


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THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCOMPATIBLE GOAL  
STRUCTURES IN CORRECTIONAL  
SETTINGS

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The Metropolitan Criminal Justice Center operates the Pilot City program in Chesapeake, Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Virginia Beach, Virginia. Established in September, 1971, the Center is a research and program planning and development component of the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. The Center's Pilot City program is one of eight throughout the nation funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U. S. Department of Justice. The basic purpose of each Pilot City project is to assist local jurisdictions in the design and establishment of various programs, often highly innovative and experimental in nature, which will contribute over a period of years to the development of a model criminal justice system. Each Pilot City team is also responsible for assuring comprehensive evaluation of such programs, for assisting the development of improved criminal justice planning ability within the host jurisdictions, and for providing technical assistance to various local agencies when requested.

The Pilot City Program has two primary responsibilities: to the host municipalities and to the improvement of the criminal justice system. In Virginia, responsibility for adult corrections, except for offenders sentenced for one year or less to local jails, rests entirely with the State Department of Welfare and Institutions. Thus, the Pilot City Program's activities in the adult corrections area consist primarily of program planning assistance to local correctional efforts and research regarding such currently important issues in Virginia as sentencing procedures and criteria (as reflected in this monograph), community corrections, and institutional programming and management.

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCOMPATIBLE GOAL STRUCTURES  
IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS\*

Most total institutions are expected to affect changes in the world-view, personality structure, knowledge, or skill of those whose lives they administer. In addition, however, some degree of control over those involved in the change process is necessary. Prisons and mental hospitals, for example, are increasingly called upon to initiate and support programs of rehabilitation and treatment, but they are also expected to maintain custodial control over those remanded to their care by other social agencies (cf. Goffman, 1961; Schrag, 1961). The potential conflict which such dual goals represent quite frequently becomes manifest through the placement of a higher priority on the achievement of either "change goals" or "control goals" when the formal goals of these organizations are translated into operational goals, and the levels of goal conflict that emerge can prove counterproductive to the overall effectiveness of the organizations.

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Perhaps the most obvious setting within which structures designed primarily to facilitate the pursuit of control goals have attempted to shift their attention to change goals without any meaningful modification in their basic organizational design is that of the traditional maximum security penitentiary. In virtually every state in the country it is possible to document an increasing expenditure of available resources toward the goal stimulating desired changes in the attitudes and behavior of inmate populations, but the probability of success has been seriously questioned (cf. Cressey, 1965). Unfortunately, apart from recidivism rates that are subject to influences which are not attributable to prison organizations and a growing number of studies which have focused attention on what Clemmer (1940: 291) has termed the "prisonization" process, only a small number of studies have attempted to examine the consequences of confinement in prison organizations (cf. Garrity, 1958, 1961; Glaser, 1964; Kassebaum, Ward, and Wilner, 1971; Thomas and Foster, 1972). Thus, in this paper we hope to explore two issues. First, on a conceptual level we will attempt to offer an interpretation of why the pursuit of both change and control goals so frequently takes place within the coercive structure of the penitentiary. Second, we will examine the extent to which a specific prison organization has been successful in its pursuit of change goals.

Conceptual Model

Any model that seeks to explain the affect of goal conflict on organizational effectiveness is confronted with at

least two basic problems. First, one must be able to provide a rationale for the pursuit of potentially incompatible goals within a single organizational structure. Second, given such a rationale, one must be able to relate the degree of goal conflict to the degree of organizational effectiveness.

The rationale for the pursuit of incompatible goals becomes clear given a brief comparison of total institutions with competitive economic organizations. The latter are defined by a more or less "rationally" interrelated network of positions and a relatively efficient allocation of available resources. Their organizational effectiveness is judged with respect to their attainment of output goals with the referent for success typically being a composite of production levels, profit margins, and so on. The particular mode of processing which they employ is generally hidden from the public view and, in any event, stands as an organizational goal in the sense that efficient processing is a prerequisite for the effective attainment of profit-oriented goals. The nature of the materials being processed is seldom an immediate issue except with regard to the economics of supply and demand, availability of resources, and the degree of technological sophistication required for efficient processing (Perrow, 1967; Thompson, 1967). Both the relative specificity of organizational goals and the unidimensional evaluation of organizational effectiveness reduce the probability of basic goal conflict and goal

displacement (Warner and Havens, 1968).

Like competitive organizations, total institutions are expected to have a "product:" rehabilitated inmates, cured mental patients, educated students, and so on. Quite unlike competitive economic organizations, however, the mode of assessing organizational effectiveness is not limited to simply an evaluation of output criteria, nor is the mode of processing employed by the organization judged directly on the basis of its contribution toward the achievement of production goals.<sup>1</sup> Instead, an evaluation of the extent to which control goals have been achieved during the period of organizational processing takes on a significant and sometimes a dominant role. The organizational effectiveness of a university, for example, is only partially related to such output criteria as the quality of the professional or vocational training provided by the organization. An additional criterion of evaluation is defined by the extent to which the organization has retained the desired level of control during the period of training and education.

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<sup>1</sup>The present concern with environmental pollution is focusing attention on the mode of processing being utilized in many industrial organizations and, not unlike the case of total institutions, the public evaluations of organizational effectiveness now include a dimension related to the model of processing as well as previous considerations of the effectiveness of that processing.

Societal expectations dictate that the university must protect as well as educate. Similarly, recidivism statistics provide one means of evaluating the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs (Schrag, 1961; Wheeler, 1961). Prisons must insure custody as well as rehabilitate. Thus, societal definition of the appropriate goals for total institutions may result in their being evaluated in terms of how they function as well as how well they function. The process may become as important as the product.

Two further distinctions existing between total institutions and typical competitive organizations are relevant for this discussion: (1) the relative visibility of goal attainment and (2) the organizational perceptions of participants. Both are crucial considerations in predicting whether control or change goals will be ascribed the higher priority. The visibility of goal attainment has two obvious referents: attainment of control goals and attainment of change goals. Because the public typically has direct or indirect control over most total institutions, and because the public tends to employ highly visible criteria making their evaluations, the assignment of goal priorities within these organizations is directly related to which of the two general goal attainment categories is the more visible. Universities provide an apt illustration of what might be termed "negotiated visibility" in this respect. The public makes a negative evaluation of a university based on a highly visible campus disturbance. (The university has failed to

achieve its control goals.) The administration counters this evaluation by pointing to the number of degrees granted, the proportion of students who go on to pursue advanced degrees, and so on. (We have achieved our change goals despite weaknesses in achieving control goals.) The implication is that when the achievement of both control and change goals are highly visible the organization may be able to barter for more favorable evaluations of their effectiveness by shifting the focus of the evaluation from points of weakness to points of strength. To the extent that the outcome of this bartering process favors the organization, no basic alteration of organizational structure is necessitated. The prison, however, is ill-suited for such negotiated evaluations. As an organization it has little prestige because convicted felons, the participants in the prison organization, are the objects of considerable fear and negative stereotyping. Further, the degree of societal commitment to the change goals of the organization is far lower than that made, for example, to education. Hence, when the prison is negatively evaluated because of a failure to achieve control goals (as after an act of violence, riot, or escape), the organization enters the bargaining process at a distinct disadvantage. The continued high rates of recidivism, for example, make it exceedingly difficult for prison administrators to point to their success in achieving change goals. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that prison organizations frequently allocate resources and develop regulations which place a high premium on controlling or preventing behavior which



would detract from the probability of efficient attainment of control goals (Cressey, 1965).

Second, organizational perceptions of the participants in the change process are an important predictor of goal priorities (Blau and Scott, 1962; Etzioni, 1961, 1965; Lefton and Rosengren, 1966). The proposition that the more positive the evaluation of the participants the higher the priority of change goals defines the form of the theoretical linkage. The familiar situation of the university provides an example of the basic idea. Consider the differential concern with control goals when the objects of control change from freshmen to graduate students. The comparatively low social distance between faculty and graduate students, the complementary nature of their interests, and the positive faculty evaluations of graduate students result in far less concern with their control than is true with less advanced students. Guidance, structure, and direction are perceived as more necessary for the latter. Further, and an important consideration in any organization, should the organization define particular participants in a negative way the organization frequently has the opportunity to remove them. Thus, should a university student not achieve certain standards of performance with respect to both the change and control goals of the institution, the organizational rules allow for his removal. In effect, the power to remove provides for intra-organizational selectivity which supplements the various types of pre-entry selectivity and screening to which many participants in total

institutions are subjected.

While the move from university to prison is considerable, the same general processes are in effect in prisons with two basic limitations: there are no "graduate inmates" nor may the organization develop rules which allow for the effective removal of those who fail to meet minimal performance standards.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, inmates stand as a permanent freshman class and, quite the opposite to standards present in most other organizations, only those who perform satisfactorily are removed from participation. The notion that all inmates require considerable guidance, structure, direction, and control is, therefore, reflected in the negative stereotypes of inmates held by personnel at all levels of the organization, even among those whose primary function is defined as treatment or rehabilitation (Wheeler, 1961). The proposition stated earlier is, therefore, reversible when the object of analysis is a coercive organization: the more negative the evaluation of the organizational

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<sup>2</sup> As was pointed out to us by Professor David M. Petersen of Georgia State University, there are exceptions to these assertions. The variations between maximum and minimum security institutions in both federal and state prisons allow for the transfer or removal of those whom the authorities wish to eliminate and there are custody gradations within most institutions. Further, the trustee inmates in many prisons provide at least an approximation of "graduate inmates."

participants the higher the priority of control goals.

In summary, the pursuit of the essentially incompatible control and change goals in such coercive organizations as prisons appears to have several interrelated determinants: (1) the relative inability to effect control by either the self-selection exercised by potential participants or organizational screening techniques; (2) the inability of the organization to sustain control through the removal of participants who fail to conform to minimal performance standards; (3) the evaluations of organizational effectiveness based more on the easily measured achievement of control goals than on the diffuse, less visible change goals; and (4) the negative organizational definitions of participants in the change process. The presence of these determinants within a single organizational context yields the prediction that the organization will have a formal structure designed to maximize the probability of achieving control goals. This orientation provides the foundation for a general definition of such organizations as prison: "A third type of total institution is organized to protect the community against what are felt to be intentional dangers to it, with the welfare of the persons thus sequestered not the immediate issue ... (Goffman, 1961: 5-6)."

#### The Research Problem

Given the preceding rationale for the presence of conflicting goals in change-oriented total institutions which incorporate negatively stereotyped and non-committed participants, a linkage must be demonstrated between goal conflict and

and reduced organizational effectiveness. This task provides the focus for the analysis which follows. The general logic of the argument is clear. A primary consequence of striving to maximize the probability of achieving control goals in an organization is the alienation of organizational participants (Etzioni, 1961, 1965; Blauner, 1964; Aiken and Hage, 1966). This is particularly true of prison inmates who are physically isolated from access to contacts with the free society and structurally isolated from access to legitimate power within the prison. The organizational emphasis on maintaining custodial control becomes articulated in highly routinized schedules, involved regulations, and continual surveillance (Clemmer, 1940; Sykes, 1958). New inmates, already the subjects of public degradation through their having been processed by the police and courts, find themselves the object of further attacks through the depersonalization associated with routine induction ceremonies when they arrive at the institution (Goffman, 1961; Garfinkel, 1956; Sykes and Messinger, 1960). The social psychological impact of these processes and the various differentials in response to imprisonment found in any institution are certainly related to factors exogenous to the prison. The inmates' prior socialization, criminal involvement before imprisonment, contacts which they maintain while incarcerated, and expectations of life-chances after release are of importance in any general explanation of the effect of imprisonment on adult felons (Irwin and Cressey, 1964; Wellford, 1967; Cline, 1968; Tittle, 1972; Thomas, 1973; Thomas and

Foster, 1973). Our intent in this essay is not, however, to examine the various determinants of what Clemmer termed "prisonization" (1940). Instead, we wish to examine the effect of alienation (herein conceived as a structurally generated pressure which emerges as a function of the coercive nature of the formal organization of the prison) on the effectiveness of the prison in achieving change-oriented goals. In this regard, our expectations may be briefly described. Initially, there seems little justification for anticipating a direct linkage between the alienation of inmates from the prison organization and any impairment of organizational effectiveness. To the contrary, it would appear to be more appropriate to view structurally-generated alienation as but another of the numerous problems and pressures to which members of the inmate population must adjust. Viewed in that fashion, alienation can be conceptualized as one of the several determinants of prisonization, an assimilative process which provides at least one means by which similarly-situated inmates can attempt to reduce the problems inherent in "doing time" in a custodially-oriented penitentiary. Prisonization, however, implies that the inmate will become responsive to a broad spectrum of normative tenets that are reflected in the "inmate code" and which promote opposition to agencies of social control in general, the prison organization in particular, and self-identification as a criminal (cf. Thomas and Foster, 1972). In other words, although the levels of alienation which are promoted among the inmate population by the coercive structure of the organization in which they are

unwilling participants does not directly lessen organizational effectiveness, it seems probable that such a pressure may well foster increased integration into the inmate society. This increased integration, in turn, does seem directly linked to consequences that do impair organizational effectiveness. The following propositions define the outline of the argument that we will examine in the analysis which follows.

Postulate I: The more coercive the nature of the formal organization, the greater the degree of alienation that will be found among the inmate population.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The fact that our study does not provide cross-institutional comparisons precludes the possibility of assessing variations in response to imprisonment which are related to variations in organizational structure. Nevertheless, the fact that perceptions of alienation, reflected by the degree of powerlessness in this study, do vary within a single organization allows an exploratory measure of the general effect of alienation. The logic of analysis of variance designs adequately represents our reasoning on this important problem. Specifically, we certainly expect within group variations in perception of and response to alienating situations, but the between group variations are expected to be even greater. For example, although measures of alienation would be important in a minimum security, treatment-oriented correctional institution, we would expect a significantly lower mean alienation level than that found in a maximum security institution.

Proposition 1: The greater degree of alienation, the greater degree of prisonization.

Proposition 2: The greater degree of prisonization, the greater the degree of opposition to the prison organization and its programs.

Proposition 3: The greater the degree of prisonization, the greater the degree of criminal identification.

Proposition 4: The greater the degree of prisonization, the greater the degree of opposition to agencies of social control other than the prison (e.g., the courts, the police, and the legal system as a whole).

Proposition 5: The greater the degree of opposition to the prison organization and its programs, the greater the degree of opposition to agencies of social control other than the prison.

Proposition 6: The greater the degree of opposition to social control agencies other than the prison, the greater degree of criminal identification.

Methodology

The data which provide the basis for the analysis which follows were obtained in the spring of 1970 from a maximum security penitentiary located in an urban area in the Southeast.

At the time of the study slightly over 1,000 inmates were confined in the institution, 810 of whom were classified as part of the working population of the institution. The majority of the remainder were confined in a reception unit prior to being assigned to a permanent institution. In order to exclude any transient inmates from our sample, we drew a systematic random sample of 405 inmates from the 810 who were in the working population, and this was supplemented by the inclusion of 37 inmates who were not in the working population by virtue of their confinement in a special maximum security cell block within the institution. Of this initial group of 442 inmates, only 401 were available for contact when the data collection began. After sample shrinkage caused by refusals, transfers, releases, and so on during the course of the data collection, we were able to obtain completed questionnaire data from 336 inmates, 84 percent of the base sample. The questionnaire materials were supplemented by matching the questionnaires with official institutional records on each inmate, and we were able to adequately match 276 of the 336 questionnaires with these records, a match rate of 82 percent. Our analysis includes only those 276 cases for whom both completed questionnaires and records data were available. The operational measures developed from these materials are described below.

Alienation Prior research has conceptualized alienation as a generalized sense of estrangement, and such techniques as factor analysis have shown that the concept should be viewed as multidimensional (Seeman, 1959, 1967; Neal and Rettig, 1967).



A six-item Likert scale derived from the measure of powerlessness reported by Neal and Rettig (1967) was used in this study.<sup>4</sup> A major difficulty in employing this measure is related to our not having comparative data from different types of organizations and, therefore, no direct empirical evidence to support the assertion that the alienation is associated with the coercive structure of the organization within which the research was conducted. Two related sets of findings, however, provide substantial indirect support for the contention that the measure employed in this analysis does reflect structurally-generated alienation rather than some more general type of alienation not associated with confinement. First, recent research has shown that measures of both general and contextual alienation are strongly associated with one another (Thomas and Zingraff, 1974). Second, in another recent paper which utilized the same data that provide the basis for the present analysis, an extended series of multiple regression analyses were unable to attribute more than a relatively small proportion of the variance in powerlessness to factors other than organizational structure (Thomas, Haen, and Swain, 1974). These findings, in conjunction

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<sup>4</sup>Item selections from our initial pool of items were accomplished by computing item-to-scale correlations. Any item which did not produce a correlation that was greater than .35 and significant at the .001 confidence level was defined as non-discriminatory and, therefore, deleted from the final scale. The same technique was employed in the item analysis for each of the other scales reported in this paper (cf. Frances, 1967: 205).

with the considerable literature which links alienation with coercive organizational structures, supports the use of the variable in our analysis despite our realization that comparative analysis is necessary for an ideal test of the model we have proposed. The mean of the scale employed is 13.53 with a standard deviation of 5.00. The lower the scale score, the higher the level of powerlessness.

Prisonization Prisonization reflects the degree of normative assimilation into the inmate contraculture. The focus of this measure is the cluster of normative prescriptions and proscriptptions implied by the inmate code which places a high evaluation on physical toughness, in group loyalty, exploitative sex relations, and manipulative relations with members of the prison staff. A fourteen-item Likert scale was developed to measure this dimension of prisonization. The mean of the scale is 38.33 with a standard deviation of 12.49. The lower the scale score, the higher the level of prisonization.

Opposition to the Formal Organization of the Prison A second cluster of normative tenets, and one which is frequently confused with adoption of the inmate code, reflects the response of the "kept" to their "keepers," and to the general characteristics of the prison as a formal organization (Goffman, 1961; Wellford, 1967). This set of norms was measured by a twenty-one item Likert scale. The mean of the scale is 55.46 with a standard deviation of 17.58. The lower the scale score the greater the degree of opposition to the prison organization.

Attitudes toward the Legal System If prison organizations are successful in attaining their change goals, one clear point at which this attainment should be evidenced would be in attitudes which legitimate and support the law. We have suggested, however, that one consequence of prisonization is the development of attitudes which oppose both the prison organization and other social control agencies. In order to examine the hypothesis, we constructed an eleven-item Likert scale which focuses on attitudes toward social control agencies and willingness to abide by and support the law. The mean of the scale is 36.40 with a standard deviation of 10.14. The lower the scale score, the more negative the attitudes toward the legal system.

Criminal Identification While prisonization is conceptualized as a process of assimilation into the inmate contraculture, one product of prisonization, "criminalization," is herein conceptualized as an index of the failure of the formal organization to implement programs which achieve basic change goals of the organization. This product is defined as the inmate's willingness to accept the label ascribed to him by the larger society and his willingness to associate with criminals in the free society. This aspect of criminalization is measured by a six-item scale. The mean of the scale is 22.04 with a standard deviation of 5.12. The lower the scale score, the higher the degree of criminal identification.

Analysis and Findings

As noted earlier, our expectations are that powerlessness will be directly linked to levels of prisonization, but only indirectly associated with the remaining variables in the model. Prisonization, however, is expected to be directly linked with each of the three consequence variables. Moreover, opposition to the prison organization is conceptualized as one aspect of a more general opposition to social control agencies in general, and it is hypothesized to be directly linked with levels of criminal identification. All other linkages in the model are expected to be indirect. A schematic representation of the model, including the necessary zero-order and partial correlations required to evaluate the adequacy of the model, is provided in Figure 1. A complete zero-order correlation matrix is provided in Table 1.

A review of the statistical information which is summarized in Figure 1 shows that there is strong support for the expectations stated earlier. Initially, the expectation that levels of powerlessness would be directly linked to levels of prisonization, but only indirectly associated with the remaining variables is strongly supported. While Table 1 shows that there were weak zero-order correlations between powerlessness and each of the three variables which we have described as consequences of prisonization, the introduction of prisonization as a control variable resulted in the reduction of each of the three associations to insignificant levels.

TABLE 1  
Intercorrelation Matrix

	X <sub>1</sub>	X <sub>2</sub>	X <sub>3</sub>	X <sub>4</sub>	X <sub>5</sub>
X <sub>1</sub>	1.000	.410	.139	.229	.131
X <sub>2</sub>		1.000	.479	.528	.513
X <sub>3</sub>			1.000	.576	.277
X <sub>4</sub>				1.000	.472
X <sub>5</sub>					1.000

X<sub>1</sub> = Powerlessness

X<sub>2</sub> = Prisonization


X<sub>3</sub> = Opposition to the Prison Organization

X<sub>4</sub> = Opposition to the Legal System

X<sub>5</sub> = Criminal Identification

TABLE 2

Zero-Order and Partial Correlations Required for a Test of the  
Theoretical Model



$X_1X_3 \cdot X_2 = -.072$	$X_1X_3 \cdot X_1 = .468$	$X_2X_4 \cdot X_3 = .351$	$X_3X_4 \cdot X_2 = .433$	$X_4X_5 \cdot X_2 = .276$
$X_1X_4 \cdot X_2 = .016$	$X_2X_4 \cdot X_1 = .489$	$X_2X_5 \cdot X_3 = .451$	$X_3X_5 \cdot X_2 = .041$	$X_4X_5 \cdot X_3 = .397$
$X_1X_5 \cdot X_2 = -.102$	$X_2X_5 \cdot X_1 = .508$		$X_3X_5 \cdot X_4 = .008$	

Thus, the impact of what we have referred to as structurally-generated alienation on reduction in levels of organizational effectiveness appears to operate only indirectly through its influence of levels of prisonization.

The relationship between prisonization and opposition to the prison organization, opposition to the legal system, and criminal identification seems equally clear. When these linkages were examined after the introduction of powerlessness as a control variable in order to test for possible spurious associations, the changes that are reflected in the partial correlations were only very slight. This, of course, does not lead to the conclusion that the linkage between prisonization and both opposition to the legal system and criminal identification is direct. As can be seen from an examination of the model which is presented in Figure 1, the association between prisonization and opposition to the legal system and criminal identification could be indirect rather than direct. An review of the appropriate partial correlations, however, shows only slight reductions in the partial correlation when opposition to the prison organization is held constant. This led to the interpretation that the predictions of direct linkages between prisonization and the other three variables are strongly supported.

Finally, attention must be directed toward an examination of the interrelationships between the three consequence variables. Our expectations were that opposition to the prison organization would be directly associated with opposition to the legal system, but that the linkage between opposition to the prison organization

and criminal identification. Were this not the case, several possibilities would have to be considered. For example, each of the three consequences could be independent outcomes of prisonization, in which case a control for prisonization would reduce the first-order correlations between the consequence variables to zero. Further, opposition to the prison organization could be unrelated to opposition to the legal system and criminal identification, but the latter two variables could remain linked with one another after the introduction of appropriate control variables. Further still, and perhaps the most likely possibility, opposition to the prison organization could be directly linked with criminal identification rather than indirectly associated through the opposition to the legal system variable, a possibility that would become obvious were a control for opposition to the legal system not to eliminate the zero-order relationship between opposition to the prison organization and criminal identification. As can be seen in Figure 1, however, the partial correlations show that the proposed model provides a better fit with the data than do any of the possible alternatives.

Given our interest in examining the consequences of alienation for the effectiveness of the prison organization in attaining its change goals, one further extension of our analysis seems appropriate. Specifically, it is instructive to determine the proportion of variance in opposition to the prison organization, opposition to the legal system, and criminal identification that can be attributed to variables in the model on which each is dependent. Toward that end we have constructed a series of multiple regression



equations. In each we have employed a stepwise solution, and any variable in the equations which did not yield a regression coefficient that was significant at the .01 level was deleted from the final computations. These equations, with the appropriate Beta coefficients, are provided below:

$$\text{Equation 1: } X_3 = 31.88 + -.069X_1 + .508X_2$$

$$\text{Equation 2: } X_4 = 15.01 + .256X_2 + .223X_3$$

$$\text{Equation 3: } X_5 = 12.65 + .389X_2 + -.094X_3 + .320X_4$$

In the initial equation, powerlessness, as expected, was not a significant influence apart from its association with prisonization, and the powerlessness variable did not have a significant regression coefficient in either of the other equations. The squared coefficients of multiple correlation yielded by these equations were .234, .414, and .325, respectively. In other words, substantial proportions of the variance in each of the consequence variables is attributable to other variables in the model.

#### Summary and Conclusions

We have presented a theoretical model in which structurally-generated alienation was depicted as a significant determinant of prisonization, a process whose consequences imply considerable impairment in the extent to which the prison organization will be successful in attaining its change goals. Such impairment is viewed as a consequence of this type of organization attempting to pursue essentially incompatible goals within the context of an organizational structure that is better suited for the maintenance of desired levels of social control than for stimulating the types of prosocial change that are explicit in the formal goal statement

of virtually all prison organizations.

Our analysis provides strong support for our expectation that levels of alienation, while not directly linked with consequences that imply the failure to attain organizational change goals, is associated with levels of prisonization. Prisonization in turn, was shown to be strongly linked with opposition to the prison organization, opposition to the legal system, and criminal identification. Further, prisonization was shown to be indirectly linked with opposition to the legal system through the direct influence of opposition to the prison organization on the opposition to the legal system variable, and opposition to the prison organization was also shown to have an indirect effect on criminal identification through its association with opposition to the legal system, a variable which was shown to be directly linked with criminal identification. When multiple regression analysis was completed in order to determine the proportion of variance which could be attributed to the other variables in the model, we found that substantial proportions of the variance in each of the consequence variables were accounted for.

Our conclusions may be simply stated. The adoption of a coercive organization structure by prison organizations appears to directly contribute to a process which will prove counterproductive to the change goals of the organization. Further, the failure of the organization to attain its change goals appears to take two referents. First, the coercive structure contributes toward a consequence which leaves the inmates hostile toward the organization and its programs. This outcome suggests that efforts

to implement effective programs of change will not be well-received by the inmates and, ironically, that the coercive structure may contribute to the emergence of levels of opposition and hostility that will impair the ability of the organization to maintain the level of custodial control which many feel is facilitated by the coercive structure. In other words, the structure may impair the organization's ability to attain either change or control goals, not simply reduce its effectiveness as a change agent.

Second, despite some argument which assert that adaptations to the prison have only slight carry-over into the postrelease lives of inmates, our analysis shows that the levels of prisonization which are in part attributable to confinement in a coercively-oriented setting elicit high levels of opposition to the legal system and significant degrees of self-identification as a criminal. While we do not have longitudinal data on those in our sample that would provide us with a means of determining the extent to which opposition to the legal system and criminal identification influence postrelease behavior, it seems very likely that such oppositional attitudes will foster postrelease success. Thus, in short, we are led to conclude that the structure of the prison organization in institutions comparable to that in which this research was conducted have the latent consequence of significantly reducing the extent to which the organization will become successful with respect to either its change or its control goals.

APPENDIX

Questionnaire Items. Respondents were asked to check one of five possible response items for the questions listed below. Only the four most discriminating items are listed for each scale, as some of the scales ran as long as 21 items.

	<u>Item to Scale</u> <u>Score Correla-</u> <u>tion</u>
1. The powerlessness scale (derived from Neal and Rettig, 1967):	
a. People like me have little chance of getting what we want when our wants come in conflict with the interests of groups that have a lot of power.	.648
b. It is only wishful thinking to believe that a person like me can have an influence in the world today.	.614
c. The world is run by a few people in power and there's not much the little guy can do about it.	.586
d. I feel more and more helpless when I see what's going on around here.	.581
2. The extent of inmate code adoption:	
a. The other inmates are right when they say, "Don't do anything more than you have to."	.670
b. You have to do what you can to help other inmates even when it might get you in trouble with the officers	.632
c. When inmates stick together it is a lot easier to do time.	.617
d. Around here it's best to do something to others before they get a chance to do it to you.	.597

Item to Scale  
Score Correla-  
tion

3. Attitudes toward the organization:
- a. Most of the people on the staff here do their best to help the inmates. (Reversed) .712
  - b. The officers are usually willing to meet the inmates half-way. (Reversed) .665
  - c. The counselors here seem to be quite helpful in discussing personal problems with inmates. (Reversed) .626
  - d. If you stop and think about it most of the rules they have here make pretty good sense (Reversed) .618
4. Attitudes toward the legal system:
- a. Laws are for the poor to obey and the rich to ignore. .568
  - b. We should obey the law even though we might not agree with it. (Reversed) .531
  - c. The only kind of person I take as a friend is one who respects the law. (Reversed) .431
  - d. It's hard to have much respect for the law after I think about how I've been treated by people who are supposed to support the law. .601
5. The extent of criminal identification:
- a. When you do the kind of work I do on the street, you just have to expect to pull a few years in prison once in a while. .691

Item to Scale  
Score Correla-  
tion

- b. It is OK to hang around with people who break the law as long as you stay clean yourself. .639
- c. Since everybody thinks I'm a criminal I might as well go ahead and be one when I leave here. .554
- d. When a man leaves the prison he can make it on the street without breaking the law if he wants to. (Reversed) .506

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