

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTIONS

George V. Voinovich  
Governor

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Lieutenant Governor

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A Systems Approach  
to  
Corrections in Ohio



SUMMER 1994

Resource Guide

Update

Reginald A. Wilkinson

Director

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# A Systems Approach to the Ohio Corrections Process

## Resource Guide Update

NCJRS

AUG 30 1995

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Reginald A. Wilkinson  
Director

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

Summer 1994

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Department is extremely appreciative of everyone who provided their valuable expertise in assisting in the preparation of this report and without whose collective knowledge this document would not have been possible.

\* \* \*

To the executive staff for their tireless efforts and professionalism, talents and contributions in collecting data, providing progress action reports and facilitating the continuous tasks of assuring that each established initiative is directed toward a productive conclusion.

\* \* \*

And to the committee whose dedication to professionalism and willingness to contribute to the mission of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) have worked many hours in compiling, assembling and packaging this document for use as a resource guide.

\* \* \*

To all ODRC support staff who provided technical assistance in the preparation of this document.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The contents of this document update the *Systems Approach to Corrections in Ohio*, which was created in the fall of 1993 to assemble and monitor major Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction initiatives resulting from information and recommendations emanating from the eleven-day disturbance at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. During the disturbance's aftermath, an abundance of data was generated about the siege and its implications for the future of corrections in Ohio. Director Reginald A. Wilkinson launched the development and compilation of this *Resource Guide* to monitor major initiatives that would enhance the management efficiency of one of the nation's largest correctional systems. The initial document outlined the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's actions immediately following the siege as well as recommendations in the following reports:

**Disturbance Cause Committee**  
**SOCF Renovation/Planning Committee**  
**The Initial Hours Chronology Committee - Preliminary Investigation**

The Summer 1994 edition includes new Departmental initiatives, as well as action taken on recommendations made by the following committees:

**Correctional Institution Inspection Committee**  
**Governor's Select Committee on Corrections**  
**\* Lucasville Media Task Force**  
**OCSEA/AFSCME Committee**  
**SOCF Delivery of Basic Services Committee**  
**SOCF Renovation/Planning Committee**  
**Use of Force Process Review Committee**

- \* The Lucasville Media Task Force submitted a report to Governor George V. Voinovich in March, 1994. (See Appendix A) Sixty-four recommendations were identified, with 48 specific to the Department. The Governor's Press Secretary, Mike Dawson, impaneled a committee consisting of representatives from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the Ohio State Highway Patrol and the Adjutant General's Office to review the report and formulate a response. An implementation plan will follow. Adopted recommendations will be folded into a new ODRC media policy and into the *Systems Approach to Corrections in Ohio*.


The *Resource Guide* reflects action taken in eight major divisions:

<b>01.00.00</b>	<b>Security and Supervision</b>
<b>02.00.00</b>	<b>Inmate Services</b>
<b>03.00.00</b>	<b>Inmate Programming</b>
<b>04.00.00</b>	<b>Employee Relations</b>
<b>05.00.00</b>	<b>Parole and Community Services</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

06.00.00	Communication and Education
07.00.00	Fiscal/Audits
08.00.00	Committees - Synopses and Status

As before, each division, category and initiative are numerically codified to provide for simple identification, systematic documentation and progress. A three-number structure is assigned to each initiative with the following descriptors:



The assigned number is retained throughout the process and each item is labeled as **Proposed, Initiated, Concluded or Deleted**. Concluded items, boxed at the bottom of each page, have either reached resolution or have become part of ongoing Departmental policy or procedure. Issues found not appropriate for the *Resource Guide*, or duplicates of existing initiatives, have been deleted and can be found in Appendix B.

To illustrate progress at a glance, initiatives whose status have changed from the original *Resource Guide* will be shaded in the text. New initiatives added since the initial publication are indicated by a double asterisk in the body of the text. A legend depicting status designations can be found at the beginning of each Major Division. Appendices are included to provide supporting and reference materials for the document.

The Fall 1994 edition of the *Resource Guide* will serve as a close-out document for initiatives generated by the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility disturbance. Remaining items will be folded into the *Systems Approach to Corrections in Ohio* which will become a complete computerized vehicle containing all Departmental initiatives such as the Operations Improvement Task Force, Strategic Plan, Goals and Objectives and more.

The *Systems Approach to Corrections in Ohio* serves to portray and evaluate issues and initiatives considered vital to operations of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The systems approach enables the Department to monitor the status of any initiative, issue reports and provide accountability to all interested stakeholders.

# SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

## Security and Supervision

01.00.00


The mission of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction includes the admonition "... to protect Ohio's citizens by ensuring effective supervision of adult offenders in environments that are safe, humane and appropriately secure..." The 1993 disturbance at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility compelled us to take a fresh look at that mission and review policies, practices and procedures that impact our mission. For example, issues emerging during the disturbance were the presence of confidential documents in unit management offices and the use of inmate clerks to type sensitive material. Such infractions in security practices should serve as warnings to all ODRC staff to evaluate their roles in institution security and employee safety.

- 01.01.00      **Critical Incident Review**
- 01.02.00      **Disturbance Control**
- 01.03.00      **Inmate Classification**
- 01.04.00      **Inmate Housing**
- 01.05.00      **Prison Violence**
- 01.06.00      **Prisoner Focus Groups**
- 01.07.00      **Security Threat Groups (Gangs) Management**
- 01.08.00      **Unit Management**
- 01.09.00      **Use of Force**

### LEGEND



Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.



New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.

# SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

## Critical Incident Review

01.01.00

Any serious event at a prison, such as an escape or assault is termed a critical incident. The Department has significantly improved and defined policies and procedures to increase the timeliness and effectiveness of our response to critical incidents.

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

**Concluded**

01.01.01

The Chief Inspector has initiated a process where special incidents may be reviewed by an independent team composed of staff from other facilities and departments. This is now an operational procedure.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Disturbance Control

01.02.00

Disturbance control is a term used for the containment and resolution of inmate mob action ranging from a sit down labor strike to a riot. The North and South regions and each prison have special teams available to manage such incidents.

#### Proposed

01.02.03\*\*

AFSCME has proposed that ODRC benchmark with Minnesota on the use of DCT teams.

01.02.04\*\*

A Joint Labor Management Committee is proposed to survey each institution, beginning with the high security institutions, to determine true safety zones for employees to seek during a disturbance. SOCF's new construction provides safety zones for employees in the living areas.

#### Initiated

01.02.01

Security policy review is ongoing. Policies have been separated into two categories, those dealing with critical incidents and those dealing with other security concerns. Policies dealing with security concerns are undergoing final review. The Critical Incident Management policy is in place. The incident action plans are in the preliminary review process. Newly formed Special Response Teams (SRT) are in place to respond immediately to institution disturbances. Regional response to disturbances has been moved under the direction of the Special Tactical and Response team (STAR) Commanders.

01.02.02

Once the Critical Incident Management System is in place, the Department will conduct regular announced and unannounced exercises and scenarios utilizing members of the institution and regional Special Response Teams (SRT) and local Hostage Negotiation Teams (HNT). This is part of the system maintenance program.

01.02.05\*\*

The SOCF disturbance control team continues to remain indefinitely on site, seven days a week on first and second shifts. The presence of the team will be reviewed periodically to evaluate their continued need and function.

01.02.06\*\*

ODRC is adopting the Incident Command System for managing critical incidents. This system delineates a clear chain of command as well as a unified command where there is a multi-jurisdictional response.

Concluded

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Inmate Classification

01.03.00

Inmate classification is designed to provide a fair, uniform and objective method for the security classification of inmates for institutional assignment and control. The classification system has been upgraded to provide additional stratification as a means to protect the public, ensure staff safety and offer inmates the opportunity to improve their security rating through appropriate behavior and program participation.

#### Proposed

01.03.02

Two Bureau of Classification staff should be hired and used as trainers for institution unit staff regarding classification, disciplinary transfers, and to perform audit activities.

01.03.04

Acquire two state vehicles to facilitate travel during training activities.

01.03.09\*\*

AFSCME proposes a joint committee to benchmark with other states on classification.

#### Initiated

01.03.05

The Office of Prisons has requested that Management Information Systems (MIS) include notification of the mandated separation of inmates for safety or security purposes on the Inmate Progression System (IPS) information software, so it will be retrievable by the Bureau of Classification and persons involved in classification and reclassification of inmates.

01.03.07\*\*

The classification of minimum level inmates was studied in October 1992 through a grant by the National Institute of Corrections (NIC). The Bureau of Classification and Reception Operational Improvement Group was formed to initiate a comprehensive study of the Inmate Classification System. The group's final report was submitted on February 3, 1994. A progress report of their recommendations is underway.

01.03.08\*\*

In order to ensure that sports equipment, commissary and other items are appropriate for the assigned security level, a focus group has developed a policy regarding access to weightlifting equipment based upon security levels. Also, a group of Deputy Wardens and Majors is developing policy regarding inmate personal property which will include items sold in the commissary.

01.03.10\*\*

The Regional Directors are consulting with the NIC to determine the possibility of contracting with an expert to evaluate inmate movement in all high security institutions.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

Proposed

Initiated

### Concluded

01.03.01

The Department conducted a unit management seminar as an initial step toward improving bureau training.

01.03.03

To provide for additional support at Central Office, the Department developed and filled the position of Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Classification and Reception.

01.03.06\*\*

Increased privileges, programming opportunities and parole considerations exist at lower security institutions to reduce the possibility that inmates would be motivated to progress to or remain in maximum security status. In order to achieve a change in security status, inmates must comply with institution rules and regulations.

## **SECURITY AND SUPERVISION**

### **Inmate Housing**

01.04.00

Inmate housing in Ohio's prisons ranges from minimum security dormitories to maximum security cell blocks and segregation units. Most inmates are housed in general population status. Groups of inmates may be housed together for peer support in programming areas such as literacy and substance abuse.

#### Cell Assignments

The practice of random cell assignment emanates from the White v. Morris court case which addressed racial "bunching" in prisons. Random cell assignments combined with crowding had resulted in strong objections from inmate hate groups.

#### Oakwood Correctional Facility

The Oakwood Correctional Facility is a 164-bed maximum security psychiatric treatment facility providing acute clinical care for mentally ill inmates. The former forensic center was recently turned over to the Department from the Department of Mental Health.

#### Segregation

Inmates requiring specially managed environments to protect the safety and security of the inmates and staff are housed under the following designations:

Security Control (SC) - Pre-hearing detention for inmates who violate serious rules of conduct or are in isolation for investigative purposes.

Disciplinary Control (DC) - Inmates may spend up to thirty days in DC after being found guilty of violating institution rules.

Local Control (LC) - Housing is for inmates who have shown an inability to adjust to prison life and present a threat to security.

Protective Control (PC) - Provides a protective environment to ensure the safety of inmates who may be endangered by placement in the general population.

Administrative Control (AC) - Houses predatory or assaultive inmates who pose a serious threat to the safety of staff and inmates.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Proposed

01.04.06\*\*

The imposition of safe operational capacity levels, the level at which the safety of inmates and personnel will be substantially threatened if more inmates are added, is under review. If all beds currently under construction and planned are completed, the Department's level of crowding will be just under 140 percent if the population projections through the year 2000 remain accurate.

01.04.11\*\*

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

### Initiated

01.04.03

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

01.04.07\*\*

Plans have been announced to single-cell maximum security inmates at SOCF following the retrofitting of L-Block. In addition, planning for the high maximum security prison has begun and will further accommodate the process of using security concerns and classification status, rather than prison crowding in determining the celling of inmates.

01.04.08\*\*

A policy is being reviewed concerning double cell assignments. Inmates will have the opportunity to request a review of their assignment.

01.04.09\*\*

A policy for a 90-day review of Administrative Control inmates and one governing inmates' privilege levels are in draft form at this time.

01.04.10\*\*

The continuing prison building program and renovation of SOCF cellblocks determines the availability of bed space for inmates transferred due to security reasons or identification as gang members.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

### **Concluded**

01.04.01

Due to expanding prison populations, Wardens have devised additional disciplinary steps such as cell and privilege restriction, extra duty assignments and loss of good time credit.

01.04.02

Staff benchmarked with Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan to study solutions to racially integrated celling.

01.04.04

The Department consulted with Attorney Vincent Nathan and a task force of Wardens to recommend a single cell policy at SOCF which was adopted and implemented by the Department. A report on the policy was filed with the Federal District Court in Cincinnati.

01.04.05

Youngstown has been selected as the site for the construction of a high maximum security prison in Northern Ohio to help house and control violent and predatory inmates in the system. Capital funding has been obtained. Architectural and engineering firm selection is underway.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Prison Violence

01.05.00

Acts of prison violence are categorized as: Inmate on inmate violence, inmate on staff violence and inmate on facility violence. During the past year, the Department has increased tracking abilities in order to recognize trends and deal with patterns of prison violence.

#### Proposed

01.05.02

**Deleted** (See Appendix B).

#### Initiated

01.05.01

A committee has been implemented to review possible formats and methods for reporting prison violence. A proposed form was tested at Mansfield, Lima, and Marion Correctional Institutions. The format and information gathered is currently being reviewed by MIS to determine format validity. Additional meetings of the committee will be required to review the MIS evaluation and make any required changes.

01.05.03

A Committee is reviewing data collection forms for documenting and tracking prisoner violence such as inmate assaults on staff to facilitate statistical analysis.

01.05.04

A fourth week of pre-service training for correction officers will include scenarios on potentially violent situations and appropriate ways of dealing with them.

01.05.05\*\*

ODRC is currently enhancing existing reporting forms to track inmate violence. The Legislature recently upgraded criminal penalties for inmate on staff assaults. Institutions work closely with the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSP) in criminal investigations and assist in gathering information and presenting criminal evidence.

01.05.06\*\*

The Crimes-by-Inmates Task Force concluded with a recommendation that the county prosecutors retain responsibility for such matters, and also recommended that the Legislature consider financial assistance for prosecutors in counties with prisons.

#### Concluded

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Prisoner Focus Groups

01.06.00

Some prison systems have utilized inmate advisory groups to keep management updated on issues and concerns. A prisoner focus group may be a short or long-term association of inmates to express concerns and inform staff on population moods and issues. Pilot programs will be developed at Belmont and North Central Correctional Institutions.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

01.06.01

A staff member has been assigned to evaluate a system for conducting inmate focus groups to discuss and provide input regarding quality of life issues in prison settings.

#### Concluded

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Security Threat Group and Gang Management

01.07.00

The control and dispersal of groups of inmates with destructive agendas is an important function in controlling violence and extortion, and in maintaining effective inmate supervision. The Department has made significant strides in identifying, tracking and controlling Security Threat Group (STG) activity.

#### Proposed

01.07.09\*\*

Representatives from Labor Unions will be included in the Gang Coordination process. Although membership in hate groups is often, by definition, a covert issue, limiting contact between members of hate groups and inmates is a function of sound prison management.

#### Initiated

01.07.06

A staff person is assigned to follow up on the STG computer data base and serve as a responsibility center. A STG-MIS system has been developed and an operation manual is currently being written.

#### Concluded

01.07.01

A committee composed of the ODRC gang coordinator, the AFSCME gang coordinator and other ODRC employees have presented and continues to update Security Threat Group training for institution majors, inspectors, investigators, STG coordinators and training officers.

01.07.02

An ODRC Rule of Conduct for inmates prohibiting STG activities was adopted in January 1993 and is currently enforced.

01.07.03

STG coordinators have been established at each institution and have held a state-wide meeting.

01.07.04

Formal classification of STG inmates began at the reception centers in January 1993.

01.07.05

A policy for the management of Security Threat Group activity was implemented effective October 25, 1993.

01.07.07\*\*

The Gang Coordinator position has been filled. The Department will continue to identify and track security threat group activity.

01.07.08\*\*

The addition of a rule of conduct prohibiting gang activity presents a disciplinary means of addressing behavior which poses a threat to the safety and security of the parent institution. Inmates found guilty of such activity could be recommended for transfer. ODRC has developed a Security Threat Group management policy. Monitoring will be the responsibility of the Central Office Security Threat Group Coordinator. In addition, gang related training is offered to staff on an ongoing basis.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Unit Management

01.08.00

Unit management is designed to improve inmate control and relationships and improve the delivery of correctional services by dividing the larger institution population into smaller, more manageable groups. In unit management, a team approach is utilized. Programmatic and personal needs are addressed in a timely manner, reducing inmate frustration and creating a less tense environment. Unit management staff work in conjunction with other employees to enhance prison security.

#### Proposed

01.08.09\*\*

AFSCME proposes an initiative for joint teams to visit other state and federal prisons to benchmark unit management for Ohio.

01.08.10\*\*

Inmate clerks should not have access to telephones, computers, or records in Unit Management Offices and should have no role in processing of cell assignments or inmate conduct reports.

#### Initiated

01.08.02

A committee has been assigned to review the unit management reporting system to enhance in-house intelligence gathering and improve cooperation among staff. An employee has been assigned to monitor the progress of the committee and assist in implementing the newly devised unit management reporting system.

01.08.04\*\*

As part of unit management training, proper file maintenance is included; e.g. handling/filing of confidential information. Storage of files will be addressed as a committee revises the unit management manual.

01.08.08\*\*

Policies to regulate inmate movement while allowing for meals, recreation and other services in the housing units to inmates who pose an unacceptable security threat are under review by ODRC Security Administrators. Mass movement of inmates from cellblocks to other areas of SOCF has been drastically reduced and limited. This process has been initiated by new movement policy and the reconstruction of various security devices in L Block.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

Proposed

Initiated

### Concluded

01.08.01

The state-wide unit management summit, held in September 1993, focused on developing cooperation between departments within the prisons.

01.08.03

A staff member has been assigned to monitor the directive issued that social service supervisors and unit management staff meet regularly to share concerns and participate in ongoing training.

01.08.05\*\*

A staff member visited Ashland, Kentucky Federal Correctional Institution in October 1993, to observe the Unit Management Operation at the facility. SOCF staff is planning a benchmark trip to Ashland, Kentucky Federal Correctional Institution.

01.08.06\*\*

Unit management is currently practiced in all Ohio prisons. After the Unit Management Summit, task groups consisting of staff from management and labor were formed to review and improve unit management implementation, practices and procedures.

01.08.07\*\*

Task groups reviewed unit management concepts to ensure that the actions of unit management staff, unit managers, case managers and correctional counselors are congruent with security needs. Unit management is defined as an operational process, not a treatment program and emphasizes the necessity of security concerns.

## SECURITY AND SUPERVISION

### Use of Force

01.09.00

The use of force in a prison ranges from slight force (guiding an inmate by the arm) to deadly force. Any time an inmate is physically handled, a use of force report is written and a review is conducted to ascertain whether the force used was the least force necessary to address the situation. The Chief Inspector is responsible for monitoring the use of force in Ohio Prisons.

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

**Concluded**

01.09.01

A Use of Force Review Committee has submitted its final report on policies and procedures governing the use of force on prisoners. The committee has reviewed the appropriateness of use of force cases in calendar year 1992 and has submitted its report.

01.09.02

Use of Force Review Committee developed procedures which were submitted with their report on September 30, 1993.

## **INMATE SERVICES**


### **Inmate Services**

02.00.00


The mission of ODRC includes the goal of instilling in offenders an improved sense of responsibility and the ability to become productive citizens. The department provides trained staff and resources to address medical problems, mental health issues, religious services and substance abuse recovery services. The diverse character of our inmate population necessitates a broad range of services within each of these categories:

- 02.01.00      Medical Issues**
- 02.02.00      Mental Health Issues**
- 02.03.00      Recovery Services**
- 02.04.00      Religious Services**

#### **LEGEND**



**Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.**



**New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.**

## INMATE SERVICES

### Medical Issues

02.01.00

The availability and quality of medical care is an important quality of life issue. Medical treatment in a prison setting ranges from specialty clinics to emergency treatment and hospice care. Ten percent of the inmate population seek medical treatment on a daily basis.

#### Proposed

02.01.05

The Bureau of Medical Services is studying the feasibility of targeting Industry and Entertainment (I&E) funds to directly evaluate and address grievances related to medical care.

02.01.10\*\*

Per Ohio Revised Code, the Department must purchase most medical supplies and pharmaceuticals from the Pharmacy Service Center, which charges an eight percent mark-up. Elimination of this prerequisite would require a change in State law.

#### Initiated

02.01.04

In order to enhance the delivery of medical care and boost the morale of nurses, pilot projects have been initiated to remove nurses from involvement in activities that do not require licensure.

02.01.06

A program to coordinate non-mandated, but often litigated medical care such as non-prescription medication and medical prosthetics is under study. A new prosthetics policy has been drafted. Other initiatives are still being studied.

2.01.07\*\*

ODRC continues to pursue good health care for all inmates. Female offenders are treated both at the female institutions and at a newly opened wing of the Corrections Medical Center (CMC). The CMC wing treats female offenders with acute and chronic medical needs. The Ohio Reformatory for Women has instituted a Health Promotion Program (preventive health care) for staff and inmates.

02.01.08\*\*

The Medical Director is leading an effort to discourage inmate abuse of medical services through direct and indirect incentives. The Office of Prisons will benchmark other systems' approaches to this issue.

02.01.09\*\*

Commitments have been made to add a number of dental positions in the institutions, and a department-wide survey of current dental care needs is being conducted by the Bureau of Medical Services staff. The biennial budget as approved by the legislature deleted funding for new dental positions.

## INMATE SERVICES

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

### **Concluded**

02.01.01

As part of the surrender agreement with the rioting inmates at SOCF, the department consulted with Islamic experts and the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) on the issue of Tuberculin testing. Islamic leaders provided assurances to Muslim inmates that there is no prohibition against inoculations in the Koran. The ODH worked with the department to evaluate tuberculin testing policies and procedures and offered advice on moving forward with the testing program.

02.01.02

As of September 1993, in response to the rise of tuberculosis cases in the United States, all ODRC inmates have completed TB testing.

02.01.03

The Corrections Medical Center (CMC) opened in August 1993, to serve as the centralized medical system for Ohio prisons. The CMC accommodates 210 prisoner beds, and serves 100-150 out-patient inmates on a daily basis.

## INMATE SERVICES

### Mental Health Services

02.02.00

Mentally ill inmates are treated through a jointly operated system provided by the ODRC and the Ohio Department of Mental Health (ODMH). The increase in inmate population has caused a corresponding increase in the number of mentally ill inmates requiring treatment. Staff from ODRC and ODMH work to identify, diagnose, stabilize and treat mentally disturbed offenders.

#### Proposed

02.02.09\*\*

Mental Health workers should be required to report to ODRC staff when inmates refuse medications or demonstrate unusual behavior.

02.02.10\*\*

A legislative select committee should be established to study all relevant issues pertaining to mental health services in prisons, including the current policy of not forcing prisoners to take prescribed psychotropic medications. The Department has advised the CIIC that it has hired a team of consultants to advise us on mental health issues and to prepare a report for the Federal Court in response to the class-action lawsuit, Dunn v. Voinovich.

#### Initiated

02.02.03

The review of existing residential treatment programs to identify problem areas in the delivery system for the mentally ill inmate is an ongoing process.

02.02.04

Methods of increasing 24-hour psychiatric coverage continues to be jointly explored by ODMH and ODRC. A pilot project is being conducted by ODMH at the Correctional Reception Center's Psychiatric Residential Unit. The results will assist in determining the cost for other correctional facilities. The cost for this type of service is not currently in either Department's budget but, will be included in either ODMH or ODRC's next biennium budget request. The Department is reviewing the possibility of contracting with local providers to augment mental health services and provide after-hours call coverage.

02.02.05

The logistical difficulties of training ODRC line staff assigned to psychiatric residential units continues to be studied. A report is to be completed by an interdepartmental committee.

02.02.06

A proposal to contract with a nursing school to develop a training video to teach skills for the management of psychiatric illnesses and psychiatric medications has been delayed pending the employment of a nurse educator.

## INMATE SERVICES

### Proposed

### Initiated

02.02.08\*\*

Regional Administrators for Psychology, Social Services, Recovery Services and the Bureau of Medical Services will begin examining the recommendation that psychiatric services in prison be run by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. ODRC and ODMH have initiated a focus group to analyze the delivery of mental health services to corrections.

### Concluded

02.02.01

Aftercare treatment coordination has been increased through the establishment of aftercare committees composed of ODRC, ODMH and community service care providers.

02.02.02

The transfer of the Oakwood Forensic Center to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to enhance specialized programming for chronically mentally ill inmates was effective January 1, 1994.

02.02.07

The following steps have been taken to increase psychiatric residential units to house behaviorally disabled and mentally retarded inmates:

1. The Oakwood Correctional Facility serves as a residential unit for chronically ill inmates.
2. The Trumbull Correctional Institution is currently in the process of implementing a privatized mental health residential unit.

## INMATE SERVICES

### Recovery Services

02.03.00

The link between substance abuse and criminal activity is well documented. A 1992 Departmental study indicates that between 70 and 80 percent of inmates entering the prison system have alcohol or substance abuse histories, while 32 percent were convicted of a drug offense. Recovery Services staff provide an array of services including identification, assessment and treatment for those needing substance abuse programming.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

02.03.01

A grant application for a treatment matching pilot project was submitted by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment. The grant was approved but not funded. The Department will reapply when funding becomes available.

02.03.02

New job classifications and specialized training to attract and retain qualified service providers have been submitted to the Department of Administrative Services and are pending approval.

02.03.03

Included in the Recovery Services budget are funds targeted for resources such as computers, literature and training. A proposal has been submitted to the Office of Criminal Justice Services to send Recovery Services staff to the Ohio Alcohol and Drug Studies Institute at Ashland College.

02.03.04\*\*

Although inmates released without subsequent supervision at the expiration of definite sentences are no longer within the control of the Department, they are referred to community drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs. The Recovery Services Administrator will benchmark this issue to increase participation.

#### Concluded

## INMATE SERVICES

### Religious Services

02.04.00

The Religious Services Department oversees all organized religious activities within institutions. Activities include conducting worship services, supervising chaplains and religious volunteers, providing pastoral care and counseling inmates.

#### Proposed

02.04.02

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

02.04.03

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

02.04.06

Funds are unavailable to fill vacant chaplain positions at Lorain Correctional Institution, Southeastern Correctional Institution and Warren Correctional Institution or to add a third position at Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.

02.04.07\*\*

ODRC should hire qualified Islamic leaders or Imams to provide leadership and Chaplaincy services for Muslim inmates and with the same manner and criteria of background checks.

#### Initiated

02.04.01

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

02.04.05

First draft of the Religious Services Handbook is complete and under review.

#### Concluded

02.04.04

Religious issues are addressed in a two hour block of diversity training required of all ODRC employees in 1994. Religious preferences are also in the diversity component of Leadership Development Training.

## **INMATE PROGRAMMING**

### **Inmate Programming** 03.00.00

Inmate programming involves work, education and recreation programs designed to reduce inmate idleness and tension, provide community service projects and help prepare inmates for the transition to becoming successful citizens upon their release from prison.

- 03.01.00 Educational Programs**
- 03.02.00 Female Inmate Issues**
- 03.03.00 Recreation Programs**
- 03.04.00 Work Assignments**

#### **LEGEND**



**Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.**



**New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.**

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

### Educational Programs

03.01.00

Educational programming is an integral part of the correctional process. In Ohio formalized education was initiated in 1961, and today provides educational programming that encompasses an average daily enrollment of 8,000 and an involvement of approximately 50 percent of our inmate population in some type of educational activity during the year.

#### Proposed

03.01.09

Explore the use of private and community agencies to provide resources and services to address job readiness and job placement and Ohio Central School System (OCSS) special education needs.

03.01.11

Explore the use of local educational programs, local joint vocational schools, community colleges as well as four year colleges and universities to provide resources and services to address the educational needs of Community Based Correctional Facilities (CBCF).

03.01.15

Hire staff and develop techniques at reception centers for identifying inmates eligible for special education.

#### Initiated

03.01.04

A plan has been written, disseminated, and implemented to provide career motivation, orientation and exploration programs.

03.01.12

A strategy is being designed for implementing a state-wide computer network that will allow educational data to be stored centrally, disseminated, and shared by all educational entities in OCSS and other appropriate departments.

03.01.13

An effective mechanism has been initiated to develop and implement a formalized research component for OCSS.

03.01.17\*\*

Needs assessment surveys and standardized programming efforts assist in the expansion of existing counseling programs including vocational counseling, family counseling, parenting training, social skills, and survivors of domestic violence programs.

#### Concluded

(Concluded Items 03.01.03, 03.01.05 to 03.01.07, 03.01.10, 03.01.14 and 03.01.16 are on the following page)

03.01.01

Created ten literacy units designed to provide intensive academic exposure for program participants to develop social and academic skills in a residential setting.

03.01.02

Montgomery Education and Pre-Release Center has opened and addresses the educational needs of inmates in pre-release status.

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

### **Concluded**

(Concluded)

03.01.03

Courses of study have been developed which emphasize student outcomes and disseminated to all instructional staff.

03.01.05

A strategy has been developed to identify potential administrators for the Ohio Central School System (OCSS).

03.01.06

Regionalization has been reviewed to determine its success relative to staff development and providing career opportunities for all staff.

03.01.07

Non-traditional programming for both men and women is being emphasized in the development and implementation when planning new educational programs.

03.01.08

The VEPD plan linkages have been established and developed between vocational education and private business and industry for placement of vocational completers on an experimental basis.

03.01.10

The use of interactive video to offer specialized courses and/or expanded program offerings to the OCSS either through local educational programs, joint vocational schools or colleges and universities and hardware is in place to implement services.

03.01.14

Educational staff have become a part of institutional planning for new prisons to effectively integrate educational programming in the overall operation of the institutions.

03.01.16\*\*

Training, Industry and Education (T.I.E.) is a fundamental part of ODRC inmate programming. The Office of Prisons plans to continue to promote the T.I.E. concept.

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

### Female Inmate Issues

03.02.00

Crowding in Ohio's three institutions for female offenders mirrors that of male facilities. The development and utilization of alternatives to incarceration for female offenders would serve to ease the severe effects of crowding, allowing for more effective use of bed space and programs. Most incarcerated women are first time offenders convicted of property crimes for which community-based punishments may be more appropriate. Extensive programming is available to incarcerated women with focuses on prenatal training, parenting, substance abuse counseling and the building of self-esteem.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

03.02.03

The FY 95-96 Capital Bill submission contained numerous requests to address the physical plant of the Ohio Reformatory for Women (ORW).

03.02.05

ORW schedules special "Mother and Child" visitation events three to four times a year. Several hundred inmates, children and family members participate. ORW is working with the Ohio Youth Advocates Program to provide services and programs to enhance mother and child interaction in the visiting hall by offering structured activities in a relaxed setting.

03.02.06\*\*

Female offenders receive educational and vocational training opportunities both within the confines of the prison and as a direct benefit of community services projects such as training pilot dogs and rehabilitating dilapidated houses.

#### Concluded

03.02.01

ORW has been very successful in using local resources, providing services to the community and working with an advisory group.

03.02.02

ORW has developed a cost saving initiative group assigned to find ways to lower expenses and conserve resources.

03.02.04

ODRC Deputy Directors met with all Wardens as well as union representatives to devise plans for the hiring of additional correctional officer staff for each institution based upon population and post analysis. Post and staffing analyses must be continuously reviewed to ensure current staffing is sufficient to the stated mission. Staffing analyses should occur at least once a year or when the mission of a particular institution is significantly changed.

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

### Recreation Programs

03.03.00

Recreational activities provide a positive outlet for inmate energy, significantly reducing stress and enhancing safety and security within prisons. Recreation reduces inmate idleness while encouraging cooperation and teamwork. Following the crisis at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, a focus group studied issues related to recreational activities in the prison setting.

#### Proposed

03.03.09\*\*

A security audit and study of all recreation equipment, furniture and other non-stationary implements which are readily accessible to inmates will be conducted by a joint labor/management task group to determine the use of such items as weapons and make recommendations for change.

#### Initiated

03.03.03

Initial data collected from the Medical Director's survey of injury incurred by weight lifters was insufficient to formulate policy recommendations. The study is ongoing.

03.03.05

The Recreation Focus Group addressed the issue of the correctional officers' role in the recreation process and has submitted its final report to the Director. The recommendations are under review by the Office of Prisons.

03.03.07

The development of an informational and educational initiative to inform ODRC employees and the general public about the benefits of recreational programming has been assigned to the Ohio Central School System's Recreational Coordinator.

03.03.08

Current utilization of non-traditional living areas is a direct result of the lack of available bed space. Some dayroom activity areas are currently in use. However, no gymnasiums are utilized for living space. ODRC recognizes the importance of athletics and physical exertion as factors in inmate well-being and rehabilitation. The use of non-traditional living areas for living space will be decreased upon the reconstruction of SOCF and as planned prisons are opened.

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

Proposed

Initiated

### Concluded

03.03.01

The Recreation Focus Group initiated a study and submitted a report on the use of free weights and alternative methods of body building activities in prisons of different security levels. Free weights have been phased out of maximum and close security facilities.

03.03.02

A member of the Recreation Focus Group benchmarked with Eddyville, Kentucky to gain input on moving from free weights to weight machines in inmate recreation.

03.03.04

The Recreation Focus Group has completed its report on ways to develop a system to streamline and provide consistency in the recreational activity budget process and submitted its findings to the Director. The Regional Directors have required each facility to include the Recreation Director on the Industry and Entertainment (I&E) Budget Committee. In addition, budgetary information regarding I&E expenditures has been discussed with the Wardens.

03.03.06

The Recreation Focus Group has submitted recommendations regarding incentives and ideas for career growth in the recreational staff classification.

## INMATE PROGRAMMING

### Work Assignments

03.04.00

Good work programs for inmates are critical in helping accomplish three important goals: to establish a controlled and positive prison environment where productive work reduces idleness; to provide efficient labor to operate and maintain the prisons; and to assist the inmates in developing good work habits and acquiring skills useful in securing employment after release.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

03.04.03

Funding to begin a pilot project to add a second shift to perform community service projects has been received. A contract supervisor has been hired and tools and equipment ordered. The pilot project will be housed at the Orient Correctional Institution.

03.04.04

The Ohio Reformatory for Women and the Columbus Housing Partnership (CHP) met on January 10, 1994 and re-established a crew from ORW to perform housing rehab work.

03.04.05\*\*

Existing ODRC policy forbids the use of inmate clerks in areas which would allow them access to sensitive information. A committee consisting of management and labor staff has been assigned to review security/unit management issues.

#### Concluded

03.04.01

The partnership between ODRC, Mid-Ohio FoodBank and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints will continue on an annual basis to produce canned beans for distribution to the hungry.

03.04.02

The Department continues to increase community service projects as well as the amount of inmate labor dedicated to them. Hours committed to work on community service projects increased from 31,491 in January to 43,457 in December 1993.

03.04.06\*\*

The expansion of meaningful work opportunities is an ongoing effort by the Ohio Penal Industries. The number of inmates working in OPI has grown from under 2,000 in 1991 to over 2,800 as of December 31, 1993. This represents an increase of over 40 percent.

03.04.07\*\*

The Psychology and Human Services Administrators and the Bureau of Medical Services continue to explore ways of expanding and targeting education and work programs for inmates with special needs.

## **EMPLOYEE RELATIONS**

### **Employee Relations**

04.00.00


Employee relations are among the most important elements of any organization. All staff offer services and bolster security. The Employee Relations Division strives to recruit and retain high quality employees which mirror the general population.

- 04.01.00      Employee Qualifications/Evaluations**
- 04.02.00      Labor Relations**
- 04.03.00      Minority Recruitment**
- 04.04.00      Staffing Issues**
- 04.05.00      Training/In-service Programs**

#### **LEGEND**



Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.



New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Employee Qualifications/Evaluations

04.01.00

The Department continues to improve the professionalism of its workforce by recruiting prospective employees with appropriate qualifications. The Ohio Corrections Assessment Center (OCAC) recently opened on the grounds of the Corrections Training Academy. OCAC recruits, evaluates and places correctional officer applicants.

#### Proposed

04.01.08\*\*

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

#### Initiated

04.01.03

A Skills Inventory instrument is being revised to more accurately identify employees with potential for advancement.

04.01.04

A Performance Evaluation Committee has reviewed the Performance Evaluation process. One part of the recommendation included supervisor training. The training program is initiated.

04.01.06\*\*

The OCOPI test for anti-social attitudes prepared by psychologists addresses the Department's attempts to avoid hiring individuals affiliated with or espousing the views of hate groups. The background investigation may also reveal hate group affiliations.

04.01.07\*\*

The four month probationary period for Correctional Officers is established by Civil Service Law and Union Agreement. The average probationary period nationally for new Correctional Officers is 8.2 months. The probationary period for Correctional Officers has been extended to six (6) months plus four (4) weeks of CTA pre-service training period.

04.01.10\*\*

The process to assure that performance evaluations are conducted and completed accurately is underway.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

### **Concluded**

04.01.01

The Ohio Corrections Assessment Center began taking applications in December 1993. Minimum qualifications include a high school education or GED, written, psychological and agility tests and an interview.

04.01.02

The new process for conducting and strengthening performance evaluations was implemented in November 1993. Completion of performance evaluations has improved from 36 percent in July 1993, to 79 percent in January 1994.

04.01.05\*\*

To ensure that all Correctional Officer candidates can work comfortably in a multicultural setting, the existing Ohio Correctional Officer Psychological Inventory (OCOPI) test includes a component to evaluate the ability to work with minorities. The interview questions prepared by the Department's psychologists also include this component. All Correctional Officer candidates must pass these tests prior to gaining employment.

04.01.09\*\*

Criteria for appointing future Wardens at maximum security institutions include prior work experience in security operations.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Labor Relations

04.02.00

The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is Ohio's largest agency, with over 11,000 employees. Of those, 8,500 are bargaining unit employees represented by four unions. Fostering a better relationship and improving lines of communication between the unions and management are top priorities.

#### Proposed

04.02.05\*\*

During FY 95 an initiative to develop and implement joint Labor/Management Training will be pursued. This effort will be facilitated with funds provided by Section 37.10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement with AFSCME/OCSEA. The Training will be co-developed with union officials.

#### Initiated

04.02.04\*\*

During FY 95 an initiative to develop and implement joint Labor/Management Training will be pursued. This effort will be facilitated with funds provided by Section 37.10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement with AFSCME/OCSFA. The Training will be co-developed with union officials.

#### Concluded

04.02.01

A focus group comprised of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees/Ohio Civil Service Employee Association (AFSCME/OCSEA) chapter presidents and bargaining unit members has been formed and met to discuss issues related to Ohio corrections.

04.02.02

The Office of Collective Bargaining presented a seminar on future bargaining unit negotiations to senior staff and Wardens in July 1993.

04.02.03

A directive was issued to Executive Staff and Wardens to include union representation in all decision-making groups as a means of enhancing the relationship between unions and management.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Minority Recruitment

04.03.00

Because over 50 percent of inmates are minorities, it is a Departmental priority to recruit, hire and promote minorities into all classifications and management levels to improve staff and inmate interaction. Intensive recruitment efforts continue to result in qualified minority and female applicants. The Ohio Corrections Assessment Center (OCAC) has assumed recruitment responsibilities for the Department.

#### Proposed

04.03.07\*\*

The Department should site prisons closer to major urban areas in order to improve minority recruitment and retention. The Department has chosen Youngstown as the site for the new High-Maximum security prison.

#### Initiated

04.03.03

The Department continuously expands recruitment activities, including live radio and television interviews, public service announcements, recruitment fliers for schools, churches and community organizations and job fairs.

04.03.06

OCAC Recruitment Coordinators have been directed to develop incentives for geographic areas with a low minority population. Long range plans are being developed to draw a minority and female applicant base for SOCF, Belmont, and Noble Correctional Institutions. Applicants from Youngstown, which has a high minority base, will be informed of relocation opportunities. OCAC has worked with a Community Action Group regarding obtaining jobs for unemployed workers.

#### Concluded

04.03.01

The Director met with the Executive Director of the Scioto County National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to explore avenues for improved minority recruitment at SOCF and state-wide.

04.03.02

The Assessment Center began taking Correction Officer applications in December 1993. The Recruitment Coordinator continues to assist in comprehensive recruitment efforts.

04.03.04

The Department networked with Central State University to develop a two-year Correctional Degree program for minorities to be hired in a correctional setting. Sinclair College will provide the academic program at Central State. Central State will provide the practicum.

04.03.05

All new Correctional Officer positions are being filled by at least 25 percent minorities and 25 percent females.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Staffing Issues

04.04.00

The issue of staffing, particularly correctional officer-to-inmate ratios, is a major Departmental concern. Initiatives to enhance the ratio have included the addition of correctional officer positions and the placement of unit staff in the living areas to assist in supervision.

#### Proposed

04.04.04\*\*

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

04.04.05\*\*

**Deleted** (See Appendix B)

#### Initiated

04.04.03

As directed in the FY 94-95 operational budget, a committee of labor and management is reviewing Department staffing. A report from this committee is due on September 30, 1994.

#### Concluded

04.04.01

The staffing review of the additional 904 correctional officers included in the FY 94-95 operational budget has been completed and allocation made. Four hundred thirty-eight correctional officer positions were filled in FY 94 with 466 to be hired in FY 95.

04.04.02

The Department continues to promote and support the Voinovich/DeWine Administration's initiative to divert appropriate offenders from prison to community based punishment alternatives.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Training/In-service Programs

04.05.00

The Department offers numerous training programs including mandatory pre-service and in-service training, on-the-job training and advancement programs to enhance career growth. Training is conducted at the Corrections Training Academy in Orient, Ohio and the Corrections Training Center in Lancaster, Ohio and on the job sites.

#### Proposed

04.05.11

Add new institution training staff to monitor additional staff requirements.

04.05.16

Refine and implement Mid-management Training.

04.05.18\*\*

Provide training on the discipline process to increase the availability of staff to conduct pre-disciplinary hearings.

#### Initiated

04.05.08

Enhanced training for the former Disturbance Control and Tactical Response Teams, now combined into the Special Response Teams (SRT) and regional Special Tactical and Response team (STAR) is underway.

04.05.09

ODRC staff consulted with American Correctional Association personnel in January 1994, regarding the development of a new curriculum for law enforcement personnel training.

04.05.17

Two regional Special Tactical and Response (STAR) team Commanders are in place. The Commanders are developing, coordinating, implementing and supervising the training of special teams.

04.05.20\*\*

A committee has been formed under the auspices of the Chief Inspector's Office to develop training to respond to fire and other emergencies.

04.05.22\*\*

The Federal Bureau of Prisons self-study program is being reviewed.

04.05.23\*\*

An intensive leadership development program is available to ODRC staff. The Leadership Design and Development Team will create a variety of programs available to all staff including Wardens. The team is currently reviewing existing admissions standards.

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Proposed

### Initiated

04.05.24\*\*

A lesson plan to include mediation and conciliation training for institution inspectors is under development.

04.05.25\*\*

The Corrections Training Academy will undergo ACA Accreditation in the fall of FY 95.

04.05.28\*\*

The Corrections Training Academy is conducting a survey of training programs nation-wide to select and adopt the best aspects for inclusion in Ohio's training program.

04.05.30\*\*

The Department's new lesson plan in the use of the Inmate Grievance Procedure adds additional training in informal usage, including a lesson plan on conflict resolution called "Getting to Yes."

04.05.31\*\*

Department officials have contacted appropriate staff of the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council to attempt to explore methods and means of enhancing the entry level and In-Service training curriculum for ODRC Correctional Officers.

### Concluded

(Concluded Items 04.05.06 to 04.05.07 and 04.05.10 and 04.05.12 to 04.05.15 and 04.05.19\*\*, 04.05.21\*\* and 04.05.26\*\* to 04.05.27\*\* and 04.05.29\*\* are on the following page)

04.05.01

Diversity training provided to executive staff has been expanded to include all ODRC staff. Wardens, Regional Administrators and Central Office staff will receive training in 1994.

04.05.02

A training advisory council is in place and meets quarterly. The council is established per ODRC policy.

04.05.03

A three day in-service seminar on STG and gangs was developed for appropriate staff and was implemented in October 1993.

04.05.04

The Corrections Training Center at the Southeastern Correctional Institution is designated as a satellite site for meetings and training sessions.

04.05.05

The department received a technical assistance grant through the National Academy of Corrections to have a consultant train staff on a problem-solving process called "Quality Function Deployment."

## EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

### Concluded

(Continued)

04.05.06

All correctional officers receive seven weeks of pre-service training. Four weeks of training are conducted at the Corrections Training Academy. Three weeks are monitored by CTA and conducted at the institutions.

04.05.07

In-service training now includes 24 hours of diversity training to enhance communication between urban and rural cultures. Quality Service through Partnership training, which includes interactive skills development, has been implemented.

04.05.10

A 16-hour intensive diversity program for SOCF staff has been presented.

04.05.12

Some additional staff have been added to the Corrections Training Academy to accommodate increased training demands. Three positions have been created and filled.

04.05.13

An ODRC curriculum design and development team presented and continues to augment special training for staff working in close and maximum security housing areas.

04.05.14

Five hours of diversity training have been added to pre-service training. Twenty-four hours are required of all staff in 1994.

04.05.15

Diversity issues and effective supervision of staff were the curricula for a two-day retreat attended by Chiefs of Security (ODRC Majors).

04.05.19\*\*

Training has been provided to appropriate staff on changes to contractual agreements resulting from negotiations with the various unions.

04.05.21\*\*

In March 1994, ODRC began to conduct needs assessments with various departments to determine what additional training is needed and how best to provide this training. Because of space constraints at CTA, alternative sites for training will also be explored. Outside vendors will be used when appropriate and cost effective.

04.05.26\*\*

All employees who work in Ohio prisons, including those employed by Mental Health, must complete Pre-Service training at the Corrections Training Academy.

04.05.27\*\*

All employees, including chaplains, must complete Pre-Service training at the Corrections Training Academy. Pre-Service training includes security procedures.

04.05.29\*\*

Stress management in a correctional setting is included in the Corrections Training Academy curriculum.

## **PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES**

### **Parole and Community Services**

05.00.00

The ODRC promotes and supports community alternatives to incarceration to assist in curtailing the rate of growth in prison populations. The Adult Parole Authority (APA) networks with local authorities, associations and agencies to address pre-sentencing issues and community resources to alleviate stress and promote efficiency in the Criminal Justice System.


**05.01.00 Alternatives to Incarceration**

**05.02.00 Local Jails**


**05.03.00 Parole Board Issues**

**05.04.00 Probation and Parole**

#### **LEGEND**



**Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.**



**New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.**

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

### Alternatives to Incarceration

05.01.00

Many inmates are non-violent property offenders who could be safely and more effectively punished in a community setting. Diverting offenders from prison would greatly reduce prison crowding, increase safety and security, and improve programming effectiveness.

#### Proposed

05.01.12\*\*

The concept of "theme prisons" is under study by a problem solving group. In these prisons, programming would emphasize work and vocational programs, community service programs and a range of intensive educational opportunities.

#### Initiated

05.01.05

Halfway Houses continue to expand. Contract negotiations have been held. Contracts are now being prepared for over 1,400 beds in FY 95.

05.01.06

The Community-Based Correctional Facility (CBCF) network will expand to 13 facilities by the end of the biennium, providing over 900 beds for more than 2,700 offenders annually. Licking and Lucas County CBCFs opened in August 1994. The final facility will open in late 1994.

05.01.07

The Adult Parole Authority (APA) is implementing statutory authority to purchase community service needs. Bids have been completed. Fourteen of 23 bid areas have contracts. Other areas have been re-bid. Policies and procedures have been written.

05.01.11\*\*

ODRC has initiated a boot camp program where institutional amenities are reduced and a strict physical and programming schedule is imposed. Successful participants earn reduced sentences. ODRC is in the planning stages of developing a boot camp for female inmates.

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Proposed

Initiated

### Concluded

05.01.01

A meeting was held with Ohio Halfway House Association representatives regarding the ODRC's budget and their specific interest in the halfway house line item.

05.01.02

The Department established an award to recognize excellence in community corrections programs. The Cliff Skeen Award, instituted in 1993, is given to outstanding residential and non-residential programs which divert offenders from prison. The late State Representative Cliff Skeen was an advocate of community corrections.

05.01.03

The Division of Parole and Community Services expanded halfway house beds by over 200 beds in FY 94 totaling more than 800 beds.

05.01.04

The ODRC increased the percentage of FY 94 Budget devoted to community corrections from 9-10 percent to 11-12 percent.

05.01.08

Grant increases for eight Community Correction Act programs were approved, increasing the projected number of diversions from state prisons from 4,524 to 4,903 for an additional 379 diversions in a six month period.

05.01.09

Five counties have been approved for, but not awarded funding as day reporting centers:

Lorain County Probation Department  
Cuyahoga County--United Labor Agency  
Miami County Probation Department  
Hamilton County--Talbert House  
Stark County--Community Treatment and Correction Center

These centers will run as a pilot project for 12 months. An evaluation will be completed by the University of Cincinnati College of Criminal Justice.

05.01.10

Eight Community-Based Correctional Facilities as of January 1994, are operating at 123 percent of capacity. Design capacity for the eight facilities is 499 and operating capacity has been increased to 616. Three additional Community-Based Correctional Facilities in Licking, Lucas and Clermont Counties will open in 1994 at 120 percent bed capacity.

**PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES**

**Local Jails**  
05.02.00

The problems of crowding and limited resources are mirrored at the local level. All ODRC assistance provided to local authorities will serve to further protect Ohio citizens and improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

**Concluded**

05.02.01

The Bureau of Adult Detention provides technical assistance to local jails in the form of disturbance control seminars.

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

### Parole Board Issues

05.03.00

The Ohio Parole Board is responsible for releasing or continuing the incarceration of inmates serving indefinite sentences in Ohio prisons. Decisions are based on information contained in inmate records regarding the nature of the crime, sentence, prison record, escape risk, institution behavior and program participation.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

05.03.01

In order to streamline the parole hearing process, a new furlough eligibility rule has reduced the number of inmates eligible for furlough hearings. A Problem Solving Process (PSP) group is studying problems regarding rescheduled parole hearings. A new projected release rule and a revised shock-parole eligibility rule have been referred back to the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review (JCARR). Both will result in reducing unnecessary hearings.

05.03.02

Budget initiatives to improve the quality of information gathering for the Parole Board are under review for inclusion in the FY 96/97 Budget.

#### Concluded

05.03.03

The Parole Board has eliminated the Review Committee procedure at correctional institutions and replaced it with a Parole Board review that requires less staff time for all concerned.

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

### Probation and Parole

05.04.00

Probation and parole serve as alternatives to prison incarceration. Parolees and probationers remain under the supervision of state or local authorities. The decision to place offenders on parole or probation is often based on information provided in Pre-Sentence Investigations (PSIs).

#### Proposed

05.04.14\*\*

The expansion of existing linkages between probation officers who specialize in supervising the mentally ill and mentally retarded and mental health caseworkers who specialize in supervising criminal offenders is under review. This could aid in the identification of the mentally ill and mentally retarded at the pre-sentence stage and divert them from the prison system.

05.04.15\*\*

The feasibility of expanding mandatory drug treatment to any inmate who has had a substantiated drug or alcohol problems and to definite sentence releasees is being reviewed.

#### Initiated

05.04.03

The plan to expand PSIs for all felony commitments is in process. Parole Officers are being hired for this purpose. Contacts have been made with receiving institutions for interview space. A new investigations manual and questionnaire are being finalized. A sample was completed at the Ohio Reformatory for Women (ORW) and is being evaluated.

05.04.04

Two additional forms of release from prison have been initiated. The Electronically Monitored Early Release (EMER) contract for equipment has been bid with a projected start date of January 1995. The 120 day/conditional release program began July 1994. Procedures are being drafted and staff trained at this time.

05.04.05

A problem solving process group is meeting regularly to develop a range of sanctions for technical parole violators as an alternative to return to prison. Sub-committees are working on a variety of tasks including development of policy and procedure; identification and development of community sanctions; completion of a comprehensive training package and collection and analysis of baseline violation and sanction related data to measure effectiveness.

05.04.06

The APA is preparing for an ACA Accreditation audit scheduled for the fall of 1994.

05.04.07

A committee of field officers and supervisors reviewed and developed a new Final Release format which was submitted to the field for use. Central Office concentrated all final release reviews under one person and assigned a full-time secretary to prepare Parole Board minutes.

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

### Proposed

### Initiated

05.04.09\*\*

Plans for Technical Parole Violator Centers have been initiated. The Division of Parole and Community Services has received \$6.8 million in capital funds for the project, and data is being collected on parole violators to define the target population.

05.04.10\*\*

As follow-up treatment for released offenders has always been a Department priority, the Division of Parole and Community Services is preparing to bid for specialized services such as mental health, sexual disorders and other special needs that are not provided for without cost for offenders under their supervision.

05.04.11\*\*

Targeted inmate populations such as violent and sex offenders receive more intensive supervision under the existing parole process. The Department is also studying recommendations made by the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission which address this issue.

05.04.13\*\*

All regional Adult Parole Authority (APA) offices are preparing to implement random drug testing. A draft policy for testing is written, and lab technicians are being hired for each region to conduct the tests.

### Concluded

(Concluded Items 05.04.08, 05.04.12\*\* and 05.04.16 are on the following page)

05.04.01

The PSI questionnaire and procedures are under revision. The survey conducted to identify key information required for sentencing, classification, programming, release and supervision decisions has also been completed. Data was aggregated and disseminated to user groups. Modifications were made to the questionnaire based on survey findings.

05.04.02

In conjunction with ODRC Policy 310-12, the Security Threat Group (STG) form has been distributed to the STG coordinators in the regions, who will distribute them to the parole officers for PSI inclusion. Gang identification data has been integrated into the PSI process.

## PAROLE AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

### Concluded

(Continued)

05.04.08

A procedure for the Office of Prisons to personally check on transfer rejections was instituted during the Lucasville crisis. The percentage of inmates released during the designated parole month has gone from 85 percent in February of 1993 to 91 percent during December. With the aid of field placement specialists, overdue placements have been reduced from approximately 300 in January 1993, to 195 in December 1993.

05.04.12\*\*

Existing Department policy requires appointments be arranged with local substance abuse programs for offenders with Parole Board imposed conditions for such treatment.

05.04.16\*\*

Psychologists have been placed in three of six APA regions to facilitate linkages between institutional mental health programs and community counterparts for offender referrals.

# COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

## Communication and Education

06.00.00


Communicating the Department's message to stakeholders is a vital function determining public, legislative and judicial perceptions of the agency and its needs. Research, provided by the Management Information Systems (MIS) is the backbone for communication efforts. Providing quality services to the citizens of Ohio is a primary responsibility which is initiated department-wide by eliciting input from staff. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employs over 11,000 people, making effective internal communication necessary for staff morale, security and safety.

- 06.01.00      Advisory Committees**
- 06.02.00      Management Information Systems**
- 06.03.00      Media/Legislative/Judicial Relations**
- 06.04.00      Quality Services through Partnership**
- 06.05.00      Staff Communication**

### LEGEND



Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.



New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Advisory Committees

06.01.00

During the past decade, the Department has recognized the value of input from a variety of advisory groups. The new generation of prisons have been developed in consultation with neighborhood advisory groups. All Ohio prisons have convened advisory groups.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

06.01.02\*\*

With prison advisory groups in place state-wide, the Department will begin the formation of an ODRC Resource Group comprised of members selected from the prison advisory groups, the Community Corrections Advisory Group, the Jail Advisory group and the Prison Labor Advisory Group.

#### Concluded

06.01.01

Each institution has formed Advisory Committees pursuant to a directive issued by Director Wilkinson.

# COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

## Management Information Systems

06.02.00

Management Information Systems (MIS) conducts research and maintains data for the Department. A new computer system combines two existing systems and several extensive stand-alone micro computer applications. The completed system will provide for data sharing between the bureaus within MIS and increase data security and integrity.

### Proposed

06.02.06

~~Deleted~~ (See Appendix B)

06.02.07

~~Deleted~~ (See Appendix B)

### Initiated

06.02.01

The Bureau of Data Systems has hired one programmer analyst and one Data Base Analyst to assist in programming for the new IPS system. Another programmer analyst position is in the process of being filled. Two positions, a programmer analyst and a data control technician are being screened. A programmer analyst and a programmer specialist have been posted and will be screened.

06.02.02

Computer equipment has been ordered by the Training, Industry and Education (TIE) division to provide the Local Area Network (LAN) at each facility. Two LANs were installed at the Ohio Penal Industries on Phillip Road and a third LAN has been installed at the Corrections Training Academy. This will provide connectivity to the DAS IBM mainframe computer. A fourth LAN is currently being installed at SCI. These four LANs will be connected to the State Network by fall 1994. The majority of the equipment for the remaining LANs has already been purchased. The TIE/IPS information exchange is now in operation.

06.02.03

A high speed communications link to the State network has been installed and is operational. All business and payroll office functions are now taking place through the wide area network backbone. The Department is in the process of connecting the Unisys system to the State network and anticipates Central Office connection in 1994. High speed communication lines have been installed between 1050 Freeway Drive North and CAM and the Peerless Building. The Department will be converting that link to the wide area network in 1994.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Proposed

### Initiated

06.02.04

A Department standard is now in place for computer hardware and software. As a part of standardization, equipment must move toward the direction of Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and or Government Open Systems Internet Protocol (GOSIP) protocol. A first phase approach to standardization is to reconfigure those hardware purchases that do not, or can not be converted into a TCP/IP environment. Purchase of proprietary non-intelligent terminals has been discontinued to meet this first phase approach.

06.02.05

A new cable plant has been installed at the Corrections Training Academy. All critical on-line access is now being provided to the OCAC. Cable plant has been completed for L Block at SOCF. Bid proposals are being developed for installation of new cable plants in J and K Blocks and administrative portions of SOCF. Estimated completion date for SOCF is 3rd quarter 1994. Montgomery Pre-Release is now active with a cable plant and new switch provided with DAS approval from AT&T term contract. Proposals are in place for the Correctional Reception Center, pending approval from the Department of Administrative Services. Research is being done regarding the feasibility of retrofitting a cable plant at Madison Correctional Institution.

06.02.08\*\*

Eight staff will code criminal history information for IPS. Selection of staff is in process. Positions have been posted and should be filled by the 2nd quarter of FY 95. Shortly after January 1, 1995 initial work should begin to develop a criminal history module as a part of IPS.

06.02.09\*\*

The Security Threat Group module is in place. There was a training session conducted for DRC investigators. Plans are to purchase additional micro computers before January 1995. Initial design work is complete for a visitation module. Programming of this module is expected to start during the 2nd quarter of FY 95.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Proposed

### Initiated

06.02.12\*\*

The newly created Bureau of Planning and Evaluation is charged with preparing high quality research in the specific areas of program evaluation and recidivism, as well as for other long-term, large scale studies as may benefit the Department. A mechanism to ensure that results of this research are disseminated to interested stakeholders is being developed.

06.02.13\*\*

The committee schedules regular (quarterly) meetings and are in the process of developing design specifications for an integrated system. A standards document has been developed. The committee is in the process of getting the word out about their existence. The committee's vision is to eventually network criminal justice systems.

### Concluded

06.02.10\*\*

A Computer Automation Committee has been established to review all automation projects and to establish priorities.

06.02.11\*\*

Research resources have been significantly expanded. Under the new organization, the Department has created a Bureau of Research to complete most of the tasks currently performed, as well as a Bureau of Planning and Evaluation to conduct methodologically rigorous, quantitative studies. Routine information requests will continue to be routed to the Bureau of Research.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Media/Legislative/Judicial Relations

06.03.00

The Department communicates with the general public through broadcast and print media. It is important to respond to media inquiries in a prompt, courteous and accurate manner. The ODRC receives funds via the legislative budget process. We solicit input from legislators and inform them of the impact of proposed legislation. The Department also interacts with judicial organizations.

#### Proposed

06.03.09\*\*

Deleted (See Appendix B)

#### Initiated

06.03.06

The ODRC has assisted the Lucasville Media Task Force throughout deliberations to formulate recommendations to improve the delivery of services from the Public Information Office (PIO) to the media.

06.03.08

The Public Information Office analyzed the unit's work during the SOCF crisis regarding established general and emergency media policies as well as National Institute of Corrections training guidelines. The PIO also met with staff who worked the Public Information Office unit during the crisis, NIC consultants, reporters and the general public. The PIO benchmarked with other states on media policy issues and is in the process of revising policy based on the best information gathered. A new media policy, including assisting the media in crisis situations is in final draft form.

#### Concluded

(Concluded items 06.03.04, 06.03.05 and 06.03.07 are on the following page)

06.03.01

An additional full-time employee was added to the Public Information Office to assist in handling media calls and other requests for information.

06.03.02

A staff member was assigned to SOCF to research and respond to media calls, improve internal SOCF communications and update executive staff.

06.03.03

It is recognized that training in media relations during a crisis must be ongoing at various levels throughout the Department. Quarterly meetings will be held with designated institution staff. Training for Adult Parole Authority staff may be presented later in 1994. Public Information Training continues on a quarterly basis. The Department also conducted a three-day media training seminar in conjunction with experts from the U.S. Department of Transportation.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

### **Concluded**

(Continued)

06.03.04

Division of Parole and Community Services staff made a presentation to the Ohio Common Pleas Court Judges Association on the need for expanded community punishment options to help reduce crowding in Ohio's prisons.

06.03.05

Department staff continuously provided input to the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission to inform them of the impact of proposed sentencing laws on prison crowding.

06.03.07

Activities to aid the legislative liaison in being pro-active in communicating critical incidents and responding to requests for information from constituents, legislators and stakeholders have been incorporated into the liaison's duties. A full-time employee has been added to the Director's office staff to assist the legislative liaison in maintaining pro-active communications.

06.03.10\*\*

The Public Information Office has developed a comprehensive media policy which includes guidelines about the release of information and its impact and ramifications.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Quality Services through Partnership

06.04.00

The Quality Services through Partnership (QStP) committee was formed to further State of Ohio goals of excellence by incorporating all staff in decision-making processes through focus groups, town meetings and problem solving process groups. The QStP Committee has developed a mission statement, goals, ground rules and a training implementation plan.

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

### Concluded

06.04.01

A focus group consisting of ten recreational directors met to discuss the status of prison recreational programs. An action plan to address issues raised by the group, including the use of free weights in the prison setting, has been developed.

06.04.02

A focus group comprised of recipients of the Ronald C. Marshall Award (Correctional Officers of the Year) was formed to discuss departmental issues and continuous improvement efforts. The focus group also serves in an advisory capacity to the Director.

06.04.03

A focus group was conducted to generate ideas for involving more staff in the Department's quality initiatives.

06.04.04

The Director met with AFSCME/OCSEA chapter presidents to discuss issues related to Ohio corrections and bargaining unit members.

06.04.05

The Department presented an educational program developed by the Pacific Institute and the American Correctional Association. The program is designed to unlock human potential, improve working conditions and enhance personal development.

06.04.06

Executive staff were trained in Quality Function Deployment by Thomas Fujiyoshi in September 1993.

## COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION

### Staff Communication

06.05.00

Maintaining effective staff communication with over 11,000 employees is a critical aspect of the Department's operation. The safety and security of staff and inmates throughout the organization is dependent on the exchange of accurate and timely information. The Department has been selected to participate in a National Institute of Corrections communications improvement process.

#### Proposed

06.05.07\*\*

Only the Warden should be informed of a shakedown to be conducted under Operation Clearout and this information should remain confidential until the team has arrived at the prison.

06.05.08\*\*

Deleted (See Appendix B)

#### Initiated

06.05.03

Deleted (See Appendix B)

06.05.05

To improve staff communications, the Public Information Office has had discussions on the format and schedule of distributing more regular digest of ODRC news to be faxed to institutions and field offices. The PIO developed a monthly departmental fact sheet that is faxed throughout the Department. A focus group is studying methods to improve communication among ODRC staff and stakeholders. Efforts to publish the Department's staff newsletter on a more systematic basis are ongoing.

#### Concluded

06.05.01

The Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) in place during the SOCF disturbance has completed a series of speaking engagements available to all Ohio prisons. Their audience included, but was not limited to, prison HNTs.

06.05.02

The SOCF special edition of "The Communicator" was published and distributed.

06.05.04

A SOCF speaker's bureau and informational resource pack have been developed. Members of the speaker's bureau continue to participate in Crisis Management Training across the country.

06.05.06

The Department hired a systems analyst to develop a "systems" approach to inter-departmental communication and cooperation.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Fiscal/Audits

07.00.00


Managing large prison systems requires that fiscal resources are sought and maximized to assure optimal results. To ensure security and safety of staff and inmates, infrastructure issues must be addressed. A sound operation is enhanced by policies, procedures and practices maintained through standards and audits to direct their use.

- 07.01.00**      **Fiscal Issues**
- 07.02.00**      **Infrastructure**
- 07.03.00**      **Inmate Grievance Procedure**
- 07.04.00**      **Legal Issues**
- 07.05.00**      **Standards and Accreditation**

#### LEGEND



Initiatives whose status has changed from the original Resource Guide.



New Initiatives added since the Fall 1993 edition of the Resource Guide.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Fiscal Issues

07.01.00

The State of Ohio is operating under budgetary constraints. At the same time, the number of inmates admitted to ODRC continues to increase, thus impacting the level of services and security provided to the institutions and the community.

#### Proposed

#### Initiated

07.01.06\*\*

In reference to the recommendation made by the Governor's Select Committee that an additional 4,000 to 5,000 beds will be needed to bring the population and capacity of the prisons to a more manageable ratio, the Department currently has the following beds under construction or recently opened:

Montgomery Education and Pre-Release Center	350 Beds
Belmont Correctional Camp	250 Beds
North Central Correctional Institution	1,260 Beds
Trumbull Correctional Camp	250 Beds
Richland Correctional Camp	250 Beds
Belmont Correctional Institution	1,008 Beds
Noble Correctional Institution	1,260 Beds
Total Under Construction	4,628 Beds

Additionally, the upcoming Capital Bill contains requested funding to construct the following additional beds:

High Maximum Facility/Camp	750 Beds
Close Custody Facility	1,000 Beds
Richland Correctional Facility	1,260 Beds
Medium Custody Facility	1,260 Beds
Total Requested Beds	4,270 Beds

07.01.07\*\*

The Department has expedited the construction of new medium custody facilities at Marion, Belmont and Noble counties through fast track construction methods. Operational dollars are being obtained by requesting a fund transfer of available dollars from FY 94 to FY 95 to facilitate earlier openings.

07.01.08\*\*

The Department has requested through the pending "Corrective Funding" bill, funding to allow ODRC to greatly expand the number of psychological staff employed in our facilities. In addition to this, a staffing needs study is being completed; and will be included in the next Operating Budget request.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Proposed

### Initiated

07.01.09\*\*

A proposal to have separate budgeting for medical services including equipment purchases to avoid unnecessary delays is under consideration. The Bureau of Medical Services staff have increased communication with State Purchasing representatives to make them more aware of Department needs.

07.01.10\*\*

The Joint Committee on Correctional Institutions is studying the staffing needs in Ohio prisons. Any safe operating capacity designations are subject to both infrastructure and staffing capabilities.

### Concluded

07.01.01

The Division of Business Administration has established a system of maintaining records to justify the disbursement or denial of funds.

07.01.02

The Chief of the Division of Business Administration chairs an ongoing committee to review ways to "do more with less" and reduce costs.

07.01.03

While the monitoring of I&E funds is a continuous process, the Regional Directors discussed proper procedures for I&E expenditures at a Warden's meeting and through written directions. Telephone I&E expenditures are processed through the Regional Directors who will continuously monitor all requests to ensure compliance to standards and policy.

07.01.04

The Grants Office actively applies for grants to help subsidize ODRC's General Revenue Fund.

07.01.05

The Division of Business Administration worked very closely with Office of Business Management in developing the FY 94/95 Budget which was enacted by the legislature.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Infrastructure

07.02.00

Overall, institutions are well managed and do a good job of providing basic services despite crowding. Prison crowding has placed extreme stress on structures, utilities and equipment. Crowding has outpaced the ability of maintenance staff to keep up with crucial repairs. Limited maintenance budgets force staff to underfund important maintenance requirements as they address critical need areas. To address prison crowding, the Department must continue to build new prisons while working to adequately maintain existing facilities.

#### Proposed

07.02.05\*\*

Establish a joint committee to benchmark with other states regarding the construction of security gun ports or galleys in maximum security prisons and the installation of automated gas injection devices.

#### Initiated

07.02.04\*\*

As government facilities become available, ODRC reviews and determines if the structures merit follow-up for use as short-term facilities. Currently, we are working with base closing authorities on the possibility of obtaining a portion of the Rickenbacker Air Force Base southeast of Columbus for possible transfer to ODRC.

07.02.06\*\*

SOCF will be operated and maintained as a true maximum security facility after retrofitting. Enhanced security policies and procedures have been implemented. All maximum security classifications have been reviewed with a resultant decrease in inmates classified as maximum security from 1,800 to 1,500.

#### Concluded

07.02.01

The FY 95/96 Capital Bill submission was prepared with input from all correctional institutions and funding for a number of projects was received. The package addressed maintenance issues and to upgrade older facilities.

07.02.02

The FY 95/96 Capital Bill submission was prepared with input from all correctional institutions and funding for a number of projects was received. The package addressed maintenance issues and to upgrade facilities.

07.02.03

The current generation of prisons being constructed are built with population growth in mind. The designers were instructed to design to 180 percent capacity on sewage, water and other infrastructure issues. Adherence to a strong perimeter and dependable materials is monitored and based on the security level of the prisoner.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Inmate Grievance Procedure

07.03.00

The Department's inmate grievance procedure was developed to resolve inmate complaints regarding quality of life issues such as health and safety, nutrition, work assignments, personal property and family visits. At the institutional level, such issues are addressed by the grievance officer. The Office of the Chief Inspector employs an Assistant Chief Inspector for each of the two regions. Issues unresolved at the institution or Chief Inspector level may be appealed to the Director. The Department's inmate grievance procedure is fully certified by the U.S. Department of Justice.

#### Proposed

07.03.03

Prison crowding has greatly increased the number of grievances filed. Inspectors are currently overwhelmed by the number of grievances and inmate correspondence. The increased volume has made an adjustment to response time frames mandated in the Administrative Rules necessary. It is proposed that all institutional inspectors be given an assistant and access to clerical support so that they may better focus on problem solving and investigations.

07.03.06\*\*

Improve mail room processing procedures.

#### Initiated

07.03.01

A team comprised of institutional inspectors, prison investigators, Majors and the ODRC Gang Coordinator will continue the development of a gang intelligence network.

07.03.02

The recommendation that communication regarding changes in policy affecting the grievance procedure be improved system-wide was reiterated by the Governor's Select Committee and is assigned to the Assistant Chief Inspector for follow-up.

07.03.04

A ODRC staff member has been selected to follow-up on developing a mechanism to discourage abuse of the inmate grievance system.

07.03.08\*\*

In order to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, the Chief Inspector's Office has developed a new employee lesson plan. The Chief Inspector continues to schedule quarterly meetings with all Institution Inspectors.

#### Concluded

07.03.05

Staff from the Office of the Chief Inspector toured L-Block and retrieved and catalogued personal property left behind by prisoners after their surrender.

07.03.07\*\*

A new telephone system was installed at SOCF and became operational in June 1994.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Legal Issues

07.04.00

Legal Services staff deal primarily with issues which include inmate litigation, court compliance issues and public records requests. Legal Services attorneys represent the Department and its employees in providing in-house legal services.

#### Proposed

07.04.12\*\*

ODRC's Chief Counsel has requested a meeting with the Attorney General's Criminal Justice Section. The meeting will be to discuss the proposal that an informal procedure by which the Governor, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House would be advised of any settlement of inmate litigation at least 30 days prior to acceptance of such a settlement by ODRC.

#### Initiated

07.04.03

Approximately two-thirds of the settlements signed by the Department with K-Block inmates whose property was damaged have been rejected by the Court of Claims. These cases will be litigated, in all likelihood.

07.04.04

The final settlement of the McDowell case was approved by the court. If the Department meets the requirements of the settlement, the case can be terminated in three years.

07.04.05\*\*

The Department has re-opened L-Block as a single-celled facility. Similar renovations will be implemented in K-Block and J-Block, following which the entire institution will be single celled. The issue of racial integration in cells will become moot at that time.

07.04.11\*\*

The Department is aggressively pursuing inmate prosecution and is reviewing methods of reimbursing county prosecutors for associated costs.

#### Concluded

(Concluded items 07.04.06 to 07.04.10 are on the following page.)

07.04.01

A tour of L-block with potential defense attorneys was conducted on August 3, 1993.

07.04.02

A revised procedure for responding to public records requests has been issued. The new system will expedite the delivery of information to journalists.

07.04.05

At the beginning of January 1994, Judge Spiegel of the Federal District Court in Cincinnati approved the request of the parties to grant the Department a 90-day extension for full compliance with *White v. Morris*, the cell assignment case. During this time, the criminal investigation may be concluded. The Department's consultant, Attorney Vincent Nathan, worked with a task force of Wardens to develop an alternative approach to achieving compliance with the court's mandate. As a result, SOCF will house only one inmate per cell.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

Proposed

Initiated

### Concluded

(Continued)

07.04.06

The legal staff has prepared a Rule of Employee conduct which prohibits certain tattoos. This rule has been presented to the Bureau of Labor Relations for discussion with the appropriate employee bargaining representatives prior to implementation.

07.04.07

The Department will continue to retain Attorney Vincent Nathan to allow him to complete his evaluations and recommendations regarding the "21-Point Agreement."

07.04.08

As part of an ongoing process, the ODRC Chief Counsel communicates with Special Prosecutor Mark Piepmeier to ensure cooperation with the SOCF criminal investigation.

7.04.09

Administrative Control placements for former L-block inmates were reversed and expunged. These inmates have been assigned to Security Control status pending completion of the criminal investigation.

07.04.10

Two staff members have been assigned to monitor and report on compliance with the "21-Point Agreement." (see 07.04.07)

## FISCAL/AUDITS

### Standards and Accreditation

07.05.00

The Bureau of Accreditation and Standards is responsible for internal management audits. The Bureau ensures that operations and management are based on the *American Correctional Association's Adult Correctional Institution Standards* for both accredited and non-accredited institutions.

Accreditation provides the blueprint for corrections and serves to:

Assist in the implementation of quality management  
Provide increased accountability  
Enhance public credibility  
Provide measurable criteria for upgrading programs, staffing and physical plants on a continuous basis

#### Proposed

07.05.08\*\*

Fire safety currently falls under the purview of each institution's Safety Officer. To bring facilities into compliance with the fire code inspections, a problem solving group has been formed to focus on the method of inspection and appropriate responsibility center to oversee fire safety.

07.05.09\*\*

Staff safety equipment and devices should be tested on a regular basis.

07.05.10\*\*

Safety equipment and devices should be replaced when newer more comprehensive devices become available.

#### Initiated

07.05.05\*\*

The Bureau of Accreditation and Standards and the Security Administrators endeavor to assure that each facility is provided with adequate security and communications systems to perform their mission.

07.05.07\*\*

ODRC has secured grants to conduct independent security audits in our facilities. The use of technical assistance grants for security reviews will continue. Also, the Security Administrators are currently developing an internal security monitoring system.

#### Concluded

(Concluded items 07.05.04 and 07.05.06 are on the following page)

07.05.01

The Bureau of Accreditation and Standards completed a revised management audit process which will measure compliance with policies and monitor practices to ensure they match the policies.

07.05.02

The American Correctional Association has granted accreditation to eleven Ohio prisons and ODRC Central Office. The pursuit of ACA Accreditation is an ongoing priority for the Department.

07.05.03

The new internal management audit program provides for a systems approach combining the *ACA's Adult Correctional Institution Standards* (3rd ed.) and Ohio's management audit standards to establish national standards as our guiding management document.

## FISCAL/AUDITS

**Proposed**

**Initiated**

**Concluded**

(Continued)

07.05.04

The ODRC has implemented a plan to accredit all institutions by January 1999. Accreditation is an ongoing process.

07.05.06\*\*

After a brief delay in the practice of annual audits due to moving from a calendar year to a fiscal year system, and the SOCF disturbance, a revised audit system, based on ACA standards, is in place and back on schedule. Dissemination of audit findings to interested stakeholders is encouraged.

## **COMMITTEES - SYNOPSES AND STATUS**

### **Committees - Synopses and Status** **08.00.00**

Several committees have been assembled to research the SOCF disturbance and make recommendations to improve the security and efficiency of the Department. Appendix A to this report includes Executive Summaries where available. The scope and status of each committee is outlined in this section.

- 08.01.00      Correctional Institution Inspection Committee**
- 08.02.00      Disturbance Cause Committee**
- 08.03.00      Governor's Select Committee on Corrections**
- 08.04.00      The Initial Hours Chronology Committee**
- 08.05.00      Quality Services through Partnership Steering Committee**
- 08.06.00      Renovation/Planning Committee**
- 08.07.00      SOCF Disturbance Follow-up Committee**
- 08.08.00      SOCF Delivery of Basic Services Committee**
- 08.09.00      Use of Force Process Review Committee**
- 08.10.00      Lucasville Media Task Force Committee**

## **COMMITTEES - SYNOPSES AND STATUS**

### **Correctional Institution Inspection Committee**

08.01.00

The Corrections Institution Inspection Committee is an ongoing legislative committee focusing on the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The CIIC has conducted a separate investigation of the SOCF disturbance as it relates to the management of Ohio's prisons. The CIIC toured L-block and spoke with staff and inmates. On June 10, 1993 Director Reginald A. Wilkinson submitted the "Chronology" and "Cause" reports to the CIIC and testified as to the disturbance's impact on the prison system. The CIIC report recommendations are included in this document, and a summary of the report can be found in Appendix A.

### **Disturbance Cause Committee**

08.02.00

This committee was directed to identify facts that caused, contributed to or triggered the disturbance. The committee examined the environment, management systems, policies and staff interaction as well as inmate demands and complaints. They also interviewed staff, hostages and inmates cleared for interview by the OSP. The "Cause" committee submitted their findings June 10, 1993. Their report will be used as a reference in the implementation of new policies and procedures.

### **Governor's Select Committee on Corrections**

08.03.00

The Governor's Select Committee on Corrections was appointed on April 21, 1993 and charged with conducting a comprehensive evaluation of all reports and information pertaining to the SOCF disturbance. The Select Committee's stated mission is "to examine the philosophy, policies and practices of the ODRC and to make recommendations germane to preventing institutional violence and to make institutions safer and less stressful for all." The Select Committee's report was published in January 1994. The Select Committee recommendations are included in this document and a summary of their report can be found in Appendix A.

### **The Initial Hours Chronology Committee**

08.04.00

This committee's charge was to document the events immediately leading up to the riot at SOCF on Easter Sunday, focusing on the hours of 3:00 PM to 6:00 PM. The committee conducted interviews with staff involved in the initial hours of the disturbance. In order to avoid jeopardizing the criminal investigation, the committee was limited to interviewing inmates cleared for interview by the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSP). The Chronology committee submitted initial findings June 10, 1993.

### **QStP Steering Committee**

08.05.00

This committee was established in May of 1993 to implement and monitor ways in which all employees of the department may be informed and involved in the decision making process. This is achieved primarily through newsletters, training, focus groups and town meetings. Focus groups established to date are: Ronald C. Marshall Award recipients (Correctional Officer of the Year); Quality Initiatives group, AFSCME/OCSEA chapter presidents, recreation directors, and a number of problem solving groups. Director Wilkinson has mandated that Union representatives be named to planning committees state-wide.

## **COMMITTEES - SYNOPSES AND STATUS**

### **Renovation/Planning Committee**

08.06.00

The Renovation and Planning Committee has completed its assignment and submitted a report to the Director which was approved and is being used in renovation and improvement work at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.

### **SOCF Disturbance Follow-up Committee**

08.07.00

The SOCF Disturbance Follow-up Committee reviewed the Disturbance Cause, Initial Hours Chronology, Lansom Newsome and AFSCME/OCSEA Reports on behalf of the Department. Recommendations were compared, sorted and put into a format compatible with the "Systems Approach to Corrections" to ensure accountability and resolution. The follow-up committee completed its assignment and turned over monitoring of the recommendations to the "Systems Approach."

### **SOCF Delivery of Basic Services Committee**

08.08.00

The SOCF Delivery of Basic Services Committee was created to develop a plan to gradually introduce normalcy back to SOCF operations. The committee has completed its assignment.

### **Use of Force Process Review Committee**

08.09.00

The Use of Force Process Review Committee (impaneled to address allegations that minority inmates at SOCF were involved in a disproportional number of use of force actions) completed its assignment and submitted a report to the Director on September 30, 1993.

### **Lucasville Media Task Force Committee**

08.10.00

The Lucasville Media Task Force was convened at the Governor's request to "find out how the state can do a better job in dealing with the media in future disasters." The purpose of the Task Force was to make constructive recommendations on how the state could better handle crisis situations in the future. The Lucasville Media Task Force submitted its recommendations in March 1994 and they are included in this document. The recommendations of their report can be found in Appendix A.

## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

**Ohio Civil Service Employees Association  
AFSCME Local 11  
Executive Summary**

**Governor's Select Committee on Corrections  
Final Report and Recommendations**

**Correctional Institution Inspection Committee Report**

**Lucasville Media Task Force Report (Recommendations)**

*Reference materials were replicated as published. The documents were electronically scanned and reformatted. Contents have not been altered or edited.*

## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

### **Report and Recommendations Concerning the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and the Southern Ohio Correction Facility Lucasville, Ohio**

**Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11**

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Understanding, overcrowding, insufficient training and inadequate prison management techniques and policies underlie a crisis in Ohio Prisons--brought into sharp focus by the riot and 11-day siege at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.

Few problems in Ohio have received the study and attention devoted to the crisis in our prisons over the past decade, yet three prison employees have lost their lives at the hands of inmates in just four years. Further study is not sufficient. Trading lives for money, by continued failure to adequately fund the results of "tough on crime" political rhetoric, is unacceptable.

Based upon research compiled by the Union, interviews with scores of staff members and other prison systems across the country over the last four months, OCSEA has developed 32 sets of specific recommendations for addressing the Ohio prison crisis. Key among them are:

- Increased staffing of Ohio prisons
- Upgraded pre- and in-service training for staff, leading to peace officer certification of Correctional Officers
- Comprehensive management policies in the areas of prison gangs, crisis response planning, unit management practices, staff communications and cultural diversity training strategies
- Management of prison overcrowding by
  - (1) Construction of a maximum security prison in Northeastern Ohio;
  - (2) Emergency legislation requiring that non-violent inmates with less than 90 days left to serve at the time of sentencing be kept in county jails or released on intensive probation, rather than being sent to the state prison system;
  - (3) Review of early release authority granted to the Director, Correctional Institutions Inspection Committee and Governor under existing emergency overcrowding legislation;
  - (4) Expanded community corrections for non-violent offenders; and
  - (5) Requiring fiscal impact statements for all legislation proposing mandatory, determinate or longer sentences for crimes.

The SOCF riot is a symptom of what is wrong in the Ohio prison system, not an isolated event. A variety of factors provided inmates with a clear advantage in the SOCF uprising:

- Understaffing
- Mass inmate movement
- Inadequate training and command structures

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

- Inmate access to sensitive information
- Judgment calls on the part of the Administration
- Prison construction and design
- Policies and practices not consistent with the nature of SOCF inmates

Other factors in the riot included:

- The nature of SOCF inmates and a history of loose prison administration
- The Warden's response to objections to TB testing by 159 of the 1822 inmates at SOCF
- Overcrowding
- Racial and cultural tensions among inmates and between inmates and staff
- Inadequacy of mental health programs for inmates

Most of these conditions and problems exist throughout the Ohio prison system. Funded substantially below that of other states, Ohio has the worst-staffed and most-overcrowded prison system in the nation.

Political slogans and empty rhetoric will not resolve the crisis in Ohio prisons. The situation cries out for vision and determination. The Union is willing to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the Administration in developing comprehensive solutions to a very complex problem.

### SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

#### FACTOR

Worst-staffed  
Prison System in  
the Nation

Mass Inmate  
Movement  
Creates Security  
Risks

#### OCSEA RECOMMENDATIONS

- \* Ohio must make a serious effort to improve the staffing patterns in its prisons, through either a significant reduction in inmates or a significant increase in staff.
- \* The State should commit to achieve the national inmate: CO ratio by the year 2000.
- \* A joint DRC/OCSEA committee should be established to review staffing patterns and needs and recommend allocation of the new staff positions among the prisons.
- \* Movement of maximum and close security inmates should be sharply curtailed and to reasonable numbers.
- \* Adequate security staff should be available to supervise all movement.
- \* Inmates in one housing Unit should not be permitted to mix or have direct contact with inmates in another Unit, even Units in the same Block or Complex.
- \* The recreations field at SOCF, consisting of three ball diamonds, a football area and general recreation areas, should be divided with security fencing to preclude inmates from different housing units mixing or having direct contact while on the yard.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

Unit Management  
Practices Undermine  
Staff and Threaten  
Security

\*Joint teams of line security staff and DRC officials should visit other state and federal prisons to evaluate their Unit Management practices, benchmarking the best practices for application in Ohio.

\*The current Unit Management system should be substantially revised to conform with true Unit Management principles and to give security and safety factors higher priority.

\*The Chief of Prison Security (Major) should report directly to the Warden and have equal rank with other Deputies.

\*Unit Managers should be trained to emphasize the primacy of security procedures in all Unit operations and policies.

\*The security of Unit staff, including clerical support staff working inside the prison, must be considered in planning the physical layout of unit/housing areas and in the security staffing patterns for the area.

\*Unit Managers who object to inmate tickets or believe that any penalties should be modified should be required to submit a written statement to the RIB considering the matter, with a copy to the Officer issuing the ticket, but should have no authority to cancel a ticket.

\*Inmate records should be maintained in the Prison Records Office, not in the Unit Offices.

\*Inmate clerks should not have access to telephones, computers or records in Unit Management offices and should have no role in the processing of cell assignments or inmate tickets.

\*Line security staff should be included as participants in the Unit Management summit meeting Director Wilkinson recently announced.

Prison Command  
Structure and  
Training Diminish  
Security

\*In the event of a disturbance, the top security officer at the institution should report to the Command Center and establish overall tactical command rather than personally respond to the scene.

\*The Duty Officer at a maximum security prison should have substantial security experience, be well-versed in Disturbance Response tactics and be required to remain at the institution at all times.

Staff Training Not  
Sufficient

\*A joint Union-Management committee should review pre-service and in-service training programs in benchmark prison systems, with the objective of adopting the best aspects of other programs into a major revision of Ohio efforts.

\*A Correctional Peace Officer training program and certification process, similar to that used for other Ohio peace officers, should be established.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

\*DRC should allocate training funds to provide the following in-service training to all DRC employees through a jointly administered training project during the current biennium:

- Gang identification and management training.
- Stress management in a Correctional setting.
- Tactical and hostage security procedures.
- Communicable diseases in Corrections.

\*DCT and TRT teams should receive full support and training from the department, including issuance of standard uniforms and equipment for all team members.

\*Tower officers should receive clear tactical training and orders concerning control of inmates in the yard under riot conditions.

\*DCT and TRT team members should be selected from among the most qualified volunteers by a joint committee at each prison.

\*DCT and TRT team members should receive a wage premium whenever the teams are activated or engaged in training.

Inmates have  
Weapons

\* To reduce injuries to both inmates and staff arising from outbursts of violence in the prisons, a joint committee should be established to review and recommend advanced devices for the control of violent persons, such as pepper gel and stun guns or shields.

\*Only the Warden should be informed of a shakedown to be conducted under Operation Cleanout—and Wardens should keep such knowledge confidential until the team has arrived at the prison.

\*A strong effort should be made to increase uniformity in the designation of contraband items.

“Safety Zones”  
Not Secure

\*A true security envelope for staff should be constructed at each end of the blocks in maximum security prisons.

\*Each security envelope should be on a television monitor with a roof or tunnel security egress wherever possible.

\*Security egress doors should be electronically controlled by the Control Center.

\*All walls, floors and ceilings in a maximum security prison should be built as true security barriers.

\*A joint committee should be established at each Ohio prison to review escape training plans and procedures to determine if flaws similar to those at SOCF exist.

Lack of Gang  
Management  
Strategy

\*All employees should receive at least six hours of gang training on an annual basis.

\*DRC must accelerate development of overall policies and tactics for establishing control and intelligence systems on prison gang behavior.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

	<p>*Joint management-union gang coordinator teams should be established at each prison, with a statewide network linking them for purposes of developing solid staff training programs and intelligence networks for sharing gang information between prisons.</p> <p>*Gang coordinator teams at each prison should participate in other law enforcement gang training programs to ensure that DRC staff remain aware of developments on the streets.</p>
Sunni Muslims Met Unsupervised	<p>*Prison employees should receive in-service training on the fundamental tenets of all non-traditional religious groups within the prison population.</p> <p>*No religious group should be permitted to meet without direct security staff supervision.</p> <p>*Security considerations must outweigh religious tenets in a prison environment.</p> <p>*DRC should hire qualified Islamic leaders or Imams to provide leadership and chaplaincy services for Muslim inmates in the same manner as for Judeo-Christian inmates, and with the same manner and criteria of background checks.</p>
Inadequate Security Awareness by Chaplain	<p>*Security monitors should be installed in the chapel areas to permit constant observation of inmates and to relieve the Chaplains of security obligations or instincts which may run contrary to their traditional values and beliefs.</p>
Inmate Access to Critical/Sensitive Information	<p>*DRC should establish a joint committee at each institution to regularly review the number and nature of inmate job assignments, with the objective of eliminating those which allow inmates—</p> <p>Access to security information or data regarding staff or other inmates; Influence over cell assignments or inmate movement; Access to Rules Infraction Board charges or results; Access to intra- or inter-departmental security communications; Access to computer systems or software.</p>
Lockdown Delay Allowed Inmates to Prepare	<p>*Prison officials must act promptly and directly when confronted with inmate resistance to prison rules or procedures. Delays in responding to group threat behavior allow inmates to play for increased resistance.</p> <p>*Prison officials should re-evaluate steps in preparing for a lockdown to avoid providing advance notice and information to the inmates.</p>
Crisis Response Staffing and Training Inadequate	<p>*Prisons housing <u>maximum</u> and close security inmates should have a full complement DCT team on duty at all times, while all prisons should have trained cell extraction teams on duty at all times.</p> <p>*Prisons housing <u>maximum</u> and close security inmates should have a full complement TRT team on duty throughout 1st and 2nd shifts.</p> <p>*Utilization of a full-time DCT squad as institutional "police" should be examined for all Ohio prisons, using the Minnesota Oak Park Heights prison as a model.</p>
Poor Communication With Staff	<p>*DRC should invest substantial energy and planning on strategies for improving its internal communications effectiveness with staff.</p>

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### Dangerous Inmate Recreation Policies

\*All free weight equipment should be removed from Maximum and Close security prisons.

\*A joint committee should be established to investigate the safety and appropriateness of alternative exercise equipment, such as Nautilus or SolarFlex.

\*In all other prisons, free weight bars should be regarded as dangerous tools or weapons, used only under direct supervision of an Officer and safely secured when not in use.

\*Muscle-building supplements should be eliminated from Commissary sales.

\*DRC should adopt a weapons-free recreation policy.

### Poor Prison Design

\*Correctional Officers should be included on every prison design review team and utilized throughout construction to help detect and correct the following shortcomings, which are common in Ohio prisons:

- Blind corners
- Lack of overhead security and protection for staff
- Inadequate lighting and use of mirrors
- Inadequate or improperly installed locks
- Missing inner crash gates to prevent inmate access to the main entrance
- Missing bars on prison administrative buildings
- Inadequate or missing fencing in prison yards.

\*A joint committee should examine the practices and policies in other states regarding the construction of security gun ports or galleys in maximum security prisons and the installation of automated gas injection devices.

\*Staff safety equipment and devices should be tested on a regular basis and replaced when newer, more comprehensive devices become available. This should include regular testing of devices such as the rear stairwell telephones.

\*Remote radio monitor speakers should be installed in Unit Offices and other administrative offices within the prison so that non-security prison employees can stay informed regarding man-down alarms and emergency situations.

### TB Testing

\*DRC should continue to screen all inmates for TB, using the most appropriate medical procedures.

\*DRC should engage in an aggressive educational program to inform inmates and staff regarding the threat of TB, particularly the new drug-resistant strains, and of the medical necessity for testing procedures.

### Racial/Cultural Differences

\*DRC should develop a serious, long-term strategy for dealing with racial and cultural differences between staff and inmates, including a significant training component.

\*Because of the shortcomings of prior efforts, effective new training strategies should build the appropriate learning content into the overall curriculum rather than focusing on a presumed need to "fix" staff under labels like "cultural sensitivity training."

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

- \*The State should construct prisons closer to major urban areas in order to increase effectiveness in recruiting and retaining qualified minority staff.
- \*Training on street and prison gangs should be recognized as a factor in assisting staff in dealing with cultural differences between inmates and staff.
- Inmate Classification System
- \*A step-down system which allows inmates to earn their way into less restrictive environments must be an integral part of any prison management strategy. It is imperative that such step-down procedures be followed if the system isn't to collapse.
- \*Inmate Classification Committees at each institution should include a Correctional Officer familiar with the inmate being reviewed.
- \*A joint committee should be established to review existing inmate classification standards and procedures and to benchmark such practices in other prison systems.
- Inadequate Mental Health Services
- \*The Legislature should review mental health needs and practices in the prison system, including an examination of whether prison inmates can be required to take prescribed psychotropic drugs which are important to controlling their behavior without hospitalization and court review.
- \*Adequate Mental Health facilities should be established in all Ohio prisons to ensure treatment and to allow the prison to deal with the special problems and conflicts which mentally ill inmates present for other inmates and the staff.
- \*Mental Health workers in the Ohio prison system should be trained regarding security procedures and report all inmates who have refused to take their medications or exhibit other unusual behaviors to prison security staff at the end of their shift.
- \*Mental Health workers in state prisons should report directly to DRC.
- Alcohol and Drug Treatment
- \*Ohio should increase funding of alcohol and drug treatment programs, both in and out of institutional settings, to reduce recidivism.
- Lack of Staff Input
- \*DRC should develop a plan for the systematic and sincere inclusion of Union leadership in efforts to involve employees and improve security and operations.
- Inmate Assaults on Staff
- \*Every assault on a staff member should be reported to the Ohio State Patrol within 24-hours of occurrence.
- \*The State should aggressively pursue prosecution and reimburse County Prosecutors for costs associated with the prosecution of inmates who have assaulted a Corrections employee.
- \*A monthly report of assaults and other safety hazards should be prepared by each Ohio correctional facility, using the format developed at SOCF, with a copy forwarded to the statewide and institutional Health and Safety Committees.
- Prison Crisis Response Planning and Policies
- \*The crisis response plan for each Ohio prison should be mandatory reading for all staff and refresher training on the plan should be incorporated into the regular in-service training program.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

- \*DRC should establish and enforce a policy which prohibits the carrying of a Disturbance Control Manual into the interior of a prison.
- \*A joint committee should conduct a benchmarking review of Disturbance Control plans and procedures in other prison systems.
- Community Corrections
- \*Ohio should continue to expand community corrections programs and operations, but not at the expense of prison safety and staffing.
- \*Policy-makers must be careful in efforts to distinguish between "violent" and "non-violent" offenders when establishing guidelines for the return or placement of convicted felons in Ohio communities.
- \*DRC should engage in a serious discussion with a broad spectrum of OCSEA leaders to explain department plans regarding community corrections and determine joint strategies for promoting them.
- Use of County Jails
- \*Legislation to require non-violent inmates with 90 days or less remaining on their sentences at the time they are to be sent to a Reception Center to serve their remaining sentence in the county detention facility or under intensive probation should be pursued on an emergency basis.
- Mandatory/Determinate Sentencing
- \*Prior to final passage in either legislative body, the Legislative Budget Office should be required to attach a 10-year fiscal impact statement to all legislation imposing new, mandatory or determinate sentences for criminal activity.
- Overcrowding Emergency
- \*The Director, CIIC and Governor should carefully examine existing statutory authority to reduce prison overcrowding by declaring an overcrowding emergency and reducing the sentences of non-violent offenders by up to 90 days.
- New Maximum Security
- \*DRC should build another maximum security prison in Northeastern Ohio.
- "Super-Max"
- \*DRC should establish a special committee to determine the percentage of Ohio inmates which should be considered for confinement in a "super-max" environment.
- \*DRC should establish a special committee to evaluate existing and planned prisons for the construction of a stand-alone super-max within the prison complex.
- False Ceilings
- \*False ceilings should be eliminated in Ohio prisons.
- Inmate Transfer Policies
- \*When transferring inmates from one prison to another as a result of a disturbance, a team of Correctional Officers from the sending institution should brief appropriate security staff at the receiving prison regarding the nature and proclivities of the inmates being transferred.

**Final Report and Recommendations  
of the  
Governor's Select Committee  
on Corrections**

**January 1994**

\*\*\*\*\*

**Committee**

**Dr. Kathleen Burlew  
Dr. Simon Dinitz, Chair  
Judge Burt Griffin  
Sheriff Gary Haines, Vice Chair  
Mr. Robert Millan  
Dr. Ruth Peterson  
Mr. Michael Quinlan  
Mr. Charles See**

# APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

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## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

### **GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS**

#### **MEMBERS**

**Dr. Simon Dinitz, Chair** - Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University

**Gary Haines, Vice Chair** - Sheriff of Montgomery County

**Dr. Kathleen Burlew** - Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati

**Burt W. Griffin** - Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County

**Robert Q. Millan** - Chair of the Ohio Prison Labor Advisory Board, former President and Chairman of the Board, First National Bank of Middletown

**Dr. Ruth D. Peterson** - Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University

**J. Michael Quinlan** - Consultant, U.S. Sentencing Commission, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons

**Charles R. See** - Executive Director of the Community Re-Entry Program and Associate Director of the Lutheran Metropolitan Ministry Association, Chairman of the N.A.A.C.P. (Cleveland Branch) Prison Committee

#### **STAFF**

**Evalyn Parks** - Chief, Bureau of Planning and Evaluation, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

**Delores Brown** - Coordinator, Ohio Quality Corrections, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

**Catalina DeLeón** - Personnel Officer I, Orient Correctional Institution

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS

#### INTRODUCTION

##### Background

The longest, most deadly and destructive prison riot in Ohio history (an inmate-set fire at the now-abandoned Ohio Penitentiary in Columbus took 322 inmate lives in 1930) began at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in Lucasville at about 3 p.m. on Easter Sunday, April 11, 1993. Before it ran its course eleven days later, twelve Correctional Officers had been taken hostage and one of them was killed. Nine inmates were also murdered by fellow prisoners. The L housing complex consisting of eight cellblocks and a gymnasium was gutted, with property damage estimated to exceed \$10 million. The riot, siege and stalemate, which commanded national media attention, ended with a 21-point agreement between the prisoners and the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC).

In the aftermath of the SOCF riot, Ohio Governor George V. Voinovich appointed an eight-member committee to study the massive Ohio penal system (over 40,000 prisoners and nearly 10,000 employees) and make recommendations for needed change and improvement. Governor Voinovich, with Lt. Governor Mike DeWine, DRC Director Reginald A. Wilkinson and DRC Assistant Director Thomas J. Stickrath present, convened the first meeting of the Select Committee on May 6, 1993 and issued a mission statement to the members. The goals of the inquiry were to examine the philosophy, policies and practices of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and to submit recommendations for making Ohio's prisons safer, more secure, less stressful environments for staff and prisoners and for preventing and reducing inmate violence. Prison programs - education, work, training, counseling and substance abuse education and treatment, among others - were to be studied with the goal of returning prisoners to the community as lawful, responsible and productive citizens. This charge parallels the mission statement of DRC, which reads as follows:

*The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction protects Ohio citizens by ensuring effective supervision of adult offenders in environments that are safe, humane and appropriately secure; the Department seeks to instill in offenders an improved sense of responsibility and the ability to become productive citizens.*

As an addendum to this statement, the Department has pledged to...

*demonstrate excellence in every facet of our operation to inspire confidence in our ability to continuously improve in a system that:*

- meets employee personal growth and professional needs;
- demonstrates justice and fairness for offenders;
- responds to the concerns of the citizens of Ohio, and other internal and external stakeholders.

Although the riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility gave rise to the Select Committee, it was not the purpose of the Select Committee to determine the cause of the riot, to evaluate the response of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, or to recommend procedures for dealing with the inmates who were or are at SOCF. That is the function of other groups.

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### Procedure of Inquiry

The Select Committee set about discharging its responsibilities by holding hearings at the DRC Central Office and at the following prisons: Mansfield, Lorain, Lebanon, Dayton, Ohio Reformatory for Women, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (Lucasville), and London. Facility tours followed the planned presentations. In addition, the Committee studied the MonDay program in Dayton (a Community-Based Correctional Facility) and devoted a day to hearings at the Corrections Training Academy. Speakers and presenters were chosen to represent significant stakeholders in the daily operation of the system. The Committee heard from DRC's medical director, the two regional deputy directors for prisons (north and south regions), wardens, and sometimes deputies as well, at all the institutions visited, the deputy director for Parole and Community Services, human resources development chiefs (personnel, minority recruitment, the assessment center administrator), the Corrections Training Academy superintendent, the Chief and Assistant Chief Inspectors, the head of the Bureau of Classification and the chief of Construction, Activation and Maintenance. Many others from the Department also appeared before the Committee, including the DRC security administrator, the medical director at the Ohio Reformatory for Women and local personnel such as the health care administrator at a reception center, the reception center coordinator and the records manager. [A complete list is found in Appendix A.]

Notable presenters from outside the system included Senator Betty Montgomery who heads the legislative investigation into the Lucasville riot and Peter Davis, executive director of the Correctional Institution Inspection Committee of the Ohio Legislature. The Committee was fortunate to hear from Dr. Michael Hogan, Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Health, and his aides. Attorney Niki Schwartz, who was instrumental in fashioning the 21-point agreement and the subsequent inmate surrender, spent a lot of time with the Committee. Later, Attorney Vincent Nathan and his associates talked with us about their initial work in implementing the agreement with the prisoners. Judge John M. Meagher of Dayton discussed community sentencing options and Professor Ronald Huff of the Ohio State University presented the prison gang situation.

The Committee heard from Lt. Governor Mike DeWine, and on several occasions from the Director and Assistant Director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. We twice called on Mr. Paul Goldberg, the Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11 to talk about the union's position on prison policies, practices and needs. Several Correctional Officers presented their views of the rights and wrongs of the system, and others were in attendance at our institutional visitations. Their input was especially challenging and is herein recognized.

Finally, a number of inmates were formally interviewed at the Warren, London and Mansfield Correctional Institutions. Many others were encountered in our facility tours and spoke with members of the Select Committee.

Lastly, "white papers" were solicited and received from operational personnel in DRC. In addition to the areas enumerated above, "white papers" were obtained from the chief of Management Information Systems, the head of Research, and the various program areas - religious services, inmate work and education programs. "White papers were also received on management and security issues and on support services. These white papers" and the discussions with those responsible for them were of inestimable value in framing our report.

Before presenting our recommendations, we wish to thank everyone involved in this investigation. The cooperation given us was outstanding at every level of the Department and by staff and inmates at the institutions. The Committee is particularly grateful to the Director and Assistant Director, Reginald Wilkinson and Thomas Stickrath, for their participation and encouragement. We encountered no roadblocks, no resistance, and found our informants to be forthcoming and eager to present their views. The Committee has already noted the input of the union and its local officers. Finally, the Committee is deeply in the debt of our proficient and hard-working staff members, Evalyn Parks, Delores Brown and Catalina DeLeón. Without them, this report would still be in the making.

This report and its recommendations try to meet the issues fairly and without favor. Despite the riot we believe the Department is in good hands, highly professional and outwardlooking. Nevertheless, the problems confronting corrections cannot be solved by management alone. The greatest problem is a surfeit of prisoners, enough to overwhelm facilities and programs and to overtax the infrastructure. Corrections is the last subsystem in the criminal justice chain,

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

and it cannot, therefore, control its own destiny. It will remain reactive into the foreseeable future with little freedom of movement or ability to control its population and their terms of incarceration or release. Unless it is understood that corrections is not master of its destiny, the very real dilemmas faced by DRC and addressed in this report will remain largely unresolved, even if all these recommendations are accepted and implemented.

### I. General Principles

Before detailing our recommendations, the Committee wants to highlight nine general principles, whose importance undergirds our thinking.

\* **Appropriate Commitments to Prison**

Not all offenders can or should be sent to prison. Prison is only one of numerous sanctions available for sentencing felony offenders. It should generally be reserved for the violent or dangerous offender, the offender who has committed an offense whose seriousness would be demeaned by a lesser sanction, the offender who earns or tries to earn a livelihood by crime, and the offender who has not responded to non-prison sanctions and for whom there is no remaining suitable community sanction.

\* **Safe and Humane Operation**

It is in the best interests of prisoners, prison personnel and the general public that prisons be operated in an efficient, humane, safe and secure manner.

\* **Idleness**

Idleness of inmates is inconsistent with the goals of both punishment and re-habilitation.

\* **Substance Abuse**

Substance abuse is one of the most significant contributors to crime and recidivism. Over 70 percent of offenders who are sentenced to prison have been chemical users and abusers; and continued abuse of alcohol or illegal drugs is a major factor in crimes which return offenders to prison. Substance abuse education and appropriate treatment opportunities must be provided to prisoners. Parolees must be monitored for continued substance abuse and also afforded reasonable treatment opportunities in the community.

\* **Opportunities for Self-Improvement**

Prisoners who desire to improve their levels of education, job skills or social skills should be given reasonable opportunities to do so while in prison.

\* **Moral Development**

We must lower our expectations of the extent to which prison programs can be devised to change inmate behavior. Although prisons lack the ability to force inmates to change behavior, the prison experience itself induces some inmates to change, and the prison system must promote an environment consistent with the values expected of law-abiding citizens. The prison system must persistently explore more effective ways to foster such attitudes, values and behavior in prison inmates.

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### \* Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Inmates

National estimates, confirmed by Ohio statistics, indicate that approximately 15 percent of prison inmates are either mentally ill, mentally retarded or dual-diagnosed prisoners. Unless their crime is extremely serious or they pose a danger to society that civil institutions cannot protect against, the mentally ill and mentally retarded should not be imprisoned. When in prison, however, they must be given adequate treatment and protection and, if necessary, other prisoners must be protected from them.

### \* Racial, Ethnic and Religious Fairness

Racial, ethnic and religious discrimination either by prison employees or inmates cannot be tolerated.

### \* Citizen Input and Support

The prison system must be open to and seek input and support from the criminal justice system which uses it and from the general public.

## II. Addressing the Major Problems

Five problems — (1) prison crowding, (2) inmate idleness, (3) inmate threat groups (gangs), (4) mentally ill, psychologically disturbed and chronically anti-social inmates, and (5) offenders with substance abuse problems — override all others. Until they are properly addressed, the prison system will be seriously impeded in achieving its goal of “operating safe, secure, and humane” institutions. The solution of these problems will enhance the possibility that prisoners will be returned to the community with an “improved sense of responsibility and the ability to become productive citizens.”

### A. Prison Crowding and Inmate Idleness

The problems of prison crowding and inmate idleness are so severe that they dwarf other major concerns of the prison system. Prison crowding exacerbates problems of staffing, physical infrastructure, violence, and inmate programming.

Appendix B presents a set of charts and tables showing the extent of overcrowding. As of January 1, 1993, Ohio's prisons were 178.5 percent of rated capacity [Table B-1]. A chart in the Appendix indicates that prison population will continue to increase, resulting in seriously crowded conditions over the next three years, in spite of the planned building program [Table B-4]. Even with the projected community facilities, the Committee estimates that an additional 4,000 to 5,000 beds will be needed to bring the population and capacity to a more manageable ratio.

The sheer number of inmates which the prison system must fit into spaces designed for considerably fewer prisoners results in certain consequences which outside observers might find surprising. Some of the most troublesome are outlined below:

1. Space which is intended for prison industries, inmate recreation, or vocational training has been converted to dormitory space to house inmates.
2. Responsibility for too many inmates (on the part of prison staff) or of living in extremely close proximity to strangers (on the part of inmates) frequently leads to stress, shortened tempers, impatience, and what the Committee has called a “diminution of civility.” It is not uncommon to see increased inmate tensions (manifested in conduct reports and assaults), coupled with high levels of staff stress (seen in the use of sick leave and high levels of turnover). These problems constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of both staff and inmates.

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3. "Prison culture" has changed significantly in the past decade. The emergence of inmate threat groups such as gangs makes the management of the population considerably more difficult than in the past.
4. Education and work opportunities available to inmates are barely adequate to keep them productive when institutional populations are at design capacity. When populations rise, it becomes impossible to keep a substantial proportion of inmates productive.
5. Essential services for inmates (including psychological services, substance abuse programs and medical services) are severely diluted by the sheer numbers of inmates needing such services.
6. Prison infrastructures were designed to deal with a specific number of prisoners - the design capacity of the institution. Generally, a prison can handle 10, 20, or even 30 percent more prisoners than the design capacity. However, in older institutions, the infrastructures are already taxed beyond their ability to function properly. The need for major maintenance and renovation is chronic. And even in the new institutions, some of which are currently operating at twice design capacity, the constant wear and tear on the facilities has caused the premature deterioration or breakage of major, critical sub-systems such as water, sewer, heating and ventilation, electrical, roofs, kitchens, shower areas - the list is almost endless. And the maintenance budget for the Department is such that routine maintenance must sometimes be sacrificed to crisis management.
7. Constant pre-occupation on the part of administrators with the problems of dealing with such staggering numbers of prisoners severely compromises their ability to attain other correctional objectives.

### Recommendations

The Committee believes the following steps should be taken immediately to address the problems of prison crowding and inmate idleness:

1. At each institution, the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction should determine the safe operational capacity. This will be the level at which the safety of inmates or personnel will be substantially threatened if more inmates are added. The General Assembly should respect that determination by providing sufficient resources so that the staff and inmates are not placed at unreasonable risk.
2. Although the precise number of beds needed to bring the inmate-space ratio to safe operational capacity must await a proper assessment by prison administrators, the Committee believes that the number may be even higher than the additional 4,000 to 5,000 beds mentioned earlier. [See Table B-4] Those housing units are needed now, and the Committee sees no alternative to providing these physical facilities even if all other recommendations of the Committee are implemented.
3. One of the new prisons should be the 400-500 bed, high security facility now being planned by the Department for male inmates who present the most serious behavioral problems and security threats. This facility should be located in the northeastern section of the state.
4. The Department's plans for the construction and opening of other facilities must be expedited.
5. In constructing new facilities, high priority should be given to creating lower security, state operated prisons for short-term offenders — those sentenced to serve 18 months or less of actual time. Such prisons would include the following:

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- a. Intensive Confinement Centers (modified "boot camps"). With the approval of the sentencing Judge, for a substantial reduction in actual time to be served, the Department will send eligible prisoners to Intensive Confinement Centers. These Centers will minimize institutional amenities, such as non-educational television and structured recreation and will provide suitable programming.
  - b. "Theme" Prisons. Targeted groups of prisoners would be sent to these facilities. Programming would emphasize heavy substance abuse treatment and education, intensive work and vocational programs, community service programs and a range of intensive educational opportunities.
  - c. Technical parole violator centers. Technical parole violators should be sent to low security facilities as a last sanction before parole revocation.
6. The Committee has not studied the proposals of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission in depth. Nonetheless, this Committee believes that some of the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission for reducing population growth (such as community alternative sanctions and post-incarceration supervision) warrant attention.
7. To eliminate at least some of the intolerable backup in reception centers, the Committee recommends that the Department study the requirement that prisoners must be delivered to the state Prison system even if their definite sentences will expire almost immediately thereafter.
8. The Department should work with military and other agencies, state and national, to determine whether any military or other government facilities can be converted into short-term facilities.
9. Security concerns and classification status, rather than prison crowding, should determine the ceiling of inmates. In spite of overcrowding, the Committee recommends that no inmate who is classified as maximum security be double-celled. Incentives should be established to reduce the possibility that inmates would be motivated to progress to or remain in maximum security status. In medium and minimum security facilities, where inmates are likely to be double-celled, prisoners should have the right to petition for cell assignment changes, unless contraindicated by good correctional practice.
10. Prison crowding contributes to the physical deterioration of prison infrastructures. Ohio has several prisons which are more than seventy years old and which are in deplorable physical condition. Even the relatively new institutions already need additional maintenance because of the strain of overuse. The Committee recommends that sufficient resources be available to allow the Department to maintain facilities at a minimum acceptable level. [See Appendix C, Testimony of David Blodgett before the Governor's Select Committee on Corrections.]

### B. The Need for Diversion Programs

The State generally has greatly underutilized and underfunded community correction-based alternative punishment sanctions. The Committee has endorsed the Cornerstones for Corrections proposal of the Governor and Lt. Governor regarding the need for community corrections programs.

The Committee supports the principles of a comprehensive penal sanctioning system, the continuity of care, oversight and treatment, and the coordination of efforts on the part of local, county and state agencies. The penal sanctioning system must include appropriate graded sanctions, ranging from fines to long-term incarceration. The range of sanctions generally should be available in all areas of the state, so that imprisonment is not the only option beyond probation. To strengthen the position of community-based correctional alternatives, the Committee makes the following recommendations, with the understanding that the use of such non-prison sanctions will not afford a one-for-one reduction in prison commitments:

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### Recommendations

1. The Committee strongly recommends that a suitable range of penal sanctions be made available to sentencing judges. These sanctions would include but not be limited to: intensive probation supervision, specialized probation caseloads, halfway-in houses, community work programs, day reporting centers and day fines, electronic monitoring, sheltered workshops, and Community-Based Correctional Facilities.
2. Currently, post-prison services are severely restricted and the ability of people in the criminal justice system to receive necessary mental health, substance abuse and other programs is usually limited to the period of their incarceration. Health, mental health, job placement and vocational training service agencies have not been eager to offer programming to convicted offenders after their release. The failure to offer these services is reflected in the large number of second and subsequent admissions of juvenile and adult offenders. We recommend that efforts be intensified to ensure the immediate availability to released offenders of follow-up services in the community. Local ADAMHS Boards (Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services) should be encouraged to view released offenders as a priority population.
3. The Committee recommends that all targeted offenders, such as sex offenders and inmates with a history of violence, be supervised on their return to the community.

### **Offenders with Substance Abuse Problems**

About 70 to 80 percent of new admissions to prison have a history of substance abuse. In addition, about 15 percent of all inmates in Ohio's prisons at this time are in for some type of drug offense and more than 30 percent of new admissions have been convicted of a drug offense. Substance

abuse programs offered in prison range from Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous programs to highly-structured therapeutic communities.

### Recommendations

1. All inmates should be afforded an opportunity to participate in a substance abuse prevention program suitable to their needs and motivation and to their expected length of imprisonment.
2. The Committee supports random drug testing of inmates; for security purposes, we recommend random testing of all institutional personnel. Action should be taken against all personnel whose drug tests indicate usage.
3. Recognizing the seriousness of drug and alcohol abuse among convicted offenders, the Committee recommends the provision of specialized services in conjunction with community-based programs for released drug or alcohol abusers. We recommend that no inmate who has had a substantiated drug or alcohol problem be released on parole without developing an appropriate plan for treatment and monitoring compliance. The Department is urged to make such mandatory follow-up a condition of parole.

Although inmates released without subsequent supervision at the expiration of definite sentences are no longer within the control of the Department, the Committee recommends that referrals to community drug and alcohol abuse treatment resources be made for these inmates, too. This recommendation for referral to community programs for non-supervised releasees is also appropriate for flat sentence sex offenders and offenders with physical disabilities.

4. All parolees should be subjected to regular, random drug testing.

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### D. Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded Offenders

Mental illness problems of offenders derive from two sources. Some inmates were psychotic or in other ways severely mentally ill when they were sentenced, but the mental illness did not result in a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity or was not even diagnosed at the time of sentencing. Many other inmates become overtly psychotic or severely depressed while they are imprisoned.

There is a consensus among psychiatrists and psychologists that more than 400 inmates (between 1 and 3 percent of the population) are in need of intensive psychiatric care and treatment. It is estimated that 12 percent of the inmate population have a treatable mental illness that requires intervention. A recent study indicated that the inmate community has a proportionately high rate of psychiatric and psychosocial impairment. Therefore, prisons should be provided with the same services available at outside community mental health centers. Currently, mental health services are provided by both DRC and the Department of Mental Health. Ohio is one of only six states that have such a split service delivery system. More than half of all facilities have no psychiatric services available.

Services are sorely needed to deal with the increasing number of people in the prison system who have mental health problems; and efforts need to be made throughout the criminal justice system to avoid sentencing the mentally ill and mentally retarded to prison unnecessarily.

#### Recommendations

1. Pilot projects already exist in Cleveland and other cities to identify the mentally ill and mentally retarded at the pre-sentence stage and to divert them from the prison system. These pilot programs have been financially supported by funds from the Ohio Department of Mental Health and the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. The programs establish probation officers who specialize in supervising the mentally ill and mentally retarded and link them with mental health caseworkers who specialize in supervising criminal offenders. The programs should be extended to all Common Pleas Courts and all parole offices.
3. Much dissatisfaction was expressed to the Committee with the current bifurcated system for delivering psychiatric service to inmates. The Committee recommends that psychiatric services in prison be run by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. This would require the hiring of psychiatrists and other mental health personnel currently provided by the Department of Mental Health and the transfer of funds, currently part of the Department of Mental Health budget, to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
4. Regardless of the shape of the service delivery structure, the Committee recommends that additional resources be allocated to achieve the Department's recommended level of psychiatric and psychological services.
5. Inmates treated by Department of Mental Health or Department of Rehabilitation and Correction staff while incarcerated are rarely followed closely in the community to see that treatment continues after release. Released inmates, by virtue of their prior confinement, are generally not integrated into the community mental health system. Parole officers have indicated the unwillingness of some agencies to accept released inmates as clients. Adaptation to parolees of the Cleveland experiment with probationers would correct this problem. We recommend increased use of referrals of released inmates to local mental health services and close linkages between parole officers and mental health caseworkers.
6. We recommend an increase in the number of dedicated beds for mentally ill inmates, such as the Oakwood Forensic Center, and space in dedicated units in one or two of the other institutions, as necessary, for the housing and treatment of these inmates.

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7. Mental health staff currently do not deal with the families of mentally ill inmates, a service which would greatly facilitate a released inmate's re-entry into the community. We recommend that local ADAMHS Boards provide services to the families of mentally ill inmates to smooth their transition into the community.
8. Many mentally retarded inmates are under-served in DRC because education and work programs are not geared to include them. We recommend that a detailed analysis be made of this and other special populations (e.g., physically and medically disabled, the geriatric group) with a view to extending programming for them.

### E. Prison Security, Security Threat Groups and Gangs

The safety and security of both staff and prisoners are of the utmost concern to the Select Committee. The incident at Lucasville demonstrated the importance of the recognition of security threat groups/gangs as a force in the institutions, the need to identify such group members and to track their movement through the system. The existence of gangs in the civilian community associated with drug trafficking and their continuation into the prison community cause these organized groups to be of special concern.

#### Recommendations

1. The Committee supports DRC in creating the position of Gang Coordinator. DRC must continue to identify and track prisoner threat group/gang members.
2. Religious groups should not be equated with gangs, although there is some possible overlap between the two. This differentiation requires screening, intelligence and understanding on the part of the security forces.
3. To minimize the threat from disruptive groups, the Department should not tolerate the show of colors, symbols or other means of gang identification. Individuals identified with gangs, particularly leaders, shall be transferred to other institutions when they pose a threat to the safety and security of the parent institution.
4. The Department should work with the prison employee unions in each institution in identifying staff members at all levels who are affiliated with hate groups and limiting their contact with Prisoners.
5. At SOCF, staff was led to believe that certain locations were safe havens in the event of inmate unrest. The Mohr Committee also determined that there were other security lapses. The Select Committee therefore urges the use of the newly created DRC Bureau of Accreditation and Standards or the National Institute of Corrections Technical Assistance Program to conduct security audits of all correctional facilities. Security audits are most critical for high security institutions.
  - a. Each facility should be examined for sports equipment and commissary and other items which are not appropriate for the assigned security level.
6. During tours of older facilities serious fire and life safety hazards were observed by Committee members.
  - a. A fire inspection should be conducted on an annual basis by either the local fire inspector or the State Fire Marshal's office and a plan of action put into place to bring these facilities into compliance with fire code expectations.
  - b. Training must be provided to contract employees or personnel from other agencies who work in DRC institutions regarding their responsibilities in the event of a fire or other emergency within the facility.

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7. Mass movement of inmates in the older linear facilities for meals, recreation, work programs, and other purposes provides numerous opportunities for security breaches, inmate disturbances and hostage-taking by inmates. Metal detectors currently in use provide at best a false sense of security for staff.

The Committee recommends that policies should be developed to regulate the movement of reasonable groups of inmates where appropriate and allow for the provision of meals, recreation and other services in their housing units to inmates who pose an unacceptable security threat.

8. The Committee recommends that DRC's Bureau of Accreditation and Standards as well as each facility's labor management group accept the responsibility of determining whether the security systems, including portable radios, telephones and electronics, facility construction and written policies are adequate for the security level of the individual facility and that facility's mission.
9. The Department should review and monitor its policy of Administrative Control to assure that it is adequate for the inmate population of that facility.
10. Adequate beds must be available for the transfer of inmates for security reasons or because they have been identified as gang members or predators by the corrections staff.
11. The system for both the classification and reclassification of inmates and the appropriate security level needs to be re-examined. Current inmate population pressures make the system of classification non-functional at times because of the lack of beds at the appropriate security level. The classification system appears to exist in name only. During visits by the Committee, Wardens indicated they were housing inmates that belonged in other facilities, many times at a lower security level, but there was no way to transfer them to a more appropriate institution. Beds at each security level are a limited commodity and the policies must assure that inmates housed in each security level are classified appropriately at admission, and are reviewed as the inmate's conduct changes.
12. Discipline within a correctional facility needs to be fair, swift and sure. Dedicated Administrative Segregation beds need to be allocated in each facility for use by the corrections staff for those inmates violating institutional rules which endanger the safety of both inmates and staff. These beds should not be considered part of the facility's available housing capacity .
13. The employment of inmates is valuable for both the inmate and Department but these workers should not be used in jobs that allow them access to sensitive information regarding other inmates, such as inmate histories, or that could compromise the security and operation of the facility.
14. Department operating procedures, emergency or disaster plans and policies should not be stored in offices or other locations where they are accessible to inmates on a daily basis or would be available in the event of riot or unrest.
15. The Corrections Training Academy should develop and provide both pre-service and in-service training on critical safety issues such as Tactical Response, Emergency Preparedness, and Disturbance Control.
16. All inmate assaults on staff or other inmates should be fully investigated and, if appropriate, charges should be filed in the local court. The Ohio Attorney General should be asked to assign an Assistant Attorney General to prosecute these cases on behalf of the State.

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### III. Female Offenders and Other Special Program Needs

#### A. Special Needs of Female Offenders

The needs of female offenders certainly overlap but may not be completely identical with the needs of male offenders. Since the female population is the fastest growing sub-group within the Ohio system, the Department needs to monitor its operations constantly to ensure that its procedures are appropriate for that group. The Committee's research revealed that at least the following recommendations may be appropriate:

##### Recommendations

1. The overwhelming majority (77.8 percent) of female offenders are mothers with dependent children. Many will assume responsibility for the welfare of their children upon release. That reality suggests that it is in the best interests of the children, the women, and society to make every reasonable effort to maintain as much contact as possible between these mothers and their children during the period of incarceration. In addition, many families find that the period of reentry is a difficult transition period. In anticipation of potential difficulties, female offenders may benefit from increased programming on parenting skills for connecting back with children after a period of separation.
2. The Committee urges DRC to take advantage of the openness of the community to the involvement of female offenders in the community. The Department may wish to explore the expansion of community involvement beyond service projects to include training or educational opportunities.
3. The Committee recommends medical services adequate to meet the increased and unique medical needs of female offenders. According to information presented to the Committee, the majority of female offenders are in the age group where their medical needs are greatest.

#### B. Program Concerns

Inmate idleness is both intolerable and dangerous. Regardless of the prison system's population level, the system's goal must be a meaningful work experience or a meaningful opportunity for each inmate to participate voluntarily in self-improvement programs. As a result of prison crowding, such programming has seriously deteriorated.

##### Recommendations

1. Program opportunities can be especially helpful for those offenders who have the potential to benefit most: young, short-term, non-violent, under-educated/unemployed offenders. Programming should be developed to meet the needs of long-term inmates.
2. Educational programs ranging from literacy training to grade school, high school and post-secondary are an essential component of institutional programming. Innovative methods, including individualized instruction, team teaching, and computer-assisted instruction, can be useful in reaching men and women who have failed in schools on the outside.
3. Work training programs must be expanded to accommodate more than the current 2 or 3 percent of the prison population. These programs must prepare people to achieve certification in their specialty and placement in a suitable institutional job as well as for post-release employment. More programs, with a broader representation of specialties, are required and more opportunities should be made available to inmates who wish to participate.
4. As population increased, meaningful work experience opportunities have decreased. A smaller percentage of inmates are now employed in Ohio Penal Industries. Every effort must be made to expand the demand for prison-made goods by state government agencies. Efforts must be made to make OPI into an off-shore source.

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5. Counseling, including vocational counseling, family counseling, parenting training, social skills, survivors of domestic violence programs, programs of health-related issues, and money management classes, should be expanded where they already exist and begun elsewhere to ensure that any interested inmate has the chance to develop and grow as a human being while in prison .
6. Athletics and other physical exertion programs are important to inmate well-being and space for these activities should not be converted into inmate housing space, if at all possible. The importance of athletics and physical exertion as factors in inmate well-being and rehabilitation should be carefully examined and appropriate efforts should be undertaken to maximize the contribution they can make.
7. Religious differences and misunderstandings were a central issue in the SOCF riot. In view of the passage of recent legislation in Congress (opposed by all state departments of corrections in the U.S.), the Department must be sensitive to protecting different religious needs in the institutional setting.
8. The Committee supports the T.I.E. (Training, industry and Education concept and recommends the continuation of an integrated, individualized approach to the selection of appropriate programming for each inmate.
9. The Department should consider the development of a Resource Group which would provide outside expertise in various programming areas. This Group could provide the same type of information and support to program administrators and staff as the Community Support Groups will provide the Wardens.
10. The Department recently launched a program of community service work Projects using inmates. Meaningful work experiences of this type should be greatly expanded. In order to facilitate these projects, institutions will have to make maintenance and work shops available during second and third shift hours.

### IV. Administrative Concerns

The Committee believes that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has done a remarkably good job of using inadequate resources to cope with the rapid growth of the prison population. The following suggestions are not meant to criticize the Department but rather to augment the Department's efforts.

#### A. Community Input and Coalition Building

DRC presently lacks a supportive constituency. It is isolated from those who use it (courts, probation departments and law enforcement) and from those who could provide private and public resources. The Department greatly needs input and support from those institutions which are most touched by it and from those which could help it. It needs a partnership with its users and supporters. To create this partnership and facilitate the needed input and support, the Committee recommends:

#### Recommendations

1. Each institution should have a Community Support Group modeled on the initiative already taken by DRC that includes possible resource providers, court and law enforcement representatives and interested local citizens who could inform the Warden on needed activities, link the institution to private and public resources and advocate for institutional improvement.
2. The Governor's Select Committee should be restructured to be a resource to the Governor, the Director and to the Legislature regarding Ohio's prison problems. The Committee should have the responsibility to explore

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ways in which the Department can receive needed support from other components of government and from private persons and institutions. The restructured Governor's Select Committee should also work with the division of Parole and Community Services to improve parole and probation supervision practices and to link parole and probation more closely to local resources, both public and private.

### B. Management Information Systems and Research

It is vital for managers to have accurate, complete and timely information on the inmates in their charge. In addition, research and analysis can provide the groundwork for intelligent and productive executive decisions.

#### Recommendations

1. The Inmate Progression System (the Department's mainframe-resident inmate database) is a good beginning for an inmate database but is not sufficiently comprehensive in terms of data elements nor is it available to enough staff to make it a good management tool.

The Committee recommends that additional resources, including programming and data entry staff, be committed to the upgrading and maintenance of the Department's inmate database, allowing the expansion of the database in terms of available information and ensuring the timely and accurate entry of information into the system. The goal should be to develop a system of information and tracking which is comparable to the federal system and more advanced state systems.

2. The Department needs a system which allows access to data regarding previous contacts with the criminal justice system as well as prior incarceration with the department.

The Committee recommends that information relating to an inmate's criminal history be added to the Inmate Progression System. Mandatory pre-sentence investigations for all offenders sentenced to the state prison system constitute a basic pre-requisite for a sound Inmate Progression System.

3. The Inmate Progression System and other stand-alone databases should be available in a user-friendly environment to all department staff who have a need for the information.

We recommend the development and use of local and wide area networks, with appropriate safeguards for the security of the equipment and data.

We also recommend that the Inmate Progression System be expanded to include sufficient inmate information to allow the computerization of the production of many of the instruments used by the Department, such as the Security Classification instrument, the Parole Risk instrument and the Parole Guideline instrument.

4. In order to increase the efficiency of the Management Information System, the Committee suggests the appointment of a coordinating committee within the Department to rationalize the system and recommend additional useful applications. The value of information systems as management tools has already been demonstrated within the Department with such systems as the T.I.E. approach. The applicability of this model for other management areas should be explored.

5. The state-level offender-based tracking system and the DRC inmate database, as well as mental health and mental retardation tracking systems, should be integrated for the purpose of improving the quality and specificity of the data for all users. Currently, DRC does not know and cannot readily obtain information on how many of its prisoners have been clients of systems other than corrections (for example, mental health or mental retardation).

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6. The Committee endorses the concept of a pilot program such as the Serious Habitual Offender program, an automated tracking system which identifies and monitors individuals in trouble with the law, beginning with juvenile problems.
7. At least a substantial portion of research resources should be dedicated to the conduct of research, rather than using research resources to respond to requests for routine information.
8. The research unit in DRC currently lacks the resources to do both basic and applied research and to respond to the needs of varied stakeholders in the Legislature, the courts and the media for policy research information. The Committee recommends that sufficient resources be made available to permit the research unit to conduct methodologically rigorous, quantitative studies on such issues as recidivism, parole outcome and program effectiveness. The basic findings of this research should be routinely disseminated to all interested stakeholders, including presentence investigation writers, judges and probation and parole supervisors.

### C. Medical and Dental Services

About 10 percent of the Department's budget is used for medical services for inmates. Although a relatively young population, the socioeconomic status and life-style of inmates predisposes them to a variety of ailments not seen to a comparable degree in outside populations. Special health problems include tuberculosis, hepatitis and sexually transmitted diseases. In this area the Committee offers a number of recommendations:

#### Recommendations

1. Minimum health care standards must be met. This includes facilities, bed space and medication. The medical system is currently being overwhelmed by population pressures, particularly at reception and intake institutions.
2. We urge the Department to exempt the medical area from policies which result in staffing below authorized levels. We urge the Department to re-evaluate the authorized staffing levels for medical personnel to reflect the increases in inmate populations in recent years.
3. Purchasing regulations should be revised so that medical staff is able to manage medical equipment purchases without inordinate delays from the state purchasing bureaucracy. The Department must purchase most supplies (medical supplies and pharmaceuticals) from the Pharmacy Service Center operated by the Department of Mental Health. The Center charges a mark-up of 8 percent. It is recommended that this "middle-man" be eliminated.
4. Some inmates characteristically over-utilize the institutional medical care system. Direct and indirect incentives (such as changes in work assignments) currently prompting inmates to over-use the system must be controlled.
5. Dental care should be expanded in those facilities where prisoners now wait more than six months for routine dental work.
6. The Committee commends the Department for providing specialized care, through its Ohio State University Hospitals contract, to inmates with special needs. The new Corrections Medical Center and the Frazier Health Center are models for the organization and delivery of medical care to the correctional system.

### D. Personnel and Human Resources

We cannot overemphasize the need for adequate staffing levels and high quality personnel, both uniformed and non-uniformed. Currently, staffing is inadequate, being predicated on a smaller inmate population base. The Committee also wishes to note that it is line staff members who run Ohio's institutions twenty-four hours a day. It is vital that all staff, managers and union, operate in concert.

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### Recommendations

1. The Department must insist on the highest practicable standards for the recruitment of qualified persons at every level. The Committee recommends:
  - a. The Committee supports the Department's initiative in establishing centralized recruitment and assessment for Correctional Officers. This can eliminate redundancy, ensure the maintenance of standards, and enable the department to hire individuals and get them on the job quickly.
  - b. The recruitment and special emphasis on career development of qualified minorities must be emphasized. DRC should establish generous "targets" for minority hiring and promotion.
  - c. We recommend that a high school diploma or GED become a minimum standard for hiring Correctional Officers and other personnel.
  - d. The Department should reach out through advertising, job fairs and career days participation to recruit the broadest possible range of qualified candidates.
  - e. All candidates for Correctional Officer should be tested to ensure that they can work comfortably in a multicultural setting. Preference should be given to candidates exhibiting good people skills."
  - f. The Department should make every effort to avoid hiring individuals affiliated with or espousing the views of hate groups.
2. With respect to training, the Committee recommends:
  - a. Entry level training is vital. Pre-service training for Correctional Officers should be long enough to encompass all of the subjects and skills the Department believes are necessary for job competence.
  - b. Specialized in-service training, particularly for professional staff should be up-graded. Training for those called upon to perform non-routine, highly skilled functions should be mandatory. When necessary, private vendors should be employed on a contract basis to provide this training.
  - c. Cultural diversity training should be an integral part of both pre-service and annual in-service training of DRC staff. All current staff members should complete diversity training as soon as possible.
  - d. DRC should offer course materials for self-development which staff members can pursue on their own time.
  - e. Leadership development training programs should be expanded to include a larger number of interested staff. Successful candidates for entry into these programs should meet rigorous standards.
3. Regarding staff issues in general, we recommend:
  - a. An in-depth analysis of DRC human resources should be undertaken to determine whether DRC actually has sufficient staff, or has enough authorized positions, to enable the Department to accomplish its mandate. The analysis of human resource needs should look not only at the need for Correctional Officers, but also at the need for non-uniformed and professional staff.
  - b. The four-month probationary period for Correctional Officers (of which one month is spent in pre-service training) is often not adequate to allow the supervisor to judge the competency and potential

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

of the probationary employee. The average probationary period nationally for new Correctional Officers is 8.2 months. Ohio's probationary period should be extended to meet the national average.

- c. Special programs such as mental health services and substance abuse education and treatment must be adequately staffed with qualified personnel. The expanded use of private and other public agency contractors is recommended.

4. Regarding labor/management relations, we recommend:

- a. In order to improve morale and operations, particularly at the Correctional Officer level, an effort should be made whenever possible to involve labor representatives, in the institutions and with Central Office, in reaching decisions affecting institutional security, safety and operations (inmate movements, dining hall procedures).
- b. Understanding and cooperation among labor, middle management and top management in each institution is critical for safe and efficient operation. An on-going dialogue among representatives of these groups is essential and should be regularized.

### E. Management Control

A number of operational subsystems which managers use to control inmates or to chart the course of the system should be reviewed.

#### Recommendations

1. One of the most persistent complaints the Committee heard from prisoners concerned the institutional inmate grievance procedures. Although departmental policy requires that inmate kites be answered within a few days of receipt, inmates complained that their kites are either not answered at all or not answered within the prescribed time lines. The Committee recommends that greater efforts be made to follow prescribed procedures in responding to inmate grievances.
2. Institutional inspector training programs should be broadened to include mediation and conciliation.
3. The grievance system is designed to adjudicate individual complaints against the system. It is not designed to resolve philosophical and other disputes, particularly involving identity, tenets, dogma and practices of religious groups. In unique or unusual situations involving disputes regarding religious and philosophical dogmas and practices, the Department should consider enlisting outside expertise to help resolve these disputes. The Committee wishes to emphasize that the use of these experts should be restricted to such one-of-a-kind events as the tuberculin testing controversy at SOCF, identified by the Department as a major precipitating factor in the riot.
4. The DRC Central Office must give serious indication that it believes in the unit management concept and will do everything necessary to make it an effective management control system.
5. The Committee supports the concept of unit management. To be successful, unit management requires physical facilities congruent with the concept. In older institutions, unit management has not been effective. The Committee urges DRC to implement unit management where feasible and to study new approaches to its implementation in older facilities.
6. Cooperation with the institutional employee unions in each institution should help the implementation of the unit management concept.

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7. DRC should ensure that the actions of unit management staff (unit managers, case managers and correctional counselors) are congruent with security needs. Unit management should not be defined as exclusively a treatment modality but as an attempt to integrate security and treatment needs.
8. The Committee recommends that DRC place greater emphasis on operational audits and proactively disseminate results of those audits to key decision makers in the Department and, if appropriate, to the Legislature.
9. The Committee commends the Department for recognizing the need for such audits and urges the Department to resume its practice of annual audits, expanded by the inclusion of American Correctional Association standards, as soon as practical.
10. The Committee commends the Department for recognizing the need for strategic planning and for its use of a system approach to strategic planning.
11. DRC is encouraged to implement a strategic planning process that involves staff from all levels, that empowers them to work together to accomplish objectives, and that communicates to all stakeholders the priorities of the organization.

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### APPENDIX A

#### GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS

#### MEETINGS AND SPEAKERS

Following its initial meeting with Governor George Voinovich and Lt. Governor Mike DeWine on May 6, 1993, the Governor's Select Committee on Corrections held a number of meetings and heard the following speakers:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SPEAKERS</u>
5/12/93	DRC Central Office	Lt. Governor Mike DeWine Director Reginald Wilkinson Paul Goldberg (Executive Director, OCSEA)
6/9/93	Mansfield Correctional Institution	Warden Dennis Baker Dr. Michael Hogan (Director, Ohio Department of Mental Health) Dr. Lawrence Mendel (DRC Director of Medical Services) Dr. J. Lamar Johnson (DRC Psychological Services) Dr. Sylvester Briggs (DRC Psychological Services)
6/10/93	Lorain Correctional Institution	Warden Terry Collins David Meeker (Reception Coordinator, LORCI) Debbie Miller (Record Officer, LORCI) Lois Love (Medical Services, LORCI) Roger Overberg (DRC Chief of Classification)
6/23/93	Lebanon Correctional Institution	Warden William Dallman Norm Hills (DRC Deputy Director, North Region) Eric Dahlberg (DRC Deputy Director, South Region) David Blodgett (Chief, Bureau of Construction, Activation and Maintenance)
7/8/93	DRC Central Office	T.D. Taylor (DRC Chief Inspector) Warden Carole Shiplevy (Hocking Correctional) Warden Arthur Tate (Southern Ohio Correctional Facility) Niki Schwartz (Attorney)
7/14/93	Montgomery County MonDay Program	Judge John M. Meagher (Administrative Judge) Tim DePew (Administrator, (MonDay Program)) Jill D. Goldhart (DRC Deputy Director, Parole and Community Services)
	Dayton Correctional Institution	Warden John Manuel Director Reginald Wilkinson

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7/15/93	Ohio Reformatory for Women	Warden Christine Money (ORW) Warden Barbara Nichols (Franklin Pre-Release) Acting Warden Norm Rose (Northeast Pre-Release) Dr. John Bradley (ORW Medical Director)
7/21/93	Southern Ohio Correctional Facility	Warden Arthur Tate Dorothy Evener (DRC, Chief of Personnel) Barbara White-Terry (DRC Minority Recruitment Coordinator) Cheryl Reed (DRC Assessment Center Administrator) Janis Lane (Superintendent, Corrections Training Academy)
9/1/93	Corrections Training Academy	Janis Lane, Superintendent Peter Davis (Executive Director, Correctional Institution Inspection Committee)
9/15/93	DRC central office	Professor C. Ronald Huff (Ohio State University, School of Public Policy and Management) Matt Meyers (DRC Office of Prisons) Ben Bower (DRC Security Administrator) Paul Goldberg (Executive Director, OCSEA)
9/16/93	London Correctional Institution	Warden Melody Turner T.D. Taylor (DRC Chief Inspector) Jeff Carson (DRC Assistant Chief Inspector) Jeff Mathew (DRC Assistant Chief Inspector) Marc Houk (Inspector of Institutional services, LORCI)
9/29/93	DRC Central Office	
10/13/93	Senate Office Building	Senator Betty Montgomery
10/27/93	DRC Central Office	
10/28/93	DRC Central Office	
11/11/93	DRC Central Office	
11/12/93	DRC Central Office	Vincent Nathan (Attorney, Appointed to monitor the implementation of the 21-point agreement)

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APPENDIX B

TABLES

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

**TABLE B-1**  
**PRISON CROWDING**  
January 1, 1993

RANK	STATE	INMATE POPULATION	RATED CAPACITY	% OVER CAPACITY
1	Ohio	37,991	21,283	78.5 %
2	Hawaii	2,674	1,566	70.8
3	Maryland	18,990	11,446	65.9
4	California	103,812	62,952	64.9
5	Massachusetts	10,395	6,624	56.9
6	Nebraska	2,604	1,706	52.6
7	Wisconsin	8,812	5,952	48.1
8	Pennsylvania	24,227	16,713	45.0
9	Oklahoma	12,211	8,646	41.2
10	Federal System	71,671	52,013	37.8
11	Vermont	873	647	34.9
12	Illinois	31,640	23,535	34.4
13	Delaware	3,975	2,979	33.4
14	New Jersey	18,110	13,749	31.7
15	Michigan	35,433	27,714	27.9
16	South Dakota	1,390	1,090	27.5
17	Washington	9,027	7,256	24.4
18	Virginia	16,996	13,852	22.7
19	Montana	1,521	1,276	19.2
20	Iowa	4,995	4,214	18.5
21	Idaho	2,219	1,926	15.2
22	North Carolina	20,642	17,913	15.2
23	Maine	1,519	1,353	12.3
24	Indiana	13,166	11,991	9.8
25	Connecticut	11,055	10,393	6.4
26	Alaska	2,599	2,466	5.4
27	Arizona	16,316	15,520	5.1
28	Minnesota	3,832	3,658	4.8
29	Missouri	16,198	15,630	3.6
30	New York	61,736	60,064	2.8

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>INMATE POPULATION</u>	<u>RATED CAPACITY</u>	<u>% OVER CAPACITY</u>
31	Utah	2,968	2,897	2.5
32	South Carolina	16,327	16,216	0.7
33	Colorado	7,535	7,496	0.5
34	Arkansas	7,627	7,614	0.2
35	Nevada	5,982	5,995	-0.2
36	Georgia	25,081	25,252	-0.7
37	Oregon	6,375	6,437	-1.0
38	New Hampshire	1,758	1,800	-2.3
39	Alabama	16,035	16,456	-2.6
40	Kentucky	8,729	9,119	-4.3
41	Louisiana	16,350	17,128	-4.5
42	New Mexico	3,288	3,443	-4.5
43	West Virginia	1,687	1,775	-5.0
44	Mississippi	7,898	8,365	-5.6
45	Tennessee	10,569	11,440	-7.6
46	Kansas	5,930	6,460	-8.2
47	North Dakota	536	596	-10.1
48	District of Columbia	9,798	11,000	-10.9
49	Wyoming	958	1,084	-11.6
50	Florida	48,466	55,100	-12.0
51	Texas	51,592	58,672	-12.1
52	Rhode Island	2,783	3,292	-15.5

Source: 1993 *Corrections Yearbook*, Criminal Justice Institute, Inc.

**APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

**TABLE B-2  
CRIME RATES 1983 - 1992**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Ohio Prison Population</b>	<b>Ohio Crime Rate</b>	<b>USA Crime Rate</b>
1983	18,054	4,505	5,175
1984	18,479	4,273	5,031
1985	19,864	4,187	5,206
1986	21,621	4,358	5,480
1987	23,230	4,575	5,550
1988	24,750	4,645	5,664
1989	30,153	4,733	5,741
1990	31,875	4,843	5,820
1991	33,356	5,033	5,898
1992	37,057	4,665	5,660

\*Crime rate is the number of reported crimes per 100,000 population.

Source: FBI Crime Data for Ohio 1992

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

**TABLE B-3  
CRIME RATES COMPARED WITH INCARCERATION RATES**

Crime Rates			Incarceration Rates		
Rank	State	Crime Rate 1992	Rank	State	Prison pop. Per 100,000
1	Dist. Columbia	11,407	1	Dist. Columbia	1,651
2	Florida	8,358	2	Louisiana	503
3	Texas	7,057	3	S. Carolina	499
4	Arizona	7,028	4	Delaware	494
5	California	6,679	5	Oklahoma	482
6	Louisiana	6,546	6	Nevada	427
7	New Mexico	6,434	7	Arizona	422
8	Georgia	6,405	8	Alabama	417
9	Maryland	6,224	9	Michigan	409
10	Nevada	6,203	10	Georgia	395
11	Washington	6,172	11	Maryland	388
12	Hawaii	6,112	12	Texas	385
13	Colorado	5,958	13	Alaska	367
14	S. Carolina	5,893	14	Arkansas	347
15	New York	5,858	15	Florida	347
16	Oregon	5,820	16	New York	347
17	N. Carolina	5,802	17	Ohio	345
18	Illinois	5,765	18	California	344
19	Utah	5,658	19	Mississippi	337
20	Michigan	5,610	20	Missouri	310
21	Alaska	5,569	21	Virginia	307
22	Oklahoma	5,431	22	N. Carolina	294
23	Kansas	5,319	23	New Jersey	290
24	Alabama	5,268	24	Tennessee	283
25	Tennessee	5,135	25	Connecticut	279
26	Missouri	5,097	26	Kentucky	275
27	New Jersey	5,064	27	Illinois	269
28	Connecticut	5,052	28	Colorado	253
29	Massachusetts	5,002	29	Indiana	248
30	Delaware	4,848	30	Rhode Island	243
31	Arkansas	4,761	31	Kansas	241
32	Indiana	4,686	32	Wyoming	225
33	Ohio	4,665	33	Idaho	220
34	Montana	4,596	34	Oregon	216
35	Minnesota	4,590	35	S. Dakota	212
36	Rhode Island	4,578	36	Pennsylvania	206
37	Wyoming	4,575	37	New Mexico	205
38	Nebraska	4,324	38	Vermont	200
39	Wisconsin	4,319	39	Hawaii	195
40	Virginia	4,298	40	Massachusetts	191

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Crime Rate			Incarceration Rate		
Rank	State	Crime Rate 1992	Rank	State	Prison pop. Per 100,000
41	Mississippi	4,282	41	Montana	188
42	Idaho	3,996	42	Washington	186
43	Iowa	3,957	43	Wisconsin	180
44	Maine	3,523	44	Iowa	178
45	Vermont	3,410	45	New Hampshire	165
46	Pennsylvania	3,392	46	Nebraska	164
47	Kentucky	3,323	47	Utah	164
48	New Hampshire	3,080	48	Maine	126
49	South Dakota	2,998	49	West Virginia	118
50	North Dakota	2,903	50	North Dakota	88
51	West Virginia	2,609	51	Minnesota	87

Source: FBI Crime Data for 1992 and 1993 *Corrections Yearbook*, Criminal Justice

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**TABLE B-4  
POPULATION PROJECTIONS**

**Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction  
July 1, 1994 - July 1, 2002**

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>	<u>Total</u>
July 1, 1993 ( Actual*)	37,286	2,506	39,792
July 1, 1994	38,177	2,679	40,856
July 1, 1995	39,587	2,692	42,279
July 1, 1996	40,490	2,763	43,253
July 1, 1997	40,956	2,740	43,696
July 1, 1998	41,987	2,746	44,733
July 1, 1999	42,734	2,770	45,504
July 1, 2000	43,610	2,873	46,483
July 1, 2001	44,268	2,895	47,163
July 1, 2002	45,129	2,962	48,091

\*Includes 343 male and 53 female furlougees

**PROJECTED CAPACITY**

	<b>Capacity</b>	<b>Population Projection as Percent of Proposed Capacity</b>
July 1, 1993	21,283	187.0 %
July 1, 1994	24,383	167.6
July 1, 1995	25,895	163.3
July 1, 1996	27,155	159.3

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APPENDIX C

TESTIMONY OF DAVID L. BLODGETT, CHIEF  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION, ACTIVATION AND MAINTENANCE

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### APPENDIX C

TESTIMONY OF DAVID L. BLODGETT, CHIEF  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION, ACTIVATION AND MAINTENANCE

GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS  
LEBANON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION  
JUNE 23, 1993

First of all, I would like to thank Chairman Dinitz and the Department's support staff assigned to the Committee for the invitation to address you today. The staff specifically requested that I address the issue of crowding as it impacts the physical plants and infrastructure of the institutions.

This is an area of concern that often gets overlooked as we discuss the increasing inmate population in our facilities. Generally what comes to mind are programs filled to capacity with waiting lists for openings to participate; never-ending lines of inmates at the dining halls at meal times; bunks stacked two high which are jammed end-to-end into large dormitory rooms with little aisle space between bunks; cells double-bunked with little space for movement; recreation areas filled with inmates; and dormitory wings with inmates standing, sitting, sleeping in these areas.

These pictures are vivid. You have seen them in your visits to the facilities; you will see some of them instantly re-enacted today. They paint a picture of crowding which conveys an air of apprehension for the real issues of safety and security. These two issues are dominant colors in this picture of crowding; they are primary responsibilities and at the heart of the correctional institutional component of the criminal justice system.

Hidden from view in this picture, and often overlooked as we review and discuss the crowding issue, is that of the physical plants themselves. They are in the background of the picture and provide the support that is needed, but they generally do not stand out specifically in our walk-throughs. Generally, they are only noticed for a fleeting moment before the next vivid scenario appears.

These concerns include the wear and tear on the physical structures, the demands on its utilities...electrical, heat, water, sewer, and the wear on its capital equipment which supports the operation of the facilities, without which, normal, routine procedures and institutional life functions are jeopardized. With disruptions and breakdowns in the physical plants, safety and security immediately rise to the top of the list and take on immense importance and concern. What has been taken for granted - smoothly functioning dishwashers; hot water in the showers and wash basins; heat radiating from fin tubes and radiators when it's needed; lock and door controls; hinges that allow doors to operate properly; toilets that carry away human waste; air handling units that change the air in living areas and work units to provide for proper healthful ventilation; potable drinking water in the fountains and faucets - pose immediate threats to the safety and security of the facilities when they don't function as expected. Even a slow-down or a temporary halt to their services is suspicious in a crowded atmosphere and climate.

"Over capacity" simply means use over and above the designed use, designed capacity. When demands are put onto a structure or onto a piece of equipment in excess of its designed load or use, then problems necessarily happen.

For comparative and illustrative purposes, I have categorized the correctional institutional physical plants into three categories:

- 1) Those institutions which were designed and built as adult correctional institutions prior to the construction efforts authorized in House Bill 530, the primary prison construction program.
- 2) Those institutions in the department which are presently used as adult correctional facilities but which were not originally constructed as places of incarceration for adult felons.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

3) Those twelve institutions which were designed and built as a result of House Bill 530 and which have opened since 1987.

The first group of institutions, those designed and built as adult correctional facilities, are six in number:

Lebanon  
Marion  
Chillicothe  
London  
Ohio Reformatory for Women  
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility

These six facilities house 31% of the inmate population in the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. These six facilities collectively are operating at 173% of the rated capacities, with the exception of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.

These physical plants are all more than twenty years old, with the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility being the youngest. This group of institutions all have million and multi-million dollar shower and restroom renovation projects either currently underway, recently completed, or in preliminary design. All have had major heating plant upgrades or conversions, or presently have such projects in progress. The physical abuse, the wear and tear of living and daily use of these particular facilities, is not as readily evident as that in the third group of institutions because these were constructed with harder materials and finishes than the most recent facilities. I shall explain more on this later.

The second category of facilities houses 22% of the Department's inmate population and collectively are at 170% of rated capacity. The five institutions in this category are physical plants that were neither designed nor constructed as adult correctional institutions, with perhaps the exception of one, the Lima Correctional Institution which previously was Lima State Hospital for the Criminally Insane.

The other facilities in this category are the Hocking Correctional Institution, designed as a tuberculosis sanitarium which contained patient rooms as you would expect to find in such a hospital. The walls defining these rooms were removed in the renovation transitions to reveal large open dormitories.

The Orient Correctional Institution, a campus type facility of cottages for mentally retarded individuals; its companion, the Pickaway Correctional Institution, also a campus complex for mentally retarded individuals at the Orient site; and the Southeastern Correctional Institution at Lancaster, previously the Boys' Industrial School, a campus-style set of buildings for juvenile offenders.

These five facilities have been reconditioned to house 22% of the Department's adult inmate population and are also operating at 170% of recommended rated capacity.

Some components of the physical plants of these five units are in bad shape and antiquated, although they have received capital improvement attention since their acquisitions and transfers to the departments.

An important consideration with this group is that they were not designed for felons; they were not expected to take the abuse and wear and tear of adults, which, in turn, is compounded by their housing 70% more individuals than the rated design capacity recommendation.

Capital projects which address the infrastructure at these facilities include a \$4 million shower renovation project at the Orient Correctional Institution, a \$440,000 shower renovation project administered at the Pickaway Correctional Institution, a \$2.8 million project administered over a ten year period to address the heating and hot water supply systems for both the Pickaway and the Orient Correctional Institutions, and a \$600,000 project to initially address the water and steam distribution system at the complex. Also, major electrical power upgrades and electrical distribution system renovation occurred at this complex for a cost of \$800,000.

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The fact that these facilities were renovated into correctional facilities poses special and unique problems. Compounding this is the crowding issue in antiquated facilities not designed for such correctional use.

The third group of institutions are those twelve new institutions the Department has activated since 1987. These twelve institutions, authorized by funds available in House Bill 530, are currently operating at an average of 200% of design capacity. These 12 institutions house 47% of the Department's inmate population. Although nice and new, these facilities were not designed nor intended to operate at this level. Rather they were intended to operate at slightly above design, possible at the 140% level of capacity, certainly not at the 200%. Consequently, these new facilities face distinct problems of their own and not something you would expect to find in recently opened facility.

As a group, you recently visited the Lorain Correctional Institution which houses almost three times its design capacity. The sewage lines leading waste from the facility are at capacity; the hot water generating capabilities are at peak performance; the grease traps in the kitchen are overloaded and require constant attention and maintenance. The heating and ventilation systems cannot function properly as designed. Warden Collins related to several of you that because the HVAC system was designed with heat regulated by the temperature in the central dayroom areas, in the winter time, cells cannot not be maintained at a comfortable temperature. The heating and ventilation system equipment and balancing was designed for activity in the dayroom area and was not designed with the extra heat in mind that is produced by the conversion of the dayroom to living quarters. Also, the ventilation system, including the circulation and mixing of fresh air in the living areas as well as the ventilation of moist air from the shower areas, is overworked and not capable of functioning at the correct volume considering the crowded quarters.

One area of all institutions which has suffered the effects of crowding is that of the shower/restroom areas. All institutions in the first two categories have extensive shower/restroom renovation projects.

It is ironic that water, which is primary for our existence, is also one of the most damaging destructive elements. Leaking showers contribute to extensive structural problems. You will see that in certain areas of this facility today. This, coupled with the damage caused by constant water vapor and the inability to adequately ventilate these humid areas, solicits damage. The over-use of the shower areas does not permit the rooms to dry out. Major renovation projects result. This problem is compounded in the second group of institutions - those not initially designed for adult prisoners - because their shower areas were added upon transfer to the Department for prison use. The original design of the facilities did not anticipate this need; especially they did not anticipate use as an adult male facility to incarcerate inmates.

Major shower projects include a recently completed extensive remodeling of Marion for \$1 million; shower floor, ceiling, and floor replacement at SOCF for \$400,000; and four projects in preliminary design: at Chillicothe Correctional Institution for \$4 million; at the Pickaway Correctional Institution for \$400,000; and the beginning of a project at the Ohio Reformatory for Women which has an ultimate estimated price tag of \$1 million.

Water treatment and waste water treatment sewage plants are strategically impacted by the crowding. Earlier, I mentioned sewage lines at capacity; at the sewage lift station at the Grafton Correctional Institution which services both that facility and the Lorain Correctional Institution, pumps which were designed and intended to pump alternately and sporadically, now run three times more than designed. The lift station is designed to store 70,000 gallons of sewage while aerating it at the same time in order to equalize the flow of sewage from the facilities to the treatment plant. Such cannot be done; rather, pumping must be constant with no equalization of the flow nor aeration of the product. The station is pumping 650,000 per day of sewage to the treatment plant that expected a flow of 470,000 gallons equalized over a 24 hour period. This is a difference of 180,000 gallons per day.

At the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, a plant designed to treat and pump 1.4 million gallons of water/sewage per day is currently processing 1.75 million gallons of sewage per day.

The average water use in a correctional institution is 150 gallons per day per inmate. This does not differ significantly with that found in the private sector. Those institutions, however, which have agricultural and large industrial settings average 200 gallons per day per inmate. Crowding causes water treatment capability problems in present plants, as well

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as water storage considerations. At the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, the water plant was designed to treat 1.7 million gallons of water per day; treatment now is at 1.95 million gallons per day, 250,000 gallons per day more than recommended. The water demand at peak periods, which exceeds the production capacity, is necessarily supplemented with treated water held in storage. The reserve tank is filled at night during quiet, little used/demand periods, in preparation for the demand supply needed during the peak usage periods.

The demands on the support systems do not permit shut-downs or slow downs for maintenance purposes, especially that of a preventative nature. Yet, such maintenance is necessary in order to keep the system functioning. We have a type of "Catch 22" position. The three pumps I mentioned earlier at the Grafton Correctional Institution which service Lorain and Grafton cannot be shut down; they must continually pump. To save the situation, we recently installed a bypass so that if something happens, we can continue pumping.

The same situation surely describes other equipment and facility maintenance situations. Dishwashers, for example, as well as most pieces of equipment in the food service areas, are critical to the operation of a facility. These areas, however, are in almost constant operation with shut down almost impossible. Dishwashers themselves take tremendous beatings from the constant use and overload. Their life expectancy is shortened greatly without constant vigilant attention.

Four new institutions have recently replaced their original dishwashers which are less than three years old- Lorain, Ross, Allen and Warren Correctional Institutions. The constant hard use and the constant humidity in the area play havoc with the systems.

Related to this are the demands on maintenance and support staff. The more and longer equipment and facilities are taxed, the more critical becomes preventative maintenance. Preventative maintenance requires staff and dedicated attention to schedules, the same as the automobile you drove here today requires regular oil changes, transmission checks, battery checks, new brake linings, etc. Without these attentions, serious problems occur which would take your auto out of circulation. Such is the same with this equipment in the correctional institution. Only this equipment suffers the extra burden of over-demands plus another factor, that of a lack of personal ownership. The personal attention you may give your own auto to make sure it is in working order may not apply to this equipment which belongs to no one personally. Regular preventative maintenance requires staff; and additional staff in this area has not been a luxury.

For the past ten years, five capital improvement biennium episodes, a total of \$124 million has been channeled toward capital improvements projects in the correctional institutions. These amounts have been steadily rising from an initial appropriation of \$13.5 million, then \$19 million, followed by \$25 million in the fiscal years 89-90; \$26 million in fiscal years 91-92; and the largest, \$40 million, in fiscal years 93-94.

Although these figures are large, they still do not address all the projects and capital needs identified. They hit the most critical. The present six-year capital plan submitted for consideration included projects for the first biennium totaling \$220 million; the next two-year period contained projects totaling \$229 million. Only a fraction were funded.

In the HB 350 prison construction program, in order to both stretch the construction dollar to fund more beds as well as to develop a more residential and relaxed internal atmosphere, the interior of the compounds were designed to be soft in nature with well supported and hard perimeter security shells and envelopes. The use of soft materials, as cost savings measures, in conjunction with designed security levels, brought with it the requirement for constant and necessary maintenance. Harder, more expensive materials require less attention. An example of this direct correlation is that of floor coverings—vinyl floor tile, at the low end of the cost requires constant and careful attention. With proper maintenance, their life expectancy is extended. Going up the line, to more expensive floor coverings and that which requires less maintenance are monolithic plastic type poured/troweled covered floors. At the top of the line, we find terrazzo floors which are very expensive, yet they last years with little maintenance. But if one opts for less expensive materials in floors, one opts for more maintenance.

The same analysis and comparison applies to doors and hardware—locks, hinges, handles etc. Three grades are in use, commercial, institutional, security. Each is more substantial than the next; each is more expensive than the next. More maintenance is required at the lower level. In order to stretch the construction dollars, doors and hardware were selected

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depending upon intended usage and population numbers. Commercial hardware is used, which required more maintenance, but crowding and overuse taxes this lighter equipment, yet initial costs prohibited the heavier hardware throughout the facilities. The need for maintenance was central to this decision concept to achieve more beds but crowding has put additional demands on the system which has, in turn, reduced maintenance time. Let me address a few remarks concerning the Lebanon Correctional Institution to identify several of the major infrastructure and capital improvement projects at work here. The supply of domestic water is a major problem at this facility caused by the crowding issue. In 1990, three instantaneous steam coil heaters were installed in the power plant. Each heater is capable of supplying 150 gallons per minute of 170 degree water. The system was designed for two units to be on-line at all times, with a third unit to be used as a stand-by. At peak flow, these units were designed to produce 18,000 gallons of water per hour or 125,000 gallons per day of hot water. Average daily flow was designed for 1800 inmates; however, 2200 plus inmates presently demand hot water and the system is producing over 200,000 gallons per day. The system is overtaxed by at least 75,000 gallons per day. The stand-by unit is no longer standby but a regular part of the supply system.

A similar problem exists at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution water plant. The maximum design of the pumps was 1.7 million gallons per day. Currently however, the pumps are pushing 1.95 million gallons per day. A project is currently in progress at that facility to increase the treatment capabilities to process these extra water needs that are critical to the institution.

At the Lima Correctional Institution, a domestic water distribution system has been initiated with a project cost of \$1.2 million, and the objective of that project is to get the water to the living areas

because the lines have become deteriorated and blocked from use. Here at Lebanon, a major roof renovation project was completed this past year at a cost of \$1.2 million. A second roofing project to address the other areas of this facility which are in dire need of repairs is ready to begin. This component has budget of \$3.2 million .

The supply lines from the institution's well field to the water treatment plant are at capacity. The tie-in of additional wells and the addition of supply lines is a present capital project to handle this infrastructure problem. Project cost is estimated at \$250,000.

Since 1982, this institution has witnessed a total of \$5.2 million in capital funds to address physical plant issues. Additional expenditures are planned here in projects to begin within the near future in the amount of \$2 million for shower renovation, \$250,000 for water plant supply, and \$3.2 million for additional roofing, as just mentioned earlier. This represents an additional \$5.5 million for this facility in this biennium.

Safety and security are primary attentions in the correctional institutions. A well functioning and maintained physical plant, operating at peak performance is the desire of every correctional administrator. A great hindrance to this, however, is the effect an abundant population has on the infrastructure, utilities, physical structures, and capital equipment of the institution. The maintenance schedules in a proactive, preventative maintenance mode are handicapped by the demands of an excess population. This scenario is like a movie picture depicting a struggle between elements, with the characters of water usage, waster water demands, heat and ventilation requirements, equipment loadings, electrical demands, and well kept and weather-tight buildings playing at the core of the story.

It is not an easy script to write; it is even harder to deliver, especially with the reality of crowding interrupting the work of the institutions in this screenplay.

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## CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION INSPECTION COMMITTEE

### INTERIM REPORT ON THE APRIL 11, 1993 RIOT AT THE

### SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

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## CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION INSPECTION COMMITTEE

### INTERIM REPORT

#### ON THE

#### APRIL 11, 1993 SOCF RIOT

### I. INTRODUCTION

The leadership of the House and Senate directed the CIIC to conduct a thorough investigation into the cause(s) of the April 11, 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility and to report its findings and recommendations. The Committee chose to narrow our scope of inquiry, so as not to frustrate any aspect of the Highway Patrol's criminal investigation nor to compromise the Special Prosecutor's case preparation. The Committee has taken no testimony from any of the correctional officer hostages. No inmates were interviewed. The Committee has received only derivative testimony with regard to issues of motive, purpose, and culpability. This interim report reflects the Committee's preliminary findings of factors which contributed to the riot and pervasive problems which adversely affected the conditions and operations at SOCF. Preliminary recommendations are also offered.

The Committee has given considerable focus and study to a number of other relevant issues regarding SOCF, including:

- Senior management leadership
- Unit Management
- ACA Accreditation
- Crowding
- Integrated celling
- Staffing levels
- Staff training and equipment
- Staff/inmate relations
- Cultural/racial sensitivity
- Inmate gang activity
- Inmate movement
- Inmate job assignments
- DRC/SOCF preparedness for major disturbances
- DRC/SOCF initial response to the riot
- Mental Health treatment programs

To date, the Committee has held six (6) extensive hearings, including a public forum in Portsmouth, Ohio, especially for residents of the Lucasville community. Two (2) on-site inspections of SOCF have been conducted. From July 28, 1993 to December 30, 1993, the Committee conducted inspections at each of Ohio's twenty-three (23) prisons. This is unprecedented in the Committee's sixteen year history.

### II. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF FACT

#### (A) TRIGGER EVENT:

Credible evidence and testimony supports a finding that the disturbance was "triggered" by inmates learning of a planned lock-down of the institution, scheduled for Monday, April 12, 1993. The planned lockdown was in response to approximately 159 inmates who had refused to take T.B. skin tests. Word of this "confidential" plan was widely spread among the inmate population beginning Friday, April 9, 1993.

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The Committee finds that any number of inmate disgruntlements could have served as the "trigger event" for a riot situation. Many inmate complaints are common, frequent and have potential for producing major disturbances. Institution lock-downs are frequently evoked to stabilize an inmate population immediately prior to or immediately after a sensitive situation. Many planned lock-downs in Ohio's prison system have successfully occurred despite advance notice being leaked to inmates.

While the disgruntlement over the T.B. testing issue may have been a "trigger" incident, it cannot be said to be the cause of the riot. The T.B. testing issue cannot be directly linked to the brutal murder of Correctional Officer Robert Vallandingham, nor to the murder of nine inmates, nor to the other violent assaults which occurred during the siege. Indeed, it is significant to note that T.B. testing was not even cited as an issue in the initial list of nineteen (19) demands issued by inmates on the second day of the riot.

### (B) CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS:

Several factors adversely influenced the operations and conditions at SOCF, contributing to an environment ripe for a major disturbance. Testimony received from DRC officials was very critical of DRC's own policies and practices, including:

- \*\*dysfunctional unit management;
- \*\*inmate clerks performing sensitive responsibilities;
- \*\*non-compliance with restrictions on inmate movement;
- \*\*improper functioning of inmate informal complaint process;
- \*\*inadequate understanding and enforcement of court ordered random double celling.
- \*\*inadequate intelligence system on inmate gang activity;
- \*\*serious inconsistency between the philosophy of DRC Central Office and SOCF staff with regard to inmate classification;

The Department acknowledged and accepted significant responsibility for not properly monitoring and correcting many of these long-standing deficiencies in institutional operations and conditions.

**(1) Crowding:** Double celling at SOCF was a significant factor contributing to the Easter Sunday riot. Severe crowding produced double celling throughout Ohio's prison system. Double celling at SOCF produced a more dangerous atmosphere and environment for those who work there and for those who live there. Double celling put an added burden and responsibility on a workforce already challenged by inadequate staffing levels and by the disruptive nature of the inmate population. Crowding had an adverse impact on every area of institutional operations and conditions.

Increased violence is linked with increased crowding at maximum and close security institutions. Crowding alone reportedly accounts for much of the stress experienced by staff throughout SOCF. There is a certain population level (slightly less than design capacity) that existing staff can manage adequately. Beyond that level, negative effects on the staff reportedly begin to be visible in staff attitude, communication and interaction with inmates and other staff.

The Department implemented "Operation Shakedown" in October, 1990, in response to the House Select Committee recommendations for increased security and control of SOCF. A major component of this plan was to single-cell all inmates at SOCF. The opening of the new Mansfield Correctional Institution (ManCI) in October, 1990, allowed for the transfer of maximum security inmates from SOCF. As a result of "Operation Shakedown" SOCF's population had been reduced to operational levels of 1,600 to 1,650 during 1991 and 1992. As of the date of the riot SOCF's population had risen to 1,820, with 804 inmates double celled. Staff size did not increase.

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**(2) Change of Security Designation at Mansfield:** Until June, 1992, the Mansfield Correctional Institution (ManCI) served as the state's alternate maximum security prison. From its opening in October, 1990, ManCI received maximum security inmates from SOCF, allowing for a gradual reduction in the inmate population at SOCF. Following the fatal assault of a correctional officer at ManCI in June, 1992, the Department decided to transfer all maximum security inmates out of ManCI back to SOCF. This was done despite the fact that it was a close security merit status inmate who had assaulted the officer. The transfer of maximum security inmates from ManCI was a critical blow to "Operation Shakedown," resulting once again in double-celling at SOCF.

**(3) Nature of the Inmate Population at SOCF:** The particular nature of the SOCF inmate population itself was a contributing factor to the riot. Department officials testified that the redesignation of ManCI as a close security institution resulted in the transfer of a "predominantly stable group of 424" inmates out of SOCF to various institutions in exchange for a "higher security, younger group" of 293 inmates from ManCI. Some inmates are initially classified as maximum security due to the nature of their criminal convictions; murderers, rapists, armed robbers, etc. Some lower security level inmates are re-classified up to maximum security solely due to their disruptive behavior exhibited at lesser security institutions. Many of the most disruptive and violent prisoners who are now plaguing Ohio's prison system are those younger inmates serving comparatively shorter sentences for drug and theft-related offenses. Many of these same inmates are involved in gang-related activities in the prison.

Until June, 1992, both SOCF and ManCI housed maximum and close security inmates. The decision to redesignate ManCI as a close security prison reversed a noteworthy achievement of "Operation Shakedown" — the ability to effectuate institution separations between general population maximum security inmates. Many maximum security inmates require institution separations from each other in order to prevent altercations or to ensure their personal safety. Placement into the Protective Control Unit at the Warren Correctional Institution is not always an approved option for maximum security inmates. Institution separations are also utilized to frustrate and impede potentially disruptive associations between and among known gang members. The redesignation of ManCI resulted in a significant loss of general population maximum security beds.

**(4) Dysfunctional Unit Management:** The improper functioning of Unit Management at SOCF was a contributing factor to the riot. Testimony from DRC officials characterized Unit Management as "dysfunctional," suffering from a "lack of communication", "lack of trust" and "lack of shared mission." Other notable deficiencies, as cited in the Disturbance Cause Committee Report, include:

An inconsistency in the interpretation and enforcement of rules and policies between the units.

Inconsistent responses to or resolutions of inmate concerns by unit staff and officers resulted in misunderstandings with the inmates.

In-unit restrictions had an impact on the accessibility and the lines of communication between unit staff and inmates.

Not all Unit Management staff had completed DRC approved training curriculum for Unit Management. Security restrictions and time and space limitations impacted programming in the various units.

SOCF Correctional Officers have long expressed the following concerns regarding Unit Management:

"There is little communication between the Unit Staff and the Block officers. There is poor consistency in how different units operate. Each unit seems to operate under different policies and procedures."

"Every cell block is run differently because every Unit Manager runs his unit differently."

"Some units are not operated by good teamwork."

"Unit staff undermine the role and authority of officers in the blocks."

"Officers must contend with inflamed inmate tensions when Unit staff are not available or not responsive."

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Testimony further revealed that Unit Management at SOCF was plagued with "independent, inconsistent functioning of units" and that "a disruptive tension exists between custody and unit management staff." The Committee finds that, in some units, there is a schism between unit staff and line officers. In some cases, the result is friction, discord and confusion, tests of authority and tests of "pull" with senior administrative staff. Shortage of staff is believed to be one of the reasons why inmates report inadequate access, response or assistance from staff. It also explains in part why the expected benefit of Unit Management, reduction in grievances due to the handling of the problem at that Unit level, has not been apparent.

The Committee is supportive of Unit Management as a concept. However, serious concerns exist as to whether Unit Management, as presently structured and understood by SOCF staff, can successfully be implemented. Unit Management, properly understood, is one method to accomplish the goal of integrating the equally valuable roles of custody and treatment. Unfortunately, the current concept has been imposed on an understaffed work force entrenched in outdated notions of "custody vs. treatment," and without sufficient training, understanding or acceptance of how Unit Management can create a more beneficial and more safe working environment. Traditional notions of "custody staff" and "treatment staff" must be integrated without sacrifice to real security needs. In this regard, the recent promotion of the former SOCF Chief of Security (Major) to the position of SOCF Director of Social Services is viewed as a noteworthy management decision. Important policies and programs affecting inmate social services are to be administered by a staff person keenly aware of security related issues.

Well developed programs serve to relieve inmate stress, tension and aggression. The Committee accepts the following proposition as it relates to the concept of Unit Management:

**Striving to lessen the tensions, anxieties, frustrations, and hostilities of those who live in prisons, simultaneously serves to lessen the tensions, anxieties, frustrations and hostilities for those who work in prisons.**

The Committee remains hopeful that a re-focused and restructured Unit Management concept at SOCF can be successfully implemented to bring about the same kinds of improvements to prison operations and conditions as reportedly accomplished at other institutions. Meaningful, shared involvement in daily decision-making between Unit Staff and Correctional Officers is essential for:

Early detection of potential problems; Earlier detection and reduction of prohibited inmate activity occurring in living areas;

A more accurate assessment of issues affecting the work environment and the living environment;

Increased extent to which inmates are held responsible for their behavior and program involvement;

Increased number of non-traditional custody staff, knowledgeable of security policies and procedures, implementing them in their day-to-day activities; Placement of multi-disciplinary staff positions on-site in the inmate living areas, increasing staff-to-inmate ratios in these areas; Unit staff exposure to all facets of institutional operations, broadening their overall experience and knowledge; and

Increased awareness of management's expectations and departmental policy on the part of line staff; Improved lines of communication between line staff and administration.

Unless all staff are sufficiently enlightened and persuaded of Unit Management's potential to enhance prison security and their work environment, then unit management will never operate to its full potential. As noted by Warden Art Tate during "Operation Shakedown", policies and procedures can be re-written and implemented quickly, but attitudes and staff composition often take years to evolve to a point where there is an atmosphere of acceptance of goal-directed initiatives.

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(5) **Inmate Access to Sensitive Information:** Advance inmate knowledge of the "confidential" planned lockdown was a contributing factor to the riot. Department officials testified that many inmates at SOCF were performing sensitive responsibilities despite previous security audit citing and direction by Warden Art Tate.

Shortage of staff is believed to be one of the reasons that in some units, inmates are not only allowed to, but are expected to take on responsibilities and tasks which they ought not to have. A shortage of staff does not explain why many who have been selected for what are regarded as the most powerful, coveted positions are known predators. Use of inmates in duties and decision-making includes, but goes far beyond the old habits of using inmates in inappropriate record-handling tasks. The level of reliance and dependency of staff on certain inmates is extremely disturbing. While staff have said for many years that the inmates allow us to control the institution," that statement was especially true in pre-riot SOCF.

The Department's policy is that no inmate will work in an area where confidential information is accessible. Corrective measures to restrict inmate access to confidential information regarding employees have already begun. However, as long as confidential and sensitive information regarding inmates are kept in unit offices, inmates who work for (or nearby) unit staff will have potential access to that information. Such access can produce dangerous situations for inmates who may have served as "confidential sources" to prison staff on disciplinary actions against other inmates.

(6) **Frequent mass movement of inmates:** Despite significant curtailment and regimentation of inmate movement initiated by Warden Art Tate during "Operation Shakedown", the movement of large numbers of inmates throughout SOCF on a daily basis was a contributing factor to the riot. With only one or two escort officers, hundreds of inmates at one time congregated in the dining room or in corridors or at recreation. Testimony from Department officials confirmed that "Operation Shakedown" established limits on inmate mass movement such as only one cell block at a time in the corridor for inmates going to and from recreation or the yard. "However, as had become the practice, inmates were permitted to come into the yard using no particular system to comply with the movement restrictions." (DRC Disturbance Cause Committee Report)

### (C) PERVASIVE PROBLEMS:

The aforementioned Contributory Factors of **Crowding, Dysfunctional Unit Management, Inmate Access to Sensitive Information** and **Frequent Mass Movement of Inmates** are also identified as pervasive problems adversely affecting the conditions and operations at many other Ohio prisons. Although not necessarily factors which directly contributed to the riot, the following issues are cited here as additional pervasive problems which need to be addressed not only at SOCF, but throughout Ohio's prison system.

(1) **Staffing:** Testimony from DRC officials revealed that 82 out of 86 staff reported for second shift duty at SOCF on the day the riot started. The inmate population at that time was 1,820; total SOCF staff was 673, including 462 uniform (security) staff. Although SOCF was far from being Ohio's most crowded prison, it was unquestionably understaffed. Statements received from Correctional Officers confirmed that, for the majority of a given shift, one officer had to work a cellblock alone — operating the console which opens and closes the cell doors; letting inmates in and out of their cells, the shower, and the dayroom; conduct the required "range checks" and "cell shakedowns"; "patdown" every inmate entering the day room; and supervise inmates in the day room, in the showers, and in other areas of the block. It was not unusual for one officer to be responsible for supervising up to 160 inmates in a cellblock.

Ohio's prisons also suffer from an insufficient number of **non-custody** staff. Staff positions which are not directly security oriented may appear as superfluous or less than essential to the perceived basic mission of confinement. However, the functions of non-uniformed staff are also essential to the security of the institution. **All prison staff positions have a legitimate and valuable security function.** Idleness ranks very high as a factor in disturbances and other breakdowns of security. This applies all the more to crowded institutions. Inmate work assignments, training, education and recreational activities (properly staffed, directed and supervised) not only keep inmates busy but direct their attention to positive goals.

Like crowding, inadequate staffing adversely affects every aspect of institutional operations and conditions. Staff shortages (custody and non-custody) in Ohio's prisons are not solely attributable to an insufficient number of DAS

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authorized positions. Large numbers of unfilled vacancies, the customary slowness of the civil service hiring process, and the limited capacity at the Corrections Training Academy also contribute to the continuing level of staff shortages.

Historically, staffing patterns at all Ohio prisons have never increased proportionately with the rapid escalation of the prison population. Compared to other state prison systems of comparable size, Ohio prison staffing has consistently ranked dangerously low. Credible testimony from OCSEA officials, citing comparative ratios of inmates to Correctional Officers, revealed that "Ohio has been the worst-staffed prison system in the nation for the last two years, and has never been better than third worst in the last five years"

At the end of FY 1993 DRC had 5,014 authorized positions for Correctional Officers, compared to 4,450 actual Correctional Officers, i.e. 564 officers below the authorized compliment. The General Assembly authorized the hiring of an additional 904 Correctional Officers during the 1994-1995 biennium. Of the 904, a total of 438 officers were allocated to be hired during FY 1994. From July 1, 1993 to April 1, 1994 DRC hired and trained 568 "new" correctional officers: 415 of the 438 allocated positions, and filling 153 "formerly vacant" positions. There are currently 5,043 Correctional Officers working in Ohio prisons, more than at any time in DRC's history.

DRC officials report that "the Department is authorized by the Department of Administrative Services and the Office of Budget and Management to have a C.O. roster of 5,384." This figure is significantly less than the 5,452 total authorized by the General Assembly for FY 1994 (5,014 authorized at the end of FY 1993 plus 438 allocated for FY 1994). The total legislative authorization for FY 1995 is 5,918 (5,014 authorized at the end of FY 1993 plus 904). In order to satisfy the legislature's total authorization, the FY 1995 allocation must equal 534 (the remaining 466 of the 904 plus an additional 68).

According to DRC officials, the Corrections Training Academy pre-service classes are "filled to capacity each and every week". Due to limited capacity at the Academy, training is limited to approximately fifty (50) persons per month.

**(2) Inmate Gang Activity:** Credible evidence was gathered for the Committee to find that SOCF suffered from an inadequate system of intelligence gathering and monitoring of inmate gang activity. Department officials testified that "As a result of the lack of official investigations initiated and/or completed by the Investigator, several other staff were conducting investigations on their own, without authorization from the Warden or coordination by the Investigators, or any one single person having knowledge of what investigations were being conducted. Each "Investigator" was collecting information that was often not shared with other key staff."

Despite each institution having a designated Institution Investigator, there was no centralized intelligence system at SOCF. The SOCF Investigator was not seen by staff as being the central coordinator for all information relating to gang activity. Investigations were conducted independently by many staff with findings not communicated to proper decision-makers to better manage the inmate population.

During 1992, the Department developed a policy regarding inmate gangs and disruptive inmates. This five-point plan established methods for the identification, stratification, intelligence gathering, monitoring and management of inmates involved in gang/disruptive group activities. Comprehensive Policy Directives relating to inmate threat groups were subsequently developed. Despite these excellent initiatives by DRC Central Office, SOCF staff did not cooperate in a cohesive, unified approach to intelligence gathering and monitoring of inmate gang activity. There is a critical need for all staff at SOCF to work together to address gang issues and problems. SOCF staff could benefit from the gang-related recommendations developed in the aftermath of the death of Correctional Officer Davis at Mansfield in June, 1992:

Establish membership, organization, leadership and habits of the gangs involved.

Establish a roster and definitions for gangs, members and affiliations, since affiliations by non-members can be just as powerful as full-fledged membership.

Establish a computer data-base of gang information.

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Continue a more sophisticated education of information source departments, i.e., Mail Office, Identification, etc., but do not allow gang education to violate intelligence concerns.

Continue to work progressively toward education and intelligence gathering.

(3) **Court Ordered Random Celling:** Contrary to common perception, the Federal Court in *White v. Morris* did not mandate that inmates be double celled on a racially integrated basis, i.e., forced integration of double-celled inmates. The Consent Decree provides for "random assignment of inmates to double cells without regard to race, but provides for exceptions where security is an issue." The court order in *White v. Morris* was "intended to apply the same standard as that set forth by the court in *Stewart v. Rhodes* (1979)." As a result of the Stewart case, the Department had issued policies and procedures directing that "Within an appropriate housing unit, the inmate shall be assigned to the first available (lowest-numbered) cell."

According to Warden Tate and other DRC staff, the problem with racial cell assignments was not so much the Court Decree, as with the manner in which it was interpreted and implemented by prison staff. Many staff wrongly understood the Court Order and the Department's policy to be absolute and inflexible. The SOCF Policy and Procedures on this issue was incorporated by reference into the Consent Decree and expressly provides that:

"Inmates may be moved within a unit upon the request of the unit manager or his designee. Such request shall be in writing, stating the reasons. If the movement will separate integrated cell mates, or create segregated cell mates, the programs deputy or his designee must determine (a) whether a legitimate penological rationale exists, or (b) the movement creates no significant impact on the overall racial balance within the unit."

Despite the flexibility and security safeguards structured into the Consent Decree, many Unit Staff were unduly rigid in their interpretation and enforcement of the random cell assignment policy. Inmates who attempted to relay objections to a particular cell placement were frequently told (regardless of the validity of their objection and regardless of the real potential for an altercation with the assigned cellmate), "Too bad; your name was pulled at random for this cell assignment and that's the way it's going to be." Inmates were being assigned to cells without being afforded meaningful opportunity to express their reasons for objecting to the placement to Unit Staff, without adequate pre-screening by Unit Staff of each prisoner and/or without a careful review by Unit Staff of the prisoner's Master File, upon which to make an informed decision prior to cell placement. In many instances, same race cell assignments were being made at random without regard to whether an inmate with predatory tendencies was being celled with an inmate that has been victimized or preyed upon in the past.

Moreover, the problem at SOCF on this issue was expressed by former Warden Art Tate in a letter to CIIC staff dated December 31, 1991:

This issue was specifically addressed by Judge Duncan in 1979 in his *Stewart v. Rhodes* ruling. The Department is supposed to be utilizing a "random cell" policy with regard to inmate cell assignments. Additionally, when documentation on investigations indicate that a problem would likely exist regarding two interracial cell mates, actions are taken to insure that serious problems are avoided. An example would be celling an Aryan with a Black Muslim.

I have repeatedly instructed my staff to closely monitor this entire process to insure that obvious problems are eliminated. My biggest "hurdle" has been the fact that random celling, per-se, had not been practiced here at SOCF prior to my arrival. I am now attempting to implement a policy that has been "on the books" since 1979, but hasn't been practiced. This has created a lot of tension and anxiety among both black and white inmates.

In my opinion, most complaints are coming from inmates who object to being told who their cell mate will be. Many inmates have refused to cell with another inmate solely on the basis of race. When this occurs, absent additional documentation, disciplinary actions have been initiated. I have been accused by many inmates of developing a "new policy" for celling simply because existing policies were never implemented. I have also met with some staff resistance to implementation of the random cell policy.

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The Committee is well aware of the security reasons for not simply allowing inmates to choose their cell mates. However, we are also well aware of the potential danger of forcing certain inmates to cell together. It is understandable why many SOCF staff adhere to the belief that their work environment is made less stressful by allowing most inmates in general population to choose their cell mates. Certainly, every cell placement at a maximum security institution should be carefully considered to avoid any probability of violence. Predatory inmates should not be celled with docile inmates. We recognize that these determinations are often very difficult to make and that they should not be made solely on the basis of race. Appropriate staff at SOCF must closely monitor the entire process to ensure that obvious cell mate problems and conflicts are eliminated.

The key to safe, successful implementation of a policy to prohibit racial segregation in cell assignments is in good communication between the inmate and staff responsible for making or changing cell assignments. If specific problems are brought to the attention of the staff by the inmate, that becomes staff's opportunity and duty to check thoroughly into it, and to make an informed, responsible decision on a case-by-case basis. Leaving cell assignment decisions solely up to the inmate's choice is as unwise as any random assignment disregarding what the record reveals and what the inmate communicates regarding anticipated or present problems. The task of making wise cell assignment decisions is regarded as a difficult one. Staff must make random cell assignments to prohibit racial segregation, yet also make responsible safety and security-based decisions in that regard. Cell assignments ought to take everything into account that is relevant to safety and security of both parties and the institution.

**(4) Racial/Cultural Conflicts:** Serious problems exist regarding interpersonal communication between staff and inmates. The DRC Disturbance Cause Committee Report revealed that:

"This disruptive relationship is both racial and cultural in its origin. Interviews and documents support tension exists at the facility regarding cultural and racial differences between staff and inmates. Three (3) SOCF employees have lightning bolt tattoos, a sign associated with the Aryan Brotherhood. The Correctional Officer interviews revealed that most white Correctional Officers felt that the Aryan Brotherhood was more of a religious group than a gang. Most white Correctional Officers did not understand the Muslim group and some considered the Muslims half gang and half religious."

Additional testimony and direct observation by Committee members reveal deep-rooted cultural and/or racial intolerance and misunderstandings between significant numbers of SOCF staff and inmates. This issue is viewed as a historical problem deriving from the placement of large numbers of urban black offenders in a rural prison with a scant number of minority employees. Although historical in origin, the Committee is deeply concerned that racial and cultural tensions may have been exacerbated by the riot. The need for immediate, ongoing racial and cultural sensitivity training, tolerance and understanding is evident.

**(5) Inmate Classification:** Security classification is a process that establishes and adjusts an inmate's security level. It is also directly linked to inmate privileges. Proper, timely and accurate classification of inmates are the most important prison management decisions made on a daily basis. The enormous daily challenge for the Department's Bureau of Classification is to decide: **who should be initially assigned to what particular institution(s); who should be transferred to what particular institution(s); at what security status, for what purpose, for how long; and which inmates should have institution separations from each other (for personal safety and/or to prevent potential threat group affiliations)**. Such decisions are compromised and frustrated by prison crowding, limited transfer options, limited bed space at appropriate institutions, delays in receiving information from sentencing courts, inadequate documentation of critical information by institution staff, and the meager size of Bureau staff beleaguered with this responsibility.

Testimony from Department officials cited several problems with the inmate classification system as a source of long-standing concern for inmates and staff at SOCF:

"The Classification Review Board does not routinely document reasons for rejections of recommendations to reduce an inmate's security status from maximum to close. Inconsistent understanding of classification philosophy between Central Office and SOCF" has long been cited as a concern. Frustration and tension "for unit staff and inmates in that inmates who are decreased to Close Security generally do not get transferred out of SOCF to a close security facility."

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The Department recently announced its determination to single cell all inmates at SOCF. This is a most laudable goal. However, its attainment is fundamentally conditioned on the strengthening, restructuring, and enhancement of the inmate classification system. Existing resources and staffing at the Bureau of Classification appear to be insufficient to accomplish this task. Existing policies, procedures and administrative rules pertaining to classification issues may have to be amended. Existing deficiencies, incongruities, inadequate documentation, staff uncertainties and other lax practices by institution staff relating to classification issues must be corrected through proper training and diligent monitoring.

**(6) Inmate frustrations with the inmate grievance procedure:** Fear of retaliation for using the grievance procedure has been a long-standing concern of inmates. CIIC staff continues to receive correspondence from many inmates who view the procedure as "futile", "ineffective" or as "a waste of time". The lack of cooperation on the part of some institutional staff with the Inspector of Institutional Services has also been cited as a long-standing problem with effectively investigating inmate grievances. Clearly, the Inspector has the duty to investigate each grievance and he or she has the authority to take corrective action or to recommend such action to the Warden.

A formal written procedure to ensure that inmates are afforded an effective, credible mechanism to provide an outlet for their complaints and dissatisfaction is a fundamental requirement in prisons. The Committee is in full agreement with the observations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:

**A formal procedure to ensure that offender's grievances are fairly resolved should alleviate much of the existing tension within institutions....Peaceful avenues for redress of grievances are a prerequisite if violent means are to be avoided. Thus, all correctional agencies have not only a responsibility but an institutional interest in maintaining procedures that are, and appear to offenders to be, designed to resolve their complaints fairly.**

The Department's inmate grievance procedure is well structured and designed. Questions remain, however, as to its effectiveness. The Department continues to face the formidable challenge of establishing credibility to the grievance system. Success in this endeavor is directly related to the Department's success in implementing an effective Unit Management system at every prison. The Committee continues to view the inmate grievance procedure as a very important and critical means of addressing many inmate concerns and that it has the potential to bring about improvements.

### (D) INITIAL RESPONSE TO DISTURBANCE:

On the basis of credible testimony relating to the chronology of events during the initial five (5) hours of the riot, the CIIC finds as follows:

- (1) The rotary telephone system at SOCF effectively impeded prompt communication of the disturbance to key institution staff who were not on-site. The first phase of a new telephone system upgrade was recently installed on March 31, 1994.
- (2) Within one half (1/2) hour of the initial disturbance, the institution's perimeter was secured with the assistance of Scioto County Sheriff Deputies.
- (3) Warden Art Tate was at home, available to be reached via telephone. Despite attempts to do so, he was not notified until two (2) hours after the initial disturbance.
- (4) Tactical Command was not effectively established and organized by SOCF staff on-site during the first two (2) hours, thereby forestalling and preempting an early opportunity to rescue five (5) Correctional Officers and one (1) inmate who had taken refuge in the rear stairwells of L2, L-4 and L-5. This failure to establish command permitted inmates to erect barricades throughout L-Block, move the hostages and gain needed organization and confidence among their population.

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(5) Unit Manager Oscar McGraw served as Assistant Team Leader of the SOCF Tactical Response Team. On the day of the riot Mr. McGraw was also serving his assigned weekend rotation as SOCF Duty Officer. His dual responsibility of "supervisor" and "implementor" created an unfair conflict of interest. Testimony revealed that he was not the most senior member of SOCF staff on-site. He arrived at the institution at the same time as one

of the Deputy Wardens. While Unit Manager McGraw performed his tactical responsibility by taking armed position in Tower 5, the Committee remains concerned that no clearly stated policy directive existed to prevent similar "conflicting roles of responsibility" from occurring with other prison staff.

(6) The Disturbance Control Team was not assembled until two (2) hours into the siege (5:00 PM); the SOCF Tactical Response Team was not assembled until 5:45 PM; critical intelligence as to the precise number, identities and specific location of the hostages was not known; inmates had erected a barricade at the lower crash gate into L-Corridor; thereby negating any real possibility for launching a successful assault on L-Block.

### (E) DISTURBANCE CONTROL PLAN:

(1) The SOCF Disturbance Control Plan was not made available or accessible to all correctional officers. All officers had not received adequate training on how to properly respond to a major disturbance or how to effectuate the plan. Credible testimony revealed the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of internal communications and the lack of information-sharing between SOCF administrators and correctional officers regarding critical components of the Disturbance Control Plan.

(2) No comprehensive district-wide plan exists. SOCF officials did have direct involvement with other local responders (police, Fire Marshal, Highway Patrol, County Sheriff) through annual reviews of the Disturbance Control Plan. However, external communications and information sharing between DRC officials and some local community officials were less than adequate with regard to critical components of the SOCF Disturbance Control Plan and the "chain of command" during the eleven (11) day siege. Local residents are directly affected by major disturbances at prisons, whether those disturbances are caused by riots or by natural disasters. Key local officials and responsible citizens in the affected community need to be involved in the development, review, training, and implementation of Disturbance Control Plans at each prison.

### (F) EFFECT OF SOCF RIOT ON OTHER PRISONS:

During the eleven (11) day siege a total of 735 inmates were transferred from SOCF to other institutions:

Warren Correctional Institution	30
Lebanon Correctional Institution	191
Mansfield Correctional Institution	191
Trumbull Correctional Institution	223
Lima Correctional Institution	83 (Mental)
Chillicothe Correctional Institute	14 (Mental)

The rapid planning, coordination and disbursement of such a large number of maximum security inmates to lesser security prisons, during riot conditions, was a truly remarkable achievement of prison management. Its quiet success is noteworthy beyond measure. Real potential existed for major disturbances to erupt at other institutions; most notably at those close security institutions which quickly had to prepare to receive SOCF inmates. The Committee highly commends DRC Central Office administrators, the various Wardens and their staffs for their skillful, conscientious, and effective management during the course of the siege.

### (G) SOCF LEADERSHIP ISSUES:

Warden Art Tate should be commended for having made significant improvements to security operations during his tenure at SOCF, beginning with "Operation Shakedown." He should also be commended for his effective leadership during the eleven-day siege and for his efforts in securing the safe release of the hostages. Credible testimony and evidence supports the Committee's finding that many SOCF staff believe that Warden Tate provided excellent leadership.

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Testimony revealed that Warden Tate did not possess confidence in key administrative staff and middle managers. As a result, a critical teamwork did not exist among institution management staff. In addition to the above referenced problems regarding SOCF unit management staff, the Committee is deeply concerned with the following observation of National Institute of Corrections Consultant, Lanson Newsome, who was on-site during the siege:

"It was evident that problems existed with executive staff and supervisors from the ranks of captain, lieutenant, and sergeant. The staff needed many questions answered during the crisis, as did the inmate population. Supervisory staff failed to fill the void which occurred during this process. It was evident that many of the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains did not move throughout their assigned units on a continual basis, assessing the operation and making corrections where necessary. The Consultant observed many of the supervisors sitting in offices or in chairs in the hall when critical decisions needed to be made concerning the operation of their unit. Until proper, competent leadership is established at all levels within the Lucasville facility, problems will continue to be experienced."

Long-standing and wide-ranging problems at SOCF have not been caused by the absence of well-defined written policies and procedures. Nor have all problems been caused by double ceiling. Many day-to-day practices of SOCF staff have been at variance with established policies and procedures. Some of those divergent practices are attributable to staff shortages. For example, some Post Orders for Correctional Officers assigned to certain cellblocks often required more tasks than could be performed realistically or practicably on a given shift. Other divergent practices, unrelated to staff shortages, are attributable to staff misunderstanding and/or unacceptance of Central Office directives on how a maximum security prison should be run. DRC Central Office administrators should be more vigilant in ensuring that day-to-day practices of SOCF staff are congruent with written policies and procedures. Enhanced training and diligent monitoring are crucial.

### III. DRC INITIATIVES

Director Reginald Wilkinson and his staff should be commended for conducting an exhaustive, self-critical internal investigation and for promptly initiating corrective measures in the aftermath of the riot. Reflective of a genuine desire to learn from their mistakes, they did not delay implementation of such initiatives until after this committee and the Governor's Select Committee had issued our respective findings and recommendations.

**(1) Resource Guide:** DRC has developed a "Resource Guide" entitled "**A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CORRECTIONS IN OHIO**". It is designed to serve as an "ongoing pro-active endeavor to be responsive to the changing demands encountered by the ODRC following the SOCF disturbance." The proposed initiatives are divided into eight major divisions:

- Security and Supervision
- Inmate Services
- Inmate Programming
- Human Resources
- Parole and Community Services
- Communications and Education
- Fiscal/Audits
- Committees-Synopses and Status

The Department's Resource Guide is described as "a vehicle to portray the paramount initiatives of the ODRC; to promote a systems approach for the department; to promote networking and cooperation within the department, media, legislators and other interested stakeholders; and to provide an instrument for evaluating the ongoing status and effectiveness of the department's primary goals and objectives."

**(2) L-Block Renovation:** DRC anticipates completion of the L Block portion of the project by April 26, 1994, at which time cell blocks K5, K6, K7 and K8 will be vacated and renovation work begun. The preliminary cost estimate for L-Block renovation and additional security improvements is \$15 million. Improvements will include reinforcing the

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security envelope of each block, including the back (stairwell) walls in both L and K-Blocks, and installation of enclosed control rooms in each cellblock, complete with a sallyport. The cellblock officer will control all cell doors by remote control.

Similarly, the security envelope for both L-Block and K-Block will be strengthened with new enclosed control rooms to be installed in the corridors. Officers stationed in the corridor pods will control access to the cell blocks by remote control. An additional thirty (30) cameras and monitors will be installed. L and K-Block outdoor recreation will be separated by two parallel fences and monitored by an additional tower to be built between the fences.

The structural improvements will be augmented by enhanced procedural processes and increased inmate classification stratification. The three main sections of the prison, L, K and J-Blocks, will be operated as individual entities, with virtually no inmate interaction between the blocks. Inmate programming will be commensurate with the facility's maximum security designation. The goal of programming will be to induce inmates to modify their behavior in order to earn a decrease in security level, a resultant increase in privileges, and eligibility for transfer to a lesser security prison. The need for meaningful programming is important due to the Department's recently announced policy of "no parole from SOCF".

General contracting bids were opened on January 5, 1994. Contract awards were made to the following:

Sherman R. Smoot Co., Columbus (MBE)  
Construction Manager \$1.198 million

Setterlin Construction, Columbus  
General Trades \$3.75 million

Southern Steel, San Antonio, Texas  
Security \$6.063 million

Advantage Enterprises, Toledo (MBE)  
Electrical \$2.0 million  
Plumbing 1.5 million  
HVAC 1.0 million

**TOTAL \$15.511 MILLION**

### (3) Special Teams:

As of January 1, 1994, there were **seventeen (17)** staff assigned to ten **SOCF Disturbance Control Team** on First Shift. **Twenty (20)** staff are assigned on second shift. Each shift designates five (5) standby members per shift. Team selection is made by team members pursuant to the DCT Guidelines and Rules of Conduct. The selection process is currently under review by Warden Terry Collins.

**The cost of staffing SOCF's Disturbance Control Teams, 16 hours per day, seven days a week, is**

**\$ 5,729 per week**

**\$ 297,908 per year.**

The Disturbance Control Squad Guidelines provide that all team members are expected to be in good physical condition and have all equipment employed "at the ready." "All training materials and topics of discussions are to be treated confidential and will not be discussed with any person outside of the squad. All manuals or handouts are to be kept in a secured place and at no times will they be left in any place which may compromise the security of the squad."

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**Special Response Teams (SRT)** have been formed at every DRC prison to "maintain readiness to respond immediately to any prison disturbance." According to DRC officials, "SRT Control Squads will restrain groups of disruptive inmates and provide special security teams to deal with all critical incidents. SRT Tactical Squads will subdue inmates engaged in disruptive behavior, rescue hostages and control dangerous situations through the use of special tactics and weapons."

The Department has established two regional **STAR (Special Tactical and Response)** team to provide a quick response to major incidents and emergencies at any prison. Each STAR team is composed of 27 volunteer members from prison staff in the North and South regions of the state. The STAR teams mission is to enhance the institutional Special Response Teams' (SRT) action during prison emergencies. STAR team services will include: hostage rescue, sniper

coverage, disturbance assault actions, prison shakedowns and high security prisoner transport. STAR team members will receive basic and advanced training in tactics and will participate in joint training exercises with SRT teams, including mock scenarios and demonstrations. According to DRC officials, "the teams will also train with outside agencies such as the U.S. Navy Seals, the FBI, the Ohio State Highway Patrol and other law enforcement agencies." Reportedly, special team training and equipment has been upgraded and standardized throughout the prison system to provide an effective response to critical incidents.

### IV. PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS:

**(1) SOCF SHOULD BE OPERATED AND MAINTAINED AS A TRUE MAXIMUM SECURITY FACILITY.** This can and should be accomplished with due regard to well established constitutional rights of prisoners. Critical measures necessary to operate SOCF as a true maximum security institution include: **single ceiling; adequate staffing; enhanced training and monitoring; appropriate restrictions on inmate mass movement; and programs that are commensurate to maximum security inmates.**

Reasonable corrections professionals (as well as informed legislators) differ on what it means to operate SOCF as a "true" maximum security institution. All parties agree that single ceiling and increased staffing are essential components. All agree that daily inmate movement should be more regimented and limited in numbers and frequency than was evident prior to the riot. Serious differences arise, however, on questions such as:

How much (frequency) inmate movement is appropriate for maximum security inmates?

How many officers are needed to safely escort how many inmates at a time?

To what extent should SOCF house "general population" inmates as well as inmates who are in Administrative Control (disciplinary isolation)?

How many hours per day should general population maximum security inmates be locked down?

To what extent should maximum security inmates be afforded out-of-cell opportunities to attend educational or vocational programs?

To what extent should maximum security inmates be afforded out-of-cell opportunities to work in Ohio Penal Industry Shops?

To what extent should maximum security inmates be afforded out-of-cell opportunities to attend treatment programs (substance abuse, sex offender, mental health)?

The most important question is **who** should have final decision-making authority to answer the above questions: DRC Central Office? SOCF Warden and staff? Correctional Employee Unions? General Assembly? All parties have a vital role and responsibility in defining how a "true" maximum security prison should be operated. The Committee is strongly encouraged by the Department's proactive and on-going initiatives and its solicitous, inclusive approach to employee unions and to the CIIC on this important matter.

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**STATUS:** DRC has announced its intention to operate SOCF as a true maximum security facility. The on-going renovation and structural security upgrades at SOCF are major achievements toward this goal.

**(2) INMATES AT SOCF SHOULD BE SINGLE CELLED.** Simply assigning 1,600 of the worst prisoners to SOCF is not a difficult task. However, SOCF does not operate in isolation from the rest of Ohio's prison system and Ohio has more than 1,600 maximum security prisoners. Major decisions, such as single celling at SOCF, adversely affect conditions and operations at Ohio's close security institutions. Moreover, the Department can not regulate or control its ever-increasing intake of violent offenders.

**STATUS:** The Department recently announced its commitment to single cell all inmates at SOCF. This process is scheduled to begin immediately upon completion of the L-Block renovation.

**(3) DRC SHOULD AGGRESSIVELY PROCEED WITH THE HIRING, TRAINING, AND PLACEMENT FOR ALL LEGISLATIVELY AUTHORIZED CORRECTIONAL OFFICER POSITIONS.** Department officials should conduct an immediate assessment and evaluation of all practicable means and methods for accelerating the hiring process. The assessment should also include a feasibility study (with appropriate budget estimates) for increasing the number of persons per month who can be trained at the Corrections Training Academy. Full consideration should also be given for possible expansion of the Academy's training capabilities.

**STATUS:** During FY 1994 the Training Academy has hired an additional six (6) staff. The number of training classes at the Academy is limited by physical space. Proposed use of a building at the Pickaway Correctional Institution could potentially result in the addition of three (3) or four (4) more classes per week.

**(4) THE MASS MOVEMENT OF INMATES FROM CELLBLOCKS TO OTHER AREAS OF SOCF SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED AND LIMITED, AS COMPARED TO THE LEVELS OF MASS MOVEMENT PRIOR TO THE RIOT.** DRC should consult with security experts in other states, and with line staff at SOCF, to determine the appropriate level. More importantly, DRC should expressly prohibit the actual inmate to correction officer ratio at SOCF from reaching the level it was for the recreation yard on April 11, 1993.

**STATUS:** According to DRC officials, "Plans have been developed by DRC which eliminate any mixing of inmates from different security classes at SOCF and reduces inmate movement in general."

**(5) DRC SHOULD CONSULT WITH NATIONAL EXPERTS AND WITH OCSEA UNION REPRESENTATIVES TO REVIEW AND DETERMINE APPROPRIATE RESTRICTIONS AND SAFEGUARDS (AS TO NUMBER AND FREQUENCY) FOR MASS MOVEMENT OF INMATES AT SOCF AND AT CLOSE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS.** The Committee supports the Department's gradual easing of the lockdown to allow for "manageable" numbers of general population inmates at SOCF to be escorted to the inmate dining room for all three meals; and to recreation; and for educational, vocational programs, and/or OPI shop operations.

**STATUS:** Inmate movement at SOCF remains substantially curtailed and more regimented than was evident prior to the riot. As of April 1, 1994 SOCF had an inmate population of 1,113. Cellblocks K-7 and K-8 house "general population" inmates; 155 inmates and 152 inmates, respectively. These inmates are escorted, one cellblock at a time, to the inmate dining rooms for all three meals. Approximately 80 inmates eat in one dining room while another 80 eat in the adjoining room. A minimum of six (6) Correctional Officers in each dining room provide security observation. Additional Correctional Supervisors also monitor the meal periods. Approximately 282 general population inmates have job assignments. Up to 80 inmates at a time from cellblocks K-5 thru R-8 are escorted to the gymnasium for one hour recreational periods each day. A minimum of six (6) Correctional Officers are assigned to the gymnasium during recreation periods.

**(6) DRC SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INITIATE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE INMATE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.** A critical assessment of existing resources and staffing at the DRC Bureau of Classification is needed to ensure that inmates are timely and accurately assessed and placed at proper institutions. Diligent efforts should be made to address deficiencies, incongruities, inadequate documentation, state uncertainties and other lax practices by

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institution staff relating to classifications issues. Enhanced training and monitoring by DRC Central Office staff is warranted. To the extent that the Department more effectively structures and utilizes its inmate classification system to ensure that the "right" inmates are appropriately assigned and retained at SOCF, DRC will have addressed a significant problem responsibly.

**STATUS:** On April 1, 1994, DRC issued a Policy Directive "to order separations between two or more inmates when there is cause to believe the inmates could be harmed by being in close proximity of each other, or their presence together could jeopardize the security and safety of the institution, staff, or other inmates."

**(7) DRC SHOULD ENSURE TRUE SAFETY ZONES FOR EMPLOYEES TO SEEK DURING DISTURBANCES.** In addition, the Disturbance Response Plan should provide for continuous monitoring of an immediate response to safety zones when summoned.

**STATUS:** With regard to SOCF, true safety zones are in place in L-Block and will be constructed in K and J Blocks.

**(8) THE SOCF DISTURBANCE CONTROL TEAM SHOULD BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY ON SITE, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK ON FIRST AND SECOND SHIFT.** Further, DRC should provide recruitment of additional team members and support for continuous training and retraining of the Special Response Teams. As noted earlier in this report, seventeen (17) staff are currently assigned to the SOCF Disturbance Control Team on first shift. Twenty (20) staff are assigned on second shift. Each shift designates five (5) standby members per shift. Reportedly, the cost of staffing SOCF's Disturbance Control Teams, 16 hours per day, seven days a week, is \$5,729 per week, or \$297,908 per year.

**STATUS:** DRC officials have announced that SOCF Disturbance Control Teams will be maintained on first and second shifts indefinitely. DRC has created regional STAR (Special Tactical and Response teams to respond more quickly to prison incidents. Through a series of initiatives, policies, training and funding, DRC will have a standardized system of critical incident management policies to address and respond to events such as prison disturbances, escape, hostage incidents, bomb threats, natural or man-made disasters, fire, evacuation and facilities failure.

**(9) SOCF SHOULD MAINTAIN A DISTURBANCE RESPONSE PLAN THAT IS CLEARLY DEFINED AND ACCESSIBLE TO CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.** The plan should clearly establish and identify a command structure in the event of a disturbance. Staff should be made aware of, trained, and retrained for the implementation of such a plan. Department officials must develop comprehensive strategies to engender improved communication and understanding between senior level staff and line staff.

**STATUS:** DRC has contracted with national experts in the area of Emergency Response Plans and has begun a process to evaluate and upgrade Emergency Response Plans system-wide. An enhanced Critical Incident Management Plan, based on a review of emergency situations, is in the final stages of preparation. Mock emergency practice scenarios, held jointly with other relevant state agencies have been intensified, both in content and frequency.

**(10) NO INMATE SHOULD BE USED IN ANY POSITION OF TRUST WHERE CONFIDENTIAL OR SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS ACCESSIBLE.** "Confidential" and "sensitive" should be clearly defined and should include information that, is known by inmates, could be potentially jeopardous to employees or to inmates.

**STATUS:** According to DRC officials, actions and policies which will bring the Department into compliance with this recommendation are "underway". DRC is conducting a preliminary review to evaluate the number of additional civilian employees required to ensure compliance with this recommendation.

**(11) DRC SHOULD DEVELOP A COMMUNICATION POLICY WHEREBY INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA ABOUT A PRISON UPRISING IS CAREFULLY EVALUATED AS TO ITS IMPACT AND RAMIFICATIONS BEFORE RELEASE.**

**STATUS:** The Department has begun drafting a new media policy to include increased training of spokespersons and has requested assistance from a national crisis/media management consultant.

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(12) SOCF SHOULD APPOINT A COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (a) TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY RESPONSE PLAN IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR DISTURBANCE AND (b) TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM.

STATUS: Every DRC prison has developed a community advisory group to assist in developing a community relations program.

(13) THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONDUCT AN EXHAUSTIVE SECURITY AUDIT AND STUDY OF ALL RECREATION EQUIPMENT, FURNITURE, AND OTHER NON-STATIONARY IMPLEMENTS WHICH ARE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO INMATES TO DETERMINE THE PROBABLE USE OF SUCH ITEMS AS ASSAULT WEAPONS.

STATUS: DRC has issued a new policy directive which eliminates all weight lifting equipment from administrative maximum security facilities and which prohibits the use of free weights in close security institutions.

(14) ONE OF THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE WARDEN POSITION AT A STATE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON SHOULD BE SOME PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE IN SECURITY OPERATIONS.

(15) IF THE GOVERNOR ISSUES AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO RESPOND TO A PRISON DISTURBANCE, THE CLEAR CHAIN OF COMMAND SHOULD NOT ONLY BE ESTABLISHED, BUT ALSO COMMUNICATED TO ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD HERETOFORE BEEN PROVIDING RESPONSIVE ASSISTANCE. DRC should make continuous concerted efforts to improve the lines of communication between prison administrators and key officials in the local community.

STATUS: DRC Central Office has instructed all Wardens more closely with local Emergency Management Agencies Enforcement personnel.

(16) CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING AN INFORMAL PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE GOVERNOR, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AND SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE WOULD BE ADVISED OF ANY PROPOSED FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE (SETTLEMENT OF INMATE LITIGATION) AT LEAST THIRTY (30) DAYS PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT BY DRC.

(17) A SELECT COMMITTEE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO STUDY ALL RELEVANT ISSUES PERTAINING TO MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS, INCLUDING THE CURRENT POLICY OF NOT FORCING PRISONERS TO TAKE PRESCRIBED PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS. At a minimum, membership should be comprised of officials from the departments of Mental Health and Rehabilitation and Correction, legislators from the Senate and House of Representatives, Correctional Officers Union representatives, and service providers from the private sector mental health community.

STATUS: DRC is exploring the possibility of contracting with local mental health providers to augment current service delivery systems and provide after-hour call coverage. DRC is also proposing to contract with a university to develop a curriculum of training custody staff assigned to psychiatric residential units. DRC staff are reviewing existing residential treatment programs to identify problem areas in the delivery system for mentally ill inmates.

(18) DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SHOULD CONSULT WITH APPROPRIATE STAFF OF THE OHIO PEACE OFFICER TRAINING COUNCIL TO EXPLORE METHODS AND MEANS OF ENHANCING THE ENTRY LEVEL AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING CURRICULUM FOR DRC CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.

(19) STATE PRISON BEDS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THOSE WHO ARE REPEAT OFFENDERS. Additional funding should be made available for less expensive facilities such as boot camps for non-violent offenders and for more community-based facilities. In this regard, the recommendations of the Criminal Sentencing Commission (S. B. 274) authorizing a "continuum of sanctions" and the expansion of community-based

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corrections programs should be enacted. Housing non-violent offenders in less expensive settings will provide real potential for meaningful rehabilitation and will make available needed space for longer prison sentences for violent offenders.

**(20) THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING OHIO'S PRISONS INTO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION STANDARDS.** The pursuit of ACA accreditation is undoubtedly costly in the short term, especially for the older institutions. However, the comprehensive accreditation process itself greatly serves the Department's efforts to develop institutions that are (1) adequately staffed for safe, secure and efficient operation; (2) adequately programmed for meaningful and effective rehabilitative treatment; (3) adequately supplied and equipped for the delivery of essential services such as food, clothing, and medical care; and (4) sufficiently engaged in preventive maintenance operations to protect and preserve the institution's infrastructures. The reduction in the number of inmate lawsuits and more successful defense of those suits are an additional benefit of accreditation status. Therefore, in the long term, accreditation status can produce tremendous overall cost savings in the operation and maintenance of a prison.

**STATUS:** DRC has developed a plan which strives to have all institutions accredited by January, 1999. Currently fifteen (15) institutions are involved in the accreditation process. Seven (7) institutions are currently accredited.

**(21) THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING RACIAL AND CULTURAL TOLERANCES AND SENSITIVITIES AMONG THE INMATE POPULATION AND BETWEEN INMATES AND STAFF.** Enhanced training components, structured throughout entry level and inservice curricula, should be identified and implemented. Inmate grievances alleging "inappropriate supervision" and "harassment" should be vigorously monitored and investigated. Inappropriate behavior with a demonstrable racial animus exhibited by an inmate should trigger swift disciplinary action and appropriate penalty enhancements.

**STATUS:** DRC has completed 10,128 hours of diversity training for all SOCF staff. Diversity training for new employees has been increased to 8 hours pre-service, 16 hours in-service, and 8 hours follow-up. Diversity training for existing employees has been increased to 16 hours annual in-service and 8 hours follow-up in a one-year period.

**(22) THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD DEVELOP A POLICY THAT WOULD BAN THE PUBLIC DISPLAY OF RACIALLY/ETHNIC INSENSITIVE TATTOOS OR IMAGES BY STAFF WHILE ON DUTY AT ANY DRC FACILITY.** Such a policy should be developed With due regard to well established First Amendment freedoms. A narrow range of disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal, should be provided for policy violations.

**STATUS:** DRC has initiated discussions with Union representatives with regard to developing an appropriate policy concerning the display of racially/ethnic insensitive tattoos or images by staff. DRC is assessing the use of an instrument to measure the effectiveness of diversity training in institutions. The Community Relations Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice has produced a "Model for Conducting Training of Correctional Officials in Reducing or Preventing Racial Conflict in Correctional Facilities."

**(23) IMMEDIATE AND COLLABORATIVE ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SEVERE CROWDING AT DRC RECEPTION FACILITIES.** Prison crowding is exacerbated by the daily delivery of first time non-violent offenders with 90 days or less remaining on their sentences to DRC Reception Centers. This critical issue should receive prompt attention from the General Assembly, DRC administrators, Union representatives, county commissioners, county sheriffs and local judicial authorities.

**(24) DRC SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY AND SYSTEM FOR THE IDENTIFICATION, INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT OF INMATE GANG ACTIVITY AT ALL OHIO PRISONS.** All DRC employees should receive extensive training on all relevant issues related to gang activity.


## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

**STATUS:** Security Threat Group (STG) and gang training has been increased. A Gang Seminar was held to increase gang awareness and tracking. STG coordinators from each prison have been selected and trained. A policy formally prohibiting gang activity has been developed. A STG identification and tracking system is in place. A STG intelligence gathering network has been established.

**(25) DRC SHOULD MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE AND APPROPRIATE EFFORT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTANCE, AND COOPERATION BETWEEN AND AMONG ALL PRISON STAFF WITH REGARD TO UNIT MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES.** Enhancing the quality of communication, cooperation and support between unit and custody staff should be viewed by all DRC Wardens as a priority consideration. Unit activities and practices should be monitored regularly by DRC Central Office and by senior staff at each prison to ensure consistent application of and proper compliance with established policies and procedures. Increased training on all aspects of Unit Management is essential for all prison staff. Improved communication and cooperation between senior level staff and line staff must be engendered. Line staff should be afforded frequent and meaningful opportunities to participate in Unit Management operations and decision-making.

**STATUS:** According to DRC officials, Unit Management training and practices have been enhanced. "Unit and custody staff have been instructed to improve cooperation in running the living areas, sharing information and collecting information." A DRC sponsored Unit Management Summit was held to explore ways of improving the effectiveness of Unit Management.

**(26) DRC SHOULD AGGRESSIVELY STRIVE TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INMATE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AT EACH PRISON.** Existing administrative rules and policies prohibiting reprisals or retaliation for filing grievances should be vigorously enforced. The Inspector of Institutional Services at each prison should be assured of receiving appropriate cooperation from all staff during his or her investigation of grievances in accordance with applicable Administrative Rules.



Lucasville  
Media Task Force  
Report  
March 1994

J. Bradford Tillson  
Chair

Gary Abernathy  
Larry Beaupre  
Stephen Dean  
Gary Gardiner

Frank Hinchey  
Ralph Izard  
Jim Otte  
Sandy Theis

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### LUCASVILLE MEDIA TASK FORCE MEMBERS

J. Bradford Tillson, Chair  
Publisher  
Dayton Daily News

Gary Abernathy  
Managing Editor  
Portsmouth Daily Times

Lawrence R. Beaupre  
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Ohio Photo Editor  
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Statehouse Reporter, Dayton Daily News

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### SUMMARY OF TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are some of the key recommendations of the Lucasville Media Task Force. The section in which the recommendation is included is in parenthesis.

1. **The overarching recommendation of the task force is that it is essential for state officials, starting with the Governor, to send a strong message throughout state government that it is the policy of the state to release information in a complete and timely manner during an emergency. The task force found a strong predisposition on the part of state officials, including public information officers, not to release information during the Lucasville emergency even when there was no operational reason not to release it. The only way to change this mind-set, which we believe would exist in another, similar emergency today, is for the strongest possible signal from the top of state government and from the directors of each state department and agency. This recommendation is the heart of this report and appears, in various forms, in most sections.**

Other recommendations:

2. The state should not enlist the media as direct participants in resolving crises or make other requests of the media that would compromise the independence or credibility of their coverage. (Role of the Media)
3. The Governor should direct that all state departments have policies for the release of information during an emergency and establish mechanisms to ensure that they are followed. The guiding premise of these policies should be maximum release of information. (Policies)
4. The task force endorses many of the guidelines contained in existing state emergency news media contingency plans. (Policies)
5. The Governor should create and enforce administrative sanctions for officials who delay or deny access to public records at any time, but especially during an emergency. (Release of Public Records)
6. It should be state policy that state employees never lie to the media. Use of "no comment" should be prohibited. (Policies)
7. The state should conduct comprehensive training of public information officers and other state officials responsible for the release of information in an emergency. (Training and Release of Public Records)
8. The state should provide a regular opportunity for state officials and representatives of the media to discuss how they interact in a crisis. (Training)
9. Media briefers must have complete access to information about the emergency. Briefings should be held regularly on a set schedule with media deadlines in mind. Unscheduled briefings always can be held if events dictate. (Procedures and Facilities)
10. The on-site media center should be as close to the scene of the emergency as possible. It should be staffed and equipped in a way that both state officials and media representatives can do their jobs effectively. (Procedures and Facilities)
11. Applicable public information policies should be posted at the site of emergencies and be available to reporters on the scene. (Procedures and Facilities and Release of Public Records)
12. The state should make every effort to make available to the media decision-makers and ranking state officials during an emergency. (Procedures and Facilities)

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13. The state should actively seek to discourage rumors during an emergency. This can be done through briefings, the use of hotlines and other means. (Rumor Control)
14. The state should have a standard policy for creation of a media pool at the scene of an emergency if open coverage is not possible. The policy should address minimum media representation in the pool and expectations of the pool members. Selection of the pool members, within the guidelines established, should be left up to the media on the scene. (Media Pools)
15. State departments and agencies should develop procedures for handling large volumes of media requests during an emergency. Some types of information should be prepared and pre-positioned in anticipation of emergencies. (Release of Public Records)
16. The Governor should designate an ombudsman to quickly mediate public records disputes during an emergency. (Release of Public Records)

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### Introduction

On Easter Sunday, April 11, 1993, prisoners in L-Block of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, Ohio, rioted. In the initial rioting more than 400 inmates captured 12 prison guards. The ensuing standoff between prisoners and authorities would last for 11 days and become one of the longest prison riots in U.S. history.

Four of the guards caught up in the initial rioting were released during the first hours because of their injuries or, in at least one case, because inmates believed the guard was dead. Two guards were released during the siege as a result of negotiations. One guard, Robert B. Vallandingham, was killed. The five remaining guard-hostages were released on the 11th day when the inmates surrendered.

Nine inmates died during the riot.

Almost from the beginning, one of the features of the Lucasville riot was the unusual role played by members of the media. Within hours of the initial rioting, hundreds of journalists descended on the prison, which is located in a rural area of Southern Ohio along Ohio 728. More than a dozen television satellite trucks lined the road. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Director Reginald Wilkinson told the Task Force that more than 2,000 media information requests were received by the Department during the first two days of the crisis.

At 5:00 a.m. on April 12 Cleveland Plain Dealer reporter Michael Sangiacomo, acting as a pool representative, was allowed into the prison and provided with a telephone line to the inmates. However, he was not allowed to interview the prisoners because they failed to release a hostage.

On the fifth day of the riot, April 15, prison authorities asked Frank Lewis, general manager of Portsmouth's largest radio station, WPAY-FM, if the station would be willing to interview inmates if it might facilitate the release of a hostage. Lewis agreed, and the exchange was set up in the prison yard that night. Inmate George Skatzes read his statement live over WPAY and guard Darrold Clark was released.

During his broadcast Skatzes promised to release another hostage in a live telecast on Columbus television station WBNS the next morning. The inmates wanted WBNS anchor, Bob Orr, a familiar face since the Columbus channel can be seen in Lucasville, to handle the live telecast. The telecast finally took place at 2:00 p.m. April 16 and resulted in the release of hostage James Anthony Demons.

During the telecast, Demons defended the Muslim inmates and said he had embraced the teachings of the Nation of Islam during his captivity. Later that same day it appeared the standoff might end when Orr and the WBNS crew were told to stand by to broadcast the surrender live. However, at 9:30 p.m., Orr was told the siege would not be ending that night.

Throughout the emergency prison officials expressed concern that news stories might influence negotiations with the prisoners. They expressed particular concern about stories citing reports of additional bodies in the prison and of the mutilation of slain guard Robert Vallandingham. Both reports later turned out to be untrue. Meanwhile, guards at the prison and families of the hostages said remarks made by a Department of Rehabilitation and Correction spokesperson, and reported by the media, may have contributed to the death of Officer Vallandingham.

For their part, reporters complained about the lack of information available to them and what they characterized as a generally uncooperative, antagonistic atmosphere between reporters and state officials at the prison. Some felt state officials purposely misled them during the crisis.

On Saturday, April 17, hostage negotiators asked for a television station willing to televise the surrender live from beginning to end. Initially, no station was willing to commit to the task which would require pre-empting regular programming for hours. Eventually WLWT in Cincinnati volunteered and, four days later when the conditions of surrender finally were agreed to, WLWT televised the seven-hour release.

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### Task Force Formed

Three weeks after the end of the Lucasville siege, Governor George Voinovich wrote to Dayton Daily News Publisher, J. Bradford Tillson, and asked him to chair a panel on "media lessons learned at Lucasville."

In his letter to Tillson, Governor Voinovich said, "My goal is to find out how the State of Ohio can do a better job in dealing with the media in future disasters. I would like to come up with a product that can be used by future governors as well as sharing it with my fellow governors...."

"I believe that the state can and should learn many lessons from Lucasville. Your Task Force can provide important information on one of the major areas we need to learn from."

Tillson and the governor agreed that it would not be the purpose of the Task Force to critique the performance of either the state or the media at Lucasville. Rather, the purpose would be to make constructive recommendations to the state on how it could better handle crisis situations in the future. It was agreed that the recommendations would be broad enough to apply to a variety of crises in which the state might be involved, not just prison riots.

Choosing the members of the Task Force was left entirely to Tillson, and over the next two months, ten persons agreed to serve on the Task Force. Two later had to drop off because of professional or personal conflicts. The final, nine-member Task Force included five newspaper representatives, a radio representative, a television representative, a wire service photographer and the director of the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio University.

All members of the Task Force donated their time and paid their own expenses. All witnesses before the Task Force appeared at their own expense with the exception of two out-of-state witnesses whose expenses were paid by the Dayton Daily News.

The governor's press secretary, Mike Dawson, acted as liaison between the task force and state government. The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction provided an employee to keep the minutes of the Task Force.

### Task Force Meets

The Lucasville Media Task Force met for the first time on August 25, 1993, in Columbus. At that time, members of the Task Force agreed on the following mission:

"To make recommendations to the governor that will help the state disseminate complete, accurate and timely information through the media in future state crises."

The Task Force met for six, full-day sessions over the next six months. It heard from representatives of the print and electronic media who covered Lucasville. It heard from officials with the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the Ohio Highway Patrol, the Ohio National Guard and the Governor's Office. It heard from employees of the FBI and the Dayton Police Department who participated in the negotiations at Lucasville. It heard from attorney Niki Schwartz who represented inmates in the negotiations at Lucasville. It heard from an attorney who represented the news media in Freedom of Information (FOI) suits stemming from Lucasville and from a representative of the Kent State School of Journalism on the issue of privacy and FOI.

The Task Force spent a day in Lucasville which included an extensive tour of L-Block and other areas of the facility involved in the April rioting. Members heard from the prison's warden, Arthur Tate, and from guards who were held hostage and their families, including the family of slain guard Robert Vallandingham.

The Task Force brought in two experts from out of state. Former New York Times writer and editor Tom Wicker, who was involved as a negotiator at the Attica prison riot in New York and later wrote a book about it, appeared before the

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Task Force in September. James Onder, an expert on media relations during a crisis and an official with the U.S. Department of Transportation, appeared in December.

In addition to hearing testimony, the Task Force viewed and listened to tapes of television and radio coverage, reviewed newspaper clippings, read the existing policies of the state agencies involved in the Lucasville riots and some policies of other states and reviewed a variety of documents, articles and other materials related to media relations in crisis situations.

### Task Force Themes

While it is not the purpose of this report to critique either the state of the media performance at Lucasville, it seems useful to provide a context for the recommendations that follow by summarizing some of the themes that emerged from the information the task force gathered.

- \* Almost from the beginning there was distrust and conflict between media representatives and state officials on the scene. As the crisis continued, the atmosphere grew worse.
- \* Physical conditions at the scene and lack of equipment made it difficult for both media representatives and state public information officers to do their jobs.
- \* State agencies had comprehensive and generally progressive public information policies in place, but state officials did not follow them during the Lucasville emergency.
- \* PIOs on the scene were ill-prepared for a lengthy hostage emergency. They lacked equipment necessary to disseminate information efficiently and appeared unclear about their role. Briefings were not scheduled on a regular basis, making it difficult for the media to plan coverage.
- \* There was confusion and perhaps conflict between officials on the scene and officials in Columbus about who was authorized to release what kinds of information.
- \* Information often had to pass through several layers of command at Lucasville and Columbus, and this impeded the flow of information to the media and public.
- \* PIOs on the scene had uneven access to information about the status of negotiations and were afraid to release what they did know. DRC spokeswoman, Sharron Kornegay, told the Task Force that she asked prison officials not to tell her everything so she wouldn't have to lie. State officials were not in agreement about the role of the PIOs and the level of access they should have.
- \* Everyone agrees rumors were a major problem both for the media and for state officials.
- \* Some state officials believe the publication and airing of reports later proven to be untrue complicated the negotiations process. State officials are critical of the media for reporting inaccurate information.
- \* Many in the media believe the lack of reliable, timely public information about the situation contributed to the growth and dissemination of unconfirmed reports and inaccurate information.
- \* Many in the media believe the state illegally suspended the state's public records laws during Lucasville. State officials acknowledge they were operating in a "gray area" of the law but deny knowingly breaking the law.
- \* Generally, there was a lack of access to high-level public officials during the crisis and this may have contributed to distrust between the media and state officials.
- \* There is considerable divergence of opinion between state officials and the media about the appropriate role for the media in a hostage situation. Many in the media are uncomfortable with members of the media becoming "players"

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in hostage release and prisoner surrender situations, especially when this results in restrictions on the release of information. State officials felt the media were one of the "tools" they could use to arrange a successful outcome to the crisis .

- \* Defining and organizing "pool" coverage and deciding when it was necessary were sources of confusion and conflict. Competitive pressures on the media contributed to this conflict.
- \* Hostage families resented media intrusion into their privacy during the crisis but were grateful for the information provided by the media and felt it served a useful role in bringing about a peaceful solution.
- \* Inmates were very media-savvy and relied on the media to provide them with reliable information and to get their message out to the public.
- \* Several witnesses commented on the need for more regular contact between the media and state officials, especially prison officials, "in peace time." Some recommended joint training sessions.

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### PROCEDURES AND FACILITIES

#### ISSUE

The state needs to have clear procedures in place at the site of an emergency to ensure the timely release of information to the media and public. Adequate on-site facilities are necessary for both state officials and the media to do their jobs.

#### DISCUSSION

In hindsight, state officials recognized a need for improving the process of releasing information about a crisis through the media. Testimony confirmed what many said — that the state was not prepared to deal with the magnitude of an emergency of the scope of the Lucasville riot that produced an estimated 2,000 media inquiries.

Major Jim Boling of the Adjutant General's Office said policy for release of information in a disaster is maximum disclosure with minimum delay, but while the Adjutant General and Emergency Management Agency normally are in charge of disasters, the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was in charge of the prison riot.

Reginald Wilkinson, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, said two immediate steps taken were to establish a media command center at central office in Columbus and to establish a communication process at the Lucasville prison, located about 80 miles from Columbus. While DRC has a general media policy, no handbook exists, he said.

Wilkinson said the state needs definitive policies on how to deal with media in such crises, and he looked to the Task Force for assistance in this regard.

Asked if an order was issued to stop releasing information during the riot, Wilkinson responded that while no such order was given, officials were concerned that information released could have had an adverse effect on negotiations with the rioting inmates. He also said that at times, no new information was available to give out.

The media briefings were coordinated by the command centers, the State Highway Patrol, the FBI and the Ohio National Guard. The negotiators would give advice to public information officers about what information could be sensitive and what information could be given out.

FBI Special Agent Allen K. Tolen, one of the advisors to the prison negotiators, said he felt the timely release of news was often delayed because up to six to seven levels of review were needed for approval.

Lucasville Warden Arthur Tate, Jr. said he would have had no objection to the media having such information as what questions were used to verify the hostages' identification during the riot, i.e. what kind of car a hostage guard owned, pet dog's name, etc.

In response to a Task Force question about on-site and off-site communication problems, Warden Tate said that while the PIO process was controlled from Columbus during the riot, "Columbus felt they were out of touch."

Wilkinson said DRC did have technical difficulties: fax machines were often busy; problems occurred with dedicated telephone lines; technical information about television satellite codes were foreign to DRC.

Boling told the Task Force the overriding concern at the Lucasville prison during the riot was safety of lives. And, there was a feeling that media concerns should be handled elsewhere. After the riot, DRC discussed utilizing a media expert, but it was felt such an expert would not be useful because the person would not be well-versed with DRC procedures.

Chief DRC PIO Sharron Kornegay said regular briefings were held during the first 40 hours of the crisis. Kornegay said she felt she knew as much as she should know and indicated that, at times, she did not know everything or chose not to

## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

know some details of the riot. She said she did not want to be put in a position in which she would have to lie to the media. It was best, she said, that she knew only that information that could be released. Warden Tate told the Task Force he viewed his role during the riot not as a media briefer, but "to manage the disturbance and bring it to a peaceful conclusion." He acknowledged, "we didn't do a good job of communicating with our own people. We were focused on the negotiations and inmates and trying to manage the process.

"As we moved closer to the surrender process, we did try to control information, because of the sensitivity level. We moved PIOs and others out of the command center," Tate said. "There was a time when I told PIOs they were hurting the process, that some information was getting out that didn't need to get out."

Tolen said the PIOs were at a possible disadvantage because they did not seem to be an integral part of the operational crisis team.

Tate acknowledged the staff was "trying to control the spin on the information.... We were trying to manipulate the emotional pitch of the inmates based on what information they were receiving. We wanted inmates to get good information."

Colonel Thomas Rice, Highway Patrol commander, told the Task Force he should have made himself more available to the media during the riot to more effectively defuse rumors that cropped up as the siege wore on.

WTVN News Director Dave Claborn told the Task Force that in the first days of the riot, it appeared PIOs were becoming frustrated by media that would crowd around when a PIO would walk across a field from the prison to conduct a briefing.

Claborn said that when he returned to Columbus, he recommended to the governor's office, that it designate and equip a central media briefing area with adequate seating and capacity for orderly briefings. Claborn also said he suggested a schedule for briefings be established and that higher ranking officials be used as lead spokesmen.

The media were relocated from in front of the prison on Ohio 728 to nearby Lang Lane within view of the prison where television production trucks were located. A tent was erected near the production equipment, which served as the media briefing center during the riot.

Media testimony also indicated the need in such rural areas for adequate parking, level space for television production equipment, portable restrooms etc. and need to be as close to an emergency as possible without jeopardizing safety or tactical concerns.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- \* The governor's office should send a strong message throughout state government that during an emergency, crisis or disaster, it is the policy of the state to release information in a complete and timely manner.
- \* In addition to a general media management plan for crises, state agencies should adhere to specific, on-site plans that are proactive to emerging events in assisting the media during an extended emergency. The policies should be posted and someone in authority held accountable for following them.
- \* Reporters covering an emergency should be provided a copy of the policy or procedures officials will follow in dealing with the media so that all involved understand the ground rules and know what to expect.
- \* Officials likely to be involved at any level and in any facet of releasing information during an emergency should be familiarized in advance with the policies and procedures, perhaps through a seminar, so that they understand the value of clear, accurate communication.

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- \* The central office also should develop and maintain a specific emergency plan for an extended emergency, dealing with chain of command, news notifications and coordination of news releases on and off site.
- \* An on-site command center and adjacent media briefing center should be activated at the onset of such an emergency and be located as close to the event as possible so that media will have an unobstructed view of the scene while not being placed in harm's way or jeopardizing operational security.
- \* The media briefing area should have adequate parking space and suitable space for television and radio production equipment and facilities. While the Task Force recognizes it is not the state's responsibility to provide such items as portable restrooms, the presence of such facilities enhances operations during extended emergencies in remote areas involving a large number of media and emergency personnel. There could be arrangements for extra phone line installations, and such things as special media badges issued for the emergency.
- \* The command center and briefing area should be staffed and kept in operation until the end of the emergency. Official state policies that deal with media during an emergency should be posted in command and briefing centers as well as distributed to media in the field and to their outlets.
- \* One or two public information professionals should be designated at the onset as the principal briefers during an emergency. These briefers should have special training in dealing with media in emergency conditions. They should have credibility with the media. They should have full access to the emergency so they may brief the media with maximum information and with a minimum of delay. They should be given authority to release information on site about the emergency.
- \* The briefers should release the most basic factual background information as quickly as available in any crisis. The briefers should also actively seek information to confirm or deny rumors or explain a situation that might give rise to rumors. A "No Comment" answer from a briever is unacceptable anytime, especially in an emergency situation. An explanation about why the briever cannot comment, whether it is for operational concerns, safety, etc., is a better answer than a "No Comment."
- \* Media briefings during an emergency should be held daily and at frequent and regular intervals to accommodate media deadlines that occur around the clock. Briefings should be held until the emergency is over, even if, in the view of the government, there is no substantive information to be released.
- \* On-site briefers should keep in communication with the central, off-site headquarters to better coordinate and disseminate information from off-site sources or news conferences. On-site briefers should take advantage of all available technology to make such off-site information available to media at an emergency scene. One suggestion would be to utilize the State Highway Patrol's new mobile command center, which can be anywhere in Ohio within a few hours. The mobile center is equipped with such items as cellular phones, fax machine, photocopier, camcorder and a laptop computer.
- \* Briefers should do everything possible to help the media gain access to as much of the emergency scene as soon as possible so that the media can provide the public with first-hand accounts of the emergency. If that is not possible, a media news pool should be granted such access. If that is not possible, the media should be provided videotape or still photos of the emergency scene only as a last resort.
- \* Access to key participants, decision-makers or other principals in an emergency should be a regular component of media briefings.
- \* Briefers should distribute written news releases, transcripts of their remarks, audio tapes, fact sheets, diagrams, maps, photos of victims, or any other pertinent visual, written or graphic aid to assist the media in reporting accurate, complete and timely news accounts. Much of this material can be prepared during non-crisis times and, therefore, be available for rapid distribution. (See Onder report in Appendix G).

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### RUMOR CONTROL

#### ISSUE

Poor handling of rumors and their sources during a crisis can have extreme consequences for both the media and the state.

#### DISCUSSION

When misinformation is published or broadcast, it can drastically affect efforts to end emergencies. It also can leave lasting scars on families or other parties not directly involved in trying to resolve the situation.

Existence of rumors does not relieve the media of their duty to report accurate information, and it should make reporters even more careful with their sources and the information they do get.

Authorities should consider the very real effects of rumors in various crises whether it is a food shortage rumor that causes a rush on grocery stores, bad information at a nuclear emergency that causes widespread panic, rumors that cause the public to jam phone lines and hinder authorities trying to resolve the event or even rumors that spread false hope that a crisis is about to end.

Some State of Ohio departments already recognize the potential damage rumors can cause by mandating solid rumor control efforts. The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction News Media policy says outrageous statements should be challenged quickly before they gain credibility. It says that simply remaining silent will cause the media to report their impressions.

During the Lucasville prison riot numerous false reports were broadcast and published. A broadcast report said the prison was on fire when, in reality, the trash incinerator was starting up for the night. A wire service reported the prison was being stormed when actually a shift change for national guard troops was in progress. There were published reports that between 19 and 150 bodies were stacked inside the prison. There were reports that the body of a slain hostage had been mutilated.

While the prison warden says reporting of rumors set back negotiations, no system was in place to bat down these rumors before they were published or aired. State briefers would simply refuse to answer questions about the matters, and phone lines manned by DRC public information officials had no means to counter the information.

The fact that no internal system existed to handle rumors contributed to many of the more widely publicized examples.

The Ohio Civil Service Employees Association report on the riot says guards were upset with the lack of information being given to them. This fed the rumor mill, the report said, and then was reported by an information-hungry media. FBI Special Agent, Allen Tolen, said he overheard prison guards repeating untruths among themselves, and Warden Arthur Tate cited examples of DRC employees calling other departments to tell them an attack was imminent

Such circumstances not only hamper the ability to control rumors, they foster rumors.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

\* The state should be proactive, not reactive in handling rumors at an emergency. The way a briefer responds to questions may directly affect whether a rumor gains life or simply goes away. Telling reporters "no comment" does not quash the rumor.

\* The state should not be silent, but rather firmly on record explaining why a rumor is believed to be false, why it may have surfaced and then explain the actual facts of the matter.

## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

- \* Rumor control hotlines for the public, state employees, their families and the media should be a high priority in any large-scale emergency.
  
- \* Briefers must handle all inquiries quickly and definitively to keep erroneous information from snowballing into something much more harmful. This should be done through frequent briefings, regardless of whether there are new developments.

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### **POLICIES**

#### **ISSUE**

Nearly all state agencies have existing and workable policies for dealing with the media in crises situations. The problem at Lucasville was that these policies were largely ignored by the state public information personnel on the scene creating conflict and confusion.

#### **DISCUSSION**

Such existing policies are found primarily in the following publications:

- The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's Command Center Contingency Plans, News Media, undated. (See Appendix C) .
- The Ohio Highway Patrol's Administrative Operations Policies on Release of Information to News Media, revised September 30, 1991. (See Appendix D).
- The Adjutant General of Ohio's "OPLAN" Public Affairs Program annex report, dated January 1992. (See Appendix E).
- The Ohio Emergency Operations Plan, Annex D, Emergency Public Information, dated November 1992. (See Appendix F).

Since DRC served as the primary media relations organization during the riot, the plan most directly applicable to the Lucasville riot is DRC's Command Center Contingency Plans, News Media. Most of the guidelines reflected in the DRC plan are similar or identical to guidelines established by the other agencies. Therefore, this report deals primarily with the guidelines found in the DRC media plan.

A major enigma during the Lucasville riot was that existing policies were not used to govern state actions. This appeared to be partly the result of a lack of knowledge on the part of public information staff members; it also became clear that some state officials systematically ignored such policies, usually with the explanation that secrecy was necessary to save lives .

The Task Force recognizes that this explanation does have merit on some occasions. But it was clear that it commonly was used to avoid dealing with the public. This attitude too often seemed to be the rule, even with regard to generally accepted guidelines regarding the availability and release of public information in connection with records, background information and statistics.

As a result, DRC lost credibility with the public, primarily because of conflicting and incomplete information from spokespersons. DRC's honesty and courtesy were undermined by failure to supply answers to even the most elementary questions, release of conflicting information and failure to deal quickly and authoritatively with rumors.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- \* The Task Force recommends that the governor direct that all state departments have written policies dealing with the release of information during crises and that mechanisms be established to assure adherence to these policies.
- \* The guiding premise of all such policies should be maximum release of information.
- \* Training sessions on existing content of such policies and any changes should be held for all government officials during non-crisis times. (See separate section on Training).

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

\* In times of crises, policies should be conspicuously posted in ways that assure maximum public access.

\* The Task Force wholeheartedly endorses those guidelines in the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's Command Center Contingency Plans, News Media, that directly relate to the process for release of public information:

### Guidelines for Media Management During Emergencies

- C. 1. Read factual statements on a regular basis, even if there are no new developments.
- C. 4. Provide factual information on the institution population and Department as background information.
- D. 3. Include the spokesman in all discussions of the emergency so that he may be able to respond with the confidence that knowing what is going on produces.
- D. 5. Make the principal decision-makers available for interviews after the critical part of the resolution has passed.
- D. 6. Make hostages or other principal participants available for interviews as soon as they are capable of being interviewed
- D. 8. Be honest, pleasant and accurate.
- D. 9. Do not lie, ignore the media, get angry, fail to respond promptly, or give misinformation.
- D. 10. Attempt to control rumors by trying to find their sources and giving information that substantially contradicts them.
- D. 11. Do not blackout; the media will cover the emergency and will report their impressions if we do not provide them with information.
- D. 12. Remember, it is more important to handle bad news in a professional and efficient manner than it is to create good news. Reporters will be more cooperative if we are helpful. Personal hostility colors the news.

### Talking with Reporters

- E. 5. Never use the words, "no comment", it is better to say almost anything else, such as, "We're looking into that issue and until we have all the facts, it is too early to discuss."

## **APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS**

### **POOL COVERAGE**

#### **ISSUE**

The state and the media should agree on a standard policy for the establishment and implementation of a media pool at the scene of an emergency when open coverage is not feasible.

#### **DISCUSSION**

There was considerable controversy and confusion at Lucasville over the issue of media pool coverage or access to the event by some members of the media, but not all. Some of this resulted from the state's decision to ask certain members of the media to become at least tangential participants in the negotiating process. Often this request was the result of demands made by inmates.

This extraordinary access by a few created problems with other members of the media. While technically these were not pure pool situations, they created expectations and competitive pressures that led to bad feelings and conflict.

For those unfamiliar with the term a "media pool" is an agreed-to-group of media representatives who are allowed access to an event or scene when authorities deem that it is not practical for all members of the media to have such access. The members of the pool gather information for all members of the media. All pictures taken, video shot, audio recorded and information gathered is shared by the members of the pool with the rest of the media. Probably the best known media pool is the small group of reporters who shadow the President when he is in public.

At Lucasville there was surprisingly little use of a media pool. Given the logistics and geography of the site and the nature of the emergency, it is understandable that more than 100 media representatives on the scene could not have access to the prison. However, several witnesses told the Task Force that it would have been possible to provide access for a limited pool, perhaps with some restrictions on what they could report. One witness involved in the negotiations said he saw no reason why a pool could not have visited the command center and even the room where the negotiators worked. Members of the Task Force felt such access would have been most useful in painting an accurate picture of the scene and also would have relieved some of the pressure on media briefers with little information to offer.

State officials were unable to offer good explanations for why there was not more access through media pools. It appeared there was little instinct by the state to provide maximum access/information consistent with security needs and other operational considerations.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- \* At the scene of an emergency the state should seek to provide the greatest possible access to the largest number of media representatives consistent with safety and other operational considerations. If open access cannot be provided initially, the state should constantly review whether limited access cannot be increased as the emergency continues.
- \* Immediately after media arrive at the scene of an emergency, the public information officer in charge should ask them to designate members of a pool in case it should become necessary to use it.
- \* The selection of pool members should be handled by the media members present, not the state. Only news organizations present at the scene of a news event have access to the pool's information. Members of the pool should be selected on the basis of their ability to accurately gather and efficiently distribute information.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

\* The pool should consist of a minimum of one representative from each media at the scene. Normally a minimum pool would include:

- one television videographer
- one television reporter
- one still photographer
- one newspaper reporter
- one radio reporter

Including more representatives than the minimum is encouraged. It is especially desirable to include smaller media market representatives, such as small and weekly local newspapers and radio stations, in an expanded pool.

\* Responsibility for setting and enforcing pool guidelines is the responsibility of the media on the scene, not the state. Representatives who do not follow the guidelines can be removed from the pool and made ineligible for future pools. Generally, the following guidelines apply to media pools:

The pool is non-competitive and represents all media. No pool representative may use his/her assignment to the pool as a competitive advantage.

All information gathered by the pool will be distributed immediately to participants in the pool. Reporters in the pool will be debriefed immediately and completely. No information should be withheld.

\* Media at the scene may set other guidelines specific to the location and event.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### RELEASE OF PUBLIC RECORDS

#### ISSUES

The demand for public documents and other information increases dramatically during a crisis. The state needs to ensure that policies and procedures are in place to comply with its legal obligation to promptly release public records.

#### DISCUSSION

Records that were available for public scrutiny before the Lucasville riot began and the morning after it concluded were unavailable during the riot itself. During those 11 days many news organizations repeatedly revised their public records requests downward, trying to reach some agreement with the state. State officials, however, refused to accept the argument that, by law, the records were open and, therefore, should be made available to the public, including the media.

While attorneys for the media were preparing to go to the Ohio Supreme Court seeking relief from the state's refusal to release records, the riot ended. The task force believes that delaying release of the records during the riot was tantamount to denying them.

Among the information the state refused to release was: names of guard hostages, any personnel records on Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees and correspondence to and from the state correction officials pertain prison's violent past.

DRC Director, Reginald Wilkinson, testified that he could not explain why some of the information was withheld, especially the names of guard hostages. Wilkinson said the agency was ill-prepared to handle the volume of media calls received during the riot. He speculated that no one was assigned to follow up on the disputed requests.

Ohio's public records law (ORC 149.43) is based on the premise that open government is good government. It calls for public records to be turned over "promptly", and the limited exemptions that exist are narrowly defined.

No additional exemptions occur during an emergency.

In fact, it is during an emergency that the need for prompt access to public records is the greatest if the media are to properly perform their functions of distributing complete, accurate information about the event and monitoring institutions involved in it.

While state officials argue they were operating within a "gray" area of the law in denying requests for records during the emergency, it is the view of the Task Force that they were circumventing the law. Often when state officials denied access to public records the reasons stated appear inconsistent with exemptions provided by law.

For example, the Task Force was told DRC's attorney refused to turn over biographical and employment information on Correction Officer Robert Vallandingham who was killed during the prison siege. The attorney cited an exemption that allows for denials if release of the records would threaten someone's physical safety. But media attorney David Marburger pointed out that Officer Vallandingham already was deceased when the request was made.

On other occasions the state failed to cite reasons for denying records.

News organizations recognize the state's right to scrupulously evaluate public records requests, especially in a crisis during which lives are in jeopardy. However, as Marburger testified, "Even during an emergency, the people of Ohio do not yield their sovereignty to the public agencies that serve them."

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### RECOMMENDATIONS

\* The governor should create and enforce administrative sanctions against officials who delay access to public records. By enforcing such sanctions, the governor would make a powerful statement in favor of open government and help end the mind-set that public records can be withheld.

Current law allows sanctions for those who illegally deny access to public records but fails to provide sanctions for those who delay such access. The Task Force believes that records delayed are records denied.

\* The governor should create a mechanism whereby an ombudsman is appointed to quickly mediate public records disputes that arise during an emergency. The ombudsman should be an attorney with expertise in public records law.

\* State employees responsible for public information should be trained properly to release it.

\* State agencies should develop procedures for handling large volumes of media requests. The procedures should include stockpiling packets of information that would be useful during an emergency.

\* During an emergency, public information officers should post state policies that define procedures to be followed during the emergency. The policies should be posted in the media center or some other appropriate location where they would be easily visible.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### TRAINING

#### ISSUE

State officials responsible for releasing information during an emergency need to be adequately trained for the demands such situations create.

#### DISCUSSION

One of the common themes that emerged during the Lucasville Media Task Force hearings was the need for better training to prepare state officials for emergency situations such as Lucasville. There was broad consensus on this point by state officials, media representatives and outside experts.

The Task Force heard testimony indicating confusion about the appropriate role of public information officers on the scene and conflict over at what level decisions about the release of information could be made. This confusion and conflict often slowed down the release of information, created friction between state officials and the media and, in some cases, between state officials and other state officials.

There were media policies in existence that were not followed and, in some cases, were not known to the people responsible for implementing them.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

\* One of the keys to the recommendations that follow is a strong message-from the highest levels of state government that being prepared to handle the public information demands of a crisis situation is as critical to the successful outcome as is being prepared for any other element of a crisis.

\* The task force recommends the state conduct three different types of training.

\* First, it recommends comprehensive crisis training for state public information staff. This training should prepare PIOs or their designated equivalents in all state departments and agencies to do their jobs in the event of an emergency involving their agency. It should clearly define what their role is and give them all the necessary tools to do it. Part of this training should be a thorough understanding of existing policies and how they apply to an emergency situation. It also should include information on the role of the media in a crisis. The training should be a combination of basic public information policy and specific procedures for emergencies likely to occur in their departments. This training should be offered on a regular basis and employees should be required to go through refresher courses at least annually.

\* Second, it recommends crisis communications training for state officials. This training would be designed to establish a culture in state government that encourages the fullest possible disclosure of public information at all times but especially in a crisis. It should be required for all state officials who have occasion to deal with the media or influence information policy. Ideally, this training should be provided to PIOs and other officials simultaneously so that the message received by both is consistent. Unlike the training just for PIOs which would include specific skills training, this training would stress understanding the role of the journalists, their needs and the role of state officials in providing information to the media in a crisis.

\* Finally, the task force recommends the state provide a regular opportunity for representatives of the media and state officials, including public relations personnel, to discuss how they interact in a crisis. This could be anything from a roundtable discussion to role playing in a mock emergency. Media participation is critical to the success of such training and the Task Force strongly urges the media to participate. It might be best to use a third party to facilitate this.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

Although the task force did not do extensive research on the types of crisis communication training available to state government, we heard enough from various witnesses to feel comfortable that the type of training described above is available or could be made available from a variety of sources at a reasonable cost. The training described in the first two recommendations is provided routinely by companies and other organizations. The third recommendation is more unique and the state may want to contract with a third party to provide a program specific to its needs.

The task force heard from James Onder, of the U.S. Department of Transportation, who provides media crisis training to government agencies and we have included excerpts of his training outline in Appendix G.

As with any training program, the key to its success is to ensure that it is institutionalized and not just a one-time occurrence.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

### ROLE OF THE MEDIA

#### ISSUE

State and law enforcement officials feel it is proper to use the media as a tool in any effective way that will aid the resolution of a crisis. Many in the media feel their credibility is damaged when they become active participants in the news, particularly when they agree to conditions that compromise the independence of the content of their reports.

#### DISCUSSION

A clear contradiction emerged in the testimony of state officials and law enforcement authorities with regard to the role of the media during the Lucasville prison riot.

On the one hand, they testified that accurate and credible coverage of the Lucasville riot was essential, not only to the public's understanding of what the agencies were doing, but to assure the inmates inside the prison that the state was not manipulating public opinion against them or taking other actions contrary to their representations during negotiations.

Repeatedly, state officials expressed concerns about the impact on negotiations of rumors and the importance the inmates placed on hearing factual, impartial accounts of the events from sources outside the control of the prison authorities. Indeed, Governor Voinovich's decision to appoint this Task Force underscores the state's interest in maintaining a credible flow of information during future emergencies.

On the other hand, state officials readily acknowledged their willingness to use the media as "a negotiating tool."

DRC Director Reginald Wilkinson put it plainly: "If the media can assist us in bringing such a crisis to a peaceful resolution, then we will ask you to do it. If there is an opportunity for the media to intercede in certain situations for a successful conclusion, and it will not endanger their lives, then it is okay for us to ask. We are going to ask, and it's up to you whether you are going to do it."

Cleveland lawyer Niki Schwartz, who was brought in as a mediator at the request of the prisoners, testified that "the inmates were more media-savvy than the authorities. . . . The inmates were extraordinarily well informed." He took a middle ground position that the media should cooperate when lives are at stake, but not to the extent of influencing the content of what is reported because of the need for an impartial source of news to fight the rumors and paranoia that were evident on both.

Tom Wicker, the retired New York Times columnist who reluctantly was thrust into the role of mediator at the Attica (N.Y.) prison riot in 1971, testified that he believes strongly that reporters should not become participants in the stories they cover.

"I couldn't be both a reporter and a negotiator (at Attica)," Wicker testified, "so the only time that I told The New York Times I could not file was when I became part of the story. I had to make that choice one way or the other. I feel very strongly: the press ought to keep to a minimum - if possible, to zero - playing a role in working it out. . . . I don't think we should play the role of intermediaries. . . . The position should be made clear from the start that we are journalists and not part of the event. . . . Our goal is to inform the public, and it does not include carrying messages back and forth."

Several Task Force members made the point during discussions that the media bears an enormous responsibility, for which they are untrained and unprepared, when they become part of a negotiating process in an event such as Lucasville. What if lives had been lost as a result of a media mistake or an action orchestrated by authorities? What would be the media's moral responsibility and financial liability if things had turned out badly?

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

At Lucasville, several media outlets did become part of the negotiating process.

- Authorities asked Portsmouth radio station WPAY to agree to inmates' demands for unrestricted access to their airwaves. WPAY agreed and, in exchange for a hostage, "Inmate George" broadcast prisoners' demands for 15 minutes.
- Columbus television station WBNS-Channel 10 agreed to a similar hostage-for-airtime deal brokered by state authorities.
- Cincinnati television station WLWT-Channel 5 agreed to several conditions, including specific words that could be spoken during its broadcast of the prisoners' surrender. These conditions apparently were imposed by the state, rather than the result of requests by inmates.

During Task Force discussions, there was consensus that the live broadcast of the surrender was not the issue so much as the restrictions that were placed on the content of the broadcast. Broadcasting or reporting the surrender was journalism; agreeing on how to report the event was manipulation of the media.

Mike Dawson, the governor's press secretary, raised the question of whether the media would feel compromised if they were asked to broadcast and report information vital to public safety and welfare, or to provide equipment that might save a life, such as a news helicopter being used to transport an injured person to a hospital. In discussion, Task Force members agreed that such humanitarian actions by the media have no compromising effect on the independence of their reports.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- \* The state should not enlist the media as direct participants in resolving crises or request other actions that would compromise the independence of the content of their news reports.
- \* The role of the media in a crisis, as it is at any other news event, is to cover the news accurately, completely and responsibly and to act as a watchdog for the public by monitoring the actions of government officials. The credibility of news coverage rests on the ability of the media to perform this vital role as detached and impartial observers.
- \* The state must recognize the importance of credible news coverage, which enhances public confidence and diminishes the possibility of rumors. It should not attempt to use the media as instruments of public policy or in any way that coerces or compromises their independence.
- \* Opportunities for pool or full coverage of negotiations or other events are encouraged so long as the media retain their independent judgment on the content of their news reports.
- \* The Task Force realizes the state's dilemma in taking whatever steps may be necessary to negotiate the peaceful settlement of a potentially lethal rebellion. However, for good reason it already enters into such negotiations with some conditions that are not negotiable or will never be fulfilled, such as granting amnesty for capital crimes. Manipulation of the content of news coverage, especially live television broadcasts, should also be non-negotiable. The state should take the position that it has no authority over the content of the media and therefore cannot negotiate their content.

However, as long as the media have final control over content, they are not compromised when asked to participate as neutral observers, impartially chronicling an event such as a hostage release, or providing humanitarian emergency assistance. Indeed, the press traditionally has felt a First Amendment responsibility to act in the public interest by reporting newsworthy and helpful information affecting the public safety and well-being.

- \* The media are not without other responsibilities, as well. Members of the Task Force repeatedly expressed the need for journalists to balance the public's interest in the news with the consequences of the decisions they make that affect the health and safety of individuals. The media have a further responsibility during times of crises to ensure the accuracy of their reports so that they do not unwittingly prolong emergencies or jeopardize lives.

## APPENDIX A - REFERENCE MATERIALS

\* The Task Force recognizes that in the absence of good information, bad information often fills the void. This is a compelling reality that the state must address by providing reliable information. Yet, there is no sentiment among Task Force members that this should be an excuse for ignoring traditional standards of attribution, which risks the spread of potentially damaging rumors, or failing to observe other sound journalistic practices.

\* The state should be explicit in its guidelines for contact with the media during emergencies to ensure that it recognizes that:

Independent reporting and scrutiny by the media of its actions are essential.

The media may be compromised and their credibility jeopardized when they become active participants in an event.

The media, to be independent, must exercise full control over the content of their reporting.

Although the state may have a responsibility to seek the cooperation of the media in reporting information that may affect the health and safety of individuals, such requests should not be presented by the state as preconditions to news coverage.

**APPENDIX B - DELETIONS**

**01.04.03**

**01.04.11**

**01.05.02**

**02.04.01**

**02.04.02**

**02.04.03**

**04.01.08**

**04.04.04**

**04.04.05**

**06.02.06**

**06.02.07**

**06.05.03**

**06.05.08**

## APPENDIX B - DELETIONS

### Deletions

01.04.03

The legislative plan to have ODRC operate the Oakwood Correctional Facility with clinical services provided by ODMH has been completed. This initiative is essentially the same as 02.02.02, and is therefore deleted.

01.04.11

The proposal to examine existing statutory authority to reduce prison crowding by declaring an overcrowding emergency and reducing the sentences of offenders by up to 90 days is rejected by the Department.

01.05.02

The reference proposing the research and evaluation of programs, security features; and staff issues such as communication skills, policies, and staffing levels is too general and encompasses a number of other initiatives.

02.04.01

The implementation of Project Angeltree, while worthwhile, does not have direct relevancy to the Resource Guide and has been deleted.

02.04.02

This initiative discussed the formation of inmate gangs under the guise of religion and offers the solution of increased work and program opportunities. These issues are covered through our general goal of increasing work and program opportunities and through the recently established gang coordinator program. As a result, continued follow-up would be accomplished elsewhere. Therefore, we recommend this initiative be deleted as duplication.

02.04.03

The reference concerning the increase of inmate jobs and school programs to reduce inmate idleness has been deleted. The issue is addressed by recommendations in Religious Services (02.04), Educational Programs (03.01), and Work Assignments (03.04).

04.01.08

Efforts to expand drug testing to staff were summarily rejected by the union.

04.04.04

The proposal that the Duty Officer should be on grounds at all times is rejected by the Department.

04.04.05

The proposal that the Major report directly to the Warden and have the same rank as Deputy Wardens is rejected by the Department.

06.02.06

The present commissary system makes use of modern technology and meets all the needs for this application. Bar code scanners and micro computer equipment provide input to all accounting functions. Also, use of current language (non-DOS) provides an additional level of security within the system to prevent break-in entries to either the Commissary or Cashier's Office System. Any new type of software and/or equipment is not expected to improve on the reporting process now in place; the proposal has been deleted.

## APPENDIX B - DELETIONS

### Deletions

(Continued)

06.02.07

The proposal to purchase on-line software to link ODRC is on hold until the Department of Administrative Services implements their new payroll system in approximately two years. The on-line payroll interface software is designed for connectivity with this new payroll system. However, this interface software must be thoroughly tested to ensure it will perform, as stated, before any purchase will be made. Due to the two year delay in possible implementation, this proposal has been deleted from the systems report.

06.05.03

The proposed "Question and Answer" section of the staff newsletter was replaced by an entire edition devoted exclusively to the disturbance.

06.05.08

The proposal that only the Warden shall be informed of an "Operation Clearout" shakedown is rejected by the Department.

## APPENDIX C - CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

ACI	Allen Correctional Institution
BeCI	Belmont Correctional Institution
CCI	Chillicothe Correctional Institute
CMC	Correctional Medical Center
CRC	Correctional Reception Center
DCI	Dayton Correctional Institution
FPRC	Franklin Pre-Release Center
GCI	Grafton Correctional Institution
HCF	Hocking Correctional Facility
LeCI	Lebanon Correctional Institution
LCI	Lima Correctional Institution
LoCI	London Correctional Institution
LorCI	Lorain Correctional Institution
MaCI	Madison Correctional Institution
ManCI	Mansfield Correctional Institution
MCI	Marion Correctional Institution
MEPRC	Montgomery Education Pre-Release Center
NCCI	North Central Correctional Institution
NEPRC	Northeast Pre-Release Center
OCF	Oakwood Correctional Facility
OCI	Orient Correctional Institution
ORW	Ohio Reformatory for Women
PCI	Pickaway Correctional Institution
RCI	Ross Correctional Institution
SCI	Southeastern Correctional Institution
SOCF	Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
TCI	Trumbull Correctional Institution
WCI	Warren Correctional Institution

## **APPENDIX C - CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

### **CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

#### **NORTH REGION**

**ALLEN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Located in Lima adjacent to the Lima Correctional Institution. The 500-bed, medium security institution opened in 1987 at a cost of \$28 million.

**BELMONT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Under construction in St. Clairsville, BeCI is a medium security facility with a design capacity of 1260 beds. The adjacent Belmont Correctional Camp opened in August 1994.

**GRAFTON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - In Lorain County on the site of the Grafton Correctional Camp. GCI is a 500-bed, medium security institution built at a cost of \$30 million.

**LIMA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - In Allen County in northwestern Ohio. LCI was built in the early 1900's as a mental institution for the criminally insane, and converted to a 1,200-bed, medium security prison in 1984.

**LONDON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Built in 1924 as a prison farm operated by the Ohio Penitentiary. The 3000 acre farm operation remains in operation at the 1,500-bed, medium security institution in Madison County.

**LORAIN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Also, on the site of the Grafton Correctional Camp, LORCI opened in early 1989 with a construction budget of \$44 million. Classified close security, it has a capacity of 750 inmates.

**MADISON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Located across State Route 56 from London Correctional Institution, MACI consists of twin 500-bed compounds. One side is classified minimum-security, the other is classified medium. The \$35 million facility opened in 1987.

**MANSFIELD CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - At the site of the Ohio State Reformatory in Richland County. MANCI houses 2,400 maximum/close security inmates. MANCI opened in 1990.

**MARION CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - Opened in 1956 on 60 acres with adjacent 925-acre farm in Marion County, MCI is a medium security prison with a capacity of 1,250. MCI contains 12 housing units, all under one roof.

**NORTH CENTRAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - North Central Correctional Institution is a 1,260-bed, medium security facility which will open in 1994. NCCI is located adjacent to the Marion Correctional Institution.

**NORTHEAST PRE-RELEASE CENTER** - Located near downtown Cleveland, this 350-bed facility for female offenders was operational by mid-1988.

**OAKWOOD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY** - Located adjacent to the Lima Correction Institution, OCF was recently transferred to DCR from ODMH. OCF houses mentally ill inmates.

**OHIO REFORMATORY FOR WOMEN** - Located on 260 acres near Marysville in Union County, ORW has a capacity of about 900 inmates and houses all security levels. ORW also manages a 250-bed correctional camp.

**TRUMBULL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION** - TCI is a 650-bed close security institution with a construction budget of \$39 million. TCI opened in 1992. An adjacent correctional camp is under construction.

## APPENDIX C - CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS

### SOUTH REGION

**CHILlicothe Correctional Institute** - Near Chillicothe in Ross County, CCI is a former Federal Reformatory turned over to the State of Ohio in 1966. This medium-security institution consists of over 50 buildings on a 72-acre compound with a 1,500-acre farm.

**Corrections Medical Center** - The 240-bed medical facility costing \$19 million was built adjacent to Franklin Pre-Release Center in Columbus and opened in 1993.

**Correctional Reception Center** - A central reception area for male inmates, this 900-bed facility opened in 1987 at a cost of \$40 million. The Department of Mental Health also staffs a psychological services unit at CRC.

**Dayton Correctional Institution** - On the west side of Dayton adjacent to the city workhouse, this 450-bed medium security prison opened in February 1987, at a cost of \$25 million.

**Franklin Pre-Release Center** - Located just south of downtown Columbus, this 250-bed center houses female offenders.

**Hocking Correctional Facility** - Located in Nelsonville, Ohio, HCF is a former state tuberculosis hospital that was converted into a 300-bed, medium/minimum security prison in 1983. Most of the state's elderly male inmates are housed at Hocking. HCF also operates a 412-acre farm.

**Lebanon Correctional Institution** - Built in 1960 on 40 acres in Warren County, LeCI is classified close security with a design capacity of about 1,200. A 1,700-acre farm is worked by inmates.

**Montgomery Education Pre-Release Center** - A \$14 million dollar facility, MEPRC opened in 1994. MEPRC provides intensive educational programming to its population.

**Orient Correctional Institution** - This medium security prison in Pickaway County was formerly a state institution for the mentally retarded. It replaced the closed Columbus Correctional Facility (Ohio Penitentiary) in 1984. OCI has a design capacity of 1,200.

**Pickaway Correctional Institution** - PCI was created in 1984 to provide training and job seeking skills to inmates who were about to be released from incarceration. The six-week pre-release program is being transferred to regional centers and PCI has become a medium security institution. It's located adjacent to OCI and has a design capacity of 1,500.

**Ross Correctional Institution** - Located across State Route 104 from CCI, Ross is a 1,250 bed medium/minimum security institution built at a cost of \$60 million. RCI opened in 1987.

**Southeastern Correctional Institution** - Formerly the Fairfield School for Boys youth facility, FCI was converted to a medium security adult correctional institution in 1982. Located near Lancaster in southeastern Ohio, SCI has a design capacity of 1,100.

**Southern Ohio Correctional Facility** - Opened in Lucasville in Scioto County in 1972, SOCF is a maximum security prison with a design capacity of 1,550.

**Warren Correctional Institution** - Located in Lebanon adjacent to LeCI, WCI is a 750-bed, close security institution and correctional camp. WCI opened in the fall of 1988 at a cost of \$44 million.