106 48	9.8 35.6	123 39	12.3 27.5	+ 16.0 - 18.8
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	100 81	7.9 33.8	140 113	12.5 42.0	+ 40.0 + 39.5
CONNECTICUT - District III Delinquent Status	15 18	1.4 8.6	57	5.6 11.5	+280.0
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	61 20	7.8 14.3	46 29	4.9 11.4	- 24.6 + 45.0
DELAWARE - Kent Co. Delinquent Status	11 8	6.7 22.2	17 9	9.9 16.4	
DELAWARE - New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	28 2	6.3 6.1	17 9	3.1 6.3	- 39.3
DELAWARE - Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	22 10	12.5 14.1	12 11	5.5 19.3	- 45.5
ILLINOIS – Cook Co. Delinquent Status	266 63	25.7 44.4	211 45	21.2 22.3	- 20.7 - 28.6
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	6 7	13.3 14.9	1	2.5 3.2	
SOUTH CAROLINA – Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	N/A**	N/A	N/A	N/A	
SOUTH CAROLINA - Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
WASHINGTON - Clark Co. Delinquent Status	248 180	47.3 82.9	309 105	49.9 53.3	+ 24.6 - 41.7
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquent Status	324 113	38.1 61.7	320 42	31.2 35.6	- 1.2 - 62.8

\* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

\*\* NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE

As relates to status offender detention prior to DSO, the high percentage of status offenders detained was in Clark County, Washington at 82.9 percent, followed by Alameda County and Spokane, Washington; the low detention percentage was 6.1 in New Castle County, Delaware. Following the DSO interventions, the high percentage of status offenders detained was 53.3 at the Clark County, Washington site; the low detention percentage was zero in Alameda County, which did not detain any status offenders.

#### Probation as a Disposition.

Table 4 presents data on the number and percent of delinquent and status offenders placed on probation before and after DSO programming at the 14 sites. These collective probation data, as has been the case with other data examined thus far, do not provide a clear pattern. For example, at 8 of the 14 sites, there was a percentage increase in the use of probation for delinquent offenders after DSO and a parallel decrease in probation usage at 6 sites. For the status offenders, there was an increase in the percentage of probation usage after DSO at two sites, a decrease at four locations, no change at one location and seven sites had changes too small to be significant.

#### Institutionalization as a Disposition.

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The data in Table 5 on institutionalization of delinquent and status offenders before and after DSO at the 14 sites also do not lend themselves to convenient collective analysis. For example, the percentage use of institutionalization for delinquent offenders increased at eight sites during the before-to-after time frames and decreased at six sites. For the status offenders, institutionalization increased at four sites, decreased at six, and was unchanged at two sites in this same before-to-after time frame.

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TABLE 4

#### NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS PLACED ON PROBATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

•	-			·	
SITE		FORE PERCENT	· · · ·	<u>ter</u> Percent	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
ARIZONA - Pima Co. Delinquent Status	53 35	-25.4 58.3	9	3.1 13.0	- 83.0 - 91.4
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	370 51	68.3 87.9	475 15	69.1 68.2	+ 28.4 - 70.6
CONNECTICUT - Statewide Delinquent Status	720 137	85.7 84.6	716 116	84.5 78.9	- 0.5 - 15.3
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	151 19	85.3 73.1	147 19	77.8 73.1	- 2.6 0.0
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	350 73	86.6 94.8	290 51	85.3 76.1	- 17.1 - 30.1
CONNECTICUT – District III Delinquent Status	219 45	84.6 76.3	279 46	87.7 85.2	+ 27.4 + 2.2
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	204 17	33.6 16.7	211 16	38.9 17.6	+ 3.4 - 5.9
DELAWARE – Kent Co. Delinquent Status	70 7	52.2 36.8	67 7	54.9 53.8	- 4.3
DELAWARE – New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	81 2	26.6 13.3	66 6	26.4 10.3	- 18.5
DELAWARE - Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	53 8	31.5 11.8	78	45.9 7.5	+ 47.2
ILLINOIS – Cook Co. Delinquent Status	144 7	80.4 14.6	206 26	76.9 74.3	+ 43.1
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	15 1	33.3 2.1	14	35.0 12.9	- 6.7
SOUTH CAROLINA – Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	36 0	11.0 0.0	49 0	24.3 0.0	+ 36.1
SOUTH CAROLINA – Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	26 17	8.4 17.0	27 10	8.6 11.8	+ 3.9 - 41.2
WASHINGTON - Clark Co. Delinquent Status	49 32	32.2 46.4	73 46	39.2 58.2	+ 49.0 + 43.8
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquent Status	45 5	48.4 20.0	93 3	45.1 50.0	+106.7

\* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15. TABLE 5

#### NUMBER AND PERCENT OF DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS INSTITUTIONALIZED AS DISPOSITION BEFORE AND AFTER THE DSO PROJECT

	BEFORE		AF	TER	DIRECTION
SITE	NUMBER	PERCENT		PERCENT	PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NUMBERS*
ARIZONA - Pima Co. Delinquent Status	3 0	-1.4 0.0	4 0	1.4 0.0	
CALIFORNIA - Alameda Co. Delinquent Status	172	31.7 12.1	212 7.	30.9 31.8	+ 23.3
CONNECTICUT - Statewide Delinquent Status	120 25	14.3 15.4	131 31	15.5 21.1	+ 9.2 + 24.0
CONNECTICUT - District I Delinquent Status	26 7	14.7 26.9	42 7	22.2 26.9	+ 61.5
CONNECTICUT - District II Delinquent Status	54	13.4 5.2	50 16	14.7 23.9	- 8.0
CONNECTICUT - District III Delinquent Status	40 14	15.4 23.7	39 8	12.3 14.8	- 2.5 - 42.9
DELAWARE - Statewide Delinquent Status	47 4	7.7 3.9	38 0	7.0	- 19.1
DELAWARE – Kent Co. Delinquent Status	9 1	6.7 5.3	13 0	10.7 0.0	
DELAWARE – New Castle Co. Delinquent Status	24 2	7.9 13.3	20 0	8.0 0.0	- 16.7
DELAWARE – Sussex Co. Delinquent Status	14	8.3 1.5	5 0	2.9 0.0	
ILLINOIS – Cook Co. Delinquent Status	35 0	19.6 0.0	62 0	23.1 0.0	+ 77.1
ILLINOIS - Macon Co. Delinquent Status	- 4 1	8.9 2.1	2	5.0 0.0	
SOUTH CAROLINA - Greenville Co. Delinquent Status	12 0	3.7 0.0	18 0	8.9 0.0	
SOUTH CAROLINA ~ Spartanburg Co. Delinquent Status	9 2	2.9 2.0	31 3	9.9 3.5	
WASHINGTON - Clark Co. Delinquent Status	14 2	9.2 2.9	20 5	10.8 6.3	
WASHINGTON - Spokane Delinquenr Status	9 1	9.7 4.0	7 0	3.4 0.0	

\* Direction and percentage of change calculated by dividing the <u>difference</u> in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The direction and percentage of change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15. Table 5 data also reveal that the institutionalization of 31.7 percent of delinquent offenders in Alameda County represents the high end of that range, and Pima County, Arizona at less than two percent institutionalization, is the low end of the delinquent institutionalization range. After DSO, Alameda County (30.9 percent), the Connecticut sites (overall, 15.5 percent), and Cook County, Illinois (23.1 percent) are high; Pima County remains at the low end for institutionalization of delinquent offenders (1.4 percent).

As relates to status offenders before DSO, Connecticut statewide (15.4 percent) institutionalized the highest percentage of its status offenders, while ten sites institutionalized two or less status offenders during the time frame. After DSO, Connecticut overall institutionalized 21.1 percent of its status offenders; eight sites did not institutionalize any status offenders as a juvenile court disposition.

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#### System Impact at the DSO Sites: A State-Site Review

#### Introduction

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The above commentary on system impact collectively at the 14 DSO sites produced neither a common thread nor clear nationwide patterns. Indeed, there were variations in intensity and direction of change at the five focal areas -- court intake, referral to the system by law enforcement, detention, and the use of probation and institutionalization. These many variations suggest a state or site-by-site portrait which examines the same five focal points within the juvenile justice system for delinquent and status offenders both before and after the introduction of programmatic DSO activities. These specific DSO programs are not described here; they are detailed in the basic descriptive report. The data provided below are not different from those presented above; they are, however, arranged by sites and accompanied by a brief narrative. The reader is provided with a system rate chart, decision point calculations, and a summary table for each site and most likely will find data interpretation facilitated by review of these documents together.

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#### Arizona: Pima County

Data for Pima County are available for three years, 1975 through 1977. The before-and-after years, however, are 1975 and 1977: those years surround the introduction of the Mobile Diversion program. The summary data for Pima County are provided in Table 6; the system rate data on system charts 1 and 2.

The Pima County data reflect a general decrease at intake over the before-and-after time frame of the deinstitutionalization project. Further, there is a substantial decrease in the detention of status offender cases at the time of their first court hearings, a significant increase in the number of cases entering the Mobile Diversion system, and reductions in the numbers of both delinquent and status cases granted probation after processing by the juvenile court. The decline in probation usage as portrayed in the system charts appears to be a reflection of a decrease in the number of status offender cases entering the formal adjudication phase and, despite an increase in the number of delinquent cases, a reduction in probation usage as a large number were pending in a "continued" status.

A caution is warranted regarding these data, particularly as relates to detention. Over time, there has been a continuing trend of less detention for status offenders -- this, in large measure a product of a juvenile court decision to reduce such detention. As a result, the decline in status offender detention may reflect that judicial decision as much as or more than the impact of DSO activities. Note also that decreases in percentages relating to law enforcement referral, court intake, detention and grants of probation are consistently greater for status rather than delinquent offenders.


## TABLE 6

## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS


# ARIZONA: PIMA COUNTY


	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1621	1430	- 11.8
Status Offenders	643	429	- 33.3
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1650	1453	- 11.9
Status Offenders	775	471	- 39.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	266	265	- 0.4
Status Offenders	197	60	- 69.5
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	53	9	- 83.0
Status Offenders	35	3	- 91.4
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	3	4	
Status Offenders	0	0	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.




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## California: Alameda County

Summary data for Alameda County for 1976 and 1977 are presented in Table 7; system rate data are on system charts 3 and 4.

The Alameda data and system charts reflect a decline in both the number of delinquent and status offender cases entering the juvenile justice system. Concurrently, there is a decrease in the number of delinquent cases closed at intake and an increase in delinquent cases becoming wards of the court, a marked declined in the detention patterns of both delinquent and status cases and an increase in the use of probation and institutionalization for delinquent offenders.

The significant drop in detention seems worthy of note. As relates to delinquent cases, the decline of some 350 detentions represents an almost 18 percent reduction over the before-and-after time frame; as for the status cases, the detention numbers drop from 486 to 0. This reduction to zero is a reflection of California legislation known as AB 3121, enacted in January, 1977, which prohibits the detention of status offenders. This significant legislation may invalidate any system rate analysis of DSO data since it became law at the same time. Indeed, the reductions in status offender referrals by law enforcement, court intake, detention and grants of probation may be a "spin-off" of AB 3121 instead of the influence of the DSO activities. The increase in probation usage and institutional commitment for delinquent cases, despite a slight decrease in the number of cases, appears to be a function of system penetration. That is, while fewer delinquent cases are entering the juvenile system, a lesser number of these are being closed at intake and more are entering a more formal adjudication process which generates decisions about "wards of the court," The increased number and percentage of juveniles declared wards, for whom the disposition is basically


either probation or institutionalization, generates increases in those dispositional categories. The system data similarly reflect that the lesser number of delinquent cases closed at intake and thus penetrating the system more deeply also generates increases in formal decisions of "not declared wards of the courts" and informal probation.


# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

# CALIFORNIA: ALAMEDA COUNTY


	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	2553	2516	- 1.4
Status Offenders	546	423	- 22.5
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	3061	2968	- 3.0
Status Offenders	736	582	- 20.9
DETAINED			
Delinquents	1988	1635	- 17.8
Status Offenders	486	0	-100.0
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	370	475	+ 28.4
Status Offenders	51	15	- 70.6
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	172	212	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	7	7	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.





NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS




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CALIFORNIA - ALAMEDA COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES

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Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

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### Connecticut: Statewide and Districts I, II, and III

Data for the State of Connecticut and the three Districts which comprise the State are provided in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. These data are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 5 through 12.

The overall data for Connecticut -- an aggregate of its three individual Districts -- reflect peculiar patterns. It is important to understand that there were separate programs in each district and that data must be reviewed on a District-by-District basis. For example, there is an approximate ten percent reduction in the number of delinquent cases at intake and an increase of seven-plus percent in status offender cases. The percentages of delinquent cases entered into the system with law enforcement agencies as the source diminished, while the percentage of status cases referred by law enforcement increased. The detention of both status and delinquent cases increased in absolute numbers and percentages (delinquents about 100 cases and 45 percent; status offenders 30 cases and 20 percent). The number and percent of delinquent cases which were disposed of by grants of probation remained constant; the number and percent decreased for status offenders. When the institutional data are examined, the number and percentage of status and delinquent offender cases increased.

There are variations within the three Districts, but the statewide pattern is generally consistent for the status offender: the juvenile justice system absorbed a greater number of status offender cases after DSO than before. This pattern was most likely a response to the judicial philosophy of the presiding state judge who desired to retain jurisdiction over status offenders. Law enforcement contributed significantly to that pattern, and

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an increasing percentage and number of status offenders were detained, a somewhat lesser number and percentage of status cases were placed on probation and a slightly greater number and percentage were institutionalized after the introduction of DSO programmatic activities.\*

<sup>\*</sup>A caution is issued concerning the completeness and reliability of data. Data collected by the University of Connecticut and these data are from different sources and seemingly utilize different definitions of status offenders.

# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

CONNECTICUT: STATEWIDE

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	3326	2958	- 11.1
Status Offenders	295	333	÷ 12.9
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	3452	3127	- 9.4
Status Offenders	585	629	+ 7.5
DETAINED			
Delinquents	221	320	+ 44.8
Status Offenders	147	177	+ 20.4
GRANIED PROBATION			
Delinquents	720	716	- 0.5
Status Offenders	137	116	- 15.3
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	120	131	+ 9.2
Status Offenders	25	31	+ 24.0
	<u> </u>		

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT I

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1028	955	- 7.1
Status Offenders	70	93	+ 32.9
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1078	1000	- 7.2
Status Offenders	135	142	+ 5.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	106	123	+ 16.0
Status Offenders	48	39	- 18.8
GRANTED PROBATION		•	
Delinquents	151	147	- 2.6
Status Offenders	19	19	0.0
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	26	42	+ 61.5
Status Offenders	7	7	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT II

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1231	1053	- 14.5
Status Offenders	147	167	+ 13.6
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1268	1117	- 11.9
Status Offenders	240	269	+ 12.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	100	140	+ 40.0
Status Offenders	81	113	+ 39.5
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	350	290	- 17.1
Status Offenders	73	51	- 30.1
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	54	50	- 8.0
Status Offenders	4	16	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

44 -


# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

# CONNECTICUT: DISTRICT III

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	1067	950	- 11.0
Status Offenders	78	73	- 6.4
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	1106	1010	- 8.7
Status Offenders	210	218	+ 3.8
DETAINED			
Delinquents	15	57	+280.0
Status Offenders	18	25	+ 38.9
		•	
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	219	279	+ 27.4
Status Offenders	45	46	+ 2.2
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	40	39	- 2.5
Status Offenders	14	8	- 42.9


\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

- 45 -




- 46 -

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



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
- 47 -






- 48 -


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


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


·- 49 -






- 50 -




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


- 51 -

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



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
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- 52 -





- 53 -



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#### Delaware: Statewide and Kent, New Castle, and Sussex Counties

Data for Delaware and Kent, New Castle, and Sussex Counties are contained in Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15. The before-and-after years are 1975 and 1977. System rate data appear on charts 13 through 20.

The system data for Delaware statewide reveal an overall increase in both the number and percent of delinquent and status offender cases. An increase of 150 delinquent cases over the before-and-after time frame represented a 20 percent jump; an increase of 115 status offender cases signified an 80 percent rise. The pattern was not consistent within the separate counties: for example, as relates to status offenders, New Castle reported an increase from 33 to 143, Sussex a decline from 71 cases to 57, Kent County an increase from 36 to 55. Overall, law enforcement agencies entered an increased number and percent of both delinquent and status offenders into the system after DSO than before. The number of delinquent cases resulting in detention dropped statewide from 61 to 46, but status offender cases detained increased from 20 to 29. This increase in status offender detention may be part of a long-range, slowly-rising trend for such detention. Indeed, it appears from other data that the courts maintained or increased the use of detention, but reduced the amount of time in detention. Again, there are variations in this pattern by county. Statewide, the utilization of probation as a court disposition for both status and delinquent offenders remained constant: the number of delinquents institutionalized declined from 47 to 38, status offenders from 4 to 0. These system fluctuations notwithstanding, the system rate charts for Delaware overall portrays clearly the role of DSO. Note that the number of status offender cases at intake increased from 140 to 255, but that 195 of the 255 were handled by DSO and that there was a concurrent reduction from 102 to 38 cases which went to a formal hearing.

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The reader will also note from the system charts that the increase in the number of delinquent cases at intake from 782 to 934 was in some ways offset by the process of "arbitration" which handled 180 delinquent and 9 status cases.

# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

## DELAWARE: STATEWIDE

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	477	588	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	70	125	+ 78.6
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	782	934	+ 19.4
Status Offenders	140	255	+ 82.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	61	46	- 24.6
Status Offenders	20	29	+ 45.0
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	204	211	+ 3.4
Status Offenders	17	16	- 5.9
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	47	38	- 19.1
Status Offenders	4	. 0	
			<u> </u>

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

JUVENILE	JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO	
	BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS	
	DELAWARE: KENT COUNTY	

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	135	104	- 23.0
Status Offenders	. 10	23	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	163	172	+ 5.5
Status Offenders	36	55	+ 52.8
DETAINED			
Delinquents	11	17	+ 54.5
Status Offenders	8	9	
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	70	67	- 4.3
Status Offenders	7	7	
•			
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	13	
Status Offenders	1	0	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases 'Derbore." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

#### TABLE 14

## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

# DELAWARE: NEW CASTLE COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT	12		
Delinquents	234	345	+ 47.4
Status Offenders	12	66	بن = تن بر
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	443	545	+ 23.0
Status Offenders	33	143	+333.0
DETAINED			
Delinquents	28	17	<b>™</b> 39.3
Status Offenders	2	9	
GRANIED PROBATION			
Delinquents	81	66	- 18.5
Status Offenders	2	6	
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	24	20	- 16.7
Status Offenders	2	· 0	****
	1		

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


- 58 -

### TABLE 15


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	BY	DELIN	NQUENT	AND	STATI	JS OI	FFEN	DERS	5		
		DELA	WARE	SUS	SEX CO		v .				

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	108	139	+ 28.7
Status Offenders	48	36	- 25.0
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	176	217	+ 23.3
Status Offenders	71	57	- 19.7
DETAINED			
Delinquents	22	12	- 45.5
Status Offenders	10	11	
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	53	78	+ 47.2
Status Offenders	8	3	
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	14	5	
Status ∩ffenders	1	0	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.




- 60 -



NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

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- 61 -

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
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
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
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- 62 -





NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

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


- 63 -







- 64 -




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
- 65 -



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding




- 66 -




NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS

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### Illinois: Cook County

The data for Cook County, Illinois appear in Table 16 and are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 21 and 22.

Data developed by sampling court records reflect that Cook County experienced an increase in the number and percent of both delinquent and status offender cases over the before-and-after time frame of the DSO project. The increase in delinquent offenders was almost ten percent, for status offenders, 16 percent. Detentions for both status and delinquent cases were reduced, 21 percent for delinquents and 29 percent for status offenders.

The system data for Cook County appear to be unstable because of the large numbers of cases which entered the system prior to the April-May-June time frame but were disposed of during those months, as well as cases which entered the system during April-May-June, but were not disposed of during that period. Thus, there is considerable "imbalance" in the data. Additionally, different data sources may have been used for the DSO analyses and there may have been some definitional variations. We note in the system charts that the ISOS project absorbed some 171 status offenders who otherwise would have entered the juvenile justice system during that three month time frame. Overall, there may have been a "net-widening" phenomenon, although Illinois law does not allow for the institutionalization of status offenders.

### TABLE 16


## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

## ILLINOIS: COOK COUNTY


	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	ÁFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	······································
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	5170	5651	+ 9.3
Status Offenders	1054	1225	+ 16.2
DETAINED			
Delinquents	266	211	- 20.7
Status Offenders	63	45	- 28.6
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	144	206	+ 43.1
Status Offenders	7	26	
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	35	62	+ 77.1
Status Offenders	0	0	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the <u>difference</u> in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


\*\*N/A = Data not available




- 70 -



<u>1977</u>



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### Illinois: Macon County

The data for Macon County, Illinois appear in Table 17 and are for before-and-after years 1976 and 1977; system rate data appear on system charts 23 and 24.

Macon County data reveal a decrease at intake of both delinquent and status offender cases. As relates to status offenders, the decline from 118 cases to 79 is a reduction of one-third. The number of detentions for delinquent and status offenders combined prior to DSO was 13; after DSO, one of each was detained. The number of delinquent cases on whom petitions were filed declined from 45 to 40 from before-to-after; the status offender filings diminished from 47 to 31. The dispositions of probation and institutionalization had numbers too small for interpretation.

Note, however, from the system rate chart that the ISOS project absorbed 19 status offender cases which otherwise would have entered the juvenile justice system. That reduction translates to a decline of cases entering the juvenile court from 60 to 41, about one-third.


#### TABLE 17


## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS ILLINOIS: MACON COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	393	377	- 4.1
Status Offenders		79	- 33.1
Status Offenders	110		55.1
DETAINED			
Delinquents	6	1	
Status Offenders	7	1	
	•		
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	15	14	- 6.7
Status Offenders	1	4	
•			
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	4	2	
Status Offenders	1	0	


\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

\*\*N/A = Data not available






CASES/INDIVIDUALS




ILLINOIS - MACON COUNTY: DECISION POINT SYSTEM RATES



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NT SYSTEM RATES



Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

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## South Carolina: Greenville and Spartanburg Counties

Limited data for the two of the five South Carolina DSO sites are contained in Tables 18 and 19 and represent before-and-after years 1976 and 1977.

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These data and the system rate charts begin at the "petition filed" stage of juvenile justice proceedings, inasmuch as the local evaluator did not retrieve data necessary for the system rates analysis up to that point shown on the system charts.

#### TABLE 18

## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS SOUTH CAROLINA: GREENVILLE COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
DETAINED			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	36	49	+ 36.1
Status Offenders	0	0	
•			
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	12	18	
Status Offenders	0	0	

\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

\*\*N/A = Data not available

### TABLE 19


# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

# SOUTH CAROLINA: SPARTANBURG COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	-, -, -,
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
DETAINED			
Delinquents	N/A	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
GRANTED PROBATION			
Delinquents	26	27	
Status Offenders	17	10	
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	31	
Status Offenders	2	3	


\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.

\*\*N/A = Data not available




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
- 79 -




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
- 80 -




Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding




- 81 -



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- 82 -



## Washington State: Clark County

Clark County data are found in Table 20 and represent before-and-after years 1975 and 1976; system rates data appear on system charts 25 and 26.

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The Clark County intake data reflect a 27 percent increase in delinquent and a 7 percent decrease in status offender cases during the beforeand-after time frame of the DSO project. The detention of delinquent cases also increased by 25 percent concurrently with a 42 percent reduction in detention of status cases; the system chart reflects that the numbers of detentions overall did not change markedly from before (428) to after (414). Probation usage overall increased in the forty-plus percentage range for both delinquent and status offenders, but the system rate charts indicate that the total numbers receiving "intensive" probation did not change significantly during this before to after time frame.

#### TABLE 20


## JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS


WASHINGTON: CLARK COUNTY

	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1976	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	503	609	+ 21.1
Status Offenders	125	N/A**	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	589	750	+ 27.3
Status Offenders	259	240	- 7.3
DETAINED			
Delinquents	248	309	+ 24.6
Status Offenders	180	105	- 41.7
GRANIED PROBATION			
Delinquents	49	73	+ 49.0
Status Offenders	32	46	+ 43.8
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	14	20	
Status Offenders	2	5	
		<u> </u>	<u> </u>


\* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.


\*\*N/A = Data not available






\* Data not available





Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding .

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\* Data not available

## Washington State: Spokane

Spokane data are found in Table 21 and represent before-and-after years 1975 and 1977; system rates data appear on charts 27 and 28.

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The Spokane data reflect an increase (20 percent) in delinquent and decrease (36 percent) in status offender cases. The decrease in status cases from 183 to 118 is partially explained on the system rate charts by the DSO Youth Alternatives activity which absorbed 45 status cases. Detentions for delinquent cases diminished minimally during this period but status offender detention dropped almost two-thirds (63 percent) from 113 to 42 cases. Overall, the numbers of cases detained was reduced from 437 to 362. This seemingly is part of a long term trend and may or may not be directly attributable to DSO activities.

Probation usage for delinquent offenders doubled during this time frame with the "minimum probation" and "probation" categories increasing about equally. A marked increase in delinquent offenders becoming wards of the court is portrayed on the system charts -- from 14 to 49 cases.


### TABLE 21


# JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM CHANGES BEFORE AND AFTER DSO BY DELINQUENT AND STATUS OFFENDERS

# WASHINGTON: SPOKANE


	BEFORE DSO SECOND QUARTER 1975	AFTER DSO SECOND QUARTER 1977	DIRECTION AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE*
REFERRAL BY LAW ENFORCEMENT			
Delinquents	N/A**	N/A	
Status Offenders	N/A	N/A	
COURT INTAKE			
Delinquents	851	1025	+ 20.4
Status Offenders	1.83	118	- 35.5
DETAINED			
Delinquents	324	320	- 1.2
Status Offenders	113	42	- 62.8
GRANTED PROBATION		•	
Delinquents	45	93	+106.7
Status Offenders	5	3	
INSTITUTIONALIZED			
Delinquents	9	7	
Status Offenders	1	0	


- \* Direction and Percentage of Change calculated by dividing the difference in the number of cases "Before" and the number of cases "After" by the number of cases "Before." The Direction and Percentage of Change is not calculated if the number of cases "Before" is less than 15.
- \*\* N/A = Data not available





NUMBER OF CASES/INDIVIDUALS





Numbers may not equal 100% due to rounding

oox due to rounding

### Summary:

A brief interlocking commentary on both the system rate methodology and the specific findings from the utilization of that methodology in the current DSO assessment is appropriate. The value of system rates for examination of the justice system and/or its component parts is limited almost uniquely by the availability of data. The methodology is data-dependent: it should have cohort or inventory (and preferably both) data. Even without data, system rates provide useful and informative portraits which may serve to illuminate the findings obtained from other methodologies. With data, system rates are a panorama with corroborative capability, able to assist in the validation of other findings, as well as having a potential for identifying additional areas worthy of special inquiry. The utility of system rates also is influenced significantly by the interface of the degree of resolution of the system charts and data availability. It should be clear to the reader that significant gaps exist in juvenile justice system data at the DSO sites. Some limited data are computerized and readily available; the bulk, however, are retrievable only by manual efforts. Often, there are no historical data -only current cases.

The system rates DSO data were examined both collectively and by individual sites without across-site consistencies being uncovered. It is clear that system rates are responsive to and portray system changes: an obvious example is the portrayal of the dramatic reduction of status offender detentions in Alameda County, California from 486 to 0. But the methodology cannot determine whether system changes are the product of DSO activities or simply occurred during the DSO time frame. As relates to Alameda County and the 0 status offender detention phenomenon, it is certain that the 0 is a product of California legislation (AB 3121) and not DSO. Similarly, changes (or lack of

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changes) which occur during the DSO time frame may result from the impact of a general policy decision as in Pima County, Arizona where a non-detention of status offender policy already was generating a reduction in status offender detentions prior to the introduction of DSO activities designed to produce such a reduction. Or, the influence of a key decison maker in the justice system, as in Connecticut where an important juvenile court judge influenced the system by her personal preference to retain jurisdiction over status offenders, may have as much or more impact as legislation or official policy. Again, although changes may be obvious in system portraits, explanations of these changes often are not obvious and may be due to influences external to specific DSO programmatic activities. Clearly, changes in the justice system may be coincidental with DSO programming, not the result of it.

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