CHANGING POLICE ORGANIZATIONS ?

FOUR READINGS

National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors
Washington, D.C.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

The four papers making up this publication came from a
limited attendance seminar sponsored by the National League
of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors, and
hosted by the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department.
The meeting was held in August of 1972, and financial
assistance came from both the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration and the Kansas City Police Department.

For the seminar a group of police planning and administra-
tive officials, and city government officials gathered
together to talk with one another about the process of
change in police departments.

The form chosen for the seminar was a combination of formal
and informal presentations, followed by large and small
group discussions among the attendees. The four papers
following were among the formal presentations, although
only one, that by Palmer Stinson, was actually prepared
formally. The remaining three were presented extemporaneously
from notes, and as included here are transcriptions from
tapes and notes.

Not all of the presentations from the seminar are included
here. For example, one presentation on the subject of
working for change from within a department suffering from
very widespread and serious corruption, at all levels of the
department, was made in a very personal and direct fashion at
the seminar. The material is not appropriate for written
communication, and is not included here. In another case a
paper already published, Mythology and the Management of
Change, by the editor and Donald Manson, was presented;
and in other cases presentations were organized by speakers
in very informal and interactive fashions which do not lend
themselves to this publication.

The papers in this publication are important because they
represent the working thoughts of a number of individuals
actively involved in the processes of change within their
respective police departments. They are interesting not so
much for any prescriptions for change which they might
present, but for the several perspectives on the process
of change which they present. I think they do that quite
clearly. For two of the presentations we have included
large portions of the questions asked of the authors at the

end of their presentations by the audience. These questions and answers give substantial additional insight into the thoughts of these people as they engage to try and effect and affect changes in the departments in which they work.

A few words are in order about the basic thrust of each of the papers. Palmer Stinson addresses the extraordinarily important and very difficult questions he has encountered as he has looked at general management theory and tried to apply it to his department. Although much of the paper is addressed to the specifics of a particular "team policing" concept, note in reading the paper that the questions he addresses go to the most basic police management issues: how one might get accountability from police employees; how to differentiate roles, functions and types of organizations, and how to decide when to apply generalist and specialist types of labor into those; and how to motivate police employees.

Tom Sweeney describes an ambitious, risky, and far-reaching organizational experiment underway in Kansas City, Missouri. The "task forces", originally conceived as vehicles to assure acceptance of the products of program planning, by involving the eventual users in the program design, has evolved into a complex and conceptually difficult, but apparently very productive change mechanism. Among other things, the task forces have been directly responsible for the conception and design of profoundly important original research into patrol functions in an urban police department. Eventually I believe this work will result in many innovations and publications. Unfortunately this paper is chronologically out of date, as the department now knows a great deal more about what it has done. However, the historical importance of this presentation is special, as it is conceptualized without the wonderfully cleansing effect of hingsight -- does it not always sound simple when someone describes why something which is finished worked the way it did? For anyone interested or involved in police management, who does not know about these experiments the paper is an essential piece of the literature. It demands to be read for the issues and challenges it raises. The research which has resulted from the task forces is qualitatively different from anything I have heard of heretofore arising out of the field organization of a large police department.

Clarence Kelley's remarks have of late gained an added dimension, when he became the new head of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. He describes in the following those several guiding principles which he feels have been most important in his "style" of management, and have therefore had significant impact on the kinds of changes which occurred in the Kansas City Police Department while he was its head for 12 years. For students of organizations, Clarence Kelley is an intensely charismatic leader, who is a gifted user of the risk-taking and innovative parts of modern management techniques -- a most unusual, almost unique, combination.

Finally, David Couper has also moved since delivering remarks which follow, He is now the Chief of Police in Madison, Wisconsin. One of the more remarkable and celebrated events occurring since he took this new post is very much in keeping with his remarks here. In the course of helping to keep a demonstration peaceable in Madison last year, he found himself at the head of a column of demonstrators marching through Madison, when, it is told, he encountered a phalanx of his own men, headed by his deputy, where they were preparing to attempt to break up the demonstration. The demonstration remained peaceful. David Couper considers himself a "new breed" police official, and his vision of the future of police as the peacemakers in our communities is intense, introspective, proud, and important.

I is my conviction that these four papers will add important dimensions to the literature of policing and police change. We live and work in a time when people seem set primarily upon solving problems, and writing down solutions to those problems. I do not believe there are many solutions, and I know there are very few in these papers. Rather, they provide insight into the workings of the minds of several intensely conscientious and talented people, and as such add to our understanding of the complexity and subtlety of the police function, and the management of police departments in this country at this time.

Chauncey Bell

THE ROLE OF A PLANNING UNIT IN

ACHIEVING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:

SPECIALIST/ORGANIZATION ISSUES

by

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Planning as a formal organizational function has existed
in the Oakland Police Department since the mid-50's. The
Planning and Research Unit was initially staffed by a
sergeant, two policemen, and one policewoman, who were
primarily concerned with the massive task of documenting
procedures and policy. A civilian statistician with a
background in criminology, R. E. McDonnell, headed the
activity from 1957 until 1960 when he left Oakland to
participate in the reorganization of the Chicago Police
Department under O. W. Wilson. Through most of the decade
of the 60's, however, the Planning and Research unit was
staffed by policemen.

During the administration of Chief Charles R. Gain, the
activity was given a new name -- research and development
-- and additional responsibility. The unit was also
elevated in status to a division and expanded in size.
A captain was placed in charge, and five civilian research
analysts were hired.

I assumed command of the new Research and Development
Division in 1969. My specific direction from Chief Gain
was to accelerate departmental changes he felt were necessary
through projects which would be financed by federal grants.

I proceeded to design a wide variety of programs for imple-
mentation with grant assistance. Some of the projects
involved community crime prevention activities, while others
furnished desperately needed technological hardware for
improved departmental efficiency. The chief also initiated
and directed several grants in which he had a special interest.
(The most innovative of these, intended to reduce the violence
potential in officer/offender situations, has attracted

national interest.)

Along with grant proposal development, the expanded Research and Development Division began applying systems analysis techniques in studies of various police functions. As the organizational units were studied, it became obvious that virtually every police activity or procedure should be systematically re-examined in the context of two basic questions:

> Is the function important enough to warrant its performance?

> Does the function contribute in an optimum manner toward the attainment of departmental objectives?

The need for change in Oakland is not limited to the streamlining of systems and procedures. When I assumed direction of the Research and Development Division, it was clear that there was a desperate need to improve the response capability of patrol. If I recall the statistics correctly, I believe that our average response time to a non-emergency call was about 20 minutes, and our average response time to a priority call exceeded ten minutes. It was an embarrassing fact that a citizen who called for a policeman often didn't get one until four or six hours later. My initial analysis of the problem suggested that the traditional organization of the Department into specialized operational divisions was aggravating the response time problem. I should note that my conclusions in this respect are receiving increasing support in publications of management experts (see Elliott & Sardino, "Crime Control Team." Charles C. Thomas, 1971). Both organization theorists and practicing managers agree that two important elements of good management are lost when police operational tasks are divided on the basis of function and/or clientele. One of the casualties is the effective coordination of efforts toward common goals. Another is accountability. A most critical concern of management in any enterprise. Most of these factors are impaired or destroyed in an urban law enforcement agency by the specialization of operational tasks.

It is obvious that a department cannot hold a patrolman or his sergeant accountable for crime conditions on beat when the officer literally runs from one report-taking assignment to another. Oakland has tried to deal with the situation by the expedient of assigning tactical responsibility to a

special operations unit and consciously relegating the beat officer to the status of report taker. The effectiveness of this backup unit, however, has been impaired by vacancies in the rank of patrolman, and departmental specialization. Under Oakland's organizational set-up, which is not unique in American policing, there will often be as many as three specialists within a particular area, each with more time available for crime prevention than the officer assigned to the District. Because these operational specialists report to different supervisors and commanders, however, the beat officer and his sergeant are ordinarily unaware of their presence in the neighborhood.

The fractionalization of police responsibility can contribute in considerable degree to a poor police image in communities where police forces are organized in the conventional manner. I think my first personal contact with the police (before I became an officer) was at an automobile accident scene. When I flagged down a policeman and tried to get some attention from him, he said, "Accident investigation is not my job, you will have to talk to a traffic officer."

In Oakland, our inability to respond promptly to calls for police services results in many citizen complaints. The response situation is aggravated because the different special operating units frequently work at cross purposes and are often unaware of problems outside of their specialities. Tactical divisions, for instance, tend to adopt aggressive policing attitudes and measure their own efficiency in terms of production statistics such as arrest totals. Traffic divisions are also production oriented. Primarily interested in vehicle code violations, the traffic officers are inclined to ignore standing routine calls for service when they are backed up and all patrol units are busy.

As a consequence of these considerations, I became convinced that the inefficiency and poor service associated with our slow response capability had reached an intolerable level, and that the team policing concept could be the mechanism whereby the problem would be corrected.

Even though my Department's management had recognized that task analysis and reorganization were desperately needed, and even though the current chief had assigned more resources to the Research and Development Division, it was apparent that we did not have enough skilled employees to do the prodigious amount of research necessary to a department-wide

systems study and move into team policing.

The fortuitousness and availability of LEAA funds, however, offered the promise of additional resources for the development of a new law enforcement organization structure in Oakland. The grant proposal I wrote for this purpose was titled, "Multidisciplinary Analysis of Police Systems," (MAPS). Its goal is to improve the quality of police service by reorganizing the Department for team policing.

I conceive of team policing as the assignment of squads to relatively small geographical districts where they are responsible for all police problems within the area. Because neighborhoods differ, teams may be dissimilar in makeup and be staffed with officers skilled in solving the police problems peculiar to the area they patrol. If a new crime pattern is noted, additional men are temporarily assigned to the squad, thereby giving the team leader the resources nenecessary to handle the unusual need. In this manner, the squad and its leader can be held directly accountable for results in their patrol district. Team policing, to be effective, requires relatively static assignments and fixed shifts. The stability gained by the arrangement will facilitate interaction between the squad and neighborhood citizens.

Implementation of the team policing concept will involve the systematic appraisal and subsequent consolidation of operational responsibilities now divided among Traffic, Youth Services, Preventive Services and Patrol Divisions. The greatly expanded responsibilities of the Patrol Division under the team policing approach will necessitate major changes in command deployment and shift structures. Various alternative models will accordingly be designed and evaluated concurrently with the analysis of the special operating divisions. The final reorganization plan will be created through a series of studies utilizing systems analysis techniques.

This brief introduction to the organizational change situation in Oakland presents a somewhat rosy and optimistic picture. I should make it clear, however, that many formidable obstacles lie ahead.

For instance, I have postuated that a police force's efficiency depends largely on its adherence to sound principles of organization (and, of course, adequate manpower resources). Implementation of the despecialization concept, however, may be opposed by persons with a vested interest in

the status quo. The Department's administration, however, is showing interest in this change and has demonstrated a willingness in the past to break with tradition. In the area of civilianization, for example, Oakland has achieved substantial economies and freed many officers from tasks which do not require either a policeman's authority or competence. Hopefully, the benefits of despecialization can be thoroughly explained and sold in a manner that will overcome the resistance of police traditionalists.

Another major problem I foresee in developing a reorganization plan concerns objectives. I feel strongly that the success of our project will depend on the formulation of sound, attainable objectives to which priority values are assigned. It is important that these targets lend themselves to quantitative measurement wherever possible. When arranged into a priority-ordered work plan, the objectives will facilitate measurement of the project results. Without clearly defined objectives the reorganization project will lack a unity of direction and may become involved in studies with little or no "pay-off." Moreover, if the project objectives are fuzzy, too generalized, or worse yet, unstated, the study teams cannot make sound recommendations.

The development of useful objectives is not easy; furthermore, even well-designed targets will have limited utility unless there is a sense of commitment by those who must work toward its achievement. In other words, crucial to the process of organizational change is a broad and meaningful involvement by middle management. Project success will accordingly depend on our ability to establish and maintain a supportive climate for participative decision making.

Questions and Answers

Q. What type of decision-making process do you intend to use in this project?

A. For my perspective, I feel that this is best done under a consensus arrangement. There are certain types of decisions which can only be made by the Chief. However, in many organizational matters, the decision-making process is best handled in a group with inputs from everyone, because of the commitment issue that I spoke about.

Q. Palmer, as I understand the team policing concept, practically a separate police department in one area of town would handle all police incidents that occur in that area. Is that what you mean?

A. I am glad you asked that question; the question makes it clear that I didn't make it clear what this is all about. I am opposed to team policing experiments. What we are proposing is to reorganize the entire department for team policing. Team policing experiments are almost certain to succeed in terms of their evaluation. Wherever they are installed you put highly motivated men and usually additional resources that did not exist there before. You are certainly going to get a better job done. I think that team policing stands on its own merit, as an organizationally sound proposition. I think that we have been crippled by over-specialization, and our proposal is to consolidate all operations in the Patrol Division, to make the districts smaller, and to give the sergeants a workable span of control and make them fully responsible for every problem in the area. But that is going to occur throughout the city, not in just one little part of town.

Q. I think that team policing is not a new concept; it is a very old one. I remember two or three years ago when I was a rookie policeman we had a kind of team policing. The policeman on his beat had a responsibility for what went on in that area and it was based on the fact that he had quite a number of areas which he could exercise some discretion.

I think that one of the key factors you can look at here is whether you are still going to gauge the performance of the policeman in terms of numbers. If he is required to turn in so many vice arrests, so many tickets, or to turn in so many juveniles, I think you are going to destroy the concept in the very beginning. I think you have to reinstill in the policeman a sense of individuality. I think we all need to get away from this gauging of performance by numbers. There must be some better way of determining effectiveness.

A. I agree and I think that many marginal supervisors hide behind the activity report and use them as a substitute for good supervision. They like to point to the production record and say, "Well, you have got to improve here because you wrote five tickets last month." I agree with you, what you say. I think the police departments hurt themselves by becoming production oriented.

Q. What type of evaluation criteria are you going to use to judge a team's effectiveness? If one team in an area is

doing a lot better than another team, will you switch these teams? Will you switch areas with the teams to see if the change is actually the sergeant or lieutenant or whatever you are going to call him, or his leadership, or his men, or the area? Has there been any thought given to that?

A. The appraisal of individuals working under this program is going to be difficult as it has always been to appraise. In terms of evaluation, we have a problem that I spoke of earlier which is response time.

I am convinced that with reorganization we can improve response time and if we do nothing else by reorganizing but get to the scene of an incident quicker than we have before, I would say that this is a major victory. Response time is also something that is very easy to measure and I think that the proposal can virtually stand on this method of evaluation. If we respond more promptly than we ever have before to police calls for service, I think that we have done a large part of the job. There are going to be all sorts of collateral problems associated with the changeover. These will have to be addressed as they come up.

Q. Palmer, if one of the things that the team policing is supposed to solve is over-specialization, isn't the team policing concept itself overly specialized?

A. I don't look at it that way. I think of all team members as generalists. Initially when the teams are formed, there will be an effort to staff them with certain kinds of people who can handle certain problems in the district. For instance, if you have a beat that has a large high school and a major problem in terms of vandalism and juvenile crime, it would be wise to put on the district squad whatever juvenile officers had been servicing this high school before. They are no longer specialists, however, in the same sense because they work under the direction of the sergeant who has responsibility for that school and all the police problems in the area.

Q. In other words, it would be specialization by area. Mightn't they not feel responsible about what happens across the boundary line?

A. Keep in mind that this is not an experiment in one area. Every beat has its own teams. I feel that what you are alluding to is perhaps even desirable, in that under this system you do have at least a real responsibility and interest in the area that you are policing.

Q. Wouldn't you get the same answer then if this member of the team is outside of his area and he is stopped by a motorist and he says, I'm sorry this is not my district, I have to get back to my own district?

A. This is what can happen in a team policing experiment, but there would be cross-beat traffic whenever it is necessary in a city-wide team policing arrangement. I don't conceive of patrolmen being locked into a geographical area; that's their prime responsibility. All other things being equal, if a call comes and their men are available they will handle it in the area in which they are assigned. But in any police department you must have flexibility that permits moving men cross-town, if there is a need there temporarily, and then they return to their beat. Team policing does not imply that you try above all other things to keep that squad intact.

Right now, because of our staffing arrangement and our organizational set-up specialization, there is a great deal of this cross-town dispatching. Further, there is a great deal of dispatching in the blind, "Any car can take a 415, etc." And this situation exists because of specialization: traffic men are sitting on the corner working it for their tickets and ignoring the dispatcher when he asks for a unit to handle a 415 on the 9200 block of E. 14th. The same thing with a juvenile officer, the same thing with tactical units -- they don't want to get involved with incidents which they consider a minor problem, unrelated to their specialty. But as I see team policing, making a sergeant and his squad responsible for all calls in his district will eliminate some of the dispatching inefficiencies.

Q. What are you going to do subsequent to the development of this project to "sell" this to your line officers. We are all aware of the problems of selling your department, because of political ramifications, not only in

the department, because of political ramifications, not only in the department but with the city leaders. What have you done to sell it? What are you going to do to sell it? Is it a pure management decision?

A. I think the idea has been talked about for years in the police department itself. There seems to be a great deal of interest at the working level. When I talk about the status quo I am talking about the management officials in charge of the various specialized units who feel that they will lose their empires.

In terms of the community, I think that they will feel they will get a better department out of it and will like the idea of the deployment stability that can be regained with team policing. They will like the idea of being able to recognize one police officer when they see him on their way to work because he regularly is in their neighborhood, regularly assigned during certain hours of the day.

Q. Palmer, would you go into this in a staging process or would you just jump off and go into it?

A. I think that phasing or staging is the best way to go. For some years, I have been trying to persuade my management to eliminate the Traffic Division. A year and a half ago, I wrote a plan that moved the motorcycle squad into patrol and put motorcycle officers in geographic districts under a beat sergeant. So a plan is set up to start in Traffic. I have visualized Traffic being absorbed first by Patrol, and then the Juvenile Division. Youth Services, as we call it, is being studied carefully and a plan is being developed whereby Juvenile can be absorbed into Patrol. Finally, would come the Tactical unit and possibly some elements of Vice. I don't think this is a hard and fast rule. However, we have already done work on the Traffic Division, and I think that the Juvenile Division commander is ready for this and interested in this, and therefore there will be less opposition.

Q. Aren't you worried about what this is going to do to your City Manager? The previous one took a disability and retirement because of migraine headaches, and the current one has had a heart attack.

I think that the team policing concept is the cutting edge of a local revolution in how municipal services are

going to be delivered. We will turn the clock back to the days when the people in the neighborhood control their police departments on a precinct basis. And unless we feel that the American people are sophisticated enough to control their own police in the neighborhoods you have got a Frankenstein monster.

City Managers' offices are scared to death of team policing because they see the political manager. You are worried about the impact on the officer; we are worried about the local political guys who are going to be telling your team what to do. He is on a fixed beat, he is there all the time, he is responsible for that neighborhood. You put a precinct officer out there that is going to be my cop and you can't move him; you can't tell him what to do. Maybe we are sophisticated enough to back to that kind of policing, I don't know. I think we have to be very careful.

If the police go out on these bases, we have to follow them with complaint officers; maybe you have to have a representative there to take garbage complaints, and maybe you ought to have a city planner standing beside the team police. Consider your team policing as a part of the whole system of delivering services in a city. Are you willing to share team policing with ten or twenty other city departments who are also responsible for everything that happens in that little neighborhood? How much linkage do you have with a guy who has to make sure that the garbage is picked up? If the garbage isn't picked up you have got problems on your beat.

Maybe that is too broad a view, but I think you have to look up as well as down. I am trying to sell my boss, the City Manager, on team policing, but I am not too sure about it. He is letting the police study the issue, and the decision has not been made to let them do it yet because they are afraid of political control at the bottom, precinct, level. I don't know whether that is a valid consideration in Oakland or not, but it is in my city.

A. First we have to keep in mind that you are defining team policing in one way, and not necessarily the way I visualize it. I am concerned about the organizational aspect of team policing. Not really changing greatly the nature of services being provided, just doing the

organization a little bit better. We are functionally despecializing but retaining central control. In fact we have a central police station which services the whole city with no precincts.

Q. You don't have any districts?

A. No districts.

Q. Are you ready to go back in the neighborhood with the other city departments, has that been one of your considerations?

A. I think we all have to go back.

Q. But you are part of a revolution of going back to the neighborhood?

A. I think that the whol government team is going to go back. People are so far removed from government now that they don't care. That is just something way away, vague.

Q. I am just saying that you might run into some trouble you didn't think you had because the manager or the mayor may say, "Wait a minute; if you are going back to the neighborhoods, I want to send my other people back with you."

Q. People are reporting a lot more crimes in our city. So crime statistics have gone up and politicians are wondering whether it is really worth it or not. What do you envision in Oakland in the event that this should occur? Will your politicians be turned off by the concept, or will they go along with you for a period of time? These things are reality, things you have to cope with.

A. Right, and I think that it is possible to cope with them. There is a very clear explanation to the problem that you just described. Reported crime statistics are one thing, and a victimization rate is another, and I don't think that it is that difficult, when you move into something like this to handle it as O. W. Wilson did in 1960. He told the people of Chicago, "The first thing you are going to see here is crime is going to go up." It did. It went up 300 percent. He handled it very nicely, beautifully -- that is something you have to anticipate.

Q. When statistics were good we were out there opening our big mouths and saying how great we were -- the crime rate was down -- and then it turned against us and we wanted to hide it. What we should do is what you described.

A. When you talk about team policing, one of the most important things has to do with the cop on the beat. That guy has had all his responsibility taken away from him, and we have said, "You are not too smart, so we will have detectives investigate crime and you can't handle kids very well so we will get juvenile officers for you, and because of what you have done in the 1960's we have got to have community relations officers because you are such an idiot." So this has gone on and on and now all of a sudden we find out we have to do something with that guy, because he has been out going to school and and he is going to ask for more responsibility. What do we do with him? How do we give that job status? Well, really, the only answer is something like team policing, where we say you are responsible out here.

A REPORT ON THE USE OF TASK FORCES FOR CHANGE

IN THE KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

by

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I first became involved with the Kansas City Police Department in November, 1971. At that time Bob Wasserman, whom some of you know, came into my office in Massachusetts. Bob said he had overextended himself in consultant commitments and asked if I would be willing to be involved in Kansas City working with a task force of field officers who were designing patrol strategies. "Patrol experiments" was, I think, the term that he used. Bob promised he would explain to me what the Task Force process was about and what "patrol experiments" really meant if I joined him on a trip to Kansas City. He never satisfactorily did that. I was left to figure them out for myself. Over a period of eight months we have seen the emergence of a process that has implications for organizational change. I have been trying to understand that process as it continues to evolve. It is full of risks and ambiguity. The department recognizes that. This has been one of the great advantages, in that Chief Clarence Kelley has stated repeatedly to his command staff that things are going to change, and that risks are going to be taken. I think we have had a fortuitous combination of people and circumstances. We started with a very modest goal of designing and implementing a patrol strategy. We have moved to a process that will help us accomplish organizational change and to increase participatory management at all levels of the department. We have a series of concurrent goals emerging, and one of those is the generation of knowledge about patrol functions. We are trying, in Kansas City, to develop an organization that is continually responsive, continually adaptive to whatever changes or problems occur in the community. We are trying to encourage innovation, and the basic process involved is getting the men in the department to come forth with ideas.

In the beginning I think that we were fooling ourselves when we said that we were going to engage in "experimentation," but I also think we surprised ourselves. We believe we ended up with perhaps the first true experiment in law enforcement in this country.

I would first like to focus on how the department and the Police Foundation entered this process; the outcome of this developmental process to date; the elements I believe are crucial to the success of that process to date; the problems we have encountered; and the future directions that we see that it is going in. Last summer the department received an increase of approximately 300 men, from 1000 to 1300. A significant debate ensued as to how those men would be used. Two major plans were offered. Chief Kelley was satisfied with neither of the alternatives proposed. At the same time, the Police Foundation held a conference in Madison, Wisconsin to which members of our command staff were invited. A number of those commanders were actively involved in addressing the questions of how to use the new men. They came back from Madison with the general consensus that their view of patrol had been much too narrow. They had become aware of the number of innovations such as team policing and family crisis intervention that were being done in other departments.

In September, Chief Kelley asked the Police Foundation to provide technical assistance to the department in the form of individuals who were knowledgeable about patrol procedures and the innovations that were being tried around the country. The department was interested in developing procedures that were more innovative, more interesting, more responsive to the community, and more efficient than what it was doing at the time. Note also that the department at that time did not feel it was under great external pressure. They had experienced a decline in crime rates for the second year in a row; response time was generally satisfactory and they had encountered no critical uproar in the community. The department's choice to go into this, I believe, was on the merits of the idea, with very little external pressure.

The project was begun because the department had accomplished all it could within the traditional framework of police improvement. Technologically it is a superb department. We had established a modern new Recruit Academy. We had a good planning and research unit, perhaps the best in the country. We had accomplished most of the support improvement activities described in the professional journals. The department perceived a need to do a better job as policemen. I think the Chief hoped that the consultants would come to Kansas City and present some simple solutions the department could pick up, and perhaps quickly and easily implement. We all came to an awareness very quickly that we really didn't know very

much about the problem. In fact everyone, both the field officers, the department's administration, and the consultants came to that conclusion.

The Police Foundation's intent in entering the process was to provide short term support. They modified that position by about the third month. At that point the process seemed to be giving rise to discussion of a quality that we had not seen elsewhere in the country, but we couldn't seem to hurry the process along. The Foundation moved into a position of working with the department on the problems that the department considered central. They provided support for the technical assistance, not demanding immediate results, not trying to fit the department into a preconceived project list, and basically supporting the Chief in the direction in which he wished to go.

Let me give a little history of the Task Force process before going into what I see as the outcomes and critical elements of the process. Police Foundation representatives and command staff discussed alternative ways in which we could develop innovative patrol strategies and utilize the technical assistance of outside consultants. They agreed on two points: individuals who would be affected by change had to be actively involved in the development of that change; and there was competence at all levels of the department regardless of rank. We looked at problems encountered in projects designed solely by staff; we looked at the weaknesses of demonstration projects; and we settled on a task force process in each of our four major Patrol Divisions.

The Department has three geographical Patrol Divisions, and a Special Operations Division which contains helicopter, canine and tactical units. In each of these divisions task forces composed of five to nine men of all ranks were created. At the outset these men were chosen by the commanding officers.

To each task force we assigned a consultant provided by the Police Foundation and a representative from the Staff Planning Division of the Department. The role of the Police Foundation consultant was to input information concerning patrol innovations elsewhere in the country. They were also to facilitate discussions and "keep the process moving." Representatives of Staff Planning were to bring to the task forces a general overview of developmental activities in the department. The task forces were given a directive, to identify the problems in their particular communities, to specify objectives, to research alternative solutions to design a program, and to

consider in that process what in direct effects their designs would have on police-community relations, public relations, and the morale of the men.

To foster communication and coordination between the task forces we established a Coordinating Council which was comprised of the majors in charge of each Patrol Division, the commanding officer of Staff Planning, and the Patrol Bureau Commander. The Council was given the authority only to review and make recommendations on proposals emerging out of the task forces.

Incidentally, the Police Foundation-related task forces were not the first attempt by the Kansas City Police Department to utilize this structure. The task force process was previously utilized by Long Range Planning to encourage involvement of personnel. They had used eight task forces in 1970 and 1971, addressing issues such as management training, police-community relations and the establishment of a metro-politan area police department.

In some ways the task force process we are now engaging in the patrol divisions is an extension of that history. There are however, significant differences. The majority of the patrol task force members are patrolmen. They are provided with funds for travel and consultant assistance. They have been provided with private offices, generally away from the Division stations. They have committed men full time to following up and working on task force projects. They have been given the authority to implement their recommendations and designs. In giving that authority, the Chief had to define some outer limits. Basically those were that the design had to reflect a very careful analysis of community-police service problems. Focus was not to be on internal problems. They had to be responsive to the needs of the community, and they had to show that they have considered all alternatives, no matter how radical. They had to work within the framework of existing laws, and they had to maintain, or surpass the present level of departmental integrity and the delivery of services.

As I mentioned earlier, there was some expectation that the consultants would be able to provide the department with some quick and easy solutions. That idea was expelled very, very quickly. I think we all came to a very quick realiza-tion that there were certain basic questions to which we had no answer. We did not know what police patrol was; we could not define what good patrol was; and we could not find

out how to measure good patrol effectively.

We dismissed the simplistic notion that patrol is the random movement of the man across the field. It is a much more complex function, filled with significant knowledge gaps. It encompasses significant role conflict, i.e., conflict between the field and the community, and conflict between the field and the administration. We knew very quickly that we were on an uncharted course when the Planning Represen-tative who was working with the South Patrol Division compiled a five page list of variables relative to patrol operations. and we could not specify what would be effected by the alteration of a single variable.

We have now reached the end of the first stage -- program development. We have seen the emergence of some project designs that we believe would not have been planned at our middle management level. We believe that the designs may be among the finest experiments that have come out of police agencies in this country. The men have a great amount of pride in the quality of those designs. As background I will take a minute here to tell you what some of the projects are.

Our South Patrol Division listed five major community problems. On considering what it could do to alter patrol procedures, the Task Forces concluded, "We don't know anything about existing patrol procedures, or the effectiveness of preventive patrol. It is, therefore, ludicrous to try to plan until we have some better knowledge." As a result, they designed an experiment to measure the effectiveness of preventive patrol, not, simply in terms of reported crime rates, but in terms of unreported crime, victimization, order maintenance, service delivery, fear, traffic problems and citizen awareness of the police presence.

We took a 15 beat area, matched it into three sub-areas. In the first we have increased the number of men, and told them to increase their aggressiveness in solving crime problems. We call that "pro-active patrol." In the second we said try to maintain conditions exactly as they were before the beginning of the experiment. That is our control area. In our third area, we said to the men, remain on the perimeter of the area, do not engage in any random patrol in the area. Go into that area only to respond to calls for service.

In conjunction with these activities the men are: 1) under-taking a task analysis of what the patrolman does on his tour of duty; 2) analyzing response time relative to outcome, such

as apprehension, victim injury, availability of witnesses, and citizen satisfaction; and 3) observing to correlate the police officer and the citizen perception of their encounters. The evaluation is being done with three basic methodologies. The first is survey research, the second is structured observation, and the third is analysis of departmental data.

In our Northeast Patrol Division, the officers have designed an Action Review Panel similar to that used in Oakland, California. In it they will sit down to undertake a peer review of the behavior of an officer who has encountered difficulty in dealing with citizens. Oakland primarily uses a resisting arrest criteria for selecting panel subjects. We are using resisting arrest, complaints and a system of peer and supervisor referral. We are concerned about the officer who fails to back up another officer and take action when it is required, as much as we are about the officer who may use force inappropriately in conducting himself.

Our Special Operations Division has designed a three part program. The first part is a patrol intelligence system which feeds into the other two components, namely the location oriented and perpetrator oriented patrol apprehension strategies. The department has used these tactics before but we are now trying to apply them in a systematic manner by which we can evaluate their effectiveness. We are developing a fairly rigorous evaluation design at this time.

Our Central Patrol Division has developed a neighborhood-oriented patrol system in which they are trying to increase patrol follow-up, improve it by working on selective types of problems, and by making referrals directly by the regular beat officer. They are planning to work with community groups around specifically selected community problems: abandoned housing, recreation, trash collection, etc.

We have seen some by-products of this task force process. We have seen throughout this work the growing skills of officers, an increase in their knowledge of patrol, an increase in their understanding of planning problems and the problems of administration. I have seen patrolmen presenting and defending their program designs before command staff. Two weeks ago I saw an officer make a formal presentation of his task force's design. Ten months ago his world of policing was restricted to Kansas City. Now in his presentation, he cites Dayton and several other cities in this country, and studies in the United Kingdom to support his case. After that presentation Chief Kelley put forth a message to his command staff that the department has begun and will continue to tap resources not used by other departments, namely their bright young patrolmen.

We have seen officers refuse appointments to specialized units, in order to continue work on their task force. Officers have volunteered to work on the task force projects. We had one officer who was shot on a Friday. He was released from the hospital by Sunday, and insisted on returning to work on Monday to finish up some task force business that he had left incomplete. We see patrolmen taking the lead in groups, while the command staff assumes the facilitator and responder roles.

In some respects we are very cautious about this process, for at least one critical reason I will raise below, and because of unique aspects of the Kansas City Police Department. In viewing this process, other departments have to move cautiously. First, Chief Kelley is not a typical police administrator. He is a compulsive achiever, who has copied the best technology that he can find in the country. When he began this process, I think that he had run out of things to copy. He thinks now his department has to innovate. Chief Kelley is also very confident in the ability of his people. He is not afraid of them being, as he would call it, "bamboozled" by outsiders. He is not afraid of their falling for gimmicks. He is not afraid of the outcome of staff supported planning by patrolmen. Finally, Chief Kelley is willing to take risks. I don't have to explain what risks are involved in withdrawing preventive patrol from an area of the city.

In terms of the department's uniqueness, state control allows it to be somewhat insulated from local politics. It has been exposed to change in the last eleven years under Clarence Kelley. There is a willingness in the department to question tradition. It is quite possible to talk to the command staff of this department and say you are violently opposed to preventive patrol, perhaps even that you think it is a total waste of time. Half are likely to agree with you and the other half will join in for a pitched battle, arguing the opposite perspective. There is a genuine appreciation of evaluation in this department. Its members are comfortable with outsiders. When outsiders come to the department they are "exploited." Someone may be visiting to observe the department, but the officers will pump him for any information that he has. The planning staff is confident in challenging the position of outside "experts." There is a growing sense in the department that they are among the best in the country, and I think that they may be right.

Certain elements were critical to success in phase one. The chief was willing to specify that the environment was going

to change. To make sure everyone knew that we were
going to engage in this process of experimentation, he
repeatedly advised the command staff, patrolmen, and others
that the department was going to change. The Chief had to
remain in close contact with the process throughout. He had
to be willing to step in and encourage patrolmen, sergeants and
and command staff at various times to keep the process moving.
I think that as a result an environment developed and it
has continued in the department.

A special question we have now is whether a department can
continue this kind of new conflict and change at the same
time it is deliving services. The "organizational rigidity"
of this department was sacrificed. A great deal of ambiguity
and conflict emerged. For example, Chief Kelley issued a
general order stating that the task forces were allowed to
plan and gather data, to request responses from men, to use
certain regular departmental devices and to ask for candid
responses from the men. All of these activities were totally
apart from normal supervisory review, and were given immunity
from disciplinary action. Chief Kelley never hid the fact
that there was a redistribution of power from the middle
management down to the lowest level. He gave to the task
forces basically a blank check if they stayed within the
criteria I mentioned earlier.

Command staff and middle management were not given authority
to veto task force projects. They could state their objections,
and the Chief would consider those objections. All task force
proposals, however, had to arrive at his desk intact. The
Chief has indicated to his staff that he will reward those who
support change in the department, and he will reward competence
regardless of rank. Everyone in each task force is
encouraged to express his ideas and feelings. Several times
Chief Kelley went to task force meetings and told the officers
to consider any and all ideas no matter how radical they might
seem. In a recent session when it was clear that a task force
was not exploring all ideas open to it -- it considered itself
somewhat constrained to traditional practices -- the chief
purposely prodded the group into considering areas which had
not been considered before, or which had been rejected when
the consultant or the staff planning people had previously
presented them.

We encountered difficulties in introducing field officers to
the planning process. They wanted to set time constraints
on themselves; they felt compelled to action: compelled to

produce projects. They felt somewhat incompetent in the
planning process. They received a certain amount of
ribbing from peers in the field, in the vein of, "You are
moving awful slow; when are you going to have a project?"
or, "You have deserted the field for the 'empty holster'
crowd." This potentially is a major area of conflict and
it is growing, I think, as we enter implementation. We have
seen officers have to make a conscious choice between the
quality of the project they were planning, and their
relationship to their peer group.

All those involved in the task force process had to
conceptualize what was going on in the process. They have
had to anticipate resistances and to confront one another
when those resistances emerged. There have been some fairly
violent clashes between commanding officers and their patrol-
men, between their supervisors and patrolmen and between
consultants and police. We were all uncertain about what we
were doing. This at times was a good deal frightening.

The role of the consultants in this I think deserves some
consideration. Usually, consultants are the "private
property" of command staff. The lower ranks of the department
usually have contact with consultants only in the process of
chauffering them to and from the airport. What was unique
here in Kansas City was that access to the consultants was
controlled by field officers. The consultants would call
and talk with patrolmen about their schedules and the field
officers controlled who they had access to and what they
would be talking about. The field officers also set out to
test the consultants. They were interested in knowing how
much an individual knew, how dogmatic he was, and how willing
he was to relate to police officers personally. We have had
to remove consultants from the project. Personnel in the
department sought to have consultants to put their particular
vested interests on the table. Long and bitter discussions
emerged, about patrol, the patrolman's image, the community's
understanding of the police, the community's relationship
with the police. I have been involved personally in two of
what I consider to have been pitch battles. In each case
we closed the door with the task force, stated we were
friends, but we now had to have some brutal discussion of
substantive issues. We have had confrontations where police
officers have screamed and yelled at the consultants. One
consultant threw a book at a police officer. Although at
times it has been very hostile, fortunately, personal
relationships have been able to overcome these individual
breakdowns.

The task oriented groups are a potentially powerful approach to organizational change. We feel they support a learning environment, support experimentation and risk-taking, and encourage innovation and creative thinking. The department has enough confidence in the process that it has just moved to establish two new task forces on personnel, and we are exploring the possibility of initiating another task force in the area of investigation.

Q. Is it fair to say you involve all levels in the Department? From a number of things that you say about middle management, I get the feeling that you are not using them to any great extent with your task force.

A. A commanding officer, usually a major, and perhaps a sergeant or captain are on each task force. The emphasis however is much more toward the patrolman.

Q. How is this affecting, so far, the middle management group as far as accepting changes in the department, and implementing those changes? Have you got much of a problem there, because traditionally the change has been impeded at that level especially?

A. Generally, no. I don't believe that there has been a significant problem. In the case of the Northeast Patrol Division a change in the working staff arrangement on the task force project which threw a significant burden to a sergeant made an improvement. I think there is less emphasis on rank in this department than is common. Chief Kelley seems to run it on a much more personal style.

Q. Did you say that the task forces were appointed by the commander of the district?

A. The mechanism that was used was very different in each of the divisions. In the South Patrol Division, the commanding officer had the sergeants choose some people whom they considered vocal, with strong points of view. They probably got a much more vocal group than any of the other divisions. Special Operations is a small group and everyone knew each other rather well; consensus was a big factor there. In some of our Divisions the commanding officers leaned toward people who could be called "their boys." That caused some task forces to lack credibility with others at the division. As is

characteristic of the department there were frequent reorganizations which occurred throughout task force work. Some new commanding officers quickly sized up the credibility issue and took steps to adjust the problem by changing the composition of the task force, or by mandating that the task force personnel get out and survey problems perceived by peers in their division.

Q. Did it require any special training -- organizational or personnel development in the task forces?

A. No. One of the problems we had in the beginning came because no one knew what we were getting into, and we should have taken a little more time on the planning process. The officers found it hard to go into the problem identification process, and at times discussions broke down into individual gripes about internal problems. It varied with the individual task force how that was handled. Some of the consultants just sat there and said, "It's irrelevant; it's an internal concern; it's not within your mandate." Others forced their groups to break problem lists into internal concerns and external concerns.

Q. How was coordination done?

A. The coordinating council met intermittently. On a day-to-day basis, I served as resource man, therapist, moving man, anything called for to keep the task force process rolling. If something needed to be taken care of coordinating council meetings could be scheduled quickly.

Q. Any other planning going on by the planning division?

A. Quite a bit.

Q. How would that coordinate with the task force?

A. There was a representative of staff planning on each of the task forces. That person was aware of what planning was doing, and the people involved in planning had some prior involvement with the task forces in long range planning.

Q. What do you think will come of it?

A. We think that by allowing the men the opportunity to become involved in design they will be more willing to support implementation. I think we have confidence that they can produce very high quality designs.

Q. Do you think maybe it will lose management support? Middle management support? First line supervisory support?

A. Middle management support is a very delicate issue. Patrolmen, when they have a design, have to go back and have to sell it to their supervisors. There are sergeants and captains on the task forces and they also share the responsibility of selling the task force projects, although the majority of the task force is made up of patrolmen. I think that the one thing you have to recognize is that this is the Chief's department and he has a fairly good relationship with middle management.

Q. There are some middle management people here from Kansas City and I think they would be interested in knowing how they can do that. I kind of think how I feel and...

A. You are thinking in terms of middle management being cut out completely. That is wrong.

Q. That is the way it sounded.

A. No, they are not cut out completely. They are informed. They have the right and access to come in and see what is going on. One of the things we may have slipped over is that the people who are on the task force are not isolated from everybody else. As a matter of fact they are charged with going out and determining what everybody is thinking and bringing these people's ideas in, so it is not just 9 people out of 220. Make it so the whole 220 knows what it is about. Not all of them are going to agree, of course not. But the majority will if it is done properly.

Q. This is a good way to get change started in the department? Do you see this as a way to plan for this kind of planning to be done on long term?

A. I don't think this is a change starter. I think they started in this department a while back, and have been in this environment for 11 years.

Q. You said the Chief was going to reward both the managers and the men who were involved in pursuing change. Is there any plan or concept for altering the salary incentive structure?

A. I have been counting the people we are going to lose in the last couple of weeks, and indicating to the Chief the critical problem we face. These people are really going out on a limb, supporting the quality of experiment, at times challenging other field officers, pressing them to do certain things that are entirely different from what they are used to. These are things that have been noted by the personnel/promotion task force which is just how to research this problem. What we are doing only works when you have a supportive man at the top. There is no question about it. It's not, "Well, go ahead, fellows and try something." It's not that kind of support. He has to step in and stand behind the process when it is required, and sometimes push.

Q. Is there implied in the whole approach a failure in whatever organizational theory you have to have input in the working level on up? What your process says is well, the middle management hasn't functioned very well and stimulated people to work and participate in the change process, therefore we have to bypass them.

A. Saying that field people are closer to the problem is part of it. People who deal with it on a day-to-day basis are a lot closer to the problem.

Q. You don't see any conflict in terms of conventional organization theory in this approach?

A. No. The question was asked over and over how middle management feels about it. Middle management thinks it's great. They have generally been supporting the process. There are those who will resist or have resisted.

Q. The question which is really a good question is what is next? After you have input from this guy you have still got a faulty apparatus that is not doing what it should do in the first place. It seems to me that a leader has a responsibility in career development as well as commanding and directing, and at every level in the organization. Implicit in this thing is that somebody

has failed, and therefore, we are going to try a new device. Was middle management doing any planning?

A. Most of the planning was being done by staff planning, that was about it.

Q. What does middle management do in this situation?

A. In this situation, first of all, you have usually a major, captain and a sergeant in the task force. They input their particular concerns, and try to see that resources required are available. They have to tell their concerns to the patrolmen, and also caution the patrolmen as to what administrative problems they are likely to encounter. They have their chance to input.

Q. They are not in the task force?

A. Yes, but the bulk of the men, that is, 6 out of 9, will still be field patrol, so they have to be able to per- suade the men about their administrative concerns are, and how this might limit them; they have their chance to work it out then and there. The men in turn have to be willing to listen to what they have to say and to exchange ideas. The whole thing is predicated on the fact that people are going to present their ideas and put them on the table. It doesn't do any good for a major to sit back and let a project go and say afterwards, "I really don't want that program because he had an opportunity before to ...."

Q. But, do they open up in a situation like this?

A. Do they? Yes.

Q. And you said that middle management had been active and responsive. Is that a fair statement?

A. Yes. Don't try to put a handle on this thing by trying to fit it into conventional theory because it is not conventional and it does not necessarily follow the guidelines that the books say that middle management says that the proper role of middle management is this, and that the proper role of this is this and that the communication flow should always go this way and that sort of thing. It is not predicated on that basis and to try to understand it on those terms, I think you are

going to hang yourselves up.

Q. I would like to understand it on some sort of terms.

A. There have been a hell of a number of fantastically perfect plans that have failed because the guy that turns the nuts or screws the bolt was not consulted. And what evolved from that was the question, how can you get your own people to move? It was an attempt to reduce the risk in a change process. The task force happened to be a vehicle which allowed these people to get involved in the process.

Q. Here is one thing that concerns me a little bit about this. As these men participate in the task forces they are going to develop some aspirations. You have got a lot of people at the bottom involved in this and a lot of aspiration, and if there are not enough holes opening up a little bit higher, you are going to have some real serious problems.

A. We are aware of this.

Q. Maybe if you made the position of a patrolman a professional position.

A. Then you have to give him decision-making power.

Q. That is right; if you don't do that, that's it.

A. But we are giving it to him in one sense in the planning. You are right. We are going to have to consider that once we get the guy's appetite whetted, how do we maintain the momentum. That is one of the most critical questions today.

REMARKS OF CLARENCE KELLEY,

AS CHIEF OF POLICE,

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

I ruminate about what happened to me when I came into
local law enforcement, and what I brought with me when
I came into local law enforcement from the F.B.I.

There is a great deal, I think, of misunderstanding about
the role of the F.B.I. And there is, of course, a form of
a cloak of secrecy cast on it which does not permit the
ordinary citizen to come in·there and find out just what
causes certain things, or to find out what are the basic
reasons for its success. Of course, I think that the
greatest reason for the success of the F.B.I. comes from
the caliber of the men in the department. They've been
chosen carefully and it is true that no investigation is
more assiduously pursued and carefully investigated than
the applicant investigation of the special agent.

There is also a thread of loyalty which has been built up
in the organization -- loyalty which is ever present. You
never miss it; you never find any office in which there is
not a great degree of loyalty. Agents will chatter among
one another, and chatter about some of the things that the
Chief -- I mean the agent in charge. (I am completely loyal
now to the Police. I call the "agent in charge" the "Chief,"
so pardon me for that mistake. When I first started in with
the Kansas City police I called the officers "agents," so
now I guess it is all even.) Agents will talk among one
another about the agent in charge -- they do that just like
anybody else -- but not outside. There's a closeness, a
great loyalty which has been built up.

There too, there is what I think is the keystone of the
whole organization, and that is its integrity. That integrity
is something which is offended from time to time. There have
been times where the agent has not had that integrity. That
has happened very rarely, and none of the instances of which
I know have been of real consequence.

Now those, to me, as I came from the F.B.I. to the Police
Department, were the things that I felt had to be instilled
in the Police Department. I did not really know whether those

things were there or whether they were not there. I had
no misgivings when I came into the police department but
I understood fully that they didn't just hire Kelley, they
also hired an F.B.I. agent. Therefore, they bought some
integrity.

They needed it on this department. I would say that my
personal style is to constantly build into this department
the idea that there is complete integrity in this department.
Now that doesn't mean that we're not going to have some
trouble once in awhile; we all do. We pursue that kind of
trouble, mercilessly, however, I don't say, by any means,
that integrity has become the by-word of everybody. But
I'll say that it's a strong strain through the department
-- it comes about due to a conscious effort in this regard.
The concern for what I call integrity is reflected in a
great many things; take for example our promotion system --
we had kind of a ragged promotion system when I arrived.
We set up a new promotion system and said: This is the way
it's going to be. Sometimes sticking to the system it has
hurt a little bit, when some of the people who have come
to the surface are low on the eligibility list. For another
example, we've had occasions from time to time where in a
press release it is difficult to tell the full truth. This,
as a matter of fact, has been one of the more painful things
that's occurred from time to time. But again, we have
stuck to our principles so no one can come back and say,
"This is a time when you have offended that idea of integrity."
We have told the full truth, and told it right down the middle.
And, I think by virtue of this, that we have built a reputa-
tion as being completely truthful when we make any press
release. And, as a consequence, we have built up the
complete support of the news media in this city. When we
say that something is not true, there's no doubt, no sniping
at us, no arguing about it -- it is accepted.

There have been one or two deviations from that. One time
about six years ago I received a telephone call about 11:30
at night, and the voice said, on the other end of the line,
"What do they have your boy in jail for?"

Now, that's just a little bit disturbing, if somebody calls
and says, "What do they have your boy in jail for?" And I
think he's in the next room. "Oh, no," the voice said, "He's
up in jail." So I checked in the next room, and there was
my boy, who was in bed. I came back and reported this to

the person and he said, "You know something? When you told
me that he was there I almost believed you because you
have always been honest. Somebody else told me that your
boy was up in jail." I said, "Who was that?" and he said,
"I'm not going to tell you because I know what he did. He
tried to fox me."

We have built up what I think is a good record of integrity
-- something which is absolutely necessary to police
organizations. Everybody has it within him, and it builds
a good, strong basis for operation throughout your city.

Then, too, there's the matter of dealing with personnel.
When I was with the F.B.I., I found that there was rather
unusual treatment of personnel. I never did go to any
management schools and I didn't have the benefit of all the
fine things some others have. But I considered it, after
having gone through many situations, that there is always
one strong presence -- the dignity of man. A man is entitled
to certain dignities, and I think that this is one of these
things, too, that I felt was absolutely necessary in order
to build this department into something really worthwhile.

And as I add a little experience, I wonder if there is
something peculiar about police departments. They're
quite the gossip factories. There are always rumors
circulating around. Many times I'd hear things rumored
about me. I wouldn't know what the background of it was.
So I started trying to attack that with the principle that
there's nothing which goes on in that Chief's office which
is not available to everyone, except matters which officers
ask personally not to be revealed.

And to perpetuate that, I have put in a policy that all my
mail -- every piece of mail that comes into my office --
is opened and read by members of the office staff before
it comes to me. And that includes personal mail -- mail
that comes from my relatives, perhaps. But there is not a
single piece of mail that comes in there that is not read
by my personnel. Then, in addition, after we heard any
rumors that were being circulated, we had the thing investi-
gated openly, and would issue a memorandum denial of this
rumor. We still have rumors, yes. But I have noted that
they're not nearly as serious, and they're certainly not
taken as seriously.

Throughout the years, we started to adjust. We had our
personnel surveyed in 1966 bt George Eastland of the Public

Administration Service. About that time it was salary
season, because we were well back of many departments,
and we needed to make some advances. George Eastland
did a good job, and as he would make recommendations, we
would implement them. I understand at the time that this
was rather an unusual procedure, but it was my feeling
that if he was there, he was the best one to guide them
through to implementation.

One of the ancillary benefits that came from this was that
it became customary to our personnel to change. As a
matter of fact they seem to have some eagerness in awaiting
change. In January of each year we have made a rotation of
all our personnel at the administration level. We have
pursued that fairly religiously, although there have been
some occasions when we have not changed. In the last three
years we have even changed the table of organization. But
we have gotten into the habit of change and it no more
becomes a traumatic experience to have something change.

Then we come to the more recent changes and the projects
that we have developed. As a result of a very unusual
system of public control whereby we get our money from the
city and are controlled only by the governor, we can do just
about anything we want to do, that is, as much as we would
like to do, restricted only by our budget. To me, the most
important thing about the project being funded here by the
Police Foundation is participatory management by a fine
source of information and intelligence -- the officer in
the lower ranks. They have made tremendous contributions.
Any success that comes to this program will come by virtue
of those contributions, and not mine.

There has been some questioning of whether this is a
capitulation to management by the patrolmen; are we perhaps
abandoning middle management by the patrolmen; or even the
top echelon? I think so, to a certain extent, but I don't
think this is catastrophic in any sense and I don't think
that I, for example, as a Chief of Police, have lost control
over the department. As a matter of fact I think it has
been enhanced tremendously, particularly because of the
build-up of morale among the men, they having realized that
they are an integral part of the progress and development
of this department.

Insofar as middle management is concerned, for too long a
time they have sat around trying to avoid the problems which

come from progress, and they now realize that they, too,
have to step up, because some of these youngsters are going
to step around them if they do not. As far as the top
echelon is concerned, there are many things that are needed
there. They're the sort of residual effects of police work
where so many times you have to "live up" to some of your
problems. I am encouraged by the virtue of some of the
things that top management has brought out in the last month.
It has been fairly recently that this thing seems to have
caught up with them. It appears that they have begun to
realize that there is some merit in some of the new programs
and that you are going to have some positive benefits as the
result of experimentation and the other "trial runs" that
we're making.

I've enjoyed every year that I've spent here. I've enjoyed
particularly the provoking presence of fine young people
and some fine old people. I think that in law enforcement
-- and I speak rather objectively, although I am a policeman
-- I think that so long have we failed to exploit the real
charm and the complete dedication of the officer. You talk
about saving lives and all that -- wonderful! And wonderful
things are done -- saving people from burning buildings and
cars. But to me, the real dedication is from within them-
selves and how they try to do a good job day after day, year
after year -- at jobs where if they were in private enter-
prise would pay much better, at jobs where they're going to
do a great deal of good for humanity.

REMARKS OF DAVID COUPER,

AS DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

BURNSVILLE, MINNESOTA

When we discuss the issue of management in the context
of organizational change, we sometimes fail to assess the
potential that leadership has within the police organiza-
tion. Cops are strange people. We are the dilemma of a
free society. We are a dilemma because we should not be
needed in a democracy which desires to be the "best of all
possible worlds." But here we are. Unfortunately, our
legacy is one of politics, corruption, inefficiency, and
ignorance. We have no honorable past and we tremble at
the brink of an unknown future. The issues are glaring
and frightening -- we struggle between the roles of "crime
fighter" and "social worker" and we struggle with union-
ization, professionalization, civilianization, standards,
career development, and mobility, community relations,
delivery of people-oriented services, conflict management
and change.

Change? But why? Some may ask, "What have we done wrong?"
Our problem, unfortunately, is one of omission -- for we
have only continued to do what we have always done. Ours
is an occupation of tradition instead of a profession of
dynamics. We ask, "Why are the good works we did yester-
day the sins of today?" The reason is change. We are
participants today in a truly changing society. The
question today in the police service is not whether change
will occur but rather what form or direction it will take.
Change is constantly occurring around us, and it is our task
to reflect on, and to reflect these changing times.

I would like to explain to you who I am and, in a current
and appropriate cliche, where my "head" is at. I am a
Director of Public Safety. My city is a rapidly growing
suburb in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. In
the last 5 years our city grew from 15,000 to 25,000 in
population. At the same time, the department grew from
13 to 26 full-time employees and 14 community service officers.
We are expected to reach 100,000 in population in the 1980's.
I was appointed by the City Manager in March of 1969 on the
basis of my education, my experience and the ideas I had
for professionalizing and humanizing the police services.

I came from the Minneapolis police department where I
served since 1962 as a patrolman and detective lieutenant.
Let me share with you some of the early events in my career.
In 1962, the Minneapolis Police Department had a unique
opportunity for controlled change. During that year
approximately 160 new patrolmen joined the 450-man department.
It was virtually impossible to socialize a group this large
into the "old ways."

What had happened in the past was that individuals joined
the police department at the rate of 2 or 3 officers per
year, were assigned to a precinct station, and had explained
to them what the job requirements were. All of a sudden
in 1962 as many as 50 men were coming into the precincts
each month and it was virtually impossible for the old
timers to socialize these new police officers into the old
ways. The young officers would come out to the precincts
and say, "It's midnight now on the dog watch; let's patrol."
The old timers didn't get any sleep. There was none of the
old posture, "Bring your pillow and alarm clock tomorrow
night." Those things were not possible with the volume of
young, eager and idealistic officers coming on the depart-
ment.

I was one of those new patrolmen, having come from the
western Minneapolis suburbs where I'd been a patrolman for
two years after my discharge from the U. S. Marine Corps.
I was idealistic and so were most of the others in my recruit
class. The civil rights movement was taking hold of our
country and many of us were affected by it. We wanted change.
We saw the police occupation as exciting, challenging, and
a unique service opportunity to our fellow man. But we also
observed that this occupation had little social status in
our society, and was somewhat hamstrung by lethargy,
incompetence, and callousness. We had an inspiring, intel-
ligent training director. He inspired us as much as he was
able to later inspire the officers in Burnsville -- you see,
this man eventually retired from the Minneapolis Police
Department as a deputy inspector to become the first Chief
of Police in Burnsville. He passed away in 1968 and I was
appointed to succeed him in 1969.

In 1962, the veterans preference law in Minnesota granted
absolute (100%) preference in the hiring and promotion of
World War II and Korean War veterans. It did not extend the
same benefits to Cold War veterans. This issue became the
rallying point for the Young Turks of the Minneapolis Police

Department, who were virtually excluded by this law from
promotion. Due to their activity the State law was changed
shortly thereafter.

In 1966 the Federal government extended educational benefits
to Cold War veterans. This one act has been the most signi-
ficant aid to police professionalization in this country.
It may actually overshadow the Law Enforcement Education
Program administered by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. The G.I. bill did, unfortunately, exclude
many police officers who did not serve in the military.
When cops started going back to school, they started dis-
cussing their careers, aspirations, and ways to bring about
needed organizational change in order to fulfill these
aspirations. Many formed professional organizations,
fraternities, and social groups. They became almost over-
night a "dangerous" group in any static organization. Some
police organizations tried to respond to these pressures.
They formed planning and research units, community relations
units, and other staff functions to keep the college cops
satisfied. Of course, this just led to other problems,
because a person with half-fulfilled aspirations was even
more dangerous. These men wanted to lead, to manage, and
somehow to influence the bureaucracy they worked for.
Unfortunately, the bureaucracy is usually bigger than the
person. Some of these officers left the police field, some
left and returned, and some remained, perhaps to try and
try again. I consider myself one of those "new breed cops."
I'm an idealist, and I see what is in our trade today in the
light of what I want to do for our profession in the future.
After receiving my Bachelor's degree in 1968 (I worked nights
for 4 years), I decided to remain in municipal law enforce-
ment, complete my graduate work, and wait for an opportunity
to get into top management. The opportunity came faster than
I expected, and during my last quarter of graduate school,
I was appointed to my present position.

I do not wish to dwell on my biography, but I do feel that
it is representative of our area which has seen a number of
Chief's positions filled by young, educated "new breeders."
Perhaps this phenomenon has been generated by city adminis-
trators, mayors or managers, who desired department heads
who would help them deliver a professional approach to the
delivery of city services.

Today's style of management must be goal oriented. We must
be able to receive, evaluate, and, when merited, implement

new ways of "doing" in this changing society. This is the technique of managing new ideas. Of course, we must first be able to generate thoughts from our officers. In order to do this, we must abandon the military style of traditional management. Plans, ideas, programs, and even budgets must be freely discussed within the department. Yes, it is dangerous to our egos, but if we have to develop thinking, intelligent policemen, and sensitive police services, we cannot continue with these archaic leadership styles. Our younger officers today want leadership in the person, not in the position. We cannot demand respect for our office if we ourselves cannot be respected.

Let me now share with you some of the changes that we successfully implemented in Burnsville. These are primarily the programs which we designed to professionalize and humanize our service to the community, and, at the same time, to develop status and worth for the police officer. In short, we wanted to develop a good service and, at the same time, have police officers who desired to deliver that service because it was good for them in terms of status, salary, and career development. We postulated that the future role of the police was one of a helping function -- a function of social mediation and buffering between diverse individuals in a society that could best be described as a mosaic of moral worlds or lifestyles. This helping function necessitates that we become better at the effective management of conflict, and the successful intervention in individual or collective crises. We have attempted to be a socially adaptive organization.

During March of 1969, we decided to raise the police department's educational entrance requirements from a high school diploma to a 4-year college degree, as long as we had enough qualified applicants to fill our vacancies. The fact is that we have always had an abundance of qualified college graduate applicants. We also stated to the department that there would never be any college requirements for any promotions within the department. Existing personnel would be allowed two courses of action for promotion -- academic or technical training. The main requirement for promotion was job performance and preparation.

We also changed our uniform to a blazer and slacks, non-military uniform. Also, titles were changed from patrolmen to public safety officers, from Sergeant or Lieutenant to Public Safety Supervisors I or II. We also introduced

a new position of Community Service Officer into the department in order to remove sworn officers from radio dispatching duties and return them to patrol duties. Our Community Service Officers are enrolled in college and pursuing a degree. They do not carry firearms, and they also wear non-military uniforms. Eventually, Community Service Officers, or CSO's, developed a capacity for patrol duties such as taking minor reports and performing a host of other paraprofessional duties that included traffic control. Currently, more than one-half of our public safety officers, or PSO's started as CSO's.

Over a year ago, we developed a Neighborhood Safety Officer program. A team of officers, including one Community Service Officer, is responsible for all events and crimes that occur in their district. They are given great latitude in scheduling and operations. We have strived to develop Officers that are generalists. The specialized functions such as photography, evidence collection and preservation, and records are in the hands of non-sworn Technicians.

I have saved our most significant, far-reaching, and controversial change for last. This change will hopefully demonstrate our capacity to be a goal-oriented, adaptive organization. When I was appointed Public Safety Director, I became several things: Police Chief, Fire Chief, and Civil Defense Director. For each capacity I was expected to be the operational head. Upon my arrival in Burnsville, there was, at best, a token compliance with the combined fire-police program. Officers were supposed to be Public Safety Officers; however, badges, identification cards, and informal conversations usually turned Public Safety Officers into police officers. We had no fire department. Some fire training was given to some officers, and some to other city employees. Most of the actual fire-fighting was done by a neighboring community on contract. Our single fire-training officer, a retired Minneapolis Fire Captain, was the only "real" fireman in our department.

A decision had to be made between structuring a pseudo-public safety department, as do many such departments, abandoning the entire concept and going to a volunteer fire department, or adopting whole-heartedly the public safety concept. We chose the latter course of action after much discussion. We justified this decision as a more rational

approach for achieving the community goals of public safety. Let me hasten to say that I am not a proponent for public safety departments to replace police and fire departments. It is almost always doomed to failure when separate departments have already been established and entrenched.

In our particular case this organizational adaptation was the most rational and feasible for our community. It lead to high salaries, job challenge and career development. Out of our department, we have placed two police chiefs and one Public Safety Director in other departments in the past 12 months. We have stressed the concept of participatory management, and shared decision making. And, in our case, the change was accomplished in only three years, instead of the five or more years we had predicted. Our City Manager and Council accepted the concept of "train to leave" and changed their expectations, recognizing that many of our officers probably will only stay 3 to 5 years and will go on to be the heads of other departments.

Our community has accepted these changes and supported us. Needless to say, it is our peers, our colleagues in the respective public safety services, who are predominantly opposed to what we are doing. We, however, feel that there is a need to develop "model" police and public safety organizations at a manageable level of a community our size. We also feel that there can be some transference, some applicability of our programs to other, as well as larger, cities.

We do strongly feel that change can be accomplished with a minimum of risk if it is well thought out and ordered. Opposition to change will almost always be an organizational response rather than a community response. However, I again have to stress the tremendous importance of executive leadership in developing, implementing, and maintaining orderly change. Top management, with honesty, openness, and the future of the American police service in mind, can develop support from within police departments as well as within the community. This kind of support can implement the kind of change needed to achieve organizational and community goals.

In conclusion, I wish to leave three precepts with you:

1. Change is contagious

2. It should be the life style of a dynamic organization

3. Well-planned change is not risky.

Other Publications of the
Criminal Justice Project

A Workbook on Standards and Goals: The Police (forthcoming, Winter, 1975)

Community Crime Prevention and the Local Official (Winter, 1974) 38 pp., $2.00

Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: A Local Approach (March, 1974) 26pp., $2.00

Juvenile Justice in Metropolitan Nashville (forthcoming, Winter, 1975)

New Directions in the Criminal Justice System (June, 1974) 16 pp., 25¢

Rape (April, 1974) 24 pp., $2.00

Survey of Local Criminal Justice Planning (June, 1973) 85 pp., $3.50

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