

X National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

SUMMARY

OF

INSTITUTE RESEARCH

RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON

HOUSING SECURITY FOR THE ELDERLY

Prepared by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to support Mr. Leonard's testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Housing for the Elderly, July 21, 197

LEAA statistics on the amount, nature and impact of crime throughout the country indicate that the aged (65 years old and older) are generally no more likely to become victims of crime than other population groups. Early data from our national victimization survey indicate that for many crime categories the aged seem to be victimized less frequently than other groups. For all crimes against the person, the aged have only 60% as much chance of being victimized as the adult population as a whole. This, of course, may merely be a reflection of the fact that elderly persons, recognizing their vulnerability to personal attack, are more cautious and security conscious than other groups, and expose themselves less frequently to risk situations.

The one crime in which the aged seem to be victimized significantly more often than the rest of the population is personal larceny, pocket-picking and purse-snatching. Aged women report one-third more purses snatched than the rest of the population, and aged men report having their pockets picked 40% more frequently than the population as a whole.

The overall thrust of the data, however, while not diminishing the extent of the crime problem among the elderly, seems to indicate that the response of the criminal justice system to crime problems of the aged should not differ substantially from its response to the crime problems of the general population.

Studies and research findings sponsored by the LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, which are described below, are not addressed to the elderly, as a separate group, but are directed at reduction of crime among the entire population. In accordance with your request, Mr. Chairman, I will concentrate my remarks on those studies which have major implications for the reduction of the rate of crimes which victimize the residents of public housing projects, many of whom are elderly.

Research applicable to the crime problems in public housing

National Institute research which directly addresses the crime problem in large public housing projects may be divided into two broad categories: (1) research primarily concerned with the problem of "street crimes" (robbery, assault, etc.) occurring on the grounds and other public areas of housing projects; and (2) research designed to prevent crimes committed inside the individual dwelling unit (burglary, theft, etc.). Research efforts and findings in these two areas are described below.

Security in public areas of housing projects

The National Institute is sponsoring a project aimed at increasing security in the public areas of large residential complexes. This is an on-going study by Oscar Newman of New York University entitled "Architectural Design to Improve Security in Urban Residential Areas" (Grant No. NI 71-127). A handbook for architects, city planners and housing officials containing guidelines for the implementation of Mr. Newman's research findings is currently being prepared for publication.1/ Mr. Barry Hersh, a staff associate of Mr. Newman's, made a presentation of project findings to this subcommittee last October.

1/ The findings are further presented in two books which should be available this Fall:

Defensible Space: Crime Prevention thru Urban Design, Newman, 450 pages, MacMillan, New York.

Architectural Design for Crime Prevention, Newman, 350 pages, GPO, 1972.

The objective of this study is to determine whether, and in what way, the physical design of residential complexes can be modified to produce significant reductions in the rates of serious crime and vandalism in large developments. The study design included a comparison of crime rates in two large New York City housing projects before and after suggested modifications in the building design and landscaping had been made. LEAA is supporting Mr. Newman's design work and evaluation; the Department of HUD, through the N.Y.C. Housing Authority, is financing the actual modifications. The following section will briefly summarize the research approach and some of the principle findings of this project.

Variables being tested included: grouping of dwelling units, definition of grounds, design and placement of elevators, doors, lobbies, use of lighting and traffic patterns.

From this experimentation, Newman developed a system to apply to public housing projects the concept of "defensible space." This term is used to describe a multi-family residential environment in which the physical characteristics, building layout and site plan permit and encourage the inhabitants to control their own security. "Defensible space" includes a wide range of physical mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers, well-defined zones of influence, improved opportunities for surveillance -- all interrelated to create an environment which is monitored and controlled by residents.

Many of the Newman recommendations merely call for what one would expect to be a basic principle of building design in any high crime area, namely, design and placement of buildings to provide natural opportunities for surveillance of grounds and other public areas by residents themselves. Most of the crimes committed in housing projects occur in the public interiors of the buildings: lobbies, hallways, and elevators. These areas should be as visible as possible to passersby and residents. Lobbies can be designed so as to be well-lighted

and easily visible from the public street. Apartment windows may be juxtaposed with stairs and hallways to insure that all semi-private space comes under the natural surveillance of residents. Elevators, a frequent site of criminal activity, may be fitted with electronic surveillance devices, such as closed circuit t.v. cameras.

In planning the layout for the exterior grounds, our study recommends that building designers avoid the traditional public housing grouping of large numbers of high rises onto a huge superblock in which building entrances face the interior of the project rather than the public street. This random positioning of large high rises in housing projects usually results in a complicated system of interior access paths connecting the buildings. These paths usually have many sharp turns which prevent individuals from scanning the areas ahead of them. Very often shrubs and other greenery are planted in strategic locations along these paths. These serve as convenient hiding places for muggers, and add more to the danger felt by residents than to their aesthetic pleasures.

Locating buildings near public streets, on the other hand, permits observation of the building and adjacent grounds by pedestrians, passing motorists and police cars. This observation potential serves as a significant deterrent to crime. Statistics comparing the incidence of crime in lobbies and grounds of buildings which face on the street, with the number of crimes committed in buildings which face on interior project grounds, support the deterrent potential of placing buildings along well-traveled public streets.

Another architectural technique which may be employed to help reduce crime is designing the environment so that both residents and outsiders will perceive various portions of it as being under the sphere of influence of particular groups of residents. Clearly defined physical subdivisions can

encourage residents to adopt proprietary attitudes which serve as a natural deterrent to crime. Such real and symbolic barriers as: fences, a short run of steps and changes in the walking surface can all inform an individual that is passing from a public space into a private zone where his presence will require justification. By designing interiors of high density buildings so that, at each floor level, two to four families share a common corridor area, residents of that floor will consider that hallway to be an extension of their apartment, and will be likely to police the area themselves. By using building design to increase the sense of territoriality experiences by residents, Newman found that both vandalism of project property and crimes against residents committed by outsiders could be reduced by 25-40%.

Newman also had some rather optimistic findings concerning the ability of elderly residents of public housing projects, in particular, to protect themselves in high crime neighborhoods. The elderly, living together in separate buildings, were found to be able to provide for their own security more effectively than other residents of high crime areas. Retired persons, with a lot of time on their hands and a common desire to protect themselves from crime, frequently organized their own systems for building security in which they themselves serve as guards or doormen. Their shared age seems to give them a stronger sense of community than that usually found among residents of large buildings to which residents are assigned on a random basis. This strong sense of community, combined with the decreased demands on their time, placed them in a position to be more able and willing to take steps to protect themselves. Their age also served as an identifying factor which facilitated screening of intruders by residents.

Burglary Prevention Research

The National Institute is also supporting research designed to add to our understanding of burglary and determine the most effective preventive measures citizens can take against it. Studies in this area include:

- "Burglary: A Study of Its Character, Correlates, Correctives and Causes" (Grant NI 70-064), by Human Sciences Research, Inc. of McLean, Virginia.
- "Burglary Prevention" (Grant NI 70-088), by the City of Alexandria, Virginia.
- "Crimes in and Around Residences" (Grant NI 71-026-C-1, C-2), by Urban Systems and Research Engineering, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The third project, "Crimes In and Around Residences," is a four-phase effort initiated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to develop architectural and security system guidelines for HUD-supported housing. HUD is supplying most of the funding for the initial phases; $25,000 of the $288,024 for the first two phases was LEAA funds. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the LEAA has primary responsibility, however, for developing and monitoring these two phases. Early findings from this study (has been, will be) presented by a representative from HUD, in his testimony before the subcommittee.

Institute - The study of burglary by Human Sciences Research, Inc. is an on-going sponsored project which examines burglary as a process, in order to produce empirically based recommendations to aid in its prevention. The study focuses on the offense, the offender, the victim and the "non-victim." The first phase of the project included an analysis of the patterns of burglary and the patterns of victimization, both of place and of person. Among the findings of the first phase which would be applicable to our consideration of the needs of elderly persons was the unsurprising determination that non-victims of burglary were more likely to have taken simple precautionary measures against the threat of burglary than victims were. The most important recommendation made in the first-phase report was that the ordinary citizen be made to realize that, "by a series of simple, straightforward acts, he can affect the likelihood of his being burglarized." A substantial number of burglaries are the result of citizen carelessness. Citizens can diminish considerably their chances of being burglarized by:

1. Making sure that residential premises always appear to be occupied, especially during the day, when most residential burglaries occur.

2. Securing their premises, particularly when they are absent by: bolt-locking doors and windows and, in the case of single and double family residences, by extensive exterior lighting.

The remaining study tasks on this proejct include an analysis of differences between victims and non-victims in high risk areas, and an integration of the overall findings to identify effective prevention and control strategies. The final report should be useful in assisting elderly residents of high risk areas, such as public housing developments, to reduce their chances of being victimized.

The Burglary Prevention project presently being conducted by the City of Alexandria, Virginia has as its primary goal the development of a model city code for building security similar in concept to city fire and building codes. The project is also working to establish standards by which cost effectiveness of existing and newly developed protective devices may be measured. In addition, the project will design a campaign to educate the public to the need for utilizing security devices and procedures which seem to serve as a deterrent to burglary.

We feel that the development of a model building security code would be especially valuable to the elderly living in large housing projects. It would place the responsibility for choosing and purchasing minimal security devices on the building landlord rather than on the individual tenants, who may not have the expertise or the finances to act effectively on their own.

Implementation

These various projects, taken as a group, are furnishing us with significant and innovative approaches to the problem of crime in our larger cities. The burden of responsibility for prevention of crime does not have to fall so squarely on the police department alone, but may be shared by enlightened architects and city planners as well as by the whole body of citizens. The results of some of our research, especially the architectural design findings of Mr. Newman, have already been put into practice. We are confident that significant additions have been made to our understanding of how we can reduce the crime problems and the fear of crime experienced by all of our citizens, including the elderly; and that this increased understanding is already producing a safer environment in our cities.

We hope many
/ of the ideas developed through these and other LEAA studies are soon to be tested in the $40 million Impact Cities Program which LEAA is beginning this year. Eight major cities, Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland, and St. Louis will be used as testing laboratories for many of our research findings. Through this program, we hope to develop fuller understanding of both, the common problems encountered, and the practical advantages experienced, by cities converting research into action.

Special Projects

In addition to outside research conducted with National Institute / funds, our staff has recently undertaken several special in-house projects which focus on the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crimes and residential burglary.

The National Institute / helped develop minimum security guidelines for both homeowners and businessmen wishing to purchase crime insurance under the Federal Crime Insurance Program. Congress had included as a provision in the original legislation a requirement that protective devices be installed by all prospective policyholders.

To comply with this requirement, the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) in HUD asked the National Institute / to recommend guidelines for building security. The FIA based their initial security standards in the crime insurance program on these guidelines. In August of 1971, the program went into operation, on an experimental basis, in eleven of our highly urbanized states and the District of Columbia. Under the program, anyone who complies with the security standards may purchase crime insurance, regardless of the crime rate in his particular community or neighborhood. This program, though still in its infancy, has the potential not only of minimizing the financial losses resulting from burglary, but also of encouraging more widespread utilization of such minimum security devices as window locks and adequate door locks in high crime areas.

In April, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice sponsored a two-day seminar on the topic, Urban Design, Security and Crime. At this seminar, researchers from Institute- / supported projects in this area discussed their findings with representatives from LEAA regional and State offices, representatives from HUD and a number of other attendees from both government and the private sector interested in crime prevention.

Most of the project directors of the Institute / studies described above made presentations to the group. The primary objectives of the meeting were to provide an opportunity for the exchange of ideas, to bring local and regional officials up-to-date on current research findings, and thus to facilitate actual implementation of workable crime prevention techniques in our cities. As a direct result of this meeting, at least one major city's police department (Kansas City) has formally adopted the Security Guidelines we developed for the Federal Crime Insurance Program and is implementing them in a city-wide security action program. A number of other cities have also experssed an interest in conducting similar efforts.

Recommendations

Our recommendations for reducing the dangers encountered by elderly residents of public housing projects correspond to the two groupings of our research efforts in this area. These two sets of recommendations are:

1. Design directives to increase the safety of the grounds and other public areas of the development;

2. Measures to encourage use of basic burglary prevention devices inside residences.

Most of these recommendations can be implemented with little or no additional legislation. I recommend HUD adoption of these recommendations as minimum standards in all federally financed housing.

Design Directives for the Elderly

1. Individual buildings in housing projects should be set aside exclusively for the elderly.

Interviews with housing project residents indicate that the vast majority of elderly residents prefer to live in buildings with others of their age group. Elderly persons living in buildings with all age groups are frequently subject to intimidation or harrassment from the youths in the building. Also, as I mentioned earlier, elderly in a building of their own are usually better able to provide for their own security and seem more willing than most groups in the population to take security precautions even when they involve slight personal inconvenience.

2. The building entrance should be located in close proximity to a well-traveled public street and the entrance and lobby should be clearly visible from the street.

This is both for the convenience of those elderly who might have difficulty in walking great distances and for the safety of all persons entering and leaving the building.

3. A seating area with benches, checkerboard tables, fountains, etc. should be located near the building entrance and preferably should be visible from the street.

An outside area near the entrance where residents can congregate for socializing encourages natural surveillance of the immediate grounds by the residents. Conversely, people in this area can be observed from building windows by other residents who would be able to call for help if they observed any trouble in the area.

4. The mailbox area should be readily visible from outside the building. In addition, the individual mailboxes should be located inside a locked mailroom whose walls are made of unbreakable glass or other transparent material.

The elderly do not mind the effort required to unlock a mailroom door in addition to unlocking a mailbox door, if by making the added effort, they can reduce the chances of having their mailboxes pilfered. Most elderly are dependent on social security checks which must be mailed to them and which are frequently stolen from unprotected mailboxes in large projects.

5. All apartment doors should have peepholes fitted with wide angle lenses and an audio mechanism which permits residents, who may have difficulty hearing, to talk to outside persons before they open the door.

If an elderly person has to open the door to find out who is there, an intruder can easily force the door open and overpower him. Even a chain lock is not much help once the door is opened. A strong person would not have much difficulty breaking it.

6. A guard (either a paid person or a tenant when there are insufficient funds to hire someone) should be placed in the lobby at all times. The lobby should have an alarm button directly connected to the local police precinct.

Elderly tenants are quite willing to serve for 2 hour shifts as security guards in their own buildings. The tenant guard would merely be expected to notify the police of any trouble, he would not take direct action himself.

Government Incentives for More Widespread Use of Burglary Prevention Devices

An important function of the federal government in the war against crime should be to encourage citizens to make their residences secure against the threat of crime.

Tax deduction for security expenditures

One incentive to citizens, which would be relatively simple to implement, would be to allow individuals to deduct expenditures for security devices in their residences from their federal income tax. This amendment to the present tax law would be an incentive to all income groups to provide for their own security. By encouraging individuals to protect their residences in the same manner that it encourages businessmen to protect commercial establishments, the federal government would be taking a relatively effortless, but nevertheless significant, step toward reducing residential crime throughout the country.

Minimum security codes

Although allowance of an income tax deduction for security expenses would be an incentive available to all groups, its impact could be expected to be greatest among middle-income groups. Many low income persons, the most frequent victims of crime, would not be able to afford adequate security devices even with the tax incentive. In low income residences, especially public housing projects, the only way to assure that every residence has a minimal degree of security is to place the requirement to maintain an adequate level of building security on the landlord or agency administering the project, rather than on the tenants. The most logical method of enforcing minimum security requirements in low income residential buildings is through inclusion of security requirements in the building code. The establishment of building

codes regulating construction requirements has traditionally, however, been a responsibility of the individual localities, not the federal government. Each locality includes its own code provisions for protecting building residents from fire and health hazards. Protecting residents from crime has only quite recently been included as a part of local building codes. Building security requirements are presently included in code regulations in only a handful of communities.

Although the federal government lacks the authority to implement compulsory security requirements which would be applicable to all multiple dwelling units throughout the country, it does have the ability to implement minimum security provisions for the construction of federally-sponsored housing projects. Most government-sponsored projects are constructed for low and middle income persons, those who are most likely to be victimized by crime and those who are most likely to lack the funds for purchasing adequate security devices to protect themselves.

Minimum security requirements for the entire building and for the individual dwelling units should be made the landlord's responsibility. All new projects constructed with federal funds should be subject to minimum federal security requirements. Old buildings could be given an appropriate period of time in which to comply with the new regulations.

The minimum security regulations could be made as basic or as elaborate as necessary: from the simple requirement of a dead bolt lock (or one of at least equal effectiveness) in each dwelling unit, to a system of security requirements which vary according to the crime rate in a particular area.

One problem in implementation of minimum requirements is, of course, the present lack of standards for security devices. Although we do not yet have a definitive complete set of standards for security devices, there does seem to be enough research already completed, by the Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory and the Alexandria Burglary project for example, to begin to address the critical need for implementation of minimal standards.

A system of minimum federal security standards could also be used as a condition for Federal Housing Authority approval of loans for existing dwellings.

The LEAA, therefore, recommends that the Congress require minimum security standards be established and implemented as soon as possible for all newly constructed residential buildings for which federal funds are used. Although the federal government could not compel privately-owned buildings to meet these requirements, the establishment of a workable minimum security code by the federal government could serve as a model code which could be adapted by localities interested in incorporating security requirements into their building codes. In this way, the federal government, by taking the initiative, would add greatly to the safety of residents of public housing units and other low income persons as well.

Department of Justice

TESTIMONY

OF

JERRIS LEONARD

ADMINISTRATOR

LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

BEFORE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY

SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

AUGUST 2, 1972

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today about the efforts of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to reduce criminal victimization among the elderly.

As I understand it, the basic question of this subcommittee is how the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is attacking the crime problems of our senior citizens, especially in the area of housing security.

In order to answer that question, I feel that I should first briefly explain how LEAA is attempting to reduce the risk of criminal victimization for all segments of the population living in high-crime urban areas.

Although our recent experimental victimization studies in two pilot cities do not indicate that senior citizens are more vulnerable to urban crime than the general population, LEAA recognizes the possibility that the elderly may experience special crime problems when inhabiting public housing in high-crime districts.

Fear of crime is, of course, an especially debilitating problem for a senior citizen who feels helpless and threatened in the city, and LEAA is striving to eliminate both the fear and the fact of criminal victimization for the entire urban population through our comprehensive anti-crime program.

Violent street crime--muggings, assaults, rapes--are ever-present spectres in the lives of nearly every urban-dweller in America today.

Burglary is an equally distressing threat to people of every age, race and socio-economic group in many of our cities.

LEAA has always recognized the special crime problems of our large cities, and has responded with priority assistance to such high crime areas. In most cases, the largest part of our block action grants are redistributed through the states to local governments on the basis of need, and substantial protions of these funds are passed on to cities with high crime rates.

In addition, a significant amount of LEAA's discretionary grants, which are awarded directly to specific anti-crime projects, have been distributed to law enforcement programs in high-crime urban areas.

But we have determined that even this considerable aid is not sufficient for our goal of a rapid decrease in urban crime, so we have instituted a new High Impact Program designed to achieve a dramatic reduction in burglary and street crime in eight large cities chosen because of their high crime rates.

During calendar years 1972 and 1973, $160 million in special LEAA funds will be distributed to the eight cities for comprehensive law enforcement programs to improve anti-crime patrol methods by police, to increase the number of patrolmen on the beat, and to supplement transportation and communication equipment with helicopters and new dispatching systems. Our goal is to reduce burglary and street crime in each of the cities by five percent in the next two years, and to pave the way for a twenty percent decrease at the end of five years.

We realize that even so comprehensive a program as this is only a beginning, but we believe that the new information obtained through program evaluations in the eight cities will be invaluable to law enforcement authorities in any urban area that wishes to initiate a similar all-out anti-crime effort.

To facilitate the availability of High Impact Program information to all criminal justice agencies, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, which is the research arm of LEAA, has already compiled a document entitled, "Planning Guidelines and Programs to Reduce Crime," containing outlines of programs to be implemented through the High Impact Program and a questionnaire containing guidelines for data-collection and program evaluations for the High Impact cities. Both of these documents are now available to all interested law enforcement agencies.

These programs are targeted at urban crime rather than at any particular kind of urban victim. But I mention them here because I believe that they will have significant impact on senior citizens living in the many housing projects located in high crime areas.

Let me now turn to the special crime problems of the elderly.

Common sense tells us that since elderly people are less able to resist a criminal assault, they would be more attractive victims to a street criminal or burglar. Available crime victimization statistics however, seem to indicate the opposite.

Age breakdowns of the victims of crime in the U. S. indicate that senior citizens are no more likely to be victimized by crime than

any other segment of the population. In fact, taking into account all common crimes, the statistics show that the elderly have only sixty percent as much chance of being victimized as have the rest of the adult population.

How might this contradiction between our common sense notion and the crime victimization statistics be resolved?

First we must recognize that victim rates obtained from these statistics on the national incidence of crime relate the number of elderly victims to the total number of senior citizens now living in the U. S.

Unfortunately, the current data does not reveal how many senior citizens are actually exposed to a high crime-risks situation in a given period of time. A more meaningful rate of victimization would relate the number of elderly victims with the number of senior citizens actually exposed to these risks. We have many reasons to believe that a significant number of persons are seldom or never in high crime-risk situations, and this fact would tend to obscure the actual vulnerability of senior citizens to criminal attack.

For instance, a retired person who spends most of his time at home is less likely to be mugged than a younger person who is on the street five days a week going to and from work.

Similarly, persons in a nursing home, while perhaps running considerable medical risks, are not likely to have their pockets picked or purses snatched.

Finally and most importantly, a senior citizen who either locks himself in his apartment in fear of ever venturing out into a once familiar and safe neighborhood, or one who must take elaborate and unpleasant precautions whenever taking a short trip through an urban area does, in fact, reduce the chances of being victimized by crime. This safety is, of course, tenuous at best and purchased dearly at the cost of personal liberty and peace of mind.

So we can easily speculate that a serious crime victimization problem for the elderly may reside beneath the aggregate statistics. Whether because of retirement, infirmity, or fear, many senior citizens may never experience a high crime-risk situation.

Moreover, there is some statistical evidence which suggests that the elderly are more vulnerable than younger people when exposed to the risk of victimization. When living in public housing projects in high crime areas the elderly may be victimized twice as often as other residents, as indicated by Public Housing Researcher Oscar Newman in a survey of public housing projects in New York City sponsored by our National Institute. Also, elderly people report more incidents of purse-snatching and pocket-picking than any other segment of the population.

Let me now report on how LEAA is addressing itself to these specific crime problems of the elderely.

In addition to the block grant and High Impact programs I have mentioned, LEAA has awarded a number of discretionary grants that directly affect senior citizens.

I have submitted to your subcommittee copies of ten discretionary grant announcements with program summaries. All of these grants fund programs designed to increase internal security in housing projects, and each of the housing projects has a significant percentage of elderly tenants. The Federal share for these grants totals $1,102,891 and the types of projects instituted are special internal police patrols, police-tenant cooperative security programs. resident civilian security patrols, and surveillance and monitoring equipment purchases.

The elderly residents of the housing projects affected by these grants should benefit generally in the same ways as tenants belonging to other age groups.

There are, however, some special benefits for the senior citizens, both general and specific.

The fear of falling victim to crime is probably most intense among the elderly. Senior citizens often have general insecurity problems, and the fear of crime adds greatly to them. The fact is that these fears are very often justified by the high crime rates of many urban neighborhoods, and we cannot presume to reassure the elderly or anyone else until a comprehensive reduction in all street crimes and burglary is achieved.

But we have learned from our research projects that we can at relatively low cost reduce both the fears and the fact of crime among the elderly within their apartments and in the halls of their housing projects.

Internal security patrols provide a visible and frequent reminder to the senior citizens that protection and assistance are close at hand, and we have been informed by housing program directors that the psychological value of security patrols is especially appreciated by elderly tenants.

In addition to such general psychological benefits, the senior citizens in some of the housing projects funded by LEAA discretionary grants receive special services under the programs. One example of this occurs in the Springfield, Mass. "Vertical Policing Project," where both a twice-daily door-check for the elderly and an errand service for disabled senior citizens are included along with the regular duties of security personnel. The Springfield program director reports that the door-check has become an appreciated daily routine for the elderly tenants, and that security personnel performing this service have already discovered a number of elderly persons who had fallen unconscious and were in need of immediate hospitalization.

General services such as the Springfield project's errand service are included in a number of the other housing projects as well, and while these services are not directly related to fighting crime, the program directors report that they are valuable as a means to integrate the senior citizens in the tenant community and familiarize them with available security programs.

LEAA has begun also to fund programs which enlist senior citizens as para-professional aides in the areas of housing security and community relations.

The "Vertical Policing Service" of Cleveland, Ohio, serves a number of apartment complexes populated entirely by senior citizens, and the program is staffed by the elderly residents themselves.

With the assistance of professional advisors, the senior citizens in this GUIDE program perform monitoring and information services for the other tenants and visitors. Although the senior citizen "guides" cannot be expected to function as an internal policing force, they have been very effective in informing local law enforcement authorities of unauthorized persons in or around the housing project, and in providing a liaison between tenants and local community service organizations.

We have been informed by the program directors of this and other community relations programs involving the elderly that senior citizens usually make excellent aides, and take great, unselfish pleasure in serving their communities.

In addition to these discretionary action grant programs, LEAA is sponsoring a number of housing security research projects through our National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

National Institute research projects which directly address the crime problem in large public housing projects may be divided into two broad categories:

1. research primarily concerned with the problem of street crimes such as robbery and assault;

2. research designed to prevent crimes committed inside the private dwelling unite such as burglary and household theft.

Concerning the first category of on-grounds security, the National Institute is sponsoring an ongoing study entitled "Architectural Design to Improve Security in Urban Residential Areas," headed by Oscar Newman of New York University. LEAA is supporting Mr. Newman's design work and evaluation; the Department of Housing and Urban Development is financing the actual modifications through the New York City Housing Authority.

Mr. Newman's project is testing such variables as the grouping of dwelling units, the definition of grounds, the design and placement of elevators, doors, and lobbies, and the use of lighting in order to determine whether, and in what ways the physical design of residential complexes can be modified to reduce crime.

The goal of this study is to develop a system by which the concept of "defensible space" can be systematically applied to the construction and renovation of public housing projects. "Defensible space" is defined as an environment which permits and encourages residents to control their own security, and it can be created by designing all areas of a housing complex to be easily and frequently surveyed by the tenants or the surrounding community.

For example, Mr. Newman's report recommends that public interiors, in which most crimes occur, should be as visible as possible to residents and passersby, that lobbies be well-lit and visible from a public street, that semi-private spaces such as paths and hallways be overlooked by apartment windows, and that elevators be monitored with electronic surveillance devices.

Similarly, the report advises designers of high-rise complexes to avoid the fortress-like super-block grouping in favor of individual buildings opening onto public streets, since the enclosed courtyards of a super-block complex often contain areas that are cut off from the view of tenants and passersby, and are therefore conducive to criminal assault.

Another way in which "defensible space" can be created is through the separation of apartment complexes into individual spheres of influence. Clearly defined physical subdivisions can encourage residents to adopt proprietary attitudes which serve as a natural deterrent to crime.

This last recommendation has special relevance for senior citizens. The elderly were found to have a particularly strong sense of community when living with fellow senior citizens, and they are known often to organize systems for apartment security and public area surveillance on their own initiative. In this area of housing security, senior citizens proved to be a step ahead of our architects and criminal justice researchers.

Although Mr. Newman's project is not yet completed, a handbook for architects, city-planners, and housing officials containing guidelines for the implementation of Mr. Newman's findings to date is now being prepared for publication.

Let me now turn to the second category of research projects which study crimes committed inside individual dwelling units.

Of these research projects, those dealing specifically with burglary have the most potential impact on the housing security problems of the elderly.

A National Institute-sponsored study in McLean, Virginia, is currently investigating patterns of burglary and victimization. To this date, the project has discovered that non-victims of burglary differ from victims primarily according to security precautions undertaken. In the language of the first-phase report on this study, an average citizen "by a series of simple, straightforward acts can affect the likelihood of being burglarized."

In other words, the common-sense precautions of leaving interiors lit during absense, bolt-locking doors and windows, and employing exterior lighting were significant deterrents to burglary. Such simple precautions should be well within the physical and financial capabilities of most elderly homeowners and apartment dwellers, and the study did not uncover any special burglary problems among senior citizens which would require additional security measures.

Another National Institute-sponsored study in Alexandria, Virginia, is seeking to develop a model city code for building security similar to existing fire and building codes. If adopted, such a code should be especially beneficial to those senior citizens who, whether because of poverty, or infirmity. are unable to avail themselves of security devices, since the code would require by law that landlords supply these devices.

As for evaluating the effectiveness of either our action grant or research programs, it is difficult to assess their impact on the elderly persons in isolation from the rest of the population affected by the programs.

Exact population breakdowns are unavailable for most of the housing projects receiving aid from LEAA, and even if these figures were known it would be artificial merely to use the percentage of elderly as a guide for their share of funds allocated or services delivered. Unless the housing projects receiving LEAA funds are populated entirely by senior citizens, we can neither tailor our grant requirements to the specific needs of the elderly nor evaluate the impact of any LEAA dollar on the specific crime problems of senior citizens.

This difficulty is not simply one of program evaluation, however; it indicates a more fundamental problem in targeting funds at the specific security problems which admittedly are faced by senior citizens.

We have learned from surveys conducted by our National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice that elderly tenants suffer greater crime problems when living in housing projects that are predominantly populated by younger tenants. Accordingly, our statistics show that elderly tenants are least likely to be crime victims when occupying housing that is restricted to senior citizens alone.

The advantages of restricted housing for the elderly are many. The most compelling is that elderly people are victimized not by their own age group, but by young criminals for whom a senior citizen represents a relatively helpless victim. There are numerous instances in which elderly tenants of mixed housing units are burglarized or assaulted by younger tenants in the same housing projects.

As for security, it is much easier to monitor potential criminals in housing projects inhabited entirely by senior citizens. In such projects,

any younger person who is seen inside the building or on the grounds can be immediately indentified as an outsider and challenged as to his business. In this way, any potential danger can usually be stopped at the front door.

Moreover, interviews conducted as part of the Oscar Newman Study with housing project residents indicate that the vast majority of elderly residents of public housing in New York City prefer to live in buildings with others of their own age group. Also, as I mentioned previously, senior citizens in a building of their own are usually better able to provide for their own security and seem more willing than most groups to participate in cooperative security programs even at the expense of some personal inconvenience.

Finally, study of the specific crime problems of the elderly can be controlled only in areas or buildings in which senior citizens constitute the majority of the population.

My first general recommendation is, therefore, that restricted housing units within projects be encouraged for senior citizens, especially in high-crime urban areas.

I would also like to make the following more specific recommendations for the subcommittee's considerations based on the findings I have reported. These recommendations will receive further study by LEAA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to determine the most appropriate means of implementation.

1. Building entrances should be located in close proximity to a well-travelled public street. This is both for the convenience of those senior citizens who might have difficulty in walking great distances and for the safety of all persons entering and leaving the building.

2. An outdoor meeting-place with benches and tables should be established near building entrances. Such areas where residents can congregate would encourage the natural surveillance of all those entering the building.

3. Mailbox areas should be readily visible from the outside of the building. In addition, individual mailboxes should be located inside a locked mailroom with walls made of an unbreakable transparent material. Such precautions should reduce the theft of social security checks, which is a serious crime problem for senior citizens living in large housing projects.

4. All apartment doors should have peepholes fitted with wide-angle lenses and audio mechanisms which permit residents to hear and see outside persons without opening their doors.

5. Either a paid guard or a tenant should be on duty in the lobby at all times, and he should be supplied with an alarm button directly connected to the local police precinct.

I believe that these recommendations can be implememted in public housing projects receiving federal aid with no additional legislation.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the comprehensive anti-crime efforts of LEAA.

We must recongnize that the threat of criminal victimization will perisist for many in the U. S. until a significant reduction in all types of crime is achieved. While the special security problems of senior citizens can often be attacked categorically through specific programs, their ultimate safety from criminal assault can be insured only when all segments of the population are liberated from both the fact and fear of crime.

LEAA is dedicated to the realization of this goal, and although much work still needs to be done, there are a number of indications that a significant reduction in crime is no longer beyond our reach.

First quarter FBI statistics for 1972 show that the overall increase in crime across the nation is down to one percent--by far the lowest rate of increase in more than a decade; and the crime rates in eighty major U. S. cities have actually decreased in the first quarter of 1972.

Finally, I would like to assure the subcommittee that LEAA will continue to fund special anti-crime programs to prevent the victimization of the elderly, and we shall continue reviewing all of our major anti-crime efforts to discover ways in which new information can be applied to further reduce the crime problems of our senior citizems.

At this time, I would be pleased to answer any questions the subcommittee may wish to ask.

DRAFT

Public Housing

Security for the Elderly

The elderly are at a disadvantage when it comes to crime prevention and protection against crime. However, there are recommendations for reducing the dangers encountered by elderly residents of public housing projects. The main two groupings of research efforts are:

A. Design directives to increase the safety of the grounds and other public areas of the development; and

B. Measures to encourage use of basic burglary prevention devices inside residences.

Most of these recommendations can be implemented with little or no additional legislation.

Design Directives for the Elderly

1. Individual buildings in housing projects should be set aside exclusively for the elderly. [interviews with publich housing residents indicate that the majority of senior citizens prefer to live in buildings with others of their age group.]

2. The building entrance should be located in close proximity to a well-traveled public street and the entrance and lobby should be clearly visible from the street. [A convenience for senior citizens who might have difficulty in walking great distances.]

3. A seating area with benches, checkerboard tables, fountains, etc. should be located near the building entrance and preferably should be visible from the street. [This is for socializing purposes, as well as for observation and emergency reasons].

4. The mailbox should be readily visible from outside the building and individual mailboxes should be located inside a locked mailroom whose walls are made of transparent material.

5. All apartment doors should have peepholds fitted wtih wide angle lenses and an audio mechanism which permits residents, who have difficulty hearing, to talk to persons at their door.

6. A guard should be placed in the lobby at all times. The lobby should have an alarm button directly connected to the local police precinct.

There are various recommendations for minimum security that are proposed for all types of living quarters. The following security guidelines are given for Multiple Family Dwellings, unless otherwise stated.

Multiple Family Dwellings:

I. Exterior Doors:

Exterior doors into these structures shall be equipped with self-closing devices.

A. Main entrance doors shall have self-locking dead latch devices with a minimum throw of 1/2 inch requiring a key to be used to gain access to the interior (unless a security guard is available in which case the door will be monitored).

B. Secondary doors to firestairs, incinerator areas shall have self-locking dead latch devices with a minimum throw of 1/2 inch. No provision of knob, key, or other hardware shall be provided on the exterior of the door.

[For the Single Family Dwelling exterior doors (non-glass panel doors) and doors leading to garage areas into private family dwellings shall be solid core no less than 1 3/4 inches thickness. Exterior doors and doors leading from garage areas shall have self-locking latch devices with a minimum throw of 1/2 inch.]

C. Glass panel doors and glass panels adjacent to the door frame be secured as follows:

1. rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material, or
2. the glass shall be covered with iron or steel bars of at least 1/2 inch round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, placed not more than five inches apart, fastened on the inside of the glazing, or
3. iron or steel grills of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh fastened on the inside of the glazing.

D. Exterior doors swinging out shall have non-removal hinge pins.

E. Exterior doors swinging-in shall have rabbeted jambs.

F. Jambs for all doors shall be constructed or protected to prevent violation of the function of the strike.

II. Sliding-Patio Doors opening into patios or balconies at ground level:

A. All single sliding patio doors shall have the movable section of the door sliding on the inside of the fixed portion of the door, or be so locked it cannot be lifted from its track.

B. Dead locks shall be provided on all single sliding patio doors. The lock shall be operable from the outside by a key utilizing a bored lock cylinder of pin tumbler construction.

Interior Doors: (other than doors in living units of motels)

The doors shall be equipped with self-closing devices.

A. Garage doors shall have self-locking dead latch devices with a minimum of 1/2 inch throw requiring a key to be used to gain access to the interior.

B. Starwell doors shall have self-locking dead latch devices with a minimum of 1/2 inch throw. The door shall allow entrance to the stairwell but not exit from the stairwell [except that exit from the stairwell will be provided on all floors six stories and above.]

C. Doors to Dwelling Units:

1. All wood doors shall be of solid core with a minimum thickness of 1 3/4 inches.
2. Swinging entrance doors to individual units shall have deadbolts with one inch minimum throw hardened material in addition to deadlatches with 1/2 inch minimum throw. The locks shall be so constructed that both deadbold and deadlatch can be retracted by a single action of the inside door knob.

3. Doors swinging out shall have non-removable hinge pins. If the hinge screws are accessible the screws shall be of the non-removable type.
4. Doors swinging-in shall have rabbeted jambs.

III. Window and Transom Protection:

A. Windows shall be so constructed that when the window is locked it cannot be lifted from the mounting frame.

B. Window locking devices shall be capable of withstanding a force of 300 pounds applied in any direction on the frame and be unaffected by manually applied vibrating motion.

C. All windows with opening sash within 8 feet of ground level or otherwise accessible shall be protected with any of the following:

1. rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material, or iron or steel bars of at least one-half inch round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced not more than five inches apart, fastened on the inside of the glazing and covering the glass, or
2. iron or steel grills of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh fastened on the inside of the glazing.

Special Detection Devices

It is very important that people become aware of and start to use special detection devices, as well as good locks. For example, it is imperative that public housing authorities realize the value in using mirrors to monitor hallways and t.v. cameras to monitor elevators.

If a public housing authority determines that security measures recommended do not adequately secure the building, the installation of a special detection device (i.e., a burglary alarm system) should be required. There are several types of detection devices:

1. The Silent Alarm - which is connected either to the police precinct or to the lobby or to the headquarters of the security personnel.

2. The Local Alarm - bell located outside of premise. This alarm can be used in homes, etc.

Alarms should be installed on all entrances and exists of public housing buildings.

The mirror and TV camera can be most effective in monitoring those parts of a building where many crimes take place -- the hallway, the stairway, the elevator and the laundry room. The mirror can be used most effectively in hallways while the TV camera is excellent in monitoring elevators, laundry rooms, exit doors, lobbies and hallways. The two devices are a great safety asset to both the tenant and the security officer.

Minimum Building Security Guidelines

Part 1. Commercial Security Guidelines

I. Exterior Doors:

(Any building requiring panic proof hardware locks on exit doors shall be exempt from the exterior door locking security guidelines).

All exterior doors shall be secured as follows:

A. A single door shall be secured with either a double cylinder deadbolt or a single cylinder deadbolt without a turnpiece with a minimum throw of one inch. Any deadbolt must contain hardened material to repel attempts at cutting through the bolt.

B. On pairs of doors, the active leaf (door) shall be secured with the type lock required for single doors in (A) above. The inactive leaf shall be equipped with throw bolts at top and bottom with a minimum throw of 5/8 inch. The throw bolts must contain hardened material.

C. All doors which require locking at top and bottom shall be secured with throw bolts at both top and bottom with a minimum throw of 5/8 inch. The throw bolts must contain hardened material.

D. Lock cylinders shall be designed or protected so they cannot be gripped by pliers or other wrenching devices.

E. Rolling doors, solid swinging, sliding or accordion garage-type doors, both vertical and horizontal, shall be secured with a cylinder lock, when not otherwise controlled or locked by electric power operation.

F. Metal accordion, grate, or grill-type doors shall be equipped with metal guide track at top and bottom, and a cylinder lock and/or padlock with hardened steel shackle and minimum five pin tumbler operation, with non-removable key when in an unlocked position. The bottom track shall be so designed that the door cannot be lifted from the track when the door is in a locked position.

G. Outside hinges on all exterior doors shall be provided with non-removable pins when using pin-type hinges. If the hinge screws are accessible, the screws shall be of non-revable type.

H. Glass panel doors and glass panels adjacent to the door frame shall be secured as follows:

1. rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material, or
2. the glass shall be covered with iron bars of at least one half-inch round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced not more than five inches apart, fastened on the inside of the glazing, or
3. iron or steel grills of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh fastened on the inside of the glazing.

I. Inswinging doors shall have rabbeted jambs.

J. Wood doors, not of solid core construction, or with panels therein less than 1 3/8" thick, shall be covered on the outside with at least 16 gauge sheet steel or its equivalent attached with 1/4" carriage bolts on minimum 18" centers penetrating through the door and fastened on the inside with nuts and flat washers.

K. Jambs for all doors shall be constructed or protected so as to prevent violation of the function of the strike.

L. All exterior doors shall be illuminated with a minimum of a 60 watt bulb. Such bulb shall be protected with a vapor-tight cover

1. rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material, or
2. outside iron bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced no more than 5" apart, or
3. outside iron or steel grills of at least 1/8"material of 2" mesh, and the window barrier shall be secured with carriage bolts with the head outside.

B. If the accessible window is of the openable type, it shall be secured on the inside with a locking device capable of withstanding a force of 300 pounds applied in any direction on the frame.

C. Jalousie windows shall not be used within eight feet of ground level, adjacent structures or fire escapes.

D. Outside hinges on all accessible windows shall be provided with non-removable pins. If the hinge screws are accessible, the screws shall be of non-removable type.

IV. Roof Openings:

A. All glass skylights on the roof of any building or premises used for business purposes shall be provided with:

1. rated burglary resistant glass or glass-like material, or
2. iron bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced no more than 5 inches apart, inside the skylight and securely fastened, or
3. an iron or steel grill of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh inside the skylight and securely fastened.

or cover of equal break resistant material.

II. Sliding Patio Doors opending onto patios or balconies which are at ground level or which are otherwise accessible from the outside:

A. All single sliding patio doors shall have the movable section of the door sliding on the inside of the fixed portion of the door, or so protected that when the door is locked it cannot be lifted from its track.

B. Dead locks shall be provided on all single sliding patio doors. The lock shall be operable from the outside by a key utilizing a bored lock cylinder of pin tumbler construction. Mounting screws for the lock case shall be inaccessible from the outside. Lock bolts shall contain hardened material and shall be capable of withstanding a force of 800 pounds applied in any direction. The lock bolt shall engage the strike sufficiently to prevent its being disengaged by any possible movement of the door within the space or clearances provided for installation and operation. The strike area shall be reinforced to maintain effectiveness of bolt strength.

C. Double sliding patio doors must be locked at the meeting rail and meet the locking requirements of "B" above.

III. Glass Windows:

A. All windows with opening sash within eight feet of ground level or otherwise readily accessible shall be protected with either of the following:

B. All hatchway openings on the roof of any building shall be secured as follows:

1. If the hatchway is of wooden material, it shall be covered on the outside with at least 16 gauge sheet steel flanged over the vertical edges of the hatch, or its equivalent attached with 1/4" carriage bolts on minimum 18" centers penetrating through the door and fastened on the inside with nuts and washers.

2. The hatchway shall be secured from the inside with a slide bar or slide bolts.

3. Outside hinges on all hatchway openings shall be provided with non-removable pins when using pin-type hinges. If the hinge screws are accessible, the screws shall be of the non-removable type.

C. All accessible airduct or vent openings exceeding 8" x 12" on the roof or exterior walls of any building shall be secured by covering the same with the following:

1. iron or steel bars of at least 1/2" round or 1" x 1/4" flat steel material, spaced no more than 5" apart and securely fastened, or

2. iron or steel grill of at least 1/8" material of 2" mesh and securely fastened, and if the barrier is on the outside, it shall be secured with carriage bolts with the head outside.

V. Special Security Measures:

A. Safes: Commercial establishments having $1,000 or more in cash on the premises after closing hours shall lock such money in a Class "E" safe after closing hours.

B. Office Buildings (Multiple Occupancy): All entrance doors to individual office suites shall have a deadbolt lock with a minimum one inch throw bolt which can be opened from the inside. The throw bolt must contain hardened material.

VI. Intrusion Detection Devices:

A. If it is determined by the enforcing authority of this code that the security measures and locking devices described in this code do not adequately secure the building, he may require the installation and maintenance of an intrusion detection device (burglary Alarm System).

B. Establishments having specific type inventories shall be protected by the following type alarm service:

1. Silent Alarm - Central Station - Supervised Service
   a. Jewelry store - Mfg., wholesale, and retail
   b. Guns and ammo shops
   c. Wholesale liquor
   d. Wholesale tobacco
   e. Wholesale drugs
   f. Fur stores
2. Silent Alarm
   a. Liquor stores
   b. Pawn shops
   c. Electronic equipment
   d. Wig stores

e. Clothing (new)

f. Coins and stamps

g. Industrial tool supply houses

h. Camera stores

i. Precious metal storage facility

3. Local Alarm (Bell outside premise)

a. Antique dealers

b. Art galleries

c. Service stations

VII. Exceptions:

No portion of this Code shall supersede any local, state, or Federal laws, regulation, or codes dealing with the life-safety factors.

Enforcement of this code should be developed with the cooperation of the local fire authority to avoid possible conflict with fire laws.

Part 2. Residential Security Guidelines

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING

I. Exterior Doors:

A. Exterior doors (non-glass panel doors) and doors leading from garage areas into private family dwellings shall be of solid core no less than 1 3/4 inches thickness.

B. Exterior doors and doors leading from garage areas shall have self-locking latch devices with a minimum throw of one-half inch.

END