

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH



Deterrence of Crime

Issue and Article References

148714

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

148714

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH

Deterrence of Crime In and Around Residences

This monograph consists of papers on related topics presented at the Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology, May 1-3, 1972 conducted by:

THE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND CRIMINOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

The Symposium was supported by Contract Number J-LEAA-021-72 awarded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Points of view or opinions stated in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official positions or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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June 1973

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price: \$2.10, domestic postpaid; \$1.75, GPO Bookstore

FOREWORD

This publication is one of a series of nine monographs extracted from the Proceedings of the Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology.

The principal Symposium theme of "Crime Prevention and Deterrence" was chosen by the National Institute as a reflection of LEAA's overall action goal - the reduction of crime and delinquency. Whereas previous Symposia examined methods of improving the operations of individual components of the criminal justice system, the Fourth Symposium was purposefully designed to look beyond these system components and focus on the goal of crime reduction.

A major conference subtheme was "The Management of Change: Putting Criminal Justice Innovations to Work." The Institute's overall mission is in the area of applied rather than basic research, with special attention being given to research that can be translated into operational terms within a relatively short period of time. We have therefore been interested in exploring the obstacles to the adoption of new technology by criminal justice agencies. Many of the Symposium papers identify these obstacles - attitudinal, organizational, and political - and discuss how they are being overcome in specific agency settings.

The titles of the nine Symposium monographs are: Deterrence of Crime in and Around Residences; Research on the Control of Street Crime; Reducing Court Delay; Prevention of Violence in Correctional Institutions; Re-integration of the Offender into the Community; New Approaches to Diversion and Treatment of Juvenile Offenders; The Change Process in Criminal Justice; Innovation in Law Enforcement, and Progress Report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

This monograph discusses the results of a series of studies that have examined the problem of controlling residential crime. Topics discussed include preventative measures such as building codes, architectural design, police patrol, and citizen education. In addition there is a discussion of burglary as a pattern of behavior.

Martin B. Danziger
Assistant Administrator
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INTRODUCTION

The Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology was held in Washington, D.C. on May 1-3, 1972. Like the three previous Symposia, it was sponsored by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Fourth Symposium was conducted by the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology of the University of Maryland.

These Symposia are one of the means by which the National Institute strives to achieve the objective of strengthening criminal justice in this country through research and development. The Symposia bring into direct contact the research and development community with the operational personnel of the law enforcement systems. The most recent accomplishments of "science and technology" in the area of criminal justice are presented to operational agencies - law enforcement, courts, and corrections - in a series of workshops and plenary sessions. The give and take of the workshops, followed by informal discussions between the more formal gatherings, provide the scholar and researcher with the all important response and criticism of the practitioner, while the latter has the opportunity to hear the analyst and the planner present the newest suggestions, trends and prospects for the future. In the case of the Fourth Symposium, these opportunities were amply utilized by over 900 participants from across the country.

The specific theme of the Fourth Symposium was "Crime Prevention and Deterrence." The content and the work of the Symposium must be seen against the immediate background of the activities of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which was appointed several months earlier and by the time of the Symposium was deeply involved in its mammoth task. Another major background factor was the National Conference on Corrections, held in Williamsburg shortly before. More generally, of course, the Symposium was one of many activities in the all-encompassing national effort to reduce crime embodied in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and the subsequently established Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

A twelve-member Symposium committee made up of representatives of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology of the University of Maryland was responsible for planning and arranging the Program. The program, extending over three days, was organized around three daily subthemes which were highlighted in morning plenary sessions. These

subthemes were further explored in papers and discussions grouped around more specific topics in the afternoon workshops.

The first day was one of taking stock of recent accomplishments. Richard A. McGee, President of the American Justice Institute, reviewed the progress of the last five years, and Arthur J. Bilek, Chairman of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, addressed himself to criminal justice as a system, the progress made toward coordination, and the ills of a non-system. The six afternoon workshops of the first day dealt with recent accomplishments in prevention and deterrence of crime around residences, violence in correctional institutions, control of street crime, court delay, community involvement in crime prevention, and the reintegration of offenders into the community.

The subtheme of the second day was formulated as "The Management of Change - Putting Innovations to Work." This is a reference to the frequently noted fact that the findings of many research projects all too often do not result in operational implementation, in spite of the funds, energy and competence invested in them. New methods that are adopted often prematurely die on the vine, with the old routines winning out and continuing on as before. The objective of the Symposium sessions was to identify the obstacles to change and to explore ways of overcoming them. Thus two papers given in the morning plenary session by Robert B. Duncan of Northwestern University and John Gardiner of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice dealt, respectively, with attitudinal and political obstacles to change. The five afternoon workshops developed this theme further by discussing the change process within specific law enforcement and correctional settings. From there attention shifted to the role that public service groups play in the process of change, the pilot cities experience, and the diversion of juvenile offenders from the criminal justice system.

The third day of the Symposium was turned over to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The daily subtheme was listed as "Future Priorities." More particularly, however, this was a series of progress reports on the all important activities of the Commission, presented by the Executive Director, Thomas J. Madden, and representatives of the Commission's four Operational Task Forces on standards and goals for police, the courts, corrections, and community crime prevention.

Finally, there was a presentation on the management of change within the eight "Impact Cities" - a major program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration - by Gerald P. Emmer, Chairman

of LEAA's Office of Inspection and Review.

By reproducing the contributed papers of the Symposium, the Proceedings admirably reflect the current intellectual climate of the criminal justice system in this country. It should be kept in mind that the majority of these papers present the results of research and demonstration projects - many of them experimental and exploratory - which have been funded by State and/or Federal agencies and private functions. Thus these papers do not only reflect the opinions of their authors, but are also indicative of the total climate of action, thought, and quest for new solutions regarding the crime problem in this country.

No reproduction of the papers of a professional meeting can fully reflect the flavor and the total contribution of the event. The questions and remarks from the meeting floor, the discussions in the workshops, the remarks exchanged in the corridors, over meals, or in the rooms of the participants often represent the major accomplishment of such a gathering. New face-to-face contacts and awareness of things done by others - both individuals and agencies - is often the most important byproduct the participant takes home with him. This Symposium was rich in all of this. Close to one thousand persons from all over the country, representing all component elements of the criminal justice system mingled together for three days under the aegis of a major Federal effort to do something about crime and delinquency, which have risen to unprecedented prominence over the last decade. The Symposium provided the needed national forum for all those engaged in the crime prevention and control effort.

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PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL RESIDENTIAL BUILDING SECURITY CODE

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Introduction

The incidence of crime in residential areas has been rising at an alarming rate over the past several years. With this rise in crime has come a rise in fear that results from the fact that ones home is no longer the traditional sanctuary of safety from outsiders. The desire for a safe and secure residential environment is a concern common to all people regardless of the type of building and area in which they live. Likewise, fear of crime is widespread throughout society. Yet, although some private action has been taken by individuals investing in various security devices, little effective public action has been taken by governmental units to combat this crime wave.

Combattance is made especially difficult in residential areas because of the dispersion and/or invisibility of crime targets. Police surveillance at its current levels simply cannot be as widespread as the criminal activity which it seeks to deter. The prevention problem is many-fold. It depends in large part upon a combination of changes in the make-up of the society which currently produces individuals who assume criminal roles. These considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. Presentation in the context of this paper refers not to the

elimination of the criminal but only to those physical changes which can hinder or thwart the criminal in his work.

There are many physical changes in buildings which can serve to prevent residential crime. They vary greatly in complexity, cost, and effectiveness--from simple hardware installed on existing openings to major changes in design of new buildings. The purpose of the instant work is to consider those physical design elements which might be incorporated into building codes as a means of residential crime prevention.

It is the thesis of this paper that building code provisions, while not the entire answer to implementation of residential security, can serve an important function in this area. Development of a comprehensive model residential building security code is a necessary step in the process of making best use of building codes as vehicles for combatting residential crime.

Background On Building Codes

Until very recently there was no mention of any security provision in any building code. Even at present, none of the four nationwide model building codes, which are used by a large number of the municipalities and other governmental jurisdictions in the country, has any provisions at all relating to building security--not even the simple requirement of a lock on the entrance door of a dwelling.

This total neglect of the security area by building codes can be explained historically. Building code requirements are promulgated as a part of the police power of the various states. The traditional

role of a building code is the protection of the health and safety of residents through requirements relating to structural soundness, fire protection, and prevention of health hazards. The area of building security--protection of people and property in buildings against crime--was not encompassed within this concept of health and safety. For in the early part of the century, when most building codes were first written, residential crime was not a matter of concern.

But historical explanation is not current justification, and the need to secure buildings against crime is now acute. In the modern context, protection of persons and property against the criminal in residential buildings is certainly a necessary part of assuring the health and safety of building residents. The safety element relates to the physical well-being of residents which is threatened by the incidence of robbery, rape, assault, and other crimes against the person. Health refers more broadly not only to the physical condition of individuals who may be the victims of crime but also to the psychological well-being of individuals which is currently jeopardized by the fear of crime directed against both persons and property. Not only are individuals often terrorized by the current level of crime but also the interpersonal fabric of the society is being gradually eroded by the distrust of individuals towards each other.

Purpose of a Model Residential Building Security Code

Code provisions are the most far-reaching means of implementing building security measures, for to the extent that such provisions are enacted, they become mandatory requirements. A model code, if thoughtfully researched and tested, well written, and widely disseminated,

could greatly speed the enactment of such security provisions by local lawmakers.

Little doubt remains, especially in the urban areas of our country in which a majority of the population now resides, that building security is a problem. The real issue regarding security is whether a building code--or any other code or ordinance--is an appropriate vehicle by which to increase implementation of building security measures.

The traditional focus of building codes, as stated previously, was the protection of the health and safety of building occupants--a people rather than a property emphasis. In contrast, much of the current discussion of crime in both residential and commercial buildings refers to burglary prevention--a property orientation. To view the building security question entirely or even predominantly as a means of preventing crimes against property rather than crimes against persons is to be unrealistic about the current crime problem and the degree to which personal confrontation and/or injury is the resultant factor. Although a residential building security code must concern itself with protection of both people and property, the overriding need for protection of people in buildings certainly makes building security a proper subject for building codes.

Fire protection is one traditional people-oriented concern of building codes. Fire protection provisions often are directly contradictory to the maintenance of building security. Most obviously, the greater the required number of means of egress from a building, the harder it is to prevent intrusion by unwanted outsiders.

Advocacy of security considerations is not intended as a suggestion

that necessary fire protection should be neglected in any way, but the two considerations must be viewed in perspective. Current building code requirements for fireproof construction materials are sufficiently stringent that fire rarely is of the proportion requiring mass evacuation of a residential building. For example, the New York City Housing Authority Insurance Division does not even list fire among its categories of liability for personal injury claims--indicating the negligibility of fire as a life-safety threat. Thus, the success of fire construction materials requirements may indicate that some fire-design requirements (e.g., placement and type of doors, corridors, and stairways) are no longer vital to fire protection.

A balancing of fire and security provisions for buildings will always be essential. Much testing will be needed to establish to what extent current fire requirements are overly stringent in their quest to assure life-safety in buildings. But, because security in buildings has arrived at the point of being another life-safety consideration, security factors can no longer be ignored when adopting or revising building construction requirements. The fact that these two concerns--fire and crime--must be jointly considered makes it all the more imperative that security provisions be embraced within current building codes rather than pushed aside into some separate code dealing with security only.

The competing considerations regarding residential buildings yield different results than for commercial buildings. Security of commercial buildings is generally oriented to non-business hours when such buildings are not occupied and as such is basically a question

of protection of property--burglary prevention. Therefore, the possible conflicts between fire protection and security are not so severe. If the point is reached where security during business hours is an important concern in the commercial building sphere, commercial and residential building security, considerations would become much more analogous, especially on the life-safety issue with regard to large high-rise office and apartment buildings. The commercial sphere is beyond the scope of the subject matter here.

In residential buildings, the security question involves both people and property at all hours of the day and night. Distinctions should be drawn between private one or two-family dwellings and multiple dwellings. The private home is much harder to secure because of the greater number of possible entrances to the building. But a private owner is free to act in whatever manner he deems necessary in order to secure his home against crime.

Multiple dwellings involve several security factors that are either absent from or not as generally applicable to other residential buildings. First, multiple dwellings normally involve a landlord-tenant relationship rather than private ownership. Tenants are not as free as owners to make security modifications. A landlord may not object to a tenant's putting an extra or better lock on his entrance door as long as it is not installed in a destructive manner, but such hardware is likely to be considered a permanent fixture such that the tenant is not free to remove his investment at the time that he quits the premises.

Relevant in this regard is a second factor--that of the ability

of tenants to pay for security. Low income tenants are least able to invest in security hardware and are most apt to be living in buildings where such hardware is needed. Higher income apartment buildings already often have door guards and/or intercom systems to regulate who enters the building. Thus, their protection problems are less acute because of this voluntary landlord action. The landlord in a high-income building is much more apt to provide security because his tenants are able to meet the costs of such when he passes them along through higher rents. The low income landlord often has a more restricted profit margin and is not apt to expend money for tenant safety without the compulsory incentive of a governmental requirement, coupled, of course, with appropriate means of enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance.

Another consideration unique to multiple dwellings involves the common areas of such buildings. These may be minor in the case of low-rise, garden-type apartments where the door to each unit opens to the outside. Often the common areas involve an extensive system of lobbies, corridors, stairways, and elevators, as well as storage and service areas. With regard to these common areas, individual tenants can exercise little if any control. Thus, landlord inaction assures at least a potentially unsafe building; the only variable would be the absence or presence of individuals with criminal intent.

In multiple dwellings, much more than in commercial or private residential buildings, the most fear is generated by crimes against people rather than against property. This is especially true in common areas where little if any personal property is involved. (The

landlord, by contrast, will be concerned with damage to common area equipment, such as elevators, and possible structural damage from vandalism.) Since traditional building codes are oriented to protection of people, the question of security in multiple dwellings with common areas is perhaps the single most appropriate building security problem to be met by building codes.

Current Residential Building Security Codes

In a recent study of building codes by the Institute of Planning and Housing at New York University, approximately 20 local jurisdictions were found to have either proposed or enacted building security provisions, almost entirely within the past two or three years. Of these, there were seven enacted codes dealing in whole or part with residential building security. These seven localities varied greatly in size, but they were all either major metropolitan areas or suburbs thereof.

The simplest of these codes call for nothing more than a dead bolt lock on the door of each dwelling unit in an apartment or hotel. Some of these lock provisions specify minimum throw and/or hardened steel inserts in the dead bolts. Provision is often made for some governmental unit to approve alternate devices.

More elaborate codes have set forth requirements for various building entrances: swinging doors, sliding doors, windows, and various other openings. All of these provisions are related to securing these openings against intrusion. Design elements such as location of glass in doors and rabbited door jambs are specified.

Construction materials enter into the picture with such requirements as door thickness. Various hardware devices are mentioned, including locks, grilles, non-removable hinge pins, viewing devices (peepholes), and security chains.

All the above-mentioned requirements are directed to securing individual dwelling units. Some apply only to units within multiple dwellings. Others are equally applicable to detached homes. One code goes further in giving some consideration to the common areas of multiple dwellings, requiring such things as mirrors in elevators, intercom systems between individual apartments and the front door, and lighting of specified intensity in the area of the building entrance.

Hardware and Construction Materials

The most common place to begin to secure a dwelling unit is the door. Various locks are available and provide varying degrees of effectiveness. Standards have yet to be adopted to determine the minimum lock requirements necessary for security, but various considerations are evident from the variety of provisions which currently exist.

A dead bolt and/or dead latch is essential. The standard latch which functions primarily to keep the door in closed position can easily be loided (pushed back) with such instruments as a credit card or nail file. A dead bolt or dead latch prevents loiding because the portion of the lock which extends into the door jamb (the strike) cannot be pushed back without a key from the outside or a key or turn-piece from the inside. The throw is the distance that the dead bolt

or latch extends into the strike. Minimum throws should always be specified to assure effectiveness of locks. Bolts may be required to consist of specially hardened material so they cannot be cut through. Secondary locks may be required. Another possibility is that locks be changed after each tenancy.

Other considerations relevant to doors relate to the hinges, joints, and materials of which the doors are made. Out-swinging doors should have non-removable hinge pins. In-swinging doors should have rabbited jambs to prevent violation of the function of the strike. Doors should be required to be of a designated solid thickness. In the alternative, they can be faced with a strengthening material, either on the inside of the door or installed in some other manner to prevent its removal from the outside. If glass is permitted in doors, it should be of a special material to resist cutting or breaking or guarded by metal bars or screening and should be placed a sufficient distance from the door knob.

Various types of doors should be considered. Special locking devices may be required for double doors or dutch doors. Sliding glass doors necessitate locks and special construction so that the doors can't be lifted out of their frames while in locked position. Mounting screws for lock cases must be inaccessible from the outside. Requirements may vary according to whether such doors are accessible from the outside ground floor, although one must beware of a series of balconies, which an intruder can jump or swing between once having entered a multiple-dwelling unit in another manner.

Windows necessitate lock requirements and construction so that

they may not be lifted from their frames. Special materials and/or bars or screens may be required in certain locations. Louvered windows may be disallowed or require special protection. Provisions should also be made for other possible building openings.

Various alarm systems are available as security devices. These may either ring inside or outside the building or may be silent and tied to a central alarm service with connection to the local police. Such devices are costly and as yet far from foolproof. The large numbers of false alarms as well as cost and manpower considerations currently render alarm devices highly impractical as mandatory requirements.

The security devices discussed thus far, while serving to protect both people and property, are the basic elements of a burglary prevention system. Other items, although also relevant to prevention of crimes against both people and property, emphasize the people-protecting aspect of building security.

People-protecting devices which are equally useful for individual entrance doors in all types of buildings are peepholes and security chains. Peepholes allow a person on the inside to view someone standing outside. Size and quality of such devices are relevant for maximum protection. Security chains are used to open the door a small amount to view outside without allowing the outsider to be able to push the door open any further. Another useful door device allows persons on either side of the door to speak to each other.

Special Considerations for Common Areas

Certain security devices have special applicability to the protection of people in common areas of multiple dwellings. These devices

have little effectiveness in isolation. Together, they make up an entire security system. This system concept has yet to be fully effected in any building security code, but it is essential to a determination of the usefulness of security devices and especially of new design concepts and fire-security balancing.

As with individual units, the foremost problem area is doors. Fire considerations normally necessitate two or more means of egress from multiple dwellings. In security terms, this means two or more possible means of entry which must be locked in a way to render them inaccessible to intruders while still allowing them to perform their fire protection function of allowing residents to exit quickly.

Tenants in a building presumably have keys to the common lobby door. One consideration relevant in this context is whether the common door key is different than the one a tenant uses to gain access to his own unit. A separate common door key will provide a more secure locking system than one which many different keys will open. Secondary exits should be inaccessible from the outside by a tenant's key.

Controlling entry of non-tenants may be achieved through use of an intercom system to allow a tenant to ascertain who seeks entry and a buzzer reply by which the tenant may release the common door lock by a button in his individual unit. Such a system, if used at all, is usually connected only to the main door of the multiple dwelling.

Enclosed fire stairways can cause many security problems, especially in situations where such a stairway leads directly to a secondary exit. Locking doors from the stairway into corridors at each level can be a boon to security, but this is often prohibited

by fire codes. This is a situation in which little if any attempt has been made to balance fire and security factors. Another necessary balancing determination is whether a swinging door is necessary for a secondary exit. Such a door allows a potential intruder to catch the door and enter any time someone exits from the door. A one-way revolving door in such a location would prevent this intrusion. Tests would have to be made to determine if this would create a hazard when fast exit is needed in case of fire.

Open common areas--lobbies, corridors, and common rooms--should be well lighted and should allow free visibility so that intruders have no places to lie in wait for unsuspecting victims. In the case of existing buildings, where common area design has not considered this visibility aspect, strategically placed mirrors can be used to enhance visibility. Closed circuit television cameras can be used to survey common areas.

A final hazardous common area is the elevator. Mirrors can allow people to view the inside of an elevator car before entering. Audio and/or visual electronic devices can broadcast to a security guard and/or to landings where other individuals might be waiting to use the elevators.

Uniformity of Codes

The construction industry is beginning to rely more and more heavily on industrialized building. This is being done in an effort to meet the tremendous housing shortage with products at a price affordable by as many as possible of those persons in need of housing.

Diversity of local building codes is a major obstacle to the creation of broad enough markets to make industrialized housing economically feasible. A large scale producer of housing units simply cannot be aware of and meet different requirements for every area to which his product might possibly be sent.

An attempt to achieve at least a measure of uniformity of building code provisions both within and among states is currently being made, but the long tradition of diversity makes such efforts slow and tedious. Because the constitutional authority under which building codes are originally promulgated is the police power of the states, each state has the power to preempt any or all portions of the local building codes within its jurisdiction in an effort to promote uniformity. At the interstate level, no such compulsory power is available.

The area of building security is really only one small part of the scope of building codes, and uniformity of security provisions is far from a complete solution to the code diversity problem. But, since security is a new area which local legislators are only beginning to consider for enactment in building codes, a widely accepted model residential building security code would promote uniformity at least in this area rather than allowing creation of a further diversity problem. Also, achievement of any measure of uniformity in one area could serve as an impetus for further moves toward uniformity by those now working in other building code subject matter areas.

As mentioned previously, there are four major model building codes which are currently in effect in whole or in part in many local

jurisdictions. None of these models has any security provisions.

At least one area which has adopted a residential security provision has made such provision as an addition to the model code which it uses as its basic legislation. The development of a model residential building security code by an independent group could serve to encourage the accepted model building code groups to incorporate such provisions into their own models. Hopefully, the four would accept like provisions; and thus entirely avoid creation of a diversity problem in the security area.

Selective Applicability

The incidence of crime and the incidence of concern over crime varies greatly in different parts of the country and in different residential settings (e.g., rural or urban, low or high income). A model code which seeks general applicability must have a means for coping with these differences. The current model building codes have some provisions which are only applicable to certain types of areas. Local jurisdictions can select appropriate options, and the overall advantage of uniformity is still maintained to the greatest degree practicable. In the case of building security provisions, choices could be provided for low, average, and high crime areas. This approach is similar to the current rate system used by many insurance companies.

Another issue of selective applicability relates to variations in types of buildings. Different provisions for different classifications of buildings are already a common occurrence in building codes,

so security considerations will raise no new issues in this regard.

Such diversity is not within the problems previously discussed in relation to industrialized building. The diversity problem exists between geographical areas, not between building types.

Standards

A major obstacle to the writing of a comprehensive and effective model residential building security code is the lack of standards indicating the effectiveness of various security devices. Currently, work is being done by various government and private groups in an effort to develop such standards.

What is important to consider for code-writing purposes is the distinction between performance standards and specification standards. Specification standards in security provisions would give requirements for hardware in terms of specific styles and materials to be used. Such standards discourage innovation and can fast become obsolete as new and hopefully better products are developed. Performance standards, on the other hand, couch requirements in terms of effect rather than design, thus making clear the purpose of a requirement and leaving producers free to develop new devices to serve these protective purposes. For example, a specification standard might require a lock of a specific description while a performance standard would prescribe that any locking device would be acceptable as long as it was able to withstand particular kinds and amounts of force directed against it.

The difficulty with performance standards lies in their administration. Whereas a lock, for example, can be easily perceived as

meeting certain design specifications, a new device which is claimed to perform as well would require testing and acceptance. This would necessitate the establishment of one or more organizations; either governmental or private, to perform such testing of new products. Then, the results would have to be approved by governmental units at each level where codes are promulgated.

Practicality of Mandatory Provisions

This paper has established that residential building security provisions are appropriate for inclusion in building codes. The question at this point relates to which of the possible code provisions discussed should be placed in codes and thus made mandatory requirements.

It will be presumed for this discussion that standards have been developed to adequately set forth code requirements. Prior to development of such standards, some requirements could be made; but it would be difficult, if not impossible, to write the comprehensive security provisions referred to here as being the ideal product of a model with wide applicability.

Four basic variables are relevant in determining which security provisions should be made mandatory. These are building type, ownership of building, balancing of cost versus need, and effectiveness. Different combinations of these variables yield different results regarding the desirability of code provisions.

The three basic building types are enclosed multiple dwellings with common areas, multiple dwellings with individual units opening

to the outside, and one or two family homes. The basic ownership question is whether a unit is owner occupied or whether a landlord-tenant relationship is involved.

As has been expressed previously, the enclosed multiple dwelling with common areas and characterized by a landlord-tenant relationship is the building type in which there is the most need for mandatory security requirements. This is largely because these are the buildings with the highest propensity towards crime, and the tenant is powerless to act on his own to effect the necessary security system. All of the provisions mentioned previously could be made mandatory requirements. However, some are more costly than others and less necessary in areas with lower crime rates. The cost/need variable must come into play. For example, the audio and visual electronic devices--closed circuit television surveillance, microphones in elevators, two-way audio devices on individual unit doors--would be impractical in a balancing of cost versus need in all but areas with high rates of crime against persons.

The same security devices are generally applicable to both multiple dwellings with individual units opening to the outside and one or two family houses. The main difference between these two building types is that there is typically a landlord-tenant relationship in the former while not in the latter. However, this dichotomy is not absolute. A one or two family house may be rented. The increasingly popular cooperative and condominium ownership forms are situations of multiple dwellings without the typical landlord-tenant relationship.

The question whether code provisions should be written as varying,

according to building type or ownership, depends to some extent on the types of provisions which are going to be required. It is likely that enclosed multiple dwellings should be treated as a building type because, regardless of whether there is a typical landlord-tenant relationship or a cooperative or condominium arrangement, ownership and control over common areas will be dispersed and will thus present a situation where the governmental decision regarding mandatory requirements will be the most effective guarantor of security.

In the case of other building types, the major decision is whether to draw a distinction between degrees of control over residential units. If the position is taken that, because an owner is free to act to secure his own dwelling, there is no need for mandatory requirements for privately owned dwellings; then code provisions relating to multiple-dwelling units opening to the outside and one or two family houses should be based upon the ownership factor so that individual homes which are renter occupied will be properly secured. If, on the other hand, it is felt that all dwelling units, regardless of the ownership factor, should be subject to security requirements, then code provisions may be written on the basis of building type alone. The decision would vary between jurisdictions partially on the basis of the rate of crime; i.e., the need for security.

The cost versus need balance is partially related to the question of ownership; i.e., landlord responsibility and who is best able to bear the expense. Since the landlord is likely to pass increased costs along to the tenants in any case, this is not a major issue. The most practical means of determining the necessity of various

security devices is in relation to the amount of crime in a particular area. Greater incidence of crime would mean greater need and would presumably justify more costly mandatory requirements.

The final variable--effectiveness--involves dual considerations. The first is the issue of enforcement of code requirements by an appropriate governmental agency. At the current time, because of the burglary orientation of a large number of the few existing code provisions, enforcement often falls to police departments. This does not seem practical on a broad basis. If security provisions are promulgated as part of a building code, enforcement should fall to building department officials who are charged with enforcing the entirety of the building code. Some provision is needed for power to grant variances to provide for occasional hardship cases and for further flexibility in the event that performance standards have not been able to adequately provide for innovation in design.

Enforcement will be much easier in the case of new buildings. A sufficient time period for compliance must be allowed for existing buildings. Inspection of multiple dwellings is likely to be easier than inspection of individual homes, although this will be less the case in subdivisions of like construction. Also, in the individual home situation, the possibility of frequent change in status from renter to owner occupancy might make building type a more practical variable than ownership in the writing of code provisions.

The harder effectiveness issue is the extent to which the cooperation of individual residents is needed to make security devices serve

their purpose. A lock is only effective in locked position. A lock on an individual unit, neglected by the resident of that unit, only endangers the persons and/or property of those in control of the unused security device. The bigger problem of loss of effectiveness is with security devices in common areas. One tenant who breaks a lock on a common door or fixes it open is jeopardizing the security of all building residents. Thus, effectiveness requires not only the supposed "mandatory" governmental legislative act but also a program of education to achieve the cooperation necessary for actual effectiveness.

Governmental Influence

Governmental influence short of mandatory code requirements could take the form of conditions on financing for residential building construction or rehabilitation. Government funding is generally limited to housing for low and moderate income groups--those groups which are most apt to be the victims of residential crime. A policy favoring safe design as a factor in choosing projects to be funded would be especially effective in encouraging innovative design of common areas of multiple dwellings to make them less vulnerable to crime. Use of security hardware would be harder to encourage in this manner because, at the time of financing, plans are often not so detailed.

Governmental loan programs through the Federal Housing Administration could require security devices for approval of loans on existing dwellings.

The Federal Crime Insurance Program, which is currently operative in nine states and the District of Columbia is an effort to provide

insurance in high-crime areas where private companies have failed to make adequate coverage available, includes security requirements for residences. Rates vary according to designations of low, average, or high crime areas; but security requirements remain the same.

Private Initiative

The insurance industry is in a position to require security measures as prerequisites for insurance coverage. Currently the only device which affects rates to any major extent is the alarm, which is basically employed as a burglary prevention device in commercial establishments. Beyond this, rates are often not categorized to the extent of distinguishing between residential building types or giving special consideration to security devices. Security, as it relates to the insurance industry, is concerned with burglary and other property-oriented crimes; and the risk is spread on more general considerations than specific security devices.

The biggest hope for private initiative in the creation of residences safe from crime is with the architects and builders who produce such housing. Up until now, security against crime simply has not been among their considerations. A program to promote awareness of and concern over security problems among those in the construction industry is needed. This is not only where the designs of possible hazardous areas are conceived but also where the purchasing is done of the locks, which will find their way to the doors of residences throughout the country. If builders would cease to order and install unsafe locks, manufacturers would cease to produce them.

Court Action

Traditionally, in the absence of statutory requirement, a landlord has been under no legal duty to protect his tenants from the criminal acts of third parties committed within a residential building. This position is in line with the general rule that a private person does not have a duty to protect another person from criminal attack by a third party. It has been justified on the basis of the difficulty of foreseeing criminal acts and of setting a standard of care which a landlord must meet, as well as the notion that protection against crime is within the police function of government.

The question of landlord liability for criminal acts is one of the many areas of landlord-tenant law that are now gradually being altered by the courts in an effort to conform traditional law to the modern context and thus to more equitably distribute duties and liabilities. The landmark case in this area is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (1970). There it was held that a landlord has a duty to protect tenants against foreseeable criminal activities in the common areas of a building. The rationale for this holding was the fact that the landlord has exclusive control over the common areas of buildings, and thus tenants are powerless to protect themselves.

This case is a big step in the direction of a safer and more secure living environment. However, it is not without limitations. Kline is specifically applicable only to those criminal activities which are foreseeable and thus put the landlord on notice of his duty of protection. With the rising crime rate in many areas, foreseeability becomes less of a variable as the expectation of crime

increases. Thus, this limitation may be more apparent than real.

Once foreseeability is established, the problem is to determine what security steps the landlord must take. In Kline, the landlord was held to the standard of security which had existed when the victimized tenant had first leased her apartment approximately ten years earlier. This is not a realistic standard because it would mean that a landlord would have different duties of protection to different tenants based on the length of their tenancy, even though the same common areas are involved in all cases. The basic standard of care, which the Kline court points out, is that which is reasonable in each particular case. A likely standard in the future, which the Kline court did not use because of a lack of evidence at trial level, is that of the custom in the area. If the security provided by a landlord is below the customary level for the building type and area, it is likely that his duty of protection has not been met. However, problems arise with this test in the situation where all landlords in the area are in breach of the standard the court feels is reasonable.

The rationale of Kline is only applicable to the common areas of multiple dwellings where a landlord-tenant relationship is present. These are the areas which this paper has argued are the most appropriate for regulation through building security codes. The Kline case is a decision of a federal appellate level court. Until its position is upheld by the Supreme Court, there is still much likelihood that other courts will continue to decide this question the traditional way--absolving the landlord from liability. But the possibility of extension of Kline is another reason for governmental units to act

to establish building security code provisions, at least with relation to common areas of multiple dwellings. The Kline position is judicially sound. Legislative action to establish landlord liability once and for all would save much unnecessary litigation and place the burden where it should, in fairness lie.

SECURITY IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A SYNERGISTIC APPROACH

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Introduction

In considering the problem of security in public housing, it is important to keep in mind that a public housing project is much more than a collection of dwelling units. It is also a social environment, an environment shaped by the quality and kind of relationships that the residents have with each other, with those who manage the project and with the larger society. The social environment of public housing is also influenced by the design of the building, its location, the efficiency with which it is managed, and the availability of social services. The characteristics of the residents, their attitudes, values, and life experiences are also factors which shape the social environment provided by a public housing project.

One of the central points that this paper will make is that we must be sensitive to all of these factors if we are going to design security systems at the project level that have any hope of success. We must be aware, in particular, of the social characteristics of the residents, their social structure, and some of their key life experiences

and responses to their environment. It will be argued that the vulnerability to crime of many public housing projects, particularly large projects, does not stem just from design and equipment deficiencies. It is not only a problem of poor lighting, uncontrolled access, poor locks, weak doors, and inadequate patrolling, although this may be the case in some projects. The problem of security in public housing also stems from the weak social structure of the residents, the absence of supporting groups, and a lack of interpersonal trust--all factors that inhibit people from protecting and helping each other.

Given the social as well as the physical properties of the environment and the related vulnerabilities of each, it follows that what is needed is an approach that is aimed at strengthening both these components of the environment. At the project level, this means a mix of improvements. Some directed at the hardening of the site, or the "target" as it is now being called, through design changes and the installation of detection and surveillance equipment; others aimed at increasing the social cohesion of the residents and their "stake" in their environment, thereby affecting the residents' willingness and capacity both to resist unwanted intrusion and to apply social sanctions and controls to members of their own community.

The ideal mix of both hard and soft improvements would produce a synergistic effect; that is, an effect that is greater than the sum of

its parts, a result caused by just the right combination of the right elements. In the case of security in public housing, this means we would be meeting the problem on its own terms. For crime itself is a synergistic effect, the result of an unfortunate combination of elements. To control it, we must be equally ingenious.

In developing this notion of the problem, this paper will first identify some of the dominant features of the environment of public housing projects where crime and property abuse could be expected to be problems. Next, to illustrate the need for approaches that are sensitive to social factors, and because the topic is so important in its own right, the limitations of relying solely or primarily on a hardware approach to achieve security will be discussed. These comments will be followed by a brief account of a HUD-sponsored project that is presently testing new approaches to improving the quality of life in public housing, and which has as one of its goals the improvement of security in public housing.

The Environment of Public Housing

The quality of life provided by public housing projects varies across the country. In many communities public housing provides some of the best housing available to poor families. It even compares favorably in a number of communities to the housing available to moderate income families.

But, what about the typically "bad" project, one that would be likely to have a security problem? What are its characteristics?

First, it would be likely that such a project would either be a high rise over eight or ten stories or a low-rise complex that sprawled in a labyrinthine fashion over a large tract. It would probably be located in a large city and could easily house over a thousand families. Although not dense in terms of its population per acre, the project would, nevertheless, be crowded because facilities, such as playgrounds, laundromats, day-care centers, transportation, as well as other important social services, would be limited in relation to the needs of the population. If it were a high rise, elevators would be few and slow, with planned common areas small and undefined--design features which would further suggest a crowded feeling even though population density might not be high.

If we toured such a project, it would give us the impression of a drab, oppressive, institution-like environment. Space would be undifferentiated. There would be few cues as to the kind of behavior expected in any given space. Almost any kind of behavior could occur almost anywhere without being challenged. Equally significant from a security point of view would be the dim lighting of the project.

The formal surveillance carried out by patrols would be made difficult in a high rise by its long corridors and elevators. In a low-rise project the many small courtyards, numerous walkways, dark stairwells and basements, and dwelling unit entrances frequently

leading off interior corridors or stairwells would present similar problems for formal surveillance. These same features would also make informal surveillance--the kind carried out by the residents that is casual and spontaneous--extremely difficult. Security problems would also stem from the virtually unlimited access to the project. Because some of these projects are extremely large and because they are not broken up into smaller social groupings, open access is a real problem, especially since the project, if it is one of the worst, might well be located in a high crime area.

The residents in our typically "bad" project would be fearful and socially isolated. Few would know more than a few people at the most in the project, even though a vast majority of them had lived there for several years. We could also expect the residents of such a project to be poor and black. Their incomes would be below the poverty line and be derived largely, if not exclusively, from public assistance. Households would invariably be female headed. Children and teenagers would abound; yet, few adult men would live in the project. The ratio of children to adult men could run as high as 100 to 1.

Social relations in such a project are marked by distrust. Few people dare to rely on one another. The social posture of the residents is basically defensive and insular. There is a good chance that many residents feel alienated from the larger society as well as from each other. This same feeling often extends to the housing authority, the local public agency that is responsible for managing the project. In many cases, housing authorities have not been able to involve tenants

sufficiently in the management process; and discontent is likely to exist among residents over this issue, as well as over the general quality of management services being delivered by the authority. Residents frequently feel, and with good reason, that housing services, for example, maintenance, are inadequate; and they see these deficiencies as one more sign of their social isolation and neglect. Vandalism, in some instances, is an expression of just that feeling: a destructive act against an environment found barren and oppressive, one in which residents have no stake in and would like to destroy.

The security problem in the kind of project we have been describing comes from several sources. First, there are forms of domestic quarrels, often involving the male friends of the females who head most of the families, that may lead to violence. "Boyfriends," for example, have been known to demand portions of the welfare checks which the resident families receive each month.

Another aspect of the security problem stems from outsiders who prey on the project. These may be dope pushers, vandals, burglars, or gangs that may extort money from the residents. In some cases, these individuals might be residents of the project themselves.

Public housing, as can be seen from this sketch, is, at its worst, a highly vulnerable environment. Its architecture, design, and the weak social structure of the residents all combine to make it susceptible to crime.

Although there is much that can be done at the project level to help with the security problem, it should be stressed that the problem did not originate at the project level; and it cannot really be solved there. Like so many of our social problems, the security problem in public housing really begins with the larger social conditions that generate poverty and with inadequate and short-sighted public policies and programs that fail to do enough. In the case of public housing, the policies that are part of the problem are those that pack multi-problem families in institutions like public housing in the first place. Large concentrations of these kinds of families with limited social services are bound to make for a stressful and limiting environment. For this reason, it should be kept in mind that the approaches outlined and recommended here are necessarily limited ones. There is only so much that can be done at the project level. The real solution to the problems of public housing, including security, lies in changes in those policies that stratify residents according to a narrow economic strata. This means changes in the subsidy system.

HUD, of course, is aware of the needs for new approaches to housing subsidies and is currently sponsoring a range of studies and experiments designed to develop improvements in the nation's housing policies. One of these is an experiment in the housing-allowance approach in which the subsidy is given directly to the family. With this subsidy, the family then goes into the housing

market itself and secures its own housing. The family is not required, as is usually now the case, to live in a project in order to receive a subsidy.

This is just one approach, and there are many variations of it. But, it does illustrate the possibility of alternatives and the opportunity for a restructuring of our housing policy. Until this restructuring is accomplished, we will continue to have trouble at the project level and be limited in what we can do to improve the quality of life in housing projects.

The Limits of Hardware

In order to improve security in the kind of environment just outlined, an integrated approach is required. On the project level, as noted earlier, this means a mix of improvements that, in combination, strengthen the social cohesion of the residents and their capacity to control their own membership and, at the same time, harden the physical plant and improve its design. The delivery of increased services and improved efficiency in the management of housing projects are also important parts of the mix.

Most attempts at improving security in public housing have not involved such an integrated approach. For reasons of funding limitations, lack of technical expertise, and the sheer difficulty of the problem, most attempts have been fragmented and piecemeal and have relied to a considerable extent on hardware or on other rather crude forms of target hardening. Although there are exceptions to this,

such as the work of Oscar Newman and George Rand in New York City, as well as the HUD-sponsored Innovation Modernization Project which this paper will discuss shortly, hardware seems to have a fascination for many of those concerned with security in multi-family dwellings. For this reason, it might be useful at this point to look at some of the limitations of relying primarily on hardware to solve the security problem. This should not only highlight the need to include a broad range of improvements in any security program, particularly those improvements designed to strengthen the social fabric of the residents, but also such a discussion might have broad applicability given our general tendency to look to hardware for solutions to social problems.

In the case of public housing, reliance on hardware has several significant limitations. First, the criminal or the vandal also has access to technology. We should not assume that we alone control the dimensions of the conflict or determine its limits. The criminal can escalate, too, and this is the danger with a hardware-based security program. It may simply result in an escalation of the conflict.

Consider, for example, the case of a light bulb. In some of our projects, these bulbs are broken by youths running down halls or stairways, holding sticks over their heads to break the bulbs. To prevent this in one of our projects, we enclosed these bulbs in metal encasements. The result? The kids simply got narrower sticks and poked them through the open spaces in the encasement. In other cases,

they simply tore the encasement off; and then, we not only had to replace the bulbs but also replace the encasement as well.

Another more elaborate example of the same point occurred in a project where crime was a problem in the elevators. To counteract it, the housing authority installed a set of master controls in the basement of the building which, in emergencies, could be used to control the elevators. A TV camera was also installed in the elevator cars, which could be monitored from the same room where the master controls were located.

Again, the result was disappointing. Youths in the building quickly learned how to put the master controls out of action, as well as how to control the elevator through the use of another set of controls that were located on the top of the elevator car. They gained this knowledge, it was reported to us, by breaking the elevator controls and then carefully watching the repairman at work. These lessons, coupled with previous experience gained through swinging around on the cables inside the elevator shaft, enabled the youths to match the technological escalation of the housing authority. They would alight on the top of the elevator car, stop the elevator using the controls located there, open the hatch on the top of the car and then demand that the passengers hand up their valuables and sometimes their clothing. All the guard in the basement could do was to watch on the TV monitor the bizarre spectacle of people passing their wallets and clothes upwards, out of the range of the TV camera. Before the guard

could do anything more, the robbers would escape by forcing open, from the inside of the shaft, the elevator door that was even with the roof of the car. It was then a simple matter to step out and make their escape through the building.

These two examples, perhaps, illustrate the problem in the extreme, as there is some reason to believe that increased surveillance and other target hardening measures might deter the spontaneous vandal or criminal, the one who operates without prior plan and moves mostly against targets of opportunity that he stumbles across. The fact remains, however, that the criminal can match escalation in many cases as he also has access to technology; this constitutes a severe limitation to a security system that relies primarily on hardware.

A second limitation is that hardware may be put to unintended uses. In one city, for example, where we are just now installing TV monitors in the lobby, we have been told by consultants that we should be prepared for the possibility that TV cameras will attract exhibitionists who want to reach a larger audience than they are usually able too.

Another, perhaps more usual, limitation is that hardware may be misunderstood by the residents. If installed without prior discussion, there is the chance that it may be viewed by the residents as directed against them and viewed as another example of their institutional environment. The presence of hardware can also create anxiety by making people feel less secure, by leading people to the

conclusion that there is real danger. Again, discussion with the residents about the hardware may minimize this effect. Our experience indicates that such discussions not only reduce misunderstanding and anxiety but also can serve to elicit some good ideas as the residents themselves often have remarkable insight into the problem of security and the kinds of things that can be done about it.

Still another limitation to hardware as the primary element in a security system is that, even at its best, all hardware can do is deter, not prevent. It may, therefore, have a high-displacement effect. As noted earlier, certain kinds of spontaneous, unplanned crime may be suppressed through the presence of visible hardware; but the determined criminal will not go out of business when confronted with known detection and surveillance devices. He will simply go elsewhere. A hardware approach, therefore, may just simply pass the crime from one place to another. And, if adopted as a general strategy, the poorer communities--those less likely to be able to afford complex equipment--would become the most promising targets for the criminal, just as they seem to be for every other type of problem.

In addition to the displacement effect, there is also the possibility that hardware, unless accompanied by other interventions, will also have an escalatory effect. By blocking minor forms of criminal behavior, it may increase the likelihood that

more serious crimes may occur, as the criminal may escalate the seriousness of the crime he is prepared to commit upon finding lower level activities blocked. This might be particularly true of the drug addict.

These limitations of hardware do not mean, of course, that no hardware should be used. The point here is simply that hardware should not be the primary focus. The search should be for the mix, for that right combination of moves that together produces the desired effect--the synergism that strengthens the social fabric of the residents as well as hardens the physical plant. Our research at HUD indicates that the mix most likely to give us this synergism would be one that includes design changes in the project, improvements in its management, increased social services, in addition to the installation of some surveillance and detection equipment.

Examples of Synergistic Approaches

We do not at HUD have any precise formulae to tell us the exact improvements that should be made at the project level to give us the result we want. We have, however, made some beginnings. One such beginning is the Innovative Modernization Project, a project which the writer had the opportunity to develop and manage in its initial phases.

The Innovative Modernization Project (IMP) is presently testing and evaluating in two housing projects in each of three metropolitan areas--San Francisco, Cleveland, and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania--new ways to improve the quality of life in public housing. Under this

project, the housing authorities in these cities, under a contract with HUD's Office of Research and Technology, joined with expert R & D firms and developed integrated plans for the demonstration housing projects. These plans outlined a number of innovative improvements to be tested on a pilot basis, which, if successful, could be applied nationwide.

The plans prepared by the housing authorities were based on a thorough analysis of the social and physical characteristics of the demonstration sites and on a substantial awareness of the problems of public housing in general. They are worthy of our attention at this point because they reflect a synergistic approach to the problem of security in housing projects.

One innovation that is particularly imaginative is the design and construction of a high-activity area in the center of one of our demonstration projects in San Francisco. We plan to transform what is now a barren, concrete expanse, located in the center of the high rises that make up the project into an active, bustling area which will become the focus of community life for the residents. We expect to accomplish this by concentrating a number of facilities and services in this area. As it stands now, many of these are spread throughout the project, where, as in the case of the laundromats located on the roofs of the buildings, they are vulnerable to vandalism when not in use because of their relative

isolation. When work is completed, the activity area will hold laundry facilities, a day-care center, a playground, and a shop where residents may borrow home improvement and maintenance equipment. The area will be attractively designed and landscaped.

We, thus, expect the high-activity area to help provide the basis for community interaction in the project. We also hope that the level of activity will prevent overt vandalism and be sufficient to assure people that they will be safe on the grounds of the project. Similar kinds of dividends are expected to flow from our plan to limit access to the project. At the present time, access is almost unlimited. Ground level walkways pass through the buildings and connect the street directly with the interior open space. The elevators are in small alcoves off the walkways. Our plan is to close off some of these walkways and place a guard or surveillance equipment at others. This will not only help make the project more secure, but also it will channel more people across the high-activity area, thus encouraging increased social contact and increased use of the facilities that will be placed there.

Other innovations planned for San Francisco reflect the same multi-purpose approach. We plan, for example, to put groups of families on a "buddy system" and to reinforce this designation by color coding the apartments of these families. In the other project, we are using in San Francisco, which is a low rise, this demarkation will be further accentuated by fences that will mark off groups of families. In this way, we hope to "de-institutionalize" the projects

to some extent by breaking them up into smaller social units of a size that someone could identify. If this happens, we feel that the social structure of the project will be strengthened; and the project as a whole will be less vulnerable to crime and vandalism.

The breaking up of projects by both design and management changes is also part of the plan for our demonstration site in Cleveland. Here, the project we are working in is a sprawling low-rise, housing some 1,700 families. To strengthen the social structure and increase the residents' stake in their environment, as well as to improve it, we plan to divide the project into seven distinct neighborhoods. These neighborhoods are not arbitrary but are based on a thorough analysis of friendship patterns, and the uses of space such as walkways and play areas. The neighborhoods, thus, conform to or accentuate existing patterns of interaction.

The identity of these neighborhoods will be reinforced by a number of design and management changes. Each neighborhood will be color coded and will receive a special demonstration. These demonstrations range from changes in lighting to changes in building design and the layout and location of play areas. In addition, each neighborhood will receive its own management staff under a plan that would decentralize parts of the project's overall operation. We think that this decentralization will be more efficient as well as more responsive to the residents' needs, and we also expect that it will

further reinforce the identity of the neighborhoods and thus increase the spirit of community within them.

These are some examples of what we are trying to do at HUD under the Innovative Modernization Project (Brill, 1972). Our approach has been to try to develop innovations that fit together and reinforce one another, and which are based on an understanding of the social environment of public housing. Only time and a careful evaluation will tell us the degree to which we achieved the right mix of physical and social changes. We are convinced, at least at this point, that the way to increased security in public housing lies with making a number of mutually reinforcing improvements in the design and management of the projects. It seems clear that "hardening" the target must include changes that improve the quality of life in the target and the social cohesion of its occupants.

NOTES

1. For a further description of the Innovative Modernization Project, see William H. Brill, "Innovation in the Design and Management of Public Housing: A Case Study of Applied Research," in Environmental Design: Research and Practice, Proceedings of 8th Annual American Institute of Architects Researchers' Conference, William Mitchell, ed. (UCLA, January, 1972).

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME PREVENTION

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Crime and the Community

This is a timely topic, for concern about crime, fear of crime, and its individual and social-economic threat is running very high. Fear runs across the fabric of the American body politic, and struggling, often halting efforts are made to make crime prevention more of an operational reality. It is ironic, however, that there has been little discussion of "community involvement" in crime prevention. How else can effective crime prevention programs be developed without community involvement. Success in crime prevention seems to be conditional and affected by the extent to which community involvement is discouraged or frustrated by agencies of government. Professor Germann probably put the matter most succinctly when he stated:

The community and police must be considered an organic unity, a mutually supportive partnership (Germann, 1968).

Certainly, the concept of community involvement, in crime prevention or any other vital area of social concern, is not a new concept. It

is part of the very fabric of self-government, of democratic government.

As the complexities of society and government increases, as government becomes more separated, aloof, and more bureaucratized, however, so too does personal commitment and community involvement diminish. Community involvement in its own affairs in large metropolitan areas is a difficult task to manage and to coordinate.

Tension often grows between community groups pressing for a "piece of the action" and governmental agencies who have been delegated the responsibility for day-to-day operations. Efforts on the part of community residents to participate in crime prevention and police matters are often viewed as meddlesome, and as direct threats to their authority by policing and other criminal justice agencies. The suggestion that individuals and community groups become really involved in the "nitty gritty" of crime prevention are often viewed as charges of official inefficiency--either implicit or explicit.

There are several matters which seem to affect official receptivity to the idea of community involvement. They are as follows:

1. First, the prior relationships between community groups and governmental service agencies, especially public safety agencies must be taken into consideration. If the history of relationships has been one of mutual hostility and suspicion, then inevitably community involvement efforts are going to be difficult to implement in any real way.

2. From the outset, there has to be some agreement on goals on the part of community agencies and governmental units.
3. If this is not the case, there has to be some joint effort made to identify areas of friction; and an agreement to work mutually for the elimination or reduction of these areas of friction must be agreed upon by both groups.
4. There must be both a willingness on the part of the criminal justice agency to re-delegate some responsibilities to the public and an understanding on the part of the public about official sensitivities and pride.
5. There must be a readiness and a willingness, coupled, hopefully, by an organizational ability on the part of the community groups, to accept these responsibilities.
6. Finally, there are operational considerations involved in the planning and the implementation of community involvement.

The SOMO Project

Now, I should like to make some brief remarks about a project in St. Louis, which, in a broad sense, demonstrates some of the very difficult aspects of community involvement in crime prevention. In a very real sense, this project, the so-called SOMO program, is an effort in community policing.

In 1969, the tenants of St. Louis Public Housing conducted a successful rent strike, the first such large-scale successful effort of its type in the nation. Through the intervention of an ad hoc community group, the St. Louis Civic Alliance for Housing, the rent strike was finally settled with the resolution of many issues which

had been troubling the tenants for a number of years. The St. Louis Civic Alliance for Housing was a broadly based community group, representing such interests as organized labor, industry, tenants, the organized clergy, and citizenry. Its actual leadership involved representatives of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Auto Workers. The involvement of the teamsters and the auto workers was a natural outgrowth of the joint efforts in 1968 to organize the Alliance for Labor Action, an organization brought into being to focus labor's attention, interest, and resources on the most pressing social issues of the day. The two men most responsible for initiating the ALA were the late Walter Ruether and Harold J. Gibbons, International Vice President of the Teamsters and the leader in St. Louis locals.

There is no need at this time to discuss the details of the settlement. As a result of the settlement, however, tenants were given, at least in theory, a voice in the management of public housing programs in St. Louis. During the discussions, which followed the settlement of the rent strike, various task forces were developed. One of these had to do with the matter of "security," whatever that term implies.

I feel I was fortunate in being selected to direct a study of security matters, for it gave me an opportunity to approach security from a human factor and a human engineering point of view. I found it necessary to downgrade "hardware" approaches to the security problem.

The conclusion of the study was that there should be established a tenant-based and tenant-staffed Security and Order Maintenance Officer system--hence, the acronym SOMO. The conclusions and the plan of action recommended in the security study were adopted by HUD, and St. Louis was the first city in the United States where HUD agreed to underwrite the expenses of a security program.

The study recommended a security force of approximately 175 personnel, drawn from residents of the various housing projects in St. Louis. The tenants were to have a voice in the development of personnel standards, in the selection of personnel, and in other matters relating to security.

Utilizing manpower training funds under the Public Service Careers program of the Department of Labor, a training program was approved. This program was to be designed and administered by the Administration of Justice Program at the University of Missouri, St. Louis. The public safety portion of the Public Service Careers program was actually a program involving three different federal agencies: Labor's funds, the community contacts of the Community Relations Service, and the grant management authority and experience of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

As conceived, the SOMO program was just as its name implies--security and order maintenance. The SOMO force was never conceived as being a police force. Its personnel were not

authorized to carry firearms; the personnel possessed only the citizen's power of arrest. Criminal matters were to be referred to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, which retained full authority in the criminal investigation field.

At this time, we are nearing the completion of our training program. We have had more than 200 trainees, and as of this time, slightly more than 100 are employed on the SOMO staff. All trainees who successfully complete the training program will have completed requirements for a standard Red Cross First Aid certificate. All of our personnel have taken a special 4-hour course in handling coronaries, the only police or quasi-police personnel in the region who have had such training. All of our personnel have completed a 30-hour course on conflict management and family crisis intervention--again, the only police or quasi-police personnel in the region to have undergone such training.

Now, it would be misleading if I suggested that everything is perfect in St. Louis or in St. Louis housing. It is not, for St. Louis still probably has the worst public housing in the nation. Crime has not been eliminated--far from it. But, we have made a dent. Police figures show a reduction of approximately 35 percent in Part I crimes during our period of operation. We are happy with this, particularly when we are convinced that the willingness of residents to report crime has doubled! During our period of operation, not a single St. Louis policeman

has been injured; previously, the project area was one of the most dangerous areas in which police could be assigned to work. Sniping incidents, which were common place for the police two years ago, have been reduced to zero. In all sorts of ways, we feel the tenant-based security program has been a success--despite the fact that no one associated with the project success is completely happy with its outcome. Some are highly critical. From the point of view of those of us who are associated with the training program, it has been the most harrowing, the most difficult project with which we have ever been associated; most of us have been involved for several years with different types of manpower development programs.

Looking back now, I would make the same recommendations as I made two years ago. Security or crime prevention is impossible to achieve without heavy community involvement.

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DEFENSIBLE SPACE: ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN FOR CRIME PREVENTION

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Introduction

Peter Lejins, in a paper entitled "Recent Changes in the Concept of Prevention" presented at the 95th Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correction Association in Boston in 1965, identified three categories of crime and delinquency prevention: punitive prevention, corrective prevention, and mechanical prevention.

Punitive prevention, he explained, involves efforts by authorities at forestalling crime by making more evident the threat of punishment. Operationally, this includes: the enactment of new and tougher laws; the reduction of the period between arrest and trial; and the streamlining of the process of booking offenders.

Corrective prevention begins with the premise that criminal behavior is caused by various factors. Efforts at corrective prevention, therefore, involve understanding and eliminating those causes before their effect on the individual channels him into crime. Some of the causes identified involve susceptibility to narcotics addiction, economic instability, a history of familial

problems, lack of opportunity for participation in the accepted life-style of society.

Mechanical prevention involves efforts at placing obstacles in the paths of criminals. It is a policy which accepts the existence of criminals, their modus operandi, and their victims, and frames a program for hardening criminal targets by making them more inaccessible. This is accomplished by providing more intensive barriers of both a physical and personnel nature. The operating mechanisms are target-hardening, increasing the risk of apprehension, and, finally, increasing the criminal's awareness of these risks.

Typical means for improving mechanical prevention include manpower increases in the form of police, security guards, doormen, tenant patrols, and dogs; and mechanical and electronic devices in the form of more and better locks, alarms, visual and auditory sensors of an electronic nature; and motorized vehicles to improve the mobility and surveillance capacity of limited personnel.

Current local governmental efforts at crime prevention involve all three of the above categories: punitive, corrective, and mechanical. Mechanical prevention is usually advocated as the most immediate panacea.

Defensible Space

The form of crime prevention we will be describing, termed "Defensible space", was seen initially to be a form of mechanical prevention, although it does represent a departure from normal practices. However, as our work in understanding and defining the

operating mechanisms of "Defensible space" progressed over the course of two years of study, it was realized that a good portion of our work was, in fact, a form of corrective prevention: a mechanism which also worked to alleviate in part some of the causes of criminal behavior.

The particular new area of mechanical crime prevention that we have assigned ourselves to exploring is the improvement of security in urban residential areas through the physical design of the living environment. Urban residential areas, for a series of reasons which have been explored ad nauseum, have of late become particularly prone to various forms of criminal behavior. Society's capacity for coping with these problems does not appear to be able to keep pace with their rate of increase. Those members of the community who are in a position to exercise choice in the housing marketplace are moving their families to the suburban areas. Many realize that the problems they are trying to escape are following them, but they hope at a much slower pace.

An illustration will perhaps serve to point up the fundamental differences in security design for low versus middle income housing. Our findings to date seem to indicate a rather simple rule: where the use of a security doorman is possible on a 24-hour, year-round basis, the buildings should be designed to have as many residential units as possible, sharing the entry controlled by the doorman. Where the use of doormen is not possible due to prohibitive costs, buildings should be designed to have as few units as possible share

a common entry. From the above, it can be deduced that those buildings publicly-supported housing across the country have been applying a high-density high-rise building solution which is predicated on the use of doormen to a set of circumstances, where the use of doormen is impossible economically. High density for a low-income population is better provided with a multi-entry solution, where each entry is restricted to the use of only a few families.

Where both of the above solutions are directed at providing maximum security to their respective inhabitants, there is a fundamental difference in approach and in the beneficiary spin-offs. The first approach is one in which tenants relegate responsibility for security to a hired individual. A doorman guarding one entry to a building complex serving 150 to 500 families is concerned predominantly with restricting entry into the complex. He cannot, by the definition of his job and within the framework of what is physically possible, also be concerned with the bordering streets on which the project sits. In order to restrict entry to one limited point of a large complex, it is usually necessary to wall off those portions of the project bordering the streets. For a two-to ten-acre project, this will result in hundreds of feet of street being removed from all forms of social or visual contact. A natural mechanism for providing for the safety of streets has, therefore, been sacrificed to insure only the security of residents within the confines of their living complex. The other solution, one in which as few units as possible share a common entry off the street,

positions the units, their windows and entries, and proscribes paths of movement and activity so as to provide a continual form of natural surveillance to the street as well as to the building. We feel that the present response of upper-income residents to the increasing crime problem is one which is introverted, withdrawn, and involves the restricting and hardening of their areas of private domain. This is coupled with their forsaking of the traditional responsibilities felt by citizenry for insuring the continuance of a viable, functioning living environment for their immediate family and surrounding community.

We are concerned that this response is short-sighted; that with every additional lock and security guard, there is a corresponding escalation by the criminal and an increase in fear and paranoia of the victim, with a decrease in the natural mechanisms that have once operated to insure the safety of our streets.

Our concern is to try to determine means for improving the security and livability of residential environments within the urban setting, particularly for low and low-middle income groups. These are groups for whom housing choice is severely limited.

Over the past two years, we have been exploring the problem of security in low and middle income housing where provision of doormen and expensive security hardware is impossible; we have uncovered residential environments which, by the nature of their physical layout, are able to provide security and continue to function in even high-crime areas. In some instances, we have been able to find

these environments in immediate juxtaposition to other residential environments, of decidedly different design, which are in the throes of the worst agonies of crime.

In conclusion, we are reasonably certain that the physical environment provided can directly result in attitudes and behavior on the part of residents which will insure the security of that environment--will enable them to naturally undertake a self-policing role which will act as a very effective form of target hardening not prone to the changing modus operandi of criminals--and finally will make evident to prospective criminals the high degree of probability of their apprehension.

Behavior and the Physical Environment

To the non-architect, it may be disconcerting to learn that the form of the physical environment can evoke behavioral attitudes and responses from both inhabitants and outsiders and can set a framework for a life-style which, by its very nature, will create a buffer against intrusion while insuring its intensive use. In its most primitive form, physical design has the capacity to limit access and activity. As a simple illustration, a T-shaped intersection in a corridor allows a turn to either the right or the left; an L-shaped corridor turning to the left simply does not allow consideration of a turn to the right. There is no question here of a perceived restriction of choice by the user; the path of movement is finite and complete. This is, of course, a very primitive example of the capacity of architecture to delimit activity and paths of movement.

The evidence we have been compiling over the past two years of study indicates that by delimiting of paths of movement, by circumscribing areas of activity and zones of influence, by providing for the visual surveillance of an area, one can create in people--inhabitants and strangers--clear feelings as to the function of the space as so defined and its intended users.

Another point must be made to the non-architect, and this is in the form of an apology for the architectural profession. If it becomes evident from our presentation that different physical environments can be marked by reduce crime and vandalism rates, why then does the architectural profession continue to provide those environments which result in high crime rates, the destruction of property, the terrorization of inhabitants, and make the residential population particularly prone to criminal action, both impulsive and premeditated. The following disclaimor probably does little to enhance the view of the profession held in the public eye, but we hope that the very act of this research will remedy any critical view we may have been responsible for creating.

Little scientific work has been done to date to accurately measure the impact of physical design of an environment on the social behavior of its users. The number of factors required of architects in the resolution of the design of a building is so large and at times so conflicting, that insights which have not been substantiated often go by the wayside. In our work, we have encountered many architects who share the opinions that will be expressed here. Many

have incorporated these as directives in one building design and then neglected them in another with what may appear as facile inconsistency. The only explanation which seems to justify this action is the uncertainty as to the real effectiveness of these design considerations and the pressures of building codes, fire codes, and economics that make one's own insights seem unimportant.

Density and Crime

Prior to the development of our hypotheses, a word must be said on the problem of density. Our findings indicate that low-density environments have less crime per capita than those of high density (see results of cross-tabulations and regression analysis). Density is usually expressed in persons or units per acre, and particular densities will also denote a residential building prototype. As an example, individual, detached housing in an urban setting usually sit on 1/6 acre and has a corresponding density of six units to the acre. Row housing (sometimes called town-housing) has a density ranging 12 to 18 units per acre. Walk-up buildings have a density as high as 40 units per acre, depending upon the number of floors. Elevator buildings place no theoretical limit on density and so normally range from 60 units an acre to as high as 400 units to the acre. The latter being rare, the former being more usual. Our regression analysis of housing statistics on 160 projects in the greater New York area has allowed for other variables affecting crime: crime area indices, population characteristics (including income level, age of inhabitants, number of broken families, etc.), and so on.

In a comparison of crime in buildings of different height, type and density, a clear pattern emerges. The chart which follows the discussion illustrates both the rate and the locational distribution of crimes (felonies) in New York City Housing Authority projects. The housing projects involved are all low income and are scattered throughout the city.

The most significant differences occur in comparing the crime location in different types of buildings. High-rise buildings (thirteen stories or over) experience 54.8 percent of their crime within the interior public spaces; low elevator buildings (six or seven stories with one low speed elevator), 40.2 percent; and walk-ups of three stories have only 17.2 percent of their crime in the interior public spaces. The interior public spaces in high-rise buildings not only must be used by all tenants but also are difficult for both police and tenants to survey; and there are far too many families using these spaces to make strangers and potential criminals conspicuous to residents. In contrast, crime in the interior public space of walk-ups buildings is minimal, as the residents share a short hallway and stair, and, consequently, recognize one another (as opposed to an intruder) readily.

This shift in crime-location pattern indicates that a form of mechanical prevention is in operation. The trend toward higher overall crime rates in the higher, denser buildings supports the hypothesis that a form of corrective prevention is also functioning.

Figure 1
Place of Occurrence of Crimes in Buildings of Different Heights

Source: New York City Housing Authority Police: 1969 Data (felonies)

Crimes in interior public spaces 17.2%

Lobbies 7.2%

Halls 3.3%

Elevators 1.3%

Stairs 1.3%

Roofs 1.3%

Social 2.8%

Apartment Interiors

40.4%

Project Grounds

42.4%

Apartment Interiors

35.3%

Project Grounds

24.5%

Crimes in interior public spaces 40.2%

Lobbies

11.1%

Elevators

8.9%

Halls

3.9%

Roofs

3.3%

Stairs

3.2%

Social

Apartment Interiors

21.3%

Project Grounds

23.8%

4.0%

Roofs

5.9%

Stairs

3.4%

Social

Crimes in Interior public spaces 54.8%

Elevators

22.6%

Halls 10.8%

Lobbies 8.1%

Three Story Buildings

Mean felony rate: 9 per 1000 population

Six and Seven Story Buildings

Mean felony rate: 12 per 1000 population

Buildings 13 Stories and Over

Mean felony rate: 20 per 1000 population

From this, one may be led to the conclusion that walk-up, low-density housing is preferable to high-rise, high-density housing, as a solution to crime problems. Unfortunately, building density is seldom a matter of choice but is directly determined by the building's economics. Competitive demand for a residential space in particular urban settings will in a free market economy' drive up the cost of land. Government programs require maximum amounts of land costs per unit. A correspondingly larger number of units must be placed on a higher priced piece of land in order to keep the land and total development cost per unit within fiscal bounds.

High-density solutions, however, are not always the result simply of economics but are, at times, the result of the need to rehouse a low-income population living in a high-density slum which will be cleared and where relocation is difficult. This latter may be the result of a more enlightened approach to urban renewal, but clearly brings with it a range of new problems which we are now only beginning to face.

Providing a uniformly low-density environment is not a universal solution to crime problems, and consideration must now be given to violating those factors that operate to make low-density environments (row housing at 16 units to the acre) operational as crime inhibitors and high-density environments (100 to 400 units per acre) magnets and breeders of crime. We have found evidence in a comparison of two housing projects composed of two different housing prototypes: one

high-rise slabs, the other densely grouped walk-ups. However, both shared identical densities, identical population, and located across the street from each other, but density in itself may not be the controlling factor. Other factors affecting crime exist as components of high density, and so make crime appear to correlate with high density.

Defensible Space and Crime

We have, therefore, developed the concept of defensible space to describe the various physical elements that promote security in urban residential areas.

Defensible space is a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms--real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, improved opportunities for surveillance--that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents. A defensible space is a living residential environment which can be employed by inhabitants for the enhancement of their lives, while providing security for their families, neighbors, and friends. The public areas of a multi-family residential environment devoid of defensible space can make the act of going from street to apartment equivalent to running the gauntlet. The fear and uncertainty generated by living in such an environment can slowly eat away and eventually destroy the security and sanctity of the apartment unit itself. On the other hand, by grouping dwelling units to reinforce associations of mutual benefit; by delineating paths of movement; by defining areas of activity for particular users through their juxtaposition

with internal living areas; and by providing for natural opportunities for visual surveillance, architects can create a clear understanding of the function of a space, who its users are and ought to be. This, in turn, can lead residents, of all income levels, to adopt extremely potent territorial attitudes and policing measures, which act as a strong deterrent to potential criminals.

The spatial layout of the multi-family dwelling, from the arrangement of the building grounds to the interior grouping of apartments, achieves defensible space when residents can easily perceive and control all activity taking place within it. It is not, of course, intended that residents take matters into their own hands and personally restrict intrusion; rather that they employ the full range of encounter mechanisms to indicate concerned observation of activity and control of the situation: offers of assistance to strangers in finding their way as a means for determining intent and legitimate presence; continued presence and the threat of possible interference; questioning glances from windows; finally, the desire to call the police and insist on their intervention. As we have seen too often lately, the ability of even secure middle class Americans to intervene, if only by calling the police, is not something that can be depended on any longer. Similarly, self-initiated police intervention in ghetto areas meets at times with community disapproval, even where the community feels intervention is required. The defensible space environment extends

the area of the residential unit into the street and within the area of felt responsibility of the dweller--of both low and middle income. By contrast, living within large apartment tower developments, the resident is isolated; he feels his responsibilities begin and end within the confines of his own apartment. He has learned to be detached even from what he sees outside his own window.

In our newly created dense and anonymous residential environments, we may be raising generations of young, totally lacking any experience of individuality, of personal space, and by extension of the personal rights and property of others. In many ways, therefore, defensible space design also attempts to attack the root causes of crime. In the area of crime prevention, physical design has been traditionally relegated the role of mechanical prevention, leaving intact the structure of motivation and attitudes, which eventually lead to the criminal event. Defensible space design, while it uses mechanical prevention, aims at formulating an architectural model of corrective prevention. Our present urban environments, created with such speed and determination, may be little more than the spawning grounds of criminal behavior.

These then are the basic ingredients that we believe are effective as crime prohibitive measures. Is it possible then, using these means, to design high-density environments, which also answer the urban expansion needs of the future without making our cities into high-crime areas and our population as prone to victimization as they presently are?

CRIME IS A THIEF'S BUSINESS, PREVENTION IS YOURS

Wilbur Rykert, Director
National Crime Prevention Institute

Introduction

The topic for today's program is crime in and about residences. While the training at the National Crime Prevention Institute will equip police officers to deal with a much broader range of crime, the very magnitude of residential crime dictates that considerable amount of time be allocated to methods by which these crimes may be reduced.

In the past, police operational strategies to reduce criminal opportunity have relied almost exclusively on preventive patrol. Given enough police manpower, preventive patrol could be effective because only the irrational would venture to commit a crime under the constant surveillance of a police officer. Preventive patrol, however, has not worked effectively in the United States because increased public demands for police service in non-criminal areas have curtailed these efforts; and the patrol function does not encourage private citizens or businessmen to assist in eliminating their own crime risk (Levley & Green, 1968). Studies also show that the citizens themselves are confused about their role in crime prevention. They have been taught to rely too extensively on insurance for protection, and

they are neither aware nor instructed in the available means to protect themselves or their property; and the tendency of both citizens and police to view crime as a police problem divorces the citizen from his role in crime prevention.

Crime Prevention Categories

One of the problems with the term crime prevention is that it means so many things to so many different people; but, it is generally viewed as something that happens to an individual or a community after a criminal act takes place. This has also been true within the police organization, where the prevention unit works primarily with juveniles after an apprehension has taken place. In order to narrow the scope of crime prevention training to a manageable area, the National Crime Prevention Institute has adopted the crime prevention categories. Punitive, Corrective, Mechanical methods have been identified by Peter Lejins of the University of Maryland (Lejins, 1967).

Punitive.--The threat of punishment deters a person from committing an offense for which he might be punished. There has been a great deal said about the punitive approach, which appears to have been the one approach used for centuries. While there are those who argue that the punitive approach has no value, Lejins has emphasized that the threat of punishment and the fact that the punishment will be carried out, not the severity of the punishment, is still a major deterrent to crime.

Corrective.--In the corrective area we see two things: first, the emphasis on working with an individual once he has committed a crime, been convicted, sentenced, and assigned to a correctional institution

or placed on probation. This approach has achieved varied success; it takes place, however, only after the criminal act has occurred.

The other part of the corrective category deals with altering social conditions; tearing down slums, building new public housing, adding street light--constructive actions that can change the environment or the conditions under which crime is thought to flourish.

Mechanical.--Placing obstacles in the path of the would-be offender to make committing the crime more difficult. The mechanical category of crime prevention is the most recent category to receive major emphasis on a national basis. To many people, the mechanical process of increasing security through locks, burglar alarms, and other devices is thought to be too simple; a method that does not take into consideration the so-called causes of crime. When related to opportunity reduction, mechanical crime prevention goes beyond mere devices relating directly to security. The altering of community environments through architectural planning, remodeling of old structures, increasing citizen surveillance levels, and any other program that will make criminal activity a high-risk action on the part of the individual can be placed in the mechanical category. Viewed according to Lejins' strict definition, the Institute's program of training is based both on mechanical prevention and the second portion of the corrective category. Target hardening may more appropriately be termed that part of mechanical prevention that deals with the hardware of security.

In the past two years, a great amount of interest has developed in the area of mechanical prevention. Critics argue that mechanical

prevention does not prevent crime but only displaces it either into another geographical area or into another crime category. This is hardly an argument against the concept. As a matter of fact, the very essence of security is that you will turn the criminal from the protected premises to the unprotected. From a community point of view, security applications on the part of individuals could push criminal activities into areas of the community with previously low crime experience. Evidence does exist, however, indicating that the bulk of criminal activities are carried out by persons who are not highly mobile and that whatever displacement occurs will force them into unfamiliar areas of operation or into types of criminal activity where they are unskilled and, therefore, more vulnerable to apprehension by the police. Success in a mechanical prevention program can be claimed if, in fact, a great deal of displacement does take place. Critics of mechanical approach may take several years before significant results can be shown, but they should also not lose sight of the fact that very little success has been shown through the operation of punitive or corrective processes.

Other critics of mechanical prevention state that increasing security will escalate the ability to criminals to defeat security devices. It should be clear to all that anything devised by man can also be defeated by man, but only a limited group of highly skilled, dedicated criminals reach the stage where they can defeat technology with other than brute force. Certain parts of the security industry recognize the lead time necessary to produce security devices, and the time required for criminals to decipher a product and intentionally

design a life span of approximately three years into improved products.

It would be disastrous if crime prevention efforts totally disregarded technology on the basis that unskilled criminals would be able to learn defeat skills faster than our scientific community could improve upon prior efforts.

In recent years, police administrators have developed more and more interest in providing services and assisting communities with the planning of crime prevention programs. Most programs, however, have been short term operations or based on a special community wide campaign at certain times of the year. Many have been developed by insurance companies, security hardware manufacturers, or service organizations interested in the general well being and progress of a community. The disappearance of these programs after what appears to be an initial success can be traced directly to the fact that no long range planning took place and that operating public service agencies had not assigned specially trained personnel to see that these programs continue.

Theoretical Approach to Police Involvement in Crime Prevention

Police involvement in a long term crime prevention program must be based on a theoretical framework that suggests the possibility of eventual success in reducing crime. There are six points to this theoretical approach to police involvement in crime prevention (Rykert, 1971).

Criminal Behavior is Learned Behavior.--Early criminologists, believed that criminals were born, and throughout the history of criminology, many attempts have been made to identify those inherited characteristics that identify a person as a potential criminal. As the body of knowledge involving learning theory developed, criminologists also looked at learning theory; and more and more have developed their theories to coincide with the process of learning. Most theorists, however, have explained criminal learning in terms of images that tend to condition the person's beliefs in the direction of criminal activity. This is certainly a vital part of learning theory, but it is also true that more important than the development of belief structures is the reinforcement of those beliefs that comes through the accomplishment of a criminal act.

A criminal act is a success if the perpetrator is not detected, but it is also successful enough to contribute to the reinforcement of criminal beliefs if, even after detection, the criminal has had ample time to consume the fruits of his illegal enterprise.

If he is able through other means to escape final punishment provided under the law, or if the punishment itself can be viewed by the perpetrator as being less a personal loss than the gains he received by the criminal act itself--the act is counted a success.

Reducing Criminal Opportunity Reduces the Opportunity to Learn Criminal Behavior.--Reducing criminal opportunity not only reduces the individual's opportunity to learn about crime, but it also reduces the opportunity to receive positive reinforcements favorable to the

criminal actions. Indeed, the individual's failure to achieve criminal success will provide negative reinforcement to criminal belief structures and positive reinforcement to the belief that crime is not the path of least resistance. Therefore, legitimate paths to success become more inviting to the individual.

Criminal Opportunity Can Be Lessened by Improved Security Measures and by Increasing the Level of Surveillance on the Part of the General Public.--By improved security measures, we mean not only the installation and operation of more sophisticated devices, but improved applications of devices that are currently installed. A large volume of burglary, for example, is committed because entry could be achieved through unlocked doors, thus suggesting that simply locking whatever device is available would deter the beginning burglar. Criminal opportunity can be lessened by a number of ways. First of all, the environment can be designed so that the individual considering the criminal act feels that there is a good chance for him to be seen by someone who will take action on their own or call the police. Secondly, the target of his attack can be made to appear so formidable that he does not believe his abilities will enable him to reach the forbidden fruit. Thirdly, if he actually attempts to reach the goal, the probability of his failure can be increased through the ready response of the police. The above process is the system wherein the physical environment plays a part, the security devices protecting a specific target are involved, and tying it all together requires the constant surveillance by both members of that particular community and the police.

Long Range Crime Prevention Will Not Be Achieved Unless Criminal Opportunities Are Reduced on a National Basis.--It can be predicted with some degree of accuracy that crime prevention applied to a small geographical area will result in considerable displacement process will tend to diminish as the area of crime prevention activity is widened and increased effort is called for on the part of the criminal to continue his activities away from a familiar environment.

The Police Are in a Pivotal Position and as Such They Should be Trained in Crime Prevention and Become Involved in the Preplanning of Any Community Activity Where Their Services Will Later be Called For.--This statement provides the basis for all training and implementation of programs as defined in the crime prevention definition used by the Institute. It means basically that if the police are called to respond to an actual crime, such as burglary, robbery, or shoplifting; they should also be concerned about reducing the crime risk that led to the commission of the overt act. Extended, this statement means that the police do not have to take a passive role in the planning process, but that they should take a positive step forward and actively solicit the opportunity to provide crime prevention advice in the planning stages of community activity. The police possess within their records and the experience of the officers much that can be valuable to the planner when considering the safety of the community.

Any business seeking a new location of a plant site is certainly concerned with the level of criminal activity in areas under consideration. A safe community is a good community within which to work

and play; and, therefore, a good crime prevention program with police involvement in the planning stages can be a valuable social and economic asset to any community.

Insurance, Security Hardware, and Other Areas of Business and Industry Involved in Crime Prevention Programs, Must Exchange Information with the Police.--Security hardware and procedures, police response, and insurance make up the three levels of protection available to all citizens. At the current time, very little exchange of personnel or information exists within these three areas of endeavor. It has been well documented by the Small Business Administration that insurance data and police data do not always compare favorably with each other, and there is evidence that some manufacturers of security hardware equipment do a better job of analyzing police resources as part of their marketing studies than the police departments do themselves. The insurance industry and security hardware manufacturers are in business purely because of the profit motive. The police, however, are in business to provide adequate levels of service to the community and should take a leadership role in coordinating the crime prevention efforts on all three levels of protection.

The National Crime Prevention Institute Training Program

The British home office has long recognized the role of police in crime prevention and over ten years ago established a school to train police officers in the techniques that would permit them to give sound advice to citizens regarding their own security (Home Office Crime

Prevention Training Center). Our program, as funded by LEAA, is based on the English model, and upon the completion of the training, an officer is expected to:

1. Understand the principles of crime prevention
2. Be familiar with current theories of community planning
3. Have obtained the basic skills required to conduct a premises survey and make valid recommendations regarding security devices
4. Be able to present a practical explanation of "risk management" to departmental personnel and to the general public
5. Have developed the skills required to evaluate security hardware and services offered in the community
6. Be familiar with the development of municipal security codes
7. Be familiar with proven methods of staging-public exhibitions and advertising campaigns relating to crime prevention
8. Understand the basic problems of public and private crime insurance
9. Gain an understanding of architectural design and its importance to crime prevention
10. Improve their ability to implement or advance a crime prevention program in the department and to generate community wide enthusiasm for crime prevention

While it is too early to measure the effectiveness of crime prevention bureaus that have been established since the implementation of our training program, we do believe that the training plus the implementation of a program by a police department will enable the

police and the public to work together more effectively than ever before. I believe that the police can provide the type of leadership in community crime prevention that will significantly reduce those crimes of opportunity that today plague both our business and residential communities.

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Adapted from material prepared by the Home Office Crime Prevention Training Centre, Stafford, England, courtesy of Detective Chief Inspector Ronald Dawson.

THE NATURE AND PATTERNING OF
RESIDENTIAL AND NON-RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES

Harry A. Scarr, Ph.D
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Introduction

Three agencies impose patterns on the environment of any area to produce the characteristic patterns of criminal behavior found there:

The offender, by taking advantage of existing opportunities and/or creating his own opportunities, commits crimes;

The citizen, by things he does or does not do, increases and/or decreases the probability that he will or will not become a victim of a particular crime.

The political jurisdiction--largely via its major law enforcement component, the police--attempts to counter the moves of the offender and support the moves of the citizen, in the never-ending interaction among these three elements of the patterning of criminal behavior.

If we consider the three agencies just cited, what we shall present in this report is a description of the crime of burglary from the perspective of the interaction of those three sets of forces. We will by no means be able to explain all the dynamics of the behavior underlying the creation of the patterns we find,

but we will at least be able to say what the patterning is and what it is not and make some practical suggestions of ways of interdicting it (1).

A Conceptual Orientation

By definition, burglary is a crime against a place, or against property, not against people; or, more appropriately, only against people indirectly. In other words, it is technically a structure that is "victimized," although in common usage we refer to the residents or owners of the structures as victims. Both from everyday observations of police personnel and from the informal reports of professional thieves, a burglar looks for likely places to hit in contrast to, say, a con-man, who looks for likely people to swindle. Thus, to a large extent, burglary is a crime of opportunity; this opportunity is reflected in the environment, both physical and social, in which the burglar moves. In order to know how this environment is constructed, we must eventually, of course, discover the perceptions of burglars as they practice their trade. However, in the absence of this information, we can learn a good deal about the characteristics of the objective opportunity structure of the physical and social environment by analyses of patternings of offenses. Regardless of this subjectivity, in approach, the pattern of an objective opportunity structure be analyzed with some meaning.


A burglary itself is behavior. More properly, burglarizing is the behavior of committing a burglary. Like all behavior, it

involves needs to be met, opportunities to meet them, perceptions of these opportunities, means to take advantage of such opportunities, satisfactions when needs are met, decisions about alternate routes to need-meeting, and the possibility of outside interference in the process. Thus, schematically, the following elements are necessary in any approach to burglary, as indeed they are for any form of motivated behavior: needs, opportunities, means, satisfactions, and choice. None of the elements are necessarily rationally conscious. This is presented schematically in Figure 1.

This approach contains the basic logic for the more elaborate cycle presented in Figure 2, specifically representing burglary. Though the order of the elements is not necessarily fixed, the elements themselves are all necessary to a full understanding of the crime itself. The elements are in the hypothetical cycle order of the figure:


- Needs that may be met through successful burglarizing.
- Perceived opportunities to burglarize.
- Burglary perceived as a path to meet needs.
- Knowledge of burglary technology.
- Choice of burglary over other paths.
- The burglary attempt, which succeeds in a complete cycle. Note that if it fails, the police and court systems come into play; and this single cycle, at least, is broken.
- Conversion of the burglarized goods into a useful form.
- Satisfaction for the act.
- Reinforcement of the whole cycle thus increasing the probability of its reoccurrence.

Figure 1 A General Behavior Cycle



These arrows represent "choices" made within each category as the cycle goes round and round. Thus, the NEED may be to get status (s), the OPPORTUNITY may be to publish in national periodicals (w), the MEANS may be one's writing skills (ws), the SATISFACTIONS may be expressions of approval from peers (p), which meet the original need and make likely the use of this "path" again because of its rewarding nature. Since each choice is largely independent of the others, criminal or noncriminal means may be used in the service of needs. The point of the approach may be broken at different points by different intervention modes, either by deflecting arrow (choice) paths or by changing the factors within elements.

Figure 2. The Burglary Cycle



Note especially that we have represented each element in a differentiated form, that is, at any point many more options are available than the one necessary to complete a burglary; and most of these options are neither burglary nor even criminal options. This data reflects the fact that non-criminal behavior cycles or partially criminal cycles are not different in kind from the particular criminal cycle we are focusing on. One important implication of this is that deflection at any point before the burglary attempt is one mode of preventing the occurrence of burglary.

Guided by this framework, three broad questions are the focus for our study of burglary:

1. What is a burglary like? (2)
2. How are burglaries distributed through space and time?
3. What social characteristics are correlated with the occurrence of burglaries?

The Setting For The Study

The three jurisdictions which provide the setting for this study are Fairfax County, Virginia, Washington, D. C., and Prince George's County, Maryland, (hereafter, FC, DC and PGC, respectively). The actual police departments (3), whose jurisdictions we are examining, are the Prince George's County Police Department (PGCPD), the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia (MPDC), and the Fairfax County Police Department (FCPD).

Fairfax County, Virginia:--Lying directly to the west of the District of Columbia, though separated from it by Arlington County and Alexandria City, FC is the wealthiest, least densely populated, whitest, freest from crime, and most lightly policed of the three jurisdictions under study. From 1940 through 1970, the population of the county has doubled each decade, making the county one of the fastest growing in the country. Though a good deal more homogeneous with respect to most social indicators than either DC or PGC, it has, nevertheless, some areas that are considerably less affluent than one might expect considering the county median family income.

The county is governed by a Board of Supervisors, all of whom are elected, who in turn appoint the county executive, who is the administrative head of government (4). The county police force consists of 396 men. Patrolling is done almost exclusively by automobile, for the obvious reason that the jurisdiction of the county police encompasses a largely suburban area. Fairfax City and Falls Church City are not part of the county, and therefore are not part of the police area of responsibility; the towns of Vienna and Herndon, though part of the county, are also not part of the county police area of responsibility. As noted above, the county is the most lightly policed of our three jurisdictions, as well as having the lowest crime rate per population. As for its burglary problem specifically, it has the lowest frequency and lowest residential rate of the three jurisdictions studied (5).

Washington, D. C.--In stark contrast to FC, DC is the poorest, most densely populated, blackest, most crime-ridden, and most heavily policed of our three jurisdictions. From 1960 to 1970, it is the only one of our three jurisdictions to suffer a net population decline. It is a rather heterogeneous urban area, encompassing within its borders at one and the same time extremes of slum and fashionable housing.

The District is controlled by the Federal government. Executive authority is vested in a single Commissioner called the "Mayor", an assistant to that commissioner, and a nine-member city council. All are appointed by the President. Its finances are controlled by Congress. It is, thus, a non-representatively governed jurisdiction. It is heavily policed but, in spite of this, suffered, at the time of the study data, from one of the highest overall crime rates of any urban area in the country. It has the largest residential burglary problem, in terms of both frequencies and rates, of the three jurisdictions under study here.

Prince George's County, Maryland.--Only the Potomac River shares a longer border with DC than does PGC. Lying directly east of Washington, the entire southeastern border and three-fourths of the northeastern border of the city touch the county. This geographical fact has implications for the future development of the county, as it has already had during the most recent decade when, experiencing the most rapid growth of our three jurisdictions, the emigration from the District to the nearer parts of PGC began to

affect the county's character. The county is, thus, in the process of attempting to cope all at once with (1) the development of a plethora of independent jurisdictions, (2) a full range of rural-suburban-urban problems, and (3) rapid growth.

The county contains eight cities and twenty towns. These incorporated areas contain 30.6 percent of the county's population. Partially in response to the changes that have been and are going on in the county, changes largely a function of the inexorable laws of demography, the government of the county has recently undergone severe change in structure. Prior to 1971, the county was governed by five commissioners, all of whom were elected, and who handled both administrative and legislative functions. Beginning in 1971, a county executive head is elected directly, while legislative functions are carried out by an 11-man elected county council. As the county adapts to this vigorously contested change, a good deal of upheaval and stress has occurred throughout the year. PGC stands between FC and DC in wealth, density, racial composition, criminality, burglary, and intensity of policing, though nationally the county is above average for suburban jurisdictions with respect to its overall crime rate.

Data and Data Sources

Police Reports.--The empirical description of the patterning of burglaries is based upon offense reports from the police departments in the jurisdictions chosen as our study sites for 1967, 1968, and 1969 (6). The number of offenses reported in police records is less

than the total number of offenses actually committed in a jurisdiction is a commonly accepted fact; non-reporting by victims, non-reporting by police, and police errors in classifying crimes are just some of the factors which contribute to the discrepancy. However, the degree of representation of the total offense population with regard to the recorded offenses is almost impossible to estimate. The fact remains that at this point in time police data is the best available information for a demographic analyses of crime patterning indeed, police provided information is almost the only data available of similar scope that is economically feasible to study.

Of the 85,292 events reported in the UCR, for FC, DC, and PGC for 1967, 1968, and 1969, we have available a total of 56,926 for our analyses. The following factors account for the major discrepancies between the two numbers:

1. The absence of police report information, coded and recorded on computer tape, in the MPDC, prior to February 1, 1968.
2. The use of all known offenses in FC and DC, but the use of a random sample of cases from PGC police report files, necessitated by the lack of a computerized data processing system in that jurisdiction.

Census Data.--By coding data according to census tract of occurrence we related burglary to social characteristics of "neighborhoods" (7). From the available data, a set of social characteristics are correlated with burglary statistics on a tract-to-tract basis after selecting those data, which we feel are most reliable.

Burglary Rates.--Though crime rates have generally been, and continue to be, computed as the number of crimes that occur in an area relative to the number of people residing in that area, it frequently has been pointed out (8) that a valid rate forms a probability statement, defining the actual likelihood of a crime occurring with respect to an appropriate target group of potential victims. For burglary, the most meaningful rate is stated in terms of the number of structures or units that are at risk.

To calculate a burglary rate in this manner, we must obtain an estimate of those units which are most likely to be burglarized. For the jurisdictions under study, estimates of the number of housing units are available and can be used as a valid base for calculating rates of residential burglaries. Unfortunately, we were unable to gain access to a similarly usable count of non-residential structural units. These data are simply not available for our jurisdictions in a form that is easily and immediately applicable to being transformed into the denominator of an expression for a non-residential burglary rate. Thus, raw frequency coupled with partial correlation techniques constitute our solution to the problem of the absence of a suitable non-residential denominator.

Social Correlates of Burglary

Table 1 presents, for FC, the mean values for the four burglary indicators and the thirteen census-tract based social indicators for the three years of the study. Several generalizations are apparent from this table. First, the average residential burglary rate across

census tracts (RBR) changed little over the three years. Second, although in 1967 the average frequency of residential and non-residential burglaries per tract was equal, since that time there has been a decline in the non-residential burglary frequency and an increase in the residential burglary frequency (12). Third, if we look for changes in the other social indicators of a similar magnitude, only housing and rental costs co-vary systematically over the three years, in both instances, increasing. The one other indicator, which might be thought to be predictive, moves in the "wrong" direction; i.e., the percentage overcrowded housing units declines.

Table 2 presents the intercorrelations among the four burglary indicators across census tracts for FC. The most interesting fact established in this table is the rather strong positive correlation over a 3 year period between the residential burglary frequency and the non-residential burglary frequency. A comparison with Tables 8 and 11 will quickly show that, while this is also the case in PGC, though dramatically less so in 1969 as compared to 1967 and 1968, it is definitely not the case in DC. Our explanation for the high correlation in one instance, and the low in another, revolves around the differences between land-use development in the urban DC and the suburban counties, FC and PGC. The existence of shopping centers throughout FC and PGC means that opportunities for both residential and non-residential burglaries will coexist in the same geographical areas to a similar degree. In DC, residential and non-residential land use is more likely to be geographically separated. Thus, to the degree that both residential non-residential burglary are a

Table 1

MEAN BURGLARY AND SOCIAL INDICATOR VALUES
ACROSS CENSUS TRACTS: FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA

	1967	1968	1969
Residential burglary rate	18.31	20.63	20.62
Residential Burglary frequency	40.56	52.85	53.23
Non-residential burglary frequency	40.51	39.97	34.23
Burglary total frequency	81.08	92.82	87.46
Population	9353.79	9842.64	10331.41
Percent white	94.87	94.85	94.92
Percent white, aged 5-24	20.18	18.69	17.46
Percent husband-wife households	89.28	88.87	88.56
Percent, aged 6-17	26.72	26.74	26.90
Percent rooming houses	1.00	1.00	1.00
Percent overcrowded	4.82	4.41	4.08
Percent black overcrowded	9.41	9.33	9.13
Percent black housing units	.79	.77	.77
Percent "lower" cost houses	58.41	55.95	53.28
Percent "lower" cost rentals	40.00	38.41	37.41
Percent owner occupied	64.67	64.13	63.54
Percent husband wife households with children under 18	73.03	72.95	73.08

Table 2. Intercorrelations Among Burglary Indicators:
Fairfax County, Virginia

	1967			1968			1969		
	RBF	NBF	BTF	RBF	NBF	BTF	RBF	NBF	BTF
1. Residential burglary rate	.16	-.09	.02	.41	-.12	.20	.27	-.17	.09
2. Residential burglary frequency		.66	.89		.66	.93		.63	.93
3. Non-residential burglary frequency			.93			.88			.87

T6

RBF = Residential burglary frequency

NBF = Non-residential burglary frequency

BTF = Burglary total frequency

function of opportunity, results such as ours for FC, and differences between FC and PGC and DC should be viewed in light of this correlation. That is, mixed use areas (such as suburbs) will present a problem of burglaries of all kinds for all geographic areas; more urban areas will result in segregated burglary patterns, by type (13).

Table 3 presents the correlations between the four burglary indicators for 1967, 1968, and 1969 for FC. There are simply no year-to-year replicated relationships between the one rate measure we are able to construct, and the social indicators derived from census tract data, in the county. In no instance is there significance in two years with respect to the same variable and the RBR. The three frequency indicators, however, show a different pattern; each of them is strongly correlated with census tract population. In addition, increased residential burglary frequency which is the most evident in the county, is associated during all three years with two other indicators which are also related to opportunity structure: the percent overcrowded housing, negative correlation, and the percent lower cost housing, negative correlation. Thus, again, we have another piece of evidence that the occurrence of burglary, on an absolute basis, is a function of the opportunities which exist. The greater the population the greater the number of burglaries. The most profitable way to think about burglary on a county-wide basis in FC is as a flat probability which is associated with population (and, by inference, structure) density alone.

Table 3. Correlations Between Burglary Indicators
and Social Indicators: Fairfax County, Virginia

	Residential Burglary Rate			Residential Burglary Frequency			Non-residential Burglary Frequency			Burglary Total Frequency		
	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969
Population	-.13	-.09	-.22	.74	.73	.73	.67	.73	.74	.77	.80	.81
Percent white	-.23	-.08	-.08	.01	-.10	.11	.00	.04	-.05	.01	.08	.04
Percent white aged 5-24	.18	-.08	-.03	.20	.09	.29	.04	-.02	.18	.12	.05	.27
Percent husband-wife households	.19	.09	.00	.13	.07	.01	-.35	-.11	-.28	-.15	-.01	-.12
Percent aged 6-17	-.28	.11	.04	.07	.21	.18	.09	.18	.11	.09	.22	.16
Percent rooming houses	.08	-.00	.34	-.123	-.18	.02	-.16	-.10	-.10	-.16	-.16	-.04
Percent overcrowded	.07	.05	.22	-.34	-.32	-.30	-.22	-.24	-.16	-.30	-.31	-.27
Percent black overcrowded	.27	.08	.02	.38	.23	.20	.18	.11	.07	.30	.19	.16
Percent black housing units	.16	.13	.42	.00	-.08	.06	.02	-.04	.02	.02	-.07	.05
Percent "lower" cost houses	-.13	-.27	-.06	-.31	-.31	-.31	-.04	-.15	.01	-.17	-.27	-.19
Percent "lower" cost rentals	.12	-.04	.07	-.22	-.24	-.29	-.18	-.16	-.13	-.22	-.22	-.25
Percent owner occupied	-.06	.16	.08	-.14	-.01	-.07	-.03	-.03	-.02	-.09	-.02	-.06
Percent husband-wife households with children under 18	-.49	-.15	-.17	.00	.09	.04	.10	.15	.02	.06	-.13	.04

Washington, D. C.

Table 4 presents the average values, across census tracts, for the four burglary indicators, and thirteen social indicators for the District of Columbia. To a lesser extent, as was the case with FC and PGC, the residential rate and frequency is increasing; while the non-residential frequency by tract is declining. Because we have data for only two time points in DC, we cannot infer trends which are in any sense compelling. Let us turn, therefore, immediately to the intercorrelations across tracts of the four burglary indicators and the thirteen social indicators.

From Table 5 we can see that unlike the two suburban jurisdictions, there is little relationship between residential and non-residential burglary frequencies in DC (14). Note further that, with this exception, all the indicators are more highly intercorrelated in DC than in either FC or PGC. This finding anticipates the general picture presented in Table 9, where the correlations of the indicators of burglary with the other census-derived indicators are presented. In general, all indicators are much more strongly related to tract characteristics in DC than in either FC or PGC, implying a very strong interaction between urban-ness of jurisdiction and the strength of the relationship between crime and social indicators (15). Thus, for all four indicators there is a relationship in both years between burglary and the percentage of whites, aged 5-24, percentage of husband-wife households, percent overcrowded, percent lower cost rentals, and

Table 4

MEAN BURGLARY AND SOCIAL INDICATOR VALUES
ACROSS CENSUS TRACTS: WASHINGTON, D. C.

	1960	1970
Residential burglary rate	36.53	53.85
Residential burglary frequency	73.28	106.53
Non-residential burglary frequency	38.85	34.48
Burglary total frequency	111.69	140.99
Population	6211.78	6210.10
Percent white	35.97	34.46
Percent white, aged 5-24	7.60	7.21
Percent husband-wife households	72.05	70.88
Percent, aged 6-17	17.15	17.35
Percent rooming houses	5.86	5.86
Percent overcrowded	11.87	11.91
Percent black overcrowded	69.45	70.25
Percent black housing units	17.27	17.60
Percent "lower" cost houses	54.56	51.69
Percent "lower" cost rentals	77.94	76.87
Percent owner occupied	27.75	28.29
Percent husband-wife households with children under 18	43.28	43.09

Table 5

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG BURGLARY INDICATORS: WASHINGTON, D. C.

	1968			1969		
	RBF	NBF	BTF	RBF	NBF	BTF
1. Residential burglary rate	.55	.30	.56	.51	.22	.54
2. Residential burglary frequency		.19	.80		.10	.91
3. Non-residential burglary frequency			.74			.51

96

RBF = Residential burglary frequency

NBF = Non-residential burglary frequency

BTF = Burglary total frequency

Table 6

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BURGLARY INDICATORS
AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: WASHINGTON, D. C.

	Residential Burglary Rate		Residential Burglary Frequency		Non-residential Burglary Frequency		Burglary Total Frequency	
	1968	1969	1968	1969	1968	1969	1968	1969
Population	-.09	-.06	.43	.46	-.12	-.18	.22	.32
Percent white	-.38	-.46	-.21	-.28	-.25	-.13	-.30	-.30
Percent white aged 5-24	-.33	-.38	-.17	-.20	-.28	-.19	-.29	-.25
Percent husband-wife households	-.62	-.66	-.29	-.31	-.35	-.25	-.41	-.37
Percent aged 6-17	.25	.39	-.01	.09	.04	-.06	.02	.06
Percent rooming houses	.33	.35	.09	.14	.36	.23	.28	.22
Percent overcrowded	.62	.63	.26	.29	.37	.30	.40	.38
Percent black overcrowded	.37	.47	.22	.28	.19	.08	.27	.28
Percent black housing units	-.14	.00	-.20	-.10	-.01	-.07	-.14	-.11
Percent "lower" cost houses	.43	.42	.25	.24	.24	.13	.31	.26
Percent "lower" cost rentals	.45	.46	.29	.29	.35	.31	.41	.38
Percent owner occupied	-.45	-.30	-.46	-.35	-.25	-.25	-.45	-.40
Percent husband-wife house- holds with children under 18	.16	.30	.03	.14	-.07	-.12	-.02	.07

percent owner-occupied housing. Furthermore, there is a relationship during both years for three out of the four indicators and a one year relationships for one out of the four indicators, between burglary and percent white, percent black overcrowded households, and percent lower cost houses. All of these relationships are in the expected directions; i.e., more burglary, or a higher rate of burglary and are associated with the less desirable end of a variable or with the presence of a higher proportion of the relatively more disadvantaged portion of the population.

Prince George's County, Maryland

Table 7 presents the mean values, across census tracts, for the by now familiar, set of variables. As noted before, for the area of the county with which we are concerned, the rate of residential burglary is increasing, while non-residential burglary is declining. With respect to direction of change of the other indicators, as well as these facts about burglary occurrences, the county characteristics resemble FC more closely than they do DC. Table 8 suggests that, with respect to land use, PGC more closely resembles FC than it does DC. In addition, one should recall that there is a larger portion of PGC which is not policed by the PGCPD than is the case with respect to FC and FCPD. Given the nature of the rapid change and growth of PGC, we would predict that the diminished correlation between residential burglary frequency and non-residential burglary frequency in 1969, as compared to 1967 and 1968, represents a real

Table 7

MEAN BURGLARY AND SOCIAL INDICATOR VALUES
ACROSS CENSUS TRACTS: PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

	1967	1968	1969
Residential burglary rate	23.08	28.95	31.41
Residential burglary frequency	25.20	26.85	28.25
Non-residential burglary frequency	13.92	11.40	11.45
Burglary total frequency	39.12	38.25	39.70
Population	8606.95	9154.35	9701.57
Percent white	79.72	79.10	78.27
Percent white, aged 5-24	22.50	21.72	20.85
Percent husband-wife households	88.97	88.30	87.67
Percent, aged 6-17	24.70	24.75	24.85
Percent rooming houses	1.77	1.77	1.77
Percent overcrowded	8.80	8.45	8.22
Percent black overcrowded	27.05	27.70	28.17
Percent black housing units	8.27	8.47	8.88
Percent "lower" cost houses	66.82	65.02	63.25
Percent "lower" cost rentals	62.42	61.02	59.72
Percent owner occupied	51.80	51.45	51.05
Percent husband-wife households with children under 18	68.50	68.47	68.57

Table 8

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG BURGLARY INDICATORS: PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

	1967			1968			1969		
	RBF	NBF	BTF	RBF	NBF	BTF	RBF	NBF	BTF
1. Residential burglary rate	.52	.11	.44	.52	.14	.45	.41	-.07	.32
2. Residential burglary frequency		.62	.97		.60	.97		.34	.95
3. Non-residential burglary frequency			.80			.78			.61

RBF = Residential burglary frequency

NBF = Non-residential burglary frequency

BTF = Burglary total frequency

trend; PGC is a unit that stands between FC and DC in its present structural characteristics and in the nature of the changes it is undergoing.

The residential burglary rate, in PGC, is negatively correlated with percent white, negatively correlated with percent husband-wife households, and positively correlated with percent black housing units (see Table 9). Residential burglary frequency, however, is positively correlated with percent white, aged 5-24, and with the total population. If one looks at Table 6, it can be noted that though the burglary rate is correlated with race in the same way in both DC and PGC, the correlation with percent white, aged 5-24, is the opposite in each of the jurisdictions. Our hypothesis to explain this anomaly is that the absolute number of crimes is a function of the population of the young age in an area, while the rate is a function of relative opportunity (16). Thus, in two jurisdictions with a preponderantly white population, whites commit most burglaries (see percent white 5-24 for FC and PGC) in an absolute sense, but the rate is higher in those areas with a high proportion of blacks simply because the areas in which blacks live offer more opportunity for committing the crime of burglary. In brief, the positive correlations between percent white, aged 5-24 and the burglary frequency indicators in PGC and FC are artifacts of the correlation between the burglary frequency indicators and the total population of the jurisdictions.

Table 9

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BURGLARY INDICATORS AND
SOCIAL INDICATORS: PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

	Residential Burglary Rate			Residential Burglary Frequency			Non-residential Burglary Frequency			Burglary Total Frequency		
	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969	1967	1968	1969
Population	.05	.14	-.15	.71	.79	.70	.75	.72	.53	.78	.84	.76
Percent white	-.30	-.44	-.63	.07	.06	-.01	.01	.18	.10	.06	.10	.02
Percent white aged 5-24	.08	.17	.03	.43	.46	.46	.23	.19	-.02	.40	.42	.38
Percent husband-wife households	-.34	-.28	-.46	-.01	.09	.01	.08	.23	.11	.02	.14	.04
Percent aged 6-17	-.19	.00	-.11	-.15	.02	-.14	.12	.16	.04	-.08	.06	-.10
Percent rooming houses	-.01	-.04	.16	-.08	-.16	.02	-.17	-.19	-.00	-.11	-.19	.01
Percent overcrowded	.09	.19	.43	-.24	-.18	-.12	-.09	-.23	-.19	-.21	-.21	-.16
Percent black overcrowded	.15	.40	.50	-.16	-.07	-.05	.04	-.13	-.11	-.11	-.10	-.08
Percent black housing units	.29	.40	.60	-.06	-.04	.04	.04	-.16	-.05	-.04	-.08	.02
Percent "lower" cost houses	.39	.03	.30	-.10	-.29	-.24	-.46	-.42	-.28	-.22	-.36	-.29
Percent "lower" cost rentals	.20	.25	.60	-.24	-.25	-.14	-.28	-.36	-.26	-.28	-.31	-.20
Percent owner occupied	-.21	-.16	-.28	-.25	-.15	-.28	.03	.15	.10	-.18	-.07	-.20
Percent husband-wife house- holds with children under 18	-.05	.04	-.05	.06	.06	.03	.03	.07	-.00	.05	.07	-.02

Conclusions

The ultimate goal of this research is the interdiction of the burglary cycle, by taking action which is based, to the greatest degree possible, on whatever we discover to be the empirics of the situation. If we return now to the conceptual orientation presented earlier, it becomes immediately apparent that our results are directly related to only a limited portion of the cycle of behavior involved in the events surrounding a burglary. In brief, we have detailed a series of findings which are relevant to interdicting the opportunities in the environment in which a burglar operates.

To facilitate the statement of particular recommendations, which we hypothesize to be potentially effective in reducing the occurrence of burglaries on the basis of findings from the completion of this first task of our study, it will be well to now state our findings in a declarative, simplified, and essential form. Each generalization we have drawn from the analysis of our data falls somewhere between a fact and a hypothesis. While there is evidence in our data to support the statements to varying degrees, it is quite obvious that they cannot be considered completely validated propositions. However, since it remains true that actions must always be based on less than perfect information, we cannot refuse to take predictive risks simply because our data are less than perfect. Here follow, then, our major empirical generalizations.

The Nature of Burglaries (17)

- Residential burglaries occur more frequently than non-residential burglaries.
- Residential burglaries, relative to non-residential burglaries, are increasing in frequency.
- Easily movable and easily convertible-into-money goods are the preponderance of stolen items; specifically, home entertainment equipment, and money itself.
- Most burglaries involve the theft of goods of moderate value.

Specifically, in our suburban jurisdictions, two-thirds of all burglaries involved the theft of items worth, in each instance, less than \$500.

- Burglarized units are usually entered via a door or window.
- Urban burglaries involved forced entry relatively more often than suburban burglaries.
- Burglary frequencies do not vary systematically by month or by season.
- Non-residential burglaries are likely to occur at night and on weekends.
- Residential burglaries are likely to occur during the day on weekdays.

Patterning of Burglaries

- Residential burglary rates tend to be geographically stable in urban areas.
- Residential burglary rates tend to be geographically unstable in suburban areas undergoing rapid population growth.

- Non-residential burglary frequencies tend to be geographically stable in both urban and suburban areas.
- Frequencies of residential and non-residential burglaries are more highly correlated, geographically, in suburban than in urban areas.

Correlates of Burglaries

- Burglary frequencies are strongly correlated with population size in suburban areas, but not in urban areas.
- Burglary rates and burglary frequencies are highly correlated with a variety of social structural characteristics in urban areas, and correlated with few such characteristics in suburban areas.

Specifically, in our urban jurisdiction, burglary rates and frequencies are strongly positively correlated with:

- percent overcrowded housing units
- percent lower cost rental units
- percent black overcrowded housing units
- percent lower-cost housing units

and strongly negatively correlated with:

- percent white population
- percent white population, aged 5-24
- percent husband-wife households
- percent owner-occupied housing units

Recommendations

Recommendations flowing from these correlation results relate to the opportunity structure of a neighborhood or of a particular site, or to the conversion of stolen goods. In some instances, they are appropriate responses for the criminal justice system; in other instances, they hold implications for the private citizen. In either case, an attempt has been made to be concrete, pointed, and specific.

Citizen Responses.--The most important recommendation that we can make is that the ordinary citizen realize that, through a series of simple, straightforward acts, he can affect the likelihood of his being burglarized. Our evidence indicates that a substantial number of burglaries is the product of citizen carelessness, providing an easy opportunity for a thief. Our prediction is that simple acts, because they affect characteristics with a high frequency among burglary offenses, could have a marked effect on counter-acting the completion of such offenses, if widely utilized.

The citizen can diminish the perceived opportunity to burglarize, by being sure that:

- Residential premises always appear to be occupied, particularly during the day and on weekends.
- Non-residential premises always appear to be occupied (or under surveillance), particularly during nights and on weekends.

The citizen can counteract most simpler, but more prevalent, forms of burglary technology by:

- Securing his premises, particularly during his absences, by such acts as:
 - Bolt-locking doors and windows.
 - Extensive lighting about the outside.

The citizen can interfere with the ease of conversion of burglarized goods by:

- Engraved identification on home entertainment equipment, or other easily pawned, portable, possessions.
- Keeping no more cash or convertible securities than is absolutely essential on his premises.

Police Responses.--By encouraging citizens to take simple precautions of the kinds we have recommended, the police can reduce the frequency of burglaries, thus enabling their own efforts to be concentrated on the substantially fewer, and--presumably-- more skillfull executed, offenses. This is the most important recommendation we can make to police departments at the moment. Success at encouraging simple citizen preventive efforts will have a multiplier effect of substantial magnitude in affecting how thinly police, and other criminal justice system personnel as well, must spread themselves.

In many instances, what we have just said is "obvious." However, it may be well to consider such "obviousness" from the standpoint of Lazarsfeld's incisive comments in his review of The American Soldier, viz,

If we had mentioned the actual results of the investigation first [rather than results which looked reasonable though, in fact, they were completely false and contrary to the actual results of the studies], the reader would have labelled these "obvious" also. Obviously, something is wrong with the entire argument of "obviousness." It should really be turned on its head. Since every kind of human reaction is conceivable, it is of great importance to know which reactions actually occur most frequently and under what conditions; only then will a more advanced social science develop (Lazarsfeld, 1949).

And, we might add, a truly more useful one, as well.

NOTES

1. This is a condensed version of the report of the research supported by NILE-CJ grants NI 70-064 and NI 72-002-G. Though it differs principally in emphasis from the fuller report, the interested reader should consult that for questions of detail. Harry A. Scarr, Patterns of Burglary. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, forthcoming.
2. In the concluding section of this article, we summarize the results of our analysis of the characteristics of burglaries, other than their distribution and social correlates. Space precludes inclusion of the empirical support for these generalizations. The interested reader is referred to Patterns of Burglary for details.
3. The particular department is of some moment since, in the case of Prince George's County, there are a total of 21 additional police presences within the County boundaries; and, in the case of Fairfax County, there are two other police departments whose jurisdictions lie within the overall county boundaries and who are completely surrounded by areas whose policing agency is the Fairfax County Police Department.
4. The county publishes each year a booklet entitled The Citizen's Handbook. The interested reader can pursue a more detailed anthropological description of the county by reading it. Though intrinsically interesting, especially to a Civil War buff, most of the material is not directly relevant to our study.
5. As will be noted later, it is not yet possible to calculate non-residential burglary rates for our sites under study. Another study has indicated that, nationally, non-residential burglary rates are higher in central cities than they are in suburban location (Reiss, 1969, p. 75).
6. In all three jurisdictions, burglary is the single largest category of crime, although its percentage varies somewhat from one site to another.

7. There was available, from the 1970 Census, at the time this report was prepared, first count and some second count data. The task of interpolation of values from 1960 census data to 1970 census data was carried out by Census Data Corporation. Under subcontract to HSR, CDC--and most specifically, Dr. George B. Bricker--was responsible for the programs necessary to convert 1970 data to 1960 boundaries, interpolate values for all characteristics used, and produce relevant percentages. The greatest difficulty was obtaining 1960 data, on tape, in order that interpolations might be made. Though it is hindsight, and though Wolfgang (1958) was one of the first to anticipate the following solution to the nastiness of interpolation, we strongly recommend that longitudinal studies, as a matter of police, "turn the corner" around census years. From our experience, the extra effort involved in working with any other time year consumes time more profitably spent on other aspects of offense patterning.
8. Stuart Lottier, who calculated burglary rates of chain grocery stores in Michigan, using the total number of grocery stores in the chain as the base for his rates, is one of the earliest examples of a recognition of the rate base problem (Lottier, 1938a). More recently, this method has been applied by S. L. Boggs (1966), Albert J. Reiss (1967), Andre Normandeau (1968), Sagi and Wellford (1968), among others in addition to ourselves.
9. Burglary rates are computed, for residential burglaries, as the number of burglaries of residences per 1,000 residential units (i.e., family dwelling space, such as a house, apartment, or room) for each census tract.
10. All discussions of burglary in the District of Columbia Metropolitan area must, at some point, come to grips with the influence during this time period of the "beltway gang," a notorious and purportedly very successful band of thieves who operated close to the circular autobahn surrounding Washington. It is our intent, as the study continues, to try to assess the extent to which this names, notorious, and known entity actually affected the statistics for the whole area. (For information on the gang, see Anthony Sterago, 1968). In the absence of hard data about the extent of their activities, we are assuming that gang members had no untoward effect on indicators at the census tract level. This is the only hypothesis which makes sense in the face of the widely differing opinions about the extent of this gang's operations on the part of equally knowledgeable criminal justice personnel.

11. This implies, by the way, that police personnel in all areas of a "suburb" must be able to cope with all kinds of burglaries. Segregated use areas, on the other hand, imply the possibility of relatively more specialization on the part of police personnel in coping with fewer kinds of burglaries for any given geographical area. A simple point, perhaps, but one that does have implications for practical matters like police staffing at substations, etc.
12. Similar results were obtained by Boggs in St. Louis in her correlations among different kinds of burglary rates (Boggs, 1964, p. 63).
13. Boggs found that, in the city of St. Louis, both residential and non-residential burglary rates were significantly and positively correlated with "minority group status," a dimension composed of percentage Negro and a fertility ratio (Boggs, 1964, pp. 72-74). Schmid, in a study using 1949-51 burglary rates (calculated on the basis of population), showed that in Seattle, non-residential burglary was correlated positively with percent male, percent 60 years and over, percent unemployed, and negatively with percent married and median income (Schmid, 1960, p. 673). In Atlanta, it was shown that family median income was negatively associated with the burglary rate based on population (Atlanta Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency, 1966; Appendix B-1, p. 15). In Chicago, the burglary rate per 100,000 population was positively correlated with percent non-white, density, and percent migrant. The rate was negatively correlated with median family income, percent owner occupied, median rent, value of owner-occupied homes, and with percent foreign born (Giertz, 1970, p. 28).
14. The issue of the relationship between burglary rates and burglar rates has been dealt with by Boggs. She found, in St. Louis, a significant correlation between burglar rates and residential burglary rates. The correlation between burglar rates and non-residential burglary rates was found to be insignificant. She concluded that residential burglaries were crimes of opportunity (Boggs, 1964, pp. 65-68).
15. The data supporting this set of generalizations are presented in Patterns of Burglary. Space precluded including those data in this article.

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THE SEARCH FOR SAFETY--A DUAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Introduction

Thousands of years ago in ancient Greece, a philosopher was asked to describe the hallmarks of a civilized society. Paramount in his answer was the concept that no society or group of people could consider themselves civilized until a crime which was committed against an individual citizen aggrieved the entire community. There can be no question that America has reached this stage in its development as a civilization. The question now, however, is whether this community concern is enough or must we do more in order to warrant consideration as a truly civilized society.

Crime can no longer be considered the exclusive province of the police. Crime is too pervasive; it strikes at all of us. Every home feels the effects of rising crime. The effects can be either direct, as in the case of the actual victim, or indirect in the form of increased insurance premiums, difficulty in obtaining crime-related insurance, and the higher taxes which pay for increased police protection.

Looking back to medieval England before the rise of organized police forces, the prevention of crime and the apprehension of law-breakers were considered a communal concern. The night watch was a duty that was apportioned among the townspeople. The hue and cry were raised when a criminal was being pursued and every able-bodied man, and very often the women too, joined in the chase. It was only with the passage of time that the citizen began to remove himself from the police role and leave law enforcement to the professional.

While no responsible official or private citizen is urging the dissolution of organized police forces or a total return to community policing, all are agreed that there must be a greater citizen input into crime prevention. The task of providing a vehicle and guidance for this civilian participation falls logically to the police agencies and their administrators. The alternative to meeting this challenge is either a complete loss of citizen confidence in the police or the rise of vigilante-type organizations.

When we discuss responsibility in this context, we must bear in mind that it is a dual responsibility. The police must accept their traditional role and the public, the individual community member, must recognize and shoulder his responsibility and work in tandem with his police.

As we look across the nation, there is certainly no shortage of viable examples of police and citizens joining together in a common cause against crime. In New York City, we pride ourselves that we have provided channels of involvement for every citizen. We can

accommodate the man or woman who wants an active role in uniform, and we have ample room for the citizen who chooses to serve in a less visible, less active capacity. We have recognized these companion responsibilities and have undertaken dramatic efforts to reduce crime. Our efforts have paid high dividends in just a few months. The year-end review for 1971 shows that overall serious crime had decreased approximately 1.9 percent. The statistics released for February show that serious crime has been reduced by over thirty (30%) percent. Most significant, however, is that robbery, one of the department's major concerns, was down 36.1 percent. This reduction is a continuation of a trend started last year when the department began a concentrated drive against street crime.

City-wide Anti-crime Unit

A substantial part of the credit for this recession in violent crime must go to our City-wide Anti-crime program, established by Police Commissioner Murphy late in 1971. The presence of a uniformed police officer has always been considered a vital factor in deterring crime. Even when successful, a criminal is only frustrated in his immediate goal of committing a crime. He will usually move on to another area or select another victim. We must ask ourselves whether this is a desirable result. Commissioner Murphy decided that a more positive outcome was necessary so the City-wide Anti-crime unit was established. Over two hundred men and women, all volunteers out of uniform, are now assigned to high-crime areas of the city at various hours. Simply to

say that they are working in civilian clothes would be misleading. These officers are on the street posing as the average citizen--in short, offering themselves as potential victims in place of the civilian. We have witnessed our men making arrests dressed as window washers, hot dog vendors, and Hassidic Rabbis. They have posed as blind mendicants, prostitutes, and ice cream men; all is done in an effort to put a stop to street muggings and robberies. The current statistics are ample proof of the success of this anti-crime effort. In addition to the city-wide unit, each of our seventy-three patrol precincts now has five (5%) percent of its allotted manpower assigned to civilian clothes anti-crime work. The efforts of these local units are being coordinated through the city-wide unit.

Citizen Involvement

The anti-crime units and other innovative programs are only one side of this dual approach to crime prevention that we are seeking. We must still achieve equal involvement on the part of the citizen. Every person has his own idea of what he wants to do in the fight against crime. We cannot expect every public-spirited citizen to be willing to put on a uniform and patrol the streets as an auxiliary police officer, but neither can we ignore his desire to serve in some other capacity.

Beyond a doubt, the Auxiliary Police Force is the backbone and mainstay of the New York City Police Department's citizen involvement efforts. The concept of an Auxiliary Police Force is by no means a

new idea in New York City. We saw civilians volunteering to supplement the police force during the First and Second world wars. The present auxiliary structure is an outgrowth of the civil defense impetus of the 1950's. Originally trained to augment police services in the event of a disaster, they have become a vital part of the police-citizen team.

Presently, over 3,500 men and women are actively serving as Auxiliary Police Officers, with an additional 900 officers in training. During 1971 alone, these volunteers performed approximately 268,000 hours of patrol. In keeping with the current re-thinking about the role of women in police work, we have recently assigned several auxiliary policewomen to actual street patrol and have found highly favorable public reaction to this novel experiment.

The public-spirited citizens who volunteer to spend four hours a week on patrol undertake an intensive forty hour primary level training course which includes the law of arrest, use of force, crowd control, first aid, police tactics, and law. The instruction is given over a period of ten weeks and is a mandatory prerequisite before a person can begin any patrol duties. Advance training programs are available for auxiliaries wishing to qualify for promotion.

In the beginning of this year, the New York City Police Department was the recipient of a grant under the provisions of the Safe Streets Act for the express purpose of strengthening the Auxiliary Police and increasing minority inner-city representation among the

ranks of the auxiliaries. In keeping with this design, we now offer our forty-hour auxiliary police training course in Spanish as well as English, thus eliminating any language barrier that might have prevented members of the Hispanic community from volunteering their services.

The Auxiliary Police Force does not represent the Police Department's sole thrust in the twin areas of encouraging private citizens to take an active role against crime and providing those citizens with a viable course of action. The department learned that an enormous number of citizens, compared to the size of the formal Auxiliary Police, were actively engaged in various self-protection activities within their communities. These activities involve many strategies including actual patrol--both on the street and in the vestibules and hallways of large apartment buildings, the establishment of "security desks" at the entrance to said dwellings so as to screen out potential muggers, burglars, and the like, and activities involving surveillance of a given location from the volunteer's window. The latter method enables elderly people and shut-ins to actively contribute to the safety of their neighborhood without calling upon them to perform the vigorous work of actual patrol.

These civilians, although displaying the same high level of motivation that is characteristic of the Auxiliary Policeman, declined to join that organization for a variety of reasons. Data are scant apropos of these reasons. In the main, however, they seemed to revolve

around the questions of physical qualification, a reluctance to don the regulation police uniform, an inability to find the available time to undergo the Auxiliaries' vigorous training course, and uncertainty as to the location(s) where they might be called upon to patrol.

A survey by my office disclosed that there were approximately 150 neighborhood civilian patrols operating in New York City. Many of these patrols were employing walkie-talkie devices as a patrol aid. A new unit was established as part of the Auxiliary Forces Section of the New York City Police Department, in order to bring these concerned citizens into closer cooperation and coordination with the Police Department. Because of the widespread use of walkie-talkie radios, we designated this unit the Auxiliary Communications Force of the Auxiliary Police Section.

The potential impact of these groups is very great and could easily encompass thousands of concerned volunteers. To-date, my office has identified 175 existing civilian self-protection groups throughout the city. At least 12 of these have been organized by my office, representing 418 volunteers. We have assisted 16 of the existing groups which were having difficulties, by increasing their membership and coordination with local precincts. We have undertaken to equip each volunteer with an identification card, some training, and a book of guidelines to be adhered to, in order to remain associated with the Police Department.

The civilian patrol groups have attracted the attention of the media and have generated Congressional and State legislative interest. Congressman Jonathan Bingham, of the Bronx, and State Senator Steve Kraft have introduced similar bills in their respective legislative bodies, which would supply funding for the purchase of walkie-talkies and other communication equipment.

I have publicly supported this legislation, although there are provisions within that I would prefer to see modified.

Our Communications Division people have located five unused radio channels and have obtained a firm commitment from the Federal Communication Commission to assign these channels to the New York City Police Department. We plan to utilize these channels for the exclusive use of the Citizen's Patrol Units in New York City.

Our department has prepared a Safe Street Act funding request that will enable us to supply each of the 73 precincts with a dozen walkie-talkies and a base station. Mayor Lindsay and Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy support this effort. The Mayor has promised to find means of supplying local funding if LEAA funds are unavailable.

The continuing and expanding role played by community patrols, auxiliary police, and others interested in crime prevention programs depends largely upon the active role taken by police at all levels. We must be responsive to the needs of the public and express approbation of a community's willingness to share the responsibility for the safety of its streets.

We cannot, however, limit our responses solely to those groups seeking active participation in community protection. We must encourage and maintain the interest of the entire citizenry. To this end, the New York City Police Department has made extensive use of its Precinct Community Councils. These councils, which operate in each of our seventy-three precincts, are made up of residents, businessmen, and religious leaders of the area. Each month they meet with the police officials of that precinct and work on solutions to problems of mutual concern.

The councils, in addition to providing a valuable link with the community, create a two-way communications flow regarding crime and general street conditions. Often, fear on the part of the public for its safety from crime is based on rumor and misinformation which can be dispelled by dissemination of factual information through the Precinct Community Councils.

We have attempted to keep this factual information of a practical nature. To deal with a rising burglary rate, we have devised two programs in which local citizens can become involved. One is the Premises Security Program, and the other is a Property Identification Program.

One officer in each precinct of the city in which there are residential or business establishments has been designated the Premises Security Officer. After a period of training, this officer

conducts continuing security surveys upon the premises of local business establishments and residences. The occupants are advised of the security weaknesses in their premises. Remedial procedures and devices are recommended to cure identified weaknesses. The officer addresses the Precinct Community Council meetings to ensure that his services become widely known.

In conjunction with this program, we have recently designed a Property Identification Program to be operated by our Precinct Community Councils. The idea is a simple one which has been employed in many small communities. New York City is so vast that it was necessary to find a special design which would work in a large city. What we have developed is a program which envisions the purchase of ten etching machines for each precinct in the city. Each family in the precinct is solicited and encouraged to borrow the machines for up to three days, during which they mark all of the property in their residences or business most likely to be stolen by burglars. In order to localize the project, we are requiring that the property be marked with the number of the precinct in which the residence is located, followed by a dash and the social security number of the head of the household. The citizen then fills out a simple index card identifying the property marked. He delivers this card to his precinct station or visiting patrolman, who will cause it to be filed by social security number in the local precinct and centrally by computer. The cooperating household receives a decal to be affixed to his premises,

which announces that all valuables therein have been marked and registered with the police department. It is expected that marking the property in this manner will (1) discourage thefts; (2) aid in property recovery; (3) decrease the likelihood of resale of stolen property; (4) assist in the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of criminals. All costs of the marking kits (approximately \$21 per kit) will be borne by the Precinct Community Councils to insure their continuing interest in the program.

A basic misunderstanding of the police role and function can be as divisive as any rumor. In attempting to eradicate this type of confusion, there is no substitute for the personal face-to-face explanation. During the late 1960's, in a search for increased police mobility and shortened response time, we moved away from the familiar foot patrolman. This is not to say that we have abandoned the concept of having a visible available police officer out of a patrol car. We have, in fact, instituted programs which combine the best of both systems.

The Neighborhood Police Team program was designed to improve understanding between the police and their community. By assigning a sergeant and a team of patrolmen to a fixed area on a continuing basis, the New York City Police Department has acknowledged that police service can be significantly improved if residents and business people in that area become personally familiar with their police.

The team commander has extensive flexibility in the use of his men. He is encouraged to provide for as much police-citizen contact as possible through the assignment of men to foot patrol and the use of

techniques such as "ride and walk." The sergeant and a portion of his team attend community meetings, meeting their public, discussing crime and related problems, offering advice, and listening to problems. Through the introduction of Neighborhood Police Teams, the officers involved have become an integral and personalized part of the community. A logical extension of the Neighborhood Police Team experiment, which would even further integrate the police into the community, would be the assignment of police officers to work in their own communities. While this idea runs contrary to established police tradition, Police Commissioner Murphy has inaugurated a pilot program to test the validity of such "Resident Patrolmen."

Six officers have been assigned to duty in their resident precincts under the supervision and guidance of the Neighborhood Police Team commander. Special telephone numbers have been established at the station houses to make it easier for community residents to reach the officers. During their tour of duty, the men wear an informal uniform, grey slacks, and dark blazer jackets with the department crest on the breast pocket. We have encouraged these men to become actively involved in community projects and concerns. We urge the resident patrolmen to make themselves available to their neighbors, providing a direct liaison between the citizen and the station house.

From this overview of the current efforts in New York City, we see the many diverse persons and thoughts that go into creating a viable, cooperative effort between the police and the public. If the

police are responsive to community needs, provide methodology and guidance for citizen participation, and aggressively and progressively perform their function under law; then, we will see the police and the public as true partners against crime.