

FINAL
REPORT


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Pt. I

TRANSFERRING
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED
POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy

NIJ Grant Award
#94-IJ-CX-0012
August, 1995
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FINAL REPORT

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TRANSFERRING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:

An Alternative Strategy

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

158381
(part 1)

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**NIJ Grant Award
#94-IJ-CX-0012
August, 1995**

COPS/200
COPS/200.1-8
COPS/200.A





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SECTION I. OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) received a grant award from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to conduct eight (8), sixteen-hour management training workshops over a period of twelve (12) months. This award and subsequent report follows a previous NIJ grant administered from 1990 to 1992 to conduct three (3) pilot training workshops for local government and law enforcement chief executives. A continuation grant was awarded to conduct four (4) additional workshops in 1993. The final report covering these grants was submitted in August of 1993.

Pre-workshop activities included convening an advisory board, selection of trainers, curriculum development, site selection, and announcements. Planning activities focused on recommendations of the advisory board. Planning coordinators identified current and applicable research resources as well as training methods and visual aides as a means to achieve significant participant interaction. Site selection activities consisted of the solicitation for host cosponsors and selection of eight (8) training locations.

This specialized training was designed to attract decision makers including, but not limited to, local government and law enforcement chief executives, nonelected community representatives, and two other officials

decided at the discretion of the local government chief executive to participate in five-member teams. Evaluation instruments were developed to compliment this unique team training. The results are reported herein, as well as other information on the project's history.

SECTION II. PROJECT BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. ICMA

Founded in 1914, ICMA is the professional and educational organization for more than 8,200 appointed chief executives and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, regions, and other local governments. The membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government. ICMA members serve local governments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

ICMA's mission is grounded in a belief that through ongoing research, training, experimentation and sharing of ideas, a body of knowledge on local government standards develops continuously and is expanded throughout the entire community. The organization's objective is driven to professionalize local government managers and prepare high-caliber leaders to meet tomorrow's problems, today.

Of the many diverse services provided by this membership organization, the dissemination of proven research and information to managers through training fulfills one of ICMA's primary goals. The NIJ sponsored "Community-

Oriented Policing: An Alternative Strategy" regional training has contributed to achieving this goal for the past year.

B. Project History

In 1994, NIJ awarded ICMA a twelve (12) month grant to develop and conduct training workshops on community-oriented policing (COP). Under the direction and expertise of a curriculum advisory board and the collection of current research information and state-of-art strategies, eight (8) workshops were delivered in 1994-1995.

Through team participation, these regional workshops provided information and new approaches for the successful implementation of COP to city and county jurisdictions. In five-member teams, workshop participants included the local government and law enforcement chief executives and a nonelected community representative (mandatory) plus two (2) other members such as elected officials, department heads, educators, union representatives, business executives, and clergy. The workshops focused on decision makers.

During the project, the COP workshop curriculum in the format of a syllabus, work book, source book, and evaluation instrument was developed and finalized. Participants were responsive to the delivery techniques, which included on-site telephone conferences with leading police and city manager practitioners; videotapes of departmentally-implemented programs such as

neighborhood-oriented policing, and problem-oriented policing; overhead transparencies; self-assessment implementation exercises; and forums for audience participation and interaction. In addition, evaluation instruments were constructed and administered to measure the quality and transferability of the workshop material and instruction.

These regional workshops were rated very high by the participants as will be demonstrated later in this report. A fundamental concept established through the workshops was that it is essential to have broad participation by community teams for successful adoption of COP in a jurisdiction. Furthermore, the workshop format presumed that these community teams required the mandatory inclusion of the local government and law enforcement chief executives as well as a nonelected community representative for the full implementation of COP within a community. The workshop evaluations conclusively demonstrated this to be true. This one-year project also included a community policing presentation at ICMA's 80th Annual Conference in Chicago, Illinois in September 1994. This conference session received outstanding ratings from the membership.

Prior to this grant award, in 1990 NIJ also funded a pilot program in conjunction with ICMA to develop and deliver a series of regional training workshops on community-oriented policing. Based on information collected

by an advisory board and a training team, three (3) pilot workshops were developed and delivered in 1991.

Through team participation, these regional workshops provided information and strategies for the successful implementation of COP to city and county jurisdictions. In four-member teams participants have included, but not limited to, the chief executive officer, chief law enforcement official, police personnel, elected officials, local government department heads, union representatives, educators, community leaders, and business executives. The workshops focused on internal operations targeting the local government decision makers.

In 1992, a continuation grant was awarded to deliver an additional four (4) workshops in twelve (12) months based on refinements from the pilot workshops and to include updated research information and relevant articles. These workshops were completed in 1993.

As a direct result of these grants but funded by local government, ICMA also conducted follow-up technical assistance for seven (7) jurisdictions, reaching 298 participants. To date, including nongrant technical assistance, 1,027 executive level managers have received community policing training from 163 jurisdictions. The training workshops have been successful in providing a

better understanding of the community policing philosophy and sufficient information to begin the initial stages of implementation. The Final Report was submitted in August, 1993, reporting on the 1990-1993 grants.

SECTION III. SCOPE OF WORK

A. Site Selection

An announcement of the grant award and a request for written invitations to host the training workshops appeared in the ICMA Newsletter on May 16, 1994. As a result of the announcements, fifty-two (52) letters of interest to attend were received, out of which thirty-eight (38) requested to host the workshops. An acknowledgement was sent on June 10, 1995, to all inquiries advising that they would be notified when dates and site selections were made, along with advance registration information. To assist the site selection committee, a system was developed to analyze the requests alphabetically and geographically.

The Site Selection Committee met through a conference call the beginning of June, 1994. The members were trainers Judith Mohr Keane, Albert Sweeney, Gayle Fisher-Stewart, and project manager E. Roberta Lesh. The selections were made from the thirty-eight (38) letters of invitation to host. Recommendations were submitted to NIJ's project manager, Carolyn M. Peake, and ICMA's assistant executive director, Gerard Hoetmer for approval. Both approved the selections. Criteria for selecting the following jurisdictions and dates were expressed need, geographical, seasonal, participation from

surrounding areas, and number of city/county manager jurisdictions in that area: Groton, Connecticut on October 3-4; King of Prussia, Pennsylvania on October 27-28; Lawrence, Kansas on November 7-8; Cincinnati, Ohio on November 14-15; Long Beach, California on December 5-6; Clovis, California on December 8-9; Athens, Georgia on January 9-10, 1995; and Boca Raton, Florida on January 26-27, 1995. Boca Raton, Florida was rescheduled to Largo, Florida on April 24-25, 1995 due to a conflict of a major event taking place in that area the end of January.

On July 15, 1994, all eight (8) co-sponsor city managers and designated liaison contact persons were notified and confirmed in writing of their selection. To assist them and to clarify what functions they were expected to perform, a "Host Jurisdiction's Role and Responsibilities" document was sent to each host (Appendix A). Items 7 and 8 on pages 1 and 2 concerning per diem was customized for each jurisdiction.

Advance announcement and registration information was sent to the remaining forty-four (44) jurisdictions that had expressed interest. Selected sites and dates were then announced in the ICMA Newsletter, Law Enforcement News, and Community Policing Digest, and Crime Control Digest.

B. Curriculum Development

At the conclusion of the curriculum advisory board meeting, the trainers met to analyze and capture the suggestions and insight that were provided in order to begin curriculum development. ICMA trainer, Dr. Gayle Fisher-Stewart, was contracted to work with the trainers and project manager to coordinate the curriculum deliverables. ICMA's senior curriculum specialist was to be consulted on a case-by-case basis if necessary. The first day was devoted to achieving a consensus on the training content while the second day consisted of not only content but process development. Three major decisions were made as follows: (1) The deliverables will be a role and responsibilities to host jurisdiction guidelines, syllabus, participant work book, participant source book, and an evaluation instrument; (2) Emphasis will be on youth issues that will be weaved throughout the workshop in the form of break out session topics, problem solving, delivery of successful program examples, and hand out material; and (3) A follow-up trainers' meeting for the purpose of finalizing and testing the curriculum to be held in late summer, 1994. After the trainers' input on several drafts and a second curriculum meeting for the purpose of finalizing the curriculum and testing the training process, the final draft version was submitted to the advisory board for comments and approval.

Following is a description of each product deliverable.

Syllabus: This document was prepared as a concise summary of the workshop to be sent to participants in advance of the training. It was also used to advertise the training and to respond to inquiries of potential participants. It was essential in coordinating with the assigned host liaison person as well as hotel personnel.

The syllabus contained the following information: Introduction to the Workshop; Workshop Mission and Objectives; About the National Institute of Justice; About ICMA; Training Team Members; Workshop Schedule; and an article written by Jerald R. Vaughn entitled, "Community-Oriented Policing: You Can Make It Happen." (See Appendix B).

Work Book: The participant work book was designed to teach the participants how to evolve from the traditional methods of policing to a better understanding of and commitment to a new way of approaching crime control. The work book was provided to attendees at on-site registration. (See Appendix C).

Before the eleven (11) modules, the following information is provided: Acknowledgments; About the National Institute of Justice; About ICMA;

Advisory Board Members; Training Team Members; Introduction to the Workshop; Mission and Objectives; Workshop Schedule; and the Workshop Outline.

Module 1 provided a preamble to the workshop and included the introduction of participants and trainers, a discussion of training purposes, an overview of the agenda, and the logistics of the training site.

Module 2 covered the traditional approach to policing by sharing the issues facing communities today and comparing and contrasting incident-driven methods of policing with the evolving concept of community-oriented policing. A presentation on the existing myths and values that drive American policing is followed by an overview of the emerging principles and values.

Module 3 dealt with the definition and key elements of community policing and discussed current research and experiences of local governments implementing community-oriented policing. A set of issues developed over the past several years within various departments across the country is presented.

Module 4 defined and developed the concept of community. In breakout groups participants discover how perceptions and people affect the way communities are defined which can have a positive or negative effect on participation and teamwork.

Module 5 provided an overview of the important issues raised in day one of the workshop.

Module 6 discussed the organizational issues for local government implementation of community policing. The participants work in small groups to generate a number of factors to be considered during the implementation phase. The results are shared with the large group.

Module 7 provided two problem-solving methodologies that can be effectively applied to community policing. Video tapes are shown from police departments that use the problem-oriented policing, and the four-stage SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) approach. A discussion and presentation followed.

Module 8 focused on issues to be faced concerning the changing relationship with the community when community-oriented policing is adopted.

Module 9 enables participants and practitioners to talk about personal concerns, experiences, and questions raised during the workshop. A telephone conference call hook-up to a chief executive officer and a chief law enforcement executive provides two-way communication to the workshop attendees. Issues of general concern can be discussed with practitioners who have already implemented community policing.

Module 10 guided participants in developing preliminary action plans for their communities. Small groups discuss the issues and concerns in their communities and devise a planning strategy as to when, how, and where to begin. The findings and recommendations are then shared and discussed with the entire group.

Module 11 summarized the key points of the workshop. The participants are encouraged to set deadlines for implementation in their communities and are encouraged to report to ICMA with their problems and successes. An evaluation instrument is distributed to each participant.

Throughout the 81-page work book, side bars are provided to give helpful comments, examples, and suggestions from past workshop attendees.

Source Book, Second Edition: This 410-page manual was provided as a supplemental text for workshop participants. It complements the work book which serves as the foundation for the workshop. The source book was distributed to each student at on-site registration. (See Appendix D).

This document contains selected readings from distinguished researchers, authors and practitioners. All the materials were carefully selected for their relevance to police work and, more specifically, their insights into community-oriented policing from various perspectives, such as local government, law enforcement, community, and academia.

A total of thirty-eight (38) writings are included from such distinguished authors as Herman Goldstein, William Bratton, Malcolm Sparrow, George Kelling, Robert Trojanowicz, Bonnie Bucqueroux, William H. Matthews, and Russ Linden. Many of the selected readings are products of NIJ research and evaluation findings.

Also included in this manual is a twenty-four (24) pages community policing bibliography.

Evaluation Instrument: This deliverable is discussed in detail in Section III-E under Evaluation Design beginning on page 20 of this report.

C. Participant and Trainer Selection

- **Participant Selection:**

ICMA viewed the training as being more effective by using a five-member team approach. Realizing that before a fundamental and cultural change such as community policing can take place, the decision makers of a jurisdiction must all have the same understanding and commitment. Therefore, the attendance of the local government and law enforcement chief executives was mandatory. The third slot was also made mandatory to be filled by a

nonelected community representative. The objective was to put community back into community police as they are the customers using this service. The remaining two vacancies were left to the discretion of the local government chief executive with the guidance that for community policing to progress other members of the community, such as department heads, elected officials, educators, business leaders, union representatives, and clergy, need the same understanding. During the 1990-1993 training it became clear that less law enforcement and more local government participation created a better balance to enable implementation.

ICMA assisted the recruiting efforts by announcing in the ICMA Newsletter and law enforcement journals the availability of the workshops. When requested, ICMA also provided individual advice to attending participants about the most successful, from past experience, composition of the team.

- **Trainer Selection:**

Eight (8) trainers were recruited and trained. Teams of two (2) trainers presented the material at each workshop, one having a law enforcement background and the other local government experience. Following are the four (4) teams which are also interchangeable:

Team 1. Albert J. Sweeney, law enforcement and Judith Mohr Keane, local government

Team 2. Edward J. Spurlock, law enforcement and Gayle Fisher-Stewart, local government

Team 3. Peter Ronstadt, law enforcement and Christine A. O'Connor, local government

Team 4. Ira Harris, law enforcement and Allison Hall Hart, local government

These teams received extremely high rating from participants at all sites as will be reported further in this document.

D. Pre-Workshop Activities

Potential trainers and curriculum advisory board members were contacted to ask their interest and availability in participating in the training project. An advisory board and trainers meeting was convened at ICMA offices on April 7 and 8, 1994. The curriculum advisory board members are listed in **Appendix E** of this report. Members represented local government, law enforcement, community, academicians, and the Department of Justice (NIJ and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). All invitees were present as well as the trainers and ICMA staff. The purpose was to gather and share information from the various perspectives to help develop

the content of the training workshop. The meeting was facilitated by senior trainers Judith Mohr Keane and Albert J. Sweeney.

On April 8, 1994, all trainers, ICMA staff, and the NIJ project manager continued to meet. Day two was devoted to analyzing and capturing the insight and suggestions provided by the advisory board in order to begin curriculum development.

Nine (9) key decisions were made and carried out in advance of the workshops as follows:

1. Two trainers will be at each training site, one with law enforcement background and one with local government experience. Eight (8) trainers will be contracted as ICMA consultant trainers;

2. Participants from each jurisdiction work together in five-member teams. It will be mandatory for the local government and law enforcement chief executives and a nonelected community representative to attend. The other two vacancies will be filled at the discretion of the chief executive. Such other members could be from the local government management team, elected officials, educators, clergy, business community, or unions. The target audience would be decision makers. The appropriate language explaining who should attend the workshops was described on all announcements;

3. Eight (8) sites will be trained with be a maximum of fifty (50) participants consisting of five (5) member teams from ten (10) jurisdictions;

4. A syllabus, role and responsibilities to host jurisdiction guidelines, trainers' manual, participant work book, participant source book, survey questionnaire, and evaluation instrument were to be developed. The participant work book would be developed through a collaborative process with the trainers and the project director with the advice and experience of the advisory board;

5. A site selection committee was to be appointed. To assist this committee, the ICMA Newsletter featured an announcement of the upcoming training and an invitation to ICMA members to host the workshops. From the results of the responses, dates and sites will be determined;

6. The training would be announced immediately in the ICMA Newsletter and in law enforcement journals giving the training description, sites, dates, registration and hotel information;

7. A tuition fee of \$550 per team was established to help defray the cost to the cosponsor/host for meeting delivery costs such as room rental and equipment;

8. Emphasis to be on youth issues that will be weaved throughout the workshop in the form of break out sessions, problem solving, delivery of successful program examples and hand out material; and

9. A follow-up trainers' meeting to finalize the curriculum and test the training was recommended. This took place August 9, 1994.

Site selection, curriculum development, the collection of community-oriented policing research and source material, and logistical coordination with training sites were an ongoing process and is explained in detail in this report.

E. Evaluation Design

The evaluation instrument was designed to compliment the work book modules and to gather information to constantly update, refine, and improve the quality and delivery of training.

Questions were designed to: obtain an overall response to the training program; impart each participant's reaction to the eight (8) individual modules; participant's intent to follow up on implementation, and elicit open comments on the quality of the workshop. The evaluation form (**Appendix F**) contained twenty-one (21) separate items to score, rank or respond. Open ended measurements like those found in Section VI of the evaluation are prone to the greatest degree of subjectivity. Therefore, all comments derived from Section VI of the evaluation have been provided in direct quotation for each

site. (See Section IV-A. Key Events and Evaluation Results, page 23). These explicit quotes clearly demonstrate how relevant and worthwhile individual participants found the training.

To further eliminate subjectivity in the survey, comments were classified in the following categories to determine how each participant's position affected their perception of the training: (1) local government chief executive; (2) law enforcement chief executive; (3) community representative; (4) local government department executive; (5) public safety personnel; (6) elected official; and (7) other, such as educators, clergy, business owner.

F. Additional Benefits to NIJ

- **Training and Technical Assistance**

Under the previous NIJ grant, a one and two-day curriculum was developed to be used for sight-specific training. It can be tailored to the need of the requesting jurisdiction.

Two jurisdictions in California (Belmont and San Jacinto) that attended the workshops in 1994 have requested the specialized two-day onsite technical assistance training. This will take place in the fall of 1995, and will be funded by the requesting jurisdictions.

Several other past participants are also interested in this training but are pending due to funding problems.

- **Publications**

The Source Book (Appendix D) that accompanies the participant workbook has not only been widely circulated to each participant attending the workshop, but has been disseminated to approximately two hundred (200) other people, police departments, and universities. It is being used for police promotional examinations and required reading for criminal justice and public administration courses at universities.

SECTION IV. COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

A. Key Events and Evaluation Results

1. GROTON, CONNECTICUT October 3-4, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 37
Evaluations Completed (E) = 35
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.4

The first workshop was hosted by Groton's Town Manager Ron LeBlanc but the training was physically located in New London, Connecticut, an adjacent community. Four jurisdictions, Enfield, New London, Norwich, and Stratford, Connecticut acted as co-hosts. The Site Selection Committee was very impressed with this cooperative effort, thereby selecting Groton as the first workshop. In attendance were thirty-seven (37) participants; three (3) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff.

Of the thirty-seven (37) participants, seven (7) jurisdictions were represented as follows: East Hartford, Enfield, Groton, New London, Norwich, Stratford, Connecticut (6); and Mansfield, Massachusetts (1).

It was decided by the trainers and ICMA staff that it was essential for new trainers to be in attendance at various workshops to observe from past trainers the on-site delivery process. The two senior trainers were Judith Mohr Keane and Albert J. Sweeney. The new trainer was Gayle Fisher-Stewart. NIJ's project manager was appraised of this decision and met with her approval.

The additional trainer did not incur an inordinate expense as the location was close to her residence by train.

Prior to day one of the training, staff and trainers met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introductions and opening remarks were provided by ICMA Project Manager, Roberta Lesh, host Town Manager Ron LeBlanc, and the Mayor of New London, Hon. Jane Glover.

Trainers Keane and Sweeney predominately facilitated, with Fisher-Stewart contributing to various portions of the two days and assisting in small group breakout sessions.

With the exception of poor and inefficient hotel service due to internal problems, no major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop. The hotel difficulty was quickly resolved with minimal discomfort to the participants.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

Module 9 offers participants the opportunity to discuss personal concerns, experiences, and questions raised during the workshop to practitioners in a telephone conference call setting. The practitioners were City Manager David Mora of Salinas, California and Police Chief Edward Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days, the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Groton, Connecticut training workshop will follow.

GROTON, CONNECTICUT
October 3-4, 1994

Participants by Position N = 37

Seven (7) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 35

Local Gov't CEO = 7

Law Enforcement CEO = 7

Community Representative = 8

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 4

Public Safety Personnel = 3

Elected Official = 5

Other = 1

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	<u>(% Responding)</u>					
Clarity	73.5	26.5	-	-	-	4.7
Informative	51.5	48.5	-	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	57.6	39.4	3.0	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	84.8	15.2	-	-	-	4.8

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	67.6	26.5	2.9	2.9	-	4.6
Informative	60.6	30.3	6.1	3.0	-	4.5
Relevancy	54.5	36.4	9.1	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	75.8	18.2	-	3.0	3.0	4.6

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	58.8	38.2	2.9	-	-	4.6
Informative	57.6	36.4	6.1	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	57.6	39.4	3.0	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	81.8	18.2	-	-	-	4.8

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	54.5	39.4	6.1	-	-	4.5
Informative	62.5	34.4	3.1	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	53.1	34.4	12.5	-	-	4.4
Presenter's Delivery	75.0	18.8	-	3.1	3.1	4.6

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	50.0	46.9	3.1	-	-	4.7
Informative	61.3	38.7	-	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	43.8	50.0	-	-	-	4.8
Presenter's Delivery						

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	52.9	44.1	2.9	-	-	4.5
Informative	45.5	45.5	9.1	-	-	4.4
Relevancy	48.5	42.4	9.1	-	-	4.4
Presenter's Delivery	75.8	15.2	9.1	-	-	4.7

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	50.0	35.3	14.7	-	-	4.4
Informative	51.5	30.3	15.2	3.0	-	4.3
Relevancy	60.6	27.3	9.1	3.0	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	60.6	33.3	3.0	3.0	-	4.5

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	59.4	37.5	3.1	-	-	4.6
Informative	67.7	32.3	-	-	-	4.7
Relevancy	64.5	29.0	6.5	-	-	4.6
Presenter's Delivery	74.2	25.8	-	-	-	4.7

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4 . 4

**GROTON, CONNECTICUT
October 3-4, 1994**

**Number of Participants (N) = 37
Evaluations Completed (E) = 35
Response = n**

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 35; n = 34

	TITLE
"SUPPORT-BY HAVING THE CITY MANAGER & CITY COUNCIL PERSON PARTICIPATE.	CHIEF OF POLICE
MEETING & LISTENING TO OTHER TOWNS & LEARNING THAT WE ALL HAVE SOME THINGS IN COMMON.	COUNCILMAN
SPECIFIC TOOLS BY WHICH WE MIGHT EXPAND COMMUNITY ORIENTED GOVT PHILOSOPHY.	TOWN MANAGER
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED PUBLIC SERVICE CONCEPT, INTERACTING WITH NEW PEOPLE.	DIRECTOR YOUTH SERVICES
A BETTER OVERVIEW & KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT I CAN ACCOMPLISH.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
TEAM INTERACTION-UNDERSTANDING OTHER DEPT AND COMMUNITY CONCERNS.	CITY MANAGER
VALUABLE INSIGHT ON WHAT OTHER COMMUNITIES HAVE DONE.	NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE PRES
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS IN THE COP PROGRAM AND APPLICATION POSSIBILITIES.	RECREATION DIRECTOR
WE DEVELOPED A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE POLICE DEPT & SCHOOL SYSTEM.	SCHOOL ASST SUPERINTENDENT
A BETTER APPRECIATION FOR THE FACT THAT COMMUNITY POLICING IS MORE THAN JUST A POLICE PHILOSOPHY.	CHIEF OF POLICE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE INVOLVED WITH CITY OFFICIALS IN AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN IMPROVING THE COMMUNITY.	POLICE OFFICER-UNION PRES

THAT COPS IS A NEW PROGRAM AND STILL IN THE ADVENT STAGES. ALL TESTS ARE BY OLD POLICING STYLES.

INFORMATION ON COPS-SOURCEBOOK.

OTHER VALUES AND IDEAS, KNOWLEDGE.

THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE THE SAME AS MOST COMMUNITIES-NEED IDEAS TO BE TRIED.

NEW INSIGHTS, NEW STRATEGY, NEW APPROACHES TO EXISTING PROBLEMS.

REALIZED THAT COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING CAN BE THE VEHICLE USED TOWARD A TOWN WIDE APPROACH.

NETWORKING.

NEW IDEAS AND IMPLEMENTATION.

WHAT OTHER COMMUNITIES ARE DOING TO THIS PROGRAM.

BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPT AND DEVELOPING A PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING.

I WAS ABLE TO INTERACT W/ALL OF THE OTHER TOWN MANAGERS AND PEOPLE FROM OTHER COMMUNITIES.

COPS IS MORE THAN POLICING & REQUIRED TOWN WIDE PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGE IN WAY WE DO BUSINESS.

NOW KNOW WHAT COMMUNITY POLICING IS I.E. A PHILOSOPHY.

IDEAS I SUPPORT BEING IMPLEMENTED ON A LARGE SCALE AND W/IN OUR TOWN.

AN OVERALL PERSPECTIVE CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MATTER WHICH ALLOWED FOR THE TAILORING OF OUR NEEDS.

KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT OTHER COMMUNITIES ARE DOING AND UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS FROM MY COMMUNITY.

SOME NEW FACTS AND INFORMATION.

A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POLICING & LOCAL GOVT.

MOTIVATED TO DO SOMETHING, TALKING W/STAFF FROM OTHER CITIES, INSIGHT INTO COPS AS A PHILOSOPHY.

BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE NEED FOR MORE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF HOW TO PROCEED FROM WHAT WE HAVE STARTED & OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN NEW IDEAS.

INSIGHT INTO COMMUNITY POLICING AS TO HOW IT AFFECTS OTHER ASPECTS OF MY TOWN.

NEED TO CHANGE, INNOVATE, RELATE SERVICES TO PROBLEM SOLVING, TEAM ORIENTED MGT."

PATROL OFFICER

TOWN COUNCILLOR

CHIEF OF POLICE

CHIEF OF POLICE

COUNCILMAN

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

CHIEF OF POLICE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

DEPUTY MAYOR

POLICE CHIEF

PROGRAM DIRECTOR

ASST TOWN MANAGER

SELECTMAN

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE LIEUTENANT

ASST DIR, DEVEL & PLANNING

CHIEF OF POLICE

FIRE CHIEF

CITY MANAGER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST TOWN MANAGER

PRESIDENT OF RESIDENT COUNCIL

TOWN MANAGER

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 35; n = 27

	TITLE
"COVERED IT ALL WELL.	COUNCILMAN
BUILDING CONSENSUS AMONG ELECTED OFFICIALS FOR COPS PHILOSOPHY.	TOWN MANAGER
SOCIAL PROGRAMS INVOLVING POLICE AND PUBLIC GOVT.	DIRECTOR YOUTH SERVICES
GRANTS-RESOURCES, LISTENING SKILLS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
UNION RELATIONS AND UNION INTERACTION IN IMPLEMENTATION OF COPS MODEL.	CITY MANAGER
COMMUNITY TRAINING IDEAS.	NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE PRES
A GREATER EMPHASIS ON COMMUNITY IMPACT AS IT RELATED TO OTHER DEPTS. BREAKDOWN OF COST ASSOCIATED WITH PROGRAM BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION AND ALSO 'SOCIAL COST SAVING' AFTER IMPLEMENTATION.	RECREATION DIRECTOR
VERY THOROUGH.	ASST SUPERINTENDENT
I LIKED HEARING ABOUT DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY POLICING.	CHIEF OF POLICE
SOLICITATION OF BUSINESSES FOR SUPPORT.	PATROL OFFICER
AFTER IMPLEMENTATION PHASE-WHAT NEXT.	TOWN COUNCILLOR
SETTING UP COMMITTEES AND REACTIONS.	CHIEF OF POLICE
TYPES OF SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR POLICE OFFICERS, TRUE COSTS OF TOTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF COP, REAL PITFALLS OF COMMUNITIES THAT HAVE TRIED COP.	CHIEF OF POLICE
HOW TO SELL THE CONCEPT TO THE TROOPS.	CHIEF OF POLICE
NONE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
HOW TO GET GRANTS.	DEPUTY MAYOR
TALK ABOUT FUNDING FOR IMPLEMENTATION.	ASST TOWN MANAGER
SPECIFICS-VIOLENCE, IDLE TEENAGERS, ENHANCING COMMUNICATIONS AMONG PARENTS.	SELECTMAN
SPECIFICS ON EMPOWERING CITIZENS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
PROBLEMS IN DEALING W/ELECTED OFFICIALS COMMITMENT TO ISSUE.	ASST DIR, DEVEL & PLANNING
PROBLEM WITH UNIONS, PROBLEMS WITH SWORN PERSONNEL.	CHIEF OF POLICE
MORE TOPICS OR SPECIFICS ON HOW THE FIRE SERVICE FITS INTO THE EQUATION.	FIRE CHIEF
MAYBE MORE ON IMPLEMENTING COPS-WHAT WORKS AND DOESN'T WORK.	CITY MANAGER
PERHAPS A BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE ROLL SENIOR COMMUNITY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS ENDEAVOR.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
GAINING GREATER SUPPORT FROM ELECTED OFFICIALS & STAFF (INGRAINED ATTITUDES).	ASST TOWN MANAGER

INFORMATION WHICH EXPLAINS WHAT HAPPENS AFTER COPS-WHERE DO YOU GO AFTER 'RIPPLE EFFECT' BEGINS TO TAKE PLACE IN YOUR COMMUNITY.

PRESIDENT OF
RESIDENT COUNCIL

MORE ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT-I WAS PREVIOUSLY SOLD ON WHY."

TOWN MANAGER

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 35; n = 28

	TITLE
"SOME OF THE WORK SESSIONS (BRAINSTORMING) COULD HAVE BEEN MORE FOCUSED OR DIRECTED.	TOWN MANAGER
I WILL NEED TO THINK ABOUT THIS QUESTION.	DIRECTOR YOUTH SERVICES
HAVE MORE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
BREAK OUT SESSIONS WERE FUN BUT NOT ALWAYS ON POINT.	CITY MANAGER
OFFER MORE IN THE WAY OF CONCRETE STEPS THAT COMMUNITIES CAN TAKE IN IMPLEMENTATION.	NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE PRES
TELECONFERENCE WITH POLICE CHIEFS.	RECREATION DIRECTOR
IT WAS WELL DONE.	ASST SUPERINTENDENT
I WISH THE SEMINAR WAS FURTHER AWAY SO THAT I COULD HAVE DEVOTED MORE TIME TO THE ISSUES.	CHIEF OF POLICE
DO NOT MENTION UNION GRIEVANCES AND BUCKING THE SYSTEM. UNIONS ARE READY FOR A CHANGE FROM OLD SYSTEM AND HOPE TO FIND THIS STYLE OF POLICING LESS ABRASIVE THEN THE OLD WAY. INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HIERARCHY AND COUNCILS.	PATROL OFFICER
LESS GROUP TIME MORE INFO.	TOWN COUNCILLOR
ADD MORE IMPLEMENTATION--HANDS ON WHEN DEALING WITH PEOPLE, PUBLIC OFFICIALS NUTS & BOLTS ON HOW TO DO.	CHIEF OF POLICE
EXPOUND ON PITFALLS AND FAILURES OF PROGRAMS-BE VERY CANDID ON COSTS ETC.	CHIEF OF POLICE
MY COMMENT IS NOT AN ADVOCATION OF UTILIZING THE SOURCE BOOK BUT A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WHAT IT IS AND ITS PURPOSE BEFORE I READ IT.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
COMPRESS--BE MORE SPECIFIC, LESS GENERALISTIC. SUBJECT NEED BETTER DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION OF SUB DEFINITIONS. I.E. 1) CITIZEN SURVEYS COMPUTER ANALYZED; 2) GETTING P.O'S TO COME DOWN TO EARTH AND GET TO KNOW THE PEOPLE.	CHIEF OF POLICE
INVITE COPS WITH PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE TO DISCUSS AND ANSWER QUESTIONS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
SPEAK AT DIFFERENT POLICE DEPTS.	DEPUTY MAYOR
BRING IN MORE CITIZENS TO HAVE A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON THEIR SIDE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
PUT MORE EMPHASIS ON COMMUNITY ORIENTED PUBLIC SERVICES-INVOLVE MORE DEPTS.	ASST TOWN MANAGER

JOIN US IN A COMMUNITY FORUM. AL AND JUDITH DID AN EXCELLENT JOB. WOULD LOVE TO HAVE YOU IN MANSFIELD.

SELECTMAN

VENTILATION.

COMMUNITY LEADER

FOCUS ON DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTATION AND HOW TO DEAL WITH OR OVERCOME THEM. ALLOW MORE THAN 5 PARTICIPANTS FROM COMMUNITY.

ASST DIR, DEVEL & PLANNING

ENSURE THAT ALL PRESENTERS HAVE HAD POLICE EXPERIENCE AND THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT.

CHIEF OF POLICE

WORK GROUPS COULD HAVE USED MORE DIRECTION/SUPERVISION IN CARRYING OUT THE ASSIGNED TASK.

FIRE CHIEF

SMALLER ROOM-NO FEELING OF INTIMACY, ONE LESS BREAKOUT SESSION.

CITY MANAGER

MAKE IT MORE KNOWN TO OTHERS IN THE COMMUNITY. NOT ONLY ELECTED OFFICIALS-FIRE-POLICE AND ACTIVISTS-THE LITTLE PEOPLE HAVE TO KNOW WHAT THIS IS ABOUT BEFORE THEY CAN SUPPORT IT.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

DEVELOP A 1/2 OR 1 DAY SEMINAR WHICH COULD BE HELD IN-HOUSE & TO THE CITIZENS.

ASST TOWN MANAGER

I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE WORKSHOP WAS SPACED OVER 3 DAYS RATHER THAN 2.

PRESIDENT OF RESIDENT COUNCIL

MOVE SEGMENT IN FIRST PART ALONG, COULD BE CUT IN HALF, SPEND MORE TIME ON ACTION PLANS, FORCE PARTICIPANTS TO FOCUS ON STRATEGY."

TOWN MANAGER

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 35; n = 16

"THANK YOU FOR THE LEARNING AND SOCIAL TIME.

TITLE

DIRECTOR YOUTH SERVICES

USING THE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COMMUNITY ORIENTED PUBLIC SERVICE.

CITY MANAGER

AL SWEENEY WAS OUTSTANDING-ONE OF THE BEST I'VE HEARD IN A LONG TIME.

TOWN COUNCILLOR

SMILE. IT'S BEEN A NICE TWO DAYS.

CHIEF OF POLICE

VERY INFORMATIVE-EXCELLENT PRESENTATION BY DYNAMIC PEOPLE. ENJOYED THE WORKSHOP.

CHIEF OF POLICE

OVERALL A GREAT WORKSHOP AND ENJOYED THE USE AND REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC EXAMPLES.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

SET UP A COURSE SPECIFICALLY FOR POLICE.

CHIEF OF POLICE

THE CONFERENCE CALL WAS HARD TO KEEP TRACK OF. WOULD INVITE SPEAKERS TO APPEAR IN PERSON.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

OVERALL IT WAS GREAT.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

THANK YOU. I ENJOYED THE WORKSHOP.

ASST TOWN MANAGER

THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS WELL THOUGHT OUT AND PRESENTED.

POLICE LIEUTENANT

AL WAS EXCEPTIONALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND HAS AN EXCELLENT GRASP OF HIS FIELD.

CHIEF OF POLICE

GET THE FIRE SERVICE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING-STARTING WITH THE CHIEF'S ASSOC.

OUTSTANDING TRAINERS!

I THOUGHT THE WORKSHOP WAS WONDERFULLY PRESENTED AND VERY EFFECTIVE AND INFORMATIVE.

I FEEL THE SPEAKERS WERE EXCELLENT. I WOULDN'T MIND SENDING MORE STAFF & POLICE PERSONNEL. I TRUST THIS SEMINAR WILL LEAD TO A COMMITMENT TO BEGIN COMMUNITY POLICING."

FIRE CHIEF

ASST TOWN MANAGER

PRESIDENT OF
RESIDENT COUNCIL

TOWN MANAGER

2. KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA
October 27-28, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 25
Evaluations Completed (E) = 25
OVERALL RESPONSE = 3.9

The second workshop was hosted by Township Manager Ronald G. Wagenmann, Upper Merion Township, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. In attendance were twenty-four (24) participants; one (1) observer; two (2) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff. The observer was a Municipal Police Consultant from the Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs, Harrisburg.

Of the twenty-five (25) participants, five (5) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Blue Bell, Coatesville, East Norriton, King of Prussia, and Norristown, Pennsylvania.

Prior to day one of the training, staff and trainers, Gayle Fisher-Stewart and Edward J. Spurlock, met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introduction and opening remarks were provided by ICMA Project Manager, Roberta Lesh, and host Township Manager Ronald G. Wagenmann.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop. The training was held in the Upper Merion Township Building. From a logistics viewpoint it was expertly organized and overseen by the Township Manager's staff.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager Terry L. Zerkle of Tempe, Arizona, and Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the King of Prussia, Pennsylvania training workshop will follow.

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA
October 27-28, 1994

Participants by Position N = 25

Five (5) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 25

Local Gov't CEO = 4

Law Enforcement CEO = 5

Community Representative = 6

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 4

Public Safety Personnel = 0

Elected Official = 5

Other = 1

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevancy** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					
Clarity	37.5	37.5	20.8	-	4.2	4.0
Informative	34.8	47.8	13.0	-	4.3	4.1
Relevancy	21.7	30.4	39.1	4.3	4.3	3.6
Presenter's Delivery	39.1	39.1	17.4	-	4.3	4.1

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	41.7	41.7	12.5	-	4.2	4.2
Informative	50.0	33.3	12.5	-	4.2	4.3
Relevancy	29.2	41.7	20.8	4.2	4.2	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	37.5	50.0	8.3	-	4.2	4.2

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	50.0	37.5	12.5	-	-	4.4
Informative	37.5	50.0	8.3	4.2	-	4.2
Relevancy	37.5	33.3	29.2	-	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	50.0	41.7	8.3	-	-	4.4

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	29.2	45.8	20.8	-	4.2	4.0
Informative	12.5	66.7	16.7	-	4.2	3.8
Relevancy	16.7	54.2	25.0	-	4.2	3.8
Presenter's Delivery	37.5	41.7	16.7	-	4.2	4.1

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	29.2	45.8	20.8	-	4.2	4.0
Informative	41.7	41.7	12.5	-	4.2	4.2
Relevancy	25.0	41.7	29.2	-	4.2	3.8
Presenter's Delivery	37.5	37.5	20.8	-	4.2	4.0

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	37.5	37.5	20.8	-	4.2	4.0
Informative	33.3	37.5	25.0	-	4.2	4.0
Relevancy	29.2	33.3	33.3	-	4.2	3.8
Presenter's Delivery	37.5	50.0	8.3	-	4.2	4.2

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	79.2	16.7	4.2	-	-	4.8
Informative	75.0	20.8	4.2	-	-	4.7
Relevancy	75.0	20.8	-	4.2	-	4.7
Presenter's Delivery	79.2	20.8	-	-	-	4.8

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	54.2	33.3	8.3	4.2	-	4.4
Informative	58.3	29.2	8.3	4.2	-	4.4
Relevancy	62.5	20.8	12.5	4.2	-	4.4
Presenter's Delivery	70.8	16.7	8.3	4.2	-	4.5

OVERALL RESPONSE = 3.9

KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA
October 27-28, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 25
Evaluations Completed (E) = 25
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 25 ; n = 21

	<u>TITLE</u>
"THAT WE WERE HEADING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WITH OUR COMMUNITY POLICE OFFICERS.	CHIEF OF POLICE
UNDERSTANDING DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS BY PEOPLE OF VARIOUS PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUNDS.	TOWNSHIP MANAGER
KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER TOWNSHIPS AND HOW THEY ALL WORK TO SOLVE PROBLEMS.	COUNCIL
KNOWLEDGE OF COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS.	ASS'T TOWNSHIP MAN/FINANCE
IT PROVIDED IDEAS FOR FORMULATING COMM GROUPS IF NEEDED.	POLICE CHIEF
THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES WITH THE OTHER TEAM MEMBERS.	COUNCILMEMBER
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF COP AND/OR COG.	ASST CITY MANAGER
BETTER CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TOTAL COP PROCESS.	MUNICIPAL POLICE CONSULTANT
A NEW INSIGHT INTO HOW WE CAN BETTER UTILIZE OUR CHIEF ASSET-OUR CITIZENS-TO THE BETTERMENT OF COMMUNITY.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
SOME SPECIFICS OF HOW TO AVOID FAILURE, SUGGESTIONS ON APPROACHES TO TAKE.	TOWNSHIP MANAGER
THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK MATTERS OVER WITH THE TOWNSHIP TEAM-BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS WERE HELPFUL.	TOWN MANAGER
ADDITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF COG.	FIRE CHIEF
NEW IDEAS & SUGGESTIONS, METHODS ETC FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF COP.	CHIEF OF POLICE

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIVERSITY OF ISSUES IN DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC AREAS.
 OTHER WAYS TO HANDLE COMMUNITY & NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS.
 I REALIZE THE ON-GOING NEED TO ADDRESS PUBLIC NEEDS-AND THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE NEEDS.
 PROBLEM ORIENTING POLICING, COMMUNITY ORIENTED GOVERNMENT.
 BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH TOWNSHIP REPS.
 WILL BE MOST HELPFUL IN INITIATING OUR OWN COP PROGRAM.
 IDEAS ON BETTER SERVING CITIZENS.
 INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH TOWNSHIP PEOPLE-GENERAL INFO ON COG."

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 25; n = 10

"PROJECT TO IMPLEMENT THE ENTIRE COP.
 OTHER CASE HISTORIES FROM GOVTS WITH SIMILAR PROFILES.
 HOW TO PREVENT SOME PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY OCCUR-HOW TO CHECK AND SEE IF WE'RE DOING OKAY.
 NONE THAT I CAN THINK OF AT THIS POINT.
 MORE INSIGHT INTO SETTING UP THE OVERALL PROGRAM AS IT RELATES TO SMALLER SUBURBAN AREAS.
 MORE SPECIFICS.
 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM INTO THE SYSTEM.
 I CAN'T THINK OF ONE.
 DECREASE OR INCREASE IN MANPOWER.
 MORE APPROPRIATE INFO FOR SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES."

TITLE

 COUNCIL
 ASS'T TWNSP MAN/FINANCE
 COUNCILMEMBER
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 TOWNSHIP MANAGER
 FIRE CHIEF
 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 25; n = 18

"MORE DETAILS AS IT RELATES TO THE DIFFERENT AREAS OF COMMUNITY POLICING.
 ENLARGE THE GROUPS TO INCLUDE MORE OF THE RESIDENTS & CITIZENS.
 DESIGN TO MEET THE SIZE OF SMALLER COMMUNITIES.

TITLE

 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COUNCIL
 DIR OF PUBLIC WORKS

MORE DIRECTED TO PROFILE OF ATTENDING ORGANIZATIONS.

ADDRESS MORE OF SMALL TOWN ISSUES.

KNOW YOUR AUDIENCE-DO SOME HOMEWORK BEFORE HAND. ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NOT EVERYONE'S A BIT CITY.

POSSIBLY ONE SPECIFIC PROBLEM TO COMPARE DIFFERENCES IN SOLVING PROBLEM IN EACH COMMUNITY.

KNOW THE SIZE & ORIENTATION OF THE COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATING BETTER.

MORE DISCUSSION WITH PEOPLE ACTUALLY DOING IT.

SCALE DOWN EXAMPLES FOR SMALLER COMMUNITIES.

SHOW THE POPS/NEWPORT NEWS VIDEO TAPE FIRST-IT IS A SUCCINCT PRESENTATION OF THE COPS CONCEPT.

MORE AUDIO-VISUALS.

I BELIEVE YOU LEARNED FROM US AS WE LEARNED FROM YOU.

LESS TIME ON THE SALES JOB (PREACHING TO THE CHOIR) MORE TIME ON PROBLEM SOLVING.

BRING IN SOMEONE WHO HAS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED THE PROGRAM TO DISCUSS IT.

BEGIN THE PROGRAM BY ASKING INPUT FROM THE ATTENDEES AS TO DEMOGRAPHICS, POPULATION, ETC.

USE OF MORE RELEVANT EXAMPLES EARLY IN SESSION TO THE COMMUNITIES ATTENDING.

PERSONALIZE PRESENTATIONS MORE TO AUDIENCE."

ASS'T TWNSP MAN/FINANCE

POLICE CHIEF

COUNCILMEMBER

MUNICIPAL POLICE CONSULTANT

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

TOWNSHIP MANAGER

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY

TOWN MANAGER

FIRE CHIEF

CHIEF OF POLICE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

CHIEF OF POLICE

TOWNSHIP MANAGER

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 25; n = 6

"GREAT JOB BY THE PRESENTERS.

VERY POOR PRESENTATION-A LOT OF FLUFF AND USELESS DIVERTING TALES. WRITTEN MATERIALS OF SOME USE.

IT TOOK A LONG TIME TO GET SPECIFIC-FIRST DAY WAS OVERLY THEORETICAL & VAGUE.

GOOD LUCK-KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK.

WE HAVE HAD A MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND OUR 3 PARTICIPANTS IN PROGRAM.

THANKS FOR PUTTING UP THE PROBLEMS."

TITLE

TOWN MANAGER

COUNCILMEMBER

TOWN MANAGER

CHIEF OF POLICE

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

CHIEF OF POLICE

3. LAWRENCE, KANSAS
November 7-8, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 32
Evaluations Completed (E) = 32
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.0

The third workshop was hosted by City Manager Mike Wildgen of Lawrence, Kansas. In attendance were thirty (30) participants; two (2) observers; two (2) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff. The observers were the Management Assistant and Assistant City Manager of Lawrence, KS.

Of the thirty-two (32) participants, six (6) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Charleston, Missouri; El Reno, Junction City, Lawrence, Overland Park, and Topeka, Kansas.

Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers, Judith Mohr Keane and Edward J. Spurlock, met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Due to a scheduling problem, ICMA's project manager was not in attendance and was substituted by ICMA's Senior Curriculum Specialist, Lydia Bjornlund. Introductory and opening remarks were provided by Ms. Bjornlund and host City Manager Mike Wildgen.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop with the exception of hotel logistics on day one. This situation was quickly resolved with minimal discomfort to the participants.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager Bruce Romer of Rockville, Maryland, and Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Lawrence, Kansas training workshop will follow.

LAWRENCE, KANSAS
November 7-8, 1994

Participants by Position N = 32
Six (6) Jurisdictions
Evaluations Completed E = 32

Local Gov't CEO = 4	Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 10
Law Enforcement CEO = 4	Public Safety Personnel = 3
Community Representative = 6	Elected Official = 4
	Other = 1

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	<u>(% Responding)</u>					
Clarity	27.6	51.7	17.2	3.4	-	4.0
Informative	33.3	37.0	25.9	3.7	-	4.0
Relevancy	40.7	29.6	29.6	-	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	33.3	40.7	18.5	7.4	-	4.0

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	50.0	28.6	21.4	-	-	4.3
Informative	42.9	42.9	14.3	-	-	4.3
Relevancy	40.7	44.4	11.1	3.7	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	40.7	37.0	18.5	3.7	-	4.1

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	42.9	25.0	32.1	-	-	4.1
Informative	42.3	23.1	26.9	7.7	-	4.0
Relevancy	38.5	23.1	26.9	11.5	-	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	42.3	30.8	23.1	3.8	-	4.1

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	24.1	58.6	17.2	-	-	4.1
Informative	25.9	44.4	29.6	-	-	4.0
Relevancy	29.6	40.7	25.9	3.7	-	4.0
Presenter's Delivery	25.9	44.4	25.9	3.7	-	3.9

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	27.6	48.3	17.2	6.9	-	4.0
Informative	18.5	44.4	29.6	7.4	-	3.7
Relevancy	29.6	37.0	29.6	3.7	-	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	25.9	40.7	29.6	3.7	-	3.9

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	16.7	46.7	36.7	-	-	3.8
Informative	14.3	42.9	39.3	3.6	-	3.7
Relevancy	21.4	35.7	35.7	7.1	-	3.7
Presenter's Delivery	21.4	42.9	35.7	-	-	3.9

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	20.7	27.6	37.9	10.3	3.4	3.5
Informative	25.9	40.7	25.9	3.7	3.7	3.8
Relevancy	25.9	48.1	18.5	3.7	3.7	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	29.6	25.9	37.0	3.7	3.7	3.7

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	42.3	42.3	15.4	-	-	4.3
Informative	36.0	52.0	12.0	-	-	4.2
Relevancy	44.0	44.0	12.0	-	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	40.0	40.0	20.0	-	-	4.2

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.0

LAWRENCE, KANSAS
November 7-8, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 32
Evaluations Completed (E) = 32
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 32 ; n = 29

	TITLE
"BETTER KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COP CONCEPTS AND INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS.	MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT
SYNTHESIS OF OPINIONS FROM OTHER CITIES.	MAYOR
WORK W/MY OWN ELECTED OFFICIALS, DEVELOP WORKING RELATIONSHIPS.	DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
HOW COPPS CAN BENEFIT THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY BY CHANGING OUR THINKING.	DIR. COMM & ECON DEVELOPMENT
IDEA SHARING W/OTHER DEPTS.	CHIEF OF POLICE
MEETING OTHERS & NETWORKING OPPORTUNITIES-CONCRETE TYPE IDEAS & INFORMATION FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS CONCEPT IN OUR COMMUNITY.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
BETTER CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF COP IMPROVEMENTS.	ASST CITY MANAGER
I BELIEVE THAT A FEW PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.	PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER
A SENSE THAT MY COMMUNITY'S PROBLEMS WERE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE. NOT HELPLESS ANYMORE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
BECOME MORE FAMILIAR WITH OTHER ATTENDEES.	POLICE CHIEF
TALKING TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE WITH SIMILAR JOBS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE MANY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS IT WAS REFRESHING TO GET AN IMPRESSION THAT OUR CITY COMMISSION GETS ALONG MUCH BETTER THAN MOST OTHERS.	MAYOR
INCREASED APPRECIATION OF SIMILARITIES OF ISSUES FOR POLICE/COMMUNITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT PHILOSOPHY.	SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT.	ASST CHIEF OF POLICE

TRUER UNDERSTANDING OF COP AND WHY THIS CHANGE IS NECESSARY.
 REINFORCEMENT OF WHAT WE ARE ALREADY DOING IN TOPEKA.
 THE IDEAS & INFORMATION FROM OTHER COMMUNITIES.
 MEETING WITH THE TEAM FROM MY COMMUNITY AWAY FROM TOWN TO LOOK AT OUR PROBLEMS IN A DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT.
 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN COMMUNITIES.
 USE OF SOME COMMUNITY STRATEGIES IN FIRE SERVICE.
 PROVIDED INSIGHT INTO A BROADER RANGE OF TOOLS AVAILABLE IN COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT CITY OF TOPEKA HAS MADE GREAT
 PERSPECTIVE OF COP.
 CONNECTION TO SOURCES.
 KNOWLEDGE FOR BETTER MORE EFFECTIVE POLICING.
 AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT COP IS.
 A NEW WAY TO ATTACK THE CRIME PROBLEM IN OUR JURISDICTION.
 THE ABILITY TO SIT DOWN W/FELLOW COMMUNITY MEMBERS & DISCUSS RELEVANT INFO. SOME NEW IDEAS TO CONSIDER.
 GAINED AN UNDERSTANDING OF COP.
 REINFORCED OF EXISTING APPROACH TO GOVT WILL PROCEED WITH COG."

POLICE CAPTAIN
 DIR. PARKS & RECREATION
 COUNCILMAN
 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 FIRE CHIEF
 CITY MANAGER
 CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
 COUNCILMAN
 CHIEF
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 COMM. HOUSING AUTHORITY
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 ASST DIR PARKS & RECREATION

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 32; n = 17

"GREATER INFORMATION ON YOUTH ORIENTED PROGRAMS AND SERVICE.
 SPECIFIC ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF HOW COP HAS WORKED IN OTHER AREAS-ALSO MORE ABOUT NEGATIVE.
 SPECIFIC SETUP, STEP BY STEP.
 NONE.
 PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS-MORE INFO ON PROBLEM SOLVING.
 I LEARNED SO MUCH MORE THAN ANTICIPATED-THAT I CANNOT THINK OF ANYTHING AT THE MOMENT.
 CRIME BILL OPPORTUNITIES-HOW COP COULD ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN FOR GRANT SUCCESS.
 GRANTS AVAILABLE.
 COST OF IMPLEMENTING TO OTHER DEPTS.
 NOT SURE, BUT THE INFORMATION SEEMED PRETTY BASIC.

TITLE

 MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT
 MAYOR
 DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
 DIR. COMM & ECON DEVELOPMENT
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER
 POLICE CHIEF
 DIR. OF PARKS & RECREATION

PROBLEMS W/IMPLEMENTATION & HOW TO SOLVE.

I WAS PLEASED WITH CONTENT.

MAYBE SOME NUTS & BOLTS.

HOW TO REALLOCATE SCARCE RESOURCES.

SPECIFIC WAYS OF DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS. WAYS OF FREEING UP OFFICERS TO IMPLEMENT IT.

COVERED EVERYTHING I CAN THINK OF.

ROLE OF OTHER DEPTS IN COP."

COUNCILMAN

CITY MANAGER

COUNCILMAN

ASST CITY MANAGER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST DIR PARKS & RECREATION

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 32; n = 22

"ACTUAL PATROL SCENARIO OF WHAT TAKES PLACE ON A SPECIFIC SHIFT. WE SEE TV SHOWS 911 ETC...SHOW COP.

I FELT THE WORKSHOPS WERE NOT WELL DONE-NOT CHALLENGING ENOUGH (MODULE #7).

A GOOD BASIC WORKSHOP-WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME WORK IN ADVANCED PLANNING.

MORE PROBLEM SOLVING OPPORTUNITIES WITH ATTENDEES.

STRESS MORE OF THE COMMUNITY-ORIENTED GOVERNANCE. IT FITS WELL WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND TAKES SOME PRESSURE OFF OF PD.

SHOW ACTUAL FOOTAGE OF HOW COP IS HELPING IN THE COMMUNITY.

PROBLEM SOLVING BY THE GROUP & STAFF OF SPECIFIC SITUATIONS FROM DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES INVOLVED IN SEMINAR.

INCLUDE SMALL DEPTS IN PUTTING COURSE TOGETHER.

PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR COMMUNITY TEAM INTERACTION.

VERY WELL DONE-NO ADDITIONAL.

I THINK THE SESSION WOULD BE BETTER IF IT INVOLVED TOGETHER COMMUNITIES WHO HAD MORE EXPERIENCE IN THIS PROCESS TO GET IN MORE SPECIFIC INTERACTION ON WHAT TO DO AND WHAT NOT TO DO. AT LEAST IN THIS SEMINAR, I DIDN'T FIND AS MUCH THAT WE COULD RELATE TO IN TOPEKA. I THINK THIS SEMINAR WAS PROBABLY MORE VALUABLE TO THOSE COMMUNITIES WHO HAVEN'T DONE THIS.

MORE INTERGROUP WORKSHOPS W/ THE GROUP BEING MADE UP OF INDIVIDUALS FROM DIFFERENT CITIES.

DON'T ASSUME BIG CITY SOLUTIONS WILL WORK IN SMALLER CITIES-TOO BIG A DIFFERENCE IN RESOURCES.

UNKNOWN

MORE INTER-JURISDICTION DISCUSSION WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL. THE CHIEF'S DISCUSSION WAS VERY IMPORTANT IN THIS SEMINAR.

COULD EASILY BE 3 DAY SCHEDULE.

TITLE

DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOP

DIR. COMM & ECON DEVELOP

CHIEF OF POLICE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST CITY MANAGER

PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE CHIEF

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS

POLICE CAPTAIN

DIR. PARKS & RECREATION

COUNCILMAN

CITY MANAGER

CITY MANAGER

CHIEF OF POLICE

CHIEF

KEEP UP THE WORK.

HOW TO REALLOCATE SCARCE RESOURCES.

YOU COULD SHORTEN IT BY A DAY AT LEAST. THE INFORMATION I CAME FOR COULD HAVE BEEN COVERED, WITH SOME FOLLOW-UP, IN A DAY AND A HALF.

EXERCISES WERE TOO SIMPLISTIC IN NATURE. (EXAMPLES W/LARGE METRO PD'S DO NOT DO ANYTHING FOR SMALL COMMUNITIES PROBLEMS.)

NOT SURE.

LET COMMUNITY OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COP DISCUSS THE PROCESS WITH YOUR GROUP. 'BOTH GOOD AND BAD POINTS.'

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST CITY MANAGER

COMM. HOUSING AUTHORITY

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST DIR PARKS & RECREATION

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 32; n = 8

"EXCELLENT PRESENTERS.

EXCELLENT-VERY, VERY GOOD-PLEASANT SURPRISE.

GREAT JOB!

VERY VERY INFORMATIVE & ENCOURAGING SEMINAR.

TOPEKA IS BEYOND THIS LEVEL IN COMMUNITY POLICING ISSUES/PROGRAM.

ADULTS NEED NOT BE TREATED LIKE CHILDREN BY HAVING US WRITING OR PUTTING IN GROUPS WITH PEOPLE NO MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE THAN I AM.

TOO MUCH FREE TIME IN SCHEDULE-COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED IN 1 DAY OR 1 1/2 DAYS. YOU HAVE 'BUSY' PEOPLE INVOLVED & TIME IS OUR MOST PRECIOUS ASSET. STARTING AT 9 INSTEAD OF 8. TAKING 1 HR VS 30 MIN FOR LUNCH LEFT TOO MUCH WASTED TIME. PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS LACK OF PREP TIME TO KNOW WHAT WE, AS A TEAM, WAS EXPECTED TO DO. PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS BEING VOLUNTEERED TO ATTEND INSTEAD BY PEER PRESSURE RATHER THAN BEING INTERESTED IN ATTENDING. A ROUND TABLE OF SURROUNDING COMM'S PD'S WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE WORTHWHILE. SHOULD ALLOW YOU, THRU EXERCISES, TO MEET OTHER COMM. TEAMS BETTER.

THANKS!"

TITLE

MAYOR

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST CITY MANAGER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

FIRE CHIEF

COMM. HOUSING AUTHORITY

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

ASST DIR PARKS & RECREATION

4. CINCINNATI, OHIO November 14-15, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 31
Evaluations Completed (E) = 31
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.5

The fourth workshop was hosted by City Manager John Shirey of Cincinnati, Ohio. In attendance were thirty-one (30) participants; one (1) observers; two (2) trainers; NIJ's project manager; and one (1) ICMA staff. The observer was Lieutenant Roger Hildebrand, Community Policing Coordinator for the Cincinnati Police Department.

Of the thirty-two (31) participants, six (6) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Carol Stream, Illinois; Cincinnati, Colerain Township, Hamilton, Louisville, Ohio; and Saginaw, Michigan.

Fine tuning and final corrections and improvements were made to the work and source books for this fourth workshop and the remaining four sessions. These final editions were printed for all remaining workshops.

Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers, Judith Mohr Keane and Albert J. Sweeney, met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introductory and opening remarks were provided by ICMA's project manager, Roberta Lesh, host City Manager John Shirey, and NIJ's project manager Carolyn M. Peake.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop with the exception of hotel logistics on day one. This situation was quickly resolved with minimal discomfort to the participants.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager David Mora of Salinas, California, and Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Cincinnati, Ohio training workshop will follow.

CINCINNATI, OHIO
November 14-15, 1994

Participants by Position N = 31

Six (6) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 31

Local Gov't CEO = 5

Law Enforcement CEO = 8

Community Representative = 3

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 4

Public Safety Personnel = 6

Elected Official = 2

Other = 3

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					
Clarity	61.3	38.7	-	-	-	4.6
Informative	64.5	35.5	-	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	71.0	29.0	-	-	-	4.7
Presenter's Delivery	67.7	29.0	3.2	-	-	4.6

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	64.5	32.3	3.2	-	-	4.6
Informative	54.8	45.2	-	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	74.2	25.8	-	-	-	4.7
Presenter's Delivery	71.0	25.8	3.2	-	-	4.7

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	43.3	53.3	3.3	-	-	4.4
Informative	43.3	40.0	16.7	-	-	4.3
Relevancy	56.7	30.0	13.3	-	-	4.4
Presenter's Delivery	50.0	43.3	6.7	-	-	4.4

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	48.4	45.2	6.5	-	-	4.4
Informative	51.6	41.9	6.5	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	61.3	32.3	6.5	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	67.7	29.0	3.2	-	-	4.6

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	67.7	22.6	9.7	-	-	4.6
Informative	61.3	32.3	6.5	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	64.5	29.0	6.5	-	-	4.6
Presenter's Delivery	61.3	32.3	6.5	-	-	4.5

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	<u>(% Responding)</u>					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	51.7	44.8	3.4	-	-	4.5
Informative	48.3	44.8	6.9	-	-	4.4
Relevancy	51.7	44.8	3.4	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	55.2	44.8	-	-	-	4.6

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	57.7	23.1	15.4	-	3.8	4.3
Informative	50.0	26.9	15.4	3.8	3.8	4.2
Relevancy	38.5	38.5	15.4	3.8	3.8	4.0
Presenter's Delivery	50.0	38.5	7.7	-	3.8	4.3

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	69.2	19.2	11.5	-	-	4.6
Informative	57.7	30.8	11.5	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	65.4	30.8	3.8	-	-	4.6
Presenter's Delivery	57.7	26.9	15.4	-	-	4.4

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.5

CINCINNATI, OHIO
November 14-15, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 31
Evaluations Completed (E) = 31
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 31; n = 31

	TITLE
"ABILITY TO DISCUSS SIMILAR ISSUES WITH OTHER COMMUNITIES.	CITY MANAGER
INTERACTION WITH OTHERS-CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS-TEAM-BUILDING-THE PRACTICALITY OF APPLICATION.	VILLAGE MANAGER
WE ALL HAVE COMMON CONCERNS. THERE IS A PLAN TO START ADDRESSING THESE CONCERNS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
TO KNOW THE OTHER COMMUNITIES HAVE SAME PROBLEM.	MAYOR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEAMWORK AND UNITY OF PURPOSE FROM CITY MANAGER, COMMUNITY LEADER, & POLICE DEPT.	CHIEF OF POLICE
INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF COP-NEW PERSPECTIVE.	TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATOR
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEND TIME WITH CITY MANAGER AND POLICE CHIEF TO DISCUSS COP ISSUES.	PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR
1ST TIME CITY MGR, CHIEF, SAFETY DIRECTOR TOGETHER AT COP STRATEGY THINK TANK-GALVANIZES THE SUPPORT AND COMMITMENT.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
IT IS MORE THAN A POLICE OPERATION IT IS A TOTAL COMMUNITY OPERATION.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
NETWORKING.	DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW POLICE & OTHER DEPARTMENTS & COMMUNITY GROUPS CAN WORK TOGETHER - THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERMINING THE CAUSE RATHER THAN REACT TO PROBLEM.	COMMUNITY DEVELOP DIRECTOR

THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE MY MAYOR & MANAGER HEAR MATERIAL THAT I'VE HEARD/
READ FOR SEVERAL YEARS. REAFFIRM VILLAGE'S COMMITMENT TO PROCEED W/COP.

POLICE CHIEF

INTER-ACTION & REALIZATION THAT WE'RE NOT ALONE IN OUR PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACH TO LAW ENFORCEMENT.

POLICE LIEUTENANT

SEEN THE NUTS-BOLTS GUYS UP CLOSE AND IT WAS NEAT!

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

CLARIFYING MY IDEAS.

DIR. CITY PLANNING

CLEARLY THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING-POSITIVE & COMMUNITY ORIENTED.

TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE

INTERACTION AMONGST DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS AND CITIZEN REP. TEAM BUILDING.
QUESTIONING OUR BASIC SERVICE DELIVERY PHILOSOPHY.

CITY MANAGER

THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING WE KNOW DOES
NOT WORK - THERE IS HOPE.

POLICE LIEUTENANT

UNDERSTANDING THAT SIZE OF COMMUNITY DOESN'T MATTER. PROBLEMS ARE VERY
SIMILAR.

FIRE CHIEF

INFO ON OTHER COMMUNITIES.

DIRECTOR OF PLANNING

THAT THERE WAS OTHER WAYS OF POLICING.

PRESIDENT, NAACP

ABILITY TO DISCUSS SIMILAR ISSUES WITH OFFICIALS REPRESENTING A VARIETY OF
COMMUNITIES.

CHIEF OF POLICE

GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF TOTAL CONCEPT.

CHIEF OF POLICE

COMMUNICATION WITH COMMUNITY LEADER.

CLERGY

A CHANCE TO REFOCUS WHY I AM IN THE CAREER I AM IN AND A CHALLENGE TO
EMPOWER MY OFFICERS TO ACHIEVE.

CHIEF OF POLICE

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION (MORE OF THESE NEEDED).

POLICE LIEUTENANT

THE NEED FOR COP AS TOTAL PUBLIC SERVICE IN A COMMUNITY.

CITY MANAGER

IDEAS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.

CITY MANAGER

A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ROOT CAUSES OF CRIME AND NEED TO ADDRESS A
MULTITUDE OF ISSUES IN A PREVENTATIVE FASHION.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

2ND DAY-ACTION STRATEGY-DEFINING WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NEXT.

CHIEF OF POLICE

COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO PROBLEM SOLVING. GREATER RESPECT FOR
THE SOPHISTICATIONS OF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS."

SUP'T HIGH SCHOOL

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 31; n = 16

TITLE

"MORE EXAMPLES OF INTEGRATED ACTIVITIES AMONG ALL VILLAGE/CITY DEPARTMENTS
AND OTHER COMM. AGENCIES/ORGS USING SARA AND RESULTS.

VILLAGE MANAGER

NONE.

MAYOR

AID IN COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT PROCEDURES.

TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATOR

ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS.

POLICE LIEUTENANT

INTERNAL (ORGANIZATIONAL) COMPLICATIONS.

ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WITH OUR SPECIFIC ACTION PLAN.

A 3RD DAY DEVOTED TO IMPLEMENTATION METHODS-PERHAPS 1/2 DAY IN THE FIELD W/CINCY NEIGHBORHOOD OFFICERS.

MORE ON BUDGET ENHANCING DEVICES.

EXPAND TO COMMUNITY ORIENTED PUBLIC SERVICE.

MORE SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION.

THIS IS WHAT WE NEEDED.

THE BREAKDOWN OF

ISSUES RELATED TO CONTINUATION FUNDING/ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FOR 'CP' PROGRAMS.

BOTH DAYS WERE FILLED WITH EXAMPLES-MY QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED.

MORE INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT.

AN ADVANCED SESSION IS NEEDED-WE ARE ALREADY WELL INTO COP AND FEEL THAT A 'WHAT'S NEXT' SESSION WOULD BE BENEFICIAL."

DEPUTY POLICE CHIEF
COMMUNITY DEVELOP. DIRECTOR
POLICE CHIEF
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
DIR. CITY PLANNING
TOWNSHIP TRUSTEE
POLICE LIEUTENANT
PRESIDENT, NAACP
CHIEF OF POLICE
CITY MANAGER
CITY MANAGER
CHIEF OF POLICE

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 31; n = 22

"INVITING TO CONFERENCE MORE ELECTED OFFICIALS.

EXPAND FROM A 5 MEMBER TEAM TO A 6 MEMBER TEAM TO GET MORE PEOPLE (ELECTED, COMMUNITY LEADERS, UNION LEADERSHIP) INVOLVED.

PROVIDE AN ADVANCED COURSE FOR THOSE ALREADY WELL UNDER WAY WITH COP.

IF NIJ IS REALLY COMMITTED TO SOLVING SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF TODAY, DO NOT DISCONTINUE FUNDING OF THE PROJECT.

EXPAND TO 3 DAYS.

DISCUSS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINALITY & QUALITY OF LIFE ISSUES.

MORE WORKSHOPS OF THIS NATURE.

INTEGRATE THE WORKBOOK IN BETTER. HOWEVER, THAT MIGHT TAKE AWAY FROM THE QUALITY OF THE PRESENTATION.

SORRY, HOW ABOUT THE SUCCESS STORIES IN COMMUNITIES LESS THAN 10,000 IN POPULATION.

WE'RE AT THE GRASSROOTS NOW WITH 3 FEDERAL GRANT OFFICERS JUST HIRED AT THIS PRELIMINARY STAGE THE WORKSHOP INCORPORATED PLENTY.

HAVE SIMILAR SIZE COMMUNITIES ATTEND SAME WORKSHOP EG. 2 OR 3 SMALL & 2 OR 3 LARGE.

SEPARATE BY COMMUNITY SIZE.

TITLE
MAYOR
CHIEF OF POLICE
PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR
POLICE LIEUTENANT
POLICE CHIEF
POLICE LIEUTENANT
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
DIR. CITY PLANNING
CITY MANAGER
POLICE LIEUTENANT
FIRE CHIEF
DIRECTOR OF PLANNING

PUT IT ON A NATIONAL LEVEL.

INVITE PARTICIPATION FROM D.O.J. OFFICIALS.

PUT US ON THE STREET.

GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ORGANIZING WORKSHOP BASED ON CITY SIZE-TRAINING AVAILABLE FOR IN-SERVICE OFFICERS?

MORE ON THE 'BUY-IN' PROCESS-SUCCESSFUL SELLING TO NEGATIVE LISTENERS.

THE TYPE OF TRAINING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MANY OF THE PUBLICATIONS I SEE SENT BY THE NIJ.

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT SOME JURISDICTIONS ARE FURTHER ALONG THAN OTHERS.

SPEND MORE TIME IN ASSISTING PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERSTAND ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CRIME AND OTHER SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.

SEE ABOVE-QUESTIONS SUCH AS HOW TO IMPROVE THE 'BUY IN' INTERNALLY. HOW TO EVALUATE WHAT IS HAPPENING, ETC.

NOTHING."

PRESIDENT, NAACP

CHIEF OF POLICE

CLERGY

CHIEF OF POLICE

POLICE LIEUTENANT

CITY MANAGER

CITY MANAGER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

CHIEF OF POLICE

SUP'T HIGH SCHOOL

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 31; n = 9

"IF THE PEOPLE WHO APPROVE YOUR GRANT ARE IN DOUBT, BRING THEM TO A WORKSHOP. MY SCORING IS SINCERE.

THANK YOU!

KEEP IT UP! GOOD LUCK. GREAT TRAINING TEAM.

VERY GOOD JOB.

I WAS VERY IMPRESSED.

TERRIFIC JOB!

OUR HOSTS WERE SPECTACULAR!

ONE OF THE BEST PROGRAMS I HAVE ATTENDED IN TWENTY YEARS.

CONSIDER USING MORE POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS THEIR PROGRAMS."

TITLE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATOR

POLICE LIEUTENANT

DEPUTY CHIEF

COMMUNITY DEVELOP. DIRECTOR

POLICE LIEUTENANT

CHIEF OF POLICE

CITY MANAGER

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

5. LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
December 5-6, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 49
Evaluations Completed (E) = 43
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.1

The fifth workshop was hosted by City Manager James C. Hankla of Long Beach, California. In attendance were forty-five (45) participants; four (4) observers; two (2) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff. The observers were a cultural awareness consultant and a police psychologist for the Long Beach Police Department, a lieutenant from the Los Angeles Police Department and ICMA workshop trainee, and the executive director of the Youth, Education, and Community Services, Long Beach, California.

Of the forty-nine (49) participants, nine (9) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Belmont, Escondido, Glendale, Highland, Long Beach, San Jacinto, Santa Monica, Stanton, and West Hollywood, California.

Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers, Judith Mohr Keane and Albert J. Sweeney, met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introductory and opening remarks were provided by ICMA's project manager, Roberta Lesh, host City Manager James C. Hankla.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop with the exception of hotel logistics on preparation and day one. This situation was finally resolved with minimal discomfort to the participants but with much embarrassment for the host team. All arrangements had been confirmed with an employee that was transferred two days before the workshop was due to begin which caused tremendous complications.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager Robert C. Bobb of Richmond, Virginia, and Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Long Beach, California training workshop will follow.

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
December 5-6, 1994

Participants by Position N = 49

Nine (9) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 43

Local Gov't CEO = 5

Law Enforcement CEO = 8

Community Representative = 4

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 11

Public Safety Personnel = 8

Elected Official = 2

Other = 5

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					
Clarity	50.0	42.9	7.1	-	-	4.4
Informative	31.0	50.0	19.0	-	-	4.1
Relevancy	33.3	50.0	14.3	2.4	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	57.1	35.7	7.1	-	-	4.5

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	57.1	38.1	2.4	2.4	-	4.5
Informative	45.2	45.2	7.1	2.4	-	4.3
Relevancy	42.9	47.6	7.1	2.4	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	64.3	31.0	4.8	-	-	4.6

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	50.0	32.5	17.5	-	-	4.3
Informative	45.0	30.0	22.5	2.5	-	4.2
Relevancy	42.5	32.5	22.5	2.5	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	50.0	32.5	15.0	2.5	-	4.3

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	38.1	38.1	23.8	-	-	4.2
Informative	31.0	47.6	16.7	4.8	-	4.0
Relevancy	29.3	46.3	19.5	4.9	-	4.0
Presenter's Delivery	47.6	33.3	16.7	2.4	-	4.3

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	33.3	50.0	16.7	-	-	4.2
Informative	28.6	45.2	26.2	-	-	4.0
Relevancy	26.2	54.8	19.0	-	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	47.6	40.5	11.9	-	-	4.4

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	36.8	36.8	26.3	-	-	4.1
Informative	34.2	36.8	28.9	-	-	4.1
Relevancy	31.6	47.4	21.1	-	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	52.6	31.6	15.8	-	-	4.4

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	26.5	35.3	29.4	8.8	-	3.8
Informative	26.5	38.2	26.5	8.8	-	3.8
Relevancy	29.4	38.2	23.5	8.8	-	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	29.4	47.1	8.8	11.8	2.9	3.9

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	40.0	50.0	6.7	3.3	-	4.3
Informative	48.4	32.3	12.9	6.5	-	4.2
Relevancy	51.6	29.0	12.9	6.5	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	44.8	44.8	10.3	-	-	4.3

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.1

**LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
December 5-6, 1994**

Number of Participants (N) = 49
Evaluations Completed (E) = 43
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 43 ; n = 37

	<u>TITLE</u>
"STATISTICS, OPINIONS & INFORMATION FROM OTHER CITIES IMPORTANT IN COMPARING & CONTRASTING WITH MY OWN CITY.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
IT CRYSTALLIZED THE COPPS CONCEPTS FOR ME.	CHAIR, PUBLIC SAFETY COMM
INTERACTION WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS/GOOD PIECES OF INFO ON SPECIFIC TOPICS.	DEPUTY CITY MANAGER
POSITIVE IDEAS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT.	CHIEF OF POLICE
WRITTEN RESOURCE MATERIAL WAS HELPFUL.	ASST CITY MANAGER
IDENTIFYING PROGRAMS THAT OTHER CITIES HAVE IMPLEMENTED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF OUR CITY.	NEIGH. REVIT. ADMINISTRATOR
IDEAS FOR ACTION PLANNING & NEXT STEPS WE NEED TO TAKE-SPENDING TIME WITH CITY TEAM MEMBERS.	DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
GETTING TO KNOW MY TEAM BETTER. PICKED UP A COUPLE OF IDEAS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS.	CITY MANAGER
I BECAME BETTER INFORMED ABOUT COMMUNITY POLICING.	MEDIA
TRIGGERED NEW IDEAS FOR DIRECTION OF OUR EFFORTS.	POLICE CAPTAIN
HOW IT CAN BE DONE.	MAYOR
HEARING WHAT OTHER COMMUNITIES DOING.	POLICE CAPTAIN

AN UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICE & THE CURRENT PHILOSOPHY COVERING CURRENT POLICE PRACTICES 1. RANDOM PATROL 2. RAPID RESPONSE 3. REACTIVE INVESTIGATIVE.

INSIGHT INTO CITY ADMINISTRATORS.

THE REALIZATION THAT THE SAN JACINTO VALLEY, AS A WHILE, HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTING COPS, PRIOR TO THE WORKSHOP. IT REINFORCED THE POSITIVE APPROACH OUR COMMUNITY IS ALREADY TAKING.

UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS AND FOCUSING IN ON FUTURE DECISIONS THAT WILL NEED TO BE MADE.

OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ABOUT IDEAS & PROGRAMS, HAVE QUALITY TIME WITH CITY REPRESENTATIVES.

THE IDEA THAT WE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN OUR COMMUNITY.

I GAINED A KEEN APPRECIATION FOR THOSE COMMONALITIES BETWEEN VARIOUS SIZES OF JURISDICTIONS. I ALSO LEARNED THAT CURRENTLY THERE EXISTS NO COMMON DEFINITION OF COPS OR A MODEL OF A SINGULARLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM.

AN APPRECIATION FOR THE ISSUES FACED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

MEETING PEOPLE COMMITTED TO COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING. SEEING TRADITIONAL POLICING FROM A NEW PERS.

OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AND DISCUSS ISSUES WITH OTHER COMMUNITY LEADERS.

IT PROVIDED ME WITH A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON COP, BOTH THROUGH THE MATERIAL COVERED AND THE DIVERSE PARTICIPATION BY A VARIETY OF CITY ENTITIES, AS WELL AS CITIZEN INPUT.

NETWORKING.

INFORMATION.

THAT OUR CITY IS AHEAD ON MOVING TOWARD COMMUNITY BASED PUBLIC SAFETY.

REFERENCE/IDEA SOURCES FROM ACROSS THE NATION FOR IDEAS, ADVICE.

OUR CITY MGR'S VIEWS, AL SWEENEY!!!!

UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY AND NEED TO EMPOWER NEIGHBORHOODS. IDEAS FOR AN ACTION PLAN TO USE IN MY CITY. GREAT DISCUSSION ON THE MEDIA.

THE TWO DAY INTERACTION W/MY CITY MANAGER AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE-ALSO MET SOME DEDICATED FOLKS.

NETWORKING.

AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERACT WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF OUR CITY GOVERNMENT.

OBSERVED THAT OUR CITY'S TRANSITION TO COPS IS ON-LINE & APPROPRIATE.

VALUABLE IDEAS-NOW KNOW WE ARE NOT ALONE IN OUR CONCERNS & FRUSTRATIONS.

AFFIRMATION THAT WE'RE ON THE RIGHT TRACK WITH C.O.P.P.S.

GOOD NETWORKING.

IDEAS USED BY OTHER AGENCIES."

CITY MANAGER

POLICE LIEUTENANT

GEN MGR RECREATION & PARK

POLICE COMMANDER

PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATOR

MAYOR

CITY MANAGER

PRINCIPAL, HIGH SCHOOL

CULTURAL AWARENESS CONSULTANT

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE LIEUTENANT

POLICE CAPTAIN

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

FIRE CHIEF

POLICE SERGEANT

POLICE PSYCHOLOGIST

CITY MANAGER

DEPUTY CITY MANAGER

DEPT. COMMUNITY SERVICES

YOUTH ED. & COMM. SERVICES

CHIEF OF POLICE

CHIEF OF POLICE

DIR. NEIGH. & ORGAN. DEVEL

SAFETY & NEIGH. SVCS. MGR.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 43; n = 24

	TITLE
"NONE.	CHAIR, PUBLIC SAFETY COMM.
WORKING W/DIVERSE COMMUNITIES-SPECIFIC POINTS ON ISSUES W/GROUPS EG. ETHNIC MINORITIES/AGED COMMUNITIES, ETC.	DEPUTY CITY MANAGER
METHODS TO EDUCATE AND INVOLVE POLICE MANAGEMENT STAFF.	CHIEF OF POLICE
WORKSHOP WAS A LITTLE TOO ELEMENTARY 1ST DAY-MORE SUBSTANCE-EVEN FROM HANDBOOK WOULD'VE BEEN HELPFUL.	DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
MORE ADVANCED LOOK AT COPS IMPLEMENTATION.	CITY MANAGER
MORE CASE STUDIES-WHAT WORKED & WHAT DIDN'T.	POLICE CAPTAIN
SUGGEST MORE IN AREAS OF NEW COP PROGRAMS-THOSE COVERED ARE ALL 10-15 YEARS OLD.	POLICE CAPTAIN
AN EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF THE COSTS TO IMPLEMENT AND HOW TO IMPLEMENT.	CITY MANAGER
THE ACTUAL PROCESS OF INVOLVING MID MGT IN COPS.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
MORE INFO ON OTHER PROGRAMS & SUCCESSES-EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFULLY INTEGRATING COM POL THROUGHOUT ALL LEVELS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT.	PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATOR
MORE CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSES AND FAILURES AND WHYS!	CITY MANAGER
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COMMUNITY WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF VALUE, ISSUE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES.	CULTURAL AWARENESS CONSULTANT
MORE COMMUNITY INTEREST ITEMS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
I ENJOYED THE MEDIA PORTION OF THE SESSION AND FEEL THAT SINCE PERCEPTION IS SO IMPORTANT THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONTINUING THIS PORTION. ALSO, ADDRESS/SOLICIT WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE POLICE, ETC.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT-EXAMPLES OF SUCCESS FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES LIKE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE OR SALES, OR TRAVEL INDUSTRY.	POLICE CAPTAIN
SCHOOLING.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
MORE FIRE SERVICE INPUT.	FIRE CHIEF
NEW NAME FOR COPS, HOW CITY LEADER WILL DEAL W/EMPOWERMENT OF LOCAL OFFICERS.	POLICE PSYCHOLOGIST
MORE MODELS OF COPS SUCCESS STORIES-HOW TO PUT IT TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY & EFFICIENTLY.	DEPUTY CITY MANAGER
NONE.	DEPT. COMMUNITY SVCS
PERHAPS A CLOSE LOOK AT A JURISDICTION THAT HAS A SUCCESSFUL PLAN. (IN PRACTICE)	YOUTH ED. & COMMUNITY SERVICES
DEALING WITH IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES-ACROSS DEPARTMENTS/ENGAGING CITIZENS/SUSTAINING COMMUNITY BASED EFFORTS.	DIR. NEIGH & ORGAN. DEVEL

NONE.

SAFETY & NEIGH. SVCS. MGR.

MORE DIRECTION OF THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS."

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 43; N = 31

"CULTURAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED, COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS WITH FOREIGN LANGUAGE SPEAKING CITIZENS.

TITLE

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

A BIT MORE SMALL GROUP DISCUSSION NOT JUST ISSUE IDENTIFICATION IN SMALL GROUPS. ALSO YOU SHOULD BALANCE THE SMALL GROUPS- NOT SIGN UP METHOD.

CHAIR, PUBLIC SAFETY COMM.

MAKE REFERENCE TO THE ARTICLES IN THE SOURCE BOOK.

CHIEF OF POLICE

SINCE SUCH AN EMPHASIS WAS PUT ON HAVING CITY TEAMS ATTEND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE TIME SPENT TOGETHER TO WORK ON INDIVIDUAL CITY ISSUES USING THE RESOURCES/IDEAS PRESENTED AT THE WORKSHOP.

ASST CITY MANAGER

HAVE COMMUNITIES OF SIMILAR SIZE WHERE ISSUES ARE MORE CONSISTENT. TOO MUCH TALKING ON 1ST DAY-MORE SPECIFICS WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL-2ND DAY WAS BETTER & MORE PRODUCTIVE.

DIR. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

BALANCE THE PRESENTATION WITH A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTRAINTS ADOPTION PLACES ON RAPID RESPONSE. OVERALL CURRICULUM SUGGESTS THERE IS A FREE LUNCH TO BE HAD.

CHIEF OF POLICE

SEND A PRE-SURVEY TO DETERMINE LEVEL OF ORG W/COPS IMPLEMENTATION AND THEN GROUP CITIES ACCORDING TO THEIR 'LEVEL' &/OR HAVE A WORKSHOP FOR CITIES WHO ARE BEYOND THE QUESTION OF 'WHAT IS COPS?' AND 'DO I WANT TO GET INTO THIS.'

CITY MANAGER

TIGHTEN UP SOME OF THE SMALL GROUP WORK.

MEDIA

MORE QUESTION/ANSWER SESSIONS ON HOT TOPICS AMONGST TRAINING GROUP. (NOT NECESSARILY DIRECTED TO TRAINERS).

POLICE CAPTAIN

VERY GOOD WORKSHOP FOR JURISDICTIONS NOT DOING ANY/MUCH COP PROGRAMS. VERY BASIC FOR THOSE THAT HAVE SUCH PROGRAMS. DURING THE SESSION WHEN ALL THE POLICE CHIEFS BROKE-OUT, THE COMMON COMMENT WAS THAT HAD WE KNOWN HOW BASIC THIS WAS GOING TO BE, WE WOULD NOT HAVE GONE OR RECOMMEND ATTENDANCE BY CITY OFFICIALS & COMMUNITY LEADERS.

POLICE CAPTAIN

BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON TEAMS-NEED MORE RANK AND FILE POLICE INVOLVEMENT.

CITY MANAGER

THE PRESENTATION WAS WELL ORGANIZED AND PROFESSIONALLY ORCHESTRATED. I COMPLIMENT YOU FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

GEN MGR RECREATION & PARK

PHONE CONFERENCING AND SOME OF THE IMPORTANT INFORMATION WAS LOST AFTER THE 1ST FEW MINUTES. MIGHT WANT TO TRY VIDEO CONFERENCING-IT WOULD ALLOW THE PARTICIPANTS TO VIEW THE INDIVIDUALS.

POLICE COMMANDER

WHILE PLEASANT, THERE WAS A LOT OF COMMENTS NOT MOVING US AHEAD IN THE TOPIC, WOULD HAVE LIKED MORE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS-TOO MUCH DEMONSTRATION BY FACILITATORS (THIS IS NOT CRITICAL OF THEIR INPUT).

PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATOR

MORE CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSES AND FAILURES AND WHYS!

CITY MANAGER

HAVE SEPARATE PROGRAMS FOR LARGE CITIES & SMALL TOWNS. THEY HAVE DIFFERENT PROBLEMS & RESOURCES. MORE EMPHASIS ON NON-POLICE PROGRAMS & ACTIVITIES.

CULTURAL AWARENESS CONSULTANT

PROVIDE MORE INTERACTION WITH AND BETWEEN ATTENDING CITIES.

ADD MORE ACTUAL CASE STUDY EXAMPLES OF CRIME/QUALITY OF LIFE PROBLEMS IN WHICH A COOPERATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH WAS SUCCESSFUL.

MORE HANDS ON PLANNING SESSIONS.

MIX SOME NEWER LINE LEVEL POLICE OFFICERS IN WITH SR. MANAGERS, CHIEFS, CITIZENS, ETC., SO THE PHILOSOPHY WILL RUB OFF ONTO TOMORROWS YOUNG FUTURE LEADERS IN A VERY DIRECT WAY THROUGH PERSONAL ASSOCIATION. BRINGING OUR YOUNG SERGEANT TO THIS THING WAS A MASTER STROKE. HE IS 'ON LINE' AND READY TO GET TO WORK!!!

YOUTH PROGRAMS.

PROVIDE A SIMILAR PROGRAM THAT INVOLVES LINE OFFICERS, LINE PUBLIC WORKS WORKERS, LINE CITY HALL EMPLOYEES, ETC.

SMALL GROUP BREAKOUTS NEED TO BE MORE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED.

BETTER FACILITIES. SOUND NOT VERY GOOD AND TOO COLD.

MORE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF HOW TO ENHANCE THE COMMUNITY EFFORT.

GREAT.

GREAT PROGRAM!

LET THE DISCUSSION GROUP CONTINUE.

THE RANGE OF ACCEPTANCE/DEVELOPMENT WAS TOO LARGE. I SUGGEST A "SELF ANALYSIS" TOOL BE USED FOR CITIES WANTING TO PARTICIPATE & THAT CITIES OF SIMILAR SIZE AND LEVELS OF IMPLEMENTATION BE GROUPED. NETWORKING WOULD BE ENHANCED IN THIS MANNER & THOSE WITH COMMON IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES COULD FOCUS ON STRATEGIES & CONCERNS RATHER THAN HEARING GENERAL BACKGROUND ON COMMUNITY POLICING. ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED THE WORK OF MR. SWEENEY.

IT WAS GREAT.

CONTINUALLY SOPHISTICATE & UPDATE COP, SOME OF US HAVE HAD THE PROGRAM IN FORCE."

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 43; n = 15

"AL SWEENEY WAS A VERY EFFECTIVE PRESENTER.

THE TWO TRAINERS WERE EXCELLENT! THEY DID WHAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO DO. ANY NEGATIVE COMMENTS I'VE MADE HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THEIR SKILLS. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT OUR LEVEL & NEED DID NOT FIT THE WORKSHOP.

SEMINAR, ALTHOUGH BASIC, PROVIDED SOME GOOD THOUGHT-PROVOKING OPPORTUNITIES. EXCELLENT INSTRUCTORS.

AL SWEENEY WAS AN EXCELLENT INSTRUCTOR.

GREAT WORKSHOP. ONE OF THE BEST. MORE POLICE LEADERS NEED TO BE EXPOSED TO THIS MATERIAL.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE LIEUTENANT

POLICE CAPTAIN

POLICE CAPTAIN

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE SERGEANT

POLICE PSYCHOLOGIST

CITY MANAGER

DEPUTY CITY MANAGER

DEPT. COMM. SERVICES

YOUTH ED. & COM. SERVICES

CHIEF OF POLICE

DIR OF NEIGH. & ORGAN. DEVEL.

SAFETY & NEIGH. SVCS. MGR.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

TITLE

ASST CITY MANAGER

CITY MANAGER

POLICE CAPTAIN

CHIEF OF POLICE

POLICE LIEUTENANT

THE WORKSHOP WAS PRESENTED IN A VERY PROFESSIONAL MANNER AND WAS WELL RECEIVED. THE SAN JACINTO VALLEY PUBLIC AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY IMPLEMENTED MANY OF THE TOPICS DISCUSSED. THE WORKSHOP REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT WHAT WE ARE ALREADY DOING CAN BE IMPROVED AND COMPLEMENTED BY COPS.

WE WILL PUT TOGETHER A WORKSHOP IN OUR COMMUNITY.

I FELT THE FIRST AFTERNOON WORKSHOPS WERE NOT USEFUL. I FELT THE LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION OF THE GROUP WARRANTED A MORE CHALLENGING FORMAT.

NEED TO DISCUSS VIDEO FIRST MORNING. GET MORE INVOLVEMENT OF EVERYONE IN DISCUSSION. COVER FEWER TOPICS IN GREATER DEPTH (OR PERHAPS HAVE A THIRD DAY, HAI HAI) GOOD FOOD, BUT LUNCH TOO HEAVY FOR EFFECTIVE AFTERNOON FUNCTIONING.

GOOD MEETING ROOM, AMENITIES, FOOD, ETC. WELL SPOKEN, CONFIDENT SPEAKERS AND WELL ORGANIZED. OBVIOUS BELIEVERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY WHO ARE REALISTIC IN WHAT WE FACE.

VERY GOOD. EXCELLENT TRAINERS AND STUDENTS.

SPEAKERS GREAT.

ESPECIALLY APPRECIATED THE WORK OF MR. SWEENEY.

SPEAKERS WERE EXCELLENT-GREAT WORK.

EXCELLENT PRESENTATION & ORGANIZATION."

GEN MGR RECREATION & PARK

MAYOR

CITY MANAGER

CULTURAL AWARENESS CONSULTANT

POLICE SERGEANT

CITY MANAGER

DEPT. COMMUNITY SVCS

DIR. NEIGH. & ORGAN. DEVEL.

SAFETY & NEIGH. SVCS.

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

6. CLOVIS, CALIFORNIA
December 8-9, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 32
Evaluations Completed (E) = 32
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.2

The sixth workshop was hosted by City Manager Kathy Millison of Clovis, California, but was physically located in Fresno, California, an adjacent community. In attendance were thirty-two (32) participants; three (3) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff.

Of the thirty-two (32) participants, six (6) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Clovis, Corcoran, Merced, Morgan Hill, Salinas, and Thousand Oaks, California. The composition of Salinas' team did not need to meet the mandatory attendance of the local government and law enforcement CEO's and community representative as this was a fourth team to attend the workshops. The first required team participated in Santa Anna, California in 1991; a second team in Springfield, Ohio, 1991; and on-site technical assistance in 1992.

The primary trainers were Christine O'Connor and Peter Ronstadt. This being their first training session, senior trainer Judith Mohr Keane served as

a resource to the new team. Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introductory and opening remarks were provided by ICMA's project manager, Roberta Lesh, host City Manager Kathy Millison.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop with the exception of hotel logistic problems on preparation day. All arrangements had been confirmed with an employee that was fired one week before the workshop was due to begin which again cause tremendous complications. This was resolved in a timely fashion with no discomfort to the participants.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals. However, it became clear during the participants' opening remarks that all jurisdictions were well advanced on the continuum of community policing understanding and implementation. The trainers were quickly able to modify the curriculum in order to satisfy the needs of the attendees.

The conference call participants were City Manager Lloyd V. Harrell, Jr. of Denton, Texas and Chief of Police Edward A. Flynn of Chelsea, Massachusetts.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining sites.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Clovis, California training workshop will follow.

CLOVIS, CALIFORNIA
December 8-9, 1994

Participants by Position N = 32
Six (6) Jurisdictions
Evaluations Completed E = 32

Local Gov't CEO = 6	Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 8
Law Enforcement CEO = 5	Public Safety Personnel = 2
Community Representative = 7	Elected Official = 3
	Other = 1

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	<u>(% Responding)</u>					
Clarity	43.3	33.3	23.3	-	-	4.2
Informative	40.0	36.7	23.3	-	-	4.2
Relevancy	50.0	30.0	16.7	3.3	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	36.7	36.7	26.7	-	-	4.1

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	33.3	60.0	6.7	-	-	4.3
Informative	43.3	43.3	6.7	6.7	-	4.2
Relevancy	46.7	36.7	13.3	3.3	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	43.3	40.0	16.7	-	-	4.3

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	40.0	36.7	16.7	6.7	-	4.1
Informative	33.3	40.0	20.0	6.7	-	4.0
Relevancy	40.0	26.7	26.7	6.7	-	4.0
Presenter's Delivery	40.0	33.3	20.0	6.7	-	4.1

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	26.7	53.3	20.0	-	-	4.1
Informative	40.0	40.0	16.7	3.3	-	4.2
Relevancy	40.0	40.0	16.7	3.3	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	46.7	33.3	20.0	-	-	4.3

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	36.7	40.0	23.3	-	-	4.1
Informative	30.0	46.7	23.3	-	-	4.1
Relevancy	30.0	46.7	23.3	-	-	4.1
Presenter's Delivery	36.7	40.0	23.3	-	-	4.1

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	29.6	48.1	18.5	3.7	-	4.0
Informative	33.3	37.0	25.9	3.7	-	4.0
Relevancy	37.0	33.3	25.9	3.7	-	4.0
Presenter's Delivery	44.4	29.6	25.9	-	-	4.2

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	65.5	24.1	10.3	-	-	4.6
Informative	62.1	24.1	10.3	-	3.4	4.4
Relevancy	58.6	20.7	10.3	6.9	3.4	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	69.0	27.6	3.4	-	-	4.7

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	33.3	60.0	6.7	-	-	4.3
Informative	46.7	46.7	6.7	-	-	4.4
Relevancy	56.7	36.7	6.7	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	53.3	36.7	10.0	-	-	4.4

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.2

CLOVIS, CALIFORNIA
December 8-9, 1994

Number of Participants (N) = 32
Evaluations Completed (E) = 32
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 32 ; n = 30

	<u>TITLE</u>
"TEAM BUILDING.	CITY MANAGER
WHAT'S GOING ON IN MY COMMUNITY AND THE WILL FOR OUR LEADERS TO WORK WITHIN OUR COMMUNITY.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE NEED I HAVE TO HELP ACHIEVE COPPS; AND, ENHANCED UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS' PERSPECTIVES.	CITY MANAGER
INFO APPLIES TO MY DEPARTMENT & CITY AS A WHOLE.	DIR. RECREATION & PARKS
SPECIFIC WAYS TO IMPLEMENT IN A CITY IE. PROMOTE INTER-DISCIPLINARY FUNCTIONS WITHIN A COMMUNITY.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
I GAINED AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING CONCEPT AND THE IDEA THAT EACH COMMUNITY HAS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN PROGRAM TAILORED TO THEIR NEEDS.	CITY MANAGER
IDEAS, STRATEGIES, BROKE DOWN THE ISOLATION (WE AREN'T ALONE!), INCREASED SELF ESTEEM (WE ARE DOING SOME STUFF RIGHT!).	DIR. REDEVELOP. SVCS
INFORMATION ON HOW OTHER DEPT. USE THE C.O.P.	POLICE SERGEANT
INFORMATION AND IDEAS TO IMPLEMENT IN OUR COMMUNITY.	DEPT. COMM. DEVELOP.
GROUP NETWORKING & KNOWLEDGE FROM INSTRUCTORS, PETE & KATHY.	CHIEF OF POLICE
NETWORK OPPORTUNITY - ACCESS OTHER COMMUNITIES.	COUNCILMAN
OPPORTUNITY TO GET OTHER AGENCY INPUT AND BIG OPPORTUNITY TO GET MY CITY MGR & COUNCILMEMBER ON BOARD!!!	CHIEF OF POLICE

PERSPECTIVE ON WHERE ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARE ON COP.
 THAT POLICE & JURISDICTIONS REALIZE A NEED TO UPDATE THEIR TRADITIONAL WAYS OF POLICING BY INVOLVING THE COMMUNITY.
 NETWORK OF OTHER AGENCIES (IMPLEMENTATION)-BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF 'COPS.'
 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.
 CONFIRMATION OF DIRECTION - SHARED IDEAS & CONTACTS.
 CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THEORY & DEVELOPMENT OF COP.
 NEW IDEAS.
 WORKING RELATIONSHIP W/OTHER MEMBERS OF MY COMMUNITY.
 COMMUNICATION WITH OTHER CITY PERSONNEL.
 NETWORKING & DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL TEAM.
 NEED TO GO BACK & GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF INTERACTING-SERVICES & APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS ACROSS DEPT. LINES - ALSO STRESS THE MINDSET ASPECT NOT PROGRAM ORIENTATION.
 PERSPECTIVE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS EXPERIENCE W/COPS.
 WIDEN PERCEPTION OF COMMON PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES.
 WORKING W/MORGAN HILL GROUP MORE CLOSELY THAN BEFORE.
 UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING.
 UNDERSTANDING OF THE VARIOUS AGENCY'S JURISDICTIONS & RESPONSIBILITIES.
 A SENSE OF THE NEED FOR PARTNERSHIP NOW.
 AN UNDERSTANDING THAT COP IS A PHILOSOPHY NOT A PROGRAM; INFORMATIVE REFERENCES, MOTIVATION."

CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CITY MANAGER
 BUILDING OFFICIAL
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 POLICE CAPTAIN
 CITY MANAGER
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 MAYOR
 EDUCATOR
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 COUNCIL MEMBER

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 32; n = 18

"INTEGRATION WITHIN CITY DEPTS.
 YOUTH VIOLENCE ASSISTANCE-WHAT REALLY DOES WORK IN PREVENTION & ENFORCEMENT.
 PROGRAM EXAMPLES.
 HOW TO GET OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY INVOLVED.
 ORGANIZING NEIGHBORHOODS.
 TRAINING GIVEN TO STAFF (FEW AGENCIES HAVE DONE IT I GUESS - WE'LL PROVIDE SOME IN NEAR FUTURE).
 PREPARATION OF POLICE ORGANIZATION FOR CHANGE, HOW TO DO IT, HOW IMPORTANT IT IS.
 NONE.

TITLE
 DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 DIR. REDEVELOP. SVCS
 POLICE SERGEANT
 COUNCILMAN
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

MORE TIME TO LEARN FROM EACH OTHER.
 HOW CAN LARGE CITIES IMPLEMENT COP. AFFECTS ON NEIGHBORING CITIES.
 MORE INFORMATION ON CODE ENFORCEMENT.
 CAN'T THINK OF ANY.
 HOW/STRATEGIES TO INTEGRATE SERVICES.
 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS.
 WAYS TO MEASURE SUCCESS.
 IT WAS VERY COMPLETE.
 AS A SCHOOL (EDUCATION) REPRESENTATIVE - SOME REFERENCES TO STRATEGIES INVOLVING SCHOOLS & SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
 SUCCESS/FAILURE OF OTHER GROUPS-LEARNED THIS IS BEING COMPILED AND WILL BE AVAILABLE."

CHIEF OF POLICE
 CITY MANAGER
 BUILDING OFFICIAL
 CITY MANAGER
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 MAYOR
 EDUCATOR
 COUNCIL MEMBER

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 32; N = 23

"GET MORE OF THE READING MATERIALS OUT TO THE PARTICIPANTS EARLIER (SO THEY COULD READ THEM PRIOR TO WORKSHOP).
 I DON'T THINK IT IS 100% CLEAR THIS ISN'T 'FADDISH' UNLESS GROUNDED IN OVERALL COMMUNITY GAME PLAN.
 IT SEEMED LIKE THE MIDDLE PART OF THE WORKSHOP SEEMED TO DRAG.
 LET ME THINK ON THIS - ENJOYED BOTH DAYS VERY MUCH!
 NEED A LONGER PROGRAM - 24-36 HRS.
 REDUCE TIME FOR INITIAL INTRODUCTIONS-IT WAS WAY TOO LONG.
 PROBABLY INVITE A WIDER GROUP OF FOLKS-I.E. CITIZENRY, PROBATION, D.A. & JUDGES, INCLUDING SCHOOL.
 TALK ON BALANCE BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND SYSTEM - CONCEPTS ON HOW TO CHANGE.
 TAKE A MORE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE OF TOTAL PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTATION.
 MORE EXAMPLES OF DRAMATIC CHANGES FROM CITIES THAT HAVE USED THE CONCEPT AND HAVE HAD GOOD RESULTS.
 LESS TIME ON INTRODUCTIONS (TOO LONG) - MORE CONSENSUS BUILDING TECHNIQUES.
 MAINTAIN ON CURRENT COURSE.
 CAN'T THINK OF ANY NOW-WILL LET YOU KNOW LATER.
 MORE EXAMPLES OF POLICING MODELS, MORE INITIAL IN-DEPTH PROCESSING OF WHAT COPP IS.
 REDUCE INTRODUCTIONS.

TITLE

 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CITY MANAGER
 DIR. REDEVELOP. SVCS
 POLICE SERGEANT
 DEPT. COMMUNITY DEVELOP.
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COUNCILMAN
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 POLICE CAPTAIN

EVALUATE KNOWLEDGE/SKILL LEVELS OF PARTICIPANTS BEFORE WORKSHOP.
 EMPHASIS ON NEED TO INTEGRATE SVCS WITH ATTENTION PAID TO SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS OUTSIDE CITY HALL.
 MORE A/V SUPPORT.
 INCLUDE IN YOUR PRESENTATION OR AS A PRESENTER A COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE.
 IT WAS AN EXCELLENT JOB.
 GREAT PRESENTATIONS-GOOD GROUP INTERACTIONS TO MEET OTHER CITY REPRESENTATIVES. I DON'T HAVE ANY MEANINGFUL IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT.
 FOLLOW UP TRAINING AT INTERVALS, WITH OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH PEERS.
 GREAT JOB! THANK YOU!"

CITY MANAGER
 ASST CITY MANAGER
 DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 MAYOR
 EDUCATOR
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 COUNCIL MEMBER

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 32; n = 6

"OUTSTANDING EFFORT!!
 IN ORDER FOR THIS PHILOSOPHY TO BE 100% SUCCESSFUL, THERE MUST BE A 100% BUY-IN FROM EVERYONE.
 PETER R. NEEDS TO SPEND MORE TIME AS THE MAIN FACILITATOR.
 KEEP TRYING TO INVOLVE COMMUNITIES IN POLICING & GOVERNING. REMEMBER THIS COUNTRY BELONGS TO THE PEOPLE.
 GREAT PRESENTERS-USED MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN MEETING OUR NEEDS."
 NICE JOB!

TITLE

 CITY MANAGER
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 EDUCATOR

7. ATHENS, GEORGIA
January 9-10, 1995

Number of Participants (N) = 33
Evaluations Completed (E) = 30
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.5

The seventh workshop was hosted by City Manager Peggy Merris of Athens, Georgia and also President of the Georgia City/County Management Association. In attendance were thirty-three (33) participants; one (1) guests; two (2) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff. The guest was Detective Monty D. Mohr of the Athens-Clarke County Police Department.

Of the thirty-three (33) participants, six (6) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Athens-Clarke County, Decatur, Griffin, McDonough, Rome, and Union City, Georgia.

Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers, Judith Mohr Keane and Albert J. Sweeney, met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Due to a personal emergency, ICMA's project manager was not in attendance and was substituted by ICMA's Community Development Director, Beth Miller. Introductory and opening remarks were provided by Ms. Miller and host City Manager Peggy Merriss.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop. Unlike some of the other training sites the logistics ran very smoothly. The workshop was held at the Georgia Center for Continuing Education at the University of Georgia, Athens.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager David Mora of Salinas, California, and Chief of Police Roger Evans of Springfield, Ohio.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session. Changes and fine-tuning suggestions were adopted for the remaining site.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Athens, Georgia training workshop will follow.

ATHENS, GEORGIA
January 9-10, 1995

Participants by Position N = 33

Six (6) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 30

Local Gov't CEO = 4

Law Enforcement CEO = 5

Community Representative = 4

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 7

Public Safety Personnel = 6

Elected Official = 2

Other = 2

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					
Clarity	51.7	48.3	-	-	-	4.5
Informative	57.1	39.3	3.6	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	57.1	39.3	3.6	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	75.0	25.0	-	-	-	4.8

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	62.1	24.1	13.8	-	-	4.5
Informative	60.7	35.7	3.6	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	64.3	28.6	7.1	-	-	4.6
Presenter's Delivery	82.1	14.3	3.6	-	-	4.8

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	48.3	51.7	-	-	-	4.5
Informative	60.7	35.7	3.6	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	53.6	42.9	3.6	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	64.3	35.7	-	-	-	4.6

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	41.4	55.2	3.4	-	-	4.2
Informative	42.9	46.4	10.7	-	-	4.3
Relevancy	39.3	53.6	7.1	-	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	59.3	37.0	3.7	-	-	4.6

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	40.7	44.4	14.8	-	-	4.3
Informative	50.0	38.5	11.5	-	-	4.4
Relevancy	42.3	50.0	7.7	-	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	57.7	34.6	7.7	-	-	4.5

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	23.8	42.9	23.8	9.5	-	3.8
Informative	31.6	36.8	26.3	5.3	-	3.9
Relevancy	26.3	42.1	26.3	5.3	-	3.9
Presenter's Delivery	35.0	40.0	20.0	5.0	-	4.1

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	56.7	33.3	10.0	-	-	4.5
Informative	44.8	41.4	13.8	-	-	4.3
Relevancy	48.3	34.5	17.2	-	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	51.7	37.9	10.3	-	-	4.4

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	62.1	34.5	3.4	-	-	4.6
Informative	57.1	39.3	3.6	-	-	4.5
Relevancy	71.4	25.0	3.6	-	-	4.7
Presenter's Delivery	63.0	33.3	3.7	-	-	4.6

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.5

ATHENS, GEORGIA
January 9-10, 1995

Number of Participants (N) = 33
Evaluations Completed (E) = 30
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 30 ; n = 28

	<u>TITLE</u>
"I FOUND A BETTER WAY OF POLICING AND DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC.	POLICE OFFICER
CHANGE IN THINKING & PHILOSOPHY.	CITY MANAGER
IDEAS, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES.	DIR. PUBLIC SAFETY
A REALIZATION THAT COP IS NOT THE RIGHT NAME: IT SHOULD BE COMMUNITY ORIENTED GOVERNMENT SERVICES <u>COGS</u> .	DIR. PARKS & RECREATION
ADDITIONAL IDEAS ON WAYS TO EXPAND C.O.P.	CHIEF OF POLICE
INTERACTION WITH OTHER TEAM MEMBERS.	CHIEF OF POLICE
CROSS SECTION OF VIEWS, GOOD FEEDBACK AND OPINIONS, BROADENED PERSPECTIVE, GAINED RELEVANT INFORMATION.	CITY MANAGER
NEW INSIGHTS & IDEAS.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
SOME SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES, PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF PROBLEM-SOLVING.	POLICE CHIEF
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE COPS PHILOSOPHY, INCLUDING UNDERSTANDING THE SIMILARITIES WITH TQM PRINCIPLES.	CITY ADMINISTRATOR
HOW TO BETTER APPROACH & PRIORITIZE ACTIVITIES AS IT RELATES TO MY POSITION.	PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION
C.O.P. IS A PHILOSOPHY AND NOT A PROGRAM.	DIR. HOUSING AUTHORITY
I WAS ABLE TO COMPARE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM OTHER SEMINARS, ENABLING ME TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PHILOSOPHY.	POLICE COMMANDER

A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF COP.
 COP IS A PHILOSOPHY, NOT A PROGRAM.
 C.O.P. & ETC GREAT INFORMATION.
 A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY POLICING.
 A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF POLICING.
 A RANKING POLICE OFFICER'S PRESENTATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF COPS.
 TIME TO REFLECT ON WHERE WE HAVE BEEN-DISCUSS WHERE WE CAN GO, NEW IDEAS.
 INVOLVE ALL OF CITY GOVT.
 INTERACTION WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS, EXCHANGE OF IDEAS.
 POSITIVE COMMUNITY RELATIONS ESTABLISHED WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
 KNOWLEDGE-NEED FOR COP.
 A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF POLICE, AND THEIR JOBS.
 IDEAS AND THOUGHTS FROM THOSE IN ATTENDANCE.
 MORE UNDERSTANDING OF NEED TO CHANGE & POSSIBLE RESULTS.
 THAT IT TAKES A TEAM EFFORT TO SOLVE MANY PROBLEMS FACING A COMMUNITY."

MAYOR
 POLICE MAJOR
 OFFICER, CODE ENFORCEMENT
 BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE
 COMMISSIONER
 POLICE COMMANDER
 CITY MANAGER
 DEPT. OF POLICE & FIRE
 POLICE LIEUTENANT
 HOUSING AUTHORITY
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CLERGY
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 DEPT. OF RECREATION

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 30; n = 11

"EVERYTHING WAS OKAY (COVERED).
 SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES WHERE PROGRAM IS SUCCESSFUL.
 HOW OTHER DEPARTMENTS FIT INTO THE PROBLEM SOLVING.
 TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT.
 WHAT TYPE AREA SHOULD ONE TARGET FIRST?
 CAN NOT THINK OF ANY AS OF NOW.
 NONE NOTED.
 TEENAGE CRIMES.
 ELECTED OFFICIAL SPEAKING TO WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT.
 MORE ON CHANGING OF ATTITUDES (POLICE OFFICERS) REGARDING COP.
 HANDS ON APPROACH WITH YOUTH AND TEENS, HOW DO WE GET THEM INVOLVED."

TITLE

 POLICE OFFICER
 CITY MANAGER
 DIR. OF PARKS AND RECREATION
 CITY ADMINISTRATOR
 POLICE MAJOR
 OFFICER, CODE ENFORCEMENT
 BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE
 COMMISSIONER
 CITY MANAGER
 POLICE LIEUTENANT
 DEPT. OF RECREATION

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 30 ; n = 22

"MAKE IT A LITTLE LONGER.
 HAVE A PRESENTER OF A SUCCESSFUL SMALL CITY.
 EXCELLENT AS IS.
 CHANGE THE NAME-EXPAND OUT TO ALL GOV'T SERVICES.
 KEEP ON WITH WHAT YOU ARE DOING.
 INSIST ON THE TOTAL TEAM (2 ELECTED, CM, PC & CITIZEN) TO PARTICIPATE.
 HAVE MORE ELECTED OFFICIALS!
 MORE TIME ON IMPLEMENTATION/OTHERS EXPERIENCES, ETC. LESS ON 'WHAT IS COMMUNITY.'
 VERY SATISFIED WITH WORKSHOP.
 EVERYTHING WAS WELL PLANNED & TRANSMITTED.
 ADDITIONAL DAYS ALLOTTED, BE MORE DEMANDING RELATIVE TO THE GROUP MAKE-UP I.E. MAKE SURE THAT THE PROPER PEOPLE ARE INCLUDED.
 HAVE AVAILABLE IN-SERVICE LESSON PLANS THAT WE COULD TAKE BACK TO OUR COMMUNITY AND USE.
 MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR CY MY, MAYORS ETC.
 MORE TIME, MORE PEOPLE INVOLVED.
 INVITE MORE GROUPS.
 SLOW DOWN, POSSIBLY ALLOW 3 DAYS, EXTEND GROUP ACTIVITIES, INVOLVE MORE SPEAKERS.
 EXPAND-INCLUDE MORE COMMUNITY PEOPLE.
 SO NEW TO ME THAT I CANNOT COME UP WITH ANYTHING.
 BECOME MORE INVOLVED.
 EDUCATE THE POLICE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY.
 MORE EXAMPLES OF WHAT HAS & HASN'T WORKED IN OTHER AREAS. SOURCEBOOK MAY COVER THIS.
 I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LIVE PRESENTATION OF C.O.P.S."

TITLE
 POLICE OFFICER
 CITY MANAGER
 DIR. OF PUBLIC SAFETY
 DIR. PARKS & RECREATION
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CITY MANAGER
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 CITY ADMINISTRATOR
 PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISSION
 POLICE COMMANDER
 POLICE MAJOR
 OFFICER, CODE ENFORCEMENT
 BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE
 COMMISSIONER
 POLICE COMMANDER
 HOUSING AUTHORITY
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 CLERGY
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 DEPT. OF RECREATION

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 30; n = 6

"I REALLY ENJOYED THE PROGRAM, THE INSTRUCTORS, AND THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
I ESPECIALLY LIKED THE GROUP MIX, MANAGERS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, ETC.

MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO MORE THAN FIVE INDIVIDUALS PER COMMUNITY.

EXCELLENT PROGRAM, VERY INFORMATIVE.

GREAT JOB FROM ALL OF YOU.

GOOD PRESENTATION!

THE TEAM TEACHING AND AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION WAS EXCELLENT!"

TITLE

DIR.OF PUBLIC SAFETY

DIR. HOUSING AUTHORITY

MAYOR

OFFICER, CODE ENFORCEMENT

POLICE COMMANDER

POLICE LIEUTENANT

8. LARGO, FLORIDA
April 24-25, 1995

Number of Participants (N) = 30
Evaluations Completed (E) = 27
OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.4

The eighth workshop was hosted by City Manager Steven Stanton of Largo, Florida, but was physically located in Clearwater, Florida, an adjacent community. In attendance were thirty (30) participants; two (2) trainers; and one (1) ICMA staff.

Of the thirty (30) participants, three (3) jurisdictions were represented as follows: Boynton Beach, Delray Beach, and Largo, Florida. The composition of Delray Beach's team did not need to meet the mandatory attendance of the city manager, police chief, and community representative as this was a second team to attend the workshops. The first required team participated in Montgomery County, Maryland, 1992.

Through analyzing evaluation comments and conversations with participants throughout the past seven workshops, it became clear that for community policing to evolve to the next level there is a need for more people from any one jurisdiction to understand and endorse the philosophy. To test this hypothesis, ICMA recommended to the host site to encourage

fewer jurisdictions to attend and more participants from each one. As a result, Boynton Beach sent seven participants, Delray Beach sent five, and Largo sent eighteen.

The trainers were Christine O'Connor and Albert J. Sweeney. Prior to day one of the training, ICMA staff and trainers met with liaison to discuss the logistics of the training and composition of the participants.

Introductory and opening remarks were provided by ICMA's project manager, Roberta Lesh, host City Manager Steven Stanton.

No major impediments were anticipated nor experienced throughout the two-day workshop.

The training curriculum was followed according to program outlines with little deviation from stated goals.

The conference call participants were City Manager David Mora of Salinas, California and Chief of Police Roger L. Evans of Springfield, Ohio.

At the conclusion of the two days the trainers, staff, and host liaison met for a debriefing session.

Certificates of satisfactory completion (See Appendix G) and thank you letters were sent to all attendees.

Evaluation results of the Largo, Florida training workshop will follow.

LARGO, FLORIDA
April 24-25, 1995

Participants by Position N = 30

Three (3) Jurisdictions

Evaluations Completed E = 27

Local Gov't CEO = 2

Law Enforcement CEO = 1

Community Representative = 2

Local Gov't Dep't Executive = 9

Public Safety Personnel = 11

Elected Official = 2

Other = 0

Assess on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) the module from the following perspectives: **Clarity** -- Was the information clearly presented? **Informative** -- Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? **Relevance** -- Is the information relevant to you, your job, and your jurisdiction? **Presenter's Delivery** -- Knowledge of subject and style. **NOTE: ALL MEANS ARE ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST TENTH.**

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					
Clarity	46.2	50.0	3.8	-	-	4.4
Informative	40.0	52.0	8.0	-	-	4.3
Relevancy	36.0	52.0	12.0	-	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	60.0	32.0	8.0	-	-	4.5

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Clarity	42.3	50.0	3.8	3.8	-	4.3
Informative	44.0	56.0	-	-	-	4.4
Relevancy	48.0	44.0	8.0	-	-	4.4
Presenter's Delivery	48.0	48.0	4.0	-	-	4.4

Module 4: What is Community?

Clarity	30.8	61.5	7.7	-	-	4.2
Informative	32.0	56.0	12.0	-	-	4.2
Relevancy	40.0	44.0	16.0	-	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	44.0	52.0	4.0	-	-	4.4

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government Issues in Implementation

Clarity	38.5	50.0	7.7	3.8	-	4.2
Informative	30.8	61.5	3.8	3.8	-	4.2
Relevancy	34.6	53.8	7.7	3.8	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	46.2	42.3	7.7	3.8	-	4.3

Module 7: COP Tool Box

Clarity	30.8	42.3	26.9	-	-	4.0
Informative	26.9	50.0	23.1	-	-	4.0
Relevancy	30.8	53.8	15.4	-	-	4.2
Presenter's Delivery	34.6	53.8	11.5	-	-	4.2

	5	4	3	2	1	Mean
	(% Responding)					

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Clarity	42.3	53.8	-	3.8	-	4.4
Informative	42.3	50.0	3.8	3.8	-	4.3
Relevancy	42.3	53.8	-	3.8	-	4.3
Presenter's Delivery	50.0	46.2	-	3.8	-	4.4

Module 9: Conference Call

Clarity	48.0	32.0	8.0	12.0	-	4.2
Informative	65.4	26.9	7.7	-	-	4.6
Relevancy	73.1	26.9	-	-	-	4.7
Presenter's Delivery	65.4	30.8	3.8	-	-	4.6

Module 10: Action Planning

Clarity	26.9	61.5	11.5	-	-	4.2
Informative	30.8	61.5	7.7	-	-	4.2
Relevancy	46.2	53.8	-	-	-	4.5
Presenter's Delivery	30.8	65.4	3.8	-	-	4.3

OVERALL RESPONSE = 4.4

LARGO, FLORIDA
April 24-25, 1995

Number of Participants (N) = 30
Evaluations Completed (E) = 27
Response = n

COMMENTS

Four open-ended measurements were used to determine participants' overall assessment of the workshop. Many participants supplied several comments to each question; others declined to comment at all. Several provided remarks which were not necessarily solicited by the intended question, but are furnished as recorded. Responses are listed according to participant's position to determine whether any hierarchical or philosophical differences could be determined. The participants are quoted as saying the following:

I. What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

E = 27; n = 27

	<u>TITLE</u>
"CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF COP PHILOSOPHY AND HOW TO GET OTHER DEPTS INVOLVED	ASST CITY MANAGER
BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF 'C.O.P.P.'	DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
THAT OTHERS ARE HAVING SIMILAR EXPERIENCES TO OURS.	DEPUTY CHIEF OF POLICE
PUTS EVERYONE TOGETHER TO THINK ABOUT TOPIC, INTERACTION.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
I GAINED AN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE RECREATION & PARKS DEPARTMENT CAN TAKE PLACE IN IMPLEMENTING THIS PROGRAM.	DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
AN UNDERSTANDING & APPRECIATION OF HOW FAR OUR DEPARTMENT AND COMMUNITY HAS COME AND A CLEARER VISION OF THE FUTURE.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
A CLEAR PERSPECTIVE OF THE PHILOSOPHY.	CHIEF OF POLICE
UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY, DEPT ROLES IN COMMUNITY POLICING INITIATIVE. ALSO WORKING WITH OTHERS FROM MY COMMUNITY STAFF.	DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
INTROSPECT - WHAT I BELIEVE ABOUT COMMUNITY POLICING.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
DIVERSE IDEAS FROM OTHER PRACTITIONERS.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
INTERACTION WITH OTHER AGENCIES AND KNOWLEDGE THAT OUR EFFORTS ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.	BLDG. CODE COMPLIANCE
BETTER INSIGHT IN COMMUNITY POLICING.	COMMISSIONER
MEASURE OUR PROGRESS WITH OTHER AGENCIES.	POLICE OFFICER

ROLE OF PUBLIC WORKS.
 A SENSE OF NEED FOR COMMUNITY POLICING.
 CLEARER IDEA OF C.P. AND WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE IN THE DEPT.
 PEOPLE REALLY CARE ABOUT PEOPLE, LOOKING FOR WAY TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE.
 UNDERSTANDING OF COP & HOW P&R FITS IN.
 INTERACTION WITH OTHERS INVOLVED IN COP.
 MORE UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED.
 A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT AND HOW C.O.P. IS. ALSO HOW WE (BOYNTON) ARE DOING EITHER CORRECTLY OR INCORRECTLY.
 A REALITY CHECK. IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO GET AWAY TO TALK ABOUT ISSUES BECAUSE IN THE MIDST OF TRANSITION THERE IS 'FOG OF WAR.'
 SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON OTHER CITY EXPERIENCES.
 THE FACT THAT COMMUNICATION ACROSS THE RANK STRUCTURE TOOK PLACE. AN INTERACTION ALSO WAS PRESENT.
 CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT OUR POLICE DEPT IS UP AGAINST AND WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO ABOUT IT.
 KNOWLEDGE OF COP PHILOSOPHY.
 BECAUSE THE CHIEF, MAYOR, AND CITY MANAGER & CIVIC LEADERS WERE PRESENT, I THINK SOMETHING WILL BE DONE. NOT JUST TALK."

DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
 DEPT. PARKS & RECREATION
 CITY MANAGER
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 DEPT. PARKS & RECREATION
 POLICE SERGEANT
 COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
 POLICE OFFICER
 POLICE CAPTAIN
 CITY MANAGER
 POLICE OFFICER
 FIRE DEPARTMENT
 MAYOR
 POLICE LIEUTENANT

II. What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

E = 27; n = 20

"OTHER SERVICES INVOLVEMENT IN 'C.O.P.P.'
 MORE ON NUTS & BOLTS APPROACHES TO PROBLEM SOLVING THAT HAVE WORKED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
 MORE DISCUSSION OF HOW PLANS ARE IMPLEMENTED.
 POLICING AND VISUALITY OF POLICE OFFICERS AT INDIVIDUAL FACILITIES.
 MARKETING INSIDE THE DEPT.
 HOW OTHER PHILOSOPHIES RELATE TO COP, I.E. NOP, POP, GOP ETC.
 IMPLEMENTATION.
 TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE SUFFICIENT.
 NONE.
 NONE.
 MORE DETAIL ON WHAT PART OF PUBLIC WORKS FUNCTIONS WOULD MOST BE NEEDED.

TITLE
 DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
 DEPUTY CHIEF OF POLICE
 POLICE LIEUTENANT
 DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
 POLICE LIEUTENANT
 CHIEF OF POLICE
 DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
 BLDG. COPE COMPLIANCE
 COMMISSIONER
 POLICE OFFICER
 DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS

HOW TO PIN-POINT SPECIFIC COMMUNITY NEEDS.	DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
SESSION ON SPECIFIC STEPS USED IN OTHER PLACES-MORE SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES.	CITY MANAGER
SPIRITUALITY, WITHOUT GOD CONSENT, NOTHING IS POSSIBLE - ALWAYS PRAY. PEOPLE PERISH FOR LACK OF VISION & KNOWLEDGE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
MORE <u>SPECIFIC</u> INSTANCES/EXAMPLES OF HOW COP HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN COMMUNITIES.	DEPT. OF PARKS & RECREATION
DO ROLE PLAYS-I FIND IT TO BE VERY SUCCESSFUL AND INTERESTING. NONE.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE POLICE OFFICER
I AM STILL CONFUSED/UNCLEAR ON WHEN YOU DECLARE VICTORY AND SUCCESS. IT IS EASY TO TALK THE TALK.	CITY MANAGER
HOW TO IMPART PHILOSOPHY UPON YOUNGER OFFICERS AS THEIR CAREER HAS YET DEVELOPED.	POLICE OFFICER
FIRE DEPT ROLE - WE CAN DEFINITELY ASSIST THEM IN COP."	FIRE DEPARTMENT

III. In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

E = 27; N = 18

	TITLE
"FOCUS SOME ADDITIONAL TIME ON PROBLEM SOLVING ANALYSIS SECTION IE COP TOOL BOX.	ASST CITY MANAGER
OTHER SERVICES INVOLVEMENT IN 'C.O.P.P.'	DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
I THINK THE PROGRAM IS RIGHT ON LINE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY POLICING PROGRAM.	DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS
MORE FREQUENT.	POLICE LIEUTENANT
LENGTHEN IT BY ONE MORE DAY.	CHIEF OF POLICE
JUST KEEP SPREADING THE NEWS!	POLICE LIEUTENANT
MORE AGENCIES INVOLVED, MAYBE AN ADDITIONAL DAY.	BLDG. CODE COMPLIANCE
IN TIME ALLOTTED 'YOU DONE GOOD.'	COMMISSIONER
VIDEO/AUDIO LINK TO OTHER C.O.P. AGENCIES.	POLICE OFFICER
HOW TO BETTER ELIMINATE THE WALLS BETWEEN DEPTS.	DEPT. PUBLIC WORKS
PRAYER 1ST BEGINNING, PRAYER AT END.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
INVOLVE/INVITE/ENCOURAGE MORE DEPTS FOR ONE SEMINAR TO INCREASE # OF IDEAS, SOLUTIONS, ETC.	DEPT. PARKS & RECREATION
MAKE THEM LONGER-TOO AMBITIOUS FOR TWO DAYS.	POLICE SERGEANT
HAVE MORE DAYS - GIVING MORE BY ALLOWING MORE TIME.	COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE
NEED TO WATCH HOW OFTEN YOU GIVE BREAKS. 1ST DAY NO MORNING BREAK UNTIL 11 AM.	POLICE OFFICER

ADDITIONAL FOCUS ON CITY DEPARTMENTS. FELT OUT OF PLACE AT NOT BEING A POLICE OFFICER.

VIDEO-PHONE AS OPPOSED TO CONFERENCE CALL. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO ACTUALLY SEE OUR PARTICIPANTS.

A LITTLE MORE DISCUSSION ON HOW TO GET THE COMMUNITY (RESIDENTS) TO BUY INTO OVERALL PHILOSOPHY."

CITY MANAGER

POLICE OFFICER

MAYOR

IV. Additional Comments.

E = 27; n = 7

"BOTH INSTRUCTORS WERE VERY GOOD!

THANK YOU.

AL'S PERSONALITY WOULD BE IDEAL IN FLORIDA. WHAT A GREAT GUY!! GO MAGIC!!

AL & CHRISTINE WERE OUTSTANDING-INFORMATIVE, PROFESSIONAL, EASY GOING, COMMITTED & INSPIRATIONAL. THANK YOU VERY, VERY MUCH.

THANKS!

THANKS FOR ALLOWING ME TO STAND UP AND STATE HOW I FEEL.

EXCELLENT INSTRUCTORS - GREAT JOB!"

TITLE

LIEUTENANT

CHIEF OF POLICE

DEPT. RECREATION & PARKS

DEPT. PARKS & RECREATION

POLICE SERGEANT

COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVE

POLICE CAPTAIN

B. Workshop Flow and Activities: Site Comparisons

TABLE A WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES BY SITE
(Based on average per individual response)

	<u>CT</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>KS</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>CA₁</u>	<u>CA₂</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>FL</u>
N =	37	25	32	31	49	32	33	30
E =	35	25	32	31	43	32	30	27
Lectures/Presentations								
Time Allotted	4.5	3.9	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.5
Opportunity for Questions	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.7
Relevancy of Visual Aids	4.3	4.1	3.9	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.6	4.5
Use of Text(s)	3.9	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.7	4.0	4.1	3.6
Workshop Flow								
Sequence of Sessions	4.7	3.8	4.0	4.7	4.1	4.2	4.7	4.6
Session Transition	4.5	3.8	3.9	4.8	4.2	4.3	4.6	4.6
Individual Work								
Utility of Individual Work	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.4	3.8	4.3	4.4	4.2
Time Allotted for Individual Work	4.2	4.0	3.8	4.4	3.9	4.4	4.4	4.3

^{1/} Long Beach
^{2/} Clovis

TABLE A (Continued)

WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES BY SITE
(Based on average per individual response)

	<u>CT</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>KS</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>CA₁</u>	<u>CA₂</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>FL</u>
N =	37	25	32	31	49	32	33	30
E =	35	25	32	31	43	32	30	27
Materials								
Syllabus	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.6	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.5
Participant Workbook	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.6	4.6
Participant Source Book	4.4	4.5	4.2	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.5
Visual Aids	4.1	4.2	3.9	4.4	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.3
Handouts	4.4	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.1	4.4	4.6	4.4
Training Equipment	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.4	3.9	4.0	4.6	4.2

1/ Long Beach
 2/ Clovis

TABLE B

WORKSHOP IMPACT BY SITE
(Based on average per individual response)

	<u>CT</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>KS</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>CA₁</u>	<u>CA₂</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>FL</u>
N =	37	25	32	31	49	32	33	30
E =	35	25	32	31	43	32	30	27
Informative	4.7	4.0	4.1	4.5	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.5
Useful	4.6	3.8	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.5
Relevant to Jurisdiction	4.4	3.6	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.4	4.5	4.6

TABLE C

FOLLOW-UP
(% Responding)

	<u>CT</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>KS</u>	<u>OH</u>	<u>CA₁</u>	<u>CA₂</u>	<u>GA</u>	<u>FL</u>
N =	37	25	32	31	49	32	33	30
E =	35	25	32	31	43	32	30	27
Discuss with Elected Official	82.9	100	81.3	67.7	55.8	71.9	80.0	51.9
Discuss with Staff	80.0	88.0	78.1	74.2	69.8	84.4	76.7	88.9
Organize Meeting	91.4	68.0	75.0	61.3	72.1	87.5	76.7	74.1
Request Information	42.9	32.0	28.1	29.0	25.6	25.0	43.3	48.1
Other	25.7	20.0	9.4	12.9	32.6	12.5	20.0	11.1

1/ Long Beach

2/ Clovis

TABLE D**PARTICIPATION BY POSITION
(Site Totals)**

	<u>LGCEO</u> ^{1/}	<u>LECEO</u>	<u>CR</u>	<u>LGDE</u>	<u>PSP</u>	<u>EO</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Connecticut	7	7	8	4	3	5	1	35
Pennsylvania	4	5	6	4	-	5	1	25
Kansas	4	4	6	10	3	4	1	32
Ohio	5	8	3	4	6	2	3	31
California ^{2/}	5	8	4	11	8	2	5	43
California ^{3/}	6	5	7	8	2	3	1	32
Georgia	4	5	4	7	6	2	2	30
Florida	2	1	2	9	11	2	-	27

^{1/} Local Government Chief Executive Officer
 Law Enforcement Chief Executive Officer
 Community Representative
 Local Government Department Executive
 Public Safety Personnel
 Elected Official

Other: Media; educator (5); cultural awareness consultant; police psychologist; business representative; clergy (2); NAACP; and municipal police consultant.

^{2/} Long Beach

^{3/} Clovis

TABLE E**PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION RESPONSE RATE**

<u>Site</u>	<u>Number in Attendance</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Response Rate</u>	<u>Mean Score</u>
Connecticut	37	35	94.6%	4.4
Pennsylvania	25	25	100.0%	3.9
Kansas	32	32	100.0%	4.0
Ohio	31	31	100.0%	4.5
California ^{1/}	49	43	87.8%	4.1
California ^{2/}	32	32	100.0%	4.2
Georgia	33	30	91.0%	4.5
Florida	30	27	90.0%	4.4

^{1/} Long Beach

^{2/} Clovis

SECTION V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CLOSING

For over five years, ICMA has disseminated NIJ research information on community-oriented public safety to local government administrators, public safety personnel, and community representatives. Over 1,000 local government leaders have been reached and enlightened through training, technical assistance, and written material.

Community-oriented public safety often has been likened to an ongoing process or a journey--not a destination--to which law enforcement agencies and communities hope to safely and efficiently arrive. It also has been described as a concept or philosophy around which programs and strategies are developed and implemented in the belief that the final product will be community-oriented public safety. While everyone can define COPS, it has proven somewhat difficult to know when a jurisdiction has "arrived." That is, when it has implemented and/or institutionalized COPS.

This theoretical base makes it hard to evaluate the ideal of policing in America and to develop one evaluation template for all jurisdictions. This difficulty has resulted in a position that sets COPS up for attack from those

who believe it is soft on crime, it is a fad, and money spent on it can be more efficiently utilized to provide other needed social services. However difficult evaluation may be, it is a component that desperately needs to be filled.

In the past, NIJ has made a major impact with local government and law enforcement managers by helping them understand and commit to begin the process of change. These are the leaders that have the power to implement community policing. During this 1994-1995 series of workshops, a crucial ingredient that allows community policing to progress--the nonelected community representative--also became knowledgeable about this concept.

NIJ has made a major financial investment and impact on local government managers as a "cutting edge" change agent in criminal justice. This should now be tested. Has change occurred? Have initiatives developed? Do they work? What strategies have been implemented? Have collaborative efforts been successful?

To reach the next evolutionary step and for the momentum to continue, it is important to determine the degree and where on the continuum community-oriented public safety is placed. In order to do this, it is

recommended that a national survey be conducted. This would assess the current state of community-oriented public safety using written and on-site assessment instruments.

There has yet to be a systematic evaluation of COPS, its focus, strategies, and impact. However, training programs abound. While these programs can be predicated on different assumptions and communicate a broad range of values to local governments, public safety personnel, and the community, there is a need to determine their impact on the implementation of COPS. Further, ICMA believes that community policing programs employ a wide variety of training strategies, often without conceptual or empirical validation. Based on the data from the written and on-site assessment instruments, it is recommended that a series of training workshops, tailored to needs of the individual jurisdictions, be conducted. This would provide a road map for the institutionalization of COPS.

To further solidify institutionalization, it is recommended that technical assistance and expertise be provided to selected jurisdictions based on assessments and training results so that the lessons learned are utilized and implemented.

Finally, it is recommended that an independent evaluation of the project and its results, including the quality of life of individual communities after the above has taken place, be provided. This evaluation also could extend to those communities receiving training and technical assistance under various federal funding (Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services) projects. This could provide a comparison of change methodologies. There are a number of private and educational institutions that are well suited for this activity. Providing an independent assessment would add to the credibility and transferability of the results.

***HOST JURISDICTION'S
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES***

**COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy**

**NIJ/ICMA
Workshop**



February 22, 1995

HOST JURISDICTION'S RESPONSIBILITIES

The following describes your role and responsibilities in co-hosting the "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING: An Alternative Strategy" workshop with ICMA:

1. Appoint a liaison person to interact with ICMA staff on all aspects of the workshop training and assist attendees regarding on-site logistics;
2. In cooperation with ICMA staff, target and assist in recruiting participants to a maximum of fifty (50), i.e., ten (10) jurisdictions in teams of five (5);
3. Select meeting site for the two-day workshop. In making this selection a professional conference center or hotel that is equipped and experienced in dealing with eminent management personnel is desirable but not mandatory.
4. Ensure that the meeting room is available at least by the evening before Day One for set up and as closely as possible to match the instructions and diagram on pages 4 and 5;
5. Coordinate with hotel/meeting site personnel, to equip meeting room as indicated on page 3, "Equipment for Training." For most items there should be no cost. If a cost is involved, it must be cleared with ICMA prior to commitment of payment;
6. Staff registration desk to ensure proper daily sign-in procedures, to include name tags as displayed in the sample on page 6;
7. Reserve sleeping accommodations for ICMA trainers, staff and participants near or at the training site. Each individual to pay the hotel directly. For your location, government per diem allows up to \$57.00 per day, per person inclusive with tax;
8. Coordinate with meeting facility on catering needs, i.e., breakfast, mid-morning break, lunch and afternoon break. Including approximately 9% tax and 18% gratuity, breakfast and mid-morning break (coffee refill) is not to exceed \$7.00 per person, per day, inclusive. With the same tax and gratuity percentage for lunch, not to exceed \$10.00 per person, per day, inclusive. Afternoon soda break is not to exceed \$4.00 per

person, per day, inclusive. Cost per day, per person, inclusive, cannot exceed \$21.00 using any combination, i.e., \$4.00 for breakfast, \$13.00 for lunch, and \$4.00 for afternoon break. See page 7 for workshop schedule;

9. Ensure that a representative meet with ICMA staff and trainers prior to workshop commencement to discuss logistical coordination, attendee composition, and geographical representation; and

10. Schedule host chief executive to deliver welcoming remarks on Day One of workshop.

ALL EXPENDITURES MUST BE APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY ICMA

ICMA'S RESPONSIBILITIES

ICMA's role and responsibilities in planning and conducting the two-day workshop are:

1. Maintain ongoing liaison with assigned personnel throughout planning and implementation of training workshop;
2. Assist in recruiting effort by announcing in national publications;
3. Administer registration and notify liaison of attendees;
4. Pay on-site delivery costs, i.e., daily continental breakfast, lunch, afternoon break, and training equipment;
5. Advise of equipment needs as shown on page 3;
6. Contract trainers to conduct workshop training;
7. Ensure receipt of course materials in a timely fashion which includes a syllabus, workbook, source book, handouts, evaluation forms, and list of participants;
8. Ensure evaluation instruments are distributed and collected; and
9. Send thank you letters, and certificate of completion (see page 8), to each participant.

EQUIPMENT FOR TRAINING

1. VHS plus two (2) to four (4) TV monitors.
2. Cables to connect TV monitors for simultaneous viewing.
3. Speaker/conference call telephone (Day Two Only).
4. Two (2) wireless lavalier microphones.
5. One (1) stationary microphone.
6. Stationary standup podium.
7. One (1) overhead projector.
8. One (1) screen for overhead projector.
9. Seven (7) flip charts.
10. Eleven (11) magic markers in dark colors (black, red, blue).
11. Writing pads and pencils for each participant.
12. Extension cords to accommodate above equipment, if necessary.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MEETING ROOM

1. Room to accommodate sixty (60) people. Fifty (50) to be seated at round tables, i.e., ten (10) tables to seat five (5) participants at each. The remaining ten (10) people are staff and trainers.
2. Seven (7) breakout rooms or areas to accommodate groups of approximately twelve (12) each. This can include breakout corners in the large training room.
3. Two (2) flip charts in front of large training room.
4. One (1) flip chart in each of the seven (7) breakout rooms or areas.
5. Stationary podium and microphone in front of training room.
6. Overhead projector and screen in front of large room.
7. Staffed registration table at entrance, with name tags and sign-in roster.
8. Food service table at rear of training room.
9. Afternoon soda break table in hallway outside training room.
10. One (1), eight (8) foot table in rear of training room for publication handouts.
11. One (1), eight (8) foot table in rear of training room for staff seating.
12. One (1), six (6) foot table in front of training room for trainers' material.
13. Water and glasses on each table.
14. Pads and pencils at each seating.
15. Message center.
16. Two (2) to four (4) TV monitors positioned for full visibility within room.
17. Jack/outlet for conference call/speaker phone.
18. Extra chairs in rear of training room.

FRONT

FLIP CHART

SCREEN

FLIP CHART

MONITOR

PODIUM

OVERHEAD

MONITOR

TRAINERS
TABLE

5

MONITOR

MONITOR

MEETING ROOM DIAGRAM


FOOD SERVICE

HANDOUTS

STAFF TABLE

REGISTRATION DESK

Rear



NAME TAG SAMPLES

**SUE TSUDA
City Manager
Sanger, California**

**JIM O'BRIEN
Chief of Police
Sanger, California**

**EDWARD LARRABEE
Director, Public Works
Sanger, California**

**AUGUST HIOCO
Director, Parks & Community Services
Sanger, California**

WORKSHOP SCHEDULE

DAY ONE

8:00 - 9:00 a.m.	Registration & Continental Breakfast
10:45 - 11:00 a.m.	Break
12:00 - 1:00 p.m.	Lunch with Group
2:15 - 2:30 p.m.	Break
4:30 p.m.	Adjourn

DAY TWO

8:00 - 9:00 a.m.	Sign In & Continental Breakfast
10:30 - 10:45 a.m.	Break
12:00 - 1:00 p.m.	Lunch with Group
2:30 - 2:45 p.m.	Break
4:30 p.m.	Adjourn

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION SAMPLE




**THE
TRAINING
INSTITUTE
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL
CITY MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION**

This is to certify that

has successfully completed the
PreConference Workshop

during the 76th Annual Conference
in Fort Worth, Texas
September 22, 1990



Executive Director
International City Management Association



SYLLABUS

Community-Oriented
Policing: An
Alternative Strategy



This syllabus was prepared for ICMA with grant assistance from the National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC

February 1995



SYLLABUS

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ment of Justice, Washington, DC

February 1995

Points of view or opinions expressed
in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of
the U.S. Department of Justice.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKSHOP

Citizens and local government officials throughout the country grow increasingly alarmed by escalating violence, drug abuse, and crime. But the hard realities of tightening local government budgets make it critical to find effective alternative strategies to help our communities cope. With the assistance of a one-year grant from the National Institute of Justice, ICMA will conduct regional workshops on Community-Oriented Policing (COPS) to show local government officials how to use the total resources of your community to improve the quality of life.

Eight COPS training workshops will be held this year to help local government and law enforcement leaders harness the best skills and interests of the entire community to control crime. Workshop participants will benefit from

- sharing perspectives and views about the policing issues your community faces with your peers
- learning how to engage the whole community's resources to help you pinpoint the causes of crime to prevent its growth
- comparing community-oriented policing to traditional law enforcement strategies
- exploring current research and case studies of communities currently using the community-oriented policing approach
- showing you how to create, strengthen, and maintain linkages between local government departments
- discussing the administrative, logistical, and political implications of implementing COPS
- developing a preliminary action plan for your community tailored to the unique features of your jurisdiction.

A maximum of ten (10) jurisdictions may attend each seminar. Each jurisdiction is to be represented by a five-member team consisting of: the local government and law enforcement chief executives; a nonelected community leader (mandatory with no substitutions); and two other local government managers chosen at the discretion of the chief executive (e.g., directors of public works, parks and recreation, finance, fire; elected official; union representative; educator; code enforcement; sanitation, etc.). Two trainers will lead each workshop, one with an extensive technical background in police management and operation and one with expertise in local government management.

Committed to the principal that audience participation facilitates comprehension, the workshop is designed to minimize lecture and maximize group problem solving. The trainers will ensure that essential points in each segment are covered adequately, with sufficient opportunity for discussion and debate.

For more information contact:

E. Roberta Lesh
Director, Police Programs
ICMA
777 North Capitol Street, N. E.
Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20002-4201
202/962-3575 FAX 202/962-3500

WORKSHOP MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

● Mission

To provide an environment for key members of a local community to interact within their "group" and with members of other local government teams to enhance the working partnership and shared responsibility needed for addressing community issues.

● Objectives

1. Provide information with examples so that participants will be able to differentiate between COP as an organizational philosophy and programs that have been called COP
2. Provide opportunities for participants to discuss and examine the evolutionary process of COP which requires the long-term commitment and participation by government and the communities served
3. Provide an atmosphere wherein participants can receive information concerning COP and discuss examples of successful and less successful strategies
4. Provide the opportunity for participants to examine and discuss organizational implications (e.g., financial, personnel, training, etc.) of COP
5. Introduce and provide the opportunity for participants to work with two problem-solving methodologies, stressing interaction between government and the communities served
6. Provide an opportunity for participants to interact with manager/chief executive through conference calls
7. Provide an opportunity for participants to develop an action plan that provides for a constructive on-going relationship with their communities.



ABOUT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

The National Institute of Justice is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice established to improve the criminal justice system and to prevent and reduce crime.

Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) direct the National Institute of Justice to:

- Sponsor special projects and research and development programs that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime;
- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice;
- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice;
- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated, and recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments, and private organizations and individuals to improve criminal justice;
- Develop new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency, and test and demonstrate new and improved approaches to strengthen the justice system;
- Provide to the Nation's justice agencies information from research, demonstration, evaluations, and special projects;
- Serve as a domestic and international clearinghouse of justice information for Federal, State, and local government; and

- Deliver training and technical assistance to justice officials about new information and innovations developed as a result of Institute programs.

The Director of the Institute is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director establishes the objectives of the Institute, guided by the priorities of the Department of Justice and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify the most critical problems confronting them and to develop projects that can help resolve them. Through research and development, the National Institute of Justice will search for answers to what works and why in the Nation's war on drugs and crime.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

ABOUT ICMA

Founded in 1914, ICMA is the professional and educational organization for more than 8,000 appointed administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, regions, and other local governments. The membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government. ICMA members serve local governments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Mission and Goals

The purposes of ICMA are to enhance the quality of local government through professional management and to support and assist professional local government administrators internationally. The specific goals that support this mission are to

1. Support and actively promote council-manager government and professional management in all forms of local government
2. Provide training and development programs and publications for local government professionals that improve their skills, increase their knowledge of local government, and strengthen their commitment to the ethics, values, and ideals of the profession
3. Support members in their efforts to meet professional, partnership, and personal needs
4. Serve as a clearinghouse for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of local government information and data to enhance current practices and to serve as a resource to public interest groups in the formation of public policy
5. Provide a strong association capable of accomplishing these goals.

Program and Activities

To meet its goals, ICMA has developed and implemented a number of programs, including member publications, professional activities, books and other publications, and management information services. Activities include but are not limited to annual awards program, annual conference, citizenship education, contract and grant research, international management exchange program, local government consortia and special interest programs, public policy, survey research, and training institute.

For further information, contact ICMA, 777 North Capitol Street, N.E., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002-4201, 202/289-4262, FAX 202/962-3500.

William H. Hansell, Jr.
Executive Director
ICMA

TRAINING TEAM MEMBERS

Ira Harris is the Executive Director of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) which comprises over 3,000 members, primarily chief executive officers and administrators of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels. He was also the past national president of NOBLE. He is a career law enforcement officer, having retired from the Chicago Police Department as Deputy Superintendent after 33 years of service. He then served 2 years as Deputy Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Aviation which has responsibility for the safety and security of the three Chicago airports. The following 2 years Mr. Harris served as Chief of Police of the Chicago Housing Authority Police Department. He is a consultant on criminal justice issues as well as a lecturer/instructor in various law enforcement areas, particularly management, operations, diversity, training, and community-oriented policing. He manages a cultural diversity contract with the City of Miami Police Department. He has achieved national recognition as a community policing expert and trainer through his vast presentations before national conferences, congressional hearings, federal law enforcement agencies, and local police departments.

Allison Hall Hart is currently assistant city manager of Irvine, California. She was previously executive director of human resources for the City of Santa Ana, California, where she worked for 5 years. She has extensive experience as a consultant to police and other local government and nonprofit agencies in strategic planning, organizational development and training. Before moving to California, Dr. Hall was executive director of several criminal justice programs (adult and juvenile diversion, victim-witness assistance) for the district attorney of the Colorado Seventeenth Judicial District. She has taught management and criminal justice courses at the University of Southern California, Pepperdine University, the University of Colorado, and Boise State University. She holds a doctorate in public administration from the University of Southern California and was a member of the ICMA advisory board on community policing.

Gayle Fisher-Stewart Ph.D. is the president of David Training & Technical Assistance Associates, which is dedicated to organizational and human resource development. She has over twenty-two years of professional experience in the areas of administration, program management, research analysis, training and curriculum development and presentation, and human resource and organizational development. She began consulting prior to her retirement from the Metropolitan Police Department, in Washington, D. C., where she attained the rank of captain. She has lectured and taught at the local and federal levels of government and for the private sector. She served as an adjunct associate professor at the University of the District of Columbia, teaching public administration, and currently is an adjunct professor in criminal justice with the University of Maryland. She is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and the George Washington University Contemporary Executive Development Program. She received her bachelor's degree in law enforcement from the University of Maryland and has masters degrees in the administration of justice (American University), public administration (University of Maryland), and adult education (University of the District of Columbia). She received her doctorate in political science from the University of Maryland. She is an author and most recently was published in the ICMA MIS Report, "Multicultural Training for Police," September, 1994. She is a nationally-known trainer on community-oriented policing having presented before local police departments, federal law enforcement agencies, and national conferences.

Judith Mohr Keane is a partner in JMK Enterprises, a private consulting firm that is devoted to personal, professional, and organizational empowerment and development. Former positions include: Assistant Administrator, Governmental Training Division, Institute of Government, University of Georgia at Athens; Associate Director, Institute of Public Affairs and Community Development, University of Kansas at Lawrence; and Assistant to the Executive Director, Piedmont Triad Council of Governments, Greensboro, North Carolina. For the past twenty-two years, she has been directly responsible for creating, designing, conducting, and managing seminars and institutes for local government management personnel. Target groups include first-line supervisors, fire and police personnel, department heads, city and county managers, mayors and councilmembers. As part of the training team for ICMA in their community-oriented policing workshops, she has trained 495 individuals from 115 jurisdictions. As a community activist, she has served as President of the League of Women Voters, Sedona-Oak Creek; Task Force Director for the Sedona Business Retention & Expansion Program; Board Member of the University of Kansas MPA

program (KUCIMATS); and currently is Citizen Member of the Board of Directors of the Northern Arizona Council of Governments (NACOG), a regional planning agency covering 42% of the State of Arizona. Ms. Keane is author of several publications concerning public management issues, including a chapter in the ICMA publication Effective Supervisory Practices. She holds a master's degree in public administration from the University of Kansas and is an ABD doctorate of public administration from the University of Georgia.

Christine A. O'Connor has been employed by the City of Tucson since 1981 and currently is the assistant director of the Information Services Department. She served for twelve years in the Tucson Police Department including ten years as an assistant director of that agency directing efforts in communications, data services, records management, budget, personnel, fleet and facility management, forensic services, and property and evidence management. Her focus is on organizational change that facilitates both cost effective and collaborative community government. She led an inter-department effort to draft a city wide information technology strategy and began the ongoing organizational change necessary to effective plan implementation. She organized, wrote and edited numerous successful funding efforts for collaborative initiatives among criminal justice, other municipal departments, and social service agencies aimed at crime prevention, substance abuse prevention and intervention, gang prevention and intervention, and community policing implementation. She has developed materials for community outreach and co-authored a manual on the Tucson Police Department's experience with implementing community policing. She was responsible for a police capital plan which opened two additional police substations and expanded the headquarters building including new technical facilities, the development of a department-wide inventory and equipment replacement system, the establishment of a participatory budget process, and the development and implementation of an information technology plan for police. Her other municipal experience includes library, budget and research, and parks. She authored a chapter on the history of railroads in the United States for the American Public Works Association's Bicentennial History of Public Works in the United States. She has successfully completed the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute. She holds a masters degree in history from the State University of New York College at Brockport, and additional course work in both history and anthropology.

Peter Ronstadt is presently a consultant dedicated to law enforcement improvement and organizational change. He has served primarily with the Tucson Arizona Police Department achieving the rank of chief from 1981 to 1992. Mr. Ronstadt offers 30 years of police experience in administration, operations, and management which includes patrol, investigations, training, community relations, financial oversight, and supervision of over 700 sworn personnel. His professional affiliations have included 3 years as the national secretary for the Police Executive Research Forum, secretary and treasurer for the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police for 1 year each, and memberships with the International Association of Chief of Police, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, and the Arizona Law Enforcement Officers Advisory Council. He was a member of the Harvard Executive Session on Drugs and Community Policing, and the Study and Information Exchange Mission to the State of Israel on Policing, Security and Counterterrorism. He has served as a special consultant to the U. S. Virgin Island Department of Public Safety, and on the advisory board of the International City/County Management Association's federally-funded grant on community policing. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the Harvard Senior Management Institute of Police, the Harvard University Research Forum, the National Executive Institute, and the University of Arizona achieving a Bachelor of Arts degree. He is the co-author of Elements of Community-Based, Problem-Oriented Policing.

Edward J. Spurlock is the President of Spurlock and Associates, Inc., an investigative and consulting firm located in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area. Mr. Spurlock brings over thirty-two years of law enforcement administrative, operational, and management experience, having retired at the rank of Deputy Chief from the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C. During his career, he has gained national recognition as an expert in the investigation and targeting of repeat and drug offenders. He has lectured nationally in the areas of community relations, terrorism, community policing, and physical security. He has served on national advisory boards and peer review panels making recommendations on proposed criminal justice research for the National Institute of Justice. Mr. Spurlock served as president of the Police Management Association from 1983 to 1989. He is a graduate of American University, Washington, D. C, receiving a degree in the Administration of Justice and is a graduate of the George Washington University Contemporary Executive Development Program. He also received an Executive Master's degree in General Administration from the University of Maryland.

Albert J. Sweeney is currently in his twenty-fifth year in law enforcement. He has served primarily with the Boston Police Department. His assignments have included police academy instructor, commanding officer of training and education, liaison officer with the mayor, and police superintendent. In 1981, he took a leave of absence to conduct supervisory and management training seminars for the cities of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Atlanta, Georgia, and Battlecreek, Michigan. In 1983, he was appointed deputy chief of police of the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Police Department. He returned to the Boston Police Department in 1985 to develop and command the Bureau of Professional Standards, where he served as superintendent. In 1988-1989 he was a principal instructor in the NIJ-funded training program "High Performance Police Management" that taught approximately 1,200 law enforcement middle managers from 700 jurisdictions. He has previously hosted a weekly public service television segment on policing in Boston. In 1990, along with the NIJ/ICMA advisory board members and trainers, he developed and designed the community policing workshop curriculum. He was a lead trainer in these regional workshops conducted throughout the country in 1991-92. Since 1993, he has also conducted community policing training nationally for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Community Policing Consortium. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and a master's degree in public administration from Northeastern University.

WORKSHOP SCHEDULE

Day One

8:00 a.m. Registration and coffee

9:00 a.m. Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

10:00 a.m. Module 2: Why Change? Why Not?

10:45 a.m. Break

11:00 a.m. Module 3: What is Community Policing?

12:00 a.m. Lunch

1:00 p.m. Module 3: Continued

1:30 p.m. Module 4: What is Community?

2:15 p.m. Break

2:30 p.m. Module 4: Continued

4:45 p.m. Wrap-up, Summary, Overview of Day Two

5:00 p.m. Adjourn

Day Two

8:15 a.m. Registration and coffee

9:00 a.m. Module 5: Highlights of Day One

9:15 a.m. Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS:
Local Government Issues

10:30 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m. Module 7: COP Tool Box

12:00 noon Lunch

1:00 p.m. Module 8: "No Surprises!"

2:00 p.m. Module 9: Conference Call

2:30 p.m. Break

2:45 p.m. Module 10: Action Planning

4:00 p.m. Module 11: Wrap-up, Conclusions, and Parting
Thoughts

5:00 p.m. Conclusion of Workshop

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING...

YOU CAN MAKE IT HAPPEN

by

Jerald R. Vaughn

The increased volume of crime and other demands for police services have placed substantial strain on most police organizations today. Increases in workforce have seldom matched the increases in the amount of work the police are required to do. Growing public frustration about crime, violence, and drugs put additional pressures on the police, and have focused a significant amount of attention on the inadequacies of the criminal justice system as a response to crime. Many of these inadequacies are simply resource problems, while others are management, policy, or procedural practices that are mired down in tradition or political dictate. The police themselves tend to become discouraged and cynical about the inability of the criminal justice system to adequately protect innocent citizens from the ravages of crime, yet often they cling to inefficient and ineffective methods of providing police services that only exacerbate the problem.

Over the past few years, research has provided considerable insight into crime and police operations. Some more significant findings are:

- Only about one third (1/3) of the total amount of crime committed is reported to the police. Much crime goes unreported because citizen's feel the police can't or won't do anything about it.
- Of that amount of crime that is reported to the police, only about 21% is cleared by exception or arrest of the offender. The 21% average has remained constant for nearly two decades. When applying this 21% clearance rate to the 2/3 of crime that goes unreported, only about 7% of the total crime committed is cleared.
- Of those arrested, charged, and convicted, less than 9% are actually incarcerated, yet jails and prisons everywhere are seriously overcrowded.
- The vast majority of crime is committed by a relatively small segment of our total society; repeat offenders who continually victimize people because the criminal justice system has failed to rehabilitate them, or in the alternative, isolate them from the rest of society.
- The role and responsibilities of the police have remained largely unchanged since the late

nineteenth century. Many basic methods and procedures remain much the same today as they were several years ago.

- With the advent of technology, particularly the automobile and sophisticated electronic and telephonic communications, the police have become isolated from the community. As a result, policing has become impersonal and the police are often viewed as *apart from* rather than *part of* the community. In addition, anti-corruption measures involving mandatory shift and beat rotation, further isolate the police from citizens in neighborhoods.

Armed with this information, progressive police administrators have begun to seriously examine the way in which police agencies are organized, how they operate, and ways in which they could become more efficient and effective in dealing with community public safety issues. The role and responsibilities of police officers has come under scrutiny and as a result, is being redefined and reshaped. Enlightened police administrators have come to several conclusions about the future of policing. Among these are:

1. The police cannot deal with crime problems themselves. Crime is a complex social problem that requires *total community involvement* for successful resolution. Proactive prevention of crime is a much more sensible approach given the dismal record of reactive, incident-driven policing.
2. The successful resolution of a criminal incident is a total team effort. It requires tremendous coordination, cooperation, and communication from the first responder through the prosecutor and must include victims, witnesses and other resources within the community. The traditional approach to investigating crime has been seriously flawed, inefficient and ineffective.

Because of these conclusions, new philosophies of police service delivery are emerging that necessarily cause changes in the way police work is done. Community-oriented policing is being adopted by progressive police agencies cooperatively with their constituent neighborhoods and other representative groups, resulting in a more positive impact on crime.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING IS NOT A PROGRAM.

Community-oriented policing is a philosophy, a style, and method of providing police service and managing the police organization. It is value based and involves long term institutional change. Community-oriented policing is *action* and *results*, not smoke and mirrors. To succeed, each

member of the department must be committed to it, and demonstrate certain kinds of behaviors and attitudes in the performance of their duties. This holds true for each position from the chief of police to the patrol officer on the street, and everyone between. Community-oriented policing is founded on a believe that traditional policing simply hasn't worked very well. With a much broader focus on problem identification and analysis, and systematic problem solving techniques, coupled with strong partnerships with the entire community, we can find more effective long term solutions to persistent crime problems. Community-oriented policing is not the panacea for all the problems in law enforcement. It is rather, a more intelligent use of limited resources to deal with a disproportionate volume of work. It allows the agency to recapture the most precious commodity of all - *time*. This time can be used for more productive preventive activities that will, in turn, reduce total caseload on the agency. To complement a community-oriented style of policing, specialized programs such as Differential Police Response (DPR), Managing Directed Patrol Operations (MDPO), Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI), and a variety of crime prevention programs can replace more traditional methods and practices resulting in improvements in total police efforts.

***YOU CANNOT USE MONEY AS AN EXCUSE NOT TO
IMPLEMENT COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING.***

To the contrary, community-oriented policing was designed to deal with an ever expanding workload *with existing resources*, simply because additional resources were *not* available. The process of community-oriented policing involves closely examining what the police do, why they do it, how they do it, and if it really makes sense to continue doing it given the limited successes of the past. This examination involves management and operational practices, decision making processes, internal and external relationships, identifying other resources available to deal with problems in the community and many other factors. The outcome of the examination process may be redefining and reshaping the role and responsibilities of police officers, restructuring the organization, and adopting a new way of thinking about how police service should be delivered.

HOW IS COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING DIFFERENT?

Traditional Policing-

In a traditional police setting, the police are generally the focus of crime fighting efforts. They are typically driven by incidents that are reported to them and are primarily reactive in nature, or *after the fact*. Information used is generally limited in nature and comes from victims, witnesses and

other traditional police sources. When a crime is successfully solved either through an on-scene arrest or because of a subsequent investigation, the police invoke the criminal justice system to deal with the offender. Success and performance is usually measured using aggregate statistics such as the F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report and other traditional police record systems. The police organization is typically managed in a top down manner with decision making focused at the top of the organization. The agency is usually highly centralized and depending on size, may have one or more large substation operations. In reality, the police more often deal with the symptoms, rather than the underlying conditions that allow the problem to persist. These symptoms are in repetitive criminal incidents, or calls for service at the same place, involving generally the same people, again. The police become frustrated, citizens become frustrated, and often a feeling develops that these problems are without end. The level of confidence, trust and support for the police often suffers in this environment.

Community-Oriented Policing-

In a community-oriented police setting, the entire community, other government and private agencies, and social service institutions are the focus of crime fighting efforts. The police are bonded to the community through the development of structured, working partnerships. One-on-one personal contact between the police and citizens at every opportunity is a priority and is reflected in the operational practices, scheduling and assignment policies of the agency. Alternative patrol strategies to accomplish this objective are used including expanded use of foot patrols, bicycle and mounted patrols, and combinations of driving/walking patrols. By "personalizing" policing, the groundwork is laid for positive working partnerships to deal with crime problems. The police effort is directed toward problem identification, analysis, and systematic problem solving methods involving more resources than the police have traditionally used. The police strategy is proactive in nature, or *before the fact*. Information used is generated from a much broader base including non-traditional agencies, neighborhood groups, and others who may hold valuable insight into police problems and solutions, but often have simply never been asked. The solution to crime problems goes beyond invoking the criminal justice process. It uses a variety of public, private and social agencies to resolve problems. Performance and success in a community-oriented police environment is based on results achieved against specific objectives developed in the problem solving process. The police organization is managed in a bottom-up fashion with expanded decision making roles for line officers who are closest to the problems and who generally have the best information to be used in designing solutions. It is characterized by a much greater level of flexibility and risk taking than may be found in a traditional police management environment and common sense prevails over bureaucracy. In contrast to the centralized nature of traditional policing, several small, fairly inexpensive, "*Community Policing*

Center," storefront operations in identified problem areas may be used. Community-oriented policing recognizes that "random patrol produces random results." As a result, activities of the police are much more directed, relying on improved, timely, and practical crime analysis information. Problems of the community take precedent over problems of the police department, and a "can do" attitude replaces a "can't be done" or "it won't work here" mentality.

DEALING WITH PROBLEMS INSTEAD OF SYMPTOMS.

"The Aspirin Doctor Parable"

A police department that tries to solve every problem the same way is like a doctor who prescribes aspirin for every known illness.

Community-oriented policing recognizes that underlying conditions and circumstances create policing problems. Incidents are usually symptoms of deeper problems. Incidents will continue as long as the problem that creates the incident persists. Perhaps the best way to view this is to think of an iceberg, and remember *"The Iceberg, or 80/20 Rule."* Typical problem recognition often examines only the tip of the iceberg. By remembering the "80/20 Rule," no matter how large the tip of an iceberg seems, 80% of it lies below the surface of the water. If you want to eliminate the problem, you have to attack the 80% that is not so visible, yet is the underlying cause and condition that allows the 20%, or tip of the iceberg, to exist. When analyzing crime problems, consideration must be given to the characteristics of all the people involved, the environment in which they live and interact with one another, and the community reaction to those factors. In addition, the optional responses of the *entire community* should be examined, rather than only what the police can do. Remember, the greatest barrier to solving a problem is not failing to come up with a solution; it is just coming up with one solution and stopping there. The problem solving process should involve all members of the police department, particularly those who are closest to the problem - line officers.

IS COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING RIGHT FOR YOU? COMPLETE THESE SIMPLE EXERCISES.

With all that has been written about Community-Oriented Policing and its companion systems, Neighborhood-Oriented and Problem-Oriented Policing, you may wonder if these are just fads or gimmicks being promoted by a few departments that have slickly market these ideas through articles in various publications. You may even question whether they are appropriate for your community since much of what has been written focuses on large, urban inner city problems such as slum housing, open air drug markets, crack houses, and a variety of other conditions that many

police agencies in the suburbs and rural areas do not necessarily experience. If so, take time to complete the following 15 step exercise. You should then have a pretty good idea if community-oriented policing would be of value in your jurisdiction.

Part I - Recapturing Time

1. Assemble a group of patrol officers and emergency communications center personnel representing each shift, and seven day a week coverage.
2. Have each of them write down three to five locations where the police respond regularly to deal with the same general problem and people repeatedly again.
3. Determine the average number of responses to those locations per month and approximately how long the problem has existed.
4. Determine the average number of officers who respond each time to these incidents.
5. Determine the average length of time involved in handling the incident.
6. Using the information from # 3, 4, and 5, determine the total number of staff hours devoted to each of these problem locations. Do this for the week, month, and year.
7. Using the people who have the most knowledge about each of these locations and the problems being experienced there, identify all the key players that either participate in, or are effected by the problem. This should include all direct and indirect participants and groups such as the complaining parties, victims, witnesses, property owners and managers, bystanders, etc..
8. Through a round table discussion, decide what it is about the particular location that allows, or encourages the problem to exist and continue.
9. Develop a list of the things that have been done in the past to try to deal with the problem, and a candid assessment of why each has not worked.
10. In a free-flowing brainstorming session, think up as many traditional and non-traditional solutions to the problem as possible. Try to include as many alternative sources like other government and private agencies that could be involved in the solution as possible. Encourage creative thinking and risk taking.
11. After you have completed the brainstorming session, consider which of those solutions are: *a. illegal, b. immoral, c. impractical, d. unrealistic or, e. not affordable.*
12. Eliminate all those that fall in category *a* and *b*.
13. For those that fall in categories *c, d, and e*, figure out if those reasons are because you are thinking in conventional terms like, *We've never done it that way - It won't work - It can't be done.* If you are satisfied that those solutions truly are impractical, unrealistic, or not affordable, then eliminate them too. If there is a glimmer of hope that some may have merit with just a little different thinking or approach, then leave them.

14. For each remaining possible solution, list what would have to be done and who would have to be involved to make it happen. Which of those solutions and actions could be implemented relatively soon and with a minimum of difficulty.
15. If the solution were successful, consider the productive things officers could do with the time that would be recaptured from not having to deal with the problem anymore.

If during this exercise you found potential ways to effectively solve problems and recapture time lost to repetitive incidents, then community-oriented policing may be a smart approach. Remember, what you accomplished in this exercise was done with existing resources.

Part II - Partnerships

1. Using the same work group described above, have each list the structured methods that the department uses to interact continuously with various neighborhood groups, businesses and other constituents in the various beats, etc.. These methods should, at a minimum, constantly identify existing and potential problems and a means by which the groups work with the police to solve the problems.
2. At the next command staff meeting, have each participant write down how they feel the police department achieves responsiveness to the community under current conditions. Have them identify the means by which the department maintains knowledge of the communities problems, concerns, and issues. Have them list examples of times the department has been "blindsided" by either a real or perceived problem of significant proportions that came to their attention from an external source such as the news media or the city council. Have them state whether this was avoidable and identify ways that they feel the department could improve the relationship and partnership with the community.

If you are unable to identify current methods and practices that facilitate on-going discussion and active working partnerships with the entire community and each of its constituent neighborhoods using beat officers, then community-oriented policing offers tremendous opportunity for your department and the citizens it serves.

Part III - Departmental Values

1. Using the work group identified in Part I, and the command staff, have each member write out the values of the department and how the values are reflected and carried out in

the day-to-day operation of the department.

If you find that a broad representative group of the department cannot tell you what the values of the department are, and what they mean in the delivery of police service, then community-oriented policing will be a worthwhile endeavor. Community-oriented policing is value-led; a foundation for what the police department does, why, and how it does it. These values must be more than a framed document hanging on a wall. They must be internalized and reflected in the delivery of police service by the members of the department.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING - MAKING IT HAPPEN

Moving ahead doesn't mean forgetting where you've been.

It means acknowledging that where you've been is not the only place you can go.

Moving toward a community-oriented style and method of policing is a long term process that involves fundamental institutional change. If you approach community-oriented policing as a program, you will likely fail. Beware of the trap that seeks guaranteed, perfect, and immediate results. Look at it this way: If your goal were to reach the top of the Washington Monument, would you jump directly from the ground to the pinnacle, Superman style? Would you keep on trying to leap all 555 feet and 5 1/8 inches in a single bound -- or would you consider using steps? You know instinctively that what is impossible to do in a single jump is easily achieved once you decide to advance one step at a time. The steps would also be easier than attempting to walk up a plank tilted at a slope between the ground and the top. You can slip on a slope...but when you advance one step at a time, you can consolidate your gains before moving ahead again.


If you remember the following principles, you will be successful in your efforts to improve policing in your community:

1. You must develop a long-term comprehensive strategy, to accomplish your goal of adopting a new philosophy, style and method of policing in your community.
2. Community-oriented policing will change the management, organization and operations of your agency. Understanding the dynamics of change is critical to your success.
 - *Change can be revolutionary:* fast, dramatic, creates significant personal and organizational stress. It is often resisted or sabotaged. Usually has short term effect, but lacks long-term staying power.
 - *Change can be planned:* Systematic, orderly, paced, usually less resisted.

- *Change can be evolutionary:* Slow, easy to adjust to, brings about long-term institutional change. Evolutionary change has long-term staying power.
 - 3. Recognize that change occurs through people - *not* through organizations.
 - 4. People change in three ways.
 - *The way they think:* A process of education and training.
 - *The way they feel:* A product of their values and beliefs.
 - *The way they behave:* A function of discipline.
- Hiring, training, discipline, promotion and supervisory practices play a major role in achieving success. Those elements must be included in your implementation strategy.
- 5. Your ultimate success in this endeavor is dependent upon the degree to which you involve others in the process. If it is to be anything more than window trim, you must have people from all levels and functions of the organization, the city government structure, and the community heavily involved. They must build ownership in the process and subsequently, believe in its value. That cannot occur through a memo from the chief dictating that the department will do community-oriented policing.
 - 6. You must encourage risk taking and creativity. You must show flexibility and support for those who are trying to make it work. You must reward those who contribute to its success.
 - 7. You must communicate openly, honestly and often, both internally and externally.
 - 8. You must create the understanding and support of elected and appointed officials for community-oriented policing. You must also build realistic expectations about what community-oriented policing can and cannot do. If you sell it as the panacea for all the city's crime problems, you will likely be writing your own obituary.
 - 9. You must lead by positive example in striving to achieve community-oriented policing objectives and constantly demonstrate your commitment to the values of the department.

Should you make the transition to community-oriented policing? Perhaps the answer can be found in the following

***IF YOU ALWAYS DO, WHAT YOU ALWAYS DID,
YOU WILL ALWAYS GET, WHAT YOU ALWAYS GOT!***







WORK BOOK

Community-Oriented
Policing: An
Alternative Strategy



WORK BOOK

Community-Oriented
Policing: An
Alternative Strategy




This work book was prepared for ICMA with grant assistance from the National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC

October, 1994

Points of view or opinions expressed
in this publication are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of
the U.S. Department of Justice.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In developing the training workshop for Community-Oriented Policing: An Alternative Strategy, ICMA received invaluable assistance from a number of local government officials, police executives and other knowledgeable persons throughout the country.

We are grateful to those executives and experts (listed on page 6 of this document) who participated in a one-day advisory board session to develop the content of this program. Their advance preparation and productive interaction substantially shaped the training workshop.

The seven trainers, Judith Mohr Keane, Albert J. Sweeney, Ira Harris, Edward J. Spurlock, Peter Ronstadt, Christine A. O'Connor, and Gayle Fisher-Stewart, provided invaluable help through their wisdom and candor. They not only participated in the one-day session, but in an ongoing, collaborative manner they developed the content, design, and process of the workshop and all relevant materials. This challenging project was overseen and coordinated by Gayle Fisher-Stewart.


Also to be thanked are Gerard J. Hoetmer, Assistant Executive Director of ICMA for his leadership and insightful critique; Willie Mae Clayton for her administrative expertise; and the fine staff of ICMA for their outstanding professional support.

Finally, the recommendations and directions received from Program Manager Carolyn M. Peake of the National Institute of Justice were both helpful and appreciated.

Much of the material contained in this text builds upon the work and publications of the National Institute of Justice and ICMA, and from information gleaned from other sources.

We trust that this workbook and the materials therein will enhance a better understanding of the philosophy of community policing among local government executives, law enforcement professionals, and the communities we are pledged to serve.

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ABOUT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

The National Institute of Justice is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, established to improve the criminal justice system and to prevent and reduce crime.

Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690) direct the National Institute of Justice to

- Sponsor special projects and research and development programs that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime
- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice
- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice
- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated, and recommend actions that can be taken by federal, state, and local governments and private organizations and individuals to improve criminal justice
- Develop new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency, and test and demonstrate new and improved approaches to strengthen the justice system
- Provide to the nation's justice agencies information from research, demonstrations, evaluations, and special projects
- Serve as a domestic and international clearinghouse of justice information for federal, state, and local government
- Deliver training and technical assistance to justice officials about new information and innovations developed as a result of Institute programs.

The Director of the Institute is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director establishes the objectives of the Institute, guided by the priorities of the Department of Justice and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify the most critical problems confronting them and to develop projects that can help resolve them. Through research and development, the National Institute of Justice will search for answers to what works and why in the nation's war on drugs and crime.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

ABOUT ICMA

Founded in 1914, ICMA is the professional and educational organization for more than 8,000 appointed administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, regions, and other local governments. The membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government. ICMA members serve local governments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Mission and Goals

The purposes of ICMA are to enhance the quality of local government through professional management and to support and assist professional local government administrators internationally. The specific goals that support this mission are to

1. Support and actively promote council-manager government and professional management in all forms of local government
2. Provide training and development programs and publications for local government professionals that improve their skills, increase their knowledge of local government, and strengthen their commitment to the ethics, values, and ideals of the profession
3. Support members in their efforts to meet professional, partnership, and personal needs
4. Serve as a clearinghouse for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of local government information and data to enhance current practices and to serve as a resource to public interest groups in the formation of public policy
5. Provide a strong association capable of accomplishing these goals.

Program and Activities

To meet its goals, ICMA has developed and implemented a number of programs, including member publications, professional activities, books and other publications, and management information services. Activities include but are not limited to the annual awards program, the annual conference, citizenship education, contract and grant research, the international management exchange program, local government consortia and special interest programs, public policy development, survey research, and the training institute.

For further information, contact ICMA, 777 North Capitol Street, N.E., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002-4201, 202/289-4262, FAX 202/962-3500.

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TRAINING TEAM MEMBERS

Ira Harris is the Executive Director of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) which comprises over 3,000 members, primarily chief executive officers and administrators of law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, county, and municipal levels. He was also the past national president of NOBLE. He is a career law enforcement officer, having retired from the Chicago Police Department as Deputy Superintendent after 33 years of service. He then served 2 years as Deputy Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Aviation which has responsibility for the safety and security of the three Chicago airports. The following 2 years Mr. Harris served as Chief of Police of the Chicago Housing Authority Police Department. He is a consultant on criminal justice issues as well as a lecturer/instructor in various law enforcement areas, particularly management, operations, diversity, training, and community-oriented policing. He manages a cultural diversity contract with the City of Miami Police Department. He has achieved national recognition as a community policing expert and trainer through his vast presentations before national conferences, congressional hearings, federal law enforcement agencies, and local police departments.

Allison Hall Hart is currently assistant city manager of Irvine, California. She was previously executive director of human resources for the City of Santa Ana, California, where she worked for 5 years. She has extensive experience as a consultant to police and other local government and nonprofit agencies in strategic planning, organizational development and training. Before moving to California, Dr. Hall was executive director of several criminal justice programs (adult and juvenile diversion, victim-witness assistance) for the district attorney of the Colorado Seventeenth Judicial District. She has taught management and criminal justice courses at the University of Southern California, Pepperdine University, the University of Colorado, and Boise State University. She holds a doctorate in public administration from the University of Southern California and was a member of the ICMA advisory board on community policing.

Gayle Fisher-Stewart Ph.D. is the president of David Training & Technical Assistance Associates, which is dedicated to organizational and human resource development. She has over twenty-two years of professional experience in the areas of administration, program management, research analysis, training and curriculum development and presentation, and human resource and organizational development. She began consulting prior to her retirement from the Metropolitan Police Department, in Washington, D. C., where she attained the rank of captain. She has lectured and taught at the local and federal levels of government and for the private sector. She served as an adjunct associate professor at the University of the District of Columbia, teaching public administration, and currently is an adjunct professor in criminal justice with the University of Maryland. She is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and the George Washington University Contemporary Executive Development Program. She received her bachelor's degree in law enforcement from the University of Maryland and has masters degrees in the administration of justice (American University), public administration (University of Maryland), and adult education (University of the District of Columbia). She received her doctorate in political science from the University of Maryland. She is an author and most recently was published in the ICMA MIS Report, "Multicultural Training for Police," September, 1994. She is a nationally-known trainer on community-oriented policing having presented before local police departments, federal law enforcement agencies, and national conferences.

Judith Mohr Keane is a partner in JMK Enterprises, a private consulting firm that is devoted to personal, professional, and organizational empowerment and development. Former positions include: Assistant Administrator, Governmental Training Division, Institute of Government, University of Georgia at Athens; Associate Director, Institute of Public Affairs and Community Development, University of Kansas at Lawrence; and Assistant to the Executive Director, Piedmont Triad Council of Governments, Greensboro, North Carolina. For the past twenty-two years, she has been directly responsible for creating, designing, conducting, and managing seminars and institutes for local government management personnel. Target groups include first-line supervisors, fire and police personnel, department heads, city and county managers, mayors and councilmembers. As part of the training team for ICMA in their community-oriented policing workshops, she has trained 495 individuals from 115 jurisdictions. As a community activist, she has served as President of the League of Women Voters, Sedona-Oak Creek; Task Force Director for the Sedona Business Retention & Expansion Program; Board Member of the University of Kansas MPA program (KUCIMATS); and currently is Citizen Member of the Board of

Directors of the Northern Arizona Council of Governments (NACOG), a regional planning agency covering 42% of the State of Arizona. Ms. Keane is author of several publications concerning public management issues, including a chapter in the ICMA publication Effective Supervisory Practices. She holds a master's degree in public administration from the University of Kansas and is an ABD doctorate of public administration from the University of Georgia.

Christine A. O'Connor has been employed by the City of Tucson since 1981 and currently is the assistant director of the Information Services Department. She served for twelve years in the Tucson Police Department including ten years as an assistant director of that agency directing efforts in communications, data services, records management, budget, personnel, fleet and facility management, forensic services, and property and evidence management. Her focus is on organizational change that facilitates both cost effective and collaborative community government. She led an inter-department effort to draft a city wide information technology strategy and began the ongoing organizational change necessary to effective plan implementation. She organized, wrote and edited numerous successful funding efforts for collaborative initiatives among criminal justice, other municipal departments, and social service agencies aimed at crime prevention, substance abuse prevention and intervention, gang prevention and intervention, and community policing implementation. She has developed materials for community outreach and co-authored a manual on the Tucson Police Department's experience with implementing community policing. She was responsible for a police capital plan which opened two additional police substations and expanded the headquarters building including new technical facilities, the development of a department-wide inventory and equipment replacement system, the establishment of a participatory budget process, and the development and implementation of an information technology plan for police. Her other municipal experience includes library, budget and research, and parks. She authored a chapter on the history of railroads in the United States for the American Public Works Association's Bicentennial History of Public Works in the United States. She has successfully completed the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute. She holds a masters degree in history from the State University of New York College at Brockport, and additional course work in both history and anthropology.

Peter Ronstadt is presently a consultant dedicated to law enforcement improvement and organizational change. He has served primarily with the Tucson Arizona Police Department achieving the rank of chief from 1981 to 1992. Mr. Ronstadt offers 30 years of police experience in administration, operations, and management which includes patrol, investigations, training, community relations, financial oversight, and supervision of over 700 sworn personnel. His professional affiliations have included 3 years as the national secretary for the Police Executive Research Forum, secretary and treasurer for the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police for 1 year each, and memberships with the International Association of Chief of Police, the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission, and the Arizona Law Enforcement Officers Advisory Council. He was a member of the Harvard Executive Session on Drugs and Community Policing, and the Study and Information Exchange Mission to the State of Israel on Policing, Security and Counterterrorism. He has served as a special consultant to the U. S. Virgin Island Department of Public Safety, and on the advisory board of the International City/County Management Association's federally-funded grant on community policing. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the Harvard Senior Management Institute of Police, the Harvard University Research Forum, the National Executive Institute, and the University of Arizona achieving a Bachelor of Arts degree. He is the co-author of Elements of Community-Based, Problem-Oriented Policing.

Edward J. Spurlock is the President of Spurlock and Associates, Inc., an investigative and consulting firm located in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area. Mr. Spurlock brings over thirty-two years of law enforcement administrative, operational, and management experience, having retired at the rank of Deputy Chief from the Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C. During his career, he has gained national recognition as an expert in the investigation and targeting of repeat and drug offenders. He has lectured nationally in the areas of community relations, terrorism, community policing, and physical security. He has served on national advisory boards and peer review panels making recommendations on proposed criminal justice research for the National Institute of Justice. Mr. Spurlock served as president of the Police Management Association from 1983 to 1989. He is a graduate of American University, Washington, D. C, receiving a degree in the Administration of Justice and is a graduate of the George Washington University Contemporary Executive Development Program. He also received an Executive Master's degree in General Administration from the University of Maryland.

Albert J. Sweeney is currently in his twenty-fifth year in law enforcement. He has served primarily with the Boston Police Department. His assignments have included police academy instructor, commanding officer of training and education, liaison officer with the mayor, and police superintendent. In 1981, he took a leave of absence to conduct supervisory and management training seminars for the cities of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Atlanta, Georgia, and Battlecreek, Michigan. In 1983, he was appointed deputy chief of police of the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Police Department. He returned to the Boston Police Department in 1985 to develop and command the Bureau of Professional Standards, where he served as superintendent. In 1988-1989 he was a principal instructor in the NIJ-funded training program "High Performance Police Management" that taught approximately 1,200 law enforcement middle managers from 700 jurisdictions. He has previously hosted a weekly public service television segment on policing in Boston. In 1990, along with the NIJ/ICMA advisory board members and trainers, he developed and designed the community policing workshop curriculum. He was a lead trainer in these regional workshops conducted throughout the country in 1991-92. Since 1993, he has also conducted community policing training nationally for the International Association of Chief's of Police (IACP) and the Community Policing Consortium. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and a master's degree in public administration from Northeastern University.



INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKSHOP

Citizens and local government officials throughout the country grow increasingly alarmed by escalating violence, drug abuse, and crime. But the hard realities of tightening local government budgets make it critical to find effective optional strategies to help communities cope. With the assistance of a one-year grant from the National Institute of Justice, ICMA will conduct regional workshops on Community-Oriented Policing (COPS) to show local government officials how to use the total resources of the community to improve the quality of life.

Eight (8) COPS training workshops will be held this year to help local government and law enforcement leaders harness the best skills of the entire community to control crime. Workshop participants will benefit from

- Sharing perspectives and views about the policing issues their community faces with their peers
- Learning how to engage the community's resources to help them pinpoint the causes of crime in order to prevent its growth
- Comparing community-oriented policing to traditional law enforcement strategies
- Exploring research and case studies of communities currently using the community-oriented policing approach
- Discovering how to create, strengthen, and maintain linkages between local government departments
- Discussing the administrative, logistical, and political implications of implementing COPS
- Developing a preliminary action plan for their community tailored to the unique features of the jurisdiction.

A maximum of ten (10) jurisdictions may attend each seminar. Each jurisdiction is to be represented by a five-member team consisting of the local government and law enforcement chief executives and a nonelected community leader (these three are mandatory, with no substitutions) and two other local government managers chosen at the discretion of the chief executive (e.g.,

directors of public works, parks and recreation, finance, fire; elected official; union representative; educator; code enforcement; sanitation, etc.).

Two trainers will lead each workshop, one with an extensive technical background in police management and operations and one with expertise in local government management.

This workshop is designed to address current issues, particularly focusing on youth in America's cities and counties, and to provide a forum wherein those who have the most at stake in terms of efficient and effective policing and crime reduction strategies come together to exchange ideas.

The workshop comprises eleven (11) modules covered over two days of training. The first day compares community-oriented policing with current policing strategies and addresses the issue of why there is a need for change. The objective is to provide participants with a solid base of understanding for community policing and what it means to their communities.

The second day provides opportunities for participants to develop effective implementation strategies that take into account the unique features of the jurisdictions represented. This day's modules provide the participants with the tools to implement community policing and presents perspectives of those with prior experience so that there are "no surprises." Participants are also provided the opportunity to speak with local government officials currently involved in community policing in order to gain first-hand knowledge and tips.

Committed to the principal that audience participation facilitates comprehension, the workshop is designed to minimize lecture and maximize group problem solving. The trainers will ensure that essential points in each segment are covered adequately, with sufficient opportunity for discussion and debate.

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MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

- **Mission**

To provide an environment in which key members of a local community can interact within their group and with members of other local government teams to enhance the working partnerships and sharing of responsibility needed to address community issues.

- **Objectives**

1. Provide information with examples so that participants will be able to differentiate between COP as an organizational philosophy and programs that have been called COP

2. Provide opportunities for participants to discuss and examine the evolutionary process of COP, which requires the long-term commitment and participation of the local government and the communities served

3. Provide an atmosphere wherein participants can receive information concerning COP and discuss examples of successful and less successful strategies

4. Provide the opportunity for participants to examine and discuss organizational implications (e.g., financial, personnel, training, etc.) of COP

5. Introduce and provide the opportunity for participants to work with two problem-solving methodologies, stressing interaction between government and the communities served

6. Provide an opportunity for participants to interact with a manager/chief executive through conference calls

7. Provide an opportunity for participants to develop an action plan that provides for a constructive ongoing relationship with their communities.



WORKSHOP SCHEDULE

Day One

- 8:00 a.m. Registration and coffee
- 9:00 a.m. Module 1: Welcome and Introduction
- 10:00 a.m. Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?
- 10:45 a.m. Break
- 11:00 a.m. Module 3: What is Community Policing?
- 12:00 a.m. Lunch
- 1:00 p.m. Module 3: What is Community Policing? (continued)
- 1:30 p.m. Module 4: "What is Community?"
- 2:15 p.m. Break
- 2:30 p.m. Module 4: "What is Community?" (continued)
- 4:45 p.m. Wrap-up, Summary, and Overview of Day Two
- 5:00 p.m. Adjourn

Day Two

- 8:00 a.m.** Registration and coffee
- 9:00 a.m.** Module 5: Highlights of Day One
- 9:15 a.m.** Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS:
Local Government Issues
in Implementation
- 10:30 a.m.** Break
- 10:45 a.m.** Module 7: COP Tool Box
- 12:00 noon** Lunch
- 1:00 p.m.** Module 8: "No Surprises!"
- 2:00 p.m.** Module 9: Conference Call
- 2:30 p.m.** Break
- 2:45 p.m.** Module 10: Action Planning
- 4:00 p.m.** Module 11: Wrap-up, Conclusion, and
Evaluation
- 5:00 p.m.** Conclusion of Workshop

WORKSHOP OUTLINE

DAY ONE

8:00 a.m.

Registration and Continental Breakfast

9:00 a.m.

Module 1: Welcome and Introduction

- Brief statement of training purpose
- Introduction of trainers
- Group introductions
- Overview of training agenda
- Site logistics

10:00 a.m.

Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

Discussion and reaction to issues facing communities

Comparing incident-driven methods of policing to community policing

What are some of the myths and values that drive policing?

Overview of emerging principles and values in community policing

10:45 a.m.

Break

11:00 a.m.

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

- Philosophy of community policing
- Key elements of community policing
- Community policing principles

12:00 noon

Lunch

DAY ONE (Continued)

1:00 p.m.

Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Continuation

1:30 p.m.

Module 4: What is "Community?"

Large and small group breakout discussions
Breakout group presentations
What is a community?
Community issues in implementation
Issues facing communities
Community duties and responsibilities

2:15 p.m.

Break

2:30 p.m.

Module 4: What is "Community?" (continued)

Partnership and planning is the framework for COP
Individual and group exercise
Shared visions

4:45 p.m.

Wrap-up, Summary, and Overview of Day Two

5:00 p.m.

Adjourn

DAY TWO

8:00 a.m.

Registration and Continental Breakfast

9:00 a.m.

Module 5: Highlights of Day One

9:15 a.m.

Module 6: Securing the Roots for COPS: Local Government
Issues in Implementation

Changes in organizational structure and values
Rethinking "service"

10:30 a.m.

Break

10:45 a.m.

Module 7: COP Toolbox

Introduction of a problem-solving methodology
Review of the SARA problem-solving process:

Scanning -- Problem identification

Analysis -- Analysis of problem

Response -- Development of intervention

Assessment -- Assessment of problem

Group discussion

12:00 noon

Lunch

1:00 p.m.

Module 8: "No Surprises!"

Implementation of COP is possible, but there are issues and obstacles that might get in the way--they can be dealt with, just don't be surprised.

DAY TWO (Continued)

2:00 p.m.

Module 9: Conference Call

Telephone conference calls with current practitioners will give the opportunity to discuss personal concerns, experiences, and questions raised during the workshop.

2:30 p.m.

Break

2:45 p.m.

Module 10: Action Planning

Small group breakout discussions on issues and concerns in their communities

Development of preliminary action plan


Presentations of selected action plans from small group leaders

4:00 p.m.

Module 11: Wrap-up, Conclusion, and Evaluation

5:00 p.m.

Conclusion of Workshop




This session provides a preamble to the workshop. It includes introduction of participants and trainers, a discussion of training purposes, an overview of the agenda, and the logistics of the training site.



NOTES





The objectives of this module are to discuss the issues facing communities today as they relate to policing and to compare and contrast incident-driven methods of policing with the evolving concept of community-oriented policing. A presentation on the existing myths and values that drive American policing is followed by an overview of the emerging principles and values.



Module 2: Why Change? Why Now?

- **Why the need for a change?**

Policing, as normally practiced in many jurisdictions, has been deemed an insufficient and costly method of controlling crime and disorder. An alternative approach has been developed that has proven to be more effective in most areas where it has been implemented. The method is generally referred to as Community Oriented Policing (COP).

COP identifies, mobilizes, and utilizes the total resources of a community in a concerted effort to impact community-based crime and disorder. It challenges incident-driven policing strategies, which are built on three principal initiatives:

Incident Driven Policing

1. **Rapid Response:** Measuring success according to response times to priority calls.
2. **Random Patrol:** Building into the patrol pattern and allocation plan a 50 percent random patrol factor. The concept of omnipresence was incorporated to reduce crime.
3. **Reactive Investigations:** Where all else fails--react to the crime and attempt to solve it through a thorough investigation. Clearance rates become measures of success with which to compare police departments with each other.

Recent studies have challenged these beliefs:

1. Rapid response is critical in less than 10 percent of all calls for service. We must implement better systems to manage calls for service--Differential Police Response (DPR)
2. Beat boundaries should reflect actual community boundaries
3. The same officers must be assigned to the identified community

MODULE 2

4. Streets should seldom be boundaries
5. Beats must not be changed--officers should be added or subtracted
6. Calls for service must be studied. A Northeastern University study showed 50 percent of calls for service were from addresses with 12 previous calls for service. Police simply respond and respond and respond
7. Citizen satisfaction with service is not a result of immediate response; it is based on expected arrival versus actual arrival
8. Community boundaries must be geographically determined to maximize community involvement.

Community-Oriented Policing

COP incorporates the following:

1. **Partnerships:** Establishing working relationships with other units or groups
2. **Problem Solving:** Collaboratively identifying and assessing community concerns and then applying effective problem-solving methodologies
3. **Prevention:** Focusing on proactive strategies that prevent crime, violence, and disorder rather than reactive strategies that deal with the after effects of crime, violence, and disorder; involving all of local government to prevent crime, rather than delegating total responsibility to the police.

There are eight critical steps involved in institutionalizing community-oriented policing, as follows:

1. Cultivating an understanding of and support for COP among local elected officials and local government managers
2. Cultivating an understanding of and support for COP among the employees of local government--police and nonpolice--who will be charged with development and implementation

MODULE 2

3. Creating and nourishing an organizational structure and process within local government to develop and implement COP

4. Cultivating an understanding of and support for COP among community residents

5. Creating and sustaining linkages between local government and communities

6. Developing an implementation strategy that balances crime suppression with crime prevention and that is understood and accepted by community residents, elected officials, local government managers, and employees;

7. Changing the role of the police from that of acting in isolation in response to incidents (incident-driven), to that of acting as community facilitators, in partnership with the community in responding to problems

8. Continuous evaluation of the process and effects of the strategies implemented under the COP concept.

MODULE 2

In the September 1989 issue of the National Institute of Justice's Perspectives in Policing, Lee Brown contrasted traditional with community-oriented policing in an article entitled "Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials."

COMPARISON CHART POLICING

Traditional

COPS

POLICE-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

Separated

Integrated

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP

Distant/Limited

Linked

METHOD-APPROACH-OPERATIONS

Incident-Driven

Problem-solving

HIERARCHY

Centralized

Decentralized

ROLES

Elected Officials
Chief Executive Officer
Chief Law Enforcement Officer
Middle Manager
Police Officer
Financial/Budget

In the November 1988 issue of NIJ's Perspectives on Policing authors Robert Wasserman and Mark H. Moore listed the contrasting values in traditional versus community-oriented policing in an article entitled "Values in Policing."

* See Appendix A on next page for additional comparisons.

MODULE 2

Appendix A:

Traditional vs. Community Policing: questions & answers

	Traditional	Community policing
Question: Who are the police?	A government agency principally responsible for law enforcement.	Police are the public and the public are the police: the police officers are those who are paid to give full-time attention to the duties of every citizen.
Question: What is the relationship of the police force to other public service departments?	Priorities often conflict.	The police is one department among many responsible for improving the quality of life.
Question: What is the role of the police?	Focusing on solving crimes.	A broader problem-solving approach.
Question: How is police efficiency measured?	Response times, number of calls handled.	Reduction of crime and disorder, and police responsiveness to neighborhood issues.
Question: What are the highest priorities?	Crimes that are high <u>profile</u> and those involving violence.	Whatever problems disturb the community most.
Question: What specifically do police deal with?	Incidents.	Citizens' problems and concerns, problem locations and problem people.
Question: What determines the effectiveness of police?	Response times.	Public cooperation and coordination with other agencies.
Question: How is police effectiveness measured?	Arrests, clearance rates, cases filed with D.A.	Reduction or elimination of neighborhood problems.

MODULE 2

APPENDIX A (continued)

	<u>Traditional</u>	Community policing
Question: What view do police take of service calls?	Deal with them only if there is no real police work to do.	Vital function and great opportunity.
Question: What is police professionalism?	Swift, effective response to serious crime.	Keeping close to the community.
Question: What kind of intelligence is most important?	Crime intelligence (study of particular crimes or series of crimes).	Criminal intelligence (information about the activities of individuals or groups).
Question: What is the essential nature of police accountability?	Highly centralized; governed by rules, regulations, and policy directives; accountable to the law.	Emphasis on local accountability to community needs.
Question: What is the role of headquarters?	To provide the necessary rules and policy directives.	To model and support organizational values.
Question: What is the role of the press liaison department?	To keep the "heat" off operational officers so they can get on with the job.	To coordinate an essential channel of communication with the community.
Question: How do the police regard prosecutions?	As an important goal.	As one tool among many.

MODULE 2

• Most important in the change to community-oriented policing is the issue of values. (These relate to the police department, but are applicable to any local government agency.)


Values: The beliefs that guide an organization and the behavior of its employees.

1. What is important to the organization?
2. What motivates its officers?
3. How is success measured?
4. What contribution does the unit make to the safety of the community?
5. What is the level of organizational satisfaction?
Personal?
6. How does the community support the department?
7. How does the organization support the local unit?
8. How important is training to the organization? To the unit? To the officers?
9. Is the expenditure of resources cost effective?
10. Is there a better, more efficient way?



NOTES





This module provides participants with the current research and experiences of community-oriented policing within local governments. A set of issues developed over the past several years within various departments across the country is presented.

***COPS at Work:* Concord, CA., has developed the department-wide community policing philosophy. A June, 1994, brochure, entitled "COMMUNITY POLICING - BUILDING A PROBLEM SOLVING PARTNERSHIP" is used to educate and involve the community.**



Module 3: What is Community Policing?

Community-oriented policing is an organization-and community-wide philosophy and management approach that promotes partnerships; proactive problem solving; and community engagement to address the causes of crime, fear of crime, and other community issues.

What is philosophy?

● Key Elements

- A philosophy and mindset that introduces a change in the way police work is conducted. Worker decision making authority and discretion is fostered, expanded, and reinforced at the service delivery level
- Focus on people accepting responsibility for improving their community and participating in the process of identifying, prioritizing, and providing solutions
- Willingness on the part of the police and local government to share responsibility and power in a community partnership
- Commitment and team effort by all departments in a local government
- Focusing of attention on the causes of problems rather than only responding to incidents
- Drawing on the creativity and resources of individuals and groups both in the community and the local government
- Establishing responsibility and accountability for police and community issues to a defined community and the police who serve that community

MODULE 3

In further support of the need for community-oriented policing, the following is offered:

- Government (governing) is too important to leave to government only.
- There must be shared responsibility between those governing and those governed because of the nature of a republican (representative) form of government. This is a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." This entails a return to shared responsibility for governing and policing; community-oriented policing can be the conduit for that movement.
- Too often, "the people" have given up their right to participate in their own governance to government officials. This also applies to policing. The laws belong to the people and the police can enforce them only with the acceptance, approval, and assistance of the people. However, over the years, the police have come to feel that the law belongs to them and that "civilians" do not understand the nature of the law, nor do they understand "policing." This has led to community apathy, which further compounds the problem and reinforces the "us vs. them" mentality of the police.

MODULE 3

- **Key Principles**


- Accountability
- Change
- Trust
- Vision
- Partnerships
- Empowerment
- Problem Solving
- Leadership
- Equality/Equity
- Service

MODULE 3

Now that we know what community-oriented policing is, it might be useful to list some programs and strategies that support the philosophy, but by themselves are not COP....

NOTES





This module encourages participants to define and develop the concept of "community." In large and small groups, participants discover how perceptions and people affect the way communities are defined. This perception can have a positive or negative effect on community participation and teamwork.

COPS at Work: Gresham, OR, in describing their community policing effort says, "In our experience, adopting the community policing philosophy and implementing our programs, the golden rules are: (1) *Involve Everyone*, and (2) *Go Slow!*"



MODULE 4

Module 4: What is "Community?"

Prior to any discussion of COP and its implementation and institutionalization, there must be consensus on what constitutes the community and communities.

Exercise: Participants are to individually list the types of communities to which they belong and the role(s) they play in each. These lists and roles will be discussed within their large groups. A spokesperson from each large group will report the types of communities and roles represented in their respective groups.

Communities to which I belong:

The roles I perform in each community:

- **"Community" Duties and Responsibilities**

What duties and responsibilities come with your roles in the community?

MODULE 4

● **Community issues in implementation**

1. What is a community? What are some other types of communities?

Entire city, a portion of the city

Community, a block

Residents of an apartment house

2. Identifying and personalizing the needs and level of services most required by that defined "community."

3. Leadership issues

Who are the community leaders?

How to organize or work with existing groups or organizations

Finding and/or providing resources

Avoiding politicizing and creating an "elite"

MODULE 4

4. Educating citizens to identify problems, understand all the dimensions of a problem, and solve problems on their own or with limited police/local government assistance.

5. Defining relationships within and between communities, especially those that are ethnically, racially, and culturally diverse.

MODULE 4

● Some Issues Facing Communities

Which of the following are of concern in your community?

- Fear of crime
- Public disorder
- Deteriorating housing and other structures
- Noise
- Traffic
- Drunk drivers
- Deteriorating tax base
- Deteriorating infrastructure
- Graffiti
- Loitering
- Lack of recreational facilities/programs
- Crime and violence
- High unemployment
- Substance abusers
- Lack of community involvement in planning and community development
- Lack of commercial services
- Feelings of hopelessness/helplessness among community members
- Political apathy (on the part of community and/or politicians)
- Lack of government services
- Racial unrest
- Homelessness
- Tourists
- Elder or child abuse
- Gangs

What are other "burning issues" in your community (or communities)?

MODULE 4

What is the relationship between community-oriented policing and these issues?

What is the role of citizens in planning and community development?

MODULE 4

● **Partnerships and Planning: The Framework for COP**

1. **Vision**

2. **Values**

MODULE 4

3. Mission

4. Goals

Exercise: *Creating a Shared Vision for the Community.*

Each team member creates a vision for improving the team's identified community with emphasis on a particular police or order maintenance problem of that community.

Individual visions are then shared with the entire group. The group then develops a group vision and selects a spokesperson to report to the large group.

COMMUNITY ISSUE:

My vision...

The group's vision...

MODULE 4

Questions...Questions...Questions... and we hope Answers...

1. What were some of the barriers/problems that had to be overcome in coming to consensus on the "shared vision?"

2. In making the group vision a reality, who are some of the key local government and community players?

3. In making the group vision a reality, what resources will be needed?

4. What steps will have to be taken when sharing this "shared vision" with the larger community back home?

MODULE 4

● Partnerships, Shared Visions, and Community-Oriented Policing

Characteristics of Partnerships

● Partnerships Lead to Stable and Safe Communities

What is the process involved in forming partnerships and what are some of the problems related to forming these partnerships?

How are important stakeholders identified and how can commitment from them be secured?

- Successful Groups Form Partnerships

- Collaborative Partnerships Involve:
 - Mutual Decision-making
 - Mutual Respect
 - Creation of a Supportive Environment
 - Augmented Resources
 - Coordinated Resources

MODULE 4


Partnerships and Consensus: In groups, we may agree to go along in the best interests of the group even when we do not agree with the particular decision or strategy. However, the consensus process is not without some potential disadvantages:

- ✓ The process may be time consuming since many meetings may be required to reach consensus
- ✓ Reaching consensus may result in accepting middle-ground decisions or products



NOTES






The opening session of Day Two provides an overview of the important issues raised in Day One.



NOTES





This session discusses the organizational implications for local government implementation of community-oriented policing. The participants work in small groups to generate a number of factors to be considered during the implementation phase. The results are shared with the large group.

***COPS at Work:* Salinas, CA., after attending the ICMA Community Policing Workshops, both in Santa Ana, CA., and Springfield, OH., adopted from the beginning, the emphasis on "Community Oriented Public Service" which is inclusive of all city departments as well as the police department.**



Module 6: Securing the Roots for Community-Oriented Policing: Local Government Issues in Implementation

INTERNAL

Exercise: What does each unit or department bring to the larger group that can contribute to the solution of the identified problem?

MODULE 6

What are additional resources and how can they be brought under the umbrella of COP?

MODULE 6

Issues...Issues...Issues

- **The role of elected officials**
 - Leadership
 - Resources
 - Advocacy

- **The role of the chief administrative officers (city manager, county administrator, etc.)**
 - Other governmental departments.

- **Developing a sense of citizen responsibility in the community**
 - Seeing police problems as substantive community problems.

- **Educating citizens on a nontraditional role for police**
 - Legitimate for police to identify emerging community problems and offer proposals to correct.

 - Police offer alternative courses of action.

 - Police become facilitators to help individuals articulate needs for government services, e.g., uncollected garbage, street lighting, recreation, housing code violations, job training.

MODULE 6

Additional Local Government Issues in Implementation

- **Community-oriented policing becomes overall local government philosophy**
 - Shared responsibility within all departments for developing a safe, secure community
 - Not just a police department responsibility
 - Police become an important link between citizens and city government
- **Sharing of power and responsibility with community and community agencies**
 - Asking what's needed
 - Building genuine linkages
 - Educating citizens about their ability to make a difference
- **City/county manager and department heads must provide vision, commitment, and priority setting in**
 - Decentralizing authority
 - Changing organizational structure
 - Evaluation and reward system
 - Approving channels of communication
- **Organization develops mechanisms for team efforts**
 - Across departmental lines
 - At all levels

MODULE 6

- **Provide training for employees in**

Problem identification and solution
Working with community leaders
Calculated risk taking
Creativity

- **Reviewing and redirecting resources--time, personnel, and money**

- **Relationships with elected officials**

In from the beginning
Maintaining a political base

- **Ability to review liability issues and make needed changes in codes, ordinances, and statutes**

- **Building linkages with other governmental agencies**

School systems

Courts

Housing authorities

State and federal agencies

MODULE 6

- **Restructuring internal police department components**
 - Recruitment**--What should be the candidate profile?
 - Hiring**--Use the "mini-maxi" concept
 - Training**--Use new sets of values and objectives
 - Promotion**--What are the qualifications?
 - Rewards**--Who gets them and for what reasons?
 - Control**--How to shift from supervisor to coach
 - Discretion**--How to loosen the rules and encourage officer input
 - Accountability**--Who is accountable for what? At the officer level?
 - Responsibility**--Empowerment means responsibility at every level
 - Evaluation**--Measures of success

- **Additional Implementation Issues**

Leadership

Employee empowerment

Changing a culture--momentum vs. maneuverability

Commitment to change--philosophy vs. program

Management through values


Decentralization

MODULE 6


Restructuring the hierarchy


Civilianization

**Resource allocation--deployment, managing calls for
service, union**



NOTES





This session introduces participants to two problem-solving methodologies that can be effectively applied to community-oriented policing.

***COPS at Work:* Maryland-National Capital Park Police have instituted the Language Minority Community Ride-Along Program which brings Montgomery County's diverse ethnic communities together with law enforcement. Volunteer students, ages 15 - 19, take special training and ride with officers.**

(The following segment on problem solving, which covers the SARA model, is a condensed version of a 2-day session developed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Newport News, VA, Police Department.)



Module 7: COP Tool Box

A successful methodology within the community-oriented philosophy has been problem-oriented policing, used in such departments as Newport News, Virginia, and Santa Ana, California. This methodology uses a four-stage approach called the **SARA** model:


1. **Scanning.** Identify major problems. Problem identification may come from police, community residents, or employees of other government agencies.
2. **Analysis.** Collect and analyze information from a variety of public and private resources--not just from police data.
3. **Response.** Work with other agencies and the public to tailor actions suitable to the problem.
4. **Assessment.** Evaluate the effectiveness of the actions to see whether the problem was alleviated or solved.

MODULE 7

PROBLEM ANALYSIS MODEL
Newport News, VA., Police Department

Actors	Incidents	Responses
Victims Lifestyle Security measures taken Victimization history	Sequence of Events Events preceding act Event itself Events following criminal act	Community Community affected by problem City as a whole People outside the city
Offenders Identity and physical description Life-style, education, employment history Criminal history	Physical Contact Time Location Access control and surveillance	Institutional Criminal justice agencies Other public agencies Mass media Business sector
Third Parties Personal data Connection to victimization	Social Context Likelihood and probable actions of witness Apparent attitude of residents toward community	

SITTING DUCKS AND RAVENOUS WOLVES



WHO

WHEN

WHERE


WHAT

WHY



NOTES





This module focuses on issues to be faced concerning the changing relationship with the community when community-oriented policing is adopted.

***COPS at Work:* Tempe, AZ., focuses on youth as part of their community policing effort with such programs as "Adopt A School", "Teen Talk Lines", and "Saturday Night at the YMCA". Plano, TX., has established a Youth Police Academy for Teens which requires participation in training for three hours a week for eight weeks.**



Module 8: "No Surprises!"

- **The Community:** "Recipients of a Social Service, Educated Consumers, or Members of the Board of Directors"--Deciding individual role (and responsibilities) in COP
 - Revisiting the issue of "power-sharing" and its implications for COP
- **Identifying and personalizing the needs and level of services most required by the defined "community"**
- **Expectations:** Must be careful not to create "false expectations." There is a need to be careful where expectations are set. Be careful of touting "new and improved," "crime prevention and reduction guaranteed"
- **Priorities:** Whose are they? The community's? The local government's? The police department's? Does it matter?
- **Responsibility:** All involved are responsible for success or "less than success."
- **The Media:** Partners or antagonists?
- **Leadership Issues**
 - Are the leaders truly representative and reflective of the communities (sub-communities)?
 - How can the politicizing and creation of an "elite" be avoided?
 - How is COP marketed to the community?

Educating citizens to identify problems, understand all the dimensions of a problem, and solve problems on their own or with limited police/local government assistance.


 - Citizen Academies
 - Town Meetings
 - Police Community Relations/Services Units

MODULE 8

- **Marketing a nontraditional role for police to citizens**
 - Legitimize police identification of emerging community issues and acceptance of corrective proposals.
 - Police in partnership with citizens to offer alternative courses of action.
 - Police become facilitators to assist individuals' access needs for local government services, e.g., uncollected garbage, street lighting, recreation, housing code violations, job training
 - The police chief as primary "marketing agent": roles and ramifications
 - Citizen role in marketing
 - Knowledges and skills for the chief and his/her marketing agents--what are they?

NOTES






CONFERENCE CALL

This session provides participants and practitioners the opportunity to discuss personal concerns, experiences, and questions raised during the workshop. A telephone hook-up to a chief executive officer and a chief law enforcement executive provides two-way communication to workshop participants. Issues of general concern can be addressed firsthand with those communities currently facing them.





Questions for the Chief Executives...

Notes and Answers...





MODULE 10: ACTION PLANNING

In this module, participants develop preliminary action plans for their communities. Through small group work, the teams discuss the issues and concerns in their communities. Participants develop a preliminary planning strategy for when, how, and where to begin. The findings and recommendations are shared and discussed with the large group.

***COPS at Work:* Brunswick, OH., has pulled together a Family Assistance Coalition Team consisting of three police departments, social service agencies and schools to create and implement a community-based, integrated corrections system that works with youth/families/schools, and the community.**



Module 10: Action Planning

In this session, participants develop preliminary action plans for their communities. Through small group work, the teams discuss the issues and concerns of their communities. The participants develop preliminary planning strategies concerning when, where, and how to begin. The findings and recommendations are discussed and shared with the large group.

• Action Planning Discussion

- In order to obtain "buy-in" for the action plan process and results, participants must be encouraged to provide input and that input must be valued.
- Action planning involves mobilizing the community to believe that this is important. It requires vision; therefore, the vision is the first step leading to the action plan. The picture needs to be shared and consensus gained.
- Think long-term. COP is a process, not an end result. While there may be issues/concerns that can be resolved in the short-term, accomplishing the vision will take years, depending upon the problems/issues, communities involved, political climate, etc. Institutionalizing COP will, in some cases, have to overturn (perhaps hundreds) of years of "this is the way we do things." Be prepared for the long haul.
- Communication is a process and it needs to be developed and practiced. One of the key components of communication is the ability to listen, actively. Communication also requires respect for individuals and the contributions they bring to the table.
- Success--before it can be measured, it has to be defined. In COP, there is a need to define "success" in non-traditional ways and those ways may develop as part of the process. The key is to be flexible and to think unconventionally.
- Constructive progress/change. Change is difficult. Remember the human factor and where people will fit as change occurs. Will they have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to determine their place in the new order of things?

MODULE 10

● Planning for Action.

Use the following questions as guides to your planning. Answer only those that will be useful to your community and local government.

1. What do we need to do to get our community ready for COP?
2. What things must we do to make our local government organizations, including the police department, ready for COP?
3. What must be done to ensure that our local elected officials are ready for COP?
4. What additional information is needed to get started?
5. What factors are resisting (or resistant to) the change to COP (both within the community and within the department)?
6. What factors are supporting a change to COP?
7. Is there a problem and/or community already demanding the COP philosophy? If yes, why?
8. Are there existing community leaders and/or citizen groups prepared to become involved in the COP philosophy?
9. Which key departments and individuals need to be involved at the beginning of this cultural and philosophical change?

MODULE 10

10. Which individuals need to be assigned key responsibilities for this process?

11. Will developing a COP approach require an additional budget allocation? How will you determine whether it will? If additional monies are needed, where will they come from?

12. What are the different strategies for establishing community involvement and intra-departmental cooperation?

Managing Expectations:

- What are our expectations for COP?
- What are the concrete results we think COP will produce?
- Are expectations reasonable?
- How will we manage the community's and politicians' expectations?




MODULE 10

COP Action Steps Chart

THE FOLLOWING ACTION STEPS WILL BE TAKEN

ACTION	WHEN?	WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?



NOTES





Module 11: Wrap Up, Conclusion, and Evaluation

The closing session summarizes the key points of the workshop. A brief evaluation instrument will be distributed to each participant.






MODULE 11

■ Evaluation and Last Thoughts

■ Parting Notes.....





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158381
Pt. II

FINAL REPORT

NCJRS

JAN 17 1996

ACQUISITIONS

TRANSFERRING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:

An Alternative Strategy

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

158381
(part 2)

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August, 1995**

COPS/200
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





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
Community-Oriented Policing: An Alternative Strategy

Second edition





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SOURCE BOOK

Community-Oriented Policing: An Alternative Strategy

Second edition



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October 1994

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
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INTRODUCTION

The Community-Oriented Policing (COPS) workshop series was developed by ICMA through a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1994. The purpose is to provide municipal executives with mechanisms for providing effective, efficient, and equitable police services through a local government team approach that draws upon the resources available in the community.

It has been approximately ten years since COPS was recognized as a viable, proactive alternative to providing police service in an incident-driven, reactive manner that has proven to be less than effective and costly to local governments. Much has been learned in these past ten years.

This workshop is a composite of knowledge and experience of the nation's most progressive police and local government agencies. This workshop series is also unique in that it has put the focus on "community" in community-oriented policing. ICMA is providing the key that will enable communities and local governments to move into the 21st century on more solid footing as it relates to crime and quality of life issues.

This source book is provided as a supplemental text for workshop participants. It complements the work book which serves as the foundation for the workshop and a resource tool to be used as guidance upon completion of the training. In this manual are selected readings from various distinguished researchers, authors, and practitioners. All the materials have been carefully selected on the basis of their relevance to putting "community" in community-oriented policing and assistant local government managers in its implementation.

We are grateful to each of the authors whose work appears in this source book. Also, we wish to acknowledge the advisors, trainers, and the NIJ and ICMA staff members, listed on page vi of this manual, who assisted in the development of this training. We thank each and every one of them for their vision, concern, and courage as they contribute to the incremental, but fundamental changes occurring in the delivery of a critical public service, policing.

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October 1994



ABOUT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

The National Institute of Justice is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, established to improve the criminal justice system and to prevent and reduce crime.

Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. (Public Law 100-690) direct the National Institute of Justice to

- Sponsor special projects and research and development programs that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime
- Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice
- Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice
- Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated, and recommend actions that can be taken by federal, state, and local governments and private organizations and individuals to improve criminal justice
- Develop new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and delinquency, and test and demonstrate new and improved approaches to strengthen the justice system
- Provide to the nation's justice agencies information from research, demonstrations, evaluations, and special projects
- Serve as a domestic and international clearinghouse of justice information for federal, state, and local government
- Deliver training and technical assistance to justice officials about new information and innovations developed as a result of Institute programs.

The Director of the Institute is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director establishes the objectives of the Institute, guided by the priorities of the Department of Justice and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify the most critical problems confronting them and to develop projects that can help resolve them. Through research and development, the National Institute of Justice will search for answers to what works and why in the nation's war on drugs and crime.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

ABOUT ICMA

Founded in 1914, ICMA is the professional and educational organization for more than 8,000 appointed administrators and assistant administrators serving cities, counties, regions, and other local governments. The membership also includes directors of state associations of local governments, other local government employees, members of the academic community, and concerned citizens who share the goal of improving local government. ICMA members serve local governments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Mission and Goals

The purposes of ICMA are to enhance the quality of local government through professional management and to support and assist professional local government administrators internationally. The specific goals that support this mission are to

1. Support and actively promote council-manager government and professional management in all forms of local government
2. Provide training and development programs and publications for local government professionals that improve their skills, increase their knowledge of local government, and strengthen their commitment to the ethics, values, and ideals of the profession
3. Support members in their efforts to meet professional, partnership, and personal needs
4. Serve as a clearinghouse for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of local government information and data to enhance current practices and to serve as a resource to public interest groups in the formation of public policy
5. Provide a strong association capable of accomplishing these goals.

Program and Activities

To meet its goals, ICMA has developed and implemented a number of programs, including member publications, professional activities, books and other publications, and management information services. Activities include but are not limited to the annual awards program, the annual conference, citizenship education, contract and grant research, the international management exchange program, local government consortia and special interest programs, public policy development, survey research, and the training institute.

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lay a foundation by ensuring that a high level of police credibility exists within the community. To accomplish this, all police response to community needs—whether reactive or proactive—must meet the most stringent standards of discipline and professionalism. Police administrators can ensure that their officers respond in this manner through careful personnel selection and training, especially in the area of police discretion.

When officers continually conduct their duties in a highly professional manner, managers can allow a wide latitude of officer discretion. However, maintaining wide latitude, while continuing to enjoy the respect and cooperation of the community, requires that each officer be personally accountable for the highest standards of professional behavior. If any officer fails in this regard, all officers suffer the consequences of low community confidence in the police.

Citizen confidence in the police sets the stage for instituting the two police strategies embodied in community-oriented policing—response to incidents and problem-oriented policing. Neither strategy takes precedence over the other, and neither can be fully successful without the other. Clearly, the combination of both strategies helps law enforcement achieve its goals by synthesizing two different approaches.

COP STRATEGIES

Response to Incidents

Response to incidents (R2I) requires law enforcement officers to react to crimes or emergency incidents. In order to promote citizen

confidence in the police, officers should swiftly respond to any such incidents and establish and maintain control over the situation.

R2I also requires officers to respond proactively to crime patterns. This is accomplished through such tactics as directed patrol, targeted identifications, etc.

However, if police administrators do not carefully manage the R2I strategy, their departments can quickly be overwhelmed by community demands. In order to manage increased calls for police service, administrators need to monitor demand and then research as many creative ways as possible to respond to these calls.


There are many ways to respond to calls for assistance that do not require the immediate dispatching of an officer in a patrol car. Other, less expensive responses may satisfy the request just as effectively. In fact, only a small percentage of calls require urgent police response. For

example, many departments dispatch officers to burglary scenes to take a report. At the same time, they dispatch a technician to the scene to collect evidence. A more efficient way to handle such calls is to have an officer take a telephonic report and dispatch the technician to the scene to collect evidence.

Another way to better serve jurisdictions using the R2I strategy is to invest in current technology in such areas as communications, information, case management and analysis, and transportation. Current technology may include automated mug systems, records management and retrieval systems, automated aging systems, and mobile data terminals. Department managers must then use all their resources, both technological and human, in a balanced way that produces not just activity but also results—results that they can measure against their mission statements.

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Chief Walters heads the Santa Ana, California, Police Department.

Managing the limited resources of departments to respond effectively to both incidents and calls for service, while producing the greatest advantage for their communities, requires managers to make informed, professional decisions. And, while managers must ensure that officers can respond rapidly to incidents—using the R2I strategy—they cannot rely on this strategy alone. Instead, they must balance the R2I strategy with the problem-solving strategy—problem-oriented policing.

Problem-Oriented Policing

At the heart of the problem-oriented policing (POP) approach is the concept that police must be more responsive to the *causes* of crime, rather than merely dealing with the results of crime. Maintaining

neighborhood safety can be more beneficial to the community than merely treating isolated neighborhood problems. This approach represents a significant shift in how both the public and the police view the role of law enforcement in the community.

Problem-oriented policing is a proactive, decentralized approach to providing police services designed to reduce crime and disorder, and by extension, the fear of crime. Department heads achieve this by assigning officers to specific neighborhoods on a long-term basis. Long-term involvement between the officers and neighborhood residents fosters the development of credible relationships based on mutual trust and cooperation. It also allows a high-level exchange of information between citizens and

police officers, as well as mutual input concerning policing priorities and tactics for specific areas of the community.

Problem-oriented policing also distributes police services more effectively across the community and targets high-crime areas for problem-solving approaches that allow law enforcement to define and deal with the causes of crime. This helps to neutralize the undue influence of special interest groups that can be the recipients of preferred services when no system of community-based priorities exists.

ACHIEVING A BALANCE

Officials can achieve a balance between R2I and problem-oriented policing by applying the differential police response (DPR) tactic. DPR involves the analysis of demand patterns made on the department by members of the community. After analyzing the demand patterns, officials then develop alternatives to traditional police responses—alternatives that provide improved community police services at a lower cost than traditional rapid response.

For example, if officers must frequently respond to an alarm located in a business establishment, a pattern develops. Once managers determine that a pattern exists, they can personally contact the owners of the business to determine whether there is a design problem or a defect of some type that causes the alarm to sound. This would eliminate the need for officers to respond repeatedly to the same alarm.

Once law enforcement agencies expand their range of possible responses to community needs,



managers should allocate resources to ensure the best and most comprehensive effect in the community. For this system to work, officers need to understand the comprehensive approach and act in ways that support their departments' missions. When a balance between R2I and problem-oriented policing exists, police managers can implement the community-oriented policing strategy.

IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING

Implementing community-oriented policing requires both time and a substantial effort. The Santa Ana, California, Police Department took the following steps to institute the strategy.

First, department administrators implemented community-oriented policing within the context of the city's commitment to total quality management. Then, they developed a task force of civilians and officers from all ranks to address community-oriented policing. This task force helped to guide the full implementation of this philosophy throughout the entire department. Members of the task force reviewed organizational structure, performance evaluation and reward systems, recruiting and training practices, and deployment strategies.

The next step was to create a police stakeholders task force, chaired by the chief and composed of representatives from the department and other related city agencies and community groups. This task force reviewed the criteria and values by which police functions and

services to the community are evaluated in the context of community-oriented policing.

To enable swift response to emergency needs, the department installed a state-of-the-art, computer-aided dispatch system and analyzed community information in order to anticipate and prevent crime and emergencies. At the same

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time, the department trained all departmental personnel in community-oriented policing. They then evaluated the community-oriented policing test areas within the department's jurisdiction and made recommendations for possible applications to other areas of the jurisdiction.

Finally, the architectural design of a new police department facility, which was already scheduled to be built, reflected the central functions, values, and vision of community-oriented policing. This facility represents the commitment of department administrators to the community-oriented policing strategy.

For example, unoccupied desks are available on the first floor of

the facility for members of the community who work temporarily with department members to solve problems occurring within specific neighborhoods. This simple feature highlights the department's commitment to community-oriented policing.

The new facility also includes a conference room that seats 250 individuals. This will allow community members a meeting place to discuss problems they experience in their particular neighborhoods.

CONCLUSION


Today's police managers must resolve new problems within their communities through cost-effective, innovative ways. Community-oriented policing offers an interesting possibility to departments nationwide.

A combination of problem-oriented policing and the response to incidents—community oriented policing—offers a comprehensive and balanced approach to maintaining high levels of safety and security throughout neighborhoods. However, in order to ensure effectiveness, managers need to adapt the strategy to the changing demands of their jurisdictions.

All police managers must continue to review their department's effectiveness, plan new and better ways to accomplish their mission, verify the appropriateness of new methods, and take the initiative to make continuous improvements in all police activities. Only through continued evaluation and adjustment can police departments maintain the utmost effectiveness. ♦

MIS REPORT

VOLUME 26 / NUMBER 9 / SEPTEMBER 1994



MULTICULTURAL TRAINING FOR POLICE

Civil disorder is costly. It can result in death, personal injury, and property loss, and it can prove highly embarrassing for the local government if the disorder is precipitated by police action. Research indicates that 90 percent of major civil disorders in the United States have resulted from police-citizen conflicts—and that many could have been avoided.

The philosophy of community oriented policing, properly implemented, can reduce the possibility of civil disorder. However, the partnership between the community and the police that community oriented policing calls for can succeed only if it is based on the acceptance and management of cultural diversity.

This report presents suggestions for integrating diversity training into ongoing learning at all levels of the police department. It includes a model for training police executives to examine and modify policies, practices, procedures, and systems that inhibit the acceptance and management of diversity. Incentives to encourage the police and the community to accept diversity and the philosophy of community policing are also discussed.

Multicultural Training for Police

Gayle Fisher-Stewart, the author of this report, spent twenty years with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., retiring at the rank of captain. She is president and CEO of a consulting consortium specializing in providing training and technical assistance in human and organizational development to law enforcement and government agencies. She is a graduate of the FBI National Academy, holds a master's in adult education from the University of the District of Columbia, and received her doctorate in political science from the University of Maryland.

The final cost of the Los Angeles riots of 1992 that followed the acquittal of the police officers in the Rodney King beating case has yet to be totaled. Even if a "final bill" is determined, the toll in terms of police-community relations and public trust and confidence will be difficult to tally. The same can be said in the aftermath of the 1991 civil disturbance in the Hispanic community in the Mount Pleasant area of Washington, D.C. Three years after that incident, residents allege that the same conditions, including harassment and abuse by the police and lack of city services, still exist. Conditions are conducive, say the residents, to further disorder and violence.

The common factor in these two incidents is that they resulted from police-citizen interactions; research indicates that 90 percent of all civil disorders in the United States are precipitated by police-citizen interactions.¹ To reduce the numbers of and reasons for civil disorders that involve police and citizens—and to confront them when they do occur—may seem to be a police matter. However, it is vitally important for local government officials to understand the ramifications of these events for the citizens and individual officers involved, the police department, the local government, and the community.

Civil disorders cost money that is sorely needed for government services and programs. Estimates of property damage alone in the Los Angeles riots ran as high as \$3 million. In addition to generating the enormous costs of rebuilding and creating grounds for civil suits resulting from the loss of lives and property, these clashes can bankrupt an already fiscally strapped government: they can negatively impact the ability of a locale to secure bonds; make it difficult to secure and maintain insurance; frighten off potential business or cause established businesses to flee to the presumed safety and security of the suburbs; and reduce the middle-class tax base as its members also leave. If tourism is a major industry, civil disorder can frighten away visitors and their money, again weakening the economic base.

These issues have not traditionally been the concern of police departments, but they should be. A reduction in a locality's revenues can result in the reduction of the police department budget and create increased competition with other government departments for personnel and resources. Fiscal problems can cause conflict and trepidation as proposals for elimination, consolidation, or absorption of the police department into other law enforcement entities are considered.

Local government officials and police chiefs need to work together proactively to eliminate the potential for civil disorder, particularly disorder that is police-related, instead of just reacting to it. Community oriented policing can lessen the opportunities for civil disorder by reducing the human factors that provide the spark; however, its potential can be realized only if there is a concurrent focus within the police department on understanding, accepting, and managing cultural diversity and human differences, both within the department and in the community. Community oriented policing and the management of diversity, while not a panacea, can be very effective management tools if chiefs of police and local government officials are committed to making the changes that must take place in the police department's organization and philosophical underpinnings.

This report discusses first what can happen when a police department fails to recognize the negative potential of cultural misunderstanding. Second, it provides a guide for local government officials and police to use in developing training curricula that promote the institutionalization of community oriented policing and the acceptance and management of cultural diversity.

WHY TRAIN FOR CULTURAL DIVERSITY?

In the law enforcement training film *Arresting Prejudice*, which vividly illustrates the impact of police-

Management Information Service

community cultural conflict and the need for community oriented policing, the introductory scenes are those of the civil unrest that occurred in the Mount Pleasant community in Washington, D.C., in 1991.² Those scenes—of businesses being burned, police department property being destroyed, and citizens and police engaging in combat—are used as a backdrop and throughout the film as examples of what can happen when the organizational culture of the police department—combined with the personal biases and prejudices of police personnel—conflicts and clashes with the culture of the community.

While discussing the topic "Community Policing in Washington, D.C.: From Philosophy to Institution," during the 1993 conference on civil disorder conducted by the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., Police Chief Fred Thomas (Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C.) stated:

I quickly discerned that community policing meant something different to almost everyone that I spoke with. . . . Then I looked at how well this philosophy had been implemented . . . and the officers did not understand. They were very confused. The citizens are still confused about it and we really do not know where we are headed. . . . We must involve the entire community. We have a very diverse community in our city. . . . But where we as an organization start to fall short was made evident by what happened two years ago in our Mt. Pleasant area, where a large Hispanic community resides. We failed to keep in mind the need to interact with the community. . . . I think this is similar to what happened in this city in 1968, when the city failed to address the needs of the African American community. In the Latino community there is a great deal of distrust between the community and the police. I think some of that is based on cultural biases; some folks from places like El Salvador carry with them a distrust of the police from their countries of origin. . . . In the department, we have not been able to break down those biases. . . . Similar things can be said of people who live in public housing. They are displaced, they are isolated, and they are not very organized — and in some cases, greatly resent police. I think it is incumbent upon the police . . . to get into those communities . . . to help break down those barriers of distrust and develop a bond. I think by doing that we can then fully start to implement community policing.³

Although it is important to understand, value, and work with the various cultures present in their service area, police agencies must also examine their own organizational culture and how that culture affects the way they view and value the people in the community. As director of the National Center for

the Study of Police and Civil Disorder at the Police Foundation, I made this closing statement at the same conference:

All through this conference, we have [discussed] the issue of race and how it has an impact on law enforcement, and that, sometimes, it has been the spark for civil disorder. At times, I have felt that my brothers and sisters in policing were getting a bum rap, because we do not always start civil disorder. But even when we do, you have to ask: what is it in policing and police organizations that creates a situation where civil disorder can occur? I have yet to hear anyone join a police department and state, "I really want to violate someone's civil rights. I really want to be the one who sets the spark to burn this city down."

In addition to looking at the institutionalized racism and sexism that does exist within law enforcement—because law enforcement is a microcosm of society at large—we need to examine the culture of law enforcement and what it does to us. . . . We need to look at what it is about the [police] culture that creates a situation where people become the spark that can ignite civil disorder.⁴

These statements point to the fact that police agencies need to embark upon an introspective journey to determine their future existence as "a part of" the community instead of adhering to their traditional stance "apart from" the community. No longer can the police act as an occupational force. There is a need for intense and ongoing educational processes for developing an understanding of culture and how it affects police-community relations and the institutionalization of community oriented policing. The two go hand in hand. Community oriented policing cannot truly exist unless officers understand the various cultures in the community and the influence of those cultures on the acceptance of the police by community members.

Those who understand the potential of community oriented policing recognize the symbiotic relationship between community oriented policing and the management of diversity and make it the foundation of any effort to control and manage crime. Police agencies have realized that in order to make any significant impact on crime, they must encourage citizens to participate in the battle. A police-community partnership must empower citizens to participate in the decision-making processes of the department and to help determine the future of their neighborhoods. This partnership can come about only if the cultures, skills, and needs of both the police and the community are understood and respected. It cannot exist without open, honest, and frank discussion about race, culture, biases and prejudices, and their implications for policing; with-

Cultural diversity and liability

There are any number of altruistic reasons for understanding and managing diversity, but one reason that all local government managers can relate to deals with money and liability. Ours is a very litigious society. Civil disorders can result in law suits from the following constituencies:

Community residents and business people

Failure to protect: The police department and fire department failed to protect persons and properties from injury and destruction.

Failure to train: The police department failed to provide the training necessary to police personnel so that they could better interact with citizens and reduce the possibility of civil disorder.

Failure to supervise adequately: The police department failed to provide proper supervision to personnel, giving them the opportunity to engage in activities that contributed to cultural misunderstanding and civil disorder.

Negligent retention: The police department knew or should have known that there were police personnel who did not understand (or consciously ignored) cultural differences, resulting in civil disorder.

Violation of civil rights: The police violated the civil rights of citizens by engaging in the excessive or illegal use of force, resulting in civil disorder.

Police personnel

Failure to protect: The police department had knowledge that there were persons in the department who had the potential to create civil disorder through their prejudiced or biased activities, and injury resulted to other police personnel who were called in to quell a consequent disorder.

Failure to train: The police department failed to provide on an ongoing and consistent basis educational activities regarding cultural differences in the community and how those differences could conflict with the police culture and result in civil disorder. Or the police department failed to retrain officers: tactics that were appropriate in the past when the community was more homogeneous are now inadequate and could lead to misunderstanding on the part of the community and the police.

Failure to supervise adequately: Either the police department failed to prepare its supervisors to detect and avert the conflicts that may develop in a changing community, or supervisors did not provide the supervision necessary to personnel who had been identified as causing problems in the community through their prejudiced or biased attitudes or behaviors.

Negligent retention: The police department knew that there were officers on the force who exhibited prejudiced or biased attitudes and behaviors and failed to take appropriate action to remove them.

out it, community oriented policing is an oxymoron.

One fact of life in late twentieth-century America is that this society is fast becoming more diverse. America is a cornucopia of multicultural, multiracial, and ethnically rich, proud people with different and competing norms, mores, values, languages, experiences; and expectations. It is becoming increasingly difficult to identify the status quo. As we look at the dynamics of this society, it is apparent that cultural and racial divisions are becoming more prevalent and that the basic social and economic disparities that were at the root of urban riots in the past have not been erased. The same frustrations that exist in our inner cities today were there 25 years ago when the Kerner Commission reported its findings.⁵ So long as the rift between the haves and the have nots continues—so long as many people perceive that they have no legitimate means to achieve the American dream—clashes will continue to occur.

IS COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING ENOUGH?

The term *community oriented policing* and its many variations have become the law enforcement buzz-

words of the 1990s, but there are still questions about what these words really mean. There are any number of definitions, although one prominent researcher has now stated that there is no need to give "good policing" a title.

The officer on the beat must know the community, its residents, its workers, and its business people intimately.

Regardless, in 1990 it was reported that over 400 police agencies were involved in community oriented policing.⁶ In 1994 it would be difficult to find a police chief who would publicly state that his or her agency is not engaged to some degree in community oriented policing. Nevertheless, many police departments have yet to come to grips with what community oriented policing actually entails and with the demands placed on the entire police agency, local government departments, and the communities served. In their zeal to implement the philosophy, some police executives confine community oriented policing to structural changes in the patrol function (e.g., increasing foot patrols, establishing mini-stations, etc.). They

Management Information Service

know that the patrol or beat officer is at the foundation of the philosophy, but they may not understand the full range of training and support that the beat officer needs in order to be effective in the new role of community oriented facilitator.

Community oriented policing requires that the beat officer (a person who has been overlooked and undervalued by the police culture), "own" his or her area of responsibility and marshal community and government resources for the benefit of the community he or she serves. The discretionary judgment of the patrol officer must be acknowledged, broadened, and fully utilized, not minutely regulated and restricted through an overabundance of rules.

The officer on the beat must know the community, its residents, its workers, and its business people intimately. Too often, cultures tend to be lumped into races or nationalities. The patrol officer is faced with challenges and conflicts which he or she may not be prepared to handle. For example, an officer may be responsible for a specific area within the "black community." But what constitutes the black community? Within the race, there are many and diverse cultures. Within a particular community, there may be blacks of Hispanic, African, African-Caribbean, American, European, or Asian decent. Each culture (as opposed to race) within a community is unique and has different as well as similar needs that require serious consideration and must be addressed if the police are to truly "serve and protect."

Actions that are common in mainstream American culture can result in miscommunication and have dire consequences if the police do not recognize cultural nuances. For example, it is not uncommon for a police officer to get the attention of someone by beckoning with a crooked index finger while repeatedly moving it back and forth, as parents often do while telling a child to come. Although most Americans consider this an innocuous gesture, it is an insult to an Ethiopian man: to use it is to call a person a dog.

If the unconsciously offending officer sees this man become irate, he or she may adopt a defensive posture, falling back on police academy training. Perhaps the man comes toward the officer, who now feels that he or she faces possible attack and resorts to the use of force. The use of force draws a crowd. The crowd draws additional police. The crowd does not understand what has happened. The police face what they perceive to be a hostile crowd. And the scene has the potential for civil disorder.

It would be unfair to expect anyone, the police included, to be aware of every possibility for miscommunication and cultural insult. Nevertheless, policing in a multicultural society requires a humanistic approach through which differences are understood and celebrated rather than viewed as cause for conflict. Opponents of community policing may believe that adding a multicultural focus will soften an allegedly already soft approach to crime prevention; how-

ever, not understanding cultural differences can result in officer injury or death and civil disorder. Understanding cultural differences does not mean that officers should avoid making arrests, but it does mean that they should be aware of how a situation may be perceived by others from different cultural backgrounds and be prepared to use alternative measures to prevent the situation from flaring up. It means that officers should be prepared to deal with the ramifications of enforcing the law in a society where there are different responses to law and authority.

It can be acknowledged that some police agencies' attempts at community oriented policing will be less than successful, resulting in wasted resources and dashed employee and community expectations. These less-than-successful experiences may be the result of the inability of the police agency to make the changes necessary to manage differently. Policing in the future will require a revised set of values and better communication inside and outside the police department. Before they can handle cultural differences in the community, police departments must get their own houses in order.

Police departments are not homogeneous entities, composed of people who are similar in appearance, background, and goals who are assigned to impose values upon the community. If accepting differences within the police department is not the organizational way of life, it is unrealistic to believe that the police will accept citizens in the community who are different.

In order to manage diversity, the department must first accept that diversity does exist. The concept of managing diversity, like the philosophy of community oriented policing, strongly suggests that the agency must make whatever changes are necessary in its systems, policies, practices, and procedures to eliminate any subtle barriers that prevent the police and the community from working in partnership to reduce the incidence of crime and civil disorder. This does not mean treating people equally, in all cases, but it does mean treating people equitably.

FROM MONOCULTURAL TO MULTICULTURAL

The internal police culture has difficulty acknowledging the diversity that exists within the police department; it may have difficulty acknowledging that a monocultural focus can and does cause cultural conflict. A monocultural focus also thwarts attempts to make police departments representative of the communities they serve. However, to fully understand the principles upon which the culture has been established and sustained, it is important to review the historical foundations of American policing.

In a somewhat controversial piece, Williams and Murphy (1990) suggested that to disregard the era of slavery and Reconstruction—and the results of that era on present day police-community relations—

fails to take into account "how slavery, segregation, discrimination, and racism have affected the development of American police departments—and how these factors have affected the quality of policing in the Nation's minority communities."⁷

The implication is that modern day policing has been influenced by the values of a repressive and oppressive society. It should be no wonder that its attitudes and behaviors permeate many aspects of policing up to the present day. As a result, in many communities a policing system exists that has been forced to include minorities but perpetuates the belief that minorities have "fewer civil rights, that the task of the police is to keep them under control, and that the police have little responsibility for protecting them from crime within their neighborhoods."⁸ Further, those minorities that join the ranks of policing unwittingly buy into the police culture and its beliefs.

Having a department that is representative of the community does not guarantee freedom from cultural conflict. The police organizational culture, reinforced through its policies, practices, and informal norms, can foster a bias against those who are different and can have serious ramifications in the treatment of minority and female segments of society, both within the police department and in the community.⁹

Unintentional conflicts can result from the norms and values that have been codified in the rules and regulations of the police department; those norms and values must therefore be examined. For example, most police departments have strict policies prohibiting the acceptance of gifts. However, officials who blindly follow rules because "those are the rules" fail to take into account how the rules may work against acceptance of the police by minority communities. It is the custom among certain Asian cultures to exchange gifts at initial meetings. Upon meeting with members of such a culture, the "community oriented policing" officer can be placed in the uncomfortable and unfortunate position of having to offend those whom he or she is there to serve, either by not offering a gift or by refusing to accept a gift.

Understanding diversity does not mean that the police agency must abolish its rule against the acceptance of gratuities. It places the responsibility on the department to institute policies that prescribe the conditions under which the exchange and acceptance of gifts can occur and how those gifts are processed. More important, this policy must apply to all personnel within the department, not just the beat officer. The beat officer cannot be required to account for a gift by turning it over to the property unit, while the police chief's office is filled with gifts that he or she takes home upon leaving the department.

With the increasing number of immigrants, American policing may face a "problem" similar to that experienced in Canada, which has a growing

Sikh population. When a Sikh joins the Royal Canadian Mounties, or any law enforcement agency, he brings his culture, one aspect of which is the religious requirement for males to wear turbans and not cut their hair. The wearing of a turban instead of the uniform hat would be a violation of department regulations in many American and Canadian policing systems.

The police department of the future will . . . establish reasonable parameters for the acceptance of cultural differences.

Does the department make an exception and accept the religious diversity its potential members bring to policing, or does it encourage litigation based on religious discrimination and again hamper, if not destroy, police-community relations? The question is whether the effective, efficient, and equitable delivery of police service is dependent on a hat—any hat. The honest answer is "no"; if success were dependent on a hat, there would be only one style throughout American police departments.

The police department of the future will recognize the diversity of its labor pool and establish reasonable parameters for the acceptance of cultural differences that do not affect the safety and well-being of the police officer or the accomplishment of organizational and community goals and objectives—as did the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the case of Sikh officers mentioned above. Failure to modify policing's value system will only further institutionalize those forms of discrimination and intolerance that plague society.

The acceptance and management of diversity, like its symbiotic twin, community oriented policing, cannot be just a program or strategy. For either to succeed, there must be cataclysmic personal, personnel, and policy changes from the top to the bottom of the organization. Both local government officials and police chiefs must have insight into the attitudes, biases, and prejudices (brought to and learned on the job) that their personnel carry into the streets of the community, and they must understand the impact that those attitudes can have. Local government officials and police chiefs must exemplify the values of community oriented policing and respect for diversity, and they must demand the same of all department heads and police department managers. Only when the rank and file see those values in action will the organizational culture—and perhaps employee attitudes—change and the philosophies become institutionalized.

In a Midwestern jurisdiction, a class on cultural diversity for executive level police officers was developed as the result of difficulties between the police and the community, particularly the black

community. Some participants questioned the purpose and value of the class, stating that discrimination was a thing of the past. Nevertheless, as the instructor was explaining the findings of focus groups conducted in preparation for the class, one white ranking official, with no apparent fear of reprisal—in front of his superior officer, who was black—used a racial epithet to say that some blacks were just “no good.” The black superior officer did not react; a subordinate black participant registered a look of disbelief and shook his head.

During the break, the black superior officer stated that he had spoken with the subordinate white official, warning him that “profanity would not be permitted in the classroom.” The instructor, who was black, observed that it was that type of inaction and tacit approval of cultural biases and prejudices that got the department in trouble with the community in the first place.

The key to managing diversity and celebrating cultural differences is training and education. No training program can automatically change attitudes, but with appropriate education and reinforcement (e.g., changes in the department’s performance appraisal and reward systems) it is possible to encourage a positive change in behavior. It is important that this education develop and refine the interpersonal skills of active listening, coaching, and providing feedback, and police personnel must become attuned to their own feelings, values, and behaviors. Managers and those who deal directly with the community must become able facilitators of concepts and practices that help people maximize their inherent and potential worth.

Although these concepts are not new and can be considered “good management,” education and training must be taken seriously and given priority by the leaders of the police departments of the twenty-first century. However, education and training are not a panacea that will cure all of the ills of an agency, particularly if the approach to training is incorrect. Unless it is clearly understood what education and training can—and cannot—do, communication may suffer and bad feelings may develop.

Particularly in the area of multiculturalism, where unless training is properly managed, participants’ values are often exposed and trounced upon, group training sessions may do more harm than good. It is vital that the objectives of the program be determined on the basis of a detailed needs analysis; that the agency leaders be prepared to deal with the results of training; and that competent personnel serve as the training facilitators.

Administrators must also be wary of creating false expectations. Too often police personnel receive the latest training only to return to an organization where the supervisors and managers have not participated in the training—or outdated procedures prevent them from using their newly acquired knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Training in community oriented policing and cultural diversity, if not conducted correctly and supported by changes in the organization, is better left undone. Training for the sake of training can diminish creativity, damage morale, and undermine leader credibility; it is a waste of time and resources. The guidelines that follow are provided for those police executives and local government managers who are serious about community oriented policing and the acceptance of diversity. Although these guidelines specifically address police departments, they can be applied to every local government department, especially if community oriented policing is being expanded to include community oriented government.

THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION

Learning can occur formally and informally, inside and outside the classroom. The police department should be viewed as a “learning organization”; every day that an employee comes to work presents a different learning situation that can work to the advantage or disadvantage of the department, the local government, and the community. Because the police chief and local government officials serve as role models, their every action or inaction provides opportunities for positive or negative reinforcement of values. They must lead by example. Ethical and equitable behavior is critical to the acceptance of community oriented policing and the management of diversity.

One of the principles of community oriented policing that affects the department’s approach to managing cultural diversity is that of empowerment. Sharing of power has to begin at the top of the local government and police department hierarchies if empowerment of the various cultures in the community is ever to become a reality. The chief administrative officer must provide the chief of police with the support and autonomy necessary to lead the police agency, not so that the police chief can create a fiefdom, but to provide an example of the management style the police chief should adopt with his or her subordinates throughout the department. Both officials must remember that rank has no privileges; it has obligations and responsibilities.¹⁰

Supervisors and managers state that one of their biggest problems is that of “micromanagement” by the police chief. Micromanagement is an indication that the chief has not made the psychological transition from a lower management level to that of administrator/executive, and it encourages dependency on the part of subordinate personnel. Micromanagement also sends the message that subordinate managers are not trusted and may lack the competence to be successful. If micromanagement is the informal value of the department, regardless of the formally espoused values, then supervisors and managers will also feel the need to micromanage their subordinates.

Micromanagement also creates another problem: rank-and-file members of the police department cannot get a decision out of the decision makers. Decision making entails risk. If subordinates are afraid to take risks because they are constantly being second-guessed and unfairly criticized, they will make as few decisions as possible.

Therefore, training should be developed for all ranks and positions and should be experiential to the extent possible. Many departments have provided training for officers and sometimes for supervisors, but little attention has been focused on training geared specifically to the upper levels of the department. Police and civilian personnel should be integrated in training classes so that participants can share experiences and learn from one another. Serious consideration should be given to including members of the community in these sessions so that they have opportunities to learn about the police. Their inclusion can lessen misperceptions, correct misinformation, and provide for ongoing dialogue that will reduce the opportunity for misunderstanding.

Training vs. Education

Training focuses on only one domain of learning, that of the acquisition of psychomotor skills (e.g., firearms and vehicle skills training). Education, on the other hand, addresses three domains: affective, cognitive, and psychomotor. The affective domain concerns the learner's feelings about the learning experience and the effect that it has on the learner; the learner's self-esteem and self-assurance should be enhanced by the learning experience. The cognitive domain involves the knowledge learned through participation in the experience and how it can be applied to the tasks to be accomplished. As previously stated, the psychomotor domain deals with the learning and practice of physical skills.

The police training academy is an institution of higher learning, an institution of adult education. When this premise is accepted, the training academy can become the foundation of the police department, taking its rightful place as the transmitter and molder of the values that are most important to the police organization and the community. It should be recognized as such and provided the support it needs to perform this function. Officials must agree upon the steps to be taken to ensure that training does what it is supposed to do and becomes the foundation of all the human resource development and management programs of the police department.

Curriculum Development

The following questions must be asked regardless of whether the department is using internal or external sources of educational curriculum development or delivery:

- Where does the educational function fit in the mission of the police department? Is it specifically addressed in the mission or values statement or in departmental directives on community oriented policing and the management of cultural diversity? Where does the "director of training" position fit in the hierarchy of the organization? Is the position viewed as one of importance, or is it where someone goes to retire (or worse yet, where someone goes as punishment)?
- What is the purpose of the learning experience? Is it to certify officers for specific tasks? How are knowledge, skills, abilities, etc., transmitted (by what methodologies)? Are the knowledge, skills, abilities, etc., applicable to the tasks to be performed? How is the learning experience evaluated? Is the curriculum cost effective—in terms of accomplishing what it is supposed to? Is there some determination of the learning level of all in the department so that newly acquired learning can be applied immediately? Does everyone in the organization participate or is learning viewed as a "grunt" requirement? Is learning viewed as a vital part of the organization or as a mandate of the state or another entity, complied with to keep the department out of trouble?
- What qualifications are required of the instructors, and how and when are they evaluated? What ongoing training should be required? Do instructors understand, accept, and model their leadership roles? Is there a balance between police and civilian instructors?

If community oriented policing and acceptance of cultural diversity are to be institutionalized, the educational process must become the primary vehicle through which institutionalization is accomplished. However, many departments use a process that almost guarantees that both will be ineffective. Too often, departments try to introduce community oriented policing and the management of diversity with a "shot in the arm." A curriculum is developed, and the entire staff of the department are marched through for their inoculation. After this first dose, there are no boosters. The curriculum is not modified on the basis of rank and position within the department. Officers are often viewed as the only ones who need training, because they are viewed as the ones causing problems in the community. As the command staff of one police department indicated on being advised that a cultural diversity curriculum had been prepared specifically for them: "We don't need training. We're here to evaluate what the officers are getting."

As stated throughout this report, for these concepts to take hold, they must become the thread that ties all human resource processes and programs together. They cannot be formed into a "block of instruction." Blocks are easily dropped when time is

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short or when the budget needs to be pared; they are also subject to the interpretation and whims of instructors. There must be a quality control mechanism put in place that not only ensures that information is imparted, but that objectives are accomplished and results evaluated.

The following examples are provided to demonstrate how community oriented policing and the management of cultural diversity can be incorporated into and link all other curricula of the training function.

Municipal/criminal code. This scenario could be used to introduce cultural diversity problem solving during recruit or in-service training dealing with the criminal code, using the offense of bribery, after the elements of the offense are discussed:

You witness a traffic violation and when you stop the driver of the vehicle, you notice two things. First, he speaks with a heavy Spanish accent; second, he appears very nervous. You ask for his license and registration. When he gives them to you, you find that he has also included a \$100 bill. The traffic offense carries a fine of \$25, but now you also have the offense of bribery. How would you handle this situation?

The instructor would acknowledge that the offense of bribery had been committed and that the officer would be well within the law to arrest the driver. The instructor could also use this as a "teachable moment" in problem solving and analysis. The officer noticed a heavy Spanish accent. If the officer had been given culture-specific training, he or she could consider the fact that in some Latin American countries the way to do business with any public official, particularly police, is to offer money. It is expected, and there can be severe penalties for non-compliance. The driver may be reacting in a manner that is expected in his culture.

The officer has several options. He could arrest. Or, after further questioning the driver regarding his country of origin, he could explain that the exchange of money is a punishable offense in this country, but charge him only for the traffic violation. However, the final decision to arrest or not arrest would be the officer's.

Criminal investigation. These scenarios can be used in a class dealing with investigative techniques when discussing interviewing and interrogation:

As an investigator, you will come into contact with people of various cultures, and by the manner in which they relate to authority they may appear to be either hiding information or being uncooperative.

Culture A shows respect for authority by not looking a person in the eye. How might this be misinterpreted? In Culture B, it is rude to say "no," even when "no" is the appropriate response. How might that thwart your attempts

to investigate a crime?

Culture C is very clannish and handles problems within the community. You may find it very difficult to get information, even when a member is a victim of crime. What techniques might overcome these obstacles?

In Culture D, family relationships prescribe who will speak for the family. You request to speak with Witness Z; however, you are told that you must speak with the patriarch of the family. The patriarch comes out—as does the rest of the family, 15 members in all—and asks the purpose of your visit. You explain that you are investigating a homicide and that you must interview Witness Z. The patriarch tells you that you must describe the nature of the questioning before he will grant you permission to speak with Witness Z. How would you handle this situation?

With an understanding of how cultural differences affect an individual's response to authority, the investigator will know that time may have to be spent explaining the police investigative process, which may lengthen it. However, the objective is not to permit cultural differences to redefine the investigator's job, but to get the needed information.

Supervisory/management training. The instructor can use this scenario to raise the cultural diversity issue during supervisory or managerial training, after discussion of leadership theories:

You are a supervisor/manager of Patrol Section A. A female sergeant comes to you to discuss a problem with a newly assigned, male recruit officer. He resists taking direction from her and on several occasions has stated, "It's not right for me to have to take orders from you." She has attempted to reason with him, but to no avail. You have an officer who is clearly being insubordinate. On the basis of your experience, what would be a typical response to this situation? How would you handle it?

Suppose you call the officer in. You find that he is a very religious person and his religious doctrine is based on a literal interpretation of the Bible. According to his beliefs, men should not be subordinate to women, and he is experiencing a real internal conflict. He does not want to be disrespectful or difficult, but he does not know how to resolve the conflict.

The objective in this situation is to carry out the mandate of the patrol function and to have all persons respond positively to lawful authority. While recognizing the officer's right to his beliefs, the supervisor would advise him that if he chooses the police profession, he will have to adhere to the rules and regulations of the organization and respond to competent authority, male or female. The supervisor would insist that the officer do as he is told, but instead of meting out punishment, he can use the conversation as a teaching experience. It would also be acceptable for the supervisor to suggest to the officer

that if he really has a difficult time resolving the conflict, then perhaps the profession is not for him.

Executive training. This scenario could be proposed in an executive-level professional development course in which the philosophy of community oriented policing is discussed in detail, focusing on the changes that must be made in the organization and the need to modify leadership styles.

Empowerment is a principle of community oriented policing. Employees and members of the community are encouraged to become self-directed, to take responsibility for the improvement of the quality of their work, community, and life. However, some patrol officers indicate that they do not want to be empowered: they want and expect direction—that is why they are still patrol officers. If they had wanted more responsibility, they would have sought promotion. As executives, firmly committed to community oriented policing, what would you do?

The "answer" to this situation is that people are different and not everyone in the department wants or is ready to be empowered. Some people prefer to receive direction from others; simply issuing an edict will not create an empowered workforce. Executives will have to ensure that their management styles and those of their supervisors and managers are flexible, so that individual differences are taken into account. Leaders should encourage and coach those who are resistant; however, do not expect everyone to accept empowered status. Supervisors, managers, and executives must understand that they have to modify their approach depending on the need of their personnel for supervision. Not wanting to become empowered is not a punishable offense.

In-service training. At roll call, a training film on domestic violence is shown that includes discussion of the criminal code, which indicates that if evidence exists that a man struck a woman, he will be arrested. The instructor could propose this scenario:

You (male) and your partner (female) arrive on the scene. A child opens the door, and both of you enter. You immediately go to the woman; you can see that she has been beaten. Your partner goes to the man, who becomes very agitated and resists her. As you speak with the female victim, the man says, "Don't talk to him! You're my wife. I'll do what I want!" The wife is visibly frightened and states that she wants you to leave; she will not press charges. When you ask whether the husband hit her, she states that it was her fault, he did not do anything. Both speak with a strong accent, possibly African. What would you do?

On the basis of most domestic violence statutes, the answer would be to arrest the husband. The instructor would also explain that in certain cultures, there is no such thing as "domestic violence" and the status of women is not the same as it is in this country; women are considered property. In some other

cultures, there is a strong sense of "machismo," and a man loses face if the woman is spoken to first or if he has to defer to female authority.

Armed with this information, if there is a choice, as there was in this situation, the male officer could have tended to the husband and the female officer to the wife and thereby avoided adding cultural conflicts to an already volatile situation.

Nevertheless, if someone commits a crime in this country, he or she may well find him- or herself being arrested by someone of a different sex, religion, culture, or race. Is it "right" to tailor responses on the basis of cultural differences? The instructor could reply that the objective is to get out of the situation safely and in this instance, there were options. If two female officers had responded, then they would have had to take the necessary action as safely as possible.

Physical skills training/defensive tactics. This is a fairly easy scenario to use when demonstrating handcuffing techniques. As the instructor is placing the handcuffs on a volunteer, he or she states:

You are on the scene of a demonstration for deaf rights. The demonstrators have violated the order to remain 300 feet from the front of the building. The officer in charge warns them on the bullhorn that they are in violation and that if they do not move back to 300 feet, they will be arrested. He gives the warning three times, as required. The demonstrators do not respond. He orders them to be arrested. As the demonstrators are handcuffed, they begin to resist. What has happened?

The rules and regulations of the department are geared toward people who can hear, see, and speak. The discussion should revolve around the fact that the demonstrators were probably deaf and did not hear the warnings. Although some deaf people read lips, many use sign language. When they are handcuffed, their means of communication is cut off. (This scenario is based on an actual event.)

MODEL EXECUTIVE-LEVEL CURRICULUM FOR COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING

Change must occur at the top, with those who have the power to affect policies, practices, procedures, and systems. They must lead by example, demonstrating their commitment to the new concepts. Too often, the training process begins with the worker.

In an ideal situation, classes should be integrated, including all ranks and positions so that interaction and learning can occur among the different people in the organization; community members should also be included. Mixed classes demonstrate a commitment to breaking down barriers, which is necessary to the success of internal and external acceptance and management of cultural diversity and community oriented policing.

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What follows is a model curriculum for the executive level of the police department that will assist in the institutionalization of the philosophy of community oriented policing. No indication is given of the number of days or hours required because that would depend on the resources available, the knowledge and behavior of the executives, the capabilities of the instructors, the needs of the community served, and most important, the commitment of the executive level. Conducted incorrectly, it could be a two-day course. Conducted correctly, it could consist of a 40-hour introductory course spread over several days or weeks with follow-up assignments and biweekly two- or four-hour workgroup sessions that continue until retirement. New executives would

undergo an abbreviated introductory session (as part of their preparation for promotion, they already would have received training in this area); a mentor from the executive staff would then provide them guidance as needed.

As part of this curriculum, the executive staff should

1. Analyze and critique executive staff motivations for assuming their current rank or position and whether their motivations support the values of community oriented policing and the acceptance and management of diversity.
2. Review and modify, if necessary, the working definition of community oriented policing and

Course outline: The police executive and community oriented policing

This outline provides an overview of the course material and demonstrates the links between this series of sessions and those in which the remainder of the department and the community will participate.

Part I What is community oriented policing, and why is understanding diversity important?

What does community oriented policing mean to us? Is our approach driven by the community or by the police department?

Why is understanding diversity important? What are the implications of civil disorders for the financial future of the city or county, the police department, and individuals within the department?

Activities: Form working groups to survey department and community readiness for community oriented policing. Assess complaints received against department personnel and their resolution.

Part II Managing diversity

How has diversity affected the department's workforce and service area?

Activities: Define and discuss diversity within the department and community.

Part III The meaning of culture

In what respects is the department's organizational culture a subset of the broader police culture?

Do the departmental culture and the police culture clash with the cultures of employees and the community?

What are our personal biases and prejudices?

Activities: Critique department experiences with civil disorders to determine what could have been done to prevent them. Clarify and discuss personal values in order to find ways to work effectively despite them if they create conflicts.

Part IV Institutionalizing community oriented policing

How can the police organizational mindset be changed? In what ways can "command-and-control"

policies, practices, procedures, and systems be modified?

How do specific human resource policies affect the type of individual employed and promoted by the organization?

What measures should the department take to develop its talent pool and ensure the future of the organization?

Activities: Take an "organizational ethics quiz" and discuss the implications of the results. Review mission and values statements and annual goals and objectives. Assess recruitment, selection, assignment, discipline, and promotion policies. Determine employees' career goals and the resources available to help meet them.

Part V Marketing the new values

What strategies might persuade department personnel and the community to "buy in" to community oriented policing and the value of diversity?

How can creativity be encouraged?

Activities: Find ways, such as simple awards for innovative ideas, to show employees that their personal contributions are valued by the organization.

Part VI Leadership for community oriented policing

How is leadership defined, developed, and used?

Activities: Facilitate communication and share information and power by breaking down artificial barriers within the department and community. Recognize the leadership found at all levels, not only within the upper ranks.

Part VII Strategies for evaluating the success of community oriented policing and diversity management

Activities: Use flexible, creative standards to evaluate achievement, in addition to conventional measures such as surveys, complaints received, and rise or drop in disciplinary problems or crime rates.

cultural diversity to meet the departmental and community needs and expectations from which all policies, procedures, practices, and systems will be formed. These modifications will affect relationships within the department and with the community.

3. Analyze and critique personal biases and prejudices and discuss how they can affect the institutionalization of community oriented policing and diversity management.
4. Analyze the diversity of the community and discuss how it affects the effectiveness, efficiency, and equitable delivery of police services.
5. Analyze the diversity that exists within the department and discuss how it can be managed to achieve the mission, goals, and objectives of the department.
6. Analyze and discuss how failure to understand cultural differences can have severe consequences—including financial repercussions—for the city or county, the department, and individual executives.
7. Analyze and plan for the removal of barriers that prevent the acceptance and management of diversity within the department and in the community.
8. Develop action plans with defined time lines to implement, modify, or delete department policies and procedures that are barriers to the management of diversity.
9. Critique the current mission and values statements in order to determine whether they are in concert with the goals of community oriented policing and diversity management and determine how they can best be presented to the workforce and the community served.
10. Develop action plans to assist in the institutionalization of the mission, objectives, and values of the department.
11. Discuss and critique the implications of cultural clash in the department and the community.

Some information will be transmitted through lectures; however, because the educational process should provide practice in the development and use of skills, most learning should take place through experiential activities. Those behaviors that executives must acquire and use should be modeled. Participants should also engage in pen-and-paper assessments, large- and small-group discussions, participant-led critiques, and out-of-class working sessions. Films and handouts can be provided as an adjunct to the learning experience and critiqued by the executives for relevance in the organization's work environment.

Changing the Organizational Mindset

The traditional police culture developed as a means of maintaining the status quo in society and internal command and control in the department; it tends to foster conformity and dependency and reduce judgment and problem-solving capabilities and opportunities. Under community oriented policing, the department must consider empowering employees to become self-directed, self-motivated, and self-disciplined. These employees must rely on the organization and its hierarchical structure to supply the resources and support to accomplish their jobs. How many levels are necessary to supply those resources?

Perhaps the most difficult part of the curriculum for executives is to critically evaluate tradition to determine what should remain the same and what should be changed. Here they must confront the issue of how change will affect them personally. The entire department must be dissected and put back together in a manner that is acceptable to the various constituencies; in the process, some executives will recognize that they do not have the skills necessary to meet the new challenges. Some will be able to gain these skills; others will come to the conclusion that it is best for them to leave.

The first step for the organization is to determine the tasks and duties of all positions and ranks; in a police department with seven levels or ranks, many of the duties may overlap and sometimes conflict. Where there is overlap, police chiefs should consider combining ranks, thus reducing the hierarchy and increasing efficiency. If the answer to the question "Why does this rank exist?" is "Because it's always been there," it should be considered for consolidation or elimination. Rank should relate to a specific listing of tasks, responsibilities, and duties.

The walking tour. It is difficult to change the organizational mindset without adequate data to define that mindset and employee reaction to it. Data may be gathered through the use of a formal "climate survey," but police chiefs and local government administrators can gain valuable insight by taking a "walking tour" as part of out-of-class activities. If possible, they should use cameras to capture evidence of the climate.

Often employees keep their feelings under wraps because of fear of reprisal. However, administrators can learn a great deal about employees' feelings about the organization and leaders' management styles by reading cartoons, anonymous messages, and clip art on

- Employee bulletin boards
- Electronic bulletin boards
- Employee desktops
- Slogans on coffee cups and memo pads
- Restroom and elevator walls
- Locker rooms
- T-shirts.

The messages may range from the funny to the obscene. Although some managers will claim that they are the work of disgruntled employees, administrators would be wise to delve further into the reasons for their existence.

Special interest employee groups. Another indicator of employee attitudes is the number and function of special interest groups, including unions. Most of these groups are not established for purely social reasons; they develop from a real or perceived need to protect their members from unfair management practices. Although many departments have written values espousing the importance of the police family, the number of these special interest groups can indicate that the police family is somewhat dysfunctional. Another way to assess how employees feel about the organization is to conduct a review of the number and type of grievances filed against the department, with either internal or external investigative agents.

These factors should be considered by the leadership of the police department if for no other reason than the fact that the community is treated only as well as employees perceive themselves to be treated.

Vertical staff meetings. Police chiefs who want to provide opportunities for members to voice their perceptions can conduct vertical staff meetings in which rank and egos are left at the door and any member is free to voice his or her concerns without fear of reprisal. The chief who does this must have a thick skin and a strong sense of self, because much of the initial venting that may occur will appear to be personal attacks on the police chief. In reality, negative comments may be the result of frustration with the organization's policies or resources or lack of community acceptance. As part of this assessment, executives are encouraged to conduct vertical staff meetings and discuss the results with the larger group.

The role of language. Police executives must also be mindful of how the organizational culture reinforces divisiveness and a sense of one's "place." Language is a strong agent of socialization and purveyor of values. Police have their own argot, and although it may serve as communication shorthand, it can also devalue human beings. It is common to hear people referred to as "scum," "collars," "perps," "complainants," "dirt balls," "civilians," etc.

This example may serve to demonstrate the potentially destructive force of language: A sergeant who has since retired from a major city police department used to end each roll call with the charge, "Put some meat on the table," which meant to make some "good," preferably felony, arrests. However, at times, in the quest to get these arrests, the "meat" became "tough" and had to be "tenderized." Officers felt little guilt using force, which in some cases

was clearly excessive, because the recipient ceased to be a person—he or she became "meat"—inanimate, with no feelings or rights.

The use of language in training should also be closely scrutinized. Police academies, particularly those that provide recruit training, are modeled on the military boot camp. In addition to imparting knowledge, the purpose of the academy experience is to instill esprit de corps and a sense of teamwork and to expose recruits to situations in which they may find themselves when they begin patrol. Often this training involves putting recruits under stress in order to determine how they will react. Some academy instructors use derogatory terms to simulate experiences that recruits may have with citizens.

Perhaps the most difficult part of the curriculum for executives is to critically evaluate tradition.

This type of training can have negative effects. If derogatory terms are used, for example, not during role play, but during morning inspection when there is little or no sense that "this is just a test," instructors can give recruits the impression that if the instructor does it, it is all right for them to do it later. The instructor, after all, would not do anything wrong. Recruits have different levels of maturity when they enter training. Some may be able to differentiate between what is only a training method and what is expected behavior in real life. Others may not. Instructors should not assume that recruits can make this distinction.

The divisive force of language may also be seen in the relationship between the police and the support members of the police department, if support staff feel that their designation as "civilians" makes them second-class citizens in the police agency. They may indicate that they are left out of training programs, not given due respect, and only secondarily considered for career advancement programs. If the police chief, when asked for the authorized strength of the department, does not include civilians, perhaps that is the first place to start to correct inequities and show appreciation of employees' diversity.

Policies and procedures. Police policies and procedures are a major purveyor of organizational values and norms. Most of them provide valuable guidelines to operations, but some are no more than the codified values of those police executives who had the power to transform their personal views into organizational policy. In the past, policies and procedures have prescribed what functions women could perform; discriminated against gays and lesbians; and contributed to confusion because they were unenforceable. For example, the male managers of one fairly large police department attempted to prohibit the wearing of short skirts by female officers by

ruling that hems had to be not more than one inch above or below the center of the knee. Their intent, to ban short skirts, may have been admirable, but the regulation could not be enforced without placing officers who wore longer skirts in violation.

Police executives must review all policies and procedures before implementing community policing or diversity management. Consider this example: One fairly large department had two documents that provided organizational guidance. The first (the manual) was the document that established the department, and it was rarely reviewed. The second (general orders) provided guidelines for daily operations. When the department adopted community oriented policing, an additional order was added to the set of general orders; however, the manual was not reviewed.

Although the new general order encouraged beat officers to "get to know" the community and engage in dialogue to foster improved police-community relations, the manual instructed members of the force not to engage in idle conversation with citizens. This inconsistency provided the supervisor who felt that community oriented policing was soft on crime and a waste of time with a legitimate means of circumventing the system and hassling officers who believed in community policing. Meanwhile, the department could do little without undermining its own policy, because the police chief could not unilaterally change the manual; the city council had to do so.

Vision, mission, and values. During the organizational review, the vision, mission, and values of the department must also be assessed for relevance and achievability and to ensure that they do not conflict with policies and procedures.

Vision. A vision is a picture, a snapshot of what the organization is to become in the future that at the same time provides guidance for the present. The local government chief executive officer should have a vision of the city or county and of the role of the police in helping to realize that vision. It should be developed in concert with the police chief so that the chief and department heads have an incentive to buy into and promote it.

The police chief expands the governmental focus to include members of the department and the community. Although the police chief should have a personal vision, the final vision should be developed in concert with department employees. If it comes from above as another edict, staff will view it as an attempt to control and force something on them. Although some will buy into the vision, others will simply ignore it and continue to engage in business as usual.

In assessing these issues, either in class or in work groups, police executives should answer the following questions:

1. What purpose does the vision serve?
2. Who participated in determining the vision?

3. How will the vision be promoted?
4. Is the vision supported by other department policies, practices, and procedures?
5. How will the vision be modeled?
6. Does the vision include the community?
7. Did the community participate in determining the vision?

When these questions are answered, the executives can take specific steps to promote the vision to the department and the community.

Values. Police departments exist in which racism, sexism, and discrimination are officially prohibited, yet tacitly condoned, encouraged, reinforced, and sometimes rewarded. Despite written policies prohibiting discriminatory actions, they still occur. Do these policies have the same "teeth" as those dealing with violations of firearms policy? Is punishment certain if someone is found guilty of discriminatory acts? What is the punishment? Are ranking officials dealt with in the same manner as the rank-and-file?

There is probably no police department that does not have some document that states that its members "serve and protect" the public and revere and respect human life and dignity. This reverence for life should also extend to death. Although officers can become jaded and cynical, they should always remember the people they serve. At the scene of a homicide, the victim's sister asked the investigator not to prod the body of her deceased brother with his foot; the investigator responded, "He's dead, ain't he?"

Curricula should be developed to answer these questions:

1. Are complaints filed by those of different economic or racial status (or any other category) given equal consideration?
2. Are specific neighborhoods targeted for police operations because it is easy for officers to make arrests there when they need them? When areas are targeted for special tactics, is the decision based on crime analysis or other hard data, or are they targeted because officers enjoy hassling the residents?

As part of this process, which really deals with ethical behavior, executives should take the "quiz" in the sidebar on page 14 and then discuss the results and their implications for the department and the community.

Goals and objectives. The goals and objectives of the police department and its individual units should be realistic and achievable. Too often, at yearly planning sessions, goals and objectives are set that can result only in failure. The staff of one Midwestern department agreed that they would reduce violent crime by 10 percent. When asked whether they would be successful in meeting this mandate if they reduced violent crime by 9.5 percent, they admitted that they

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would not. Because they were involved in community oriented policing, they were then asked to consider what would happen if—due to increased trust between the citizens and the police—citizens felt more comfortable reporting crime and reporting of violent crime therefore increased: Would they consider increased reporting a sign of failure?

The point here is that police departments are used to numbers, to numerical goals. It is easier to

measure something that is quantifiable, but the result can indicate failure when an effort has not failed.

Training in the area of goal setting should include discussion of

- Why a mission, goals, and objectives are needed and how they can be personalized
- What will happen to this mission and the goals and objectives once written
- Who participated in their determination and why
- Whether the mission, goals, and objectives are measurable
- The mechanism by which they will be evaluated
- Whether they can be reassessed if difficulty is encountered in achieving them.

During an in-class session, executives should review previous annual plans listing goals and objectives to determine

1. The seriousness of the exercise
2. The amount of time spent in preparing the report
3. The actual results of the planning process.

Human Resource Interventions

While the policies, procedures, mission, and goals are being reviewed and modified, the type of individual needed by the community and the organization must also be determined. An ideal candidate can be envisioned, but organizations must work with raw material, which cannot be shaped if there is no mold. The mold is determined by an analysis of the skills needed to actualize the vision. Recruitment, selection, assignment, and promotion—the specific programs that funnel people into and throughout the organization—are areas that must be assessed.

Recruitment and selection. Recent training programs in community oriented policing and the management of cultural diversity have proposed that a “new kind of officer” is needed for the future police department. This statement leads one to believe that everyone now involved is somehow obsolete. However, most departments have little idea of the talents, skills, knowledge, and abilities of those already on staff.

A balance must be struck between those officers who are called “traditional” and those called “community oriented.”

When employees in most departments are asked whether they feel that the department requires them to work to their full potential, the majority answer “no.” When asked whether they are willing to use previously unused skills for the benefit of the department, the majority answer “yes.” These questions were posed to a mixed group of police and civilian employees of a police department, with the police chief present. All but one person—the police chief

Have you ever ...

Incident

	Yes	No
Pled the Fifth?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physically abused a prisoner?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Verbally abused a prisoner?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Verbally abused a citizen?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bumped a prisoner's head while assisting him or her into a transport vehicle?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Called a citizen a derogatory name?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Referred to a female officer by a derogatory name?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Referred to a minority officer by a derogatory name?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Referred to a majority officer by a derogatory name?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Provoked a citizen into an arrest situation?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Have you ever witnessed a fellow officer (official) do any of the above?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If you answered, “yes,” what did you do about it?		

As a member of the executive staff of this department, have you ever engaged in any activity for which, had you been an officer (private), you would have been reprimanded?

If the answer is “yes,” why did you do it?

As a member of the executive staff, have you ever committed a violation of the department's rules or regulations and then reprimanded a subordinate for the same or a similar infraction?

If the answer is “yes,” why did you do it?

himself—answered “no” to the first question. Looking around the room, the chief stated, “I’m surprised. I didn’t know.” The participants remarked that they felt that management did not care about their abilities, so there was little point in making them known.

It is incumbent upon police executives and managers to find out what skills exist within the workforce and how they can contribute to community oriented policing and the management of cultural diversity. They should then begin to develop guidelines for recruitment and selection of entry-level personnel. There is one caveat, however. Some departments throw the baby out with the bath water. There is still a need for personnel who are reactive. A balance must be struck between those officers who are called “traditional” and those called “community oriented.” A melding or blending of the two should occur, creating officers who can use problem solving and analysis to determine the mode in which they should operate, depending upon the circumstances in which they find themselves.

Training should revolve around these issues:

- Why are both police and civilian personnel being brought into the department—to fill vacancies or to ensure a stable future?
- Is the department able to match personal abilities with the needs of the department and community?
- When personal potential exists, is the police department able to provide the training and support necessary for employees to acquire or strengthen skills that may be lacking or weak at the time of recruitment?

Assignment and promotion. Ensuring that the right person is selected or promoted begins with an analysis of the job to be performed. The job must then be matched with people in the organization who have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities, or the potential to acquire them. In the process, the issues that follow must be raised and openly and honestly discussed:

In this police department, does the director of finance have financial background or experience? Does the director of training have training background or experience? Does the director of personnel have personnel background or experience? If not, why not? It is true that people can learn on the job, but in many departments, police are exempt from specific qualifications and time-in-grade requirements although they require others (for example, civilian personnel) to meet them, regardless of the quality of their experience.

Police departments send contradictory messages. For example, recruits must meet certain standards for entry, but once rank is attained, standards become irrelevant. Position descriptions and qualifications should be developed for “police” as well as for civilian positions, giving job candidates an in-

centive to prepare for the competitive selection process through continuous self-improvement. Continuous learning leads to organizational growth and stability. Executives must ask themselves why their department promotes—to fill vacancies or to provide leadership? If the objective is to provide leadership, what qualities are necessary to ensure that the department’s philosophy and goals are institutionalized?

There should be a balanced emphasis on a person’s performance under the controlled conditions of the promotional process and his or her actual past and anticipated future performance and ability to exemplify the ideals of community oriented policing. Once an individual is promoted, there should be a period of learning and evaluation to determine whether the promotee, the organization, and the community fit well. A person does not have a right to a promotion because he or she has achieved a certain score. The right to a position comes with the demonstration of a commitment to the ideals of the organization and the community.

Executive training in this area should include discussion on

- How to instill the belief that if the “fit” is not right, being returned to a previously held position is not punishment
- The need to recognize that there is nothing wrong with not wanting to get promoted
- The false expectations that arise when people are encouraged to believe that anyone can be promoted if he or she studies hard, when in fact the top narrows and only so many will be promoted regardless of how intelligent, skilled, and effective others may be.

Performance evaluation. Performance evaluation is critical to the success of community oriented policing and the management of diversity. This process serves several functions:

1. It provides guidance to individuals by specifying job requirements.
2. It serves as a measure of accomplishment of organizational objectives.
3. It provides a basis for career development.
4. It helps to institutionalize community oriented policing and the management of diversity by providing incentives to adopt the behaviors necessary to their success.

An analysis must be made of the various tasks to be performed, and then appropriate standards must be devised (see sidebar on page 16).

In organizations, subordinates are customarily evaluated by supervisors; however, the following should also form part of the evaluation process:

- Peer evaluations—employees in similar positions evaluate each other

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- Self-evaluation—prior to the supervisor/subordinate session, employees evaluate themselves; the two evaluations are then discussed
- Subordinate evaluation—subordinates evaluate their supervisors.

These variations serve as information and training tools and provide concrete examples that the organization is serious about trying new ways to foster an atmosphere in which individuals are valued. The key is to have valid, job-related criteria that support the direction of the department and to provide learning opportunities in which supervisory, management, and executive personnel can practice and receive feedback on observing and documenting performance.

Discipline. The word *discipline* has come to mean punishment, something that is “done” to the workers by supervisors or management. However, the *World Book Dictionary* states that discipline also means “training, especially training of the mind or character; the training effect of experience; a trained condition of order and obedience.” Only when the eighth definition is offered does the word *punishment* appear.

Job standards that support community oriented policing

Standards for supervisors could include

Actively encourages personnel to be accountable for their targeted areas by meeting with them and assisting in the development of plans to resolve crime or order maintenance problems

Meets with members of the community to determine police strategies to be used regarding order maintenance problems

Consistently updates skills regarding cultural differences and their impact on policing strategies as demonstrated by participation in self-initiated learning activities.

Standards for managers could include

Does not micromanage; creates an atmosphere wherein employees are encouraged to take risks without fear of reprisal for honest mistakes

Solicits subordinate and community feedback on his or her performance and uses the information in planning for self-development activities

Uses a variety of management skills and techniques based on analysis of subordinates' skills and level of knowledge.

Disciplinary systems must be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that discipline has the desired training effect. Discipline must be seen as a management tool, not a weapon. If risk taking is a part of community oriented policing and the management of diversity, the mistakes that occur as a result must be viewed as opportunities for learning. Even if punishment becomes necessary, it should serve to educate the individual.

Executives, in small class groups or in out-of-class work groups, can engage in discussions and activities to determine

- The meaning and effects of discipline on the achievement of individual and organizational goals and objectives
- The perception of discipline as an instrument of management command and control
- The role of negative discipline in buoying up the low self-esteem of some supervisors and managers and in keeping subordinates in their “proper place”
- The use of discipline as a weapon as opposed to a tool to help the individual and the organization learn.

As part of the discovery process, executives could conduct an attitude survey on discipline in the organization and those who mete it out. On the basis of the results the executives could revamp the process, devise specific curriculum activities, and develop an incentive system to change the use of negative discipline.

Incentive system. Policing has traditionally rewarded those who exceed numerical quotas. In community oriented policing, reward systems are modified to include the accomplishment of goals that may appear a bit fuzzy. For example, an award could be given for “increasing the level of trust between the police and community.” The task would be to provide concrete examples of how this was accomplished.

There will have to be a balance between awards to those who “thwarted a bank robbery” and those who “organized the community and ensured that vacant buildings were boarded.” If there is no balance, officers and others who could be very supportive of the new philosophy will have little external incentive to change. Incentive systems must recognize nontraditional strategies or ways to accomplish the tasks at hand.

It must also be remembered that as people mature, what motivated them when they were younger may not provide the same incentive. In many organizations, money has been used as a carrot; however, there may come a point when money ceases to motivate. For example, a young officer trying to make mortgage payments and pay a car note may welcome a cash award. But an older person whose mortgage is paid and who has a tidy nest egg may consider time off from the job more important. Any incentive

program must take these individual differences into account.

In order to develop curricula in this area, focus groups of department personnel and community members could give examples of how the principles of community oriented policing and diversity management can be made concrete.

Career development. Each of the previously discussed topics underlies an effective human resource development system in which differences are taken into account and systems modified to manage and utilize those differences effectively, not only for the benefit of the individual but also for the police department and the communities served. Only when community oriented policing and the management of diversity form the basis for the organization's human resource program will they become a reality.

As part of this process to secure the future of the organization, each employee should have a career development plan that is reviewed and modified frequently. The plan should provide opportunities for vertical and horizontal development and include specific developmental activities to guide the employee in his or her chosen direction. Ultimately, the employee must take responsibility for self-development, but the department must provide training activities. An investment in the organization's employees is an investment in the community.

Promoting the New Values

Executives promote by example. They must live up to the ideals they espouse for the organization. If this goal seems restrictive, time-consuming, or unrealistic, perhaps they should step aside to allow someone else to lead. Although the living example is most important, it may be easier in the beginning to take concrete actions that encourage employees and the community to practice the new values:

- Say "Thank you." This may seem simplistic, but lower level employees indicate that sometimes all that they need is to be personally acknowledged as someone who is valuable to the organization. This can be accomplished simply by speaking to employees, by saying "Thank you"—by offering a "warm fuzzy."
- Establish the "Risk-Taker Award." A simple computer-generated certificate could suffice. Executives could give unit and department awards to employees who presented the "most innovative idea to resolve a recurring problem."
- Conduct a contest to determine a slogan for the unit or department that conveys the organizational mission.

Executives should be reminded that leadership is not automatically bestowed because one assumes a rank or position. Look behind you; if there is no

parade, you're not a leader. It must be recognized that leadership can (and will) be found anywhere. It exists at every level of the department and at every level and in every segment of the community. The task is to find leadership, nurture it, and use it to benefit the organization and the community.

Evaluation Strategies

Conventional strategies for evaluating community oriented policing (e.g., surveys, review of complaints received, rise or drop in disciplinary problems) are available, but new strategies must be developed, and these will require a level of comfort with ambiguity. Community oriented policing and diversity management are evolutionary processes; evaluation of their success must therefore be continuous and creative.

For example, one jurisdiction implemented a program in which a police officer took up residence in the public housing development where he worked; one of his goals was to "build trust in the community." He could have used more orthodox measures of achievement (e.g., a drop in crime rate), but he said that he knew that he had come to be trusted on the basis of a single incident: One afternoon his next-door neighbor asked him where he was going. When he said that he was on his way to the store, she asked him to pick up something for her and handed him a folded slip of paper to give to the salesclerk. He did what she asked, curious about what was in the package the clerk gave him to take back to his neighbor. When he returned, his curiosity got the best of him, and he asked her what was in the bag. She opened it and pulled out a hank of hair used to weave extensions.

The officer was laughing as he related the story, but he remarked, "I don't know how this can be used to evaluate me, but I knew I had her trust. I knew I had arrived." The message here is to be open to different ways of evaluating progress toward achievement of the organizational vision.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Many police departments will "implement" community oriented policing by edict, assuming that it will take hold through osmosis. They fail to realize that traditional values and ways of doing things have deep roots that reach throughout the organization.

Only through training and continuous reinforcement will the new concepts take hold and become the organizational way of life. Failure to provide up-to-date, state-of-the-art learning activities can result in death, injury, and destruction resulting from misunderstandings between the police and the community. Failure to train can result in civil suits charging failure to properly train or negligent retention.

Local government administrators need to remember that civil disorder is only a human interaction away. Neither managers nor police chiefs can

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afford to sit with fingers crossed, hoping that civil disorder will not occur. If they institutionalize community oriented policing and manage cultural diversity through ongoing and criteria-based training, they can improve their chances of maintaining peace and order.

¹ William A. Geller and Michael S. Scott, *Deadly Force: What We Know: A Practitioner's Desk Reference on Police-Involved Shootings* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 1992).

² *Arresting Prejudice* (Northbrook, IL: MTI Film and Video, 1991).

³ *Civil Disorder: What Do We Know? How Should We Prepare?*, A compilation of papers presented before the Police Foundation National Conference, April 1993, Washington, D.C.: pp. 110-112.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 166.

⁵ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, *Final Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968).

⁶ Edward Tully, "Policing in the 90's," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (April 1990).

⁷ Hubert Williams and Patrick V. Murphy, "The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View," *Perspectives on Policing*, no. 13 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice and Harvard University: January 1990).

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 2


⁹ If there were not this bias, there would be no need for "special" employee groups in police departments and national organizations whose premise is to protect the rights of their members and to ensure equal access to opportunities within the field.

¹⁰ As stated, rank no longer has privileges; it has obligations and responsibilities. The patriarchal mentality of policing must be replaced with the idea of "leader as living emblem" of what is right and fair. For example, there are probably only a few, if any, police departments that do not have a prohibition against drinking alcohol on duty or in uniform. It is not acceptable for a beat officer who has been going from call to call during a really tough tour of duty to drink a beer with his or her hamburger when he or she finally gets 15 minutes to eat. However, it is not unusual to see high ranking police officials having an alcoholic drink at a retirement party or other departmentally required social function.



MIS REPORT

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RE-ENGINEERING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

- *Five minutes instead of five days to obtain city property maps.*
- *One staffer and three steps instead of three divisions and nineteen steps to determine departmental utility use.*
- *Three days instead of forty days to determine eligibility for social services.*
- *One staff contact for all human resources needs instead of many for city employees.*

These are the kind of results that make many local governments interested in learning more about the concept of re-engineering. This report explains the principles behind business process re-engineering, explains what re-engineering is and is not, and discusses the barriers to and requirements of re-engineering. The author presents several recommendations based on research and case studies. Examples drawn from local government and other public sector as well as private sector organizations illustrate the benefits of this practical, hands-on approach to improving effectiveness and efficiency.

Re-Engineering Local Government

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THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN GOVERNMENT

In Phoenix, Arizona, it used to take five days to obtain city property maps. Today it takes five minutes.

In Charlottesville, Virginia, identifying department utility use once required 19 steps involving three divisions using three different and incompatible computer systems, and took hundreds of staff hours each month. Today, one staffer uses one system to complete the process in three simple steps.

In Merced County, California; it used to take up to 40 days to determine eligibility for social services. Today applicants are scheduled for interviews to learn of their eligibility in one to three days.

In Hampton, Virginia, city staff formerly went to one human resource professional for training, a second for career counseling, a third for EEO guidance, a fourth to file a grievance, etc. Now Hampton staff go to the personnel staff member assigned to their department, who provides one-stop service for virtually all their needs.

What's going on here? Local governments are beginning to use a powerful methodology that goes by the awkward title of business process re-engineering (BPR). It is not for everyone, but those government units that find a need to make fundamental changes in quality, cost, speed, and customer responsiveness are increasingly turning to BPR, with impressive results. Consider two case studies:

Obtaining a Business License in Charlottesville

The old system. In the past, people who wanted to open a business in Charlottesville, Virginia (40,000), had to do the equivalent of a "bureaucratic triathlon," going through three different departments, up and down several flights of stairs. Many had to

return home for information they did not know they were required to bring with them.

First they went to the commissioner of revenue's office and filled out a form (with three carbon copies). Then it was up two flights of stairs to the building and life safety department, where staff checked to see whether their business was approved for the building they were using. Staff also checked handicapped accessibility and the certificate of occupancy for the intended use. If everything was in order, the applicant went to a third office, the department of community development, two floors down. Here staff asked about use of a sign (if one was to be used, it required another application and a check); determined whether the building was in the city's historic district (any changes to a building in this district involve review by the board of architectural review and a whole new set of procedures); checked the zoning to see whether the proposed business use was permitted; determined whether the required number of parking spaces was provided; and noted whether a house was being used for the business (only certain types of occupations are allowed in houses). Those using a house then had to fill out an affidavit with the home owner's signature, requiring a trip to the owner if the applicant did not own the house.

Finally the applicant took all forms and permits back to the commissioner of revenue's office, where the signatures were checked. When everything was in order, the applicant paid a fee and received the business license. Because three different offices were involved and because only one to two people were authorized to sign the permits and application forms in two of the offices, the applicant went through a long and circuitous process. Time to obtain a license: one to two days (if all went well).

The re-engineered system. The department heads involved and several staff met and decided to re-engineer the process. They decided to replace the

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
assembly line of stops, forms, and approvals with a streamlined, one-stop process. Today an applicant goes only to the commissioner of revenue's office, where an employee helps the applicant fill out a simple one-page application form. The employee calls the other two offices to verify zoning, sign usage, handicapped accessibility, etc., while the applicant is there. There is no waiting (several staff are cross-trained and available to help applicants); there are no surprises (applicants are told up front everything they need to complete the process); and there are no carbons to carry around. Once the other two departments have verified the applicant's eligibility

by phone, the applicant is granted a business license on the spot, and the other departments send their verification later to the commissioner of revenue via E-mail, to save the applicant unnecessary waiting.

Result: What used to take up to two days now takes 15 to 30 minutes. Applicants make one stop—technology does the running around. Staff spend far less time filling out paper because the information has been consolidated onto one form. And applicants have to deal with only one employee, who oversees the whole job.


Figure 1 Before and After Re-Engineering: Obtaining a Business License in Charlottesville, Virginia

The Old System



Time to obtain license: 2 days average.

The Re-Engineered System



Time to obtain license: 15 to 30 minutes.

"Seamless" Care at Lakeland Regional Medical Center

The old system. Many hospitals in this country offer their patients the ultimate in good news/bad news stories. Brilliant physicians and the latest in hi-tech equipment save our lives, yet the process of being cured can be a horrifying experience. Patients are treated like objects, they are carted from one specialist to another, things (and people) fall through the cracks, and important-looking doctors scurry down the halls while patients wait for the simplest services.

Often it is not much better for the staff. At one hospital in Indianapolis, there are 598 separate job classifications, over half having only one incumbent. The most routine services are provided centrally and thus with little flexibility. Those who spend the most time with patients—nurses and technicians—usually have little power within the system to effect change.

Two of the main culprits are fragmentation of services and rigid bureaucratic practices. When seven to nine management layers separate the CEO from the patient's bedside, it drives costs up and becomes virtually impossible to understand patient needs or hospital effectiveness. One Booz-Allen & Hamilton study showed that, of every dollar spent on hospital wages, only 16 cents goes for actual medical care. The rest is consumed in administrative duties: scheduling, documentation, management, transportation, etc. Functional fragmentation and rigid centralization of services characterize most modern American hospitals.¹

The re-engineered system. A few innovative hospitals are reversing the trend toward specialization and fragmentation. They are removing the walls between departments and units in order to give patients integrated, seamless medical care.

The 897-bed Lakeland (Florida) Regional Medical Center used to operate in a centralized and fragmented fashion, but it is re-engineering the way it delivers health care. As of 1994, four units will be operating on what is termed a patient-focused model. The key innovation: a team of multi-skilled practitioners made up of "care pairs" and "care trios" (registered nurse and cross-trained technicians) supported by a unit-based pharmacist, a unit clerk, and a unit

support aide, provide up to 90 percent of the services to their group of four to seven patients. Services once provided by centralized departments (X-rays, EKGs, respiratory care, lab work) are performed by the team. Certain equipment is redeployed to the unit. In this patient-centered system, patients seldom leave their units and very little scheduling is required.

Patients no longer go from department to department, waiting for hours in between; the care pairs are trained to perform a full range of patient care and information processing functions—from admitting, charting, and charging to therapeutic interventions, test administration, and evaluation. The care pair is backed up by computer terminals in each patient's room, which link each patient and team to the hospital's mainframe. Specially developed software gives teams the information needed to coordinate the patient's overall care. When physicians visit the patient, team members are able to provide immediate information on the patient's status. Further, the information processing system enables staff teams to oversee a complicated scheduling procedure involving admissions, discharge, and bed control. There are no handoffs. Physicians and other professionals get first-hand information ensuring continuity of care through a seamless service system.

This model requires changes in all aspects of hospital operations. Nurses and technicians go through an intensive, six-week training program so that they can move into generalist roles. Previously centralized services such as the pharmacy are now broken into smaller sections, each dedicated to one or more units. Nurses and technicians are involved in the budgeting process and resource allocation decisions. Training; evaluation; compensation; budgeting; and the information, performance management, and accountability systems all had to be changed to align with the new patient-focused model.

The results have been impressive, from every point of view. Turnaround time for routine tests went from 157 to 48 minutes. Care pairs/trios now spend over twice the time with patients that they did under the previous system (53 percent instead of 21 percent of their time). Medication error rates in the patient-focused units are the lowest in the hospital. Patients see an average of 13 hospital employees in the new units; patients in other units contend with an average of 53. Employee turnover in patient-focused units is the lowest in the hospital. One reason is that less time is spent on documentation, which now occupies only 2 percent of a staffer's day, compared with 30 percent in some hospitals. Physicians are delighted because paperwork is reduced and because turnaround time on patient tests is now 30 percent faster than before. Perhaps most important, patients' evaluations of the system are very positive. In addition, the costs of direct bedside care are 9.2 percent lower than in the traditional Lakeland units.

Figure 2 shows the radical change at Lakeland. The arrows in the old, functional system symbolize


multiple handoffs and fragmented communications patterns. In the new system, cross-functional teams manage the entire process with far fewer handoffs and with an understanding of how their work contributes to the desired outcome.

A DEFINITION OF BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING


These two case studies are different in most respects. The business license case is a specific, limited example of re-engineering that cost very little, did not require extensive use of new technology, and took less than six months to design and implement. The Lakeland

Figure 2 From Functional to Process Orientation: Lakeland Regional Medical Center

The Old System



The Re-Engineered System



(All functions are represented on most process teams.)

Management Information Service

story is one of a total organizational transformation that will continue through the rest of the decade and has cost \$5 million to support the new information systems and other changes. What these two cases have in common is that *they changed the way the work itself is organized*. That change is central to all re-engineering projects. Unlike other management approaches that focus primarily on teamwork, customer-supplier relations, flattening the hierarchy, or heroic leadership, business process re-engineering focuses on the way work is done. The point is to organize the work in the simplest, leanest manner possible, by

Challenging the underlying *assumptions* on which the organization is built and redesigning its *processes*, systems, and structure around desired *outcomes*.

The three words in italics are the critical ones. We will explore each.

Challenge Assumptions

Business process re-engineering challenges assumptions, forcing us to examine and question the unspoken premises that drive the organization. In the business license case, staff challenged the common bureaucratic assumption that one size fits all. Because the process of obtaining a license involved three different departments, it was assumed that *all* three departments had to be directly involved with applicants. Once that assumption was made explicit and questioned, it became evident that most applicants did not need to wander through a bureaucratic maze; cross-trained staff and appropriate technology could do all the wandering needed for the great majority. Only those requiring special clearance (e.g., by the architectural review board) have to go to more than one department.

In Lakeland, an even more fundamental assumption was examined—that the hospital should be organized for the convenience of the staff. Hospitals, like schools and many bureaucracies, respond to the demands of professionals far more than they respond to the needs of their end users. As that became clear, the concept of patient-focused care took hold, and that concept changed virtually everything about the hospital.

Focus on Processes

The emphasis on work processes is at the core of the revolution in innovative organizations today. It has been said that the organization of the future will be horizontal rather than vertical; the emphasis will be on four to six core processes, and those who “own” the processes will be the organization’s true leaders.²

Focusing on processes rather than functions requires a different understanding of work. Work pro-

cesses are defined as “*an interrelated set of activities that transform inputs into outputs that satisfy customer needs*.” In this definition, inputs are what comes into a system from outside, such as sick patients and health-related needs in the Lakeland example (see Figure 2). Organizations apply their resources and technical know-how to transform these inputs into outcomes that satisfy customers.

Processes in this definition are “end-to-end” sequences; they begin with a need and cut across functions and departments, just as the new Lakeland design cuts across its functions and departments. Because we tend to organize around departments, the work processes are less visible to us. However, they are highly visible to the customer. In fact, the work process is usually the *only* thing the customer cares about.

Think about it. When you take your car for service and the job is done wrong, do you care where the ball was dropped? Chances are that you want only one thing—for your car to be running well when you pick it up. That is, you want the *process* of servicing the car to work. The auto shop or dealership may have several units involved in that process: from the person who takes your appointment on the phone, the person who writes up the order, and the chief of the service department to the people who do the actual work on your car, verify that the work is completed, take your money, and give you your keys at the end. Each may report to a different unit, but all are involved in the same process—servicing your car.

Local governments are no different. In public works departments, for instance, there are several divisions—engineering, sanitation, fleet, streets and sidewalks, utilities, etc. Each is responsible for the specific tasks assigned it, but who manages the overall process of satisfying the customer? If a public works crew is cutting a street to put in new water and sewer lines, for instance, and it causes a problem on a resident’s property, the resident calls the department to complain. But who is responsible? Engineering? Streets and Sidewalks? Perhaps it was the utilities crew that put in the new water and sewer lines? Every city manager and public works director knows the experience of investigating a resident complaint, only to find staff divisions pointing fingers at each other.

In these finger-pointing situations, it is tempting to say that the real problem is a lack of communication and coordination; that with better teamwork we could work these things out; that the main need is for better leadership; or that what the staff really need is training so that they can see the big picture. The problem with all of these cures is that they do not address the underlying reality—*when functional units have responsibility for one narrow slice of a project, they cannot be expected to take responsibility for the big picture*. They cannot even see the big picture. They

are not rewarded for addressing the big picture; they are not organized to work on the big picture or to satisfy all of a customer's needs.

Let's return to the public works example. In a functionally oriented public works department, each division and unit focuses on very specific and narrow objectives (see Figure 3). The main advantage to this functional orientation is that it provides clear accountability; the major disadvantage is that nobody is responsible for customer satisfaction. An alternative is to organize around *processes*, not functions. A process orientation lets staff know what major work processes they are responsible for, how their work contributes to the overall process, and what the outcome of that process is. It also designates one "process owner," a manager who has overall responsibility to see that the process satisfies the customer and is authorized to draw on staff from all functions to achieve that objective.


For instance, major work processes in a department of public works include planning new subdivisions, completing street work, and responding to customer requests and complaints (see Figure 4). To organize the department around these three work processes, staff from each function would be put on one or more process teams, each with a process owner. The process team for planning new subdivi-

sions could include staff from engineering, utilities and sanitation, as well as from other city departments (e.g., planning, transit), and certain suppliers (such as the local power company). This cross-functional team would have responsibility for the complete process, from identifying needs to getting site plans developed and approved through developing the land and servicing the new residents. The staff on this process team would contribute based on their areas of expertise, but the walls that typically separate divisions and departments would disappear, because staff would be organized around the complete process and have only one objective—to satisfy the customer.

Organize Around Outcomes


This part of the business process re-engineering definition is fundamental. Most local governments are organized around functional departments that are responsible and accountable for specific departmental outputs—the number of potholes repaired, number of sewer lines serviced, etc. But outputs are different from outcomes, and outcomes are what matter to the customer. An output is the specific service or product that a unit produces; an *outcome* is the result of the unit's outputs.

Figure 3 A Functional View of the Public Works Department



Functional Performance Criteria — Outputs

Figure 4 A Process View of the Public Works Department



Process Performance Criteria — Outcomes

Output	Outcome
Personnel policies	Staff who understand their roles so that they can meet public needs
Budget	Prudent use of public funds
Design specs for new road	Safe, efficient transportation

We know how to organize to produce the outputs shown on the left side of the box above, but what are the citizens paying us to do? Does anyone really believe that the purpose of local government is to develop personnel policies, budgets, and design specs? The public's *only* real concern is with outcomes. Do staff serve us well? Are our hard-earned tax dollars used wisely and efficiently? Can we drive safely on the streets? Those are the legitimate outcomes that citizens expect, and BPR helps staff learn how to produce them.

HOW DO YOU DO BPR? SEVEN PRINCIPLES

It makes sense to most people in government to organize around outcomes. The question is, just how do we do that? How do we focus on "end-to-end" processes that satisfy customers when we are structured around functions and that structure is reinforced by the budget, the governing board's mindset, and past practice? In this section we will look at seven design principles that support BPR efforts and offer a methodology for re-engineering work processes.

1. Organize Around Outcomes

This point has been explained. Here are some examples of organizing around outcomes, rather than around functions, inputs, and outputs:

Example. Some self-managing work teams are organized around desired outcomes. In the city of Hampton, Virginia (125,000), over 200 city employees work on self-managing teams. The first one was created in the human resources department in 1985.

In the past, the department's staff members were each responsible for a specialized task such as EEO, employee relations, training, compensation and classification, etc. The system was simple for the staff, who enjoyed being subject matter experts. Their customers, other city employees, saw it differently; they had to go from one staffer to another to solve complex problems that crossed functional boundaries.

The self-managing team concept completely changed the system. The human resources staff were given cross-training in each other's technical areas and were coached to work as a team with minimal direct supervision. They were also organized around

one key outcome: satisfying customer needs. To do that, they let go of their narrow specialist roles and took on broader, generalist responsibilities. Each staff member is a consultant to certain customer departments and is responsible for meeting all of their departments' human resource needs. Since no one person can be an expert on all aspects of personnel work, the staff meet frequently to discuss problems and exchange information. To support the team concept and focus on outcomes, they are evaluated as a team—all get the same percent raise, which is largely determined by twice-yearly surveys of the team's customers.

The payoffs are many: other city staff no longer have to talk with three or four personnel staff members to get needed services; the human resources staff are learning and growing as they master broader skill areas; the department head is freed up to spend time on city-wide issues; and the department's costs are lower because the self-managing team model requires fewer staff than did the old, functional specialist approach.

Example. Community policing, when fully implemented, is a good example of organizing around outcomes. In the traditional random patrol and rapid response mode, officers are separated by function and have little impact on the desired outcome of safe neighborhoods. When a community policing philosophy takes hold, officers are given much broader responsibility and authority within certain neighborhoods. The rigid lines between traffic, narcotics, and investigations blur as officers work with residents and other agencies to solve and prevent problems. They are able to take some responsibility for the desired outcome of safe neighborhoods because they have been organized around that outcome (see Figure 5).

2. Bring Downstream Information Upstream

In most organizations, information is held within each department and treated as power. Re-engineering requires information to be shared widely. All information held by those who work in later stages of a process ("downstream") must be made available to those who work at the earlier stages ("upstream"). If not, information is hoarded; mistakes multiply; and organizing around outcomes becomes impossible.

In addition, customers don't want to be told by the person behind the desk or the counter that they should have brought certain information to the interview, or that they should have filled out certain forms before reaching the counter. They want to know at the beginning of the process what steps they must go through, what information or documents they will need, and how long each step will take.

Example. Some government agencies are revolutionizing their relationships with contractors. All too often, contractors and their government clients main-

tain an adversarial relationship. The government contracts specialist watches the contractor like a hawk, convinced he or she will try to cut corners to save money. The contractor resents such micro-management and inflates charges to make up for the time spent filling out endless forms. Both sides lose.


In the mid 1980s, the Army Corps of Engineers initiated a new approach to working with contractors called "partnering" that some local and state governments are now adopting. In partnering relationships, managers from the government and the contractor's organization spend several days together reviewing all aspects of the job, *before* the work begins. They bring downstream information upstream by anticipating possible problems, identify-

ing what each needs from the other, and doing contingency planning. They create a relationship built on trust. This is not a soft, "touchy-feely" arrangement. It is based on the exchange of information that each party needs to have from the other. And by bringing downstream information upstream, they create a "no-surprises" environment.³


Example. In the business license case noted earlier, staff at the commissioner of revenue's office were cross-trained, so that all downstream information (the needs of the other two departments involved) was known by the staff serving the customer. Customers are no longer told halfway through the process that they have to return home to get documentation they did not know was needed. That information is now provided at the start.

Figure 5 From Functional to Process Orientation: Community Policing

The Old System



The Re-Engineered System



(All functions are represented on most process teams.)

3. Capture Information Once, at the Source

Traditional, bureaucratic organizations capture information several times. They have little choice. They were built during a low-tech age. Indeed, one reason for the classic organizational pyramid was to provide a means of capturing and transferring information, level by level. Front-line employees gathered information at the source and passed it to the first-level supervisors, who reviewed it and passed it to the middle managers, who analyzed it, perhaps acted on some of it, and passed it to the senior managers, who made decisions based on it. Those decisions were then passed down to the middle managers, and so on. The assumption: information must be captured and analyzed frequently, to ensure control and accuracy.

Today, with modern technology, well-trained staff, and customers who will not put up with multiple forms and bureaucratic runarounds, information must be captured once, at the source. It is faster and more accurate to operate that way. It also respects customers and staff, by making better use of their time.

Example. Ordering pizza from certain large chains has been streamlined. Through the use of caller ID and computer technology, organizations such as Dominoes are storing information on their repeat customers. Dominoes does not need to ask customers for directions to their homes or to call back to ensure that the call was not a prank. It has captured information once, at its source.

Example. The Charlottesville Fire Department issues incident reports needed for insurance purposes to residents who have suffered fire losses. The old process was a classic bureaucratic nightmare—the information on the fire damage was entered at least five times, and often two or three officers entered the same information on the same fire after the call. The process has been re-engineered. Today, one officer enters the information, once.

Management Information Service

Example. Lakeland Regional Medical Center no longer captures information several times. Because the care pair and care trio teams understand the patient's complete history, because they can access that information through the PC at the patient's bedside, and because they see the patient through 90 percent of medical and administrative activities, the patient is not forced to repeat his problems and history to a string of care-givers who troop in and out of the room.

4. Provide Single Point-of-Contact for Customers and Suppliers

Customer service research has shown that the more employees a customer deals with in obtaining a service, the lower his or her satisfaction with that service. Consumers today simply do not want to be shuttled from one office to another. Re-engineering makes specialist staff into generalists, who, with backup from specialists and on-line systems, can provide customers with one-stop service, as the business license example demonstrated.

Example. The Merced County (California) Social Services Department mentioned earlier provides one-stop service to welfare applicants and recipients. Expert system software enables one case worker to keep up with thousands of eligibility rules and handle all programs for applicants. It helps applicants by radically reducing processing time, thus showing them greater respect, and it helps staff: because 400 of 750 preprinted forms were eliminated, tedious work is reduced and there is more time to focus on client needs. And the department also comes out ahead—three workers can do the work of four, turnover is down, and productivity increased 148 percent in the first ten months of the program.⁴

5. Substitute Parallel for Sequential Processes

Anyone who has ever prepared a multi-dish meal for a large group understands this principle. You simply cannot get everything ready to be served if you work on one dish at a time. Computer buffs also understand this principle. Today, giant computers are programmed to work in parallel on different aspects of complex problems, radically reducing problem-solving time. Our industrial-era bureaucracies were built to perform one step at a time. Given the technology available and prevailing mindset during the 19th century, there probably was little choice. The industrial-era assumption was that sequential processes provide greater control and accountability. Re-engineering calls for the use of parallel processes whenever possible. The new assumption is that sequential processes result in too much lost time, lost information, and lost energy. Parallel processes meet the need to respond quickly to change and to process information immediately.

Example. The mortgage approval process in some lending institutions is a long sequence of steps that can involve six or more departments and over a dozen staff. Typical turnaround time on a mortgage request is four to eight weeks. Some institutions have re-engineered this process, replacing the sequential assembly line with teams of up to 17 employees who are linked together electronically. They can make decisions on several applications in a matter of hours, lowering overall turnaround time to three to five days.

Example. "Concurrent engineering" refers to a parallel process in industry. Chrysler Corporation used concurrent engineering when it designed the new LH series of cars that came out in 1992. In the old design process, one department did its work, then "threw it over the wall" to the next department. The result was delays, arguments, turf battles, and poor quality. Typical time from conception to showroom was 60 months. But the LH, like most new cars today, was built by a cross-functional team that stayed with the process from beginning to end. It brought the new cars to market in 39 months, and they have received excellent reviews for quality.

Example. A public works department organized by process teams would use parallel processes much like Chrysler's. Paving a street, cutting a street for utility lines, or planning a subdivision would be done by a multi-functional team. In place of a linear assembly line of handoffs from one division to the next, staff from all units work together from start to finish. They share downstream information, work on their own aspects of the project in parallel, and maintain ongoing, immediate communication as the project moves along.

6. Maintain a Continuous Flow of the "Main Sequence"

Main sequence activities are those activities that add value to the end user. To maintain a continuous flow, identify and eliminate (or separate) non-value adding steps, and use triage to separate complex and risky cases from routine ones. A process should contain only value-adding steps. "Value adding" refers to steps that an end user cares about (see box on the opposite page). Steps that bring a product or service closer to the customer (picking up materials for recycling at curbside rather than at central collection points); steps that add to quality (surveying citizens to learn what they want from a service); steps that reduce time (one-stop service); and steps that provide convenience (access to city hall information via home computer) add value. Steps that add no value should be eliminated. Those that add no value but must be done anyway, such as certain overhead activities, should be done in parallel with the main sequence, so that the flow of value-adding activities does not slow down unnecessarily. Several of the

other principles (using parallel processes, providing single point-of-contact, capturing information once at its source) contribute to this principle.

Example. Waiting in lines is one of life's least value-adding activities. At the Four Seasons hotels, repeat customers are checked in *before* they arrive. The hotel's information system has all the data it needs. The customer walks in, picks up a key, and goes right to the room. The Ritz-Carlton chain is also experimenting with "deskless check in" for its best customers.

Example. When non-value-adding steps (like waiting) cannot be totally eliminated, reduce them and do them in parallel with the value-adding work. That is what happened in the business license example: two departments needed to collect and verify applicant information, a necessary but non-value-adding step. Today those departments give initial approval verbally and formalize that approval later, allowing the main sequence of value-adding activities to progress.

One way to maintain a continuous flow of the main sequence is to avoid one-size-fits-all approaches.

The customer's perspective

Value-added activities (what customers value and usually will pay for):

- Steps that bring a program/service to the customer faster (fax, overnight delivery, 911 systems)
- Activities that bring a service closer to the customer (bookmobile, community police officers who come to neighborhood meetings)
- Services that provide customers with accurate, real-time information on matters of importance (information on street conditions during a storm, job information)
- Steps that add features customers care about (enrichment programs for talented students, information on fire prevention)
- Activities that combine or refine ingredients to produce something (clearing/landscaping a vacant field to make a city park, analyzing data and turning it into information that the governing board can use to make decisions)

Non-value-adding activities (what customers do not care about and will not pay for):

- Inspection
- Supervision
- Accumulating estimates on how much each department will spend on various line items
- Signoffs, handoffs
- Accounting and almost all overhead activities
- Many words that begin with "re": reports, rework, revisit, reorganize, repeat, even repent!

In many bureaucracies, the same approach is used for all purchases, all hires, all applications for permits, all people waiting in line. The triage approach separates out the routine from the non-routine and complex. It allows the routine cases to move along quickly and focuses separately on the high risk or complex cases that require more attention.

Example. Airports use a form of triage. Passengers can check their luggage and get their tickets processed at the curb when they drive up. Or they can go to the appropriate window inside and purchase a ticket. Those with tickets and no luggage to check in can usually move right to the gate.

Example. The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs is using triage to handle a huge increase in passport renewal requests. In the past, all requests for renewals, as well as new passport applications and emergencies, went through one of 13 regional passport agencies. The result: a bottleneck. First-time applications took months to process and renewals often required six weeks or more to complete.

To handle the increase in renewals expected in 1993, the Bureau re-engineered the process. Today, citizens wanting a renewal can save time by sending a one-page application and current passport directly to a bank that contracts with the government to do initial data entry. The bank puts the data on tape, bar codes the applications, and sends all information overnight to a separate passport office, where government employees do final verification and issue the renewal. Citizens making first-time applications go to the local post office, which sends their applications to one of the 13 regional agencies. And those with emergency needs go directly to the closest passport agency. The long waits are gone, turnaround time has been cut by over 50 percent, and the Bureau was able to handle a 25 percent increase in passport applications in 1993 with fewer staff because triage took pressure off the regional agencies that previously handled all of the work.

7. Don't Pave "Cow Paths"

For over a decade American managers were told that the computer revolution would lead to great gains in productivity. In fact, U.S. organizations spent over \$1 trillion on new technology in the 1980s, with barely a 1 percent increase in productivity to show for it. One major reason: advanced technology was being used to automate old, outmoded work processes. Automating antique processes only helps us make the same mistakes faster!

First re-engineer the processes, then automate. This re-engineering principle makes the role of technology very clear: technology is an *enabler*, not a cause of productivity. When the work has been streamlined, technology can truly work wonders, but first the work must be redesigned.

Example. The state of Oregon re-engineered its process for issuing requests for proposals (RFPs). Formerly, 15 staff members took the proposals and stuffed them into envelopes, which they then addressed, stamped, and mailed. The cost of postage alone was \$100,000.

First staff challenged the existing assumption that the state should pay for vendors to have the privilege of doing business with the state. Once that assumption was challenged, state officials turned to modern technology. Oregon now puts its RFPs on line. Vendors are given state-supplied software and they can find out what the state wants to purchase by dialing into a state computer from their PCs. They also bring up state application forms on their screens, fill in the blanks, and submit bids electronically. With a one-time investment of \$300,000 for hardware, software, and phone lines, Oregon was able to reassign over a dozen staff and save \$100,000 annually on postage for RFPs. Technology enabled the radically new process to work, but first, the process itself was redesigned.⁵

Example. Napa County in California (104,000) re-engineered its public assistance program. Like Merced County, Napa was plagued with a tedious, paper-intensive process that forced applicants to wait through long lines and actually gave welfare workers writer's cramp! Determining eligibility under the old system took about eight hours.

Today, advanced technology keeps track of complex eligibility regulations. While computers process applicant information, workers engage in interactive interviews with clients, respecting their dignity and the value of their time. What took eight hours is now done in minutes. But this is not a story about technology alone. The new systems, which cost millions, are effective because the work process itself was redesigned. The assembly line of workers is gone, and cross-trained caseworkers take the client from start to finish.⁶

WHAT ABOUT CONTROLS?

Those who learn about re-engineering for the first time may wonder whether the organization maintains sufficient control when it uses the above principles to meet citizen demands for speed, convenience, and value. It is a fair question. After all, the multiple levels of review, handoffs, and signoffs that slow down our bureaucratic processes were created for a reason (usually to prevent abuse and fraud). If we let go of these controls in the name of speed and user friendliness, are we not opening our organizations up to corruption?

The answer is no. The bureaucratic layers and levels of review that have grown up since the Reform Era are relics of our low-tech past. The only apparent way to prevent fraud was through a series

of checks and balances, a division of labor that ensures multiple control points. Technology, properly used, changes all that.

A case in point is purchasing. Most governmental employees sigh and roll their eyes when they think of the many forms, steps, and delays involved in making purchases. The forms and steps were created to prevent fraud, but today they often create far more problems than they solve. One small city in the Southeast documented the costs (in terms of staff time) for making small purchases and learned that it spent over \$200 to process the various forms for each purchase. If it bought four different items costing \$9.95 each, it could spend the equivalent of \$900 in staff time to obtain \$40 worth of supplies.

The city now provides department heads with credit cards, good for purchases up to \$1,000 per month. The credit card is issued by a local bank, which sends the city and each department head a monthly tape indicating all purchases made by plastic. This provides adequate controls for fraud or abuse. Managers can buy what they need when they need it. And the local merchants love it, because they can get their accounts credited immediately after a sale if need be, rather than having to wait a month or more for the city to pay on their invoice.

That is not to say that abuses will not occur in a re-engineered system. Some people will look for ways to "game" the system. But the *potential* costs of occasional abuses and mistakes must be compared to the *guaranteed* costs of multiple forms, signoffs, and handoffs. Once the governing board is shown the real costs of doing business in an overly-bureaucratic fashion, it is usually quite open to a re-engineered approach.

A MODEL FOR BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING

These BPR principles can be very helpful in re-engineering projects, but more is needed. To succeed, staff need to understand an overall methodology of re-engineering. Many BPR projects, including the Lakeland hospital and business license examples, follow a three-phase model (see "A Model for Process Re-Engineering," Figure 6).

Phase 1: Assessment ("Ready")

In the assessment phase, a senior leadership team gets the organization ready for fundamental change and determines whether key preconditions for re-engineering are in place: considerable "pain" that is felt throughout the organization, strong leadership commitment to change, and a plan for change.

At Lakeland, the pain was caused by rising costs. The hospital administrator realized the organization was headed for a crisis if major changes were not made. He brought in a well-regarded hospital

consultant whose findings confirmed the problems and were shared with all staff. In Charlottesville, the pain was experienced by both the applicants and the staff, neither of whom appreciated the multiple forms, redundant questions, and time delays.

Phase 2: Design ("Aim")

Once senior leadership determines that the preconditions are present for successful business process re-engineering, the actual design work can begin. In this phase, a design team goes through four basic re-engineering steps. First, it maps the current processes and determines which steps do and which do not add value. These process maps should also measure time, cost, quality, and customer satisfaction with the current process.


The second step is critical to successful BPR: "start at the end and work backward." Starting "at the end" requires listening to the end users of the process to learn what they need and expect; it makes no sense to re-engineer for outcomes that customers do not care about. In fact, many organizations have leapt on the bandwagon without bothering to learn what their customers really value, which is one reason that many BPR efforts have not delivered the promised results. The best way to learn what customers expect from the process being re-designed is to ask them. Once their expectations are understood, the team can use a re-engineering tool called "backward chaining" to work backward from the final process output in order to identify the simplest, leanest way to meet end user needs.

The third step in the design phase—"set a stretch objective"—highlights a major difference between business process re-engineering and other improvement strategies. Stretch objectives (e.g., reduce lead time for purchases from 30 days to three hours; lower costs by 50 percent) force the design team to think "outside the box." Such objectives promote radical change in systems and processes, because it is obvious that the current process cannot come close to meeting the stretch objective; if it could, BPR would be inappropriate. Lakeland's stretch objective—to have the care pair/trios provide 90 percent of the patient's services—also forced fundamental change in all aspects of the service delivery system.

The fourth step, which results in a new model, requires the design team to "begin with a clean sheet." Like stretch objectives, this step distinguishes BPR from other methods, most of which begin by seeking improvements within the current structure and systems. Design team members ask themselves, "If we could start over, how would we design these processes to meet the stretch objective and our customers' needs?"

Many in government doubt that the clean sheet approach can really work in the fishbowl of public life. After all, we are not about to eliminate federal and state mandates, special interest groups, and a host of laws and regulations that dictate much of the work. But fundamental change will not come about unless the design team does its work *as if* it had a clean sheet. Of course the laws and oversight groups will not vanish; however, breakthrough thinking is far less likely if the design team begins with existing

Figure 6 A Model for Process Re-Engineering



Management Information Service

constraints. Like benchmarking and the use of stretch objectives, the clean sheet approach forces innovative thinking.

Phase 3: Implementation ("Fire")

Implementing a re-engineered design usually occurs in three steps. The first step should include changes that can be made quickly, within the existing budget and culture, such as streamlining the current process by eliminating non-value adding steps; reducing layers of management; and providing cross-training for expanded roles. In the second step, teams work on longer-term changes that require additional resources (e.g., adopting new information technologies; forming close partnerships with suppliers). Some agencies use the phased approach adopted by Lakeland, in which units are re-engineered one at a time.

The third step is termed *alignment*. Once a process is fundamentally changed and starts to produce benefits, the only way to maintain those benefits is by aligning certain systems with the new process. If the process is re-engineered but everything else remains the same, old habits and roles will creep back in. Only by aligning other systems with the new process can the hard-won gains from BPR be maintained.

For instance, one local government social services department recently re-engineered its benefits division, adopted the one-stop approach, and supported it with new technology. The clients loved it, productivity went up, and administrators were delighted; in fact, it is now being used as a model for the whole state. There was only one problem: staff were miserable.

Staff were pleased that the new process worked well, but they were miserable because nothing else had changed around them. Their new roles required far greater use of discretion, their responsibilities were broader, they had truly professional jobs. But the performance measurement system had not changed; it was still based on number of errors. Supervisors' roles had not changed; they were still cops, expected to play "gotcha." The budget system, communications system, and evaluation and rewards system were still stuck in the old industrial model. In a word, the division was out of alignment. Once administrators understood the dilemma, they put staff teams together to address the gap between the new process and outdated systems, and morale picked up considerably.

One other note about implementing process re-engineering. It is rare that a BPR effort fails to deliver on its promise because of a poor design in the design phase. Almost all problems result from a lack of readiness in the assessment phase or lack of attention to the third phase, implementation. The design phase is fun, exciting, visible, creative; it energizes a team and generally produces imaginative new work models. Local governments that embark

on BPR need to focus carefully on the first phase to be certain they have the necessary preconditions in place. And they need to understand that the most creative new designs will not succeed without a well-thought-out implementation plan.

It is often said that TQM is a bottom-up method, whereas BPR is top-down. Well, yes and no. When it comes to design and implementation, BPR is both bottom-up and top-down. The design work is performed by staff who understand the work itself, a bottom-up process. Gaining support for the new design is also bottom-up. The design team must consult regularly with key stakeholders in the process—external and internal customers, those who will work in the newly designed process, information management and human resource personnel—to get their input and support and avoid surprises. However, BPR is also top-down, because it is usually too threatening to some employees to be carried out without active involvement from agency leaders. The manager's office, and sometimes the governing board, must remain actively involved and supportive; otherwise, those who fear a loss of power may try to block change and sabotage the effort.

BENEFITS AND COSTS; RISKS, AND BARRIERS

Benefits

The benefits of properly applied re-engineering are usually apparent within 12 to 18 months of beginning, but that is not to say that BPR is a quick fix or "silver bullet." The 12 to 18 months will involve very hard work, the resistance can be fierce, and the effort may require a team of six to ten staff to devote 50 percent or more of their time for periods of several months. It is rare that a government is willing to invest the time and energy in such a project unless it is feeling considerable pain from its current way of doing business.

When government agencies make the commitment to re-engineering, the benefits are often remarkable. They come most often in four areas:

- Time
- Cost
- Quality
- Customer satisfaction.

Examples of time savings were mentioned at the beginning of this report. It is common to find cycle times of work processes go from weeks and months to days or even hours. Cost reductions are a second benefit of BPR projects. These reductions will not be evident initially if large expenditures are required for new information systems. However, most BPR efforts demonstrate that more people are involved in a work process than are usually needed. The re-engineering methodology gives managers a rational way to deter-

mine where value is being added and where it is not. Line managers no longer need fear that an open position in their department will not be filled. Vacant positions are truly opportunities, from a re-engineering point of view. These openings give managers a chance to re-think how the work itself should be organized, rather than assume that an unfilled position means lower productivity and effectiveness.

Quality and customer satisfaction typically go up after re-engineering. When staff work only on narrow aspects of the job and pass their work back and forth across division and department lines, they are not in a position to observe poor quality and take action to improve it. Consider a public park. A mowing crew may do a great job of cutting the grass in the park; the maintenance crew can be quick and efficient at repairing broken windows and clogged toilets in the park shelter; the parks department can build beautiful ball fields; and the recreation staff may support several popular leagues. But who is responsible for the overall experience of the park's users? Whose job is it to report teenagers hanging out at the park when they should be in school or to be on the lookout for suspicious people who may frequent the park after hours? A cross-functional park team made up of mowers, planners, maintenance, and parks and recreation staff would understand their true mission—to do whatever is necessary to satisfy the park's users and maintain the park's beauty and safety.

Costs, Risks, and Barriers

The two major costs to re-engineering are clear: time and money. First, it takes a good deal of time to prepare adequately for the project, see it through the design stage, and carefully implement it. And because process re-engineering is about fundamental change, it must be done with great care; otherwise, staff run the risk of causing more problems than they solve. Thus, senior management must commit time and attention to the project, and one or more teams of six to ten staff must do the same.

The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recently did a study of state and federal agencies that have experience in BPR projects. (Unfortunately, there are no comparable studies of local government efforts to date).⁷ The NAPA study reviews the experiences of 31 federal and 36 state agencies involved in re-engineering projects. The study asked managers how much time was required to complete BPR projects. The sidebar on this page shows the results.

The second cost is financial. Re-engineering can be expensive when the redesigned process requires new information technology. Social services departments (such as those of Napa and Merced counties) that automate complex regulations and case records can end up spending several million dollars. Because these costs run so high, some state social service de-

Staff time for business process re-engineering

Time devoted to BPR project	Percentage of team members
Ad hoc, no set percentage:	40.0%
25 percent or less:	11.7
26-50 percent:	15.0
51-75 percent:	11.7
More than 75 percent	21.7

Note: Most re-engineering teams work on a project for two to six months.

Source: National Academy of Public Administration

partments are supporting the development of new systems and sharing them with localities.

Concerning risks, there is an interesting, inverse relationship between the amount of "pain" the government is experiencing and the level of risk: *The greater the pain, the lower the risk.* That is, the greater the gap between where the organization is and where it needs to be—and the greater the dissatisfaction of its primary customers—the more pressure it feels to change, which lowers the risk of trying BPR, for two reasons. First and most obvious, staff feel they have little to lose (that is, if the staff are aware of the pain, or gap). Second, when the organization's leadership and staff clearly understand how big the gap is between their current and needed performance levels, they are motivated to work for change.

The converse of the above is also true: When there is little pain in the system, when things seem to be going well, citizens are satisfied, the budget is in decent shape, and the governing board has confidence in the staff, BPR is far more difficult to implement. The risk, then, for governmental organizations that are functioning relatively well is that they may "overcorrect." In the enthusiasm to start with a "clean sheet," the design team may abolish programs and processes that work well. And those who are threatened by a potential loss of power will scream "It ain't broke" and fight the effort every step of the way. This is not to say that the only successful re-engineering efforts are in troubled agencies, but that the risks and costs of failure are greater when the government unit feels little need to change.

The NAPA study cited above also looked at barriers to successful re-engineering in government agencies. The results are shown in the sidebar on page 14. A recent survey of re-engineering projects in the private sector turned up similar results, with resistance to change, limitations of existing systems, and lack of executive consensus and leadership leading the list of obstacles to re-engineering success.⁸

Barriers to re-engineering

The numbers at the right show the percentage of agencies responding to the NAPA study who reported each type of barrier to BPR.

Turf battles by functional officials	50.8%
Employee resistance to change	45.3
No one in charge or with authority to push BPR across the organization	42.2
Lack of incentives from department or central oversight agencies	41.3
Managers and staff find it hard to do "out of the box" thinking	40.6
Resources tied up in out-dated systems	40.6
Non-committed top management	37.5
Skepticism about another reform effort in government	37.5

Source: National Academy of Public Administration

The bad news about these data is that re-engineering, like all major efforts to change, runs into some very entrenched attitudes and fears. Turf battles, fear of new roles, skepticism—these make it difficult to realize the gains that re-engineering promises.

The good news, however, is more striking: every one of the barriers identified in the NAPA study (with the possible exception of lack of incentives from department or central oversight agencies) is fully within the government unit's ability to control. That is, state and federal managers do not report political and legislative constraints as their major barriers, nor do they blame other agencies for placing barriers in their way. The barriers are primarily within our control, and they are often in our minds.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCES

What other lessons can we learn from government experience with re-engineering? Two studies have been especially useful. One, by the U.S. General Services Administration, looked at eight federal agencies that are using business process re-engineering or business process improvement methodologies to change and improve their business practices.⁹ The second study was conducted by the Department of Defense. Senior staff spent several months studying twelve organizations (nine private, three public) that had varying levels of success with re-engineering. Two of the organizations studied are at the local government level. These studies identify certain critical success factors essential to any re-engineering effort:

- *Top-level management support is absolutely critical.* Without it, fundamental change simply will not happen.
- *BPR must be linked to strategic business plans.* BPR is not primarily about empowerment, visionary leadership, or teamwork, although those are important. Rather, it is about redesigning the way the government unit does its core business. *It is not vision driven, it is business driven.*
- *Obtain high-quality staffing for the BPR project.* The design team must have credibility within the organization. It needs staff from human resources, from information resources, and from the functional areas being re-engineered. It also needs talented, creative staff who work outside the area being re-engineered and who can bring fresh perspectives to the design phase.
- *Capture the "voice of the customer" throughout the project.* Like the second step in the design phase, BPR starts "at the end" with customer expectations. Those expectations and needs must guide the project.
- *Make appropriate use of information technology, integrated with the newly designed processes.* As BPR guru Michael Hammer puts it, "Don't pave cowpaths." First re-engineer outmoded work processes, then automate.
- *Place a strong emphasis on change management issues.* BPR usually moves from a functional to a process orientation. Such radical change requires new performance measurement, budgeting, information, and reward systems. It changes the culture. Thus, organizational leaders must maintain open, ongoing communications with staff and key stakeholders during the process. Staff need to understand the purpose of the change, its scope, how it will affect them, and how it will improve performance and customer satisfaction. Another factor that can affect BPR efforts in local government is the governing board. Its members need to understand, without jargon and acronyms, what re-engineering is, why it is being proposed, its likely benefits, costs, and risks. And, like all important decisions affecting governing boards, the case for BPR must be presented in terms that are appealing to the elected officials' interests.
- *Maintain accurate performance measures.* The design team needs to document a few simple outcome measures of the current process. Such measures help them when they benchmark the process against other "best in class" organizations. Baseline data also allow the team to measure the improvements made in the re-designed process.

Further research on, and experience with, re-engineering projects confirms the findings from these

studies.¹⁰ Three additional critical success factors can be added for local government managers interested in re-engineering:

- *Focus is important.* Rather than trying to re-engineer everything, focus on those few processes that are most important to customers and have the greatest impact on overall performance.
- *Don't underestimate the power of the bureaucracy to wait you out and wear you down.* Government employees have been bombarded by too many trends and fads over the past decade, and they are understandably skeptical, even cynical. The only way to create credibility for re-engineering is for senior managers to commit considerable time to it by, for example, assigning an assistant city or county manager to head up the project full time, finding a half dozen staff to work on the project at least half time, and giving at least three hours a week from the manager's own agenda to the project. Commitment like that can convince staff that this time, it's for real.
- *Include department and division managers and information systems and human resources staff in the planning and design teams.* Their help will be critical to implementation, so get their input early and listen and respond to their concerns.

WHERE IS ALL OF THIS LEADING?

The term "business process re-engineering" is awkward at best and inaccurate to boot, at least when applied to government. After all, our governmental structures and agencies were never "engineered" in the first place, at least not in the precise sense that the term suggests. However, the basic principles behind BPR are sound, and they are likely to form the basis of new government designs over the coming decade.

One of BPR's most important contributions is the concept of organizing horizontally around "end-to-end" processes that respond to customer needs. When government organizes "from left to right," from customer needs and input to customer satisfaction and outcomes, it removes the organizational walls that have created so many of our problems. This concept of seamless government, or government without boundaries, is one compelling vision of the future. And signs of it are already evident:

- The city of Englewood, Colorado (30,000), combined all neighborhood-related services and formed a Neighborhood Services Division. It includes the police department's animal control, abandoned vehicle, and parking enforcement functions with zoning and code enforcement from planning. The staff in the new division are cross-trained to provide all enforcement activities in these areas.

- Mercer Island, Washington (21,000), has formed a new department, the development services department, with employees formerly housed in the engineering, planning, and building departments. The development services manager helps twelve self-directed teams (for instance, a downtown streets team and a geographic information systems team) develop goals and timelines.
- More walls come tumbling down when local government staff begin to view employees of other organizations as potential partners in a common enterprise. Redondo Beach, California (63,000), works with the postal service to train its carriers to spot and report suspicious people and hazardous conditions. Springfield, Ohio (70,500), understands that community policing means much more than getting cops out of cars—it means organizing horizontally, enabling staff to access virtually anyone who can help them meet a citizen need. In Springfield, they are breaking down the walls between departments, changing traditional supervisory relationships, and empowering the community police officers to function as case managers for their neighborhoods. With the active involvement of the assistant city manager, officers call on staff and others in the community without going through the normal chain of command. It is working, largely because of the horizontal relationships they form with other departments and agencies in the city.¹¹
- A more fundamental change occurs when staff challenge the assumption that services take place only from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., inside city hall or the county building. The concept of an "anytime, anyplace" government is slowly taking hold, supported by advanced technology and customer demands for convenience and speed. For instance, the North County Municipal Court in San Diego County, California (2,201,000), uses a mobile traffic unit as a branch office. This van, open 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. four days a week, travels to four locations in the county, making it more convenient for citizens to pay fines for various violations. Two clerks process payments and access records on a laptop connected to the court's mainframe. One-time expenses to outfit the van came to \$26,000, and ongoing annual costs are about \$3,100. The mobile unit collected \$270,000 in fines its first year. Equally important, it brought the "county" to 6,100 outlying residents and reduced their average waiting time from 40 to 15 minutes.¹²
- Bringing staff to citizens several days a week, as the North County Court does, is an important step. Bringing information and services to citizens 24 hours a day is a giant leap but it is not a pipe dream. Some local governments like Plano, Texas (111,000), and Brisbane, Australia (690,000),

are investing in user-friendly computer kiosks to deliver government information. In Plano, a kiosk located in a shopping mall provides residents and visitors with up-to-date information on local events and attractions, parks and recreation activities, and procedures for getting driver's licenses, marriage licenses, and pet licenses. Brisbane has installed more than 24 multimedia information kiosks throughout the city. Citizens can access the kiosks at any time of day, every day, to get information on city services, user fees, and building permit applications. They can also pay their property taxes and utility bills and order tickets for events. Residents can use their bank cards to pay for services and the system debits their accounts. The system is especially helpful to tourists, who can access up-to-date schedules of events and performances.

- The state of California has set up a similar system called Info/Cal. Dispensing information and services for everything from ordering birth certificates to registering cars and hunting for job openings, the Info/Cal kiosks break down walls between government and the citizens. They also break down walls *between* governments, because Info/Cal connects citizens with information and services of local and federal government agencies and with nearby states as well. These examples are our first glimpse of seamless, anytime/anyplace government.¹³

The pilot phase of Info/Cal was supported through a partnership with two high-tech firms. Such partnerships, like the partnering approach described earlier, are key elements of a seamless government. Partnerships work when the arms-length mentality often seen between government and contractors is replaced by a mutual commitment to meeting the end users' needs. They work because they organize around *processes*, not around functions and departments. They work because they are focused on *outcomes*, not inputs and outputs. And they work because they *challenge assumptions*—in this case, they challenge the assumptions that governments are hopelessly bureaucratic and uncreative, and that corporate vendors must be watched like a hawk because their only interest is making a quick buck. By paying close attention to these factors—processes, outcomes, and assumptions—business process re-engineering adds value.

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³ For more on partnering in government, see Ed Cole, "Partnering: A Quality Model for Contract Relations," *The Public Manager* (Summer 1993), pp. 39-42.

⁴ Jerry Mechling, "Reengineering: Part of Your Game Plan?," *Governing* (Feb. 1994), pp. 42-52.

⁵ John Martin, "Reengineering Government," *Governing* (March 1993), pp. 26-30.

⁶ Martin, "Reengineering Government."

⁷ The NAPA study report, authored by Sharon Caudle and entitled "Government Business Process Reengineering: Agency Survey Results," was completed in February 1994.

⁸ The barriers mentioned were reported by Deloitte & Touche based on a 1993 survey of 400 U.S. and Canadian private sector executives. A survey of 350 private sector executives conducted by Arthur D. Little Inc. in 1994 revealed that 2 out of 5 are dissatisfied with the results of re-engineering and cited turf battles, lack of management buy-in, and inadequate implementation skills as problems.

⁹ U.S. General Services Administration, "Lessons Learned to Date From Business Process Reengineering in the Federal Government" (1994).

¹⁰ Author's observation based on personal research and experience.

¹¹ "Responsive Service Delivery: A Community Orientation for Problem Solving," *MIS Report*, vol. 25, no. 5 (May 1993), pp. 9-11.

¹² From *The Guide to Management Improvement Projects in Local Government*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Washington, DC: ICMA, 1992).


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MIS REPORT

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NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICE DELIVERY

Neighborhood service delivery programs spring from a philosophy that seeks substantive involvement of neighborhood residents in local government decisions through the development of citizen-government partnerships. Approaches such as community strategic planning have been used to help elected and appointed officials identify community goals. However, little effort has been made to develop programs to achieve the implementation of strategic plans. Neighborhood service delivery should be viewed as a vehicle to implement common community goals.

A surprising number of neighborhood service delivery programs are being developed in a variety of local government areas, such as code enforcement, police, and public works. Programs from Wilmington, Delaware; Edmonton, Alberta; Rockville, Maryland; and St. Petersburg, Florida, show the diversity of approaches.

A detailed case study of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, the 1992 winner of the U.S. Conference of Mayors Livable Cities Award (population under 100,000) shows how early, disjointed efforts can be molded into a comprehensive neighborhood improvement program. This report ends with a review of the components of a successful neighborhood service delivery program.

Neighborhood Service Delivery

The author of this month's report is James B. Borsig, former chief administrative officer of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and currently research coordinator for the John C. Stennis Institute of Government at Mississippi State University.

CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT

The recent avalanche of management techniques—Total Quality Management, customer service, citizen empowerment, rightsizing, public-private partnerships—center on one truth: citizens want government to be responsive to their needs and effective in achieving results. Putting neighborhoods at the very heart of local government policy is the beginning.

John Herbers, writing about citizen activism, states, "In the current era of public cynicism about government and its elected officials, grass roots citizens movements, though little noticed nationally, may prove to be a major force in the revitalization of American democracy."¹

Robert Nisbet, author of *The Quest for Community*, tells us,

Where power is external or centralized, where it relieves groups of persons of the trouble of making important decisions, where it is penetrating and minute, there, no matter how wise or good it may be in principle, it is difficult for a true community to develop. Community thrives on self-help (and a little disorder), either corporate or individual, and everything that removes a group from the performance of or involvement in its own government can hardly help but weaken the sense of community.²

Perhaps, as local government professionals, we should challenge traditional ways of governing our communities; in particular, we should reexamine the role of citizen involvement. In many places, it is assumed that it is the citizen's responsibility to become well-informed and attend public hearings or meetings. This notion of a "good citizen" may be outmoded. Stop and think for a minute what this requires of citizens. They must learn the time and place of the public meetings of various boards and commissions and, at the same time, develop sufficient understanding of rules of procedure to par-

ticipate fully. This structural and procedural knowledge of local government must precede the citizen's effort to influence public policy.

Take a few minutes to evaluate the procedural and structural components of the public input opportunities your local government offers its citizens. Now, on a blank monthly calendar,

- Note all monthly meetings of your governing body
- Note all monthly board and commission meetings
- Note all available public hearing opportunities for each
- Note all public notice and agenda deadlines for each
- Note those that accept written comments
- Note those that allow public speaking
- Note any time limits imposed on public speaking.

How many of your citizens could complete this task? Is it possible that we have allowed our local governments to become so rigid and organized that the public they intend to serve has been squeezed out of the process?

In many instances, opportunities for public involvement are spread throughout the entire month. Each public body has developed its own detailed rules to ensure that the public's business is accomplished in a timely manner and that the public is involved. An honest evaluation is likely to reveal that our well-organized, highly specialized local government organizations probably deter public involvement and cause public dissatisfaction.

In some places, issues and decision processes are so complicated that only a very few members of the public comprehend them. Frank Bryan and John McClaughry say that the very nature of community requires that decisions be made on "a scale that human beings can understand and cope with."³

In his book *Human Scale*, Kirkpatrick Sale says, "It would seem sensible for any rational society to attempt

to protect and promote the institution of the community. . . . The organization is not simply *one* way of ordering human affairs, but a *universal* way, found in all times and places, among all kinds of people." Sale concludes that "the increasing loss of communal life is undoubtedly at the heart of the malaise of modern urban culture and its disappearance clearly cannot bode well for the future."⁴

Stuart Meck's advice for the planning profession (see box) applies to every area of local government activity. The time has come for a local government philosophy that encourages a view of the entire community, while

A framework for public policy

Stuart Meck identified characteristics of the "old culture" and an emerging "new pragmatism" in the planning profession. Meck's old culture contained four assumptions:

- Elected officials could not be trusted to plan—planning was above politics. The institutions of planning should be removed from their control. Planning was to be done by the "best" people; the decision-making was insulated from politics.
- Surroundings affect behavior.
- The values of the dominant group should apply to the whole community; a middle-class lifestyle was appropriate for everyone.
- Planning should take the long view (20 to 30 years) because events were not causing change fast enough to warrant otherwise.

Meck's ultimate evaluation of the old culture is that "it (was) high-minded—it saw the world through rose-colored glasses—but, viewed from today's perspective, (it was) relatively ineffective." His new pragmatism is action-oriented, emphasizes effectiveness now, and involves planners in envisioning the future and being active participants in making that future come about. Meck's new pragmatism

- Embraces politics, instead of rejecting it
- Values small scale and the intimate in the everyday environment, over the monumental and imposing
- Recognizes that the city and the suburbs may no longer be middle class in the purist sense
- Is less concerned about the long term.

Meck describes this new pragmatism as being less predictable than the old culture. It recognizes that today's problems are "messy and complex, requiring not unitary grand physical design schemes that are attractively rendered to provide moral uplift, but approaches that are brokered and negotiated and compromised."

Source: Stuart Meck, "The Two Cultures of Planning: Toward the New Pragmatism," *Land Use Law* (3), 1991, pp. 3-5.

taking into account its discrete parts. Local elected and appointed officials must seek to harness the energy of an informed, involved citizenry by encouraging new organizational structures to bring citizens directly into the governing process.

The new model is the neighborhood service delivery program outlined in this report. It embraces the legitimacy of public opinion, alongside professional opinion, and gives public choice equal importance in the making of public policy. Its goal is to improve services by tailoring them to local needs and to build community strength in the process.

A Citizen-Centered Organization

Most recent attempts to improve public organizations—various initiatives to treat citizens like customers, as well as efforts to empower citizens and employees—recognize the importance of individuals. Even the focus on quality improvement in local government—whether applied to policy decision or pothole repairs—suggests a change from traditional bureaucratic notions to a citizen-centered approach.

Public organizations are increasing their efforts to improve accountability and responsibility and disperse authority as part of "reinventing government." While most management initiatives begin in an incremental and disjointed manner, scattered throughout a public organization, a few local governments have designed and implemented experimental organizational frameworks that seek citizen-centered solutions by recognizing the importance of neighborhoods.

Expanding the Role of Government

A focus on neighborhoods can be a philosophy, a process, and a program. Neighborhood service delivery programs redirect existing local government resources toward problems identified with the help of citizens. This process is carried out within a set of clear policies adopted by the local governing board and is implemented within the administrative framework of the local government. The elected representatives establish the policy and procedural guidelines for neighborhood service delivery in their jurisdiction but individual citizens help determine implementation strategy and may even participate in service delivery.

Local government employees are allowed and encouraged to . . . consider multi-service responses to community problems.

The practical result is that *more* citizens become directly involved in the implementation of the policies established by the elected officials, and contact between local government employees and citizens is increased. Local government employees are allowed and encour-

aged to look beyond the limitations of one service to consider multi-service responses to community problems.

Government employees working in neighborhood service delivery programs develop inclusive partnerships with citizens, as well as with the not-for-profit and private sectors. The local government harnesses all of the resources of the community to address community problems. In many instances, the problems of neighborhoods defy a neat fit with government programs; a neighborhood approach allows a community to capitalize on the strengths of each sector of society to improve its quality of life.

The local government forms a real partnership in which the government employees, the non-profit and private sectors, and citizens work together to achieve the community goals articulated by local elected officials. Achieving public policy objectives identified through the process of representative government becomes the work of all sectors of society, not just a few public employees.

COMMUNITY CASE STUDIES

Few, if any, local governments set out on this road by introducing a comprehensive effort. In fact, it should be noted that most implementation strategies begin in a fragmented fashion, emerging from almost any part of the local government organization. There is no single formula, no "best way" that requires a neighborhood service delivery program to develop first in the public safety department, the public works department, the planning department, or the recreation department.

Roberta Brandes Gratz, author of *The Living City*, criticizes urbanologists for seeking "solutions [that] must be reduced to an exact repeatable formula in every neighborhood, in every city." Too often, this "repeatable formula" becomes "the logic behind the development of government programs, but cities cannot be approached this way."⁵

Understanding that neighborhood improvement programs can spring from any department of local government and that no repeatable formula exists for developing solutions to the problems faced in our neighborhoods becomes both the guiding principle and the foundation for a neighborhood service delivery program. The following community case studies support Gratz's observation, and illustrate neighborhood service delivery innovations.

Wilmington, Delaware—Neighborhood Partnerships

In Wilmington, Delaware, a not-for-profit organization develops partnerships with neighborhood residents to reduce opposition to low-income housing. The Interfaith Housing Task Force works with a neighborhood-based task force to site housing in order to avoid the "not in my back yard" syndrome. According to Emilie Barnett,

executive director of Interfaith, "Partnerships are not an intellectual theory or pious principle, but an intense and lively process. In the two short years that the partnerships have been operating, their value has been demonstrated—[they are] now a fundamental requirement at every Interfaith site."

The Interfaith effort builds directly on public involvement. Neighborhood residents are brought into the process through a partnership developed by Interfaith and are involved directly in policy decisions. The partnership allows residents to air their concerns and fears and gives Interfaith a chance to respond to those concerns and to build acceptance for its low-income housing projects. The collaborative partnership between the task force and residents also provides an organizational framework to address other community problems.

The needs of families and concerns about drug problems often dominate initial neighborhood meetings. Interfaith staff make clear to the neighborhood representatives with whom they meet that Interfaith is in the business of providing housing, but they invite the neighborhood residents to begin to define a course of action and identify which agencies might be of assistance in solving other problems. For example, in one neighborhood, Interfaith heard residents' concerns about stormwater runoff and a dangerous intersection that needed a stop sign, and worked with them to find solutions. In doing so, the task force won the trust of the neighborhood and reinforced the idea that residents could take responsibility for finding remedies to community problems.⁶

St. Petersburg, Florida—Geographic Accountability

In 1975, St. Petersburg's utilities maintenance division found that 70 percent of employees' time was devoted to corrective maintenance and only 30 percent was dedicated to preventive maintenance. This ratio was unacceptable, and St. Petersburg reorganized its utilities maintenance division. First, the city was divided into four sewer districts, and the districts were subdivided into zones. Each zone became the responsibility of a "public works representative," who was tasked with the responsibility to patrol the zone, locate potential problems, record them on work order sheets, and forward them to the correct division. These public works representatives became the eyes of the utilities division.

Ten years later, crews were spending 65 percent of their time on preventive maintenance and only 35 percent on corrective maintenance. During the same period, the number of sewer blockages fell from over 2,000 to 950 annually.

The St. Petersburg program succeeded because it developed geographic areas of responsibility, and specific employees were assigned to each area. These employees became accountable for the condition of the utilities infrastructure in their zone; they became the

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primary link between their zone and the utilities maintenance division.

The accountability factor developed by the St. Petersburg program is important to the development of neighborhood service delivery programs. Too often, local government professionals rely on information aggregated for the entire jurisdiction. Such information may well be misleading, if it is not tied to a specific area.

Although the St. Petersburg utilities maintenance program does not involve interaction with the public, its development and its organizational structure underscore a major attribute of successful neighborhood service delivery programs—decentralized management based on clearly established territorial accountability.⁷

Rockville, Maryland—Accountability and Partnerships

The information on Rockville's Community Enhancement Program was compiled by Linda McDermid.

Rockville, Maryland's inspection services developed a Community Enhancement Program by dividing the city into five areas. The Rockville program begins with an organizational premise similar to that seen in the St. Petersburg, Florida, example. However, in Rockville one objective of the program is that the inspectors will develop personal relationships with the citizens in their area of responsibility.

Each area has a housing inspector assigned to, and responsible for, a specific territory. The Community Enhancement Program replaced the previous practice of doing "sweeps," in which the entire housing inspection staff was concentrated in one area of the city for a specified period of time. Under the new arrangement, housing inspectors cover their entire area each year in a systematic fashion, but also conduct quick windshield surveys on a weekly basis. In addition to finding violations, inspectors are tasked with sending "good job" letters to property owners whose property is exceptionally well maintained, or who complete exterior remodeling. Often, inspectors attend homeowner associations in their area.

Rockville has identified the following benefits of its Community Enhancement Program:

- Inspectors become visible and residents know them.
- Inspectors become very familiar with their area, its residents, and their needs. Often, inspectors refer residents to other local government programs.
- Phone complaints have been reduced by 30 percent since 1987.
- Inspectors see tangible results of their efforts over time, since each stays in one area.

Rockville's program includes several different components of a comprehensive neighborhood service de-

livery organization. First, it assigns housing inspectors to specific geographic areas. Second, it encourages the housing inspectors to become familiar with their territory and the residents. Third, inspectors go beyond their primary assigned duties to assist residents with other needs by referring them to available programs. Finally, Rockville's Community Enhancement Program provides citizens with a link to the city government, increasing the likelihood of customer satisfaction.

Edmonton, Alberta—Community-Based Policing

This case study was provided by Chris Braiden, superintendent of community-based policing in Edmonton.

The Edmonton Police Service began its formal move toward community-based policing in April 1988, with a neighborhood foot patrol program modeled in part on the Flint, Michigan, foot patrol experiment. Officers were assigned to 21 neighborhoods that had been identified on the basis of a careful repeat-call address analysis. The officers were encouraged to work with their community to solve problems. In early 1990, plans began for implementation of community policing across the department, and massive structural changes were undertaken.

The police department's conventional structure emphasized specialization and centralization. The new plan emphasizes decentralization, despecialization, ownership, and new service delivery. The explicit core value adopted by the department under the new structure is "Committed to Community Needs."

Every unit and function of the department was reviewed against the core value by asking five questions:

- What was the original mandate of the unit?
- What is it doing now?
- Should it be doing what it is doing now?
- What else should it be doing?
- How should it do what it should be doing?

As a result of the review, 58 constables were re-assigned from specialized to generalized roles, and several specialized units were eliminated, reduced in force, merged with others, or decentralized.

A deferred response plan was implemented. Police now defer response to non-emergency service calls to a date and time acceptable to the citizen when in-progress calls for service will be at lower levels. To give citizens a place to report non-emergency matters in person, twelve community stations were added to the four existing district stations. In addition, the city has 32 neighborhood foot patrol beats. This decentralized infrastructure of community stations was used by 200,000 people during 1992. Of the people using the stations, 98 percent were walk-ins. Another measure of effectiveness was a survey of Edmonton citizens that indicated a 90-percent satisfaction rate with the community stations. And approximately 400 citizens have

volunteered their services to a community station or neighborhood foot patrol office.

As a result of the reorganization,

- 24 fewer members are assigned to administrative duties
- 13 fewer members are assigned to conventional crime prevention duties
- 58 more members have been reassigned from specialized duties to patrol duties
- In total, 137 members have been reassigned.

Statistics for 1992 compared with 1991 show that the changes are positive:

- Dispatched calls were down 17 percent
- Calls to the complaint line were down 30 percent
- The average telephone answer time was down 40 percent
- "Hang-ups" on the complaint line were down 36 percent.

Also in 1992, compared with 1991,

- Robberies were down 7.7 percent
- Thefts were down 14.6 percent
- Other property offenses were down 22.1 percent.

Local Government as Catalyst

These four examples show how neighborhood improvement programs can spring from virtually any division or department of a local government. These cases suggest that it may be important for citizen-centered principles to be tested in a single area of local government first and given the time necessary for development and evaluation.

The next stage is to extend this neighborhood approach to the entire local government organizational structure. The objective of a neighborhood program is to integrate "government" into the life of the community. Instead of letting citizens continue to view government as something apart from community life, human-scale partnerships between government employees and citizens help the local government recover its position as a catalyst to improve the community's quality of life.

In 1992, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, was selected by the U.S. Conference of Mayors as the winner of its Livable Cities Award for cities with a population of 100,000 or less. Hattiesburg's Neighborhood Improvement Program was honored as "a new approach to the way government responds to the needs of the community," but in 1989 when the program was developed, it appeared

that it might not survive its infancy, much less become nationally recognized.

Hattiesburg's government, prior to 1989, was organized into departments that worked independently of one another to deliver municipal services. However, in separate areas of the organization, several programs provided the momentum to move it toward a neighborhood improvement philosophy.

Employees began to seek opportunities to explain their objectives, mostly in informal, one-on-one settings.

In 1985, the city council expressed concern about the fairness of service delivery across the entire city. Older neighborhoods had seriously deteriorated. The public service department responded first with its "Area of Pride" effort, a "sweep" of a targeted area to quickly improve the condition of infrastructure and the appearance of public rights-of-way. Next, the inspection department, under pressure to remove abandoned, dilapidated structures, also conducted comprehensive sweeps to log violations and begin the long, difficult legal process to eliminate code violations.

Finally, the department of planning and community development introduced the "Main Street Program," following the program developed by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. The Main Street approach marked the earliest effort of city government to involve property owners directly in developing solutions to problems facing the downtown area.

For a variety of reasons, these three disjointed efforts failed to produce long-lasting results. However, they planted the seeds that would mature after the 1989 city elections in the form of the Neighborhood Improvement Program.

During this same period, the city was busy adopting a new comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance to implement it. This process brought over 1,000 residents to a series of public hearings, demanding protection of their neighborhoods. In 1989, this momentum carried over into the newly-elected administration, which included, for the first time, an appointed chief administrative officer with the authority to coordinate the efforts of all city departments.

The first initiative of the new management team was to develop a plan for a Neighborhood Improvement Program built in large part on the city's earlier efforts. The Neighborhood Improvement Program was envisioned to be a comprehensive city government response to solve neighborhood problems. The program was to focus on one neighborhood at a time and move from neighborhood to neighborhood as improvements were completed in each. (However, as the program matured, it became clear that no neighborhood was ever "completed.")

A test neighborhood area was selected in August 1989, and a 90-day trial period began. First, senior

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management from the city departments formed a coordinating committee; its first chair was an assistant fire chief. The NIP committee (as it was later called) was to coordinate a comprehensive neighborhood assessment.

The main business of the coordinating committee quickly became peacekeeping as departments, unaccustomed to working together, found employees of other departments routinely "interfering" with their work. Each city department was attempting to conduct an independent, comprehensive assessment of the target neighborhood, block by block. These assessments were originally to be limited to the perspective of each department. Firefighters inspected buildings, building officials identified dilapidated and abandoned structures, police officers went door-to-door introducing themselves to residents, and the public works department inventoried infrastructure needs.

The final step involved tapping into other community resources to . . . increase the problem-solving capability of neighborhoods.

Suddenly, the management information system of the city was inundated with data, and work loads became unmanageable. Simultaneously, meetings began with neighborhood residents. Neighborhood watch groups were organized in response to an overwhelming surge of requests to improve neighborhood safety. Weekly meetings were scheduled in the target area for two months in an effort to inform and involve the public. However, the NIP coordinating committee did not anticipate the tone of the public response, which almost deflated the program before it got started.

Neighborhood residents, who felt they had been ignored for a number of years, used their first substantive contact with city representatives as an opportunity to vent their frustrations. Police officers found themselves being used as scapegoats for public works staff, while code enforcement officers heard complaints about the responsiveness of the police department. Frustrated citizens did not wait to direct their complaints to representatives of the appropriate department and would not delay their input until meetings scheduled to address their particular problem. In fact, residents seemed to be under the impression that city employees were capable of communicating with each other—and expected them to do so.

During its initial stage, NIP was seen by city employees as being project-oriented, not people-oriented. For instance, the evaluation of the test neighborhood reported that only four neighborhoods could be covered annually. NIP was thought of by the employees involved as additional work, not as a process to solve neighborhood problems. However, the public responded to the program.

As a result of this new neighborhood emphasis, the department of planning and community development began organizing neighborhood watch groups across the city. Meanwhile, assessment techniques learned in the test neighborhood by code enforcement officers and public works employees soon began to be used by almost every city department, even outside designated NIP neighborhoods.

During the first twelve months, the NIP program tried to move from neighborhood to neighborhood, while continuing to address needs in other parts of the city. While this dual approach continued, the attitude of senior city employees began to change. Instead of viewing citizen inquiries as "getting in the way of their work," employees began to seek opportunities to explain their objectives, mostly in informal, one-on-one settings. And while new NIP neighborhoods were brought into the system, it quickly became evident that no neighborhood would ever really be "completed."

This realization led to the purchase of a computerized complaint tracking system to be used by all departments. Key NIP committee members found themselves attending public meetings across the entire city. As a result, the few employees on the NIP committee were stretched thin. They began to feel that their main function was to be a target for citizen complaints. In every one of the first public meetings held in each new NIP area, residents insisted on being heard on topics of disagreement with the city—some of which were two decades old!

This venting of frustrations confused the city employees involved. Generally, the employees were highly motivated and wanted to please the public. And at first they lacked the perspective to understand that these attacks were really expressions of citizens' dissatisfaction with their treatment by city government in the past.

The sudden rise in the level of vocal complaints and the availability of a new forum for citizen involvement made the elected officials uneasy. They were concerned about discussions of expensive public works problems and were afraid that the machinery of city government would be overwhelmed by the requests. One member of the city council flatly declared the program a failure after only six months. However, overall support from elected officials remained strong, allowing the NIP coordinating committee to push forward in hopes of changing the perception of the program within city government.

In the fall of 1990, a major reorganization of the project took place. The NIP committee was reorganized as the NIP management team. The city was divided into six neighborhood service delivery districts based on the fire station service areas—as in most other localities, the fire service in Hattiesburg has a long history of geographic accountability, and most of its public services are routinely delivered at the station level. A fire officer, a police officer, a code enforcement officer, and a mid-

level manager from the public services department were appointed to serve on a neighborhood service delivery (NSD) team in each of the six districts. The NSD team became the primary, permanent link between city government and its neighborhood, for routine, basic service delivery and for problem-solving.

The neighborhood service delivery districts and their corresponding teams enabled the Neighborhood Improvement Program to blanket the city. The teams were tasked with working with the neighborhood watch groups in their districts to help them develop into comprehensive neighborhood organizations. Another key responsibility was proactive problem-solving with the district. Each team member evaluated his or her district from the perspective of a mid-level manager now held accountable for services within the district.

During a single month, over fifty meetings were held at the neighborhood level with watch groups or other existing neighborhood organizations. These proved to be the first meetings conducted as part of the NIP effort that were able to focus on solving problems, not dissatisfaction with city government.

The change to a city-wide concept allowed the NIP management team to refocus its strategy. Training was developed for NSD team members, as well as for the new neighborhood leaders. The chairmanship of the NIP management team was rotated to the public services representative, and the team began the process of identifying programming that could be delivered through its emerging network.

City programs, such as the surveys required for historic conservation district nominations, were redesigned to involve the newly-formed neighborhood organizations. A project to secure state forestry commission funds for planting street trees in four different commercial areas of the city involved the adjacent neighborhood organizations. The national "Night Out Against Crime" became a staple of neighborhood programming; Hattiesburg ultimately won a national award for its program. Each October the local drug awareness partnership conducted its red ribbon month, with most neighborhood watch groups and comprehensive organizations participating. The "Keep Hattiesburg Beautiful" committee merged public, private, and not-for-profit efforts to coordinate semi-annual clean-up days and an "adopt-a-median" program.

The final step involved tapping into other community resources to develop additional partnerships to increase the problem-solving capability of neighborhoods. Linkages were developed with local banks to coordinate their Community Reinvestment Act programs. A housing partnership task force developed from this process, consisting of neighborhood leaders, local bankers, realtors, and city staff. The task force prepared a grant application that combined all of these resources to obtain \$500,000 in community development block grant funding (Hattiesburg competes in the state-run program for small cities).

Other projects took shape. City government worked with the public school district to lease an abandoned school building, so that it could be sublet to the newly formed Pine Belt Boys' and Girls' Club, a United Way agency. The Pine Belt Boys' and Girls' Club was founded in response to the need for programs for children at risk.

Program Results

After three years, the results of Hattiesburg's program are both visible and measurable. City government is reorganized to better respond to the needs of all of its neighborhoods—residential, commercial, and industrial. City government now views itself as both a facilitator and a catalyst to assist citizens. One important result is that basic service needs are now defined with the help of those affected, while existing resources are reallocated to meet newly defined needs. City government no longer sets priorities by itself.

The development of the neighborhood improvement philosophy and the implementation of the process have enjoyed the following results:

- Troubled neighborhoods have received additional attention for at-risk youth, overgrown lots and dilapidated structures, routine maintenance, and crime prevention.
- Over 200 abandoned, dilapidated structures have been removed.
- The Hattiesburg Keep America Beautiful program won first place in the local government category of the Mississippi People Against Litter competition.
- An adopt-a-median program was sold out within one month of its announcement.
- A local housing task force consisting of representatives of neighborhoods, city government, public agencies, and local lending institutions leveraged \$500,000 in grants funds.
- The number of active neighborhood watch groups increased from 15 to 80.
- The number of comprehensive neighborhood organizations grew from 4 to 15.
- Serious crimes decreased by 7.5 percent, and the clearance rate increased by 10 percentage points from 37 to 47 percent. The police department credited these improvements to increased citizen involvement and awareness.

COMPONENT OF NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICE DELIVERY

Reduce Fear of Crime

If public safety is not restored, then the community cannot be knit together for other common purposes. Neighborhood watch programs should be the first step of the

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renewal process instead of a hastily applied "final" solution. Communities must again become "front-porch societies," where sidewalks, streets, and front yards are the common ground for neighborhood interaction.

Neighborhood watch programs should focus not only on catching criminals. They should establish a climate of reduced fear among neighbors, while rekindling community spirit. Crime cannot be eliminated by neighborhood watch programs or the police department; however, it can be reduced by successful citizen-government partnerships.

These partnerships are an active process that begins with the neighborhood watch effort but is sustained over time by continued interaction. Fear of crime is the most visible and vocal concern of a neighborhood in crisis. It must be confronted before other needs can be addressed.

Identify Underlying Service Needs

Attention must be brought to the basic service needs of the neighborhood. Basic service needs are often unmet because of a lack of communication. For instance, few neighborhoods, if any, would choose to have their streets repaved when they believe that their safety is threatened by inadequate street lighting. But in many neighborhoods, information about residents' priorities never gets to city hall. Streets may be repaved when what residents really want is more lighting. Or recreation programs may be offered, but at the wrong time or place.

Local governments tend to develop policies that encourage the delivery of basic services in a uniform, fair manner. What is fair is seen as everyone getting the same share of public goods. It takes only a cursory reading of block group census data to reveal that no two neighborhoods are exactly alike. Common sense tells us that some neighborhoods need more or different services than others.

Local governments must move beyond being satisfied to act with the "consent of the governed" toward the understanding that the community of residents wants the opportunity to influence public policy decisions impacting service delivery.

Develop A Problem-Solving Organization

Neighborhood improvement is a continuous process. The fact that it is a process does not imply that it is simple or easy, or that it fits neatly into four-year terms of office. It is impossible to develop "repeatable" government solutions that fit every neighborhood in the country. Solutions must be developed that will work and survive within the context of each local government.

Neighborhood decline is measured in terms of decades, and few short-term "fixes" exist. The rebuilding process must be sustained by a neighborhood-local government partnership. Rebuilding happens in small, sometimes seemingly insignificant steps, not swift, dramatic action.

Slowly, the social and civic infrastructure of neighborhoods must be rebuilt, side-by-side with the physical infrastructure.

Develop a Neighborhood Improvement Philosophy

Local governments often look at a problem to determine whether it is a government problem, but this approach may be too simplistic. Problems of neighborhoods often require a substantial government effort to mobilize the resources of *other* sectors of the community. Local governments can serve not only as the provider of services but also as the catalyst for mobilizing other community resources toward the common good. In some neighborhoods, local government programs are inadequate, and help is needed as well from private agencies, civic groups, and other levels of government.

If neighborhood health is the central purpose of local government, then each and every action taken by local government must strengthen neighborhoods. This becomes both the philosophy that frames public policy, and the litmus test for good public policy. Local government employees learn to value neighborhoods and understand the importance of improving the delivery of basic, routine services in direct consultation with citizens. The local government plays a proactive role in improving services, sometimes as the primary service provider, often as the catalyst for change.

Make Neighborhood Improvement Comprehensive

Decentralizing public service delivery is not new. In fact, fire departments have used this concept for most of this century. Fire companies protect a geographically specific territory, and it is normal for fire inspections, fire drills, and other fire department services to be delivered at the station level. Fire service policies and procedures are centralized, but the activities are not. Community-oriented policing follows the same pattern.

A few local governments have applied what they know about the delivery of police and fire services to completely reorganize their basic service delivery system; they include substantive public involvement strategies in a comprehensive policy and organizational framework like Hattiesburg's Neighborhood Improvement Program.

A neighborhood service delivery program rests on a citizen-centered, neighborhood improvement philosophy. In fact, "neighborhood improvement" is a philosophy, a process, and a program. It is a philosophy of service delivery for basic city services, and a process of improving quality of life through neighborhood revitalization. As a process, it cross-cuts the traditional organizational structure of the local government, and creates human-scale, citizen-government

partnerships. As a program, it redirects existing resources through comprehensive, geographic service districts.

Encourage Public Involvement

Once the geographic service districts are established, then the public must be involved. In many communities, the primary neighborhood service request involves public safety. In response, the first service (beside fire) implemented is neighborhood watch. This is the starting point for the organization of the neighborhood service delivery process.

Neighborhood watch groups are first developed for public safety, but are encouraged to become active in other aspects of community life, such as identifying code violations, programming recreation, locating drainage problems, or improving street lighting. The objective of the process is to transform the neighborhood watch group into a comprehensive self-help organization.

Local government employees involved in this process must be prepared to become the focus for public complaints. The development of partnerships depends on the success of these new relationships with the public; citizens must learn to trust local government employees and develop new avenues of communication.

Improve Accountability

Each geographic service team member is held accountable for the basic service activities of his or her department within the respective geographic service district. For these team members, accountability is reduced to a manageable size: from the entire local government jurisdiction to the geographic service district. Success, progress, or failure are more readily measured.

Once accountability is established, then effectiveness can be identified. Performance measures are established for individuals, teams, and departments. Geographic service district team members must be trained to adopt a proactive style that encourages locating and resolving problems. Team members move outside their narrow frames of reference and pool all available information for individual and team success. When the teams succeed, the ultimate winners are the citizens.

Use Geographic Service Districts and Teams

A geographic service district is a specific service response area, such as an area historically served by a fire station. The fire department model is one that other departments can readily understand. These geographic service districts establish territorial accountability, and must become second nature for the other local government departments.

Geographic service districts, like established fire protection districts, should be permanent. In other words, they should not be based on political boundaries. The relationships developed within each service district

require the boundaries to remain constant. Usually, neighborhood boundaries do not neatly fit planned service district boundaries. Simple adjustments should be made to align them so that further change is unlikely.

Once public safety strategies have been introduced in a service district, then other basic services follow. To accomplish this, mid-level managers from each department are brought together as a team and assigned responsibility for the geographic service district as part of their routine duties.

The team becomes the primary connection between the local government and its citizens for resolving routine service delivery issues. If successful, this approach redirects existing human and financial resources of the local government toward solutions reached by the team and the residents.

The geographic service district teams must avoid complicating their roles. Teams meet every week for 30 minutes over a cup of coffee at a central public building, such as a community center, fire station, public school, or library. No minutes are kept, no agenda is prepared, and no cumbersome administrative structure evolves. These meetings are held simply to exchange information needed to improve routine service delivery.

If an individual team member is unable to solve a given problem, then it is referred to the member's supervisor for consultation. Geographic service delivery teams coordinate internal communication and responses, while at the same time maintaining direct contact with neighborhood watch groups and comprehensive neighborhood associations.

Since neighborhood watch groups are merely a beginning point for the neighborhood improvement process, not its end product, efforts must be made to get them concerned about the total welfare of their area. Group leaders may need additional training, and increased contact with the geographic service delivery team is important. The team members must be available to them and known to them by name and face. In other words, the watch groups and comprehensive neighborhood groups within each service district become the responsibility of the service district team.

The team member from the police department becomes the one contacted for law enforcement-related problems; the same is true for fire, public works, and planning and community development. Teams coordinate external contact with each of the groups under their care and make certain that problem-solving occurs. Teams become advocates for the area they serve.

Local government managers are among the most resourceful of all public servants. They are close to the public so they know daily the public's perception of how effectively it is being served. These factors encourage local government managers to adapt and innovate.

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Too often, local government decision-making relies on narrow, professional advice. Professional recommendations for street widening, traffic signals, rezoning, or the hours of operation of recreation facilities receive preliminary approval, and then are placed on meeting agendas for formal action. At this point, citizens learn of the impending decision (often for the first time) and attend the official meeting to voice their opinions. At the least, hard feelings result; at worst, disagreement blocks or delays a decision and results in inaction.

Geographic service districts give the local government managers a partnership with the citizenry that encourages public participation in government. Smaller, human-scale structures allow for two-way communication between citizens and their government, and at the same time increase the accountability of everyone involved. Public participation becomes a routine occurrence, not an exception that is reserved until confrontation is imminent.

Too often, local governments shield themselves from direct public involvement through the very processes designed to encourage it. When it is somehow the public's "fault" for not knowing how to find the narrow opening provided for participation, much faith may be placed in professional opinion, and too little in the wisdom of the public.

Quality of life is the business of the entire community.

In the information age it is difficult to distinguish between data and information. It is even more difficult to determine whether substantive public participation has emerged from the forums provided for that purpose.

Obviously, professional opinions should carry great weight in matters of public health or safety, but many of the contentious problems placed before local governing bodies could have been avoided if "citizen-centered" policy-making had been the practice of the local government.

Each local government adopting this approach will develop unique solutions likely to be effective only within its own community. No two solutions will be alike; fragmentation and innovation should occur. It is important to find those solutions that work and make sense in the context of your jurisdiction. Citizen-centered public policy and neighborhood improvement programs will involve innovation, change, and local "tailoring" to ensure a snug fit.

Quality of life is the business of the entire community. Governing is the blending of the resources of the public, private, and the not-for-profit sectors to solve problems and improve the quality of life. The social and civic infrastructure of the community, however, is an important determinant of the quality of life, and must

be maintained with the same vigor and enthusiasm as solutions that require bricks and mortar.

Neighborhood service delivery programs require that we expand the traditional view of government responsibilities to include significant partnerships with the other sectors of society. Approaches such as community strategic planning have been used to help elected and appointed officials identify community goals. However, little effort has been made to develop programmatic strategies to achieve the implementation of strategic plans. Neighborhood service delivery should be viewed as a vehicle to implement common community goals, while at the same time creating local government organizations that are citizen-centered and human-scale.

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
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MIS REPORT

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RESPONSIVE SERVICE DELIVERY: A COMMUNITY ORIENTATION FOR PROBLEM SOLVING

No two jurisdictions face exactly the same problems. Each local government must respond to the needs, both perceived and real, of its own community. A local government can use strategies modeled after successful problem-solving methods in other communities, but every borrowed approach must be tailored to the local community's unique needs. Appointed and elected leaders must work closely with citizens to find out exactly what problems take first priority, what citizens want done, and who can help do it.

Examples from eight jurisdictions demonstrate problem-solving approaches that are responsive to local circumstances, responsive to citizen needs, and responsive to opportunities for collaboration. The eight case studies are:

Temple Terrace, Florida—Citizen Participation in Code Compliance
Reno, Nevada—Responsive Traffic Services

Provincetown, Massachusetts—Cooperation to Overcome Hate Incidents

Daly City, California—Finding Flexible Solutions to Gang Violence

Springfield, Ohio—Neighborhood-Oriented Problem Solving

Montgomery County, Maryland—The Community Policing Triangle

Mason, Ohio—Empowering Employees to Improve Customer Service

Salinas, California—Community-Oriented Public Service

Responsive Service Delivery: A Community Orientation for Problem Solving

This report was compiled by Robert M. Grims, an intern with ICMA's police programs. Mr. Grims is a candidate in the public administration program at George Washington University. The community-oriented policing case studies were developed under the direction of ICMA project director E. Roberta Lesh. John C. Martin, deputy city manager of Daly City, California, contributed to the introduction of this report.

INTRODUCTION

This report focuses primarily on public safety problems because how effectively a locality solves its public safety problems will determine the quality of life for its citizens. Since public safety problems are inextricably linked with a variety of economic, political, and social problems, community-oriented policing is beginning to be replaced by community-oriented municipal services in many places.

But community-oriented municipal services may be a redundant phrase. The real issue for most local governments is responsiveness—the ability to move quickly to identify changing needs and redirect often meager resources to address those needs in a timely manner.

Creating an organizational environment of sensitivity and responsiveness is often a difficult task.

For many communities, the rate of change brought about by complexity and diversity has increased dramatically. Managers have responded with more systematic approaches to evaluating services and to allocating resources, for instance, by using strategic planning. But creating an organizational environment of sensitivity and responsiveness is often the more difficult task.

Organizations have their own history, traditions, and inertia. Local government managers must attempt to preserve the positive aspects of the organizational culture, while establishing new expectations for creativity, mutually supportive programs, and individual empowerment of employees. In truth, we are replacing those earlier traditions and perspectives in which departments were frequently seen as individual fiefdoms or, at best, compartmentalized activities. The new traditions build on cooperation and teamwork in a dynamic environment. Further, they require a broadened

view of available resources. A community's resources do not exist solely within a local government organization and often are underutilized because of a lack of direction or recognition of potential.

These new approaches to service delivery and problem solving are dependent on the leadership of both the policymakers and management, from elected officials to recreation leaders on the playground. Their professional effort to create this organizational capability is as critical and substantial as the effort to provide the services themselves.

Last month's MIS Report, *Neighborhood Service Delivery*, discussed the philosophy and the process of involving neighborhood residents and businesses in the implementation of local government policy. It emphasized local input and geographic accountability for service delivery. This month's report is titled *Responsive Service Delivery: A Community Orientation to Problem Solving* to emphasize the integration of government and community in responsive service delivery. It will profile eight local governments that have tried to increase their own capacity to be responsive to community needs. The case studies are arranged progressively, moving from relatively simple single-issue problem solving to government-wide initiatives that seek to improve all departments' responsiveness to the needs of the entire community.

One Department, One Problem

Temple Terrace, Florida's code inspection department and Reno, Nevada's police department have developed proactive responses to single-issue problems. In each case the problem was relatively straightforward, and the solution was within the capabilities of a single department, but these two cities improved the service delivered and conserved resources by building a closer working relationship with citizens.

The city of Temple Terrace, Florida (17,000), initiated a neighborhood participation code compliance

program to reduce municipal code violations without increasing the cost of enforcement. The ultimate goal was to preserve the character and quality of life in residential neighborhoods by empowering the residents to get involved in the city's code enforcement efforts. The proactive approach has been well received—over 50 percent of the homes in the target neighborhoods are participating.

In Reno, Nevada (110,000), the police department changed its traffic services program by applying community-oriented policing principles. It began surveying citizens and created a service-request system to handle previously ignored complaints about traffic problems in neighborhoods. Police officers have been empowered to solve problems by, for instance, requesting engineering alterations or organizing neighborhood meetings. The program was awarded a \$20,000 grant as a finalist in the Innovations in Local Government Program sponsored by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University.

A Multifaceted Approach

In the next two case studies, both cities use an inter-departmental approach to address a specific public safety problem. The problem in Daly City, California, was youth gang violence; the problem in Provincetown, Massachusetts, was hate crimes.

Provincetown, Massachusetts (population 4,000-30,000), is a diverse community whose seasonal population has a high percentage of gay and lesbian residents. Its major problem has been hate crimes committed against this group. To address the problem the city applied the community policing model and brought together citizen activists, police, and municipal officials. This approach resulted in a 30 percent drop in reported hate incidents for the summer of 1992.

Youth gang violence has been a serious problem in Daly City, California (population 83,000). Here, the city orchestrated a coordinated response that included the schools, the community, the police, and other agencies.

Going to the Neighborhoods

Springfield, Ohio (population 70,500), is exploring community-oriented policing to address a variety of problems in specific neighborhoods. In this model the police department essentially serves as the lead agency in bringing the resources of several departments to bear on localized problems identified by citizens.

The implementation team for Springfield's community-oriented policing program was made up of police and local government personnel. The team placed community-oriented police officers in neighborhoods to solve problems by walking the beat and working with other city departments. The officers have formed trusting relationships with the residents, in addition to developing close working relationships with the city's development and public works departments.

Building in Responsiveness

In the final three case studies, the jurisdictions have implemented wide-ranging changes aimed at creating a more responsive local government. Mason, Ohio, and Montgomery County, Maryland, each took the time necessary to lay strong foundations for their new community-oriented programs. Salinas, California, brought community-oriented policing ideas to service delivery in other departments.

Before Mason, Ohio (population 12,000), a suburb of Cincinnati, embarked on an ambitious customer service approach to service delivery, it concentrated on employee empowerment. Employees in each department were given the tools to implement proactive problem-solving methods.

In the preliminary stages of implementing community policing, Montgomery County, Maryland (population 760,000), took as its motif a triangle, whose three sides are the community, the local government, and the police department.

Salinas, California (population 115,000), has incorporated the principles of community policing in a citywide philosophy it calls "community-oriented public service." Each city department is expected to practice the philosophy. The Salinas case study highlights the proactive problem-solving approaches the city's building and police departments have taken and describes the city's concerted effort to construct a community center in an area plagued by gang activity.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CODE COMPLIANCE

Thomas J. Bonfield, city manager, Donald Sawyer, director of community development, Gail Garnier, chief of code compliance, and Joe Gross, code compliance officer, contributed to the following case study.

The city of Temple Terrace, Florida, is a residential, suburban community of about 17,000 people located adjacent to Tampa on Florida's west coast. Over the years, the city has derived considerable tax revenue from the high property values of its residential neighborhoods.

The department of community development's code compliance section includes a section chief and two field officers. Although the city prefers voluntary compliance, the municipal code enforcement board acts as the ultimate enforcement arm to obtain code compliance.

The Problem

As the city's neighborhoods have aged, the number of unsatisfactory conditions has increased. Like many cities, Temple Terrace is not in a fiscal position to hire the additional staff needed to investigate code compliance complaints. The municipal code enforcement board is effective, but the time constraints placed on the process by the enabling legislation can result in delays in

obtaining compliance of as much as six months. Most citizens do not understand these due-process issues and simply assume that the city is dragging its feet. Also, this process often pits the city staff against a citizen, creating hard feelings.

In 1990, the department began to look for more effective ways to do its job without increasing costs. Drawing on the concept of community-oriented policing, the staff conceived a neighborhood participation code compliance program based on the following ten strategies:

- Provide quality service to all city residents
- Attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with all city codes
- Increase the visibility of the city's community services
- Provide verifiable measurement of effective enforcement practices
- Identify the neighborhood's primary concern
- Identify problems perceived as most important regardless of their frequency
- Develop frequency data to assist in establishing priorities
- Develop and implement action plans to address neighborhood concerns
- Measure the program's effectiveness
- Determine the citizens' level of satisfaction with the city's enforcement efforts.

The Survey

A survey was developed to obtain valid, accurate information from citizens. Three separate and distinct city neighborhoods with economic and social diversity were selected for the initial program. These neighborhoods included both single-family detached homes located in somewhat insulated neighborhoods and multifamily residences in fringe neighborhoods adjacent to commercial areas. The selected neighborhood areas were similar in size.

A questionnaire entitled "Tell Us What You Think About Code Compliance" was used as a primary data collection method. Part I asked respondents to identify the major code violation problems in their neighborhood and to rank these problems in order of importance. Part II listed conditions in four areas—safety, nuisance, aesthetics, and city-wide problems—and asked respondents to rate the frequency and intensity of these conditions. Part III of the survey asked respondents to rate the overall appearance of their neighborhood and the city compared to other neighborhoods and cities and invited additional comments.

To let the public know in advance about the survey project, public information notices were posted on more than thirty community bulletin boards. Local businesses, banks, grocery stores, and restaurants assisted by displaying the notices in conspicuous locations. Similar information was disseminated via the news media and government cable television channel.

The survey was mailed to all residences in each of the target neighborhoods, accompanied by a letter of introduction and a postage prepaid envelope. The surveys were color-coded by neighborhood to facilitate the recording of the responses. In all three neighborhoods, the survey response rate was almost 50 percent.

Before compiling the survey results, the code compliance officers conducted their own surveys to document their personal observations of the conditions of the neighborhoods. With the survey results in hand, the officers visited each neighborhood again for field verification at different times of the day and on different days of the week (evenings and weekends) since some conditions, such as commercial vehicles in residential areas, appeared only in certain hours. During these neighborhood visits, officers paid special attention to the major concerns of the survey respondents. After comparing the survey responses with the field inspection data, the staff began a six-month service campaign.

The Service Campaign

The first step of this campaign was to mail out an update to the residences in each of the target areas detailing the survey results and outlining those problem areas that "neighbors" believed detracted from the neighborhood. Residents were urged to review the results and encouraged to be "good neighbors" by taking steps to correct any problems that might appear on their property and recommending other actions that could be taken to improve the neighborhood's image. At this point, specific violations were not charged.

About a month later, the code enforcement officers used door-hanger warning notices to advise residents of previously identified, specific violations that had not been corrected. Once the residents began to see that violations and problems could be corrected, either voluntarily or after the city's reminder, they realized that the city and the neighbors were serious about their desire for improvements. These efforts led to even greater voluntary compliance.

After a two-month period, the code compliance officers initiated formal code enforcement proceedings against those responsible for the most serious uncorrected violations.

At the end of the three-month service campaign, a follow-up questionnaire was mailed to tell citizens about the efforts of the neighborhood and the city and to obtain feedback on the campaign. This second survey addressed the concerns from the initial survey and asked the citizens to rank current conditions compared to conditions before the campaign. The response rate to the second survey equaled that of the initial survey.

Results

Results of the final responses revealed that the respondents recognized some degree of improvement in all categories in their neighborhoods. Additionally, and

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unexpectedly, results and findings indicated that almost half of the problems staff categorized previously as "neighborhood problems" or "nuisances" were not considered by the citizens to be problems at all. This resulted in a reevaluation and revision of several ordinances, such as those regulating garage sales and home occupations.

In all cases, residents believed that conditions in their neighborhoods improved as a result of the program. The city was not able to document every violation that was corrected voluntarily and therefore cannot quantify a total savings generated by the program. It is believed that the total staff hours saved by not initiating and processing code violations that were corrected voluntarily exceeded the staff time devoted to the campaign.

Conclusions

Citizens know better than anyone whether their neighborhoods are clean, safe, and attractive, and what problems are most important. Involving citizens in identifying and correcting problems is a highly effective way to bring about voluntary compliance and improve perceptions of the city and the code compliance staff without increasing the cost of code enforcement. Additionally, the program has enabled the city to interact with individual residents, inform them of the code compliance programs, and instill in them an appreciation for the importance of citizen involvement and opinions.

Citizen input has also freed staff to address issues that are most important to residents. Staff has developed a greater sensitivity to citizens' concerns and, in turn, is regarded as being of greater service to the residents. The city has continued this program by adding two neighborhoods and by informing previously surveyed neighborhoods of changing regulations.

RESPONSIVE TRAFFIC SERVICES

This case study was written by Jim Weston, deputy chief of the Reno, Nevada, Police Department.

1986 was a bad year for the Reno, Nevada, police department. Not only had sworn staff decreased during the previous 10 years as the city's population swelled by 25 percent, the department had also lost the second of two ballot issues within a year asking the public to pay for staffing increases. The department suffered from a declining public image, a series of incidents involving off-duty officers that the media relentlessly alleged were examples of common behavior in the department, and poor employee morale. In fact, a study at the time showed that six of every ten residents surveyed thought that the police department was doing a bad job.

Four years later a similar survey showed that eight of ten residents thought the department was doing a good job. Voters were so pleased they finally passed a

ballot issue that financed a 40-percent increase in sworn staff, adding 88 police officers to the force of 225. The key to the change was a community policing philosophy that went much further than most approaches. COP+ (community-oriented policing with a plus, as it is called in Reno) created a quality assurance bureau that conducted public surveys in order to evaluate the department's performance. In Reno, community policing is more than a management philosophy preached by top level managers, it is the solid foundation of everything the department does. One key element in Reno's success has been its traffic services program.

Community-Oriented Policing and Traffic Services

Traffic enforcement in Reno had been a source of community dissatisfaction for many years. The police department had no formal program to deal with residents' complaints about neighborhood traffic problems. Instead it focused on the management-by-objective goals of writing citations and reducing accidents. The department used ticket quotas to evaluate officer performance and raise revenue and had no organized selective enforcement system to achieve traffic program goals. Officers patrolled the streets looking for violations and tended to migrate to "duck ponds," places where it is easy to write tickets.

In 1986, a traffic safety grant allowed the purchase of 21 radar units to increase the number of speeding citations issued. Over the next three months, the number of citations written increased by more than 50 percent, which resulted in an increase of complaints from drivers that the police were simply generating revenue, not reducing accidents. In fact, the accident rate over this period increased slightly.

Managers of the department revamped the traffic services program and applied the community policing philosophy in 1988, with dramatic results. A service-request system was created to handle the previously ignored complaints about traffic problems in neighborhoods. Motorcycle officers were assigned to visit the homes of all complainants to ask how the department could address their problems. The officer then had three weeks to take a variety of problem-solving approaches, such as requesting engineering alterations (new speed signs, stop signs, reversal of one-way streets, etc.), conducting intense enforcement efforts, or organizing neighborhood meetings.

This was a time-consuming process, and many officers were hesitant to stop writing citations, which were the traditional measure of their performance. Management responded by changing the evaluation system to rate officers on how many problems or service requests they resolved rather than how many citations they issued. Productivity was gauged by a new system that identified why officers were writing citations. Three categories were created: service request citation, high accident target citation, and randomly issued citation. The ratio among these categories was

constantly monitored to ensure that citations were being issued only for accident violations and citizen complaints.

The immediate impact was a 57-percent decrease in citations issued. Interestingly, this decrease had almost no impact on the accident rate. Although revenue did decrease, the decrease was not in proportion to the reduction in citations, since fewer citations normally meant higher quality citations that were not challenged as often in court.

The program became quite popular over the next few months. Residents asked for more neighborhood traffic officers, local schools collected donations to buy another of the mobile display radar trailers used to warn speeding drivers, and citizen complaints about traffic officers virtually disappeared.

Successes

A typical example of the program's success involves a problem with speeders in an older neighborhood. Every day at noon high school students would leave for lunch via St. Lawrence Street, a two-lane downhill one-way street and a favorite shortcut to local fast-food restaurants. Residents regularly complained about speeders on the street. Neighborhood residents, police, and traffic engineers jointly solved the problem by reversing the direction on the one-way street and making some other minor engineering changes.

In another area of town, residents had frequently complained of speeders in a school zone where the lack of sidewalks forced children to walk on the dirt shoulder of the road. Police negotiated with the public works department to revise its schedule of capital improvement projects, and sidewalks were installed in a matter of weeks.

Today, the Reno community policing program has been replicated in part or in whole by several jurisdictions, and in 1992 the program was awarded a \$20,000 grant as a finalist in the Innovations in Local Government Program sponsored by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University.

COOPERATION TO OVERCOME HATE INCIDENTS

This case study was prepared by Keith A. Bergman, town manager, and Michelle Jarusiewicz, assistant town manager, of Provincetown, Massachusetts.

The town of Provincetown is committed to becoming one of the first communities in Massachusetts to implement the community-oriented policing philosophy. During its initial strategic planning phases, the local government has applied the community policing model of police-community-government cooperation to the development of a plan to overcome "hate incidents." This term includes civil rights violations—most notably violence against gays and lesbians in this tourism-based Cape Cod resort community.

Diversity and Community Policing

In the words of Elizabeth Watson, police chief of Austin, Texas, civil rights plays a "special role . . . in community policing; because community policing is reaching the community, and the community is diverse. Therefore, diversity is implied in community policing."¹

Civil rights violations—crimes that are motivated by hatred of people who are different—represent one of the biggest challenges to policing. Community policing seems uniquely suited to confront this issue head on, because it draws upon the richness and resources of the community.

At the tip of Cape Cod, Provincetown is a very diverse community with a reputation for acceptance of a variety of lifestyles. It rightly boasts that the Pilgrims' first landfall in 1620 was in its harbor—not Plymouth's—and that the Mayflower Compact was signed there. The ensuing centuries saw this fishing village and artists' and writers' colony become dependent almost entirely upon summer tourism, carving out for itself an international reputation among gay and lesbian tourists. Meanwhile, Provincetown's annual unemployment rate averages over 30 percent, and over 60 percent of its households qualify as low and moderate income. The population swells from less than 4,000 in winter to more than 30,000 in the summer—all in an area of less than three square miles. A permanent police force of 17 sworn officers is doubled with summer special police officers and parking enforcement personnel, to cope with this seasonal swing.

Summer unrest in the streets broke out in the 1980s, with marches and protests against hate crimes, and a near-riot occurred in September 1990. By 1991, a Boston-based victim advocacy group reported that hate motivated violence against gays and lesbians was worse in Provincetown than in any other town in Massachusetts, including Boston neighborhoods of comparable size, and that 20 of the 25 incidents of anti-gay and lesbian violence on Cape Cod occurred in Provincetown. However, officials and activists agreed that such figures also reflected the relative safety and security victims felt in reporting these crimes to Provincetown's police department.

The retirement of the town's police chief of 22 years offered an appropriate opportunity to reassess the direction of the department, and it was during this transition that the town manager introduced the community to community-oriented policing. By March 1992, a citizens' police chief goals committee concluded that "the goals and objectives we recommend for the new chief are rooted in the strong belief that Community Policing should be the operational philosophy of the Provincetown Police Department."

April saw the town manager's selection of a new acting chief of police firmly committed to this new philosophy and to the sharing of responsibility both within the department and with the community. By June, the board of selectmen's set of annual policy goals included the implementation of community-oriented policing as

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a top priority, and Provincetown sponsored a day-long ICMA training workshop on community-oriented policing. Members of Provincetown's management team attended the National Community Policing Conference sponsored by the Portland, Oregon, police bureau in September, and established contacts with future benefactors from the San Francisco, California, police department and the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA).

San Francisco sent a lieutenant from its Tenderloin task force to Provincetown for a week of training aimed at helping our police officers recognize the value of the community-oriented policing philosophy. BJA provided a training program on strategic planning and a survey conducted by Community Research Associates of Nashville, Tennessee.

The principle distinction between traditional and community-oriented policing is that the latter empowers the community to work with the police department. Together they identify needs and, even more significant, they acknowledge co-ownership of problems, and work jointly to help solve them. One of Provincetown's first successes with the COPS model came when the community itself, through the call of the newly formed Cape Cod Campaign for Civil Rights and the Subcommittee for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Civil Rights, articulated the need to deal directly with hate crimes. Their challenge was succinct: haters watch to see what leaders do.

This time, the leaders did something.

A Working Group

In Provincetown, a working group of citizen activists, police, and municipal officials was convened to implement the community policing model.

Community. The community-based groups were instrumental in articulating the issue. They helped line up editorial support for development of a plan, and worked to create a climate of cooperation, in part by quietly agreeing not to take to the streets. Instead, they came to the table as active members of the town manager's Hate Plan Working Group, with issues as significant as the need for providing more victim assistance, as complex as the tracking of individual cases through the judicial system, and as simple as suggesting that court dates be scheduled for Mondays or Fridays, to make it easier for weekend residents and tourists to return to the community to testify.

Police. A police sergeant was designated as civil rights officer to coordinate the development and implementation of departmental policies and procedures to investigate and prosecute hate incidents, and to establish a protocol for referring victims to providers of assistance. The department strengthened existing relationships with the courts, the office of the district attorney (including its victim witness program) and the attorney general (who, under Massachusetts law, has the

unique ability to seek civil restraining orders against perpetrators of hate crimes). Diversity training became routine rather than a response to political crisis. Supervisors provided quality control and evaluation, ensured that patrolmen got the resources and training they needed, and coordinated procedures with other municipal departments.

Local government. Municipal officials provided leadership and direction for the organization and the community. The elected board of selectmen took the lead by authorizing the town manager to develop the Plan to Overcome Hate Incidents. The board itself adopted a resolution against hate crimes; established a policy that the town comply fully with the state's Hate Crimes Reporting Act; and, in November 1992, approved the comprehensive set of policies and procedures for the police department presented by the manager's Hate Plan Working Group. The town manager spread the word to all municipal employees and to members of all community groups, many of whom came forward in support of the town's efforts.

Within town government, the department of human services was reorganized and given a new mission statement that included the provision of victim assistance services by town staff. The agency's head and her staff coordinate existing services and providers, including area hospitals and rescue staff. The town also committed itself to support needed staffing and training in the police department and to seek outside grant funding aggressively.

Looking Forward

The commitment to work together got the community through the summer of 1992. Reported hate incidents dropped 30 percent in 1992 compared to 1991, with fewer still involving acts of physical violence. Alarmingly, though, fully one third of those incidents occurred within one block of the town hall. In response, the town will open a police substation next door to the town hall in the summer of 1993.

The working group process is a dynamic one, and as Provincetown's community policing strategy matures, its focus will inevitably be on prevention through education. This is the issue that Provincetown's strategic planning process will address, drawing upon successes as well as setbacks.

FINDING FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO GANG VIOLENCE

This case study was written by John C. Martin, deputy city manager of Daly City, California, with the assistance of many others.

Late on a fall afternoon in 1990, a 14-year-old African-American youth left his friends after a minor confron-

tation at a nearby outdoor basketball court and started toward home. A few blocks from his house, three Filipino youths drove up behind him and murdered him in the street. Eddie, a top student and well liked, was the latest and most visible victim of increasing violence among the youth of Daly City.

Daly City, California, immediately adjoins San Francisco. From 1970 to 1990, a dramatic change occurred in the ethnic makeup of the community. Originally strongly Italian, the white population dropped from almost 87 percent of the community in 1970 to less than 40 percent in 1990. The Hispanic population grew from 14 percent to 22 percent, but the most dramatic change was the increase in the Asian/Pacific Islander population, which grew from less than 3 percent to 43 percent. Within this population, Filipinos are the most significant single group, with more than 27 percent of the population. By 1990, more than 45 percent of Daly City residents were born outside the United States, and approximately 10 percent of the households were estimated to be linguistically isolated. Even more dramatic, over 90 percent of those enrolled in local schools were Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, or black. Almost 33 percent of the children lived in single-parent families. Since 1986, the number of children in this community of 83,000 has grown substantially.

During the latter part of the 1980s, Daly City experienced an increasing number of youth-related violent incidents ranging from assaults to stabbings, armed robberies, drive-by shootings, and a torture murder. The majority of these incidents resulted from the eruption of tensions among a growing number of juvenile gangs, formed primarily along racial, cultural, and ethnic lines.

Currently active are five Filipino gangs, three African-American gangs, four Hispanic gangs, and two Chinese gangs. In addition, the community is frequented by a number of youth gangs from San Francisco. Violence occurs as frequently between these "outside" gangs and those from the community as between the local youth gangs. In what was once a quiet residential community, violent juvenile activity has dramatically increased to an average of more than one major incident and dozens of minor incidents every month.

The city's initial response to the rising level of youth-related violence was traditional. Concentrating additional resources in problem areas, the police department increased enforcement, assigned campus officers, developed intelligence networks, and initiated internal programs.

In addition, the management team of Daly City (consisting of the city manager's office staff and department heads) began efforts to evaluate the situation and identify programs that would complement the efforts of the police department. It was apparent that an overall, community-based strategy was needed and that it should include enforcement, intervention, diversion, and recreation. With the support and approval of the five-member city council, the management team began

identifying ways to coordinate resources and programs to address the community's needs. Although confronting youth violence is an extreme example, the response was typical of the team's approach to restructuring service delivery.

Individual city councilmembers assumed active leadership roles in a number of key areas. One member of the council organized and led an antigraffiti committee made up of young volunteers who conduct graffiti paintouts each weekend, using donated paint supplies.

Anti-Gang Task Force

After Eddie's death, the city council supported the mayor's appointment of an anti-gang task force, which consisted of members of the business community, school and church officials, homeowner association representatives, parents, two councilmembers, and key staff members, including the deputy city manager, the police chief, and the director of parks and recreation. This task force generated community support for a number of recommendations ranging from increased youth employment by businesses to innovative programs sponsored by the city and the schools. Based on the recommendations of the task force a number of programs were implemented, including the following:

- An ongoing youth advisory committee with a membership similar to that of the anti-gang task force. The committee acts as a coordinating body among different agencies and interest groups in the community. It has also initiated a parent awareness campaign and provides support for parent education workshops presented by parents, teachers, and student associations.
- The Team Leadership Challenge Retreat. A member of the city council organized this program with support of school officials and the director of parks and recreation to bring together natural youth leaders from the community's two high schools. Approximately 60 young people representing a cross section of the many cultures found in Daly City attend a three-day retreat at a rural camp outside the city. Teachers, parks and recreation employees, a councilmember, and a professional facilitator help them define their vision for their community and develop an action plan to be presented to the city council. The objective is to bridge ethnic and cultural gaps and reduce gang rivalry.
- An anti-gang education program in the elementary and middle schools, both public and private, conducted by the police department. Substantial efforts were required to restructure class schedules, maintain state requirements, and resolve other difficulties to provide this program, which is strongly supported by the schools.
- A restructured juvenile diversion program. Provided through a contract with a nonprofit agency, this program counsels first-time juvenile offenders

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and provides services to the youths and their families. Sponsored by the city and funded with local moneys as well as federal and foundation grants, it is overseen by the youth advisory committee. The program has achieved a recidivism rate of less than 5 percent among its clients.

Collaborative Programs

Reallocating resources to address the changing needs of Daly City's ethnically diverse population is an ongoing process requiring considerable innovation and experimentation. Many of the collaborative departmental and interagency programs implemented with the support of the city council were seen as relatively high risk due to their potential for creating environments or situations attractive to gang confrontations. However, the council and management team felt it was critical to provide alternative activities and was willing to accept some risk in order to be successful in modifying behavior patterns and social relationships. A sample of initiated programs include:

- The expansion of city-supported after-school sports and recreational programs on school sites to replace those eliminated by the schools due to budgetary reductions
- The institution of midnight basketball at the city's gymnasiums
- The creation of the CARES program in which the city libraries, the recreation division, and the police department work closely with school counselors to assist at-risk youth in elementary schools by providing intervention services ranging from homework assistance to placement in youth sports leagues and other activities
- The production of safe and secure rap and rock concerts for teenagers
- The creation of a youth "volunteer" program to assist in staffing recreational activities and the expanded hiring of youth as part-time employees
- The creation of a collaborative after-school program for preteens and older teenagers with the Boys and Girls Club of San Mateo County in one of the poorest and roughest neighborhoods in the city
- The expansion of the role of community-oriented police officers in working with neighborhood organizations, schools, community groups, and other city staff to identify potential or ongoing juvenile problems, to explore options for intervention, and to create a mechanism to assess the impact of various efforts
- The expansion of library programs to serve young children and adults: the Grandparents and Books program, in which trained bilingual and bicultural seniors read and tell stories to children one afternoon a week at the main library, and an adult literacy program that has served nearly 200 adult learners since 1985 and has been adapted to serve adults

who have limited English language skills. Parents' lack of communication skills and knowledge of customs and cultures is seen as a major impediment to their ability to control their children.

The management team regularly reviews the impacts and relationships of all these programs.

Targeting Resources

Daly City has one of the lowest per capita revenues of any of the communities within San Mateo County. Greater effort is required to target limited resources to ensure that the services and programs provided are oriented toward meeting the community's specific needs and desires. The city council and management staff are part of an ongoing team effort to find new opportunities to provide service.

In the spring of 1992, one such opportunity arose. The county manager and the county superintendent of education outlined an innovative pilot program (named the FUTURES project) to establish on-site, school-based social service offices to address the needs of at-risk youths. These offices would be staffed by representatives of county social and health service agencies. The staff would be trained to evaluate the needs of children and their families and to identify all of the resources that could be brought to bear on the dysfunctional aspects of a family's life. Staff would work closely with teachers, counselors, and local police in identifying at-risk youth and encouraging them to seek assistance.

In order to select sites with the greatest potential for success, county officials asked applicants to demonstrate not only need, but also a track record of collaborative efforts with local agencies. Two elementary school districts and one high school district supported by Daly City representatives, local child care providers, and others, made successful presentations to the evaluation committee and were chosen as pilot project sites.

This integrated service delivery approach is designed to meet health, mental health, social service, and academic support needs of low-income youth and their families. The response from families, teachers, and administrators has been extremely positive. The program fills a major gap by providing early intervention for at-risk youth and deals with many of the causes of youth violence. Five FUTURES offices have been established within the community and within eight months of its inception, more than 800 cases have been addressed.

The relationships and ongoing collaboration between the agencies and residents of the community have resulted in reducing significant violent incidents. It is understood by everyone involved that efforts must be long-term and consistent in order to address culturally, racially, and ethnically based patterns of alienation that have expressed themselves through the youth of the community in the formation of gangs and violent behavior. Individual programs created to address specific

needs have received recognition and awards at the national, state, and local level. However, their true value is their role as part of the larger effort to address this community issue.

NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED PROBLEM SOLVING

This case study was written by Robert M. Grims and Allen Lew of ICMA, and Ellen B. Hoover, special projects administrator for Springfield, Ohio. The case study was developed by ICMA under a community-oriented policing grant from the National Institute of Justice.

The city of Springfield, Ohio, is located in west-central Ohio just west of Columbus and east of Dayton. Its population of 70,500 is culturally and racially diverse, industrious, and mainstream. The city's location off I-70 has made it an attractive site for industry.

With the downturn in the national economy and the discontinuance of federal funding in the 1980s, the local government had to reduce services, but it also joined forces with the chamber of commerce and the citizens to rebuild the downtown and pursue new industries. It succeeded in increasing development, stabilizing its finances, and reinstating many basic services.

As the downtown redevelopment was completed, the city commission began to look at committing future grant dollars to the neighborhoods for demolition, water and sewer projects, street repairs, nuisance abatement activities, and a more comprehensive housing program.

Neighborhood Deterioration and Rising Crime

Some of the city's oldest neighborhoods have high incidences of housing violations and complaints regarding nuisances. Residents in these deteriorating neighborhoods tend not to take advantage of the city's housing rehabilitation programs because it is not economically feasible to renovate many of the older homes.

Visually these neighborhoods are not attractive, cohesive areas. The police and city inspectors receive frequent complaints about vacant lots, trash, weeds, abandoned cars, and vacant and open structures. The city's traditional approach has been to attack these problems with code enforcement legislation, coupled with housing rehabilitation programs, landlord/tenant resolution, and mediation programs when appropriate. Success has been at best limited.

Crime has become a serious problem. Between 1988 and 1990, the city's reported violent crimes increased by nearly 33 percent, and in the last 20 years larcenies—typically burglaries, auto theft, grab-and-run offenses, and armed offenses—have more than doubled. During the 1980s the police force had become understaffed as a result of the city's long-standing financial difficulties. As nearby cities stepped up drug enforcement, Springfield, located on the Interstate 70 and 75 "crack run"

between Detroit, Columbus, and other larger midwestern cities, became the "safe haven" and drug-related crime increased.

A Shift in Focus

In 1988, the city manager, the police chief, and the city commission shifted some of the resources being used in downtown redevelopment to the neighborhoods. Policing was the city service that seemed to need most attention. The command structure of the department was redesigned to support new programs, and with the addition of 24 officers to the 100-member force and the replacement of approximately one third of the force due to retirements, the police department gained a new vitality. It was an excellent opportunity to explore the concepts of community-oriented policing.

In the summer of 1990, the police division implemented neighborhood foot patrols in a high crime area of the city specifically to deal with drug and youth activity. Officers were assigned to walk this beat, allowing them the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the residents and local merchants.

Working with the city's development and health departments, the officers took a more proactive approach to their jobs. They addressed problems such as nuisance abatement, unsightly trash buildup, unruly youth, and abandoned vacant structures. The city had yet to implement community-oriented policing; however, it was applying some of its principles.

In the spring of 1991, Springfield hosted a multicounty workshop on community policing. The workshop was given by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) under a grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). A community-oriented policing implementation team was formed that included ten people: the city manager, the chief of police, the assistant city manager, three of the four police department captains, the president of the command officers' union, the president of the patrolmen's union, the former president of the patrolmen's union, and a labor/management committee member.

The team met monthly with an action agenda. The team has made every decision involving implementation, planning the staff organization, the training curriculum, the pilot areas, choosing the community-oriented policing officers and participants, and determining departmental involvement.

The participation of the police unions was critical to all of the implementation team's decisions. The team wanted to ensure that the unions understood the new philosophy, since they would be communicating with the officers.

Police staff on the implementation team, including the union officials, set the criteria for community officers and chose six candidates.

With the help of the development department and the team's police officers, but without input from the administrative members of the team, the team then chose

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target neighborhoods. This method removed any impression that the choices were politically motivated. The team decided the pilot areas should be borderline neighborhoods—areas not needing intensive policing efforts. Putting the officers in a relatively stable environment would give the initiative a better chance of succeeding.

After choosing the target neighborhoods, the implementation team brought in Albert Sweeney, an ICMA consultant and an expert in community policing, to lead a seminar in which key players developed an action plan to fit the needs of the target areas and the police department of Springfield. Seminar participants included the implementation team, the six selected officers, the city commission, directors of the other city departments, four school principals, and two church leaders. The plan they developed set a target date of July 1, 1992, for implementation in the pilot areas.

Officer Training

The implementation team decided that it would initially use only three of the six community-oriented policing officers. One officer would be assigned to each of the two selected neighborhoods, while the third officer would work in both. The three other officers would be given assignments when the program was expanded.

Before deployment each officer received 32 hours of training, provided by key personnel in several city departments, including the city manager's office and the fire, human relations, public works, recreation, legal, and development departments. The officers also met with representatives from the department of natural resources, the Humane Society, and the United Way. An additional training component included a session on understanding ethnic and cultural diversity.

Each officer received a reference book containing telephone numbers for Springfield city offices and departments, county offices, support groups, and emergency public health services (such as food, clothing, housing, and medical services). The officers were instructed to keep the booklet in their cars and use it to contact the proper personnel.

On June 30, 1992, the three officers took to their beats. They were scheduled to work from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Monday through Friday, but eventually they were granted flex-time so that they could attend neighborhood events during hours that were not part of their shift.

The officers were encouraged to get to know the neighborhood residents and businesses. Their job was to identify problems in their assigned neighborhoods and seek solutions. The assistant city manager was assigned as liaison to internal departments for the necessary support for the program. Traditional supervisory channels were changed so that each officer became the contact person for the complainant and the agency of referral. Officers developed a sense of stewardship about their jobs and the added independence enhanced job performance.

The Neighborhoods

The small Selma Road neighborhood is in a larger area known as "Irish Hill." It is bounded by railroads and factories. The area has an unusually high number of code enforcement violations, and demolitions there are difficult. The area, which contains one third of all the city's boarded structures, is one of the city's poorest areas and has one of the lowest rates of home ownership. Police calls for this area include assaults, burglaries, interpersonal problems with neighbors and family members, and many calls on nonpolice related issues.

The newly assigned officers began by going door-to-door explaining their program and listening to the problems of the residents. The officers were attempting to set the boundaries of their jurisdictions, inform residents, and find the community leaders. The officers learned that the problems were different from those anticipated, that residents wanted solutions for easily resolved problems rather than those they considered out of their control (barking dogs instead of housing conditions, for example). The officers began to provide those solutions and have succeeded in reducing the number of calls to the police dispatcher for nonpolice concerns. The hope is that residents will become more willing to assist in resolving larger problems.

The second neighborhood, North Hill, is just outside the central downtown and is bounded by vacant factories, a major city thoroughfare and a creek. This area has a higher percentage of home ownership and more stable incomes. North Hill has some troublesome vacant structures and is beginning to show deterioration, but not nearly to the extent of Irish Hill. Burglaries and assaults are the crimes most frequently reported. The officers in the area feel these are related to the area's drug problems.

The officer assigned to North Hill was able to find community leaders almost immediately, and with their assistance a neighborhood committee established goals for the area. Unlike Irish Hill, this area wanted housing issues addressed as a priority. The residents were clear about their priorities and were strongly supportive of the officer's efforts. A resident of the neighborhood comments, "He is ours, he is our friend and he has put us in a position where we can now solve our own problems. I don't live in fear anymore."

Other City Departments

Nearly all of the city departments, and in particular the development department, have worked with the community-oriented policing officers in some capacity. Each department developed a horizontal working relationship with the officers; the officers call directly when they have a problem.

The police officers have come to understand how each department operates, and hence, have been able to work closely with staff. Each department works with the officers to avoid some of the red tape that can hinder problem-solving in local governments.

The police officers have also been empowered to take the initiative to correct problems. Because they see the same areas every day, they notice developing problems. For example, the officers now notify the appropriate staff when they see abandoned buildings that might pose a threat to the community. Although the procedures for processing complaints have not changed, administrative personnel have a better sense of the neighborhood priorities regarding a specific problem and are better able to respond to those priorities.

Evaluation

A six-month evaluation helped the implementation team identify aspects of the program in need of correction. First, the program was hampered by a lack of continuity of supervision, partially due to transfers and other department demands. In addition, the goals and objectives of the program were not clearly communicated to the entire police force at the outset. As a result, routine administrative items such as the reporting criteria needed to evaluate the program in the pilot areas were not established, and an early opportunity to involve other departmental personnel in community-oriented service delivery was lost.

The three neighborhood officers were frustrated that the department's remaining police officers were not trained for community-oriented policing concepts and were not advised of its progress. The officers also expressed concern that they were not able to solve citizens' problems as quickly as they would like because of departmental regulations they felt powerless to change.

Most of these concerns have been addressed since the six-month evaluation. An original member of the implementation team has been given direct supervision of the program. The community-oriented policing philosophy has been integrated into the departmentwide in-service training curriculum, and goals and objectives have been established for the pilot areas with the assistance of the participating officers. The implementation team still meets regularly; its current agenda is to continue evaluation, refine the program, and oversee its expansion and transition into other neighborhoods. The other city departments appreciate the efforts of the officers and feel the program should be continued and expanded.

THE COMMUNITY POLICING TRIANGLE: INVOLVING CITIZENS IN PLANNING

This case study was prepared by Sergeant David E. Bodie, office of staff inspections, and Lieutenant Palmer D. Wilson, director, office of staff inspections, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department.

Montgomery County, Maryland, has a population of 760,000 residing in an area of 502 square miles. The police department has 850 sworn officers and 250 civilian

employees. In early 1992 Police Chief Clarence Edwards committed the Montgomery County Department of Police to a philosophy of community policing, but he recognized that the department needed to work with the community and the local government to improve the quality of life in Montgomery County.

Community policing depends upon this three-sided partnership to define crime-related problems, find their root causes, and carry out solutions that will reduce or eliminate these problems.


A Multiyear Strategic Plan

Montgomery County is developing a multiyear strategic plan for implementing community policing that will define the mission, values, goals and objectives, organizational structure, and staffing necessary for the police department to meet the citizens' long-term needs. At every step its actions include all three sides of the community policing triangle.

Individuals appointed to serve on Montgomery County's Community Policing Steering Committee include sworn and nonsworn department members representing both management and labor and individuals representing other government agencies, the business community, and civic associations.

Community Input

To get input from a larger segment of the community, the steering committee conducted a series of six forums at various locations in the county. Citizens were asked to comment on the proposed transition to community policing, the draft mission statement, and the draft state-



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ment of values. The last forum was videotaped and shown repeatedly on the local cable channel. The enthusiasm of the citizens who attended the forums reinforced the department's belief that community policing would be welcome in the community and that a partnership was beginning to form.

The steering committee created eight working committees to develop goals and objectives.

- Employee development
- Media, education, and information referral
- Recruiting and training
- Workload analysis
- Operations
- Organizational structure
- Governmental coordination (legal and legislative)
- Technology development.

More than 120 members of the police department representing sworn members of all ranks, more than 20 civilian employees, more than 40 citizens, and 30 representatives from the governments of Montgomery County and the cities of Gaithersburg and Rockville are actively participating on these working committees to determine how policing will be conducted in Montgomery County.

To make others involved in county government aware of the impact that community policing could have on the delivery of county services, the police department conducted a briefing on community policing for county government department heads and hosted an ICMA/NIJ community policing workshop that was attended by key government officials and staff.

The department has also established a 20-member advisory committee on cultural diversity that is co-chaired by the director of the office of community policing and a private citizen. Agenda items may be referred to the committee by the chief of police, presented by members of the community, or generated by the committee itself. Recommendations will be forwarded to the chief of police for review.

Implementation

When completed, Montgomery County's strategic plan for community policing will include proposals for funding and manpower needs. It will be submitted for review to both the county executive and the county council, allowing them to evaluate budgetary requests as part of a comprehensive multiyear plan. Some community policing prototypes may be established in limited areas of the county, before community policing is employed countywide.

The Montgomery County police department has begun a partnership with the community and the local government. All three components of the community policing triangle are working as equal partners to decide how law enforcement services will be delivered within the county.

EMPOWERING EMPLOYEES TO IMPROVE CUSTOMER SERVICE

This case study was written by Patrick Ibarra, assistant city manager of Mason, Ohio.

Mason, Ohio, is a northeastern suburb of Cincinnati with a population of 12,000 occupying a 13-square-mile territory, of which half is developed.

Recent growth has placed a strain on the ability of Mason's government to provide superior services. Understanding that citizen perceptions are vital to government performance and credibility, the manager and his staff decided to embark on a program designed to emphasize excellent customer service as the hallmark of a well-run organization. The first step was to raise the morale of employees, since employee enthusiasm was seen as a key ingredient of more responsive service. To demonstrate a commitment to the employees, the manager and his staff decided to make the employees their internal customers.

Employee Development

The manager believed that incorporating values such as trust, teamwork, innovation, a respect for the worth of the individual, and a desire to provide high-quality service in the day-to-day life of the organization would improve employees' performance. The idea was to create an environment in which employees were made to feel successful. People tend to act in accordance with their image of themselves—if they see themselves as well regarded, they will try to perpetuate this image. Factors identified that could foster a successful environment are praise, appreciation, respect, new responsibilities, delegated authority, pleasant atmosphere, and recognition.

The first step was to show the "Excellence in the Public Sector" videotape to all 75 employees. This video, hosted by Tom Peters, highlights three governmental agencies that disregarded bureaucratic norms and actively pursued innovation. The video showed the employees that other public sector agencies had reinvented their systems for delivering services. After the video was shown to each department, employees took part in a discussion facilitated by the manager on how similar techniques could be applied in Mason. As the manager listened and responded to problems raised, the employees began to see that their comments mattered.

After the discussion, each employee received a questionnaire with 10 open-ended questions. Over half of the employees responded. All the comments were categorized and included, unedited, in a 25-page document, which was then forwarded to each of the employees. Most of the employees wanted to feel more appreciated and more involved, and wanted management to demonstrate a stronger interest in their welfare. Some commented that positive attitudes would increase morale.

The manager's staff initiated several new strategies to address employee concerns. Some of these included:

- More frequent departmental meetings between department directors and employees
- A quarterly employee newsletter—"Mason Minutes"
- A Public Service Recognition Week that includes management-employee luncheons with the departments to discuss departmental operations and employee concerns
- An annual employee excellence award. Employees select someone from their department who has demonstrated a positive attitude, outstanding effort, and high productivity. Winners are announced at an employee picnic held during Public Service Recognition Week and each receives prizes and a plaque. A group photo of the winners is displayed at all city facilities
- Service anniversary lapel pins
- An employee wellness program
- A S.W.I.T.C.H. (Stop Working In The City Hall) program for the assistant city manager, who works alongside two different employees a month in order to get a better perspective on their daily responsibilities
- Employee profiles in a "We're Proud Of" section in the city's quarterly newsletter delivered to residents
- A management reference library and a list of all materials, including books, magazines, videotapes, and audio cassettes on topics such as supervisory skills, team building, empowerment, and motivation
- A three-ring binder for all department directors and front-line supervisors to hold articles distributed at staff meetings on topics such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, employee motivation, personnel matters, and technological advances.

Finally, employees decided on their own departmental values, mission statement, and goals for the upcoming year.

Citizens as Customers

The next step was to improve external customer service. The departmental mission statements were evaluated and "Commitment to Excellence in Public Service" was chosen as the mission statement for the entire organization. The motto appears on the doors to the municipal building, and on stationery, memos, and business cards. We wanted the public as well as the employees to see this motto.

During the first phase of the program we continually discussed quality customer service with employees. Therefore, having seen our commitment to them, they were ready for the second phase commitment to reach out to the citizens.

Historically, educating citizens about services they

receive for their tax dollars and improving those services has not been a priority. But, with taxpayers' deteriorating perception of government at all levels, it has become a necessity.

After extensive evaluation of customer service programs practiced by both private and public-sector organizations, Mason took the following steps:

- Divided administrative and clerical personnel into two work groups, each of which participated in four training sessions on customer service, telephone techniques, and listening and communication skills.
- Prepared customer service survey for the engineering and building, utility billing, and tax departments. Each of these departments has large volumes of pedestrian traffic.
- Instituted a police department citizen survey that is sent out to every fifth person who has contact with the police department (not including people arrested). Officers are ranked on courtesy, helpfulness, and resolution of the problem. The response rate is 40 percent.
- Prepared materials to inform citizens about city activities: a monthly on-hold tape; departmental photo display boards picturing city services; a new parks and recreation brochure describing recreation programming and amenities at local parks; a directory of services that covers everything from A-Abandoned Vehicles to Z-Zoning & Subdivision Regulations, is written in laymen terms, and is revised annually.
- Initiated a program to help Mason students understand their local form of government and distributed a Youth and Local Government Activity Book to Mason second graders.
- Distributed a Directory of Public Officials, which includes all local, school, township, county, state, and federal officials, and created and included in the city's quarterly newspaper a "Who Do I Contact" one-page sheet that includes phone numbers for all city departments and other useful phone numbers for noncity operations, such as utility companies and the chamber of commerce. Both are updated annually.
- Installed answering machines for the municipal building and city garage telephones.
- Established a 15-minute parking spot for citizens near the side door of the municipal building and encouraged city employees to park in the downtown area in order to free more parking spaces for citizens at the municipal building.
- Initiated a breakfast program for citizens—three council members, the city manager, and the assistant city manager meet with two to four residents one month and two business people the next month to get feedback on the community and city services. A survey on city services is sent to participants before the meeting.

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- Introduced annual open houses in the police department, the city garage, and the engineering and building department.
- Included a feedback form for residents to clip out and send in with their comments or suggestions in the city's quarterly newsletter.
- Borrowed a publication from the city of Fairfield, California, entitled "How To Get It Done" for the police department to distribute to citizens. Topics include reporting suspicious or criminal activity, calling in an emergency using 9-1-1, forming a neighborhood block watch group, and requesting a traffic accident report. Each topic is outlined on a one-page flier.

Problems Solved

Two areas that received much attention were the city's water conservation program and the engineering and building department's activities. Because of Mason's tremendous residential and commercial growth, the demand for water cannot always be satisfied, especially during the summer months. The city has restricted lawn watering and has also seized the opportunity to educate homeowners about water conservation. It has distributed to residents a water-saver kit with a toilet tank water displacement bag; a water wheel that lists potential water wasters and conservation methods; and brochures outlining everyday tips for saving water, saving energy, handling household hazardous waste, and reducing and recycling waste. In addition, the city's utility billing office began selling low-flow shower heads, faucet aerators, toilet dams, and lawn watering timers.

To save staff time, the engineering and building department staff published a booklet entitled "How to Obtain a Building Permit," designed to answer common citizen inquiries.

The department faces a problem in the summer, when contractors performing street repairs and applying slurry seal block off streets without warning. Nothing is more annoying to citizens than finding that they can't park in their own driveways when they come home from work in the evening. The department decided to hang a flyer entitled "The Truck Stops Here" on residents' doorknobs a few days before the contractor is scheduled to arrive on their street. The door hanger includes a letter outlining the homeowner's responsibility for vehicles while the street is closed and answering some commonly asked questions about asphalt overlays and slurry seal.

The department also produced a four-page brochure entitled "Erosion Control for Home Builders." The brochure, which is sent to each homebuilder who builds in Mason, identifies the problems of erosion, gives tips on how to prevent it, and describes commonly used erosion controls. The city engineer hosted a breakfast for the homebuilders to review the brochure.

Key Lessons

We have learned a great many things from both the employees and citizens. The most important is that it is imperative that any appointed official who plans to "reinvent" the organization and begin making "total quality" customer service a priority first check the pulse of the employees. Managers should expect responsive customer service from all employees, but in order to achieve it they must first identify, and then attempt to remedy, those pressures and demands their employees are experiencing.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED PUBLIC SERVICE

This case study was written by Robert M. Grims and Allen Lew of ICMA, based on information provided by David R. Mora, city manager, and Daniel Nelson, police chief of Salinas, California. The case study was developed by ICMA under a community-oriented policing grant from the National Institute of Justice.

The city of Salinas is a community of 115,000 residents, the majority of whom are minorities. According to the 1990 census, Hispanics represent 47 percent of the population; the Asian/Pacific population is 8 percent; the black population is 3 percent; and other minority groups represent 2 percent.

Salinas is surrounded by farmland. The community's geographic isolation makes it possible for local decisions to have a noticeable impact on the community.

Significant budget deficits in the last two years have made it necessary to reduce various city services, including police and fire. At the same time, the introduction of district elections has brought about political change. Before 1989 the mayor and city council were elected at-large. Beginning in 1989, councilmembers were elected by district elections. In a period of less than four years, the representation of minorities on the Salinas city council has gone from zero to a plurality with four minorities among the seven members of the city council. The new political leadership is demanding more attention to neighborhoods, and in response the management team has adopted a community-oriented public service approach involving all city departments. This approach emphasizes problem solving, participatory management, community empowerment, and customer service, all of which center around the main goal of improving the quality of life in Salinas.

The Problems

The problems facing Salinas are not unique. Although the population is only 115,000, the general demographics and economic characteristics of the community provide an environment that is afflicted by the same problematic issues as other larger, more urban areas.

Many Salinas neighborhoods are facing problems caused by criminal street gangs, illegal use and sale of all types of drugs, and numerous difficulties associated with high-density residential development. These include overcrowding, noise, domestic disputes, insufficient lighting, deferred maintenance by absentee landlords, parking problems, and the need for more recreational activities. In addition, the city has a significant transient population and a high percentage of minorities, many of whom speak only Spanish. These educational and cultural differences serve as obstacles to developing real neighborhood support groups. There is a history of distrust of the police by the minority community. Drive-by shootings have been prominently featured by the local media, heightening the fear within the community.

The Goal

The goal of the community-oriented public service effort in Salinas is to build a more responsive organization that not only identifies community needs but also works with the residents of neighborhoods in developing and delivering services that meet both real and perceived needs.

The Strategy

In the spring of 1991, with six new city department heads in place (police, fire, parks and recreation, public works, redevelopment, and library), the city manager introduced local officials to the community-oriented public service philosophy through visits to two ICMA/NIJ workshops on community-oriented policing, one in Santa Ana, California, and the other in Springfield, Ohio. The city manager took a team of city department heads to each of the two workshops. In addition to the city manager, the first team consisted of the police chief, the parks and recreation director, and the public works director. The second team included a city councilmember, the fire chief, the redevelopment director, and a police captain.

The workshops served as foundations for implementing a new local government philosophy. The city described this philosophy as community-oriented public service, not community-oriented policing, to emphasize the inclusion of all city departments. Although the titles are different, the focus is on the same principles: improving the quality of life, customer service, participatory management, community partnership and empowerment, and problem solving.

After a seminar on community-oriented service delivery organized by the city manager, each city department was given responsibility for implementing its own community-oriented public service program. Each department was and still is expected to report periodically to the city manager on its community-oriented public service program.

Community-Oriented Policing

The Salinas police department has traditionally emphasized a conservative approach to law enforcement, and its intergovernmental relationships did not reflect a community orientation. Since June 1991, the department has undergone reorganization and has developed a mission statement that reflects a community-oriented public service philosophy. Traditional police methods were not abandoned, but were integrated with the new approach. The police department is engaging in educational and recreational programs, as well as many volunteer efforts that reflect this approach to community problem solving.

In early 1992 the Salinas police department began its transition to community-oriented policing. The police chief discussed the overall strategy for a successful transition to community policing with everyone in the department and stressed the importance of understanding this new philosophy, noting that promotions would be largely based on candidates' knowledge of community policing. This knowledge would be evaluated by an extensive interviewing process. However, no departmentwide training was provided. Officers were encouraged to learn the philosophy through independent reading and to practice it in daily operations.

The department's two special enforcement teams, whose mission had previously been reactive, were converted into a single gang task force committed to a proactive approach to problem solving.

Two logistical changes were also made as part of the transition to community policing. The first was to move from random patrolling to a beat system. Prior to community-oriented policing, the city had been divided into three random patrol areas. The city was resectioned into twelve beats (areas of responsibility) and officers were strongly encouraged to develop professional relationships with the residents and business owners whom they served. The officers were empowered to take innovative, proactive approaches to problem solving.

(The current beat shift system, the rolling ten plan, requires further examination. Officers work the same ten-hour shifts when they are on duty, but the days of those shifts rotate weekly. Also, senior officers are given priority in selecting the beats they wish to work and may bump a lower ranking officer from his or her beat. These two factors combine to prevent officers from becoming well acquainted with the residents and merchants on their beats.)

A second logistical change was made to the police department's response procedure to calls for service. In order to reduce the overwhelming number of calls to which officers had to respond every shift, calls were sorted according to priority and alternatives were developed for those that did not require response by a police officer. For instance, minor thefts can now be reported on a mail-in incident form. Some calls are referred to other city departments.

For calls that require uniformed police response, a new system has been established. Calls that involve

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danger to life or property, which are generally in-progress, receive first priority and get immediate response from the nearest units. Calls involving a suspect in custody or an accident that presents a hazard on the roadway are to be answered by the beat officer but the watch commander may dispatch another unit to the scene if the beat unit is unavailable. Calls that involve incidents that have already occurred and that do not present an immediate danger to the victims or to the public may be held up to two hours for the beat unit.

To establish closer, more positive relationships between school children and the department, the department has established a Police Activities League and has assigned police officers to schools.

Resident involvement is necessary and extremely valuable in the selection of target projects for community-oriented public service action. Resident groups can lobby for change and focus public attention on problems. Most important, resident involvement provides feedback to the police agency and empowers the community. The long-range goal of the resident involvement approach is to create a high level of police/resident trust via community-oriented public service partnerships. This effort will help residents feel more safe and secure, and when police experience the support of residents who lobby for better legislation and more resources for police work, the partnership will flourish.

The Fire Department

Active involvement in the community has become an integral factor in the Salinas fire department's service philosophy. The fire division is working to improve customer service and reach out to the community's youth. The building inspection division has created a building inspection newsletter that is sent to the Builder's Exchange and the chamber of commerce to improve communication with the communities they serve. The newsletter notes changes in codes and interprets ambiguous codes. The division also meets each week for one hour to brainstorm new ideas and strategies.

The building inspection division has also adopted a proactive approach to prevent costly construction errors. Before a project is begun, division staff hold a pre-job conference with the contractors to discuss and solve any problems that might occur during construction. Foundation and frame inspections are also enforced at new project sites to ensure that construction codes and standards are met prior to the actual building construction.

The Bread Box Recreation Center

The Bread Box Recreation Center is an example of the possibilities of community-oriented public service. Acting under an emergency powers ordinance, which exempted the city from its own building, planning, and development standards, the Salinas city council was able to transform an empty bakery warehouse into a recreational facility.

The old warehouse lacked a heating system and fire sprinklers. City staff worked together to design a plan that would make this substandard facility into an operational one. With a budget of only \$38,000, funded through community development block grants, the renovation took approximately three months to complete. More than 100 volunteers donated labor, tools, equipment, and additional funds for the final completion of the new facility.

The location of the Bread Box Recreation Center is important. It is situated on a street that divides the territories of two rival Hispanic gangs, both competing for control of the city's east side. The center is a neutral site for the community and prohibits patrons from wearing gang colors within the facility.

The facility offers supervised recreational activities ranging from boxing, weight-lifting, and aerobics, to arts and crafts, billiards, and movies. There is an average daily attendance of 250 community residents, ranging in age from three to thirty-five. Counseling is offered to those who have had run-ins with the law through two locally sponsored nonprofit programs. The Salinas police department also has an office on-site to provide residents an opportunity for positive interaction with the police. What makes this facility a community center is the effort both residents and local officials have undertaken to develop and make the Bread Box work.

The Future

Implementation in the midst of layoffs and budget cuts is the true test for community-oriented public service. After all, the primary goal of this contemporary philosophy is to allow local government agencies to be more responsive, not only to the communities they serve, but also to the ever-changing economic, political, and social environments.

By applying this nontraditional philosophy, Salinas may be able to overcome its financial obstacles. Salinas has taken some risks. Through a cooperative effort among the city council, the local government, and the community, the city is making significant changes. The city is emphasizing customer service in all its departments. Partnerships have been established with numerous governmental agencies ranging from the justice system, public health, and school districts, to public housing. The private sector has begun to participate in some successful community-oriented projects. All of these linkages will be continued.

Are these changes solving problems and improving the quality of life for residents? It may be too early to answer these questions, but one thing is clear. Community participation and satisfaction will be the deciding factor.

The city's ability to be the facilitator in empowering the community to become more involved in the solution of its problems will be crucial in the years to come.

¹ Elizabeth Watson, National Community Policing Conference, Portland, Oregon, 1992.

June 1992

HELPFUL HINTS FOR THE TRADITION-BOUND CHIEF

By John E. Eck

In my job as the Police Executive Research Forum's (PERF's) Associate Director of Research, I am given the opportunity to observe and assist police leaders who are dedicated to improving law enforcement practices. I have also had the dubious honor of working with a few law enforcement practitioners who seem determined to sabotage innovation — that ugly monster of change — at all costs. Contrary to popular belief, killing progressive programs can require as much creativity and subtle coercion as fostering positive change. PERF has a long tradition of helping law enforcement's pioneers advance innovative programs so that all citizens can enjoy a better quality of life. This paper is not meant for them, but rather, for those neglected, tradition-bound law enforcement practitioners. After all, they need help too.

TEN THINGS YOU CAN DO TO UNDERMINE COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing and problem-oriented policing are concepts that have been embraced and heralded by countless police leaders, public officials, and the press as the most important approaches to improving policing in the 1990s. Many of you, however, may be far less enthusiastic about the implementation of these approaches to policing. After all, a department that is organized to only fight crime and to handle calls is much easier to control and seems to pose fewer risks to the chief's and agency's reputation and image. Further, in the traditional policing model, blame for increasing crime rates and deteriorating social conditions can be placed on community leaders outside the police agency, while improvements in neighborhood conditions can be attributed to the latest, more conventional police program.

This paper is not meant for [law enforcement leaders who are dedicated to improving policing practices], but rather, for those neglected, tradition-bound law enforcement practitioners.

For those of you who are concerned about community policing in your department, but are afraid to openly oppose it, here are 10 tactics that are virtually guaranteed to mark you as a team player while you subvert community policing.

Any one of these tactics can be successful alone – they have all been field-tested and you will find many departments in which someone has been able to effectively introduce these viruses. But to be on the safe side, use as many as possible.

1. **OVERSELL IT** – Community policing should be sold as the panacea for every ill that plagues the city, the nation, and civilization. Some of the evils you may want to claim community policing will eliminate are

- a. crime
- b. fear of crime
- c. racism
- d. police misuse of force
- e. AIDS
- f. homelessness
- g. deteriorating neighborhoods
- h. drug abuse
- i. inadequate housing
- j. unemployment
- k. gangs
- l. civil disturbances
- m. bad government
- n. corruption
- o. disease
- p. injustice
- q. toxic waste
- r. alcoholism
- s. domestic violence
- t. sexism
- u. calls for service

Community policing should be sold as the panacea for every ill that plagues the city, the nation, and civilization.

- v. bad taste
- w. infertility
- x. teen pregnancy
- y. litter
- z. lousy drivers

There are other social conditions you can add to this list, but their inclusion must meet certain minimum criteria. For example, the list should only include those conditions, that if eliminated, could result in a department representative being invited to appear on "Geraldo," "A Current Affair," or the cover of the *National Enquirer*.

[R]eports of tangible successes should be suppressed in favor of broad promises of what community policing can yield that have no real hope of success.

To be sure, community policing may be able to properly address some of these concerns in highly specific situations. But, reports of these tangible successes should be suppressed in favor of broad promises of what community policing can yield that have no real hope of success. By building up the expectations of the public, the press, politicians, and some police administrators, you can set the stage for later attacks on community policing when it does not deliver.

2. **DON'T BE SPECIFIC** – This suggestion is a corollary of the first principle. Never define what you mean by the following key terms:

- a. community
- b. service
- c. effectiveness
- d. empowerment
- e. philosophy
- f. neighborhood
- g. communication
- h. cooperation
- i. collaboration
- j. problem-solving
- k. partnership
- l. co-production of public safety

Less than 10 percent of the department should be engaged in this effort, lest community policing really catches on.

Use these and other like terms indiscriminately, interchangeably, and whenever possible. At first, people will think the department is going to do something meaningful and won't ask for details, so the department can carry on as before with only cosmetic changes. Once people catch on, you can blame the amorphous nature of community policing and go

back to what you were doing before (since nothing of significance has changed, this will not be difficult).

The best image for community policing will be a uniformed female officer hugging a small child. This caring and maternal image will warm the hearts of community members suspicious of the police, play to traditional stereotypes of sexism within policing, and turn off most cops.

If the community policing officers do not handle calls or make arrests, but instead conduct get-closer-to-the-neighborhood approaches, they will not be perceived as "real" police officers by their colleagues.

3. **CREATE A SPECIAL UNIT OR GROUP** – Less than 10 percent of the department should be engaged in this effort, lest community policing really catches on. Further, since you plan to go back to traditional call-handling once everyone has attacked community policing, there is no sense in involving more than a few officers. Finally, special units and groups simultaneously gratify the press and politicians (who think something important is happening) while antagonizing most of the officers who see this for the sham it is. Thus, you look good in the public eye while undercutting the effectiveness of community policing.

4. **CREATE A SOFT IMAGE** – The best image for community policing will be a uniformed female officer hugging a small child. This caring and maternal image will warm the hearts of community members suspicious of the police, play to traditional stereotypes of sexism within policing, and turn off most cops. By subtly attacking their tough-cop image, the majority of male and female officers will reject community policing. Eventually, the community will begin to realize that there is a major difference between the image and the reality of this new approach to policing, and they too will begin questioning community policing.

5. **LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT COMMUNITY POLICING IS ONLY FOR MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS** – This is a corollary of items 3 and 4. Since a small group of officers will be involved, only a few neighborhoods can receive their services. Place the token community policing officers in areas like public housing. If this is done and their soft image accentuated, "get tough on crime" groups inside and outside the department will attack community policing for not making enough arrests and letting crime escalate.

With any luck, racial antagonism will undercut the approach. It will appear that minority, poor neighborhoods are not getting the "tough on crime" approach they need, while the affluent white neighborhoods still enjoy the more stringent traditional services. In a moderately to extremely polarized community, this tactic works wonders. Note that this tactic will not work in a city in which whites are not the majority of residents or a community that appreciates racial diversity. (Have no fear, though, the other nine tactics can be used to kill community policing in cities like these.)

6. **DIVORCE COMMUNITY POLICING OFFICERS FROM "REGULAR" POLICE WORK** – This is an expansion of the soft image concept. If the community policing officers do not handle calls or make arrests, but instead throw block parties, speak to community groups, walk around talking to kids, visit schools, and conduct other get-closer-to-the-neighborhood approaches, they will not be perceived as "real" police officers by their colleagues. This will further undermine their credibility and ability to accomplish anything of significance. Here are some tried and true projects undertaken by community policing officers that will help you accomplish this end:

- a. horse patrols
- b. bike patrols
- c. foot patrols
- d. helicopter patrols
- e. community meetings
- f. job fairs
- g. trash removal
- h. officers in schools
- i. street light repair
- j. garden and beautification projects
- k. sports and recreation events
- l. health care provision/coordination
- m. alley repair or pavement
- n. at-risk youth programs
- o. self-esteem building for young people
- p. store-front operations

By consciously ignoring any logical or theoretical links between the tactics and the problem to be solved, the credibility of community policing can be dashed. Always remember: the means are ends, in and of themselves.

Note that each of these projects can be very effective if tailored to the appropriate situation (see items 9 and 10). So to sabotage community policing, each activity has to be applied across the board, to appropriate and to inappropriate situations, indiscriminately. Further, attention must be drawn to the activity, and away from whatever harm the activity could redress (see item 7).

7. OBFUSCATE MEANS AND ENDS – Whenever describing community policing, never make the methods for accomplishing the objective subordinate to the objective. Instead, make the means more important than the ends, or at least put them on equal footing. For example, if your agency wants to reduce drug dealing in a particular neighborhood, make certain that the tactics to accomplish this end (arrests, community meetings, etc.) are as, or more, important than the objective. Arrests and community meetings can be structured to occupy everyone's time but still leave the drug dealing problem unresolved. For example, if mobilizing community members is the tactic to be used, focus attention on the number of meetings, the fact that a local merchant supplied the coffee and danish, and the warm, fuzzy feelings the cops and residents felt toward each other. But, by all means, never talk about how the meetings relate to developing a workable solution to the problem. By consciously ignoring any logical or theoretical links between the tactics and the problem to be solved, the credibility of community policing can be dashed. Always remember: the means are ends, in and of themselves.

8. **PRESENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS WITH PROBLEMS AND PLANS** – Whenever meeting with community members, officers should listen carefully and politely and then elaborate on how the department will enforce the law. If the community members like the plan, go ahead. If they do not, continue to be polite and ask them to go on a ride-along or witness a drug raid. Co-opting community members like this avoids having to change the department's operations while demonstrating to them how hard police work is, and why nothing can be accomplished. In the end, they will not get their problem addressed but they will see how nice the police are. This support will be very handy when community policing is dismantled.

Some rogue officers will not get your message and will go out and gather enough information to formulate a response that reduces a problem. Try to ignore these examples of effective policing and make sure that no one else hears about them.

9. **NEVER TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHY PROBLEMS OCCUR** – Many problems can be addressed quite effectively if officers develop some knowledge about the underlying causes of the problems. Do not let them gain this information; successfully addressing problems will only encourage community policing. Problem solving should not include any analysis of the problem and as little information as possible should be sought from the community, other agencies, or the department's records. Try following some of the guidelines listed below to increase ignorance of community problems:

- a. Make certain that crime analysis only produces management reports.
- b. Prevent crime analysis from being responsive to officers' special requests.
- c. Keep officers away from computer terminals.
- d. Mandate that officers get special permission to talk to members of any other agency. (This can be facilitated by making it difficult for officers to make long distance calls to agencies outside the jurisdiction without permission.)
- e. Demand quick action on all problems.
- f. Do not allow community policing officers to go off their assigned area to collect information.
- g. Instruct officers to only talk to people who are already supportive of the police.
- h. Prevent access to research conducted on similar problems.
- i. Suppress listening skills.
- j. Acknowledge the honor in reinventing the wheel.

If everything else fails, reprimand the problem-solving officer for not wearing a hat.

10. **NEVER PUBLICIZE A SUCCESS** – Some rogue officers will not get your message and will go out and gather enough information to formulate a response that reduces a problem. Try to ignore these examples of effective policing and make sure that no one else hears about them. When you cannot

ignore them, you can describe them in the least meaningful way (see item 2). Talk about the wonders of empowerment and community meetings. Describe the hours of foot patrol, or the new mountain bikes, or shoulder patches that were involved. In every problem-solving effort there is usually some tactic or piece of equipment that can be highlighted at the expense of the accomplishment itself. If everything else fails, reprimand the problem-solving officer for not wearing a hat.

These ten recommendations should stop community policing from gaining a foothold in your department and keep any similar change effort from being recommended for years to come. If you are pessimistic about your chances of subverting community policing, look to other departments. You will see many of these tactics being applied, sometimes out of ignorance and sometimes intentionally. And by all means, avoid being influenced by professional, do-good associations. To do otherwise risks the unspeakable — lasting, positive law enforcement reform.

CAUTION: PERF is required to notify readers that attempting to employ these techniques in your department may result in serious harm.

Reflections on Community-Oriented Policing

By
ROBERT BOBINSKY

On the east side of Bensenville, Illinois, sits an island community made up of over 250 single-family residences and a complex containing more than 200 closely spaced townhouses. This "community within a community" is separated from the mainstream of the village by more than the railroad tracks and international airport that border it on three sides.

A psychological barrier also exists that isolates the residents of this community from those of the village at large. Much of the gang activity in the village is centered in the townhouse complex. Other problems stem from the fact that a majority of the residents in the complex are recent or illegal immigrants, of either Hispanic or East Indian origin. Most harbor fears and distrust toward law enforcement, held over from experiences in their native countries. The language barrier between these residents and employees of the village's public service agencies also led to a lack of understanding regarding the problems in the area. Over the years, this lack of communication and cooperation gave way to an overall deterioration in the physical state of the neighborhood.

In March 1991, several residents concerned with the declining condition of the area enlisted the



cooperation of the police chief and the department's DARE officer to establish a Neighborhood Watch. The first sparsely attended meetings of this group produced small, but important, results. Police response times to the area improved, as did

the sense of cooperation between other village agencies and the residents of the area.

Then, in October 1991, an incident occurred that proved to be a catalyst for far greater change. A 15-year-old resident with ties to gang

activity was shot and killed while standing in front of his home. At the next Neighborhood Watch meeting, over 300 residents and several village officials agreed that the quality of services for the area—policing among them—required immediate reform.

The police department responded by forming a two-officer undercover tactical team, which focused its efforts on disrupting gang and criminal activity in the island community. Then, the chief of police approached me with another idea for improving the quality of life in the troubled area. The chief's proposal called for implementing an aggressive Community-oriented Policing (COP) Program in the townhouse complex. It would be an experiment that could lead to profound changes in the residents' attitudes toward the police.

Not fully understanding the principles of community-oriented policing, I initially declined my

chief's offer to participate in Bensenville's COP program. My instincts told me that the approach was too much like social work and would no longer involve any real police work. Not one to take "no" for an answer, the chief convinced me to read several articles and pamphlets about community-oriented policing before refusing the position outright. This brief investment of time helped me to put the somewhat abstract concept of community policing into a practical perspective.

The more I read, the more I came to realize that community-oriented policing represents the approach law enforcement must take in order to meet the changing needs of communities. This policing concept also completely changed the way I viewed the role of law enforcement in society.

Traditional Policing

Historically, local law enforcement in the 1930s and 1940s was

characterized by the "beat cop," who knew every resident and business owner in an assigned area. Likewise, this officer became aware almost immediately when a crime occurred and generally found out quickly from members of the community who committed it. This timely apportionment of justice helped to create a strong bond between members of the community and the officers who patrolled their districts.

However, this policing model harbored significant drawbacks. Officers often gained appointments through corrupt political deals, were poorly trained, and rarely displayed a professional appearance or demeanor.

As a result, the 1960s and 1970s saw the dawn of the "professional policing model." These new officers used the most up-to-date technology—such as high-speed cruisers, forensic laboratories, mobile radios, and 911 emergency systems—to serve the sprawling suburban environment that came to characterize much of the American landscape. Considering the vast areas covered by a limited number of officers, response times were exceptionally quick. Such areas as recruiting practices, training, and professionalism were vastly improved.

But the professional policing model possessed its own inherent shortcomings. Officers became less a part of the communities they served. In fact, they were intentionally placed "outside" of the community as a reaction to the potential for corruption that existed in prior policing models. And, even though response times were exceptional, calls for police service still brought



Officer Bobinsky serves in the Bensenville, Illinois, Police Department.

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By allowing one area to deteriorate, cycles of poverty and crime intensify, creating a situation even more difficult to address in the future.
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officers to the scene *after* a crime had been committed. This "incident-oriented" policing model placed an impressive array of resources at officers' disposal to locate offenders, but made little attempt to reduce actual crime numbers.

Bringing Policing Back to the Community

Community-oriented policing combines the familiarity, trust, and sense of ownership characterized by the "beat cop" with the professionalism and expertise of the professional policing model. Officers working in this mode conduct their patrols from a problem-oriented, rather than incident-oriented, perspective. Accordingly, the focus becomes preventive—rather than reactive—police work.

Officers involved in community-oriented policing have access to residents on a personal level, which helps to build a better relationship between the community and the police department. Residents see the police as more than just anonymous blue suits driving down the street in patrol cars. The community is more involved with the officers, and in turn, becomes the eyes and ears of the department in the neighborhood.

Overcoming Obstacles

Officers involved in community-oriented policing programs need to foster a good working relationship with other municipal agencies. Cooperation is essential, not only in the planning and implementation stages but also in the daily operation of any satellite office. In addition, because these municipal officials possess experience in

securing funds, hiring new employees, and managing personnel, they can be a valuable resource when expanding a program. When it comes to a community-oriented approach, having the municipality's management on your side can mean the difference between an initiative just getting by and truly succeeding.

Still, incorporating community-oriented policing into the daily operations of the police department

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Community-oriented policing does not transform police officers into social workers.

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may breed some problems from different quarters. As I had expected, the expenditure of village funds into an area historically separated from the rest of the community raised some eyebrows. Often, I found myself having to respond to the question, "Why is *our* money going to *that* area?"

Fortunately, there were many answers to that question. Residents who asked it needed to be reminded that if one area of town is allowed to become a "slum," the entire village is adversely affected. Gangs would eventually break out of their "home turf" and infest other residential and business areas. By allowing one

area to deteriorate, cycles of poverty and crime intensify, creating a situation even more difficult to address in the future.

In contrast, reduced crime rates in the target area allow the police department to devote more resources to other parts of the community. In addition, by raising the standards of the townhouse complex, property values increase, yielding additional tax revenues for the village.

While I expected a degree of community skepticism regarding the ambitious program, the negative sentiments expressed by some of my fellow officers represented a more formidable obstacle. These comments, whether directed to one another or to local residents, were difficult to deal with, both on a personal and professional level. Still, many officers expressed great interest in the program, and through education and encouragement to participate, the few that publicly voiced their doubts eventually assisted in the overall success of the effort.

A Different Beat

The Police-Neighborhood Resource Center (PNRC) serves as the centerpiece of the COP program in Bensenville. Using Federal, State, and county grants, as well as local tax revenues, the village purchased a townhouse in the target area and renovated it into a satellite police and village office.

I now work at the Police-Neighborhood Resource Center. However, my job description has not changed—I am still a uniformed police officer. My beat is much smaller than other officers in the patrol division, which has its distinct advantages.

For example, I now know many of the residents on a personal level. More importantly, the relationship between the police department and the neighborhood has greatly improved. In addition to reporting known and suspected criminal activity to me, the residents also seek my assistance when dealing with other village agencies. Often, residents stop me in the street as I walk by their homes and ask who they can call to resolve specific problems. Partly as a result, sanitation conditions and problems associated with overcrowding have shown signs of improvement. Additionally, in the course of my duties, I have returned lost children to their homes, solved parking problems, and assisted other officers during emergency calls.

Despite my intolerance toward gangs in general, local gang members display a grudging respect for me and my position. They appreciate that I treat each person on an individual basis and do not view them merely as gang members. They also realize that I have a job to do, and that if I treat them with respect, I demand the same treatment in return. I am rarely disappointed.

For example, during my first week at the PNRC, several gang members advised me that a member

of a rival gang had driven into the area in a car he claimed to have stolen. The gang members brought me directly to the vehicle, and a subsequent computer check

and requested that I take the report. In both cases, the offenders were identified and arrested. Through such incidents, the gang members have come to realize that I am a police officer who they can trust to take any criminal act seriously, no matter who the victim is.

Additional Benefits

Aside from enhancing the relationship between the police department and area residents, the community-oriented approach produced additional benefits. Because of the assistance I try to provide to tenants, I now have a better line of communication with

village and county officials. If residents advise me of an inordinate number of people living in a townhome, for example, I can contact the village zoning officer, who will immediately make inspections of the house for safety, fire, and ordinance violations. Slowly, the combined efforts of several government agencies are driving criminal slumlords—who once preyed on low-income residents—from the area.

From the outset, various village agencies coordinated their efforts to ensure the most efficient use of resources. The Director of Community Services persuaded the different village taxing entities to cooperate in making revenues available. She also coordinated an effort to provide public library programs and job placement services at the PNRC. In addition, the school district established an after-school tutoring program at the site.

revealed that the car had indeed been reported stolen only 12 hours earlier. With information given to me by these gang members, I recovered a stolen automobile and arrested the offender.

In fact, after just a few months of working in the PNRC, I observed a distinct swing in the attitude of the gang members. Many actually stop by my office, either to just sit and talk or, more often, to relate information regarding suspicious or illegal activity in and around the village. Recently, on two separate occasions, members of rival gangs damaged a truck belonging to a local gang member. Instead of retaliating, the victim called the police station

Photos © Tribute



The Police-Neighborhood Resource Center is also being used for more programs than originally anticipated. The Neighborhood Watch uses the center for its meetings, as do two local Girl Scout troops. A local community college offers an "English-as-a-Second-Language" course at the center, and the local public library created a satellite library at the site, using its own grants to purchase books.

Preliminary Results

Despite the visible signs of improvement in the island community, I found myself disappointed by the initial statistical results. A comparison of the rate of calls for police service showed a dramatic increase during the first 2 months of the PNRC's operation. However, at face value, these figures proved somewhat deceptive. The rate of *crime* did not increase, only the rate of calls to the police for service. Rather than indicating a worsening situation, the initial rise in the number of calls revealed a new willingness on the part of residents to trust the police.

In subsequent months, the rate of calls showed a steady decline. More importantly, the rate of criminal activity also fell. When compared to 1991 figures, totals for 1992 revealed an overall lower rate of calls for service and crime throughout the target area.

This reinforces the need for departments to make long-term commitments to community-oriented policing. During the early stages, calls for police service may indeed increase. However, administrators should not view this as a negative

outcome. Increased calls for service generally reveal positive changes in the mindset of area residents.

Other COP Programs

From my experiences with Bensenville's Community-oriented Policing Program, I have become familiar with some of the COP initiatives being employed in other police departments throughout the Nation. Though they share similarities, none are—or should be—identical. Likewise, when adopting a COP

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A more involved community translates into a community more willing to cooperate with its police department.

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program, each police department should look at the local needs of each neighborhood or target community. Not every situation is alike, and there is virtually an infinite number of programs from which to choose.

For example, in Elgin, Illinois, the Resident Officer Program of Elgin (ROPE) actually houses police officers and their families in target areas. Officers in this program conduct their police business from a satellite office.

Aurora, Illinois, employs a mobile police trailer that can be moved

from community to community, staying until the target areas have been improved. Officers can also position the trailer in the middle of a street to act as a checkpoint for vehicles and individuals entering or leaving an area.

This diversity of programs underscores one of the strengths of community-oriented policing. Departments can tailor programs to meet the unique needs of communities. And, because officers assume more personal responsibility for the areas they patrol, their input adds imaginative details to the programs.

Conclusion

Like many officers, I approached community policing very cautiously—even skeptically. I did not wish to surrender my role as a law enforcement officer only to become a “social worker with a badge.” However, my experiences with the Police-Neighborhood Resource Center changed my previously held perception.

Community-oriented policing does not transform police officers into social workers. It does, however, empower officers to connect individuals with problems to agencies that can help them. COP does involve a few extra minutes handling each call, but this is time well-spent. Most importantly, community-oriented policing recognizes the value of the police and the community working together to reduce crime. A more involved community translates into a community more willing to cooperate with its police department. In the words of my chief, such a relationship is a “win-win situation.” ♦

Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves, and Helping Hands: New Approaches to Urban Policing*

by William Spelman and John E. Eck†

Drug dealers have taken over a park. Neighborhood residents, afraid to use the park, feel helpless. Foot patrols and drug raids fail to roust the dealers.

A city is hit with a rash of convenience store robberies. Stakeouts, fast response to robbery calls, and enhanced investigations lead to some arrests—but do not solve the robbery problem.

Disorderly kids invade a peaceful residential neighborhood. Although they have committed no serious crimes, they are noisy and unpredictable; some acts of vandalism have been reported. The kids are black and the residents white—and the police fear a racial incident.

* A revised version of this article will appear in James J. Fyfe, ed., *Police Management Today: Issues and Case Studies*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1989).

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Problems like these plague cities everywhere. Social incivilities, drug dealing and abuse, and violent crime hurt more than the immediate victims: they create fears among the rest of us. We wonder who will be next, but feel incapable of taking action.

Until recently, there was little the criminal justice system could do to help. Police continued to respond to calls for service, and attempted (usually without success) to arrest and punish the most serious criminals. Sometimes they tried to organize a neighborhood watch. But research conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s showed repeatedly that these strategies were severely limited in their effectiveness.

Since the mid-1980s, some innovative police departments have begun to test a new approach to these problems. This "problem-oriented" approach differs from the traditional methods in several ways:

- Police actively seek ways to prevent crime and better the quality of neighborhood life rather than simply react to calls for service and reported crimes.
- Police recognize that crime and disorder problems arise from a variety of conditions and that thorough analysis is needed before they can tailor effective responses to these conditions.
- Police understand that many crime and disorder problems stem from factors beyond the control of any single public or private agency. If these problems are to be

solved, they must be attacked on many different fronts, with the police, other agencies, and the public "coproducing" neighborhood security.

Recent research shows that when police adopt a proactive stance, analyze local conditions, and recognize the value of coproduction in framing and implementing a response, they can reduce crime and fear of crime. This new approach has profound implications for the management and operations of police agencies, and for the relationship between the police and the communities they serve.

THE PROBLEM: THE INCIDENT-DRIVEN APPROACH

Problem-oriented policing is the culmination of more than two decades of research into the nature of crime and the effectiveness of police response. Many strands of research led to the new approach, but three basic findings were particularly important:

- Additional police resources, if applied in response to individual incidents of crime and disorder, will be ineffective at controlling crime.
- Few incidents are isolated; most are symptoms of some recurring, underlying problem. Problem analysis can help police develop effective, proactive tactics.

Crime problems are integrally linked to other urban problems, and so the most effective responses require coordinating the activities of private citizens, the business sector, and government agencies outside the criminal justice system.

In short, "incident-driven policing," the prevailing method of delivering police services, consistently treats symptoms, not diseases. By working with others to identify, analyze, and treat the diseases, police can hope to make headway against crime and disorder.

Adding Police Resources Will Be Ineffective

Most police work is reactive—a response to crimes and disorders reported by the public. And current reactive tactics may be effective at controlling crime, to a point. For example, by maintaining some threat of apprehension and punishment, current police actions may deter many would-be offenders.¹

Nevertheless, twenty years of research into police operations suggest that the marginal value of additional police resources, if applied in the traditional, reactive ways, will be very small.² For example, preventive patrol tactics probably will not deter offenders unless the patrol force can be increased dramatically—perhaps by a factor of thirty or more.³ Only 10 percent of crimes are reported to the police within five minutes of their being committed; thus even the fastest police response to the scene will not result in apprehension of a suspect for the vast majority of crimes.⁴ And case solution rates are low because detectives rarely have many leads to work with; even if the number of detectives could be doubled or tripled, it would have virtually no effect on the number of cases solved.⁵

Research has also revealed that alternative deployment methods—split force, investigative case screening, differential response to calls—can succeed in shifting scarce resources to those incidents where they are most needed.⁶ In the cases studied, these schemes, often directed by crime analysis, made police operations more efficient and freed up resources for other activities. But they did not make operations more effective.

Crime Analysis Can Lead to More Effective Tactics

Three elements must generally be present before a crime will be committed:

Someone must be motivated to commit the crime; a suitable target must be present; and the target must be (relatively) unguarded, providing the offender with an opportunity to commit the crime.⁷ These elements are more likely to be present at some times and places than at others, forming crime patterns and recurring crime problems. The removal of just one of the elements can alter a crime pattern. Thus, by identifying the elements that are easiest to remove and working to remove them, police can make crime prevention tactics more efficient and effective.

The most obvious crime patterns are spatial. Since the 1930s, researchers have shown that crime types and offender methods of operation—not to mention gross crime rates—differed substantially among neighborhoods.⁸ One reason for these differences is that some kinds of neighborhoods have fewer unguarded targets than others. For example, neighborhoods with diverse land uses, single-family houses and garden apartment buildings, and intense street lighting provide criminals with fewer opportunities and incur lower crime rates.⁹ Social characteristics such as residential stability, homogeneity of lifestyle, and family orientation empower residents of a neighborhood to "handle" bad actors without calling the police.¹⁰

Another reason crime rates differ between neighborhoods is that some areas have more potential offenders and victims than others. Adolescents, the poor, and members of minority groups commit property crimes at higher rates. Also, poor youths have few sources of transportation, so it is not surprising that burglary and robbery rates are highest in neighborhoods with many poor Black and Hispanic youths. Some neighborhoods attract more than their share of offenders because open-air drug markets or bars that cater to the especially rowdy or criminal are located there. Potential victims who have the money to do so can make themselves unattractive to offenders by keeping valuables in safe deposit boxes or safes, garaging their cars, and buying houses with sturdy locks and alarms.


Thus neighborhood crime patterns differ in predictable ways, for comprehensible reasons. The implications for crime prevention policies are obvious: if our aim is to reduce the crime rate in a given neigh-

borhood, it is clearly important to know what crimes are committed there, and what might be done either to reduce the number of available offenders or victims or to increase the number of willing and able guardians. Since neighborhoods differ, the crime prevention strategies will differ from one neighborhood to the next. Officers assigned to an area must study the social and physical conditions there before developing and implementing strategies.

These strategies are given a focus by one regularity that seems to hold for crime problems in all neighborhoods: crime is concentrated. Suppose we took all the criminals active in a community and lined them up in order of the frequency with which they committed crimes. Those who committed crimes most often would go to the head of the line; those who committed crimes only occasionally would go to the end. If all offenders were alike, then it would not matter much where we lined the offenders up; the offenders at the front of the line would commit about as many crimes as those at the end. For example, the "worst" 10 percent of criminals would account for

Figure 1

Ducks, Wolves, and Dens: Crime is Concentrated



about 10 percent of all crimes. But if there were significant differences among offenders, those at the head of the line would account for far more than their share of all crimes committed; the worst 10 percent would account for much more than 10 percent of all crimes. Analysis of arrest records and offender interviews shows that offenders differ substantially, and that the worst 10 percent of criminals commit about 55 percent of the crimes (see figure 1).¹¹

The same principle applies to victims and places. A few particularly vulnerable people run risks of victimization that are much higher than average—the most vulnerable 10 percent of victims are involved in about 40 percent of all crimes.¹² And over 60 percent of crimes are committed at a few particularly dangerous locations.¹³ Research suggests that there are usually good reasons why these offenders, victims, and locations account for so many crimes. If something can be done about these “ravenous wolves,” “sitting ducks,” and “dens of iniquity,” the crime problem can, in theory, be reduced dramatically.

This is all the more true because current police policies systematically overlook the most crime-prone people and places. For example, until recently, police gave little attention to cases of family violence—even though abused family members suffer particularly high risks of being abused again.¹⁴ If repeat calls to a single

location are made at different times of the day, they will be distributed over several shifts; thus even the beat officers may not recognize the continuing nature of the problem. The most frequent offenders are also the most successful at evading arrest.¹⁵

These concentrations of crimes among victims, locations, and offenders are important handles for proactive crime-prevention activity. They are the “problems” that are the focus of problem-oriented policing. Government and private agencies have mounted a wide variety of programs aimed at preventing these most predictable of crimes. For example, police, prosecutors, judges, and parole boards have adopted programs and policies aimed at deterrence and incapacitation of frequent, serious offenders.¹⁶ Especially vulnerable people—abused spouses and children, the elderly, the mentally disabled—have been the subject of many recent crime prevention efforts. Through directed patrols¹⁷ and environmental and situational crime prevention,¹⁸ police and other agencies have begun to deal with crime-prone locations as well.

But because the nature of these concentrations is different for every problem, standardized responses will not generally succeed. Previous experience can be a guide, but police must study and create a somewhat different response for each problem they take on.

Neighborhood Problems Are Linked to Other Urban Problems

Knowing whether a given crime or disorder problem results from frequent offenders, high-risk victims, vulnerable locations, or some combination of the three may be helpful, but it is often insufficient to allow the police to identify a workable solution. To solve many problems, the police need the help of outside agencies, the business sector, or the public.

Often this cooperation is necessary because the police lack the authority to remove the offending conditions. If a rowdy bar produces many assaults, it can be closed down—by the state alcoholic beverage control board. If a blind corner produces many automobile accidents, a stop light can be installed—by the city traffic department. If a woman is continually beaten by her husband, she can move out—by her own volition, perhaps with the assistance of a battered women’s shelter; the police cannot force her to do so, however.

Perhaps a more important reason for cooperative solutions is that recurring problems have many parts, and no single agency is responsible for all of them. A run-down apartment complex may look like a serious burglary problem to the police. But the fire department sees burnt-out, vacant apartments and a high risk of fire. The housing

department sees code violations and the health department sees an abundance of trash and rats. The bank sees a bad risk and refuses to loan the apartment owner the money needed to renovate the vacant apartments taken over by the drug addicts who commit the burglaries. The residents, beset on all sides, see no hope—they cannot afford cleaner and safer housing.

Clearly, no single agency will be able to solve this problem, because the various parts feed off one another. On the other hand, if all the parts could be addressed at the same time, it is possible that the conditions could be removed and the problem solved. This would require the cooperation of the police, fire, housing, and health departments, the bank, and the apartment owner. It might also require the help of the residents, to ensure that the appropriate agencies are notified should the problems start to return.

There is evidence that citizens in particular “coproduce” crime control with public agencies. In addition to cooperating with the police and pressuring public and private agencies to deliver the goods and services the neighborhood needs, citizens sometimes intervene directly in disorderly or criminal incidents. Although some experts maintain that these informal interventions are the most important determinants of a neighborhood’s crime rate, they are difficult to maintain in high-crime areas. The physical design of urban neighborhoods—public housing, in particular—discourages surveillance and intervention by neighbors.¹⁹ Often the residents of these poor neighborhoods are fearful of cooperating with the police; they have little in common with one another; they do not expect to stay long; and they do not even recognize one another. These characteristics make it hard for neighbors to control the minor disorders that may contribute to crime. When families are headed by single parents who must work, parents may not even be able to control their own children.²⁰ On the other hand, the physical and social environment of high-crime neighborhoods can be improved by governments and businesses, in turn increasing the prospects for intervention and cooperation.

All this suggests that crime prevention strategies are incomplete and possibly ineffective unless they recognize the close links between crime, the physical environment, neighborhood culture, and other factors. In general, these links require that the public

and outside agencies work with the police to eliminate or ameliorate the conditions that cause the problem.

A SOLUTION: PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Police could be more effective if they reduced their reliance on traditional methods and instead relied on tailor-made responses that coordinate the activities of people and agencies both inside and outside the criminal justice system. How would such a police department work? How would it be structured? How well would it control crime and disorder? The problem-oriented approach is new, but the experiences of innovative departments suggest some intriguing answers.

Designing Problem-Oriented Policing

The heart of problem-oriented policing is systematic thinking. Although problem solving has been conducted in very different ways in different departments, the most methodical approach has been adopted in Newport News, Virginia.

The Newport News Police Department based its problem-solving system on three principles. First, officers of all ranks, from all units, should be able to use the procedures as part of their daily routine. Second, the system must encourage officers to collect information from a broad range of sources and not limit themselves to conventional police data. Finally, the system should encourage “coproduction” solutions not limited to the criminal justice process.

After several months of work, a department task force developed a problem-solving process that fit these criteria. It consists of four parts:

- **Scanning.** As part of their daily routine, officers are expected to look for possible problems.
- **Analysis.** Officers then collect information about the problem. They rely on a Problem Analysis Guide, developed by the task force, which directs officers to examine offenders, victims, the social and physical environment, and previous responses to the problem. The goal is to understand the scope, nature, and causes of the problem.

- **Response.** The knowledge gained in the analysis stage is then used to develop and implement solutions. Officers seek the assistance of other police units, public and private organizations, and anyone else who can help.

- **Assessment.** Finally, officers evaluate the effectiveness of their response. They may use the results to revise the response, collect more data, or even redefine the problem.

Newport News’s systematic process has since been adopted by other agencies interested in problem solving, including San Diego, Tulsa, Madison, and New York City. Similar approaches have been adopted, although less explicitly, by other police agencies that have experimented with problem-oriented policing.

Problem Solving in Practice

Since the early 1980s, police agencies have applied the problem-solving approach to a wide variety of problems. To illustrate the breadth of problems and solutions that are possible, three case studies are described here. The first two are serious and complex problems—one affecting a residential neighborhood, the other an entire city—that succumbed to careful analysis and comprehensive responses. The third case is an apparently difficult neighborhood problem that was solved in only a few hours through careful observation and a little thought.

New York Retirees Sting Drug Dealers. When out-of-towners think of New York City, they think first of the Empire State Building, Wall Street, and Broadway—the glitz and glitter of Manhattan. But New Yorkers tend to think first of districts like Sunset Park in Brooklyn, a neighborhood of row houses and small businesses peopled by a mix of working- and middle-class Irish, Italians, Puerto Ricans, and Blacks. Contrary to the national stereotype, Sunset Park is clean. Many streets are lined with trees. The district is dotted with vest-pocket parks containing such amenities as handball and basketball courts for the vigorous, sandboxes and swings for the young, and sunny benches for the relaxed.

Despite these amenities, for years the neighborhood park at the corner of 49th Street and 5th Avenue had lured only drug users looking for a quick score. Respectable residents avoided the park, fearing confrontations with the drug traffickers. The New York Police Department tried to respond to the problem, directing its officers to patrol the park and issue loitering citations to apparent dealers. This dispersed the dealers and users—until the patrol car had turned the corner and disappeared from view. Then business returned to normal. Not surprisingly, the problem persisted.

In May 1986, Officer Vinny Esposito was assigned to the 49th Street beat. As one of the first members of New York's innovative Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), Esposito was expected to do more than just handle individual incidents on his beat. His job was to identify and solve recurring problems. The drug-ridden 49th Street park clearly fit the bill, and Esposito went to work.

At first, Esposito used the old tactics. He spent as much time in the park as he could, dispersing dealers and making arrests whenever possible. Unfortunately, his beat was large and the time he could spend in the park was limited. Worse yet, every arrest took him away from the park for an hour or more—and whenever he left, the junkies returned. Weeks passed with no apparent effect on the drug trade. Esposito considered the problem further, and decided to take a different tack.

He began by recognizing that loitering citations and even drug arrests were at worst minor inconveniences to the dealers and users, since few arrests led to jail or prison terms. On the other hand, Esposito reasoned, the threat of losing hundreds or thousands of dollars worth of drugs could be a serious deterrent. Dealers, recognizing their vulnerability in the event of a police field stop, typically hid their stashes in the park. Esposito could seize the dope if he knew where it was hidden—but that required the assistance of local residents.

Esposito held meetings of the tenants in the apartment buildings that overlooked the park. Many tenants were elderly and spent most of their days at home. Esposito asked them to watch the dealers from their windows and report the locations of any drug stashes they saw to the local precinct station. Reassured that their tips would

remain completely anonymous, the frustrated tenants readily agreed to help.

Calls began coming in. For each one, a CPOP officer at the precinct station took down the information and radioed the location of the stash to Officer Esposito, who then confiscated the drugs and took them to the station. Within twenty minutes of each tip, Esposito was back on the beat and the dealers were a little bit poorer.

This new strategy had several effects. Some dealers found themselves having to explain to unsympathetic suppliers where their goods had gone. Others began keeping their stashes on their person, making them more vulnerable to arrest. Others simply quit the park. Within one month, all the dealers had gotten the message—and the park was free of drugs.

Today, the park is a different place. Children play on the swings, youths play basketball. Many of the older residents who once sat at home, phoning in anonymous tips, now spend their days sunning themselves on the benches of "their" park. They show no signs of giving it back to the dealers.

The actions taken by Officer Esposito and local residents may not work as well anywhere else. But the thinking that led to their actions can. Like the Sunset Park case, many persistent problems affect residents of small neighborhoods the most. As Officer Esposito's actions illustrate, these problems can often be solved with the resident's help. But other such problems are not restricted to small localities—they affect residents throughout the city. For problems like these, citywide changes in policies and practices are necessary. Sometimes there is a citywide "community of interest" that can be relied upon to assist the police in much the same way that the elderly residents of Sunset Park helped clear the drug dealers out of their vest-pocket park. Merchant associations, chain retail stores, and citywide community groups may all be of assistance. Even when these communities are uncooperative, however, the police may still be able to solve the problem.

Gainesville Puts the Brakes on QuikStop Crime. When the university town of Gainesville, Florida, was hit with a rash of convenience store robberies in spring 1985, the police recognized that they were dealing with more than just a series of unrelated

incidents. The department's crime analysts expected to find that one or two repeat offenders were responsible for the robberies, but suspect descriptions provided by the victims proved otherwise—many different offenders were responsible. Word had apparently spread that convenience stores were an easy target. Police Chief Wayland Clifton, Jr., wondered why, and detailed several members of his department to find out.²¹

Gainesville police officers compared the stores that were robbed to others that were not. Their conclusions were revealing. Many of the stores that had been robbed had posted large advertisements in their front windows, blocking the view from the street. Often, the checkout stand could not be seen by a passing car or pedestrian. Many stores failed to light their parking lots, further limiting visibility. Others kept large sums of money in the cash register, and some provided only one inexperienced employee during the late night hours. The stores that had not been robbed tended to provide better visibility, limit the amount of cash in the register, and train their employees in crime prevention techniques. Thus the criminals seemed to be focusing on the most lucrative and vulnerable targets.

To confirm their findings, the Gainesville Police arranged for a psychologist at a local university to interview sixty-five offenders who were serving sentences for convenience store robberies. This independent analysis provided even clearer results: would-be robbers avoided stores staffed by two clerks. Many of the robbers were simply taking advantage of available opportunities; if they had had trouble finding stores with only one clerk on duty, many of the robberies might never have been committed at all.

The police department presented these findings to an association of local merchants that had been established to develop a response to the problem. The police asked for a commitment to change the conditions that made robberies easy to commit. They were disappointed: the merchants felt that the solution lay in more frequent police patrols, and they refused to agree to voluntary crime prevention standards. In effect, the merchants argued that the costs of convenience store crime prevention should be borne by the public as a whole rather than by the stores themselves.

Chief Clifton knew that he could not stop the robberies with police presence unless he assigned his officers to stand guard at every convenience store in the city. Instead, he directed his officers to search for another way of mandating crime prevention measures. Their research revealed that the cities of Akron, Ohio, and Coral Gables, Florida, had passed ordinances requiring merchants to take certain crime prevention measures, and that these ordinances had reduced the incidence of robbery. Clifton and his officers began drafting such an ordinance for Gainesville.

By the summer of 1986, the department was ready to present its findings to the City Commission. The proposed ordinance would require convenience stores to remove window advertising, place cash registers in full view of the street, install security cameras and outside lighting, and limit the amount of cash available in the register. Most important, it would require two or more employees, trained in crime prevention techniques, to work late at night. In July, the City Commission overruled the objections of the convenience store owners and passed the ordinance.

The stores fought the ordinance in court, arguing that the crime prevention measures would be costly and ineffective. But the judge found the police department's research to be persuasive. The store owners' injunction was denied, and the ordinance took effect on schedule.

The first year after the adoption of the new ordinance brought encouraging results: convenience store robberies were down by 65 percent overall, and by 75 percent at night. Best of all, the robbery rate was reduced far below its pre-1985 levels. Convenience stores continue to do a land-office business in Gainesville, and many store owners now admit—a bit grudgingly—that the police department's city-wide approach has solved a difficult problem.

Persistent problems are natural targets of problem solving. It is easy to see how time-consuming research and complex crime prevention measures can be worth the effort if they will help to remove a longstanding problem. But many crime and disorder problems are temporary and nagging, rather than persistent and severe; they do not merit lengthy analysis and complicated responses. Still, thinking systematically about even a minor problem

can often reveal quick solutions that are easy to implement.

Newport News Skates out of Trouble. The quiet nights of a middle-class Newport News neighborhood were spoiled when groups of rowdy teenagers began to frequent the area on Fridays and Saturdays. There had been no violence, and the kids' primary offenses were loud music, horseplay, and occasional vandalism. But residents felt the teenagers were unpredictable, particularly since they came from the city's mostly Black southeast side, several miles away. The neighborhood became a regular stop for officers working the evening shift.

Sergeant Jim Hogan recognized that responding to these calls took time but accomplished little except to irritate everyone involved. One Friday night he asked the beat officer, Paul Summerfield, to look into the problem and develop a better solution.

Summerfield suspected that the source of the problem might be a roller skating rink. The rink had been trying to increase business by offering reduced rates and transportation on Friday and Saturday nights. As he drove north toward the rink later that night, Summerfield saw several large groups of youths walking south. Other kids were still hanging around the rink, which had closed shortly before. Summerfield talked to several of them and found that they were waiting for a bus. The others, he was told, had become impatient and begun the three-mile walk home. Then Summerfield talked to the rink owner. The owner told him he had leased the bus to pick up and drop off kids who lived far from the rink. But he said there were always more kids needing rides at the end of the night than the bus had picked up earlier.

When Officer Summerfield returned to the skating rink early the next evening, he saw about fifty youngsters get out of the bus rented by the skating rink. But he saw others get out of the public transit buses that stopped running at midnight, and he saw parents in pajamas drop their kids off, then turn around and go home. Clearly the rink's bus would be unable to take home all the kids who would be stranded at closing time.

Summerfield consulted Sergeant Hogan. They agreed that the skating rink owner should be asked to bus the kids home. Summerfield returned to the rink Monday and spoke with the owner. When

informed of the size of the problem he had unwittingly created, the owner agreed to lease more buses. By the next weekend, the buses were in use and Summerfield and Hogan saw no kids walking home.

Elapsed time from problem identification to problem solution: one week. Resources used: about four hours of an officer's time. Results: fewer calls, happier kids, satisfied homeowners.

Institutionalizing Problem-oriented Policing

Problem-oriented policing is a state of mind, not a program, technique, or procedure. Problem-solving procedures and analysis guides can be helpful, but only if they encourage clear-headed analysis of problems and an uninhibited search for solutions. Moreover, there are any number of ways of implementing the approach. The New York Police Department established a special unit to focus on neighborhood problems full time; in Newport News, all officers are obliged to spend some of their time identifying and working out problems. There is a place for problem-solving in any agency's standard operating procedures. In the long run, however, it is likely that the problem-oriented approach will have its most dramatic impact on the management structure of American policing and on the relationship between the police, other city agencies, and the public.

Changes in Management Structure. As the case studies considered above suggest, crime and disorder problems are fundamentally local and specialized in nature. As a result, they are best analyzed and responded to on a case-by-case basis by the line officers and detectives assigned to the problem neighborhood or crime type. Implementing this approach will require changes in the centralized, control-oriented organizational structure and management style of most police agencies. Command staff and mid-level managers can structure problem-solving efforts by creating standard operating procedures, such as the problem-solving process created in Newport News. They can also encourage effective and innovative efforts by rewarding the officers who undertake them. But they cannot make the many individual decisions that are required to identify, analyze, and solve problems.

Inevitably, the changes in structure and style will affect line supervisors—sergeants—the most. Problem solving puts a dual burden on supervisors. On the one hand, they must make many of the tough, operational decisions: setting priorities among different problems, facilitating communication and cooperation with other divisions of the police department and outside agencies, and making sure their officers solve the problems they are assigned. On the other hand, sergeants must also provide leadership, encouraging creative analysis and response. As the sergeant's role shifts from taskmaster to team leader, police agencies must take greater care in selecting, training, and rewarding their line supervisors.

As the structure and style of police agencies change, managers must also shift their focus from internal management problems to the external problems of the public. When a few routine procedures such as preventive patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investigations formed the bulk of an agency's activity, the manager's job was mostly to remove barriers to efficient execution of these routines. Good managers streamlined administrative procedures and reduced paperwork; they implemented new resource deployment schemes; they structured officer discretion.²² They did not need to emphasize crime and disorder reduction, since crimes and disorders would presumably take care of themselves if the routines were implemented properly.

On the other hand, problem-solving activities are inherently nonroutine; it is far more important to choose the correct response from among many possibilities—to "do the right thing"—than it is to "do things right." Thus managers must shift their attention from internal efficiency measures to external effectiveness measures. And they must shift from global, city- and precinct-wide measures to carefully defined, problem-specific measures. Instead of city-wide clearance and arrest rates, police must emphasize neighborhood crime rates; instead of counting the number of tickets written by all officers, they must count the number of auto accidents on particular stretches of road. Implicitly, police must recognize that problem-specific crime rates, accident rates, and the like are partly within their control. Whereas no agency can be held accountable for citywide crime and accident rates, police managers and offi-

cers must accept partial responsibility for conditions in their areas.

Changes in Police Role. Of course, crime, disorder, and other evils are only partly the responsibility of the police. As the three case studies illustrate, police cannot solve these problems by themselves; they need help from other public service agencies, the business community, and the public. The need to obtain cooperation and assistance from these "coproducers" of public safety requires that the role of the police agency must change.

One fundamental change will be in the autonomy of the police relative to other public service agencies. Urban bureaucracies are currently structured along functional lines—public works maintains roads and sewers, codes compliance ensures that building codes are met, and so on. But if urban problems are interrelated and concentrated, as the research and case studies presented above suggest, then these functional distinctions begin to blur. The activities of the public works, codes, and other departments affect (and perhaps worsen) the problems of all the other departments, so at a minimum they must communicate to one another what they are doing about a problem and why. A more ambitious and effective strategy would be for them to develop and implement a common response. In the short run, each agency gives up some of its "turf"; in the long run, each agency saves itself a lot of work.

Problem-oriented police agencies have found that line personnel in other agencies can be "hidden allies," bending procedures to get the job done. For example, one police agency attempted to solve a recurring traffic accident problem at a blind corner by convincing the traffic engineer to install a stop sign. The engineer refused to comply until he had conducted his own study; unfortunately, many similar problems were already awaiting study, so the engineer would not be able to consider the corner for several months. Then a police officer discovered that the public works personnel who actually installed the signs could replace a missing or deteriorated sign within a few days, and that the roadworkers would be happy to install the "missing" stop sign. The work order was placed, and the sign was installed within a week. Now police officers in this jurisdiction regularly bypass the traffic engineer and deal directly with

public works officials.

Hidden allies may help get the job done, but in the long run turf difficulties are best surmounted when top managers—city managers and department heads—recognize the value of a cooperative, problem-solving approach and urge their managers and line personnel to comply. This puts the onus on problem-oriented police administrators to educate and lobby their colleagues, running interference for their officers. As will be discussed later, such an education effort may ultimately result in substantial changes in the city bureaucracy.

Problem-oriented policing also requires that police take on a different role with regard to the public it serves. At present, police ask little more of citizens than that they report crimes, be good witnesses, and stand aside to let the professionals do their job. As with public service agencies, however, problem solving requires that the police and the public communicate and cooperate more frequently, on a wider variety of issues. In particular, problem-oriented police agencies recognize that citizens often know their problems more intimately than the police do, and that sometimes citizens know better what must be done.

This raises many difficult questions. Just as different public service agencies see different aspects of a problem, so do different groups of citizens. If there is no consensus among the community of interest as to the nature of the problem, but public cooperation is necessary to solve it, the police must play a role in forging this consensus. Few police agencies are well equipped for such essentially political activities.

The dilemma is even more serious when the conflict is of values, not just perceptions. Quiet residents of an urban neighborhood may see nothing wrong with police harassment of their rowdier neighbors; the rowdies may legitimately claim that they have the right to be raucous so long as they end their loud parties before midnight and do not threaten other residents. In dealing with such a problem, police must balance the rights and needs of the two groups. This is hardly new—police have always had to balance the goals of serving the majority while guarding the liberties of the minority. Because the problem-oriented approach encourages police to seek such difficult situations, however, they may find themselves making such tough choices more

often. On the other hand, problem solving also emphasizes the power of information and cooperative action over the power of formal, unilateral authority. If police can develop a broader repertoire of solutions to conflicts like these, they may find that these tough choices are easier to make.

It remains to be seen how the limits on police authority will be set, but it is certain that problem solving will require a new consensus on the role, authority, and limitations of the police in each jurisdiction that adopts it.²³

THE FUTURE: BEYOND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Problem-oriented policing is new. Traditional procedures die hard, problem solving methods are still under development, and no one knows for sure how successful the approach will be. As a result, no police agency has adopted the approach fully, and it will be a long time before many agencies do. On the other hand, problem-oriented policing is a realistic response to the limitations of traditional, incident-driven policing. It relies on our growing knowledge of the nature of crime and disorder, and it has been successful in a wide variety of police agencies, for a wide variety of urban crime and disorder problems. The problem-oriented approach seems to be where police work is going.

It also seems to be where other urban service agencies are going. Problem-oriented approaches have been implemented on an experimental basis in electric utilities,²⁴ urban transit authorities,²⁵ and recreation and parks departments.²⁶ Over the next few years, it makes sense to expect dramatic growth in the use of problem-solving techniques not only in municipal policing but in other areas as well. It is likely, then, that problem-oriented police officers will find problem-oriented firefighters, housing inspectors, and others to work with.

This seems to be the case in Madison, Wisconsin, where city agencies have been working on problem solving since 1984. The city has implemented a program of quality and productivity improvement, a form of problem solving originally developed in the private sector to improve the quality of manufactured goods. Project teams have been established within most

city agencies, consisting of line personnel, supervisors, and managers, often working with a statistical consultant. They identify a recurring problem within their agency, usually an administrative bottleneck, and use methods successful in private industry to analyze and solve it.²⁷ Although most Madison city agencies have concentrated on administrative problems, some—including the Madison Police Department—are beginning to extend the methods to public problems. When Madison police officers take on a public problem, chances are they will find sympathetic and experienced problem solvers to work with in other agencies.

The growing use of problem-oriented approaches should help to reduce turf problems. As standard operating procedures become more flexible and decisionmaking becomes decentralized, line officials may find that they owe as much allegiance to their colleagues from other agencies as they do to their own bureaucracies. One natural method of institutionalizing these developments would be to adopt a matrix organizational structure. Neighborhood teams, consisting of members of the police, fire, public works, and other departments, would work together on a formal basis to deliver urban services. Although full implementation of a matrix is a long way off, the foundation for such a structure has already been laid in New York City. All urban service agencies are decentralized into eighty-eight districts with identical boundaries; citizens participate in agency decisionmaking through community boards, a permanent part of the city government structure.²⁸

A central element of problem-oriented policing is that administrative arrangements are less important than the activities that line officers undertake. But just as the centralized, control-oriented police structure helped police administrators to institutionalize incident-driven policing, so might a decentralized, team-based matrix help city managers to institutionalize problem-oriented urban service provision.

Such an interagency team approach would also provide long-term benefits for the relationship between city government and the public. More problem solvers would be available, with different backgrounds, viewpoints, and opportunities for contact with the public; this would improve the chances of early identification and com-

plete analysis of problems. Because they would report to different bureaucracies, members of problem-solving teams would act as a check on one another, reducing many of the potential dangers of community problem solving. Finally, the team would provide a unified contact point for frustrated citizens who would otherwise be unable to negotiate their way through the city bureaucracy. If problem-solving teams can be linked to community organizations, the opportunities for cooperative efforts would increase dramatically.

Such benefits, like the interagency team or matrix structure, are speculative. Problem-oriented policing is not. It provides a tested, practical approach for police agencies frustrated with putting Band-Aids on symptoms. By responding to recurring problems, and by working with other agencies, businesses, and the public whenever possible, innovative police agencies have begun to develop an effective strategy for reducing crime and other troubling conditions in our cities.

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Perspectives on Policing



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Implementing Community Policing: The Administrative Problem

By George L. Kelling and William J. Bratton

The current generation of police leadership, tuned to changes in American society, technology, and economics, is revising the strategy of municipal policing. Whether identified as community or problem-oriented policing, the current changes represent nothing less than a strategic shift in the basic "business" of policing. As dedicated as they are, as supported by research, as responsive to neighborhood demands for change, this generation of reformers finds regeneration and strategic repositioning as difficult as has any other. Why is it that innovators of every generation have so much difficulty shifting the strategies of their organizations and professions?

For police executives, three sources of resistance seem to be foremost in their minds and conversations: unions, detectives, and mid-management. This paper will deal with mid-management. We have repeatedly heard top police executives say with frustration, "If only it wasn't for mid-management," or "If only I could wipe out lieutenants, I could really change this department." The experience with team policing during the 1970's seemed to confirm this impression empirically. Sherman et al. conclude in their case studies of team policing: "Mid-management of the departments [studied], seeing team policing as a threat to their power, subverted and, in some cases, actively sabotaged the plans."¹

Yet, there are problems with this formulation. Review of the literature on mid-management presents a more complicated picture. On the one hand, many articles, especially those in journals of a semipopular nature, portray mid-managers as a dying breed in organizations, especially in those organizations that are being downsized or in which their services or products are information-based. Certainly, many organizations are portrayed as top-heavy, especially at mid-managerial levels. This is not just a "pop" view; Peter Drucker states it strongly.

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

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[M]iddle managements today tend to be overstaffed to the point of obesity. . . . This slows the decision process to a crawl and makes the organization increasingly incapable

of adapting to change. Far too few people, even in high positions with imposing titles, are exposed to the challenge of producing results.²

Mid-management ranks are bloated in many police departments: some have many captains and lieutenants without commands but serving as aides, often doing relatively menial work that could be carried out by a secretary or administrative assistant.

It does not follow from this, however, that mid-managers—captains and lieutenants—are a hindrance to innovation per se. Having too many mid-managers is a different issue from suggesting that mid-managers are inherently resistant to change. Indeed, many people who study organizations, especially in the private sector, identify the locus of innovation precisely in mid-management. Probably the work of Rosabeth Moss Kanter is most noteworthy in this regard. She argues that middle managers are essential to the process of innovation, and argues even more strongly that creativity can originate only in middle management.³ Perhaps the experience of mid-management in organizational change in the private sector is instructive as we consider the current changes in policing. The role of mid-management in change—which for reasons that will become apparent, we call the *administrative problem*—is a generic issue in innovation and the strategic repositioning of organizations.

Defining the administrative problem

Considering the circumstances within which early 20th-century police reformers like August Vollmer and O. W. Wilson found themselves, the law enforcement strategy they constructed had much to commend it. Those circumstances included extensive political corruption of police agencies, widespread financial corruption of police officers and departments, extensive police abuses of their authority, and large-scale inefficiencies. To counter these circumstances, reformers redefined the basic strategy of American policing. They narrowed police functioning to criminal law enforcement. They centralized police organizations, standardized and routinized the official functioning of police, and measured their success by arrests and clearances and the newly created Uniform Crime Reports.

“... in New York City, patrol officers were constrained from making low-level drug arrests because administrators feared they would be corrupted.”

Over time, this strategy became consistent, coherent, integrated, marketable, and dominated the police field. This strategy has shaped both how police are thought about and how they think about themselves. It has been so potent that for a generation, questioning it was tantamount to uttering “fighting words.” To suggest that the police role was more complex was heard as

tantamount to demeaning police, reinventing political meddling and financial corruption into policing, suggesting that police were social workers, and pandering to criminals.⁴ Real policing was law enforcement, crime fighting.

The business of policing in this strategy had two elements. The first element, crime fighting, was conducted through preventive patrol, interception patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and criminal investigations. The intent of preventive patrol was to create a feeling of police omnipresence in a community; the intent of interception patrol and rapid response was to intercept crimes in progress; and the intent of criminal investigation was to investigate crimes. In each of the latter two activities, the goal was to arrest offenders and feed them into the criminal justice system.

Controlling officers was the second element of the strategy. At first, this assertion seems strange—control of officers should be a means of improving police performance, not an end in itself. Yet, one has to put oneself in the position of the reformers. For them, political meddling, corruption, and abuse were so rampant in policing that it was impossible to direct effectively efforts to any desired goal; therefore, control was in the forefront of all their innovations.⁵ Concern for means overshadowed ends. Control became the strategy. Thus, it is no surprise that even as recently as the 1970's in New York City, patrol officers were constrained from making low-level drug arrests because administrators feared they would be corrupted. As Herman Goldstein observes: “It is a sad commentary on the state of policing in this country that the need to control corrupt practices stands in the way of more effective policing.”⁶

Much could be written about the fact that control of officers was central to the reform strategy: its wisdom, its efficacy, the extent to which it interfered with good policing activity, how the public came to judge police departments as it does, and other issues. Our purpose here, however, is simply to argue that the basic business of police organizations was two-fold: law enforcement and control of officers.

Early reformers confronted three sets of problems as they attempted to shift the strategy of policing to law enforcement: entrepreneurial, tactical, and administrative.⁷ In this respect, they were similar to entrepreneurs and owners/executives in commerce. They had to define their *core services* in a changing environment, the *engineering services* required to produce their services, and the *administrative mechanisms* to ensure production. For police reformers:

- 1) entrepreneurial problems included redefining core police services and ensuring that an adequate market or demand for such services existed;
- 2) engineering problems included devising the tactics and technologies that were required to provide those services; and
- 3) administrative problems included creating the organizational structure and managerial processes required to develop, maintain, and monitor the organization's activities.

For each of these problems, police reformers such as Vollmer and Wilson devised solutions.

The entrepreneurial solution

The entrepreneurial solution was discussed above. The reformers emphasized crime fighting and control of officers as their core services and systematically marketed them as their core competencies. Allying themselves with progressive reformers, police leaders adroitly steered public attention towards what they perceived as a major crime wave, police corruption, and political interference. They accomplished this reorientation of the public to the new business of policing through advertising, public relations, public education, local and national commissions (e.g., Wickersham⁸), and police surveys (assessments of local police departments by recognized national experts like Vollmer and Bruce Smith).⁹

The tactical solution

The tactical solutions of the reformers initially centered on patrol and criminal investigation. At first, patrol was modified by the rather simple move of abandoning foot patrol for cars (during the 1930's and 1940's). Primary justifications for putting police into automobiles were to match the speed and mobility of criminals in cars and to increase the sense of the prowess of the officer, equipped as the officer would be with a powerful car. Later, reformers developed the more sophisticated tactics of preventive patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and interception patrol.

Additionally, criminal investigation came into its own during the reform era. Previously, criminal investigation units and detectives had unsavory reputations. Recruited from the private sector until the early 20th century, detectives and detective units and agencies (the Bureau of Investigation—the predecessor of the FBI) were noted for corruption and unprofessional behavior. J. Edgar Hoover's strategy for eradicating corruption from the Bureau of Investigation and converting it into the highly respected and professional FBI became the model for local police chiefs and helped reshape the public view of local police department detectives as well.

Detectives began to look and act like professionals. They worked regular hours, controlled their own schedule, saw people by appointment, "took over" crime scenes, controlled esoteric information, and in other ways operated with professional prerogatives. Additionally, detectives became the "stuff" of movies, radio, and later, television. As a consequence, they became the leading edge in the law enforcement strategy. Their prestige and external and internal clout soared. The successful cop? A detective. The failed cop? An unpromoted patrol officer.

The administrative solution

The administrative problem for the reformers consisted of the need to establish the structural and administrative mechanisms required to produce the desired services. The administrative solution was large-scale adoption of the ideas of Frederick Taylor, the renowned early 20th-century organizational theorist. Known as scientific (or classical) management, Taylor's work focused on improving productivity by rationalizing both production efforts (human work) and management. His concepts and practices have become well known. They include: time and motion studies; routinization and simplification of work tasks; division of work tasks; and administrative control mechanisms,

which include unity of command, layers of command, close supervision, span of control, and linking productivity to reward systems.

The undertakings of reformers to rationalize the productive work (tactics and technologies) of patrol officers are now well known: narrowing the official responsibility of patrol to law enforcement; reducing, even attempting to eliminate, patrol officer discretion; and developing routinized patrol tactics (preventive patrol and rapid response to calls).

The reformers' rationalization of administration—their attempts to solve the administrative problem—as well as the attempts by the current generation of reformers are the central concerns of this paper. Consider the situation of a chief of police during the early decades of this century. Generally a political appointee, the chief served at the pleasure of the mayor. Tenure or contracts for chiefs were unheard of. Police districts were contiguous with wards and ward leaders made most of the police appointments, administrative and operational. The links between ward leaders and police were so close during this political era of policing that historians like Fogelson have dubbed police "adjuncts" of urban political parties (machines).¹⁰

In these circumstances, police reformers needed to accomplish two things to gain control over their departments. The first was to sever *all levels* within police departments from undue external influences. This was accomplished largely by adopting the political agenda of progressive reformers: centralization of urban services (taking control away from ward leaders); election of councilpersons-at-large (weakening neighborhood-based ward politicians); strengthening mayors and creating city management forms of government; creating civil service (hiring, retaining, promoting, and terminating personnel on the basis of merit); removing control of police chiefs from politicians; and developing mechanisms to protect the tenure of police chiefs. Elements of this agenda were achieved with varying degrees of success; however, the overall results were so successful that by 1977, Herman Goldstein appropriately pointed out that many, if not most, police departments had achieved such degrees of autonomy that they were virtually unaccountable to local government.¹¹

The second task for police reformers was to extend the reach of police chiefs into the department itself. That is, police executives had to implement and maintain over time their strategy by socializing and managing personnel; devising a range of specialized tactical functions; establishing new relations to the external environment; maintaining equipment, including a fleet of automobiles and later telephone, radio, and computer equipment; controlling financial functions, including recordkeeping, allocating resources, and reporting; and developing the means of reporting on the achievements of their new strategy.

In some respects, their responsibility was akin to that of late 19th-century owner-managers in industry who, confronted with the need to extend their reach into their increasingly large enterprises, "literally invented the methods and systems of administrative coordination and, in the process, gave definition to a wide range of functions such as finance, collection, service, marketing, distribution, pricing, sales, training, and labor management."¹² That is, police reformers, like owner-managers of burgeoning industrial enterprises some decades earlier, created

a mid-management infrastructure, the purpose of which was to ensure the implementation and maintenance of the reform strategy. Creating functional organizations, as opposed to the geographically based organizations of early policing, chiefs delegated to a mid-managerial group specific authority over functions that included training, analyzing and planning, accounting, reporting, allocating personnel, scheduling, and other functions. Over time, the skills required to manage these functions became increasingly complex, resulting in a management group that had many of the skills of professional managers in the corporate world: planning, fiscal and budgeting analysis, marketing, research, and education.

Police chiefs extracted from their own executive functions, authority, and skill the elements that could be rationalized. Chiefs delegated these functions to mid-managers—captains and lieutenants who oversaw administrative units and patrol operations on a day-to-day and shift-to-shift basis. Administratively, captains generally head departments and units such as planning and the police academy.

In operations, captains serve usually as district/precinct/area commanders and commanders of special units. Responsible to inspectors/assistant chiefs/majors, captains in patrol direct activities in a geographical area. Responsibilities of these captains include the establishment of district priorities; supervision of operations; relations with community and neighborhood groups; coordination with other patrol districts and police units; direction of assignments, scheduling, instructions, procedures, and communications; preparation of the district budget; and the preliminary handling of citizen complaints against officers. Generally, captains work business hours and days. In special units, captains have similar duties, but usually have citywide responsibility for a function, such as handling juveniles, rather than for a geographical area.

Lieutenants work directly under captains. Often designated as “desk officers” in patrol units, lieutenants are responsible for the shift-to-shift operation of a district or function. As such, most lieutenants work shifts. During shifts, lieutenants are responsible for equipment; proper preparation of all reports; review of field investigations; maintenance of logs; transmission of all orders; supervision of sergeants; investigation of complaints; and other administrative duties. Typically, lieutenants “sign off” on all reports and district records. As such, they are the guarantors of line performance. But under the reformers, captains and lieutenants also gained control of the *practice, knowledge, and skill base* of the occupation. This requires some explanation.

As part of the law enforcement strategy, reformers moved to simplify and routinize the work of patrol officers, the service base of the occupation. This was accomplished in policing, as it was in industry, by attempting to reduce the discretion of line personnel, those providing the service of the organization. To accomplish this, the essence or the craft of the work had to be understood and then distilled by engineers and planners (mid-managers). Once understood and distilled, the productive efforts of workers could be reduced to relatively simple and repetitive tasks. In this way, both skill and knowledge about productivity were concentrated in the managerial domain.¹³ Sparrow et al. capture this:

Police officers, for all their field’s talk about professionalism, are treated not like professionals but like factory workers. The duties and methods of their jobs are presumed to have been well worked out. Someone else has already done the thinking; only their faithful adherence to procedure and their willingness to show up for work are required. Their superiors, for the most part, merely supervise and discipline.¹⁴

The concentration of expertise, the practice skill, was located in the leadership of line operating units (patrol and special units) and staff units like planning and the training academy. Mid-managers would thus define the problems that police would address and the methods that police would use to manage them.

The task of police officers was simply nondiscretionary law enforcement. If someone breaks the law, he or she is arrested. If laws are not broken, nobody need fear the police. Some training in procedure was required but, as Bittner has noted, all a police officer really needed in this view of police work was a little common sense and the “manly virtue” of being able to overcome resistance.¹⁵

Thus, the solution to the administrative problem in police departments was the establishment of a powerful mid-management group that: 1) extended the reach of chiefs throughout police departments and 2) became the locus of the practice and skill base of the occupation. As such, mid-managers became *the leading edge in the establishment of centralized control over police departments’ internal environment and organizational operations*.

In the following section of this paper, we will examine the way in which mid-management’s role in the establishment of centralized control over the police organization plays itself out in contemporary efforts at police reform. We will begin by reviewing three 1970’s efforts funded by the Police Foundation in Dallas, Texas; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Kansas City, Missouri. Projects in these three cities consumed at least one-third of the Police Foundation’s original \$30 million endowment from the Ford Foundation. The work in Dallas is largely forgotten. Cincinnati is recalled as the final major test of team policing. The work in Kansas City is considered pathbreaking in policing. Following this, we will examine more recent attempts to strategically reposition police departments in Baltimore County, Maryland; Madison, Wisconsin; Houston, Texas; Reno, Nevada; and the New York City Transit Police Department.

Three cases: Dallas, Cincinnati, and Kansas City

Dallas. Although the Police Foundation had given a few small grants, the centerpiece of its strategy was the Major Cities Program. The central idea of this program was to identify police departments that had an unusual potential for change and to help them overhaul thoroughly and radically their organization and operations. They, then, would become national models for the profession. The Dallas Police Department (DPD) was to be the first Major City.

Given the assumptions of such an approach, no city could compare with Dallas. The vision of its chief, Frank Dyson, was revolutionary. In today’s organizational language, his vision of

policing and his attempts at reform would be understood as a strategic repositioning of the Dallas Police Department. The very nature of the business of the organization would change: official recognition would be given to all police activities; authority would devolve to operational levels of the department; community needs would determine operational priorities; police would be accountable to the community; management and personnel processes and physical structures would be altered to facilitate such devolution of authority and community priority-setting; and police would develop close relations with other community institutions.

The model for instituting these reforms emphasized careful planning, creating systems to support such a strategy (e.g., recruitment, preservice and inservice training), developing a management infrastructure to maintain and monitor the strategy, and changing the definitions of organizational, unit, and individual performance.

Planning for these activities was conducted by the Office of Program Administration (OPA). This office was headed by a confidante of Chief Dyson who was widely viewed in the department as a police renegade. The staff of OPA was made up mainly of newly hired civilians. The dominant view of those involved in planning for the implementation of the effort was that the plan, while worthy and innovative, threatened the vested interests of major segments of DPD. For example, detectives were to be decentralized, and the rank of lieutenant was to be eliminated. OPA responded to the anticipated resistance by developing an official policy of maximum secrecy during the planning stages. To facilitate this secrecy, OPA offices were moved out of police headquarters to a relatively inaccessible location. (Other reasons existed for moving—shortage of space, for example—but inaccessibility was a major goal of OPA.)

Mid-managers generally were described by key personnel in OPA as “perchers”—persons who merely filled organizational slots, without contributing to the organization. They, especially lieutenants, were viewed as the primary source of resistance to the effort to change.

Elements of the plan were implemented, primarily those having to do with improving the personnel processes of the DPD. But before a single operational element of the strategy was in place, Dyson was fired, the operational thrusts of the effort were abandoned, and the planning unit that was charged with designing the implementation plan was renounced and liquidated. Essentially, the overthrow resulted from a coalition among detectives, the media, and the Dallas Police Association, which at that time was dominated by detectives. The detectives opposed the plan because of decentralization. The news media, especially the print press, were exasperated by the continuing attempts to maintain the plan in virtually total secrecy. Broad-based opposition arose to minority recruitment. The DPA sided with the detectives, not surprising since detectives dominated its leadership. Fiscal improprieties within OPA were alleged. No champions arose to defend the plan. City officials began to fear for the city's image.

Cincinnati. Cincinnati was the second Major City effort of the Police Foundation. Cincinnati had a reputation both of high integrity and for being one of the more progressive police departments in the United States during the 1950's and 1960's. It also was quite militaristic; for example, officers saluted their

superiors. Stanley Schrotel was considered one of the country's premier reform chiefs during his tenure in the 1960's and early 1970's. Like many departments at the time, the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) was enjoying a period of expanding resources.

The major goal of the project was to increase the sensitivity and responsiveness of police to the communities they served. This was to be accomplished largely through the decentralization of police services. This effort, called team policing, encouraged officers to identify special needs of the community and to devise police responses to those needs. This gave sergeants and officers responsibility for determining the content and method of their work. Patrol officers were to work interactively among themselves and with their supervisors to formulate policing tactics for their neighborhoods.

“... before a single operational element of the strategy was in place, [the police chief] was fired . . . and the planning unit . . . was renounced and liquidated.”

The experimental phase of the effort was mounted by a task force in selected areas of the city. The planning phase for the experiment lasted for 2 years. The implementation of the experiment proceeded smoothly. The officers involved adopted the program enthusiastically, and top management provided the necessary organizational support. Over time, however, upper and mid-management began to intrude on team responsibility. Allocation of personnel to teams had to be made by mid-management. Authority for team leaders to assign officers to dress in plain clothes for surveillance or investigative work was withdrawn in the name of uniform dress standards. Management also adopted a program of management by objectives (MBO). This effort:

. . . became a means through which headquarters imposed standardized demands for increasingly rigid levels of measurable activity. [Team policing] officers found their MBO plans were continually returned until they included all CPD priorities. Perhaps inadvertently, MBO helped to destroy the autonomy of team policing and to recentralize control of the police.¹⁶

Despite these difficulties, team policing was found to be more effective than traditional policing in a variety of dimensions: crime reduction, clearances, fear reduction, and citizen satisfaction. CPD was sufficiently satisfied with the results of the experiment to expand team policing departmentwide in 1975. The Police Foundation extended its evaluation to monitor the expansion. Convinced that CPD had learned to conduct team policing, management bypassed the careful planning that characterized the experimental phase—all that was necessary was to direct the other districts to operate as the experimental district had been operating.

By the end of 1975, the evaluation team concluded that while some of the form of team policing still existed, little of substance remained. The evaluators believed that the effort had suffered lack of support from both top and mid-management, the latter due in part to the fact that middle-level managers had never been fully drawn into the program, and they tended to view it as a threat to their traditional authority.

Kansas City. Chief Clarence Kelley, later to become director of the FBI, had wanted Kansas City to receive one of the Police Foundation's Major City grants. Somewhat jaded by the Dallas experience, the foundation's board of directors was backing away from the Major City concept. Kansas City was turned down as a Major City, but the Foundation offered assistance in the development of specific projects.

The hub of Kansas City's approach to projects was the 300 new officers that had been authorized and funded by government. Kelley wanted to allocate them in ways that maximized their impact on crime. The top command staff was convened with several consultants invited by both the Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) and the foundation to determine how to use the personnel. Two ideas surfaced: use the new officers as backup in the current allocation scheme to achieve shorter response times and add the new officer group to the total officer pool and reduce beat size.

Kelley was dissatisfied with these ideas. With advice from the lead consultant, Robert Wasserman, he decided to create task forces in each of the three districts and the special operations unit. These task forces, made up of all ranks in the units, were to determine what special problems existed in their domain and devise tactics to deal with those problems. The Police Foundation would fund the evaluations. The special operations unit, for example, decided it wanted to experiment with forms of interception patrol: location-oriented patrol (LOP) and perpetrator-oriented patrol (POP). The unit devised its plans, received approval for operations from the KCPD command staff and for evaluation funds from the Police Foundation, implemented its efforts in a quasi-experimental design, maintained the project for the required time, terminated the project, and then returned to business as usual. The Central and Northeast Districts went through similar processes.

The South Patrol District responded to the chief's mandate somewhat more literally than the other districts. Carefully analyzing its own problems, it determined that the most serious problem in the district was juvenile behavior around the schools. Two points of view developed. The first was that preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were so important that the new officers had to be used to patrol and respond to calls, regardless of the seriousness of the juvenile problem. The other was that officers should be sequestered to deal specifically with the identified problem.

A debate emerged about the value of preventive patrol. Influenced by Wasserman, and later by one of the authors of this paper (Kelling), the South Patrol Task Force decided to address the issue of the value of preventive patrol by conducting an experiment in preventive patrol before moving on to the problem of juveniles around the schools. Like the other KCPD units, the South Patrol District devised its plans, received approval for operations from the KCPD command staff and for evaluation

funds from the Police Foundation, implemented its efforts in an experimental design, maintained the project for the required time, terminated the project, and then returned to business as usual.

What do we learn from these three cases? In Dallas, Frank Dyson had a vision of a new police strategy. Mid-management was perceived as the enemy in repositioning the department. While this need not have been a self-fulfilling prophecy, no credible internal champions developed inside the department to defend the efforts or to provide alternate interpretations of the motives or goals of the innovators. The effort was dead before it got started.

In Cincinnati, team policing was misinterpreted as a tactical innovation rather than as a strategic repositioning. Some middle-management resistance was noted during the maintenance phase of the experiment; it was not sufficient, however, to derail the effort. Despite these early warnings, no special efforts were made to capture, orient, or train mid-management before departmentwide implementation of team policing. Team policing waned and died.

In Kansas City, a series of projects was planned and implemented to improve the functioning of the department. Middle managers were involved in planning all of the experiments and, with some problems, successfully implemented, maintained, and terminated the projects. Lest the achievements seem modest, it should be recalled that the projects were hardly simple or easy to administer. The patrol experiment, the first successful experiment conducted in policing, was extremely complicated and was held in place for a full year.

Simultaneously, the department fielded a quasi-experiment in special operations, a peer review project to control use of force, and several other projects. These projects were developed and maintained through working collaborations between mid-managers (most often district commanders), their key aides, working task forces, outside consultants, and representatives of the KCPD planning unit. Moreover, although it did hire some Police Foundation consulting and evaluation staff, the department went on, independent of the foundation, to conduct with funds from the National Institute of Justice the first major research into rapid response to calls for service.

Stepping back somewhat, this capacity for project implementation in Kansas City ought not to have been surprising. Police departments have extensive experience managing projects. The President of the United States comes to town? The police department sets in motion a massive project to insure his protection, reroute traffic, and manage large masses of citizens, some of whom may be demonstrating, while simultaneously maintaining business as usual. Business robberies increase before Christmas? The police department sets in place a special holiday antirobbery effort. Drug dealing becomes an aggravated problem in a neighborhood? A drug unit conducts a targeted effort.

In other words, managing special projects is a core competency of the current police strategy. And whether the competency is at the service of traditional police issues, such as controlling drug

dealing in a neighborhood, or at the service of creative experimentation, mid-management has shown remarkable ability to implement and manage projects.

These experiences suggest that attempts to strategically reposition an organization without bringing mid-management along, in fact defining mid-management as the enemy as was done in Dallas, is done at great risk. No champions develop. It follows that CEO's alone do not reposition an organization. Even when involved, mid-management has the potential to mildly subvert a project, as occurred in Cincinnati.

This does not mean, however, that mid-management is inherently anti-innovation. As the experience in Kansas City suggests, when innovative projects are conducted that are congruent with the then-current strategy of the organization, and when mid-managers are brought into the planning and implementation efforts, they can perform successfully, if motivated to do so. Indeed, mid-managers demonstrate considerable creativity and resourcefulness in *project* or *tactical* innovations. The critical issue is whether mid-management can play an equally positive role in *strategic* innovation.

Community policing, mid-management, and the administrative problem

Repositioning through problem solving: Baltimore County. Captain Fred Kestler was responsible for taking the Baltimore County Police Department's successful experimentation with problem solving and implementing it departmentwide. BCPD's successful experimentation is detailed elsewhere,¹⁷ but under the leadership of Chief Neil Behan, the county police pioneered in problem-solving methodology.

Chief Behan has summarized his management philosophy: "My management style is to direct people toward an idea and let them develop the how-to. One, they can do it better than I can do it, and two, then they have ownership. The ownership's got to happen, and if they're just following orders it's not going to happen, or only with great difficulty."¹⁸

Under this philosophy, Chief Behan used the resources created by 45 new positions to create three special 15-person COPE units (Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement), one for each of the department's three districts. Headed by lieutenants and freed from many administrative and operational restrictions—they could establish their own schedules and did not have to respond to calls for service—their task was to fight fear. The units' early results were mixed: a few success stories, a lot of time spent surveying, and a nettlesome tendency to return to traditional tactics.

With encouragement from Gary Hayes, then director of the Police Executive Research Forum, and Herman Goldstein, a professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, COPE adopted, with Chief Behan's blessing, a problem-solving methodology. The units produced a respectable number of successful interventions to reduce fear and crime in neighborhoods, although with some unsuccessful experiences. Generally, however, the efforts were well thought of in both the department and the community.

One of the major problems was the deteriorating relationship with regular patrol units. From the patrol units' point of view, the COPE units had all the "perks" without being responsible for the press of constant calls for service. For Chief Behan, already nervous about the idea of special units, the answer was to adopt the COPE methodology departmentwide. Captain Fred Kestler, formerly one of the lieutenants in charge of a COPE unit, was given the responsibility of implementing "precinct problem solving" throughout patrol in one of Baltimore County's three districts. The experiences there would frame the implementation of the COPE methodology throughout the county. These efforts are now underway.

Repositioning through experimental decentralization: Madison and Houston. W. Edward Deming's approach to attaining quality in the production of goods and services is central to Chief David Couper's approach to repositioning the strategy of the Madison Police Department.¹⁹ Chief Couper depends on quality leadership, organizational decentralization, creation of a work environment that encourages creativity and that ensures high levels of job satisfaction, a "customer" orientation, developing close linkages to neighborhoods and communities, and use of problem solving as defined by Herman Goldstein.²⁰

After a multirank task force planned details of quality policing, the Experimental Police District (EPD) was created under command of Captain Ted Balistrieri and Lieutenant Mike Masterson. Each allowed himself to be nominated for his position and was then selected by the officers who volunteered to work in EPD.

The chief provided the guiding vision of EPD. The planning task force initially shaped the policies and practices of EPD; however, within those loose guidelines, EPD was free to innovate. The innovations were wide-ranging and included the extensive use of problem solving; encouragement of more collegial relations between officers and ranks; modified rollcalls (rollcalls became district conferences about problems and tactics); and modified reporting procedures (while the rest of the department retained the former procedures).

While EPD experimented with quality policing, the rest of the organization performed, for the most part, as usual. At times, business as usual conflicted with quality policing. Non-EPD police saw EPD as draining resources away from the total organization and providing special privileges to organizational favorites. Some non-EPD lieutenants were bothered by what they perceived as inconsistency in handling calls for service, complaints, disciplinary procedures, and other procedural matters. Opponents of decentralization, especially lieutenants, rallied around these complaints. The strongest opposition to the EPD came from detectives, who claimed that investigations done by decentralized investigators were simply not up to the caliber of those conducted by centralized detectives.

Nonetheless, EPD is now institutionalized. Although plans for additional police stations have been curbed because of Madison's financial circumstances, plans for administrative and operational decentralization of the rest of the department are now proceeding.

In Houston, former Chief Lee Brown had been a strong advocate of what he termed the "philosophy" of community polic-

ing. Building on formal experiments in fear reduction and the planning activities of multirank "executive sessions" (meetings oriented around substantive and administrative issues associated with community policing), Houston's approach was similar to Madison's: innovate in one district, learn from successes and failures, and then go citywide. Operationalization of community policing in Houston's target area, Westside, was left to mid-managers.

Then-Deputy Chief Elizabeth Watson and Captain William Young were the second management team to head Westside. The first team either could not or would not move the district in the directions Chief Brown wanted. Watson and Young inherited what they believed to be a highly resistant group of sergeants and lieutenants who would not come on board with the plans—the major obstacle to innovation.

Closer analysis by Watson and Young revealed that most sergeants and lieutenants simply did not know what was expected of them. They knew what had been expected in their old roles, but had little idea of their new roles and responsibilities. The

"Houston's approach was similar to Madison's: innovate in one district, learn from successes and failures, and then go citywide."

field operations commander, Tom Koby (now chief in Boulder, Colorado), designed a cascading training program. Each rank would be charged with defining the responsibilities of, and a training program for, the rank immediately below its own. Captains would define the role of lieutenants and prepare training for them; in turn, lieutenants would do the same for sergeants. Note that defining the problem and devising solutions were not pushed up to higher level command or aside to staff units, but rather were pushed *down* to the ranks involved for identification and solution.

The Westside district continued to implement the community policing philosophy. Elizabeth Watson was promoted to Houston's chief of police when Lee Brown became commissioner of the New York City Police Department. Captain Young was reassigned to the second district to be decentralized under the long-range plan. Political and financial uncertainties threatened the move to community policing in Houston, however. When a new mayor was elected in 1992, Chief Watson was replaced by Sam Nuchia. Watson then became chief of police in Austin, Texas.

Repositioning in response to crisis: Reno, Nevada, and the New York City Transit Police Department. Frustrated with the performance of the Reno Police Department (RPD), citizens of the Nevada city twice rejected attempts to override a statewide tax cap. From the point of view of the RPD, the situation was acute: by 1987, the police department had shrunk from 305 to 225 officers, while the city's population had increased from 103,000 to 123,000. Calls were up substantially. Surveys indi-

cated that citizens believed the police were efficient, nonetheless held them in relatively low esteem.

Believing that repositioning the department to community policing was essential if RPD was to thrive, Chief Robert Bradshaw planned and implemented citywide Community-Oriented Policing Plus (COP+), a community/problem-oriented approach to policing. While involving many levels of personnel in planning for the effort and providing extensive training, the most dramatic change was organizational. From its previous functional organization, Chief Bradshaw reorganized the department geographically, dividing the city into three areas, each with three subdivisions. After a week's retreat, during which broad discussions were held about the nature of community policing and the plans for organizational change, these captains were given complete responsibility for their areas, including the option of calling in a tactical unit if required, and reported directly to Chief Bradshaw rather than through a chain of command.

To ensure that activities were coordinated among the three areas and that RPD did not Balkanize into three departments, the chief, the three area captains, and the remaining command staff had daily meetings. Each captain would present major problems in his or her area to the group, and the group would consult about possible solutions in light of the department's new strategy.

The three area captains, although they worked much harder than they had previously, became champions of the changes. Not only did surveys indicate that Reno's citizens noted positive changes in RPD, the voters also overrode the State's tax restraints to increase their financial support of RPD. Although Chief Bradshaw resigned in 1991, the department continues to operate out of this new strategy and structure.

In New York, the Transit Police Department (TPD) polices the city's subway system. When TPD required a new chief in April of 1990, the department was moribund. The reasons for this are complicated. Primarily, however, the condition sprang from political indecision about whether TPD should be merged with the New York City Police Department (NYPD). This debate had gone on for years without resolution.

The consequence of the indecision was a department in limbo, without champions. Radios were inadequate. Officers in the subways, even when patrolling alone, were regularly out of radio contact. Vehicles were decrepit and available in insufficient numbers to respond to emergencies or to back up officers who worked alone. The physical facilities, district stations, were woefully inadequate—an insult to officers. Morale was low. The department had lost its pride, lack of which showed in the demeanor and dress of officers. Sector team policing, a major attempt to decentralize authority that was modeled on team policing, lagged and, with a few exceptions, existed in name only.

These were the chronic problems of TPD. In 1989, however, the department had entered a crisis. Surveys of citizens and subway users pointed to an acute problem for citizens and subway users: ridership was dropping as a consequence of passenger fear of disorderly behavior associated with both farebeating and use of the homeless of the subway stations as surrogate shelters. Estimates of revenues lost from farebeating ranged from \$60 million to \$120 million a year.

Despite these problems, police remained fixed on robbery as their priority: officers preferred it, the union insisted on it, and management oriented its tactics around it. To be sure, special units were assigned to deal with the disorder created by the homeless and farebeating, and at times these special units were quite large. Nonetheless, the basic strategy of TPD remained oriented around robbery.

In some respects, this was not hard to understand: leaders and staff of TPD longed to be "crime fighters" like their above-ground colleagues (or at least to the extent they believed their NYPD colleagues were). For transit police, concentrating on farebeating and disorderly behavior was demeaning. Nonetheless, the leadership of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) persisted. When TPD's chief retired, they sought a chief who would refocus TPD strategy.

After his appointment in April 1990, William Bratton (coauthor of this paper) initiated a series of changes. Cognizant of the need to refocus the department, his first concern nevertheless was to redress the consequences of years of neglect. The fleet of cars was replaced and additional cars added. New personal radios were purchased as a "quick fix" to the communications problem, and financial support was sought, with the full support of MTA and NYCTA, to install a state-of-the-art radio communications capacity. Uniforms were redesigned with the special needs of transit police in mind, and the changeover was initiated. A long-range plan was developed to revamp or reconstruct district stations. Departmental values were reviewed and revised with input from all levels of the department. Use-of-force policies were reviewed and strengthened. Certification was accomplished in 1991.

As part of this process, the department set out a plan of action to establish long-range goals. The main goal was to "take back the subway" for passengers by reducing disorder, farebeating, and robbery. Strengthened district command was supported by problem-solving teams composed of personnel from all levels. District captains were charged with identifying the most critical problems in their districts and adopting tactics that both targeted those problems and enriched the work of line patrol officers.

Within this general definition of the business of TPD, and within its values, district commanders were free to innovate. In District 4, Captain Francis M. O'Hare instituted 4-ACES (the Anti-Crime Enforcement Squad). With officers rotating through this district unit, 4-ACES concentrates on apprehending serious offenders by enforcing laws against farebeaters.²¹ Captain Mike Ansbro, in District 30, developed "Operation Glazier" to fix "broken windows." As one method of increasing the sense of police presence in the subway in this district, trains stop briefly in stations, the sound system announces that officers are checking the trains, and they do. In District 34, Captain Gerald Donovan introduced the TCOP (Transit Community-Oriented Policing) program (a takeoff on the NYPD's CPOP—Community Patrol Officer Program), which encourages officers to familiarize themselves with the employees, passengers, and ordinary problems found within the officers' "own" areas. Officers are expected to identify problems and propose solutions.

Direct communication channels between district captains and the chief help ensure that departmental priorities are maintained

in each district. Promotions above the rank of captain are now linked to performance as a district commander rather than to a staff assignment. All indicators of police activity, save one—felony arrests—are up by substantial amounts. Robberies have declined every month since the new strategy began.

Not only can mid-managers (as earlier shown) demonstrate considerable creativity and resourcefulness in *project* or *tactical* innovations, these experiences in Madison, Houston, Baltimore County, Reno, and the New York City Transit Police Department suggest that mid-managers also are at the heart of *strategic* innovations.

Conclusion: the administrative solution

This paper began by examining the role of mid-management, especially captains and lieutenants, in policing during the past 50 years. Largely that role has been to extend the reach of management into the day-to-day operations of police departments by standardizing and controlling both organizational procedures and officer performance. As such, captains and lieutenants have been the leading edge of the control functions of police departments. They, especially lieutenants, are the guarantors of quality—the buck stops with them. They sign off on shift reports.

Discussion of the role of middle management in strategic innovation of police departments, at least at a casual level, has tended to focus on its resistance to change. We have seen, however, that whether one considers project or strategic innovation, abundant examples of mid-management creativity exist. Abundant examples of mid-management resistance to change exist as well, whether one thinks of the Police Foundation efforts of the 1970's or of current examples.

Perhaps such resistance to change should not be surprising if we recall that in the past, one of the basic functions of captains and lieutenants—their *raison d'être*—has been to forestall creativity and innovation.

Consider the situation of lieutenants. They are responsible for the activities of patrol officers during a shift. Departmental procedures are in place for responding to calls for service, filing forms, receiving complaints. In the name of new models of policing (formerly called team policing, now called community or problem-oriented policing), officers respond differently to calls, modify reporting procedures, alter practices, and establish new priorities. Officers are encouraged to innovate, to be risk-takers, to be creative.

Yet, lieutenants still perceive themselves as accountable to captains for the maintenance of patrol priorities; to detectives and ultimately to the prosecuting attorney for offense reports; and to communications for the proper response of officers to calls for service. Lieutenants, in the past, were on the leading edge of a prime mid-management responsibility: maintaining control and ensuring that operations functioned according to the book. Now lieutenants, attempting to maintain the standards that have been their reason for being, find themselves cast as the *lagging edge*: a major source of resistance to innovation. Such a characterization of mid-managers in policing is not surprising, given their basic function.

This conflict is not of their own making; mid-managers are victims more than culprits in a process that catches them between conflicting role demands (control your officers so that all former expectations can be met *versus* encourage your officers to be creative and self-initiating). Focusing on mid-managers as a source of resistance may be exactly the wrong approach.

As Drucker points out:

[T]o focus on resistance to change is to misdefine the problem in a way that makes it less, rather than more, tractable. The right way to define the problem so as to make it capable of resolution is as a challenge to create, build, and maintain the innovative organization, the organization for which change is norm rather than exception, and opportunity rather than threat.²²

This conceptualization appropriately shifts the focus from the resistance of mid-managers to the responsibilities of top management—CEO's, chiefs. The question becomes: how should top management behave to ensure that those in the organization who have been the organization's champions for standardization and control—captains and lieutenants—become its leading edge for creativity and innovation? We believe some principles emerge from police experience in innovation to date.

First, the experiences in Kansas City, Cincinnati, Madison, Reno, and Houston suggest that when mid-managers are involved in the process of planning innovations, they are capable of providing instrumental leadership regardless of whether the innovations are programmatic or strategic. Alternatively, whenever mid-managers are kept out of planning or perceived as a source of resistance, they *are* a potentially strong source of resistance. Mid-managers must be included in the planning process.

Second, chiefs have to acknowledge that mid-managers have legitimate vested self-interests that must be served if commitment to change is to be secured. Middle managers have legitimate professional goals. When innovations threaten mid-managers' achievement records and performance indicators, it should be expected that they will be less than enthusiastic about

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change. If goals have been predicated on successful control, they must be replaced with goals predicated on creativity. Experiences in all the examples noted above make this abundantly clear. It is the function of the CEO to shape the new goals and to tie professional rewards to them.

Third, when CEO's (chiefs) create a strong vision of the business of the organization, mid-managers (captains and lieutenants) are prepared to pick up the mantle and provide leadership in innovation. The experiences in Madison, Baltimore County, Houston, Reno, and the Transit Police attest to mid-management leadership when a relatively clear mandate is given by the chief, preparatory experiments or efforts are conducted, clear authority to implement is granted, and rewards are linked to performance. All the cases above provide examples of the innovativeness of mid-managers when values and strategy are articulated clearly and when mid-managers are given the space and freedom to innovate within their context. Rosabeth Moss Kanter's work gives similar examples from the private sector.²³

Fourth, mid-managers must believe that they can succeed.²⁴ The vision or new direction of the CEO must be clearly articulated, bolstered unwaveringly, tied to organizational "winners," and supported through resource allocation, administrative action, and emergent policies and procedures. Early milestones of success must be clearly identified, and management must provide feedback about successes and failures.

Fifth, organizations must develop tolerance for failure. This is difficult in the public sector, in which rewards for success are rare but penalties for failure are potentially severe.²⁵ Nevertheless, if managers are to be risk-takers, they must be buoyed by their sense of mission and their commitment to improve service. Respect and rewards should be given for acknowledging failure and backtracking; covering up or perpetuating failures must be perceived as a serious breach of responsibility. Finishes, whether efforts are successful or not, must be as valued as starts.

Finally, given the importance of attempting to develop a system in which innovation and renewal are to be valued, mid-managers will need to add skills not necessarily in their current repertoire, dominated as police organizations have been by the need to control. We will mention just two here.

First, managers must develop team-building skills. Building coalitions, managing task forces, establishing linkages between departments and other units of the organization, and building relationships with consumers of police services will require extraordinary team-building skills. Such skills must be basic in mid-managers.

Second, mid-managers must be real managers, not overseers. The focus of overseers is control. Overseers know best and their purpose is to ensure that their instructions are followed. Managers view their responsibilities differently. Their task is, or ought to be, to develop personnel who will be free to innovate and adapt—break the rules if necessary on behalf of the values of the organization. Thus, the core competency of managers is to make long-term investments in people, their staff. They teach and create an organizational climate in which persons can experiment; but primarily they present themselves as models for persons in their charge. That is, they coach, lead, protect, inspire, understand mistakes, and tolerate failure.

The idea that mid-managers are spoilers, that they thwart project or strategic innovation, has some basis in fact. Mid-managers improperly directed can significantly impede innovation. Yet, ample evidence exists that when a clear vision of the business of the organization—its purpose or objective—is put forward, when mid-managers are included in planning, when their legitimate self-interests are acknowledged, and when they are properly trained, mid-managers can be the leading edge of innovation and creativity.

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The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met 12 times; some of the members changed in 1990. During the 3-day meetings, the participants energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and should guide, policing.

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THE PHILOSOPHY AND ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING

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Introduction*

The recent history of policing shows that the field has been littered with well-meaning concepts whose names seemed to imply automatic acceptance — police/community relations, crime prevention, team policing. All promised to provide new ways to cope with the growing realization that modern policing, with its logical and laudable adoption of high-tech equipment and scientific investigation and management techniques, had inadvertently left people out of policing, both in the sense that officers are human beings and that their primary duty is to satisfy the needs of the people they serve.

While it can be argued that each of these ideas failed to flourish purely because of inherent faults in the concepts themselves, the fact also remains that only by defining and communicating the precise philosophy, role, and goals of these concepts could their merits and drawbacks be accurately debated.

Community policing now also stands at an important juncture in its relatively brief, but promising, evolution. While community policing appears today as the potentially brightest option to provide policing a new focus to meet the pressing needs of the eighties, it also suffers guilt by association with those failed concepts of the recent past. In addition, much confusion remains concerning what the term community policing actually means, whether and how it may differ from other terms (such as foot patrol and problem-oriented or problem-solving policing), and how it fits into the existing police hierarchy.

*Assistance was provided by Bonnie Bucqueroux.

Unfortunate Legacy

Perhaps much of the misunderstanding about community policing stems from the misguided view that it is yet another community relations or "PR" effort, without real substance. The fact is that community policing does promote excellent police/community relations, but only as a by-product of this new philosophy of policing that stresses community involvement in combating crime and disorder. What has happened is that community policing has been confused with previous efforts that failed at their intrinsic goals. As noted in "From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police" by George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, the history of policing in the United States began with what was called the political era, when beat officers performed a wide variety of duties in the community. However, foot officers of that era were tainted because they served at the behest and direction of local politicians. The fact that community policing is also often called foot patrol evokes images of that era, when direct police involvement in the community all too often also meant political corruption. The excesses of the political era led to the reform era, when police were brought under centralized and less politicized control, with departments organized using the scientific or classical management model. That model provided many needed improvements in policing, but at the same time it narrowed the police mandate almost solely to controlling crime, thereby limiting many previous police services that citizens had learned to expect and appreciate. While reform was a worthwhile and logical goal, in conjunction with increased dependence on the automobile and its technology, it also led to increased reliance on measuring police performance almost exclusively on three parameters—response time, visibility (pass-bys by motor patrol), and a reduction in the crime rates as reflected in the Uniform Crime Reporting statistics. Furthermore, the detective was the primary crime solver.

While such measurements provided easy accountability, they also narrowed the focus of police accountability. In reality, the vast majority of calls police receive do not involve a crime in progress, which makes response time of little value in assessing how police handle most of the calls they receive. Also, disorder is as much, if not more, concern to most

residents as crime itself. So, by measuring police performance on these limited parameters, when crime rates began to rise in the sixties, both citizens and police began to wonder whether the police were losing their overall effectiveness.

In addition, the riots of the sixties brought to light certain problems that resulted from increased police alienation from the community. In an effort to make officers "objective," because it was believed this would make them more "effective," most were isolated in automobiles and told that they should limit discretion and follow prescribed "professional" procedures. In some communities, this isolation was heightened further when officers were cautioned not to live in communities they served. This alienation from their clientele meant that when the civil rights, anti-war, and racial disturbances of the sixties began, the police who were supposed to impose order were often perceived as hostile invaders.

When it became evident that this increasing alienation was the major flaw in the reform era of policing, efforts were made to provide links between police and community. However, at first, all too often the emphasis was on "public relations," not in making a substantive philosophical change in the way police related to their constituents. The initial idea was to institute a program where officers in a "police/community relations" unit would "make friends" with the community. Even though that was a valuable goal, all too often the programs instituted were flawed from the beginning. For one thing, many departments tended to select officers for community relations duty, not because the officers were committed to the program's ideals, but because they had failed to function well in other capacities. This logically had the effect of these units being perceived as ineffective.

In addition, citizens often rightly perceived that the goal of these units was to put a "good face" on whatever the police did, without providing a valid two-way conduit for citizens to have input into police priorities, policies, and procedures. As a result, many citizens viewed these officers with skepticism, correctly perceiving that they had no ability to effect changes within the department or the governmental structure.

Once departments and governments admitted such efforts were failing to make real improvements in police/community relations, attempts were made to provide the officers with a valid, tangible function in the community as well, leading to the birth of so-called crime prevention units. This meant the officers visited schools, businesses, and community groups, giving lectures on anti-crime tactics. Such efforts recognized that "happy talk"

alone would not impress the community with the police department's sincerity in wanting community approval and these efforts also suffered problems akin to those evidenced by police/community relations efforts. Again, the officers were often selected for the wrong reasons; and, again, the community often rightly perceived there was too often a major difference between the "nice" officer who visited the seniors club with hints on how to safeguard their homes and the "macho" officer in a patrol car who cruised their neighborhood without having any personal stake in what happened there. Neither the police community relations officer nor the crime prevention officer were the actual deliverers of day to day service. They were isolated specialists who "bounced" from neighborhood to neighborhood reacting to the concerns of special interest groups.

While each of these two kinds of efforts had some impact, if only because they demonstrated that the police were at least somewhat concerned about how the community felt about their departments, public relations and crime prevention both fell short of the goal of persuading citizens that the police were adequately addressing all their needs and concerns. During this transitional era, new research also helped dispel some myths concerning what people wanted from their police. For instance, minorities, often the group most hostile to police, did not, as anticipated, list as their major gripe unfair treatment at the hands of the police. Instead, research confirmed that their main complaint was that police failed to protect them from predators.

In response, the next related concept (although often instituted at the same time as community relations and crime prevention) designed to attack the isolation problem was team policing, which suggested that sending a coordinated team into a neighborhood could have a positive impact on preventing and controlling crime. However, again, that lack of a continuing stake in the neighborhood meant that these officers often found it difficult to enlist more than limited community cooperation. Interorganizational jealousy and bickering contributed to team policing's demise.

Such realizations then helped spawn a new idea, one that attempted to take the effective parts of both the political police era and the reform era. The reform era proved the value in recruiting highly educated and motivated officers who could be forged into a professional unit. Yet part of the failure of the reform era was that it was aloof from the community and it often attempted to take more educated and trained police officers and routinized their jobs, removing part of their incentive to develop and adopt creative solutions. So, borrowing from the benefits of the political era, a decision

was made to put these enthusiastic officers back on beats in the community, where they would function as full-fledged law officers, but with the added mandate of working directly with citizens to help them solve the plethora of problems that had eroded the community's overall quality of life.

Initial efforts, such as the foot patrol programs in Newark, New Jersey, and Flint, Michigan, demonstrated that citizens not only fear crime, but also disorder, because they rightly perceive that predators can tell when a neighborhood is on its way up, or down, and that criminals parasitically feed on neighborhoods in obvious trouble. Again, as might be expected, fellow officers at first criticized these new community policing efforts as being no more than "grin and wave" squads — yet another effort designed to pacify the citizenry.

However, as it became apparent that these officers worked as hard at solving crime as motor patrol officers and detectives did, and in fact may well have worked harder because their role required so many additional community-oriented services, community policing began to earn grudging but deserved respect. Conversion to the community policing philosophy was also aided as motor patrol officers were rotated into foot patrol, where they quickly learned the assignment was not a "cush" or dead-end job, but a galvanizing challenge.

As the concept evolved, the term foot patrol began to give way to community policing, reflecting a broad mandate. While many such efforts do employ foot patrol as the primary means of insuring the same officer has daily face-to-face interaction with the community, today's educated, and trained officers do not approach the job in the same way the more passive beat officers of the political era did.

Indeed, at least initially, the term foot patrol misled many into thinking this approach was simply a nostalgic desire to recapture the past. However, not only have today's foot officers been de-politicized, their functions extend far beyond what was expected of foot patrol officers in the political era and, at the same time, their excesses have been curbed.

In the past, foot officers often abused minorities and immigrants, because the political leaders in control felt that keeping "upstart" populations in their place would win them votes among mainstream constituents. In contrast, today's foot officer serves both the department and the residents of the neighborhood: as a result, such programs have done much to end conflict between police and residents.

As discussed in the Kelling-Moore paper, community policing reflects a "marketing" approach to serving the community, while those previous

efforts constituted "selling." What that means is that community policing attempts to meet the demands made by consumers, in this case the agenda of services dictated by community residents. The previous efforts discussed earlier failed because they were often rightly perceived as efforts to sell the community services without regard for whether the community wanted those services or not.

Indeed, one of the major surprises uncovered by community policing programs was that the police and community leadership often did not have a good idea of what the real community priorities were. Routinely what happened was that police officials would confer with established community leaders to outline an agenda, typically one that would target Part I crimes — murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. Then when open community meetings were held, it quickly became apparent that the rank-and-file community residents had an entirely different agenda of concerns, often ranging from petty crimes to uncollected garbage.

What these residents accurately identified was that a deteriorating neighborhood quickly becomes a magnet for serious crime. While few people actually become victims of Part I crimes, a decaying neighborhood diminishes the quality of life for the majority of citizens because of the constant barrage of so-called petty crime and disorder problems. While community policing deals with serious crime, both in solving crimes that do occur and in working to prevent Part I crimes, it also addresses the more immediate and pressing concerns of community decay and disorder that provide the breeding ground for serious crime.¹

Another Useful Model

Perhaps the best model to explain the evolution to community policing requires examining what happened to the U.S. auto industry at the same time. The analogy makes special sense when you consider that Michigan was the birthplace of the auto industry and also that Flint, Michigan, is often credited as one of the communities that was the cradle for community policing.

Historically, when the reform movement was taking hold in American policing, those same management strategies and reliance on sophisticated technology were shaping the fledgling auto industry, helping it to mature from a part-time garage enterprise into an industrial giant. Henry Ford's assembly line, which took a complex task and broke it down into relatively simple components that all workers could master, mirrored the routinizing of police functions. Ford also adopted a classical management style, where orders emanated from the top, just as a military hierarchy was established in police departments nationwide.

In retrospect, it may seem that the system's drawbacks are as apparent as its benefits, but in that era both the American auto industry and the newly reorganized police departments seemed to offer the promise of unlimited progress. Until the sixties, it appeared both had found the magic keys that had forever unlocked both systems' full potential.

Then, shockingly, both systems began to fall on hard times. In the case of the auto industry, rumblings began when consumers balked at buying new cars that ignored the consumers' increasing demands for fuel efficiency and safety. At the same time, many American citizens began expressing doubts that the police were taking their needs into account.

In the case of the auto industry, competition from foreign imports soon proved that, in this market-oriented economy, corporations cannot long flourish ignoring consumer demand. In the case of policing, the consumers of policing services increasingly balked by reducing their tax dollars for police, while spending more and more dollars for private security, so that there are now more private security officers in the United States than sworn police.

Faced with these threats to their existence, both systems responded by adapting positively to these changes, restructuring their systems to reflect the changing world. Not only did both shift from a selling-oriented philosophy to a marketing orientation, they also changed in ways that addressed the increasing alienation within their own ranks. Again, it is not surprising that during the era when sabotage at the Lordstown plant in Ohio was making headlines, many highly educated and highly trained officers in police departments began grumbling about the authoritarianism within police departments, ushering in an era of hard-nosed union negotiations. Obviously, what was needed was a new management model and both the auto industry and the police made the philosophical shift from being suspicious of their workers to learning to trust them, decentralizing decision making.

Today, American auto workers are increasingly encouraged to take the initiative to find new solutions to internal problems. Borrowing from the Japanese, U.S. automakers are employing new techniques, such as quality circles, to involve workers in finding ways to produce quality cars in which both the company and its workers can take pride. Concomitantly, community policing officers demonstrate markedly higher degrees of job satisfaction and perceptions of safety than their motorized counterparts, because of their direct involvement in the community, where they can see their actions making a difference.

Perhaps the biggest error that is made when assessing such changes is to believe that these changes denigrate what was done in the past. But just as American automakers reached dominance with the classical or scientific model of management, U.S. police departments made great strides using these same tactics and the "professional" model in upgrading the quality of their police forces. The fact is, both systems have proven remarkably resilient in adjusting to the changing realities of the past two decades, struggling to find innovative ways to maintain the best of past traditions, combined with bold, new solutions.

The strength of the American democratic system is that it is responsive to the needs and concerns of its people. During periods of transition, as existing traditions evolve into new ones, there are inevitably periods of social or economic upheaval, but the ability of this country's institutions, private and public, to respond by creating new models that serve to meet new realities is unparalleled.

A Look at the Literature: Research Supporting the Community Policing Concept

The community policing concept did not emerge as an independent alternative to policing strategies. Instead, it is based on a solid foundation of research on police service delivery which has been performed over the past two decades. In the best tradition of integrating and applying research knowledge to new programs, community policing has been built on the findings of this research. Some of the more critical research efforts and their role in community policing are worthy of review.

Police staffing commitments— According to the research of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, less than 10% of a patrol officer's on-duty time is spent on crime related activities.² This includes answering crime calls, conducting investigations, writing reports, booking arrestees, and testifying in court. The remainder of the time is spent on handling service calls (although admittedly some of these calls—such as disturbances—can evolve into an arrest situation), traffic enforcement and control, information gathering, and uncommitted patrol time. The implications of these data are that traditional patrol operations are inefficient and perhaps misdirected. That is, there is a significant amount of wasted patrol officer time organized for crime control duties which are not forthcoming. Importantly, even in the nation's largest police departments and in the busiest patrol districts, the uncommitted patrol time is less, but the proportion of time spent on crime-related duties remains about the same.

Preventive patrol— It was noted that much of the officers' uncommitted time was spent on patrol. The amount of time varies significantly depending on the jurisdiction's characteristics, number of patrol personnel, nature of the patrol district, deployment characteristics, and variously assigned duties of the patrol officers. Traditionally, this uncommitted time has been designated as "preventive patrol," wherein the officer in a marked patrol car drives randomly through the patrol district as a crime prevention activity. The Police Foundation's Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study challenged the preventive patrol assumption through a year-long quasi-experimental

design study. The findings clearly indicated that preventive patrol had no significant effect on crime rates.³ Essentially, in the most basic of terms, the study found that preventive patrol was not only uncommitted time, it was also nonproductive time. (It should be noted that there have been some methodological criticisms of this study; however, it appears that there is general acceptance of the research findings.) When viewed in conjunction with the staffing issues described above, one may assume that traditional approaches to police patrol may be flawed. If little time is devoted to crime-related duties and a significant amount of time is devoted to uncommitted patrol which does not prevent crime, how can police resources be better utilized?

Response time — One argument for maintaining traditional patrol is the need to have police officers available for rapid response to calls. Specific emphasis has been focused on the belief that the faster an officer responds to a crime scene, the higher the probability of apprehending the criminal. A Law Enforcement Assistance Administration project called the Kansas City Response Time Study tested this assumption.⁴ A later National Institute of Justice replication of the study in Peoria, San Diego, Rochester, and Jacksonville (FL) supported the Kansas City findings.⁵ The results indicated that there was no relationship between a rapid crime scene response and the apprehension of criminal perpetrators. (The closest variables showing a correlation was "response time and robbery," but even these were not statistically significant.) In arriving at this conclusion, the studies divided response time into three segments: (1) the amount of time from victim/witness discovery of the incident to the time the police were called; (2) the time from when the police received the call until the time a patrol unit was dispatched to the crime scene; and (3) the time of the patrol unit's receipt of the call until the officer arrived at the incident scene. While the latter two segments are the ones most frequently thought of with respect to response time, the first segment was the most critical. Typically, the perpetrator was gone by the time the victim or witness called the police, hence negating the possibility of apprehending the criminal at the crime scene.

These results seem to indicate that response time is therefore not an important element in patrol management. However, a compounding variable was discovered in the Kansas City Response Time Study. The research indicated that citizens used response time as a measure of satisfaction with the police and, indirectly, a measure of police competence. That is, if response time was slow, citizens were more likely to indicate dissatisfaction

with the police and to believe that the police had limited competence. Conversely, with a rapid response, both satisfaction and perception of competence increased. These findings were fairly consistent regardless of the actual actions taken by the officer at the incident scene. To further compound the problem, it appears that the citizen's *perception* of response time — regardless of actual elapsed time — influenced their rating of the police in a similar manner. This was particularly true in traumatic, high-stress situations. The dilemma is clear: functionally, response time is not an important variable in patrol management; however, its influence on the police constituency is significant and must be addressed. How can these conflicting demands be resolved?

Patrol deployment — The deployment of police officers has been a constant source of indecision for police administrators. Based on population, police employment in the United States ranges from 0 to 44 officers per 1,000 residents. Geographically, the number of officers per square mile ranges from 0 in Angoon Division, Alaska, to 1,278.5 officers in the Manhattan Borough of New York City.⁶ In between these extremes are variable distributions about which no meaningful conclusions can be drawn. There is no single factor or ratio which can be used to determine the "ideal" police strength for a given area. While certain quantitative variables can be programmed into a comprehensive model for determination of optimum patrol officer deployment, the most fundamental variable is available resources — how many police officers are available for deployment? A second consideration is the types of activities officers are expected to do — answer crime calls, answer service calls, take accident reports, aggressively initiate "police activity," check buildings, speak to citizens, and so on. Obviously, these duties will vary with the area, shift, nature of the community, and mandate of the community. The types of calls and demands for police service will also influence deployment patterns.⁷ The proverbial bottom line to deployment issues is that given the number of personnel available, how can the department most effectively perform those functions the community expects. The answer lies largely in the qualitative variables of service delivery and a change in the traditional concept of patrol deployment. That is, instead of deploying personnel simply based on numerical demands, we should first examine the policy and functional demands of the patrol force and then match officer availability to those demands. Concomitantly, we must develop our directives for officer performance to fulfill the qualitative policy/service demands as well as the raw quantitative

demands. It is proposed that if the citizen demands for service can be met through alternate patrol strategies, such as community policing, then the numerical call demands will, over time, conform to officer availability. That is, by placing the qualitative needs and desires of the community as a primary factor in deployment decisions, the administrator is effectively placing the "horse in front of the cart."

Performance measures — An ongoing problem in police personnel management has been how to measure police performance. Traditional quantitative measures — number of arrests, number of reports written, number of calls answered, number of miles driven, number of traffic tickets issued — lack substance with respect to the nature of the police function and the delivery of police services. The notable advantage to such measures is that they are relatively easy to collect, document, and compare. Ideally, qualitative measures of individual police performance should be collected. Factors such as an officer's communications skills, how the officer relates to the public, how the officer evaluates calls/situations, and the quality of the officer's decisions, all tell us more about the type of work the officer does as well as his/her effectiveness.⁸ Unfortunately, this information is very difficult to validly collect and substantiate if an officer's performance evaluation is challenged. The research on the subject, notably that done in a National Institute of Justice study by Whitaker, infers that police agencies should strive for a balance between the qualitative and quantitative measures.⁹ In order to do this, police administrators must first clearly establish goals for the organization to accomplish. Next programs must be implemented to achieve those goals with clearly articulated officer responsibilities incorporated into the program. Officers should be evaluated specifically on the criteria delineated in the program. In some cases, the evaluation methods need to be nontraditional such as interviewing or surveying citizens with whom the officer has had contact or reviewing the officer's plans as well as his/her progress in executing those plans. In traditional police patrol there are typically no unique programs or plans on which officers may be individually evaluated. Moreover, as noted previously, to measure variables associated with preventive patrol or response time would be misleading indicators of productivity. Thus, in order to effectively measure both the performance of the individual officer and the police organization, comprehensive and specifically oriented plans for officer performance must be developed.

Job enrichment—Job enrichment refers to the increase of quality of life in the workplace. Included are factors which increase morale and job satisfaction such as increasing individual decision making, urging innovativeness, delegating greater responsibility, and involving subordinates in policy development and organizational plans. While the literature shows that job satisfaction may not increase individual performance *per se*, the research does indicate that it contributes to a lower turnover rate, less absenteeism, fewer cases of tardiness, and fewer grievances by employees.¹⁰ Further research shows that high job satisfaction is a good predictor of length of life, and low satisfaction is correlated with various mental and physical illnesses. On the matter of productivity, the research indicates that morale and job satisfaction are related to productivity; however, these are mutually reciprocating variables. That is, higher productivity contributes to greater satisfaction and vice versa. Since there are defined organizational and individual benefits to increasing job satisfaction and morale, it behooves the prudent administrator to consider these factors in the development of any program.

Public perceptions of the police—In general, the public is supportive of the police. They feel that the police are fundamentally honest, generally corruption free, do not discriminate, and do not regularly use excessive force. However, when the population is stratified by various demographic variables, the picture begins to change somewhat. Notably, blacks and Hispanics are less supportive of the police in general and are particularly more likely to feel that the police are discriminatory and use excessive force.¹¹ Furthermore, blacks indicate the belief that they receive poorer service from the police than whites, and Hispanics feel they receive inadequate police protection.¹² It must be recognized that most crime victims are minority group members and that the majority of police calls for service are from lower income minorities. Thus, those citizens who must rely the most on police services also rate the police the lowest. This should send a message to police administrators. More attention must be given to the needs and quality of service afforded to the citizens who are most reliant on public law enforcement agencies.

Citizen demands for police service—Crime analysis has provided—and continues to provide—important information on crime trends and police

calls for service needs. However, with sophisticated analytic techniques and computer-driven reporting methods, law enforcement has drifted away from communications with citizens. The emphasis is on the data output based on the sample of calls and reported crimes the police receive. However, these represent the most problematic incidents and skew the perspective of what the public desires from the police. While citizens feel that response to serious crimes is important, they also want the police to attend to the minor, yet annoying, facets of community discomfort such as abandoned cars, barking dogs, and juvenile vandals and trespassers. The police need to listen to the community and establish a dialogue to determine what types of services the citizens want. Then, those needs must be addressed — not ignored or given lip service. The preliminary research indicates that responding to community needs on these minor calls may significantly increase citizen satisfaction of police performance and perception of confidence.¹³

Police community relations — Since the genesis of the community relations movement by the National Conference of Christians and Jews and the National Institutes held at Michigan State University, there has been an ongoing search for the best means by which to establish effective police community relations.¹⁴ Philosophies have varied ranging from special programming, police training programs, community education, to special police units with the charge of establishing effective community relations. As the concept evolved, the research directly pointed to the fact that effective community relations must have two major elements. First, the police must recognize that they receive their mandate from the community and are responsible to the community in the performance of their task.¹⁵ Second, community relations must be a product of total police operations involving all personnel — it is the interactive effect of departmental programming and officer behavior.¹⁶ As a result, police community relations should be viewed as a primary and ongoing responsibility of all officers, a responsibility that is constitutionally mandated because the authority the police exercise is granted by the people.

Relating the Research to the Community Policing Concept

The findings of the research projects in these various areas have had

important implications in the development of the community policing concept. Since we know from the Bureau of Justice data that less than 10% of an officer's time is spent on crime and a significant amount of time is spent on service calls, we should recognize this in our patrol force programming. Furthermore, since we also know that a significant amount of a patrol officer's time is uncommitted patrol, yet that patrol does not prevent crime, the inference is that we need to make better use of that time.

Further research showed us that rapid response does not help us apprehend criminals, yet it is an important variable in citizen satisfaction and perception of competence. How can this discrepancy be reconciled? This is aggravated by the question, how does an administrator most effectively deploy personnel to meet new patrol programming needs yet have cars available for responding to calls while not wasting time on uncommitted patrol? We also know that the minority communities are the least satisfied with the police and that there is the feeling that the police are not responding to citizen service demands.

From a management perspective, the prudent administrator wants effective performance measures in order to validly measure personnel performance and have effective milestones by which to gauge organizational success. Similarly, administrators want to enrich the satisfaction and morale of employees in order to achieve the best, hence providing the most effective, organizational environment.

While not a panacea, community policing addresses all of these needs. By reallocating patrol officer time, neighborhood policing makes better use of personnel. Furthermore, by getting "closer to the community" and establishing a dialogue with citizens, the public has a different — and more accurate — measure by which to assess officer competence and rate satisfaction with the police compared to response time. With these alternate measures, the police can give less attention to the response time issue and have the dilemma it posed largely resolved. Through the community dialogue developed in a neighborhood policing program, law enforcement agencies may more accurately define community concerns and respond to those constituent needs. Similarly, this targeted response will contribute to greater satisfaction from minority groups and help establish overall better community relationships.

By the same token, when a police officer is given the mandate to diagnose community problems, be creative in the development of solutions to those problems as well as to serve the roles of a community organizer, facilitator, educator, and referral resource in addition to law enforcement officer, then

A New Model: What Community Policing Is Not

Before defining what community policing is not, let us first use a thumbnail sketch to define community policing.

Community policing — A philosophy and not a specific tactic, community policing is a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and, by extension, fear of crime, by intensely involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis, so that residents will develop trust to cooperate with police by providing information and assistance to achieve those three crucial goals. Community policing employs a variety of tactics, ranging from park and walk to foot patrol, to immerse the officer in the community, to encourage a two-way information flow so that the residents become the officer's eyes and ears on the streets helping to set departmental priorities and policies. In addition, the officer then carries this information back to the rest of the department so that problems can be solved and the quality of life improved. Unlike the precursor programs mentioned above, improved police/community relations is a welcomed by-product of this approach, not its primary goal.

Community policing seeks to intervene directly in the twin problems of crime and disorder in communities by direct involvement in the community. The community policing officer acts as a uniformed armed presence to deter crime, but equally as important, he or she also takes action with citizen assistance to resolve problems before they erupt as crime. The officer performs a myriad of services, from educating citizens on preventing crime and organizing neighborhood organizations to gathering information that leads directly to the apprehension of criminals. In addition, the community policing officer also targets specific populations for special attention, typically children, women, and the elderly. The officers' efforts have concrete impact on the day-to-day lives of community residents.

Community policing can also be distinguished from other forms of policing because it derives its priorities in part from community input. In addition, because physical and social disorder cluster closely with crime, the CPO also acts as the community facilitator in dealing with these problems.

In the CPO's role as liaison, the officer acts as the community's link to public and private agencies, acting as an ombudsman to deal with neighborhood decay.

However, just as it is important to explain what community policing is, an even clearer picture emerges by looking at what community policing is not. Eleven myths continue to cloud community policing's true role:

Community policing is not a technique — Police terminology abounds in jargon used to define specific strategies or tactics. Community policing instead embraces a philosophy that says it will provide everyone in the community, not just special interest groups, the kind of people-oriented policing everyone would want for him- or herself. At the heart of this effort lies the attitude that people deserve police who not only command, but earn, respect by listening to the community's wants and needs, maintaining daily face-to-face contact and involving the community in efforts to prevent and control crime. David Bayley, in effectively playing the devil's advocate, states that "community policing in 1987 is more rhetoric than reality. It is a trendy phrase spread thinly over customary reality."¹⁷ Furthermore, he comments, "community policing over a period of years may become unevenly distributed socially and hence geographically. It could become the mode for the affluent, educated middle-class, while traditional, reactive policing remained the mode for the poor and undereducated underclass."¹⁸

The above could not be further from the operational reality of effective community policing programs.

Community policing, if operating properly, distributes police services more evenly and, in fact, targets high crime rate areas. It neutralizes the undue influence of special interest groups that have often been the recipients of preferred services.

Community policing recognizes that the welfare mother has as much right to quality police service as the affluent or the business person. It is broader based protection for all groups. It is an attempt to legitimize the police role, recognizing that crime is only one of the issues the police deal with, not the only issue.

Community policing is a proactive, decentralized approach that depends on community residents for input into police policy making, priority setting and advice on patrol deployment. It is a philosophy that recognizes that the foundation of the department is a strong departmental mission statement incorporating the *values* necessary to deliver services equitably and of high quality.

Community policing is not "limited" or specialized policing — Community policing is full-service policing. Unlike specialists like police community relations (PCR) officers and crime prevention people, the CPO is the one who gives advice on target hardening and then may be the officer who responds to the complaint of a burglary at the same household. The community policing officer in this expanded and broadened role performs a line function, not a staff function. Bayley feels that, "community policing provides a new and less demanding rationale for the police at the very moment when the traditional justification is failing."¹⁹ Furthermore, he asks if the police should "...mediate quarrels, overcome the isolation of marginal groups, organize social services, and generally assist in developing 'community'."²⁰ Another of his concerns is that "community policing will increase the power of the police relatively among government agencies."²¹

The trend toward specialized policing in the U.S. over the past few years has often meant fragmented policing, with a loss of a sense of the community's needs. Why is there an increasing legitimization of the community policing officer's expanded role as mediator, organizer and diagnostician? Because private and public 8-5 agencies are not filling the void by providing the necessary services. The police are usually the only 24-hour-a-day agency. If communities are willing to expend additional resources to fill the void, the police will gladly agree to a constriction of their role.

In regard to community policing increasing the power of the police, it is about time that police be the *catalyst* in helping people get what they deserve from inefficient bureaucracies. When police give people the service they deserve, then the people will begin demanding similar efficiency from other agencies.

What many community residents have so long lacked is a voice that makes an impact on the delivery of governmental services. People are fed up with bureaucracies that they perceive as catering to special interest groups.

An expanded role that gives legitimacy to the police for what they are already doing also has obvious implications for selection and training.

Community policing is not foot patrol of the past — While today's community policing often puts officers on foot in the community as was done in an earlier era, today's officers do much more than patrol a beat. The same officer day after day diagnoses the beat area and then develops problem-solving approaches ranging from organizing neighborhood associations to referring people to appropriate community social agencies. Com-

munity policing is not, as Bayley states, "old wine in new bottles" or "neighborhood policing reborn."²²

The foot patrol officer of the past had a different environmental context and different informal resources like the extended family, churches, and ethnic organizations. Present community policing officers must rely more on formal private and public agencies. Thus, the necessity to be a neighborhood diagnostician and a link to community agencies.

Community policing is not public relations— Bayley has stated that "as a public relations strategy, community policing is exceedingly clever."²³ Improved public relations is a welcomed by-product of community policing's mandate, not its goal. Community policing's goal is to provide effective police service with a proactive focus. The delivery of quality service to all segments of the community will increase rapport. "Happy talk" will be counter productive, and its positive results will be short lived.

Community policing is not antitechnology— CPO's may eschew cars to walk a beat and they may be more likely to spend time visiting homes and businesses than sitting behind a computer, but this should not be misconstrued as a rejection of technology. Instead, if funding permits, many CPOs would welcome the addition of a computer terminal linked to the department. However, the effort recognizes that the goal should be to employ sophisticated and expensive technology where it will provide the greatest payback. The community policing officer is like the base of a funnel, using information filtered down from various "hi-tech" sources and providing information upward generated from his/her neighborhood beat.

A misconception is that community policing is antithetical to hi-tech policing, that the two conflict, like fire and water. Instead, if functioning properly, they should mesh. For example, a technique like criminal profiling obviously falls into the hi-tech approach. Using sophisticated computers, the FBI can profile a likely perpetrator and create a description of what that person is like. Yet, obviously, that information still requires identifying the individual, finding out where he or she lives, and apprehending the suspect. Consider the advantage a community policing officer, so familiar with bad actors in his beat area, has in employing that information to make an arrest. Because of community trust, the officer will have information superior to that of a centralized agency like the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

More broadly, consider the effectiveness of a two-pronged approach toward drugs, employing both hi-tech policing and community policing.

The hi-tech aspect must concentrate on efforts such as locating and then eradicating fields of cocaine in Colombia. If successful, those efforts translate into a reduction of the amount of cocaine on the streets, thereby reducing supply.

In tandem, community policing must work on reducing demand. For example, the community policing officer can make daily stops at the local coke house as part of his regular tour of his beat. If successful, the individuals inside dispose of their drugs and users stop frequenting the establishment, which forces the traffickers to go out of business or move elsewhere. The community policing officers' visibility on a drug transaction street-corner can also be effective in reducing demand. Innovative methods like taking pictures of the license plates of customers, even if there is no film in the camera, can also be useful. So while hi-tech policing concentrates on the supply side, community policing effectively reduces demand. Also, ideally, wherever their respective efforts intersect, both the hi-tech policing effort and the community policing effort work together to leave drug traffickers nowhere to hide. Users can be encouraged to seek treatment.

Community policing recognizes that crime means people—criminals and victims—and that the most impressive technology you can employ when dealing with people is a fully functioning human being. Hi-tech is not only hardware of contemporary electronic technology, like automated fingerprint systems and chromosomal analysis, it is also contemporary ideas like profiling, patrol enhancement and crime analysis.

Community policing is not soft on crime—Critics attack community policing's focus on physical and social disorder by arguing that this detracts from "real" policing, in other words, coping with serious crime. Many attempt to denigrate community policing by nicknaming CPOs as the "grin and wave squad" or by calling them "lollipop cops." The reality is that these social action duties are performed *in addition to* traditional law enforcement duties, not as a substitute for them.

One of the writers, on a visit to a police department, was confronted by an obviously macho police officer who asked, "aren't you the professor who's pushing community policing? Why don't you teach *real* police work, not social work?" I then asked him, "when was the last time you interrupted an armed robbery, caught a person breaking and entering, or had a knock down drag out fight in a bar?" The twelve-year veteran replied, "*never*, but I am more prepared if one of those events does happen than your soft community policing officer."

Not only don't many officers know what real police work is, they are caught up in the fantasy that muscles and machismo are the key ingredients in the delivery of quality police services in the community.

Community policing is not flamboyant — When a SWAT team swoops in and disarms a sniper, everyone cheers. When a CPO awards a youngster a donated football for bringing in a garbage bag full of litter, the long-term effect may be equally as dramatic, but the effort fails to make headlines.

Community policing is not an independent entity within the department — Community policing is not meant to substitute for other forms of policing, like motor patrol, but to complement all efforts. If the program is functioning properly, the vital information the CPO gathers should be disseminated through the department. Community policing works best when it is not forced to operate in isolation.

Community policing is not a top-down approach — What makes community policing unique is that it relies on input from average citizens — not just community leaders and blue-ribbon panels. Community policing *actively* solicits input from all constituents, encouraging those whose fear has spawned a paralytic apathy to become involved; at the same time it defuses those so frustrated they risk vigilantism.

Community policing is not paternalistic or elitist — Professionals in any field often feel they know better than others how the job should be done. Just as American businesses, like the auto industry, have learned that you cannot leave the consumer out of the equation, community policing gives the “consumers” of police service a voice. It focuses on values, not artificial “professional” images.

Bayley feels that community policing “may undermine professionalism.”²⁴ He is correct if the definition of professionalism is elitism with an “I know what’s best” attitude. Professionalism is not aloofness and spit-shined shoes. Professional makes sense if it means that the person has received certified and proper education and training to do the job. Most importantly, however, are the incalculable values that respect the person and the delivery of quality service.

Bayley also asks, “can police put on a velvet glove and keep their iron hand in shape?”²⁵ Being a community policing officer does not neutralize the other requirements of a full-service officer. Why does one parent’s iron hand work and the other’s is child abuse? If a parent demonstrates caring and builds trust, “getting tough” on occasion is respected. Just getting

tough encourages rebellion and defiance.

Perhaps Bayley's greatest concern in that community policing: "legitimizes the penetration of communities by forceful enforcement agents of government. . . . the bottom line is that police officers are now being assigned and welcomed to watch, probe, and penetrate social processes and institutions that have previously been out of bounds . . . so the public's fear of crime may impel the police to play an interventionist role in social life."²⁶

Community policing is much less intrusive than SWAT. The citizen can refuse a visit by the community policing officer. The reason people let officers into their homes willingly is because of trust and the feeling that the officer has a stake in the community.

There is already extensive intrusion into people's lives with computers. Why shouldn't officers be allowed to collect information that solves problems and improves the quality of life?

The insidious collecting of information by some undercover officers is going on right now. Community policing officers are not visiting homes to take down credit card numbers, review bank balances, or look for political literature.

Community policing is not anti-accountability—Another concern about community policing is its supposed lack of *accountability*. Indeed, poor supervision and lack of independent oversight of foot patrol officers in the political era demonstrably led to problems and abuses. However, if we return to the model discussed previously, we see that the rise of unionism that threatened to strangle the U.S. auto industry was the direct result of seeing workers as a population to be controlled, instead of as a resource of individuals who derive satisfaction from doing a good job. The change in philosophy that allows workers to take pride in their efforts has resulted in concessions from unionized autoworkers who see they have a vested interest in maintaining their jobs, by insuring the overall health of their industry.

The same holds true for community policing efforts. Instead of relying exclusively on formal evaluations by superiors who may not actually know much about the officer's performance on the job, the community itself acts as an additional check on the officer. As citizens become more involved in the police process, they lose their reluctance to communicate directly with the police department. Control of police behavior from the "grass roots" is much more effective than control by a police supervisor or control by either "Blue Ribbon" committees or civilian review boards.

The criticism has been leveled that "police organizations may be less accountable for the character of operations because the community policing officer will have greater freedom of action."²⁷ As stated above, not only is the officer monitored by the formal supervisory process, the community residents are involved as both the "eyes and ears" to prevent and solve crime and as eyes and ears to prevent and control deviant behavior by the police.

The context of policing today is much different than in the past "political era." Political "machines" don't control the neighborhoods or the police: many officers are highly educated and/or trained; police officers are protected by collective bargaining agreements; and, in most cases, pay scales are reflective of the community marketplace. Corruption (especially as it relates to drug trafficking) is always a concern, but contemporary communities are much different than in the past.

Critics of community policing discuss how officers risk being co-opted by special interest groups, assuming that other officers, motor, and investigators are not now influenced by special interest groups. Noncommunity policing officers often rely on paid informants who constitute many of the "seamiest" elements of society. Their testimony is often so suspect, because of their past and the fact they are being paid, that it weakens court cases.

The primary accountability problem community policing faces, however, stems from the fact that no new measures of its effectiveness have yet been developed to supplant the common reliance on such measures as response time, arrests, traffic citations, and a reduction in UCR figures. The reality, of course, is that response time tells us only how fast an officer arrives on the scene, not how effective the officer is when he/she gets there. In addition, as indicated before, the vast majority of calls do not involve a crime in progress, so the speed of response probably has little impact on preventing or solving the crime.

In addition, proactive efforts, such as community policing's emphasis on preventing future crime by intervening with juveniles, now suggests there may well be a long lag time before the results show up as a reduction in UCR figures. Also, of course, no one can say how much even the following year's figures might have risen had the officers not impacted on juveniles who would have otherwise become involved in criminal activity.

Without debating the accuracy of UCR figures, though it is a valid concern, the fact remains that crime rates reflect a number of variables, such as unemployment and age of population, over which the police have virtually no control. These rates also do not reflect improvements in the

precursors to crime — deteriorating neighborhoods. What community policing does is employ a broad-based approach to community improvement that makes the entire environment one that deters, inhibits, or prevents crime. So, because of their involvement in the community, when an officer fails to be effective, his/her superiors ultimately will hear about it. Indeed, a supervisor can simply drive through beat areas and see what kind of direct impact the officer is having. If the supervisor sees a neighborhood sliding downhill, with uncollected garbage and dope dealers operating openly on the streetcorners, it is obvious the officer is not doing the job.

Again, just as the auto companies are allowing autoworkers more autonomy, they do so recognizing that this also allows for more mistakes. Yet the price of spurring pride and creativity is toleration of a few mistakes. As demonstrated repeatedly, treating motivated employees with respect and trust fosters an atmosphere that promotes initiative. Given that today's police officers are the most highly educated in the history of this country, this helps instill an attitude of professionalism, and at the same time it reduces union/management friction.

Conclusion

Community policing's unique contribution is a radical departure from the past and present. While today's community policing efforts retain the best elements of the foot patrol programs of the past, they are intended to avoid both the old system's abuses and shortcomings.

There continues to be much debate and the discussion is healthy. As Bayley has stated, "evidence about the shortcomings of customary policing is much greater than evidence about community policing."²⁸

Those who are quick to criticize community policing should be clear and straightforward about the criteria used to evaluate it. For example, there is general agreement that traditional policing has little impact on crime. Why then should community policing be attacked for its perceived lack of impact on crime?

In addition, how do you measure intangibles like intervention with juveniles and the improved feelings of safety of the elderly. Are we to judge community policing in isolation or in comparison to other police efforts?

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FOOTPRINTS

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Please circulate
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The basics of Community Policing

by Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux

Editor's Note: This article, published in the Christian Science Monitor on June 18, 1992, is being reprinted here as a service to readers who may want to use it to explain the basics of Community Policing to others inside and outside of policing. While readers of this newsletter are experts in the field, this is offered as a useful wrap-up of what Community Policing is, how it works, and what we see for the future.

The ugly chain of events that began with the brutal beating of Rodney King confirms the urgent need for Community Policing reform. While Community Policing is no panacea, it promotes mutual trust and cooperation between people and police, at the same time it helps to empower neighborhoods in danger of being overwhelmed by crime, drugs, and the poisonous mix of apathy, despair, and unrest.

Los Angeles thrust Community Policing into the spotlight, yet many people still do not know exactly what it is and what it can do. Many now know that there is a new breed of police officer who walks a beat, but true Community Policing reform does much more, rein-

venting the old-fashioned beat cop as today's Community Officer, who acts as a neighborhood organizer and problem solver, not just as a visible deterrent to crime. The Community Officer's mission is to involve average citizens in prioritizing their problems and in developing grass-roots initiatives to address them.

Problems can vary from gunfire to graffiti, from battered wives to barking dogs, from drugs to disorder. By stationing a Community Officer permanently in a manageable beat, the police can reach out to the law-abiding people imprisoned in their homes by fear, the people that other officers meet only as victims. By challenging people to work as partners in making their communities better and safer places, Community Policing produces a subtle but profound shift in the role and responsibility of the police. No longer are they the experts with all the answers, the "thin blue line" that protect the good people from the bad—"us" versus "them." Community Officers are part of the community, generalists who do whatever it takes to help people help themselves.

In New York, a Community Officer helped residents make sweeps of their drug-infested apartment building in

Harlem, driving away the dealers and customers alike. In North Miami Beach, a Community Officer supervised young volunteers who painted the dilapidated homes of the elderly and infirm, since areas in decline act as a magnet for crime and drugs. In Lansing, Michigan, a Community Officer attends apartment showings, signalling potential predators to look elsewhere.

By encouraging Community Officers to act as the catalyst in confronting not only crime, but fear of crime and neighborhood decay and disorder, this decentralized and personalized form of policing breaks down the anonymity that plagues traditional police efforts. In a Community Policing beat, people know their officer by name, which means that they can hold the officer directly accountable if he or she does too little—or goes too far. The daily, face-to-face contact also allows the officer to learn whom to trust and whom to keep an eye on. And, as people start to take back their streets, those who would prey on them eventually find that they have no place to hide.

Crucial as well is that Community Policing allows officers to intervene with youngsters at risk, before they grow up

No longer are police the experts with all the answers... Community Officers are part of the community, generalists who do whatever it takes to help people help themselves.

to become the hardened, adult career criminals for whom we have no good answers. Traditional policing simply cannot provide motor patrol officers the time, the opportunity, and the continuity to do much about young shoplifters, muggers, and drug gang lookouts who quickly melt away into the crowd. Part of the answer might be for the Community Officer to work on providing kids with recreational activities or summer jobs. In Aurora, Colorado, an officer pairs youngsters with cadets from the Air Force Academy as mentors.

While Community Officers are full-fledged police officers, their perform-

ance is judged on how well they solve the problem, not on how many arrests they make and how quickly they answer the next call. Community Policing gives them the autonomy to tailor the response to local needs and resources, the chance to see whether the ideas work, and the opportunity to tinker or try again if they don't.

Critics call this social work, not "real" police work, ridiculing Community Officers as "lollicops" or the "grin-and-wave squad." Yet the police are the only public-service agency open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, that still makes house calls. And while many Community

Officers risk early burnout trying to do too much, the best response is to decentralize and personalize other social services, using Community Policing as the model, so that Community Officers can return to spending more of their time doing what they do best.

Back when beat cops pounded the pavement, social workers, public health nurses, and probation and parole officers also made home visits, and "truant officers" scoured the streets looking for kids playing "hookey." So, in the same way that Community Policing updates the past, what we call the Neighborhood Network Center concept asks other

Community Policing and Neighborhood Network Center reforms make it clear that the ultimate responsibility rests with the people trapped in troubled areas—those who have the most to lose and the most to gain.

service providers to join the Community Officer in an office in the beat, where they can work together as a new community-based team of problem solvers.

The Neighborhood Network Center that opened in Community Officer Don Christy's beat in Lansing recently applies the lessons of Community Policing to the delivery of other public and non-profit services. He serves as the protector and unofficial leader of the others who have followed his lead, and depending on the problem, he can seek help directly from the school psychologist, the social worker, student nurses, drug treatment counselors, other specialists, and a host

of community and outside volunteers who work there.

Community Policing and Neighborhood Network Center reforms acknowledge that the police must be part of the solution, since they are the only public servants whose options range all the way from patting a youngster on the back for a job well done to the use of deadly force. At the same time, both approaches make it clear that the ultimate responsibility rests with the people trapped in troubled areas, who have the most to lose and the most to gain. The biggest challenge now is to persuade citizens fortunate enough to live in stable and

secure neighborhoods to invest in and support such efforts in those dangerous areas that many have worked hard to escape. If any good comes from the violence in Los Angeles, perhaps it is the recognition that until we are all safe, no one is truly safe.

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Making the Difference Together

*Partnership
Empowerment
Problem-solving
Accountability
Service Orientation*



"We have made our agency more open and more accountable, and through a strengthening partnership with the community we hope to continue that trend."

In Portland, the Police Bureau and the community have worked hard together to develop our definition of community policing and to help make it a success for us. We have made our agency more open and more accountable, and through a strengthening partnership with the community we hope to continue that trend.


When Mayor J.E. Bud Clark and the Portland City Commissioners adopted the transition plan in 1990 we knew we had forwarded an ambitious plan for a department-wide changeover from traditional to community policing methods. The progress made on this plan by the Bureau and the community has put Portland on the map for developing a progressive police agency. We look forward to sharing our ideas, and learning from others, in our National Community Policing Conference in 1992.

To the men and women of the Bureau, and to the people in our community — thank you!



Community Policing Profile

In 1991, the Portland Police Bureau began its second year of a five-year transition to community policing: The transition plan, adopted the previous year, sets forth an extensive set of goals and objectives touching on every aspect of Bureau functions from patrol to personnel evaluations, from communications to recruitment. The five major goal areas of the transition plan are: partnership, empower-



At the open house of the Iris Court Community Contact Office, North Precinct Capt. Charles Moose talks to a young resident of Iris Court. Ongoing projects for kids at Iris Court include camp activities, improvements in playground equipment and bicycle safety talks.



Sgt. Jeanne Bradley, commander of the Sunshine Division, helps accept food donations from students at Alameda School to kickoff the holiday food drive.

ment, problem-solving, accountability and service orientation.

With this transition plan, a mission statement was adopted which reads: "The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to work with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect

property and promote individual responsibility and community commitment."

This profile highlights the major activities of community policing for 1991, and outlines the Portland vision for community policing for the next years to come.

Joining together with
Portland's many communities

"Community policing simply could not have moved forward without working partnerships from Portland's communities... Together, we worked on many critical public safety issues to try to improve and maintain our city's livability."

The goal of partnership encompasses a wide variety of activities, from participating in Public Safety Action Committees and the Inter-Bureau Task Force, to working with familiar agencies such as Neighborhood Crime Prevention or the Bureau of Buildings, to forging new alliances through the Community Policing Demonstration Projects or the Police Activities League.

With tightened budgets with the passage of Ballot Measure 5 in late 1990, the necessity of partnership became even greater to meet increasing service requests with fewer resources. The police and community came together to provide equipment, such as bicycles for the bike patrol, and to provide services, such as staffing for the new Community Contact Offices sprouting up throughout the city.

Community policing simply could not have moved forward

without working partnerships from Portland's communities: neighborhoods, businesses, service organizations, government agencies, social service agencies and religious institutions. Together, we worked on many critical public safety issues to try to improve and maintain our city's livability from citywide concerns to precinct-specific issues.

Citywide, two organizations, one new and one that has been around for a long time, helped in reaching the disadvantaged in the community. The challenge of reaching out to at-risk youth and helping them with positive role models went to the Greater Portland **Police Activities League**, which held its second annual sports quickness camp in 1991 and conducts year-round sports activities to reduce gang and drug activity among the community's youth. More than 50 Police Bureau employees volunteer their time throughout the year to help with PAL.

Volunteers from the police and the community are also the driving force that moves the **Sunshine Division** to help feed and clothe needy families. Sunshine, which has been helping the community since 1923, expanded its operations



At the second annual Greater Portland Police Activities League summer day camp, Lt. Greg Clark coaches a camp participant for his next round of flag football.

to include becoming the recipient charity for two downtown music festivals and providing new clothing to children in need.

Forming citywide partnerships to bridge cultural differences is a priority for the success of community policing. In late 1991, the Tactical Operations Division Gang Enforcement Team gained a grant to assist in victim assistance and **crime prevention to the Asian communities** of Portland. The grant funds three assistants to work with the Asian Gang Detail on outreach, community education, youth gang intervention, victim advocacy and crime analysis for the city's Asian communities.

In order to better address crimes that occur because of differences of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation, the Detective Division created the **Bias Crime Unit** to work with the community to prevent, identify, investigate and track bias crimes. Bias crimes are defined by state law as those crimes motivated by prejudice based on perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, age, disability or certain status or affiliations of the victim. The unit works closely with neighborhoods, law enforcement and human rights organizations in defining, reporting and prosecuting bias crimes.



Multnomah County Deputy District Attorney Wayne Pearson and North Precinct Capt. Charles Moose discuss plans for the new district attorney office in the Holladay District/Lloyd Center.

Joining together with
Portland's many communities

"A strong partnership and a commitment to change were key steps to success for the adoption of an Old Town Drug Free Zone resolution forwarded to the City Council in 1991."

Drug crimes continue to be a major source of crime problems for Portland and most other cities, and efforts aimed at curbing these problems got a boost from a new policy and a familiar training. The Drug and Vice Division, together with the precincts and the Regional Organized Crime and Narcotics Task Force, created a **drug enforcement policy** which outlines responsibilities for street drug sales and middle- and upper-level drug enforcement. Included within this policy is a goal of demand reduction with community involvement. This is the first step toward creating a regional drug enforcement policy for the metropolitan area. In addition, the **Landlord Training Program** continues to serve the community by training landlords how to spot and prevent drug problems on their properties. So far this program has reached 4,000 landlords representing 65,000 rental units.

In addition to citywide priorities, individual precincts and work units worked to form partnerships specific and important to the neighborhoods and areas they serve.

In East Precinct, community leaders from the **Central Eastside** worked with police in a community



East Precinct Officer Chauncey Curl explains the features of new equipment for the bicycle detail to the media and to Eastside business district leaders who raised money for the bikes.

policing demonstration project to help with the problems of homelessness and street violence. The Central Eastside Industrial Council and the police worked in close cooperation to promote the extension of the drug-free zone ordinance to the inner Eastside and to eliminate problems associated with abandoned buildings and illegal transient camping.

In another partnership, culminating in a fundraising effort by three business districts, East was outfitted with its own bicycles for **bike patrol**, allowing officers to work even closer with the people they serve. The bikes have been useful and popular tools for use in the downtown, Northwest, Hollywood and Hawthorne business districts.

Central Precinct was the first to open its community contact office in spring 1990, in **Old Town**, and created its community policing demonstration project steering committee from leaders in business, social service and neighborhoods to work on street drug dealing and street violence. A strong partnership and a commitment to change were key steps to success for the adoption of an **Old Town Drug Free Zone** resolution forwarded to the City Council in 1991.

A community policing demonstration project in a public housing project named **Iris Court** opened many doors for creating partners for North Precinct. Many strategies created at Iris Court through the involvement of the tenants, the Housing Authority of Portland and the surrounding community were incorporated into other ongoing precinct projects.

Through the work of the Holladay District Public Safety Committee, the Lloyd Center/Holladay District was assigned the first **community-based prosecutor** who continues to work closely with precinct personnel and community members. The group, made up of representatives from business, neighborhoods and police, has helped in the removal of illegal transient camps, reorganized private security radio systems and coordinated district officers, the district attorney and security guards to reduce thefts from cars.



A federal grant helped create a team to work on victim assistance and crime prevention for Portland's Asian communities with the Gang Enforcement Team. Asian Gang Detail Sgt. Larry Ratcliff (right) stands with his team of Kao Chin, Mitchell Phan and Doan Thaooanh.

Creating ways citizens and employees can be part of community policing

"Their number one message to police and city leaders: We want more police visibility and closer communication between neighborhood police officers and citizens."

Community policing requires that citizens take an active role in determining what services they need and that employees take an active role in determining how those needs can be met — that is the message behind the goal of empowerment. Throughout the implementation process, the Bureau and the community created several opportunities to listen to each other.

Created in late 1990, the **Chief's Forum** finished its first full year of operation in 1991. The 25-member advisory group, with members representing business, neighborhoods, City Council, the police and the community at large, advises the Police Chief on issues ranging from drug enforcement policies and use of Pepper Mace to recruitment practices and diversity goals. In addition, the group continues to assist the Bureau in seeking appropriate funding and resources to provide services the community requests.

With guidance from the Chief's Forum and Neighborhood Crime Prevention, the Bureau conducted a

citywide **Workshop on Community Policing** in May 1991 to hear what citizens had to say about what they wanted police to do in their neighborhoods and what strategies were working on their crime and livability problems. About 250 people participated in the workshop and turned in surveys asking for more specific information. Their number one message to police and city leaders: We want more police visibility and closer communication between neighborhood police officers and citizens.

Improving that visibility and communication were the goals behind creating **Community Contact Offices** or storefront police facilities that officers can use to write reports and meet with neighbors. Each precinct now has access to at least three contact offices.



Chief's Forum member Steve Moskowitz facilitates a discussion group at a workshop on community policing.



Small group discussions were useful in gaining insights on community priorities for police services. Capt. Roy Kindrick, a Chief's Forum member, leads a group at a workshop on community policing.

Contact offices and neighborhood liaison officers help the Bureau keep track of individual neighborhood needs, and through the **neighborhood-based patrol project**, neighborhood and police representatives are meeting to establish responsibilities of a liaison officer, boundaries that match more closely with existing neighborhood boundaries and formulas for allocating personnel based on neighborhood profiles of crime and livability issues.

Creating a police force that not only responds to community needs but is made up of groups representing the entire community is the goal of many **recruitment** activities for the agency and community. The Personnel Division realigned its recruitment efforts to concentrate on bringing in women applicants and applicants from the African-American, Native American, Asian and Hispanic communities.

Turning to the internal side of empowerment, police employees also began creating ways they could have more of a say in determining their work environment. North and Central precincts started a trend of asking shifts to **realign work hours** to meet service needs. North Precinct also started its **employee of the month** award which comes with the prize of having a parking space near the building entrance.

The task of keeping everyone in the agency informed of the progress and projects of community policing fell to the **Comments & Notes** newsletter published once every two weeks. Comments & Notes contains news from different precincts and divisions and a regular update from the Chief.



Personnel officers pose with other Bureau staff to prepare a recruitment poster. Public Information Officer Sgt. Derrick Foxworth; Officers Lori Smith-Dyer, Linda Johnson, and Harry Jackson; and Sgt. Ray Tercek help showcase the Bureau.

Creating innovative approaches to solving problems

"The group formed the 122nd Avenue Citizens Patrol, which swore out traffic complaints against repeat offenders, dramatically reducing noise and complaints."

With community policing, officers can add problem-solving to traditional law enforcement techniques. With problem-solving, officers and other police personnel can work with citizens and other agencies to find solutions to long-standing neighborhood crime and livability problems.

And there is no lack of creativity when it comes to thinking up solutions. From the classic example of neighbors who got an agreement from the Parks Bureau to turn up the sprinklers at night to deter drug dealers in parks to new examples of selective street closures to deter cruisers or "No Parking" signs to prevent street parties, Portlanders showed a great deal of courage and innovation to work on their problems.

The **Neighborhood Liaison Officer** program, created in North Precinct in 1990, does a great deal to encourage problem solving by assigning an officer to work with a particular neighborhood and follow the issues of the neighborhood, business and civic organizations



Central Precinct Officer Haven Baxter takes special pen in hand to add his signature to the Washington Park Partnership Agreement. Neighbors West/Northwest Crime Prevention Specialist Lisa Horne (far left) and Sgt. Steve Smith (right) are also ready to sign.

within those boundaries. East and Central precinct soon followed suit. Neighbors like the program because they get to know the officer; officers like the idea because they get to know the area better and they are more appreciated. Neighbors frequently call the officer, "our officer."

Officers were trained in the use of the SARA problem-solving method (Survey, Analyze, Respond, Assess) and were given **Community Policing Partnership Agreements** to use. In the Partnership Agreement, all the parties affected by a particular problem commit to specific actions to alleviate the problem.

• For drug problems at **Washington Park**, Central Precinct, Neighbors West/Northwest and representatives from parks and the zoo gathered to conclude their partnership agreement in an official signing ceremony. To reduce the problems of drug dealing, vandalism and car prowls, this coalition organized neighborhood foot patrols, park exclusions for drug dealers, enhanced police details, case management by the District Attorney's Office, park cleanups and tours promoting use of the park. Crime reports declined dramatically.

• For **Broadway cruising** problems, Central Precinct, the Downtown Community Association and downtown business leaders applied selective street closures in their agreement. Noise, vandalism, public drinking and street violence were reduced through tactical closures of Broadway, Morrison and Yamhill streets.



The Washington Park Partnership Agreement brought together community, agency and police representatives to work out solutions to chronic problems. Neighbors West/Northwest Crime Prevention Specialist Lisa Horne holds the agreement, with Officer Bill Calder and Sgt. Bob Baxter at left and Officer Haven Baxter and Sgt. Steve Smith at right.

Creating innovative approaches to solving problems

“Together they were able to reduce police calls for service by more than half by restricting parking at night, installing barriers and increasing patrol.”

• In **Operation Target**, North Precinct, Northeast Neighborhoods, Reserve Officers and community leaders who contributed to the North-Northeast Rescue Plan began with a community survey to find almost 100 problem areas to address. These organizations, together with the Bureau of Buildings, Housing Authority of Portland, Oregon Liquor Control Commission, Drug and Vice Division and the Parks Bureau, endorsed an agreement to use aggressive strategies to close down drug houses in the target area. By the end of 1991, almost all of the cases were resolved, and Operation Target II was created.

• For **Marine Drive**, East Precinct, East Portland Neighbors and representatives from Multnomah County Parks, the Bureau of Transportation, the Port of Portland and the Federal Weather Service created an agreement to alleviate large juvenile parties and associated problems of vandalism, underage drinking, drunk driving, assaults and gang activity. Together they were able to reduce police calls for service



Mapping chronic call locations prove to be a useful tool in problem-solving. Community Policing Support Division Officer Dick Karman and Public Safety Analyst Steve Beedle test the new equipment.

by more than half by restricting parking at night, installing barriers and increasing patrol.

• Along **122nd Avenue**, cruising and its related crimes of vandalism, noise and drug and alcohol abuse, became a priority for the Cruising Task Force made up of representatives from police, neighborhood associations, business associations and private security

companies. The group formed the 122nd Avenue Citizens Patrol, which swore out traffic complaints against repeat offenders, dramatically reducing noise and complaints.

Problem-solving agreements and strategies rely not only on close cooperation between the police and citizens, but also between district officers and other Bureau resources. Expanding those capabilities resulted in a pilot project for a **precinct team of detectives** which works out of East Precinct. This gives officers more access to crime information for neighborhood-specific trends and allows detectives to work closer with officers and citizens in gathering information and solving cases.

Information and support are also supplied by the newly renamed **Community Policing Support Division** which provides mapping information, crime analysis, information and referral, statistics on chronic call locations and specialized crime prevention services such as Block Homes, WomenStrength self-defense classes, Telephone Reassurance Program, street safety trainings, engraver loan program through libraries, Victim Callback and the Senior Locks Program which makes free locks available to low-income seniors who want better security in their homes.



Visibility at key community functions is a strategy used by Gang Enforcement Team members in their mission to prevent and suppress gang activity. GET Officers Andrew Kirkland and Greg Duvic visit with residents at Piedmont Pride Day.

Meeting the goals set for community policing

"Through the Chief's Forum, which includes members appointed by the Council, local officials are kept informed and involved in Bureau policy development."

The Police Bureau is responsible to the community for providing appropriate services and the community is responsible for getting involved in helping solve its own problems.

The Bureau is responsible to the City Council for responding to the priorities set and the City Council is responsible to the Bureau for providing adequate resources to meet those priorities.

Employees are responsible for following through on commitments made to the public or co-workers and Bureau managers are responsible for helping employees do their job. These are some of the examples of mutual accountability community policing sets out to achieve.

Accountability has been fostered through several means and is described in the Community Policing **Attributes and Success Factors** adopted by City Council in 1991. The attributes describe qualities the Bureau is achieving such as "Community drives priori-

ties," "Performance is evaluated" and "Recruitment and hiring reflect community" and the success factors describe what the Bureau will be like when it has achieved them such as "Officer safety," "Job satisfaction" and "Community-neighborhood livability."

The Attributes and Success Factors were adopted as part of an annual **Report to City Council** on community policing. The report also included recommendations from the Chief's Forum asking the Council to support increased staffing levels, support efficiencies and continue its support of community policing. Through the Chief's Forum, which includes members appointed by the Council, local officials are kept informed and involved in Bureau policy development.

The Forum and other citizen committees working with the police such as the Precinct Advisory Councils and the Bureau Advisory Committee, serve to help the agency adopt **community priorities** in its service delivery. This is also accomplished through the use of community workshops and surveys conducted periodically.

These priorities are reflected in the programs of the Bureau and budget accountability will be



Assistant Chief Wayne Inman, Mothers Against Drunk Driving representative Marie Brown, Asset Forfeiture Sgt. Roger Hediger, Portland Mayor J.E. Bud Clark and anti-prostitution activist Andy Anderson take part in the grand opening of Seizure World, a facility to store vehicles seized for prostitution or driving while suspended/drunken driving.

monitored through a multi-year plan, started in 1991, to shift from a line-item budget to a **program-based budget**. Program budgeting allows police, citizens and elected officials to determine the costs of current programs, to project future costs and human resource requirements and to establish more accountability for taxpayer dollars.

Internally, to promote better accountability between employees, the Bureau provided **training** to all personnel in what is expected of them under the community policing model. From clerks to detectives to identification technicians to sergeants, all employees have been informed of what is expected of them and what they can expect from others.

Holding employees responsible for goals like efficiency and service is one matter; responsibility for holding the Chief accountable for commitments made fell to the **Chief's Advisory Committees** reactivated in late 1990. Non-sworn, Supervisors, Officers, Commanders and Investigators gather with the Chief periodically to develop mutual problem-solving strategies.

The need for all employees to be accountable to the community and to each other led to research being completed for a **personnel performance evaluation system** that allows Bureau supervisors and managers the opportunity to evaluate and support employees. This system would also fulfill the transition plan strategies to "create methods for improving internal information, suggestions and feedback."



Records Police Data Technician Harriet Sheets assists officers, attorneys and the public in obtaining crime reports and other records.

Training and rewarding people for community policing

"It states that the employees in the Bureau will work to make it a model of equal opportunity for all."

Helping employees gain the skills to help serve people better and rewarding employees and citizens when accomplishments are achieved are the strategies emphasized in the goal of service orientation.

Just as private businesses work to identify customers' needs and improve ways to meet those needs, public entities like the Police Bureau are discovering that service orientation is a good foundation to sound management practices.

In-service training was expanded from firearms, vehicles and felony stops to problem-solving, community meetings and cultural diversity. Training offered to all employees, both sworn and non-sworn, increased, as did training for specialized groups such as Field Training Officers, telephone personnel and managers. Training varied from a traditional classroom atmosphere to "spend an hour with the Chief" sessions to discuss community policing philosophy and current events.


As part of training, all employees became familiar with the

diversity goals in the Human Goals statement created and adopted in 1991. It states that the employees in the Bureau will work to make it a "model of equal opportunity for all" and will "provide the opportunity for everyone to rise to as high a level of responsibility and interest as desired, dependent only on that individual's talent, diligence and commitment."

That talent, diligence and commitment will also be rewarded, as a method of encouraging outstanding performance and serving the agency's internal customers. Rewards went for outstanding



Members of the Piedmont Neighborhood Association Foot Patrol are pleased with the Neighborhood Crime Prevention outstanding service award for Piedmont Neighborhood Liaison Officer Len Braithwait.



Police Chief Tom Potter presents the National Guard service award the Bureau received to Bureau Officer Paul Jensen, Reserve Lt. Danny Rowley, Reserve Officers Matt Wagenknecht and Joe Kaney and Bureau Officer John Thomas.

community service, both on a local and national scale:

- The Neighborhood Crime Prevention program every year honors about one dozen **outstanding law enforcement personnel** in a City Council ceremony. In 1991, Portland Police Bureau honorees were Officers Haven Baxter, Len Braithwait, Jonathon Cox, William Field, Eric Hendricks, Dan Jensen, Herschel Lange, L.D. Smith and Brian Whalen and Sergeants Bob Baxter and Beth Mulvihill. The officers and sergeants were honored for their problem-solving efforts and their ability to exemplify the spirit of community policing.


- Bureau officers in the National Guard who served in **Operation Desert Storm** were honored and thanked by the Chief for their outstanding service, and the Bureau received an award for supporting the Bureau and Reserve officers serving overseas. They were Bureau Officers Paul Jensen, Ed Lock and John Thomas, Detective Dave Simpson, Reserve Officers Joe Kaney and Matt Wagenknecht, Reserve Lt. Danny Rowley and then-Reserve officer now Bureau Officer Doug Gunderson.

Another project is underway to reward people for their efforts at community policing. The **Awards Committee** has been restructured to include both Bureau and community members and will confer the Medal of Valor, the Police Star, the Meritorious Service Medal for Valor, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Commendation Medal, the Unit Commendation Award and the Physical Achievement Award in 1992.



Officers Margaret Crump and Sue Kahut enjoy a break during in-service training between an hour with the Chief and panel of precinct personnel discussing community policing roles and responsibilities.

Phone numbers for police, neighborhood crime prevention and other community contact agencies are listed on the back page of this brochure.



*Want more information?
Here are some suggestions*

Emergency

Police-Fire-Medical 9-1-1
 Non-emergency 230-2121

Portland Police Bureau

Central Precinct 796-3097
 Old Town Office 823-2160
 Hillsdale Terrace
 Office 246-3966
 East Precinct 823-2143
 Brentwood-Darlington
 Office 248-3916
 Grand/Wentworth
 Office 823-2165
 Rose City Village
 Office 823-2134
 Russellville School
 Office 823-4182
 Hollywood Station 288-4472
 North Precinct 823-2122
 Iris Court Office 823-4070
 Jantzen Beach
 Office 289-0667
 5450 N.E. 14th 335-8263

Chief's Office 796-3000
 Community Policing
 Support Division 796-3126
 Block Homes 796-3133
 Elderly Programs 796-3134
 WomenStrength 796-3139
 Detectives 796-3400
 Drug and Vice 796-3246
 Gang Enforcement 823-4189
 Internal Investigations 796-3236
 Museum 796-3019
 Personnel 796-3200
 Police Activities
 League 796-3017
 Property Room 823-2101
 Records
 Autos 796-3044
 Reports 796-3041
 Reserve Coordinator 796-3179
 Sunshine Division 823-2102
 Traffic Division 823-2103
 after 4:30pm 823-2143
 Training Division 796-3316

Neighborhood Crime Prevention

Neighborhood Crime Prevention
 Program Coordinator 823-4519
 Central Northeast
 Neighbors 823-3156
 Downtown/Burnside 295-0912
 East Portland Neighbors ... 256-0014
 Neighborhood Mediation
 Center 823-3152
 Neighborhoods
 West/Northwest 223-3331
 Peninsula Neighbors 823-4524
 Northeast
 Neighborhoods 823-4575
 Southeast Uplift 232-0010
 Southwest Neighborhoods 823-4592

Other City/Community Contacts

Alarm Coordinator 796-3031
 Animal Control 667-2300
 Bureau of Buildings
 Neighborhood
 Nuisance 796-7306
 Abandoned
 Vehicle Reports 796-7309
 Cascade Aids Hotline 223-2437
 CHIERS Van 238-2067
 Child Abuse Hotline 238-7555
 City of Portland
 General Information .. 823-4000
 Personnel 823-4157
 Gay and Lesbian Violence
 Hotline 796-1703
 Hooper Detoxification
 Center 238-2067
 International Language
 Bank Interpreter 1-800-621-1646
 Metro Crisis Intervention
 Service 223-6161
 N.E. Coalition Youth
 Gang Problem Hotline ... 823-GANG
 School Police 823-2166
 Tel-Abuse Hotline
 (Harassment) 1-206-345-4444
 United Way Information
 and Referral 222-5555
 Women's Crisis Line 235-5333

MIS REPORT

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING IN COUNCIL- MANAGER CITIES

A quiet redefinition of role and philosophy in American policing is becoming apparent in cities and counties across the country. The change, to what is generally called community-oriented policing, is perhaps the greatest innovation in police work since it became a profession early in the 20th century.

Community policing builds on the professional training, skills, and technology now available in the country's best police forces. To these it adds a focus on crime prevention as well as control, an emphasis on grassroots contact and specific police beats, and a willingness to work with other local government departments to identify and address the causes of crime.

This report describes in detail the way police departments in four council-manager cities—Aurora, Colorado; Richmond, Virginia; Rockville, Maryland; and Hayward, California—have made the transition to community-oriented policing. Throughout, the emphasis is on community initiative or receptivity to the change, local government backing, the local government manager's role, and the all-important understanding and participation of the backbone of any police department—its line officers. The report also emphasizes the departments' continued attention to traditional police activities.

Community-Oriented Policing in Council-Manager Cities

Robert M. Grims, a candidate in the public administration program at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., compiled this report while he was a research assistant with ICMA's MIS Inquiry Service. Grims is currently employed by the city of Rockville, Maryland.

INTRODUCTION

Society today is seeing vast changes in management style. Traditional, hierarchical management is being replaced by participatory management in numerous areas of both the public and private sectors. One area that has been unable to make this switch as quickly as others is law enforcement. Police work historically has been very centralized and hierarchical. Its mandate has been crime control. As a result, two major problems have developed. The first is that technology and increasing crime rates have isolated police departments from the community. Recent events in Los Angeles illustrate the dangers of isolation. The second major problem is that street-level police officers have been instructed only to respond to situations and follow orders and have been largely excluded from participation in decision making.

During the past 15 years, the doubling of the number of cars patrolling the streets has not affected the level of serious crime. Rapid police response has not affected the probability of making an arrest. Forensic technology has not been nearly as important in the investigative process as the evidence collected from victims and witnesses. As a result, a new theory of policing is taking the place of traditional police styles in many U.S. communities. This new concept is community-oriented policing.

About This Report

In September of 1989, ICMA published an MIS Report entitled *Community-Oriented Policing*. This month's report will first explain how the definition of community-oriented policing has changed and expanded since 1989 and will then examine how four communities—Aurora, Colorado; Richmond, Virginia; Rockville, Maryland; and Hayward, California—have switched to community-oriented policing.

The four case studies were selected based on three criteria:

- Community-oriented policing has been in full operation for at least one year
- The city manager/administrator played a leading role in the switch.
- Community-oriented policing involves law enforcement *and* other city departments.

Each case study focuses on five areas: the role of the city manager, the method of implementation, program design and allocation, results, and lessons learned.

Throughout each case study, the community's reaction is described. Citizen feedback is critical, because it is in the hope of serving citizens better that these four communities have made the transformation to community-oriented policing.

An outline with key dates for each case study is included to provide readers an idea of the time it took to get the different phases of the transformation in motion.

The Community-Oriented Policing Philosophy

Although there is no single definition of community-oriented policing, its philosophy in 1992 does include four principal elements:

- Partnership with the community
- Participatory management
- Problem solving
- Visionary leadership.

In forming a partnership with the community, the police are acknowledging that they alone cannot solve the problems of crime, drugs, and urban decay. The police and the community together need to define the local crime problems and devise methods for resolving them. The police also need to encourage and support citizen self-help initiatives. As these concepts take shape, police begin to see the citizens they serve not just as potential criminals, victims, and witnesses, but also as allies and friends.

Management Information Service

Community-oriented policing tries to break down the bureaucratic hierarchy of the typical police department. It gives more discretion to line officers. Officers participate more in the management process. Task forces and "teams" are organized. Police administrators spend less time in command and control functions and more time assisting officers with their work in the community, solving and identifying problems.

Decentralization is needed for two reasons. First, the police officer who is given a new focus begins to handle delicate problems with more discretion. Because the officer sees the problem firsthand, he or she is in the best position to solve it. The officer's purpose is not simply to respond to calls and make arrests, but to use his or her own judgment to solve problems.

Second, decentralization makes police work more rewarding. Nearly every major study done over the last two decades on worker satisfaction indicates that workers need to be able to participate in the management process. Community-oriented policing gives the line officer a greater voice and thus increases job satisfaction.

Solving problems is an essential element of community-oriented policing. This is where training becomes very important. Community-oriented police officers are trained to respond to calls, but they are also trained to make themselves visible in their community. Communication and interpersonal skills are emphasized so an officer can develop relationships with the citizens. When a problem occurs, the officer has several people to go to for help in solving the problem. Greater emphasis is given to treating citizens with respect. The officer also is trained to recognize developing patterns, not just a series of unrelated events. As training methods change, so do recruitment methods. Community-oriented police departments look for individuals who can work effectively with diverse groups, be team players, and demonstrate good leadership skills. They put less emphasis on adventure and more on service.

When a switch is made to community-oriented policing, reported crime rates usually rise because people are more willing than before to report crimes. After a short period, the crime rates fall as criminals become aware that citizens who never before would express themselves are now working with the police to stop crime. Incidences of burglary, robbery, assault, and vandalism typically decline the most.

A Philosophy, Not a Program

Several observations about community-oriented policing are in order.

- Community-oriented policing does not replace tough police work. It is not a panacea or a quick fix. It does allow police officers to get to know the communities they serve.
- If community-oriented policing is to be effective and lasting, it has to be perceived by law enforcement, local government, and the community as

more than just a passing program. It is a philosophy and a way of thinking, not a program. It succeeds the traditional philosophy and organization that have dominated police work for the past half century.

- The increased individual responsibility and attendant decentralization of authority that are integral to community-oriented policing do not in any way undermine the screening process, accountability procedures, and internal investigation or civilian review practices of the modern professional police department.
- Community-oriented policing depends on the understanding, endorsement, backing, and active participation of the department's middle management and senior career officers. The changes required by community-oriented policing are perhaps hardest for veteran officers who came in under another set of rules: some of them have to change their professional focus and attitudes.
- The community-oriented policing philosophy must be institutionalized so that it can survive personnel turnover and political changes.

Sharing the Vision

To transform the organizational cultures of police departments, advocates for community-oriented policing have to provide a vision, a set of values that focuses on community service. The evolution of this vision is the major change in community-oriented policing over the past four years.

Community-oriented policing is used not only in police departments but in inspection services, animal control, fire, parks and recreation, health and human services, and other departments.

Police departments typically keep their distance from other sectors of government. This is not the case in community-oriented policing. Here, officers learn to think of the police department as part of a unified community department, the local government, whose main goal is to improve and defend the quality of life of its citizens.

Case Study Previews

Aurora, Colorado. Aurora has a population of 220,000 and borders Denver. The Aurora case study shows how community policing has evolved there over the last 15 years. Detailed descriptions of the programs implemented are given. In Aurora, local businesses as well as various local government departments have played major roles.

Richmond, Virginia. Richmond, the only state capital among the case study jurisdictions, has a population of 203,000. In Richmond, too, the city manager was a major player in the conversion to community policing.

Drastic changes were made in patrol functions, and detective operations were decentralized.

Rockville, Maryland. Rockville, a city of 45,500, is 12 miles from Washington, D.C. Its experience shows that community-oriented policing can be successful in a small, suburban jurisdiction. The Rockville government used a rigorous selection process to hire a police chief in tune with the concepts of community-oriented policing.

Hayward, California. Hayward, a city of 111,500 people, is very close to San Francisco. Here, the city manager actually went out to the community and asked citizens what they wanted. This case study discusses the nuts and bolts of COPPS (Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving), including changes made in personnel policies and training. The role of other city departments is highlighted.

**COMMUNITY COMMITMENT:
AURORA, COLORADO**

The author of this case study is Division Chief Ronald C. Sloan of the Aurora police department.

Aurora (population 220,000) is an eastern suburb of Denver, occupying a 40-square-mile territory, about half of it developed. The city has a mix of residential, retail, and light industry areas. Three military bases and an international airport are immediately adjacent, and a second airport is planned.

The Early Years

From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Aurora police department participated in the national trend toward strong crime prevention programs supported by federal and state funding for education, training, and implementation. Aurora's Crime Prevention Unit (CPU), inaugurated in 1975, focused on Neighborhood Watch, Operation I.D., home and business security surveys, and education in topics such as target hardening.

Community relations training. During roughly the same period, Aurora also emphasized training all sworn officers in community relations. The training was designed to heighten sensitivity to the problems minorities face and to the need to treat people with compassion and respect. However, the positive results achieved were usually short-lived once the officers "hit the streets" and faced the reality of an urban environment.

Direct contact patrols (DCPs). In the late 1970s, the Aurora police department started formal direct contact patrols, which encouraged motor officers to park their patrol vehicles and walk around specified business areas. Frequent rotation was part of the reason DCP soon stopped being a viable program.

Comparing traditional and community-oriented policing

The chart below shows comparisons between traditional policing and C-O-P (community-oriented policing).

TRADITIONAL	C-O-P
Police-government relationships	
Separate	Integrated
Police-neighborhood relationships	
Distant/limited	Linked
Method-approach-operations	
Incident-driven	Problem-solving
Hierarchy	
Centralized	Decentralized
Measured outcomes	
Crime control	Quality of life

Informal park-and-walk and bicycle patrols. In the past 15 to 20 years, Aurora initiated a number of informal efforts to put officers in closer contact with the community. Programs came and went, and some succeeded in addressing specific problems, such as liquor-law violations, groups of idle teens on the street, and even burglaries and street robberies.

Direct action response team (DART). In 1981, the Aurora police department embarked on a program to

- Target high-profile crimes—such as street robberies, burglaries, and armed retail robberies—in selected areas
- Provide a more versatile and flexible quick response to those identified crimes
- Place officers previously bound to their vehicles back into closer contact with certain high-crime communities.

DART placed five officers on small (400cc) motorcycles under the supervision of one sergeant. The DART team was used primarily in a section of Aurora called the Colfax Corridor, a deteriorating part of the city that includes businesses and low-income residences.

The DART team produced increased arrests for target crimes and a second team was added, but efforts to redeploy the teams to other sections of the city often met with resistance from citizens who wanted to keep "their" teams.

Over the years, DART evolved from its original mission into a tactical and special operations team used for solicitation for prostitution operations, park patrols and sweeps, armed robbery stakeouts, shopping mall patrols during the Christmas season, juvenile problems

Management Information Service

in residential areas and parks, and crack cocaine and other narcotics raids.

Most recently, DART teams were combined with the dispersed, on-call Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) to make up a full-time consolidated DART/SWAT squad. The squad has since been downsized to provide resources to a Gang Intervention Unit directed at recent youth-gang problems.

DART removed officers from their patrol cars and put them into closer contact with the community. Some communities did begin to feel that they "owned" their officers. But DART was not designed as a problem-solving force. Targeting specific crimes is a reactive response; success was measured by the number of arrests made and not by whether the problem was solved. DART also differed from community policing because its priorities were set solely by crime statistics and investigative information on Part I crimes (murder, sexual assault, aggravated robbery or assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft charges). DART was not oriented toward networking with other service providers to address community fears and problems.

Police area representative program (PAR). In the late 1970s, the Aurora police department crime prevention unit (CPU) organized residents and business owners and managers into cooperative groups designed to help make their neighborhoods safer. Neighborhood Watch groups, business associations, and other loose-knit groups proliferated in the early 1980s.

In 1982, the police were urging people to get involved, to do something about the causes of crime and fear of crime, and to take care of each other, but the entire department was not part of that process.

Unlike the crime prevention officer, the officer who responded to a call for service was the incident-driven "professional crime fighter," a stranger who did little to reduce residents' fears or solve underlying problems. Responding officers had little opportunity to listen and no incentive to help resolve quality-of-life issues, because the focus was on "real" crimes and making sure that the "bad guys" did not get away.

The CPU first-line supervisor proposed a pilot project in which a single officer, a police area representative (PAR), would be assigned to a specific community, where he or she could exercise a great deal of discretion concerning police strategies and techniques that would make the area safer.

The job was designed to emphasize listening to the people in the community and adopting a problem-solving approach to working with them on their concerns and fears. PAR officers would be afforded the flexibility to work in uniform or plain clothes. Their mode of transportation could run the gamut from driving a marked patrol car to riding a bicycle to walking a beat. Hours would also be flexible, to accommodate the need to work nights and weekends or on special enforcement operations at different times.

In short, the PAR officer was freed from primary response to citizen calls for service, though he or she

still served as a full-fledged law enforcement officer. And though officers could switch off so that they could be exposed to different roles, PAR officers were, in practice, permanently assigned to specific areas. They became the primary catalyst for city government participation with neighborhoods concerning public safety issues.

The pilot project was launched in 1983, with one sergeant and five patrol officers, as Aurora's first true community policing effort. The five officers were assigned to a section of the city divided into five PAR areas.

The residents of the area involved were pleased with the PAR concept and soon citizens in other sections of the city issued appeals for their own PAR officers. The officers involved also liked the concept: job satisfaction among PAR officers was extremely high.

In 1990, PAR expanded to cover the entire city, with 21 officers assigned to 21 PAR areas, under the supervision of two sergeants.

Implementation of Community Commitment

During the summer of 1987, the Aurora police department, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice, conducted an eight-hour training and orientation session that was mandatory for all sworn officers. The presentation covered community relations and, in particular, relations with minorities.

To learn more, Police Chief Jerry Williams asked the National Center for Community Policing housed at the School of Criminal Justice of Michigan State University to develop a strategy for assisting the department in implementing community policing.

During an on-site visit, the MSU team assessed the demographics of the community and held in-depth interviews with the Aurora police staff to determine the direction technical assistance should take. The resulting blueprint identified four important elements:

- Initial training of all police employees (sworn and nonsworn)
- Preimplementation surveys of all police employees, with the information tabulated by the MSU team
- Preimplementation surveys of approximately 2,000 randomly selected residents and businesses within the community, again with the information tabulated by MSU
- Development of an internal mechanism to encourage employee involvement, develop community-oriented programs, evaluate survey results, develop recommendations for training, and monitor and document progress toward institutionalization of community policing.

In August and September 1988, the MSU team presented a series of four-hour introductory training seminars for all employees, sworn and nonsworn. These sessions were important for several reasons:

- They offered outside help from knowledgeable and respected scholars and practitioners of community policing as a way to introduce the concept.
- From the beginning, all employees were encouraged to adopt the concept of community policing as part of the way the entire department would operate.
- The sessions provided early exposure to the way community policing already works in other departments nationwide.

The MSU team also appeared before the Aurora city council and City Manager John Pazour to explain how adopting community policing would affect them and their constituents as well as other municipal government services.

The concept was explained again at a public meeting that had been heavily promoted to the community and to the media. Those who attended seemed to appreciate how the community policing philosophy could improve their communities, but the poor turnout verified that one of the biggest challenges in launching the new effort would be to arouse public support.

Core Team

The department needed a formal mechanism to promote internal participation and representative input into the community policing project. A task force composed of representatives from all groups within the department was unworkable, so the division chief developed the Core Team, with responsibility for identifying and meeting with various groups in the department about ways to implement community policing in their jobs.

The Core Team was formed in late 1988. It initially included a facilitator (division chief); the community services bureau commander; the patrol bureau commander(s); the training bureau commander; the public information officer; a nonsworn employee representative; a supervisor or above from the investigations division; and the staff inspections bureau commander. The mission statement they adopted is "To provide a catalyst for change from traditional policing styles to the institutionalization of the interactive, problem-solving approach of community-oriented policing, through departmentwide participation and input, review of surveys, development of proposals, recommendations for training, and evaluation of overall efforts."

Their first project was to identify groups within the department, called advisory input groups, that might have special needs or concerns regarding community policing. The groups consisting of sworn personnel included the police association; women police officers; minority officers; PAR teams; investigations, traffic, training, and field training officer staff; K-9 officers; special assignments bureau officers; and six officers (three from each of the city's two patrol districts). The groups of nonsworn personnel included communications, technical services (property, detention, records), clerical,

front desk (switchboard), crime scene investigators, investigations, minority, nonsworn supervisory, and nonsworn professional/administrative/technological.

The Core Team scheduled at least an hour for discussion with each group, and the schedule was maintained, even though it soon became obvious that many groups overlapped. The next step was to develop a framework to gather information from each group. The challenge was to structure the mechanism to encourage freedom of expression, yet limit the discussion to productive issues. The division chief set the following parameters for these discussions:

- Advisory group participation had to be voluntary.
- Each group's representative would be contacted by a Core Team member, preferably the facilitator, to provide information on the intent and format of the meeting in advance.
- The discussion would be confined to five areas, all related to community policing, and the agenda would be monitored by the facilitator.
- Core Team members should not become defensive or combative with advisory group input at meetings.
- The Core Team members were never to invoke their rank during the meetings.
- Every effort would be made to turn workable advisory group suggestions into tangible programs within a reasonable time.

The memo sent to the advisory group representatives urged them to limit their comments in discussions to community policing philosophy; specific tactics, strategies, and methods to implement community policing in their area or in other areas that affect them; and training needs related to community policing.

In addition to its mission statement, the Core Team also developed a list of ten goals and responsibilities. The 1989 agenda includes

- Evaluating the results of the internal and community preimplementation surveys upon receipt
- Meeting with identified diverse interest groups throughout the department for advisory input
- Formulating proposals and recommendations regarding community policing for executive and command staff review and action
- Receiving, distributing, and cataloging community policing literature
- Monitoring training needs regarding community policing
- Enhancing both the internal and the external public image of the department regarding community policing
- Providing up-to-date status reports and information to department and city personnel
- Evaluating the progress of community policing proposals and strategies
- Encouraging direct community involvement in the department's community policing efforts

Management Information Service

- Providing constant encouragement and reinforcement toward departmentwide institutionalization of the community policing philosophy.

The adoption of the Core Team itself was a major step in institutionalizing community policing. The team provides a formal mechanism to evaluate processes and programs, and serves as a watchdog to maintain momentum.

The Core Team realizes that it is not the only catalyst for producing new community policing efforts; its role is as the focal point and cornerstone of support. With this in mind, the Core Team continues to make recommendations, evaluate surveys, direct training needs, and provide support by giving credit to individuals and groups who initiate ideas and projects.

The PAR program provides the foundation for the entire department's commitment to community policing, so many of the Core Team's recommendations focus on coordinating the activities of other units, sections, and city departments with that effort. The team members hope that by using the strengths of the PAR program, they will succeed in institutionalizing community policing in the department and city.

After a great deal of discussion, the department adopted the slogan "Community Commitment." The Core Team also developed a definition of the slogan:

The underlying philosophy or style of providing public police services which embodies the concepts of police employee/community identification, ownership, and trust; two-way dialogue between the police organization and the community; a problem-solving approach to the delivery of police services; attention to those factors that contribute to deteriorating conditions in neighborhoods and community decay; official recognition and an action-oriented approach to those issues which give rise to fear of crime in the community; a skilled utilization of the network of governmental and community resources through the use of specific referrals and coordination; and an orientation toward the facilitation of community self-help through involvement, knowledge, and organization.

Solving Problems

Within the last few years, the police department has worked collaboratively with other local government services on problems plaguing some of the neighborhoods. The following is a summary of several of those efforts and of the problem-solving process.

Macon-Moline Partnership. In November 1988, two PAR officers were very much concerned over the deterioration of a four-block area of apartments that had fallen prey to neighborhood decay, criminal elements, drug dealing, and overall reduction in the quality of life

for residents there. Working together with the apartment managers in the area, as well as with city zoning and code enforcement officials, the officers formed the Macon-Moline Partnership to "reduce crime, address service-delivery issues, and improve neighborhood appearance." The various segments of city government and private individuals together have established a board that has instituted apartment manager training, tightened tenant screening, improved lighting, established an effective crime watch network, and enhanced the overall physical appearance of the neighborhood.

Within months of the establishment of the Macon-Moline Partnership, the following developments were noted:

- Reduction of crime (burglary was down 59 percent, motor-vehicle theft was down 80 percent, larceny from vehicles was down 100 percent, and vandalism was down 25 percent)
- Identification of career criminals through information shared with the police by apartment managers and tenants
- Organized neighborhood association now eligible for block grant funds for neighborhood reclamation projects
- Establishment of a board of directors consisting of apartment managers, two apartment owners, city of Aurora neighborhood specialist, and city police officer
- Cleanup details in conjunction with city community services, public works, police, fire, and animal control.

As a result of the Macon-Moline Partnership model, several other neighborhoods have begun to organize and to work together with the police and other city agencies to improve their quality of life.

While similar operations are flourishing citywide, the most notable and active organization that has sprung from the efforts to work with high-density housing neighborhoods is the North Aurora Apartment Coalition (NAAC). This coalition of apartment owners, managers, and residents meets monthly with the police, city community service representatives, and elected officials to address public safety and other issues in their communities.

High-Impact Community-Oriented Policing (HICOP). In January 1990, an officer and her sergeant devised a plan to target gang and drug activity in her beat. They identified specific areas within the beat for intense neighborhood involvement and enforcement by the police. The objective of HICOP (pronounced high cop) was "to reduce fear of crime" and to "increase community involvement with the hope to identify and address a wider variety of community problems."

The neighborhoods were surveyed with a personal contact questionnaire to target crack houses and gang hangouts. Survey results were combined with community information from District I PAR officers, police intelligence, and other patrol officers in the district.

"Zero tolerance" enforcement approaches in the target areas were used to disrupt drug markets and arrest wanted criminals living in or frequenting the areas. The project is designed to concentrate on increasing citizen involvement in policing their own neighborhoods through assistance of the police, fire, code enforcement, animal control, and zoning departments.

Downtown Aurora Business Association. The Downtown Aurora Business Association (DABA) has been an outstanding partner in providing assistance in community policing as well as community-oriented municipal government activities. Four of the public safety initiatives with which DABA has been extremely helpful are described below.

Project "Treat or Treat" is a PAR officer's effort to coordinate business and police officers to encourage citizens to bring families back to the downtown Aurora business district. Community Policing the Corridor of Aurora's Retail Establishments (COP CARE) represents another officer's efforts to build a better relationship between downtown businesses and the police department through working with street people and the homeless. Free tokens are the project of a third officer. They are intended to provide transportation to shelters for homeless and indigent people. The tokens are donated by DABA. Finally, police foot patrols were early efforts by an officer in the Colfax Corridor. A formal foot patrol program also was established in April 1992 for original Aurora, the city's northeast section.

South Aurora patrol efforts. In one of Aurora's police beats, two officers working the graveyard shift focused their attention on the calls for service at two apartment complexes. The officers' objectives were to reduce calls for service through education of the community; to increase communications between the residents and the police; to clean up the areas; and to assist the communities in creating activities for the youngsters residing there.

The officers determined that a problem common to both complexes was the lack of on-site activities: neither complex had playground equipment for the children, although both had pools. The officers further learned that neither complex had a resident council or a Neighborhood Watch program.

The officers contacted the management for both complexes. They decided to act as catalysts in

- Creating youth organizational activities at the complexes to channel youth into a positive direction
- Creating an adult organization or council to oversee a Neighborhood Watch program and the youth program
- Introducing outside support to stimulate activities and increase cooperation.

The officers contacted the following people and agencies:

- A member of the Governor's Task Force on Communities for a Drug-Free Colorado
- A professional speaker and coach (a former Oakland Raiders football player), who introduced the concept of organizing a group of teenagers and training them as coaches to work with other youths
- The director of the Aurora YMCA, who offered the possibility of YMCA involvement both on-site and in developing transportation to YMCA sites
- A spokesman from Aurora Youth Initiative, who addressed the possibility of forming youth groups on-site that would develop their own program of activities. Funding was available to these groups through AYI.

The officers observed that the majority of police calls to one of the apartment complexes were alcohol related. These calls included complaints about noise, loud parties, vandalism, trespasses, and assaults. The officers asked one of the city attorneys to develop stringent guidelines for sentencing after conviction. The guidelines included Level I alcohol counseling for drug or alcohol-related offenses and community service to be performed in the apartment complex.

The officers turned the programs over to the residents of each community. The success of these programs rests with the apartment complex residents and their ability and enthusiasm to keep them going.

In another beat, officers are working with the staff of a shopping plaza to help eliminate problems that include indecent exposure, frauds at the Department of Motor Vehicles booth, and parking lot vehicle break-ins. An officer also is working with the management of an apartment complex to improve living conditions by using the eviction process for undesirables.

In yet another beat, an officer has been working with various businesses to assist them with their primary concern of stopping shoplifting. He is also working on traffic problems in his area and assisting the police area representative officer at an elementary school. The city traffic engineering division has been involved in this effort with the PAR officers and traffic officers.

HICOP task force. The most recent and most significant departmental community policing effort has been the implementation of several very large task force approaches to severe gang- and drug-related problems. These task forces have been commissioned with the use of overtime to staff the operations and have used the original HICOP model to

- Identify targets through community, police, and other governmental information
- Kick off the operations with drug warrants, where possible, along with the assistance of fire officials, code enforcement, zoning, animal control, and county social services

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- Maintain a prolonged, intense police presence in the targeted area while facilitating the community's ability to hold its ground where safety has been established
- Gradually withdraw the heavy police activity as community maintenance activities become entrenched and are facilitated by the remaining beat officers and the PAR officers
- Use both specialty units and generalist police officers in the task force, leaving area officers to work in the long term with residents.

Early returns on evaluation of the HICOP task force efforts indicate enormous successes. Not only have the traditional measures of police success been encouraging (numbers of arrests, summonses, etc.), but other measures have also yielded exciting results:

- Sample arrest statistics in one targeted area during a six-day measurement period were: total contacts, 433; total arrests, 54; total criminal summonses, 25, total traffic summonses, 35. One out of three persons contacted was wanted on active warrants
- New neighborhood organizations dedicated to self-help are starting up and membership has increased in existing neighborhood organizations

Aurora timeline

- 1980s** Foundations of community-oriented policing are laid as various community-oriented operations are initiated on different beats
- 1987** With the help of the Department of Justice, extensive training in community-oriented policing is conducted within the police department
- 1988** Full-scale community-oriented policing is implemented, led by a Core Team that includes representatives from other city departments
- 1989** Implementation of community-oriented policing is complete within the police department and other city departments are beginning to get involved
- 1990** Involvement of other city departments continues under a new city manager who, like his predecessor, is a proponent of community-oriented policing
- 1992** Community-oriented policing has been in operation for more than three years

City manager's perspective on community policing

The foundations for community policing were laid during the early 1980s, when the police began a pilot program called police area representatives, or PAR. This project assigned police officers to specific areas of the city with a range of duties including crime suppression, crime prevention, school and business liaison, and community ombudsman. The program grew to encompass all of Aurora.

The success of the PAR program paved the way toward acceptance of the community policing philosophy, which was initiated in 1988 by the police chief. The council and the then city manager, Jim Griesemer, gave their support to its implementation.

The current city council and I continue this support. Community policing has been accepted to the point that we take for granted the ability of the police department to respond to everything from small neighborhood problems to comprehensive event planning.

Community policing has paid off in many ways, but I will single out two examples. First, in the summer of 1991, the city was chosen by a hate group as the location of a rally. No one welcomed this intrusion, and we feared a disruptive, even violent outcome. However, the police department worked with other city departments to implement a comprehensive strategy for public safety. In addition, they spent a lot of time addressing the concerns of neighborhoods around the site of the event. The collaborative effort and the attention to citizens resulted in a nondisruptive rally.

The police department is also using the community policing philosophy effectively to address the growing problems of gangs and drugs. Residents voiced concern that disorder, fear of crime, gangs, and drug-related crime had taken over in some neighborhoods. It was clear that a collaborative approach similar to that used for the rally should be put into place. We are currently in the final stages of the first phase of High-Impact Community-Oriented Policing (HICOP). The initial reports are promising. We are encouraged by strong public support and the involvement of all city departments in the spirit of community-oriented government throughout these neighborhoods.

What lessons have we learned from community policing? First, community policing has a powerful potential to improve the quality of life in a community by allowing a more creative and collaborative approach to problems. Second, it should not be viewed as a quick fix, but should be given time to take root and grow throughout the community. Once the community has embraced the personalized and responsive philosophy of community policing, there is no going back to the traditional approach.

I believe community policing is here to stay in Aurora and I look forward to seeing it flourish.

—John Pazour, city manager
Aurora, Colorado

- Criminal intelligence sources indicate the total disruption of drug markets
- Known gang members have been arrested or have moved out of apartments in these areas
- The Downtown Aurora Business Association, the North Aurora Apartment Coalition, and other organizations in the area have shown increased interest in self-help.

Summary

The efforts listed in this case study are just a few of the many projects and initiatives of the officers and employees of the Aurora police department. Under the leadership of city management and the city council, the police department has been able to expand its efforts to include the other services of city government. The police department is committed to the community and knows that it is not alone in the effort.

COMMUNITY POLICING: RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

This case study was contributed by Marty M. Tapscott, Richmond chief of police.

The city of Richmond, Virginia, has been undergoing substantial changes in the past few decades. With a declining population, increased concern among residents about crime, a changing demography, and intense competition for new commercial and industrial enterprise, old patterns in the city have changed as new leadership has come into place. The 1990 census set the city's population at 203,000, far below its peak. As the state capital, the city remains an important government and commerce center, but the remaining sectors of the economy have become weak.

The Richmond Bureau of Police, typical of many city institutions, had a staff that was largely white, which did not reflect the diverse Richmond community. Tensions between police and citizens appeared to be growing. The rapid escalation of violence in the city and the extremely high rate of black-on-black homicides required a proactive policing presence that was out of character for Richmond's traditional police force.

The Community Policing Vision

City Manager Robert Bobb has concentrated on bringing community-oriented government to Richmond since his appointment in 1986. The development of neighborhood teams bringing together city agency representatives and city residents to plan service improvements in their neighborhoods helped improve government responsiveness, but the Richmond police bureau generally resisted deep involvement with other agencies of government.

In 1988, the city manager hired a new public safety director, Kent A. Ryan, who was committed to a new

vision of policing. One of his tasks was to assist in selecting a new police chief. Key criteria for the position included sophistication in dealing with an urban community and an understanding of the philosophy of community policing.

The individual selected, Marty M. Tapscott, is a former career officer with the police department in Washington, D.C., who had become chief of police in Flint, Michigan, following his retirement. He understood his role as a change agent but also recognized that the transition from traditional to community policing would take a number of years.

The police chief, public safety director, and city manager shared a common vision of effective policing. The key elements of success would have to be developing and maintaining a close relationship with the citizens of Richmond's neighborhoods at the line officer level. The plan for implementation would have several phases:

- Developing a clearly defined conceptual base upon which community policing could be built and identifying a set of core values to guide policing in the city
- Altering the organizational structure to reflect increased accountability in community policing, as well as strengthening various systems in the bureau
- Testing new approaches to problem solving and building new training initiatives upon approaches that were successful
- Implementing the problem-solving approach citywide and conducting a thorough evaluation to monitor the implementation's success or failure.

To provide the technical assistance necessary for the complex implementation process, the city manager brought in a consultant group from Maryland. Working with the police chief and the department's senior management, the consultants developed a detailed work plan for implementing community policing that became the key ingredient for the organizational transformation.

Developing the Conceptual Base

Several separate activities were undertaken to develop the conceptual base for community policing. Information briefings, or forums, held at police facilities throughout the city introduced officers to the elements of community policing and provided answers to their questions. Up to 100 officers attended each forum and heard presentations by the police chief and the consultants, followed by lengthy question-and-answer periods. A bimonthly newsletter was introduced to strengthen communications within the bureau. The newsletter became an important means of addressing implementation issues with officers throughout the department, with substantial attention focused on answering officers' questions from the field.

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To develop a statement of core values to be reflected in policing, the police chief convened a series of executive sessions on community policing. Community leaders, government executives, and police officers were invited to participate in a series of discussions aimed at identifying a revised mission and a new set of values for the department. The values agreed upon became the basis for discussions throughout the department about standards of police performance. They were distributed to all employees and were prominently displayed throughout the department. The values became the means for making policy decisions on matters such as firearms and force policies and discipline.

Altering the Organizational Structure

The second phase of community policing implementation was restructuring the bureau of police to increase accountability. This reorganization included structural changes as well as the reallocation of resources.

The police chief redistributed responsibilities among the three deputy chiefs of police to provide for a more rational basis of assignments. A number of specialized units were eliminated; their resources were moved to precincts to strengthen patrols so more patrol officers could be on the streets interacting with citizens. Several new units were formed, including a quality control unit.

With an authorized sworn strength of 648, the Richmond Bureau of Police found its resources stretched between the need for highly visible patrols and for performance of a variety of specialized functions. While other communities had added officers to support their community policing transformation, the city manager decided that in Richmond, any gain in personnel would come through improvements in resource allocation and reduction in the bureaucracy supporting policing. No new sworn personnel were committed to the community policing effort, but some civilians were added to the department to free officers for neighborhood policing duties.

To strengthen the quality of police training, the city manager initiated discussions with Virginia Union University about constructing a new police academy on campus grounds and involving the university in developing model community policing training programs. The city manager recognized that some of the new skills and sensitivities required for community policing would not be accepted easily by police officers. The current training site was in the basement of a theater, and he hoped that a modern facility would make the training process more acceptable. And having that training on the campus of a prestigious black university would strengthen the quality of the training process.

The university, under contract with the city for some of the costs, established a new chair of the criminal justice program, with responsibility for oversight and management of the police training program. This collaborative arrangement permitted the university and the city to attract to the position an individual with a

Ph.D. and substantial experience in a community policing agency. The basis for an improved and expanded police training program was now in place.

Community Policing in Action

At this stage, officers had heard about the community policing concepts but had seen little change in their "policing life." Two developments raised their level of involvement dramatically. Richmond's escalating violence focused community attention on the need to try new interventions. And the police chief decentralized detective operations.

The urban violence initiatives. By late 1989, the homicide rate in Richmond was higher than that of most other cities in the country. Homicide had become almost a daily occurrence. The city manager convened a task force to consider a new urban violence strategy.

During these discussions, the police chief and the deputy chief of field operations recognized that implementation of novel strategies could become a testing ground for problem-solving techniques and provide the department with the opportunity to gain experience with the problem-solving approach. The chiefs involved a number of officers in the strategy design process. The resulting urban violence intervention strategies became the bureau's initial community policing strategies. They included initiation of drug-free blocks, a code enforcement team, and a joint state police/Richmond police special enforcement effort.

The initiation of the drug-free blocks was particularly important for the community policing transformation. To become a drug-free block, 80 percent of the residents and building owners, joined by 60 percent of the block's youth, had to submit an initiative petition to the city stating that they wanted their block drug free and committing to maintaining that drug-free environment. Once the petition was submitted, police provided priority assistance to the block when drug dealing was observed. Citizen observers were given pager numbers to call that would ring in nearby patrol units.

By putting themselves on the line and providing a commitment to maintaining their area, police officers working the area came to understand the potential return from engaging citizens positively in cooperative undertakings. Fifteen blocks that were previously areas of intense street-level drug markets have become truly drug free.

The code enforcement team, consisting of police, fire, building inspection, and other city personnel, was directed to focus on closing down buildings where drug dealing had become intense.

Within six months, numerous drug-dealing hot spots were eliminated, and police officers came to recognize the importance and benefit of working closely with other city agencies on solving problems.

The special enforcement teams in each precinct consisted of both Richmond and state police officers who targeted street-level drug markets to remove drug deal-

ing from the streets. The officers who designed the Richmond initiative were able to travel to other cities to observe various programs in operation. In the process, they gained insight into how other police agencies operated. In the formerly closed environment of the Richmond police bureau, these observation trips were quite meaningful.

Detective decentralization. For years, Richmond had maintained a strong, centralized investigative operation, with all investigations run from headquarters. Few detectives favored the prospect of decentralizing functions to the three precincts.

The police leadership and the consultants decided to decentralize one precinct at a time, beginning early in 1992. After five months in which precinct detectives focused individually on specific beats, no detective wanted to go back to headquarters. Not only was the experience positive for the detectives, but their clearance rates increased dramatically over the test period. After five months of experience in one precinct, decentralization was implemented in a second; decentralization will begin in the third precinct as soon as space is available for the detectives.

Ongoing activities. Several important steps are at the brink of implementation. A total redesign of patrol beats or response unit sectors processing 911 calls for service will be implemented soon. Rather than simply respond immediately to each call, the police bureau plans to base assignment on the neighborhood police officer's area of accountability, telling citizens with nonemergency requests that they may have to wait a bit until their neighborhood police officer is available to assist them. This new system also will use alternate responses to calls where a police presence will not make a difference. It will limit greatly the current practice of having police officers run from call to call both inside and outside their assigned beats. Other local government departments will begin to play a larger role in answering service calls.

To increase the bureau's interaction with other police agencies involved in a community policing transformation, the police chief, with the active support of the city manager, cosponsored the first of what now will be an annual event—a community policing conference that brought together over 200 representatives of East Coast police agencies involved in community policing. With this step, the Richmond Bureau of Police moved from being an insular institution to one exhibiting leadership in community policing.

The Key Lessons of Implementation

Community policing implementation in Richmond has not been rapid. Officials chose to implement it methodically, so officers have accepted the fact that the transformation will continue. Few, if any, police officers in Richmond now oppose community policing. It is all they have heard for two years, and they have begun to see the benefits of close collaboration with the community.

Richmond timeline

- 1988 ↓ The city manager hires a public safety director who is a proponent of community-oriented policing
- 1989 ↓ A new police chief is hired who is in tune with the philosophy of community-oriented policing
- A consultant group is hired to aid implementation of community-oriented policing
- 1990 ↓ Departmental restructuring and training of officers in community-oriented policing begin
- 1990-91 ↓ With the cooperation of other city departments, task forces are created and drug-free block programs begin
- 1992 ↓ Decentralization of the detective force begins
- Richmond cosponsors a community-policing conference

Because they were involved in the design and implementation process, both employees and community members have come to believe in the value of the changes. Implementation has been brought about without rancor or divisiveness. And while there are still doubters, no one questions that community policing in Richmond is here to stay.

City Manager Bobb's original sense that a transformation to community policing needed strong police leadership has been supported by events. Likewise, his decision to provide consulting assistance to the police bureau has speeded the process.

The challenge has been to permit the seed of community policing to germinate while still facing the challenge of escalating crime and violence. The strategy that used new antiviolence initiatives as learning tools for community policing appears to have been productive.

Only time will tell if the community policing transformation ultimately will affect the community's propensity for violence. But policing in Richmond today is far different from that of three years ago.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICE SERVICES: ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND

This case study was written by Don Vandrey, public information officer for the city of Rockville.

In 1987, the police department in Rockville, Maryland, was near extinction. A consultant's report concluded that the city should either expand the department or disband it. Citizens complained about excessive use of force, low visibility, and poor response to neighborhood

needs. Elected officials were frustrated by the citizen complaints and the lack of police response to neighborhood concerns. Officer morale was low and turnover was high. Communication was at a standstill between the city police and the Montgomery County police, who have jurisdiction in Rockville. Public safety as a whole was jeopardized.

In 1992, Rockville's police department has become a model of community-oriented policing, a concept as old as the police profession itself but experiencing a rebirth in an age when technology and bureaucracy have come between the police officer and the citizen. The way this transformation took place and the success of citizen-based police services in Rockville provide valuable insight into the future of public safety services in the United States.

Background

The Rockville city police department is 30 years old. It consists of 35 sworn police officers plus an administrative and support staff of 18. The department serves a city of 45,500 residents and 11.6 square miles in a suburban setting 12 miles north of Washington, D.C.

The Rockville police department was formed in response to park and recreational area patrol needs. It also provided parking and traffic enforcement functions. From the beginning, the city police were supplemental to the Montgomery County police department, and they still are. Growth of the city, increasing residential and commercial crime, rapidly increasing traffic volume, and the emergence of drug-related neighborhood crime resulted in gradual evolution of the police force. But this process was marked by shifts in priorities and direction, confusion over the role of the city and county departments, and conflict between calls for a full-service city police force and no police force at all.

These forces came to a head in 1987 with the election of a mayor and council committed to providing enhanced police service and refocusing the city police on neighborhood concerns. A new city manager was appointed in 1988 and given a mandate to resolve the problems surrounding police services.

City Manager Bruce Romer began the transformation with the selection of a new police chief. Rather than following the usual procedures to select a department head, the city manager called together a broad-based group of civic, business, and public safety representatives to serve as an advisory committee, beginning with development of the position description and continuing through candidate interviews. The process was designed both to ensure that every applicant interviewed understood the priority the community placed on public safety, and to gain the strong endorsement of the community representatives for the eventual appointee. As a result, when the new police chief, T. N. Treschuk, arrived, he was embraced enthusiastically by all sectors of the community and had a high degree of credibility and respect already firmly established.

The city manager directed the police chief to assess the attitude of the department's sworn officers toward developing a closer working relationship with citizens. After making the assessment, the chief reported that he thought the department would accept the change. The city manager and police chief then briefed the mayor and council on the concept of community-oriented policing and told them how they thought it could work in Rockville. Implementation of community-oriented police services in Rockville then began, with the strong support of the elected officials.

A Community-Oriented Police Program

Rockville's philosophy, or mission statement, says that community safety "... gives equal emphasis to events or circumstances that do not involve serious crime but, by their nature or frequency of occurrence, do threaten the peace and sense of safety. ... This department is one that sees itself as a peacekeeper, not solely an enforcer of laws and ordinances."

The community policing philosophy frees officers from viewing the world as a narrow one of law-abiders and lawbreakers; it empowers officers to view the citizen as a partner in the pursuit of public safety. This new and freer way of thinking about law enforcement further allows the police officer to be creative, to form new ideas and take initiatives to improve the delivery of police service in the community. Such freedom is possible only when it is supported from the very top echelon of the police agency and city government.

In Rockville, these creative ideas have included Officer Tuttle, the bicycle patrol, and the Citizen Police Academy.

Officer Tuttle. Officer Tuttle is a mannequin that sits in a police car along streets where speeding has been identified as a problem. A coffee can hangs out the rear window to mimic a radar device. Occasionally, the mannequin is replaced by a real police officer, just to keep drivers alert. The program allows the department to respond to neighborhood speeding complaints without always placing an officer at the scene.

Bicycle patrol. Anyone who has seen a bicyclist whip past an automobile in the midst of a traffic jam knows that in certain circumstances, the bike is far more efficient than a car. That is the concept behind Rockville's bicycle patrol. Two police officers on bikes (donated by a local bicycle shop) can patrol Rockville's town center streets and area parks more efficiently than they could in a cruiser.

A police officer on a bike, furthermore, is much more approachable than the same officer in a car. Children are naturally curious and inquisitive. Adults find the bike an easy topic around which to strike up a conversation. The result is positive public contact with no loss of enforcement capability.

Citizen Police Academy. How often do citizens express

frustration over seeing police cars parked side by side, apparently having a casual conversation instead of patrolling? anger about getting a ticket for a minor traffic violation (while the real criminals are getting away with murder)? bemusement at having beat a ticket because the issuing police officer failed to appear in court? These and similar misunderstandings between citizens and police contribute to mistrust and alienation. Rockville's Citizen Police Academy is designed to reduce such misunderstandings.

The seven-week, 15-hour course is designed to provide citizens with an overall view of what the field of law enforcement is about, how the police officers perform their daily tasks, and how to involve the community and the police in cooperative policing efforts. Police professionals and regular officers teach the classes. The course covers patrol techniques, criminal law, decision-making rationale, accident investigation, detection and enforcement, court preparation and the judicial system, probable cause, officer hiring and training, and neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy. Graduates are viewed as ambassadors to the greater community, assets to the local police, and partners with police in law enforcement.

Training and equipment. Simultaneous with a police agency's commitment to the community must come a commitment to police officer training and equipment. Any officer who feels unprepared or underequipped to perform the most dangerous parts of the job is not going to be comfortable with any task. The reason is simple: a life-threatening event can occur during even the most routine call for service.

While the Rockville police department changed its focus to community-oriented policing, its officers also were among the first in the suburban area to switch to 9mm semiautomatic weapons. Training requirements were strengthened. Patrol schedules were modified to assure the greatest strength during the highest crime periods. Attention to the basic skills of law enforcement has never been greater than during the period of implementing community-oriented policing.

Measuring Results

The success of community-oriented policing is measured by the response from various populations as well as the impact it has on crime. These populations include residents and business operators who are the direct beneficiaries of public safety services, elected officials who respond to the reaction of the various community groups, and police officers inside and outside the department who make the difference between the success and failure of any policing philosophy.

Public reaction. Response from citizens and businesses has been overwhelmingly positive. Measured in terms of letters of appreciation for services delivered, positive newspaper articles, and public comments in various forums, the recognition and image of the Rockville

police department has never been better. The various Rockville service clubs have begun to sponsor an annual public safety awards banquet to recognize acts of valor by city police officers as well as other public safety agency personnel based in Rockville. The Maryland Municipal League presented its annual Award for Excellence to Rockville for its community-oriented police initiative.

Police officer reaction. Perhaps the best measure of the success of community-oriented policing among officers is the turnaround in recruitment and retention success. The Washington metropolitan area is served by numerous local, county, regional, state, and federal law enforcement agencies offering many opportunities for employment after a candidate completes the police academy. Rockville once experienced difficulty recruiting top-rated police officers or retaining trained officers, especially minority officers, because of the attraction of larger police agencies. In the past two years the situation has reversed. Officers from other agencies, including some officers who once worked for Rockville and left, are calling to inquire about positions. The representation of minority and women officers has increased significantly; most officers now remain with the city.

Response by elected officials. The early stages of implementing a community-oriented police service provided an opportunity to involve the elected officials in a hands-on way so that they became comfortable with the way the philosophy was being put into operation. The mayor and all four council members took part in neighborhood antidrug marches alongside residents, the city manager, the police chief, and police officers. They also attended some sessions of the first Citizen Police Academy and participated in its graduation ceremony, gaining a better understanding of how much the graduates appreciated the opportunity. They approved a plan to create a Police Explorers Post for young men and women interested in police work and immediately witnessed the results when the Explorers appeared at various special events in new uniforms, providing traffic control and crowd assistance.

These early actions by the mayor and council ensured their acceptance of and support for community-oriented policing. Rather than justifying to citizens the existence of a separate Rockville police department, as was the case a few years ago, elected officials in Rockville are now pointing proudly to a series of positive, effective, citizen-oriented initiatives that set the city police apart from other law enforcement agencies in the region. Perhaps most notably, the mayor and council enthusiastically endorsed a proposal by the city manager to expand the concept of community-oriented policing to other city departments, especially to city building inspectors.

Impact on crime. Crime statistics compiled by Montgomery County for each of its five police districts, including Rockville, show that serious crime in Rockville

Management Information Service

was down 14 percent in 1990 and down another 8 percent in 1991. In the first quarter of 1992, serious crime in Rockville was up 7 percent, compared to a 2.7 percent increase countywide. Rockville's statistics for the first quarter were skewed by a 100 percent increase in homicide due to a single case and a 60 percent increase in rape based on eight incidents versus five at this time last year. But robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary in the Rockville district were all down—by 3.4, 28.6, and 16.2 percent respectively, while countywide, robbery declined 6.4 percent, aggravated assault declined 6.8 percent, and burglary increased 7.9 percent. Meanwhile, between 1990 and 1991 the city of Rockville police reported a 25 percent increase in total caseload, reflecting a higher presence and increased calls for service from citizens.

Cost Implications of Community-Oriented Police Services

Community-oriented policing offers a low-cost or no-cost approach to improving police services because it

is neither a new service nor a new program. Typically, resources will be reallocated to reflect changing priorities. Neighborhood Watch support, for example, may be given greater staff time. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) or similar school-based educational programs may increase. New initiatives, such as Rockville's bicycle patrol, may attract in-kind private sector support.

No reduction should be expected in officer training, equipment, or technical support. Community safety demands that every police officer have the highest possible level of training and proficiency in all aspects of law enforcement. Furthermore, officers require a thorough understanding of other city programs and services in order to respond to citizen inquiries.

Among the significant costs incurred as part of Rockville's experience with community-oriented policing have been the purchase of a single-family house in a key drug-sale neighborhood to serve as a highly visible police substation; conversion to 9mm semiautomatic weapons; and dedication of two officers to the DARE program.

City manager's observations about community-oriented policing

Community-oriented policing makes my job easier, and I don't know any city manager who wouldn't appreciate that. We in city government receive a continuous stream of letters and phone calls about how helpful, polite, sensitive, and caring our police officers have been. Our elected officials have the same experience. No one is questioning the efficacy of the city's police force, as they were five years ago.

While we still have serious crime in Rockville, we no longer have a sense of crisis about open-air drug markets, violence, or unsafe neighborhoods. This is a direct result of the heightened role of citizens in law enforcement. When residents didn't know if a police officer would even respond to a call about suspicious activity, they hesitated to get involved. But knowing that their call is something the police rely on and respond to promptly gives residents added incentive to take the initiative.

Our police department adapted smoothly to community-oriented policing. This was partly the result of setting a foundation for the change in the process of selecting a new police chief, and partly the skill and sensitivity with which the new chief made the transition. The bottom line was that we lost no officers due to adopting the community-oriented philosophy, and we found former officers and officers from other jurisdictions calling us to inquire about joining the Rockville police department.

The decision to bring in a new police chief provided the mechanism for change. The selection process involved a cross-section of the city, including residents, business operators, and surrounding local government law-enforcement officials. The qualities, experience, and philosophies of police work that would be desirable in a Rockville police chief were

widely discussed. Each finalist was interviewed by a panel of community representatives; given an opportunity to meet and mingle with citizens, elected officials, and staff; and thoroughly briefed on the standards of citizen service Rockville provides in all of its departments.

This process sent an important message to the community and the police department about the future direction of the city police. Even while great expectations were being set for the new chief, the process helped assure that he would have few barriers in the way of implementing change. Within three months after assuming the job, the police chief completed his first assignment by reporting that the department was ready to implement community-oriented policing. Together we briefed the mayor and council on the program and our implementation plan. We have never had any reason to regret our decision.

Skeptics from around the country say that community-oriented policing is not the answer to our crime problems. Yet we watch outmoded, paramilitary-style police forces standing by helpless, isolated, and out of touch with the neighborhoods they are sworn to protect. We read about neighborhoods feeling so abandoned they seek outside help from self-appointed enforcers. In Rockville, Richmond, Aurora, Hayward, and elsewhere, community-oriented police services are setting a new standard.

Police managers, city managers, and chief administrative officers in municipalities large and small need to assess the quality of police services they are providing and the results they are getting. We are convinced a citizen-oriented, neighborhood-based, community partnership approach to law enforcement is the answer.

—Bruce Romer, city manager
Rockville, Maryland

Rockville timeline

- 1987: Rockville police department is threatened with disbandment.
- ↓
- 1988: New city manager is given a mandate to resolve problems surrounding police services.
- ↓
- After an extensive selection process, a new police chief is hired.
- The city manager and the police chief brief the mayor and council on community-oriented policing.
- Implementation of community-oriented policing begins.
- 1990: Crime in Rockville diminishes.
- ↓
- 1992: Rockville continues to use community-oriented policing; citizens routinely compliment department's work instead of complaining.

Transferability to Other Municipal Services

If community-oriented policing is so effective, what other city services might benefit from a similar approach? When the city manager asked that question, several obvious applications were identified. Code enforcement officials, building inspectors, and housing codes inspectors clearly were candidates. These officials perform similar enforcement-related tasks, require considerable public interaction, and have similar barriers to overcome.

Inspectors were assigned to specific sectors of the city and encouraged to make themselves known to neighborhood leaders, to attend civic association meetings, and to talk with residents and business owners in their area. The inspectors were empowered to take the initiative in identifying problems before they became serious and in working with residents to correct them.

Economic development staff members, in cooperation with the Economic Development Council, began a proactive program and business outreach. Rather than working exclusively to attract new business to the city, the council placed priority on retaining existing businesses, helping them expand, and working together on such common issues as signage, parking, and promotion.

What Lessons Have Been Learned?

Nearly three years after Rockville implemented its community-oriented policing philosophy, the police department has proven to the community, the media, elected officials, and other police agencies that the concept works—with no diminution in the effectiveness of law enforcement. Community-oriented policing does not eradicate drug abuse, street crime, homicide, or domestic violence. What it does do is involve the greater com-

munity in a partnership with police to attack the sources of crime and violence earlier, more efficiently, and with positive public support.

Community-oriented policing increases officer morale, improves recruitment and retention efforts, and encourages better training and development by officers. The result is a higher level of police performance, reduced incidents of poor judgment, and positive public image.

Community-oriented policing has not reduced the Rockville police department's presence on patrol, ability to respond to calls for service, or crime and accident investigations. In fact, the department's capability in these areas has actually improved. The difference in the daily functions of police officers is not readily apparent. On patrol, an officer will use his or her discretion in deciding when to park the vehicle and walk; will become familiar with local business operators by stopping and going inside routinely; will attend a civic association or Neighborhood Watch meeting in the evening; will spend a weekend afternoon at a community center in a drug-impacted neighborhood helping children get to know the police officer as a friend.

The opening of a police substation in this same neighborhood has had a tremendous benefit in giving officers day-to-day positive contact with children and adults alike. The police officer now provides information and interacts with the city government on a range of individual or community concerns.

Citizens love to know their police officers. Children and adults alike want to have a personal relationship with their neighborhood police officer and respond positively to community outreach efforts. When trust is established between citizens and police, everyone wins. This is the ultimate goal of community-oriented policing. This is what the Rockville police officer learns on the very first page of the city's General Order book: "[Community-oriented policing] requires us to recognize that the law is the basis for all our actions while acknowledging [that] our ultimate authority rests as surely on the trust and confidence we earn from the community."

THE COPPS EXPERIENCE: HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA

This case study was submitted by Chief Joseph E. Brann of the Hayward police department.

In Hayward, California (population 111,498), the police department's organizational structure for community-oriented policing was implemented in July 1991. However, the groundwork for this approach to public safety in Hayward was laid much earlier. In 1988, Hayward's city council and city manager initiated a series of roundtable meetings to learn what the community perceived as its most pressing issues. Hayward's city government, relying upon a Field Research Corporation survey, identified ten major issues facing the city. Among them were issues within the purview of the police: crime, safety, and drugs.

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This city's leaders believed the issue of crime, which incorporates concerns about safety and drug abuse, could best be addressed through strong partnerships between the police and the community and through a focus on dealing with neighborhood issues. The city manager realized the importance of integrating the efforts of all city departments to create lasting solutions to quality-of-life issues, including safety-related ones. This article describes the Hayward police department's response to the challenge of moving from being a traditional policing agency toward becoming a fully integrated community-oriented policing and problem solving (COPPS) agency.

Adoption of Community-Oriented Policing

City Manager Lou Garcia initiated Hayward's move toward the incorporation of the philosophy of community-oriented policing. When the incumbent police chief retired, the city manager recruited a chief of police who would lead the department toward community policing. Joseph E. Brann was brought in as chief of police in January 1990. He understood the city's course, had experience with and commitment to the concept of community-oriented policing, and possessed the skills to help the department implement it.

Community-oriented policing and problem solving (COPPS) is based on a philosophy that recognizes the importance of participative management, problem solving, visionary leadership, the empowerment of employees, and the need to establish a partnership between the police and the community to provide for shared responsibility. Regular, meaningful contact between the police and the community must be maintained to address crime effectively. The COPPS approach facilitates this interaction by forming a functional partnership between the police, the community, and other public and private service organizations to identify and resolve community problems that affect the quality of community life.

The COPPS philosophy has to be ingrained into both the organization's value system and that of every individual within the department. Fine-tuning the value system of the personnel within a highly traditional police agency is a gradual process that requires continuous reinforcement from command and supervisory personnel. At the core of this transition in Hayward was management's recognition that COPPS is value-oriented rather than rule-driven. Management initiated a systems assessment focusing on personnel department functions—recruitment, hiring, training, performance appraisal evaluations, and promotion guidelines—with the objective of incorporating and reflecting the new organizational values in all personnel practices.

Recruiting and Hiring

The first processes targeted were recruitment and hiring. The Hayward police department had taken a secondary role to the city personnel department in

determining the qualities for which law enforcement personnel were recruited and tested. Those qualities being tested were such attributes as weight in proportion to height, ability to read and write basic English, technical skills, physical agility, and so forth.

To transform the recruiting and hiring processes, the personnel and police departments jointly began exploring the following questions:

- Overall, what type of candidate, possessing what types of skills, is being recruited?
- What specific knowledge, skills, and abilities reflect the COPPS philosophy, particularly problem-solving abilities and sensitivity to the needs of the community?
- How can these attributes best be identified through the initial screening process?

To promote sensitivity to the needs of the community, management acknowledged that the city's work force should reflect the community. In addition, the police department's management worked closely with the hiring psychologist to develop a profile of an effective Hayward COPPS officer, which was incorporated into hiring criteria.

These issues had not been part of the hiring process. The previous criteria had not explored a candidate's ability to learn, to engage in effective problem solving, or to appraise a situation for a long-term solution. Though the profile of the ideal COPPS officer and employee will continue to evolve, the new recruitment perspective, coupled with mandated traditional policing skills, has begun to identify individuals who possess both conceptual understanding and skills for problem solving and dealing with the complexities of human behavior.

Training

A true organizational transition to community-oriented service requires both recruitment of personnel who possess values consistent with the COPPS philosophy and training for existing sworn and civilian personnel. Addressing the roles, responsibilities, and expectations of each employee became the second matter to be addressed.

The police department's initial training in the new philosophy was directed toward management and supervisory personnel, since a successful transition to community policing is linked directly to managers' and supervisors' commitment and understanding. Values and concepts are assimilated and practiced from the top down. Training was designed to help management and supervisory personnel accomplish the department's goal of reinforcing COPPS values and modifying the existing police culture.

Specifically, management leadership training promoted a philosophy consistent with the city's *Statement of Organizational Values*. That document emphasizes the delivery of quality service to the city's residents and recognizes the contributions of city employees in the

delivery of such services. In addition, training that focused on coaching extraordinary customer relations and satisfying citizens and customers of local government provided all employees with new skills and understanding to increase their effectiveness.

There were also extensive discussion and consideration of the organizational changes necessary to implement COPPS. Changes desired throughout the organization, and specifically at the line level, required a different management and supervisory perspective. In addition to the changes needed in selection processes, training focus, and performance appraisals, promotional and reward practices for personnel also had to be modified to reflect the new criteria. Efforts had to be implemented to transform long-held perceptions and attitudes about what constitutes "real" police work. This internal organizational change process is expected to be laborious and slow.

The annual advanced officers training provided the medium for the initial line and staff training. Intensive instruction in COPPS concepts, in conjunction with police agency site visits to other cities, became the basis for the training. This 40-hour block of training was provided to all employees of the Hayward police department, in validation of the COPPS perspective that all employees—nonsworn, sworn, clerical, and command staff—are involved in delivering services to the community.

The staff was introduced to the general concepts of community policing as well as the specific refinements necessary within core functions of the department; i.e., management and supervision, service delivery, problem solving, and involvement with the community. The training segments were delivered by in-house personnel who could translate this philosophy effectively. A benefit of using in-house instructors was that employees were able to hear command personnel sincerely support the concepts of decentralization of authority and risk-taking.

To insure that new employees understand COPPS concepts, the in-house academy and the field training officer's programs now provide training in COPPS to new employees. In addition, the police chief and staff are working with police academies to refine course content to include community-oriented policing concepts for recruits during the basic academy.

Evaluation and Reward Systems

Continuous reinforcement is required if the COPPS philosophy is to mold the value system of all Hayward police department employees—and of the organization itself. To meet this need, the evaluation process and reward systems need to be changed to provide ongoing encouragement and support for community-oriented policing.

The concept of emphasizing quality over quantity represents a major difference between traditional and community-oriented policing. Hayward's traditional performance-appraisal evaluations emphasized quan-

titative measurements such as statistics or data reflecting arrests, numbers of citations, response times, and number of calls for service. Institutionally, law enforcement has not recognized or rewarded behavior or performance that is consistent with community-oriented policing efforts.

Community-oriented policing emphasizes how well a call for service is handled and what types of approaches are used to solve problems. An evaluation process is necessary that allows realistic, subjective assessments recognizing employees for excellence in these endeavors.

Recommendations for refinement of the evaluation process were solicited from and provided by managers, supervisors, and line personnel. As part of the new focus on decentralization, all work units will eventually develop their own evaluation instruments and processes. These will be designed around the specific services each work unit provides and will recognize creative solutions and problem-solving approaches.

As COPPS becomes the norm, the performance evaluation process becomes heavily reliant upon the input of the employee being evaluated. Identified significant events, performance, and new goals (personal or departmental) that further the department's commitment to community policing and problem solving are recognized. The evaluation process is intended to benefit both the employees and the department as a whole.

Other reward systems that promote COPPS and reinforce employees' community-oriented and problem-solving approaches include broadcasting and communicating such efforts through supervisors' logs, a COPPS newsletter, citywide recognition of extraordinary customer service efforts, and commendations for employees' creative problem-solving approaches. Public acknowledgments are given to individuals at all levels of the organization for excellence in adopting the COPPS philosophy.

Promotion Practices

To provide recognition and reward to employees committed to the values and understanding of COPPS, the promotion policies of the department have also been retooled. The police department and city personnel department together have developed new rating instruments to reflect COPPS concepts and values. These instruments contain guidelines that help the evaluators understand the shifts in values and behaviors necessary to move from a traditional policing style toward the COPPS philosophy.

Knowledgeable evaluators are critical to this process. Every possible effort is made to select promotion board representatives from agencies actively engaged in community policing.

One of the best indicators of a candidate's potential for future performance is previous performance and behavior. In recognition of this fact, a new phase was added to the department's promotion test. This assessment is conducted by in-house personnel and is de-

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signed to evaluate the candidate's experience and performance, both on and off the job, as they relate to the promotion under consideration. The promotability assessment is based on materials submitted by the candidate to an internal assessment panel. The rating panel typically is composed of experienced supervisors or managers from the rank tested for, in addition to raters from the next higher rank. Typical dimensions assessed are leadership, analytical skills, decision-making abilities, communication skills, interpersonal skills, and professional contributions.

As a result of these modifications in the promotion testing, the rating emphasis now considers the new expectations and standards attached to the various roles within the department. This redesign of the promotion process reflects the police department's commitment to a future based on community policing and problem solving.

Involving Other City Departments

The involvement, understanding, and commitment of other city departments is critical to the successful implementation of the COPPS philosophy. Community-oriented policing and problem solving is not only a police department commitment, but a citywide commitment to the community. The foundation for involving all city departments was the direct result of the commitment of the city manager, as well as the willingness of other department heads and their staffs to involve themselves in the development of COPPS in Hayward.

The police chief made COPPS an integral part of all department head meetings by discussing the progress of the effort and continually expanding understanding of the philosophical approach. Ultimately, other department heads began to visualize how their departments could integrate a community-oriented service philosophy. Increased understanding of and excitement about the concept on the part of department heads has resulted in a citywide commitment—to the extent that most departments have incorporated this philosophy into their own work units.

Organizational Transition: Strengths and Areas to Revisit

Hayward's smooth transition and organizational adoption of the COPPS philosophy were facilitated through a visionary implementation plan. The change process both revealed strengths and highlighted areas for improvement.

Areas of strength included

- A mission statement reflective of COPPS values
- Development of an area command structure
- Employee involvement
- City departments' involvement
- Empowerment of citizens and officers
- Understanding that change is gradual
- An initial community survey for future comparisons
- A COPPS assessment team

Hayward timeline

- 1988 Hayward's city council and city manager initiate a series of meetings to get community input on the city's problems
- ↓
- A better relationship between the police and the community is identified as a goal
- The city begins developing a community-oriented policing philosophy for Hayward
- 1990 A new police chief committed to community-oriented policing is hired
- ↓
- The police department begins community-oriented policing training and visits other police departments using community-oriented policing
- Community-oriented policing is promoted in other city departments
- 1991 A new community-oriented policing structure is implemented
- ↓
- 1992 The police department develops a full partnership with the community and other city departments

- COPPS tailored to the community's needs
- Flexibility.

Areas to revisit are

- Support of risk taking
- Evaluation of an entire effort (positive or negative)
- Role conflict between watch and area commanders
- Organizational communication breakdown
- Sergeant shift/area priority conflicts
- COPPS education for all city departments.

Conclusion

Community-oriented policing and problem solving makes a statement not only to the community, but to the employees of the city of Hayward as well. The philosophy symbolizes what the city is all about and how it intends to deliver services. The transition to the COPPS philosophy depends on understanding, involvement, and commitment at all levels. The foundation that has been laid is solid, but it will be necessary to build on that foundation through further modifications based on experience with COPPS.

The members of the Hayward police department have joined in a partnership with their community. Ongoing redefinition, growth, and development of the COPPS philosophy will enhance an environment that promotes improved quality of life for the entire community.

BROKEN WINDOWS

BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING


IN THE MID-1970S, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ANNOUNCED a "Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program," designed to improve the quality of community life in twenty-eight cities. As part of that program, the state provided money to help cities take police officers out of their patrol cars and assign them to walking beats. The governor and other state officials were enthusiastic about using foot patrol as a way of cutting crime, but many police chiefs were skeptical. Foot patrol, in their eyes, had been pretty much discredited. It reduced the mobility of the police, who thus had difficulty responding to citizen calls for service, and it weakened headquarters control over patrol officers.

Many police officers also disliked foot patrol, but for different reasons: it was hard work, it kept them outside on cold, rainy nights, and it reduced their chances for making a "good pinch." In some departments, assigning officers to foot patrol had been used as a form of punishment. And academic experts on policing doubted that foot patrol would have any impact on crime rates; it was, in the opinion of most, little more than a sop to public opinion. But since the state was paying for it, the local authorities were willing to go along.

Five years after the program started, the Police Foundation, in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot-patrol project. Based on its analysis of a carefully controlled experiment carried out chiefly in Newark, the foundation concluded, to the surprise of hardly anyone, that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. But residents of the foot-patrolled neighborhoods seemed to feel more secure than persons in other areas, tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime (staying at home with the doors locked, for example). Moreover, citizens in the foot-patrol areas had a more favorable opinion of the police than did those living elsewhere. And officers walking beats had higher morale, greater job satisfaction, and a more favorable attitude toward citizens in their neighborhoods than did officers assigned to patrol cars.


These findings may be taken as evidence that the skept-

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tics were right—foot patrol has no effect on crime; it merely fools the citizens into thinking that they are safer. But in our view, and in the view of the authors of the Police Foundation study (of whom Kelling was one), the citizens of Newark were not fooled at all. They knew what the foot-patrol officers were doing, they knew it was different from what motorized officers do, and they knew that having officers walk beats did in fact make their neighborhoods safer.

But how can a neighborhood be "safer" when the crime rate has not gone down—in fact, may have gone up? Finding the answer requires first that we understand what most often frightens people in public places. Many citizens, of course, are primarily frightened by crime, especially crime involving a sudden, violent attack by a stranger. This risk is very real, in Newark as in many large cities. But we tend to overlook or forget another source of fear—



the fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.

What foot-patrol officers did was to elevate, to the extent they could, the level of public order in these neighborhoods. Though the neighborhoods were predominantly black and the foot patrolmen were mostly white, this "order-maintenance" function of the police was performed to the general satisfaction of both parties.

One of us (Kelling) spent many hours walking with Newark foot-patrol officers to see how they defined "order" and what they did to maintain it. One beat was typical: a busy but dilapidated area in the heart of Newark, with many abandoned buildings, marginal shops (several of which prominently displayed knives and straight-edged razors in their windows), one large department store, and, most important, a train station and several major bus stops. Though the area was run-down, its streets were filled with people, because it was a major transportation center. The good order of this area was important not only to those who lived and worked there but also to many others, who had to move through it on their way home, to supermarkets, or to factories.

The people on the street were primarily black: the officer who walked the street was white. The people were

made up of "regulars" and "strangers." Regulars included both "decent folk" and some drunks and derelicts who were always there but who "knew their place." Strangers were, well, strangers, and viewed suspiciously, sometimes apprehensively. The officer—call him Kelly—knew who the regulars were, and they knew him. As he saw his job, he was to keep an eye on strangers, and make certain that the disreputable regulars observed some informal but widely understood rules. Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, Kelly would ask him if he had any means of support and what his business was: if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.

These rules were defined and enforced in collaboration with the "regulars" on the street. Another neighborhood might have different rules, but these, everybody understood, were the rules for *this* neighborhood. If someone violated them, the regulars not only turned to Kelly for

help but also ridiculed the violator. Sometimes what Kelly did could be described as "enforcing the law," but just as often it involved taking informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order. Some of the things he did probably would not withstand a legal challenge.

A determined skeptic might acknowledge that a skilled foot-patrol officer can maintain order but still insist that this sort of "order" has little to do with the real sources of community fear—that is, with violent crime. To a degree, that is true. But two things must be borne in mind. First, outside observers should not assume that they know how much of the anxiety now endemic in many big-city neighborhoods stems from a fear of "real" crime and how much from a sense that the street is disorderly, a source of distasteful, worrisome encounters. The people of Newark, to judge from their behavior and their remarks to interviewers, apparently assign a high value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain that order.

SECOND, AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL, DISORDER AND crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing. (It has always been fun.)

Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family—father, mother, and young son—who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began—windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.

Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider

themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx—its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"—vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares."

We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable






table and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by panhandlers.

At this point it is not inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks on strangers will occur. But many residents will think that crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay apart from their fellows, moving

with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. "Don't get involved." For some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their "home" but "the place where they live." Their interests are elsewhere; they are cosmopolitans. But it will matter greatly to other people, whose lives derive meaning and satisfaction from local attachments rather than worldly involvement; for them, the neighborhood will cease to exist except for a few reliable friends whom they arrange to meet.

Such an area is vulnerable to criminal invasion. Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped. That the drunks will be robbed by boys who do it as a lark, and the prostitutes' customers will be robbed by men who do it purposefully and perhaps violently. That muggings will occur.

Among those who often find it difficult to move away from this are the elderly. Surveys of citizens suggest that the elderly are much less likely to be the victims of crime than younger persons, and some have inferred from this that the well-known fear of crime voiced by the elderly is an exaggeration: perhaps we ought not to design special programs to protect older persons; perhaps we should even try to talk them out of their mistaken fears. This argument misses the point. The prospect of a confrontation with an obstreperous teenager or a drunken panhandler can be as fear-inducing for defenseless persons as the prospect of meeting an actual robber; indeed, to a defenseless person, the two kinds of confrontation are often indistinguishable. Moreover, the lower rate at which the elderly are victimized is a measure of the steps they have already taken—chiefly, staying behind locked doors—to minimize the risks they face. Young men are more frequently attacked than older women, not because they are easier or more lucrative targets but because they are on the streets more.

Nor is the connection between disorderliness and fear made only by the elderly. Susan Estrich, of the Harvard Law School, has recently gathered together a number of surveys on the sources of public fear. One, done in Portland, Oregon, indicated that three fourths of the adults interviewed cross to the other side of a street when they see a gang of teenagers; another survey, in Baltimore, discovered that nearly half would cross the street to avoid even a single strange youth. When an interviewer asked people in a housing project where the most dangerous spot was, they mentioned a place where young persons gathered to drink and play music, despite the fact that not a single crime had occurred there. In Boston public housing projects, the greatest fear was expressed by persons living in the buildings where disorderliness and incivility, not crime, were the greatest. Knowing this helps one understand the significance of such otherwise harmless displays

as subway graffiti. As Nathan Glazer has written, the proliferation of graffiti, even when not obscene, confronts the subway rider with the "inescapable knowledge that the environment he must endure for an hour or more a day is uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and that anyone can invade it to do whatever damage and mischief the mind suggests."

In response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening controls. Sometimes they call the police. Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs, but crime continues and disorder is not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or first-time offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either ineffective or uncaring; to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because "they can't do anything."


The process we call urban decay has occurred for centuries in every city. But what is happening today is different in at least two important respects. First, in the period before, say, World War II, city dwellers—because of money costs, transportation difficulties, familial and church connections—could rarely move away from neighborhood problems. When movement did occur, it tended to be along public-transit routes. Now mobility has become exceptionally easy for all but the poorest or those who are blocked by racial prejudice. Earlier crime waves had a kind of built-in self-correcting mechanism: the determination of a neighborhood or community to reassert control over its turf. Areas in Chicago, New York, and Boston would experience crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return, as the families for whom no alternative residences were possible reclaimed their authority over the streets.

Second, the police in this earlier period assisted in that reassertion of authority by acting, sometimes violently, on behalf of the community. Young toughs were roughed up, people were arrested "on suspicion" or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. "Rights" were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a lawyer.

This pattern of policing was not an aberration or the result of occasional excess. From the earliest days of the nation, the police function was seen primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain order against the chief threats to order—fire, wild animals, and disreputable behavior. Solving crimes was viewed not as a police responsibility but as a private one. In the March, 1969, *Atlantic*, one of us (Wilson) wrote a brief account of how the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting crimes. The change began with the creation of private detectives (often ex-criminals), who worked on a contingency-fee basis for individuals who had suffered losses. In time, the detectives were absorbed into municipal police

agencies and paid a regular salary; simultaneously, the responsibility for prosecuting thieves was shifted from the aggrieved private citizen to the professional prosecutor. This process was not complete in most places until the twentieth century.

In the 1960s, when urban riots were a major problem, social scientists began to explore carefully the order-maintenance function of the police, and to suggest ways of improving it—not to make streets safer (its original function) but to reduce the incidence of mass violence. Order-maintenance became, to a degree, coterminous with "community relations." But, as the crime wave that began in the early 1960s continued without abatement throughout the decade and into the 1970s, attention shifted to the role of the police as crime-fighters. Studies of police behavior ceased, by and large, to be accounts of the order-maintenance function and became, instead, efforts to propose and test ways whereby the police could solve more crimes, make more arrests, and gather better evidence. If these things could be done, social scientists assumed, citizens would be less fearful.



A GREAT DEAL WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING THIS transition, as both police chiefs and outside experts emphasized the crime-fighting function in their plans, in the allocation of resources, and in deployment of personnel. The police may well have become better crime-fighters as a result. And doubtless they remained aware of their responsibility for order. But the link between order-maintenance and crime-prevention, so obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten.

That link is similar to the process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—namely, that serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

Some police administrators concede that this process occurs, but argue that motorized-patrol officers can deal with it as effectively as foot-patrol officers. We are not so sure. In theory, an officer in a squad car can observe as much as an officer on foot; in theory, the former can talk to as many people as the latter. But the reality of police-citizen encounters is powerfully altered by the automobile. An officer on foot cannot separate himself from the street people; if he is approached, only his uniform and his personality can help him manage whatever is about to happen. And he can never be certain what that will be—a request for directions, a plea for help, an angry denunciation, a teasing remark, a confused babble, a threatening gesture.

In a car, an officer is more likely to deal with street people by rolling down the window and looking at them. The door and the window exclude the approaching citizen; they are a barrier. Some officers take advantage of this barrier, perhaps unconsciously, by acting differently if in the car than they would on foot. We have seen this countless times. The police car pulls up to a corner where teenagers are gathered. The window is rolled down. The officer stares at the youths. They stare back. The officer says to one, "C'mere." He saunters over, conveying to his friends by his elaborately casual style the idea that he is not intimidated by authority. "What's your name?" "Chuck." "Chuck who?" "Chuck Jones." "What'ya doing, Chuck?" "Nothin'." "Got a P.O. [parole officer]?" "Nah." "Sure?" "Yeah." "Stay out of trouble, Chuckie." Meanwhile, the other boys laugh and exchange comments among themselves, probably at the officer's expense. The officer stares

harder. He cannot be certain what is being said, nor can he join in and, by displaying his own skill at street banter, prove that he cannot be "put down." In the process, the officer has learned almost nothing, and the boys have decided the officer is an alien force who can safely be disregarded, even mocked.

Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the authorities what is worrying them (whereby they gain a modest but significant sense of having "done something" about the problem). You approach a person on foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a person in a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a private chat. Suppose you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who offered to sell you a stolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a "fink."

The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. And therein lies the problem.

SHOULD POLICE ACTIVITY ON THE STREET BE SHAPED, in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than by the rules of the state? Over the past two decades, the shift of police from order-maintenance to law-enforcement has brought them increasingly under the influence of legal restrictions, provoked by media complaints and enforced by court decisions and departmental orders. As a consequence, the order-maintenance functions of the police are now governed by rules developed to control police relations with suspected criminals. This is, we think, an entirely new development. For centuries, the role of the police as watchmen was judged primarily not in terms of its compliance with appropriate procedures but rather in terms of its attaining a desired objective. The objective was order, an inherently ambiguous term but a condition that people in a given community recognized when they saw it. The means were the same as those the community itself would employ, if its members were sufficiently determined, courageous, and authoritative. Detecting and apprehending criminals, by contrast, was a means to an end, not an end in itself; a judicial determination of guilt or innocence was the hoped-for result of the law-enforcement mode. From the first, the police were expected to follow rules defining that process, though states differed in how stringent the rules should be. The criminal-apprehension process was always understood to involve individual rights, the violation of which was unac-

ceptable because it meant that the violating officer would be acting as a judge and jury—and that was not his job. Guilt or innocence was to be determined by universal standards under special procedures.

Ordinarily, no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of neighborhood order. That is true not only because most cases are handled informally on the street but also because no universal standards are available to settle arguments over disorder, and thus a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer. Until quite recently in many states, and even today in some places, the police make arrests on such charges as “suspicious person” or “vagrancy” or “public drunkenness”—charges with scarcely any legal meaning. These charges exist not because society wants judges to punish vagrants or drunks but because it wants an officer to have the legal tools to remove undesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts to preserve order in the streets have failed.

Once we begin to think of all aspects of police work as involving the application of universal rules under special procedures, we inevitably ask what constitutes an “undesirable person” and why we should “criminalize” vagrancy or drunkenness. A strong and commendable desire to see that people are treated fairly makes us worry about allowing the police to rout persons who are undesirable by some vague or parochial standard. A growing and not-so-commendable utilitarianism leads us to doubt that any behavior that does not “hurt” another person should be made illegal. And thus many of us who watch over the police are reluctant to allow them to perform, in the only way they can, a function that every neighborhood desperately wants them to perform.

This wish to “decriminalize” disreputable behavior that “harms no one”—and thus remove the ultimate sanction the police can employ to maintain neighborhood order—is, we think, a mistake. Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire community. A particular rule that seems to make sense in the individual case makes no sense when it is made a universal rule and applied to all cases. It makes no sense because it fails to take into account the connection between one broken window left untended and a thousand broken windows. Of course, agencies other than the police could attend to the problems posed by drunks or the mentally ill, but in most communities—especially where the “deinstitutionalization” movement has been strong—they do not.

The concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person more undesirable than another, but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that

the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?

We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority. That limit, roughly, is this—the police exist to help regulate behavior, not to maintain the racial or ethnic purity of a neighborhood.

Consider the case of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, one of the largest public-housing projects in the country. It is home for nearly 20,000 people, all black, and extends over ninety-two acres along South State Street. It was named after a distinguished black who had been, during the 1940s, chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority. Not long after it opened, in 1962, relations between project residents and the police deteriorated badly. The citizens felt that the police were insensitive or brutal; the police, in turn, complained of unprovoked attacks on them. Some Chicago officers tell of times when they were afraid to enter the Homes. Crime rates soared.

Today, the atmosphere has changed. Police-citizen relations have improved—apparently, both sides learned something from the earlier experience. Recently, a boy stole a purse and ran off. Several young persons who saw the theft voluntarily passed along to the police information on the identity and residence of the thief, and they did this publicly, with friends and neighbors looking on. But problems persist, chief among them the presence of youth gangs that terrorize residents and recruit members in the project. The people expect the police to “do something” about this, and the police are determined to do just that.

But do what? Though the police can obviously make arrests whenever a gang member breaks the law, a gang can form, recruit, and congregate without breaking the law. And only a tiny fraction of gang-related crimes can be solved by an arrest; thus, if an arrest is the only recourse for the police, the residents' fears will go unassuaged. The police will soon feel helpless, and the residents will again believe that the police “do nothing.” What the police in fact do is to chase known gang members out of the project. In the words of one officer, “We kick ass.” Project residents both know and approve of this. The tacit police-citizen alliance in the project is reinforced by the police view that the cops and the gangs are the two rival sources of power in the area, and that the gangs are not going to win.

None of this is easily reconciled with any conception of due process or fair treatment. Since both residents and gang members are black, race is not a factor. But it could be. Suppose a white project confronted a black gang, or vice versa. We would be apprehensive about the police taking sides. But the substantive problem remains the same: how can the police strengthen the informal social-control mechanisms of natural communities in order to minimize fear in public places? Law enforcement, per se, is no an-

swer. A gang can weaken or destroy a community by standing about in a menacing fashion and speaking rudely to passersby without breaking the law.

WE HAVE DIFFICULTY THINKING ABOUT SUCH MATTERS, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we have become accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines *my* rights, punishes *his* behavior, and is applied by *that* officer because of *this* harm. We assume, in thinking this way, that what is good for the individual will be good for the community, and what doesn't matter when it happens to one person won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those are plausible assumptions. But in cases where behavior that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others—fear, withdrawal, flight—may ultimately make matters worse for everyone, including the individual who first professed his indifference.

It may be their greater sensitivity to communal as opposed to individual needs that helps explain why the residents of small communities are more satisfied with their police than are the residents of similar neighborhoods in big cities. Elinor Ostrom and her co-workers at Indiana University compared the perception of police services in two poor, all-black Illinois towns—Phoenix and East Chicago Heights—with those of three comparable all-black neighborhoods in Chicago. The level of criminal victimization and the quality of police-community relations appeared to be about the same in the towns and the Chicago neighborhoods. But the citizens living in their own villages were much more likely than those living in the Chicago neighborhoods to say that they do not stay at home for fear of crime, to agree that the local police have “the right to take any action necessary” to deal with problems, and to agree that the police “look out for the needs of the average citizen.” It is possible that the residents and the police of the small towns saw themselves as engaged in a collaborative effort to maintain a certain standard of communal life, whereas those of the big city felt themselves to be simply requesting and supplying particular services on an individual basis.

If this is true, how should a wise police chief deploy his meager forces? The first answer is that nobody knows for certain, and the most prudent course of action would be to try further variations on the Newark experiment, to see more precisely what works in what kinds of neighborhoods. The second answer is also a hedge—many aspects of order-maintenance in neighborhoods can probably best be handled in ways that involve the police minimally, if at all. A busy, bustling shopping center and a quiet, well-tended suburb may need almost no visible police presence. In both cases, the ratio of respectable to disreputable people is ordinarily so high as to make informal social control effective.

Even in areas that are in jeopardy from disorderly elements, citizen action without substantial police involvement may be sufficient. Meetings between teenagers who like to hang out on a particular corner and adults who want to use that corner might well lead to an amicable agreement on a set of rules about how many people can be allowed to congregate, where, and when.

Where no understanding is possible—or if possible, not observed—citizen patrols may be a sufficient response. There are two traditions of communal involvement in maintaining order. One, that of the “community watchmen,” is as old as the first settlement of the New World. Until well into the nineteenth century, volunteer watchmen, not policemen, patrolled their communities to keep order. They did so, by and large, without taking the law into their own hands—without, that is, punishing persons or using force. Their presence deterred disorder or alerted the community to disorder that could not be deterred. There are hundreds of such efforts today in communities all across the nation. Perhaps the best known is that of the Guardian Angels, a group of unarmed young persons in distinctive berets and T-shirts, who first came to public attention when they began patrolling the New York City subways but who claim now to have chapters in more than thirty American cities. Unfortunately, we have little information about the effect of these groups on crime. It is possible, however, that whatever their effect on crime, citizens find their presence reassuring, and that they thus contribute to maintaining a sense of order and civility.

The second tradition is that of the “vigilante.” Rarely a feature of the settled communities of the East, it was primarily to be found in those frontier towns that grew up in advance of the reach of government. More than 350 vigilante groups are known to have existed; their distinctive feature was that their members did take the law into their own hands, by acting as judge, jury, and often executioner as well as policeman. Today, the vigilante movement is conspicuous by its rarity, despite the great fear expressed by citizens that the older cities are becoming “urban frontiers.” But some community-watchmen groups have skirted the line, and others may cross it in the future. An ambiguous case, reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, involved a citizens' patrol in the Silver Lake area of Belleville, New Jersey. A leader told the reporter, “We look for outsiders.” If a few teenagers from outside the neighborhood enter it, “we ask them their business,” he said. “If they say they're going down the street to see Mrs. Jones, fine, we let them pass. But then we follow them down the block to make sure they're really going to see Mrs. Jones.”

THOUGH CITIZENS CAN DO A GREAT DEAL, THE POLICE are plainly the key to order-maintenance. For one thing, many communities, such as the Robert Taylor Homes, cannot do the job by themselves. For another, no citizen in a neighborhood, even an organized one, is like-

ly to feel the sense of responsibility that wearing a badge confers. Psychologists have done many studies on why people fail to go to the aid of persons being attacked or seeking help, and they have learned that the cause is not "apathy" or "selfishness" but the absence of some plausible grounds for feeling that one must personally accept responsibility. Ironically, avoiding responsibility is easier when a lot of people are standing about. On streets and in public places, where order is so important, many people are likely to be "around," a fact that reduces the chance of any one person acting as the agent of the community. The police officer's uniform singles him out as a person who must accept responsibility if asked. In addition, officers, more easily than their fellow citizens, can be expected to distinguish between what is necessary to protect the safety of the street and what merely protects its ethnic purity.

But the police forces of America are losing, not gaining, members. Some cities have suffered substantial cuts in the number of officers available for duty. These cuts are not likely to be reversed in the near future. Therefore, each department must assign its existing officers with great care. Some neighborhoods are so demoralized and crime-ridden as to make foot patrol useless; the best the police can do with limited resources is respond to the enormous number of calls for service. Other neighborhoods are so stable and serene as to make foot patrol unnecessary. The key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point—where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered.

Most police departments do not have ways of systematically identifying such areas and assigning officers to them. Officers are assigned on the basis of crime rates (meaning that marginally threatened areas are often stripped so that police can investigate crimes in areas where the situation is hopeless) or on the basis of calls for service (despite the fact that most citizens do not call the police when they are merely frightened or annoyed). To allocate patrol wisely, the department must look at the neighborhoods and decide, from first-hand evidence, where an additional officer will make the greatest difference in promoting a sense of safety.


One way to stretch limited police resources is being tried in some public-housing projects. Tenant organizations hire off-duty police officers for patrol work in their buildings. The costs are not high (at least not per resident), the offi-

cer likes the additional income, and the residents feel safer. Such arrangements are probably more successful than hiring private watchmen, and the Newark experiment helps us understand why. A private security guard may deter crime or misconduct by his presence, and he may go to the aid of persons needing help, but he may well not intervene—that is, control or drive away—someone challenging community standards. Being a sworn officer—a "real cop"—seems to give one the confidence, the sense of duty, and the aura of authority necessary to perform this difficult task.

Patrol officers might be encouraged to go to and from duty stations on public transportation and, while on the bus or subway car, enforce rules about smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct, and the like. The enforcement need involve nothing more than ejecting the offender (the offense, after all, is not one with which a booking officer or a judge wishes to be bothered). Perhaps the random but relentless maintenance of standards on buses would lead to conditions on buses that approximate the level of civility we now take for granted on airplanes.

But the most important requirement is to think that to maintain order in precarious situations is a vital job. The police know this is one of their functions, and they also believe, correctly, that it cannot be done to the exclusion of criminal investigation and responding to calls. We may have encouraged them to suppose, however, on the basis of our oft-repeated concerns about serious, violent crime, that they will be judged exclusively on their capacity as crime-fighters. To the extent that this is the case, police administrators will continue to concentrate police personnel in the highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in the areas most vulnerable to criminal invasion), emphasize their training in the law and criminal apprehension (and not their training in managing street life), and join too quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "harmless" behavior (though public drunkenness, street prostitution, and pornographic displays can destroy a community more quickly than any team of professional burglars).

Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not measure communal losses. Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—ought to recognize the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows. □



*Sometimes "fixing broken windows" does more
to reduce crime than conventional "incident-oriented" policing*

MAKING NEIGHBORHOODS SAFE


BY JAMES Q. WILSON AND GEORGE L. KELLING


NEW BRIARFIELD APARTMENTS IS AN OLD, RUN-down collection of wooden buildings constructed in 1942 as temporary housing for shipyard workers in Newport News, Virginia. By the mid-1980s it was widely regarded as the worst housing project in the city. Many of its vacant units provided hiding places for drug users. It had the highest burglary rate in Newport News; nearly a quarter of its apartments were broken into at least once a year.

For decades the police had wearily answered calls for assistance and had investigated crimes in New Briarfield. Not much came of this police attentiveness—the buildings went on deteriorating, the burglaries went on occurring, the residents went on living in terror. Then, in 1984, Detective Tony Duke, assigned to a newly created police task force, decided to interview the residents of New

Briarfield about their problems. Not surprisingly, he found that they were worried about the burglaries—but they were just as concerned about the physical deterioration of the project. Rather than investigating only the burglaries, Duke spent some of his time investigating the *buildings*. Soon he learned that many city agencies—the fire department, the public-works department, the housing department—regarded New Briarfield as a major headache. He also discovered that its owners were in default on a federal loan and that foreclosure was imminent.

The report he wrote to Darrel Stephens, then the police chief, led Stephens to recommend to the city manager that New Briarfield be demolished and its tenants relocated. The city manager agreed. Meanwhile, Barry Haddix, the patrol officer assigned to the area, began working with members of other city agencies to fix up the project, pend-







ing its eventual replacement. Trash was carted away, abandoned cars were removed, potholes were filled in, the streets were swept. According to a study recently done by John E. Eck and William Spelman, of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), the burglary rate dropped by 35 percent after Duke and Haddix began their work.

Stephens, now the executive director of PERF, tells the story of the New Briarfield project as an example of "problem-oriented policing," a concept developed by Professor Herman Goldstein, of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and sometimes also called community-oriented policing. The conventional police strategy is "incident-oriented"—a citizen calls to report an incident, such as a burglary, and the police respond by recording information relevant to the crime and then trying to solve it. Obviously, when a crime occurs, the victim is entitled to a rapid, effective police response. But if responding to incidents is all that the police do, the community problems that cause or explain many of these incidents will never be addressed, and so the incidents will continue and their number will perhaps increase.

This will happen for two reasons. One is that a lot of serious crime is adventitious, not the result of inexorable social forces or personal failings. A rash of burglaries may occur because drug users have found a back alley or an abandoned building in which to hang out. In their spare time, and in order to get money to buy drugs, they steal

from their neighbors. If the back alleys are cleaned up and the abandoned buildings torn down, the drug users will go away. They may even use fewer drugs, because they will have difficulty finding convenient dealers and soft burglary targets. By the same token, a neglected neighborhood may become the turf of a youth gang, whose members commit more crimes together in a group than they would if they were acting alone. If the gang is broken up, former members will still commit some crimes but probably not as many as before.

Most crime in most neighborhoods is local: the offenders live near their victims. Because of this, one should not assume that changing the environmental conditions conducive to crime in one area will displace the crime to other areas. For example, when the New York City police commissioner, Ben Ward, ordered Operation Pressure Point, a crackdown on drug dealing on the Lower East Side, dealing and the criminality associated with it were reduced in that neighborhood and apparently did not immediately reappear in other, contiguous neighborhoods. Suburban customers of the local drug dealers were frightened away by the sight of dozens of police officers on the streets where these customers had once shopped openly for drugs. They could not—at least not right away—find another neighborhood in which to buy drugs as easily as they once had on the Lower East Side. At the same time, the local population included some people who were willing to



aid and abet the drug dealers. When the police presence made drug dealing unattractive, the dealers could not—again, at least not for the time being—find another neighborhood that provided an equivalent social infrastructure.

The second reason that incident-oriented police work fails to discourage neighborhood crime is that law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not frightened by these signs of urban decay. Those not frightened turn out to be the same people who created the problem in the first place. Law-abiding citizens, already fearful, see things occurring that make them even more fearful. A vicious cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear.

A Los Angeles police sergeant put it this way: "When people in this district see that a gang has spray-painted its initials on all the stop signs, they decide that the gang, not the people or the police, controls the streets. When they discover that the Department of Transportation needs three months to replace the stop signs, they decide that the city isn't as powerful as the gang. These people want us to help them take back the streets." Painting gang symbols on a stop sign or a storefront is not, by itself, a serious crime. As an incident, it is trivial. But as the symptom of a problem, it is very serious.



IN AN EARLIER ARTICLE IN *THE ATLANTIC* (MARCH, 1982) we called this the problem of "broken windows": If the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows. Likewise, when disorderly behavior—say, rude remarks by loitering youths—is left unchallenged, the signal given is that no one cares. The disorder escalates, possibly to serious crime.

The sort of police work practiced in Newport News is an effort to fix the broken windows. Similar projects are under way in cities all over America. This pattern constitutes the beginnings of the most significant redefinition of police work in the past half century. For example:

- When a gunfight occurred at Garden Village, a low-income housing project near Baltimore, the Baltimore County police responded by investigating both the shooting and the housing project. Chief Cornelius Behan directed the officers in his Community Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit to find out what could be done to

alleviate the fears of the project residents and the gang tensions that led to the shooting. COPE officers worked with members of other agencies to upgrade street lighting in the area, trim shrubbery, install door locks, repair the roads and alleys, and get money to build a playground. With police guidance, the tenants organized. At the same time, high-visibility patrols were started and gang members were questioned. When both a suspect in the shooting and a particularly troublesome parole violator were arrested, gang tensions eased. Crime rates dropped. In bringing about this change, the police dealt with eleven different public agencies.

- When local merchants in a New York City neighborhood complained to the police about homeless persons who created a mess on the streets and whose presence frightened away customers, the officer who responded did not roust the vagrants but instead suggested that the merchants hire them to clean the streets in front of their stores every morning. The merchants agreed, and now the streets are clean all day and the customers find the stores more attractive.

- When people in a Los Angeles neighborhood complained to the police about graffiti on walls and gang symbols on stop signs, officers assigned to the Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire station did more than just try to catch the gang youths who were wielding the spray cans; they also organized citizens' groups and Boy Scouts to paint over the graffiti as fast as they were put up.

- When residents of a Houston neighborhood became fearful about crime in their area, the police not only redoubled their efforts to solve the burglaries and thefts but also assigned some officers to talk with the citizens in their homes. During a nine-month period the officers visited more than a third of all the dwelling units in the area, introduced themselves, asked about any neighborhood problems, and left their business cards. When Antony Pate and Mary Ann Wycoff, researchers at the Police Foundation, evaluated the project, they found that the people in this area, unlike others living in a similar area where no citizen-contact project occurred, felt that social disorder had decreased and that the neighborhood had become a better place to live. Moreover, and quite unexpectedly, the amount of property crime was noticeably reduced.

These are all examples of community-oriented policing, whose current popularity among police chiefs is as great as the ambiguity of the idea. In a sense, the police have always been community-oriented. Every police officer knows that most crimes don't get solved if victims and witnesses do not cooperate. One way to encourage that cooperation is to cultivate the good will of both victims and witnesses. Similarly, police-citizen tensions, over racial incidents or allegations of brutality or hostility, can often be allayed, and sometimes prevented, if police officers stay in close touch with community groups. Accordingly, most departments have at least one community-relations officer.

who arranges meetings between officers and citizens' groups in church basements and other neutral locales.

But these commonplace features of police work are additions, and rarely alter the traditional work of most patrol officers and detectives: responding to radio calls about specific incidents. The focus on incidents works against a focus on problems. If Detective Tony Duke had focused only on incidents in New Briarfield, he would still be investigating burglaries in that housing project; meanwhile, the community-relations officer would be telling outraged residents that the police were doing all they could and urging people to call in any useful leads. If a tenant at one of those meetings had complained about stopped-up drains, rotting floorboards, and abandoned refrigerators, the community-relations officer would have patiently explained that these were not "police matters."

And of course, they are not. They are the responsibility of the landlord, the tenants themselves, and city agencies other than the police. But landlords are sometimes indifferent, tenants rarely have the resources to make needed repairs, and other city agencies do not have a twenty-four-hour emergency service. Like it or not, the police are about the only city agency that makes house calls around the clock. And like it or not, the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order.

Community-oriented policing means changing the daily work of the police to include investigating problems as well as incidents. It means defining as a problem whatever a significant body of public opinion regards as a threat to community order. It means working with the good guys, and not just against the bad guys.

The link between incidents and problems can sometimes be measured. The police know from experience what research by Glenn Pierce, in Boston, and Lawrence Sherman, in Minneapolis, has established: fewer than 10 percent of the addresses from which the police receive calls account for more than 60 percent of those calls. Many of the calls involve domestic disputes. If each call is treated as a separate incident with neither a history nor a future, then each dispute will be handled by police officers anxious to pacify the complainants and get back on patrol as quickly as possible. All too often, however, the disputants move beyond shouting insults or throwing crockery at each other. A knife or a gun may be produced, and somebody may die.

A very large proportion of all killings occur in these domestic settings. A study of domestic homicides in Kansas City showed that in eight out of ten cases the police had been called to the incident address at least once before; in half the cases they had been called *five times* or more. The police are familiar with this pattern, and they have learned how best to respond to it. An experiment in Minneapolis, conducted by the Police Foundation, showed that men who were arrested after assaulting their spouses were much less likely to commit new assaults than those who were merely pacified or asked to leave the house for a few

hours. Research is now under way in other cities to test this finding. Arrest may prove always to be the best disposition, or we may learn that some kind of intervention by a social agency also helps. What is indisputable is that a domestic fight—like many other events to which the police respond—is less an "incident" than a problem likely to have serious, long-term consequences.

Another such problem, familiar to New Yorkers, is graffiti on subway cars. What to some aesthetes is folk art is to most people a sign that an important public place is no longer under public control. If graffiti painters can attack cars with impunity, then muggers may feel they can attack the people in those cars with equal impunity. When we first wrote in these pages about the problem of broken windows, we dwelt on the graffiti problem as an example of a minor crime creating a major crisis.

The police seemed powerless to do much about it. They could arrest youths with cans of spray paint, but for every one arrested ten more went undetected, and of those arrested, few were punished. The New York Transit Authority, led by its chairman, Robert Kiley, and its president, David Gunn, decided that graffiti-free cars were a major management goal. New, easier-to-clean cars were bought. More important, key people in the Authority were held accountable for cleaning the cars and keeping them clean. Whereas in the early 1980s two out of every three cars were covered with graffiti, today fewer than one in six is. The Transit Police have played their part by arresting those who paint the cars, but they have been more successful at keeping cars from being defaced in the first place than they were at chasing people who were spraying already defaced ones.



WHILE THE PHRASE "COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING" comes easily to the lips of police administrators, redefining the police mission is more difficult. To help the police become accustomed to fixing broken windows as well as arresting window-breakers requires doing things that are very hard for many administrators to do.

Authority over at least some patrol officers must be decentralized, so that they have a good deal of freedom to manage their time (including their paid overtime). This implies freeing them at least partly from the tyranny of the radio call. It means giving them a broad range of responsibilities: to find and understand the problems that create disorder and crime, and to deal with other public and private agencies that can help cope with these problems. It

means assigning them to a neighborhood and leaving them there for an extended period of time. It means backing them up with department support and resources.

The reason these are not easy things for police chiefs to do is not simply that chiefs are slaves to tradition, though some impatient advocates of community-oriented policing like to say so. Consider for a moment how all these changes might sound to an experienced and intelligent police executive who must defend his department against media criticisms of officer misconduct, political pressure to cut budgets, and interest-group demands for more police protection everywhere. With decentralized authority, no one will know precisely how patrol officers spend their time. Moreover, decentralized authority means that patrol officers will spend time on things like schmoozing with citizens, instead of on quantifiable tasks like issuing tickets, making arrests, and clearing cases.

Making the community-oriented officers generalists means letting them deal with other city agencies, a responsibility for which few officers are well trained and which cuts across sensitive questions of turf and public expectations.

If officers are left in a neighborhood, some of them may start taking money from the dope dealers and after-hours joints. To prevent that, officers are frequently moved

around. Moreover, the best people are usually kept in the detective squad that handles the really big cases. Few police executives want their best people settling into a neighborhood, walking around the bus stops and shopping malls.

The enthusiasts for community-oriented policing have answers for all these concerns, but sometimes in their zeal they forget that they are contending with more than mere bureaucratic foot-dragging—that the problems are real and require thoughtful solutions. Many police executives get in trouble not because the crime rate goes up but because cops are accused of graft, brutality, laziness, incivility, or indifference.

In short, police management is driven more by the constraints on the job than by the goals of the job. You cannot cope with those constraints without understanding them. This may be why some of the biggest changes toward community-oriented policing have occurred in cities where a new chief has come in from the outside with a mandate to shake up a moribund department. Lee Brown brought a community orientation to the Houston Police Department under precisely those circumstances—the reputation of the department was so bad that almost any change would have been regarded as an improvement.

What can we say to the worried police chief who is al-

SAVING MEMORY

Summer nights we put pennies on the track.
Even the station was quiet enough for crickets.
Mountains surrounded us, middling high and purple.
No matter where we stood they protected us
with perspective. People call them gentle mountains
but you can die in there; they're thick
with creeper and laurel. Like voodoo,
I drew pictures with a sparkler. A curved line
arcked across the night. Rooted in its slope,
one laurel tree big as the mountain holding it.

You can hear the train in the rails.
They're round, not flat, as you'd expect,
and slick. We'd walk the sound, one step, two,
slip, on purpose, in the ballast, hopscotch
and waltz on the ties, watching the big round eye
enter the curve and grow like God out of the purple,
the tracks turning mean, molten silver blazing
dead at us. We'd hula. Tango. And the first
white plume would shoot up screaming long, lonely,
vain as Mamma shooing starlings from her latticed pies.

Sing Mickey Mouse, the second scream rising long, again;
up and up. Stick our right hip out, the third
wailing. Give it a hot-cha wiggle, the fourth
surrounding us. And bidding each other fond adieux,
we'd count to three, turn our backs, flash it a moon,
and materialize, fantastic, run over with light,
the train shrieking to pieces, scared, meaning it,
short, short, short, short, pushing a noise
bigger than the valley. It sent us flying,
flattened, light as ideas, back on the platform,
the Y6B Mallet compound rolling through
southbound, steamborne, out of Roanoke.

It wasn't to make the train jump the track
but to hold the breath-edged piece of copper
grown hot with dying, thin with birth,
wiped smooth of origin and homilies.
To hold such power. As big as the eye
of the train, as big as the moon burning
like the sun. All the perspective
curved and gone.

—Mary Stewart Hammond

ready running a pretty good department? Start with corruption: For decades police executives and reformers have believed that in order to prevent corruption, you have to centralize control over personnel and discourage intimacy between police officers and citizens. Maybe. But the price one pays for this is very high. For example, many neighborhoods are being destroyed by drug dealers, who hang out on every street corner. The best way to sweep them off the streets is to have patrol officers arrest them for selling drugs and intimidate their customers by parking police cars right next to suspected drug outlets. But some police chiefs forbid their patrol officers to work drug cases, for fear they will be corrupted. When the citizens in these cities see police cars drive past scenes of open drug dealing, they assume the police have been paid off. Efforts to prevent corruption have produced the appearance of corruption.


Police Commissioner Ben Ward, in New York, decided that the price of this kind of anti-corruption strategy was too high. His Operation Pressure Point put scores of police officers on the streets to break up the drug-dealing bazaar. Police corruption is no laughing matter, especially in New York, but some chiefs now believe that it will have to be fought in ways that do not require police officers to avoid contact with people.

Consider the problem of getting police resources and managing political pressures: resources can be justified with statistics, but statistics often become ends in themselves. One police captain we interviewed said that his department was preoccupied with "stacking widgets and counting beans." He asked his superior for permission to take officers out of radio cars and have them work on community problems. The superior agreed but warned that he would be watching to see what happened to "the stats." In the short run the stats—for example, calls answered, average response time—were likely to get worse, but if community problems were solved, they would get better as citizens had fewer incidents to report. The captain worried, however, that he would not be given enough time to achieve this and that the bean counters would cut off his program.

A better way to justify getting resources from the city is to stimulate popular demand for resources devoted to problem-solving. Properly handled, community-oriented policing does generate support for the department. When Newark police officers, under orders from Hubert Williams, then the police director, began stopping city buses and boarding them to enforce city ordinances against smoking, drinking, gambling, and playing loud music, the bus patrons often applauded. When Los Angeles police officers supervised the hauling away of abandoned cars, onlookers applauded. Later, when some of the officers had their time available for problem-solving work cut back, several hundred citizens attended a meeting to complain.

In Flint, Michigan, patrol officers were taken out of their cars and assigned to foot beats. Robert Trojanowicz,

a professor at Michigan State University, analyzed the results and found big increases in citizen satisfaction and officer morale, and even a significant drop in crime (an earlier foot-patrol project in Newark had produced equivalent reductions in fear but no reductions in crime). Citizen support was not confined to statements made to pollsters, however. Voters in referenda twice approved tax increases to maintain the foot-patrol system, the second time by a two-to-one margin. New Briarfield tenants unquestionably found satisfaction in the role the police played in getting temporary improvements made on their housing project and getting a commitment for its ultimate replacement. Indeed, when a department experiments with a community-oriented project in one precinct, people in other precincts usually want one too.



POLITICIANS, LIKE POLICE CHIEFS, HEAR THESE VIEWS and respond. But they hear other views as well. One widespread political mandate is to keep the tax rate down. Many police departments are already stretched thin by sharp reductions in spending that occurred in the lean years of the 1970s. Putting *one* additional patrol car on the streets around the clock can cost a quarter of a million dollars or more a year.

Change may seem easier when resources are abundant. Ben Ward could start Operation Pressure Point because he had at his disposal a large number of new officers who could be thrown into a crackdown on street-level drug dealing. Things look a bit different in Los Angeles, where no big increases in personnel are on the horizon. As a result, only eight officers are assigned to the problem-solving Community Mobilization Project in the Wilshire district—an economically and ethnically diverse area of nearly 300,000 residents.

But change does not necessarily require more resources, and the availability of new resources is no guarantee that change will be attempted. One temptation is to try to sell the public on the need for more policemen and decide later how to use them. Usually when that script is followed, either the public turns down the spending increase or the extra personnel are dumped into what one LAPD captain calls the "black hole" of existing commitments, leaving no trace and producing no effects.

What may have an effect is how the police are deployed and managed. An experiment jointly conducted by the Washington, D.C., Police Department and the Police Foundation showed that if a few experienced officers con-

centrate on known repeat offenders, the number of serious offenders taken off the streets grows substantially. The Flint and Newark experiences suggest that foot patrols in certain kinds of communities (but not all) can reduce fear. In Houston problem-oriented tactics seem clearly to have heightened a sense of citizen security.

The problem of interagency cooperation may, in the long run, be the most difficult of all. The police can bring problems to the attention of other city agencies, but the system is not always organized to respond. In his book *Neighborhood Services*, John Mudd calls it the "rat problem": "If a rat is found in an apartment, it is a housing inspection responsibility; if it runs into a restaurant, the health department has jurisdiction; if it goes outside and dies in an alley, public works takes over." A police officer who takes public complaints about rats seriously will go crazy trying to figure out what agency in the city has responsibility for rat control and then inducing it to kill the rats.

Matters are almost as bad if the public is complaining about abandoned houses or school-age children who are not in school. The housing department may prefer to concentrate on enforcing the housing code rather than go through the costly and time-consuming process of getting an abandoned house torn down. The school department may have expelled the truant children for making life miserable for the teachers and the other students; the last thing it wants is for the police to tell the school to take the kids back.

All city and county agencies have their own priorities and face their own pressures. Forcing them to cooperate by knocking heads together at the top rarely works; what department heads promise the mayor they will do may bear little relationship to what their rank-and-file employees actually do. From his experiences in New York City government Mudd discovered that if you want agencies to cooperate in solving neighborhood problems, you have to get the neighborhood-level supervisors from each agency together in a "district cabinet" that meets regularly and addresses common concerns. This is not an easy task (for one thing, police district lines often do not match the district boundaries of the school, housing, traffic, and public-works departments), but where it has been tried it has made solving the "rat problem" a lot easier. For example, Mudd reports, such interagency issues as park safety and refuse-laden vacant lots got handled more effectively when the field supervisors met to talk about them than when memos went up the chain of command of one agency and then down the chain of command of another.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF Neighborhood Watch programs may help reduce crime, but we cannot be certain. In particular, we do not know what kinds of communities are most likely to benefit from such programs. A Police Foundation study in Minneapolis found that getting effective community orga-


nizations started in the most troubled neighborhoods was very difficult. The costs and benefits of having patrol officers and sergeants influence the delivery of services from other city agencies has never been fully assessed. No way of wresting control of a neighborhood from a street gang has yet been proved effective.

And even if these questions are answered, a police department may still have difficulty accommodating two very different working cultures: the patrol officers and detectives who handle major crimes (murders, rapes, and robberies) and the cops who work on community problems and the seemingly minor incidents they generate. In every department we visited, some of the incident-oriented officers spoke disparagingly of the problem-oriented officers as "social workers," and some of the latter responded by calling the former "ghetto blasters." If a community-service officer seems to get too close to the community, he or she may be accused of "going native." The tension between the two cultures is heightened by the fact that in many departments becoming a detective is regarded as a major promotion, and detectives are often selected from among those officers who have the best record in making major arrests—in other words, from the ranks of the incident-oriented. But this pattern need not be permanent. Promotion tracks can be changed so that a patrol officer, especially one working on community problems, is no longer regarded as somebody who "hasn't made detective." Moreover, some police executives now believe that splitting the patrol force into two units—one oriented to incidents, the other to problems—is unwise. They are searching for ways to give all patrol officers the time and resources for problem-solving activities.

Because of the gaps in our knowledge about both the results and the difficulties of community-oriented policing, no chief should be urged to accept, uncritically, the community-oriented model. But the traditional model of police professionalism—devoting resources to quick radio-car response to calls about specific crime incidents—makes little sense at a time when the principal threats to public order and safety come from *collective*, not individual, sources, and from *problems*, not incidents: from well-organized gangs and drug traffickers, from uncared-for legions of the homeless, from boisterous teenagers taking advantage of their newfound freedom and affluence in congested urban settings.

Even if community-oriented policing does not produce the dramatic gains that some of its more ardent advocates expect, it has indisputably produced one that the officers who have been involved in it immediately acknowledge: it has changed their perceptions of the community. Officer Robin Kirk, of the Houston Police Department, had to be talked into becoming part of a neighborhood fear-reduction project. Once in it, he was converted. In his words, "Traditionally, police officers after about three years get to thinking that everybody's a loser. That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems." □





Reducing Costs in Law Enforcement Operations

By

RICHARD M. AYRES, M.P.A.

With the United States battling a recession, unemployment, and alarming increases in violent and drug-related crimes, many cities, counties, and States face the dilemma of cutback management. Law enforcement agencies nationwide continue to examine ways to streamline their operations without laying off officers—managing with less while still fulfilling their mission of serving the community and protecting life and property.

Gone are the days when the traditional response of meeting crime control problems and community service needs was to hire more of-

ficers and purchase more equipment. Gone, too, are the days when salary and benefits could be arbitrarily increased. Gone, indeed, are the ample budgets that often permitted managers to use intuition and snap judgments—even to cover up administrative mistakes without undue embarrassment or concern. Looking back, a manager's job was much easier when budgets were fat.

Effective management is vastly different in today's difficult economic times. Now, there is a critical need for law enforcement managers to promote efficiency and effectiveness. As this almost impossible responsibility of providing more serv-

ice with less funding falls upon the chief of police or sheriff, it can be easy to simply tighten the administrative screws and allow the burden to fall on the employees. However, this shortsightedness may well lead to resentment, labor/management conflict, or serious morale and job satisfaction problems.¹

To avoid these difficulties, law enforcement managers should involve their officers, employee associations, and unions to resolve the urgent management issues of the 1990s. This forces employees to accept more responsibility for shaping the future and may reduce their resistance to cost-cutting measures.



“**...there is a critical need for law enforcement managers to promote efficiency and effectiveness.**”

Mr. Ayres, a former Chief of the Management Science Unit at the FBI Academy, is currently a management consultant in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

Given the fact that employees frequently have firsthand knowledge of how to best cut operational costs, their involvement has never been more critical. This article discusses tactics law enforcement managers can take to come to grips with cutback management, while upholding efficient and effective police services.

Case in Point

Recently, the Michigan State Police needed to abolish numerous positions in order to meet mandated budget reductions. This required the agency to implement a contractual reduction in force or institute layoff procedures, which would result in significant numbers of members either being demoted in rank and/or relocated. The relocation factor also applied because of a seniority bumping provision in the department's collective bargaining contract.

However, in an effort to avoid significant grievance action, litigation, and the emotional trauma associated with the threat of layoff and/or demotion, the department ob-

tained the assistance and cooperation of its troopers' union. The department's management invited the union to assist in the administration of the contract and to be a partner in the actual reduction-in-force process. Union officials were asked to manage telephones, assist in verifying seniority lists, and be available to answer specific questions from bargaining unit members confronted with certain bump options.

As a result of their participation, union members developed an appreciation for the emotional trauma, the significant complexity, and the inherent difficulty in their mutual effort to interpret the contract language in a practical, efficient manner. When the contract was accomplished, few grievances were experienced, no litigation was encountered, and management received expressions of appreciation from the union.²

Cooperation and Sensitivity

As this case illustrates, both managers and employees need to cooperate and remain sensitive to the feelings and sentiments of the

work force in order to implement successfully the types of changes necessary to downsize or streamline law enforcement services. Thus, for managers, the following steps are critical:

- Ask employees for ideas about how to cut costs
- Maintain high visibility (Managers should be available for both formal and informal discussions with employees to facilitate organizational assessment, as well as to strengthen morale. Also, when employees are involved, either individually or through their organizations, their level of awareness is raised, and there is usually an increased readiness for change.)
- Determine how other departments are cutting costs (Law enforcement executives struggling with cutback measures should not hesitate to tap the rich reservoirs of experience available from other agencies faced with the same dilemma. Reinventing the wheel can be costly, and many mistakes can be avoided by learning from the successes and failures of other counties and municipalities.)

NEI Survey

As mentioned, sharing ideas on how to cut costs is critical. Therefore, to facilitate idea-sharing among agencies, the National Executive Institute (NEI) recently queried more than 100 law enforcement executives in the United States and Canada on ways their agencies either increased productivity or cut

costs effectively during the past year.

Most respondents applauded the NEI for its timely undertaking of such a study, as they were presently facing decreasing tax revenues, rising costs, and a down-turned economy—all of which placed greater demands on departmental services. Further, because nearly all departments were in the process of attempting to implement major cost-cutting measures without adversely impacting the quality of services, they were eager to share their experiences.

The ideas submitted covered the entire spectrum of law enforcement services and reflected a wide range of creativity and imagination. Many departments provided lists of ideas of cost-saving measures implemented recently, while others sent information only on their most effective method of reducing costs during the past year.

Upon reviewing the survey results, the NEI found the areas that provided the greatest opportunity for cutting costs involve:

- Overtime
- Vehicles
- Volunteers
- Civilian participation
- Operational streamlining/downsizing
- Automation
- Reducing false alarms
- Increased use of Federal forfeiture funds


- Service fees
- Subcontracting for services.

Specific examples on how police departments have cut costs in each of these areas are available through the FBI Academy.³ Each example contains a description of the process, the savings and benefits derived, and the point of contact for further information.

These examples provide a valuable exchange of information on cost-cutting measures currently being employed in the United States and Canada. And, as more agencies are confronted with shrinking

tional effectiveness. For example, the Chief of Police in Orlando, Florida, recommends developing a "Strategic Long-range Plan" (SLRP) to solidify the police department's vision and long-range strategies. For the Orlando Police Department, the SLRP not only analyzes trends and the city's future direction but also documents how the department must respond to growth and other external factors. The SLRP also ensures that every attempt is made to maintain an acceptable level of police service for the next 15 to 20 years and beyond.

Numerous departments have made other recommendations combining cost-cutting measures and community policing to ensure long-term productivity. Many of the managers in these departments also warned against the temptation to apply simple, ineffective solutions that may, in fact, be knee-jerk reactions to whatever ails the organization at the moment. Additionally, before cost-cutting programs are instituted, managers should also examine all of the interrelated aspects that



budgets and increasing demands for service, ideas will become even more vital to law enforcement managers.

Cost Cutting: One Positive Step

In focusing on cost cutting as a necessary means to efficient management, law enforcement leaders should understand that this effort, although a critical one, is only one step toward long-term organiza-

tion to the department's problems, such as ineffective management skills, poorly functioning work groups, bureaucratic red tape, and reward systems that ignore performance.

Conclusion

Today's law enforcement leaders who tackle the problem of managing with less will be truly successful only when they recognize that

Management Suggestions

Law enforcement managers from across the United States and Canada submitted the following suggestions for cutting costs:

Automation

- Decentralize entry of police incident reports to reduce lag time and the number of mail runs to headquarters
- Install phone mail on department telephone systems to automatically direct outside callers to the proper extension
- Implement automation of tasks, where feasible

Administration

- Eliminate unnecessary business and training expenses
- Delay promotions for 45 days
- Streamline and downsize administrative positions
- Consolidate various job responsibilities
- Increase use of civilian volunteers, auxiliary police officers, and cadets
- Reduce overtime
- Use flexed work schedules for some units, where possible

Maintenance

- Use jail maintenance personnel and/or inmate labor to maintain grounds and buildings, to build K-9 pens for dogs, or to build a tactical recovery vehicle from an

old patrol car and old bullet-proof vests

- Delay or cut back renovation projects not necessary to the department's mission
- Repair radios in-house
- Subcontract for services

Training

- Use video technology for roll call training

Automobiles

- Implement an accident reduction program consisting of pursuit policy training and high performance driving techniques and sanctions against negligent drivers
- Remove roof-mounted emergency lights from a significant number of marked vehicles
- Switch from premium to regular-grade gasoline
- Install sophisticated radio equipment in operational vehicles only
- Reduce the number of take-home cars
- Defer replacing vehicles for one more fiscal year
- Change marked vehicles from traditional two colors to less expensive and more visible single white color
- Downsize investigative and administrative (unmarked and non-pursuit) vehicles to smaller, less expensive models

Other

- Institute service fees for special events and extraordinary non-emergency services
- Minimize police response to false alarms
- Implement bicycle patrol in congested areas
- Prohibit use of alcohol in park and beach areas to reduce calls for service
- Use Federal forfeiture funds to purchase computers, office equipment, and protection and enforcement-related equipment

Qualities of Commitment in a Law Enforcement Manager

- Commitment to the customer, to the community or anyone who benefits from the department's service
- Commitment to the organization—project pride in organization and instill this sense of pride in others
- Commitment to self—present a strong, positive image with a sense of humility, consistently working toward self-improvement
- Commitment to people—display a dedication to employees
- Commitment to the task—know and support the mission of the organization by emphasizing quality service, cost effectiveness, and productivity

this issue, much like violent crime, illegal drugs, and community unrest, is one of leadership that will require long-term commitment toward planned organizational and institutional change. Excellent law enforcement leaders must believe in what they are doing and must combine these beliefs with actions. The most consistently described quality of excellent leadership can be characterized by one word—commitment. Commitment can be seen as a powerful combination of beliefs and actions.

Managers must be committed to the customer, the department, themselves, employees, and the task at hand. Separately, these commitments are extremely important to effective leadership. Together, they form the essential framework for long-term achievement of excellence.⁴

Today, there are no quick fixes. Only through genuine dedication and commitment can law enforcement managers provide effective leadership to the department and positive service to citizens. ■


Endnotes

¹ Nancy K. Austin, "No Panic Managing for Tough Times," *Working Women*, May 1991.

² Gary Maher, "Layoffs: A Sign of the Times—Making a Smooth Transition," North American Police Labor Relations Association, Spring 1991.

³ For specific examples on how various law enforcement agencies have cut costs, please contact Special Agent Edward J. Tully, Unit Chief of the Education and Communication Arts Unit, at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia 22135.

⁴ Keilty, Goldsmith, and Boone, *Building Commitments*, 1984.



Leadership in the Nineties

By
RONNIE GARNER, M.P.A.

On a hot, lazy afternoon, a small boy sits barefoot under a shade tree, idly watching a small stream of water from a sprinkler trickle down the street toward him. As tiny rivulets inch their way along the asphalt gutter, they seem to pause at each pebble to build momentum and then push forward again.

Eagerly, the boy grabs handfuls of dirt and builds a small dike that momentarily halts the flow. However, the water slowly wells up in a puddle and edges its way around the barrier. The boy adds

more dirt, vainly attempting to outflank and contain the water.

As the battle progresses, it becomes apparent that despite the boy's best efforts, he will never prevail. There are larger forces of nature at work.

How often do organizations struggle in a like manner against the forces of human nature? An organization is, after all, a large pool of human resources. Not unlike the stream of water, this pool seeks movement—*progress*. It cannot stand still; that is not the natural order. It must either move forward or stagnate.

What organizations require is guidance of that movement. This guidance comes in the form of direction and leadership.

Visionary leadership is not for everyone. A gnarled police veteran once counseled me to "never try to teach a pig to sing. It sounds like hell and it annoys the pig."

There is some wisdom in that advice. Many police administrators become so preoccupied with current problems that they fail to plan for the future. Some do not believe that strategic planning is worth the effort. Others lack the imagination and creativity required to project in



Deputy Chief Garner serves with the Beverly Hills, California, Police Department.

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An organizational vision presents a clear picture of what direction the organization plans to take in the future.
”

the abstract. To ask them to conceptualize the organization 5 years in the future is akin to asking a pig to sing—it only annoys them. For these individuals, the vision of the future must be articulated with such vividness and detail that the abstract becomes concrete.

Organizational Vision

An organizational vision presents a clear picture of what direction the organization plans to take in the future. It should represent an achievable, challenging, and worthwhile long-range target toward which personnel can direct their energies.

For example, one police department's vision statement projects that a mutual understanding of shared problems will result in a high level of confidence and harmony between the police and the community. The statement then specifies that the department and the community will forge a close and consistent partnership to address issues and to solve problems effectively, making

the city a safe, healthy, and attractive place for commerce and community life.

Having a clear understanding of the organizational vision can change an employee's entire perspective. The story is often told of a passer-by who asked a bored bricklayer, "What are you doing?" The bricklayer replied, "I am placing one brick on top of another." The passer-by then asked another bricklayer, who was working with greater enthusiasm, "What are you doing?" The second bricklayer replied, "I am building a magnificent cathedral where hundreds will worship."

To form an analogy, how many officers simply drive around answering radio calls and how many actually make a meaningful contribution to the quality of life in the community by maintaining order and ensuring that justice prevails? To attach real meaning and value to their jobs, employees must understand that they are collectively engaged in a worthwhile endeavor. A clear organizational vision fills this need.

Rowing v. Steering

Articulating the organizational vision and holding it firmly in focus for personnel is a demanding task. Frequently, operational problems divert the attention of administrators from their primary role as leaders. They must ensure, however, that they do not become so involved in *rowing* the boat that they forget to *steer* the boat.

In fact, some organizations shift to systems that separate policy-making from service delivery in order to allow top managers to concentrate on decisionmaking and direction.¹ Those who *steer* must possess the ability to view the whole spectrum of issues and possibilities and then balance competing demands for resources; *rowing* requires individuals who focus on one task, performing it well.²

Unfortunately, law enforcement administrators often become so intent on overseeing the delivery of services that they neglect their primary responsibility—steering. Instead, they should concentrate on a basic steering challenge: Communicating a clear vision of what they hope the organization will become in the future, giving employees a goal to work toward.

While setting such a goal is crucial, leaders must, at the same time, make additional information available to employees. For example, employees need to know how managers plan to meet this goal, what types of conduct are acceptable, and what criteria leaders will use for decisionmaking. Administrators should make this information available to employees through mission and value statements.

Mission Statement

A clear mission statement may be an organization's most important asset. It calls attention to what management believes is important, and it sets goals that align practices with values.³ In addition, it expresses the purpose for which the organization exists, allowing management to set priorities in decisionmaking. In other words, it acts as a guide for the organization. The mission statement of a California police department reads as follows: "The mission of [this department] is to work in partnership with the community to protect life and property, solve neighborhood problems, and enhance the quality of life in our City."

When developing a mission statement, the process of arriving at consensus among leaders can, itself, be a positive experience. It requires a debate of the various attitudes and beliefs existing among organizational leaders and then, finally, agreement on one basic mission.⁴ The final statement should help employees at all levels make decisions.

Values Statement

The values statement declares the moral and ethical qualities to which the organization is committed. For example, values statements often clarify how much significance the organization places on honesty, customer satisfaction, ethical conduct, innovation, teamwork, community awareness, self-directed work, tolerance of dissenting views, and public relations. While the mission statement describes *where* the organization is going, the values statement articulates *how* it will get there. It is a

Examples of Strategic Goals

- Focus departmental resources on the detection and apprehension of criminals, their prosecution, and control, such as developing a career criminal apprehension program
- Manage the traffic flow on city streets in order to lessen vehicle collisions through a program that enhances the patrol division's ability to enforce traffic laws and to respond to neighborhood traffic complaints
- Educate citizens in crime prevention techniques and services that can be useful self-help, crime-fighting tools, to include a Citizens Police Academy to increase community awareness of law enforcement, a Youth and Community Services Unit to provide outreach, delinquency prevention, and drug and gang prevention, and increased participation in neighborhood watch and other crime prevention efforts
- Work in partnership with the entire community to resolve crime-related problems in neighborhoods by establishing drug-free zones in target areas and expanding the Neighborhood Revitalization Program by incorporating the Federal Weed and Seed Program. This also includes expanding the use of problem-oriented policing strategies, decentralizing two-area command structure into a four-area command structure, encouraging community mobilization efforts, and encouraging and forging positive police-public partnerships
- Implement an ongoing strategic planning process to assist the department in managing the future through coordinated programs and activities with other city departments and criminal justice agencies and input from community forums
- Provide a work environment conducive to employee growth and development, while ensuring high-quality, efficient, and cost-effective services through expanded use of volunteers, active recruitment of minority applicants, career development, and training opportunities and upgraded technology
- Continue to improve, with concern and compassion, the quality of service delivered to victims and witnesses of crime with the implementation of a Community Chaplaincy Program and a total quality management culture in the department with a commitment to provide exceptional customer service.

detailed guide of behaviors that management accepts and supports within the organization.

A Positive Framework

The organizational vision, mission statement, and values statement form a framework to support management decisions by attaching reasons to actions. The philosophy, goals, and work standards embodied within these documents provide a basis for decisionmaking within the organization. They are the lodestars by which the organization navigates its course through the uncharted waters of both the present and the future.

Creating this framework for leadership is vital to maintain consistency and direction in the management of the organization. However, this framework alone is not sufficient to attract and motivate employees to achieve the organization's mission. Organizations need to incorporate a final leadership principle—empowerment.

Much like the stream discussed earlier, it is the nature of an organization to change and progress. Individual members of the organization continually develop plans and expectations about their roles. Each creates a personal agenda. It is the confluence of these personal agendas that creates a dynamic undercurrent within organizations. Leaders must channel this undercurrent in order to accomplish the organization's objectives.

The cumbersome, monolithic organizational structures in which many agencies currently labor do not allow leaders sufficient latitude to channel individual talents. A more open, flexible participative

model must be used so that leaders can successfully empower subordinates.

Empowerment

Empowerment is enabling others to participate in the process of change within the organization. It often involves sharing power with subordinates and allowing them sufficient leeway to accomplish tasks in their own way.

“
The organizational vision, mission statement, and values statement form a framework to support management decisions by attaching reasons to actions.
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Empowerment is the most effective way to gain the active participation of others. When employees are truly empowered to make meaningful decisions and effect appropriate change within the organization, they develop a stake in the system—a franchise. Enfranchised and empowered employees have a vested interest in the success of the group. They become important members of a team with a meaningful purpose.

Most individuals want to believe they are contributing to a common purpose and that they are not consumed with pointless exercises. Leaders who promote such an atmosphere secure the commitment

and trust of employees.⁵ True leadership involves providing a collaborative atmosphere, where all workers focus on the critical work of the organization.⁶

However, some leaders resist sharing power. They fear that subordinates, if not sufficiently controlled, may take over the organization. Although there may be some rationality to this fear, establishing a positive leadership framework ensures that employees are both motivated and unified in achieving the organizational mission. By focusing on vision, mission, and values, an enlightened leader empowers and energizes subordinates toward the attainment of organizational objectives.

Conclusion

The issue of leadership in law enforcement is neither broad nor obscure. It involves the concrete process of articulating the vision, mission, and values of the organization within the context of a long-range strategic plan and giving impetus to that plan by empowering subordinates. Without this base, police managers serve only as custodians of a bureaucracy that preoccupies itself with the present at the expense of the future. ♦

Endnotes

¹ Ted Gaebler and David Osborne, *Reinventing Government* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1992), 35.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*


⁵ Burt Nanus, *The Leader's Edge: Seven Keys to Leadership in a Turbulent World* (Chicago, Illinois: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1989).

⁶ *Ibid.*

On Troubled Waters

Promotion and Advancement in the 1990s

By
IRA GROSSMAN, Ph.D.
and JACK DOHERTY, J.D.



From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, America experienced extensive corporate and governmental growth. The country expanded in unprecedented ways, providing opportunities for promotion in most employment arenas, both to well-qualified and minimally qualified individuals.

The country's need for managers eventually outstripped its supply, resulting in situations where many individuals were promoted to levels beyond their capabilities. By the 1980s, Yuppies—young,

upwardly mobile professionals—epitomized aggressive young workers running in the fast lane of advancement. While the image of the Yuppies was being popularized, however, the reality in America was that the standard of living and the opportunities for promotion were declining.

The illusion of increasing wealth was due, in part, to increasing national credit and debt, as well as an increase in the number of two-career families. In the past 2 decades, the number of women contributing to the family income in

order to maintain the lifestyle of their parents has grown steadily.

IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

Within the law enforcement community, parallel trends have been observed. Only a few years ago, the opportunity for promotion and for selection to specialty assignments was high. From the time recruits entered the police academy, they expected to receive rapid promotions, as well as assignments to coveted specialty positions, such as SWAT, detectives, and motorcycle

squads. These expectations became part of the belief system of young officers.

However, in the mid-1980s, growth in law enforcement agencies began to stagnate. As with corporate America, the bulge in middle-management law enforcement positions was recognized as a drain on increasingly scarce financial revenues. The terms "flattening" and "downsizing" crept into the vocabulary of many law enforcement administrators who were forced to reduce the size of their departments.

An example of this phenomenon occurred in the San Diego Police Department, which began to flatten its ranks in 1992. Two upper-level management job classifications (commander and deputy chief) were eliminated from the organizational structure. In addition, 15 other management positions (2 captains and 13 lieutenants) were cut from the budget.

Reductions similar to those noted above produce serious repercussions for the current generation of officers. These officers are less likely to benefit from promotions, despite their well-established beliefs equating promotions with their value to the agency and to their own sense of professional competence. Even to those officers who are able to gain perspective about the demographic and economic reasons governing the stagnation of growth and mobility, the emotional impact remains devastating.

Unfortunately, the lack of upward mobility is frequently not viewed as a matter of circumstance in society. To the contrary, it is almost universally perceived as personal failure, a betrayal of a system

that has reneged on its promises, or both.

To make matters worse, the impact of not being promoted within the law enforcement community is literally "worn on the sleeve." The paramilitary structure of law enforcement, with stripes and bars on uniforms denoting rank, makes officers keenly aware, on a daily basis, of their lack of promotion.

Sadly, the opportunity for law enforcement officers to advance will be reduced through the early part of the next century. Those currently in positions of management are relatively young. Combined with the difficult economy and current population demographics, it is unlikely that many current managers will leave their positions for outside opportunities or be promoted to higher positions of authority within the department. The effect of this situation on other officers is profound, particularly because their

expectations for promotion have not, as yet, been altered.

IMPACT ON PERSONNEL

Young police officers often revel in the exhilarating environment of patrol work for the first 2 years of their careers. During this time, they are financially well-rewarded in comparison to others with similar educational backgrounds and experience. Moreover, they are charged with enormous responsibility and authority at the outset of their young careers. Calls are answered with the knowledge and hope that life-saving or crime-stopping activity may occur.

After this initial period, however, young officers begin to search for new ways to be challenged and to recapture the thrill of the job. As soon as a department allows, most seek specialty assignments or promotion. They believe that their hard work and mastery of police skills




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"...the opportunity for law enforcement officers to advance will be reduced through the early part of the next century."



will launch their careers in new directions.

Failure for these young officers to advance begins a pattern of repeated attempts at promotion or applications for specialty assignments, followed by disappointment. Departmental managers exacerbate the problem by continuing to encourage officers to apply for career-enhancing positions. When they still are not selected, supervisors often advise them to become more qualified candidates through hard work and additional education.

The positive side of this predicament is that officers are forced to work harder to make themselves more marketable in the workplace. This has become evident in the soaring educational levels of patrol officers. Advanced degrees are now common at supervisory and management levels. On the down side, higher education has become so common that it no longer guarantees promotion. Simply said, current economic conditions reduce the

number of opportunities for promotion, no matter how qualified the individual.

That law enforcement executives have not yet heard an outcry from the ranks of peace officers should not come as a surprise. Officers are trained to handle any physical or emotional crisis without being personally affected.¹

However, the calm will not last forever. Repeated attempts at promotion and the cumulative effects of failure in this endeavor will lead to a host of personal and departmental ills. For example, individual officers are likely to begin displaying psychological dysfunction as a result of shame, guilt, anger, and a sense of being betrayed. Family dysfunction can also be expected.

Burnout or stress disability are likely endpoints for some of these officers. From an organizational perspective, administrators should anticipate poor morale, lack of creativity, and lack of commitment to management goals.

THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

Unfortunately, the law enforcement community was not quick to respond to its limited promotional capability. When it did respond, it created specialty positions for the sole purpose of providing advancement opportunities to officers. In fact, there has been an explosion of new specialties, including bicycle squads, K-9 and gang units, and interagency task forces. One major law enforcement agency now has 60 specialty assignments. As one police chief observed, "Specialties are multiplying like rabbits."²

While specialty programs can be extremely valuable, agencies are coming to realize that these programs have limits. All such programs draw resources from the core work of the agency and sometimes survive more on their popularity than on an objective assessment of their worth. This means that agencies that previously had the luxury of holding out promotional and special assignment opportunities to young officers as a means to encourage excellent performance will have to develop other mechanisms for rewards.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

How, then, should law enforcement agencies proceed? First, administrators should level with their officers. Using an organizational chart, they should indicate how many job openings, whether through retirements or the creation of new positions, the agency can expect in the next 5 to 10 years. Police administrators should then calculate officers' probabilities of advancement through promotion

and describe precisely what factors, such as additional education and prior experience, will impact the possibility of promotion.

Second, agencies should be prepared not only to use but also to expand existing psychological services. Dealing with unrealistic expectations and disappointments falls squarely in the discipline of psychology. Psychologists can help younger officers to adjust their expectation levels and to redefine success for officers already affected by this difficult situation. Law enforcement executives should consult with police psychologists to develop agency-wide programs and policies to alter old and ill-fated beliefs about measures of success.

Third, agencies can experiment with new ways to acknowledge officers and provide them with a sense of growth and accomplishment. This is especially important in paramilitary organizations, such as law enforcement, where officers typically have little control over their futures and little say in how their agencies are run. In paramilitary agencies, when ample opportunity for promotion exists, officers' sense of ownership stems from the possibility of being promoted to a position where their ideas and goals might be implemented. Fewer prospects for promotion, however, are likely to breed a cadre of officers who feel alienated within their own departments.

One way to alleviate these feelings of alienation is to create programs that allow officers at all levels to participate in the decisionmaking, growth, development, and operation of their agencies. This, in turn, produces a sense of

ownership, loyalty, and commitment to the agency. It gives officers more authority, more autonomy, and a greater influence in the communities they serve.

POSSIBLE PROGRAMS

There are several programs that positively influence officers' self-worth in this era of declining promotional opportunities. These programs include community-based policing, problem-oriented policing (POP), self-managing work teams, progressive salary schedules, officer-selected assignments, take-home patrol cars, and career counseling.

“

Career counseling programs help officers to understand better their abilities and opportunities....

”

Community-Based Policing

Community-based policing involves police officers working in partnership with the community and other governmental agencies to reduce crime and improve community safety. Agencies using this approach have found officers gain tremendous satisfaction from this type of interaction with community members.

This should come as no surprise to those involved in law

enforcement. Individuals are often drawn to law enforcement careers because of their desire to interact with various kinds of people. In community-based policing, officers have the opportunity to interact with citizens who both appreciate and value their efforts. Recognition for their efforts and successes is realized directly.

Problem-Oriented Policing

Problem-oriented policing—often used in conjunction with other community-based approaches—allows officers to focus on identified community problems and to use a variety of resources to reach solutions. By using POP strategies, patrol officers can become managers and facilitators of community action. They can develop and use a range of skills infrequently employed in conventional police situations.

The POP approach appeals to another personality trait frequently seen in peace officers—solving problems efficiently and witnessing firsthand the results of their efforts. Police officers value the opportunity to use skills and personal attributes that are congruent with their personality styles. Ongoing challenges and opportunities to solve problems serve as energizers and provide a sense of challenge and accomplishment to officers. Levels of personal satisfaction, which is so critical to job satisfaction, are high in these situations.

Self-Managing Work Teams

The concept of self-managing work teams acknowledges officers as professionals capable of managing their own work. “Over the

shoulder" supervision is reduced in this type of work environment, with supervisors more often acting as coaches and advisors rather than as evaluators and disciplinarians. It gives officers much more latitude in their daily work tasks.

Progressive Salary Schedules

In most law enforcement agencies, patrol officers hit their top pay level after 3 to 5 years. The only way to increase their salaries is to be promoted.

Progressive salary schedules acknowledge that highly capable workers are not intrinsically worth less than supervisors. Salary ranges overlap, allowing the pay of certain employees to equal or exceed the pay of some supervisors.

Officer-Selected Assignments

In traditional police settings, calls for service are assigned first by urgency, then by order of receipt. In larger communities, this often results in officers continually responding to radio calls throughout the jurisdiction, rather than spending time on their beats.

An officer-selected assignment program allows officers with computerized dispatching and display terminals in their patrol vehicles to select the radio calls to which they would like to respond. While urgent calls can still be dispatched, the ability of officers to choose their non-urgent assignments enhances their sense of control over work and allows them to continue strengthening their ties with the citizens living in their beat areas.

Take-Home Patrol Cars

Patrol vehicles are notorious for getting hard use and poor treatment. However, agencies that allow officers to take patrol cars home see a remarkable transformation. Because officers take great pride in the vehicles, the vehicles are cleaner and better maintained.

Cars represent a status symbol for officers. Allowing patrol officers with more than 5 years' field experience to take the vehicles home results in an immediate upswing in employee morale.

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**...several
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”

Career Counseling

Career counseling is designed to help officers focus realistically on their careers. Recruits should receive information about the counseling program at the police academy, and they should have a one-on-one session with a career counselor after they complete field training. All subsequent visits should be voluntary.

Career counseling programs help officers to understand better their abilities and opportunities, as well as what steps they might take to

move their careers in a positive direction. These programs are also helpful in developing a talent inventory for the agency. Most important, career counseling programs can send a message to the officers that they are valued as unique individuals, not just as bodies that walk a beat or answer radio calls.

CONCLUSION

It is incumbent upon law enforcement executives and others who influence both short- and long-term organizational goals to recognize the growing frustration of officers in terms of their inability to be recognized through the promotional process for their skills and hard work. Furthermore, it is critical that law enforcement administrators value the professionalism of their officers. In this context, pride, sense of growth, and feelings of achievement are factors that must be considered.

Officers must not perceive that only promotions equate to success. Rather, they should equate success with meeting challenges, continuing to learn their craft, and making positive contributions to their departments, communities, and families. These values, when fostered by the organization, promote satisfied officers and a sense of well-being in the workforce. ♦

Endnotes

¹ F. Stillman, "The Invisible Victims: Myths and Realities," *Psychological Services for Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1986), 143-146.

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**Toward Development of
Meaningful and Effective
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATIONS**

by

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PREFACE

The authors would like to thank the following for their invaluable input and advice:

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Please give us your input and advice

We consider this booklet as a rough draft/talking paper, designed to initiate dialogue about how best to assess performance in Community Policing departments. While we believe that this is an important first step in the process of formulating meaningful and effective performance evaluations, we eagerly await your comments, criticism, input, and advice. Our goal is to publish one or more revised versions of this booklet whenever the topic warrants re-issue and funding permits.

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NOTE: The National Center for Community Policing will be surveying police departments nationwide to develop a job description/role definition for Community Officers under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. When completed, this information will contribute to revising this information on performance evaluations.

INTRODUCTION

When Ed Koch was mayor of New York City, he was famous for asking people on the street, "How'm I doing?" Though a bit gimmicky perhaps, this was a great way for the mayor to receive instant feedback—on how people felt about his performance as mayor, how his administration was perceived, and how people felt about the city in general. A consummate politician, Koch instinctively recognized that everyone in public service must ultimately answer to the "consumer"—the citizens, voters, and taxpayers—and that survival in a political and public job requires knowing how people really feel about your performance. No matter what the polls and surveys say, what really matters is how the person on the street says you're doing.

The police, too, need ways to determine how well they are doing—as a department and also as individuals within the department. No issue is more basic to the functioning of the police in a democratic society, and no issue more clearly underscores the difference between traditional policing and Community Policing than performance evaluation.

This booklet is an initial attempt to stimulate dialogue about how best to assess the performance of Community Policing departments and of individual Community Officers out on the street. The information included in this publication is by no means cast in stone; rather it is an attempt to promote discussion—even argument—about how best to proceed. As you saw in the Preface, we have provided our address so that you can also tell us "how we're doing." We promise to incorporate your ideas in upcoming revisions.

EVALUATING THE DEPARTMENT

The mission of the police

Without belaboring the obvious, the first challenge in creating a yardstick by which we can measure how well any given police department is doing requires defining the job of the police and that is far more controversial and complicated than it might at first seem. Is the primary function of the police to fight crime or to maintain the peace? Which is more basic—catching bad guys or preventing crimes before they occur? Which matters more—how fast the police arrive or what they do when they get there?

Increasingly, the police have come to recognize that defining the function of the police exclusively in terms of crime is problematic, for many reasons:

- **How much crime is there?** Nobody really knows how much crime there is, so this means that even a dramatic rise in the number of crimes reported may not mean there has been any increase in the actual number of crimes committed, but merely that more are coming to the attention of police. The reverse may also account for at least part of any reported decrease in crime. Indeed, in a community where people do not trust their police, crime rates may plunge merely because residents become increasingly reluctant to call the police.

- **How much can police affect crime rates?** The rise and fall in the rates of various crimes may have less to do with police activity than with other factors beyond police control, ranging from changes in the local unemployment rate to the effectiveness of courts and corrections.

- **Is crime the measure that average citizens use to assess the police?** There is little doubt that people often enjoy grumbling about how the police should do more to get all the bad guys off the street, but scratched a little deeper, most people understand the limitations under which the police operate. Indeed, most people develop their impressions of police because of contacts that have nothing to do with serious crime—they are stopped for a traffic violation, or they call the department because of a problem with a barking dog or a loud party next door.

Traditional versus Community Policing

Traditional police departments have long defined their primary mission and therefore their overall effectiveness in terms of crime-fighting. As this suggests, this all too often leaves police officials no choice but to apologize for increases in the crime rate that are not their fault—and to claim victory for declines that may or may not have much to do with police activity.

The danger is that this will lead to policing by and for the numbers—overvaluing quantitative results and undervaluing qualitative outcomes. It promotes an evaluation system that would, for example, ignore the contribution of an officer who takes the time to convince a youngster suspected of burglarizing dozens of homes to enroll in drug treatment, and who cuts the red tape to get him in. At the same time, the system would record and reward an officer who arrested the youngster as a user, even if that was likely to do little more than engage the rest of the expensive criminal justice system to little effect.

Community Policing, in contrast to the traditional system, focuses on solving the problem rather than on generating arrest statistics—quality not

quantity. Community Policing rests on the belief that the police must become partners with the people in the community, so that together they can address local priorities related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. Instead of making it difficult for an officer to find the time and opportunity to intervene with that youngster who needs drug treatment, Community Policing restructures the department so that Community Officers have the face-to-face contact required to effect such solutions. Community Policing shifts creative problem-solving—which the police have always done—from being an informal part of the job to recognition as the essence of formal police work, while at the same time, the Community Policing approach allows police the continuity they need to make the most of community-based problem solving.

As this suggests, the challenge is to find ways to capture and present Community Policing's successes to others, along with the traditional kinds of data that the police have always kept. How do we record, compile, and codify incidents such as when the officer got that young man into drug treatment? How can the police use such examples to help people understand how Community Policing works?

Persuading public policymakers

This booklet is an attempt to find new ways to gather, analyze, and express qualitative information about police performance in an easy-to-understand format, because the reality in a complex society is that data drives policy. The police must compete for scarce resources in a political environment where other agencies are also building cases to justify receiving more funds.

Particularly in times of recession, dollars grow tighter as social ills multiply—more homeless, more crime, more runaways, more domestic violence, more substance abuse, more unemployment and poverty. All too often, public policymakers do not recognize the role that the police play in dealing with all of these problems because of the perception that the police should focus on crime, as if they were not all part of the same matrix.

Now that Community Policing makes dealing with a broad spectrum of problems an integral part of the police mission, departments must find ways to collect and analyze data that reflect this commitment, as a means of educating public policymakers about the need for strong financial support. The chief should tell that story about how the officer steered the young man to treatment, and how that will cut the number of burglaries in the area

overnight. But civic officials and representatives of funders also want cumulative data about how many, how much, how often.

HOW IS YOUR DEPARTMENT DOING?

Basic ideals

Community Policing appears unstoppable, and estimates suggest that as many as two-thirds of police departments that serve communities of 50,000 population or more have already embraced Community Policing or plan to do so within a year. Yet questions persist concerning the actual depth and breadth of this commitment.

Many departments, especially those in big cities, adopt Community Policing first as a limited experiment, all too often applying sterile and outmoded measures to assess its relative success or failure—primarily before and after analysis of response time, clearance rates, arrests, number of citations issued. Unfortunately as well, because Community Policing is not always fully understood, departments eager to climb on the bandwagon often claim every new initiative is Community Policing, whether or not it accurately reflects the Community Policing philosophy.

So a department that wants to know “How’m I doing?” must first begin by gauging its understanding of Community Policing and how well its activities reflect this approach. Toward that end, it pays to reiterate some of the basic principles of Community Policing, so the following is a checklist of basics for any Community Policing effort:

- **Community Policing is a philosophy, not an isolated program.** Understanding and application of the approach should permeate the entire department, civilian and sworn, and, ideally, the entire community, including the Big Five (see Page 6), and the philosophy is expressed in the organizational philosophy that assigns Community Officers to beats.

- **Community Policing broadens the mission of the police beyond crime control.** In addition to serious crime, Community Policing targets so-called petty crime (vandalism, low-level drug dealing, juvenile offenses), fear of crime, and social and physical disorder, including neighborhood decay.

- **Community Policing provides decentralized service.** This often means the officer works directly out of an office in the community, many times as part of a larger team (recognizing that circumstances may dictate other arrangements), with the goal of providing Community Officers a defined beat.

Regardless of specifics, the objective is to reduce centralized control of Community Officers by the department, in favor of making them directly accountable to the people in their beat.

- **Community Policing provides personalized service.** The purpose in decentralizing officers is to allow them the time and opportunity to maintain daily, direct, face-to-face contact with the people in the community, so that they can forge a new partnership, based on mutual trust, to prioritize and address local problems.

- **Community Policing implies a permanent commitment to the community.** Community Officers are permanently assigned to specific beats, and they must not be routinely rotated or used to fill in for vacancies elsewhere in the system.

- **Community Policing focuses on problem-solving.** The overarching purpose of assigning Community Officers to permanent beats is to allow the officer the time and opportunity to solve problems regardless of whether the solution includes arrest or some other traditional measure of success. Community Officers are immersed in the life of the community, so that they can fashion creative solutions that address the underlying dynamics of crime, fear of crime, and disorder, with the support and often the direct participation of the community.

- **Community Policing enhances accountability,** by robbing the predator, the police, and the people in the community of anonymity that can cloak misbehavior.

- **Community Policing is full-service policing.** Community Policing does not supplant but rather builds upon traditional policing, and Community Officers function as full-fledged law enforcement officers who make arrests, but who do much more.

- **Community Policing is not a specialty.** Everyone in the department should practice Community Policing, and Community Officers are not removed from—or elevated above—their fellow officers. Instead they are generalists who perform a variety of tasks that enhance the delivery of decentralized and personalized police service.

- **Community Policing involves average citizens in the police process.** By providing a neighborhood its own officer, Community Policing allows people a voice in how they are policed—in setting local priorities, in fashioning solutions, in developing new proactive efforts and activities. Average citizens will also be asked to participate directly in a variety of initiative activities.

- **Community Policing complements reactive policing with proactive policing.** Traditional policing is structured to focus the vast bulk of its resources on responding to calls for service promptly, whereas Community Policing balances those efforts with activities aimed at short- and long-term prevention of crime, fear of crime, and disorder.

- **Community Policing must face the test of operating within existing resources.** Community Policing must be affordable and cost-effective; it is not something a department tries for a while or employs as an add-on, but rather it must become the way that the entire police department conducts its business in the community.

- **Community Policing may serve as the model and as the centerpiece for the decentralization and personalization of other social services.** Experience shows that the next phase of the Community Policing revolution may be the application of the lessons learned from Community Policing to the delivery of other social services. In practical terms, this can mean assigning other social service agents—the social worker, public health nurse, mental health therapist, drug counselor—to a neighborhood storefront called a Neighborhood Network Center, where the Community Officer acts as both protector and catalyst.

Participation of the Big Five

Important as well is that Community Policing cannot function in a vacuum; it depends on broad-based support inside and outside the department. Success in Community Policing depends on the involvement and interaction of the so-called Big Five—the police, the citizens (individuals and groups), civic officials, the community's public and private agencies, and the media. The following is an initial attempt to outline what police departments can do to educate groups outside the department—those whose support is essential for success:

- **Citizens (individuals and groups)**

Has the department developed and implemented a strategy to educate average citizens about the trade-offs implicit in the shift to Community Policing and the timetable required to see positive change? (Among the most obvious and common trade-offs are that response time for non-emergency calls may be slowed to allow deploying officers in beats, and average citizens are allowed input into setting local priorities in exchange for providing their direct participation and support.)

How will people be made aware of their responsibilities and that the ultimate success of Community Policing depends on them?

Has the department planned (or executed) pre- and post-implementation surveying of the residents of the community? Did the surveys ask residents for input on problems and priorities?

Have Community Officers made contact with both average citizens and community leaders within their beats? Has the department identified the official and unofficial leaders in the community?

Is the department sensitive to the issue of overselling Community Policing to people as a panacea?

- **Civic officials**

Have they been included in the planning process? Do they understand Community Policing, its trade-offs and its timetable?

How will they respond when Community Policing often means that groups which traditionally receive priority service (the business community, the affluent) may perceive that their service has declined in favor of others (typically those who live in poorer neighborhoods)?

Do civic officials understand that Community Policing means giving line officers greater autonomy, including the opportunity to make embarrassing mistakes?

With Community Officers providing what may previously have been the province of constituent service, are elected officials who must run for re-election aware of the potential for jealousy and conflict?

Will elected officials support Community Policing even if a powerful constituent complains?

- **Community agencies (public and private)**

Have they been involved in the planning process?

Are they willing to cooperate? Does this include direct participation and maybe changing their work hours?

Are they willing to consider decentralizing their social service agents, so that they can work directly with Community Officers, part-time or full-time?

- **The media**

Has top command met with editors and reporters in electronic and print media to provide information on Community Policing during the planning process?

Has the department made an effort to explain to the media the importance of educating the public about trade-offs and to encourage them to include this information in their stories?

Has the department provided reporters tips on success stories related to Community Policing?

Do Community Officers speak directly to the press, touting their achievements?

Applying the Community Policing Checklist

For a department to see how well it is doing against the basic ideals proposed above, we offer the Community Policing Checklist. It is a unique instrument because it is as much a stimulus for discussion and debate as a performance assessment tool. The real goal is not to apply this as a traditional test, ticking off yes-or-no answers to see how well the score stacks up to some theoretical ideal. Rather, the checklist is designed to prompt two basic kinds of discussion:

• Theoretical

How long must Community Officers spend in the same community?

Would allowing Community Officers occasional use of a patrol car violate the spirit of the approach?

What is the proper relationship between Community Officers and their motor patrol counterparts?

Should average citizens have direct input into setting police priorities—how much influence should they have?

How much participation should we expect from average citizens?

Can Community Officers benefit from advanced technology, such as computer link-ups and cellular phones?

Does Community Policing raise new ethical issues?

Can specialty units really be part of Community Policing?

Does Community Policing make the police more—or less—vulnerable to lawsuits?

• Applied

Are our beats too large?

Have civilians, particularly dispatchers, received enough training on how to apply the philosophy of Community Policing?

Do Community Officers have an easier—or tougher—time earning promotions?

Are there safeguards in place to detect burnout in Community Officers?

Are we expecting too much—or too little—from average citizens?

Have Community Officers succeeded in delegating appropriate tasks to other social service providers?

These sample questions are certainly not meant to be exhaustive, only illustrative. Indeed, as noted before, the authors encourage you to provide information about your experience in using these tools, as well as suggestions about how to improve them.

Community Policing Checklist

The department as a whole

1. Is Community Policing a department-wide commitment, not just a specialty unit?
2. Does the department mission statement reflect the commitment to Community Policing?
3. Has the department implemented a comprehensive strategy to educate the Big Five—police, citizens, civic officials, community agencies, and the media—about the benefits, trade-offs, and risks of Community Policing before, during, and after implementation?
4. Has the department developed a strategy for soliciting and analyzing formal and informal feedback from the community (surveys, a citizen advisory council, etc.)?
5. Is everyone in the department, including civilians, receiving special training in Community Policing?
6. Beyond initial training, is there a follow-up training?
7. Have recruitment and selection guidelines been changed to reflect the new commitment to Community Policing?
8. Have performance evaluations been changed to reflect both a quantitative and qualitative assessment?
9. Have promotional guidelines been changed to reflect the commitment to Community Policing?

Top command

1. Has top command structured and implemented the plan discussed above to educate and involve the Big Five—police, citizens, civic officials, community agencies, and the media?
2. Has top command communicated to everyone within the department what is expected of them with a department-wide commitment to Community Policing?
3. Has top command developed and implemented a deployment plan that allows officers, both Community Officers and motor patrol officers,

- sufficient time and opportunity to express the Community Policing philosophy?
4. Has top command addressed the need to revise hiring and promotional criteria, as well as training, to reflect the department-wide commitment to Community Policing?
 5. Does top command clearly communicate the differences between Community Policing and other proactive efforts, such as crime prevention and police-community relations?
 6. Has top command developed and implemented a plan to empower front-line employees (civilians such as clerks and dispatchers as well as line officers)?
 7. What will top command do to foster creativity and innovation?
 8. Is top command implementing Community Policing as a total philosophical and organizational commitment, not as a set of tactics to be applied to specific problems?
 9. Does top command communicate that Community Policing focuses on both short- and long-term results?
 10. Does top command explain to others inside and outside the department that problem solving requires focusing on arrests as only one tool in achieving results?
 11. Has top command structured and implemented a training plan to provide line officers and their supervisors information on how to optimize Community Policing?
 12. Has top command structured and implemented a plan to reduce internal friction, particularly between Community Officers and motor patrol officers?
 13. Has top command developed and implemented a system so that supervisors and line officers document their efforts?
 14. Does top command have a strategy to handle rotation of officers and use of officers as fill-ins that does not unduly rely on interrupting the continuity of Community Officers?
 15. Does top command make periodic visits to the field to encourage line officers and to monitor performance?
 16. What has top command done to encourage two-way information flow within the department?
 17. Has top command developed and implemented a system to measure Community Policing's impact on crime, fear of crime, and disorder?

18. Has top command communicated its willingness to give officers the "freedom to fail" and to tolerate well-intentioned mistakes?
19. Has top command developed and implemented a plan to assist officers in efforts to network with public and private agencies within the community?
20. Has top command developed and implemented a plan to facilitate teamwork and cross-fertilization between Community Officers and sworn and non-sworn personnel in other divisions?
21. Has top command structured a means of promoting and monitoring coordination among Community Policing efforts and the activities of other divisions and units, such as vice, narcotics, motor patrol, etc.?
22. Has top command determined and provided the resources required to implement Community Policing?

First-line supervisors

1. Have first-line supervisors been involved in the planning process and have they been allowed input?
2. Have first-line supervisors received training in Community Policing?
3. Have first-line supervisors been included as part of a Community Policing team effort?
4. Do first-line supervisors make announced and unannounced visits to the beats to provide assistance and monitor performance?
5. Have first-line supervisors taken steps to reduce red tape?
6. Have first-line supervisors communicated encouragement for innovation and a tolerance for well-intentioned mistakes?
7. Have first-line supervisors addressed how to reduce friction between Community Officers and motor patrol officers (and special units)?
8. Have first-line supervisors communicated to motor patrol how they can express the Community Policing philosophy through their job?
9. Have first-line supervisors found ways to express creativity and problem-solving in their job?

Line officers

• Beat assignments

1. Does the Community Policing plan include clearly defined beat areas?
2. Has the community had input in determining boundaries of the beat area?
3. Is the size of the beat appropriate, as reflected in analysis of the geographic

size of the beat, the number of people in the area, and the number of crimes reported and calls for service?

4. Has the officer received a permanent assignment to the beat (at least 18 months)?

- **Role of line officers**

1. Are officers freed from the patrol car to allow daily, face-to-face contact with the public?
2. Have line officers been delegated sufficient authority to self-initiate innovations with a minimum of red tape?
3. Are Community Officers full-service officers who make arrests?
4. Are Community Officers provided enough time to do more than answer calls for service?
5. Are Community Officers allowed the continuity required to develop rapport and trust?
6. Have Community Officers been instructed to make the effort to introduce themselves to everyone within the beat?
7. Are Community Officers given the time, opportunity, and instruction to apply problem-solving techniques to address the problem of crime, drugs, fear of crime, and community disorder and decay?
8. Are Community Officers selected for superiority in communication skills, as well as for their empathy and sensitivity to ethnic, racial, sexual, religious, and cultural difference?

- **Line officers' autonomy and attitudes**

1. Are Community Officers evaluated on parameters that reflect qualitative as well as quantitative measures appropriate to assessing Community Policing?
2. Do Community Officers have input into their performance evaluations?
3. Do Community Officers have sufficient time to develop rapport and trust with people in the community and to generate proactive efforts?
4. Are Community Officers used unduly to fill in for shortages elsewhere in the department?
5. Do Community Officers complain of being bogged down in red tape?
6. Does departmental policy allow line officers, including Community Officers, to talk with the media about their initiatives and activities?
7. Do officers have backing from their superiors for making well-intentioned mistakes?

8. Is duty as a Community Officer meted out as punishment?
9. Does duty as a Community Officer impair or enhance promotability, or does it have no impact on chances for advancement?
10. Do Community Officers have the autonomy to initiate projects on their own?
11. Do Community Officers have the "freedom to fail"?
12. Do Community Officers have the support of:
 - top command?
 - middle management?
 - motor patrol and other units?
 - sworn and civilian personnel?
 - the police union or association?
 - local politicians?
 - the community?
13. Have Community Officers themselves actively enlisted the support, participation, or cooperation of:
 - the media?
 - average citizens?
 - citizen volunteers?
 - community leaders/groups?
 - other government agencies and officials?
 - public social service providers (code enforcement, social services, mental health, educators, etc.)?
 - non-profit agencies (such as Salvation Army and Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts)?
 - the private sector (ranging from small business to major corporations, including landlords)?
 - private security?

Problem solving and quality of life

1. Do Community Officers initiate proactive short- and longer-term efforts to reduce crime, drugs, fear of crime, and social and physical disorder, including neighborhood decay?
2. Do officers tailor their response to local priorities, needs, and resources in the community?
3. Are average citizens allowed input into the process of setting local priorities?

4. Do Community Officers take into account the capacity of the courts and corrections in the development of strategies to reduce problems such as street-level drug dealing?
5. Do Community Officers balance the efforts of the narcotics unit to target the supply side of drugs with initiatives aimed at drug demand (low-level sales)?
6. Do Community Officers work with landlords on efforts to screen tenants as a means of eliminating dope houses?
7. Do Community Officers work with code enforcement to close dope houses?
8. Do Community Officers work with drug education/treatment specialists?
9. Do Community Officers target at-risk youth for special attention?
10. Do Community Officers help develop positive activities for youth as an alternative to misbehavior?
11. Do Community Officers interact with youngsters in ways designed to promote self-esteem?
12. Do Community Officers support families in efforts to encourage youngsters to live within the law?
13. Do Community Officers take petty crime seriously?
14. Do Community Officers promote informal conflict resolution among residents?
15. Do Community Officers address the needs and problems of special groups:
 - women?
 - the elderly?
 - the disabled?
 - substance abusers?
 - the homeless?
 - runaways?
 - youth gangs?
 - juveniles?
 - members of various racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural groups and those of different sexual orientations?
16. Do Community Officers work with the community on prioritizing and addressing problems with social disorder—panhandling, gambling, prostitution, etc.?
17. Do Community Officers work with the community on prioritizing and addressing problems with physical disorder and neighborhood decay—

graffiti, abandoned cars and buildings, potholes in the street, trash in yards, uncollected garbage, etc.?

18. Do Community Officers work with code enforcement and landlords to upgrade properties while maintaining affordable rents?
19. Do Community Officers delegate to others as appropriate—fellow officers, other social service providers, citizen volunteers?

Ethical and legal concerns

1. Are Community Officers trained in and evaluated on building rapport with members of the community in ways that promote mutual respect?
2. Has the department taken specific steps to stress respect for individual civil rights?
3. Are there safeguards in place to ensure that sworn personnel do not harass or abuse citizens?
4. Have steps been taken to ensure that civilian personnel express the Community Policing philosophy through courteous interaction with citizens?
5. Do Community Officers take steps to restrain vigilantism within their beat areas?
6. Do Community Officers know and follow the ethical and legal constraints on their behavior?
7. Does training and supervision reinforce the importance of ensuring that Community Officers do not initiate efforts that favor one group over another?
8. Do all officers express respect for racial, ethnic, religious, cultural, and sexual difference?
9. Are measures taken to ensure that Community Officers do not function as the “good cops,” while the other sworn and non-sworn personnel conduct “business as usual”?
10. Are Community Officers free of political contamination?

EVALUATING THE COMMUNITY OFFICER

Purposes and functions

Adopting Community Policing as a department-wide approach requires modifying the performance evaluations of virtually everyone in the department to reflect how well they are expressing the Community Policing

philosophy in their work. However, it is the Community Officer out on the beat who most completely and directly expresses the Community Policing philosophy, so if we can structure a valid and workable performance evaluation for the Community Officer's job, the changes that should be made in all the other performance evaluations would logically flow from that example.

Yet before we struggle with the question of how best to assess the performance of the Community Officer, we should discuss some of the reasons that performance evaluations are kept. Indeed, many employees resent or ridicule the effort as a waste of time. Others think that management documents performance merely to avoid litigation or defend their decisions in a lawsuit or grievance procedure if someone is fired.

However, as noted earlier, well-crafted performance evaluations provide the department the data that they need to justify budgets to public policy-makers. The most basic purpose, however, is to give the employee honest feedback to the question of "How'm I doing?"

Yet the problem is that many employee evaluations fall far short of accomplishing even these basic goals. All too often, formal evaluations over-value those who "play the game" by generating the numbers. Indeed, too many performance evaluations penalize those who innovate. As one former police officer noted, officers who do little more than show up on time, neatly dressed, may well score better than the creative officer willing to take a risk. In professional jargon, the evaluation process in most police departments is risk averse—just don't let us hear any bad or embarrassing news and you will score OK. The winners are those who best play CYA—Cover Your 'Anatomy.'

As this suggests, this kind of performance evaluation process stifles creativity and impairs morale. Admittedly as well, it is far easier to craft a performance evaluation that measures and rewards busyness, efficiency, and speed than effectiveness.

So the attempt to create performance evaluations for Community Officers that accurately reflect the virtues of the approach is indeed a challenge. On the one end of the spectrum is the performance evaluation employed in a small department in Texas where the Community Officers are asked to write one or more sentences every few months about what they are trying to accomplish. While that may be enough to satisfy everyone inside and outside the department in a small town where everyone knows each other, consider the challenge of fashioning fair and effective performance evaluations for

Community Officers in a department like New York City, which employs upwards of 27,000 police officers.

The best way to proceed to address the challenge of developing a suitable performance evaluation for the Community Officer requires identifying the many objectives that an ideal evaluation would meet:

- To document the individual Community Officer's performance (for purposes of raises/promotions/commendations/censure/dismissal, etc.).
- To provide some basis for comparing one Community Officer's performance to another's.
- To serve as a foundation for future goals for the individual Community Officer evaluated.
- To gather and document effective strategies and tactics that can be shared with others.
- To collect and analyze efforts that failed, to warn others of potential pitfalls.
- To contribute data to assessments of the impact and effectiveness of all Community Officers within the department.
- To serve as a foundation for decisions concerning Community Officers, such as those related to training, deployment, etc.
- To contribute to assessments of the impact and effectiveness of Community Policing as a department-wide commitment.
- To provide documentation useful to public policymakers/funders.

As this suggests, combining the individual Community Officer's evaluation with others demands finding ways to express quality as quantity, in other words, to make quality a countable commodity. The optimal approach would supplement this information with an essay, to capture anecdotes and to flesh out the data. But the challenge is to identify quantifiable outcomes that truly relate to the job and to ensure that this does not corrupt Community Policing into policing by the numbers.

Opening up the process

Part of the solution in reassuring people inside the department that the performance evaluations are meaningful and fair requires allowing Community Officers input into the process of developing their own performance measurements. Once they understand the range of purposes that a performance evaluation must meet, they will appreciate the difficulties involved, and supervision will have gone a long way toward allaying their anxiety about its uses. There will always be cynics who will carp at the process, but

Community Policing recognizes the importance of opening up dialogue as a means of enhancing trust. However, for the opportunity to be meaningful, the department must be willing to allow Community Officers to make substantive contributions to developing the measurements by which they will be judged.

Also vital is ensuring that the evaluations focus on behavior—not character, personality—as a means of enhancing objectivity in the process. Every department wants officers to be hard-working, honest, fair, dedicated, brave, compassionate—but the challenge is to find ways to measure the relevant behavior without resorting to subjective judgments. First-line supervisors can tour the area and ask residents for feedback on how often they see the officer, do they know him or her by name, and has the officer been courteous to them—focus on what the officer does, not on who he is.

Indeed, no doubt many departments have hired individuals who have hidden prejudice toward one group or another—minorities, Jews, Moslems, gays. But the issue is not what the person thinks or feels, but what he or she does on the job. If people allow their personal feelings to influence their behavior on the job, their misbehavior must be uncovered and dealt with. But if they can overcome their biases and behave appropriately on the job, difficult as that may be, then their personal feelings and attitudes are irrelevant in a performance evaluation.

The other consideration in soliciting support for performance evaluations concerns how they are used. It doesn't take long for employees in any organization to figure out when the performance evaluations are used for punitive rather than constructive purposes. One function of performance evaluations is indeed to provide documentation to justify disciplinary action, but this use should apply to only a handful of cases.

Performance evaluations are not a bludgeon to whip people into shape, but rather a tool that can be used to set goals for the future. The challenge is to make the officers a real part of the process, so that they do not feel that they are being coerced by supervisors who have no feel for their problems and potential.

Enhancing quality

We have the example of U.S. automakers to remind us that quality is not something you tack on like chrome, but it must be everyone's job. When the top brass loses touch with the consumer, when the system pits workers against bosses, quality suffers, and people balk and begin buying from some-

one else if they can, as happened when American car buyers switched to Japanese and German cars.

The public police have also found that they do not have a lock on the market, but those consumers who can afford to do so are shopping elsewhere for safety. We see the exodus from major cities to the suburbs—taxpayers voting with their feet, leaving urban police with smaller and smaller budgets. Indeed, the most affluent typically choose gated and walled communities patrolled by private security, where the residents receive decentralized and personalized policing for a fee. Given the choice, people want police officers that they know—officers that they can hold directly accountable.

So police managers should borrow from the experiments and innovations taking place in the private sector, as companies struggle to find new ways to involve workers in the process of producing quality. As Alvin Toffler notes in *Power Shift*, Ford Motor Company discovered that the traditional system of looking for defects and correcting them after the fact just wasn't working. "Only by allowing workers more discretion—no longer programming their every move—could the goal of zero defects be approached...and this... meant 'recognizing the power of the operators right down to shop floor level.'"¹

In *In Search of Excellence*, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., insist that the best organizations recognize the importance of treating all employees as adults. They note that one reason that the Roman Empire survived so long, even though managers back in Rome couldn't pick up the phone to issue orders, was that this meant that they had to assign someone to a 'beat' and then trust them to run the show on their own.²

Goal-setting and problem-solving

As this suggests, the real function of the performance evaluation for the Community Officer should be that it provides him or her the structured opportunity to talk with management about how to make even more of the job. Indeed, as one management expert said, the biggest mistake that managers make is to use performance evaluations as a way to dwell on weakness rather than to enhance strengths.

As a case in point, the expert noted that Ted Williams was a great batter and a lousy fielder, but Williams didn't waste much time practicing fielding. Williams' coach figured that, no matter how hard he tried, Williams could only make a minimal improvement in his fielding, from poor to fair perhaps, but that focusing on the negative would add to his frustration and self-doubt.

So Williams instead spent his time working on batting—his strength—and that allowed him to progress from good to great to fantastic.

All too often, managers use performance evaluations primarily to identify weaknesses. Then the hapless employee spends the next few months struggling to improve—often to the detriment of the person's strengths.

Obviously, if the problem is serious (excessive use of force) or easily rectifiable (chronic tardiness), managers must demand immediate, positive change. But consider the department that urged its Community Officers to write a newsletter for their beats. Now think of gregarious Community Officer Tom, who is a superstar on the beat when dealing with people face-to-face, but who cannot put pen to paper without gritting his teeth in agony. Yet each time there is a performance evaluation, Tom is told that he must concentrate on putting out that newsletter—his boss spends more time talking about that than about all of Tom's wonderful new projects. So instead of concentrating on what he enjoys and does well, Tom spends hours in the office, struggling to put together a newsletter which is likely to be poor at best.

The solution? Encourage Tom to find someone else—a citizen volunteer, the local minister, a teacher—to write the newsletter, freeing Tom to spend more time doing what he does best. In essence, this means applying Community Policing's personalized, problem-solving approach to the problem of producing a good newsletter.

The danger, of course, is that some may perceive "letting Tom off the hook" as a serious fairness issue. A fellow Community Officer who spends the time to produce a newsletter may resent seeing Tom "get away" with "sloughing the job onto someone else." Indeed, because the department will want to document the production of that newsletter, Tom may even be able to claim credit for it, even though it does not take much of his time.

At a certain level, this is reminiscent of squabbling among kids in a family ("Why does Tommy get to stay up later than I do?"), but the issue of fairness must be addressed, to reduce internal friction and maintain morale. And the best explanation is that tailoring the performance evaluation process to the individual, when feasible, will ultimately prove to be the fairest system.

Again, if officers are involved in the process of developing and modifying performance evaluations, they will begin to recognize that they may lose in one instance, but that they can gain in another. Also of importance is the reminder that the goal is to move beyond the family model, where "Daddy"

tells "Junior" what to do, to one where adults reason together about how best to proceed, and that requires greater flexibility.

Identifying tasks and activities

As noted in the Preface, the National Center for Community Policing will be working to produce a job description/role definition for the Community Officer. However, the real world cannot wait for research before proceeding, so the following is a tentative list of duties and activities commonly performed by Community Officers, as a starting point for discussion. The more reference points for the job, the more foundation for building a quantitative measurement of quality.

The Community Officer's Duties & Activities

1. **Law enforcement**—The Community Officer performs general duties common to all police patrol assignments.
2. **Directed patrol**—Though increased visibility on the street is an added plus, the main reason for removing the Community Officer from the patrol car is to allow the officer the time and opportunity to work behind the scenes, involving the community in efforts to make the beat a better and safer place in which to live and work.
3. **Community involvement**—The Community Officer attempts to build an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust, so that average citizens and community leaders form a new partnership with the police to address the problems of crime, drugs, fear of crime, and social and physical disorder, including neighborhood decay.
4. **Identifying and prioritizing problems**—The Community Officer works with community residents to identify and prioritize problems.
5. **Reporting**—The Community Officer shares information, including information about problems in the beat, with officers who are part of the team and also with the rest of the department, including special units (such as narcotics).
6. **Problem-solving**—Because of the knowledge that the Community Officer has of the neighborhood and the people who live there, he or she can be the catalyst to develop creative solutions to problems that do not focus exclusively on arrest.
7. **Organizing**—The Community Officer rapidly moves beyond organizing activities such as Neighborhood Watch to organizing a number of

- community-based initiatives and activities aimed at specific problems and at enhancing the overall quality of life in the community.
8. **Communicating**—The Community Officer gives formal and informal talks to individuals and groups to educate people about crime prevention techniques, to discuss problems in the beat, etc. The Community Officer also employs writing skills to communicate with residents in the beat, and the Community Officer may also be empowered to communicate directly with the media.
 9. **Conflict resolution**—The Community Officer mediates, negotiates, and resolves conflicts formally and informally (and challenges people to begin resolving problems on their own).
 10. **Referrals**—The Community Officer refers problems to appropriate agencies: code enforcement, social services, drug treatment, animal control, sanitation, etc.
 11. **Visiting**—The Community Officer makes home and business visits to acquaint individuals in the beat with Community Policing, to enlist their help, and to educate them about crime prevention.
 12. **Recruiting and supervising volunteers**—The Community Officer must solicit, train, and supervise paid and/or unpaid community volunteers, ranging from individuals who assist with clerical duties to people who provide technical assistance, help in coaching youth, etc.
 13. **Proactive projects**—In addition to efforts that focus on solving immediate problems, the Community Officer works with the community on short- and long-term efforts to prevent problems and enhance the quality of life.
 14. **Targeting special groups**—Part of the Community Officer's mandate is to protect and assist groups with special needs—women, juveniles, the elderly, the disabled, the homeless, etc., as well as to target other groups, such as youth gangs, for special attention.
 15. **Targeting disorder**—Unlike traditional police officers, the Community Officer's mandate includes emphasis on developing solutions to problems of social and physical disorder and neighborhood decay.
 16. **Networking with the private sector**—The Community Officer contacts and solicits the active participation of business, ranging from donations of goods from small business to broad corporate support for new initiatives.
 17. **Networking with non-profit agencies**—The Community Officer acts as both liaison and facilitator with non-profit agencies, ranging from food banks to the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts.

18. **Administrative/professional duties**—The Community Officer participates in:

- training
- roll call
- office duties (answering mail, phone calls, reports)

NOTE: For an example of a job description for Community Officers, please see Appendix A, provided by the Lansing Police Department, which is used when the job is posted.

Building an evaluation

To understand how we can proceed to produce a performance evaluation for Community Officers that includes countable items, it pays to look at the kinds of measures used to assess the performance of the traditional motor patrol officer. While we can debate how well these parameters actually relate to success in the job, the fact remains that most motor patrol officers are evaluated on countable items such as:

- **Radio calls**—Number and types of calls, alarm responses (true and false); disposition; reports written; time spent; follow-up required.
- **Arrests**—Number and types of felonies and misdemeanors (self-initiated and assigned); warrants; juvenile apprehensions; DUI's.
- **Traffic**—Number and types of traffic stops (moving and non-moving), including seatbelt and child-restraint violations (self-initiated and assigned); accidents, injuries; citations issued; action taken; time spent; motorist assists; parking tickets issued.
- **Suspicious persons/situations checked/investigated**—Number and type (self-initiated and assigned); number of persons contacted; action taken; disposition; time spent.
- **Property recovered**—Type and value, time spent.
- **Desk/other assignments**—Number and type, time spent.
- **Administrative/miscellaneous**—roll call, court appearances, prisoner transport assignments, subpoenas served, patrol car maintenance, reports written/taken, bar checks, etc.

Community Officer Performance Evaluation

In addition to the items listed above, the performance evaluation for the Community Officer must take into account factors directly and indirectly

related to the officer's performance. The following is an initial attempt to contribute to a model.

Outcomes INDIRECTLY Related to Officer Performance

- **Crime rates**—Number and types of crimes in beat area; trends up or down from previous month, year; crime analysis.

- **Agency involvement**—Number and types of other public and private social service agencies operating in the community (including agencies working out of a Neighborhood Network Center).

(Statistics for crimes in the Community Officer's beat area are a valid part of any performance evaluation; however, it is important to recognize that this may be only indirectly related to the specific officer's performance. Also, while the participation of other public and private social service agencies in community-based problem solving is a valid goal, the Community Officer may lack the power to make this happen.)

Outcomes DIRECTLY Related to Officer Performance

- **Rates of targeted crimes**—Number and type; monthly and annual trends.

(With input from the community, the Community Officer may have prioritized specific crimes: drug dealing, burglary, vandalism, etc.)

- **Neighborhood disorder:**

- Social disorder**—open drug use/sales, panhandlers, runaways, addicts, "winos," truants, curfew violations, prostitution, homeless, mainstreamed mental patients, unlicensed peddlers, gambling, loitering, unsupervised youngsters, youth gangs, etc.

- Physical disorder**—graffiti, abandoned cars, abandoned buildings, potholes, trash in yards, litter on streets, building code violations (residences and businesses), etc.

[The first-line supervisor and the Community Officer can work together to decide which items apply, then they can develop ways to measure progress. Some items will be countable (see below); the Community Officer can tabulate how many abandoned cars are tagged and towed, but the overall perception of improvement in neighborhood decay will require an on-site assessment from the first-line supervisor. If resources are available, the department could also survey residents periodically to assess their perceptions of progress toward improving the safety and quality of life in the beat.]

- **Calls for service**—Number and type; monthly and annual trends.

(Experience shows that a new Community Policing effort typically results in an increase in the number of calls for service from that area, as people begin to look to the police for solutions to problems more than in the past. However, over time, most effective Community Officers discover that the number of calls for service declines, as people wait to tell the Community Officer about problems in person, or because residents begin handling more conflicts informally. Monitoring calls for service not only helps verify whether the Community Officer is doing a good job in the beat, but public policymakers should also appreciate that the time saved allows the police to do more with the same resources.)

Quantifiable Activities (Community-Based Problem Solving)

(NOTE: There is some redundancy and overlap among categories.)

- **Communications**
 - **Community meetings**—How many, what kind, number of people in attendance. Did officer attend, organize, or both?
 - **Newsletter**—Size, frequency, number of readers.
 - **Organizing**—Number and type of block/watch groups formed; monthly and annual trends; number of other kinds of groups and projects formed; number of participants; demographics of participants; time spent.
 - **Telephone calls**—Number, type, time spent.
 - **Speeches**—Number, kind of group, size of audience, time spent.
 - **Home and business visits**—Number, type, time spent.
 - **Personal contacts** (on the street, drop-ins at office)—Number, type, time spent.
 - **Media contacts**—News releases, interviews, etc.
 - **Other outreach**—Surveys, feedback from community leaders, etc.
- **Social disorder**
 - Number and types of individual efforts undertaken by the officer aimed at the problems of social disorder listed above.
 - Number and type of group projects aimed at the problems of social disorder listed above; number of people involved; demographics of participants (race, income, etc.); participation of youth, area businesses, public agencies (Social Services, etc.), non-profit groups (Salvation Army, etc.)

- **Physical disorder (beautification)**
 - Number and type of individual efforts undertaken by the officer aimed at the problems of physical disorder listed above.
 - Number and type of group projects aimed at the problems of physical disorder listed above; number of people involved; demographics of participants (race, income, etc.); participation of youth, area businesses, public agencies (code enforcement, etc.), non-profit groups (Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, etc.).
- **Anti-drug initiatives**
 - Number and type of individual and group initiatives aimed at drug use (demand); number of people involved; demographics of participants; participation of youth, area businesses, public agencies (drug treatment counselors, etc.), non-profit groups (12-Step Programs, etc.).
 - Number and type of individual and group initiatives aimed at low-level drug dealing (supply); number of dope houses closed; number of open drug markets closed; number of arrests; number of people involved; demographics of participants; participation of youth, area businesses, public agencies, non-profit groups.
- **Special groups**—Juveniles, youth gangs, women, the elderly, the disabled, the unemployed, the poor, etc.
 - Number and types of individual and group proactive initiatives aimed at the special needs of fragile, troubled, or uniquely vulnerable groups; number of people involved; demographics of participants; participation of youth, area businesses, public agencies, non-profit groups.
 - Note in particular those occasions when the Community Officer provided specific support to families, including single-parent families (individual or group initiatives aimed at individual families or groups of families to reduce problems of domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, etc.)
- **Networking**
 - Number and types of contacts (in person, telephone, correspondence) with: citizens, community leaders, business owners/managers, corporate officials, other social service or city service providers, agents of non-profit groups, church officials, teachers/educators, print and electronic media, etc.
- **Referrals**
 - Number and types of referrals; number and types of agencies involved; number of referrals per agency.

- **Intelligence gathering/information sharing**

- Number of occasions when the officer received useful information that contributed to resolving a crime, drug, or disorder problem; amount and kinds of useful information generated about a crime, drug, or disorder problem (aliases, street names of drugs, availability of different kinds of drugs, etc.); contribution to crime analysis; number of occasions information was shared with others in the department (name of unit, type of information).

- **Innovation**

- Documentable incidents where the Community Officer has demonstrated an imaginative approach toward problem solving, through new projects, new use of technology, etc.
- List specific proactive initiatives: educational, athletic, and social activities for youth and families, etc.

- **Teamwork**

- If Community Officers work as part of a team with other police officers (motor patrol, narcotics, etc.), the performance evaluation should reflect the numbers of contacts/joint activities; outcomes; time spent.
- If the Community Officer is part of a Neighborhood Network Center, document the interaction with other public social service providers who work from the facility. Note separately those occasions when the Community Officer's role was specifically to protect the other social service agents and when the officer was a participant in group problem-solving.

- **Solicitation of resources**

- Number and kind of donations from: individuals, foundations, private funders, corporations, small businesses, government agencies, etc. (Options can range from donated paint for a fix-up project to a monetary grant.)

Other Parameters

There are also a number of standard measurements of an officer's performance that should be part of the Community Officer's performance profile:

- **Administrative duties/responsibilities**
 - Attendance (at roll call, on the beat, at meetings, etc.)
 - Promptness (or tardiness)
 - Courtesy to the public and to fellow officers
 - Cooperation with others in the department
 - Reports (meets deadlines, completeness, etc.)
- **Professional improvement**
 - Participation in in-service training
 - Attendance at other training seminars/workshops
 - College coursework (number of hours, topics, grades)
 - Other efforts toward improvement of knowledge or skills (specify details)
- **Use of technology**
 - Has the officer demonstrated mastery of the appropriate technology (computer, radio, etc.)
 - Has the officer attended workshops/classes on technology when available.

As noted earlier, in addition to the measurements available through this model, the performance evaluation for a Community Officer should also include an opportunity for the officer to write a brief essay concerning any anecdotal evidence of success. It might also be useful to ask the Community Officer to use the essay format to provide anecdotal evidence of success, to document how he or she expresses sensitivity for diversity in the job, how he overcomes vigilantism and apathy on the part of citizens, etc. Quantifiable assessments measure who, what, where, and when, but the essay format allows delving into the how and why.

The officer should also have the opportunity to affix transcripts or tapes of any media coverage of initiatives in the beat. Community Officers can also solicit letters of support from local residents.

As you will see in Appendix B (Management by Objective—MBO), Dr. Bruce Benson, director of Michigan State University's Department of Public Safety, has developed a simple form that asks officers to identify three goals for the upcoming evaluation period, with space at the bottom for follow-up. Benson says that the goals can be as vague as "increased contact with the community," or as specific as "start new basketball league for youth by May 1." The goal is for the officer and supervisor to negotiate items that are appropriate to the challenges in the beat and to determine how progress toward the goals will be monitored.

Appendix C provides a sample log sheet, as used in the Aurora (CO) Police Department. It provides a reference that first-line supervisors can use to document critical incidents related to the Community Officers they supervise.

Opportunities for understanding

An individual Community Officer's performance evaluation should give a useful snapshot in time of that particular officer's activities. Yet performance evaluations must also contribute to a bigger picture, the effectiveness of Community Officers in the field. Toward that end, top command can begin to aggregate information, so that a broader picture emerges.

Obviously, because Community Policing often sparks an explosion in creativity, no one can anticipate all the unique efforts that Community Officers will undertake. However, we find, for example, that Community Officers, many of whom are assigned to low-income areas with a high percentage of renters, spend significant time trying to deal with the disorder problems associated with low-income rentals. The following is the kind of analysis that could be done by combining information from a number of Community Officers' performance evaluations:

- **Affordable housing**—*In the past X months, XX Community Officers have spent more than XX hours dealing with the disorder problems associated with the low-income rental housing in their beats. An immediate sign of success was that such initiatives led directly to the closing of XX dope houses, as well as the arrest of XX suspected dealers.*

XX Community Officers also held a series of XX meetings with landlords, instructing them on how to avoid renting to dealers and other undesirables. One Community Officer is even working on developing a database that they can use to warn each other of problem tenants.

XX Community Officers had XX contacts with code officials, so that they could work together to upgrade housing stocks—without triggering gentrification that can put affordable housing out of the reach of the poor. The officers were able to effect improvements in XX homes, and they were able to assist in resolving XX landlord/tenant disputes. Community Officer X is planning to host a community meeting on the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants. The officer has also found a donor who will supply those tenants who need a deadbolt lock.

Community Officers had XX contacts with city officials about improving the streetlighting, as an assist in keeping dealers and prostitutes off the street.

The officers also made XX contacts with City Sanitation to improve the timeliness of garbage removal.

As this suggests, the individual performance evaluations of Community Officers can provide the raw material for a sophisticated presentation on a variety of topics. Some topics are obvious—efforts aimed at the demand side of drugs, for example—but, since Community Policing tailors its efforts to local needs, the topics targeted for breakout may differ, department to department. For example, some departments may have enough data to justify an entry on public housing, while others may not. In other circumstances, the department may want to keep track of efforts aimed at youth, at the homeless, etc. Departments in states like Florida may need to document efforts to protect tourists. Indeed, the reason for keeping the categories listed above so general is that no one listing could possibly anticipate all the items that might be worth keeping track of.

Blending quantitative and qualitative information in this manner can also go a long way toward making the case for Community Policing within the department and also to public policymakers. Moreover, this kind of report would make an excellent news release to the media on the department's efforts in providing affordable housing. If there is a suitable site, the release of this information might be a good occasion for a news conference. The department must make the case to reporters that footage and photos of officers standing in front of a huge seizure of drugs, guns, and cash tell only part of the story.

A few tips borrowed from the field of journalism: Remember to go from the general to the specific, the specific to the general, as a way of making your point, while maintaining interest. In addition, an opening (or closing) anecdote (culled from the Community Officers' essays) would help humanize the effort and drive home the impact that Community Officers have on the lives of real people.

THE FIRST-LINE SUPERVISOR

A performance evaluation for the sergeant who assists and supervises the Community Officer must obviously build upon the model provided above. To avoid repetition, it goes without saying that the performance of the first-line supervisor can also be measured on the same list of **Quantifiable Activities (Community-Based Problem Solving)** listed above, in terms of the

supervisor's activities in the same regard (communication, contacts, etc.) or in terms of actions that the supervisor takes to facilitate the activities of the Community Officer in that regard (such as securing resources that Community Officers can use). The first-line supervisor will also, of course, be evaluated on traditional measures, just as Community Officers are also evaluated on these measures.

In addition, the first-line supervisor can be assessed on:

- **Contacts with Community Officers**

- Number of face-to-face meetings with Community Officers, time spent.
- Number of suggestions made for innovation/problem-solving.
- Number of trips to the beat (announced and unannounced) (with and without the Community Officer in attendance), time spent.
- Number of "assists" with other groups: with citizens, community leaders, community groups, civic officials, public agencies, church officials, teachers/educators, non-profit agencies, the media; outcome; time spent.

- **Career development of supervisees**

- Number of occasions that supervisor facilitates training opportunities and/or secures resources for training Community Officers.
- Appropriate maintenance and updating of records on supervisees.
- Development/execution of an appropriate reward/recognition program for supervisees.
- Efforts to acquire appropriate technology; disposition.
- Maintenance of technology.

- **Political issues**

- Efforts to shield Community Officers from political pressure/interference.
- Activities designed to educate politicians about the benefits and trade-offs implicit in Community Policing.

- **Qualitative issues**

- Does the supervisor juggle rotation/fill-ins so that Community Officers are interrupted as little as possible?
- Has the supervisor cut red tape for Community Officers?
- Has the supervisor run interference for Community Officers with critics inside and outside the department?
- What has the supervisor done to shield Community Officers from local politics?

- Has the supervisor found ways to determine how well Community Officers express respect for diversity?
- Has the supervisor investigated complaints/rumors—about misbehavior, discourtesy, excessive use of force, unethical behavior?
- Has the supervisor supported the Community Officer when he or she made well-intentioned mistakes?
- Does the supervisor act as the Community Officer's ombudsman with top command?
- Does the supervisor "share glory" with the officers?
- Is the supervisor alert to the danger of burnout among Community Officers?
- What steps has the supervisor taken to reduce the stress/workload on Community Officers?
- What has the supervisor done to enhance the autonomy and flexibility of the Community Officer?
- Does the supervisor ignore petty concerns?
- Has the supervisor attempted to tailor performance evaluations to the specific problems in different beats?

CONCLUSION

This booklet should be considered the first word—not the last—in an on-going attempt to develop performance evaluations that document Community Policing's impact without burying those who must administer them under a blizzard of paperwork and red tape. Again, there is some happy medium between asking Community Officers to write a sentence about their efforts versus an eight-hour marathon session to fill out a 20-page report. But when we consider all of the disparate purposes that performance evaluations serve, the importance of the challenge cannot be denied. We look forward to your input, advice, and criticism. How're we doing so far?

FOOTNOTES

1. Toffler, Alvin, *Power Shift* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), p. 206.
2. Peters, Thomas J., and Waterman, Robert, Jr., *In Search of Excellence* (New York: Warner Bookers, 1982), p. 277.

APPENDIX A
SAMPLE JOB DESCRIPTION
(POSTED FOR OPENINGS)

COMMUNITY POLICING OFFICERS—
LANSING POLICE DEPARTMENT

The position of Community Policing Officer will be responsible for a variety of duties which will include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Perform the duties of a police officer assigned to the Uniform Patrol Bureau as necessary.
2. Gather and report intelligence-related information in reference to the officer's assigned neighborhood.
3. Provide a sense of security for businesses and citizens within the assigned neighborhood.
4. Become acquainted with the merchants, businesses, and citizens within the neighborhood and assist them in identifying problem areas or concerns.
5. Enforce local and state laws, particularly those related to, or specifically drafted for, the assigned neighborhood.
6. Respond to all calls for service within the assigned neighborhood when available.
7. Respond to and investigate reports of criminal offenses within the assigned neighborhood when available.
8. Be responsible for building security, where applicable, particularly vacant or temporarily closed businesses and residences.
9. Develop and conduct speaking presentations on topics which have been identified as concerns and/or problems within the neighborhood.
10. Research and develop materials for preparing outlines, newsletters, and citizen training programs, as well as in-service training programs.
11. Conduct interviews with representatives of the media.
12. Serve as a member of various organizations and committees at the direction of the administration.
13. Conduct security surveys, complete business cards and crime risks reports, and provide follow-up contacts on commercial/residential burglaries and armed robberies which occur within the assigned neighborhood.
14. Prepare and coordinate the tasks to be accomplished within the neighborhood on a weekly basis.

15. Prepare weekly evaluation reports describing task accomplishments related to program goals and objectives.
16. Coordinate the services of various governmental and private agencies in an effort to resolve identified problems within the neighborhood.
17. Due to the nature of the assignment, it is anticipated that the officer selected will have to work a flexible schedule of 40 hours per week with variable leave days. Authorized functions or activities above 40 hours will be compensated as overtime.

Selection criteria

1. The expression of interest and qualifications for the position.
2. Seniority insofar as possible.
3. Be able/willing to physically withstand the rigors of walking throughout the assigned neighborhood.
4. The willingness to work flexible hours as community needs dictate.
5. The demonstration of an ability to communicate effectively with all levels within the department and with the general public.
6. The demonstration via previous work history of his/her dependability.
7. The demonstration via previous work history of the ability to work independently with a minimum of direct supervision.
8. At the time of selection, all eligible applicants will submit a one-page handwritten document as directed, to demonstrate an ability in the use of written communication skills.
9. Participate in an oral interview board to demonstrate interest in the position and the ability to communicate effectively.

Examples of problem-solving approaches

- Use of community surveys to identify problems and their solutions.
- Citizen surveillance (with or without cameras) at peak times of crime and disorder.
- Drug hotlines for reporting drug-related activity.
- Education and recreational programs for neighborhood children (including such activities as tutoring and playground participation).
- Conflict resolution training for citizen volunteers.
- Self-esteem enhancing classes and activities for neighborhood children.
- Fingerprint identification programs.
- Eliminating abandoned vehicles from the neighborhood that are being used by prostitutes.

- Community Policing Officer involvement in the Special Olympics.
- The CPO being a member of a community problem-solving team.
- Community volunteers escorting the elderly and new neighbors to businesses and resource centers.
- Use of the media to provide safety tips, especially at special times of the year like Halloween.
- Cleaning up vacant lots that attract drug dealers, prostitutes, and other undesirables.
- Tearing down buildings that are havens for problem people.
- Using *No Parking or Standing* signs to reduce congestion and undesirable "vendors."
- Using volunteers to collect clothes for the homeless.
- Enactment of loitering laws to keep streets clear of problem people.
- Encouraging churches, businesses, and volunteers to provide food, clothing, and shelter for street people.
- CPOs using different types of transportation to facilitate movement, including all-terrain vehicles, dirt bikes, ten-speed bikes, horses, and golf carts.
- Enforcing park restrictions and hours to control undesirable persons.
- Development of exchange programs between urban and suburban churches.
- Recreational programs for inner-city youth in rural areas.
- Identification of absentee landlords and holding them responsible for their building code infractions and unkempt property.
- Closing up houses and apartments that have more than one drug violation.
- Removing telephones or limiting them to only out-going calls to eliminate their use for drug dealing.
- Use ID cards for residents of crime-ridden apartments to keep non-residents from misbehaving.
- Establishing Neighborhood Network Centers to decentralize and personalize other service providers.
- Use of volunteers to supervise recreation activities at neighborhood school gymnasiums during non-school times.
- Educating the youth on their legal rights and responsibilities.
- Educating senior citizens on how to avoid and deal with "con" artists.
- Encouraging residents to use their homes as "safe havens" for children going to and from school who may be targets of deviant behavior.
- Supervision of community service/prisoners.

**APPENDIX B
MBO (MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE)
WORK PLAN**

**DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY**

Date _____

My main objectives for the period _____
through _____ for my beat are:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Officer _____

Supervisor _____

Community leader _____

Date _____

Evaluation of progress toward above objectives:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Officer _____

Supervisor _____

Community leader _____

Developed by Dr. Bruce Benson—10/90

**APPENDIX C
COMMUNITY OFFICER SIGNIFICANT
INCIDENT LOG**

AURORA (CO) POLICE DEPARTMENT

NOTE: This is kept by supervisors on the employees—this is a copy of actual handwritten entries by supervisors (with names X'ed to maintain confidentiality).

NAME _____

Evaluation Date From _____ to _____

DATE	EMPL	SUP	INCIDENT
2/14	X	X	Received a good letter from a Jackie X regarding assisting them in December of 1989.
3/19	X	X	Corrective action for loss of gas card.
5/8	X	X	Gave me a letter on Community Policing project update.
6/8	X	X	Good letter from Adams County DA office.
6/8	X	X	Good letter from Det. Sgt. X on project.
7/16	X	X	Talked to X about unacceptable sick leave. I gave him an order to bring in doctor's slip on any future sick days.
7/16	X	X	Good letter from Det. X from citizens.
8/6	X	X	Gave me a Community Policing memo update for month of July.
8/9	X	X	Went over 6 month eval.
8/27	X	X	Inspection today, all in order—all cards, uniform, etc.

PUBLICATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR COMMUNITY POLICING

Books

An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan

A Manual for the Establishment and Operation of a Foot Patrol Program

Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective, by Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Anderson Publishing Company, Cincinnati, OH

(Please contact Anderson Publishing directly by calling 1-800/543-0883)

Community Policing Series

1. Perceptions of Safety: A Comparison of Foot Patrol Versus Motor Patrol Officers
2. Job Satisfaction: A Comparison of Foot Patrol Versus Motor Patrol Officers
3. The Status of Contemporary Community Policing
4. The Impact of Foot Patrol on Black and White Perceptions of Policing
5. Uniform Crime Reporting and Community Policing: A Historical Perspective
6. Performance Profiles of Foot Versus Motor Patrol Officers
7. Community Policing: A Taxpayer's Perspective
8. Implementing a Community Policing Model for Work with Juveniles: An Exploratory Study
9. Community Policing: Training Issues
10. Community Policing Programs: A Twenty-Year View
11. Community Policing: The Line Officer's Perspective
12. Community Policing: Community Input into Police Policy
13. The Philosophy and Role of Community Policing
14. Community Policing: University Input into Community Policing
15. The Meaning of Community in Community Policing
16. Community Policing: Would You Know It If You Saw It?
17. Reinventing the Wheel in Police Work: A Sense of History
18. Preventing Civil Disturbances: A Community Policing Approach
19. Turning Concept into Practice: The Aurora (CO) Story

20. Rapid Response and Community Policing: Are They Really in Conflict?

21. Community Policing and the Challenge of Diversity

Articles

The Foot Patrol Officer, the Community, and the School: A Coalition Against Crime


Community Policing: Defining the Officer's Role

Foot Patrol: Some Problem Areas

An Evaluation of a Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program

Community Policing is Not Police-Community Relations

The Community Policing Challenge



Perspectives on Policing



January 1993

No. 14

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John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

The Strategic Management of Police Resources

by David M. Kennedy

Many American police departments feel themselves to be slowly drowning in a rising tide of serious crime and calls for service. Over the last decade, department workloads have risen steadily while their resources have stayed constant or often declined.¹ Police executives generally have responded by striving to enhance the efficiency of police operations and focus police resources on only the more serious calls. Computer-aided dispatching and other information systems have been employed to make the most of the patrol force, and many departments no longer respond at all to nuisance calls or provide services like escorts and house checks that the public once took for granted. Nonetheless, police in many cities find themselves more and more pressed, a problem recently greatly exacerbated—even in smaller communities—by unprecedented increases in drugs and violence.

It is thus understandable that many departments find calls for community policing unrealistic. As most police—and most mayors—understand the concept, community policing means taking on difficult new responsibilities, like fighting fear and solving community problems, using fresh tactics like foot patrol and community organizing. What room could there possibly be to do new jobs when the department can scarcely do the old ones?

Mayor Bud Clark of Portland, Oregon, was a community policing enthusiast when he took office in 1985, but he saw no place for the new strategy in what both he and the police agreed was a short-handed, overworked department. "Community-oriented policing means less relying on heavyhanded law enforcement and more getting at root causes," said Chuck Duffy, a Clark aide. "But we recognized the fact that you can't do it well unless you have an adequate level of police officers, because you've got to do the community outreach stuff with police on top of your base of patrol officers, and we were having trouble with our base."

Such sentiments are often, and understandably, expressed by police and municipal officials. They are the sum of four widely

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

We hope that these publications will challenge police executives and local officials to reexamine their approach to law enforcement, just as those who participated in the Executive Session have done.

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held beliefs about contemporary policing (until recently, nearly universally held). One is that the public demand for police services, particularly for 911 rapid-response services, is largely out of police control. The second is that departmental resources are, in the main, already deployed to best advantage, efficiently and effectively. The third is that community policing (like other new policing strategies such as problem-oriented policing) is a discretionary add-on to the core job of policing. Because it is seen as “soft,” aimed more at community and public relations than at crime control, it is often delayed and resisted when crime and workloads are on the rise. (In other words, the real job of policing is traditional enforcement, and departments should not be distracted from that mission.) The fourth belief is that police resources, meaning police department budgets, are largely static, particularly in the current climate of fiscal constraint. The largest gains a department can hope to make, on this line of thinking, are still small—an improvement in patrol deployment here, a few extra positions there. It is no surprise that the police find large increases in calls for service, or striking new challenges like the crack epidemic and waves of youth violence, very difficult to meet.

Increasingly, however, there is reason to believe that none of these four beliefs is true. The concrete experience of numerous innovative police departments—including Portland, which found ways to move into community policing despite resource constraints—is proving otherwise. The police can, in fact, manage public demand and expectations for police services. They can deploy their current resources in new and improved ways. They can use community and problem-solving policing strategies to achieve ambitious crime-control objectives. And they can find and win new resources, budgetary and otherwise, to help them do their various jobs. These are fundamental, not marginal, gains; they hold out the hope of major advances in the struggle to fight crime and improve the quality of life in troubled cities. This paper will take each of these arguments in turn, then turn to a discussion of their combined significance for the future of policing.

Call management and differential response

No challenge is more immediate, no job more demanding, in many police departments than the crushing burden of answering the public’s calls for service. Individual officers in busy cities feel the weight on every shift. “If you drive out there and make yourself available for calls, you wouldn’t be available one minute that night for anything else,” says Los Angeles Police Department patrol officer Joe Ciancanelli. “There wouldn’t be a dull moment, no time for anything.” Patrol forces have, over the last 10 years, increasingly been restricted to answering the tolling of the 911 bell. Fewer and fewer people and less and less time are available for foot patrol, problem solving, crime prevention, or any other important tasks a chief might want the force to perform.

That concern is heightened by a growing sense that for the vast majority of calls for service, rapid response is not—contrary to several generations of police belief and expectations—an appropriate or effective crime-fighting tool. Most dispatched calls—

50 to 90 percent, in most jurisdictions—are not about crime. In only a small percentage of those that are about crime—less than 5 percent of all dispatched calls, in most cities—does the officer have a chance to intervene or make an arrest.² Nobody doubts that for that crucial 5 percent, the response should be immediate and authoritative. But in the other 95 percent, the scene is cold and the officer can do little more than take a report and soothe the victim. “Most of the time,” says Ernest Curtsinger, chief of the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department, “irrespective of the call, you get there and the bad guy is gone and the real emergency situation is over.” The high hopes once pinned on rapid response and 911 systems have turned, in many police quarters, to a profound concern about their insatiable appetite for resources. “We have created,” says one chief, “a monster.”

At the same time, many police executives despair of winning public acceptance for any other way of delivering police services, even approaches like problem solving that might actually improve conditions and cut down on the volume of calls coming

“The police can, in fact, manage public demand and expectations for police services.”

into departments. Rapid response, in this view, is a promise that the police have made to the public and that cannot be broken, regardless of its operational shortcomings. “People expect us to come when they call; that’s an absolute,” says one chief. “Believing anything else is a pipe dream.”

Other executives, though, are looking for new ways both to handle calls and to reshape public expectations. Their goal is generally to preserve, and even enhance, their departments’ ability to respond immediately to true emergencies while finding more efficient, and perhaps more effective, ways to respond to less urgent calls without disappointing the public in the process. Evidence is accumulating that it can be done.

Much of the work being done in this area builds on one core idea: that the public will not insist on immediate responses to nonemergency calls, if it is properly prepared for what to expect instead. As long ago as 1976, research showed that public satisfaction with police handling of calls was less influenced by the speed of response than it was by the difference between anticipated and actual response times.³ The public’s expectations, in other words, seemed to be central to their sense of how well the police were performing. Could those expectations be deliberately reshaped?

In the early 1980’s, the National Institute of Justice designed its Differential Police Response experiments to find out. The DPR research tested public reaction to a range of alternative response strategies for nonemergency calls—walk-in and mail-in report-

ing, telephone report units, officer response delayed by up to half an hour, officer response by appointment, and the like—in Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio. Dispatchers were carefully trained in how to rank calls and, when appropriate, inform callers about the new responses. Administrative mechanisms were developed in each department to make sure that what dispatchers promised—for instance, to have an officer arrive to take a report at a particular time—was actually delivered.

The results were striking. More than 90 percent of callers in all three cities who received the alternative responses were satisfied with them (with the exception of the write-in option, which proved less popular).⁴ Nearly half of all calls could have been so handled (not that many were, because of the experiments' designs).⁵ Even with the limited proportion of alternative responses permitted in the experiments, patrol workload was reduced by as much as one-fifth.⁶ Instituting and staffing the

“Their goal is . . . finding more efficient . . . ways to respond to less urgent calls without disappointing the public . . .”

alternatives turned out to be fairly straightforward and inexpensive; in Toledo, for instance, 4 report-takers in a headquarters telephone unit were worth 10 in the field. Many of the alternatives were, and more could have been, staffed by civilians. The speed and quality of rapid response to priority calls was unaffected. Overall, the NIJ report concluded, “Police departments can achieve a sizable reduction in the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch, without sacrificing citizen satisfaction.”⁷ Contemporary reports from the field bore them out. Some departments were able to take as much as 45 percent of their reports over the phone.⁸

While that view has gained some currency in policing in recent years, it has generally done so against the grain of police wishes and preferences. Conditions may have made it impossible to answer every call with a dispatched officer, and differential response strategies (particularly telephone reporting units) are no longer as rare as they once were, but there is often a lingering sense that they represent an unfortunate backing away from the ideals of policing. Nor, in most departments, have call management and differential response had much effect on the nature and role of the patrol force. Street officers may be less burdened as a result, but the basic job of patrol and response remains largely as before.

This is beginning to change. Police executives are increasingly undertaking call management and differential response as part

of a purposeful shift to new community and problem-solving policing strategies, and with the express intent of substantially reshaping patrol (and often other) operations.⁹ Chief Darrel Stephens, for instance, relied heavily on a relatively traditional telephone report-taking unit to make room in the Newport News department to do problem-solving policing, which proved successful against a wide variety of crime and order problems.¹⁰ In St. Petersburg, Florida, call management allowed the department to shift significant resources into community policing while simultaneously cutting response times to high-priority calls by more than 20 percent.¹¹

The Reno, Nevada, Police Department, a recent convert to community policing, splits its patrol force on a day-to-day basis between special projects and mobile response. Call management is handled through the headquarters dispatching center, which presents callers with a wide variety of service options for non-emergency calls. Where an officer's presence is appropriate or insisted upon, the dispatcher keeps callers apprised of when one should be available. Because mobile response is now handled by perhaps half as many officers as in the pre-community policing department, getting a car to a low-priority scene often takes several hours. But with careful departmental attention to explaining why, citizen satisfaction—tracked by formal polling—has remained high.¹²

There is reason to believe that problem solving can reduce calls for service. Addresses and areas that generate repeat calls for service are easily identified by police from departmental information, and efforts to address these repeat calls often feature in departments' problem-solving efforts. In one now-classic example, a sergeant in the Philadelphia Police Department solved a noise problem caused by a jukebox bar and cut calls for service that had been coming in at a rate of a thousand a year down to zero.¹³ In Florida, Tampa's QUAD program against street drug dealing appears to have cut citywide calls for service considerably.¹⁴ And, while they generally lack firm proof, officers and supervisors involved in problem solving are invariably convinced that their work lowers their departments' call loads. Difficult though the job may be, making room in departments for proactive, problem-solving policing appears likely to pay substantial returns.

The new strategies' overall emphasis on such things as devolution of police authority, beat integrity, and street-level problem solving is beginning to give rise to new models of call management. One of the most interesting comes from the Houston Police Department, which—as part of its neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy—has planned a high-tech decentralization of call management. Priority one and two calls would still be dispatched from headquarters. Other calls, though, would be patched through via in-car video display terminals to shift sergeants, who would be expected to manage both their officers, via radio, and the callers, via cellular phone. The sergeants' job would be to provide the best mix of police response for their areas, balancing the need to work on community and problem-solving projects against the need to respond to individual callers—and, where necessary, to explain and justify their decisions to the public.¹⁵ The result, if the scheme works, will be call

management and police services custom-tailored precinct by precinct, and even shift by shift, to Houston's varied and ever-changing needs.

Two additional important points should be made about community policing and call management. First, community policing itself seems to perform a call management function. Calls in the pioneering Flint, Michigan, foot patrol districts, for instance, dropped 43 percent over the course of that department's formal experiment. Some of the decline was attributable to problem solving, but much of it was due to residents in the districts passing minor complaints directly to the foot officers rather than making formal calls for service. The foot officers then handled them as and when they wished. This was a far more efficient scheme than dispatching officers to every such call, and a much more popular one than refusing service for calls that failed to merit a formal dispatch, or promising a rapid response that in fact took hours to materialize.

Second, community policing makes formal call management schemes easier to sell to the public. When call management is used solely to relieve the workload on traditional patrol operations, the public is asked to give up something tangible and immediate—a response—in exchange for an efficiency gain that is usually perceived to benefit only the department. With community policing, the public arguably gets something—more responsive, more effective policing—for its sacrifice. As the Newport News, Reno, and other departments can attest, the public often finds this a welcome trade.

Reorganizing to make the most of departmental resources

Just as departments can reexamine their service preferences and obligations, they can reexamine their allocation and utilization of personnel. The first step is often simply to take a fresh look,

“New strategies, new allocations of resources, and new lines of authority give the new [policing] a much better chance to succeed.”

with basic principles of good management in mind, at how a department does business. Police agencies, like all organizations, have a tendency to get set in their ways, and a management review, performed internally or by consultants, can often uncover significant room for improvement. For example, the Rivlin Commission on Budget and Financial Priorities of the District of Columbia examined the Washington, D.C., Police Department in 1990. The Commission discovered that the department, though an extreme case, had the highest overtime

expenses in the country, due chiefly to rigid work rules and hugely inefficient arrangements for the booking and charging of arrestees; the lowest proportion of civilian employees among 17 major departments; no capacity for crime and workload analysis, and therefore none for efficient personnel allocation; and actual assignment practices that bore little relation to formal ones (500 assignments to patrol existed only on paper, while the Youth Division had more than twice its authorized strength).¹⁶ While few departments may be in such dire straits, many could benefit from a similar examination.

Beyond such fundamental attention to rationalization and efficiency, policing is increasingly seeing moves toward a major, sometimes radical, strategic redistribution and reprogramming of departmental resources. One of the most visible is shifting people—and authority—out of headquarters and specialist units back to field commands. When Sir Kenneth Newman took over the London Metropolitan Police Department in 1982, he both “desquadded,” returning 10 percent of all headquarters squads and 1,200 additional headquarters posts to the field, and “flattened” the rank structure, entirely eliminating a senior rank that stood between Scotland Yard and its territorial commands. John Avery, commissioner in New South Wales, Australia, shifted much of his detective force to the field and put it under the authority of patrol commanders. Lee Brown put nearly 500 officers back on patrol when he took over in Houston, and began a similar but even more ambitious program in New York.¹⁷ The Reno department effectively eliminated all supervisory ranks between chief and area captain. Such moves are in part efforts to ease the burden of call response and other field activities. More fundamentally, however, they are intended to promote decentralization, precinct- and street-level problem solving, and responsiveness to the community.

In most departments, headquarters functions have long been valued more highly than precinct functions, and the work of detectives and other specialists more highly than that of patrol. Generations of police chiefs have found creating special squads an attractive response to new problems. It can be done fast; the new unit, consistent with traditional police concern for centralized command and control, can be easily monitored and supervised from headquarters; and the department has something concrete to point to, demonstrating it has taken the problem seriously. Unfortunately, such units, once established, are difficult to disband and tend to monopolize responsibility for the problem. In this way, they limit opportunities for police officers to learn how to handle such problems, and drain strength and creativity from geographic commands and more general functions like patrol.

Many departments now are trying to reverse that tendency by enhancing the authority and discretion of geographic commands. In New South Wales, for instance, detectives probably do not do any more detecting than they did before the shift. However, they worked before according to headquarters' interest in major cases and clearance rates, while now they are guided in part by geographic commands' assessments of the problems and community needs they face. The same is true with shifts of narcotics, juvenile, vice, and other specialists into geographic lines (though care must be taken to preserve the

department's capacity to act against highly mobile crime). Not only are more personnel in the field, but the department's overall capacity also is deployed for maximum problem-solving and community-service effectiveness.

This is, in a way, a new version of the very promising but generally short-lived team policing experiments of the 1970's.¹⁸ Those programs often failed because the demands of rapid response and headquarters expectations ran counter to teams' interest in local problem solving. New strategies, new allocations of resources, and new lines of authority give the new teams a much better chance to succeed.

Less tangible but no less important than these changes, in many innovative departments, is a major development in the philosophy of police administration. Police departments have long been governed by a paramilitary command-and-control approach that puts a premium on close supervision and the prevention of corruption and operational error. The traditional emphasis on discipline and propriety is laudable, but many modern police executives have come to believe that the paramilitary approach won that ground at the cost of organizational flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation. They are actively seeking ways to gain those qualities without at the same time opening the door to police misbehavior.

Beginning to emerge is a managerial and organizational style that looks more toward the best in private-sector and professional organizations than toward policing's own heritage. Modern police executives, no less than the CEO's of innovative high-tech firms, directors of teaching hospitals, or senior partners in architecture firms, are coming to believe that one of their main jobs is forging departments that are tied closely to their clients and in which junior and senior officers alike have the freedom and support to contribute as fully as they are able.¹⁹ This new environment, combined with schemes like call management, resource shifts like enhancing the strength and authority of patrol, and ideas like problem solving, can create significant new police capacities. Traditional policing, with its enforced focus on individual calls for service, gives patrol officers little choice but to handle each incident quickly and with little attention to underlying causes.

The new strategies, by letting officers look at patterns and clusters of calls and complaints, create within the department the capacity to investigate and intervene in situations that previously would have been handled far more superficially. Houston's Neighborhood Oriented Policing created institutional ground so fertile that one tactical squad sergeant was able to craft a scheme for putting a major open-air drug bazaar out of business, win community and departmental support for it, and see it through not only the elimination of the drug problem but through the area's commercial redevelopment—all by reprogramming precinct resources and putting them to new use.²⁰ Such individual successes, if they can be made the rule rather than the exception in policing, would represent not just more efficient, but substantially more effective, use of police resources.²¹

Doing more successful work

It increasingly appears that such stories could become policing's norm. In fact, the outlines of a very promising progression now are visible. The beginning came in the 1970's with programs like team policing, the Los Angeles Police Department's Senior Lead Officers, and Flint's foot patrol program, aimed at cultivating officers' contact with the community through innovative use of a relatively small proportion of the force.²² These programs often showed considerable operational promise, but they also showed insightful police executives that

“The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy . . .”

bottom-up, community-focused policing was not easily commensurable with the claims and procedures of a predominantly response-oriented department. Over the course of the next decade came a host of attempts to shift departments wholesale into a new community-policing style, most notably in America by Lee Brown in Houston, but in different ways in a number of other departments as well. This was a time of striking, but frustratingly partial, results. Success stories like Link Valley in Houston; the Community Mobilization Project in Los Angeles; problem-solving policing in Newport News, Virginia; and many others seemed to herald the ability of police to prevent crime and solve problems in league with public and municipal allies. Generally, however, they remained isolated tales, both in the effect they had on cities and in the proportion of police effort they represented even in the most dedicated and experimental departments.²³

A third phase now appears to be beginning, in which departments more or less familiar with community-policing ideas apply them wholesale to policing cities, or to solving major citywide problems. This is happening first, predictably enough, in smaller cities whose forces can shift more readily to the new style. In some of these places, community policing is beginning to deliver on its promise of making a dent in serious crime. In Reno, Nevada, the police credit the new style with ending overt public drug dealing in the city and driving off the Los Angeles-based gangs that were establishing a beachhead in town. In Gainesville, Florida, a problem-solving approach cut convenience-store robberies by 65 percent. Tampa police, whose city was being overrun by crack and crack-related violence, organized a citywide problem-solving and community-

policing approach that eliminated street dealing almost entirely and brought overall crime levels down to pre-crack levels. Reported crime was down 12.4 percent in 1989; in some hot spots reported crime was down more than 20 percent.²⁴ All of these gains were made without additional resources (at least initially, a point we will return to), simply by employing smarter and more effective policing. One can hope that more cities will soon be able to tell similar stories.

If it is true that new policing strategies can make such striking improvements in police performance, then the most crucial resource management decision facing police executives is a new and extremely fundamental one: how to craft their departments in these new shapes, and how to manage the transition from here to there. Facing this task squarely is essential if the new strategies are to succeed. The new strategies are not programmatic add-ons to a police department's traditional organization and functions. Community organizing and problem solving represent a fundamentally different approach to doing the job of policing than do rapid response and retrospective investigation. They represent, in fact, an approach that is in many important ways incompatible with traditional police organization and tactics.

Making patrol officers responsible for problem solving, for example, means granting them a degree of operational discretion and giving them time to think and work that are not easily combined with a centralized dispatching operation devoted to minimizing response time to calls for service. Developing a departmental capacity to respond in a comprehensive fashion to community concerns—be they narcotics, guns, or the homeless—cannot easily be combined with a structure of detectives and other specialist squads operating largely autonomously from patrol and other geographic commands. The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy and often draconian management style common to traditional departments. The list goes on and on; points of conflict are many and severe.

There is, here, both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the job of shifting a department, especially a large department, into the new strategies is a large and probably long one. The good news is that making that transition—not finding new resources—is the fundamental challenge facing a police executive interested in the strategies' potential. *How much money?* and *How many people?* while clearly still critical are no longer the central resource questions. The fundamental questions are *Money for what?* and *People for what?* As Houston, Newport News, Reno, and other departments are demonstrating, high workloads and limited resources are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to moving successfully into community and problem-solving policing. The new ideas, to a considerable degree, open up to reconsideration all departments' traditional resource allocations. Just what can then be done with them the profession is only beginning to discover.

New resources

This is not to say that most police departments would not find more money and other resources very welcome, particularly as they move from traditional policing to more community-oriented, problem-solving policing. During that difficult transition, departments are in some ways in the worst of both worlds: they must invest in the reorganization, training, and technology the new strategy demands, and suffer the dislocations and inef-

“ . . . the police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but . . . in partnership with others who have . . . time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment, and more—perhaps they can.”

ficiencies of change without yet realizing many of the new strategy's promised gains. With most departments stretched to their limits already, additional resources would be useful. Fortunately, much is possible on this front. The experience of many departments shows that even cities in serious fiscal trouble often can find ways to offer their police significant new support.

One approach is for departments to raise, or cause to be raised, nontax revenues. A National Institute of Justice report on supplementing police budgets found the most promising avenues to be donation programs and asset forfeiture.²⁵ Businesses in Oakland, California, for instance, concerned that declining police budgets would threaten the planned revitalization of the city's commercial areas, raised more than \$750,000 for the Oakland Police Department.²⁶ The Miami Police Department netted \$5.5 million over 3 years from seizing and auctioning property used in criminal enterprises.²⁷ Cash assets seized through drug and money-laundering enforcement have proved important in many jurisdictions. In addition, many departments have experimented with user fees (for instance, for answering private burglar alarms), fees-for-services (for instance, for extra patrol in malls), and in-kind contributions (for instance, management training).

Such efforts can be significant, but they also raise important management and equity issues. Private funding, both of a general nature and for particular details, can create questions of improper access to and control over a public service. Aggressive asset seizure programs can create questions of public authority being deployed for narrow institutional interests. Many departments have managed to avoid any cast of impropriety, but

in each instance careful attention to actual and apparent conflicts is essential.

Some special relationships with the private sector, as in programs in which police managers attend corporate training programs, are by their nature much more benign. They can also be extremely important, particularly in departments working to reshape their administrative structures and cultures. Kevin Tucker, who took over the Philadelphia Police Department after the disastrous MOVE bombing, made this kind of management training a key part of his strategy to move the department toward more flexible, community-oriented policing.²⁸ The alliance not only built the kind of capacity in the department that Tucker wanted, it enlisted the cachet of private-sector management ideas in the service of his controversial reforms.

The new policing strategies create fresh and important opportunities for bringing outside resources to bear on police problems. Community and problem-solving police departments have shown, over and over again, that they can draw heavily on help from outside the department to handle what traditional police departments would have considered entirely police business. This is welcome news. It seems more and more apparent that the police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but that in partnership with others who have resources of their own to offer—time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment, and more—perhaps they can. It has become, therefore, the aim, on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds, for innovative police departments to invest a good deal of effort in enlisting the aid of others, and to tackle problems by allying police resources and strengths with those of others.

Police give up something when they enter into such partnerships: their claim that responsibility for public safety is theirs and theirs alone. But they gain more than they lose. When public safety becomes a joint police, community, and municipal responsibility, others have to chip in as well. The resulting

“... even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police ...”

contributions can be of major importance. When the Houston Police Department, together with a coalition of community organizations, tackled the Link Valley drug market, local people cleaned up the area (a daylong effort by hundreds of volunteers and a large number of corporations), donated technical help with deed and title searches, and made sure that city departments delivered on their obligations to bring property owners into code compliance. When Tampa's police took on the city's

crack dealers, they needed—and received—the active help of citizens in identifying, monitoring, and tracking street dealers, and of city departments in cleaning up street-dealing sites, taking down abandoned buildings, and closing down businesses fronting for traffickers.

These cooperative relationships are not always easy. The police and other parties do not always have the same agenda, or agree on the merit and propriety of particular ends and means. Police should be sensitive to the possibility, or the perception, that they are demanding too much in the way of public resources, or doing so in a way that slights other departments' procedures and priorities.²⁹ But the proven power of partnerships between the police and the public, and the police and other government agencies, means that, with the new strategies, police effectiveness becomes not just a matter of their own resources and operational capacity, but their ability to design solutions that capture the support and active aid of others. That ability has only begun to be developed, even in the most innovative departments.

Finally, the new approaches to policing change the nature of the political dialog about police resources. With the traditional strategy, the political question was basically whether a city wanted to buy more policing: more patrol, more investigation, quicker response. In today's climate, where municipal fiscal crisis and near-crisis are the norm, more of the same can be hard to justify. The new strategies, in important contrast, foster a debate over what kind of policing cities want. Do citizens want foot patrol officers in their neighborhoods? Do they want fear reduction? Do they want a department that both answers emergency calls promptly and has time for attending to neighborhood nuisances? The public is skeptical that simply hiring more people to do traditional police work is worth doing. But hiring more people to do different things is another matter entirely.

There are numerous examples that the public is more willing to pay for a new kind of policing than it is for the old. In 1982, the citizens of financially strapped Flint, Michigan, voted a \$3.5 million tax increase specifically to continue the city's innovative foot patrol program (previously grant-funded), a move it repeated twice subsequently.³⁰ The Reno department shifted to community policing in the explicit hope that it would lead to increased public support. A 1987 study had revealed that 6 of 10 residents thought the police were doing a bad job, and the city had twice voted down a tax override to increase the police budget. Late in 1987, the department switched to community policing, which proved so popular that less than 6 months later Reno voted for a 40 percent increase in police strength. By the first half of 1989, public satisfaction had increased to nearly 90 percent.³¹ Baltimore County, Maryland, and Portland, Oregon, both experienced similar, if less dramatic, increases in tax revenues after undertaking community policing. Portland won its extra money after going through two chiefs in less than 2 years, in considerable part due to intragovernmental feuding over funds. “Their answer to everything was just ‘more,’” a Portland official said of one of the fired chiefs' maneuverings.³² When a new chief proposed a strategy that was not just more, but different, the city proved more than willing.

Conclusion

Policing, then, need not feel that its ability to manage its business and explore innovative strategies is hamstrung by today's admittedly punishing workload. Departments can, experience shows, manage their call burdens; they can deploy their resources in new and more productive ways; they can pursue promising new approaches to policing; and they can, at least sometimes, win substantial new resources, both financial and otherwise. It is not yet clear which techniques, and which combinations of techniques, are most effective, though certain ten-

“ . . . police effectiveness becomes not just a matter of their own resources and operational capacity, but their ability to design solutions . . . ”

dencies and directions appear to be evident. It is clear, though, that police departments can explore these areas even where call loads are heaviest; that, indeed, exploring them is probably an essential step toward addressing those calls, and the crime and disorder that lie behind them.

A warning is in order here regarding expectations and criteria of success. The new strategies carry no guarantee that they will be accompanied by reductions in calls for service, reported crime, or overall police workload. They may well lead to a rise in calls and reported crime, especially in troubled and demoralized parts of cities, as residents come to believe that the police can and will help with their problems. This is no bad thing, but it does mean that departments (and elected officials and newspapers) that look for an automatic reduction in crime statistics and officers' workload can be disappointed and misled when the reduction fails to materialize. Officers' workload likewise may well

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rise, or at least not fall, since the community organizing, service delivery, and problem solving that the new strategies require all take time. The hope is that, in the long run, they will improve conditions sufficiently that both demands for service and overall workload will start to decline. Even that cut in workload can be swallowed up, however, if departments take on new responsibilities such as fighting fear (as with COPE in Baltimore County) or coordinating the delivery of municipal services (as community police officers in Los Angeles, Houston, and many other departments tend to do).

This basic fact—that even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police—has a major implication for police executives. Policing success will not relieve chiefs of their responsibilities for managing department resources to best effect, and may in fact add to and complicate them. The new strategies, with their wider range of tactics, new menus of possible responsibilities, and new roles for officers and managers, will require more, not less, in the way of strategic management and hard choices about resource allocation.

Notes

1. For an account of this pressure in one large urban department, particularly its impact on proactive and community work, see David M. Kennedy, "Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-87-717.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1987.
2. For a nice summary of this research, see John E. Eck and William Spelman, *Problem Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1987: 13-14.
3. Tony Pate et al., *Police Response Time: Its Determinants and Effects*. Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1986; Stephen L. Percy, "Response Time and Citizen Evaluation of Police," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 8, 1 (March 1980): 75-86; and James M. Tien et al., *An Alternative Approach in Police Patrol: The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Public System Evaluation, Inc., 1977, all cited in J. Thomas McEwen et al., *Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test*. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, 1986: 42.
4. *DPR Field Test*, note above, p. 17.
5. *DPR Field Test*, p. 16.
6. *DPR Field Test*, p. 101.
7. *DPR Field Test*, p. 16.
8. Thomas J. Sweeney, "Managing Time—the Scarce Resource," *Law Enforcement News*, January 11, 1982.
9. For three recent discussions of community and problem-solving policing, see Commissioner Lee P. Brown, *Policing New York City in the 1990's: The Strategy for Community Policing*. New York, New York City Police Department, January 1991; Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990; and Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York, Basic Books, 1990.

10. *Problem Solving*, n. 2 above: 40.
11. Chief Ernest Curtsinger, St. Petersburg Police Department, personal communication.
12. Captain Jim Weston, Reno Police Department, personal communication.
13. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, n. 9 above: 81.
14. The exact impact is hard to figure, inasmuch as Tampa went to a 911 system for the first time late in 1988, just before QUAD was begun. Although it is impossible to ascribe the change with certainty to QUAD, after calls had been rising for years, they fell from 606,755 to 549,402 between 1989 and 1990. Against regional and statewide trends, Tampa's crime rate, index crimes per 100,000, and drug-related homicides also fell during the same period. See David M. Kennedy, "Closing the Market: Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida," Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, forthcoming (1992).
15. Chief Elizabeth Watson, Houston Police Department, personal communication.
16. James J. Fyfe and Patrick V. Murphy, "D.C. Police: Trim the Fat," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1990, p. A21. See also "Financing the Nation's Capital: The Report of the Commission on Budget and Financial Priorities of the District of Columbia," Washington, D.C., November 1990.
17. Commissioner Lee P. Brown, New York City Police Department, personal communication.
18. See, for instance, Lawrence Sherman et al., *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies*. Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1973.
19. See, for instance, David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz, *Quality Policing: The Madison Experience*. Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1991, and *Policing New York City in the 1990's*, n. 9 above: 66-72.
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23. On Link Valley, see "Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley," n. 20 above. On Houston and other innovative departments, see *Beyond 911*, n. 9. On Newport News, see *Problem Solving*, n. 2.
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29. For an account of how one local government dealt with these tensions, see David M. Kennedy, "Fighting Fear in Baltimore County," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-90-938.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990: 16-17.
30. Edwin Meese III and Bob Carrico, "Taking Back the Streets: Police Methods That Work," *Policy Review*, Fall 1990: 24.
31. Jim Weston, "Community Oriented Policing: An Approach to Traffic Management," Unpublished paper, November 8, 1990, p. 2.
32. David M. Kennedy, "Patrol Allocation in Portland, Oregon (Part B): PCAM in the City," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C15-88-819.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1988: 5. "PCAM" stands for "Patrol Car Allocation Model."

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met 12 times; some of the members changed in 1990. During the 3-day meetings, the participants energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and should guide, policing.

STRATEGIC PLANNING & COMMUNITY POLICING

PORTLAND, OREGON

By Police Bureau Chief Tom Potter

Introduction

Over the five year period from 1985 to 1989, sharp increases in crime, gangs and drugs severely impacted the quality of life for the citizens, neighborhoods, institutions and businesses of Portland, and strained the resources of the Portland Police Bureau.

Since Police resources could not expand, they were redeployed as officers were moved from support functions to patrol activities. Detectives were demoted; Crime Analysis was eliminated; Crime Prevention and Planning and Research units were pared to skeleton crews; and tactical units that had addressed specific problems were eliminated or cut back to almost nothing. Civilian positions, the almost invisible life support of the street officer, were drastically reduced, and those dollars used to "put more police on the streets." But even as more officers hit the streets, the number of radio calls answered by each one continually increased (up 44% from 1984 to 1988) and the response time to the highest priority radio calls increased to an average of over nine minutes. So, although there were more officers on the street, they could seldom stop and talk with citizens who were not in immediate crisis. The trend toward separation that began when officers were placed in patrol cars, years ago, was accelerated by the dramatically increasing work load that kept them rushing from one radio call to the next.

Worse than the physical separation from citizens was the separation of purpose and loss of unity. Citizens and police were no longer partners in maintaining their neighborhoods, but separate components with different roles. Citizens saw the police as special responders who could be called upon only to deal with major problems. The police often gave the impression that they didn't have time to hear about citizens' general concerns and day-to-day public safety problems — even though these problems often become major when not attended to. Citizens did not want to bother overburdened officers and risk drawing them away from more important business.

Officers came to regard citizens as complainants who called the police and then got out of the way so the police could fight crime — alone. They lost the awareness of the many day-to-day activities that residents of an area perform to make it a safe and secure place. Officers often developed a distorted picture of the true

problems and concerns of an area. When police only contact a neighborhood at its crisis points, it is natural to assume that those are the most important ongoing issues. Thus, officers tended to see a drug house as a problem of periodic customer robberies that produced shoot-outs, while the neighborhood saw the drug house as a constant aggravation of loud traffic, late night noise, minor harassment of residents, and a place that drew undesirable outsiders into the neighborhood.

These separate viewpoints also meant that many officers lost sight of the tremendous resources the community could provide to help them and, worse yet, they lost awareness of the community's tremendous desire to help. The pressure was on to provide a quick fix and move on to the next call, so most officers stuck with the traditional reactive approach. But the traditional approach did not control crime or the incapacitating fear it brings. Portland continued to show up near the top of every nationwide measure of crime. The City's feeling of vulnerability and fear of crime rose, while confidence in the Police and City government plummeted. Officers' morale crumbled as they continued to fight crime but saw few successes, even as their efforts increased.

In response to this situation, hundreds of citizens and police personnel presented their ideas and concerns to the City Council. The ultimate result was the adoption of a City Council resolution, in July 1989, outlining an approach to policing that would better align police resources with the public safety concerns of neighborhoods and businesses. A second resolution, passed in October 1989, defined organizational issues and expected outcomes for a mandated Police Bureau implementation of Community Policing over a five-year period.

Developing a Transition Plan

In response to the Portland City Council resolutions, the Chief of Police established a Community Policing Division and directed it to fully involve the community, the Police and other City Bureaus, and outside agencies to develop a comprehensive plan for the transition. A multi-bureau Transition Committee, composed of citizens, City Bureau managers, police personnel and Police Bureau Commanders, came together to examine the host of issues involved in converting the philosophy and operation of a major City bureau. Twelve

committees, several focus groups, attendees at many public meetings, and individual experts from the academic, business and law enforcement arenas worked together to formulate goals and objectives, develop strategies from those recommendations, assign priorities and responsibilities and prepare an implementation schedule and budget. These ideas were combined into a first draft of a transition plan. Almost five hundred copies of that draft were then circulated throughout the community for response and criticism. That feedback was then incorporated into the final *Community Policing Transition Plan* document.

The five-year (1990-1994) transition plan outlines the initial steps to adopting Community Policing as the operational philosophy of the entire Police Bureau. Community Policing, however, is an ongoing planning and evaluation process that views change as critical to success. The core element of the plan, therefore, is its flexibility to incorporate new information and make positive changes at any point in the process. It sets in motion a community-driven process to create a new, dynamic organization. Specifically, the plan:

- ❑ Defines the new mission of the Police Bureau and fixes the goals and objectives to fulfill that mission.
- ❑ Identifies the first year priorities to be implemented; sets out a developmental process to achieve measurable progress towards a fully functional Community Policing philosophy.
- ❑ Specifies outcomes to be achieved or at least started in the first year as well as the activities, who is responsible for implementation, and resource requirements necessary.
- ❑ Provides estimated resource projections (the unpredictable variations of a major transition made definite statements of long term resource requirements impossible).
- ❑ Shows the progressive steps to occur during year two and beyond to institutionalize the major components of the community-police partnership.

Beginning the Transition

The initial planning effort identified three strategic components to guide the five year implementation period:

Rebuilding the Organization

The Police Bureau's resources had been greatly reduced over the past few years by the urgent need to redirect all available sworn personnel to battle the rapidly growing gang and drug problems. Yet,

the precinct patrol officers were still understaffed to handle the work load. Many essential support functions and units needed to be restored. Like an athlete, the Bureau must have a base level of fitness before it can pursue its new goal of Community Policing.

Refining the Organization

The Police Bureau must maximize the operating efficiency of existing resources so additional resources for Community Policing will be wisely deployed. The Bureau must revise its direction as a result of the continuing internal and external input of the strategic planning process. Like a ship, the Bureau must take frequent navigational sightings and make occasional course corrections to safely reach its destination of Community Policing.

Retooling the Organization

While rebuilding and refining the organization, the Police Bureau will begin laying the foundation for Community Policing. The vision of Community Policing will not become reality by merely reorganizing the Bureau. It requires a total transformation of the organizational culture to a service orientation. It calls for direct commitment at every level and in every activity of the organization. Like the U.S. auto industry, the Bureau must retool to convert its product line to be more streamlined, efficient, and responsive to its customers — the community.

Each of these components is being addressed as the Police Bureau realigns the organization to its new mission statement. During the first year, the concentration was focused largely on rebuilding the organization while identifying operating efficiencies, and beginning the processes and projects that lay the foundation for Community Policing. During subsequent years, resources and effort are being increasingly shifted to the refining and retooling components as Community Policing is incrementally implemented.

The additional resources required to fully implement the Community Policing plan are expected to be provided by a combination of new resources, increased internal efficiency, reduced work load, and ultimately greater citizen control over their environment.

Mission and Goals

Throughout the transition period, the Police Bureau is continuing to deploy uniformed police, respond to emergencies, investigate crimes, staff specialized investigative and detective units, participate in multi-agency task forces (e.g., gangs and drugs), and perform many other traditional police activities. While retaining its basic mission and traditional police functions, the Bureau is shifting to a different mode of policing. The focus is changing from enforcing laws to solving problems as the Bureau becomes increasingly sensitive and responsive to community desires and expectations.

Old Mission Statement: *The Bureau of Police is responsible for the preservation of the public peace, protection of the rights of persons and property, the prevention of crime, and the enforcement of all Federal laws, Oregon state statutes and city ordinances within the boundaries of the City of Portland.*

New Mission Statement: *The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to work with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility and community commitment.*

Goals:

- 1) **Partnership:** Develop a partnership with the community, City Council, other Bureaus, service agencies and the criminal justice system.
- 2) **Empowerment:** Develop an organizational structure and environment that reflects

community values and facilitates joint citizen and employee empowerment.

- 3) **Problem Solving:** Enhance community livability through use of pro-active, problem-solving approaches for reduction of incidence and fear of crime.
- 4) **Accountability:** Foster mutual accountability for Public Safety resources and strategies among Bureau management and employees, the community and the City Council.
- 5) **Service Orientation:** Develop a customer orientation in our service to citizens and our Bureau members.
- 6) **Project Management and Direction:** Develop a process for overall management and direction of the Community Policing transition.

First Year Priorities

Year One implemented key steps to rebuild the police organization, increase operating efficiencies, and continue the strategic planning process to more fully involve the Police Bureau and citizens in the organizational changes required to support Community Policing.

The major functional activity categories for Year One include: increased staffing, new recruitment and hiring practices, new training programs, demonstration projects, improving resources to support Community Policing, interagency communication, and review and analysis of Police Bureau internal operations.

Rebuilding

The prior precinct staffing levels did not allow for the uninterrupted blocks of time required for uniformed patrol officers to focus on problem-solving activities. Restaffing the precincts was critical for transitioning to Community Policing. Fifty-four of the sixty new police officer positions provided by Operation Jumpstart were allocated to

restaffing the precincts, approximately a 20% increase in patrol resources. Essential support units such as planning and crime analysis were also staffed. Due to hiring, classroom and field training delays, however, the full impact of the new recruits was not realized immediately. (Preliminary forecasts estimate the eventual need for an additional 140-170 personnel over the next five fiscal years.)

Refining

The Bureau reviewed recommendations from the Institute of Law and Justice (ILJ) organizational analysis, the City Auditor's reports, and the Work load/Productivity Committee for ideas to improve operating efficiency of the department, and then began developing plans to implement suggested changes.

The Community Policing Division continues to coordinate and facilitate the strategic planning process and the Transition Committee meets monthly to provide on-going community oversight of the process. A dozen other working committees were integrated into the Police Bureau's structure along functional lines to assist in the process of building organizational commitment and involvement in Community Policing.

Each of the first-year activities was assigned to a Branch of the Police Bureau to ensure accountability. Unit Commanders and the appropriate work committees then developed specific work plans for activities in their functional areas. Significant communication and coordination was initiated among the Police Bureau, City Bureaus, neighborhoods, criminal justice agencies and social service providers.

Base line data was collected during the first year to evaluate the Bureau's transition to Community Policing and the subsequent impact on community problems.

Retooling

In-service training during fiscal year 1990-91 was significantly expanded and 60% of the training

content was targeted to address the interpersonal communication, problem-solving, information and referral customer service skills needed for a Community Policing orientation. These skills and attributes were also emphasized in recruitment and hiring for Operation Jumpstart.

The Police Bureau also began making specific changes in its structure including promotion systems, employee reward systems, neighborhood officer assignments, decentralized decision making and operations, and related management and supervision issues.

Year One also included Community Policing demonstration projects in each of the precincts as well as the start-up of a Police Activities League (P.A.L.) for at-risk youth diversion and positive role modeling.

Strategic Planning – Years Two to Five

Building on the foundation laid in Year One, the Police Bureau is continuing to rebuild the organization, refine its processes through internal review and program development, and intensify Community Policing activities. The two major thrusts guiding Years Two to Five are: Institutionalizing the Community Policing values of community and employee participation, initiative, and empowerment; and increasing coordination and networking with other City Bureaus, social services providers, and the criminal justice system. The key for Year Two to Five activities is the Strategic Planning Process adopted by the Police Bureau (see table on next page).

The Strategic Planning Process in Year One resulted in a detailed plan for the subsequent years. Also during Year One, Police Bureau Unit Commanders were provided with specific training in the preparation and development of work plans. They learned new techniques for planning, scheduling, and management of activities assigned to them. Thus, each successive year the planning

Community Policing Strategic Planning Process

Throughout the process of developing the strategies and programs for Community Policing, community and other outside input have played a key role. A Strategic Planning Process has been developed to formulate future strategies and programs. The Planning Process is a loop that starts and continues with outside input. We can only broadly suggest the direction and needs for future years based upon the input received thus far. As each year approaches and the planning cycle continues, desired outcomes and activities will change as the needs of the community change. This process allows for greater accountability to the community for any additional resources. *Resource needs evolve, not from the Police Bureau, but from the expectations of the community.*

Step 1. Input: The foundation for the planning consists of extensive input from all segments of the community. Citizens, outside agencies, various City and State government, and the Police Bureau all have opportunities to contribute to future planning.

Step 2. Outcomes: Desired or expected outcomes from Community Policing are identified based upon the input received in Step 1.

Step 3. Activities and Strategies: Activities and strategies needed to achieve desired outcomes are developed. Community input is still a key component because *activities and strategies may evolve from many sources*, not just the Police Bureau.

Step 4. Current Resources: After the determination of activities and strategies, a thorough examination of current resources is done. Are we using current resources in the best way to meet community need? Do we need to move resources from current activities and strategies that are no longer needed? Only after this is done do we look at additional needs to implement new strategies and activities.

Step 5. New Resources: New resource needs that are necessary to accomplish collectively identified strategies are identified and prioritized. *New needs of lower priority may be moved to future years*, depending upon available funds. These are not discarded but only suspended until resources are available.

Step 6. Implementation: Strategies and activities are implemented. This implementation may be a program of short duration (one year or less), long duration (one to five years), or indefinite duration (beyond five years).

Step 7. Measurement: Actual outcomes of strategies and activities are measured for evaluation.

Step 8. Program Evaluation: The actual and expected outcomes and strategies are compared and evaluated. Did the strategies accomplish the desired outcomes, or something else? Was the program effective, or should it be changed? This evaluation information becomes just one piece of the input for the next year's planning cycle. The strategic planning process then repeats in order to accurately determine the next year's needs.

cycle will yield an updated comprehensive work plan to guide the Bureau-wide Community Implementation in the following fiscal year.

The ongoing strategic planning process will enable the Police Bureau to change according to community expectations and conditions. With community and Police Bureau input, yearly outcomes will be identified, activities and strategies initiated, resource requirements specified, outcomes measured, and programs evaluated. Internal and external reporting procedures and feedback insure accountability and continuing input. As the City's strategic planning process gathers momentum, the Police Bureau planning process will be folded in as part of the overall strategy for the delivery of city services.

In this community-driven process of organizational development, the specific form that the Police Bureau assumes depends upon how the community and Police Bureau jointly determine what is needed and what demonstration projects work. At the early stage, it was estimated that 140-170

police personnel, both officers and support, in addition to the 60 Jumpstart positions, would be required for Community Policing. As these resources are incrementally added, the Bureau anticipates reduced patrol officer work load, increased operating efficiencies, and more blocks of time available for meaningful community policing activities.

Extensive involvement, energy, enthusiasm, and creativity have generated an unprecedented commitment to change. This momentum must be sustained by bold actions and concrete steps to make the vision of Community Policing a reality.

All are stakeholders and all share equally in the process of shaping this new mission — citizens, the Police Bureau, other agencies, and City government. Each has been willing to get involved, take initiative and cooperate. Building good working relationships is helping build a new organization to significantly improve the safety and livability of Portland.

Citizen Police Academies

By
MARTIN ALAN
GREENBERG, M.A.



During the past 2 decades, law enforcement has expanded the involvement of private citizens in community-based crime prevention efforts. The nature of the public's involvement depends on the individual department. Usually, local police departments center their efforts on one or two programs and invite the public to participate. One such program for citizens is the citizen police academy.

Basically, citizen police academies provide a mechanism for educating the public about the criminal justice system and the ways to resist crime. The overall goals are to gain support for police work, explain

the operations of police agencies, and encourage private citizens to undertake appropriate security measures. Typically, police personnel conduct the classes, which are coordinated by community relations units.

This article gives an overview of citizen police academies and describes their inherent advantages and disadvantages. It then addresses ways to expand the scope of such academies.

Overview

In 1977, the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary designed a program to familiarize private citi-

zens with the nature of police work and the organization of the police system in the United Kingdom. The course, known as the "Police Night School," met for 10 consecutive Wednesday evenings and was conducted by police personnel on a volunteer basis. The success of this program prompted other British police departments to imitate it.¹

Eight years later, in 1985, the Orlando, Florida, Police Department organized the first citizen police academy in the United States. Modeled after the British Police Night School, the academy convened 1 evening a week for 10 weeks. Also, participants were given an option to

complete a short course on the use of police sidearms and to ride as observers with officers on patrol.² Graduates of the citizen police academy received a departmental cap, certificate of completion, and a commemorative paperweight.³

Other U.S. communities followed Orlando's lead. The Missouri City, Texas, Police Department introduced its first citizen police academy in 1986. Media announcements attracted academy participants, who were screened through background checks. This program's success resulted in the expansion of the academy to 11 evening sessions and the incorporation of firearms practice and safety training as a regular part of the curriculum. Several followup activities implemented by the police department, such as a quarterly newsletter and special invitations to police public relations activities, kept interest in the program alive.

In Commerce City, Colorado, the police department recruited participants for its first citizen police academy through personal contacts. The curriculum, initially based on the regular police academy schedule, was condensed into 11 nightly sessions and some weekend activities. The extra sessions were devoted to firearms practice and safety training, ride-alongs, and the use of department vehicles on the department's driving course. From the outset, departmental officials, personnel from other criminal justice services, and community members (e.g., news media representatives) served as instructors or special guest lecturers. Police department instructors also volunteered, but were

given compensatory time off for their participation.

Advantages of Current Programs

The public's involvement in a citizen police academy expands community-based crime prevention efforts. Academy participants become better prepared to cope with criminal incidents, are more willing to report crime, and realize the need to testify when they observe a crime. They also gain an understanding of police procedures that is more reflective of everyday police work than what is portrayed by the media. This helps to reduce complaints about routine police matters.

Participants in academy classes also learn how they can help to make their communities crime-free. They become sources for new ideas or provide ways to better educate the public. For example, a bank executive, who participated in a citizen

police academy, offered to include crime prevention messages in the monthly statements mailed to depositors.⁴

For police departments, citizen police academies provide an avenue to learn about the concerns of community members. These academies encourage police interaction with the public, which can augment police job satisfaction and provide a measure of accountability to the community.


At the same time, police departments can use a citizen police academy to recruit individuals into the profession. They can also emphasize specific problems in the course of instruction, that is, types of crime that are specific to the locale.

The use of guest instructors from other agencies furthers inter-agency cooperation. In addition, these academies are a means to increase morale within a department as a result of the internal cooperation neces-

“...citizen police academies provide a mechanism for educating the public about the criminal justice system....”



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“The public’s involvement in a citizen police academy expands community-based crime prevention efforts.”

sary for organizing the academy program.

Disadvantages

While citizen police academies offer several avenues to police departments to encourage community support, they also have their disadvantages. First, two of the existing programs have been designed for suburban communities with relatively low populations. Consequently, the programs reach only a small number of residents and probably are not suited to urban areas.

Inherently, some academy instructors could lose sight of the goal of citizen police academies. They might overplay the public relations aspects and curtail the delivery of more useful information about the realities of policing and the ability of the criminal justice system to contend with crime.

At the same time, planning activities for the academy, such as preparing curriculum and screening applicants, may detract from the time

and resources needed for routine police work. In addition, local liability considerations may limit or eliminate high-interest activities, such as firearms instruction and ride-alongs. And while the expenditures needed to maintain a citizen police academy are supposedly minimal, instruction may be costly if volunteer instructors are unavailable. For example, in Commerce City, Colorado, firearms training was preceded by a 3-hour orientation class, and individual instructors were provided for each student while on the firing range.

Police departments need to maintain citizen interest when the academy ends. This is difficult unless followup activities are planned. A few months after completing the academy, some participants may be disappointed if all they have to show for their efforts are a cap or T-shirt, a certificate, and memories.

Academies could also turn into victims of their own success. Participants could become so overzealous in their concern for justice that

they engage in conduct that undermines departmental policies and programs, e.g., establishing a vigilante-type neighborhood patrol organization.

Another area of concern is the number of requests for crime prevention speakers and home and business security surveys that academy participation may generate. While this is not a disadvantage, per se, such requests could overburden officers by increasing their workload.

Recommendations

The existing citizen police academies demonstrate a willingness on the part of local police departments to share information with the general public. However, their efforts should merely be considered as a beginning, especially if large metropolitan areas adopt this initiative.

Obviously, achieving the support and cooperation of diverse segments of a metropolitan population will require more than an annual course for a few hand-picked participants. A better approach would be for urban police departments to use their resources to train and certify classes of citizen volunteer instructors who would then be qualified to offer a series of continuous free courses to the public. This would allow for all age groups, sooner or later, to learn a variety of self-help skills.

Moreover, since graduates of the certification program are expected to become future teachers of citizen police academies, concern about followup activities diminishes signifi-

cantly. And if departments want to maintain close supervision of citizen instructors, they could include the program as part of a new or existing auxiliary or reserve police unit.

Another recommendation is to apply a much broader term to these academies, such as "neighborhood police academy." This term emphasizes the importance of people working together for the betterment of the community and works to broaden the format of the academies. Future participants might be drawn from occupations holding peace officer status, such as correctional personnel and reserve officers.

Increased Scope

By expanding the role of these police academies, most of the current disadvantages would be reduced. For example, newly certified citizen instructors would be more motivated to concentrate on crime prevention topics and less likely to overemphasize public relations. Their services can be used to develop new curriculum guides or to expand and revise current materials for diverse populations. They could also serve to augment the department's personnel resources as crime prevention speakers and home security inspectors.

If made part of a police auxiliary or reserve unit, the department maintains the interest of volunteer instructors. In turn, upon completion of a certification class, highly qualified reservists could increase the availability of firearms instructors for one-on-one safety instruction and practice. Also, in the event regular patrol officers are unavail-

able to accommodate a citizens' ride-along program, auxiliary or reserve officers could be used. Finally, the existence of a volunteer police unit that has been thoroughly trained, closely guided, and given meaningful assignments would reduce the possibility that overzealous course participants might establish their own independent vigilante-type patrols.

Conclusion

As FBI Director William S. Sessions stated, "We need citizen involvement more than ever today."⁵ Therefore, police agencies should not hesitate to enlist the services of their law-abiding community members. Without the cooperation of victims and witnesses in reporting crime and testifying about what they saw, criminals would be virtually held unaccountable for their actions.

Moreover, additional human resources are urgently needed to provide educational programs in urban areas (e.g., family abuse prevention, etc.). By expanding the current model of citizen police academies, departments take one step forward in resolving many of the crime problems facing their communities.

LEB

Footnotes

¹ R. Ferguson, "The Citizen Police Academy," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 54, No. 9, September 1985, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴ J. Seelmeyer, "A Citizen's Police Academy," *Law and Order*, vol. 35, No. 12, p. 28.

⁵ W. Sessions, "Director's Message," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 57, No. 10, October 1988, p. 1.



NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

Research in Brief

Charles B. DeWitt, Director

August 1992

Community Policing in Seattle: A Model Partnership Between Citizens and Police

When citizens and police in South Seattle banded together to fight crime, quarterly crime statistics showed dramatic improvements in the quality of life. Citizen activity spread in the city's other three police precincts; now community policing is a going concern throughout Seattle—a citywide success.

The story of this success shows what can happen when citizens work in partnership with the police to prevent crime and create safer neighborhoods.

Community policing

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has been a leader since the mid-seventies in the development and implementation of what is now called community policing.

NIJ's early research on comprehensive crime prevention programs focused on policing, community involvement, and environmental security strategies as exemplified in Hartford's Crime Control Program.

"Fear of crime" studies in Houston and Newark confirmed that community conditions, the "Broken Windows" of which James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling wrote,¹ help to define crime's interaction with community life. Also, "problem-oriented policing" studies in Norfolk demonstrated how police, as individuals and as an institution, can assume an innovative and participatory role in community life.

As part of its efforts to increase information about community policing, NIJ granted funding in 1988 for the Seattle

Police Department to conduct a descriptive research project on the South Seattle crime prevention efforts that led to community policing in the city.

A city's postwar changes

South of downtown Seattle and the city's racially mixed Central Area lies Rainier Valley (see figure 1). Businesses along its main thoroughfares, Rainier Avenue and Martin Luther King Way, focus on lower middle-class and working-class needs. (To the west is a heavily industrial area and, further still, West Seattle—geographically separated from the rest of the city and reached by bridges and causeways.)

Rainier Valley once resembled the rest of Seattle: prosperous, progressive, demographically two-thirds white with fair-sized

From the Director

The outlines of a new direction for police, known as "community policing," emerged in the 1980's in response to a rising tide of crime in the 1960's and 1970's. The approach affirms the importance of police and citizens working together to control crime and maintain order.

NIJ has been conducting research in community policing for more than a decade and a half. Early field experiments tested various police-citizen partnerships and ways in which foot patrol, door-to-door contact, and other positive contact between police and citizens could reduce the fear of crime and improve neighborhood life.

Later, the Institute explored various facets of the problem-oriented approach to con-

trolling crime, particularly drug trafficking. This approach calls on police to exercise both initiative in identifying the source of problems and imaginativeness in enlisting community help in developing solutions.

NIJ is currently engaged in a comprehensive program of research, technical assistance, and training to encourage innovations in community policing and police-citizen partnerships to combat crime and drugs. The Institute is also evaluating neighborhood policing projects funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

We believe in community policing's potential for better, smarter law enforcement. This *Research in Brief* on South Seattle's police-citizen partnership is the first in a series of new NIJ publications on community policing in

urban areas. Other publications are planned on projects in Madison, Wisconsin, and Houston, Texas.


We also know that citizens have a stake in their neighborhoods and, when given a chance, will work hard with police to take back their streets from drug traffickers and other criminal elements. In South Seattle that is exactly what citizens and police did, working together. By putting their story on these pages, NIJ encourages citizens and public servants in other communities to take heart and do likewise.

Charles B. DeWitt
Director
National Institute of Justice

Figure 1

City of Seattle

Seattle is located on a peninsula in Puget Sound. The shaded area is the Southeast, loosely referred to as Rainier Valley, where formation and activities of the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council began in 1987.



African-American and Asian minorities and smaller groups of Hispanics and Native Americans. After World War II, two large new public housing projects and an influx of African Americans from the Central Area increased the proportion of low-income minorities.²

However, the Southeast failed to keep pace economically. New construction declined. The crime rate rose.

Confident of their long-standing political clout, community activists met in the 1970's with city and county officials, including the county prosecutor, to express their concern over what they perceived to be a crime wave. Their Court Watch program helped defeat two judges perceived as lax on offenders. Furthermore, a precinct police commander promoted team policing and community involvement, a proposal that won much citizen support.

In 1979, the mayor established the Economic Renewal Task Force of Rainier Valley. This was preceded by a Block Watch program to cut the rate of residential burglary; the Nation's first Business Watch program to tackle commercial burglaries; and the Crime Prevention League to serve as the southeast Seattle business community's private crime fighting agency.

Narcotics and street crime

Then crack cocaine came to Rainier Valley.


Paralleling developments in the rest of the city, State, and Nation, cocaine use spread in minority areas, especially the housing developments. The city's narcotics violations rose from 582 in 1983 to 4,850 in 1989. Police discovered fortified homes dealing cocaine, and street gangs infested parks, parking lots, and other public areas. Calls for service started to climb in 1984 (see figure 2).

Community organizations and police tried tough new tactics. A black activist whose father was a police officer became security officer for the housing projects and gave police information they needed to get search warrants. The Rainier Chamber of Commerce also launched a cleanup and antigraffiti drive.

For its part, the Seattle Police Department set up a precinct Anticrime Team (ACT)

Figure 2

Calls for Service Seattle Police Precincts: 1982–1989



Calls for service¹ rose sharply throughout Seattle from 1984 onwards. While they declined slightly beginning in 1988 for other parts of the city, in the south they continued to rise. This trend may reflect a rise in public awareness of police services following the formation of SSCPC. (See figure 3 for a picture of crime trends during the same period.)

¹This includes all on-views/calls for service.

²Citywide total CFS 1989 = 429,960.

comprising a sergeant, a detective, and two uniformed officers—not to make arrests but to disrupt or destroy drug operations. Although the team's efforts drew wide community support, a department review of its tactics led to a restructuring of the ACT operation.

The department directed the new Anticrime Team to adhere strictly to established departmental procedures, with more emphasis placed on making arrests. Yet even though the new ACT squad made 422

arrests in 2 months, the increasingly involved community voiced continued support for the original ACT procedures. Furthermore, the commercial burglary rate continued to rise.

Raising a new community voice

At an informal gathering at the Rainier Chamber of Commerce in the spring of 1987, some citizens questioned the motiva-

tion of patrol officers in the South Precinct. While the immediate concern was the rising commercial burglary rate, an ultimate concern was the economic and social future of the Southeast. Many of those at the meeting had businesses there; most still lived there.

The editor and publisher of the *South District Journal* had called the meeting. He had close ties with Chamber of Commerce members and with police officials both in the South Precinct and throughout the city.

The police precinct commander, who frequently attended subsequent meetings, convinced the businessmen and women that the commercial burglaries were tied to the prevalence of crack houses and drug use. The business leaders then met with the mayor to propose a program that included:

- A community review committee to set priorities for reducing crime.
- Greater productivity and better communication within the police department and other city departments.
- A proactive, not reactive, police response to citizen concerns.
- Standards of achievement for police from the chief on down.
- Reporting procedures to assure citizens the police were making progress.

The mayor expressed faith in the police chief who, in turn, encouraged police supervisors to meet frequently with the citizen group. At those meetings, the police stressed the legal, administrative, and budgetary restraints they faced. Although discouraged by this, the community group considered its previous years of cooperation with the police and decided the community itself would have to supply the "vision and imagination" to solve its problems.

The police, for their part, discovered they faced not a group of mere complainers, looking for quick fixes, but people seeking broad-based, long-term solutions to the problem of crime. Rather than using information supplied by the police to attack the police, the citizen group lobbied before the city council and legislature for more police funds and powers.

In September 1987, the Rainier Chamber of Commerce submitted a plan to the mayor that proposed:

- Increasing South Precinct staff by 15 sworn officers and several civilians.
- Creating a Community Advisory Committee "to develop the program" and its guidelines.
- Obtaining "total support" from the chief of police, the mayor, and the advisory committee for the precinct commander, who would head the program.

- Giving special training for precinct personnel "to provide liaison between the community, the [advisory] committee, and the South Precinct."

- Providing special community support "if the [Police] Department has insufficient funds."

Although police department negotiators were unable to promise additional resources for the South Precinct without disrupting citywide patterns, they did point out ways of stretching available precinct resources.

Community negotiators felt the word "advisory" meant "partnership," that the community truly would exercise a strong voice in selecting police targets and goals. Police felt they had the legal power to run their own operations. Still, they were aware that the Chamber had the power to take its case to the press.

Neither side overplayed its hand. The advisory committee's powers remained ambiguous, but a pattern of cooperation developed. In testimony before the city council, the police chief praised the community's intervention into their social problems.

Crime prevention group reborn

In January of 1988, the Chamber resurrected the corporate shell of the defunct Crime Prevention League (a private crime fighting agency formed in 1984 that had since faded because of a lack of funds) and changed its name to the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC).

This became a self-perpetuating assemblage of community organizations, not an open membership association. The lightly publicized regular meetings were attended only by approximately 17 members (whose attendance record ran about 80 percent) and a few invited guests. Either the precinct captain or one of his lieutenants attended as a full participating member.

The police "members," high ranking as they usually were, talked as frankly as the civilians. They freely discussed police plans and tactics that, in a group considered less "a part of the team," would have been considered strictly confidential.

Choosing police targets

SSCPC discussed targeting of crime problems at an early meeting, 2 weeks before its activity became official, but adjourned for lack of a quorum. The clear implication was that when a quorum was present, this community organization, despite having no formal government status, could decide where police would concentrate their efforts.

A truly radical departure in American policing was now under way. At subsequent weekly meetings, with police command staff present, targets were selected, added, or classified as "pending" or "resolved"—all by formal parliamentary motion.

The chosen targets were, for the most part, those the police determined were the principal hot spots in the Southeast. The community agreed. The issue of "power" or "control" as opposed to "advice" did not yet arise because there was no controversy over the action itself.

With the dominant initiative in selection coming from the police, police targets could be specific locations and offenses or more general problems, such as abandoned cars. The precinct captain's biggest concern over abandoned cars was their use for drug dealing. The citizens were more concerned with appearances in the neighborhood. Yet even before the citizen concern had been made known, SSCPC went along with the captain's suggestion.

Dealing with targets

Police action consisted of aggressive patrol with special attention to the targets. Officers were expected to visit these at least twice each shift, fully documenting the visits in special log entries.

In addition, police reviewed crack house reports from the community hotline. Confirmed reports were added to the target list. By the end of the first year, police were working on 39 targets, successfully "completing" nearly half. By the end of the following year, the other half had been taken care of. Twenty crack houses were included in the initial 39 targets, and most were closed within the first year. Yet police and community had to persist in efforts to drive crack houses permanently out

of an area since these tended to move from place to place.

At SSCPC meetings, police reported in detail on criminal or disorderly behavior at the targets. Citizen representatives reported, too—on how citizens, no longer afraid of being accosted by drug dealers at bus stops, began to use public transportation again and how graffiti or prostitution declined in a given area.

The targeting procedure reaped other benefits as well. It gave the police a chance to interact with the community around specific public safety issues. This went beyond "public relations." Citizens learned how the criminal justice response to crime works (or doesn't work). For example, when arrested drug dealers showed up on the streets again, people realized that arrests alone did not assure public safety; the rest of the criminal justice system had to follow through.

Targeting also broadened the police's outlook. When the community put pressure on landlords who were not cooperating in the civil abatement process to evict tenants who deal in drugs, the connection between a community's pressure and a suddenly cooperative landlord was soon clear to the police.

Thus encouraged by the community's help, the police viewed their work differently from before. The target selection process directed their attention away from mere response to individual calls toward broader responsibility for dealing with community issues.


Despite a few administrative problems, including some dissatisfaction with a lack of patrol officer input into the target selection, the procedure was successful in either displacing or ending illegal activity at the targets.

Programs aid crime control

Concerns were wide ranging and led to the development of several key programs and strategies. These included the following:

Narcotics activity reports (NAR's).

Citizen complaints of drug activity were received by phone or in person, at the station, on the beat, or through the community hotline. Each NAR was forwarded to



Police had an active presence in many neighborhoods, including several housing projects where resident managers were concerned about drug-related crime. Officer Marsha Wilson talks with the manager of Martin Luther King Apartments.

the Narcotics Division, which assigned it for followup investigation by patrol, the Anticrime Team (ACT), the narcotics street team, or narcotics detectives. Usually a precinct officer in the area of narcotics activity did a followup investigation to substantiate the activity. If further action was required, the officer notified ACT, the narcotics street team, or other detectives. If the activity was not substantiated, an officer or sergeant contacted the complainant to report this fact. Police followed up 1,219 such reports in one year.

Criminal trespass program. Property owners gave police advance permission to enter private property such as parking lots or exterior stairs to investigate and potentially arrest loiterers. Police could cite or arrest individuals who might have been loitering to do drug transactions, even though the transactions were not taking place at the time. The trespass program required a first warning (either in person or

through posted signs) that trespassing was illegal and that violators would be cited. More than 100 businesses signed up, and 1,044 persons received citations.

Pay telephone program. Standard pay phones were put on a "call out only" status. Once the phones could not receive incoming calls, drug dealers could no longer use them to receive messages. During 1988, 13 phones were put on "call out only" status.

Owner notification (drug trafficking civil abatement program). This program gave property owners quick notice that their tenants faced legal action for using their property for drug-involved purposes. Originally started by the police department as a mere warning that illegal activity was being carried out on an owner's premises, the program became part of the city's implementation of the State's 1988 Abatement Law.

Two warnings are given to the owner of a property where narcotics activity has been observed and documented through search warrants. If the problem is not corrected after the second search warrant, a final abatement notice is mailed and abatement proceedings are initiated. The large majority of owners (90 percent) have been responsive, and only a small number of premises actually go through the entire abatement process.

A landlord education component was incorporated into the abatement program. SSCPC sponsors a series of training sessions for apartment owners and managers on how to keep their property drug free. SSCPC's strong link to the real estate community, heretofore seen as an obstacle to building a broader base in the community, turned out to be an asset in this case. SSCPC could reach into the network of apartment owners and operators to encourage them to attend the workshops. SSCPC representatives and the South Precinct captain showed the landlords how they could legally screen renters for previous drug involvement, require that tenants keep the apartment drug free, and obtain police assistance during evictions.

Antigraffiti program. "Paintouts" were a popular activity for anticrime volunteers. Launched by the Rainier Chamber of Commerce, the program gained the support of both the police and SSCPC, which promotes the program in its information packet. Some police officers have participated in the paintouts in addition to looking for and citing people making graffiti. In 1989, Seattle's engineering department received funding for an antigraffiti coordinator as well as paint for the program. In addition, the city's Summer Youth Employment program (a supervisor and seven staff) joined the effort, and a graffiti hotline was established, with calls relayed to the engineering department coordinator for followup.

Telephone hotline. This is basically an anonymous tipline. However, callers were urged to use it for any public service problems that were *not* "911 emergencies." If they wanted to sacrifice anonymity in order to learn the results of a call, they could leave a phone number or address.

Much to the surprise of SSCPC and some of the police, 40 percent of the calls con-

cerned abandoned cars. Police arranged for the removal of so many cars that the towing company temporarily ran out of space to store them. As the abandoned cars began disappearing from the streets, citizen calls shifted to calls about drugs, especially crack houses.

At first volunteers manned the hotline, but later an answering machine that had been put into use for after-hours calls was used for all calls. The recorded hotline greeting, originally very brief to conserve storage capacity, was expanded for more effective police followup. The expanded greeting encouraged callers to supply details needed about the address, date, and time of the incident.

Garden police car program. A two-officer police car was dedicated to work in two housing projects located in the South Precinct area. The officers, who were not responsible for responding to any but extreme emergency radio calls, used conventional neighborhood-oriented police tactics, even though the layout of the projects did not encourage a walking beat. They checked on drug activity and made arrests when needed. Usually the same two officers were assigned to the car, and the residents grew to feel they "owned" the garden car.

Gaining broader participation

Heightened police presence and activity eventually led to broad community support for the SSCPC-police partnership. Although dominated from the start by members of the powerful, politically sophisticated, mainly white Rainier Chamber of Commerce, SSCPC acknowledged its responsibility to extend its activity and power to the broader community.

Early efforts were not promising. When SSCPC delegated two white members to seek out additional black representation, they discovered that membership in black organizations and churches tended not to be geographically based and that few were located in the South Precinct (most were in the Central Area to the north).

In mid-1989, however, a large middle-class neighborhood group met at the South Precinct station to express its anger over a rash of burglaries. SSCPC sent representatives, though few from the aggrieved

neighborhood had ever heard of SSCPC. At a followup meeting, an SSCPC member took one of the incensed protestors aside to compare notes, converting him instantly to an SSCPC activist.

Transferring its efforts less from race to race than from neighborhood to neighborhood, SSCPC gradually spread its umbrella. Neighborhood leaders seeking empowerment and self-respect found they could quickly tie their own anticrime crusades to the larger effort of SSCPC. Spreading its geographic influence gave SSCPC the ethnic diversity it sought.

Police liaison broadens

A different lack of diversity appeared in the original arrangement in which the citizen group, arguably a somewhat elite one, communicated mainly with precinct command-level police officials: the precinct captain, occasionally a lieutenant, but only rarely a sergeant, much less a patrol officer.

The police department's Crime Prevention Division, staffed mainly by civilian employees rather than sworn officers, was responsible for such activities as Neighborhood Block Watch and Business Watch. But the division had little rapport with the Rainier Chamber of Commerce and received public criticism from the Chamber.

Only after the Crime Prevention Division was reorganized in 1989 did relations improve. The Crime Prevention Division began to assign Block Watch organizers permanently. Before then, once Block Watch was established in a neighborhood, the organizers were reassigned to other neighborhoods.

Relations between SSCPC and the Crime Prevention Division now became more positive. Even the crime prevention organizers began to stop into the South Precinct station more frequently.

Involving other city agencies

Inevitably, other public agencies were affected by the SSCPC-police partnership. The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) had already developed a tough policy of evicting tenants found with drugs and worked in close cooperation with the police. The second-ranking SHA official participated

In SSCPC meetings. Although at first SHA did not feel participation in SSCPC needed to extend to the housing projects' onsite managers, pressure and encouragement from SSCPC led to SHA's advocacy of increased resident manager involvement in controlling drug-related crime and participation in community cleanup programs.

SSCPC lobbied legislative branches and various agencies of the city government. Its purpose was twofold: to obtain more resources for the police and to further the goals it shared with the police. Particular efforts were directed to the strengthening of State antidrug legislation that the police had long desired. All the top commanders in the Seattle police joined in the lobbying, as did a number of city organizations.

Pressure was similarly applied to other parts of the criminal justice system—to the prosecutor's office to urge that drug traffickers be charged with the most serious crime legally possible—and to other city agencies to solve community public safety problems such as poor lighting in the parks.

This pressure showed that successful collaboration between SSCPC and the police was taking place. The police reported the problems that needed to be solved, and SSCPC applied the pressure that brought about action.

Spreading to other parts of the city

SSCPC operated in only two of the three "sectors" of one of the city's four police precincts. But when quarterly crime statistics indicated the South Precinct was showing substantial improvement (see figure 3), a loosely formed group in the East Precinct (the Central Area and Capitol Hill) sought guidance from SSCPC. The group obtained a grant to hire away an SSCPC activist to work in the East Precinct. By-laws, loosely patterned after those of SSCPC, were used to establish the East Precinct Crime Prevention Coalition.

Originally interested in a broad range of social problems such as teen pregnancy, housing, and substance abuse prevention, the East Precinct decided by the end of 1988 to concentrate on criminal justice issues. Rather than complain about problems and demand police action, the group

discovered it could play a positive role in controlling crime.

The West Precinct lies mainly in the downtown Seattle area encompassing the central business district. It houses a host of social service agencies, including release centers for parolees, food and shelter missions for street people, shelters for battered women, alcohol and drug treatment centers, and shelters for runaway or abandoned youth.

It also has a growing number of luxury condominiums; two popular tourist areas, the Pike Place Market and Pioneer Square; and a nationally known sports facility, the Kingdome.

Downtown has a number of small business groups such as the Pioneer Square Business Association and the Pike Place Market Association. There is also a large umbrella organization, the Downtown Seattle Association, that conducts some of the most effective lobbying in the city, typically in favor of police budgets.

The Pioneer Square Business Association helped lead strong lobbying efforts for better control of work release probationers; enforcement of liquor laws, including prohibition of open bottles in public; and for foot and bicycle police patrols in downtown areas where young people congregate.

Citywide coordination

In spring 1989, the city and police department brought in a management consulting firm to recommend improvements in public safety. The consultants recommended the addition of 147 sworn and civilian positions to the police department as well as citywide expansion of the South Precinct partnership. This involved developing citizen-based advisory councils in all precincts to play a strong role in advising precinct commanders on community affairs.

The city accepted the team's recommendations and incorporated them in a referendum, the Public Safety Action Plan, which was placed before the voters in November 1989. It gained overwhelming approval and furthered the joint interests of SSCPC and the police by strengthening not only the police but a number of community organizations that were helping in the

crime prevention effort. The plan had several provisions.

Crime Prevention Councils. The plan authorized the city to allot \$95,000 each year to increase citizen involvement in precinct work. This took the form of grants to SSCPC and other crime prevention councils to pay for recordkeeping, mailing lists, board support, and other expenses.

Police Department Advisory Councils. Funds were also earmarked for the development of citizen-based councils that would advise the precinct commanders on community issues. Precinct commanders would have input into the selection of board members as well as agenda items.

Community-Police Teams. A key recommendation of the consultants' study that was incorporated into the Public Safety Action Plan was to introduce into each precinct of the city a community policing team composed of five officers and one sergeant. The team would give full-time attention to community policing and would be specifically excluded from the responsibility of answering 911 calls. The purpose of creating the specialty teams was to lock the concept of community policing into each precinct.


The East and South Precincts actually implemented the team idea ahead of the funding package. This served to test the concept and identify potential problems, such as the perception that the teams had "soft" jobs and the need to develop special training, operating procedures, and performance evaluation criteria for the officers on the teams. Close communication and coordination within the department, together with judicious selection of targets appropriate to the specialized team approach, were deemed important in mitigating these problems.

Joint Parks Department and Police Guild Program. Funds were allocated to a program in which police union volunteers would work with older youth in an evening hour recreational program. The Police Guild had been eager to work with the Parks Department in developing such a program.

Youth Intervention Program. The plan called for a program to be jointly planned by the police, the Department of Human Resources, the schools, and community

Figure 3

Part 1 Offenses Seattle Police Precincts: 1982-1989



Serious crime rose throughout the city beginning in 1982 and 1983. The reverse in this trend that began in South Seattle in 1987 and in other parts of the city in 1988 indicates the positive effects of SSCPC's and eventually other precincts' police-citizen partnership.

(The FBI's Part 1 offenses comprise the following serious crimes: murder, rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, arson, and motor vehicle theft.)

agencies. The program's purpose was to prevent youth from getting involved in gangs and to intervene with youth who were already at high risk of involvement.

Lessons learned about communities and police

Many definitions of community policing exist, but they all have one element in common: a cooperative approach to work-

ing with citizens and other agencies based on the concept of shared responsibility for community security.

Yet too often, the neighborhoods where crime is worst and poses the greatest problems for police and citizens are precisely the neighborhoods where police have had few positive contacts with residents and no experience of cooperation. Their relationship to citizens in these areas is more likely to have been marked by distrust, confrontation, and hostility.

Despite this, the Seattle experience indicates there is cause for optimism. Even when the climate is at first confrontational, police and citizens can still forge a positive working partnership. But the partnership must be built step by step. These are the stages that communities can often expect to go through:

Stage 1. This is the *challenging/venting* stage, when citizens vociferously criticize police methods and instances of abuse of power or fault the police for doing "too

little, too late." The police, put on the defense, can do little but explain their lack of resources and power. Many of their accusers may abandon the fray once they have vented their anger.

Stage 2. At this *organizational* stage, participants agree to "play ball." Community members start to attend meetings regularly, ready to work on specific issues. A stable relationship is developed within which police and community can hammer out a mutual agenda.

Stage 3. Now police and community, having formed a stable relationship, commit to action. This is the *success* stage. Actions are accomplished. Success breeds not only more success but also a trusting relationship. The group is even secure enough to weather turnover and changes in leadership.

Stage 4. In the final *long-term stability* stage, the group can mount continuous efforts to resolve problems as well as recruit wider community representation.

New roles for the community

In cities that have successfully implemented community policing methods, citizens and citizen groups have fulfilled a variety of roles to help police enforce the law. In Seattle the community:

- Supported traditional police efforts by helping select targets for police action.
- Sent a message to potential lawbreakers that a neighborhood was off bounds, for instance by painting out graffiti with police officers painting beside them.
- Served as the "eyes and ears" of the police by manning a hotline for receiving crime information from citizens.
- Obtained legislative help for police by lobbying and testifying on behalf of laws and ordinances that would give police forceful tools, especially to stop drug loitering on private property.
- Provided feedback to police on the success of their efforts by organizing dinners and special events where officers and supervisors were thanked for work well done. These special occasions provided the formal vehicle for recognizing police that is frequently missing under traditional policing methods.

- Brought the need for adequate police services to the attention of the State legislature, the mayor, city council, and upper echelons of city government. While this activity has the potential for inducing neighborhoods to compete with each other for services, in Seattle police managers were able to prioritize and allocate resources in a way that was fair to all groups.

Some conclusions

In addition to identifying the steps toward fruitful cooperation, one can distill several other lessons from the Seattle experience in community policing:

Traditional policing and community policing must remain partners.

Traditional police methods are not, as many fear, incompatible with community policing. Community policing is not just a joint problem-solving process. It can also involve arrest-oriented, get-tough solutions. The difference is that under community policing, the "tough" police action is not a surprise to the law-abiding community. In fact, it may have been requested by residents and citizens working with the police. Seattle is having little difficulty blending the traditional and community-oriented policing approach. Community-Police Teams work in tandem with regular patrol to handle the full range of public safety problems.

Some community policing programs are natural.

A more livable neighborhood is good for its own sake. The argument, for example, that painting over graffiti and removing abandoned cars should reduce crime is intuitive to citizens in livable neighborhoods. Such activities unite the community and send a message that residents care about what happens to their neighborhoods and are watching. It tells would-be lawbreakers that criminal activity will no longer pass unnoticed. But in Seattle, it is also clear that the removal of "bad actors" from the neighborhoods is what most encouraged the residents to act. Police cleaned drug trafficking out of a park and outlying streets. Reducing the criminal element meant reducing fear of crime; it

allowed neighborhood residents to reclaim their parks and streets.

Community policing may create turf problems.

Other public agencies are often surprised at the amount of work created for them when police become concerned with community problems; some may not be able to respond as quickly as police and citizens would like. For instance, some agencies must follow a very slow and careful legal process in dealing with such problems as building code violations. A housing agency does not want the police to dictate its processes and priorities any more than the police want to be managed by a citizens league.

A related problem arises when it is clear that a call by a business leader to the mayor's office brings a faster agency response than one from the neighborhood police officer. In Seattle this politicization became a two-edged sword. On the one hand, officers were in a position to mobilize some action by the community to produce a response by the agency. On the other hand, if the agency perceived that the police played such a role, interagency conflict resulted.

Community policing, and the workload it implies for other agencies, suggest the need for municipal leadership to mandate some common interagency goals and chart a new way for agencies to operate together.

New coordination links must be created by police.

Community policing may involve conscripting the entire department into solving broader community problems, or it may focus on establishing specialized units, freed from responding to 911 calls. One of the problems with specialty units is that they become isolated from other units and from patrol.

Although it is often prudent to get the programs going with specialized teams like Seattle's Community-Police Teams, or by initially testing the program in certain parts of the city, the whole department needs to be brought on board as local conditions and constraints permit. In any event, community policing will require more coordination and enhanced information sharing

not only between police units, but ideally within city government as a whole.

When implemented, community policing may influence citizen calls for service and neighborhood crime levels.

Community policing tactics presume an understanding that not all calls for service require the immediate, car-on-the-way response of decades past. In the Seattle South Precinct, however, calls for service have actually increased since SSCPC began, while declining in the rest of the city. Although the number of serious crimes declined throughout the city, the decline was most dramatic in the South Precinct areas where SSCPC was most active.

Incorporating community policing into a department's operational structure may require sensitivity to issues of police accountability.

Community policing holds that neighborhood officers should be able to use their judgment in taking whatever action is necessary to solve a problem. These elements, however, may create concerns about the appearance of corruption, excessive force, and "letting the officer own too much of his beat."

Typically, modern policing employs rotation of assignment (among other tactics) to prevent such abuses. Arbitrary rotation, however, is antithetical to the idea of community policing. Under this style of policing, an officer is encouraged to get to know the community, become aware of a neighborhood's dynamics, and develop open lines of communication. All of this takes time and would be undermined by the normal police rotation cycle.

Another important aspect of community policing—target selection—need not create the risk of payoffs or corruption that some critics might predict. In Seattle officers were dealing with an organized group of neighborhood citizens rather than with individuals in defining issues to be addressed and targets to be selected.

Community policing duties require officer skills different from those used in traditional policing.

Officers using community policing strategies need to think independently and creatively. They must be able to develop appropriate steps for solving problems.

Seattle's lesson is that departments implementing community policing techniques must modify their recruitment, selection, and training programs to develop a core of officers with the initiative and instinct for working with the community and with government agencies. A first step for police departments is to develop standards for recruiting, training, and evaluating staff assigned to community policing duties.

A successful citizen-police partnership expands its goals and membership to include broad segments of the community.

While at first the partnership may address only a selected group of issues that are of concern to a limited number of residents, the success of the police-community partnership requires an expansion of both its goals and participants. This is clearly the course taken in Seattle, where SSCPC and the police found that many resources they needed to solve their local problems rested with the State legislature, the city council, or public and private agencies. In reaching out to these entities and to the diverse elements within their own community, SSCPC and the police not only achieved their initial goals but also were able to see them eventually adopted citywide.

Having identified the lessons learned in Seattle, NIJ's reporting team offered 17 community-police program recommendations and 14 recommendations for research. A partial list follows.

Program recommendations

- Strongly consider the community policing approach in all police agencies and jurisdictions. This is in keeping with present NIJ theory and policy, which holds that in recent years discussion of the *rhetoric* of community policing has slowed its actual implementation, and that developing and implementing successful community policing models should take immediate priority.

- Establish the partnership nature of the community-police relationship in the early stages.

- Develop clear and reasonable goals and time schedules; pushing too fast involves a large degree of risk.

- Secure the commitment of city and elected officials at an early stage.

- Develop programs (and communications mechanisms) with other city departments and service delivery groups.

- Begin with an evaluation plan.

Research recommendations

- Update and extend research on the relationship between decay, physical disorder, fear, and crime.

- Study the financial impact on police and cities of the community-oriented approach.

- Explore whether and how community-oriented programs may *displace* crime (move it from one neighborhood to another).

- Review the coordination needed between police and other departments in order to enhance this process.

Evolution of a true partnership

The Seattle experience offered no new answers to the frequent definitional demand, "What *is* community policing?" It has, however, underscored the need for police and citizens to share responsibility for community security and has emphasized the usefulness of target selection and a problem-solving focus. Usually, ad hoc neighborhood groups organize around specific problems, but interest fades when the problem appears solved. In Seattle, the community and police continued their partnership.

In 1987, when the SSCPC revolution was growing rapidly, a new police captain took command in the South Precinct. He soon met with SSCPC and established his dedication to its principles.

When potential investigators asked him about crime, he pointed out that crime in the South Precinct was decreasing and

ing confined to smaller areas. A news-photo showed him brush in hand, in civilian work clothes, at a graffiti paintout. He repeatedly pointed out that he was raised in South Seattle and still lived there. Best of all, he told SSCPC:

In essence, what you are doing here is asking [the police] to do what I used to do as a young officer 20 years ago. You're asking us to come out to the neighborhoods and get to know the people.

Even more than this, the Seattle experience can provide useful guidance and serve as a model for other communities that are interested in developing meaningful partnerships involving citizens and the police. Several elements in the SSCPC-police partnership experience in Seattle are particularly noteworthy:

- The partnership has enabled the community and the police to work together on a day-to-day basis in the joint task of controlling crime and increasing public security. Together, citizens and police define problems, select the targets to be addressed, and in many cases share in developing the strategies to deal with them. In short, the basis for the partnership is a sense of shared responsibility for community security.
- The partnership has provided benefits for both parties that sustain and reinforce the relationship between the police and the community. When citizens feel more safe and secure, and when police experience the support of citizens who lobby for better legislation and more resources for

police work, the partnership is continually reinforced.

- SSCPC's evolution from a committee of the Rainier Chamber of Commerce to a working partner with the police has involved many discussions and decisions about each side's responsibilities for achieving common goals. At each juncture, decisions have been jointly taken and formalized. These form the foundation for a workable collaboration between the police and citizens.

- Over time the partnership has developed into an effective means of increasing community security by expanding its focus to encompass a range of issues that affect the quality of neighborhood life. It has demonstrated that crime prevention, broadly defined, benefits from the joint attention of police and community.

The seeds of the partnership between police and citizens were sown 5 years ago in the Rainier Valley section of Seattle. In the short time since then the partnership has spread to the entire city. The citizens of Seattle have endorsed the partnership's goals in a referendum and committed public funds to a stronger, safer community. The Seattle experience offers a useful model of strategies for other cities to study and make their own.

Notes

1. In *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982.
2. Citywide, based on 1987 data: 67 percent white, 10 percent African-American, 9 percent

Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 percent Hispanic, 1.4 percent Native American. Rainier Valley: 40 percent white, 30 percent African-American, 5 percent Hispanic, and 25 percent Asian and "other."

This *Research in Brief* summarizes a descriptive study of the South Seattle Crime Reduction Project conducted for the National Institute of Justice by Dan Fleissner, Nicholas Fedan, Ph.D., and David Klinger of the Seattle Police Department; and Ezra Stotland, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus of the University of Washington.

The full report of the study will also be available in the near future. For information on this publication as well as other NIJ reports on community policing, write NIJ/NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20850, or call 800-851-3420.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the researchers and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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National Institute of Justice

Research in Brief

Michael J. Russell, Acting Director

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The New Policing: Confronting Complexity

by Herman Goldstein

Community policing is well on its way to becoming a common term in households across the Nation. That is a satisfying development for many, but causes some anxiety and discomfort for others. What accounts for the mixed reactions?

Under the rubric of community policing, progressive police administrators and interested citizens have been working hard for more than a decade to design and implement a form of policing that better meets the extraordinary demands on the police in the 1990's. Within these circles the term "community policing" has been used to embrace and intricately web together initiatives that have long been advocated for modern-day policing. These efforts have stimulated more productive thought and experimentation than has occurred at any previous time in the history of policing in this country. They have also created a new feeling of excitement and optimism in a field that has desperately needed both. It is understandable, therefore, why the current wave of popular support for community policing is so welcome in many quarters. It gives a tremendous impetus to these new initiatives.

Note: Herman Goldstein is Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. This article is adapted from his address to the 1993 national conference Community Policing for Safe Neighborhoods: Partnerships for the 21st Century, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, in Arlington, Virginia.

The downside of this new-found popularity is that "community policing" is widely used without any regard for its substance. Political leaders and, unfortunately, many police leaders latch onto the label for the positive images it evokes but do not invest in the concept itself. Some police personnel resist community policing initiatives because of the belief that they constitute an effort to placate an overly demanding and critical segment of the community that is intent on exercising more control over police operations.

Indeed, the popularity of the term has resulted in its being used to encompass practically all innovations in policing, from the most ambitious to the most mundane; from the most carefully thought through to the most casual. The label is being used in ways that increase public expectations of the police and create the impression that community policing will provide an instant solution not only for the problems of crime, disorder, and racial tension, but for many of the other acute problems that plague our urban areas as well.

With such varied meanings and such broad expectations, the use of "community policing" creates enormous problems for those seriously interested in bringing about meaningful change in the American police. Carefully developed initiatives bearing the community policing label, fragile by their very nature, are endangered because superficial programs are so vulnerable to attack.

One reaction to this dilemma is to press for definition and simplification, to seek

agreement on a pure model of community policing. This pressure for simplification is joined by well-intentioned practitioners who, understandably, want to know—in specific detail—what they are supposed to do. *Oversimplification*, however, can be a deadly enemy to progress in policing. The field already suffers because so much in policing is oversimplified.

Crime, violence, and disorder, for example, are simple, convenient terms, but they disguise amorphous, complex problems. Their common and indiscriminate use, especially in defining the responsibilities of the police, places a heavy burden on the police and complicates the police task. The police respond with law enforcement and patrol—equally simple terms commonly used by the public without any awareness of the methods they embrace and their value. If community policing takes its place alongside law enforcement or patrol as just another generic response to a simplistic characterization of the police function, not much will have been gained and the concept will quickly lose its credibility.

Rethinking the police role

The policing of a free, diverse, and vibrant society is an awesome and complex task. The police are called upon to deal with a wide array of quite different behavioral problems, each perplexing in its own way. The police have tremendous power—to deny freedom and to use force, even to take a life. Individual officers exercise enormous discretion in using their authority and in making decisions that affect our

lives. The very quality of life in this country and the equilibrium of our cities depend on the way in which the police function is carried out.

Given the awesome and complex nature of the police function, it follows that designing the arrangements and the organization to carry it out is equally complex. We are now in a period in which more attention is being given to the police function than at any prior time, a period in which we are rethinking, in all of its multiple dimensions, the arrangement for the policing of our society. We should not, therefore, lose patience because we have not yet come up with the perfect model; we should not get stalled trying to simplify change just to give uniform meaning to a single, catchy, and politically attractive term. We need to open up explorations rather than close them down. We need to better understand the complicated rather than search for the simple.

Some of the most common changes associated with community policing are already being implemented; for example, the permanent assignment of officers to specific beats with a mandate to get to know and relate to the community. There is now growing and persuasive support for decentralization, permanent assignments, and the development of "partnerships" between the police and the community. But these changes represent only a fragment of the larger picture.

Policing in the United States is much like a large, intricate, complex apparatus with many parts. Change of any one part requires changes in many others and in the way the parts fit and work together. For example, altering the way officers are assigned and how they patrol may be easy. But to gain full value from such changes, and to sustain them, changes are also necessary in the organization and leadership of the police department—in its staffing, supervision, training, and recruitment; and in its internal working environment. Thus, a change in direction requires more than tinkering. It requires, if it is to be effective, simultaneous changes in many areas affecting the enterprise. This, in turn, requires careful planning and coordination. And perhaps most important, it requires time, patience, and learning from experience.

Moreover, to succeed in improving policing, we need to move beyond the exclusive focus on the police *agency*. There is an urgent need to alter the public's expectations of the police. And we need to revise the fundamental provisions that we as a society make for carrying out the police function. For example:

- Refine the authority granted the police (curtail it in some areas and expand it in others).
- Recognize the discretion exercised by the police and provide a means for its review and control.
- Provide the police with the resources that will enable them to get their job done.

We need, in other words, without compromising our commitment to democratic values, to bring expectations and capacity more into harmony so that a job increasingly labeled as "impossible" can be carried out.

The nature of change

To illustrate, in some detail, the complexity of change in policing, it is helpful to examine five spheres in which change is now occurring. What types of issues arise? And what is the interrelationship and interdependence among the factors involved in these changes?

1. Refining the police function and public expectations

The new forms of policing expand the police function from crime fighting, without any abdication of that role, to include maintaining order, dealing with quality-of-life offenses, and fixing the "broken windows"—all now recognized as being much more important than previously believed. The police have become more proactive, committed to preventing incidents rather than simply *reacting* to them. These shifts in emphasis appear to have gained widespread support.

But we need to be aware of the avalanche of business that this expansion of the police function invites lest it constitute a serious self-inflicted wound. The volume and nature of the miscellaneous tasks that accrue to the police are many. Cutbacks in other government services only add to their

number. In areas that are starved for social services, the slightest improvement in police response increases the demand on the police. As water seeks its own level, the vast array of problems that surface in a large urban area inevitably find their way to the agency most willing to accept them.

For example, consider the officer assigned to a specific neighborhood with a broad mandate to improve service. Within a very short period of time, that officer will be overwhelmed by the need for services that—despite the greatest creativity and resourcefulness—far exceeds his or her capacity to deliver.

Very often the police *can* do more to satisfy citizen needs. They can identify problems and take actions that result in mitigating or solving them when they are given the time and license to do so. But in the larger scheme of things the need to reduce public expectations is every bit as important as the need to broaden the police function—not simply to make limited resources fit the demand, but for more complex reasons. Many of the most troublesome aspects of policing stem from the pressure that has been exerted on the police to appear omnipotent, to do more than they are authorized, trained, and equipped to do.



Photo by Eugene E. Hebert, NIJ

"...what may work for one will not work for the other... That is the beginning of wisdom in policing: One size clearly does not fit all." —Professor Herman Goldstein

Police tend to like challenges. But the challenge to fill needs, to live up to expectations, can lead to the taking of shortcuts, the stretching of authority and, as a consequence, the potential for abuse of that authority. It is demoralizing to the thoughtful, dedicated officer to create the expectation that he or she can do more than take the edge off some of the more intractable problems that the police confront.

The new policing seeks to make the police job more achievable by realigning what the police do and do not do by giving higher priority to some tasks and lower priority to others, by reducing public expectations and leveling with the public about police capacity, by engaging the public in taking steps to help themselves, and by connecting with other agencies and the private sector in ways that ensure that citizens referred to them will be helped. There is a need to invest much more, in our individual communities, in working through the questions that arise in trying to achieve this better alignment.

2. Getting involved in the substance of policing

A common theme in initiatives under the community policing umbrella is the emphasis on improving relationships with the citizenry. Such improvement is vital in order to reduce tensions, develop mutual trust, promote the free exchange of information, and acquaint officers with the culture and lifestyle of those being policed.

Improved relationships are important. They would constitute a major advance in some cities. But many would argue that they merely lay a groundwork and create an environment in which to strive for more. When citizens ask if community policing works, they are not so much interested in knowing if the community likes the police or if the police are getting along with the community. Rather, they usually want to know if the community policing initiative has had an impact on the problems of concern to them: their fear of using the streets, the abandoned cars in the neighborhood, the gang that has been intimidating them. If the initiatives that have been taken do not go beyond improving relationships, there is a risk that community policing will become just another means by which police operate without

having a significant, demonstrable impact on the problems the police are expected to handle.

This tendency in policing to become preoccupied with means over ends is obviously not new. It was this concern that gave rise to the work on problem-oriented policing. The police must give more substance to community policing by getting more involved in analyzing and responding to the specific problems citizens bring to their attention. This calls for a much heavier investment by the police in understanding the varied pieces of their business, just as the medical field invests in understanding different diseases. It means that police, more than anyone else, should have a detailed understanding of such varied problems as homicides involving teenage victims, drive-by shootings, and car-jackings. And it means that a beat officer should have in-depth knowledge about the corner drug house, the rowdy teenage gang that assembles at the convenience store on Friday night, and the panhandler who harasses passersby on a given street corner. Analyzing each of these quite different problems in depth leads to the realization that what may work for one will not work for the other, that each may require a different combination of different responses. That is the beginning of wisdom in policing: One size clearly does not fit all.

Problem-solving is being integrated into community policing initiatives in many jurisdictions. It dominates the commitment to change in some jurisdictions. Conference and training sessions for police have, with increased frequency, focused on such problems as the homeless, family violence, high-risk youth, child abuse, and school violence.

More of the momentum associated with community policing must be focused on these and similar problems. Smarter policing in this country requires a sustained effort within policing to research substantive problems, to make use of the mass of information and data on specific problems accumulated by individual police agencies, to experiment with different alternative responses, to evaluate these efforts, and to share the results of these evaluations with police across the Nation. It would be useful to do more to reorient the work of research and development units in police

departments, and to entice some of the best minds in the field of criminology and related specialties to assist in these efforts. The police should not only make greater use of research done by others; they should themselves be engaged in research.

3. Rethinking the relationship between the police and the criminal justice system

Buried in all of the rhetoric relating to community policing is the fact that, with little notice and in subtle ways, the longstanding relationship between the police and the criminal justice system is being redefined. This is a radical change, but it is given scant attention in the literature on community policing. And the full consequences of the changes—and their relationship to some of the developments most commonly associated with community policing—have not been adequately explored.

The enforcement of criminal law is inherent in the police role. The great emphasis on enforcement affects the shape of their organizations, the attitudes and priorities of their personnel, and their relationship with the community. Significantly, police officers are referred to as “law enforcement officers.” The felt need for objectivity and neutrality in law enforcement often results in the police being characterized as having no discretion. And the commitment to enforcement encourages the police to act in ways designed to inflate the public’s impression of their capacity to enforce the law in the hope that their image alone will reduce crime and disorder.

Advanced forms of community policing reject many of the characteristics stemming from the emphasis on enforcement. A neighborhood police officer, for example, is expected to have a much broader interest than simply enforcing the criminal law, to exhaust a wide range of alternatives before resorting to arrest for minor offenses, to exercise broad discretion, and to depend more on resourcefulness, persuasion, or cajoling than on coercion, image, or bluff.

Reconciling these different perspectives has always been difficult. Some would even argue the two postures are incompatible. Simplistically, they are often



*A large crowd and the media were present for Professor Herman Goldstein's keynote address at NIJ's conference, *Community Policing for Safe Neighborhoods: Partnerships for the 21st Century*.*

distinguished as the “hard” and “soft” approaches in policing. But as a result of a sequence of developments in the past decade the difference between the two approaches has been diminished.

What has happened? So long as the police were intricately intertwined with the criminal justice system, they came to depend more heavily on the system. Thus, as violence and, especially, crimes associated with drugs increased, the police made more and more arrests of serious offenders. And to deal with disorder on the streets they arrested thousands of minor offenders as well, often stretching their authority somewhat (as police are pressured to do) in order to restore order. Predictably, the criminal justice systems in most large urban areas, and many smaller ones as well, have been overwhelmed to the point that it is no longer possible for the system to accept some serious offenders, let alone minor offenders.

The consequences of recognizing that the capacity of the criminal justice system has limits are more far-reaching than is commonly recognized. Police can no longer use arrest, as they so freely did in the past, to deal with a wide variety of ambiguous situations. Moreover, the aura of authority on which the police have so heavily depended for getting so much of their job done, rooted in the capacity to arrest, has been greatly diminished. Police officers today simply do not appear as powerful and threatening to those who most frequently come in contact with them because they can no longer use the criminal justice system as they once did.

What does this mean for some of the central themes under the community policing umbrella? It means that there are new, pragmatic reasons for searching intensively for alternatives to the criminal justice system as the way in which to get the police job done.

It also means that there is now an added centive to cultivate positive relationships with the community. The police need to replace the amorphous authority that they previously derived from the criminal justice system and on which they depended so heavily in the past. What better way to do this than arm themselves with what Robert Peel characterized in 1829 as that most powerful form of authority, the “public approval of their existence, actions, and behavior.”

The congested state of affairs in the criminal justice system means, too, that the police must conserve their use of that system for those situations in which it is most appropriate and potentially most effective. This latter need should lead the police and others committed to community policing to join Attorney General Janet Reno in speaking out for a more sensible national criminal justice policy that curbs the indiscriminate overuse of a system that will, if not checked, draw scarce funds away from the police and away from preventive programs where those funds can do more good.

4. Searching for alternatives

The diversification of policing—the move from primary dependence on the criminal law to the use of a wide range of different responses—is among the most significant changes under the community policing umbrella. It enables the police to move away from having to “use a hammer (the criminal justice system) to catch a fly;” it enables them to fine-tune their responses. It gives them a range of options (or tools) that in number and variety come closer to matching the number and variety of problems they are expected to handle. These may include informal, common sense responses used in the past but never formally authorized.

The primary and most immediate objective in authorizing the police to use a greater range of alternatives is to improve police effectiveness. Quite simply, mediating a dispute, abating a nuisance, or arranging to have some physical barrier removed—without resorting to arrest—may be the best way to solve a problem.

But there are additional benefits in giving police officers a larger repertoire of responses. Currently, for example, one of the greatest impediments to improvement in policing is the strength of the police

subculture. That subculture draws much of its strength from a secret shared among police: that they are compelled to bend the law and take shortcuts in order to get their job done. Providing the police with legitimate, clear-cut means to carry out their functions enables them to operate more honestly and openly and, therefore, has the potential for reducing the strength and, as a consequence, the negative influence of the police subculture.

The diversification of options is also responsive to one of the many complexities in the staffing of police agencies. It recognizes, forthrightly, the important role of the individual police officer as a decision-maker—a role the officer has always had but one that has rarely been acknowledged. Acknowledging and providing alternatives contribute toward redefining the job of a police officer by placing a value on thinking, on creativity, and on decisionmaking. It credits the officer with having the ability to analyze incidents and problems and gives the officer the freedom to choose among various appropriate responses.

Changing to a system in which so much responsibility is invested in the lowest level employee, one who already operates with much independence on the streets, will not occur quickly or easily. And absent sufficient preparation, the results may be troublesome. This is especially so if officers, in their enthusiasm, blend together community support and their desire to please the community to justify using methods that are either illegal or improper. And implementation in a department that has a record of abuse or corruption is obviously much more problematic. Those concerned about control, however, must recognize that the controls on which we currently depend are much less effective than they are often thought to be. Preparations for the empowerment of officers requires changes in recruitment standards and training, establishing guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inculcating values in officers that, in the absence of specific directions, guides their decision-making. Meeting these needs in turn connects with the fifth and final dimension of change.

Changing the working environment in a police agency

If new forms of policing are to take hold, the working environment within police

agencies must change. Much has been written about new management styles supportive of community policing. But with a few remarkable exceptions relatively little has actually been achieved. And where modest changes have been made they are often lost when a change in administration occurs or when the handling of a single incident brings embarrassment, resulting in a reversion to the old style of control.

“Working environment” means simply the atmosphere and expectations that superiors set in relating to their subordinates. In a tradition-bound department, managers, supported by voluminous, detailed rules, tend to exercise a tight, paramilitary, top-down form of control—perhaps reflecting the way in which they have historically sought to achieve control in the community.

The initiatives associated with community policing cannot survive in a police agency managed in traditional ways. If changes are not made, the agency sets itself up for failure. Officers will not be creative and will not take initiatives if a high value continues to be placed on conformity. They will not be thoughtful if they are required to adhere to regulations that are thoughtless. And they will not aspire to act as mature, responsible adults if their superiors treat them as immature children.

But properly trained and motivated officers, given the freedom to make decisions and act independently, will respond with enthusiasm. They will grasp the concept, appreciate its many dimensions, and skillfully fill their new roles. These officers will solve problems, motivate citizens to join together to do things for themselves, and create a feeling of security and goodwill. Equally important, the officers will find their work demanding but very satisfying. In rank and file officers, there exists an enormous supply of talent, energy, and commitment that, under quality leadership, could rapidly transform American policing.

The major impediment to tapping this wellspring has been a failure to engage and elicit a commitment from those having management and supervisory responsibilities. It is disheartening to witness a meeting of the senior staff of a police agency in which those in attendance are disconnected and often openly hostile to changes initiated by the chief executive

and supported by a substantial proportion of the rank and file. It is equally disheartening to talk with police officers on the street and officers of lower supervisory rank who cite their *superior officer* as their major problem, rather than the complexity of their job.

Because the problem is of such magnitude, perhaps some bold—even radical—steps by legislative bodies and municipal chief executives may be necessary. Perhaps early retirement should be made more attractive for police executives who resist change. Perhaps consideration should be given to proposals recently made in England that call for the elimination of unnecessary ranks, and for making continuation in rank conditional on periodic review.

But before one can expect support for such measures, the public will need to be satisfied that police executives have exhausted whatever means are available to them for turning the situation around. When one looks at what has been done, it is troubling to find that a department's investment in the reorientation of management and supervisory personnel often consisted of no more than “a day at the academy”—and sometimes not even that. How much of the frustration in eliciting support from management and supervision stems from the fact that agencies have simply not invested enough in engaging senior officers, in explaining why change is necessary, and in giving these supervisors and managers the freedom required for them to act in their new role.

Some efforts to deal with the problem have been encouraging. The adoption of “Total Quality Management” in policing has demonstrated very positive results and holds much promise. It ought to be encouraged. An important lesson can be learned from experiences with TQM. Training to support changes of the magnitude now being advocated in policing requires more than a one-shot effort consisting of a few classroom lectures. It requires a substantial commitment of time in different settings spread over a long period, a special curriculum, the best facilitators, and the development of problems, case studies, and exercises that engage the participants. It requires the development of teamwork in which subordinates contribute as much as superiors. And it requires that the major dimension of the training take the form of

conscious change in the day-to-day interaction of personnel—not in a training setting, but on the job.

Conclusion

Dwelling on complexity is risky, for it can be overwhelming and intimidating. It is difficult. It turns many people off. But for those who get involved, the results can be very rewarding.

There have been extraordinary accomplishments in policing in the past two decades by police agencies that have taken on some of these difficult tasks. There is an enormous reservoir of ability and commitment in police agencies, especially among rank and file officers, and a willingness on the part of individual citizens and community groups at the grass roots level to engage with the police and sup-

port change. Viewed collectively, these achievements should be a source of optimism and confidence. By building on past progress and capitalizing on current momentum, change that is deeper and more lasting can be achieved.

But there is an even more compelling, overriding incentive to struggle with these complexities. We are being challenged today to commit ourselves anew to our unique character as a democracy, to the high value we as a nation place on diversity, ensuring equality, protecting individual rights, and guaranteeing that all citizens can move about freely and enjoy tranquil lives. The social problems that threaten the character of the Nation are increasing, not decreasing. It will take major changes—apart from those in the police—to reduce these problems. In this turbulent period it is more important than

ever that we have a police capacity that is sensitive, effective, and responsive to the country's unique needs, and that, above all else, is committed to protecting and extending democratic values. That is a high calling indeed.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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Doing Something About

Children at Risk

The Children at Risk program (CAR), formerly the Strategic Intervention for High Risk Youths (SIHRY) program, reported on in the following article is being conducted in six cities. Certain elements of the program—case management, community policing, safe passages, drug-free zones, individual and family counseling—are common to all six sites. Each city, however, is unique in its needs and the ways in which it is implementing CAR. This article describes the CAR program in general and its application in Austin, Texas, in particular.

by Eugene E. Hebert

During the past 20 years the city of Austin, Texas, capital of the State, home to a great university, has experienced tremendous growth. The population of Austin's greater metropolitan area has more than doubled, reaching

more than 780,000 in the 1990 census. The city has expanded outward, mostly to the south and west, and as jobs, stores, theaters, and services developed to accommodate the new, mostly young, prosperous residents, many of Austin's older, poorer neighborhoods began declining—in population and in prosperity.

On Austin's east side, Zip Code 78702 is one area that has experienced this decline. Even as Austin's overall growth rate was soaring, the population in 78702 fell by more than 4,000 residents—a 17-percent drop—between 1980 and 1990 alone. The 1990 census identified the 78702 population as being 61.4 percent Hispanic, 31.4 percent African American. By far, the largest percentage of single mothers in Austin lives in 78702: 20 to 30 percent of the households are headed by single women, compared to a citywide average of less than 10 percent.

The largest percentage of low-income families in Austin resides in 78702. Some 92 percent of the elementary school-age children participate in the free and reduced lunch programs in their schools. The average annual income is \$12,980; 29 percent of the households earn less than \$7,500 annually.

A large number of houses in 78702—about 15 percent—are vacant; only 47 percent of the residents own their own homes. Aging houses abound; vacant stores are boarded up; deserted houses are used by drug dealers, transients, and prostitutes. Abandoned properties are overgrown with weeds and shrubs and infested with rats and other pests. Graffiti identifying various competing youth gangs mark buildings and sidewalks throughout the area.

More violent crimes occur in 78702 than in any other area in Austin. Of the city's six police sectors, 78702 ranked highest in 1990 in incidents of rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and murder. More crimes against persons were committed in 78702 than in any other part of the city. More children between the ages of 10 and 13 were arrested and referred to juvenile court than in any other section of Austin. In 1990 the level of crime in 78702 rose 16 percent over 1989.

CAR involves "youths in a productive and comprehensive array of services that offer attractive alternatives to criminal behavior."

Yet, some families and individuals continue their effort to make their neighborhood a clean and pleasant place to live. Scattered across 78702 are homes with fresh paint, neatly trimmed lawns, bright flowers—attractive islands in a sea of burgeoning blight.

Austin's 78702 area is one of six communities nationally where the Children at Risk program (CAR), a unique collaboration among private foundations, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), are attempting to involve neighborhood youths in a productive and comprehensive array of services that offer attractive alternatives to substance abuse, gangs, drug dealing, and other criminal behavior. The CAR project identifies at-risk adolescents in the target areas and provides a coordinated, broad range of services for these children and their families.

Private funding for CAR includes \$2.5 million from the Ford Foundation, \$1




Photo by Anne E. Hebert, NIJ

million from the Pew Charitable Trusts, \$1.3 million from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, \$315,000 from the Prudential Foundation, \$200,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation, and \$25,000 from the Ronald McDonald Foundation. These funds have been matched by \$4.8 million in commitments from three agencies of the Justice Department's Office of Justice Programs: the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). CASA (see "The CAR Program and CASA") acts as the foundations' intermediary for the program and oversees both the operational aspects and the research and evaluation parameters of this innovative private/public partnership.

The program was initially launched in 1992 in target communities in Austin; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Memphis, Tennessee; and Seattle, Washington. Operations in Newark, New Jersey, and Savannah, Georgia, began in April 1993.

The CAR Program and CASA

The Children at Risk program (CAR) aims at diverting inner-city youngsters from involvement in drugs, gangs, and crime through an intensive program of activities, including one-on-one case management, afterschool and summer programs, individual and family counseling, community policing, tutoring, mentoring, and more. Begun in 1992 in four cities—Austin, Texas; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Memphis, Tennessee; Newark, New Jersey; Savannah, Georgia; and Seattle, Washington.

CAR represents a unique public/private partnership between agencies of the U.S. Department of Justice—specifically, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)—and private charitable foundations.

The project was designed and is being managed by the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), a national nonprofit organization founded in 1992 by Joseph A. Califano, Jr., former domestic adviser to President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the Carter Administration.

Based in New York City, the center's stated purpose is to examine the impact of substance abuse over a wide range of areas, including the Nation's work force, health care, schools, and children. CASA assembles under one roof a multidiscipline team to conduct policy research and clinical studies, and develop and manage programs such as CAR.

CASA's diverse staff includes economists, health services and policy researchers, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, an anthropologist, and persons experienced in government, the law, labor, law

enforcement, and other related disciplines. CASA teams selected the four initial CAR sites, established the framework for the program, and provided technical assistance for program implementation.

CAR components

The CAR program consists of a service intervention component that includes family intervention, tutoring, afterschool and summer activities, mentoring, and incentives for participation; and a criminal justice component that includes neighborhood-based activities designed to reduce the prevalence of drug dealing and drug use. In addition, schools, service providers, police, and other criminal justice agencies collaborate at both a policy and service delivery level to provide a coordinated array of services and support for at-risk youths.

CASA site monitors visit each of the six sites once a month, following up on various issues as they arise, arranging technical assistance as needed, overseeing expenditures, and providing support to the operating organizations. CASA maintains a link with the program sites through a sophisticated research and program management information system (MIS) that contains a broad array of information on every youth in each of the six CAR programs. Each site enters its own data and can generate reports on its own program.

Technical support

Technical assistance in the area of family counseling is provided by Dr. Karol Kumpfer of the University of Utah, an expert on family programs. She works with each of the sites in assessing local program resources and identifying specific site strategies for providing family intervention services.

Through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) provides technical assistance on community policing and the integration of law enforcement and social services. In addition, ILJ is available to conduct community training needs assessments in each city, involving police officers, case managers, and service providers.

Documentation study

The center's documentation study or process analysis is being conducted by Dr. Janice Hirota of the CASA staff. An initial report, *The Pivotal Role of Collaboration: The SIHRY Planning Grant Phase*, was completed in December 1992. Documentation products include site visit memos, which analyze site issues and contain observations on program development, and concept papers that explore major themes that arise across sites. Dr. Hirota's documentation study team is currently preparing a second paper.

Outcome evaluation

The National Institute of Justice and CASA have jointly awarded the Urban Institute a contract to conduct the outcome evaluation, with Dr. Adele Harrell as principal investigator. The evaluation will measure the program's impact on school performance, family functioning, delinquent behavior, and substance use; it will include an assessment of the effectiveness of CAR interventions with participating youngsters in comparison with other youths and their families from comparable neighborhoods in each of the four initial CAR sites. Data collection involves interviews with youths and caregivers as well as information from school and criminal justice records and CAR MIS data.

The multisite CAR project is scheduled to conclude in 1995.

Safe neighborhoods

Community policing, an integral element in the CAR safe neighborhoods strategy, includes the establishment of drug-free zones around the target schools, safe passage corridors for students to and from school, and a prominent police presence in the community. Austin's police chief, Elizabeth Watson, is a staunch proponent of community policing and, according to CAR project coordinator Lynn Walker, has been instrumental in getting the city's program off to a good start.

"Chief Watson is really big on community policing," says Walker. "She was strong on community policing in Houston and brought that philosophy with her when she came here to Austin. And when we talked to her about the CAR project she said, 'This is exactly what I want. We want the community to be empowered; we want to be able to identify what the needs of the community are and have our police go out and come up with solutions to the community's problems.'"

Sergeant Kim Nobles, who is community policing administrator for the Austin Police Department, says that the problems in 78702 will not be easily solved.

"What you have with these two schools (Kealing Junior High and Martin Junior High—the two target schools in 78702) is like the difference between night and day; they might as well be on other sides of the planet. You're looking at a predominantly Hispanic population in the Martin area and predominantly African American around Kealing. So what we've had to do, we've created *two* citizen task forces.

"The hard part is getting people to participate. We called a meeting, I think four people showed up. So

we've been going around, telling people 'let us know what you want us to work on. We need the drug-free school zones and safe passages, and beyond that we'll work on whatever you want.'"

A CAR community task force, typically, comprises the school principal, a representative group of teachers, some parents of students in the school, and some of the students, including those in the CAR program. Working with the two task forces in 78702 are two full-time neighborhood police officers, one of whom grew up in the community.

Coordinating efforts

The CAR program, as it is being applied in Austin, has two basic com-

ponents—case management and community policing. And the coordination of efforts is critical.

"I think the beauty of this project is that it focuses on the family, it's not just working on an individual," Walker says. "We focus on the family by providing comprehensive services, intervention, prevention, recreation, therapy. And the case management component interfaces with the community policing. For so long the police have performed a lot of social services; what we're doing now is bringing the two efforts together so the police are talking to the social service providers, and they can work together instead of duplicating efforts."

Working together in the Austin CAR project are city and county agencies,



In the summer of 1993, Austin's CAR program placed about 25 youngsters in the public library's summer youth program.

the school district, and community service organizations.

"We've had programs for years for young people we considered at risk," points out Jesse Flores, executive director of Austin's Youth Advocacy Program, a community service agency. "What is different now is that with CAR we have all this coordination. We can concentrate on what we do best; the parks and recreation people can provide activities, summer programs. I think this integration of services will really make a difference."

Overseeing the cooperative effort is Dennis Campa, director of Austin's Department of Youth Services, to whom Walker reports. She, in turn, supervises the five case managers who work directly with the CAR youths and their families.

"The intent, in theory and in practice, has to do with working with the client, persuading the children to participate in this program," Campa says. "I think the youngsters are responding pretty well so far. What surprised me was the willingness of the families to sign on. What we found when we began to recruit families was that because we picked at-risk youths, that their families were very receptive to the offer of assistance."

"I think many of the families were willing to sign on because they saw it as an opportunity for their child to get help, not realizing that for the child to get help, the parent would have to participate too. So our challenge now is finding more creative ways to engage those families in deeper forms of intervention for themselves, too."

Eligibility criteria

Obviously, not all youths — even from comparable environments and

economic levels — are equally at risk for addiction and problems of welfare dependence, domestic violence, and criminality. However, early experimentation with alcohol and drugs, delinquency, family histories of substance abuse or criminality, are indicators of a higher probability of risk.

Austin follows the general CAR guidelines for eligibility, requiring that youths satisfy both demographic requirements and at least one of the high-risk eligibility criteria. In Austin, the youths must reside in the 78702 ZIP Code area, be between the ages of 11 and 13 (though there are some 14-year-olds in the program), and attend either Kealing or Martin Junior High School.

The high-risk eligibility criteria are:

◆ School-based factors

Student is identified as at risk by the Austin Independent School District's guidelines.

School behavior has resulted in disciplinary action.

◆ Personal-based factors

Experimentation with alcohol or drugs.

Involvement in drug trafficking.

Referred to juvenile court.

Special education student.

Pregnant, parent, or previous pregnancies.

Abused child.

Gang involvement.

◆ Family-based factors

Family members involved in the criminal justice system.

Family history of substance abuse.

Family member is a known gang member.

History of family violence.

Putting CAR to work

CAR programs involve intensive case management, family intervention, afterschool and summer activities, mentoring, tutoring, and so on. Afterschool and weekend programs include arts and recreation activities; sessions are held involving self-esteem building activities. Youngsters receive individual psychiatric and psychological assessments and counseling on both an individual and group basis. Family counseling sessions are held as well.

In its first summer of operation, Austin's CAR program in 1993 involved its youngsters in a wide array of activities, ranging from nature hikes and canoe trips to museum visits and even work in the Austin city library.

"We discussed with the library people how we might get these youths involved," Walker says. "They're really too young to be employed, but the library was able to place about 25 of them in their summer youth program, and CAR is providing the children a \$20 weekly stipend for a 4-week program."

"The children had to go through interviews, they have to follow a strict dress code, and now they've been assigned jobs in the library. And these are kids that act up a lot. Actually, someone did light off a stink bomb during orientation, and we thought the whole thing would go right down the tubes. But we worked it out; the library still placed them, and they've done great."

"They've worked 3 days a week, Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, a

half day each. Then we bus them to parks and recreation for lunch, and then they either go on to an afternoon youth activity or to the Child Guidance Center for a therapy session.”

Monitoring the program


The CAR case managers work directly with the youths and their families, visiting them at home, driving them about, and generally ensuring that the youngsters actually take part in the various activities. Theresa Wright is currently working with 10 youngsters; her case load will increase when the next increment of youths is admitted to the CAR program.

“We do crisis intervention, family intervention. We’re advocates; I’m an advocate at school. We help the families with problems in parenting. And, of course, I help the children with social skills because that’s what a lot of them are lacking.

“I meet with my kids every day. Sometimes it’s me going after them, and sometimes they seek me out. There are some things they are going to come to me with that I probably wouldn’t have been informed about. And there are times when they need to see me, usually when they’re in trouble.

“You know, these are good kids. They haven’t reached the point of real trouble yet. But there are gangs around; we’re going to talk to them about the gangs, try to steer them away from getting involved. I think this program can work. I think it’s important for all of us to be patient. And you have to be firm, fair but firm. They expect to be corrected; they *want* to be corrected.”

Under CAR, the children in the Austin library summer youth program worked 3 mornings a week and participated in either recreation activities or therapy sessions in the afternoon.



The CAR case managers meet with Walker and representatives of child guidance every 2 weeks. Together they review school records, attendance at special activities, general behavior by the youngsters. Careful records on each youth’s attendance are kept and forwarded regularly to CASA.

Evaluating the program

Although a formal outcome evaluation will be performed (see “The CAR program and CASA”), Dennis Campa informally conducts his own ongoing evaluation of Austin’s CAR project every day.

“I think the expectations were that the city was receiving this large grant, and we were going to go in and make significant differences in large parts of

the community. In reality, this is a very targeted, focused program that deals with a limited number of children and families. So I think the expectations in our community, of the city council, were hard to meet.

“On the other hand, I think that what we have is something that is working. I’m very encouraged, very excited about the progress we’ve made starting from ground zero. I think we’ll look very different a year from now; I just have to be patient.”

Eugene E. Hebert is a senior writer/ editor at the National Institute of Justice.

Policing Distressed Public Housing Developments

This article will not focus on a specific local government or department attempting to implement community policing. According to training experience at ICMA and to ongoing research, law enforcement agencies serving metropolitan areas still are trying to find their community policing sea legs. These local governments also have public housing stock. To my knowledge, no major police department has translated the community policing concept into action departmentwide. The institutionalization of community policing still is on the horizon, and its impact on the troubled public housing community is largely unknown. Signs and observations, however, have led me to believe that when community policing is properly implemented, it is about the only solution that will work in areas of distressed public housing.

Many people associate public housing with crime, violence, and hopelessness. Visions of broken windows, graffiti, run-down apartments, rats, and roaches are burned into our subconscious. In reality, public housing of this type represents only a small fraction of the stock. For the most part, public housing residents are law-abiding, and their homes are clean, safe, and affordable. In severely distressed areas where public housing appears to fit the stereotype, however, the seeds of urban disorder (crime, violence, and substance abuse) are deeply planted in the fertile ground of social and economic neglect, despair, and spiritual deprivation.

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The Answer

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W. H. Matthews

Public Safety and Housing

Public housing residents are survivors; victims and victimizers frequently are related by family bond or statistical group. The Department of Justice's 1991 criminal victimization data highlight what residents living in high-crime neighborhoods of public housing already know. Nonwhites are likelier than whites to be victims of violent crime; persons under 25 have the highest victimization rates; and those living in households in the lowest income category are likelier to be violent crime victims than persons from households in the higher income brackets. Victimization statistics define the plight of many inner-city public housing residents. These sobering statistics provide an important backdrop for a difficult problem for policing distressed public housing—the epidemic of black-on-black homicide.

Where is severely distressed public housing to be found? According to many residents, it exists where violence rules the streets although the police do patrol. A 1992 report published by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing defines this kind of housing as dwellings in which "social, physical, and environmental conditions have deteriorated to a degree that renders the housing dangerous to the health and safety of residents." This definition also identifies fertile ground for urban civil disorder.

While there is little disagreement that since the mid-1970s, victimization rates for public housing residents living in distressed areas have increased, Public Housing Authority (PHA) budgets for resident protection have not increased significantly. A 1992 report published by the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities—*Security, Crime and Drugs in Public Housing*—indicates that of 38 large and small PHAs surveyed, security service expenditures (1975-1990) did not keep up with the crime problem.

Statistics compiled by the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities (CLPHA) for the same period indicate that the proliferation and use of drugs in the United States contributed to increases in violent and petty crime in public housing. CLPHA warns that such public housing issues as vacancies, the need for modernization, economic development, and resident empowerment can not be addressed without dealing with the drug problem. Moreover, public housing problems are no longer confined to selected inner-city developments or areas. During the last 10 years, public housing residents have begun moving from centralized developments to scattered sites and private-sector properties, commonly referred to as Section 8 housing. And to no one's surprise, housing management problems have followed them. According to FBI *Uniform Crime Reports* (1975-1990), the drugs, crime, and violence problem is no longer limited to large, inner-city urban areas. But the seeds of its destructive character have flourished for the last decade in distressed public housing environments. The greatest impact of the drug problem is felt by those least economically able to resist or recover.

For many poor urban families, public housing represents the only hope for housing of any kind. Disadvantaged by lack of education, skills, and health, the urban poor pass on public housing dependency from generation to generation. For young, single-parent families who can not find decent, safe, and affordable temporary housing (transitional housing), severely distressed public housing becomes the permanent housing of last resort. In most cases, these young residents are those with the greatest need for affordable housing and the least experience in independent living. For many reasons, including their lifestyle, the young are the most vulnerable and the most difficult to manage and pro-

vide security for. They also are the victims who will be caught up in the anger, frustration, and emotional excitement of drugs, violence, and other forms of civil disorder.

In urban communities nationwide, a growing number of civic leaders are expressing concern that illegal drugs and alcohol will directly and indirectly kill a generation of inner-city youth, especially black males. Based on crime data and on my observations of public housing in large urban centers, a significant number of inner-city youth already have been destroyed by drugs and violence. Street gangs—both celebrated and little known—consisting of misguided youth and hardened adult criminals are responsible for much of the carnage.

What Is the Appropriate Police Response?

The fact that residents now are demanding police protection is surprising, given their general history of mistrust of the police. More and more residents are complaining to elected and appointed administrators that the police are slow to respond to public housing communities with the kind of sensitive presence the environment requires. But what is the appropriate form of police protection?

On Foot or on Wheels? For many urbanites protection against street violence and drug dealers may require providing neighborhood foot patrols by police. To others, police scooter, bicycle, or automobile patrols may be enough. Some administrators of law enforcement agencies see foot patrols as an expensive, labor-intensive proposition. They worry that ever-increasing citizen calls for service will not leave their agencies with enough officers to deploy foot patrols. These administrators ask, Will community policing require the deployment of foot patrol officers?

The answer depends on the following: how well the agency's calls for service are managed; whether adequate human resources exist for the agency's current mission; the extent to which the agency is decentralized; the geographical dimensions of the communities and dwellings; the distances to be traveled; and the availability of alternative means of transit (e.g., scooters, bicycles, horses, and the like).

Strained Relationships. Thirty years of allowing the police to become isolated in patrol cars have contributed to a strained relationship between police and public housing residents. Currently, many police departments are studying the feasibility of reinvesting in foot patrols. The reinvestment in labor-intensive foot patrols or other forms of direct police-citizen contact is necessary because police officers are no longer seen by urban residents as friendly neighborhood presences and symbols of law and order. This regrettable situation has contributed to an unacceptable relationship or, in some cases, no relationship at all between the police and public housing residents.

PHAs also are suffering from a strained relationship with residents. Cuts in federal subsidies during the 1980s have forced even well-managed PHAs to choose among vital resident services. Because of complex social and order-maintenance problems associated with living in distressed public housing complexes, PHAs are forced to address a new dilemma: what should they fund first, building maintenance or order maintenance? This is not an easy choice for those living and working in housing developments.

Dangers of Police-Generated Public Order

Police and security specialists recognize the difficulties of restoring and maintaining order in and around

Community
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policing is not a
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quick result. It is
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public housing developments. They know, although they may not publicly admit, that traditional, hard-hitting police intervention in housing developments may further alienate an already estranged population. Public housing residents ask that the police clear the hallways, stairways, lobbies, and streets of open-air drug sales. The police recognize that distressed housing can be difficult to patrol, especially where high-rise buildings require vertical and horizontal patrols. When the police do respond, residents complain that they are heavy-handed, insensitive, and prone to treat the people they are protecting as criminals. But in spite of these reservations, when an incident requires medical attention, residents fearfully call the police and hope for the best.

Everyone realizes that the next unintended emotional incident between the police and residents or their guests can produce the spark that ignites a new round of civil disorder. Although local government officials and resident leaders want drugs out of public housing, everyone is concerned that stepped-up drug enforcement activities will increase evictions and accelerate homelessness and despair.

In almost every way, the living con-

ditions of public housing residents affect every citizen's quality of life. Government officials, private-sector leaders, and residents have difficult decisions to make concerning public housing. Ready or not, local law enforcement agencies are finding themselves partners in the decision-making process. Failure to take this new role seriously will mean being left with the sole responsibility of containing the fallout from resulting social and civil disorder.

Containment or Empowerment?

Community policing offers the best hope for successful order maintenance and drug enforcement in public housing. Unfortunately, community policing is often seen as something the police do. It is not. It is something the police and communities do together. The notion that community policing is "a police program" must be disregarded if it is to be effective in distressed housing developments. It is a process by which civic duties and responsibilities are shared (see Figure 1).

Unfortunately, the term "community policing" means different things to different people, so it is important to state what it is not. Community policing is not a containment strategy; it can not be used to keep problems localized to a given area. It is not an intelligence program; its primary objective should not be to cultivate informants. It is not an appeasement program; it must not be used to placate residents and public housing staff. It is not a catch-all program; the police department's Officer Friendly Program, the police girls and boys clubs, or the public relations unit should not be renamed to fit the community police banner. Community policing is not a code name for returning to the foot patrol era of the "good old days," when neighborhood foot patrol officers knew everyone, talked to everyone, and knew

Figure 1

Ten Community-Based Duties and Responsibilities for Residents, Private Institutions, PHAs, and Police

- | | |
|-----------------------|--|
| 1. CORRECT | Correct the conduct of children in public areas. |
| 2. TEACH | Teach children to respect adult authority. |
| 3. RESPECT | Respect the rights of neighbors to enjoy a peaceful environment. |
| 4. REPORT | Report crimes and other lease and rule violations. |
| 5. SUPERVISE | Supervise children's and teenagers' recreational activities. |
| 6. ENCOURAGE | Encourage youth to respect the rights of others. |
| 7. DISCIPLINE | Discipline those who damage public and private property. |
| 8. PARTICIPATE | Participate in neighborhood activities that strengthen and reinforce community values. |
| 9. ARREST | Arrest and remove signs of community decay and dysfunction. |
| 10. MOBILIZE | Mobilize, recognize, and reward community revitalization efforts. |

everyone's personal and political business. To blacks and other minorities, the phrase "good old days" brings back memories of police brutality and other forms of violence directed against them.

Community policing is a philosophy of service delivery that, once implemented, changes the traditional role of the police in the community. It introduces officers as change agents and as facilitators of social service programs. It is the ideal embodiment of urban policing. It broadens the police function to include conflict resolution, problem solving, and social service referral.

The policing philosophy is at its best when it becomes a conceptual framework for reducing the fear of crime. Studies conducted by the National Institute of Justice indicate that fear of crime more closely correlates with disorder than with crime itself. In other words, fear destroys the community's immune system, ren-

dering the whole body helpless, dysfunctional, and prone to many disorders. Fear has a life of its own, apart from that of any casual event. Community policing fortifies the community's immune system by involving the public in its own defense. Everyone is involved, and everyone is responsible for the outcome.

From Concept to Strategy

Police departments should guard against initiating traditional police sweeps in distressed public housing developments under the guise of community policing. Although community policing can provide the foundation for police drug enforcement strategies, it should not be used as a police tactic. Community policing can not be accomplished by the police alone. Police sweeps are most effective after community policing strategies have been initiated.

There are those who contend that

community policing can not be effective unless drug dealers, their supporters, and the homeless are first swept from the neighborhood, thereby giving economic revitalization efforts an opportunity to take hold. Unfortunately, "weed and seed" procedures often are not followed up with treatment and community revitalization programs. Drug enforcement and drug treatment programs or referrals must be vital components of any successful community policing effort in public housing. Too often, this strategy is long on weed and short on seed. Unlike weeds, human beings can not be left out on neighborhood lawns waiting for the next trash pickup.

Stand-alone police sweep tactics leave the police susceptible to criticism and to possible conflicts with public housing residents, guests, and transients. Even if a police-sweep, show-of-force tactic does not produce an immediate, tumultuous outburst of mistrust, anger, or violence, its success will be a short-term one at best. In the final analysis, moving the problem from one building or street corner to another is easier to accomplish than developing an infrastructure that will "take back" the community and defend it against further attacks.

The Advocacy Dilemma

As stated earlier, severely distressed public housing developments usually are located in isolated and economically depressed neighborhoods. Often, the surrounding community is deteriorating faster than the public housing itself. Because of blight and the fear of crime, social and maintenance workers are reluctant to provide services to these areas. Community revitalization dollars are hard to come by. The poor physical conditions of the developments place an enormous financial burden on PHAs that try to provide maintenance, security and, in some cases, police

services.

Although crime and violence are important to residents, their number-one concern is their physical living environment. The first big test of community policing will be the department's ability to orchestrate basic repairs and maintenance within the development. Residents will test the power of the police to make a difference. The police must pass this test before residents will be willing to support and assist them in their efforts to eliminate drug abuse and trafficking. Elected and appointed administrators must clearly understand what is expected of police officers with community policing assignments and how police empowerment will affect services provided by other municipal agencies.

If the police department commits to the community policing concept, the chief should assign the most ex-

perienced and charismatic officers to distressed public housing developments. The chief must blend the department's traditional and legal authority with the charismatic authority of officers permanently assigned to public housing developments. To accomplish this, the department should consider decentralizing decision-making authority.

Sooner or later, a police department—especially a housing authority police force—committed to community policing initiatives sets the stage for conflict with the PHA. The conflict usually centers on maintenance and repair issues or such turf issues as who should enforce conduct provisions of the lease. The police may find it easier to deal with traditional municipal agencies than to influence an independent housing authority with preset funding priorities. If the police force falls under the authority

of the PHA, internal conflicts over resources, priorities, and authority may occur.

For these and other reasons, it is critical that the police department discuss "rights of passage" (limits of authority) with the housing authority before attempting to implement community-oriented policing. The PHA's plans to rehabilitate the development must be known to the law enforcement agency before community policing efforts are undertaken. For their part, law enforcement administrators must never forget that PHAs with severely distressed properties are under tremendous political pressure and want quick programmatic results.

Community policing is not a quick result. It is an empowerment process. Agencies that force quick results are doomed to regress instead of progress. For example, a large east-

ern PHA recently installed an obtrusive, automated security assess system in four high-rise developments. The PHA targeted the most crime-ridden and violent of the four to receive the system first. The system is designed to make it more difficult for drug dealers to use the high-rise building for drug trafficking. The system also provides physical obstructions that increase the risk of trespassers' getting caught. It incorporates electric locks, computerized turnstiles, electronic identification cards, closed-circuit television, security guards, alarms, and housing police patrols.

Before the system's installation, the PHA organized and deployed a community policing action team that consisted of community service officers of the housing police, social workers, drug education specialists, and resident organizers. The action team was deployed in force at the target development, with the objective of galvanizing community support for "taking back" the development. The action team worked with the community for six months before massive police intervention (police sweeps and drug raids) took place and the new security access system was introduced.

As a result of the team's work, the community supported a massive police presence, even during the heightened tensions of the Rodney King disturbance in Los Angeles. In December 1992, the community also supported, with minor reservations, this obtrusive security access system. The high-rise development now enjoys the lowest crime rate of any inner-city community in the city and continues to improve monthly. In developments where community policing was not used to prepare the community before such a system was installed, residents rejected the system in spite of their concerns about crime and violence. Thus, community policing is not a program; it is the proper way to implement a program.

Working with Resident Leaders

A rewarding and challenging aspect of community policing in distressed public housing developments is working with resident leaders. This interaction provides an opportunity to identify and resolve the long-standing misconceptions and mistrust that exist between the police and residents. Resident leaders are political survivors who know how to function in a hostile environment. They have the political savvy that allows them to operate in the tough streets and hallways of their developments at night and to negotiate the corridors of power with their local housing authorities by day. Residents take advantage of every opportunity to denounce their living conditions publicly. They know that the disenfranchised often are not heard.

Jacqueline Massey, president of the Valley Green Resident Council, Washington, D.C., puts it this way: "... People don't even listen to people in public housing when they cry out. We have a community with service providers that don't even listen to us. They give us our needs according to the way they have been trained, not the way we ask or we present ourselves...."

It is difficult for police administra-

tors and line officers to evaluate community policing objectively when residents publicly express the anger and frustration they feel when confronting "the system." In fact, the police are frustrated too. Many dedicated officers work hard to correct a problem, risk their lives, and then are told, "It's still not enough." Although frustration runs high on both sides, it is critical for public administrators to keep one rule in mind. Any attempt to implement community policing without community-oriented government will likely spell disaster for everyone. Community policing can not be used as a public relations tool.

Community policing facilitates constructive communication between interested persons and groups, but it can not be used to orchestrate it. Advocacy, referral, information, consultation, responsiveness, and protection must be the new brick and mortar for rebuilding public housing. **□**

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Perspectives on Policing



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Community Policing and the Police Officer

By Edwin Meese III

Alvin Toffler, the author of *Future Shock*, and Heidi Toffler have stated that "... almost all the major systems on which our society depends ... are in simultaneous crisis" and the "failure to prepare in advance for the turbulent [nineties] could produce a grave breakdown in public security."¹ For almost a decade, many farsighted law enforcement executives and public safety scholars have been responding to this challenge in what has been described as "a quiet revolution" that is reshaping American policing.²

Under a variety of names—strategic policing, problem-solving policing, neighborhood-oriented policing, community policing, and others—police agencies are developing new concepts to better satisfy the demands and needs of the citizens they serve. In the course of the self-examination and creative thinking that are taking place, fundamental questions have been raised about the basic purpose and responsibilities of the police, the capabilities they possess, the types of contributions they can make to society, the optimum methods of their organization and deployment, and the relationship that they have with the communities that employ them. In contrast to a philosophy of "business as usual," police executives sense the need to "redeploy the money and authority entrusted to them in hopes that their organizations will produce greater value for society."³

Much has been written about the potential effects of these innovative changes in policing on community involvement, city government, and the police department itself.⁴ This paper examines the impact of creative forms of policing on the ultimate key to their success—the individual police officer.

As the emphasis and methods of policing change, the position of the police officer in the organization changes also. Instead of reacting to specified situations, limited by rigid guidelines and regulations, the officer becomes a thinking professional, utilizing imagination and creativity to identify and solve problems. Instead of being locked in an organizational straitjacket, the police officer is encouraged to develop cooperative relationships in the community, guided by values and purposes, rather

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

We hope that these publications will challenge police executives and local officials to reexamine their approach to law enforcement, just as those who participated in the Executive Session have done.

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than constrained by rules and excessive supervision. To make this possible, much thought must be given to designing the structure of police organizations and to recruiting, selecting, training, and supporting officers in the field. Changes must be made in all of these areas to create a new police professionalism.

New strategies require new roles

This new philosophy of police work has been called "community policing," a term intended here to include problem-solving techniques, strategic utilization of resources, and increasingly sophisticated investigative capabilities. But these attributes must be understood in the context of a different view of the status and role of community institutions in guiding and assisting police operations. As Moore and Trojanowicz note, "In community policing, community institutions such as families, schools, neighborhood associations, and merchant groups are seen as key partners to the police in the creation of safe, secure communities. The success of the police depends not only on the development of their own skills and capabilities, but also on the creation of competent communities. Community policing acknowledges that police cannot succeed in achieving their basic goals without both the operational assistance and political support of the community. Conversely, the community cannot succeed in constructing decent, open, and orderly communities without a professional and responsive police force."⁵

The police, then, must be more than a reactive force that responds to crimes already committed. They must develop into a proactive entity that deals with a broad variety of conditions that tend to disrupt the community peace or adversely affect the quality of life.

This description of the police task and the citizen relationships that are required to fulfill it is different from the popular concept of a crimefighter in blue, whose position is reminiscent of the pistol-toting marshal of the Old West. Indeed, the success of new policing strategies depends on the ability of a police agency to recruit, develop, and field a group of officers who not only understand their role as highly visible representatives of governmental authority, but also recognize that their responsibility for community service and peacekeeping is of equal importance to law enforcement and crime suppression. These requirements give new meaning to the notion of a professional police officer in the modern era.

The conflicts that some perceive in the various roles of peacekeeping, community service, and crime fighting are not a new problem. A report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, published in 1970, states, "Perhaps the most important source of police frustration . . . is the conflicting roles and demands involved in the order-maintenance, community service and crime-fighting responsibilities of the police."⁶ Too often officers feel that their efforts are not appreciated or deemed important by either their supervisors or the public.⁷ One police executive has even suggested that the police function should be divided into two separate agencies under one department: one agency for law enforcement, the other for community service.⁸

A more sophisticated view of the police function, which is inherent in the concept of community policing, is that community service, peacekeeping, and crime fighting are complementary, not conflicting, activities. Historically, the "patrolman on the beat," maintaining order and communicating with the citizenry, was carrying out a major police priority.⁹ In addition, the information obtained through expanded direct contact with citizens, generally on a routine and informal basis, helps to solve crimes and apprehend offenders.¹⁰

As one police department notes, neighborhood disorder and crime are viewed more and more as slightly different aspects of the same problem. When police officers deal with the symbols of urban decay—abandoned buildings, accumulated rubbish, panhandlers roaming the streets—they mitigate the conditions under which crime and disorder flourish. The result is lessened fear of crime and greater satisfaction with the police among members of the community.¹¹ The attention of the police to such matters, combined with increased communication between officers and the public, can stimulate community pride and provide the basis for police-citizen cooperation in building safer neighborhoods and an improved quality of life.

A new professionalism

The changed strategy of policing alters in important ways the content of the police officer's job. Police responsibilities expand beyond attempting to control criminal activity—to preventing crime, promoting order, resolving disputes, and providing emergency assistance in social crises. The officer's methods and resources extend beyond arrests and citations. They now include mediation and negotiation, referrals to other municipal agencies, and community mobilization. As police activity focuses on the neighborhood, the demands on the basic police officer increase, as do the scope of responsibility and the skills required.

More fundamental than the change in skills, however, is the change in the basic position of the police officer. Instead of primarily reacting to incidents, the officer analyzes, plans, and takes the initiative. Instead of constantly looking up the bureaucratic chain of command for guidance and assistance, the community police officer looks out toward the problems to be solved, and toward the community's interests in helping to solve them. In community policing, the de facto discretion that always existed (and that often was used well by police officers) is recognized and developed, rather than limited or discouraged.

In both the complexity of the skills and the initiative required of the officers lies a new vision of police professionalism. James Q. Wilson has stated that the characteristics of a professional include the exercise of "wide discretion alone and with respect to matters of the greatest importance" and that this is based on a status "conferred by an organized profession" that "certifies that the member has acquired by education certain information and by apprenticeship certain arts and skills that render him competent" to "handle emergency situations, to be privy to 'guilty information,' and to make decisions involving questions of life and death or honor and dishonor." He goes on to say that a professional "is willing to subject himself to the code of ethics and sense of duty of his colleagues."¹²

Professionalism has been the goal of modern policing for several decades and is indeed a worthy objective. Police have pursued it by trying to develop their technical skills through discipline, training, and apprenticeship,¹³ and by the use of increasingly sophisticated methods and equipment. While that is an important part of professionalism, it is only a part.

Another aspect of professionalism, which requires extensive development if community policing is to be successful, focuses on the values that the profession must adopt, the position of the officer in the organization and the community, and the manner in which the police are held accountable for their professional performance. It is a matter of both self-image and community perception. The commitment to constitutional and legal values, to mutual respect, and to service to the community, combined with self-reliance and self-motivation, are the hallmarks of the new police professional.

The military model and professionalism

Ironically, one of the principal factors preventing the development of a strong sense of professionalism among police officers—not only in their own eyes, but in the eyes of the public—may be the military form of organization that the police have adopted from their earliest days.¹⁴ The military system, with its rigid organizational structure and authoritarian management style, increasingly has been called into question as a proper model for modern policing.¹⁵

In some respects, the military form has served the police well, at least for traditional policing. It has created a structure of discipline within which ordinary people, hired for an exacting job, can be trained, equipped, and motivated to function effectively. It has provided a means of controlling the behavior of “working-level” employees. It has been useful for coordinating large numbers of officers in operations such as crowd control, riot suppression, and investigative searches. And it has enhanced the stature of police as a whole by presenting an attractive image of discipline, skill, and service.

Yet, it has not often been acknowledged that the military model, as it traditionally has been applied by police organizations, inadvertently downgrades the position of the primary figure in police service: the individual officer. Too often the basic police officer is viewed as comparable to a private in the army, the lowest ranking military person, who has virtually no individual authority. Such a perception is understandable when several police officers report to a sergeant who, in turn, reports to a lieutenant, and so on up the chain of command. Sometimes police officers are described as constituting a “squad,” again a reference to those holding the lowest military rank. In some departments the rank of corporal further reinforces the enlisted person versus commissioned officer stereotype. It is little wonder, then, that those holding the rank of police officer often are regarded as something less than professionals and that they are denied individual authority, the presumption of expertise, and the discretion that normally would accompany professional status.

Nevertheless, there are ways in which certain constructive aspects of the military style could be retained, while still affording

the basic police officer the professional standing that modern policing strategies require. Rather than being considered as the equivalent of an army private, the police officer should be given the distinction of an aviator in the military services. Aircraft pilots initially are appointed as lieutenants in the Air Force or ensigns in the Navy,¹⁶ not because of the number of personnel reporting to them (which is usually small or nonexistent), but because of the great responsibility entrusted to them when they are given charge of an expensive and potentially dangerous aircraft. Just as military pilots must exercise considerable judgment on their own and accept that their individual actions may have grave consequences, so police officers on the street should be considered the equivalent of commissioned officers, with concomitant respect, authority, and discretion.

This change in the perception of a police officer—on his or her own part and on the part of police superiors and the public—may be a difficult task in most places, but it is crucial to properly defining the individual officer’s role in community policing. Several Federal law enforcement agencies already have moved away from the military model in their organization and rank structure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Secret Service classify their basic officers as special agents, a term used for all nonsupervisory positions from entry level through veteran members. All required to be college graduates, special agents are regarded as, and expected to perform as, professionals.

Reducing hierarchy and enriching skills

Organizations of professionals are distinguished by extensive and continuing professional training, by shared understanding of and commitment to the values of the profession, by extensive lateral communication, and—perhaps most important—by the absence of elaborate and complex hierarchies. Organizational structures are relatively flat, but often deep and differentiated in types and levels of skills. How to create such arrangements for policing has been the subject of attention for many years. In 1967, for example, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended changes in personnel practices that would improve the quality and professionalism of the police service.

One such proposal, designed to “attract better personnel, to utilize them more effectively in controlling crime, and to gain greater understanding of community problems,” suggested that police candidates enter departments at three levels of qualification, competence, responsibility, and pay: community service officer, police officer, and police agent. The community service officer would be essentially an apprentice working on the street under close supervision, unarmed and without full law enforcement authority. The police officer would carry out regular police functions, such as response to calls for service, routine patrol, traffic enforcement, and accident investigation. The police agent would handle the basic police tasks that are the most complicated, sensitive, and demanding. Under this scheme, an individual could enter the police department at any one of the three levels, depending upon prior education and experience, and could advance through the various levels and attain the position of police agent without having to compete for

the limited number of supervisory positions available in a traditional hierarchy.¹⁷ Thus, an officer who was good at street policing or investigation could continue performing those types of duties throughout his or her career without having to become an administrator.

Although various aspects of the Commission's recommendations were tried by a number of departments throughout the Nation, the proposal never caught on, and very few police agencies utilize either the concept or the nomenclature today. One defect of the proposal, particularly in the context of the community policing philosophy, is the creation of a structure that relegates community service to the lowest level of the pyramid.

One way to eliminate the view of the police officer as a nonprofessional army private is to revise the police rank system, utilizing nonmilitary titles for some or all personnel grades. Such a revolutionary change may be difficult to achieve, since law enforcement agencies typically are resistant to major change and may be more comfortable with the rank nomenclature that traditionally has been used.¹⁸ Nevertheless, such a change in titles could be used skillfully by enterprising departments as part of their implementation of new policing strategies.

A more limited change in the grade structure would be to substitute another title for the rank of sergeant, to eliminate the non-commissioned officer connotation. Terms such as supervising police officer, master police officer, or inspector (a title historically used in many parts of the country to depict a rank just below lieutenant)¹⁹ could be used for the first level of supervision. This would retain the existing management position while encouraging the view of the basic police officer as a professional.

One major problem of current rank systems is that promotional opportunities and the accompanying financial reward and rise in professional stature are relatively few. They could become even fewer if police organizational structures are simplified as suggested below. It is desirable, therefore, to expand the array of nonsupervisory positions to make a graduated series of opportunities available to most career police officers. The Los Angeles Police Department has done this by creating four grades of police officer and three grades of detective. An officer in that department can earn more than \$50,000 per year without having to attain an administrative position.²⁰ A system that provides sufficient incentives for the successful police officer throughout a career of basic police work properly recognizes the professional status of the person who is on the street and in the neighborhood, working directly with the public.

Organizing for empowerment

Changing titles and rank structure, however, is not enough to elevate the professional standing of the basic police officer. Police organizational structures should be revised to decrease the number of levels of authority, particularly at the bottom of the hierarchy. Community policing envisions the empowerment of officers to take independent action to solve problems, work with community leaders, and improve the social environment of the neighborhoods they serve. Such a vision, however, is a far cry from the experience of most officers today. The average

police officer spends an 8- or 10-hour tour of duty sitting in a police car, responding to calls when directed by a dispatcher, and complying with the rigid structure of detailed rules and regulations that will keep the officer from being criticized or penalized by superiors.

As Herman Goldstein notes, "The dominant form of policing today continues to view police officers as automatons. Despite an awareness that they exercise broad discretion, they are held to strict account in their daily work—for what they do and how they do it . . . Especially in procedural matters, they are required to adhere to detailed regulations. In large police agencies, rank-and-file police officers are often treated impersonally and kept in the dark regarding policy matters. Officers quickly learn, under these conditions, that the rewards go to those who conform to expectations—that nonthinking compliance is valued."²¹

These rigid prescriptions for police conduct and limitations on creativity are caused by the desire of both supervisors and command officers to avoid wrongdoing by police officers and to ensure that the activities of subordinates will not result in criticism of or embarrassment to their superiors. Obviously, the successful implementation of community policing requires a major change in attitudes and methods of supervision by managers. The new philosophy requires that officers perform their responsibilities on the basis of shared values and personal commitment to professionalism, rather than by constant supervision and limitations on their authority.

As more discretion and decisionmaking authority are shifted to individual officers, many police executives recognize that the rigid, hierarchical model of organization is obsolete. New structural arrangements, emphasizing streamlined administration and fewer layers of management, are being employed. This has facilitated rapid decisionmaking, more relevant policy guidance, and overall improvement in communication among all ranks.

Community policing has a variety of organizational styles in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. They range from home-beat officers in outlying areas of London, to basic car units in Los Angeles, to crime control teams composed of both patrol officers and detectives, to officers patrolling in pairs on fixed neighborhood beats, as well as numerous other structural combinations. An important ingredient of all organizational patterns, however, is the decentralization of authority to the lowest operational level—to the officers in direct contact with citizens and the community. No longer is the individual police officer merely a report taker who must pass along information about a problem to superiors, who then make the decisions and take the actions for solving the problem. Instead, the patrol officer becomes a decisionmaker, solving the problem if possible or at least participating in decisions about the ultimate response.

In England, for example, the chief superintendent commanding a division in London (an organizational element roughly equivalent to a precinct in a U.S. police department) divided the area of his command into four quarters. He then placed an inspector (the equivalent of a U.S. police lieutenant) in charge of each quadrant. He gave that middle management officer full authority to act as a minichief in implementing community

policing. Specifically, the local inspector was given great flexibility in deploying the sergeants and constables assigned to that area in order to meet the particular needs of the community.²²

The purpose of changes in the management structure is to create a supportive organizational environment for community policing and to revise the relationship between police leaders and rank-and-file officers. One caveat should be mentioned: new organizational changes imposed by police executives often look good on paper, but the test must be whether they do in fact improve communication and expedite action. For this reason, it is important that feedback be obtained from line officers at each stage of implementation, to determine whether the new structure is providing the intended benefits. Tables of organization and channels of communication should be regarded as provisional, not immutable, until they have been proved in practice. Even then, changes in conditions may require further changes in organizational arrangements.

Whatever the organizational model, it must facilitate maximum participation by the line officer who is in direct contact with citizens of the community. As Herman Goldstein has written, by "making it legitimate for rank-and-file officers to think and be creative in their daily work . . . the potential benefits are of two kinds. The most important is the improvement that this could produce in the quality of the responses that the police make to oft-recurring community problems. In addition, such a change would be directly responsive to some critical needs in the police organization—the need to treat rank-and-file police officers as mature men and women; to demonstrate more trust and confidence in them; to give them more responsibility and a stake in the outcome of their efforts; and to give them a greater sense of fulfillment and job satisfaction."²³

Selecting and developing the new professionals

Changes in titles and organization can provide the conditions for improved professionalism, but only human beings can fulfill the potential of the new strategies for police work. Community policing is said to rest "on the belief that no technology can surpass what creative human beings can achieve together." Police departments must deploy the most innovative, self-disciplined, and self-motivated officers directly into the community as outreach specialists and community problem solvers.²⁴ Furthermore, commanders and supervisors will be supportive of the new philosophy and the accompanying modifications of managerial style only if, in the long run, the people under their supervision justify the increased freedom and greater discretion that are inherent in successful community policing. It must be remembered that the individuals who work most directly with the public and who are perceived as the primary representatives of the police department are patrol officers who occupy the lower ranks in the police agency and who will probably serve out their careers in those positions.²⁵

Considerable attention must be given, therefore, to the type of individual who is encouraged to join a police department that emphasizes community policing. Qualities that traditionally have been associated with the higher ranks, such as leadership,

communication skills, and the ability to persuade and motivate others, must now be required of all officers. Recruiters must look for self-starters who possess initiative and imagination, rather than "plodders" who will unquestioningly follow directions and will be comfortable merely by complying with explicit regulations. Indeed, as one of America's foremost law enforcement leaders has stated, "the officer in a modern department today must possess many skills, including those of information processor, community organizer, crime analyst, counsellor, street corner politician, arresting officer, school liaison, and community leader."²⁶

Is college necessary?

An immediate question arises about the selection of the "new" police officer: should a college education be required? This has been a subject of great debate over the years, with advocates on both sides of the question. An argument for college-educated officers is that the department would be composed of people from the general population "who have certain qualities (motivation, self-discipline, general intelligence) that are probably quite useful in a police career and, second, it inculcates certain characteristics (civility, urbanity, self-control) that might be especially desired in an officer."²⁷

On the other hand, it also has been argued that college-educated people may not understand the problems and attitudes of lower- and working-class persons with whom police officers must deal; that a police career often is unattractive for the college graduate because it is "routine, sometimes dull, frequently unpleasant, and occasionally dangerous"; and that advanced education may produce a higher level of cynicism than would be present among those with less schooling.²⁸

Another concern is that the requirement of a college degree might decrease the number of minority citizens available for recruitment into police work. This is a matter of great concern to many city governments that are seeking to have the police department reflect the demographic composition of the citizenry.

Most recent studies and commentators, however, have concluded that a college education is necessary, or at least desirable, in contemporary policing. One factor has been a change in society itself. As more of the general public has attended higher education institutions, and as the educational level of the community at large has increased, it is necessary that the educational level of the police also be raised.²⁹ In addition, a college-educated police force makes a difference in the agency itself. As Patrick Murphy has stated, "In general, a police department that has had a four-year college degree as an entry requirement for ten years or more can be quite a different organization from one requiring only a high school diploma. More responsibility can be placed on the officers, and a more collegial style of management can be utilized. The college-educated force sets higher professional standards and goals, which in turn, command public respect and help shape public opinion. Finally, a college-educated police force has the potential to proactively, rather than just reactively, address the crime and drug problems that plague society today."³⁰

It is notable that the educational level of police officers has risen considerably during the past 20 years. In 1967, the average educational level for police was 12.4 years, just beyond a high school diploma. The most recent survey indicated that the current average educational level among law enforcement officers was 13.6 years, more than halfway through the second year of college. The study found that 65.2 percent of officers in the responding agencies had one or more years of college, 22.6 percent had earned at least a baccalaureate degree, and 3.7 percent had a graduate degree.³¹

There are various approaches to achieving a college-educated police department, several of which address the matter of attracting minority applicants. Many police executives do not believe that lack of a college degree should absolutely disqualify an individual from entering a department, if the person is willing to seek higher education during his or her career. Many departments help the individual attend college, some by arranging work schedules to permit class attendance, others by providing financial support. One department, for instance, pays half the college tuition of any officer working toward a bachelor's degree. Another pays all the costs of books and tuition for its officers. Some departments require 1 or 2 years of college as an entry requirement, while many provide premium pay for those who have attained a bachelor's or master's degree.³²

Another approach that has been suggested is to use Federal funds already available:

The U.S. Department of Education now distributes a large amount of public funds in grants and loans for higher education, most of which require no obligation of public service. A portion of these grants and loans should be allocated to young men and women willing to enter the police service, or to those already serving in police departments, who seek higher education. Loan funds could be disbursed with the understanding that repayment would be forgiven if the individual serves two years in the police service for each year of college education. Grants and loans should also be available for veteran officers to pursue advanced degrees, with a requirement of three additional years of service for each year of graduate education.³³

A variation of this idea is the creation of a Police Corps, which already has been proposed through legislation introduced in Congress. Like the military Reserve Officer Training Corps, the Police Corps would provide educational funding for college students, provided they serve a period of several years in a police agency after graduation. Also, these types of programs that provide higher education benefits for both preservice and inservice police officers could increase the opportunities for minority citizens to attend college and thus expand the pool of qualified applicants for police service.

While the specific selection criteria, types of individuals recruited, and educational background required may vary from department to department, it is clear that "if the new mode of policing is to realize its full potential in crime control and com-

munity service, police departments must attract highly educated persons with broad life experience and an expanded perspective on their position of public service."³⁴

Expanded training programs

If the concept of community policing is to be the guiding strategy for a police department, it must be reflected not only in recruiting, but throughout the training programs as well. This includes both the basic training for new recruits, who presumably have been selected for their potential capabilities to carry out community policing, as well as veterans of the department who essentially have to be retrained in the new philosophy and practices. The revisions that must be made in the curriculum of traditional police academies reflect the range of changes that must be made in the department as a whole. It usually will involve expanding the entire program, lengthening the number of weeks of recruit training, and adding additional periods of inservice training for veteran officers.

Most important is the approach or "tone" inherent in the revised training. Community policing cannot be imposed from "on high," but must become a part of the culture of the department, and thus be reflected in significant attitude changes. As one law enforcement agency phrased it, such attitude changes cannot be mandated through policy, but must come about "through a long series of environmental changes that foster behavior modification which consequently alters attitudes."³⁵ Officers must understand that community policing helps them to be more effective, that it gives them a greater participation in fashioning their own work environment, and that they, as well as the community, will benefit from the new policing strategy.

The content of training programs must provide recruits with an ample understanding of police tasks. It should provide information on the history of law enforcement, the role of police in modern society, and the need for discretion in law enforcement. Rather than preparing officers to perform police work mechanically, it should help them to understand their communities, the police role, and even the imperfections of the criminal justice system.³⁶ In addition, the following specific skills—which have not necessarily been a part of traditional police training curriculums—must be taught:

- (1) Communications skills: the ability to talk effectively with all types of citizens, from community leaders to ordinary residents, as well as the ability to listen and learn effectively.
- (2) Public speaking: the ability to articulate ideas and motivate others, as well as the art of leading meetings in ways to draw out the thoughts and ideas of the participants.
- (3) Problem-solving techniques: how to identify and analyze problems, as well as how to develop effective responses and solutions.
- (4) Conflict resolution and negotiating: how to help citizens resolve disputes within the community, rather than resorting to violence or "self-help," or engaging formal legal mechanisms.

In addition, two bases of knowledge about the community should be taught:

- (1) Social, economic, and demographic conditions of the community.
- (2) Supporting agencies in the community: the existence of city departments, social agencies, and other resources that can be used for referral of citizens and support for officers in their work.

Two other specialized skills should be included in the training curriculum. One is the ability to type, since more and more police work will involve the use of computer keyboards, whether on mobile digital terminals in police cars or laptop computers. Being able to type quickly and accurately will save a great deal of time during an officer's career. The other specialized skill, which would be adapted to particular community conditions, is language capability. The ability of an officer to converse, or at least understand, the languages spoken in his or her patrol area is not only a valuable attribute but may be necessary for the officer's safety.

Field training, under the specific leadership of qualified field training officers (FTO's), has become a regular part of most recruit training programs. A variation of the traditional training sequence, in which recruits complete the academy phase and then go on the street for training under FTO's, might better relate the two types of training, however. For example, the initial training of the recruits should be in the academy, where they would learn the history and role of policing, as well as specific skills and techniques, such as use of firearms, laws of arrest, police procedures, defensive combat, and others. Then officers might go on the street for field training for several weeks, where they would observe conditions in the community. They could then return to the academy for more advanced training in communication skills, community conditions, techniques of community policing, and other subjects related to their work as members of a community policing team. The street experience between the phases of academy training will make them more knowledgeable about the community they will serve and thus more receptive to learning the police role in dealing with neighborhood problems.

Training in the concepts of community policing is as important for those already in police service as it is for recruits. The way in which new ideas are presented is critical, since the revised strategies that are relevant to problem solving and community orientation will require many officers to change the manner in which they perform their duties. Again, the emphasis on benefit to the officer and increased participation in decisionmaking should be stressed. The formal training in community policing, particularly in the subjects described above, should be continually reinforced by informal discussions at all levels of command. Two-way communication and the opportunity for effective dialog is a vital part of a truly professional organization.

Quality supervision

The most careful recruiting and selection, accompanied by an enlightened and motivating training program, nevertheless can

be nullified by poor supervision on the street. If the new officers find that the values they were taught in the police academy are not respected by their superiors under actual working conditions, or that their own participation is reduced to mindlessly obeying orders and regulations, the idealism and initiative fostered during the training period will be neutralized, if not destroyed. The climate of the officer's working environment is established to a great extent by the immediate supervisor. As Goldstein has stated, "However strongly the head of an agency may elicit a different style of policing, the quality of an officer's daily life is heavily dependent on how well the officer satisfies the expectations and demands of his or her immediate supervisor."³⁷

Changing the supervisory style to reflect the values and techniques of community policing is therefore of critical importance. Supervisors must demonstrate that the objectives and expectations developed in the police academy are carried out in practice. The emphasis on relating to the community, on problem solving, and on the use of creativity and imagination must be fostered by the daily contact that an officer has with the supervisor. Leaders on the street must learn to develop the talents and capabilities of each of their subordinates to the maximum, and must provide guidance rather than simply issuing orders. Since the individual officer has more discretion and is being urged to utilize his or her own skills and judgment to a greater extent, the supervisor's function as a coach and role model becomes even more significant. The new requirement includes being a facilitator, to increase the effectiveness of those who serve under his or her leadership.

Teamwork, flexibility, mutual participation in decisionmaking, and citizen satisfaction are concepts that initially may threaten the supervisor who is more comfortable with the authoritarian role and routinized operations inherent in traditional policing. Thus, the education of supervisors in new styles of leadership and management must be given a high priority if they are to carry out their responsibility for the success of community policing.

This establishment of a new philosophy must go beyond management training. Commanders and supervisors must not only be knowledgeable, but must be committed to the new form of leadership. The values that underlie the culture of the department must be modified and reflected in appropriate statements of policy by the departmental command group. Furthermore, rules and regulations must be streamlined and, generally, reduced in number, so that the flexibility needed by both supervisors and line officers will be possible. Just as the new policing style requires more communication and guidance between supervisor and officer, it also requires continuous dialog and sharing of information between the police chief and command officers and those involved in direct supervision. It is unlikely that improved communication will occur between police officers and citizens if effective communication within the police department has not been established first.

Maximized participation in decisionmaking

Since the 1970's, police executives have been following the example of private sector business and industrial firms in devel-

directly proportional to the followup work of the FSU. To perform several of these field support functions, the Los Angeles Police Department has established a community relations officer/crime prevention unit, under a sergeant, in each area's headquarters.⁴¹

Another type of specialized support needed by the community policing officer involves crime analysis and information about ongoing criminal activities in his or her territory. To fill this need, the London Metropolitan Police have established a Division Intelligence and Information Unit (DIU) in each precinct-level command. Composed of detectives and support personnel, the DIU collects, analyzes, and disseminates to local police officers information about criminals and crimes located within their area. This information can be used not only to apprehend specific offenders, but also to develop crime prevention strategies.

Information support for the officer in the community must go beyond crime analyses. The full resources of the police agency's records and identification facilities must be available quickly and conveniently. Computer equipment in the field, such as mobile digital terminals in patrol cars and laptop units equipped with telephone connections, can save valuable time in preparing reports and can provide immediate access to essential data. In addition, officers should receive timely information on municipal government actions (such as ordinance or regulation changes affecting neighborhood residents and businesses), as well as facts about public and private health, welfare, and education resources that might be used for referral or assistance.

Relationships within the police department

An important part of the community policing officer's success and personal satisfaction is the relationship that he or she has with the rest of the police department. Particularly important is the working relationship between patrol officers and detectives. The functions of report taking, information collecting, crime investigation, and apprehending criminals become more integrated under community policing, and the distinction between patrol and detective operations should diminish considerably. In some agencies, detectives are part of the neighborhood crime control teams.

The officer in the community is able to obtain valuable information, both from citizen input and his or her own observations, about crime conditions, particular offenses, and criminal suspects. The officer can use neighborhood-based information for followup investigations within the local community, including the arrest of perpetrators found there. Information also can be passed on to detectives investigating crimes over a broader geographical area. When an officer's information has assisted in the identification and apprehension of a suspect and in a conviction, feedback should be given to the patrol officer to validate the value of those efforts and to motivate the officer to continue to provide such information. Similarly, by continual communication with street officers, detectives can alert them to crimes committed, information needed, and suspects to be sought.

Through this exchange of information, the solution to many crimes and the arrest of criminals increasingly can be accom-

plished by officers working in neighborhoods. Centralized detective activities then can focus more on problem solving—identifying the nature of criminal activity in the community and designing crime reduction strategies that will affect different types of crimes.

The police officer working in a particular neighborhood should be supported by other specialized elements of the police department. As conditions require, special investigative units such as narcotics, juvenile, and gang units should be available for specific crime problems. The officer should be able to call upon staff units such as criminal intelligence, crime laboratory, and records and identification for their expertise. The planning and research staff should assist the community policing effort as a whole, through citywide operational research and evaluation programs to improve the effectiveness of the agency in handling the problems of the community, as well as through assistance to individual field officers in solving specific problems in the neighborhoods they patrol.

Assistant Chief Robert Vernon, Director of Operations for the Los Angeles Police Department, has described this relationship between specialized units of a police agency and the field officers responsible for community policing in terms of a medical model: the patrol officer in a specific neighborhood or beat area is like a general practitioner physician who has the principal interface with the individual citizen. Surrounding and supporting the police general practitioner is a series of specialists—detectives, juvenile investigators, narcotics officers, headquarters staff units, and others—who are available for consultation or referral of the case.⁴²

Quality assurance

Under the traditional style of policing, with a quasi-military environment and rigid sets of rules and regulations, inspection and control are relatively easy functions to perform. Regular inspections and audits are conducted to determine whether officers are complying with regulations. The more mechanically the individual adheres to the letter of the rules, the less likely he or she will get into trouble. Displaying unusual creativity, going beyond minimal requirements of the job, or exercising individual judgment are at odds with the rule-compliance mode. It is easy to see, then, that community policing—with its emphasis on self-motivation and individual initiative—requires a new approach to the inspection function.

Nevertheless, the importance of that function—maintaining the quality and integrity of the police force—is in no way minimized by the new concepts of policing. Indeed, the greater freedom of action afforded the individual officer places greater reliance on effective systems for monitoring, evaluating, and, when necessary, disciplining police conduct. If the community is to sustain satisfaction with and confidence in the police department, executives must insure that internal wrongdoing is prevented and that sufficient safeguards are established to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the force.

The philosophy of community policing, in recognizing the professionalism of the police officer and emphasizing greater opportunities for job satisfaction, is ideal for making a commitment to essential values the basis for maintaining necessary standards of conduct. The concept of values in policing is discussed in an issue of *Perspectives on Policing*.⁴³ Such value orientation is an essential component of achieving professional responsibility within the force.

Beyond the delineation and promotion of values, mechanisms for quality control—monitoring of performance and investigation of complaints—must be part of overall management controls. In a professional organization, the model should be the “quality assurance” programs of modern business and industrial institutions, where the emphasis is less on rigid compliance with rules than on successful results. Techniques such as self-evaluation by individuals and patrol teams, citizen surveys, and performance audits should be used to stimulate analysis and improvement, rather than as negative instruments of penalization.

At the same time, investigation and resolution of complaints or indications of misconduct should be prompt, thorough, and decisive. A professional police organization cannot tolerate betrayal of its values or breaches of integrity. When such incidents occur, the factual situation should be analyzed carefully so that candid information about the matter can be incorporated into future training sessions to prevent other officers from becoming enmeshed in wrongdoing.

Conclusion

Community policing is now an established concept of modern law enforcement doctrine. While much experimentation and innovation continues to occur, the benefits of this strategy are being proclaimed by more and more cities throughout the Nation. But “making the transition from a traditional reactive, incident-driven style of policing to a more contemporary proactive, problem-directed style of community-oriented policing requires a comprehensive strategy that is based on long-term institutional change.”⁴⁴

The practice of community policing, and the implementation planning that inaugurates it, must recognize the pivotal role of the individual officer. As an article in *Footprints: The Community Policing Newsletter* states, “we must always remember that

it is the Community Policing Officers themselves who make the system work . . . All the theories, strategies, and tactics associated with Community Policing that the experts discuss ultimately boil down to a single officer on the street, intervening one-on-one in efforts to . . . make the community safer.”⁴⁵

By lifting some of the constraints under which police officers in the field now operate, and by giving them the freedom to make decisions, innovate, and be problem solvers, community policing promises great benefits for the community in terms of quality of life and for the officers in terms of job satisfaction. By focusing on the person in the front lines of police service—the individual patrol officer—the community policing strategy will be built on a solid foundation.

Notes

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2. George L. Kelling, “Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution,” *Perspectives on Policing* 1, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, June 1988: 1.
3. Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz, “Corporate Strategies for Policing,” *Perspectives on Policing* 6, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, November 1988: 2.
4. See *Perspectives on Policing* Nos. 1–11, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, June 1988–September 1989; *Footprints: The Community Policing Newsletter*, National Center for Community Policing, Michigan State University.
5. Moore and Trojanowicz, “Corporate Strategies,” n. 3 above: 9.
6. James S. Campbell et al., *Law and Order Reconsidered*, Report of the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, New York, Bantam Books, 1970: 286.
7. See Jesse Rubin, “Police Identity and the Police Role,” in *The Police and the Community*, ed. Robert F. Steadman, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972: 26.
8. Bernard L. Garmire, “The Police Role in an Urban Society,” in *The Police and the Community*, n. 7 above: 6.
9. See James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1982: 29–38.
10. Tony Pate et al., *Three Approaches to Criminal Apprehension in Kansas City: An Evaluation Report*, Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1976.
11. William Medina, “Neighborhood Based Policing,” unpublished paper, Los Angeles Police Department, 1987.
12. James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968: 29–30.

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The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

13. Rubin, "Police Identity," n. 7 above: 22.

14. Note that while in the early days of an organized police in England, ranks such as inspector and superintendent were substituted for the military titles of lieutenant, captain, etc., the same basic hierarchical structure of command was retained, with the position of sergeant as the first level of supervision.

15. William L. Tafoya, "The Future of Policing," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, January 1990: 15.

16. In the Army, a helicopter pilot usually is appointed as a warrant officer, a professional rank just below second lieutenant, but pay and career status rise in parallel to officer ranks.

17. *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967: 107-109.

18. See Dorothy Guyot, "Bending Granite: Attempts to Change the Rank Structure of American Police Departments," *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, September 1979: 253-284.

19. The rank of inspector has had several different usages in the United States. In many police departments, particularly in the West, it was the title assigned to detectives, placing them between sergeants and lieutenants in the hierarchy. In other departments it was an executive rank above captain. Because of this confusion, the term has fallen into disuse in many parts of the country, but still is common as a command rank in the Northeast.

20. "Promotional/Advanced Paygrades," Memorandum provided to the author by the Los Angeles Police Department, March 1990.

21. Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990: 27.

22. Author's interview of Commander D. Monk, Metropolitan Police of London, February 1990.

23. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, n. 21 above: 28.

24. Robert C. Trojanowicz and David L. Carter, "The Changing Face of America," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, January 1990: 9.

25. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, n. 21 above: 27.

26. Patrick Murphy, foreword to *The State of Police Education: Policy Direction for the 21st Century* by David L. Carter, Allen D. Sapp, and Darrel W. Stephens, Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1989: iii.

27. James Q. Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," in *The Police and the Community*, n. 7 above: 73.

28. Wilson, previous note: 73-74.

29. Carter et al., *The State of Police Education*, n. 26 above: 157.

30. Murphy, foreword to Carter et al., n. 26 above: iv.

31. *The State of Police Education*, n. 26 above: 38.

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35. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, *Star News*, March 1990: 6.

36. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: The Police*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967: 138.

37. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, n. 21 above: 157.

38. See John E. Eck and William Spelman, *Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*, Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1987.

39. Author's interview of Commander Monk, n. 22 above.

40. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, n. 35 above.

41. Los Angeles Police Department, unpublished briefing paper on community policing provided to author, March 14, 1990.

42. Author's interview of Assistant Chief Robert L. Vernon, Los Angeles Police Department, March 14, 1990.

43. Robert Wasserman and Mark H. Moore, "Values in Policing," *Perspectives on Policing* 8, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, November 1988.

44. National Law Enforcement Leadership Institute Bulletin on "Community-Oriented Policing Implementation Strategy Session," August 1990.

45. "Community Policing: The Line Officer's Perspective," *Footprints: The Community Policing Newsletter* 3, 2(Summer 1990): 5.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met 12 times; some of the members changed in 1990. During the 3-day meetings, the participants energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and should guide, policing.

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Information Systems and the Development of Policing

By Malcolm K. Sparrow

Developments in police technology often appear to have little to do with developments in police strategy, although there are plenty of both. They frequently are debated by different audiences at separate conferences, but remarkably little literature exists that attempts to draw the two strands together.

At one time, information technology was thought to be best left to technicians so that managers could concentrate on the serious business of management. However, that might have been an effective division of labor only when computers were used solely to automate well-defined administrative functions, such as batch processing of payroll or preparation of summary financial returns. The organizational effects of information technology in that era were limited to gains in efficiency.

Now, information systems are the essential circuitry of modern organizations, often determining how problems are defined and how progress is evaluated. They frequently help determine how work gets done, often who does it, and sometimes what the work is.

Organizational strategy no longer can be separated from information technology strategy, for the organizational effects of information systems no longer are limited to efficiency gains. In information-intensive businesses (for example, the provision of medical services or insurance), information systems can make or break an executive's strategy and thus help or hinder the process of change.

Without doubt, policing is an information-intensive business. The kinds of data stored or not stored within police information systems help determine to what a police department pays attention. The way that data are arranged within data files helps determine the types of analysis that can be performed and the uses to which they can be put. The manner in which information flows around a department largely determines which matters are nominated for attention at different levels and who makes which decisions, and may have profound effects upon the relative status of different categories of employees. The content and

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

We hope that these publications will challenge police executives and local officials to reexamine their approach to law enforcement, just as those who participated in the Executive Session have done.

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form of information released to the public help determine the framework within which the department is held accountable to the community, and play a significant role in fashioning public expectations.

Properly managed, information systems can serve as a powerful tool in the hands of progressive police executives. They can cut labor costs, improve resource allocation, and increase efficiency and effectiveness of existing operations. They also can help redefine the work, emphasize new values, and facilitate the development of new partnerships. If badly managed, however, they can frustrate managerial purposes, enshrine old values, emphasize outdated and inappropriate performance measures, give power to the wrong people, perpetuate old ways of doing business, create false or misleading public expectations, destroy partnerships, and impose crippling restrictions on new styles of operation—apart from their propensity to consume millions and millions of tax dollars.

Advances in technology do not inevitably advance the performance of police departments. Police departments must manage technology rather than allow themselves to be managed by it.

“Properly managed, information systems can serve . . . [to] cut labor costs, improve resource allocation, and increase efficiency and effectiveness . . .”

Today's 911 systems are the most pervasive example of technology driving police departments. The advent of radios, cars, telephones, and finally computerized dispatch systems was heralded as major progress for policing. But many departments currently are struggling to retake control of their resources from the insatiable demands of their systems in order to experiment with new styles of policing. Gains in technological efficiency when not properly managed easily turn into constraints. The task for this paper is to look at the continuing evolution of police strategy and the advances in police information technology, then formulate some guidance for ensuring that the latter serves the former.

Changes in police strategy

Police strategies are continuously evolving and diverse. Nevertheless, common threads are readily discernible, both within the United States and internationally. Some of the more significant trends have acquired names. Two of the most prominent are community policing and problem-solving policing. They are not the same, or mutually exclusive. However, they certainly are compatible, can be complementary, and have emerged as part-

ners in many departments. Both are regarded by many people as representing real promise for the future of policing.

The relative merits of these two strategies have been discussed elsewhere.¹ The task at hand is to look at the situation facing a police executive committed to these new strategies and deduce the implications for information technology strategy. Before discussing the kind of information support demanded by these new styles of policing, however, the essence of the two strategies should be clarified.

“Community policing,” as a term, focuses attention on a police department's partnership with the communities it serves. It seeks to revitalize that partnership for two major reasons: to produce a cooperative process of identifying police priorities and to provide a more effective method of achieving the jointly nominated goals. It tends to broaden the scope of police actions and distribute more widely the responsibility for producing results.

“Problem-solving policing,” as a term, focuses attention on redefining the nature of police work. It stems from a conviction that police “incidents” are symptoms of underlying problems, usually soluble, and that policing is more effective when it pays attention to the problems rather than treats each incident in isolation. It seeks to identify patterns among the myriad calls for service and emphasizes the long-term impacts and effects of police actions. It redefines the basic unit of police work from “incident” to “problem” and acknowledges a wider variety of problems as appropriate for police attention.

Problem-solving policing permits identification of problems on many different scales and in many different dimensions, encouraging creativity by officers of all ranks. It requires careful analysis of the nature of a problem, identification and weighing of all relevant interests, careful selection of the most appropriate solutions, and systematic monitoring of the effectiveness of action taken.

Many departments have embraced both of these major ideas and do not feel the need to choose between them. Use of the name “community policing” reveals an emphasis on the power of partnerships. “Problem-solving policing” reveals an emphasis on the power of thoughtfulness and analysis when applied across the whole spectrum of police activity.

The terms “community policing” and “problem-solving policing” do not cover all the types of progress that different police departments are currently making. Together, however, they capture the essential elements of a movement in policing philosophy and practice that appears to be of growing significance.

Community policing and neighborhood patrol officers

In order to support a community policing philosophy, a department needs to make some changes both in the types of information generally regarded as valuable and in the ways certain types of information flow within the department. Many departments that have embraced the strategies of community and

problem-solving policing have adopted the tactics of neighborhood-oriented policing: that is, they give individual officers primary responsibility for well-defined geographical beats. One way to determine the kinds of information that are valuable is to ask especially good neighborhood or community beat officers what information they have or use that makes them so good. When they respond to calls as well as when they perform more proactive work, excellent beat officers seem to exploit four basic types of knowledge: special skills, knowledge of resources, local knowledge, and local acquaintance.

“Special skills” refers to the range of techniques that excellent beat officers use in support of their mission. Currently, they include negotiation and mediation skills; time management skills (necessary to balance immediate tasks against more protracted problem-solving tasks); interviewing and interpersonal skills, which are not common among patrol officers; and the skills associated with mobilizing and building self-respect among communities. Eventually, they should include analytical and problem-solving skills as well.

“Knowledge of resources” refers to the resources available within the department, from outside agencies, and within the community itself. The neighborhood beat officer is, in many respects, the general practitioner of policing. The definition of competence for general practitioners includes knowing their own limitations, knowing where specialist help can be found, and knowing how to obtain it. The best beat officers know when and how to call specialist resources from the department. They frequently have useful contacts in other agencies (which they often guard jealously) and solve many community problems through the use of community resources.

“Local knowledge” covers the accumulated experience of an officer or officers in one particular area—the foibles of the community, the history of its problems, the nature of its tensions and unrest, the names of troublesome individuals or groups, the identities of active criminals and nuisances, and the locations of criminal activities.

Finally, “local acquaintance” covers the special advantages that an officer enjoys through personally knowing people within a neighborhood. Successful beat officers are able to interpret individual demands, spot and interpret anomalies in behavior, demand more tolerance from people, and enlist their support more readily—all because of personal acquaintance and the resulting accumulation of mutual respect.

These four types of knowledge are not always valued by police agencies. Furthermore, none of the types necessarily has a formal channel of dissemination within the department. Of the four, only one—local acquaintance—cannot, in theory, be passed from one officer to another. The other three—special skills, knowledge of resources, and local knowledge—can be codified, communicated, and taught. In most traditional departments, however, an air of mystery remains about these types of knowledge and skill. Some officers just have them. Others do not. Who does and who does not seems dependent more upon fate than upon the department’s information and training strategies.

A community policing philosophy should, therefore, acknowledge and require support for the three transmittable types of knowledge. First, more attention needs to be paid to the “special skills” of beat policing, particularly those not formerly associated with the “fight against crime.” Although some officers had these skills in the past, departments did not acknowledge or value them and thus did not establish formal channels for teaching and sharing them. The “special skills” need to be defined and taught in the academy. Use of these skills needs to be recognized, prized, and rewarded in the continuing evaluation of officers.

Second, “knowledge of resources” needs to be recognized as one of the most valuable data bases a department can build. It should be a major investment that is regularly updated and universally available throughout the department. The data base structure needs to be flexible enough to accept new types of resources, as well as new sources within existing categories. Although beat officers need a simple means of access to the data base, they may have to be trained to utilize the capacity of the system or at least to appreciate the scope of information available. Furthermore, the department should devise an incen-

“ ‘Problem-solving policing’ reveals an emphasis on the power of thoughtfulness and analysis . . . ”

tive scheme that will persuade the most experienced and knowledgeable beat officers to allow their own knowledge to be disseminated through such a system.

Third, “local knowledge” has to be recognized as a valuable asset. The department cannot afford to lose vast stores of local knowledge every time an officer is moved from one beat to another, is promoted, or retires. Moreover, a beat officer’s local knowledge should be accessible to others even when he or she is off duty.

To make local knowledge accessible, police departments need to design instruments for collecting and codifying it, which will then serve as effective frameworks for communicating it. For example, some departments already have asked beat officers to produce “beat profiles.” The job of designing information frameworks (whether automated or not) will demand both the experience of the best beat officers and the skills of the best analysts. Once done, the job will need to be redone, probably many times. The science of information support for community policing is in its infancy (some would say it has not even been born yet) and so will probably develop fast if appropriately supported.

Community policing and partnerships

Community policing, insofar as it points towards the power of partnerships, demands a reevaluation of a department's policies regarding data and information sharing, with both the community and other government agencies. Parochialism, possessiveness, and the clutching of information as a source of power will all have to diminish. Also, issues of confidentiality and privacy and public fears about government aggregation of data from different agencies will need to be addressed.

Emerging notions of police as the "eyes and ears" of urban government, as a motivator of and partner with the community, and as a coordinator of the delivery of government services will have profound ramifications for the types of information a department keeps, as well as the way information flows, is analyzed, and is disseminated.

Information support for problem-solving policing

Herman Goldstein, in *Problem-Oriented Policing*, describes the range of problems that can be nominated for police attention and offers some useful definitions of "problem": "a cluster of similar, related, or recurring incidents rather than a single incident," "a substantive community concern," and "the unit of police business."² He makes it clear that problems may or may not be crime-related. He also points to several dimensions in which incidents may be clustered. They might reveal common types of behavior; they might all occur in the same geographic location; they might all involve a similar type of offender or victim, or repeat offender or repeat victim; or they might be clustered around a particular time of day, week, or season.³

"... information and data are different commodities. Information products are as different from raw data as a table is from a plank of wood."

Problems also can be nominated at different levels within the department, and might be called projects or programs if they are large enough. At one extreme, a small localized problem might be handled by one patrol officer and be resolved within a week. At the other extreme, a large problem might necessitate a major program that requires considerable departmental resources over a protracted period, spans several different districts or regions,

and requires senior management direction and control. However, whatever the scale or type of problem, the framework for resolution, which Herman Goldstein so clearly describes, is the same. The task here is to identify the information support that problem solving requires and note any special difficulties or opportunities for providing it.

Four principles regarding information support for problem solving now are clear. First, the clustering of incidents to form a problem might occur in any one of several different dimensions—geographic, temporal, offender class, victim class, behavior type, weapon type, and so on. Thus, analyzing the incidents that a problem comprises will require the facility to aggregate and disaggregate incident data along one, or any combination, of these dimensions. That process requires flexible data base structures with versatile access and analytic capabilities. Probably, it also will require expert system management.

Second, information and analytic support for problem solving might be required at many different levels within the department—ranging from support for quick street-level problems to major and protracted investigations or programs. Third, the department's information and analytic support must be available for problems whether they are crime-related or not.

Fourth, information and analytic support will have to be provided for problems that never have been identified before, that might not look like any previous police business, that might not have any data readily available, and that might in fact be unique. Provision of the appropriate information support will require unprecedented creativity, improvisation, and innovation.

The problem-solving police department, therefore, needs to build the capacity to produce a wide variety of information products, some of which may have to be tailor-made for particular problems. These products will have to be available in a wide range of scopes (from street level to departmental level) and timeframes (from short term to long term), utilizing data from a variety of sources, many of them unconventional and some from outside the department. Also, they will need to be presented in a variety of forms to make absorption and comprehension of the information possible for not-so-analytical officers.

If a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system remains the information entry gate to the police department (and thus the principal repository of call-related data), then the demands of problem-solving policing will have profound ramifications on the types of data stored, their availability within the department, and their uses. CAD systems may not be the best vehicle for analysis, however. With their primary emphasis on supporting dispatch, CAD systems probably will always retain attention to incidents rather than problems as their organizing logic. They may be philosophically unsuited to supporting problem solving, in which case the analytical capabilities will have to lie elsewhere within a department and the CAD system must feed the call-specific data to other systems.

The shift in focus from provision of data to the manufacture of information products is important since information and data are different commodities. Information products are as different from raw data as a table is from a plank of wood. Data are the ingredients, the raw materials. Information, on the other hand, is the final product. Information products, like chairs and tables, have form and style; have been designed for a purpose, with a user or class of user in mind; often incorporate raw materials from many different sources; and have been crafted by a great variety of tools and methods.

Good-quality data only have to be accurate, up to date, and maybe, in some sense, complete. Good-quality information has to be relevant, useful, comprehensible, well-designed, appropriately structured, appropriately presented, and placed in the right hands. Problem-solving policing cannot be supported adequately by a "data warehouse." Police departments are already awash in data. Problem solving has to be supported by an "information craft shop" and by "information craftspeople."

The role of analyst

Where will we find the information craftspeople within the department? A few (often civilians) already exist, usually called analysts. The analysts are the people who identify sources of data relevant to an investigation, integrate the data in some useful way, apply various analytical methods (statistical or graphical) to deduce relevant information from them, and then employ various methods of presenting the resulting data to others in a meaningful way (graphs, printouts, Anacapa charts, PERT charts, etc.).

Some problems would have to be overcome in order to deploy such people in support of problem-solving policing. First, the number of analysts is small, and the relevant skills are rare. Few police officers have the appropriate skills or quantitative and technological background to become expert analysts.

Second, analysts customarily have had a specific focus on serious crime. They have been employed to maintain specialized data bases relating to specific categories of crime. Thus, they often have been assigned to a unit, such as the armed robbery unit or the sex crimes unit, and occasionally to specific investigations. Their periodic assignment to particular investigations—where they make the whole range of their analytic skills available to the investigating officers—most closely parallels the kind of deployment that problem-solving policing would require.

Third, they traditionally have been valued for their knowledge rather than for their skills. By remaining with one investigation or in one unit for long periods, they become valuable sources of knowledge. The focus, therefore, has been upon their capacity to absorb and regurgitate data, rather than upon their ability to design and create new information products through use of creative analytical skills.

Fourth, they have become comfortable with the types of analysis traditionally performed by police departments. Having absorbed the traditional values and culture of the department, they may not be ready to stretch their imaginations to new forms of analysis or be readily motivated to think creatively. Fresh perspectives on analytical opportunities might be easier to find outside the department than inside.

“Fresh perspectives on analytical opportunities might be easier to find outside the department than inside.”

Problem-solving policing demands that the skills of analysis be given a higher profile, more akin to the recognition afforded analysis as a basis for professional judgment in the fields of medicine, defense, and intelligence. The organization has to learn how to recruit and train people who can look at a problem and answer the following questions:

- What data would support analysis of this problem?
- Where can we get the data?
- How do we get the data?
- How can we usefully integrate the data?
- What kinds of analysis are needed?
- What type of information technology will best help?
- Who needs the resulting information?
- In what form can they best use it?

In fact, analytical skills should be regarded as an essential part of the problem-solving toolkit. As such, they probably should be taught to the patrol officers who will bear the major responsibility for identifying and solving problems. Nevertheless, a place will remain for specialist analysts within the department—those who, operating as internal consultants, will offer expert guidance and assistance to patrol officers engaged in analytic problem solving.

The department has to convince the expert analysts that their skills are more important than their knowledge—so that they will accept assignment on a project-by-project basis rather than being assigned permanently to a unit. The department has to

convince its analysts that their status is not being diminished when they lose their exclusive focus on serious crime. To reorient expert analysts to the needs of problem-solving policing, the department must design educational programs and structural reorganization that will make the skills of "information craftsmanship" broadly available and appreciated throughout the ranks.

Developments in police information technology

The development of police technology during the late 1980's focused principally on the acquisition by police departments of two major types of systems: CAD (computer-aided dispatch, sometimes "enhanced") and AFIS (automated fingerprint identification systems). CAD systems often have been augmented by the use of mobile display terminals (MDT's) in patrol cars, by automatic vehicle locator systems, and by integration of geographic information system (GIS) capabilities into CAD control systems.⁴ AFIS frequently has been tied to existing criminal histories data bases.

Proponents of community policing and problem-solving policing might be tempted to downplay the significance of these developments, or even dismiss them, on the basis that both CAD and AFIS can be seen as serving the "reform" model of policing, with its reliance upon rapid response to calls for service and its emphasis on retrospective crime solution. It certainly is true that CAD has been marketed largely on its capacity to reduce response times, and that AFIS primarily serves retrospective crime solving.

Still, there are good reasons to embrace both. Nothing in the concepts of community policing or problem-solving policing suggests that solving crime is not important. They only acknowledge that it is not the sole purpose of policing. The new styles of policing do not deny the importance of responding quickly to emergencies. Rather, they recognize that only a few calls require emergency response⁵ and acknowledge the importance of leaving discretion for the allocation of patrol time in the hands of patrol officers and their local supervisors.

Computer-aided dispatch

Police executives wishing to pursue the new styles of policing should not miss the opportunities afforded by CAD systems. While it clearly remains important to get to real emergencies fast, intelligent dispatching should be able to treat urgent and nonurgent calls differently. Indeed, modern CAD systems can be used to implement differential police response strategies, thereby helping to make available the resources required for proactive policing by restricting rapid response to only the most urgent calls.⁶ Also, CAD systems might be able to help provide the information support and analytic capabilities needed for problem-solving policing, as described above.

Despite the potential benefits, the dangers are also considerable. Installation or use of CAD systems without adequate managerial attention paid to organizational consequences can cripple the new styles of police operations. It is essential to make sure that any CAD system serves the organization's strategy, rather than vice versa.

The Houston experience

The Houston Police Department discovered how difficult it can be to reconcile a CAD system, basically designed around more traditional forms of policing, with the neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy (which pursues most of the central elements of community policing and problem-solving policing).

The department purchased a state-of-the-art CAD system in the mid-1980's at the same time that then-Chief Lee Brown was implementing the strategic change toward neighborhood-oriented policing. By the end of 1989, it became clear that there were real difficulties in making the CAD system serve the new philosophy.⁷

Three apparently technical problems stood in the way of making the new CAD system fit the new style of service. The first was the question of whether "call stacking" should be allowed. Neighborhood-oriented policing demanded that local beat officers attend as many of the nonurgent calls on their beat as possible, both for continuity and to utilize and supplement their local knowledge. Stacking calls—holding them for beat officers to deal with in turn rather than assigning them to the first available cars—was one way to accomplish that. However, the CAD data processing staff opposed call stacking on the basis that allowing calls to "sit" for long periods—hours, even days in some cases—would cause irreparable damage to average response times, which were the single most visible performance measure for the system.

"... technical problems stood in the way of making the new CAD system fit the new style of service."

Second, the CAD system had no way of recording the patrol car status known as "checking by" (which meant that officers were available for urgent calls, but were using their time in proactive work in a particular area and should not be interrupted for unimportant calls). The CAD system distinguished only between available and not available, and recognized nothing in between.

Third, a dispute arose about expanding the system's management information capabilities. It concerned the amount of memory space available within the system's address files for premise and location information pertinent to particular calls. Data processing staff suggested 3 days as a period of information retention, whereas Chief Elizabeth Watson (who succeeded Lee Brown) thought that a 6-month history was the minimum required for officers to be able to understand the real context of many calls.

Another information-related issue was more a policy question than a technical issue. The question was whether or not patrol officers should be allowed to see the list of "calls waiting." By using the mobile digital displays in their patrol cars, officers would be able to see the list and take calls that they knew were important or about which they had some previous or background knowledge. Seeing the list also would enable officers to spot patterns in the calls that would signal a common or familiar cause—in other words, a problem.

However, the dispatching office opposed release of the information, believing that patrol officers would "cherry-pick"—that is, take the good calls and leave the uninteresting, unpredictable, or unpleasant ones. From the dispatcher's perspective, cherry-picking would degrade both service and response times. Furthermore, allowing officers access to the calls waiting list would constitute a significant shift in power from the dispatchers to the patrol officers, with the role of dispatcher diminishing in "control" and increasing in "provision of information."

These four issues (call stacking, checking by, call histories, and cherry-picking) at first look somewhat technical, at most procedural. In fact, they all reveal fundamental dilemmas about the nature and strategy of policing.

The call-stacking issue pits the drive for faster response times against the useful employment of patrol officers in proactive policing and problem-solving activities. It also questions reliance upon the performance measures that are easiest to count. The checking-by issue begs acceptance or denial of the existence of any useful police work other than answering calls and significantly affects perceptions of the proportion of patrol resources devoted to emergency response. The extent of call histories that a department uses reveals whether it regards the fundamental units of police work as incidents or problems.

Most striking of all is the issue of cherry-picking, which questions the status and nature of patrol officers. On the one hand, patrol officers are viewed as pins on an automated map, who go where they are told, who require constant centralized direction, and who cannot be trusted to make their own judgments for fear of messing up the system. On the other hand, a neighborhood-oriented patrol strategy assumes patrol officers to be mature, responsible, creative, capable of making their own resource allocation decisions, and honorable enough to subjugate their own personal preferences to the professional demands of their job. Within the neighborhood-oriented strategy, transgressions

in these areas are personnel and management issues to be dealt with by more sophisticated means than eliminating discretion and hiding information.

These four issues, therefore, are important strategic issues, not merely technical or insignificant. As with many information systems issues, however, the debate about them tends to gravitate to the technical domain (and is often left to technical specialists typically unfamiliar with police roles and tasks) rather than being confronted as major questions about strategy that

“Many officers feel that genuine localized control requires the use of separate radio channels . . . or some other device that makes precinct communications private from the rest of the world.”

require senior management attention. Fortunately, in Houston, senior management recognized the import of these questions and became directly involved in managing the difficult search for an appropriate resolution.

Control over patrols

Another issue that frequently arises around CAD systems is that of who has control over patrols. Many departments refer to their centralized dispatching operation as the "control room." For the sake of dispatching efficiency, as well as procurement and technical efficiencies, CAD systems tend to be regionally structured with one dispatch area covering multiple precincts.

Local commanders are right to ask, therefore, how they can assume control of their local resources when their patrol cars appear to be under central direction. They also ask how they can be expected to tailor differential police response to local conditions when they have no control over the CAD system's call-prioritization categories.

Some CAD systems make it possible for calls to be shunted electronically over a network. Thus nonurgent calls, received and logged into the system centrally, can be passed to decentralized radio control stations (at the precinct or district level) for allocation. That way control over resources is held at the precinct level except for genuine emergencies.

The technical ability to shift calls over a network raises questions about privacy and control. Many officers feel that genuine localized control requires the use of separate radio channels, or trunk radio, or some other device that makes precinct communications private from the rest of the world. To them it seems unnatural for several different "controls" to share the same frequency.

In fact, there is no reason that multiple controls should not all use the same channel (assuming that decentralizing control does not increase the aggregate radio traffic, and there is no reason that it should). Nevertheless, it is perfectly natural for the precinct or district controllers to be uneasy about such an arrangement.

Their unease reflects the adage "information is power." In general, if a senior manager has access to a junior manager's information, and just as quickly, then the junior manager may not feel that he or she is truly in control. Similarly, district dispatchers, whose radio conversations are overheard constantly by a regional dispatcher, probably will not feel comfortable about their status, power, or usefulness. Such reservations are natural, need to be acknowledged, and may constitute a sizable hurdle to be overcome—either by providing the confidentiality that decentralized controllers will request, or by restoring their feelings of autonomy through explicit protocols or memorandums of understanding. The use of MDT's also can provide privacy, as well as decreasing the volume of radio traffic.

Minimal requirements for CAD systems

Experiences with CAD systems in Houston and other progressive departments enable us to prescribe some minimal requirements for CAD systems that can support rather than frustrate the new styles of policing:

1. The entire dispatching operation (system and people) has to learn to regard patrol officers as autonomous professionals—rather than as unthinking pins on the dispatcher's automated map.

2. The efficacy of the dispatching operation must not be measured solely by aggregate response times. Information about average response times should be generated and communicated only for the subset of calls that actually require rapid response. (Appropriate implementation of differential response strategies should, of course, improve the performance on high-priority calls.)

3. The CAD system must allow for decentralized control over all resources, with the possible exception of genuine emergencies and coordinated team operations (such as crowd control, civil disturbances, etc.).

4. Patrol officers and lower level managers should, if it is technically possible, be able to see the list of calls waiting. They should be allowed to make decisions about which to attend, based on their own knowledge and judgment.

5. Address files (call histories) must be adequate in size, format, and ease of access to support the information needs of problem-solving and community policing. The best and most committed of the neighborhood beat officers should be enlisted to help draw up the specifications.

6. Call categorization under differential response schemes must allow for local variations in priorities. They should also be readily changeable from one week to the next.

7. If a CAD system is to provide real help for problem-solving policing, the data base of recorded incidents must have a form and structure capable of supporting the many kinds of analysis that problem-solving policing requires. The data base in the CAD system will need to be sufficiently flexible and indexed to facilitate a much broader range of analytic approaches than the simple generation of geographic incident patterns or of standardized aggregate management information reports.

“Very few departments have the in-house technical knowledge to compare the accuracy and reliability of [fingerprint] systems.”

This list is not by any means exhaustive. It is only a start. As more departments experiment with both CAD systems and new styles of policing, the best fit will become clearer. At this point, however, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of paying high-level managerial attention to the operational, strategic, and philosophical consequences of these systems and of investing intellectual capital in their design, testing, and evaluation.

Automated fingerprint identification systems

Apart from CAD systems, the other major technological investment being considered by many police departments is automated fingerprint systems. Their impact on the strategy and philosophy of policing is much less than that of CAD systems, but the investment is enormous.

The advantages of automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) have become clear to many of the agencies that have procured them. They have solved many cases for which manual searches never would have been attempted. However, AFIS cannot be a major subject of this paper. Extremely complex and technically sophisticated systems, they are a huge subject in their own right.

Briefly noted, the major managerial issues currently facing law enforcement agencies with respect to AFIS include the following:

1. Cost-benefit analysis, justifying the not-inconsiderable cost of these systems. Any such analysis would need to take into account the solvability of various crimes without AFIS (i.e., how likely that they would be solved without AFIS), and how much their solvability would change with the addition of AFIS. It would also need to take into account the value of rapid identification of dangerous offenders once in custody.

2. Compatibility and data exchange standards, the fact that different vendors' systems are not compatible, despite the formulation of an American National Standard for fingerprint data exchange. The different systems use different types of data from fingerprints (some spatial, some topological, some a mixture of the two), and run fingerprint-matching algorithms that can work only on their own particular kinds of data.

3. Benchmarking and testing, the considerable difficulty that police departments face in acquiring the expertise to test systems adequately prior to purchase. Very few departments have the inhouse technical knowledge to compare the accuracy and reliability of different systems. They remain hostage to a variety of misleading performance measures devised by vendors. Police departments seem reluctant, compared with their military or intelligence community counterparts, to budget for the requisite professional expertise.

The first and third of these issues (whether to buy and which to buy) go to the heart of a department's procurement practices. These questions often are decided on political or pragmatic grounds rather than on sound statistical analysis.⁸ Often the selection of a vendor is made on the basis of the need to be compatible with neighboring jurisdictions.

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Selection on the basis of compatibility will become progressively less critical over time, because the compatibility problem does have a solution that now is becoming apparent. Data exchange between systems will be achieved by concentrating on the exchange of the gray-scale images (essentially digitized photographs of the fingerprints, usually using 64 levels of gray), rather than through exchange of the subsequently extracted minutiae data.

Exchange of minutiae data (the positions or relationships of the ridge-endings and bifurcations revealed in a fingerprint) once seemed to be a more fruitful avenue because the memory requirements per print, and thus the data transmission speeds, were so much less than for the gray-scale images. However, two things have changed. First, mass memory space and bulk data transmission become easier and cheaper every day, making longer term storage and high-speed transmission of the scanned (digitized) images more feasible and less expensive. Second, it is now clear that the methods of extracting and recording minutiae data are almost infinitely variable, making it unlikely that AFIS vendors will ever agree on one format. Even if they could agree on the best method currently available, insistence on compliance would preclude development of more accurate systems.

Both of these factors highlight the need for establishing standards for gray-scale data exchange at sufficient resolution to serve all of the different matching systems. The process of establishing those standards is well under way.⁹

Conclusion

It is clear that the design and implementation of information systems should not be left to technologists. They are matters for strategists and managers. If these matters are neglected, they can undermine the best intentions for strategic reform.

In many departments these matters now are urgent. In some departments, however, debate about these issues is being conducted in the wrong quarters. In order for the full potential of the emerging strategies of policing to be realized, executives will have to ensure that their information support fits their policing strategy.

Notes

1. For a discussion of what these new strategies offer to policing, see Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*, Chapters 1-4, New York, Basic Books, 1990. For a detailed discussion of problem-solving policing, see Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990.
2. Goldstein, note above: 66.
3. Goldstein: 67-68.
4. GIS has the capacity to handle, manipulate, and display spatial coordinate data in a variety of formats, including maps.
5. See Kansas City Police Department, *Response Time Analysis*, Volume II, *Part I Crime Analysis*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.
6. See Richard Larson, "Rapid Response and Community Policing: Are They Really in Conflict?" Community Policing Series No. 20, East Lansing, National Center for Community Policing, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, 1990.
7. For a fuller account of these difficulties and how the Houston Police Department approached them, see David M. Kennedy, "Computer-Aided Police Dispatching in Houston, Texas," John

F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-90-985.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990.

8. This overview paper is not the place to provide the requisite analytical training for more scientific decisions.

9. This work is being conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and is actively supported by the SEARCH group.

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met 12 times; some of the members changed in 1990. During the 3-day meetings, the participants energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and should guide, policing.

NCJ 139306

Community-Oriented Policing

Selection, Training and Evaluation Ensure Success

By James H. "Chuck" Kriebel, Community Policing Sergeant,
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As law enforcement agencies throughout the country embrace the philosophy of community-oriented policing (COP) and implement those strategies that best serve their communities, it is becoming more apparent that innovative, nontraditional personnel practices heavily influence the rate and degree of policing success. Traditional methods of personnel selection and evaluation are not likely to identify—or adequately assess—the talents of those who can best lead their agencies into a new era.

Modern management theory suggests that in order for organizations to prosper in the current business and political climate, they must recruit and retain personnel who operate comfortably and effectively in a dynamic environment where the watchwords are empowerment, effective communications and innovation. Operating under this premise, the Redmond Police Department (RPD) has introduced its own personnel management innovations in the areas of hiring, training and performance evaluation. Recognizing the organization's need to select and retain "new era" policing professionals to fulfill its mission statement—"Provide quality policing in partnership with the community"—these enhancements are best represented in the hiring interview process, the field training officer (FTO) program and the assignment-evaluation methods employed by the department.

Hiring Interviews

The RPD employs interview questions that solicit responses based on the candidate's actual experiences, in order to assess his demonstrated problem-solving

ability, creativity, skill development and interpersonal skills.

It has been the RPD's experience that the hypothetical approach—"What would you do if . . ."—found in the traditional interview format seldom yields an accurate and verifiable accounting of performance capability. This format has given way to a "Describe how you reacted when . . ." approach to candidate qualification assessment. The tangible benefit derived from this personnel screening strategy is that anything said during the hiring interview can be validated in a subsequent background investigation.

The type of questions posed to candidates requires a description of past behaviors that best demonstrate their aptitudes in performance areas critical to the ultimate success of the organization. These performance areas reflect the quality management philosophy and principles embodied in the department's statement of values, including teamwork, problem solving, initiative and risk taking within an organizational setting and leadership by example. By incorporating these value statements into interview questions, the interview team can assess the candidate's community policing talents, abilities and sensitivity to such values based upon previous life experience(s) and/or professional achievements.

The following is an example of an interview question designed for an entry-level candidate, as well as the corresponding answer scale.

Question: "Describe a problem that existed within your department or community that prompted you to develop solutions and take steps necessary to im-

plement those solutions. Describe the net result of your efforts."

Preferred response: The circumstances described had adverse consequences for the community or agency if not otherwise addressed, or reflected a significant opportunity for agency/community improvement. The candidate accurately assessed the problem and initiated the events that led toward the solution process. Positive results were achieved within the candidate's scope of influence to achieve them.

Satisfactory: The circumstances described presented opportunities for agency/community improvement. The candidate participated in a combined effort to address the problem and contribute toward the solution(s).

Unacceptable: The circumstances described had little or no consequences in terms of community or agency improvement. Examples given were not relevant to the question. The candidate showed little or no experience at identifying problems and implementing solution strategies.

The candidate's response to this inquiry may yield valuable insight into his experience in problem solving, teamwork, initiative and risk taking within the context of the organizational culture he is leaving. It is incumbent upon the background investigator to assess—to the extent possible—the cultural setting of the candidate's agency and how it has influenced his behavior.

The content validation and, hence, the appropriateness of experience-based questions are assured since these performance dimensions have been established through a job-task analysis and incorporated within the classification de-

scription for the position of police officer. The RPD believes that this approach to officer selection, which is grounded both in theory and application, is integral to identifying those best suited to achieve community/quality policing success.

FTO Program Curriculum

The department's FTO training program has developed a training curriculum for its newly hired officers that exposes them to the fundamental principles and definitions of quality management (Continuous Quality Improvement or CQI), the inherent relationship of CQI to community-oriented policing and the department's philosophical and practical shift toward problem solving, teamwork and active involvement with citizens. This curriculum is a synthesis of the department's efforts during the past several years to infuse its organizational culture with a mandate for continuous improvement in the delivery of quality policing services and the utilization of COP.

A conceptual overview and discussion of strategies and methods that embody the "how to" of community-oriented policing has been incorporated into the FTO training manual carried by each new officer. Those programs and organizational trademarks that best illustrate Redmond's commitment to COP and CQI—such as permanent officer-patrol district assignments and community Apartment, Block and Business Watch programs—are outlined in the training syllabus.

As the officer experiences duty on the different patrol squads, the assigned FTO familiarizes him with community problems facing the squad and corresponding policing strategies developed using teamwork, problem solving and citizen interaction. At the earliest opportunity—and as often as possible—officers in training are involved in the community meeting process in order to experience the dynamics of community interaction firsthand. "Quality policing" and "partnership," which previously may have been only rhetoric, take on form and substance. Operating on the belief that primary training programs within an organization often leave the most lasting influence on a new employee, the introduction of CQI and COP principles during this time period is a central theme of the FTO program.

Assignment and Evaluation

Upon completion of the department's 12-week FTO program, officers are assigned to a patrol squad with the immediate responsibility of developing problem-solving strategies in their assigned districts and networking among their counterparts on other squads, in order that business owners and private citizens

can receive coordinated "quality policing." Because these responsibilities have long since exceeded the narrow scope of conventional, complaint-oriented, "Band Aid"-style policing, there has emerged a greater need to effectively manage—through personnel evaluation and performance planning—each officer's community policing effectiveness.

To accomplish this, the personnel evaluation system for patrol officers was retooled to emphasize quality improvement and community policing practices. It is no coincidence that these criteria for personnel evaluation mirror those qualities and attributes sought in the initial hiring interview process.

In addition to developing a new patrol officer performance evaluation instrument, the department changed the evaluation criteria for officers assigned exclusively to community policing-driven projects. Following a comprehensive job-task survey including each of the four officers assigned to the department's community policing squad, it was apparent that COP project management required the adoption of unique measures of performance effectiveness. The following criteria and definitions were developed for community policing team members.

Problem analysis: Completes an accurate assessment of conditions within the community that affect police service delivery and/or can be effectively addressed by police services. Such an assessment is accomplished in a timely manner given the available data; liability and risk management issues are identified; awareness of politically sensitive issues associated with the problem is demonstrated.

Problem resolution: Develops effective solutions to problems. Community resources are incorporated in solution strategies as appropriate. Long-term solutions are emphasized; follow-up and continued analysis-response processes are used.

Communication skills: Enhances team or department effectiveness through content and delivery of information in pub-

lic forums and while representing the department in local government affairs.

Public relations: Establishes effective relations within local government and with community groups and individuals, business owners, fringe citizen groups or individuals, and youth at risk.


Team member relations: Actively participates in group processes and takes initiative to offer possible approaches to problems and issues; demonstrates respect for the personal styles of others; keeps others in the group apprised of issues that affect them; behaviors contribute toward group effectiveness.

The same analytical and problem-solving dimensions reflected in the performance criteria for officers are incorporated into the design of the "performance analysis" section of the police officer's performance evaluation report. This section provides the supervisor with a performance planning tool that organizes the "coaching" process of officers engaged in policing practices that require unprecedented levels of decision making.

As both a record of performance and a performance planning tool, the evaluation report is a central element of the department's personnel management system. Its most significant contribution, however, is to validate the productive and often innovative contributions of officers who have created their personal framework within a community policing framework.

Summary

RPD's transition to a quality-oriented and community-responsive method of policing is supported by its internal personnel management system, which is designed to promote individual officer effectiveness. The introduction of CQI and COP concepts and practices within the hiring, training, assignment and evaluation systems of the department represent the department's commitment to pursue and accomplish its stated mission. ★



Bulletin

Bureau of Justice Assistance

The Systems Approach to Crime and Drug Prevention: A Path to Community Policing

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) announced in 1985 that it would issue grants for a "law enforcement-based crime prevention program . . . to demonstrate the importance of crime prevention as a major police activity of equal professional stature to patrol and investigative activities in the country's major police and sheriff's departments."¹ The initiative led at least two of the demonstration sites²—Knoxville, Tennessee, and Tucson, Arizona—into what today can be characterized as a community-based, problem-oriented style of policing.

In a draft Implementation Guide it submitted in 1991,³ the Knoxville Police Department cited two examples of the success of this approach:

■ In a public housing community there was a street called "Deal Street" to which 1,200 cars daily would come to buy or sell drugs, "driving through as they would at a fast-food restaurant." Through teamwork and environmental design techniques, the city installed speed bumps, concrete barriers, and additional lighting; closed streets; and gave the neighborhood a general

cleanup. Now only 50 cars a day come into the neighborhood and children play outside once again.

■ When another Knoxville neighborhood became notorious for prostitution and its accompanying problems of drugs, armed robberies, and theft, interagency teamwork shut down the motel around which the prostitution centered. Criminal activity dropped by 75 percent.

Three-phase program

The first phase of the demonstration program in each city was to integrate crime and drug prevention activities into all law enforcement operations.

In phase two, each police department developed working partnerships with its city's other government agencies, community groups, churches, and schools. The communities learned what tools they had at their disposal and developed plans of action specific to the needs of individual neighborhoods.

Phase three saw the programs swing into high gear and into new neighborhoods. Citizen volunteers operated drug demand reduction programs. Architects were challenged to develop continuing programs of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) or Safe by Design techniques. Police also expanded the activities of their crime analysis units to support local problem-solving efforts.

¹ *Federal Register*, July 26, 1985.

² The four demonstration sites were Jacksonville, Florida; New Haven, Connecticut; Knoxville; and Tucson.

³ Knoxville Police Department, *The Systems Approach to Community Crime and Drug Prevention: Implementation Guide*, July 1991. (NCJ 132541)

Every six months, BJA held "cluster meetings" for the four sites participating in the demonstration. These meetings were designed to:

- Monitor program performance.
- Provide training and technical assistance.
- Provide a forum for the exchange of information among the sites to improve their programs through peer technical assistance.

In addition, the sites were used to share information with other BJA-funded demonstration program sites.

Phase one: Integrated prevention effort

The phase one objective was to integrate crime and drug prevention activities into all law enforcement operations. Although in Tucson, this new policy concentrated first on the Midtown police district, one of four police districts, crime prevention was declared an emphasis of the entire police department, *a part of* (rather than *apart from*) patrol and investigation. No longer shunted to a small, specialized unit, prevention became a goal of all officers, uniformed and plain clothes, and the subject of specialized training for all.

This first phase began for Tucson in April 1987. By April 1988, the Tucson Police Department was able to adopt a new mission statement:

The mission of the Tucson Police Department is to serve the public by furthering a partnership with the community to protect life and property, prevent crime, and resolve problems.⁴

4. Tucson Police Department, *Safe by Design, Enhanced Crime Prevention Program Final Report*, December 1991. (NCJ 136042)

In Knoxville, the Police Department said, "For law enforcement, involvement with this process means:

1. Emphasizing a proactive response toward residents' fear of crime and victimization.
2. Enriching line officers' jobs with greater community interaction.
3. Emphasizing the police officer's role in a general human service network rather than as someone who appears only when there is a problem.
4. Sharing the burden of solving neighborhood problems with other community agencies and community groups.
5. Improving citizen/police interaction.
6. Expanding the scope of traditional crime prevention activities.

7. Elevating the professional stature of crime prevention activities.
8. Providing a simple, straightforward process to effect systematic improvements in the delivery of services.
9. Developing police strategies based on interagency information-sharing and on research findings—rather than belief or myth—to verify the effects of community involvement on levels of fear and victimization. Many elements of the systems approach described above are found in community- and problem-oriented policing."⁵

5. *Systems Approach*, note 3 above.

Training programs

Although Louisville, Kentucky, is a fair distance from Knoxville, the training element in Knoxville's implementation was aided by the location at the University of Louisville of the National Crime Prevention Institute, which offers a 40-hour course in basic crime prevention, including the use of locks, lighting, alarms, and security surveys. This training was provided not only for line police officers, but for others in the community as well:

- Mayor.
- Chief of Police.
- Fire Chief.
- Housing Director.
- Juvenile judges.
- City council members.
- School board members.

Crime prevention was declared an emphasis of the entire police department, a part of (rather than apart from) patrol and investigation.

- Neighborhood leaders.
- Community action group leaders.
- School resource officers.

In addition to the basic course, selected individuals could seek specialized study such as the following:

- The National Crime Prevention Institute's class in CPTED or Safe by Design.
- The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) classes in the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Plan (SHOCAP) and other policy and procedural courses on youth services.

When the Institute for Social Analysis conducted a national evaluation of the systems approach to crime prevention demonstration, it cited Knoxville's minimum of 40 hours training per officer as the most thorough training program of any of the four sites.⁶

For training in Tucson, the police department's video production unit prepared an introductory videotape, *The Enhanced Crime Prevention Program*, and five self-paced training modules for study during normal duty hours. A crime prevention specialist was available to answer questions. In addition, officers were required to attend program meetings such as those of Neighborhood Watch. By November 1987, all officers in the central patrol unit of the Operations Division Midtown were qualified for such duties as residential security surveys, formerly the province of a specialized crime prevention unit.

Meanwhile, Tucson created a crime analysis unit. In August 1987, a full-time crime analysis officer was assigned, supported by the existing planning and research unit, and computer hardware for crime analysis was installed. In rapid succession, the analyst took theoretical, software, and practical courses from the Institute of Police Technology and Management. The new unit set up six data bases—burglaries, suspects, offenders, field interviews, modus operandi, and pawn tickets—and trained officers in how to use them and how to help prepare the computerized "pin-maps" of burglaries.

At the same time, the department was encouraging initiation of documented positive contact with citizens during officers' uncommitted time. In this contact, the most popu-

lar citizen suggestions for improving police performance were for more patrols and faster response. When the crime analysis unit reported a rising burglary rate, however, instead of increasing patrols, police responded in a nontraditional way by calling a meeting with area residents. A mass meeting—attended by more than 400 citizens—was held, which was followed by a notable increase in the number of citizen-generated calls. The citizen calls resulted directly in 15 of 17 area burglary arrests, and the burglary rate dropped 30 percent virtually overnight. By the end of phase one, letters and phone calls of appreciation for police officers had increased between 300 and 400 percent in Tucson.

Phase two: Moving to partnerships

In progressing to phase two, Knoxville sought a citywide task force that would channel information and cooperation from, among others:

- All local agencies such as police, fire, schools, public utilities, housing, juvenile courts, traffic engineering, and community development.
- Political leaders.
- Nonprofit organizations.
- Grassroots citizens organizations.
- Private sector.

It was important, organizers felt, that the effort not be labeled "the mayor's program" or "a police program." All elements of the community had to be involved, and the most difficult task was to identify (and enlist spokespersons for) those groups that might otherwise feel left out or disenfranchised. Following formation of this task force, once its individual members were convinced that crime and drugs were everybody's problems, an assessment team—"the A-Team"—was formed to act as a clearinghouse for community problems.

An interagency information-sharing process was developed requiring agency policymakers, in interagency partnership, to profile individual neighborhoods in order to improve understanding of a neighborhood's problems and thus aid development of strategies to solve those problems through better allocation of resources.

In phase two in Tucson, creation of neighborhood task forces—community action teams (CAT's)—was the primary goal, with education in crime prevention another phase two emphasis.

To learn more about crime prevention techniques, two senior police command staff members together with top managers of the city's planning, transportation, and operations departments traveled to Orange County, California, to meet with representatives of other cities that were embarking on programs of crime prevention through environmental design. Later, a similar Tucson interagency group attended a CPTED training course at the National Crime Prevention Institute in Louisville, as did a crime prevention officer. In addition, the Tucson police video unit produced a new educational slide show about CPTED, *Safe by Design*.

Crime prevention through environmental design involves the design or redesign of living or recreational areas through the use of natural and constructed barriers to reduce criminal opportunities in the community defined by these barriers. Barriers to criminal activity are created in several simple but important ways: by street redesign (closing streets, developing cul-de-sacs, or adding bumps, turns, or other obstacles to speed so as to eliminate drive-through drug markets), by improving lighting, by remodeling buildings, and by installing protective fencing—all contributing to territorial definition.

Meetings with the city planning department and building safety

⁶ Roehl, Janice A., George E. Capowich, and Robert E. LLaneras, *National Evaluation of the Systems Approach to Community Crime and Drug Prevention*, Final Report submitted to the Bureau of Justice Assistance by the Institute for Social Analysis, May 1991.

division resulted in the police CPTED specialist being added to the municipal building plan review process. In December 1988, the city's director of economic development requested police advice on planning a major expansion of the Tucson convention center.

Seeking to deter crime far into the future, police presented their *Safe by Design* slide show to a board meeting of the Southern Arizona chapter of the American Institute of Architects and to a design class at the University of Arizona College of Architecture—their hope and expectation being that the architects-in-training would carry crime-reducing principles into their active design careers and thus make countless neighborhoods safer.

Neighborhood analyses

In Knoxville at this point, newly acquired crime analysis capabilities were applied to a new area: neighborhood analysis. Whole Knoxville communities were described in terms of data such as:

- Crime rates and offender information.
- Physical features.
 - Street conditions.
 - Lighting.
 - Recreational areas.
 - Building conditions.
- School statistics.
 - Truancy.
 - Dropout rate.
 - Vandalism.
 - Violence.
- Social information.
 - Children and families at risk.
 - Poverty levels.
 - Welfare.
- Community conditions.
 - Crime underreporting.
 - Neighborhood concerns.
 - Social service needs.
 - Juvenile problems.

- Demographic information (age, sex, ethnicity).

- Land use.

This sophisticated, comprehensive data base covering the entire city was built around 33 small areas. The citywide assessment team would approve one neighborhood analysis, then move on to a new one. This proved to be a mixed

Street lighting. Dark streets and alleys had fostered a perception of contributing to increasing crime. The neighborhood successfully sought designation as a lighting improvement district, by which each homeowner would be assessed \$600 to \$700 payable over 10 years.

Street signs and traffic control. The city traffic engineer's office found

High school students who learned about the cleanup efforts during a crime prevention assembly volunteered their labor.

blessing. Although the analyses came close to the original analytic goal for the national demonstration, by the time the team finished all the analyses and began to design interventions for the first neighborhood, the original analysis was out of date.

Tucson at first chose only three community areas to be profiled, its first candidates from which to select its first target neighborhood. Police officers and commanders in the three areas, however, moved almost immediately to address problems uncovered in the preparation of their neighborhood profiles. As a result, rather than selecting target neighborhoods based on police concerns and profiles, Tucson sent more than 800 letters to neighborhood groups inviting them to *apply* to have their areas targeted. Twenty-eight groups did apply.

Profiles were prepared of each, and from the 28 the profile team recommended El Cortez Heights, which the management review team approved. Five citizens agreed to serve on the El Cortez community action team, which developed the following 12- issue plan:

that many street markings were missing or incorrect and many streets lacked adequate traffic signs, including stop signs and one-way designations. The engineer's office installed the needed control signs and the missing street designations as well.

Lack of a visible police presence. An informal neighborhood survey revealed that residents thought increased patrolling by uniformed officers would improve neighborhood safety and that Neighborhood Watch should be more active. The patrol district commander increased uniformed patrol of the neighborhood and assigned an officer to provide liaison with the CAT.

Burglary, gangs, drugs. Residents were concerned about what they perceived as a rising crime trend, particularly in residential burglary. The CAT recommended buying locks for those who did not qualify for a "Locks for the Elderly" program and establishing contact with the police department's gang unit, major offenders (burglary) unit, and metropolitan area narcotics traffick-

ing interdiction squad. Fifty dead-bolt locks were purchased, together with tools to install them, and police helped train neighborhood volunteers to install them.

Speeding vehicles. The CAT recommended closing a major road on the boundary of the neighborhood to through traffic. When residents learned that they, too, would lose use of the thoroughfare, they withdrew their support for closing the road, so instead, the city traffic engineer installed several new stop signs and yield signs.

Identification and cleanup. Signs identifying the neighborhood were purchased to help instill pride in it. The neighborhood set up a tool bank of shovels, rakes, and the like, and high school students who learned about the cleanup efforts during a crime prevention assembly volunteered their labor at about 20 homes, working through the summer and receiving school credit for their work. In addition, more than 60 abandoned vehicles were found and removed.

Street names and numbers. Many buildings had addresses shown incorrectly or confusingly—"North" when it should have read "East" or street names other than the correct ones. The traffic engineer surveyed the problem and added or changed several signs. A troop of Boy Scouts painted address numbers on the curbs of 145 buildings.

Pedestrian crosswalks. A busy thoroughfare bordering the neighborhood lacked any pedestrian crosswalks by which residents could reach nearby shopping centers; therefore the CAT recommended one be built. The city traffic engineer studied traffic patterns on the thoroughfare and reported there was not sufficient pedestrian activity to justify a crosswalk. Because of the continuing citizen interest, however, the project remained under consideration. After further investigation, the city traffic engineer found that,

unfortunately, there was not sufficient visibility along the thoroughfare to build a safe crosswalk. As a result, none was built, but evaluators found that citizen dissatisfaction with neighborhood traffic and street problems had declined, many of the problems having been solved.⁷

Drug-haven apartments. Use of a large apartment complex for drug dealing and other activity created a public nuisance that disturbed many citizens. Several agencies advised the complex owner of health and safety violations, and the police and other agencies helped correct the

neighborhood association was successfully formed, although it replaced the Neighborhood Watch group that originally had asked for implementation of the systems approach in El Cortez Heights.

An under-utilized park. The CAT found a park under-utilized except for drug- and gang-related activity. So that the park facilities might better respond to the needs of the community, the police department initiated a dialog with the parks and recreation department and with neighborhood residents. As a result of this dialog, the parks officials set

The police department in partnership with other agencies mobilized to take action.

violations through inspections and cleanup efforts.

Lack of sidewalks. Neighborhood residents sought a more adequate system of sidewalks. The CAT recommended they seek an "improvement district" to build the sidewalks in much the same way they petitioned for a street lighting district. The residents accepted the advice and petitioned for a district that could assess the cost of the improvements. Installation of new sidewalks began two years later, with the city paying half the cost and assessing the residents for the remainder.

Lack of representation. Residents of El Cortez Heights felt unorganized and unrecognized in city politics. The CAT recommended that residents form a neighborhood association for representation in all matters of concern to the neighborhood. The

up a series of exercise stations to increase legitimate activity in the park and reduce the crime problem through the natural surveillance provided by those participating in this activity.

"Crime prevention through environmental design"—a Knoxville example

Knoxville offered this example of how its crime prevention through environmental design partnerships worked: an area was experiencing major drug activity against which enforcement efforts alone were futile. When the pushers saw increased police activity, they would simply move to another nearby street corner. The police department in partnership with other agencies mobilized to take action:

■ The service department picked up piles of garbage and debris and

7. Roehl et al., cited previous note.

also replaced burned-out and shot-out street lamps.

- Traffic engineers changed the traffic flow. They designated areas to be closed or to become cul-de-sacs; they added speed bumps and barriers as needed.
 - Codes enforcement personnel determined which building and merchandising codes were being violated and acted to enforce them.
 - Fire Department inspectors made sure that, with all the various changes in place, their firefighters still could reach all the apartments in an emergency.
 - Parks were changed to encourage appropriate use; in one park an exercise walking trail was installed that deterred inappropriate use of the park almost completely within six weeks.
- Faced with this focused attention to the environment, drug dealing dwindled. In addition, CPTED led to the following:
- Training of volunteers to conduct security inspections.
 - Installation, free or at a reduced rate, of security hardware such as locks.
 - Provision of low-interest loans for security improvements.
 - Training of police officers to work with architects, builders, and planners.
 - Surveying of areas for lighting requirements.
 - Encouragement of residents to improve alleyways and paths that police may need to use.
 - Removal of garbage and abandoned vehicles.
 - Clear identification of neighborhood boundaries, enhancing cohesiveness and safety.

Phase three: Coordinated delivery

Having completed crime prevention training in only one of its four patrol divisions during phase one, Tucson next extended the program to the other three divisions and, to ensure that training would continue, incorporated crime prevention into its field training program for all future officers.

A bigger effort was required for *community* education. Both to stress neighborhood improvement and to encourage volunteerism, the term "Team Tucson" was widely used in brochures, newspaper ads, public service announcements, and "information guides" that promoted improvement districts, removal of abandoned vehicles, street repair, and traffic signs. The demand-reduction brochure *Don't Get Tied Up With Drugs* featured bright orange shoelaces that unexpectedly became a teen fashion hit. "Team Tucson" pins became so familiar they were even permitted on police uniforms.

An amended ordinance enabled the police to use civilian volunteers (of whom they had 81) to ticket drivers for violating handicapped parking restrictions. So successful was this effort that the traffic division and fire department started examining the possibility of having frequent and flagrant violations of fire lane restrictions enforced by using volunteers also.

The most common use of volunteers was for office work, thus freeing paid employees to take on other assignments. However, a student helicopter pilot helped out at the heliport, a certified public accountant volunteered to work in the police budget section, and a retired Royal Canadian Mounted Policeman worked in the "Park Watch" program.

Neighborhood targeting

To extend its successful phase two efforts, Tucson decided to target at least one more neighborhood for Safe by Design activities in phase three, while continuing its phase two efforts in El Cortez Heights. Again, 800 applications were sent to neigh-

**Doing their part, residents, too,
worked to build closer relationships
with their neighborhood police for a
drug-free neighborhood.**

Seeking volunteers to augment salaried personnel in both drug demand reduction and crime prevention, Tucson also stressed existing crime watch programs such as Cab on Patrol (taxi drivers calling in tips to police) and McGruff Homes (scattered safehouses where children could take refuge).

borhood groups. Nine areas felt they had problems enough to submit requests for participation. The police crime prevention unit prepared "neighborhood profiles" of each of the nine.

The Wakefield neighborhood was selected. In addition to five neighborhood residents who made up the

CAT, officials of the Tucson Unified School District and the City of Tucson joined in identifying problems and developing strategies.

Drug activity

A survey of Wakefield residents named drug use and sales as the biggest problem in the neighborhood and its schools. Pueblo High School, just outside Wakefield, already had a Drug-Free School Zone program, and the Wakefield CAT suggested that the Wakefield Middle School start one also. Monthly meetings were held at the Wakefield Middle School to train residents in drug-reduction tactics. To demonstrate their commitment, two city council members, the city manager, and high-ranking school and police officials attended the Neighborhood Watch "National Night Out" at the school.

Doing their part, residents, too, worked to build closer relationships with their neighborhood police for a drug-free neighborhood. For example, one Tucson resident had been documenting activity at a suspected crackhouse for four months, but did not know what to do with the information. He eventually passed it along to a police beat officer. The house occupants shortly thereafter realized the house was known to police as a crackhouse and all drug activity there ceased. The neighborhood congratulated itself on solving the problem.

Neighborhood identity

The Drug-Free Zone program at Wakefield Middle School helped convince the CAT that more needed to be done to give the neighborhood a sense of identity. A contest was held at the middle school and the high school to develop a neighborhood logo, which was then posted on 10 signs placed around the neighborhood perimeter.

Graffiti also was a problem, often on walls adjacent to paved areas with insufficient space for landscaping.

At one of the worst sites, an art class from the middle school painted a mural with a religious and ethnic theme. The city's operations department, street division, and sanitation division joined neighborhood residents on seasonal cleanup days in the fall and spring to make the neighborhood look better.

Surveys by the traffic engineering division, aided by police traffic and community resources divisions, found that more traffic signs and better enforcement were needed. These were provided. The city engineer's office, however, found that it could not approve the recommended closing of an alley that bisected the entire neighborhood. A compromise led to closing one end of the alley to vehicular traffic, yet leaving the entire alley open to pedestrians, which brought a significant reduction in speeding and other traffic violations.

Efforts to enlist professional support from architects for the "Safe by Design" program continued—and continued to succeed. CPTED principles now are an intrinsic part of the coursework at the College of Architecture, University of Arizona. It appears that training and support of professional architects have a more significant impact on design than would legislation requiring "defensible space."

In addition to the targeted neighborhood activities in Wakefield and El Cortez Heights, a third Tucson neighborhood organized a CAT and implemented several improvements through funding provided by the Tucson city council. Beyond that, citywide anti-drug efforts had a large role in phase three activities.

Citywide drug efforts

Partly because of its location, Tucson is a major conduit for the flow of cocaine and other drugs from Mexico into the United States. Even before Wakefield Middle School and Pueblo High School, drug-free zones were established at the Amphitheater

High and Junior High Schools, the Flowing Wells High School, the Nailer Middle School, and the Cholla High School.

An evaluation of the drug-free zone program at Flowing Wells found a 43 percent reduction in drug-alcohol incidents and a 36 percent reduction in marijuana incidents. Flowing Wells had such a positive experience in its contact with officers that the school district requested an off-duty officer, paid by the district through a U.S. Department of Education grant, to work four hours daily as a campus safety officer—not to displace the assigned drug-free school zone liaison officer, but to promote campus safety.

Tucson police proposed to identify publicly a "known drug trafficking area," Mirasol Park, by posting signs, assigning officers full-time, and notifying by letter the registered owners of vehicles seen there that police had spotted their cars in the area. However, media attention was so great that the area residents and police took back the park from the drug dealers without any of the letters to vehicle owners ever having to be sent!

When drug activity from the park moved into houses in the area, the city's community services division took action to evict the drug-using tenants and provide the housing to new applicants.

Conclusion

As successful demonstration agencies for the Systems Approach to Crime and Drug Prevention grants, the police departments in both Knoxville and Tucson have welcomed their responsibility to share information with law enforcement agencies of other jurisdictions through documentation and through informal technical assistance.

It should be noted that the Knoxville police, having already developed explicit reciprocal agreements with other agencies, used both the term

The goal is to change . . .
from a traditional role to one of
community policing.

and the concept "systems approach" before BJA adopted them for the national demonstration. During the BJA demonstration program in Knoxville, its program director was promoted to chief of police, thereby adding impetus to cooperative efforts both within and beyond the police department.

Tucson developed its systems approach, on the other hand, from a background of long commitment, both by its chief and as a department, to the principle of community policing.

One message *both* departments have sounded consistently, however, is that the ideas of crime prevention and community partnership are related and that both ideas need to be woven into all aspects and activities of law enforcement. The goal is to change the entire *culture* of their law enforcement agencies from a traditional role to one of community policing.

Sources for further information

Publications cited in the footnotes and other crime and drug prevention reports are available from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Clearinghouse. Contact the:

BJA Clearinghouse
Box 6000
Rockville, Maryland 20850
Telephone: 800-688-4252
FAX: 301-251-5212
EBB: 301-738-8895

Additional information on the systems approach to crime prevention as a path to community policing, crime prevention through environmental design, or both is available from the following sources:

Knoxville Police Department
800 East Church Avenue
Knoxville, Tennessee 37915
Telephone: 615-525-1020
FAX: 615-521-1344

Tucson Police Department
P.O. Box 1071
Tucson, Arizona 85702-1071
Telephone: 602-791-4441
FAX: 602-791-5419

New Haven Department of Police Service
One Union Avenue
New Haven, Connecticut 06519
Telephone: 203-787-6269
FAX: 203-772-7294

Jacksonville Office of the Sheriff
501 East Bay Street
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Telephone: 904-630-2161
FAX: 904-630-2772

The National Crime Prevention Institute
The University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky 40292
Telephone: 502-588-6987
FAX: 502-588-6990

Maggie Heisler, Program Manager
Law Enforcement Branch
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20531
Telephone: 202-307-1065
FAX: 202-616-2421

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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Making the Transition to Mission-Driven Training

By Robert Trojanowicz, Bonnie Bucqueroux and Ron Sloan, National Center for Community Policing, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

With community policing rapidly becoming the standard by which police departments are judged, police managers are facing the challenge of dealing with the major internal changes that such a switch demands, as well as rethinking the ways in which the department relates to other individuals and groups in the community. The shift to community policing therefore has significant implications for training. If all aspects of training are driven by the philosophy and mission of community policing, training will become the key to promoting and institutionalizing this fundamental change in policing.

While this paper's primary focus will be on training line officers, it is also necessary to provide effective training in community policing to sworn and non-sworn personnel at all levels. Far too many departments have learned, at painful cost, that the "user-friendly" reputation of the entire department can be undermined by a civilian dispatcher who has not been trained properly to explain to callers why the shift to community policing can mean a delay in police response to non-emergency calls.

Free Patrol Time

If community policing is to become a department-wide commitment, it must be expressed by all line officers, not just community officers. Experience shows that if community policing is viewed internally as a "specialty" assignment, handled by a few, the rest of the officers will quickly revert to business as usual.

This means motor patrol officers must be required to leave their automobiles to interact—face-to-face—with citizens. While many complain that they do not have enough free patrol time to leave their cars to work with the community on problem identification and resolution, the real challenge lies in convincing these officers to use the time they have.

The solution requires consistency—from recruitment through in-service

training—for the duration of the officer's career. If academy trainees have been recruited with the understanding that they will be expected to leave their vehicles on free patrol time, they will be more amenable to doing so once out on their own. Academy training can reinforce this expectation by pointing out how face-to-face contact is essential in gaining citizens' trust, so that officers can be more effective in their problem-solving efforts.

The Field Training Officer (FTO) program should reinforce the academy training. For instance, the FTO can teach by example, exiting the vehicle whenever possible so that trainees learn to see this as "normal" behavior.

Ongoing in-service training should not only reinforce the two previous training experiences, but be expanded by encouraging officers to share examples about how they solved problems as a result of their involvement with the community.

Benefits of Interaction

Experience shows that officers enjoy their jobs more when they can see that their efforts in working directly with law-abiding people produce concrete, positive results. Decentralized and personalized police service encourages residents to think of officers who patrol their areas as "their own" officers and tends to make residents feel more protective of them. Exchanging real stories about how community policing enhances job satisfaction and safety is a potent training tool, even more powerful than any kind of formal training through the academy, the FTO program or in-service training.

If the support and rewards for "out-of-auto" interactions are long term and consistent, fewer officers will tend to retreat to the confines of their mobile "office." Officers who complain about leaving their cars can be reminded that this was clearly stated as an integral part of the job when they signed on, and that this requirement was emphasized all the way through training.

Parallels to Undercover Work

It is interesting that many officers who are reluctant to leave their vehicles either have worked undercover or want to do so, and there are many parallels between these activities. Successful undercover officers are rarely in the office—they are out communicating and interacting, using their verbal skills to gather information. When they "make a case," they credit their interpersonal skills with helping them achieve success, and their peer group applauds them for those skills.

Over time, as peer group support builds for community involvement, this can legitimize community-based problem solving, just as it legitimizes undercover operations.

Deficiencies in Traditional Productivity Standards

Job assessment is an important first step in fashioning an effective training program, since one must know what it takes to perform the job well in order to outline a suitable training program. All complex organizations, including—perhaps especially—the police, face significant problems in developing productivity measures that adequately evaluate actual performance.

At General Motors, for example, there is little doubt that most of the people in the organization work hard and try to work smart, yet they face a massive reorganization if they are to regain market share, because effort and intelligence alone are not the sole indicators of whether the organization is meeting its goals for success.

Typically, what is missing from most productivity standards is a thorough job analysis. Without knowing what the job really entails, gauging performance at any organizational level is virtually impossible. Crucial as well is that the job analysis must be informed by the mission and goals of the organization. In the case of General Motors, everyone in the organi-

zation understood that the goal was to make cars, yet the organization lost sight of the overarching goal: meeting the needs of the consumer and making cars that people want to buy.

The same holds true for police departments: the job is to provide police service to the community, but the overarching goal is to provide people the kind of police service that they want and need.

Complications in Job Analysis

Analyzing the job of police officers is difficult because their relationship with the community is so complicated. Instead of actually discussing what officers do on the job, most police performance literature tends to focus on innate character traits—intelligence, analytical ability, sensitivity and moral character. As a result, police administrators who rely on such criteria tend to dismiss poor police performance as stemming from a lack of training or from the failure to recruit the right types of people. This kind of system can be dangerously subjective since it is so difficult to assess fairly.

No doubt, GM tried to hire the best and brightest at all levels of the company, but those qualities alone do not ensure success unless the organizational environment allows those talented individuals the opportunity to work together to achieve the overall mission.

On the other hand, administrators with a quantitative bent argue that removing subjectivity from performance evaluation requires focusing on objective criteria—the number of traffic tickets issued, arrests made, convictions secured, security checks performed, etc. The obvious flaw in this system is that the most easily countable items may not be the best indicators of an officer's effectiveness, and they may not provide the greatest benefit to the community.

Again using GM as a frame of reference, we can assume that everyone in the organization, from executives to assembly-line workers, worked hard to produce as many cars as they could as quickly as possible, yet the end products failed to meet the test of the market—the community of consumers.

Communities and neighborhoods are complex social structures, with varying normative patterns. An evaluation system that relies on simplistic assessments, such as tickets issued and arrests made, ends up focusing on activities that account for only a fraction of an officer's time. Such a system may also promote abuses. Officers may feel pressured to fulfill arbitrary "quotas" if they are to earn raises and promotions. The job then becomes distorted to fulfill the expectations of supervision, rather than the wants and needs of the community.

The critical issue is how police performance standards and productivity measures can be structured to relate to actual job functions so these can be used to project realistic training guidelines. The police role must be defined in ways that can serve as a foundation for effective evaluation. Even more specifically, the role of the individual officer in a community policing department must be defined, keeping in mind that this approach differs from traditional policing because it is a special effort to create a symbiosis between police officers and the communities they serve.

Comprehensive Training

Most often mentioned as a potential solution to this challenge is the development of a comprehensive, in-depth training program for new officers. However, specifics about such training, especially basic training, remain the subject of debate. An ideal system would also include identifying characteristics required to be an effective officer, with these characteristics codified into a model that could then be used in the selection process. Standardizing training is also widely accepted as a valid goal.

If we look at the auto industry, the two obvious success stories are Saturn and Chrysler's second comeback, both of which were driven by teaching personnel to harness the entrepreneurial spirit to the mission of producing cars that people want.

As David Osborne and Ted Gaebler point out in their provocative book, *Reinventing Government*, comparing private enterprise to public service has its pitfalls, especially since the "consumers" of government services cannot, in most cases, shop elsewhere. However, government can adapt the lessons of private enterprise to the public sector, including the need to focus on outcomes, not inputs.

Inputs such as character traits and "productivity" (tickets written, arrests made) are irrelevant unless tied to the mission of empowering police personnel to make the community a better and safer place in which to live—the ultimate outcome. The authors propose transforming rule-driven organizations into mission-driven organizations that focus on *empowering* communities rather than serving them. Thus, an in-depth look at the forms that training will take is imperative in police organizations that adopt community policing.

As author Robert Pirsig wrote about the auto industry, the lesson that German and Japanese automakers teach is that quality is not something tacked on at the end,

like chrome. Instead, a commitment to quality must infuse every step of the process, and that requires that everyone work together as a team.

As this suggests, the commitment to quality demands rethinking every aspect of the training agenda to ensure that the philosophical underpinnings of community policing are woven into every element of the training approach.

Mission-Driven Training

In a community policing department, focusing on the department's mission rather than its rules requires a dramatic shift in training from a focus on mastery and obedience to a focus on empowerment. Any police organization that attempts to institute such a significant philosophical change must establish a comprehensive approach to training that provides the foundation for that change. As expected, many within the department will resist such sweeping change for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to:

- inherent reluctance to change established attitudes and behaviors;
- disagreement with the new philosophical approach;
- misunderstanding of the implications of change;
- perceptions that the change will threaten achieved status; and
- dissatisfaction with training that is not tied directly to mechanical skills, especially those considered as life-saving or those that are tactically based.

Of course, all of these obstacles must be understood and addressed. However, the last objection is among the more troublesome because of the particular challenge it poses to trainers. Police officers, as a whole, are very receptive to hands-on skills training, such as arrest control and defensive tactics, firearms proficiency, high-risk driving techniques and the use of intermediate force (batons, chemical agents, etc.).

Part of the appeal may be that the policing profession attracts action-oriented, competitive individuals who tend to enjoy mastering action-oriented skills where their performance can be measured objectively and their final "score" clearly assessed and compared to others'.

Philosophical mission-driven training, which forms the conceptual basis for the individual's role as well as the overall organization's collective goals, is often viewed as too theoretical and impractical. The reality, of course, is that rarely does any officer's daily routine include use of deadly force, high-speed pursuits or physical restraint of unruly citizens. In

fact, most of an officer's time is instead spent on taking cold reports, settling civil disputes, patrolling assigned areas or other similar tasks.

If training is to help officers do their best in a community policing department, it should: (1) mirror what it takes to do the job well, (2) be informed by the philosophy and mission of community policing and (3) be structured to maintain the trainees' interest. This is not to say that training should ignore such skills as firearms proficiency, since these skills can be crucial to both officers' and citizens' safety and survival. But traditional training has tended to place less emphasis on skills that might help to defuse potentially dangerous situations *before* they escalate.

A shift to community policing implies a balance of reactive efforts with initiatives that emphasize proactive and positive community interaction. Skills training must reflect the balance of these priorities, for example, by including more focus on improving interpersonal skills.

A comprehensive approach to training can serve as a foundation for community policing, with the term "comprehensive" used to indicate department-wide training that touches on

- introduction or orientation training (sworn and non-sworn)
- basic academy training (sworn)
- other new-hire training (non-sworn)
- police officer training (sworn)
- in-service training (sworn and non-sworn)
- other specialized training (sworn and non-sworn): supervisory/managerial/technical skills
 - sharing of current literature
 - ongoing information sharing

Introduction or Orientation Training

Implementing the shift to the community policing philosophy must begin with an introduction or orientation to what the philosophy entails, how it differs from what is currently being done, illustrations of its effectiveness and an overall opportunity for examining the underlying basis for change.

This initial training need not be lengthy, but it should include all department employees, either in the same session or in sessions tailored to each group's specific needs. The lesson here is that the success of the department does not rest solely with its officers. The critical functions provided by technical and support personnel require that they be involved in the process of changing the philosophical approach to line functions.

Basic Academy Training

It is when entry-level police officers join the organization that they are the most open to adopting a philosophical mindset for the police role. Even in situations where recruits have prior experience, they are usually willing to consider subtle changes in their role as they enter a new environment. This is especially true if recruitment, screening and testing are designed to select individuals with the desire and aptitude for community policing.

The basic academy setting should offer two tracks for community policing training:

"Dedicated" community policing training is specifically devoted to explaining what community policing is and how it works. It should include brief courses on the philosophy and role of community policing, selected strategies for problem solving, community organization and involvement, and the philosophy of "accountable creativity" at the line level, as well as other courses, such as mediation and de-escalation of emotionally charged situations (verbal judo, etc.).

Traditional training must also feature the common thread of community policing running through as much of the other training courses as possible. Examples include:

- Patrol procedures: Identifying strategies for becoming more community directed and concerned with quality-of-life and fear-of-crime issues while on "normal" patrols.
- Investigations: Determining strategies for effectively engaging residents in assisting investigations, directing investigative efforts toward identifying the underlying causes of crime and disorder, and encouraging trainees to think more broadly.
- Traffic enforcement and accident investigation: Identifying strategies for diagnosing underlying causes of traffic safety hazards and engaging the community and other service providers in resolving troubling community traffic safety issues.
- Law enforcement ethics: Establishing the ethical confines of a law enforcement role in the context of increased community engagement; outlining creative methodologies to increase order maintenance; and understanding the potential for a return to bias, favoritism and improper use of influence in a community-based model of policing.
- Arrest control and baton/defensive tactics: Providing the underlying philosophical approach to the use of force and physical restraint that includes the principles of minimum necessary force, technical proficiency designed to protect of-

ficers and citizens alike and concern for community acceptance of methods.

- Department rules and directives: Providing an understanding of the framework and rules for the delivery of police service that emphasizes creativity, fairness, community sensitivity and effective yet humane use of force.

Other New-Hire Training

When new non-sworn employees are hired into the organization, special attention should be paid to orienting them toward the department's mission and role. New support and technical employees need to understand early on that the department is committed to the ideals of community policing. This can help them see how their jobs support operational efforts to translate the community policing philosophy into practice.

Any new employee who has direct contact with the public (report technicians, dispatchers or complaint clerks, records clerks, receptionists, property and evidence clerks, etc.) should be trained in customer service, and all should be introduced to the concept of community organization and empowerment with regard to problem solving. Many of these employees interact directly with line officers, providing assistance and support, so it is imperative that they understand the changing role of the police officer.

Police Officer Field Training

The most profound impact on how a police officer works and acts during the early years of his career comes from the direction given and the example set during field training. Indeed, field training may well be the most crucial element in changing the departmental culture. This "on-the-job" training, which tends to override whatever trainees learn in academy classrooms, sets the standards for acceptable behavior. The mentoring provided by field training officers (FTOs) shapes the strategies, techniques and—most importantly—the role that recruits embrace.

Because of the tremendous impact field training has on the entire organization, the philosophical orientation and skills of the training officers are crucial. Therefore, training the trainers in community policing deserves special attention. Trainers must be committed to community policing themselves if they are to transmit that message to others.

Put bluntly, if an FTO does not both believe in and practice the principles of community policing, it will be virtually impossible even for rookies who are enthusiastic about community policing to withstand field training that undermines their commitment. Trainers who subvert the principles of community policing, whether consciously or because of lack of proper training themselves, can end up perpetuating the ineffective and outmoded strategies of the professional policing model. For example, trainers can talk all they want to about the virtues of "out-of-automobile" experience, but unless rookies learn by seeing field training officers do this whenever they can, the chances are that rookies will follow the negative example rather than the positive advice.

Among the more important changes that must be made in a structured field training program is that the job task categories of the daily evaluation should reflect the philosophy and practice of community policing. Rectifying problems can require either a redefinition of performance standards under existing job categories (i.e., field performance, investigation, officer safety, interaction with the public, etc.) or the creation of new job task categories (with corresponding performance standards) that reflect the community policing philosophy, such as:

- Knowledge and application of resources in daily work. Standards should reflect an acceptable knowledge base, as reflected in verbal or written tests (scores between 70 percent and 95 percent on written tests), the ability to make appropriate referrals on a daily basis, the maintenance of a list of appropriate referrals for reference in the field and the ability and willingness to explain options and resources.

- Responsiveness to quality-of-life issues in performance. Standards should reflect general recognition of the importance of quality-of-life issues in the community and the need to address them properly in daily work; self-initiation of activities such as those listed above; use of innovative approaches to problem-solving; commitment to the idea of community service, participation and empowerment; courtesy, empathy, respect and helpfulness in daily contacts; and a focus on solving problems rather than avoiding them or just taking reports.

- Relationship with the community. Standards should reflect positive interaction with the community, face-to-face contact with law-abiding citizens whenever possible, a commitment to involving citizens in nominating and prioritizing problems and developing short- and long-term solutions, the ability and willingness to explain actions and directions to citizens and a commitment to following up on citizen questions and concerns.

It is essential that management closely supervise the field training program. Weekly evaluations of training officers and sergeants can help ensure that anyone who strays off track from the community policing model can be redirected quickly. Additionally, field training sergeants must lead both the trainers and recruits by example on the street.

In-Service Training

Achieving change is difficult, but maintaining change and empowering employees to use new techniques or skills is impossible without a mechanism for continual reinforcement. Formal in-service training provides a way to maintain momentum and build new skills.

Unfortunately, many organizations either provide little refresher training or direct such training only at sworn officers. We believe not only that training should be provided to both sworn and non-sworn personnel, but that it should devote entire sessions to the principles and strategies of community policing.

Workshops on community organization and empowerment, problem solving, special projects, performance evaluation guidelines, and local and national updates on police strategies can be structured to suit the needs of both sworn and non-sworn personnel, depending on the needs and constraints of the organization. Of overriding importance is that police managers understand that in-service updates are critical to institutionalizing community policing.

Other Specialized Training

Overlooking the need to provide specialty training may doom attempts to institutionalize community policing. Not only must first-line supervisors be able to recognize and reward community empowerment and creative problem-solving, but they must be trained to encourage risk-taking and innovation among subordinates. At issue as well is that risk-taking and innovation depend on mutual trust between supervisors and line officers. Without such trust, line officers will stick with the status quo, which typically rewards those who do not take chances or make waves.

If supervisors and managers are not willing to accept honest mistakes, line officers will continue to rely on conventional strategies that ultimately lead to stagnation. Accountable risk-taking emphasizes responsibility, not license, and it examines failures or mistakes as a means of learning how to do better in the future, not as a means of assigning blame.

Managers in a community policing department can specifically benefit from skills training in redirecting, leading by example and constructive criticism.

Managers and command officers should also be given the opportunity to understand and facilitate the philosoph-

As efforts to shift to community policing gain momentum, the department should explore methodologies for sharing information on strategies and projects with others inside and outside the department.

ical change to community policing. Without repeated training, top leaders in the department can see community policing as a threat to their status and power. Again, training must emphasize that under community policing, all functions in the department are driven by the mission, not by the rules, and that consequently the role of police managers must change from that of "controller" to "facilitator." Unless this problem is addressed, top-level support can wane, undermining and even sabotaging the entire effort.

Other areas of specialized skills training include application of performance assessment systems, development of community policing goals and objectives, organization and facilitation of community self-help groups, and public speaking.

The explosion in new information on community policing can make it difficult to stay abreast of what is happening in the field. Therefore, a department should consider establishing a system to gather materials, assess their usefulness and disseminate them. A central repository or library of articles, books, other research, and video and audio tapes can provide a valuable training resource for the entire department. The department should also maintain contact with the National Center for Community Policing, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Police Foundation, the IACP and other national organizations to ensure receipt of new publications as they become available.

As efforts to shift to community policing gain momentum, the department should explore methodologies for sharing information on strategies and projects with others inside and outside the department. This is important for many reasons. First, disseminating this information can make it possible for others to

borrow useful ideas. Second, it can help reinforce the message that community policing works. Third, it provides an "attaboy" for individuals and groups who deserve praise for their initiative. Fourth, documenting success to groups outside the department can help to build broad-based support—among civic officials, business owners, community leaders, taxpayers, other government agencies, non-profit groups and average citizens.

Many departments have produced newsletters and videos, and some have established computerized data bases. A data base accessible throughout the department can eliminate the need to reinvent the wheel each time someone is looking for possible solutions to community problems.

Conclusions

Training is crucial for the adoption of any significant change, and it is the foundation for our response to challenges. Consequently, a comprehensive training approach is essential in institutionalizing the philosophy and practice of community policing within an agency.

The new role expectations for community officers have obvious implications for selection and training. For example, the superior communication skills required

by these officers raises the question of whether such skills should be a precondition of employment or the subject of training after hiring. If communication skills training is added to basic training, what other subjects should be dropped or curtailed to make room? Should such classes be offered in addition to the existing program? If so, what are the cost implications?

If such training is offered as part of advanced training, should classes be conducted in formal classroom sessions, or should they be part of roll call? Are self-paced home-study materials a viable option? Again, what are the costs?

Thus far, we have discussed only one area of specialized training, but a case can be made that community policing officers would benefit from additional training in foreign languages, basic psychology, human relations, gerontology, child psychology and development, political science, urban planning and city management: Of course, the question is how much training is both desirable and feasible? Unless a department can afford to expand its training program, adding something new to the roster implies short shrift for something else. Obviously, the training roster cannot be determined simply by allocating training time according to how officers spend most of their time—officers spend

less than 1 percent of their time administering first-aid or firing a weapon, yet these are life-and-death skills.

The challenge is to balance both traditional and non-traditional training to ensure that the community policing philosophy infuses both. If all the worthwhile skills cannot be added to basic training, there may be ways to provide them in advanced training or through self-paced studies, by assigning trainers to roll call or by providing training through new technologies like video and audio cassettes and computers.

Law enforcement is under intense scrutiny today, because of everything from riots following the verdict in the Rodney King case, to the constraints of a criminal justice system overwhelmed by rising arrests and the myriad effects of a lingering nationwide recession. As a result, police must employ innovative training strategies to inculcate the community policing philosophy as the prevailing mindset among everyone in the department.

When the pressures on police are the greatest, we must be creative if we are to survive. If we approach training as a means of reinforcing the tenets of community policing, not only do we enhance our chances of survival, but we can address many of the challenges facing police today. ★

The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy

Chicago is not the first major city to implement community policing. But in the tradition of Daniel Burnham, Chicago is making no little plans when it comes to its vision of the new policing philosophy. Started on a prototype basis earlier this year in five police districts, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy will be expanded citywide during 1994 with an ambitious program of community-based problem solving and organizational change.

By Kevin P. Morison

When residents on the far North Side of Chicago noticed a sudden increase in foot traffic in and out of a local tavern, they knew what to do—talk with their beat officers.

The citizens knew the bar didn't sell carry-out goods, so at the next regular neighborhood meeting they informed their beat officers of the suspicious activity. A subsequent police investigation uncovered an intricate drug-dealing operation that included the bartender. Six arrests were made, and the tavern's liquor license is now being challenged.

On the West Side, local gang members were using the front yard of an elderly couple to store weapons and drugs. The couple had become unable to care for their property, which had overgrown with weeds and bushes. When notified of the situation by neighbors, local beat officers worked with the city's Department of Streets and Sanitation to clear the yard, which resulted in the recovery of three automatic weapons.

On the city's Southwest Side, a foot patrol officer responded to community concern over street vendors and their impact on safety. In response to several accidents, the city council passed an ordinance banning ice cream

trucks and other vendors in the neighborhood. The officer developed a "No Peddlers" sign for area businesses to display, and he has made several arrests. Aware of the community's concern, judges have ordered stiff fines in many cases.

These are not just isolated instances of "good police work." They are examples of the new partnership being forged in Chicago among the police department, other agencies of city government, and the communities they serve.

A new and different way of policing

That partnership is at the heart of Chicago's new community policing program, known officially as the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, or CAPS. Chicago Police Superintendent (and member of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority) Matt L. Rodriguez said the name is significant for two reasons.

"The name 'CAPS' says this is Chicago's vision of community policing, not a strategy defined by or for any other city," he said. "The name also makes it clear that this is a new and different way of policing, not simply a repackaging of what we've done

in the past. Under CAPS, police officers are working with the community to identify and solve neighborhood crime problems, not simply treat their symptoms," he explained.

CAPS officially rolled out last April, on a prototype basis, in five of Chicago's 25 police districts: Englewood (7th District) and Morgan Park (22nd) on the South Side; Marquette (10th) and Austin (15th) on the West Side; and Rogers Park (24th) on the North Side. These five districts have vastly different populations—racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically—and vastly different crime problems.

Englewood, for example, has one of the highest crime rates in Chicago. Last year, there were 80 homicides, more than 2,100 robberies and 3,000 serious assaults in this 6.5-square-mile neighborhood of approximately 130,000 people. Just a few miles south, the Morgan Park District has one of the city's lowest crime rates.

According to Superintendent Rodriguez, the department is using the five prototype districts as a unique laboratory for evaluating and improving the basic CAPS model before it is expanded citywide during 1994.

Maintaining beat integrity

A key element of the new strategy, according to Charles H. Ramsey, deputy chief of patrol and CAPS project manager, is maintaining "beat integrity"—that is, keeping officers on their assigned beats and engaged in crime-fighting and problem-solving activities with local residents.

"Patrol officers have always been assigned to beats," Deputy Chief Ramsey said. "But in the past they were frequently pulled off those beats to answer calls for service in other parts of the district. This prevented officers from getting to know the people and the problems on their beats, and it prevented the people from getting to know their beat officers."

To address this problem, he said, the Chicago Police Department has restructured the prototype districts to include teams of "beat officers" and "rapid response officers." Police have also developed a new dispatch policy designed to minimize the time that beat officers spend off their beats.

"Priority 1" calls for service—those requiring an immediate dispatch of an officer because they involve an imminent threat to life, bodily injury, or major property damage of loss—are handled by either a rapid response unit or the unit on the beat where the incident occurred. If neither is available, the call is given to one of the district's tactical or gang units, or to a field sergeant. Only if none of these units is available, and only if a field supervisor authorizes, will officers be assigned to a call off their beat.

To support these new roles and responsibilities, 200 additional police officers and supervisors were made available earlier this year for deployment among the five prototype districts. Deputy Chief Ramsey said the additional officers are helping to ensure that beat officers can remain on their beats, engaged in proactive policing and crime prevention activities, while the department maintains sufficient resources to handle the volume of calls for service it continues to receive.

In addition, officers are now working the

same beat on the same shift week in and week out. In the past, officers rotated every 28 days among the midnight, day, and evening shifts. The new shift schedule is designed to improve problem solving by enhancing contact and trust between police officers and the neighborhood residents they serve.

Community-based problem solving

Problem solving under CAPS is being formalized through a process known as beat profiling and action planning.

Beat profiling involves officers working with the community to record the characteristics and chronic problems of their beats and to identify the resources available to address those problems. Police, other city agencies, and community residents use this beat profile to develop specific plans of action for addressing neighborhood problems of crime and disorder. These action plans prioritize problems, identify strategies, assign responsibility, and provide a means for measuring success.

The community is involved at all levels of the process, according to Deputy Chief Ramsey. Each prototype district has a District Advisory Committee, consisting of the district commander and other police personnel; business and community leaders; elected officials such as aldermen, school, and park district representatives; and other city, state, and federal officials. The committee meets at least once a month to identify district-level issues and problems, and to help set broad priorities.

More localized problem solving is accomplished at the beat level. Beat officers, along with the department's neighborhood relations staff and other district personnel, meet regularly with citizens on the beat to share information and go over specific plans. Some districts have formal community representatives—called "beat facilitators" or "beat representatives"—to coordinate the community's role in the process, and the Chicago Police Department is now planning a program of joint police-community training at the beat level in the prototype districts.

Police and citizen training partnerships: New York's approach

The Citizens Committee for New York City, Inc., offers grants, training, publications, and technical assistance to more than 10,000 neighborhood and tenant associations in New York City. After more than 20 years as a community activist, Felice Kirby, founder and associate director of the committee's Neighborhood Anti-Crime Center (NACC) was recruited to train New York City's Community-Problem Oriented Policing (C-POP) officers. Currently, Ms. Kirby conducts training seminars for police and community leaders across the country.

Ms. Kirby addressed four executive sessions on community policing held by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority this fall, two for the Chicago Police Department and two for top law enforcement officials statewide. At the executive sessions, Ms. Kirby emphasized that community policing does not work by law enforcement officers alone—community leaders must also have a commitment to change and to the new style of policing. She stressed that only by the community and police working together—practicing real-life collaborative problem solving—can problem oriented policing live up to its full potential of creating more livable neighborhoods.

"People have to say, 'I'm not going to take it anymore,' and then take some action," Ms. Kirby said. "There are no miracles, but community policing does work," she added.

The NACC advocates experience-based training for community policing, rather than traditional in-service training, in which an officer's day is spent in the classroom. Instead, officers spend much of their time in field exercises, with classrooms used only for morning and mid-afternoon briefings, and occasional return trips for interactive classroom sessions.

In addition, NACC's community policing training sessions are conducted by teams of law enforcement officers and citizen trainers—this collaboration lends credibility to the program and offers additional resources to its participants. In some cases, officers are trained alongside community organization representatives, giving officers a chance to meet and interact with residents who are active in the community.

NACC's philosophy of involving citizens and law enforcement together in community policing training was summed up by Ms. Kirby: "Police should identify community organizations as positive pieces to a puzzle and work together to reduce the problems in a community."

Teresa Vlasak

"The CAPS program has raised the consciousness of citizens to crime and showed how they can have an impact on deterring it," said Kevin O'Neil, chairman of the citizen beat representatives of Beat 2431 in the Rogers Park District.

"I've seen a lot of enthusiasm, but the community needs to realize how important their participation is to the ultimate success [of CAPS]," said Peggie Haggerty, a member of Morgan Park's District Advisory Committee. "Police need their input to know the priorities."

Other key features

In addition to beat integrity and community involvement, here are some of the other key features of the CAPS model:

◆ **Training.** With the help of federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) funds awarded by the Authority, the Chicago Police Department has made a substantial invest-

ment in training for CAPS. Approximately 1,750 officers and supervisors from the five prototype districts received training earlier this year in a curriculum that included interpersonal communication, problem solving, alliance building, and, for sergeants and lieutenants, advanced leadership skills.

Citizen experts were brought in to co-teach many of the classes, and community leaders were invited to participate in some of the sessions.

◆ **Computerized crime analysis.** To support the collection and analysis of data at the neighborhood level, each of the five prototype districts is installing a local area network of advanced computer workstations. These computers will allow the districts to analyze and map crime hot spots, to track other neighborhood problems (such as problem liquor establishments), and to share statistical information with the community.

◆ **Support from other government**

agencies. Mayor Richard M. Daley has made CAPS a priority of the entire city government, not just the Chicago Police Department. "I recognize that the police can't do it alone," the mayor said. "If community policing means reinventing the way the Chicago Police Department works, it also means reinventing the way all city agencies, community members, and the police work with each other," he said.

Police officers and personnel from other city agencies are now being cross-trained in each others' operations. In addition, special procedures for requesting, logging, and following up on requests for city services such as towing abandoned vehicles and fixing street lights have been established in the CAPS districts.


◆ **Communication and marketing.** Communicating the CAPS philosophy to members of the Chicago Police Department and to the community—and getting their feedback and suggestions for improvement—are important elements of the strategy. Ongoing communication includes a CAPS newsletter and regular staff and community meetings. Feedback is being collected through focus groups, surveys, a special CAPS hotline, and various suggestion forms.

◆ **Evaluation.** CAPS is undergoing probably the most extensive evaluation of any community policing program in the country. A consortium of four Chicago-area universities—Northwestern, Loyola, DePaul, and the University of Illinois at Chicago—is conducting a three-year evaluation of the process and results in the prototype districts. Federal ADAA money from the Authority is also being used for this evaluation.

In addition, the department's research and development division is analyzing the internal survey and focus group data that are being collected.

Future expansion

Chicago Police Department planners are using the preliminary results of these evaluations to fine-tune the CAPS model before it is introduced in the remaining 20 police districts during 1994. City officials are also counting on additional resources to ensure a full complement of beat and rapid response



Deputy Chief of Patrol (and CAPS Project Manager) Charles H. Ramsey fields officers' questions during CAPS training this summer at the South Shore Cultural Center. The Authority helped to fund the unique CAPS training curriculum.

officers to implement community policing citywide.

Mayor Daley's 1994 budget proposal calls for hiring 400 additional officers, and the department plans to redeploy an almost equal number of officers from administrative assignments to street duty.

Even with this ambitious implementation schedule, officials are realistic about their short-term expectations.

"Community policing is not a panacea. It will not instantaneously eliminate or reduce crime," cautioned Superintendent Rodriguez.

"It will, however, help us work toward providing long-term solutions to many of the social problems which are a stimulus to crime. Through early intervention and problem solving, many crimes can be prevented, and we can create an alternative to the seemingly endless cycle of victimization, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration," he said. ■

Kevin P. Morison is coordinator of special projects for the Research and Development Division of the Chicago Police Department.

"Together We Can"

The implementation of any new policing philosophy entails more than new personnel and operating procedures. A variety of policy and organizational issues must be addressed as well.

To support the implementation of community policing throughout the Chicago Police Department, Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez has initiated a comprehensive strategic planning process.

In October, the department published *Together We Can: A Strategic Plan for Re-inventing the Chicago Police Department*. This 29-page document identifies the critical components of change that will be needed to fully implement the CAPS philosophy over the next 3-5 years. These include areas such as management style and practices, organizational structures, training, resource allocation, discipline, differential response, use of technology, and the role of the community.

"In the future, the department must be prepared—organizationally, educationally, managerially, and motivationally—to fulfill the key components of change identified in the strategic plan," Superintendent Rodriguez said.

Turning the department's new strategic vision into specific plans of action is the responsibility of the recently created policy and planning committee. The committee is co-chaired by Charles H. Ramsey, deputy chief of patrol and CAPS project manager, and Barbara McDonald, director of research and development.

For copies of *Together We Can*, contact the Chicago Police Department, research and development division, at 312-747-6207.

Kevin P. Morison

CAPS evaluation is underway

In order to understand the outcomes of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), it is necessary to evaluate both the implementation process and the impact of the program on the community.

The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, with support from the MacArthur Foundation, is funding a three-year evaluation study of each these issues in the five prototype districts. Spearheaded by Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, the evaluation is being conducted by a consortium of Chicago area universities that also includes Loyola University of Chicago, DePaul University, and the University of Illinois at Chicago. An Authority research analyst will also work on the project.

The process evaluation will measure the police department's progress in making the organizational changes that are necessary to the success of CAPS. The research team is studying many factors that may affect the implementation of the program, including the resources available to the police department, such as funding and technical assistance, program planning, the implementation process, program management, police-community partnerships, and tactical programs.

The community impact evaluation will look at the effect of CAPS on the prototype communities. Measured will be changes in the levels and types of community problems, such as abandoned buildings and cars, broken windows, litter, and graffiti, comparing the prototype areas to districts that have not had community policing. In addition, "before and after" interviews with neighborhood residents will measure their perceptions of police officers and any change they have seen or felt in their neighborhoods before and after the introduction of CAPS. Community residents will be specifically surveyed about their level of crime reporting, whether they have been victimized by their fear of crime, and whether they have police relations.

To help the Chicago Police Department manage the continuing implementation of CAPS, the research team is providing interim findings to the department. This feedback has already helped the department make adjustments and improvements to the program, improving the prospects for CAPS success.

Lynn Higgins, Authority Research Analyst

Adapting to needs: community policing around the state

Community policing is a statewide phenomenon in Illinois. This article profiles three different departments—Elmhurst, Frankfort, and Carbondale—that have adapted the principles of community policing to fit the specific needs of their communities.

By Steve Anzaldi

As police departments struggle to control rising incidents of violence and other crimes, community policing is becoming accepted throughout the state as an effective alternative to an incident-driven philosophy. The concept of community policing is being adapted and transformed to meet the needs not only of large, metropolitan areas, but also of suburbs, small towns, and rural communities.

The new style of community policing promotes an accountability of officers to the citizens they serve, while providing shared agenda setting and decision making. It calls for a decentralization of police authority and structure, which leads to greater empowerment of officers throughout the individual department.

In Illinois, increasing numbers of departments are adopting—and adapting—the ideas and tactics of community policing. The three communities profiled here represent various applications of this modern policing style, of taking local citizens as

partners in problem solving and crime prevention.

Elmhurst

In Elmhurst, a city of 43,000 in east DuPage County, community policing is not new, according to Chief John Millner. "We have always been responsive to citizens' needs in that way," he said, operating anti-drug abuse and crime prevention programs. Now, the problem that most concerns Chief Millner is citizen satisfaction with day-to-day, non-emergency service calls.

In an effort to provide citizens with "one-stop shopping" convenience, the Elmhurst Police Department created a cadre of officers who can handle the full range of needs any citizen might have, including noise complaints, broken street lamps, fallen trees, or other problems. When possible, the officer handles the problem him- or herself, or, if need be, forwards complaints to the city maintenance department, forestry division, or another appropriate

To provide the citizens of Elmhurst with "one-stop shopping" convenience, the police department created a cadre of officers who can handle the full range of needs any citizen might have, from noise complaints to fallen trees.

public agency.

New and veteran officers are repeatedly reminded of the full extent of their modern policing responsibilities. From an administrative standpoint, this process represents the greatest challenge in community policing, according to Chief Millner. Today's new recruits have been trained mainly to enforce laws.

However, Chief Millner said, their responsibilities on the job do not end there. "Our officers are also resource people from government to the citizen," he stated.

The Elmhurst Police Department is in constant contact with citizens. In town meetings and forums, both parties have access to one another to discuss safety in the community, crime prevention, and growing concerns such as drugs or gangs. The department also provides drug- and gang-related seminars for community residents and sends officers into schools to interact with children and their parents.

Chief Millner has taken steps to ensure that the departments' officers have a stake in the policing process. Each officer has a measure of policy- and procedure-making power. They test and select department equipment and uniforms. They even developed a new design for Elmhurst police vehicles.

Instead of relying solely on quantitative measures—such as the number of arrests made—evaluating an officer's performance, Chief Millner uses what he calls, community sensing mechanisms. He actively seeks feedback from elected governmental officials and residents. Random callbacks are conducted to gauge citizen satisfaction on officers and calls for service. Personal letters to the department reflect the service a particular citizen received. "For every letter of complaint I get, I want to see ten letters of compliment," Chief Millner said. Other sources of criticism, both positive and negative, are newspaper articles, editorials, and the chamber of commerce.

Chief Millner believes the biggest challenge for the future of community policing in Elmhurst will be increasing coordination with the various other branches of city gov-

ernment. Chief Millner hopes to become part of a united system, in which the police, public works, city hall, and other such institutions would work together in public service.

Frankfort

The challenges faced by Chief Darrel Sanders and the Frankfort Police Department differ from those of Elmhurst. Located 35 miles south of Chicago, the town of Frankfort has a population of approximately 10,000. The greatest percentage of calls to the police department are in response to non-emergency complaints or accident reports.

According to Chief Sanders, policing in Frankfort has always been community-oriented. The same can be said in most small town agencies. "The whole agency is involved in community policing," Chief Sanders said, "in that we are *part* of the community."

Being part of the community means being *in* the community. With individual patrol areas, officers are able to monitor one specific location in town. In addition, officers are made available to citizens as needed, at any time. "The community has direct access to us," Chief Sanders said.

At public meetings, citizens or organizations meet officers to discuss certain problems or concerns in their neighborhoods. For instance, a debate arose over youth skateboarders in the downtown area. The police department and the parents of the youngsters in question got together to address the problem. The department was concerned about the liability issue, claiming there was a clear danger to the youngsters and pedestrian traffic. Parents did not agree, and the two sides eventually worked out an agreement, prohibiting skateboards in certain areas.

In addition to these problem-solving debates, the community is kept up to date on police activities and happenings through local newspapers articles and public notices. When Chief Sanders hears from citizens, in the form of criticisms or complaints, he knows their needs are not being



Teresa Viasak

Sergeant Raymond Turano of the Elmhurst Police Department checks in at a restaurant in downtown Elmhurst. Elmhurst Police Chief John Millner encourages constant contact between his officers and citizens by allowing each officer a measure of policy-and procedure-making power.

met. "If there is silence, we assume they are satisfied," he said.

Although Frankfort's crime rate is low (two armed robberies in 1993, for instance), Chief Sanders noted the need to keep on top of the crime problem, large or small, in a community policing system. He attributes the low crime rate not only to the town's size and location but to Frankfort's united efforts between police officers and citizens.

"The citizens have a willingness to work with the police department to help us fight crime. And the elected officials staff us properly, giving us the resources we need," Chief Sanders said. He expects that the Frankfort Police Department will continue to do everything that is necessary to continue community policing, since this style has had a positive impact so far.

Carbondale

Carbondale differs from most other municipi-

palities in Illinois in that its population of 27,000 shares the city, neighborhoods, and resources with a transient population of about 23,000 college students.

The high turnover in population caused by the waves of students entering and leaving Southern Illinois University makes it impossible for the police of Carbondale to establish a stable, long-term relationship with many neighborhoods. "They [college students] do not identify with Carbondale as they do with their own hometowns," said Chief of Police Don Strom.

The northeastern section of town, however, contains neighborhoods of permanent Carbondale residents. "It lends itself to community-oriented policing because a relationship can be established," Chief Strom said. "There is a greater possibility for involvement and we work together to change problems."

Since taking over the department two

Frankfort's relatively small size means that officers can be assigned to individual patrol areas, monitoring one specific location in town. In addition, officers are made available to citizens as needed, at any time.

The Carbondale Police Department must cope with a stable population of 27,000 and a transient student population of 23,000, tailoring programs to fit both situations.

years ago, Chief Strom has continued to develop community policing in his department. "Our officers have been doing a lot of the things related to community policing all along, but there is more to be done," he said.

Increasing the department's involvement in community policing required some reevaluating and restructuring of Carbondale Police policies and procedures. This included a reprioritization of service calls, the implementing of an alternative reporting system, and enhanced city crime analysis. The department now employs a full-time crime analyst, who supports officers on the street by identifying "hot spots" and keeping track of repeated calls for service. Beat areas were also redefined, and officers have been assigned to specific beats in order to develop consistency.

The department is also actively seeking

outside resources to help develop programs. For example, the police department used a portion of a housing authority grant to put a team of officers to work in public housing in various neighborhoods. Their mission was to work with groups of citizens to improve the quality of life in these areas. They did so by sponsoring neighborhood picnics, helping to build a local playground, and forcing drug dealers away. In one situation, tenants of a particular building documented an individual's continuous drug dealing activities. They signed a petition requesting his eviction, which ultimately led to his removal from the building. "It sent a signal of strength through the neighborhood," Chief Strom said.

Local organizations throughout the city are teaming up with the police department to identify problems and discuss solutions. For instances, in a group called Seniors and

Law Enforcement Together, older adults responded to surveys to inform police of their major concerns. One result was a door watch operation that was developed to combat burglary.

The need to cooperate closely with the university and its police department adds another element to the mix. Many problems relate specifically to the university, such as underage drinking, parties, burglary, and sexual assault. Chief Strom and his department often work in tandem with the university's police department on these issues. They have organized joint foot patrols on weekends to monitor areas of heavy activity, such as downtown areas and student-populated neighborhoods.

These three Illinois police departments each have taken the general principles of community policing—such as increased citizen participation and empowerment of individual officers—and tailored them to fit the unique requirements of their communities. The success of their efforts, and those in other communities where community policing is being implemented, will depend largely on how well the tailoring fits. ■

Community policing: a citizen-police partnership

Despite all the words that have been written about community policing none have offered a single definition that is espoused by all its proponents.

Malcolm K. Sparrow, of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, wrote in a 1988 article, "(T)he concept of Community policing envisages a police department striving for an absence of crime and disorder and concerned with, and sensitive to, the quality of life in the community. It perceives the community as an agent and partner in promoting security rather than as a passive audience."

At the heart of the "concept" of community policing—which has its roots in the findings of foot patrol and fear reduction experiments, research on the relationship between fear and disorder, and experiences with team policing in the 1960s and 1990s—is the formation of a partnership between the police and the community at the most basic level: the officer and the citizen. In departments promoting community policing, police functions have been broadened to include such activities and skills as conflict resolution, problem solving, and the provision of services, as well as law enforcement. Departments adopting a community policing philosophy thus recognize both crime control and prevention as important and legitimate activities for police to pursue and dedicate officers' time to both.

This being the case, new measures are called for to help departments assess the effectiveness of their efforts. No longer can the work of a department or an individual officer be evaluated by the numbers of persons arrested, calls answered, or tickets written. Instead, as noted by George Kelling and Mark Moore, both of the Kennedy School of Government, departments using community policing should consider measures such as the quality of life in neighborhoods, problems solved, reduction of fear, increased order, and citizen satisfaction with police services, as well as crime control. In addition, community residents need to carry their share as partners of the police in improving their neighborhoods.

Candice Kane

Leadership for Change: A National Agenda

By Chief David Couper, Retired, Madison Police Department, Wisconsin,
and Sabine Lobitz, Madison, Wisconsin

How important today is leadership? How important is it for police leaders to better meet the expectations of the communities they serve? In most communities, there exists a feeling that police departments could do more to satisfy members' expectations. For many police departments, this would require significant changes in the way they have done business for a long time.

There are, we believe, three basic "truths" about changing and improving the police:

First, outsiders can't change the police. Some may think that a lawyer, judge or some other public or private sector person or committee can change us, but they're wrong. Outsiders may be able to maintain the status quo, but they will never be able to take us anywhere we aren't inclined to go. We are a strong subculture. To change a subculture, a person has to live it himself and find it wanting.

The complexities of a subculture like ours necessitate the development of internal change agents—"organizational guerrillas"—who are thoroughly knowledgeable about the police mystique as well as its work systems. But even internal change agents have their work cut out for them. Some work systems may be formal and easily identified, while others are very informal and almost impossible to understand without working directly in that system.

Second, we must change the inside first. We can't improve police organizational behavior, or services, without first addressing changes inside the police organization itself. The best example of this is almost every instance of failed police innovation. It is not that there has been a dearth of

innovative ideas in the police field; it is that these ideas have proven unsuccessful, due in large part to the lack of preparation inside the police organization.

Successful organizational improvement and change will come about only through a three-stage process:

1. Change yourself.
2. Improve the workplace (primarily by improving the organizational leadership style).
3. Ask your employees to treat customers the same way you are trying to treat them; i.e., improve services to citizens.

In *Principle-Centered Leadership*, Stephen Covey explains:

When one of our governing values is total quality, we will care not only about the quality of our products and services, but also about the quality of our lives and relationships. . . . Total quality is a total philosophy. . . . And it is sequential; if you don't have it personally, you won't get it organizationally.

Finally, things take time, but change takes even longer. We have come to believe that an investment of seven or more years of consistent top leadership is needed to implement any significant change. For such change to be effective and lasting, it must be made clear to everyone in the organization that you are here to stay as long as it takes to bring about this change.

There are seven essential factors in improving and changing a police department to meet community expectations. To be effective, the leader of the department must be committed to all seven.

1. Create and Nurture a Vision

As a leader, you must be able to create a clear vision of the future—after the

change. Your colleagues, employees and the citizens you serve must be able to "see" your vision. A leader on the improvement trail must be able to clearly and succinctly communicate what he is trying to do. The vision statement developed in Madison—"Closer to the People—Quality from the Inside—Out"—was instrumental in formulating the department's 1985 decision to assign neighborhood officers with area responsibility to the city's critical neighborhoods.

This was followed by a mission statement that attempted to capture the dominant values in the community:

We believe in the dignity and worth of all people . . . we are committed to providing high-quality, community-oriented police services with sensitivity . . ."

The mission statement also captured the following additional values: "protection of constitutional rights . . .," "continuous improvement . . .," "providing leadership to the police profession . . .," and "pride in the diversity of the work force . . ."

2. Live Your Values

The foundation of American policing reaches back to 19th-century Great Britain. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel had a vision about what policing in a free society should be like. His "First Principle of Policing" states that police should be "in tune with the people, understanding the people, belonging to the people, and drawing its strength from the people."

Police leaders must be able to identify and discuss their shared values with their communities and begin to live those shared

values as an organization. When crisis hits, most people look for direction. This is time for the chief to guide the discussion toward crime prevention and the need for the community to start addressing the causes of crime. In Madison, for example, in response to a growing number of violent juvenile offenses, we put together data indicating that the community needed to address unemployment, child abuse, poor school performance and school drop-out rates in order to affect the symptom of violence. In most instances, these factors were outside of the police department's area of responsibility.

3. Be Able to Listen

To implement effective change, leaders must first be able to really listen and understand what their communities and their employees are saying. Leaders may have to choose between conflicting statements and expectations, but they will be unable to make such a choice if they are not clear about the terms of the discussion. In Madison, we have found an ongoing, random survey of persons who use police services to be an excellent way to solicit constituent input regarding the quality of police services.



Courtesy of ICMA and the Fairfax County, VA Police Department



Courtesy of ICMA and the Fairfax County, VA Police Department

4. Hire for Tomorrow

To be effective in the community, a police organization must reflect the community it serves. Given the diversity of our nation's cities, police organizations must reflect their communities' demographics if they are to function effectively and safely. In the past, the diversity argument was made on the basis of being best for the community; today, an equally valid argument can be made that a police department with diversity in its ranks is a "safer" police department for its members. A diverse police department is also perceived as a fairer police department and one that reflects the shared values of the community.

After 20 years of department-initiated affirmative hiring practices, the Madison Police Department has over 25 percent women and 10 percent minority officers in its sworn police officer ranks (which is slightly higher than the percent of minorities within the community). Similar achievements have been made in bringing women and minorities into supervisory positions.

In order to determine future diversity patterns in your city, take a look at the composition of your elementary schools. They are good indicators of what your city will look like in the early part of the 21st century. For example, the current racial and ethnic diversity in Madison's elementary schools is close to 30 percent. It is this future that determines our hiring decisions.

5. It's "Turf," Not Time, in Policing

We believe the shift from time to turf is an absolute organizational necessity for the future of policing. Being shift-driven has had a destructive influence on the ability of the police to listen, relate to and effectively act on community-identified police problems.

In 1985, the Madison Police Department reassigned some officers to neighborhood foot patrol. Today, 13 officers patrol the city's 13 "critical" neighborhoods—primarily low-income housing, student housing and downtown areas of the city. There has been a statistical reduction in police incidents—both in number and severity—in neighborhoods that have had a neighborhood officer for more than three years. This strategy works to reduce calls for police services and helps to increase the satisfaction of residents in these areas.

6. Pay Attention to Perception

Police leaders must realize that perception is as important as reality. In order to be effective, police departments must

be perceived by their communities as respectful of others, well-trained and caring, fair and honest, just in their actions and decisions, supportive of important community values, and trained to use the legal and proper amount of force.

Open and honest relations with the news media are an important factor—if not *the* factor—in the management of community perception. A department at war with the local media usually loses.

A good example of the “reality versus perception” issue is in the area of crime prevention. For example, an officer may go to a neighborhood meeting with the intention of discussing burglary, which his findings indicate is a real problem in the area. People listen politely for awhile and then begin to tell him that their real problems are noise and disturbance issues. Most do not share his perception that the real problem is burglary: “I can handle the burglars, they don’t bother me that often, but I can’t tolerate that family next door who keeps me up every night with their loud parties!” To be responsive, police must look at both statistical data and community perceptions before making critical tactical decisions.

7. Practice the Quality Improvement Method

Real organizational change is the result of improving the work systems within an organization. Systematic improvement of systems must be tied to data-based decision making. Known as the quality improvement method or total quality management (TQM), this method is based on the teachings of Dr. W. Edwards Deming, Kaoru Ishikawa, Joseph Juran, Phillip Crosby, Tom Peters and others.

In Madison, we found that until we began looking at data in graphic form, we could not make conclusions about cause and effect. Instead, decisions were based more on emotion than fact. When efforts were made, using the Quality Method, to bring overtime expenditures under control, it became clear that systems thinking and making data-based decisions were not only effective management and leadership methods, but essential in making the best and most effective decisions.

We also found out that teams make better decisions than individuals. For example, a team of officers was empowered to select department patrol vehicles, frequently a “lose-lose” proposition for both manager and employees. Two guidelines were established: (1) they must stay within the overall budget for new vehicles, and (2) they must survey all the users of those vehicles and listen to their input before making the final decision. For over six years now, an employee team has been used to select and purchase new vehicles.

The end result of this empowerment process has been threefold: the vendors’ vehicles are field tested (they weren’t before), the cost savings realized are put back into the fleet to purchase additional cars and features such as automatic windows, and employees express far more satisfaction with the patrol vehicles.

Quality Improvement

Most successful businesses today are using the quality improvement method in one way or another. Madison’s adaptation of this method for police agencies

is called “quality leadership.” (See articles by the authors in the April 1988 and May 1991 issues of the *Police Chief*.) Regardless of what it is called, however, there are seven characteristics that are essential to its success. The first is the most important:

1. *Belief in people.* To practice quality effectively, it is essential to possess (or develop) an overriding belief in the ability and “goodness” of people—especially our employees and other customers. We no longer think of our employees as lazy and trying to avoid work, but rather as people who—like us—really want to do not just a good job, but a great job.



Courtesy of the Newark, NJ Police Department



Courtesy of the Newark, NJ Police Department

2. *Systems thinking.* This is understanding that all work is done through systems, most of which involve problems with such things as speed, re-work, barriers and extra steps. Every work process can be documented in two ways: the way it is supposed to work and the way it actually works. Once the work systems are understood, the effective leader can work with employees to eliminate unnecessary steps and barriers in the work process.

3. *Teamwork.* The best way to get work done is through work teams. Not only do teams make better decisions, but the

decisions they make are accepted more readily within the workplace and, therefore, are more efficient.

4. *Customer focus.* We all have customers. Victims and witnesses are customers, but so are arrested persons. Knowing who our customers are is vital to quality improvement. It is also important for us to realize that some customers are more important than others. Because only a customer can define quality of service, we must solicit input, listen to the response and act on suggestions for improvement.

5. *Employee empowerment.* Belief in people enables us to take the next step—belief

in employee empowerment; that is, letting employees at the lowest levels of the organization make the decisions whenever possible. Our employees are not children; in many instances, they are better educated, more creative and more energetic when it comes to implementing change than many leaders are. But such empowerment simply does not happen without leadership action.

6. *Data-based decision making.* Organizational decisions must be made on data and not emotions. Data-based decision making is the core of the quality method, along with employee empowerment. Few management or leadership methods give such importance to making decisions based on data. Employees are empowered at all levels of the organization to think about and act on data. What makes this different is that the effort involves everyone in the organization—not just the bosses.

7. *Continuous improvement.* Overall, the quality method means continuous improvement of everything we do forever. It is not a destination, but an ongoing, incremental process.

Community-Oriented Policing


Unless we begin moving away from "Officer Friendly" and "Community Relations Unit" policing to real community-based policing, most officers will continue to perceive community-oriented policing as someone else's job, and we will continue to experience problems—some of them severe—between us and our citizen-customers.

In Madison, for example, community-oriented policing did not happen until the officers began to really believe the quality message that "our people are important!" Real community-oriented policing began with the development of the vision and mission statements. Community-oriented policing began when individual officers were empowered and encouraged to work with community members, and rewarded when they started working with residents to solve problems at the neighborhood level. Community-oriented policing began when command-level officers were trained, enabled and permitted to lead, to become improvers, coaches and organizational "barrier removers." Community-oriented policing began when the department's leadership style started to replace fear with teamwork, trust and toleration for "honest mistakes."

Today we hear much about community-oriented policing as a method to meet community expectations and improve the nature of policing. We agree. We do not, however, believe that the police community has an agreed-upon definition as to what it is. Too many times we have been asked to send out our "community-



Courtesy of the Newark, NJ Police Department



Courtesy of the Newark, NJ Police Department

Have we met the needs of our employees in our workplace? Do we treat them with respect? Do we give them an opportunity to grow and develop their skills? Do we listen?

oriented policing policy." These people are missing the point as to how community-oriented policing is implemented within a police agency. It is accomplished not by promulgating rules and ordering community-oriented policing, but by empowering rank-and-file police officers and their leaders with an organizational climate of respect and trust, which in turn permits the delivery of police services that have the same concern for the citizen-customer outside the organization.

In Madison, community-oriented policing is defined this way:

A community-oriented police department is a police organization that enables and empowers its police officers to function as community workers and organizers to work alongside neighborhood residents to help them prevent, resist and eliminate criminal and other disorder in their neighborhood while adhering to our Constitution and rule of law.

From Coercion to Consensus

We believe the key to meeting community expectations is to begin using the quality method in the police service, with the first step being to change the leadership style of the police agency.

Unfortunately, the dominant model of leadership and management in America—from commando units to retail stores—has been the use of coercion to get the job done. No employee liked to be on the receiving end of that coercion, but most people thought it was the only way to run an organization.

Today, an ever-growing number of leaders believe that the most effective contemporary management process today is the quality method. Max De Pree, author of *Leadership is an Art*, writes:

Work should be and can be productive, rewarding, meaningful and maturing, enriching and fulfilling, healing and joyful

Leadership is an art It is a weaving of relationships It is understanding and accepting diversity It is polishing, liberating and enabling others.

but how does one become this kind of leader? First, we believe that an effective leader must know what his employees need to do a quality job. Unfortunately, many leaders believe that they already know what their employees want without having to ask them, and understandably, their employees pattern the same behavior. They also think they know what their customers (citizens) want without ever having to ask them.

We need to ask ourselves, how have we met the needs of our employees in our workplace? Do we treat them with respect? Do we give them interesting and challenging work? Do we give them recognition for the good work they do? Do we give them an opportunity to grow and develop their skills? Do we listen to them? If we asked our employees these questions, what would they say?

Making Changes

We believe there are five important ingredients for successful leadership:

1. *A clear, shared vision.* Have a clear vision of where you are going based on the input of your employee and citizen customers. Work toward a shared vision.

2. *A personal commitment.* Have a strong, unyielding and continuous commitment to the values of the department. Hire the best and the brightest; commit to diversity. Build trust by maintaining respect for and among all members of the organization.

3. *A system that empowers people.* Permit employees to participate in the direction taken and decisions made by the organization. Encourage them to empower the citizens of the communities in which they serve to actively participate in meeting their own expectations.

4. *A method that develops and rewards people.* Develop the skills and abilities of members of the organization and ensure continual improvement through coaching, training and rewarding.

5. *Ability to think and live in the long-term.* Operate the organization for the long-term with persistence and patience. As in life, the "band-aid" approach to problems will have short-lived success, at best. We must find the root of the problem and be willing to commit to real solutions. In most cases, these will require a great deal of time and energy.

We believe that police departments today can effectively meet their future. You and your organization can achieve success in community policing if you create a shared vision, maintain a sense of commitment, develop a work system that empowers and rewards both employees and their citizen customers, and nurture your own and your organization's ability to think and live in the long term. ★

TQM: Is It Right for Law Enforcement?

By Clifford E. Simonsen, Ph.D., CPP, Director, Institute for Public Safety and Security, and Douglas Arnold, Ph.D., Director, Institute for Quality and Values, IBID / City University, Bellevue, Washington

A major shift is underway in the business sector of America. The new wave of management is called by a number of names: total quality management (TQM), total quality improvement (TQI), world class quality (WCQ) and a variety of other acronyms that include "quality" in the title.

Probably the most recognizable of these "buzz words," TQM is derived from the work of W. Edwards Deming, the management guru responsible for the recovery and ascendancy of Japanese business over the past 48 years. At a glance, Deming's famous "14 Points" seem to be easily applicable not only to the private sector, but to the public sector as well—including law enforcement.

1. Create constancy of purpose for improvement of product and service.
2. Adopt the new philosophy.
3. Cease dependence on mass inspection.
4. End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag alone.
5. Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service.
6. Institute modern methods of training on the job.
7. Institute modern methods of supervision.
8. Drive fear from the workplace.
9. Break down barriers between staff areas.
10. Eliminate numerical goals for the work force.
11. Eliminate work standards and numerical quotas.
12. Remove barriers that rob people of pride of workmanship.

13. Institute a vigorous program of education and training.

14. Create a structure that will accomplish the transformation.*

While not all of these points have direct applicability to a governmental agency such as law enforcement, four basic elements might be distilled into a model that applies to this sector. These include, but are not restricted to: client identification and feedback; the tracking of performance with simple, statistically valid methods; constant and continuous improvement; and worker participation in all processes. As noted, application of these principles will require some translation and adaptation from the *business* model of TQM.

A major concern of most law enforcement leaders is whether TQM is appropriate for criminal justice. Responding to "clients" and "customers" may seem to put the problem in alien terms for law enforcement, but identifying these elements and responding to their wants and needs are key to TQM's success. The question, "Who is the client (customer)?" is a difficult one for law enforcement. Law enforcement has many clients and customers: prosecuting attorneys, the courts, witnesses and victims, jailers, state and local elected officials, other police agencies and jurisdictions, the media (to some degree) and—of course—the taxpayers. In addition to these external clients and customers, law enforcement must also respond to many internal clients and customers in the process of getting the job done.

Providing satisfaction to each of these disparate groups can create distressing

paradoxes for the law enforcement executive attempting to provide protection and service. If police administrators always give in to the budget cutters, for example, they not only risk displeasing their clients and customers but may even jeopardize their core purposes of providing service and protection for their jurisdiction. (Of course, in today's fiscal climate, restraint at every level of government is called for, and such cuts demand improved productivity in every process.)

Improved quality and productivity in law enforcement is a need well-known among most law enforcement leaders across the nation. Unfortunately, rising rates of crime (especially violent crime) in America put them in a "catch-22" situation. If quality and productivity do not improve (as perceived by various clients and customers), then support for law enforcement will diminish. If, however, their efforts are expended in the wrong direction because they do not know what these clients want or need, they will also receive little support. Law enforcement officials who cannot do more with what they already have will soon find themselves trying to do more with less.

Budget reviews are beginning to demand that law enforcement executives not only identify their clients and customers, but provide some measure of how they are responding—or planning to respond—to clients' wants and needs, before getting any support for improvement promises. TQM is one way to address this quandary—one that has shown great promise in the private sector, where the "bottom line" is the ultimate measure.

While TQM may not have the immediate appeal to law enforcement administrators that MBO, MBR and other similar techniques have had, the fact is that these methods have had a dismal record—typically, because they are composed of quotas or numerical objectives that are usually dictated from the top and involve only management-derived results. Such techniques are focused on organizational goals to create quick, short-term results by simply doing *more of the same*—which may not have been the right thing to do in the first place.

While there is no actual, profit-oriented “bottom line” in law enforcement, an agency is scrutinized according to its ability to stay within the projected budget. The “bottom line” in this case is whether or not that agency exceeds that budget, not how well the money was spent. Increasingly, however, taxpayers across America are demanding answers to several critical questions:

- What services does law enforcement provide?
- How much does the provision of these services actually cost?
- How effectively are they delivered—and what measure is used to gauge that performance?
- Can these services be provided more efficiently?

Since the development of the Uniform Crime Reports, law enforcement has gauged what it does on the basis of voluntarily supplied statistics that show crimes cleared by arrest as a percentage of crimes reported. It takes only a quick look at these statistics to determine how well law enforcement has been doing. In the past decade, the percentage of all crimes cleared by arrest has hovered between 20 and 25 percent. A manufacturing company with a failure rate of 75 percent would certainly not enjoy the enthusiastic support of its stockholders.

In the public sector, we do not have stockholders, but we do have *stakeholders*, consisting of all our internal and external clients and customers. Stockholders in corporate America have caused more removals of CEOs and other top executives in the past few years than ever before in history. If public agencies in America are not yet aware that their stakeholders are approaching the same kind of mood, they should be.

Rethinking Our Role

A shift to consideration of the client/customer perspective creates opportunities for rethinking what law enforcement really does and—especially—how it does it. Since most law enforcement statistics are based on quantitative, rather than qualitative, measurements, it is difficult to define quality in law enforce-

ment. Despite the many *numbers* collected, there is often little information available about the performance of the many operational processes within the agency:

- How long do these various processes take to produce a service/product?
- How much time does it take to pass that service/product on to the next process?
- How much of the original effort is reworked or completely rejected at a later stage?
- How would your clients/customers want these processes to be handled?

Through careful scrutiny, we can find ways to improve each process, speeding up paperwork or effort and devoting more officer time to serving and protecting.

Improvement in law enforcement, as in most government agencies, is best accomplished only in relatively small increments. Striving for constant and continual improvement in incremental steps is the heart and soul of TQM, and must be a part of all efforts to implement it. Organizational change cannot be based on initial acceptance and the use of “buzz words.” Only a major agency commitment to sustaining the effort over time until it is institutionalized will result in real change.

Americans are an impatient bunch. We want results. . . and we want them *now*. Short-term planning, however, generally results in short-lived programs for organizational change. The following four critical conditions must occur before there is any assurance that incremental improvement through TQM can and will survive:

- a commitment from—and participation of—all members of the management team, especially the chief or sheriff;
- identification of the strategic processes that are critical for improved customer satisfaction;
- incremental employment of TQM, starting with small pilot projects that are likely to demonstrate short-term success; and
- continuous training and retraining of personnel, accompanied by performance tracking to document improvement in both productivity and quality.

These four steps *must* be taken; rushing the application of TQM throughout an entire agency is almost always doomed to failure. Success breeds success, and pilot programs that prove their effectiveness tend to persuade others to accept the challenge.

Today, when all governmental budgets are being squeezed, one of the first things to be sacrificed is typically training. In a TQM environment struggling to get off the ground, that choice is a sure route to failure. Training is the only way to provide knowledge, skills and tools necessary

to improve quality and productivity. It may even be preferable to accept small personnel cuts in exchange for the necessary training funds. This would produce long-term gains, allowing the remaining well-trained people to “do more with less.” When the clients/customers see the improvement in quality and productivity, they will be more willing to provide the additional budget, based on performance rather than promises.

Only when an agency makes the effort to clearly understand the needs and wants of its external and internal clients/customers, develops simple and understandable statistical tracking techniques, seeks constant and continual improvement, and makes a sustained effort to enlist the participation of workers at every level will TQM work in a public agency, especially in law enforcement. While results will not be immediate, a long-term commitment will both improve the agency’s productivity and promote greater job satisfaction, quality and productivity in all its employees. ★

* W. Edwards Deming, *Quality, Productivity, and Competitive Position* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1982), p. 17.

Dusting Off a Forgotten Management Tool: The Citizen Survey

Gregory Streib

As many authors have observed, we are living in an era marked by change. Like all parts of society, local governments have found less and less to be certain. This constant tide of change requires a level of leadership and management skill that is much greater than was required in the past. In addition, the burden of responding to change is falling on different shoulders. Increasingly, it is the appointed administrator who formulates the policies and strategies for community prosperity and survival.

The challenge facing local government managers is to seek management excellence while addressing the needs and desires of citizens. Meeting these dual demands requires levels of foresight, sensitivity, and skill that few humans possess. This is especially true since the viewpoints of citizens are, on the one hand, muddled by a lack of knowledge and awareness and on the other hand, hidden by a refusal to vote or participate in a political system that is largely viewed with disdain.

Developing a knowledge of community needs will require local government managers to emphasize a slightly different complement of management tools. One tool that has potential for increased use is the citizen survey. Interest in this tool intensified during the 1970s due to the combined pressures of social change and federal mandates, but interest seemed to wane during the 1980s as fiscal issues became the dominant concern. I believe that the time is right to give citizen surveys a second look and that this tool offers an effective means to communicate with the public in an era that is marked by a lack of citizen involvement.

Participation Breakdown

Local governments offer a variety of mechanisms to allow and encourage citizen participation, including both provisions for direct democracy (in the form of initiatives and referenda)

and involvement in the budgeting process. In addition, most communities rely to some extent on such alternative participation methods as town meetings, open meetings, and advisory committees and commissions. It is no secret that low turnout has undermined the voting process, but less is known about the level of participation through other means. A 1979 study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) focused on the evaluations of citizen involvement in the budget process by local government officials.¹ The respondents felt that participation most commonly occurred through such formal structures as advisory committees and hearings, but that the extent of participation seldom went beyond a desire to obtain funding for a particular special interest. ACIR concluded that low levels of interest among the general population leave all available participation mechanisms likely targets for capture by single-issue oriented groups.

A Participation Mechanism

The greatest strength of citizen surveys is that they have the potential to sample the viewpoints of all citizens—not simply those who choose to participate. While the areas where managers might seek information are limited only by the imagination, Kenneth Webb and Harry Hatry identified a number of areas where the information-gathering abilities of surveys can be applied:

- Measuring satisfaction with the quality of specific services including identification of problem areas
- Uncovering facts such as the numbers and characteristics of users and nonusers of various services
- Discovering the reasons that specific services are disliked or not used
- Evaluating demands for new services
- Examining citizen opinions on various community issues, including feelings of alienation toward government officials.²

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While citizen surveys are able to provide useful information, the technique does have some weaknesses. Perhaps one of the biggest problems is that citizen surveys can ask the public to answer questions on subjects about which they have insufficient knowledge or expertise. As author Thomas Miller pointed out, "Surveying the public about how to solve an unexpected budget shortfall would be like asking children how to make the world safe for democracy."³

A second serious problem with citizen surveys is that they can have some serious political repercussions. The public may express a negative view of whatever services are dutifully provided. Pressures may develop to enact whatever recommendations the public might suggest. And then, apart from the issues of effectiveness and political advisability, there is always the issue of cost. With budgets getting ever tighter, a citizen survey might easily seem like an unnecessary frill. The costs could be particularly onerous to small governments.

It should always be remembered that surveys will lose their credibility if they are not skillfully done. Use of surveys should be accompanied by the political and resource commitments necessary to do the job right. Without this kind of effort the results will be less than desirable.

Performance Assessment

While the use of surveys to gather general information has a great deal of appeal, the literature on citizen surveys has focused most on the use of surveys for client-centered evaluations of government activities. Authors Harry Hatry and John Greiner argued in a 1987 *MIS Report*, "Monitoring the Quality of Local Government Services," that this is the most effective use of citizen surveys. Some of their arguments in defense of this position are:

- Client surveys can be more efficient than general citizen surveys for getting information from persons who have had experience with a given service, facility, or program. To pick up these individuals from a general survey would be very expensive.
- Because client surveys focus on only service users, they are likely to allow sample sizes large enough for meaningful examination of a variety of user subgroups.
- Surveys can be more detailed, allowing examination of more characteristics of a particular service and reasons why respondents rated a particular service attribute poorly. Thus client surveys can be useful to program managers in uncovering problems and deciding how to address identified problems.

Researcher Brian Stipak is one of the most influential critics of the use of citizen surveys as a performance measure. While his writings can now be considered dated, the logic and persuasiveness of his arguments persist. He discussed the findings of two studies which showed little relationship between objective service indicators and citizen evaluations and concluded that false conclusions were likely when surveys are used to assess the quality of urban services.⁴ He maintained that local officials should not assume that citizens respond to satisfaction or evaluation questions on the basis of actual service performance.

A Competing View

A recent defense of citizen surveys as a performance measure was provided by Stephen Percy, who argued that previous findings demonstrating that there was no relationship between citizen evaluations and services were an artifact of poor methodology.⁵ He argued that previous studies had relied on so-called "objective" measures of service performance that were really contextual factors, determined by aggregating measures, such as crime levels, response time, and numbers of officers assigned to incidents, to the neighborhood or community level. In Percy's view, these previous studies expected individual citizens to recognize and report changes that were far removed from their individual experiences.

Percy suggested that efforts to evaluate citizen surveys would have to compare responses with additional factors, such as direct personal experience, and information from secondary sources, such as neighbors and the media. He advocated a better understanding of citizen perceptions and expectations before attempting to examine assessments of service performance. Percy's analysis suggests that citizen survey techniques can be honed to produce more accurate appraisals of citizen satisfaction than previously thought possible.

Strategic Decision Making

In the past five to ten years there has been a great deal of literature that suggests local governments need to pay more attention to future goals and challenges when making today's decisions. This type of "strategic perspective" can help local governments to cope with a rapidly shifting environment and to make the most effective use of their resources. Recent research has demonstrated that many U.S. cities are making use of strategic decision-making techniques.

Citizen surveys can be an important component of a stage in strategic decision making known as the environmental scan, where an

effort is made to identify key factors and trends that may take on critical importance in the future. Experts suggest that managers consider the importance of an array of potential trouble spots ranging from political and economic factors to changes in technology and social relationships. Clearly this kind of effort would benefit from the type of community perspective that a citizen survey can provide.

It is important for local government managers to always be aware that strategic decision making is as much a process for making political decisions as it is an analytical tool. As a result, good communication is essential among local government officials and with the public. This point was clearly made by Carl Neu in the March/April 1988 issue of *National Civic Review*, where he noted that strategic governance requires constant communication with all citizens to articulate the vision, attain community support and citizen involvement, and foster an atmosphere of trust and confidence. Citizen surveys can help local government officials to communicate with a broad cross section of the public and to incorporate their hopes and concerns into community goals and objectives.

How Are Surveys Done?

Most importantly, surveys must be honest and respect the intelligence of citizens who are expected to answer them. This means not asking questions about complex issues on which respondents lack the information to make a good judgment, and not including unclear or misleading questions. Avoid surveys that try to make a political point or remove elected officials from their responsibilities as decision makers. A survey that is poorly constructed or offensive is a waste of money and will only serve to alienate the public.

It is also important to safeguard the validity of the survey findings. This means that a representative sample of the population must be obtained, assuring that the individuals surveyed reflect the population under study and that the response rates are uniform across all subgroups in the population. Usually some type of stratified sample is necessary for a citizen survey. Whatever the survey design, the overall response rate may be a function of the way the survey is conducted.

The three traditional ways of conducting citizen surveys are the personal face-to-face interview, the telephone interview, and the mailed, self-administered form. Simply mailing out a questionnaire is the easiest way to conduct a survey, but it may not be the best way to get people to respond. The telephone survey is currently popular, especially in areas where eligible respondents are likely to own phones. Personal interviews are always

effective if one can find reliable interviewers and handle the cost.

Many jurisdictions may need a consultant to help them understand the strengths and limitations of surveys; aid with the design of a survey instrument, collection, and tabulation of the resulting findings; and aid with analysis. Remember that once a survey is completed the majority of the work is just beginning. Data analysis is an important task, essential to attaining the full benefits of a citizen survey.

A Valuable Process

Increasingly, authors speak of the growing list of challenges and intractable problems facing modern local governments. It is inevitable that these pressures will initiate a great deal of discussion on how to deal effectively with previously unknown complex problems. While answers will be found in technology, the effective use of these new breakthroughs will require informed, imaginative leaders. Citizen surveys offer a valuable technique that can help leaders gain a community perspective, which will be invaluable as they seek to chart a course through these difficult times.

The historical view of citizen surveys is that they are useful to reach groups less involved in the political process, particularly those segments of the population that have traditionally benefited from government aid. While this use is still valid, citizen surveys can also be used to pull together all segments of a community by identifying common needs and goals and help to focus programmatic efforts. In addition, the process of performing a citizen survey can be used to inform citizens about the choices that a community must face. Perhaps the most beneficial use of citizen surveys will come from applying this approach to a strategic decision-making framework. One of the great advantages of this type of approach is that it will make a direct link between the assessment of public opinion and the development of public decisions. Whatever the mode of use, however, the technique will most certainly remain a valuable way for managers to improve communications and support effective leadership. **PM**

¹Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Citizen Participation in the American Federal System* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) chapters 4 and 5.

²Kenneth Webb and Harry Hatry, *Obtaining Citizen Feedback: The Application of Citizen Surveys to Local Government* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1973), p. 15.

³Thomas I. Miller, "The Nine Circles of Citizen Survey Hell," *Management Science and Policy Analysis* 4 (Spring, 1987), p. 27.

⁴Brian Stipak, "Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Services: Potential Misuse as a Performance Indicator," *Public Administration Review* (January/February 1979), pp. 46-52.

⁵Stephen L. Percy, "In Defense of Citizen Evaluations as Performance Measures," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 22 (September 1986), pp. 66-83.

COPS COMMUNITY- ORIENTED POLICING: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY

by Genie Zakrzewski

Why would a parks and recreation director participate in a seminar about policing? Is it because my community faces escalating violence, drug abuse and crime? Thankfully, not yet, but the hard reality is that of tightening local government budgets. This forces local government managers to identify effective alternative strategies in managing existing city resources.

What is a Community-Oriented Policing Strategy (COPS)? With grant money from the National Institute of Justice, ICMA (International City Management Association) has developed the COPS workshop to show local government officials how to use total resources of their community to improve the quality of life. Of three pilot workshops held throughout the country this year, 15 jurisdictions could attend each seminar. Each jurisdiction was represented by a four-member team consisting of the chief executive and the chief of police (mandatory with no substitutions) and two other local government managers chosen by the chief executive (in my case the director of parks and recreation and the director of public works).

How Does COPS Work?

The authors of this strategy make the assumption that traditional policing, as normally practiced, is not an effective or cost efficient manner to control crime and social disorder. As outlined in the workbook, *Community-Oriented Policing: An Alternative Strategy*, COPS identifies, mobilizes and deploys the total resources of a community in a concerted effort to reduce neighborhood-based crime. The workbook further states eight critical steps in developing and implementing COPS:

1. Cultivating an understanding of and support for COPS among local elected officials and administrative managers,
2. Doing same as in #1 but among employees of local government — police and nonpolice — who will develop and implement COPS,
3. Creating and nourishing an organizational structure and process within local government to develop and implement COPS,
4. Cultivate an understanding of and support for COPS among neighborhood residents,
5. Create and nourish linkages between local government and neighborhoods,

6. Developing an implementation strategy that balances crime suppression with crime prevention and that is understood and accepted by residents, elected officials, administrative managers and employees,

7. Changing the role of the police from that of acting in isolation in responding to incidents, to that of acting as community facilitators in cooperation with the community in responding to problems, and

8. Continuous evaluation of the process and effects of the implemented strategy.

COPS in Crestwood

We are not yet dealing with uncontrollable violence, crack houses and gang-related problems so many of the workshop participants have in their respective city neighborhoods. However, we think the concept is good. Perhaps, in our case we might name this strategy Community-Oriented Service Delivery.

Our current strategy is one of community service response orientation. City employees, regardless of their job position, are directed to respond in an efficient, specific manner in order to provide for a need and correct a concern in such

a way that attempts to satisfy a resident. This requires communication and interaction both internally and externally. By understanding and strengthening interdepartmental linkages in local government, we can be successful in our delivery of total city services.

We are confronted with restraints and constraints at every turn. We all are "policing" in our own manner based on what our city departmental function happens to be. We all are concerned about our healthy survival, given revenue shortfalls and soaring costs to provide municipal services. It gets harder to reconcile rising expectations of the public served, when resources are diminishing.

Our park and recreation profession continuously has stated how our services provide opportunities that improve the quality of life in our communities. I find it particularly enlightening that the police

community, committed to this new policing method, share a similar philosophy.

Does COPS have to originate and work only in the police department? No, this seems to be the logical department given the premise of growing public frustration about crime and an attempt to make police services more proactive in the prevention of crime. Based on your city's current problems and needs, this method can work across department lines. The originators of COPS firmly believe that community-oriented policing is a philosophy, style and method ... not a program.

Interested in how COPS might work for you? You can call ICMA at (202)962-3575 for further information. □

Genie Zakrzewski is the Director of Parks and Recreation in the City of Crestwood.




Courtesy of the Newark, NJ Police Department

MIS

REPORT

VOLUME 24 / NUMBER 9 / SEPTEMBER 1992



PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH AT RISK

Dropped out, turned off, headed for trouble—every community knows some of its young people are at risk of academic failure, underemployment or unemployment, substance abuse, poverty, homelessness, imprisonment. Most communities try to address these problems through a number of different public and private agencies: social services, health clinics, mental health services, employment offices, court-related programs, the school system.

A few communities have begun to offer these services under one roof because many youth at risk need a variety of services. And a few local governments are designing programs that use school achievement as the focus for determining need and measuring progress.

This month's report presents three successful models of programs designed specifically to keep young people in school. Each represents an unusual combination of resources. In each, collaboration is the key.

The first case study describes K-SIX, Fresno County, California's program to discover children at risk of academic failure before they begin to fail. The second case study looks at Sarasota, Florida's community-centered approach to getting high school dropouts back on track. The third case study explains how a national dropout prevention program, Cities In Schools, works in Charlotte, North Carolina.

K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership— Fresno County, California

This case study was authored by county of Fresno management and program staff responsible for the K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership's day-to-day operations.

The county of Fresno's award-winning K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership identifies socioeconomically and educationally disadvantaged children who are at high risk of school failure and ensures that they receive the help they need to succeed in school. It does so by outstationing experienced county social workers, mental health specialists, and juvenile probation officers at elementary schools, where they team up with school personnel, community services providers, and parents to deliver a comprehensive array of academic, health, and related human care services tailored to the individual needs of each child and family referred to the program. These efforts are supported by strong links with the home agencies of the outstationed personnel, and they are supplemented by coordinated family and neighborhood-centered services provided or funded by a network of public and private sector entities.

RECONFIGURATION

K-SIX uses a child's presentation at school as an indicator that the child is at risk of a wide range of negative life outcomes. It is proactive (targeting children as young as five years old) and family-centered (bringing services into the homes and neighborhoods where they are needed). K-SIX is non-categorical: help is provided because it is needed to improve a child's quality of life. It is an integrated interagency project in terms of program administration, and it pools public and private funding. Its long-range goal is to help children grow into productive adult members of their families and communities.

Generally, K-SIX differs from other "service integration" approaches by virtue of its unique combination of strategies:

- Funding is not subject to the vagaries of annual budgeting because it consists of redeployed existing resources.

- The focus is on intervening with high risk elementary school children before their problems become chronic or severe.
- Program administration is integrated.
- The staffing pattern provides access to a broad range of disciplines and institutional resources.
- It addresses the full range of potential youth-related problems.
- Its structure is fully adaptable to both urban and rural settings.

K-SIX differs from other school-based approaches in at least two important respects:

- It actively reaches out to its neighborhoods and does not require parents to come to the school to be served.
- It increases direct services to children and families instead of referring them to already overburdened community providers.

A SHARED VISION

K-SIX is one of the oldest and most extensive school-based human services programs in the nation. Now approaching its eighth year, it has expanded and continues to thrive despite the budgetary crises that have escalated annually since its inception. Its longevity and success can be attributed in large part to the fact that it is based on an idea and a set of principles that were developed by the community it serves:

- Academic success is the key to reducing the incidence of dropping out, underage pregnancy, substance abuse, and delinquency.
- Youth who can avoid these negative conditions are far more likely to become self-sufficient adults.
- A stable, nurturing home environment is critical to school success and healthy life outcomes for children.

Management Information Service

- The entire community is affected by a child's failure to become a productive adult; thus, all segments of that community have a stake and a role in improving the conditions of, and outcomes, for children.
- No single institution can address the broad range of factors that place a child at risk.

However, for principles to be meaningful, they must form the basis for a common vision of a common goal. The absence of common vision often leads to two undesirable consequences: institutions fail to move beyond the narrow confines of "business as usual," and the program initiatives are viewed as "owned" by only one agency. The vision that drives K-SIX cuts across institutional lines and may be stated as follows:

All children served are to be assisted in developing the skills they need to take advantage of life's opportunities, and the availability of those opportunities shall be maximized.

The program began with . . . a strong sense of joint ownership, investment, responsibility, and accountability.

Of equal importance, the creators of K-SIX saw the need to systematically translate their vision into a set of goals and objectives that would also cut across institutional boundaries and firmly establish its dual role as a direct service program and a catalyst for institutional change. As a result, the program began with—and re-


tains—a strong sense of joint ownership, investment, responsibility, and accountability. Those goals are

- To reduce school failure and its attendant negative consequences by addressing academic, personal, social, environmental, and institutional barriers to school success
- To increase the academic and social literacy of high risk children
- To promote regular school attendance
- To reduce chronic transience
- To strengthen family functioning and improve the home and neighborhood environments
- To empower parents to serve as effective partners in education and positive role models in their children's lives
- To increase community accountability for the conditions of Fresno children by serving as a bridge for neighborhood involvement in education and human care services
- To identify institutional, fiscal, and regulatory barriers to the effective delivery of comprehensive preventive services to children and their families and to develop and demonstrate effective means to overcome those barriers.

COMMUNITY ROOTS

The concept that became K-SIX was developed in 1984 by a community task force formed to study the growing

Figure 1 K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership.



Funding sources for K-SIX

Source	Amount (\$)	% of Budget	Category
County of Fresno	784,500	69	Child Welfare Services and General Fund
City of Fresno	25,000	2	General Fund
California State, Fresno	25,000	2	Academic Affairs
Fresno Foundation	5,000	<1	Grant Program
Private Industry Council	150,000	14	JTPA Title II
Private business	8,500	<1	Donations
State of California	105,200	10	OCAP Grant
van Loeben Sels Foundation	5,000	<1	Grant Program
Total	1,108,200		

These figures do not include the value of in-kind donations made by college student interns, civic groups, and the media. The budget also does not include \$117,000 awarded by the Annie E. Casey Foundation to Fresno Tomorrow (the community's formal youth services collaborative) to support coordination and systems development activities on behalf of K-SIX and other at-risk youth programs.

problem of school dropouts, sanctioned by the Fresno Interagency Committee (a coalition made up of the directors of the county's youth-serving departments, school superintendents, and law enforcement agencies, convened by the juvenile court judge). The impetus was provided by Interagency's general membership (a 200-person forum open to any community member concerned about children), which identified school dropouts as a critical issue.

The task force itself was composed of approximately thirty individuals representing a cross-section of the community. For almost a year it conducted research and heard testimony from teachers, administrators, parents, students, and service providers. Its major findings were that

- Children who dropped out of school without graduating made up the majority of local youth who became teenaged parents, delinquents, substance abusers, and welfare recipients
- Children who fell prey to these conditions shared a common profile. A growing body of research strongly suggested that the existence of a well-defined set of factors placed children at risk of school failure and that these high risk children could be identified very early in their school careers
- There was not a comprehensive, coordinated early intervention effort in place because 90 percent of all the community's resources that supported youth services was being devoted to remediation, rehabilitation, and retrieval.

The 1984 task force report contained almost two dozen recommendations to improve the community's responsiveness to potential dropouts. The first priority was to establish a multidisciplinary/interagency school-based early intervention pilot project targeting elemen-

tary school children and their families. This recommendation was adopted by the Interagency Committee. The department of social services (DSS) agreed to serve as lead agency, primarily because of the extremely broad state mandate under which it operates. Because the task force also identified health, mental health, and legal problems as being characteristic of the projected target population, the health and probation departments also agreed to participate, as did the Fresno Unified School District.

Over the ensuing six months, staff and resource commitments were secured and school sites identified. Policy, procedure, and protocol were developed to cover operational issues such as confidentiality, case documentation, and so forth. After intensive cross-training of project staff, in-servicing of school personnel, and publicity campaigns in the targeted neighborhoods, the pilot project began in spring of 1985 in two schools under the name of Human Services Strike Force (HSSF). In 1988, the program was "adopted" by Fresno Tomorrow, Inc., the name was changed to K-SIX, and expansion began.

THE CHILDREN

K-SIX is now operational in eleven schools, all of which are located in Fresno's most disadvantaged urban neighborhoods and rural communities. On average, each school is approximately 70 percent minority; four of ten students have limited English proficiency; an equal percentage live in single-parent homes; and over half of the enrollment receives public assistance. Six of ten K-SIX students are classified as educationally disadvantaged. It is estimated that 25 percent of the families who live in K-SIX neighborhoods have at least one member who is drug or alcohol dependent.

Total enrollment in project schools is close to 6,800. Using a formula that weights test scores, attendance,

Management Information Service

age relative to same-grade cohorts, behavior, and personal/family characteristics, more than 1,500 children have been identified as "extremely high risk."

These children constitute the target population for case management services. Those who receive services are selected by the on-site case management team on the basis of a preliminary assessment of the needs of the child and family, what services are already being provided, and so forth.

Figure 2 K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership high risk referral form.

Case #:			
To Be Completed By Person Making Referral:			
Name of Student: _____			
Age: _____	DOB: _____		
School: _____	Grade: _____		
Teacher: _____			
Referred By: _____	Date Referred: _____		
Primary Language: _____			
Reassessment? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No			
SELECTION RATING SCALE			
	Lowest	Average	Highest
1. Learning Rate	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
2. Interest in School Work	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
3. Parental Involvement	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
4. Adjustment to Peers	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
5. Attendance	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
6. Health	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
7. Grades	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
8. Reading Ability	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
9. Self-Esteem	1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9
Narrative: _____			

To Be Completed By Case Manager:			
Assigned To: _____			
Date Assigned: _____			
Number of Schools Previously Attended: _____			
C.A.T. Scores: _____			
Parent(s): _____			
Siblings: _____			
Address: _____			
Home Phone: () _____			
Work Phone: () _____			
Date Closed: _____			

Approximately 265 (15 percent) of those identified as extremely high risk receive case management services each year. Over 2,800 children per year (40 percent of total enrollment) are served by some component of the K-SIX program. The average cost per child/family served is approximately \$375.

CASE MANAGEMENT

The basis for K-SIX's operations is its case management approach to service delivery. Once high risk children are identified (using both computer analysis of data and teacher/parent observation), referred, and screened, a comprehensive assessment is conducted to clearly identify problem areas. This forms the basis for a care plan that clearly specifies roles and responsibilities and that is developed with the active involvement of parents, child, school, and significant others. The K-SIX case manager coordinates the implementation of the plan by arranging or providing all needed services, monitors progress through regular home and school visits and consultation with other team members and service providers, and periodically reassesses the family's circumstances.


A care plan that clearly specifies roles and responsibilities ... is developed with the active involvement of parents, child, school, and significant others.

In addition to case management, the K-SIX partners engage in a wide range of culturally sensitive and appropriate activities that strengthen the academic and social functioning of children and families and are specifically designed to address known correlates to school failure and other serious youth-related problems. The activities, which also serve as a bridge between the home, neighborhood, and school, include attendance incentives, community and family advocacy, cross-age tutoring, cultural enrichment, family literacy, mentoring, parent involvement workshops, parenting/household management education and training, parent and child support groups, and positive recreation.

SHARED GOVERNANCE

The five-member Fresno County Board of Supervisors exercises ultimate legislative control over the K-SIX program by virtue of its legal mandate to ensure that the county provides for the health and welfare of children and families and its responsibility for approving all program budgets and expenditures. Overriding administrative responsibility for county operations is vested in the county administrative officer, who reports directly to the board of supervisors and is charged with carrying out its policies and directives.

Figure 3 K-SIX service delivery system.



Because K-SIX service delivery is managed by the department of social services (DSS), executive responsibility for the program rests with the director of DSS. Internal administrative responsibility is assigned to the assistant director of the social work services division working through the adult and family resources program manager and the K-SIX social work supervisor.

K-SIX case management staff is also drawn from the health and probation departments. Thus the director of the health department and the chief probation officer (whose reporting responsibilities are similar to those of the director of DSS) and their respective middle

and line managers are also key participants.

The DSS K-SIX supervisor oversees the day-to-day activities of all case management staff regardless of their home agency. Effective operations at each K-SIX school are ensured through a program administration team made up of the K-SIX supervisor, line staff, and school administrators. A program steering committee consisting of middle managers from all involved institutions facilitates program coordination, interagency communication, and conflict resolution.

Community-wide coordination is achieved through Fresno Tomorrow, Inc., a 501(c)(3) collaborative funded

Management Information Service

by the Casey Foundation whose board of directors includes the chief executive and elected officials of virtually every major public institution in the county, and representatives from the for-profit sector, community-based service providers, and constituent populations. In addition to ensuring collaboration, Fresno Tomorrow also secures and integrates additional resources in support of K-SIX.

The broad base of participation in K-SIX and the unique blending of funding sources is supported by a number of contractual relationships. The county maintains memoranda of understanding with participant school districts and Fresno Tomorrow that address staff and resource commitments and working relationships. DSS also contracts with the health and probation departments for staff and with the state of California for funds to support activities in rural communities. Fresno Tomorrow has agreements with California State University, Fresno (K-SIX management information services funding), the city of Fresno (K-SIX attendance incentives and related supportive services funding), Fresno Unified School District (K-SIX primary mental health intervention services), and the van Loeben Sels Foundation (cross-age tutoring moneys).

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

The K-SIX program has encountered six major challenges, all of which have proven to be on-going and in need of constant attention. The first relates to establishing an effective case management team at each school, in which members function as equal partners. By its nature, the school culture does not readily or easily accommodate a staff person who is not under the control of the site administrator (the "working with" vs. "working for" phenomenon). This is now addressed by a minimum of four months of intensive preimplementation planning combined with frequent on-site program administration team meetings after a school is brought "on line."

The county of Fresno has demonstrated that the children served are at extremely high risk of neglect and that early intervention is squarely within its mandate to provide preventive services.

The second involves regulations specific to information sharing, confidentiality, and categorical funding. By having DSS contract with other departments for staff and having all staff closely adhere to Child Welfare Services (CWS) regulations governing assessments, client contacts, and case documentation, these barriers to cooperation have been significantly lowered.

The third challenge has been the resistance or suspicion exhibited by many parents of high risk children. This is addressed by employing a variety of strategies

including a strong emphasis on mutual concern for the child's school performance as the reason for intervening, extensive use of group activities that are perceived as less threatening, assignment of bilingual/bicultural staff, and the provision of some services at school to children whose parents reject in-home intervention.

The fourth is the virtual absence of resources to support K-SIX expansion into low density population centers (primarily rural communities in Fresno County). Fresno Tomorrow aggressively pursues outside funding to enhance services available to rural families.

Fifth, state and federal funding sources have periodically criticized K-SIX, not because it is deemed ineffective or unnecessary, but because they contend it is not an activity that should be funded with Child Welfare Services moneys. They applaud its intent and efforts but believe it should be supported by locally raised dollars only. In response, the county of Fresno has demonstrated that the children served are at extremely high risk of neglect and that early intervention is squarely within its mandate to provide preventive services to reduce out-of-home placements.

Finally, a few school site administrators who do not have the program on their campuses loudly criticize the program. They contend that it dilutes scarce school resources due to its requirement for intensive hands-on involvement of school staff in the case management team. These individuals also prefer non-school personnel (such as K-SIX staff) to be under the direct control of the site administrator because that person is responsible for activities on or around the campus.

KEY PLAYERS

The county of Fresno has gotten some major help from other agencies. California State University, Fresno (CSUF); California Tomorrow; the Annie E. Casey Foundation; the city of Fresno; the Fresno County and City Chamber of Commerce; Fresno Tomorrow; and the Fresno Private Industry Council (PIC) have collectively and individually played significant roles in the development, implementation, and operation of K-SIX:

- CSUF has assisted with the framing of an in-home family literacy component and provided student resources in support of that effort. It has also begun developing a curriculum designed to better prepare both human services professionals and school personnel for cooperative programs like K-SIX. The human services professionals will learn to work in a school setting and the school personnel will be prepared to work cooperatively with outside agencies.
- California Tomorrow has given technical assistance to program development efforts.
- The Casey Foundation supports the efforts of Fresno Tomorrow and provides assistance to systems building and institutional reform.

- The Chamber of Commerce has secured resources from its members to support cultural enrichment activities, tutoring, and mentoring.
- The city of Fresno allocates funds for enhanced recreation, primary mental health services, and attendance incentives.
- The PIC redeployed substantial levels of JTPA funds to develop and operate a cross-age tutoring program that employs high school students as tutor/mentors for K-SIX children.
- Fresno Tomorrow coordinates all these efforts.

EVALUATION

Due to a number of factors, including rapid expansion, limited resources, and variations in data collection techniques and computer hardware and software, 1992 will be the first year that a comprehensive, longitudinal program evaluation has been conducted (Fresno Tomorrow will coordinate this effort). However, the program is evaluated regularly on at least five levels. These include individual case assessment, wherein the case manager measures the attainment of care-plan goals; supervisor review of cases; DSS quality control sampling; state and federal program audits; and statistical analysis of data compiled by staff. Overall, teacher-assessed degree of risk on nine known correlates to school failure is reduced an average of 14 percent per child. More specifically:

Parental involvement. In the last full year of operation, almost 225 families out of approximately 420 referred voluntarily accepted services (56 percent). On average, these parents had less than two contacts per year with their child's school prior to K-SIX intervention. After K-SIX became involved, they averaged two self-initiated contacts per month with the school to discuss their child's progress.

Attendance. In each of the last two years, schools new to the K-SIX program witnessed an average reduction in unexcused absences of 40 percent with no increase in excused absences. Ongoing K-SIX schools maintain similar reductions.

Behavior. In each of the last two years, referrals for misbehavior requiring administrative intervention have been reduced by 70 percent per child who received case management services.

Performance. In 1991, approximately 75 high risk children who had been case managed by the K-SIX program while in elementary school were of high school age. None had dropped out or become teen-aged parents, and only three had committed delinquent acts.

INTANGIBLES

The most important and vocal supporters of K-SIX are line staff, school site administrators, parents, and children themselves. Workers assigned to the program quickly take ownership of "their" school and its surrounding neighborhood, recognizing that innovation and resourcefulness will be rewarded by noticeable improvements in the quality of life. Most school personnel recognize they have neither the resources nor expertise to address the home, family, and environmental factors that affect their ability to carry out their primary mission of educating children and are thankful for the assistance K-SIX brings to their school. Parents welcome K-SIX involvement because it is often the first positive overture that has ever been made to them. Children support it because it shows them they can be successful, improves their self-esteem and self-image, and demonstrates that someone cares about them.

REPLICABILITY

The K-SIX Early Intervention Partnership is replicable in virtually any community. However, this kind of program requires a commitment to performing intensive preimplementation and postoperational planning at the community, policy making, and service delivery levels.

K-SIX is adaptable because its core operations are supported by redeployed resources. Every locality receives substantial funding to serve youth from a variety of sources. However, most do not know how much is flowing into the community, what the funds are supporting, or who is being served. But given the commitment, every community can establish a mechanism to determine where its funds for children are being used and how they can be better spent.

Even lacking such a comprehensive local inventory, K-SIX can still be established by the focused efforts of just two major institutions: the county (or its equivalent) and a school district. The deployment of existing staff to a school-based early intervention program does not increase costs and, on average, has minimal impact on caseloads in the program from which they are reassigned. Few costs accrue to schools because contributions are primarily in-kind. In addition, the activities of the case manager increase attendance and thus increase state reimbursement to the school.

The interagency nature of K-SIX is advantageous because it maximizes cost sharing; no single entity need bear a disproportionate burden. Many of the expenses, such as field trips, attendance incentives, mentoring, and tutoring, can be donated in-kind.

Perhaps most important to replication is that K-SIX provides a structure and a mechanism for the community to become involved in efforts to address the problems of high risk children. In most communities, the private sector, university students, and others are often an untapped resource because there is no means for them

Management Information Service

to become involved in service delivery. Being neighborhood based, K-SIX is a ready vehicle to facilitate involvement.

Given the commitment, every community can establish a mechanism to determine where its funds for children are being used and how they can be better spent.

Due to the structure of their existing service delivery systems or other unique local factors, some communities may conclude that they cannot afford a K-SIX program because those factors dictate that there will be hard costs related to its establishment. However, these costs should be seen in context. Research of countless organizations documents the fact that every dollar spent on preventive services to children and families saves at least three dollars in future welfare, health, and judicial system costs.

LESSONS LEARNED

K-SIX has demonstrated that institutional change can be effected and sustained. It has shown there are viable ways to blend mandates, relinquish autonomy, and combine funding to materially improve the lives of high risk children and families. It has changed the way business is conducted in Fresno County schools and public agencies by integrating service efforts. Most important, the working relationships that now exist in K-SIX schools and the partnerships that have been forged

between schools and the neighborhoods where students live will remain in place long after elected and appointed officials move on.

The literature shows that the profiles of children who drop out of school, become underage parents, use drugs or alcohol, and engage in delinquent acts are strikingly similar. Further, the factors that place children at risk of negative life outcomes are almost identical. K-SIX was specifically designed to be comprehensive and flexible so that it could address the full spectrum of youth-related problems. The awards it has received reflect its success at fulfilling this mission:

- 1989 *Most Innovative Family Service Program* (Semifinalist). Recognizes trend setting approaches by the public sector that strengthen and preserve families with minor children. American Public Welfare Association
- 1990 *Health and Human Services Challenge Award* (Grand Prize Winner). Recognizes the most innovative and effective county-administered human care services program in California. County Supervisors Association of California
- 1990 *Innovations in Local and State Government Award*. Recognizes unique and effective program and policy initiatives by governmental entities. Ford Foundation/John F. Kennedy School of Government (Harvard)
- 1991 *ICMA Program Excellence Award*. Recognizes professional local government administrators for innovation and leadership in meeting management challenges. International City/County Management Association.

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King Academy— Sarasota, Florida

The following case study was contributed by David R. Sollenberger, city manager of Sarasota, Florida.

The city of Sarasota houses an alternative high school in a police community resource building that also serves as a police substation. The city used a combination of drug forfeiture money, community development block grant funds, school board money, and private contributions to create this community-based program.

King Academy is part of the dropout prevention program administered by the Sarasota County school board. The academy's objective is to provide an alternative education for dropouts and students with problems that threaten to keep them out of school. The curriculum allows students to learn individually at their own pace, with computer-aided instruction supervised by certified teachers. Approximately forty students have graduated—having passed the GED and the state of Florida's high school competency test and demonstrated vocational skills—since the program started in 1991.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS

The city's collaboration with the county school board began when two apparently unrelated events occurred. First, the city decided to purchase a building that had been a bar and lounge to use as a police community resource facility in a minority neighborhood. This move was part of the city's new community-based policing effort. The building had been the scene of several murders and frequent drug dealing and was notorious as a hangout for criminals. The police department planned to install a substation in the building, but it contained far more space than the police needed.

The interviewers found that many of the dropouts . . . wanted to return to school but were unwilling to re-enter a traditional high school.

Second, the school board determined that 600 students had dropped out of high school during the 1988-89 school year. Concerned, the board hired a team of

school counselors, psychologists, and social workers to contact all 600 dropouts during the summer of 1989. The team members knocked on doors to find each young person. They interviewed each one to find out why he or she had dropped out of school and to discuss educational alternatives such as returning to school, taking GED courses, or joining the Job Corps.

The interviewers found that many of the dropouts in the minority neighborhoods of north Sarasota wanted to return to school but were unwilling to re-enter a traditional high school. The school system had been operating the New Directions Alternative High School for twenty years, but it could not begin to accommodate all the young people who said they would come back to an alternative school environment. In addition, New Directions was on the other side of town and most of the prospective students in north Sarasota could not provide their own transportation.

The solution was to establish a second alternative high school in the excess space at the police community resource building. The city offered the space to the school board, and King Academy was born.

WAYS AND MEANS

The principal and the guidance counselor from New Directions, along with the vice mayor (who represented the north Sarasota district) and the city manager, visited a computer-aided instructional program across the state to observe its work. Police personnel and other school administrators also made visits to observe this program.

The city and the school board reached an agreement that obligated the city to handle building renovation and parking lot and landscaping improvements, while the school administration agreed to assist in remodeling the portion of the building to be used by the alternative high school. The city allows the school system to occupy the space at no charge and also pays for utilities.

The building had been purchased on April 6, 1990, and by September 22, 1990, renovation was complete.

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The costs of property acquisition and renovation came to approximately \$225,000. Funding came from the following sources: \$127,500 from the Law Enforcement Trust Fund (drug forfeiture money), \$70,000 from community development block grant funding, \$928 from the general fund, and \$26,500 from a church and a foundation. The school board contributed labor for a portion of the building's renovation.

Figure 4 The police community resource center in Sarasota, Florida, before and after renovation for use as a police sub-station and an alternative high school.



Computers were supplied by the school board, and software costing approximately \$100,000 was supplied by the Selby Foundation.

Students come to King Academy by two paths, but all enroll voluntarily. Some are recruited by permanent part-time school employees who now routinely interview all recent dropouts. The school system has learned that by waiting at least a month to conduct these interviews, it finds students who have dropped out in search of "better opportunities" already disillusioned about their prospects in the world of work and receptive to suggestions that they explore alternative schooling. Some students enroll in King Academy before they drop out, at the suggestion of guidance counselors at the traditional high schools.

THE PROGRAM

A total of 56 students attend King Academy. Entering students are first put through an interactive computerized educational assessment to determine their level of competence in each academic subject. An individual plan of study is then developed.

All students must satisfy three requirements to graduate from the academy: they must pass the state-mandated high school competency test; they must pass the GED test; and they must demonstrate proficiency in a vocation, either by completing a vocational course at the technical institute run by the county, or by performing well in a job through which they learn general work skills. To be accepted at the county technical institute, students must have adequate reading and math skills, so the immediate goal for some students is to acquire these basic skills.

Each student at King Academy spends half of each day at a computer, working on academic subjects. Twenty-eight computer stations—one for each student—are available. The course work software meets state standards for graduation in subjects such as English, math, science, and social studies. Academic course work is supervised by two certified teachers. The second half of the day is spent at the county technical institute or on a job. At least half an hour each day is devoted to group or individual counseling provided by various county agencies, teachers, a counselor, and volunteers, on subjects ranging from AIDS prevention to assertiveness and job skills.

Most of the students at King Academy are self-supporting or are contribut-

ing to the support of their families. Accordingly, the school allows them considerable flexibility, for example, in scheduling tests. However, they must show competency at each academic level to advance to the next. The school administrators refer to this system as self-paced and competency-based.

Most of the students at King Academy are self-supporting or are contributing to the support of their families.

At the King Academy facility, adult education is offered during evening hours, and volunteers tutor elementary and junior high school students in the afternoons. The county school board pays the salaries of the King Academy faculty and receives supplemental payments from the city to make up the difference between state reimbursements and the total cost of salaries for the night-time adult education program.

The police department's role in the King Academy story did not stop with the contribution of drug forfei-

ture money for the purchase and rehabilitation of the community resource center. King Academy is a drug-free zone under Florida law, which means that people arrested for drug violations can be charged under a special statute that carries higher penalties. Those caught within 1,000 feet of King Academy with controlled or illegal substances such as cocaine face a minimum prison term of three years without parole. This law applies 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Police officers working in the police substation patrol the area by foot, car, and bicycle. They enforce all laws but pay close attention to infractions that involve boom boxes, alcohol, and loitering.

The officers also cooperate with the county parks and recreation department to organize activities for youth in the area. Individual officers take neighborhood youngsters to movies, football games, restaurants, wrestling matches, musical plays, and even to Disney World. Some officers serve as volunteer tutors after school.

The city of Sarasota is very proud to participate in an intergovernmental, public/private consortium of resources to address the needs of youth at risk.

Cities In Schools— Charlotte, North Carolina

John Morris, the author of the article, is a writer with Cities In Schools, Inc. Jennifer Davis contributed to his report.

During the 1980s, Charlotte, North Carolina, was one of the boom towns of the South—a medium-sized metropolitan area fast becoming a large one. Charlotte serves as the finance, distribution, and transportation center for the Carolinas, and the city has a substantial white collar job base; it provides banking, insurance, and marketing services for many of the textile, furniture, and tobacco factories scattered throughout North Carolina and much of South Carolina as well.

Although Charlotte is within Mecklenburg County, the city is governed by a separate political system. Charlotte has a council-manager form of government, with a mayor and an 11-member council elected by the voters. The council employs a full-time city manager responsible for administering city business. Mecklenburg County is governed by a county commission of seven elected members. A full-time manager is responsible for county government administration. The county provides some services to the city of Charlotte, including police, social services, and public transportation.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg consolidated school system is the 31st largest in the country, with 100 schools and about 77,000 students currently enrolled. A nine-member elected board of education formulates the policies that govern the school system; the superintendent is appointed by the board.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system has a tradition of innovation in providing services to students. In the past, special programs have been developed for teenaged parents, students with unique physical and emotional needs, children who need extended day care because of working parents, and students who desire vocational or advanced academic training from the local community college.

As with any large system, however, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system does have its share of problems—one being a substantial high school dropout rate. One in four ninth graders does not finish school. The state has recognized the problem and provided funding for dropout prevention counselors in some elementary and all middle and junior high schools in Charlotte.

In addition, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg community has formed a partnership with Cities In Schools, a national dropout prevention organization, to provide alternative schooling for at-risk students.

THE CIS PROCESS IN CHARLOTTE

Cities In Schools came to Charlotte at the invitation of a Mecklenburg County-appointed task force on dropouts and school truancy, which was convened in 1984. The task force was aware of a national dropout prevention program called Cities In Schools as a result of a speech given to the Charlotte Junior League by CIS President Bill Milliken. Milliken made several visits to Charlotte in the following year to discuss CIS and to meet with members of the task force. By May of 1985, the city was ready for an informal CIS assessment of community leadership, which was carried out by the Cities In Schools director for the Southeast region.

If students stayed in school and graduated, there would be a better educated work force available, potentially less crime, and less tax revenue spent on welfare payments.

This assessment is an important element of the CIS replication process (see page 15). In Charlotte, meetings were scheduled with officials of the Mecklenburg County department of health and mental health, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, city government, the Charlotte housing authority, First Union National Bank, and Central Piedmont Community College. A juvenile court judge and other influential urban leaders were also consulted. The response was positive, and the committee recommended in July 1985 that CIS be implemented in Charlotte.

Private partners were quickly found. Business leaders in Charlotte accepted the premise that in order to

have a healthy economic climate, the community had to be a healthy place to live and work. If students stayed in school and graduated, there would be a better educated work force available, potentially less crime, and less tax revenue spent on welfare payments. As an IBM employee (and member of the CIS Charlotte board) explained, "There would be a financial gain to the community by not having dropouts."

Jack Tate, a banking executive, agreed to serve as chairman of the new CIS local board, a position he held for five years. One of the first actions of the board was to hire Cynthia Marshall, a former president of the Charlotte Junior League and the liaison for CIS, as executive director of the new program.

Initial local government support for CIS had to come from top city and county management. The county manager was introduced to the program through meetings with Marshall, Tate, and a representative from the CIS national staff. The county manager was supportive and agreed to be on the board of trustees. The assistant county manager, Marie Shook—who manages human services, including the department of social services (DSS)—was appointed by the county manager to the working CIS board. Shook and the director of DSS gave approval for DSS support.

The mayor of Charlotte also became a member of the CIS board of trustees, and O. Wendell White, city manager, later joined the board of directors. As city manager, White was responsible for the department of parks and recreation, and he asked the director of the depart-

ment whether he would be willing to be involved in the program. The director needed little encouragement. He was familiar with the Atlanta CIS program, where the agency he had worked for had repositioned staff to that program. He was very willing to do the same in Charlotte, and a recreation specialist was outstationed to CIS for 90 percent of his time. During the first semester, the recreation specialist had his own caseload of 25 students.

CIS in Charlotte-Mecklenburg began serving 61 students in one junior high school in the fall of 1986. The staff included one department of recreation worker, one repositioned social worker from the department of social services, two school dropout prevention counselors, and a part-time court counselor with a caseload including all the CIS students involved in the court system. Three part-time people were also available: a drug education counselor, a health department nurse, and a youth services bureau counselor. Students were grouped one period per day by grade level to ensure access for tutoring and other special activities.

CIS IN CHARLOTTE TODAY

Since 1986, the program has experienced rapid growth and is now one of the most successful local CIS programs. During the second semester of the 1991-92 school year, CIS reached 1,096 students and their families at one elementary school, four middle schools, and two

How CIS works

The mission of Cities In Schools is to develop public/private partnerships designed to connect appropriate human services with at-risk youth in addressing such critical issues as school attendance, literacy, job preparedness, teen pregnancy, drug and alcohol abuse, self-esteem, teen suicide, suppressed creativity, and school violence.

The concept behind the CIS approach is simple. CIS has found that the dropout problem is tied to and perpetuated by the fragmentation of the health and human services intended for at-risk students and their families. Most of the services needed to help the at-risk population are already in place—but they are in the wrong place. Troubled students are being asked to seek out the help they so badly need—health care, alcohol and other drug education, AIDS education, career counseling, and so forth—from a confusing variety of disconnected agencies scattered throughout the community. The young people themselves are expected to locate needed resources and then penetrate what is often a faceless, intimidating bureaucracy in hope of connecting with counselors or mentors who are able to see them as individuals, not as collections of "problems." The task usually proves overwhelming—to give up and drop out appears preferable.

Cities In Schools believes that the public schools alone cannot resolve the diverse problems that directly influ-

ence at-risk students' ability to learn and grow. Other community sectors must be willing to work together to address the complex problems facing youth. CIS insists that it is the community's responsibility to bring helping resources to its children, not the children's responsibility to figure out where they are. CIS reverses the model that demands that students seek help outside and instead brings help inside, by repositioning service providers to work alongside teachers as a coordinated team in the battle to keep children in school. To these primary groups, CIS adds student interns and large numbers of volunteer mentors and tutors.

CIS has found that when the teacher, a health worker, and a career counselor, for example, work together each day as a team with the same group of at-risk students, they are able to achieve positive changes in the students' behavior, academic performance, and attitudes—changes not possible when services are delivered in uncoordinated isolation outside the educational setting.

This approach, which is based on the more than 30 years' experience of CIS's founders, has achieved widespread acclaim in a relatively short time. The number of locally owned CIS programs has nearly tripled in the last three years. The CIS network is now a national force comprising 64 locally owned programs in 21 states and 122 communities.

alternative high schools. The 1990-91 school year found CIS social workers and counselors providing 5,196 individual counseling sessions; 423 home visits; and 2,041 parent conferences. Three hundred fifty-one volunteer tutors and mentors gave more than 10,000 hours (worth at least \$100,000) to individual CIS students. Mecklenburg County nurses and nurse practitioners performed health assessments on 116 students. Overall, the CIS students had a 96-percent retention rate and a 92-percent promotion rate, all the more remarkable when it is borne in mind that these youngsters were referred to the CIS program precisely because they were likely to drop out.

The continual involvement of city and county government has been critical to the success of CIS in Charlotte. The program operates on a budget of about \$450,000 per year, of which about \$200,000 comes from city and county sources. The mayor of Charlotte continues to serve on the board of trustees, as does the chairman of the Mecklenburg county commissioners. City Manager White remains on the board of directors, along with the Charlotte assistant chief of police, who has been instrumental in getting the Optimist Club to support CIS financially and has also provided classroom speakers. Marie Shook, whose original support for CIS helped create the public/private partnership, remains an active supporter. "CIS shares my vision of how human services should be made available to citizens," she says. "We have the same values. Citizens of Charlotte should be at the top of the organizational structure, with government meeting their needs. That's what CIS is all about." In addition to repositioning a social worker to the CIS program, Shook has been able to open doors for CIS in other county agencies.

She is particularly pleased that the CIS collaborative concept has had an impact on the way county management is implemented throughout Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Community social workers are now located in neighborhoods, where they provide more accessible services.

The program operates on a budget of about \$450,000 per year, of which about \$200,000 comes from city and county sources.

Recently CIS helped raise enough money from local and regional foundations to employ an additional social worker. The money was given to the county in order to create a new social work position for the next year, after which CIS hopes the county will fund the position.

"PROJECT HOPE" FOR YOUNGSTERS

Betty Snow is the health director for Mecklenburg County. She describes how CIS students were identified to become part of an innovative program to combat ado-

lescent pregnancy: Project Hope. "We were looking for a different approach," she remembers. "I got together with a community group and CIS, and we came up with this idea: to enter the lives of youth and family in a community setting, before adolescence, to promote a responsible transition to adulthood using a holistic approach."

The program begins in the fourth grade and continues for five years. CIS students are offered a number of activities and incentives in the elementary school, all designed to help them make positive choices, not only about delaying sexual activity, but also about completing school and avoiding drugs and delinquent behavior. Partners include the YMCA, a local church, the health department, the Council on Adolescent Pregnancy, the elementary school involved, and CIS.

The program operates weekdays after school at the school site until about 6:00 p.m.—extending the time that medical social workers have with the students. Age-appropriate materials tailored to specific outcomes are presented to the children. Incentives to succeed form a strong component. Snow says, "CIS, because of its excellent private sector involvement, is able to arrange a number of in-kind donations for these students. For instance, we had a scholarship award for fourth and fifth graders presented at the end of the school year. Outstanding students were given a gift certificate from a local department store, and then they and their families were driven in a limo to have breakfast at a restaurant."

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH THE CITY

Another important public sector supporter of the dropout prevention program is Ben Stacy, safety coordinator for the Charlotte department of transportation. In 1987 his department participated in "Uptown Experience," a job fair in which CIS students visited the booths of several city departments to broaden their picture of possible employment paths. "It became clear to me when I talked with these kids," he says, "that many of them were having a tough time staying in school and getting diplomas because of family financial problems."

Stacy approached Cynthia Marshall with an idea for a pilot program: she would identify a student who would benefit from a regular part-time job, and Stacy would locate a city department that needed workers and arrange for the youth to be hired. Marshall liked the idea, and Stacy began working to implement it, with the approval of the city manager. "We didn't want to be in the position of hiring a student who would take a job away from someone with a family to support. So I located a clerical job in the animal control division that was going unfilled—apparently no one wanted to apply for it." The department head agreed to provide a supervisor for the CIS student, 15-year-old Angela, since it was important to give her guidance and support in her new position.

The job paid six dollars an hour, which Angela welcomed, as she was helping her mother support her

invalid father. Stacy got the transportation system to provide Angela with free bus passes, a benefit since extended to a number of CIS students. "Everybody bent over backwards to help," Stacy recalls.

The results of Angela's employment confirmed his belief that money worries were connected with Angela's performance in school. Before starting work, she was chronically absent, and her grades were low. Six months later, her grades had risen to As and Bs, and her record showed almost no absenteeism.

Stacy and CIS decided to try to expand the concept. He found similarly "unwanted" jobs for five more CIS students, and a supervisor was arranged to oversee the mini-program. The students were expected to conform to strict guidelines: they were to follow all regular rules at the offices and had to meet certain standards in their schoolwork as well. As in Angela's case, everyone benefitted. At this writing, four of the five have graduated from high school (the fifth is not yet in the 12th grade). "I don't think their lives would have turned out as well without this opportunity," says Stacy.

Money for a major expansion of the employment program remains a problem, but Stacy is working on it. "It's a plus for the city, if we can do it. We're training future employees for them." He also hopes to interest the private sector in supporting the program.

Stacy describes his role in the city government as that of coordinator. "I bring people together to get a certain task accomplished. So this work with CIS was a natural extension of what I like to do anyway. I was able to get through all the bureaucratic barriers, and seeing Angela graduate made it all worthwhile."

And Angela herself says, "I learned that you can make something out of your life, and you should make something out of your life."

THE REPLICATION PROCESS: HOW CITIES IN SCHOOLS GETS STARTED IN A NEW COMMUNITY

Part I

Activity A: Respond to an initial inquiry. The replication process begins when CIS receives an initial inquiry about its program. The inquiry is typically made by a local community leader (e.g., a superintendent of schools, a mayor, a top business executive, a president of a private industry council, a juvenile court judge) to the CIS national headquarters or to a CIS regional office. CIS requires a formal letter from the superintendent of schools before the next steps are put in motion. This letter does not authorize the establishment of a CIS program but invites CIS to explore the feasibility of working in the local school system.

Activity B: Orient the community. CIS regional staff next hold meetings to orient the community to the Cities In Schools concept. The goals of the meeting are

- To acquaint local community leaders with the CIS program and the process used to replicate the program
- To produce a strategic plan that articulates the commitment of CIS regional staff and local leaders to the next steps in the process
- To begin structuring a group called the Preimplementation Task Force to formally plan the local CIS program.

Activity C: Select the local CIS liaison. The local liaison is chosen by the community leadership group. He or she must possess a number of skills, including public speaking skills, advocacy and negotiating skills, and the ability to work with a broad range of public officials and business leaders.

The local liaison organizes and performs the tasks necessary to complete the planning phase of the CIS replication process. He or she must recruit members for the Preimplementation Task Force, gather data, conduct the community assessment, and begin planning for fundraising activities. The job is a temporary assignment that ends once the executive director for the program is chosen. In most cases, the local liaison is a community volunteer or an official on loan from a business or public agency.

Activity D: Assess community leadership support. The local liaison conducts a community leadership assessment designed to answer four critical questions:

- Is the community committed to a public/private partnership?
- Is the business sector committed to supporting such a partnership financially?
- Are the health and human services agencies committed to integration of services and repositioning of staff?
- Is the school system willing to reposition staff and provide transportation and lunches?

Activity E: Establish a CIS preimplementation task force. If the community leadership assessment is positive, the local liaison establishes the Preimplementation Task Force. The group is given an orientation to the CIS process, and discussions are held regarding an appropriate workplan. The responsibilities of this group include developing a workplan, beginning fundraising efforts, and carrying out the necessary steps leading to 501(c)(3) incorporation.

Activity F: Prepare and implement a workplan. The workplan includes

- Incorporation as a nonprofit entity
- Completion of the community assessment
- Development of a tentative budget and preliminary fundraising efforts
- Continuation of public relations and outreach
- Confirmation of support from the public education system

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- Confirmation of the willingness of human service agencies to reposition staff and provide in-kind resources to the CIS education site.

Activity G: Conduct community assessment. The community assessment provides information on the problems of local youth, the amount and kinds of resources available, and the degree of commitment to CIS. When the assessment is completed it is analyzed by the local liaison and other task force members to determine whether the community is able to support a CIS program and what problems need to be addressed.

Part II

Activity A: Incorporate and establish a board of directors. A 501(c)(3) corporation is formed. The board of directors is almost always drawn from the membership of the Preimplementation Task Force. The recommended configuration is 60-percent private sector and 40-percent public sector membership; the chairperson should always be a member of the private sector. The board's duties include drafting a multiyear plan; establishing program policies and procedures; hiring and supervising the management team; developing fundraising activities and resources; approving site plans; and institutionalizing the CIS project at the school site.

Activity B: Conduct fundraising. The board of directors lists numerous sources from which donations and pledges will be sought. They contact foundations, corporations, and individual donors, and implement a variety of fundraising events.

Activity C: Hire local management team. The day-to-day operations of a CIS program are typically conducted by a management team that includes an executive director, a project director, and an administrative assistant.

The local board hires these individuals. They receive training at the CIS training institute, the National Center for Partnership Development, operated in collaboration with Lehigh University's College of Education and Iacocca Institute, and headquartered at the

university's Mountaintop Campus in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

Activity D: Select the education site. The superintendent of schools must make the final selection of a site for the CIS project. However, the newly hired executive director works closely with the superintendent on this decision.

Activity E: Obtain agency agreements. Repositioning of staff from human service agencies is a key to a successful CIS project. The following entities are normally approached:

- Health agencies (for direct services and health education programs)
- Public and private human service agencies (for various counseling services)
- Parks and recreation departments (for recreational and cultural enrichment activities)
- Businesses (for mentors and tutors, career awareness, field trips, internships, and employment)
- Universities (for student interns)
- Private Industry Council (for pre-employment job training and part-time employment).

Activity F: Develop the comprehensive site plan. The management team drafts a comprehensive site plan for approval by the board of directors. This plan covers all activities, timelines, and persons responsible for implementing the site plan.

Activity G: Prepare project site. The executive director

- Develops the site mission statement
- Finalizes details with participating agencies and secures signed agreements
- Recruits and assigns repositioned staff
- Establishes student selection criteria and referral procedures
- Orients parents
- Finalizes space requirements
- Acquires equipment and supplies
- Develops the service delivery plan
- Trains the site team and orients school personnel.

With the completion of this activity, the new program is considered operational and ready for the students.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

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
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NIJ/ICMA

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING: An Alternative Strategy Training Workshop

Largo, Florida
April 24-25, 1995

EVALUATION FORM

NAME: _____
(As you would like to appear on Certificate of Completion)

TITLE: _____

AFFILIATION: _____

POPULATION OF YOUR JURISDICTION: _____

Your response to the following questions will help us to improve the quality and delivery of this training workshop. Read each item carefully, circle the rating which most accurately reflects your assessment, and provide any comments, suggestions or recommendations you wish.

I. The modules will be rated on a 5-point scale (5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor) utilizing the following perspectives:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| CLARITY | Was the information clearly presented? |
| INFORMATIVE | Was the presentation helpful in providing you with new solutions to your jurisdiction's needs? |
| RELEVANCY | Is the information relevant to you, your job and your jurisdiction? |
| PRESENTER'S DELIVERY | Knowledge of Subject and Style |

(5=excellent; 4=good; 3=average; 2=poor; 1=very poor)

1. WHY CHANGE? WHO NOW?

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

2. WHAT IS COMMUNITY POLICING?

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTERS' DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

3. WHAT IS COMMUNITY?

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

4. SECURING THE ROOTS FOR COPS: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTATION

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

5. COP TOOL BOX

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

6. "NO SURPRISES!"

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

7. CONFERENCE CALL

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

8. ACTION PLANNING

CLARITY	5	4	3	2	1
INFORMATIVE	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY	5	4	3	2	1
PRESENTER'S DELIVERY	5	4	3	2	1

II. WORKSHOP FLOW AND ACTIVITIES

Please indicate your level of satisfaction with the activities and processes of this training workshop listed below:

(5=very satisfied; 4=satisfied; 3=neutral; 2=room for improvement; 1=dissatisfied)

LECTURES/PRESENTATIONS

TIME ALLOTTED	5	4	3	2	1
OPPORTUNITY FOR QUESTIONS	5	4	3	2	1
RELEVANCY OF VISUAL AIDS	5	4	3	2	1
USE OF TEXT IN HANDBOOK	5	4	3	2	1

WORKSHOP FLOW

SEQUENCE OF SESSIONS	5	4	3	2	1
SESSION TRANSITION	5	4	3	2	1

INDIVIDUAL WORK

UTILITY OF INDIVIDUAL WORK	5	4	3	2	1
TIME ALLOTTED FOR INDIVIDUAL WORK	5	4	3	2	1

MATERIALS

SYLLABUS	5	4	3	2	1
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK	5	4	3	2	1
PARTICIPANT SOURCEBOOK	5	4	3	2	1
VISUAL AIDS	5	4	3	2	1
HANDOUTS	5	4	3	2	1
TRAINING EQUIPMENT	5	4	3	2	1

III. IMPACT OF WORKSHOP

How informative was the total workshop to you?

Very Informative 5 4 3 2 1 Uninformative

How useful was the total workshop to you?

Very Useful 5 4 3 2 1 Not Useful

How relevant was the information in this workshop to your jurisdiction?

Very Relevant 5 4 3 2 1 Irrelevant

IV. FOLLOW-UP

As a result of the training workshop, will you implement all or any portion of the topics discussed? If so, please check one or more below.

- Discuss with Elected Official
 - Discuss with staff
 - Organize meeting to discuss ways to implement strategy in your jurisdiction
 - Request more written material on specifics to implement
 - Other--Please Specify Below:
-

V. OVERALL RESPONSE

What is your overall reaction to the workshop? Circle one:

- 5 ONE OF THE BEST
- 4 GOOD, VALUABLE
- 3 AVERAGE, FAIR
- 2 NOT VERY GOOD
- 1 POOR, NOT USEFUL

VI. COMMENTS

What did you gain most from attending this workshop?

What other subjects/topics (not covered) would have been of interest to you or your jurisdiction?

In your opinion, what could we do that would help us to enhance the community-oriented policing workshop?

ADDITIONAL





This is to certify that

Jerome Amis

has satisfactorily completed a
professional training course in

*Community-Oriented Policing:
An Alternative Strategy*

Co-sponsored by:


U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

International City/County Management Association

Hosted by:

City of Athens, Georgia
January 9-10, 1995

William H. Hansell, Jr.
Executive Director, ICMA



**ICMA-NIJ Workshop
on
COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy**

**Groton, Connecticut
October 3-4, 1994**

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy

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An Alternative Strategy

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An Alternative Strategy

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING:
An Alternative Strategy**

Largo, Florida
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
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<i>B</i>	
<i>C</i>	
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