Crime Trends and
Crime Prevention Strategies

United States Discussion Paper
for the Sixth United Nations Congress
on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders
Crime Trends and Crime Prevention Strategies


Prepared by
National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice
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The opinions and views expressed in the paper are those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The 20th century has been a period of unparalleled social change in many countries. Industrialization—with its rapid economic growth and technological development—and the concentration of the population in large metropolitan centers have greatly altered the social fabric of the developed nations. Stable families, interdependent social networks, and shared values that typified small towns and rural communities of earlier times have given way to mobile, independent, impersonal lifestyles and value systems more appropriate to competitive urban industrial societies. This shift already has happened in the industrial nations. Similar changes are beginning to occur in the developing nations as they become industrialized.

Although these societal transitions have brought many physical, social, economic and intellectual benefits, they also have been accompanied by the negative consequences of rapid social change: increased social disorganization, conflict, and crime. As the United States' 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals pointed out, "Every serious study of crime has noted the association between fluctuations in crime rates and changes in population, social values, and economic conditions."

As a major urban industrialized nation, the United States has experienced a significant growth in crime during this century. In recent decades, crime has come to be recognized
as a serious national problem, with increases in crime rates reported by all major U.S. cities. From 1960 through 1978, for example, the rate of reported serious crimes (homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary) rose an average of 250 percent nationwide, and public fear and concern have grown accordingly.

In response to escalating crime and fear the U.S. Congress in 1968 enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which authorized a Federal program of financial and technical assistance and research to help states and localities control crime. In 1979, that legislation was amended and expanded with the passage of the Justice System Improvement Act, whose preamble notes our continuing national concern about crime: "Congress finds and declares that the high incidence of crime in the United States is detrimental to the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens ... the future welfare of the Nation and the well-being of its citizens depend on the establishment and maintenance of viable and effective justice systems which require ... systematic and sustained action by Federal, State, and local governments ...."

During the past 15 years, the United States has devoted substantial attention as well as public and private resources to combating crime. Research and development has yielded improved methods of crime measurement and data-collection, increased knowledge and understanding
of the nature and patterns of specific types of crimes, and alternative strategies of prevention and control. Management studies have produced techniques for improving the efficiency, effectiveness and fairness of the criminal justice system—arrest and investigation, prosecution and adjudication, and correctional and other treatment for offenders. Demonstration and action programs have contributed new strategies for preventing crime, many of which depend on community participation and citizen involvement for success.

This paper describes some findings and recent developments in crime prevention in the United States. The information should be relevant not only to industrialized nations with serious crime problems but also to developing nations likely to experience similar crime problems in the future as they more toward urban, industrialized societies.

The paper reviews four topics: Section II discusses current U.S. crime patterns and trends; it highlights problems in measuring U.S. crime and recent methodological developments. Section III presents three major perspectives on crime and crime prevention now prevalent in the U.S. Because the report focuses on crime prevention, it excludes crime control strategies such as police investigation, court processing, and treatment of offenders. Section IV discusses some issues relating to Federal crime prevention planning and coordination,
and presents case studies of several national programs now under way in the United States. Section V concludes the discussion with a brief overview of the future directions in the Nation's general approach to crime prevention.
Section I. Footnotes


II. INCIDENCE RATES, PATTERNS, AND RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. CRIME

A. Principal Measures of U.S. Crime: Victimization and Reported Crime

The United States has two primary methods of measuring crime. The newly-developed National Crime Survey (NCS) collects data from crime victims. The survey is conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The more traditional Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), is based on reports from state and local police departments collected by the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At the time of the Fifth U.N. Congress in 1975, the NCS, in operation for less than two years, had not collected victimization data for a period sufficient to gauge crime trends, patterns, or changes over time. Hence, much of the U.S. report at the Fifth Congress was based on official UCR measures of reported crime. Because crime victimization data are now available for the period 1973-1978—long enough to measure trends and changes over time—both victimization and reported crime are included in this paper.

The following sections describe the NCS and UCR methods and the relationship between victimization rates and reported crime rates, and discuss current United States crime rates, patterns, and trends, as measured by the two systems.
1. **Comparison of Victimization and Reported Crime**

Data from the Census Bureau's *National Crime Survey* are derived from personal interviews with a representative national sample of individuals in approximately 60,000 households.* The survey focuses on crimes that victims are able and willing to report to interviewers. Crimes against individuals (rape, robbery, assault, and personal larceny) and against households (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft) are covered. Murder and kidnapping are excluded, as are commercial crimes and so-called victimless crimes, such as drunkenness, drug abuse, or prostitution. Also excluded are acts which victim may not know are criminal such as buying stolen property, and crimes in which the victim willingly participates, such as gambling.

In addition to revealing victimization rates for the crimes covered, the *National Crime Survey* provides valuable information on other features of the crime as well. For example, it profiles victims and indicates the relative risk of being victimized for certain sectors of society. The survey also reveals whether multiple victims and offenders were involved, and reports on the type of weapon used. Some data on costs of crime, such as the injury or economic loss sustained by the victim, also are presented, as are facts about the crime setting—time and location, for example.

* *The sampling and survey methodologies for the Survey were developed over several years to establish maximum levels of statistical validity and reliability.*
Unlike the Victimization Survey, which includes crimes brought to official attention as well as those that are not, the FBI's annual Uniform Crime Report covers only those crimes officially reported to law enforcement agencies. UCR data are derived from statistics submitted by most United States police departments on the total number of serious personal (violent) and property crimes reported to them during the previous quarter. Hence, the UCR measurements are more a reflection of criminal justice activity than of the total number of crimes or victimizations.

There are other differences between the two measurement systems. Scope of coverage is one. The Survey, for example, covers personal crimes against individuals aged 12 and older, while police statistics include victims of all ages. In addition, the Survey does not measure some offenses (such as homicide, kidnapping, white collar crimes, and crimes against commercial establishments) that are included in police statistics. Even crimes that are covered by both systems are not completely comparable, however, because counting and classifying rules for the two programs are not fully compatible. Crime rates developed by the two systems also differ. Rates developed from police statistics are based on crime "incidents." Those generated by the Survey are based on victimization: specific criminal acts affecting single victims. For crimes against persons, therefore, the number of victimizations is somewhat greater than the number
of incidents, because some crimes are committed simul-
taneously against more than one victim.

Differences in methodology and coverage between the National
Crime Survey and the Uniform Crime Reports make it difficult
to directly compare victimization and reported crime. Each
system has particular advantages and utility. Victimization
rates are generally more effective in calculating national
statistics on major types of personal and property crimes
(excluding homicide); in determining trends in these crimes;
and in comparing crime rates and patterns by setting (urban/
rural), by type of victim, and by other features of the
crime or setting. Reported crime rates are useful to
policymakers and government planners who must determine
criminal justice system needs, allocate funds and resources,
develop crime control strategies and programs, and enact
legislation.

a. Overview of Rates and Trends

According to the National Crime Survey (NCS) an estimated 40.4 million victimizations (including attempted offenses) occurred in the United States in 1978. Rape, personal robbery, and assault are the most serious of the offenses measured because they involve confrontation between victim and offender and the threat or act of violence. These serious crimes made up 15 percent of the total. Larceny—the least serious—accounted for a majority of the total U.S. crime (65 percent). The remaining 20 percent included motor vehicle thefts and household burglaries.

As Tables 1 and 2 (on pages 11 and 12) show, most major categories of crime registered changes between 1973 through 1978, the 6 years for which NCS data have been collected. Assault, personal larceny without contact, and household larceny registered higher victimization rates in 1978 than in 1973. Robbery, household burglary, and motor vehicle theft were lower in 1978, although the decline for motor vehicle theft was not conclusive. In general, these trends persisted throughout the period. The exceptions were household larceny, which despite an overall increase for the entire period, declined since 1975, and motor vehicle theft, which exhibited no clear trend. Personal larceny (with contact) and rape, the two crimes with the fewest victimizations, did not change from 1973 to 1978.
Table 1 below presents numbers and rates of victimization by type of crime for 1973-1978, while Table 2 compares the yearly changes in these rates. The following sections examine trends for specific types of crime.

Table 1. Personal and household crimes: Number of victimizations and victimization rates, by type of crime, 1973-78.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>5,351,000</td>
<td>5,510,000</td>
<td>5,573,000</td>
<td>5,599,000</td>
<td>5,902,000</td>
<td>5,941,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rate</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,108,000</td>
<td>1,199,000</td>
<td>1,147,000</td>
<td>1,111,000</td>
<td>1,083,000</td>
<td>1,038,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>4,087,000</td>
<td>4,148,000</td>
<td>4,272,000</td>
<td>4,344,000</td>
<td>4,664,000</td>
<td>4,732,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,655,000</td>
<td>1,735,000</td>
<td>1,631,000</td>
<td>1,695,000</td>
<td>1,738,000</td>
<td>1,708,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>2,432,000</td>
<td>2,413,000</td>
<td>2,641,000</td>
<td>2,648,000</td>
<td>2,926,000</td>
<td>3,024,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes of theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>14,971,000</td>
<td>15,889,000</td>
<td>16,294,000</td>
<td>16,519,000</td>
<td>16,933,000</td>
<td>17,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal larceny with contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>504,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>524,000</td>
<td>497,000</td>
<td>461,000</td>
<td>549,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal larceny without contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>14,466,000</td>
<td>15,369,000</td>
<td>15,770,000</td>
<td>16,022,000</td>
<td>16,472,000</td>
<td>16,501,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population age 12 and over</td>
<td>164,363,000</td>
<td>167,058,000</td>
<td>169,671,000</td>
<td>171,901,000</td>
<td>174,093,000</td>
<td>176,215,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Household sector

| Household burglary       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Number                   | 6,458,700  | 6,720,600  | 6,743,700  | 6,663,400  | 6,764,900  | 6,704,000  |
| Rate                     | 91.7  | 93.1  | 91.7  | 88.9  | 88.5  | 86.0  |
| Household larceny        |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Number                   | 7,537,300  | 8,933,100  | 9,223,000  | 9,300,900  | 9,418,300  | 9,351,900  |
| Rate                     | 107.0  | 128.8  | 125.4  | 124.1  | 123.3  | 119.9  |
| Motor vehicle theft      |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Number                   | 1,343,900  | 1,358,400  | 1,433,000  | 1,234,600  | 1,296,800  | 1,365,100  |
| Rate                     | 19.1  | 18.8  | 19.5  | 16.5  | 17.0  | 17.5  |
| Total number of households | 70,422,600  | 72,162,900  | 73,559,600  | 74,956,100  | 76,412,300  | 77,980,400  |

NOTE: Detail may not add to total shown because of rounding.
Table 2. Personal and household crimes: Comparison of changes in victimization rates, by type of crime, 1973-78.

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimes of violence</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
<td>+2.7</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>+6.6</td>
<td>+15.5</td>
<td>+9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>*-12.6</td>
<td>*-18.0</td>
<td>*-12.9</td>
<td>**-8.8</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>*+8.0</td>
<td>*+8.1</td>
<td>*+6.6</td>
<td>*+6.3</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>*-6.7</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple assault</td>
<td>*+16.0</td>
<td>*+18.8</td>
<td>*+10.3</td>
<td>*+11.4</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crimes of theft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal larceny with contact</td>
<td>*+6.2</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal larceny without contact</td>
<td>+1.6</td>
<td>+0.3</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>+8.0</td>
<td>**+17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household burglary</td>
<td>*-6.2</td>
<td>*-7.7</td>
<td>*-6.2</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household larceny</td>
<td>*+12.1</td>
<td>**-3.1</td>
<td>*-4.4</td>
<td>***-3.3</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
<td>**-8.2</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>*-10.1</td>
<td>+6.3</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
**Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
b. Personal Crimes of Violence: Assault and Robbery
Victimization rates for assault and robbery moved in opposite directions between 1974 and 1978. Assault rose about 8 percent during this period, mainly because of an upward trend in the rate for simple assault. Simple assault increased clearly between 1974 and 1978, but an apparent decrease in aggravated assault was not significant. There was some indication of an increase in assaults by strangers between 1973 and 1978.

In contrast to assault, the overall robbery rate decreased by 18 percent between 1974 and 1978. Robbery victimization between strangers paralleled the overall decrease.

c. Personal Crimes of Theft: Larceny With and Without Contact
Personal larceny without contact—the principal personal crime of theft—increased throughout the 1973-1978 period, recording an overall rise of about 6 percent.

Personal larceny with contact—pocket picking and purse snatching—exhibited an inconclusive decline in rates from 1973 to 1977, followed by some indication of a rise between 1977 and 1978.

d. Household Burglary
In contrast to the increase in personal larceny without contact, the victimization rate for household burglary declined about 8 percent between 1974 and 1978.
e. Some Common Characteristics of U.S. Crime

Information on crime characteristics gathered by the NCS fall into two categories: the circumstances under which the violations occurred (such as time and place, number of offenders, self-protective measures taken by the victim, and weapon use); and the impact of the crime on the victim (including physical injury, economic loss, and worktime loss). The NCS found that both the circumstances and the impact of the crime vary appreciably depending upon the type of offense and the population group examined. Some examples:

The majority of all violent crimes in 1978 occurred at night: 60 percent of all armed robberies took place after dark. In general, personal crimes of violence were more apt to occur on the street, in a park, field, playground, school ground, or parking lot than in any other location; where nonstrangers were involved, however, the home was the most common setting.

In 1978, the majority of all violent personal crimes involved lone victims (88 percent) and single offenders (69 percent). Assault was more likely to have been committed by single than multiple offenders, but such was not the case for personal robbery. Half of all such robberies were carried out by two or more offenders. Robbers were more apt than other types of offenders to use a gun, knife, or other weapon.
Victims of violent attack frequently were injured, but relatively few were hurt seriously enough to require hospitalization. Although economic loss occurred frequently, the amounts lost generally were small. Recovery of stolen property was uncommon. Lost worktime occurred most often in motor vehicle thefts and serious robberies.

f. Some Common Characteristics of U.S. Crime Victims

The incidence of victimization for the U.S. as a whole does not reflect the varied pattern of vulnerability among different segments of the population. NCS findings repeatedly have shown that some groups appear to be highly susceptible to crime while others remain relatively untouched. Striking variations were evident in the rates at which certain segments of the population were victimized by various types of crime in 1978.

Clearly, age is associated with the risk of victimization. Young people, for example, consistently have high victimization rates. In 1978, as before, young persons under the age of 25, particularly males, had an exceptionally high incidence of victimization for both personal crimes of violence (robbery, and assault) and personal crimes of theft (larceny with and without contact). In contrast, individuals in their mid-thirties and over had much lower victimization rates for personal crimes of violence and theft. Moreover, households headed by older persons had lower burglary, household larceny, and motor vehicle theft rates than those headed by younger individuals.
Other demographic or socioeconomic groups within the population—males, blacks, those divorced or separated or never married, and the unemployed, among others—had relatively high rates of violent victimization in 1978. Members of some of these groups (for example, males and those never married) also were the more likely victims of personal crimes of theft. And finally, certain population subgroups (such as individuals who rented, lived in the city, or belonged to large families) were the victims of household property crimes more often than other demographic or socioeconomic groups.


a. Overview of Incidence and Trends

In 1978, an estimated 11.1 million Crime Index offenses—2 percent more than in 1977—were reported to law enforcement agencies. Both violent and property crime categories showed increases. Violent crimes, which represent 10 percent of the total Crime Index, rose 5 percent and property crimes increased 2 percent. Individually, all offenses within the Index increased in volume during the year. Among the violent crimes, murder was up 2 percent; forcible rape and aggravated assault, 7 percent; and robbery, 3 percent. In the property crime category, larceny-theft rose 1 percent, while burglary and motor vehicle theft each increased 2 percent.
Since 1974, the total volume of Crime Index offenses rose 9 percent; the upward trend occurred in both violent and property crime, each of which registered increases of 9 percent for the 5-year period.

Tables 3 and 4 (on page 18) present UCR data on reported crime incidence, rates, and trends from 1974 to 1978. These tables include both overall statistics on total Crime Index offenses, summarized above, and individual statistics on each of the Index offenses, discussed in the following paragraph.

b. Murder

The UCR data show that an estimated 19,555 murders took place in 1978. This represented an average of 9 murder victims per 100,000 inhabitants. A geographic breakdown revealed that 42 percent of the murders occurred in the Southern States, which account for the largest regional population (32.40 percent); 21 percent in the North Central States (which account for 26.7 percent of the population); 20 percent in the Western States (where 18.4 percent of the population resides); and 17 percent in the Northeastern States (where 22.5 percent of the population resides).

Murder accounts for 2 percent of the total violent crime. Nationally, the number of murders increased by 2 percent from 1977 to 1978. The increases occurred in cities of 250,000 or more inhabitants (up 2 percent) and suburban areas (up 4 percent). In the rural areas, murders declined 3 percent.
### Table 3 — Index of Crime, United States, 1974-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Offenses</th>
<th>Violent Crime</th>
<th>Property Crime</th>
<th>Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter</th>
<th>Forcible Rape</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Aggravated Assault</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Larceny-Theft</th>
<th>Motor Vehicle Theft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>10,253,400</td>
<td>974,720</td>
<td>9,278,700</td>
<td>20,710</td>
<td>55,400</td>
<td>442,400</td>
<td>456,210</td>
<td>3,039,200</td>
<td>5,262,500</td>
<td>977,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11,256,600</td>
<td>1,026,280</td>
<td>10,230,300</td>
<td>20,510</td>
<td>56,090</td>
<td>464,970</td>
<td>454,710</td>
<td>3,252,100</td>
<td>5,977,700</td>
<td>1,000,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11,304,800</td>
<td>986,580</td>
<td>10,318,300</td>
<td>18,780</td>
<td>56,730</td>
<td>420,210</td>
<td>490,850</td>
<td>3,089,800</td>
<td>6,270,800</td>
<td>957,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>10,915,800</td>
<td>1,009,500</td>
<td>9,926,300</td>
<td>19,120</td>
<td>63,020</td>
<td>404,850</td>
<td>522,510</td>
<td>3,052,200</td>
<td>5,905,700</td>
<td>968,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>11,141,300</td>
<td>1,061,830</td>
<td>10,079,500</td>
<td>19,560</td>
<td>56,730</td>
<td>417,040</td>
<td>558,100</td>
<td>3,104,500</td>
<td>5,983,400</td>
<td>991,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Violent Offenses</th>
<th>Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants</th>
<th>Percent Change over 1977</th>
<th>Percent Change over 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,850.4</td>
<td>461.1</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,281.7</td>
<td>481.5</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,266.4</td>
<td>459.6</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>5,055.1</td>
<td>462.4</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5,109.3</td>
<td>466.9</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Populations are Bureau of Census provisional estimates as of July 1, except April 1, 1970, census.
2 Due to rounding, the offenses may not add to Crime Index totals.
3 Violent crimes are offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
4 Crime rates calculated prior to rounding number of offenses.

### Table 4 — National Crime, Rate, and Percent Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,141,300</td>
<td>5,109.3</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>1,061,830</td>
<td>486.9</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>10,079,500</td>
<td>4,622.4</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>19,560</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>+2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcible rape</td>
<td>67,130</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>417,040</td>
<td>191.3</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
<td>558,100</td>
<td>255.9</td>
<td>+6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>3,010,400</td>
<td>1,422.7</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-theft</td>
<td>5,983,400</td>
<td>2,743.9</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
<td>991,600</td>
<td>454.7</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Due to rounding, offenses may not add to Crime Index totals.
To permit more detailed analysis, the Uniform Crime Reporting Program collects supplemental information on murder. Data are collected monthly on the age, sex, and race of murder victims and offenders; the types of weapons used in murders; the circumstances surrounding the offenses; and the relationships between victims and offenders. As in previous years, 1978 murder victims were predominantly male (approximately 3 out of every 4 cases). On the average, 54 out of every 100 victims were white (including Hispanics),* 44 were Black, and 2 were members of other races. Fifth-six percent of the murder victims in 1978 were acquainted with their assailants and 1 out of every 5 victims were related to the offender. Nearly half the murders resulted from arguments, while 17 percent occurred as a result of felonious activity and 6 percent were suspected to be the result of some felonious act.

c. Forcible Rape

An estimated 67,131 forcible rapes occurred in 1978, accounting for 6 percent of violent crimes. The Southern States, the region with the highest population, recorded 34 percent of the total volume; the Western States reported 27 percent; the North Central States, 22 percent; and the Northeastern States, 17 percent.

The number of forcible rapes was up nearly 7 percent over 1977 and 21 percent over 1974. During 1978, 40 percent of the forcible rapes occurred in cities with 250,000 or more inhabitants, a 6 percent increase over the previous

* As of January 1980, these statistics, as they relate to Hispanics, will be collected separately.
year. In the suburban areas, such offenses rose 5 percent, and rural areas registered a 2 percent increase over 1977. Only forcible rape of females is reported in the UCR. In 1978, an estimated 60 out of every 100,000 females in the United States were reported rape victims, a 5 percent rate increase over 1977. Since 1974, the forcible rape rate has risen 18 percent.

d. **Robbery**

In 1978, robberies totaled an estimated 417,038, amounting to 4 percent of the total Crime Index and 39 percent of the violent crimes. The Northeastern States experienced the highest proportion of robberies; 31 percent of the total. The Southern States followed with 25 percent; the North Central States reported 21 percent; and the Western States accounted for the remainder.

Although robberies increased by 3 percent in 1978 over the previous year, the crime has decreased by 6 percent since Suburban areas reported a 5 percent rise in robberies in 1978. Increases were also reported in rural areas, (2 percent) and in cities with 250,000 or more inhabitants (1 percent).

e. **Aggravated Assault**

During 1978, there were an estimated 558,102 aggravated assaults nationwide, representing 5 percent of the total
Crime Index and 53 percent of the violent crimes for that year. Regionally, the Southern States reported 36 percent of the total reported assaults, followed by the Western States (with 23 percent); the Northwestern States (with 21 percent); and the North Central States (with 20 percent).

Since 1974, the volume of aggravated assaults increased 22 percent, and a 7 percent rise occurred from 1977 to 1978. Rural areas and cities with 250,000 or more population were each up 5 percent over the previous year, and suburban areas reported a 6 percent increase during the same period. Aggravated assaults rose in each geographic region. The North Central States had an upswing of 9 percent; the Western States rose 7 percent; and the Southern and Northwestern States each showed increases of 6 percent.

f. Burglary

An estimated total of more than 3.1 million burglaries occurred in 1978, with large cities of 250,000 or more inhabitants accounting for 29 percent of the total. Burglary made up 28 percent of the total Crime Index offenses and 31 percent of the property crimes. Geographically, the Southern States experienced 31 percent of all reported burglaries; the Western States, 25 percent; and the Northeastern and North Central States, 22 percent each.

The 5-year (1974-1978) trend data show burglary rose 2 percent. Nationally, in 1978, the number of burglaries
increased 2 percent over 1977. For the year, cities of more than 250,000 population and rural areas each reported decreases of 1 percent, while suburban areas recorded a 2 percent rise. Regionally, the Southern States registered a 4 percent upswing; the Western States, a 3 percent increase; and the North Central States, a 1 percent rise. Only the Northeastern States recorded a decrease: 2 percent.

g. Larceny-Theft

In 1978, there were nearly 6 million reported larceny-theft offenses in the U.S. This high-volume offense made up 54 percent of the Crime Index total. Geographically, the Southern States reported the highest number of larceny-thefts (31 percent of the total), while the North Central, Western, and Northeastern States followed (with 26, 24, and 19 percent, respectively).

Larceny-theft rose 1 percent in volume from 1977 to 1978. Large cities reported a 1 percent decrease. Rural and suburban areas increased by 2 and 1 percent, respectively. Viewed regionally, larceny-theft showed varying trends. The Southern and Western States experienced upswings of 4 and 3 percent, respectively, while the Northeastern States reported a 3 percent decline. In the North Central States, the volume of larceny-theft showed virtually no change from the year before. Nationwide, larceny-thefts climbed 14 percent since 1974.
h. Motor Vehicle Theft

In 1978, motor vehicle thefts totaled an estimated 991,611. These offenses represented 9 percent of all Index Crimes. Geographically, the volume of motor vehicle thefts in 1978 was highest in the Northeastern States, which reported 30 percent of the total. The Southern States accounted for 24 percent, and the North Central and the Western States each reported 23 percent.

The number of motor vehicle thefts rose 2 percent from 1977 to 1978. During the 1977-1978 period, thefts of motor vehicles decreased 3 percent in large cities with 250,000 or more inhabitants, while suburban and rural areas recorded increases of 4 and 7 percent, respectively. Geographically, motor vehicle thefts were up 10 percent in the Southern States and 7 percent in the Western States. The Northwestern States reported a 3 percent decrease and the North Central States, a 1 percent decline from the prior year.


Data from both the National Crime (Victimization) Survey and the Uniform Crime Reports must be interpreted cautiously. Both systems provide useful indicators of criminal activity in the United States. But some crimes always will elude measurement because they are not reported or not recorded--
perhaps because they are insignificant or occur infrequently. Thus, the total number of crimes that actually occur nationwide cannot be known precisely.

The fact that the systems provide national-level estimates also must be kept in mind. Although national averages are a valuable baseline for examining local crime rates or assessing law enforcement strategies, they obviously cannot mirror the crime picture in a given jurisdiction. Thorough appraisal of local conditions is a prerequisite for effective action against a community's crime problem.

Despite these inherent limitations, both the NCS and UCR, when used correctly, provide valid, reliable estimates of crime patterns and trends in the United States. They serve as important data resources for criminal justice officials and researchers in the United States and in other parts of the world.

B. New Developments in U.S. Crime Measurement

1. Revising Current Measures of Crime Severity

Since the last U.N. Congress, the United States has launched research to improve its assessment of the severity of crime. The research is expanding and updating the currently-used measurement standard, the Selling-Wolfgang Crime Severity Scale, originally developed in the early 1960's.4/
The researchers surveyed a large sample (30,000) of U.S. households to determine their perceptions of the relative severity of more than 200 crimes. The new study expands the number of crimes measured by the earlier scale and includes a wide range of non-traditional crimes. Such crimes as white collar crime, public corruption, organized crime, racial discrimination, and family violence are covered as well as the previously-measured personal and property offenses such as robbery and burglary.

Analysis of the data is currently under way and a final report is expected in 1981. The report will present the perceptions of crime severity for the Nation as a whole and will compare differences in perceptions of individuals in different geographical regions and with different social characteristics (such as age, race, sex, education, and occupation). The study also will compare responses from crime victims with those not victimized to determine whether and how victimization changes an individual's assessment of the severity of various crimes.

Although detailed analyses are not yet complete, preliminary findings indicate some recent changes in the public's perception of the severity of various types of crimes. Public corruption and environmental pollution, for example, are now among those crimes perceived as serious by the U.S. public, along with such traditionally-rated serious crimes as burglary, robbery, and assault.
2. Measuring Crimes of Current Concern

A number of crimes have become increasingly important public concerns either because they have increased in frequency and seriousness or because citizens have become more aware of their potential dangers to the community. As these new public concerns have emerged, criminal justice officials and researchers have devoted more attention to accurate statistical analysis of them, especially those that involve special measurement difficulties. Some of the most problematic recent crime concerns are discussed below, with emphasis on their measurement aspects.

a. Arson

The U.S. Congress recently passed legislation that made arson a serious (Part I) crime as measured by the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, stimulating efforts to improve measurement of arson offenses. Because much of the evidence of criminal intent is destroyed, however, arson is a very difficult crime to measure. Increasing the number and training of investigations is one strategy adopted to help improve arson data collection. The problems inherent in measuring this crime, however, are not likely to be easily solved.

b. Family Violence

Growing public recognition of the prevalence of violent behavior within the family--such as spouse and child abuse--have prompted efforts to develop more accurate
statistics and treatment strategies for such offenses. Current Victimization Survey data show that 3.8 million violent incidents occurred during a 4-year period among people who knew each other well; about one-third were committed by offenders who were related to the victim. Only a little more than half of these violent incidents among relatives were reported to police. And family violence also is one of the crimes most seriously under-reported in the Victimization Survey, as revealed when known victims--identified from police records of officially-reported crimes--are interviewed to check whether they reported this known victimization to the Survey interviewer as well as to police. Because family members are reluctant to report (or perhaps even to perceive) the violent behavior of their relatives as "crimes," there are severe measurement problems that must be dealt with before accurate statistics can be gathered on the incidence and characteristics of family violence in the United States. Public concern about the problem is likely to generate increased methodological study and innovation.

c. White Collar Crime, Public Corruption, and Organized Crime

Determining the extent of white collar crime, public corruption, and organized crime is another enormous challenge to criminal justice statisticians. One
special difficulty is that such offenses often have no clearly-identifiable "victims" who perceive themselves as such and thus can report the crimes to Survey interviewers or to police. Since these offenses have ramifications for the entire society, however, they are receiving priority attention from criminal justice statisticians as well as researchers and practitioners, as detailed in a separate report submitted to the Sixth United Nations Congress.

3. Improving the National Crime Survey
The need to enhance the accuracy of measurement tools and broaden the range of crimes measured are key concerns in the United States. Evidence of the nation's commitment to securing advances in the field is apparent in the creation of a new Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) within the Department of Justice. One of the Bureau's major efforts is a 5-year project to redesign and improve the National Crime Survey, the source of official U.S. data on crime victimization. This project entails research on a variety of conceptual, methodological and analytical issues raised since the survey began. Researchers will examine methods for expanding the scope of the Survey and improving measurement of underreported crimes, such as family violence and rape. The project is an important vehicle for gaining valuable information on crimes of increasing concern in the United States and for improving the state of the art in crime measurement.
Section II Footnotes


5) Research to update the 1960 Crime Severity Scale is currently being sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, with publication of findings anticipated sometime in 1981.


8) Research to improve the National Crime Survey is currently being conducted by a consortium of private and university research centers sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Completion of the revised Victimization Survey instrument is expected by 1984.
III. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES IN U.S. CRIME PREVENTION

Despite growth and improvement in law enforcement, crime in America remains high. It is increasingly apparent that the criminal justice system cannot be expected to assume total responsibility for crime control. Criminal justice institutions remain the primary agents of society's official response to crime, of course, but there is growing realization that crime cannot be adequately controlled by offender-directed strategies alone. No matter how effective the criminal justice system may be in reducing the current offender population (through effective arrest, prosecution, and sentencing procedures and successful incarceration, rehabilitation, and other treatment strategies), new offenders will continue to commit crimes unless we extend our efforts beyond official punishment or treatment of the offender and attempt to prevent the conditions that appear to motivate or facilitate the initial criminal behavior.

A growing number of U.S. communities appear to accept this reality and are shouldering some of the responsibility for preventing crime. They are adopting strategies to reduce the levels of victimization and fear of crime. The strategies vary, but most are based on one of three major perspectives on crime currently predominant in the United States: the Victimization Perspective, which views "crimes" as "victimizations" and aims to reduce the opportunity for crime by decreasing the vulnerability of potential targets;
the Social Disorganization Perspective, which views "crime" as one manifestation of social disorganization in the community and approaches "crime prevention" through activities that strengthen community social controls and order and promote residents' feelings of security and satisfaction with the community; and the Legislative Perspective which accepts the legal interpretation of "crime" as unlawful behavior and attempts to prevent it either by legalizing the behavior or by enacting severe sanctions to deter it.

A. The Victimization Perspective: Reducing the Opportunities for Crime

The victimization perspective became popular in the early 1970's, following a national upsurge in crime during the late 1960's. This view of crime has prevailed in the United States in recent years and undergirds the design of the majority of crime prevention strategies currently implemented in the country. The strategies can be grouped under five headings: self-protective strategies by potential victims; neighborhood-protective strategies by residents; "Defensible Space" strategies to create a secure physical environment; police-community strategies; and comprehensive crime prevention strategies that combine a number of approaches in a multi-focused program. Each type of strategy is described in detail below.
1. Self-Protective Strategies

Perhaps the most widely accepted and easily implemented prevention strategies are precautions that private citizens themselves—as potential crime victims—can adopt to safeguard their persons and property. Such "target hardening" strategies enable citizens (either individually or in groups) to reduce their vulnerability by adopting protective behavior patterns and using security devices that increase the difficulty and/or risks for would-be offenders. Among the most popular and effective approaches is installation of security devices such as dead-bolt door locks, window pins or grills, special lights, and perimeter or space alarms 1/ to prevent illegal entry to protect property from theft.

Increasingly, police and private security agencies offer advice on target-hardening strategies. In more than 300 cities, for example, individuals may call upon police or professional security consultants to conduct crime prevention security surveys of their homes or businesses, pinpointing places where a criminal is likely to enter and how security can be bolstered.2/

Another target-hardening technique often recommended for groups as well as individuals involves engraving personal property with a unique identification number or symbol. Known as "Operation Identification," these programs
encourage participants to engrave on their valuables a name, identification number, or other mark of ownership and to register the identified property with police or program officials. The process is intended to facilitate recovery and return of stolen items and to deter theft. Participants are urged to post window decals or signs warning potential offenders that their possessions are marked for identification and registered with police, making them risky items to steal and sell illegally.3/

Assessments of the effectiveness of property target-hardening strategies generally indicate that those who use protective devices and participate in home security surveys or property-marking activities have lower burglary rates than those who do not.2/3 It is not clear, however, whether lower burglary victimization among participants is due to these specific target-hardening efforts. Such individuals may be more likely to participate in other types of crime prevention behavior which may also lessen their vulnerability.

A variety of strategies are employed to prevent victimization from violent crime. The most effective, of course, is avoiding particularly dangerous areas whenever possible. If this is not feasible, however, some individuals carry whistles to summon help if necessary. Volunteer escort services for elderly people or other individuals concerned about
protection also have sprung up in recent years. Mastery of self-defense techniques, such as karate or judo, also has gained popularity. Courses are available commercially in most U.S. cities and are sometimes offered by police, civic, and educational institutions as well. Although some individuals own and carry weapons of various types, the approach is not widely recommended because it poses danger for the potential victims as well as for offenders.

2. Neighborhood-Protective Strategies

Citizens also may adopt more "public-minded" strategies to prevent crime in their neighborhoods. Two of the most frequently implemented—citizen patrols and citizen surveillance and reporting programs—are described below.

Citizen patrols consist of residents who organize into teams to patrol neighborhood streets or apartment buildings and thus deter potential criminals. More than 800 citizen patrols are currently functioning in U.S. communities. Most were initiated in the 1970's, in response to local increases in crime, and most operate on a low-budget volunteer basis. Recent assessment of such citizen patrol programs showed that (apartment) building patrols seemed most effective in reducing crime and increasing a sense of security among apartment residents but that neighborhood (street)
patrols also performed valuable services. Overall, the
evaluation found that those patrols that carefully
selected and trained members, established procedures,
affiliated with community organizations, and had
positive contacts with local police were most likely
to be successful.

Another popular neighborhood-protective strategy
emphasizes citizen surveillance and reporting activities.
These programs encourage residents (either individuals
or neighborhood groups) to watch out for suspicious
and criminal behavior and to report their observations
to police. Because effective surveillance programs
increase the offender's risk of apprehension, they can
deter or prevent crimes in neighborhoods where they are
implemented. In addition, such programs may help to
foster a more cohesive relationship among neighborhood
residents, improve citizens' relations with police,
and reduce unwarranted fear of crime among community
members. A recent assessment found that particular
types of citizen surveillance and reporting programs
are especially popular nationwide. "Block-Watch" programs
emphasize cooperative surveillance by neighbors to protect
homes and property. Another approach uses special tele­
phone numbers for reporting to police. Truckers and
taxi-cab drivers participating in "Radio Watch" use
their two-way radios to report suspicious and criminal
activity observed in the course of their normal work routines. The program was found to be an especially effective way for private citizens to help prevent crime in their communities. Local police frequently offer support for these programs by holding neighborhood meetings to encourage participation and by educating citizens on proper techniques of surveillance and reporting.

3. "Defensible Space" Strategies to Create A Secure Physical Environment

A relatively new approach to crime prevention has gained popularity in U.S. communities. The strategy focuses on modifying the physical environment to create a more secure, more defensible space for residents and users. This is achieved both directly (by reducing the physical opportunities for offenders to enter the area and move about without being observed or hindered) and indirectly (by incorporating physical features that encourage and enable residents themselves to take responsibility for safeguarding their neighborhoods).

The environment of many communities offers numerous opportunities for crime. Streets are too often poorly lighted or deserted, doors and windows are easily entered, and bus and subway stops offer places of concealment for offenders. People are afraid to venture out into such areas for fear of being victimized,
and the resulting lack of normal activity exacerbates the problem. To explore the subject, the Federal government in 1969 initiated research to examine the relationship between design features of particular environmental settings and citizens' fear of and vulnerability to crime. Preliminary studies found that certain physical design features of public housing could affect both the rate of victimization of residents and their perceptions of security. This work led to the hypothesis that proper physical design could be used not only to deter crime, but also to encourage and enable citizens to protect their streets and private property—in other words, to create a "defensible space" in their own neighborhoods.6/,7/,8/

Three major types of physical strategies are employed to reduce crime opportunities and achieve defensible space: access control, surveillance, and increased informal social controls by the area residents and users themselves. These are explained below.9/

Access control involves setting up barriers to prevent unauthorized persons (potential offenders) from entering a building or area. Guarded entryways, door locks, and window bars are common access control strategies. Layout and routing of streets, placement of buildings and community facilities, and other design principles may be equally effective techniques.
The primary aim of surveillance design features is to keep intruders and potential offenders under observation so that the risk of detection and apprehension is high enough to deter criminal behavior. Mechanical security devices and police or citizen behavior (such as patrolling or block watch activities) are generally vehicles for surveillance, but these can be facilitated by a variety of physical design features. For example, surveillance can be greatly assisted by improved street lighting and by elimination of visual barriers such as fences, shrubs and walls.

Perhaps the most effective deterrents to criminal behavior are the informal social controls exercised by community members themselves. To take control of their own neighborhoods, however, individuals must not only be present in the public areas outside their homes or offices, but must also be persuaded that they both can and should exercise responsibility for activities occurring in their communities. Physical design features can help. Physical improvements, for example, might encourage residents to increase the use of a neighborhood by making it more attractive or comfortable. Such changes might range from building a recreational center to planting flowers in a park or installing benches in a shopping mall. Other environmental changes might increase residents'
sense of community and belonging; general improvements in the quality and attractiveness of houses and buildings can encourage such a positive community image and sense of neighborhood pride. Still other physical changes might subdivide or personalize a large impersonal environment and thus give residents a greater sense of security and control over their particular living space. In all these ways, proper design of the physical environment is a potentially important crime prevention strategy that can influence how individuals feel about their neighborhood: whether they perceive it as "defensible," and whether they will act to protect the security of its streets, its parks and open spaces, its public facilities, and its private commercial and residential buildings.

4. Police-Community Strategies
Most police departments view themselves as society's agent for controlling serious crime. Hence, they are organized to operate most effectively in responding to individual crimes. As the criminal justice agency most visible to the public, however, police traditionally have been expected to prevent crime as well. It is now clear that the expectation is unrealistic. Given their limited resources and manpower and the volume and urgency of their other law enforcement activities, the police cannot be solely responsible for crime prevention.
As crime continues to rise, public demands for protection have correspondingly increased, widening the gap between community expectations and police performance and fueling a growing public dissatisfaction with law enforcement. Further eroding community support for police is the recent trend toward professionalization in U.S. law enforcement, which has increasingly isolated the police in patrol cars, on rotating patrols, and in technical specialist roles.

Initially, the police responded to public distrust through Community Relations Offices, whose staff met with citizen groups, held press conferences to explain police policies and air community concerns, and attempted to improve the public image of the department. The failure of this approach, however, together with increasing personnel shortages due to recent cutbacks in many city budgets, have given police a new perspective on the community. Many are beginning to view the community as a potential contributor to, as well as recipient of, law enforcement services, especially in crime prevention.

This new perspective has led many departments to replace their Community Relations Offices with Crime Prevention Units, which combine the earlier emphasis on public relations with a new concern for involving the community actively and productively in crime prevention.
activities. Police Crime Prevention Units perform community-oriented services designed to encourage citizen crime prevention. Many units conduct residential security surveys (to advise citizens on how to protect their homes); organize property-marking programs and provide necessary tools and assistance to citizens who wish to participate; sponsor Block Watch or other citizen surveillance programs and encourage neighborhood groups to join; and speak to school or community groups to inform them about the facts of crime and the range of strategies individuals may adopt to protect themselves and their neighborhoods from being victimized.

Some U.S. cities have gone beyond the concept of a specialized Office or Unit as the principal locus of community contact. Instead, their law enforcement agencies have changed their traditional framework and experimented with a new form of police operations known as Neighborhood Team Policing. As with Crime Prevention Units, Neighborhood Team Policing emphasizes: (1) the improvement of police-community understanding and interaction; and (2) the encouragement of active citizen involvement in crime prevention. Although they may differ in organization and function, most team policing programs use three principal strategies to accomplish their goals:

- the stable assignment of officers (or "patrol teams") to fixed geographic areas or neighborhoods:
increased positive police-citizen contact through provision of civic and social as well as crime-related services; and

increased citizen participation in law enforcement, primarily in prevention programs and activities, but also through service on citizen advisory boards and recruitment as volunteers to assist in performing many functions requiring less than specialized law enforcement skills.

The premise of the new approach is that team policing enables citizens to assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own security. Thus, departments are able to allocate more resources to their primary criminal justice functions and respond more effectively to serious crime.

5. Comprehensive Crime Prevention Strategies

In recent years, several U.S. cities have implemented comprehensive crime prevention programs, when resources were sufficient, incorporating many of the strategies discussed above. Properly designed and coordinated, such programs can have a cumulative impact on crime by reducing criminal opportunities on a number of levels simultaneously. One such program in a residential neighborhood community, for example, successfully combined self-protective strategies (target-hardening);
neighborhood protective strategies (citizen patrols and Block Watch surveillance and reporting activities); "Defensible Space" (environmental) strategies (including street closings and traffic re-routing to increase the residential character of the neighborhood, and "beautification" to make it more attractive); and police-community strategies (neighborhood team policing). The result was a reduction in burglary in an inner-city community where crime had been increasing rapidly prior to the program.12/ Because they offer a wider spectrum of activities, such programs have the added advantages of appealing to a broader range of potential participants and avoiding over-dependence on an individual strategy. In fact, because of these special benefits and promising results, a number of federally-sponsored anti-crime efforts emphasize the comprehensive crime prevention approach.

B. The Social Disorganization Perspective: Improving Social Control, Order, and Security in the Community

Before the "victimization opportunity reduction" approach described above gained acceptance, a broader perspective on crime and crime prevention prevailed--one which viewed crime as one of many manifestations of weakness in the overall social order of the community rather than as a separate social problem to be dealt with on its own.
This view, which may be called the "social disorganization perspective" on crime, was originally developed in the United States in the 1920's and 1930's. Crime was seen as an indication of the decline of moral order and social control in the community, with the offender as the key actor in this decline. Citizens' fear was a response to the decline in the moral order and control rather than a direct response to specific crimes. There were non-crime effects of such a decline as well, including the increase in abandoned buildings in the community or the aimless gathering of neighborhood youths in the streets.

The social disorganization perspective held that local institutions were the key to successful crime prevention and control. Thus, crime prevention strategies should be designed not only to reduce victimizations but also to increase the socialization and social control capacity of local institutions. The approach emphasized strategies such as help to adolescents who were in danger of becoming offenders and general improvements in local institutions and neighborhood conditions.

Recent research on community groups and collective citizen responses to crime has produced findings that provide more support for the social disorganization perspective on crime and crime prevention than for the currently-prevailing victimization/opportunity-reduction approach. Some of these findings are discussed below.
The research found that most community groups do not isolate crime from their many other concerns. Most of these multi-issue groups included collective responses to crime among their other problem-solving activities but crime usually was not the issue responsible for initiating the group nor was it generally selected as the first issue they addressed. Although participation in group anti-crime activities depended less on concerns about crime than on the role of a group member, most groups were found to be successful eventually in persuading their members to participate.

Studies of community groups also show that their collective responses to crime are responses to the total social environment as perceived by community residents. This includes more than just the perceived threat of victimization, reflecting a general concern about the lack of social control and a perceived inability by local institutions to protect the individual. For this reason, their collective strategies against crime go beyond activities designed to directly reduce crime to encompass efforts to reduce the features of social disorganization perceived as causes of crime. Crime, unemployment, lack of recreational facilities, alcohol and drug abuse, lack of neighborhood interaction, lack of community pride, and lack of community power to maintain social control: all these negative features and evidences of disorder are perceived as appropriate targets for what the community calls "crime prevention strategies."
One framework for classifying the range of approaches to crime prevention used by community groups is the following:

- Social, Economic, and Environmental Approach
  - Neighborhood Maintenance and Improvement
  - Social and Economic Programs
  - Social Integration
- Protective Behavior Approach
  - Property Protection
  - Personal Protection
- Surveillance Approach
  - Structured Surveillance
  - Unstructured Surveillance
- Sanction Approach

The Social, Economic, and Environment Approach, as well as some of the activities which fall under the Sanction Approach, are attempts to deal indirectly with crime by attacking conditions of social disorganization, which community residents perceive as the root causes of crime. Protective Behavior and Surveillance Approaches, on the other hand, attempt to prevent victimization.

Finally, recent research findings reveal the influence of the social and cultural contexts in which collective responses to crime occur. Studies of community groups show that the social and cultural characteristics of a community may affect responses to crime independent of perceptions to existing crime conditions. In other words, two communities that perceive similar conditions
of crime and social disorganization in their neighborhoods may respond differently to them because they differ socially and culturally. Factors such as family composition, socio-economic status, race, and ethnicity seem to lead to different interpretations of how best to respond to crime because they influence how communities define the causes of crime and the nature of offenders. To be successful, then, crime prevention strategies not only must be appropriate for the crime conditions that exist but also must be consistent with the social and cultural makeup of the community that is to implement them.

The social disorganization perspective on crime also places renewed emphasis on educational, employment, and recreational programs as crime prevention strategies. Such programs have been popular with local citizens' groups for a number of years, and the Federal Government has a history of supporting such efforts.

In education, for example, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, part of the U.S. Department of Justice, is sponsoring a major demonstration program this year to prevent delinquency through projects designed to keep students in schools and prevent unwarranted and arbitrary suspensions, expulsions, dropouts, pushouts, and truancy.
The United States also has spent substantial funds over the years to enhance employment opportunities for inner-city youth. Such programs as New York City's "Mobilization for Youth" were established in the 1960's with the goal of changing conditions viewed as most conducive to delinquency, including unemployment. Although the initial hopes of these programs were never fully realized, recent research shows that community groups still believe such programs to be a part of crime prevention.

The importance of employment for ex-offenders also has been recognized at the national level. Federal support for such programs has been provided primarily under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973. Based on this experience and the wide theoretical and research support for employment services as part of offender rehabilitation and crime reduction efforts, the Justice Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1980 is field-testing an approach to providing such services to ex-offenders. The goal is to determine the effectiveness of particular program concepts and strategies in various settings. NIJ also is supporting long-term research on the relationship between employment and crime. This study, conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City, seeks to increase our understanding of the relationships between unemployment, underemployment and criminality.
Recreational programs also are seen by citizen groups as important in crime prevention. These programs have been defined as "semi-organized nonwork activities engaged in by youth for pleasure and considered by practitioners as an appropriate youth development activity to prevent destructive behavior." Examples of such programs include youth athletic leagues as well as other types of social clubs, which are supported in communities across the nation.

Educational, employment, and recreational programs have been widely implemented as crime prevention strategies. Recent research showing continued community support for such strategies and revival of the "social disorganization perspective" of crime and crime prevention is likely to provide further justification for official support of such efforts. It is probable, therefore, that a growing number of crime prevention programs in the United States will include not only opportunity-reduction strategies but also activities directed at reducing the conditions of social disorder that give rise to community insecurity and crime.
C. The Legislative Perspective: Reducing Crime Through Decriminalization and Deterrence Legislation

A third strategy for preventing and deterring crime uses the mechanism of legislation. The legislation is of two general types. The first legalizes formerly criminal behaviors that is commonly engaged in or accepted by the public. In contrast, the second type of legislation enacts increased penalties to deter criminal behavior. Examples of each type are discussed below.

1. Decriminalization Strategies
   a. Legalized Gambling
      Since 1963, many States have legalized one or more forms of gambling behavior. By 1975, 29 States had legalized on-track betting on horses, 12 States had initiated state lotteries, 8 States had legalized casino gambling, and at least 6 States had instituted other types of legal gambling.\textsuperscript{17} The move toward legalization is likely to continue because of the increased revenue gambling generally brings. Faced with mounting fiscal pressures, legislatures across the country are considering legal commercial gambling as one alternative source of revenue.

Legislators also are concerned, however, with the effects of legalized gambling on law enforcement policies and procedures, on the attitudes and per-
ceptions of police, on citizen gambling behavior and attitudes, and on public perception and attitudes toward law enforcement.

A recent research study examined these issues in 16 U.S. cities selected to represent all of the most prevalent statutory policies in existence, ranging from no legal gambling to legalization of three major types of gambling--horse track betting, lotteries, and off-track betting. The findings and conclusions of the research are:

- The laws against gambling in private are primarily a symbolic gesture by legislators; they are neither enforced nor are they enforceable within the context of U.S. legal privacy guarantees and privileges. Thus, only public gambling is potentially controllable by legislation.

- The effectiveness of legislation against public gambling, however, is determined more by the strictness of enforcement by local police and prosecutors than by the severity or leniency of the statutes themselves.

- Citizens also were found to favor enforcement. Contrary to the belief held by many officials that the public does not want gambling laws
enforced, citizens were more concerned when anti-gambling statutes (no matter how lenient or severe) were not enforced, often perceiving this as evidence of official corruption.

Despite the above findings, however, police resources devoted to the control of public social gambling are too limited to provide for aggressive, effective enforcement policies. Moreover, police perceive themselves to be in a "no-win" situation, since they receive little credit if they succeed and considerable abuse if they fail to control illegal gambling.

Prosecutors are likely to be even less aggressive than police in enforcing gambling laws. Even in commercial gambling cases, prosecutors generally do not recommend penalties for conviction that are severe enough to deter further involvement in such illegal enterprises. Furthermore, they are not held accountable for their leniency since records are kept only of the judge's ultimate sentencing decision, not of the prosecutor's recommendation.
Even though these research findings are not definitive in supporting either increased or decreased legalization of gambling behavior, they have important implications for legislative crime prevention strategies in general. It is clear that no legislation can succeed without adequate attention to the demands it places on subsequent law enforcement policies and practices and without adequate resources for increasing the capabilities and accountability of police and prosecutors to meet these demands. And, as the above findings show, gambling laws (and other laws as well) that are not, or cannot be, effectively enforced not only fail to control illegal gambling behavior but also may undermine both the morale of the enforcers and the public's respect for law in general.

b. Marijuana Decriminalization

In contrast to most other strategies discussed in this paper, national policies to control marijuana abuse confront not only legal and social issues, but health concerns. In reviewing the impact of recent U.S. trends toward change in the legal status of marijuana this paper considers the overall national and local impact of recent legislative changes and developments and their relation to the various social, legal, and medical arguments that underlie alternative sanctioning policies.
When the epidemic of youthful interest in marijuana occurred during the late 1960's and early 1970's, possession of the drug was a felony under Federal and State laws. That epidemic was followed by a reduction of the offense to a misdemeanor in all but three States. And in 1972 the Shafer Commission recommended that the policy be further liberalized to a partial prohibition of marijuana, under which penalties would apply to trafficking but not to possession of small amounts.19/ Between 1973 and 1978, the legislatures of 11 states (representing one-third of the total U.S. population) passed laws which had the effect of decriminalizing possession of marijuana, although most maintained some form of civil penalty and only one State appeared to go as far as the Shafer Commission recommended. A number of other States have rejected such proposed measures. As of early 1980, measures to re-criminalize the drug had been introduced in two States, while a third state bill would increase penalties for possession of the drug.20/

Assessment of the direct and indirect effects of such changes is best viewed in terms of the opposing positions held by supporters and opponents of marijuana decriminalization. Advocates of decriminalization argue that:
Occasional marijuana use is essentially a recreational activity that is intrinsically no more harmful to the individual or society than alcohol use, and therefore severe penalties are not justified.

Incarceration and a permanent criminal record for the otherwise noncriminal user are more harmful than the use of marijuana, and are themselves criminogenic;

Criminal justice resources should be reserved for more serious offenses; and

Widespread acceptance of marijuana use and non-enforcement of penalties perceived as too severe lead to disrespect for all law, and such sanctions should either be enforced or reduced.

Opponents of decriminalization contend that:

- Marijuana is physically or psychologically harmful and therefore should be prohibited;
- Marijuana use tends to lead to the use of other drugs that are much more damaging to the individual and society;
- Marijuana use tends to lead to other forms of criminal activity; and
- Decriminalization would be a sign of societal approval and therefore would lead to increased use, especially among the young.
It is not yet possible to adequately evaluate the long-term impact of decriminalization on each of these points, but available data permit some tentative assessments of the initial impact on the criminal justice system and on overall usage trends. A recent survey of usage trends in States with severe, moderate, or changing penalty structures during the period from 1972-77 showed:

. General increases occurred for all States and age groups, with relatively greater rates of increase for those under age 18 and for States maintaining severe penalties;
. States with severe sanctions tended to have lower initial levels of usage, but the data indicate a long-term trend toward similar high levels of usage for all States;
. Reduced penalties have tended to occur in States where use was high; lower penalties do not appear to accelerate rate of use compared to other States.22/

On a national basis, a study comparing substance abuse trends by high school seniors showed that marijuana use was not as great as alcohol consumption. Recent rates of increase in current monthly usage of marijuana however, were greater than those for other major drugs of abuse. While marijuana use increased 10 percent
from 1975 to 1978 (from 27.1 percent to 37.1 percent), alcohol use increased by only 4 percent during the same period (from 68 percent to 72.1 percent); use of other commonly-abused substances tended to be much less prevalent, showing relatively small increases or decreases over this same period.\textsuperscript{23/}

A third study, which surveyed States that have decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use, found that most report a reduction in marijuana-related arrests following those legislative changes, but the impact has not been uniform. Moreover, actual changes in arrest rates within a State are difficult to assess, because decriminalization may follow a previous trend toward non-enforcement of marijuana laws by police. Comparisons between States are similarly unclear due to variations in their charging and incarceration policies.

Although evaluations conducted in individual States vary in methodology and purpose, the majority tend to agree on several basic findings: in the short run, decriminalization has not resulted in greater increases in use than those occurring in States that maintained severe penalties; many people are
favorably disposed toward decriminalization laws; and decriminalization has saved State criminal justice systems both time and money.24/ A caveat is in order, however: the evaluations for the most part do not take into account that under the federal system of government in the United States there is a dual system of laws under which drug offenses may be investigated and prosecuted, and that, even though a State may decriminalize possession of marijuana, such possession remains a criminal offense under the concurrent federal laws.

2. Legislative Deterrence Strategies

A second strategy finding favor in American legislative bodies is the policy of increased severity in sentencing, particularly for more serious offenses and more habitual offenders. One hypothesis underlying this approach stems from the classic crime control theory of deterrence: that increased severity of punishment for an offense will constitute an increased threat that will deter potential offenders, thus preventing the occurrence of the crime.

In the past decade, extensive research has been conducted to examine the validity of the deterrence theory, beginning with Isaac Ehrlich's econometric analysis of the general deterrent effects of capital punishment. To sum up the burgeoning research on deterrence, the National Institute of Justice funded a review of the major studies of a panel of experts assembled by the National Academy of Sciences.
In its review of the research evidence on deterrence, the National Academy of Sciences concluded: "...we cannot yet assert that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion regarding [the effectiveness of] deterrence." However, they also noted that "...the evidence certainly favors a proposition supporting deterrence more than it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent." 26/

Certain crimes have been singled out for more severe penalties as outlined below.

a. **Drug Deterrence Legislation**

In 1973, New York State passed a comprehensive set of "get tough" laws whose main objectives were to reduce levels of illicit drug use and associated crime through the imposition of severe criminal sanctions. This shift to a legislative deterrence strategy was made only after a long history of more lenient treatment policies failed to check the increasing problem of drug abuse in the State. During the 1960's, for example, New York's general policy had been to divert low-level users of illegal drugs into treatment programs and to invoke criminal sanctions primarily against higher-level traffickers. By the early 1970's it was commonly agreed that this approach had largely failed to limit illegal drug use and traffic. In 1972, for example, accidental narcotics deaths in the State were six times higher than in 1960. In 1973, the strategy shifted to deterrence.
The 1973 statutes specified that defendants convicted of drug trafficking or possession offenses would receive automatic long-term prison sentences—for example, the penalty for the sale of 1 ounce or possession of 2 ounces of a narcotic drug would be mandatory sentence to a minimum term of 15-25 years in State prison. In addition, the laws restricted prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain down to charges that would not involve a mandatory prison term and limited judicial discretion to impose sentences that did not involve incarceration. Conviction for the sale of any amount of a narcotic drug not only required the offender to serve at least the minimum sentence, but also imposed mandatory lifetime parole supervision after release.

The National Institute of Justice sponsored an evaluation of the effectiveness of these laws. The findings indicated that, during the first 3 years after enactment, the strategy of increasing the severity and certainty of penalties for drug offenses had not achieved its objectives. Heroin use, for example, was as widespread in New York City in mid-1976 as in 1973, and patterns of illegal drug use over this period were similar to those of other major East Coast cities. Likewise, State-wide patterns of drug-related property crimes were similar to those in nearby States, and the stiff New York penalties for repeat offenders
produced no sustained deterrent effects. Finally, although initial court caseload backlogs tended to level off, the new drug laws required substantial additional expenditures from criminal justice court and correctional budgets without providing measurable deterrent benefits to offset these costs.

The failure of the legislative changes to alter New York's drug problem, however, cannot be interpreted as a definitive test of the basic deterrence hypothesis. In many ways, the experience was also a failure of implementation. Despite official attempts to provide the criminal justice system with sufficient resources to handle the increased offender population the new laws were expected to produce, the impact was too great: the system was unable to implement the sanctions effectively.

The New York experience in drug deterrence legislation parallels the findings of the previously-discussed study of gambling legalization. Both cases demonstrate the need to integrate legislative crime prevention strategies (both decriminalization and deterrence) into criminal justice crime control operations, expanding capabilities if need be to assure effective implementation.

b. **Handgun Crime Legislation**

As crimes committed with handguns have become increasingly prevalent, specific legislation mandating increased
penalties for gun-robbery or gun-assault have been adopted as one way legislators can single out and penalize the use of this deadly weapon. The State of Massachusetts, for example, implemented a strict mandatory 1-year imprisonment for unlicensed carrying of a firearm. Several independent studies sponsored by the National Institute of Justice found significant decreases in gun-related crimes following the laws adoption. 29/,30/

Two important facets of the Massachusetts experience qualify the meaning of these successful findings, however. First, a massive publicity campaign preceded actual implementation of the newly-enacted law and gun-related crime began to decline immediately after the anti-gun publicity, thus occurring prior to enforcement of the statute. Second, although assault and robbery with guns decreased dramatically, the commission of these crimes with other weapons increased. Additional research has been funded by the National Institute of Justice to examine the long-term effects of this legislation and to investigate further its impact on the type of weapon used in crimes.

Other jurisdictions have adopted similar legislation to deter criminal use of handguns usually in the form of mandatory minimum sentences or other enhancements to existing criminal sanctions. Michigan, for instance,
is following this strategy, making possession of a gun while committing a felony an additional crime subject to its own severe sanctions added to sanctions imposed for the felony itself. The Michigan law is currently being evaluated, with findings on its deterrence effectiveness expected next year.

Revisions of Federal regulations governing handgun commerce have been considered by the U.S. Congress, but no changes in the present regulation of commercial handgun sales have as yet been adopted. Increased enforcement of existing laws has been tested in selected urban jurisdictions, but it is unclear to what extent such piecemeal enforcement can reduce the criminal supply, ownership, or use of handguns.

c. Airline Hijacking

As a final example, the evidence available on airport security demonstrates that deterrence legislation--strictly enforced--can effectively prevent at least some types of crime. Airline hijacking, once a frequent occurrence, has been virtually eliminated since strict airport security measures have been adopted and aggressively enforced. International cooperation in implementing deterrence legislation has been successful in preventing airline terrorism.
It is hoped that similar techniques will be equally effective against other types of international terrorism.
Section III Footnotes


30. David Rossman et al., The Impact of the Mandatory Gun Law in Massachusetts (forthcoming).

IV. CURRENT PRACTICES AND TRENDS IN FEDERAL CRIME PREVENTION COORDINATION AND PLANNING

As crime remained high despite increasing local efforts to control it, State and local officials have turned to the Federal government for technical and financial assistance. Recognizing this need, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation mandating programs to improve national planning, coordination, technical assistance and information dissemination on crime prevention and control. Some major examples are described below.

A. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979

Recently enacted by the U.S. Congress, the Justice System Improvement Act emphasizes increased coordination, planning, and communication within the Federal criminal justice system and between the Federal system and State and local agencies involved in crime prevention and control.

Under the new Federal structure, research on crime and justice and collection of national statistics are carried out by agencies within the Department of Justice:

- The National Institute of Justice supports research, demonstration and evaluation programs in criminal justice and disseminates the findings to State, local, and Federal agencies;
- The Bureau of Justice Statistics collects and analyzes criminal and civil justice statistics and supports development of improved crime measurement systems at all governmental levels.1/
B. National Strategy to Combat Arson: A Case Study in Crime Prevention Planning and Coordination

One example of the current U.S. trend toward national planning and coordination of crime prevention efforts is the national strategy to combat arson. Well-organized and comprehensive, the approach integrates activities of multiple Federal agencies and provides assistance to State and local anti-arson efforts. Since it represents the type and degree of planning and coordination the Federal government is applying to combat a growing number of serious offenses (organized crime, white collar crime, and international terrorism, among others), the national strategy against arson is described in detail below.3/

During the past decade, arson--the willful and malicious burning of property--has increased dramatically. A newly-released survey sponsored by the National Institute of Justice shows that arson fires, per capita, doubled between 1971 and 1977. Arson caused an estimated $1.3 billion in losses in 1977 alone. In terms of lives and dollars lost, arson may be one of America's most costly crimes.4/

Whatever the motive--profit, spite, jealousy, intimidation, crime concealment, vandalism, or psychopathy--the criminal justice system and fire services are charged with protecting citizens from arson. Public concern about the crime had led to the creation of special anti-arson programs and task forces at all levels of government. To enhance their effectiveness these efforts are coordinated at the Federal level by the following agencies:
The U.S. Department of Justice in 1979 convened a workshop of nationally known experts on arson. From this came a national arson control assistance strategy, which combined the investigative and prosecutorial expertise of Federal criminal justice agencies with the financial and technical assistance provided by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)*

Approximately $3.5 million in Federal funds were earmarked for grants to assist States and localities in reducing deaths, injury, and economic losses from arson, and upgrading the collection and analysis of information about the incidence and control of the crime. An additional effort will train more than 15,000 State and local personnel through an interagency agreement with the U.S. Fire Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Finally, LEAA has also funded community-based campaigns to educate the public about arson prevention and ameliorate conditions known to contribute to arson.

* The LEAA program, begun in 1968, will be phased out in 1981. During its life, the LEAA channelled Federal funds to States and localities for a variety of criminal justice improvements. Budget constraints and the dominant role of States and localities in controlling crime dictated the end of massive Federal financial and technical aid, although Federal support for research and statistics will continue. Many of the innovative approaches begun with LEAA funds are expected to be continued at the State and local level.
Within the Justice Department, the National Institute of Justice sponsors and coordinates research to determine effective ways to counter the growing arson threat. Research is examining investigation, offender and incidence statistics, and adjudication. This year, the Institute published a Program Models report suggesting guidelines for public safety agencies on existing arson legislation, alternative ways to organize anti-arson programs, investigative techniques, and a preliminary assessment of existing anti-arson programs. The report also provides a diagnostic tool communities can use to analyze their arson problems and plan appropriate countermeasures.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation now includes arson as a Part I crime on the Index of Crime in its Uniform Crime Report as a result of a 1978 congressional directive. The Bureau's arson control effort is aimed at curtailing organized crime involvement and targeting for prosecution cases of major impact. FBI agents also are working closely with Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials to insure prosecutions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute. In coordination with the United States Fire Administration, which collects arson data from fire agencies, the FBI collects similar data from law enforcement agencies. The FBI also provides in-service training and arson crime-scene evidence examinations for State and local agencies.
The United States Fire Administration is charged with reducing the nation's losses caused by fire. In dealing with arson, the Fire Administration has sponsored seminars, developed model training courses and manuals, and provided training for both police and fire personnel in fire investigation techniques. The agency recently submitted a detailed report to the U.S. Congress on the Federal role in arson prevention and control. It is based on an intensive national survey and an analysis of existing research and programs at the Federal level.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is responsible for investigating violations of Federal firearms and explosives statutes, which prohibit the possession of many explosives and incendiary devices commonly used by arsonists. In coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies, ATF established arson task forces in several cities. The agency maintains laboratories and provides staff investigators to assist States and local efforts.

The United States Post Office is authorized to investigate the mail frauds and postal violations that frequently occur in arson-for-profit schemes. Working with private insurance organizations, the Post Office investigates individuals who agree to burn property and then submit fraudulent insurance claims on that property through the mail.
Other Federal agencies are also involved. For example, the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Forces experienced significant success in prosecuting cases involving arson-for-profit by organized crime; the United States Attorneys' Offices sponsor training for local prosecutors and participate in local arson control; and the Federal Insurance Administration, under the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plan, provides essential property insurance to areas where private insurance is unavailable.

C. The National Citizen's Crime Prevention Campaign: An Experiment in Raising Public Awareness and Involvement in Crime Prevention

Recruiting participants is a major problem for planners and implementers of any crime prevention program. Whether the strategy is individual protective action (such as the adoption of security devices to safeguard person and property) or a collective community program (such as a neighborhood patrol), it must have active support and participation by citizens to be effective in preventing victimization. Research has shown personal contact is the most effective recruitment technique; it is also the most costly, requiring large amounts of money, time, and manpower that is frequently beyond the resources of local crime prevention groups.

The vehicle that reaches the greatest number of potential participants at the lowest per capita cost is the mass media. Studies of mass media campaigns to date suggest they are effective in raising public awareness, but not successful in prompting citizens to act.
Because the recruitment potential of the mass media is so high, however, many jurisdictions throughout the country conduct public education campaigns about crime through the mass media. Last year, a national media campaign was launched by the Advertising Council of America, the public service arm of the advertising industry.

The media effort is part of a larger National Citizens Crime Prevention Campaign, supported by a coalition of public and private organizations with funding from both sectors. The sponsoring group, the Crime Prevention Coalition, is made up of representatives of law enforcement, minorities, the elderly, labor, education, and business and professional associations. Among the participants: the National Council on Crime and Delinquency; the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Sheriffs' Association; the National League of Cities; the National Education Association; The AFL-CIO; the Urban League; the National Council on La Raza; the National Council of Senior Citizens; the National Retail Merchant's Association; and the Boy Scouts of America.

American media are donating millions of dollars of air time and print space to the crime prevention messages, which offer tips on protecting individuals homes, and business and encourage citizens to get involved in collective crime prevention programs in their local communities.
Crime prevention booklets on such topics as residential security, personal security, fraud prevention, business security, arson control, avoiding sexual assault and others are available to the public free of charge. Organizations participating in the campaign are committed to stimulating new crime prevention programs by their local chapters and technical assistance is available to help local groups mount effective programs.

The campaign's goals are to broaden public understanding of the crime problem, reduce unwarranted fear of crime, and motivate citizens to take individual and collective action against crime. An evaluation is under way so the lessons learned in the campaign can benefit future research and planning for crime prevention.
Section IV Footnotes


V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN U.S. CRIME PREVENTION

A precise and detailed prediction of specific U.S. crime prevention policies and strategies is beyond the scope of this paper. Such forecasting would require accurate, in-depth assessments of future crime patterns and trends, criminal justice needs and capabilities, economic and technological resources, and many other complex social issues. On a more generic level, however, this section offers some tentative estimates about general trends in U.S. crime and crime prevention during the next 5 to 10 years. Although these predictions must remain tentative, barring more specialized forecasting research and analyses, they reflect the current facts and recent trends in U.S. crime and crime prevention, as reviewed in this paper.

A. Crime Incidence

High crime rates are likely to remain a serious problem in this country for a number of years to come. Since the complex, basic social and economic factors giving rise to current rates of personal and property crime cannot be easily or quickly changed, crime incidence is likely to continue at these elevated levels for some time. Fear of crime, however, seems to be more amenable to change through particular programs. With continued efforts to improve and increase their use of crime prevention strategies, U.S. communities may anticipate some lessening in the fear and insecurity experienced by residents. As noted, however,
crime rates are likely to remain relatively stable, and communities may expect current levels of personal crimes of violence and property offenses to continue for the next few years.

The nation's increasing concentration of its economic and political centers in ever-larger metropolitan areas, the growing bureaucratization of the society, and the movement of increasing numbers of the workforce away from industrial production ("blue collar") jobs and into administrative and service-delivery ("white collar") employment, have given rise to a new type of economic—or "white collar"—crime in the United States. Although such crimes produce less fear than the traditional violent crimes whose offenders use force to victimize individuals, white-collar criminals "victimize" the economic and moral fiber of the community and its institutions through deception, fraud, and corruption. Increasing levels of white collar crimes can be expected in the United States in the coming years, as the conditions that spawn them continue to increase.

B. Crime Prevention

In assessing future directions for crime prevention in the United States, this paper does not attempt precise predictions about the implementation of specific strategies. Rather, it describes some changes in emphasis likely to occur in our overall approach to crime prevention.
Section III of this paper presented three major perspectives on crime currently prevailing in the United States: the victimization perspective, the social disorganization perspective, and the legislative perspective. The victimization and social disorganization perspectives offer alternative approaches for involving citizens in crime prevention, while the legislative perspective offers decriminalization and deterrence as alternative strategies for using legislation to prevent crime. Since a nation's current theoretical and operational approaches may play an important role in determining future policies, the following examines these alternatives, their effectiveness, and their implications for future U.S. responses to crime.

Comparisons of two legislative alternatives—decriminalization (which legalizes previously criminal behavior and thus "prevents" its occurrence from being classified as "crime") and deterrence (which increases the severity of penalties for crime in order to deter it) suggest that future U.S. strategies are likely to emphasize deterrence rather than decriminalization as the preferred approach to crime prevention. Comparing results of recent examples with each type of strategy (discussed in Section III C of this paper), deterrence achieved some measure of success in reducing crime; decriminalization has had mixed results at best and sometimes has been associated with subsequent increases in offenses as well as with other negative criminal justice consequences.
Similarly, a future shift in emphasis is also likely to occur between the victimization and social disorganization perspectives on crime and their alternative approaches for involving citizens in crime prevention. Since the early 1970's, the victimization perspective has predominated in this country, and it is responsible for most of the recent crime prevention innovations described in this paper. Although some important successes have been achieved, the "victimization" approach has frequently experienced difficulties both in recruiting citizen participation and in making a successful impact on crime.

In addition, recent research findings have suggested that most citizens or community residents (as opposed to criminal justice and official personnel) do not view crime as a problem of "victimization" alone, but rather view it from the broader "social disorganization" perspective. Consequently, conditions that generate community insecurity and fear include not only crime but all types of community disorders, disruptions, and deterioration in services and living conditions, which are manifestations of the basic problems of social disorganization and loss of social control. Perhaps for this reason, programs that address a broad range of community issues and problems are generally more successfully implemented, recruit greater community participation and sustain a higher level of activity over a longer period of time than those programs that focus more specifically on preventing crime. Multi-issue programs also seem to be more effective than single-issue crime.
reduction strategies in decreasing community insecurity and fear and in achieving some improvements in community living conditions.

For these reasons, future U.S. crime prevention efforts are likely to reflect the social disorganization perspective on crime. Although future programs may well include victimization-prevention strategies, they will encompass a much wider range of community concerns than crime alone, and they will work toward the much broader ultimate social goal of improving the quality of community life.