


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## PORTLAND POLICE STRIKE FORCE SUBPROJECT

Evaluation Report No. 1

The First Eighteen Months

Subproject Description and Preliminary Outcome Assessment

Prepared by the

State Planning Agency

Impact Evaluation Unit

of the

Oregon Law Enforcement Council

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### Suggestion for the Reader

A thorough reading of this report may be facilitated by removing the paper from the binding and separating the narrative and the figures and tables into two groups allowing easy referral back and forth between the text and appropriate tables.

## POLICE STRIKE FORCE SUBPROJECT

### Summary

The three-year, five million dollar Portland Police High Impact Project was divided at the outset into the Police Strike Force Subproject and the Police Communications Subproject for administrative purposes. The Police Communications Subproject will be the subject of separate reports.

The Police Strike Force Subproject consists of coordinated utilization of Impact-provided resources and exploration of alternate means to improve (1) collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime incident and suspect information, (2) detection and investigation of target crimes, (3) apprehension, and (4) interdiction of professional activities related to target crimes.

Of the two and one-half million dollar direct cost budget for the subproject, 47 percent provided 21.5 additional, full-time personnel; 33 percent provided roughly 67,000 overtime manhours; 10 percent provided new equipment including a \$145,000 intrusion alarm system, nineteen unmarked cars, two vans and surveillance equipment; and 9 percent provided supplies and operating expenses, including \$100,000 for information purchase and other undercover activities.

Coordination is provided by the Impact-funded Office of Strike Force Operations which includes Crime Analysis, Tactics, and Logistics Units. From timely information about crime incidents and suspects, problem situations are identified which are amenable to focused response solution utilizing Strike Force missions. Missions are generally two to twelve man teams of rotating volunteers, working on temporary overtime assignment. Most missions have involved surveillance and most have been fielded in response to burglary or fencing activities. Overtime missions appeared to be more productive in terms of target arrests, major positive catalytic effects on routine operations have occurred, and missions are demonstrating better ways for regular duty units to operate.

Two new units have been developed in the bureau during the subproject. The Specialized Surveillance Team (SST) provides highly proficient use of surveillance equipment and provides well-coordinated, highly skilled interception of armed criminals. The Fence Detail is successfully interdicting fencing operations, disrupting complacent attitudes of businessmen toward casual purchase of stolen merchandise, and propagating a regional intelligence network.

### Summary (cont.)

Addition of key personnel is producing desired results. A newly dedicated alarm specialist has turned an ill-used, older alarm system into a productive commercial burglary fighting tool. Best utilization of a replacement alarm system is anticipated.

Increases in the number of cases accepted for prosecution by the District Attorney has indicated greatly improved robbery casework and slightly improved burglary casework by the police, particularly by the Detectives Division. Improved equipment and added manpower in the Criminalistics Division has resulted in greatly increased scientific investigations at crime scenes and significantly more suspect identifications from latent prints.

Although no hard evidence exists to measure improvement in intelligence quantity or quality, encouraging structure and role changes have been implemented in the Intelligence Division. Intelligence collation activities in Intelligence and Detective's Division together with that of the Strike Force Operation Crime Analyses Unit have provided valuable, timely intelligence as inputs for mission planning and for direct support of missions while they are in the field.

### INTRODUCTION

Police response to crime relates to the following principle functions of the criminal justice system:

- (1) prevention
- (2) detection
- (3) response to reported crime
- (4) investigation
- (5) apprehension
- (6) disposition

The Impact Program afforded the Portland Police Bureau an unprecedented opportunity to identify needed improvements in its capabilities to contribute to these functions and to implement a comprehensive program of functional improvement. Five possible basic means to achieve improvements were identified:

- (1) personnel additions
- (2) improved recruitment methods and standards
- (3) additional and higher quality training
- (4) alteration of basic operations
- (5) improved equipment

It was perceived that adding personnel should not be the major means of improvement since (1) by the time training and experience prepared the newly appointed officer to assume his role as a qualified policeman, the three-year Impact Program would have been over, and (2) it was unrealistic to hire and train a considerable number of officers when local funds could not support their retention without federal aid.

Means (2) was rejected for the same reason and on the basis that additional prerequisite qualifications would narrow the recruitment base too much. Extensive training was also rejected on the basis that returns would be too long in coming.

Thus, the primary means of improvement of police functions chosen were alteration of police operations and requisition of additional or improved equipment, not just for the reasons stated above, but because of identified needs. The single most critical identified need, based on operational and morale criteria, was improved radio communications. A second important need identified was reorganization of the bureau. It was felt that the bureau's organizational structure was not optimally functional, that lines of authority and

communication could be improved, and that an intensified focus on Impact target crimes could be better coordinated if the Bureau were reorganized.

With regard to functional units within the Bureau, the following problems were enunciated:

- (1) An increasing case load was tying detectives to their desks and phones, diminishing their capability to conduct case follow-up in the field, surveillance of suspects and probable crime targets, and informant handling. In addition, decreasing time was available for highly beneficial interaction with the District Attorney's staff.
- (2) The Intelligence Division had diminishing capability to handle its apparent primary function since auxiliary functions, including explosives disposal, licensing investigations, VIP security, and liaison with the FBI and other outside agencies, were demanding a majority of the Division's manpower resources.
- (3) The Criminalistics Division was unable to keep up with ever increasing requests for identification and forensic investigation services.

These and other needs and constraints resulted in the design and implementation of the following comprehensive project.

#### THE PROJECT

The grant for the three year Portland Police High Impact Project was awarded in July, 1973, the amount of the award totaling \$3,699,509 in LEAA support matched by \$1,233,170 in City of Portland funds. Thus, the total grant was in the amount of \$4,932,679. At the outset, the project was divided into two subprojects for administrative purposes. All resources and activities relating to radio communications are being administered separately as the Police Communications Subproject. All other resources and activities comprise what is somewhat misleadingly called the Police Strike Force Subproject. Description and evaluation of the Police Communications Subproject will be reported separately. All remarks throughout the remainder of this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, will have reference to the Police Strike Force Subproject.

#### Resources

Resources of the Police Strike Force Subproject consist primarily of (1) additional manpower, (2) overtime funds (3) equipment, and (4) funds for purchasing information from informants and for supporting other undercover operations.

The additional manpower originally consisted of sixteen (16) full-time positions and one half-time position. In May, 1974, five other full-time positions were added. The current twenty-one and one-half full-time equivalent positions consist of:

- (1) Staff of the office of Strike Force Operations, including one assistant deputy chief, one lieutenant, one sergeant, one crime analyst, one data clerk, and one clerk-typist.
- (2) Six Detectives Division personnel.
- (3) Two Intelligence Division personnel.
- (4) Two Criminalistics Division personnel.
- (5) One half-time Legal Advisor.
- (6) The Specialized Surveillance Team (SST) consisting of one sergeant and four patrolmen, which was added by budget revision in May, 1974.

Overtime funds, utilized to pay for Strike Force Missions described below, were originally budgetted at \$900,000 (not including fringe). This amount has been reduced to \$667,000 through two budget revisions - one in the amount of roughly \$13,000 for salary adjustments for regular Impact-funded positions, and the other in the amount of \$220,000 in May, 1974, to pay for the SST.

When fringe is included, total personnel funds for the Police Strike Force Subproject were roughly \$1,999,550 of which \$820,400 (41%) was for Strike Force Mission overtime, and of which roughly \$1,179,150 (59%) was for regular duty positions.

Roughly \$256,450 was budgetted for equipment utilized by the Police Strike Force Subproject. Equipment included:

- (1) One hundred (100) silent radio alarms and accessories (\$145, 100).
- (2) Nineteen (19) older-model, unmarked cars (\$66,500).
- (3) Two vans - one for surveillance or mobile command, one for mobile scientific investigations (\$16,200).
- (4) Surveillance equipment (\$19,950).
- (5) Office equipment (\$8,700).

Funds to purchase information from informants and to support undercover operations, which amounted to \$100,000, were included in a total of roughly \$233,800 budgetted for supplies and operating expenses.

No funds were originally budgetted for professional services or travel, and budget revisions for these purposes were very small. Thus, the total resources of the Police Strike Force Subproject were roughly \$2,489,800, excluding indirect costs. This amounts to about five percent (5%) of a projected \$50,000,000 budget for the Portland Police Bureau over the same three-year period.

#### Activities

In general, the Police Strike Force Subproject resources have allowed the Portland Police to do a little bit more of everything that they usually do to respond to serious crimes, with a few conspicuous innovations. The most salient change has been the coordination of a focused effort to draw together more information about crimes and suspects, to identify target crime-related problems amenable to focused response, and to coordinate the response to those problems with an eye on optimal cost-effectiveness.

#### Strike Force Operations

On August, 1973, the office of Strike Force Operations was created to provide coordination of the activities and use of resources of the Police Strike Force Subproject. Staff includes: an Assistant Deputy Chief whose primary role is command and administration; a Lieutenant, whose primary roles are tactical development, tactical implementation, and internal evaluation; a Sergeant, whose primary role is logistical implementation; a Crime Analyst, who develops and implements means for collating and disseminating information about the where, when, how and who of target crimes; a data clerk who assists in collating data and mapping; and a steno-typist.

#### Strike Force Missions

A major means of providing response to target crime problems is the fielding of Strike Force Missions. Missions are teams consisting of two to twelve experienced personnel from various divisions or precincts with varying skills. Overtime hours are used and missions may operate continuously or intermittently for only one night or any number of days, weeks or months until the problem to which the team is responding is resolved. Team structure depends on the problem of focus of the mission, which can range from a backlog of latent prints to be identified, to a four square mile area experiencing a periodic, unusually high residential burglary rate. The teams are under the tactical control of the appropriate precinct or division and are usually directed by a sergeant. If the problem is localized within one precinct's area of responsibility and appears amenable to patrol, that precinct patrol unit will assume responsibility for the mission. If the problem is amenable to investigatory solution, the Detectives Division would assume responsibility.

A generalized scheme of the Strike Force Mission function of Strike Force Operations is presented in Figure I. First, a crime problem amenable to mission solution is (1) identified by the crime analyst or other Strike Force Operations staff who analyze ten-day maps of incident locations, tables of information about crime incidents, victims, and suspects prepared by Strike Force Operations clerical staff, and intelligence summaries prepared by the Intelligence Division or Detective Division, or (2) a problem amenable to focused solution is brought to the attention of the office of Strike Force Operations by any Bureau member by means of the usual communications channels.

Next, an old concept of how to respond is recalled or a new one is developed and "sold" to the appropriate responsible commanders. Then a specific response formula or action plan is developed and sold, detailing personnel configuration, equipment, place, time, activities, and appropriate intelligence. Next, the participating parties are specified and the mission is implemented (fielded). The mission is reviewed as it unfolds with respect to concept, formula, and human factors. Then, based on the review, the mission is continued, altered, suspended, or terminated. Depending on the nature of the problem and the response plan and in consideration of limited resources, the duration of a mission is usually set in advance; however, when the problem persists and promise is shown by the response and costs are not excessive, a mission may be continued beyond the initial termination date.

#### General Activity Emphasis

The opening sentence of this activities section indicated that, in general, the Portland Police with Impact funding have been able to do a little more of everything they usually do to respond to serious crimes. The augmented regular duty manpower, the overtime manhours, the equipment, and the informant and undercover activity funds have been utilized to emphasize several crime-fighting activities. These activities have included:

- (1) Coordination of efforts against target crimes and criminals.
- (2) Superimposition of overtime efforts utilizing rotating, volunteer personnel..
- (3) Concentration of efforts against target crimes and criminals.
- (4) Efforts to interdict professional fencing, robbery, and burglary.
- (5) Concentration of efforts in high crime areas.
- (6) Comprehensive collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of information about target crime incidents.

- (7) Collection, collation, and dissemination of information about target crime suspects.
- (8) Overt and covert patrol in high crime areas.
- (9) Surveillance of suspects, high crime areas, and likely targets.
- (10) Employment of silent radio alarms.
- (11) Investigation of burglaries and robberies.
- (12) Informant handling and information purchases.
- (13) Undercover work.
- (14) Scientific investigation at crime scenes.
- (15) Efforts to identify latent prints.
- (16) Legal advice.

#### Bureau Reorganization

In addition to the above multi-various activities, the bureau was reorganized twice by general order on August 24, 1973, and on February 7, 1974. The former structure (see Figure 2a) divided operational activities between two major branches and assigned support services to a third; a structure which, it was felt, did not promote coordination nor maximum utilization of resources toward achieving common objectives. Figure 2b reflects the resulting structure of the August 27, 1973 reorganization. The office of Director of Operations was never filled or implemented and was abolished in the structure resulting from the reorganization of February 7, 1974 (see Figure 2c). This final structure does not split up divisions or precincts with common objectives and decreases the steps in the chain of command between the chief and the functional units. One change of critical interest is placement of the Office of Strike Force Operations under the Deputy Chief of Operations, a placement which makes good functional sense, but which could be interpreted as moving the office to a slightly less prominent position.

#### EVALUATION APPROACH

The evaluation of the Police Strike Force Subproject focuses on the following components:

- (1) Strike Force overtime missions.
- (2) Specialized Surveillance Team.

- (3) Detectives Division manpower augmentation and operational changes.
- (4) Intelligence Division manpower augmentation.
- (5) Criminalistics Division manpower and equipment augmentation.
- (6) Ultimate outcomes of the subproject.

#### Strike Force Overtime Missions

Evaluation of Strike Force missions consists of (1) describing what the problems of focus, concepts of response, and amplitude of the responses (manhours expended) have been for the one hundred and five (105) missions fielded during the first eighteen (18) months of the subproject; (2) summarizing the experience gained by in-house staff from those missions; and (3) summarizing the effects of mission experience on routine operations. The direct, tangible products of missions, such as target crime arrests, other non-traffic arrests, and property recovery, are assessed, but assessment of true success or failure of Strike Force overtime mission activity would be grossly unfair and irrelevant if based solely on direct tangible products. Thus, a summary of the subjective experience of members has been given major consideration, as well as the history of missions fielded. Occasionally, mission success has been indicated when a particular type of operation has been assumed by routine bureau operations under regular funding.

#### Specialized Surveillance Team

Although many details of the SST's activity remain confidential, the general activity of the detail has been reviewed and will be described in this report.

#### Detectives Division

Personnel assignments by detail (e.g. robbery, burglary, auto theft, etc.) have been traced since before Impact to determine whether Impact-funded, additional personnel have been utilized to increase and focus detective activities on Impact target crimes. One selected indicator of productivity is the number of criminal arrest warrants issued. Another is search warrants issued. Warrant data has not yet been collected, but will be included in the next report.

The Alarm Program is the assigned responsibility of one detective. Detailed data concerning the employment of alarms and results has been collected, including false alarms, failures to detect incursions, and alarm related arrests.

The Fence Detail was newly formed and full-time personnel of the detail included Impact-funded personnel. Data on arrests resulting from the detail's activity, as well as data on the type and extent of activity of this detail has been collected.

#### Intelligence Division

Changes in the operations of this division made possible through augmented manpower have been assessed via interview. Unfortunately, there is no valid measure of the quantity or quality of intelligence gathered.

#### Criminalistics Division

The number of personnel, scientific (forensic) crime scene investigations, and latent print identifications have been traced for several years.

#### Ultimate Outcomes of the Subproject

The activities which make up the Police Strike Force Subproject have direct tangible results, direct intangible results, indirect results to which direct results are linked, and catalytic, side-effects on normal Police Bureau productivity. In order to assess the ultimate outcomes of all these kinds of results, the ultimate contribution of the Police Bureau to related functions of the criminal justice system, several measures have been selected which are quantifiable and for which baseline data exists, and cross-time comparisons have been made or are planned.

Below, these selected, ultimate outcome measures are listed in a logical order, beginning with those most under the control of the police and ending with those which are the most confounded by the inputs of other components of the criminal justice system or the general social environment. The measures are:

- (1) Bureau-wide arrests for robbery, assault, and burglary.
- (2) Robbery and burglary cases considered by the district attorney.
- (3) Proportion of robbery and burglary cases accepted for prosecution.
- (4) Proportion of cases accepted resulting in convictions or guilty pleas.
- (5) Robberies, assaults, and burglaries known to the police.
- (6) Value of property stolen in robberies and burglaries known to the police.
- (7) Robbery, assault, and burglary victimization rates measures via sample surveys.

At the time of this writing, data on 1974 arrests was not yet available; thus, assessment of this outcome must be deferred to later reports. District Attorney data through half of 1974 was collected, tabulated and reported as part of the District Attorney's High Impact Project Preliminary Evaluation, and some findings relevant to the police contribution are included in this report. Data on robberies, assaults, and burglaries known to the police through 1974 is included in this report, but recent values are so far out of trend that the validity of recent data, which was tabulated by a new computerized system, is questionable. Sample surveys on victimization for two periods (July, 1971 through June, 1972, and May, 1973, through April, 1974) were compared by Oregon Research Institute and some relevant findings are reported here.



## FINDINGS

### Strike Force Missions

#### Missions Described

Strike Force missions are (1) team responses to identified target crime-related problems, (2) flexible in concept of response, and (3) flexible in make-up or formula. Although 112 missions were considered during the first eighteen (18) months of the Police Strike Force Subproject, 105 were actually implemented. The first mission was fielded on September 4, 1973, two months after the grant was awarded. Table 1 lists, in order of the mission number, the 112 missions considered over the sixteen month period, from September 4, 1973, through December 31, 1974. For each mission, items included in the table are:

- (1) The mission number, the first two digits of which are the year during which the mission was begun.
- (2) The date the mission was begun, the first date of the principle activities of the mission.
- (3) The date the mission ended, the last date of any overtime activities related to the mission.
- (4) The problem of focus, usually the type of crime to which the problem predominantly related.
- (5) The response concept, usually the predominant activity.
- (6) Overtime manhours expended on the mission, unless the mission was performed during regular duty time.
- (7) The mission days, the number of twenty-four hour periods during which activities took place (values in parentheses are best guesses where precise data was unavailable).
- (8) Manhours per mission day total mission manhours (6) divided by the number of twenty-four hour periods of mission activities (7), a figure which gives indication of the size of the mission team (again, values in parentheses are based on best guesses).
- (9) Target arrests, specifically, arrests for robbery, burglary, assault, and theft.
- (10) Other arrests, excluding traffic related offenses.
- (11) Property recovered, amounts not in parentheses were estimated by the police, amounts in parentheses were estimated by the author.

If a mission was never implemented, it is so indicated in columns (2) and (3) by the word "cancelled". Print file searches resulted in tangible products - suspects identified - which are entered under columns (9), (10), and (11). For "cancelled" missions, dashes indicate irrelevant items. For implemented missions, dashes indicate zero values and question marks indicate unknown values. The abbreviations utilized for problems of focus and response concepts are listed alphabetically in the Table of Abbreviations Used in Other Tables, the first table in the Figures and Tables section.

Table 2 aggregates the missions by the problem of focus, which could be a single type of crime problem; a combination of crimes; or, as in the case of a latent print backlog, a problem which relates to unspecified crimes. The majority of the missions were fielded in response to: (1) a persistent high level of a particular crime or combination of crimes in a particular area of Portland; (2) "flare-ups" of particular crimes or combinations in particular areas, detected by pattern analysis of ten-day incident maps in conjunction with MO information; or (3) "lead" intelligence regarding pending activities of suspects. In addition, many missions capitalized on the unique capabilities of flexible team membership, size, duration, and equipment to respond to normally illusive criminal activities such as fencing.

It is important to note that Impact target crimes - namely stranger-to-stranger street crimes and burglary - were defined by Strike Force Operations for pragmatic reasons as six primary crimes of focus: (1) residential burglary; (2) commercial burglary; (3) commercial robbery; (4) street robbery; (5) street assault, and (6) purse snatch. Commercial robbery was included for reasons of overriding local priorities.

From Table 2 it can be seen that nearly half (48.4%) of mission overtime manhours were focused specifically on residential burglaries. Commercial burglaries specifically accounted for another 6.7 percent of mission overtime. Missions focused on fencing activities ultimately effect the burglary problem and the same can be said for the majority of latent print identification efforts. Thus, directly or indirectly, about 31,070, or 77.5 percent (roughly four-fifths) of mission efforts were focused on burglary. Thefts of property are also indirectly effected by anti-fencing activities, so perhaps the degree of focus on burglary is overestimated, but it should also be noted that anti-fencing activities should have little effect on any of the other target crimes.

Table 3 aggregates the missions by response concept. Response concepts can generally be considered equivalent to predominant activities or combinations of activities. Clearly the predominant activity across missions has been surveillance - surveillance of areas, potential targets, or suspects. Investigation places a close second. The term investigation as used in this report excludes surveillance, but includes such activities as talking to informants, victims, suspects, and associates, intelligence collation, and search and apprehension activities.



About 36,148 or 90.3 percent of mission overtime manhours were expended performing more or less traditional activities of covert area surveillance, overt patrol, suspect surveillance, and investigation. Thus, Strike Force missions generally do not represent a radical departure from traditional ways of fighting crime, although there is a shift from the traditional "follow-up" approach toward a "catch-them-in-the-act" approach. Also new is the unprecedented amount of inter-divisional teamwork and the capitalization on "ripe" situations and "lead" intelligence. The remaining ten percent of the missions especially demonstrated the expanded capability to respond to unique problems in unique ways.

Table 4 lists, in ascending order, values for the 105 fielded missions for total overtime manhours (the total overtime effort of each mission), mission-days (the number of 24-hour periods during which activities took place), and manhours per mission-day (a rate of effort, generally related to the size of a mission team). From Table 4, it can be seen that 20 percent of the missions (21 missions out of 105) accounted for five-sixths (84.4%) of all Strike Force mission overtime. Twenty missions lasted only one day and twenty more were completed on two days. For another eighteen missions, activities took place on only three or four days. Over half (55.2%) of the missions had activities on four or less days and nearly four-fifths (78.3%) had activities on fourteen or less days. Excluding three regular-duty (non-overtime) missions, one-eight (12.7%) of the missions employed eight or less manhours per mission-day, more than one-third (36.3%) employed sixteen or less manhours per mission-day; nearly two-third (69.7%) employed thirty-two or less manhours per mission-day; and only seven out of 102 overtime missions employed more than eighty manhours per mission-day.

#### Strike Force Practical Knowledge and Experience Gained

Practical knowledge about which response concepts work best against which identified problems was brought into Strike Force mission operations by the staff and other Bureau members, and additional practical experience was gained throughout the first sixteen months of Strike Force missions. Prior knowledge and new experience are reflected by the history of responses to different problems and by the development of the Specialized Surveillance Team (SST) and the Fence Detail.

Of twenty-two missions fielded specifically in response to residential burglary (RB), thirteen involved area surveillance (AS), four of them with AS as the sole primary activity, two with AS in combination with investigation, and seven with AS in combination with investigation and overt patrol. Investigation was involved in fourteen of the twenty RB missions; five times as the sole primary activity, twice in combination with area surveillance, and seven times in combination with area surveillance and overt patrol. Residential burglary was the only type of target crime problem against which the response concept of combined area surveillance, overt patrol, and investigation was utilized.

These AS, P&I missions were generally very large and expensive and were a last resort for response to the broad-area nature of the residential burglary problem. The last large scale AS, P&I mission was fielded from mid-May through mid-July, 1974. Four very small, investigation only, RB missions were fielded during the last two months of 1973, but only one additional such mission was applied later, in July, 1974. Only two suspect surveillance missions were fielded in specific response to residential burglaries.

The fourteen missions fielded against commercial burglary (CB) differed drastically in concept from those to residential burglary (RB). While only two RB missions were suspect surveillance (SS) and only one RB mission was a stake-out (SO) of an anticipated target, four CB missions were SS and four were SO. Also, silent radio alarms were employed against CB; but, although considered, were not employed against RB. However, the eleven CB missions which utilized alarms, SS and SO utilized only 694 overtime manhours while one CB mission, which promoted self-protective measures on the part of business, utilized 1911 overtime manhours during the last half of 1974.

The nine missions fielded against burglaries in general included three suspect surveillance, three training, one investigation, one stake-out, and one area surveillance. No cross-time trend was apparent.

Fifteen missions were fielded against fencing or fencing and burglary combined. That eleven of the missions utilized suspect surveillance is not surprising. Other missions included three investigations and one storefront.

Seven different response concepts were applied in nine missions against commercial robberies, indicating that a good, consistent means for combating this target crime has not been found.

Against purse snatches, five out of seven missions involved area surveillance, one in combination with investigation. Two remaining missions involved surveillance of decoys.

Eleven missions were fielded against combined street robberies and street assaults, all (except one) involved primarily area surveillance combined with overt patrol. Across time the number of police personnel involved per mission decreased, while businesses in the target areas were involved to an increasing extent, mainly through discouragement of overconsumption of alcohol by potential victims and help in identifying "predators".

In the early months of the project, the Strike Force staff realized that large missions could not be the norm. They were too expensive to hope to continue after the Impact project was over. Also, crime patterns were too unstable, shifting dramatically within days.

Thus, the desire predominated early to shift emphasis to working suspects whenever possible. If area coverage was appropriate, then information about possible suspects who could be looked for was made available and was considered highly valuable.

Small missions also were found not to be uniformly productive. Success depended on "good", "fresh" intelligence, optimal surveillance and communications equipment, and able and dedicated personnel. Other experience gained included the realization that line officers make good leaders in the field, but that administrative experience was prerequisite to expeditious mission planning, staffing and equipping.

It was soon learned that rotating overtime duty participation was not producing individuals proficient in the use of sophisticated surveillance equipment. Second, the surveillance emphasis of the majority of missions was quite expensive as overtime. Third, need was identified for a small, highly trained, and extremely well-coordinated team for armed criminal interception. This degree of training and teamwork experience could never be attained through rotating participation. Thus, the concept of the Specialized Surveillance Team (SST) evolved, incorporating the functions of armed criminal activity interception and sophisticated surveillance. The diversion of overtime funds to support full-time, regular-duty SST positions, in effect, provided more crucial target crime response activities for the same money. Also, in conjunction with a portable, ten-alarm encoder and appropriate deployment of silent radio alarms at up to ten commercial sites, a promising means of response to commercial robbery has been developed and utilized.

A considerable amount of Strike Force overtime resources were being expended to interdict fencing activities and networks. To conserve overtime resources, and once again to capitalize on developing expertise, these antifencing activities were largely transferred beginning in June, 1974, to a newly formed Fence Detail in the Detectives Division, which utilized a mixture of substitute overtime and two of the Impact designated positions within the Detectives Division. For many activities, the Fence Detail made extensive use of SST services. The Fence Detail and SST were largely responsible for the propagation of a regional fencing intelligence network involving law enforcement agencies in four counties, two states and the FBI.

#### Comparative Productivity and Focus: Strike Force Versus Routine Operations

An attempt has been made to compare the arrest productivity of Strike Force missions with that of routine operations. This attempt has of necessity included some questionable assumptions and therefore is only meant to convey the very rough estimate of comparative productivity. The comparison is also confined, by necessity, to tangible products, namely, arrests. For comparison purposes, arrest productivity has been adjusted in consideration of the difference in the resources of the two ways of operating. Thus, the final comparisons made are between arrests per thousand manhours of activity.

Questionable assumptions were made determining both the numerators (arrests) and denominators (manhours of effort devoted toward arrests). Target arrests, as interpreted by Strike Force Operations, include arrests for aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, purse snatch, and fencing crimes (stolen property: buying, receiving, or possessing). Strike Force Mission Summary forms often tallied only the four broad categories of assault, robbery, burglary and theft. The sums of these four tallies are recorded for each mission in Table 1. Additional investigation in Team Leader's Reports resulted in revised figures for Strike Force target arrests of 9 aggravated assault, 37 robbery, 124 burglary, 57 stolen property, and 3 purse snatch arrests for a total of 230 Strike Force target arrests.

Routine bureau target arrests (similarly defined) were first collected from UCR Return A's. Arrests for stolen property showed a suspicious sharp drop between 1971 and 1972, corresponding to a change in Oregon's statutes, which may have resulted in inclusion of some stolen property crimes into theft tallies. A revised estimate for arrests for stolen property: buying, receiving, or possessing, was calculated using the ratio of such arrests to theft arrests in 1969, 1970, and 1971. Routine target arrests for 1973 were, thus, estimated to be 1830.

Determination of the denominator (manhours of effort aimed at arrests) was straightforward for Strike Force missions. From the 40,047 total mission overtime manhours, 2,175 manhours spent at promoting self-protective measures were subtracted, yielding 37,872 manhours.

Determination of the appropriate denominator for routine operations was much more complicated primarily because the police perform three principle functions - crime prevention, law enforcement, and public service. Because the mixture of activities devoted to these diverse ends was not readily discernible, eventually the appropriate level of effort related directly to arrests was determined to lie somewhere between two extremes. The lower extreme was determined by multiplying 1840, the average manhours of duty during one year for a typical member of the Bureau, by 253, the number of personnel in the Detectives, Intelligence, Special Investigations, Juvenile, and Criminalistics Divisions during 1973. The higher extreme was determined by multiplying 1840 by 583, the number of personnel in the preceding divisions plus the number in the patrol precincts.

Although arrest productivity estimates were based on a sixteen-month period for Strike Force missions and a twelve-month period for routine operations, the dividing operation renders the rates comparable. Table 5 contains the derived figures for arrest productivity for both target arrests and for all non-traffic arrests. When routine arrest productivity rates were calculated on the basis of 253 personnel, Strike Force mission non-traffic arrest productivity appeared to be only half that of routine operations, but Strike Force mission target arrest productivity appeared to be 54 percent higher. When routine arrest productivity rates were calculated on the basis of 589 personnel, Strike Force mission non-traffic arrest productivity appeared to be only slightly better than routine operations but Strike Force mission target arrest productivity appeared to be three to four times that of routine operations.

Either way, Strike Force mission target arrest productivity appeared to be meaningfully higher. However, it is important to note that each type of operation provides considerable input into the success of the other. Skills, experience, criminal intelligence, and partially completed casework are constantly carried back and forth between the operations due to rotational, volunteer assignment to overtime duty.

Table 6 shows that Strike Force missions are successfully focussing on target crimes and are also successfully avoiding involvement in traffic law enforcement.

#### Routine Operations Altered Due to Strike Force Experience

The single most critical aspect of Strike Force activities is that they comprise an exploratory capability not previously available to the Portland Police Bureau. Evaluation of the success of the Strike Force Operations component of the subproject should, therefore, emphasize the extent to which better ways of operating are demonstrated. Exploratory success is clearly indicated when a new way of operating is assumed by routine operations under normal funding. This has been the case for at least two types of operations explored by Strike Force missions, "Operation CRIMP" (Missions 73-36, 74-29, and 74-49) and Commercial Burglary Crime Prevention (Mission 74-45).

"Operation CRIMP" was a set of missions fielded against street assaults and robberies. It consisted of foot patrols, area surveillance, and a high degree of involvement of local businesses. It took place in a downtown Portland area which had previously experienced a persistent high density of street robberies and street assaults largely attributed to the over-consumption of alcohol. Earlier missions had generally involved up to six personnel, mostly plainclothes, surveilling the areas from unmarked vehicles. The involvement of local businesses in the problem and a switch to two-man foot patrols proved to be a successful, inexpensive way to combat the problem during missions conducted from December, 1973 to February, 1974 and from June, 1974 to September, 1974. Since then, the police precinct with responsibility for the problem area has included two-man foot patrols of the area as part of its routine operations.

The Commercial Burglary Crime Prevention mission consisted of promotion of self-protective measures on the part of commercial establishments in downtown Portland from July to December, 1974. Since then, the two patrolmen who performed the bulk of the field work of overtime missions have been continuing the work as a regular duty assignment.

#### Detectives Division Manpower Augmentation and Operational Changes

Prior to the Impact project, the Detectives Division operated with a complement of 85 detectives. Six detective positions were added with Impact funds in August, 1973. In September, one detective position was exchanged for two clerks. Then in March, 1974, the chief promoted two detectives to sergeant and assigned them permanently to the Internal Affairs Division. In May, 1974, the Fence Detail was created, incorporating an Impact position as a patrolman specialist and another as a lead Investigator Sergeant. The other Impact detectives remained in their original assignments, one in the Burglary Detail, one for the Alarm Program, one in the Morning Relief Robbery Detail, and one in the Afternoon (First Night) Relief Robbery Detail, where he concentrates on purse snatches.

Net effects were that the Detectives Division personnel complement changed from 85 detectives temporarily to 91 detectives, then back to 87 detectives, plus one lead Investigator Sergeant. The manpower levels in the Burglary and Robbery Details were unaltered by the Impact positions, but the alarm specialists and two members of the Fence Detail were added.

Other non-project changes which should have had effects on Detectives Division productivity were:

- (1) A new division commander in August, 1973.
- (2) Position and role shifts which yielded a sergeant in charge of every detail.
- (3) Position and role shifts which yielded a clerk for each basic detail, a change which relieved detectives of much tedious clerical work.
- (4) Rotation of detail supervisors.
- (5) Dropping of a manual incident cross-index file and switching to a computerized system which is not yet useful as an investigative tool.
- (6) Relocation of the jail, which until January, 1975, made it more difficult and time consuming to interrogate all felony defendants upon arrest.

Data on a productivity measure, arrest warrants, has not yet been collected; thus, determination of the combined direct effects of all these project and non-project changes will be deferred until the next report. However, outcomes of two special aspects of the organizational and role changes within the Detectives Division have been assessed.

### Alarm Program

Equipment delivery delays for the new 100-alarm system have afforded the opportunity to evaluate the effects of dedication of an alarm specialist to employment of an older, 42-alarm system. Fifteen months of data on several relevant measures of system-specialist performance have been collected and are presented in Table 7.

Prior to the dedication of the alarm specialist (an Impact-funded position within Detectives) the old 42-alarm system was not employed to its maximum potential. Sporadic records indicate that prior peak employment of the old system occurred in 1968 when arrests resulted in 25 (64%) of 39 incursions detected by alarms. By 1972, employment of the system had declined to the extent that arrests resulted from detection by alarm for only nine incursions, and during the first nine months of 1973, only two incursions detected by alarms resulted in at least one arrest.

The dedication of a full-time alarm specialist dramatically improved the alarm system's usefulness. As can be seen from Table 7, apprehensions resulted from good alarms in 43 incursions during the fifteen-month period from October, 1973, through December, 1974. On the average 2.87 (43 ÷ 15) incursions at alarm sites resulted in at least one apprehension each month. This rate is a 37.6 percent improvement over the prior peak monthly rate of 2.08 (25 ÷ 12) in 1968.

Since October, 1973, in three-fourths (74.7%) of the intrusions at alarm sites, the alarm detected and signalled the intrusion. Apprehensions were made in nearly half (45.3%) of the intrusions. When the intrusion was detected and signalled, three-fifths (60.6%) of the time an apprehension resulted. For every good alarm, there were only 3.55 false alarms. Almost all false alarms were caused by innocent parties, such as employees or phone calls to the alarmed premises and in three-tenths (28.3%) of the false alarms, police were informed quickly enough of the mistake to call-off response. In all, ninety-six (96) offenders were caught in the act and arrested.

The dedication of a specialist to employ the old 42-alarm system definitely provided the Portland Police with a useful means to help combat commercial burglary. Retention of the specialist and employment of the new 100 alarm system (phase in began in December, 1974) should show even better results and will be evaluated in future reports.

### Fence Detail

On May 23, 1974, Strike Force mission 74-44 implemented the Fence Detail within the Detective Division consisting of a lead investigator, three investigators, a special operative and a property control officer.

Strike Force Operations allocated sufficient (substitute duty) overtime to provide two of the investigator personnel and the two attached police officers. The other two investigators are Impact funded detective positions originally assigned to the Burglary Detail. Fence Detail mission objectives are to (1) identify, investigate and prosecute fencing operations, (2) develop criminal intelligence for dissemination, and (3) recover, identify and return stolen property.

During the remainder of 1974, the Fence Detail expended 4841 overtime manhours and the two full-time regular duty positions while making 59 target arrests, including 47 for Theft by receiving, and 38 other non-traffic arrests. In addition, they recovered \$70,767 in stolen property, of which better than 90 percent was returned to its rightful owners.

One interesting discovery made during an undercover selling operation was that the great majority of legitimate business people were willing to purchase items that they were informed were stolen. Twenty-one indictments arose from this activity and a considerable public furor ensued.

The Fence Detail frequently called on the SST for surveillance and apprehension support. Detail members were sworn in several adjoining counties and an intelligence net spanning four counties in two states grew out of its activities.

### Intelligence Division

The Police Strike Force Subproject provided two additional positions for the Intelligence Division. The Sergeant-Night Relief Commander and Patrolman Specialist brought the Division's personnel complement up to one lieutenant, one sergeant specialist, eight patrolman specialists, and two clerks. The additional positions allowed a restructuring of the division and alteration of previous roles and activities.

Previously the Division had been dubbed the "Night Club Detail". Members worked mostly on their own at surveillance and collating intelligence for report preparation and dissemination, particularly relating to suspect's vehicles and associates. These surveillance and intelligence collation activities were severely limited by other "catch-all" responsibilities of the Division, including explosive disposal, VIP protection, licensing investigations, and liaison between the Bureau and outside agencies. The increased manpower and altered structure and roles have resulted in:

- (1) Increased utilization of, and cooperation with precinct officers, primarily through specified liaisons to each precinct at each role call and through ride alongs.
- (2) Support of, and participation in Strike Force missions.
- (3) Development and updating of a local "10 Most Wanted" handbill.
- (4) Increased numbers of intelligence reports.

Unfortunately, no baseline data on the number of intelligence reports exists, and more importantly, amount and quality of intelligence is not readily quantifiable. Thus, improvement in intelligence collection, collation, and dissemination cannot be objectively evaluated.

#### Criminalistics Division

The Police Strike Force Subproject provided two additional identification officers and a mobile scientific investigation unit (van) for the Criminalistics Division. The added positions increased the number of identification officers from nine to eleven. The additional personnel and equipment were linked in the grant proposal to objectives of:

- (1) Increased on-the-scene scientific investigations.
- (2) Increased latent prints identified.

Table 8 presents several years counts of these two activities aggregated by six-month periods. Scientific scene investigations have shown a 41.4 percent increase when the first twelve months after the Impact project, July, 1973 - June, 1974 are compared with the first twelve months before (July, 1972 - June, 1973). Data for additional periods indicates that the change corresponds with the Impact Project. This finding of an apparent great improvement must be tempered by uncertainty that the thoroughness of the investigations has not diminished, something for which the author has only had verbal assurance.

Latent prints identified showed a 19.0 percent increase across the same comparable twelve-month periods. This difference is statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 10.26$ ,  $p < .01$ ), and data for additional six-month periods supports the conclusion that the increase corresponds with the Police Strike Force Subproject.

The Criminalistics Division has been the recipient of other desirable side-effects of Strike Force mission activity. Since the inception of the missions, officers who have been participants have shown continuing interest in the capability of scientific investigation and requests for services from Criminalistics have dramatically increased. Again, this latter finding is based on subjective information, obtained verbally.

#### Ultimate Outcomes of the Subproject

##### Robbery and Burglary Cases Considered by the District Attorney

Although the Multnomah County Sheriff and several small municipal law enforcement agencies also bring cases to the District Attorney for consideration, the great majority of cases (about four-fifths of the robbery cases and two-thirds of burglary cases) originate at the Portland Police Bureau. Thus, percent increases across time in robbery and burglary cases brought to the DA for consideration fairly accurately reflect percent increases for the Portland Police Bureau alone.

From Table 9, it can be seen that across comparable eight-month periods before and after initiation of the Police Strike Force Subproject Robbery I and II cases considered increased by 120 percent and Burglary I and II cases considered increased by 37 percent. These increases are statistically significant ( $\chi^2$ 's equal 58.56 and 16.13 respectively, and both p's are less than .001) and appear to be meaningful, desirable changes.

##### Percent of Considered Robbery and Burglary Cases Prosecuted

Quantitative increases in cases considered (above) are only meaningful if the quality of casework is maintained or improved. The percent of cases considered which are accepted for prosecution is a good indicator of the quality of casework, although it also reflects confounding efforts by the DA to prosecute whenever reasonable, a judgment which is susceptible to public and administrative pressure. However, these pressures are kept in check by counter-pressures to keep dismissal rates low, conviction rates high, and plea bargaining at a minimum.

Percent of Robbery I and II cases accepted for prosecution remained virtually the same across the two periods, while the percent of Burglary I and II cases accepted dropped somewhat, but not significantly ( $\chi^2$  corrected = 1.94, 1df,  $p > .05$ ). The acceptance rate together with the number of cases considered indicates a large and meaningful improvement in police casework for robberies, but only a small improvement for burglaries.

##### Percent of Prosecuted Cases Resulting in Convictions or Guilty Pleas

Improved police casework or increased in-the-act apprehension should result in more guilty findings and more guilty pleas to original charges. The data in Table 10 show the desired changes in prosecution outcomes. However, other data (most notably pleas pursuant to bargain data) indicates that changes are more likely due to the DA's project, goals of eliminating plea bargains. Thus, this outcome measures usefulness to evaluation of the Police Strike Force Subproject is eliminated.

##### Crime Suppression Measures

The remaining ultimate outcome measures to be discussed relate to the contribution of police activity to suppression or deterrence of crime. Because offenses known to the police, values of property taken in offenses known to the police, and real victimization rates are profoundly influenced by factors not in control of the police, the author is reluctant to apply them as criteria for measuring crime suppression or deterrence. Regardless, analysis of trends in crime rates is a generally expected part of assessment of police program success.



Table II presents offense data for several twelve-month periods prior to and including the first such period after Police Strike Force Subproject implementation. When offenses known to the police are compared between the first twelve months of the subproject and the immediate preceding twelve-month period, robberies show a 16.6 percent increase, assaults, show a 19.5 percent increase, and burglaries show a 25.7 percent increase. Thus, if the assumption were made that this type of data were a valid measure of program effectiveness (an assumption the author rejects) then one would be forced to conclude that the police were getting worse at suppressing crime.

Table 12 similarly presents data for the value stolen in robberies and burglaries known to the police. When the value stolen in known offenses during the first twelve months after subproject implementation is compared to that of the immediately preceding twelve-month period, values stolen in known robberies show a 44.2 percent increase and values stolen in known burglaries show a 48.8 percent increase. Again, depending on whether such measures are considered valid in assessment of crime suppression, the police appear to have gotten much worse.

When the data for the several periods are examined, the jump in value stolen is so abrupt that a switch to a new on-line computerized system for entering and tallying the data appears to be a more likely source of explanation for such large changes.

The major factors which undermine the validity of offenses known to the police across time as measures of relative crime suppression are other criminal justice programs, changes in the whole criminogenic environment, and changes in the tendency of victims or witnesses to report crimes. Victimization rates determined at different points in time via sample surveys are an improvement over offenses known to police and value stolen in known offenses, in that at least changes in reporting behavior are no longer a confounding factor.

Table 13 presents data of robbery, assault, and burglary victimization rates for two periods<sup>1</sup> - July, 1971, through June, 1973, and May, 1973, through April, 1974. The second period nearly corresponds to the first year of the Police Strike Force Subproject. The robbery and burglary rates have declined significantly, while the assault rate has probably remained unchanged. Perhaps the Subproject was partially responsible for the desired changes in the robbery and burglary victimization rates.

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1. Values for the first period were determined by the LEAA - Census Bureau Victimization Survey. Values for the second period were determined by the Oregon Research Institute.

FIGURES AND TABLES

Generalized Strike Force Mission Procedure

Figure 1





Figure 2a - Portland Police Bureau organization structure prior to August 27, 1973






Figure 2b - PPB organizational structure after August 27, 1973 reorganization




Figure 2c - PPB organizational structure after February 7, 1974 reorganization

Table of Abbreviations Used in Other Tables

PROBLEMS OF FOCUS	
All	- all target crimes, assault, robbery, burglary, fencing
B	- burglaries
CB	- commercial burglaries
CR	- commercial robberies
F	- fencing
Hom	- homicides
Prints	- backlog of latent prints to be identified
PS	- purse snatches
R	- robberies
RB	- residential burglaries
RR	- residential robberies
SA	- street assaults
SR	- street robberies

RESPONSE CONCEPTS	
Alarms	- silent radio alarm employment
App	- apprehension
AS	- covert area surveillance
Files	- latent print identification by files search
I	- investigation, with or without IC, informant handling, or App
IC	- intelligence collation alone
P	- overt patrol
Plan	- planning of large or lengthy missions
Poly	- polygraph (lie detector) testing of questionable victims
PSP	- promotion of self-protection on the part of citizens, businesses
PVDS	- potential victim or decoy surveillance
SO	- stake-out of potential target or discovered loot
SS	- suspect surveillance; activities, residence, or business
Store	- storefront operation
Train	- training

Table 1

STRIKE FORCE MISSIONS

MISSION NUMBER	DATE BEGAN	DATE ENDED	PROBLEM OF FOCUS	RESPONSE CONCEPT	OVERTIME MANHOURS	MISSION DAYS	MANHOURS PER MD	TARGET ARRESTS	OTHER ARRESTS	PROPERTY RECOVERED
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
73-01	090473	090573	CB	Alarms	20	2	10	--	--	--
73-02	091273	091273	CRorCB	SO	73	1	73	--	--	--
73-03	091373	091473	CB	SO	32	1	32	--	--	--
73-04	092173	092273	SR&SA	AS&P	87	2	43	--	7	--
73-05	101173	102473	Prints	Files	234	(10)	(24)	(15	Suspects	ID'd)
73-06	092873	093073	SR&SA	AS&P	86	2	43	--	6	--
73-07	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
73-08	100473	100673	SR&SA	AS&P	115	2	58	--	2	--
73-09	100473	100473	RB	SS	26	1	26	--	--	--
73-10	100173	123173	CB	Alarms	54	20	3	--	--	--
73-11	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
73-12	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
73-13	101573	101573	CR	PVDS	21	1	21	--	--	--
73-14	101673	101873	RB	I	194	3	65	--	--	(500)
73-15	101973	102173	SR&SA	AS&P	79	2	40	2	--	(5)
73-16	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
73-17	101973	102673	RB	I	24	1	24	--	2	25
73-18	102473	110573	F	I	REG	7	--	--	--	--
73-19	102673	102873	SR&SA	AS&P	201	2	101	1	--	--
73-20	102973	103073	SR&SA	AS&P	87	2	44	2	--	--
73-21	103073	103073	PS	AS	10	1	10	--	--	--
73-22	110173	110473	SR	AS	252	4	63	--	--	--
73-23	110273	110373	RB	AS	85	2	43	--	--	--
73-24	110773	110773	RB	I	8	1	8	--	--	--
73-25	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
73-26	110573	Open	SA	IC	REG	--	--	--	--	--
73-27	110773	111373	SR&SA	AS	104	6	17	--	--	--
73-28	110773	111073	PS	PVDS	174	4	44	1	--	39
73-29	110973	111073	CB	SO	24	2	12	--	--	--
73-30	111473	111973	RB	AS,P&I	294	6	49	--	--	--
73-31	111573	021174	F	Store	59	12	5	?	?	?
73-32	112173	121973	RB	AS,P&I	2945	28	105	23	9	5867
73-33	111673	111873	CR	SO	110	3	37	--	--	--
73-34	112473	112673	F	SS	136	3	45	1	--	450
73-35	113073	120673	PS	AS&I	106	7	15	--	--	--
73-36	112673	020874	SR&SA	AS&P	1038	33	31	9	65	120
73-37	120773	120973	B	SS	28	3	9	--	--	--
73-38	120773	122673	RB	I	12	2	6	--	--	300
73-39	121173	121173	B	Train	64	1	64	--	--	--
73-40	121473	021574	F & B	SS	1087	60	18	11	1	54840
73-41	122073	122373	RB	AS&I	218	4	55	1	2	800
74-01	Cancelled	ed	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
74-02	011774	013074	RB	AS,P&I	1729	14	124	12	--	7180

MISSION NUMBER	DATE BEGAN	DATE ENDED	PROBLEM OF FOCUS	RESPONSE CONCEPT	OVERTIME MANHOURS	MISSION DAYS	MANHOURS PER MD	TARGET ARRESTS	OTHER ARRESTS	PROPERTY RECOVERED
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
74-03	011574	021574	Prints	Files	80	(20)	(4)	(11 prints ID'd)		
74-04	011674	011674	F	SS	18	1	18	2		62700
74-05	012274	012274	F	SS	7	1	7			
74-06	012874	031374	All	PSP	264	33	8			
74-07	012974	020574	B	Train	28	2	14			
74-08	020874	020974	F	SS	19	1	19			5000
74-09	021374	021474	CB	SS	20	1	20			CC*
74-10	021674	030674	RB	AS,P&I	808	21	38	3	1	500
74-11	021574	021674	RB	SO	26	1	26			
74-12	022174	050374	F&B	SS	576	36	16	1		
74-13	021974	030274	F&B	SS	214	9	24	4		100
74-14	022174	042274	F	SS	191	14	14			
74-15	030174	031274	B	I	92	4	23			
74-16	030174	030474	RB	AS	73	4	18	3		(4800)
74-17	030174	030174	B	SS	15	1	15			1200
74-18	030174	031574	F&B	SS	REG	14				
74-19	031274	031574	PS	AS	128	4	32			
74-20	031074	031074	CB	SO	15	1	15			
74-21	031974	042674	RB	AS,P&I	555	33	17	11	1	130
74-22	031874	032574	B	SS	296	8	37	6	3	10
74-23	032574	040374	RB	AS	75	7	11			
74-24	032274	040374	RB	AS	142	10	14		1	300
74-25	010174	123174	CB	Alarms	152	(76)	(2)			
74-26	032674	032674	CR	SS	44	1	44			
74-27	032774	040374	PS	AS	522	8	65			
74-28	032874	040474	All	SS	695	7	99		1	
74-29	032574	040274	SR&SA	Plan	24	(2)	(12)			
74-30	032974	040374	Hom	SS	58	6	10		2	
74-31	032674	032974	B	SO	50	2	25			
74-32	032974	040774	CR	AS	595	9	66	1		
74-33	040374	042074	RB	SS	418	18	23	3		
74-34	040474	040574	CR	SO	57	2	28			
74-35	041074	041574	B&CR	I	137	4	34	2		400
74-36	041274	051574	Prints	Files	101	(25)	(4)	(15 suspects ID'd)		
74-37	052174	052374	B	Train	82	2	41			
74-38	041874	042574	CB	I	70	4	18	1		11510
74-39	042474	043074	PS	AS	485	6	81	4	3	
74-40	050974	061074	All	Train	337	(24)	(14)			
74-41	052174	071474	RB	AS,P&I	6840	53	129	40	50	
74-42	051874	051974	B&R	SS	71	2	36			
74-43	060174	063074	Prints	Files	34	(9)	(4)	(3 suspects ID'd)		
74-44	052374	123174	F	SS	4841	221	22	68	29	70767
74-45	070874	123174	CB	PSP	1911	125	14			
74-46	061174	061474	F&B	I	98	3	33			
74-47	061474	061474	Hom	I	48	1	48			
74-48	061874	091374	CB	SS	130	17	8	2		550

\* Credit Cards

MISSION NUMBER	DATE BEGAN	DATE ENDED	PROBLEM OF FOCUS	RESPONSE CONCEPT	OVERTIME MANHOURS	MISSION DAYS	MANHOURS PER MD	TARGET ARRESTS	OTHER ARRESTS	PROPERTY RECOVERED
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
74-49	061974	090674	SR&SA	AS&P	1601	80	20	9	152	(3000)
74-50	062874	123174	RB	AS&I	4273	185	23	49	33	8205
74-51	062774	070474	SA	SS	82	8	10			
74-52	070374	071274	CR	I	95	10	10			
74-53	072974	081274	CB	SS	168	11	16			
74-54	072474	080174	RB	Plan	58	(5)	(12)			
74-55	071774	071874	F	SS	30	2	15			
74-56	Cancelled									
74-57	072474	072874	RB	I	45	2	23			1000
74-58	072274	080474	B	AS	520	14	37	6	6	150
74-59	072274	072474	Hom	I	291	3	97			
74-60	080774	081074	F&B	I	118	3	39	2		
74-61	083174	090274	CB	SS	43	3	14			
74-62	090974	091074	B&CR	I	33	2	17			
74-63	091874	101174	CR	Poly	104	24	4			
74-64	092374	102874	CR	I	505	35	14	1	1	1750
74-65	100174	100474	CB	App	4	1	4			
74-66	101274	101374	CB	SO	36	2	18			
74-67	101974	102174	CR	AS&I	73	3	24			
74-68	102274	123174	RB	AS,P&I	527	40	13	19	13	(3000)
74-69	103174	103174	RR	SO	48	1	48			
74-70	111374	111374	SR&SA	AS&P	48	1	48		37	
74-71	111474	111774	PS	PVDS	97	4	24			
TOTAL	090473	123174			40047	1459*	27*	300	423	245198

\*These values exclude regular duty mission from their computation.

Table 2

Number of Missions, Overtime Manhours, and Percent of Total Overtime Manhours  
By Problem of Focus

PROBLEM OF FOCUS	No. of Missions	Overtime Manhours	% of Overtime
Residential Burglary	22	19,373	48.4
Fencing	9	5,301	13.2
Street Robbery and Street Assault	11	3,469	8.7
Commerical Burglary	14	2,678	6.7
Fencing and Burglary	6	2,093	5.2
Commerical Robbery	9	1,603	4.0
Purse Snatch	7	1,521	3.8
All Target Crimes	3	1,296	3.2
Burglary	10	1,176	2.9
Latent Print Backlog	4	449	1.1
Homicide	3	397	1.0
Street Robbery	1	252	0.6
Burglary and Commercial Robbery	2	170	0.4
Street Assault	1	80	0.2
Commercial Robbery or Commercial Burglary	1	73	0.2
Burglary and Armed Robbery	1	71	0.2
Residential Robbery	1	48	0.1
Totals	105	40,047	99.9*

\*Not 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 3

Number of Missions, Overtime Manhours, and Percent of Total Overtime Manhours  
By Response Concept

RESPONSE CONCEPT	No. of Missions	Overtime Manhours	% of Overtime
Area Surveillance, Patrol, and Invest.	7	13,697	34.2
Suspect Surveillance	25	9,210	23.0
Area Surveillance and Investigation	4	4,669	11.7
Area Surveillance and Patrol	9	3,342	8.3
Area Surveillance	12	2,990	7.5
Promotion of Self-Protection	2	2,175	5.4
Investigation	16	1,770	4.4
Training	4	511	1.3
Stake-Out Potential Targets or Loot	10	470	1.2
Latent Print Files Search	4	449	1.1
Potential Victim or Decoy Surveillance	3	292	.7
Silent Radio Alarm Employment	3	226	.6
Polygraph Testing of "Victims"	1	104	.3
Planning of Large or Lengthy Missions	2	82	.2
Storefront Operation	1	59	.1
Apprehension	1	4	.0
Intelligence Collation (On-Going)	1	regular	-
Totals	105	40,047	100.0

Table 4

Overtime Manhours, Mission-Days, and Manhours per Mission-Day  
For 105 Missions, Ascending Order

Overtime Manhours <sup>1</sup>			Mission-Days <sup>2</sup>			Manhours per Mission-Day <sup>2</sup>		
0	57	152	1	2	9	0	15	34
0	58	168	1	2	9	0	15	36
0	58	174	1	2	(9)	0	15	37
4	59	191	1	2	10	(2)	16	37
7	64	194	1	(2)	10	3	16	37
8	70	201	1	3	(10)	4	17	38
10	71	214	1	3	11	4	17	39
12	73	218	1	3	12	(4)	17	40
15	73	234	1	3	14	(4)	18	41
15	73	252	1	3	14	(4)	18	43
18	75	262	1	3	14	5	18	43
19	79	291	1	3	(14) <sup>3</sup>	6	18	43
20	80	294	1	3	17	7	18	44
20	80	296	1	3	18	8	19	44
21	82	337	1	4	20	8	20	44
24	85	418	1	4	(20)	8	20	45
24	86	485	1	4	21	9	21	48
24	87	505	1	4	24	10	22	48
26	87	520	1	4	(24)	10	23	48
26	92	522	1	4	(25)	10	23	49
28	95	527	2	4	28	10	23	55
28	97	555	2	4	33	10	23	58
30	98	576	2	4	33	11	24	63
32	101	595	2	(5)	33	12	24	64
33	104	695	2	6	35	(12)	24	65
34	104	808	2	6	36	(12)	24	65
36	106	1038	2	6	40	13	(24)	66
43	110	1087	2	6	53	14	25	73
44	115	1601	2	7	60	14	26	81
45	118	1729	2	7	(76)	14	26	97
48	128	1911	2	7	80	14	28	99
48	130	2945	2	(7) <sup>3</sup>	125	14	31	101
48	136	4273	2	8	185	14	32	105
50	137	4841	2	8	221 <sup>3</sup>	(14)	32	124
54	142	6840	2	8	Open <sup>3</sup>	15	33	129

- 1 - Zero values for regular duty (non-overtime) missions.  
 2 - Values in parentheses are best guesses where precise data was unavailable.  
 3 - Regular-duty (non-overtime missions).

Table 5

## Comparative Arrest Productivity

	Strike <sup>1</sup> Force Missions	Routine <sup>2</sup> Operations (253) <sup>3</sup>	Routine <sup>2</sup> Operations (589) <sup>4</sup>
Estimated Manhours of Arrest Effort	37,872	465,520	1,083,760
Total Non-Traffic Arrests	723	17,425	17,425
Total Target Arrests	230	1,830	1,830
Non-Traffic Arrests per 1000 Manhours	19.09	37.43	16.08
Target Arrests per 1000 Manhours	6.07	3.93	1.69

1 - For the period from September, 1973, through December, 1974.

2 - For the period from January through December, 1973.

3 - Personnel in Detectives, Intelligence, Special Investigations, Juvenile and Criminalistics Divisions.

4 - Personnel in above divisions plus the three patrol precincts.

Table 6

## Comparative Target Crime Arrest Focus

	Strike Force Missions	Total Bureau
Hazardous (Traffic) Citations	95	59,552
Total Non-Traffic Arrests	723	17,425
Total Target Arrests	230	1,830
Ratio of Traffic to Non-Traffic	.13	3.42
Ratio of Traffic to Target	.41	32.54
Ratio of Non-Traffic to Target	3.14	9.52

Table 7  
Alarm Program Data<sup>1</sup>

Month & Year	False Alarms	Crime Occurred, But No Alarm	Good Alarm But No Arrests	Good Alarm, Suspects Released	Good Alarm With Arrests	Total Alarm Related Arrests
Oct., 73	19	0	1	0	3	6
Nov., 73	19	1	1	1	3	7
Dec., 73	18	2	4	0	3	14
Jan., 74	19	0	0	0	1	2
Feb., 74	19	1	2	0	3	6
Mar., 74	20	1	4	2	4	6
Apr., 74	14	2	1	0	1	2
May, 74	15	1	2	0	4	6
June, 74	14	2	1	0	3	7
July, 74	18	0	3	0	0	0
Aug., 74	10	4	4	0	2	3
Sept. 74	19	1	2	0	3	6
Oct., 74	15	2	1	0	2	5
Nov., 74	18	7	1	1	5	20
Dec., 74	15	0	1	0	2	6
Total	252	24	28	4	39	96

1 - The alarm program through December, 1974, consisted of an older 42-alarm system employed by an Impact-funded, dedicated specialist.

Table 8

## Scientific Crime Scene Investigations and Latent Prints Identified

Period	Scenes Investigated	Prints Identified
January - June, 1971		136
July - December, 1971		112
January - June, 1972	3,422	138
July - December, 1972	3,523	158
January - June, 1973	3,573	126
July - December, 1973	5,238	156
January - June, 1974	4,793	182
July - December, 1974	5,175	183

Table 9

Robbery<sup>1</sup> and Burglary<sup>2</sup> Cases Considered and Prosecuted

Charge Period	Cases Considered	Number Accepted for Prosecution	Percent Accepted for Prosecution
Robbery I and II			
Nov. 72-June 73	41	24	59%
Nov. 73-June 74	90	55	61%
Burglary I and II			
Nov. 72-June 73	120	85	71%
Nov. 73-June 74	164	93	57%

Table 10

## Disposition of Prosecuted Robbery and Burglary Cases

Charge Period	Cases Prosecuted	Found Guilty		Pled Guilty to Original		Pled Pursuant to Bargain	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Robbery I and II							
Nov. 72-June 73	24	5	21	0	0	19	79
Nov. 73-June 74	55	6	11	27	49	4	7
Burglary I and II							
Nov. 72-June 73	85	5	6	7	8	67	79
Nov. 73-June 74	93	9	10	45	48	19	20

Table 11

## Robberies, Assaults, and Burglaries Known to the Police

Period	Robbery	Assault	Burglary
July 68 - June 69	1120	2192	6598
July 69 - June 79	1600	2896	8543
July 70 - June 71	1629	3196	10402
July 71 - June 72	1808	3395	11200
July 72 - June 73	1527	3416	10580
July 73 - June 74	1780	4081	13302

Table 12

## Value Stolen in Robberies and Burglaries Known to the Police

Period	Robbery	Burglary
July 68 - June 69	\$155,550	\$1,164,147
July 69 - June 70	272,399	1,770,385
July 70 - June 71	307,799	2,001,901
July 71 - June 72	272,910	2,134,989
July 72 - June 73	324,906	2,344,301
July 73 - June 74	468,547	3,488,015

Table 13

Victimization Rates per 1000<sup>1</sup>

Crime Type	July 71 to June 72	May 73 to April 74	Percent Change	Z Score	p Value
Robbery	16	10	Down 38	2.16	< .05
Assault	40	40.7	Up 2		n.s.
Burglary	151	127	Down 16	2.69	< .01

1-Per 1000 households for burglary; per 1000 persons over 12 years old for assaults and robberies.

**END**