In the Line of Fire:
A Study of Selected Felonious Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to America's law enforcement officers who unselfishly and continually place themselves In The Line of Fire protecting the lives and safety of the public they serve.
Acknowledgments

The authors of this study would like to thank the many individuals who unselfishly gave their time and effort while this study was being conducted. We are particularly grateful to the law enforcement officers who put aside personal considerations to provide their candid assessments of the circumstances surrounding the assaults against them in an effort to assist in the safety training of other law enforcement officers.

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Preface

Over 50,000 law enforcement officers are assaulted each year. One of every three officers assaulted is injured, and approximately 70 officers make the ultimate sacrifice in the performance of law enforcement service, losing their lives. While progress in officer safety has been and continues to be a prime objective in law enforcement agencies, law enforcement clearly remains a high risk profession as we approach the 21st century.

There are no simple explanations as to why officers are feloniously killed or injured in one instance, but escape harm in instances seemingly identical. Complexities inherent in the nature of criminal activity preclude any simple, singular method of ensuring officer safety. Yet we continue the search for clues as to how to most definitively prepare our officers to face danger in the line of duty. In keeping with that search, what we have attempted to do with this study is to gather, examine, and analyze all available information about situations leading to selected line-of-duty casualties. This study's most valuable information, we believe, was provided by 52 officers who were actual victims of serious assaults in the service of their communities.

Since 1945, the FBI has gathered and disseminated data on situations during which officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty. These historical data were supplemented by a 1992 study entitled Killed in the Line of Duty. While these efforts at data collection and analysis were extensive, they were missing an element crucial to understanding the dangers that officers face daily: the perspective of the officers themselves. This current study, In the Line of Fire, attempts to tap the resource of the law enforcement officer to further the investigation of issues vital to assessing and addressing risks to officers.

Findings, theories, and principles presented in this document by no means offer complete or exhaustive methods of securing officer safety. One goal of this publication is to raise levels of awareness and create direction for discussions, so that each department can more successfully determine and pursue law enforcement officer training unique to its own needs.

As occurred with its 1992 companion report, this study may well raise more questions than present solutions. We believe that this can be positive. We believe that the more consideration given at any level to officer safety, the greater the potential for securing that safety. If we have succeeded in raising important questions that prompt further research, we have met our greatest goal.
In September 1992, the FBI published *Killed in the Line of Duty: A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers*. The objective of the study, which analyzed 50 cases in which law enforcement officers were slain, was to identify situational elements which resulted in the killings of the officers and to attempt to isolate any commonalities in the fatal incidents. Well received by the law enforcement community, the 1992 publication had a significant impact on the direction and substance of training procedures and programs in various law enforcement agencies across the country. The extent of that impact is evidenced by the fact that one sheriff directly credited the study with saving the life of a deputy.

In preparation for *Killed in the Line of Duty*, a thorough and exhaustive review of each selected incident of officer fatality was conducted: all interrelated aspects of the officer, the offender, and the situation which brought them together were synthesized and analyzed. Case reports and news accounts were reviewed. Interviews with victim officers’ peers and supervisors were conducted. The convicted offenders, the survivors of the incidents — the only ones alive to address the incidents — were subjected to extensive personal interviews.

The consensus following the 1992 study was that the potential for positive contribution to law enforcement safety might have been even greater had the personal perspective of the victim officer been available, something tragically precluded by circumstances. The publication, however, also prompted requests for more detailed information and raised questions beyond the scope of the study. Further study seemed warranted, and the need for attention to the perspective of the victim officer seemed both appropriate and imperative.

Because of the interest generated by *Killed in the Line of Duty*, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting staff explored the possibilities of proceeding with another study. Working from the consensus premise that the victim officer could provide valuable insight into safety issues, a proposal to review 40 cases in which law enforcement officers were seriously assaulted was prepared. The proposal was then presented to the National Institute of Justice which agreed to partially fund the project.

**The Study Plan**

To conduct this national study, FBI staff would select 40 cases of serious assaults across the country using cases submitted by FBI field offices and UCR Program participants at the state and local levels. At the conclusion of the entire process, including the preliminary interviews of law enforcement personnel, reviews of institutional records, and the actual officer and offender interviews, the entire assault incident would be analyzed in an integrative manner. As in the study on law enforcement officer killings, the proposed study would grant complete anonymity to the victim officer, the victim’s department, and the offender.

Six hundred twenty-five cases were submitted by agencies for possible inclusion in the study. During the initial gathering of documentation, anonymity was not involved. Once a particular officer agreed to participate in the study, he or she was granted complete anonymity, and neither the department nor any officials were subsequently contacted.
The case selection was made by the size and type of the victim’s department, the type of assignment the victim officer was on at the time of the assault, and the region of the country in which the officer worked. The assailant must have either been convicted or pled guilty to the assault. A complete description of the protocols used appears in Appendix I.

The Study Results

The study was conducted over a 3-year period and addressed 40 distinct cases of serious assaults on law enforcement officers. The cases involved 52 victim officers and 42 offenders. Nine cases involved more than one victim, and three involved more than one offender.

Along with the many specific findings of this study, certain global issues emerged as common among the cases studied. Confirming what has long been the opinion in the law enforcement community, routine, repetitive tasks emerged as a continuing threat to officer safety. Traffic stops, communicating with the dispatcher, communicating with other involved jurisdictions, searches, use of handcuffs, etc., are examples of tasks that should be second nature to officers but posed problems to the victims in the cases studied.

Training was cited by officers as critical to the actions they took to protect themselves. Many victims credited repeated safety training as effectively equipping them to deal with the situations. Others, however, cited inadequate or improper training that actually made them unsure of the proper action. Some recounted that through training they were certain what “not to do” but were uncertain what “to do.”

Post-assault trauma and recovery were discovered to be areas that perhaps have not been given appropriate attention by the law enforcement community. The occurrence of these attacks has a profound impact not only on the victim officers themselves, but also on fellow officers and command staff, the department at large, the victims’ families, and the overall community. An agency’s ability to respond to the needs of each affected individual or group can minimize the negative impact of these incidents.

Finally, while there is no definitive answer as to why one officer survives a life-threatening attack and another does not, many of the victim officers in the study displayed an uncommon “will to survive.” This attitude, many officers believed, was developed after exposure to survival training. These officers believe the actions they took to save themselves, frequently after they were seriously injured, were chiefly influenced by their determination to “win.” That determination, they believe, was ingrained in them by concentrated training. This study did not identify whether this will-to-survive which the officers displayed was brought to the law enforcement job or was learned on the job. This issue requires additional research.

This report presents extensive information on the victims, offenders, and incidents studied. It identifies specific areas where law enforcement training and procedures may be improved. The results of the study provide law enforcement managers with actions to consider that will minimize the impact of these events on those involved. Like its companion, Killed in the Line of Duty, it does not answer all questions. It does take us further in the process of understanding the various threats that face officers as they perform their duties.
Chapter 1

THE OFFENSE AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OFFENSE

General information concerning assaults, both fatal and nonfatal, on duly sworn law enforcement officers is collected by the FBI and released annually in the publication *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted*. The data included on nonfatal assaults address circumstances surrounding the incidents, weapons used, victim officers' assignments, time of occurrence, and whether injury resulted. This information is reported monthly by the nearly 17,000 law enforcement agency participants in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. This study, however, views a selection of these assault cases with much more specificity, and interviews with 52 victim officers and 42 offenders provide an in-depth picture of the circumstances surrounding the incidents.

Pre-Assault Circumstances

In an effort to assess the influence of events just prior to the assault, the victims' pre-assault activities were examined. Of particular interest were questions concerning the phase of duty during which the assault occurred, whether the victim officers had been involved in any part-time employment prior to reporting to duty, and whether the victim was involved in court proceedings. The 52 victims in this study reported that they had, on average, been on duty 4 hours prior to the assault. One officer had attended court prior to the tour of duty; 1 had worked an outside job, and another was on annual leave in the 24-hour period prior to the assault. No officer had engaged in any departmental overtime just prior to the assault incident. Therefore, among the study participants, only 3 had

![Figure 1: Circumstances at the Scene of the Incident](source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1995 FBI Study)
performed outside activities that may have influenced the assault events.

**Incident Circumstances**

A thorough assessment of the circumstances surrounding line-of-duty assaults is central to a full understanding of the incidents. During 1995, 53 percent of the assaults reported nationwide resulted from incidents during which officers were responding to disturbance calls (man with gun, family quarrels, etc.), attempting arrests, or intervening in crime-in-progress situations. Of the 40 cases examined for this study, 50 percent involved response to disturbance calls, attempted arrests, or crime-in-progress calls. Twenty percent of the incidents under study occurred while officers were investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, 18 percent during traffic stops or pursuits, 5 percent while officers were handling or transporting prisoners, and 8 percent in other situations. Figure 1 shows the circumstances for all assaults during 1995, as well as those for the incidents included in this study.

The most prevalent assault location in this study, 24 in total, was a highway/roadway or an alley. Eight assaults occurred in residences or homes; 6 in fields or woods; 3 in parking lots/garages; 2 at construction sites; 2 in government/public buildings; and 1 each in a hotel/motel, bank, department store, specialty store, jail/prison, and liquor store.

In 80 percent of the incidents studied, officers arrived at the crime scene in vehicles. Two incidents involved officers on foot patrol, and the remainder involved other duty assignments, such as office or court duty, helicopter surveillance, etc. The victim officers traveled an average of 3 miles to the scene of assault. Thirty-seven percent were radio dispatched, and 37 percent self-initiated some type of law enforcement action. Ten percent of the incidents involved high-speed chases before arrival at the scene of the assault. Victim officers reported having been to the same locations on previous calls in 21 percent of the cases.

Victim officers frequently formulated plans of action prior to arriving on the assault scene. Of those who received a radio dispatch, 23 percent developed plans based on their personal knowledge of the location given by the dispatcher, 8 percent planned by the type of call for service, 4 percent by knowledge of the offender, and 8 percent by additional information provided by the radio dispatcher.

Nearly half of the offenders arrived at the incident scene in a motor vehicle, and 36 percent were on foot. One offender used public transportation, and 1 hitchhiked. For the remaining incidents, the mode of transportation was not relevant. One offender, for example, was being transported in a police vehicle at the time the assault occurred. In 76 percent of the incidents,

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**FIGURE 2**

Law Enforcement Officers Assaulted by Time of Day

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<th>Time</th>
<th>All Assaults-1995 data</th>
<th>Current Study</th>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 am-6am</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:00 am-6pm</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:01 pm-6pm</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:01 pm-12am</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. 1995 FBI Study
the scene of the assault was the same location as that of
the initial encounter between the offender and the victim
officer.

The arriving officer in 46 percent of the
incidents found the eventual offender in the company
of other persons. Thirty-five percent of the victim officers
stated that they were aware that they were about to be
assaulted. Fifty-six percent reported that no cover was
available, and 27 percent stated that they were able to
use a motor vehicle as cover.

In summary, historical and study data show that
officers are most likely to be assaulted after being
dispatched to or observing disturbances, interrupting
crimes-in-progress, or attempting arrests. The officers
are most frequently assigned to vehicles, and the assaults
occur on streets, highways, or in parking lots in the same
location at which the officer first encounters the
offender(s). Officers frequently plan their actions in
advance, based on varying criteria. The offenders most
likely use vehicles for transportation and are usually
accompanied by others.

Environment

Most assaults occur during the nighttime hours.
Among the incidents in this study, 29 percent occurred
from 12:01 a.m. to 6 a.m.; 13 percent from 6:01 a.m. to
noon; 25 percent from 12:01 p.m. to 6 p.m.; and 33 per-
cent from 6:01 p.m. to midnight. The times of incidents
in the study closely parallel the 1995 overall statistics
on officers assaulted. Both show the fewest officers assas-
saulted during the morning hours of 6:01 a.m. to noon.
Figure 2 shows a comparison of the times for the inci-
dents under study, as well as for all assaults reported to
the FBI in 1995.

That most assaults occur at night raises visibility
as a possible issue warranting safety training attention.
In some instances, the assaults during the nighttime hours
were further complicated by the elements of rain, fog, or
other weather conditions that decrease visibility. One
officer reported his assault occurred in total darkness,
while 20 at least had the benefit of artificial lighting.
Twenty-one percent of the victim officers reported using
a flashlight for visibility at the time of the assault; 6
percent also used one for self protection.

While environmental issues were not definitively
defined as causal factors in assaults, they do affect the
officer's ability to respond effectively. These conditions
are, for the most part, uncontrollable, and the full range
of possibilities should be addressed in law enforcement
survival training exercises.

Weapons Used in the Assault

Fifty of the 52 victim officers in this study were
assaulted with a firearm. Some were also struck with a

![FIGURE 3 Types of Weapons Used to Kill and Assault Victim Officers](source)
blunt instrument or cut with a knife. This study, however, centered on the principal weapon. Of the 50 officers assaulted with firearms, 40 were assaulted with handguns, 6 with shotguns, and 4 with rifles. The remaining 2 victims were both assaulted with some type of blunt object, and each of these officers required hospitalization. Figure 3 compares the types of weapons used in the assaults in this study to those used in felonious killings of officers during 1995.

All of the victim officers were armed with handguns. In addition, 3 officers were armed with shotguns, and 1, a submachine gun. All but 1 of the handguns were department issued. The 3 shotguns were personally owned by the victim officers. Nine officers were in possession of batons, and 1, a blackjack. None of the officers had rifles, chemical agents, or tasers. Forty percent of the victim officers in the study fired their weapons. Six officers disabled their assailants through the use of firearms. Seven victim officers, principally armed with handguns, were disarmed and had their firearms used against them. Three offenders had and used more than one firearm.

Considering only assaults with firearms, the distance between the victims and offenders varied by weapon type. For the 40 handgun assaults, the distances ranged from 0 to 75 feet, with the average being 14. Shotguns were generally used from further distances, at ranges from 18 to 50 feet. The average distance from victim to offender was 40 feet. Rifles were used in 4 instances at ranges of 10 to 375 feet. The average distance from the officer was 174 feet.

Firearms were discharged by 22 officers at 19 offenders. In 3 instances, 2 officers fired at a single offender. Twenty-one of the 22 weapons discharged were handguns fired from 1 to 75 feet. The average distance was 21 feet. The remaining weapon was a shotgun fired from a distance of 30 feet.

Table 1 shows a comparison of rates with which victims and offenders hit their intended targets. The percentages indicate that offenders were more successful than officers in achieving target objectives. The offenders, however, fired first in 38 of 39 cases. In the single instance of an officer firing first, the offender was struck and wounded. Also, in the 7 cases where officers were disarmed, all officers were shot at very close range, 0 to 3 feet. In addition, the average distance of the shot taken by victim officers was 21 feet; for offenders, the average was 14 feet.

Geographical Variations

The 1995 Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted publication reported a rate of 12 per 100 law enforcement officers nationwide assaulted during the year. The assault rate was highest in the Southern States where 16 of every 100 officers were assaulted and lowest in the Northeastern and Midwestern States, each recording rates of 9 per 100 officers. The Western States registered a rate of 13 per 100 officers for the year. Rates of assaults with injury showed less variation among the regions. Both the South and West recorded injury rates of 4 per 100 officers, while the Northeast and Midwest showed rates of 3 per 100 officers.

During the period of this study, the South accounted for a disproportionate number of law enforcement officers feloniously killed. Twenty of the 40 cases studied for this report occurred in the South. While cases from this region dominated those studied, no conclusions were reached concerning the reasons for the South's high law enforcement officer death and assault rates. For more discussion on the disproportionate number of officer killings and assaults in the Southern region, see Chapter 1 of Killed in the Line of Duty.

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<tr>
<td>Percent hitting target</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from victim to offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- range</td>
<td>1-75 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- average</td>
<td>21 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent hitting target</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from victim to offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- range</td>
<td>18-50 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- average</td>
<td>40 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent hitting target</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from victim to offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- range</td>
<td>10-375 ft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- average</td>
<td>174 ft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 One shot was fired from a distance of 30 feet.
2 Not applicable; no rifles were fired by officers.
Chapter 2

THE VICTIM

The law enforcement officers who agreed to participate in this study did so with the full knowledge that their actions would come under intense scrutiny, possibly by the entire law enforcement community. Understanding, however, that careful study of their experiences could potentially lead to knowledge that might prevent further casualties, they set aside their personal concerns and shared their valuable information and insight. They hoped that their assistance would help save fellow officers from serious assault or death. Even though revisiting the incidents that resulted in the assaults and sometimes serious injury was not easy, these officers realized that the key to the future is often in the past. Their willingness to participate, their candor, and their enormous contribution to this study are a credit to them personally and to the law enforcement community in general.

Complete anonymity was granted each victim participating in this study. Each officers’ agency provided case files, including offense reports, statements made by assisting officers, witnesses, and offenders. After the victim officer was contacted in person and agreed to participate in the study, neither the officers’ peers nor management of the employing agencies were interviewed about either the incidents or the officers themselves. The victims provided additional records, such as reports, performance ratings, newspaper articles about the assault, copies of police radio transmissions, and any other documentation they thought would promote a better understanding of his or her particular assault.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Victims: A Demographic Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assault Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>33 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Height</td>
<td>5' 9&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Weight</td>
<td>186 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No degree</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 yr. college degree</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 yr. college degree</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years of Service</td>
<td>8 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1995
NA - not available in historical FBI database.
descriptions are not available on all law enforcement assault victims, this demographic description is similar to that of all officers killed in the line of duty from 1986 through 1995. These victims likewise were generally male (98 percent), white (87 percent), and an average age of 36 years.

Similar data on the assault offenders in this study are shown in Table 5. While many of the physical characteristics of victims and offenders were on the average very similar, the officers were frequently older, better educated, and more likely to be married. These observations mirror those of the 1992 study, Killed in the Line of Duty.

In examining physical attributes, offenders stated in their interviews that the victim officers' age, size, or race had no effect on their decision to assault. It is interesting to note, however, that throughout the 40 cases examined there were no physical attacks of victim officers who were substantially larger in height and weight. Conversely, there were several incidents where physical attacks were initiated by offenders who were substantially larger in height and weight than their victims.

This study included 6 cases involving female assault victims. In 2 of these incidents, the officers were attacked while assisting male officers who had already been fired upon. In another instance, a female officer was assaulted while accompanied by a male officer. In contrast to the 1992 study in which police killers stated they would have been less likely to have killed a female officer, 3 of the assault offenders interviewed stated that, as they believed female officers would be easier to overcome during a physical confrontation, the sex of the victim officers would have a positive influence on their decision to assault. Two of these offenders did, in fact, assault female officers. In each of these incidents, the victims were acting alone and encountered the offenders in one-on-one situations.

**Agency Affiliations**

The cases chosen for this study reflected a variety of types of law enforcement agencies. Figure 4 summarizes the agency affiliation of the victim officers at the time of the assault. These data are shown along with the affiliation of all officers feloniously killed in the line of duty from 1986 through 1995.

Fifty-eight percent of the victims in the study served municipal police departments, 12 percent county police departments, and 10 percent sheriffs' offices.

---

**FIGURE 4**

Professional Affiliations of Victim Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1986-1995</th>
<th>Current Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Police</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff's Office</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Police*</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Officers</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Police</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1995 FBI Study

* Includes one victim from the State Department of Corrections.
These types of agencies, of course, supply most of the law enforcement service in the Nation and employ the majority of officers.

**Types of Duty Assignments**

The duty assignments of the victim officers at the time of their assault are presented in Figure 5. Forty-four of the victim officers were in uniform at the time of the assault. Three were in business attire, and 5 were in casual clothes. The study group was diverse and included 1 detective sergeant, 5 sergeants, 1 corporal, 3 detectives, 5 deputies, 8 troopers, 28 patrol officers, and 1 correctional officer. Seven victims were on detective or special assignments.

Similar to FBI historical distribution data, most officers in the study were on vehicle patrol when assaulted. Nineteen officers were assigned to marked, one-person patrol vehicles, and 15 to two-person, marked patrol vehicles. Two were assigned to uniform foot patrol, and one to uniform motorcycle patrol. Two officers were off duty but acting in a performance-of-duty capacity when assaulted.

**Work Performance**

Not all agencies for which the victim officers worked conducted regular work performance evaluations. Some worked for small departments that had no formal work evaluation plan. Others worked for large agencies that suspended regular scheduled work performance reviews because of contractual or court agreements. Seventeen percent of the victims in the study did not receive work evaluations. Of the victim officers evaluated, 85 percent were rated satisfactory or above satisfactory, and only 4 percent were rated below satisfactory. Eight percent, or 4 victims, reported that their rating was lower just prior to their assault than their previous rating.

Twenty percent of the victim officers from the 1992 study had received a lower assessment of their performance just prior to their slayings. While similar findings could not be confirmed through this study, the value of regular periodic work evaluations was effectively illustrated by the case of one officer who admitted having a decline in performance just before he was assaulted.
Table 3
Behavioral Descriptors of Officers Killed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly to everyone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well-liked by community and department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to use less force than other officers felt they would use in similar circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to perceive self as more public relations than law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- service oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used force only as last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- peers claim they would use force at an earlier point in similar circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't follow all the rules, especially in regard to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- confrontations with prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- traffic stops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- waiting for backup (when available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels he/she can &quot;read&quot; others/situations and will drop guard as a result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to look for &quot;good&quot; in others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Laid back&quot; and &quot;easy going&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Killed in the Line of Duty

This officer had over 10 years of law enforcement experience and had received numerous ratings. He finished in the top 1/3 of his academy class and had been selected to be a field training officer. The reasons he cited for the out-of-character lower rating were that his marriage to another officer within the department was dissolving; his wife was having an affair with another member of the department; his total number of arrests and traffic citations dropped; and he was facing major financial problems. He developed a drinking problem, and his use of sick leave increased. The officer reported that he did not realize how his personal life was affecting his job performance until he received this bad rating. He incorrectly thought that he was able to separate his personal life from the job. He stated that he was appreciative that his deficiencies were brought to his attention by his supervisor and that he was given a chance to improve. He reported he stopped drinking, separated from his wife, and ultimately got a divorce.

For this officer the work evaluation was highly effective and achieved the result for which it was intended -- to provide the officer with appropriate, objective, professional feedback. The lower appraisal encouraged corrective action that improved the officer's performance. As a result, he received an above satisfactory rating during the next rating period.

Years of Service

The victims of this study averaged 8 years of law enforcement experience at the time of their assaults. One had less than 1 year. This officer was assigned to patrol with a field training officer when both were assaulted. Fifty-six percent of the victims had 1-5 years of service; 15 percent had 6-10 years; and 29 percent were veterans with over 10 years experience. The average age of officers killed was not significantly different: victims of all officer killings during the past decade averaged 10 years of service.

Behavioral Descriptors of the Victim Officers

During the 1992 study on selected killings of law enforcement officers, similar descriptors of the victim officers readily surfaced during interviews with peers and supervisors. Likewise, offenders who had spent some time with the officers prior to the killings used similar adjectives when describing their victims. A list of these behavioral descriptors was formed during the

Table 4
Behavioral Descriptors of Officers Assaulted

| Friendly |
| Hard working |
| Service oriented |
| Willing to use force when justified |
| Doesn't follow established rules and procedures, especially in regard to: |
| - arrests |
| - traffic stops |
| - calling for or waiting for backup (when available) |
| Feels he/she can "read" situations or persons and will drop guard as a result |
| Survivor |

Source: FBI Study
early stages of the study and increased as additional cases were completed. Table 3 shows a summary of the descriptors most frequently used.

This list of behavioral descriptors of the victim officers generated more comments from law enforcement officers around the country than did any other issue in the 1992 study. One question was, "How do you compare these descriptors with those descriptors of officers involved in Community Policing?" A second question was, "Are you saying that good, friendly officers are the only ones killed?" Still another question was, "Are aggressive, by-the-book cops the only ones that come out on top?"

The answers to these questions are complex and have yet to be totally answered. While the current study does provide additional insight into the characteristics of victim officers, the anonymity guaranteed to the officers interviewed prohibited validation of self-demonstrated characteristics because there were no follow-up interviews with peers and supervisors. Descriptors of the victims' behavior were developed through review of the written documentation of the actions taken during the incident, as well as through observation and evaluation of the behavior and comments of the victims during the interview processes. Table 4 summarizes some of the most frequently observed behavioral descriptors of these victim officers. As in the 1992 study, not all of these descriptors are favorable. Also, no actual tabulation of each adjective or phrase was recorded.

One adjective that emerged with frequency during the interviews with victims was "hard working." Most of the victims described themselves as "hard working," and the investigators concurred with that observation. Many had received awards or had been selected for special assignments for which selection criteria included superior performance. The "hard working" officers wanted to be the "best cops" possible. To achieve this objective, they often became, or perhaps by nature already were, "risk takers." One officer explained that prior to his assault he had received the award for "officer of the month" in his patrol district. There were over 300 patrol officers in his district, and the award was based on several factors. It was given to the officer who "put the most meat on the table," that is, who made the most arrests, issued the most traffic citations, and submitted the most correct reports. In short, it was given, in the officer's opinion, to the hardest worker in the district. To maximize his "output," and thereby increase his perceived productivity, the officer learned to take short cuts. Serving an assault warrant alone was one. He never requested backup, never advised the dispatcher of his plan or location, and never expected to be shot by the individual he attempted to arrest.

Nineteen of the officers in this study were assaulted when they unilaterally took action in response to a situation. While it is impossible to say that the outcome of their incidents would have changed had help been available, serving warrants alone, not calling in traffic stops, and acting without backup are obviously high-risk actions. The demonstration of these behaviors is also a sign that a "hard working" officer is not necessarily following the rules established for his or her safety. These "short cuts" may generate productivity statistics, but the risk involved does not warrant the action.

The results of this study suggest that the "will to survive" might be one of several characteristics which separates an officer who survives a felonious assault from one who is killed in the line of duty. This personal determination to survive was recognized by the investigators in virtually all of the victim officers. In recalling their actions subsequent to the assault, the officers demonstrated tremendous determination. One officer who was shot twice and stabbed repeatedly walked out of a wooded area so that fellow officers might find him. He recalled fighting a dark cloud or fog attempting to envelope him, and he directed his thoughts to focus on his family. Another officer reported concentrating on a spot on a wall after being shot. He claimed this act helped prevent him from going into shock. Still another stated she knew that her parents, who lived 700 miles away, had been telephoned to advise them of her shooting. She was determined to live so that her parents would not be notified of her death by a telephone call. An officer shot in a dirty, trash-filled building refused to die in such a place. He used his shoestrings as tourniquets to stop the flow of blood from serious arm and leg wounds. He managed to make his way out of the building and found a citizen to call for help.
In another incident, an officer suffered a severe bullet wound directly below his eye. After being unconscious for an unknown period of time, he concentrated on observing his breath in the cold night air. He stated that as long as he could concentrate on breathing, he knew he would continue to live. Nearly blinded, the officer stuck the thumb of his weak hand into his wound and held it there to control the bleeding. He held his weapon in his strong hand. Nearly blinded and without a portable radio to call for help, the officer struggled approximately 300 yards to his patrol unit to summon aid. These officers walked, crawled, and limped away from the scenes of their assaults; they refused to give up; they were survivors.

Physical Well-being

From the self-reported data from the 52 victim officers, 47 stated that they were in “excellent” health at the time of the assault. Four stated that they were in “better than average” health, and the remaining officers reported “average” health. Not one of the officers reported their physical health to have been less than average at the time of assault.

Seventy-three percent of the victim officers were involved in some type of physical fitness program. The most common was running (48 percent), while few (14 percent) reported weight lifting. Seventy-three percent were non-smokers at the time of the assault. Only 6 percent reported any use of alcohol within the 24 hours prior to the assault. None reported use of alcohol either immediately prior to or during the tour of duty in which the assault took place.

Additional Assault Experience

Fifteen percent of the victims of this study had observed a fellow officer assaulted or killed prior to the assault under review. Nineteen percent of the officers had been the victim of a previous performance-of-duty aggravated assault. The length of time between the first assault and the one being studied averaged 72 months. Seventeen percent of the officers were again assaulted subsequent to the incident under study.

Training

Adequate training is critical to an officer’s ability to take the appropriate action while handling any law enforcement function. The officers in this study were questioned concerning their basic, in-service, and other training in an attempt to understand their views on the quality of that training, as well as on its value to them in life-threatening situations. Obviously, the types and quality of training varied among the officers.

Concerning basic training, victims, on the average, entered their first law enforcement academy at age 25. The average length of time spent at the academy was 15 weeks. One officer did not attend a recruit academy and had received no basic training throughout the course of his career.

Basic recruit training, according to the officers, included the following types of training aimed at survival:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Average Hours</th>
<th>% Affirmative Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Side Arm</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Jack</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Agent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxing/Martial Arts</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taser</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Retention</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defense/physical fitness</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Intervention</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Survival</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 victim, 2 hours

Following recruit training, the victims’ departments offered the following on an ongoing basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Training</th>
<th>Hours per year</th>
<th>% Affirmative Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Side Arm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Agent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taser</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Retention</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 officer, 2 hours
Although only 8 percent of the victims reported that their law enforcement agencies provided post recruit academy physical training, 73 percent, as was previously stated, were involved in some sort of physical fitness program at the time the assault occurred. When asked what they or their departments could have done to better prepare them for incidents like their assaults, most officers said, “Nothing.” Among the few positive responses were personal actions such as better physical and mental conditioning and departmental actions such as better equipment and training in areas such as handcuffing, firearms in general, shooting under stress, etc.

Almost half of the officers stated that none of the training they had received prepared them for their assaults. Among those that said training had helped, several cited street survival, firearms, first aid, and physical fitness as most valuable. In fact, some of the victim officers attended "street survival" training in their off-duty hours and paid for this training themselves.

As this study progressed, issues emerged as having an impact on the outcome of the assault incidents. Several training issues are discussed at length in Chapter 5, Procedural and Training Issues.

**Body Armor**

Seventy-one percent of the victim officers were wearing bullet resistant vests at the time they were assaulted. The reasons officers cited for not wearing the vests included that they are uncomfortable, ill-fitting, and/or “too hot.” Two officers said their departments did not issue the garments. Additional discussion about the use of vests is included in Chapter 5, Procedural and Training Issues.
Chapter 3

POST-ASSAULT EFFECTS AND TRAUMA

Much has been written on the elements of job stress and duty-related injuries as they impact upon the personal and professional existence of law enforcement officers (Blau, 1994; Mann & Neece, 1990; Martin, McKean, Veltkamp, 1986; Reese, Horn, Dunning, 1991; Reese & Scrivner, 1994; Reese & Goldstein, 1986). This study further explored these elements by freely eliciting the comments, the observations, and the reflections of 52 officers who actually survived assaults on their lives. The discussion that follows in many ways validates the findings of the earlier research; in other ways it expands upon the existing materials. In either instance, it provides valuable insight into the trauma of assault and the subsequent effects on the officers, their families, other officers, department personnel, and community members. The discussion falls into three sections. Section one deals with the effects of a life threatening assault on the officer. Section two addresses the effects of the assault on the victim officer's family. Section three presents a discussion of thought-provoking assault-related issues brought forth from the officers during the interviews.

Material in this chapter should be of particular interest to law enforcement management. Information provided by the assault victims shows that their support systems oftentimes fail them at some time following the incident. It is the responsibility of the law enforcement agency to meet the needs of victim officers, not only immediately following the assault, but through the period of convalescence as well. Awareness of the effects of near-fatal assaults on officers can provide solid groundwork for the development of specific procedures agencies can follow to minimize the negative assault impact and meet their responsibilities to their officers.

Effects on the Officer

The responses of the victim officers regarding the effects of the assault on them appear to reflect what has been described by Blau (1994) and others as responses related to having experienced a critical incident. Blau (1994) describes the critical incident as “a psychologically distressing event outside the range of usual human experience” (p. 164). Elsewhere, Blau and colleagues (Wells, Getman, & Blau, 1988) identify four common characteristics of a critical incident which are listed below and followed by discussion of the study results.

1. The critical incident is an event that is likely to be one that is sudden and unexpected:

Most of the officers (64 percent) stated that they were not aware that the assault incident was coming. Of the 36 percent who were aware that the offender was about to assault, over half of them stated that there was no time to prepare in any way for the assault. It is common law enforcement experience to encounter a citizen who is distressed or agitated without a subsequent assault on the officer. So it does not seem atypical that, while there may have been some external signs from offenders that they were distressed or agitated, the officers reported that there were few signs that an assault was imminent.

2. The critical incident is an event that is a threat to the officer’s life or physical well-being:

In the minority of cases where the officer recognized that an assault “may be forthcoming,” the general reason for the concern was the
immediate presence of a weapon. Twenty-five percent of the officers interviewed were immediately aware that the offender was armed. Even in those situations in which the offender was unarmed and a struggle developed, officers were keenly aware that their service weapons were within reach of the offenders.

3. The critical incident is an event that may include some element of loss (this may involve one's partner, one's physical ability, or one's position):

Thirty-five of the victim officers in this study received physical injuries that were serious enough to require some hospitalization. Of those 35, 34 received bullet wounds and 1 was seriously cut. The average time off before returning to duty was 15 weeks. (Not factored into this number were 5 officers who retired, 8 who received no physical injuries and incurred no leave time, and 1 who remains on sick leave status.)

The nature of these felonious assaults — whether serious bodily injury resulted or not — is such that the threat of loss of life was present in each of them. Actual loss or the threat of loss impacts upon non-physical areas of the officer’s life such as a sense of personal loss of control, self-reliance or independence, as well as the more obvious physical loss of life. In several cases, officers mentioned their concern over the potential loss of control as a result of their injuries. Losing control, or the threat of losing control, clearly can affect one’s sense of self-reliance and often highlights the very unpleasant reality of just how vulnerable one is (Gentz, 1991).

4. A critical incident is an event that might also result in an abrupt change in the officer’s values, confidence, or ideals:

This study did not, with any specificity, incorporate questions that dealt with the officers’ values or ideals. However, one question in the protocol dealt with the officer’s confidence in his or her ability to use the service weapon in the future. Only one officer felt that he or she would not be able to use the service weapon in a similar set of circumstances were they to occur again. It is apparent that this “critical incident” element warrants further research. Most of the officers reported that when their good physical condition was coupled with a positive psychological predisposition, their chances of survival and recovery increased. Over 36 percent of the officers claimed that the combination of “street-survival mental dispositions,” knowledge and application of first aid, and physical training most helped them to survive the attack.

Fewer than half (23) of the victim officers reported any post psychological or physical problems associated with being a victim within 6 months of the assault. Among those officers, the psychological and physical effects most frequently included difficulty sleeping, bad dreams, tenseness, irritability, intrusive thoughts; and less frequently included nervous stomach, differences in eating habits, headaches, and muscle spasms/shaking — all symptoms identified by the American Psychiatric Association as possible indicators of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Appendix II provides a complete description of the criteria for PTSD as found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association.

The symptoms, intensity, and course of this disorder are affected by various elements of the precipitating incident, e.g. “The severity, duration, and proximity of an individual’s exposure to the traumatic event” (p. 426). DSM-IV states that there are other variables that also influence whether one who suffers a traumatic incident actually develops this disorder. These variables include, but are not limited to, social supports offered to the individual, family history and childhood experiences, individual personality components, and preexisting mental disorders. DSM-IV does delineate, however, that PTSD may appear in individuals “without any predisposing conditions, particularly if the stressor is especially extreme” (p. 427). A real and immediate threat on an officer’s life, although relatively short in duration, is perhaps one of the most severe traumas that one can experience.

The onset and duration of the symptoms associated with PTSD can vary greatly from individual to individual which makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to which the assaulted officers might suffer from PTSD. It is entirely possible that any indicators of the syndrome may not have been present at the time of the interview. It is equally possible that such indicators have surfaced subsequent to the interviews. Also, since the interview, the officers may have experienced more symptoms than those reported at the time of the study.
Effects on the Family

The officers did feel that the assault, and its aftermath, had some influence on their relationships, both within and outside the family setting. Officers variously reported these effects as: strained marital relationship (19 percent), strained relationship with other family members (12 percent), strained relationship with friends (12 percent), and problems with children (4 percent).

At the time of the assault, 32 of the officers were married, and an additional 6 officers, although unmarried, were living with a significant other. Fourteen of the officers were “unattached” at the time of the assault. Of the 38 who were either married or attached at the time of the assault, less than half reported that they felt they had received support from their families following the assaults.

Eight victim officers stated that they experienced major changes to their family structure following the assault. Of these 8 officers, 7 involved conflict with their spouse or significant others, and 1 resulted in divorce. Of the 8 who experienced a dramatic change within the family, 5 believed that the assault was a catalyst in the change.

In general, these findings are consistent with the research on the effects of critical incidents or trauma on intimacy (Gentz, 1991; Hartsough, 1991; Sheehan, 1991) which suggests that although the traumatic incident can be the cause of problems within a relationship, a strong, intimate relationship can help the individual through the stresses of dealing with the critical incident (Blau, 1994).

The need to incorporate the spouse or other significant parties (children, for example) into post-critical incident counseling was highlighted by several officers. However, this was oftentimes not done. The need to engage significant others in joint counseling emerges as an important issue for many reasons. Officers who had been involved in the critical incidents were not always aware of — or chose not to talk about — the negative effects of the incidents on them (Bohl & Solomon, 1994). Some officers may, in fact, have been or continue to be unaware of the effects of the stress, although the spouse may have noticed significant changes in the officer’s behavior and life-style. In other cases, although the officers might deny to a counselor that any significant changes occurred in their behaviors or life-style, they may be either consciously holding back or unable to identify the actual distress they are experiencing.

Bohl and Solomon (1994) reported that spouses sometimes experience greater fears and anxieties than do the officers who were involved in a critical incident. In one case in the current study, the spouse experienced significant difficulty when his spouse returned to duty after her assault.

Assault-Related Issues: Victims’ Perspectives

As discussed above, there are many factors that create stress and lend to the development or exacerbation of stress disorders (DSM-IV). The support one receives from significant others, family, peers, society, the officer’s department, all affect an individual’s reaction to stress. Twelve officers reported issues that remained unresolved in their minds, affecting their perceptions of the support they received from those within and outside the department. In some cases, these perceptions remain a source of discomfort and stress for them.

Community Support

One potentially exacerbating circumstance develops when more than one officer is injured in a single incident. In two unrelated cases, both sets of partner officers were seriously injured and hospitalized. The partners were released at different times. In each case, the release of the first officer from the hospital was covered by the news media and received a significant amount of community attention. The initial release was described as “a parade down main street.” Within several weeks of their partners, the second officers were released. Their recovery was no longer “fresh news” and received no media coverage. Neither officer, each happy to see their partners celebrated and congratulated by the local community, expressed any resentment toward the partner earlier released. The officers who had been released last did wonder, however, why they received little community attention. Feeling local community support for their law enforcement efforts was reported to be important to them — and according to them, important to the speed and totality of their recovery.
Debriefing

In other cases where two or more officers were injured in the same situation, the officers failed to communicate with each other about how they felt about the incident following the resolution of the case. In one situation, a departmental debriefing took place without two of the involved officers since they were hospitalized immediately following the incident. Because these officers were not present for the debriefing, they did not have the opportunity to discuss with each other their perceptions of what took place. The interviews for this study took place several years following the actual incident; yet, these officers still had not discussed that incident between themselves. One of the officer wondered what the other thought about “how it all came down.” There remains no closure of that incident for this one officer.

Three officers stated that although formal departmental briefings took place regarding the operational aspects of the incident in which these officers were injured, no “emotional or psychological debriefing occurred. Individually, these officer explained that they did not feel that they had the opportunity to express their distress and anger that in their perception they had been injured because either faulty procedures were followed (for example, no clear “police markings” on raid uniforms) or mistakes were made by other officers on the scene (for example, no covering the victim officer during the operation). These officers felt that a certain unwritten law of silence prevented them from bringing these issues out in the open.

Official Visit

Nine officers stated that while recuperating in the hospital, they received no “official visit” from the department. In other words, the chief executive of the department never visited or contacted them. The officers stated that they were not necessarily looking for the chief to tell them that what they did was correct or incorrect. What they did want, and did not receive, was the moral support of the chief commanding officer.

Counseling

A majority of the officers, 40, stated that they now feel some form of professional counseling following a critical incident should be mandatory. Although only 23 percent of the officers stated that they did, in fact, receive professional counseling from the department following their incident, 32 officers interviewed in the study believe that they would have benefited from counseling support during their recovery period. In addition, they suggested that those persons providing the counseling should be acutely aware of the unique situations which law enforcement officers face.

The officers stated that it is not sufficient that counselors just be aware of the special sets of circumstances in which law enforcement officers frequently find themselves, but that counselors must also embody qualities of professionalism. In two cases, the counselors provided by the department reportedly “fell asleep” during the interviews. In both cases, at the conclusion of the interviews the officers were found “fit to return to full duty.” Although both officers stated that they were angry and disappointed with the counselors’ behaviors in these cases, they both stated that they saw at the time — and see more clearly now — the importance of counseling.

Medical Attention

In four cases, officers stated that the responses of other officers and emergency medical technicians to their injuries elevated their own levels of stress. In each of these cases, the officers stated that they were conscious of attempting to remain calm so that they could keep their blood pressure from fluctuating either very high or very low. In the midst of these attempts to remain calm, the circumstances around them were quickly reaching dramatic proportions.

In one case, the medical personnel who responded apparently became agitated when they realized they knew the victim officer. One technician, in the excitement of the moment, exclaimed, “Oh, my God, look how bad he’s hit!” As the nervousness and anxiety on the technicians’ part grew, they placed the victim officer in the ambulance backwards. Realizing their mistake, they had to delay both the victim officer’s treatment and the trip to the hospital until they reversed the position of the gurney.

In another case, the officer heard the medical personnel talking among themselves about the seriousness of the victim officer’s wounds. The officer
stated that he heard one of the technicians state that he thought the officer might die.

In a case where the victim officer was being transported to the hospital, a law enforcement supervisor removed the victim officer's badge from his uniform shirt, a gesture which the victim officer mentally translated into the statement, "They don't send bodies to the morgue with their badges on." In this same case, the officer noticed that the medical technicians were whispering among themselves. He perceived their whispering as yet another indicator of the precariousness of his condition, and he stated to the technicians, "It's all right, you can talk out loud. I know I'm going to die."

When responding to scenes where officers have been seriously injured, both law enforcement and emergency medical personnel must be aware that their actions speak loudly and can greatly impact upon the psychological condition of the wounded officer.

Reactions to Officers with Long-term Disabilities

It is an unfortunate but all-too-often accurate observation that the general population appears uneasy in the presence of individuals with handicaps. And, that uneasiness around persons with a disability sometimes manifests itself in illogical and inappropriate behaviors on the part of the nonhandicapped. Among the officers who incurred permanent disabilities as a result of assaults, four stated that some friends and associates now interact with them quite differently than before their injuries. One officer stated that he perceives a great deal of uneasiness from some of his officer-friends since his injury. Individuals who in the past "joked" often and were generally "up-beat" around him are now "overly protective" and "always trying to do things" for him. These behaviors are so different from the past that the victim officer now feels uncomfortable around these friends.

Another officer stated that during the initial recovery period, he received a great deal of support and attention. After several months of recovery, little contact has been made by the department or by some of the individuals with whom he had been very friendly before incurring his disability. The officer's perception is that the department lost interest in him and that his friends feel too uncomfortable seeing him disabled.

Court Testimony Regarding the Incident

Reliving traumatic situations can create an emotional environment that has the potential for triggering the feelings of distress, pain, alienation, and detachment with intensity similar to that experienced by the victim officer during the critical incident (Sutker, Uddo-Crane, & Allain, 1991). In one case, an officer stated that he experienced a great deal of difficulty testifying in court regarding his incident. As the court date drew closer, his eating habits changed, his sleep was disturbed, and he began to experience additional stress when he recalled details about the incident. These symptoms of trauma can manifest themselves in many ways, including difficulty in concentration, avoidance of reminders of the incident, and confusion surrounding the details of the incident (Bartol & Bartol, 1994). Though not every victim officer will experience these effects and those who do will experience them in varying levels, law enforcement managers need to be aware of and recognize the potential for these long-term side-effects following a critical incident. It could, perhaps, be in the best interest of all for law enforcement managers to assess how the officers are dealing with the effects of the trauma prior to their court appearance concerning the incident.
A total of 42 offenders were interviewed during the course of this study. Although 5 of the cases involved multiple offenders, only 1 of the offenders in 3 incidents was interviewed. In 2 of these 3 cases, the co-offenders were killed by law enforcement personnel as a result of the incident. In 1 case co-offenders were not interviewed because they had not been directly involved in the attack upon the victim officer.

The victim officers in the study possessed a preconceived image of the kind of person they considered likely to assault them. These descriptions, however, varied from officer to officer. In correlating the physical characteristics of the offenders participating in this study to the characteristics of the offenders in the 1992 study, the data suggest that there is no singular profile of an individual who would assault, attempt to kill, or actually kill a police officer. Of the 52 victim officers interviewed, only 18 stated that they were aware that they were about to be attacked. These data support the assumption that officers’ preconceived ideas of the “assaulter profile” were of little value in securing their personal safety.

**Offender Demographics**

Table 5 presents the aggregate demographic attributes applicable to the assailants in this study. When compared to the demographic descriptions of the victim officers in Table 2, the data indicate that, on average, the victim officers were older than the assailants, more likely to have families and better educated. The offenders were generally male, young (average age 27), nonwhite, single, and high school educated. Only 3 of the offenders were female. The offender, on average, was 6 years younger than the victim officer. Only 19 percent of the offenders were married at the time of the incident, as compared to 62 percent of the victim officers and 57 percent of the offenders had achieved a high school education or higher, as compared to 96 percent of the victim officers.

**Family History**

Family history of the offenders was obtained through interviews and is, therefore, highly subjective. There were no corroborating interviews with family members of the offenders. Mothers were the most significant figures in the family. Fifty-seven percent of

| Table 5 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Offenders: A Demographic Description** | **Gender:** | 93% male; 7% female |
| **Age:** | 27 years |
| **Race:** | 41% white; 59% nonwhite |
| **Height:** | 5 feet 9 inches |
| **Weight:** | 170 pounds |
| **Marital Status:** | 19% married; 69% single; 7% separated; 5% divorced |
| **Education:** | 41% no degree; 47% high school degree; 5% 2-year college degree; 5% 4-year college degree |

Source: FBI Study
the offenders reported that the most dominant parental figure in the home was their mother. Ninety-one percent of the assailers reported that their natural mother was present most of the time during their preadult life, while 2 percent stated they had never lived with their natural mother. In contrast, only 43 percent of those interviewed stated that their natural father was present most of the time, and 21 percent reported that they had never lived with their natural father. Forty-one percent reported that they were raised in non-religious households.

Table 6 shows further social and economic conditions regarding the background of the offenders. The study revealed that the offenders frequently reported hostile and aggressive relationships with both the dominant male and female members of the household. Over half of the assailers reported that problems in their families were solved by arguing, shouting, and physical violence. More than half also considered their preadult socioeconomic status to be marginal or sub-marginal.

While the earlier study of police killers demonstrated parallel findings on family composition, the assailers tended to report less instability in family caretaking and less physical and psychological abuse within the family than did the killers. (Psychological abuse was defined to include verbal abuse, neglect, and cold, distant, uncaring and indifferent treatment.) Also, although most assailers considered their preadult economic status to be marginal or lower, most of the killers in the earlier study considered themselves to have been at least average or comfortable.

**Criminal History**

Figure 6 summarizes the self-reported criminal activity of the 42 offenders involved in this study. The average age at which the offenders committed their first crime was 11, and the first crime of 67 percent of the offenders was larceny-theft. Overall, weapons violations were reported with greater frequency than any other crime. Along with these offenses, drug law violations, burglaries, larcenies, assaults, and robberies clearly dominate the criminal history of the law enforcement officer assailers in this study. These offenses coincide, however, with the reported predominant incarcerating offenses of all convicted felons (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 1996). Twenty-one percent of the offenders reported that they had attempted to assault a police officer in the past.

Figure 7 shows the actual criminal histories, as maintained in institutional records, of the offenders in this study, as well as those for all persons identified in connection with the slayings of law enforcement officers from 1986 through 1995. Again, drug law violations, crimes of violence, and weapons offenses predominate. The numbers presented in Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate a
pattern of assaultive or violent behavior by the offenders who physically attack officers. In examining these figures, it should be noted that the self-reported criminal involvement figures tend generally to be higher than those resulting from the review of criminal history records. There are several possible explanations for that phenomenon. Foremost is the possibility that the offenders were not necessarily arrested and charged for each violation they admitted committing in the past. Another possibility is that these individuals tended to overstate their past criminality as it is tied to status within the inmate community.

It is interesting to note that in contrast to the tendency to "over report" previous criminality, more offenders had actually been arrested for murder than admitted to having killed someone. Since the criminal history records used in the study related to arrests not convictions, the offenders may have been reluctant to admit to such serious offenses.

**Weapons Usage**

Firearms were by far the "weapon of choice" in the assault incidents studied. Of the 52 law enforcement officers involved in this study, 50 were assaulted with firearms. Table 7 illustrates that availability of the firearm was the overriding factor in weapon choice. In 7 of the cases examined, the offender fired a weapon at multiple law enforcement officers.

The 2 remaining officers were assaulted by the use of a blunt object. Eight of the incidents examined involved the use of more than one weapon by the offender, including knives, blunt objects, and personal weapons such as hands, fists, and feet.

The majority of the offenders reported carrying a handgun during childhood or teenage years. Twenty-four offenders reported that they began to carry handguns prior to the age of 18. Eighteen offenders reported carrying a gun prior to the age of 16, and 8 offenders reported carrying a handgun prior to the age of 24. The average age at which these offenders began to carry firearms was 17 years.

Figure 8 illustrates the offenders' dependence on weapons in their everyday behavior. Eight out of 10 offenders interviewed stated that they had at one time or another regularly carried a handgun. Sixty percent of the offenders stated that they always carried a
weapon while traveling, and almost half carried a weapon while socializing. Of the offenders employed at the time of the assault, 29 (62 percent) admitted to usually being armed at work.

Seventy-three percent of the offenders reported that they practiced with a handgun at least once a year. Approximately one-third practiced at least once a month, and 14 percent stated they practiced once a week. Sixty-nine percent of those who practiced said practice was informal and occurred at various locations. Among all offenders, 17 percent reported having received weapons training in the military.

When questioned as to the method of carrying a handgun on their persons, 36 percent of the offenders said they carried the weapons in their crotch area. Half of these offenders stated they felt the groin area was the most overlooked by law enforcement personnel who conducted searches. When in a vehicle, according to 50 percent of the offenders, the handguns were carried directly on their persons rather than hidden elsewhere in the vehicle. Twelve percent of the offenders reported that in the past they had given their weapons to other persons to carry for them. Over one-fourth of the offenders reported carrying a second weapon at least part of the time. In most instances, the second weapon carried was a handgun. All of the offenders carrying a second weapon stated that they hoped to use the second weapon against a law enforcement officer or any other person who removed the first weapon from them.

Table 7
Offender’s Reason for Choice of Firearm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarity</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer's weapon</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: based on 50 firearms: 40 handguns; 4 rifles; and 6 shotguns

Source: FBI Study
Figure 8 demonstrates the extent to which the results of this study directly correlate to the study of 1992. Clearly, the offenders' familiarity with handguns, proficiency in the use of them, and methods of carrying/concealing them are important factors to be considered in the development of procedures relating to approaching and searching suspects.

Involvement In Prior Shooting Incidents

A total of 24 of the 42 offenders interviewed reported having been involved in shooting incidents (either firing upon someone or they themselves being fired upon) prior to the assault under study. Six offenders stated they had been involved in 5 or more previous shooting incidents. One of these offenders, who said his first encounter with gunfire was at age 13, chose to fire at the officer in order to avoid arrest for a drug offense.

Two of the offenders, from inner cities of large urban centers, reported being involved in as many as 20 to 30 shooting incidents. One of the 2 related that in the course of his young life, 15 to 20 of his neighborhood friends had met violent deaths and that the carrying and use of handguns in the inner-city is simply a way of life.

Recounting one of his previous experiences, another offender said he was armed with a semiautomatic pistol when he engaged in a gun battle with four police officers. During the exchange of fire, three of the police officers ran out of ammunition and sought cover. The officers' fire wounded the offender three times before they were forced to retreat. The offender, who had three extra loaded ammunition magazines and did not run out of ammunition, stated, "They ran out of ammo and hid."

The fourth officer, although wounded, continued to exchange gunfire with the offender and subsequently apprehended him.

In another case examined in this study, the offender stated he had been involved in street shootings in four large eastern cities. This individual stated he always carried his handgun in the front waistband of his pants, as he wanted quick access to it. He also always assessed the person he was encountering and added that he felt he could tell if a person was intent on shooting him. He stated, "You can see it in his movements; you can feel it; he's more or less nervous; he's more aggressive." The offender reported that on the night of the assault under study the police officer had his gun out of his holster and that the police officer had "that look." He fired first as a matter of survival. The officer, who was struck twice by the offender's fire, stated he was in the process of raising his weapon in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE 8</th>
<th>Circumstances in Which Offenders Reported Carrying Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992 Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling (no specific destination)</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling (specific destination)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socializing</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in criminal activity</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the direction of the offender when he was fired upon. The unwounded offender in this instance was eventually arrested by backup units who responded to assist.

Of the 24 offenders who admitted to being involved in prior shooting incidents, 23 stated they were instinctive shooters. Instinctive shooting can best be described as the pointing and firing of a weapon without consciously aligning the sights. Most of the offenders stated that in street encounters with other armed individuals, there is simply not enough time to aim down the sights of a gun. In yet another case, the offender stated, “There’s no time to sight up the gun. If you hesitate, you’re dead. You have the instinct or your don’t. If you don’t, you’re in trouble.”

Several of the offenders who were interviewed grew up in an environment where violence was commonplace. They were raised among street sales of narcotics and open air drug markets. These “street combat veterans” are prepared to use deadly force on a moment’s notice. Officers, on the other hand, must consider the legality of the action, use of deadly force policy, various departmental administrative policies, and moral justification before such force can be exercised. It appears that in many cases, the “street combat veteran” may enjoy a distinct advantage over a police officer who is relatively inexperienced in the use of a firearm in real life situations and who must operate under legal restraint.

**Alcohol/Drug Use**

For the purpose of this study, drug and/or alcohol use was defined as any activity regarding the buying, selling, or using of these substances. Drug use alone was more common than just alcohol use, but the simultaneous use of each substance was the most common. Among the offenders studied, 62 percent were using drugs, alcohol, or both. (See Figure 9.) Sixty percent of the offenders in this study stated that they were engaged in drug or alcohol activity at the time of the assault of the law enforcement officer. The drug most frequently used by the offenders was cocaine or cocaine derivatives. Twenty-four percent of the offenders who stated they were using drugs at the time of the incident admitted to being under the influence of cocaine.

In discussing the effect of drugs on his behavior, one offender stated, “Heroin makes you feel invincible; cocaine makes you feel defensive and somewhat paranoid. Drugs do not hinder your ability to use a firearm. They make you quicker to shoot. When you’re on drugs, you’re irritable and cranky and maybe quicker to use a gun.”

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE 9</th>
<th>Drug and Alcohol Involvement of Offenders at Time of Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drug use only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28
This offender also attempted to explain his frame of mind on the night of the assault by stating, "I had suicidal thoughts because of drugs and knowing I couldn't get away from them. I had thought about jumping off a bridge; but that's too painful. I thought about overdosing on drugs or shooting myself in the head. The drugs were just driving me crazy. When you can't have them, you don't have the money to get them, you've got to go rob and steal. If you do have them, you're not really satisfied cause it's a weird experience. People say it's a good high. It's not a good high, it's a weird experience. A cycle constantly, constantly, then you want more drugs and you can't get them. It's a mind thing, you just want to get rid of the pain." This offender was involved in an armed robbery that was interrupted by a police officer. He stated it wasn't necessarily his intention to hurt the officer, he was simply attempting to avoid capture. If captured, he knew there would be no more drugs, and his need for drugs was his reason for committing the robbery in the first place. This offender also stated that he did not feel the use of drugs hindered his ability to use a firearm. This statement, of course, is the personal opinion of the offender and is not supported by clinical data.

Offenders' Perspectives

The offenders were asked what, in their opinions, the victim officers could have done, if anything, to prevent the assaults. These data should be viewed with great caution and circumspection due to likely offender biases. Every person, including officer and offender, perceives experiences in distinctly individualized ways. It is not uncommon when interviewing several witnesses at a crime scene to receive quite different statements. Each sees different aspects of the same experience and processes that information differently.

Past experiences, hopes, and expectations all enter into each individual's report of the occurrence. These past experiences and expectations actually affect the way the person perceives or "sees" an incident. If, for example, an individual's past experiences with law enforcement have been very positive, this individual would have a positive expectation that would color future encounters with the police. The opposite is true also. An individual's past negative exposure to law enforcement, especially coupled with a generally hostile and aggressive disposition, would affect any future encounter with law enforcement personnel. The investigators were cognizant of these perceptual dynamics when interviewing the offenders and reporting their perspectives and recollections. The investigators were also very aware that these individuals are capable of boldly lying or attempting to relate the facts in ways that justify their actions.

Thirteen (one-fourth) of the offenders stated that there was nothing the officers could have done to prevent the attacks. Nine of the offenders stated the victim officers should have requested and/or waited for backup. Six of these cases involved officers who approached offenders alone. Concerning an instance where a lone female officer approached two male suspects, one of the offenders specifically remarked that the assault could have been prevented only if the female officer had received assistance from a male officer. An offender confronted by 2 male officers was of the opinion that the attack could have been prevented only if more officers had surrounded him.

Five offenders stated the assault could have been prevented if the officer discontinued the pursuit or arrest effort. One offender stated, "It could have been prevented if he let me go."

Four offenders alleged they were not treated with the proper "dignity and respect." In one instance, the offender stated he had been stopped 1 to 2 weeks earlier by other police officers who had frisked both him and his wife, neither of whom was arrested. On the night of the assault, he was stopped again while in the company of his wife. He was told to place his hands on the trunk of the vehicle and spread his legs. He reported that he was called a name, kicked, and struck on the head by the victim officer. The offender stated, "The officer never told me what the situation was. The blow to my head; I didn't think it was an arrest but an...whipping. This situation could have been avoided if the officer announced his intentions and gave me the respect that should have been given to anybody." This offender, it was later discovered, was wanted for robbery and had previously assaulted police officers. The victim officer in this incident reported that he was knocked to the ground before having any opportunity to take action which might have prevented the assault.
Three offenders stated the assaults would not have occurred if the officers had properly identified themselves. All three of these incidents involved narcotics-related offenses. One incident involved an off-duty, uniformed officer in foot pursuit of a suspected narcotics violator. The other was a search warrant entry team officer clad in black with the word “POLICE” on the front vest pocket of his clothing. The lettering was approximately 2 inches in height. The offender claimed lighting conditions were poor, and he was unable to observe the markings. This defense was successfully refuted as the offender was convicted of the assault on the officer.

Three offenders stated the assault could have been avoided if the officer acted calm and tried to “talk them down.” In one situation, police were called to the scene of a domestic disturbance involving a “man with a gun.” According to this offender, the officers did not attempt to communicate with him. The offender stated that if the police had called him by name, the subsequent assault more than likely would have been avoided. In another instance, an offender, holding a small child in front of him, was pointing a rifle at an officer. The presence of the child prevented the officer from firing. The offender stated the assault could have been avoided if the officer had talked to him instead of screaming for him to drop the weapon. In the third instance, the offender, who was acting in retaliation for an earlier arrest by a different officer, was holding two officers at gunpoint. One of the officers attempted to disarm the offender, and he and his partner received gunshot wounds as a result. The offender, who was intoxicated at the time, claims the situation could have been avoided if the officers had attempted to talk to him and calm him down. The officers, in fact, had unsuccessfully tried this approach of calming the offenders in each of the above cases before attempting to disarm them.

Two offenders stated the assaults could have been avoided if the officer had taken control of the situation or immediately arrested them. Both of these cases involved traffic stops. In the first incident, the offender was not able to produce a driver’s license after committing a minor traffic infraction. The officer threatened the offender with arrest and walked away from the vehicle. He returned approximately 2 minutes later and was assaulted. In the second incident, the officer was assaulted after arresting the offender for Driving While Intoxicated and asking him to step over to the police cruiser. Both of these officers reported that they were surprised when they were attacked. Once again, there was no confrontation between the officer and offender prior to the attack.

When asked what their intentions were at the time of the assault, 38 percent of the offenders stated they wanted to escape or avoid arrest, 19 percent stated they wanted to kill the victim officer, 14 percent stated they wanted to frighten the officer, 7 percent stated they wanted to wound the officer, and 2 percent stated they wanted to immobilize the officer. The remaining offenders gave no specific answer to the question.

When asked to assess the officers’ demeanor at the time of the confrontation, 31 percent of the offenders were of the opinion that the officer was surprised by the attack. As earlier mentioned, the offender was the first to attack in all but 1 of the cases examined. Nineteen percent of the offenders described the officer as appearing capable and/or professional, while another 19 percent said the officer appeared unprepared and/or indecisive. Other descriptions included menacing (14 percent), afraid (7 percent), loud (5 percent), and soft-spoken (2 percent).

Given the above assessments provided by the offenders, they were then asked how the assault would be described. Thirty-three percent of the offenders stated the assault was intentional and premeditated. Sixty-four percent of the offenders stated the assault was either impulsive, unplanned, or opportunistic; and 29 percent reported some type of precipitating stress or crisis prior to the assault. These crises stemmed from a variety of personal and family-related issues.

When asked if they considered the possibility that they might be killed or severely injured during the commission of a crime, 48 percent of the offenders said, “yes.” Forty-one percent stated they never gave it any thought, and 7 percent stated they were confident that they would come out on top. Ninety-three percent of the offenders stated they did not take into account that the officer might be wearing body armor at the time the assault was committed.

When asked whether they expected to be arrested and/or prosecuted for their actions, 29 percent of the offenders stated they knew they would get caught, and 50 percent stated they did not think about it or did not
care if they were caught. Only 17 percent felt that they could avoid arrest and/or prosecution.

The average age at which offenders reported having their first experience with law enforcement officers was 7. Recalling these first encounters, 50 percent of the offenders reported they liked the officers; while 19 percent reported not liking the officer and 31 percent stated that the experience made no impression. Among those interviewed were four offenders who were involved in three separate assault incidents. All four of these offenders admitted to being members of street gangs and exhibited “street gang mentality.” In one of the assault incidents, two offenders were paid $50 to kill the next narcotics enforcement officer that entered a particular area. One of the offenders stated, “I had to do it to save face, respectability; he was interfering with the drug business. We was paid to crack the police down.” The offender reported that he was a winner no matter how the incident turned out. If he was not arrested, he would receive status and respectability. If he were arrested and convicted he would receive “status” and be “blessed” by the gang in jail.

In describing life as a street gang member, this same offender stated, “They can do for me what my family can’t. They gave me everything and took care of me. I can go to anybody’s house and sleep and eat. It was like heaven to me.” The offender reported he was 12 years old when he joined the gang. When asked how he became involved in gang life, he stated the gang culture in his neighborhood was nearly impossible to avoid. “You join the gang or die. The only way you can quit the gang is to retire, you have to be 35 years or older.”

Asked to describe circumstances involved in the contract shooting of the narcotics officer, the offender recounted that the officer begged for his life and offered money as compensation. The offender reported that he said, “We don’t want your money, we want your life.” The offender stated he and a fellow gang member then shot the officer seven times, leaving him for dead. The offender also said he had no choice in the matter; he had already accepted the $50 from the gang.

This type of cold-blooded and non-remorseful “street gang mentality” was exhibited by all four of the gang members interviewed. All of the gang members seemed to key in on such words as “respect,” “status,” “honor,” and “loyalty.” Training in understanding these types of cultures and mentalities would be of benefit to the law enforcement community.
Chapter 5

PROCEDURAL AND TRAINING ISSUES

Throughout this study, assault incidents were examined in an integrative manner which considered the events that transpired in conjunction with both the victims' and offenders' perspectives of those events. As in the earlier study on officers killed in the line of duty, several specific areas in which law enforcement procedures and/or training (or a lack thereof) may have influenced the outcome of the incidents emerged, which provided opportunity for comparison to current generally accepted law enforcement training and procedures.

The victim officers participating in the study were asked to make hindsight judgments concerning the procedural and training aspects of the incidents in which they were involved. The victims' perspectives of proper police procedures and training were the major focus and are highlighted in the various case narratives included in this chapter. The cases examined often presented multiple issues regarding procedural and training issues, and thus may be used to illustrate various, yet related, aspects of the event.

While much has been learned from previous studies on officer survival, this effort offered an opportunity to delve into a select number of life-threatening incidents for the information and lessons unique to them individually. These incidents illustrate not "what might happen," but "what did happen." The reasons the events progressed in a certain manner and escalated from a seemingly "routine" law enforcement function into a life-threatening confrontation are the theme of this chapter.

While it is recognized that it is impossible for law enforcement to develop procedures to address every single situation with which an officer may be faced on a daily basis, the results of this study identified several areas of concern in connection with law enforcement training and procedures. Following are discussions of various issues that arose as a result of the integrative approach to the 40 cases in this study. Some cases include both procedural and training concerns. None of the topics is ranked in order of importance; in fact, some issues are addressed without conclusions or resolutions. They are presented to provide information to be used in developing survival training programs that must be tailored to meet the unique needs of each jurisdiction. Addressed in the detailed discussions are issues relating to:

Procedural Errors — There were cases in the study in which the victim officer did not follow accepted law enforcement procedures. Examples of such incidents included failure to notify the radio dispatcher of traffic stops; acting alone prior to the arrival of back-up support; and improper placement of the police vehicle during both arrest and traffic stops.

Correct Procedures — In some cases, the victim officers followed all acceptable procedures and still found themselves faced with an assault situation. The best example found in this study was that of a traffic stop conducted by a municipal police officer. The stop was initiated during darkness, but a well-lighted location was chosen by the officer. The dispatcher was notified of the location and the license number of the stopped vehicle. The police vehicle was properly positioned behind the offender's vehicle, and the spotlight was used to illuminate the interior of the offender's vehicle and to assist in the approach. The officer was very cautious
in his approach. While watching the offender's hands, the officer observed the offender pick up a handgun from the seat. When the offender turned the weapon toward the officer, the officer fired first and stepped toward the rear of the vehicle. Although wounded, the offender was able to drive away. The officer's adherence to proper approach procedures, coupled with his observation and quick action, possibly saved his life.

Absence of Procedures — Several situations were identified as those for which law enforcement agencies had no formalized or accepted procedures. Areas which were identified as those for which procedures needed to be explored and developed included established written directives for officers in regard to appropriate action when off-duty; the issuance of safety equipment such as soft body armor and established mandates for its use, and written policies concerning the proper use of handcuffs.

Training — It is the obligation of law enforcement agencies to keep their officers apprised of updates in the latest law enforcement methods and practices. Staying abreast of new literature, studies, procedures, concepts, court decisions, and equipment is central to ensuring that training programs are current and relevant to today's law enforcement problems. Adequate training not only benefits the department and its officers, but the communities they serve as well. Well-educated officers can better respond to the needs and demands of the agency's constituency.

As with procedural issues, victim officers in the study were asked to judge the adequacy of training in helping them react correctly in their particular assault incident. The following example strongly demonstrates what can result when an officer, whose training is lacking in some significant element, encounters a critical incident. In this case, the officer responded to assist others answering a bank holdup alarm call. He parked his vehicle beside the bank, observing no one in the entryway. Prior to entering the second set of doors in the vestibule area, he stopped to look inside when he observed what appeared to be a robber at the counter in conversation with a clerk. When the gunman saw the officer, he immediately fired several shots. The officer returned fire and retreated to his vehicle for cover. The robber left the bank, followed the officer, and fired several additional shots. The victim, now behind cover, returned fire and struck the offender several times. The officer expressed shock at what transpired: he was not prepared for the offender to pursue him; he expected him to flee. Although trained to seek cover, the officer was never trained to face the possibility that he would be pursued and attacked after taking cover. The officer stated that he was not mentally prepared to fend off an attack and that training in this area would be of benefit to the law enforcement community. The officer felt the "panic" feeling he experienced while actually under attack would have been lessened if he had been trained for the possibility of such actions on the part of a perpetrator. This situation is one where the officer's training helped— he knew to seek cover immediately and automatically — but was also lacking — he didn't know how to respond to the out-and-out attack.

Facing a Drawn Gun

In the 1992 study, one of the convicted killers of a law enforcement officer asked, "Why do officers have to act so macho and attempt to outdraw a trigger squeeze?" This assumes that the victim officer had a choice of action when facing a drawn gun and generates several questions. The following paragraphs suggest answers to two of those questions: Do assaulters make demands of officers when they have a gun pointed at them, or do the offenders just shoot? Does the way officers respond to these demands and situations affect the outcome?

In each of the 1992 and current study cases, when the officer observed the weapon, the distance between the victim officer and the offender was 5 feet or less. Eighty percent of the offenders in the 1992 study were instinctive shooters, i.e., persons who do not consciously prepare to fire their weapon, but who, by reflex, draw, point, and discharge the weapon. Sixty-seven percent of the assaulters in this study were instinctive shooters.

An offender who was not categorized as an instinctive shooter was one who made no demands of the officer. The officer, who was directing traffic, turned to face the offender who yelled, "Hey Officer." When the officer turned, the offender's weapon was pointed directly at the officer's head. The offender seemed to be attempting to place the sight of the weapon in the center
of the officer's forehead. The victim officer immediately lunged and pushed his hand toward the weapon, deflecting the weapon from the point of aim. As a result of this movement, the bullet struck the officer in the side of the jaw. The wound was very serious, but the officer's action saved his life. After the shot, the offender fled the scene but was later arrested. The offender stated that he attempted to use the sights of the weapon in order to place the bullet between the officer's eyes.

In the next two cases, the victim officers complied with the demands made by the offenders holding a handgun pointed at the officers. In both cases the officers were shot while complying with orders. In the first case, the offender stood over the officer who had slipped and fallen during a scuffle. The offender then produced a handgun and ordered the officer not to go for his gun. The officer remained motionless. The offender stated he would kill the officer if he attempted to go for his service weapon. This threat was made while the offender was extending his arm and pointing the weapon at the officer's head. The victim officer later stated that he sensed that when the offender's arm was completely extended, the offender would shoot. The officer struck out with his hand in an attempt to deflect the weapon and was shot in the side of the head. A large amount of blood immediately began gushing from the wound, and the officer was stunned. The offender, thinking he had killed the officer, fled the scene. The bullet did not penetrate the victim officer's skull, but entered the skin and glanced off of the skull and exited.

In the second case of an officer complying with the demands made by an offender holding a drawn gun, the officer was attempting to make an arrest for “Driving Under the Influence.” A struggle ensued, and the offender managed to gain possession of the officer's weapon. The offender ordered the officer to lie on the ground directly behind the marked patrol vehicle. The officer complied, but was shot several times by the offender who fled the scene. The officer stated he only complied with the instructions of the offender because having been disarmed, he could think of no other option.

In the last “drawn gun” case to be reviewed, the victim officer was struggling with an offender who was a suspect. A second suspect then handed the offender a weapon. The offender ordered the officer to drop her weapon on the ground. The officer chose to draw and fire at the offender. Both the offender and the victim officer were shot. The officer recovered, and the offender was arrested.

The quick action taken by these officers who faced a drawn gun may have meant for each the difference between living and dying. All four victim officers related that they could not recall any training that they had received to help them in their moment of decision. Could additional training have helped these survivors? Each officer thought that additional training in this area would have helped them in their particular situation.

Traffic Stops

The following assault cases resulted from officer-initiated traffic stops. Two incidents involved offenders who were either wanted on an outstanding felony warrant, or believed themselves to be wanted; two involved offenders who had been advised they were under arrest for “Driving under the influence;” two involved offenders who were transporting large quantities of illicit narcotics; and one incident involved a well-known narcotics dealer being stopped for a minor violation. The assault in this last case was perpetrated by a bystander who was not in any way involved with the traffic stop.

Approaches to Motor Vehicles

All of the victim officers generally agreed that there are two extremely dangerous times during a traffic stop: approaching the vehicle and walking away from the vehicle. In examining the traffic stop issue, many law enforcement trainers throughout the country have been interviewed. It is the consensus of the trainers contacted that a safe manner of approaching an occupied motor vehicle does not exist if the perpetrator is willing to exchange gunfire with the police; however, caution, good judgement, and attention to good procedure can reduce the potential for tragedy. Two police officers in this study were assaulted while approaching motor vehicles, while none was assaulted while walking away.

In the first of these incidents, the offender was stopped for a speeding violation and was unable to produce a driver's license. The officer walked back to
his police vehicle to verify the operator’s license. The officer was shot several times as he approached the vehicle for the second time. The operator erroneously believed himself to be wanted on a felony warrant. The officer, who was struck in the chest, fell to the ground but did manage to return fire as the vehicle sped from the scene.

In the second incident, the officer observed the offender raise a handgun as he approached the vehicle. The officer was able to step backwards and draw his service weapon. The officer stated that by using his flashlight, he was able to observe the impending danger. As a result, the officer was able to fire the first round, injuring the offender. The offender immediately drove away. As this incident was occurring, the officer’s partner, who was not in possession of a flashlight, was approaching the vehicle on the passenger’s side. These events happened so quickly that the officer’s partner did not have time to draw his weapon until the shooting had ceased, and the offender was fleeing the scene.

When interviewed, this assisting officer stated he was not in a position to observe the offender as he raised the handgun. He stated the sudden gunshot left him momentarily confused. The officers then returned to their patrol unit and pursued the offender. After a chase of considerable length, the offender stopped and exchanged gunfire with the officers. The officer who originally approached was seriously injured as a result of the second confrontation. His partner was not injured by the gunfire. Both officers stated they had received training in the approach of vehicles stopped for traffic violations, but neither had received training in approaching vehicles as a team, nor had they received instruction on the responsibilities of the assisting officer.

During the interview of the offender in this case, he stated that he was unaware of the presence of the second officer during the time he was stopped for the traffic violation. He remained unaware of the second officer’s presence until the conclusion of the vehicular chase. At that time, he realized that two police officers were shooting at him.

The need for alertness upon approach is further illustrated by a third incident which escalated because the officer disregarded the passenger in a vehicle she had stopped. As stated in Chapter 1, offenders are frequently in the company of others when encountered by victim officers. In this incident, the officer was seriously injured when the passenger, her assailant’s girlfriend, handed him a firearm. The officer and the offender were struggling when the girlfriend passed the weapon. The offender then rose to his feet and pointed the gun at the officer. The officer, in turn, removed her service weapon and simultaneously exchanged gunfire with the offender. The officer was wounded but was able to remain on her feet. The offender was struck four times by gunfire and fell to the ground. The officer later learned that, during the exchange of gunfire, the girlfriend was attempting to get behind the officer to further assist her companion.

The female was a passenger in the suspect’s vehicle when the officer first made her approach. The officer said she did not view the woman as a threat. When the officer was struggling with the offender, her full attention was focused on retaining her service weapon and preventing the man from removing it from her holster. The female offender reported that she had intended to disarm the officer prior to the start of the shooting. She was approximately 2 feet from the officer when the firing began. She said, “The policewoman never paid attention to me or gave me a command.” Only the eruption of gunfire and observing her boyfriend lying on the ground seriously wounded stopped her from her attempt to disarm the officer. The woman stated, “I would do the same thing again when someone’s hurting my man.”

Although the officer had requested backup, the male assailant exited his vehicle before its arrival. The officer stated she acted to prevent his escape. She reported, however, that in the future she would certainly be more cognizant of all occupants of a vehicle she approached. In this case, the victim officer’s quick decision to use her firearm may have saved her from more serious injury and possibly death.

Frame of Mind

Issuing traffic violation notices is a common task which is performed by the majority of uniformed law enforcement personnel with great frequency. It is very easy for officers to become complacent while performing these types of functions and consider the contact “routine.” This is especially true in specialized units such as radar enforcement and alcohol
enforcement. In this study, two of the traffic stop incidents included officers who were working in these specialized units. Both of the victim officers stated their performance was under constant scrutiny for levels of production.

Although specific numbers for tickets and arrests were not established on a daily basis, both officers were required to meet an unofficial quota. In the case of the alcohol enforcement officer, the basis of funding for the unit was in the form of overtime pay. If an officer failed to produce an adequate amount of arrests for a specified period of time, he or she would then be released from the unit, and a more productive officer would be brought in. The loss of this assignment meant a direct financial loss to the officer who was removed from the unit. For this reason, officers in the unit felt pressured to produce cases. The majority of the work performed by the alcohol units in this jurisdiction occurred either on or near the weekends. On the night of the incident, the alcohol enforcement officer had yet to make an arrest in the tour of duty. He spotted a traffic violator and soon discovered the violator was under the influence of alcohol. The officer stated he did not run the tag number of the stopped vehicle because the radio frequency was very busy, and he did not have the time to wait until the radio frequency was clear. The operator was driving a stolen car. When the officer attempted to place the vehicle operator under arrest, he was seriously assaulted. When asked if he anticipated being assaulted, the officer stated he was “surprised.” The officer also stated had he known he was attempting to arrest the offender for operating a stolen vehicle, the situation would have been handled much differently. The officer stated he thought he was handling a “routine DWI arrest.” When asked what, if anything, he would change if he were to relive the incident, the officer stated that he would have slowed down and not been in such a rush. He would have taken the time to run the tag, learned that the vehicle was stolen, and not treated the offender in such a casual manner.

In the case of the radar unit officer, he stated it was his last ticket for the day, and he was thinking about his need to make a lumber purchase for some work he was doing at home. When asked if he in any way expected to be attacked, he said, “It came from nowhere; I couldn’t believe it was happening.”

The frame of mind of the officer conducting a traffic stop is of crucial importance when officer safety is considered. Both of the specialized unit officers stated that they considered these contacts “routine.” This attitude may have prevented them from detecting warning signals, which may have prevented the attacks.

**Mention of Arrest/Decision to Arrest**

Four cases were examined where the operators of motor vehicles were advised they were being placed under arrest, or arrest was mentioned or implied. Each of these incidents involved officers employed by major metropolitan police departments, and all of the victim officers stated that they were aware that assistance was readily available. However, assistance was requested in only one incident. In that incident, the back-up officer was in the process of placing one prisoner in a transport vehicle when the assault occurred.

The three additional incidents in which arrest of the violator was mentioned or implied occurred when the officers were acting alone. In all of these incidents, the officers stated the offenders were completely cooperative until the prospect of arrest was mentioned or implied. In each case, avoiding arrest appeared to be the sole motive for committing the assault. This strongly suggests that regardless of how minor a violation is or seems to be, officers should call and wait for assistance prior to mentioning or actually attempting to place a violator under arrest, if such assistance is available.

**Communication with Dispatcher**

In two incidents, the officers did contact the dispatcher and convey vehicle information and the nature and location of the stop. These actions, however, did not prevent the attacks from occurring. Both of these cases involved offenders who were transporting large quantities of illicit narcotics. In both cases, the offenders committed the assaults in an attempt to prevent the victim officers from discovering the illicit substances. Although both offenders were successful in that they were able to abandon evidence during the pursuits that followed the assaults, eventually they were captured and convicted for assaulting the officers.

In one case, the operator of a stolen auto was stopped for a minor traffic infraction. The victim
officer did not notify the dispatcher of the stop. The officer effecting the stop suspected that the driver was under the influence of alcohol. The officer then asked the operator to perform a series of psycho-motor field sobriety tests, and the operator complied. Having failed the field sobriety tests and being faced with the prospect of arrest, the offender shot the officer several times and fled the scene. The victim officer was incapacitated as a result of his wounds and was unable to pursue his attacker. A civilian witness reported the incident by telephone and provided the police with a description of the offender. As a result, the offender was apprehended several blocks from the scene of the shooting.

The victim officer stated that the assaulter gave no indication or warning signal that indicated potential danger. He further stated that if he had known that the offender was operating a motor vehicle that was stolen, he would certainly have called for assistance and approached the offender with a much greater degree of caution.

Another area of consideration to be given in the area of notifying the dispatcher of the nature and location of traffic stops is the supplying of evidence in the event the officer is seriously injured or killed. One officer who was interviewed made the appropriate notification to the dispatcher at the time of the traffic stop. This did not prevent the officer from being assaulted, but it did assist in the apprehension of the offender. The officer was very seriously wounded and experienced a great deal of trouble speaking. He was able to let the dispatcher know that he was injured. The dispatcher immediately broadcast a description of the suspect vehicle, and the offender was apprehended a short distance from the scene of the offense. The officer credits the proper notification to the dispatcher with saving his life. The officer was bleeding profusely from his wounds, and the dispatcher knew precisely where to send an ambulance.

In another case, an officer failed to notify the dispatcher of the location and nature of a traffic stop. This officer was shot several times by an offender who fled the scene. This officer was incapacitated from his wounds. A citizen observed the officer as he was being assaulted and followed the suspect vehicle. The citizen made note of the tag number, the location that the suspect parked the vehicle, a description of the offender, and the direction he was last seen running. This information led to the ultimate capture of the offender whose identity may have otherwise been unknown.

In another interview, an officer pointed out an additional advantage to be gained by properly notifying the dispatcher of a traffic stop. The officer stated that other patrol units in the area monitor these broadcasts and very often "roll by" the location of the traffic stop. This makes assistance more readily available when required. The visible presence of additional units may deter a suspect who is contemplating an assault.

Attentiveness to Surroundings
Should officers pay attention to their surroundings when effecting a traffic stop or concentrate their attention solely on the vehicle occupant(s)? Does the potential for violence increase when a traffic stop is effected in a high crime or known narcotics sales area? Although answers to these questions seem obvious, the following incidents suggest that attentiveness is yet an area that needs to be addressed in training.

In one case that was examined, two officers stopped a violator for a minor traffic infraction in a well-known narcotics distribution area. The officers described the area of the stop as an "open air drug market." The stop was conducted in the evening hours, and there were numerous citizens on the street. In this case, a well-known drug dealer, who admittedly conducted his narcotic business in the immediate vicinity of the stop, was the individual who had been stopped. Both officers exited their patrol vehicle and were standing at the rear of the suspect vehicle, with one officer writing a violation for a traffic infraction. An offender approached and immediately began to fire several rounds at the officer who was writing the citation. The victim officer was seriously wounded and fell to the ground, while the offender fled the scene on foot. The victim officer and his partner managed to return several rounds of fire but did not strike the offender. The offender was later captured and has since been convicted of this offense.

In an interview with the offender, he would not admit to the reasons for seriously wounding the police officer. He did admit that the vehicle operator was a known associate of his. He also stated that the attack
was easy to accomplish, as both of the officers had their attention focused on the traffic violator who was standing alongside of his vehicle. Neither officer was aware of the offender's presence until the shots were fired by the offender.

Law enforcement personnel should be cognizant of the circumstances surrounding all police action taken. When patrolling an area known for drugs and violence, officers should be very aware of their surroundings, and when possible, "pick their spots" for initiating any encounters.

Control of Persons and/or Situations

In two cases the victim officers had planned on issuing traffic citations and releasing the offenders; yet, these contacts resulted in their assaults. The offenders in these cases stated they felt the victim officer should have taken control of them at some earlier point in the contact, thereby avoiding the assault situation entirely. Ironically, both of these cases involved traffic stops for minor violations which escalated into actual arrest situations. The issue of control over the offenders commenced when the victim officers allowed them to exit their vehicles and move about in an unrestricted fashion.

In one case, the offender was being placed under arrest for DWI. The officer advised the offender that he was under arrest and asked him to step to the rear of the patrol car. In the offender's opinion, this gave him the opportunity to attack. The victim officer stated that the offender was cooperative and appeared passive up until the actual moment of the attack. The offender stated that had the officer taken physical control of him, he could have been arrested without incident.

In another case, the offender was operating a stolen vehicle, and the officer allowed the offender to step out of the car. As the conversation between the officer and the offender deteriorated, the offender became increasingly aggressive. The officer stated that by the time he realized that he was in need of assistance, it was too late. Though he did attempt to return to his unit to call for assistance, he was attacked by the offender who obtained the officer's service weapon. The offender stated he felt he had the upper hand in the situation as the officer appeared to be very tolerant and non-controlling.

It is not possible to say how these situations would have been resolved if the officer had been more assertive. However, the offender's perception of control or gaining control over the officer appears to be a significant issue in safety training.

In another case, an officer was instructed to remove handcuffs from a prisoner by the magistrate of the court. The officer objected but was instructed again to remove the cuffs. Once the cuffs were removed, the offender fled from the courtroom. The officer gave foot pursuit and eventually caught up with the offender. Through no fault of his own, the officer by this time had lost control of the situation and was assaulted. The officer reported that he failed to consider what action he would take in the event he captured the offender.

In three other cases, officers were injured while attempting to assert control over offenders they were attempting to arrest.

Use of Protective Body Armor

In comparing the use of body armor indicated in the 1992 study with the use of body armor indicated in this study, it is of note that only 8 of the victims (15%) were wearing protective body armor at the time they were killed, while results of the present study indicate that 37 of the victims (71 percent) were wearing armor at the time they were assaulted. In spite of the armor, forty-four percent of the victim officers were injured. Eleven percent of the officers stated that the protective body armor prevented injury. This statistic can be misleading due to the fact that four officers were shot in unprotected areas of their bodies. In all four of these cases, the officers were shot in the vest as well as the extremities. The vest protected them from experiencing even more serious wounds.

A total of four officers involved in this study may not have been injured seriously if protective body armor had been worn at the time of the assault. One officer was shot in the chest during a traffic stop and is now confined to a wheelchair as a result of his injuries. A plainclothes officer was shot in the abdomen during an exchange of gunfire with a suspected narcotics dealer and has fully recovered from his injuries. Another plainclothes officer who was searching a closet for a suspect was shot in the stomach and has since fully recovered.
A uniformed officer, who completed a building search and then removed his vest, responded to another call to search an abandoned house on his way back to the station. He entered the house without the vest and was shot in the stomach. He has since fully recovered.

When asked to cite reasons that the protective body armor was not worn by the victim officers, the most frequent reason cited was one of personal comfort: the officers found the vest uncomfortable, particularly in hot weather, and ill-fitting. In some instances, it was noted that several police departments did not purchase vests for their personnel. It was also noted that while the majority of departments did purchase vests for their officers, the wearing of the vest was not mandatory.

As earlier mentioned, 93 percent of the offenders who were interviewed stated that they did not take into account the fact that the officer might be wearing protective body armor at the time the assault took place. Seven of the victim officers were shot in the head during the attacks, six with handguns and one with a shotgun. Three of these victims were shot directly in the facial area, and two were shot in the back of the head from a distance of 2 feet or less. Neither officer was aware that the attack was about to occur. In the latter case, one of the officers died as a result of the wound. In the case involving the use of the shotgun, the officer was leaning over the hood of a patrol vehicle and only his head and shoulders were exposed. This officer was shot from the front and the top portion of his scalp was blown off. In each of the aforementioned incidents, it appears that the officer's head was the intended target of the offender.

In one case, the offender lifted the officer's vest away from his body, while shoving the handgun directly into the officer's stomach and discharging the weapon. In a second case, an officer who was attempting to foil a bank robbery was shot in the throat by an offender. In yet a third case, an offender who had obtained the victim officer's service weapon ordered the officer to lay face down on the ground. The officer complied, and the offender stood directly over the officer and shot him in the lower back, immediately below the protective garment.

While the offenders stated that whether an officer wears body armor or not has no effect on their behavior, the evidence indicates this may not be the case.

It is also possible that offenders aimed at the head for reasons unknown.

**Off-Duty Performance**

In two cases, the victim officers were off duty but dressed in full police uniform when the assault situation developed. The offenders in these cases observed what to them was a uniformed police officer who was about to arrest them for their criminal activity. The offenders' actions were directed against the law enforcement figure, and it made no difference to the offenders if the officers were on or off duty. Both victim officers stated that they had not received any training from their department about what actions to take or refrain from taking when observing criminal activity while off duty.

Off-duty performance was an issue presented in the 1992 study for the development of training procedures. Statistics report that from 1985 through 1994, 1 in 7 officers who were feloniously killed were off duty at the times of their deaths. The issue of off-duty procedures was discussed in depth in an article in the April 1996 issue of the FBI publication *Law Enforcement Bulletin* (Davis & Pinizzotto, 1996.)

**Communications**

Conveying information from one officer to another was a crucial issue in several cases. Communications issues in the following paragraphs address the importance of communication 1) from department to department; 2) between officer and dispatcher; and 3) from officer to officer.

Criminal incidents crossing jurisdictional boundaries occurred in several cases in this study. One case crossed through four different departmental boundaries which created several problems. A major problem was that the patrol units of the different departments were unable to communicate with each other. A complex system of relaying and repeating information had to be used, resulting in losing current locations of both the offenders and the officers. In this incident, three officers received gun shot wounds. Emergency medical units were dispatched from three jurisdictions to assist the injured officers. This incident highlights the importance of communication systems which enable municipal, county, state, and federal
agencies to have the ability to communicate not only at the dispatch level, but at the street level also. All officers interviewed in this incident suggested that a regional radio frequency should be made available for use in multi-jurisdictional incidents. (Cost was reported to be the reason that this was not previously adopted.)

In two cases, information provided by the radio dispatcher was either lacking or misleading to the patrol officer. In one instance, a patrol officer was dispatched to a location where an escapee was allegedly observed. Neither he nor a second officer who arrived at the scene requested a physical description of the escapee, a description of his clothing, or even the identity and location of the person who had notified police of the sighting. As a result, the officers were unable to identify the escapee with any certainty. The officers stated that when they finally did find a possible suspect among the group of people at the dispatched location, they did not really believe he was, in fact, the escapee. Unfortunately, their suspect, who was the escapee, disarmed one officer and shot both.

Two officers in a municipal department were attempting to make an arrest for “drinking in public” charge when the subject ran from the scene. A foot chase extending over several blocks ensued. During the chase, the subject drew a handgun, turned, and fired at the officers. One officer dove for cover and was surprised when his partner did not. The officer who sought cover was the officer who saw the handgun. He failed to convey this information to his partner. The officers had never practiced sharing information during any of their training sessions. Simple communication skills when incorporated into a safety training program could prevent injury.

**Identification When Not in Uniform**

As with the 1992 study, in every case examined where the victim was not in uniform, the offenders claimed that they did not know that the victim officer was a law enforcement officer. In all cases in this study, the victims stated that they properly identified themselves as law enforcement officers. The tragedy of a law enforcement officer killed or seriously injured is increased if the offender is released during the trial with a defense of “I did not know that this individual was a law enforcement officer.”

In one case in this study, members of a drug unit were making an arrest. Each officer had been issued a “Raid” jacket marked with the word Police in bright color. When initiating the arrest, the four officers jumped from their unmarked vehicles. The victim officer stated that only one of the four officers had his badge in one hand and his gun in the other. He additionally related that all four officers yelled “Police! Freeze!” while attempting to make this arrest. The victim stated that the officers did not have the opportunity to put their raid jackets on before effecting the arrest. The offender, who shot the victim before he himself was shot, stated that the four individuals he saw with guns drawn looked just like his clients -- a bunch of dopers. He also related that he did not see a police badge. He did state, however, that he would have attempted to protect himself from this group even if one had displayed something that could have been a police badge. The total appearance of the four individuals resembled dope robbers and not law enforcement officers.

A clear and positive law enforcement identification can assist officers both on the scene of an arrest or other police action and also later in the court room. When not in uniform and time permits, the use of a clearly marked raid jacket or other identifying clothing can assist in eliminating the potential defense of the offender not knowing the individual was a law enforcement officer. The raid jacket can also assist in eliminating misidentification by other law enforcement officers. More than one officer has been killed or seriously injured by fellow officers because of misidentification.

**Searches**

In this study, only 3 of the 42 offenders indicated that law enforcement searches were always thorough. When questioned about the frequency of searches when they were arrested, only 14 percent of the offenders stated that they were always searched by law enforcement. Fifty percent of the offenders interviewed stated that the most overlooked area by both male and female officers was the groin area of both male and female prisoners. The offenders stated that this was their favorite place to carry their weapon. One offender reported that when arrested, the arresting officers appeared so overjoyed at finding drugs in his outer jacket pocket that they overlooked a revolver hidden in his
groin. He was handcuffed in front, palms together, and placed in the rear of the police vehicle. During the drive to the lock-up, he removed his weapon and slid it under the driver’s seat. Also, during this drive the offender was able to convince the officers that he could take them to the biggest dope dealer in town and make a buy with them. After the searching and booking process was completed, the officers were able to convince the watch commander to allow this prisoner to be released to them so the buy could be made. When permission was given, the prisoner was again handcuffed, palms together in front, and taken back to the officer’s vehicle. During the ride to the alleged dope house, the offender retrieved the weapon and shot both officers. One officer died at the scene. The other, though severely wounded, survived and returned to work. The advice given by the offender to all law enforcement was to thoroughly search the vehicle after every transport.

Two important observations emerge from these examples. One is that finding one weapon does not preclude the presence of a second, a caution which would apply to contraband searches as well. The second is that handcuffing the wrists with palms together in front of the offender results in little loss of hand and arm movement and provides the offender with another weapon — the handcuffs.

**First Aid**

The following two cases demonstrate first aid issues in extremes — one case in which a life was saved by first aid measures and one in which a life was placed in great jeopardy for want of such procedures.

In the first case, the victim officer was taken into a building, placed against a wall, shot seven times and left for dead. The officer was extremely fortunate that the offenders had not removed his soft body armor. He received two serious wounds, one to the arm and one to the leg. He was bleeding profusely, but refused to die in such a “dirty, filthy place.” Blood loss from the arm and leg wounds was severe, but the officer removed his shoe laces and used them as tourniquets to stop or slow the blood loss. He then walked and crawled out of the building and found help. He is convinced that his use of self-administered first aid saved his life.

In a case that was used in testing the protocol but not used in the study, the victim officer reported that while working in uniform during the midnight to 8 a.m. tour of duty in a marked patrol vehicle, he responded for a suspicious person call. While questioning an individual at the scene, a confrontation developed, and the officer’s throat was cut from ear to ear. He was able to protect himself from additional injury by shooting his assailant. In response to his call for help, numerous officers responded to the crime scene; yet, none of these officers attempted any sort of first aid to the victim. The injuries were apparently so severe that he was placed in a police patrol vehicle and transported to a hospital. A physician was the first person to render first aid, and this was a single act of placing his hand over the wound to stop the flow of blood. This victim reported that first aid training was conducted in the training academy but was not supported by an in-service program. He also stated that if he had responded to assist another officer, he would not have administered first aid and did not think to self administer a compress to stop the flow of his own blood.

These training issues have been presented to assist both individual law enforcement officer and agency focus on training areas that could assist an officer in surviving a felonious line-of-duty assault.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Prior to conducting this research project, the investigators hoped a clear and definitive “profile” of a “felonious assaulter” would emerge. The findings, however, suggest that there is no singular profile of an individual who feloniously assaults a law enforcement officer, just as no singular profile was found for the law enforcement officer killers studied in 1992. What did emerge from this study were several significant issues directly relating to officer safety which would appear to warrant review. In the following closing paragraphs, these issues, all touched upon in the previous chapters and by no means the only issues presented in the material, are briefly recounted and followed by recommendations which, it is the authors’ hope, will be appropriately addressed by law enforcement personnel throughout the nation.

Use of Force

In general, the study results indicate that officers had clear memories of what “not to do” and when “not to use force” but that some had difficulty in recalling instances in which the use of force was an appropriate, timely, necessary, and positive decision. While all officers felt that it was appropriate to wrestle or tussle with an offender, some experienced difficulty in determining the point at which to progress to the next level of force. It was also determined that many officers had great difficulty in recognizing the point at which they were actually fighting for their lives. Some officers had to make a conscious effort to recall their departments’ use of deadly force policy prior to the initiation of necessary force. In some instances, that recall came too late.

In addition, insight provided by the victim officers in this study clearly established that repetitive safety training, which reflected real-life circumstances, enabled them to survive potentially lethal situations. In contrast, officers felt that training which reinforced improper procedures or was deficient in some element could increase the chance of officer injury or death. Some of the survivors who were interviewed stated they were not satisfied with the safety training provided by their agencies. Others stated that they were not provided with realistic training and used their own funds to obtain commercially sponsored training in the area of “street survival.”

Recommendation:

Based on this information, it is recommended that each department review its use of deadly force policy to determine that all elements of the policy are clearly articulated and easily understood. Department members should be constantly tested for their recall of this policy, and positive aspects of the policy should be stressed, especially in reference to the proper time to use deadly force. Negative aspects, such as when not to shoot, should not be overemphasized. It is also recommended that training content and procedure be regularly reviewed and evaluated for the express purpose of keeping the officer alert to the constant potential for danger inherent in law enforcement service.

Traffic Stops

The results of both studies serve as reminders that what are frequently viewed as routine and repetitive tasks performed by law enforcement officers pose a
potential threat to the officer. The officers infrequently considered the fact that someone they stopped for a minor infraction of the law would consider taking their lives in an effort to escape. A number of officers severely injured in this study clearly thought they were simply making one more minor traffic stop. The officer’s drive, whether externally or internally motivated, to produce statistics sometimes caused safety-related shortcuts. Dispatchers, for example, were not always informed of the location of the stop, the nature of the stop, or the vehicle description and tag number. Officers rarely considered the physical surroundings of the location they chose to effect a traffic stop. Officers related that on extremely hot days, when making numerous traffic stops required them to spend the majority of their time away from their air conditioned units, the wearing of the bulletproof vest became very uncomfortable. The potential for physical danger did not enter the officer’s mind until the offender initiated and/or completed the attack.

Recommendation:

Each law enforcement agency whose responsibilities include the enforcement of traffic regulations should include sections dealing with officer safety in their enforcement policy. Parts of this policy should include the proper selection of stop location, with a view towards the safety of the violator and the officer. This policy should require that every officer properly notify the police dispatcher of the location and nature of all vehicle stops. Officers performing traffic enforcement duties should also be required to wear soft body armor. Supervisors should constantly monitor the compliance of these safety related policies.

Communicating with the citizens in one’s jurisdiction is a safety avenue often overlooked. The department should periodically advise citizens of the proper response when stopped by a marked police unit. The citizen who exits a vehicle in order to greet the officer who has stopped him or her could be viewed as a potential threat by the officer. Citizens should be advised that they should remain in the vehicle, keep their hands in plain view, and await further directions from the officer. Pro-active community policing that leads to additional interaction between citizens and law enforcement officers has the potential to reduce miscommunication and prevent conflicts that might arise. Departments should review policies that allow the driver of a stopped vehicle to be brought back to the officer’s vehicle.

Searches

The victim officers interviewed stated they experienced problems in remaining focused while conducting searches for a variety of reasons, but the results of instances in which offenders were not thoroughly searched made their own statement. Officers reported that thorough searching sometimes became secondary to their perceived need to gain physical control of the offender. Officers also mentioned the difficulty of searching in the hours of darkness, especially in one-on-one situations.

Officers reported experiencing great reluctance to thoroughly search offenders when their appearance was very dirty; they appeared to be a person who lived on the street; they appeared to have urinated or defecated on themselves; they appeared to be a narcotics addict; or they were arrested for a narcotics’ related offense. In circumstances such as these, officers reported their primary concern was not their immediate physical safety but rather the possible long-range effects of making contact with persons carrying communicable diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, etc. Several of these officers also reported that disposable latex gloves were not supplied by their departments, making these tasks especially difficult and/or unpleasant. Other officers reported that while, in theory, their department did equip patrol vehicles with latex gloves, they often made arrests and discovered that there were no gloves. In addition, the officers made the point that latex gloves were of no value in protecting them from needle punctures when searching narcotics addicts.

Law enforcement officers also voiced displeasure at searching the groin area of male arrestees. Most reported that they would pat down the area on the outside of the clothing but were reluctant to go into the prisoner’s clothing in that area. Several offenders interviewed stated they were aware of law enforcement officers’ reluctance to search the groin area. These offenders also stated that the groin area was normally where they secreted weapons and contraband.

Male police officers also reported a reluctance to thoroughly search female arrestees. The officers
stated that they avoided this practice for fear of complaints on the part of the offender. Several officers stated that their department had no written directives regarding this practice and were not sure under what conditions thorough searches would be justified.

It was also found that the officer’s attention shifted when items of contraband were recovered. On one occasion when the search revealed other contraband, the officer’s attention was diverted to effecting an arrest for the contraband rather than continuing to search for a weapon. While attempting to effect the arrest, the overlooked handgun was subsequently used to assault the officer. Officers often reported that individuals were placed in their police vehicles without being searched. In addition, officers stated that they did not always search their vehicles after transporting individuals.

**Recommendation:**
Proper techniques for search training should simulate realistic situations and include procedures for searches conducted during the day, at night, under low-level lighting conditions and in residences and other various locations. Additional training should include searching a resisting subject. A core policy governing the proper searching of all persons arrested for violations of the law should be established and articulated to department members. Department policies should be clear in the mandatory searching of female prisoners and outline the types of situations when a search is justified and there are no female personnel available to conduct the search. A prisoner should be searched thoroughly by each officer accepting responsibility for the custody of the prisoner. Such a policy should also include thorough searches of police vehicles at the beginning of duty tours, particularly if cars are used on a rotating basis. Officers should also search the vehicle before and after any other person is placed into or transported in the vehicle. Law enforcement administrators should ensure that their departments adequately supply proper safety equipment, which would lessen officer concerns about searching offenders who present an offensive or questionable appearance. Proper equipment is especially important for officers who regularly arrest and transport narcotics violators.

**Waiting for Back Up**
It is recognized that some officers, by virtue of geographic location and/or available personnel, are forced to act without benefit of assistance. Several officers reported that when working in a one-person patrol vehicle and requesting backup, they initiated police action prior to the arrival of assistance because they believed that the situation required immediate action. In each case, the officer was injured prior to the backup unit’s arrival on the scene. The officers’ desires to make an arrest or prevent an escape outweighed their concerns for personal safety. Officers reported that positive comments are often made about the ability to perform police duties without benefit of assistance. This “macho” attitude applies to both sexes and was found to exist throughout the country. This attitude also applies to several cases where officers attempted to effect arrests without calling for assistance.

**Recommendation:**
Departments should establish a policy which states definitively when assistance should be summoned and delineates what actions, if any, should be taken prior to the arrival of backup. By strictly adhering to and enforcing such policies, departments would relieve members of the responsibility of exercising personal discretion in making these decisions.

**Use of Handcuffs**
Officers throughout the country reported a great inconsistency in written policies as they pertain to the use of handcuffs. Some officers reported that their agencies had no policies or directives regarding this subject. In some agencies, handcuffs were considered optional equipment, and both their acquisition and use were left to the discretion of the officer.

**Recommendation:**
Because properly used handcuffs serve to protect both the officer and the person being taken into custody, departments should establish policy for their use. Officers should receive thorough training in the proper use of handcuffs. Such training should be conducted during the day, at night, under low-level lighting conditions, and, when possible, under adverse weather conditions. Additional training
should include procedures involving a resisting arrestee. Officers should be required to demonstrate a proficiency with the handcuffs during training, and any officer who might be required to make an arrest should be mandated to have handcuffs. Supervisors should monitor officer possession of handcuffs and determine that they are properly used with persons taken into custody or being transported.

**Off-Duty Performance**

At the present time, the data regarding assaults on law enforcement officers which are provided to the FBI are categorized only by "specialized assignment" or "other." As a result, these data cannot be analyzed by the officer’s duty or off-duty status. However, from 1986 to 1995, 1 out of 7 officers killed in the line of duty in the United States was off-duty.

In the two cases in this study in which the victim officers were off duty at the time of their assaults, both officers were attired in full departmental uniforms. The offenders in these cases stated that they were aware that the victims were law enforcement officers. Off-duty behavior, however, was an important issue that was discussed by all the victims interviewed. Most officers stated that their departments did not have a written policy covering how and when to act in an official capacity when off duty. Some agencies required officers to have their service weapons in their possession while in their jurisdictions. Other departments required their officers to leave their weapons at the station upon completion of their tour of duty. Yet other departments left this matter solely to the discretion of the officers. Off-duty behavior was further complicated by the fact that the penal codes in some jurisdictions require officers to take action when a felony is committed in their presence.

**Recommendation:**

After reviewing these incidents of off-duty assaults and after interviewing officers who accidentally wounded off-duty officers in cases of mistaken identity, the investigators suggest that law enforcement agencies consider several points. Each agency should have a well-defined departmental policy which clearly explains off-duty performance of duty-related conduct for all members of the department. This policy should include the carrying of firearms, ammunition, holsters, and qualification with the off-duty weapon if it is other than the issued service weapon. How off-duty officers should act when observing an offense both in the officers’ own jurisdiction, as well as in surrounding jurisdictions, should be addressed. How off-duty officers should react if they become victims of an offense should be considered. A procedure should be developed and clearly stated for off-duty officers to follow if armed and confronted by an on-duty officer, stressing that the off-duty officer should NEVER turn toward the on-duty officer with the weapon in hand.

A collateral issue brought to the investigators’ attention during the study was proper action of officers’ family members who may be present when off-duty action is required. The department should strongly suggest that each officer develop a plan of action clearly covering what each family member should say or do if the family becomes drawn into a crime-in-progress. Each family member old enough to use the telephone should know how to contact the emergency police dispatcher and should know what information should be relayed. For example, this information should include the type of action in which the officer is involved, the officer’s name and physical description, if the offender is armed and a description of that weapon, and any other relevant information that might assist the on-duty officers who are responding to the scene.

**Post-Assault Trauma**

Several officers who were seriously wounded reported that confusion was generated when numerous other officers were in some way involved in the assault incident. This confusion often led to distortion of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident, which in turn resulted in false information being circulated by well-intentioned officers. As this information passed through the department, it often became increasingly distorted, which was of great concern to the victim officers involved in these incidents. The miscommunication and/or misinformation was exacerbated when victims of more than one agency were directly involved in the incident. False information can create problems for the department at all levels.

Also, victims reported in some cases that debriefings were not completed for all members who were involved in the incident. The reasons for that were
Recommendation:

Each department should develop a policy of thoroughly debriefing all members involved in serious assaults of law enforcement personnel and/or use of deadly force. Debriefing of members must be mandatory. A completed report of this debriefing should be released to all members of the department in a timely fashion. Additionally, these incidents should be critically reviewed for lessons learned by members of the agency's training staff and beneficial findings incorporated into the agency's safety/survival training program.

Post-Incident Recovery

The basic descriptors of the victim officers portrayed “hard working” individuals who have, in most cases, devoted their lives to the service of the community. Law enforcement service was not just a job to these officers, but a way of life. In spite of serious injury and subsequent disability, some officers who have been seriously assaulted reported that they still have a desire to remain in law enforcement and serve the community. In this study, several victims who received the most severe physical injuries were the ones who most wanted to return to duty. Yet, these officers were denied the opportunity to return to service by the very agreements that were established for their protection.

Whether a victim has the opportunity to return to duty or is forced to retire is generally predetermined by some type of labor contract and/or departmental policy. At the time of their inception, the policies regarding the continued law enforcement service of disabled officers were well-intentioned and made to protect and assist the officer. However, many of these decisions were made many years ago and have not been reviewed or updated.

Recommendation:

In light of the fact that law enforcement tasks have changed since many of these agreements were developed and the overall awareness of and sensitivity to the disabled have improved, it would appear that these policies need careful review. Departments are encouraged to review present rules, and where possible, provide an opportunity for the victim of a serious performance-of-duty assault the option of returning to a productive function within the agency. These changes would directly provide mutual benefit to the victim, the agency, and most importantly to the community served by this law enforcement agency.

Resolution

It is obvious from the results of this study that, in addressing the issue of law enforcement safety, an arrest for what appears to be a minor infraction of the law might well result in a felonious assault against a police officer. During an unplanned encounter with a violator of the law, an officer does not possess, nor has he or she the means to possess, prior knowledge of the violator’s previous criminal history, previous criminal actions, and willingness to use force and violence against law enforcement personnel. While these types of individuals represent a very small portion of the total population, law enforcement must recognize that in order to serve and protect the larger community, they must first be prepared to protect themselves.
Chapter 7

METHODOLOGY

In the 1992 study, *Killed in the Line of Duty*, the investigators examined as closely as possible the myriad of complexities which surrounded the circumstances resulting in the fatality of an officer. These events, including the officer, the offender, and the circumstances that brought them together, were referred to in the 1992 study as "the deadly mix." Response from the law enforcement community suggests that efforts to analyze these complex interactions were successful. Also judging from responses to that study, however, it was apparent that the nature of the study precluded the investigators from including any analyses of information from the single most potentially important source: the victim officer.

Working from the common belief that a totally multidimensional approach — one which includes involvement of the victim officer — could possibly provide even greater insight into officer safety, the authors of this study sought to incorporate the missing element. The current study was designed, therefore, closely akin to the 1992 study, with the important addition of the element of extensive interviews with officers who had survived an assault in the line of duty.

Because the number of cases included in the study was small and the sample population was not achieved using a scientific random selection method, the results of the study should not be generalized. Although this study offers a great deal of data concerning the victim officers, the offenders, and the circumstances that brought them together, those data must be carefully evaluated for relevancy to individual departments and situations.

The Study: Sample Selection

Predetermined parameters restricted sample cases to those which 1) occurred between 1987-1994; 2) involved an offender whose appeals were exhausted and who was available for an interview; and 3) involved an officer who survived the assault and would agree to be interviewed. In addition, it was the intention of the investigators that cases selected mirror national law enforcement assault data as closely as possible. The final sample on which the study was based consisted of 40 incidents, wherein 52 law enforcement officers were feloniously assaulted by 42 offenders.

Considerable effort was made to provide ample opportunity for local law enforcement to be involved in the case selection, and sample cases were sought through a variety of channels. Approximately 17,000 law enforcement agencies contribute to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), submitting data either directly or through state UCR programs. The chief executive of each of these 17,000 law enforcement agencies was sent a letter requesting recommendations for incidents to be included in the study. In addition, the special agent in charge in each of the 56 field offices of the FBI was also sent a letter requesting cases from within their respective jurisdictions. This nationwide search resulted in the identification of 625 cases for consideration. Each agency recommending a case for inclusion supplied official offense reports and other supporting documentation.

Of the 625 cases initially identified, 465 were eliminated because one or more of the predetermined conditions for selection were not met. Some of these
incidents had not taken place within the 1987-1994 parameter. Others involved offenders who had been killed during the assaults, eliminating the opportunity for offender interview. Further incidents were excluded because the offenders had been committed to mental institutions or had been acquitted. Others were eliminated because charges against the offender had been dropped or otherwise dismissed. Of the remaining 160 eligible cases, 40 were selected as representative of the characteristics targeted for this study: the region of the nation in which the incident occurred, the circumstances of the assault situation, and the type of law enforcement agency by which the victim officer was employed at the time of the assault.

In every case, both the officer and the offender had to agree freely to cooperate in the interview process. No promises or special considerations were offered by prison administrators or the FBI in exchange for an offender’s participation in the study. Of the offenders approached, only two refused to be interviewed, prompting the selection of other incidents. In one of the 40 cases, an officer refused to participate in the study after the case had been selected and processed, which also prompted the selection of another incident.

**Data Collection**

Once the selection of sample assault cases was finalized, each of the officers’ departments was notified. The agency’s command staff was personally contacted to initiate proceedings. The officer who had been assaulted was then given the opportunity to participate in the study, and his or her approval for the interview was sought. Once the officer agreed to participate in the study, the authors sought compliance from the offender. This procedure was followed to verify that both the victim officer and the offender in each case were committed to participation before moving forward with the data collection.

After consent from both the officer and the offender was received, the investigators reviewed department case documents initially provided by the employing agency. The available documentation varied but included, at a minimum, offense and/or investigative reports. Because complete anonymity was granted to each officer, other members of the agencies were not interviewed about the victims or incidents beyond that point in time. When possible, the victims provided supplemental background records, such as statements, copies of radio transmissions, performance ratings, and any other documentation they thought would assist in better understanding the particular assault.

Also, all available correctional documentation relating to each offender was examined. Unfortunately, very little mental health information was available on most offenders. In general, either minimal psychological or intellectual testing had been completed, or in instances where such testing had been completed, the offender refused to allow the investigators access to the information. In the 1992 study, since each offender was incarcerated on a capital offense, comprehensive mental health evaluations were completed. However, the majority of offenders in the current study were not facing capital charges. Consequently, such comprehensive mental health evaluations had not been conducted.

**Officer Interview: Setting**

The investigators felt that allowing the officer to determine the location of the interview would encourage the most comfortable interviewing environment; therefore, the location was entirely the choice of the officer. The majority of the interviews were conducted in an office of the victim officer’s department. Several interviews were conducted in the victim officer’s residence. One was conducted at a vacation home, one in a hotel room, and one in a non-public area of a local restaurant.

As a matter of convenience to the victim officer, the investigators attempted to conduct the interviews while the officer was working regularly scheduled tours of duty, provided that the victim officer had actually returned to duty. Numerous interviews were conducted on the evening and midnight tours of duty.

**Officer Interview: Atmosphere**

It was clearly the intention of the investigators to put the victim officers as much at ease as possible. Because the victim officer’s behavior relative to assault incidents was heavily scrutinized by the department, especially when the use of deadly force on the part of the officer was involved, the investigators expressed
sensitivity to the fact that the officers had already been subjected to lengthy interviews by their respective departments, as well as lengthy examinations and cross-examinations in the adjudication of the assault incidents. In several cases, the officers were also subjected to lengthy civil litigation as a result of the assault circumstance. The investigators made clear their position; they would remain non-judgmental, and they had no interest in attempting to point fingers or affix blame and responsibility. Rapport with the victim officers was easily developed once they came to the realization that they did not have to justify or defend their actions to the investigators.

The investigators assured the victim officers of their personal interest in them as individuals. They let the victims know clearly that they were interested in their life experiences both prior to and during their law enforcement careers and that they believed that as "survivors," the officers, in fully sharing their assault experiences, could potentially help other law enforcement personnel survive a line-of-duty assault.

Officer Interview: Process

In preparation for meeting with the officer, the investigators collected and reviewed all data relevant to the assault to assure the quality and accuracy of facts that could be extracted at the time of the interview. For obvious reasons, the interviews with the officers tended to be longer than those with the offenders. The interviews ranged in length from 4 to 8 hours, with an average of 6 hours. A detailed description of the protocol used to facilitate the interview appears in Appendix I.

Because there was no opportunity for involvement of victim officers in the 1992 study, it was necessary to develop approaches and techniques which would appropriately facilitate interviewing the assaulted officers. The interview approach for the victim officer was developed with several assumptions: 1) that these victims had information that would potentially benefit the law enforcement community; 2) that the victim officers would be able to provide information which was unobtainable in the 1992 study; 3) that the victim officers could be reluctant to discuss details of the incident with "outsiders;" and 4) that the interview process had the potential of opening previously healed wounds.

In the initial approach to the victim officer, the investigators attempted to establish a commonality by sharing with the officer something of their own personal law enforcement experiences. They then thoroughly explained the purpose and intent of the study. A copy of the 1992 study was provided to the victim officer and attention was called to Chapter 5, entitled "Victim Officer," which emphasized the fact that the participants involved in the first study were granted total anonymity — just as they would be. The victim officers were also advised that any information provided by them would be presented in a manner greatly similar to that presented in the 1992 study. Once any questions which the victim officer had were answered, the officer was asked to sign a release stating that he or she understood the nature of the study, accepted the condition of anonymity, and was freely cooperating with the investigators.

During the interview process, the officers were allowed to vent their feelings and emotions with respect to the incidents in which they were involved. One victim officer who was very seriously wounded in the assault stated that in the past he had experienced a great deal of trauma when recalling the facts of the assault. Though he stated to investigators that he believed he had now emotionally recovered and felt he was prepared to discuss the incident, he later stated, "The demons will come back again tonight," evidencing the extent of the emotional impact of such an experience.

Some of the officers interviewed harbored ill feelings towards certain of their department personnel. Those ill feelings stemmed from such things as a command official's reluctance to let the investigators speak with the victim officer concerning the incident, or the treatment they did or did not receive by the department members following the incident.

At the conclusion of the interview, the officer was asked the same question that was asked of the offender: "Is there anything you can think of which was not asked in this interview which you feel is important to relate to us?" This question was asked specifically to provide an opportunity to the respondents to offer information that the protocol and associated interview did not elicit. In some cases, the investigators felt that the message the officer had
to offer to the law enforcement community was so powerful that they requested the officer to participate in a short video-taped discussion. Of the 32 officers who were asked to participate, 30 agreed. Every attempt was made during the video interviews to maintain the anonymity of the officer and the officer’s department. The purpose of the video is to share exclusively with the law enforcement community throughout the Nation these officers’ thoughts concerning their assaults in the hope that other officers might benefit from their experiences.

**Offender Interview: Setting**

The setting for the offender interview depended upon whether or not the offender remained incarcerated at the time of the interview. Of the 42 offenders interviewed, 38 were still in prison at the time of the interview. Inmates who remained in correctional facilities were housed in 32 city or state facilities, and 4 federal prisons, located throughout 17 different states. Specific space within each facility identified as the interview area differed with each correctional agency. Four of the offenders had been released from prison and had returned to society. In these instances, investigators met with the offenders in their local communities.

Regardless of the location of the interview, it was the investigators’ contention that the setting should be as neutral and non-threatening as could be managed under any given circumstances. It was important to them that the interview area be one in which distractions and disruptions were minimal and from which any major physical barriers, such as furniture, partitions, etc., which might impede total involvement in and observation of verbal and non-verbal communication, had been removed. Though efforts were made to maintain control of these external factors affecting the interview process in both custodial and non-custodial settings, non-custodial settings were more difficult to control. In relation to the offender, for maximum observation purposes, the investigators attempted to position themselves so that one interviewer would be in front of the subject, and one would be seated to the side and slightly to the rear of the subject.

**Offender Interview: Atmosphere**

Approaches and techniques for interviewing the offenders were originally developed in conjunction with the 1992 study and, with minor adjustments, were readily adaptable to the direction of the current study (See Pinizzotto and Davis, 1996). The interview approach for offenders was developed with several assumptions: 1) that these subjects had information that would potentially benefit the law enforcement community; 2) that these subjects would initially be antagonistic toward the investigators; 3) that these subjects received no compensation for cooperating with the investigators; and 4) that these subjects could terminate the interview at any point.

In order to maximize the amount of information forthcoming from the offender, the investigators attempted to keep the process as flexible, fluid, and non-threatening as possible. The interview process was initiated by discussing personal history of the offender, before moving on to more incident-specific information. As the offender became more comfortable with both the investigators and the process and some level of rapport was established, the investigators were able to make the transition to the crime in question, the assault on a law enforcement officer.

**Offender Interview: Process**

All of the victim, circumstance of incident, and offender background data were collected and reviewed prior to the interview in order to increase the quality and accuracy of facts that could be extracted. A detailed discussion of the protocol used to facilitate the interview process appears in Appendix I.

At the beginning of the interview process, the purpose of the interview and its correlation to the overall study were explained to the offender. The offender was assured of complete anonymity and asked to sign a release form stating that he or she understood the purpose of the interview process and was cooperating without any promises from the FBI investigators.

It was the goal of the primary investigator to establish rapport with the offender and maintain that rapport as they progressed through the interview. The secondary investigator recorded all responses and he was coming from, and he had no intention of explaining too much about himself.

At the conclusion of the interview process, a final question was asked of the offender: “Is there anything you can think of which was not asked in this interview
which you feel is important to relate to us?" The question was included to provide the offender an opportunity to offer information that the protocol and associated interview did not extract.

If the investigators felt that the offender had a message which might in some way be important to the law enforcement community, he or she was asked to participate in a short video interview. Of the 42 offenders interviewed in this study, 26 were given the option of taking part in the video interview. Of those given the option, 21 agreed. The offenders were made aware that the taped interview would be used in law enforcement training seminars on safety and street survival across the country. The videos include some information which was not specifically related to or included in the protocol but was felt to relate to the assault incident or to the offender’s criminal behavior in a significant way.
Appendix I

Protocols

The Protocols

To make relevant any comparison of data presented in the 1992 study with that in the present study, only minor changes to the earlier offender protocol were made. Basically, the changes were limited to altering any reference to killing a law enforcement officer to assaulting the officer. Otherwise, the protocol remained virtually the same. Since there were revisions, however slight, the authors did field test the revised protocol on two cases prior to using it for the study.

Since the 1992 study did not include officer interviews, it was necessary to develop a new protocol for this element of the current study. This protocol was designed to capture data comparable to that retrieved from the offender protocol and to that presented in the 1992 study, as well as to capture new information. In formulating this protocol, the investigators consulted with various members of training and homicide units from law enforcement agencies of all sizes across the country, as well as members of the FBI's Firearms Training Unit. In addition, special contract consultants in research methodology, along with law enforcement specialists, were contacted under the auspices of the grant provided by the National Institute of Justice. Comments from all groups were considered and appropriately collated and incorporated into the protocol for the victim officers. This protocol was also field tested prior to commencement of the interviews.

Officer Protocol: Nature, Content, and Construction

The officer protocol was composed of seven sections to be completed during the interview. A brief explanation of each section's content follows.

1. Background information concerning the officer — Questions concerning the officer's physical condition, military background, exposure to violence prior to entering law enforcement service, and reason for choosing a law enforcement career are included in this section.

2. Family structure — Questions in this section address the officer's family of origin, his or her current marital status, and children.

3. Law enforcement training — The type of academy the officer attended, his or her perceived level of performance, subject matter preference, subject matter areas in which he or she excelled, recruit training, and in-service areas are questions included in this section.

4. Before assault — These questions are intended to ascertain the officer's performance prior to the assault, his or her physical conditioning (including the use of alcohol/drugs, tobacco) both on and off duty, prior uses of force, any critical incident debriefing with earlier uses of force, and previous incidents of assault.

5. Assault under study — This section assesses the officer's physical condition at the time of the assault, including self-reported general health and use of any medication.

6. Characteristics of the scene — The intent of questions in this section is to examine the actual incident. The tour of duty during which the assault occurred, the environmental conditions, the officer's attire, the mode of transportation, familiarity with the location and assailter, assessment of the assailter and the assailter's behavior, use of backup units, personal behavior, injuries sustained by both officer and offender, and the officer's perception of how past training impacted on the outcome of the assault are addressed.
7. Post-assault activity — Assessing the extent of any subsequent effect the incident has had on the officer’s life is the goal of this portion of the interview. Questions address the support received by the officer from family, friends, department personnel, other officers, and community members and explore the potential for psychological impact on the officer and/or the family. In addition, these questions examine the perception of the officer concerning the potential for his or her personal use of deadly force in future situations.

Offender Protocol: Nature, Content, and Construction

As with the officer protocol, the offender protocol was composed of seven sections and was completed with the information obtained during the interviews with the offenders. A short description of the seven interview areas follows.

1. Background information concerning the offender — This section consists of questions regarding the offender’s physical, ethnic, occupational, educational, medical/psychiatric, and social background.

2. Family structure and home environment — In this section, questions concerning the offender’s immediate family are addressed. Specific questions elicit information on the stability of the family, occupations of family members, and the extent/nature of religious expression within the family. Questions in this section are designed to help the investigators determine the presence of any physical or psychological abuse by family members, and/or any evidence of alcohol/drug abuse, psychiatric disturbances, or criminal history within the immediate family.

3. Attitudes toward authority — The questions in this section assess the offender’s response to authority figures. For interview purposes, authority figures include parents/guardians, teachers, supervisors, clergy, law enforcement officers, and other adults in general.

4. Criminal history — Questions in this section are designed to examine the extent of the offender’s criminal history beginning with the first crime he or she can recall having committed, whether or not he or she was caught, and the extent to which the offender was aware of the consequences of his or her criminal conduct. Questions also address the type of weapon used in criminal activity, whether the offender ever attempted to kill or assault a law enforcement officer in the past, and whether he or she had predetermined any course of action if interrupted or confronted by police during the commission of a crime.

5. Weapons training and use — The intent of these questions is to assess the offender’s knowledge of and involvement with weapons. Questions address whether the offender had any weapons’ training or practice and, if so, where and when; where the weapon was kept when not being carried; and why the weapon was carried.

6. Characteristics of scene and encounter — Demographics of the actual incident are examined in this section. Questions cover the following fields: area of the country, month, day, time, weather conditions, description of the location, distance from assaulted officer, and, if applicable, means of transportation and description of vehicle.

7. Self-reported offense data — The intent of this section is to examine the incident from the perspective of the offender. Questions concern the offender’s psychological and emotional states prior to, during, and following the incident; alcohol/drug use at the time of the incident; influence of any co-defendants; the nature of conversation, if any, with the officer prior to the assault; consideration of victim officer’s age, sex, race, size, and behavior in his or her assault; intention of the offender at the time of the assault; and description of offender’s subsequent arrest. Questions in this section also address searches, related to this or other incidents, to which the offender may have been subjected. In general, the questions are designed to assist the investigator in determining if the victim officer could have done something to prevent the assault from occurring.
Appendix II

Diagnostic Criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were present:

1. The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others.

2. The person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: In children, this may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior.

B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:

1. Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, or perceptions. Note: In young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.

2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content.

3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young children, traumatic-specific reenactment may occur.

4. Intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.

5. Physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.

C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

1. Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma.

2. Efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma.

3. Inability to recall an important aspect of trauma.

4. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities.

5. Feeling of detachment or estrangement from others.

6. Restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings).

7. Sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span).
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following:
   (1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
   (2) irritability or outbursts of anger
   (3) difficulty concentrating
   (4) hypervigilance
   (5) exaggerated startle response

Specify if:

Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than 3 months
Chronic: if duration of symptoms is 3 months or more.

Specify if:

With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least 6 months after the stressor.

E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month.

F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
APPENDIX III

Selected Summaries of the Assault Incidents

Five cases from each region of the country were selected to assist the reader with a better understanding of the situations faced by the victim officer. Numbers assigned to each of the following cases are meant as reference designations and imply no other meaning or significance.

Case Study #1
On a fall Saturday morning at approximately 2 a.m., a 27-year-old officer with a large city police department was wounded while attempting to apprehend two suspects alleged to be armed with a handgun. The victim officer, who had 5 years of law enforcement service and was wearing a protective vest, was riding in the patrol vehicle with his partner when they spotted two individuals in an automobile. The pair was identified by the officers as suspects wanted for possessing a handgun, and a traffic stop was made. When the suspect’s vehicle came to a halt, the passenger immediately fled the car and a chase of several blocks began, with the victim officer in pursuit. The officer lost sight of the suspect, and while searching the area in front of a building, was fired at by the man, who was hidden in bushes nearby. Bullets from a small caliber handgun struck the officer in the head and legs, causing extensive injury. After 18 days hospitalization and months of physical therapy, the officer was unable to resume his duties and was retired. The assailant, who escaped from the scene of the shooting, turned himself in 2 days later, after extensive radio and television publicity.

Case Study #2
On a fall Monday evening at approximately 6:30 p.m., a 29-year-old uniformed officer, driving a one-officer marked patrol vehicle, was shot by a 42-year-old repeat offender. Responding to a call of armed robbery at a liquor store, the officer, who was wearing a vest, approached the store and saw what appeared to be a clerk and two customers at the counter. Even though there appeared to be nothing unusual, the officer drew his service weapon and entered the store. Upon entering the store, he observed the offender acting suspiciously and commanded him to raise his hands. At that time, the offender produced a handgun obtained from the store and fired at the officer, wounding him in both wrists. The officer was also struck in the area of his bullet proof vest, which prevented additional serious injury. Returning fire but not striking the offender, the officer retreated from the store and called for backup, advising that he had been shot. The store was surrounded, and a barricade situation developed. The offender, who had originally attempted to rob the clerk at knife point, eventually surrendered. The victim officer, a 5-year veteran of law enforcement service, recovered from his wounds and was able to return to work. The offender had an extensive prior arrest record and had assaulted a police officer in the past.
Case Study #3

During the winter months, a female 28-year-old officer was wounded during a robbery-related incident on a Monday at about 9 a.m. Two male uniformed officers, traveling in a marked patrol car, responded to a bank holdup alarm in time to give chase to the vehicle driven by the alleged robbers. During the chase, two of the three offenders fired at the police vehicle through the back doors of their vehicle. The officers called for assistance. As the chase continued several units responded, among them the 5-year veteran female who was also in uniform and driving an unmarked vehicle. The chase continued for approximately 5 minutes until the fleeing vehicle wrecked. All three male occupants, armed with a 9-millimeter pistol, a sawed-off shotgun and a .380-caliber pistol, fled in different directions. In pursuit of one the offenders, the female officer received a bullet graze to the leg. Her return fire killed the 20-year-old offender. Prior to their capture within several blocks of each other, the other two offenders, both aged 22, were severely wounded, but each survived. Neither of the male officers, one 26-year-old with 2 year's law enforcement service and one 22-year-old with 2 months' law enforcement service, was injured. The victim officer returned to duty the next day.

Case Study #4

At approximately 4 a.m. on a summer Saturday morning, two uniformed officers were assaulted by a 40-year-old male with a history of two previous assaults on law enforcement officers. Both officers were completing reports in police department headquarters when the assailant entered the station, displayed a handgun, and threatened to kill them. The officers unsuccessfully attempted to talk the assailant into surrendering his weapon, and a struggle ensued. One of the officers, a 35-year-old with 4 years' law enforcement service, was shot in the left leg. The other officer, a 34-year-old 12-year veteran of law enforcement service, was shot in the right leg and the left ankle. In spite of their wounds, the officers were able to subdue the assailant. Both officers recovered from their wounds and returned to work.

Case Study #5

On a spring Tuesday at approximately noon, two officers were assaulted by a bank robber. A 30-year-old officer assigned to horse patrol was first to respond to a holdup alarm that had been sounded at a bank. Outside the bank, the 5-year veteran mounted officer, who was wearing a vest, observed the bank manager following and pointing at a suspect. When the officer attempted to stop the suspect, the 47-year-old male responded by firing two semiautomatic 9-millimeter handguns. A 24-year-old officer then arrived on the scene and took cover behind a van. During the continuing exchange of fire, a round passed through the van and struck the officer in the throat. The assailant attempted to flee the scene in his vehicle. Additional responding officers arrested the assailant without incident a few blocks from the scene. The victim officer never fully recovered and was forced to take disability retirement from the police department. He had 2 years of law enforcement service at the time he was assaulted. The offender had previously committed numerous bank robberies throughout the United States.

Case Study #6

At approximately 7 p.m. on a summer Sunday, two female suspects arrived at the outskirts of a penal institution with the intention of freeing the one woman's husband, who was an inmate. The women were armed with several weapons, including a high-powered rifle with scope. The wife of the inmate slipped through the woods, armed with the rifle, until she was within 150 yards of the guard tower. She then shot the 57 year-old corrections officer, striking him in the back, with the bullet exiting through his neck. With the incapacitation of the corrections officer, who had 15 years of law enforcement experience, the assailant's husband managed to climb over barbed wire to a getaway car that the second female had driven to the area. Nine days later the husband and wife team were spotted in a small grocery store. The owner notified the authorities, who responded with a large contingency of officers. Tracking dogs were brought in to help pursue the pair through a densely wooded, swampy area. During the pursuit, the
female fired one round from a shotgun at a 27-year-old, 5-year veteran officer who was handling the dogs, striking him in the shoulder with several shot pellets. As the chase continued deeper into the woods, a helicopter was brought in to aid in the search for the two suspects. After spotting the helicopter, the male escapee fired one round from a .30-06 rifle at the helicopter, shattering the windshield and causing fragments to injure the arm of the pilot, aged 30. The shot lodged in the helicopter's transmission, causing the 6-year veteran to make an emergency landing. Later that night, the police made contact with the pair, and the husband was subsequently shot. The female suspect was then persuaded to surrender in order to obtain medical attention for her husband, who later died of his wounds. The wife was later convicted in two states, and her accomplice, the driver of the getaway car, was also apprehended. All three wounded officers recovered from their injuries and eventually returned to their duties.

**Case Study #7**

A 31-year-old uniformed officer was wounded at approximately 3 a.m. on a spring morning upon responding to a complaint of a breaking and entering an automobile parked at an apartment complex. The victim officer, who was aware that a backup unit had been dispatched to assist but had not yet arrived on the scene, reached the complex to find an 18-year-old male rummaging through the glove compartment of a parked vehicle. When the suspect, who was under the influence of drugs, observed the police, he fled into a nearby wooded area. The victim officer pursued the man and a struggle ensued, during which the assailant gained possession of the officer's weapon. The assailant fired one round, striking the officer on his protective vest and knocking him to the ground. Before fleeing the scene, the perpetrator fired two more shots, both striking the fallen officer. After being transported to the hospital, the officer recovered from his wounds and returned to duty after a 12-week convalescence. The suspect, with a prior juvenile record of drug abuse and robbery, was apprehended 2 days after the shooting. The victim officer had 3 years of law enforcement service at the time of the assault.

**Case Study #8**

On a summer Wednesday at about 3:30 p.m., a 24-year veteran of law enforcement service suffered multiple gunshot wounds. The 46-year-old officer, dressed in a black utility-type raid uniform and a vest, was accompanied by five fellow officers in executing a narcotics search warrant. The first officer to enter the apartment, the victim was shot several times in the leg and hand by a 23-year-old male who admitted to drug use and had a prior criminal record. The victim officer was transported to the hospital, released after 2 days, and returned to duty. The offender, who did not receive any injuries, surrendered at the scene.

**Case Study #9**

An officer who had 4 years' law enforcement service was wounded on a spring Tuesday at noon during a search for a robbery and burglary suspect. The 28-year-old and a fellow officer, both assigned to investigative work and in civilian dress, responded to an address to look for the suspect. When the victim officer opened a closet door, he was shot in the chest by a 41-year-old female. A struggle ensued and the officer returned fire, striking the offender. Both the officer and the assailant were transported to the hospital. The victim officer was released after 13 days and returned to duty. The assailant, who had a prior record for robbery, burglary, and assault, is confined to a wheelchair as a result of her wounds.

**Case Study #10**

A uniformed sergeant was fired upon on a fall Tuesday at noon. When the 40-year-old sergeant left the police station to have lunch, he monitored a call concerning a holdup alarm at a bank approximately four blocks away. He notified dispatch that he would respond. Even though the dispatcher called back to inform him that the alarm was accidental, he proceeded to the bank. Entering the vestibule area near the front door of the bank, he observed an individual who appeared to be dressed in a suspicious manner. Upon turning and seeing the sergeant, the suspect began firing a .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun. The 14-year veteran sergeant then retreated from the bank and sought protection behind
his vehicle. The assailant pursued the sergeant, continuing to fire as he did so. Returning fire, the officer’s rounds struck the offender twice. The assailant, who admitted to both drug and alcohol use during the day, was transported to the hospital where he remained for about 40 days. The officer was not injured in the incident.

Case Study #11

On a summer Wednesday at about 3:30 p.m., while attempting to locate and apprehend a major drug dealer, one officer was killed and another wounded by an informant that was supposed to be helping them. Earlier in the day, the plainclothes officers had been patrolling with the purpose of making drug-law violation arrests. The officers arrested a 20-year-old suspect who was in possession, took him to the station, and booked him. During this procedure, the suspect told the officers that he could help them locate a major cocaine dealer. After obtaining their supervisor’s approval, the two officers took the handcuffed suspect from his holding cell and placed him in the back of their unmarked car in order to search for the drug dealer. After patrolling with no success, the officers stopped the vehicle in a parking lot. At this time, the assailant produced a weapon and fired one round into the rear of the 28-year-old officer’s head, killing him instantly. The perpetrator then shot the other officer, a 31-year-old veteran with 5 years’ experience. The suspect then got out of the back of the car and retrieved the key to the handcuffs, as well as the service weapon, from the wounded officer. The assailant fled the scene but was subsequently arrested. The murder weapon and the wounded officer’s gun were recovered. The wounded officer recovered from his injuries and returned to duty.

Case Study #12

At about 8:30 p.m. on a spring Thursday, a 32-year-old uniformed patrol officer was wounded upon answering a radio dispatch for a robbery in progress. Assigned to a one-person marked patrol car, the 10-year veteran officer arrived at the fast food restaurant, and as he entered the establishment, the suspect fled from the parking lot in his vehicle. Returning to his cruiser, the officer pursued the suspect for several minutes to the front of a residence, later found to be the home of the perpetrator. The suspect and the officer exited their vehicles and were about 18 feet apart as the officer attempted to persuade the man to drop his weapon. The assailant then fired one round from a shotgun, striking the officer, who was wearing a protective vest, in the head. Additional officers responded to the scene, and the wounded officer was transported to the hospital. A barricade situation then developed. After a period of time, the assailant was persuaded to surrender and was arrested. The injured officer was hospitalized for 14 days and returned to duty after 5 months of extensive rehabilitation.

Case Study #13

On a summer Saturday at about 1 a.m., a 33-year-old veteran tactical unit officer, with 5 years’ experience, was wounded while working an undercover drug operation. The officer, who was in plainclothes and wearing a ballistic vest, was dropped off in a known drug area by backup officers. While walking through this section of a large city, the officer was spotted and identified by three suspects associated with gang activity in the area. One 36-year-old suspect and two 16-year-old suspects forced the officer into their minivan at gunpoint. They drove around for approximately 1 hour, during which time they searched the officer and took his service weapon and police radio. The officer had a backup weapon concealed near his ankle, but the gun was discovered as he attempted to reach for it. The suspects finally took the officer to an alley where he was unbound and placed against a garage wall. The two 16-year-old perpetrators, who were being paid $50 each to kill the next officer enforcing narcotic violations in the area, then shot him numerous times with handguns, leaving him for dead on the floor of the garage. The officer’s ballistic vest saved him from more severe injuries from the majority of the rounds, but he was seriously wounded in the leg and arm. Though the officer slipped in and out of consciousness, he was able to make
tourniquets for his wounds from his shoestrings and crawl from the garage, getting to his feet eventually and finding assistance. All three assailants have extensive criminal histories of assaults, larcenies, drug, and weapons offenses. The wounded officer, after a 10-week recuperation, returned to work.

Additional officers arrived at the scene, and the offender fired upon them. They returned fire, striking him four times. The victim officer who had 1 year of law enforcement service returned to work the following day. The 25-year-old offender was also wanted for bank robbery.

Case Study #14
On a spring Friday at approximately 9 p.m., a 26-year-old uniformed officer was shot while making a traffic stop. The officer and his partner were patrolling in their marked cruiser when they observed a car run a stop sign and pulled the vehicle over. The assailant approached the scene from an alley, and observing the traffic stop in progress, opened fire with a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun. The victim officer, who was wearing a protective vest, was hit several times in the lower leg. Fleeing the scene, the 18-year-old assailant disposed of the weapon. He was observed by several witnesses who identified him, and he was later arrested at his residence. The gunman, who was apparently angry over a recent controversial court verdict, was using drugs at the time of the assault and reportedly had set out to attack a police officer. He had a prior criminal history. After 7 days of hospitalization and 4 months of rehabilitation, the wounded officer, who had 2 years of service, returned to duty.

Case Study #15
A 27-year-old female officer alone on patrol was assaulted at approximately 1 a.m. on a winter Wednesday. Responding to a radio call to a residential address for a burglar alarm, she observed a suspect departing the area of the burglary. The officer, wearing a vest, exited her vehicle, approached the suspect, and a confrontation developed. The suspect assaulted the officer, who in return was able to strike him with a flashlight, draw her service weapon, and fire one round. The assailant continued to struggle with the officer, striking her in the head with an unknown object. He then took her service revolver, fired one round at her, and started to flee.

Case Study #16
Three officers were wounded by gunfire at about 8 p.m. on an summer evening. Neighbors had called police when violence among drug dealers broke out in a nearby house. Two male suspects, later found to be wanted for bank robbery, were leaving the house as a 44-year-old, 7-year veteran officer approached in his cruiser and attempted to pull the suspects over. As the men fled in their motor vehicle, they fired once at the uniformed officer, striking him in the shoulder outside his ballistic vest. A chase by other officers ensued. During the pursuit, one of the males continued firing out the window of the vehicle and struck a second policeman, a 26-year-old uniformed officer with 2 years’ experience, who was forced to end the chase due to his injuries. The pursuit was continued into a metropolitan area by other police officers. Several blocks into the city, the males, aged 29 and 33, lost control of their vehicle, wrecked, and then again attempted to flee the scene on foot. The 29-year-old suspect was apprehended at the scene after being wounded in a gun battle with the police. The second man fled down an alley and took cover at the side of a house. As the police surrounded the area, the man hiding near the rear of the house began firing and struck a third police officer, a 38-year-old uniformed veteran with 5 years’ experience. The officer, who was wearing a protective vest, was struck in her ankle. This gunman surrendered after being surrounded by responding officers. All three police officers recovered from their wounds and subsequently returned to their duties. Both assailants had a history of violence. The 29-year-old assailant remains paralyzed as a result of his injuries.
Case Study #17

On a fall Saturday at about midnight, a uniformed officer with 3 years’ experience was wounded upon responding to a report of a larceny in progress. The victim officer heard a unit being dispatched to investigate a report of an auto being broken into in the parking lot of an apartment complex. He informed dispatch that he was near the area and would assist in the call. When he arrived at the complex, he extinguished the lights of his cruiser and followed a service roadway in order to survey the parking lot without being observed. In the complex parking lot, the officer saw a suspect fleeing on foot and radioed that he was going to pursue. After a chase of about 500 yards, the suspect fell. The officer approached the man, grabbed him, and was pulling him to his feet, when the man began striking at the officer’s chest. Since he was wearing a protective vest, the officer did not realize that the assailant had a knife until he received a serious wound to the side of his chest. A struggle ensued, during which the suspect took possession of the officer’s service revolver. Working the revolver under the ballistic vest, the suspect fired one round, striking the officer in the stomach. After the officer fell to his knees, the perpetrator attempted to shove the barrel of the pistol in the officer’s mouth, but failed and instead fired one round into the officer’s jaw. The round exited the side of his face. The officer managed to push his attacker away, and the man then fled the scene. After radioing the dispatcher that he had been shot, the officer managed to make his way back to his cruiser. Officers responded to the scene, and the victim was transported to the hospital. Meanwhile, the perpetrator had sought refuge in a nearby camping area. He was tracked to this area by the police, where he was arrested. The knife, with part of the blade still imbedded in the victim officer’s protective vest, as well as the officer’s service revolver, was recovered. It was later learned that the attacker had been released from prison only 2 months prior to the incident and had served several assault sentences—one for attacking a police officer. The 29-year-old officer, after recovering from his extensive wounds, returned to duty.

Case Study #18

On a summer Saturday at about 1 a.m., while patrolling in a large city, a 35-year-old uniformed officer was shot when he attempted to apprehend a suspect wanted for robbery. Patrolling in a marked car, the 9-year veteran officer observed a vehicle occupied by two individuals and identified the driver as a robbery suspect. After stopping the vehicle, the victim officer radioed for backup and asked the perpetrator to accompany him to the rear of the stopped vehicle. With the suspect’s hands on the rear of the car, the officer prepared to search and handcuff him. Suddenly, the assailant spun around and knocked the officer to the ground, taking his weapon. The assailant then fled the scene. With the officer in pursuit, the gunman fired several rounds. The officer reached for his weapon to return fire and realized that he had been disarmed. The officer, who was wearing a ballistic vest, was wounded in the leg and subsequently transported to the hospital. A K-9 patrol unit apprehended his assailant several blocks away from the shooting, and the officer’s weapon was recovered. The assailant had an extensive criminal record, including arrests for police assaults. The injured officer returned to duty after a 2-week convalescence.

Case Study #19

At about 4 a.m. on a fall Thursday morning in a large city, a 29-year-old patrol officer, with 5 years of law enforcement experience, was wounded while attempting to arrest a suspect. The officer, who was patrolling in her cruiser, was stopped by a citizen reporting the theft of his father’s car. Shortly after broadcasting the theft, the officer spotted the vehicle, which was occupied by one female and two males. Stopping the vehicle, she observed one male passenger exit the car and attempt to leave the scene. The individual was detained by the officer, who requested identification and conducted a body search, which revealed possession of a hunting knife. While the suspect was being placed under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon, a struggle ensued. As the officer and her assailant wrestled on the ground, the assailant unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the officer’s weapon. Unable to obtain it, the man called to his female companion to go to his vehicle and retrieve
his gun. The 29-year-old female accomplice brought the gun to the assailant, and as both the officer and perpetrator got to their feet, he threatened to kill the officer if she did not relinquish her weapon. Instead, the officer drew her weapon and the offender shot her once in the left arm with a .25-caliber semiautomatic weapon. The officer, who was wearing a protective vest, returned fire with her .357-magnum revolver, striking the assailant in the abdomen, leg, and pelvis. The offender continued to fire at the officer but without further effect. The officer radioed that she had been shot as the two perpetrators fled the scene. After several blocks, the female stopped the vehicle when the male told her he was too badly hurt to continue, and both were arrested at that time. The shooter, after recuperating in the hospital, and his female accomplice were both convicted and sentenced to prison terms. After 6 days of hospitalization and 4 weeks of recuperation, the officer returned to her duties.

Case Study #20

Two officers, both 42-years-old, were wounded in an incident on a spring Tuesday at about 5 p.m. One of the officers, an 8-year veteran of law enforcement service, was dispatched to a store to check for the presence of a prison escapee. The second officer, a 12-year veteran, volunteered to assist. After interviewing several persons in the store, the officers, both wearing vests, questioned a 33-year-old suspect inside the building. The offender disarmed the 8-year veteran, who had been standing in front of him, and shot the officer several times. He also fired upon and wounded the 12-year veteran whose return fire did not strike the offender. Both officers were transported to the hospital, subsequently recovered from their wounds, and returned to duty. The escapee was arrested a short distance from the assault and returned to prison where he had been serving time for a prior conviction. He had an extensive criminal record and was armed at the time of the assault incident.
APPENDIX IV

List of References Cited


