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WHAT IMPACT WILL LAW ENFORCEMENT
HAVE ON ILLEGAL DRUG MANUFACTURING
BY THE YEAR 2000?

by

GARY R. BARNES

COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS IX

PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

1989

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U.S. Department of Justice
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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

What can be expected from illegal drug laboratories in the next ten years?

PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A strategic plan to improve law enforcement's ability to control illegal drug laboratories.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Implementing an illegal drug laboratory task force.

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Executive Summary

California is often seen as the "trend-setter" for our society. Unfortunately, these trends are not always positive. Drug abuse, and, in particular, illegal drug manufacturing, is one of these negative trends. Between 1983 and 1988, 3,084 illegal drug laboratories were reported seized by law enforcement in the United States. Of these seizures, California accounted for 1,603, or 51.8 percent of the total, with most of these being methamphetamine.

The issue of illegal drug laboratories has been a growing problem for law enforcement for the past two decades. However, only during the last few years have significant law enforcement resources been directed at controlling this proliferating problem.

The question of what impact will law enforcement have on illegal drug manufacturing by the year 2000 was studied. Current trends and possible future events which could have an impact on illegal drug manufacturing were identified and forecast by a study group to determine their impact on this problem. Information obtained from the study group has been used to develop three scenarios depicting three possible law enforcement futures that may occur during the next decade. One of the future scenarios has been used to provide a platform from which to develop a strategic plan to help law enforcement avoid, as best as possible, the negative events in the selected scenario.

To help facilitate law enforcement's ability to control illegal drug laboratories, a strategic plan and management process took into account two major strategies identified in this monograph. They entail the need for law enforcement to cooperate with one another by forming task forces to address illegal drug laboratories. This would allow consolidation of resources and knowledge to pursue an often mobile criminal enterprise which recognizes no borders and is increasingly sophisticated.

The second strategy concerns drug education and postulates that only through education can any long term positive effects be realized in controlling drug abuse and related criminal enterprises associated with illegal drug manufacturing.

To help facilitate the orderly implementation of the strategic plan, a transition management process was developed. This transition plan takes into account the current strengths and weaknesses of contemporary law enforcement, as well as making certain assumptions regarding key individuals and groups who are needed to ensure successful implementation of the strategic plan.

Additionally, a "Project Manager" and "Representatives of Constituents" transition management structure is utilized to help ensure a successful transition.

The study concludes by stressing the need for a cooperative effort by law enforcement in their mission to control what could be the next wave of illegal drug activity faced by our society. Lastly, only through education and the determination of our citizens to face an expensive and extended battle with not just illegal drug laboratories, but illegal drugs in general, will this problem be brought under control.

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Methamphetamine called bigger threat


The Press-Enterprise Friday, September 15, 1989 A-3

New form of 'speed' has officials worried

By S.L. WYKES
Knight-Ridder Newspapers
SAN FRANCISCO

Ice's particular chemical structure allows the full strength of the drug to be absorbed by the body.

Drug a big problem in California
Methamphetamine production skyrockets
10/10/88




New Drug 'Ice' Called Worse Peril Than Crack

Honolulu

By Emory Holmes II
Special to The Chronicle
Editor for the Honolulu Police Department

Sunday, July 9, 1989



'Speed' labs easy to start up and hide

...two counties between October and early June, and all but one were...
By ROSS FULCHER
The Press-Enterprise

WHAT IMPACT WILL LAW ENFORCEMENT
HAVE ON ILLEGAL DRUG MANUFACTURING
BY THE YEAR 2000?

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

Social Considerations

The use of illegal and abuse of legal drugs in American society is considered by many to be one of our country's most pressing social issues,¹ and the responsibility for controlling this problem has fallen primarily on law enforcement. Unless this approach of "leaving it to law enforcement" changes as a result of major modifications in state and federal law, or if America as a society says "no" to drugs, it will be important for law enforcement to assiduously keep abreast of current trends associated with drug abuse and, when possible, influence positive responses to future illegal drug-related issues.²

In January of 1988, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese announced the results of a study by the National Institute of Justice which revealed that well over half of the men arrested for serious crimes in a dozen U.S. cities tested positive for

¹"Drug Use in U.S. Plummets," The Press Enterprise, August 1, 1989, Sec. A, p. 1.

²"Question of Legalizing Drugs is Back on the Table," New York Times News Service, The Press Enterprise, May 15, 1988, Sec. A, p. 1.

Illegal drug use.³ The resulting percentages are as follows:

New York City - 79%
Washington D.C. - 77%
San Diego - 75%
Chicago - 72%
New Orleans - 72%
Portland - 70%
Los Angeles - 69%
Detroit - 66%
Ft. Lauderdale - 65%
Houston - 62%
Indianapolis - 60%
Phoenix - 53%

It is important to note that most of the individuals who provided the voluntary urine tests had been charged with street crimes such as burglary, grand theft, larceny and assault, and a few men were charged with drug sales, drunk driving, or disorderly conduct.⁴

Technical Considerations

Criminals using elaborate methods and sophisticated equipment have realized huge profits by importing illegal drugs into the United States.⁵ Their planes, boats, cars, and communication equipment are the best money can buy.

The large open borders and extensive coastlines of the United States make it very difficult, if not impossible, to interdict most imported drugs. Even if it were possible to completely secure our borders, the results would not be total

³"Drug Users Commit Most Crimes, Justice Department Says," The Press Enterprise, January 22, 1988.

⁴Ibid.

⁵"Survey Rates Drugs as Top Concern," Fort Lauderdale News & Sun-Sentinel, (Gallup Poll), The Press Enterprise, A-3, August 15, 1989.

control as most people might expect. To illustrate the continuing problem, a "source" on the staff of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations revealed to an Associated Press reporter, "we've had people tell us that if the borders were sealed, within three days domestic labs would be producing synthetic cocaine."⁴ In other words, the vast technical and financial resources of the current foreign cocaine cartels would shift to U.S.-based clandestine laboratories.

The illegal domestic drug laboratories that now exist are normally operated by "kitchen" chemists. The chemists' knowledge ranges from that derived from the advanced degrees of universities to that of individuals using drug recipes obtained through underground books or recipes handed down from other individuals involved in illegal drug manufacturing.⁷

In recent years, the term "designer drugs" has come to be associated with clandestine labs. The term "designer drugs" is credited to Dr. Gary Henderson of the University of California, Davis. The term originally referred to the increased capabilities of illicit chemists to manufacture drugs "designed to fit the tastes of the individual client."⁸

Unfortunately, too, the methods of these chemists allow them to frequently circumvent state and federal laws by varying the

⁴"Drug Flow on Rise, Some Officials Say," The Associated Press, The Press Enterprise, A-4, June 15, 1989.

⁷Jack B. Nimble, The Construction and Operation of Clandestine Drug Laboratories, Port Townsend, Washington, Loopanics Unlimited, 1986, p. 2-5.

⁸Narcotic Control Digest, v. 15, no. 7, April 1985, p. 2.

molecular structure of their designer drugs. This circumvention is possible due to the fact that a drug must be listed as a controlled substance, either federally or by the state, to be illegal. By slightly altering the molecular structure of the substance, the drug still produces the same physiological effects on the user but is not controlled by law.⁹

Currently, the most common type of clandestine laboratory encountered by law enforcement is the methamphetamine laboratory. Law enforcement has witnessed a proliferation of these "speed" laboratories in the 1980s. Although several large laboratories have been seized in various parts of the United States, recent statistics indicate most amphetamine, as well as other illegal laboratories, remain particularly in the western portion of the United States, with California being the leader.¹⁰

Between 1983 and 1988, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) received reports of 3,094 illegal laboratories being seized by law enforcement in the United States. The Western States Information Network (WSIN)¹¹ received reports that California accounted for 1,603, Oregon accounted for 498, and Washington for 104. These three western states

⁹"Controlled Substance Analogs and Other Synthetically Manufactured Drugs of Abuse," Special Report, U.S. DOJ/DEA, March, 1986, p.3.

¹⁰Gary J. Miller, Drugs and Law, Gilroy, Miller Publications, 1988, Sec. 2, p. 42.

¹¹W.S.I.N. - a clearinghouse for illegal drug information/statistics for law enforcement in California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii.

accounted for over 71 percent of all reported clandestine laboratories in the United States.¹²

An interesting event did occur in 1988; California seized 109 fewer laboratories than were seized in 1987. This reduction in seizures is believed to be the result of stricter laws requiring chemical companies to report sales of chemicals (precursors) used to make illegal drugs.¹³

Currently, California law requires the reporting of sales of precursor chemicals to the California Department of Justice.¹⁴ However, without active law enforcement to monitor wholesale chemical companies, this law only keeps honest companies honest. With little fear of prosecution, many companies have reaped huge profits by selling chemicals they know are being used to produce illegal drugs. Despite that limitation, however, these current precursor laws, along with numerous task forces focusing on clandestine laboratory investigations, the illegal drug laboratory operators and their wholesale chemical suppliers, are finding it less risky to produce their illegal substances outside of California.¹⁵

Based on interviews with various officials, it is also felt the voluntary reporting system now used by California law enforcement when illicit drug laboratories are seized has

¹²Clandestine Laboratory Report 1988, W.S.I.N.

¹³"Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement Program," Legislative Report 1987-1988, State of California D.O.J./B.N.E.

¹⁴California Health and Safety Code, Sec. 111000.

¹⁵"Speed Labs Easy to Start Up and Hide," The Press Enterprise, July 9, 1989, Sec. B, p. 1.

resulted in an under-reporting by many agencies.¹⁴

Of the 377 clandestine laboratories reported by California agencies to WISN in 1988, 93 percent manufactured methamphetamine or methamphetamine-related products. Corresponding figures are 90 percent for Oregon and 95 percent for Washington. Further breakdown of the California laboratories shows that 1 percent were manufacturing analogs (drugs having similar effects to methamphetamine), or precursors required to manufacture methamphetamine. Of the remaining laboratories, there was one cocaine processing laboratory, one hash oil laboratory, two heroin laboratories, three LSD laboratories, one MDMA, 15 PCP, one PEPAP, and one methaqualone laboratory.¹⁷

PEPAP is a designer drug which is a synthetic version of heroin and demerol, but is 36 times more powerful than heroin and highly toxic. MDMA has similar stimulating effects as methamphetamine; research has shown, however, that repeated use of this substance can be extremely toxic, causing severe damage to the brain's serotonin metabolism. (The serotonin is a neurotransmitter involved in regulation of sleep, mood, pain, perception, sexuality, aggressiveness and other functions.)¹⁸

¹⁴Personal communication with Bill Flores, W.S.I.N. representative to Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, San Diego, and Imperial Counties

¹⁷"Clandestine Laboratory Report 1988, W.S.I.N., p. 11.

¹⁸Narcotics Control Digest, v. 15, no. 23, November 13, 1985, p. 2.

Economic Considerations

The Bush Administration has proposed a 9.4 billion dollar budget for law enforcement in its fight against illegal drugs during fiscal year 1990. This is an increase from the 3.35 billion dollar budget for the 1989 fiscal year.¹⁹ This substantial federal budget does not include the additional funds expended by state and local law enforcement from their annual budgets.

It is estimated by the U.S. Customs Service that 6.2 billion dollars was expended by state and local law enforcement fighting illegal drugs in 1986.²⁰ According to the Triangle Research Institute, in 1983 drug-related expenses directly or indirectly cost this nation 59.7 billion dollars.²¹

On the other side of this issue, as long as there is a thriving market for illegal drugs in the United States and the corresponding opportunity to make large sums of money, there will always be people intent on receiving a portion of the billions of dollars generated by illegal drug trafficking.

Environmental Considerations

Adding to the problems associated with clandestine drug laboratories are the hazards posed by toxic and volatile

¹⁹"Drug Flow on Rise, Some Officials Say, The Associated Press, June 15, 1989, A-4.

²⁰Estimates by U.S. Customs, The Press Enterprise, October 19, 1987.

²¹Art DeWerk, POST Command College Project No. 7-0114, April 1989.

chemicals used by the illegal chemists. These chemicals not only pose immediate health risks to officers and the surrounding communities due to their toxic and volatile nature, but they also pose serious long-term health hazards to the broader environment. To illustrate this point, a combination of two chemicals used to manufacture PCP, sodium cyanide and hydrochloric acid, are the same two chemicals combined to produce the deadly mixture used in California's gas chamber at San Quentin.²²

The illegal chemists or their associates are not adverse to discarding hazardous, carcinogenic chemicals, and contaminated containers or laboratory equipment in areas frequented by many people, including children. These dump sites not only pose serious health hazards but are expensive to clean up. This cost, of course, is absorbed by the taxpaying public.²³

Political Considerations

Politics plays a key role in the war on drugs because it is the political system which ultimately determines how the resources (money) are divided among the many government programs.²⁴ Candidates running for elected office often raise the issue to bolster their campaigns and argue in favor of rigorous enforcement. However, they ultimately find that attempting to

²²Robert G. Hussey and Eugene D. Randolph, "Phencyclidine and Officer Survival," Journal of California Law Enforcement, v. 13, 4, April 1979, p. 173.

²³"Drug Organizations Now in Rural States, Survey Finds," New York Times, August 5, 1989., The Press Enterprise, A-13.

²⁴"\$300 Million Anti-Drug Plan Pushes U.S. Training," The Press Enterprise, August 13, 1989, Sec. A, p. 1.

meet the services demanded and required by our citizens is far more costly than anticipated. Clearly, not all programs can be funded, resulting in some programs not receiving the resources needed. Political decisions of who gets what and how are not easy, considering the limited resources available.

Scope of the Project

Through the use of futures methodology, this project will identify trends and events and evaluate their likely effects on the primary issue of "What impact will law enforcement have on illegal drug manufacturing by the year 2000?" From information received during this process, three future scenarios will be written. One of these scenarios will be selected to formulate a strategic plan which will serve as a model providing possible alternatives for the management of clandestine laboratory programs by law enforcement in the future. In addition, a management structure for the orderly implementation of the plan will be identified.

This monograph is intended for present and future law enforcement managers, with the hope that it will better prepare law enforcement to address the escalating problems associated with clandestine drug laboratories.

PART ONE - A FUTURES STUDY

What Can Be Expected from Illegal Drug Laboratories in the Next Ten Years?

Objective Statement

The first objective of this study is to explore the general issue using futures research methodologies. These methods include:

1. A combination of literature scanning, brainstorming and interviews (direct and by telephone)
2. Nominal Group Technique
3. Trend and event identification
4. Trend and event evaluation
5. Cross-impact evaluations matrix
6. Development of future scenarios

As stated previously, the outcome of this research will be three future scenarios defining a distinct set of future environments related to the general issue: What impact will law enforcement have on illegal drug manufacturing by the year 2000?

The Scanning Process

To better understand the general issue, it is helpful to identify past, present and emerging sub-issues. This was accomplished through a review of related published literature and interviews with law enforcement managers, personnel charged with the responsibility of investigating clandestine laboratories, and persons involved with handling of hazardous materials generated by these laboratories.

A small group was formed to identify and evaluate these issues as well as assist in developing a futures (impact) wheel. (See Figure 1.)

This group consisted of a police captain who is a patrol division commander, a police sergeant who is supervisor of a narcotics unit, a supervising special agent of a regional clandestine lab task force, and a police officer assigned to explosive ordnance disposal and hazardous materials handling.

After reviewing the material obtained in the scanning process and group discussion, the following issues were identified.

Related Forerunner Issues

1. Increase in the number of illegal drug laboratories in the past ten years.
2. Willingness of drug users to experiment with various types of drugs.
3. The increase in recent years of drug related problems of the United States and the world such as crime, corruption, health hazards, and unstable economies.
4. Long term health problems experienced by police who investigate illegal drug laboratories.
5. Unsafe storage by law enforcement of seized chemicals from illegal drug laboratories.
6. Legitimate businesses financed by, or laundering money from, illegal drug operations.




Figure 1. "FUTURES/IMPACT WHEEL"

This figure demonstrates the relationship between the general issue, "Illegal Drug Labs," and the many sub-issues

Present Emerging Sub-issues

1. Increasing recognition of environmental and physical health hazards.
2. Improved chemical methods of producing illegal drugs to avoid detection and increase potency.
3. Increased costs related to cleanup and disposal of hazardous chemicals generated from illegal drug laboratories.
4. Increased demand on law enforcement to take action against illegal drug organizations.
5. Increased violence of traffickers directed toward law enforcement officers, citizens, and each other.
6. Asset forfeitures (the seizure by government of money or other property of the violators who obtained the property as a result of their drug activities or use).

Potential Sub-issues that Can Emerge in the Future

1. Decreased availability of disposal sites.
2. Stricter regulations controlling legitimate wholesale chemical supply companies.
3. Improved protective equipment for law enforcement personnel.
4. New illegal drugs developed and manufactured.
5. Fewer jobs, poor economy (resulting in more people turning to illegal activity).
6. Increased use of portable laboratories to avoid detection.

7. Availability of federal and state grant money to local agencies.

8. Large financial settlements awarded to employees who were exposed to hazardous chemicals resulting in health complications.

9. Improved medical treatment for drug users.

To further focus on the listed sub-issues, the group was again used to identify the five sub-issues felt most appropriate for study and state them in question form. Criteria for the selection of these five sub-issues were based on their relevance to the general issue and relationship to other sub-issues previously identified.

1. What effect will the growing number of illegal drug laboratories have on law enforcement?

The more illegal drug laboratories there are in a community, the more calls there are for general service. Police will be responding to more such drug-derived problems, such as assaults, thefts, drug sales, disturbances, etc. Additionally, more personnel will be needed to investigate the drug laboratories themselves. According to Chief Joe Doane, the chief executive officer of the California State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, approximately 40 percent of his personnel are currently involved in clandestine laboratory enforcement.²⁵

²⁵Personal communication

Increased laboratories will also add to the hazardous waste risks faced by law enforcement officers including those of seizure, handling, and storage.

2. How will the illegal drug manufacturer attempt to avoid detection in the future?

Those who manufacture clandestine drugs have used various methods to avoid detection in the past and will no doubt devise new methods in the future. As mentioned before, these individuals commonly vary the molecular structure of their products in an attempt to produce a drug not classified as controlled, but which gives the user the same physical and psychological effects as the original drug. Manufacturers are also using methods of producing drugs which reduce the telltale odors and other more noticeable side effects of illegal drug manufacturing which has resulted in their being reported to police.

Drug manufacturers frequently move into a residence long enough to produce a given quantity of illegal drugs, then shut down their operation for a period of time while the laboratory moves. Illegal drug manufacturing operations, if properly disguised, can be run in a crowded metropolitan area or an isolated rural area without detection or suspicion of police or neighbors.

Illegal drug manufacturers are also becoming more sophisticated in their networking, using practices and methods

of avoiding detection found effective by others involved in the activity. Laboratories are also operated in other states and countries and their products imported to California.

3. How can safety equipment be better utilized to protect law enforcement personnel during seizure of illegal labs?

Law enforcement personnel in the past investigated drug laboratories using very little or no special protective equipment. Chemicals were often spilled on the officers who then wore the same contaminated clothing and equipment home, possibly contaminating other members of their families and residences. But safety equipment is being used more and more by most agencies which conduct investigations of clandestine laboratories on a regular basis. With new chemicals being produced, it is imperative that law enforcement stay current in the area of safety equipment and use this equipment during any investigation involving hazardous chemicals.

As the number of laboratories increases, training for on-scene handling, as well as the storage of seized hazardous chemicals, must be assigned a high priority.

A relaxing of the rules of evidence through case law may be required to completely alleviate the hazards associated with storage of seized chemicals. In addition, robots, similar to those used in explosive ordnance disposal units, may become desired equipment during clandestine laboratory investigations.

4. What avenues can law enforcement management pursue to help finance drug laboratory investigations?

Law enforcement must initially look at two obvious areas in financing drug investigations: 1) increasing revenue, and 2) decreasing operating costs. Utilization of asset forfeitures and the pooling of resources, including personnel and equipment often financed by state and federal grants, are common methods of financing law enforcement personnel specializing in illegal laboratory enforcement.

Decreasing law enforcement costs is very difficult due to the fact that the majority of the expense of law enforcement is personnel. To maintain high quality personnel, competitive wages and benefits must be provided.

Another possible alternative could be to seek private grants or donations to finance specific areas of drug enforcement such as special equipment. Government entities must continually explore and examine additional ways to fund investigative operations if they desire to keep pace with the illegal drug laboratory problem.

5. What long term health problems could law enforcement personnel experience as a result of contact with chemicals from illegal laboratories?

Long term health hazards resulting in shortened careers due to medical retirements not only affect the efficiency of an

agency but cost the taxpayers huge sums of money. Additionally, the effects on the human body from exposure to chemicals used to produce illegal drugs are still being discovered.²⁴

The Jurisdictions must consider the cost of providing adequate short and long term health care to employees who are exposed to hazardous chemicals during laboratory investigations.

Relevant Trends and Events

Before an effective strategy for addressing illegal clandestine laboratories can be developed, it is necessary to look at current trends that could shape the future of this issue. It is also necessary to attempt to identify possible events that may occur in the future which could have an impact on the issue of illegal laboratories and related trends.

The Nominal Group Technique was used to identify trends and events related to the general issue. Members of the nominal group consisted of:

1. Chief of police, small Southern California department.
2. Captain of police, a large city patrol services commander.
3. Special Agent, investigator for California State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement--currently working Clandestine Lab Task Force.
4. Lieutenant, internal affairs manager for medium sized Southern California department.
5. Sergeant of a larger city major narcotics unit.
6. Civillian intelligence analyst working for WSIN.
7. Police officer, hazardous material handler.
8. Fire Captain, hazardous materials response team.

²⁴"Chemical Hazards in Law Enforcement," Journal of California Law Enforcement, v. 18, Summer 1984, p. 27.

The following trends were identified by this nominal group as being relevant to the issue.

1. Increasing number of illegal labs in California.
2. Increasing number of illegal labs in the Inland Empire.
3. Increasing number of PCP "phencyclidine" labs.
4. Increasing number of methamphetamine labs.
5. Increasing costs for illegal lab cleanup.
6. Increasing number of illegal lab seizures.
7. Increasing rate of buying of uncontrolled chemicals to make illegal precursors.
8. Increasing use of "ephedrine method" of manufacturing methamphetamine to avoid detection.
9. Increasing number of illegal dump sites discovered.
10. Increasing amount of precursors being sold by chemical suppliers.
11. The number of wholesale chemical suppliers increasing.
12. Increasing number of California "cookers" moving to nearby western states to avoid California precursor reporting regulations and law enforcement task forces.
13. Increasing involvement of outlaw motorcycle gangs running illegal labs and organizations.
14. Increasing number of officers being trained to work lab cases.
15. Increasing number of illegal designer drugs being developed.
16. Increasing law enforcement access to equipment and personnel to detect designer drugs.
17. Increasing number of law enforcement agencies focusing on smugglers rather than illegal labs because of large cash seizures.
18. Increasing tasks law enforcement required to do which take away from lab investigations.
19. Accumulated exposure of officers to chemicals during investigations of illegal labs increasing.
20. Increasing number of individuals or groups involved in smuggling international drugs now involved in domestic manufacturing of illegal drugs.
21. Increasing sophistication of lab operators.
22. Decreasing number of available disposal sites for confiscated substances.
23. Increasing precursor smuggling and transportation from surrounding states.
24. Increasing number of federal troops involved in drug enforcement.
25. Increasing number of criminals who know how to manufacture illegal drugs.
26. Increasing number of street dealers becoming manufacturers because of profit ratio.
27. Increasing number of businesses involved in financing of

drug operations, or laundering profits from drug labs.

28. Increasing number of lab operators willing to increase level of violence to avoid apprehension.
29. Increasing awareness of lab operators concerning law enforcement tactics in lab investigations.
30. Increasing lenient attitude of courts.
31. More health hazards showing up due to contamination of houses and drinking water.
32. Increasing drug education in schools.
33. Market for designer drugs increasing.
34. Decreasing amount of overall drug use by citizens compared to addiction.
35. Increasing multi-jurisdictional approach to enforcement and detection of labs.
36. Decline of "mom and pop" manufacturers.
37. Increasing manufacturing done in remote areas of California and neighboring states due to lack of law enforcement resources.
38. Increasing public awareness of dangers involved with clandestine labs.
39. More use of explosives or incendiaries for protection of labs against intruders.
40. Increasing number of labs in highly populated areas due to improved manufacturing processes.
41. Decreasing rate of reporting of seized labs by law enforcement to WSIN.

This list of 41 trends was too long to evaluate in its entirety so, after discussion, the group identified what appeared to be the five most important trends. The five trends identified as having the most impact on the issue were as follows:

1. Increasing use of multi-regional approach to enforcement and detection of illegal labs.
2. Increasing costs to local governments for cleanup of illegal labs.
3. Increasing number of sophisticated illegal lab operators.
4. Increasing drug education in schools.
5. Increasing number of illegal labs in Southern California.

Next, the group forecasted the direction and intensity of each of the five selected trends on a "trend evaluation form."

In this forecast, each member of the group was asked to determine whether law enforcement could have an impact on the direction or intensity of each trend.

Each member was told to use today as a benchmark, giving it a score of 100. If today is 100, what was the direction and intensity five years ago? What will it be in 1995, 2000? The group was also asked to rate the trend based on what level they thought the trend "will be" given current information and what they thought the level of the trend "should be" in 1995 and 2000.

The highest and lowest ratings received from any one group member, as well as the median group average rating, are shown on the "trend evaluation" form. (See Table 1.)

The intensity and direction of each trend are listed below:

1. Increasing use of multi-regional approach to enforcement and detection of illegal labs.

This approach is increasing at an accelerating rate. The average group rating indicated that its intensity had increased by 66.66 percent from five years ago and is expected to increase by another 95 percent by the year 2000. The group viewed this as a positive trend in response to a negative--the increased number of illegal laboratories.

2. Increasing costs to local government for cleanup of illegal labs.

According to average group ratings, costs have increased by 100 percent over the past five years and are expected to continue to increase by 125 percent by the year 2000.

TREND STATEMENT		FIVE YEARS AGO	TODAY	WILL BE 1995	SHOULD BE 1995	WILL BE 2000	SHOULD BE 2000
1 Increasing Use of Multi-Regional Approach to Enforcement and Detection of Illegal Labs	High	100		200	250	300	500
	Median	60	100	137.5	187.5	195	200
	Low	10		100	100	100	100
2 Increasing Costs to Local Government for Cleanup of Illegal Labs	High	50		200	200	500	300
	Median	50	100	200	130	225	160.5
	Low	10		150	75	200	50
3 Increasing Number of Sophisticated Illegal Lab Operators	High	75		250	200	500	500
	Median	40	100	150	95	200	87.5
	Low	10		110	0	120	0
4 Increasing Drug Education in Schools	High	80		250	500	500	500
	Median	50	100	200	200	200	200
	Low	10		115	100	120	100
5 Increasing Number of Illegal Labs in Southern California	High	100		200	120	400	200
	Median	50	100	150	75	155	50
	Low	25		75	0	50	0

Table 1. "TREND EVALUATION" - This table reflects the highest, lowest and median average ratings received from the study group. It presumes the level of the trend is "100" today.

"Will Be" - The expected level of the trend in the year 2000 A.D. if law enforcement managers do not attempt to influence it.

"Should Be"- The expected level of the trend in the year 2000 A.D. if law enforcement managers do influence it.

"High" - The highest rating received by any group member.

"Low" - The lowest rating received by any group member.

This trend, of course, is negative, and it was felt that only by consolidated effort by all those involved in the cleanup and disposal of the hazardous materials generated by illegal laboratories and aggressive ways of addressing this issue will costs in this area be brought under control.

3. Increasing number of sophisticated illegal lab operators.

The average group ratings reflected that the number has increased by 150 percent in the past five years and that it will double again by the year 2000. This trend is, of course, negative and reflective of the increased amount of drugs being consumed by society, as well as the public's willingness to experiment with various analogs. Obviously, police managers can have a tremendous influence on this trend by efficient use of resources and by supporting legislation which makes it more difficult for the laboratory operator.

4. Increasing drug education in schools.

The average group rating reflected that drug education has increased by 100 percent over the past five years and anticipated that it will increase by another 100 percent by the year 2000. This trend is felt to be a positive reaction to the negative situation of drug abuse within our society. It was felt that law enforcement managers can impact this area by supporting drug education and providing personnel to assist schools in their curriculum and in the presentation of special programs.

5. Increasing number of illegal labs in Southern California.

The average ratings indicated that the number of illegal laboratories has increased by 100 percent since 1985 and is expected to increase another 55 percent by the turn of the century. The group felt that although reported seized laboratories decreased this year, in reality the number of laboratories is increasing, especially in the Inland Empire (Riverside/San Bernardino counties), and that this decrease in reported seized laboratories was due to a lack of reporting by seizing agencies. Again, police management can have a positive effect on this negative trend through increased cooperation and sharing of resources.

Each of the trends and its direction is shown on graphs of Figure 2.

Critical Events

The nominal group then developed a list of candidate events that could impact the issue and might alter trends if the events were to occur. These events are as follows:

1. Major civil disturbance occurs in larger California cities.
2. "Life in prison law" passes for manufacturing or distributing drugs.
3. Plea-bargaining on major narcotics cases is prohibited by law.
4. California-based terrorist group turns to drug manufacturing to support its causes.
5. State mandates water rationing.
6. Two hundred or more people die within a two month period of drug overdose due to mixture of "designer" drugs with methamphetamine.
7. Major economic depression.
8. Mandatory drug education in schools.

9. A method which solidifies hazardous chemicals is discovered allowing for its easy disposal.
10. Legalization of drugs.
11. Federal government allots 500 acres of federal land in Riverside County for waste disposal.
12. A new drug-detecting sensor is perfected for law enforcement and municipality use.
13. Major celebrity convicted of financing illegal lab.
14. Five officers from one agency are medically retired due to being exposed to designer drugs.
15. Methamphetamine process refined making it simpler, safer and less expensive to produce.
16. Asset forfeiture money used for national budget deficit.
17. Governor permanently assigns National Guard troops to drug enforcement details in California zones.
18. U.S. military takes over patrolling Mexican-American border from U.S. Customs.
19. State law requires all agencies to have a hazardous materials response unit.
20. U.S. Supreme Court decides to significantly reduce search and seizure requirements during illegal drug investigations.
21. Part I crimes double in one year due directly or indirectly to illegal drugs.
22. Supreme Court rules that all drugs may be used in religious ceremonies.
23. Penalty for unlawful drug manufacturing is enhanced to life in prison without possibility of parole.
24. U.S. Supreme Court rules all asset forfeiture laws are unconstitutional.

The group members then (using the NGT) identified from this list five events they felt would have the greatest impact on the issue. These five events are listed below:

1. Mandatory drug education in schools
2. Legalization of drugs
3. Penalty for unlawful drug manufacturing is enhanced to life in prison without possibility of parole

4. U.S. Supreme Court decides to significantly reduce search and seizure requirements during illegal drug investigations
5. U.S. Supreme Court rules all asset forfeiture laws are unconstitutional

1. Mandatory drug education in schools.

This event was viewed as being the key in reducing the demand for illegal drugs in our society. Only through honest, accurate education of our young people can drug abuse be controlled by future generations. Even though it appears that drug abuse will always be a part of our society to a certain degree, through education the number of abusers would decrease just as society seems to be responding to the hazards of legal drugs such as nicotine and alcohol.

2. Legalization of drugs.

This event was viewed by the panel as being extremely negative, but the members also realized the question of legalizing drugs was again being discussed by many libertarians and scholars. It was felt, however, that most politicians and policy-makers still regard abandonment of anti-drug laws as dangerous.²⁷ The group felt that even though the problem would be taken out of the criminal arena by this event, the medical problems and expenses related to addiction, accidents, and

²⁷"Question of Legalizing Drugs Is Back on the Table," New York Times News Service, The Press Enterprise, May 15, 1988, Sec. A.

treatment due to a large increase in drug use would far exceed that now being expended in efforts to control drug abuse through law enforcement. Nevertheless, if this event did occur, it would have a major impact on the issue, much like the abandonment of prohibition affected liquor stills.

3. Penalty for unlawful drug manufacturing is enhanced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

The group felt that this would have a positive effect on the issue of controlling illegal drug labs, provided the penalty is made mandatory. This would help increase the perception among drug manufacturers that spending the rest of their lives in prison could occur. It is hoped this would act as a deterrent for some of those currently engaged in or contemplating becoming involved in clandestine labs.

4. U.S. Supreme Court decides to significantly reduce search and seizure requirements during drug investigations.

This was viewed as a positive event by the group in that it would allow police to seize more labs and increase probability of conviction. However, the group also discussed a negative side of this event in that possible abuse of relaxed search and seizure laws by police would require that strict guidelines be followed and/or severe penalties be given to any law enforcement agency or personnel abusing its authority.

5. U.S. Supreme Court rules all asset forfeiture laws unconstitutional.

This was viewed as a negative event on the issue for two

reasons. First of all, asset forfeiture has allowed police agencies to purchase equipment and other resources that limited budgets would have prohibited. Secondly, the group felt that one of the major impacts law enforcement has had on drug organizations recently has resulted from its ability to financially impact the organizations and individuals through seizure of assets.

The group felt, however, if law enforcement abused this windfall, setbacks from adverse court rulings regarding asset seizures would occur.

Event Evaluation

The group then discussed the events and evaluated each of them on an "event evaluation form." The high, low and median of those evaluations, as well as the impact (+) or (-) on the issue if the event occurred, are shown in Table 2.

The graphs in Figure 3 demonstrate the increasing probability of each of the events occurring in accordance with the group's median ratings.

Cross-Impact Analysis

Should any of the possible future events actually occur, it could expedite or postpone the occurrence of one or more of the trends and other events.


Each member of the study group independently completed a "cross-impact matrix" to show the effect he felt each event

would be expected to have on other events and trends if the event actually occurred. The various ratings from each member were compiled and median scores determined. (See Table 3.)


The trends and events were then plotted on graphs (Figures 4 through 11) in an attempt to forecast both. These graphs are based on the assumption that all events will occur when they reach a 30 percent probability level. This 30 percent probability level provides a standard benchmark from which to compare probability of events as well as intensity of trends.

It is noted that the probability level of Event #2, legalization of drugs, will never reach 30 percent by the year 2000. Thirty percent was used to ensure maximum interaction between trends and events. The occurrence of all other events either will not affect Event #2, or they will decrease its probability; therefore, the event is not used in the development of a strategic plan.


TREND #1




TREND #2




TREND #3



TREND #4



TREND #5



KEY

W/B - "Will Be" —————
 S/B - "Should Be" - - - - -

H - Highest estimate received from study group
 L - Lowest estimate received from study group
 R - Range between highest and lowest estimate received from study group

Figure 2. This figure shows the study groups' highest and lowest forecasts of the five most significant trends (see Table 1). The effect of other trends or events are not reflected in these forecasts.


EVENT STATEMENT	YEAR PROBA- BILITY FIRST EXCEEDS ZERO	PROBABILITY			IMPACT ON ISSUE IF EVENT OCCURRED
			1994	2000	
1 Mandatory Drug Education in Schools	1990	HIGH	100	100	+10
		MEDIAN	92.5	100	+ 9
		LOW	30	50	+ 7
2 Legalization of Drugs	1991	HIGH	50	100	+10
		MEDIAN	17.5	32.5	+ 5
		LOW	0	0	+ 2
3 Penalty for Unlawful Drug Manufacturing is Enhanced to Life in Prison Without Possibility of Parole	1991	HIGH	100	100	+10
		MEDIAN	50	75	+ 6
		LOW	20	40	+ 5
4 U.S. Supreme Court Publishes Case Decision that Significantly Reduces Search/Seizure Require- ments During Drug Investigations	1990	HIGH	100	100	+10
		MEDIAN	45	55	+ 8
		LOW	10	15	+ 4
5 U.S. Supreme Court Rules All Asset Forfeiture Laws are Unconstitutional	1990	HIGH	75	85	+ 2
		MEDIAN	22.5	45	-6.5
		LOW	0	1	-8

Table 2. "EVENT EVALUATION" - This table reflects the highest, lowest and median ratings received from the study group. Impact on the issue area is rated on a scale of one to 10. A positive (+) number indicates a positive impact. A negative (-) number indicates a negative impact.


"High" - The highest rating received by any group member.

"Low" - The lowest rating received by any group member.


"EVENT FORECAST"




Probability first exceeds
zero in 1990




Probability first exceeds
zero in 1991



Probability first exceeds
zero in 1991



Probability first exceeds
zero in 1990








Probability first exceeds zero
in 1990

Figure 3. This figure demonstrates the percentage of probability of each of the five most significant events from 1989 to 2000 A.D. It is based on the median rating of the study group.

EVENT STATEMENT		EVENTS					TRENDS				
		E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	T-1	T-2	T-3	T-4	T-5
E-1	Mandatory Drug Education in Schools	X	-47.5	+12.5	+9	-27.5	+15	-0-	-0-	+200	-50
E-2	Legalization of Drugs	-5	X	-72.5	-80	-72.5	-62.5	-75	-0-	+45	-80
E-3	Penalty for Unlawful Drug Manufacturing is Enhanced to Life in Prison Without Possibility of Parole	+15	-27.5	X	-72.5	-0-	+12	-22.5	+30	+7.5	-35
E-4	U.S. Supreme Court Publishes Case Decision that Significantly Reduces Search/Seizure Requirements During Investigations	-0-	-15	-24	X	-33	+62.5	+70	+12	-0-	-27.5
E-5	U.S. Supreme Court Rules All Asset Forfeiture Laws Unconstitutional	-6	-0-	+37.5	-5	X	+55	+32	-0-	+15	+30

Table 3. "CROSS IMPACT MATRIX" - The table reflects the estimated changes that the occurrence of each event could be expected to have on the probability of other events occurring, and the intensity of each trend. Positive (+) numbers indicate an increase in percentage. Negative (-) numbers indicate a decrease in percentage.

- Trend #1 - Increasing use of multi-regional approach to enforcement and detection of illegal labs.
- Trend #2 - Increasing costs to local government for cleanup of illegal labs.
- Trend #3 - Increasing number of sophisticated illegal lab operators.
- Trend #4 - Increasing drug education in schools.
- Trend #5 - Increasing number of illegal labs in Southern California.




KEY

———— Prior to Event #1
occurring


- - - After Event #1 occurs

Figure 4. At a 30% probability level, Event #1 is first to occur in January 1991. The probability of Events #2 and #5 are reduced, while Events #3 and #4 are increased.




INCREASE MULTI-REGIONAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT AND DETECTION OF ILLEGAL LABS

Intensity of trend is increased by 15%




INCREASE COSTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR CLEANUP OF ILLEGAL LABS

No Impact




INCREASING NUMBER OF SOPHISTICATED ILLEGAL LAB OPERATORS

KEY
 — Intensity prior to Event #1
 - - - Intensity after Event #1




INCREASING DRUG EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS




INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL LABS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Event #1 occurred January 1991, requiring drug education. All schools geared up for the next year and by 1992 all schools had drug education. There ceases to be a trend of increasing drug education in schools because everyone includes it by law.


Figure 5. At a 30% probability level, Event #1 occurred in January 1991 (Mandatory Drug Education in Schools) and the intensity of Trend #1 increases, Trend #5 decreases. No impact on Trends #2 and #3. Trend #4 increases by 200%, but is no longer a trend because all schools have programs.




MANDATORY DRUG EDUCATION
IN SCHOOLS
Event occurred January 1991




LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS
Probability decreased by 15%



LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
Probability decreased by 24%




SEARCH/SEIZURE REQUIREMENTS
REDUCED
Event occurs April 1993




ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Probability decreased by 33%

Figure 6. At a 30% probability level, Event #4 is second to occur in April 1993. The probability of Events #2, #3 and #5 decreases.




INCREASE MULTI-REGIONAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT AND DETECTION OF ILLEGAL LABS

Intensity of trend is increased by 62.5%




INCREASE COSTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR CLEANUP OF ILLEGAL LABS

Intensity of trend increased by 70%




INCREASING NUMBER OF SOPHISTICATED ILLEGAL LAB OPERATORS

Intensity of trend increases by 12%



INCREASING DRUG EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS


No longer a trend after 1992




INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL LABS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Intensity of trend decreases by 27.5%


Figure 7. At a 30% probability level, Event #4 (Search/Seizure Requirements Reduced) occurred in April 1993. Intensity of Trends #1, #2 and #3 are increased. Trend #5 decreases.




MANDATORY DRUG EDUCATION
IN SCHOOLS
Event occurred January 1991




LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS
Probability decreases by 27.5%



LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
Event occurs June 1993




SEARCH/SEIZURE REQUIREMENTS
REDUCED
Event occurred April 1993



ASSET FORFEITURE LAWS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Event is not impacted


KEY
 ——— Prior to Event #3
 - - - After Event #3

Figure 8. At a 30% probability level, Event #3 is third to occur. Event #3 occurs in June 1993, and the probability of Event #2 decreases. Event #5 is not impacted.




INCREASE MULTI-REGIONAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT AND DETECTION OF ILLEGAL LABS

Intensity of trend increases by 12%




INCREASE COSTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR CLEANUP OF ILLEGAL LABS

Intensity of trend decreases by 22.5%




INCREASING NUMBER OF SOPHISTICATED ILLEGAL LAB OPERATORS

Intensity of trend increases by 30%



INCREASING DRUG EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

No longer a trend after 1992








INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL LABS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Intensity of trend decreases by 35%

KEY


———— Intensity prior to Event #3
 - - - Intensity after Event #3

Figure 9. At a 30% probability level, Event #3 (Life in Prison Without Possibility of Parole) occurred in June 1993. The intensity of Trends #1 and #3 increase, while #2 and #5 decrease.




KEY
 — Prior to Event #5
 - - - After Event #5


Figure 10. At a 30% probability level, Event #5 is the fourth event to occur. Event #2 never reaches a 30% probability level and does not occur by 2000 A.D. This chart reflects the occurrence of all events after each has impact the others.




INCREASE MULTI-REGIONAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT AND DETECTION OF ILLEGAL LABS
Intensity of trend increases by 53%




INCREASE COSTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT FOR CLEANUP OF ILLEGAL LABS
Intensity of trend increases by 30%



INCREASING NUMBER OF SOPHISTICATED ILLEGAL LAB OPERATORS
No impact



INCREASING DRUG EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS
No longer a trend



INCREASING NUMBER OF ILLEGAL LABS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Intensity of trend increases by 30%

KEY
 — Intensity prior to Event #5
 - - - Intensity after Event #5

Figure 11. At a 30% probability level, Event #5 (Asset Forfeiture Law Unconstitutional) occurs in December 1996. Trends #1, #2 and #5 increase, while there is no impact on intensity of #3.

SCENARIOS

After the trends, events, and their possible effects on each other were calculated, three scenarios were developed. These scenarios will describe possible futures related to the issue of illegal drug labs. These scenarios do not attempt to predict the future. They simply are a means of presenting information obtained from the nominal group process into a more understandable form.

The scenarios are written in the following modes:

- (1) Normative--"Desired and attainable."
- (2) Normative--"Feared but possible."
- (3) Exploratory (nominal)--"Play out."

The third scenario--play out--will be the scenario used for the purpose of developing a strategic plan to avoid, as best as possible, the negative events in this scenario.

Scenario One

This scenario concentrates on the "should be" data obtained during the trend forecasting by the nominal group. This scenario posits that law enforcement took a pro-active role in the illegal laboratory problem.

The Airport

Chief Gary Mahoney walked into the coffee shop in the Sacramento Airport at about 8 p.m. His flight back to Saddleback City wouldn't leave for another hour. He had just spent two long days lobbying legislators in an attempt to ensure that a new bill legalizing drugs would not pass. He and other

representatives from law enforcement, medicine, as well as others, felt comfortable that their efforts had been successful. They felt they would not see drugs legalized this year and would be able to welcome the 21st century without fear of narcotics being available on the open market.

He sat at a table and turned the computer toward him so he could read the menu. After selecting a light meal, he began to think about why the idea of making drugs legal had come up in the first place.

With his mind on other things, he forgot to turn over his cup, and the computer began to pour coffee onto the base of the cup. He turned off the coffee and pushed a button on the computer to speak with a waitress. He thought then that this is what had happened to society in general. We had become too impersonal. "Just as this restaurant must give personal service, law enforcement must go back to giving personal service to our communities," he thought.

"At first we really cared about enforcing drug laws. The president even declared war on drugs in 1989, and we went after it with enthusiasm. We thought our best answer was to remove the desire of people to buy drugs. We thought we could get the whole country to say 'no.'"

He said, "no," aloud just as the waitress arrived, and she responded with some sarcastic remark and began to leave. Gary apologized quickly, reordered his meal and coffee and then asked her, "How do you feel about drugs?"

"Are you offering?" she asked.

"No," he replied, "I just finished with a two-day session trying to stop our lawmakers from making illegal drugs legal, and I wanted to know how a nonpolice person might feel."

"Well, I don't think it should be legal. I was in junior high in 1991 when they made drug education a required subject. I remember the cops were always coming to class telling us about dope. I wouldn't have used dope anyway, or at least I don't think I would have, but I learned enough about dope to know I don't want it legalized. Do you want real potatoes or synthetic?"

Gary chose the real potatoes even though he was trying to watch his weight, and he knew his wife would be upset if she found out. He was tired of synthetic and make-believe commodities. "After all," he thought, "it was the existence of 'designer' drugs that caused a lot of the narcotics problems we've been worrying about.

"Percentage-wise, the manufacturers seemed much more sophisticated than years ago. He had to feel that law enforcement was part of the reason for new, more cunning, experts appearing on the scene. After all, law enforcement was the driving force behind most of the new technology for detecting drug labs. Those new "sniffers" really work well in locating labs, as long as the batteries are up.

"It was this technology which finally convinced the courts to become more lenient in search and seizure requirements in

April of 1993. Easier searches made it harder for the crooks, but it also has made them better at concealing their labs. As they got better, the number of labs increased for a while. But we're finally seeing that trend level off.

"The war against drugs was still going strong then. It was only a few months after letting up on search requirements, in June of 1993, that the legislature passed a law that allowed drug makers to go to prison for life without the possibility of parole. The stiffer sentencing had to have made a lot of 'fence sitters' decide not to become 'cookers'.

"People really cared then, including the cops. The number of police agencies joining together in multi-regional task forces to combine scarce resources really increased. It was the only effective way to combat some of the sophisticated drug organizations."

The waitress brought him some ham, potatoes and something that would have been an egg ten years ago. The waitress put the food on the table and said, "I've been thinking about it. If drugs are such a problem, you need more police officers."

"They are expensive," Gary replied.

"Well," the waitress said, "it's too bad you don't have all the money the pushers have, or make them pay for more police."

"They used to."

"Why don't they now?" she asked.

"That was our fault, I suppose. It's like me ordering real

potatoes because I thought my wife would never find out," he explained.

"I guess some officers went after too many questionable forfeitures or got a little overzealous in pursuit of some crook's assets because they thought they could get away with it. Anyway, whatever the reason, courts abolished asset forfeiture laws back in December of 1996."

"Start taking their money again," she said.

"It's not that easy," Gary replied.

"Well, neither is working for a minimum wage of a lousy 20 bucks an hour," replied the waitress as she slowly shuffled back to her control console.

"Twenty dollars an hour to clean up make-believe egg leftovers," he thought. "We pay \$1,000 an hour to clean up leftovers from drug labs, and the costs just keep going up. Lucky for us, the courts are still ordering the crooks to pay us back. We don't get all our costs returned, but it helps. Also, the way the new asset forfeiture bill looks, with a little more lobbying on our part, maybe we'll get another chance to start taking the crooks ill-gotten gains again. This time I think all of us will do a better job managing that resource."

As Gary finished his meal, he thought of the many approaches law enforcement had taken to combat illegal drugs. Some had been very good, such as when they began to focus on drug education in schools back in the late 1980s.

"Maybe things could have been done differently. Maybe we

could have avoided some problems. But, all things considered, drug use is down and, like the waitress, most of the people are saying, 'no.'

Gary pushed his empty plate into the automatic disposer, typed a gratuity into the computer, and slid his credit card in the payment slot. He thought, "If only I had gone to Command College."

Scenario Two

This scenario describes a "feared but possible" future based on negative data furnished by the nominal group. Much of the "should be" data are excluded, leaving a less desirable future.

Geraldo

"Hello, I'm Geraldo Fernando. Welcome to our show. Today we are going to be discussing a problem which seems to have no answers--drug abuse in our society. More specifically, today we will focus on drug education, and the problems we have in this country with illegal labs producing methamphetamine, more commonly called 'ice.'

"Our guests today will be California State Superintendent of Schools, Edward Meany; Phil Donovan, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and last we will have a pre-recorded interview with a major drug trafficker. Stay with us."

After a twenty minute commercial that introduced the public to new cars, hair growth products, disposable kitchenware, a couple of public service announcements, and a new solution for the ever-present body odor, Fernando came back.

"What has happened in our war against drugs," he began. "Are drugs still being pushed to our children in schools? Let's talk with Edward Meany, the California State Superintendent of Education."

The broadcast technicians blended Meany's holograph with Fernando's so that the audience saw a picture of the two men sitting in chairs opposite each other in the same room.

"What is the drug situation like in our schools? Has the war on drugs had an effect?" asked Fernando.

"Well, if you're asking if the drug problem is gone...no," Meany replied. "But things have been done. Even before the President declared war on drugs, we were trying to encourage our schools to include drug education in their curricula. The number of schools that taught drug education increased, but not by much. Then the legislature made drug education mandatory in 1991. It took about a year, but by 1992, drug education was being taught in every school in California. Within five years, every state in the country had the same mandate.

"Kids today understand drugs better, and many have avoided drugs who might otherwise have become addicts. But drugs are still there in greater amounts, and we've not received much cooperation from law enforcement. I know they're busy, but I think a lot of their time could be better spent preventing future drug problems instead of focusing all their efforts on catching the dealers."

"Thank you, Mr. Meany, for taking time out of your busy

schedule as Superintendent of Schools and chairman of the state lottery to be with us."

Superintendent Meany's holograph fades.

"After a short break we'll talk to Phil Donovan, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration."

Another series of commercials began that lasted long enough to go to the local market for the generic equivalent of a six pack of beer.

When the program began again, Fernando appeared to be sitting in a chair talking with D.E.A. C.E.O. Phil Donovan.

"What is law enforcement doing in the war against drugs?" asked Fernando.

"Most of our successes have resulted from a multi-regional approach by many police agencies joining forces. Most police departments are small and do not have enough personnel to work major cases alone. The multi-regional approach began to become popular in the mid-80s and has grown continuously until recently, especially in the area of clandestine lab investigations."

"What happened to this approach?" asked Fernando.

"Two things, first we lost our asset seizure laws."

"What's that?"

"Prior to 1996, law enforcement could seize assets that people had acquired through unlawful narcotics activity. Unfortunately, some law enforcement agencies had become dependent on the funds to pay for equipment and personnel. Some abuses occurred and finally the Supreme Court held that the entire

forfeiture system was unconstitutional. The sudden shortfall of seized property and funds was devastating to many departments. Many lost personnel and had to cut back on enforcement of drug activities. Manpower is always a problem.

"Secondly, petty jealousies and local politics began to affect the productivity of the task forces. Agencies were sending officers they wanted to get rid of instead of quality people. Everyone was so afraid another agency was going to get more of the seizures or 'glory' that the in-fighting pretty much destroyed the concept."

"So the courts and police egos have hurt the effort?" Fernando asked.

"They certainly have. But the Supreme Court, in the case of Snow vs. United States in 1993, significantly reduced search and seizure requirements in narcotics cases. This has helped, but we're not keeping pace with the most pressing problem now, and that is illegal drug laboratories. Our technology is hurting in this area."

"Where are the drugs coming from now?" asked Fernando.

"After the five year civil war in Columbia, we were able to cut most cocaine smuggling down to a manageable level. But now we're seeing more and more drugs being manufactured here in the U.S. It was next to impossible to catch smugglers bringing drugs into the country, but stopping illegal drug manufacturing in this country is even tougher."

"Thank you, Mr. Donovan."

"Now let's take a look at the interview I conducted with a major drug supplier approximately one week ago."

The holograph fades to reappear with Fernando sitting in what appears to be the cabin of a yacht with a subject whose face is blurred and voice electronically disguised.

"Good evening, ladies and gentlemen," says Fernando. "I'm with an individual here who calls himself the 'Iceman.' He is currently the subject of several investigations relating to the manufacturing of 'ice,' which is a smokeable methamphetamine developed in the far east in the late 1980s and has become the drug of choice in the United States during the 90s."

Fernando then turns to the Iceman and asks, "Don't you believe that what you are doing is wrong?"

To which the Iceman replies, "No, man, if people want to use drugs, they are going to use. All I do is supply a demand. If I don't do it, somebody else will."

"Yes, unfortunately, I understand that," Fernando replied. "But, don't you fear getting caught? The penalty for manufacturing is now, and has been since 1993, life in prison without possibility of parole. Doesn't that bother you?"

"No, man," replied the Iceman.

"Sure, the police get better and the penalties get tougher, but I also get tougher. You should see some of my people, man. Their labs are something else, man. They would make a lot of the

universities Jealous when it comes to sophistication.

"Besides," continued the Iceman, "sometimes I don't think the police really want to catch me or my home boys."

"What do you mean by that?" asked Fernando.

"Well," continued the Iceman, "because I know it costs the cops a lot of money to clean up one of my labs. In fact, now that asset forfeitures have been ruled unconstitutional, a large chunk of their money is eaten up by cleaning up labs, man.

"While the cops keep getting poorer, I keep getting richer. Ain't that a trip, man?"

"Besides," asked the Iceman of Fernando, "How many people do you know who wouldn't go to prison for a little while if they came out millionaires?"

"Well, interjected Fernando, "a lot of people don't agree with you. Statistics indicate that the number of people trying or experimenting with drugs has continued to drop since the early 90s."

"That's right," added the Iceman, "but there's still enough people out there using that I don't have to worry about my next meal."

Just as Fernando was about to ask his next question, Captain Ralph Couch got up from his sofa, hit the button on his remote control turning off his holograph, drank down the last

of his beer and went to bed mumbling, "We lost the war a long time ago."

Scenario Three

This scenario assumes that trends selected by the nominal group continue in their current direction. Events with a low probability rate of under 60 percent do not occur (Figures 13 and 14). This scenario also assumes that law enforcement made no effort to influence trends or events through policies and assumed a reactive role.

ILLEGAL DRUG LABORATORIES - 1999

A PERSPECTIVE OF SAN MORITZ POLICE DEPARTMENT

San Moritz is a fictional city of about 100,000 people. It is typical of a Southern California city its size. The police department has about 100 sworn officers and provides general law enforcement to the community.

There have been few surprises over the past ten years when looking back at the illegal drug laboratory problem. This overview will look at some of the trends we've observed over the past ten years, as well as some events law enforcement officials believe have impacted this continuing problem.

Ten years ago, President Bush officially declared war on drugs. The federal government budgeted 9.4 billion dollars to help finance this war and attack it on several fronts, from interdiction to education. Even with this financial support, local communities did not fare well. Violent crime and gang-related activity continued to dominate police activity as

the overall crime rate continued its rise. When the crime problem was analyzed, to no one's surprise, it pointed to illegal drug abuse. This article will deal with illegal laboratories and provide a short historical perspective.

In the 60s and 70s, local law enforcement came into contact with few illegal drug laboratories, which consisted primarily of amphetamine or methamphetamine laboratories. Most illegal drugs and narcotics were smuggled into the United States.

During the latter half of the 70s, law enforcement began to realize that the drug laboratory problem was increasing and that many of these laboratories were controlled or operated by members or associates of outlaw motorcycle gangs. Not many resources were committed to the problem.

During the 80s the number of illegal laboratories in the U.S. continued to increase. Cocaine became the drug of choice, particularly "crack." Much of the crack was controlled by street gangs who distributed it to metropolitan as well as rural areas.

During the latter part of the 1980s, most local law enforcement agencies focused their efforts toward this cocaine problem and the violent activities of street gangs. Police managers realized they were no longer able to independently address the increasing problem of illegal drug laboratories. Slowly, police managers began participating in multi-regional lab task forces. However, many of the officers assigned to these

regional task forces were untrained and often not the best personnel.

As time passed, managers began to realize that regional task forces were able to direct more resources to illegal laboratories, provide better training to officers within the units, and more successfully address the laboratory problem than when they operated independently.

Unfortunately, even with the successes achieved by the task forces, there was still a certain amount of animosity and jealousy between officers assigned to the task forces and those of local narcotics details. This resulted in some hoarding of information and "one-upmanship" in attempts to see who made the biggest case, got the most press, or received the most asset forfeitures.

Also during this same period of time, the idea of having drug education programs in public schools began to gain momentum. Elementary, Junior high, and some senior high schools began to include some type of drug education in their curricula. However, due to limited resources of the school districts, as well as some resistance to change within the teacher ranks, it took several years for this idea to gain momentum.

In retrospect, the education seemed to pay off. Of students who received formal drug education, a smaller number were found to abuse drugs later in life than were students who gained their drug education from peers or in a street setting. Although drug experimentation seemed to drop in the latter 1980s and

early 1990s, overall drug consumption rose due to the increasing number of people addicted to illegal drugs.

In the early 1990s, there was a reduction in the supply of cocaine from Columbia. The drug of choice became methamphetamine in a smokeable form called "ice." This drug originated in the far east during 1989, migrating to Hawaii and the west coast.

A major problem law enforcement faced regarding this substance was that it could be easily produced in great quantities inside the U.S. Drug abusers quickly realized that "ice" gave them the same physiological and psychological affects as "crack" cocaine with the added benefit that the effects of "ice" lasted much longer.

As a result of this trend, the number of illegal laboratories in Southern California began to increase. As a result of the increase in the number of illegal laboratories, law enforcement began to assign additional officers to the laboratory problem. Unfortunately, their actions were of a reactive nature, and they never gained the upper hand on this problem.

Further complicating the problem was the increased sophistication of laboratory operators. Law enforcement began to notice that laboratory operators were no longer primarily individuals with criminal backgrounds obtaining recipes for illegal drugs from a friend. Now they were often educated, well-trained persons who saw an opportunity to make money. They were adept at manufacturing designer drugs in methods which produced high quality drugs with few of the telltale odors or

other by-products normally associated with illegal drug laboratories. This allowed them to produce their products in densely populated areas, as well as rural areas, with much less chance of being discovered.

Awareness and concerns of environmental hazards posed by hazardous chemicals from illegal drug laboratories mandated proper cleanup and disposal. Most agencies did not have the personnel or equipment to handle hazardous chemicals and were forced to enter into costly contracts with private agencies.

Mandatory drug education in public schools became law in the latter part of 1992. Schools developed curricula but lacked the practical experience relating to the current trends of street drug abuse. Law enforcement agencies were slow to assist school districts due to a lack of personnel and left the primary burden of drug education to school districts.

The problem with illegal drug abuse and drug laboratories continued to increase, and in the fall of 1993 the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed some long-standing search and seizure requirements during drug investigations.

The change in law shifted much of the control away from court guidelines to those of department policies to ensure that police did not overstep their authority. Unfortunately, some departments did not police themselves in this area, resulting in several indictments for improper police practices.

One political response to the drug manufacturing problem resulted in legislation authorizing life in prison without

possibility of parole for those convicted of manufacturing illegal drugs. This law, which became effective in January of 1996, was believed to have had some deterring effect on individuals contemplating becoming drug manufacturers. However, due to over-crowded prisons as well the lack of resources in the criminal justice system to handle lengthy trials and appeals, many illegal drug manufacturers were offered substantially less prison time in exchange for a guilty plea to lesser charges. Consequently, the deterring effect intended by this law was not fully realized.

Law enforcement was still enjoying the fruits of asset forfeitures, but many thought asset forfeitures would be lost to law enforcement by now, due to mismanagement and corruption. Although this has not occurred, many feel this valuable tool will be lost eventually.

Additionally, the argument for legalizing most illegal drugs continues to be raised, and with the continued lack of success in controlling illegal drugs, increasing numbers of policy makers are expressing more openness to this action.

As we are about to enter the 21st century, law enforcement officials have little to be optimistic about regarding drug abuse. In spite of the many advances made in science and technology which have benefited law enforcement, they have had little success in stopping the drug abuse and drug related crime.

Even though drug education programs implemented in schools are viewed as successful, it is often felt that because law

enforcement has not taken a more active role, these programs are not as successful as they could be.

In spite of the record number of arrests for drug trafficking and drug manufacturing, drugs are still readily available on the streets. Many progressive law enforcement managers feel the reactive approach that law enforcement generally took in the past 10 years has played a major role in leaving our community with gloomy prospects for entering the next century in a condition that is the same, if not worse, than it was when the war on drugs was declared in 1989.

Summary. Part One

This futures study forecasts that illegal drug laboratories will continue to be a major problem in the next decade. Through various methods of futures forecasting and analysis, current trends, future events and related issues were identified and presented in various tables, figures and scenarios.

With this information, we are now ready to look at possible alternatives for law enforcement that may help more effectively address illegal laboratories in the next 10 years.

PART TWO - STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

A Strategic Plan to Improve Law Enforcement's Ability to Control Illegal Drug Laboratories

Objective Statement

The second objective of this monograph is to develop a strategic plan and management process. This plan will include recommended policies to move law enforcement away from the exploratory, "play out" future described in scenario three of part one of this monograph. Although scenario three generally describes a negative future, it also contains positive aspects. Policies in this section are designed to help prevent the negative, as well as support the positive, aspects.

Situation Audit

Prior to developing a strategic plan, it is important that a department review its own capabilities and resources to ascertain if it is ready to implement change. For the purposes of this portion of the study, the Riverside Police Department will be used as a model agency for conducting this capability analysis. Although every department has its own unique qualities, it is felt the Riverside Police Department provides a representative look at a California police department.

The Riverside Police Department is located in Riverside County, which is a portion of the Inland Empire metropolitan area of Southern California. The department currently consists of 301 sworn officers and provides general law enforcement services to

the city of Riverside which has approximately 215,000 full-time residents and encompasses 90 square miles.

This section is divided into three principal segments for the purpose of evaluating this readiness:

1. Environmental analysis, utilizing the WOTS-UP (Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, Strengths, Underlying Planning) process.

2. Internal Capability Assessment, identifying broader perceptions of the model agency's strengths, weaknesses and ability to change,

3. Stakeholder Analysis (SAST - Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique).

Environmental Analysis A study group consisting of three managers of the Riverside Police Department familiar with the problems associated with clandestine laboratories studied the department's strengths, weaknesses and capabilities. The study group reviewed future trends and events identified during the futures research portion of this monograph and analyzed their impact on the organization's ability to respond to the increasing problems associated with clandestine laboratories.

This WOTS-UP analysis was divided into two parts. The first analysis took into consideration opportunities and threats based upon the external environment in which the department operates. The second analysis consisted of an assessment of the organization's internal environment by looking at strengths and

weaknesses.

Opportunities: The group identified the primary opportunities in the organization's external environment which would support proposed strategies:

1. Strong community support.
2. Good reputation with other agencies in the area.
3. Viewed as a law enforcement leader in Riverside County.
4. Good support from city council.
5. Good support from city manager.
6. Growth potential.

Threats: The study group identified the primary external threats to the organization which could be potentially damaging when implementing strategies to address illegal laboratories:

1. Increased demand for services versus availability of officers.
2. Increased competition for general funds between city departments.
3. Perceived lack of support from district attorney/courts.
4. Conflicts between agencies regarding asset forfeitures.
5. Change of political priorities away from drug enforcement.

Strengths: The group identified what they felt were internal strengths of the organization, defining resources or capabilities to effectively achieve the objective of illegal laboratory control:

1. Departmental priority regarding narcotic violations.

2. Pro-active attitude of officers.
3. Training.
4. Experienced officers working illegal laboratories.
5. Involvement with the regional lab task force.
6. Lack of corruption.

Weaknesses: The group identified the primary internal weaknesses such as limitations, faults or defects within the organization which could prevent the achieving of objectives:

1. Need for additional sworn officers.
2. Need for additional support staff, i.e., clerical.
3. Lack of equipment for proper handling and storing of hazardous materials.
4. Lack of training for handling hazardous materials.
5. Lack of budgetary funds for special programs.

Internal Capabilities Analysis Following the small study group's analysis of the department's weaknesses, opportunities, threats and strengths directly related to the study issue, a capabilities analysis was completed by a cross-section of the department. This analysis identified perceptions of the department on a broader plain related to the department's strengths and weaknesses.

A total of 10 officers of various divisions and ranks participated in this survey. Each member completed a "present capability analysis" form and a "future adaptability analysis"

form. A compilation of this survey is shown on Tables 4 and 5.

With this WOTS-UP information, it becomes easier to identify persons or organizations who have an interest in the issue related to illegal drug laboratories.

RIVERSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT
PRESENT CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

Instructions:

Check each item, as appropriate, on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition.
- IV Problems here. Not as good as it should be.
Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern.

Category	I	II	III	IV	V
Manpower (assigned to illegal lab enforcement)	—	4	5	1	—
Technology for detecting illegal labs	1	1	6	2	—
Safety equipment	—	2	2	4	2
Facilities	—	1	2	6	1
Money available for lab investigations	—	4	5	1	—
Calls for service	—	5	4	1	—
Supplies	—	1	3	6	—
Department management skills	—	4	3	3	—
P.O. skills (all officers)	—	3	6	1	—
Department supervisory skills	—	2	6	2	—
Drug enforcement training in general for officers	—	1	6	2	1
Detective training specific to illegal labs	—	2	4	3	1
Image of RPD relating to drug enforcement	—	3	3	4	—
Council support of Department	1	3	3	3	—
City Manager support of Department	1	3	3	3	—
Potential for more illegal labs in area	4	—	2	3	1
Specialties	—	4	4	1	1
Management flexibility	2	1	3	4	—
Sworn/non-sworn ratio	—	1	7	2	—
Pay scale	—	5	3	2	—
Benefits	1	5	2	2	—
Turnover	—	2	6	1	1
Community support	—	1	8	1	—
Complaints received	3	2	4	—	1
Justice system support (D.A., courts, probation)	—	1	2	5	2

Table 4. This table demonstrates the present capabilities of the Riverside Police Department. Scores indicate the total number of group members who rated each category. Ten points were possible in each category.

RIVERSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT
FUTURE ADAPTABILITY ANALYSIS

Instructions:

Evaluate each item for RPD as to what type of activity it encourages:

- I Custodial - Rejects Change
- II Production - Adapts to Minor Changes
- III Marketing - Seeks Familiar Change
- IV Strategic - Seeks Related Change
- V Flexible - Seeks Novel Change

Category	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Acceptance of Change	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:					
Customs/Norm	<u> </u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>
PERSONNEL:					
Middle Management (Lt./Sgt.)	<u> </u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Line Personnel	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>

Table 5. This table demonstrates the future adaptability of the Riverside Police Department. Score indicates the total number of group members who rated each category in the area indicated. Ten points were possible in each category. Survey results indicate the organization adapts to minor change/ seeks familiar change.

Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (SAST)

The SAST identifies stakeholders. Stakeholders are defined as individuals or groups who are impacted by illegal drug laboratories or who are able to impact the organization regarding this issue. After identifying stakeholders, it is also necessary to identify any "snaildarters." A snaildarter is defined as an individual or group, sometimes an insignificant player, who has the ability to negatively impact the organization's actions regarding the issue. Once the stakeholders and snaildarters are identified, certain assumptions must be made about each.

Following is a list of 28 stakeholders which relate to the issue of "What impact will law enforcement have on illegal drug manufacturing by the year 2000?" From this list, 13 stakeholders which are felt to be most important are identified by (*).

Possible snaildarters are identified by (S).

- | | |
|---|---|
| *1. Residents | *18. P.T.A. |
| *2. Elected local/state officials | 19. California Narcotic Officers Association |
| *3. Courts | 20. Fire Department |
| *4. District Attorney | *21. County/city where disposal sites are located |
| 5. A.C.L.U. | 22. Health care agencies |
| *6. Teachers | 23. Environmental organizations |
| *7. School districts | 24. Drug treatment programs |
| *8. City Manager | *25. State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement |
| 9. Chemical supply companies | S26. Police management |
| 10. Hazardous material disposal companies | 27. Business community |
| S11. Other law enforcement agencies | 28. Public Defender |
| 12. Landlord organizations | |
| *13. Police associations | |
| 14. State bar association | |
| 15. Jails | |
| 16. Drug dealers | |
| 17. News media | |

Once the most important stakeholders were identified, assumptions were made regarding the position each could take

regarding the issue.

1. Residents--The residents of the community would generally support a program designed to reduce the amount of illegal drugs in their neighborhoods. This support would not only be due to fear of the obvious problems associated with drug abuse, but also because of possible hazardous chemical contamination of their neighborhoods.

2. Elected local/state officials--Local and state elected officials would support a program designed to eliminate illegal drug laboratories due to the personal and political benefits they could receive. They would be most concerned about the cost of the programs as well as if the programs would divert law enforcement's focus from any pet projects they might have.

3. Courts--The courts would be concerned as to how any change in procedures by law enforcement would affect their case load. They would also be concerned about any changes in the law requiring interpretation in such areas as sentencing and search and seizure.

4. District Attorney--The district attorney would also share some of the concerns of the court in the area of workload.

5. Teachers--Teachers would be concerned regarding requirements related to drug education; what benefit a drug curriculum would have for their students and how much time drug education programs would take from their current curricula would be concerns.

6. School districts--School districts would share the same concerns of teachers, in addition to any costs associated with drug education.

7. City Manager--The city manager would generally support any program designed to reduce the number of illegal drug laboratories within the city; however, he/she would be concerned that other priorities relating to law enforcement services would receive less attention.

8. Other (neighboring) law enforcement agencies--Their concern would be related to what support and participation they would receive or be asked to provide, and whether a focus on laboratories in one area could cause an increase of laboratories in their jurisdiction. They would also be concerned about receiving their share of any asset forfeitures seized as a result of their participation.

Without the active support and cooperation of neighboring agencies, most programs would be much less effective. If these agencies closed ranks against a program it would not succeed; therefore, they could be an unexpected snarl-darter.

9. Police Association--The police association would support a program related to reduction of clandestine laboratories. It would neither support nor block any program relating to the general membership, such as drug testing, polygraphs, etc., to detect or discourage corruption and drug abuse within the department.

10. Parent Teacher Association (P.T.A.)--The P.T.A. would support any program that would reduce the amount of drugs available to the children of the community.


11. County/city where disposal sites are located--The fear of problems related to hazardous chemicals being disposed of in their jurisdictions could result in their refusal to accept any additional hazardous materials. This could increase costs for disposal of hazardous materials seized during illegal laboratory investigations due to increased hauling distance (out of state) or processing.

12. Police officers--Police officers would support programs to reduce illegal drug laboratories as long as assignments to the program were fairly made, and those not in the program were not expected to pick up additional work.

13. Police Management--Police management would support programs designed to reduce the number of illegal laboratories within their jurisdiction; however, they would not support a program if it resulted in a loss of resources to the point that they could not meet their goals. If this loss of resources is perceived as occurring, this group could be a snaildarter to a program.

After assumptions were made regarding each of these stakeholders, their assumptions were mapped on Figure 12 to determine how certain, and important, each of the assumptions is to the issue.

ASSUMPTION MAPPING



- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Residents <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program 2. Elected local/state officials <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Not support if it took away from a "pet" project 3. Courts <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Concerned about work loads b) Concerned about changes in laws 4. District Attorney <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Concerned about work load b) Asset forfeitures 5. Teachers <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Concerned about drug education curricula c) Costs to district 6. School Districts <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Concerned about drug education curricula c) Costs to district 7. City Manager <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Concerned about other law enforcement priorities | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Other (neighboring) law enforcement <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Concern about level of their participation b) Cause increase of labs in their areas c) Asset forfeitures 9. Police Association <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Neither support nor block drug testing, polygraph, etc. of officers 10. Parent Teacher Association (P.T.A.) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program 11. County/city where disposal sites are located <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Concerned about hazardous chemicals dumped in their areas 12. State Narcotic Enforcement (B.N.E.) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Key role in any task force approach b) Concerned about safety procedures 13. Police Management <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Support program b) Concerned about loss of resources to programs |
|---|---|

Figure 12.

Modified Policy Delphi

Discussions were held with sworn management and command personnel familiar with illegal laboratories, the deputy district attorney charged with the responsibility of prosecuting hazardous waste violators, and the safety officer of a major aerospace corporation which uses various hazardous materials. From these discussions the following alternative strategies were developed:

1. Discontinue the department's drug laboratory unit and assign officers to a regional drug lab task force, while placing a departmental priority on drug education in elementary and junior high schools.
2. Leave all drug laboratory investigations to state and/or federal agencies. Assign no local personnel to task forces and keep these personnel for general narcotic enforcement investigations within the city.
3. Operate an independent illegal laboratory bureau by assigning 10 percent of the department's personnel to this bureau.
4. Train patrol officers in the detection and follow-up of illegal laboratory investigations. This responsibility would no longer be primarily that of detectives.
5. Reduce the narcotic enforcement bureau by half and assign these personnel to educational responsibilities within the schools.

6. Assign the responsibility for drug education to patrol division.

7. Make drug laboratory enforcement the number one priority for the department.

8. Contract with private investigation companies to gather intelligence information through surveillance and open sources. Information regarding suspected illegal drug laboratories would be turned over to police officers for obtaining warrants and execution of the warrants.

9. Reduce illegal laboratory crews by one half. Use funds saved on personnel costs to purchase high-tech equipment for monitoring suspected illegal laboratories.

10. Establish a permanent Inland Empire drug enforcement team funded by local city and county taxes from Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Taxes would be determined on a per capita formula.

11. Place asset forfeiture funds into a trust account. Additional personnel are hired for illegal drug laboratory investigation as interest on these funds allows.

12. Aggressively pursue private funding to finance drug education in all elementary schools within the city, similar to "adopt-a-school" programs by private organizations.

13. Increase school districts' percentage of the California lottery funds to be used specifically for drug education.

These strategies were presented to a study group of four managers and command level personnel. This study group

selected three alternative strategies. The selection was accomplished by looking at the feasibility/desirability of each, utilizing a "Modified Policy Delphi." (See Appendix A.) The three alternative strategies are as follows:

Alternative One: Make illegal drug laboratory enforcement the number one priority for the department. The department would make a commitment to provide available resources to eliminate illegal drug laboratories within the community.

This commitment would include equipment and personnel, as well as training. It would also entail the training of beat officers in the recognition of illegal drug laboratories, and rewarding them when their observations resulted in a laboratory seizure. The advantages and disadvantages of this priority for the department are listed below:

- Pro--The department is focused on one major police and community problem.
- Pro--Expertise through training and experience will increase the number of illegal laboratory seizures within the community.
- Pro--Many illegal chemists would avoid the jurisdiction due to the priority.
- Pro--Better safety equipment and procedures would be developed for officers seizing illegal laboratories.
- Con--Other programs within the department may suffer from lack of support.
- Con--Officers may develop an attitude that if it's not an illegal drug laboratory investigation, it's not important.
- Con--The department may develop tunnel vision due to the emphasis placed on this priority.

Stakeholder Perceptions: Depending on stakeholders' perceptions of the illegal drug laboratory problem, as well as how they perceive other police problems in their community, many

stakeholders may not support this alternative. Some may believe that a general law enforcement department should not be focused on just one problem.

Many stakeholders within the criminal justice system would feel a comprehensive approach to the drug problem would be more appropriate rather than the narrowly defined alternative above.

Alternative Two: Establish a permanent independent illegal drug laboratory enforcement agency within the Inland Empire funded by local taxes from both counties on a per capita formula. An independent agency without direct ties to any other law enforcement agency within the Inland Empire would be established. This agency would be specifically designed to investigate and seize illegal laboratories affecting the Inland Empire and would not be burdened with peripheral drug enforcement problems in any one community. They would be able to provide training to street officers in the recognition of illegal drug laboratories. The advantages and disadvantages of establishing an independent agency are as follows:

Pro--More freedom from local politics.

Pro--Would be a highly trained and specialized group.

Pro--Would look at the entire Inland Empire's illegal drug laboratory problems rather than the narrowly defined jurisdiction of one local agency.

Con--Would have to be recognized as having police powers through statute changes by the state.

Con--Could become an "us and them" situation which would diminish cooperation with other law enforcement agencies in the Inland Empire.

Con--If drug laboratories lost their priority, the program could be discontinued.

Stakeholder Perceptions: Many would view this approach to the issue as merely creating another bureaucratic level of wasted tax dollars; many might become frustrated in having to be referred to yet another government agency when they want to report a suspected illegal drug laboratory.

The political interests could also see this as a loss of political control, while those in law enforcement may not be as cooperative with the "outside" agency as they might be within their own departments. Generally, most stakeholders would prefer their tax dollars be used locally to increase established programs and departments to address the issue.

Alternative Three: Discontinue the department's drug laboratory unit and assign officers to a regional illegal drug laboratory task force, while placing a priority on drug education in elementary and junior high schools.

The department would funnel all information regarding illegal laboratories to the task force, not undertaking any investigations regarding illegal laboratories themselves. Personnel from the department would be assigned to the task force with a command level officer participating on an advisory board to ensure commitment of their department, as well as avoiding duplication of effort. The department would assign two persons to coordinate drug education programs with the school districts. The advantages and disadvantages of this alternative are as follows:

- Pro--Provide unity between participating agencies.
- Pro--Distribute the burden of personnel and other resources needed to address the issue among the various agencies.
- Pro--Task forces are common to law enforcement and are understood by them.
- Pro--Provides a broader view of the problem over that of a single jurisdiction.
- Pro--Ensures better commitment to the issue; it is not easy for a department to withdraw commitment on a whim.
- Pro--Addresses drug education.
- Con--A group decision-making process can be cumbersome and slow.
- Con--It is difficult to keep multiple agencies happy.
- Con--Level of commitment may vary between participating agencies, resulting in on-again, off-again participation.
- Con--The department would not have control over day-to-day operations of the task force.

Stakeholder Perceptions: Generally, this alternative would be received positively by political officials, police management, and those in education. It would be viewed as a unified approach to the problem without extensive drain on any one resource. The lead agency would be responsible for ensuring that all members of the task force received appropriate training, as well as providing training upon request of local agencies. Some stakeholders could view the task force as being "theirs" due to members of their organization participating the task force.

Recommended Alternative: Following evaluation of the three alternatives in terms of feasibility, desirability, impact on the issue, and mission statement, Alternative 3, "Commitment to a regional illegal drug laboratory task force, with emphasis on drug education," was selected by the study group.

The group felt that this approach would provide the most results with the least amount of resources committed, allowing

the agencies to fulfill their missions both on a macro and micro level by providing pro-active enforcement as well as prevention.

The environmental analysis was conducted using a real department (Riverside Police Department) to allow the study groups to relate to a department they were familiar with, but for purposes of strategic planning and transition management (Part three), the fictitious city known as "San Moritz," referred to in Scenario 3 has been used. San Moritz is located in the fictitious county of "Goodwin."

San Moritz

San Moritz and Goodwin County are experiencing rapid growth, both in industry and population, but have retained their rural atmosphere. Goodwin County still has large undeveloped areas consisting primarily of mountains and desert.

The San Moritz Police Department has 100 sworn officers and provides full-service law enforcement to the community. Their narcotic investigations are performed primarily by street officers who discover violations during their routine patrol duties. Follow-up and under-cover investigations are conducted by four detectives assigned to the vice and narcotics unit. These four detectives divide their time between major violators and street narcotic problems. The department is viewed as a progressive department within Goodwin County and is surrounded by six comparably sized cities.

Mission Statements

A mission statement gives an organization purpose. It should convey this purpose to those inside and outside the organization. The macro statement in this case is for the entire department, while the micro statement focuses on illegal drug laboratories, keeping the overall mission statement of the department in mind.

The macro mission statement of the San Moritz Police Department is to provide safety and security for all the people of San Moritz. A micro mission of the San Moritz Police Department regarding illegal drug laboratories is to enhance the safety and security of the citizens of the city of San Moritz by significantly reducing the number of clandestine drug laboratories in the community through aggressive enforcement, public education, and awareness.

Administration

The Chief of Police of San Moritz must now direct the implementation of Alternative 3. The chief feels Alternative 3 will provide the needed emphasis to reduce the number of illegal drug laboratories in his community without subjecting the department to major change. Based on the WOTS-UP assessments, he knows he has good community and political support for change. He also knows his department is only comfortable with familiar or minor changes.

There are several action steps he must implement, including negotiations with key stakeholders, determining who will be the lead agency, and determining the resources for the operation of the unit.

Negotiations would be directed at the possible snall darters, as well as stakeholders located in the most important/least certain portion of the assumption map. Other stakeholders would be monitored for changes in their commitments. Negotiations with the management of San Moritz Police Department would be conducted showing the benefits of having a task force to address the problem rather than trying to attack the problem in a fragmented approach. An outline of the program would be presented to help alleviate fears of lost resources and programs.

Negotiations would then be directed toward neighboring law enforcement agencies due to the need for a united effort to be effective. The techniques used for these negotiations would be those directed toward participation and cooperation. Most agencies would want to be involved in a task force if they viewed the task force as providing improvement to the quality of life within their communities. Once this benefit is realized, most agencies would support and participate. The chief would also seek their commitment to share resources needed to implement the task force. Next, negotiations would take place with the State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (B.N.E.). A major priority of B.N.E. at this time is directed toward illegal drug laboratories

and they are anxious to assist in the development of regional drug lab task forces.

The chief realizes that B.N.E. would be the ideal choice for the lead agency of the task force and solicits a commitment from them to fill this position. The B.N.E. would also be of great assistance in the area of training and establishing safety procedures during the operation of the task force.

Negotiations with the school district would be important if a team effort is to be realized regarding drug education. Without the district's cooperation, it would be extremely difficult to obtain classroom time and cooperation of principals and teachers. Costs should be minimal to the districts, and the benefits of having fewer drug related problems on their campuses would be an additional incentive.

Lastly, a commitment would be solicited from the courts to support efforts of the task force. They would be asked to take a firm approach to sentencing of convicted illegal drug manufacturers and dealers, which would act as a deterrent.

Once the required commitments were obtained from key stakeholders, the development of implementation as well as time tables of selected policies should be set to ensure the selected strategy is realized.

Timetable for Implementation of this Policy

Negotiations and planning would be conducted during 1990 with the projected start date for the task force the summer of

1991. The educational portion of the program should also be in the planning stages in 1990, beginning in the classrooms in the fall of 1991.

Control

To monitor and evaluate the progress and accomplishments of the task force, an advisory board of representatives from participating agencies would meet once a month during the first year of the task force's operation.

The B.N.E. would chair the meetings and provide statistical information on such things as arrest and conviction rates, availability and prices of street drugs, and the number of illegal drug laboratories seized, to determine if the task force is being successful.

Any asset seizures would be divided equally among the agencies with the chief executive officers determining how the funds are used.

Summary of Part Two

The development of a strategic plan provides a means of bringing into reality a more desired future and avoiding the negative issues identified in the nominal scenario. The strategic plan is developed through a situational analysis that reviews the opportunities and threats presented to the San Moritz Police Department, as well as the strengths and weaknesses that are generally experienced with medium-sized police agencies.

Identification of persons or organizations who have a vested interest in the issue, and their perceptions and level of cooperation expected from them in the development of the alternative strategy, is important if the strategy is to be realized. The final step of development of a strategic plan is to develop an evaluation plan to ascertain if the plan is working. The strategic plan should provide a broad enough base to allow for appropriate transition management which is addressed in part three.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

Implementing an Illegal Drug Laboratory Task Force

OBJECTIVE STATEMENT

The third objective of this monograph is to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of the strategic plan developed in part two. The goal of this transition process is to move the agency from the present through the transition, sometimes referred to as the "neutral zone," to a desired future state.

To help ensure that this transition is smooth, the transition management process must take into account the current state of the environment, as well as the needs of key stakeholders called "critical mass." To manage this change process, it is important to identify major tasks which must be performed during the transition period and what management structure or mechanisms will be used to accomplish the transition.

San Moritz Police Department - Situation Update

This section will provide a more detailed description of the San Moritz Police Department. Although this is a fictitious agency, it is believed the overall structure, environment and goals are similar to other California police departments of similar size. Again, the environmental analysis was conducted using a real department (Riverside Police Department), but for

purposes of strategic planning and transition management, the fictitious city of San Moritz, first mentioned in scenario three, has been used.

The city of San Moritz is a council/manager charter city. The elected mayor serves primarily a ceremonial role and chairs council meetings but does not have a vote on council issues. He does, however, possess considerable political clout in the community. The city council and city manager have been supportive of the police department and generally do not get involved with day-to-day operations of the police department. The council has received considerable pressure from the community regarding drug-related problems and feels, as does the chief, that something needs to be done to address this problem.

Chief Thomas of the San Moritz Police Department has been chief for about four years, after having come up through the ranks. He is respected in the community and by other law enforcement managers in the area. He also enjoys the respect and trust of most of the officers in the department. Chief Thomas has organized his department along traditional lines, with captains managing three divisions. These divisions are administrative services, investigative services, and uniformed services.

Sgt. Jones is responsible for supervising the drug enforcement unit of the San Moritz Police Department. This unit is a part of investigative services division and Sgt. Jones reports directly to Captain Pang, Division Commander. Sgt. Jones

has four detectives assigned to drug enforcement. They have been spending an increasing amount of time investigating illegal drug laboratories, most of which are methamphetamine. These investigations have taken Sgt. Jones' personnel away from other drug-related problems within the city, but he feels when the opportunity arises to stop illegal drugs at the source it should be taken. This philosophy is also that of Captain Pang and Chief Thomas.

The four investigators assigned to drug enforcement have had minimal training in clandestine laboratories and the safety equipment used by this unit is also minimal. Due to the nature of investigating illegal drug laboratories, this unit has often found itself working with other agencies, consolidating resources on a case-by-case basis.

The drug education responsibilities of the department have been placed upon one officer assigned to the public education section of administrative services division. This officer is also responsible for several other major community programs for the department which consumes a great deal of her time.

Part I crimes for the city have steadily increased the last few years, with most observers feeling the increase is due to the drug problems facing the area.

Strategic Plan

Chief Thomas, after having completed an environmental analysis of his department, feels he has the external and

internal support for the implementation of an illegal drug laboratory task force, as well as committing the department to a more active role in drug education within the community.

In order to implement this strategy, Chief Thomas met with his command staff and mapped the change process he had identified as necessary to implement his strategy. The major goals in this mapping process are to do the following:

1. Determine the critical mass. The critical mass is defined as the minimum number of stakeholders whose support will make the change more likely to succeed; if they opposed the change the program is likely to fail.
2. Analyze this critical mass to determine their commitment to the strategic plan.
3. Identify the management structure to be used during the transition period.
4. Develop a responsibility chart to identify who will perform individual tasks during this transition period.
5. Identify supporting technologies to train and evaluate those involved in the strategy, as well as the strategy itself.

Critical Mass

The critical mass portion of transition management is, first, to identify key players who are necessary to make the strategy become reality; second, it must cause some of these key individuals to take ownership into the strategy and play an active role in its implementation.

From the list of stakeholders identified in part two, five critical mass players were identified. These critical players were assessed as to their current level of commitment toward the strategic plan to determine where their commitment would have to be for the plan to work. The critical masses' commitment was broken down into four areas.

1. Block the change--do not let the plan happen.
2. Let change happen--neither block the change nor actively help the plan.
3. Help change happen--take an active role in implementation of the plan.
4. Make change happen--take a leadership role in causing the plan to become a reality.

Figure 13.

Commitment Analysis

Critical Mass Players	Block Change	Let Happen	Help Happen	Make Happen
City Manager		(X - 0)		
Neighboring Law Enforcement		X →		0
Superintendent of Schools			X →	0
San Moritz Police Management			(X - 0)	
State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement		X →		0

X = Current commitment
 0 = Position needed to effect change

The city manager would most likely take the position of neither actively causing the plan to become a reality, but neither would he block the plan. By taking the position of "letting" the regional task force become a reality, the city manager continues his philosophy of not interfering with Police Chief Thomas' running of the police department.

The city manager would, however, want to be apprised of the accomplishments of the task force. He would also support the program and express this to city council members when necessary. The city manager would most likely leave most of the publicizing of the program to the police chief, thereby remaining out of the media. Without the city manager's tacit support, the program could not become a reality, but with his neutral position, Police Chief Thomas can move forward with his plan.

Neighboring law enforcement agencies--Neighboring law enforcement agencies, primarily their chiefs, would have to be educated as to the benefits of pooling resources, technologies, and commitments to reducing the number of illegal drug laboratories in the area. Once they were satisfied of little risk and the possibility of substantial rewards to the task force approach, they could be moved from the "let it happen" position to actively supporting the task force and helping it become a reality. Without their help in establishing the task force by bringing their respective departments into the task force, the strategic plan could not be implemented.

Superintendent of Schools would take the position of wanting to help drug education become a reality; however he/she would have to be moved from the position of "helping it happen" to "making it happen." By using his/her authority and influence over the individual principals of the elementary and junior high schools, he/she could get the principals to actively support and work in partnership with law enforcement with the drug education of their students. The superintendent of schools' support would be felt within the school system as well as the community.

San Moritz Police Management was identified as being in the "help it happen" category, and it is felt that as long as its commitment remains in this category, the strategic plan could be implemented. Although there would be a slight loss of resources perceived initially, if the task force was successful in reducing the number of illegal drug laboratories, the whole community would benefit.

State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (B.N.E.) would take a role of "letting it happen" until they were asked to become involved in the establishment of the task force. Chief Thomas would attempt to negotiate with Sacramento for the purposes of having B.N.E. act as the lead agency; therefore, they would have to be brought from a "let it happen" commitment to "making it happen."

By having B.N.E. as the lead agency, other participating agencies would not feel that San Moritz or any other department

was receiving special treatment. This would help alleviate some of the jealousies which could arise within the task force. Additionally, B.N.E.'s ability and expertise in investigating illegal drug laboratories would be an asset to the task force in the areas of training, safety, and additional resources which could be brought into the area if needed.

Once a critical mass and its commitments have been identified and adjusted, it is necessary to identify the transition management structure best suited to implement this strategy.

Management Structure

Prior to beginning the transition process, it is important to identify a transition management structure that creates the least tension with the on-going system and the most opportunity to facilitate and develop the new system.

The following list of management structures were identified by Beckhard and Harris.^{2a}

1. Chief Executive
2. Project Manager
3. The hierarchy
4. Representatives of constituents
5. Natural leaders
6. Diagonal slice
7. "Kitchen Cabinet"

The primary management structure used to implement this

^{2a}Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, Organizational Transitions, Second Edition, Addison-Wesley, 1987, pp 76-78.

strategic plan will be "project manager" and "representatives of constituencies."

A project manager functions with the authority of the chief executive officer and is charged with "getting the job done." "Representatives of constituencies" is a group that represents the major participants involved in the change. The project manager will have the responsibility for initially implementing the transition phase of the strategic plan. Once representatives of the various participating agencies are appointed and sitting as an advisory board, the structure would then shift to a "representatives of constituencies" mode.

Chief Thomas selected Captain Pang to act as project manager because he feels Captain Pang has the clout, respect and interpersonal skills necessary to be fill the position and bring representatives of the neighboring departments together.

It is also felt that after Captain Pang's initial efforts, the constituents from the participating agencies will develop more of an ownership in the strategic plan as they become involved during the transition period. Just as Captain Pang has the authority from Chief Thomas to make final decisions regarding the strategic plan, constituencies from the other agencies must have the same authority in order to move the transition plan along in a timely manner.

Responsibility Charting (R.A.S.I.)

The responsibility charting portion of the transition management is designed to clarify role relationships of the "actors" who are involved in the transition. Actors are those individuals directly involved, bosses of those involved, or groups who will play a key role in moving the organization from the present to the desired future state.

The remaining portion of this section will operate under two assumptions: first, that Chief Thomas was successful in convincing neighboring law enforcement chief executive officers to participate in the regional illegal drug laboratory task force; second, that the State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement has agreed to act as lead agency.

Captain Pang would then set up a meeting so that he and representatives of the other agencies could discuss what responsibilities would be divided among the primary actors. This could be accomplished through "responsibility charting." Refer to Figure 14 for an example of this charting process.

Captain Pang and other department representatives would find the responsibility charting very valuable in determining certain tasks and assigning responsibility for those tasks. This charting also allows for a better visual understanding of those assignments and allows for communication between responsible parties for completing assignments. It is also felt that those actors listed on the chart were ready and capable of completing assigned tasks.

Figure 14.

RESPONSIBILITY CHARTING

ACTIONS OR DECISIONS	ADVISORY BOARD	B.N.E.	P.O.S.T.	D.O.J. CHEMISTS	LICENSED HAULERS
Office Space	A	R	---	---	---
Equipment	S	A	---	I	---
Training	S	A	R	I	---
Operating Policies	R	A	S	I	I
Hazardous Chemical Collection	S	A	---	R	I
Hazardous Chemical Disposal	A	A	---	S	S
Evidence Storage	A	R	---	S	---
Evaluate Program	R	S	I	I	I
Refine Program	A	R	S	S	I

Legend:

- R = Responsibility (not necessarily authority)
- A = Approval (right to vote)
- S = Support (put resources toward)
- I = Inform (to be consulted)
- = Irrelevant to this item

Supporting Technologies

In addition to the above-described technologies, it would be beneficial to implement other methods to ensure that goals and time lines are met. Prior to the charting, the group agreed upon an "action statement" to keep the group focused. The action statement reads as follows: "To establish a regional illegal drug laboratory task force in Goodwin County by June 1991."

"Confrontational goal-setting meetings"²² could also be a very effective tool in identifying essential goal setting considerations. Because the advisory board may not have all the answers, it would be essential to include other actors (once they are identified as the task force transition progresses) in these meetings to allow for input from all affected persons. These meetings would be held on a scheduled periodic basis for the purpose of identifying and solving unexpected problems.

To help alleviate anxiety and uncertainty during the transition period, it is important for the advisory board and, in particular, Captain Pang, acting as transition manager, to avoid the pitfalls and problems with what is referred to as the "six C's"--clarity, commitment, communication, control, coalitions, creativity. Of these six, the advisory board identified communication as being the most important and endeavored to keep those involved with the task force informed of progress being made toward the implementation of the illegal drug

²²Procedure for Confrontation/Goal Setting Meeting, "Confrontation Meeting," Handout No. 1, Command College, Strategic Decision-making and Transition Management notebook.

laboratory task force.

"Accountability charting"³⁰ is of value in determining specific job descriptions as the task force begins to take shape and grow. This technology also allows for input from individuals performing various functions as well as those observing the task force's development from the outside.

Members of the advisory board must solicit feedback from stakeholders and from other interests involved in the implementation of the task force. Acceptance and responsiveness to feedback would assist in planning as well as organizational concerns. These feedback systems would allow for an on-going evaluation during the transition period and establish solid foundations for the future task force.

Summary of Part Three

Transition management allows an organization to traverse that neutral zone between the present and future states in an orderly manner. This transition management plan is not intended to explore all the technologies of transition management; it is intended to provide technologies, which, if implemented during the transition period, would aid in the establishment of a strategic plan.

³⁰Neil Miller, "The Accountability Chart--A Tool for Team Building," Personnel, November-December 1977, pp 51-56.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Through examining current trends related to illegal drug laboratories and by evaluating the impact of the connection between these trends and predicted future events, it is possible to forecast future scenarios and develop alternative strategies to assist in choosing the most favorable policy to deal with the illegal drug laboratory problems of today and the future. The formation of regional drug task forces, especially among small to medium-sized departments, as well as an aggressive drug education program within the community, have been determined to be the strategy that will best address this problem.

The difficulties law enforcement faces in controlling this problem lies in several areas. Some of these are that illegal drug laboratories operate within our borders, alleviating the necessity of smuggling drugs or other substances used for the purpose of manufacturing of designer drugs into this country.

The monetary incentives for illegal drug manufacturing and the ever-increasing sophistication of techniques used by manufacturers has made it difficult to adequately police. Many current policies directed toward illegal drug laboratory investigations narrowly compete with the tactics of the expansive criminal drug community.

Chemicals, or what are more commonly referred to as precursors, required for illegally produced drugs, can be obtained in a variety of methods. These include purchasing of

the chemicals from legitimate supply houses, to theft and obtaining necessary ingredients from suppliers who operate solely for the purpose of supplying illegal drug manufacturers. With the increased sophistication of laboratories and their operators, many chemists now produce their own precursors. Additionally, the operators of illegal drug laboratories are becoming more educated and more aware of police practices, often avoiding detection through frequent moves of the laboratories and sophisticated methods of camouflaging their locations.

In studying this issue and attempting to determine the best method of enforcement to use in the next 10 years, a study group identified two major strategies. First, law enforcement agencies must cooperate with one another by forming task forces to address the problem, allowing for a consolidation of resources and knowledge to pursue an often mobile criminal enterprise which recognizes no borders and is increasing in its sophistication. The second area of the strategic plan concerns the educational aspect of discouraging drug use and informing young people of the dangers of drugs. It is generally felt that the overall drug abuse problem is an issue that will take generations to control, and only by changing attitudes of our society regarding abuse of drugs will the demand side of this issue be diminished or controlled.

In implementing the recommended strategic plan of forming regional drug task forces and focusing on drug education in schools, two major issues must be overcome: the jealousies among

the agencies; and the attitude that "we can handle it ourselves." Overcoming these two things will be necessary before viable task forces can be formed.

In the area of education, the question arises of how already overburdened teachers can incorporate another curriculum and present timely, accurate information which can be retained by the students.

This monograph slightly touched several related issues which are deserving of future studies. One of these issues is related health concerns of hazardous wastes and chemicals produced by illegal drug laboratories. The long and short term effects both on law enforcement and citizens is of major concern.

Another issue is the supply of precursors needed to manufacture designer drugs. Even with recent statutory changes in California better regulating this area, there are inconsistencies among the states, and it does not appear that most illegal chemists have difficulty obtaining or manufacturing these substances.

Another major issue is the safety of officers while they are seizing illegal drug laboratories. Many agencies lack appropriate training, as well as equipment, to enter these locations; however, they do so on a daily basis.

Also related to the health issue and deserving of future study is the storage and disposal of hazardous chemicals and equipment seized from illegal drug laboratories. Many departments haphazardly store these hazardous chemicals, and the

disposal of such is projected to continue to be a major issue in the future.

Recommendations resulting from this study are two-fold. Agencies, especially those small to medium in size, should form task forces to better control illegal drug laboratories in their jurisdictions. Even larger departments that have the resources to equip and train illegal drug laboratory teams should participate in regional drug laboratory task forces to prevent duplication of effort, as well as to ensure communication between agencies. Secondly, law enforcement agencies must promote and participate in drug education programs for elementary and junior high schools. This problem must be given priority within agencies while it is still considered controllable.

Lastly, this is a problem which will not diminish within the next few years, and our society must be ready for an extended and costly battle to control not only illegal drug laboratories, but illegal drugs in general.

Appendix A

RATING SHEET FOR MODIFIED POLICY DELPHI

Alternative 1:

Discontinue the department's drug laboratory unit and assign officers to a regional drug lab task force, while placing a departmental priority on drug education in elementary and junior high schools.

SCORE: 24

Alternative 2:

Leave all drug laboratory investigations to state and/or federal agencies. Assign no local personnel to task forces and keep these personnel for general narcotic enforcement investigations within the city.

SCORE: 12

Alternative 3:

Operate an independent illegal laboratory bureau by assigning 10% of the department's personnel to this bureau.

SCORE: 6

Alternative 4:

Train patrol officers in the detection and follow-up of illegal laboratory investigations. This responsibility would no longer be primarily that of detectives.

SCORE: 12

Alternative 5:

Reduce the narcotic enforcement bureau by half and assign these personnel to educational responsibilities within the schools.

SCORE: 6

Alternative 6:

Assign the responsibility for drug education to patrol division.

SCORE: 18

Alternative 7:

Make drug laboratory enforcement the number one priority for the department.

SCORE: 24

Alternative 8:

Contract with private investigation companies to gather intelligence information through surveillance and open sources. Information regarding suspected illegal drug laboratories would be turned over to police officers for obtaining warrants and execution of the warrants.

SCORE: 4

Alternative 9:

Reduce illegal laboratory crews by one half. Use funds saved on personnel costs to purchase high-tech equipment for monitoring suspected illegal laboratories.

SCORE: 6

Alternative 10:

Establish a permanent Inland Empire drug enforcement team funded by local city and county taxes from Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Taxes would be determined on a per capita formula.

SCORE: 24

Alternative 11:

Place asset forfeiture funds into a trust account. Additional personnel are hired for illegal drug laboratory investigation as interest on these funds allows.

SCORE: 16

Alternative 12:

Aggressively pursue private funding to finance drug education in all elementary schools within the city, similar to "adopt-a-school" programs by private organizations.

SCORE: 6

Alternative 13:

Increase school districts' percentage of the California lottery funds, to be used specifically for drug education.

SCORE: 18

SCORING

FEASIBILITY:

Definitely Feasible
3 points

No hindrance to implementation
No R&D required
No political roadblocks
Acceptable to the public

Possibly Feasible
2 points

Indicates this could be implemented
Some R&D still required
Further consideration to be given
to political or public reaction

Possibly Infeasible
1 point

Some indication unworkable
Significant unanswered questions

Definitely Infeasible
0 points

All indications are negative
Unworkable
Cannot be implemented

DESIRABILITY:

Very Desirable
3 points

Will have positive effect and
little or no negative effect

Desirable
2 points

Will have positive effect,
negative effects minor
Beneficial
Justifiable as a by-product or
in conjunction with other items

Undesirable
1 point

Will have a negative effect
Harmful
May be justified only as a by-
product of a very desirable item

Very Undesirable
0 points

Will have a major negative effect
Extremely harmful