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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Date filmed: 9/26/75

HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

SAMPLE IMPACT PROJECT EVALUATION REPORTS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
The High Impact Program has reached the point where the Crime Analysis Teams not only have designed and implemented evaluations of criminal justice projects but are already using interim and final results to improve project operations and planning. These project evaluation results have been forwarded to the National Institute and we are pleased with the quality of the reports being published. We are happy to forward the attached examples of actual evaluation reports in the hope that they will be helpful. The Grantee's address is included in the event that more details are needed.

As additional and appropriate reports are made available to the National Institute, we will supplement this set and forward them to you. Comments and suggestions you may have are welcomed.

Gerald M. Caplan
Director
NATIONAL IMPACT PROGRAM EVALUATION

SAMPLE IMPACT PROJECT EVALUATION REPORTS

Prepared by
G. KUPERSMITH
THE MITRE CORPORATION

FEBRUARY 1974

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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FOOT PATROL EVALUATION REPORT
OPERATION IDENT EVALUATION REPORTS - DENVER
OPERATION IDENT EVALUATION REPORT - ST. LOUIS
INTRODUCTION

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program was designed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to demonstrate, in eight large cities, the effectiveness of comprehensive, crime-specific programs in reducing stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary.

The crime-specific programs and projects developed by each of the eight Impact Cities—Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and St. Louis—represent a new approach to crime reduction which emphasizes the allocation of resources to develop, implement, and evaluate projects aimed at reducing specific types of crime.

Each Impact City will evaluate the projects and programs being implemented within its own jurisdiction. The degree to which projects and programs have attained their own objectives will be determined using evaluation designs developed by city Crime Analysis Teams and State Planning Agencies. These project level evaluations should assist criminal justice planners in understanding and assessing the effectiveness of various strategies in reducing specific types of crime.

In conjunction with the city-level evaluation effort, LEAA’s National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (National Institute) and The MITRE Corporation are conducting a National Level Evaluation of the Impact Program. The major thrust of this effort is to explain and understand many of the events and effects which are related to, or were generated by the Impact Program. To this end, inter-city and intra-city variations in project planning, implementation, and evaluation are being examined. Comparative analyses of specific city-level projects and general hypothesis testing of selected criminal justice system axioms are being conducted. Additionally, successful candidates for technology transfer and innovativeness as well as effective evaluation techniques and important evaluation findings are to be identified and documented.

Thus, the Impact Program entails a large scale evaluation effort whose findings should provide new insights for the design, implementation, and evaluation of other social action programs.

Given the scope of this evaluation effort, it is LEAA’s intent to maximize the dissemination of Impact Program information. To this end, the National Institute/MITRE have selected for wider distribution the group of city-generated evaluation reports which appear in this document.
These interim and final evaluation reports provide feedback to improve project operations, identify project and/or evaluation strengths and limitations, and guide program planning. In addition, interim and final evaluation reports supply invaluable information regarding the effectiveness of various evaluation techniques for assessing project effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, evaluation under the Impact Program is a dynamic process.

To illustrate this process, six evaluation reports have been included in this document representing the type of reports prepared to date by the Impact cities. Based on these reports, decisions have been made, for example, to relocate foot patrolmen to replicate their effectiveness in other target areas, discontinue an overtime police patrol, and redirect a property identification effort. Thus, evaluation reports have provided the Impact cities with useful information regarding the short term effectiveness and efficiency of projects aimed at reducing crime.
PROJECT TITLE: Anti-Robbery/Burglary Division

GRANT NUMBER: 72-DP-04-0073

PROJECT OBJECTIVE: To establish a plainclothes anti-robbery/burglary division in the Atlanta Police Department in order to reduce robberies in the city by 30% and burglary by 10%.

PROJECT DIRECTOR: John F. Inman, Chief of Police

HOST AGENCY: Atlanta Police Department
175 Decatur Street, S.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

DATE OF AWARD: 6 February 1973

PERIOD OF AWARD: 15 January 1973 - 30 April 1974

FUNDING:

Federal Share: $795,449
Local Share: $274,690
Total Project Amount: $1,070,139

This project will establish a plainclothes Anti-Robbery/Burglary Division which will include stake out teams of two or more officers or detectives assigned to observe businesses that are likely to be robbed or burglarized. Additionally, a civilian-clothed or disguised patrol of officers in high burglary and robbery areas will serve as both stake out and information gathering elements of the division. Funding is also requested for creating an anti-receiver of stolen property unit.
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INTRODUCTION

During 1972 there were over 14,000 burglaries and over 3,000 robberies committed in the City of Atlanta. Compared to 1971 data these represent increases of almost 7% in burglaries and over 39% in robberies. The Atlanta Police Department's Anti-Robbery/Burglary Project (ARB) is aimed at reducing these crimes through employment of stake-out and decoy squads, and an anti-receiver of stolen goods section. The project was initiated in April, 1973.

The purpose of this report on ARB is:

1. To provide information for assessing:
   a. The effectiveness of six months of ARB operations in reducing robberies and burglaries in the City of Atlanta.
   b. The degree of success in meeting pre-established interim goals and objectives.

2. To provide insights which would be of value in replicating the project or similar projects.

3. To provide information for determining if project modifications or redirections are required and provide a base for evaluating alternative courses of action.

4. For sake of completeness, data on program monitoring visits and cost expended to data have been included. Although this data focuses on measures of project inputs rather than effectiveness it does provide information on current project status and is a valuable adjunct to effectiveness measures.

The approach used in determining \( \#1 \) and \( \#2 \) was basically a study of conditions before and after project implementation. In accordance with the evaluation component of the grant application, the following quantitative comparisons were made:

1. Comparison of conditions in the most recent quarter with those in the quarter immediately preceding project implementation and with those in the comparable quarter for the previous year.

2. Comparison of actual achievement with pre-determined goals and objectives.
Additional analyses can be found in Sections IV and IX. It is anticipated that the final evaluation report will contain a comparison between projected conditions without the project and actual conditions.

The ensuing pages present the results of the first six months of ABB operation. The contribution of this project to the overall Impact program goal of 5% will be addressed in the Semi-Annual Program Evaluation Report.

I. PROJECT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Goals

1. Reduce the number of reported robberies during the fourth quarter of the project by 30% and the number of reported burglaries during the same quarter by 10% when compared to the number of reported robberies and burglaries during the same quarter for the year prior to ABB.

Baseline Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglaries</td>
<td>3,844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Between the first and fourth quarters of the project increase the number of on-site apprehensions for robberies and burglaries made by ABB by 5%.

3. Increase the clearance rate (number cases cleared/number of arrests) for robberies and burglaries by 10%. The clearance rate for ABB for each of these categories is to be compared with that achieved by the Atlanta Police Department. The 10% increase is to be achieved by the fourth quarter of the project.

Objectives

1. Obtain at least 250 operations (stake-out and decoy) per month.

Interim Goals

Goal

1. Achieve during the second quarter of the project a 15% reduction in reported robberies and a 4% reduction in reported burglaries when compared to the number of robberies and burglaries reported during the quarter prior to project initiation. It is recognized that throughout the year the number of reported crimes is subject to seasonal and other variations. To account to some extent for such seasonal variations the second quarter results on reported crimes will also be compared with the number of such reported crimes during the comparable quarter of the year prior to project initiation.
II. EVALUATION RESULTS SUMMARY

In evaluating the effectiveness of the ARB project during its first six months, it is necessary to review the trends in crime prior to project initiation. Between the first and third quarters of 1972 robberies increased by 99.6% and burglaries by 7.9%. The ARB project was initiated in the second quarter of 1973. Comparing the number of robberies and burglaries committed in the first and third quarters of 1973 shows that robberies have increased by 5% and burglaries by 9%. Thus, although the project did not achieve the stated goal of 15% reduction in robberies and a 4% reduction in burglaries, there has been a substantial reduction in the rate of increase of robberies. Although less success has been achieved in reducing burglaries, various actions are being taken to address this problem. These include the development of a street index file for commercial burglaries and more effective supervision of ARB squads by Sergeants. In addition, the anticipated receipt of less conspicuous cars and night vision scopes should help in this area.

ARB was unable to sustain in its second quarter of operation the number of on-site arrests for robberies and burglaries made in its first quarter. This may be the result of the transfer from the project of several detectives who had been responsible for a large number of robbery and burglary arrests. In addition, ARB personnel have reported that initially open space robberies were concentrated in a few census tracts and they believe that as a result of their success in these tracts the concentration of open space robberies in these tracts has been reduced.

The effectiveness of the project may also have been impaired by the use of overtime personnel and by the lack of training received by recent transfers into the project. There have been several problems associated with overtime personnel. Since overtime personnel from the regular police force have not been trained in the special requirements and methods of operation of ARB, they cannot be expected to perform with the same effectiveness. Also, since their primary responsibility is not to the ARB project, their commitment to the project may not be as great as that of the ARB regulars. Quite often those scheduled for overtime duty are unable to meet their assignment. Unfortunately this is usually not known until the last minute and therefore necessitates last minute planning and deployment of the squads. Since such adjustment must be made without advanced planning it is possible that overall effectiveness of the deployment of the squads is lessened.

Initially those detectives assigned to ARB were given special training in the requirements and methods of operation of ARB. When, however, transfers are made it has not been possible to provide such training prior to the assignment of the new detectives.

Although through on-the-job experience it may be expected that the men will acquire the necessary training, initially they will not be as effective on-the-job as those who had received prior training.

Several of the project goals and objectives are being reviewed as to their reasonableness in light of the increases in crime that occurred prior to project initiation and as a result of actual project experience. Also under study is the possibility of narrowing the focus of ARB to those crime categories where it appears the most substantial reduction can be achieved through ARB-type activities.

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SUMMARY INTERIM RESULTS AND COST DATA

Project success or failure should not be judged by this data alone. For a detailed analysis of the program results refer to Section IV, Evaluation.

A. Interim Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numerical Change</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>3575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Site Apprehensions</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Rate</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Stake-Outs/Month</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conviction Rate</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Ten Fences</td>
<td>Identified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Refer to Section IV, Evaluation, for a detailed analysis of program results.
2) Based on comparison with the comparable period during the year prior to project initiation.

B. Cost (Through September 30, 1973 - Six Months of Operation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-Kind</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (Includes Fringe Benefits)</td>
<td>$285,068.86</td>
<td>$122,067.06</td>
<td>$407,135.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>35,562.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,562.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,706.06</td>
<td>5,706.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$320,631.05</td>
<td>$122,067.06</td>
<td>$444,804.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. ACTUAL EVALUATION RESULTS

Goal 1. Evaluation Measures

The rate of Burglaries and Robberies committed during the current quarter compared to the same data for the quarter preceding project implementation and the quarter preceding project initiation. The following data is to be compared with the same data for the previous quarter for an accurate comparison with the current quarter.

**Crime Reduction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglar</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Goal 2.**

The number of incidents identified for the most recent quarter is to be compared with the same data for the first quarter of the project.
Objective 1. The performance measure is the total number of stake-outs during the most recent quarter of the project. The data follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stake-out</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decoy</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objective 2. Data on the disposition of the on-site apprehensions made by ARB in April through August 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convictions for Robbery and Burglary</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convictions for Reduced Charges</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead Docketed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Disposition</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The category entitled "other disposition" consists mainly of juvenile cases. Due to the varying dispositions that may be made in such cases, these cases, as well as those still pending, were not considered in computing the conviction rate. In the computation both convictions for robberies and burglaries and convictions for reduced charges were counted as convictions. For the period April through August, 1973, the conviction rate was: 9

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**Goal 3.** The number of cases cleared per arrest for the most recent quarter of the project is to be compared with the clearance rate for the quarter preceding the project.

Since clearance data for September, 1973, was not available at the time this report was written, the clearance rates for the most recent quarter of the project were calculated based on July and August data only.

Separate clearance rates have been computed for robberies and burglaries. These calculations follow.

### Burglary Clearance Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number Cases Cleared</th>
<th>Number Arrests</th>
<th>Clearance Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan., Feb., Mar.</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, Aug.</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+31.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Robbery Clearance Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number Cases Cleared</th>
<th>Number Arrests</th>
<th>Clearance Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan., Feb., Mar.</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, Aug.</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+100.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objective 3. The top ten fences have been identified. According to the ARB Project Director, this list has been kept current.

10. 

IV. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF EVALUATION RESULTS

Goal 1. The interim goal of a 15% reduction in robberies and a 4% reduction in burglaries was not achieved. Further analysis, however, of the number of robberies committed during 1972 and the first three quarters of 1973 reveals that there has been a substantial reduction in the rate of increase in robberies. Data on the comparative changes in the number of robberies are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan., Feb., Mar.</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>+112.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, Aug., Sept.</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>+ 11.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Change: +99.6% +5.0%

As shown in the table, there has been a 5% increase in robberies between the three months prior to the project and the most recent three months. During this same period in 1972 there was a 99.6% increase in robberies. Furthermore, in comparing the first quarter of 1973, the quarter prior to project initiation, with the first quarter of 1972, we note an 112% increase in robberies; while comparing the most recent quarter of this year with the same quarter of 1972 there was only a 11.5% increase in robberies.

The same comparative data for burglaries is given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan., Feb., Mar.</td>
<td>3617</td>
<td>3844</td>
<td>+ 6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, Aug., Sept.</td>
<td>3902</td>
<td>4188</td>
<td>+ 7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Change: +7.9% +9.0%

For burglaries the type of comparative analysis used above for robbery shows that there are no substantial
Based on the above analyses, it is apparent that ARB was not met. Differences between periods before and after project initiation. For example, between the quarter prior to the project and the most recent quarter there has been a 9% increase in burglaries. During this same period in 1972 there was a 7.9% increase.

During the first quarter of project operation, 83 on-site apprehensions were made for robbery and burglary. This decreased to 76 during the second quarter of the project or a 8.4% reduction. Therefore, the goal of a 5% increase was not met.

Some of the factors that may account for this reduction follow.

1. ARB has stated that during the first months of project operation there were a large number of open space robberies in census tracts 12, 27, and 35. By concentrating on these tracts, ARB was able to obtain a large number of on-site arrests for robberies. These arrests resulted in a decrease in the open space robberies in these tracts and as a result these crimes are no longer concentrated in a few tracts, thus making it more difficult to obtain on-site apprehensions by concentrating on only special census tracts.

2. The on-site arrests for robberies and burglaries do not account for all on-site arrests made by ARB personnel. ARB believes that many of these on-site arrests may have resulted in a target crime arrests had the arrest been delayed. Circumstances were such, however, that in order to avoid violence and possible harm to victims, the arrest had to be made prior to carrying out what may have been a target crime. During

3. Since initiation of the project, 16 men have been transferred out of the project. These 16 participated in 85 arrests for robbery. Further, of the sixteen, two men participated in 38 of the 85 arrests. Thus, the project has lost some men who have proven to be very effective in apprehending robbery offenders. The transfer of most of these 16 men was completed by the first week in August. Those replacements that have been added to the project since August have participated in only 3 robbery arrests. More by those detectives who have been transferred and the regular ARB detectives are included in the data section of this report. It should also be noted that replacement personnel have not received the training provided to those originally assigned to ARB.

4. The use of overtime personnel from the Atlanta Police Department at large may also have had negative effects on effectiveness. The overtime personnel did not receive specific training for ARB. It is possible that overtime personnel to ARB's goals as great as that of ARB regulars. This is considered understandable since ARB is not their primary responsibility, but nevertheless may be reducing effectiveness. Use of overtime personnel has also resulted in the necessity of making last minute changes in assignments and planned tactics.

Between the quarter prior to the project and the most recent quarter of the project there has been a 9% increase in the clearance rate for robberies and a

-- End of Document --
Objective 1.

The objective of 250 stake-outs per month has been achieved every month since project initiation.

Objective 2.

A conviction rate of 88.4% has been achieved for those on-site apprehensions and burglary apprehensions made by ARB. This is slightly less than the objective of 90%. Thirty cases are still pending, however, and data is not yet available for the September arrests. Therefore, a final determination cannot be made at this time.

Objective 3.

The top ten fences in Atlanta have been identified.

Additional Analysis. For this project, additional data is accumulated on the deployment of stake-out and decoy squads, on-site apprehensions, and the number of reported crimes in census tracts. Analyses will be made to determine if there is a relationship between these items. Should the data support the conclusion that on-site apprehensions in a tract result in a decrease in reported crimes in that tract, then if ARB is successful in sustaining a high number of on-site apprehensions (Goal 2), this would to some extent support the hypothesis that ARB was responsible for the reduction in those crimes and also lend some support to the assumption that increasing apprehensions increases risk as perceived by the criminal and thus acts as a deterrent.

100.9% increase in the clearance rate for burglaries. Thus, Goal 3 was met. These results, however, must be tempered somewhat because of recent changes in the method used by the Atlanta Police Department to classify a case as cleared. This change

Thus, Goal 3 was met. These results, however, must be tempered somewhat because of recent changes in the method used by the Atlanta Police Department to classify a case as cleared. This change in January and February, 1973, there were a total of 108 robberies cleared and 315 burglaries cleared. In March, 1973, alone, 197 robbery cases were cleared and 276 burglary cases.

Another problem with the measure associated with this goal is that it is not feasible to obtain data on the number of clearances associated with the arrests made by ARB. Therefore, the success of ARB in meeting this goal is directly dependent on the clearance rate achieved by the entire Atlanta Police Department.

V. ACTIONS AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS

Future Expectations

It is expected that various factors will contribute to improved performance of the ARB project in the ensuing months. These are discussed below.

1. More effective utilization of Sergeants in supervising decoy and stake-out squads. This will insure that these squads are performing as planned. An example of the possible need for such supervision is provided by the streetworkers' report included in the data section. This report indicates that the cover for one of the decoy squads may have been blown. Field supervisors could check for such possibilities and corrective action could be taken as needed.

2. Development of a street index file for commercial burglaries and the diversion of more squads to the morning watch is expected to lead to reductions in commercial burglaries.

3. Delays have been encountered obtaining compact cars and night vision scopes. ARB believes that the standard vehicles assigned to it are too easily recognized and the night vision scope will be of value to commercial burglary squads. It is expected that both the compact cars and the scopes will be available in the near future.

4. With any innovative project of this type there is an associated learning process. As experience is gained in analyzing robbery and burglary data it is expected that ARB will be able to more effectively plan the deployment of its stake-out squads.

5. Arrangements are being made in the Atlanta Police Department to provide for coordination of ARB and the high crime foot patrol activities. This should permit more effective utilization of both forces.

6. The Atlanta Police Department is considering requesting authorization to allow detectives assigned full-time to ARB to work one day of overtime per week. This should assist in alleviating some of the problems which have been occurring with current overtime personnel.

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VI. POSSIBLE EVALUATION COMPONENT REVISIONS

Based on an analysis of the trends in robberies and burglaries preceding project implementation, there is some concern as to the reasonableness of Goal 1. This goal and others are currently under review by both ARC and the Atlanta Police Department. In addition, the possibility of narrowing the focus of ARB is being considered. This would permit ARB to concentrate its effort on fewer categories of crime and achieve a more substantial reduction in these areas. For example, concentrating analytical efforts on fewer crime categories would permit more detailed analysis of crime and victim data in these categories. These analyses in turn may result in more effective deployment of the ARB squads.

One possible project modification now under consideration is to redirect the project to focus on commercial and pedestrian robberies. If this redirection is made, revisions will be required to the project goals and objectives. A comparison of the number of reported commercial robberies in the first quarter of 1972 with those in the first quarter of 1973 shows that there was a 16.7% increase. Since the initiation of ARB, however, similar comparisons between the second and third quarters show decreases of 27.4% and 16.0% respectively. With the proposed redirection of effort a goal of a 20% to 30% reduction in the number of commercial robberies per quarter when compared to the same quarter during the year prior to ARB would appear reasonable.

Information on the number of pedestrian robberies prior to project initiation is not readily available. Therefore, it was necessary to find some other measure which would be indicative of pedestrian robberies. Since 1973 according to the Atlanta Police Department, the majority of those robberies classified as open space robberies would be pedestrian robberies. Prior to that time, however, miscellaneous robberies would have contained a high proportion of pedestrian robberies. Therefore, a reasonable surrogate for pedestrian robberies that would permit analysis over time would be the total of open space and miscellaneous robberies. Data on the number of open space and miscellaneous robberies by quarter for 1972 and 1973 is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>+198.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>+68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>+21.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparing comparable quarters of 1972 and 1973, prior to ARB, there was a 198.5% increase in these crime categories, to 68.8% and in the second quarter to 21.5%. Based on this percent increase over comparable quarters to zero by the end of ARB.

If these goals were to be established and achieved, the total number of commercial, open space, and miscellaneous robberies same quarter of 1973 would be 846 versus 908 in the categories of robberies...
VII. MONITORING FORM COMPLETED BY PROJECT PERSONNEL

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Descriptive title of the project. This should be the same project title that appears on the grant application.

2. A) Time Span Since Last Report
   Ex.: September - December
   B) Date This Report Completed

3. Self Explanatory

4. Time Period Expected Actual
   Ex. 1st 3 months 5% 6%

5. EXAMPLE: Police Project to Reduce Robberies.

Measurement Record Data
Number of robberies in target area 4 8pm - 12pm
9pm - 12pm
Sept. 1 - Sept. 8
Number of robberies in control area 7 8pm - 12pm
9pm - 12pm
Sept. 1 - Sept. 8

INSTRUCTIONS

5. Give Opinion.

3) Many businessmen are still hesitant to become involved with ARB.

MONITORING FORM

1. Project Title Anti-Robbery/Burglary

2. Report Period and Date
   A) July-September, 1973
   B) October 15, 1973

3. Amount of Grant Award Spent to Date by Budget Category.
   $448,404

4. Degree to which project is meeting its objectives:
   Time Period Expected Actual
   See Supplement

5. Complete or attach form which answers each column

Measurement Record Data Time Period

PAGE 2 - To Be Completed Each Quarter

5. External Factors Influencing Results

1) The tremendous turn-over in personnel in stake-out locations and the fact that employees reveal the presence of stake-out men has greatly hindered the program.
2) The news media have continued to give the program favorable coverage.

B. Project Conclusions

See supplement.

6. Examples: Street-Lighting Project - 10 poles installed
   Methadone Project - 15 addicts treated

6. Products Since Last Report:

- 892 Separate Stake-Outs
- 285 Separate Civillian Clothes Patrolls
- 16 Robbery On-Site Apprehensions
- 23 Burglary On-Site Apprehensions

PAGE 3 - To Be Completed Each Quarter
INSTRUCTIONS

7. Self-explanatory

8. If you have other work responsibilities, you could easily not have adequate time available to conduct the project in the manner you would like. If this is your situation write NO in the answer space.

9. Do not include problems. They will be listed later.

MONITORING FORM

7. Is your project currently: CHECK ONE
   a. On schedule   X
   b. Behind schedule
   c. Ahead of schedule
   d. Special circumstances

   Explain:
   Lacking equipment:
   Compact cars, vans, night-vision scopes, body bugs,
   Computer print-outs of robberies and burglaries by census tract
   Is still unavailable.

8. Have you had as much time as you needed to conduct this project?
   YES  X
   NO

9. A. Were there results, achievements, or developments from or in your project you did not expect?
   YES  X
   NO

   B. If yes, describe.

PAGE 4 - To Be Completed Each Quarter

INSTRUCTIONS

10. A. Major problems are:
    1) A problem which substantially interferes with or delays reaching the project objectives for three or more months.
    2) Total re-direction or change in the scope of the project.
    3) Evaluation records inaccurate or non-existent for three months.

   B. Minor problems: Any problems that would not fit into the Major problems categories.

MONITORING FORM

10. Have any problems developed during the past 3 months in operation of this project?
   YES  X
   NO

   A. Major problems:
   1) Use of extra-overtime personnel has continued to be a hindrance to ARB.
   2) Lack of communication between divisions has caused poor planning of assignments.
   3) The use of regular detective cars has resulted in easy recognition of personnel.
   4) The fact that the 5 vans were unavailable prevented the division from doing needed surveillance on stake-outs.
   5) Location of division in the City Auditorium, the roll call room and weapons in the Police Department, and the cars in the city shop caused the detectives to lose a great deal of time in arriving at their stake-out locations (situation corrected 9/4/73).

   B. Minor problems:
   1) Tendency on the part of other police personnel to refer cases unrelated to ARB objectives to our division, resulting in a great deal of time spent explaining to others why we cannot give them coverage.
   2) The loss of certain personnel with high performance records has decreased our effectiveness.

PAGE 5 - To Be Completed Each Quarter
INSTRUCTIONS

11. Self-explanatory

12. Authorization

Your signature indicates you are assuming responsibility that the content of the report is accurate and complete.

MONITORING FORM

11. Indicate achievements not covered, or other comments you consider significant in an evaluation of your project. See Supplement

12. AUTHORIZATION OF REPORT CONTENT

Signature

Local Project Director Date

PAGE 6 - To Be Completed Each Quarter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
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<td>+9.1</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
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<td>+31.5</td>
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<td>422.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>% of Change</td>
<td></td>
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NUMBER 4.

AVERAGE ROBBERIES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% of Change</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>226.6</td>
<td>292.3</td>
<td>+29.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>326.6</td>
<td>364.3</td>
<td>+11.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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AVERAGE BURGLARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% of Change</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1135.6</td>
<td>1211.3</td>
<td>+60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1300.6</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>+75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the charts in the supplement to Number 4, AEB has failed to meet its interim six-month goals, which were to reduce robberies by 15% (actual 9.1% increase over quarter prior to program, 11.5% increase over same quarter, 1972), and burglaries by 4% (actual 9.1% increase over quarter prior to program, 15.4% increase over same quarter, 1972). We feel that there are some obvious explanations for this failure.

First of all, the goals in the grant seem a bit unrealistic and unfair as a measure of the division's success. It is almost impossible to imagine that 50 detectives could make any noticeable difference in the 347 monthly robberies and 1281.3 monthly burglaries that occurred in the quarter prior to implementation of the program. These goals also make the division responsible for all robberies and burglaries, and this is unfair, since there are types of robberies (resident, miscellaneous, and those involving automobiles) and burglaries (resident) that we have been unable to attack due to lack of personnel and time.

Our failure in burglary is due, in part, to the fact that we almost completely ignored this area in the first quarter, making only eight apprehensions. The second quarter we paid a great deal of attention to business burglaries, and increased our apprehensions to 23. This shows that we have been working on burglary the second quarter, and have had some success, despite the continued increase in burglaries.

The fact that the 1972/1973 growth rate of robberies fell from 112% the first quarter of this year to 292% the second quarter, and continued to fall to 11.5% the third quarter says that we have been very effective in reducing robberies. Had we emphasized robbery as strongly in the second quarter as we did in the first, rather than spending a great deal of time with burglaries, we may have been able to bring this year's robberies down to last year's level. One of our main problems with robberies has been the fact that our success during the first quarter eliminated most of the large clusters of robberies in the downtown area and scattered these robberies throughout the city, necessitating a stronger concentration on robbery in the second quarter, which we have already stated did not occur due to our work in burglary. Having achieved the success we have in robbery, it is not inconceivable that we can still meet our 30% reduction goal in robbery if we are able to devote the necessary time to it.

NUMBER 5b.

As can be seen from the charts in the supplement to Number 4, AEB has failed to meet its interim six-month goals, which were to reduce robberies by 15% (actual 9.1% increase over quarter prior to program, 11.5% increase over same quarter, 1972), and burglaries by 4% (actual 9.1% increase over quarter prior to program, 15.4% increase over same quarter, 1972). We feel that there are some obvious explanations for this failure.

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Over all, we feel that we are doing a good job, in spite of these problems, as well as those problems listed in Number 10 of the Monitoring Form. Rather than sending a few men out each night to work robbery, and a few men to work burglary, we would like a chance to work robbery, and a few men to work burglary, we would like a chance to be able to concentrate all of our men on one area at a time and be judged on that basis for success or failure.

NUMBER 11.

IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF OPERATION ARB DETECTIVES MADE THE FOLLOWING 147 COURT CASES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abusive and Profane Language</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attempted Kidnapping</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying a Concealed Weapon</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying a Pistol w/o License</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a Turmoil</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Attempt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Trespassing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharging Firearms in City</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Violations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunkenness</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving False ID</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife Violations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Witness</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandering</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of Tools to Commit Crime</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Indecency</td>
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<td>Simple Battery</td>
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<td>Terroristic Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theft by Taking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vagrancy</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>147</strong></td>
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### VIII. DATA

#### BURGLARIES

**(BY MONTH)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>897</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>309</td>
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<td>4,612</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>00</td>
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#### BURGLARIES

**(TO DATE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
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<td>918</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>769</td>
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<td>476</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>476</td>
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<td>1,291</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>11,666</td>
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</table>

#### ROBBERIES

**(BY MONTH)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
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<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>133</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>141</td>
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<td>307</td>
<td>266</td>
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#### ROBBERIES

**(TO DATE)**

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<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
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<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>140</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>350</td>
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<td>269</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>350</td>
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## ON-SITE APPREHENSIONS

### ROBBERIES

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<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
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### BURGLARIES

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### NUMBER OF STAKE-OUTS

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### NUMBER OF DECOYS

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## ARREST DATA

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### REPORTS CLEARED BY ARREST

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### REPORTS CLEARED

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<th>A</th>
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September 24, 1973

The following is a list of court dispositions on cases made by ARB detectives from April to August, 1973:

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<th>Month</th>
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<th>BURGLARY</th>
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<td>4 Reduced to “Theft by Taking”</td>
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<td>4 Reduced to “Simple Battery”</td>
<td>2 Still Pending</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Put on Dead Docket</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>2 Convictions</td>
<td>1 Conviction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>JUNE</td>
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<td>1 Conviction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Reduced to “Theft by Taking”</td>
<td>4 Dismissal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Dismissal</td>
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<td>JULY</td>
<td>2 Convictions</td>
<td>4 Sent to Juvenile</td>
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</tr>
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<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>2 Reduced to “Simple Battery”</td>
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<td>1 Dismissal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Still Pending</td>
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In the first quarter of operation ARB detectives made 36 miscellaneous arrests resulting in the following court cases:

- Aggravated Assault: 3
- Aiding and Abetting: 1
- Carrying a Concealed Weapon: 5
- Carrying a Pistol Without License: 6
- Criminal Trespass: 7
- Discharging Firearms in City: 2
- Drug Violations: 5
- Drunkenness: 1
- Larceny: 4
- Obstructing Officer: 1
- Operating Without License: 1
- Possession of Stolen Goods: 1
- Possession of Tools to Commit a Crime: 4
- Reckless Conduct: 1
- Simple Battery: 6
- Theft by Taking: 11

Total: 59
## ARRESTS PARTICIPATED IN BY ARB DETECTIVES WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN TRANSFERRED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4/1/73</td>
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<td>Detective L. O. Bittaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detective S. M. Blizzard</td>
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<td>8/7/73</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Detective P. Q. Cagle</td>
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<td>Detective P. M. Cain (F)</td>
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<td>6 Skibiski</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detective R. M. Dempsey</td>
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<td>8/7/73</td>
<td>7 (6 Skibiski)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detective R. G. Franklin</td>
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<td>8/7/73</td>
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<td>-</td>
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**ARRESTS PARTICIPATED IN BY REGULAR ARB DETECTIVES**

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**ARRESTS PARTICIPATED IN BY REGULAR ARB DETECTIVES (CONTINUED)**

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<th>Robbery</th>
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<td>Detective E. J. Stuldvent</td>
<td>4/1/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective E. H. E. Surman</td>
<td>4/1/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective E. W. Wates (F)</td>
<td>4/1/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective E. F. White</td>
<td>4/1/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective R. F. Williams</td>
<td>4/1/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective J. W. Wright</td>
<td>9/4/73</td>
<td>10/12/73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TO: Ross Owens  
FROM: Terry Sprott  
DATE: July 17, 1973  
SUBJECT: Street Information System

July 16, 1973

Report on Impact Youth Translator assignment

Assignment: To determine if decoy squads were "burned."

Method: Observed the following locations:
1) Central and Hunter
2) 7th and Peachtree
3) Pryor and Alabama
4) Forsyth and Luckie

Conclusions of IYT: Not visible at Central and Hunter or Pryor and Alabama. Very obvious at 7th and Peachtree, although in plain clothes. Forsyth and Luckie, "A little shaky. I seem to recognize a guy because he was hanging around a little more than usual." However, IYT felt it was not noticeable to passing people.

Captain Harris reported that decoys were at the following locations the Friday night of IYT's observations:
1) Gordon and Ashby
2) Peachtree and 7th
3) Forsyth and Luckie
4) Central and Hunter

Note: Decoys were present at three of the locations observed by IYT. He reported no evidence of decoys at the location they did not work. There were no arrests at the location where IYT said the decoys were visible.

The observations were given to Captain Harris by telephone on July 16. He also felt the cover was blown at 7th and Peachtree. He intends to try switching locations between the 7th and Peachtree squad and one of the other squads.

NOTATION:

\[ \frac{Q_{t}^{\ast} - Q_{t}}{Q_{t}} \times 100 \]

\( Q_{t}^{\ast} \) = Average number of crimes of the specified category committed during the ith quarter of year t.
### 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>3,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglaries</td>
<td>3,848</td>
<td>3,634</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>11,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>4,511</td>
<td>5,281</td>
<td>14,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Comparison

- Q2,73 vs Q1,73: +99.60%
- Q3,73 vs Q2,73: +17.10%
- Q3,73 vs Q1,73: +8.10%

### 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>2,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglaries</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>6,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,108</td>
<td>4,087</td>
<td>6,882</td>
<td>13,077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Comparison

- Q2,72 vs Q1,72: -0.01%
- Q3,72 vs Q2,72: +19.70%
- Q3,72 vs Q1,72: +99.60%

---

### ROBBERIES

#### COMPARISONS ON A QUARTER-TO-QUARTER BASIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1,73</td>
<td>347.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2,73</td>
<td>292.3</td>
<td>-15.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3,73</td>
<td>364.3</td>
<td>+24.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1,72</td>
<td>163.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2,72</td>
<td>226.7</td>
<td>+58.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3,72</td>
<td>326.7</td>
<td>+44.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison:

- Q3,73 vs Q1,73: +5.00%
- Q3,73 vs Q2,72: +11.50%
- Q2,72 vs Q1,72: +99.60%
- Q1,73 vs Q1,72: +112.00%
### ROBBERIES

#### ANALYSIS OF ROBBERIES BY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan/Feb/Mar 1973</th>
<th>July/Aug/Sept 1973</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open Space</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>+21.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>+8.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>-31.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-39.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,041</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,093</strong></td>
<td>+52</td>
<td>+5.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ANALYSIS OF % CHANGE BY QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>4th Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>+38.50%</td>
<td>+44.10%</td>
<td>-5.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>+12.80%</td>
<td>-15.80%</td>
<td>+24.60%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ROBBERIES

#### 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,482</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,081</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( . ) indicates % of total

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>(12.80%)</td>
<td>(17.10%)</td>
<td>(15.20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>(54.80%)</td>
<td>(44.00%)</td>
<td>(41.30%)</td>
<td>(45.20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>(4.70%)</td>
<td>(5.10%)</td>
<td>(3.10%)</td>
<td>(4.10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>(27.70%)</td>
<td>(33.60%)</td>
<td>(40.40%)</td>
<td>(35.40%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

( . ) indicates % of total
### Analysis of Open Space Robberies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1^73</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>-21.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2^73</td>
<td>392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3^73</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>+153.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1^72</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2^72</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>+84.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3^72</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>+28.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Comparison

- Q3^73 vs Q1^73: +21.30%
- Q3^72 vs Q1^72: +136.70%

### Analysis of Commercial Robberies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1^73</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>-30.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2^73</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>-56.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3^73</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>+35.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1^72</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>+11.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2^72</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>+35.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Comparison

- Q3^73 vs Q1^73: +8.20%
- Q3^72 vs Q1^72: +50.50%
### ROBBERIES

**ANALYSIS OF RESIDENTIAL ROBBERIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 73</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 73</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-42.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 73</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>+18.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 72</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>+452.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 72</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-16.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparison** | **% Change**
---|---
Q3 73 vs Q1 73 | -31.60%
Q3 73 vs Q1 72 | +29.90%

---

### BURGLARIES

**COMPARISONS ON A QUARTER-TO-QUARTER BASIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 73</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 73</td>
<td>3,636</td>
<td>-5.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 73</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>+15.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 72</td>
<td>3,617</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 72</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>-5.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 72</td>
<td>3,902</td>
<td>+14.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparison** | **% Change**
---|---
Q3 73 vs Q1 73 | +9.00%
Q3 73 vs Q3 72 | +7.30%
Q3 72 vs Q3 72 | +7.90%
Q1 73 vs Q1 72 | +6.30%
### BURGLARIES

**ANALYSIS OF BURGLARIES BY TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan/Feb/Mar 1973</th>
<th>Jul/Aug/Sept 1973</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>2,898</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>+2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>+25.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,844</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>+9.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ANALYSIS OF % CHANGE BY QUARTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st Quarter</th>
<th>2nd Quarter</th>
<th>3rd Quarter</th>
<th>4th Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.80%</td>
<td>+14.50%</td>
<td>-3.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>+2.50%</td>
<td>-5.50%</td>
<td>+15.30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( ) indicates % of total
###分析：商业入室盗窃

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>期</th>
<th>总计</th>
<th>变化率</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>+3.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>+21.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,209</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>-10.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>+20.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

比较 | 变化率 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q1</td>
<td>+25.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q2</td>
<td>-1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q2</td>
<td>+7.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

###分析：住宅入室盗窃

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>期</th>
<th>总计</th>
<th>变化率</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>938.7</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>856.3</td>
<td>-8.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>966.0</td>
<td>+12.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>802.7</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>774.7</td>
<td>-3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>866.3</td>
<td>+11.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

比较 | 变化率 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q1</td>
<td>+2.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q2</td>
<td>+11.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 vs Q2</td>
<td>+7.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ST. LOUIS  

PROJECT SUMMARY

PROJECT TITLE: Burglary Prevention Project

GRANT NUMBER: S-MP39-72-D1

PROJECT OBJECTIVE: To reduce non-residential burglaries by the installation of wireless alarm systems at twenty selected businesses and by lecturing the Police Department's in-service training classes on burglary prevention.

PROJECT DIRECTOR: Sgt. Eugene Broaders

HOST AGENCY: St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
1200 Clark Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri

DATE OF AwARD: 11 April 1973

PERIOD OF AwARD: 11 April 1973 - 10 April 1974

FUNDING:

Federal Share: $100,000
Local Share: $4,606
Total Project Amount: $114,606

This is a continuation of the earlier project and during this phase of the project, RF alarm installations will be made primarily in the Third and Fifth Police Districts, the only districts of the City's nine that showed an increase in business burglary in 1972. Surveys of businesses for burglary prevention will continue using overtime personnel. Project personnel will be available to address business groups on burglary prevention and formal lectures on burglary prevention will be given to the Department's In-Service Training classes in 1973.
INTRODUCTION

Field reviews are conducted for each Impact project at least once each award period. The field review, conducted by staff of the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council - Region 5, consists of site visits by program, fiscal, and evaluation personnel, and analyses of data relevant to the project. Impact data, called for in each project's evaluation plan and designed to permit study of crime reduction and rehabilitative impacts, are analyzed by the High Impact Evaluation Unit and form the basis for a technical appendix to each review report. The entire report is then used to assist in preparing recommendations regarding future operations and funding levels for the project.

In St. Louis the Impact Evaluation Plan for a project has typically been developed during the project's first award period. Preliminary evaluation results and a field review of the project are used to make decisions regarding funding for a second award period. During the second period, if there is one, a full-scale technical evaluation of the project is conducted. The following field review and evaluation report represents the results of a full-scale technical evaluation for a St. Louis Impact project which has completed its second award periods. This report is presented with the related correspondence between project and Region 5 staff.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The specific objectives of the Burglary Prevention (Phase I) project are:

1. Reduce business burglary by 5% in two years and 20% in five years, in conjunction with the operation of other components of the Impact program.
2. Acquire 50 businessmen with the benefits of protecting their premises with alarms.
3. Develop sound selection techniques for installing alarms temporarily based upon police department computer data.
4. Examine the feasibility and requirements of an automated information system on business burglary.
5. To make presentation to 25 business groups on security and burglary prevention.
6. To develop a film presentation for the police officers in-service training program.

The project began on May 15, 1972 and was originally scheduled to terminate on November 15, 1972. However, due to a series of difficulties in obtaining alarm equipment from manufacturers, it was necessary to extend the termination date four times: to 1/31/73, 3/1/73, and 10/1/73. This equipment was finally delivered on 11/12/73 and Phase I may now be closed out.

A field review of this project was accomplished by Region 5 staff on November 20, 1972, at which time all significant programmatic activities had been set in motion except for those which required the utilization of the aforementioned equipment. The use of this equipment will be a part of the scope of the Phase II grant.

For these reasons the emphasis of this report will center on Phase II and rely on the previous field review of the Phase I activities.

The specific objectives of the Burglary Prevention (Phase I) project are:

1. Reduce business burglary by 5% in the first two years and by 20% in five years.
2. Conduct approximately 1,000 surveys of businesses.
3. Acquire and install wireless alarm at selected businesses. Alarms will remain at each selected site for a period averaging 60 days.
4. Install the ten dialer alarms at approximately twenty different sites during this phase of the project.

5. Give burglary prevention lectures to the Department's In-Service Training classes. (2,500 commissioned personnel.)
6. Upon request, conduct surveys of those businesses requested by the Small Business Administration.

The project began on March 1, 1973 and was originally scheduled to terminate on September 3, 1973. However, it was necessary to extend the termination date to December 31, 1973. The project is now expected to proceed without further major delays.

The evaluation of this project is being carried out by the St. Louis High Impact Evaluation Unit and is included in this report.

FINDINGS:

A. Significant Activities implemented:

1) All budgeted equipment has finally been delivered and may now be utilized by the Burglary Prevention Unit.

2) On February 1, 1973 Burglary Prevention Unit personnel began their formal lecture series in the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department In-Service Training Program and have, to date, addressed 46 classes on burglary prevention. These lectures total approximately 92 hours exclusive of preparation time. The series will continue through April 18, 1974. An average of 25 police officers attend each of these lectures.

3) Since March 1, 1973, Burglary Prevention Unit personnel have spoken to 29 business and civic groups such as the American Association of Retired People and the Kiwanis Club. Furthermore, Sgt. Broaders and Ptn. Ward have appeared on radio and television programs a total of five times during this period.

4) During Phase II 1,530 surveys of local businesses have been carried out, mostly by overtime patrolmen. The original subgrant period ran from March 1, 1973 through September 30, 1973. During this time 1,163 surveys were accomplished as compared to 1,000 which were called for in the application.

5) A sample of 300 businesses surveyed by BPU were burglarized 587 times during the twelve-month period prior to being surveyed and only 250 times in the 12 months after being surveyed. No cause and effect relationship is being implied; however, these figures may serve as a...
rough indicator of the value of the services provided by this project. The High Impact Evaluation Unit has explored this area more fully in their report (Appendix).

6) The Impact Evaluation Unit at the Central Police District is in the process of plotting areas in which burglaries are highly probable. This information will be used by BPU personnel to determine where alarm devices will be installed.

B. Below are listed areas of deficiencies or areas that could be improved which would strengthen the program.

1) There has been a great time lag between project inception and delivery of equipment.

2) The dialer alarms funded by the Phase I grant and in use in Phase II operations seem to be far inferior to the more sophisticated portable (wireless) alarm equipment funded by the Phase II grant.

3) The new alarm transmitters were manufactured without a carrier signal (coded squelch) compatible to the Metropolitan Police Department's radio system. This has resulted in further delay while the equipment is being modified.

C. Impact evaluation indicates project is succeeding in reducing burglary rates and increasing clearance rates for surveyed businesses. Details of the evaluation are given in the Appendix; a summary follows:

1) Over the period 1965-1973 non-residential burglary in St. Louis peaked in 1969 and has dropped steadily since then, except for a slight increase expected for 1973. The city-wide impact of the Burglary Prevention Unit's activities is not yet observable in city-wide non-residential burglary totals, but may become clearer as the number of surveyed businesses comes to represent a more substantial fraction of the business sites in the city.

2) The Unit has almost tripled its survey rate (measured in businesses surveyed per month) under the Impact Program, compared to its rate for the period prior to Impact.

3) The total number of businesses surveyed up to October 1, 1973 is 2785. The relative change in the burglary rate for these businesses, comparing the rate since the survey to the rate for the year preceding the survey, amounts to a remarkable 41.5 percent decrease. When compared to the city-wide trend for non-residential burglaries, the decrease amounts to 45.6 percent.

4) The business burglary rate as a function of survey age (time elapsed since the survey was conducted) is fairly erratic, but a relationship is apparent between the rate before survey and survey age. Those businesses whose surveys are the oldest appear to have the highest before-survey rates. This is because the businesses were selected to be surveyed on the basis of their burglary history, beginning with those with the highest burglary rates. Consequently, these businesses also have, in general, the greatest burglary rate reductions following their survey.

5) An analysis of 217 businesses not surveyed by the Unit, each selected as a "control business" matched to one of a sample of the surveyed businesses, indicates that no significant changes in burglary rates are being experienced by non-surveyed businesses. This lends further support to the conclusion that burglary rate reductions at surveyed businesses are due to the activities of this project.

6) An estimate of the number of business burglaries "prevented" at surveyed businesses during the 21-month period from January 1, 1972 to October 1, 1973 was obtained by projecting the burglary rate of surveyed businesses during the year before survey into the period since the survey and subtracting the number of burglaries actually experienced during that period at the surveyed businesses. The results indicate an impressive 755 burglaries "prevented". Using the average figure for burglary dollar losses at surveyed businesses since their surveys, this amounts to "prevented" losses of about $230,000 (not counting the cost of police services, or subsequent business costs related to filing insurance claims, etc.)
CONCLUSION

This project is operating within the guidelines set forth in the original grant application. Its impact on the target crime of business burglary is clearly demonstrated by the very encouraging reductions in burglary rates and increases in clearance rates for surveyed businesses.

In fact, thecrime specific impact of this project appears greater than any of the other Impact projects evaluated to date.

While the project is operating quite well with respect to its burglary survey objectives, many of the other services proposed have not yet been fully implemented due to the difficulty in acquiring the full complement of alarm equipment.

The same delay in receiving and putting this equipment into operation has been experienced in both the Phase I and Phase II grants. It is understood that a transaction involving technical equipment may give rise to complex problems. However, it would seem that some sort of coordination should have been effected to eliminate the delay in receipt of Phase II equipment, especially after the experience of Phase I.

The dialer alarm equipment purchased under the Phase I grant is definitely inferior to the portable (wireless) alarm cases utilized in Phase II and the project personnel have pointed out serious limitations in the older, less sophisticated dialers.

A survey taken in 1971 showed that of approximately 22,000 alarms initiated between January 1, 1971 and October 1, 1971, over 19,000 turned out to be false. There is no indication that the dialer contributes to a reduction in the rate of false alarms. Therefore, it would seem that more care should have been exercised in selecting this equipment. Not one on-site burglary apprehension has been made due to dialer alarms. The new wireless equipment should cut false alarms to a minimum and significantly improve on-site burglary apprehension rates.

The service provided by the Burglary Prevention Unit is far superior to that offered by private alarm companies which merely rent or sell their alarm devices to businesses and then call the police when an alarm is triggered at their headquarters. The Burglary Prevention Unit offers much faster service and also makes alarms available to small businesses which could not otherwise afford them.

It is recommended that any future purchases of equipment made on the present or subsequent grants be more carefully administered to prevent further delay and technical difficulties in implementing project objectives.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

The evaluation and review staff would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Burglary Prevention Unit staff, and Mr. Barry Weismantle and the staff of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Impact Evaluation Unit, especially in connection with collection of activity and crime data.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

On the basis of the Impact evaluation analyses and the field review of this project, the following recommendations are made:

1) The Unit consider expanding its survey activities sufficiently to approximately double the number of surveys per month being made under Phase II. It is understood that such an increase would require an increase in the project's personnel resources.

2) The Unit, together with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Impact Evaluation Unit, and the MLEC-Region 5 High Impact Evaluation Unit, develop a plan to study the reasons for increased clearance rates for burglaries at surveyed businesses.

3) A study be conducted by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, in conjunction with the Burglary Prevention Unit, to develop and examine alternative plans for the integration of Unit activities into Police Department operations and budgeting so the Department will have a sound basis for a decision regarding whether or not to continue Unit activities (and at what level) at the end of Phase III.
The planning effort may include the following activities:

a. Identification of alternative manning levels for continued operation, and associated costs.

b. Plans for experimental operation at various manning levels under study during the second half of Phase III, to permit refinement of operation plans prior to the end of the award period.

c. Planning relating to any public or internal information activities which may be required at the end of the project (e.g., to explain changes in operations or discontinuance to the public and to the project personnel).

4) Refunding the Burglary Prevention Unit project for Phase III is recommended at a level sufficient to permit operation at the proposed increased rate of surveys.

APPENDIX

EVALUATION: BURGLARY PREVENTION UNIT

Figure 1 shows the number of non-residential burglaries reported annually to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department for the years 1965 through 1973. After peaking at over 8000 in 1969, the number of reported incidents dropped to fewer than 6000 in 1972. An estimate for 1973, based on data for January through September, indicates a slight increase over 1972.

The number of non-residential sites in the city is not known. City of St. Louis business license statistics indicate that there are about 14,000 licensed businesses in operation (with no data being available on unlicensed businesses). Since its inception, the Burglary Prevention Unit has surveyed over 2700 businesses. While this is a substantial accomplishment, it appears unreasonable to expect a clearly indicated decrease in city-wide, non-residential burglary as yet, since probably fewer than 10 percent of the non-residential sites have been surveyed. Consequently, the best test of survey effectiveness at the moment is examination of the burglary experience of the surveyed sites only, comparing burglary rates prior to and following the survey.

Figure 2 indicates current trends in city-wide, non-residential burglary rates. The periods indicated are related to Burglary Prevention Unit grant periods. In each case, the burglary rate for the period shown is compared to the same period one year earlier. For example, the 2.6 percent decrease shown for Phase I (the project's initial award period under the Impact Program) results from comparing the rate for the period from July 1, 1972 to March 1, 1973 to the rate for the period from July 1, 1971 to March 1, 1972.

The figure shows a slight increase in city-wide totals for non-residential burglaries during Phase II, in spite of the overwhelming decrease in the burglary rate measured for surveyed businesses, which will be seen in subsequent figures. Figure 2 indicates the same reversal in city-wide crime trends shown on an annual basis in Figure 1.

Figure 3 indicates the number of businesses surveyed each month for the period from January, 1972 through August, 1973. The number of surveys per month, which average 69 during the "pre-Impact" period in 1972, increased to an average of 142 during Phase I, and increased again to an average of 182 in that portion of Phase II for which data was available. In short, the project has almost tripled its survey rate under the Impact Program, compared to its rate for the period prior to Impact.

Figure 4 presents survey and burglary rate information by police district and city-wide.
Number of Non-Residential Burglaries Reported Annually (City-Wide)

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Figure 1

*1973 total is estimated from data for January through September.

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Time Periods

Phase I (7-1-72 to 3-1-73): project's first award period under Impact Program
Phase II (3-1-73 to 10-1-73): second award period under Impact, up to data cut-off date of 10-1-73
A (7-1-71 to 3-1-72): same as Phase I, but one year earlier
B (3-1-72 to 10-1-72): same as Phase II, but one year earlier

Percent Change in Non-Residential Burglaries Reported in the Indicated Period, Compared to the Same Period One Year Earlier (City-Wide)

Figure 2
Figure 3

![Chart showing number of businesses surveyed by month (City-Wide)](chart)

### Figure 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Number of Businesses Surveyed up to Oct. 1, 1973</th>
<th>District-Wide Non-Residential Burglary Trend, Nov. 1 to Oct. 1, 1972 vs. Mar. 1 to Oct. 1, 1972 (percent change)</th>
<th>Decrease in Burglary Rate for Surveyed Businesses for Period Following Survey Compared to Year Preceding Survey (percent decrease)</th>
<th>Decrease for Surveyed Businesses Relative to District Trend (percent decrease)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>256</td>
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<td>2782</td>
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<td>41.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
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</table>
Column 1 shows the number of initial surveys accomplished in each police district prior to October 1, 1973, including those performed during the pre-Impact operations of the Burglary Prevention Unit.

Column 2 indicates the trend in non-residential burglary in each police district for Phase II (obtained by comparing the rates for the period March 1, 1973 to October 1, 1973, to the rates for the same period one year earlier).

Column 3 indicates the decrease in burglary rate for surveyed businesses for the months following their survey compared to the year preceding the survey. The burglary rate was measured in terms of burglaries per business month. Substantial decreases in the burglary rates of surveyed businesses were found in all police districts, ranging in value from 27.1 percent to 66.6 percent, with a city-wide average decrease of 41.5 percent.

In Column 4, the burglary rate decreases for surveyed businesses are given relative to the corresponding district-wide trend for non-residential burglary. These figures may be interpreted as the decrease in burglary rate for surveyed businesses relative to the burglary rate experienced for all non-residential sites in the same district. On a city-wide basis, the 2782 surveyed businesses experienced a burglary rate decrease of 45.6 percent since the date of their survey, compared to the preceding year, when measured against the city-wide trend in non-residential burglary. This truly remarkable impact on the burglary experience of surveyed businesses is marginally inflated by the procedure by which businesses were selected to be surveyed — namely, that most had shown high burglary rates in the recent past. In mathematical terms, this will make the burglary rate for the year preceding the survey look marginally higher for these businesses than if the one-year period had been chosen at random (it is not, however, based on the supposed "truth" that high burglary rates one year mean low rates the next, since this has not proven out in actual experience). The extent to which this phenomenon effects the present results is unknown, but the magnitude of the burglary reductions are so large that it is most unlikely that they could be due to the inflation effect alone.

Figure 5 indicates the variation in the average burglary rate for surveyed businesses (measured in burglaries per business per month) as a function of survey age (measured by the number of months elapsed since the survey); also shown is the variation in average burglary rate for the year prior to the survey as a function of survey age. The graph was constructed to attempt to answer two questions:

-Does the burglary rate for surveyed businesses drop for successive months following the survey due to...
increased compliance with recommendations made in
the survey report? and,
-Were the businesses surveyed when the project first
began, ones with higher burglary rates than those
surveyed later in the project (as measured by the
rate of burglaries in the year preceding the survey)?

The answer to the first question is found by examining the shaded
part of the graph. No clear trend in burglary rate since the survey is
in evidence, although businesses surveyed 17 to 21 months prior to the
10-1-73 data cutoff date seem to show lower rates than those whose sur-
evage is not a great. The answer to the second question may be found
by examining the line topping the unshaded part of the graph. Here a
more definite pattern is indicated — with the burglary rate for the
year preceding the survey increasing almost uniformly with increases in
the survey age. Apparently, the businesses surveyed when the project
first began were those having shown the most serious burglary histories
at that time; as these were completed by the Unit, they moved on to other
businesses with progressively less serious (but significant) burglary
histories.

Another approach to examining the effect of the surveys on the
burglary rate for surveyed businesses, as a function of the survey age,
is shown in Figure 6. This graph depicts the percent decrease in burg-
lary rate for surveyed businesses, comparing the burglary rate since the
survey (for the number of months indicated by the survey age) with the
rate for the same set of businesses for the year preceding their surveys.
The graph indicates progressively greater burglary rate reductions with
increasing survey age, although the curve is fairly erratic. This re-
sult may be partially explained by the more serious burglary histories
of those businesses surveyed early in the project, compared with those
surveyed later on, but it may also be true that progressive compliance
with survey recommendations has led to fewer and fewer burglaries in the
later months following the surveys.

In order to determine the extent to which burglary reductions in
surveyed businesses might be due to more wide-spread burglary reductions
in their neighborhoods (i.e., local trends), a sample of 217 non-surveyed
businesses was selected and studied. The selection procedure involved
locating a business in the neighborhood of a surveyed business (using a
reverse telephone directory), confirming that it had never been surveyed
by the Unit, and assigning it a hypothetical "survey date" identical to
that of the neighboring surveyed business to which it was paired. This
procedure was carried out for every twelfth surveyed business. An anal-
ysis of burglary rates during the year preceding, and the months follow-
ing the hypothetical "surveys" for this control group of non-surveyed
businesses was then made and compared to a similar analysis for the
The results are presented in Figure 7. While the surveyed businesses experienced a 41.5 percent decrease in their burglary rate after being surveyed, the control group showed virtually no change (a 1.1 percent increase). In short, this analysis indicates that the burglary reductions for surveyed businesses are almost certainly due to the impact of the surveys, and not to general burglary rate reductions in their neighborhoods.

Figure 8 is based on only those surveys conducted between January 1, 1972 and October 1, 1973. During that period 2714 businesses were surveyed. The district-wide totals are shown in Column 1.

Column 2 presents estimates of the number of burglaries "prevented" at surveyed businesses since the date of the survey. For each district a projected number of burglaries is obtained by multiplying the average burglary rate for the year before survey (in burglaries per surveyed business per month) by the cumulative number of survey months for the district (the sum of the number of months since survey for each surveyed business in the district). The number of burglaries "prevented" is obtained by subtracting the actual number of burglaries since the survey date from the projected number.

By multiplying the number of burglaries "prevented" in each district by the average dollar loss per actual burglary since the survey date, the total dollar amount "saved" is estimated for each district. (Column 3)

Column 4 contains changes in clearance rates, obtained by comparing the clearance rate for those burglaries occurring at surveyed businesses since the date of the survey to the clearance rate for burglaries occurring at those businesses the year before survey. As shown in the row labeled Total (City-Wide), an increase of 53.5 percent is indicated by the data (from an average clearance rate of about 30 percent prior to the surveys to an average rate of about 45 percent since the surveys). From the data at hand it was not possible to pinpoint the reasons for this very favorable increase in the clearance rate. Possible reasons might include greater cooperation by surveyed businesses in regard to investigations of burglaries at those sites, and an increase in arrests arising from improved security equipment at those businesses.
MISSOURI LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE COUNCIL
REGION 5
812 OLIVE, SUITE 1032
SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI 63101
314-421-2329

January 22, 1974

Colonel Theodore McNeal
St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
1200 Clark Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63103

Re: Burglary Prevention
(Phase II)

Dear Colonel McNeal:

Please reference your letter of January 16, 1974 in response to the
MLEAC - Region 5 Program and Fiscal Review of the above-cited
project.

This is to acknowledge acceptance of your response as sufficient
to resolve the deficiencies noted, both programmatic and fiscal.
Documentation in support of the corrective action taken to resolve
the referenced discrepancies should be maintained for future audit
reviews by Region 5, the State Planning Agency, or LEAA Federal
auditors per Federal and State guidelines.

Please accept my thanks for the aid and assistance provided by
yourself and your staff in accomplishing this review.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Executive Director

Floyd D. Richards

cc: Messrs. Grimes
Heinecke
Gruensfelder
Taylor
Mr. Floyd Richards  
Executive Director  
Region 5 - MLEAC  
812 Olive St., Suite 1032  
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Dear Mr. Richards:  

Re: Burglary Prevention (Phase II)

The following is a response to the field review and evaluation report submitted by Region 5 for the Burglary Prevention Impact grants (Phase I and II).

Field Review Report

Background Information

All background information is correct as stated in the report.

Findings

Section A.1 is not totally correct. All budgeted equipment in Phase I has been delivered but delivery of the RF (Radio Frequency) alarms budgeted in Phase II has not been completely fulfilled. All other findings were correct.

Conclusions

The delay in receiving and implementing the RF alarm equipment did not involve a lack of coordination. The delay has resulted because of technical problems encountered with the interfacing of alarm equipment into the Department's radio system. The experience encountered in Phase I did not aid the Burglary Prevention Unit (BPU) in Phase II, since the equipment in each phase was purchased from different suppliers, each system posing its own problems.

The dialer alarm is inferior due to the method of reporting. The dialer reports the intrusion message over telephone wires while the RF alarms report via radio frequency. The dialer is also easily defeated because of the method of reporting.

False alarms are caused mainly by the type of detection sensor employed. In Phase I, portable ultrasonic detectors were used with the dialers. These detectors are sensitive and have been activated by numerous extraneous noises such as bells, sirens, ringing telephones, space heaters and blowers. In Phase II, the BPU utilized some pulsed infra-red detectors which have proved to be highly resistant to false alarms.

There were no apprehensions on alarmed sites mainly because of the slow reporting of the dialer through the switchboard, coupled with the response of the dispatched vehicle, provides ample time for the hit and run type burglar.

It has been the BPU's experience (which also accounts for the absence of arrests) that as soon as alarms are installed in a business the burglaries usually cease. This could be the result of false reporting on the part of some merchants; a cessation by employees who had been committing the offense; the owner letting it be known he has an alarm.

Recommendations

1. Increasing the number of surveys to double the amount of Phase II would require an estimated 240 hours overtime per week. This is 120 hours a week more than what was used in Phase II and 90 hours more than the Phase III request.

If the number of surveys are to be doubled, it will be necessary to recruit and train more officers in Burglary Prevention. Availability of vehicles could be a problem but an investigation is now in progress to lease vehicles for Burglary Prevention survey work.

2. The indicated increase in clearance rates of business burglaries that have been surveyed by BPU is a very interesting by-product of this project. The Department will cooperate with the Region 5 High Impact Evaluation Unit in studying this phenomenon.
3. As of this writing, definite plans to address the planning effort under item number three in the recommendations has not been settled. This recommendation has been brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Impact Funds Committee, Mr. Thomas O'Farty, on Tuesday, January 15, 1974. It is his intention to hold several planning meetings in the next several weeks to address the subject of planning efforts for all Impact projects. The results of these meetings will be forwarded to Region 5 and the Crime Commission.

4. The Phase III Burglary Prevention grant application was submitted to Region 5 on December 12, 1973. The amount of overtime hours requested for survey work was 150 hours per week. This was an increase of 30 hours over Phase II. It is anticipated that some additional evening hours will be needed to monitor and install the new radio frequency alarms.

Fiscal Findings and Analysis

The Budget and Finance Section of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department maintains that the present duty roster system employed by the Department does meet LEAA standards (see attachment). The duty roster system is the generally accepted practice of the Department and does support the time and attendance of individual employees. The following information can be found on the duty roster:

- a. Vacation
- b. Holidays
- c. Recreation
- d. Sick Leave
- e. Death Furlough
- f. Furlough w/o Pay
- g. Furlough with Pay
- h. Leave
- i. Sick injured
- j. Travel
- k. Suspended

Any overtime claimed must be signed by a commander. To implement a time sheet system for the recording of overtime personnel would mean an unnecessary increase in paperwork for the Department.

Sincerely,

T. D. McNeal
President
**PROJECT SUMMARY**

**PROJECT TITLE:** Denver Court Diagnostic Center

**GRANT NUMBER:** 72-IC-0005-44

**PROJECT OBJECTIVE:** To provide the services of psychological and psychiatric evaluations for probationers and parolees and to test the efficacy of a diagnostic service specifically for Impact target offenders.

**PROJECT DIRECTOR:** George A. Manerbino

**HOST AGENCY:** Denver County Court

City and County Building

Denver, Colorado

**DATE OF AWARD:** 25 October 1972

**PERIOD OF AWARD:** 1 November 1972 - 31 October 1973

**FUNDING:**

- Federal Share: $41,457
- Local Share: $13,885
- Total Project Amount: $55,342

This project proposes to assist in the reduction of the incidence of Impact target crimes through better understanding of the individuals who commit these crimes and the consequent development of more relevant sentencing and supervision practices. A secondary objective of the project includes determining the relevancy of providing similar evaluation services for those committing lower priority crimes, then relating this to clearly preventive correctional work. A third objective will be the demonstration of a cooperative effort involving four autonomous correctional agencies.
INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT

For the Period
January 1, 1973 - September 30, 1973

DENVER CRIME COUNCIL

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT

The County Court Diagnostic Center project provides psychological, social and psychiatric diagnostic information for the Colorado Parole Department and the District Court Probation Departments for felons in the Denver Criminal Justice System. The staff consists of two psychologists (part-time), one psychiatrist (part-time), two administrative interns (full-time) and one secretary (full-time). Referrals for a diagnostic evaluation come from probation officers writing a pre-sentence report on those already convicted and from parole and probation officers of those on active parole or probation status. The decision as to whether or not the individual is to receive a diagnostic evaluation is made by the individual parole or probation officer. Upon occasion a judge will also request this service. With the increasing activity of the Intensive Parole and Probation Supervision Project (Grant No. 72-IC-0008-(1)-64), the psychologist for that project has been referring many of the individual clients in that project to the diagnostic center.

The diagnostic evaluation consists of a battery of tests administered and interpreted by the staff of two psychologists, an interview with a psychiatrist (for most clients) and a report on the results of the testing and the interview. This report (summary and interpretation of the tests and psychiatrist’s interview) is made part of the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation officer. For referrals already on probation or parole the diagnostic report (which may or may not include an interview with the psychiatrist) goes to the caseworker (parole or probation officer) or to the psychologist with the Intensive Supervision Project.

The battery consists of instruments designed to measure:

1. Intellectual functioning
2. Brain damage
3. Psychological and psychiatric symptomology
4. Educational achievement levels
5. Self-concept
Among the tests routinely used are:

1. Wechsler Memory Scale
2. Hooper Visual Organization Scale
3. IPAT (Cultural Fair Test of Intelligence)
4. Wide Range Achievement Test
5. Semantic Differential Test of Self-Concept
6. The Hand Test
7. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)
8. Incomplete Sentences Test
9. Mooney Problem Checklist
10. Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
11. Draw-a-Person Test

Other tests are sometimes given to clients with known or suspected alcohol or drug problems or suspected brain damage. In addition, a questionnaire on prior criminal history, drug and alcohol use is given to all clients. A fact sheet containing personal and demographic information (including previous hospitalization) is filled out for each client. Approximately 75% of the clients are also interviewed by the psychiatrist on the project.

Reports based on the diagnostic information are written by the psychologist and a separate report is written by the psychiatrist. These reports are included in the pre-sentence report or sent to the person requesting the evaluation (probation officer, parole officer, judge, supervisor). Often there is consultation between the psychologist and/or psychiatrist and the person requesting the diagnostic evaluation. The entire procedure (testing, scoring, report writing, consultation) takes between one and two days for each client.

OBJECTIVES

The major goal of the County Court Diagnostic Center is to help reduce the incidence of Impact crimes through a better understanding of the individuals who commit these crimes in terms of sentencing and supervision practices.

Other objectives are:

1. Provide the services of psychological and psychiatric evaluation for the Denver District Court Probation Department and Colorado Department of Parole.
2. Demonstrate cooperative efforts among four autonomous criminal justice agencies.
3. Develop profiles based on the test, background and criminal history data for Impact offenders as a group and for offenders with each of the four Impact offenses. Profiles, based on similar data, will also be developed for clients who have lesser offenses who will be matched with Impact offenders upon selected demographic characteristics. Differences and similarities will be assessed.

The last objective gives the project a specific research function in addition to operational and organizational functions.

Data on the crime reduction objective is not available at this time. The influence, both direct and indirect, of the diagnostic information on crime reduction among those diagnosed will be extremely difficult to isolate. Comparison groups of similar offenders who have not received diagnostic evaluations are not readily available, and controlling for similar experiences in the criminal justice system would be impossible. Nevertheless, follow-up on recidivism (arrest and judicial processing) will be done for those with a diagnostic evaluation (both for pre-sentence purposes and for those on active parole and probation). Comparison groups will be developed, if possible, from those offenders not receiving the diagnostic services, keeping in mind the factors, not controlled, which may influence any differences in recidivism statistics. Any serious follow-up recidivism study must also look at differential decisions (sentencing, parole, and parole supervision decisions) which may be influenced by the diagnostic information and compare these decisions to ones made for similar offenders without a diagnostic evaluation. Although data will be collected regarding follow-up recidivism as part of this project, direct and unambiguous assessment of the effects of diagnostic information on recidivism cannot be obtained within the limitations of this project. However, the acceptance of diagnostic information by practitioners (administrators, judges, prison personnel, probation and parole officers, etc.) may eventually lead to studies which can more directly assess the effects of diagnostic information about offenders on recidivism. The research function of this project (see Objective 3, Page 3) may also lead to activities in the future which can be assessed in terms of prevention of impact and/or reduction of impact offense recidivism.
Most of the data to be presented will be concerned with the objective of providing psychological and psychiatric evaluations of offenders for the Denver District Court Probation Department and the Colorado Department of Parole. The County Court Diagnostic Center has been established and functioning since January 15, 1973. The number of clients referred and tested during the first two quarters (January - June) were lower than expected. A total of 40 clients were referred during this period. Starting in July the number of clients took a dramatic turn upward with 21 referrals. A total of 19 offenders were referred in August and 27 in September. Through the end of September 1973 a total of 106 clients have been referred.* (See Figure 1). The project estimates that there will be approximately 10 referrals per week from now on and are asking for another psychologist and intern. The sharp increase in referrals in July coincided with the opening of two of the three satellite parole and probation centers which are part of the Intensive Parole and Probation Supervision Project (Grant No. 72-IC-0-08-64). The parole and probation officers operating from these offices as well as the psychologist associated with the project have shown a great willingness to refer their clients to the Center. Most of the clients in this project who are taking part in the group counseling are now being referred to the center by the project psychologist. The increase in referrals may also be influenced by the greater knowledge and acceptance of the Center's services by judges, administrators and intake probation officers as well as staff in the Intensive Supervision Project.

According to the data supplied by the project, a total of 68.7% of the clients show an impact or impact-related offense (possession of burglary tools, criminal menacing, 3rd degree assault, etc.) as the original charge, current charge or during sometime in their past history. Only 19.2% of the clients showed an impact offense at a previous time only, while 19.2% had an impact offense either as the current charge or the original charge. Common charges among non-impact offenders receiving diagnostic services were theft, drug offenses and forgery. Most of the clients have been on probation, on parole or awaiting a probate hearing.

In order to assess the acceptance and the use of the diagnostic information, a special study was undertaken in August and early September by Dr. James H. Bridges of the School of Social Work of Denver University who is the research consultant to the project. The acceptance and use of the Center's diagnostic and consultative services

*Several referrals had not been tested by the end of September but will be in the near future.
is important in evaluating both Objectives One and Two listed on Page 3. Dr. Bridges conducted telephone or personal interviews (semi-structured and unstructured) with 46 people including the five judges who hear criminal cases (one interview done with the judge's clerk only), all six members of the center's staff, three probation and parole administrators, 29 probation and parole officers (including those who had not referred, as well as those who had referred clients to the center) and three supervisors who had not referred clients directly. In addition, the study included a postcard survey of those who had referred clients. A postcard questionnaire was sent to the referring personnel along with the diagnostic report. Mail questionnaires identical to that of the postcard questionnaires were sent to those who had referred clients previous to the initiation of the postcard survey. The major questions to which these surveys (interviews and mail questionnaires) were directed: "Was the service of the Diagnostic Clinic proving to be of help to District Court judges and to parole and probation officers, and would there be sufficient future demand for the services to justify continued support by Impact Crime Funds?"

As of early September, 61 responses were received to the postcard and mail questionnaires sent to those who referred clients. This total included individual parole and probation staff responding more than once. About half of the cases were referred for disposition (pre-sentence) and half for supervision-related information (for clients already under probation or parole supervision). Of the 61 responses (not 61 different individuals): 46% considered the diagnostic evaluation very helpful; 44% considered it to be somewhat helpful; and only 10% of the responses stated that the diagnostic evaluation was of little or no help.* (See Table 1).

Professor Bridges included selected comments made by those responding to the postcard or mail questionnaire. Among those comments which reflected the direct utility of the diagnostic evaluation are:

*It should be noted that these percentages are based on officers who referred clients for diagnostic evaluation and perhaps would be expected to be initially favorable or prone to be favorable to the diagnostic report. In addition, several officers are responding more than once. Their second and third response is also, on an a priori basis, likely to be favorable for the second, third, etc., referral. It should also be noted that only 9 of 43 parole and probation officers (excluding supervisors and administrators) who could have, did not refer clients. Thus, a large percent of the probation and parole officers referred clients and are represented among the responses to the mail survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE OF HELP</th>
<th>NUMBER OF RESPONSES</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY HELPFUL</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMEWHAT HELPFUL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF LITTLE OR NO HELP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"The evaluation was helpful in that it indicated that the proclivities of the defendant which along with the evidence shown at trial and the information contained in the regular probation report, substantially helped me in deciding on the sentence." (This comment was made by a judge who referred the client.)

"The evaluation was of help because of the fact that it showed the client would not be responsive to directed psychiatric care. It also showed the need for closer ties and understanding between him and his father. An understanding has been reached between the two and they have reconciled a lot of differences."

"The evaluation caused me to change my methods of supervising this man, and he has responded better to a helping method rather than a harsh enforcement method."

"It confirmed my opinion that was not in need of extensive therapy. It was brought out that she could handle the fact that she is a homosexual and was really quite comfortable living and working as a man. After the evaluation I was able to understand this, and the client and I were able to discuss it openly."

Some of the few negative comments to the diagnostic evaluation on the questionnaire were:

"Gave no direction, showed what I already knew and gave me very little in concrete matter to deal with." 

"I would like to see your people recommend possible options regarding an individual's court situation."

"Would have appreciated receiving some specific clarification for failure to recommend ongoing mental health counseling."

It can be seen that at least for a few officers and a judge the diagnostic evaluation appeared to be very relevant in decision-making about the client and provided meaningful guidelines for direct action.

Telephone interviews with the directors of the Probation and Parole Departments showed a very positive opinion of the Center's service. There were no problems indicated by these men with regard to the evaluations or the procedures. Both directors thought that the referrals from their organizations would increase.

Three of the five judges who hear criminal cases had used the services of the Center. The two others raised legal issues. One said he would use the Center only upon request of the defendant's attorney, and the other on the initiative of the defendant himself. It was the opinion of the interviewer that these two judges were not familiar with the details of the service provided by the Center. The three who had used the Center's services were positive and two of the judges who were asked whether or not the evaluations influenced their dispositions answered in the affirmative.

Three division supervisors of the District Court Probation Department were interviewed. All three were very positive about the quality of service provided and the need of the department that this service was meeting. Supervisors as well as other interviewees stressed the need for obtaining diagnostic evaluations of offenders held in the County Jail. No other procedural problems were mentioned.

Twenty-four of the parole and probation officers who had referred at least one client to the Center were interviewed, including supervisors of the satellite Centers of the Intensive Parole and Probation Supervision Project. Eighteen (18) or 75% of those interviewed said the diagnostic evaluation was very helpful or helpful, while six (6) thought they were not very helpful or not helpful at all (25%). The percent of those officers interviewed who were favorable was smaller than that in the mail questionnaire and the number unfavorable was greater (25% vs 10%). The mail and postcard questionnaire data was based on the number of responses received not on separate individuals as for the interviews.

Of the six officers who responded negatively to the utility of the diagnostic evaluation, several said they would like to see more concrete suggestions in the report. A few also had some positive opinions concerning the diagnostic evaluations. Four of the six officers who were generally negative were investigating probation officers who prepare pre-sentence reports.

Eighteen of the 24 officers interviewed said that the evaluations made a difference in the disposition or handling of the case. There were only a few complaints about procedures and general satisfaction with the Center's staff in terms of cooperation, concern and interest. In regard to clients' reaction to the testing procedures, the majority of officers said there had been no overt reaction, but a large minority indicated that the clients had expressed frustration with the length of the testing.
Sixty-three percent of the 24 officers indicated that center hours should be extended into the evening mainly because many clients work during the day (See Table 3). Fifty-four percent of the 24 officers said they would increase their rates of referrals, 38% said they would refer clients at the same rate as before, and 8% were undecided (See Table 2).

Four of the nine officers who could have referred clients, but had not, were interviewed. All were parole officers and all seemed positive toward the Center. They all said that they intended to refer clients in the future.

In summary, Dr. Bridges' study showed acceptance of the Diagnostic Center by a large majority of those who had used the services as well as positive feelings from some personnel who had not used the Center. Many officers who make pre-sentence and supervision decisions felt the diagnostic evaluation useful and influential. Among those who were generally negative, several indicated that the diagnostic report could be of use if more specific suggestions were made. Three of the five judges were well aware of the Center's functions and had used the evaluations. Top administrators of the District Court Probation and Parole Department were very favorable toward the diagnostic services. There were strong indications from the interviews for expansion of the diagnostic services to those offenders held in County Jail. A little more than half of the parole and probation officers indicated that they would refer more clients to the Center in the future. There were very few expressed procedural difficulties and the overall relationships among the County Court Probation, District Court Probation and Colorado Department of Parole revolving around the County Court Diagnostic Center appeared to be proceeding smoothly with no obvious inter-organizational conflicts.

With regard to the research objectives—the development of profiles of impact offenders and comparison of these profiles with non-impact offenders—no data has been analyzed so far. The analyses will be done during the second year of the project when a large enough number of clients have been tested and have had data recorded to develop stable profiles. Both background data and test data will be used. In addition, the second year of the project will provide data on the influence of diagnostic information on sentencing and supervision decisions and perhaps evidence relating to the role of these decisions on recidivism.

Procedures and instruments for the routine collection of demographic, personal history, criminal history and test data have been developed and are in operation. Fact sheets for the recording of personal,

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anticipated Rate</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater</td>
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<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>63</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
demographic and criminal history information are being used. This information as well as test data are being coded and transferred to punched cards for computer analysis.

It appears as if the County Court Diagnostic Center has been well accepted by most relevant personnel, its products (diagnostic evaluations) are useful for most of the parole and probation officers and some of the judges for sentencing and supervision decisions. There are strong indications of desire for expansion of their activities to include more offenders. Research procedures have been established and data will be available to develop detailed profiles of impact and non-impact offenders based on demographic, historical and psychological test data. This project provides a new service to aid the treatment of serious offenders at various levels of the criminal justice process and should receive continued funding for its expanded activities.
ST. LOUIS

PROJECT SUMMARY

PROJECT TITLE: Foot Patrol
GRANT NUMBER: S-MPL-73-d1

PROJECT OBJECTIVE: To provide Foot Patrol in those geographic areas with the highest incidence of street crimes and suppressible burglaries where suppressible is defined as a crime that could be prevented or interrupted by a cruising patrol car.

PROJECT DIRECTOR: Captain John Walsh
St. Louis Police Department

HOST AGENCY: St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
1200 Clark Avenue
St. Louis, Missouri 63103

DATE OF AWARD: 2 February 1973
PERIOD OF AWARD: 15 January 1973 - 15 September 1973

FUNDING:
Federal Share: $1,000,000
Local Share: $34,248
Total Project Amount: $1,534,248

This project is a continuation of the six-month Foot Patrol project. Foot Patrol will be provided on a city-wide basis for crime prevention. Foot Patrol will be utilized during the hours which have the greatest frequency of the impact crimes of burglary and robbery. High crime areas will receive extensive Foot Patrol while areas with less crime will receive limited amounts of Foot Patrol. The project will consist of three major components: high crime panoramic patrol, omnipatrol and shopping area patrol. All of the Foot Patrol will be performed by officers working on an overtime basis.
INTRODUCTION

Field reviews are conducted for each Impact project at least once each award period. The field review, conducted by staff of the Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council - Region 5, consists of site visits by program, fiscal, and evaluation personnel, and analyses of data relevant to the project. Impact data, called for in each project's evaluation plan and designed to permit study of crime reduction and rehabilitative impacts, are analyzed by the High Impact Evaluation Unit and form the basis for a technical appendix to each review report. The entire report is then used to assist in preparing recommendations regarding future operations and funding levels for the project.

In St. Louis, the Impact Evaluation Plan for a project has typically been developed during the project's first award period. Preliminary evaluation results and a field review of the project are used to make decisions regarding funding for a second award period. During the second period, if there is one, a full-scale technical evaluation of the project is conducted. The following field review and evaluation report represents the results of a full-scale technical evaluation for a St. Louis Impact project which has completed its second award period. An approval of the Foot Patrol Report has been received from the Metropolitan St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners. This approval and related correspondence will be included in a future update of this compendium.

BACKGROUND

In Phase II of its operation, the Impact Foot Patrol project expanded to provide city-wide crime prevention services. Foot Patrol activity was to be targeted on the areas and at the times when the Impact crimes of burglary and robbery occurred with the highest frequency. From its initial phase providing foot patrolmen in six high crime Pauly Blocks, the project was expanded to include three components:

2. Omnipatrol, three "mobilized" foot patrol units which were utilized within the three Area Commands of the St. Louis Police Department.
3. Shopping Area Patrol, a complement of 37 patrol officers utilized on Friday and Saturday nights in 24 shopping districts.
The Phase II deployment of foot patrol was initiated on February 15, 1973. On the basis of the manning pattern described on the grant application, a full complement provided for a total of 771 watches each week or a total of 5,062 patrol hours each week.

In May of 1973, the operations of the project were re-evaluated and a major adjustment was made. A revised manpower allocation system was developed and approved based on 1973 statistics to specifically attack the target impact crimes at the time and place of occurrence. The primary thrust of the revision was to provide a method of reducing daytime residential burglary, which had accounted for the greatest increase in crime in the first three months of 1973. The revised manning pattern provided four types of foot patrol, three of which were designed to reduce a specific type of impact crime:

1. Day Residence Burglary Patrol, which included an eleven man Burglary Reduction Unit operating in casual attire and focusing on areas of high daytime burglary activity.
2. Robbery and Purse Snatching Patrol, operated from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m., six days a week.
3. Nighttime Burglary Patrol, operated from 6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.
4. Shopping Center Patrol, which was retained as originally described in the grant.

The Pauly Blocks to be patrolled by each type of foot patrol were selected on the basis of frequency of the particular type of crime targeted for that patrol. Twenty-two Pauly Blocks were selected for patrol, with some blocks receiving more than one type due to a high ranking in more than one crime category. The new pattern was implemented on May 28, 1973.

Another factor involved in the revision was the inability of the project to man full complements of the patrol patterns originally planned for Phase II. The project was experiencing significant shortfalls (15-30%) in manning the Friday and Saturday night Pauly Block Patrols. Under the revised patrol patterns, the required complements were more easily manned because the total manning rate was significantly reduced. The total number of weekly watches became 662 (as opposed to the former rate of 771) and the number of patrol hours per week became 3,852 (down from 5,062). This represented a 24% reduction in the number of patrol hours manned weekly.

PROGRAMMATIC FINDINGS

Supplementary information on the project and a more detailed evaluation of its benefits are presented in Appendix I. Results of monitoring and evaluation are summarized in the following paragraphs.

1) Data on the manning of each patrol complement is maintained by the Foot Patrol Office. A summary of the manning experience of the project under the revised patrol patterns is attached as Exhibit I.

As indicated in the exhibit, the only patrol with a serious variation from the planned manning rate is the Shopping Center Patrol, which has been undermanned by 26.6%. Because of this problem and a general evaluation of a lack of effectiveness of this component, the Department has plans to drop the Shopping Center Patrol.

Due to overscheduling of officers for the Robbery and Purse Snatching Patrol, this component had an average excess of nearly 8%. The two remaining modalities have been manned within one percent of the planned rates. Overall, the total manpower requirements of the revised patrol methodology have been met with a 1.6% shortage.

2) The activity of each watch conducted on the project is recorded and submitted by the individual officer. This data (number of arrests, field interview reports, building and pedestrian checks, etc.) is summarized and reported on a weekly and monthly basis by the project. A summary of the activity reported in Phase II is provided in Exhibit II.

Most of the data indicated on the daily activity report are reported at the discretion of the individual officers and is not supported by related documentation, (e.g., building and pedestrian checks, business interviews, etc.) Some of the more important data are supported by appropriate documentation, such as arrests and field interview reports.

In order to provide some comparison of the rates of activity experienced under the two types of patrol deployment utilized in Phase II, relative rates of activity have been developed and presented in Exhibit III. Since the number and length of watches was revised, the activity rates have been converted to a "per patrol hour" basis in order to provide a standard basis of comparison. Comparative statistics for selected categories of activity are reflected in Exhibit III.
The data generated regarding patrol activity is utilized by project management for monitoring and control purposes. In addition to its presentation in weekly and monthly reports, this information has been utilized to assess the performance of individual officers on the patrol.

3) The project has developed the basic operating systems required for the management and internal monitoring of grant activity. The major systems under utilization are:

a) application procedure for officers seeking to work under the project, requiring written approval of the applicant's commanding officer and the Project Director

b) scheduling and assignment system. Using the department's recreation schedule as the basis for determining officer availability, a system of assignment to foot patrol duty has been developed and is effectively utilized

c) maintenance of attendance data. Records of individual attendance are maintained in the foot patrol office. The incidence of "no shows" are recorded and suspension from foot patrol duty is utilized as a disciplinary measure for lack of attendance. Attendance verification is obtained by completion of rosters by the lieutenant supervising each shift. Rosters are cross checked against activity sheets submitted by the individual officers. In addition, daily tallies of over and under-manning are maintained for each shift (as described in Item 1 above)

d) operating statistics provided by activity reports. As indicated in Item 2, weekly and monthly reports of foot patrol activity are maintained and utilized for project monitoring.

In addition to the systems described above, the project also maintains a log of pertinent memoranda and correspondence, an "order book" of directives to foot patrol personnel, detailed records of all arrests made by foot patrol officers, and other records and information utilized in project management. The procedures and systems developed for the operation of the project were well-maintained and provided current and relevant information to the project staff.

4) During Phase II, from its start to the end of August, 1973, the number of Pauly blocks patrolled and the number of foot patrol hours per week increased with each change in patrol mode. At the same time, however, the average number of foot patrol manhours per patrolled block per day decreased from 29.4 at the end of Phase I to 14.9 at the end of Phase II (car patrol levels during the foot patrol hours are estimated to have remained constant at about 3 man-hours per block per day). The number of arrests per week per 100 foot patrol manhours remained relatively constant at about 30 percent of the corresponding rate for car patrols.

5) Impact crimes in patrolled areas decreased relative to the city-wide throughout Phase I and Phase II's two periods of patrol operation, but the decrease became progressively smaller as the patrol modes shifted to less concentrated deployment. The type of Impact crime which appears to have been most affected by the Foot Patrol Project is burglary, especially day residence burglary. On the other hand, night business and night residence burglary, and Impact crimes in shopping areas, all selected as targets for foot patrol operations during patrol period II-B, appear to have been the least affected. The capability of foot patrol to reduce crimes against the person varied with the degree of patrol concentration, with the greatest reductions experienced at times when the patrols were most concentrated.

6) No conclusive evidence of displacement of Impact crime from patrol areas to non-patrol areas has been found; however, data from patrol period II-B suggests the possibility of displacement of person crime (especially suppressible person crime) within patrol areas from patrol hours to non-patrol hours.

Conclusions

Phase II of the Foot Patrol project has been implemented in accordance with LEAA, MLEAC, and grant requirements. No significant deviation from approved grant activity or major operating deficiency was noted. Foot patrol activity has been targeted at areas and hours where a high incidence of Impact crime has been reported. Systems have been developed and implemented which provide for effective manning of designated patrol patterns and monitoring of performance.

There are several areas of program operation where a reassessment or re-evaluation is recommended; these areas are:
1) The current method of selection and assignment of foot patrol officers provides for random allotment of available officers to the various foot patrol assignments. Thus, each patrol unit consists of a group of officers (lieutenant, sergeants and patrolmen) from various districts and bureaus within the Department. The randomness of this procedure provides several disadvantages:

a) difficulty in creating and maintaining supervising relationships among officers who do not regularly work with each other.

b) inability to provide specialized foot patrol training for officers used on the patrol. With nearly 1200 men scattered throughout the Department participating, a workable method of reaching participants with some form of specialized training for foot patrol activities has not yet been developed.

c) lack of familiarity by many officers with the areas they patrol under foot patrol assignment. This extends both to the physical and other characteristics of the areas and to the current types of criminal activity being experienced in the target area.

d) a lack of continuity of officers assigned to particular areas and types of patrol.

It is recognized that the manning of over 600 shifts of overtime activity presents a tremendous logistical problem. However, we would recommend some consideration of addressing the problems discussed above in the planning of future foot patrol operations.

2) As indicated above, a substantial change in patrol patterns and philosophy was made in the project in the form of the new deployment implemented May 28, 1973. This revision was made in response to crime statistics for the first three months of 1973 and in order to provide improved targeting on Impact crime. On September 11, 1973 a request for a second revision of patrol plans was submitted to Region 1. This plan is designed to intensify foot patrol coverage due to an apparent lack of effectiveness in Phase II deployment in comparison to Phase I.

As a result of the actions mentioned above, Phase II of the project will have undergone two major changes in patrol philosophy, namely levels and target areas and hours within eight months. Under these circumstances an adequate evaluation of the patrol concept being utilized may be difficult to achieve. With the emphasis on short term data evaluation and retargeting, the results of any underlying patrol concept being tested may not be adequately tested.

3) In response to the question of assumption of financial responsibility for the project, the grant application states that the department will attempt to determine how the foot patrol fits into its regular operations. As it is currently operated, the foot patrol continues to be an "add on" to regular Police Department activity. It is completely separable (budgetary and operationally) from regular department functions.

Due to its size (approximate annual cost of $1.5 million) and its nature, the Foot Patrol has assumed the status of a significant activity of the St. Louis Police Department. The LEAA funding provided by Impact funds are by definition available for only a fixed period. Assuming the project provides benefits sufficient to warrant its continuation, some provision should be made for the integration of the program's concept into regular Department operations.

4) All foot patrol activity data (described in item 2, above) is manually summarized and accumulated from the individual activity reports prepared by each officer. This involves over 600 such reports each week. Since this data is regularly utilized by the project staff in various formats, it might be desirable to consider putting this data on data processing device. It would be possible to produce summaries on the basis of any number of variables (activity for the week, month, by type of patrol, by individual). In addition to relieving the staff of a considerable clerical burden, the additional flexibility would provide for project management a wider range of analytical data.

5) In view of the changing manpower deployment of the project, it might be necessary to re-evaluate the equipment utilization required. For example, under the current patrol pattern, the maximum daily requirements of radios occurs on Friday and Saturday when 73 radios are needed. (The Monday through Thursday requirement is 52 radios.) Due to the different patrol hours involved (one shift from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M., another from 6:30 P.M. to 12:30 A.M.), the maximum number of radios required at any one time is 49. The number of radios purchased and in use is now 87. A re-evaluation of total equipment requirements in view of reduced peak manning levels is, therefore, recommended.

FISCAL REVIEW

The field review was conducted on September 11, 1973, and September 12, 1973. Reese Joiner, MRAE auditor, completed the fiscal segment. His discussions were mainly with Messrs.: Ed Lamwether, Jack Wilburn, and Captain John Walsh, all members of the St. Louis Police Department.
FISCAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A payroll authorization "by exception" system is employed. This system is not considered appropriate for the p.m. shift of LEAA federal grant funds. A procedure should be established whereby staff employees prepare time and attendance reports indicating daily work hours for each pay period. These reports should be signed by the employees and approved by their supervisors.

FISCAL APPRAISAL

An effective accounting system is employed. Fiscal and internal controls are utilized that provide for adequate and full accountability of the receipt, expenditure, and use of federal and non-federal program funds.

Expenditures are made and reports prepared in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Federal and State governments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Patrol manning levels should be returned to a more concentrated level of approximately four patrolmen per Pauly block per watch for at least the first half of Phase III. This will permit more reliable evaluation of the crime reduction capabilities of the patrols.

2. A planning element should be established during the first three months of Phase III to develop and examine alternative plans for the integration of foot patrol activities into Police Department operations and budgeting so that the Department will have a sound basis for a decision regarding whether or not to continue foot patrol at the end of Phase III. The Department may elect to contract with an outside organization (such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police or the Governmental Research Institute) for related consultation and technical assistance.

The planning effort should include the following activities:

a. Identification of alternative modes of foot patrol operations (such as semi-patrol, burglary teams, etc.) and alternative manning levels.

b. Review of the use of foot patrols in other cities. (Include travel plans.)

c. Planning of experimental use of promising patrol modes during the last half of Phase III, using patrol alternatives selected by the planning effort during the first half of Phase III.

d. Examination of the feasibility of computerizing foot patrol activity data.

e. Investigation of solutions to the four problems relating to officer selection and assignment listed on page five, number 1, in the "conclusions" section.

f. Planning relating to a program of public information, to be used if the Department chooses to discontinue foot patrol after Phase III, to explain the discontinuance to the public and to members of the foot patrol project.

g. Planning for future equipment needs, including reallocation of equipment in case of project reduction or termination after Phase III.

3. Consideration should be given to forming a new Impact project to begin a public education and information service for residential burglary prevention measures.

This suggestion is made with two factors in mind: the apparent effectiveness of foot patrol operations with respect to decreasing burglary, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the target hardening operations of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Burglary Prevention Unit (for business burglary reduction).

The purpose of the project would be to continue and extend the residential burglary reductions achieved by foot patrol.

4. Due to the relatively small number of target crimes involved and the apparent ineffectiveness of the night business and residence burglary patrol (6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.) of Phase II-B, these patrols should be reallocated to a different target crime.

5. Evaluation results substantiate the Department's decision to discontinue the shopping center patrols.

6. The selection of Pauly blocks for patrol coverage should be based on total burglary and Index crimes against the person rather than on the subset of these crimes which are classified suppressible. Although foot patrols may be more effective against suppressible crime, the volume of these crimes is very erratic and, therefore, seems to be a poor indicator of the need for foot patrol coverage.

7. Based upon the field review and evaluation, it is recommended that the High Impact Foot Patrol be refunded for Phase III as recommended in the High Impact Plan Update with a federal share of $1,327,937.
FOOT PATROL
Manning Experience
May 28 to August 25, 1973

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of Patrol</th>
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<th>Robbery and Purse Snatching</th>
<th>Nighttime Burglary</th>
<th>Shopping Center</th>
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<td>156</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>662</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Shifts For Period</td>
<td>3510</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>2028</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>8606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Shifts Over or Short for Period</td>
<td>-35</td>
<td>+160</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>-277</td>
<td>-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Over or Short</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>+7.9%</td>
<td>+0.7%</td>
<td>-26.6%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOT PATROL
Summary of Activity Statistics
Under Phase II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2/27/73 thru 5/29/73</th>
<th>5/30/73 thru 9/10/73</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Checks</td>
<td>56,096</td>
<td>48,647</td>
<td>104,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian Checks</td>
<td>20,969</td>
<td>24,110</td>
<td>45,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Interviews</td>
<td>27,731</td>
<td>31,896</td>
<td>59,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Checks</td>
<td>14,849</td>
<td>17,141</td>
<td>31,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist Motorists</td>
<td>5,361</td>
<td>10,363</td>
<td>15,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR's</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>4,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking Tags</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aided Districts</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>2,319</td>
<td>4,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Disturbances</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigated Insecure Buildings</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew Notice Issues</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovered Stolen Vehicles</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXHIBIT II

FOOT PATROL ACTIVITY
COMPARISON OF DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGIES
February 27 to September 1, 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial Deployment</th>
<th>Revised Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period Covered</td>
<td>2/27/73 to 5/29/73</td>
<td>5/30/73 to 9/1/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Weeks</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Patrol Watches per week</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Watches during period</td>
<td>9615</td>
<td>8988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Patrol hours per week*</td>
<td>5062</td>
<td>3852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Patrol hours during period</td>
<td>65,806</td>
<td>53,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTIVITY REPORTED AND COMPARATIVE RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial Deployment</th>
<th>Revised Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Interview Reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate per patrol hour</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate per patrol hour</td>
<td>.00189</td>
<td>.00224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Car Recoveries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate per patrol hour</td>
<td>.0050</td>
<td>.00083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on planned level of manning for both deployment patterns
APPENDIX I

EVALUATION OF THE BENEFITS OF THE FOOT PATROL PROJECT

The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's Foot Patrol Project represents a significant milestone in the continuing effort of law enforcement agencies to improve their capability to reduce crime and to better serve the public. For the first time since foot patrol operations were supplanted by motorized patrols decades ago, a major effort was undertaken to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of concentrated police foot patrols in areas whose emergency service and crime control needs were also being served by motorized patrols.

From the start, the foot patrol operations were well received by both the community and the police officers who manned them. It was felt that a new rapport between police and members of the public was becoming a reality, as officers were no longer isolated by their patrol cars. Improved police-community relations mean greater cooperation from the public in reporting crime and in assisting the police in carrying out their responsibilities.

Fear of crime is a part of everyday life in almost every major city in the country. The effects of this fear are many. Business drops off in neighborhoods where people no longer feel safe. People stay off the streets at night and may feel uncomfortable when walking alone, even during the day. The presence of police officers walking the streets of high crime neighborhoods is a powerful antidote to this fear. People feel safer knowing that help, if needed, is close at hand, and that the potential criminal will have second thoughts about his intended acts when an officer could be standing next to him at any moment.

In conducting its evaluation of the benefits of the Foot Patrol Project, the High Impact Evaluation Unit focused its efforts on measuring the crime reduction impact of the patrols. First, and foremost, the evaluation sought to determine the extent to which Impact crimes could be prevented by the patrols. Would the patrols reduce crime city-wide? Would the patrols be effective in reducing some types of crime more than others? Would crime reductions in patrolled areas be offset by corresponding increases in the neighboring area? All these questions were explored. The results of the analyses, based on the project's evaluation component, are given in the following section.

Many of the other benefits of foot patrol, besides crime reduction, were probably achieved by the Foot Patrol Project. Limited evaluation resources and limited time prevented the explicit measurement of the extent to which these other benefits were achieved. In that regard, the evaluation which follows presents only one facet of the many useful products of this project.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME REDUCTION IMPACT OF THE FOOT PATROL PROJECT

Since the start of foot patrol operations on July 1, 1972, the basic mode of deploying the patrols has been altered twice. In the following analysis an attempt has been made to compare the crime reduction impacts of the patrols during each of the three periods when the modes of deployment were relatively constant. In general, two types of comparisons are made for each period. First, to expose trends in crime rates, the number of crimes committed during each period of patrol deployment are compared with the number committed during the same period one year earlier. The result is expressed as a percentage. For example, during the initial phase of patrol deployment Impact crimes decreased city-wide about one percent compared to the number reported during the same period one year earlier. To test the significance of such crime reductions, the number of crimes reported during the period one year prior to the start of the patrols is compared to the number reported during the corresponding period two years prior to the start of the patrols. Figures such as these, for example, show that Impact crimes decreased city-wide about 4.2 percent during the period one year before the start of the patrols, for the same months as those of the initial deployment mode, compared to the corresponding period two years prior to the initial deployment. Since this decrease is larger than that experienced once the patrols began, it is unlikely that the one percent drop observed once the patrols were underway represents a significant crime decrease attributable to the patrols.

The second type of comparison made relates trends in crime in patrolled areas to city-wide trends for the same time periods. Thus, if crime increases city-wide by 10 percent during a given period, but increases only one percent in the patrolled areas during the same period, this may indicate that the patrols are in fact succeeding (by keeping crime increases to lower levels). The results of these comparisons are also expressed as percentages, which may be interpreted as rates of change in the patrolled areas compared to those city-wide.
experienced city-wide. For the figures just cited (+10% city-wide, +1% for patrolled areas), for example, the percentage computed for the patrolled areas compared to city-wide is -8.2 (i.e., relative to the city-wide increase, the crime trend in the patrol areas has decreased by 8.2 percent). The same procedure is used to test the significance of these percentages as was described above for the first type of comparison; namely, the use of the corresponding percentage computed for the same time periods one and two years prior to the start of the patrols.

The three time periods under study, and the attributes of patrol operations during these periods are summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PATROL PERIOD</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II-A</th>
<th>II-B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot Patrol Dates</td>
<td>7-1-72 to 2-14-73</td>
<td>2-15-73 to 5-28-73</td>
<td>5-29-73 to 9-1-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year earlier</td>
<td>7-1-71 to 2-14-72</td>
<td>2-15-72 to 5-28-72</td>
<td>5-29-72 to 9-1-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years earlier</td>
<td>7-1-70 to 2-14-71</td>
<td>2-15-71 to 5-28-71</td>
<td>5-29-71 to 9-1-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocks patrolled</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral blocks</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol hours per week (patrolmen only, not including shopping patrols)</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>2480²</td>
<td>2808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average foot patrol manhours per Pauly block per day</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>17.7²</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average car patrol manhours per Pauly block per day</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.04³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot patrol arrests per week per 100 patrol hours</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.36³</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car patrol arrests per week per 100 patrol hours</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ 1260 omni-patrol hours per week are excluded
² Semi-patrol hours are excluded
³ Based on 2480 patrol hours. If the 1260 omni-patrol hours per week were included, the arrest figure would be 0.23
⁴ An approximation based on an assumed four ninths of the 24-hour day car patrol manpower total being deployed during the hours of foot patrol operation.
The format of the graph used to compare crime trends from period to period is given below. The three periods of interest are indicated both for the months following the start of the foot patrol operations and for the corresponding months one year prior to each patrol period. The vertical axis indicates rates of change, in percentage points, for each period compared to the same period one year earlier. It is important to recognize that this type of graph does not show the number of crimes experienced in any given period, it shows only how this number compares with the number for the corresponding period one year earlier.

Interpretation: Using the sum of Part I personal crimes and burglary as a surrogate for impact crimes, the generally decreasing rate of crimes which preceded the start of the foot patrol reversed to a generally increasing rate of crimes. If the period preceding the start of the patrol included unusually large crime decreases, then the increases later experienced may be in part due to a return to more average crime rates.
Interpretation: When the Impact crime trends in the patrolled areas of the city are compared relative to the city-wide trend in Impact crimes, a generally decreasing trend prior to the implementation of the foot patrol accelerated to a relatively steeper decrease after the start of the patrols. During the three periods under study, Impact crimes in patrol areas decreased at rates from one to fifteen percent faster than the city-wide trends. (These figures relate to 24-hour days, that is, they include both patrolled and unpatrolled hours of the day).

When evaluating the effects on person crimes and then on burglary:

Interpretation: Crimes against the person in the patrolled areas, compared to city-wide trends for person crimes, dropped sharply in the months preceding the start of the foot patrol. During Phase I of the patrol operations, person crimes continued to drop faster in the patrolled areas (by about 15.5 percent) than city-wide. Phase II, which consisted of patrols concentrated in six Flatbush blocks, was then replaced by Phase II operations which diffused patrols over a significantly larger proportion of the city. During Phase II person crimes dropped 6 percent faster in patrolled areas than city-wide; during Phase II they increased faster than city-wide. If the more concentrated operations of Phase I produced its person crime reductions, then the effectiveness decrease during Phase II may be due in part to the less concentrated deployment of this period. (These figures also relate to 24-hour days).
Are crime reductions greater during patrol hours?

a. Person crimes in patrolled areas during patrol hours compared to person crimes city-wide for all hours

Interpretation: This chart should be compared with the one given in 3a for person crimes in patrolled areas (all hours) compared to person crimes city-wide (all hours). The two charts are quite similar. During Phase I, person crimes dropped 24 percent in the patrolled areas during patrolled hours, compared to city-wide. This represented a greater drop than the 15.5 percent decrease computed when all hours are used for the patrolled areas. After Phase I, however, when the patrol deployment switched to a less geographically concentrated operation, the patrolled areas showed virtually no decrease in person crimes during patrolled hours compared to city-wide (all hours). In fact, during the periods one year prior to II-A and II-B when no patrols existed, the experimental area showed fairly substantial decreases in person crimes during patrolled hours compared to city-wide (all hours). These results indicate no clear evidence of a greater impact by patrols on person crimes than person crimes in general. Since person crimes are fewer in number they exhibit more random fluctuation, as seen in the variations from +14 to -14 percent prior to the start of the patrols. Additionally, the relative reductions experienced once patrols started are not greater than those for person crimes in general, except for II-A.
5. Are patrols displacing crimes from patrolled areas to neighboring areas (considering person crimes and burglary)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Patrol Areas (All Hours)</th>
<th>City-Wide (All Hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-1-71</td>
<td>11A -11B</td>
<td>11A -11B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-15-72</td>
<td>5-27-72</td>
<td>5-27-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-27-73</td>
<td>9-1-73</td>
<td>9-1-73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation:** The above chart presents total person crime and burglary in areas adjacent to patrolled areas (all hours) relative to city-wide totals (all hours). Since the deployment plans differed for the three time periods under study, the peripheral, or adjacent areas differed as well. These differences make direct comparisons difficult, however, as the chart indicates, no significant crime increases were experienced in these areas after the start of the patrols.

6. Are foot patrols displacing crimes against the person in patrolled areas from patrol hours to other times of day?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Patrol Hours</th>
<th>Non-Patrol Hours</th>
<th>All Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person Crimes</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
<td>+20.9</td>
<td>+15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supressible Person Crimes</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>+29.2</td>
<td>+19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation:** While Index crimes against the person for all hours rose 15.2 percent relative to the city-wide rate, the increase appears to have occurred principally during non-patrol hours (when the corresponding increase was 20.9 percent; for patrol hours the increase was only 1.3 percent). Looking at suppressible Index crimes against the person indicates a similar result: the all hours increase, relative to the city-wide rate, was 19 percent, but during patrol hours a slight decrease was measured (-1.1 percent); during non-patrol hours an increase of 29.2 percent was registered. Although these figures are not conclusive, they do suggest that foot patrols provide their maximum deterrent capability during patrol hours, and that the effect may not carry over to hours of the day when no patrols are on duty.

7. Patrol Specialization (Phase II-B)

Foot patrol operations during the period 5-28-73 to 8-31-73 were aimed at reducing specific types of impact crimes. The day residence burglary patrol operated from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.; the robbery-purse snatching patrol from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m.; and the night business and residence burglary patrol from 6:30 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. All three types of patrol operated Monday through Saturday in Pauly blocks where the specific target crimes were thought to be most likely to occur.

The following results represent percentage changes in the target crimes for the time period from June 1 to August 31, comparing 1973 data to 1972 and 1971 to 1971. The figures given represent a comparison of crime in patrolled areas during patrol hours relative to the city-wide crime rate (all hours).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day Residence Burglary</th>
<th>Robbery-Purse Snatching</th>
<th>Night Residence and Business Burglary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973/1972</td>
<td>-35.5</td>
<td>+9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/1971</td>
<td>+14.6</td>
<td>+7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Shopping area patrols (periods II-A and II-B)

During Phase II, 24 shopping areas in the city were selected for periodic patrol by Foot Patrol officers. Each area was patrolled for one six-hour period every two weeks, either on a Friday or Saturday evening (from 4 to 10 p.m.). During the patrol hours a total of 34 officers were assigned to the shopping area (in four teams of eight to nine officers each) with four areas being patrolled on any given patrol night. Impact crime rates in the patrolled shopping areas (during patrol hours) for the period from February 17, 1973 (when these patrols began) to August 31, 1973, relative to the citywide rate (for all hours), compared to the same period one year earlier, indicate a 41.0 percent increase. Making the same comparison for crime rates one year earlier compared to the same period two years earlier shows a relative decrease of 22.7 percent. It is quite likely that random fluctuations in the shopping area crime rates, and the fairly infrequent coverage of each area patrolled, can explain the apparent increase in Impact crimes after the patrols began. It is possible, of course, that the presence of the officers resulted in more crimes being reported to the police, but no evidence is available to prove or disprove this possibility.

Factors which may affect sections of the above analysis:

1. The three time periods under study differed in length. Therefore, a comparison of performance in Phase I with that of II-A, for example, implies comparison of a seven and a half month period to a three and a half month period. All other factors being equal, one would expect more reliable evaluation results from period I, since it was the longest period.

2. A different set of Pauly blocks, each set consisting of a different number of blocks, was patrolled during each patrol period (I, II-A, II-B). All other factors being equal, one would expect more reliable evaluation results from II-A and II-B, since these periods involved patrol of larger numbers of blocks.

3. When Pauly blocks are selected for patrol because they have had the highest Impact crime rates for a specified period of time, the likelihood that these crime rates will remain the highest (or even remain at their current level) is rather small due to a tendency for the rates to return to a more normal level for those blocks (i.e., there can be a built-in tendency for crime decrease in the patrolled blocks; this phenomenon is called "regression artifacts").

4. "Random" fluctuations in crime trends shown in the preceding charts may have inflated or masked the actual results, particularly if the actual crime reduction impacts are small. Numerous circumstances may contribute to these random fluctuations. For example, a large concentration of Operation Ident participants in a foot patrol area could contribute to a burglary reduction.

5. The statistics used in this analysis are based on crimes reported to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. It has been necessary to assume that the crime reporting rate has remained constant for the different time periods and areas of the city under the study.

6. Since no data on stranger-to-stranger street crimes could be obtained from the computerized crime data base, Index crimes against the person have been used as a surrogate for this category.

Postscript

Data for this analysis were compiled from records kept by the Foot Patrol Project staff and other units of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and from the monthly crime tapes prepared by the police computer center. The High Impact Evaluation Unit would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Police Department's
Impact Evaluation Unit, and the staff of the Foot Patrol Project in preparing parts of this evaluation. Computer programs used to analyze the crime data were written by the High Impact Evaluation Unit and run on the REJIS computer system.
DENVER PROJECT SUMMARY

PROJECT TITLE: Operation Identification
GRANT NUMBER: 72-DP-080029
PROJECT OBJECTIVE: To effect a measurable reduction in the incidence of burglary, as an integral part of the Police Department's total anti-burglary program, by providing a system whereby the public can mark personal property as a way of determining burglaries and assisting the police in tracing stolen property.

PROJECT DIRECTOR: John R. Hindes
HOST AGENCY: Denver Police Department
1257 Champa Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
DATE OF AWARD: 25 October 1972
PERIOD OF AWARD: 19 October 1972 - 31 January 1974
FUNDING:
Federal Share: $66,940
Local Share: 24,400
Total Project Amount: $91,340

The intent of this project is to make available lightweight portable electric engraving tools to selected residents of Denver's third district for the marking of their own household equipment. The project's specific objectives are: (1) to reduce the number of residential burglaries in Southeast Denver by 10%; (2) to enroll at least 25% of the families living in District 3 in the project; (3) to increase the value of stolen property returned to the rightful owner by 50%; (4) to increase the clearance rate of burglary in the target area by 5% over the existing clearance rate; and (5) to decrease citizen fear of burglary.
Operation Identification is a burglary prevention program funded through the Impact Cities program and conducted by the Denver Police Department. The main activities of the project are to (1) contact residential units in one of the four police districts within the city (District 3), (2) mark valuable items with special engraving tools, and (3) submit inventories of the engraved items to the police department. Other activities involve advising on security for residences and commercial establishments enrolled in the project, providing public places (police district headquarters, several fire stations, and offices of a savings and loan company) for individuals to borrow engraving tools, and turning in inventories of marked items.

Contacts with potential enrollees, as well as the marking operations and security checks were made by trained reserve police officers. There was a total of 60 reserve officers (44 males and 16 females) used in the project, of whom 40 males and 15 females met their required participation of 245 hours during the 6 month period of full operation. There was attrition during the 6 month period with 18 leaving and 13 joining. Three teams were utilized, each team member working 9 hours per week. In addition to house-to-house canvassing, the project also responded to requests through a telephone line at the police department. The reserve officers did the marking of items, concentrating on those items of high risk which could be marked without damage by an electric engraving tool such as electronic sound equipment, typewriters, adding machines, calculators, movie and slide projectors, television sets, etc.

Reserve officer teams with one leader worked three-hour shifts on four weekdays and three four-hour shifts on weekends. In making house calls the average time spent per private home fell from 45 to 27 minutes over the months. Toward the end of the six month period approximately 500 contacts with enrollees per week were made which included the marking and completion of the inventories.

The project was made known through various techniques including newspaper advertisements, announcements in churches and church publications, and contacts with handouts to homeowners groups, apartment...
Observe that all burglaries decreased between the first 6 months of 1972 and the first 6 months of 1973 by 18.1% in District 2 and by 23.9% in District 4 while there was an increase of 28.1% in District 1. It should be noted that the Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT, Grant Number 72-IC-0029-01) was operative in parts of Districts 2 and 4 during this time period with much of its activity involved in burglary prevention. The SCAT project was also operative in parts of District 3 between the middle of April and the end of June 1973. The overall decrease for the city between the first 6 months of 1972 and the first six months of 1973 was 10.9%. Again, it should be emphasized that comparison with other districts or the city as a whole is not the best comparison for making decisions about the effectiveness of the project. However, as a very gross interpretation of the above data it may be said that Impact projects such as SCAT and Operation ID may have played an important role in the reduction of burglary in Districts 2, 3, and 4. An interesting point is that while District 1, which showed a substantial increase in burglary from 1972 to 1973, did not at the time have any Impact projects. To summarize, the use of other districts as comparisons presents many methodological problems for interpretation and the results obtained are equivocal. However, there is some evidence that Impact police projects (SCAT and Operation ID) have been influential in reducing burglary during the first 6 months in 1973 from the same time period the year before.

Still another method of comparison is to compare households in District 3 who participated in Operation ID (enro..lees) with those who did not, in terms of rate of burglary. We will make the assumption that participating households do not differ from non-participating households along dimensions which relate to the probability of being burglarized except for the Operation ID sign and the engraving of valuable items. No data are available to test this assumption.

There was a total of 11,438 enrollees in the project. During the 6 months only 32 of these were burglarized, or .28%. For those households (estimated from census data) in the district not enrolled there were 1,707 actual burglaries, or approximately 31 - 1,707/61,593.

There were approximately 10 times the number of households burglarized who were not enrolled than among those who were enrolled. Again, assuming the comparability of enrollees and non-enrollees, in terms of prior probability of being burglarized, the data show that enrollees...
have a much lower probability of being burglarized than non-enrollees. These data present more evidence on the possible influence of Operation ID on burglary reduction.

Among the 32 burglaries for ID enrollees only 8 items which were marked were stolen. The total value of the marked items stolen was $4,004. Among these 32 burglaries, 46 unmarked items valued at $23,977 were stolen. The marked items are more likely to be of more value than unmarked items (with the exception of jewelry, furs, etc.). Almost $46,800 worth of marked items were not stolen in the 32 burglaries. Less than 3% of the marked items were taken in the 32 burglaries. In the project a total of 102,942 items were marked. None of the 8 marked items stolen had been recovered by the end of June 1973.

Among these 32 burglaries (marked and unmarked items) was $249.37 in contrast to an average loss of $413.19 in the 1,707 burglaries of non-enrollees in District 3.

OBJECTIVE 2 - A total of 11,438 units (households and non-residences) were enrolled (items marked, inventories completed and filed with the police department, and the Operation ID sign displayed). The initial estimate of household units (excluding non-residences) for the area was 42,799. The total number of enrollees was 26.7% of this estimate, slightly exceeding the goal of 25%. The estimate of 40,799 was shown later to be incorrect. Estimates from census data were 73,031 households. However, the project manpower, budget, and operations were based on the initial estimate of 40,799. In this light, objective 2 has been met.

OBJECTIVE 3 - Fortunately, the attainment of this objective of an increase of 30% in recovery of ID-marked items is meaningless. As mentioned previously, only 8 items were stolen which were marked of the total of 283 marked items among those who were burglarized. Only 2.8% of the marked items were taken in the 32 burglaries. In the project a total of 102,942 items were marked. None of the 8 marked items stolen had been recovered by the end of June 1973. The extremely small number of marked items stolen made the recovery objective unimportant in terms of aggregate statistics.

* However, it should be noted that among the enrollees the period of "risk" for being burglarized varies for statistical purposes from time of enrollment to the end of June. Among those not enrolled any burglary occurring during the 6 month period would be counted giving all a 6 month risk exposure period. Thus, the non-enrollees have a longer period of time, statistically, to be counted as burglary victims than the enrollees who are counted only from the time of enrollment. This would, to a minor extent, decrease the difference in percent burglared between enrollees and non-enrollees.

OBJECTIVE 4 - With respect to the activities of Operation Identification, increased clearances should be relevant mainly to the burglaries occurring to enrollees. It is expected that other burglaries should also be cleared by the arrest of suspects for burglaries of ID enrollees. Clearances for burglaries of ID enrollees are not available at this time because the record-keeping does not allow such a breakdown. Clearances are long-term activities which cannot be fully assessed during a short follow-up period subsequent to the burglary. The very low volume of burglaries of ID enrollees also makes this objective somewhat less important, from a statistical point of view. It should be noted that the percent of burglaries cleared by arrest decreased in the first 6 months of 1973 from 1972 by 5.7% for District 3.

OBJECTIVE 5 - No definitive quantitative data on the decrease of citizen apprehension of being burglarized is available. The public acceptance of the project has been good and many have expressed pleasure at the service performed by the police department. Comments made by enrollees to project staff would lead one to believe that many felt safer than previously by being enrolled in the project. In order to obtain more precise data concerning this objective a systematic survey of enrollees and non-enrollees would have to be undertaken.

In summary, although the evidence of burglary reduction in District 3 from the previous year and the lower rate of burglaries among enrollees than non-enrollees can be interpreted in terms other than the influence of Operation Identification, the data are also congruent with the hypothesis that the project activities lead to a reduction of burglary. It is suggested that this program, on the basis of the evidence presented, be continued and perhaps expanded as one element in an overall program of crime prevention.
**SUMMARY OF DATA**

1. **TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITS ENROLLED** (households and non-residences) 11,438
2. **NUMBER OF ITEMS ENGRAVED** 102,942
3. **VALUE OF ITEMS ENGRAVED** $16,367,778
4. **NUMBER OF ACTUAL BURGLARY OFFENSES IN DISTRICT 3 FROM Jan. 1, 1973 to June 30, 1973** 1,739
   - **NUMBER OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES, DIST. 3 (1-1-73 - 6-30-73)** 1,195
   - **NUMBER OF NON-RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES, DIST. 3 (1-1-73 - 6-30-73)** 563
5. **DECREASE IN TOTAL BURGLARY IN DISTRICT 3 FROM FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1972 TO FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1973** 304
   - **PERCENT DECREASE** 14.8%
6. **DECREASE IN RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN DISTRICT 3 FROM THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1972 TO THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1973** 230
   - **PERCENT DECREASE** 16.1%
7. **DECREASE IN NON-RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN DISTRICT 3 FROM THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1972 TO THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1973** 78
   - **PERCENT DECREASE** 12.1%
8. **NUMBER OF TOTAL BURGLARIES AMONG ID ENROLLEES DURING THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1973** 32
   - **PERCENT OF TOTAL ID ENROLLEES** .3%
9. **NUMBER OF BURGLARIES AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN DISTRICT 3 NOT ENROLLED IN ID DURING THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1973** 1,707
   - **PERCENT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS NOT ENROLLED IN ID** 2.8%
10. **% OF ID MARKED ITEMS STOLEN IN THE 32 BURGLARIES** 8
    - **A. % OF ALL ID MARKED ITEMS PRESENT IN 32 BURGLARIZED UNITS** 8.22
    - **B. VALUE OF ID MARKED ITEMS STOLEN** $4,004
    - **C. VALUE OF NON-MARKED ITEMS STOLEN** $7,980
11. **AVERAGE VALUE OF STOLEN ITEMS IN BURGLARIES OF PROJECT ID ENROLLEES** $249.37
12. **AVERAGE VALUE OF STOLEN ITEMS IN BURGLARIES OF NON-ENROLLEES** $413.19
OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
QUARTERLY EVALUATION REPORT
January-March, 1973
Prepared by
John D. Carr, Research Analyst

This evaluation covers the first operational quarter of the project and attempts to objectively evaluate progress on three levels:

a. Effectiveness measurements—how effective has the project been in meeting its crime reduction objectives?

b. Efficiency measurements—how well has the project been implemented and managed?

c. Attitudinal measurements—how successful has the project been in terms of public acceptance?

Although this project could not be designed as a "true" experimental research project, sufficient information is available to lead to some inferences as to the probable impact this project has had in meeting its objectives.

EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENTS

The primary objective of Operation Ident is to realize a net effect of 10% reduction in District 3 residential burglaries. Compared to the first quarter of 1972, residential burglary in District 3 has decreased by 25.4% for the first quarter of 1973. Also in District 3, commercial burglaries have been reduced by 15.0% for an overall reduction of 18.7% in commercial burglaries. If one could assume that these figures were indicative of trend and no other factors were relevant, then the net impact of Operation Ident would be a 23.5% reduction in residential burglaries and an increase of 3.7% in District 3 commercial burglaries. Such a comparison, however, is most misleading, particularly in light of the fact that another burglary reduction project, SCAT, was operational in parts of District 2 and 4 during this same time frame.

The only area of the city with no burglary reduction project is District 1. Although different in terms of demographic characteristics, District 1 is the closest approximation to a "control" group for measuring the effect of Operation Ident.

Although this type of "before" and "after" measurement would lead to the conclusion that Operation Ident has, thus far, more than doubled its crime reduction objective, one cannot automatically assume that this project is the one factor contributing to District 3 burglary reduction. Other measurements, perhaps more meaningful, are to compare the target area, District 3, with the city as a whole, better yet, with a comparable area where no project has been implemented (i.e. a "control" group).

A comparable analysis of burglary offenses for the city as a whole indicates an overall reduction of 8.3% from the first quarter of 1973 compared to 1972, with a net increase of 12% in residential burglaries and a decrease of 19.7% in commercial burglaries. If one could assume that these figures were indicative of trend and no other factors were relevant, then the net impact of Operation Ident would be a 23.5% reduction in residential burglaries and an increase of 3.7% in District 3 commercial burglaries. Such a comparison, however, is most misleading, particularly in light of the fact that another burglary reduction project, SCAT, was operational in parts of District 2 and 4 during this same time frame.

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The only area of the city with no burglary reduction project is District 1. Although different in terms of demographic characteristics, District 1 is the closest approximation to a "control" group for measuring the effect of Operation Ident.

As background information, it should be noted that burglary increased by 13.4% in District 1 from the first quarter of 1971 to 1972, while District 3 increased by 17.8% during the same time period. These figures illustrate that the growth rate of burglary offenses was not that dissimilar for the two districts prior to the Impact Program. However, District 1 burglaries for first quarter of 1973 increased by 49.4% compared to 1972, consisting of a 108.4% increase in residential burglaries and an 11.6% increase in commercial burglaries. While residential burglary decreased by 25.4% in District 3, it increased by 108.4% in District 1. It should be noted that this increase in

(*) Total burglary is actual offenses (exclusive of unfounded burglaries) while commercial and residential totals are reported offenses; consequently, comm. burg. + resid. burg. ≠ total burg., although a close approximation (difference of 38).
District 1 burglaries is only partially a result of upward trend, (i.e., one cannot assume that burglary would have increased by 49.4%, or that the result of this upward trend is most likely the result of District 1 burglaries for the entire city since a portion of the burglary increase is attributable to Operation Ident and SCAF target areas. Based on this analysis, it seems highly probable that without Operation Ident and SCAF target areas, District 3 burglaries would have increased rather than decreased by 23.1%.

Another measurement tool is to compare the value of property stolen to the average loss of $90 per burglary in District 3. If 7 of the 8 burglaries of enrollees were not marked items taken and the average property stolen was valued at $27, all unmarked items, the total marked item loss was from one burglary which included the theft of an organ for a total loss of $2,299.

A secondary objective of Operation Ident is to increase by 50% the value of stolen property recovered for the target area. For the first quarter of 1973, 16.9% of District 3 stolen property was recovered. Only $2,299 of marked items were stolen, none of which has been recovered. At this point in time, insufficient volume of marked items has been stolen to measure the effectiveness of the project in meeting this objective.

Similarly, the objective of increasing the clearance rate of burglary by 5% in the target area is a long-term objective that cannot be realized with the current low volume. The current annual clearance rate is 23.4% for District 3 burglaries. To meet the objective, long-run clearance rate will have to increase to 28.4% due to recovery of marked items.

### EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENTS

The primary operational objective is the enrollment of 25% of the District 3 families. The Project goal is stated as enrolling 10,700 dwelling units based upon an estimated total of 40,799 dwelling units. However, census tract data indicates an estimated 73,000 occupied housing units in the district which implies a goal of 18,250 units. As of April 1, total enrollees amounted to 4,768 of which an estimated 3% (143 enrollees) are either outside of District 3 or commercial units, leaving 4,625 District 3 residential units.

Based upon current performance of approximately 300 completed residential units per week, it can be projected that an additional 6,500 units can be enrolled by July 1, resulting in a total of 11,125 District 3 residential enrollees. This figure surpasses the stated objective of 10,700 units but falls short of the 25% enrollment of District 3 families by approximately 7,125—(1/4)(73,000 - 11,125 = 7,125). If through advertisement the number of self-enrollments increases (currently, only 282 self-enrollees) or if the reserve officers become more efficient, actual enrollment may be greater than the projected 11,125 at the end of the project. Additional operational data for the first quarter is shown below:

- # items engraved: 42,912
- Estimated value: $6,140,000
- # requests for service: 5,179
ATTITUINAL MEASUREMENTS

An additional objective of the project is to decrease citizen apprehension over being burglarized. A public opinion survey will be conducted at the end of the project in an attempt to measure public reaction. At this point in time, the 5,179 requests for service, zero complaints, numerous "thank you" calls and letters, and free advertisement by a large business institution, point to an overwhelming positive reaction to the program.

SUMMARY

Operation Ident appears to be meeting its crime reduction objective. Residential burglaries in District 3 significantly decreased in the first quarter, whether compared to the prior year, the entire city or to a "control" district. It appears as though the project provides a deterrent effect, for the community as a whole, through publicity of the program, since only a portion of the burglary reduction can be attributed to the lower frequency of burglaries among enrollees.

Due to the low volume of burglaries to enrollees, the objective of higher recovery of stolen property and more clearances by arrest are not being met. In part, this can be attributed to the fact that a burglar seemingly would rather "pass over" than steal marked items. Efficiency objectives as understood by the grantee, and the qualitative public opinion objective are successfully being met by the Operation Ident project.
Operation Ident's major objective is the reduction of residential burglaries in inner city areas with the highest residential burglary rate during calendar year 1971. The methodology involved in accomplishing this objective is summarized as follows: (1) to assign 30% of the project's field task to the Women's Crusade; (2) to provide education and assistance to a minimum of 1000 community residents in the area of burglary prevention; (3) to coordinate the planning and activities of all participating community organizations; (4) to purchase 1,000 electric engraving pens and make them available to citizens through various organizations; (5) to distribute 1,000 valuable property forms to citizens for record maintenance purposes; (6) to place decals in the homes where property has been engraved; (7) to publicize Operation Ident on billboards and through the media; and (8) to distribute 50,000 promotional posters and fliers throughout the community.
The survey was conducted as part of an evaluation of the Operation Ident project of the St. Louis High Impact Anti-Crime Program. Two questionnaires, one for Ident participants and one for non-participants, were designed by the project staff and the St. Louis Impact Program's High Impact Evaluation Unit, with the advice of a market research company which assisted in the survey.

This report provides information on the objectives of the survey, the procedures used to design the sample and questionnaires, and the insights gained from studying the completed questionnaires (348 in all). The report concludes with a brief discussion of the value of the telephone survey as an evaluative tool and of the cost of the survey.

In general, comparing the group participating in Ident to the non-participants, the results show that:

- Prior to becoming participants, the participating households had about the same burglary rates as do the non-participants at present;
- Neighbors of participants (most of whom are non-participants) have not experienced burglaries in any greater frequency than those of other non-participants;
- Most participants learned of the program through Police-Community Relations activities, the newspaper, and friends or relatives, while most non-participants who knew about the program learned of it through the newspaper and television;
- Participants have taken slightly fewer other precautions to protect their premises from burglary than had non-participants; and
- A larger proportion of participants live in single-family dwellings than do non-participants.
indicated that:

- most of the participants were engraving their Missouri driver's license number on their valuables, as instructed, and were displaying the "Blue Hand" participation decals on doors and windows;
- about half of the non-participants had heard of the Indent program (through one or more of its promotional efforts);
- and
- almost all non-participants expressed a favorable reaction to the program (those who were unfamiliar with it were given a brief explanation) but only two-thirds expressed an interest in participating.

The survey followed shortly after a computer analysis of burglary rates for participating households which indicated that they had experienced a sixteen percent drop in burglary rate since joining the program, while the city-wide residential burglary rate showed a much smaller decrease (about 3.4 percent).

I. Introduction

The objectives of the Operation Indent project include educating the public with regard to the risk of residential burglary and the reduction of residential burglary by making stolen items easier to identify. Achievement of these objectives requires both an effective public education program and the informed cooperation of participants recruited into the program. The Evaluation Unit, when faced with the problem of assessing the extent to which these objectives were being achieved, considered several alternatives for obtaining related information directly from participants and non-participants. A door-to-door survey was considered too costly and unreliable of the responses. The following paragraphs describe a mailed questionnaire was rejected because of the suspected unreliability of the responses. The telephone survey finally selected as the evaluative instrument.

II. Objectives

The objectives of the survey included measurement of public sentiment regarding Operation Indent; measurement of the success of the various media being used to promote the project; determination of victimization background of the differences, if any, in the burglary victimization background of the participants as compared to non-participants; and determination of the number of dwelling units per address.

In addition, the survey sought information from the participants regarding their dates of enrollment, the extent to which they made use of the state driver's license number when engraving property, and their use of the "Blue Hand" decals on doors and windows.

III. Choice of the Samples and Design of the Questionnaires

At the time the survey was being planned, there were 2311 registered participants in St. Louis. A computer program was written to provide an alphabetical listing of the participants according to street name. Another program was developed to provide totals of the numbers of participants per police district, census tract, and police reporting area (Police block).

The goals, in terms of completed questionnaires, were set at 230 non-participants and 125 participants. Samples for each group were chosen as follows. To insure a proper geographic distribution of the sample of non-participants in the city, 1970 census data on the number of year-round housing units for St. Louis was obtained (the total number of units was found to be 238,441). The totals for each of the city's 126 census tracts were used to compute the percentage of housing units found in each census tract relative to the city total. Since the goal of the non-participant survey was 230 contacts, then, if "n" is the percent of total housing units in a particular census tract, the formula:

\[ \frac{x}{250} = \frac{n}{100} \]

may be used to compute the number of questionnaires, x, to be completed in the census tract. This procedure distributes the members of the sample in the same manner as the distribution of housing units in the city.

Because the formula yields values of x which are not necessarily integral, the following round-off procedure was used:

- Complete 1 questionnaire if 0.2 ≤ x < 0.6
- Complete 2 if 0.6 ≤ x < 1.0
- Complete 3 if 1.0 ≤ x < 1.4
- Complete 4 if 1.4 ≤ x < 1.8
- Complete 5 if 1.8 ≤ x < 2.2

In this process, it became necessary to adjust the goal from 250 to 255.
In order to provide enough names to complete the required number of questionnaires for each census tract, the numbers obtained from the process outlined above were multiplied by three.

A reverse telephone directory, a detailed street map showing census tract boundaries, and a street guide were then used to choose the necessary amount of names and telephone numbers for each census tract. The information was next keypunched, and a printout was obtained for use by the telephone workers.

The participant sample was based on the participation rate in each police district, as well as the number of housing units per police district, which had to be estimated using the same census data as mentioned above.

Employing formulas similar to the one used in the non-participant case, two percentages were computed for each police district, first using the participation rate, and then using the census data. The two resulting figures for each district were then averaged and used to compute the quota for the district. As in the non-participant case, three times the desired number of names were supplied for use by the telephone workers. The goal was adjusted from 125 to 130 due to round-off procedures.

To conduct the telephone interviews, the project staff and the Evaluation Unit decided to assign one half of each of the two questionnaires to a professional market research company and the other half to the St. Louis Women's Crusade Against Crime, a community group which shares responsibility for the project with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.

It was agreed that the market research company employed would aid in the development of the two questionnaires, and would conduct a training session for the volunteer telephone workers from the Women's Crusade.

Since the Evaluation Unit has not had previous experience with telephone surveys, a number of St. Louis market research companies were contacted (they were located by looking under "market research" in the Yellow Pages) and invited to bid for the job. Three companies submitted bids; the lowest bidder's proposal was accepted.

IV. Results

After the consultation and training were accomplished, the survey was conducted, resulting in 130 completed participant questionnaires, and 218 non-participant questionnaires. Tabulation was done by hand by members of the Evaluation Unit. A copy of each of the two questionnaires is attached to this report.

Two sets of percentages were calculated for each question. The first indicates the distribution of answers within each group (i.e., participants or non-participants). The second indicates the distribution of participants and non-participants within each possible response.

To test for significant differences in the responses given to questions which were similar on both participant and non-participant surveys, a standard chi-square contingency table test was employed. For each such test, significance or non-significance is indicated for the 95 percent confidence level and appropriate degrees of freedom.

A. Questions which were similar on both questionnaires

1. Previous Burglary Experience:

For the participant survey, respondents were asked if they had been burglarized in the year preceding their enrollment in the program (question 3); for the non-participant survey respondents were asked if they had been burglarized in the past year (question 1).

a. Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Participants answered</th>
<th>Non-participants answered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes: 25 (19%) yes; 105 (81%) no</td>
<td>36% participant; 64% non-participant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No: 36% participant; 64% non-participant</td>
<td>36% yes; 64% no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square value: 2.57 (not significant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Interpretation:

Before joining the program, the average burglary rate for participants was not significantly different from that for non-participants. This discounts the likelihood that households which chose to join the program are largely those with less than average burglary rates (a situation which would make the project seem off target).
2. Type of Dwelling:

The answers to questions 8 and 3 on the participant and non-participant questionnaires were totalled with respect to whether the respondent lived in a single or multiple dwelling.

a. Results:

Participants answered: 84 (65%) single; 46 (35%) multiple
Non-participants answered: 106 (49%) single; 111 (51%) multiple
Single: 44% participant; 56% non-participant
Multiple: 29% participant; 71% non-participant
Chi-square value: 8.16 (significant)

b. Interpretation

The significantly higher number of residents occupying single dwellings in the participant group could indicate a relationship between home ownership and increased concern regarding burglary, or a greater feeling of security on the part of multiple dwelling residents.

c. Additional Information:

The answers to these questions yield estimates of approximately 3.2 dwelling units per address for participants and 4.1 units per address for non-participants. This information will be useful to the Evaluation Unit in computing estimates of the burglary rates per dwelling unit (as compared to per address) since no distinction is made on the computer crime data tapes between dwelling units with the same street address (i.e., apartment numbers are not included in the addresses).

3. Other Precautions:

Answers to questions 7a on the non-participant and 9a on the participant questionnaires, regarding whether or not other burglary prevention precautions were taken, were compared.

a. Results:

Participants answered: 66 (51%) yes; 62 (48%) no
Non-participants answered: 138 (63%) yes; 79 (37%) no
Yes: 32% participant; 68% non-participant
No: 44% participant; 56% non-participant
Two participants and one non-participant declined to answer this question.
Chi-square value: 4.82 (significant)

b. Interpretation:

Participants appear to have taken significantly fewer other precautions. This could indicate that they tend to rely on Operation Ident for successful burglary prevention, or that the non-participants, having taken a significantly higher number of other precautions, tend to feel secure as a result of their precautions and feel no need for Ident.

4. Types of Other Precautions:

Those who answered that they were taking other precautions were asked what type of methods they were using. This was accomplished in questions 7b for non-participants and 9b for participants. Precautions were classified as: dog, extra locks, alarms, and other. The "other" category included such answers as bars on basement windows, leaving lights on while away, etc. More than one answer was recorded if given by the respondent.

a. Results:

Participants answered: 12 (18%) dog; 27 (41%) extra locks; 2 (3%) alarm; 25 (38%) other.
Non-participants answered: 45 (35%) dog; 73 (53%) extra locks; 11 (8%) alarm; 41 (30%) other.
Dog: 21% participants; 73% non-participants
Extra Locks: 27% participants; 73% non-participants
Alarms: 15% participants; 85% non-participants
Other: 38% participants; 62% non-participants
Four participants who had responded "yes" to questions 9a declined to answer 9b and two non-participants who had responded "yes" to question 7a declined to answer 7b.
Chi-square value: 4.49 (not-significant)

b. Interpretation:

The most popular method used by both groups is extra locks while residential alarms are rarely used in either group (only 13 of 204 respondents who had stated that they were taking some other precautions against burglary).
5. Neighbors Burglarized:

Participants in Ident were asked if they knew if any of their neighbors had been burglarized since they (the participants) had joined the program. Non-participants were asked if any of their neighbors had been burglarized in the past year. These two questions were compared, keeping in mind the difference in the time periods involved and the possible differences in interpreting the term "neighbor" on the part of the respondents.

a. Results:

Participants answered: 39 (30%) yes; 87 (67%) no; and 3 (2%) don't know.
Non-participants answered: 80 (37%) yes; 123 (56%) no; and 15 (7%) don't know.

Yes: 33% participant; 67% non-participant
No: 41% participant; 59% non-participant
Chi-square value: 2.41 (not-significant)

b. Interpretation:

It was thought that Ident might tend to displace burglaries from participating households to their neighbors. The answers to these questions give no evidence of such displacement; neighbors of non-participants appear to be burglarized about as frequently as those of participants.

6. Promotional Activities:

Participants, and non-participants who indicated they had heard about Operation Ident, were asked how they first learned of the program. Multiple answers were recorded if given.

a. Results:

Participants answered: 1 (1%) billboard; 12 (9%) TV; 4 (3%) radio; 27 (21%) newspaper; 30 (23%) Police-Community Relations; 16 (12%) Women's Crusade Against Crime; 3 (2%) library, police station or fire house; and 77 (59%) other.
Non-participants answered: 7 (3%) billboard; 41 (19%) TV.

b. Interpretation:

The media having the most impact on the two groups of respondents were television and newspapers. Their reach was somewhat more effective with non-participants than with participants. Police-Community Relations efforts were most effective in reaching the participant group, except for those answers which were grouped into the "other" category (friends, relatives, etc. as listed above). Billboards and radio seem to be ineffective for both groups. Libraries, police stations, and fire houses, though appearing ineffective as means of publicity in either group, have served well in their prime function as engraving tool distribution centers.

7. Reaction to Operation Ident:

Both groups of respondents were asked about their reaction to the Ident Program. In the case of non-participants who had never heard of Ident, a brief explanation was given before the question was asked.

a. Results:

Only one participant and seven non-participants out of 348 respondents expressed an unfavorable reaction.
b. Interpretation:

Most of the unfavorable reactions were due to a simple lack of enthusiasm toward the project, however, one non-participant felt that placing the "Blue Hand" decal on his residence would show burglars that he had possessions worth stealing.

B. Questions directed to participants only:

1. Use of Identification Numbers:

The identification number suggested for use in marking valuables has been the individual's Missouri driver's license number. Engraved stolen property, if found, can be traced to the owner via Department of Revenue computerized files. The Ident participants were asked if this was the ID which they used.

a. Results:

Yes: 108 (83%); No: 21 (16%); Don't Know: 1 (1%)

b. Interpretation:

The results indicate very good cooperation in this area. Most who are not using the driver's license number are using social security numbers. Some have the mistaken idea that the driver's license number changes, however, this would occur only if a license expires and a new one issued later or if the licensee changes state.

2. Use of the "Blue Hand" Stickers:

Participants in Ident have been asked to place "Blue Hand" decals on their doors and windows for the purpose of informing a would-be burglar that valuable property has been engraved for easy identification, thereby providing a deterrent. The participants were asked whether or not they had used these stickers.

a. Results:

Yes: 106 (82%); No: 24 (18%)

Note: Although these percentages are similar to those for the question regarding use of the driver's license number, the data does not indicate that people who failed to use the driver's license number also failed to post the decals.

C. Questions directed to non-participants only:

1. Non-participant awareness of the program:

Non-participants were asked if they had ever heard of the Operation Ident program:

a. Results:

Yes: 107 (49%); No: 111 (51%)

b. Interpretation:

Roughly half of the non-participants had heard of the program, quite a good response, considering the project's limited budget for promotional activities.

2. Willingness to Participate:

Those non-participants who had given favorable responses when asked their reaction to Ident were asked if they would like to join Operation Ident. Those answering "no" were asked "why not?".

a. Results:

Yes: 132 (63%); No: 72 (34%); Undecided: 7 (3%)

b. Interpretation:

About two thirds of the respondents indicated that they would like to join. Based on the explanations received for "no" answers, reasons for not wanting to join were generally related to objections to the effort required to obtain and use the engraver or to a feeling of relative security derived from other precautions taken.

V. Cost and Time Considerations

The responsibilities assigned to the market research firm included review of the draft questionnaires, completion of 192 questionnaires using a given list of names and phone numbers, and conducting a training session for volunteer interviewers from the St. Louis Women's Crusade Against Crime. For this work they were
paid $935. Although the fee was not broken down into an amount for the calls and an amount for the other services, if the services had cost $200, then the average cost per completed questionnaire would have been about $3.83. The volunteer interviewers completed an additional 156 telephone interviews.

Additional tasks required to conduct a survey such as this include drawing the sample (which can be quite time consuming), designing and pretesting the questionnaires, and tabulating the results. Since some respondents are bound to be suspicious of the interviewer's motives, it will probably prove useful to notify the local Better Business Bureau of the survey prior to beginning the telephone interviews (this was done for the present survey).

The time required to complete the survey was about six weeks, from commencing design of the questionnaire to tabulation of the results. The actual telephoning was completed by the market research firm in about a week, and by the volunteers, in about two weeks. The procedure can be speeded up significantly, at increased cost, by having the sample and questionnaire developed by the contractor.

VI. Value of the Survey

The telephone survey permitted the Evaluation Unit and the project staff to obtain information on the impact of Operation Ident which could not have possibly been obtained from crime statistics and project activity data, the items most commonly available for project evaluation. It provided an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the information dissemination aspects of the project, and supplied information on both participants and non-participants.

Telephone surveys of this magnitude, of course, provide only an estimate of the results a more complete survey might show. In addition, factors such as the construction of the questions, the attitudes and skills of the interviewers, the methods used to construct the sample, and the possible instability of public opinions may all affect the validity of the results. Despite these problems, business, industry, and government have used telephone surveys successfully for many years. The present experience with the Operation Ident survey indicates that such surveys may well have a valuable contribution to make to the planning and evaluation of crime control programs.

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OPERATION IDENT
NON-PARTICIPANT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. Introduction

Hello, my name is ___________________. I'm calling on behalf of the Women's Crusade Against Crime. I would like to ask your opinion on one of our crime-fighting programs. Your answers will help us improve the program so that it might better help to reduce crime.

II. Questions

1. How many times have you been burglarized at your present location during the past year?
   (1) once
   (2) twice
   (3) three times
   (4) four times
   (5) more than four times

2. Have any of your immediate neighbors been burglarized during the past year?
   (1) yes
   (2) no

3. Are you presently located in:
   (1) single dwelling residence
   (2) multiple dwelling residence
   If multiple, specify:
   (1) two-family
   (2) three-family
   (3) four-family
   (4) five to twenty
   (5) more than twenty

4. Have you ever heard of the Operation Ident program?
   (1) yes (skip to question 5)
   (2) no (do not ask question 5, but give the following description of Ident and skip to question 6)
   The Operation Ident project is sponsored by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and the Women's Crusade Against Crime. All residents are being asked to engrave their Missouri driver's license number on valuable property and then display the Operation Ident blue hand decal on doors and windows.
   It's important to engrave your Missouri driver's license number on your valuable property. In case of a burglary, that is the only number that can be used to trace recovered goods to their rightful owner. The Operation Ident program is free of charge to all residents. You may borrow an engraving tool and obtain other materials at any of the following locations:
   - District Police Stations
   - The Women's Crusade Against Crime
   - Libraries
   - Fire Stations
   - Human Development Corporation Neighborhood Centers
   - Police-Community Relations Offices

5. How did you first learn of the Operation Ident program?
   (More than one is acceptable.)
   (1) Billboard
   (2) TV
   (3) Radio
   (4) Newspaper
   (5) Police-Community Relations
   (6) Women's Crusade Against Crime
   (7) Library, Police Station, or Firehouse
   (8) Other (specify)
6a. Would you say your reaction to this program is:
   (1) favorable
   (2) unfavorable

If "Favorable" in question 6a, ask:

6b. Why?

6c. Would you like to join Operation Ident?
   (1) yes
   (2) no; if no, why not?

If "Unfavorable" in question 6a, ask:

6d. Why?

7a. Have you taken any other precautions to prevent a burglary?
   (1) yes
   (2) no

If yes:

7b. How?
   (1) dog
   (2) extra locks
   (3) alarm
   (4) other (specify)
OPERATION IDENT
PARTICIPANT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. Introduction

Hello, my name is _______. I'm calling on behalf of the Women's Crusade Against Crime. We understand that you have participated in the Operation Ident program and we would like to ask you some questions regarding the program. Your answers will help make Operation Ident an even more successful program.

II. Questions

1. When did you join Operation Ident? __________ (month/year)

2. How did you first learn of the Operation Ident program? (More than one is acceptable)
   (1) Billboard
   (2) TV
   (3) Radio
   (4) Newspaper
   (5) Police-Community Relations
   (6) Women's Crusade Against Crime
   (7) Library, Police Station, or Firehouse
   (8) Other (specify) __________

3. How many times were you burglarized at your present location during the year before you joined Operation Ident?
   (1) once
   (2) twice
   (3) three times
   (4) four or more times

4. Have you or any of your neighbors been burglarized since you joined Operation Ident?
   (1) yes (you have)
   (2) yes (neighbors have)
   (3) no

5. Did you use a Missouri driver's license number to mark your valuables?
   (1) yes
   (2) no __________

6. Were the Ident stickers placed on the premises?
   (1) yes
   (2) no

7a. Would you say your reaction to the Operation Ident program is:
   (1) favorable
   (2) unfavorable

   If "Unfavorable" in question 7a, ask:

   7b. Why? __________________________________________

8. Is your present location:
   (1) single dwelling residence
   (2) multiple dwelling residence

   If multiple, specify:
   (1) two-family
   (2) three-family
   (3) four-family
   (4) five to twenty
   (5) more than twenty

9a. Have you taken any other precautions to prevent a burglary?
   (1) yes
   (2) no

   If "Yes":

   9b. How?
       (1) dog
       (2) extra locks
       (3) alarm
       (4) other (specify) __________
III. Closing

1. I would like to thank you for your time and cooperation in completing this interview.

2. Sex determination by voice:
   (1) male
   (2) female

Name __________________________ Sequence No. ______________
Address ___________________________________________________
Telephone ___________________________________________________
Interviewer __________________________ Date ______________

END