
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ACQUISITIONS



# DEATH ON PATROL: FELONIOUS HOMICIDES OF AMERICAN POLICE OFFICERS

### A DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE


# FROM THE POLICE FOUNDATION

By

Lorie A Fridell Florida State University

> Antony M. Pate Police Foundation

> > March, 1995



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#### CHAPTER 1

#### **INTRODUCTION**

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 3,141 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty between 1972 and 1993; 1,986 were killed feloniously and 1,313 accidentally. Although the number of felonious killings each year declined notably from 1972 to 1984, (probably due to better training, increased use of body armor, and improved medical care), police officers are killed feloniously at work at a higher rate than all occupations except taxi drivers (Castillo and Jenkins, 1994).

Although many police policies are designed to protect officers from the threat of violence and a great deal of training dedicated to teaching officers how to thwart assaults, researchers have paid little attention to this subject. Criminologist Lawrence Sherman (1980) has discussed the emphasis placed on different types of violence between citizens and police, i.e., police against violence, violence by police, and violence against police:

If we are concerned with the dignity and safety of all persons . . . each [topic] is equal in importance to the others. What is not equal is our knowledge, both theoretical and practical, about each question. We arguably know the most about how to reduce violence by police and the least about how to reduce violence against the police (p. 4).

As a step toward providing such an understanding, the authors of this study, with support from the National Institute of Justice, conducted a comprehensive analysis of felonious killings of officers. The purposes of this study were to:

- Analyze trends in the numbers and rates of killings across different types of agencies and attempt to explain these differences,
- Analyze the nature and circumstances of incidents of felonious police killings, and,

Increase knowledge regarding the use and effectiveness of soft body armor.

Chapter 2 summarizes what is currently known about killings of the police, drawing upon the FBI-UCR reports and upon the academic and practitioner literature. The three subsequent chapters report the empirical findings of the present study. Specifically, Chapter 3 reports the results of the analyses of trends in the numbers and rates of felonious killings by agency type and size. That chapter also includes the results of analyses conducted in an attempt to explain differences in rates of police killings in the nation's largest cities.

Chapter 4 presents the results of an in-depth analyses of all incidents in which officers were killed in the U.S. and its territories for the 10-year period, 1983-1992. These data were collected from the narrative descriptions of felonious killings provided by the FBI in their annual reports. Information was gleaned from these narratives regarding the context and circumstances of the incidents, as well as, the actions of officers and assailants.

Chapter 5 describes the results of an agency survey regarding policies, practices, and effectiveness of soft body armor. Over 1100 state, county, and municipal agencies provided information regarding whether they provide their officers with body armor, their policies regarding who is required to or encourage to wear body armor, and their enforcement mechanisms for those policies. Additionally, the agencies provided data on firearms assaults against officers for purposes of assessing the effectiveness of body armor in reducing officer deaths.

#### CHAPTER 2

# POLICE KILLINGS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In this chapter we review the existing literature on police killings, paying particular attention to what is known about the duty-related felonious deaths of law enforcement officers in the United States and its territories. That is, our focus is on those officers who are the victims of criminal homicide while acting in a law enforcement capacity. We shall discuss the sources of the data for the various studies, the reported rates of these deaths within the profession, the trends in the number and rate of killings over the last two decades, as well as the characteristics of the victim officers, the offenders, and the incidents in which the deaths occurred. We also review some of the limited information available concerning assaults on officers and about the accidental deaths of on-duty officers—subjects about which much less is known than felonious killings.

#### Sources Of Data

As mentioned above, the major source of information on felonious killings of police are the data collected by the FBI through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. Additional information on this topic has been generated by research focused on particular jurisdictions (e.g., cities, states) which relied upon original departmental data.

# **Uniform Crime Reports Data**

The primary source of data concerning duty-related deaths are the supplementary reports from the state and local law enforcement agencies that participate in the UCR program. However, the UCR database is not restricted to felonious deaths of officers within UCR-participating agencies. The UCR collects information concerning all of these deaths,

(of local, state, and federal officers) nationally and within the United States territories with the aid of FBI field divisions and the Bureau of Justice Assistance Public Safety Officers Benefits Program. The data on officers killed in the line of duty are reported annually in the UCR Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA). The FBI first began collecting data on felonious killings of police officers in 1945. The information was first reported, starting in 1961, in the annual UCR publication Crime in the United States. In 1972 the UCR developed a separate publication (Law Enforcement Officers Killed) which focused on officers killed in the line of duty. Indeed, it was in the early 1970s that general compliance by law enforcement agencies with the voluntary reporting system was achieved. The amount of and quality of data regarding these incidents have improved progressively since that time and are considered the most reliable of all data collected in the UCR (Vaughn and Kappeler, 1986).

The incidents included in the FBI data involve persons who are sworn law enforcement officers with full arrest powers. The deaths occurred while these law enforcement officers were acting in a duty-related capacity. (This includes officers who were officially "off-duty" when they intervened in incidents in their law enforcement capacity.) The offenders intended to harm the officers and/or otherwise resist the officers' interventions.

The annual LEOKA reports provide both summary statistics and narratives. The summary statistics, provide information regarding the officers who were killed. For instance, data are presented regarding the age, gender, race, years of experience, and so forth for the officers slain during each year, and aggregated over various time periods (e.g.,

a decade). Data regarding the offenders include demographics and criminal history.

Regarding the situation in which the officer was killed, the LEOKAs present information regarding the activity and assignment of the officers at the time of their deaths. Additional information includes the weapon used, the type of agency with which the officer was employed, and the region of the country in which this agency was located. The narratives provide a one- to two-paragraph description of each incident which occurred during the year.

The pervasiveness of the use of these data is demonstrated by the fact that Cardarelli (1968), in one of the earliest studies of this topic, used these data to describe the characteristics of police killed during the years 1961 through 1963. Lester (1978a, 1978b, 1982, 1984) used the FBI data for various periods to test hypotheses related to city and state characteristics. Little (1984) and Boylen and Little (1990) used the data on police killings for 1972-1980 and 1977-1986, respectively, to assess characteristics of the officers, assailants, and incidents. Konstantin (1984) tested various hypotheses using the FBI data (including the narratives) for felonious line-of-duty deaths for 1978 through 1980 and Sherman et al., (1989) focused on drug-related police killings between 1972 and 1988.

Bailey (1982) and Bailey and Peterson (1987) used these data, for the years 1961-1971 and 1973-1984, respectively, to assess the relationship between the existence of the death penalty and police homicides. Peterson and Bailey (1988) looked at the "structural determinants" of police killings using data from 1977 through 1984. Chamlin (1989) tested conflict hypotheses using FBI data on felonious killings for 1980 through 1982.

#### FBI In-Depth Study

In 1992, the FBI published the results of an in-depth study of the felonious killings of police officers (FBI, 1992b). The primary purpose of the study was to add to what we know about "why" officers are killed. To do this, the researchers selected 51 incidents in which officers were killed, primarily during the period 1975 through 1985. The researchers chose this time period balancing the desire for recent information which would still have practical policy relevance against the need to avoid incidents involving offenders whose court cases were still on appeal. From incidents which occurred during this time period, attempts were made to select a group of cases which would be representative of all law enforcement officers killed in terms of the region of the country, the circumstances of the deaths, and the types of agencies in which the officers were employed. Because the study involved offender interviews, only those cases for which the offender was alive, in custody, and willing to cooperate without compensation or consideration, were eligible.

The 51 incidents involved 50 offenders and 54 slain law enforcement officers. Data were collected for each incident with regard to the officer, the offender, and the situation. For instance, peers and supervisors of the officer, as well as the officers assigned to investigate the case, were interviewed, and the departmental documents pertaining to the case were reviewed. The offender was interviewed, his files were reviewed, and prison guards were interviewed concerning the offender's behavior in prison. The offender interviews, averaging five hours in length, addressed the offender's background, family structure and home environment, attitudes toward authority, criminal history, and history with weapons.

Further the offender was asked to describe the encounter which led to the officer's death.

Selected results from this study are described in appropriate sections below.

#### Jurisdiction-Level Data

Some researchers have collected data on police killings (or shootings at police) directly from agencies within particular jurisdictions. One of the earliest studies of this type was conducted by Bristow (1963) who described the characteristics of a convenience sample of 150 incidents in which officers were shot. Marafioti (1972) studied 23 police officers killed in New York city from 1966 through 1971 and, in the same city, Margarita (1980) studied 245 police homicides occurring between 1844 and 1978. Geller and Karales (1981) studied shots which hit Chicago on-duty and off-duty police officers between 1974 and 1978, and Fyfe (1978) collected data on officers shot in New York City between 1971 and 1975. Chapman provided a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the killings of 41 Oklahoma law enforcement officers murdered between 1950 and 1974 (1976) and of 54 Oklahoma law enforcement officers murdered between 1950 and 1984 (1986). Moorman and Wemmer (1983) reviewed the 15 incidents where California officers were killed during the years 1980 and 1981.

Collecting data on a national level for various periods of time are the National Law Enforcement Memorial project and the Law Enforcement Memorial Foundation. These two entities have tried to identify every officer killed in the line of duty in the history of the United States. The American Police Hall of Fame and Museum, based in Miami, has also released figures regarding line of duty deaths. The data sources vary in terms of the criteria

by which law enforcement deaths are included, and, as such, the numbers, even for identical time periods, may vary considerably. (See Geller and Scott, 1992: 122.)


#### **Extent of the Problem**

According to the FBI figures, the number of U.S. law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty per year more than doubled between 1960 and 1966 (from 28 to 57) and doubled again between 1966 and 1971 (from 57 to 126; FBI, 1971). The number of officer homicides peaked in 1973 (at 134) and, since then, has been declining. Figure 2-1 shows the FBI figures of officers feloniously killed during the period 1972 through 1993. During this period an average of 90 officers per year lost their lives in the line of duty at the hands of citizens. The 70 killings recorded in 1993 represent a 32.7 percent decrease from the 104 killings in 1980, and a 48.0 percent decrease from the 134 killings recorded in the peak year, 1973.

Estimates of the rates at which police are feloniously killed vary as a result of the differing estimates of the number of sworn personnel in the U.S. and its territories. Geller and Scott (1992) calculated rates for officers killed nationally per 100,000 officers, per 100,000 violent crime arrests, and per 10,000 homicides (murders and non-negligent manslaughter). They report that during the period 1960 through 1989, 23 officers per 100,000 officers were feloniously killed. Calculating rates for five-year periods, the authors report that 21 officers per 100,000 were killed during the period 1960 through 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>This reported increase could reflect an actual increase in felonious killings and/or could reflect the increasing validity (e.g., representativeness) of the data base during the early years.

Figure 2-1: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, 1972-1993



The rate peaked at 33 during the period 1970 through 1974, and then decreased steadily to 14 for the period 1985 through 1989. These authors report that similar trends are indicated by the rates derived from the violent crime arrests, and homicide figures. Thus, for instance, the same downward trend noted for the per capita rates above, is indicated, even when police killings are placed in the context of violent crime. For the period 1970 through 1974, 33 officers were killed per 100,000 officers. The 1985 through 1989 rate was 14. Similarly, the corresponding rate for the same time periods based on violent crime arrests were 34 and 13. Both rates indicate an approximately 60 percent decrease from the first time period to the second.

According to Geller and Scott (1992), the relative likelihood of police being feloniously killed compared to citizens has decreased over the last decade. In 1980, police were 2.4 times more likely than citizens in the general population to be feloniously killed. By 1990 and 1991, the victimization rate for officers was about the same as that of citizens in general. Specifically, in those two years, officers were about 1.2 times as likely as citizens to be murdered.

Below, we describe what is known about the characteristics of officers who have been killed, the characteristics of the assailants, the circumstances of the event, geographic correlates of police shootings, and other factors associated with police killings which have been reported by researchers.

#### Officer Characteristics

The FBI and various researchers have described the characteristics of the officers slain in the line of duty.

#### **Demographics**

As indicated by the FBI figures presented in Table 2-1, most of the officers killed between the years of 1972 and 1992 were male (98.7%). One-third (37.2%) of the officers were 18 to 30 years of age and another third (34.5%) were 31 to 40. The mean age was 35.8 years. (See Table 2-2.) Just under 6 percent (5.8%) of the officers had less than one year of experience. One-third (33.2%) had one to four years of experience, and another one-third (31%) had between five and 10 years of experience. Thirty percent (30%) had eleven or more years of experience in law enforcement. The average number of years of experience for the slain officers was 8.3. (See Table 2-3.)

TABLE 2-1
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER
1972-1992

Sex	Number	PERCENT
Male	1891	98.7
FEMALE	. 25	1.3
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 2-2

AGE OF VICTIM OFFICER
1972-1992

AGE	Number	PERCENT
18-24 YEARS	183	9.6
25-30 YEARS	528	27.6
31-35 YEARS	410	21.5
36-40 Years	249	13.0
41-45 YEARS	215	11.3
46-50 YEARS	130	6.8
51 + YEARS	196	10.3
TOTAL	1911	100.0

Average Age = 35.8 Missing = 5

TABLE 2-3
OFFICERS' YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
1972-1992

YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	Number	PERCENT
LESS THAN ONE	109	5.8
1 THROUGH 4	629	33.2
5 то 10	586	31.0
11 OR MORE	568	30.0
TOTAL	1892	100.0

Average = 8.3 years Missing = 24

Using FBI data from an earlier period (1961-1963), Cardarelli (1968) reports similar characteristics of slain officers. He noted that 43 percent of the 132 officers were killed during their first five years of service, and 12 of these officers were killed during their first year on the force. He explains (p. 449):

These findings are probably a function of two major factors: first, there may be a greater proportion of police throughout the country who not only have less than five years of service, but, in addition, probably constitute a greater proportion of the police on patrol. As the officer's years on the force increase, he may be promoted and assigned to desk work or other duties where the risk of being killed decreases. However, even if the policeman continues on patrol throughout his career, his experience in dealing with criminals would increase, possibly leading him to be more cautious in potentially dangerous situations and thereby reducing the probability of his being killed.

Little (1984) used FBI data from 1972 through 1980. During that period the police-victims were 99.6 percent male, 89.5 percent white, and 41.3 percent had between one and five years of service. Chapman (1986) reports similar results regarding the race, gender, and years of service of slain officers in Oklahoma.

#### Race

Konstantin (1984), using the FBI data and data on law enforcement personnel, found that black officers were disproportionately the victims of police killings relative to their representation nationally as law enforcement officers. Specifically, Konstantin found that, whereas approximately 6 percent of the law enforcement officers in the United States in 1978 through 1980 were black, they comprised 10.7 percent of the law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty. Fully one-third of the black officers killed were off-duty at the time of the incident, compared to only 10.4 percent of the white officers. Geller and Karales (1981) who studied incidents in which shots hit Chicago officers between 1974 and 1978, also found that black officers were disproportionately represented among those who were shot both on-duty and off-duty.

These findings are consistent with research on police use of deadly force that indicates that black officers are disproportionately more likely to use deadly force (Fyfe, 1978, 1981;

Geller and Karales, 1981). In both areas—killings of police officers and killings by police officers—the authors have suggested that these findings might be due to the nature of the assignments of the on-duty black officers and the location of the residences of the black officers. Assignments and residences of black officers, compared to those of white officers, are more frequently in high-crime areas (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981).

Table 2-4 provides the FBI information regarding the race of officers killed during 1972 through 1992. Close to 90 percent (88.2%) of the officers were white (including Hispanics), 11.3 percent were black, and just 11 officers of 1,916 (or 0.6%) were of another race.

TABLE 2-4

RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER
1972-1992

RACE	Number	PERCENT
Wнгте	1689	88.2
BLACK	216	11.3
OTHER	11	0.6
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

#### Rank

The data supplied to the FBI indicate that the vast majority of the law enforcement officers killed between 1972 and 1992 were at the lower ranks of their agencies. Table 2-5 indicates that 80.6 percent of those officers killed were at the lowest ranks, including those of "patrol officer," "police officer," "deputy sheriff," "trooper," and "constable." Sixteen percent (16.0%) were supervisors and/or detectives and 3.4 percent were the top officers of

their agencies (e.g., chiefs, sheriffs). Chapman reported a similar tendency for officers killed to be of lower ranks, although "persons in higher ranks were by no means safe" (1986: 27-28). Specifically, he found that though most (43 of 54) of the officers were of lower ranks, one lieutenant, one undersheriff, one assistant chief, and five chiefs of police or sheriffs were among the victims.

Figure 2-2 shows the percentage of slain officers of each rank for the period 1972 through 1992. These proportions indicate no consistent upward or downward trend for any of the three groups.

TABLE 2-5

RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER
1972-1992


Rank	Number	PERCENT
FRONT LINE	1537	80.6
SUPERVISOR/DETECTIVE	306	16.0
TOP ADMINISTRATOR	65	3.4
TOTAL	1908	100.0

Missing = 8

# **Duty and Uniform Status**

Cheek and Lesce (1988) write about the special dangers for off-duty officers and officers working in plain clothes. (See also Girodo, 1985, and Farkas, 1986.) According to FBI figures, between 1972 and 1992, 12.6 percent of the slain officers were off-duty at the time of the incident. The proportion of slain officers who are off-duty at the time of the attack appears to have increased in the first few years of the 1990s. Between 1972 and

Figure 2-2: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Agency Type: 1972-1993



11.5 percent of the slain officers were off-duty; similarly, 12.1 percent were off duty during 1980 through 1989. Of the officers slain in 1990, 1991, and 1992, however, 20.1 percent were off duty.

Geller and Karales (1981) found that 44 percent of the officers shot by civilians in Chicago during the period 1974 through 1978 were off-duty at the time of the incidents. Fyfe (1980) discussed the dangers associated with arming off-duty police, both in terms of police killings and police use of deadly force. Cheek and Lesce (1988) cover issues related to off-duty officer survival.

Geller and Scott (1992:164) discuss the factors which might account for the apparent large number of officers who are shot while off-duty. They point out that though many departments encourage officers to take action in response to criminal activity when off-duty, often the officers are "at a tactical disadvantage." The officers do not have radio communication, access to backup, the array of equipment they might otherwise have, and so forth, and it is unlikely they will be wearing their body armor. Further, the circumstances are likely to be such that they'll have little time to plan a course of action, and there is the possibility that they'll be under the influence of alcohol.

A relatively large percentage of officers who are feloniously killed in the line of duty are in plainclothes. This includes the ones referred to above who are off-duty as well as those working as detectives, undercover, and so forth. Forty-four percent of the on-duty officers shot by civilians in Chicago between 1974 and 1978 were in plainclothes. Fyfe (1978) found that a number of plainclothes police officers were shot by their colleagues who mistook them for suspects. (Officers mistakenly shot by colleagues are not included in the

FBI-UCR data base as feloniously killed.) Between 1976 (when the FBI first started collecting this information) and 1992, 28.6 percent of the slain officers were in plainclothes.


Without information regarding the number or percentage of field officers who work plainclothes, it is difficult to determine whether this percentage is proportionate or disproportionate to the overall representation of plainclothes officers. Geller and Karales' (1981) research in Chicago revealed that the plainclothes officers on the tactical squad were much more likely than the uniformed officers in the department to be feloniously killed. Whereas the plainclothes tactical officers represented less than 6 percent of the Chicago sworn personnel during the late 1980s and 1990s, they represented 36 percent of the officers slain in the line of duty. The tactical unit, however, is a special subgroup of plainclothes officers. Other plainclothes personnel are not assigned to such risky duties.

The fact that the proportion of slain officers in plainclothes has stayed fairly constant over the years, but that the proportion of officers slain off duty has risen, indicates that the proportion of slain plainclothes officers who were off duty has risen over the years and the proportion of plainclothes on duty officers has gotten smaller. Indeed, during the 1976 through 1979, 15.2 percent of the slain officers in plainclothes were off-duty and during the 1980s 17.1 percent of the plainclothes officers were off duty. For the period 1990, 1991, and 1992 this percentage rises to 30.1 percent.

#### **Assignment Type**

As indicated in Figure 2-3, 63.4 percent of the officers slain during the period 1972 through 1992 were on vehicle patrol, in either one-officer (46.6%) or two-officer (16.8%) vehicles. Eighteen percent (17.6%) were on special assignment, and 2.4 percent, 2.2

Figure 2-3: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, By Assignment: 1972-1992



NOTE: Numbers in parentheses denote number of officers killed. Sources: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1992.

percent, and 1.8 percent were serving as detectives, undercover, and on foot patrol, respectively. As noted previously 12.6 percent of the officers were off-duty at the time of the attack.

### Officer Performance and Personality

As part of the FBI-UCR (1992b) in-depth study of 51 incidents of felonious killings of law enforcement officers, information was collected regarding the 54 victim officers' performance evaluations. The researchers report that "a most surprising finding" was that 10 of the officers had received "successful" or "better than successful" ratings over the period preceding the killing, except that a lower assessment was received just prior to their deaths. Though the interviewers hadn't intended to analyze the personalities of the victim officers, they began to note a "remarkable similarity among the adjectives and phrases law enforcement sources and a limited number of offenders used to describe the victim officers" (FBI, 1992b: 32). A list was developed of the most frequently mentioned behavioral characteristics of the victim officers. Included on this list were: "friendly to everyone," "well-liked by community and department," "tends to use less force than other officers felt they would in similar circumstances," "hard working," "tends to perceive self as more public. relations than law enforcement," "doesn't follow all the rules, especially in regard to arrests, traffic stops, and confrontations with prisoners," "tends to look for 'good' in others," and "easy going."

# Officer Errors During the Incident

Using data from the in-depth study of 51 incidents, the FBI-UCR researchers pinpointed a number of procedural errors committed by the officers who were attacked.

These included failing to call for backup when appropriate, inadequate suspect searches, improper use of handcuffs, faulty vehicle placement on a stop, faulty approaches to vehicles and suspects, and so forth (FBI, 1992b). The FBI pointed out, however, that some of the slain officers were following correct procedures and others were killed in situations for which no formal procedures had been formulated.

Brooks (1975) noted that individual officers and departments are reluctant to discuss any procedural/tactical errors made by officers killed in the line of duty. He maintains, however, that "many police officers who die in the field have made mistakes." In his book he outlines and discusses 10 "deadly errors" which have been linked to the circumstances of many felonious killings of police officers. These are (pp. 6-7):

- 1) Failure to Maintain Proficiency and Care of Weapon, Vehicle and Equipment;
- 2) Improper Search and Use of Handcuffs;
- 3) Sleepy or Asleep;
- 4) Relaxing too Soon;
- 5) Missing the Danger Signs;
- 6) Taking a Bad Position;
- 7) Failure to Watch (Suspects') Hands;
- 8) Tombstone Courage [e.g., not waiting for backup];
- 9) Preoccupation; and
- 10) Apathy.

#### Soft Body Armor

### **History**

The first "body armor" was made out of animal skins. Metal was used as body armor by knights in the fifth century BC (Athey, 1983). Body armor used during the Civil War would stop a musket bullet, but was very heavy (Stewart, 1988). The armor used by both allied and German forces during WWI weighed 20 to 25 pounds (Stewart, 1988).

Concealable body armor wasn't developed until after WWI and consisted of overlapping steel plates sealed in plastic (Athey, 1983; Stewart, 1988). Though adopted by some police departments (and used by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin), these vests allowed for limited flexibility and thus were used primarily by special police teams.

"Flak jackets" were used by police departments in the 1940s and 1950s, but "the bulk, weight and conspicuousness was such that they were not suitable for constant use, particularly during the normal activities of a law enforcement officer" (Stewart, 1988: 18). The armor available during the late 1960s was either heavy and visible or concealable, hot, and uncomfortable. Further, these types provided protection from nothing more powerful than a .38 Special (Stewart, 1988).

Soft body armor designed to protect the torso from shotguns and small-caliber handguns while being comfortable enough for routine wear under a uniform, was first patented in 1972 (U.S. Congress, 1992a:2). The new vests were made from the fibre, Kevlar, developed by DuPont. Athey (1983: 2) describes these new vests:

The new vest's protection capability arises from the very high strength of Kevlar--five times as strong as steel on an equal weight basis. The vest's comfort results from the fact that Kevlar is a textile fibre, and can be made into fabrics which possess normal textile properties of flexibility, light weight, etc. Protective panels are made up for the vest, using as many layers of Kevlar fabric as are required for the chosen level of protection. The development of the Kevlar vest instigated a new interest in the use and testing of body armour.

After Kevlar vests passed some preliminary tests, the National Institute of Justice contracted for 5,000 vests in 1975 and provided some to departments in 15 U.S. cities for voluntary use by officers. Stewart (1988:21) describes the first Kevlar "save":

On December 23, 1975, an off-duty but uniformed Seattle patrolman, Ray Johnson, was standing in a food market checkout line. A stickup man shot him. 'He was only three feet away,' said [one of the researchers] 'but he did not fall down, so the guy shot him again. We rushed out to Seattle to see him. All he had under the vest were two mean-looking bruises. He was out of the hospital in three days.'

#### **Levels of Protection**

Body armor is divided into two general categories, that suitable for routine full-time wear and that suitable for terrorist threat and tactical use when weight and bulk are less of a factor. The former type can be made concealable and is designed for protection from handgun bullets but not from rifle bullets or edged or pointed weapons such as knives or ice picks. The latter type is not concealable and is designed for protection from rifle bullets as well as those fired from pistols. Although both types are commonly called "bulletproof vests," there is no guarantee that even a bullet of a type a garment is designed to stop will not kill the wearer since much of the body is not covered by the protective panels of a particular type of armor.

The vests are made in five "threat levels." They provide protection as follows ("The Basics of Body Armor," 1983: p. 27):

Threat Level I: Threat level I body armor protects against .22 cal. long rifle handgun rounds to .38 special projectiles.

Threat Level II-A: Threat level II-A armor provides protection against the lower-velocity .357 magnum and 9mm projectiles. It also provides protection against rounds included in the Threat Level I classification.

Threat Level II: Threat Level II armor provides protection against higher velocity .357 magnum and 9mm projectiles. It also provides protection against those rounds included in the Threat Level I and II-A classifications.

Threat Level III: Threat Level III armor provides protection against the 7.62mm (308 Winchester). It also provides protection against those rounds included in Threat Level I, II-A and II classifications.

Threat Level IV: Threat Level IV armor provides protection against 30-06 projectiles. It also provides protection against those rounds in Threat Level I, II-A, II and III classifications.

Vests are not designed to, nor are they generally able to, protect the officer from knife attacks or attacks with other sharp pointed weapons ("Soft Body Armor ... Some Answers," 1984).

#### Officer Use of Body Armor

Since the use of Kevlar for the production of vests, the wearing of such armor has become widespread, even mandated in some agencies. McLean (1990) reports the results of a survey of officers conducted within three law enforcement agencies in Missouri. In the survey, the officers indicated whether they wore their body armor always, sometimes, or never during the various seasons of the year. Between 27 and 39 percent of the Highway Patrol officers responding to the survey reported that they wear their vests all of the time. The rates varied by squads and by season. Within the Springfield Police Department there was much variability of vest wearing across squads and some across seasons. Fifty-percent of the officers in one squad reported that they always wore their vests. (An additional unspecified percentage indicated they wore their vests some of the time.) This percentage increased to 59 percent in the Spring. Among officers in another squad, however, fifty percent indicated that they "never" wore their vests.

Among Greene County deputies, between 66 and 73 percent reported that they wore vests, depending on the shift. The highest rates were reported in the winter.

A recent survey, conducted by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice for the Allied Signal Corporation, a body armor manufacturer, also explored the issue of body armor use. That survey, using a sample of approximately 1,700 officers in cities with populations of 25,000 or more, indicated that over two-thirds of the police departments represented directly supplied officers with soft body armor, slightly higher than indicated by a 1987 survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S. Department of Justice, 1989). In that survey, over 72 percent of "front-line" officers indicated that they wore body armor "all of the time" (John Jay College, 1991). An additional 19 percent of these officers said that they wore a protective vest "some of the time." Five percent said they never wore such armor. Since the data were collected by means of self-administered questionnaires, the wear rate reported in the survey may be higher than it actually is.

A major reason that more officers do not wear body armor is the warm temperatures generated by body heat. Heat build up is exacerbated by the vests' inability to absorb moisture ("Soft Body Armor ... Some Answers," p. 28). Additional drawbacks to the vests are that they restrict movement and are heavy (McLean, 1990).

#### **Effectiveness**

The need for soft body armor is indicated by the fact that 909 officers, or 51.2 percent, of the 1,775 officers who were killed with firearms between 1972 and 1992 were killed as a result of wounds in the upper torso area (FBI, 1972-1991). Since only 72 of these officers were wearing soft body armor when they were killed, it seems reasonable to expect that a significant number of those officers' lives might have been saved had they been wearing body armor.

One might have expected that, since the introduction and widespread use of body armor, the number of officers killed by firearm wounds to the upper torso would account for the overall reduction in felonious killings over the years, or at least would be decreasing at a rate greater rate than that for the categories of officers killed by wounds in the other two areas. Table 2-6 shows the location of fatal wounds from firearm attacks for the period 1972 through 1992. The next two figures provide information regarding the location of the fatal firearm wounds of the slain officers for each year during the period 1972 through 1992. Figure 2-4 provides the absolute numbers for the three locations (head, upper torso, below waist) for each year, and Figure 2-5 provides the percent of officers each year which were fatally hit in the three locations. As seen in Figure 2-4, officers killed by firearm wounds to the upper torso is declining at a rate similar to the other two wound categories. Similarly, the proportion of officers killed by firearms wounds to the upper torso has not been reducing over the 21-year time period. (Neither, as we will see later, has the proportion of officers killed with firearms reduced over this time period.)

As part of a study conducted by DuPont (as discussed in Clede, 1989), three persons independently analyzed the wounds of the 657 officers felonious killed in the line of duty between 1980 and 1987. They sought to determine if, for each incident, wearing a vest might have saved the officer's life. There was unanimous agreement that one-third of the officers feloniously killed during the eight year period "might have" been saved by body armor.

TABLE 2-6

LOCATION OF FATAL WOUNDS FROM FIREARM ATTACKS
1972-1992

LOCATION OF WOUND	Number	PERCENT
FRONT HEAD	605	34.1
Rear Head	153	8.6
FRONT UPPER TORSO	761	42.9
REAR UPPER TORSO	148	8.3
FRONT BELOW WAIST	92	5.2
REAR BELOW WAIST	16	0.9
TOTAL	1775	100.0

Missing = 2

This same study also reviewed the deaths of the 125 officers killed during the eightyear period who were wearing vests. Over ninety-percent (92%) of these deaths involved
firearms. Six percent involved vehicle assaults and 2 percent involved knives. Of the cases
involving firearms, 93 percent of the deaths resulted from bullets hitting parts of the body
outside of the coverage areas. In the remaining seven percent of the deaths, the bullet which
exceeded the designed capabilities of the vest, penetrated the vest. (No bullet penetrated a
vest which the vest was designed to stop.) Half (51%) of the officers who were shot while
wearing body armor were shot in the head, one-fifth (19%) were shot in the neck or
"unprotected upper torso," seven percent were shot in the shoulder/armhole area, 6 percent
were hit in the "unprotected lower abdomen," and one-tenth were shot between the panels of
the vest (Clede, 1989).

Figure 2-4: Number of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed

By Location of Fatal Firearm Wound: 1972-1992





Figure 2-5: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Location of Fatal Firearm Wound: 1972-1992



Sources: Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1992.

Estimating the actual number of officers whose lives have been saved because they were wearing soft body armor is extremely difficult. Sometimes "saves" are defined very broadly, including, for instance, all incidents in which bullets were "caught" by the vest, even if, without a vest, the bullet would not have caused life-threatening injury. Further, "saves" not involving ballistic attacks might include reduction in injury to the officer who is attacked with another weapon or is involved in an auto accident.

Geller and Scott (1992) use the DuPont "Kevlar Survivors' Club" figures to explore whether the downward trend in felonious police killings since the early 1970s might be attributable to the wearing of soft body armor. They estimate that, but for the use of soft body armor, an additional 24 to 70 officers would have been feloniously killed each year during the period 1974 through September, 1991. Looking at rates, the difference between those killed and those that would have been killed is not as dramatic. Geller and Scott report that, though the rate at which officers were killed or "might have been killed" but for soft body armor, rose between 1984 and 1988, the rate at which officers were killed or might have been killed in 1992 "was considerably lower than in most of the earlier years since soft body armor became available" (p. 134). They conclude, "Thus, if soft body armor were not available, the chances of American police officers dying in 1991 at the hands of assailants still would have been lower than at most other times in the past 20 years. One has to go back to 1960 and 1961 to find an appreciably lower rate of officers being murdered" (Geller and Scott, 1992: 134).

The primary source of data, that provided to the UCR, though superior in ways to the data from DuPont, also has particular limitations. According to the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress (n.d.:8):

The Justice Department's <u>Uniform Crime Reports</u> do not record precise locations of fatal wounds, which would be needed to estimate accurately the number of officers that would have been saved had they worn armor. Nor do they record precise locations of non-fatal wounds, which would be needed to estimate the number of assaulted officers that would survive if they do <u>not</u> wear body armor. Thus estimates and forecasts of "saves," as well as estimates of the number of officers that "would have been saved" had they worn armor, are of doubtful accuracy and may be inflated.

Another difficulty in estimating the number of deaths prevented by wearing body armor is the fact that an unknown number of officers hit in the torso without wearing such armor can be expected to live. Despite all these limitations, the Office of Technology Assessment, using evidence from the military indicating that approximately 43 percent of shots to the torso are fatal, estimates that about 10 officers per year are saved from death by gunfire because they were wearing vests (U.S. Congress, 1992b:29).

Although no police officer has been documented to have been killed by a bullet that pierced armor designed to stop it, the data collected by the FBI indicate that, for the period between 1972 through 1992, 12.3 percent of the officers feloniously killed were wearing protective body armor at the time of the attack (FBI, 1972-1991; see Table 2-7).

TABLE 2-7
WAS VICTIM OFFICER WEARING BODY ARMOR?
1972-1992

BODY ARMOR	Number	PERCENT
No	1675	87.7
YES	235	12.3
TOTAL	1910	100.0

Missing = 6

#### Characteristics of the Offenders

The FBI and various researchers have compiled information about the persons identified as the assailants of the officers feloniously killed in the line of duty in the U.S. and its territories.

# **Demographics and Family Background**

As indicated in Table 2-8, the FBI data indicate that most of the persons identified as the perpetrators of police killings during the years 1980 through 1992 were between 18 and 29 years of age (53.8%), male (96.3%), white (54.8%), and had at least one prior arrest (73.2%). Likewise, Chapman (1986) reports that 66 of 69 (95.6%) suspects were male in the 52 incidents (between 1950 and 1984) in which Oklahoma officers were killed. Forty-six (66.7%) were white, 18 (26.1%) were black, and 5 (7.2%) were native Americans. The average age of the suspects was 31.1 years with a range in age from 16 to 74. The educational attainment of the 39 suspects for which information was available ranged from no formal schooling to 1.5 years of college with an average of 9.5 years of school. Less than half (42.0%) of the suspects were employed at the time of the crime.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED
PROFILE OF PERSONS IDENTIFIED IN THE FELONIOUS KILLING

TABLE 2-8

OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 1980-1992

PERSONS IDENTIFIED	NUMBER	PERCENT
AGE		
Under 18 years of age	108	7.9
From 18 through 29	738	53.8
Average age	28	
SEX		
Male	1320	96.3
Female	51	3.7
RACE		
White	751	54.8
Black	587	42.8
Other Race	33	2.4
PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD		
Prior Criminal Arrest	1004	73.2
Convicted on Prior Criminal Charge	762	55.6
Prior Arrest for Crime of Violence	528	38.5
On Parole or Probation at Time of Killing	340	24.8
Prior Arrest for Murder	71	5.2
Prior Arrest for Drug Law Violation	329	24.0
Prior Arrest for Assaulting an Officer or Resisting Arrest	152	11.1
Prior Arrest for Weapons Violation	518	37.8
TOTAL	1371	100.0

Source: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1980-1992

The in-depth study conducted by the FBI (1992b) asked during offender interviews about the offenders' family histories. While 82 percent of the assailants lived with their natural mothers during most of their youths, only 44 percent of the offenders indicated that their fathers were present "most of the time" during those years. Fourteen percent had never lived with their natural fathers. Just under 60 percent of the offenders reported that the socioeconomic status of their families during their pre-adult years was "at least average to comfortable" (FBI, 1992b). Fifty-four percent of the offenders indicated that verbal abuse and physical violence were quite prevalent in their homes. Forty-four percent of the offenders thought they had suffered physical abuse by their parents, and 36 percent claimed they had been psychologically abused by their parents.

Allan, Mannie, Lewis, and Carlson (1979) studied 11 of 14 "cop killers" who were on death row in Florida in June of 1977 and compared them to other murderers on death row. They termed the offenders who had killed cops as "marginal misfits," significantly different from the other murderers in that they had fewer juvenile arrests, they were not residents of the cities in which they killed their victims, and they "steadfastly maintain(ed) their innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence" (p. 13). More than the other murderers, but not significantly so, the "cop killers" were less likely to have ever married, less likely to have served in the military, and were more likely to have been diagnosed as a "mental abnormal."

#### Criminal Records

The FBI data indicate that the persons who killed officers between 1974 (the earliest date for which comprehensive information is available) and 1979 were less likely to have

prior criminal records than the perpetrators of the more recent killings. Specifically, offenders who perpetrated their killings during 1980 through 1992, compared to offenders who perpetrated their killings during 1974 through 1979, were more likely to have a prior criminal arrest (73.2% compared to 65.8%), a prior criminal conviction (55.6% compared to 49.7%), a prior arrest for a crime of violence (38.5% compared to 32.1%), a prior arrest for a drug law violation (24.0% compared to 15.4%), a prior arrest for assaulting an officer or resisting arrest (11.1% compared to 5.0%), and a prior arrest for a weapons violation (37.8% compared to 21.7%). Recent perpetrators were also more likely than earlier ones to have been on parole or probation at the time of the killing (24.8% compared 17.2%). Chapman (1986) found that approximately 75 percent of the offenders he studied had prior criminal arrests.

For the in-depth FBI study of 51 incidents of felonious killings of officers, described earlier, researchers collected more detailed information (than contained in the annual reports) regarding the offenders' criminal histories (FBI, 1992b). The FBI reports that, on average, these offenders committed their first criminal offenses at the age of 12. Just under half indicated they had murdered or attempted to murder someone prior to the slayings of the officers and just under 20 percent indicated that they had previously assaulted an officer or resisted arrest. Three of the offenders claimed that they had no criminal history prior to their fatal assaults on the officers.

Three-fourths of the offenders reported that they carried handguns regularly. The average age at which these persons started carrying guns was 18. One-third of the killers

had been shot at some time in their lives. Several who mentioned this, also indicated that they had vowed never to be shot again, and instead, that they would shoot first.

#### Psychological Profile

The researchers of the FBI in-depth study conducted or accessed files from previously conducted psychological evaluations of the killers. Five of the 50 offenders were not found to have any personality disorder. Two offenders (4 percent of the total) were found to have organic personality disorders. Each of these persons had been victims, prior to the attack on the police officer, of head injuries. The remaining 43 offenders were found to have various personality disorders. Most of these were classified as "antisocial personality types." The next largest group was diagnosed as dependent personality types. Other names for persons with antisocial personalities are "sociopaths" or "psychopaths." These persons have a "diseased relationship" (FBI, 1992b: 19) with society generally and with family members and acquaintances. According to the report, "This diseased model is connoted by the term psychopath, suggesting that the psyche of the individual is pathological. This psychopathy is evidenced in his or her lack of conscience, lack of positive regard and feeling for others, and in a sense of entitlement to the possessions of others" (FBI, 1992b: 19). They are manipulative, cunning, and do not learn from their experiences.

The dependent personality is also known as the "passive personality" or "inadequate personality" (FBI, 1992b: 16). These persons are dependent, submissive, and weak. The authors of the report explain that these persons repress, over many years, feelings of frustration, anger and hostility which result from their weak, submissive behaviors. At some point, these repressed feelings can explode into violence. "In some instances, the pressure

that results from years of repressed anger and hostility reaches a level which can no longer be contained or tolerated. When a situation occurs which is perceived by the individuals as hostile, they react excessively and inappropriately, releasing years of anger and frustration" (FBI, 1992b: 18).

# Weapon Used by Assailant

Little and Boylen (1990) sought to determine the types of weapons to be encountered by police on the streets by characterizing the 4,254 firearms confiscated by a police department of "a major southwestern city" between 1976 and 1986 (p. 49). The largest group was handguns (74%), mostly of smaller calibers (e.g., .22, .25, and .32). Shotguns accounted for 15 percent of the sample, and rifles, for 11 percent.

These findings are consistent with the FBI data reported for 1972 through 1992 (FBI, 1972-1992a). As seen in Table 2-9, during that period, 92.8 percent of the police killings were committed with firearms, including 69.1 percent with handguns, 13.7 percent with rifles, and 10.0 percent with shotguns. Just under two percent (1.9%) of the officers were killed with sharp objects (primarily knives) and the remaining 5.4 percent of the killings involved officers being struck by cars, beaten to death, pushed to their deaths, killed by explosives, or killed with "personal weapons," such as hands and feet (FBI, 1972-1992a). Other studies which have found guns to be the predominate weapon in police killings are Cardarelli (1968), Chapman (1976), Little (1984), and Margarita (1980).

TABLE 2-9
WEAPON USED
1972-1992

WEAPON	Number	PERCENT
HANDGUN	1323	69.1
RIFLE	263	13.7
Shotgun	191	10.0
Sharp Object (Knife, Etc.)	36	1.9
Вомв	8	0.4
PERSONAL WEAPONS	10	0.5
OTHER	85	4.4
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

Figure 2-6 shows for each year the proportion of slain officers which were killed with handguns, rifles, shotguns, and other weapons (sharp objects, bombs, personal weapons, etc.). The proportions have remained fairly constant over this 21-year period.

During the period 1972 through 1992, 387 (20.3%) of the officers had their weapons stolen during the attack and 265 (13.8%) officers were feloniously killed with their own weapons (FBI, 1980-1991). (See Tables 2-10 and 2-11.) In all but one of these incidents, the officer was killed with his own firearm; in one incident the officer was killed with his flashlight. Thus, 13.8 percent of all officers feloniously killed during this 21-year period were killed with their own weapons, and 14.9 percent of those killed with firearms were killed with their own firearms. Though the absolute number of officers slain with their own firearms during the last two decades has declined, the proportion of officers feloniously slain with their own firearms remained fairly constant during the 1970s and 1980s despite

increased emphasis during the later years on training in weapon-retention techniques and the widespread adoption of holsters designed to prevent offenders from disarming the officers. However, in the early 1990s, the proportion of officers slain with their own weapons did, in fact, get smaller. During 1990 through 1993, just 7.5 percent of the officers were slain with their own weapons. (See Table 2-12.)

TABLE 2-10

WAS THE OFFICER'S SERVICE WEAPON STOLEN?
1972-1992

	Number	PERCENT
No	1519	79.7
YES	387	20.3
TOTAL	1906	100.0

Missing = 10

TABLE 2-11


OFFICER SLAIN WITH OWN SERVICE WEAPON
1972-1992

OFFICER SLAIN WITH OWN WEAPON	Number	PERCENT
No	1651	86.2
YES	265	13.8
TOTAL	1916	100.o

Missing = 0

Boylen and Little (1990) found that for the years 1977 through 1986, between 8 percent and 29 percent of all slain officers were killed with their own weapons. Some practitioner authors have used the fact that police are frequently shot with their own weapons

Figure 2-6: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Type of Weapon Used: 1972-1992



Sources: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1992.

to guide their policy recommendations concerning what weapons officers will carry. Cipriano (1982), for instance, maintains that civilians take much longer to discharge semi-automatic weapons than revolvers and thus, argues that officers would be safer with semi-automatics.

#### **Assailants' Motives**

Margarita (1980), using data from 245 killings of New York City police officers between 1844 and 1978, examined the motives of the assailants. Her five categories of motives were based on a social-psychological classification scheme developed by Toch (1969). "Perseverance" encompasses those situations wherein violence is persevered in or transferred to the officers. An offender may transfer the preexisting violence to the officer when interrupted. According to Margarita, the motive of "autonomy" comes into play when the opponent perceives that his "power, strength, or independence is threatened" (p. 65). "Protection" motives exist to avoid arrest and "defense of others" motives serve to protect and/or aid accomplices. An assailant shooting an officer out of hatred for him/her or out of hatred for officers in general, describes the motive of "contempt."

Margarita found that the most frequently occurring motive in the killings she studied was protection. She reports: "The most common motivating factor, present in almost two thirds of police homicides, was the perceived need for protection against concrete danger posed by the officer--usually during an escape attempt following the commission of a violent crime" (p. 67).

TABLE 2-12

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF OFFICERS KILLED WITH THEIR OWN GUN
BY YEAR
1972-1992

YEAR	Number Killed With Own Gun	PERCENT OF OFFICERS KILLED THAT YEAR
1972	16	13.7
1973	23	17.2
1974	11	8.3
1975	19	14.7
1976	17	15.2
1977	10	10.8
1978	14	15.1
1979	17	16.0
1980	14	13.5
1981	13	14.3
1982	6	6.5
1983	13	16.3
1984	13	18.1
1985	11	14.1
1986	15	22.7
1987	14	18.9
1988	13	16.7
1989	10	15.2
1990	3	4.5
1991	8	11.3
1992	4	6.5
TOTAL	264	13.8

Missing = 0

### Offenders' Perspectives of the Incidents

One aspect of the FBI's in-depth study of 51 incidents was interviews with the offenders regarding the slayings. In these interviews, three-fourths of the offenders reported that they were "engaged in drug or alcohol activities" at the time the officers were killed (FBI, 1992b:12). That is, they were either using, buying, or selling drugs or alcohol. Fifty-seven percent of the offenders indicated that the officers they killed were unprepared or surprised during the encounters. However, just under half of the killers said that there was nothing that their victim officers could have done to prevent their own deaths. Just under 10 percent indicated that the officers might have acted more "professional" and been spared, though the researchers point out that "none of these offenders was able to articulate what was meant by being 'professional'" (FBI, 1992b:13).

Even when specifically asked, none of the offenders indicated that the race of the officer had any affect on his or her decision to kill. Interestingly, however, seven of the offenders, all males, indicated that they would not have killed the law enforcement officers if the officers had been female.

#### **Disposition of Assailants**

In the 1990 report, the FBI reviewed the dispositions of 1,179 persons who were "identified in connection with officers' murders" for the decade, 1979-1988. (Using this time period, versus a more recent one, reduced the number of pending cases to only nine.) Over eighty percent (976, or 82.8%) of these persons were arrested and charged with murder, another 12.9 percent were justifiably killed. Forty-five persons (3.8%) committed suicide and six of these persons (0.5%) remain fugitives. Of the 976 persons who were

arrested and charged, 72.4 percent (707) were found guilty of murder and another 13.1 percent were found guilty of a lesser offense. Ten percent (10.1%) were acquitted or otherwise had their cases dismissed. Nineteen persons (2.0%) were committed to mental institutions and 14 (1.4%) died in custody. For nine cases (0.9%) the disposition is either pending or unknown.

The FBI reports that of the 707 persons found guilty of murder for their police homicides during this time period, 20.5 percent were sentenced to death, 49.1 percent received sentences of life imprisonment, and 30.1 percent were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two months to 450 years (FBI, 1990). One received a sentence to community control and one was given an indeterminate sentence.

Chapman (1986) reported on the resolution of the cases involving the 69 persons identified in connection with the slayings of 54 Oklahoma law enforcement officers between 1950 and 1984. Twelve were either killed by police or committed suicide. The remaining 57 were arrested and charged with either murder (94.7%) or manslaughter (5.3%). Twothirds (66.7%) were ultimately convicted of first degree murder and another 15.8 percent were convicted of second-degree murder or manslaughter. The remaining 10 persons either were acquitted (3.5%), had their charges dismissed (10.5%), or died or were killed prior to trial (3.5%). Of the 47 who were convicted, two-thirds (66.0%) were sentenced to life imprisonment. Seven (14.9%) were sentenced to death.

# Characteristics of the Incidents

Characteristics of the killings incidents described by the FBI and other researchers include the precipitating criminal activity, the time of day of the attack, the geographic location and so forth.

### **Precipitating Circumstances**

Konstantin (1984) looked at how officers had become involved in incidents which led to their deaths. He found that three-fourths (73.3%) of the incidents were officer-initiated, as opposed to citizen-initiated (26.7%). More researchers have focused, not on how the incident was precipitated, but on the criminal activity or other circumstance which led to police intervention.

Table 2-13 provides information regarding the circumstances of the police killings in the categories provided by the FBI (1972-1992a). Just over 40 percent (41.9%) of the officers feloniously killed in the line of duty during 1972 through 1992 were involved in arrest situations at the time of their deaths. Robbery-related arrests (16.2%) and "attempting other arrests" (13.9%) are the two largest subcategories. Disturbance calls (including family quarrels, bar fights, "man with a gun," etc.) account for 18.1 percent of the total. Traffic pursuits/stops and investigating suspicious persons/circumstances account for 14.0 percent and 11.1 percent of the situations, respectively.

Figures 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, and 2-10 show, for each year during the period 1972 through 1992, the proportion of officers killed in each category. Figure 2-7 indicates a slight decrease over time in the proportion of killings which involved robberies, and a slight increase in the proportion of killings which involved drug arrests. There appears to have


TABLE 2-13

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY
1972-1992

	·-·	
TYPE OF ACTIVITY	NUMBER	PERCENT
DISTURBANCE CALLS		
Bar fights, man with gun, etc.	220	11.5
Family quarrels	127	6.6
TOTAL	347	18.1
ARREST SITUATIONS		
Burglaries in progress or pursuing burglary suspects	110	5.7
Robberies in progress or pursuing robbery suspects	311	16.2
Drug-related matters	114	5.9
Other matters	267	13.9
TOTAL	802	41.9
CIVIL DISORDER (MASS DISOBEDIENCE, RIOT, ETC.)	4	0.2
HANDLING, TRANSPORTING, CUSTODY OF PRISONERS	80	4.2
INVESTIGATING SUSPICIOUS PERSONS OR CIRCUMSTANCES	212	11.1
AMBUSH SITUATIONS	212	11.1
Entrapment and premeditation	85	4.4
Unprovoked attack	86	
TOTAL	171	4.5 8.9
MENTALLY DERANGED	31	
TRAFFIC PURSUITS AND STOPS	<del></del>	1.6
TOTALS	269	14.0
	1916	100.0


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Figure 2-7: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Circumstance: Arrest Situations, 1972-1992




Sources: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1992.

Figure 2-9: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Circumstance: Disturbance Calls, 1972-1992



Sources: Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1992.

Figure 2-10: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Circumstance: Other Situations, 1972-1992



been a slight increase over time in the proportion of slain officers who were involved in domestic disturbances, and a slight decrease in officer involvement in other types of disturbances. (See Figure 2-9.)

Geller and Karales (1981) compared precipitating circumstances across shootings of on-duty and of off-duty officers. They report that, while armed robberies were the situation faced by fully one-third (33%) of the off-duty officers, the corresponding figure for incidents involving on-duty officers was only 7 percent. Conversely, 32 percent of the incidents involving on-duty officers were characterized by "person with a gun/shots fired," compared to only 11 percent of the off-duty incidents.

The degree of danger associated with disturbance calls has been a subject of debate in the police killings/assaults literature. Garner and Clemmer (1986) recently reviewed the history of this debate. (See also Hirschel et al., 1994.) They noted that there have been misconceptions regarding the types of incidents included under the heading of "disturbance" in the FBI reports. Until the FBI split the "disturbance" category into its two subgroups (i.e., "family quarrels" and "bar fights, man with gun, etc."), many criminal justice practitioners and researchers believed that the category was mainly comprised of domestic disturbances.

Further compounding the problem was the presentation of raw numbers and percentages instead of (the elusive) rates. As Garner and Clemmer (1986) point out, to assess the relative danger of types of calls requires base rate information on the frequency of all types of calls. (See also Geller and Scott, 1992.) This confusion has its corollary in the deadly force literature. Scharf and Binder's comments are constructive (1983:66-67):

Simply knowing the relative proportion of incidents that result in a fatality or a wounding by a police officer will not be very helpful. Knowing the proportion of hits or fatalities associated with a particular incident tells us little about the relative hazard of such incidents. For example, knowing that 25 percent of all New York City shots fired evolved from "disturbance" calls...does not yield any useful information about the relative danger of such calls. Such information is similar in kind to knowing that in a certain city, 25 percent of all deaths were related to influenza, whereas only 1 percent were related to the always fatal myasthenia gravis (or Lou Gehrig's disease). From such information one might, wrongly, conclude that influenza was more hazardous than is myasthenia gravis. In reality, myasthenia gravis is infinitely more hazardous; however, it is also far rarer. The lower proportion of deaths from myasthenia gravis is attributable to its rareness, not its benignity; similarly, influenza causes many deaths because it is an extremely common, if only occasionally fatal, disease.

Garner and Clemmer (1986) relied on two earlier studies which measured police activity to estimate the relative risks (in terms of deaths and assaults) of types of police activity. Consistently robbery calls ranked as the most dangerous.

Other researchers have also found that robbery-related calls, instead of domestic disturbance calls, are the most dangerous (e.g., Margarita, 1980; Konstantin, 1984; and Little, 1984). Other studies have found that the situations accounting for the largest percentages of police deaths are "attempting arrest for matters other than burglary or robbery" (Chapman, 1976), "person with gun/shots fired" calls (Geller and Karales, 1981), or "making arrests or transporting prisoners" (Cardarelli, 1968).

One of the more recent studies (Hirschel et al., 1992) determined assault rates over a three-year period in Charlotte, North Carolina, using calls for service as the denominator in calculating those rates. In terms of "ratio of injuries to calls for service," domestic disturbance ranked fifth, following situations involving the mentally deranged; the handling

of prisoners; arrests other than disturbances, burglaries, robberies; and general disturbances. Robbery situations ranked sixth.

The results of a study conducted by Uchida, Brooks, and Kopers (1987) are different from those described above concerning the danger of domestic violence incidents. These researchers analyzed non-fatal assaults against officers in the Baltimore County Police Department and calculated "danger rates" for various types of calls (domestic violence, robbery, etc.) using dispatch information to determine the frequency of each type of call. They found a higher "danger rate" (relative probability of assault) for police responding to domestic violence calls than for any other category of activity. One reason why the dispatched domestic violence calls were found to have a higher "danger rate" than other calls, such as robbery, may be because an officer upon arrival is more likely to find a perpetrator at the scene of the former than the latter. Since the presence of a perpetrator is likely to increase the probability of assault against an officer, the changes of injury would be expected to be higher in domestic violence calls for that reason.

# Time and Distance

Other factors related to police killing incidents examined by various researchers include month, day, and time of day of the incidents (e.g., Moorman and Wemmer, 1983; Chapman, 1986; and Boylen and Little, 1990), and the distance between victims and perpetrators (e.g., Chapman, 1986 and Margarita, 1980).

Chapman (1986) pinpointed June and July as months during which a disproportionate number (33.3%) of the officer killings he studied took place. This is not supported by the FBI data for 1972 through 1992. For those data, the month during which the most officers

were feloniously killed was January (10.1%), followed by December (8.9%). The fewest killings occurred in the months of July and October, which each had 7.6 percent of the killings. (See Table 2-14.) Boylen and Little (1990), using FBI data from 1977 through 1986, found minimal differences in police killings across months of the year.

Boylen and Little (1990) and Chapman (1986) found minimal differences in police killings across days of the week. The FBI data for 1980 through 1990 indicate police officers were most often killed on Tuesdays and Thursdays; each accounting for almost 17 percent of the felonious killings.

Boylen and Little (1990) report that most shootings (60%) occurred at night (between 6 p.m. and 4 a.m.). Chapman (1986), too, found the evening/night hours to be the most dangerous, especially between the hours of 10 p.m. and midnight. (See also Stobart, 1972.) The FBI data for 1972 through 1992 indicate that felonious killings were most likely to occur between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m., during which 39.5 percent of deaths occurred. The fewest killings (12.5%) occurred between 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. (FBI, 1972-1992a). (See Table 2-15.)

Of the officers killed by firearms during the period of 1972 through 1992, 53.8 percent were within five feet of their assailants, another 19.9 percent were between six feet and ten feet from their assailants. Just under 14 percent (13.7%) of the officers were between eleven and twenty feet from their opponents; 7.0 percent were from twenty-one to fifty feet away; and 5.6 percent of the officers were over fifty feet from their opponents (FBI, 1972-1992a). (See Table 2-16.) Chapman (1986) also found that approximately half of the 54 law enforcement officers slain in Oklahoma between 1950 and 1984 were within five feet of their opponents.

TABLE 2-14

MONTH OF DEATH
1972-1992

Монтн	Number	PERCENT
January	194	10.1
FEBRUARY	158	8.2
March	150	7.8
April	165	8.6
Мач	153	8.0
June	165	8.6
JULY	146	7.6
August	159	8.3
September	156	8.1
OCTOBER	145	7.6
November	154	8.0
DECEMBER	171	8.9
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 2-15
TIME OF ATTACK
1972-1992

Тіме	Number	Percent
9 PM TO 3 AM	756	39.5
3 AM TO 9 AM	239	12.5
9 AM TO 3 PM	385	20.1
3 PM TO 9 PM	536	28.0
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 2-16

DISTANCE BETWEEN OFFICER AND OFFENDER
FOR FIREARM ATTACKS
1972-1992

DISTANCE	Number	PERCENT
0-5 FEET	955	53.8
6-10 FEET	. 353	19.9
11-20 Feeт	243	13.7
21-50 FEET	125	7.0
OVER 50 FEET	99	5.6
TOTAL	1775	100.0

Missing = 2

# Alone or Assisted

Some researchers have attempted to determine the relative safety for patrol officers of two-person versus one-person cars (e.g., Cardarelli, 1968; Chapman, 1976; Little, 1984).

For instance, Cardarelli (1968) found that 51 percent of the slain officers he studied were

alone on patrol; the other 49 percent were on two-person patrol. Cardarelli recognizes that the figures do not provide information regarding the relative danger of the two types of patrol, absent information about the extent to which officers are on one- or two-car patrol.

Little's study (1984) takes into account the fact that officers in one-officer vehicles may not be alone at the scenes, since some of the slain officers who were in one-officer cars might have received assistance from fellow officers who responded to the scenes prior to the attacks on the officers. His results indicate that of the 728 officers on vehicle patrol in his sample of slain officers, 32 percent were assigned to two-officer vehicles, 48 percent were assigned to one-officer vehicles and were alone at the time of the killings, and 20 percent were assigned to one-officer vehicles but were "assisted" at the time of their deaths. Again, however, these figures have limited utility for determining the relative safety of one-person and two-person cars without baseline information indicating the proportion of all officers within the jurisdiction who are assigned to one- or two-person vehicles.

Swanton (1983) found that, of the slain Australian officers he studied, 35 percent were unaccompanied at the time of the shootings. His interpretation of these results acknowledge the baseline information necessary for drawing firm conclusions (p. 238):

It may be police officers in Australia generally operate in company more than do their US counterparts, with the result that when officers are shot, they are inevitably shot more often in company.

According to the FBI-UCR data (FBI, 1972-1992a), just under 50 percent (49.4%) of the slain officers had assistance at the scene. Another 13.0 percent were alone, but had requested assistance, and 37.6 percent were alone and had not requested assistance. (See Table 2-17.)

TABLE 2-17
INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS
1972-1992

Involvement	Number	PERCENT
Alone, No Assistance Requested	721	37.6
ALONE, ASSISTANCE REQUESTED	249	13.0
ASSISTED AT SCENE	946	49.4
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

A problem with the above studies, besides the absence of baseline data, is the lack of information regarding where officers on the scene were situated, relative to the victim officers, at the time of their colleagues' slayings. As Geller and Scott (1992:168) point out, officers who were "assisted" according to the FBI classification, had fellow officers on the scene, but these officers may not have been in the immediate vicinity of the slain officers.

# Organizational Correlates of Violence Against Police

Handberg, Unkovic, and Feuerstein (1986) examined two explanations for violence against police: the organizational hypothesis and the ecological hypothesis. The former argues that the style of policing, for instance, degree of aggressiveness will affect the rate of violence against police. The latter explanation explains levels of violence against police with community characteristics, particularly crime rate. The researchers found a positive relationship between police aggressiveness and violence against police, but found that the community characteristics were the stronger predictors.

#### Geographic and Demographic Correlates

Other researchers have looked at the relationship between police killings/assaults and crime rates, as well as the relationship between police killings/assaults and other community characteristics, such as poverty, income inequality, population ethnicity, and other social/cultural variables. One of the earliest studies was conducted by Cardarelli (1968) who found that rates of police killings were positively correlated with city size and highest in the south. Lester (1978a) used state-level data (for the period 1970 through 1975) and found significant relationships between rates of police killings and the "political climate" and violent crime rates. Like Cardarelli (1968), Lester reported higher rates of police homicides in the South.

Lester (1982) used city-level data for 57 cities with populations over 250,000 (in 1975) and a subsample of the 21 largest United States cities, to determine what city-level characteristics were associated with rates of police murders. The strongest relationships were found in the subsample of 21 cities. Lester found that high rates of police murders were associated with high gun ownership, southern locations, and high murder and manslaughter rates in the general population. Other studies by Lester using city-level data indicated that rates of police killings were associated with percent Black population, percent of the population below the poverty level, gun ownership per capita, the index crime rate, the murder rate, the manslaughter rate, the rate of murder by gun, the rate of aggravated assault by gun, the percentage of suicides by gun, the percentage of homicides by gun, the percentage of robberies by gun, and the percentage of aggravated assaults by gun (Lester, 1978b, 1982, 1987). The rate of police murders was not correlated with the rape rate, the

robbery rate, the aggravated assault rate, the burglary rate, the larceny rate, the motor vehicle theft rate, or the rate of robbery by gun (Lester, 1987).

Peterson and Bailey (1988) used state-level data for the years 1977 through 1984 and multivariate statistical techniques, and found significant associations between police killings and poverty and a measure of social disorganization. No relationship was indicated between police killings and income inequality, percent black population, or urbanization.

Interestingly, they reported no relationship between the rate of police killings and serious crime rate (violent crime, property crime, total index crime).

Chamlin (1989), in the context of the conflict hypotheses, assessed the relationship between the existence of "threatening groups (e.g., blacks, Hispanic, and the poor)" (p. 357) and the felonious killings of police. Consistent with his hypotheses, Chamlin found, using state level data and multivariate techniques, that related to the rate of police killings were the percent of families below the poverty level, the percentage of blacks in the population, and the percentage of persons with Spanish surnames. However, like Peterson and Bailey, he found no relationship between police killings and a measure of economic inequality.

Geller and Scott (1992) provided some interesting figures which give rise to questions regarding the experiences of large versus small departments in terms of officers killed and killings by officers. Specifically, these authors calculated the ratio of police killed (feloniously killed in the line of duty) to civilians killed by police for the nation as a whole and for the 50 largest cities for the period 1979 through 1984. Among the 50 largest cities, the ratio is one officer slain for every 11.8 civilians killed by the police. For the nation as a whole, the ratio is one officer slain for every 4.4 civilians killed. That is, in the largest

cities compared to the nation as a whole, proportionately more citizens are killed for every officer slain. The authors note that these differences could be due to "different qualities of officer 'survival training,' supervision, shooting policies, or the availability of protective apparel and other equipment" (1992: p. 41) or due to the data used to calculate the two ratios. Regarding the latter possibility, they point out that though the measure for police homicides for both groups comes from the same source, and is arguably quite accurate, the data on justifiable killings by police officers comes from 100 percent of the 50 cities, but not from 100 percent of the nation. The data regarding killings by police for the national calculations come from the voluntary monthly UCR submissions of only about 60 percent of the departments in the nation. This discrepancy in the data would tend to reduce the ratio for the nation of police killed to civilians killed, as was found.

Table 2-18 indicates the states/territories in which the officers were slain between 1972 and 1992. As noted above, both Cardarelli (1968) and Lester (1978a) reported higher rates of police homicides in the South. Peterson and Bailey (1988) found a regional relationship for only four of the eight years studied (1977-1984). Specifically, for 1977, 1980, 1981, and 1984 there were greater rates (per 1,000 full-time equivalent sworn police officers) of police killings in the South compared to the rest of the United States.

TABLE 2-18

STATES AND U.S. TERRITORIES WHERE KILLINGS OCCURRED
1972-1992

State	Number	PERCENT
ALABAMA	51	2.7
ALASKA	14	0.7
ARIZONA	34	1.8
Arkansas	35	1.8
CALIFORNIA	160	8.4
COLORADO	29	1.5
Connecticut	6	0.3
DELAWARE	2	0.1
Washington, DC	11	0.6
FLORIDA	114	5.9
Georgia	82	4.3
Hawaii	5	0.3
Ідано	7	0.4
ILLINOIS	72	3.8
Indiana	32	1.7
Iowa	9	0.5
Kansas	18	0.9
KENTUCKY	37	1.9
Louisiana	52	2.7
MAINE	3	0.2
MARYLAND	41	2.1
MASSACHUSETTS	21	1.1
MICHIGAN	64	3.3
MINNESOTA	23	1.2
Mississippi	57	3.0
Missouri	44	2.3
Montana	8	0.4

STATE	Number	PERCENT
Nebraska	8	0.4
Nevada	11	0.6
New Hampshire	1	0.1
New Jersey	34	1.8
New Mexico	21	1.1
New York	117	6.1
NORTH CAROLINA	56	2.9
NORTH DAKOTA	2	0.1
Оню	56	2.9
OKLAHOMA	29	1.5
Oregon	10	0.5
PENNSYLVANIA	56	2.9
SOUTH CAROLINA	42	2.2
SOUTH DAKOTA	6	0.3
Tennessee	47	2.5
Texas	170	8.9
Utah	7	0.4
VERMONT	2	0.1
Virginia	41	2.1
Washington	19	1.0
West Virginia	23	1.2
Wisconsin	27	1.4
WYOMING	3	0.2
AMERICAN SAMOA	2	0.1
GUAM	4	0.2
Mariana Islands	2	0.1
PUERTO RICO	83	4.3
Virgin Islands	4	0.2
Foreign	2	0.1
TOTAL	1916	100.0

Missing = 0

**TABLE 2-19** 

#### LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED BY REGION 1987-1990

1987	South	Northeast	Midwest	Wes
% Law Enforcement Officers Killed	39	17	24	21
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMPLOYED	34	25	22	
% TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	34	21	24	19
1988		21	24	20
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED	50	9	16	25
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMPLOYED	34	24	23	
% TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	35	21	24	19
1989			24	21
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED	49	14	12	
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMPLOYED	28	22	24	14
% TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	34	20	24	22
1990		20	24	21
% Law Enforcement Officers Killed	46	11	22	14
% LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMPLOYED	30	22	23	14
% TOTAL U.S. POPULATION	32	19	24	22

Source: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1987-1991

Starting in 1987, the FBI included in its annual reports a regional comparison of police killings. For each of the years 1987 through 1990, the percentages of the officers killed in the West, Midwest, South, and Northeast were compared to the percentages of all law enforcement officers nationwide employed within each region, as well as the percentage of the national population residing in each region. As indicated in Table 2-19, for all four years, the southern officers comprised a disproportionate percentage of all police killings relevant to the proportion of officers employed as well as to the total population within the region. For instance, whereas in 1988 officers in the South comprised only 34 percent of the total number of law enforcement officers nationwide, policing only 35 percent of the total United States population, they accounted for fully 50 percent of all of the police officers feloniously killed. These data on police killings correspond with the criminological literature indicating a disproportionately high rate of homicide in the southern states (Porterfield, 1949; Kowalski, Dittmann, and Bung, 1980). A supposed "predisposition to lethal violence" (Gastil, 1971; 412) in the South has been linked by some criminologists to a "subculture of violence" (Gastil, 1971; Hackney, 1969) as well as to the greater absolute poverty and/or to the economic inequality in the southern states (Loftin and Hill, 1974; Blau and Blau, 1982; Parker, 1989). (See Bailey, 1984; Doerner, 1975 and 1978; Jacobs and Britt, 1979; Messner 1982, 1983a and 1983b; and Nelsen, Corzine, Huff-Corzine, 1994, for empirical and theoretical assessments of these hypotheses.)

Table 2-20 shows the proportion of officers slain in each of the four regions of the U.S., the territories, and foreign countries for a 21-year period. Figure 2-11 indicates for each year during the period 1972 through 1992 the proportion of slain officers from each of

TABLE 2-20

REGION WHERE OFFICER WAS KILLED
1972-1992

Region	Number	PERCENT
Northeast	240	12.5
South	888	46.3
Midwest	363	18.9
West	328	17.1
Territories	95	5.0
Foreign	2	0.1
TOTAL	1916	100.0


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the geographic categories. Except for a slight increase in the number of officers killed in foreign countries and the U.S. territories in recent years, there do not appear to be any regional trends over this 21-year period.

#### The Death Penalty As A Deterrent

Bailey (1982) and Bailey and Peterson (1987) assessed the effects of capital punishment on the rate of police killings. Bailey (1982), using state level data for 1961 through 1971, concluded that the existence of the death penalty did not affect the rate (per 1,000 officers) at which officers were feloniously killed. Bailey and Peterson (1987) replicated the study in the Post-Furman years (1973-1984), using multivariate analyses to predict felonious killings of police per 1,000 officers. There was no relationship between any of their three measures of capital punishment and the rate of police homicides.

Figure 2-11: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Geographic Location: 1972-1992



Sources: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1993.

#### Surviving Relatives

Stillman (1986, 1989) studied the "psychological, emotional, financial, and practical problems" of the survivors of officers killed in the line of duty. Responding to questionnaires were 126 survivors of officers who died between November 1982 and February 1986. Some of the most prevalent symptoms identified by his subjects were loneliness (75% reporting), unhappiness (70%), lethargy (68%), and anxiety (66%). Distress reactions were exacerbated for those who were notified over the phone (instead of in person) about the death of their loved ones, and for those married 10 years or less. There were no differences in distress response between survivors of officers who were killed accidentally and officers who were murdered.

#### **Policy Recommendations**

Policy recommendations or implied policy implications emanating from research on police killings have ranged from reducing poverty and oppression (see e.g., Boylen and Little, 1990) to increasing the distances officers stand from suspects (Margarita, 1980).

Many of the suggestions have been implemented to some extent within police departments over the years. Bristow (1963), for example, suggested implementing special procedures and training as they relate to traffic stops, effective use of "cover," dealing with hostages, searching suspects after arrest, and so forth. Many of the more recent suggestions also advocate enhancing training to promote officer safety. Konstantin (1984), for instance, suggests improved training of police with regard to officer-initiated encounters. He claims (p. 42), "officers caught in such situations are inadequately prepared to plan their approaches to the scene, and are instead plunged into the middle of ongoing and very dangerous events."

Sherman et al. (1989) suggest that rehearsing each drug raid could reduce the danger to police in drug-related circumstances.

Chapman (1976, 1986) provides a comprehensive assessment of measures to reduce danger to officers. He addresses prevention methods related to department training and policy, the use of special equipment (from radios to protective body armor), and the role of the legislature in enacting laws to protect the police. At an even higher level of analysis, he discusses the reduction in the use of alcohol and other drugs in society and the reduction of anti-police violence on television.

As a result of the in-depth study of 51 incidents where officers were feloniously killed, the FBI, too, made a number of training and policy recommendations. The researchers noted that in a significant number of the incidents studied, officers made tactical errors such as approaching improperly a suspect or vehicle, or failing to conduct a thorough search of the suspect for weapons. Increased training was recommended in those areas, as well as in the general handling of traffic stops, weapon retention, handcuff use, and teamwork. The researchers also noted that, for some types of encounters, departments did not have policies to guide their officers or had policies and procedures which put the officers' safety in jeopardy. Thus, for instance, the FBI recommended the development of procedures to guide officers who become victims of robbery while off-duty and the adoption of procedures for traffic stops which increase officer safety. And, not surprising, the FBI recommended the use of body armor by all uniformed field officers.

Finally, many of the policy implications of the research conducted in the area of police use of deadly force have ramifications for the reduction of violence against police, as

well (see e.g., Blumberg, 1989; Brown, 1984; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Fyfe, 1978, 1979, 1980; Geller and Karales, 1981). For instance, Fyfe (1978) found that when the New York City Police Department reduced their "buy and bust" narcotics enforcement tactics in favor of the pursuit of higher-ranking dealers, both shootings by and of police were reduced. Sherman (1980:1) points out that the areas of police killings and police use of deadly force "are to some degree artificially distinguished, since most of what they encompass are police encounters with citizens from which violence emerges." Consistent with this conceptualization, Toch (1980) maintains that violence is clearly transactional, and thus, the program he implemented within the Oakland Police Department, although focused on officers prone to use violence, was intended to reduce simultaneously the violence both by and against police. In the same vein, the Metro-Dade Violence Reduction Program sought to improve training of officers to defuse potentially violent situations--those with the potential for violence against the citizen or the officer (Fyfe, 1987).

#### **Accidental Deaths**

During the period 1972 through 1993, 1,313 law enforcement officers, or an average of 60 per year, were killed accidentally while acting in the line of duty. Information available for the period 1973 through 1992 indicates that the largest percentage (41.8%) of accidental deaths during this 20-year period were due to automobile accidents. Other circumstances included being struck by vehicles (22.2%), aircraft accidents (12.3%), accidental shootings (10.0%), motorcycle accidents (7.6%), and "other" (6.1%).

Geller and Karales (1981) found that 21.4 percent of all of the police shootings (onand off-duty) in Chicago during the five-year period they studied, were accidentally selfinflicted. These incidents involved accidental discharges during "non-combat" handling of weapons and accidental firings during the course of arrest attempts. Eleven percent of all the officers shot in Chicago between 1974 and 1978 were accidentally shot by other officers. Specifically, of these 20 shootings, 16 were accidental gun discharges, two were stray bullets, and two involved mistaking officers for suspects. Fyfe (1978) found a similar situation in New York City during 1971 through 1975. He states that police in New York "are at least as likely to be killed by themselves, their acquaintances or their colleagues as by their professional clientele" (1978:476).

Table 2-21 indicates the number and rate of officers who were killed accidentally between 1972 and 1993. The number of accidental killings reported to the FBI rose between 1972 and 1975, dropped in 1976, rose consistently and dramatically between 1976 and 1989, and fell back to the level of the late 1970s in the early 1990s. Figure 2-12 provides a comparison of the number of officers feloniously and accidentally killed between 1973 and 1993. That figure makes clear the strikingly different trends reported for the two types of killings. While the number of reported felonious killings fell during the 1970s, the number of reported accidental killings increased. As a result, although there were two to three times as many felonious, as compared to accidental, killings reported in the 1970s, there have been approximately equal numbers of both types since the mid-1980s.


The reasons for these differences require further attention before they can be understood. It may simply be, for example, that police departments began systematically reporting felonious killings earlier than they did accidental killings. Another explanation is that the major policy and training interventions that departments have adopted to reduce

**TABLE 2-21** THE NUMBER AND RATE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ACCIDENTALLY KILLED PER YEAR 1972-1992

YEAR	NUMBER OF OFFICERS KILLED	TOTAL NUMBER OF SWORN OFFICERS	RATE PER 100,000 OFFICERS
1972	41	374,178	11.0
1973	42	389,253	10.8
1974	47	399,994	11.8
1975	56	411,140	13.6
1976	29	418,295	6.9
1977	32	436,731	7.3
1978	52	430,724	12.1
1979	58	436,868	13.3
1980	61	438,442	13.9
1981	66	444,240	14.9
1982	72	449,491	16.0
1983	72	496,919	14.5
1984	75	515,112	14.6
1985	70	519,218	13.5
1986	67	525,058	12.8
1987	74	530,641	13.9
1988	77	537,125	14.3
1989	79	547,315	14.4
1990	67	588,334	11.4
1991	52	594,488	8.7
1992	66	600,066	11.0
1993	58	600,066*	9.7

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1972-1992. \*1992 Figure

Figure 2-12: Law Enforcement Officers Accidentally and Feloniously Killed, 1972-1993



Sources: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1972-1981. FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1982-1993.


officer risks of being feloniously killed have not been matched by interventions to reduce accidental killings. For though the absolute numbers of accidental killings have increased over the 22-year period covered in Table 2-21, the rates indicate that accidental killings in the 1990s are about the same as they were in the 1970s. The average rate in the 1970s was 10.9. This figure increased to 14.3 during the 1980s, and returned to the level of the 1970s in the early 1990s (10.2 accidental killings per 100,000).

#### Research on Assaults Against Police

An understanding of killings of police requires a broad understanding of all violence against the police. Assaults against law enforcement officers are also reported by the FBI in the UCR. Figure 2-13 provides the data compiled by the FBI for 1972 through 1992, for numbers of assaults and Figure 2-14 provides the rates of assaults per 100 officers for the same period. The reduction in officers' deaths over the years is not paralleled in the figures on assaults. In 1972 there were 15.1 assaults per 100 officers, in 1982 the figure was 17.5, and in 1992 the corresponding figure was 17.6. For 1972, 1982 and 1992 the rate of assaults with injury per 100 sworn officers were 5.8, 5.4 and 6.4, respectively.


Geller and Scott (1992), found that the number of firearms assaults resulting in injuries increased during the late 1980s and in 1990. They conjecture that "this increase probably consists in part of officers who suffered bruises when shot while wearing soft body armor" (1992: 131). They calculate the rates of nonfatal firearms injuries of officers and determine that in 1978, 1989, and 1990, 127, 174, and 183 officers were injured with firearms per 100,000 employed officers. That is, from 1978 to 1990 the rate of nonfatal firearms injuries rose 44 percent.

Figure 2-13: Law Enforcement Officer Assaults, 1972-1992



Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1972-1992.

Figure 2-14: Law Enforcement Officer Assaults Per 100 Sworn Officers, 1972-1993



Thus, despite a decrease in the rate of officers killed in the line of duty, Geller and Scott (1992: 132) report that "working police officers coast to coast with whom we have talked in training sessions almost uniformly say that the streets have become increasingly dangerous for them in the 1980s and into the 1990s." In response to a mail survey, 80 percent of the 238 responding members of the Portland, Oregon police department reported that "the level of violence directed at [them] has increased in the past year or two" (Snell and Long, 1992a, reported in Geller and Scott, 1992). An even larger percentage, 84 percent, believed that the field officers were in greater danger today than they were five years ago. Specifically, officers reported that they are more likely today than in the past to have to fistfight and/or wrestle with subjects.

Geller and Scott (1992) also report that there is an inverse relationship between jurisdiction size and the rate at which police officers were assaulted and injured.

In addition to the compilation of figures by the FBI in the UCR, information on assaults on police come from studies conducted by Banon (1976) on assaults against Detroit police officers which resulted in arrests, and by Stobart (1972) on assaults which resulted in sick leave within three police departments in England. The very comprehensive Police Assaults Study was conducted by researchers with the Bureau of Government Research at the University of Oklahoma (see e.g., Chapman et al., 1974a, 1974b; Meyer et al., 1974, 1978, 1979; Morrison and Meyer, 1974; Regens et al., 1974). The Police Assaults Study team studied 1,143 assaults which occurred in 1973 against municipal police officers in five South Central states. "Assault" was defined as "any overt physical act that the officer perceives or has reason to believe was intended to cause him harm" (Meyer, et al., 1979: 162). These

events were analyzed in terms of the characteristics of the officers, characteristics and motivations of the assailants, the environment in which the assault took place, and the "dynamics of the assault event" (Meyer et al., 1979: 162). Meyer et al. (1981, 1982, 1983, 1986) conducted some supplementary studies which focused on specific types of assaults (e.g., robbery-associated assaults and ambush assaults) to assess the variation in dynamics across subgroups.

Also of note, this team looked at the potential of combinations of factors to generate violence against police and focused on the specific actions of the officer and assailant throughout the incident to determine the precipitating elements of the events.

#### Conclusion

The data collected by the FBI and reported annually in the <u>LEOKAs</u> are the most comprehensive, though some jurisdiction-level data have also provided valuable information. The national and jurisdiction-level data have informed us about the offenders, opponents, and circumstances of incidents which have resulted in officers' felonious deaths. In its comprehensive study of law enforcement deaths, the Police Foundation has attempted to build upon the existing knowledge regarding these tragic occurrences. In the chapters which follow, we present the results of our attempt.

#### III. AGENCY-LEVEL ANALYSES

The preceding chapter provided information from existing literature about the national-level trends and characteristics of felonious killings of police officers. This chapter reports information compiled specifically for this report concerning levels, trends, and differences among agency types, as well as across agencies within types. (Complete agency-level data are provided in Appendix A.)

## Number of Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers by Agency Type

Table 3-1 provides data concerning the number of felonious killings of law enforcement officers, by year, across types of agency from 1972 through 1993. As that table indicates, the largest numbers of killings have occurred among municipal agencies, which accounted for 1,130 of the total of 1,986 felonious homicides recorded by the F.B.I. County agencies, including both sheriffs' departments and county police departments, accounted for 469 such homicides. The third highest number of felonious homicides, 174, occurred among sworn personnel of state police and highway patrol agencies. A total of 53 federal law enforcement officers were feloniously killed during this 22-year period. An additional 41 employees of other State agencies, such as Fish and Game Authorities and Alcohol Beverage Control Boards, were also feloniously killed as were 17 officers employed by other local agencies (such as regional transit authorities). Finally, a total of 102 law enforcement officers employed in United States territories (such as Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa) were also killed.

#### TABLE 3-1 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED BY YEAR AND AGENCY TYPE 1972-1993

AGENCY	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1999	1990	1991	1992	1993	-
Municipal Agencies	70	83	85	80	70	61	47	49	64	58	52	35	34	44	33	42	47	37				<u> </u>	Total
County Agencies	26	30	20	25	27	20	27	31	18	21	29	26	21	14	19				31	35	30	43	1130
Other Local Agencies	0	i	3	2	0	0		2	2	0		0		17	19	18	19	14	19	20	18	7	469
State Police/Highway Patrol	13	11	14	11	7	10	10	12	-	<del>,</del>	4	- ,	11	10	-	3	- 0	0	0	0	0	1	17
Other State Agencies	3	2	4	0	2	0	3	3	2	2	1	2		3		,	•	2	2	7	5	7	174
Federal Agencies	3	3	2	4	2	0	1	4	2	0	2	3	1	-	•	1	4			-	0	0	41
Total U.S. Agencies	115	130	128	122	108	91	89	101	97	88	88	73	70	72	62	73	76			1	4	4	53
Foreign Agencies	2	4	4	7	4	2	4	5	7	3	4	7	2	- 12	4		1	.58	61	63	57	62	1884
Total Agencies	117	134	132	129	112	93	93	106	104	91	92	80	72	78	66	74			3	8	5	•	102
	<del></del>										/2	- 60	12	/6	- 00	/4	76	66	66	71	62	70	1986

To better understand the overall trends in felonious killings, Table 3-2 provides a comparison of the number of felonious killings that were recorded within each agency type for the periods 1972-1982 and 1983-1993, the change in the number of killings between those two periods, and the percentage change.

TABLE 3-2
FELONIOUS KILLINGS OF POLICE OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE
1972-1982 COMPARED TO 1983-1993

AGENCY TYPE	Killings 1972-1982	KILLINGS 1983-1993	CHANGE	PERCENT CHANGE
MUNICIPAL	719	411	-308	-42.8%
COUNTY	274	195	-79	-28.8%
OTHER LOCAL	11	6	-5	-45.5%
STATE POLICE/HP	108	66	-42	-38.9%
OTHER STATE	22	19	-3	-13.6%
FEDERAL	23	30	+7	+30.4%
Puerto Rico	39	52	+14	+35.9%
OTHER FOREIGN	7	4	-3	-42.9%
TOTAL	1203	783	-420	-34.9%

As Table 3-2 indicates, there was an overall decline of 34.9 percent in felonious killings of police officers between the 1972-1982 and 1983-1993 periods. That table also indicates that there was considerable variation across agency types in the change between the two periods. Among municipal police departments, for example, the change between the two 11-year periods was 42.8 percent. Among county agencies, the decrease in felonious

killings was 28.8 percent. Among other local agencies (such as transit and housing authority police) the decrease was 45.5 percent. Felonious killings of state police and highway patrol officers declined by 38.9 percent. Among other state agencies (such as Fish and Game Authorities and Alcohol Beverage Control Boards), there was a decrease of only 13.6 percent. The number of foreign officers (excluding Puerto Rico) declined by 42.9 percent. Finally, there were increases in felonious killings of Federal police officers and police officers in Puerto Rico. Among federal officers, the number of such killings rose by 30.4 percent. Among officers in Puerto Rico, the number of felonious killings rose by 35.9 percent.

The results of the differential changes in trends across agency types are seen more clearly in Table 3-3, which shows the percentage distribution of felonious killings during the 1972-1982 and 1983-1993 periods, respectively. As that table indicates, the percentage of municipal officers among those who were feloniously killed fell from 59.8 percent during the 1972-1982 period to 52.5 percent during the 1983-1993 period, a decline of 12.2 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of slain officers who were employed by county agencies rose from 22.8 percent in the first half of the period studied to 24.9 percent during the second half, an increase of 9.2 percent. The portion of slain officers employed by state police and highway patrol agencies decreased by 6.7 percent, from 9 percent to 8.4 percent. The percentage of felonious killings of Federal officers doubled from 1.9 percent between 1972 and 1982 to 3.8 percent during the 1983-1993 period. The percentage of Puerto Rican officers among those feloniously killed increased by 106.3 percent, rising from 3.2 percent during the first period to 6.6 percent during the second. No appreciable changes occurred among the other agency types.

TABLE 3-3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FELONIOUS KILLINGS OF POLICE OFFICERS
BY AGENCY TYPE
1972-1982 COMPARED TO 1983-1993

AGENCY TYPE	PERCENT 1972-1982	PERCENT 1983-1993	Change	PERCENT CHANGE
· MUNICIPAL	59.8%	52.5%	-7.3%	-12.2%
COUNTY	22.8%	24.9%	+2.1%	+9.2%
OTHER LOCAL	0.9%	0.8%	-0.1%	-11.1%
STATE POLICE/HP	9.0%	8.4%	-0.6%	-6.7%
OTHER STATE	1.8%	2.4%	+0.6%	-33.3%
FEDERAL	1.9%	3.8%	+1.9%	+100.0%
Puerto Rico	3.2%	6.6%	+3.4%	+106.3%
OTHER FOREIGN	0.6%	0.5%	-0.1%	-16.7%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%		

Further breakdowns of the numbers of officers feloniously killed, by agency type and jurisdiction size, are provided in Table 3-4. As that table reveals, the largest numbers of officers feloniously killed (484) have been in cities with 250,000 and more inhabitants, followed by cities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants (342), suburban counties (259), rural counties (210), cities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (178), state police and highway patrol agencies, (174), cities with between 100,000 to 250,000 inhabitants (126), and Puerto Rico police (91).

To provide a better understanding of the changes that have occurred in the last two decades, Table 3-5 provides a comparison of the number of felonious killings that were

TABLE 3-4
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED IN LOCAL AGENCIES
BY YEAR AND JURISDICTION SIZE
1972-1993

Size	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	Total
Cities 250,000 and over	26	45	42	38	27	14	19	21	26	23	24	14	16	15	13	19	27	15	17	16	9	. 18	484
Cities 100,000 to 250,000	4		10	3	5	7	4	5	10	4	7	2	4	6	6	5	6	,	4	4	6	7	126
Cities 25,000 to 100,000	16	9	13	12	12	12	7	7	8	9	6	4	10	10	5	9	3	4	-	-	7	7	178
Cities Under 25,000	24	21	20	27	26	28	17	16	20	22	15	15	4	13	,	9	11	9	6	11	1	11	342
Suburban Counties	11	14	10	15	15	10	18	16	8	12	17	16	11	9	11	11	13	10	10		•	5	259
Rural Counties	15	16	10	10	12	10	9	15	10	9	12	10	10	5	8	7	6	4	9	12	9	2	210
Other Local	0	1	3	2	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	17
State Police/Highway Patrol	13	11	14	11	7	10	10	12	9	7	4	7	11	10	4	7	4	2	2	7	5	7	174
Other State	3	2	4	0	2	0	3	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	1	2		2	5	0	0		41
Total	112	127	126	118	106	91	88	97	95	88	86	70	69	71	58	72	72	55	57	62	53	58	1831

1

recorded within city and county agencies, by type and jurisdiction size, for the periods 1972-1982 and 1983-1983, the differences in recorded numbers between those two periods, and the percentage difference in those numbers. As that table indicates, although declines occurred in municipal and county agencies of all types and jurisdiction sizes, there was considerable variation among categories of agency type and size. The greatest decline, 55.1 percent, occurred among municipal police departments in jurisdictions with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants. The second largest decline, 41.3 percent, occurred in city police departments serving jurisdictions of 250,000 or more inhabitants. By far the smallest decline, 11.9 percent, was noted among city police departments serving jurisdictions with 100,000 to 249,999 persons.

TABLE 3-5

FELONIOUS KILLINGS OF POLICE OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE AND JURISDICTION SIZE MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY AGENCIES: 1972-1982 COMPARED TO 1983-1993

AGENCY TYPE	KILLINGS 1972-1982	Killings 1983-1993	Change	PERCENT CHANGE
CITIES 250,000 AND UP	305	179	-126	-41.3%
CITIES 100,000-249,999	67	59	-8	-11.9%
Crries 25,000-99,999	111	67	-44	-39.6%
CITIES UNDER 25,000	236	106	-130	-55.1%
SUBURBAN COUNTIES	146	113	-33	-22.6%
Rural Counties	128	82	-46	-35.9%

### Rates of Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers by Agency Type

In order to control for the variability in the numbers of officers across different agency types, Table 3-6 provides rates, by year, of felonious killings per 100,000 sworn

# LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE AND JURISDICTION: 1972-1993

ſ	CITIES 250,000	CITIES 100,000 TO	CITIES 25,000 TO	CITIES UNDER	TOTAL CITIES	SUBURBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	STATE POLICE/	TOTAL
YEAR	AND OVER	249,999	99,999	25,000		Counties	Counties	COUNTIES	HIGHWAY PATROL	TOTAL
1972	20.77	15.89	28.33	38.35	25.98	24.25	76.90	40.09	30.60	28.93
1973	35.75	30.40	15.82	31.00	29.98	29.35	78.00	43.98	24.87	31.86
1974	32.92	34.64	21.66	28.36	29.62	20.96	48.74	29.32	31.25	29.75
1975	30.49	10.00	19.32	35.72	27.36	29.24	45.33	34.08	24.21	28.21
1976	22.43	17.22	18.89	34.90	24.35	24.90	46.31	31.34	15.66	24.86
1977	11.67	23.47	18.78	35.27	20.82	14.48	33.68	20.26	22.14	20.83
1978	16.23	12.89	10.71	20.96	15.95	28.53	33.16	29.92	21.78	19.50
1979	18.14	16.95	10.54	18.90	16.54	23.94	52.19	32.44	26.16	21.02
1980	23.32	33.81	11.92	23.26	21.76	11.54	33.53	18.15	19.42	20.70
1981	20.58	12.84	13.24	25.46	19.51	16.61	31.56	20.85	15.16	19.36
1982	21.33	22.48	8.79	17.36	17.43	22.41	58.20	27.60	8.64	18.90
1983	12.79	6.22	5.83	15.99	11.51	19.97	15.32	17.89	14.75	13.69
1984	13.81	12.74	14.68	4.23	10.97	12.60	14.32	13.36	22.91	12.81
1985	12.62	18.67	14.79	13.82	14.07	10.29	7.09	8.86	20.60	13.10
1986	10.72	18.56	7.07	9.55	10.36	12.78	11.22	12.07	8.16	10.67
1987	15.60	15.20	12.55	9.52	13.09	12.57	9.73	11.29	13.90	12.62
1988	22.18	18.56	4.05	11.34	14.46	14.52	8.46	11.84	7.76	13.03
1989	12.68	27.35	5.45	9.22	11.48	10.11	5.32	8.04	3.84	9.66
1990	13.67	11.50	5.13	5.75	9.08	9.49	11.77	10.45	3.75	9.02
1991	12.76	11.34	5.03	10.20	10.06	7.34	15.28	10.66	13.43	10.55
1992	7.09	17.01	8.68	7.27	8.50	7.59	12.36	9.41	9.53	8.88
1993	13.90	19.23	8.66	9.87	12.18	4.15	2.66	3.58	13.46	9.49
TOTAL	18.29	18.27	11.78	17.50	16.63	14.89	19.45	16.64	16.50	16.62

officers for municipal, county, state police and highway patrol agencies, and for all of those agencies between 1972 and 1993. (Data concerning sworn personnel for other local and state agencies or for federal law enforcement officers were not available.) As the table indicates, the overall rate has declined notably from approximately 30 per 100,000 sworn officers in the early 1970s to less than 10 per 100,000 in four of the last five years. As that table also indicates, there is a remarkable similarity in the overall rates at which officers in municipal, county, and state police and highway patrol agencies have been feloniously killed; the rates per 100,000 for each of those three agency types has been 16.63, 16.64, and 16.50, respectively. Similarly, the table shows that there was a general downward trend in rates among city, county, and state agencies between 1972 and 1986, after which rates in all three types have remained basically constant.

In order to provide insight into the relative trends in the rates at which officers have been killed in municipal, county, state police and highway patrol, and Puerto Rican police agencies, Table 3-7 shows the rates at which officers were feloniously killed for the 1972-1982 and the 1983-1993 periods.

TABLE 3-7
FELONIOUS KILLING RATES PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS, BY AGENCY TYPE
1972-1982 COMPARED TO 1983-1993

AGENCY TYPE	Killing Rate 1972-1982	KILLING RATE 1983-1993	Change	PERCENT CHANGE
MUNICIPAL	22.56	11.35	-11.21	-49.7%
COUNTY	28.83	10.44	-18.44	-63.7%
STATE POLICE/HP	21.71	11.85	-9.86	-45.4%
PUERTO RICO	39.77	41.02	+1.25	+3.1%
TOTAL	24.09	12.01	-12.07	-50.1%

As the table reveals, the overall rate per 100,000 at which law enforcement officers were feloniously killed fell from 24.09 to 12.01, a reduction of 50.1 percent. The greatest reduction was among county agencies, in which the rate fell from 28.83 per 100,000 to 10.44, a reduction of 63.7 percent. (It should be noted, in interpreting these rates, that a change in definitions by the U.C.R. in 1983 led to a 123.4 percent increase in the reported number of officers employed in sheriffs/rural agencies between 1982 and 1983. Part of the reduction in rates must be attributed to this increase.) Among municipal agencies, the rate of felonious killings per 100,000 fell from 22.56 to 11.35, a reduction of 49.7 percent. Among state police and highway patrol agencies, the rate per 100,000 officers at which officers were feloniously killed fell from 21.71 to 11.85, a decline of 45.4 percent. Contrary to all other agency types, the rate at which officers in Puerto Rico were feloniously killed rose from 39.77 to 41.02 per 100,000 sworn officers, an increase of 3.1 percent.

Table 3-8 provides a comparison of the felonious killings rates within municipal and county agencies, by type and jurisdiction size, for the periods 1972-1982 and 1983-1993, the change in rates between those two periods, and the percentage change in those two rates.

TABLE 3-8

FELONIOUS KILLING RATES BY AGENCY TYPE AND JURISDICTION SIZE MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY AGENCIES: 1972-1982 COMPARED TO 1983-1993

AGENCY TYPE	KILLING RATE 1972-1982	KILLING RATE 1983-1993	CHANGE	PERCENT CHANGE
CITIES 250,000 AND UP	23.24	13.42	-9.82	-42.3%
Crties 100,000-249,999	20.83	16.04	-4.79	-23.0%
Crries 25,000-99,999	15.90	8.24	-7.66	-48.2%
CITIES UNDER 25,000	27.61	9.64	-17.97	-65.1%
SUBURBAN COUNTIES	21.83	10.56	-11.27	-22.6%
RURAL COUNTIES	45.45	10.28	-35.17	-77.4%

As Table 3-8 indicates, the greatest decrease in felonious killing rates (77.4%) occurred among rural county agencies. (As discussed above, part of this change is attributable to a change in the definition by the U.C.R. of sheriff/rural agencies occurred between 1982 and 1983.) The second greatest decline (65.1%) occurred among cities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants. There was also a decline of 48.2 percent among cities with between 25,000 and 99,999 inhabitants, a decline of 42.3 percent among cities 250,000 or more inhabitants, a 23 percent decline among cities with between 100,000 and 249,999 inhabitants, and a 22.6 percent decline among agencies in suburban counties.

# Number of Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers by Agency

Table 3-9 provides information about the number of officers who were feloniously killed between 1972 and 1993, by agency, for all agencies which had at least five officers killed feloniously during that period. As that table indicates, a total of 60 agencies had five or more officers feloniously killed during that period. Among those agencies, 31 were municipal police departments, 9 were county agencies, 2 were other local agencies, 12 were state police or highway patrol agencies, 5 were Federal agencies, and the last was the police of Puerto Rico.

More particularly, 22 agencies had ten or more of their officers feloniously killed. The greatest number of those killings occurred among the Puerto Rican police, which had 91 of their officers feloniously killed. The second highest number was found among the officers of the New York City Police Department, which had 64 of its officers killed feloniously between 1972 and 1993. Following far behind in this tragic list were the municipal departments in Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, and Houston, with between 17 and 35 officers feloniously killed during that period.

Only two county agencies had as many as ten of their officers feloniously killed between 1972 and 1993: the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, which had 16 officers killed, and the Metro-Dade Police Department, which had 12 officers killed.

Four state highway patrol agencies had ten or more of their officers feloniously killed between 1972 and 1993: those in Texas (15), Florida (11), North Carolina (10), and South Carolina (10).

TABLE 3-9

AGENCIES IN WHICH FIVE OR MORE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WERE KILLED:
BY TYPE: 1972-1993

NUMBER OF KILLINGS	CITY POLICE	COUNTY SHERIFFS OR POLICE	OTHER LOCAL AGENCIES	STATE AGENCIES	FEDERAL AGENCIES	OTHER AGENCIES
91						Puerto Rico
64	New York					Tucho Aco
35	Chicago					
25	Philadelphia					
24	Detroit					
19	Los Angeles					
18	Atlanta					
17	Baltimore Dallas Houston					
16		Los Angeles Sheriff				
15			4	Texas Dept. of Public Safety	·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
13	Milwaukee					<del></del>
12		Metro Dade Police			Drug Enforcement Administration	
11	Washington San Diego			Florida Highway Patrol	Federal Bureau of Investigation	***************************************

Number of Killings	CITY POLICE	COUNTY SHERIFFS OR POLICE	OTHER LOCAL AGENCIES	STATE AGENCIES	FEDERAL AGENCIES	OTHER AGENCIES
10	San Antonio			North Carolina Highway Patrol South Carolina Highway Patrol		
9	Cincinnati New Orleans Oakland St. Louis	Prince Georges' County Police, MD	New York City Housing Police	California Highway Patrol		
8	Charlotte Cleveland Indianapolis Memphis			Michigan State Police New York State Police Oklahoma State Police		
7	Boston Fort Worth Nashville Phoenix			Kentucky State Police Virginia State Police		
6	Columbus, OH Denver Kansas City Shreveport		New York City Transit Police		Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms U.S. Customs U.S. Marshall Service	
5	Columbus, GA Newark, NJ	Broward, FL E. Baton Rouge, LA Harris, TX Marion, IN Montgomery, MD Sacramento, CA		Arkansas State Patrol West Virginia State Patrol		:

Finally, two Federal law enforcement agencies had 10 or more of their officers feloniously killed between 1972 and 1993. Specifically, the Drug Enforcement Administration had 12 of its officers killed during that period; the Federal Bureau of Investigation experienced 11 felonious killings of its officers during the same time.

Among the 38 agencies that had between 5 and 9 of their officers feloniously killed between 1972 and 1992, 18 were municipal police departments, 7 were county agencies, 2 were other local agencies (the New York City Housing Authority and the New York Transit Authority Police Departments), 8 were state agencies (the state police in California, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Virginia, Arkansas, and West Virginia), and 3 were Federal agencies (the B.A.T.F., U.S. Customs, and U.S. Marshals Service).

Rates of Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers by Agency

As with agency types, the number of sworn officers employed by each agency varies considerably. In order to take into account these differences in staffing levels, it is imperative to calculate rates of felonious killings standardized by the number of sworn officers per agency. Further, because these rates can be erratically inflated among agencies with a small number of sworn officers, it is important to restrict the comparison of these rates to agencies with large enough numbers of sworn officers to avoid that erratic inflation. Recognizing these concerns, Table 3-10 provides information concerning the rates (per 100,000 sworn officers) at which officers were feloniously killed among the fifty largest municipal police departments for the period between 1972-1982, the period between 1983-1993, and the entire period between 1972-1993. As that table indicates, the ten highest rates

**TABLE 3-10** 

# LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS: HIGHEST RATES AMONG 50 LARGEST MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (1972-1982, 1983-1993, 1972-1993) (RANK ORDER ACCORDING TO 1972-1993 RATE)

2	Oakland Police, CA  Atlanta Police, GA  Charlotte Police, NC	83.04 76.86	42.62 44.86	63.10
<b></b>		76.86	44.04	
3	Charlotte Police, NC		44.50	60.17
		31.82	75.50	56.21
4	Cincinnati Police, OH	69.88	9.81	41.58
5	Ft. Worth Police, TX	66.62	20.01	40.00
6	Indianapolis Police, IN	52.15	18.68	36.02
7	San Antonio Police, TX	49.88	25.25	35.88
8 ;	San Diego Police, TX	38.67	32.20	34.85
9 ]	Dallas Police, TX	36.94	3.03	34.76
10	Nashville Police, TN	66.12	9.02	34.73
11 1	New Orleans Police, LA	51.20	7.20	30.50
12	Albuquerque Police, NM	18.60	37.94	30.11
13 1	Memphis Police, TN	51.93	7.23	29.28
14 I	Milwaukee Police, WI	43.70	13.80	29.13
15 I	Birmingham Police, AL	55.52	0.00	27.16
16 I	Baltimore Police, MD	30.03	18.58	24.67
17	Oklahoma City Police, OK	13.61	33.13	24.39
18 N	Minneapolis Police, MN	34.91	12.20	23.82
19 I	Detroit Police, MI	21.56	25.61	23.41
20 0	Columbus Police, OH	34.46	13.87	23.06
21 K	Kansas City Police, MO	29.59	16.02	23.08
22 S	St. Louis Police, MO	26.45	17.25	22.46
23 H	Houston Police, TX	42.80	8.69	22.25
24 L	Long Beach Police, CA	43.42	0.00	21.12
25 D	Denver Police, CO	20.20	20.42	20.31
26 T	ſampa Police, FL	30.55	12.15	20.30

RANK	AGENCY	1972-1982	1983-1993	1972-1993
27	Phoenix Police, AZ	18.45	19.97	19.29
28	Cleveland Police, OH	25.83	10.55	18.96
29	Newark Police, NJ	26.89	8.52	18.79
30	Jacksonville Sheriff, FL	20.17	16.81	18.34
31	Philadelphiia Police, PA	17.18	13.76	15.63
32	Boston Police, MA	12.24	18.97	15.35
33	Tucson Police, AZ	34.93	0.00	14.96
34	Jersey City Police, NJ	18.92	10.30	14.80
35	Las Vegas Police, NV	24.71	8.06	14.63
36	Austin Police, TX	37.08	0.00	14.74
37	El Paso Police, TX	0.00	24.84	13.46
38	Chicago Police, IL	14.69	10.49	12.67
39	Seattle Police, WA	8.63	15.94	12.43
40	Portland Police, OR	26.15	0.00	12.34
41	Metropolitan Police, DC	17.10	6.62	11.94
42	Los Angeles Police, CA	11.58	12.11	11.85
43	New York City Police, NY	14.07	7.95	11.02
44	San Francisco Police, CA	22.32	0.00	10.43
45	San Jose Police, CA	0.00	17.39	10.12
46	Miami Police, FL	11.94	8.67	10.05
47	Honolulu Police, HI	6.19	10.41	8.49
48	Pittsburgh Police, PA	6.41	7.96	7.10
49	Tulsa Police, OK	0.00	12.98	6.81
50	Buffalo Police, NY	7.71	0.00	4.20

for the entire period were found in Oakland, Atlanta, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Fort Worth, Indianapolis, San Antonio, San Diego, Dallas, and Nashville.

A comparison of the rates at which police officers were feloniously killed within individual agencies during the 1972-1982 and 1983-1993 periods reveals that although most rates declined between the two periods, those in Charlotte, Albuquerque, and Oklahoma City increased notably. Other agencies, including Cincinnati, Nashville, Fort Worth, and Birmingham, experienced large rates at which their officers were feloniously killed.

Table 3-11 provides a similar comparison of the rates among the nation's 50 largest county law enforcement agencies. As that table indicates, the highest rates at which county law enforcement officers were feloniously killed were found in the Tarrant County, TX, Sheriffs Department, the East Baton Rouge Parish, LA, Sheriffs Department, the Prince George's County, MD, Police Department, the Broward County, FL, Sheriffs Department, and the DeKalb County, GA, Police Department. In general, the rates among the largest county agencies were appreciably lower than the rates among the largest city agencies. In fact, 20 of the 50 largest county agencies had none of their officers feloniously killed between 1972 and 1993.

Table 3-12 provides data on the felonious killings rates for the 49 state police and highway patrol agencies, as well as the Puerto Rican police. As that table shows, the highest rates were found among officers of the South Dakota Highway Patrol, the Alaska State Police, the South Carolina Highway Patrol, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and the New Mexico State Police. It is worth noting that the Puerto Rico Police have a lower felonious killing rate than eight state agencies.

**TABLE 3-11** 

## LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS: HIGHEST RATES AMONG 50 LARGEST COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (1972-1982, 1983-1993, 1972-1993)

(RANK ORDER ACCORDING TO 1972-1993 RATE)

RANK	AGENCY	1972-1982	1983-1993	1972-1993
1	Tarrant County Sheriff, TX	52.14	55.80	54.53
2	E. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff, LA	89.99	15.59	46.04
3	Prince George's County Police, MD	57.76	35.42	45.12
4	Broward County Sheriff, FL	71.99	36.10	45.09
5	Dekalb County Police, GA	73.03	15.91	38.49
6	Erie County Sheriff, NY	26.75	45.30	36.80
7	Bexar County Sheriff, TX	78.49	15.91	33.97
8	Jefferson Parish Sheriff, LA	58.73	12.83	31.01
9	San Joaquin County Sheriff, CA	38.34	24.89	30.18
10	Montgomery County Police, MD	62.23	0.00	29.59
11	Sacramento County Sheriff, CA	56.29	9.59	28.51
12	Palm Beach County Sheriff, FL	33.27	26.55	28.47
13	Metro-Dade County Police, FL	39.51	18.94	27.20
14	Kern County Sheriff, CA	0.00	40.01	24.13
15	Riverside County Sheriff, CA	46.60	12.21	24.03
16	Salt Lake County Sheriff, UT	33.47	0.00	22.34
17	Harris County Sheriff, TX	65.74	5.85	21.58
18	Cook County Sheriff's Police, IL	0.00	36.28	19.75
19	King County Sheriff, WA	21.13	16.77	18.70
20	St. Louis County Police, MO	17.26	18.14	17.69
21	San Bernardino County Sheriff, CA	27.74	8.93	16.29
22	Los Angeles County Sheriff, CA	15.11	12.54	13.87
23	Maricopa County Sheriff, AZ	0.00	22.47	13.77
24	Wayne County Sheriff, MI	12.36	13.12	12.73
25	Hamilton County Sheriff, OH	0.00	15.13	10.67
26	Orange County Sheriff, FL	0.00	13.26	9.49

RANK	AGENCY	1972-1982	1983-1993	1972-1993
27	Baltimore County Police, MD	7.52	6.21	6.80
28	San Diego County Sheriff, CA	0.00	7.63	4.88
29	Nassau County Police, NY	7.73	0.00	4.15
30	Suffolk County Police, NY	0.00	7.11	3.65
31	Orange County Sheriff, CA	0.00	0.00	0.00
32	Fairfax County Police, VA	0.00	0.00	0.00
33	Hillsborough County Sheriff, FL	0.00	0.00	0.00
34	Alameda County Sheriff, CA	0.00	0.00	0.00
35	Pinellas County Sheriff, FL	0.00	0.00	0.00
36	Fulton County Sheriff, GA	0.00	0.00	0.00
37	Ventura County Sheriff, CA	0.00	0.00	0.00
38	Contra Costa County Sheriff, CA	0.00	0.00	0.00
39	Oakland County Sheriff, MI	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>4</b> 0	Franklin County Sheriff, OH	0.00	0.00	0.00
41	Mecklenburg County Rural Police, NC	0.00	0.00	0.00
42	Anne Arundel County Police, MD	0.00	0.00	0.00
43	Camden County Sheriff, NJ	0.00	0.00	0.00
44	Milwaukee County Sheriff, WI	0.00	0.00	0.00
45	Shelby County Sheriff, TN	0.00	0.00	0.00
46	Caddo Parish Sheriff, LA	0.00	0.00	0.00
47	Passaic County Sheriff, NJ	0.00	0.00	0.00
48	Jefferson County Sheriff, AL	0.00	0.00	0.00
49	Calcasieu Parish Sheriff, LA	0.00	0.00	0.00
50	Cook County Sheriff, IL	0.00	0.00	0.00

**TABLE 3-12** 

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS: HIGHEST RATES AMONG STATE POLICE AND HIGHWAY PATROL AGENCIES AND PUERTO RICO (1972-1982, 1983-1993, 1972-1993)

(RANK ORDER ACCORDING TO 1972-1993 RATE)

RANK	RANK AGENCY	1972-1982	1983-1993	1972-1993
1	South Dakota Highway Patrol	57.87	60.72	59.19
2	Alaska State Police	61.71	51.53	56.04
3	South Carolina Highway Patrol	62.41	50.28	55.12
4	Oklahoma Highway Patrol	92.44	23.37	53.50
5	New Mexico State Police	54.33	49.38	51.50
6	Arkansas State Police	58.85	38.11	48.38
7	West Virginia State Police	71.96	17.35	44.30
8	Nevada Highway Patrol	56.98	35.49	43.82
9	Puerto Rico Police	39.77	41.31	40.47
10	North Carolina Highway Patrol	56.86	22.76	39.25
11	Florida Highway Patrol	63.94	17.73	37.37
12	Utah Highway Patrol	46.34	25.59	36.41
13	Kentucky State Police	60.05	9.71	34.50
14	Mississippi Highway Patrol	16.54	52.01	33.93
15	Kansas Highway Patrol	69.80	0.00	29.96
16	Texas Department of Public Safety	30.11	23.51	26.74
17	Colorado State Police	34.17	17.45	25.96
18	Virginia State Police	7.73	35.39	23.39
19	Montana Highway Patrol	43.01	0.00	22.20
20	Nebraska State Patrol	47.29	0.00	21.70
21	Alabama Department of Public Safety	41.90	0.00	20.58
22	Delaware State Police	42.35	0.00	19.86
23	Michigan State Police	17.74	17.14	17.45
24	Missouri Highway Patrol	0.00	32.20	16.78
25	Arizona Department of Public Safety	10.87	19.85	15.51
26	Maine State Police	0.00	26.23	13.79

Rank	RANK AGENCY	1972-1982	1983-1993	1972-1993
27	Indiana State Police	0.00	25.38	13.45
28	Maryland State Police	0.00	25.38	13.79
29	Georgia Department of Public Safety	11.77	11.48	11.57
30	Washington State Patrol	23.33	0.00	11.00
31	Oregon State Police	10.23	10.88	10.55
32	Illinois State Police	11.03	9.48	10.22
33	New York State Police	16.34	4.69	10.09
34	Wisconsin State Patrol	20.26	0.00	9.79
35	Minnesota Highway Patrol	18.22	0.00	9.08
36	New Jersey State Police	9.88	6.97	8.17
37	California Highway Patrol	15.71	0.00	7.47
38	Tennessee Department of Public Safety	0.00	11.99	6.22
39	Louisiana State Police	11.47	0.00	5.99
40	Connecticut State Police	0.00	9.10	4.89
41	Pennsylvania State Police	9.57	0.00	4.68
42	Massachusetts State Police	0.00	7.00	4.01
43	Idaho State Police	0.00	0.00	0.00
44	Iowa Department of Public Safety	0.00	0.00	0.00
45	New Hampshire State Police	0.00	0.00	0.00
46	North Dakota Highway Patrol	0.00	0.00	0.00
47	Ohio Highway Patrol	0.00	0.00	0.00
48	Rhode Island State Police	0.00	0.00	0.00
49	Vermont State Police	0.00	0.00	0.00
50	Wyoming Highway Patrol	0.00	0.00	0.00

It is also worthy of note that, when the felonious killings rates are compared across the largest agencies of all types, 6 of the highest 10 rates were demonstrated by state agencies, 3 by municipal police departments, and 1 by a county law enforcement agency. Among the highest 20 rates, 10 were demonstrated by state agencies, 8 by municipal departments, and 6 by state agencies (including Puerto Rico).

## Regression Analyses of Felonious Killing Rates in Largest Municipalities

In an attempt to find systematic differences among the rates at which law enforcement officers have been feloniously killed, we developed an analytical model to structure multiple regression analyses to explain variations among the 56 largest municipal agencies. We focused on these agencies primarily because of the fact that data concerning a large number of potential explanatory variables are available. In addition, our review of the literature produced few empirically testable hypotheses concerning either county or state agencies.

Because the rates at which officers have been feloniously killed have declined dramatically in the last several years, we produced two empirical versions of this model, the first to explain the killings rates between 1977 and 1984, the second to explain the killings rates between 1985 and 1992, the last year for which data were available at the time of these analyses. The analytical models selected, presented here as Figures 3-1 and 3-2, included independent variables representing the general environment of the 56 cities, the specific crime environment of those cities, and selected characteristics of the law enforcement agencies themselves. The selection of indicators of the general environment was based on the work of Cardarelli (1968), Lester (1978a, 1978b, and 1982), Peterson and Bailey (1988), and Chamlin (1989).

Among the indicators of the general municipal environment, we used a dichotomous ("dummy") variable to indicate whether the city was or was not located in the South, in order to test the hypothesis that violence was highest in that region. Based on earlier research indicating a relationship between poverty and income inequality and violence, we created a three-item "poverty index," based on the results of factor analysis, composed of standardized scores of the percent of the families in the city which were below the poverty level, the Gini index of income inequality, and the percent of the population which was African-American.

We also included as independent variables the population density of the city, the percent of the population that was Hispanic, and the percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 34, the most violent-prone population category.

Among indicators of the crime environment, we included the number of recorded violent and property crimes per 100,000, as indicated in the Uniform Crime Reports. Based on the hypothesis that cities with large numbers of crimes involving guns could be expected to have the highest levels of violence, we also created a three-item index of gun-related crime. Based on the results of factor analysis, this index was created by combining the standardized scores of the percent of homicides committed with guns, the percent of aggravated assaults that were committed with guns, and the percent of robberies that were committed with guns.

Figure 3-1

#### Analytic Model for Agency-Level Multiple Regression Analysis of Police Killings (1977-1984)

#### General Environment





Figure 3-2

#### Analytic Model for Agency-Level Multiple Regression Analysis of Police Killings (1985-1992)

#### General Environment



As indicators of the agency environment, we included the number of violent and property crime arrests per 1,000 sworn officers, as measures of activity and potential vulnerability. We also included the percent of officers who were injured in assaults, as a general measure of the dangerousness of the department. Finally, for methodological reasons, we included the inverse of the number of sworn officers, multiplied by 100,000. This latter variable adjusts for possible bias introduced by including both independent and dependent variables with the same denominator, in this case, the number of sworn officers.

Results. For each time period, we included in the regression analyses all of the hypothesized independent variables (the "full model") in order to determine what relationship those variables had with the dependent variable, the felonious killing rate. We then systematically reduced the model by removing nonsignificant predictors, to the point where we maximized the adjusted variance explained by the predictors, producing the "reduced model." The results of the first series of regression analyses, for the killings rates between 1977 and 1984, are presented in Table 3-13. As that table indicates, the reduced model produced four significant predictors and explained 28.3 percent of the variance in the felonious killing rate, after adjusting for the number of predictors in the equation. Among the significant results were that the killing rate was positively related to the violent crime rate, the gun crime index, and the number of property crime arrests per 100,000 sworn officers. On the other hand, the killing rate was negatively related to the number of violent crime arrests per 100,000 sworn officers.

**TABLE 3-13** 

# RESULTS FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FELONIOUS KILLINGS OF POLICE OFFICERS IN 56 LARGEST UNITED STATES CITIES: 1977-1984 (COEFFICIENTS NOT IN PARENTHESES ARE UNSTANDARDIZED; THOSE IN PARENTHESES ARE STANDARDIZED.)

	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS		
Variables	FULL MODEL	REDUCED MODEL	
Constant	-4.778	-3.289	
South	632 (088)		
POVERTY INDEX	.557 (.157)		
POPULATION DENSITY	.000 (.297)	.000 (.204)	
PER CAPITA INCOME	000 (183)		
PERCENT HISPANIC	037 (152)		
PERCENT AGED 15-34	.164 (.206)		
VIOLENT CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS	.002** (.512)	.003*** (.578)	
PROPERTY CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS	.000 (.049)		
Gun Crime Index	1.717*** (.468)	1.831*** (.498)	
VIOLENT CRIME ARRESTS PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS	000* (403)	000** (374)	
Property Crime Arrests Per 100,000 Sworn Officers	.000** (.510)	.000** (374)	
PERCENT OF OFFICERS INJURED BY ASSAULTS	003 (016)		
1/Number of Sworn Officers x 100,000	618 (131)	194 (041)	
R <sup>2</sup>	.434	.367	
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	.235	.283	
Number of Cases	51	52	

<sup>\*</sup> p<.10

<sup>\*\*</sup> p<.05

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<.01

The results of the second series of regression analyses, for the killings rates between 1985 and 1992, are presented in Table 3-14. As the table shows, the reduced model again produced four significant predictors, but explained 40.7 percent of the variance in the killing rate, after adjusting for the number of predictors used. Among the significant results was the finding that the killing rate was positively related the violent crime rate but negatively related to the poverty index, population density, and the inverse of the number of sworn officers.

Table 3-15 provides a comparison of the results of the two "reduced models." In comparing these results, what is most striking is that only one predictor, the violent crime rate, was significantly related to the felonious killing rate during both periods. In each case, cities with high violent crime rates were more likely to have high felonious killing rates. However, the other three significant predictors in the 1977-1984 period, the gun crime index and the violent and property crime arrests per 100,000, failed to reach statistical significance during the second period. Likewise, none of the other significant predictors during the second period, the poverty index, population density, and the inverse of the number of sworn officers, reached the level of statistical significance during the first time period.

Thus, in the last two decades, not only have the number and rate at which police officers are feloniously killed gone down dramatically, the factors that empirically predict differences in those rates among the nation's largest cities have undergone a significant transformation.

**TABLE 3-14** 

### REGRESSION RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF POLICE KILLINGS IN 56 LARGEST UNITED STATES CITIES: 1985-1992 (COEFFICIENTS NOT IN PARENTHESES ARE UNSTANDARDIZED; COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES ARE STANDARDIZED.)

Variables		DEL REGRESSION FICIENTS
	FULL MODEL	REDUCED MODEL
CONSTANT	15.057**	9.261***
South	.938 (.123)	
Poverty Index	-1.395* (381)	-1.313 <b>**</b> (357)
POPULATION DENSITY	000 (292)	000 (266)
PER CAPITA INCOME	000 (187)	000 (191)
PERCENT HISPANIC	.011 (.046)	
Percent Aged 15-34	161 (126)	
VIOLENT CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS	.002* (.422)	.002** (.411)
PROPERTY CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS	000 (248)	000 (137)
GUN CRIME INDEX	.044 (.012)	-
VIOLENT CRIME ARRESTS PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS	.000 (.027)	
PROPERTY CRIME ARRESTS PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS	000 (011)	
PERCENT OF OFFICERS INJURED BY ASSAULTS	.012 (.071)	
1/Number of Sworn Officers x 100,000	-3.889*** (687)	-4.109*** (721)
R <sup>2</sup>	.503	.471
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	.337	.407
Number of Cases	53	56

p<.10

<sup>\*\*</sup> p<.05

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<.01

**TABLE 3-15** 

#### REGRESSION RESULTS FROM ANALYSIS OF POLICE KILLINGS IN 56 LARGEST UNITED STATES CITIES: COMPARISON OF 1977-1984 AND 1985-1992 REDUCED MODELS (COEFFICIENTS NOT IN PARENTHESES ARE UNSTANDARDIZED; COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES ARE STANDARDIZED.)

	REDUCED MODEL REGRESSION COEFFICIENT		
Variables	1977-1984	1985-1992	
CONSTANT	-5.128	15.057	
South			
POVERTY INDEX		0.531495	
POPULATION DENSITY	000 (204)	000 (266)	
PER CAPITA INCOME	-	000 (191)	
PERCENT HISPANIC			
PERCENT AGED 15-34			
VIOLENT CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS	.003*** (.578)	.002** (.411)	
PROPERTY CRIMES PER 100,000 INHABITANTS		000 (137)	
Gun Crime Index	1.831*** (.498)		
VIOLENT CRIME ARRESTS PER 100,000 SWORN OFFICERS	000** (.355)		
Property Crime Arrests Per 100,000 Sworn Officers	.000** (.355)		
Percent of Officers Injured by Assaults			
1/Number of Sworn Officers x 100,000	194 (041)	-4.109*** (721)	
R <sup>2</sup>	.367	.471	
ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	.283	.407	
Number of Cases	52	56	

<sup>\*</sup> p<.10

<sup>\*\*</sup> p<.05

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p<.01

#### **CHAPTER 4**

#### INCIDENTS IN WHICH OFFICERS ARE KILLED: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS

In this chapter we describe the results obtained from an in-depth analysis of the incidents in which officers were feloniously slain during the ten year period, 1983 through 1992.

#### **Methodology**

The incident-level data base for the decade encompassing 1983 through 1992 is comprised of two parts: UCR-coded data on the officers and incidents, and incident and officer data coded by the Police Foundation from the LEOKA narratives.

## UCR-Coded Data on the Officer and Incident: 1980-1992

As noted earlier, the FBI has been collecting information on the felonious killings of police since 1945. Starting in 1972 this agency started issuing the LEOKAs which summarized for each year the nature and extent of felonious police killings. Information was presented regarding the officer, the incident, and the opponent. Starting in 1980, the FBI computerized these data. The FBI provided the Police Foundation with this computerized data set for the years 1980 through 1992.

## Police Foundation-Coded Data on the Incidents: 1983-1992

The information contained in the FBI data set, though valuable, is not sufficient to characterize the nature of police killings. The Foundation drew upon the academic and practitioner literature in the area of police killings, as well as, the methodological developments in the areas of police use of deadly force and assaults against police to identify, for coding purposes, more detailed and useful data elements for study. These data elements

were coded from the narratives describing the incidents of police killings contained in the FBI LEOKAS for 1983 through 1992. These variables were added to the UCR-coded data described above to form the comprehensive 10-year incident-level data base upon which this chapter is based.

The data provided from the narratives is valuable in two respects. First of all, the variables provide more detail than that provided by the UCR data set. For instance, the Foundation data includes information regarding the type of agencies for which each officer worked, whether or not the officer was armed, whether the officer was working a security job, the manner in which the officer's attention was drawn to the incident, the locations of the officer and opponent, the number of threatening persons faced by the officer, and whether or not the officer was disarmed during the encounter. For some categories of information, Foundation data set provides more in-depth information regarding a particular aspect of the encounter, than that provided by the UCR. For instance, the UCR provides information regarding whether there were other officers at the scene of the encounter which resulted in the officer's slaying. The Foundation goes further by indicating the number of officers at the scene and the number of officers in the immediate presence of the victim officer at the time of the attack. In another example, the UCR codes "Circumstances at the Scene of the Incident" using the following major and sub categories:

Disturbance Calls

Bar Fights, man with gun, etc.
Family Quarrels

Arrest Situations

Burglaries in progress/pursuing burglary suspects
Robberies in progress/pursuing robbery suspects
Drug-related matters
Attempting other arrests

Civil Disorders (Mass disobedience, riot, etc.)
Handling, Transporting, Custody of Prisoners
Investigating Suspicious Persons/Circumstances
Ambush Situations
Entrapment/premeditation
Unprovoked attack
Mentally Deranged
Traffic Pursuits/Stops

These categories do not provide the level of detail necessary to draw policy-relevant conclusions. For instance, not discernable from this scheme is information regarding the frequencies with which officers are killed: conducting searches of homes or autos, investigating completed crimes, conducting drug-related undercover work, serving arrest warrants, providing non-crime assistance, and so forth. One cannot distinguish between officers killed while in pursuit of vehicles, killed while staffing roadblocks, or killed during traffic stops. Under "drug-related matters" one cannot determine if the officer's death occurred conducting a search of the offender's home, attempting an undercover buy, attempting an arrest per a warrant, attempting a warrantless arrest, or while conducting surveillance. To provide more detailed information regarding this aspect of the incidents, the Foundation separated "circumstances at the scene" into two variables: police activity and crime type. Thus, the first variable indicates, for instance, whether the officer is investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, intervening in an ongoing crime, investigating a completed crime, attempting an arrest pursuant to a warrant, attempting a warrantless arrest, conducting a vehicle pursuit, staffing a roadblock, executing a search warrant, conducting a warrantless search, doing undercover work, providing non-crime assistance (e.g., assisting at a traffic incident), and so forth. The second variable indicates the crime type which is the focus of the police activity, for instance, murder, robbery, drug

offense, and so forth.

Even more detail regarding the incident, however, is needed to adequately understand the nature of the phenomenon and, indeed, most of the narratives indicate the actual behaviors of officers and suspects which preceded the lethal events. In some instances, for example, the officers were frisking suspects immediately prior to their deaths. Knowing the extent to which police deaths occur during this specific police procedure (rather than "during an arrest") is more helpful for developing prevention strategies. Similarly, knowing that an officer was killed while emerging briefly from his place of cover is useful information for training-related purposes. The Foundation collected this detail from the narratives where it was provided.

Another advantage of the Foundation code scheme is that it incorporates into the study of police killings the conceptualization used in deadly force research to assess the progression of incidents. Scharf and Binder (1983) argue that analyses of deadly force incidents should not focus only on the "final frame" of the encounter, but also on decisions made early in such an encounter which may increase or decrease the likelihood of a violent outcome. This involves conceptualizing potentially violent encounters, not merely as "split-second decisions" made by officers (or opponents), but as incidents involving multiple decisions made by both opponents and officers where early decisions in an encounter affect the options available at a later point. Or as Binder and Scharf (1980:111) explain, "the violent police-citizen encounter ... is ... a developmental process in which successive decisions and behaviors by either police officer or citizen, or both, make the violent outcome more or less likely."

To facilitate the analysis of potentially violent armed confrontations between citizens and police from beginning to end, Binder and Scharf (1980) and Scharf and Binder (1983) developed a four-phase model. The four phases of the confrontations are Anticipation, Entry and Initial Contact, Information Exchange, and Final Phase. Within each of the phases, various alternative behaviors of officers, actions of opponents, and situational factors are analyzed which may affect whether the encounter moves toward a violent or nonviolent resolution.

The Anticipation phase begins when the officer is initially made aware of the situation or event, for instance, through the officer's own observation, via dispatch, or through some other means. During the first stage, the officer will acquire information (again, through observation, dispatch, etc.) which may affect his early conceptions of the event, and subsequently, his early decisions. The information will determine whether or not he makes a plan for approaching the situation and the content of that plan.

The next phase, Entry and Initial Contact, encompasses the entry of the officer onto the scene and the initial contact with the opponent. The officer will get more information at this time which may confirm or contradict earlier information and which will affect decisions. Some decisions which might be made at this stage include taking cover, unholstering a weapon, and calling for backup. In accordance with the Binder/Scharf conceptualization of potentially violent encounters, the decisions made during the early stages are likely to affect options available to both the officer and opponent in later stages.

Many, but certainly not all, potentially violent encounters have an Information Exchange stage. Binder et al. (1981:22) explain:

An officer might tell a citizen to "freeze" or "drop his gun" or possibly order him to stop. A police officer might similarly say something to distract or intimidate the citizen. Some "information exchanges" with opponents, as with opponents holding hostages, might proceed for hours or even days. Often the information exchange phase in armed confrontations ends with only short epithets.


It is possible that non-verbal, as well as verbal, communication may affect the interaction between the offender and opponent.

The Final Phase encompasses the moments immediately prior to the actual violence on the part of officer and/or opponent. Important aspects of this final phase include the opponent's action (e.g., drawing and pointing a weapon) and the availability of cover to the officer.

The traditional conceptualization of police-citizen violent encounters encompasses only the final phase, whereas the Binder/Scharf model incorporates early phases of the event, maintaining that the decisions made in the final frame are dependent upon the interaction among earlier decisions, earlier actions, and situational features. Decisions made and actions taken may increase or decrease the likelihood of a violent outcome.

The Police Foundation incorporated the phase conceptualization of police-citizen violent encounters into the coding scheme for police killings. The general components of the coding scheme, as fitted into the phase conceptualization is contained in Figure 4-1. Similar to the Binder/Scharf model, the stages include Initiation, Anticipation, Entry, and Final Frame. The Information Exchange phase of Binder/Scharf was expanded to the "Engagement" phase for this project. Whereas the Binder/Scharf model recognized only that not all encounters have an Information Exchange, the Foundation model recognizes that, in fact, some encounters will not contain Anticipation, full Entry, and/or Engagement stages.

FIGURE 4-1
POLICE KILLINGS: ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK



<sup>\*</sup>New Variable

The stage of "Initiation" was the manner in which the officer was made aware of or linked to the situation which brought him/her to the killer. For instance, officers may have been dispatched to a call, have been on assignment (e.g., serving a warrant), have been contacted by citizens, or have observed activity which led him into the situation. This stage allows for the possibility that an officer was not acting in a police capacity when s/he "walked in on a crime" or had a crime "walk in on her/her." (For instance, an officer on break goes to deposit a check and finds himself in the midst of a bank robbery.)

"Anticipation" is that period of time amounting to more than a few seconds during which the officer anticipates fact-to-face contact and/or being "on scene" with the person(s) who turns out to be the killer. Information was collected regarding whether or not there was anticipation and if there was, the circumstances anticipated. That is, information was coded regarding what activity (e.g., make arrest, execute warrant) and crime type (e.g., burglary, drug-related) the officer anticipated. Unfortunately, there was insufficient information available in the narrative to also discern whether or not the officer had specific information regarding the seriousness of the situation, for instance, whether the suspect was armed, whether the suspect was intoxicated or mentally unstable, and so forth.

Generally, "Entry" occurs when the officer is first face-to-face with the opponent or first "interacting" with that opponent. (The latter would include the initiation of a car or foot chase. That is, "entry" would occur when the officer initiates a car or foot chase, even if there were no face-to-face encounter.) As will be seen, for some incidents the first "interaction" of the officer with the opponent was the attack itself. That is, the officers were attacked "at entry." For this stage, information was coded regarding the circumstances at

entry. That is, information was collected regarding the general police activity deemed necessary at entry (e.g., investigate suspicious persons or circumstances, issue citation, execute warrant) and the crime category, it appeared upon entry, that this action would be linked to (e.g., domestic disturbance, robbery, traffic citation). Information was also coded regarding the locations of the officers and opponents at entry and the number of subjects, related to the incident to which the officer is directing his/her attention, who are apparent.

Up to two "Engagement Activities" (e.g., talking, running, checking ID) were coded for both the officer and the primary offender. (These activities by definition, preceded the "Final Activity" of the officer in the "Final Frame.")

Information coded from the "Final Frame" included location of officer and subject, the number of subjects apparent to the officer, and the final action of the officer prior to the attack. Information was collected, for instance, regarding whether or not the suspect disarmed the officer, whether the subject knew the person he was attacking was an officer, the type of weapon used, the number of officers at the scene and the number of officers in the immediate vicinity of the officer at the time of the attack.

In sum, the more detailed level of analysis of police killing incidents includes information on the officers' and opponents' activities immediately prior to the officers' deaths, as well as a more complete picture of the incident using the Binder/Scharf phase conceptualization of potentially violent encounters.

## Limitations of the Data

Both of the subsets of data rely upon the information provided by departments following the felonious killings of their officers. Clearly the validity of these data could be

affected by human error as well as by the possible biases of departments when describing the events. Further, by virtue of the subject matter, there are many instances where the information sought was not available because there were no living witnesses.

In coding the data from the narratives the Foundation was relying on the departmental summaries as revised and interpreted by FBI-UCR staff. Visits to several cities allowed us to compare, for a number of incidents in which officers were feloniously killed, the LEOKA narratives and the more detailed records of the departments. Though, generally the LEOKA narratives were consistent with the departmental files, in several incidents, the descriptions were disparate.

Though overall the narrative summaries were quite consistent with regard to the information they provided, there was some variation in the level of detail provided in these summaries which affected the Foundation data base. Some variables were more affected by this variation than others. For example, in attempting to determine the officer's final action, the Foundation was dependent upon the level of detail provided by the narrative. For instance, for three hypothetical incidents in which officers were killed following foot pursuits during which the officers unholstered their weapons and yelled at their opponents, the final actions could conceivably have been "foot pursuit" in one, "yelled at perpetrator" in another, and "unholstered his weapon" in a third depending on the information provided by the department and included in the narrative.

## **Description of the Sample**

Seven hundred and thirteen officers were slain during the 1983 through 1992 period.

Table 4-1 shows the breakdown of the 713 officers by year. In 655 of these incidents, a

single officer was killed. In an additional 26 incidents, two officers were killed, and in two incidents three officers were killed. (See Table 4-2).

TABLE 4-1
YEAR OF OFFICER'S DEATH
1983-1992

YEAR	Number	PERCENT
1983	80	11.2
1984	72	10.1
1985	78	10.9
1986	66	9.3
1987	74	10.4
1988	78	10.9
1989	66	9.3
1990	66	9.3
1991	71	10.0
1992	62	8.7
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

This subset of officers from the 1972 to 1992 population (discussed in Chapter 1) is quite representative of the larger group. The officers contained in the 1983 through 1992 data base are comprised of 16 (2.2%) females and 697 (97.8%) males. (See Table 4-3.)

Not surprisingly, this percentage of females is slightly larger than the corresponding 1.3 percent for the 1972 to 1992 population. In terms of race the subset is very similar to those

TABLE 4-2

NUMBER OF OFFICERS KILLED IN INCIDENTS
1983-1992

NUMBER OF OFFICERS KILLED	Number	PERCENT
ONE OFFICER	655	95.9
Two Officers	26	3.8
THREE OFFICERS	2	3.3
TOTAL	683	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-3
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER
1983-1992

Sex	Number	PERCENT
Male	697	97.8
FEMALE	16	2.2
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

of the 21-year population. In this 1983 through 1992 subset, close to 90 percent (87.2%) were white, 12.1 percent black, and 0.6 percent "other." (See Table 4-4.) The corresponding percentages for the 21-year population were 88.2, 11.3, and 0.6. The average age of the officers slain during 1983 through 1992 was 36.9. (See Table 4-5.) They averaged 9.2 years of experience (Table 4-6). These officers are slightly older and more experienced than the 21-year population.

TABLE 4-4

RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER
1983-1992

RACE	Number	PERCENT
Whrte	622	87.2
BLACK	87	12.2
OTHER	4	0.6
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-5
AGE OF VICTIM OFFICER
1983-1992

AGE	Number	PERCENT
18-24 YEARS	48	6.8
25-30 YEARS	171	24.1
31-35 YEARS	137	19.3
36-40 YEARS	125	17.6
41-45 YEARS	102	14.4
46-50 YEARS	48	6.8
51+ YEARS	78	11.0
TOTAL	709	100.0

Average Age = 36.9 Missing = 4

TABLE 4-6
OFFICERS' YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
1983-1992

Experience	Number	PERCENT
LESS THAN ONE	33	4.6
1 Through 4	210	9.6
5 Through 10	201	28.3
ELEVEN OR MORE	266	37.5
TOTAL	710	100.0

Average = 9.2 years Missing = 3

Three-fourths (75.9%) of the officers in this subset were "front line" officers (for instance, they were serving as foot or vehicle patrol, working undercover, and so forth), 20.8 percent were supervisors or detectives, and 3.4 percent were the top administrators of their departments (e.g., chief or sheriff) (Table 4-7). Compared to the 21-year population, proportionately fewer of the officers in the subset were "front line" officers and proportionately more were supervisors, detectives, or top executives.

Over half (51.6%) of the officers were employed by municipal police agencies, and another one-quarter (26.4%) were employed by county law enforcement agencies. Eleven percent (10.9%) were state officers, 6.2 percent were officers employed by the U.S. territory

of Puerto Rico, 3.6 percent were federal officers, and 1.3 percent were none of the above.<sup>1</sup> The latter included four other territorial police, an officer with a regional police agency, three tribal police officers, and a school district police officer. These proportions across agency types are similar to those for the 1972-1992 sample.

TABLE 4-7

RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER
1983-1992

Rank	Number	PERCENT
FRONT LINE	541	75.9
SUPERVISOR/DETECTIVE	148	20.8
TOP ADMINISTRATOR	24	3.4
TOTAL	713	100.0


Missing = 0

Figure 4-2 indicates the proportion of officers killed from each agency type for each of the years, 1983 through 1992. As can be seen, there has been no significant change over this period in the proportion of officers killed from each of the agency types.

For the municipal and county agencies, information was available regarding jurisdiction type or size. The 556 municipal and county departments were comprised of 19.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Puerto Rico was included as a separate agency type because its law enforcement structure is distinct from municipal, county, state, and federal agencies. We chose not to combine the Puerto Rico data with the four other territorial killings during the 1983 through 1992 time period (1983 in Guam and the Mariana Islands, 1988 in America Samoa, and 1991 in St. Croix) because it was clear that Puerto Rico was distinct in terms of the rate of police killings and thus, should receive individual attention for purposes of reporting and for designing policy interventions.

Figure 4-2: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, By Agency Type: 1983-1992



Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1983-1992.

percent suburban counties, 14.4 percent rural counties, 29.0 percent cities with populations over 250,000, 9.4 percent of cities with 100 to 249,999 persons, 10.8 percent cities with between 25,000 and 99,999 persons, and 17.1 percent cities with less than 25,000 persons. (See Table 4-8.)

TABLE 4-8

JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE

FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES

1983-1992

JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE	Number	PERCENT
Crries 250K+	161	29.0
Crries 100-250K	52	9.4
Crries 25K-100K	60	10.8
Crries <25K	95	17.1
Rural Counties	80	14.4
SUBURBAN COUNTIES	108	19.4
COLUMN TOTAL	556	100.0

Missing = 0

As shown in Table 4-9, just over one-half (50.5%) of the officers were in vehicle patrol in a one-officer car and another 11.8 percent were in a two-officer vehicle on patrol. Fifteen (14.7%) were on special assignment, 13.5 percent were off duty, 4.2 percent were undercover, 4.3 percent were detectives conducting investigations, and 1.0 percent were on foot patrol. Special Assignment includes, for instance, on-duty persons assigned to jail duty, special event security, a specialty team (such as a tactical unit), and off-duty persons assigned to bank security per their off-duty employment. These figures reflect a slight

overrepresentation of one-person vehicle patrol officers compared to the 1972-1992 population and a slight underrepresentation of two-officer vehicle patrol officers.

TABLE 4-9
OFFICER'S ASSIGNMENT
1983-1992

Assignment	Number	PERCENT
FOOT PATROL	7	1.0
1 OFFICER VEHICLE	360	50.5
2 Officer Vehicle	84	11.8
DETECTIVE	31	4.3
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	105	14.7
Undercover	30	4.2
OFF DUTY	96	13.5
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

Table 4-10 indicates the states or territories in which these officers were employed. The distribution is not very different from the distribution of the total 1972-1992 population. Forty-six percent (46.1%) of the officers were employed in the South, 17.8 percent in the West, 17.7 percent in the Midwest, and 11.5 percent in the Northeast. Just under seven percent (6.7%) of the officers were in the territories and one officer was killed outside the U.S. and its territories (Table 4-11). Again, this reflects the regional breakdown of the 1972 to 1992 population of slain officers.

TABLE 4-10

STATES AND U.S. TERRITORIES WHERE KILLINGS OCCURRED 1983-1992

STATE	Number	PERCENT
ALABAMA	15	2.1
ALASKA	7	1.0
Arizona	19	2.7
Arkansas	13	1.8
CALIFORNIA	57	8.0
COLORADO	10	1.4
Connecticut	3	0.4
Delaware	0	0.0
Washington, Dc	3	0.4
FLORIDA	51	7.2
Georgia	30	4.2
Hawaii	4	0.6
І <b>дан</b> о	2	0.3
Illinois	29	4.1
Indiana	10	1.4
Iowa	2	0.3
Kansas	5	0.7
KENTUCKY	17	2.4
Louisiana	17	2.4
Maine	2	0.3
MARYLAND	12	1.7
MASSACHUSETTS	10	1.4
MICHIGAN	28	3.9
MINNESOTA	7	1.0
MISSISSIPPI	25	3.5
Missouri	18	2.5
MONTANA	5	0.7
Nebraska	2	0.3

STATE	Number	PERCENT
Nevada	3	0.4
New Hampshire	0	0.0
New Jersey	9	1.3
New Mexico	7	1.0
New York	38	5.3
North Carolina	15	2.1
NORTH DAKOTA	2	0.3
Оню	14	2.0
OKLAHOMA	10	1.4
OREGON	3	0.4
PENNSYLVANIA	20	2.8
SOUTH CAROLINA	17	2.4
SOUTH DAKOTA	1	0.1
Tennessee	13	1.8
TEXAS	70	9.8
UTAH	1	0.1
VERMONT	0	0.0
Virginia	18	2.5
Washington	8	1.1
West Virginia	3	0.4
Wisconsin	8	1.1
WYOMING	1	0.1
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	0.1
GUAM	1	0.1
MARIANA ISLANDS	1	0.1
PUERTO RICO	44	6.2
Virgin Islands	1	0.1
Foreign	1	0.1
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-11

REGION WHERE OFFICER WAS KILLED
1983-1992

Region	Number	PERCENT
Northeast	82	11.5
South	329	46.1
Midwest	126	17.7
West	127	17.8
Territories	48	6.7
Foreign	1	0.1
Total	713	100.0

Missing = 0

#### **Incident Characteristics**

The above information describing the sample was obtained from the data set provided by the FBI. The information in the following section provides the information obtained through the Foundation coding of the narratives.

Assignment and Uniform Status. At the time of the incident, 24 (3.4%) of the 713 slain officers were working a security job while off-duty (Table 4-12). Four-fifths (80.7%) were in uniform (Table 4-13) and another 20 officers (2.8%) were somehow otherwise easily identifiable as an officer. For instance, they were wearing raid jackets, were in cars with police lights, and so forth. Thus, 82 percent were somehow visibly identifiable as officers (Table 4-14). Fifteen of the officers (2.3%) were not armed at the time of the encounter

TABLE 4-12
WAS THE OFFICER WORKING A SECURITY JOB?
1983-1992

SECURITY JOB	Number	PERCENT
No	687	96.6
YES	24	3.4
TOTAL	711	100.0

TABLE 4-13
WAS THE OFFICER IN UNIFORM?
1983-1992

In Uniform	Number	PERCENT
No	127	19.3
YES	531	80.7
TOTAL	658	100.0

Missing = 55

TABLE 4-14

WAS THE OFFICER IDENTIFIABLE AS AN OFFICER?
1983-1992

Identifiable as Officer	Number	PERCENT
No	121	18.0
Yes	552	82.0
TOTAL	673	100.0

Missing = 40

(Table 4-15). Three of these were off-duty at the time of the incident and 10 of the officers were on duty within a jail facility or at a law enforcement office (e.g., police headquarters). One officer on patrol in Alaska was described as "unarmed" in the narrative and a sworn investigator (with full arrest powers) with the state attorney's office of Florida was unarmed while visiting a threatened witness.

TABLE 4-15
WAS THE OFFICER ARMED?
1983-1992

Armed	Number	PERCENT
No	15	2.3
Yes - Gun	650	97.7
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 48

### **Initiation Stage**

Scharf and Binder (1983) argue that the mode of initiation may have ramifications for subsequent developments within the encounter. Of the 713 officers killed during the years 1983 through 1992, one-third (33.5%) of them were dispatched to the incident in which they were killed (Table 4-16). Another one-third (30.7%) of the officers initiated the contact with the opponent as a result of observations. Twenty percent (19.6%) of the officers were on assignment at the time of the incident. They were, for instance, serving a warrant, questioning a witness, or conducting surveillance. Some of the officers who were working security jobs were "on assignment" at a bank security desk. (Patrol was not defined as assignment.) In 5.8 percent of the incidents, police action was "unanticipated." This

category included the situations in which the officers "walked in" on crimes that they were unaware were taking place, or had the crimes "walk in" on them. For instance, one officer was on break conducting a transaction at his bank when a robbery took place. Similarly, some situations involved on-duty or off-duty officers walking into establishments where crimes were taking place. Finally, 51 of the incidents, or 7.5 percent, involved ambushes of the officer. That is, the assailant sought out a particular officer to kill, usually as a result of some previous police action against the assailant, or an assailant killed an officer only because of his/her status as an officer.

TABLE 4-16
INCIDENT INITIATION MODE
1983-1992

Initiation Mode	Number	PERCENT
DISPATCH	227	33.5
Assignment	133	19.6
CITIZEN CONTACT	19	2.8
OFFICER INITIATED	208	30.7
POLICE ACTION UNANTICIPATED	39	5.8
Амвизн	51	7.5
TOTAL	677	100.0

Missing = 36

In only one-third (37.1%) of the incidents was the assailant visible to the officer at the time the officer's attention was drawn to the incident (via dispatch, citizen contact, etc.)

(Table 4-17).

TABLE 4-17

WAS ASSAILANT VISIBLE WHEN OFFICER'S ATTENTION WAS

CALLED TO THE INCIDENT?

1983-1992

Assailant Visible	Number	PERCENT
No	425	79.7
YES	251	20.3
TOTAL	676	100.0

Missing = 37

#### **Anticipation Stage**

The anticipation stage acknowledges that some officers have periods of time during which they anticipate the face-to-face contacts with the assailants and others do not have these moments. Having a period of time to anticipate may provide the critical moments during which an officer can plan his/her actions. Ninety percent of the encounters had anticipation stages; that is, a period of time amounting to more than a few seconds during which the officer anticipated face-to-face contact and/or being "on scene" with the persons who turned out to be the assailants (Table 4-18).

Police Action and Crime Type/Circumstances Anticipated. For each incident with an anticipation phase, information was gathered from the narrative to indicate both (1) what primary police activity the officer anticipated (e.g., intervene in ongoing crime, execute search warrant), and (2) what crime or other situation the officer anticipated (e.g., robbery, domestic disturbance, non-crime assistance). Unlike the FBI code scheme for incident circumstances, this dual code defines each incident in terms of the police activity and the crime type. As indicated in Table 4-19, in one-third (30.5%) of the incidents for which there was an anticipation stage, the officers anticipated intervening in ongoing crimes or the

immediate escape therefrom. An additional 14.8 percent of the officers anticipated making arrests (in a context other than intervening in an ongoing crime). Fourteen percent (14.4%) anticipated issuing citations (e.g., traffic citations) and 13.9 percent anticipated investigating suspicious persons or circumstances. In the other incidents, officers anticipated conducting a warrant (4.1%) or warrantless (0.8%) search, providing some assistance unrelated to criminal activity (e.g., serving eviction papers, assisting at a traffic accident, containing an unruly dog; 4.3%), conduct undercover activity (4.1%), handle or transport prisoners or mental patients (3.6%), or investigate a completed crime (2.3%). Seven percent (7.2%) of the officers anticipated some action other than those listed above. These included anticipating joining a vehicle pursuit, conducting surveillance, protecting a threatened or vulnerable citizen, and so forth.

The four types of crimes or incident types most frequently anticipated by the officers were traffic (17.4%), non-violent crimes other than burglary or drug crimes (14.3%), drug-related offenses (12.0%), and domestic disturbances (10.3%). In ten percent (9.8%) of the incidents with an anticipation stage, the officer anticipated the crime type of robbery and in 8.4 percent and 8.1 percent of the incidents, respectively, the officer anticipated a non-crime situation or a non-domestic disturbance call (e.g., bar fights, shots fired). (See Table 4-20.)

TABLE 4-18
WAS THERE AN ANTICIPATION STAGE?
1983-1992

ANTICIPATION STAGE	Number	PERCENT
No	69	10
YES	620	90.0
TOTAL	713	100.0

TABLE 4-19
POLICE ACTION ANTICIPATED
1983-1992

ACTION ANTICIPATED	Number	PERCENT		
INVESTIGATE SUSPICIOUS	85	13.9		
INTERVENE IN ONGOING CRIME	186	30.5		
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	14	2.3		
Issue Citation	88	14.4		
ARREST	90	14.8		
SEARCH	30	4.9		
Undercover Assignment	25	4.1		
HANDLING PRISONER/PATIENT	22	3.6		
Noncrime Assistance	26	4.3		
OTHER	44	7.2		
TOTAL	610	100.0		

Missing = 10

TABLE 4-20
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES TYPE ANTICIPATED
1983-1992

CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES ANTICIPATED	Number	PERCENT	
MURDER	30	5.6	
ROBBERY	52	9.8	
DISTURBANCE CALL	43	8.1	
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	55	10.3	
OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	29	5.4	
Burglary	32	6	
Drugs	64	12	
OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	76	14.3	
Traffic	93	17.4	
Non Crime	45	8.4	
OTHER	14	2.6	
TOTAL	533	100.0	

Table 4-21 provides a crosstabulation of the police activity anticipated by the crime type anticipated. Where a crime type was indicated in the narrative for officers anticipating the investigation of suspicious persons or circumstances, it was primarily either for a violent crime other than murder, robbery or domestic dispute; possession of a weapon (18.6%); a drug-related crime (18.6%); or a non-violent offense (other than burglary or drugs) (16.3%). Where officers anticipated intervening in an ongoing crime, they were most likely to anticipate this in relation to a domestic disturbance (26.9%), a non-domestic disturbance (19.2%), a robbery (13.7%), a burglary (13.2%), or a non-violent crime other than a burglary or a drug offense (13.2%). One-half (50.0%) of the incidents where the officer anticipated the investigation of a completed crime, s/he anticipated the investigation of a nonviolent crime other than burglary or drugs. Ninety-five percent (95.5%) of the officers anticipating the issuance of a citation, anticipated this action in relation to a traffic offense. Officers not intervening in an ongoing crime who anticipated an arrest were most likely to anticipate the arrest for a non-violent crime other than burglary or drugs (30.8%), robbery (21.8%), or murder (19.2%). Fourth-fifths (83.3%) of the anticipated searches were for drugs and 92.0% of the anticipated undercover action involved drug crimes, as well. Officers anticipating the handling or transporting of persons were anticipating the interaction with mental patients (27.3%), prisoners charged with or suspected of robbery (18.2%), or prisoners charged with or suspected of a non-violent crime other than burglary or drugs (18.2%).

In 9 of the 713 incidents, the officer anticipated an incident with hostages.

An attempt was made to determine if the officer anticipated an armed or an intoxicated

TABLE 4-21
POLICE ACTION ANTICIPATED BY CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT 1983-1992

				CRI	ME/CIRCUMST	ANCES OF INCH	DENT ANTICIP	ATED		·		
Police Action Anticipated	Murder	ROBBERY	DISTURBANCE	DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	BURGLARY	DRUGS	OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	TRAFFIC	Non- Crime	OTHER	Row TOTAL
INVESTIGATE Suspicious	1 2.3 3.3	4 9.3 7.7	2 4.7 4.7	0 0.0 0.0	8 18.6 27.6	5 11.6 15.6	8 18.6 12.5	7 16.3 9.2	4 9.3 4.3	2 4.7 4.4	2 4.7 14.3	43 100.0 8.1
INTERVENE IN	7	25	35	49	11	24	2	24	1	0	4	182
ONGOING	3.8	13.7	19.2	26.9	6.0	13.2	1.1	13.2	0.5	0.0	2.2	100.0
CRIME	23.3	48.1	81.4	90.7	37.9	75.0	3.1	31.6	1.1	0.0	28.6	34.2
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	2 14.3 6.7	0 0.0 0.0	1 7.1 2.3	0 0.0 0.0	2 14.3 6.9	2 14.3 6.3	0 0.0 0.0	7 50.0 9.2	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	14 100.0 2.6
Issue Citation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	84	0	0	88
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	95.5	0.0	0.0	100.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	90.3	0.0	0.0	16.5
ARREST	15	17	4	4	5	0	3	24	2	0	4	78
	19.2	21.8	5.1	5.1	6.4	0.0	3.8	30.8	2.6	0.0	5.1	100.0
	50.0	32.7	9.3	7.4	17.2	0.0	4.7	31.6	2.2	0.0	28.6	14.7
SEARCH	2	0	0	0	1	0	25	2	0	0	0	30
	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	83.3	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	39.1	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6
UNDERCOVER	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	2	0	0	0	25
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	92.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	35.9	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7
HANDLING	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	3	0	11
Prisoner/	9.1	18.2	0.0	0.0	9.1	9.1	9.1	18.2	0.0	27.3	0.0	100.0
Patient	3.3	3.8	0.0	0.0	3.4	3.1	1.6	2.6	0.0	6.7	0.0	2.1

# POLICE ACTION ANTICIPATED BY CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT - continued 1983-1992

POLICE ACTION ANTICIPATED	CRIME\CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT											
	MURDER	Robbery	DISTURBANCE	DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	BURGLARY	Drugs	OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	TRAFFIC	Non- Crime	OTHER	Row Total
Non-Crime Assistance	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	26 100.0 57.8	0 0.0 0.0	26 100.0 4.9
OTHER	2 5.7 6.7	4 11.4 7.7	1 2.9 2.3	1 2.9 1.9	1 2.9 3.4	0 0.0 0.0	2 5.7 3.1	4 11.4 5.3	2 5.7 2.2	14 40.0 31.1	4 11.4 28.6	35 100.0 6.6
COLUMN TOTAL	30 5.6 100.0	52 9.8 100.0	43 8.1 100.0	54 10.2 100.0	29 5.5 100.0	32 6.0 100.0	64 12.0 100.0	76 14.3 100.0	93 17.5 100.0	45 8.5 100.0	14 2.6 100.0	532 100.0 100.0

Missing = 69

Number Row Percent Column Percent citizen, or a mentally disturbed citizen. Unfortunately, this information was not provided consistently in the narratives and thus, the data collected are presumed to be unreliable.

#### Entry

Defining "entry" was difficult due to the many variations and nuances of encounters. Generally speaking, "entry" defines the stage at which the officer and assailant are first interacting. In most situations this occurs when the officer first is face-to-face with the assailant. This includes defining "entry" in a traffic stop as the point at which the officer and assailant are face-to-face and "entry" in a search situation when the officer sights the opponent.

In a foot or car chase, "entry" occurs when the pursuit begins, even though there has not been face-to-face interaction. And "entry" occurs if communication occurs between the officer and the opponent even if this communication is brief and even if it is not face-to-face (e.g., in a barricaded suspect situation).

The key is the interaction between the officer and the person who subsequently kills him or her. The officer's interaction with the assailant, and not his/her interaction with other persons or suspects at the scene, defines "entry." The attempt was to be very conservative. If anything, killed at entry is underestimated. Brief communications such as identifying oneself as an officer or commanding an opponent to stop, initiated "entry."

Killed at Entry. The following cases from 1989 and 1991, respectively, provide examples of situations wherein the officers were attacked "at entry," that is, the officer was immediately attacked upon encountering the suspect.


While attempting to serve a warrant for possession of narcotics and failure to appear on October 20 at about 1:30 p.m., a deputy with the Erie County Sheriff's Department was killed and another wounded. Reportedly, upon arrival at the residence in Clarence in separate patrol cars, the deputies were fired upon with a .30-.30-caliber rifle from a kitchen window of the residence... (FBI, 1989: p. 37).

A 27-year-old patrolman with the Fulton County Police Department for over 3 years was shot and killed at approximately 8:15 p.m. on August 19. Responding to a call of a person shot in a local neighborhood, the patrolman and his partner found a woman suffering from a gunshot wound to the leg. She and a friend were working in an open garage behind her residence when the shooting occurred and could provide little information. After stabilizing the woman, the patrolman and his partner began to search the neighborhood for her assailant. As the patrolman, wearing a protective vest, approached the residence adjacent to the wounded woman's house, the garage door opened and he was shot once in the head by a male wielding a Remington Arms Model 760 .30-.06 caliber pump rifle...(FBI, 1991: p. 39).

In just under 40 percent of the incidents, the first interaction of the officer with the assailant was the fatal attack. Specifically, 39.6 percent of the officers were "killed at entry." The remaining 60.4 percent of the officers had some sort of interaction with the suspect prior to their attacks. (See Figure 4-3.) No notable increase or decrease over the 10-year period, 1983-1992, occurred. Except for 1991, when 59.4 percent of the officers were killed at entry, the percentage has varied within a 12 percentage point spread between 31.3 percent (in 1990) and 43.1 percent (in both 1983 and 1992).

Police Action and Crime Type. As with the Anticipation Stage, information was collected regarding the Entry Stage in terms of the police action which appeared required at entry and the crime or other type of situation for which this action was required. Scharf and Binder (1983) argue that, in some situations, what the officer anticipates and what the officer finds are disparate. This has ramifications for any preconceptions the officer has formed and thus, for any plans the officer has made. There was relatively little change

## Figure 4-3: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed Immediately Upon Encountering Suspect: 1983-1992



NOTE: Number in parentheses denote total number of officers killed. Source: Police Foundation coding of FBI/UCR narratives.

between the anticipated and required-at-entry police activity and anticipated and found-atentry situation type. In fact, agreement for police activity for the two stages was 91.7 percent and agreement for the crime/situation type for the two stages was 94.9 percent.<sup>2</sup>

This finding does not imply that incidents don't change in their character during the encounter. Assessing this change "at entry" as opposed to later in the encounter was too soon to capture the changes. Frequently the officer did not gather his new information until after he interacted with the opponent, if only briefly.

Because of the agreement between the two variables at the two stages, the data for circumstances (activity and crime type) found at entry are not presented, and the two variables were combined to describe the situation by using the circumstances found at entry as the default substituted by circumstances anticipated if the officer was killed at entry. The combined variable, "Police Action" will be used in subsequent characterizations of the encounters to denote the police activity of the incident and "Crime/Circumstances Type" will be used to denote the crime (e.g., murder, robbery) or other situation (e.g., traffic offense) to which the officer was responding.

As indicated in Table 4-22, in one-third (32.5%) of the incidents, the officers were intervening in ongoing crimes (or the immediate escape therefrom) when slain. Sixteen percent (16.4%) were arresting or attempting arrests in situations other than those in which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This first percentage is based on the number of accordances (310) divided by the number of cases with non-missing information for both variables (338). For 278 cases, the matching was not applicable because the officer had no anticipation stage and/or was killed at entry. For 97 cases which had both anticipation and entry stages, information was missing for one or both variables. The second percentage denotes 282 accordances for 297 cases for which information was relevant and available. Information was missing on at least one variable for 138 cases.

the crime was ongoing. Thirteen percent were issuing citations (13.1%) and 12.8 percent were investigating suspicious persons or circumstances. Figure 4-4 indicates for each year the proportion of slain officers who were engaged in each of the activities. Across the decade, the changes in the proportion of officers killed during the various circumstances were sporadic, indicating no general trend.


TABLE 4-22
POLICE ACTION
1983-1992

ACTION	Number	PERCENT		
Investigate Suspicious	83	12.8		
INTERVENE IN ONGOING CRIME	210	32.5		
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	15	2.3		
Issue Citation	85	13.1		
Arrest	106	16.4		
SEARCH	29	4.5		
Undercover Assignment	23	3.6		
HANDLING PRISONER/PATIENT	21	3.2		
Noncrime Assistance	25	3.9		
OTHER	50	7.7		
TOTAL	647	100.0		

Missing = 66


The crime or circumstance type the officers were responding to is contained in Figure 4-5. In sixteen percent (15.5%) of the incidents, the officers were attending to traffic offenses. Another 14.1 percent were attending to robbery incidents, and 13.8 percent were attending to non-violent criminal activity other than burglary or drugs.

Figure 4-4: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Police Action: 1983-1992



Source: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1983-1992.

# Figure 4-5: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed By Focus of Victim Officer's Attention: 1983-1992



NOTE: Number in parentheses denote total number of officers killed. Source: Police Foundation coding of FBI/UCR narratives.

It became apparent as the narrative coding scheme was being developed that officers classified by the FBI as being feloniously killed in the line of duty during incidents involving the crime of robbery, were frequently in situations where they themselves were being victimized (e.g., while off duty or on assignment in plainclothes) or found themselves inside commercial establishments when robberies took place.

In fact, of the 81 incidents in which an officer was feloniously killed in the course of a robbery, 42 of these, or 51.9 percent were the type of victimizations described above. Twenty-eight, or 66.7 percent, of those 42 incidents involved personal victimizations of the officer. (This includes one home burglary.) The remaining 14, or 33.3 percent, involved victimizations of the establishments the officers were in (Table 4-23).

TABLE 4-23
OFFICER SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION
1983-1992

Officer Slain During Own Robbery Victimization	Number	PERCENT
No	661	94.0
YES, PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION	28	4.0
YES, ESTABLISHMENT VICTIMIZATION	14	2.0
TOTAL	703	100.0

Missing = 10

Four of the LEOKA narratives describing these types of events follow.

While working undercover narcotics assignment, an 11-year veteran officer with the Detroit Police Department was killed. Arrangements had been made for a 1-kilo cocaine purchase which was to take place outside a restaurant. On November 22 at approximately 6:45 p.m., four males arrived at the restaurant's parking lot where the 38-year-old, plainclothes officer was seated in his vehicle. Carrying a plastic bag containing flour they apparently intended to sell as cocaine, two of the mean approached the officer's vehicle. While one was talking wit the officer who remained in the car, the other allegedly pulled a .38-caliber handgun from his jacket, shot the officer in the face, and took the money allocated for the buy... (FBI, 1988: pp. 31-32.

On October 27, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Special Agent on temporary assignment in Dallas was fatally shot during a robbery attempt. The 38-year-old agent and an EPA civilian employee were confronted at 9 p.m. by an armed male as they exited their vehicle outside a restaurant. The man demanded the EPA employees to place their wallets on the automobile. After both complied, the agent was attempting to draw his service weapon from an ankle holster when he was shot twice with a .38-caliber revolver. One bullet struck the agent in the stomach, but he managed to fire five rounds at the fleeing assailant... (FBI, 1988: p. 37)

A 23-year-old St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department officer was shot and killed on June 12. At approximately 9:20 p.m., the off-duty officer, with less than 2 years' experience, drove to a laundromat, exited his vehicle, and was walking to its rear when accosted by a male who attempted to rob him. When the officer pulled his weapon in an attempt to arrest the robber, shots were exchanged, and the officer was fatally struck in the head with a round from a Smith & Wesson .38-caliber revolver... (FBI, 1990: p. 30)

On February 13 at approximately 2:10 a.m., a 33-year-old patrolman with the Little Rock Police Department for nearly 3 years was shot and killed. Off duty and in civilian clothes, the patrolman was sitting at the counter of a local restaurant when a male entered and sat in a booth near the cash register. A second male entered, pointed a rifle at an employee, and demanded money from the register. In an attempt to thwart the robbery, the patrolman disarmed the man with the rifle, but a struggle ensued and both fell to the floor. As the patrolman attempted to draw his service weapon, the male who had first entered the restaurant picked up the rifle and struck the officer in the head. Allegedly, the males obtained the patrolman's Sigarms Model P22 9-millimeter service weapon, and one of them shot him three times in the chest ... (FBI, 1991: p. 37).


Three-fourths (73.8%) of these officers were off-duty and 16.7 percent were working undercover. One was working as a detective (2.4%) and two (4.8%) were on special assignment.

As indicated in Figure 4-6, robbery victimizations as a percentage of all felonious killings of officers has increased slightly over time.

Table 4-24 provides a crosstabulation of police activity and crime/circumstances type. Frequently a narrative which described the officer as investigating suspicious persons or circumstances did not indicate a crime type. For those instances where the crime type information was available, the suspicious activity or persons being investigated were most frequently thought to be related to drug activity (20.9%) or an "other" violent crime (that is, other than murder, robbery, or disturbance). Officers slain while intervening in an ongoing crime, were most frequently intervening in a domestic disturbance (24%) or a robbery (22.1%). Just under half (46.7%) of the officers slain while investigating a completed crime were investigating a non-violent crime other than burglary or drugs. Ninety-four percent (94.1%) of the situations involving citations, involved traffic citations. Four out of five officers (82.8%) slain while executing a search were searching for people or evidence related to drug offenses. Ninety-one percent of the slain undercover officers were working on drug cases.

Assailant Activity At Entry. Unfortunately the narratives did not consistently report what the assailant was doing when the officer encountered him/her for the first time. Of the 381 incidents with completed entry (that is, the officer was not killed at entry), data on the assailant's action at entry were provided for 259. That is, data were missing for 122 incidents or 32 percent. Notable was that 29.3 percent of the assailants were trying to get

Figure 4-6: Percent of Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed In Incidents Involving Robbery Victimization of Officers: 1983-1992



Source: FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1983-1992.

TABLE 4-24
POLICE ACTION BY CRIME TYPE
1983-1992

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			CRIME/SITU	JATION TYPE A	NTICIPATED		•			
POLICE ACTION	4 Murder	ROBBERY	DISTURBANCE	DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	Burglary	DRUGS	OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	TRAFFIC	Non- Crime	OTHER	Row Total
INVESTIGATE Suspicious	1 2.3 3.3	4 9.3 4.9	2 4.7 4.7	0 0.0 0.0	8 18.6 22.2	6 14.0 18.2	9 20.9 13.8	6 14.0 7.6	2 4.7 2.2	3 7.0 6.8	2 4.7 11.1	43 100.0 7.5
INTERVENE IN	7	46	35	50	13	24	2	23	1	1	6	208
ONGOING	3.4	22.1	16.8	24.0	6.3	11.5	1.0	11.1	0.5	0.5	2.9	100.0
CRIME	23.3	56.8	81.4	90.9	36.1	72.7	3.1	29.1	1.1	2.3	33.3	36.3
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	3	0	1	0	2	2	0	7	0	0	0	15
	20.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	13.3	13.3	0.0	46.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	10.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	5.6	6.1	0.0	8.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6
Issue Citation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	80	0	0	85
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.9	94.1	0.0	0.0	100.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	89.9	0.0	0.0	14.8
ARREST	15	19	4	4	9	0	6	26	3	0	6	92
	16.3	20.7	4.3	4.3	9.8	0.0	6.5	28.3	3.3	0.0	6.5	100.0
	50.0	23.5	9.3	7.3	25.0	0.0	9.2	32.9	3.4	0.0	33.3	16.1
SEARCH	2	0	0	0	1	0	24	2	0	0	0	29
	6.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	82.8	6.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	0.0	36.9	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1
Undercover	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	2	0	0	0	23
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	91.3	8.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	32.3	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
HANDLING PRISONER/ PATIENT	1 10.0 3.3	2 20.0 2.5	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	1 10.0 3.0	1 10.0 1.5	9.1 1.6	2 20.0 2.5	0 0.0 0.0	2 20.0 4.5	0 0.0 0.0	10 100.0 1.7

POLICE ACTION BY CRIME TYPE - continued 1983-1992

POLICE ACTION	Murden	ROBBERY	DISTURBANCE	DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	BURGLARY	Drugs	OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	TRAFFIC	Non- Crime	077117	Row
Non-Crime Assistance	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0	0	0 0.0	25 100.0	OTHER	Total 25
OTHER	1 2.3 3.3	10 23.3 12.3	1 2.3	1 2.3	2 4.7	0.0	2	0.0 6	0.0	56.8	0.0	100.0
COLUMN	30 5.2	81	2.3 43	1.8 55	5.6 36	0.0	4.7 3.1	14.0 7.6	7.0 3.4	30.2 29.5	9.3 22.2	443 100.0 7.5
	100.0	14.1 100.0	7.5 100.0	9.6 100.0	6.3 100.0	33 5.8 100.0	65 11.3 100.0	79 13.8 100.0	89 15.5 100.0	44 7.7 100.0	18 3.1	573 100.0

Number Row Percent Column Percent away when the officer arrived on scene. Another 18.6 percent were acting violently, either committing a violent crime against a citizen or threatening with a weapon.

Location at Entry. Half of the officers (50.1%) were roadside at entry (including on sidewalks, but not including parking lots or driveways). Twenty-four percent (24.2%) were outside at entry, but not roadside. Twenty-two percent (21.5%) were inside of a structure when they first came face-to-face with the assailant. In 4.1 percent of the incidents, the officer was outside but it was not clear whether or not he was roadside (Table 4-25).

TABLE 4-25

LOCATION OF OFFICER AT ENTRY: INSIDE OR OUTSIDE 1983-1992

LOCATION	Number	PERCENT
Inside	78	21.5
OUT, NOT ROADSIDE	88	24.2
Outside, Roadside	182	50.1
Outside, Unknown	15	4.1
TOTAL	363	100.0

Missing = 18

One-third (34.3%) of the officers were in residential areas at entry and 22.4 percent were in commercial areas. In an additional one-quarter (23.4%) of the incidents, it was not clear from the narrative whether the environment was commercial or residential. Seven percent (6.6%) of the officers were in government areas, for instance, in a Post Office, law enforcement building, jail, or courthouse. Thirteen percent (13.2%) were in some other environment, such as in a hospital, subway, train) (Table 4-26).

TABLE 4-26
OFFICER'S LOCATION AT ENTRY: ENVIRONMENT
1983-1992

LOCATION	Number	PERCENT
RESIDENTIAL AREA	104	34.3
COMMERCIAL AREA	68	22.4
RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL	71	23.4
GOVERNMENT	20	6.6
OTHER	40	13.2
TOTAL	303	100.0

Missing = 78

Of the 381 incidents with a full entry, 194 of the officers were in or around automobiles when they confronted the assailants. Of these 194 cases, 49.5 percent were in the immediate vicinity of the assailant's automobile at entry, an additional 37.6 percent were inside their police vehicles. Eleven percent (11.3%) were in the immediate vicinity of the police vehicle (Table 4-27).

Number of Opponents. Information was available for 375 of the incidents with full entry regarding the number of persons the police officer encountered at entry who were related to the incident to which the officer was responding. In 58.4 percent of the incidents, the officer encountered a single subject. In an additional one-quarter of the incidents (25.1%) the officer encountered two persons. Seven percent (6.7%) of the officers encountered three persons, 3.7 percent encountered four, and 2.9 percent encountered five or more subjects. In an additional 3.2 percent of the incidents, the officer encountered a group of subjects of unspecified or unknown size (Table 4-28).

TABLE 4-27
OFFICER'S LOCATION AT ENTRY RELATIVE TO VEHICLES
1983-1992

LOCATION RELATIVE TO VEHICLES	Number	PERCENT
IN POLICE VEHICLE	73	37.6
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF POLICE VEHICLE	22	11.3
In Assailant's Vehicle	2	1.0
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ASSAILANT'S VEHICLE	96	49.5
OTHER	1	0.5
TOTAL	194	100.0

TABLE 4-28

NUMBER OF SUSPECTS AT ENTRY
1983-1992

Number of Suspects	Number	PERCENT
ONE	219	58.4
Two	94	25.1
THREE	25	6.7
Four	14	3.7
FIVE OR MORE	11	2.9
GROUP OF UNKNOWN SIZE	12	3.2
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 6

An attempt was made to determine some of the officers' impressions of the subjects upon entry. For instance, impressions regarding whether the suspect was suspected of or known to be a felon, intoxicated, armed, and/or mentally imbalanced. Unfortunately, this information was not consistently available in the narratives.

#### Final Frame

The Final Frame encompassed the attack and the actions immediate preceding the attack.

Time of the Attack. Just under 40 percent (37.4%) of all the attacks on officers occurred between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. Another one-third (32%) occurred between 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. Eighteen percent occurred between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. and 12.6 percent occurred between 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. (Table 4-29).

TABLE 4-29
TIME OF ATTACK
1983-1992

TIME OF ATTACK	Number	PERCENT
9 PM TO 3 AM	267	37.4
3 AM TO 9 AM	90	12.6
9 AM TO 3 PM	128	18.0
3 AM TO 9 PM	228	32.0
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

Location of Attack. Forty-three percent (43.3%) of the officers were roadside when they were killed. An additional one-quarter (25.3%) were outside but not roadside. (This includes attacks in parking lots and driveways.) In 30 incidents (4.4%), the narrative

indicated that the officer was outside, but did not indicate whether or not he was roadside.

Twenty-seven percent (27.0%) were inside structures. (This includes one officer killed inside a parking structure.) (See Table 4-30.)

TABLE 4-30

LOCATION OF OFFICER WHEN SLAIN: INSIDE OR OUTSIDE 1983-1992

LOCATION	Number	PERCENT
Inside	183	27.0
OUT, NOT ROADSIDE	172	25.3
Outside, Roadside	294	43.3
Outside, Unknown	30	4.4
TOTAL	679	100.0

Missing = 34

Forty-three percent (42.9%) of the officers were in residential environments when killed; 21.7 percent were in commercial environments. (In 16.2 percent of the incidents, it was not clear from the narratives whether the officer was in a residential or a commercial location.) Seven percent (6.5%) of the officers were in government settings and 12.7 percent were in locations "other" than listed above. The latter included such locations as a hospital, a golf course, a stadium, a highway and a beach (Table 4-31).

TABLE 4-31

LOCATION OF OFFICER WHEN SLAIN: ENVIRONMENT
1983-1992

Location	Number	PERCENT
RESIDENTIAL AREA	249	42.9
COMMERCIAL AREA	126	21.7
RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL	94	16.2
GOVERNMENT	38	6.5
OTHER	74	12.7
TOTAL	581	100.0

Most (55.2%) of the officers who were inside structures when attacked, were in residences. Twenty-eight percent (28.4%) were inside commercial establishments. For a large percentage (38.7%) of officers who were killed roadside, the narratives did not indicate whether they were in residential or commercial areas. The narratives indicated that 27.2 percent of the officers killed roadside were in residential areas and 8.9 percent were in commercial areas. One-quarter (23.6%) of the officers killed roadside were in neither a residential nor commercial area. Many of these were at the side of highways. (See Table 4-32.)

Forty-six percent (46.0%) of the officers who were outside, but not roadside, were in residential areas. An additional 29.4 percent were in commercial areas. Fourteen percent (13.5%) were in neither residential nor commercial areas.

TABLE 4-32

LOCATION OF OFFICER WHEN SLAIN:
INSIDE/OUTSIDE BY ENVIRONMENT
1983-1992

	Environment								
Inside/Outside	RESIDENTIAL	COMMERCIAL	RESIDENTIAL OR COMMERCIAL	GOVERNMENT	OTHER	Row Total			
Inside	101 55.2 42.8	52 28.4 43.3	1 0.5 1.1	24 13.1 64.9	5 2.7 6.8	183 100.0 32.7			
OUTSIDE, NOT ROADSIDE	75 46.0 31.8	48 29.4 40.0	9 5.5 9.6	9 5.5 24.3	22 13.5 30.1	163 100.0 29.1			
Outside, Roadside	52 27.2 22.0	17 8.9 14.2	74 38.7 78.7	3 1.6 8.1	45 23.6 61.6	191 100.0 34.1			
Outside, Unknown	8 34.8 3.4	3 13.0 2.5	10 43.5 10.6	1 4.3 2.7	1 4.3 1.4	23 100.0 4.1			
TOTAL	236 42.1 100.0	120 21.4 100.0	94 16.8 100.0	37 6.6 100.0	73 13.0 100.0	560 100.0 100.0			

Number Row Percent Column Percent Since such a large number of officers were killed roadside or in parking lots, information was collected regarding the location of the officers relevant to vehicles on the scene. Three hundred and twenty-four of the 713 officers (45.4%) were in or around automobiles at the time of their deaths. A full one-third (31.5%) of these officers (14.3% of all slain officers) were in their police vehicles or their own personal vehicles when assaulted. Another 66.0 percent of the 324 (30.0% of all slain officers) were in the immediate vicinity of either their (police or personal) vehicles or of the subjects' vehicles. Three officers were inside the subjects' vehicle. (One was searching a van, one was inside a motor home, and another was hiding in the back seat of a kidnappers' vehicle.) (See Table 4-33.)

TABLE 4-33

LOCATION OF OFFICER RELATIVE TO VEHICLES WHEN SLAIN
1983-1992

LOCATION	Number	PERCENT
In Police Vehicle	102	31.5
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF POLICE VEHICLE	95	29.3
In Assailant's Vehicle	3	0.9
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ASSAILANT'S VEHICLE	119	36.7
OTHER	5	1.5
TOTAL	324	100.0

Missing = 55

Assailant's Location. Table 4-34 indicates the location of the assailants in terms of whether they were inside or outside, roadside, and so forth. Table 4-35 indicates that in 91.3 percent of the 670 cases where information on both the officer and the assailant were available, the officer and assailant were both inside (26.3%) or both outside (65.1%). In six

(3.3%) of the 182 incidents in which the officer was inside when killed, the assailant was outside of a structure. Conversely, in 50 of the 488 incidents (10.2%) in which the officer was outside when killed, the assailant was inside. There were two incidents in which the assailant was not present at the attack. These both involved illegal bombs exploding.

TABLE 4-34

LOCATION OF ASSAILANT AT TIME OF ATTACK: INSIDE OR OUTSIDE 1983-1992

Location	Number	PERCENT	
Inside	228	33.9	
OUT, NOT ROADSIDE	142	21.1	
OUTSIDE, ROADSIDE	270	40.2	
Outside, Unknown	30	4.5	
TOTAL	672	100.0	

Missing = 41

Table 4-36 indicates the location of the assailant at the time of attack relative to vehicles and Table 4-37 provides a crosstabulation of the officers' and assailants' locations vis a vis the vehicles, if applicable. In one-third (34.1%) of the incidents (missing = 20) in which the officer was killed while inside either a police vehicle or his personal vehicle, the assailant, too, was in that vehicle. In another one-third (37.8%) of those incidents, the assailant was in the immediate vicinity of the officer's or his own vehicle when the attack occurred. In 28.0 percent of the incidents when the officer was killed in his own or a police vehicle, the assailant was in another vehicle.

TABLE 4-35

LOCATION OF OFFICER AND ASSAILANT AT TIME OF SLAYING:
INSIDE/OUTSIDE
1983-1992

	LOCATION OF ASSAILANT				
LOCATION OF OFFICER	Inside	OUTSIDE	NOT PRESENT	ROW TOTAL	
Inside	176	6	0	182	
	96.7	3.3	0.0	100.0	
	77.9	1.4	0.0	27.2	
OUTSIDE	50	436	2	488	
	10.2	89.3	0.4	100.0	
	22.1	98.6	100.0	72.8	
TOTAL	226	442	2	670	
	33.7	66.0	0.3	100.0	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Number Row Percent Column Percent 4-54

In 20.6 percent of the incidents (missing = 27) wherein the officer was in the immediate vicinity of his own vehicle (personal or law enforcement), the opponent was in another vehicle. In 75.0 percent of those incidents, the opponent was not in a vehicle, but rather in the immediate vicinity of either the officer's vehicle or his own vehicle.

TABLE 4-36

LOCATION OF ASSAILANT AT TIME OF ATTACK RELATIVE TO VEHICLES
1983-1992

LOCATION	Number	PERCENT
IN POLICE VEHICLE	31	11.4
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF POLICE VEHICLE	61	22.4
In Assailant's Vehicle	95	34.9
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ASSAILANT'S VEHICLE	82	30.1
OTHER	3	1.1
TOTAL	273	100.0

Missing = 74

Of the incidents (missing = 10) in which the officers were killed while in the immediate vicinity of the offenders' vehicles, 46.8 percent of the offenders were inside their own vehicles and 53.2 percent were in the immediate vicinity of either the officers' or offenders' vehicles.

Number of Suspects. Sixty-nine percent (68.9%) of the slain officers faced a single threatening opponent at the time of their deaths. Nineteen percent (19.0%) faced two threatening opponents, 4.9 percent faced three, and 2.9 percent faced four. Just under two

# 4-56

# TABLE 4-37 LOCATION OF OFFICER AND ASSAILANT AT TIME OF SLAYING: RELATIVE TO VEHICLES 1983-1992

	LOCATION OF ASSAILANT					
Location of Officer	Inside Officer's Vehicle	IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF OFFICER'S VEHICLE	Inside Assailant's Vehicle	IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ASSAILANT'S VEHICLE	OTHER	TOTAL
Inside Officer's Vehicle	28 34.1 90.3	28 34.1 45.9	23 28.0 25.3	3 3.7 3.8	0 0.0 0.0	82 100.0 30.9
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF OFFICER'S VEHICLE	3	32	14	19	0	68
	4.4	47.1	20.6	27.9	0.0	100.0
	9.7	52.5	15.4	23.8	0.0	25.7
Inside Assailant's Vehicle	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	3 100.0 3.3	0 0.0 0.0	0 0.0 0.0	3 100.0 1.1
IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ASSAILANT'S VEHICLE	0	1	51	57	0	109
	0.0	0.9	46.8	52.3	0.0	100.0
	0.0	1.6	86.0	71.3	0.0	41.1
OTHER	0	0	0	1	2	3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	66.6	100.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	100.0	1.1
TOTAL	31	91	61	80	2	265
	11.7	34.3	23.0	30.2	0.8	100.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Number Row Percent Column Percent percent (1.9%) faced five or more suspects with another 2.1 percent facing a group of unspecified size. As mentioned before, in two incidents (0.3%) involving bombs, no suspect was present when the officer was slain (Table 4-38).

TABLE 4-38

NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS WHEN OFFICER SLAIN
1983-1992

Number of Threatening Persons	Number	PERCENT	
ZERO	2	0.3	
One	467	68.9	
Two	129	19.0	
THREE	33	4.9	
Four	20	2.9	
FIVE OR MORE	13	1.9	
GROUP OF UNKNOWN SIZE	14	2.1	
TOTAL	678	100.0	

Missing = 35

In 14 incidents (3.7% of 374 with full relevant data) the number of opponents the officer faced during the final frame exceeded those he encountered at entry. In 19 incidents (5.1%), the officer faced fewer threatening opponents during the final frame than persons encountered at entry.

In 66 incidents (9.8%), the narratives indicated that the officer did not know or at least strongly suspect (e.g., if searching a home) that the assailant was present. This includes situations in which an officer was attending to one suspect, unaware that another suspect was nearby. In 14 incidents (2.1%) the narrative specifically indicated that the

officer knew that the assailant was present, but the officer was attending to another suspect at the time of his death. In the remaining incidents (88.2%), the officer was aware of his opponent's presence before the attack. (See Table 4-39.)

TABLE 4-39

OFFICER AWARE THAT ASSAILANT WAS PRESENT
1983-1992

Officer Aware	Number	PERCENT
No	66	9.8
Yes	596	88.2
YES, BUT HE WAS ATTENDING TO ANOTHER	14	2.1
TOTAL	676	100.0

Missing = 37

Number Column Percent

In 18 incidents (2.8%) the narratives indicated that the assailant was unaware that his victim was a law enforcement officer (Table 4-40). This includes one-fourth of the officers who were not identifiable as officers.

TABLE 4-40

ASSAILANT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER
1983-1992

Assailant Knew Victim Was Officer	Number	PERCENT
No	18	2.8
YES	626	97.2
TOTAL	644	100.0

Missing = 69

Weapons. As indicated in Table 4-41, 70.1 percent of the officers were killed with handguns, 13 percent with rifles, and 8 percent with shotguns. Thus, a full 91.1 percent of the officers were killed with firearms. Just under 4 percent (3.9%) of the officers were killed with vehicles, and 2.0 were percent killed with sharp objects. Included in the "other" category are the 1.4 percent killed with blunt objects, six officers (0.8%) killed with "personal" weapons (e.g., hands and feet), and two officers (0.3%) killed with bombs. Finally, one officer suffocated from a gag and two officers (in a single incident) were burned to death.

Just under 18 percent (17.6%) of the officers were disarmed by their opponents before or during the lethal attack. (All but 3 of these 123 persons were disarmed of a firearm.) (See Table 4-42.) Of those who were disarmed, 84.6 percent were killed with their own firearms. Overall, 14.6 percent of the slain officers were killed with their own weapons (Table 4-43). There were only two instances wherein the narrative indicated that an officer's firearm malfunctioned during the encounter.

TABLE 4-41
WEAPON USED
1983-1992

Weapon	Number	PERCENT
HANDGUN	500	70.1
RIFLE	93	13.0
SHOTGUN	57	8.0
SHARP OBJECT	14	2.0
BLUNT OBJECT	10	1.4
Вомв	2	0.3
PERSONAL WEAPONS	6	0.8
VEHICLE	28	3.9
OTHER	3	0.4
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-42
OFFICER DISARMED DURING ATTACK
1983-1992

OFFICER DISARMED	Number	PERCENT
No	574	82.4
YES	123	17.6
TOTAL	697	100.0

Missing = 16

Soft Body Armor. The FBI data indicate that within this subset of cases (1983 through 1992) 26.4 percent of the officers were wearing soft body armor when slain (Table 4-44). Of these 188 officers, 110, or 58.5 percent) received fatal bullet wounds to the head. (This includes 18 officers who received fatal wounds to the head and had bullets circumvent

the body armor.) Sixty-six additional officers, or 35.1 percent, died because bullets circumvented their body armor. Seventeen of these officers were shot between the side panels of the vest, 11 received wounds through the body armor armhole or in the shoulder area, 16 were wounded above the vest in the neck or collarbone area, and 13 received their wounds just below the vest in their lower abdominal area. In seven incidents, the round exceeded the vest's specified capabilities; none of these were body armor failures. That is, there was no situation in which the vest did not stop a round it was designed to stop.<sup>3</sup> In two incidents, the officers were wearing only the front panels of their vests and received wounds to their rear upper torsos. In one additional case, the officer succumbed to a rifle round which "went through his left and then right upper thighs." (See Table 4-45.)

TABLE 4-43
OFFICERS SLAIN WITH OWN SERVICE WEAPONS
1983-1992

Slain with Own Weapon	Number	PERCENT
No	609	85.4
YES	104	14.6
TOTAL	713	100.o

Missing = 0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>A narrative describing a 1985 slaying of a Puerto Rican officer (FBI, 1985: p. 34) reported that "Although wearing protective body armor, the officer was fatally wounded in the chest from a single round fired from a .357 magnum handgun." A subsequent review of the FBI files on this case indicated that the teletype from Puerto Rico reported that the bullet penetrated the officer's badge and lodged in his chest. This teletype did not indicate that the officer was wearing armor.

TABLE 4-44
OFFICERS WEARING BODY ARMOR
1983-1992

BODY ARMOR	Number	PERCENT
No	524	73.6
Yes	188	26.4
TOTAL	712	100.0

Missing = 1

Presence of Other Officers. As indicated in Chapter 2, the FBI collects information regarding whether the slain officer was "alone, no assistance requested," "alone, assistance requested," or "assisted by other officer(s) at the time of the attack." For the officers slain during 1983 through 1992 this information is contained in Table 4-46. Per the FBI data, 47 percent of the slain officers had assistance at the scene at the time of attack, 39.1 percent of the slain officers were alone and had not requested assistance, and 13.9 percent were alone but had requested assistance. Using the narratives we acquired more specific information regarding how many officers were at the scene and, further, how many officers were in the immediate vicinity of the slain officer at the time of the attack. This information provides a very different picture. Table 4-47 indicates the number of officers who were present at each incident before the attack on the victim officer. In just over half of the incidents (51.7%), no other officers were at the scene with the victim officer. In one-quarter of the incidents (25.2%) one additional officer was present. Two, three, four, and five or more officers were present in 5.2 percent, 1.4 percent, 0.3 percent, and 3.4 percent of the incidents, respectively. In 12.8 percent of the incidents, the narratives indicated the presence of other officers, but the numbers were not specified.

TABLE 4-45
OFFICERS KILLED WEARING SOFT BODY ARMOR 1983-1992

HOW OFFICERS WERE KILLED	NUMBER	PERCENT
FATAL WOUND TO HEAD	110	58.5
BULLET CIRCUMVENTED BODY ARMOR		
Entered between side panels of vest	17	25.8
Entered through armhole or shoulder area	11	16.7
Entered above vest (front or back of neck, collarbone area, etc.	16	24.2
Entered below vest (abdominal or lower back area)	13	19.7
Entered through vest (round more powerful than vest's capabilities)	7	10.6
Entered through vest (body armor failure)	0	0.0
Officer wearing half vest	2	3.0
TOTAL	66	35.1
OTHER		
Stabbed	3	25.0
Killed with Vehicle	6	50.0
Killed with Personal Weapons	1	8.3
Killed with Blunt Object	1	8.3
Other	1	8.3
TOTAL	12	6.4
TOTAL	188	100.0

Missing = 32

TABLE 4-46
INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS
1983-1992

Involvement	Number	PERCENT
Alone, No Assistance Requested	279	39.1
Alone, Assistance Requested	99	13.9
Assisted at Scene	335	47.0
TOTAL	713	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-47

NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICERS AT THE SCENE 1983-1992

Number of Officers	Number	PERCENT
None	361	51.7
One	176	25.2
Two	36	5.2
THREE	10	1.4
Four	2	0.3
Five or More	24	3.4
SOME UNKNOWN NUMBER OF OFFICERS	89	12.8
TOTAL	698	100.0

Missing = 15

In some incidents, officers may be together at the scenes, but not in one another's immediate presence. For instance, officers might be at different locations at a residence. To account for this, Table 4-48 indicates for those cases where additional officers were at the scene, the number of officers who were in the immediate vicinity of the victim officer at the time of the attack. That is, these officers were close enough to intervene and/or to be in immediate danger themselves. This information indicates that one-quarter of the officers (22.7%) who had fellow officers on scene, were virtually alone at the time of their attacks, and that overall, then, 64 percent of the officers slain during 1983 through 1992 had no support in their immediate vicinity at the time of their deaths (Table 4-49). Further, of the 242 (or 35.9%) of the incidents where more than one officer was at the immediate scene, 23 resulted in multiple officer deaths. In 19 of those 23, all officers at the immediate scene were killed. (In 18 of these incidents two were killed, in one incident three were killed.)

Officer's Final Action. Information was collected regarding the officers final actions prior to their deaths. As can be seen in Table 4-50, only one action, "talking," characterized the last actions of more than 10 percent (specifically, 12.4%) of the incidents. The next most frequent activities in descending order were the actions of "approach suspect" (9.7%), "enter a building or room" (8.2%), "arrest killer" (6.2%), "drive" (5.2%), "search" (4.5%), "pursue" (4.5%), and "exit vehicle" (4.2%). None of the other activities accounted for more than 4 percent of the officers' final actions. Included in the "other" category (24.5%) are such actions as write report/other, check ID or request ID, walk away from suspect, give a field sobriety test, attend to roadblock, escort citizen, assist wounded partner, and so forth.

TABLE 4-48

FOR SITUATIONS IN WHICH OTHER OFFICERS ARE AT THE SCENE:
NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE VICTIM
1983-1992

Number of Officers	Number	PERCENT
No Other Officers	71	22.7
ONE OTHER OFFICER	162	51.8
Two Other Officers	26	8.3
THREE OTHER OFFICERS	5	1.6
FOUR OTHER OFFICERS	0	0.0
FIVE OR MORE OTHER OFFICERS	7	2.2
SOME UNKNOWN NUMBER OF OFFICERS	42	13.4
TOTAL	313	100.0

Missing = 23

TABLE 4-49

PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER
AT TIME OF ATTACK
1983-1992

Number of Officers	Frequency	PERCENT
No Other Officers	432	64.0
ONE	162	24.0
Two	26	3.9
THREE	5	0.7
Four	. 0	0.0
Five or More	7	1.0
SOME UNKNOWN NUMBER	42	6.2
TOTAL	674	100.0

Missing = 38

TABLE 4-50
FINAL ACTION OF OFFICER BEFORE SLAYING
1983-1992

FINAL ACTION	Number	PERCENT
TALK	74	12.4
APPROACH SUSPECT	58	9.7
ENTER BUILDING OR ROOM	49	8.2
ARREST KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	37	6.2
Drive	31	5.2
SEARCH	27	4.5
Pursue	27	4.5
EXT VEHICLE	25	4.2
APPROACH BUILDING	22	3.7
ARREST OTHER PERSON	16	2.7
ESCORT SUSPECT/CITIZEN	16	2.7
CALL DISPATCH	15	2.5
Unholster Weapon	14	2.3
RESIST ROBBERY	12	2.0
IDENTIFY SELF	11	1.8
DISARM KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	11	1.8
APPROACH CAR W/O SUSPECT	7	1.2
OTHER	147	24.5
TOTAL	599	100.0

Missing = 114

#### Characteristics of Officers and Incidents: By Officer Assignment

It is likely that the characteristics of incidents in which officers are feloniously killed differ across various categories of law enforcement roles. For instance, it is likely that the particular dangers faced by municipal officers are different than those faced by state officers. Similarly, it is likely that an officer working undercover faces different potentially lethal situations than those faced by foot patrol officers. In this and subsequent sections we look at the characteristics of incidents which result in officers deaths within various subcategories.

In this first section of this type, we look at the characteristics of the fatal incidents in terms of the officer's assignment. Specifically, we compare the characteristics of the incidents in which foot patrol officers, one-officer vehicle patrol officers, two-officer vehicle patrol officers, detectives, officers on special assignment, undercover officers, and off-duty officers are slain. First we look at the characteristics of the officers killed while in these roles.

#### Officer Characteristics

Agency Type and Officer Assignment. As seen in Table 4-51, a majority (56%) of the slain patrol officers of all three types and a majority (53.3%) of the undercover officers, worked for municipal agencies. Additionally, over half (54.7%) of the off-duty officers who were slain worked for municipal agencies. Forty-one percent (40.8%) of the officers on special assignment worked for county agencies, as did one-fourth of the slain officers on one-person vehicle patrol (28%), on two-person vehicle patrol (22%), and working as detectives (25.8%). Fifteen percent (15.4%) of the one-person vehicle patrol officers worked for state

TABLE 4-51

#### AGENCY TYPE BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT							
AGENCY TYPE	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
MUNICIPAL	5	192	52	15	36	16	52	368
	83.3	53.8	63.4	48.4	35.0	53.3	54.7	52.3
COUNTY	0	100	18	8	42	3	17	188
	0.0	28.0	22.0	25.8	40.8	10.0	17.9	26.7
STATE	0	55	1	5	10	1	6	78
	0.0	15.4	1.2	16.1	9.7	3.3	6.3	11.1
FEDERAL	0	2 0.6	0 0.0	2 6.5	13 12.6	7 23.3	2 2.1	26 3.7
PUERTO RICO	1	8	11	1	2	3	18	44
	16.7	2.2	13.4	3.2	1.9	10.0	18.9	6.3
COLUMN TOTAL	6	357	82	31	103	30	95	704
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 10

agencies, and 16.1 percent of the detectives did, as well. Slainfederal officers comprised one-fourth (23.3%) of the officers killed while working undercover, though federal officers accounted for only 3.7 percent of the slain officers overall. Nineteen percent (18.9%) of the slain off-duty officers and 16.7 percent of the foot patrol officers worked in Puerto Rico.

Table 4-52 indicates the assignment of municipal and county officers by agency type and size. All five of the municipal or county foot patrol officers, just under half (48.6%) of the two-person vehicle patrol officers, and 49.3 percent of the off-duty officers who were killed were from the largest cities, that is, from cities with greater than 250,000 persons.

Just under 40 percent (39.7%) of the municipal or county officers who were killed while on special assignment were from suburban counties.

Gender and Race. None of the slain foot patrol officers, undercover officers, or offduty officers were females. Among the slain officers on special assignment, on two-person vehicle patrol, working as detectives, and on one-person vehicle patrol, female representation was 3.8, 3.6, 3.2, and 2.2 percent, respectively (Table 4-53). Blacks were disproportionately represented among slain detectives (32.3%), foot patrol officers (28.6%), off-duty officers (26%), and undercover officers (21.9%) (Table 4-54).

Rank and Experience. At least 70 percent of the slain officers in each assignment category (except detective assignment) were front line officers (Table 4-55). Relatively large proportions of the undercover officers (30%), officers on special assignment (24.8%), and off-duty officers (21.9%) were supervisors or detectives (all of the detectives, by definition, fell into this category.) Nineteen (5.3%) of the one-officer vehicle patrol officers were the top administrators of their departments, as were 2.9 percent of the officers on special assignment, and 1.2 percent of the slain officers on two-person vehicle patrol.

**TABLE 4-52** 

#### JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				Type of Assign	IMENT			
Jurisdiction Type/Size	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercover	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
CITIES 250K	5	56	34	8	19	5	34	161
	100.0	19.2	48.6	34.8	24.4	26.3	49.3	29.0
CITIES 100-250K	0	28	5	2	7	5	5	52
	0.0	9.6	7.1	8.7	9.0	26.3	7.2	9.4
CITIES 25K-100K	0	38	3	4	7	3	5	60
	0.0	13.0	4.3	17.4	9.0	15.8	7.2	10.8
CITIES <25K	0 0.0	70 24.0	10 14.3	1 4.3	3 3.8	3 15.8	8 11.6	95 17.1
RURAL COUNTIES	0	53	10	3	11	1	2	80
	0.0	18.2	14.3	13.0	14.1	5.3	2.9	14.4
SUBURBAN COUNTIES	0	47	8	5	31	2	15	108
	0.0	16.1	11.4	21.7	39.7	10.5	21.7	19.4
COLUMN TOTAL	5	292	70	23	78	19	69	556
	0.9	52.5	12.6	4.1	14.0	3.4	12.4	100.0

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-53** 

#### SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

Sex of Victim Officer				Officer Assign	MENT			
	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
Male	7	352	81	30	101	30	96	697
	10.0	97.8	96.4	96.8	96.2	100.0	100.0	97.8
FEMALE	0	8	3	1	4	0	0	16
	0.0	2.2	3.6	3.2	3.8	0.0	0.0	2.2
COLUMN TOTAL	7	360	84	31	105	30	96	713
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-54

RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER

#### BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				OFFICER ASSIGN	MENT			622 87.2						
RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY							
Wнгге	5 71.4	334 92.8	76 90.5	21 67.7	90 87.4	25 78.1	71 74.0							
Black	2 28.6	23 6.4	7 8.3	10 32.3	13 12.6	7 21.9	25 26.0							
OTHER	0 0.0	3 0.8	1 1.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	4 0.6						
COLUMN TOTAL	7 100.0	360 100.0	84 100.0	31 100.0	103 100.0	32 100.0	96 100.0	713 100.0						

Missing = 0
Column
Row Percent

Four of seven of the foot patrol officers (57.1%) who were slain had less than five years of experience with their agencies. (See Table 4-56.) Similarly, 48.8 percent of the two-person vehicle patrol officers and 40 percent of the undercover officers had less than five years of experience. Between 32 and 37 percent of the one-person vehicle patrol officers, off-duty officers, and officers on special assignment, respectively, had less than five years of experience. None of the detectives had less than five years of experience.

Uniform and Weaponry. Overall, 18 percent of the victims were not identifiable as officers at the time of the killings (Table 4-57). This includes all (100.0%) of the undercover officers, 72.4 percent of the off-duty officers, and 41.7 percent of the detectives.

Officers on special assignment or off-duty were, not surprisingly, more likely to be unarmed (Table 4-58). Just under 10 percent (9.4%) of the officers slain while on special assignment were unarmed, as were 4.2 percent of the officers slain while off-duty. <sup>5</sup>

#### **Incident Characteristics**

Anticipation. Incidents in which off-duty officers were killed were least likely to have a stage of anticipation (Table 4-59). Only 55.6 percent of these officers had a period of time amounting to more than a few seconds during which they anticipated face-to-face

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The patrol officers who were not identifiable as officers were plainclothes officers on foot or vehicle patrol and/or officers that, though they were not assigned to patrol, responded to a request for backup, and, as such, their departments classified them on the FBI-UCR forms as on patrol.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> All of the unarmed officers on Special Assignment were working in a government building (e.g., a jail) at the time they were slain. The "unarmed" Alaskan one-person vehicle patrol officer was previously mentioned. The two two-person vehicle patrol officers were together in the booking area of the station when slain.

**TABLE 4-55** 

#### RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER FRONT LINE				OFFICER ASSIGN	MENT			74 541 77.1 75.9 21 148							
	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY								
FRONT LINE	7 100.0	285 79.2	78 92.9	0 0.0	76 72.4	21 70.0	74 77.1								
SUPERVISOR/ DETECTIVE	0	56	5	31	26	9	21	148							
	0.0	15.6	6.0	100.0	24.8	30.0	21.9	20.8							
TOP	0	19	1	0	3	0	1	24							
Administration	0.0	5.3	1.2	0.0	2.9	0.0	1.0	3.4							
COLUMN TOTAL	7	360	84	31	105	30	96	713							
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0							

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-56** 

#### OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				OFFICER ASSIGN	MENT			33 4.6 2 210 29 29.6 2 201						
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY							
LESS THAN ONE	0	14 3.9	8 9.5	0	7 6.7	2 6.7	2 2.1							
1 Through 4	4 57.1	103 28.6	33 39.3	0 0.0	31 29.8	10 33.3	29 30.9							
5 Through 10	3 42.9	119 33.1	19 22.6	12 38.7	19 18.3	7 23.3	22 23.4	201 28.3						
11 OR MORE	0 0.0	124 34.4	24 28.6	19 61.3	47 45.2	11 36.7	41 43.6	266 37.5						
COLUMN TOTAL	7 100.0	360 100.0	84 100.0	31 100.0	104 100.0	30 100.0	94 100.0	710 100.0						

Missing = 3

**TABLE 4-57** 

#### VICTIM IDENTIFIABLE AS POLICE OFFICER BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT							
Identifiable as Police Officer	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	Special Assignment	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
No	1	3	4	10	15	25	63	121
	14.3	0.8	4.8	41.7	16.7	100.0	72.4	18.0
YES	6	354	79	14	75	0	24	552
	85.7	99.2	95.2	58.3	83.3	0.0	27.6	82.0
COLUMN TOTAL	7	357	83	24	90	25	87	673
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 40

**TABLE 4-58** 

#### OFFICER ARMED WITH WEAPON BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

					OFFICER ASSIGNMENT				
Armed	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total	
No	0	1	2	0	9	0	3	15	
	0.0	0.3	2.4	0.0	9.4	0.0	4.2	2.3	
YES	6	358	80	28	87	22	69	650	
	100.0	99.7	97.6	100.0	90.6	100.0	95.8	97.7	
COLUMN TOTAL	6	359	82	28	96	22	72	665	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 48

contact and/or being "on scene" with the persons who turned out to be the assailants.

Incidents involving foot patrol officers and detectives were slightly less likely than other onduty incidents to have a stage of anticipation. Eighty-six percent (85.7%) of the foot patrol officers and 90 percent of the detectives had moments of anticipation, compared, for instance, to 96 to 97 percent of the vehicle patrol officers and undercover officers.

Mode of Initiation. Table 4-60 indicates the mode of initiation for the various officer assignments. Not surprisingly, vehicle patrol officers were most likely to be dispatched to the incidents which led to their deaths, and the incidents which led to the deaths of foot patrol officers were more likely to be citizen initiated. Forty-eight percent (48.4%) of the vehicle patrol officers were dispatched to the lethal incidents, and two of the five (40.0%) foot patrol officers were linked to the lethal incidents by citizen contacts.

Close to 60 percent of the detectives (59.3%) and officers on special assignment (57.6%), and just under 80 percent (79.3%) of the undercover officers, were acting in accordance with an assignment when killed.

The incidents which led to the deaths of vehicle patrol and off-duty officers were more likely than the other officer assignments to have been officer initiated. Thirty-seven percent (36.4%) of the vehicle patrol officers and 36.3 percent of the off-duty officers initiated proactively the incidents which led to their deaths. As noted above, "police action unanticipated" refers to situations in which the officer "walked in" on a crime that he was unaware was taking place, or had the crime "walk in" on him/her. This was the case in one-third (31.9%) of the incidents involving off-duty officers. One of the five (20%) foot patrol officers was ambushed, as were 17.2 and 18.7 percent of the undercover officers and off-duty officers, respectively.

**TABLE 4-59** 

#### EXISTENCE OF A STAGE OF ANTICIPATION BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT							
Anticipation Stage	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
No	1	14	2	3	8	1	40	69
	14.3	4.0	2.4	10.0	7.9	3.3	44.4	10.0
Yes	6	335	80	27	93	29	50	620
	85.7	96.0	97.6	90.0	92.1	96.7	55.6	90.0
COLUMN TOTAL	7	349	82	30	101	30	90	689
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 24

TABLE 4-60

#### INCIDENT INITIATION MODE BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				OFFICER ASSIGN	NMENT			
Initiation Mode	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
DISPATCH	1 20.0	162 46.8	44 55.0	3 11.1	17 17.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	227 33.5
Assignment	0	24 6.9	6 7.5	16 59.3	57 57.6	23 79.3	7.7	133 19.6
CITIZEN	2	5	3	0	3	1	5	19
CONTACT	40.0	1.4	3.8	0.0	3.0	3.4	5.5	2.8
OFFICER INITIATED	1	133	22	6	13	0	33	208
	20.0	38.4	27.5	22.2	13.1	0.0	36.3	30.7
POLICE ACTION UNANTICIPATED	0	4	0	1	5	0	29	39
	0.0	1.2	0.0	3.7	5.1	0.0	31.9	5.8
Амвизн	1	18	5	1	4	5	17	51
	20.0	5.2	6.3	3.7	4.0	17.2	18.7	7.5
COLUMN TOTAL	5	346	80	27	99	29	91	677
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 36

Killed At Entry. Detectives were most likely to be killed at entry (Table 4-61).

Sixty-three percent of the detectives were killed at entry compared to between 35.7 and 50 percent of the other categories of assignment.

Time of Attack. Just under one-half (47.9%) of the off-duty officers were killed between the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. (Table 4-62). No more than 39 percent of the other categories were killed during this time period. Two of the seven foot patrol officers were killed between 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. This percentage, of 28.6 percent, was higher than for any of the remaining officer assignments. The largest proportion of detectives (38.7%) was killed during the period between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. and the largest proportions of special assignment officers and undercover officers were killed during the period between 3 p.m. and 9 p.m.

Location of Attack. Vehicle patrol officers were least likely (17.9%), and foot patrol (50.0%) and special assignment officers (46.9%) were most likely to be killed inside (Table 4-63). In contrast, vehicle patrol officers were most likely (53.1%) and foot patrol (16.7%) and special assignment officers (23.5%) were least likely to be killed roadside. Similar proportions of officers across all categories of assignment were killed while "outside, not roadside."

Over half of the slain foot patrol officers (57.1%) and off-duty officers (55.7%) were killed in commercial areas. These two groups were least likely of all assignment categories to be killed in residential areas. Between 14 and 18 percent of the special assignment officers (14.4%), undercover officers (16.7%), and one-officer vehicle patrol officers

**TABLE 4-61** 

#### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT							
Officer Killed at Entry	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
No	3	196	51	10	51	18	52	381
	50.0	63.0	63.8	37.0	55.4	64.3	59.8	60.4
YES	3	115	29	17	41	10	35	250
	50.0	37.0	36.3	63.0	44.6	35.7	40.2	39.6
Column Total	6	311	80	27	92	28	87	631
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 82

**TABLE 4-62** 

#### TIME OF ATTACK BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT									
TIME OF ATTACK	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total		
9 p.m. to 3 a.m.	1	138	31	7	35	9	46	267		
	14.3	38.3	36.9	22.6	33.3	30.0	47.9	37.4		
3 а.м. то 9 а.м.	2	57	11	1	10	0	9	90		
	28.6	15.8	13.1	3.2	9.5	0.0	9.4	12.6		
9 а.м. то 3 р.м.	2	65	16	12	18	8	7	128		
	28.6	18.1	19.0	38.7	17.1	26.7	7.3	18.0		
3 р.м. то 9 р.м.	2	100	26	11	42	13	34	228		
	28.6	27.8	31.0	35.5	40.0	43.3	35.4	32.0		
COLUMN TOTAL	7	360	84	31	105	30	96	713		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-63

LOCATION OF OFFICER, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE, WHEN SLAIN

BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

Location		Officer Assignment								
	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total		
Inside	3	57	19	11	46	9	38	183		
	50.0	16.6	23.5	36.7	46.9	34.6	40.0	27.0		
OUTSIDE, NOT	2	81	22	7	25	6	29	172		
ROADSIDE	33.3	23.6	27.2	23.3	25.5	23.1	30.5	25.3		
OUTSIDE, ROADSIDE	1	195	30	11	23	8	26	294		
	16.7	56.9	37.0	36.7	23.5	30.8	27.4	43.3		
Outside,	0 0.0	10	10	1	4	3	2	30		
Unknown		2.9	12.3	3.3	4.1	11.5	2.1	4.4		
COLUMN TOTAL	6	343	81	30	98	26	95	679		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 34

(18.0%) were in an environment other than residential, commercial, or governmental. Many of these officers, for instance, were in rural areas, e.g., along rural roadsides. Others were in hospitals, stadiums, recreational areas, and so forth. (See Table 4-64.)

Police Activity. Table 4-65 presents, for each of the assignment categories, the type of activity the officer was engaged in at the time of the attack. Three of the six foot patrol officers were intervening in an ongoing crime at the time of their deaths. One-third (33.4%) of the one-officer vehicle patrol officers and 42.0 percent of the two-officer vehicle patrol officers were similarly engaged. Off-duty officers, however, were the most likely (57.3%) to be intervening in an ongoing crime at the time of their lethal attacks. One-officer vehicle patrol officers were most likely to be issuing citations (21.4%) and detectives were most likely to be either attempting an arrest (32.1%) or executing a search warrant (25.0%) at the time of their slayings. Three-fourths (75.9%) of the undercover officers were acting pursuant to their undercover assignments when slain.

Crime/Circumstances Type. Table 4-66 indicates the type of crime or circumstance for which the officer was responding. Three of five (60.0%) foot patrol officers and 47.9 percent of the off-duty officers were killed during incidents involving robberies. Fifteen percent (14.6%) of the vehicle patrol officers were responding to domestic disturbances at the time of their slayings and 24.6 percent of the one-officer vehicle patrol officers were involved in a traffic-related incident when attacked. Just under 90 percent (89.7%) of the undercover officers were killed while working on drug cases, as were 30.4 percent of the detectives and 21.3 percent of the officers on special assignment.

**TABLE 4-64** 

#### OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

Environment	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT									
	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total		
RESIDENTIAL	1	122	34	15	48	10	19	249		
	14.3	43.9	50.0	60.0	49.5	55.6	21.6	42.9		
COMMERCIAL	4	47	11	5	5	5	49	126		
	57.1	16.9	16.2	20.0	5.2	27.8	55.7	21.7		
RESIDENTIAL-	1	51	14	5	8	0	15	94		
COMMERCIAL	14.3	18.3	20.6	20.0	8.2	0.0	17.0	16.2		
GOVERNMENT	1	8	6	0	22	0	1	38		
	14.3	2.9	8.8	0.0	2.7	0.0	1.1	6.5		
OTHER	0	50	3	0	14	3	4	74		
	0.0	18.0	4.4	0.0	14.4	16.7	4.5	12.7		
COLUMN TOTAL	7	278	68	25	97	18	88	581		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 132

# TABLE INCIDENT ACTIVITY BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

		Officer Assignment								
Incident Activity	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total		
INVESTIGATE	1	55	8	3	9	0	7	83		
SUSPICIOUS	16.7	16.6	9.9	10.7	9.4	0.0	9.3	12.8		
Investigate	3	111	34	3	16	0	43	210		
Ongoing Crime	50.0	33.4	42.0	10.7	16.7	0.0	57.3	32.5		
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	0	7	2	2	2	0	2	15		
	0.0	2.1	2.5	7.1	2.1	0.0	2.7	2.3		
Issue Citation	0	71	8	1	2	0	3	85		
	0.0	21.4	9.9	3.6	2.1	0.0	4.0	13.1		
ATTEMPT ARREST	1	52	16	9	20	4	4	106		
	16.7	15.7	19.8	32.1	20.8	13.8	5.3	16.4		
SEARCH WARRANT	0	0	0	7	19	3	0	29		
	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	19.8	10.3	0.0	4.5		
Undercover	0	0	0	1	0	22	0	23		
	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	0.0	75.9	0.0	3.6		
HANDLING	0	5	0	2	14	0	0	21		
PRISONER/PATIENT	0.0	1.5	0.0	7.1	14.6	0.0	0.0	3.2		
Non Crime	1	9	6	0	3	0	6	25		
Assistance	16.7	2.7	7.4	0.0	3.1	0.0	8.0	3.9		
OTHER	0	22	7	0	11	0	10	50		
	0.0	6.6	8.6	0.0	11.5	0.0	13.3	7.7		
COLUMN TOTAL	6	332	81	28	96	29	75	647		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 66

### CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT							
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCE TYPE	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
Murder	0	13	3	3	9	1	1	30
	0.0	4.4	3.8	13.0	12.0	3.4	1.4	5.2
Robbery	3	25	9	2	7	1	34	81
	60.0	8.5	11.5	8.7	9.3	3.4	47.9	14.1
DISTURBANCE CALL	0	22	6	0	7	0	8	43
	0.0	7.5	7.7	0.0	9.3	0.0	11.3	7.5
DOMESTIC	0	43	11	1	0	0	1	56
DISTURBANCE	0.0	14.7	14.1	4.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	9.8
OTHER VIOLENT	0	12	8	3	9	0	4	36
CRIME	0.0	4.1	10.3	13.0	12.0	0.0	5.6	6.3
Burglary	0	25	3	1	1	0	3	33
	0.0	8.5	3.8	4.3	1.3	0.0	4.2	5.7
Drugs	0	10	6	7	16	26	0	65
	0.0	3.4	7.7	30.4	21.3	89.7	0.0	11.3
OTHER NON VIOLENT CRIME	1	42	12	2	15	1	6	79
	20.0	14.3	15.4	8.7	20.0	3.4	8.5	13.8
Traffic	0	72	10	2	2	0	3	89
	0.0	24.6	12.8	8.7	2.7	0.0	4.2	15.5
OTHER NON CRIME	1	19	8	0	5	0	11	44
	20.0	6.5	10.3	0.0	6.7	0.0	15.5	7.7
OTHER	0 0.0	10 3.4	2 2.6	2 8.7	4 5.3	0 0.0	0.0	18 3.1
COLUMN TOTAL	5	293	78	23	75	29	71	574
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 139 Number

Column Percent

Of the 34 off-duty officers who were killed during a robbery incident, 19 were responding to their own personal robbery victimizations and 12 were responding to the robbery of an establishment in which they were present. (See Table 4-67.) That is, one-third (32.3%) of the officers slain while off duty were victims (either singly or as part of a group of victims) of the robberies to which they responded. Further, one-quarter (25.9%) of the undercover officers were slain during their own robbery victimizations.

Number of Opponents. Five of the seven (71.4%) foot patrol officers faced more than one threatening person at the time of their attack, as did 64.3 percent of the undercover officers, and 44.4 percent of the off-duty officers (Table 4-68). Most of the off-duty officers who faced more than one opponent, faced two (31.1%). In contrast, undercover officers who did not face single opponents were as likely to face five opponents as they were two (17.9%).

Assailant's Knowledge of Officer Status. In 95 to 100 percent of the incidents involving patrol officers, detectives, and officers on special assignment, the assailant knew that the person he was attacking was a law enforcement officer (Table 4-69). Eleven percent (10.9%) of the persons who killed off-duty officers and a full 45 percent of the persons who killed undercover officers apparently did not know that their victims were officers.

Weapons. Between 57 and 81 percent of the officers in each of the assignment categories were killed with handguns (Table 4-70). Detectives and officers on special assignment, who were less likely than the officers in the other groups to be killed with handguns, were more likely to be killed with rifles and shotguns. Nineteen percent of the special assignment officers and 16.1 percent of the detectives were killed with rifles. Within these same groups, 12.4 percent and 12.9 percent were killed with shotguns.

**TABLE 4-67** 

### OFFICERS SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER ASSIGNMENT								
Officers Slain During Victimization	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total	
Not Slain During	7	357	83	29	100	20	65	661	
Robbery Victimization	100.0	99.7	100.0	96.7	98.0	74.1	67.7	94.0	
Yes, Personal	0	0	0	1	1	7	19	28	
Victimization	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	1.0	- 25.9	19.8	4.0	
Yes, Establishment	0	1	0	0	1	0	12	14	
Victimization	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	12.5	2.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	7	358	83	30	102	27	96	703	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 10

TABLE 4-68

NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS WHEN SLAIN
BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT

1983-1992

Number of Persons	Officer Assignment								
	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total	
None	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	
	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	
One	2	251	58	24	72	10	50	467	
	28.6	73.4	70.7	80.0	72.7	35.7	55.6	68.9	
Two	2	67	10	3	14	5	28	129	
	28.6	19.6	12.2	10.0	14.1	17.9	31.1	19.0	
Three	2	9	7	1	6	2	6	33	
	28.6	2.6	8.5	3.3	6.1	7.1	6.7	4.9	
Four	1	6	4	0	2	5	2	20	
	14.3	1.8	4.9	0.0	2.0	17.9	2.2	2.9	
Five or More	0	1	3	1	4	1	3	13	
	0.0	0.3	3.7	3.3	4.0	3.6	3.3	1.9	
GROUP OF UNKNOWN	0	7	0	1	0	5	1	14	
SIZE	0.0	2.0	0.0	3.3	0.0	17.9	1.1	2.1	
COLUMN TOTAL	7	342	82	30	99	28	90	678	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 35

**TABLE 4-69** 

## ASSAILANT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	Officer Assignment								
Assailant Knew Victim Was Police Officer	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total	
No	0 0.0	1 0.3	0 0.0	1 4.2	0 0.0	9 45.0	7 10.9	18 2.8	
YES	7 100.0	356 99.7	81 100.0	23 95.8	91 100.0	11 55.0	57 89.1	626 97.2	
COLUMN TOTAL	7 100.0	357 100.0	81 100.0	24 100.0	91 100.0	20 100.0	64 100.0	644 100.0	

Missing = 69



#### WEAPON USED BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				Officer Assign	NMENT			4
Weapon Used	FOOT PATROL	1-Officer Vehicle Patrol	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
HANDGUN	5	247	68	20	60	24	76	500
	71.4	68.6	81.0	64.5	57.1	80.0	79.2	70.1
RIFLE	1	53	8	5	20	4	2	93
	14.3	14.7	9.5	16.1	19.0	13.3	2.1	13.0
SHOTGUN	0	26	4	4	13	2	8	57
	0.0	7.2	4.8	12.9	12.4	6.7	8.3	8.0
SHARP OBJECT	0	7	0	1	3	0	3	14
	0.0	1.9	0.0	3.2	2.9	0.0	3.1	2.0
BLUNT OBJECT	0	5	1	0	2	0	2	10
	0.0	1.4	1.2	0.0	1.9	0.0	2.1	1.4
Вомв	0	1 0.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 1.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 0.3
Personal Weapons	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	6
	14.3	0.6	1.2	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.8
VEHICLE	0 0.0	17 4.7	2 2.4	1 3.2	3 2.9	0 0.0	5 5.2	28 3.9
OTHER	0	2 0.6	0 0.0	0	1 1.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 0.4
COLUMN TOTAL	7	360	84	31	105	30	96	713
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

More foot patrol officers and one-officer vehicle patrol officers, than other groups of officers, were disarmed during the attacks against them (Table 4-71). Two of the seven (28.6%) foot patrol officers and 23 percent of the one-officer vehicle patrol officers were disarmed. None of the undercover officers were disarmed, and only 1 of the 30 detectives (3.3%) was disarmed.

As indicated in Table 4-72, both of the disarmed foot patrol officers were killed with their own weapons, as were 68 of the 81 one-officer vehicle patrol officers.

**Body Armor.** Wearing body armor were four of the seven (57.1%) foot patrol officers, and one third of the vehicle patrol (31.6%) and special assignment officers (32.4%) (Table 4-73). Not surprising, in light of their circumstance, few of the undercover (6.7%) and off-duty (4.2%) officers were wearing body armor.

Presence of Other Officers. Officers on two-person vehicle patrol (89.2%) and officers on special assignment (65.3%) were most likely to have other officers in their immediate presence at the time of the attacks (Table 4-74). Just 9.4 percent of the off-duty officers had another officer immediately present, as did 22.1 percent of the one-person vehicle patrol officers and 28.6 percent of the foot patrol officers.

Officer's Final Action. The final actions of officers were so disparate that the "other" category is comprised of between 10.3 and 33.3 percent of the incidents in each assignment category (Table 4-75). Note also that this information was not clear in the narratives in 114 cases.

The largest numbers of one-officer vehicle patrol officers were talking (14.3%) or approaching the suspects (12.9%) at the time of their deaths. The largest numbers of two-

**TABLE 4-71** 

### OFFICER DISARMED DURING ATTACK BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	Officer Assignment									
Officer Disarmed	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total		
No	5	271	71	29	84	29	85	574		
	71.4	77.0	85.5	96.7	81.6	100.0	91.4	82.4		
YES	2	81	12	1	19	0	8	123		
	28.6	23.0	14.5	3.3	18.4	0.0	8.6	17.6		
COLUMN TOTAL	7	352	83	30	103	29	93	697		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 16

**TABLE 4-72** 

## OFFICERS KILLED WITH OWN SERVICE WEAPONS BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

		Officer Assignment									
Killed With Own Weapon	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total			
No	5	292	74	30	89	30	89	609			
	71.4	81.1	88.1	96.8	84.8	100.0	92.7	85.4			
YES	2	68	10	1	16	0	7	104			
	28.6	18.9	11.9	3.2	15.2	0.0	7.3	14.6			
COLUMN TOTAL	7	360	84	31	105	30	96	713			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-73** 

#### OFFICER WEARING BODY ARMOR BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

		Officer Assignment									
Wearing Armor	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total			
No	3	246	57	27	71	28	92	524			
	42.9	68.5	67.9	87.1	67.6	93.3	95.8	73.6			
Yes	4	113	27	4	34	2	4	188			
	57.1	31.5	32.1	12.9	32.4	6.7	4.2	26.4			
COLUMN TOTAL	7	359	84	31	105	30	96	712			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 1

**TABLE 4-74** 

# PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER AT THE TIME OF ATTACK BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	Officer Assignment										
PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercove R	OFF-DUTY	Row Total			
No	5	271	8	13	34	14	87	432			
	71.4	77.9	10.8	44.8	34.7	60.9	90.6	64.0			
YES	2	77	66	16	64	9	9	243			
	28.6	22.1	89.2	55.2	65.3	39.1	9.4	36.0			
COLUMN TOTAL	7	348	74	29	99	26	96	675			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 38

**TABLE 4-75** 

#### OFFICER'S FINAL ACTION BY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

				Officer Ass				<u>-</u>
Final Action	FOOT PATROL	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-Officer Vehicle Patrol	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercover	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
TALK	0	42	6	2	9	5	10	74
	0.0	14.3	8.1	6.9	10.2	20.0	12.0	12.4
Approach Suspect	0	38	6	6	3	0	5	58
	0.0	12.9	8.1	20.7	3.4	0.0	6.0	9.7
Enter Building	0 0.0	12	3	7	19	5	3	49
Or Room		4.1	4.1	24.1	21.6	20.0	3.6	8.2
ARREST KILLER	0	25	3	0	3	1	5	37
(OR ATTEMPT)	0.0	8.5	4.1	0.0	3.4	4.0	6.0	6.2
Drive	0	18	6	2	3	0	2	31
	0.0	6.1	8.1	6.9	3.4	0.0	2.4	5.2
SEARCH	1	16	4	0	4	1	1	27
	16.7	5.4	5.4	0.0	4.5	4.0	1.2	4.5
Pursue	1	9	9	1	4	2	1	27
	16.7	3.1	12.2	3.4	4.5	8.0	1.2	4.5
Exit Vehicle	0	14	9	1	1	0	0	25
	0.0	4.8	12.2	3.4	1.1	0.0	0.0	4.2
Approach Building	1	13	2	0	4	0	2	22
	16.7	4.4	2.7	0.0	4.5	0.0	2.4	3.7
ARREST OTHER PERSON	0	9	1	2	2	0	2	16
(OR ATTEMPT)	0.0	3.1	1.4	6.9	2.3	0.0	2.4	2.7

				OFFICER ASS	SIGNMENT		·	
Final Action	Foot Patrol	1-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	2-OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	DETECTIVE	SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	Undercover	OFF-DUTY	Row Total
ESCORT	0	9	4	0	3	0	0	16
SUSPECT/CITIZEN	0.0	3.1	5.4	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	2.7
CALL DISPATCH	0	11	0	1	1	0	2	15
	0.0	3.7	0.0	3.4	1.1	0.0	2.4	2.5
Unholster Weapon	1 16.7	3 1.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1.1	1 4.0	8 9.6	14 2.3
RESIST ROBBERY	0	0	0	1	0	2	9	12
	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	8.0	10.8	2.0
IDENTIFY SELF	0	0	0	0	4	1	6	11
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	4.0	7.2	1.8
DISARM KILLER	0	5	1	2	1	0.0	2	11
(OR ATTEMPT)	0.0	1.7	1.4	6.9	1.1		2.4	1.8
APPROACH CAR	0	4	0	1	0.0	1	1	7
W/o Suspect	0.0	1.4	0.0	3.4		4.0	1.2	1.2
OTHER	2	66	20	3	26	6	24	147
	33.3	22.4	27.0	10.3	29.5	24.0	28.9	24.5
COLUMN TOTAL	6	294	74	29	88	25	83	599
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

officer vehicle patrol officers were pursuing the suspects (12.2%) or exiting their vehicles (12.2%). One-fifth (20.7%) of the detectives were approaching suspects and one-fourth (24.1%) were entering a building or room at the time of their attacks. Similarly, 21.6 percent of the special assignment officers and 20 percent of the off-duty officers were entering buildings or rooms when attacked.

#### **Summary**

Below we summarize the findings for each of the seven assignment groups.

Foot Patrol Officers. All of the foot patrol officers were armed, and six of the seven were identifiable as officers when slain. All but one of the incidents had a stage of anticipation. Three of the six for which information was available were killed at entry and the attacks of these officers were spread fairly evenly across daylight hours. Half were inside structures and a majority were in commercial areas. A plurality were intervening in ongoing crimes, primarily responding to the robberies of others. Five were facing more than one opponent when slain and five were slain with handguns. Two were disarmed and killed with their own weapons. Most were alone and wearing body armor.

One-Officer Vehicle Patrol Officers. All but one of the one-officer vehicle patrol officers (described in an earlier section) was armed and virtually all were identifiable as officers at the time of the killings. Ninety-six percent of these incidents included a stage of anticipation. One-half of the one-person vehicle patrol officers were dispatched to the incidents and in another one-third of the incidents the officers initiated the interactions with the opponents. A relatively small proportion compared to other assignments (37%) were killed at entry. Two-thirds (66.1%) of the slayings occurred between 3 p.m. and 3 a.m.

Forty-five percent of the incidents occurred in residential areas and a relatively large proportion of the killings of these officers (56.9%) occurred outside at the side of a road. Most of the officers were intervening in ongoing crimes (33.4%) or issuing citations (21.4%). More of this category of officers (24.6%) than the other groupings were attending to traffic-related incidents. A small proportion (5.2%) were ambushed and three-fourths faced only one opponent at the time of the attacks. As with other categories, these officers were most often killed with handguns (68.6%). Relatively large proportions of these officers were disarmed (23%), killed with their own weapons (18.9%), wearing body armor (31.5%), and without immediate help (78%).

Two-Officer Vehicle Patrol. The circumstances of the killings of the two-person vehicle patrol officers were similar to the circumstances of the one-person vehicle patrol officer killings except that the two-officer vehicles were more likely to be dispatched (55%), more likely to be killed indoors (23.5%), more likely to be intervening in ongoing crimes (42%) (and less likely to be issuing citations, 9.9%), more likely to be killed with handguns (81%), less likely to be disarmed (14.5%) and killed with their own weapons (11.9%), and much less likely to be without immediate assistance (10.8%).

Detectives. More detectives than patrol officers were not identifiable as officers when attacked. Like officers working undercover and on special assignment, they were likely to be working on their assignments (59.3%) when the attack occurred. More detectives (63%) than any other group were killed at entry. In just under one-half of these incidents, the detective was executing either a search warrant or an arrest warrant. More of the attacks against detectives (38.7%) than the other assignment groups occurred during the

hours of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. Their attacks were most likely to occur in residential environments (60%) and equal proportions were killed inside structures (36.7%) or by the side of a road (36.7%). More than any of the other assignment categories, detectives were killed while attempting arrests (32.1%) or while executing search warrants (25%). As with undercover officers and special assignment officers, a relatively large proportion of the detectives (30.4%) were killed while conducting law enforcement activities related to drug offenses. A larger proportion of detectives than any other group, faced a single opponent at the time of attack. Along with special assignment officers, detectives were more likely than the other categories of officers to be shot with rifles (16.1%) or shotguns (12.9%). Relatively few of the detectives (3.3%) were disarmed and shot with their own weapons (3.2%). Except for the undercover and off-duty officers, detectives were the least likely (12.9%) to be shot while wearing soft body armor. Just over half (55.2%) had assistance in the immediate vicinity at the time of the attacks. Consistent with the finding that a large proportion of detectives were shot at entry is the finding that the final actions of many of these officers were to approach suspects (20.7%) or enter buildings or rooms (24.1%).

Special Assignment Officers. As mentioned above, officers on special assignment, includes officers working jails, working on special teams, assigned to execute arrest and/or search warrants, and so forth. This group had the highest percentage of unarmed officers, 9.4 percent. More of these officers than detectives, undercover officers, and off-duty officers were identifiable as officers. Special Assignment Officers had the third highest percentage of officers, 44.6 percent, who were killed at entry. Along with undercover officers, a plurality of this group (40%) was killed during the hours of 3 p.m. and 9 p.m.

They were primarily inside structures and primarily located in residential areas. One-fifth (20.8%) were acting in an arrest capacity at the time of the attack and another one-fifth (19.8%) were executing search warrants. One-fifth of the incidents (21.3%) involved drug-related offenses. In three-fourths (72.7%) of the incidents, the officer was facing a single opponent. All of the opponents knew that their victims were law enforcement officers. Compared to the other groups, officers on special assignment were least likely to be killed with handguns (57.1%) and most likely to be killed with rifles (19%). A relatively large proportion (12.4%) were killed with shotguns. They were not more or less likely than the other groups to be disarmed (18.4%), killed with their own weapons (15.2%), or wear body armor (32.4%). Two-thirds of the officers on special assignment had immediate assistance at hand when they were attacked. This percentage is second only to two-person vehicle patrol officers. The final action of one-fifth of the officers on special assignment was to enter a building or room. No other final action accounted for a larger proportion of these officers.

Undercover Officers. All of the slain undercover officers were armed and none were identifiable as law enforcement officers when attacked. These officers were second most likely to have a stage of anticipation and relatively unlikely to be killed at entry. A relatively large proportion (17.2%) of this group was ambushed. As with officers on special assignment, a plurality of undercover officers were slain between the hours of 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. One-third (34.6%) of these officers were killed while inside a structure and one-third (30.8%) were killed while roadside. Most were in residential areas and most were working drug-related assignments. The proportion of undercover officers killed during their own robbery victimizations (25.9%) exceeded that even of off-duty officers (19.8%), and a very

large proportion of the undercover officers, relative to the other groups, faced more than one opponent when attacked. In only one-half of the incidents, did it appear as if the opponent knew that his victim was a law enforcement officer. None of the slain undercover officers were disarmed and killed with their own weapons. Relatively few (6.7%) were wearing body armor and relatively few had the immediate assistance of other officers when attacked. The final action of one-fifth (20%) of the undercover officers for whom there were data, was talking; another one-fifth (20%) were killed immediately upon entering a building or room.

Off-Duty Officers. All but three (95.8%) of the off-duty officers were armed during the incidents which led to their deaths. One-fourth were identifiable as police officers. (For the most part, these unidentifiable officers were just going to work, returning from work, or working off-duty as security in uniform.) Of all the assignment groups, this group had the lowest proportion of incidents (55.6%) in which there was a stage of anticipation. Consistent with this, these incidents were most likely to involve situations where police action was unanticipated. That is, a situation "walked in" on the officer or the officer "walked in" on it. One-third of the incidents (31.9%) were initiated in this manner, and another one-third (36.3%) were officer initiated. A plurality (47.9) were killed during the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. This percentage is higher than any other group. The off-duty killings were not distinctive in terms of occurring inside or outside, but a relatively large proportion (55.7%) of these killings occurred in commercial environments. Two-thirds of the off-duty officers intervened in ongoing crimes and in half (47.9%) of the incidents, the crimes being attended to were robberies. A full 91.2 percent of the robberies in which off-duty officers

"intervened" involved personal victimizations of the officers (55.9%) or victimizations of the establishments the officers were visiting (35.3%).

As with undercover officers, one-fifth of the off-duty officers were ambushed. In a vast majority of these situations, the assailants set out to kill the particular officers as a result of some previous interaction with those officers. Half (44.4%) of the off-duty officers faced more than one opponent, but less than 10 percent of them had immediate assistance at the scene. Not surprisingly, just 4 (4.2%) of the 96 officers slain off-duty were wearing body armor.

#### Characteristics of Officers and Incidents: By Agency Type

Various types of agencies have different roles and thus, face different risks which might lead to officers' deaths. Below we compare and contrast the characteristics of the incidents in which officers were feloniously killed across agency type. Specifically, we compare incidents involving municipal, county, state, federal, and Puerto Rican officers. As noted earlier, Puerto Rico is maintained as a separate category because its structure does not coincide with any of the other four categories and because its high rate of police killings appeared to differentiate it from the other territories in which there were only a total of four felonious killings during the 10 year period under study. Thus, these four killings are a subset of the nine agencies which do not fit into any of the five major categories and are, thus, not included in the comparisons described in this section. In addition to these territorial agencies, the "other" agency types, as reported earlier, include three tribal police departments, one school police departments, and a regional police department.

#### Officer Characteristics

Gender and Race. Over 97 percent of the slain officers of each agency type were male (Table 4-76). Between 11 and 14 percent of the municipal, county, and Puerto Rican officers slain, were black (Table 4-77).

Rank and Experience. Table 4-78 shows the rank of the offices killed within each agency type. County and municipal agencies had the highest proportion of top administrators and supervisor/detectives killed. Just under six percent (5.8%) of the slain county officers were the sheriffs of their jurisdictions and an additional 19 percent were either supervisors or detectives. Just under 4 percent (3.5%) of the municipal officers were the chiefs of police of the jurisdictions and another 22.6 percent were supervisors or detectives (Table 4-79).

TABLE 4-76
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE							
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER	MUNICIPAL	County	State	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total		
Male	357	185	77	26	44	688		
	97.0	97.9	98.7	100.0	100.0	97.7		
FEMALE	11	4	1	0	0	16		
	3.0	2.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.3		
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	· 44	704		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 9

TABLE 4-77

RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE								
RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO	Row TOTAL			
Whrre	316	164	72	25	.39	615			
	85.9	86.8	92.3	96.2	88.6	87.4			
BLACK	51	22	6	1	5	85			
	13.9	11.6	7.7	3.8	11.4	12.1			
OTHER	1	3	0	0	0	4			
	0.3	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6			
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

#### Number Column Percent

A relatively large proportion of the slain county officers (32.3%) had between five and ten years of law enforcement experience. Relatively large proportions of slain state (44.9%) and federal (48.0%) law enforcement officers had eleven or more years of experience within their agencies. Slain officers working for municipal agencies or for Puerto Rico were most likely to have less than five years of experience. Thirty six percent (36.3) of the municipal officers and 36.4 percent of the Puerto Rican officers had less than five years of experience when slain (Table 4-80).

TABLE 4-78

RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE							
RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total			
FRONT LINE	272	142	60	23	37	533			
	73.9	75.1	76.9	88.5	84.1	75.7			
Supervisor/Detective	83	36	18	3	7	147_			
	22.6	19.0	23.1	11.5	15.9	20.9			
TOP ADMINISTRATOR	13	11	0	0	0	24			
	3.5	5.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4			
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 9
Number
Column Percent

TABLE 4-79

OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

			AGENCY	Түре		- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total
Less than One	18 4.9	10 5.3	2 2.6	1 4.0	1 2.3	32 4.6
1 Through 4	115	49	21	6	15	206
	31.4	25.9	26.9	24.0	34.1	29.4
5 Through 10	103	61	20	6	10	199
	28.1	32.3	25.6	24.0	22.7	28.4
11 or More	130	69	35	12	18	264
	35.5	36.5	44.9	48.0	40.9	37.7
COLUMN TOTAL	366	189	78	25	44	701
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Number Column Percent

Uniform and Weaponry. Federal officers were least likely (59.1%) to be identifiable as law enforcement officers. Puerto Rico, too, had a large proportion (46.3%) of officers who were not identifiable. In the remaining three types of agencies, between 10 and 18 percent of the law enforcement officers were not identifiable as such (Table 4-81). None of the federal officers were unarmed at the time of the attack, whereas 4.5 percent of the county offices were unarmed (Table 4-82).

**TABLE 4-80** 

## VICTIM IDENTIFIABLE AS POLICE OFFICER BY AGENCY TYPE 1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE							
VICTIM IDENTIFIABLE AS OFFICER	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	State	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total		
No	60	18	9	13	19	119		
	17.0	10.1	12.7	59.1	46.3	17.9		
Yes	292	161	62	9	22	545		
	83.0	89.9	87.3	40.9	53.7	82.1		
COLUMN TOTAL	352	179	71	22	41	664		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 49

Number Column Percent

#### TABLE 4-81 OFFICER ARMED WITH WEAPON BY AGENCY TYPE 1983-1992

Officer Armed	AGENCY TYPE							
	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total		
No	5	8	1	0	1	15		
	1.4	4.5	1.4	0.0	2.8	2.3		
Yes	343	171	73	22	35	643		
	98.6	95.5	98.6	100.0	97.2	97.7		
COLUMN TOTAL	348	179	74	22	36	658		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 55 Number Column Percent

TABLE 4-82

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

			AGENCY	Түре		
Type of Assignment	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	State	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row TOTAL
FOOT PATROL	5 1.4	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0	1 2.3	6 0.9
1 OFFICER	192	101	55	2	8	357
VEHICLE PATROL	52.2	53.4	70.5	7.7	18.2	50.7
2 OFFICER	52	18	1	0	11	82
VEHICLE PATROL	14.1	9.5	1.3	0.0	25.0	11.6
DETECTIVE	15	8	5	2	1	31
	4.1	4.2	6.4	7.7	2.3	4.4
SPECIAL	36	42	10	13	2	103
ASSIGNMENT	9.8	22.2	12.8	50.0	4.5	14.6
Undercover	16	3	1	7	3	30
	4.3	1.6	1.3	26.9	6.8	4.3
OFF DUTY	52	17	6	2	18	95
	14.1	9.0	7.7	7.7	40.9	13.5
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Officer Assignment. Most of the slain officers from municipal (52.2%), county (53.4%), and state (70.5%) agencies were on one-officer vehicle patrol at the time of their deaths. Puerto Rico had the largest proportion (25%) of officers slain while on two-officer vehicle patrol. The federal officer were more likely than any of the officers from the other agency types to be on special assignment (50%) or working undercover (26.9%). A full 40.9 percent of the slain officers from Puerto Rico were off-duty at the time of their deaths. The next highest percentage, 14.1 percent, was among the municipal officers (Table 4-83).

TABLE 4-83

EXISTENCE OF STAGE OF ANTICIPATION
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

ANTICIPATION STAGE	AGENCY TYPE							
	MUNICIPAL	County	State	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total		
No	32	15	3	4	14	68		
	9.1	8.1	3.8	16.7	33.3	10.0		
YES	319	171	75	20	28	612		
	90.9	91.9	96.2	83.3	66.7	90.0		
COLUMN TOTAL	351	186	78	24	42	680		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 33

Number Column Percent

# **Incident Characteristics**

Anticipation. The incidents in which federal officers and officers from Puerto Rico were killed, compared to the incidents involving officers of other agency types, were least

likely to include a stage of anticipation. One-third (33.3%) of the Puerto Rican officers and 16.7 percent of the federal officers did not have a period of anticipation (Table 4-84).

TABLE 4-84
INCIDENT INITIATION MODE
BY AGENCY TYPE
.1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE								
Initiation Mode	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total				
DISPATCH	140	63	10	0	11	224				
	40.1	35.0	13.5	0.0	26.2	33.5				
Assignment	48	52	14	18	0	132				
	13.8	28.9	18.9	75.0	0.0	19.8				
CITIZEN	16	0	1	0	1	18				
CONTACT	4.6	0.0	1.4	0.0	2.4	2.7				
OFFICER	104	44	44	3	11	205				
INITIATED	29.8	24.4	59.5	12.5	26.2	30.7				
POLICE ACTION	14	10	2	3	10	39				
UNANTICIPATED	4.0	5.6	2.8	12.5	23.8	5.8				
<b>Амв</b> иѕн	27	11	3	0	9	50				
	7.7	6.1	4.1	0.0	21.4	7.5				
COLUMN TOTAL	349	180	74	24	42	668				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 45

Number Column Percent

Initiation Mode. Municipal, county, and Puerto Rican officers were dispatched to the incidents which led to their deaths in percentages of 40.1, 35, and 26.2, respectively. (Table 4-85). None of the federal officers and only 13.5 percent of the state officers were dispatched to the incidents. Three-fourths (75%) of the federal officers and one-third

(28.9%) of the county officers were on assignment. The proportion of state officers (59.5%) who initiated the incidents which led to their deaths was almost two times the corresponding proportions for the other agency types. One-fourth (23.8%)of the officers from Puerto Rico did not anticipate police action when slain and a startling 21.4 percent were ambushed.

TABLE 4-85
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE							
Killed at Entry	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total			
No	200	94	43	18	21	375			
	60.4	57.3	64.2	78.3	55.3	60.3			
YES	131	70	24	5	17	247			
	39.6	42.7	35.8	21.7	44.7	39.7			
COLUMN TOTAL	331	164	67	23	38	622			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 91

Number Column Percent

Killed at Entry. Federal officers were least likely (21.7%) and Puerto Rican officers were most likely (44.7%) to be killed at entry (Table 4-86).

Police Activity. Over half (55.6%) of the slain Puerto Rican officers were intervening in ongoing crimes at the time of their deaths. Thirty-nine percent (38.4%) of the municipal officers and 29.1 percent of the county officers were also intervening in ongoing crimes during the incidents which led to their deaths. A relatively large proportion (46.7%) of state officers were involved in interactions related to the issuing of citations when

TABLE 4-86
INCIDENT ACTIVITY
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		The second secon	Agency	TYPE		
Incident Activity	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total
Investigate	50	24	7	1	0	82
Suspicious	15.1	13.7	9.3	4.3	0.0	12.8
Intervene in	127	51	8	3	20	209
Ongoing Crime	38.4	29.1	10.7	13.0	55.6	32.7
Investigate	8	4	2	0	0	14
Completed Crime	2.4	2.3	2.7	0.0	0.0	2.2
Issue Citation	36	9	35	1	4	84
	10.9	5.1	46.7	4.3	11.1	13.1
ATTEMPT ARREST	53	34	10	4	2	103
	16.0	19.4	13.3	17.4	5.6	16.1
SEARCH WARRANT	12	10	4	3	0	29
	3.6	5.7	5.3	13.0	0.0	4.5
Undercover	11	3	1	6	2	23
Assignment	3.3	1.7	1.3	26.1	5.6	3.6
Handling Prisoner/	4	15	0	2	0	21
Patient	1.2	8.6	0.0	8.7	0.0	3.3
Noncrime	11	8	3	0	3	25
Assistance	3.3	4.6	4.0	0.0	8.3	3.9
OTHER	19	17	5	3	5	49
	5.7	9.7	6.7	13.0	13.9	7.7
COLUMN TOTAL	331	175	75	23	36	639
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

attacked. None of the corresponding percentages of the other four groups exceeded 12 percent. Federal agencies had the largest proportion of officers killed during the execution of search warrants (13%) and working undercover (26.1%). Nine percent of both the county (8.6%) and federal officers (8.7%) were handling prisoners or patients (e.g., mental patients) at the time of their deaths (Table 4-87).

Crime/Circumstances Type. As seen in Table 4-88, 45.7% of the Puerto Rican officers were slain during robbery-related interventions. As seen in Table 4-89, 10 of these 16 robberies (62.5%) were personal victimizations (7% of all incidents) or victimizations of establishments in which the officer was a patron (16.3% of all incidents). One-fourth (27.3%) of the federal officers were slain during robbery-related interventions, and almost all of those (five of six, or 83.3%) involved their own victimizations. Ten percent (9.8%) of the county officers and 12.7 percent of the municipal officers were slain during domestic disturbance interventions. Federal agencies had the largest proportion of officers intervening in drug offenses. Forty-one (40.9%) of the federal officers were intervening in drug-related offenses compared to 11.7 percent of the municipal agencies and 10.5 percent of the county agencies. One half (49.3%) of the state officers were involved with traffic related offenses during the incidents which led to their deaths. Thirteen percent (12.6%) of the county officers were involved with some other activity unrelated to crime during the incidents which led to their deaths.

Time of Attack. Thirty to forty percent of the officers in each agency type group were attacked between the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. Slightly larger proportions of municipal and county officers were killed between 3 p.m. and 9 a.m.; and slightly larger

proportions of federal and county officers were slain between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Approximately, forty-one percent of both state (42.3%) and Puerto Rican (40.9%) officers were slain between the hours of 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. (Table 4-89).

TABLE 4-87

CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

	1	1903-1		v 7:		
	<del> </del>	1	AGENC	Y 1 YPE	<b>.</b>	
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES TYPE	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total
Murder	12	10	3	1	2	28
	4.0	7.0	4.3	4.5	5.7	4.9
ROBBERY	39 13.0	18 12.6	2 2.9	6 27.3	16 45.7	81 14.3
DISTURBANCE CALL	29	10	2	0	2	43
	9.7	7.0	2.9	0.0	5.7	7.6
DOMESTIC	38	14	3	0	1	56
DISTURBANCE	12.7	9.8	4.3	0.0	2.9	9.9
OTHER VIOLENT	22	10	3	1	0	36
CRIME	7.7	7.0	4.3	4.5	0.0	6.3
BURGLARY	22	9	1	0	1	33
	7.4	6.3	1.4	0.0	2.9	5.8
Drugs	35	15	4	9	2	65
	11.7	10.5	5.8	40.9	5.7	11.5
OTHER NON	38	22	12	2	3	77
VIOLENT CRIME	12.7	15.4	17.4	9.1	8.6	13.6
Traffic	38	12	34	1	4	88
	12.7	8.4	49.3	4.5	11.4	15.5
OTHER NON CRIME	19	18	4	0	3	44
	6.4	12.6	5.8	0.0	8.6	7.8
OTHER	7	5	1	2	1	16
	2.3	3.5	1.4	9.1	2.9	2.8
COLUMN TOTAL	299	143	69	22	35	567
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 146

TABLE 4-88

OFFICERS SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE							
OFFICER SLAIN DURING VICTIMIZATION	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total			
No	345	179	77	19	33	652			
	95.0	95.7	98.7	79.2	76.7	93.9			
YES, PERSONAL	14	5	1	5	3	28			
VICTIMIZATION	3.9	2.7	1.3	20.8	7.0	4.0			
YES, ESTABLISHMENT	4	3	0	0	7 16.3	14			
VICTIMIZATION	1.1	1.6	0.0	0.0		2.0			
COLUMN TOTAL	363	187	78	24	43	694			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 19
Number
Column Percent

**TABLE 4-89** 

#### TIME OF ATTACK BY AGENCY TYPE 1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE								
TIME OF ATTACK	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row TOTAL				
9 p.m. To 3 a.m.	144	64	28	8	17	261				
	39.1	33.9	35.9	30.8	38.6	37.1				
3 а.м. То 9 а.м.	51 13.9	27 14.3	7 9.0	0 0.0	4 9.1	89 12.6				
9 а.м. То 3 р.м.	58	46	10	9	5	128				
	15.8	24.3	12.8	34.6	11.4	18.2				
3 р.м. То 9 р.м.	115	51	33	9	18	226				
	31.3	27.5	42.3	34.6	40.9	32.1				
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 9 Number Column Percent Location of Attack. Larger proportions of Puerto Rican (38.1%), county (30.6%) and municipal (29%) officers, than federal (12%) and state (10.5%) officers were inside structures when attacked. The largest proportion of officers slain outside, but not roadside were federal (36%). Sixty-eight percent (68.4%) of the state officers were roadside when slain (Table 4-90).

TABLE 4-90

LOCATION OF OFFICER, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE, WHEN SLAIN
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE								
LOCATION	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total				
Inside	101	55	8	3	16	183				
	29.0	30.6	10.5	12.0	38.1	27.3				
OUTSIDE, NOT	94	46	13	9	7	169				
ROADSIDE	27.0	25.6	17.1	36.0	16.7	25.2				
OUTSIDE, ROADSIDE	133	78	52	12	16	290				
	38.2	43.3	68.4	48.0	38.1	43.3				
Outside, Unknown	20 5.7	1 0.6	3 4.0	1 4.0	3 7.1	28 4.2				
COLUMN TOTAL	348	180	76	25	42	670				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 43

Number Column Percent

The plurality of municipal and county officers were in residential areas when attacked. Most (56.3%) of the Puerto Rican officers were in commercial areas. Over half of the state officers (52.7%) and one-quarter (27.8%) of the federal officers were in locations other than residential, commercial, or governmental. For instance, a large number of these were beside rural roadways (Table 4-91).

TABLE 4-91
OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE								
Environment	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total				
RESIDENTIAL	140	79	19	2	7	247				
	45.9	47.6	34.5	11.1	21.9	42.9				
COMMERCIAL	72	26	3	7	18	126				
	23.6	15.7	5.5	38.9	56.3	21.9				
RESIDENTIAL/	61	22	3	2	4	92				
COMMERCIAL	20.0	13.3	5.5	11.1	12.5	16.0				
GOVERNMENT	13	21	1	2	0	37				
	4.3	12.7	1.8	11.1	0.0	6.4				
OTHER	19	18	29	5	3	74				
	6.2	10.8	52.7	27.8	9.4	12.8				
COLUMN TOTAL	305	166	55	18	32	576				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Number Column Percent

Number of Opponents. Federal officers were least likely and county officers were most likely to be facing a single opponent at the time of their deaths. Three-fourths (75%) of the county officers compared to only 37.5 percent of the federal officers faced a single opponent. Thirty-eight (37.5%) of the federal officers faced two opponents and 16.6 percent faced four or more. One-fourth (26.2%) of the Puerto Rican officers faced two opponents and another 9.5 percent faced three (Table 4-92).

Assailant's Knowledge of Officer's Status. At the time of the attacks, one-fifth (21.1%) of the assailants of federal officers did not know that their victims were law enforcement officers.

TABLE 4-92

NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS WHEN SLAIN
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE								
Number of Persons	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total			
None	1	0	1	0	0	2			
	0.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.3			
ONE	251	132	51	9	22	464			
	71.1	75.0	68.0	37.5	52.4	69.4			
Two	62	29	17	9	11	128			
	17.6	16.5	22.7	37.5	26.2	19.1			
Three	14	8	3	1	4	30			
	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.2	9.5	4.5			
Four	13	2	2	2	1	20			
	3.7	1.1	2.7	8.3	2.4	3.0			
Five or More	7	3	0	2	1	13			
	2.0	1.7	0.0	8.3	2.4	1.9			
GROUP OF UNKNOWN SIZE	5	2	1	1	3	12			
	1.4	1.1	1.3	4.2	7.1	1.8			
COLUMN TOTAL	353	176	75	24	42	669			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

This was the situation in less than 3 percent of the incidents involving municipal (2.4%), county (0.6%), and state (2.7%) officers (Table 4-93).

TABLE 4-93

ASSAILANT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

Assailant Knew Victim Was Police Officer	AGENCY TYPE						
	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total	
No	8	1	2	4	3	18	
	2.4	0.6	2.7	21.1	8.6	2.8	
YES	328	173	71	15	32	618	
	97.6	99.4	97.2	78.9	91.4	97.2	
COLUMN TOTAL	336	174	73	19	35	636	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 77

#### Number Column Percent

Weapons. More of the officers from Puerto Rico than the other groups were killed with handguns (97.7%), more federal officers than the other groups were killed with rifles (23.1%), more county officers were killed with shotguns (11.1%) and more municipal officers than officers in the other four groups were killed with vehicles (5.4%) (Table 4-94).

As shown in Table 4-95, approximately one-fifth of the slain municipal officers (18%) and county officers (21.2%) were disarmed during the lethal attacks against them. And 15.8 and 16.9 percent of the municipal and county officers, respectively, were killed with their own weapons. (See Table 4-96.) Just 7 percent of the officers in Puerto Rico were disarmed, and 2.3 percent were killed with their own weapons.

TABLE 4-94
WEAPON USED
BY AGENCY TYPE

1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE							
Weapon Used	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row TOTAL		
Handgun	265	119	52	17	43	495		
	72.0	63.0	66.7	65.4	97.7	70.3		
RIFLE	39	34	12	6	0	91		
	10.6	18.0	15.4	23.1	0.0	12.9		
Shotgun	28	21	7	1	0	57		
	7.6	11.1	9.0	3.8	0.0	8.1		
SHARP OBJECT	6 1.6	4 2.1	3 3.8	0	1 2.3	14 2.0		
BLUNT OBJECT	6	3	0	1	0	10		
	1.6	1.6	0.0	3.8	0.0	1.4		
Вомв	1 0.3	0 0.0	1 1.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 0.3		
PERSONAL WEAPONS	2	4	0	0	0	6		
	0.5	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9		
VEHICLE	20	4	3	1	0	28		
	5.4	2.1	3.9	3.8	0.0	4.0		
OTHER	1 0.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 0.1		
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 9

TABLE 4-95
OFFICER DISARMED DURING ATTACK
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

Officer Disarmed	AGENCY TYPE						
	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	State	FEDERAL	Puerto Rico	Row Total	
No	296	145	64	22	40	567	
	82.0	78.8	84.2	88.0	93.0	82.4	
Yes	65	39	12	3	3	121	
	18.0	21.2	15.8	12.0	7.0	17.6	
COLUMN TOTAL	361	184	76	25	43	688	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Number Column Percent

TABLE 4-96

OFFICERS KILLED WITH THEIR OWN SERVICE WEAPONS
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

Killed With Own Weapon	AGENCY TYPE						
	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total	
No	310	157	67	23	43	600	
	84.2	83.1	85.9	88.5	97.7	85.2	
Yes	58	32	11	3	1	104	
	15.8	16.9	14.1	11.5	2.3	14.8	
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	44	704	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 9

Body Armor. One-third (31%) of the municipal officers and one-fourth of the county (24.9%) and state (28.2%) officers were wearing body armor when slain. Twelve percent (11.5%) of the federal officers and one of 43 Puerto Rican officers (2.3%) were wearing body armor when slain (Table 4-97).

TABLE 4-97
OFFICERS WEARING BODY ARMOR
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

WEARING BODY ARMOR	AGENCY TYPE						
	MUNICIPAL	County	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total	
No	254	142	56	23	42	517	
	69.0	75.1	71.8	88.5	97.7	73.5	
Yes	114	47	22	3	1	186	
	31.0	24.9	28.2	11.5	2.3	26.5	
COLUMN TOTAL	368	189	78	26	43	703	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 10

Number Column Percent

Presence of Other Officers. Federal officers were most likely and state officers least likely to have another officer in their immediate presence at the time of attack. Only one-fifth (21.3%) of the state officers had another officer immediately present at the time of attack, compared to 27.5, 37, 38.7, and 53.8 percent of the officers in Puerto Rico, municipal officers, county officers and federal officers, respectively (Table 4-98).

Officer's Final Action. The final action of one-fourth (22.7%) of the federal officers was talking. One-fifth (18.5%) of the state officers were approaching the suspect, for

TABLE 4-98

PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER
AT THE TIME OF ATTACK
BY AGENCY TYPE
1983-1992

	AGENCY TYPE							
Presence of Other Officers	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	STATE	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total		
No	218	111	59	12	29	428		
	63.0	61.3	78.7	46.2	72.5	64.2		
Yes	128	70	16	14	11	239		
	37.0	38.7	21.3	53.8	27.5	35.8		
COLUMN TOTAL	346	181	75	26	40	667		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Number Column Percent

instance, a suspect in a vehicle. Thirteen percent (12.3%) of the county officers and 8 percent of the municipal officers were entering a building or room when slain. A relatively large proportion of the Puerto Rican officers (13.2%) were driving when slain and a relatively large proportion of federal officers were killed immediately after they identified themselves as officers (Table 4-99).

# <u>Summary</u>

Municipal Officers. Three-fourths (73.9%) of the slain municipal officers were front line officers, that is, a large number were on foot (1.4%), one-person vehicle (52.2%), or two-person vehicle (14.1%) patrol. Four percent (3.5%) of the slain municipal officers were chiefs of police. Just under fifteen percent (14.1%) were off-duty. A larger percentage of municipal officers (17%) than state (12.9%) or county (10.1%) were not identifiable as law

enforcement personnel when slain. All but five (98.6%) of the officers were armed when killed. Forty percent (40.1%) of the slain municipal officers were dispatched to the incident which led to their deaths; another 29.8 percent initiated the interaction themselves. Eight percent (7.7%) of the slain municipal officers were ambushed and in four of every ten incidents (39.6%) the officer's first interaction with the assailant was the attack.

A plurality of municipal officers (38.4%) were slain while intervening in ongoing crimes. Another 16 percent were attempting arrests (though not for ongoing crimes) and another 15.1 percent were investigating suspicious persons or circumstances when slain. The crimes involved in the incidents were primarily robberies (13%), domestic disturbances (12.7%), and non-violent offenses other than burglaries and drug crimes (12.7%). Thirteen percent (12.7%) were responding to traffic violations. Eighteen of the 39 officers (46.2%) responding to robbery situations were intervening either in their own personal robbery victimizations or in the victimizations of the establishment they were in.

Just over 70 percent (70.4%) of the municipal officers were slain between the hours of 3 p.m. and 3 a.m. Forty-percent (38.2%) were roadside. Just under 30 percent (29%) were inside of a structure and a plurality (45.9%) were in residential areas. Seven out of ten (71.1%) of the municipal officers faced a single opponent when killed. Another 17.6 percent faced two. Three-fourths (72%) were shot with handguns and 15.8 percent were killed with their own service weapons. One-third (31%) of the officers were wearing body armor when slain.

TABLE 4-99 OFFICER'S FINAL ACTION BY AGENCY TYPE 1983-1992

		AGENCY TYPE								
FINAL ACTION	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	State	FEDERAL	Puerto Rico	Row TOTAL				
TALK	37 11.8	22 14.2	6 9.2	5 22.7	3 7.9	73 12.3				
APPROACH SUSPECT	27 8.6	12 7.7	12 18.5	1 4.5	6 15.8	58 9.8				
ENTER BUILDING OR ROOM	25 8.0	19 12.3	2 3.1	1 4.5	5.3	49 8.3				
ARREST KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	20 6.4	8 5.2	6 9.2	0	2 5.3	36 6.1				
Drive	11 3.5	8 5.2	6 9.2	1 4.5	5 13.2	31 5.2				
SEARCH	15 4.5	8 5.2	5 7.7	1 4.5	0	27 4.6				
Pursue	15 4.8	6 3.9	2 3.1	0.0	2 5.3	25 4.2				
Exit Vehicle	11 3.5	12 7.7	1 1.5	0	0 0.0	24 4.1				
APPROACH BUILDING	14 4.5	5 3.2	1 1.5	0	1 2.6	21 3.5				
ARREST OTHER PERSON (OR ATTEMPT)	11 3.5	4 2.6	1 1.5	0 0.0	0	16 2.7				
ESCORT SUSPECT/CITIZEN	9 2.9	4 2.6	2 3.1	0 0.0	1 2.6	16 2.7				
CALL DISPATCH	10 3.2	1 0.6	4 6.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	15 2.5				
UNHOLSTER WEAPON	4 1.3	3 1.9	1 1.5	1 4.5	5 13.2	14 2.4				
RESIST ROBBERY	5 1.6	2 1.3	1 1.5	1 4.5	3 7.9	12 2.0				
IDENTIFY SELF	4 1.3	2 1.3	1 1.5	3 13.6	1 2.6	11 1.9				
DISARM KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	6 1.9	2 1.3	1 1.5	1 4.5	1 2.6	11 1.9				
Approach Car W/o Suspect	2 0.6	4 2.6	1 -/1.6	0	0 0.0	7 1.2				

			AGENC	у Түре		
Final Action	MUNICIPAL	COUNTY	State	FEDERAL	PUERTO RICO	Row Total
OTHER	88	33	12	7	6	146
	28.1	21.3	18.5	31.8	15.8	24.7
COLUMN TOTAL	313	155	65	22	38	592
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Number Row Percent County Law Enforcement Officers. Like municipal agencies, three-fourths (75.1%) of the slain county officers were front line personnel. Almost six percent (5.8%) of the slain county officers were the sheriffs of the jurisdiction. More of the slain county officers (89.9%), than the other categories of officers, were identifiable as law enforcement officers when slain. A relatively large percentage of county officers (4.5%) were unarmed at the time of the attacks against them.

Most (53.4%) of the county officers were on one-person vehicle patrol when slain. One-fourth (22.2%) of these officers were on special assignment, for instance, working at jail facilities. One-third (35%) of the officers were dispatched to the incidents which led to their deaths, and another one-third (28.9%) were on assignment. As with the municipal officers, four of every ten (42.7%) slain county officers were killed at entry. That is, their first interactions with the assailants were the attacks. Over one-fourth (29.1%) of the county officers were intervening in ongoing crimes at the time of their deaths and another one-fifth (19.4%) were attempting arrests in situations where the crimes were not ongoing. Nonviolent crimes other than drug offenses or burglaries accounted for 15.4 percent of the incidents. Non-crime assistance, other than traffic, accounted for 12.6 percent of the incidents. Between 8 and 13 percent of the incidents involved the crime of robbery (12.6%), drugs (10.5), and traffic offenses (8.4%). In 8 of the 18 incidents which involved the crime of robbery, the officers were intervening either in their own personal robbery victimizations (5 incidents) or in the robbery victimizations of the establishments they were in (3 incidents). Two-thirds (61.4%) of the incidents involving county officers occurred during the hours of 3 p.m. and 3 a.m. One-third (30.6%) occurred inside structures and forty-three percent (43%)

occurred roadside. A relatively large proportion (47.6%) of county officers were killed in residential areas. Also, more county officers (12.7%) than any other agency type, were killed in government facilities, for instance, inside jails.

More county officers than any other type (75%), were facing a single opponent when slain. Only one assailant (0.6%) did not know that his victim was a law enforcement officer. County officers were more likely than municipal state and Puerto Rican officers to be killed with rifles (18%) and more likely to be killed with shotguns (11.1%). A relatively large proportion of county officers (21.2%) were disarmed, and 16.9% percent were killed with their own weapons. A smaller proportion (24.9%) of county officers than municipal (31%) and state officers (27.3%) were wearing body armor when killed.

State Officers. Three-fourths (76.9%) of the slain state officers were front line officers and ninety-nine percent (98.6%) were armed. More of the state officers (70.5%) than any other type of officers were on one-person vehicle patrol at the time they were attacked. Another 12.8 percent were on special assignment. Incidents involving state officers were more likely than incidents involving other types of officers to have a stage of anticipation (96.2%). A relatively large proportion (59.5%) of the incidents involving state officers were officer initiated; relatively few were dispatched (13.5%). One-third of these officers (35.8%) were killed at entry and close to half of the incidents involved the issuance of traffic citations (49.3%). A relatively large percentage (42.3%) of state officers were killed between 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. and a relatively large proportion (68.4%) were along rural roadsides when slain. In one-third (30.7%) of the incidents the state officers faced more than one opponent when slain.

State officers were somewhat more likely than other types of officers to be slain with sharp objects (3.8%). They were less likely than municipal and county officers, and more likely than federal and Puerto Rican officers, to be killed with their own service weapons (14.1%). One fourth (28.2%) of the state officers who were slain were wearing body armor. A larger proportion of state officers than any other group (18.5%) were approaching the suspect as their final act before the attack.

Federal Officers. Ninety-six percent (96.2%) of the slain federal officers were front line officers; the other 3.8 percent were supervisors. A far greater proportion of federal officers (59.1%) than municipal, county or state officers were not identifiable as law enforcement personnel when slain. Many of the Puerto Rico officers, too, were not identifiable as officers, but primarily as a result of being off duty when slain. In contrast, only 7.7 percent of the slain federal officers were off-duty when attacked, 50 percent were on special assignment, and 26.9 percent were working undercover when slain. Other than the incidents involving Puerto Rican officers, the incidents involving federal officers were least likely to have a stage of anticipation. Just 83.3 percent of the incidents provided those moments of anticipation, compared to up to 96.1 percent of the incidents involving state officers. More federal officers (75%) than any other group of officers were on assignment when slain. Though, as noted above, a large percentage of incidents involving federal officers were without a stage of anticipation, a relatively small percentage of federal officers were shot at entry. In terms of the activity in which the officers were involved at the time of attack, relatively large proportions of federal officers were on undercover assignments (26.1%) or executing search warrants (13%). Many more of these incidents, compared to

those of the other officer groups, involved drug offenses (40.9%). Federal officers, more than any other group, were killed during their own robbery victimizations. Five of the 24 (20.8%) federal officers were slain while intervening in their own robbery victimizations. Three of these officers were on duty at the time of their attacks. None of the slain federal officers was ambushed.

A relatively large proportion of federal officers (34.6%) were killed during the day, that is between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., and a relatively large proportion (36%) were killed outside, but not roadside, compared to other groups of officers. Federal officers were least likely to be slain in residential areas (11.1%) and were least likely to be facing a single opponent (37.5%) when slain. In four of the incidents (21.1% of the cases for which this information was available) in which a federal officer was slain, the opponents did not know their victims were law enforcement officers. All four of these officers were killed during their own robbery victimizations. A relatively large proportion (23.1%) of federal officers were killed with rifles. The final action of 22.7 percent of the slain federal officers was talking. The final action of 13.6 percent was identifying himself as an FBI agent.

Puerto Rican Officers. Most striking about the deaths of Puerto Rican officers is the proportion of them which were killed off duty and the number who were ambushed. Fortyone percent (40.9%) of the Puerto Rican officers were killed while off duty, compared to no more than 15 percent of the other officer groups. Half of the officers killed off-duty were killed intervening in either their own robberies or in the robberies of establishments which they were in. Overall, 23.3 percent of the slain Puerto Rican officers were killed during

personal robberies or during the robberies of the establishments they were in. Twenty-one percent (21.4%) were ambushed, compared to zero to 8 percent of the other officer groups.

A relatively large proportion (25%) of Puerto Rican officers were killed while on two-person vehicle patrol and a very large proportion (33.3%) of the incidents had no anticipation stage. Relatedly, in one-fourth (23.8%) of the incidents no police action was anticipated on the part of the officer when the event occurred. That is, the officer "walked in" on a crime or had a crime "walk in" on him. Forty-five percent (44.7%) of the Puerto Rican officers—more than any other group—were killed at entry. That is, the officer's first interaction with the opponent was the attack. In 55.6 percent of the incidents, the officers were intervening in ongoing crimes. This percentage, too, was larger than for any other officer group.

A relatively large proportion of Puerto Rican officers were slain inside structures (38.1%) and a majority of the incidents occurred in commercial environments. Half of the officers (47.6%) faced more than one opponent when slain.

Relatively few of the slain Puerto Rican officers (7%) were disarmed during the attack, and just one officer (2.3%) was slain with his own weapon. Only one officer (2.3%) was wearing body armor<sup>6</sup>.

# Characteristics of U.S. Officers and Incidents: By Region

As reported previously, of the 713 officers slain during the period 1983 through 1992,

The reports regarding the slaying of one other officer, mentioned earlier, were inconsistent with regard to whether or not he was wearing body armor.

82 (11.5%) were working in the Northeast, 329 (46.1%) were working in the South, 126 (17.7%) were working in the Midwest, 127 (17.8%) were working in the West, and the remaining 49 were working in Puerto Rico (6.7%) or in foreign territory (0.1%). In this section we focus on the 664 officers who were working in one of the four regions of the United States when slain. Table 4-100 provides the number and percentage of officers slain within each region of the U.S. for the period 1983 through 1992.

# Officer Characteristics

Agency Type. Relatively large proportions of the slain officers in the Northeast (76.5%) and Midwest (64.3%) were municipal officers. Less than 50 percent (47.4%) of the officers slain in the South were municipal officers. Instead, relatively large proportions of officers slain in the South worked for county agencies (34.7%) and state agencies (14.6%). Fifty-six percent (56.1%) of the officers slain in the West were municipal officers. Relatively large proportions worked for county agencies (29.3%) and for federal agencies (6.5%) (Table 4-101).

Of the slain county and municipal officers slain in the Northeast, over 50 percent were officers in cities with greater than 250,000 persons. Thus, the Northeast, which accounts for 12.9 percent of all of the slain city and county officers, accounts for over half of the officers slain in the largest cities. Conversely, though officers in the South comprised 48.6 percent of all city and county officers slain during 1983 through 1992, they only comprised 18.1 percent of the officers slain in the largest municipalities. Instead, 21.9 percent of the city and county officers slain in the South were from rural counties (Table 4-102).

TABLE 4-100

YEAR OF OFFICER'S DEATH
BY REGION
1983-1992

YEAR	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row Total
1983	5	37	13	18	73
	6.1	11.2	10.3	14.2	11.0
1984	10	37	10	13	70
	12.2	11.2	7.9	10.2	10.5
1985	11	36	14	10	71
	13.4	10.9	11.1	7.9	10.7
1986	6	32	11	13	62
	7.3	9.7	8.7	10.2	9.3
1987	12	28	17	16	73
	14.6	8.5	13.5	12.6	11.0
1988	7	38	12	19	76
	8.5	11.6	9.5	15.0	11.4
1989	9	32	8	9	58
	11.0	9.7	6.3	7.1	8.7
1990	7	31	14	9	61
	8.5	9.4	11.1	7.1	9.2
1991	7	29	20	7	63
	8.5	8.8	15.9	5.5	9.5
1992	8	29	7	13	57
	9.8	8.8	5.6	10.2	8.6
TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4-101

#### AGENCY TYPE BY REGION 1983-1992

	By Region						
AGENCY TYPE	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	West	Row Total		
MUNICIPAL	62	156	81	69	368		
	76.5	47.1	65.1	56.1	55.8		
COUNTY	10	114	28	36	188		
	12.3	34.7	22.2	29.3	28.5		
STATE	8	48	12	10	78		
	9.9	14.6	9.5	8.1	11.8		
FEDERAL	1 1.2	11 3.3	5 4.0	8 6.5	25 3.8		
COLUMN TOTAL	81	329	126	123	659		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 6

**TABLE 4-102** 

## JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES BY REGION 1983-1992

		By Region							
Jurisdicition Type/Size	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total				
Crries 250K	38	49	39	. 35	161				
	52.8	18.1	35.8	33.3	29.0				
CITIES 100K-250K	6	28	7	11	52				
	8.3	10.4	6.4	10.5	9.4				
Crries 25K-100K	11	23	16	10	60				
	15.3	8.5	14.7	9.5	10.8				
CITIES < 25K	7	56	19	13	95				
	9.7	20.7	17.4	12.4	17.1				
RURAL COUNTIES	0	59	10	11	80				
	0.0	21.9	9.2	10.5	14.4				
SURBURBAN COUNTIES	10	55	18	25	108				
	13.9	20.4	16.5	23.8	19.4				
Column Total	72	270	109	105	556				
	12.9	48.6	19.6	18.9	100.0				

Missing = 0

Gender and Race. The largest percentages of slain females (5.6%) and slain blacks (19.8%) were in the Midwest (Table 4-103 and 4-104). Just 2.4 percent of the officers slain in the West were black.

TABLE 4-103
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER
BY REGION
1983-1992

			By Region		
SEX OF OFFICER	Northeast	South	Midwest	WEST	Row Total
Male	80 97.6	325 98.8	119 94.4	124 97.6	648 97.6
FEMALE	2 2.4	4 1.2	7 5.6	3 2.4	16 2.4
COLUMN TOTAL	82 100.0	329 100.0	126 100.0	127 100.0	664 100.0

Missing = 0

#### Number Column Percent

Rank and Experience. In terms of rank, the South had the largest percentage of top administrators killed in the line of duty. Just under 5 percent (4.9%) of the officers slain in the South were the top administrators, compared to between 1.2 and 3.2 percent of the officers in the other regions (Table 4-105). The South also, however, had a relatively large proportion of officers slain with less than five years of experience (Table 4-106). Forty percent (39.5%) of the officers slain in the South and 35.3 percent of the officers slain in the Northeast had less than five years of experience. In contrast, the corresponding figures for the Midwest and West are 27.4 and 23.8 percent. Over half (50.8%) of the officers slain in the Midwest had over 10 years of experience.

**TABLE 4-104** 

#### RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER BY REGION 1983-1992

	By Region							
Race of Officer	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row TOTAL			
Wнгге	68	290	101	120	579			
	82.9	88.1	80.2	94.5	87.2			
BLACK	14	39	25	3	81			
	17.1	11.9	19.8	2.4	12.2			
OTHER	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0	4 3.1	4 0.6			
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0 Number Column Percent

# TABLE 4-105 RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER BY REGION 1983-1992

		By Region						
RANK OF OFFICER	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total			
FRONT LINE	66	238	97	98	499			
	80.5	72.3	77.0	77.2	75.2			
SUPERVISOR/	15	75	25	26	141			
DETECTIVE	18.3	22.8	19.8	20.5	21.2			
TOP	1 1.2	16	4	3	24			
ADMINISTRATOR		4.9	3.2	2.4	3.6			
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0
Number
Column Percent

TABLE 4-106

OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
BY REGION
1983-1992

		By Region					
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total		
LESS THAN ONE	1	20	5	5	31		
	1.2	6.1	4.0	4.0	4.7		
1 Through 4	28	110	29	25	192		
	34.1	33.4	23.4	19.8	29.0		
5 Through 10	25	88	27	51	191		
	30.5	26.7	21.8	40.5	28.9		
11 or More	28	111	63	45	247		
	34.1	33.7	50.8	35.7	37.4		
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	124	126	661		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

#### Number Column Percent

Uniform and Weaponry. One-third (31.2%) of the officers slain in the Northeast were not identifiable as police officers (Table 4-107). In the other three regions, the corresponding figures were less than 15 percent. Over 97 percent of the officers slain in each region were armed (Table 4-108).

Assignment. Officers on one-person vehicle patrol comprised at least one-half of the slain officers in the South (58.7%), West (53.5%), and Midwest (50%) (Table 4-109). In contrast, just one-third (34.1%) of the slain officers from the Northeast were on one-person vehicle patrol. Relatively large proportions of officers slain in the Northeast were detectives (8.5%) or off-duty (22%).

TABLE 4-107
VICTIM IDENTIFIABLE AS A POLICE OFFICER
BY REGION

1983-1992

IDENTIFIABLE AS POLICE OFFICER			By Region		
	NORTHEAST	South	Midwest	West	Row Total
No	24	46	13	17	100
	31.2	14.7	10.8	14.4	15.9
YES	53	267	107	101	528
	68.8	85.3	89.2	85.6	84.1
COLUMN TOTAL	77	313	120	118	628
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 36

Number Column Percent

**TABLE 4-108** 

# OFFICER ARMED WITH WEAPON BY REGION 1983-1992

	By Region							
ARMED WITH WEAPON	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row Total			
No	2	6	3	3	14			
	2.7	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.2			
Yes, Gun	72	305	118	117	612			
	97.3	98.1	97.5	97.5	97.8			
COLUMN TOTAL	74	311	121	120	626			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 38

TABLE 4-109
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT

BY REGION 1983-1992

			By Region		
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row Total
FOOT PATROL	3	1	0	2	6
	3.7	0.3	0.0	1.6	0.9
1 OFFICER	28	193	63	68	352
VEHICLE	34.1	<b>5</b> 8.7	50.0	53.5	53.0
2 Officer	12	27	19	13	72
Vehicle	14.6	8.2	15.1	10.2	10.7
DETECTIVE	7	13	5	5	30
	8.5	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.5
SPECIAL	11	46	24	20	101
ASSIGNMENT	13.4	14.0	19.0	15.7	15.2
Undercover	3.7	17 5.1	1 0.8	6 4.7	27 4.1
OFF DUTY	18	32	14	13	77
	22.0	9.7	11.1	10.2	11.6
Column Total	82	329	126	127	664
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

# **Incident Characteristics**

Anticipation. A relatively large proportion of the incidents involving officers from the Northeast had no stage of anticipation (Table 4-110). Thirteen percent (12.8%) of the incidents in the Northeast lacked an anticipation stage, compared to less than 9 percent of the incidents occurring in the other three regions.

TABLE 4-110

EXISTENCE OF AN ANTICIPATION STAGE
BY REGION
1983-1992

		By Region						
ANTICIPATION STAGE	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	West	Row Total			
No	10	27	9	9	55			
	12.8	8.4	7.4	7.4	8.6			
YES	68	294	113	113	588			
	87.2	91.6	92.6	92.6	91.4			
COLUMN TOTAL	78	321	122	122	643			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 21

Number Column Percent

Initiation Mode. Incidents occurring in the Midwest and West were more likely than the incidents in the other two regions to have been initiated by dispatch (Table 4-111). Incidents occurring in the Northeast and South were more likely to have been officer initiated. The largest percentage of incidents (8.3%) in which the officer was ambushed was in the South.

TABLE 4-111
INCIDENT INITIATION MODE
BY REGION
1983-1992

	By Region						
Initiation Mode	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	West	Row Total		
DISPATCH	20	99	50	45	214		
	25.0	31.6	41.0	38.8	33.9		
Assignment	15	63	24	31	133		
	18.8	20.1	19.7	26.7	21.1		
CITIZEN	3	7	4	3	17		
CONTACT	3.8	2.2	3.3	2.6	2.7		
OFFICER	29	107	31	29	196		
INITIATED	36.3	34.2	25.4	25.0	31.1		
POLICE ACTION	8	11	7	3	29		
UNANTICIPATED	10.0	3.5	5.7	2.6	4.6		
Амвизн	5	26	6	5	42		
	6.3	8.3	4.9	4.3	6.7		
COLUMN TOTAL	80	313	122	116	631		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Killed at Entry. In one-half (50%) of the incidents occurring in the West, the officer was killed upon entry (Table 4-112). The corresponding figures for the South, Midwest, and Northeast, are 39.1, 35.1, and 31.1 percent, respectively.

TABLE 4-112
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY REGION
1983-1992

OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY	By Region						
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row TOTAL		
No	51	176	74	56	357		
	68.9	60.9	64.9	50.0	60.6		
Yes	23	113	40	56	232		
	31.1	39.1	35.1	50.0	39.4		
COLUMN TOTAL	74	289	114	112	589		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 124

Number Column Percent

Police Activity and Crime/Circumstances Type. The proportions of officers across the regions engaging in the various types of law enforcement activities were very similar (Table 4-113). There were some modest differences among regions with regard to the crime/circumstances of the incidents which led to the officers deaths (Table 4-114). Relatively large proportions of incidents in the Northeast involved robberies (16.7%) and non-domestic disturbances (10.6%). A relatively large percentage (18.6%) of the incidents in the South involved traffic violations. Incidents in which Midwest officers were slain

TABLE 4-113
INCIDENT ACTIVITY
BY REGION
1983-1992

			By Region		
INCIDENT ACTIVITY	NORTHEAST	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row Total
Investigate	12	35	15	21	83
Suspicious	16.2	11.7	12.6	18.1	13.7
Intervene in	25	85	39	41	190
Ongoing Crime	33.8	28.5	32.8	35.3	31.3
Investigate Completed Crime	2 2.7	8 2.7	4 3.4	0	14 2.3
Issue Citation	11	47	11	12	81
	14.9	15.8	9.2	10.3	13.3
ATTEMPT ARREST	9	58	19	16	102
	12.2	19.5	16.0	13.8	16.8
SEARCH WARRANT	3	12	5	9	29
	4.1	4.0	4.2	7.8	4.8
Undercover	3 4.1	13 4.4	1 0.8	4 3.4	21 3.5
HANDLING	3	11	5	2	21
PRISONER/PATIENT	4.1	3.7	4.2	1.7	3.5
Non Crime	3	9	6	4	22
	4.1	3.0	5.0	3.4	3.6
OTHER	3	20	14	7	44
	4.1	6.7	11.8	6.0	7.2
COLUMN TOTAL	74	298	119	116	607
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 4-114

CRIME\CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCIDENT
BY REGION
1983-1992

			By Region		
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCE Type	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row
MURDER	3.0	10 3.9	7 6.6	7 6.7	26 4.9
ROBBERY	11	30	11	13	65
	16.7	11.6	10.4	12.4	12.1
DISTURBANCE CALL	7 10.6	20 7.8	6 5.7	8 7.6	41 7.7
DOMESTIC	6	24	14	11	55
DISTURBANCE	9.1	9.3	13.2	10.5	10.3
OTHER VIOLENT	6	15	7	8	36
CRIME	9.1	5.8	6.6	7.6	6.7
Burglary	2	15	10	5	32
	3.0	5.8	9.4	4.8	6.0
Drugs	7	31	7	18	63
	10.6	12.0	6.6	17.1	11.8
OTHER NON	7	37	16	15	75
VIOLENT CRIME	10.6	14.3	15.1	14.3	14.0
Traffic	11	48	16	10	85
	16.7	18.6	15.1	9.5	15.9
OTHER NON CRIME	5	21	9	6	41
	7.6	8.1	8.5	5.7	7.7
OTHER	2	7	3	4	16
	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.8	3.0
OLUMN TOTAL	66	258	106	105	535
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

involved relatively large proportions of domestic disturbances (13.2%) and burglaries (9.4%). A relatively large proportion of the incidents occurring in the West involved drug crimes. The largest proportion of slayings which occurred during personal robbery victimizations were in the Northeast (Table 4-115). Seven percent (7.4%) of the killings in the Northeast involved personal robbery victimizations and an additional 3.7 percent occurred during the robberies of the establishment where the officers were.

TABLE 4-115

OFFICER SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION
BY REGION
1983-1992

	By Region					
Officer Slain During Victimization	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	West	Row Total	
No	72	312	120	120	624	
	88.9	96.0	95.2	96.8	95.1	
Yes, Personal	6	9	6	4	25	
Victimization	7.4	2.8	4.8	3.2	3.8	
YES, ESTABLISHMENT VICTIMIZATION	3 3.7	4 1.2	0	0 0.0	7	
COLUMN TOTAL	81	325	126	124	656	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 8

#### Number Column Percent

Time of Attack. More of the slayings in the South (40.7%) and Midwest (38.9%), compared to the Northeast (28.0%) and West (32.3%), occurred during the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. (Table 4-116). Conversely, more of the slayings in the Northeast (22%) and West (22%), compared to the South (16.4%) and Midwest (17.5%), occurred during the hours of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.

TABLE 4-116
TIME OF ATTACK
BY REGION
1983-1992

TIME OF ATTACK		By Region						
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total			
9 p.m. To 3 a.m.	23	134	49	41	247			
	28.0	40.7	38.9	32.3	37.2			
3 A.M. TO 9 A.M.	15	37	17	17	86			
	18.3	11.2	13.5	13.4	13.0			
9 а.м. То 3 р.м.	18	54	22	28	122			
	22.0	16.4	17.5	22.0	18.4			
3 р.м. То 9 р.м.	26	104	38	41	209			
	31.7	31.6	30.2	32.3	31.5			
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0
Number
Column Percent

Location of Attack. Similar proportions of officers within all four regions were killed in residential and commercial environments (Table 4-117). Slightly more officers in the Midwest (10.6%), compared to the other regions, were slain while in government buildings or areas. The highest proportion of officers slain while inside a structure were from the Midwest (34.4%) (Table 4-118). More of the officers from the South (27.9%) and West (30%), compared to the other two regions were killed while outside, but not roadside. Officers from the Northeast (50%) and South (47.3%) were most likely to be slain while roadside.

Number of Opponents. Proportionately more officers in the Northeast were facing more than one opponent when slain (Table 4-119). Thirty-eight percent (38.2%) of the officers in the Northeast faced two or more opponents, compared to 28.6 percent, 28.4 percent, and 27.9 percent in the Midwest, South, and West, respectively.

TABLE 4-117
OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN
BY REGION
1983-1992

		By Region					
Environment	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row Total		
RESIDENTIAL	29	115	47	50	241		
	43.9	41.8	45.2	49.0	44.1		
COMMERCIAL	13	56	20	19	108		
	19.7	20.4	19.2	18.6	19.7		
RESIDENTIAL/	17	40	20	12	89		
COMMERCIAL	25.8	14.5	19.2	11.8	16.3		
GOVERNMENT	2	18	11	7	38		
	3.0	6.5	10.6	6.9	6.9		
OTHER	5	46	6	14	71		
	7.6	16.7	5.8	13.7	13.0		
Column Total	66	275	104	102	547		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

TABLE 4-118

LOCATION OF OFFICER, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE, WHEN SLAIN
BY REGION
1983-1992

	<del></del>	By Region ·						
TIME OF ATTACK	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	West	Row Total			
Inside	21	70	42	34	167			
	27.6	22.2	34.4	28.3	26.4			
OUTSIDE, NOT	15	88	26	36	165			
ROADSIDE	19.7	27.9	21.3	30.0	26.1			
OUTSIDE, ROADSIDE	38	149	45	43	275			
	50.0	47.3	36.9	35.8	43.4			
Outside, Unknown	2	8	9	7	26			
	2.6	2.5	7.4	5.8	4.1			
COLUMN TOTAL	76	315	122	120	633			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

TABLE 4-119

NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS WHEN SLAIN
BY REGION
1983-1992

		By Region						
Number of Threatening Persons	Northeast	South	Midwest	WEST	Row Total			
None	1 1.2	1 0.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 0.3			
One	49	221	88	85	443			
	60.5	71.3	71.5	72.0	70.1			
Two	21	58	20	19	118			
	25.9	18.7	16.3	16.1	18.7			
Тнкее	6	11	7	3	27			
	7.4	3.5	5.7	2.5	4.3			
Four	1	8	4	6	19			
	1.2	2.6	3.3	5.1	3.0			
FIVE OR MORE	1 1.2	4 1.3	4 3.3	3 2.5	12 1.9			
GROUP OF UNKNOWN SIZE	2	7	0	2	11			
	2.5	2.3	0.0	1.7	1.7			
COLUMN TOTAL	81	310	123	118	632			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Assailant's Knowledge of Officer's Status. Though, as noted above, one-third of the officers slain in the Northeast were not identifiable as police officers by their vehicles or clothing, in only 3 percent of the incidents did it appear that the assailants were unaware that their victims were law enforcement officers (Table 4-120). Similarly, in only 2 to 3.4 percent of the instances within other regions were the assailants unaware that they were attacking law enforcement officers.

TABLE 4-120
ASSAILANT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER
BY REGION
1983-1992

Assailant Knew Victim Was A Police Officer	By Region					
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total	
No	2	6	3	4	15	
	3.0	2.0	2.5	3.4	2.5	
YES	64	298	116	113	591	
	97.0	98.0	97.5	96.6	97.5	
COLUMN TOTAL	66	304	119	117	606	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 58

#### Number Column Percent

Weapons. Over 65 percent of the officers slain in each of the regions were slain with handguns (Table 4-121). Proportionately fewer (7.3%) officers in the Northeast were slain with rifles and proportionately more (10.9%) of the officers in the South were slain with shotguns. Just under 8 percent (7.9%) of the officers killed in the Midwest were slain with vehicles. This is larger than the corresponding percentages within the other three regions.

TABLE 4-121 WEAPON USED BY REGION 1983-1992

		By Region						
Weapon Used	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total			
HANDGUN	59	227	82	86	454			
	72.0	69.0	65.1	67.7	68.4			
RIFLE	6	40	21	25	92			
	7.3	12.2	16.7	19.7	13.9			
SHOTGUN	7	36	8	6	57			
	8.5	10.9	6.3	4.7	8.6			
SHARP OBJECT	3	6	2	2	13			
	3.7	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.0			
BLUNT OBJECT	1 1.2	3 0.9	2 1.6	3 2.4	9			
Вомв	1 1.2	1 0.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 0.3			
PERSONAL WEAPONS	1	3	1	/ 1	6			
	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9			
VEHICLE	4	12	10	2	28			
	4.9	3.6	7.9	1.6	4.2			
OTHER	0	1	0	2	3			
	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.6	0.5			
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Officers in the Northeast were least likely (8.8%) to be disarmed during the attack and least likely (7.3) to be slain with their own weapons. (See Tables 4-122 and 4-123.)

TABLE 4-122
OFFICER DISARMED DURING ATTACK
BY REGION
1983-1992

Officer Disarmed	By Region					
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total	
No	73	259	97	101	530	
	91.3	79.7	80.2	81.5	81.5	
YES	7	66	24	23	120	
	8.8	20.3	19.8	18.5	18.5	
COLUMN TOTAL	80	325	121	124	650	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 14 Number Column Percent

TABLE 4-123

## OFFICERS KILLED WITH THEIR OWN SERVICE WEAPONS BY REGION 1983-1992

Killed With Own Weapon	By Region					
	Northeast	South	Midwest	WEST	Row TOTAL	
No	76	271	104	110	561	
	92.7	82.4	82.5	86.6	84.5	
YES	6	58	22	17	103	
	7.3	17.6	17.5	13.4	15.5	
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 0

Body Armor. Forty-four percent (44.1%) of the officers slain in the West were wearing body armor (Table 4-124). This compares to just 31.7, 28.6, and 21 percent of the officers in the Northeast, Midwest, and South, respectively.

TABLE 4-124

OFFICERS WEARING BODY ARMOR
BY REGION
1983-1992

Officer Wearing Body Armor		By Region				
	Northeast	South	MIDWEST	WEST	Row TOTAL	
No	56	260	90	71	477	
	68.3	79.0	71.4	55.9	71.8	
Yes	26	69	36	56	187	
	31.7	21.0	28.6	44.1	28.2	
COLUMN TOTAL	82	329	126	127	664	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Missing = 0

Number Column Percent

Presence of Other Officers. A smaller proportion of officers in the South had fellow officers in their immediate vicinity when slain (Table 4-125). Thirty-percent (29.6%) of the officers in this region had at least one other officer in his/her immediate presence, compared to over 42 percent of the officers in each of the other three regions.

TABLE 4-125

PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER
AT THE TIME OF ATTACK
BY REGION
1983-1992

Presence of Other Officers	By Region						
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row		
No	47	219	67	67	400		
	57.3	70.4	56.8	55.8	63.4		
Yes	35	92	51	53	231		
	42.7	29.6	43.2	44.2	36.6		
COLUMN TOTAL	82	311	118	120	631		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Number Column Percent

Officer's Final Action. Relatively more of the officers in the Northeast, compared to the other regions, were arresting (or attempting to arrest) persons other than their assailants (8.6%), or were resisting robberies (5.7%) as their final actions prior to being slain. (See Table 4-126.) Officers in the South were more likely to be approaching a suspect (12.2%) or arresting (or attempting to arrest) their assailants (9.2%). Along with officers in the West, the officers in the Midwest were more frequently entering buildings or rooms when slain. A relatively large proportion of officers in the West (9.3%) were executing searches when slain.

# Summary

Northeast. A relatively large proportion (76.5%) of the officers slain in the Northeast worked for municipal departments and a relatively small proportion (12.3%)

worked for county agencies. As with the Midwest, a relatively large proportion (17.1%) of the officers slain in the Northeast were black. The Northeast was the region with the smallest proportions of supervisor/detectives (18.3%) and top administrators (1.2%) among the slain officers. A full one-third (35.3%) of the officers slain in this region had less than five years of experience. Officers slain within this region were least likely to be identifiable as law enforcement personnel. One-third of the officers slain in the Northeast were not identifiable as officers via uniforms or vehicles, though the narratives indicated that in just two of the incidents (3%), the opponents did not appear to be aware that their victims were law enforcement officers.

Consistent with the above, the Northeast region had the highest percentage of officers killed while off-duty. One-fifth (22%) of the officers were off-duty when attacked. The Northeast also had a relatively large proportion of detectives (8.5%) who were slain. The plurality (34.1%) were on one-officer vehicle patrol.

Incidents in which Northeastern officers were slain were least likely to include a stage of anticipation. As with the South, a full one-third (36.3%) of the officers slain in the Northeast were slain during officer-initiated incidents.

Officers in this region were least likely to be killed at entry. One-third (33.8%) of these officers were intervening in an ongoing crime when attacked. Proportionately more of the officers in the Northeast compared to their counterparts from the other regions were dealing with robberies (16.7%) or with (non-domestic) disturbance calls (10.6%) at the time of their deaths.

TABLE 4-126
OFFICER'S FINAL ACTION
BY REGION
1983-1992

Officer's Final Action	By Region						
	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total		
TALK	10	41	11	8	70		
	14.3	15.1	10.2	7.4	12.6		
APPROACH SUSPECT	3	33	5	11	52		
	4.3	12.2	4.6	10.2	9.3		
ENTER BUILDING	3	15	14	15	47		
OR ROOM	4.3	5.5	13.0	13.9	8.4		
Arrest Killer	4	25	3.7	2	35		
(or Attempt)	5.7	9.2		1.9	6.3		
Drive	4	10	8	4	26		
	5.7	3.7	7.4	3.7	4.7		
SEARCH	0.0	13 4.8	4 3.7	10 9.3	27 4.8		
Pursue	3	9	4	7	23		
	4.3	3.3	3.7	6.5	4.1		
EXIT VEHICLE	2	10	6	6	24		
	2.9	3.7	5.6	5.6	4.3		
Approach Building	2 2.9	14 5.2	1 0.9	4 3.7	21 3.8		
ARREST OTHER PERSON (OR ATTEMPT)	6	6	4	0	16		
	8.6	2.2	3.7	0.0	2.9		
ESCORT	0	12	3	0	15		
SUSPECT/CITIZEN		4.4	2.8	0.0	2.7		
CALL DISPATCH	3	4	4	4	15		
	4.3	1.5	3.7	3.7	2.7		
Unholster Weapon	0	7	1	1	9		
	0.0	2.6	0.9	0.9	1.6		
RESIST ROBBERY	4 5.7	3 1.1	1 0.9	1 0.9	9 1.6		
Identify Self	3	1	3	3	10		
	4.3	0.4	2.8	2.8	1.8		
Disarm Killer	0	4	5	1	10		
(or Attempt)	0.0	1.5	4.6	0.9	1.8		

	By Region					
Officer's Final Action	Northeast	South	Midwest	West	Row Total	
APPROACH CAR	0	5	0	2	7 1.3	
W/o Suspect	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.9		
OTHER	23	59	30	29	141	
	32.9	21.8	27.8	26.9	25.3	
COLUMN TOTAL	70	271	108	108	557	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

One in every ten (11.1%) of the officers in the Northeast were slain during incidents in which they were personally robbed (7.4%) or in establishments which were robbed (3.7%). In fact, these types of robberies comprised 9 of the 11 incidents in which officers were slain in connection with robberies.

Officers slain in the Northeast were more likely than officers from the other regions to be attacked during the hours of 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. (18.3%). They were least likely to be attacked during the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. (28%).

Forty-four percent (43.9%) of the officers in this region were slain in residential areas; another 19.7 percent were slain in commercial areas. (For another 25.8% it was unclear if the area was residential or commercial.) Along with officers from the South, a relatively large proportion (50%) of officers slain in the Northeast region were roadside at the time of the attack.

Officers in the Northeast were the least likely to be facing a single opponent when attacked. Instead, one-quarter (25.9%) were facing two opponents and 9.8 percent were facing three or more.

Officers in the Northeast were slightly more likely than their counterparts in other regions to be killed with handguns and less likely to be slain with rifles. Of all four regions, the Northeast had the smallest proportion of officers (8.8%) who were disarmed during the attacks, and the smallest proportion of officers (7.3%) who were slain with their own weapons. One-third (31.7%) were wearing body armor and 42.7 percent had at least one other officer in the immediate vicinity when slain.

South. Relatively large percentages of officers slain in the South between 1983 and 1992 worked for county agencies (35%) and state agencies (14.6%); a relatively small proportion (47.1%) worked for municipal agencies. Twelve percent (11.9%) of the slain officers were black.

Compared to the other regions, the South experienced proportionately more deaths of supervisors/detectives and top administrators. Twenty-three percent (22.8%) of the slain officers were supervisors/detectives, and 4.9 percent were the top administrators of their agencies. A relatively large proportion (39.5%) of the officers slain in the South had less than five years of experience.

Six of every ten slain officers were working one-officer vehicle patrol when slain. The corresponding percentages in the other three regions were between 34 and 54 percent. One-third (31.6%) of the incidents in the South were initiated by dispatch; another one-third (34.2%) of the incidents were officer initiated. Forty percent of the officers in the South were slain at entry. This percentage was higher than in the Northeast and Midwest, and lower than the 50 percent figure in the West. Most of the officers in this region were intervening in ongoing crimes (28.5%), attempting arrests (19.5%), or issuing citations (15.8%) when attacked. One-fifth (18.6%) of the officers were involved in traffic-related incidents when slain.

Along with the Midwest, the South had a relatively large proportion of officers (40.7%) who were slain between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. Forty-two percent (41.8%) were slain in residential areas; 20.4 percent were slain in commercial areas, and in 14.5 percent of the

incidents it was unclear whether the environment was residential or commercial. As with the Northeast, the South lost a relatively large proportion (47.3%) of their officers roadside.

One in ten (10.9%) of the officers slain in the South were killed with shotguns and two in ten (20.3%) were disarmed during the attacks. Along with the Midwest, a relatively large proportion (17.6%) of officers were slain with their own weapons. Just one-fifth (21%) of the officers slain in the South were wearing body armor. This was the lowest percentage of the four regions. Officers in the South were least likely to have immediate assistance of other officers when slain. Just 29.6 percent had such assistance.

Midwest. Two-thirds (65.1%) of the officers slain in the Midwest worked for municipal agencies. Another 21.4 percent worked for county agencies. The Midwest was the region with the highest percentage of slain female officers, at 5.6%, and slain black officers, at 19.8%. Just over half (50.8%) of the officers slain in the Midwest had 11 or more years of experience. The corresponding percentages for the other three regions were all less than 36 percent. Relatively few (10.8%) of the officers slain in the Midwest were not identifiable as officers at the time of their attacks.

On one-officer vehicle patrol, special assignment, and two-officer vehicle patrol were 50.0 percent, 19.0 percent, and 15.1 percent of the officers in the Midwest, respectively. Eleven percent (11.1%) were off-duty. Incidents in the Midwest were more likely than those in the Northeast and South to be dispatched (41%) and less likely than those in the Northeast and South to be officer-initiated. One-third of the officers (35.1%) were killed at entry.

One-third of the officers (32.8%) were intervening in ongoing crimes when slain;

another 16 percent were attempting arrests. The Midwest had the highest percentages of incidents which involved domestic disturbances (13.2%) or burglaries (9.4%). The plurality (38.9%) of officers slain in this region were killed between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. Forty-five percent (45.2%) were attacked in residential areas. One in every ten (10.6%) of the Midwest officers were slain in a governmental environment, for instance, a jail or police station. A relatively large proportion (34.4%) were inside when slain.

Seventy-two percent (71.5%) faced a single opponent. A relatively large percentage, 7.9 percent, were killed with vehicles. Along with the South, a large percentage (17.5%) of the officers from the Midwest were killed with their own weapons. Forty-three percent (43.2%) had the assistance of at least one other officer.

West. Fifty-six percent (56.1%) of the officers slain in the West worked for municipal agencies; another 29.3 percent worked for county agencies. Only 2.4 percent of the slain officers in the West were black. Between 11 and 20 percent of the officers slain in the other three regions were black. Just one-fourth (23.8%) of the officers slain in the West had less than five years of experience. A plurality (40.5%) had between five and ten years of experience. Like the South and Midwest, over fifty percent of the officers slain in the West were on one-officer vehicle patrol when attacked. Just under 40 percent (38.8%) were dispatched, and one-fourth (25%) were officer-initiated incidents.

A full one-half of the officers in the West were slain at entry. This was higher than the corresponding percentages of the other regions (between 31 and 40 percent). One-third of the officers were intervening in ongoing crimes when slain; another 18.1 percent were

investigating suspicious persons or circumstances. The percentage of officers responding to drug-related incidents was higher in the West (17.1%) than the other three regions.

Half (49%) of the officers slain in the West were attacked in residential areas. Over one-third (35.8%) were roadside when attacked, and another 30 percent were outside, but not roadside when slain. Seventy-two percent (72%) were facing a single opponent.

Two-thirds (67.7%) were killed with handguns and 19.7 percent were slain with rifles. One in five (18.5%) was disarmed, and 13.4% were slain with their own service weapons. More of the slain officers in the West (44.1%) than in the other three regions were slain while wearing body armor.

### Characteristics of Officers and Incidents: By City and County Jurisdiction Size

In this section we explore how the characteristics of incidents which result in the felonious killings of officers vary across jurisdictions of different sizes and types. For municipal and county agencies represented in the LEOKA data base, the FBI records the size of the jurisdiction. The categories are (1) cities with 250,000 or more persons, (2) cities with 100,000 to 249,999 persons, (3) cities with 25,000 to 99,999, (4) cities with less than 25,000 persons, (5) rural counties, and (6) suburban counties. The designation is not relevant to the state, federal, and Puerto Rican agencies, and thus they are not included in the descriptions in this section.

Table 4-127 provides a break down of the municipal and county agencies within each of the categories listed above. In the data base, there are 161 agencies serving cities of 250,000 or more persons. (The Jacksonville Sheriff's Department was included in this group

as the county and city perimeters are the same.) There are 52 municipal departments in the data base which serve 100,000 to 249,999 persons, 60 serving 25,000 to 99,999 persons, and 95 serving municipalities with less than 25,000 persons. Among county agencies in the data base, 80 are rural and 108 are suburban.

#### Officer Characteristics

Gender and Race. Of the slain officers which were employed by municipal agencies serving cities of 25,000 to 100,000, 6.7 percent were female. None of the other agency types had more than 3.1 percent slain officers who were female (Table 4-128). One-fifth (21.1%) of the slain officers employed by cities with more than 250,000 persons were black. This percentage was higher than for any of the other agency types (Table 4-129).

Rank and Experience. None of the slain officers from cities with over 25,000 persons in the population or from suburban counties were the top administrators of the agencies they were serving. In contrast, 13.7% of the slain officers working cities with less than 25,000 persons, and 13.8 percent of the slain officers working for rural counties were the top administrators of their agencies (Table 4-130).

Slain officers who were working for the smallest municipalities (with populations of less than 25,000) were most likely to have less than five years of experience with their agencies. Forty-five percent (45.7%) of the officers in these jurisdictions had less than five years of experience, compared to less than 35 percent of the officers from the other types of agencies (Table 4-131).

#### **TABLE 4-127**

#### TYPE OF AGENCY BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE 1983-1992

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
AGENCY TYPE	Crries 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries < 25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total			
MUNICIPAL	161 100.0	52 100.0	60 100.0	95 100.0	0 0.0	0	368 66.2			
COUNTY	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	80 100.0	108 100.0	188 33.8			
Column Total	161 100.0	52 100.0	60 100.0	95 100.0	80 100.0	108 100.0	556 100.0			

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-128** 

### SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			JURISDIC	TION TYPE/SIZ	E		
SEX OF VICTIM	Crries	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
MALE	156	51	56	94	78	106	541
	96.9	98.1	93.3	98.9	97.5	98.1	97.3
FEMALE	5 3.1	1 1.9	4 6.7	1 1.1	2 2.5	2 1.9	15 2.7
Column Total	161	52	60	95	80	108	556
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

TABLE 4-129

#### RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
RACE OF VICTIM	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row				
	250K +	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total				
Wнгге	127	48	57	84	70	93	479				
	78.9	92.3	95.0	88.4	87.5	86.1	86.2				
BLACK	34	4	3	10	9	13	73				
	21.1	7.7	5.0	10.5	11.3	12.0	13.1				
Отнек	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 1.1	1 1.3	2 1.9	4 0.7				
Column Total	161	52	60	95	80	108	556				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-130** 

#### RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	Jurisdiction Type/Size									
RANK OF VICTIM	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total			
FRONT LINE	130	38	46	58	60	81	413			
	80.7	73.1	76.7	61.1	75.0	75.0	74.3			
SUPERVISOR/	31	14	14	24	9	27	119			
DETECTIVE	19.3	26.9	23.3	25.3	11.3	25.0	21.4			
TOP	0	0	0	13	11	0	24			
Administrator	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.7	13.8	0.0	4.3			
Column Total	161	52	60	95	80	108	556			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-131** 

#### OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			JURISDIC	TION TYPE/SIZ	E		
YEARS OF	CITIES 250K+	CITIES	Cities	CITIES	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
EXPERIENCE		100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
LESS THAN ONE	4	1	2	11	5	5	28
	2.5	1.9	3.3	11.7	6.3	4.6	5.1
1 Through 4	52	14	17	32	17	32	164
	32.5	26.9	28.3	34.0	21.3	29.6	29.5
5 Through 10	41	18	19	25	25	35	163
	25.6	34.6	31.7	26.6	31.3	32.4	29.4
11 OR MORE	63	19	22	26	33	36	199
	39.4	36.5	36.7	27.7	41.3	33.3	35.9
COLUMN TOTAL	160	52	60	94	80	108	554
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 2

Uniform and Weaponry. Officers slain in the largest municipalities (250,000 or more population) were least likely to be identifiable as officers. Three-fourths of these officers (74.5%) were identifiable as officers compared to over 84 percent within all of the other jurisdiction types (Table 4-132). Slain officers from counties were slightly less likely than the officers working for municipalities to have been armed when attacked. Five percent (5.2%) of the officers working in rural counties were unarmed, as were 4.1 percent of the officers working for municipalities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 persons, and 4 percent of those working for suburban counties; this compares to one to two percent of the officers working for the other municipal jurisdictions (Table 4-133).

Assignment. Table 4-134 provides information regarding the assignments of the slain officers by the jurisdiction type/size. Officers working for the largest cities (250,000 or more population) were least likely, and officers working for municipalities with less than 25,000 persons were most likely to be killed while on one-officer vehicle patrol. Within the largest cities, just one-third (34.8%) of the slain officers were on one-officer vehicle patrol. One-fifth (21.1%)--more than any other jurisdiction type--were on two-officer vehicle patrol when slain. Officers working in suburban counties, compared to other officers, were most likely (28.7%) to be slain while on special assignment (e.g., working at the jail). One-fifth (21.1%) of the officers from the largest cities were slain while off-duty.

#### **Incident Characteristics**

Anticipation. Incidents involving officers from the largest cities, from the smallest cities, and from suburban counties were less likely, compared to the incidents involving

#### **TABLE 4-132**

#### VICTIM IDENTIFIABLE AS POLICE OFFICER BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
IDENTIFIABLE AS OFFICER	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	Crries 25K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total				
No	39 25.5	7 14.3	6 10.5	8 8.6	3 3.8	15 15.2	78 14.7				
Yes	114 74.5	42 85.7	51 89.5	85 91.4	76 96.2	84 84.8	452 85.3				
COLUMN TOTAL	153 100.0	49 100.0	57 100.0	93 100.0	79 100.0	99	530 100.0				

Missing = 26

**TABLE 4-133** 

#### OFFICER ARMED WITH WEAPON BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdic	tion Type/Siz	E		
OFFICER ARMED	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total
No	2 1.3	2 4.1	0 0.0	1 1.1	4 5.2	4 4.0	13 2.5
YES	150 98.7	47 95.9	58 100.0	88 98.9	73 94.3	97 96.0	513 97.5
Column Total	152 100.0	49 100.0	58 100.0	89 100.0	77	101 100.0	526 100.0

Missing = 30

**TABLE 4-134** 

## TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdie	CTION TYPE/SIZE			
Type of	CITIES 250K+	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
Assignment		100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
FOOT PATROL	5 3.1	0 0.0	0 0.0	0	0.0	0	5 0.9
1 OFFICER	56	28	38	70	53	47	292
VEHICLE PATROL	34.8	53.8	63.3	73.7	66.3	43.5	52.5
2 OFFICER VEHICLE PATROL	34	5	3	10	10	8	70
	21.1	9.6	5.0	10.5	12.5	7.4	12.6
DETECTIVE	8 5.0	2 3.8	4 6.7	1 1.1	3 3.8	5 4.6	23 4.1
SPECIAL	19	7	7	3	11	31	78
ASSIGNMENT	11.8	13.5	11.7	3.2	13.8	28.7	14.0
Undercover	5 3.1	5 9.6	3 5.0	3 3.2	1 1.3	2 1.9	19 3.4
OFF DUTY	34 21.1	5 9.6	5 8.3	8 8.4	2 2.5	15 13.9	69 12.4
Column Total	161	52	60	95	80	108	556
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

officers from other jurisdictions, to have a stage of anticipation. Eleven percent of the officers from suburban counties (11.3%) and from municipalities with less than 25,000 persons (10.8%) did not have a period of anticipation, nor did 12.7 percent of the officers from cities with populations of over 250,000 (Table 4-135).

Mode of Initiation. Officers from the largest municipalities and officers from suburban counties were least likely to have been dispatched to the incidents which led to their deaths. One-third or fewer of the slain officers in each of these groups were dispatched to the lethal incidents. Instead, a relatively large percentage of the officers slain while working for suburban county jurisdictions were on assignment at the time of their deaths. In the largest municipalities, relatively large percentages of officers were slain in incidents initiated by citizen contacts (6.8%) or found themselves in lethal incidents when no police action was anticipated (7.4%). A relatively large percentage of the officers slain while working for the smallest cities (less than 25,000 population), were ambushed. Over fifteen percent (15.2%) of these officers were ambushed compared to less than 8 percent of the officers working for any of the other jurisdiction types (Table 4-136).

Killed at Entry. Officers from the largest municipalities were least likely and officers from the smallest municipalities were most likely to be killed at entry. Just one-third (33.8%) of the officers within cities with populations of over 250,000 persons were killed at entry, compared to 47.1 percent of the officers employed by municipalities with less than 25,000 persons (Table 4-137).

**TABLE 4-135** 

#### EXISTENCE OF ANTICIPATION STAGE BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
ANTICIPATION	CITIES 250K+	CITIES	Crries	CITIES	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row				
STAGE		100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total				
No	19 12.7	3 6.0	0 0.0	10 10.8	3 3.8	12 11.3	47 8.8				
YES	131	47	58	83	76	94	489				
	87.3	94.0	100.0	89.2	96.2	88.7	91.2				
Column Total	150	50	58	93	79	106	536				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 20

**TABLE 4-136** 

#### INCIDENT INITIATION MODE BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdi	CTION TYPE/SIZ	E		
Initiation Mode	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
DISPATCH	49	20	32	39	32	31	203
	33.1	40.0	54.2	42.4	42.1	30.1	38.4
Assignment	24	9	10	5	19	33	100
	16.2	18.0	16.9	5.4	25.0	32.0	18.9
CITIZEN	10	1	0	5	0	0	16
CONTACT	6.8	2.0	0.0	5.4	0.0	0.0	3.0
OFFICER	46	15	15	28	20	23	147
INITIATED	31.1	30.0	25.4	30.4	26.3	22.3	27.8
Police Action	11	1	1	1	1	9 8.7	24
Unanticipated	7.4	2.0	1.7	1.1	1.3		4.5
AMBUSH	8	4	1	14	4	7	38
	5.4	8.0	1.7	15.2	5.3	6.8	7.2
COLUMN TOTAL	148	50	59	92	76	103	528
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 28

Officer Activity and Crime/Circumstances Type. A relatively large proportion (43.9%) of the slain officers employed by the smallest municipalities (populations less than 25,000) were killed while intervening in ongoing crimes. A relatively large proportion (26.7%) of officers employed by rural counties were slain while attempting arrests (in situations which did not involve intervening in ongoing crimes). Ten percent (10.2%) of the officers slain from mid-sized cities (with between 25,000 and 100,000 persons) and 9.1 percent of the officers slain from suburban counties were executing search warrants when slain. All of the corresponding percentages for the other jurisdiction types were less than 3 percent. Seven percent (6.7%) and 10.1 percent of the officers employed in rural counties and suburban counties, respectively, were handling prisoners, or patients (e.g., mental patients) at the time of their deaths (Table 4-138).

In terms of crime/circumstance type, relatively large proportions of officers working in the largest cities were slain during activities involving the crimes of robbery (22.0%) and disturbances other than domestic disturbances (10.6%). The smallest municipalities had relatively large proportions of officers killed during activities involving domestic disturbances (20.8%); violent crimes other than murder, robbery and disturbances (11.7%); and traffic offenses (16.9%). Relatively large proportions of officers employed by rural counties were slain while engaging in police activities related to murder (11.1%), burglary (11.1%), and non-criminal incidents other than traffic (12.7%). Relatively large proportions of officers employed by suburban counties were slain while engaging in police activities related to non-violent crime (other than burglary and drugs, 16.5%) and non-criminal activity (other than traffic, 12.7%). (See Table 4-139.)

**TABLE 4-137** 

#### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY	Crries 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 250K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total			
No	96	26	32	46	39	54	293			
	66.2	56.5	60.4	52.9	58.2	56.3	59.3			
Yes	49	20	21	41	28	42	201			
	33.8	43.5	39.6	47.1	41.8	43.8	40.7			
Column Total	145	46	53	87	67	96	494			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 62



### INCIDENT ACTIVITY BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdi	CTION TYPE/S	SIZE		
INCIDENT ACTIVITY	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total
INVESTIGATE SUSPICIOUS	26 18.4	8 16.3	7 11.9	9 11.0	9 12.0	15 15.2	74 14.7
INTERVENE IN ONGOING CRIME	54 38.3	17 34.7	20 33.9	36 43.9	23 30.7	28 28.3	178 35.2
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED CRIME	2 1.4	2.0	3 5.1	2 2.4	2 2.7	2 2.0	12 2.4
Issue Citation	11 7.8	.5 10.2	9 15.3	11 13.4	3 4.0	5 5.1	44 8.7
ATTEMPT ARREST	21 14.9	9 18.4	9 15.3	14 17.1	20 26.7	14 14.1	87 17.2
SEARCH WARRANT	4 2.8	1 2.0	6 10.2	1 1.2	1 1.3	9	22
Undercover	4 2.8	3 6.1	1 1.7	3 3.7	1 1.3	2 2.0	14 2.8
Handling Prisoner/patient	2 1.4	2 4.1	0 0.0	0 0.0	5 6.7	10 10.1	19 3.8
Non Crime	5 3.5	1 2.0	1 1.7	4 4.9	4 5.3	4 4.0	19 3.8
OTHER	12 8.5	2 4.1	3 5.1	2 2.4	7 9.3	10 10.1	36 7.1
COLUMN TOTAL	141 100.0	49 100.0	59 100.0	82 100.0	75 100.0	99 100.0	505 100.0

Missing = 51



#### CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT BY JURISDICTION TYPE AND SIZE 1983-1992

			1903-1992				
				Jurisdiction	N Type/Size		
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCE TYPE	Crries	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	Suburban	Row
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	Counties	Total
Murder	4 3.3	4 8.7	3 5.7	1 1.3	7 11.1	3 3.8	22 5.0
ROBBERY	27	6	2	4	5	13	57
	22.0	13.0	3.8	5.2	7.9	16.5	12.9
DISTURBANCE CALL	13	7	4	5	3	7	39
	10.6	15.2	7.5	6.5	4.8	8.9	8.8
DOMESTIC	13	2	7	16	8	6	52
DISTURBANCE	10.6	4.3	13.2	20.8	12.7	7.6	11.8
OTHER VIOLENT	8	2	3	9	2	8	32
CRIME	6.5	4.3	5.7	11.7	3.2	10.1	7.3
Burglary	7 5.7	5 10.9	4 7.5	6 7.8	7 11.1	2 2.5	31 7.0
Drugs	16	6	7	6	6	9	50
	13.0	13.0	13.2	7.8	9.5	11.4	11.3
OTHER NON	17	4	7	10	9	13	60
VIOLENT CRIME	13.8	8.7	13.2	13.0	14.3	16.5	13.6
Traffic	10	5	10	13	6	5	49
	8.1	10.9	18.9	16.9	9.5	6.3	11.1
OTHER NON CRIME	7	3	5	4	8	10	37
	5.7	6.5	9.4	5.2	12.7	12.7	8.4
OTHER	1 0.8	2 4.3	1 1.9	3 3.9	2 3.2	3 3.8	12 2.7
COLUMN TOTAL	123	46	53	77	63	79	441
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 115 Number Column Percent The largest proportion of officers slain during their own personal robbery victimizations were employed by the largest municipalities (populations of 250,000 or more). Seven percent of the officers slain from these large cities were responding to their own robbery victimizations, and an additional 1.3 percent were present in establishments which were robbed (Table 4-140).

Time of Attack. Forty-six percent (45.3%) of the officers employed by the smallest municipalities were killed between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. The corresponding percentages for the other jurisdiction types were all less than 38 percent. Conversely, a relatively small proportion (9.5%) of the officers employed by the smallest municipalities were attacked during the hours of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. One-fourth of the officers in rural counties (27.5%) and suburban counties (22.2%) were attacked between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. These proportions were larger than those for the municipal officers. One-third (35.7%) of the officers from the mid-sized cities (between 25,000 and 250,000 in population) were attacked between the hours of 3 p.m. and 9 p.m. (Table 4-141).

In terms of location, a relatively large proportion (39.2%) of the slain officers from suburban counties were slain while inside of a structure. One third (31.2%) of the officers from rural counties who were slain were outside, but not roadside. This was slightly larger than the corresponding percentages for the other groups. Both small cities (less than 25,000 population) and rural counties lost large proportions of officers roadside. Forty-six percent (45.6%) of the officers from small cities and 49.4 percent of the officers from rural counties were attacked by the side of roads (Table 4-142).

**TABLE 4-140** 

## OFFICER SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
Officer Slain During Victimization	Crries 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total				
No	144	50	58	93	78	100	523				
	91.7	96.2	98.3	97.9	98.7	93.5	95.3				
YES, PERSONAL	11	1	0	2	1 1.3	4	19				
VICTIMIZATION	7.0	1.9	0.0	2.1		3.7	3.5				
YES, ESTABLISHMENT	2	1	1	0	0	3	7				
VICTIMIZATION	1.3	1.9	1.7	0.0		2.8	1.3				
COLUMN TOTAL	157	52	59	95	79	107	549				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 7

**TABLE 4-141** 

### TIME OF ATTACK BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
TIME OF ATTACK	Cities	Crries	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row			
	250K +	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total			
9 p.m. To 3 a.m.	60	19	22	43	26	38	208			
	37.3	36.5	36.7	45.3	32.5	35.2	37.4			
3 A.M. To 9 A.M.	23	7	7	14	10	17	78			
	14.3	13.5	11.7	14.7	12.5	15.7	14.0			
9 а.м. То 3 р.м.	32	7	10	9	22	24	104			
	19.9	13.5	16.7	9.5	27.5	22.2	18.7			
3 р.м. То 9 р.м.	46	19	21	29	22	29	166			
	28.6	36.5	35.0	30.5	27.5	26.9	29.9			
COLUMN TOTAL	161	52	60	95	80	108	556			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-142** 

#### LOCATION OF OFFICER, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE, WHEN SLAIN BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE								
Location	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	Crries 25K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total			
Inside	48	14	17	22	15	40	156			
	31.2	28.0	31.5	24.4	19.5	39.2	29.6			
OUTSIDE, NOT	40	14	16	24	24	22	140			
ROADSIDE	26.0	28.0	29.6	26.7	31.2	21.6	26.6			
OUTSIDE, ROADSIDE	55	19	18	41	38	39	210			
	35.7	38.0	33.3	45.6	49.4	38.2	39.8			
Outside, Unknown	11	3	3	3	0	1	21			
	7.1	6.0	5.6	3.3	0.0	1.0	4.0			
COLUMN TOTAL	154	50	54	90	77	102	527			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 29

Officers from mid-sized cities (with populations of between 25,000 and 100,000) were disproportionately represented among officers slain in residential environments. Over 55 percent (55.8%) of the officers in this group were slain in residential areas, compared to less than 50 percent of each of the other groups. A relatively large proportion of officers from the largest cities (27.2%) were slain in commercial environments. Reflecting their work in jail settings, the county officers were more likely than municipal officers to be slain in government environments (Table 4-143).

Number of Opponents. Officers employed within the largest municipalities and within the suburban counties were most likely to have faced more than one opponent when slain. Only 65.8 percent of the officers from the largest cities and 67.0 percent of the officers from suburban counties faced a single opponent. A relatively large percentage (21.6%) of the officers working in suburban counties faced two opponents when slain. Just under thirteen percent (12.5%) of the officers from the largest cities faced three or more opponents. This compares to 10.3 percent for suburban counties, 10.1 percent for the cities with populations of between 100,000 and 250,000 persons, and less than 9 percent for each of the remaining three jurisdiction types (Table 4-144).

Assailant's Knowledge of Officer's Status. In all of the situations where officers in rural counties or mid-sized cities (with populations of between 25,000 and 100,000) were killed, the assailants knew that their victims were law enforcement officers. The largest percentage (4.1%) of incidents where the opponents did not know the identity of their victims was for cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 (Table 4-145).

**TABLE 4-143** 

#### OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			JURISDI	CTION TYPE/S	IZE		
Environment	CITIES 250K +	Crries 100-250K	Crries 25K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total
RESIDENTIAL	58	20	29	33	33	46	219
	42.6	47.6	55.8	44.0	49.3	46.5	46.5
COMMERCIAL	37	9	8	18	7	19	98
	27.2	21.4	15.4	24.0	10.4	19.2	20.8
RESIDENTIAL/ COMMERCIAL	29	8	12	12	11	11	83
	21.3	19.0	23.1	16.0	16.4	11.1	17.6
GOVERNMENT	2	4	1	6	9	12	34
	1.5	9.5	1.9	8.0	13.4	12.1	7.2
OTHER	10	1	2	6	7	11	37
	7.4	2.4	3.8	8.0	10.4	11.1	7.9
Column Total	136	42	52	75	67	99	471
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 85

**TABLE 4-144** 

#### NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS WHEN SLAIN BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdi	CTION TYPE/S	SIZE		***************************************
Number of Persons	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
None	1 0.7	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 0.2
ONE	100	37	42	72	66	65	382
	65.8	71.2	73.7	78.3	84.6	67.0	72.3
Two	30	7	10	15	8	21	91
	19.7	13.5	17.5	16.3	10.3	21.6	17.2
Three	11	2	0	1	1	7	22
	7.2	3.8	0.0	1.1	1.3	7.2	4.2
Four	5	2	5	1	1	1	15
	3.3	3.8	8.8	1.1	1.3	1.0	2.8
Five or More	3	2	0	2	1	2	10
	2.0	3.8	0.0	2.2	1.3	2.1	1.9
GROUP OF UNKNOWN SIZE	2	2	0	1	1	1	7
	1.3	3.8	0.0	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.3
COLUMN TOTAL	152	52	57	92	78	97	528
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 28

**TABLE 4-145** 

### ASSAILANT'S KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE								
Assailant Knew Victim Was Police Officer	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row		
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total		
No	4	2	0	2	0	1	9		
	2.9	4.1	0.0	2.1	0.0	1.0	1.8		
YES	132	47	57	92	77	95	500		
	97.1	95.9	100.0	97.9	100.0	99.0	98.2		
COLUMN TOTAL	136	49	57	94	77	96	509		
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

Missing = 47

Weapons. The largest proportions of officers slain with handguns were in the largest cities, those with populations of at least 100,000. Sixty-seven percent (67.3%) of the slain officers from cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000, and 80.1 percent of the officers from cities with populations greater than 250,000 were slain with handguns. A relatively large percentage (20%) of officers from the cities with between 25,000 and 100,000 persons were slain with rifles and relatively large proportions of officers from the smallest cities (less than 25,000 persons, 12.6%) and from rural counties (15%) were slain with shotguns. More officers working for municipal agencies compared to officers working for county agencies were killed with vehicles (Table 4-146).

Mid-sized cities (with between 25,000 and 100,000 persons) had the highest proportion (22.4%) of officers disarmed during the attacks and killed with their own service weapons (20%). (See Tables 4-147 and 4-148.)

**Body Armor.** Relatively small proportions of officers from the smallest cities (20%) and from rural counties (11.3%) were wearing body armor when slain (Table 4-149).

Presence of Other Officers. Relatively large proportions of the officers working for suburban counties or the larger municipalities (greater than 100,000 population) had other officers in their immediate presence when attacked. Over forty percent of the slain officers in each of these groups had at least one other officer in his/her immediate presence when attacked. In contrast, just one-quarter (25%) of the officers from small municipalities (less than 25,000 persons) had immediate assistance (Table 4-150).



#### WEAPON USED BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

			Jurisdi	CTION TYPE/S	SIZE		
INCIDENT ACTIVITY	CITIES	Crries	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total
HANDGUN	129	35	40	61	47	71	383
	80.1	67.3	66.7	64.2	58.8	65.7	68.9
RIFLE	10	5	12	12	15	19	73
	6.2	9.6	20.0	12.6	18.8	17.6	13.1
SHOTGUN	9	5	2	12	12	9	49
	5.6	9.6	3.3	12.6	15.0	8.3	8.8
SHARP OBJECT	1	1	1	3	1	3	10
	0.6	1.9	1.7	3.2	1.3	2.8	1.8
BLUNT OBJECT	2 1.2	2 3.8	1 1.7	1 1.1	2 2.5	1 0.9	9 1.6
Вомв	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Personal Weapons	1 0.6	0 0.0	1 1.7	0 0.0	2 2.5	2 1.9	6 1.1
VEHICLE	8	3	3	6	1	3	24
	5.0	5.8	5.0	6.3	1.3	2.8	4.3
OTHER	0 0.0	1 1.9	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0	1 0.2
COLUMN TOTAL	161	52	60	95	80	108	556
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-147** 

#### OFFICER DISARMED DURING ATTACK BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
OFFICER DISARMED	Crries	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row			
	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total			
No	130	44	45	77	61	84	441			
	82.3	84.6	77.6	82.8	78.2	80.0	81.1			
YES	28	8	13	16	17	21	103			
	17.7	15.4	22.4	17.2	21.8	20.0	18.9			
COLUMN TOTAL	158	52	58	93	78	105	544			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 12

**TABLE 4-148** 

### OFFICERS KILLED WITH THEIR OWN SERVICE WEAPONS BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

		Jurisdiction Type/Size									
Killed With	CITIES 250K+	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row				
Own Gun		100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total				
No	135	46	48	81	65	92	467				
	83.9	88.5	80.0	85.3	81.3	85.2	84.0				
Yes	26	6	12	14	15	16	89				
	16.1	11.5	20.0	14.7	18.8	14.8	16.0				
COLUMN TOTAL	161	52	60	95	80	108	556				
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

Missing = 0

**TABLE 4-149** 

#### OFFICERS WEARING BODY ARMOR BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

	Jurisdiction Type/Size									
WEARING	CITIES	CITIES	CITIES	Crries	RURAL	SUBURBAN	Row			
BODY ARMOR	250K+	100-250K	25K-100K	<25K	COUNTIES	COUNTIES	Total			
No	106	34	38	76	71	71	396			
	65.8	65.4	63.3	80.0	88.8	65.7	71.2			
Yes	55	18	22	19	9	37	160			
	34.2	34.6	36.7	20.0	11.3	34.3	28.8			
COLUMN TOTAL	161	52	60	95	80	108	556			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 0

#### **TABLE 4-150**

# PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER AT THE TIME OF ATTACK BY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE									
	CITIES 250K+	CITIES 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row Total			
No	87	29	36	66	49	61	328			
	56.9	59.2	64.3	75.0	64.5	58.7	62.4			
YES	66	20	20	22	27	43	198			
	43.1	40.8	35.7	25.0	35.5	41.3	37.6			
Column Total	153	49	56	88	76	104	526			
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

Missing = 30

Officer's Final Action. Talking was the final action of relatively large percentages of officers from cities with 25,000 to 100,000 persons (18.4%) and from rural counties (17.2%). Entering a building or room was the final action of relatively large proportions of officers from suburban counties (17.8%), from cities with between 25,000 and 100,000 persons (16.3%), and from cities with populations of 100,000 to 250,000 (11.6%). Eleven percent (10.9%) of the rural county officers who were slain exited vehicles as their final action. The corresponding percentages for the other categories of agencies were all less than 6 percent. (See Table 4-151.)

#### Summary

Largest Municipalities: Populations of 250,000 or More. Just 5 (3.1%) of the 162 law enforcement victims from the largest cities were female, though a full one-fifth (21.1%) were black. This latter figure was higher than the corresponding figures for the other five jurisdiction types. As with all of the cities with populations greater than 25,000 persons, none of the victims from this jurisdiction type were the top administrators of their agencies. One-third of the officers had between one and four years of experience, one-fourth had between five and 10 years of experience. Just under 40 percent (39.4) had 11 or more years of experience. These largest jurisdictions had the greatest proportion of officers (25.5%) who were not identifiable as officers. This is consistent with the relatively large proportion of officers (21.2%) from cities of this size who were slain off-duty. Half of the officers were on one-person (34.8%) or two-person (21.2%) vehicle patrol.

In thirteen percent (12.7%) of the incidents in which officers from these large jurisdictions were slain, there was no stage of anticipation. A relatively low percentage of

### TABLE 4-151 OFFICER'S FINAL ACTION BY JURISDICTION TYPE AND SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

FINAL ACTION	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE						
	CITIES 250K+	Crries 100-250K	CITIES 25K-100K	CITIES <25K	RURAL COUNTIES	SUBURBAN COUNTIES	Row
TALK	15 10.8	3 7.0	9 18.4	10 12.2	11 17.2	11 12.2	59 12.6
APPROACH SUSPECT	9 6.5	5 11.6	6 12.2	7 8.5	7 10.9	5 5.6	39 8.4
ENTER BUILDING OR ROOM	8 5.8	5 11.6	8 16.3	4 4.9	3 4.7	16 17.8	44 9.4
ARREST KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	9 6.5	2.3	3 6.1	7 8.5	6 9.4	2 2.2	28 6.0
Drive	7 5.0	0 0.0	1 2.0	3 3.7	4 6.3	4 4.4	19 4.1
SEARCH	7 5.0	3 7.0	2 4.1	2 2.4	3 4.7	4 4.4	21 4.5
Pursue	7 5.0	3 7.0	2 4.1	3 3.7	3 4.7	3 3.3	21 4.5
Exit Vehicle	6 4.3	1 2.3	1 2.0	3 3.7	7 10.9	5 5.6	23
Approach Building	3 2.2	3 7.0	1 2.0	7 8.5	4 6.3	1 1.1	19 4.1
Arrest Other Person Or Attempt)	5 3.6	2 4.7	4 8.2	0 0.0	1 1.6	3 3.3	15 3.2
Escort Guspect/citizen	4 2.9	1 2.3	3 6.1	1 1.2	0	4 4.4	13 2.8

	JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE						,
FINAL ACTION	CITIES 250k+	Cities 100-250 <sub>K</sub>	CITIES 25K-100K	Crries <25k	RURAL COUNTIES	Suburban Counties	Row
CALL DISPATCH	5 3.6	1 2.3	2 4.1	2 2.4	0.0	1.1	11 2.4
UNHOLSTER WEAPON	1 0.7	1 2.3	1 2.0	1 1.2	2 3.1	1 1.1	7 1.5
RESIST ROBBERY	3 2.2	1 2.3	0.0	1 1.2	0	2 2.2	7
IDENTIFY SELF	3 2.2	0 0.0	1 2.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 2.2	6
Disarm Killer (or Attempt)	3 2.2	1 2.3	0 0.0	2 2.4	0	2 2.2	8
Approach Car W/o Suspect	0 0.0	1 2.3	0 0.0	1 1.2	2 3.1	2 2.2	6 1.3
OTHER	44 31.7	11 25.6	5 10.2	28 34.1	11 17.2	22 24.4	121 25.9
COLUMN TOTAL	139 100.0	43 100.0	49 100.0	82 100.0	64 100.0	90	467 100.0

Missing = 89

Number Column Percent the incidents were precipitated by dispatch (33.1%). Instead, relatively large percentages of incidents were initiated through citizen contacts (6.8%) or were incidents in which police action was unanticipated (7.4%). Of all jurisdiction types, the municipalities with 250,000 or more persons were least likely to have officers killed at entry. For only 33.8 percent of these officers was their first interaction with the opponents the attacks.

Similarly to the officers from other jurisdiction types, a plurality of officers from these large municipalities were intervening in ongoing crimes when slain. In the largest cities, another 18.4 percent of the officers were investigating suspicious circumstances and 14.9 percent were attempting arrests (in situations not involving interventions in ongoing crimes). The crime of robbery (22.0%), non-violent crimes other than burglary and drugs (13.8%), and drug offenses (13.0%) were the criminal activities which most frequently were receiving the officers' attentions when they were slain.

Eleven of the 27 (40.7%) robbery incidents involved personal victimizations of the officers. Overall, 7.0 percent of the slain officers from these large municipalities were slain while intervening in their own robbery victimizations. This was higher than any other jurisdiction type.

Two-thirds of the officers (65.9%) were slain between the hours of 3 p.m. and 3 a.m. A plurality (35.7%) were roadside when slain; another one-third (31.2%) were inside of structures. Forty-three percent (42.6%) were in residential environments and 27.2 percent were in commercial environments. This latter figure is higher than the corresponding figures of the other jurisdiction types.

A relatively large percentage of officers from these largest cities were facing more than one opponent during the attack. Two-thirds of the officers faced one opponent, 19.7 percent faced two, and 12.5 percent faced three or more.

More of the officers in this jurisdiction type, than the others, were slain with handguns. Eighty percent (80.1%) were slain with handguns, compared to less than 68 percent within the other groups. Eighteen percent (17.7%) were disarmed during the attack, and 16.1 percent were slain with their own weapons. One-third of the officers (34.2%) were wearing body armor when killed.

A relatively large percentage of these officers had assistance in the immediate vicinity at the time of the attack. Forty-three percent (43.1%) had the assistance of other officers in their immediate presence.

Large Municipalities: Populations of 100,000 to 249,999 Persons. Just one (1.9%) of the 52 slain officers from municipalities with 100,000 to 249,999 persons was female; 7.7 percent were black. None were the top administrators of the agencies, but a relatively large percentage (26.9%) were supervisors or detectives. Over half (61.5%) had between one and ten years of experience and another 36.5 percent had 11 or more years of experience. Fourteen percent (14.3%) were not identifiable as officers when slain. Two of the officers from this type of jurisdiction (4.1%) were unarmed when attacked.

Over half (53.8%) of the officers were on one-person vehicle patrol when slain; just 9.6 percent were on two-person vehicle patrol. Forty percent (40%) of the incidents were initiated via dispatch and another 30 percent were officer initiated. In twenty of the 46 incidents (43.5%) the officers' first interactions with the opponents were the attacks. One-

third of the officers (34.7%) were intervening in ongoing crimes, and another 18.4 percent were attempting arrests in circumstances other than those involving ongoing crimes.

Disturbance calls (15.2%), drug offenses (13%), and robberies (13%) were the offenses with which the officers were most frequently dealing.

Three-fourths of the incidents (73%) occurred during the period 3 p.m. to 3 a.m. Just under forty percent (38%) occurred roadside and just under half (47.6%) occurred in residential areas.

Seventy-one percent (71.2%) of the officers faced a single opponent, 13.5 percent faced two, and 10.1 percent faced three or more. In two of the incidents in which officers from jurisdictions with between 100,000 to 249,999 persons were slain, the opponents did not know that their victims were law enforcement officers. This 4.1 percent figure was higher than the corresponding figure of the other jurisdiction types.

Two-thirds (67.3%) of the officers from these jurisdictions were slain with handguns, 9.6 percent with rifles, 9.6 percent with shotguns, and 5.8 percent with vehicles. Fifteen percent (15.4%) of the officers were disarmed during the attack and 11.5 percent were slain with their own weapons. One-third (34.6%) of the slain officers were wearing body armor.

Forty-one percent (40.8%) had the immediate assistance of fellow officers during the incidents.

Municipalities: Populations of 25,000 to 99,999 Persons. Four of the 60 (6.7%) officers slain in municipalities with populations of 25,000 to 99,999 were female and three (5%) were black. None of the victim officers were the top administrators of their departments, though 23.3 percent were supervisors or detectives. Two-thirds (68.4%) of the

officers had five or more years of law enforcement experience. Eleven percent (10.5%) of the victim officers were not identifiable as officers when attacked, and all of the officers from this type of jurisdiction were armed when attacked.

Two-thirds (63.3%) of the officers were on one-person vehicle patrol and another 11.7 percent were on special assignment. A relatively high percentage (54.2%) of the incidents were initiated via dispatch. All of the incidents involving officers from this type of jurisdiction had stages of anticipation and under 40 percent (39.6%) were killed at entry.

One-third (33.9%) of the officers were intervening in ongoing crimes and a relatively large proportion (10.2%) of the officers from this type of jurisdiction were killed while executing search warrants. Almost one-fifth (18.9%) of the officers were slain while involved in a traffic related incident. This was higher than the corresponding figures of the other jurisdiction types. None of the robbery-related incidents involved the personal victimization of the officers.

Over two-thirds (71.7%) of the incidents took place between 3 p.m. and 3 a.m. and approximately equal proportions of incidents took place inside (31.5%), outside, not roadside (29.6%), and roadside (33.3%). A greater proportion (55.8%) of incidents within this jurisdiction type took place in residential areas than any other jurisdiction type.

Three-fourths (73.7%) of the officers faced a single opponent and one-third (35.7%) of the officers had the immediate assistance of other officers. All of the assailants appeared to know that their victims were law enforcement officers.

A full 20 percent of the slain officers from jurisdictions with populations of between 25,000 and 99,999 were killed with rifles. Two-thirds (66.7%) were killed with handguns.

Officers from this type of jurisdiction were most likely to have been disarmed during the attack (22.4%) and most likely to have been killed with their own weapons (20%). One-third of the slain officers (36.7%) were wearing body armor at the time of their attacks.

Relatively large proportions of officers were talking (18.4%) or entering buildings or rooms (16.3%) as their final actions.

Municipalities: Populations of 25,000 or Fewer Persons. One (1.1%) of the 95 slain officers from municipalities with fewer than 25,000 persons was female, 10 (10.5%) were black. Fourteen percent (13.7%) of the victim officers were the top administrators of their municipal departments. This high percentage was matched only by rural counties within which 13.8 percent of the slain officers were the top administrators. A relatively large percentage of the officers from these smallest municipalities had less than five years of experience. Forty-six percent (45.7%) of the slain officers from this type of jurisdiction had less than five years of experience, compared to less than 35 percent of the officers in the other five categories. All but one (1.1%) of the officers were armed when attacked. Three-fourths (73.7%) were on one-person vehicle patrol.

Forty-two percent (42.4%) of the officers were dispatched to the incidents which led to their deaths, and 30.4 percent of the incidents were officer initiated. The largest percentage of ambushed officers was within these smallest municipalities. Fifteen percent (15.2%) of the officers in this type of jurisdiction were ambushed.

Eleven percent (10.8 percent) of the incidents in these smallest cities contained no stage of anticipation and for just under half (47.1%) of the officers from these cities the

lethal attack was the first interaction with his opponent. This was the highest percentage of the six jurisdiction types.

A relatively large proportion of the officers (43.9%) were intervening in ongoing crimes at the time of their attacks. A relatively large proportion (20.8%) of the police actions pertained to domestic disturbances and an additional 16.9 percent related to traffic offenses. Two of the four robbery incidents involved the personal victimizations of the officers.

A greater proportion (45.3%) of the incidents in this type of jurisdiction, compared to the other types, took place during the period 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. A smaller proportion (9.5%) took place between 9 a.m. and 3 pm. Along with the officers from rural counties, officers from these smallest cities were most likely to be killed roadside. Forty-six percent (45.6%) of the officers were attacked by the sides of roads. Forty-four percent were slain in residential areas and 24 percent were slain in commercial areas. A relatively large percentage (78.3%) of the officers faced a single opponent when attacked. Just 4.4 percent faced three or more opponents. Just one-fourth of the officers had the immediate assistance of other officers at the time of the attack. This was the lower percentage of the six jurisdiction types.

As with officers from rural counties, the officers from these smallest cities were more likely than officers from other jurisdiction types to be killed with shotguns. Thirteen percent (12.6%) were killed with shotguns. Two-thirds (64.3%) were killed with handguns and 12.6 percent were killed with rifles. Seventeen percent (17.2%) were disarmed during the attack

and 14.7 percent were slain with their own weapons. A relatively small percentage (20%) were wearing body armor when attacked.

Rural Counties. Two of the 80 (2.5%) officers from the rural counties were female and nine (11.3%) were black. As with the smallest municipalities, the rural jurisdictions lost a large proportion of officers who were the top administrators of their agencies. Fourteen percent (13.8%) of the slain officers were the agencies' top administrators. Consistent with this, a full 41.3 percent of the slain officers from rural counties had 11 or more years of experience. Just 27.6 percent had fewer than five years of experience.

Two-thirds of the officers (66.3%) were on one-person vehicle patrol at the time of attack and four officers (5.2%) were unarmed. Forty-two percent (42.1%) of the incidents were initiated via dispatch, 26.3 percent were officer initiated, and 25 percent involved officers on assignment. For 41.8 percent of the officers their first interactions with the opponents were the attacks against them.

Relatively large proportions of the officers (26.7%) of the officers were attempting arrests at the time of attack or handling prisoners or patients (6.7%). Relatively large proportions were attending to murders (11.1%), burglaries (11.1%), or non crime situations other than traffic (12.7%).

Almost 28 percent (27.5%) of the officers were slain between the hours of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. This percentage was higher than the corresponding figures for the other jurisdiction types. Also high were the 49.4 percent figure denoting officers killed roadside and the 31.2 percent figure denoting officers killed outside, but not roadside. One of every two officers (49.3%) killed in rural counties were in residential areas.

Rural officers were most likely to face single opponents. Eighty-five percent (84.6%) of the officers faced single opponents, 10.3 percent faced two, and 3.9 percent faced three or more. All of the assailants apparently knew that their victims were law enforcement officers.

One-third (35.5%) of the officers had the immediate assistance of fellow officers during the attack.

Along with the officers from the smallest municipalities, rural officers were most likely to be killed with shotguns. Fifteen percent were killed with shotguns, 58.8 percent with handguns, and 18.8 percent with rifles. Twenty-two percent (21.8%) of the officers were disarmed during the attack and 18.8 percent were killed with their own weapons. A small percentage (11.3%) of the officers were wearing body armor.

Relatively high percentages of rural officers were talking (17.2%) or exiting vehicles (11.1%) as their final actions.

Suburban Counties. Just two (1.9%) of the officers slain from suburban counties were female, and 13 (12%) were black. One-fourth (25%) of the slain officers were supervisors or detectives. Thirty-four percent (34.2%) of the officers had less than five years of experience.

Fifteen percent (15.2%) of the officers from suburban counties were not identifiable as officers when attacked. Four percent were unarmed. A relatively large proportion (28.7%) were on special assignment at the time of their slayings. Consistent with this, a relatively large percentage (32%) of the officers were linked to the lethal events through assignment; another 30.1 percent were linked via dispatch. Eleven percent (11.3%) of the

incidents had no stage of anticipation and for 43.8 percent of the suburban officers the lethal attack was their first interaction with the opponent

Relatively large proportions of suburban officers were executing search warrants (9.1%) or handling prisoners or patients (10.1%). A relatively large percentage (12.7%) were handling incidents pertaining to non-criminal activities other than traffic.

Similar to rural police officers, a large proportion of the suburban officers (22.2%) were killed between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. Just under 40 percent (39.2%) were slain inside structures. This percentage was higher than the corresponding percentages of the other five jurisdiction types. Forty-seven percent (46.5%) were slain in residential environments and 19.2 percent were slain in commercial areas.

Just two-thirds (67%) faced single opponents when attacked. A full one-fifth faced two opponents and 10.3 percent faced three or more. Four in every 10 (41.3%) officers from the suburban counties had the immediate assistance of other officers at the scene.

Two-thirds (65.7%) were killed with handguns, 17.6 percent with rifles, and 8.3 percent with shotguns. Twenty percent were disarmed during the attack and 14.8 percent were killed with their own weapons. One-third (34.3%) were wearing body armor.

## Incidents in Which the Officer's First Interaction with the Opponent is the Lethal Attack

As indicated earlier, four of every 10 officers slain during 1983 through 1992 were attacked "at entry." That is, the first interaction of the officer with the assailant was the

lethal attack. In this section, we describe how incidents in which the officers are killed at entry differ from those in which the officer is not.

### Officer Characteristics

Agency Type. Federal officers were least likely, and Puerto Rican officers were most likely, to be shot at entry. One-fifth (21.7%) of the federal officers were killed at entry, compared to 44.7 percent of the officers working in Puerto Rico (Table 4-152). Among the city and county officers, the proportions of officers who were killed at entry did not vary much by the county type and/or city size, except that the officers from the largest cities (with 250,000 or more persons) were least likely to be shot at entry (33.8%) (Table 4-153).

Gender and Race. A larger proportion of the male officers (40%) were shot at entry than female officers (23.1%), and proportionately more whites (40.3%) than blacks (36.3) or officers of other races (0 of three) were killed at entry. (See Tables 4-154 and 4-155).

Rank and Experience. Over half of the top administrators who were killed, were killed at entry. Fifty five percent (54.5%) of the top administrators were killed at entry, compared to 47.7 percent of the supervisors/detectives, and 36.7 percent of the front line officers (Table 4-156).

Similar proportions of slain officers in the various categories denoting years of law enforcement experience were killed at entry. For instance, 40.7 percent of the slain officers with more than 10 years of experience and 40.7 percent of the slain officers with less than one year of experience were killed at entry (Table 4-157).

**TABLE 4-152** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY AGENCY TYPE 1983-1992

	Offic	T ENTRY	
AGENCY TYPE	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
MUNICIPAL	201	131	332
	60.5	39.5	100.0
COUNTY	93	70	162
	56.8	43.2	100.0
STATE	43	24	67
	64.2	35.8	100.0
FEDERAL	18	5	23
	78.3	21.7	100.0
PUERTO RICO	21	17	38
	55.3	44.7	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	375	247	622
	60.3	39.7	100.0

Missing = 91

**TABLE 4-153** 

# OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY JURISDICTION TYPE/SIZE FOR CITY AND COUNTY AGENCIES 1983-1992

Jurisdiction Type/Size	No	Yes	Row Total
CITIES 250K	96	49	145
	32.8	24.4	29.4
CITIES 100-250K	26	20	46
	8.9	10.0	9.3
CITIES 25K-100K	32	21	53
	10.9	10.4	10.7
CITIES < 25K	46	41	87
	15.7	20.4	17.6
RURAL COUNTIES	39	28	67
	13.3	13.9	13.6
Suburban Counties	54	42	96
	18.4	20.9	19.4
COLUMN TOTAL	293	201	494
	59.3	40.7	100.0

Missing = 62

**TABLE 4-154** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER 1983-1992

	Officer Killed At Entry			
SEX OF VICTIM OFFICER	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
Male	371	247	618	
	60.0	40.0	100.0	
FEMALE	10	3	13	
	76.9	23.1	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82

Number Row Percent

### **TABLE 4-155**

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
RACE OF VICTIM OFFICER	No	YES	Row Total	
White	327	221	548	
	59.7	40.3	100.0	
BLACK	51	29	80	
	63.8	36.3	100.0	
OTHER	3	0	3	
	100.0	0.0	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82

**TABLE 4-156** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
RANK OF VICTIM OFFICER	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
FRONT LINE	303	176	479	
	63.3	36.7	100.0	
SUPERVISOR/DETECTIVE	68	62	130	
	52.3	47.7	100.0	
TOP ADMINISTRATOR	10	12	22	
	45.5	54.5	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82 Number Row Percent

**TABLE 4-157** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
OFFICER YEARS OF EXPERIENCE	No	YES	Row Total	
LESS THAN ONE YEAR	16	11	27	
	59.3	40.7	100.0	
1 Through 4	119	67	186	
	64.0	36.0	100.0	
5 Through 10	105	74	179	
	58.7	41.3	100.0	
11 Or More	140	96	236	
	59.3	40.7	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	380	248	628	
	60.5	39.5	100.0	

Missing = 85 Number Row Percent Uniform and Weaponry. More of the victims who were identifiable as law enforcement officers were killed at entry than those not identifiable as officers (Table 4-158). Only one of the fourteen (7.1%) victims who was not armed during the incident was killed at entry. Just under forty percent (39.2%) of the armed officers were killed at entry (Table 4-159).

TABLE 4-158

OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY OFFICER IDENTIFIABLE AS POLICE OFFICER
1983-1992

Identifiable as Police Officer	Officer Killed At Entry			
	No	YES	Row Total	
No	74	37	111	
	66.7	33.3	100.0	
YES	293	197	490	
	59.8	40.2	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	367	234	601	
	61.1	38.9	100.0	

Missing = 112

TABLE 4-159
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY

BY OFFICER ARMED
1983-1992

	Officer Killed At Entry			
Officer Armed	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
No	13	1	14	
	92.9	7.1	100.0	
Yes, Gun	350	226	576	
	60.8	39.2	100.0	
Column Total	363	227	590	
	61.5	38.5	100.0	

Missing = 123

Number Row Percent

Assignment. Vehicle patrol officers were least likely and detectives most likely to be killed at entry. Just thirty-seven percent (36.8%) of the one and two-person vehicle patrol officers were killed at entry, compared to 63 percent of the detectives (Table 4-160).

#### **Incident Characteristics**

Anticipation. Proportionately more of the incidents which lacked a stage of anticipation resulted in the officer being killed at entry. Fifty-eight percent (58.2%) of the incidents lacking anticipation resulted in the officer being killed at entry, compared to only 37.6 percent of the incidents in which there was a stage of anticipation (Table 4-161).

Mode of Initiation. Over 90 percent (91.8%) of the officers who were ambushed were killed at entry. In contrast, relatively small proportions of officers who initiated the encounters or who did not anticipate police action were killed at entry (Table 4-162).

TABLE 4-160

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
Type of Assignment	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
FOOT PATROL	3	3	6	
	50.0	50.0	100.0	
1 Officer Vehicle	196	115	311	
	63.0	37.0	100.0	
2 Officer Vehicle	51	29	80	
	63.8	36.3	100.0	
DETECTIVE	10	17	27	
	37.0	63.0	100.0	
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	51	41	92	
	55.4	44.6	100.0	
Undercover	18	10	28	
	64.3	35.7	100.0	
OFF DUTY	52	35	87	
	59.8	40.2	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82

**TABLE 4-161** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY EXISTENCE OF ANTICIPATION STAGE 1983-1992

ANTICIPATION STAGE	Officer Killed At Entry			
	No	YES	Row Total	
No	28	39	67	
	41.8	58.2	100.0	
YES	345	208	553	
	62.4	37.6	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	373	247	620	
	60.2	39.8	100.0	

Missing = 93

**TABLE 4-162** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY INCIDENT INITIATION MODE 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
Incident Initiation Mode	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
Dispatch	125	82	207	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	
Assignment	65	57	122	
	53.3	46.7	100.0	
CITIZEN CONTACT	11	7	18	
	61.1	38.9	100.0	
Officer Initiated	129	48	177	
	72.9	27.1	100.0	
POLICE ACTION	30	5	35	
UNANTICIPATED	85.7	14.3	100.0	
Ambush	4	45	49	
	8.2	91.8	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	364	244	608	
	59.9	40.1	100.0	

Missing = 105

Police Activity and Crime/Circumstances Type. Four of every five officers (81.5%) killed while executing search warrants were killed at entry. In contrast, just 15.0 percent of the officers who were handling prisoners or mental patients were killed at entry (Table 4-163). Half of the officers (50%) dealing with the crime of murder were killed at entry as were 57.5 percent of the officers dealing with disturbance calls, other than domestic violence. In only one-fourth of the incidents involving robberies (26%), non-violent crimes other than burglary or drugs (23.3%), or traffic offenses (26.9%) were the officers killed at entry (Table 4-164). The incidents in which officers were killed during personal robbery victimizations were unlikely to involve killings at entry. However, in those situations where the officer was in an establishment while it was being robbed, the officer's first interaction with the opponent was the lethal attack in 46.2% of the situations (Table 4-165).

Time of Attack. Forty-five percent of the officers attacked during the hours of 3 a.m. and 9 a.m. were killed at entry. Less than 40 percent of the officers slain between the hours of 9 a.m. and 3 a.m. were killed at entry (Table 4-166).

Location of Attack. Just under half (47.6%) of the officers attacked inside structures were killed at entry. This compares to 42.3 percent of the officers attacked outside, not roadside; and 34.6 percent of the officers attacked roadside (Table 4-167). Over half of the officers attacked in residential environments were killed at entry. For forty-two percent (42.1%) of the officers attacked in commercial areas, their first interactions with their opponents were the lethal attacks (Table 4-168).

**TABLE 4-163** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY INCIDENT ACTIVITY 1983-1992

	Officer Killed At Entry		
Incident Activity	No	YES	Row Total
Investigate Suspicious	44	19	63
	69.8	30.2	100.0
Intervene in Ongoing Crime	115	78	193
	59.6	40.4	100.0
Investigate Completed Crime	8	7	15
	53.3	46.7	100.0
Issue Citation	55	19	74
	74.3	25.7	100.0
ATTEMPT ARREST	68	32	100
	68.0	32.0	100.0
SEARCH WARRANT	5	22	27
	18.5	81.5	100.0
Undercover Assignment	14	7	21
	66.7	33.3	100.0
HANDLING PRISONER/PATIENT	17	3	20
	85.0	15.0	100.0
Noncrime	16	7	23
	69.6	30.4	100.0
OTHER	34	14	48
	70.8	29.2	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	376	208	584
	64.4	35.6	100.0

Missing = 129

**TABLE 4-164** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
CRIME/CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
Murder	13	13	26
	50.0	50.0	100.0
Robbery	57	20	77
	74.0	26.0	100.0
DISTURBANCE CALL	17	23	40
	42.5	57.5	100.0
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	27	22	49
	55.1	44.9	100.0
OTHER VIOLENT CRIME	21	13	34
	61.8	38.2	100.0
Burglary	19	11	30
	63.3	36.7	100.0
Drugs	31	29	60
	51.7	48.3	100.0
OTHER NON-VIOLENT CRIME	56	17	73
	76.7	23.3	100.0
Traffic	57	21	78
	73.1	26.9	100.0
Non Crime	31	11	42
	73.8	26.2	100.0
OTHER	11	6	17
	64.7	35.3	100.0
Column Total	340	186	526
	64.6	35.4	100.0

Missing = 187

**TABLE 4-165** 

## OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER SLAIN DURING OWN ROBBERY VICTIMIZATION 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
Officer Shot During Own Robbery Victimization	No	YES	Row Total
No	350	238	588
	59.5	40.5	100.0
Yes, Personal Victimization	23	3	26
	88.5	11.5	100.0
Yes, Establishment Victimization	7	6	13
	53.8	46.2	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	380	247	627
	60.6	39.4	100.0

Missing = 86

**TABLE 4-166** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY TIME OF ATTACK 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
TIME OF ATTACK	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
9 PM TO 3 AM	141	92	233	
	60.5	39.5	100.0	
3 am to 9 am	44	36	80	
	55.0	45.0	100.0	
9 am to 3 pm	71	45	116	
	61.2	38.8	100.0	
3 рм то 9 рм	125	77	202	
	61.9	38.1	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82

OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY LOCATION OF OFFICER, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE, WHEN SLAIN
1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY				Officer Killed At Entry	T ENTRY
LOCATION OF OFFICER	No	YES	ROW TOTAL			
Inside	86	78	164			
	52.4	47.6	100.0			
OUTSIDE, NOT ROADSIDE	90	66	156			
	57.7	42.3	100.0			
Outside, Roadside	172	91	263			
	65.4	34.6	100.0			
Outside, Unknown	19	9	28			
	67.9	32.1	100.0			
COLUMN TOTAL	367	244	611			
	60.1	39.9	100.0			

Missing = 102

**TABLE 4-168** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
OFFICER'S ENVIRONMENT WHEN SLAIN	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
RESIDENTIAL	109	118	227
	48.0	52.0	100.0
COMMERCIAL	66	48	114
	57.9	42.1	100.0
RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL	65	19	84
	77.4	22.6	100.0
GOVERNMENT	20	12	32
	62.5	37.5	100.0
OTHER	42	22	64
	65.6	34.4	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	302	219	521
	58.0	42.0	100.0

Missing = 192

Number of Opponents. Proportionately more officers were killed at entry if they were either facing a single opponent (40.2%) or five or more opponents (45.5%). Officers who were facing two, three, or four opponents were killed at entry in percentages of 32.8, 30, and 35, respectively (Table 4-169).

TABLE 4-169

OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY NUMBER OF THREATENING PERSONS
1983-1992

	Officer Killed At Entry		
Number of Threatening Persons	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
None	1	1	2
	50.0	50.0	100.0
One	251	169	420
	59.8	40.2	100.0
Two	82	40	122
	67.2	32.8	100.0
THREE	21	9	30
	70.0	30.0	100.0
Four	13	7	20
	65.0	35.0	100.0
Five	6	5	11
	54.5	45.5	100.0
Group of Unknown Size	3	7	10
	30.0	70.0	100.0
Column Total	377	239	615
	61.3	38.7	100.0

Missing = 98

Number Row Percent

Assailant's Knowledge of Officer's Status. In one-third (33.3%) of the situations in which the assailant did not know that his victim was a law enforcement officer, the officer

was killed at entry. In 39.7 percent of the incidents in which the assailant was aware that his victim was a law enforcement officer, the officer was killed at entry (Table 4-170).

OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY ASSAILANT KNOWLEDGE THAT VICTIM WAS A POLICE OFFICER
1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
Assailant Knew Victim Was A Police Officer	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
No	12	6	18
	66.7	33.3	100.0
Yes	336	221	557
	60.3	39.7	100.0
Column Total	348	227	575
	60.5	39.5	100.0

Missing = 138

Number Row Percent

Weapons. Most (58.0%) of the officers attacked at entry were slain with handguns. One-third (33.3%) of the officers slain with handguns were killed at entry. In contrast, two-thirds of the officers who were slain with rifles (68.2%) or shotguns (62.7%) were shot at entry (Table 4-171).

Ten percent of the officers who were disarmed during the incidents which led to their deaths were attacked by the opponent at entry. That is, the first interaction between the officer and opponent was the struggle which led to the loss of the weapon (Table 4-172).

Similarly, 11.9 percent of the officers slain with their own weapons were attacked at entry (Table 4-173).

**Body Armor.** Thirty-seven percent (37.3%) of the officers not wearing body armor, and 45.4 percent of the officers wearing body armor were attacked at entry (Table 4-174).

TABLE 4-171
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY
BY WEAPON USED
1983-1992

	Officer Killed at Entry			
Weapon Used	No	YES	Row Total	
Handgun	290	145	435	
	66.7	33.3	68.9	
Rifle	28	60	88	
	31.8	68.2	13.9	
Shotgun	19	32	51	
	37.3	62.7	8.1	
Knife	11	2	13	
	84.6	15.4	2.1	
Вомв	1	1	2	
	50.0	50.0	0.3	
PERSONAL WEAPONS	6	0	6	
	100.0	0.0	1.0	
OTHER	26	10	36	
	72.2	27.8	5.7	
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631	
	60.4	39.6	100.0	

Missing = 82

**TABLE 4-172** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER DISARMED 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY			
Officer Disarmed	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
No	289	238	527	
	54.8	45.2	100.0	
YES	87	10	97	
	89.7	10.3	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	376	248	624	
	60.3	39.7	100.0	

Missing = 89

Number Row Percent

### **TABLE 4-173**

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY OFFICER KILLED WITH OWN SERVICE WEAPON 1983-1992

OFFICER KILLED WITH OWN SERVICE WEAPON	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
No	307	240	547
	56.1	43.9	100.0
YES	74	10	84
	88.1	11.9	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	381	250	631
	60.4	39.6	100.0

Missing = 82

**TABLE 4-174** 

### OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY VICTIM WEARING BODY ARMOR 1983-1992

	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
VICTIM WEARING BODY ARMOR	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
No	286	170	456
	62.7	37.3	100.0
Yes	95	79	174
	54.6	45.4	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	381	249	630
	60.5	39.5	100.0

Missing = 83

#### Number Row Percent

Presence of Other Officers. A larger proportion of officers who had the immediate assistance of fellow officers were slain at entry than those without immediate assistance. Forty-four percent of the officers with immediate assistance were attacked at entry, compared to 37.2 percent of the officers without that assistance (Table 4-175).

Officer's Final Action. Not surprising, large proportions of officers were killed at entry whose final actions were exiting vehicles, approaching cars (without the suspect inside), approaching buildings, entering buildings, or approaching the suspects. Between 70 and 87 percent of the officers engaging in those finals actions were killed at entry. One-fifth (19%) of the officers who were slain at entry were approaching the suspects when attacked. Sixteen percent were entering buildings. (See Table 4-176.)

**TABLE 4-175** 

## OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY BY PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF VICTIM OFFICER AT THE TIME OF ATTACK 1983-1992

PRESENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
	No	YES	ROW TOTAL
No	230	136	366
	62.8	37.2	100.0
YES	130	102	232
	<b>5</b> 6.0	44.0	100.0
COLUMN TOTAL	360	238	598
	60.2	39.8	100.0

Missing = 115

TABLE 4-176
OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY: FINAL ACTION OF OFFICER BEFORE SLAYING
1983-1992

	-1992	·		
	OFFIC	OFFICER KILLED AT ENTRY		
Final Action	No	YES	ROW TOTAL	
Talk	62	10	72	
	86.1	13.9	100.0	
Approach Suspect	11	45	56	
	19.6	80.4	100.0	
ENTER BUILDING OR ROOM	8	38	46	
	17.4	82.6	100.0	
Arrest Killer (or Attempt)	36	1	37	
	97.3	2.7	100.0	
Drive	21	10	31	
	67.7	32.3	100.0	
SEARCH	11	15	26	
	42.3	57.7	100.0	
Pursue	26	1	27	
	96.3	3.7	100.0	
EXIT VEHICLE	7	18	25	
	28.0	72.0	100.0	
Approach Building	3	19	22	
	13.6	86.4	100.0	
Arrest Other Person	8	8	16	
	<b>5</b> 0.0	50.0	100.0	
ESCORT SUSPECT/CITIZEN	16	0	16	
	100.0	0.0	100.0	
CALL DISPATCH	12	3	15	
	80.0	20.0	100.0	
Unholster Weapon	10	1	11	
	90.9	9.1	100.0	
RESIST ROBBERY	9	3	12	
	75.0	25.0	100.0	
IDENTIFY SELF	10	1	11	
	90.9	9.1	100.0	
DISARM KILLER (OR ATTEMPT)	10	0	10	
	100.0	0.0	100.0	
Approach Car W/O Suspect	2	5	7	
	28.6	71.4	100.0	
OTHER	86	59	145	
	59.3	40.7	100.0	
COLUMN TOTAL	348	237	585	
	59.5	40.5	100.0	

Missing = 128
Number
Row Percent

#### **CHAPTER 5**

### SOFT BODY ARMOR: DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES AND EFFECTS OF USE

An important aspect of the Police Foundation study on the felonious killings of police was the effort to increase our understanding of the use and effect of soft body armor. To this end a survey was sent to city, county, and state agencies soliciting information on departmental policies regarding the use of body armor, methods used to enforce those policies, and firearms assaults data. Below we summarize the methodology related to this aspect of the overall study. A more complete description of this methodology is contained in Pate and Fridell (1993).

#### Methodology

### **Questionnaire Construction and Sample Selection**

Questionnaire items pertaining to this research were included in an extensive survey used to gather information from departments on the police use of force. The original items were developed following a thorough review of the literature and revised during a one-day focus group meeting with personnel from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and practitioners from five law enforcement agencies in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Eighteen agencies of various types completed the pre-test version and provided feedback for final revisions. The entire instrument is contained as Appendix B; the items developed for purposes of this study on the felonious killings of police are items 10 through 15.

Using the Law Enforcement Sector portion of the 1990 Justice Agency List from the Governments Division of the Bureau of the Census, the 15,801 municipal police departments,

county sheriffs' departments, county police departments, and state agencies were identified.

All state agencies on the Census list were included in the sample. The agencies within the other three categories were stratified by jurisdiction population and sample selection was designed to ensure adequate representation of agencies within all size categories. For instance, it was important in selecting the sample to ensure adequate representation of agencies serving the largest jurisdictions, even though they account for a small number of the total, because a large majority of law enforcement officers work in those agencies.

Among municipal police departments, all agencies serving jurisdictions of 50,000 inhabitants or more were selected for the sample, along with a random sample of 20 percent of the agencies serving between 25,000 and 49,999 persons, a random sample of 10 percent of agencies serving jurisdictions of 10,000 to 24,999 persons, and a random sample of 2 percent of the agencies serving below 10,000 inhabitants. Among county agencies, including sheriffs' departments and county police departments, all agencies serving jurisdictions of 100,000 inhabitants or more were selected for the sample. A random sample of the remaining agencies was selected as follows: 20 percent of agencies serving between 50,000 and 99,999 persons, 10 percent of agencies serving between 25,000 and 49,999 persons, and 2 percent of agencies serving below 25,000 inhabitants.

Table 5-1 shows the universe of law enforcement agencies within the four agency types and by jurisdiction size. Table 5-2 provides the corresponding information for the sample.

TABLE 5-1

Universe of Law Enforcement Agencies
by Agency Type and Population of Jurisdiction Served

			AGENCY TYPE		
Population Served	COUNTY SHERIFFS' DEPT.	COUNTY POLICE DEPT.	MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPT.	STATE POLICE AGENCY	TOTAL
50,000 and over	794	47	535	53	1,429
	(26.2)	(78.3)	(4.2)	(100.0)	(9.0)
25,000 to 49,999	607	5	690	0	1,302
	(20.1)	(8.3)	(5.4)	(0.0)	(8.2)
10,000 to 24,999	905 (29.9)	5 (8.3)	1,668 (13.2)	0 (0.0)	2,578 (16.3)
Below 10,000	721	3	9,768	0	10,492
	(23.8)	(5.0)	(77.2)	(0.0)	(66.4)
Total	3,027	60	12,661	53	15,801
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent column percentages.

TABLE 5-2

Sample of Eligible Law Enforcement Agencies
by Agency Type and Population of Jurisdiction Served

		T	AGENCY TYPE		
Population Served	COUNTY SHERIFFS' DEPT.	COUNTY POLICE DEPT.	MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPT.	STATE POLICE AGENCY	TOTAL
50,000 and over	479	43	527	50	1,099
	(81.5)	(100.0)	(51.9)	(100.0)	(64.8)
25,000 to 49,999	67	0	139	0	206
	(11.4)	(0.0)	(13.7)	(0.0)	(12.1)
10,000 to 24,999	23	0	174	0	197
	(3.9)	(0.0)	(17.1)	(0.0)	(11.6)
Below 10,000	19	0	176	0	195
	(3.2)	(0.0)	(17.3)	(0.0)	(11.5)
Total	588	43	1,016	50	1,697
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses represent column percentages.

Of the 1,725 agencies which were asked to complete the questionnaire, 1,111, or 67.2 percent, responded. This includes 72.4 percent of the municipal agencies, 88.9 percent of the county police departments, 54.2 percent of the county sheriffs' departments, and 90.0 percent of the state agencies. Not all of the responding agencies, however, were able to provide all of the data requested.

### Weighting of Responses

Because sampling was conducted for the county and municipal agencies after stratifying within agency type by size, the distribution of agencies from which information was requested overrepresents the number of agencies in large jurisdictions, compared to their presence in the nation in general. Compounding this overrepresentation, larger agencies

were somewhat more likely to respond to the survey than were smaller ones. To compensate for the stratified sampling and differential response, analyses in this chapter comparing agency types are made by presenting means, percentages, or rates that have been weighted to reflect the distribution, by agency size, found in the universe of agencies. Weighting was conducted for the county sheriffs' departments, the county police departments, and the city police departments. Weighting was not necessary for state agencies because virtually the entire universe of state agencies responded to the survey.

To provide these weighted estimates, the responses to each question were categorized according to the number of sworn officers in the responding agency (1 to 24, 25 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 249, 250 to 499, 500 to 999, and 1,000 or more). The responses from each category were then weighted according to their percentage distribution among all agencies of that type, as estimated by the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Reaves, 1992a, 1992b, 1993).

### Grouping of Responses for Analyzing Responses by Agency Size

There were sufficient number of both County Sheriff and Municipal Police

Departments to conduct analyses within agency size categories. So, for instance, responses
were broken down by the following size categories, based on number of sworn personnel: 1
to 24, 25 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 249, 250 to 499, 500 to 999, and 1,000 ore more. Among
some of the size categories for sheriffs' departments, however, the number of respondents
was low. To provide the most robust estimates, no size category indicators were utilized
unless they were based on the responses of at least 20 agencies. For example, because fewer

than 20 responses were received from sheriffs' departments in the size category of 500 to 999 sworn personnel and in the category of 1,000 or more personnel, these categories were combined into a category of 500 or more sworn personnel.

Because of the small sample sizes among county police departments and state agencies, we do not draw conclusions from the agency size analyses for those agency types. Tables providing the size breakdown information for the county and state agencies for the survey items are, however, contained in Appendix C.

#### Tests of Statistical Significance

All comparisons of categorical variables have included tests of the statistical significance of differences on the unweighted data. The results of these tests have been taken into consideration in interpreting the results of the various comparisons presented in this report. Such tests, however, are heavily influenced by sample size, making small differences among large samples likely to be found significant while large differences among small samples likely not to be found significant.

Thus, in the discussion that follows, although we have paid attention to those differences that reached the .05 level of statistical significance, we have also recognized that some of those differences reached that level primarily because of the large number of cases being examined. On the other hand, we have brought attention to differences that, although not reaching the typical standard of statistical significance appeared to us, based on our experience, to merit further attention and discussion.

### **Departmental Provision of Body Armor**

Departments responding to the survey indicated whether they (1) supply armor to their officers, (2) provide a cash allowance which could be used to purchase soft body armor, or (3) make no provision to provide their officers with armor. Table 5-3 presents the responses to this item by agency type. (As noted above, the percentages for sheriffs' departments, county police departments, and city police departments are weighted.) More of the county police departments (94.9%) than the other three types of departments, reported that they supplied their officers with body armor. The corresponding percentages for state agencies, sheriffs' departments and city police departments are 86.7, 79.4, and 69.4, respectively. Twenty five percent (24.2%) of the city police departments reported that they made no provisions to supply their officers with body armor. Fourteen percent (14.1%) of the sheriffs' departments, 8.9 percent of the state agencies, and 1.7 percent of the county police departments did not provide armor nor did they provide a cash allowance for purchasing body armor.

Tables 5-4 and 5-5 indicate departmental policies regarding provision of soft body armor for sheriffs' departments and city police departments by agency size. (The corresponding tables for county and state agencies are contained as Appendix Tables C5-1 and C5-2.) Among both sheriffs' departments and city police departments, larger proportions of the larger agencies than smaller ones provide armor to their officers.



### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING PROVISION OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY AGENCY TYPE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	AGENCY TYPE						
	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	State Agencies			
DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES ARMOR	79.4	94.9	69.4	86.7			
CASH ALLOWANCE IS PROVIDED	6.6	3.4	6.5	4.4			
No Provision is Made	14.1	1.7	24.2	8.9			
TOTAL NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals are	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

TABLE 5-4

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING PROVISION OF SOFT BODY ARMOR SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY			Number	e of Sworn Per	SONNEL								
	-												
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500 OR MORE	TOTAL	WCP*					
DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES ARMOR	42 (80.8)	35 (71.4)	59 (75.6)	60 (87.0)	25 (83.3)	22 (91.7)	243 (80.5)	79.4					
CASH ALLOWANCE IS PROVIDED	3 (5.8)	3 (6.1)	9 (11.5)	5 (7.2)	5 (16.7)	1 (4.2)	26 (8.6)	6.6					
No Provision is Made	7 (13.5)	11 (22.4)	10 (12.8)	4 (5.8)	0 (0.0)	1 (4.2)	33 (10.9)	14.1					
TOTAL  * Weighted Column Percent	52 (100.0)	49 (100.0)	78 (100.0)	69 (100.0)	30 (100.0)	24 (100.0)	302 (100.0)	100.0					

Weighted Column Percent

TABLE 5-5

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING PROVISION
OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

•			N	UMBER OF SWOR	N PERSONNEL									
DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL	WCP*					
DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES ARMOR	87 (67.4)	83 (76.1)	120 (77.9)	157 (76.2)	51 (75.0)	24 (75.0)	23 (82.1)	545 (75.1)	69.4					
CASH ALLOWANCE IS PROVIDED	6 (4.7)	14 (12.8)	22 (14.3)	25 (12.1)	9 (13.2)	5 (15.6)	3 (10.7)	84 (11.6)	6.5					
No Provision is Made	36 (27.9)	12 (11.0)	12 (7.8)	24 (11.7)	8 (11.8)	3 (9.4)	2 (7.1)	97 (13.4)	24.2					
TOTAL	129 (100.0)	109 (100.0)	154 (100.0)	206 (100.0)	68 (100.0)	32 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	726 (100.0)	100.0					

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

Ninety-two percent (91.7%) of the sheriffs' departments with 500 or more sworn personnel provided armor to their deputies. This compares to just 76 percent of the departments with fewer than 100 sworn personnel. Similarly, among city police departments, 82.1 percent of those in the largest size category (1,000 or more) provided armor, compared to just 67.4 percent of those in the smallest size category (one to 24 sworn personnel). Between 75 and 78 percent of the agencies in the remaining five size categories (encompassing those departments with between 25 and 999 sworn personnel) provided body armor. Over one-quarter (27.9%) of the agencies with fewer than 25 sworn personnel made no provision for soft body armor.

### Departmental Policy Regarding the Wearing of Body Armor

Departments responding to the survey were asked to indicate their policies regarding the wearing of soft body armor by personnel serving in seven different law enforcement functions. That is, for the functions of radio car patrol, foot patrol, plainclothes enforcement, detective operations, tactical operations, serving warrants, and "other" departments indicated whether wearing body armor was "mandatory," wearing body armor was "optional," or "no such function" existed in their departments. Tables 5-6 through 5-9 provide, for each agency type, the original responses for the seven functions for all three response categories. These tables indicate the extent to which the various agency types utilize each of the seven functions. For instance, 60.3 percent of the sheriffs' departments, 26.7 percent of the county agencies, 23.6 percent of the city police departments, and 77.3 of the state agencies

TABLE 5-6

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
BY VARIOUS PERSONNEL
BY SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS

Function	Mandatory	OPTIONAL	No Such Function	Row TOTAL
RADIO CAR PATROL	89	195	15	299
	(29.8)	(65.2)	(5.0)	(100.0)
FOOT PATROL	28	88	176	292
	(9.6)	(30.1)	(60.3)	(100.0)
PLAINCLOTHES ENFORCEMENT	21	236	40	297
	(7.1)	(79.5)	(13.5)	(100.0)
DETECTIVE OPERATION	28	236	33	297
	(9.4)	(79.5)	(11.1)	(100.0)
TACTICAL OPERATION	173	65	57	295
	(58.6)	(22.0)	(19.3)	(100.0)
SERVING WARRANT	70	218	8	296
	(23.6)	(73.6)	(2.7)	(100.0)
OTHER	7	47	240	294
	(2.4)	(16.0)	(81.6)	(100.0)

TABLE 5-7

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
BY VARIOUS PERSONNEL
BY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Function	MANDATORY	OPTIONAL	No Such Function	Row Total
RADIO CAR PATROL	7	24	0	31
	(22.6)	(77.4)	(0.0)	(100.0)
FOOT PATROL	5	17	8	30
	(16.7)	(56.7)	(26.7)	(100.0)
PLAINCLOTHES ENFORCEMENT	2 (6.5)	25 (80.6)	4 (12.9)	31 (100.0)
DETECTIVE OPERATION	2	27	2	31
	(6.5)	(87.1)	(6.5)	(100.0)
TACTICAL OPERATION	21	7	3	31
	(67.7)	(22.6)	(9.7)	(100.0)
SERVING WARRANT	5	24	1	30
	(16.9)	(80.0)	(3.3)	(100.0)
OTHER	1	2	26	29
	(3.4)	(6.9)	(89.7)	(100.0)

TABLE 5-8

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
BY VARIOUS PERSONNEL
BY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Function	MANDATORY	OPTIONAL	No Such Function	Row TOTAL
RADIO CAR PATROL	188	525	6	719
	(26.1)	(73.0)	(0.8)	(100.0)
FOOT PATROL	135	408	168	711
	(19.0)	(57.4)	(23.6)	(100.0)
PLAINCLOTHES ENFORCEMENT	45	603	59	707
	(6.4)	(85.3)	(8.3)	(100.0)
DETECTIVE OPERATION	36	623	52	711
	(5.1)	(87.6)	(7.3)	(100.0)
TACTICAL OPERATION	377	212	119	708
	(53.2)	(29.9)	(16.8)	(100.0)
SERVING WARRANT	171	491	48	710
	(24.1)	(69.2)	(6.8)	(100.0)
OTHER	21	92	593	706
	(3.0)	(13.0)	(84.0)	(100.0)

TABLE 5-9

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
BY VARIOUS PERSONNEL
BY STATE AGENCIES

Function	MANDATORY	OPTIONAL	No Such Function	Row TOTAL
RADIO CAR PATROL	10	34	1	45
	(22.2)	(75.6)	(2.2)	(100.0)
FOOT PATROL	1 (2.3)	9 (20.5)	34 (77.3)	44 (100.0)
PLAINCLOTHES ENFORCEMENT	4	33	8	45
	(8.9)	(73.3)	(17.8)	(100.0)
DETECTIVE OPERATION	3 (6.7)	27 (60.0)	15 (33.3)	<b>45</b> (100.0)
TACTICAL OPERATION	29	10	5	44
	(65.9)	(22.7)	(11.4)	(100.0)
SERVING WARRANT	10	29	5	44
	(22.7)	(65.9)	(11.4)	(100.0)
Отнек	1 (2.3)	7 (15.9)	36 (81.8)	44 (100.0)

have no foot patrol function. Because of the variation among and within agency types with regard to the existence of these functions, the policies pertaining to whether wearing body armor was mandatory or optional for the various functions were analyzed only for those responding departments with the respective functions.

Table 5-10 presents information regarding the body armor policies for those agencies which report having radio car patrol officers (virtually all of them). The differences across agency types are very minor. Between 22 and 30 percent of the agencies within each type have a policy mandating that their radio car patrol officers wear body armor. Among both sheriffs' departments (Table 5-11) and city municipal departments (Table 5-12), the size of the agency appears to be unrelated to this policy. The breakdowns by size for county and state agencies, are contained in Appendix Tables C5-3 and C5-4, respectively.

Again, with regard to foot patrol officers, fairly similar proportions of agencies within each type mandate the wearing of soft body armor. Fourteen percent of the sheriffs' departments, 25.5 percent of the city departments, and 33.4 percent of the county police departments mandate the wearing of body armor by foot patrol officers. Ten state agencies reported that they utilize foot patrol in some instances, and one of these departments (10%) indicated that those officers must wear body armor. (See Table 5-13.) Size of department was not related to this policy. (See Tables 5-14, 5-15, and Appendix Tables C5-5 and C5-6.)

Of the departments within each agency type which use plainclothes officers, similar proportions mandated that these persons wear body armor. As indicated in Table 5-16, between 5.6 percent and 10.8 percent of the agencies within each type had this policy in

**TABLE 5-10** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY RADIO CAR PATROL OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	AGENCY TYPE							
MANDATORY	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES				
MANDATORY	23.2	24.2	30.0	22.7				
OPTIONAL	76.9	75.8	70.1	77.3				
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0				

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

### **TABLE 5-11**

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY RADIO CAR PATROL OFFICERS SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY				of Sworn Per	SONNEL			
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500 OR MORE	TOTAL	WCP*
Mandatory	7 (15.2)	19 (42.2)	24 (32.4)	25 (37.3)	8 (27.6)	6 (26.1)	89 (31.3)	23.2
OPTIONAL	39 (84.8)	26 (57.8)	50 (67.6)	42 (62.7)	21 (72.4)	17 (73.9)	195 (68.7)	76.9
COLUMN TOTAL	46 (100.0)	45 (100.0)	74 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	23 (100.0)	284 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-12** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY RADIO CAR PATROL OFFICERS BY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY			N	UMBER OF SWOR					
DEFARIMENTAL FULICI	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL	WCP*
Mandatory	37 (31.1)	28 (25.7)	42 (27.1)	45 (22.3)	16 (23.9)	10 (31.3)	10 (34.5)	188 (26.4)	30.0
OPTIONAL	82 (68.9)	81 (74.3)	113 (72.9)	157 (77.7)	51 (76.1)	22 (68.8)	19 (65.5)	525 (73.6)	70.1
Column Total	119 (100.0)	109 (100.0)	155 (100.0)	202 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	32 (100.0)	24 (100.0)	713 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-13** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY FOOT PATROL OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE

		AGENCY TYPE								
DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES						
Mandatory	14.2	33.4	25.5	10.0						
OPTIONAL	85.9	66.6	74.6	90.0						
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0						

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

5-19

### **TABLE 5-14**

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY FOOT PATROL OFFICERS SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	Number of Sworn Personnel								
DEPARIMENTAL POLICY	1-49	50-99	100-249	250 or more	TOTAL	WCP*			
Mandatory	7 (19.4)	8 (32.0)	4 (16.7)	9 (29.0)	28 (24.1)	14.2			
Optional	29 (80.6)	17 (68.0)	20 (83.3)	22 (71.0)	88 (75.9)	85.9			
COLUMN TOTAL	· 36 (100.0)	25 (100.0)	24 (100.0)	31 (100.0)	116 (100.0)	100.0			

\* Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-15** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY FOOT PATROL OFFICERS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
DETACIONENTAL I VIACI	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*		
Mandatory	16 (25.0)	20 (29.0)	29 (26.1)	37 (21.3)	15 (22.7)	8 (25.8)	10 (35.7)	135 (24.9)	25.5		
OPTIONAL	48 (75.0)	49 (71.0)	82 (73.9)	137 (78.7)	51 (77.3)	23 (74.2)	18 (64.3)	408 (75.1)	74.6		
Column Total	64 (100.0)	69 (100.0)	111 (100.0)	174 (100.0)	66 (100.0)	31 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	543 (100.0)	100.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-16** 

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR **BY PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS BY AGENCY TYPE**

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	AGENCY TYPE								
DEI ARIMENTAL I OLICI	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES					
Mandatory	5.6	8.1	9.9	10.8					
OPTIONAL	94.5	91.9	90.2	89.2					
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0					

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

place. Among sheriffs' departments, the mid-sized departments (that is, those departments with 25 to 499 sworn personnel) were most likely to mandate that plainclothes officers wear body armor. (See Table 5-17.) Among city departments, there was a positive linear relationship between the proportion of departments with this policy and the size of the departments, except that the proportion of the smallest agencies with the policy (11.5% among those with 1 to 24 sworn personnel) nearly matched the corresponding proportion among the largest agencies (13.8% among those with 1,000 or more sworn personnel). (See Table 5-18.) (See Appendix Tables C5-7 and C5-8 for the agency size breakdowns among county and state agencies, respectively.)

Ten percent or less of the departments within each agency type required that detectives wear body armor. The existence of this type of policy did not appear to vary systematically by agency size. (See Tables 5-19 through 5-21, and Appendix Tables C5-9 and C5-10.)

As indicated in Table 5-22, between 14.5 and 26.1 percent of the departments within each agency type which served warrants, required that officers executing these warrants wear body armor. This policy did not seem to vary by department size among sheriffs' departments (Table 5-23), though among city police departments, the largest departments were most likely to require the wearing of body armor when warrants were executed (Table 5-24). For instance, 44.8 percent of the departments with 1,000 or more sworn personnel required body armor when executing warrants, compared to 26.5 percent of the smallest agencies (with 1 to 24 sworn personnel). (See also Appendix Tables C5-11 and C5-12.)

**TABLE 5-17** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS

SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500 OR MORE	TOTAL	WCP*			
Mandatory	1 (2.9)	5 (11.9)	7 (10.8)	6 (9.7)	(6.7)	0 (0.0)	21 (8.2)	5.6			
OPTIONAL	34 (97.1)	37 (88.1)	58 (89.2)	56 (90.3)	28 (93.3)	23 (100.0)	236 (91.8)	94.5			
COLUMN TOTAL	35 (100.0)	42 (100.0)	65 (100.0)	62 (100.0)	30 (100.0)	23 (100.0)	257 (100.0)	100.0			

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-18** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*		
MANDATORY	9 (11.5)	2 (2.1)	7 (4.7)	12 (6.0)	6 (9.0)	5 (16.7)	4 (13.8)	45 (6.9)	9.9		
OPTIONAL	69 (88.5)	94 (97.9)	142 (95.3)	187 (94.0)	61 (91.0)	25 (83.3)	25 (86.2)	603 (93.1)	90.2		
COLUMN TOTAL	78 (100.0)	96 (100.0)	149 (100.0)	199 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	30 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	648 (100.0)	100.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-19** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY DETECTIVES BY AGENCY TYPE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	AGENCY TYPE								
	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES					
MANDATORY	8.9	6.5	6.1	10.0					
OPTIONAL	91.2	93.5	93.8	90.0					
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0					

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

### **TABLE 5-20**

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY DETECTIVES

### SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500 OR MORE	TOTAL	WCP*			
Mandatory	2 (6.3)	7 (16.7)	9 (12.3)	8 (12.3)	2 (6.9)	0 (0.0)	28 (10.6)	8.9			
OPTIONAL	30 (93.8)	35 (83.3)	64 (87.7)	57 (87.7)	27 (93.1)	23 (100.0)	236 (89.4)	91.2			
COLUMN TOTAL	32 (100.0)	42 (100.0)	73 (100.0)	65 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	23 (100.0)	264 (100.0)	100.0			

\* Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-21** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY DETECTIVES BY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY				UMBER OF SWOR	N PERSONNEL				-
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL	WCP*
Mandatory	5 (7.0)	2 (1.9)	9 (5.8)	11 (5.5)	4 (6.0)	2 (6.9)	3 (10.3)	36 (5.5)	6.1
OPTIONAL	66 (93.0)	106 (98.1)	146 (94.2)	189 (94.5)	63 (94.0)	27 (93.1)	26 (89.7)	623 (94.5)	93.8
COLUMN TOTAL	71 (100.0)	108 (100.0)	155 (100.0)	200 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	659 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-22** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY OFFICERS SERVING WARRANTS BY AGENCY TYPE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		AGENCY TYPE							
	SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES					
MANDATORY	20.3	14.5	26.1	25.6					
OPTIONAL	79.8	85.5	74.0	74.4					
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0					

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

**TABLE 5-23** 

# DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY OFFICERS SERVING WARRANTS SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel										
1-24	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL	WCP*			
MANDATORY	8 (16.7)	13 (27.7)	22 (29.7)	14 (20.9)	8 (27.6)	2 (14.3)	3 (33.3)	70	20.3			
OPTIONAL	40 (83.3)	34 (72.3)	52 (70.3)	53 (79.1)	21 (72.4)	12 (85.7)	6	(24.3)				
COLUMN TOTAL	48 (100.0)	47 (100.0)	74 (100.0)	67 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	14 (100.0)	(66.7) 9 (100.0)	(75.7) 288 (100.0)	79.8			

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-24** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY OFFICERS SERVING WARRANTS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*		
MANDATORY	26 (26.5)	22 (23.2)	43 (28.9)	42 (21.3)	13 (20.3)	12 (40.0)	13 (44.8)	171 (25.8)	26.1		
OPTIONAL	72 (73.5)	73 (76.8)	106 (71.1)	155 (78.7)	51 (79.7)	18 (60.0)	16 (55.2)	491	74.0		
COLUMN TOTAL	98 (100.0)	95 (100.0)	149 (100.0)	197 (100.0)	64 (100.0)	30 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	(74.2) 662 (100.0)	100.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

As shown in Table 5-25, between one-half and three-fourths of the agencies within each agency type which conduct tactical operations mandate that the tactical officers wear body armor. Among Sheriffs' departments, greater proportions of the larger departments (e.g., 100-249 sworn personnel, 250-499 sworn personnel, 500 or more sworn personnel) compared to the smaller ones had this policy in place. Eighty-five percent of the departments with 100 or more sworn personnel mandated that tactical officers wear body armor, compared to 63.6 percent of the agencies with fewer than 100 sworn personnel. (See Table 5-26. This relationship appears among city police departments, as well, though there is more fluctuation. (See Table 5-27.) (See Appendix Tables C5-13 and C5-14 for the county and state information broken down by agency size.)

Departments indicated "other" personnel for which there were policies regarding the wearing of body armor. Some of those personnel which were listed were mounted officers, VICE officers, officers responding to armed suspect calls, court security officers, street supervisory personnel, and reserves. There were not sufficient responses to provide for meaningful comparisons across agencies or across agency size.

### Methods Used to Enforce Body Armor Policy

The survey listed five methods for enforcing body armor policy. Responding departments indicated for each one whether they used the method, did not use the method, or did not have a policy. Tables 5-28 to 5-31 provide the full break down of responses for each agency type for the five methods: education and encouragement, daily checks, periodic checks, supervisory inspection on tactical operations, and "other."

**TABLE 5-25** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY TACTICAL OPERATIONS BY AGENCY TYPE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		AGENCY TYPE					
DE ARIMENTAL I OLICI	SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	State Agencies			
MANDATORY	55.0	75.8	54.7	74.4			
Optional	45.1	24.2	45.4	25.6			
COLUMN TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0			

NOTE: Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

**TABLE 5-26** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY TACTICAL OPERATIONS SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	Number of Sworn Personnel							
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500 OR MORE	TOTAL	WCP*
Mandatory	12 (46.2)	22 (62.9)	48 (70.6)	49 (86.0)	24 (82.8)	18 (78.3)	173 (72.7)	55.0
OPTIONAL	14 (53.8)	13 (37.1)	20 (29.4)	8 (14.0)	5 (17.2)	5 (21.7)	65 (27.3)	45.1
COLUMN TOTAL	26 (100.0)	35 (100.0)	68 (100.0)	57 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	23 (100.0)	238 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

**TABLE 5-27** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY TACTICAL OPERATIONS BY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel							
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
MANDATORY	26 (52.0)	50 (62.5)	98 (70.0)	122 (62.9)	38 (58.5)	19 (61.3)	24 (82.8)	377 (64.0)	54.7
OPTIONAL	24 (48.0)	30 (37.5)	42 (30.0)	72 (37.1)	27 (41.5)	12 (38.7)	5 (17.2)	212 (36.0)	45.4
COLUMN TOTAL	50 (100.0)	80 (100.0)	140 (100.0)	194 (100.0)	65 (100.0)	31 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	589 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding

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TABLE 5-28

RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEM REGARDING METHODS USED FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY BY SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS

METHODS USED	YES	No	No Policy	TOTAL
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	198	22	79	299
	(66.2)	(7.4)	(26.4)	(100.0)
DAILY CHECKS	35	158	105	298
	(11.7)	(53.0)	(35.2)	(100.0)
PERIODIC CHECKS	103	95	99	297
	(34.7)	(32.0)	(33.3)	(100.0)
Inspection on Tactical Operations	151	54	93	298
	(50.7)	(18.1)	(31.2)	(100.0)
Отнек	4 (1.3)	176 (59.1)	118 (39.6)	298 (100.0)

NOTE:

Row totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 5-29

RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEM REGARDING METHODS USED FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY
BY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

METHODS USED	YES	No	No Policy	TOTAL
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	24	4	4	32
	(75.0)	(12.5)	(12.5)	(100.0)
DAILY CHECKS	4 (12.5)	21 (65.6)	7 (21.9)	32 (100.0)
PERIODIC CHECKS	13	13	6	32
	(40.6)	(40.6)	(18.8)	(100.0)
Inspection on Tactical Operations	15	10	7	32
	(46.9)	(31.3)	(21.9)	(100.0)
OTHER	1	20	11	32
	(3.1)	(62.5)	(34.4)	(100.0)

TABLE 5-30

RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEM REGARDING METHODS USED FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY
BY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

METHODS USED	YES	No	No Policy	TOTAL
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	438	49	230	717
	(61.1)	(6.8)	(32.1)	(100.0)
DAILY CHECKS	81	334	298	713
	(11.4)	(46.8)	(41.8)	(100.0)
Periodic Checks	210	216	287	713
	(29.5)	(30.3)	(40.3)	(100.0)
Inspection on Tactical Operations	321	149	244	714
	(45.0)	(20.9)	(34.2)	(100.0)
OTHER	23	373	320	716
	(3.2)	(52.1)	(44.7)	(100.0)

NOTE:

Row totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding.

TABLE 5-31

RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEM REGARDING METHODS USED FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY
BY STATE AGENCIES

METHODS USED	YES	No	No Policy	TOTAL
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	28	4	11	43
	(65.1)	(9.3)	(25.6)	(100.0)
DAILY CHECKS	4	24	15	43
	(9.3)	(55.8)	(34.9)	(100.0)
PERIODIC CHECKS	14	16	13	43
	(32.6)	(37.2)	(30.2)	(100.0)
Inspection on Tactical Operations	23 (53.5)	11 (25.6)	9 (20.9)	43 (100.0)
OTHER	1 (2.3)	19 (44.2)	23 (53.5)	43 (100.0)

NOTE:

Table 5-32 presents the percentages of departments within each agency type which use each of the various methods. A majority (63.1%) of the departments use education and encouragement to enforce their body armor policies. This includes 45.4 percent of the city police departments, 59.8 percent of the sheriffs' departments, 65.1 percent of the state agencies, and 72.2 percent of the county police departments. Between 8 and 12 percent of the departments within each agency type enforced their body armor policies with daily checks. Periodic checks were utilized by 20 to 40 percent of the departments within each agency type; and between 26 and 54 percent of the departments within the agency types conducted supervisor inspections on tactical operations to ensure that officers were adhering to body armor policy. Just under three percent (2.7%) of the departments indicated they used another enforcement method not listed, for instance, annual inspections and contracts linked to the cash allowance for purchasing body armor.

Generally, each method was more likely to be utilized by the larger agencies than the smaller agencies within both sheriffs' and municipal departments. That is, among sheriffs' departments, more of the larger agencies than smaller agencies used education and encouragement, daily checks, and supervisory inspection on tactical operations. (See Table 5-33.) Among city police departments, more of the larger agencies than smaller ones used education and encouragement, daily checks, periodic checks, and supervisory inspection on tactical operations. (See Table 5-34.) (The information for the county and state departments by department size are contained in Appendix Table C5-15 and Table C5-16.)

**TABLE 5-32** 

#### PERCENT DEPARTMENTS USING VARIOUS METHODS FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY BY AGENCY TYPE

METHODS USED		AGENCY TYPE					
	Sheriffs' Departments	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS	STATE AGENCIES			
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	59.8	72.2	45.4	65.1			
DAILY CHECKS	8.6	11.5	10.8	9.3			
PERIODIC CHECKS	20.2	40.2	23.5	32.6			
Inspection on Tactical Operations	31.0	44.7	26.9	53.5			
OTHER	0.4	2.7	2.5	2.3			

NOTE:

Percentages are weighted. Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding. Multiple responses are possible.

TABLE 5-33

PERCENT DEPARTMENTS USING VARIOUS METHODS
FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY

SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

	N	Number of Sworn Personnel							
METHODS USED	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL	WCP*
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	29 (56.9)	30 (61.2)	47 (61.0)	52 (75.4)	24 (80.0)	9 (64.3)	7 (79.8)	198 (66.2)	59.8
DAILY CHECKS	3 (6.0)	7 (14.3)	8 (10.4)	12 (17.4)	1 (3.3)	2 (14.3)	2 (22.2)	35 (11.7)	8.6
PERIODIC CHECKS	5 (10.0)	17 (35.4)	31 (40.3)	32 (46.4)	9 (30.0)	5 (35.7)	4 (44.4)	103 (34.7)	20.2
Inspection on Tactical Operations	11 (22.0)	15 (30.6)	46 (59.7)	42 (60.9)	20 (66.7)	9 (64.3)	8 (88.9)	151 (50.7)	31.0
OTHER	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (2.6)	1 (1.5)	0 (0.0)	1 (7.1)	0 (0.0)	4 (1.3)	0.4

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding. Multiple responses are possible.

**TABLE 5-34** 

#### PERCENT DEPARTMENTS USING VARIOUS METHODS FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

		Number of Sworn Personnel							
METHODS USED	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	51 (40.8)	63 (58.9)	108 (69.7)	131 (64.9)	44 (64.7)	23 (71.9)	18 (64.3)	438 (61.1)	45.4
DAILY CHECKS	13 (10.5)	13 (12.0)	21 (13.5)	16 (8.1)	4 (5.9)	4 (12.5)	10 (35.7)	81 (11.4)	10.8
PERIODIC CHECKS	28 (22.6)	24 (22.2)	49 (31.8)	66 (33.0)	22 (32.8)	11 (34.4)	10 (35.7)	210 (29.5)	23.5
Inspection on Tactical Operations	27 (22.0)	42 (38.9)	88 (56.8)	99 (49.3)	31 (45.6)	18 (58.1)	16 (57.1)	321 (45.0)	26.9
OTHER	3 (2.4)	2 (1.9)	7 (4.5)	5 (2.5)	3 (4.4)	1 (3.1)	2 (7.1)	23 (3.2)	2.5

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding. Multiple responses are possible.

### Firearms Assaults: The Effects of Soft Body Armor

Providing detailed information on firearms assaults were 289 sheriff's departments, 31 county agencies, 676 municipal agencies, and 37 state agencies. These agencies provided information regarding the number of officers which were "hit by bullets intentionally fired by civilians" for the period 1987 through 1992. Regarding each of these incidents, the departments indicated whether the officer was killed or wounded, whether the officer was wearing body armor or not, and the location of the hit (as either within the upper torso area, outside of the upper torso area, or both within and outside the upper torso area). Figure 5-1 shows the number of law enforcement officers shot per year per 100,000 sworn officers for each agency type. The rates for the sheriffs' departments, the county police departments, and the city police departments are weighted based on agency size. County police agencies have a weighted rate of 214.1 officers shot per year per 100,000 sworn officers. (It should be pointed out that this is based on 31 reporting agencies, as such the rate is sensitive to the relatively small number of officers represented.) The corresponding rates of firearms assaults per 100,000 for the state agencies, sheriff's departments, and city police departments are 86.1, 28.2, and 5.3, respectively.

Figure 5-2 indicates for each agency type, the percent of hits which were fatal for officers who were and who were not wearing body armor. Of the sheriffs' department officers who were assaulted with firearms while wearing body armor, 7.5 percent were killed. Of those officers who were assaulted with firearms while not wearing body armor, 28.8 percent were killed. None of the data from the other agency types indicated such a dramatic effect of body armor. Among county officers assaulted with and without body

Figure 5-1: Law Enforcement Officers Shot per Year per 100,000 Sworn Officers, Total Five Year Period by Agency Type





Figure 5-2: Percent of Hits Which Were Fatal for Officers Not Wearing and Wearing Body Armor, Total Five Year Period by Agency Type



NOTE: With the exception of state agencies, percentages are weighted by agency size. Numbers in parentheses denote number of responding agencies. Source: Police Foundation 1991 National Law Enforcement Survey.


armor, 13.6 percent and 11.9 percent, respectively, were killed. Among city officers assaulted with and without body armor, 4.2 percent and 7.6 percent died from the assault. Among state agencies 16.7 percent of the assaulted officers wearing body armor were killed, compared to 13.3 percent of the officers who were not wearing body armor.

Figures 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5 look at the extent to which firearms assaults of officers with and without body armor are fatal, adding information regarding the location of the bullet wound. The data for Sheriff's departments are contained in Figure 5-3. Less than one percent (0.2%) of the officers who were wearing body armor when they were shot in the upper torso area--the area that soft body armor is designed to protect--were killed. In contrast, one-fourth of the officers who were not wearing body armor when shot in the upper torso died from their wounds.

Among city agencies, 1.9 percent of the officers who were wearing body armor when shot in the upper torso were killed, compared to 4.7 percent of the officers who were shot in the same location, but were not wearing soft body armor. (See Figure 5-4.)

Seven percent of the state officers who were wearing body armor when shot in the upper torso died from the assault, compared to 13.3 percent of their counterparts who were not wearing body armor. (See Figure 5-5.)

Figure 5-3: Percent of Hits Which Were Fatal for Officers Not Wearing and Wearing Body Armor By Location of Hit(s), Total Five Year Period: Sheriffs' Departments



NOTE: Percentages are weighted by agency size. Data represents responses from 289 sheriffs' departments. Source: Police Foundation 1991 National Law Enforcement Survey.

## Figure 5-4: Percent of Hits Which Were Fatal for Officers Not Wearing and Wearing Body Armor By Location of Hit(s), Total Five Year Period: City Agencies





Figure 5-5: Percent of Fatal Hits for Officers Not Wearing and Wearing Body Armor By Location of Hit(s), Total Five Year Period: State Agencies



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### APPENDIX A

### LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE

### Law Enforcement Agency Questionnaire



Police Foundation and



International Association of Chiefs of Police

ASSURANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY — The data from this survey will be used for statistical reports which do not identify the agency or individual responding to the questionnaire by name. Agency names will not be attached to the data set that is provided to the National Institute of Justice.

### Instructions for Completing Ouestionnaire

		Completing Questionnaire
1.	Ple que	ease answer ALL questions unless otherwise instructed. In completing the estionnaire you will find two types of questions:
	a.	Questions with boxes . These questions should be answered by placing a mark in the box for the appropriate response.
	b.	Questions that require you to supply a number. Please write the answer in the space provided. If the answer is none, write "0" in the space.
2.	Wh	en you are unable to respond to a question, use one of the following:
		Do Not Know. Information is not available or unknown.
		Not Applicable to your agency (e.g., for question 11, your agency does not have a body armor policy).
	ND	No Data. Information requested is not routinely recorded

- ND No Data. Information requested is not routinely recorded or capable of being
- compiled from records in order to answer the question.
- 3. A glossary containing definitions of various terms used throughout this questionnaire is attached for your convenience.

So that we may follow-up with assistance in answering questions, please complete and return the enclosed postcard identifying the person that you assign to complete the questionnaire. Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope within 3 weeks.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact Tony Pate of the Police Foundation at (202) 833-1460 or Jack Gillen of LACP at (703) 243-6500.

Please provide the name and rank of the person completing the questionnaire whom we may call to clarify answers if necessary.				
AGENCY NAME:				
CITY AND STATE:				
NAME AND RANK:				
TELEPHONE:				

JUTE	een	er		
Please answer this screener to determinagency.	ne if th	is questionnaire appl	ies to yo	ur
Does your department perform the following	lowing	functions?		
<ul> <li>a. Answers calls for service<sup>1</sup></li> <li>b. Serves warrants and makes arrests</li> </ul>		Yes No 1 2 1 1 2 2 1		
ABOVE, DO NOT COMPLETE THE QUEST AND RETURN IT TO US. THANK YOU FO QUESTIONNAL	R YOU	disariti tarabadian indi ili di dilitaringkan dagisa di rada dinagisa di kada di kada di dilitari di dilitara d		
Section I — Personnel  What was the total number of sworn and	2.	What was the total num personnel, by ethnicity/ra in your department as of 1991?	ce and by	sex,
What was the total number of sworn and non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as	2.	personnel, by ethnicity/rain your department as	ce and by of December	sex, per 31,
	2. a.	personnel, by ethnicity/rain your department as	ce and by	sex,
What was the total number of sworn and non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991?		personnel, by ethnicity/rain your department as a 1991?	ce and by of December	sex, per 31,
What was the <i>total number of sworn and</i> non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991?  Total sworn personnel	a.	personnel, by ethnicity/rain your department as of 1991?  White Black Hispanic	ce and by of December	sex, per 31,
What was the total number of sworn and non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991?	<b>a</b> . b.	personnel, by ethnicity/ra in your department as of 1991?  White Black Hispanic American Indian	ce and by of December	sex, per 31,
What was the total number of sworn and non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991?  Total sworn personnel	a. b. c. d. e.	personnel, by ethnicity/ra in your department as of 1991?  White Black Hispanic American Indian Asian/Pacific Islander	ce and by of December	sex, per 31,
What was the <i>total number of sworn and</i> non-sworn <sup>2</sup> personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991?  Total sworn personnel	a. b. c. d.	personnel, by ethnicity/ra in your department as of 1991?  White Black Hispanic American Indian	ce and by of December	<i>sex</i> , per 31,

1.

**a**. b.

	3. Please indicate the number of sworn personnel in your department as of December 31, 1991, by levels of education completed.	6. What was the total number of sworn field personnel, by rank, in your department as of December 31, 1991? [If a rank is not used by your department, write "N/A" in the space provided.]
6	a. High School	• •
ł	c. Less than 2 years college	a Potrel Off
C	: Associate Degree	a. Patrol Officer b. Detective/Investigator
Ċ	l. BA/BS Degree	
e	Advanced Degree (MA, Ph.D.)	c. Sergeant d. Lieutenant
	,	e. Captain
		f. Above Captain*
4	Please indicate the average age and average	g. Total
	length of time in service for (a) sworn personnel and (b) sworn non-supervisory field personnel <sup>3</sup> in your department as of December 31, 1991?	*Majors, Deputy Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Commanders, Colonels, Chiefs, etc.
a. b.		<ul><li>7. How many of the field patrol officers in your department were in (a) one-officer patrol and (b) two-officer patrol, across all shifts, on an average day in 1991?</li><li>a. One-officer patrol</li></ul>
		b. Two-officer patrol
5. a.	Please indicate the number of sworn personnel, by rank, actually employed by your department as of December 31, 1991. [If a rank is not used by your department, write "N/A" in the space provided.]  Patrol Officer	Section II — Calls for Service
b.		_
c.	Detective/Investigator Sergeant	
d.	Lieutenant	(a) received and (b) dispatched by your department in 1991?
е.	Captain	
f.	Above Captain*	a. Calls for Service Received
g.	Total	b. Calls for Service Dispatched
	*Majors, Deputy Chiefs, Assistant Chiefs, Commanders, Colonels, Chiefs, etc.	·

Section III— Equipment  9a. Does your department provide electrical devices such as Tasers to the following types of personnel? [Please indicate whether electrical devices are provided to each type of personnel.]	<ul> <li>10. What is your department's policy regarding providing soft body armor?</li> <li>a. Department supplies armor 1</li> <li>b. Cash allowance is provided 2</li> <li>c. No provision is made 3</li> </ul>
a. Sworn field personnel  b. Field personnel supervisors 1 2 3  c. Tactical Units  d. Special Assignments  e. Court Bailiff/Security  f. Other	11. What is your department's policy regarding the wearing of soft body armor by sworn personnel performing the following functions? [Please mark one box to indicate whether it is "mandatory" or "optional" for each function.]  No such Mandatory Optional Function
9b. Does your department provide chemical agents <sup>5</sup> such as Mace to the following types of personnel? [Please indicate whether chemical agents are provided to each type of personnel.]  Does Not No Such Provides Provide Personnel.	a. Radio car patrol  b. Footbeat patrol  c. Plainclothes  enforcement  d. Detective operation  e. Tactical operation  f. Serving warrant  g. Other  (Specify)
a. Sworn field personnel  b. Field personnel supervisors  c. Tactical Units  d. Special Assignments  e. Court Bailiff/Security  f. Other  (specify)	12. How is your department's body armor policy enforced?  YES NO POLICY  a. Through education and encouragement  b. Daily checks  c. Periodic checks  d. Supervisory inspection on tactical operations  e. Other

### Section IV — Assaults Against Police Officers

- 13. For each of the years below, please indicate the number of incidents in which officers in your department were hit by bullets intentionally fired by civilians?
  14. How many officers were hit in those incidents?
  1987
  1988
  1989
  1990
  1991
- 15. For those officers hit by bullets, please record a number indicating how many officers were wearing or not wearing soft body armor, where the bullet hit the officers, and whether the officers were wounded or killed. For location of the hit, please indicate the number of officers who were hit within the upper torso area, outside the upper torso area, or both within and outside the upper torso area.

		Location of	Body Armor Hit(s)	We	aring Soft 1  Location o	cers Hit While Body Armor
	Upper Torso Area	Outside of Upper Torso Area	Both Within and Outside Upper Torso Area	Upper Torso	Outside of Upper Torso	Both Within and Outside Upper Torso
Wounded				Alea	Area	Агеа
Killed				ARGO -		
Wounded						
Killed				3 1. St. 1 St. 1 St.		
Wounded						
Killed			87879 1800 1900 000			
Wounded					15, 18 V	
Cilled	jarik (pisa)		21 1 2 Va 2			
Vounded				4723.0		
illed		and the control of				
	Killed Wounded Killed Wounded Killed Vounded Killed Vounded	Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Vounded	Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed  Vounded	Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed	Wounded  Killed  Wounded  Killed	Wounded Wounded Wounded Killed

# SECTION V — COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS

	SECTION V — COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS			18. Does your department make complaint forms available for citizens at any of th following locations? [Please mark "yes, "no," or "not applicable" for each location.]					
a. b. c. d. e.	Flyers Newsletters Public Service Announcements	form citiz	zens about	<ul> <li>a. Agency Headquarters</li> <li>b. Store Front or Mini/Mobile Stations</li> <li>c. Fire Stations</li> <li>d. Public Libraries</li> <li>e. Public Housing  Management Offices</li> <li>f. Office of City Clerk</li> <li>g. City Council Field Offices</li> <li>h. Community/Grassroots  Organization</li> <li>i. Other</li></ul>		2	8 8 8		
17:	Can citizens file complair misconduct against office department in the follow	rs in you	ır	19. Where can citizens file misconduct? [Please m "not applicable" for ea	19rk "t	77 66 <sub>1</sub>	no " o=		
a. b. c. d. e.	Anonymously <sup>7</sup> Through the mail By telegram Over the telephone (main department numbers) Over the telephone (separate or special number) In person	YES  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	No 2	<ul> <li>a. Agency Headquarters</li> <li>b. District/Precinct Station</li> <li>c. Store Front or Mini/ Mobile Station</li> <li>d. Civil Service Commissions</li> <li>e. Board of Commissioners</li> <li>f. Civilian Complaint Review Agency</li> <li>g. City Hall</li> <li>h. Other</li></ul>	YES 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1	NO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	NOT APPL. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8		

20	Who in your department is authorized to a complaints from citizens? Any employee	ccept	23.	Which of the following type does your department procitizens file complaints of misconduct?	vide wh	ssistance en
	Any sworn personnel Only sworn supervisors	2 3		•	Yes	No
			a. b.	Provides complaint form Provides bilingual	1	2
21	21. What time of day can a citizen file a wrice complaint of police misconduct against officers in your department?  Any time of day  Day shift only  Other  (specify)	itten	<b>c.</b> :	complaint form Officer completes	1	2
			d.	complaint form Civilian employee completes	1	2
		1	e.	complaint form	1	2
			f.	speaking citizens Provides copy of complaint	1	2
t.	(specify)		g.	report to citizen Informs citizens of case	1	2
			h.	final status/disposition Informs citizens of disciplinar	1 <b></b>	2
22.	What is the time limit for a citizen to fil complaint, after the alleged incident?	e a	i.	action taken Other	1 1	2 2
	No time limit Within one month	1 🔲 2 🔲		(specify)		
	1 month up to 3 months 3 months up to 6 months 6 months up to a year	3		Which of the following doe department require of personal file a complaint of police n	sons who	o seek to
	Other(specify)	6			YES	No
			ъ. с.	Swear to complaint Certify complaint	1	2 2 2 2 2

2.	5. With whom can an employee of your department file a complaint of misconduct against an officer in your department?	28. What is the rank of the individual in charge of the Internal Affairs Section/Unit in your department?
a. b. c. d. e.	Sworn supervisor  Chief/Commissioner/Sheriff  Internal Affairs personnel  Board of Commissioners  Equal Employment  Opportunity (EEO)  Other  (specify)	Civilian  Sergeant  Lieutenant  Captain  Commander  Assistant/Deputy Chief/Under Sheriff  Chief/Commissioner/Sheriff  City/County Executive  Mayor/Other elected official  Other  (specify)
26.	How is the internal affairs function handled in your department?	
<b>a.</b> b. c.	Internal Affairs Division/Section/ Unit <sup>11</sup> with full-time responsibility  Cases formally assigned to specific individuals Complaints handled on a case-by-case basis  Internal Affairs Division/Section/  [Skip to Q29]	29. Does your jurisdiction have a Civilian Complaint Review Board/Agency <sup>12</sup> ?  YES 1 No 2 [Skip to Q32]
	If you have a separate Internal Affairs Division/Unit how many people perform the internal affairs function? [Please indicate how many personnel are sworn and non-sworn as well as how many are investigators and non-investigators.]	30. How many persons work for the Civilian Complaint Review Board/Agency? [Please indicate how many personnel are sworn and non-sworn as well as how many are investigators and non-investigators.]  Number of Number of Investigators  Number of Investigators  a. Sworn
b. 1	Number of Number of Non-Investigators  Sworn  Von-sworn  Total	b. Non-sworn c. Total

31. To whom is the person in charge of the Civilian Complaint Review Board/Agency accountable?  YES NO  a. Mayor/Other elected official 1 2 5 b. City/County Executive 1 2 5 c. Chief/Commissioner/Sheriff 1 2 5 d. Other 1 2 5	<ul> <li>33. Can an officer against whom a complaint has been filed, refuse, without penalty, to provide information requested during administrative investigation for (1) excessive force and (2) deadly force cases?</li> <li>YES NO</li> <li>a. Excessive force cases</li> <li>b. Deadly force cases</li> <li>1 2</li> <li>b. Deadly force cases</li> </ul>					
Section VI —	34. What is the time limit for completing an					
Investigations of	investigation of a personnel complaint, <sup>14</sup> filed by (1) a citizen or (2) an employee?					
Use of Force Complaints	CITIZEN EMPLOYEE					
32. Who conducts administrative (non-criminal) investigations of citizen complaints about police use of (1) excessive force <sup>13</sup> or (2) deadly force in your department? [Mark all that apply for each type of force.]	No time limit  Within one month  1 month up to 3 months  3 months up to 6 months  6 months up to one year  Other					
EXCESSIVE DEADLY FORCE FORCE						
a. Sworn personnel						
<ul><li>b. Non-sworn personnel 1 1 1</li><li>c. Internal Affairs Division/</li></ul>	35. Does your department have a policy					
Section/Unit 1 1 1 1 1 d. Civilian Complaint Review	requiring that citizen complaints receive separate review outside the chain of command where the officer is assigned?					
Board/Agency 1 1 1	YES 1 No 2 [Skip to Q37]					
Standards 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1						
(specify)						

36.	36. Who conducts the separate review? [Check all that apply.]				on th	has the final res	ons for disc	iplinary
		YES	No		(2) de	n in use of (1) ex eadly force cases or each type of fo	cessive forc? [Please n	e and
a.	Internal Affairs Unit	1	2			•	-	
b.	Civilian Complaint Review	.m	- CT				Excessive Force	DEADLY <u>Force</u>
c.	Board/Agency Board of Police	1	2		Imme	diate supervisor	0	
Ů,	Commissioners	1	<b>₁</b> □			Commissioner/She		
d.	Other	10	2 <b></b> 2 <b></b>			al Affairs Division	-	1
	(specify)		4_1			n/Unit	² <b>_</b>	2
	(1 )/				Trial I	Board	3	3
					City/C	County Manager	4	4 
27	Who reviews the investiga	49	. •			n Complaint Revi		
37.	Who reviews the investigations makes recommendations	ttive repo for discir	ort and			/Agency	5	5
	action in (1) excessive for	ce and (2	2) deadly			of Police		
	force cases? [Please mar for each type of force.]	k all that	apply			issioners	6	6
	for each type of force.					Other elected off	icial 7	7
	E	XCESSIVE Force	DEADLY		Other		. 8	8
	•	FORCE	FORCE			(specify)		
a.	Immediate supervisor	1	1_			٠.		
b. с.	Chief/Commissioner/Sheriff Internal Affairs Division/	1	1	39.	Who l	has a right to app	ceal <sup>15</sup> the de	ecision?
C.	Section/Unit	1	. 🗀		[Pleas	e mark one box	for each typ	e of
d.	Civilian Complaint Review	1	1		force.]			
	Board/Agency	1	1				Excessive	DEADLY
e.	Board of Police				<b>5</b>		FORCE	FORCE
	Commissioners	1	1			itizen and police		_
f.	Arbitrator	1	1			ant.	1	1 🔲
g.	Other	1	1		Citizen	•	2	2
	(specify)					officer only	3 🔲	3
					NO One	has right to appe	al 4	4
				40.	compla	your department ation on investigaints of police mination to the pu	ations of cit sconduct fo	izens'

41. In the table—ow please record, by complaint type, the total number of citizens' complaints filed against employees of your department and the dispositions of the complaints in COMPLAINTS THAT OCCUR IN JAIL]. Also, for each category, record the number of complaints that were internally generated, that is, brought against employees by their supervisors or other employees. Record "0" if "None" or "DK" if "Don't Know."

TYPE OF COMPLAINT	COMPLAINT SOURCE	NUMBER UNFOUNDED <sup>17</sup>	NUMBER EXONERATED <sup>10</sup>	NUMBER NOT SUSTAINED!	NUMBER SUSTAINED*	NUMBER PENDING <sup>21</sup>	NUMBER OTHER	TOTAL NUMBER RECEIVED
a. Excessive/undue/ unnecessary use of force; brutality (including use of weapons, cuffs, etc.)	Citizen generated							
	Internally generated							
b. False/unlawful arrest/ imprisonment, improper detention/ interrogation (false charges filed)	Citizen generated							
	Internally generated							
c. Illegal/unlawful search or seizure	Citizen generated							
	Internally generated							
l. Harassment, intimidation, threats, verbal abuse	Citizen generated							
verdal aduse	Internally generated							
Abuse/misuse of authority (conduct	Citizen generated							
unbecoming an officer)	Internally generated							
Improper language (demeaning,	Citizen generated						•	
ethnic/racial slur)	Internally generated							

### **APPENDIX B**

### POLICE OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED BY STATE BY AGENCY TYPE BY AGENCY BY YEAR

. 4	YES 1	N		
. 4			0 2	
·	CVCC331AC II2	y/race, who re	ll <b>ed</b> cor	~~!~
		MAL	E	FEMAL
a.	White			
b.			_	
		-	_	
e.	Iotal			
45	whom compla	aints of use of 1991.	npleted, of excess	against sive force
		COMPLA	INT (S) WI	ERE FILED
a.	High School			
ь.	Less than 2 yes	ers		<b>-</b>
_				_
_	Associate Degr	ee .		-
	BA/BS Degree	-		<b>-</b>
C.	(MA Ph.D.)	ree		
	(MA, PII.D.)	-		-
Officer	rs. hv sev and a	•hminia./		
	-, of sex and E	unicity/race,	against	whom
_	a. b. c. d. c. d. e.	a. White b. Black c. Hispanic d. Other e. Total  49. Please indicate by levels of ewhom complete were filed in  a. High School b. Less than 2 year college c. Associate Degrate d. BA/BS Degree e. Advanced Degrate (MA, Ph.D.)	a. White b. Black c. Hispanic d. Other e. Total  49. Please indicate the number by levels of education community of use of were filed in 1991.  OPPICE COMPLA  a. High School b. Less than 2 years college c. Associate Degree d. BA/BS Degree e. Advanced Degree (MA, Ph.D.)	excessive use of force against of your department in 1991.  MALE  a. White b. Black c. Hispanic d. Other e. Total  49. Please indicate the number of yo by levels of education completed, whom complaints of use of excess were filed in 1991.  OFFICERS AGAINS COMPLAINT (s) WI  a. High School b. Less than 2 years college c. Associate Degree d. BA/BS Degree e. Advanced Degree

	W	HITE	ST WHOM COMPLA		HISPANIC				,EU	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE			PANIC	O'	THER	1	OTAL
One complaint filed			MALLE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMAL
Two or more complaints filed	•									

<ul><li>51. Please indicate the average age and average length of time in service for officers against whom complaints of use of excessive force were filed in 1991.</li><li>a. Average Age</li></ul>			52	CYCE221A	re use o	he number ace, whose f force we nt, in 199	e comp] ere sust	ainte of		
	Age Time in Se	enice.	<del></del>	•				Mai	LE	FEMAL
. riveruge	1 mic m Se	IVICE .		•	a.	White		•		
					ъ. b.	Black		•		
					C.	Hispanic				
					d.	Other		<del></del>		
					e.	Total				
									<del></del>	
In the ta	able below that of exc	w, please r essive forc	ecord ti	he number sustained	of officin 1991.	ers, by sex	and et	hnicity/ra	ce, agai	nst whom
	OFFICERS	AGAINST	WHOM (	COMPLAIN	TS OF EX	CESSIVE F	ORCE W	FRE SLICE	CAINTED	<del></del>
	w	ніте		LACK	TS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE WE		7155			
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	TOTAL
one complaint ustained									MALE	FEMALE
wo or more omplaints ustained										
`otal										
Please inc by levels whom con were sust	or education in a series of the series of th	tion comple of use of e	eted, ag excessive	gainst c force	<b>a.</b>	Please in length of whom conwere sust	mplaint ained i	s of use on 1991.	OT Offic	erc anaim
High School	Less than 2 years				b.	Average Ti	me in Se	ivice		_
_	2 years									_
Less than 2	Degree gree					Of the co were sust were disci	mplaint ained is	s of exce	ow man	v Officers

Section VII —   Section VII	57. Does your depart following for of using unnecessar mark "mandate provided" for each	ry/excess	o are identified as	$\underline{r}$	MANDATORY OPTIONAL NONE  1 2 3 1 1 2 3 3
Section VII—  Police Use of Force  Solution VII—  Police Use of Force  What is your department's policy regarding the reporting of the following types of use of force? [Mark "mandatory," "optional" or "none" for each type.]  MANDATORY OFTIONAL NONE  Civilians shot and killed  Civilians shot and killed  Civilians shot and wounded but not killed  Civilians shot at but not hit Electrical devices (e.g., Taser)  Cice,, Mace, Capstun)  Electrical devices  Ce, Chemical agents  (e.g., Taser)  Ce, Chemical agents  Ce, Mace, Capstun)  Ce, Amace, Capstun)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Ce, saps, soft projectiles, rubber bullets)  Cother impact devices  Cother impact	<ul><li>a. Counseling</li><li>b. Retraining</li><li>58. Does your depar or psychiatrist eit officers?</li><li>a. On staff</li></ul>	MANDATOR  1 1 1	2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	(e.g., arm, feet, leg, etc.) k. Unholstering weapon l. Swarm <sup>28</sup> m. Firm grip <sup>29</sup> n. Neck restraint/ unconsciousness- rendering hold <sup>30</sup> o. Handcuff/leg restraint p. Come-alongs q. Dog attacks or bites	1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1
	Police U  59. What is your depregarding the representation to the representation of the	Se of partment porting of price? [Notional"  MANDATOR  1	Force 's policy f the following fark or "none" for  EX OPTIONAL NONE  2 3 3  2 3 2  3 3  2 3 3  2 3 3  2 3 3	reported by officers in 1991. Please enter "0 if this information is n  Type of Force  a. Civilians shot and killed b. Civilians shot and wound but not killed  c. Citizens shot at but not he d. Electrical devices (e.g., Te. Chemical agents (e.g., Mace, Capstun)  f. Batons  g. Other impact devices (e.g. soft projectiles, rubber but h. Flashlight  i. Twist lock/wrist lock  j. Bodily force	al number of th type of force was a your department in "for none or "ND" ot recorded.  Number of incidents  ded  ait aser)  saps, llets)

61. Does your department regularly review and investigate use of force reports filed by your officers even if no citizen complaint or civil suits <sup>31</sup> was filed?	64. For the total number of civil suits and criminal charges for excessive use of force reported in Q63, please provide information on how they were resolved.
a. Yes, reviews and investigates all reports	
b. Yes, reviews and investigates selected reports 2	CASE OUTGONES CIVIL CRIMINAL
c. No, does not review or investigate reports 3	CASE OUTCOME SUITS CHARGES
62. Does your agency have a written policy for the following:  YES NO  a. Use of lethal force 1 2  b. Use of less-than-lethal force 1 2  c. Vehicle pursuit 1 2	a. Cases pending b. Cases decided in court in favor of litigant c. Cases decided in court in favor of department d. Cases settled out of court in favor of litigant
d. Soft body armor	e. Cases settled out
PLEASE INCLUDE A COPY OF EACH WRITTEN POLICY WITH THE QUESTIONNAIRE.  Section VIII — Civil and Criminal Litigation	of court in favor of department  65. What was the total amount paid by the department in civil litigation cases involving use of force, including out of court settlements, in 1991?  Total Amount Paid
63. How many (a) civil suits and (b) criminal charges <sup>32</sup> resulted from use of excessive force complaints filed by citizens against police officers, your department, city or other public officials, in 1991? [If no lawsuit was filed, record "0" on the appropriate line. Count multiple lawsuits or charges stemming from a single incident as one case.]	66. Does your department have a policy against settling excessive force cases out of court?  Yes 1 No 2
Civil Suits Criminal Charges	
	•

# Section IX — Arrests and Citations

67. Please indicate the number of (1) adult arrests and (2) juvenile arrests made by your department for the following crimes for the year ending December 31, 1991.

	for the year ending i	becember.	51, 1991.			
Pa	RT I CRIME ARRESTS	ADULTS	Juveniles		applicants	
a.	Murder and non-negligen manslaughter	ıt		70.	How many of those applicants were accepted and began academy training in 1991?	
b.	Forcible rape				m 1991?	
C.	Robbery				<b>**</b>	
đ.	Aggravated assault				persons	
e.	Burglary					
f.	Larceny-Theft			71	. Is a psychological or psychiatric evaluation	~
g.	Motor vehicle theft			, 1.	required for all pre-service officers?	ЭΠ
Pai	RT II CRIME ARRESTS				Yes 1 No 2	
h. i.	Non-aggravated assault		<del></del>	72.	How long is the academy training?	
_	Weapons violations				hours	
j. k.	Drug abuse violations Drunkenness	<del></del>	<del></del>		nours	
k. L	Drunkenness DUI					
n. n.	Disorderly conduct All other Part II crimes			73.	How many academy classes that began in 1991 have been completed?	n
	The outer Fait II cillies				<u>-</u>	
					classes	
68.	Please record the nunissued for traffic viola ending December 31,	tions for tl	ations he year	74.	How many recruits attended those classe	s?
	CITATION		Number			
a. b.	Moving/non-moving viola Parking violations	ations		75.	How many of those recruits have graduated?	
					graduates	

Section X —

Selection and Training

69. How many persons applied to become police officers in 1991?

76. Please indicate for each of the subjlisted below the number of hours of academy training provided to police recruits in your agency.	cts  80. How long do your officers spend in the field under FTO supervision, after graduation?
Cranto on	TOURS Weeks OVIDED
a. Use of non-lethal force b. Stop and approach skills c. Use of deadly force d. Crisis intervention skills e. Officer survival training f. Use of non-lethal weapons g. Cultural sensitivity h. Code of ethics/values training i. Bilingual training	81. Does your department have special requirements for selecting Field Training Officers?  Yes 1 No 2 [Skip to Q85]
<ul> <li>j. Communications with people with disabilities</li> <li>k. Human relations skills</li> <li>l. Legal training</li> <li>m. Victims assistance</li> </ul>	82. Which of the following special requirements does your department use for selecting FTOs? [Mark "yes" and "no" for each requirement.]
n. Domestic violence o. Suicide prevention p. Physical fitness q. Physical combat skills r. Stress management s. Community-oriented policing t. Firearms qualification u. Pursuit driver training v. Other  (specify)	a. Length of service  b. Disciplinary record  c. Completion of formal  training  d. Education  e. Time in patrol  f. Other  (specify)
77. Does your department have a probat period for recruits <sup>33</sup> after completing academy training?	onary he 83. Is there formal training available for the FTOs?
Yes 1 No 2 [Skip to No 2]. [Skip to No 2]. No 2 No	Yes, but optional 2  No 3 [Skip to Q85]
79. Does your department have a formaling Field Training Officer (FTO) program	84. What percent of your current FTOs attended the formal training before they began working as FTOs?
Yes 1 No 2 [Skip to	Q85]

85	How often do swo requalify with their (handguns)?		weapons		87.	PLEASE CHECK THE A BOXES BELOW TO INI HAVE ENCLOSED COP RELEVANT DEPARTM	DICATE PIES OF	IF YOU THE
	No requalifications		1				YES	No
	Less than once a year	ar	2		•		1 E3	No
	Once a year		3			Lethal Force Policy	1	2
	Twice a year		4			Less-Than-Lethal Force Policy	1	2
	More than twice a y	ear	5			Vehicle Pursuit Policy Soft Body Armor Policy		2 2
86	i. Please indicate wh training are provid [Check whether th "mandatory," "opt provided."]	ded for your desire training ional," or	our office g is r "not	ers.	88.	We appreciate your taking complete this survey. Please below for any comments your resoncerning any of your resoncerning	ase use thou wish	he space to make
	]	MANDATORY	OPTIONAL	PROVIDED		questions or about the sur		
a.	Use of non-lethal force	1	2	3		•		
b.	Stop and approach skills	1	2	3				
C.	Use of deadly force	1	2	3.				
đ.	Crisis intervention skills	1	2	3 🔲				
	Officer survival training	1	2	3				
	Use of non-lethal		•□	- CTI				
	weapons Cultural sensitivity	1	2	3 🔲				
_	Code of ethics/values training	_	2	3 3				
	Bilingual training	1	2	3				
	Communications with		2	ے۔				
	people with disabilities	1	2	3				
k.	Human relations skills	1	2	3				
1.	Legal training	1	2	3		•		
m.	Victims assistance	1	2	3				
n.	Domestic violence	1	2	3				
0.	Suicide prevention	1	2	3			•	
p.	Physical fitness	1 🛄	2	3				
q.	Physical combat skills	1 🛄	2	3				
	Stress management	1	2	3				
	Community-oriented policing	<u>ا آ</u>	<u>-</u>	- Ti				
	Firearms requalification	1	2 2	3 <u> </u>				
	Pursuit driver training	1 <u>.</u>	$2 \square$ $2 \square$	3 <b>□</b> 3 <b>□</b>				
	Other	1	2 🔲	3 <u> </u>				•
	(specify)	٠		السياد				

# Glossary

The following is a glossary of terms, concepts and categories used in this questionnaire. The glossary can and should be used to clarify questions with the survey. When in doubt about the meaning of a question please refer to this section or call Tony Pate or Sampson Annan at the Police Foundation - (202) 833-1460.

- 1. Calls for service: Calls for service include (1) citizen calls, (2) officers' calls, (3) walk-ins, and (4) alarms.
- 2. <u>Non-sworn personnel</u>: Civilian law enforcement personnel performing either semi-skilled services of secretarial, clerical, parking enforcement, or similar nature, or highly-skilled services of a technical nature requiring specialized education, training, or skills.
- 3. <u>Field personnel</u>: Uniform and non-uniform sworn personnel assigned to field operations, i.e., routine patrol, non-traffic, vice, tactical, and other special units which have routine contact with the public. This does <u>not</u> include personnel assigned to jails.
- 4. <u>Electrical devices</u>: Some types of less-than-lethal weapons used by law enforcement agencies. They include electronic stun devices such as Tasers and close-range electrical devices such as Talons.
- 5. <u>Chemical Agents</u>: These less-than-lethal weapons include sprays such as Mace, Capstun, and systemic chemical agents such as tranquilizer darts.
- 6. Police misconduct: A police officer's commission of criminal offense; neglect of duty; violation of Departmental policies, rules, or procedures; conduct which may tend to reflect unfavorably upon the employee or the Department.
- 7. Anonymously: Filing a complaint without giving the name or any information that would identify the individual making the allegation.
- 8. Swear to: The complainant has to appear before a magistrate and swear to the truthfulness of the allegations being filed.
- 9. <u>Certify</u>: To formally attest to, in the presence of the person accepting the complaint, the truthfulness of the facts being presented in the allegations.
- 10. Notarize: To appear before a public official and sign the complaint, acknowledging or attesting to the truthfulness of the allegations.
- 11. Internal Affairs Division/Section/Unit: Specialized individual or unit whose main function is to respond to allegations of misconduct against the agency or its employees. The individual or unit has authority to take charge of an investigation of any act of censurable conduct when, in his/their opinion, it is advisable.
- 12. <u>Civilian Complaint Review Board/Agency</u>: Non-sworn persons who are charged with the responsibility for reviewing investigative reports of complaints of police misconduct filed against individual officers or the agency. The initial fact-finding report may have been conducted by either sworn or non-sworn officers.
- 13. Excessive Force: Police use of more force than is necessary in seizing or detaining an individual.
- 14. Personnel complaint: An allegation of misconduct that is received from any source.
- 15. Appeal: A request that a prior decision be reconsidered.
- 16. <u>Internally generated complaint</u>: The allegation of misconduct was filed by either sworn or non-sworn personnel of the law enforcement agency.

- 17. <u>Unfounded</u>: The complaint was not based on facts as shown by the investigation, or the reported incident did not occur.
- 18. Exonerated: The incident occurred, but the action taken by the officer(s) was deemed lawful and proper.
- 19. Not Sustained: The allegation is supported by insufficient evidence which could not be used to prove or disapprove the allegation.
- 20. <u>Sustained</u>: The allegation was supported by sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action against the officer(s).
- 21. Pending: The investigation and review process still are underway. Final disposition of allegation has not been made.
- 22. Reprimand: A supervisor formally issues severe criticism of officer for having done something wrong.
- 23. <u>Suspend</u>: To relieve a sworn officer of his/her duties, for a period of time, as a result of actions taken on or off duty for which the department feels a relief period is necessary for reasons of investigation or any other relevant reasons.
- 24. Termination: The discontinuation of employment.
- 25. <u>Batons</u>: Impact devices including Conventional Baton, Side-Handle Baton, and Telescoping Baton.
- 26. Twist lock/wrist lock: A less-than-lethal force technique involving twisting the wrist of a suspect.
- 27. Bodily force: Force that uses hands, legs, or other parts of the body.
- 28. Swarm: A less-than-lethal technique in which several officers combine efforts to immobilize a suspect. Once the suspect is down, he/she is swarmed (surrounded) and handcuffed.
- 29. Firm grip: A low-level control used in conjunction with verbal direction.
- 30. Neck Restraint/Unconsciousness-rendering hold: A less-than-lethal immobilization technique in which the police officer applies his/her arm(s) to some part of the suspect's neck. There are various types of neck holds, including the arm bar, the lateral vascular neck restraint, and the carotid restraint which produce unconsciousness.
- 31. <u>Civil Suits</u>: Legal action alleging non-criminal negligence such as fake arrest, negligence, abuse of authority.
- 32. Criminal Charges: Legal action based upon police misconduct that violates local, state or federal law.
- 33. <u>Probationary Period for Recruits</u>: A specified length of time utilized to evaluate a new-hire's performance before offering a position with full job guarantees and civil service protection.

#### ALABAMA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
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Birmingham	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Chickasaw	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Crossville	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fairfield	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
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Montgomery	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Mountain Brook	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Opelika	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Oxford	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Ozark	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	01
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# ALABAMA - continued

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Mobile Co.	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Morgan Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Tallapoosa Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
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#### ALASKA

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#### ARIZONA

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Payson	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01 01
Phoenix	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	07
Springerville	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
South Tucson	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Tempe	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tucson	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	· -
Yuma	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	03	01											<b>~</b> _
	-		•	-		••		•	00	00	03	01	01	00	02	01	02	00	00	01	01	01	16
•									COU	TY ?	GEN	CIES											-
Apache Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00															
Coconino Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Maricopa Co.	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Mohave Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Navaho Co.	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pima County	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Yavapai Co.	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
ratapar co.	UU	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01

COUNTY BUBTOTAL	00	02	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	08
								A	RI 201	NA -	con	tinu	<b>ed</b>							•			
										YI	ZAR												
AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ОТН	er a	GENC	PIES							•				
Navaho Tribe	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
									AL:	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	00	02	02	03	00	00	00	02	00	00	04	03	01	00	02	03	04	01	00	02	01	01	30

#### ARKANSAS

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST?	TE ?	AGENC	CIES											
Alcohol Bev Com	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00					
Game & Fish Com.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
State Police	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 05
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	07
								Þ	IUNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	<b>E</b> 8										
Beebe	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0									
Benton	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Conway	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cotton Plant	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02
Dermott	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00		02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Fort Smith	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hazen	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Hot Springs	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Little Rock	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Magazine	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02
No. Little Rock	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pine Bluff	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pocahontas	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00		01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Springdale	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02
West Fork	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	01	02	03	00	00	01	03	02	00	02	Λ1	<b>01</b>								

ARKANSAS - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY .	agen	CIES											
Clay Co. Lawrence Co. Miller Co. Nevada Co. Polk Co. Pulaski Co. COUNTY SUBTOTAL	03 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 00	03 01 01 01 01
					_					ER A			01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	08
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	es											
TOTAL	03	00	01	02	04	04	00	00	03	03	02	01	05	01	01	00	02	0.0	00	02	01	00	26

#### CALIFORNIA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T?	TE I	GENC	EIES											
Fish and Game	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00					
Highway Patrol	01	01	00	01	00	01	02	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
State Bur. Narcs	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09
State Police	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									•	•	00	00	O	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	02	01	01	00	01	02	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	12
								_															
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Alameda	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00								
Berkeley	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Buena Park	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Calapatria	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Compton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cypress	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	02
E. Palo Alto	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
El Centro	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Exeter	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Fairfield Dps	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Firebaugh	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fresno	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fullerton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Garden Grove	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Hayward	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02
Inglewood	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Long Beach	00	00	00	02	01	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Los Angeles	00	03	01	01	02	01		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
	-	0.5	01	O1	UZ	OI	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	01	02	01	01	01	01	00	19

# CALIFORNIA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Manhattan Beach	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									,,	TOTAL
Martinez	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Maywood	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Oakland	00	03	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Ontario	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	09
Oxnard	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Parlier	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02
Pinole	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Redwood City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Rialto	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Richmond	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Riverside	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	- 00	00	02	00	02
Sacramento	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
San Clemente	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
San Diego	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	02	00	01	02	00 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
San Fernando	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	11
San Francisco	01	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
San Jose	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
San Pablo	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02
Santa Ana	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Stockton	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sunnyvale	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	03
Torrance	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Turlock	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tustin	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Union City	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Ventura	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
West Covina	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
W. Sacramento	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								50	00	50	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01

# CALIFORNIA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Whittier	00	00	00	00	00													•	-		72	73	TOTAL
Yreka	00	00	00	00		01	00	01	00	00	00	00	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Yuba City	00	00	01		00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
· ·	00	00	O1	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	05	11	07	06	04	08														•	00	00	OI
	•••		•	•	-	VO	07	03	04	05	03	05	05	03	02	02	05	02	04	02	04	07	104
									COU	NTY .	AGEN	CIES											
Humbolt Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00																	
Kern Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lake Co.	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02
Los Angeles Co.	00	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
La Co Harbor Ptl	00	00	00	00	00 00	01	02	02	00	00	01	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	02	00	16
La Co. Parks	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Madera Co.	00	00	00	01		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Placer Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Riverside Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sacramento Co.	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	03
San Bernad. Co.	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05 05
San Diego Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
San Joaquin Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Santa Clara Co.	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02
Santa Cruz Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
Shasta Co Sher	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Solano Co.	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Sonoma Co.		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
conomic co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	04	01	04	01	01	03	04	01	02	03	04	01	03	01	02	02	00	00	••	00	00	01

# CALIFORNIA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	ER A	GENC	EIES											
Compton School Dist	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	06	17	09	11	05	10	12	08	06	07	07	09	06	06	03	05	07	04	05	03	06	08	160

# COLORADO

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T	ATE 1	AGENO	CIES											
State Patrol	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00													
		•		•	00	00	UU	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	03
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	03
								M	UNIC	CIPAI	. AGE	NCIE	:s										
Aurora	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	•														
Boulder	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Colorado Sprgs	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Delta	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Denver	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	ÒO	00	00	00	00	01
Firestone	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	06
Manitou Sprgs	00	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Montrose	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pueblo	00	01	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Steamboat Sprs	01	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
occamboat opis	UI	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	03	00	03	00	00	00	00	01	03	02	01	00	00	01	02	01	00	00	00	00	00	18
									<b>2011</b>													•	10
									COUL	NTY I	AGEN	CIES											
Adams Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									
Costilla Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Denver Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
El Paso Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Jefferson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Otero Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	-	<b>0</b>	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	01	00	06

# COLORADO - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	er a	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	01	06	00	04	00	00	00	00	01	03	02	01	00	00	02	03	02	00	00	00	02	00	27

#### CONNECTICUT

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T	ATE 1	AGEN	PIES											
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
								M	UNIC	CIPAL	AGE	ENCIE	8:										
Bridgeport Darien Milford Plainville Waterbury NUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 01	00 01 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00	01 01 01 01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	00	06

#### DELAWARE

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8TI	ATE 2	AGEN	CIES											
State Police	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
STATE SUBTOTAL	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02 <b>02</b>
								M	UNIC	:IPAI	L AGI	encie	:8										
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									COU	NTY :	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02

# DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									CI	TY A	GENC	IES											
Metropolitan	00	01	01	00	01	01	01	00	01	00	02		00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	• •
CITY SUBTOTAL	00	01	01	00	01	01	01	00	01	00	02	00	00	01	00	01		00	00			01	11
									COIT					-		•	00	00	00	00	00	01	11
COUNTY SUBTOTAL									COO	NTY	AGEN	CIEB											
COUNTY BUBTUTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									OTH	IER A	GENC	IES											
Metro Transit	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									00	00	UU	01	01
								00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	01	01	00	01	01	01	00	01	00	02	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	12

#### FLORIDA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8 <b>T</b> 1	ATE 1	AGEN	CIES											
Game & Fish Comm.	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0											
Highway Patrol	00	03	01	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
St. Atty.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	11
-					-	•	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	03	02	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	02	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	01	00	16
								Ľ	UNIC	:IPAI	AGE	NCTE	28										
Belleair	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			
Carrabelle	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01	01
Clearwater	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01
Coral Gables	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Crestview	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Dania	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Daytona Beach	00	00	-00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Delray Beach	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Ft. Lauderdale	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Fort Pierce	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	01
Frostproof	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Hallandale	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hialeah	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Hollywood	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Jacksonville Sher.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
Kissimmee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Miami	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00		- •	01
Miami Beach	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02
Miami Springs	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02
North Miami	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 01	00 00	01 02

# FLORIDA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88		•	•			
Opa Locka													•		-	4,	00	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Orlando	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	
Palm Bay	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Palm Beach Gdns	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01
Pensacola	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Pompano Beach	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Ponce Inlet	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	02
Riviera Beach	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00		01
St. Petersburg	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Sarasota	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
South Miami	00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Sweetwater	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tallahassee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Tampa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	
Titusville	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01 03
W. Palm Beach	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	
Williston	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	02	01	04	03	00	03	01	01	04	04										00	00	00	01
				•		••	<b>V 1</b>	01	V <b>4</b>	U4	03	02	01	00	03	06	06	01	03	02	02	01	53
									COU	TY A	GEN	CIES											
Bay Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00		••															
Broward Co.	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Collier Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	05
Columbia Co.	00	00	00	00	02		00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Duval Co.	01	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Escambia Co.	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hendry Co.	00	00	00	00		00	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Hernando Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	00	<b>3</b> 0		UU	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
																					30	50	OI

# FLORIDA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL	
Indian River Co	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	~~										
Jackson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Lee Co.	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Metro-Dade	00	00	02	00	03	00	00			00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04	
Orange Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	-	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	00	01	12	
Palm Beach Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Polk Co.	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	03	
St Johns Co.	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Seminole Co.	. 00	00		01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Volusia Co.	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	
vorasia co.	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	02	00	03	01	06	00	03	03	03	01	03	03	03	01	02	00	02	02	03	00	00	02	43	
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES												
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
									AL	L AG	enci	ES												
TOTAL	05	04	09	04	07	04	05	04	07	06	06	05	06	01	05	ΛΩ	nΩ	0.3	07	^^	0.2			

#### GEORGIA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Bur of Inv.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	03
Dpt of Publ Sfty	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	s										
Albany	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Atlanta	00	03	01	02	01	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00 01	00 02	00	00 01	00 01	00 00	01
Augusta	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	18 01
Austell	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cochran	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
College Park	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Columbus	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	05
Cordele	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Decatur	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
<b>Hogansville</b>	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Iron City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Marietta	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Meigs	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Monroe	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Monticello	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Moultrie	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pearson	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Ray City	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Reynolds	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Rome	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Savannah	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02

# GEORGIA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Swainsboro	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tallapoosa	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Union Point	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Valdosta	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Whigham	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	03	06	02	03	05	02	01	04	06	01	00	00	03	01	02	01	01	04	01	01	01	00	48
									COU	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
Camden Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Catoosa Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chatham Co.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cobb Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Colquitt Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Crawford Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
DeKalb Co. DPS	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
Dodge Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	01
Forsyth Co.	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Fulton Co. Marshalls	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fulton Co. Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02
Houston Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Jeff Davis Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Johnson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Lowndes Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Madison Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Polk Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Richmond Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Terrell Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01

#### GEORGIA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Tift Co Sheriff	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Towns Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	_
Webster Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	03	02	04	01	01	01	02	01	03	00	01	00	00	01	03	01	00	00	01	03	01	01	30
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	06	80	06	05	06	03	03	05	09	01	01	01	04	03	05	02	02	04	02	04	02	01	83

# HAWAII

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T?	ATE #	AGENC	PIES											
State DOD	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										•
Honolulu	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02				00	00	00	03
											AGEN	-	00	00	00	UZ	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
									COU	NII A	HGEN	SIEB											
Hawaii Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									7A T.	t. Ag	enci	Pa								00	00	00	00
									AL	n va	BNCI	LO											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	00	00	05

IDAHO

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Fish & Game	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								М	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8									-	
Lewiston Osburn	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	01 01																
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
			-						COU	TY I	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04

# ILLINOIS

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8TI	ATE #	AGEN	CIES											
Ill Bur Inv	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									
State Police	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
								-	•	00	00	00	UU	00	01	UU	01	00	00	00	00	00	04
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05
																				•		•	03
								ŀ	IUNIC	:IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8					*					
Alorton	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									
Bloomington	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chicago	01	03	06	01	02	01	00	02	00	00	05	00	01	01	01 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chicago Hspd	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02 00	02	01	03	01	01	01	35
Danville	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Downers Grove	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
E St Louis	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Forest Park	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hillsdale	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Joliet ·	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lansing	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
North Chicago	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Paxton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Peoria	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Rockford	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. Anne	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Waukegan	00	00	00	00	00	01			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
West Chicago	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Wheeling	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
	UU	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	02	04	08	03	03	02	00	03	02	00	06	00	02	02	02	03	02	01	03	02	03	01	E 4

#### ILLINOIS - continued

GENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									cou	NTY 2	agen(	CIES											
ook Co. Sheriff PD	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
dgar Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
ake Co.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
ee Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
t. Clair Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
angamon Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
arren Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
ill Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
'innebago Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	01	00	02	00	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	11
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
ll Centl Rwy	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
enn Centl Rwy	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
THER SUBTOTAL	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
OTAL	03	04	11	04	05	03	00	04	02	01	06	02	02	03	04	03	03	02	03	02	04	01	72

#### INDIANA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T)	ATE 2	AGEN	CIES											
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	03
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	03
								3	IUNIC	IPAI	L AGI	encii	85										
Avilla	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Bloomington	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Bremen	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Crawfordsville	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
French Lick	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Gary	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Hammond	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Indianapolis <b>N</b> uncie	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	08
	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Nappanee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
North Vernon Shelburn	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	02
South Bend	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
* * * * *	. 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Terre Haute	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	00	05	02	01	00	00	02	02	02	00	02	0.1	00	••								
								02	02	02	00	UZ	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	02	23
									COUL	ITY 1	AGEN	CIES											
Hancock Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00										
Henry Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Laporte Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
•	30	-			00	00	UU	UU	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01

# INDIANA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Marion Co.	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00			
Morgan Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				00	00	00	00	05
Vigo Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00								00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	00	00	00	00	00	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	02	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02	02	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	10
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
<b>FOTAL</b>	03	00	05	03	01	00	00	02	04	04	00	02	01	00	01	02	03	00	00	01	00	04	36

IOWA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T?	TE A	GENC	PIES											
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								2	UNIC	PAL	AGE	encie	8										
Cedar Rapids	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
Des Moines	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Keota	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Newton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	01
Pella	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	01
Waterloo	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	01
							•		•••	02	•	00	00	UU	00	UU	00	UU	00	00	00	00	02
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	01	02	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
									COU	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		••	
									•		•	00	•	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
																• •	••				•	•	•
						-			AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	01	02	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08

# KANSAS

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
•									STI	TE F	GENC	IES											
Highway Patrol	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
STATE SUBTOTAL	.00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
								Ľ	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Bonner Springs Hutchinson Kansas City Kingman Leoti Overland Park Salina Wichita MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
									COID	mv 1	AGENC	1750											
									COUL	NII 2	Made	TED											
Butler Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Marion Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Riley Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sedgwick Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	03
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	06

#### KANSAS - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									отн	er a	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
•									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	01	02	01	01	01	00	01	01	01	01	02	00	00	01	01	00	01	01	00	01	00	00	07

#### KENTUCKY

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Dept of Fish & Wldl	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
State Police	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	07
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	08
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Campton	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	~~	0.1
Elsmere	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00 00	00 00	01
Irvine	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Louisville	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mayfield	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Maysville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Salyersville	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Shively	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Stanford	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	09
									cou	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
Boyle Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fayette Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Floyd Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Harlan Co.	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	,00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Jefferson Co. PD	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	02
Jefferson Co. Sher.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Jeff Co Corrs	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Johnson Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02

## KENTUCKY - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Knott Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Livingston Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Perry Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Pike Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Powell Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	02
Shelby Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Warren Co. Cnstbl.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Wolfe Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	02	01	00	01	01	01	00	02	02	00	00	02	01	00	01	00	01	01	01	00	03	01	21
									OTH	ER A	GENC	:IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	02	02	00	02	03	01	01	05	03	01	00	02	01	00	03	01	02	01	02	01	04	01	38

## LOUISIANA

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Dept of Publ Sfty	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Abbeville	00	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
3aton Rouge	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	01 03
Bossier City	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03 01
Farmerville	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
lenderson	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03 01
Lake Charles	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Logansport	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
New Orleans	01	04	01	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	09
Port of N.O.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Shreveport	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	01	06
3lidell	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
<b>Vinnfield</b>	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
UNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	03	06	02	02	00	01	02	01	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	01	02	01	00	03	02	29
									PARI	SH A	GENC	IES											
3. Baton Rouge P.	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00				
efferson P.	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05
afourche P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	01	00	00	00	00	04
lorehouse P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	01 01							
																						70	<b>~ ~</b>

# LOUISIANA - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Orleans P.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				
St. Charles P.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. John P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. Mary P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00		01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sabine P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. Tammany P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Tangipahoe P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Union P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00		00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
W. Baton Rouge P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
W. Carroll P.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	•	-	00	00	00	UU	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
PARISH SUBTOTAL	02	01	00.	00	02	01	04	01	01	01	02	00	03	01	00	00	02	02	00	00	00	00	23
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	05	07	02	02	02	03	06	02	02	01	03	00	03	01	00	01	03	04	02	00	03	02	54

MAINE

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL	
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES												
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	
								М	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8											
Lewiston Paris	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	01 01	
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	
									cou	TY 1	AGEN	CIES												
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES												
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
									AL	L AG	ENCI:	ES												
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	03	

## MARYLAND

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	TE !	GENC	IES											
State Police Toll Facils.	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	01 00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00 01	00	00 00	00	01 00	00	00	00 00	04 01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	óo	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	05
								K	UNIC	IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Baltimore Hagerstown	01 00	02 00	04 00	01 01	01 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	01 00	01 00	00 00	00	01 00	00	00 00	01 00	01 00	17 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	02	04	02	01	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	18
									cou	NTY :	AGEN	CIES											
Baltimore Co. Garrett Co. Montgomery Co P.G. Co.	00 00 01 00	00 00 01 01	00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 02 00	01 00 00 00	00 00 00 02	00 01 00 00	00 00 00 01	00 00 01 00	00 00 00 01	01 00 00 02	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00 01	00 00 00	00 00 00 01	00 00 00	02 01 05 09
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	02	00	00	02	01	02	01	01	01	01	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	17
									ОТН	er a	GENC	IES									••		-,
BWI AIRPORT	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									AL	L AG	enci	B8											
TOTAL	02	04	05	03	03	02	02	03	01	02	01	03	01	01	02	00	00	01	02	00	02	01	41

#### MASSACHUSETTS

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
								M	IUNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Billerica	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Boston Chelsea	00 00	01 00	01 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	01 00	07 01
Fall River	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Holliston	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lawrence Lowell	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Milford	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Revere	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01							
Saugus	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Shrewsbury	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Springfield	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Westwood	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	03	01	03	00	00	01	00	02	01	00	00	00	04	00	01	01	00	01	01	00	01	20
									COU	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

## MASSACHUSETTS - continued

AGENCY TYPE	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	er a	GENC	IES											
Metro Dist. Com	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	03	01	03	00	00	01	00	02	01	00	01	01	04	00	01	01	00	01	01	00	01	22

## MICHIGAN

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Dept of Natl Resrces		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
State Police	01	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	08
STATE SUBTOTAL	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	.00	00	00	00	01	00	00	09
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Adrian	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bay City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	02
Burton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Dearborn	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Detroit	03	02	04	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	01	01	00	01	01	03	01	02	01	00	01	24
East Lansing	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Grand Rapids	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Highland Park	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Inkster	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Jackson	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lansing	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lansing Park	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Milan	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Mt. Clemens	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Muskegon Hts	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Oak Park	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pontiac	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
South Haven	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Troy	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Wayne	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Ypsilanti	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL BUBTOTAL	03	04	09	04	02	02	01	00	01	00	02	02	02	00	02	04	04	01	02	04	00	01	50

# MICHIGAN - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY :	agen	CIES											
Montcalm Co. Otsego Co. Presque Isle Co. St. Clair Co. Wayne Co. COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	01 01 01 01 02
											GENC				01	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	06
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	es											
TOTAL	05	04	11	04	03	02	01	01	01	00	04	03	03	01	03	04	04	01	03	06	00	01	65

## MINNESOTA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T)	TE 2	AGENC	CIES										,,,	IOIAL
Highway Patrol	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00					
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00									00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	01
		-		00	00	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
•								3	IUNIC	IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Claremont	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00								
Columbia Hts	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Duluth	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hutchinson	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Minneapolis	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Oakdale	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	04
Robbinsdale	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Roseau	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Rosedale	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Roseville	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	01
Wayzata	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	01
				,						•	01	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	03	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	01	03	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	00	01	00	14
									COU	TY 2	AGENC	CIES											
Carlton Co.	•																						
Douglas Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Itasca Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Olmsted Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pine Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Redwood Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01

#### MINNESOTA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Waseca Co. Winona Co.	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	01 01												
COUNTY BUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	08
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									ΆL	L AG	enci	ES											
TOTAL	04	01	00	00	01	02	02	00	01	02	03	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	01	01	01	23

#### MISSISSIPPI

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Bur. Of Narcs.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Dept. Of Wildl.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
Hwy Safety Ptl	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	02	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	07
								M	IUNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	s										
Aberdeen	00	00	0.0	00																			
Bolton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Columbia	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Crenshaw	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	03
Doddsville	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Drew	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Gulfport	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hastings	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hattiesburg	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Heidelberg	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Hernando	00	00	01	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Indianola	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Jackson	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Leland	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	03
Lexington	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mccomb	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Meridian	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mize	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	01
Natchez	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pottscamp	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
				-	-	-	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01

## MISSISSIPPI - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Southhaven	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Taylorsville	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Verona	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Walnut Grove	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Waveland	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
																							••
MUNICIPAL BUBTOTAL	01	02	02	01	01	01	04	02	01	02	00	00	01	01	00	00	02	05	00	01	01	02	30
									COU	NTY I	AGEN	CIES											
Alcorn Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chickasaw Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Claiborne Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Desoto Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Forrest Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Franklin Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Harrison Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Madison Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Marion Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Marshall Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Montgomery Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Panola Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pike Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Rankin Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Simpson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Tallahatchie Co.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Warren Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	01	01	00	01	01	01	01	01	03	01	01	01	01	02	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	19

## MISSISSIPPI - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ОТН	er a	GENC	IE8											
Ill Centl Rwy	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OTHER AGENCIES	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									AL	L AG	enci	ES											
TOTAL	01	03	03	02	02	02	05	04	02	06	01	02	04	02	02	01	03	05	02	01	02	02	57

## MISSOURI

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	ATE 1	AGEN	CIES										70	IOIRD
State Hwy Ptrl	00	00	00	00	00																		
- care in the care	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
								•	///X/ <i>T</i> /										•	•	•		<b>V</b> 3
									IONT	CIPAI	. AGE	INCLE	28										
Arnold	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00									
Crestwood	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Harrisonville	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Jennings	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Joplin	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Kansas City	00	00	00	01	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Lincoln	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	06
Normandy	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Oronogo	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pine Lawn	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pineville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Reeds Spring	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Rolla	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. Charles	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0,0	00	00	00	00	01
St. Louis	02	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
University City	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	09
Wellston	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
							-	00	00	OI	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	05	01	01	02	05	03	01	01	03	01	00	02	00	01	00	01	00	02	01	01	01	00	32

## MISSOURI - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL	
									COU	NTY :	agen(	CIES												
Cedar Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Cooper Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	
Daviess Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Grundy Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Jefferson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Miller Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	
Mississippi Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	
Moniteau Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. 00	00	01	00	00	01	
St. Louis Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02	
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	04	00	00	10	
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES												
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES												
TOTAL	05	01	01	02	05	04	02	02	03	03	00	02	00	03	00	03	00	02	01	Λ5	01	00	45	

#### MONTANA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8TI	ATE 2	AGEN	CIES											
Fish and Game	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		••						
Highway Patrol	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	01 01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	00	00	•											•	•	00	00	00	01
	•	•	VI.	UU	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								M	IUNIC	:IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Anaconda	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00				
Billings	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fairview	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01	00	00	00	00	01
Thompson Falls	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	04
									cou	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Big Horn Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0								
Missoula Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01
COMMU GUDMOMA													-		00	00	00	00	UU	00	UU	UU	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						_					
			••		•	•	•	00	00	00	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	00	08

# NEBRASKA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	TE I	GENC	IES											
State Patrol	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								1	IUNIC	PAI	AGE	NCIE	8										-
Gothenburg	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Nebraska City	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Omaha	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01
York	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	01 01
***************************************																						-	<b>4</b>
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	04
									cou	NTY :	AGEN	CIES											
Douglas Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.1
Lancaster Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
												•	•	•	O	01	00	UU	UU	00	UU	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
																							~-
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			••							
								00	00	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	00	01	01	00	00	03	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04			••	••

#### NEVADA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	EIES											
Div of Inv & Narcs Highway Patrol	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00	00	00 00	01 00	00	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 01	01 02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	03
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	encie	8										
Caliente Elko Las Vegas Reno	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00 00	00 00 00	01 00 00 00	00 00 01 00	00 00 01 01	00 00 00	00 00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	01 01 03 01							
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	06
									cou	NTY 2	AGEN(	CIES											
Lyon Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	00	02	00	01	01	03	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	10

#### NEW HAMPSHIRE

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE I	AGENC	EIES											
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								K	UNIC	IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Manchester	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									cou	NTY :	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
			•						ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				••					

#### NEW JERSEY

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
State Police	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Atlantic City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bradley Beach	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. 00	00	01
Camden	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hainesport	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hillside	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Irvington	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Jersey City	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Montclair	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Moorestown	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mount Holly	00	00	00	01	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Newark	00	00	00	01	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	05
Pennsauken Twnp	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Plainfield	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Riverton	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
So. Plainfield	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Union City	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Woodbine	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL BUBTOTAL	01	03	01	03	05	00	01	02	01	01	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	22

## NEW JERSEY - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									com	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Bergen Co. Essex Co. Sheriffs Essex Co. Park/PD COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00 00 00	01 01 01	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 01 01	00 02 00	00 00 00	01 04 02 07													
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IE8											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	01	04	01	03	05	00	01	05	01	03	00	00	03	04	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	34

#### NEW MEXICO

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8TI	ATE 2	AGEN(	:IE8											
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
									47731 <i>7</i> 7 /			***	,										
								F	IONT	CIPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Albuquerque	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Almagordo	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bosque Farms	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Clayton	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Deming	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Las Cruces/Dona Ana Mesilla	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Questa	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Questa	UU	UU	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	02	00	00	00	02	00	01	01	00	01	01	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	11
									cou	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Managar Arangar																							
Grant Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lincoln Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Rio Arriba Co	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
San Miguel Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Santa Fe Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				

# NEW MEXICO - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	er a	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	00	02	00	00	00	02	01	03	03	01	01	01	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	02	00	00	20

# NEW YORK

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T?	TE A	GENC	IES											
State Police	00	01	02	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	01	02	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Binghamton	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Buffalo	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cheektowaga	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	-00	. 00	00	00	02
Dexter	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hornell	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Larchmont	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mechanicville	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mt. Vernon	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Newburgh	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
New York City	04	04	04	06	01	03	04	04	06	03	02	01	03	00	02	04	03	05	00	02	02	01	64
NYC Hlth & Hosptl	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
NYC Housing Authty	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	02	09
NYC Transit Authty	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	06
New Rochelle	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Nyack	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Salamanca	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Schenectedy	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Syracuse	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	
Yonkers	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 02
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	05	07	07	06	03	07	04	06	10	06	05	01	04	00	02	06	04	05	02	02	03	03	98

#### NEW YORK - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY :	agen	CIES											
Erie Co. Nassau Co. Onondaga Co. Suffolk Co. Westchester Co.	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00	00 01 00 00	01 01 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00	01 00 01 00	00 00 00 00	01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00	03 03 01 02
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	01	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	11
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
Port Authority	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	05	80	09	80	04	09	05	07	12	06	06	01	05	01	02	09	04	06	02	03	04	03	119

NORTH CHROLINA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
		,							ST	ATE 1	agen(	CIES							,				
lighway Patrol	02	00	02	02	00	00	00	01	00	00													
Vildlife Res. Comm.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	03	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10
TATE SUBTOTAL	02	00	02	02	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 11
									anna e	37 D S +													
									IONT	CIPAI	AGE	NCIF	28										
sheville	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
lessemer	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
anton	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
harlotte	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	01		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
layton	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	02	08
linton	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
urham	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
lizabethtown	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
air Bluff	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
ayetteville	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
our Oaks	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
ibsonville	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
reensboro	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
endersonville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
acksonville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
annapolis	00	00	00	00	00	00		01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
aleigh	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
oanoke Rapids	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
aluda	00	00	00	00		01	00 .	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
outhern Pines	00	00	00		01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
homasville	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
ilmington	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
inston-Salem			00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
run com-patem	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01 02
JNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	04	01	02	00	03	05	01	<b>01</b>		•	••					-			-	-	71	91	UZ

# NORTH CAROLINA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY :	agen(	CIES											
Anson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bertie Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01
Cabarrus Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Columbus Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00	01
Cumberland Co.	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Davie Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	02
Forsyth Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hertford Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lincoln Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Martin Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Montgomery Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00 00	01
Rutherford Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 02
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	01	01	02	00	01	00	03	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	14
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	es											
TOTAL	07	02	05	04	03	06	01	05	02	03	02	00	02	0.4	00	01	00	00				••	

## MORTH DAKOTA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T)	TE A	GENC	:IES											
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									COU	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Benson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES					÷			-			
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01

OHIO

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	:IES											
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								1	UNIC	PAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Akron	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00							
Bedford Hts	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Belle Center	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Butler Twnshp	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	01
Cambridge	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	01
Canton	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01
Cincinnati	01	00	02	01	00	00	01	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01 09
Cleveland	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09 08
Columbus	02	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	08 05
Coshocton	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	05 01
Dayton	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	03
E. Cleveland	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03 01
Lancaster	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
Lima	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	01
Lodi	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mansfield	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Morrow	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Niles	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01
Oak Hill	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	01
Parma Hts	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	01
Poland	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Youngstown	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	06	03	05	04	06	01	01	04	01	01	01	02	02	00	00	0.2	00	00	00	00	00	00	01

OHIO - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY	AGEN	CIES											
Ashland Co. Clark Co. Cuyahoga Co Hsg Ath Hamilton Co. Loraine Co. Mahoning Co. Miami Co. Montgomery Co. Union Co. Washington Co.	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	01 01 01 01 01 01 02 01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	02	02	00	01	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	12
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	GENC 00 ENCI	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	07	03	05	05	06	01	02	05	01	03	03	02	03	00	02	04	00	01	01	01	00	02	57

## OKLAHOMA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T)	ATE 2	AGENO	TER											
Dum Of Namatian																							
Bur. Of Narcotics Highway Patrol	00 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
mighway racioi	OI	00	00	01	00	01	03	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00,	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	01	00	01	03	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09
								¥	IIINTC	TPAT	. ACE	NCIE											0,
								•	.0111	,4E AL	, MGE	MCTE	.0										
Bokchito	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Catoosa Dewar	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Duncan	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Elk City	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Miami	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Norman	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Oklahoma City	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	-00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Shawnee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	04
Spencer	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00	00	01
Tulsa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 01	01
MINITATES CHEMOME																	00	V	00	UU	00	01	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	02	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	01	00	02	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	14
									<b>2011</b>														
									COUL	NTX 1	AGENC	:IE8											
Beaver Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	••						
Kowa Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Okmulgee Co.	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tulsa Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	01
Washita Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	01
Woodward Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	01	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	06

# OKLAHOMA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IE8											
Will Rogers Airp	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	04	01	03	01	00	03	04	01	01	00	01	02	01	03	02	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	30

## OREGON

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T1	ATE #	GEN	CIES											
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
								1	<b>IUNI</b> C	:IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
John Day Pendleton Portland	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 01	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 01	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	01 00	00	01 01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 <b>01</b>	00	02 04
									COU	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
Curry Co. Grant Co. Lake Co. Lane Co.	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	01 00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	01 01 01							
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 04
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	02	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	10



## YEAR

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T?	ATB #	GENC	CIES											
SE PA Tran Auth	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00				
State Police	- 01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 04
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	05
						•		•	mute	.TD&+	3.05	NCIE											
									TONT	TENL	AGE	INCIE	18										
Apollo	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Avoca	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bensalem Twnshp	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Blair Twnshp	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Bristol Twnsp	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chester	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02
Erie	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	.00	02
Glenolden	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Harrisburg	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Johnsonburg	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Kennett Sq.	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Lower Merion Tp.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
McCandliss Twnsp.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
McKeesport	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Norristown	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	
Penn Hills	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Philadelphia	01	01	01	03	03	00	01	00	03	02	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	00	03	01			02
Pittsburgh	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	02	25
Saxonberg	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	02
Shamokin	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Shamokin Dam	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	01
Union City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Upland	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00				00	01	00	00	00	01
•			•	00	-	V	00	UU	UU	UU	00	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	06	02	03	05	04	00	02	00	06	02	00	03	01	02	03	00	01	00	04	02	02	04	52

#### PENNSYLVANIA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Delaware Co. Court Lehigh Co. Montgomery Co. COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 01 <b>01</b>	00 00 00	01 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	01 01 01												
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	07	02	03	05	05	01	03	01	07	02	00	03	01	02	03	00	01	01	04	02	03	04	60

#### RHODE ISLAND

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T/	TE 1	AGENC	EIEB											
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								M	IUNIC	IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									COU	NTY	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
		-							ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00

#### SOUTH CAROLINA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T)	ATE 1	AGEN	CIES											
Highway Patrol	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00										
Wildlfe & Marine	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	00 00	01 00	00	00	01 00	00	00	01	01	00	10
671 FT 671 671											00	00	00	UU	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	01	02	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	11
								ŀ	UNIC	CIPAI	L AGI	ENCIE	28										
Charleston													-										
Clio	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Columbia	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Cottageville	00 00	00 00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Forest Acres	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Honea Path	00	01	01 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
N. Charleston	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Orangeburg	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Perry	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Rock Hill	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
St. Stephen	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Swansea	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
W. Columbia	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Westminster	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	•	•	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL BUBTOTAL	00	01	03	01	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	01	00		
														•		•	00	01	01	OI	UU	01	14
									COU	TY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Aiken Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00														
Allendale Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
	-		00	00	50	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01

#### SOUTH CAROLINA- continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Anderson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
Beaufort Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
Berkeley Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
Charleston Co.	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Colleton Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Greenville Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	01
Greenwood Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	02
Kershaw Co.	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	01
Laurens Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	02
Marion Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	02
York Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	02	02	02	01	02	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	02	00	03	00	01 18
									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	01	04	07	03	02	02	00	04	00	00	02	02	00	03	00	01	01	01	03	02	04	01	43

#### SOUTH DAKOTA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST?	TE ;	GENC	IES											
Highway Patrol	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								M	IUNEC	PAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Custer Huron	01 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00	00 00	01 01																
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									cou	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
							-		AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04

#### TENNESSEE

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	GENC	IES											
Dept of Publ Sfty.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00													
Motor Vehcl Enf.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 01	01 00	00	00	01									
										•	00	00	00	00	00	00	VV	UU	OI.	UU	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02
								Þ	IUNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Bolivar	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		
Chattanooga	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01
Chattanooga Park	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03 01
Clarksville	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Columbia	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Dyersburg	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	-00	00	00	00	01
Gatlinburg	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hendersonville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lewisburg	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lexington	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Memphis	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	02	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
Nashville	00	01	00	00	02	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	07
Newport	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sweetwater	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	03	01	04	02	04	04	01	01	04	03	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	29
									COU	TY 1	AGENC	EIES											
Anderson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.1
Cheatham Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 01

#### TENNESSEE - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Fentress Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.1
Giles Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	01
Johnson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Knox Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02
Lauderdale Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 02	00	00	00	01
Rhea Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	02
Roane Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Sullivan Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	01
Sumner Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
McMinn Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Tipton Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Williamson Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	02	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	02	01	00	00	00	02	00	03	01	00	00	16
•									отн	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00												
		•	00	00	00	Ů,	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	02	03	01	06	02	04	05	01	01	05	04	03	01	00	00	00	02	00	04	03	00	00	47

TEXAS

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	TE A	GENC	EIES											
Alc. Bev. Comm.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.1
Dept. Of Publ Sfty	01	00	02	00	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00 01	00 01	00 01	01 15
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	01	02	00	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	01				
															•	01	00	UU	01	01	01	01	16
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Alice	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Amarillo	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Anthony	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Arlington	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Austin	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Balcone Hts	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Beaumont	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Conroe	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Corpus Christi	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Crowley	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Dallas	02	01	01	01	02	00	00	00	00	01	00	02	00	00	01	00	05	00	00	00	00	01	01 17
Decatur	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
El Paso	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01 02
Elsa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Farmer's Branch	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	-		01
Fort Worth	00	01	00	01	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Galena Park	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	01	07
Garland	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	01
Harker Hts	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			01	00	00	00	00	01
Hedwig Village	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Houston	02	02	00	02	02	00	01	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 01	00 01	00 01	00 01	00 00	00 00	01 17

#### TEXAS - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Huntsville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.1									
Jacksonville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Kaltom City	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
Laredo	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Live Oak	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Longview	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lorenzo	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Los Fresnos	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Lubbock	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
McAllen	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	01	00	02
Mathis	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02
Mesquite	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	01
Mexia	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	01
Midlothian	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	01
Mission	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Munday	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Orange	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Paris	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Pasadena	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Pittsburg	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 00	02
Port Arthur	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Port Isabel	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Quinlan	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
San Antonio	01	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	01	00		01
Sugar Land	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	10
Terrill	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01
Texas City	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Vernon	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	01
Waco	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01
Wichita Falls	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00 00	00	00	02
								-						00	00	90	50	OT	UU	UU	00	00	01

#### TEXAS - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Windcrest	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Wolfe City	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Yorktown	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	01
Zapata	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
-											•		00	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	UU	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	06	07	05	80	09	04	07	04	07	03	05	06	03	06	01	03	80	07	01	05	02	06	113
									cou	NTY 2	AGEN	CIES											
Angelina Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	
Atascosa Co.	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	02
Bexar Co.	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Brazoria Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	03
Comanche Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Dallas Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Dimmit Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	02 01
Falls Co.	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Fort Bend Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02 01
Grimes Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Harris Co.	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01 05
Hemphill Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	05 01
Hidalgo Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Hunt Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02 01
King Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Motley Co.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Nacogdoches Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Nueces Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Ochiltree Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Pecos Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Presidio Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
												-	-	-	00	50	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	01

#### TEXAS - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Tarrant Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Travis Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
Upton Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Uvalde Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01
Waller Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	01
Webb Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	- 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Wheeler Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01
Wilson Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Zavala Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	03	07	02	03	01	00	00	04	01	01	04	03	00	01	03	03	03	01	00	04	00	00	44
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	10	15	09	11	12	04	08	08	09	05	09	11	03	07	04	07	11	08	02	10	03	07	173

UTAH

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8T	ATE :	AGEN	CIES											
Dept of Corrns Highway Patrol Narcotics Enf STATE SUBTOTAL	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 01	00 00 00	00 01 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	01 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00	01 03 01
Julia popioini	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	05
								1	IUNI	CIPAI	L AGI	ENCIE	8										
Salt Lake City	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									cou	NTY :	AGEN	CIES											
Salt Lake Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	00	02	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	08

VERMONT

#### YEAR

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	8.4	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	genc	IE8											
Fish & Game	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	В										
fanchester Cntr	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									COUN	TY A	GENC	IES											
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
				•					OTH	ER A	GENC:	IES										٠	
THER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
!OTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	02

02

#### **VIRGINIA**

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	ATE 2	AGEN	CIES								•	76	73	TOTAL
State Police	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	01	00	00	00		
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	01		00	00	01	07
														-	•	01	00	OI	00	00	00	01	07
								)	UNIC	PAI	AGI	ncie	28										
Alexandria	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00													
Bridgewater	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	02
Buena Vista	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Chesapeake	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01 01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Clarksville	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Front Royal	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Hampton	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Manassas	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Newport News	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
Norfolk	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Richmond	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Richmond City Sher.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Roanoke City Sher.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Salem	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Stanley	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Virginia Beach	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	01	01	01	01	02	01	00	01	00	02	02	01	01	02	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	01

#### VIRGINIA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									COU	NTY	agen	CIES											
Arlington Co. Carroll Co. Dickenson Co. Henrico Co. Henry Co. James City Co. Lancaster Co. Lee Co. Pr. William Co. Rockingham Co.	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01	00 00 00 00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00	03 01 01 02 01 01 01
Stafford Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	02	01	00	00	01	02	00	01	01	00	01	02	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	14
									ОТН	ER A	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	02	03	02	01	03	02	02	01	01	03	02	02	04	03	02	01	02	03	01	00	00	01	41

#### WASHINGTON

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	70	~~															
	-	.,	/ -	/3	/ 0	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ST	ATE 2	AGEN	CIES											
State Patrol	01	00	01	00	. 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
								1	(UNI	CIPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Hoquiam Seattle Spokane Tacoma Tenino MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 01 00 00 00	00 00 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 01 <b>01</b>	00 00 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00	00 00 01 00 00	00 01 00 00 00	00 01 00 01 00	00 00 00 00 00	01 03 01 02 01							
									COU	NTY Z	AGEN	CIES											
Island Co. King Co. Kitsap Co. Pierce Co.	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 01 01	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00 00	00 00 00	00 01 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00	02 00 00 00	00 00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	00 00 00	02 02 01 01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	06

#### WASHINGTON - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									OTH	ER A	GENC	IES											
Colville Tribe	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									AL	L AG	ENCI	E8											
TOTAL	01	01	01	00	01	01	03	00	01	00	01	01	02	02	01	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	18

#### WEST VIRGINIA

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									STA	TE A	AGENC	EIES				,							
Dept. of Natrl Res.	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	•									
Dept. of Publ Sfty	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
State Police	00	00	00	00	00	03	00	01			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
10220	00	00	UU	00	00	03	UU	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	05
STATE SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	03	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	07
								M	UNIC	IPAL	AGE	NCIE	8										
Beckley	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00													
Charleston	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Fort Gay	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Huntington	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Kenova	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Milton	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Welch	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00			00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	01	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL AGENCIES	02	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	03	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09
									COU	NTY 1	AGEN	CIES											
Calhoun Co.	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00						
Fayette Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mason Co.	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
McDowell Co.	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Monroe Co.	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Putnam Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00		00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
	-	-	-	00	00	00	UU	UU	UU	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	02	04	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	08

#### WEST VIRGINIA - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									ОТН	er a	GENC	IE8											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AL	L AG	enci	E8											
TOTAL	02	00	00	03	04	04	01	01	00	03	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	23

#### WISCONSIN

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									3.1	.T 3/	ENC1	· 10.0									-		101111
									n.	DI W	PRCI	.EB											
Dept. of Ntrl Res	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00								
State Patrol	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	0.0	00	01
								•	00	00	UU	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
STATE SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	
															•	•••		•	<b>V L</b>	•	00	00	02
								M	IUNIC	:IPAI	AGE	NCIE	8										
Eau Claire	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00													
Fairchild	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Iola	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Menomenee Falls	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Milwaukee	00	03	02	01	00	01	00	00	00	02	01	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Town of Summit	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	13
Two Rivers	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
							•••	00	00	00	00	UU	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	03	02	04	00	02	00	00	00	02	02	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	Λ1				
													•••		•	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	20
									COU	NTY 1	AGENC	:IES											
Brown Co.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00														
Burnett Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Grant Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Waukesha Co.	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01
			00	00	00	UU	02	UU	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	00	01	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	05

#### WISCONSIN - continued

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									отн	er a	GENC	IES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									λL	L AG	ENCI	ES		,									
TOTAL	01	04	02	04	00	02	02	00	00	02	02	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	03	02	00	00	27

#### WYOMING

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
									8TA	TE A	GENC	:IE8											
STATE TOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
								2:	UNIC	:IPAI	AGE	encie	8										
Gillette Rock Springs	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 01	00 00	00 00	00 00	00 00	01 00	00 00	01 01									
MUNICIPAL SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
									COU	NTY .	AGEN	CIES											
Teton Co.	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
COUNTY SUBTOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
									OTE	IER I	GENC	CIES											
OTHER SUBTOTAL	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
									AI	L AG	ENCI	ES											
TOTAL	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03

#### FEDERAL AGENCIES

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
B.A.T.F.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	-00	00	00	00	00	04	06
Bur of Indn Afrs	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	03
D.E.A.	01	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	02	01	00	00	01	00	12
E.P.A.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	01
F.B.I.	00	01	00	02	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	11
I.N.S.	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
US Border Patrol	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
US Customs	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	06
US Forest Service	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
US Marshals Service	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02	00	06
US Natl Park Srv.	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
US Park Police	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
US Secret Service	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	.00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
FEDERAL AGENCIES	03	03	02	04	02	00	01	04	02	00	02	03	01	01	04	01	04	03	04	01	04	04	53

#### FOREIGN AGENCIES

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Puerto Rico	02	04	04	06	04	01	04	03	06	02	03	05	02	06	04	01	01	80	05	07	05	08	91
Virgin Islands	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
American Samoa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02
Mariana Islands	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Guam	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
TOTAL	02	04	04	07	04	02	04	05	07	03	04	07	02	06	04	01	02	08	05	80	05	08	102

#### STATE AGENCIES: All Types

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	. 84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Alabama	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	06
Alaska	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Arizona	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	03
Arkansas	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	02	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	07
California	01	02	01	01	00	01	02	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	12
Colorado	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	03
Connecticut	00	00	00	00	00	0Ô	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Delaware	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Florida	01	03	02	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	02	00	00	02	00	00	01	00	01	00	16
Georgia	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05
Hawaii	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Idaho	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Illinois	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	05
Indiana	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	03
Iowa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Kansas	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Kentucky	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	08
Louisiana	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
Maine	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Maryland	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	05
Massachusetts	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Michigan	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	09
Minnesota	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mississippi	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	02	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	07
Missouri	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Montana	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Nebraska	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Nevada	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	03
New Hampshire	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

### STATE AGENCIES - continued All Types

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
New Jersey	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
New Mexico	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
New York	00	01	02	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
North Carolina	02	00	02	02	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	11
North Dakota	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Ohio	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Oklahoma	01	00	00	01	00	01	03	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09
Oregon	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
Pennsylvania	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	-00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	05
Rhode Island	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
South Carolina	01	01	02	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	11
South Dakota	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Tennessee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	0.0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02
Texas	01	01	02	00	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	01	16
Utah	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	05
Vermont	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Virginia	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	07
Washington	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
West Virginia	00	00	00	00	00	03	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	. 07
Wisconsin	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02
Wyoming	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	16	13	18	11	09	10	13	15	11	09	05	09	13	13	05	09	06	04	07	07	05	07	215

### STATE AGENCIES STATE POLICE AND HIGHWAY PATROL

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
Alabama	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Alaska	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Arizona	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	03
Arkansas	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	05
California	01	01	00	01	00	01	02	00	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	09
Colorado	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	03
Connecticut	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Delaware	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Florida	00	03	01	00	01	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	11
Georgia	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Idaho	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Illinois	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	οo	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	04
Indiana	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	02	03
Iowa	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Kansas	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Kentucky	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	02	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	07
Louisiana	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Maine	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01
Maryland	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	04
Massachusetts	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Michigan	01	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	08
Minnesota	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Mississippi	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Missouri	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	03
Montana	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Nebraska	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Nevada	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	02
New Hampshire	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
New Jersey	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
•		_													-	• •	~	~	00	•	00	00	U T

#### STATE AGENCIES - continued STATE POLICE AND HIGHWAY PATROL

AGENCY	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	TOTAL
New Mexico	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	04
New York	00	01	02	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
North Carolina	02	00	02	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	10
North Dakota	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Ohio	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Oklahoma	01	00	00	01	00	01	03	00	00	00	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08
Oregon	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	02
Pennsylvania	01	00	00	00	00	01	00	01	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	04
Rhode Island	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
South Carolina	01	01	01	00	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	01	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	00	10
South Dakota	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
Tennessee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	01
Texas	01	00	02	00	02	00	01	00	01	01	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	01	01	01	01	15
Utah	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	03
Vermont	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Virginia	00	00	٠ 00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	01	01	01	00	01	00	00	00	01	07
Washington	01	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	02
West Virginia	00	00	00	00	00	03	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	05
Wisconsin	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	01
Wyoming	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	13	11	14	12	07	10	10	12	09	07	04	07	11	10	04	07	04	02	02	07	05	07	174

### APPENDIX C

### AGENCY SURVEY RESPONSES: COUNTY AND STATE AGENCIES BY SIZE

Table C5-1

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING PROVISION
OF SOFT BODY ARMOR
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

			N	UMBER OF SWOP	N PERSONNEL				
DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES ARMOR	2 (100.0)	2 (66.7)	6 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	10 (100.0)	3 (75.0)	2 (100.0)	30 (93.8)	94.9
CASH ALLOWANCE IS PROVIDED	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (3.1)	3.4
No Provision is Made	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (3.1)	1.7
TOTAL	2 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	10 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	32 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-2

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING PROVISION OF SOFT BODY ARMOR STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
DEPARTMENT SUPPLIES ARMOR	5	9	9	16	39
	(83.3)	(9.0)	(69.2)	(100.0)	(86.7)
CASH ALLOWANCE IS PROVIDED	1	0	1	0	2
	(16.7)	(0.0)	(7.7)	(0.0)	(4.4)
No Provision is Made	0	1	3	0	4
	(0.0)	(10.0)	(23.1)	(0.0)	(8.9)
TOTAL	6	10	13	16	45
	(100.0)	(100.0)	100.0	(100.0)	(100.0)

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-3

# DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY RADIO CAR PATROL OFFICERS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY			N	UMBER OF SWOF	RN PERSONNEL				<del></del>
227,111,112,117,12,1 02,101	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
MANDATORY	1 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (20.0)	2 (40.0)	3 (30.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	7 (22.6)	24.2
OPTIONAL	1 (50.0)	3 (100.0)	4 (80.0)	3 (60.0)	7 (70.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	24 (77.4)	75.8
COLUMN TOTAL	2 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	10 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	31 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-4

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY RADIO CAR PATROL OFFICERS BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
MANDATORY	2	3	2	3	10
	(33.3)	(30.0)	(16.9)	(18.8)	(22.7)
OPTIONAL	4	7	10	13	34
	(66.7)	(70.0)	(83.3)	(81.3)	(77.3)
COLUMN TOTAL	6	10	12	16	44
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-5

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY FOOT PATROL OFFICERS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY			N	UMBER OF SWOR	N PERSONNEL			·	
DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
MANDATORY	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (50.0)	1 (33.3)	2 (22.2)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	5 (22.7)	33.4
OPTIONAL	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	1 (50.0)	2 (66.7)	7 (77.8)	3 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	17 (77.3)	66.6
COLUMN TOTAL	1 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	22 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

#### TABLE C5-6

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY FOOT PATROL OFFICERS BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
Mandatory	O (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (10.0)
OPTIONAL	1 (100.0)	0 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	9 (90.0)
COLUMN TOTAL	1 (100.0)	1 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	10 (100.0)

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-7

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		·	N	UMBER OF SWOF	N PERSONNEL				
DEFANIMENTAL FOLICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
Mandatory	O (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (11.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (7.4)	8.1
OPTIONAL	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)	3 (75.0)	5 (100.0)	8 (88.9)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	25 (92.6)	91.9
COLUMN TOTAL	0 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	27 (100.0)	100.0

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-8

# DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY PLAINCLOTHES OFFICERS BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY					
DE ANIMENTAL FOLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL
MANDATORY	O	2	1	1	4
	(O.O)	(28.6)	(8.3)	(6.7)	(10.8)
OPTIONAL	3	5	11	14	33
	(100.0)	(71.4)	(91.7)	(93.3)	(89.2)
COLUMN TOTAL	3	7	12	15	37
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

TABLE C5-9

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY DETECTIVES COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		NUMBER OF SWORN PERSONNEL								
DEFARTMENTAL FOLICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*	
MANDATORY	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (10.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (6.9)	6.5	
OPTIONAL	1 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	3 (75.0)	5 (100.0)	9 (90.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	27 (93.1)	93.5	
COLUMN TOTAL	1 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	10 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	100.0	

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-10

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY DETECTIVES BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
Mandatory	O (0.0)	2 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	1 (6.7)	3 (10.0)
OPTIONAL	1 (100.0)	4 (66.7)	8 (100.0)	14 (93.3)	27 (90.0)
COLUMN TOTAL	1 (100.0)	6 (100.0)	8 (100.0)	15 (100.0)	30 (100.0)

TABLE C5-11

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY OFFICERS SERVING WARRANTS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel									
DEFANTMENTAL FULICY	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or more	TOTAL	WCP*		
Mandatory	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (20.0)	2 (40.0)	2 (22.2)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	5 (17.2)	14.5		
OPTIONAL	1 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	4 (80.0)	3 (60.0)	7 (77.8)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	24 (82.8)	85.5		
COLUMN TOTAL	1 (100.0)	3 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	9 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	29 (100.0)	100.0		

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-12

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY OFFICERS SERVING WARRANTS BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
Mandatory	1	3	3	3	10
	(16.7)	(42.9)	(30.0)	(18.8)	(25.6)
OPTIONAL	5	4	7	13	29
	(83.3)	(57.1)	(70.0)	(81.3)	(74.4)
COLUMN TOTAL	6	7	10	16	39
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

**TABLE C5-13** 

## DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY TACTICAL OPERATIONS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

DEPARTMENTAL POLICY		Number of Sworn Personnel								
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*	
MANDATORY	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	4 (80.0)	4 (80.0)	8 (80.0)	2 (50.0)	1 (50.0)	21 (75.0)	75.8	
OPTIONAL	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (20.0)	1 (20.0)	2 (20.0)	2 (20.0)	1 (50.0)	7 (25.0)	24.2	
COLUMN TOTAL	0 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	5 (100.0)	10 (100.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	28 (100.0)	100.0	

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

TABLE C5-14

### DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES REGARDING THE WEARING OF SOFT BODY ARMOR BY TACTICAL OPERATIONS BY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

				4	
DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL
MANDATORY	4	4	9	12	29
	(80.0)	(57.1)	(81.8)	(75.0)	(74.4)
OPTIONAL	1	3	2	4	10
	(20.0)	(42.9)	(18.2)	(25.0)	(25.6)
COLUMN TOTAL	5	7	11	16	39
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

TABLE C-15

### PERCENT DEPARTMENTS USING VARIOUS METHODS FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS BY AGENCY SIZE

METHODS USED	Number of Sworn Personnel								
	1-24	25-49	50-99	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or More	TOTAL	WCP*
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	1 (50.0)	1 (33.3)	5 (83.3)	3 (60.0)	8 (80.0)	4 (100.0)	2 (100.0)	24 (75.0)	72.2
DAILY CHECKS	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	1 (20.0)	2 (20.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (12.5)	11.5
PERIODIC CHECKS	1 (50.0)	1 (33.3)	4 (66.7)	2 (40.0)	5 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	13 (40.6)	40.2
INSPECTION ON TACTICAL OPERATIONS	0 (0.0)	2 (66.7)	3 (50.0)	2 (40.0)	7 (70.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (50.0)	15 (46.9)	44.7
OTHER	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 10.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (3.1)	2.7

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding. Multiple responses are possible.

**TABLE C5-16** 

#### PERCENT DEPARTMENTS USING VARIOUS METHODS FOR ENFORCING SOFT BODY ARMOR POLICY STATE AGENCIES BY AGENCY SIZE

	NUMBER OF SWORN PERSONNEL								
METHODS USED	100-249	250-499	500-999	1,000 or MORE	TOTAL				
EDUCATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT	5	4	7	12	28				
	(83.3)	(44.4)	(58.3)	(75.0)	(65.1)				
DAILY CHECKS	0	1	0	3	4				
	(0.0)	(11.1)	(0.0)	(18.8)	(9.3)				
Periodic Checks	2	3	1	8	14				
	(33.3)	(33.3)	(8.3)	(50.0)	(32.6)				
INSPECTION ON TACTICAL OPERATIONS	4	4	5	10	23				
	(66.7)	(44.4)	(41.7)	(62.5)	(53.5)				
OTHER	0	0	0	1	1				
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(6.3)	(2.3)				

<sup>\*</sup> Weighted Column Percent

NOTE: Column totals may not sum to 100.0% due to rounding. Multiple responses are possible.