


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POLICE REFORM FROM WITHIN

If the police do not reform themselves, they will be forced to accept reforms imposed from the outside. Patience is wearing thin with inadequate police performance. The whole weight of evidence indicates that the police are falling behind public expectations. The crime rate continues to rise and some types of crime such as petty theft, car stealing and public vandalism seem out of control. Highway accidents climb and traffic jams are more frequent. Daily mass media highlight unsolved murders, robberies and kidnappings. Organized crime, entrenched in drugs, prostitution and illegal rackets, moves in to legitimate business. Gangsterism is joined by terrorism and politically motivated violence. Revelations of police corruption, police brutality and police riots diminish confidence in the guardians of law and order. Something has gone wrong. Action is demanded. Belatedly, inquiries are being conducted to determine what can be done and who is at fault. If the police do not take the initiative, they will continue to act as the convenient scapegoat and the changes imposed on them may well be ineffectual.

For too long the police have been complacent about reform. They have preferred to get on with the job rather than gain new perspectives and review their societal relationships, revise their objectives, and redefine their policies. They have permitted others to take the lead and been content to follow.

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As a result, that have gone along with rather simplistic ideas held generally about the relationships between the police and society, even though they know the actual complexities and complications. . They have allowed themselves to be judged by inappropriate standards and refrained from exposing them as fraud. They have not developed alternative measures of police performance, let alone impressed them on the public. Until they do they will continue to find themselves in difficulties, their case misrepresented and distorted, and their good works unappreciated.

Let us take, for example, the popular measures of police performance, which are irrelevant to the point of absurdity.

(a) Crime rates, that is the number of crimes reported, are rising, partly because the police have improved their record-keeping and the police are more willing to report offences and reveal more about offenders. . Knowledge about the actual number of crimes committed in a society depends on the willingness of the public to complain and to seek police assistance, though admittedly public propensity to report crime is a function of confidence in police protection and police success in apprehending offenders. When the police draw attention to repeaters, juveniles, deprived minorities, and suburbanites, they point to factors beyond their control or ability to influence - to problems in the legal system and prisons, to public attitudes toward offenders, to differences between

criminologists, social workers, psychologists and other experts over the root causes of crime and the approach to be taken to offenders, to general societal changes such as the rise in urban population, the close proximity between extremes of wealth and poverty, the decline of social controls and religion, and the opening up of new crime vistas in contemporary society. The police cannot be held accountable for crime, crime rates or offenders. They cannot prevent crime. They are only one force in combatting crime, and not necessarily the most important force either.

(b) Highway problems. Traditionally the police have been responsible for the safety of highways, meaning security for all travellers against robbery. In time, they also became responsible for all aspects of highway safety and the free flow of traffic. Highway casualties and blockages these days are due to the sheer increase in the number of vehicles and travellers, the inability of public authorities to keep public transit systems and road building and design in pace with traffic volume, the heavy pressure on inner city parking space, and the impossibility as yet of producing accident-free vehicles and accident-free drivers. The blame unfairly falls on the patrolman who does his best to unsnarl traffic jams not of his making or who catches dangerous driving, speeding and parking offenders.

(c) Sensational crimes have always captured public imagination. They do sell newspapers and thanks to world-wide instantaneous reporting and visual aids, they make a deep impression. But - more

to the point - they have always existed. Assassinations, mass murders, gruesome sex crimes, kidnappings of public figures, orgies, drug addiction - none of these is new or unfortunately that infrequent. They merely receive wider and better publicity.

(d) Organized crime - like sensational crimes - is not new. It has existed wherever people were willing to pay for illegal services and to tolerate accessibility to them and their organizers. Much depends on what is considered a crime and whether the contravention of the law is serious and threatens the rights of others. In the past, party, political and trade union activities, escape from slavery and serfdom, gambling, and brewing alcoholic beverages, have constituted crimes and the evasion of the law deemed criminal activity. Today, organized crime takes different forms, being mainly involved in drugs, prostitution, rackets, protection and trade in stolen property. It exists because its services are demanded and politically tolerated, not because of police ineffectiveness.

(e) Violence. Civilized society is based on certain behavioral norms and whenever these are contravened or disregarded, the police, like everyone else, are helpless. All they can hope to do is to confine the offences and apprehend the offenders. Easier accessibility to sophisticated weaponry by non-conformist groups endangers the public and makes the task of the police harder.

(f) Police malfeasance. Given the circumstances in which they work, the surprise is not the frequency of police corruption, police brutality, and police riots, but their infrequency. Given

the sensational nature of the popular press and public readiness to find fault with the police in democratic regimes, it is doubtful whether the exposures represent only the tip of the iceberg, which they may well do in autocratic regimes. An absolutely pure police is certainly an ideal at which to aim, but that any particular police force should fail to attain perfection should not surprise.

These measures are only indirectly related to police performance and effectiveness. They do point to the need for the police to review their societal relationships and to devise more appropriate attainable and realistic measures. The police cannot work miracles. They cannot prevent crime or obtain accident-free highways. They may be doing inappropriate things which distract from their more important responsibilities. They may be inefficient tax-collectors or parking supervisors or badly trained emergency staff. Until the police return to fundamentals - what do policemen do? What should they do? What is police work and who should perform it? - they will continue trapped in their own straight jacket, protesting justly but ineffectively about lack of staff, finance, modern buildings and equipment, and general lack of investment in police services. Perhaps policemen are not needed at all or in their present form. Perhaps police careers are inevitably unappealing, dangerous, unrewarding, discriminatory, narrow, and the wrong kind of people are attracted to it for the wrong reasons. Perhaps nothing fundamentally needs changing, only an improvement in police public

relations and an uplift in the police image. Until each police force undertakes this elementary task, it will not be able to muster arguments against reforms imposed from the outside that it feels inopportune, inadequate, ineffectual, unfortunate, degrading, and will fall back on worn cliches which are now outdated and brand those who use them old fashioned, reactionary, incorrigible.

While each police force must do its own rethinking in the light of its own peculiar circumstances, there are universal problems in addition to police reluctance to take the initiative in their own reform and their general downgrading of innovation and change. Here five key areas are considered - policy, decision-making, manpower, and innovative capacity. They may not be considered the most important problems of a particular force or general considerations may not apply to specific circumstances, but they do have a profound effect on operations and therefore on police effectiveness.

Policy

Police forces on the whole are notoriously conservative. They continue accepted modes of operation and follow the guidelines of their political overseers. They tend to entrench conservative leaders. They look inward and backward rather than outward and forward. They separate themselves from other organizations and work for a self-contained or closed system. They project defensive attitudes. They often ignore opportunities for change. Outside criticism misfires; instead of responding, they close ranks and defend sometimes the indefensible out of

loyalty to tradition or the organization or leaders or colleagues, until they become virtually unapproachable. Senior staff move through the system and perpetuate what they have been taught in attitude, style and approach. Structural arrangements, office procedures, even the forms used and the style of uniforms worn are continued from one year to another without much questioning, review or evaluation. Comparative career conditions decline and as staff shortages worsen, a police career is considered unfairly as a second-rate occupation for second-rate people despite appreciation of police importance in society, professionalism, exclusiveness, low-key profile, and devotion to duty. Internal reformers, dissatisfied with this state of affairs, are kept out of harm's way until they are forced to resign out of frustration, bitterness, thwarted ambition or resentment, or conform, at least outwardly, to existing patterns until they achieve a prominent position from which they can attempt to change things and challenge current policy.

The reformers, the Young Turks, find too often that police leaders are not even aware that conservatism is their policy or they have no policies except to do more of the same. What was good enough for their predecessors is good enough for them, only more so. They see no reason to change anything, and attribute mistakes and failings to factors beyond their control, lack of resources and poor staff. They do not contemplate that the uncontrollable factors can be influenced by them, that the lack of resources may be their fault for not pressing harder or changing budgetary tactics, and that poor staff may be a reflection on their

unenterprising attitude and their misuse of available staff. Yet they sense a loss of prestige and a decline in occupational status and they suspect declining morale in the ranks as evidenced by turnover, absenteeism, staff association attitudes, and general malaise at lower levels. The ranks blame their leaders for their failure to admit weaknesses, to fight for police ideals against outside interference, to improve police conditions of employment, and to adapt police operations to changes in societal environment. They accuse them of relying too heavily on a para-military bureaucratic structure with a too rigid chain of command, strict subordination of staff, and lack of formal provision for consultation between ranks. They complain that police recruitment is too negative in approach, and that inadequate personnel management fails to hold good policemen, that police training courses are too short, too intermittent, and too restrictive in content and method; and that policemen are discouraged from using their initiative and there is no extra recognition for seeking difficult and dangerous tasks. They maintain that the fire-brigade model is inadequate. Society cannot afford public disorder and disregard for laws before police action is taken. Society now demands a pro-active not reactive police policy - one that anticipates problems and crises and actively heads them off, a police leadership that plans ahead, decides what tasks the police ought to assume or disclaim, how these tasks should be carried out, and what standards of performance should rule, and a police rank and file that is enterprising, innovative and rewarded for a highly professional

job. A negative image reflects negative policies: positive policies would make for a positive image. Something more is needed than more effective police leadership, better technical methods, more effective use of policemen, and a greater appreciation of administrative needs and quality controls. A much broader perspective of police work must be taken.

Traditionally the police have been expected to provide the following services:-

- protection of life and property when threatened by public disorder
- apprehension of apparent law-breakers and their pre-trial detention
- assistance to public authorities in enforcing the law
- protection of public dignitaries, buildings and documents
- assistance in public emergencies
- regulation of highway traffic
- border patrol
- public safety and suppression of violence
- crowd control at public ceremonies and events.

In addition, the police may be used to serve documents and provide other governmental services, supervise places of detention, test vehicles and drivers, undertake counter espionage and deploy themselves for civil defense and in emergencies engage in military activity. In autocratic regimes, they may also be used for political and party purposes, covering a wide variety of activities

from propaganda to genocide. On the whole these services are taken for granted by public and police alike. Public loss of confidence in policemen stems from inadequate performance of the services or the detection of less than ready enthusiasm to perform them, as for instance when police fail to respond to public requests of assistance deemed outside the narrow conception of police of their work.

Police have fixed conceptions of what they should do and perform other activities only with reluctance. They do not seem to respond to changing conditions and expectations. They waste policemen's time and qualifications. What does a spot check of police work reveal? Policemen are doing much that is not identifiably police work - they are typists, social workers, drivers, repairmen, cleaners, clerks - and much that is identifiably police work is being performed in such an outmoded fashion that they accomplish very little for the time and effort spent in dull routine activity of questionable value. How many police are actually doing police work? How much of the work being performed by police could be performed by somebody else? How could things be rearranged to put more police work in a policeman's work day? What is police work? What should policemen be doing? These are not idle questions. If policemen perform work that does not use their professional training, then they are being wasted and they cannot claim exceptional treatment for their professional expertise. If they are performing activities which others could do better or for which they are not properly

qualified, then society is the loser and the police must expect to be judged critically and found wanting. Each police force should ask itself what activities it should perform and how much of those activities need be performed by members of the police force and by career policemen.

(a) Protection of life and property when threatened by public disorder. The police perform this function in the place of the militia which in the modern state is reserved for external defence rather than internal security unless the situation threatens to get out of hand. The question is not one of police performance but of political initiative and operative methods.

(b) Apprehension of apparent law breakers and their pretrial detention. This task falls far short of the police oft quoted but unrealisable aim of crime prevention. The pursuit of the impossible had led to the dispersal of forces and persistence with a great deal of dull routine in the name of preventative action, at best, useful public relations, at worst, a complete waste of resources and manpower in soul destroying make-work. It is not within the power of the police to prevent crime however how many policemen are available and whatever the budget at their disposal. But they can play an important part in the minimization of crime, which is a more attainable objective. This means, however, that instead of dispersing forces, the police should concentrate on serious crime at the cost of law enforcement and minor crime, such as gambling, vagrancy, jaywalking, impersonation and so forth. Perhaps less attention would also be directed to crimes against

property with the transfer of responsibility for protection to property-owners, except where human life is endangered in the process of theft and arson. The police would not attempt the impossible task of minimizing all crime but concentrate on serious categories, such as murder, terrorism, rape, kidnapping, robbery with violence, aggravated assault and negligent manslaughter, that is, crimes against the person, and rely on periodical blitz campaigns on less serious crime to keep these within tolerable bounds.

In the minimization of crime the police have a positive role in defining crime, that is, the constant revision of the law and redefinition of crime and offenders, the sharing of responsibility of law enforcement with other organizations, and research into crime. What constitutes a crime varies between societies and in time. The police have a duty to themselves to press for changes in the law and treatment of offenders when they feel attitudes have changed and better methods are available for apprehension. Prevention activities could be transferred to insurance companies, other government agencies, and voluntary organizations. The police should review their current services to see what could be delegated or transferred to other bodies - public or private - and what could be performed indirectly through third parties such as welfare agencies, religious institutions and medical authorities in the case of juvenile prostitution and drug addiction. More investment in research and development in crime control is required, not only in crime detection techniques,

police laboratories and criminology, but also in apprehension, prosecution techniques, the measurement of police effectiveness or performance indicators, and the monitoring of current activities.

(c) Assistance to public authorities in law enforcement.

The multiplication of law enforcement agencies serves no particular purpose and confuses the public. The question is one of police capability in serving as adequate law enforcement agents for other public authorities. The law is becoming so complicated that there is a tendency to relieve the police from law enforcement activities and to establish separate autonomous investigatory services with police powers.

(d) Protection of public dignatories, buildings and documents. The police are also being relieved of bodyguard and custodian services which are of a special nature, thus releasing policemen for other police work. The police could resume these activities through special branches, providing police forces are prepared to break away from their traditional adherence to the concept of the generalist.

(e) Assistance in public emergencies. Undoubtedly the public in distress looks to the police for help and trust them to be of assistance. This instinctive reaction should be encouraged, not because the police may be in the best position to help (often they are not), but because public confidence in police performance depends on this first hand contact. It is good for the public to know that the police will help or will see that the proper help will be available. Where the police are not properly trained to

help, they should be in a position to channel all emergencies to the right authority. This means that police switchboards and patrols should be in constant touch or accessible to fire, ambulance, military, sea and air rescue, first aid, religious, psychiatric and such like services. Where such services do not exist, the police must encourage or provide suitable substitutes round the clock and monitor their performance. The police should assume the role of public guardian and protector of people in distress. But playing public nursemaid is not every police force's conception of its role. Who else is so well situated? The police have the contacts, facilities, courage and goodwill, and they already perform the role to a large extent.

(f) Regulation of highway traffic. The police are called upon to control only highway traffic, not traffic on canals, railroads, air terminals or ports. No other body seems willing to assume responsibility for the highways and the police have no choice or they claim that highway control is an integral part of police work. While the police cannot divest themselves of traffic control, they well could be rid altogether of responsibility for illegal parking, road worthiness (except for spot checks, unsafe loads, dangerous driving, and accidents), and driver competence, and responsibility for vehicle registration, driver licenses, accident reporting, insurance reports and road safety training could be made incidental rather than central to police work.

(g) Border patrol. Some police forces perform border control functions. They check passports and visas, issue entry and exit permits, and control all movements across the border. These functions could be transferred but with the international nature of organized crime and terrorism, it may be necessary to maintain reserve units at all major entry points.

(h) Public safety and suppression of violence. The maintenance of order is a prime function of the police who have to decide how much self-protection can be left to citizens through alternative arrangements and whether the alternative arrangements compare in standard and conduct with public police forces. In any event the police need an intelligence system that indicates potential troublesome areas and potential trouble makers, so that public disorder can be anticipated.

(i) Crowd control. Organizers of public events could be made responsible for crowd control arrangements but police control is probably more effective although the police could insist on better design of stadiums and public thoroughfares that would reduce the numbers of policemen needed.

How are all these activities to be organized for maximum effectiveness and minimum waste of resources and effort? To date police forces have trained recruits to perform all these activities and placed them wherever they had vacancies. The generalist policemen may be outmoded in large police forces.

His training encompasses so much that it may become superficial. Much may be wasted as he may not be called upon to use certain skills for long periods. Many aspects of police work are so highly specialized that it is either wasteful to transfer trained police personnel or difficult to recruit professionals who are willing to give up their civilian status. Police reorganization should therefore consider the employment of civilians outside a police career system for non-specialized police work, the division of police work into specialized career areas, the separation of the administrative hierarchy from the operational hierarchy such that the latter could be freed of administrative distractions and the former act in a supportative rather than controlling role.

Decision-Making.

One of the most important functions of people in organizations is to make decisions, preferably, of course, the right decisions. They must decide numerous things daily, everything from simple routine requests to complicated long range organizational objectives. Certainly decision-making is the most important activity of police leaders and the performance of police forces depends largely how well they make decisions. Police decision-making takes on a special significance because the functions performed by the police are so crucial to society and the public expects exceptional standards to be maintained at all times. For this reason, police discretion is strictly controlled and supervised and police forces take a cautionary approach. Police forces are

subject to special provisions. They deliberately elaborate their procedures. They adopt rigid hierarchical authority structures whereby senior officers direct and control their subordinates and strict accountability is exercised all the way down the line. Strict discipline is enforced and police freedoms are curtailed to minimize possible abuse of power and discretion. All these arrangements are designed to enforce conformity to decisions made by the most responsible, experienced and authoritative policemen.

Even so, considerable discretion exists all the way down the line, particularly at patrol level. The policeman is required to decide which calls for help should be answered, to judge the seriousness of public complaints, to determine whether to arrest, caution or ignore law breakers, when and how to act in self-defence, when to intervene in public gatherings and when to interfere with citizens' rights. Every action is watched. Every word is liable to misinterpretation. Policemen are proud of the trust and responsibility placed on them. They welcome every opportunity to learn the correct exercise of their duties and responsibilities and on the whole they respond well. Police decision-making has reached high standards of competence and correctness. Few crises are attributable to police forces. The public is alarmed on relatively few occasions. Scandals are rare. Though the record is commendable, there is little room for complacency. Every mistake has dire consequences.

Not surprisingly the public remains uneasy and unconvinced even when it has no cause to complain. But it rightly concerns itself about six common problems of police decision-making.

(a) Closed decision-making. A common public complaint is that few people have adequate access to police decisions. The police are accused of being too closed, too secretive, too isolated. They do not keep the public sufficiently informed of what the police are doing and too often keep the public guessing. It is suspected that the police excuse that they cannot be more open is used to cover up mistakes. Various solutions suggested include more effective use of police spokesmen, closer relations between police and mass media, wider distribution of police reports and pamphlets, more open days and exhibitions, an improvement in police courtesy, and additional police training in public relations.

(b) Unconveyed decisions. Policemen complain that they themselves do not know what decisions are made. The three most important shortcomings seem to be that police chiefs do not know what the ranks are doing, that is, headquarters is isolated from operations; that policemen do not know what their chiefs are doing, that is, operations staff do not know current policy; and that one part of operations does not know what another part is doing, even when they operate out of the same building. In short, there is lack of communication and insufficient circulation of information within the police, which results

in contradictory, bad, inexplicable and unjustifiable decisions.

In many large police forces, the chiefs are too distant from operations. Too many ranks separate them and they often deliberately isolate themselves, even confining themselves to their own rooms, never seeing anything for themselves but reliant on intermediaries to keep themselves informed of what happens at lower levels. They are chained to their desks because they do not delegate enough or too many demands are made on them. They are often told only what they want to hear because subordinates may fear that their words may be used against them. Suggestions to improve this situation include the reduction in hierarchical layers, greater delegation, more assistants for police chiefs, personal inspections and spots checks, better interpersonal relations, more informality and improved communications.

Where operations staff rarely hear directly from headquarters and have to rely on the inadequate circulation of formal documents, they do not get to know what is happening at headquarters or what changes in policy and methods have been decided. Operations staff tend to disregard the formal documents and discover higher level decisions with reluctance. Proposals to overcome these shortcomings include adequate circulation of documents and records, personal follow up briefings, greater self reliance in operations and routine, more frequent transfers between headquarters and operations staff, reduction of needless paperwork and routine, and the engagement of civilians in clerical work.

Every organization experiences occasional breakdowns in communications. It is natural for everyone, every unit, every section to concentrate on their special assignments and to view the rest of the organization from the narrow perspective. In many cases, no real reason exists why anyone should know what everyone else is doing and the cost of making sure people do is prohibitive. Even supposing those who have to know make it their business to know, often the need is not recognized and the business of getting to know is difficult. Possible ways of overcoming this difficulty include greater propensity to consult affected parties, more joint consultation, fostering informal contacts, adequate central communications and faster information retrieval.

(c) Top-heavy decision making. Too many decisions are made by police chiefs and them alone. They justify their monopoly by referring to their supervisory responsibilities and the need to minimize political embarrassment. Sometimes political overseers insist on the centralization of police power and strict accountability. Other times police chiefs use political supervision as an excuse to hide their distrust of subordinates or to cover incompetence at lower levels. Whatever the reason, top heavy decision-making is slow, involves considerable delays and results in many bottlenecks. It often ends in decisions inapplicable to the circumstances. Again a variety of measures could cover this situation - decentralized structure for operations and

and routine decisions, revision of regulations to permit greater delegation, formal executive development, career planning and job rotation, more self-direction, instant communications through electronic aids, and the adoption of an inverse decision-making structure whereby decisions are made as close to the point of action as possible.

(d) Reluctant decision-makers. All organizations have their share of reluctant decision-makers, particularly at lower levels of responsibility and authority. Policemen can be found at all levels who prefer to delay decisions, continually refer matters back and generally shuffle paper around. At top level, such policemen are misfits; they should be dropped as soon as they show sure signs of caution, feeble mindedness, senility or loss of nerve. At lower levels, policemen may be made that way by authoritarian leadership and the suppression of individual initiative. They are forced to become functionaries; decision-making, they are told, is somebody else's task. What is called for is an appointments and promotions system that tests decision-making abilities and stresses initiative and responsibility, rotation and easy transfers, greater group participation, proper recording of innovations and suggestions, confidential complaints review, reduction of authoritarian and paternalistic management styles, adequate recognition of leadership, and training in decision-making, sensitivity, human relations and problem-solving.

(e) Mistaken decisions. The police cannot be right every time. They make mistakes, which mass media and political overseers are quick to seize on. Why do police forces make mistakes? Lack of education (or sheer stupidity), lack of experience (because of high turnover, low staff mobility, maldistributed staff, low job variety), lack of knowledge, lack of sensitivity, lack of adequate safety precautions, lack of awareness of changing conditions, and lack of judgment or wisdom. Naturally mistakes result directly from inadequate organization, staff shortages, inadequate equipment, poor records, low level technology, short-sighted policies, and so forth, but failures in decision-making ability contribute and can be overcome by well-trained staff, job rotation and varied experience, reduced staff turnover, close police-community relations, error correction devices, forecasting and planning, enlarged information services, safety measures, innovative atmosphere, openness in business dealings, and constant self-evaluation and appraisal.

(f) Ignorance of decision-making tools. Many police forces have conducted their decision-making almost unchanged for decades despite the progress made in decision-making aids during this century. They still rely largely on native .. intelligence and knowledge of the situation. They fail to avail themselves of more up-to-date aids and to admit that innovations are desperately needed. While proud of advances in police science and technology, they fail to reveal that

investment in police research and development is low, that innovations have been forced on them, and that they employ few researchers and discourage external assistance. They still administer their affairs by rule of thumb. They spend little on discovering whether they get value for the money they spend. Economy they know, but not efficiency and cost-benefit ratios, performances measures, and decision-making tests. They fail to apply scientific methods to their operations and their administrative activities. Elementary scientific management they know, but not advances in organization theory and administrative behavior. Only relatively recently have police forces begun to recognize the significance of management sciences in police work, or, for that matter, the behavioral sciences even though police work is intimately related to human behavior. They lag far behind in their application of policy sciences and advances in decision-making technology. Most police forces need to increase their investment in police science and technology, encourage police research and development, support police science in institutes of higher learning, expand research, information and scientific liaison services, establish data banks, improve executive development, employ management-scientists, policy scientists, scientific management professionals, behavioral scientists and decision-making technology.

Manpower.

Police chiefs everywhere complain that they have insufficient policemen and the policemen they have are not of the required calibre. The overriding problem as far as they are concerned is to get more and better policemen. They blame their inability to attract a better quality recruit on various factors. Public service, more especially police work, has a declining occupational status. Nobody, it seems, wants to be a policeman anymore. Policemen even do not encourage their relatives and friends to join the police force. The public's image of the police is incorrect, or at least the picture portrayed in mass media. Few people understand what policemen do or appreciate the wide gap between image and reality. Police rewards are too low. The police cannot properly compete with other employers. Policemen have been underpaid for too long. Private policemen and custodians are often paid higher. Policemen are forced to moonlight. They often leave for higher paid jobs elsewhere. If policemen were paid more, police forces would be able to attract more and better recruits.

These assumptions are all too neat. It is not true that there is a universal shortage of policemen, and even city police forces which have laboured with many unfilled vacancies for years have attracted sufficient recruits but they have lost them. Furthermore they have not done enough to retain experienced policemen. Part of the chronic shortage of policemen is attributed

to high turnover and more stringent police standards. Many recruits attracted and retained are wasted on non-police work which could be done by others, thereby releasing them for the policework for which they were trained. Much police talent is wasted on outmoded, dull, routine work, which is monotonous and boring. Many recruits leave because their initial conception of police work is not realized. They seek variety and excitement in other jobs. The quality of police recruits is as high as it ever was, and thanks to improved selection methods, probably higher in potentiality. The talent is there but wasted. The initial training is good on the whole but there is insufficient follow up. Elaborate entry barriers could well be modified along with other changes in standard personnel practices. However, these do not tackle the fundamental personnel problems. They deal with superficialities not the compelling manpower shortcomings.

a) The doctrine of conformity.

Without discounting the problem of attraction and retention, the penetrating malaise of police forces which colours all manpower considerations is largely psychological. There are too many other-directed policemen, too few inner-directed. This is not due to lack of ambition, self-drive and low career expectations. It is due to the tightly structured hierarchical career pyramid and the paternal autocracy of those at the apex. Too many lower rank policemen worry about how they appear to their

superiors and what impression they make on them. They look for every clue as to what is correct behavior. When they do not know what is wanted, they are lost. They fall on the defensive, and play for safety by doing nothing or following precedent. They do not respond to inner conviction. They rarely do things because they believe them to be right. They are concerned that if they do, they will appear to be too headstrong, exceptional, and marked down for following independent conviction, not tradition or group norms. The results are only too apparent - an unwillingness to innovate, a reluctance to lead, suppression of frustration, ritualism without substance, an undistinguished and indistinguishable rank and file, and the search for the safe niche. Inner-directed policemen tend to leave or to settle for secure conformity. Higher ranks discourage departures and dampen the enthusiasm (which is too often described as recklessness) of the lower ranks; they may also prefer other directed policemen for advancement. Much of the training stamps a uniform pattern, which stresses adherence to rules and conformity, than self-initiative. Disciplinary procedures further discourage initiative.

Nobody suggests that the whole system should be abandoned. It is what it is for good reason - political control, public accountability, strict enforcement of standards, reliability of experience, operational dictates. It should be overhauled to accommodate inner-directed recruits, to encourage them to

be innovative, to speed their advancement, and to permit them to encourage their subordinates to be less orthodox. Many policemen in the lower ranks are waiting to respond to a change in attitude in institutional patterns that would base recognition and advancement on performance, not conformity to established ways. Otherwise the dull conservative image of policework will remain self-perpetuating. Bright people will not consider a police career, except as a last resort when they find other avenues of employment blocked. It will remain a refuge for those who value respectability, security, and conformity. Creative talent will not tolerate for any length of time being surrounded by a lot of dull, conformist types, prepared to put up with almost anything to stay, and to be set routine work which does not satisfy or permit one to show his real worth, not when one's superiors apparently do not care, and even favour sycophancy.

The police image has to be transformed from the inside into a dynamic, innovative force, abreast of its field, with the highest performance record, and a richly satisfying endeavour for all who undertake police work. Again the same points arise for consideration - review of police activities, reduction of dull routine work, employment of civilians on non-police work, more research and development, improved police technology, better facilities. These things can only be accomplished by a change in the attitude of police chiefs that would encourage

innovation, urgency, sense of purpose, and highlight results. They have to depart from the traditional master-servant relationship with lower ranks and see the whole as a cooperative enterprise, with everybody sharing in decisions and contributing to the common enterprise whatever he can, irrespective of status and rank. Certainly the caste system has to be modified. The new recruit has to feel part of a team, where everyone is concerned about his performance, and where good performance will be rewarded by speedier advancement, where, in short, the apex is accessible and reachable without a lifetime condemned to dull routine work, strict conformity and waiting for dead men's shoes. No amount of glossy advertising or improvements in material awards can overcome a recruit's disillusionment with his chosen career.

b) The generalist illusion. The concept of the all-round policeman (patrolman?) is dated. Police work is quite different from what it was twenty, forty or one hundred years ago. It is more demanding. It is probably more dangerous. It needs high level skills and a greater diversity of talent. For what is asked, the rewards are inadequate. Private policemen whose job is considerably easier are paid more. The answer is not just to pay public policemen more but to increase the professional content of their work, relieve them of as much non-professional (i.e. non-police) work as possible, and pay them as professionals, not public guards, so that they rank

alongside other public professionals in health, education and welfare fields. But first the professional content of police work has to be identified. The present generalist training is a good basis and serves as a good general induction to the police profession.

As large police forces have found, much more needs to be done and policemen must specialize. After induction and perhaps some time in a general introductory rotation, the policeman should be asked to choose his speciality with the understanding that he will be changed at some time in the future or he can request a change at any time. No policeman would be stuck with one speciality over his career, unless he specifically requested that he remain in that speciality or he is found wanting in other specialities. On the basis of specialities, career planning could be instituted to rotate every policeman in a systematic fashion from one speciality to another. Not only would this break monotony, it would give each member of the police force a thorough background and a variety of experience. Interspersed at various times, he would repeat or undertake a more advanced form of his initial induction courses so that despite specialization, each would maintain a certain minimum standard of performance in all aspects of police work if called upon in emergencies to lend a general hand. Career planning and job rotation would, of course, require considerably more personnel organization than currently provided. It would also

entail counselling services, continuous career training and education (a growing necessity anyway with changing methods and new technology), and performance rating. The professionalization of police work would enable policemen to devote more time to professional considerations rather than moonlighting, improve the police image of themselves and the respect for advances in the state of the art, and give added support for the establishment of police academies and police science faculties on a par with schools of social work and schools of education at university level, and somewhat wider in scope than current schools of criminology.

Just as school teachers gave up their gowns and schools employ other people besides schoolteachers, so police forces would find that not all policemen would wear uniforms and police establishments would not be confined to professional policemen. In certain specialities, it is undesirable for police to be identifiable as such or the necessity for wearing a distinctive uniform no longer exists except for ceremonial occasions. Nor, as has been repeatedly argued, is there any reason for policemen to do everything connected with the police function, from repairing police vehicles to typing reports in triplicate. Hopefully, police reluctance to recruit other occupations and professions would be overcome. Large police forces would be better off employing their own doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, social workers, laboratory technicians, geographers, sociologists

and management scientists, without their being police professionals or undergoing police induction courses.

Reciprocity should not be one-way. A police professional should not be tied to a particular police force or even to the police profession. At present policemen feel tied to police careers and specific police organizations. The whole police tradition locks them in. The pension scheme is a handicap to mobility. Yet there is no essential reason why policemen should remain faithful all their lives to the same job or that it should be deemed treasonable to leave the police for something else. The police would benefit from a greater interchange with other institutions and the public would welcome a less distant and isolated police. Policemen should not be discouraged from moving around and police arrangements should permit continuous staff turnover. Obviously pensions, for instance, should be transferable and portable, over the widest possible area.

c) Poor career prospects. Most policemen are confined to lower ranks; they will never be promoted high. Most, then, are faced with limited career prospects, which means, low rewards, low living standard, and no way out however one performs, except, of course, to leave or moonlight or exploit position for private gain. This is hardly an attractive proposition. Recognition for self initiative and performance and the professionalization of police careers will do much to improve the prospects. But not enough. The career system has to be regularized in such

a way that justice is done, seen to be done, and felt to be done. Regular performance rating, impartial selection and the right of appeal have to be guaranteed. Personnel ranking may have to be separated from position classification and organizational structures, so that more policemen can progress professionally to the top or through the career structure, without having to wait for vacancies at different organization levels. If not, then policemen have to be compensated in other directions for poor career prospects, high performance and organizational loyalty.

Naturally it would be beneficial if policemen received higher compensation and extended benefits. But the interest of the taxpayers also has to be considered as well as comparability with similar and related professions and occupations. Some system of comparability and pay research has to be established so that police gain automatic increases and their general conditions of employment are maintained on a par with related occupations. In particular police forces might well review their attitudes on overtime pay, incentives, special allowances for dangerous work, isolation, special qualifications, and hardship, and fringe benefit areas such as accommodation and rent, loans, auto insurance, maintenance and mileage, study aids, and vacations. A good hard look has to be made at the restriction of the political, civil and industrial rights of policemen. Weak police associations probably do more harm than good. - they raise expectations without offering the possibility of fulfilment. A strong police employee

organization which gains advances for the ranks can only enhance the position of police chiefs when differentials are maintained.

The feeling of just and better conditions of employment will do much to recompense policemen for their lot. If they were not so subservient to their superiors, they would feel even better. Many policemen are at the mercy of their chiefs. They have no right of representation, bargaining, appeal or third party arbitration. They complain of distance, estrangement, and lack of communications. They feel a general lack of understanding and sympathy with their predicament. They would prefer less formality in their dealings - a more informal atmosphere, more easy going personal relationships without any reflection on status, performance, qualifications, ethnic background, religion or age (and one might now add sex with the increasing employment of women in police work). Formality is irksome, undue formality irritable, excessive formality ridiculous. They want everyone to behave more naturally and drop some of the stuffiness of the official front. For those who cannot relax in official relations, sensitivity sessions should be provided.

Another common complaint is that nobody seems to care about the individual. People are treated like automatons or personnel files or just numbers. They are rudely shunted aside or cast off. They do not receive the help they request. They are expected to hide all personal feelings on the job. A well-oiled

machine may have soulless parts but a police force is an organization of human beings where each is an individual in his own right and wants to be treated as such. If the individual were made to count for something, the police would not need to restore sense of purpose and commitment to public safety or raise staff morale and public respect.

To summarize into simple prescriptions what needs to be done to overcome current manpower problems, the police need to do the following:

1. Improve the image of police work. Answer critics.
Display performance. Be proud of accomplishments.
Show willing to remedy public complaints and grievances. Boost public relations.
2. Stop good policemen leaving. Find out why they leave. Pay the market price for talent.
Accelerate the advancement of performers.
Expand job opportunities. Move staff around.
Back judgment and effort.
3. Redesign the organization to permit career planning and staff development. Minimize dead end jobs. Break down dull monotonous, routine, mechanical tasks. Provide continuous training and education.

4. Push for better conditions of employment. Compare living standards of the average career. Compete in perquisites. Review incentives. Instigate aggressive recruitment. Speed formal processing.
5. Revitalize the police profession. End dilution of professional duties. Reduce paper work. Recognize specialization. Reward performance. Provide career counselling. Offer training inducements.
6. Become more humane. Divide large uniform premises and halls. Introduce colour. Encourage informality and innovation. Treat staff as mature, responsible, trustworthy individuals. Share information and decision-making. Strengthen teamwork and mutual trust.
7. Provide adequate staff leadership. Employ troubleshooters. Look ahead and prepare in advance.

Instigating Innovation.

Throughout the analysis the lack of innovation in police forces has been referred to - lack of innovation in policy, decision-making and manpower, lack of innovation in organization, structure and process, lack of innovation in operations, activities and problem-solving. It is not to be inferred that innovation

in itself is valuable or that conservatism is outmoded. Rather, that if police forces are to survive in rapidly changing circumstances, they must change too. They must become different organizations. They must continuously transform themselves into something new. They must be innovative, that is, their leaders must innovate, encourage innovation, persuade the ranks to devise innovations and to accept innovations, and provide conditions for innovations. To stay in the same place in a rapidly changing world is, in fact, to fall behind - a deterioration that will eventually lead first, to complaint and criticism; second, to reduced performance and collapse of internal morale; third, to loss of talent and failure to replace experience; fourth, to lack of cohesion, coordination and cooperation; fifth, to failure, non-performance, or collapse in some areas; and sixth, to outside intervention to prevent further deterioration. Police forces tend to fall behind because they are sheltered more than most organizations by political supports and lack of financial measures by which to judge their performance of crucial societal functions. A police force that is too conservative, however, will sooner or later find itself outsmarted by innovative criminals and law breakers and unable to cope adequately with public disorders, organized crime, rising crime rates, traffic jams, smuggling and public discontent at growing insecurity, danger, corruption, violence, destruction and illegal imposition.

The capacity to innovate includes objective self-evaluation, continuous organizational overhaul (of objectives, policies, decision-making capacity, structure, regulations, communications, technology, processes, finances; manpower, public relations, and innovative capacity) and adoption of changes. One of the major responsibilities of police chiefs is to ensure that these activities are performed, despite practical difficulties. Available evidence suggests that many police forces fail to conduct continuous reviews and have difficulty in accepting, accommodating and assimilating change. They prefer the well-tried to risky innovations, and resent the struggle to improve on existing achievements. They have no competitors. Their clientele - the public - have no ready alternative. They can exploit their monopolistic position to cover inefficiency, ineffectiveness, stagnation and disinterest. They can continue for an appreciable time without innovation, making the minimum changes necessary for survival, not better performance. No self-respecting police force should tolerate such a state of affairs.

What should they do? They should be receptive to innovations and changes which aim to improve performance and effectiveness, increase efficiency and economy, heighten responsiveness, sensitivity and adaptability, and raise standards, more specifically, innovations

- that clarify objectives, define standards, improve measures and evaluation
- that better use resources, reduce budgets and manpower, minimize waste
- that improve techniques, processes and methods
- that meet community expectations, reduce complaints and criticism, overcome crises
- that solve problems, improve policies and decisions, anticipate future developments
- that raise morale, make police work more interesting and the police profession more attractive, promote good working relations, improve working conditions
- that increase cooperation and flexibility and minimize conflict.

Such innovations spring from creative people, that is, people who live to invent things, to speculate, conject, dream, to explore and discover new ground for themselves, to seek novel solutions to problems, people who are open to new vistas, receptive to new ideas, and eager to try something different.

Fortunate is the police force that contains creative people and encourages them to innovate.

Innovation is a valuable commodity. It needs to be nurtured, protected and cherished. The basic requirement is an innovating atmosphere, a creative environment in which the organization encourages its members and associates to innovate,

research, experiment and offer suggestions. The best source of practical and relevant innovations is the people known to the organization. They usually have the requisite knowledge, experience and talent and they are usually capable of producing better results than people unknown to the organization or even highly reputed experts. What is needed is stimulus and incentives to produce a sympathetic leadership willing to support staff efforts and protect risky innovations, open accessible, encouraging and innovation-minded, an organized system for acknowledging, rewarding and publicizing innovations, and allocation of time and finance for people working on innovations in their own time or as part of their job. The organization should stress the importance of innovation and impress this on its members and associates through example, advancement credits and outside testimony.

Structural arrangements have much to do with a creative environment and innovation. Too many levels of authority and concentration of decision-making on top leadership discourage innovation. More productive of creativity and initiative is an inverse hierarchy, one that decentralizes decision-making at operational level with the leadership responsible for supplying the necessary resources to enable the operational units to work effectively, providing uniform policy guidelines and advice, controlling key points, reviewing the whole organization, representing the organization to the outside, and controlling


economical centralized services, including computers. The operational units arrange local affairs in the light of local conditions within general guidelines and are free to change and innovate at will, as long as they perform satisfactorily. Departures from general guidelines require central authorization but otherwise the leadership supports local initiative. Local failures have local repercussions and penalize only the operational units concerned. Likewise, exceptional local performance is rewarded and the local people marked out for rapid advancement. In all this, information freely flows between operational units and the central leadership and among the operational units so that as far as possible anyone can find out what everyone else is doing and what innovations are being contemplated, implemented and abandoned.

Within the central leadership, control groups keep the information circulating. They also review the whole organization, evolve and apply criteria of performance evaluation, police operational units to see that they follow general guidelines, and advise on innovations. In addition, innovation is institutionalized by the provision of central advisory management services and the maintenance of a central research and development unit with support facilities. Special links between central leadership and the operational units are maintained in respect to formal arrangements for public relations, complaints and suggestions.

What all this amounts to is a radical change in police outlook. The focus needs to be shifted from the formal, static elements - such as institutional forms, methods, processes, laws, formal behavioral codes - to the behavioral dynamic elements that enable police forces to retain their flexibility and adapt themselves to new circumstances - such as organizational strategies, administrative politics, reform and innovation, change processes, informal behavior and self-corrective devices. They need to shift from bureaucratization, standardization and sugared coercion to self-activation, voluntarism, participative decision-making, conflict management, science, and open ended problem-solving. In training and education, they need to shift from accumulation of information to the development of personal skills. The production of conforming organization men needs to be leavened by a sprinkling of creative activists able to anticipate problems, mobilize resources in advance, devise appropriate solutions, adopt self-corrective measures and assess results and performance.

The Israeli Police for long an overly conservative organization has moved recently in this direction. It has broken out of its isolation. It has transformed its public relations, sought allies in the public arena and academia, expanded its training and education activities, recruited outside professionals, and begun an extensive reorganization of its policies, decision-making processes, manpower arrangements and innovative capacity. Traditional defense mechanisms were overcome by a change in top

leadership, the insistence on reform from within, the encouragement of internal innovation and change, the use of outsiders as catalytic change agents, and concentration on key areas and major shortcomings whose improvement would produce a chain reaction. A change in approach at the apex was immediately spotted by the ranks who responded in kind. Rarely had innovations to be forced on reluctant supervisors; experienced officers, long troubled about what they were doing, revealed their hearts and welcomed the winds of change; willing cooperation and participative decision-making overcame fears. Experiments were tried and tested, evaluated and either adopted generally or abandoned. Feedback was encouraged and used to modify innovations. Some fundamental changes were made, despite the heavy operational pressures resulting from a deterioration in internal security. The Israeli experience, as yet incomplete, suggests that police forces can be changed radically, given firm leadership, enlightened attitudes in the part of police chiefs, and loyal and devoted rank and file keen to upgrade the police profession.



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