



**POLICE RESPONSE TO DRUGS AND GANGS:
CASE STUDIES OF POLICE DECISIONMAKING**

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The Police Executive Research Forum

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FINAL REPORT

**POLICE RESPONSE TO DRUGS AND GANGS:
CASE STUDIES OF POLICE DECISIONMAKING**

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I. OVERVIEW

The Police Executive Research Forum has conducted an 18-month research project, entitled **Case Studies of Police Decisionmaking: Police Response to Drugs and Gangs**, to develop a broader understanding of the various approaches that local police departments have developed to respond to gang problems in their communities exploring, particularly, the nexus between drugs and gangs in various jurisdictions. The findings from this study provide unique insight into the day-to-day operations of police agencies struggling to deal with emerging or rapidly evolving problems in their cities. Such insight offers a rare inside glimpse at how agencies address rival problems that compete for an agency's scarce resources, the impact and influence of public and political pressure to respond to these often high-profile problems and how organizational changes occur in response to these issues.

The primary research product for this study takes the form of narrative case studies developed for each of the five cities studied. Each of the studies can be read and utilized as a stand-alone descriptive document, particularly for instructors using a case study method for police management training. The documents also form a compendium to contrast various and alternative responses being used by police agencies.

The rationale for this study developed from an awareness that police administrators make many decisions that affect the lives and welfare of their communities. Most of these decisions are relatively minor, but each may have important consequences for public safety particularly those that occur within the context of major police challenges. Unlike other well-developed professions, such as law and medicine, police administrators neither document nor discuss the process in which major decisions are made. Often decisions are made and implemented but never discussed or evaluated outside the agency. The result is a dearth of

valuable information which other police executives could find both informative and educational, as well as a model for their own decisionmaking. This dearth is particularly hard-felt in areas of critical police decisionmaking, dealing with major issues such as drug and gang enforcement efforts because of their currency and primacy among issues with which police executives currently struggle.

Useful case studies for police executives should do more than describe programs and outcomes. These documents should also fully detail how administrators decided to carry out their efforts and describe the context within which that decisionmaking occurred. The focus should be less upon on operating styles, informal work rules and organizational cultures than on processes that affect decisionmaking at the executive level.

The field of criminal justice and police officials can benefit from case studies of decisionmaking, particularly those which represent complex decisionmaking. Cases can create the basis of police professional education as used in recruit, in-service or advanced management training. Cases can be used to educate the public, media and elected officials about the complexities of policing. And cases can assist other police agencies in developing and refining decisionmaking processes.

In recent years, researchers have developed a set of methods specifically for case studies. In particular, Robert K. Yin in **Case Study Research: Design and Methods** (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), describes approaches for using case studies as a research method. Cases on police organizational reform have been prepared for the Harvard Executive Sessions (for example, David M. Kennedy's "Neighborhood Policing: The Long Metropolitan Police Force," Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.) Rarely,

however, have researchers and practitioners applied these methods to police decisionmaking and there has been no police-specific model developed for professional case development.

Yin noted that a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.

Thus the case study method has proved an excellent means for studying police decisionmaking in a complex decisionmaking environment. Seeking to meet those objectives, the research project studied police decisionmaking regarding responses to gang and drug enforcement. This demanding arena of police decisionmaking fit within the parameters of conditions for conducting successful case studies. First, police gang and drug enforcement efforts are of major importance to both police and the communities they serve. Second, it was perceived that anti-gang and drug efforts were relatively inseparable from each other and from the larger context of anti-crime activity. Third, drug and gang problems have been volatile, thus agency responses have tended to also change quickly. In addition, meaningful quantitative data were unavailable or not clearly indicative of the scope of the problem or the effectiveness of the intervention.

Under these compelling conditions, PERF conducted its research using a case study approach to identify and document decisionmaking processes used in five police agencies to respond to drug and gang problems, assessing, to the degree possible, how agencies have incorporated federal funding into their decisionmaking.

The case study methodology provided a solid framework for conducting the research. Using a subject matter expert panel, research staff developed a rigorous site protocol to guide

on-site data collection, which was performed by a team of a police practitioner and a researcher. Information was collected through structured interviews with identified individuals within and outside the agency. Extensive documentation was collected in the form of interdepartmental memoranda, news clippings, crime statistics, general orders, and other documents.

On site, the research team used a protocol consisting of three sets of questions designed to formally guide information collection of information and assure some standardization among cases. The first set of questions dealt with identifying events that stimulated the agency to respond to gang and/or drug problems. Answers to these questions described the background of the case and chronicled the development of the problem. The second set of questions sought to describe the decisions that were made and the responses that were implemented by the agency. The third set of questions sought to describe the outcome of the department's response, including any evaluative information, if available.

Background questions included identifying the jurisdiction's economic conditions, political arrangements, race relations, geographic location, demographic characteristics and other background factors. Such questions including determining the police department's culture, leadership style, policies, procedures, organizational structure, staffing and resource allocation plan. Research staff also identified key decisionmakers in the organization, their tenure and experience, reviewed the city's form of government and determined the relationship between key elected officials and the chief of police. In particular, the research team sought to determine the degree in which the department's response to drug and gang-related problems was influenced by local politics and community demand.

The research team also documented the scope of the current gang problem in the

jurisdiction, determining how many gangs and gangmembers existed, their ethnicity, age distribution, leadership, and primary activities. To the extent possible, the research team examined the current gang problem to determine any evidence of change in gang characteristics over time, carefully examining the nexus between organized gangs and drug activity in the jurisdiction.

The second set of questions in the protocol examined the agency's current response to perceived gang and drug problems. In addition to determining if the agency used a special unit or generalist approach to gang problems, the research team looked carefully at how the department formally defined gang membership, gang activity, and gang-related incidents. The team sought to identify any specific triggering event, set of events, or other stimulus that created the need for the agency to respond specifically to gang problems, including identifying who made the decision, determining who exerted control in the decisionmaking process and the degree of formality of that decisionmaking.

The team identified specific information that was used in decisionmaking and determined what external events and/or individuals affected the department's decisionmaking. In addition, the team reviewed the degree to which the department provided explicit guidance for patrol officers and supervisors on how to deal with gang-related problems, examining, for example, the extent to which decisions related to gang enforcement had been defaulted to street officers, street supervisors and/or unit commanders.

Each agency was studied for the degree of its focus on enforcement, determining if elements of gang prevention, education, or other proactive approaches were included in the response. The team examined the extent to which other public and private agencies in the

jurisdiction collaborate with the police department in its gang efforts and examined the existence of intra-agency links, again, determining the formality or informality of these linkages

In the third set of questions, the research team looked at the results or outcomes of the department's current response to gangs, examining the attitudes of department members towards the way in which gang enforcement efforts are conducted, the perception by police officers of the attitudes of the community towards gang enforcement.

The team also collected and reviewed information about the impact of the anti-gang effort as revealed by department members, available press accounts, local reports and statistics.

Project advisory committee members and research staff, in conjunction with the National Institute of Justice, selected five sites for study in this project. The sites were selected upon the basis of the severity of their drug and gang problems, for regional diversity, for ethnic diversity in terms of gang manifestation and because of variations in their approach to gang problems. The study sites included Chicago, Kansas City, San Diego, Austin and Metro-Dade County, FL. In Chicago, the study focused on public housing on the city's South side as a way to get a handle on the city's extensive gang problems. In Kansas City, the study reviewed the department's integration of a BJA discretionary grant into the departmental response to gang-related problems, scrutinizing efforts related to a problem with Jamaican posses. In San Diego, the research effort partially focused on the role of the District Attorney's Office, the recipient of another BJA discretionary grant, in addressing gang-related problems by using a vertical prosecution effort. In Austin, the research effort involved documenting the department's generalist approach to its gang-related problems, while the Metro-Dade study focused on the department's mixed decentralized-centralized approach to gang problems with its emphasis on collaborative sharing

of information with other agencies.

Although no formal cross site analysis was included in this study, importantly, research teams noted the wide variance in the manifestation of gang problems from one city to another and also within cities. Similarly, the range of police responses to gang problems was equally varied. The range of these findings is discussed in detail in Section VII of this report.

Although the study sites were in fact selected because of their diversity, the research effort identified vast differences in the manifestation of gang problems from one city to another. Similarly, police responses to these differing problems varies widely. The variance in the manifestation of gang and drug-related problems appears to have become increasingly clear. In recognizing that variance, some police had begun taking steps to develop tailored responses to their problems. During the course of the research, several agencies were on the precipice of altering their departmental responses to gang problems.

These studies were conducted by both practitioners and researchers using an investigative team approach designed to generate maximum relevance for the police practitioner while assuring that high research standards were maintained. Standardization of cases was maintained through the use of the protocol; research teams were provided guidance on maintaining neutrality and a non-judgmental approach to the research task.

Five practitioners participated in the research effort. These individuals included the following:

William Tegeler is a lieutenant with the Santa Ana, CA, Police Department, one of the nation's leading police departments implementing community-oriented policing. Lt. Tegeler is district commander of the department's Developmental Policing District, a decentralized police

command, who maintains full responsibility for patrol, investigations, traffic, narcotics, vice, narcotics and gang activity. Lt. Tegeler was a key representative in the Mayor's Task Force on Neighborhood Policing in Santa Ana, an effort designed to educate citizens about the department's approach to policing and elicit input from the community.

Deputy Chief Jim Weston of the Reno, NV, Police Department is division commander of the department's detective division, a division of some 65 employees. He previously served as commander of the department's Administrative Support and Patrol divisions.

Major Carolyn Robison Kusler of Tulsa, OK, Police Department serves as an area commander. She was previously assigned as a training division commander and, as an area commander, pioneered the implementation of community-oriented policing in the department.

Larry Lewis is a captain in the Corona, CA, Police Department, which he joined in 1989. He currently serves as division commander with responsibility for one of three major divisions within the department. He is in charge of the city's community-oriented policing program, a gang awareness program, field operations and special enforcement. Lewis previously worked for the Fullerton, CA, Police Department from 1971 to 1989.

A fifth practitioner was selected but was unable to complete the research effort.

The close involvement of practitioners in development of these cases insured a rich level of detail which otherwise may have remained unidentified. Because of the experience of each of the practitioners in drug and gang problems, along with a sensitivity to addressing community demands, the practitioners enhanced the practical dimensions of the research effort.

In addition to the participation by practitioner investigators, PERF obtained the guidance and insight of an advisory committee in crafting key elements of the research plan. Participating

on this advisory committee were Ernest Curtsinger, former chief of the St. Petersburg, FL, and the Los Angeles Police Department; Division Chief Ronald C. Sloan of Aurora, CO; and Chief Ronald Nelson of University of California Police Department, formerly chief of the Berkeley, CA, Police Department. These advisory committee members helped identify criteria for site selection, reviewed preliminary data collection tasks, reviewed case study protocols and reviewed each of the cases, providing guidance and direction for refinements. Their efforts helped refine the research design for the project, ensured completeness of data collection and consistency across the multiple sites.

II. METRO-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO GANGS AND DRUGS*

by Lt. Bill Tegeler

National trends toward spiraling drug abuse and growth in youth and street-gang criminality pose formidable challenges to law enforcement in metropolitan Dade County, Florida. Concern over these issues is heightened by southeastern Florida's well-documented reputation as one the primary entry points of illegal narcotics into the United States.

According to narcotic experts in the Metro-Dade Police Department (MDPD), the drug cartels that control the illicit trafficking of narcotics pose a significant threat to outsiders and have prevented youth street gangs from entering their markets. As gang membership grows, however, the potential for gangs to use their organization for the distribution of drugs increases.

To prevent a nexus between drugs and street gangs, the MDPD, under the leadership of Director Fred Taylor, has adopted a three-tiered strategy for curtailing gang activity. The first tier involved the creation of a centralized investigative gang unit specifically designed to monitor gang activity and gather intelligence on gang members throughout the department's jurisdiction. The second tier required the decentralization of detectives into each of the department's eight policing districts, where they specialize in the investigation of gang-related crimes and act as liaisons between patrol officers and the gang unit. The final tier consisted of the MDPD's taking the lead in the implementation of a countywide task force approach to gang enforcement.

The Multi-Agency Task Force, as it was called, attained national recognition in 1990,

*The field work for this case study was conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. The titles of some individuals and the names of persons holding particular positions may have changed since then. Unless otherwise noted, quoted statements were made by the person indicated during interviews conducted as part of the field work.

when it received the Juvenile Justice Award of Merit from the National Juvenile Association and Kentucky Justice Cabinet. Perhaps one of the most telling compliments given to the task force was made by a Los Angeles police official, who said, "We should have taken this approach 10 or 15 years ago!"

OVERVIEW OF DADE COUNTY

Located in the southeastern portion of Florida, Dade County is surrounded by Collier and Monroe counties to the west, Broward County to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the east and south. Dade County comprises 2,139 square miles, which makes it the second largest county in the United States; it is also the most populous county in the Florida.

According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the population of the MDPD's service area is 1,036,925, a 29 percent increase over 1980. As shown below, the ethnic makeup of Dade County has changed significantly. Over the past 20 years the percentage of non-Hispanic whites has decreased by nearly half, and the percentage of Hispanic whites has more than doubled. This change is attributed to a sharp increase in refugees from Cuba and Central and South America. This trend is expected to continue in Dade County during the 1990s. It is estimated that the population will grow by 30 percent during the decade, to over 1.3 million people, and that 74 percent of the population will be Hispanic by the year 2000.

Responsibility for law enforcement in Dade County has evolved through a diverse history, which continues to influence the delivery of services today. From 1900 to 1966, the office of Dade County Sheriff was an elected position. In 1957, a metropolitan form of government was adopted and the Dade County Sheriff's Office became known as the Public Safety Department

Ethnic Makeup of Dade County

Census Year	Non-Hispanic White	Hispanic White	Non-Hisp Black	Hispanic Black	Asian/Other
1970	358,867 67%	82,000 15%	92,500 17%	2,500 1%	1,500 1%
1980	424,567 53%	204,344 26%	158,557 20%	7,550 1%	4,200 1%
1990	365,031 35%	414,969 40%	226,669 22%	15,045 1%	14,263 1%

(PSD). In 1960, the PSD consisted of 623 sworn personnel and assumed responsibility for policing the Port of Miami and the Miami International Airport.

A long-standing controversy over the selection/election procedure for choosing the sheriff was resolved by voter referendum in 1966. The county manager was empowered to appoint a "Director of the Public Safety Department and Sheriff of Metropolitan Dade County" to replace the previously elected sheriff's position. The county's charter specified the structure of the Public Safety Department, which had grown to a sworn capacity of approximately 850 officers. In addition to police functions, the PSD assumed responsibility for fire protection, the jail and stockade, civil defense, animal control, and motor vehicle inspection.

Dade County is governed by the Metro-Dade Board of County Commissioners, which is made up of the Metropolitan Dade County Mayor and eight commissioners elected by the public. The board appoints the county manager, who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of county departments in accordance with policies established by the board and the county charter. The county manager appoints the MDPD director (metropolitan sheriff). The director answers exclusively to the county manager; the director is prohibited by statute from taking direction from any member of the county commissioners.

By 1973, the Public Safety Department had divested itself of many of its responsibilities in order to concentrate solely on providing policing services for one of the fastest growing regions in the nation. The PSD had increased in size to approximately 1,200 sworn positions, twice its size in 1960. In 1981, the department was reorganized and became known as the Metro-Dade Police Department. Through the establishment of home rule, the MDPD was given jurisdiction over enforcement throughout the county.

The MDPD enjoys strong community support from those who live and work in Dade County, according to Maj. Dick Rogers, commander of the MDPD's Doral District. This support is perhaps best illustrated by the recent completion of the new Metro-Dade Police Headquarters complex. Financed through the passage of a bond issue by taxpayers in 1982, construction for the \$28 million complex, located on a 22-acre site, began in October 1986. The complex consists of a three-story police headquarters building designed to accommodate 1,500 employees; the two-story Doral District Station; a two-story property and evidence warehouse; and a vehicle maintenance building.

THE METRO-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT

The MDPD is the largest police agency in the southeastern United States. It has a complement of 3,736 personnel (2,614 sworn and 1,122 non-sworn) and an authorized budget of \$236,516,000 (fiscal year 1990-91).

As stated in its 1990 annual report, the MDPD is committed to providing professional police services by developing innovative programs, making use of the latest technology and equipment available, maintaining standard operating procedures, rules, and regulations, and

providing advanced training for its personnel. The department is a candidate for accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.

Departmental Organization

The director of the MDPD formulates plans and policies and provides managerial coordination of departmental operations. The statutory obligations of the Office of Sheriff are required duties of the director. The second in command is the deputy director, who executes departmental operations as prescribed by the director. In the absence of the director, the deputy director assumes command of the agency.


Following the deputy director, the chain of command for the MDPD is assistant director, chief, major, commander, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, and police officer/deputy sheriff. The rank of captain is the highest civil service position within the department. Commanders and above are appointed by and serve at the will of the director. Police officers (deputy sheriffs) hold one of two positions: officer (uniformed) or detective (nonuniformed).

The MDPD is organized into four sections, each providing specific services under the command of an assistant director (see Figure 1). The Department Services component provides essential administrative and technical support. Special Services fulfills the statutory responsibilities of the Office of Sheriff, plans and organizes special events, promotes public awareness through crime prevention, and encourages a cohesive relationship between the police and the community. Investigative Services conducts centralized and highly specialized criminal investigations, including homicides, robberies, narcotics trafficking, economic crime, and crimes involving juveniles. Within Investigative Services is the Juvenile Investigations Bureau, which

includes the Habitual Offender Unit (HOU), the unit responsible for investigating gang-related activity, maintaining gang-related identification records, and apprehending juvenile repeat offenders.

The fourth component of the department, Police Services, performs traditional patrol functions while seeking innovative ways to serve the changing needs of the community. The head of Police Services is responsible for managing the assignment and use of the department's uniformed personnel (over 70 percent of the department's sworn personnel) and their equipment.

Figure 1
MDPD Organizational Chart



The county is divided into two geographic operational divisions (north and south), each under the command of a division chief, who coordinates division functions. Both North and South Operations are divided into four decentralized districts. Each of the eight districts is headed by a district commander (rank of major), who is responsible for the entire police effort within the district, including uniformed police patrol, traffic enforcement, and general investigations.

Policing Problems

Major crime in unincorporated Dade County dropped slightly during 1990, the first decline since 1984. Although the decrease was only about 1 percent, it came at a time of rapid population growth and when other Florida communities were experiencing double-digit crime increases. Director Taylor believes the decrease is due in part to "the many proactive crime fighting programs we have introduced." The comparison below of Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data for Dade County in 1989 and 1990 shows the decline in crime by crime type.

Dade County UCR Crime Rates

Crime Type	1989	1990	Change
Murder/nonnegligent manslaughter	228	250	+9.6%
Forcible rape.....	854	848	-0.7%
Robbery.....	8,036	8,455	+5.2%
Aggravated assault.....	10,526	10,421	-1.0%
Burglary.....	30,472	29,359	-3.6%
Larceny theft.....	57,980	58,899	+1.6%
Motor vehicle theft.....	19,788	18,572	-6.1%
Arson.....	292	399	+36.6%
Total.....	128,176	127,203	-0.8%

According to Director Taylor, the three most significant policing problems within Dade

County, in the order of the department's priorities, are "drugs, robberies and gangs." The Bureau of Justice Statistics confirms that southeastern Florida is one of the major distribution regions for narcotics in the United States. MDPD narcotics detectives have participated in a number of task force initiatives that targeted mid- to upper-level trafficking networks. The department reports that during 1989 and 1990 over \$72 million in U.S. currency and over \$100 million worth of cocaine were seized as a result of task force efforts.

Departmental statistics indicate that robberies increased by nearly 60 percent from 1985 to 1990. Violence during the commission of robberies also rose, as evidenced by a disproportionate increase in injuries sustained by robbery victims.

The high visibility and threat to the community posed by gangs in the county cause the director to rate gangs third among the department's prioritized problems. As described below, the MDPD has implemented strategies to address gang problems in order to prevent their growth and the related violence often experienced in other jurisdictions.

THE EMERGING GANG PROBLEM

In 1984, a newly impaneled grand jury examined the issue of gangs in Dade County to determine their impact on the community. After reviewing documentation and hearing testimony from local police, school, and community leaders, the grand jury issued its final report in the spring of 1985. The grand jury concluded that the presence of gangs is "far below [that of] urban cities of comparable size," but it warned that gangs appeared to be "an emerging phenomenon which could expect to grow if not controlled." At that time, the MDPD had two specialized detectives responsible for gang operations.

In the fall of 1987, a second grand jury investigation was conducted to determine if the level of gang activity in Dade County had changed since 1984. In its final report, issued in May 1988, the grand jury said that gang membership had grown by 47 percent and the number of identified gangs had increased from 36 to 53 since 1984.

The 1988 grand jury report made nine recommendations for addressing gang-related criminal and antisocial behavior. Two of the recommendations relating specifically to law enforcement became the blueprint for Dade County's response to gangs:

1. Develop a computerized central registry, accessible to police officers 24 hours a day containing information of youth gang membership, crimes and activities throughout Dade County. All of Dade County's police departments should be involved in the collection, storage and distribution of this information to other agencies.
2. Improve interdepartmental and crossjurisdictional cooperation among all law enforcement and other appropriate agencies both within Dade County and between agencies in Broward and Palm Beach Counties to better track gang members and their criminal activities.

In addition to the grand jury report, a number of events occurred during this period that heightened the public's awareness of gangs.

First, on October 16, 1987, while working in an extra-duty capacity at a local theater, a South Miami police officer was confronted by a group of youths and stabbed. The officer later died from his injuries. Following the death of his officer, Chief Perry Turner of the South Miami Police Department became dedicated to preventing the spread of gangs in his and nearby communities. Soon, Chief Turner was appointed chairman of the Cross-jurisdictional Subcommittee of the Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council's Juvenile Gang Intervention Project.

Second, a newspaper article in The Miami Herald of September 18, 1988, described the increasing presence of youth gangs in Dade County. That same day, a fight broke out at

Tropical Park, located within Metro-Dade's Kendall District, in which two gang members were shot. Police in riot gear were needed to stop the brawl, and an estimated 75 gang members were arrested. Before order was restored, 2 officers and 20 citizens were injured. The combination of the newspaper article and footage of the fight on the evening television news are believed to have greatly increased the public's fear of gangs.

Third, on March 12, 1989, during the annual "Calle Ocho" street festival in Dade County, gang members from all over the county engaged in hand-to-hand combat. One member was shot by a rival gang member, and police were once again called in to restore order. A total of 223 arrests were made, a large percentage of which were of juveniles. The gang problem was once again brought to the attention of the public.

Profile of Juvenile Gang Members

An analysis of gang crimes in several of the 27 independent Dade County police jurisdictions showed gangs were highly mobile, lacked a traditional "turf" or neighborhood orientation, juvenile, and advantaged by a lack of concerted enforcement.

The Multi-Agency Gang Task Force estimates that there are 96 street gangs in Dade County and approximately 4,700 gang members. Of that number, 60 to 65 gangs are considered active and to have an active membership of 2,500 to 3,000. Most gangs identify themselves as factions of "People Nation" or "Folk Nation," which reflects a strong influence from Chicago. In the 1940s, immigrant neighborhoods of Latin origin in Chicago organized themselves for the preservation of their heritage while supporting the personal, social, and economic growth of their people. Gang members migrating from the Midwest to south Florida adopted the Chicago-based

gangs' philosophy, as reflected in their terminology: the Latin Kings represent the People Nation and the Latin Disciples, the Folk Nation.

Based on a sample listing of Dade County youth gang members provided by the City of Miami, the MDPD's Habitual Offender Unit developed a profile of known juvenile gang members. Fifty-three young adults or youths were randomly selected for study, and the following profile was developed:

- . Sorted by zip code, the geographic distribution of gang members was strikingly clustered. The cities of Hialeah and Miami had the greatest concentration of gang members sampled.
- . By a significant percentage, the average member sampled was white and likely to be of Hispanic origin. Sixty-one percent had Spanish surnames indicative of a Hispanic heritage, 33 percent were classified as white, and 6 percent were identified as black. Almost all were male (94 percent).
- . Seventy-nine percent had an arrest referral history with the Human Resource Services Delinquency Intake unit. Of those, less than 1 percent were referred for weapons violations, but 62 percent had referrals for crimes against persons. The average number of violations charged was 9, and the range was from 1 to 32.

A separate study of gang members residing in the City of Miami was conducted by Sgt. Joseph Rimondi of the Miami Police Department. This study revealed the following ethnic makeup of gang members: 50 percent Cuban, 20 percent Puerto Rican, 15 percent Nicaraguan, 10 percent American black, 3 percent Haitian, and 2 percent "other." Gang members ranged in age from 10 to 34 years, but the majority of police interventions were with individuals 14 to 21 years of age. Approximately 3 percent of the gangs had female members, who were as dangerous and violent as the males and often used to "hold" weapons and narcotics for male members.

According to Lt. Bill Bogolub of the MDPD's Juvenile Investigations, the extent of

criminal behavior by Miami youth gangs ranges from vandalism in the form of graffiti to murder. The most common crimes are auto theft, aggravated assault and battery, auto and residential burglaries, strong-armed robberies, and weapon and narcotic violations. Gang detective Gregory Truitt reports that gangs are becoming more organized and sophisticated and arming themselves with assault rifles.

COUNTYWIDE GANG STRATEGY

As the various communities and local police departments formally acknowledged a growing gang problem, Chief Turner of the South Miami Police Department met with MDPD Director Taylor in late 1987. At that time, Taylor was the president of the Dade County Association of Chiefs of Police (DCACP). Turner and Taylor discussed the concept of a interagency gang task force to address the perceived lack of a coordinated effort. Any one agency might not have the individual resources to address the gang problem, they recognized, but collective resources, used on an ad hoc basis, might improve effectiveness. On January 26, 1988, the idea was presented to the DCACP's Executive Board for its support. As a result of that meeting, a resolution was passed that called on all police agencies in Dade County to "participate in a county wide gang inter-agency task force, to pro-actively thwart illegal youth gang activity in Dade County."

It was agreed that as the largest agency, the one with the most resources, and the one with authority throughout the county, the MDPD would provide logistical support for a countywide gang task force. Regardless of jurisdiction, all members of the task force would have unrestricted enforcement authority under the provisions of an existing agreement on "Mutual Aid

for Pro-Active Operations/Investigations Throughout Dade County."

The implementation of a countywide response to gangs consisted of two components, each mirroring the recommendations of the 1987 grand jury. First, a centralized clearinghouse for intelligence data on gangs was established. Second, the creation of "a major cooperative effort among Dade's Law Enforcement agencies" was realized with the formation of the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force.

Gang Clearinghouse Project

Studies underwritten by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, such as the Serious Habitual Offender Drug Involved (SHODI) and the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (SHOCAP), convinced members of the MDPD that only a small percentage of juveniles were responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. Based on grand jury testimony by local enforcement officials and the grand jury's recommendations, gathering intelligence on that relatively small group of individuals was critical to police enforcement efforts.

The MDPD's Sgt. Larry Neill developed a strategy for the automated collection and dissemination of gang intelligence. His plan began to take shape in 1988 with the initiation of the Gang Clearinghouse Project. Then in January 1989, the Metro Dade County Commission approved the purchase of a computer system and related equipment to establish the clearinghouse. The county's Law Enforcement Trust Fund, a repository for asset forfeiture money from drug cases, was used to fund the project. Under the supervision of Sergeant Neill, responsibility for the gathering, maintenance, and analysis of information on gang members and their activities was centralized in the clearinghouse.

The MDPD operates the clearinghouse, which is located within the headquarters Detective Division and under the command of the Juvenile Investigations Bureau. The clearinghouse unit consists of one sergeant and two nonsworn employees--a police crime analysis specialist and a police records specialist. The unit collects information on gangs from the eight MDPD policing districts and all other police agencies in the county. The clearinghouse is a resource for all police agencies requesting information on suspected gang members in Dade County. Staff prepare monthly reports outlining documented intelligence and gang activity, which is disseminated at the monthly Multi-Agency Gang Task Force meeting.

When the project first began, data were kept on a personal computer and maintained by the MDPD's computer staff. After an evaluation of software packages in use across the nation, the decision was made to purchase the Gang Reporting, Evaluation and Tracking, (GREAT) system in order to expand the automated capabilities of the clearinghouse. The GREAT system, which is marketed by Prime Computer, Inc., of Natick, Massachusetts, provides the capability to maintain and search data, including identification, nickname, gang association, vehicle, and associates.

Currently, personnel in the Metro-Dade, Miami Beach, Hialeah, Coral Gables, Boca Raton, and City of Miami police departments maintain GREAT system files. In the future, the clearinghouse may be upgraded to an on-line system. The installation of a super minicomputer capable of operating the GREAT system would enable a simultaneous multiuser environment accessible at any time through the use of modems. Once a budget is developed, a request for support will be submitted to the Law Enforcement Trust Fund. This type of

system could be the beginning of a statewide gang data base, which could eventually be expanded to allow participation on a national basis.

As information began to be collected in late 1989, Sergeant Neill quickly identified a problem: Various law enforcement agencies, courts, social services agencies, and citizens each had a different perception of what constitutes a "gang" and "gang activity." In order to standardize terms, definitions were developed and adopted for use by all law enforcement agencies within the county through the Dade County Association of Chiefs of Police in November 1989 (see the appendix).

In July 1989, the Florida legislature mandated a study and recommendations regarding establishment of a statewide computerized youth- and street-gang intelligence system. During the last quarter of 1989, three meetings of the Youth Gang Advisory Group were held in Orlando. The group consisted of representatives from eight of the larger police agencies in the state and was established by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in response to the legislature's mandate. The advisory group endorsed the gang definitions adopted in Dade County and the use of the GREAT data base for a statewide system.

Realizing the value of standardization, the clearinghouse developed a gang interview or intelligence card to speed the entry of data into the GREAT system. The card obtains all appropriate information, such as gang affiliation and physical description, in the format used by the GREAT system. The gang interview card was supported and adopted by the Dade County Chiefs of Police and is now used by police personnel throughout the county. With the potential use of all Dade County police officers as data collectors, the system's data base can be expanded and improved, according to Robert Riker of the MDPD, the current

clearinghouse sergeant.

Multi-Agency Gang Task Force

The Multi-Agency Gang Task Force comprises police officers from all local law enforcement agencies in Dade County that specialize in gang operations. The task force performs two important functions: through its monthly meeting, it enables members to develop common goals and exchange gang information in a timely manner; and it provides the means for mobilizing member agencies for any large-scale event in the county that has the potential to attract gang members.

In the late 1980s, the City of Miami had the most experience with and intelligence on gangs. During the early development of the task force, the Miami Police Department shared its expertise with the other county police departments, and the Metro-Dade Police Department supplied administrative staffing, logistical support, and equipment. According to Lieutenant Bogolub, this early cooperation set the tone for how the task force would operate in the future as a resource for all law enforcement agencies in Dade County.

The coordination and planning of the task force are overseen by an advisory board consisting of supervisors from the largest participating agencies. When an upcoming event in the county has the potential to attract gang members, the task force is mobilized through the collective use of Dade County gang enforcement resources. When activated, the task force's authority falls within mutual aid agreements between agencies and extends countywide jurisdiction to municipal officers for the term of the event or incident. By policy and practice, when the task force is mobilized, the agency that has primary jurisdictional authority

for an event has overall responsibility for the use and deployment of the task force.

The promoter of an event many times shares the cost of providing police services. During the process of obtaining necessary permits for a special event, promoters often agree to reimburse police agencies for all or some of the overtime monies expended during the event. In this manner, police budgets are not adversely affected by an event within their jurisdiction.

Operationally, the task force uses the tactics of high visibility, immediate contact, and surveillance of gang members to deter illegal activity at large public events at which public safety might be jeopardized by gang criminal misconduct. The task force was first deployed during the 1988 Dade County Youth Fair at Tamiami Park Fairgrounds, located within Metro-Dade's Doral District. Previous Youth Fairs had been marked by gang disturbances. Gang specialists from the Metro-Dade, Miami, Hialeah, South Miami, and other municipal police agencies "greeted" arriving gang members from their respective jurisdictions. This approach eliminated the anonymity of gang members and is believed to have deterred gang activity at the event. Although numerous street and youth gangs were in attendance, no major incidents occurred.

MDPD Cdr. Pete Cuccaro was the Youth Services Bureau commander during the start-up of the task force. Cuccaro believes the Task Force has been successful:

The Task Force has labored to insure the safety of the responsible kids in Dade County, allowing them to enjoy a positive social atmosphere. It has hopefully eased the concern of parents who allow their teenagers to attend youth oriented functions. It has also targeted the aberrant behavior of gang members. The information gathered has led to the successful conclusion of investigations in which gang members were involved. The challenge for the future will be to improve upon the foundation that so many people are responsible for establishing.

The success of the task force in curtailing potential violence and gang activity at the 1988 and 1989 Youth Fairs was acknowledged by Director Taylor. But additional strategies were implemented during the 1990 Youth Fair to deal with the increasing gang encroachment at Dade County events. For example, gang detectives from neighboring counties were stationed at major transportation centers to identify out-of-county gang members arriving to attend events in Dade County.

At the 1990 Youth Fair, the mobilized task force consisted of 31 detectives from nine police departments. During the 18-day event, 374 gang interview cards were completed, compared with 303 the previous year and 14 in 1988, the first year the task force was used. Forty-eight gang members were ejected from the fair by task force detectives for disruptive behavior and 3 arrests were made compared with 5 in 1989 and 20 in 1988. In addition, nearly every youth associated with any gang activity was photographed during the fair, which provided valuable intelligence information, such as identifying hand signals and tattoos. Group photographs provided documentation about membership association and interaction of the 27 gangs in attendance at the fair.

A report filed after the fair stated, "There were no significant incidents or problem areas encountered during the 1990 DCYF." Police hours devoted to the 1990 fair totaled 1,316 (844 on-duty and 472 overtime) compared with 1,585 hours the previous year (1,006 on-duty and 579 overtime). The promoter of the event provided nearly \$10,000 in overtime pay to reimburse task force agencies providing security for the event.

In addition to the Dade County Youth Fair, the task force has been used at other large events that attract gang members. In 1990, Calle Ocho, an annual street fair, erupted into

violence as a result of gang misconduct. Since then, the task force has been mobilized for that event. The task force was also recently mobilized for a Halloween Haunted House event, and the potential for gang violence at the 50th anniversary celebration of the city of Sweetwater led to mobilization of the task force again. Proactive efforts are also conducted by the task force. Gang "hangouts" are monitored, for example, and investigations are cooperatively conducted by task force personnel from several agencies.

As the MDPD's Juvenile Investigations Bureau lieutenant, Bill Bogolub has the collateral duty of chairing the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force. In addition to overseeing the Gang Clearinghouse Project, he is responsible for planning and facilitating monthly task force meetings and preparing the monthly report on gang activity throughout the county.

An open forum discussion is conducted at each meeting, during which attendees have the opportunity to either solicit or provide information on specific cases or crime trends in their jurisdiction. The January 1992 monthly Multi-Agency Gang Task Force meeting provides an example of the exchange of information and networking that take place at the meetings. In addition to gang detectives from all law enforcement agencies in Dade County, South Miami Chief Perry Turner was present. Chief Turner, who regularly attends the monthly meetings, sees his role as that of being a "participant" and "providing support" for the task force as necessary.

Andrew Hague, the chief of gang prosecution for the Office of the State's Attorney, and members of his staff also attended the meeting. Hague provides support for law enforcement agencies and their efforts to prosecute gang cases. At the discretion of field personnel, he will respond to the scene of any gang-related crime to assist in the investigation

and subsequent prosecution. Hague provided an update of a Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organization case in which several members of a gang were prosecuted for the sale of narcotics as far away as Chicago. He also informed them of recent case law regarding "fruits of the crime."

Others attending the January task force meeting included representatives from Probation and Parole, Corrections and Rehabilitation, Metro Dade Housing Authority Police, Dade County School Board's Special Investigations Unit, School Resource Officers, and detectives from MDPD district stations.

Members of the task force have identified training as a key element in antigang efforts--training for the community, for field personnel, and for themselves. Thus, task force personnel act as an in-service training resource for their respective agencies. Members of the task force are collaborating with other organizations to develop videotapes, aimed at students in middle and junior high school grades, that depict alternatives to gangs. Training is also provided at each task force meeting. At the January 1992 meeting, for example, MDPD gang detective Gregory Truitt provided information on the "pager holsters" used by some gang members. This sparked discussion on gangs' use of "boom boxes" to conceal weapons.

At the conclusion of task force meetings, interaction among the members does not stop. Officers having or wanting specific information often meet on a one-to-one basis. All supervisors assemble following the meeting to discuss supervisory and managerial concerns, operational issues, and future planning.

With the exception of Chief Turner, ranking officers do not attend the meetings. Empowering line supervisors and officers has been the approach to building and maintaining

the cohesiveness of the task force. Ranking officers are seen as a resource for the task force, rather than vice versa.

MDPD INTERNAL GANG STRATEGIES

By communicating with persons both within and outside the department, Director Taylor says he "keeps a close eye" on gang activity. He meets with district commanders and line personnel regularly, and talks with members of the press to help determine the level of gang activity and its impact on the community.

Taylor does not believe the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force and Gang Clearinghouse Project are a panacea for gangs. Thus, the department has developed internal strategies that complement countywide efforts to impede gang activity. Responsibility for the collection and maintenance of intelligence resides generally with the centralized Juvenile Investigations Bureau, and most investigative and enforcement efforts are conducted by decentralized district personnel.

MDPD Centralized Gang Strategies

When it was created in 1982, the Gang Unit consisted of two detectives and was part of the Community Affairs Section. The following year, the unit was elevated to bureau status, and its name was changed to the Habitual Offender Unit. In 1987 the unit was assigned to the Youth Services Bureau, which was renamed Juvenile Investigations in 1991.

The HOU consists of 2 sergeants, 10 detectives, and support staff. One sergeant (Robert Riker) and the support staff are responsible for the operation of the Gang

Clearinghouse Project, as previously described. The remaining sergeant (Mitch Reis) and the detectives are responsible for gathering and disseminating intelligence information on gangs. Personnel from the unit also represent the department on the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force.

According to Director Taylor, the unit was purposefully designed to "pass on" information about criminal activity to the appropriate agency or specialized unit responsible for criminal investigation. As an example, if the unit obtains information that gang members are involved in street robberies, that information is passed on to robbery detectives, who handle the criminal investigation up to and including an arrest. Members of the unit do, however, remain a resource during the course of the investigation.

Mitch Reis describes the unit's objectives as including the proactive enforcement of gang activity; gathering intelligence through observations; monitoring day-to-day activities of gang members; and arresting offenders, if necessary. According to Reis, the majority of the unit's time is spent "assisting other municipalities and entities such as the robbery and homicide units."

Each HOU detective is assigned a geographic area of the city about which to develop an expertise regarding the gangs that reside in or frequent the area and their activities. The exchange of information between the HOU and district stations is accomplished through personal relationships among detectives. Weekly contact between HOU detectives and district station detectives specializing in gang investigations is encouraged. Copies of reports involving gang members and their activity are often shared between members of the HOU and those district stations that emphasize gang enforcement. Because the coordination of information is based on personal relationships rather than a formal system, not all information

is consistently shared between sections, however.

MDPD Decentralized Gang Strategies

Each district commander is responsible for providing police services for one of the eight policing districts. The emphasis and resources given to gang activity within a district are at the discretion of the district commander, based in part on the input of the community through the Community Advisory Committee.¹

Each of the eight districts has at least one general investigations detective who specializes in cases involving gang activity. These detectives act as liaisons between their district and the HOU and are responsible for gang operations within their assigned district. They also attend monthly gang task force meetings and are often selected to fill vacancies in the HOU. Two examples of gang efforts at the district level illustrate the department's decentralized approach.

The Cutler Ridge District Commander, Maj. Frank Boni, has assigned two full-time detectives responsibility for gang activity in the district. Although only a small percentage of gang members in the district are involved in typical gang criminal activity, gang violence does occur, including drive-by shootings. When a special youth event occurs within the district, such as the Halloween Haunted House event, Boni calls in the HOU and gang task force to assist. As district commander, however, he maintains functional responsibility and is held accountable for the event.

Ozzie Hernandez is one of the gang investigators in the Cutler Ridge District. He spends about half of his time gathering intelligence on gang activity within the district and

sends all arrest reports involving gang members to the HOU. Hernandez also coordinates the collection and dissemination of information gathered by district patrol offices and uses roll calls as a forum for providing training and exchanging information on gangs.

Hernandez has developed an expertise on gang members and their activity in the district and maintains an automated file of gang information at the district station. There is no procedure, however, to ensure this information is also included in the clearinghouse files. Gang members in his district are most often involved in auto theft, burglary, and vandalism (graffiti). Through daily contact with gang members, Hernandez has been able to build a personal relationship with local "gang-bangers." By targeting the leadership of the gangs, Hernandez believes, he has been somewhat successful in neutralizing their threat to the community.

Maj. Dick Rogers is the district commander at the Doral District Station. According to Rogers, many gang members live within the Doral District, but "they do their crime" in other areas. Other than the annual Youth Fair, which is held within the district, "gang activity is not a large portion of our workload." The Doral District has one gang investigator, who also acts as liaison between the district and the HOU. Rogers views the district's School Resource Officers as his most effective way of dealing with gangs.

The School Resource Officers of Doral District are multifunctional. They perform their duties in uniform on school campuses. They try to develop rapport with students on a personal level and to gather intelligence information by serving as confidants to friends of gang members. They also serve as a liaison between the police department and the school administration. Paging devices enable them to stay in close contact with school administrators.

School Resource Officers also provide presentations on narcotics and gangs to parents and teachers and are active in the Parent Teacher Association. The unit also initiated a "Sports Day" program, during which 60 students from each school are recognized for their school attendance and citizenship and participate in a day of team sporting events.

The presence of the School Resource Officers in the schools provides at-risk students a positive role model designed to deter their participation in street gangs. Officers state that the development of personal relationships with students provides the opportunity for them to avert some gang activity by obtaining intelligence on gangs and their activities.

MDPD AntiGang and Diversionary Programs

The MDPD's gang enforcement and educational efforts are supplemented by programs to divert children from the temptations of gang activity. The following are some of the MDPD's antigang and diversionary programs:

School Resource Officer: In addition to their work on school campuses, School Resource Officers conduct various programs for elementary through high school children. Examples include Project SCORE (School, Community, Officer, Relationship and Education), which provides an alternative to "outdoor school suspension" and teaches goal setting, the importance of self-esteem, and drug and alcohol prevention; a drop-out prevention program, funded by a Citicorp grant, which is directed at identifying fifth and sixth graders who are considered to be at high risk of dropping out; Jail Field Trips, which exposes students to the results of criminal behavior; and Officer Safety presentations on various topics.

Police Athletic League (PAL): PAL provides an opportunity for youths in economically deprived areas to participate in athletic activities. Good sportsmanship, teamwork, and interaction with positive police role models are combined in an effort to redirect juveniles who might otherwise get involved in crime.

Police Explorer Program: A part of the Boy Scouts of America, the Explorer Program provides youngsters with positive role models and an opportunity to

interact with police officers.

- Join A Team, Not A Gang: This program is designed to discourage youths from joining a gang. Players and coaching staff from the University of Miami are used to suggest positive alternatives to gangs.

- Adopt A Wall: Officers coordinate and participate in graffiti eradication through this program. Students from local high schools "adopt a wall" and pledge to discourage graffiti activity at that location. Should the wall be defaced, students cover the graffiti with paint donated by a local paint company.

- Task Force Against Graffiti: The objectives of the TAG program are to increase public awareness regarding the seriousness of the graffiti problem, arrest vandals responsible for the crimes, and restore neighborhoods most victimized by graffiti.

Through its participation in the countywide Gang Clearinghouse Project and Multi-Agency Gang Task Force, the Metro-Dade Police Department has taken a strong, proactive approach to stemming gang and drug activity in the county. A central feature of the two projects is the enhanced communication and coordination they encourage among law enforcement agencies in the county. The task force mechanism, in particular, provides the structure for quickly mobilizing the resources needed to prevent public events anywhere in the county from becoming the scene of gang misconduct.

The MDPD's internal strategies to impede drug activity have been developed complement the countywide efforts. The centralized Habitual Offender Unit collects gang intelligence, monitors gang activity, and disseminates gang information to other departmental units. A possible drawback is that information sharing by the HOU is based on personal relationships with other officers, not a formalized system.

Each of the eight MDPD policing districts also has at least one detective who is responsible for monitoring and handling gang activity in the district. The resources devoted to

these gangs, however, are left to the discretion of the district commander.

NOTES

1. Formed in each of the policing districts in 1982, the Community Advisory Committees serve in an advisory capacity to the district commander regarding issues of mutual concern. Members consist of people living in the district who are concerned about police/community relations and are sensitive to community needs and perceptions. Membership is reflective of the demographics of the district. Committee members are appointed by the county manager based on recommendations from various entities, including the County Commission and district commanders. The chairperson, selected by committee members, and the district commander jointly establish an agenda for public meetings.

APPENDIX

GANG TERMINOLOGY ADOPTED BY DADE COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

YOUTH AND STREET GANG - An ongoing organization, association, or group of three (3) or more persons, whether formal or informal, which meets BOTH of the following criteria:

- A. Has a common name or common identifying signs, colors, or symbols; and
- B. Has members or associates who, individually or collectively, engage in or have engaged in criminal activity.

YOUTH AND STREET GANG MEMBERS - A person who meets any TWO of the following criteria:

- A. Admits to gang membership;
- B. Is a youth up to 21 who is identified as a gang member by a parent or guardian;
- C. Is identified as a gang member by a documented reliable informant;
- D. Resides in, or frequents, a particular gang's area and adopts their style of dress, use of hand signs, symbols, or tattoos, and associates with known gang members;
- E. Is identified as a gang member by an informant of previously untested reliability and it is corroborated by independent information;
- F. Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified gang members for offenses which are consistent with usual gang activity;
- G. Is identified as a gang member by physical evidence, such as photographs or other documentation; or
- H. Has been stopped in the company of known gang members four (4) or more times.

YOUTH AND STREET GANG ASSOCIATE - A person who meets EITHER of the following criteria:

- A. Admits to gang association; or
- B. Any single criteria enumerated in "Youth and Street Gang Member" (A-H).

YOUTH AND STREET GANG ACTIVITY - An incident may be classified as gang-related when the investigation reveals ANY of the following:

- A. The participants are identified as gang members or associates, acting individually or collectively, to further any criminal purpose of the gang;
- B. A reliable informant identifies an incident as gang activity;
- C. An informant of previously untested reliability identifies an incident as gang activity and it is corroborated by other existing circumstances or independent information; or
- D. When there are strong indications that an incident is gang-related, but it does not fit the above criteria.

These definitions are meant to specifically address the emerging phenomenon of Youth and Street Gang crime. While there may be some crossover they are intended to exclude drug, robbery, auto theft, burglary, graffiti crews, and subversive or terrorist groups which do not fit the criteria as outlined in "Youth and Street Gang."

III. THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO GANGS AND DRUGS*

by Deputy Chief Jim Weston

Since the early 1980s, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) has responded to public concerns about gang and drug violence by maintaining an aggressive gang enforcement program.

The program's main element is a 455-officer Gang Crimes Section, which works in conjunction with other organizational units to generate a large number of arrests and seize weapons used in gang violence.

This case study focuses on the CPD's organizational structure and its approach to gang and drug problems. The area of particular interest is the CPD's Wentworth District, on the city's South Side, which has a high concentration of minorities and public housing developments.

CHICAGO'S GANGS

Unlike many cities in which gangs are an emerging phenomenon, Chicago has been dealing with gangs since the turn of the century. By the late 1920s gangs were so numerous that Frederick Thrasher's *The Gang* detailed the activities of 1,313 gangs in Chicago.¹ At the time, street gangs were organized around color and ethnicity and were made up mostly of immigrants, who brought their Old World animosities with them to the United States. In the 1960s gangs were limited in number and mostly concentrated in black communities on the South Side. They engaged largely in extortion and ripoffs of federal aid programs. When intergang conflict arose, sticks and fists were usually sufficient to settle the problem. Members were typically aged 14

*The field work for this case study was conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. The titles of some individuals and the names of people holding particular positions may have changed since then. (For example, Supt. Martin retired in 1992 and others in the department may also have changed positions.) Unless otherwise noted, quoted statements were made by the person named in the course of interviews conducted as part of the field work.

to 21 years and most reached their peak of gang activity by age 20. A general decline in gang membership occurred in the early 1970s as some communities organized resistance against gangs, which resulted in many members being sent to prison.

Today, gangs have spread to every portion of the city and its surrounding neighborhoods. Guns and knives have replaced sticks and fists, and cars have increased gang mobility. The gangs are still primarily racially oriented, but it is not uncommon to find white members in black or Hispanic gangs. The sale of narcotics, prostitution, extortion, and theft are now the gangs' financial lifeblood. Several of the most organized and experienced gangs have made inroads into legitimate businesses, such as real estate.

According to Irving Spergel, author of several books on gangs, today's gang members get more economic rewards from membership than their earlier counterparts.² Because there are few legitimate jobs for them and many are poorly educated, many feel they have no place else to go but into a gang. As a result the age range of gang members in Chicago has increased; members are now commonly between 7 and 50 years old. Fewer members are maturing out of gangs, and many return from prison to resume earning their livelihood as a gang member. In many parts of Chicago, being a gang member is a family affair. Children are trained early to hold guns and give hand signals identifying their gang affiliation. Gangs are also firmly entrenched in the state prison system and have links with gangs on the outside.

In 1990, the Chicago police made 23,595 arrests for gang-motivated crimes and, in the process, recovered 3,141 guns (see Table 1).³ Included were 98 arrests for gang-motivated homicide and 1,601 felony battery and assault crimes. Although gang violence has been attributed to both black and Hispanic gangs, Chicago's gang-motivated homicides appear to be

predominately a Hispanic problem.⁴

Table 1. Gang-Motivated Crime and Arrests, Chicago, 1989 and 1990*

Offense or Arrest Category	1990	1989	Percent Change
Total Part I crime	314,179	303,789	3.4 %
Gang-motivated Part I crime	1,784	1,371	31.4 %
Total homicides	851	865	-1.7 %
Gang-motivated homicides	98	72	36.1 %
Total arrests, all offenses	306,367	276,912	10.6 %
Total gang-motivated arrests	23,595	19,944	18.3 %
Gang-motivated narcotics arrests	778	1,659	-53.1 %
Guns seized in gang incidents	3,141	2,748	14.3 %

*To be considered a gang-motivated crime, both the offender and the victim must be affiliated with a gang.

Gangs have taken control of many of Chicago's neighborhoods and apartment buildings, especially in public housing developments. The majority of gang members live on the city's South Side and belong to 20 major gangs, which, together with the 40 factions or affiliated gangs they have spawned, total almost 10,000 members. Depending on the criteria used to define a gang, anywhere from 12,000 to 120,000 gang members are active in Chicago today.

According to the "Guide for the Identification of Chicago Street Gangs," prepared by the Gang Crimes Section, gangs in Chicago are loosely affiliated with one of the two supergangs, which have adopted specific methods of identification. On one side are the Gangster Disciples and affiliates, commonly referred to as "Folks," and on the other side are the Vice Lords/El Rukn's and affiliates, the "People." Regardless of which gang an individual belongs to, most gang members claim affiliation with one of the supergangs and, in theory, are allies with any gang member claiming affiliation with that supergang. Experts and former prison inmates claim

that survival in prison depends on belonging to one the two supergangs.

Robert Dart, commander of the Gang Crimes Section, observed:

Gangs are changing in the United States and Chicago. Street gangs are becoming narcotics cartels. Youth gangs no longer can be placed in a box and dealt with as they used to be--they're now crossing over into organized crime involving narcotics. Surprisingly, gang violence in some cases is no longer acceptable behavior for gang members involved in narcotics sales. Being economically motivated, stereotypical activities such as representing [making hand signs indicating gang membership], fighting, or drawing attention are shunned to avoid police attention which would adversely affect income from drugs.

"You have to realize that gangs and drugs can't be separated. Seventy-five percent of our gang crime arrests are related to narcotics," said Capt. Harold Duffy, commander of the Gang Crimes unit assigned to the South Side. Sgt. Stan Zaborac, who heads a Violent Crimes detective team in the Wentworth District and spent 16 years on patrol tactical teams, emphasizes,

Gang violence is narcotics violence--gangs are the symptom and narcotics is the problem ... just because a gang is involved doesn't make it a gang crime, it's narcotics. Addicts use \$300 to \$500 a day in drugs and have to commit crimes to get the money. So far this year [1991] in Area 1 [the city is divided into six police areas] we have had 157 murders and all but 10 were narcotics related.

Rosendo Morreno is a uniformed patrol officer in the Wentworth District. As he and his rookie partner Kerry Little cruise Wentworth Avenue along an endless stretch of 16-story public housing apartment buildings early in the evening, he points out a group of young blacks clustered around an entrance and remarks,

We can't get near these guys--they run up into the projects when we get close. Gangs control the projects. It's not like the street corners where we can take control, the projects are their environment and they are in control.

Gang membership in Chicago has been difficult to assess fully, for several reasons. First, information concerning gang demographics and intelligence is not automated. The Gangs Crimes

Section, for example, has only one personal computer. The section does not have a computerized system for its gang intelligence, and the state of Illinois is just starting one. Second, the police department is restricted in its ability to maintain gang intelligence files because of a 1988 civil suit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Alliance to End Repression. The suit challenged the department's procedures for investigating groups or individuals exercising their First Amendment rights. A result of the suit was an injunction against the department that restricted and closely regulated First Amendment investigations. Captain Duffy explained, "The only files we can maintain are actual case files of arrests or investigations. We're behind the curve in this area."

THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chicago is a lakefront city of approximately 3 million residents in an area of 228 square miles; the metropolitan area has over 6 million people. The city has a large minority population--41 percent of the residents are black and 17 percent are Hispanic. The city has a mayor/council form of government, which administered a budget of \$3.1 billion in 1990. Despite an extremely political structure in the city of Chicago, where the police chief serves at the pleasure of the mayor, most of the department's top level officers say there has been little interference or political meddling from city hall or local politicians. If anything, past and current mayoral administrations have been supportive of the police department's actions to deal with the gang issue. tions have been supportive of the police department's actions in dealing with gang problems.

The police department's 11,818 officers (1990) provide a staffing-to-population ratio of

3.9 officers per 1,000 residents. About 22 percent of the officers are black, 5 percent are Hispanic, and 17 percent are female. From a work-load perspective, in 1990 police cars were dispatched to 96 percent of the 2.4 million 911 calls in Chicago, which reflects a decades-old policy of responding to most calls by sending out a patrol car. The remaining 4 percent of 911 calls were handled by a "call back" unit of 60 light-duty officers, which has been in operation since 1984.

Organizational Structure

The department is headed by a superintendent appointed by the mayor and who has traditionally risen from within the ranks. The superintendent rank as well as approximately 100 "exempt" positions (e.g., first deputy superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant deputy superintendent, chief, deputy chief, commander, and director) that make up the command staff are not protected by career service rules. This gives the superintendent considerable flexibility in selecting his management team. In addition, within the career service ranks up to the level of captain, the superintendent can appoint 25 percent of the positions in each specialty assignment based on merit.⁵ The department is highly specialized in function and rank structure throughout its hierarchy.

The city's six police areas are subdivided into 25 districts, each containing a district station. When the districts were formed in the 1960s, they were designed to generate a proportionate number of calls for service in each area, and police officers were allocated evenly among the districts. Today, however, many districts handle a disproportionate share of the work load, which results in loading individual beat cars with up to six calls at a time. Dispatchers

assign calls based on the last-known location of cars, and this has a tendency to increase response time. At this writing, the dispatch system is not automated, but funding has been committed to upgrade the 911 system and implement computer-aided dispatching.

A police commander is in charge of each district and oversees captains, who are in charge of the three patrol shifts. Each shift is staffed by lieutenants and sergeants, who function as field supervisors. Uniformed patrol officers work in two-man beat cars and spend a major portion of their time responding to 911 calls. Although each district commander is responsible for all policing issues in his district, he must rely on the support of special units (e.g., Narcotics, Gang Crimes, Traffic, Community Services), which are outside his direct control.

Responsibility for gangs is not specialized into one unit, but is spread throughout the department. For example, in Police District 2 (also called the Wentworth District) the following units have some responsibility for dealing with gang problems: Wentworth Patrol, South Side Gang Crimes Section, Narcotics Section, Public Housing Section, School Patrol Unit, Bureau of Community Services, Detectives Division, and Youth Services Division. Additionally, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) operates a police department, which has some responsibility for gangs in public housing. (See Figure 1.)

Organizational Direction

Interviews with many top-level command officers in the department reveal a belief that, as police managers, their responsibility for dealing with gangs is primarily limited to the identification and arrest of gang members involved in criminal activity. Other public and private agencies have the responsibility to deal with the range of social issues that breed gangs and

related problems. According to Superintendent of Police LeRoy Martin,

Our approach is to track the leadership of gangs and whenever possible charge them with federal crimes since the federal institutions still have jail room for them. Locally, there's a liberal policy of bonding criminals out partly because of a lack of jail space.

Superintendent Martin, who worked his way up through the ranks and took over command of the department in 1987, has addressed gang problems primarily with an enforcement-oriented approach that relies on the 455-officer Gang Crimes Section. Martin believes his department has been doing a good job of identifying and arresting those involved in gang violence. However, the gang problem does not appear to be abating, and Martin says he often has to "take the beating" for the entire criminal justice system:

Seldom do I see a judge, a prosecutor, or a social service agency head taking any heat at the community meetings I constantly attend. My job is to pick them [criminals] up and put them in jail. I have to identify the other part of the system that's not doing its job and let the public know. If I don't, I'll take the rap for the entire system.


Nonetheless, he believes most people are aware that the police are not solely responsible for solving gang problems or the underlying social issues that spawn gangs.

First Deputy Superintendent Charles Ford is Martin's second in command and is in charge of operations for the entire department. As head of the Bureau of Operational Services, he is in control of most of the organizational units that deal with gangs and is responsible for overseeing major gang enforcement efforts. He considers the Gang Crimes Section as a body of officers he can call on to fight the front-line battle in emergencies, such as looting/vandalism during power outages, demonstrations, and outbreaks of gang violence. "We've never lost a major incident in the city," says Ford.

In order to coordinate the department's gang enforcement efforts, Ford meets daily with

the chiefs of the Patrol and Special Functions divisions. He also consults regularly with the superintendent. Based on the information Ford receives, mission plans are developed and the gang unit and other support units are assigned to problems throughout the city. According to Ford, the individual district commanders have responsibility for everything occurring in their districts, but it is not feasible to divide the special units (e.g., Gang Crimes, Narcotics, School Patrol) and give them to the commanders. "I need to have a large group of officers available

Figure 1
Abbreviated Organizational Chart,
Chicago Police Department and Chicago Housing Authority Units
With Responsibility for Youth Gangs in District 2



to throw at problems. The district commander can ask for help by picking up the phone and calling other commanders," said Ford.

Deputy Superintendent John Townsend has been with the CPD for 36 years. He is in charge of the Bureau of Investigative Services, which is responsible for criminal investigations of adult and juvenile crimes, including gang-related crimes. He believes the department's specialized-unit approach to gang problems works well: "All of the specialized units come together, or gel, to get the job done. I don't think we go in too many directions." Although Townsend's Youth Services Division operates the School Patrol Unit (over 200 officers), which has responsibility for gang problems in schools, he believes the district commander has just as much responsibility to safeguard schoolchildren as the School Patrol Unit does.

Deputy Superintendent John Whigham, who heads the Community Services Bureau, also supports the specialized approach to dealing with gang problems. He comments, "I don't agree that [too] many units have responsibility for gangs. Anyone who encounters gang problems has the responsibility." His bureau, which he describe as the conduit between the community and police department, operates a number of nonenforcement-oriented programs, which have had some impact on gang activity. However, his bureau is targeted in the city's proposed 1992-93 budget for a staffing cutback that will reduce his staff from 204 to 60 officers.

Since the late 1960s, when a formal CPD gang unit was first organized, the policy and strategy developed to deal with gangs have primarily been a product of the department's command staff. Most of Superintendent Martin's top-level officers say there has been little interference from city officials or local politicians. Past and current mayoral administrations have been supportive of the police department's actions in dealing with gang problems. In 1984, for

example, then State's Attorney General Richard Daley fulfilled a campaign promise and created a gang prosecution unit to get tough on gangs. The unit claimed an 84 percent conviction rate for more serious drug crimes.

DEALING WITH GANGS AND THE WENTWORTH DISTRICT

Police District 2, the Wentworth District, is located a few miles south of Chicago's business center and borders the busy Dan Ryan expressway. The district is one of the department's smaller ones (3.7 square miles). Almost all of its 90,000 residents are black. In 1990, officers responded to 122,000 calls for service, which involved 15,417 Part I crimes, including 75 murders and 3,200 robberies. An analysis by the Chicago Tribune based on U.S. census data and police department records indicates that Wentworth had the highest violent crime rate of the 25 police districts and the second highest number of police officers per 1,000 residents.

When approaching the Wentworth area from the expressway, one's attention is drawn to the towering public housing buildings that stretch nonstop for almost four miles. The Chicago Housing Authority manages over 42,000 units providing low-income shelter to nearly 150,000 residents. A large portion of the public housing comprises rows of apartment towers built in the early 1960s.

Near the police station at 51st Street and Wentworth Avenue is the Robert Taylor Homes development, which consists of 24 high-rise towers bordering two miles of the expressway. It is said to be the largest public housing development in the world. Nearly all of the 20,000 residents are poor and black. More than 90 percent of the households receive public assistance

and three-quarters are headed by women. Between the towers are playgrounds, trees, and some lawn area. At 2 pm one afternoon, however, no children were playing outside, although many adults were lingering about. Broken glass covers much of the playground sand. According to the police department's Gang Identification guide, all but three of the towers in Robert Taylor Homes are controlled by a large gang, the Black Gangster Disciples.

Wentworth Patrol

A majority of the officers assigned to the Wentworth District are young and black. This is partly a result of an assignment bidding process that allows officers to select the district they work in based on seniority. According to Acting Wentworth District Commander, Capt. Dominic Rizzi, "This is the pits of the city. It's a dumping ground; we use it for a training district." Enforcement by making arrests is the primary approach to dealing with not only gang-related crime but all crime in the district. Rizzi states, "I think the officers are focused on enforcement because you're rated on numbers. Every commander wants to look good--how many lockups, how many guns taken--there is always criticism if numbers are down."

Wentworth is a busy district. Many calls are not prioritized by the dispatcher, and frequently there are so many calls, the dispatcher simply broadcasts them in the hope that a unit will volunteer for the assignment. According to Rizzi, patrol officers do not have time to determine if a call involves a gang crime because the pressure is to go on to the next call. He believes the average street officer cannot identify gang crime, anyway, but he also believes that most crime is not gang motivated. He said, "My focus is to make good arrests, not simply arrest gang members. Good arrests will take care of the gang problem; no one cares if you're a gang

member." When street officers do encounter gang members, they have several options says Rizzi: "They can call a sergeant and give it to the tactical team; they can give it to the Gang Crimes unit; give it to another officer with whom they have developed a working relationship; or they can make an 'information report' to submit through channels." The officers can also check off the "gang" box on the police report. The individual officer normally does not deal with the issue himself unless he can make an arrest immediately.

According to Rizzi, the district commander has primary responsibility for 911 calls in Wentworth's developments, although the CPD's Public Housing Unit and the CHA police provide police services also. "The Chicago Housing Authority Police is a supplement to us, not a replacement. We have a good working relationship." Rizzi says officers from all three units could respond to the same call, however, because there is no official policy on who is responsible for handling the call.

Rizzi spends time each day reviewing crime reports to determine what problems are occurring in the district. However, he finds the available reports of limited use. For example, crime analysis reports prepared by the Detective Division are 10 days old when he receives them, and gang intelligence is not automated nor collected in a manner that would enable him to access current gang activity information each day. When Rizzi has problems in his district that he needs help with, whether involving gangs or not, he can call on the Patrol Division's 28-officer district tactical team and assign them to an enforcement mission.

Lt. Leroy Grant supervises the Wentworth tactical team. The team consists of 3 sergeants and 24 police officers, who work primarily in plain clothes. His officers are also arrest oriented and are selected for the assignment based on their prior productivity as patrol officers

(productivity is measured by arrests, citations issued, and activity reports). Grant says, "My team is a mobile strike force for the district commander. We are responsible for all crime in the district. Much of it is committed by gang members over drugs, but I don't have the luxury to zero in on gang crime." When gang problems are identified by the district commander, either the Gang Crimes unit or tactical team could be assigned to help and there might be some overlap. Both units can conduct some follow-up investigation activities involving gang crimes, but departmental procedures require that area detectives handle all follow-up investigations as well as approve each felony arrest completed by officers.

Grant does not believe Gang Crimes South has any lasting effect on gang problems in the district because the unit can only work on a gang problem for a week or two and then must move on to some other problem in the area. What may also occur is that concentrated gang enforcement in other areas will simply shift problems into his district.

Officers Morreno and Little work the evening shift in the Wentworth District. Most of the calls they handle involve domestic violence. Gangs are prevalent but some common perceptions about gang activity are not borne out for Morreno. He says, "I've never seen a gang fight. Most of the gangs don't represent or wear colors for fear of retaliation. When they go to school they take out their earrings and remove hats to avoid problems. They only represent when going to parties." Morreno also says that gangs are not as territorial as they used to be and that makes them difficult to track. Public housing poses a special problem for Morreno: "Lookouts let drug dealers know when we're coming and they drop their dope before we can get close." He does not spend much time in the projects unless assigned to calls. According to Morreno, patrol units have little interaction with Gang Crimes:

Gang Crimes gives us nothing [in terms of gang intelligence]. We don't make any contact with them during the shift unless they show up on our calls. They do heavy cases sometimes, but we may not know about it. Everything we do know about gangs comes from on-the-job training. Each officer keeps his own intelligence file and shares information with his friends in the field.

Assigned to each district is a Neighborhood Relations sergeant, who provides a link between the neighborhood and the district commander. Organizationally, the Neighborhood Relations Division is under the command of the Bureau of Community Services, but according to Sgt. Melvin Powell (Wentworth Neighborhood Relations), he takes his direction from the district commander and has little dealings with the bureau. He has two police officers assigned to assist him and spends much of his time taking complaints from citizens and attending neighborhood meetings. Powell says, "Most of the complaints involve drugs being sold by gang members. My job is to pass along information to other units and let them do their job." When he receives complaints, Powell passes the information to the district tactical team, Narcotics, or Gang Crimes by writing a memo directly to them. He can also write a "special attention" memo for entry into the beat book maintained in each squad car so the officers can work on the problem. Powell does not work much with public housing residents. As he explains, "We interact with residents of Robert Taylor Homes, but I found it's hard to do a workshop because they get afraid when the police are there since it can cause retaliation."

Gang Crimes Section

The department's Gang Crimes Section has a lengthy history. It was formed in March 1967, under the title of Gang Intelligence Unit. Prior to 1967, individual districts had formed unofficial gang units to combat localized gang problems. Since 1967, staffing has fluctuated


from less than 100 officers to its current peak of 455, and the section has undergone several name changes. Organizationally, the Gang Crimes Section has been assigned to several different parts of the department until finally settling under the Special Functions Division of the Bureau of Operational Services, where it is today. Most of the staffing and organizational changes were in response to community and political pressure to address increasing gang violence and juvenile crime.

In 1982 the Gang Crimes Section received a large staffing boost when then Mayor Jane Byrne responded to public concern over increasing gang homicide rates. She authorized increasing the unit from under 100 to almost 400 officers, who were to deal with increasing street violence and problems in public housing. Gang Crimes was elevated to a bureau-level unit of the police department and headed by a deputy superintendent. The resulting crackdown by police led to allegations of civil rights violations and heavy-handedness by police. The political cost of the unit's independence and tactical methods was recognized by the new mayoral administration that took office in 1984. At that time Gang Crimes was reassigned to a unit of the Patrol Division and its staffing was cut.

The Gang Crimes Section is currently divided into three geographic areas--south, north, and west. (See Figure 2.) Each of the three areas or units is commanded by a captain, who reports directly to the section's commander, Robert Dart. Each unit has two working watches, each commanded by a lieutenant, and provides daily shift coverage from 9:00 am to 2:00 am. Two types of officers are on duty on each watch--tactical officers and Gang Crimes specialists.

Tactical officers are the enforcement arm of Gang Crimes and can be assigned to enforcement missions in any portion of the city on short notice. For the most part, they are

Figure 2



Staffing

1	Commander
3	Captains
6	Lieutenants
42	Sergeants
81	Gang Crime Specialists
<u>322</u>	Police Officers
455	Sworn Officers

assigned to teams of six to eight officers, supervised by a sergeant, and work one of the three areas of the city.

Gang Crimes specialists are police officers specializing in the identification of street gangs, their members, and gang operations--that is, intelligence gathering. Individual specialists are assigned specific gangs about which to develop intelligence information and prepare periodic synoptic reports describing such gang characteristics as number of members, geographic areas

located, allied gangs, and crimes committed. As with tactical officers, six to eight specialists are assigned to a team and supervised by a sergeant. Each of the three area gang units maintains its own files. As with most other sections in the department, Gang Crimes does not have much access to computers or automated recordkeeping systems.

The tactics used by the Gang Crimes Section are primarily controlled by Commander Dart. He believes the only effective way to put gangs out of business is to target the leadership and put them in jail. He has developed an enforcement-oriented strategy that has been characterized as a battle plan to control gangs. As he describes it,

One of the tactical operations used by the Gang Unit is a "quadrant" mission for their area of operation. These missions are strategic in nature and specifically designed to impact select locales for a predetermined time period. The officers then move en masse to an adjoining quadrant of approximately four to six city blocks and proceed to make their anti-gang presence felt. The criminal element is kept off balance not knowing if the police are still close by or if and when they will return. Frequent street stops of individuals on foot and lurking in cars are made to ferret out the guns on the street.

A popular element of the Gang Crimes Section is the Concentrated Community Gang Enforcement Unit, commonly referred to as the "Flying Squad" in the media, which consists of 44 uniformed tactical officers. According to Dart,

This aggressive and mobile unit meets nightly in predetermined staging areas and is sent on nightly missions to challenge the gangs. The officers are in uniform so there can be little doubt who they are when they exit a car and approach the gang bangers [members]. The key to their success has been working different areas each night and the mobility to quickly saturate a "hot spot" as the need arises. The squad saturates the designated communities strictly enforcing nuisance laws to insure minimal gang activity.

About 50 Gang Crimes officers are assigned to participate in a variety of federal, state, and local task forces dealing with gang problems. Commander Dart spends a great deal of time meeting with representatives of the various law enforcement agencies to share information

concerning gangs.

Captain Duffy is in charge of Gang Crimes South, which is responsible for gang activity in Wentworth and all other districts in the South area. Duffy has 75 tactical officers and 28 gang specialists assigned to him. He believes the department has moved away from the intelligence function in recent years, primarily because of a fear of legal challenges such as the First Amendment lawsuit (see above). This has made his job especially difficult in regard to developing reliable information on local gangs. Although specialists are assigned gangs on which to gather intelligence, he says the synoptic reports they produce are largely subjective. Duffy points out that "gang specialists know all of the gangs and the players, but there is no system to pass it along to the troops." According to Duffy, most information is passed along informally, but many officers are protective of their information. Gang Crimes specialists review the daily 24-hour detective log for cases that may be gang related. From this, they can assist detectives with investigations involving gang crimes in order to develop information about gang activity. When assisting with investigations, they take information from existing investigative reports and prepare a Major Gang Incident Notification report. These reports are then manually filed after review by a Gang Crimes sergeant. Other information, such as Gang Arrest Information cards, Nickname cards, Vehicle cards, and Polaroid photos can be submitted for filing in folders maintained for each of the 17 identified major gangs in the South area. When criminal investigations are cleared by detectives, the Major Gang Incident Notification report must be removed from the gang file.

Duties for both tactical officers and specialists include handling daily assignments of complaints about gang activity received over the gang hot line or other means. According to

Captain Duffy, "Almost all of the complaints we receive are related to narcotics in some manner." He says the South Gang Crimes unit was handling more narcotics arrests than the Narcotics Section and there was pressure to refrain from targeting narcotics violations. However, Duffy adds, "The tactical officers just can't avoid it. We should have gang specialists assigned to Narcotics."

Duffy thinks communication among Gang Crimes, Narcotics, and the district tactical teams is limited, although their activities overlap. The district commanders do call frequently asking for help in their areas, however. Duffy says he can assign a gang squad to a district for up to a month if necessary to deal with a problem. For example, a recent split of the Disciples gang in the Englewood District resulted in major warfare for weeks in that area. One hundred Gang Crimes officers were assigned each day for six weeks to deal with the violence.

Sergeant Gallivan supervises a team of Gang Crimes South specialists working the evening shift (6 pm to 2 am). He has six nonuniformed specialists working in two-man cars on most shifts. He remarks, "We pretty much operate independently and try to coordinate with detectives." According to Gallivan, communication between Gang Crimes and other units does not always work smoothly: "Just last night they had four in custody in the sixth district for a gang homicide. We're supposed to be notified by the district officer and no one did."

Robert Norise and his partner Clyde Raymond are Gang Crimes specialists assigned to Gang Crimes South. Both officers have acquired a considerable amount of street knowledge and have seen firsthand the results of the CPD's efforts to deal with gangs. As they cruise through the Robert Taylor Homes projects in the early evening, Raymond says,

We do what we can. It's little, but it's something. If we did nothing, it would be like Max Thunderdome -- everyone for himself. Most of these kids living here are raised

seeing nothing but dopers with money and nice cars. You try to put these kids into programs and it doesn't do any good -- they make too much money selling dope to give it up.

Raymond comments that the highly publicized sweeps and lockdowns of the housing projects did little good. During the sweeps, hundreds of officers went from floor to floor confiscating guns and removing unauthorized residents. After the sweeps, private security guards were hired to control access to each building. But Raymond does not believe two young adults in uniform in each building are any match for the hundreds of gang members they must constantly deal with. He says, "They would be stupid to challenge a gang banger by asking for identification and risking their life for \$5 an hour."

As noted above, officers normally do not go into the project buildings unless on a call. When they do go in, trying to catch drug dealers or any criminal is very difficult. According to Norise, many of the elevators in the buildings do not work so officers have to chase suspects up numerous flights of stairs. Their handie-talkie radios do not always work inside the buildings, and help may be a long way off for the officer who finds himself several stories up in one of the towers. In many of the apartments holes have been opened in walls to provide escape routes for gang bangers familiar with the building. In the projects, gangs control the environment and, according to Raymond, maintain a defined structure of leadership that cannot be broken. As quickly as gang leaders are targeted for arrest, new ones take their place, and there is an endless supply of individuals wanting to move up the ladder.

Raymond says gang officers are under pressure to make arrests: "Politicians are crying for a solution. They don't know what to do, so they say make more arrests. We had 125 gang bangers rent a hall last night and order 200 pizzas for a meeting. There was a lot of pressure

to arrest them, but what for?" Gangs, drugs, and weapons are all synonymous for Raymond since most crime seems to involve a combination of these elements. However, he says gang officers get pressure not to focus on drug arrests.

Area 1 Detective Division

Detectives are assigned to each of the six police districts to conduct follow-up investigations; they are also responsible for authorizing felony arrests made by patrol officers. Detectives for Area 1, which includes the Wentworth District, are housed in the Wentworth station and investigate gang crimes, including those occurring in public housing. Although Gang Crimes specialists can assist with the investigations, their role is usually limited to providing gang information to the detectives and collecting whatever intelligence is uncovered during the process. According to Cdr. Fred Miller, who heads the Area 1 detectives, most of the cases his detectives handle (sexual assault, theft, burglary) are not gang related. When his detectives encounter a gang relationship during investigations, they can contact Gang Crimes specialists to share information that may help the case. He says, "It's not a formal relationship--investigator can contact investigator. There is no established system of routing paper, except the information report maybe." According to Sgt. Stan Zaborac, who heads the Area 1 Detectives Violent Crimes Unit, "There is an old gumshoe mentality of keeping your own notebook with your own intelligence and informant information."

OTHER CPD UNITS DEALING WITH GANGS Public Housing Section

Hosea Crossly is very familiar with life in Chicago's public housing. He has been

working in the developments as a police officer since 1977, and today is commander of the 100 officers assigned to the CPD's Public Housing Section. Most of Crossly's officers are black (including Crossly), and his lieutenants are handpicked for the job. He says, "People living in public housing are responsive to the perceptions, attitudes, and personality of the officers so it's very important who you select to work here. It's hard to put a white officer here in plain clothes."

According to Crossly, the department formed the Public Housing Section in 1981 under pressure from then Mayor Jane Byrne to address growing problems with violence in public housing. At that time, officers from the district and other sections did not spend much time dealing with public housing problems. It was necessary to find some dedicated people who were willing to work there, so a special section was created just for public housing. Officers are currently allowed to bid, based on seniority, for the mostly plainclothes assignments on two work shifts (9 am to 5 pm and 6 pm to 2:30 am). In addition to the officers permanently assigned to section, Crossly fields another 40 uniformed officers each day on a hire-back program funded by the federal government. The program enables him to hire officers from other districts on their days off to supplement his staff by patrolling the developments in two-man cars. Eighty percent of Crossly's officers are plainclothes tactical officers; his uniformed officers are primarily those in the hire-back program.

Crossly says the individual police districts have primary responsibility for responding to calls for service in public housing developments. The mission of the Public Housing Section is to assist the district with uniformed and tactical patrols.

Gangs are present everywhere in the developments, but the section's enforcement efforts

are not directed specifically at gangs. Crossly says, "We don't concentrate on gangs and I don't consider it a gang problem. Drugs and guns are what we have to deal with, and the gangs have taken control of it."

Enforcement missions are conducted frequently, targeting drugs and guns. For example, shootings in the Stateway Gardens, a high-rise housing development, were a recent problem.

As Crossly relates,

Shootings were occurring every night -- cops were being shot at -- a 2 year old was hit by a stray bullet through a window, 9 mm rounds littered the ground. I had the tactical people visit all eight of the buildings at 16 addresses and hand out my business card asking people to give information anonymously about who had guns and drugs. So much information was received we had to filter it down and target only a few locations. Twenty search warrants were obtained and we put together a force of 300 officers from everywhere to serve the warrants all at one time. One apartment alone resulted in 12 guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

On a more routine basis, Crossly says officers conduct vertical patrols of buildings nightly by riding the elevators to the top, then walking down stairwells and along breezeways.

Although Crossly's officers do not specifically target gangs for enforcement, when they encounter gang-related problems, they can make a report for the gang officers to follow up. He says, "Arrest is not the answer, but it's what the administration wants you to do. The gang unit had gotten away from working shootings and was making too many drug arrests." According to Crossly, Gang Crimes and Narcotics do not do very much in the public housing developments, and the district officers normally stay out, too, unless they receive 911 calls or he requests help.

Organized Crime Division, Narcotics Section

The Organized Crime Division is headed by Acting Chief Michael Hoke and consists of

three sections--Vice Control, Intelligence, and Narcotics. Hoke says his division pays little attention to gang membership: "Drugs are taking priority in gangs, not membership."

Narcotics enforcement is specialized into one section of the Organized Crime Division and deals with drug crime throughout the city. Specialization has resulted in the separation of narcotics enforcement from Gang Crimes, district patrol, and other sections of the police department. According to Cdr. Charles Ramsey, who heads the 165-officer Narcotics Section, "Our sole mission is drug trafficking. It's substantial in Chicago." Ramsey believes that Gang Crimes and Narcotics should be combined to some degree because they operate too independently at lower levels. Since such a large portion of street narcotics activity involves gangs, Ramsey believes Gang Crimes specialists should be permanently assigned to Narcotics to obtain a better sharing of efforts and information.

Ramsey's section is organized into three levels: a special enforcement unit, which deals with long-term investigations, including international trafficking; a general enforcement unit, which handles shorter term investigations; and a street-level enforcement unit, which focuses on generating arrests. According to Ramsey, 60 to 70 percent of the estimated 300 open-air drug markets in Chicago involve street gangs. To deal with them, he usually has 6 teams of 8 officers assigned to street-level enforcement, but that number can increase to 10 teams in the summer. Their focus is strictly on arrests.

Ramsey's officers have no automated information system other than the RAMIS program, which detectives operate. RAMIS is a mainframe computer crime analysis program that takes data entered from police reports and generates statistical reports and graphic displays of reported crime activity occurring in the city.

The Narcotics Section does not devote much of its resources to addressing drug problems in public housing. Ramsey says, "We don't do much with the CHA police--we deal more with the Public Housing Section. Public housing has drug problems similar to the rest of Chicago, but I don't get near the complaints from the projects that I do from streets and neighborhoods." Working cases in the projects is very difficult, says Ramsey: "Most residents know each other so conducting undercover operations is almost impossible. The subculture and physical layout of the projects make it an alien environment to officers--and to me. It's dangerous for narcotics officers to work there. I don't know what the solution is."

Ramsey's officers can contact Gang Crimes informally to share information when gangs are involved in investigations. However, many of them develop their own intelligence information. According to Ramsey, officers in other units have a tendency to withhold or protect their information because that is what they are rated or evaluated on; information an individual officer develops is used to generate arrests, for which the officer receives credit.

Coordinating his efforts with other units in the police department and other agencies has been problematical, according to Ramsey. There have been efforts at formal communication, such as meetings among Gang Crimes, the State's Attorney, and Narcotics. However, Ramsey says,

There is no formal mechanism to channel information to Gang Crimes or from Gang Crimes to us. You have a problem with tunnel vision -- narcotics officers focus on narcotics and don't pay attention to gang information when it's there. Information reports about gang activity, which we have access to, aren't always useful since field officers don't always take the time to complete the reports.

On an interagency level, there is a Metro Enforcement Unit involving Chicago area law enforcement agencies, but communication among this group is limited also. Ramsey says,

"Problems have occurred with officers from several agencies not knowing who is doing what."

Youth Services Division

Illinois State law requires that every juvenile arrested for a criminal or status offense be processed by a specially trained officer. In the CPD, this is a Youth Services officer, a separate classification from the rank of detective.

The responsibilities of the division include follow-up investigations of child abuse and the maintenance of delinquency prevention programs. To become a youth officer, an officer must take a promotional exam and, if selected, attend a 14-week training academy. Each police district is assigned one youth officer. However, due to the volume of work in the Wentworth District, a second officer has been assigned.

Cdr. John Chamberlain heads the Youth Services Division, which consists of 277 youth officers (Youth Investigations Unit) and 232 school officers (School Patrol Unit). He says his officers do not usually collect gang information unless it is directly related to a case.

Youth Investigations. Lt. Dan Gibson is a 27-year veteran of the police department and is commander of the Area 1 Youth Division, which has responsibility for the Wentworth District. He says his division does not have much of a relationship with Gang Crimes because of limited staffing. As a result, his officers do not do much proactive work. They have three options when handling arrested youths: releasing the youth to a parent without charging; detaining or referring to court; or making "community adjustments," which involves referring the youth to one of a network of community agencies. More referrals are completed than detentions.

Youth officers are among the few in the department who have direct access to the RAMIS

computer program operated by detectives. Records of arrested juveniles are entered into the computer and can include gang-related information, which is accessible by youth officers in each of the area headquarters. Since access to juvenile records is restricted by statute, other units (e.g., Gang Crimes, district patrol) must request any information they need from a youth officer.

School Patrol Unit. The School Patrol Unit was created in the fall of 1990 after the Board of Education entered into an agreement with the CPD to have officers patrol each of the 67 high schools in Chicago. Most of the funding for the 200+ officers is provided by the Board of Education. According to Lt. Thomas Byrne, commander of the unit, the purpose of the unit is to suppress and prevent crime in and around the schools, particularly gang and drug activity. The unit operates from a large room in the basement of Area 4 headquarters. Byrne says, "My officers made 10,000 arrests last year [1990] involving everything from murder to disorderly conduct; 182 guns were taken and 9 arrests were for murder."

The Board of Education maintains portable metal detectors similar to the walk-through devices found at airports. When principals and counsellors of individual schools desire, they set up the devices and school patrol officers assist with the screening. Officers also patrol hallways on foot and areas surrounding schools in cars. A six member tactical team was created to target drug sales occurring around the schools, and undercover officers occasionally pose as students. School patrol officers do not receive any special training concerning narcotics or gangs.

According to Byrne, school principals think his officers should handle discipline problems and even counsel students with academic deficiencies, which are not responsibilities of the unit. The primary activity with which the school unit is involved is enforcement.

Bureau of Community Services

The Bureau of Community Services is responsible for most community-based educational, crime prevention, and outreach programs. Deputy Superintendent James Whigham, who heads the bureau, considers his operation a conduit between the community and the police department. His 204 employees are responsible for community services programs throughout the city. According to Whigham, any gang-related information his officers and civilian employees obtain from the community is channeled to the Gang Crimes Section whenever possible. As noted above, the 1992-93 city budget proposes cutting his staff to 60, which will result in the elimination of many programs.

Community Services is divided into several units, including Neighborhood Relations, Preventive Programs, Senior Citizens, and the Beat Representative Program. Cdr. Thomas Ferry is in charge of the Neighborhood Relations Division, which is responsible for school visitation programs, such as Drug Abuse Resistance (DARE) and Officer Friendly. The DARE program, which currently consists of 16 officers, is working in 49 of the 700 public and private elementary schools in Chicago. Whigham does not believe DARE is the most useful program for Chicago children: "Teaching DARE to fifth and six graders is too late. By then 40 percent of the kids have already used drugs. I want to reach three- and five-year-olds, when we still have a chance to do something." He is considering abandoning DARE to develop a program that will target younger children.

Neighborhood Relations is also responsible for the Community Gang Control Program, which was created in 1986 to identify youths before they join gangs and redirect them into educational, employment, and recreational activities. A system was developed that allows anyone

(citizens or police) to refer a child into the program by contacting a Neighborhood Relations sergeant or district Beat Representative Center. Commander Ferry says the program is primarily a job referral system. His staff solicits jobs from local businesses, such as fast food restaurants, and provides the information to the Beat Representative Program, which is supposed to match the jobs with referred youths. Over 1,000 jobs commitments were secured by Neighborhood Relations in 1990.

Lieutenant Jose Urteaga is assigned to the Preventive Programs Division. The division's 42 employees provide presentations to community groups on a variety of topics, from bicycle safety to shoplifting prevention to drug abuse. A gang awareness presentation targets "fringe" youths in an effort to prevent them from joining a gang. Originally, the Gang Crimes Section handled the gang presentations, but according to Preventive Programs Sgt. Sam Mosely, that responsibility was "interfering with the ability of the Gang Crimes Unit to do their job," and it became a responsibility of Preventive Programs. Today, two speakers, who were trained by gang specialists, make the gang presentations, one of which attempts to focus on preschoolers.

The Beat Representative Division has been in existence for over 15 years and is designed to provide a link between the community and police department. The link is made with civilian representatives in each police district rather than police officers. Cdr. Lorenzo Chew heads the program. Chew says, "The difference between Neighborhood Relations and Beat Rep is that people deal with civilians, not cops. People can talk to civilians and have less fear of retaliation." A Beat Representative Center is staffed by civilians in each district in an office separate from the police station. Chew's staff consists of two sworn personnel and 44 civilians, who attempt to maintain regular contact with citizen groups, local businesses, and housing

associations. The contact is maintained through personal relationships or programs such as Neighborhood Watch. Complaints are frequently received concerning drugs and gang problems, which Chew refers to district commanders for action. He says he does not deal with the Gang Crimes Section and usually communicates information directly to district commanders.

Greg McLaughlin is assistant director of the Beat Representative program. He is a civilian employee and has been involved in the Program for 12 years. He says he tries to focus his efforts at community-based solutions as an alternative to enforcement whenever possible. For example, complaints about drug dealing in abandoned buildings can be dealt with by arranging to have the place boarded up. Public housing can be a problem because many residents are afraid of complaining to the police and have a fear of retaliation from gang members.

Chew is currently developing a program for public housing, called Safe Paths, to increase the school attendance rate of children in the developments. He says the school dropout rate for public housing youths is over 57 percent and that there is a 50 percent absenteeism rate at the high school level. The problem results partly from intimidation and extortion of children by gang members as they walk to and from school. Chew has designed a program that solicits parents as volunteers to monitor the path of children to and from school. The parent volunteers can wear specially designed jackets, and they notify police when they see problems. The CPD's Public Housing Section also stations patrol cars along school routes in the mornings to provide a sense of security. To sell the program to the community, officers assigned to foot patrol in District 2 went from door to door and posted signs about a meetings to discuss the program. The concept was also presented to school officials and parent committees in the area. However, one of the public meetings held in the Wentworth station attracted only about 14 residents from

the thousands who reside in the projects.

CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Ira Harris, a retired CPD Deputy Superintendent, is the chief of the CHA Police Department. The department was created in 1989 to replace a contingent of private security guards who were seen as unable to deal effectively with problems in public housing. Harris hired 188 young sworn officers over two years to staff his new department, which includes a headquarters in Robert Taylor Homes and an office on the West side. According to Harris, "The theory was that real police officers assigned 100 percent of the time would have to interact with residents and develop a sensitivity to their problems. Public housing residents felt that Chicago Police Department cops were arrogant and did not help them."

The role of the CHA police has not been formally defined. The CPD has legal responsibility for calls for service and crime occurring in public housing. Although CHA police maintain their own radio communications system, radio calls are received and dispatched by the CPD to district patrol officers. CHA police officers have the capability to monitor the calls as they are broadcast, but they are not permitted to communicate with CPD officers on the radio. Harris says his officers monitor the broadcasts and assist the responding CPD unit whenever possible. Once on the scene, they may also handle the call so the CPD unit can go on to another call.

The CPD's district tactical officers, Gang Crimes Section, and Public Housing Section may become involved in 911 calls or other activities in public housing. However, there is no formal system in place to ensure that CPD and CHA units coordinate their response. Some

confusion may also occur when plainclothes officers from CHA and Wentworth patrol encounter each other. According to Harris, "The only time we know Chicago Police Department is coming into public housing is if we hear a broadcast on their frequency. Narcotics officers might or might not let us know if they're doing anything." Similarly, CPD detectives are responsible for follow-up investigations of crimes occurring in public housing, but there is no formal process for coordinating with CHA police. Although his agency cannot share the CPD's radio frequencies, Harris says his officers have been given permission by Superintendent Martin to communicate directly with CPD commanders to request assistance.

Before the CHA police came into existence, the CPD's Public Housing Section had organized major sweeps of targeted developments to "take back" the buildings from the control of gangs. Hundreds of CPD officers, assembled from several sections, searched each floor and apartment seizing weapons and drugs and removing unauthorized residents. When the CHA police unit was formed, it assumed responsibility for the sweeps, but it relies on CPD staffing assistance.

Harris says a CHA tactical unit was formed in July 1991 to make arrests, recover weapons, and develop gang files. CPD gang officers have completed some missions in public housing developments, usually on their own initiative, but the two agencies do not do much sharing of gang intelligence information.

Despite problems with his new agency, Harris believes he is having an impact: "Any time you can take one building and give it back to the residents is good." Although it is an autonomous agency, Harris does not think the CHA police should be completely independent of the CPD. He believes duplication of effort between the agencies should be minimized and that

the cumbersome process for handling calls should be simplified.

POLICE AND THE MEDIA

According to Tina Vicini, director of CPD Media Relations, the department has an open policy toward the press. Officers of any rank can discuss gang-related cases with the media as long as they do not jeopardize an investigation. The unwritten policy is that actual names of gangs should not be mentioned and gang activities should not be publicized. Captain Duffy, Gangs Crimes South, says that most officers prefer to refer the media to Commander Dart, Media Relations, or a designated supervisor at the crime scene. Reporters interviewed for this case study say it is difficult to obtain information about gang crimes from the police department. Press releases are issued rarely, and no information is volunteered. A subtle resistance exists throughout the department although there is no written policy that restricts media access.

The majority of Chicago's gang members live on the city's South Side, where they have taken control of many neighborhoods and buildings, especially in public housing developments. The size of these sprawling developments and the number of residents involved challenge the CPD's enforcement efforts. Gangs have posted police lookouts in many buildings, and residents are fearful of retaliation if they are seen talking with the police.

The CPD's approach to gang-related problems in the city is centered on identifying and arresting gang members who engage in criminal activity, particularly criminally active gang leaders. Gang membership, per se, is not of particular concern, and the department does not

attempt to deal with social issues that breed gangs and related problems.

The main element in the CPD's response to gangs is the 455-officer Gang Crimes Section. Its tactical officers (enforcement arm) and gang crimes specialists (intelligence arm) work to generate a large number of arrests and to seize weapons used in gang violence. Gang crimes specialists also assist detectives in conducting follow-up investigations as a means of gathering information on gang activity.

Responsibility for gangs is not specialized into only one unit, however. The Narcotics Section, Detectives Division, Public Housing Section, and School Patrol Unit, among others, all have responsibility for handling gang-related problems that fall within their functional area. Communication among units is largely limited and informal, even though their responsibilities often overlap.

At this writing, neither the CPD nor the state of Illinois has an automated system for storing and analyzing demographic data and intelligence on gangs. Each unit and even individual officers maintain gang-related information. Information sharing among units is largely informal. The department has, however, been restricted in its ability to maintain gang intelligence files as a result of a successful legal challenge based on First Amendment rights.

NOTES

1. Frederick Thrasher, *The Gang*, 2nd Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).
2. Irving Spergel, *Youth Gangs: Problem and Response* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991, unpublished).
3. In Chicago, crimes are classified as gang motivated if they are prompted by some factor that benefits the gang in general and when both the offender and victim are gang members. For example, if a gang member commits a robbery and there are no indications the act was intended to benefit the gang, it probably will not be classified as a gang crime. An officer

completing an initial offense report or arrest report can classify the crime or arrest as gang related by marking off a box on the department's General Offense Case Report. This information is tallied periodically to determine gang-motivated arrests and offenses.

4. J. Hagedorn, *People and Folks: Gangs, Crime, and the Underclass in a Rustbelt City* (Chicago: Lakeview Press, 1988):143.

5. Management flexibility is to some degree restricted by the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represents sworn employees. The FOP was formed in 1981 in Chicago and has acquired considerable political strength and influence over internal policies. Joe Beazley, director (sworn command-level rank) of the CPD's Research and Development Section, says, "The union has become an influential voting bloc which lobbies, campaigns, endorses candidates and receives attention from the politicians." Specialty assignment selection practices, assignment bidding, and scheduling practices have evolved over the years and are, to a large degree, controlled by agreements made with the FOP.

IV. AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO DRUGS AND GANGS* by Major Carolyn Robison Kusler

It was 4:30 in the afternoon of September 20, 1990. Austin's rush hour was just beginning. The bus driver had made the 5th Street and Congress Avenue stop many times before, but that day, as he pulled away from the intersection, his eyes remained glued to the rearview mirror. He saw about half a dozen youths on the southwest corner begin to cross the street toward a dozen youths on the northwest corner. He could tell by the gestures and facial expressions that a fight was about to begin. Then, abruptly, he heard gunfire. The violence he had previously only read about was now happening in the middle of the central business district-- a gang confrontation complete with guns, violence, and chaos.

THE CONGRESS AVENUE SHOOTING

The day before the Congress Avenue shooting, 18-year-old Arthur Harris, a member of one of east Austin's gangs, put a gun to his head and pulled the trigger. The news reports said his biggest dream was to quit the life of a gang member. According to Robert Mendoza, an art teacher at Johnston High School, Arthur "kept using the word 'trapped,' when he talked about it. He said he felt trapped by the gang life and he tried to keep younger kids from joining gangs" (Austin American-Statesman, September 20, 1990. The next day, some of Harris's friends and fellow gang members, who were hurt, angry, and depressed by his death, got into

*The field work for this case study was conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. The titles of some individuals and the names of persons holding particular positions may have changed since then. Unless otherwise noted, quoted statements were made by the person indicated during interviews conducted as part of the field work.

a fight with members of a rival gang they suspected of "insulting the memory of their deceased friend."¹

And fight it out they did. Armed with a 9-mm Smith & Wesson, members of the Este Grande Varrios (EGV) gang found the offending Latin King gang members in front of Eckerd's Drug at the bus stop at 5th and Congress. Each group taunted the other with words and gestures. As the EGVs approached the Latin Kings from across the street, one of the Latin Kings reached into a trash can, found a glass bottle, and threw it at the EGVs. Arthur's grieving friend Bonifacio Alba pulled a gun from a fanny pack tied around his waist and opened fire. Three people were hit--a 16-year-old girl, a 16-year-old boy (both with the Latin Kings), and a 61-year-old man, who had tried to stop the fight.

Sgt. Edward Villegas, a supervisor in the Austin Police Department (APD) Street Crimes Unit, describes the Congress Avenue shooting as the "end of the denial stage" in Austin's response to gangs. Prior to the shooting, the APD's approach to gang activity was fragmented. Similarly, coordination of city initiatives focusing on the young was in its infancy. It was the death of reluctant gang member Arthur Harris that sparked a movement that made controlling gangs number one on the agenda of the public, the elected officials, and the police department.

PUBLIC OUTCRY FOR A GANG UNIT

After the Congress Avenue shooting, the public outcry for an APD gang unit focused the attention of city officials and the police department on gang violence. The public saw a gang unit as the answer to the problem, but city officials and the police department saw the need for a comprehensive effort that went beyond creating a special unit. A Youth at Risk task force,

which had been formed prior to the Congress Avenue shooting, developed an issue paper that presented the group's view of the appropriate response: "There is no single solution to the rising problems of gang violence.... They must be addressed by a broad based community effort and there must be cooperation and coordination between all groups involved." The paper went on to describe the role of the police as requiring something more than a heavy-handed approach. "In the area of law enforcement, the City of Austin is committed to prevention and alternative programs for youth at risk."

Austin Police Chief Jim Everett, speaking out against the formation of a gang unit, said that "a 'systemized' response by the entire police force instead of the creation of a special unit is the answer to stopping gang violence in Austin" (Austin American-Statesman, March 12, 1991). He advocated a multidimensional approach to the gang issue consisting of prevention, education, and enforcement components. Deputy Chief Ken Muennink echoed what was being said throughout the organization, "There is no quick fix. It's not a police problem, it's not a school problem, it's a community problem" (Austin American-Statesman, May 9, 1991:A15).

The balanced approach to the gang problem was also supported by the elected political leadership. City Councilor Gus Garcia emphasized that "gangs are a core part of the problem. They attract kids in and for whatever reason the kids want to hang with it." But then he added, "The major focus should be on the majority of the kids--gangs should be just a part of it. They are the creator of a lot of problems, but a comprehensive approach is needed--schools, police, etc." This emphasis on service, cooperation, and identifying and attacking the root causes of gang membership stilled the public's gang hysteria and galvanized action within Austin's diverse communities to deal with the problem.

AUSTIN DEMOGRAPHICS

The city of Austin is located about 200 miles south of Dallas-Fort Worth, 162 miles west of Houston, and 77 miles north of San Antonio. It is considered to be one of the fastest growing cities in the United States; it experienced a 35 percent increase in population, from 345,890 to 465,622, between 1980 and 1990. The population is spread throughout the city's 225 square miles.² Austin is a multiracial city. According to 1990 census data, 23 percent of the population is Hispanic, 12 percent is black, 62 percent is white, and 3 percent is primarily Asian (Native Americans and other non-Hispanic groups are also included).

About 10 percent of Austin's families live below the poverty level. Most low-income families live in east Austin. Some consider the community separated by economics and a man-made barrier, Interstate 35, which separates east from west. "The west has moved further west and the east has gone down" is how one city councilor described it.

Austin is the capital of Texas, the county seat of Travis County, and the home of the University of Texas system. With approximately 9,000 employees, the city is the second largest employer in the community. It provides social programs, health services, housing and economic development programs, supplementary educational programs, recreation, and victim's services, among other programs. It has a city manager form of government with an elected mayor and city councilors (six).

HISTORY OF GANGS IN AUSTIN

Gangs have been in and around the Austin area for many years. Hispanic gangs in their current form can be traced back to the 1950s. According to Sergeant Villegas, however, gangs

were not a serious problem until 1988. Both Villegas and Off. Mark Gil (Gang Liaison Unit) think that the escalation of the gang problem in Austin reflects the influence of the movie "Colors," which popularized the drive-by shooting and the mimicking of gang behaviors.

Some families in Austin have a long history of gang involvement, and gang membership is usually based on neighborhood boundaries. Sgt. Harold Piatt of the Criminal Intelligence Unit reports that most of the gangs are racially mixed. "If you live in the neighborhood you can belong."

In addition to the EGVs and Latin Kings, the major Austin street gangs include the Brothas, the Crips, and the 10th Syndicate. The majority of gangs are Hispanic, but black and Asian gangs are emerging. According to Sergeant Piatt,

the Hispanic gangs are the oldest gangs in Austin and primarily originate in the neighborhood. The black and Jamaican gangs are involved in drug sales to anyone wanting to buy, while the Oriental gangs keep criminal activity within the Oriental community. The violent street gangs are racially mixed and deal in violence for the sake of violence.

The police department has identified approximately 63 gangs in Austin, only 18 of which are considered fairly active and 3 to 5 of which are considered very active. Of the 1,900 known gang members, about 1,200 are considered active; 200 of the latter are considered the most active gang members and responsible for the majority of the violence in Austin. In 1991, 523 gang members (267 adults and 256 juveniles), representing 27 gangs, were arrested. As one police officer pointed out, however, "You don't have to be a gang member to be at risk." Approximately 1,500 youths are considered to be in the at-risk category.

Sergeant Villegas identifies the most problematic gang personality as the individual who aspires to be a full member. These individuals are called "wanna-be's--those who haven't walked

the line."³ He characterizes them this way: "They are more dangerous. They try to prove themselves to gain acceptance. Once a wanna-be murdered a man, cut off his ears and brought them to the leader of a gang to prove that he was worthy of membership."

The major criminal activity among the gangs is auto theft. According to Chief Everett, "We are averaging over 300 auto thefts monthly and a large number of these can be attributed to gang activity." Other frequent offenses include misdemeanor and felony assault and vandalism. In 1991, gang members were responsible for committing 773 offenses (Part I and Part II) known to the police (Table 1).

AUSTIN'S RESPONSE TO GANGS PRIOR TO THE CONGRESS AVENUE SHOOTING

Prior to the 5th and Congress Avenue shooting, the APD had been proactive in becoming involved with the community. Neighborhood centers were established as a cooperative venture among private enterprise, the city, the police, and the community in response to public perceptions that officers should become closer to the communities they serve. The centers provide access to needed governmental and social services for those living within the surrounding neighborhoods. The neighborhood centers, DARE and PAL programs (see below), and miscellaneous other efforts targeted gang members in a piecemeal fashion, however. Each unit dealt with gangs as gang members' activities fell within their purview. There was no organizational focus on the gang issue at this time. According to Capt. Joe Putman, commander of the Repeat Offender Unit, "the missions of each unit were not interrelated to the gang issue. Gangs were a side-line issue. Gangs, per se, were not addressed in a systematic or coordinated fashion."

Police Department Initiatives

DARE/APPLE/PAL Programs. The police department initiated a Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program in the city's schools in 1987. DARE officers teach fifth and seventh graders the life skills needed to resist drug use and other negative activities, such as belonging to a gang. To complement DARE, the police department developed the Austin Police Promoting Leadership and Education (APPLE) camp, which draws its participants from those who graduate from the DARE program. This week-long camp includes presentations by law enforcement and emergency personnel and activities designed to help build self-esteem. In addition, the Police Athletic League (PAL) was formed to build young people's character and self-esteem by sponsoring sports activities and stressing the importance of respect for others and adherence to the law.

Despite these efforts, the gang problem and the associated violence continued to grow. In response, some APD officers organized softball games between gangs and held gang meetings to cool the tensions between rival gangs. A now-retired lieutenant who had been assigned to the Criminal Intelligence Unit was responsible for getting the gangs together. Much of the work was done on a voluntary basis by the officers, and they experienced some short-term successes.

Hispanic Crimes Unit. Prior to 1990 the closest thing to a gang unit within the police department was the Hispanic Crimes Unit. This unit was formed in 1984 in response to a growing number of unreported crimes in Hispanic neighborhoods. There had been three or four homicides of aliens, which were unsolved, and an increasing number of robberies by assault among the undocumented population. Communication between the APD's robbery squad, which had only one bilingual investigator, and the Hispanic population was minimal. In addition, the

Table 1. Annual Gang Offense and Arrest Data

Offense	Offenses			Arrests		
	1991	1990	Percent Change	1991	1990	Percent Change
Murder	4	7	-42.9	7	8	-12.5
Rape	1	2	-50.0	0	4	-100.0
Robbery	39	33	18.2	125	22	468.2
Aggravated Assault	97	111	-12.6	46	46	0.0
Burglary	51	60	-15.0	41	51	-19.6
Theft	52	47	10.6	21	52	-59.6
Auto Theft	103	90	14.4	104	114	-8.8
Arson	11	326	6.7	5	0	**
Total Part I Offenses	385	353	1.4	349	297	17.5
Simple Assault	135	201	-32.8	15	51	-70.6
Forgery	2	0	**	0	0	0.0
Fraud	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Embezzlement	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Stolen Property	4	3	33.3	6	1	500.0
Vandalism	103	154	-33.1	25	43	-41.9
Weapons	31	44	-29.5	32	62	-48.4
Prostitution	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Sex Crimes	7	5	40.0	1	3	-66.7
Drug Abuse	20	18	11.1	21	21	0.0
Gambling	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Child Abuse	10	5	100.0	4	0	**
DWI/DUI	2	4	-50.0	1	4	-75.0
Liquor Laws	7	18	-61.1	8	39	-79.5
Public Intoxication	14	30	-53.3	14	41	-65.9
Disorderly Conduct	16	36	-55.6	7	28	-75.0
Loitering	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Obscenity	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
All Other Criminal	47	89	-47.2	32	58	-44.8
Kidnapping	1	2	-50.0	0	1	-100.0
Perjury	2	0	**	0	0	0.0
Organized Crime	1	0	**	0	0	0.0
Bribery	10	5	100.0	8	0	**
City Ordinance Violation	3	10	-70.0	0	9	-100.0
Violation State Law	0	1	-100.0	0	1	-100.0
Total Part II Offenses	415	625	-33.6	174	362	-51.9
Total Offenses	773	978	-21.0	523	659	-20.5

undocumented population was mobile and had no ready access to telephones. As a result, a lot of cases involving Hispanics just stacked up--no information, no leads, no solutions.

One of the investigators identified the problem as locals preying on transients and a lack of communication with, and trust of, the police. Recognizing the need to overcome language and cultural barriers, the chief assigned four officers to a task force dedicated to solving crimes involving Hispanics. The unit soon became highly acclaimed for its work within the Hispanic community.

Even though Hispanic gangs are the most populous gangs in the Austin area, the Hispanic Crimes Unit was created to support the Criminal Investigations unit, not to deal with gangs. The unit provided assistance in cases involving minorities and in which language was a barrier, for example, by providing translators and interrogators. Based on crime analysis information, the unit targeted individuals and areas, conducted surveillance, and maintained a high profile in targeted areas. For those reluctant to testify, the unit sought grand jury subpoenas. Many of those the unit came in contact with were gang members, but again, gang members were not the focus of the unit.

City/Community Initiatives

Before the Congress Avenue shooting, there was evidence that city officials and the community were also concerned about Austin's youths. In March 1990, City Manager Camille Cates Barnett had created an interdepartmental task force "to present issues to the City Council and recommend actions that would be most effective in addressing issues affecting youth at risk." In its final report, the task force identified involvement with gangs as an indicator of youths who

are at risk.

At the community level, Robert Mendoza, the art teacher at Johnston High School, provided leadership in opening avenues of opportunity for those who did not want to belong to a gang. He organized a softball and athletic program for at-risk youths in east Austin (Austin-American Statesman, November 3, 1990, where gang violence had been the norm since December 1988, when drive-by shootings became more the rule than the exception.

In addition, the public at large became aware of the growing violence as newspaper headlines highlighted the problems with gangs and youth. The *Austin American-Statesman*, for example, published articles with the following headlines: "Gang Battles, Crack Trade Blamed as Arrests Mount" (April 22, 1990); "Teen Gets 10-year Sentence in Slaying" (May 30, 1990); "5 Injured After Guns Fired at East Austin Crowd" (June 4, 1990); "Death After Concert: Gang Ties Suspected in Chase by Youths" (July 28, 1990).

GANG PROBLEM BECOMES A COMMUNITY PROBLEM

It was not until September 20, 1990, that the gang problem really became a community problem. On that date, the gunfire crossed from east Austin into the heart of the city. Gang violence could no longer be contained on one street, in one neighborhood, on one side of the interstate highway. In a report on "Gangs in Austin," Chief Everett described the problem as follows:

Gang violence is not restricted to any part of the city. We have seen violent acts in every part of Austin ... and violence is not the province of any racial group. Our local gangs are made up of blacks, whites, hispanics, and orientals. The violent act is carried out by persons in any of these racial groups toward the victim who may or may not be of the same racial background.

Sergeant Piatt said, "after the shooting, the citizens wanted a gang unit and the primary cry was for more police officers." But the department maintained the stance that hiring more officers does not equate with a reduction in crime. Captain Putman expressed it this way: "Adding more police officers equals putting more people in jail. Putting people in jail does not solve the problem." Chief Everett identified the solution as having "a departmental response and a community response. There is strength in interagency cooperation."

APD REORGANIZES IN RESPONSE TO THE GANG PROBLEM

The public outcry in the wake of the Congress Avenue shooting led the APD to review its past approach to handling the gang problem. Chief Everett described the approach as follows:

Initially we tried to get the gang members to talk to each other and try to work out their differences rather than fight with or shoot at each other. This was done by a series of meetings which eventually led to supervised sports activities. This worked for a while but was not enough to hold the fragile truce. Gang members started assaulting each other and drive-by shootings followed soon afterwards. The violence continued to escalate unabated and the criminal intelligence unit became more and more involved in identifying gang members and gathering information on specific crimes.

Before developing a new strategy, Chief Everett conducted a review of all the department's units, programs, and divisions to determine their contribution to the prevention, intervention, and suppression of gang activity and to identify gaps in service.

Departmental Changes

The departmental review revealed that the necessary pieces for dealing with gangs were in place but not a focused design. For example, the units of the Special Investigations Division (e.g., Repeat Offender Unit, Hispanic Crimes Unit, Criminal Intelligence Unit, and Fugitive

Section) had a mission that did not deal with gangs specifically. To close this gap, their focus was expanded to include local gang members. Because many gang members were repeatedly involved in violent acts but escaped prosecution because of the victim's reluctance to prosecute, the focus and name of the Special Investigations Division was changed to the Repeat Offender Division.

The units within the Repeat Offender Division were expanded to accommodate the broadened focus. The Hispanic Crimes Unit and the Property Recovery Unit were combined and renamed the Street Crimes and Gang Section. The combination allowed the formation of two units and expanded their coverage from 8 to 16 hours a day. There was some opposition to the renaming of the Hispanic Crimes Unit because of its identity with the Hispanic community. But, according to Captain Putman, "the reorganization allowed us to address the issue as a gang problem, not a race problem."

The Street Crimes and Gang Section continues to use the high-profile tactics developed by the Hispanic Crimes Unit. These tactics include regularly checking gang hangouts and taking enforcement action on criminal violations. The officers are guided in their activities by weekly information provided to them by the Criminal Intelligence Unit (see below). They, in return, refer intelligence on gang members who are active in the community to the Special Investigations Section for targeting.

As in the formation of the Street Crimes and Gang Section, the Repeat Offender Section was divided into two units, one to work days and one to work nights, and renamed the Special Investigations Section. The assigned personnel were cross-trained with the Street Crimes and Gang officers in gang investigations and the preparation of arrest and search warrants. The

Special Investigations officers use a variety of tactics to bring targeted individuals to justice-- development of search warrants, stings, reverse buys and sales, paid informants, and the intervention of the prosecution, probation, parole, and penal systems. The officers target gang members and their associates with the same resources and tactics that they employ to combat repeat offenders.

The Criminal Intelligence, Crime Analysis, Crime Stoppers, and Fugitive units were combined and renamed the Criminal Apprehension Section. The section's primary purpose became the collection, analysis, and distribution of information on known or suspected violators and their arrest and prosecution.

Formation of the Gang Liaison Unit

Although the DARE, APPLE, and PAL programs provided a broad prevention/intervention component in the police department, the department did not have specific prevention/intervention strategies focused on gangs. According to one officer, "The department recognized the need for an entity to diffuse situations, do intervention and prevention, dedicated to the gang issue exclusively." Accordingly, the Gang Liaison Unit was formed.

Off. Robert Martinez, a nationally recognized gang expert, was selected as the sole member of the unit in October 1990. In May 1991, Officer Gil was assigned to the unit. Gil's experience in the Repeat Offender, narcotics, and Hispanic Crimes units complemented Martinez's extensive experience with Hispanic gangs. According to Gil, "We were both born and raised in Austin to poor families and we made it. This qualifies us as instant role models to those who claim circumstances as a barrier."

Together, the two developed an antigang strategy that linked the resources of the community and the police department and brought them to bear on the gang problem. Part of their strategy included the development of a media campaign. In January 1992, antigang posters were placed in locations that gang-prone youths frequented. In addition, two public service announcements were produced for television. One features the Dallas Cowboys, the other, Texas Senator Gonzalo Barrientos, appealing to youths to find other opportunities for expression--"Say no to street gangs. Say yes to your future." A third announcement is being planned. Officer Gil has written an antigang rap that is popular with the kids in schools. According to Gil, "The department has given us the flexibility to pursue new ideas."

Coordination/Cooperation Mechanisms

To ensure that the police and the public were speaking the same language when referring to gangs and gang members, the Criminal Apprehension Section published a gang information booklet entitled "Austin Street Gangs, A Community Problem, Not Just a Police Problem." In it, a gang is defined as follows:

Gang--a group of three or more people who interact together to the exclusion of others
--a group that claims a territory or area--a group that has a name (e.g., Latin Kings)
--a group that has rivals (enemies)
--a group that exhibits antisocial behavior, usually associated with crime or a threat to the community.

According to Sergeant Piatt, the department "expanded the definition of gangs beyond street gangs so that it would include any group that engages in illegal activities such as the Skinheads and Jamaicans."

To assist the Criminal Apprehension Section with intelligence information, the units are

connected by modem with the computerized tracking system operated from the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office. In 1990, the Criminal Intelligence Unit started its own local gang file. Based on the information it gathers, the unit publishes weekly intelligence bulletins on gang-related activities: (1) gang activity for the week--a synopsis of each incident by area, other activity in the area, related offense reports, victim and suspect information, and persons arrested; (2) drive-by shooting incidents and charges filed; (3) gang offense reports filed that week; and (4) gang arrests by gang, offense, and status (juvenile or adult). The information is distributed widely among city officials and the police department. The bulletins guide the activities of the Street Crimes and Special Investigations officers when they are not assisting the Criminal Investigation Section with active cases involving gang members.

To make the response to gangs inclusive of all members of the department, the Criminal Apprehension Section conducts training in gang identification and reporting. All officers are given two hours of in-service training relating to gangs, how to recognize and report their activities, and other such essential information. They are instructed in how to follow procedures that will readily identify their report as gang related so that data entry personnel can record the information in the gang files. The field information, along with other intelligence, forms the basis for the Criminal Intelligence Unit's weekly gang bulletins.

To assist with prosecutions, the Austin District Attorney's Office has committed itself to priority prosecution of gang members. Four assistant district attorneys are housed within the Repeat Offender Division. Whenever a gang member is charged with a crime, the Criminal Intelligence Unit provides the District Attorney's Office with a packet of information on the individual. The information includes prior arrests, nonarrest involvements, probation or parole

status, and other pertinent data.

The Criminal Intelligence Unit also networks with the Department of Probation and Parole by exchanging information on prison gang members who are released into the community. The "Gang Hot Line" is also one of their tools. It is used for receiving anonymous tips concerning gang members involved in criminal activity.

To increase the opportunity for a coordinated approach to the gang problem by other partners in the criminal justice system, the Criminal Intelligence Unit and the Repeat Offender Unit host weekly gang intelligence meetings. These meetings, begun in February 1991, provide a forum for each of the units in the Repeat Offender Division and representatives from each patrol area in the city to meet with representatives from probation and parole, the District Attorney's Office, juvenile court, the sheriff's office, and other interested parties. About 30 criminal justice personnel attend. Off. Tony Hippolito of the Criminal Intelligence Unit chairs the meetings. Each person presents current information concerning criminal activities of gang members and who's looking for whom on the street. The dialogue among the various parties helps in the identification of those who are on probation or parole and whose illegal activities could result in revocation of their release status.

The Gang Liaison Unit officers encourage these meetings. "These meetings are essential to our function," said Officer Gil, "because we can't intervene and prevent without the hardcore off the streets. Our intervention and prevention efforts run parallel with the suppression campaign."

APD officers also interact with the public school system. In October 1990, the Austin Independent School District and the department created the School Visitation Program to provide

additional opportunities for positive contacts between students and police officers. In addition, these contacts give field officers the opportunity to learn who they should contact within the schools in emergencies, to become familiar with the physical layout of the schools, and to become aware of special problems the schools are experiencing so that solutions can be developed. Since most gang members and wanna-be's are school age, field officers who deal with them on the street gain an edge as they become familiar with them at school also.

In addition to local networking, APD officers travel outside the city to stay informed on gang trends. For example, APD officers participated in the Gang Forum held in Dallas on June 6, 1991 and the National Gang Conference in Denver on September 11, 1991. APD officers are also members of the Texas Interagency Gang Association, which is headed by Dr. Beth Peltz of the University of Houston. "Collaboration with other agencies through forums, conferences, and workshops fosters creativity and provides a sounding board for ideas and projects," according to Officer Gil. Their involvement and creativity are limited only by the resources available.

NOT JUST A POLICE PROBLEM

The reorganization of the department, called the Gang Intervention Program, took effect on Sunday, October 14, 1990, approximately one month after the Congress Avenue shooting. According to Captain Putman, "the reorganization brought more officers into the response to the gang problem in a coordinated fashion."

Chief Everett believed that "the police department should lead the response," but he knew that "there are some things the police can't do." According to Sergeant Piatt, "the police can't do it all" philosophy developed as a result of the demise of the softball games. "The officers

couldn't play ball on Saturday and arrest Monday through Friday." Chief Everett explained another dimension of the problem: "Playing ball was successful for a while but more and more kids became gang members as they [gangs] received publicity." The media became part of the problem by contributing to the glorification of gangs and gang membership. Media coverage sometimes also created the wrong impression. "There is a perception that gangs are responsible for a lot of crime," says Chief Everett. "Twenty-six percent of our arrests are of juveniles. About 1 percent of those are gang members. The media highlights the gang issue making it appear more significant than perhaps it is."

The need for more than just a police response is recognized throughout the department. Field officers, for example, see a need for a more effective juvenile justice system. Sergeant Villegas agrees that "a joint effort between the public and the police department is needed." But he sees the problem as basic to the home:

There are a lot of good programs out there but the problem begins with the family unit. The youth may have both parents at home but no affection or discipline. That youth will find affection and brotherhood in the gang. The bottom line is love, affection, and belonging. A basketball doesn't satisfy that.

Councilor Garcia expressed it this way, "The carino is gone."

CITY RESPONSE

The "police can't do it all" philosophy is also shared by city officials. Assistant City Manager Alicia Perez, who is responsible for emergency services in the city, describes the impact of the 5th and Congress shooting as "changing the way we do our work." She espouses an "integrated approach that avoids duplication of services." Councilor Garcia agrees: "A comprehensive approach is needed. We need to mobilize the community to solve the problems

themselves. We need many layers of initiatives and all of them coordinated. We need to create many opportunities and recruit the youth into them."

Community Task Force

Mayor Lee Cooke also responded to the challenge. In October 1990, he formed a Community Task Force on Gangs, Crime, and Drugs. Mona Gonzaloz, of South Austin Youth Services, and Robert Mendoza co-chaired the task force. A broad-based community group, including representatives from the police department, made up the task force. Members of the task force listened to hours of testimony and then compiled their findings. They identified the absence of "a long range plan for our most valuable resource, our youth" as part of the problem. Their report, *Code Blue: Youth at Risk--Partnership to Reclaim our Community*, published in May 1991, focused on the community perspective and the need to provide "a combination of general direction and specific processes, programs, and strategies to begin the hard work of generating a sense in our citizens that they, too, can become a part of the solution to gangs, crime, and drugs."

The report outlined 77 recommendations in a number of general areas: education, social services/mental health, recreation, employment, law enforcement, and prosecution. According to Officer Gil, the document was welcomed by the police "because the situation is to the point that the community as a whole must identify the youth at-risk problem so that we can incorporate a team concept." Councilor Garcia sees the report as "background to establish what's next ... what we have been doing up until now isn't enough. The issues are mobilization of all community resources and support of all government and private agencies." Speaking of the *Code*

Blue report, Alicia Perez said, "We now have an integrated approach to the issue of gangs as well as to all the issues involving youths at risk in Austin."

The City Council, which is responsible for allocating resources to city programs, had to wrestle with the funding issue. According to Gus Garcia, "the role of the council is determining how much money ... [to] devote to social ills. How much leadership."

Community leaders like Robert Mendoza did not wait for council action or money to initiate change. After he completed his work on the task force, he helped form the East Austin Youth Council--"a grass roots effort to tackle the problems now."

Council Action

In September 1991, the focus on gang issues was translated into action by the mayor and City Council. Over \$1 million was added to the budget for programs that target youths. The money was distributed among health, social services, youth-at-risk, child care, and grant coordination programs. This was the first increase in six years for those services. The council adopted youth at risk as their number one priority, and their budget allocations affirmed their commitment.

Employment Opportunities

The city manager is setting the example for the business community in the area of employment. The city's Opportunities for Youth program provides temporary employment to young adults over 18 years of age who are without a diploma and who may belong to a gang. The participants attend weekly support group meetings, which assist them in obtaining a general

equivalency diploma (GED), establishing personal and professional goals, and resolving work issues. The group convening in the fall of 1991 included members of four east Austin gangs. Off. Rita Delgado, who works with the group, said that "in the beginning the gang members would not talk to each other. But now the tension is gone."

The group started with 13 members, 4 of whom dropped out. Of the remaining members, 6 earned either high school diplomas (2) or GED's (4), and 1 was working on a GED. All are currently employed, one in a full-time position. And there has been no recidivism within the group.

REDUCTION IN GANG ACTIVITY

Have these concerted efforts had an impact on the problem? The APD's Criminal Intelligence Unit has been collecting data on gang activities since January 1990. A review of the offense information indicates a reduction in activity during 1991. Compared with 1990, the number of gang-related arrests decreased by 20.6 percent in 1991, and the number of gang-related offenses by 21 percent. The individual offenses of robbery, theft, auto theft, and arson increased in 1991, but murder, rape, aggravated assault, and burglary decreased. (See Table 1.) The number of drive-by shootings decreased from 60 to 50, or 16.7 percent.

The effectiveness issue centers around definitions (what is a gang and what is gang related) and perceptions (how gang activity is portrayed). Captain Putman believes that "the gang stats have gone down even with a liberal definition of gang activity." Chief Everett says that the "statistics were probably inflated" in the beginning due to the liberal definition. On the other hand, Sergeant Piatt thinks "the problem is larger than is presented. Present reporting is

too low because of underreporting. There is a propensity among gang members to handle retaliation personally and therefore they don't report. The Gang Hot Line helps get some of this information but my guess is that only about 50 percent of the activity is reported."

Sergeant Villegas thinks that the reports on gang activity may have gone down because of the focus on gangs. "Individuals used to admit gang membership. Now they don't. They don't want to be targeted." Chief Everett recognizes that many variables contribute to the kinds of numbers an agency produces: "We have an open mind. We don't have the answer. We are still looking."

Assistant City Manager Alicia Perez would like to "be able to quantify success by measuring teenage pregnancy rates, drop out rates, increased employment, and other quality of life issues that would indicate that the needs of the youthful population are being met." The city is currently working on the development of a data base with the University of Texas that would enable the city to conduct that type of analysis.

After the Congress Avenue shooting, gang-related problems became the public's number one agenda item, but Austin's city officials and the leaders within the police department maintained a broader focus and made all youths at risk the priority. They developed a strategy based on service rather than on fear or retaliation, and they involved the public in striving for a comprehensive approach that included prevention, education, employment opportunities and other programs for youth, as well as law enforcement. City officials, the police, and the community are working together to develop solutions that Chief Everett hopes "will help the

children make better choices."

Within the police department, a departmental review following the Congress Avenue incident revealed that the resources for dealing with gang-related problems were available but they were scattered and unfocused. The review led to reorganization of the department and the centering of responsibility for handling gang problems in the Repeat Offender Division. In addition, a Gang Liaison unit was formed to link the resources of the police department and the community, and coordination mechanisms were established to facilitate the exchange of gang-related information within the department and between the department and other criminal justice agencies in the city.

NOTES

1. Code Blue report, 1991:A-1.
2. *Growth Watch*, VIII, no. 1(1991):4.
3. "Walking the line" is a gang initiation ceremony designed to test an individual's toughness. In this rite, gang members form a double line and hit the initiates as they pass. One Austin youth died from injuries received during such a ceremony on November 19, 1990.

V. KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO GANGS AND DRUGS*

by Captain Larry Lewis

This case study examines the processes and influences of police executive decision making on the problem of gangs and gang involvement in drugs. Police officials make decisions every day that affect the lives of people in their community. What may influence a police decision may not be wholly internal. Social, political, legal, and economic considerations may also influence police decision making. Even the occurrence of an incident in another city may influence local police decisions and the factors that motivate them. This is evidenced by the far-reaching impact the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles is having on law enforcement agencies throughout the nation. Examining how decisions to address local police problems are made may provide insights that will assist other communities and law enforcement decision makers in dealing with a variety of issues.

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

Kansas City, Missouri, is representative of medium-to-large cities dealing with the issue of gangs and gang violence. Part of a metropolitan area of more than 1.5 million people, its gang problem has been compared with that of Los Angeles 25 years ago. The community and the police department are at a point where decisions they make now regarding gangs will have significant implications into the future.

Two separate political units, Kansas City, Kansas, in the northeastern part of its state, and

*The field work for this case study was conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. The titles of some individuals and the names of persons holding particular positions may have changed since then. Unless otherwise noted, quoted statements were made by the person indicated during interviews conducted as part of the field work.

Kansas City, Missouri, on the western side of its state--each located on opposite banks of the Kansas River where it meets the Missouri River--make up the Kansas City metropolitan area. Kansas City, Missouri, has a population of 427,799 people and a land area of 322 square miles. The inner city area is predominately black, and outlying suburban areas are home to a cross-section of races and income levels. According to the Kansas City Planning Department, the city is 66 percent white, 30 percent black, and 4 percent Hispanic. The city has a council-city manager form of government, under which council members are elected from geographical wards within the city.

THE KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) is unique in that it is guided by a Board of Police Commissioners appointed by the governor. The governor, with the consent of the Missouri Senate, appoints four citizens to serve on the board for a term of four years; one member's term expires each year. The fifth member of the board is the Mayor of Kansas City by virtue of his or her elected office. A secretary/attorney is appointed by the board as legal advisor. The board oversees the Office of Citizen Complaints, which receives and processes complaints from citizens regarding misconduct by the police department's employees.

The state legislature requires that a certain percentage of the city's general revenues be committed to police operations. According to Chief of Police Steven Bishop, although the department strives to be responsive to all segments of the community, it does not have the same relationship with the city council that departments in other cities might have. The inference from Chief Bishop was that the city council's input on police matters was limited by the state's role

in controlling the department. Various members of the department said efforts had been made to change the state's role but they had not been successful.

Members of the Board of Police Commissioners have active professional lives and act much like a corporate board with responsibilities for setting general policy. The board appoints the chief of police, who implements policy and provides day-to-day leadership and guidance to the organization.


Chief Steven Bishop came up through the ranks of the organization to be appointed chief in June 1990. According to the chief, he has focused on human relations and communications during his tenure. He has instituted training policies that emphasize recognition of the differences among people and the need to use alternatives to lethal force. The chief visits the police training academy regularly to reinforce his directives in this area, and he has suspended or terminated officers for excessive use of force. Departmental employees stated that the chief's policies appear to be positively received by the majority of the department, but those interviewed up and down the organization's hierarchy provided mixed reviews.

The chief reorganized the department in an effort to streamline some operations. The Narcotics and Vice Division was placed under the Investigations Bureau, and the Intelligence Unit was placed under the Chief's Office. A deputy chief was also added to the Chief's Office. The chief oversees four bureaus, each headed by a deputy chief: Field Services, Investigations, Fiscal Services, and Administration and Services. Within the Chief's Office is the Operations Division, which includes the Internal Affairs Unit, Audit Unit, Intelligence Unit, Public Affairs Section, Private Officers Commission Section, and Legal Advisor. (See Figure 1.)

As of 1990, the KCPD had 1,162 law enforcement officers and 604 civilian personnel,

a 7.7 percent increase in sworn personnel and a 5 percent increase in civilian personnel since 1986. The department's structure includes eight sworn ranks: officer, investigator, detective, sergeant, captain, major, deputy chief, and chief. Promotion to sergeant and captain is by competitive examination; majors and deputy chiefs are appointed directly by the chief. Law enforcement experience among the command staff (chief to major) ranges from 20 to 30 years. Approximately 43 percent of the department's personnel at the officer/investigator rank (excluding probationary officers) have four years of experience or less.¹

Figure 1
Organizational Chart, Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department



Field operations are decentralized into five geographical divisions: Central, Metro, East, North, and South Patrol Divisions. Of the 495,110 calls for police service recorded in 1990, Central, Metro, and East each handled about 24 percent of the calls and North and South each

handled about 9 percent. The crime rate for 1990 Part I offenses (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny over \$200, larceny under \$200, auto theft, and arson) was 13,280 per 100,000 population, an increase of 5.3 percent over 1989. The largest increase was for robbery, 23 percent.² The listing in Table 1 of major crimes in Kansas City, Missouri, San Diego, California, Metro-Dade, Florida, and Austin, Texas, provides an interesting comparison and may reflect the population density of Kansas City's inner city.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime appears to be the most active community group in Kansas City. It is a nonprofit, community-based, grass-roots organization formed in November 1977 by a group of residents of the black community. These citizens were concerned about a perception that the police were not investigating the murders of nine black women as diligently as possible. Ad Hoc soon focused on four major areas: (1) raising the level of awareness and concern regarding the impact that crime and violence were having on the black community, (2) community-police relations, (3) establishing a community-wide, 24-hour secret witness hot line, and (4) organizing an annual metropolitan-wide anticrime radio marathon to raise funds to pay rewards for information that helps to solve crimes, assist victims, and support the hot line. Since 1977, Ad Hoc has initiated and implemented neighborhood and community-wide anticrime programs and worked to prevent illicit drug use, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities.

Ad Hoc serves the metropolitan Kansas City area, but the Reward Fund and Victim/Witness Support Program are directed toward the inner city. Originally operated by volunteers, Ad Hoc has now hired a staff with funding from the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation. Today, the organization is governed by a 17-member Board of Directors. Its eight

Table 1. Comparison of Violent Crime Rates in Kansas City and Other Cities³

Jurisdiction/Population	1986	1990	Percent Change	Rate per 100,000 (1990)
Kansas City, Mo. Pop. 434,711				
Violent Crime	9,673	11,087	14.6%	2,550
Assault	5,655	5,957	5.3%	1,370
Robbery	3,442	4,492	30.5%	1,033
Burglary	13,525	11,640	-13.9%	2,678
Jurisdiction/Population	1986	1990	Percent Change	Rate per 100,000 (1990)
San Diego, Calif. Pop. 1,110,549				
Violent Crime	8,522	12,047	41.4%	1,085
Assault	4,044	7,142	76.6%	643
Robbery	3,985	4,331	8.7%	390
Burglary	17,533	16,691	-4.8%	1,504
Austin, Texas Pop. 465,622				
Violent Crime	2,667	3,326	24.7%	714
Assault	1,107	1,539	39.0%	331
Robbery	1,124	1,461	30.0%	314
Burglary	12,454	11,371	-8.7%	2,442
Metro-Dade, Fla. Pop. 1,309,504				
Violent Crime	11,676	15,607	33.7%	1,192
Assault	5,540	7,007	26.5%	535
Robbery	5,767	8,172	41.7%	624
Burglary	12,371	13,507	9.2%	1,031

full-time and one part-time staff oversee an annual budget of \$600,000. Funding comes from a variety of sources, including private foundations, the Kansas City School District, the Missouri Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, the Missouri State Division of Public Safety, the Black Community Fund, and the City of Kansas City, Missouri.

Some of Ad Hoc's community programs are The Reward Fund and Victim/Witness Support Program, the Ex-Offender in School Project, Black Men Together, Metropolitan Task Force on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Youth Information and Drug Abuse Hot Line, Urban Interpersonal Violence Reduction Program, Environmental Enhancement and Drug Free School Zone, Project Neighborhood, and the HIV/AIDS Information and Prevention Program. A variety of other problem-centered programs are pending adoption. "It's Ad Hoc Live from Police Headquarters," is a program that broadcasts live radio reports on unsolved violent crimes from the police department's Crimes Against Person Division.

The influence of Ad Hoc in the community and within the criminal justice community is significant, as evidenced by the agencies represented at one of its recent monthly meetings: the local FBI office, juvenile court, probation, parole, the U.S. Attorney's Office, state Highway Patrol, District Attorney's Office, the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the mental health agency. Also in attendance were several mid- and upper-level KCPD managers, including Deputy Chief Lomax, commander of the Investigations Bureau. Recruits from the police academy were also at the meeting, as required by their training program. As part of the agenda, a representative from each of the KCPD's geographic police and detective divisions gave a report on the incidence of crime in their area. (For further information regarding the Ad Hoc group, refer to the appendix.)

BACKGROUND OF THE GANG AND DRUG PROBLEM IN KANSAS CITY

Kansas City's 1989 application for federal assistance with its Gang Narcotics Intelligence and Enforcement Program provides the background for the connection between gang and drug problems in the city.⁴ According to the grant application, in 1985 drug trafficking patterns changed in Kansas City. Prior to 1985 the drugs of choice on the street were marijuana and pharmaceutical drugs diverted from the legitimate market. In late 1985, however, crack cocaine appeared in the inner-city drug houses. Crack, or free-base cocaine, had been encountered by the police in some drug-possession cases but not to the extent of being packaged for retail sale. However, citizens began reporting an increased number of crack houses in their neighborhoods, and by the end of 1986, reports of new houses had increased by 360 percent over 1985. At the same time, sources indicated that the Jamaican organized crime gang, the Posse, was moving into the Kansas City area. Due to Kansas City's central U.S. location and its large airport and rail and bus transportation corridor, it soon became a prime location for crack distribution.

Through coordination with federal agencies (discussed below), Kansas City developed a strategy for deal with this new threat as organized crime. After the Jamaican Posse problem was addressed, a new problem arose. Drug investigators' intelligence information revealed that Los Angeles-based Crips and Bloods gangs had begun entering the metropolitan Kansas City drug market. Members of the Los Angeles gangs established themselves in the area through relatives who had relocated from southern California. This provided the L.A. gangs with insider contacts to Kansas City drug connections and networks. Distribution was either through family members or others who were willing to use their residence as crack houses. Once established in the neighborhood, the gang maintained control through the threat of violence.

Rather than operating crack houses themselves, the L.A. gangs began supplying large quantities of crack cocaine to recruited local distributors. Rented apartments and motel rooms were used as distribution points. Young blacks were recruited as street dealers, many of whom modeled themselves after apparently wealthy L.A. gang members. At this lower sales level, disputes often broke out over territory and profits.

The gang group referred to as the L.A. Boys showed up in Kansas City about 1989 and entered the crack cocaine market. Some were members of the Los Angeles Bloods and Crips. The L.A. Boys influenced local juveniles, who were easily convinced by the high profits in drug sales and their perception that juvenile laws were lenient. The L.A. Boys began educating local youths about gangs, including signing with hands, color and style of dress, talk, and the use of weapons. "Initially it was easy to identify the L.A. gang members," Chief Lomax said, "because if you were a local you were a 'wanna-be.' Now it's not that easy because we have our own version. Now there is a local core of gang members that are operating crack houses and competition between gangs is occurring."

THE KCPD'S ORGANIZED CRIME APPROACH TO GANGS, 1986-1989

When the first signs that the Jamaican Posse gang was moving into Kansas City appeared, detectives from the department's narcotics unit began working street-level and sporadic mid-level cases involving the gang in concert with the DEA, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Funding for enforcement at that time came from the police department and the DEA. As problems continued with the Jamaican Posse gang, the department adopted a new approach--attacking the gang and drug problem from

an organized crime perspective. Maj. David Barton led an effort to apply for Bureau of Justice Assistance grant funds to start a task force that would treat the gang as an organized crime entity. The department was awarded a grant of \$250,000 for 1989-1991. Funds were to be used for investigative costs, informant fees, and evidence. The grant application identified the following goals:

1. Develop a gang narcotics intelligence program for gathering information from throughout the police department, using all available sources of information.
2. Identify gang narcotics distribution networks through a complete analysis of automated gang intelligence and other information sources.
3. Once identified, target upper- and mid-level gang organization members utilizing all available resources and law enforcement techniques and strategies.
4. To complement all existing multi-agency efforts, prosecute organized narcotics trafficking hierarchies.
5. Establish a strong unified prosecution strategy, using both state and federal resources, on gang-related investigations.
6. Complement existing efforts to seize gang narcotics organizations' financial assets, using both state and federal forfeiture and seizure statutes.
7. Measure and reduce the number of organized gang-related incidents of violence, including the crimes of homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and rape.
8. Develop systems to share organized gang narcotics intelligence and investigate information with other gang or task force projects to assist in stopping the spread of gang narcotics activity.⁵

The program was intended to limit obvious gang activity and related drug sales in areas of Kansas City. Progress toward achieving the goals would be measured by arrests, prosecutions, amounts of seizures, public response, and the effectiveness of sharing intelligence information.

The project's goals were to be achieved in two ways. First, a reporting procedure was

to be established for collecting gang intelligence information. The information would be processed by computer for easy retrieval in a variety of categories. Second, once intelligence information had identified organizations or individuals, available resources would be assessed, targets prioritized, and organizations attacked by the methods deemed most effective, such as executing state and federal search warrants on identified "stash" houses and distribution centers, using the Street Narcotics Unit to attack crack distribution networks and develop evidence for conspiracy charges, and conducting investigations in conjunction with the Financial Investigations Squad to maximize seizures and prosecution under federal money laundering statutes.

With the approval of the grant monitor, Kansas City began target gangs as organized crime, in particular Jamaican Posse gangs, the L. A. gangs, and the Moorish Science Temple, a gang with affiliations in Chicago and New York City. The KCPD had started to investigate the Jamaican gangs before the grant was awarded, but the grant enable it to continue and expand the effort. As a result of this investigation, several Jamaican gang members were arrested and successfully prosecuted, and several thousands of dollars and quantities of narcotics were seized. A second target was the Los Angeles gangs with their Crips and Bloods connections. This investigation centered on a gang of drug traffickers known as the L.A. Boys. In August 1989 a search warrant resulted in the seizure of 4,331 grams of crack cocaine, worth in excess of a half million dollars. In addition, guns and over \$64,000 in currency were seized. From November 1989 through September 1990, several other investigations were conducted that resulted in arrests of black gang members and the seizure of large quantities of crack cocaine, cash, and weapons. Through the identification of distribution points and information obtained by investigators, a clear connection between the L. A. gangs and Kansas City was shown.

According to Major Barton, the DEA was reluctant about participating in the task force because it involved crack cocaine, which was not considered a major threat. The Jamaican gangs were also regarded as a "local" problem and not organized to the scale that federal agencies should become involved. However, the BATF assisted in task force efforts and was successful in several cases. Seeing this success, according to Barton, the DEA participated more fully in the task force.

THE CURRENT GANG PROBLEM

Maj. David Barton, former commander of the Narcotics/Vice Division and now director of the KCPD's Regional Police Academy, sees the current gang problem as a direct result of the L.A. gangs that came to Kansas City. When the major Bloods and Crip dealers withdrew from the city, they left a legacy for the local black youths to follow. Major Barton further related that the gangs are now formed from many cells, and no one person is necessarily in charge as in a traditional organized crime group. In order to protect themselves against other gangs, retain power in their areas, and have money, the gangs rely on huge profits from drugs sales. They also commit other crimes, such as theft, burglary, and intimidation. The connection between gang activity and drugs is inseparable, however. As one KCPD officer said, "It's the glue that bonds the gangs."

In the KCPD, official identification of an individual as a gang member is the responsibility of the Perpetrator Identification Center (PIC). PIC uses a standard that requires at least two means of identification, such as admitting to belonging to a gang, outward signs (e.g., clothes, physical marks), other documentation, or outside sources. Although these criteria

are used when gang information is being entered into the computer system, the standard is not widely known throughout the department. Patrol officers reported not knowing what PIC used to identify a gang member.

Some officers and detectives also talk about those who want to be a gang member but haven't "jumped in" yet. These "wanna-be's" can be as dangerous or more so than documented gang members. One PIC detective said, however, that there really isn't any such thing as a gang member wanna-be; you either are or you're not. "When that shot is fired and the bullet hits someone, it's no longer a question of was it done by a gang member or a wanna-be, the bullet doesn't know the difference."

The gang influence has reached the schools as well. Use of colors and athletic team designations has started in the schools. This has brought the violence and use of weapons to Kansas City school campuses at all levels. During the week of November 4, 1991, for example, a 14-year-old boy was shot and killed by another youth gang member when approached about the L.A. Raiders jacket he was wearing. Such incidents have created controversies within the community about dress codes for public schools; the mayor has called for uniform dress for all schools.

Gang activity in Kansas City is not solely a black issue. Other gangs, including the 9th Street Dawgs (a prison gang) and the Latin Counts are present, but not to the extent of the Bloods and Crips. In January 1991, Sgt. Hardy Smith of the KCPD's Street Gang Task Force, identified the following gang sets in Kansas City.

Gangs in Kansas City, 1991

Gang Set	Number of Members
1. Macken Gangster Crips	8
2. 51st Street Gangster Crips	18
3. 12st Hoover Crips	17
4. Malditos	13
5. East Side Latin Counts	9
6. 23rd Street Hard Core Gangsters	21
7. 33rd Street Latin Kings	16
8. Black Gangster Disciples	9
9. 57th Street Road Dogs	9
10. 9th Street Dawgs	15
11. 25th Street Crips (Posse)	10
12. 69th Street Dogs (also known as the Bounty Hunter Bloods)	5
13. Rollin 40's Crips	3
Total	147
Unconfirmed Gang Sets	
14. 75th Street Crips (also known as the 75th Street Saints)	2
15. Waldo Gang	4
Total	6
Bloods or Crips Unknown Sets	
16. Bloods or Crips	26

The informal reaction among officers and others familiar with the city's gang problem was that the estimates above were very conservative and that the number of individuals who identified themselves either formally or informally with a gang was much higher. The Street Gang Task Force estimates that there may be as many as 80 gang sets and a total of over 460 gang members.


Perceptions of the complexity of the gang problem and what should be done about it vary within Kansas City. KCPD patrol officers see gang violence increasing and the L.A. connection continuing. A recent investigation of a shooting in the city, for example, revealed that the same gun was used in another crime in Los Angeles a week later. Officers also report that gang members show them little respect and readily aim guns at them and even shoot at them. Patrol officers said that they frequently encounter gang members, both juvenile and adult, who do not hesitate to become violent toward them. A recent incident in the East Patrol Division involved officers conducting canine training in the evening at a school. During the training session, shots rang out in the area of the officers and local gang members were suspected of the attack.

Maj. Dennis Shreve, former project director of the gang grant project and now commander of the Central Patrol Division, says the gang problem is increasing. He referred to a 1991 Ad Hoc study, conducted by consultants who were former L.A. gang members, that concluded that Kansas City is where Los Angeles was 25 years ago--only at the beginning of its gang problem,. Thus, according to Major Shreve, something had better be done now or Kansas City could face the same gang problems and violence that Los Angeles is contending with today.

Officers at various levels of the department indicated that the prosecutor's office is too lenient on gang-related cases. They had the sense that as long as gang members keep shooting each other little attention will be given to the matter by the prosecutor's office. The impression was that there were so many shootings and killings that unless the victim died, was not a gang member, and perhaps not a minority, little would be done. Other comments by officers indicated that federal officers did not work well with the Jackson County prosecutor's office and that hindered prosecutions as well.

under age 30. Of the 107 victims, 63 percent had criminal records or known criminal associations. This criminal record/association factor was almost double that recorded for victims in the previous seven months of 1991. Figure 2 shows a monthly comparison of drive-by shootings for 1990-1991.

Figure 2
Drive-by Shootings in Kansas City, 1990-1991



Note: Data for Sep.-Dec. 1991 not available at the time of this report.
 Source: Kansas City, Mo. Police Department, 9-91.

THE KCPD'S CURRENT RESPONSE TO GANGS

At first, "Nobody wanted to face the problem that we had gangs in Kansas City," said a high-ranking officer. One official reported attempting to advise superiors and peers that there was a gang problem in Kansas City. "Here I was looking at the outside wall of my police station sprayed with gang graffiti and being told there were no local gangs in Kansas City." The resistance by some police command staff was partially due to a view that Kansas City had always

percent of the victims knew the suspects by name, 89 percent were black, and 81 percent were under age 30. Of the 107 victims, 63 percent had criminal records or known criminal associations. This criminal record/association factor was almost double that recorded for victims in the previous seven months of 1991. Figure 2 shows a monthly comparison of drive-by shootings for 1990-1991.

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resistance by some police command staff was partially due to a view that Kansas City had always had gangs and this was not anything new. There was some indication that since gang violence was generally directed against other gang members, no one was concerned. Moreover, because the local gangs were not organized, no heads or leaders per se, they were not viewed in the same light as gangs that had been encountered previously.

Some patrol command officers tried to establish limited gang intelligence and patrol enforcement efforts at their local level by assigning some of their officers to address gang problems and attempt to identify gang members in their area. They made some progress but could not continue the effort because calls for patrol police services were increasing, and they did not have the officers to devote to gangs. Detective Reyes, assigned to the Intelligence Unit, began an informal process of gathering gang information. She shortly became the expert on current gang activity. She talked to in-custody gang members and with beat officers in order to identify gang members, become familiar with the connection between drugs and gangs, and discover intelligence information that might link gang members to crimes. Some officers said that she had been told to stop doing gang intelligence and return to her other duties. A high-ranking officer said that this was evidence of how support for gang suppression was stopped in an area if the commander did not think there was a problem. Officers said that Detective Reyes is still contacted from time to time for information and is now a member of the department's Street Gang Task Force.

Those interviewed could not identify the specific action or group that initiated the pressure, but as a result of that pressure, the KCPD formed the Street Gang Task Force within the Investigations Bureau in January 1991. The purpose of the task force was intelligence

gathering, not field or enforcement work. The task force was started by Chief Lomax and coordinated by Sergeant Smith. According to Smith, the task force was to develop a coordinated effort by departmental personnel to accumulate intelligence information about gang members and their activities. The information was to be channeled to the Perpetrator Information Center for analysis and made available to departmental personnel and other law enforcement agencies. Task force members would be drawn from different segments of the department and would meet regularly to share information. The task force would also facilitate training for officers in gang activity and provide information to the public.

On behalf of the task force, Sergeant Smith presents antigang public information programs to schools, business associations, and public service organizations. He has developed informational material to help the public identify gang behavior, and he has developed presentations and written materials to help the business community cope with gang activity that may affect their businesses.

The task force encountered a number of problems during the first three months of operation, as reported by Sergeant Smith, including the following:

1. Task force members had no prior knowledge or experience with street gangs and their activities.
2. Half the task force members were assigned from investigations and half from patrol, which led to communication problems. Each group had different command structures and did not always report information from the task force back to their superiors. Moreover, information from the task force was being challenged by commanders who had previously stated there were no gang problems.
3. Gang intelligence compiled prior to the organization of the task force was found to be unsubstantiated and unreliable. The following example was cited by Sergeant Smith: "If an L.A. gang member was intercepted in Kansas City at the bus station or airport and it was later determined he was with the 74 Hoover Crips out of Compton, California, it was entered as a Kansas City based gang."

Another example cited a problem in identifying the extent of gang activity: "We found the computer listed the Kansas City gang '12th Street Hoover Crips' as '12th Street Eioys' and '12th Street Crips.' The data entry error caused the computer to count one gang as three different gangs."

4. Significant time was spent in educating task force members about gangs so that they could make public presentations and provide departmental training.
5. Distribution of information gained by various members of the task force was difficult.
6. Providing training to officers so they could articulate why an officer believed an individual or activity was gang related was difficult.
7. The quality of written reports from officers, from which gang intelligence was to be obtained, was poor.
8. Obtaining intelligence information from the schools was difficult because they denied having gang problems.⁷

According to Sergeant Smith, the task force has initiated a key project, called "J-11."

This is a computerized data base of known gang members that can be accessed by patrol officers in the field. PIC has established criteria for documenting gang involvement and is coordinating the input of data regarding gang activity. It was anticipated that the data base would be available at the end of November 1991, but the operational date was delayed until issues concerning the release of information are resolved.

In brief, the Kansas City area encompasses more than one county with more than one presiding juvenile court authority that sets requirements for the release of juvenile information. The Jackson County court had allowed the information to be used in that county but would not allow it to be released to other counties. Thus, the J-11 project was put on hold until legal issues about confidentiality and purging records could be resolved, and at this writing it is not clear when the project will be able to proceed.

Although the task force seems a significant first step in gathering gang information, some officers think the project has been ineffective. Officers at all levels said that a gang unit was needed that targeted gang-related crimes. Currently, gang enforcement is handled by tactical officers assigned to the patrol divisions. These officers, who are primarily tactical response officers (SWAT), patrol in marked cars for signs of gang activity and take action on incidents they observe.

When asked about the information provided by the task force, officers said that much of the information that finally reaches the beat officers is old and that information from PIC was not always what the field officer needed. They reported there is a reluctance to share intelligence information between bureaus or work units. One officer said "You have to really know what to ask for from PIC, otherwise you don't get useful information. They [PIC] really don't have the time to help you develop information." Command-level officers stated that the task force was a good start but that the department now needed to do something with the information and take action. Tactical units in each area station are targeting gang members and their narcotics activity, but they seem to be relying on information they develop themselves rather than intelligence gathered by the task force.

Officers Peter Schillino and Patty Marnett are assigned to the Central Patrol Division as uniformed officers/crime analysts. The officers review all division reports and develop crime bulletins and other information for the division's officers. Both officers thought that their area of the city had a significant gang problem, including drive-by shootings. They said there is still a definite connection with the L.A. gangs.

Schillino and Marnett think that more effort is needed on tracking gangs and developing

intelligence information. When asked how they would handle the problem if they had the opportunity and resources, they cited the success of one particular beat officer, who has worked the same area for several years and knows everyone in the community. That officer has developed an information network and nothing happens in his area that he doesn't know about. They said he is constantly asking them for crime information regarding his area and he, in turn, passes on intelligence information to them. "It's like we have to return to the basics--the cop on the beat like it used to be in the old days," one of the officers said. "We need to be in closer contact with the public in order to develop a trust with the citizens. Right now they won't tell us much because they don't know us and they are afraid of the gangs and the police."

The Kansas City Police Department currently has an informal and loosely organized approach dealing with the city's gang problem. Many officers cited the need for getting the schools involved with the police to solve the problem. Chief Bishop has indicated that it is his goal to develop better relations with the inner-city schools. And many officers indicated that they thought a change was coming because of the recent shooting of a teenager on a school campus and the drive-by shooting of a teacher's house that resulted in the teacher's death. If gang problems continue to worsen, a more formalized approach may be in the offing.

Already the department has introduced a training program within its academy on gangs and, additionally, in-service training is now being provided on gang awareness. Departmental members see this as a positive step. The delay in implementing the J-11 gang identification program has been a setback, but it is viewed as a viable program for furthering intelligence

gathering and analysis of gang activity. Reliably determining the scope of gang problems in the city may assist the agency with developing future responses.

The notion of the department getting "back to the basics" relying upon beat cops to maintain responsibility for gang enforcement is compatible with current attention being given to community-based policing across the country. Using this approach, the department may be able to build upon the concept of providing information to beat officers to address gang-related problems if these problems continue to worsen in the Midwestern city.

NOTES

1. Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, *Annual Report-1990*.
2. Ibid.
3. Crime in the United States: FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1986-1990).
4. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, "Urban Street Gang Drug Trafficking Enforcement Demonstration Programs," draft report, January 1991. Prepared by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Narcotics Control Technical Assistance Program. Administered by the Institute for Law and Justice, Alexandria, Virginia.
5. Ibid.; U.S. Department of Justice, "Applications for Federal Assistance," Bureau of Justice Assistance Grants for Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, 10-1-90 to 9-30-91.
6. Memorandum to Sgt. Larry Weishar from Det. Chester Lucas, Perpetrator Information Center, September 5, 1991.
7. Sgt. Hardy Smith, "Street Gang Activity, Identification and Problem Solving Report (01-09-91 to 03-31-91)," Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department.

Appendix

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime



“A Community’s Movement Against
Crime, Violence and Drugs”

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime





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“A Community’s Movement Against
Crime, Violence and Drugs”

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime

How do individuals cope with community problems like crime, violence and drugs? When people are dissatisfied with the way things are going in their community, the choices are usually limited to three possibilities: 1) resign themselves to the situation, do nothing, and just tolerate it; 2) move away and find a community that provides more satisfaction; 3) stay and make an attempt to change things. Members of the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime in Kansas City, Missouri have opted to do the latter, and they have been doing so effectively for the last decade, working in tandem with the Criminal Justice System.

The Group provides a model for others by focusing on real issues and solutions to resolve community problems. The mission they have adopted for themselves goes beyond providing passive community support for local law enforcement efforts. Helping people of different incomes, occupations, ethnicity, skin color, and lifestyles to live together in a reasonable, peaceful fashion is the real core of their mission. Albeit a seemingly impossible task but, nonetheless a vital one, which the Group meets head-on.

The Group is highly regarded in Kansas City by the law enforcement community at the local, state and federal levels. They have received national recognition for their accomplishments in features produced by ABC's Nightly News and NBC's The Today Show. Individual members of the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime are deservedly proud of the attention the Group has received. They will tell you enthusiastically of future plans and projects and visions of expanded cooperative efforts between the community and the police in addressing urban crime problems.

However, they would also be able to tell you that their course has not been an easy one. Initially, the Group was confronted with distrust and not taken seriously by several segments of the community, including the Police Department.



The Beginning

In early 1977, nine young women were murdered in Kansas City. The murders were particularly brutal and went unsolved for several months. Many people felt the Police Department was not vigorously pursuing a solution, because the victims were Black. Enraged, several hundred concerned citizens joined together and met with members of the Police Department on November 30, 1977. It was a heated but constructive meeting.

As a result of that meeting, the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime was formed along with two major programs: the Reward Fund Commission, and the 24-Hour Secret Witness Hotline. By early summer of 1978, several thousand dollars were raised for the Reward Fund Commission. The effort was beneficial. The police solved several of the murders with a tip received through the Hotline and rewards were paid.

The positive relationship that is now enjoyed between the Ad Hoc Group and the Kansas City Missouri Police Department has not always existed. In the early years there was a great deal of misunderstanding and distrust experienced by both sides. The Police Department was unfamiliar with this type of community intervention and involvement. There was not always a willingness to share and accept suggestions and information. Some of the initial concerns that were raised in addition to the nine unsolved homicides were:

1. Alleged police brutality toward those living in the Black community.
2. Under-utilizations of minorities in high ranking administrative position, within the Department and
3. The police community relations policy as it related to working with the black community on a continuous basis and incorporating community suggestions.

There were questions raised for which no easy answers were found. The years of mutual suspicion and distrust were not easily erased. But after a few years of continuous hard work and patient determination, there now exists a better sense of cooperation and mutual dependence on the Ad Hoc Group to always maintain its right to be constructively critical, but always united with the Police Department to fight the criminal element.

It is through the example of good community relations with the Police Department that other law enforcement agencies have been led to begin networking with the Ad Hoc Group. They now have an on-going relationship with the FBI, U.S. Attorney's Office, County and City Prosecutor's Office, Juvenile Justice Center, School District, and other public and private agencies.

Ad Hoc Today

It has become increasingly clear that the police alone cannot rid communities of the crime and violence which threatens to turn tranquil neighborhoods into drug infested armed camps, where violence is the rule. There has to be grass roots involvement to assist police authorities in a legitimate manner. The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime is doing just that. Today the Ad Hoc Group is governed by a 15-member board of directors, and it is at the forefront of a community-based effort to do something about escalating crime and violence in Kansas City. The following is a synopsis of the programs and activities of the Ad Hoc Group:

Reward Fund Commission

Donations are accepted to go into a reward fund set up to be paid to persons who provide information which helps solve a particular crime.

Secret Witness Hotline and Victim/Witness Assistance Program

A 24-Hour telephone hotline is provided for persons who have witnessed a crime or who have information about a crime, to anonymously report information which leads to an arrest and conviction in exchange for a reward. The Victim/Witness Assistance Program offers support to victims and witnesses of violent crimes and recommends the use of reward funds to relocate victims and offer minimal assistance.

Interpersonal Violence Reduction Project

Seeks to reduce violence in the community by providing conflict resolution training to persons prone to violent confrontations. Separate groups are available for youth and adults.

Crisis Intervention Project

Mediates disputes between high school youth and families, in cooperation with the Human Relations Department.

Youth Information and Drug Abuse Hotline, 861-SAVE

Provides help for troubled young people who want help with drugs, alcohol or gang problems, through cooperation and with a grant from the Kansas City School District. Youth can call collect from any pay phone for information about drugs or violence.

Black Men Together

A coordinated effort to rescue the inner city from the influence of drug dealers and gangs. The Black Men Together also serve as role models for youth, seeking to build pride, self-esteem and improve the image of black males in Kansas City.

Victim Support Committee

Co-sponsors a support group for relatives of homicide victims.

Court Watch Program

Monitors Kansas City Municipal Courts as part of a community consortium. In the past results of this monitoring were prepared for presentation along with recommendations to the Court. This committee also arranges for young people to visit with prosecutors and judges, and provides trips to federal and state trials.

African-American AIDS Prevention Project

Because minority drug users are at high risk for AIDS, the Ad Hoc Group has begun a major educational campaign to communicate to minority populations both the risks and the steps for overcoming the risks of contracting AIDS.

Today the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime is a diverse group of volunteers who are concerned about the level of violence which threatens to overwhelm the community. The membership reflects a cross section of people representing all ages, different ethnic backgrounds, and various occupations, who share a community consciousness and a desire for a safe place to live.

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime has been a success story of problem-oriented policing and people coming together to work for the common good of the community. Through its various programs and activities, Ad Hoc has been able to mobilize the community to get involved in the fight against crime and violence.

For additional information on the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime contact:

Ad Hoc Group Against Crime
P.O. Box 15351
Kansas City, Missouri 64106
(816) 861-9100

AD HOC COMMUNITY NETWORK

AD HOC COMMITTEES

- * MAJOR EVENTS
- * YOUTH
- * VICTIM SUPPORT
- * CRIMINAL JUSTICE
- * INTERVENTION
- * REWARD FUND COMMISSION

NEIGHBORHOOD COMMUNITY GROUPS/BLOCK CLUBS

JACKSON COUNTY JUVENILE COURT

JACKSON COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER

U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

JACKSON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER

F.B.I.

KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT

FULL EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL

FEDERAL, STATE, CITY, PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICES

FEDERAL, STATE, MUNICIPAL JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

STATE OF MISSOURI, DEPT. OF MENTAL HEALTH

MISSOURI DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES

HOUSING AUTHORITY - (PUBLIC HOUSING)

EAST AREA COMMUNITY COALITION

PRIVATE SECTOR AND PUBLIC SECTOR

SOCIAL AGENCIES

THE AD HOC GROUP AGAINST CRIME PROGRAMS/PROJECTS PAST & PRESENT

- ** SECRET WITNESS HOTLINE 921-9000
- ** VICTIM WITNESS SUPPORT
- ** YOUTH INFORMATION DRUG ABUSE HOTLINE 861-SAVE
- ** SECRET WITNESS REWARD FUND
- ** ANNUAL COMMUNITY-WIDE ANTI-CRIME RADIO MARATHON
- ** COURT WATCH PROGRAM (YOUNG ADULTS)
- ** COURT WATCH PROGRAM (ADULTS)
- ** BILLBOARD PROJECT
- ** MEDIA SUPPORT
 - * HEADLIGHTS FOR LIFE
- ** CANDLELIGHT VIGILS
- ** VICTIM WITNESS SUPPORT TASKFORCE
- ** EX-OFFENDERS PROGRAM
- ** BLACK MEN TOGETHER (BMT)
 - NON TRADITIONAL SCOUTING PROGRAM
- ** ANTI-DRUG HOUSE RALLIES
 - * ANTI-DRUG/CRIME PARADES
 - * ANATOMY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
 - "HOW IS IT SUPPOSED TO WORK: HOW DOES IT WORK?"
- ** PRISON VISITS (YOUTH)
- ** ENVIRONMENTAL ENHANCEMENT PROJECT
- ** REPORT THE DRUG HOUSE/EVICT THE DEALER
 - LANDLORD NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
- ** ANTI-DRUG PARAPHERNALIA PROJECT
 - * CB PATROL AGAINST RAPE
- ** AFRICAN-AMERICAN AIDS PREVENTION PROJECT
- ** URBAN INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE PROJECT
- ** POLICE/COMMUNITY RIDE-A-LONG PROGRAM

SPECIAL REPORTS / COMMISSIONS

- ** TASK FORCE FOR THE STUDY OF THE STATUS OF THE BLACK MALE IN KANSAS CITY
 - HEALTH
 - DRUGS
 - EDUCATION
 - SUPPORT SYSTEMS
 - CRIMINAL JUSTICE
 - EMPLOYMENT

* "BLACK ON BLACK HOMICIDE IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, 1980-1986"

** DENOTES CURRENT PROGRAMS/PROJECTS
* DENOTES PAST PROGRAMS/PROJECTS

Black-on-Black Homicide: Kansas City's Response

MARK A. MITCHELL, MD, MPH
STACEY DANIELS, PhD

Dr. Mitchell is the Deputy Director of the Kansas City, MO, Health Department. Dr. Daniels is a Research Associate with the Greater Kansas City Mental Health Foundation. Tearsheet requests to Mark Mitchell, MD, MPH, Kansas City Health Department, City Hall, 10th Floor, 414 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, MO 64106.

Synopsis.....

In many metropolitan areas, homicide continues to be the scourge of Black Americans despite increasing awareness of the overrepresentation of Blacks among victims and perpetrators. The risk of being a homicide victim among Black males is so high that the Department of Health and Human Services has set a priority of reducing the risk to 60 per 100,000 by 1990. The recent escalation in the number of homicides in the United States associated with drugs makes attainment of that goal unlikely.

In Kansas City, a black community grassroots organization, the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, commissioned a multidisciplinary task force to study Black-on-Black homicide in 1986. The report generated by this task force identified factors placing Kansas Citians at high risk of being homicide victims or perpetrators, including being Black, male, unemployed, between the ages 17-29, a high school nongraduate, frequently involved in or around violence, and having prior arrests on weapons charges.

One hundred recommendations were made, of which 12 were targeted for immediate implementation. These included increasing public awareness of the incidence of Black-on-Black homicide, involvement of Black men in role model programs for young Black males, training in anger control and alternatives to violence for those identified as being at high risk for homicide, and providing a role for ex-offenders in violence prevention.

Working with community organizations has inherent strengths and weaknesses for public health workers. However, such a group can successfully impact the affected community in ways which would be difficult for traditional resources.

Homicide continues to be a major cause of death in the United States. Victims of homicide have been disproportionately represented among Blacks since statistics on the race of victims were first compiled in 1914 (1). Although in 1983 homicide was the 11th leading cause of death in the nation, it was the fifth leading cause of death among Blacks, and it was the leading cause of death for Blacks ages 15-34 (2). In the United States homicide is generally a segregated phenomenon: 94 percent of Black murder victims are killed by other Blacks (3). In America today, a White female has 1 chance in 606 of becoming a murder victim, a White male has 1 chance in 186, a Black female has 1 chance in 124, but a Black male has 1 chance in 29 (4). The high incidence of homicide among Black males resulted in a priority set by Department of Health and Human Services to reduce the rate to 60 per 100,000 by the year 1990 from the rate of 83 per 100,000 in 1980 (5).

These statistics underscore the scope and severity of the problem of Black-on-Black homicide. It has increasingly become a topic of discussion among black scholars, journalists, politicians, and community activists concerned about its endemic nature. Between 1980 and 1986, 751 homicides were recorded in Kansas City, MO. Although Blacks represented approximately 27 percent of Kansas City's population during that time, more than 60 percent of the homicide victims in the city

were Black. Concern about the overrepresentation of Blacks among both homicide victims and perpetrators led the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, a Black community grassroots organization, to commission a task force to study Black-on-Black homicide. This paper describes the task force's efforts, its findings, and subsequent endeavors to address homicide in the Black community.

Community Organization

The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime (subsequently referred to as the Ad Hoc Group) was formed in Kansas City in 1977, in response to the Black community's perception of lack of diligence by the police in pursuing the unsolved murders of nine Black women. Since that time, the organization's attention has been given to the full spectrum of criminal activities in the Kansas City community. About 200 volunteers from various professions and occupations, and the victims and relatives of victims make up the Ad Hoc Group. The common denominator among all volunteers is a desire to actively address issues related to crime, violence, and drug abuse in the Black community.

The Ad Hoc Group has raised and distributed more than \$100,000 in rewards for crime tips and has identified more than 400 suspected drug houses. It sponsors a secret witness program, and it has developed excellent relationships with the local police department, prosecutor's office, and court system. The organization enjoys a great degree of respect in the community because of its efforts against crime and drug abuse.

Black-on-Black Homicide Task Force

In 1985 the Kansas City Health Department and the Ad Hoc Group began discussions on the epidemiology of homicide in the metropolitan area, and how the group might be involved in this issue. Over a period of months, information exchange and discussion of national studies on homicide prevention led the group to request information regarding the number and demographic characteristics of homicide victims in Kansas City between 1980 and 1985 from the chief of the homicide division of the Kansas City Police Department. In response to this information, the Ad Hoc Group proposed the creation of a task force to document the problem of Black-on-Black homicide and recommend solutions.

Task force participants were selected from a pool of nearly 100 nominees. To generate nominations, local Black radio stations and newspapers announced the creation of the task force as a response to the "alarming and shocking" level of black homicides. Community residents were asked to submit names of persons whom they believed should be members of the Black-on-Black Homicide Task Force. A selection committee of the organization chose 17 of the nominees to serve on the multidisciplinary task force. Consultants in varying areas of expertise also contributed their services.

The task force and consultants took a comprehensive approach to the study of Black-on-Black homicide, so that programs could be later implemented to respond to the problem. The need for data was obvious, so the research subcommittee was initially formed. This subcommittee gathered overall statistics on homicides in Kansas City from 1980 through 1986, and then it selected a random sample of 102 homicides for more detailed examination, using the records of the police and prosecutor's office. The analysis included demographic, descriptive, and situational factors regarding victims and suspects that may have contributed to the homicide.

Another goal of the project was to document resources and services currently available to families of homicide victims - a goal which led to establishment of a resource and referral committee. In addition, because of the Ad Hoc Group's unique proven ability to communicate with victims' families, it was decided to supplement the research effort with an actual survey of such families. Therefore, a community survey subcommittee was formed to gain a more detailed understanding of personal characteristics that may differentiate homicide victims from nonvictims. Finally, a recommendations subcommittee was formed to identify ways in which the findings of the Black-on-Black Homicide Task Force Report could be used for future programming. The job of this subcommittee was to brainstorm ideas and to review the homicide literature to find recommendations that would apply and could be implemented in Kansas City.

To publicize the findings of the Black-on-Black Homicide Task Force, a press conference was scheduled in 1987, roughly 1 year after the call for its creation. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday was chosen as the date for the conference because of its symbolism of nonviolence. The press conference was held at police headquarters to further symbolize the cooperative nature of the community effort. This event was well covered by the media, and it focused on major findings of the report as well as what the community could do to address the issue of Black-on-Black homicide.

Summary of Findings

The report's authors found that for each year between 1980 and 1986, more than half of all homicide victims in Kansas City were Black males. A Black Kansas Citian was more than four times as likely to die from homicide as a White counterpart. In addition, for 1984-86 (years in which data on suspects were collected), blacks represented two-thirds of all known murder suspects. ("Task Force Report: Black on Black Homicide in Kansas City, Missouri, 1980-1986," A.M. Herron, editor. Unpublished report issued by the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, 1987.)

The task force identified factors placing members of the community at high risk of being either a victim of perpetrator of homicide. Indicators included being Black, male, unemployed, between the ages of 17-29, a high school nongraduate, having a previous arrest on a weapons charge, having a previous arrest for interpersonal violence, in possession of or frequently in proximity to firearms, having a criminal record, being frequently in or around domestic quarrels or other disturbances, and residing within a cluster of four inner-city zip code zones. The report stressed that not only are persons having these characteristics at risk for violence, but also at some risk are acquaintances and family members of persons with such characteristics.

Members of the task force identified more than 100 recommendations to address issues related to Black-on-Black homicide in Kansas City. Of these, 12 were targeted for implementation within the next year. These recommendations ranged from increasing awareness through "Headlights for Life" days, to encouraging role model programs for children, to providing a forum for ex-offenders to address the problem of violence, to providing training in conflict resolution.

Seven committees were formed to put the recommendations into action. The most active and visible committee has been the Headlights for Life Committee. This committee was formed out of the realization that many residents of the areas of the city with high homicide rates have come to accept homicide as a normal part of existence and are unaware of the frequency of homicides or of their own individual risk for homicide. This committee tries to increase awareness of the occur-

rence of homicide through a novel approach. At periodic intervals after the occurrence of one or more homicides, the Ad Hoc Group releases radio and newspaper announcements asking people to drive with their headlights on throughout the day to raise awareness and to indicate the nonacceptance of homicide in the Black community.

Also, at 6 p.m. each Friday of a week in which a homicide has occurred, there is a Community Circle or vigil organized by the Ad Hoc Group and held at a central location in the Black community. Community Circles are structured gatherings designed to express concern over the loss of potential contributors to humanity, rather than to judge circumstances surrounding the death. Family and friends of homicide victims are personally invited to attend. Flyers are distributed door-to-door in the neighborhood where the homicide occurred, informing people of who was murdered, telling them that they are also at risk, letting them know how to reduce their personal risk for violence, and inviting them to participate in the vigil. The vigil is opened with a prayer and a chant followed by general statements recognizing and opposing violence and premature death and statements expressing general support for the family and the community. Family members, neighbors, and friends of the victim are given an opportunity to speak, then the vigil is brought to a close by encouraging people to get involved in reporting crime and violence. Support services are also privately offered to the victim's loved ones.

The Ad Hoc Group has established a number of other committees to carry out recommendations of the report. Black Men Together was begun with one of its purposes being to provide positive role models for young Black males. The group is nearing its membership goal of 100 Black men who wish to provide a stabilizing influence in the Black community.

The Community Education Committee has implemented many of the recommendations. It sponsors Speakers' Bureau training, which involves people who have not been members of the Ad Hoc Group in educating the public about homicide risks and crime prevention strategies. The Speakers' Bureau has participated in radio and television talk shows and makes presentations to neighborhood groups and parent groups. Members of the audience at these presentations are recruited for the Speakers' Bureau, as are persons who are well-known in the community. The group also includes a very popular cadre of youth speakers who address youth gatherings.

The Community Education Committee has been successful in securing grant support for specific programming. A small grant was obtained for crisis intervention teams to identify high-risk youth for a summer gang and drug prevention effort. Another grant funds a program in which ex-offenders give antidrug and anticrime presentations to middle and high school students. A larger grant has been obtained in cooperation with Kansas City's Health Department for a project of interpersonal injury intervention focusing on persons who have been involved in assaults. This project is testing the effectiveness of a five-session course on anger control and alternatives to violence, using an experimental and control group of potentially homicidal assault victims and perpetrators referred by adult and youth authorities from the four identified high risk zip code zones. An annual conference on violence prevention attended by interested community members as well as those who work in the criminal justice system has also been instituted.

Discussion

Working with community organizations such as the Ad Hoc Group has inherent strengths and

THE AD HOC GROUP AGAINST CRIME

Ad Hoc Office (816) 861-9100
Ad Hoc Secret Witness Hotline &
24-Hour Telephone (816) 921-9000
Youth Info & Drug Abuse Hotline
(816) 861-SAVE

P.O. Box 15351
Kansas City, MO 64106

Ad Hoc Today

It has become increasingly clear that the police alone cannot rid communities of the crime and violence which threatens to turn tranquil neighborhoods into drug infested armed camps, where violence is the rule. There has to be grass roots involvement to assist police authorities in a legitimate manner. The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime is doing just that. Today the Ad Hoc Group is governed by a 15-member board of directors, and it is at the forefront of a community-based effort to do something about escalating crime and violence in Kansas City. The following is a synopsis of the programs and activities of the Ad Hoc Group:

Reward Fund Commission

Donations are accepted to go into a reward fund set up to be paid to persons who provide information which helps solve a particular crime.

Secret Witness Hotline and Victim/Witness Assistance Program

A 24-Hour telephone hotline is provided for persons who have witnessed a crime or who have information about a crime, to anonymously report information which leads to an arrest and conviction in exchange for a reward. The Victim/Witness Assistance Program offers support to victims and witnesses of violent crimes and recommends the use of reward funds to relocate victims and offer minimal assistance.

Interpersonal Violence Reduction Project

Seeks to reduce violence in the community by providing conflict resolution training to persons prone to violent confrontations. Separate groups are available for youth and adults.

Crisis Intervention Project

Mediates disputes between high school youth and families, in cooperation with the Human Relations Department.

Youth Information and Drug Abuse Hotline, 861-SAVE

Provides help for troubled young people who want help with drugs, alcohol or gang problems, through cooperation and with a grant from the Kansas City School District. Youth can call collect from any pay phone for information about drugs or violence.

VI. SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO GANGS AND DRUGS*

by Deborah Lamm Weisel

The twin problems of gangs and drugs are not a new phenomenon in San Diego, an urban area (1.1 million population) that sprawls southward along the Pacific Coast to meet the northern border of Mexico. Gang problems mostly developed in the mid-1970s; drug problems, particularly the sale and use of crack cocaine, exploded between 1984 and 1987.

The local law enforcement community in San Diego has responded to the problems of gangs and drugs in five key ways. First, the municipal police agency, San Diego Police Department (SDPD), which has primary responsibility for law enforcement, maintains a Narcotics Unit for addressing street-level drug activity and a separate Street Gang Detective Unit for investigating gang activity. Second, the department has charged its line personnel with responding to problems that occur on the street. The chief of police is committed to neighborhood-oriented policing, in which patrol officers are front and center in the agency's response to any community problems.

Third, a countywide Narcotics Task Force, made up of representatives from local police and sheriffs' agencies, working in cooperation with federal agencies, handles problems related to drug trafficking. Fourth, the San Diego District Attorney's Gang Prosecution Unit, which includes SDPD gang detectives, coordinates gang-prosecution efforts, from inception to disposition.

Fifth, the SDPD coordinates a number of proactive efforts designed to intervene in what

*The field work for this case study was conducted in late 1991 and early 1992. The titles of some individuals and the names of persons holding particular positions may have changed since then. Unless otherwise noted, quoted statements were made by the person indicated during interviews conducted as part of the field work.

As Hispanic gangs were evolving in San Diego, black gangs began to emerge in the city. It is commonly believed in San Diego that black street gangs were "exported" from nearby Los Angeles as part of a "resettlement" of Crips factions by probation and parole officers. These relocations are believed to have occurred about 1972. It was during this period that street gangs began to increase at an alarming rate in the county of San Diego. In 1975, police estimated that there were three gangs and fewer than 300 gang members. By 1992, police had documented more than 4,000 active gang members, who ranged in age from 13 to 25 years.

Contrary to popular belief, more than 70 percent of the members of so-called youth gangs are adults, that is, individuals over the age of 18. The city's 40 currently documented gangs also reflect greater racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity than is often assumed. The majority of the city's "gangsters," as police call the gang members, are Hispanic (approximately 45 percent) or Black (approximately 40 percent), although Asian participation in gang activity has accelerated. There has been a noticeable rise in the number of Indo-Chinese, white, and Filipino gangs, which currently account for about 15 percent of all gang membership. The city itself is predominately white (59 percent); the remainder of the population is Hispanic (21 percent), Asian (11 percent), black (9 percent), or "other" (0.6 percent).

Recently, some dimensions of gang-related violence have risen to new heights, although the numbers are not unidirectional. From 1987 to 1988, the number of documented gang-related homicides rose 250 percent (from 8 to 28); more than 90 drive-by shootings occurred in 1988. By 1990, the number of gang-related homicides fell to 12 and drive-by shootings declined to 52.

Other gang-related crime rose during the same period, however. Assaults with a deadly weapon rose 54 percent (from 193 to 296), shootings at dwellings, 94 percent (from 34 to 66), and other

gang-related crimes (including robbery and burglary), 232 percent (133 to 442).¹

Despite the gangs' proclivity for violent activity, police believe most gangs have little formal organizational structure; members simply follow the leadership of the boldest in the group. In general, the gang organization is tiered according to the members' degree of commitment to a criminal life-style and their criminal sophistication. Police categorize gang members as hard core, active participants, or peripheral members (often called wanna-be's). The latter group adopt the external manifestations of gang membership but are generally not fully immersed in the gang culture.

Based on crime data, gang members participate in a wide range of criminal behavior, from misdemeanor incivilities that create the need for police intervention to property and violent crime. Generally, police believe the city's black gangs are most involved in drug sales. The black gangs also participate in strong-armed robbery, burglary, and auto theft, as well as a pastime known as mad driving, in which a gang member steals a car, smashes through a store window, and steals as much merchandise as possible before the police arrive. Asian gangs often participate in residential robberies, auto thefts, and extortion from other Asians. Among the Asians, Filipino gangs engage in recreational drive-by shootings, not related to drug sales or neighborhood protection. Vietnamese gangs engage in auto theft and home invasions. And Hispanic gangs participate in drug use (particularly PCP) and sell small quantities of drugs (often heroin and rock cocaine), but usually only within the neighborhood and to selected outsiders.

A dramatic change occurred in the composition of gangs in San Diego in the 1980s. Police attribute much of the change to several factors, in particular, the city's proximity to Los Angeles, its preeminence as the site of an international airport and its proximity to Mexico, its

strong year-round tourist industry, the presence of numerous naval and other military installations dominated by males under the age of 25, and the number of major universities in the area. Because of these factors, there was a ready market for drugs and large quantities of easily available narcotics for street-gang drug traffickers.

Detectives in the SDPD believe that gang members became involved in the sale of rock cocaine about 1982 and that the nature of gang problems began to change with the increase in popularity of crack use. Some of the black gang members established sophisticated drug organizations that yielded enormous profits for the gang members involved, which they began investing profits in high-powered weapons, expensive vehicles, mobile telephones, countersurveillance equipment, and real estate.

The largest gangs in San Diego are the West Coast Crips and the East Side Piru. The West Coast Crips have about 440 members, 98 percent of whom are black. The Crips' major rivals are the 5-9 Brim, the East Side Piru, and Lincoln Park, all factions of the Bloods. Crips engage in a great deal of property crime, and some members mature into drug sales, armed robbery, and murder.

The Crips are believed to have been the first black street gang to operate in San Diego after the relocation from Los Angeles of a paroled gang member in the early 1970s. The animosity between factions of the Bloods and the Crips was cemented about 1976, when a major interstate highway (I-805) dividing the city was constructed. Following the opening of the highway, all Crips on the east side of the roadway joined Piru or Blood factions, and most Crips factions established themselves and their territory on the west side of the highway.

The East Side Piru gang has about 285 members, most of whom are black; a few

Hispanics and Samoans are also members. This gang is primarily involved in property crime and street and commercial robberies, especially of grocery stores. The gang became the major supplier of rock cocaine in the city, although the drug of choice for many of its members remained marijuana.

Other gangs in the city include the Linda Vista Crips, an ethnically mixed gang known for its violence toward other street gangs and the police; the Oriental Killer Boys, a group of about 65 Vietnamese and Laotian males, who engage heavily in auto theft; Sherman, a 180-member, predominately Hispanic gang engaged in the sale and use of heroin, cocaine, PCP, and marijuana. Logan, a Hispanic gang believed to have existed since the 1940s, has about 175 members, who engage in assaults, drive-by shootings, and murder.

THE SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Background

The SDPD's response to gang problems has occurred within the organizational context of the department and the sociopolitical dynamics of the city. A major factor in how the department responds to any long-term crisis is the scarcity of human resources. Currently, the department has a staffing ratio of 1.63 officers per 1,000 citizens, compared with the national average of 2.3 per 1,000. With some 1,800 officers and 700 civilians, the need to allocate scarce resources efficiently drives much of the decision making in the police department. It is a task that routinely challenges police department managers in responding to the city's short- and long-term crises, those which grab headlines and capture the interest of residents in the city's diverse neighborhoods. "Everywhere we go, people want more police officers," says LeRoy

Brady, who as special advisor to the chief, coordinates much of the department's outreach efforts to facilitate community input into police operations. "The perception is that if we had more [officers], crime would be better, and I can't dispute that."

Among the nation's top 10 cities, however, San Diego fares fairly well in terms of crime. For example, the city is ranked sixth in population but tenth in the number of homicides (135) in 1990. This rate of .12 homicides per 1,000 population contrasts with Detroit at .53 per 1,000 residents, for example.²

"We certainly have a gang problem in this city," says Robert Burgreen, chief of police since 1988. "Clearly I hear that message, [but] it's not out of hand in this city." Burgreen believes that San Diego is a relatively safe city. Overall crime in the city in 1990, in fact, was down by 1.4 percent from 1989, and Index crimes were down 4 percent. The decline, the first decrease since 1983, was driven by a reduction in property crime, which accounted for most of the crime in the city. From 1989 to 1990, however, violent crime rose significantly--19 percent; robbery and aggravated assaults increased markedly. Police attributed the rise in violent crime to the volatility of drug abuse and sales in the city, much of it linked to a proliferation of gangs.³

Organizational Strategies

Given current crime problems and scarce resources, the department's chief executive is committed to responding directly to the community's problems. Burgreen, as noted, is an ardent advocate of neighborhood-oriented policing, and he has dedicated some 70 sworn personnel to address community problems. To find those officers, in early 1992 Burgreen effectively

dismantled the department's Special Enforcement Unit (SEU), a walking patrol of more than 40 uniformed officers charged with proactively targeting gang problems throughout the city. The SEU had subsumed a similarly sized group (including many of the same personnel), the Walking Enforcement Campaign Against Narcotics (WECAN) unit, which had been formed during the height of the crack epidemic in the late 1980s. The department had also maintained a special border patrol unit, which was disbanded and loosely restructured into the WECAN unit.

The organizational changes and concomitant birth of successive special units reflect a changing view of the nature of city's problems over the years. "The focus shifted from one ill to another--from drugs to gangs," says one of the department's supervisors. Ten years earlier, for example, according to a deputy chief, the department stopped detaining aliens, a practice that had been a major police activity.

Burgreen has recognized the tendency of the department to create special units to respond to community crises. Such special units are often the result of political influence emanating from either the city council or the mayor's office. But Burgreen views the specialization of police agencies as problematic, particularly, when it comes to interdepartmental communication. "[Communication] is always a problem when you specialize," says Burgreen, who has spent recent years reorganizing and flattening the agency's hierarchy in order to enhance communication and management. The most recent reorganization followed a thorough review in late 1991 of roles and resources throughout the agency. "Now I'm hearing [concerns] much better. The more you can decentralize, the more you can communicate," Burgreen says.

Burgreen's recognition of the difficulties associated with specialization complements his commitment to neighborhood-oriented policing: "I want problem-oriented policing and

neighborhood-oriented policing to become the way we do business, not just an experiment." Another key part of Burgreen's vision is the department's commitment to the community, a view closely akin to that of his long-tenured predecessor, William Kolender. Burgreen interacts extensively with the community by conducting "town hall" meetings throughout the city. The meetings, held at community or recreational centers, churches, and schools, provide an opportunity for the chief to talk directly with citizens, sharing his vision and listening to their complaints or concerns.

Burgreen's openness with the community is reflected in the department's policy of working with the local media. The policy, for example, encourages patrol officers to participate in interviews with local media. (Officers spend three hours in the training academy on "How to Survive an Interview.")

Burgreen has not been free of political and community pressures to respond to the various problems that have erupted during his tenure. Media coverage has often fed these pressures, particularly in regard to gang activities. At the same time, media coverage has also spread the word about successful antigang police initiatives, including one in 1991: [operations] were highly praised by community leaders because they brought peace and control back to the streets."⁴

The public and political attention to antigang efforts has led the police to guard against being overzealous in their enforcement efforts. One deputy chief, for example, notes that the department "must be careful not to give too much attention to specific groups," especially Hispanic groups, for fear of appearing to be ethnically biased in its enforcement efforts. Thus, antigang tactics, such as saturation patrols of certain neighborhoods, must be carried out carefully in order to maintain support from the communities, notes the deputy chief.

The chief's close relationship with City Manager Jack McGrory has enabled him to handle pressure from the public and political figures. McGrory, previously an assistant city manager in charge of police services, did not appoint a deputy to that spot when he was promoted to city manager. Instead, he continues to work closely with the police department on many pressing issues, maintaining familiarity with both individuals and politics within the agency. Although some SDPD personnel think that McGrory takes too active a role in running the department, it appears that the relationship between chief and city manager is symbiotic. Burgreen has made clear his intentions to remain at the helm of the police agency for only five years, positioning himself to retire in 1993.

THE SDPD'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO GANGS

The SDPD has been concerned about gang problems in the city since at least 1974. That year, the department appointed one of the agency's School Task Force officers to monitor the activity of gangs and car clubs. In 1975, the department formed the Gang Enforcement Team, staffed by four officers, to monitor car clubs and gangs. By 1978, some 25 street gangs, with an estimated membership of about 1,500, had been identified in the city. In response to growing problems with gangs, the department expanded its special unit to include a supervisor and 10 plainclothes officers and renamed the squad "Group Activities Section." The objective of this unit was to gather intelligence, identify individual gang members, and monitor gang activity. In the early 1980s, the unit was renamed the "Gang Detail" and its officers were given detective status. The mission of the unit was expanded to include responsibility for investigating all gang-related incidents.

In 1989, rising gang violence and several well-publicized gang-related incidents, including the killing of a police officer, led the department to form its Special Enforcement Division, a 109-officer unit staffed with gang detectives (21), SWAT personnel, the Special Enforcement Unit mentioned above(40), School Task Force officers (16), mobile police station officers (7), and a motorcycle unit. Noteworthy was the creation of the SEU, 36 uniformed officers and 4 sergeants, designed to target gang- and drug-related violence, particularly drug-related drive-by shootings. For nearly three years, SEU personnel worked hand-in-hand with the gang detectives in the division to augment their resources and maintain a high-visibility profile. The division had included gang detectives among its personnel in order to form a single command and enhance communication, but the separation of gang detectives from other investigatory units made some internal communications more difficult. By early 1992, as part of the chief's move toward less specialization and more community-based efforts, the department disbanded SEU, reuniting street-gang detectives with the Investigations Division and sending the uniformed gang officers back into patrol districts to augment the department's neighborhood policing effort.

Street Gang Detective Unit

Despite the organizational transformations that have occurred over the past decade and a half, the department's Street Gang Detective Unit has been a continuing factor in targeting gang problems. Each gang detective is assigned responsibility for a number of gangs, based on the gangs' common ethnicity, and handles a case load of about 10 cases. Cases normally consist of reported crime incidents, which the detectives investigate. The unit is considered reactive (the SEU had been proactive).

Unlike some other major cities, San Diego does not maintain an automated data base on gang members. Instead, gang detectives keep a manual archive, in which information on individual gang members and photographs are filed. Information from patrol officers, often gained through field interviews, is also used to augment the files on gang members. Patrol officers can request information from the file, and homicide detectives often request information about known associates and other data kept in the file. To be included in the file, a gang must meet the department's formal definition of a gang: (1) It must have a name. (2) It must claim a territory, turf, or neighborhood. (3) Its members must associate internally with each other on a continuous basis. (4) It must be involved in criminal activity. Each of these conditions must be met before a gang can be documented.

Gang detectives use a variety of tactics to carry out their investigations depending on the type of criminal activity involved. A prevalent activity among gang members is drug sales, although local experts vary in their opinions about the extent of gang involvement in drug distribution in San Diego. Most citizens and many police see a close link between gangs and drugs in the city. The two are "inextricably intertwined," although "gangs aren't responsible for all drugs in the city," says Assistant Chief Dave Worden.

"Most gangs do deal in narcotics, but not vice versa," echoes Capt. Kraig Kessler, commander of the city's Southern Division and former commander of the Special Enforcement Division. "Drugs and gangs are synonymous," says Assistant Chief Norm Stamper. "What we know about gangs is that gang members do other crimes and then sell some drugs in their spare time."

Two pieces of evidence shed light on the claim of the link between drugs and gangs.

Arrests of gang members for narcotics violations numbered 971 for 1986-87, approximately 9 percent of all felony drug violations. And a 1989 study of documented gang members who were on probation in the city revealed that 75 percent had drug convictions.⁵

The involvement of gangs in drug activity provides an opportunity for police. Despite the diversity of gang-related criminal activity, "Narcotics is an easy way (for police) to get into the gang," says Kessler. By using an undercover officer, police are easily able to infiltrate gangs, but often only black gangs. Asian gangs, such as Oriental and Vietnamese gangs, are more difficult to penetrate because of language barriers and because they are more closed to outsiders. The department also lacks the cultural diversity among its personnel to infiltrate these ethnic gangs.

Other infiltration tactics, such as sting operations, are also used. For example, police once set up a "chop shop" to front for stolen automobiles; it provided access to gangs engaged in auto theft. Conversely, tactics such as surveillance of a single gang member, regardless of ethnicity, are rarely used because of the extensive human resources necessary to carry out an effective surveillance effort. The investigatory unit's approach is largely to identify an illegal activity gang members engage in and work on that specific activity, using documentation of gang affiliations and other intelligence information to develop leads for investigation.

Management of the investigative gang unit presents some challenges to supervisors. Gang detectives are not evaluated in terms of quantifiable activities. Instead, supervisors look at such factors as the detective's cooperation with other departments, the thoroughness with which cases are presented, the detective's success in getting cases issued, and punctuality. "They've never emphasized numbers," says Det. Joe Howie.

Supervisors also look at the role of the investigator. For example, Det. Felix Aguirre and another detective are responsible for all Hispanic gangs in southeast San Diego, groups that engage in drive-by shootings, stabbings, assaults, and intergang conflict. The pair serves as a resource to detectives based in division stations. "We monitor, document and know the gangs--no one else knows them like we do," says Aguirre. The unit's primary mission is to gather intelligence, investigate gang-related incidents, and document gang members.

Gang-related activity throughout the city is tracked by the Street Gang Detective Unit, not the department's crime analysis unit. Jack Freitas, a detective in the gang unit, uses the Argis computer system, which is accessible by all local law enforcement agencies, to make gang information available within the department and to other agencies. The system identifies matches on individuals for any law enforcement contact and is known as "Officer Notification System." Data in the system include results of field interviews, arrests, incident reports, and jail censuses, says Freitas.

As part of the data management and quality control process, Freitas reviews all violent crime reports daily, an average of 75, that involve a member of a minority group. The distinction by race is a reality for the city: "We don't have [any documented] white gangs," says Freitas. Although the incident reports have a box for officers to indicate the incident is gang related, Freitas believes the boxes often go unchecked. Thus, he is alert to any potential evidence of gang involvement in a crime, and he uses the information to update files and passes it along to appropriate detectives.

Role of Communication and Coordination in Gang Operations

Communication is important in the operations of the gang unit, and procedures for internal and external communication are set out in written policies and procedures. For example, members of the unit engage in public outreach to community and school groups, the media, and others. Gang detectives also regularly present information to citizens and other law enforcement officers (e.g., at patrol line ups) on key issues, including how to identify gang activity. Because of time restrictions, such presentations are often squeezed in on a detective's personal time. Most detectives make five or six presentations a month.

The gang detectives unit maintains internal communication through several mechanisms. A gang incident log is one means of exchanging information. "The formalized point of contact is this book," says one sergeant. Information is also frequently exchanged informally, for example, when personnel run into each other.

For new gang detectives, members of the unit prepare a resource document. The compendium profiles all the major gangs in the city, including common locations, rival gangs, graffiti used, and documented number of members. The unit also developed an overview of street gangs in the city called, "Street Gang History," to provide information and a historical perspective to new gang detectives.

Despite the prominent role of the gang detectives in the SDPD's response to gang problems, Chief Burgreen articulates a clear vision of the functional responsibility of special units. He views special units as serving as referral points to the beat officer. The department is organized into division patrol commands, each managed by a patrol captain. This captain, suggests Burgreen, is equivalent to a mini-chief of police and has the authority to address problems within that division as appropriate. Thus, from beat officer to investigator, the captain

has the latitude to use resources to meet divisional objectives.

Gang detectives are highly supportive of that vision. "As far as I'm concerned, the beat officer is the key" to addressing gang problems, says Detective Aguirre. Thus, the presentations by gang detectives at line ups can facilitate communication between line and detective personnel. Detectives are also required by written policy to maintain regular contact with administrators and patrol officers in relevant command areas.

To increase officers' knowledge of gang problems, personnel from the gang detective unit also teach at Advanced Officer Training, a four-day program all officers must attend. Two hours of this training are on gangs in San Diego. "We tell them how to identify gang members, how to understand graffiti and ... how to contact us," says Aguirre. Despite their efforts, Aguirre thinks there is a wall between investigators and patrol officers, which he tries to overcome. For example, Aguirre routinely monitors the radio to identify and assist in potentially gang-related incidents.

Getting a job in the gang detectives unit is considered desirable by many line officers. Supervisors respond by trying to pick what they call "good" officers, that is, those who use little sick time, write good reports and submit them on time, require little supervision, and are self-motivated. Historically, line officers try to provide or request information from gang detectives, at least partly because it enables them to make a connection they can follow up on later in an effort to earn a spot in the unit. Some patrol officers, for example, routinely carry cameras to snap photographs of gang members to add to the detective units gang file.

Other units in the agency also have responsibility for gang-related problems. The department's Narcotics Unit, as mentioned, has primary responsibility for addressing street-level

drug problems in the city. Potentially conflicting responsibilities of units are coordinated through supervisors. For example, lieutenants of all units meet daily to discuss operations, including informing one another about operations currently under way. This communication was particularly important between Narcotics and Street Gang Detectives while the two units were separated divisionally; the department's recent reorganization rejoined these two units in the Investigations Division, which facilitates communication. Communication between the two units is often informal; however, whenever gang detectives are working on a gang involved in drug activity, their directive is to work with the Narcotics street team, points out Detective Howie of gang detectives.

Communication is less critical but still important with the countywide Narcotics Task Force, which merged all city and county narcotics units with personnel from the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs Service. The unit focuses on wholesale drug activity. Communication among the various specialized units is facilitated through the use of a Narcotics Information Network, in which investigators enter addresses and subjects' names to avoid conducting simultaneous investigations.

Joint Investigations with District Attorney's Office

The San Diego District Attorney's Office also takes an active role in addressing gang problems in the city. The District Attorney's Office began its systematic efforts to address gang problems with a \$250,000 grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 1990. The grant proposal laid out a plan for conducting vertical prosecution of gang members. The effort was launched with a major operation conducted in tandem with the police department, called Blue

Rag, which was designed to focus on members of the Crips gang in the city. This special investigation lasted about five months and netted more than 75 indictments. A subsequent operation, Red Rag, targeted hard-core Bloods gang members. Operation Bandanna, conducted in late 1991 and 1992, was a similar operation directed at Hispanic gangmembers.

As a result of these focused joint investigations, many gangmembers were arrested. Most of the original members of the West Coast Crips were taken into custody as a result of Operation Blue Rag. "We have been really successful in solving black gang crime," says Detective Howie. Gang detective Lt. Dennis Gibson agrees: "We were successful with the arrest and prosecution of black gang members because of their involvement with drug deals."

The operations above were part of a multiagency investigation and prosecution effort designed to disrupt gangs by targeting hard-core and violent gang members. Red Rag, for example, targeted hard-core gang members belonging to 8 of the city's 10 black street gangs involved in drug trafficking. The strategy of the operation included four key elements:

- . A gang member was identified and used as a confidential informant.
- . An integrated vertical prosecution team was organized, including assistant district attorneys who participated in the planning process to ensure solid felony drug sales cases. This team maintained responsibility for coordinating all evidence.
- . Video corroboration of undercover purchases was arranged by installing a video camera in the rear of the informant's car.
- . Arrangements were made to use state grand jury indictments thereby avoiding the time-consuming preliminary hearings usually required for such cases.

The operation was carried out by establishing a buy pattern for each day of the operation, providing buy money to the confidential information, and briefing the informant about targets for the buy. Police personnel conducted loose surveillance of the confidential informant, relying

on the two-hour videotape in his car to monitor and record both his activity and the controlled buys. At the conclusion of the buys, personnel conducted a debriefing of the informant, which included marking evidence and photographing the informant with the evidence. The team maintained a log with all information related to the individual buy, including date, time, and amount of drugs involved.

An important element of the investigations was that targets were often known only by their street name. Thus, after a completed buy on a target, police would conduct field investigations to verify the identities of the targets or have officers view photographs from the field interviews in order to identify them.

Based on their formally specified goals, the directed operations have been extremely successful. For example, in the Red Rag operation, the team conducted 149 buys from 121 gang members over 90 days in the fall of 1991, at a cost of \$21,000, primarily for rock cocaine. All the cases were reviewed by the District Attorney's Gang Prosecution Unit and 102 cases were filed. All of the defendants pleaded guilty and 77 suspects were indicted. Judges were briefed in advance and probation officers began revocation procedures immediately. Only two defendants were able to get out on bail.

A key player in the multiagency vertical prosecution effort has been Keith Burt, who heads the Gang Prosecution Unit for the District Attorney's Office. The unit was formed in 1981 when the police chief (William Kolender) called the district attorney: "We've got a great gang unit but when our cases get the to the D.A., they die," Kolender is reported to have said.

In its early days, the prosecutor's gang unit spent a lot of time with police gang personnel, riding with officers to "learn the ropes" of gang activity. Conviction rates climbed

from 37 percent to the 88-90 percent rate of the past 10 years, says Burt. At first, the unit had to beg cases away from other assistant district attorneys to build a case load. Now, the unit's case load is extremely heavy, and prosecutors take only those cases with a good chance of ending in a conviction. "The key to a successful (prosecutors) gang unit is a reduced case load," says Burt. "Previously if a witness called, we would go over and hold their hand even if there were no danger." Time restrictions have since halted that practice. Still, prosecutors claim they are available 24 hours a day and asked to be "called out" by police to the scene for major gang-related incidents. "You cannot underestimate the value of having a D.A. at the scene when the scene is hot," says Burt. The unit currently has about 23 members, including 9 attorneys, 6 investigators, at least 1 police officer, and support staff.

Working jointly with the police department and other agencies has proved valuable to the District Attorney's Office. "We could never do a thing like this [by ourselves] and get rid of 200 people at one time," says Burt. Despite the apparent strengths of the collaborative approach, relations with the police department have not always been smooth. Difficulties have centered around access to resources, supervision of personnel, and related issues. Nonetheless, both agencies are committed to the approach and plan to continue cooperative efforts.

Other SDPD Antigang Activities

The antigang efforts of the police department are not solely enforcement oriented. Juveniles out of Gangs is a three-week, add-on curriculum to DARE that teaches youths how to resist peer pressure and other practical antigang tactics. The city council has been supportive of the department's DARE initiative and has mandated an expansion of the program, which uses

uniformed but unarmed officers to provide a 17-week antidrug curriculum in elementary, middle, and junior high schools. Competition among police personnel for participation in DARE is stiff. Prospective candidates are interviewed using a structured questionnaire designed to determine whether prospective DARE officers have the skills needed to interact effectively with young people. In the Juvenile Intervention Program, another proactive effort, officers counsel parents and first-time juvenile offenders.

Additionally, the department's School Task Force consists of 2 sergeants and 13 officers responsible for enforcing laws at the city's 59 secondary schools. The focus of this effort is predominately drugs and gangs. "Gangs are probably our major focus," says Sgt. Bob O'Donnell, although the task force directly handles minor narcotics problems. Major problems are referred to the department's Narcotics Unit.

Like many other police agencies in the nation, the San Diego Police Department has struggled for several years to find the right organizational strategy for addressing drug- and gang-related problems that have taken hold in the city. The struggle has included revamping the organization several time and experimenting to find the right approach. The constantly changing nature of gang and drug problems has contributed to the challenge of determining the best use of scarce resources. "The common wisdom on gangs changes from one year to the next," says one gang expert. To stay abreast of the changing panorama of gang-related misconduct in the city, the department has shown itself willing to experiment and use alternative approaches to address well-entrenched although volatile problems related to drugs and gangs.

NOTES

1. San Diego Police Department, "Street Gang Statistics," undated.
2. San Diego Police Department, "Quarterly Crime Briefing," a report to the Public Services and Safety Committee, February 6, 1991.
3. Ibid.
4. San Diego Police Department, "Street Gang History," undated.
5. Office of the District Attorney, "Urban Street Gang Drug Trafficking Enforcement Demonstration Project," proposal to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, 1990.

VII: Conclusion: Summary of Findings

Based on the study of police responses in four selected cities of San Diego, Chicago, Kansas City, Austin and the metropolitan county of Dade, FL, it is clear that gang problems in the nation vary widely from one city to another as well as within cities. This finding is important for it suggests the importance of crafting individual responses rather than ubiquitous strategies. Given the wide variation in gang problems, comparisons among cities and police agencies are elucidating although not of tremendous utility. Consider, for example, that the range of gang members in the five jurisdictions studied in this project varies from several hundred in Kansas City to more than 4,000 in both San Diego and Metro-Dade while estimates range from 12,000 to 120,000 in Chicago. Even when examining jurisdictions with similarly sized service populations this variation exists: Austin and Kansas City are roughly equivalent in size with around 450,000 population each, while San Diego and Metro-Dade serviced populations of 1.1 and 1.3 million, respectively; Chicago stands in a league of its own with a service population of some 3 million. Sworn officers for populations were relatively consistent with population size: with San Diego at 1,882 and Metro-Dade 2,500; Kansas City, 1200, and Austin 770; while Chicago, has more sworn personnel than the four other departments combined at 12,000 officers (4:1,000). Given the additional wide variance between agencies in terms of agency and population size, as well as the scope of its gang problem, it is not unexpected that as many differences as similarities appear in a descriptive review of the responses of agencies to their local gang problems.

Gang Activity

Ethnic variation among gangs is a distinguishing characteristic in all of the cities studied. Ethnicity of gangs was used as an organizing characteristic by most of the police departments studied. For example, Black and Hispanic gangs were considered most problematic and dominant in Kansas City and Chicago, while Latin (the term used in San Diego) or Hispanic (used in Austin, Chicago and Metro-Dade) gangs were more prevalent in Austin, Metro-Dade and San Diego. In Austin, many members of gangs are racially mixed while most other gangs in other cities appeared to be racially segregated. In discussions, police personnel frequently refer to gangs by ethnicity rather than name and gang assignments in some cities are made according to ethnicity, so that Detective Smith handles only Latin gangs while Detective Jones handles Asian gangs.

The type of criminal activity among gangs also appeared to vary widely. Participation in automobile theft was a prevalent gang activity, for example, in Austin while robberies were of key concern in Metro-Dade. Most gang unit personnel concentrated their investigations on violent crime, making referrals to property crime investigators as appropriate. At least some gangs in each of the cities were perceived to engage in a variety of drug activity, although the nature and extent of the activity varied greatly as did the locus of the department's response to any participation in drug activity.

Despite specific efforts to identify and elaborate on the extent of the nexus between drugs and gangs in these five jurisdictions, it is unclear to what extent such a relationship exists. Information about the connection was only anecdotal and points to the need for further research on this issue. Responding to drug-related problems took precedence over gang-related problems

in terms of the police response in Metro-Dade where the drug problem may be more chronic and more entrenched than in the other cities. In Chicago and San Diego, gang problems existed for many years before drug problems emerged although a heightened response to gangs in terms of staffing had occurred within the last decade for both agencies.

Chicago, San Diego, Austin and Metro-Dade reported participation by gang members in drug trafficking to be much more common among their city's black gangs rather than Latin or other ethnic groups. Narcotics investigations, however, were considered to serve as easy entree to many gangs, ranging from extensive undercover efforts or use of confidential informants to the more pecuniary possession charges to harass gang members. Kansas City's earlier response to gang problems took the shape of responding to drug trafficking being conducted by the Jamaican Posse gang. The department used an organized crime approach, developing a gang-intelligence system targeting upper and mid-level gang members and a coordinated prosecution effort. The San Diego Police Department, in conjunction with the local District Attorney's office, extensively and successfully used narcotics violations to target members of gangs for arrest and prosecution.

Based on evidence collected in this study, it is likely that many gangs are extensively involved in drug trafficking or street drug activity, but, because of the wide variation of activity among gangs, sweeping generalizations about gang activity are misleading. In some places, gangs, drug activity and weapons were nearly synonymous terms; in other areas of the same city, the nexus is much looser, with drug activity peripheral to other criminal activity. In other areas, drugs are merely recreational activity of gang members.

It is important to note, however, the comments of Chicago's gang crimes commander:

"Gangs are changing in the United States and Chicago ... street gangs are becoming narcotics cartels. Youth gangs no longer can be placed in a box and dealt with as they used to be -- they are now crossing over into organized crime involving narcotics...They are heavily armed and in some cases highly organized." While it is clear that at least some gangs are metamorphosing as the commander describes, no data is available to document the nature or extent of this transformation.

Gangs also vary widely in terms of size. In one area of Chicago, there were an estimated 10,000 gang members, most of whom were in five specific gangs. Gang officers kept wall maps defining which blocks were controlled by which gangs. A few of San Diego's largest gangs accounted for several hundred members while most were much smaller groupings.

Gang members were considered to vary widely in age, although police perceptions are that gang members are much older than perceived in previous years. It is rare to hear police speak of youth gangs; many identify local gangmembers as ranging from 12 or 13 years to middle and upper 20s, the former being known as Pee Wees, the latter as O.G.'s for original or old gangsters.

Police consistently reported gangs as being less structured and organized than commonly believed and also reported a range in the sophistication and organization of various gangs. For example, a targeted gang in Kansas City, the Jamaican Posse, was viewed as well-organized and engaging in well-defined criminal activity of drug trafficking.

Many police believe that gang behaviors also vary from common perception. At least some police officers believe that gang members rarely "represent" or wear colors for fear of retaliation or identifying themselves to police (based on information from San Diego, Austin and

Chicago). As reported from Chicago, "being economically motivated, stereotypical activities such as representing, fighting or draw attention are shunned to avoid police attention which would adversely affect income from drugs."

In several cities, gang specialists and patrol officers believe gangs emigrated to their area. Personnel from both Kansas City and San Diego believe their problems with black gangs originated in Los Angeles. Metro-Dade officers attribute the origin of their gang problems to migration from Chicago. Both cities point to individuals who emigrated from these larger metropolitan areas and to named gangs and gang activity. Latin gangs of San Diego and Austin, however, were considered home grown and had existed in the municipalities for many years.

Thus, from the five case studies it has become clear that police increasingly see a wide variation among gangs, particularly a deviation from common stereotyped views of gang members.

Variance in police responses

Consistent with the wide variation in gang problems is a wide variation in police responses to gang problems. Most departments studied used a combination of suppression, intelligence gathering and investigatory strategies. Some departments engage in community relations-type efforts, although such efforts are generally limited. Very few agencies engaged in any identifiable long-term planning processes or conduct research related to the nature of the problem; none provided extensive training to personnel or engaged in meaningful evaluations of effectiveness of specialized or other departmental efforts related exclusively to gang enforcement.

Although departments combined anti-gang strategies (such as suppression, investigations

and so forth), for most departments, particularly those with specialized units, a clear theme is apparent. For example, Chicago's focus is upon suppression; although personnel engage in other strategies as well, suppression is the dominant approach and involves concentrating on the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of gang members. By contrast, San Diego focuses upon investigation, with gang detectives handling primary responsibility for investigations and carrying a case load. The focus in Metro-Dade is upon the collection and dissemination of intelligence information in a collaborative approach to handle the region's gang problems. Austin and Kansas City, the smaller agencies among those studied, reflect more of a generalist approach to gangs and a central focus is less visible although the efforts of both are organized primarily into intelligence gathering and dissemination of information. As departments used various strategies, the number of personnel dedicated to gang activity in departments ranged widely among the agencies studied, varying from one primary person in Kansas City and two gang liaison officers in Austin to more than 450 personnel in Chicago. The large range of personnel reflects both a variance in agency size as well as the focus of the department's effort. Suppression efforts require much more personnel than do intelligence gathering and investigative efforts.

The organizational responses of the departments studied reflect, for the most part, relatively recent changes. Except Chicago, gang units in departments were all formed within the last 10 years. Kansas City began its Gang Task Force in January 1991 for intelligence gathering. The focus of Austin's response developed after a major incident in 1988. Metro-Dade began its current approach in 1988 with the formation of the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force and its Gang Clearinghouse project. Metro-Dade had created a gang unit in 1982 consisting of two detectives; by 1992, the department's response consisted of about 15 centralized detectives and supervisors,

and one or two gang investigators in each of the department's eight patrol districts. San Diego's gang response had consisted primarily of investigators until 1988 when a uniformed assignment more than doubled the department's response. Those personnel, however, were reassigned in 1992. Even in Chicago, which has had gangs since the turn of the century, the department's specialized gang unit was boosted from 100 to 400 personnel in 1982 by Mayor Jane Byrne. As Spergel (1991) reports, gang units "tend to be frequently reorganized or to come under political or community pressures to deal more vigorously with rising gang crime problems..."

A variety of police organizational arrangements to address gang-related problems were evidenced in the study. These included specialized gang units with officers who carried out specialized functions such as investigations, tactical assignments, directed patrol, intelligence gathering and liaison with other agencies, including other law enforcement agencies. Some of these units were centralized while others were partially decentralized. For example, Chicago's large gang unit is divided into three areas of geographic responsibility: North, South and West while Metro-Dade has a small centralized gang unit with additional gang specialists in each of the district stations whose number and responsibilities are left to the discretion of the district captain.

Some departments have a more mixed generalist-specialist or functional specialist approach to gang problems, using personnel from youth division, narcotics, community relations, school resource units, robbery and homicide detectives to each deal with gang crimes. Such units can be centralized or decentralized (for example, Chicago has these divisions in each of the area stations). Some police departments combined the two approaches while others used specialists as support to other units of the agency.

The variation of police organizational responses among the cities studied is consistent with Curry et al (1992), who found that 65 percent of large city (greater than 200,000 population) police departments reporting a gang problem had a specialized gang unit, while among smaller cities (under 200,000), 49 percent had a gang unit.

The findings of the five city case studies are also consistent with Spergel et al (1991), who wrote that "Police approaches [to gang problems] are surprisingly complex and variable, and not easily categorized" (p. 177). The sites in the case studies were intentionally selected for their differences thus the variation in organizational responses should not be considered representative of the universe of responses.

Most departments studied engaged in a range of organizational responses, including several related to mobilization of community support. These programs include anti-gang school curricula (Juveniles Out of Gangs in San Diego) to DARE (Chicago, San Diego, Austin, Kansas City) Task Force Against Graffiti, Join a Team, Not a Gang, Adopt a Wall and extensive use of School Resource Officers (all in Metro-Dade). Three of the five departments have located their primary gang personnel with career criminal units: Austin, Metro-Dade and Kansas City. San Diego previously had a stand-alone Special Enforcement Division but now locates gang detectives within the department's investigative division, while Chicago's gang unit is within the department's special functions bureau.

Austin has not responded with a large specialized unit although the city has 63 documented gangs and 1,900 gang members. The city's police department had handled its historic gang problems with a repeat offender unit and a street crimes unit addressing the special needs of Spanish-speaking victims. In 1988, when the community demanded a special unit and

more officers be dedicated to the problem, the agency's chief reviewed the department to determine the relative contribution of each unit to gang prevention, intervention and suppression efforts and to identify any gaps in service. The review resulted in the merger and renaming of several units and a realignment of responsibilities without launching a special unit. Thus all the gang-related units have remained small and the department's emphasis has been placed upon the collection of information and its dissemination.

An organizational audit in 1992 also lead the San Diego Police Department to change its approach to gang problems, basically shifting officers from a special unit into neighborhood policing efforts, relying on a generalist approach to handle gang problems on the street with gang detectives to investigate specific gang-related crime.

Kansas City has also not responded to current problems with the formation of a specialized gang unit. Instead, personnel focus on collecting gang intelligence for dissemination to patrol officers and tactical response officers (SWAT) in marked units. In Chicago, a recent management study recommended that the police department realign its numerous gang personnel into an investigation section within the department's organized crime bureau. The move would also realign gang specialists into district gang tactical teams and a special task force in order to improve accountability and focus resources within patrol districts (Office of the Mayor, 1992). This proposed approach is similar to the organizational structure in the Metro-Dade Police Department, which combines elements of a special unit and a generalist approach to neighborhood gang problems.

Difficulties with Organizational Configurations

It is speculated that the formation of specialized units may serve to give some credibility to the existence and spread of gangs. Most of the specialized units studied focus on identifying individual gangs and gangmembers and develop systematic counts of both. An important side effect of the formation of specialized gang units is the contribution of the arrangement to difficulties in communication within departments. Although several chief executives view gang personnel as support personnel for patrol, these specialized units are often viewed as elitist, and many patrol officers strive to join these specialized units, which are generally freed from constant demands of handling calls, offer flexible hours to personnel and usually steady shifts, and, importantly, a sense of excitement other than the routine handling of calls for service that characterized the workload of many patrol officers. Gang unit personnel were generally assigned to a detective position, and although the units do not have the perceived status of homicide or other investigative units, the gang unit is seen as entree to more prestigious units.

Communication difficulties were a common theme in each agency studied. Decentralized gang efforts, such as the configuration that exists in Metro-Dade, appeared to least stymie communication between district officers and other specialists, such as school resource officers, with the district gang detective. Centralized efforts, such as San Diego's, despite the fact that gang detectives are formally tasked with communicating with district personnel, appear to make communication more difficult. Some formal efforts at communication are made, such as gang detectives occasionally attending roll calls to inform patrol officers about gang activity; for the most part, these roll call briefings appeared to take the form of a gang detective seeking assistance in locating a particular gang member or other specific information.

In most departments studied, patrol officers appeared to have only peripheral or ad hoc knowledge about gangs. In incident reports, these officers were able to identify gang members if the members self-identified their participation in a gang or identified a gang as an offender in an incident. Otherwise, patrol officers were largely unable to articulate specific information about gangs even in heavily gang-infested areas of their jurisdiction.

In departments with heavy call loads, supervisors reported that patrol officers had little time to identify gang-related incidents because they are under pressure to respond to other calls that are stacked and awaiting a response.

Communication and collaboration between gang units and other specialized units, even narcotics, was seldom in evidence. Most departments had a policy among gang personnel of handling narcotics problems only if the activity involved a small amount of drugs. For example, in Chicago, it was understood that gang specialists were not to target drug activity; the implication being that "running across" drug activity was acceptable but specifically seeking drug arrests was not. There was little evidence of cross-training occurring between any specialized units, such as gang officers offering recognition tips to narcotics officers or vice versa.

Informal communication between most specialized units occurred at ranks above that of sergeant. Unit commanders reported that they would pick up the phone to call other unit commanders if coordination or communication needed to occur. Other formal meetings between units occurred regularly in some cities. For example, San Diego's gang detective lieutenant meets regularly with unit commanders of other investigatory units, including narcotics. This kind of formalized interaction appeared easier within departments with centralized commands located in a single building. In Chicago, for example, gang units and narcotics unit are housed away

from each other and communication is more difficult.

Most departments have mechanisms for formally communicating information through the chain of command. For example, the Chicago Police Department uses a "information report" to pass along specific information through channels. Such information might involve reports of narcotics or gang information observed by a patrol officer in which he or she was unable to make an immediate arrest.

The difficulty of communication and collaboration between the specialized gang units and other personnel within the departments did not necessarily carry over to external communications. For example, Metro-Dade successfully administers the Multi-Agency Gang Task Force as a vehicle to facilitate communication between the numerous metropolitan law enforcement agencies operating in the county. There was a strong emphasis in Austin on interagency collaboration and prevention efforts. Austin also works closely with the District Attorney, departments of probation and parole, using a gang hot line to network with the community. Interagency collaboration was a key focus of the department's anti-gang effort. Similarly in Kansas City, formation of a task force occurred in order to exchange useful information among a wide network. Unlike Austin, Kansas City's effort is very new and its success in collaboration is not yet known.

Reporting variations and accuracy of information

Spergel (1991) suggests much is not known about gangs because of systematic differences in reporting across cities; however, it has become clear that gangs and their criminal patterns differ significantly across and within cities raising doubts about the utility and validity of

standardized reporting of gang problems. Nonetheless, virtually all of the cities studied used incident reporting forms where uniformed officers were tasked with the responsibility of checking a box labeled "Gang Related" or "Gang Motivated." Without exception, specialist gang officers felt underreporting by patrol officers occurred; on occasions, an officer's narrative would describe gang characteristics but the box would not be checked. Most patrol officers said they had no exposure to training in how to identify gang activity such as reading gang graffiti or familiarization with gang signs. Officers in Austin receive two hours of in-service training related to gang recognition and reporting. Two gang liaison officers provide this training. Kansas City recently introduced academy training related to gangs and provides gang awareness training through in-service to patrol officers. Despite the occasional training, gang specialists doubted the accuracy of reporting. Several departments (such as San Diego) routinely manually review the narrative of incident reports (particularly those of violent crimes) to identify possible gang activity. In contrast to the patrol officers, many of the gang specialists took great pride in knowing the individual members of gangs, claiming that police need rapport with the gangmembers in order to accurately document gang affiliation and build comprehensive intelligence files.

Police state that documentation of any gang-related crime also suffers from typical crime reporting problems such as lack of victim cooperation and underreporting of crime. Documentation is also affected by failure to recognize gang association, victim intimidation, false reporting to focus police attention on rival gangs, and other factors that seriously compromise the reliability of documentation.

If the five departments studied are typical, gang reporting is inconsistent and highly

unreliable. Thus national efforts to estimate the scope of current gang problems may be troubled not only by differences in reporting guidelines (such as nonstandardized definitions) but also by variations in the quality of reporting.

All the departments studied had developed and maintained background information about individual gang members and gangs for investigative purposes, using their own standardized definitions of what factors justify the label of gang membership. (Metro-Dade uses a definition included in the state of Florida statutes.) Three of these intelligence files of police departments were automated (Metro-Dade, Austin, Kansas City), while the San Diego and Chicago departments maintained manual files. Austin and Metro-Dade both used an automated system developed for the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office (Gang Reporting, Evaluation and Tracking or GREAT system); Kansas City used Perpetrator Information Center for gang intelligence information. Austin published weekly intelligence bulletins distributing widely.

The intelligence files are used to investigate crimes such as looking for associates of a specific gang member, identifying hangouts, weapons, vehicles and so forth. Many investigators were able to describe cases which were solved quickly because of the information contained within the intelligence files. Importantly, Chicago's files consist only of information directly the result of an arrest of criminal investigation. This limitation upon maintained files results from an interpretation of a 1988 ACLU suit against the department.

Access to intelligence files was restricted to other law enforcement officers and regulated, but access for officers wishing to contribute or tap information was consistently available across all five agencies. Officers, however, were required to have some specific knowledge of what information needed to be accessed, an issue posed as problematic in Kansas City where many

police personnel were new to gang problems.

The findings in this study related to recordkeeping are consistent with other studies. For example, among large cities surveyed in a Curry's study, ninety-seven percent with youth-based organized gang crime problems (consisting of gangs, crews, posses or similar groups) maintained records on the extent of the problems in their jurisdiction. Despite some variation in recordkeeping, the majority of these jurisdictions kept information on groups, individual members and incidents occurring. Of the agencies maintaining records, 89 percent maintain records that were fully or partially automated. Among smaller cities and counties included in the same survey, 62 percent kept records on groups members and incidents, while 20 percent kept partial information. Fully 60 percent of this group had an automated system (Curry et al, n.d.: 16-17).

Evidence of effectiveness

Spergel et al note that "[N]o research evaluations of police efforts in respect to youth gang programs exist... [T]herefore, any analysis of criminal justice system [sic], and in particular police or law enforcement programs, must be largely descriptive and tentative at this time" (1991: p. 177)." All of the departments studied could pose no useful information on their effectiveness, although the District Attorney in San Diego tracked conviction rates, pleas, dismissals and related evidence of effectiveness. Some departments did rely on arrests (Chicago) figures among investigators while others looked at more qualitative information regarding effectiveness (San Diego, Metro-Dade); however, all the departments cited gang-related crime incidents as a bench mark for comparisons of both the extent of the problem and the agency's relative success in addressing the problem.

Austin cited a 20.5 percent reduction in the number of drug-related offense reports and 21 percent reduction in number of offenses while the number of gang-related arrests dropped by 20.6 percent, all from 1990 to 1991. Drive-by shootings fell from 60 to 50 or 16.7 percent.

In Chicago, police in 1990 made 9,074 arrests for gang-motivated crimes including 71 arrests for homicide and 1,601 for felony battery and assault crimes. In the process of these gang-motivated arrests, police recovered some 3,141 guns.

Crime declined in Metro Dade in 1990, the first decline since 1984 and during a period of rapid population growth when other Florida cities were experiencing double digit crime increases. The decline was fed by a reduction in motor vehicle theft (-6.1 percent) and burglary (-3.6 percent). Robbery, considered to be the county's biggest crime problems behind drugs but ahead of gangs, rose 5.2 percent in the one year period compared to a rise of 60 percent over the last 5 years.

Monthly tallies of drive-by shootings in Kansas City have risen steadily since a count was begun in January 1990. By August 1991, the city witnessed 53 shootings in a single month. Kansas City also cites arrests, seizures of drugs, cash, and weapons.

Although San Diego had witnessed a rise in gang-related statistics since 1987, by 1990 some gang-related statistics fell dramatically. Gang-related homicides fell to 12 and drive-by shootings to 52, from 28 and 90, respectively in 1988. Other gang-related crimes, however, increased, including assaults with deadly weapons, shootings and robberies.

Whether the anti-gang efforts used by any of the police departments studied resulted in the various measures of effectiveness cited is of question. Research indicated that departments tended to rely upon available data, sometimes of questionable quality, because it was the only

information available. The reader should be cautioned, however, that this information may be less useful than it may appear at first glance.

Common themes among police responses

Some common themes related to police responses to gangs emerged in each of the cities studied. For example, departments were all subjected to political or community pressure to respond or beef up their responses to gang problems. These pressures were often related to major incidents that occurred within the jurisdiction, such as a well-publicized homicide or major youth confrontations. In Metro-Dade those events included a riot in Tropical Park in 1988 and altercations at the Calle Ocho annual street fair in March 1989. In Austin, the Congress Street shootings in 1990 in Austin showcased major warfare between the Esta Grande Varrio and the Latin Kings. Gang-related killings of police officers occurred in San Diego and Metro-Dade (a South Miami police officer in the latter), standing as crystallizing events in these jurisdictions. The element of violence and potential for spread appears to have significantly raised public attention to the issue and motivated most departments to respond specifically to gang problems. The violence generally took the form of increased assaults, robberies, and homicides, particularly drive-by shootings.

Departments took quite similar approaches to responding to the media on gang-related events. Almost universally, police do not report the names of gangs involved in criminal activity, nor those of victims or offenders. Reporting of the gang or gang members name was oft cited as contributing to the notoriety that gang members often seek. And the reporting was seen as contributing to possible retaliatory actions by other gangs. Similarly, reporting the name

of a gang-affiliated victim was believed to invite retaliatory action by the gang of the victim or affiliated gangs.

All of the departments engaged in some form of community outreach, making presentations to community groups, including how to recognize if a youth had joined a gang and so forth. Sometimes, the gang specialist or detective would conduct this activity. In Chicago, the district Neighborhood Relations sergeant serves this function as do personnel in the department's downtown Preventive Programs Division, although there is no specialized training in gangs or drugs. In Kansas City, one sergeant makes most presentations and disseminates information.

Gang problems appeared to be prevalent in parts of the cities troubled by crime and subject to heavy call loads for police. Because of bidding systems related to seniority for shifts and/or geographic areas, patrol officers assigned to these troubled areas appeared disproportionately to be rookie officers. Thus, the most gang-infested areas of the cities were often policed by personnel with less street experience and, in at least one city, by experienced officers who had been "dumped" by being assigned to the problem area. In other cities, however, patrol officers worked these areas by choice. Descriptions were heard from several officers who wanted "to make a difference" in these neighborhoods.

Directions for Future Research

The course of this study has indirectly raised a number of questions about the efficacy of police responses to gang problems. For example, what is the utility of dedicating extensive police resources to building gang intelligence files, particularly those in which names are not

regularly purged? All cities studied focused their efforts not exclusively upon characteristics unique to gangs but upon networks and participation in criminal activity. Such investigative tactics thus represent activities in which departments would participate regardless of an offender's affiliation with a gang. If "gangness" is unimportant, is much intelligence information thus gathered for rather unclear purposes? The purpose is particularly unclear when the information is not routinely shared with other law enforcement personnel. For example, a comment from an advisory panel member regarding Chicago Police Department's intelligence gathering:

"They can't give it to field officers for use or store it in any meaningful way - so why do it? It has very limited use. Seems like a waste of time and energy under the existing rules and organization."

The importance of sharing information within an agency surfaced in each of the agencies. Many of the personnel in the departments appeared to collaborate more easily with external agencies than with other personnel within their own departments. This difficulty may have been exacerbated when departmental reward structures recognized individual production (that is, arrests) rather than collaborative efforts.

Departments uniformly lacked ways to determine the effectiveness of their anti-gang efforts. Although police articulate some dissatisfaction with citing numbers of arrests, numbers of gangs and gang members, numbers of reported incidents, weapons, drugs and cash seizures, police consistently rely on this data as their sole measure of effectiveness. Given the lack of reliability of gang-related incidents reports, is it useful to document these incidents as evidence

of trends in gang activity? Even with highly reliable data, the simple before and after design implicit in self-declared statements of success is insufficient to document effectiveness with any degree of confidence.

Despite the breadth of knowledge about local gang problems, the police departments studied engaged in little research or documentation of significant facts about gangs, including their participation in drug activity. Do local agencies need more guidance on how to analyze their gang-related problems and resources for identifying appropriate responses?

Further, local knowledge is often interpreted through the lenses of a national paradigm, imposed by news media or other law enforcement agencies. Does this process generate a false consensus about local gang problems that are likely to be quite different? And, if it does, how does that national paradigm shape local policies toward gangs? A national approach may inappropriately lead agencies to adopt national tactics to local problems.

Future studies are clearly needed to flesh out the information collected in this research effort. In future studies, comparisons between cities may be most useful for similar cities but only when there are striking similarities between those cities. This study has determined that gang problems are so widely varied that problems clearly must be disaggregated in order to be of any utility. The research has shown it to be exceedingly difficult to make summary statements that are applicable to more than one or two agencies. Thus, seeking common themes in police responses to these various problems is an exercise in futility. Although there is no evidence of effectiveness, it appears that specific strategies used by police agencies work best when targeted at specific behaviors, locations or individuals. Intuitively, most police personnel can readily describe targeting specific activities yet many agency-wide discussions, reports and policies tend

to generalize widely about gang members and approaches. References to "the gang problem" as a definable issue are common, particularly above patrol level.

The research in this study intentionally looked at diverse settings and manifestations of gang problems, with natural results of identifying diverse responses, there were expectations that some common problems and themes would be identified. Instead, many more differences than similarities were found. Many questions about police responses to gang problems have been raised by these case studies, making a significant contribution to the field and pointing clearly to the need for future research. Such research should definitively include mechanisms for guiding police agencies to analyze their local problems and develop appropriate and measurable responses.

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