
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531 Evaluation of the Community Centered Team Policing Program 1971

Submitted to:

Community Research, Inc.

Transmitted by:

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Social Research and Evaluation Team



The evaluation report on the Department of Police, City of Dayton's Community Centered Team Policing Program was prepared by Wright State University in conformance with the guidelines established by the Dayton/Montgomery County Criminal Justice Pilot City Project. Funding for this evaluation was obtained under Grant #NI 70-092 by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to Community Research, Inc., Dayton, Ohio. The fact that the NILE&JC furnished financial support to the activity described in this publication does not necessarily indicate the concurrence of the Institute in the statements or conclusions contained herein.

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and institutions have contributed towards the completion of this report.

₩ We wish to thank those faculty members of the Social Research and Evaluation Team, Leonard Cargan, Jack Stone, and James Walker, for their contributions.

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Finally, we wish to thank Gary Pence and the other staff members of Community Research Incorporated for their consultation and financial support.

FOREWORD

Dayton/Montgomery County were selected to participate in the pilot cities program in June of 1970. The pilot cities program was implemented by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, as a research and demonstration program. The project provided the local community with a technical assistance/ research team of four professionals who worked with criminal justice administrators and community leaders to identify problems and develop more effective programs designed to reduce crime. The local community is to receive \$500,000 per year in non-competitive "Pilot O" funds for the purpose of supporting demonstration programs.

During Phase I of the pilot cities program, assistance has been provided to local criminal justice agencies in organizing the evaluation components for the demonstration projects developed in Dayton/Montgomery County. In addition, by prior agreement, Pilot Cities assumed the evaluation responsibility for four demonstration projects which had been developed prior to the formation of Pilot Cities. The demonstration projects were:

- 1. Community Centered Team Policing, Grant #70-DF-418
- 2. Community Oriented Conflict Management, Grant #70-DF-292
- 3. Community Service Officer, Grant #PC 3902
- 4. Comprehensive Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation

Program,	Grant	#
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The Pilot Cities team drafted an independent evaluation plan and a statement of work for each of these demonstration projects.

The evaluation plans and statements of work were submitted to, and approved by, the National Institute. The Pilot Cities team then

prepared a Request for Proposal (RFP) which incorporated the approved evaluation plans and distributed the RFP to local universities for bids. Wright State University was selected to evaluate the aforementioned demonstration projects based upon the cost and quality of their proposal.

The Wright State University proposal provided for a Social Coerations Research and Evaluation team comprised of two Economics professors, two Political Science professors, and a Sociology professor. This team approach offered the following advantages: combined knowledge of several social science disciplines; ability to assess impact of all four programs from several points of view; and, reduction in duplication of interviewing and other evaluative efforts.

The evaluation of each of the demonstration programs included four measurement indices:

- 1. Determining if the programs are functioning as stated, i.e., was it possible to establish the program as planned.
- 2. Measuring program performance in some technical sense, such as social benefits social cost-reduction in specific crimes or changes in certain attitudes.
- 3. Exploring alternative methods of accomplishing the stated objectives.
- 4. Discovering any objectives that should have been included.

The results of these four evaluations are now available upon request.

Dayton/Montgomery County Criminal Justice Pilot Cities Project

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Introduction to the Study

Background and Statement of the Problem.

Over the past ten years, the general crime rate has been increasing throughout the United States and increases have been especially marked in large urban centers. At the same time, there has been an alarming disintegration of congenial relations between the police and the communities they serve.

The city of Dayton is no exception in either of these respects. The average crime rate in Dayton has increased over 18 percent during the 1969-70 period. In addition, the out-migration of affluent whites from the central city has left concentrations of the black and white poor. In some communities (particularly black communities) where life styles and attitudes have changed, coupled with a continuation of the traditional policing approach, an ever-increasing isolation and alienation of police from the community has occurred.

The Dayton Police Department has recognized the possibility that the two problems, increasing crime rates and alienation of police from the community, might be interrelated. Working on the assumption that a new organizational structure might increase police effectiveness and at the same time enhance police community relations, a new organizational concept was implemented in the 5th District.

¹Dayton Police Department

The 5th District in Dayton was chosen as an experimental district because it is representative of a large variety of social and economic classes. According to 1970 census data, this experimental district has a population comprised of 20 percent. Blacks, 60 percent renters, 15 percent of the population less than 25 years of age, 17 percent of the households headed by we men and a population density of 3.25 persons per acre. The family income distribution of the population, estimated from an August 1971 survey, included 20 percent of the sampled incomes at less than \$5000, 55 percent between \$5000 and \$12,000 and 22 percent over \$12,000 with 3 percent of the sample not responding to the income question. This heterogeneous social, economic, and cultural community represents an experimental district having diverse opinions on the subject of how police should handle community-police related problems.

In this community three innovative ideas were put to use. The first innovation was to change the function of a police officer from that of a specialist handling only one aspect of a given complaint to that of a generalist/specialist handling all aspects of most complaints (Team Policing). The second innovation was to hire, train and utilize members within the community to perform certain police tasks. (This innovation was part of a larger police program known as the Community Service Officer Program.) The third innovation was to use volunteer services of citizens within the community as assistants in performing certain police tasks, and as extra "eyes and ears in the street" (Neighborhood Assistance Officers.) Three new programs (Conflict Management, Community Service Officers, and Alcohol and Drug Rehabil-

itation), established at the entire city level, will help accomplish the stated goals.

Knowledge of the difference between the traditional police organizational structure and the Team Policing structure is necessary in order to understand why one method of police organizational structure has special units for investigation, traffic control, accident investigation, juvanile aid, community relations, and other special activities. When a complaint is received, several specialists may be called upon in the solution of this one complaint. Although the specialist approach does have the advantage of each officer "knowing" his job, it also has some disadvantages. Additional paper work is involved because of separate reporting at each step. More importantly, however, it does not give a police officer the sense of responsibility for the entire solution of a complaint, nor does it place the responsibility of the solution of a complaint upon any one officer.

In a recent Seattle Police experiment, Rhodes (1970), discusses alternative management approaches to increasing the effectiveness of police departments. Borrowing from Douglas McGregor's theory X and Y concepts (1960), he believes that the key to greater effectiveness lies in the involvement of police officers in the decision-making process at the lowest logical level. He also believes a greater role in the decision making process would lead to higher morale, more productivity and fewer citizen complaints.

The Team Policing concept as described by Angell (1971) and others would place the decision making at the lowest logical level. In addition the Team Policing organizational structure places the responsibility of handling a complaint upon the initial officer at the scene, i.e., it is his responsibility to investigate the complaint. If a situation arises where the officer does not from the needed operational knowledge to proceed with the investigation, he will then call upon one of the team specialists within the district for additional services; thus, the concept of generalist/specialist. Increasing responsibility, following McGregor's theory Y, leads to an increasing capacity by members of the organization to accept and to deal with additional responsibilities.

Because Team Policing involves police officers in decision-making at the lowest logical level, it increases police officers' responsibility and does not fragment the apprehension process.

The results of the Team Policing experiment are expected to provide an increase in police effectiveness and an improvement in community relations over the traditional policing organization.

The policemen handling service calls in the 5th District all volunteered for their assignment. Psychologists from Organization Behavior Institute, Inc., interviewed a total of 80 patrolmen and selected 39 for the 5th District experiment. The variables used to select these men were categorized as follows: a) motivation to become a policeman, b) motivation for volunteering in the program, c) experience, d) verbal facility and 3) attitude. 2 In general,

policemen who were more willing to change their policing practices and viewed their police functions as incorporating broader social involvement were selected. The psychologists concluded that the 39 men selected did not differ significantly from the non-selected volunteers with regards to the above criteria. However, the results of an analysis of age, years on the police force, and mental ability scores would support the claim that on the average the team policing officers are younger, have fewer years of police force experience and scored higher on their mental ability test.

Team members received four weeks of training prior to assuming their police duties in the Fifth District. Two weeks were spent learing the technical skills of investigation and other aspects of police work. One week was spent getting acquainted with the business and social organizations within the 5th District. The fourth week consisted of training sessions conducted by the Organizational Behavior Institute, Inc., a Division of B.F.S. Psychological Associates, from New York. The general objective of the training in the fourth week was to identify psychological factors that could lead to conflict between police and community and develop techniques for resolving those conflicts.

The police officers were organized into four teams. Men selected the sergeants with whom they wished to work, and were assigned to geographic areas, i.e., beats. The officers work three rotating shifts. One shift begins at 11:00 p.m., and ends at 7:00 a.m., the second shift runs from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.,

²A more complete discussion of the specific criteria evaluation procedure and conclusions used to select these officers can be obtained from "Training Police in Crisis Intervention," The Final Report to the Director of Police, Dayton, Ohio, by Myron L. Katz.

³The police officers' evaluation of the crisis intervention training can be found in the "Final Report on the Crisis Intervention Program," The Final Report to the Director of Police, Dayton, Ohio, by Myron L. Katz.

and the third from 3:00 p.m. to II:00 p.m. Each team works a given shift for approximately one week and then will work another shift. The rotating shift was necessary to allow men to follow-up on complaints.

One half of the Team Policing members began their duties in the Fifth District during the week of November 25, 1970 and four weeks later the entire Team Policing organization was operative. The Team consists of Lt. Lyle E. Grossnickle, four sergeants, and 43 patrolmen.⁴

In addition to the police personnel, a Community Co-ordinator, Festus Cassels, was employed to organize and coordinate various police-community group activities. Mr. Cassels has developed a network of communications between the police and social, educational and church groups in the community. The specific programs and their results are referred to throughout this report.

The Objectives of Toam Policing

The Team Policing organizational concept requires that individual police officers have the major responsibility of bringing police calls or complaints to a satisfactory solution. This may require (depending on the call) that the officer(s) must make the initial identification of the complaint, the follow-up investigation, the apprehension and the preparation of evidence for trial. In other words, an officer in the Team Policing experiment is required to answer dispatch calls, investigate crimes, apprehend suspects, recover stolen property, and prepare evidence for trial. Within a given time period these tasks may require the officer to choose, for example, between additional preparation of evidence for court or answering of dispatch calls. A trade-off between tasks is likely and knowledge of these trade-offs are essential if a move toward citywide implementation of Team Policing were to be considered.

One objective of this experiment is to determine the effectiveness of the Team Policing organizational concept of providing police services compared to the traditional organizational concept. Measures of effectiveness used in this study were:

- Total number of dispatch calls answered.
- 2. Increase in clearance of reported Part I and Part II crimes.
- 3. Increase in recovery of stolen property.
- 4. Decrease in apprehension time of Part I crimes.
- Increase in successful prosecution of persons arrested.

After June 1, 1971 four additional patrolmen and one sergeant were added to the team.

Data on the above measures were analyzed for a period of eleven months prior to and nine months during the experiment. For some measures where data did not exist for the previous time period the results in the 5th District during 1971 were compared to other districts.

A second objective of this experiment is to produce a community-centered police structure that is more responsive to and understanding of, meighborhood life styles. Measures of this objective were obtained through community surveys. Specifically, information on changes in community attitude toward the police service, reduction of tesnion incidents and change in rapport with and recidivism of community youth were sought.

Accomplishments of the above objectives within the 5th District could be the result of combined efforts of Team Policing and Neighborhood Assistance Officers. The NAO is a direct involvement of the community with the police and presumably contributes directly to diminishing the distance between police and community. Also, the NAO, by providing particular services, releases regular police officer time for additional service. For the purpose of the evaluation, however, this study will separate the indications of effectiveness as outlined on page 7 and attribute them to the Team Policing organization.

Summary of the Results of the Team Policing Experiment⁵

The two tested objectives of this experiment were:

a) Does the Team Policing organization structure provide police services as effectively or more effectively than the traditional approach? and b) Can the Team Policing approach provide a community-centered police structure that is more responsive to, and understanding of, neighborhood life styles? The effectiveness of the Team Policing organizational concept was compared with the traditional policing organizational structure by using the measures given on page 7.

The average monthly number of dispatch calls answered by the Second, Third, and Fifth Districts prior to (January to November, 1970) and during the experimental time period (December, 1970 through June, 1971) was 2825.8, 2479.4, 2390.6, and 1991.4, 2102.0, 2105.5, respectively (Table 1). Two primary observations are: a) that the number of dispatch calls declined city wide during the period in which the experimental program was operative and b) the relative number of dispatch calls answered changed between the two periods. The officers serving the Fifth District were, relatively speaking, servicing more calls on the average than either the Second or Third District. In addition, the experimental team was performing these services with a smaller percentage of the total manpower than the percentage that these calls represented of the total

⁵ A complete discussion of the results begin on page 16 of this report.

dispatch calls, i.e., their manpower represented about 20 percent of the total police manpower and the number of calls being dispatched in the Fifth District represented about 25 percent of the total calls (Table 2). Also, the officers in the Fifth District did their own follow-up investigation, which in the other districts would generally be done by officers of a specialized detective squad.

An analysis of manpower requirements showed that the same services provided during the experiment, on an annual basis, by 43 Team Policing officers would have required 44.5 manpower units in the traditional policing organization i.e., including both patrolmen and detectives. During June 1971, four patrolmen were added to the experiment increasing the manpower units from 43 to 47.

It appears the community acceptance of the police function is related to their demand for police service. Therefore, as the community acceptance of police increases, so does the need for additional manpower.

In addition to the number of dispatched calls answered, the proportion of crimes cleared was also investigated. Clearance rates for the time period January through November, 1970, i.e., prior to the experiment were compared to the clearance rates during the experimental period. Also, clearance rates of the detective squads for the first six months of 1971 were compared (Tables 3 and 4). The results support the conclusion that the Team Policing organization had clearance rates similar to the prior period in which the traditional pattern was used.

Before reaching a final conclusion on the ability of the Toam Policing concept to increase clearance rates, two facts should be considered: a) the clearance rates of the detective bureau represents many years of investigative experience which has not yet been acquired by many members of Team Policing and b) the experiment did not receive the expected amount of overtime hours nor the additional manpower from the CSO Program because of the city's austerity program.

The value of property lost and recovered was compared.

During the eleven months prior to the experiment approximately
14 percent of lost property was recovered while approximately
7 percent was recovered during the experiment. Again, an improvement in investigative techniques as a result of longer experience can be expected to increase the percentage of recovered property.

Two other effectiveness measures, "minutes required to notify the police" and "minutes required to apprehend the suspect", were compared for the eleven month time period prior to, and the months during, the experiment (Table 5). In general, a mixed pattern of shorter and longer times were observed. Thus for some crimes the officers of the Team Policing organization were notified earlier or apprehended the criminal sooner than the time required during the control period.

Successful prosecutions of criminals arrested by members of Team Policing were compared to the results of the entire police department in 1969 and 1970. Again, the data would support the conclusion that the evidence provided by the officers

within the experiment was no more and no less successful in convicting criminals than evidence that had been submitted in 1969 or 1970 (Table 8). These conclusions are somewhat tentative because of the large percent of Part I crimes which had not some to court as of the end of the data collecting period.

To measure the accomplishment of the second objective, i.e., to produce a community-centered police structure that is more responsive to, and understanding of, neighborhood life styles, this study conducted two community surveys and compared data on the number of criminals by type of crime, age, sex, and race (the latter data was obtained from the Dayton Police Departments).

Programs to accomplish the above objective were developed and coordinated primarily through the efforts of the Community Coordinator, Festus Cassels. Cassels' primary concern was to develop and improve police-juvenile rapport and organize a community information network where citizens having a wide variety of police-related problems could have a channel or means to reduce or terminate these problems. Numerous police-youth activities were conducted under his leadership. Written communications by various persons and groups provide some evidence of increased police-youth rapport within the Fifth District. Other programs were aimed at developing the information network: the family sponsor plan, neighbor councils, and special medical services.

Data was analyzed to determine if juvenile crimes had declined within the Fifth District as a result of instituting the Team Policing organizational structure. The average number of arrests per month and the average number of juvenile arrests

per month has declined during the experimental period (195 total arrests per month prior to and 165 total arrests per month during the experiment, while 49 juvenile arrests per month prior to and 45 during the experiment (Tables 9 and 10). While the average number of arrests per month declined during the experiment the proportion of juvenile arrests to total arrests increased (25.2 percent prior to and 29.1 percent during the experiment). Thus no definite conclusion can be made regarding juvenile rapport.

Two community surveys were taken to determine the community attitude towards the experimental program. Citizens who had made service calls to the police department during the month of February were randomly selected and interviewed during March. The Second District was used as a control district. In general, the two communities viewed police service favorably.

The Dayton residences within the Fifth and Second Districts believe:

- I. That the police respond to their calls within a period of time that they regard as about right.
- 2. That the police serve the public in a courteous and polite manner.
- That the police service was carried out in an acceptable way.
- 4. That the respect for the police was about the same before and after the service call.
- That most of the residents are not dissatisfied with the police service.

On the other hand residents of the experimental 5th District:

- Reported having more difficulty recontacting the police officer responsible for handling their call.
- 2. Believed they were discriminated against more than residents in the Second District.

The second community survey was designed to measure the entire community attitude toward the accomplishments of the experimental police program. Citizens were randomly selected from the Second, Third, and Fifth Districts. Answers of citizens from the Second and Third Districts were used as the control group. The conclusions concerning the attitudes of members from the experimental and control districts were:

- 1. Citizens in the experimental district believed that their property was safer from illegal activities.
- 2. Citizens in the experimental district believed that neighborhood violence was more prevalent in their district.
- 3. A larger percentage of citizens in the experimental district believed that the police in their district were handling community tensions in a manner that they thought police should handle community tensions.
- 4. Citizens rated the members of the Team Policing experiments overall performance higher than did the members of the control district.

The data from the community survey would support the tentative conclusion that the Team Policing experiment has developed, relative to the control districts, a community-centered police structure that is more responsive to, and understanding of, neighborhood life styles. That is, officers of the Team Policing experiment provide, in some respects, the kind of services that the community wanted most.

In summary, the conclusions from this study, based upon evidence collected from the Dayton Police Department and the Dayton community, were: a) the Team Policing experiment has made some notable steps toward the development of a more community-centered police department, and b) the officers of the experiment have achieved measures of effectiveness comparable to achievements

in the prior time period. Specifically, they have:

- 1. Answered more dispatch calls than their counterparts in other districts.
- 2. Achieved an overall clearance rate similar to the clearance rate in the earlier time period.
- 3. Responded and apprehended suspects as rapidly as was accomplished in the earlier time period.
- 4. Achieved an overall successful prosecution rate similar to what was achieved by the entire police department during 1969 and 1970.

Thus, the Team Policing experiment merits continuation. With time the deficiency in clearance rates and property recovered can be expected to improve and thus the total effect of the program will be strongly positive.

Empirical Findings of the Team Policing Experiment

In the previous summary of results, the conclusion that members of the Team Policing experiment achieved an overall performance similar either to their current counterparts in other districts or their past (1970) counterparts within the Fifth District was stated. This section will detail the methodology by which this conclusion was reached. Measures of police effectiveness were, a) number of dispatch calls answered, b) manpower, c) overall clearance rates, d) lost property recovered, e) apprehension time, f) successful prosecutions. Measures for estimating the development of a community center police organization and increased rapport with community youth were obtained from two community questionaires, analysis of the juvenile arrest patterns and personal interviews with Festus Cassels, Community Coordinator within the Fifth District.

The Dispatch Calls

Data on number of dispatch calls answered by the police was collected by district from January 1970 through June 1971 (Table 1) Comparing the Second and Fifth Districts (67,000 and 70,000 population respectively) the number of service calls in the Second District was consistently larger than in the Fifth District during the January to November 1970 time period. However, beginning with December 1970 and continuing through June 1971 the . number of service calls answered in the Fifth District was slightly larger than in the Second District.

The total number of dispatch calls answered from 1970 to 1971 declined in each of the two districts during the January to June period. This reduction in number of dispatch calls may reflect a change in criminal activity or a general reduction in the overall 1971 Dayton Crime rate (estimated at 11 percent decrease). Data in Table 1 on number of dispatch calls would indicate that although service calls answered have, in general, declined from last year, the 5th District has answered more service calls during the December 1970 to June 1971 period than the other districts.

The number of policemen assigned to each district is an important factor in determining the number of dispatch calls answered. In general, the larger the number of available more power, the larger the number of potential dispatch calls that could be answered. The number of policemen assigned to each district, the number of service calls answered and the percentage of each is shown in Table 2. Manpower is defined as the number of police officers available to answer dispatch calls within each district. Manpower to answer follow-up detective analysis is not included except in the 5th District, where the Team Policing officers do their own follow-ups. The data indicates that the experimental team is answering nearly 25 percent of all dispatch calls with approximately 20 percent of the available manpower, and in addition is doing its own follow-ups.

Table I. Dispatch calls serviced by the Dayton Police Department by districts - January, 1970, through June 1971

				· ·		
Month			Distri	ct		
	First	Second	Third	Fourth ^b	Fifth	
1970		(n	umber)			
January February March April May June July August September October November December	1,315 1,199 1,360 1,465 1,605 1,698 1,655 1,670 1,584 1,464 1,220 1,584	2,541 2,200 2,548 2,928 2,956 3,177 3,227 3,305 3,144 2,673 2,385 1,910	2,142 1,910 2,178 2,458 2,702 2,810 2,833 2,995 2,624 2,558 2,064 2,180	837 804 825 940 930 973 1,012 939 877 929 722 825	2,101 1,820 2,030 2,279 2,511 2,607 2,730 2,817 2,637 2,637 2,521 2,244 2,095	
1971						
January February March April May June	1,375 1,347 1,510 1,536 1,619 1,748	1,779 1,754 1,895 1,960 2,237 2,405	1,992 1,775 1,954 2,130 2,269 2,414	715 686 756 778 779 861	1,990 1,778 1,988 2,067 2,355 2,466	
		•				

a Source: Dayton Police Department

bCalls in the Fourth District were from one relief only and included calls from beats that were in the First, Second, and Third Districts during the other two reliefs.

In June 1971, four additional officers were added which changed the dispatched service call-manpower ratios in such a way that officers in the 5th District then represented approximately 25 percent of the total manpower and were servicing approximately 25 percent of the service calls.

A further analysis was made to determine the total number of manpower units required for investigation. A study of investigation hours per crime conducted by Systems Development Corporation, Dayton, Ohio revealed that, on the average, 2.22 hours of investigation time per crime is required. Thus, with an estimated yearly figure of 6768 crimes (see Table 4, 9 month total of 5074) a total of 15,025 investigation hours would have been required. Assuming 2000 man-hours per investigator per year, a total of 7.5 manpower units would be required for the investigation of 6768 crimes.

Last year, 1970, 37 patrolman units, i.e., officers answering dispatch calls but doing no investigation, were used in Fifth District policing. Adding the estimated investigation time of 7.5 manpower units would total 44.5 manpower units. Assuming that the Sergeants and Lieutenant were not available for answering dispatch calls or follow-up investigation, the 43 manpower units originally allocated to the Fifth District was less than the calculated 44.5 manpower units required.

As the number of dispatch calls increased during late spring, 1971, additional manpower units were required. After June 1, the number of manpower units available for patrol and investigation was increased from 43 to 47 men. Assuming under the Traditional Policing organization that 44.5 manpower units of both patrol and investigation could have serviced this increased demand of dispatch

calls, then the 47 manpower units utilized in the Fifth District represents an increase in manpower requirements of 2.5 units.

Clearance Rates and Recovered Property

Clearance rates and percent of lost property recovered were . two measures used in this study to determine the investigative performance before and during the experiment. Data on a) the number of crimes before and after reclassification and unfounded, b) the number of crimes cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared, i.e., the offender and his whereabouts are positively known, but yet cannot be apprehended because of circumstances beyond the control of the police, and c) the dollar value of property lost and recovered within the 5th District for the time period January through November 1970, i.e., an eleven month period before the Team Policing experiment began and December 1970 through August 1971 was compared (Tables 3 and 4).6 A total of 7.068 Part I and II crimes occurred in the 5th District during the eleven month period prior to the experiment, and 5,074 during the nine months of the experiment. The average number of crimes per month was 642 and 564 respectively. If these months can be considered representative of the entire year then it would appear that either fewer crimes were committed within the 5th District during the experiment or fewer crimes were being reported by citizens. Assuming that fewer crimes were committed during the experiment, what are the reasons for the

Table 2. Manpower and dispatch calls answered by the Dayton Police Department by district, January through June, 1971a

	 	······································			
Month and District	Dispatch	calls	Manpowerb		
	(number)	(percent)	(number)	(Percent)	
January First Second Third Fourth Fifth Total	1,375	17.5	28.	18.3	
	1,779	22.7	36	23.5	
	1,992	25.4	44	28.8	
	715	9.1	13.	8.5	
	1,990	25.3	32.	20.9	
	7,851	100.0	153	100.0	
February First Second Third Fourth Fifth Total	1,347	18.5	32	20.4	
	1,751	23.9	38	24.2	
	1,775	24.2	43	27.4	
	686	9.3	12.	7.6	
	1,769	24.1	32	20.4	
	7,328	100.0	15.7	100.0	
March First Second Third Fourth Fifth Total	1,510	18.6	34	21.0	
	1,895	24.4	40	24.7	
	1,954	24.1	44	27.2	
	756	9.3	14	8.6	
	1,988	24.5	32	19.8	
	8,103	100.0	164	100.0	
April First Second Third Fourth Fifth Total	1,536	18.1	34	21.4	
	1,960	24.4	42	25.0	
	2,130	25.1	44	26.2	
	778	9.2	14	8.3	
	2,067	24.4	32	19.0	
	8,471	100.0	168	100.0	

⁶A longer time period to estimate the effects of the Team Policing organization upon clearance rates would have been desirable, however, data was not available at the time this report was completed.

A recent victimization study (not yet available) in the Dayton area may shed some light on this latter question.

Table 2 (continued)

Month and District	Service	calls	Manpower		
-	(number)	(percent)	(number)	(percent)	
May					
First	1,619	17.5	43	21.9	
Second	2,237	24.3	50	25.5	
Third	2,269	24.6	45	23.0	
Fourth	779	8.2	15	7.7	
Fifth	2,355	25.4	43	21.9	
Total	9,259	100.0	196	100.0	
June					
First	1,748	17.7	40	21.2	
Second	2,405	24.3	4.4	23.4	
Third	2,414	24.4	42	. 22.3	
Fourth	861	8.7	15	8.1	
Fifth	2,466	24.9	47	25.0	
Total	9,894	100.0	188	100.0	

bManpower represents the number of police officers that were available for answering dispatch calls. It does not include detective follow-up except in the Fifth District where the officers do most of their own follow-up.

change? Conceivably, the reduction may be attributable to the results of 1) the Team Policing experiment and 2) the Neighborhood Assistance Officers.

Other possible reasons for the lower number of reported crimes per month could have been: 1) Crimes which were reported to members of Team Policing by citizens within the 5th District were not recorded as crimes. There is no evidence to indicate such practice was observed, 2) Federal and State funded drug abuse programs could have reduced drug-related crimes.

The clearance rates of specific crimes by month for the experiment are shown in Appendix A, Tables 1 through 9. Clearance rates were low in December 1970 (18.4 percent) and increased to 30.2 percent by February; however, they declined steadily from March to June (25.5 to 21.7 percent) increased to 24.5 in July but declined to 19.9 in August 1971. The decline in clearance rates during these months were coupled with an increase in the nubmer of dispatch calls answered (1778 in February to 2466 in June, Table 2). Also the Team Policing experiment was depending upon additional manpower from the Community Service Officer (CSO) Program to perform certain police functions within the 5th District. Because of the city austerity program the number of men expected from the CSO program was never realized. These men were notified almost immediately upon arrival in the 5th District that they would be laid off. By July all CSO's were severed; however, four additional patrolmen and one sergeant were added to the 5th District during the month of June. Also because of the city's austerity almost all over-time work had to be denied, thus the officers had to answer an increasing number of dispatch calls and

^aSource: Dayton Police Department

Table 3. Crimes and Value of Property Lost and Recovered in the 5th District, January through November 1970a

	Classif	ication	Clea	red ^b	Value of	Property	
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered	
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)	
	,			7.5			
Homicide	4	4	3	75.0	***		
Rape	30	29	17	58.6	77 0 77	4 450	
Armed Robbery	161	160	57	35.6	31,041	4,458	
Armed-Assault Robbery	17	17	2	11.8	0 1 4 7	7 1 5 7	
Unarmed Robbery	31	30	10	33.3	9,143	3,152	
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	31	30	10	33.3	3	U O	
Aggrevated Assault	146	143	58	40.6	30	U.	
Assault and Battery	533	530	352	66.4	- .	-	
Breaking and Entering			m	70 1	001 766	45 657	
Residence	1,334	1,289	336	38.4	221,766	42,657	47~
Nonresidence	291	284	. 31	10.9	68,927	2,618	1
Vacant Residence	21	21.	4	19.0	925	0 205	
Pocket Picking	17	16	3	18.8	1,263	404	
Purse Snatching	29	29	13	44.8	1,004	599	
Shoplifting	122	122	7 3	59.8	2,644	595	
Larceny		11.		e H	17 200	7 0.50	
Auto	199	194	13	6.7	13,289	1,049	
Buildings	190	186	20	10.8	18,928	1,078	
Residence	.387	371	54	14.6	35,142	11,408	
Money Deposits	25	25	7	28.0	. 889	139	
General	60	5 9	1.1	18.6	16,890	480	
Locked Compartments	847	845	104	12.3	58,233	8,347	
Auto Theft	524	496	87	17.6	466,565	56,568	
Auto Accessory	525	519	37	7.18	15,719	2,940	
	467	443	69	15.6	5,628	705	
Bicycle Theft Arson							
Residence	12	11	5	45.5	230	200	
Nonresidence	5	5	1	20.0	••	en e	
Vehicle	3	3	1.	33.3	•		

Table 3. (continued)

Crimes and Value of Property Lost and Recovered in the 5th District, January through November 1970^{α}

Type of Crime	Classification		Clea	Cleared ^b		Value of Property	
rype or orime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered	
	(num	iber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)	
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	69 61 1	69 58 1	46 33 0	66.7 56.9 00.0	6,672 7,073 2,300	3,682 1,978 0	
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon. Morals	717 79 106	689 77 106	96 69 62	13.9 89.6 58.5			
Narcotics Possession Sales Miscellaneous	38 7 31	38 7 31	23 6 26	60.5 85.7 83.9	<u> </u>	<u>-</u>	
Drugs Possession Sales	9 2	9 2	7 2	77.8 100.0	- -		
Offense Against Family Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	9 5 12 106	9 5 12 105	9 5 4 50	100.0 100.0 33.3 47.6	12	- 0	
TOTAL	7,263	7,068	1,816	25.7	984,316	142,667	

aSource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

^{**}Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

Table 4. Crimes and Value of Property Lost and Recovered in the 5th District, December 1970 through August 1971

The same of Coming	Classif	ication	Clea	ared ^b	Value of	Property
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(do1	lar)
Homicide Rape Armed Robbery Armed-Assault Robbery Unarmed Robbery Unarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault	7 12 140 13 211 23 110	8 11 137 13 211 23 104	7 9 50 1 43 11 85	87.5 81.8 36.5 7.1 20.4 47.8 81,7	38,600 - 10,276 20	1,336 - 325
Assault and Battery Breaking and Entering Residence Nonresidence Vacant Residence Pocket Picking Purse Snatching Shoplifting	326 984 220 32 6 1 78	306 967 220 31 5 1 78	251 165 36 3 - 1 46	82.0 17.1 16.4 9.7 00.0 100.0 59.0	192,225 65,916 2,278 453 482 2,741	5,485 1,669 5 480 78
Larceny Auto Buildings Residence Money Deposits General Locked Compartments Auto Theft Auto Accessory Bicycle Theft	119 164 285 28 33 481 345 404 411	114 160 270 28 31 476 320 401 406	7 17 26 6 6 9 32 18 4	6.1 10.6 9.6 21.4 19.4 1.9 10.0 4.5 1.0	10,415 16,770 19,512 .1,439 4,370 34,788 278,662 11,515 4,431	2,422 292 940 120 1,000 26,236 6,570 40 10
Arson Residence Nonresidence Vehicle	4 2 6	4 2 6	1 - 2	25.0 00.0 33.3		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Table 4. (continued)

Crimes and Value of Property Lost and Recovered in the 5th District, December 1970 through August 1971

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clea	ared ^b	Value of	Property
Type of Girme	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(num)	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol1	ar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	4 2 6 1 2	41 57 2	30 42 1	73.2 73.7 50.0	4,298 5,818 21,754	234 1,249
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon Morals Narcotics	458 45 36	4 4 8 4 4 3 6	76 35 22	17.0 79.5 61.1	- - -	 -
Possession Sales Miscellaneous	31 7 20	30 7 20	26 7 17	86.7 100.0 85.0	 	- 1
Drugs Possession Sales Offense Against Family	26 3 3	26 3 3	23 3 2	88.5 100.0 66.7	- -	<u>-</u> -
Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	121	1 1 2 3	0 68	00.0 00.0 55.3	75 .	- -
TOTAL	5,141	5,074	1,188	23.4	726,372	48,492

asource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

^cClearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

make the necessary follow-up all within their 8 hour shift.

The overall police clearance rate within the 5th District, i.e., the number of crimes cleard by arrest or exceptionally cleared divided by the number of crimes committed after reclass- . ification and unfounded, was compared for the first 9 months of the experiment and the previous eleven month time period (23.4 to 25.7 percent respectively). This two percent difference in overall clearance rates was not judged to be significant by local authorities. In addition, a test of hypothesis to determine if these differences between percentages was merely due to chance or some factors inherent in the Team Policing experiment was performed. The null hypothesis that this difference was due to chance alone was rejected at the .05 statistical level (z=2.90). Also the overall clearance rate of the Dayton Police Department for the first six months of 1971 was compared to the clearance rate of the experimental district (41.6 and 23.4 respectively). The hypothesis that the clearance rates between the entire police department (excluding the Fifth District) and Experimental 5th District were due to chance alone was rejected.

In partial defense of the slightly lower clearance rates when compared to last year and the lower clearance rate when compared to the entire city this year, the following argument should be considered. Last year's clearance rates and this year's, except in the 5th District, were achieved by an experienced detective staff. The science and art of investigative procedures requires time to develop. It seems reasonable to expect that as the experiment increases over a period of time the members of

Team Policing will acquire the science and art of investigation and the clearance race will improve.

The dollar value of property lost and recovered between the two time periods within the 5th District was compared (\$984,316 lost, \$142,667 recovered, 14.5 percent for the 11 month period prior to Team Policing and \$726,372 lost, \$48,492 recovered, 6.7 percent during the experiment). Again using a monthly average as a basis of comparison, making the assumption that the data is representative of the yearly loss and recovery, last year almost \$89,500 per month was lost and \$5,500 recovered, while this uear \$80,708 was lost and \$5,388 was recovered per month during the experiment which is probably correlated with the reduction in number of crimes.

The relatively lower clearance and dollar property recovery rates are expected to improve with time. However, an alternative policy aimed at enhancing investigative services of a Team Policing experiment would be to assign detectives to a geographic area. Thus, they would be expected to become part of the community in the same respect as the members of Team Policing. An experienced person would then be assisting the less experiened officers during the investigation. This specialist would be working hours that would be more acceptable to follow-up investigations. A change of this nature in detective deployment is not without its costs. The detective staff builds a network of cross-district information concerning different crimes and criminals. Currently, no information is available concering the probably effect on clearance rates if detectives were active only in one geographic area.

Apprehension Time.

Another measure of police effectiveness is the length of time required to apprehend suspected criminals, i.e., apprehension time. The average apprehension and notification time (time between the occurrence of the crime and when it was reported to the police) by month was collected for the 5th District for January through November 1970 (Appendix B, Table 1). No general seasonal variation of notification or apprehension time is observed. Additional study is required to determine an appropriate model that would explain the many factors including notification time that are likely to cause differences in apprehension time.

Also apprehension and notification time from January to June 1971 within the 5th District was collected. The mean and standard deviation of each crime type was compared for the two time periods (Table 5). The average apprehension times for burglary, assault and larceny would appear to be less during the experimental period. However, one must be cautious about this conclusion. First, the large standard deviations (over twice the numerical value of the means in most cases) would suggest that these mean estimates are not very reliable. These large standard deviations would also indicate that the distribution of apprehension and notification time varies substantially from case to case. Second, the number of observations are far fewer during the experimental period than the prior period.

Given the above cautions, however, there is some evidence that the notification times, particularly for unarmed robbery and larceny, were less. Statistical test of differences between means was performed but with the large standard deviations no tests were statistically significant at the .1 level.

Table 5. Mean and standard deviation for apprehension and notification times by crime within the 5th District - January through November 1970 and January through June 1971a.

Type of	Apprehe	nsion Time	9	Notification Time					
Crimeb	· Me	an	St. Dev	viation	Mean		St. Dev	riation	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970 Minute	1971	1970	1971.	
Armed robbery	898.9	11829.0	2450.0	21715.2	23.47	90.3	4265	220.5	
Burglary	3460.9	2954.7	6699.6	7694.9	1096.8	945.1	2462.7	5090.4	
Unarmed robbery	3770.7	5651.2	6975.6	10125.1	552.0	10.3	1888.7	14.0	
Assault	4109.7	3541	6778.4	6524.0	253.1	258.9	821.9	862.7	
Larceny	7238.6	5554.0	14683.1	17543.0	803.3	210.0	3458.1	330.6	
Auto theft ^C	4837.8	tria evo	10427.8		223.2	-	256.7		

aSource: Dayton Police Department

bThe number of observations for the January through November 1970 period were: 15 for armed robbery, 71 for burglary, 27 for unarmed robbery, 141 for assault, 191 for larceny and 29 for auto theft. The number of observations for the January through June 1971 period were: 11 for armed robbery, 63 for burglary, 10 for unarmed robbery, 65 for assault and 22 for larceny.

^CNo information on notification or apprehension times of auto theft was available for the January through June time period.

The overall conclusions are mixed. For some crimes (burglary, unarmed robbery and larceny) the members of the community tended to notify the police more quickly, on the average, than they had in the prior time period. And for the crimes of burglary, assault and larceny, the members of the Team Policing experiment appeared to apprehend the suspects more quickly than had been the case in the previous time period.

Successful Prosecution

Another meansure of police effectiveness is the number of prosecutions relative to the number of arrests. During the period January through June, 1971, members of the 5th District Team made 895 arrests. Of these, 43 were released without being formally charged of any offence, 31 were turned over to other jurisdictions, 267 being minors were reprimanded and referred to the appropriate juvenile authorities, and in one case the charges made were withdrawn upon subsequent review (Table 6). The other arrests, 553, were charged with various offenses: about 20 percent for Part I offenses and 80 percent for Part II.

To evaluate the rate of successful prosecution of those arrested by members of Team Policing, court records of 373 cases (over 67% of those who had been arrested and formally charged by members of the Fifth District Police Team) were examined (Table 7). The charges made against 31 persons were either withdrawn, acquitted or dismissed (8.3 percent of those formally charged). In 1969 and 1970, 5.2 percent and 10.0 percent of those arrested and charged by the Dayton Police Department were withdrawn, acquitted or dismissed. The Generalist/Specialist scheme, i.e., Team Policing, has not contributed in any way to a notable increase or decrease in the number of withdrawals, acquittals, or dismissals.

Table 6. Persons arrested and charged by members of Team Policing, January through June 1971a.

Item			Month.				
I Cem	January	February	March	April	May	June	Total
Number of arrests	124	103	153	150	176	189	895
Released without charge	13	6	14	2	3	5	43
Reprimanded and Referred to juve- nile authorities	67	12	38	47	47	56	267
Turned over to other juris-dictions	6	3	6	3	7	6	31
Charges dropped upon review	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total charged	38	82	94	98	119	122	553

^aSource: Dayton Police Department

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Table 7. Disposition of persons charged by members of Team Policing, January through June, 1971

Nature of disposition	1		Mont	h				
	January	February	March	April	May	June	Total	
Transferred to another jurisdiction			1				1	amen er
Presucution withdrawn	3		1		2	4	10	
Acquitted or other- wise dismissed	2	. 1	6	3	2	7	21	
Marked "Open docket"	1	1	2	1	3	1	9	
Warrant of arrest for failure to appear	2	1	4		3	4	10	
Forfeiture of bail and discontinuance	14		12	23	19	25	93	
Trial pending	2	19	12	28	15	30	106	
Sentence pending after guilty plea		2	. 1		1	1	5	
Pleaded "guilty" or "no contest" and sentenced	10	2	32	23	14	27	108	
Pleaded "guilty" lessor	2				1		3	
Tried, convicted, and sentenced	2		1	1	2	1	7	

aSource: Dayton Police Department

In 116 cases, the accused either pleaded guilty or entered a pleas of nolo contendre. In 93 other cases, the accused failed to appear in Court at the designated time and the Court declared their deposits forfeited and the cases discontinued. Usually the guilt of the accused is assumed in such cases. A vast majority of the cases involving forfeiture of bail are related to the offense of drunkenness. The practice of releasing the accused upon deposit of \$10 cash bail and forfeiture of this sum upon subsequent failure to appear in court seems to have acquired the character of a well-established tradition. In 7 cases, the accused pleaded not guilty, and were tried, convicted, and sentenced. Thus, a total of 215 cases of the 373 (57.6 percent) that were examined, had been found guilty, pleaded guilty, or could be assumed guilty. The corresponding figures for the entire Dayton Police Department for the years 1969 and 1970 were 53.9 and 61.6 percent respectively.

A comparatively large number of cases (106) were found to be pending at some stage of the judicial process. In 10 cases, warrants of arrests were outstanding for failure to appear in Court at the designated time, 9 cases had been placed on the "open docket", and 106 others had yet to come to trial. This constitutes 33.5 percent or one-third of those who had been formally charged. Most of the pending cases were Part I offenses.

This large number of pending Part I offenses makes any qualitative assessment of the impact of Team Policing on successful prosecutions difficult. Since most of the Part II

offenses are handled by the City Prosecutor's Office, his judgment concerning quality of prosecuting evidence was sought. Before files are forwarded to the City Prosecutor's Office a special section of the Dayton Police Department screens the evidence; members of Team Policing screen their own cases. Nevertheless, the City Prosecutor believed that the quality and comprehensiveness of the files he has been receiving from the members of Team Policing are no better or worse than those from the Department as a whole.

The prosecution of the more serious offenses (Part I) is handled by the County Prosecutor's Office. Since the majority of these cases have not come to trial, it was not possible to evaluate the quality and comprehensiveness of the evidence and facts gathered by officers of Team Policing for these cases. Subjective opinions from the County Prosecutor's Office, however, was not as complementary towards the evidence submitted by members of the experiment. Further study on dispositions of Part I crimes, after the cases have come to trial, is necessary to determine if evidence submitted by members of the experiment is of equal quality to that submitted by the detective bureau.

When the Team Policing Program was introduced, the question,
"Can inexperienced patrolmen perform investigative functions
with the same rate of successful prosecutions as experienced
detectives?" was raised. The conclusion drawn from these preliminary
results is that members of Team Policing have a prosecution record
of Part II crimes which is comparable to that of the entire
Dayton Police Department, however, the evidence of successful
prosecutions on Part I crimes is still unknown (Table 8).

Table 8. Results of prosecutions within the Experimental District - 1971, and the entire police department - 1970 and 1969a

Results	Team policing ^b	Entire Police	Department 1969
		(percent)	•
Charges withdrawn, acquitted, or dismissed	8.3	5.2	10.0
Tau 1 1 1 1	•		
Found, pleaded, or assumed guilty	57.6	53.9	61.6
	* **		

aSource: Dayton Police Department

bTeam Policing results are based upon January through June arrest data 1971.

The Police Officer and the Community

Officers servicing the 5th District have attempted, in many ways, to improve the police image within the various neighborhoods. Through the organizational and directional efforts of Festus Cassels, Community Coordinator, the 5th District police have participated in civic, social, school and church programs.

Because over 25 percent of the criminals apprehended within the 5th District were juveniles and over 54 percent were less than 25 years old (Table 9), Cassels directed a large amount of his time towards the solution of police-youth confrontations. The activities included basketball and volleyball games, visits to various community schools, student classes visiting the police station for rap sessions and students riding in police cars.

To determine the results of the above activities, a comparison of the number of criminals classified by type of crime, age, sex, and race was made between the time period prior to the Team Policing experiment (January through November 1970, Table 9) and the experimental period (December 1970 through June 1971, Table 10). A total of 2155 people were arrested for a variety of offenses during the period prior to the experimental period and 1156 during the experimental period. The number of criminals arrested on a monthly average was 196 prior to and 165 during the experiment. Although many factors exist which could lead to a reduction in the number of crimes or criminals, some of this reduction may have been caused by the special Team Policing activities previously cited.

Table 9. Criminals apprehended in the 5th District, January to November 1970, classified by type of crime, age, sex, and race.

			Age	,	Se	X	Rac	е	111	1
Type of crime	uvenile	18-24	25-44	45&over	Male	Female	White	Nonwhite	Total	1
Murder-Manslaughter	_	1	1		2	<u>-</u>]	1.	2	
Negligible Manslaugh	ter -	-	_	, 		-		<u>~</u>	0	
forceable rape	3	5	1	-	9	- ,	7	2	9	
Rolbery	34	43	15	. ••	8.5	9	26	68	94	
Aggravated assault	11	13	21	8	54	6	27	33	60	
Breaking & entering	70	67	25	5	168	7	100	75	175	
Larceny	109	84	25	9	187	58	90	155	245	
Auto theft	ნ5	23	3	1	87	5	40	52	92	
Other assault	. 54	25	18	11	93	26	63	56	119	
Arson	5	1		-	6		2	4	б	
Forgery	1	7	5	1	11	5	14	2	16	
Frand	2	4	3	3	13	·	5	8	13	
Embezzlement		_	~		-	-		_	0	
Receiving &concealin	g 3.	~	1	-	3	1	4 .	. -	4	
Vandalism	27	.4	8	· -	42	-	35	· 7	4.2	
Concealing weapons	7	24	17	3	62	3	38	27	65.	
Prostitute		9	1	₽ 	1	9	5	5	10	
Other sex offenses	1	8	9	1	20	1	17	4	21	
Other narcotics	4	24	4	-	23	10	29	4	33	
Opium, etc.	· -	4	2	2	7	3	1.	9	10	
Marijuana	6	44	6	<u>.</u>	45	12	4.4	13	57	
Synthetic narcotics	-		1	•	1	-	~-	1	1	
Bookmaking	 				, -	,. -	per		0	

Table 9 (continued)

Type of crime			Age		Se	x	Ra	de l	***	
Type of crime	Juvenile	18-24	25-44	45Gover	Male	Female		e Nonwhite	Total	
							 	· w	-	-
Numbers	. 7	н	ŕ	,			-	-	0	
Other drugs	, ,	— ·	2	- .	5	-	3	2	5	
Other gambling	3	12	3	1	21	1	_	22	22	
Offense against d	lamily -	••	1		1	1	1	1	2	
Driving under int		6	6	20	47	2	37	12	49	
Liquor	1	1	-	1	3	1	3	1	4	
Drunkenness	24	70	91	222	534	38	500	72	572	
Disorderly	13	13	3	1.	28	4	20	12	32	
Vagrancy	. · · -	3	- ,	1	5		5	-	5	
All other offense	s . 40	131	61	43	265	65	209	121	330	
Curfew loiter	10		-	-	10	_	3	7	10	
Runaway	50	<u></u>	. =	-	1.7	33	42	8.	50	
TOTAL	543	626	333	333	1855	300	1371	784	2155	

Source: Dayton Police Department

14.

Table 10. Criminals apprehended in the 5th District, January to November 1970, classified by type of crime, age, sex, and race.

-										
Type of crime			Age	**************************************	Se:	X	Rac	a	***	
Type of crime	Juvenile	18-24	25-44	45Gover		Fomale	White	Nonwhite	Total	
Manslaughter	-	6	2	1	8	1.	5	4	9	and the second second second second
Negligible manslaug	ghter-	_		~	-	~	_	<u>.</u>	n	
Forceable rape	2	2	1	-	5	-	7	4	Š	
Robbery	12	23	5	*	38	2	8	32	40	
Aggravated assault	1	12	1.4	4	25	6	10	21	31	
Breaking & entering	g 42	33	1.1	1	77	10	34	53	87	
Larceny	42	28	19	5	70	24	31	63	94	
Auto theft	12	12	2		23	3	12	14	26	
Other assault	42	8	13	6	52	17	26	43	69	
Arson		· ••	1		1		1	•	1	
Forgery	4	9	6	1	16	4	8	1.2	20	
Fraud	5	1	6	3	11	4	11	4	15	
Embezzlement		,	•	-			-	*	0	
Receiving & conceat	ling -	1	-	-	~	1	1	. **	1	
Vandalism	17.	5	2	1.	23	2	13	12	25	
Concealing weapons	14	13	8	1	33	3	14	22	36	
Prostitute		9	2	-		11	7	4	11	
Other sex offenses	7	4	6	1	14	4	14	4	18	
Other narcotics	•	11	· 11	2	19	' 5'	10	14	24	
Opium, etc.		-	6	-	4	2	-	6	5	
Marijuana	4	19	8	•	28	3	26	5	31	
Synthetic narcotics	s -	2	2		2	2	1	3	4	
Bookmaking	-		~		-	<u> </u>	-	•	0	•

Table 10. (continued)

Type of crime	uvenile	118-2/	Age 25-44	45Gover	Sex	Female	Rac	Nonwhite	Total	
	uvenire	10.74-6	22 77	7540101	146.1.0	I OHICK I.O	.11.12.4.6.0.		1	والمناسطة والمناسبة
•										
Numbers	_		-	-	-	. •••	-	•	0	
Other drugs	3	3	15	1	21	1	1	21	22	
Other gambling	<u>-</u>	5	9	1	1.5	-	5	10	15	
Offense against		_								
family	-		7	1	2	-	2		2	
Driving under				_						
influence	· 	-	12	ς	17	 '	14	3	17	
	_	. 2	· /	Δ	10	<u></u>	6	4	10	
Liquor	20	43	83	6.5	185	26	182	29	211	
Drunkenness			0.5	7	20	1	8	16	24	
Disorderly	10	8	. 5	<u>.,</u>	2.0	-r	-		0	
Vagrancy	-	-	110	52	216	53	135	134	269	
All other offenses	39	66	112	5 %		2	3	1	203	
Curfew Loiter	4		-		2			11	40	
Runaway	40	-	· 	~	13	27	29	1. 1.	*F- {J	
TOTAL	320	317	363	156	940	21.6	611	545	1156	•

Source: Dayton Police Department

Because a large effort was made to reduce juvenile-committed crimes a special comparison of the numbers and percentage of total arrests of juveniles was conducted. The number of monthly juvenile arrests were very similar (49 prior to and 45 during the experiment). In addition juveniles arrested as a percentage of all persons arrested prior to the experiment was 25 percent; 23 percent during the experiment. Thus, no firm conclusion could be made with respect to the change in rapport with community youth.

Mr. Cassels has worked with a large number of neighborhood organizations whose primary goals are to improve the general living conditions of their specific neighborhoods. He and police officers have developed a communication network among these groups and the police. Intraneighborhood problems are now discussed, alternative solutions are sought, and appropriate policy, be it police or other, are implemented.

The Family Sponsor Program was one of the methods used to help build this communication network. This program encouraged police officers to spend one afternoon and evening with a sponsor family. Five patrolmen participated in this program. The general response from those officers participating was that the visits were worthwhile. Participating officers agreed the results were these: increased knowledge about the community was obtained, change of stereotyped beliefs occurred and discussions of common problems seemed to weld the police and the families together. Police officers not participating were more critical. They believed that because families were paid to participate that the program was a money making scheme for these sponsor families. Some argued that families participating

were pro-police and thus there was no possible exchange of ideals, beliefs or values. On the other hand, families sponsoring police officers in their homes responded positively to the exchange.

An increasing number of families requested policemen visit with them in the future. This program had to be curtailed because of individual officer work load increases.

Community Attitude Toward Police Service by Victim

The President's Commission of Law Enforcement (Task Force Report: Police 1967) emphasized the importance of police-community relations in the overall effectiveness of the police department. The Report summarizes the effects of hostile community attitudes as (a) limiting the ability to recruit officers, (b) inhibiting financial support, (c) limiting police understanding of and adaptation to the community, (d) inhibiting the prevention of crimes and apprehension of criminals, and (e) increasing personal danger. To determine the community attitudes toward police service, citizens of the Fifth and Second Districts, who had received direct police service during February 1971, were interviewed during March 1971.

Because police-community attitudes before Team Policing were unavailable, social profiles of the Fifth and Second Districts were compiled as a step toward determining, in an indirect way, if police attitudes were similar before the Team . Policing experiment. The major discernible difference between the Second and Fifth Districts was the percent of Blacks residing in the Fifth District (Table 11)⁸. National studies (Task Force

Table 11. Social profile of selected characteristics of the Fifth and Second Districts, Dayton 1971a

	F:	Lfth	Second				
Characteristics -	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation			
Percent Blacks	19.1	28.3	2.0	6.1			
Percent Renters	57.2	23.0	50.8	26.5			
Percent Persons Less than 25 years of age	15.3	2.0	16.0	5.4			
Percent of Households Headed by Women	17.6	11.1	13.7	5.0			
Population Density ^b	3.3	I.3	3.2	2.3			
Average Number of Part I Crimes ^C Per Month	68.4	30.7	33.8	16.2			

aData was calculated from the 1970 census tracts.

⁸Income data by census tract was not available; however, incomes between districts was reported by the Dayton Public Opinion Center to be similar.

bpopulation density is based upon the number of persons per acre.

CThe average number of Part I crimes are calculated for the first six months of 1971.

Report: Police, Chapter 6, 1967; and Bayley and Mendelshon, pages 110-114, 1969) and a Dayton survey (Public Opinion Center, 1971) report that minority communities tend to have less respect for police and a generally less approving attitude than white communities. Based upon the above conclusion, the attitudes of citizens in the Fifth (experimental) District could not be judged comparable to citizens' attitudes toward police in the Second (control) District. Therefore, the results and conclusions from this survey should be interpreted cautiously and in the vein of comparing one district (the experimental Fifth), which is somewhat skeptical in its attitudes toward police, to another district (the control Second) which is essentially favorable in its attitudes.

A sample of citizens from both districts, making service calls to the police department during the month of February 1971, were randomly selected from the police dispatch calls. Calls were stratified by district, time of day, and time of service. Proportional sampling techniques were employed to select individuals according to the proportion of crimes occuring during the three reliefs and the types of service calls. The type of service calls included Type I and II crimes and emergency, and non-emergency calls. The completed sample included 95 interviews from citizens in the Fifth District and 71 from the Second District.

The questionnaire (Appendix C) was designed to test the differences in community attitudes toward police service between the Fifth and Second Districts. Also differences in attitudes of Blacks and whites was obtained.

The first question was searching for the community's attitude toward police response time. The hypothesis was that the police officers within the Fifth District would respond more quickly to calls because of their location and empathy, thus the community attitude toward their response time would be more favorable. The conclusion drawn from sample information is that both districts believed that the police responded in a time period that they regarded as about right.

Combining the "very short", "short", and "about right" responses reveals that 73 percent of the respondents in the Fifth District and 78 percent in the Second District believed that the police responded in "good" time (Appendix D, Table 1). These percentages are 75 and 76 respectively for Black and white respondents. The hypothesis tested for no association between district and response time, and race and response time could not be rejected at the .1 significant level ($x^2 = 2.02$ and 8.93 respectively). Thus, at this time there is no association between response time and the method of police organization.

The second question was designed to estimate attitude toward police "manners". Each person interviewed was asked if he thought the police officers handling the call acted in a manner that was "courteous and polite", "discourteous and disrespectful", or "neither courteous nor discourteous." The evidence would lead to the conclusion that both the general communities and the racial groups within these communities believe the police officers are courteous and polite (77 percent

in the Fifth District, 76 percent in the Second, and 80 percent of the Blacks and 77 percent of the whites interviewed, Appendix D, Table 2).

The third question dealt with the efforts made by the police to collect information about the call. Again, both districts and races tended to agree that the police made an "excellent" or "very good" attempt at collecting the needed information (Appendix D, Table 3).

Team Policing requires the same officer(s) to follow most service calls through to completion. Thus, if follow-up investigation is required, these follow-up calls may have to be made at inconvenient hours or if the citizen made a return call to the investigating officer, that officer may be off duty or working another shift. Questions 4 and 5 were to determine if citizens found it difficult to recontact the investigating officer. Approximately 25 percent of the interviewees required a follow-up effort. Some evidence supports the hypothesis that people in the 5th District did have more difficulty recontacting the police than those in the 2nd District (37 percent said they had difficulty in the 5th District, only 23 percent in the 2nd District) (Appendix D, Table 4).

The two communities were very favorably impressed by the way the Dayton Police Department handled service calls. Eighty percent of those interviewed agreed that the police handled their calls in an acceptable manner (Appendix D, Table 5).

Four questions concerning discrimination by age, by sex, by race, and by style of life were asked. The evidence from the sample survey would support the hypothesis that there is an

association between districts and discrimination of age, of sex, of race, and of style of life (Chi square values are statistically significant at the .l and .05 significance level, Appendix D, Table 6). Furthermore, the evidence would support that discrimination is occurring in the 5th District. However, a closer examination of the data will show that a larger percent of the citizens in the 5th District failed to respond to this question.

Question 8 was directed at the change in respect for the police by the individual as a result of the service call.

Question 9 dealt with the case of the individual being dissatisfied and how he made his dissatisfaction known. Over 70 percent of the people interviewed found no change in their respect for the police. Over 15 percent had a greater respect and 10 percent said they had less respect for the police.

The comparison between races was similar to that among districts, with dissatisfied Blacks tending to have lowered respect for the police after the service call (Appendix D, Table 7).

Over 60 percent of the sample interviews found no dissatisfaction with the police performance. By and large, those not satisfied either kept it to themselves or told the officer (Appendix D, Table 8).

In summary, this sample survey would lead to the following favorable conclusions. The Dayton residents within the 5th and 2nd Districts believe:

1. That the police respond to their calls within a period of time that they regard as about right.

- 2. That the police serve the public in a courteous and polite manner.
- 3. That the police service was carried out in an acceptable way.
- 4. That their respect for the police was about the same before and after the service call.
- 5. That most of the other residents are not dissatisfied with the police service.

Also, the findings of this survey would support the following unfavorable conclusions:

- I. Residents in the 5th District have more trouble recontacting the police.
- 2. Blacks have more trouble recontacting the police.
- 3. Residents in the 5th District believe they are discriminated against more than residents in the 2nd District.

The Community Attitude Towards Police Service by Entire Community

A survey to determine the entire community attitude towards services provided by members of the Dayton Police Department was conducted during August 1971 (Appendix E).

A total of 186 citizens of the 5th District (151 Whites and 35 Blacks) and 85 White citizens from the 2nd and 37 Black citizens from the 3rd District were interviewed. The citizens interviewed from the 2nd and 3rd Districts served as a control group. The experimental and control groups were similar in race, demographic, social, and economic characteristics (Appendix F, Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Of the total (309) citizens interviewed, 97 had personal contact with the police since December 1970 (60 from the experimental and 37 from the control districts). The reason given most frequently (43 percent and 35 percent in the experimental and control districts) was that they had been victimized by a crime (Appendix F, Table 7).

Citizens were asked how they would rate the safety of property in their neighborhood and how they would rate their neighborhood in terms of physical violence or community tensions (Appendix F, Table 8). In the experimental district 22 percent agreed that their community was "very safe" with respect to property, while 19 percent in the control district thought the same of their community. The real difference concerning property safety was that 52 percent of the experimental district and only 40 percent of the control district believed that their property safety was above average. The hypothesis of no differences in the proportion of families believing their property was "very safe", "about average", and "not very safe" between districts was tested. The null hypothesis was statistically rejected ($X^2 = 12.2$ with 4 degrees of freedom) at the .025 level. The conclusion drawn from this evidence is that the experimental group believed their property was safer from illegal activities than did members of the control district.

The evidence on the attitude toward community tensions or physical violence would support the conclusion that both districts have about the same proportion of citizens believing that the community is "very safe", "about average", or "not very safe". A test of this null hypothesis could not be rejected at the 0.1 statistically significant level $(\chi^2 = 7.1 \text{ with 4 degrees of freedom})$.

A follow-up question was raised regarding the community impression about changes in numbers of property crimes and neighborhood violence or tension incidents since December 1970

(Appendix F, Table 9). This question was asked to determine . if residents of the experimental district believed that the numbers of crimes against property and the number of community tension incidents increased, remained the same, or decreased after the Team Policing experiment began. The two communities did not differ significantly in their views on the changes in . number of property crimes $(X^2 = 2.0)$. However, there was a statistically significant (.025 level) difference in views on the changes in the number of neighborhood violence or tension incidents ($X^2 = 10.0$ with 3 degrees of freedom). The evidence would support a suggestion that neighborhood violence or tension incidents increased more in the experimental than the control district. A group of young Blacks, who called themselves the Chains of Rap Brown, had been active in the experimental district during the survey period and could have been one reason that the experimental group believed that neighborhood violence or tension incidents had increased.

One of the goals of the Team Policing experiment was to produce a community-centered police structure that was more responsive to, and understanding of, neighborhood life styles. Thus, additional questions were asked concerning how the police should handle community tensions and how they do handle community tensions. The experimental and the control districts tended to have the same degree of concensus with regard to whether the police should understand the causes of the problem and encourage people to discuss their problems even if this was not acting in the manner of ordinary policemen (50 percent in the experimental

and 49 percent in the control communities, Appendix F, Table 10). However, on the follow-up question the community expressed a belief that the police do handle tension situations differently than they believe police should handle them. About 30 percent of the people interviewed in the experimental group and 18 percent in the control believed that the police were attempting to understand the problems and get people to talk about them. Nearly 50 percent in both groups believed that the police were either showing maximum force or enforcing the laws strictly. The evidence would support the claim that members of the Team Policing are conforming more closely with the way the majority of the community believes tension incidents should be handled than are the officers in the control district. This would lend some support to the claim that the experimental Team Policing program was responding, in terms of police procedures, more towards the desires of the community they serve than was the regular police organization.

With the increasing crime rates which have occurred throughout the city over the past several years, a question addressing what steps members of the community have taken to reduce the possibility of being victimized was raised. Nearly 46 percent of the control group and 35 percent of the experimental group took no preventive steps (Appendix F, Table 11). The largest single preventive step taken was to avoid being out at night. From the evidence one would conclude that a larger proportion of the members of the experimental group took more preventive steps than members of the control group ($X^2 = 13.1$ with 5 degrees of freedon, statistically significant at the .025 level).

Citizens from both districts were asked if they had heard of the Team Policing experiment, and if they had, the approximate date they had learned of the program. About 50 percent had heard of Team Policing in the experimental group and 35 percent in the control group. Most people who heard of the experiment learned of it early, i.e., prior to January 1971.

The question might be raised whether a large percentage, i.e., 80 to 90 percent, of the community must know about the program if it is to achieve its stated goals. No answer on this question is available from this study. However, a lack of citizen knowledge concerning all the Dayton Police programs exists. For example, few citizens said they knew about the Conflict Management Program or the Community Service Officer Program.

Similar questions were asked about the respondents' acquaintence with the Neighborhood Assistance Officer (NAO)

Program. About 50 percent of those questioned in the experimental district and 30 percent of the control group had heard of the NAO program. Two percent of the sample were, themselves, Neighborhood Assistant Officers. Five percent of the experimental group and about 18 percent of the control group indicated an interest in becoming a Neighborhood Assistance Officer. Forty-two percent of the experimental panel believed . the NAO program should be expanded and 47 percent gave no response. In the control group, 25 percent believed the program should be expanded while 56 percent gave no response. This evidence suggests that residents of the experimental district

believe the NAO program has been helpful in performing some of the police functions and that this program should be continued.

The final question posed to the two panels was, "what rating would you give the Dayton Police Department?" The rating choices were "excellent", "good", "average", "fair", and "poor". The results of this question would support the contention that the citizens who have been served by members of the Team Policing organization have given their police personnel higher overall ratings than have members of the control district (49 percent in the experimental group and 40 percent in the control group rated the overall police performance as excellent or good, Appendix F, Table 12).

The hypothesis that the respondents within the experimental and control districts gave equal ratings to police performance was rejected at the .01 statistically significant level $(X^2 = 15.1)$. This evidence also would lend support to the claim that members of Team Policing have begun to produce a community-centered police structure that is more responsive to, and understanding of, neighborhood life styles.

The Police Officer and the Internal Organization

Questions concerning the internal organization and operational difficulties were raised periodically by members of the research and evaluation team through one structured questionnaire and several personal interviews of officers participating in the experiment. Conclusions based upon these interviews are summarized in the following categories:

attitude toward the Team Policing concept, organization structure and decision making, follow-up, public relations, and communication.

Attitude toward the Team Policing Concept. In February 1971, all members of the police department were sent a questionnaire designed to determine their views of the Team Policing experiment. They were asked to rank on a 1-4 basis (where #1 was most preferred and #4 least preferred) what policy they favored for Team Policing. 9 .A total of 89 policemen responded to this questionnaire (approximately 22 percent, 20 out of 89 responses, were from members of the Team Policing experiment). Attitudes received from the sample, although they could have been biased towards or against the experiment, were assumed representative of the Dayton Police Department. No attempt was made to obtain additional responses. However, the responses were categorized into three classes: members of the regular police force, excluding members of the Team Policing experiment; members of Team Policing; and officers with the rank of sergeant or above, excluding members of Team Policing.

The four policies suggested for future Team Policing experiments were:

1. Continuation of Team Policing in the 5th District.

- 2. Adopt Team Policing in other districts on an experimental basis.
- 5. Adopt Team Policing in other districts.
- 4. Discontinue Team Policing at the end of the experimental period.

The most preferred policy was to continue Team Policing in the 5th District, although the regular police were indifferent between continuing Team Policing in the 5th District and trying it in other districts on an experimental basis.

Also, during January and February 1971, officers in the Team Policing experiment were asked their attitude towards the Team Policing organizational concept. Most patrolmen saw the Team Policing organization as a reversion back to police techniques of twenty years ago. Those favoring this organizational approach believed that they would become better acquainted with the people they served, and thus would obtain more accurate information when investigating service calls. Those, a minority, skeptical of this approach pointed to the problem that the knowledge of criminal peculiarities, i.e., their mode of operation, will be limited to those criminals residing in the 5th District. It was contended that MO's of criminals outside the district who commit crimes within the 5th District will not be known and thus longer apprehension times or even more unsolved crimes may result. However, those favoring the Team Policing organization argue that this disadvantage would be out-weighed by the willingness of the residents to report criminal activity to a patrolman they know and trust.

⁹During September 1971, a planned follow-up questionnaire to determine the change in the entire police department's attitude towards Team Policing was to be conducted. Budget constraints prevented this survey.

During September 1971, a planned follow-up questionnaire to determine the attitude of the entire police department towards Team Policing was to be conducted. Budget constraints prevented this survey from being taken; however, over one half of the members of the Team Policing program were interviewed during July, August, and September. Most men interviewed still believed that the concept of Team Policing was the most desirable organizational approach and wanted to see it continued. The officers interviewed believed that it would require perhaps five more men per team, i.e., twenty additional officers. In addition, it was suggested that if additional men were not available then the beats be redivided from six to five. The men released from this one beat would be assigned to follow-up investigative work only.

Organizational Structure and Decision Making. Was Team
Policing organized and operated as the men perceived it at the
beginning? This question is very difficult to answer. First,
members of the team had different perceptions on how Team
Policing was to be organized and on their individual decision
making role within the organization. If one perceives that the
Team Policing organization should have been organized around
the individual team within a beat and that this team would
make most of the decisions with respect to policing that
beat, i.e., who will work when, how you will report, when
follow-up will occur, what will be worn, etc., then one would
conclude that this has not occurred. Some of the men interviewed
would have preferred this organizational structure.

Attempts were made in the beginning to have group meetings in which issues of this nature would have been discussed. However, because of lack of participation from the officers, these regular meetings were discontinued. Possible reasons for failure of the meetings were these: some officers found it objectional to spend off hours in meetings; the issues to be discussed were never clearly stated; many decisions could not be implemented because of lack of funds; and the transformation from an authoritarian structure to a democratic decision making body requires a real desire to change on the part of all members involved.

The 5th District organizational structure tended to take on the same structure as its parent. This is not to say that the officers did not have easy access to the top, i.e.,

Lt. Grossnickle and the sergeants. According to most men interviewed they could take their questions, suggestions, etc., to them. Most men interviewed thought their decision role was adequate and were not demanding that their decision role ircrease. There was some dissent with respect to dress code and personal life style, particularly the growing of beards.

The authoritarian ranks were still present and most officers seemed to prefer that rank be recognized and observed. Most officers were very complimentary towards their sergeants and the way they handled the Team.

Follow-up. Another problem expressed by the officers was the difficulty involved with follow-up investigations. Because no over-time pay was available for follow-ups,

patrolmen made their follow-up investigation on their on-duty time. The result has been that police officers carry several unsolved complaints and work on them when they are not on immediate service calls. This inability to stay with an investigation on a pay basis could lead to a reduced clearance rate.

The officers interviewed believed (as previously stated) that at least two men from each team should be allowed to devote their full time to follow-up investigation. This time would occur during the normal daylight hours. It was stressed that this should not remove the responsibility of each officer taking on his own follow-up but rather help to facilitate follow-up during convenient hours from the citizen's point of view or when the case load became overwhelming.

<u>Public Relations</u>. The time involved with follow-up plus the fact that the CSO program did not provide the expected manpower prevented police officers from spending as much time as they would have preferred in public relations work. The inability to accomplish this goal was due in large part to the overall reduction in police manpower ordered by the city. It is a goal that many interviewed police officers would like to pursue, given additional manpower.

Communications. A major concern of officers interviewed,
(as previously stated) was the loss of manpower. A related
concern was whether the available manpower could be better used.
The efficient use of manpower was questioned in two particular subject areas. The first was communication among officers
concerning what had occurred among beats and within beats.

The second area of concern was the use of officers' time in filling out reports.

The solution suggested by police officers for improving communications within the same beat was to install tape recorders within each car. Then the on-duty officers would listen to the important activities that had occurred previously.

The officers estimated that about two hours per day per crew are spent doing "secretarial chores". When one multiplies these hours by the number of crews (18) and also by the representative hourly wage for police officers (\$5.00 per hour) the totals become sizeable: \$180 per day. Again, the officers believed that using tape recorders to orally fill out the reports and submit them to a secretary to complete, would provide at least three or four more police-man units per district to be used towards patroling or investigating.

From the subjective evaluation of what the officers working within the experimental 5th District think about the experiment it can be concluded that in spite of this year's loss of manpower from the two sources (loss of overtime and loss of CSO) these officers have not changed their basic views of the team policing concept. They believe that with the changes they have suggested (cited above), the concept will work. Also, if some improvements of efficiency in communications and reporting can be made they feel that the additional manpower requirements suggested could be reduced.

Team Policing: Its Cost

No attempt was made in this study to determine how the money allocated to the Team Policing experiment was broken

down. That is, no accounting was made of how much was spent for the 5th District Police Security Office space, civilian personnel, special clothing, equipment, etc. Further, no attempt was made in this study to determine what the benefits from such expenditures were. The answers to the above questions would be useful as a guide to administrative policy. In other words, given that the Team Policing concept proves out as a more effective organizational structure than the present structure, an administrator would be faced with several questions of administrative policy: (I) whether there is a need to have separate police facilities in each district to make the concept work; (2) whether there is a need for special community civilian personnel; (3) whether the officers need special clothing, etc. Further study is recommended to measure the benefits accruing from these special features.

A rigorous cost-effectiveness study comparing the team policing concept with the specialist approach would be difficult in conception (although not impossible) and expensive in execution. It was a question beyond the resources and time available to the evaluation team. Without a very similar control district, plus the man-hour inputs of all the various services from all sections of the department, one could not compare cost-effectiveness of Team Policing and the traditional policing structure. A study using simulation techniques could probably be undertaken to some advantage.

This study makes no attempt to answer the question, "Was Team Policing worth the X dollars which were allocated to the project?" At this early stage of the experiment we have

observed a few increases in effectiveness and some apparent improvements in community-police relationships. It is the conclusion of the evaluation team that the record of the team policing experiment suggests these policy actions or alternatives:

- 1. The Fifth District Team Policing program should be continued since the available evidence indicates that it is an alternative to the conventional policing system with:
 - (a) Approximately equivalent effectiveness in terms of crimes cleared.
 - (b) More effective relationships with residents of the community served.
 - (d) Approximately equivalent efficiency in terms of service calls answered per officer and per man-month (including other paid and unpaid personnel besides sworn officers).
- 2. The Team Policing practices should be examined by Departmental command personnel to determine:
 - (a) If more manpower is needed in order to provide more investigative time for all Fifth District officers.
 - (b) If more training in investigative skills should be given to all Fifth District officers.
 - (c) If specialists in investigation should be assigned to the Fifth District, and if so, how they can best be used in conjunction with the investigative work of line officers of the District.
- 3. If the generalist/specialist concept is extended to another district it may be useful to vary somewhat the organization and practices from those of the Fifth District in order to provide a basis for finetuning the concept through comparison of results. Some possible points of variation might be one or more of these:
 - (a) Change the proportion of NAO's.
 - (b) Change the proportion of CSO's (Note: the effective proportion in the Fifth District was well below the originally planned proportion due to the city's austerity budget.)

- (c) Change the staffing of sworn officers so as to provide more investigation time.
- (d) Eliminate the community relations coordinator, or add another.
- (e) Cycle-in officers to serve on the policing teams who may not be favorably disposed toward the concept.
- (f) Eliminate the district office.

Further Areas of Team Policing Research

In the final analysis, police officers are going to ask, "Should we consider switching from our traditional policing organizational structure to the Team Policing Concept?" The areas suggested for further study should provde additional information to decision makers. They include:

- 1. Several experimental (and subsequent evaluation)
 efforts to introduce additional investigation time
 to the Fifth District.
 - a) Overtime pay for Fifth District officers.
 - b) Assignment of additional line officers in order to permit more investigative time.
 - c) Assignment of specialist investigator(s)

 (detectives) to serve the Fifth District only
 by working out of District headquarters.
 - d) Assignment of investigative time from the central detective force rather than assignment of an investigator to work out of the Fifth District headquarters.

These experimental results should provide answers to the ability of these different techniques towards improving criminal investigation, apprehension and prosecution.

Documentation of the specific services rendered by the Neighborhood Assistant Officers; determination of the types of NAO activity and behavior which are most helpful in the prevention or solution of crimes; and listing of possible additional patterns of behavior

which might tend to improve results in crime prevention or solution.

The NAO concept may provide the additional security manpower that a given community desires but is not willing to tax current income to obtain. In other words, this concept reveals the willingness of certain members of a community to tax themselves in terms of leisure time rather than income. Answers provided in the above study should help decision makers determine the tasks and expected accomplishments that the NAO program is likely to provide.

- on the time of "downtown" specialty officers as a result of the team policing as compared with the situation in the Fifth District prior to team policing.

 Answers to the above question would specify the kinds and duration of supporting services that must be provided by the traditional police organization.
- 4. Follow-up survey of policy attitudes comparing current attitudes with those found in February, 1971 survey (see pp 56 -58) on Team Policing.

 We hypothesize that police attitudes towards this program will improve with time and increased accomplishments. However, a police department considering changing from the traditional organization to team policing should have some information about the expected internal skepticism and its likely duration.

S. Cost-benefit comparison of Fifth District experiment with a control district using traditional policing.

One of the factors to consider when changing from traditional to team policing is what additional resources, if any, are required (costs) and what are the expected results (benefits). The benefit-cost analysis would provide decision makers answers to these questions.

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APPENDIX A

Number of crimes and dollar value of property lost and recovered by members of the Fifth District Team Policing experiment, by month.

CONTINUED 10F2

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, DECEMBER 1970^{α}

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clea	ared ^b	Value of	Property
Type of Citme	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(do1	lar)
Homicide	. 0	0	0	00.0		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1	U T				-
Rape	2 7	26	0	00.0	- 400	~ ∧
Armed Robbery	2		6	23.1	6,420	0_{+}
Armed-Assault Robbery		2	0	00.0		.
Unarmed Robbery	28	28	6	21.4	645	()
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	2	2	0	00.0	. 0	. ()
Aggrevated Assault	17	15	10	66.7	0	0
. Assault and Battery	23	23	15	65.2	 .	·
Breaking and Entering						
Residence	109	107	12	11,2	23,989	0
Nonresidence	28	29	2	6.9	8,546	0
Vacant Residence	3	3	1	33.3	155	0
Pocket Picking	0	0	0	0.0.0	. 0	0
Purse Snatching	0	0	0	00.0	. 0	0
Shoplifting	14	1.4	11	78.6	127	52
Larceny	•				7 - '	17 14
Auto	15	1.5	3	20.0	980	40
Buildings	19	1.8	2	11.1	1,554	300
Residence	23	21	3	14.3	898	176
	5	5	Õ	00.0	66	0
Money Deposits	7	5	7	20.0	227	20
General	87	8.5 8.5	Ú	00.0	5,807	()
Locked Compartments	42	39		10.3	27 570	3,210
Auto Theft	46	44	2	4.5	23,570 884	
Auto Accessory	13	14	0		180	70 0
Bicycle Theft	± 3 .	T 4	U .	00.0	TO()	U .
Arson	0	0	•	00 0		^
Residence	0	0	0	00.0	0	$\frac{0}{2}$
Nonresidence	0	0	0	00.0	$\frac{0}{2}$	0
Vehicle	-0	0 .	0	00.0	0	0

Table 1. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, DECEMBER 1970a

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clearedb		Value of Property	
Type of Grime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
	A	4	77	77 0	700	2.00
Forgery	12	12	. 5	75.0	300	190
Fraud	7.7	1. 2.	. /	58.3	1,267	96
Embezzlement	V	U	U	00.0	U	. 0
Malicious Destruction	" "	F 2	_	0 (
of Property	55	52	5	9.6	()	0
Carry a Concealed Weapon.	10	1.0	7	70.0	0	()
Morals	Š	3	2	66.7	0	Ó.
Narcotics		0	•			
Possession	Ü	0	0	00.0	0	0
Sales	. <u>0</u>	0	0	00.0	0	0
Miscellaneous	1	1	0	00.0	0	O
Drugs						
Possession	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	100.0	0	. 0
Sales	0	0	0	00.0	0	0
Offense Against Family	1.	1.	0	00.0	0	-{}
· Disorderly Conduct	0	0	0	00.0	0	0
False Fire Alarm	0	0	0	00.0	0	0
Miscellaneous	11 •	11	6	54.5	0	0
TOTAL	. 609	591	109	18.4	75,615	4,154

a Source: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

^cClearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, JANUARY 1971 $^{\alpha}$

Type of Crime Iomicide Iape Irmed Robbery Inarmed Robbery Inarmed Robbery Inarmed-Assault Robbery Ingrevated Assault Issault and Battery Ireaking and Entering	Before Rec		After Reclas	Actual (number)	Rate	Loss	Recovered
lape Armed Robbery Armed-Assault Robbery Anarmed Robbery Anarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery		(numt	er)	(number)			
lape Armed Robbery Armed-Assault Robbery Anarmed Robbery Anarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery			(number)		(percent)	(dol	llar)
rmed Robbery Armed-Assault Robbery Anarmed Robbery Anarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery			3	3	100.0	. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,,,
rmed Robbery Armed-Assault Robbery Anarmed Robbery Anarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery			2	2	100.0		
rmed-Assault Robbery Inarmed Robbery Inarmed-Assault Robbery Iggrevated Assault Issault and Battery	19		18	· 6	33.3	20,910	1,250
Inarmed Robbery Inarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery	0		0,	Ô	00.0	20,910) ()
Inarmed-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault Assault and Battery	25		25	4	16.0	898	45
ggrevated Assault	1.		7	Ó	00.0	350	4.5
ssault and Battery	7		6	6	100.0	0	0
	26		21	16	76.2	0	0
TOURTHE HILL THEOLETIC					10,4		· U
Residence	95		93	20	21.5	15,192	170
Nonresidence	13		13	4	30.8	3,573	579
Vacant Residence	1		1	Ó	00.0	0,470	0
Pocket Picking	1		ī	ŏ	00.0	340	0
Purse Snatching	0		0	Ö	00.0	0	0
Shoplifting	6		6	Š	83.3	36	36
arceny					0010		50
Auto	18		18	0	00.0	1,860	0
Buildings	14		14	ñ	00.0	3,234	Ö
Residence	18		16	4	25.0	2,262	20
Money Deposits	2		2	Ó	00.0	200	<u>. ()</u>
General	5		5	i	20.0	138	ő
Locked Compartments	46		45	2	4.4	2,862	ő
uto Theft	35	•	33	3	9.1	24,998	475
uto Accessory	37		37	0	00.0	865	0
Bicycle Theft	7		7	1	14.3	125	1.0
Residence	^			. 0	00.0		•
Nonresidence	·U		0	. (1	((1 2	11
Vehicle	, A		Ō	Ŏ	00.0	0	0

Table 2. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, JANUARY 1971

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clea	red^b	Value of	Property
Type of Grime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
W.	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	2 5 0	2 5 0	0 5 0	00.0 100.0 00.0	249 212 0	0 205 0
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon. Morals Narcotics	5 0 3 4	5 0 3 4	8 3 1	16.0 100.0 25.0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Possession Sales Miscellaneous	5 0 2	4 0 2	4 0 2	100.0 00.0 100.0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Drugs Possession Sales Offense Against Family Disorderly Conduct	4 0 0 0	4 0 0 0	4 0 0 0	100.0 00.0 00.0 00.0	0 0 0	0 0 0
False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	0 8	0 8	0 4	00.0	0	0 0
TOTAL	464	450	108	24'.()	77,954	2,890

a Source: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

cClearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, FEBRUARY 1971 lpha

Two of Cuina	C1	assif	ication		Cle	ared^b	Value of	Property
Type of Crime	Before Rec	lass	After	Reclass	Actual	Ratec	Loss	Recovere
		(num	ber)		(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Homicide	1			1	0	00.0	· •	•
Rape	1			1	Ō	00.0	• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Armed Robbery	14			14	Ğ	42.9	497	. 0
Armod-Assault Robbery	-1				ñ	00.0	0	0
Unarmed Robbery	16			16	ž	12.5	519	30
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	Q			0	Ō	00.0	0	0
Aggreented Assault	7			7	6	85.7	ő	ő
Assault and Battery	40			37	33	89.2	Õ	ň
Breaking and Entering							v	
Residence	92			91	26	28.6	14,970	237
Nonresidence	23			23	4	17.4	5,855	41.5
Vacant Residence	2			2	i	50.0	20	0
Pocket Picking	1			1	$\overline{0}$	00.0	75	ň
Purse Snatching	0			0	Ö	00.0	0	0
Shoplifting Shoplifting	3			3	. 3	100.0	70	70
Larceny								
Auto	11			9	0	00.0	224	0 -
Buildings	12			11	2	18.2	874	20
Residence	14			11	0	00.0	1,555	0
Money Deposits	8			8	ĺ	12.5	246	26
General	1			1.	0	00.0	3	0
Locked Compartments	35			35	1	2.9	1,428	0
Auto Theft	29			25	3	12.0	19,483	2,275
Auto Accessory	58			58	3	5.2	1,630	7 0
Dicycle Theft	2			2	0	00.0	30	0
Arson								
Rosidence	0			0	0	0.00	0	. 0
Nouresidence	0			0	Ö	00.0	ő	Ö
Vehicle	0			0	Ö	00.0	Ő	Ó

Table 3. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, FEBRUARY 1971

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Cleared ^b		Value of Property	
Type of Grame	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	6 7 0	5 7 0	2 6 0	40.0 85.7 00.0	345 345 0	0 144 0
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon. Morals	48 5 1	45 5 1	6 5 1	13.3 100.0 100.0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Narcotics Possession Sales Miscellaneous	6 0 5	6 0 5	6 0 4	100.0 00.0 80.0	0 0 0	0 0 0
Drugs Possession Sales	8 0	8 0	7 0	87.5 00.0	0	0
Offense Against Family Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	0 0 0 11	0 0 0 11	0 0 0 8	00.0 00.0 00.0 72.7	0 0 0 1	0 0 0
TOTAL	471	453	137	30.2	47,982	3,217

aSource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, MARCH 1971 $^{\alpha}$

Time of Chine	Classif	ication	Cle	$ared^b$	Value of	Property	
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovere	
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	(dollar)	
Homicide	en e	en e		, -	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e		
Rape		· _ ·	**	, -		· -	
Armed Robbery	9	9	4	44.4	445	==	
Armed-Assault Robbery	4	4	-	00.0	-	***	
Unarmed Robbery	20	20	-	00.0	3,615	1	
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	5	5	1.	20.0	20		
Aggrevated Assault	12	12	10	83.3	9		
Assault and Battery	43	40	35	87.5		•••	
Breaking and Entering	•						
Residence	9 2	89	17	19.1	15,175	1,930	
Nonresidence	25	25		00.0	4,382		
Vacant Residence	4	4	1	25.0	135	5	
Pocket Picking	1	i	-	00.0	23		
Purse Snatching		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		00.0		~	
Shop lifting	- 8	8	4	50.0	1.74	38	
Larcony			•	V V • 17	- · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Auto	9	. 8		00.0	342	·	
Buildings	10	10	-	00.0	1,072		
Residence	22	21	3	14.3	1,490	20	
Money Deposits	2	2		50.0	4	4	
General	ž 3	2 *	$\overset{\cdot}{2}$	100.0	600	100	
	68	67		00.0	4,327		
Locked Compartments Auto Theft	29	28	7	25.0	28,986	12,025	
Auto Indit Auto Accessory	50	50	4	8.0	1,108	96	
	18	19	*	00.0	185		
Bicycle Theft Arson	u.∵	J. J	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	00.0	, u. O .		
Residence		•					
		••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	••		•	-	
Nonresidence ·		en e		•		. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Vehicle		~	•		•	***	

Table 4. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, MARCH 1971

Type of Crime	Classi	fication	Cleared ^b		Value of Property	
Type of Grine	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(nu	nber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement	9 6	9 5	5 4 -	55.5 80.0	777	44 137
Malicious Destruction of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon, Morals	48 6 4	4 7 6 4	10 6 3	21.3 100.0 75.0		2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Narcotics Possession Sales Miscellaneous	- - 3	- - 3	- - 3	100.0	. - 	
Drugs Possession Sales	4 2	4 2	4 2	100.0		- - -
Offense Against Family Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	- - - 9	- - - 9	- - - 5	- - - 55.5	
TOTAL	525	513	131	25.5	64,201	14,399

a Source: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

Table 5. CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, APRIL 1971a

Time of Crime	Classif	ication	Cle	red^b	Value of Property	
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	· Loss	Recovered
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	llar)
lomicide		. · · ·		-		•••
Rape	1	1	1	100.0	~	*** ·
Armed Robbery	7	7	5	71.4	3,009	40
Armed-Assault Robbery	4	4	0	00.0	· ·	•
Jnarmed Robbery	22	22	4	18.2	828	15
Jnarmed-Assault Robbery	1	1	0	00.0	-	
Aggrevated Assault	14	13	10	76.9	-	. · ·
Assault and Battery	30	29	25	86.2	-	
Breaking and Entering						
Residence	131	130	22	16.9	36,845	500
Non: esidence	27	27	4	15.4	8,758	500
Vacant Residence			 .	_	.	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Pocket Picking	1	1	0	0.00	5	
Purse Snatching				-	-	-
Shoplifting	7	7	5	71.4	163	97
Larceny						
Auto	17	16		00.0	1,532	
Buildings	19	18	3	16.7	1,782 .	in the second se
Residence	24	2.4	1	4.2	2,553	· -
Money Deposits	. 2	2	1	50.0	20	
General	1.		· -	-		- ·
Locked Compartments	4.8	48	2	4.2	5,645	1,000
Auto Theft	38	35	3	8.6	25,893	2,450
uto Accessory	43	44	2	4.5	1,450	100
Bicycle Theft	40	39	1	2.6	771	8
Arson						
Residence	1	1.	1	100.0	-	-
Nonresidence		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	-	· •	-	·
Vehicle	1	1	* see	00.0	. -	-

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Table 5. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, APRIL 1971^{α}

Time of Chine	Class:	fication	Cleared ^b		Value of Property	
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Ratec	Loss	Recovered
	(nı	umber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement	11 6	11 6	10	90.9 66.7	516 52	14
Malicious Destruction of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon Morals	57 3 4	5 5 3 4	14 3 3	25.4 100.0 75.0		<u>-</u>
Narcotics Possession Sales Miscellaneous	1 -	1 - -	1 -	100.0	- -	
Drugs Possession Sales Offense Against Family	- - 1	- - 1	- - 1	100.0		
Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	13	13	- 10	76.9	- - 75	
TOTAL	574	563	136	24.2	89,897	4,724

aSource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

m of Coning	Classif	ication	Clea	$ared^b$	Value of	Property	A. A
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Ratec	Loss	Recovered	1
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)	
Homicide	3	3	3	66.7		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	<i>3</i> 2	2	2		~	_	
Rape Armed Robbery	17	17	2	100.0	1 000		
Armed Robbery	7.7		4	23.5	1,007		
Unarmed Robbery	26	1 26	•	00.0	- dma		
	9		2	7.8	1,672	7	
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	9	8	8	100.0	-		
Aggrevated Assault	33	71	20	07 =	-	. •	
Assault and Battery	33 	31	29	93.5	-		
Breaking and Entering	1 1 m	770	7.0				
Residence	117 32	112	18	16.1	25,875	900	
Nonresidence	32	32	6	18.8	8,076		
Vacant Residence		_	-				
Pocket Picking	1	•••	~	-	, - .	-	
Purse Snatching	_	<i>5</i>	-			<u> </u>	
Shoplifting	2	2	2	100.0	22	22	
Larceny	7	•					
Auto	7	7	-	00.0	288		
Buildings	33	32	4	12.5	3,247	600	
Residence	33	33	5	15.2	1,839	76	
Money Deposits	3	3	1	33.3	70	0	
General	4	4		0.0.0	431		
Locked Compartments	5.5	55	1	1.8	4,388	· -	
Auto Theft	38	33	3 2	9.1	27,205	2,475	
Auto Accessory	42	42	2	4.8	1,766	202	
Bicycle Theft	44	39	1	2.6	390	10	
Arson							
Residence	. -	•			•	•	
Nonresidence	1	1	=	00.0	en e	.	
Vehicle	1	1	-	00.0	-		

Table 6. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, MAY 1971 $^{\alpha}$

Type of Crime	Classi	Eication	Cleared ^b		Value of Property	
Type of offine	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered
	(nui	nber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement	11	4 10	3 8	75.0 80.0	161	12
Malicious Destruction of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon	47 3	4 7 3	7 3	14.9	- - - -	- - -
Morals Narcotics Possession	7 4	7	3	42.8	<u>.</u>	
Sales Miscellaneous Drugs	4	1	4	100.0	• *** • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	, -
Possession Sales Offense Against Family	2	2 - -	. 1 - 	50.0		- (x)
Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	10	<u> </u>	5	55.6		
TOTAL	599	577	129	22.4	78,105	4,304

asource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, JUNE 1971 lpha

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clea	red^b	Value of	Property
Type or Grime	Before Reclass	(number) (number) (percent) (dollar lar lar lar lar lar lar lar lar lar	Recovered			
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percenc)	(do1	lar)
Homicide	~ 1		<u>-</u>	100.0	<u></u>	•
Rape Armed Robbery	11	1.0	7		651	
Armed-Assault Robbery Unarmed Robbery	18	18	7	38.9	508	111
Unarmod-Assault Robbery Aggrevated Assault			б		- -	
Assault and Battery						- -
Breaking and Entering Residence Nonresidence						330 70
Vacant Residence Pocket Picking			0	00.0	225	-
Purse Snatching	1 K	- 1 E			-	187
Shoplifting Larceny						1.07
. Auto Buildings	30	30		16.7	3,731	1,500
Residence Money Deposits			1		2,869 133	••• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• •• ••
General						• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Locked Compartments Auto Theft	36	35		11.4	32,970	3,325
Auto Accessory Bicycle Theft			<u>.</u>			J, <i>L</i> ,
Arson Residence	1	1	-			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Nonresidence Vehicle	1 3	3	2	00.0 66.7	•••	vo.

182

Table 7. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE STH DISTRICT, JUNE 1971 lpha

Type of Crime	Clas	sifi	ication		Cleared ^b			Value of browner		
Type of Grime	Before Recla	SS	After	Reclass	Actual		Ratec	Loss	Recovered	
	(numb		er)		(number	.)	(percent)	(do1	lar)	
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	5 2 1			5 2 1	4 2 -		80.0 100.0 00.0	612 165 21,754	15	
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon Morals Narcotics	5 5 5 6			5 4 4 6	9 3 6		16.7 75.0 100.0	- - -		
Possession Sales Miscellaneous	4 2 1		•	4 2 1	4 2 1		100.0 100.0 100.0	.	- - -	
Drugs Possession Sales Offense Against Family	1 1 -			1	1 1 -		100.0	 - -	- 54	
Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	11			12	7		58.3			
TOTAL	614		0	500	130	標	21.7	95,762	5,550	

aSource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

	Classif	ication	Clea	ared ^b	Value of Property		
Type of Crime	Before Reclass	After Reclass	Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered	
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dollar)		
Homicide	1	1	1.	100.0			
Rape	1	1	1	100.0	-		
Armed Robbery	1.5	15	6	40.0	2,353	11	
Armed-Assault Robbery	1	1	1.	100.0		-	
Unarmed Robbery	32	32	5	15.6	857	115	
Unarmed-Assault Robbery	0	0	0	00.0	-	. -	
Aggrevated Assault	18	17	17	100.0	•	•	
Assault and Battery	38	38	31	81.6			
Breaking and Entering	(x,y) = (x,y) + (y,y) + (y,y						
Residence	106	104	15	14.4	18,804	521	
Nonresidence	25	25	7	28.0	7,723	5	
Vacant Residence	19	18	0	00.0	1,643	•	
Pocket Picking	0	0	. 0	00.0	<u>-</u>	. 	
Purse Snatching	1.	1	0	0.00	2	-	
Shoplifting	13	1.3	6	46.1	823	33	
Larceny						_	
Auto	15	15	1.	6.6	723	2	
Buildings	6	6	0	00.0	1,053		
Residence	43	42	4	9.5	2,049	380	
Money Deposits	1	1	0	00.0		=	
General	3	3	1	33.3	2,262	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Locked Compartments	40	40	2	5.0	3,564	1	
Auto Theft	4.5	42	3	7.1	55,728	-	
Auto Accessory	48	46	1	2.1	1,446	••	
Bicycle Theft	5.3	53	0	00.0	750	-	
Arson							
Residence	2	2	0	00.0	. ••	-	
Nonresidence	0	0	0	•			
Vehiclo	0	0	0	\ 		· •	

Table 8. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE . 5TH DISTRICT, JULY 1971

Type of Crime	Classi	fication	Clea	ired ^b	Value of Property		
Type of Grime	Before Reclass After Reclass		Actual	Rate	Loss	Recovered	
	(nu	nber)	(number)	(percent)	(do1	lar)	
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	2 4 0	2 4 0	1 3 -	50.0 75.0	74 629	599 -	
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon. Morals Narcotics	4 6 3 6	47 3 6	11 2 3	23.4 66.6 50.0	- - -	- - -	
Possession Sales Miscellaneous	6 4 3	6 4 3	5 4 3	83.3 100.0 100.0	- -		
Drugs Possession Sales Offense Against Family	5 0 0	5 0 0	5 -	100.0		- U	
Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	0 0 19	0 0 20	_ 11	55.0			
TOTAL	624	616	151	24.5	100,962	7,477	

asource: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by armst or exceptionally cleared.

^{**}Clearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

Table 9. (continued)

CRIMES AND VALUE OF PROPERTY LOST AND RECOVERED IN THE 5TH DISTRICT, AUGUST 1971^{α}

Type of Crime	Classif	ication	Clea	$ared^b$	Value of Property			
type of offine	Before Reclass	After Reclass	· Actual	Ratec	Loss	Recovered		
	(num	ber)	(number)	(percent)	(dol	lar)		
Forgery Fraud Embezzlement Malicious Destruction	4 8 1	4 6 1	2 3 1	50.0 50.0 100.0	1,264	27		
of Property Carry a Concealed Weapon Morals Narcotics	5 2 7 1	51 7 1	6 3 -	11.8 42.8 00.0	- - -	- - -		
Possession Sales Miscellaneous	5 - 1	5 - 1	2	40.0				
Drugs Possession Sales	<u> </u>	1		00.0		- 1		
Offense Against Family Disorderly Conduct False Fire Alarm Miscellaneous	1 27	- 1 28		00.0				
TOTAL	721	712	10	19.9	93,556	1,869		

a Source: Dayton Police Department.

bCrimes may be cleared by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

^cClearance rates are determined by dividing number of crimes after reclassification and unfounded into the number of crimes cleared.

APPENDIX B

Average notification and apprehension time in the Fifth District by type of crime, January through November, 1970.

Table 1. Average notification and apprehension time in the Fifth District by type of crime, January through November, 1970 a

Month		T	ype of crime	Ъ		
	A	В	C	D ·	1	F.
January			(minutes)			
January Notification Apprehension	5.5 62.0	82.0 3,906.3	31.8 7,749.5	363.6 6,305.2	600.0 1,414.1	253.5 4,667.8
February Notification Apprehension	5.0 250.0	704.6 379.4	6.0 62.5	111.6 4,199.6	796.7 148.5	118.8
March Notification Apprehension	0.0	635.0 211.6	3,180.3 170.3	111.6 7,698.4	13.6 1,638.9	573.5 2,369.0
April Notification Apprehension		490.3	- -	233.7 4,456.4	1,216.9 12,385.9	30.0 240.0
May Notification Apprehension	3.0 17.0	815.1 2,322.6	24.3 6,244.0	833.3 8,137.0	6,665.0	311.0 2,249.0
June Notification Apprehension		668.0 2,683.5	1,233.3 4,590.0	294.3 3,654.9	425.7 5,937.9	102.0

APPENDIX B
Table 1 cont.

Month		T	ype of crim	le b		
	A	, B	T C	T D	li li	F
	11	1	(minutes)		1.	1 1.
July			,			
Notification	63.0	2,776.0	243.8	49,2	2,701.3	256.0
Apprehension	13.0	5,116.8	4,430.2	439.1	10,547,7	415.0
August						
Notification		2,052.3	21.0	142.0	909.5	224.5
Apprehension		1,655.4	223.5	1,729.5	25,799.3	8,281.8
September	ř					
Notification	13.2	91.2	46.0	543.9	624.4	310.0
Approhension	2,169.3	8,630.8	2,694.0	2,820.4	6,003.5	
S						
October Notification	5.0	305.0	36.0	1,707.5	27.9	184.0
Apprehension	45.0	12,630.0	3,032.8	6,081.5	340.4	96.0
Apprenension	₩₩ ¥ Q.	12,000.0	5,052.0	0,001.5	340,4	30.0
Vovember						•
Notification	6.0	62.3	, — • • • •	136.2	124.4	*
Apprehension	14.0	4,620.7		1,280.1	43.9	

^aSource: Dayton Police Department

bA = armed robbery; B = burglary; C = unarmed robbery; D = assult; E = larceny; F = auto theft

APPENDIX C

Questionnaire used to determine community attitude toward police service.

Code	
Туре	

COMFIDENTIAL

Within the past year, the Dayton Police Department has begun several new programs in modern policing techniques. These programs are now in the "growing" stages. It is extremely important to have your opinion about these programs if they are to be expanded across the entire city. You are being contacted because of your recent call to the police department. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. No names are required. Your answers will be totaled with the entire sample. These questionnaires will be viewed only by members of our research team at Wright State University.

Plea	se answer the following questions:
1.	Do you think the police responded to your recent call within a time period which you regard as:
American de la composition della composition del	a. Very short b. Short c. About right d. Long e. Very long f. The police did not come to my house
2.	In his behavior towards you, would you say that the police officer handling your call was:
	_a. Courteous and polite _b. Discountcous and disrespectful _c. Neither courteous or discourteous
3.	Do you feel the efforts made by the police to collect the needed information were:
	a. Excellent b. Good c. Fair d. Poor e. Very poor
4.	Did you make a follow-up call to the police department to give additional information or ask additional questions?
	a. Yes b. No
5.	If you answered <u>yes</u> to question 4, did you have any trouble contacting the police officer who was handling your complaint?
	a. Yes b. No
6.	Which of the following best describes your impression of how the police handled the problem?
	a. Acceptableb. Not acceptable
7.	. Did you feel that you were discriminated against by the police because of:
	Race: Yes No Age: Yes No Sex: Yes No Style of life: Yes No

8.	After your recent contact with the police, would you say that you now have:
*************	a. Greater respect for the police than before b. The same respect for the police c. Less respect for the police
9.	If you were dissatisfied with the police behavior and actions, how did you show the dissatisfaction?
gand delegation of the state of	a. I was not dissatisfied with the police service b. Kept it to myself c. Told tem of my dissatisfaction d. Thought of reporting him e. Edd report his behavior to his superiors
10.	If the police were able to satisfactorily resolve the problem, why to you believe that they were successful?
11.	If the police were unable to satisfactorily resolve the problem,
	why do you believe that they were uncuccessful?

12.	The	pc mu	olic nity	e d Se	epa rvi	rtm ce	ent Offi	has i.cer	re	cen Fav	tly e yo	sta ou h	rte ear	d a d al	new out	pro the	e p	im et rogra	ille m?	ı t	he	
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	ລ	r e.	Yes No																			

16. If you answered yes to question 15, list some of the things that the Conflict Management team does.

17. What changes would you like to see in the way the police handle neighborhood and school disturbances?

APPENDIX D.

Tabular results of community attitude towards police service.

Table 1. Community attitude toward police response time by district and race - 1971a

						······································
Attitude Toward	District b			Race		
Police Response Time	Fifth	Second			Black	White
			(perc	ent)		
Very Short	23	5 _j i			24	2 <u>1</u> 1
Short	17	20			24	17
About Right	33	34			27	35
Long	13	8			16	10
Very Long	7	7			6	6
Did Not Come To House	6	7			0	8
No Response	1	0			3	0
Chi Square	2.02			•	8.93	

aSource: Community attitude questionaires

bThe sample included 95 interviews from citizens in the 5th District and 71 from the 2nd District. There were 30 blacks and 134 whites interviewed. Two interviews did not reveal race, thus district totals do not equal race totals. Proportions are shown. The number of respondents in each class can be derived or obtained from the survey.

Table 2. Community attitude toward police behavior by district and race 1971a

Attitude Toward	Dis	trict	Rac	Race	
Police Behavior	Fifth	Second	Black	White	
Courteous	77	76 (pe	ercent) . 80	77	
Discourteous	7	11	10	5	
Neither	10	14	10	13	
No Response	6	6		5	
Chi Square	1.28		3.33		

^aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 3. Community attitude toward police efforts to collect information by district and race - 1971a

Efforts To Collect	Dis	trict	Rac	Race		
Information	Fifth	Second	Black	White		
The same of the sa		(per	cent)			
Excellent	34	31	21	36		
Good	39	48	47	42		
Fair	15	9	20	11.		
Poor	5	6	6	6		
Very Poor	14	14	6	2		
No Response	3	2	0	3		
Chi Square	2.21		5.95			

^aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 4. Community experience when making a follow-up effort by district and race - 1971a,

Follow-Up	Dis	trict	R	Race		
Effort	Fifth	Second	Black	White		
		(pe	ercent)	•		
Response Yes	24	30	5 ₇ 1	27		
Was it difficult to make contact? Yes No	37 63 73	23 77 70	43 57 73	28 72 72		
No Response	3	0	3	1		
Chi Square	3.31		.58			

^aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 5. Community impression of police work by district and race - 1971a

	Distr	ict	Rar	Se .	
Impression	Fifth	Second	Black	White	
		(per	cent)		
Acceptable	80	80	82	80	
Not Acceptable	14	18	18	15	
No Response	6	2	0	5	
Chi Square	1.16		1.64		

aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 6. Discrimination by age, sex, race, and life style by district and race - 1971a

Discrimination	Dist	rict	Race		
By:	Fifth	Second	Black	White	
	en deutsche Begrin der gerenderen Stemmer Spreiche Begrin der der der Schrift des der der Schrift des der der Schrift des	(per	cent)	•	
Age Yes No No Response X ²	8 78 14 6.36	կ 92 կ	7 76 17 2.36	1 ₄ 87 9	
Sex Yes No No Response X ²	2 80 18 7.16	0 94 6	3 73 24 8,39	0 89 11	
Race Yes No No Response X ²	3 8 <u>1;</u> 14 4.78	0 94 6	3 83 1 ¹ 4 1.29	1 90 9	
Life Style Yes No No Response X2	1, 78 18 6.81	2 92 6	0 73 27 10.2	ц 88 8	

aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 7. Community respect for police by district and race-1971a

	ىلىقىيىدىنىڭ ئىلىنىڭ ھەنىدىنىڭ ئىلىنىڭ ئۇسىنىنىيىنىڭ ئېرىنىنىڭ يېرىدىنىڭ		1	ininany tanàna ao amin'ny mandrona dia kaominina dia kaominina dia kaominina dia kaominina dia kaominina dia k I	وبالأخوا والمتاه	
Respect for Police	Dis	trict		Rae	98	
LOTTCE	Fifth	Second		Black	White	
		(perc	ent)		
Greater	15	18		6	18	
About the Same	71	73		76	. 71	
Less	10	7		13	7	
No Response	1,	2		3	2	
χ2	1.25			3.34	•	

^aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 8. Community actions if dissatisfied with police performance by district and race - 1971a

How Dissatisfaction	Dist	crict	Rad	oe
Was Made Known	Fifth	Second	Black	White
	(percent)			
Not Dissatisfied	65	63	63	64
Kept It To Myself	12	12	17 ·	12
Told Him	7	<u>}į</u>	10	5
Thought Of Reporting Him	. 1	1	0	2
Did Report Him	2	0	3	0
No Response	12	20	7	16
χ2	3,50		4.9	

aSource: Community attitude questionaires

Table 9. Knowledge of Community Service Officer Program and Conflict Management Program by district and race-1971a

			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Frogram	Dist	District		ıce	
	Fifth	Second	Black	White.	
		(per	cent)		
Cormunity Service Officer Yes No No Response X2	26 69 5 2.14	16 77 6	30 66 3 1.19	20 7 ¹ 4 6	
Conflict Manage- ment Yes No No Response	8 87 5 ,64	8 84 8	13 83 4 1.21	7 87 6	•

• \$

APPENDIX E

Questionnaire to determine the community attitude towards the Team Policing concept.

^aSource: Community attitude questionaires

District

Code

CONFIDENTIAL

Within the past year, the Dayton Police Department has begun several new programs in modern policing techniques. These programs are now completing the first year. It is extremely important to have your opinion about these programs if they are to be expanded across the entire city. You have been randomly selected from your neighborhood. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. No names are required. Your answers will be totaled with the entire sample. These questionnaires will be viewed only by members of our research team at Wright State University.

•		
18.	Your occupation:	
•	a. Self-employed	
	b. Wage-earner	
	c. Salaried employee	
•	d. Student	•.
• •	e. Other (specify)	
19.	Your level of education:	
now card)	a. Less than 9 years	
·	b. Less than a high school diploma	
	c. A high school diploma	
	d. Some college	
	e. College degree	
20.	Total household income:	
ow card)	a. Less than \$5000	

ъ. \$5000 to \$12000

Over \$12000

APPENDIX F

Results of the community attitude survey towards the Dayton Police Department, August 1971

Table 1. Distribution of family size in the experimental and control districts, Dayton Police experiment, 1971

Family		Districtb				
size	Experimental	Control				
	(p	ercent)				
1-2	34	33				
3 - 4	40	39				
5 - 6	15	17				
7 - 8	8	8				
9-10	2	2				
11-12	1	1				
		. , 				

aSource: Dayton community survey.

bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

Table 2. Distribution of interviewee's age in the experimental and control districts, Dayton Police experiment,1971

Age		Districtb				
.	Experimental	Control				
Under 18	2	percent) 2				
18-25	15	19				
26-35	22	17				
36-45	20	23				
46-55	19	18				
over 55	22	21				

^aSource: Dayton community survey.

Table 3. Distribution of number of years living in the Dayton area by district, 1971

Year	Districtb			
	Experimental		Control	
less than one year	9	(percent)	9	
1-2	15		11	
3 - 4	18		18	
5-10	22		25	
over 10	36		37	

^aSource: Dayton community survey

b A total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

^bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

Table 4. Distribution of types of employment by experimental and control districts, Dayton Police experiment, 19712

Type of	Districtb			
employment	Experimental	Control		
Self employed	9	(percent) 8		
Hour wage earned	32	29		
Salaried worker	23	17		
Student	5	11 11 1		
Other (retired, welfare, unemployed, etc.)	31	35		

^aSource: Dayton community survey.

Table 5. Distribution of the number of years of formal education by experimental and control districts, Dayton Police experiment, 1971

Years of	Districtb				
formal education	Experimental		Control		
Less than 9	8	(percent)	14		
9 but less than 12	17		22		
High school diploma	41		40		
Some college	25		22		
College degree	9		2		

^aSource: Dayton community survey.

^bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

^bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

-12

Table 6. Distribution of incomes by experimental and control districts, Dayton Police experiment, 1971

	I	District ^b	
Income	Experimental	Control	
Less than \$5000	21 (p	ercent) 27	
\$5000 - 12,000	54	60	
over \$12,000	22	12	
No response	3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

^aSource: Dayton community survey.

Table 7. Types of Personal Police Contact by Members of the Experimental and Control District, Dayton Police Experiment, 1971^a

Type of Contact			Distr	ict ^b		
	Total	Experimental		Co	Control	
		(number)	(percent)	(number)	(percent)	
All contacts	97	60	100.0	37	100.0	
Victimization	39	26	43.3	13	35.1	
Traffic	12	9	15.0	3	3.0	
Neighbor Dis- turbance	19	9	15.0	10	27.1	
Family Dis- turbance	5	4	6.7	1	2.7	
Other	22	12	20.0	10	27.1	

aSource: Dayton community survey.

bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

Table 8. Community Attitude Toward the Safety of Property and Neighborhood Violence or Tension by District, Dayton Police Experiment, 1971

		Property Safe	ty ^b	Neighborhood \	Violence or Tensic
	Attitude	Experimental District	Control District	Experimental District	Control District
* 20,400 2000			q)	ercent)	
	Very safe	22	19	26	31
	About average	_{&} 52	40	47	39
* e p	Not very safe	22	31	21	14
	Cannot say	Ž,	8	6	15
	Did not say	0	2	0	1
	x^2	12.2		7.1	

a Source: Dayton community survey.

Table 9. Community Attitude Toward the Change in Numbers of Property Crimes and Neighbor Violence or Tensions Since December, 1970 by District, Dayton Police Experiment, 1971

74444	Property Safe	ty ^b	Neighborhood Viol	ence or Tension
Attitude -	Experimental District	Control District	Experimental District	Control District
		(pe	rcent)	
An increase	29	20	22	15
No change	51	53	60	53
A decrease	5	9	5 .	10
Cannot say	13	11	1.3.	21
Did not respond	2	1	0	1
x ²	2.0		10.0	

a Source: Dayton community survey.

A total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

A total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

Table 10. Community Attitude Toward How the Dayton Police Should and Do Respond to Community Tensions, by District, 1971a

Attitude E	Should Respon	đ	Do Respond	
	Experimentalh District	Control ^b District	Experimental ^b District	Control ^b District
	**************************************	(pe	rcent)	
Maximum show of force	12	15	23	24
Enforce the law strictly	y 26	21	27	39
Police under- stand cause of problem ^C	50	49	29	18
Separate groups of people ^d	9	13	8	10
No Response	3	2	13	9
x^2	3.0		7.9	

aSource: Dayton community survey.

Table 11. Preventive Steps Taken to Reduce the Possibility of Being a Victim of a Crime by District, 1971

Preventive Step	. District ^b				
	Experimental	Control			
	(percent)				
Avoided being out at night	27	15			
Added more lights	12	11			
Improved locks	9	10			
Carried a weapon	6	4			
Other	11	11			
No preventive steps were necessary	35	46			
No response	0	3			
x ²	13.1				

a Source: Dayton community survey.

bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizers of the control district were interviewed.

CThe complete response was "try to understand the causes of the conflict and get people to talk to one another even if this was not acting exactly like an ordinary cop."

dThe complete response was "prevent conflict by keeping people out of dangerous areas and off the streets."

b A total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.

Table 12. Citizen's rating of the Dayton Police Department by members of the Experimental and Control Districts, 197

Rating		District b	
ra cing	Experimental		Control
		(percent)	
Excellent	11		13
Good	38		27
Average	30		42
Fair	13		5
Poor	6		13
No response	2		0
x ²	15.1		

aSource: Dayton community survey.

END

bA total of 186 citizens of the experimental 5th District and 123 citizens of the control district were interviewed.