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## Co-Producing Commercial Safety Services in Philadelphia

### Final Report

by

Robert J. Stokes

Brian Lawton

Kirsten Henderson

Jack R. Greene

Center for Public Policy  
Temple University  
Philadelphia, PA

The research reported here was supported by Grant # 1997-IJ-CX-0049 from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After more than a decade of program implementation and related evaluation effort, the concept of community policing has produced a number of themes. This project sought to study the application of community policing in 5 commercial districts within the City of Philadelphia.

The importance of studying the community policing approach in commercial areas is rather straightforward. Commercial districts offer vastly different social dynamics than residential areas. They often offer high levels of “community” organization as well as possessing more resources to deal with local community problems. Moreover, the political importance of a promoting commercial activity in urban areas often results in significant public resource allocation to promote a stable basis for commerce.

This research seeks to fill some of the gaps in our current knowledge on the topic of community policing and crime prevention in commercial districts, while at the same time developing a research design for the assessment of efforts aimed at the co-production of safety between private organizations and public agencies. To this end, this study examines 5 commercial districts in Philadelphia, each with a differing attachment to community and problem-oriented policing as implemented by the Philadelphia Police Department. Such an approach can provide useful information on crime and disorder problems within commercial districts, as well as police and business partnerships aimed at “co-producing” safety services to these areas.

### Research Questions

The specific research questions to be addressed by this research are:

- 1) How does crime and disorder impact the economic vitality of commercial districts?
- 2) How are crime prevention and safety services produced in commercial districts in Philadelphia? What do businesses and the police bring to the co-production of these services?
- 3) How do businesses within our selected case districts perceive issues of crime, disorder, community vitality and economic development outcomes?
- 4) What security measures do businesses take to assure their safety?
- 5) How do Business Improvement Districts identify and address crime and disorder problems and with what impacts? How do these BIDs articulate needs to local police, and with what perceived success?

### Research Design

This research examined the issue of crime, policing and security efforts in commercial areas at three different levels of analysis: (1) The system as a whole (e.g., the interactions of crime, police and business-based crime prevention strategies within Philadelphia); (2) Intermediate units (our 5 specific commercial sites); and, (3) Individual-level programs

and actors. Each level of analysis will be nested within the other so that the analysis can move up and down the scale of units of analysis, thereby providing for a more robust analysis of crime, community policing, and the co-production of safety services within a commercial sector frame of reference.

### **Crime in Philadelphia**

- Crime in the City of Philadelphia rose slightly throughout the five-year period from 1994 through 1998. Property crimes constitute the highest number of reported offenses rising from just over 600 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 760 offenses in 1998. Violent offenses also increased from 235 in 1994 to 325 per square mile in 1998. The illicit market offense rate experienced a slight increase from 77 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 106 in 1998, while disorder offenses remained stable through out the four years (260 per square mile in 1994 and 256 per square mile in 1998).
- The city saw similar trends in the arrests occurring during the five years. The arrest rate for property crime remained the highest rate through out the time period, decreasing slightly from 141 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 120 arrests in 1998. Arrests for disorder offenses also decreased from 1994 to 1998 (105 in 1994 and 37 in 1998.) Arrests for violent crime remained stable, with only a slight increase from 69 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 75 in 1998. Finally, arrests for illicit market offenses saw the largest increase, rising from 104 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 153 in 1998.

### **Crime in Commercial Districts -Collectively**

- Philadelphia's commercial districts experienced increases in violent, disorder and illicit market offenses from 1994 to 1998. Violent offenses rose on average from nine offenses per square mile in 1994 to almost 16 offenses per square mile in 1998.
- Similarly, disorder offenses increased on average from nine offenses in 1994 to almost 18 offenses per square mile in 1998. Illicit market offenses saw the greatest increase during the five years, growing from an average of only one reported offense per square mile to over 20 offenses in 1998.
- Business property offenses remained over 22 offenses per square mile, as personal property offenses decreased only slightly from 35 property offenses per square mile in 1994 to 33 offenses in 1998.
- Arrest rates in the commercial districts follow a different trend than the offense rates. The average arrest rate for violent crime decreased slightly from six arrests in 1994 to almost five arrests in 1998.
- Arrests for disorder offenses saw, on average, a larger decrease. The average rate dropped from 9.5 arrests for disorder crimes in 1994 to less than two in 1998. Arrest rates for illicit market offenses remained stable, with the average arrest rate in 1994 of 2.8 in 1994 and 3.3 in 1998.

- Arrests for property crime decreased for both business property arrests (an average of 16 in 1994 and 11 in 1998) and personal property arrests (an average of six in 1994 and 4.5 in 1998.)

### **Problems in the Commercial Districts Over Time**

- Captains of the fifteen responding police districts were asked about the police districts ability to respond to particular problems over the past year.
- Five of the problems concerned incivilities in the district. These five are “quality of life” concerns and not necessarily criminal, or were, at the very least, victimless crimes.
- One problem was concerned with illegal businesses while the final four focused on criminal acts within the commercial districts.
- The five incivilities focused on were loitering, trash on the streets and sidewalks, panhandling and begging, parking and traffic and public consumption of alcohol and drugs.
- The captains felt that the largest gains were in the areas of public consumption of alcohol and drugs (60.0%), while the largest decrease was in the same category (26.7%).
- The four criminal issues identified were shoplifting/theft, drug selling, robbery and burglary.
- Approximately half (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that all of the criminal problems listed had improved substantially, except burglary, which showed a slightly lower improvement as compared to the other crimes (40.0%).
- A third of the captains surveyed felt that drug selling was the criminal act that had actually gotten the worse.
- Another issue addressed in the course of the survey was the presence of illegal or unlicensed businesses. This, however, seemed to be a constant problem with only a small proportion of captains feeling that the presence of illegal businesses in the district had either gotten better (6.7%), or worse (13.3%).
- What is interesting in assessing the captains’ responses is that across the ten problems as listed we see that the largest decline in the area of drug selling. This could be the result of the efforts by commercial districts to “clean their streets”, or a byproduct of displacement, which moves the problem from the areas frequented by shoppers or tourists to surrounding areas.

### **Role of the Police within the District: Commercial vs. Residential**

- A majority (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that the problems they dealt with were worse in the commercial districts in comparison to the residential districts. Only approximately a quarter (26.7%) of the respondents felt that the problems in the residential districts were worse than the commercial districts. Approximately a quarter (26.7%) felt that there was no difference between the problems in the residential districts versus the commercial districts.

- The captains were asked which problems they felt had a larger impact on commercial districts in comparison to residential districts. The most frequently reported problems were retail theft, panhandling, robberies and loitering. The question then is do policing styles differ between the residential and commercial districts to address these problems?
- The reported efforts made to police different type of districts varied in over three-quarters (80%) of the responses. The most common (60%) difference is simply the use of foot patrol in commercial districts, which is not found in the residential districts. A smaller group (13.3%) reported the use of a combination of both bike and foot patrol.
- A number of questions focused on tactics associated with community policing. The captains were asked to indicate which efforts were utilized in the commercial districts. Several of the districts (26.7) reported the use of mobile mini stations, while a smaller number (13.3%) reported the use of stationary mini stations. All of the districts reported the use of bicycle patrols in the commercial districts.

### **Services to the Commercial District**

- A majority of the districts (80%) reported offering crime prevention training for retailers. A similar majority (80%) reported providing escorts for cash drops for local businesses. Only roughly a quarter (26.7%) of the districts provided police located within the commercial establishments.
- Two-thirds (66.7%) of the responding captains reported offering special seasonal details designed to increase police presence in the districts.
- Captains felt that over half of the time (60%) their Crime Prevention officer dedicated “a lot” of time to the commercial district.
- Over a third of the time (40.0%) both Sanitation Officers and Abandoned Auto Units were also reported to spend “a lot” of time in the commercial district.
- The captains reported that they dealt with incidents such as shoplifting, employee theft, credit or check fraud, or suspicious loitering in a variety of ways.
- They reported using a number of methods in handling these problems that would normally be primarily associated only with commercial areas as opposed to residential areas.
- Some of the captains’ responses included, creating partnerships between the police and private security where the police would provide transportation while private security was responsible for the apprehension of the suspects.
- Another reported intervention was to dispatch police detectives to the store who would act undercover and attempt to apprehend suspects identified by local security agents.
- In some cases private security personnel were allowed to fill out necessary paperwork to file charges, and at times plainclothes or patrol officers were dispatched to search for suspects.
- T the captains were asked about efforts or initiatives undertaken for planning or implementing crime prevention strategies and tactics in commercial districts. The most common strategy reported was assignment to foot patrol or increase in foot

patrol, however, only approximately half (46.7%) of the captains reported requesting additional manpower for the commercial districts.

### **Comparisons Across Special Service Districts**

- The goal of the SSD's should be to become increasingly self-sufficient organizations that partner with the city service providers, and the commercial businesses themselves to create a safer, cleaner, and more prosperous commercial district. Each site has strived toward this goal in its own ways, such as weekly membership meetings, safety meetings, flyers, Customer Service Representatives, etc. However, each has met with varying success.
- Both the Manayunk and South Street SSD's seem well on their way to becoming increasingly successful agencies. Through strong leadership they have partnered their organizations with the local police and created a strong supportive community of businessmen and businesswomen.
- The Germantown and Frankford SSD's require increased effort to achieve similar goals. Both have had the burden of uncooperative city agencies and high turnover in the upper echelons of their organizations. Frankford has had limited success with the hiring of Customer Service Representatives to patrol the commercial district, interact with the community, and increase police surveillance through the use of two-way radios. Frankford is also trying to increase pride in the commercial district by purchasing street sweepers to eliminate the reoccurring problem of litter throughout the district. Germantown's SSD is working towards this goal. Unless the Germantown District can increase the cooperation between themselves and their clients, it is unlikely that they will achieve their desired results.

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## INTRODUCTION

After more than a decade of program implementation and related evaluation effort, the concept of community policing has produced a number of themes. One theme stresses the importance of converting community policing from an organizational philosophy to a coherent set of activities with measurable efforts, outputs and results. Another important theme concerns the differential impacts of community and problem-oriented policing efforts in variable social and land use settings. The very idea of "community" can prompt several different and often competing interpretations (Greene and Taylor, 1988; Goldstein, 1990) giving rise to the notion that there may be considerable variation in what is considered a "community" in community policing. Moreover, while "community" most commonly refers to a group of people living together in the same geographic space, and their associated social relationships-- others posit that "communities of interest" also exist, be they functional or temporal. Often these two ways of defining "community", in addition to many others, exist together in discussions of public safety.

A range of philosophical and methodological orientations, as well as the political reality that policy efforts most often focus on people, and more specifically where they live, has placed much of the programming and research emphasis on community policing in residential settings. Moreover, community and problem-oriented policing initiatives have tended to focus on the interactions between the police within residential communities that are typically lower income, socially disorganized, and, or minority communities. How the police enact community and problem-solving approaches to address crime, order, and fear problems in varying commercial and business settings are less studied at present, and the focus of this research effort.

Among its many definitions, *community policing* has been represented as "foot patrol" (Trojanowicz, 1983, 1986), a fear of crime reduction strategy (Wycoff, et. al., 1985, 1985a, 1985b; Cordner, 1986, 1988), a crime prevention strategy (Kelling, 1987), a method to improve police officer job satisfaction (Hayeslip and Cordner, 1987, Greene,

1989; Greene and Decker, 1989), a problem-solving process (Cordner, 1985, Eck and Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990), a process for greater police and community consultation and sharing of information and values (Wetheritt, 1983; Manning, 1984; Alpert and Dunham, 1988), a method for changing police organizations and service delivery (Manning, 1984; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Alpert and Dunham, 1988; Goldstein, 1990), a community-based crime prevention effort employing aggressive order maintenance tactics by the police (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996); and, a "reform" movement (Bayley, 1988; Mastrofski, 1988).

Despite considerable variation in definition, the philosophies, strategies, programs and tactics which have emerged in modern-day policing over the past 10 to 15 years — and which are tied to the community and problem-oriented policing movement — suggest some common orientations. Common "core" elements of community policing programs include a redefinition of the police role; greater reciprocity in police and community relations; area decentralization of police services and command; and some form of civilianization (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Each of these changes is viewed as a necessary condition to realizing greater police accountability to the community. At the same time these efforts suggest that, if adopted, the police can become more effective and efficient.

### **Crime and Policing in Commercial Districts**

The importance of studying the community policing approach in commercial areas is rather straightforward. Commercial districts offer vastly different social dynamics than residential areas. They often offer high levels of "community" organization through business member organizations, as well as possessing more resources to deal with local community problems. Moreover, the political importance of a promoting commercial activity in urban areas often results in significant public resource allocation to promote a stable basis for commerce. Collectively, businesses located in commercial districts have a strong interest in establishing and maintaining a safe and attractive place in which to

attract customers, while individually, business owners have an interest in preserving safety for themselves and their employees.

Commercial districts are also unique in that they often offer greater opportunity for crime than do residential areas. This gives rise to a paradox within which commercial districts simultaneously provide both community stability (in terms of job creation and accessibility of products and services) and instability (by providing more targets and attracting more perpetrators) (see Taylor and Harrel, 1996).

In addition, commercial districts are often separated from residential districts, at least economically and politically. This has led to differing strategies among the police as they approach these communities (residential versus commercial). Despite the perceived differences between commercial and residential areas of any city, the relationship between community development in the larger sense, and community *economic* development, has become inextricable. This is due to the importance that job creation strategies play in promoting social stability--often through providing increased attachment to formalized employment (see Wilson, 1996). Community viability may be ultimately linked to business viability, with the general decline of urban areas over the past twenty years reflecting this interactive and mutually supportive (or defeating) relationship (Titus, 1987).

The phenomenon of urban commercial decline, however, has not been uniform--with some commercial areas flourishing, while others have rapidly collapsed. The character of crime and fear of crime within different commercial areas can have vastly different impacts and probable solutions. While perceptions of high crime areas may be driven by visual cues such as abandonment and market mix (e.g., lower-end retail, pawn shops and check cashing operations) in a given commercial district (Taylor and Harrel, 1996), victimization levels may actually be greater in areas that appear safe. Moreover, some flourishing commercial districts that serve a specific market, such as bar and night club patrons may offer a distinctly different set of crime problems (see Wikstrom, 1995). Successful commercial districts can also cause spillovers into residential areas adjacent to

thriving commercial districts. So, what may be perceived as a positive for the city as a whole, may indeed be negative for local residents whose quality of life suffers from the temporary importation of additional (often inebriated) offenders into their community. Thus, the relationship between community viability and commercial development is complex due to the need to balance the general goal of economic development with local concerns over order and safety.

This report seeks to fill some of the gaps in our current knowledge on the topic of community policing and crime prevention in commercial districts, while at the same time developing a research design for the assessment of efforts aimed at the co-production of safety between private organizations and public agencies. To this end, this study examines 5 commercial districts in Philadelphia, each with a differing attachment to community and problem-oriented policing as implemented by the Philadelphia Police Department. Such an approach can provide useful information on crime and disorder problems within commercial districts, as well as police and business partnerships aimed at “co-producing” safety services to these areas.

Business crime has generally been understudied. However, some research has examined issues of commercial victimization. This literature has typically been focused on the social and financial impacts of commercial victimization, with some work looking at more generalized policing issues in downtown areas. While this work has raised many important concerns about the special needs of downtowns, little work has been done in commercial areas outside of the central business districts of cities. Moreover, except for an examination of policing in downtown Oakland by Reiss (1985) and to a lesser extent the work of Eck and Spelman (1987), little work has been done to link police work with crime, disorder and service levels in these commercial areas.

This is unfortunate because urban areas generally, and central business districts specifically, are often cited as having a higher incidence of crime and disorder than residential areas (Wilkstrom, 1995). These increased levels of crime have been attributed to greater levels of opportunity along with lower levels of social control within these

areas. Moreover, as cities have followed an economic development scheme that has relied almost exclusively on the professional services, retail and visitor sectors as the linchpin for fiscal viability, the nexus between a business district's economic success and its ability to control negative external threats is more direct in a consumption-based economy (Milder, 1987). Thus, city and business leaders, who must focus on marketing commercial areas in highly competitive national and regional marketplaces, are extremely concerned about the fiscal and emotional impact of criminal victimization, and perhaps more importantly, the perception of disorder that comes from "soft" crimes within these areas (Reiss, 1985; Kotler, 1993).

The focus on "soft", or "quality of life", crimes within urban areas has become the *sine quo non* of most crime reduction and policing efforts following the success of such efforts in New York City (see, Kelling and Coles, 1996, particularly chapter 4). Moreover, other cities too have focused on addressing "quality of life" issues, generally through partnerships between the police, private citizens and businesses. While this movement to establish formalized working relationships between business districts and the police is fledgling, there is anecdotal evidence that such relationships do have an effect (see, Langdon, 1992; Kelling and Coles, 1996, chapter 6).

Business districts, however, offer a set of unique challenges to policing professionals. Reiss's (1985) examination of Oakland points to some of these challenges including: a) the transient nature of central business district (CBD) workers and visitors provides a wide variation in population by both volume and type between the day/evening, and weekday/weekend time periods; b) the growth of homeless populations that tend to congregate in business districts; c) increasing fear among workers and visitors that has exacerbated a cycle of flight; and d) an incredible growth in the number of private security personnel, rendering crime reduction coordination efforts more difficult--and resulting in less public accountability of policing efforts.

Reiss also focused on the reduction of soft crimes (defined as harassment, panhandling, loitering, and offensive or threatening behavior) in city centers. Policy solutions proffered

by Reiss include the need to diversify patrols to conform to those expressed within a community policing orientation (i.e., bicycle, scooter and foot beats), while pointing out the importance of private-public partnerships in establishing goals, sharing resources, reporting incidents and implementing situational crime prevention strategies. More recent work by Kelling and Coles (1996) has documented aspects of police responses to subway crime in New York.

The importance of coordinating a proper police response to crime in commercial districts is paramount, especially with the cost of commercial crime being greater than the sum of individual criminal incidents. On a larger scale, the cost of crime against business in cities is associated with an inflationary effect. That is, crime leads to increasing expenditures in taxes (for increased levels of protection and punishment), insurance premiums, or the availability of privately offered business insurance (see Litton, 1982), and the costs of goods purchased from suppliers who must also include the costs of crime into their pricing structures. These increased costs result in higher prices for urban consumers, putting city merchants at a disadvantage when compared to their competitors outside of the city.

A cumulative consequence of uncompetitive urban commercial areas is seen when customers and operators look elsewhere to conduct their business, with the resultant disinvestment causing blight, customers' avoidance and unemployment. Under these conditions, the city becomes less diverse, less active and even more prone to greater levels of victimization (see Skogan, 1990). In addition, this cycle of decline shifts the market mix to higher priced, lesser quality goods, while also reducing business operating hours reflecting increasing fear of victimization during the evening hours. These phenomena were evident in many urban business districts that have experienced commercial abandonment, particularly during the 1980s. In recent years commercial development in central cities has included a focus on "clean and safe"; that is, on reducing social and physical incivility in these communities -- conditions associated with community decline (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990).

Another consequence of commercial crime arises when local residents, who favor city living because of the proximity of culture, shopping and recreation--as well as diversity of population --, feel the effects of crime both directly and indirectly, thereby reducing their quality of life. As levels of fear rise, city residents grow weary of being afraid and trade off their preferred mode of urban living for a less desirable and less convenient suburban location -- further damaging the city's tax base (Taylor, Taub and Dunham, 1981).

The far reaching impact of commercial crime is reflected in a survey conducted by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress (1979) which showed that businesses consider quality of life issues to be *more important* in choosing a location than tax rates and real estate prices. Crime was one of two (along with the quality of public education) key determinants of businesses' location decisions. Indeed, the importance of understanding crime in commercial districts, and its attendant fear factor, is of critical importance to urban communities whose economic viability and social stability through job creation also rests with attracting commercial activity. As noted by Porter (1996), urban communities often have a distinct competitive advantage over their suburban and global competitors--with cost advantages arising from the existence of less expensive labor and infrastructure development costs, as well as an under-served local market. Where urban areas are at a disadvantage, however, is in their failure to create safe and clean environments for consumers and workers--with crime and fear of crime eroding the ability of local commercial districts to develop as competitive and attractive places for commerce. This is especially true for small businesses and less developed commercial areas.

Studies indicate that small businesses represent the fastest growing segment of business activity (Fisher, 1991). This fact would suggest that nurturing small businesses may offer the best hope for the revitalization of urban areas. However, small businesses have a particularly difficult time surviving in urban areas. With relatively low levels of profit and capital capacity, a mere few victimization can be sufficient to put a small business out of operation.

Ways need to be found, then, for making business more viable within the urban context. An important first step in this process may be the development of an increased understanding of the consequences of crime for commercial areas, the linkage of these interests with those of the police, and the design and implementation of strategies to assist the police and commercial areas to "co-produce" public order and safety.

### **Place-Based Theories of Crime**

The economic base of the United States has shifted dramatically in the past several decades. Northeastern and Midwestern "rustbelt" cities have experienced economic downturns, spurred mainly by massive de-industrialization and the flight of businesses to international and non-urban areas within the United States. The structure of American business and economic activity has direct implications for crime against business, and, by consequence, for the relationships the police can build with business communities. Commercial activity within any given city also has implications for place-based theories of crime; the underlying premises that the police and others act upon to address crime problems in any particular area of a community.

According to "routine activities," "rational choice" and other ecological theories of crime, illegitimate criminal activity is a direct outgrowth of legitimate business activity (Clark and Felson, 1993). The two are intertwined in a symbiotic relationship, with major shifts in the structure of legitimate activity leading to shifts in the structure of illegitimate activity. The explosion of computer technology, for example, has led to the creation of whole new categories of crime, such as electronic piracy and wire fraud.

Macro shifts in the structure of American society including changes in the way we do business helps, in large measure, to determine the type and amount of opportunity for criminal conduct (Clark and Felson, 1993). Understanding the structure and nature of legitimate business becomes a key to understanding illegitimate activities. The lack of a comprehensive data set on business crime and victimization, however, has hampered our

efforts to understand this interplay between legitimate and illegitimate activity. The increase in consumption-based economic sectors has also proven problematic in terms of data collection efforts. In the new economic reality for cities, the product is often the place itself, with all the perceptions of its quality and safety being directly linked with its success (see Kotler et al., 1993).

In addition to macro-economic impacts on criminal behavior theorized by routine activities theory, another emerging theory of crime identifies an increased importance on place and its attendant effect on criminal behavior. This approach, borrowing from the logic of the idea of criminal convergence set forth in routine activities theory--where an offender and a victim come together at a place and time under a specific set of circumstances--seeks to mitigate those situations where criminal activity flourishes. Situational crime prevention elaborates on such criminological theories as routine activities, opportunity and rational choice (Clarke; 1992, 1995).

The situational crime prevention approach is directed at specific forms of crime and involves the management and design of the environment in a systematic and permanent way for the purpose of raising the risks and reducing the rewards of criminal activities (Clarke; 1992, 1995). The geographic orientation of situational crime prevention rests with its focus on the manipulation of the physical environment as a means of reducing criminal opportunity and activity. Borrowing from the place-specific urban planning and architecture models developed by Jacobs (1961) and Newman (1972), situational crime prevention employs an environmental and strategic planning approach to crime reduction. Moreover, as a theoretical outgrowth of many practical efforts to reduce crime by local public agencies, private organizations and individuals, the situational crime prevention model offers a pragmatic "action-based" theoretical research paradigm for the study of crime and its impacts.

Typically, situational crime prevention studies follow a strategic planning process to the problems of crime through the following steps: a) identification of key stakeholders; b) an environmental assessment to determine the source of problems; c) implementation of

crime prevention elements; d) evaluation of efforts; and program adjustments. Some of the specific crime prevention efforts include: "target hardening", facilitation of "natural" surveillance by pedestrians/shoppers, employees and security personnel; increased usage of electronic surveillance techniques; pedestrian traffic management techniques; increased levels of lighting; and coordination of transportation with other uses/attractions (Crowe, 1991; Clarke, 1992, 1995; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995). A recent use of this research model by Felson et. al. (1997) at the Port of New York and New Jersey's bus terminal in midtown Manhattan resulted in reductions of criminal and non-criminal activity construed as threatening by terminal users. Viewed in this light, situational crime prevention and problem-oriented policing share common frames of reference.

Despite the success of situational crime prevention efforts, some problems with this approach have been identified. Generally, the critique of this approach--especially with its use in business districts -- has fallen into four major categories. First as an environmental model, situational crime prevention fails to account for what motivates offenders. As such, some see situational crime prevention as shortsighted and piecemeal. Second, is the issue of displacement; that is will increasing barriers to offenders in a commercial district lead to higher crime rates in surrounding residential communities, discrete commercial sites, or other less defended commercial districts? Some recent work by Clarke would indicate that displacement is not the problem theorized by critics of situational crime prevention (1992, 1995). Third, in terms of its space orientation, some see situational crime prevention efforts as overly obtrusive forms of social control, with some critics pointing to problems of the privatization of public space (Mallet, 1995; Zukin, 1996), the militarization of public space, and the development of a fortress mentality through increased surveillance and target hardening efforts espoused by the model (Davis, 1991). Fourth, is the issue of political legitimacy and accountability, as many situational crime prevention efforts involve some form of public-private partnership or quasi-public agency structure, concerns have arisen over what is perceived as movement to privatize enforcement. Even the judicial aspects of commercial crime have been raised by some critics (Reiss, 1985; Mallet, 1995; Zukin, 1996).

Despite these criticisms, situational crime prevention efforts, and the cooperative framework in which they develop have gained popularity. Due to their focus on place, and a pragmatic, bottom-up, orientation to reduce criminal activity, situational crime prevention programs have become a popular tool for commercial districts to combat crime and decrease fear of victimization among visitors--especially in urban areas. The use of a public-private partnership or business alliance approach to community planning and crime prevention has in the past proven effective (see BJA, August, 1994). Moreover, traditional business associations often engender strong relationships with policing and political leaders.

The Philadelphia Police Department has several types of linkage to business communities. One of the most significant of these relationships comes through the establishment of "business improvement districts" (BIDs); formalized organizations capable of more directly reflecting the collective needs of the business community and providing direct liaison with city government.

## **THE BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT MODEL**

The current popularity of the BID model arose from an acknowledgment on the part of local government that the competitive advantage of cities often rested on a healthy commercial core. Concomitantly, local business elites recognized that traditional urban service delivery systems were failing to meet the special needs of downtown commercial districts (Hudson, 1996). While only downtown actors initially pursued the BID model, neighborhood-level commercial areas seeking to similarly augment their appearance, safety and promotional efforts have recently adopted it.

Although a relatively recent phenomena--with most BIDs being chartered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the popularity of BIDs is evidenced by their growth-- there are currently over 1200 BIDs in existence (Hudson, 1996), with many more in the planning stages.

### **Legal and Organizational Issues**

BIDs are chartered sub-governmental units incorporated by state and/or local governments that derive their funding from special tax assessments on commercial property. While the legal means to create BIDs differs from state to state, they are created as state municipal corporations and are run as non-profit corporations (Pack, 1993; Mallet, 1995; Travers and Weimar, 1996; Houstoun, 1997). Special examples exist, such as in California, where two types of BID financing schemes exist; one involves the assessment of commercial property, while the other requires fees paid by merchants (City of Los Angeles Clerks Office, 1998).

The services provided by BIDs (discussed below) are public in nature, in that it is difficult to exclude anyone from enjoying the benefits of their operations. The public nature of their operations, however, is limited to a clearly defined geographic district. Thus, to enjoy BID benefits, one must own commercial property, reside within, or visit the district (Travers and Weimar, 1996).

BIDs are typically formed through a vote of property owners within the district after a period of public disclosure and hearings. In many areas, district inception is made more facile by instituting a “negative election” incorporation policy where a threshold of objections to the proposal rather than a majority support is required. Voting rights can also be tied to total assessed value of each property. Thus in Philadelphia, a district is not approved if is objected to by property owners representing more than 31% of the total assessed value (Philadelphia City Council, 1991).

BIDs are managed by an executive director hired by a board of directors comprised of district property owners, commercial tenants, resident leaders and political leaders. While the mix of these interests varies depending on enabling legislation, commercial real estate owners dominate most boards (Houstoun, 1997).

Property owners are required to pay an assessment to the BID. Assessment methods vary around the country, with different classifications of buildings, usually depending on the type of establishments in the building, area of building frontage, or distance from central areas (Houstoun, 1997). Legal challenges to the legitimacy of the BID governing structure have been pursued in the name of “one-person, one-vote” requirements laid out in the U.S. constitution. These challenges, most notably pursued by tenants of residential properties in New York City’s Grand Central area, have tended to be rejected by the courts. Litigants argued in the Grand Central case that BID assessments, which tend to be passed along from landowners to commercial and residential tenants, represent a form of taxation without representation with the limited or non-existent requirement for residential or community representation on BID boards limiting fair and democratic input from fiscally affected parties within a district. The courts, have generally held, however, that BIDs assessments do not meet the legal definition of a tax. This is due to their limited programmatic and geographic focus, as well as the loose legal requirement that assessment costs be bore by those benefiting from services (Briffault, 1999).

In addition to property assessments received within the district, BIDs also rely on outside sources of income. Mainly, these sources come from competitive grant funds, governmental transfers, corporate sponsorship, or donations from philanthropic foundations

District resources vary locally and nationally. For instance, in New York, BID annual budgets range from the \$9.3 million of Grand Central Partnership to White Plains Road in the Bronx at \$67 thousand (Travers and Weimar, 1996). In 1995 the Pittsburgh Downtown Alliance (a BID itself) surveyed 23 BIDs in large and medium sized cities around the United States. The results of this survey revealed that the average budget of surveyed BIDs was \$2 million and that large properties were over-represented, with the 10 largest properties on average accounting for 43% of BID budgets. The average size of BIDs within the survey was 90 city blocks, with the average age being seven years and a range between 20 years (New Orleans) and 4 years (Baltimore and Dallas) (Mallet, 1995). Most BIDs keep track of the level of public services provided in the area by performing an initial accounting of service levels before BID formation, and tracking these levels each year (Houstoun, 1997).

### **Explanations for BID Growth**

The proliferation in BIDs over the past ten years has given cause for some analysts to link larger economic and political developments to their ascendance. The rapid growth in BID use is evidenced by such urban centers as New York City, which currently has 40 BIDs, Los Angeles, which has 15, with 29 more proposed, while San Diego and Milwaukee each have 15 districts. Mallet points to five main developments for the current proliferation of BIDs in U.S. urban centers (1995, 100-103):

- 1) More value in the downtown built environment calling for more protection from devaluation.
- 2) Greater visibility of the homeless on city streets and in downtown areas.
- 3) Extension of public/private partnerships seeking to add vitality to urban centers for the purposes of promoting greater use by tourists and other consumption-based economic activities.

- 4) Failure of public policing agencies and private building security to coordinate safety services, that create a sufficient milieu of safety for middle class workers and visitors, and
- 5) Increasingly limited resources of urban governments.

BIDs represent the latest incarnation of the public-private partnership model employed throughout the modern history of urban redevelopment (see Friedan and Sagalyn, 1989; Squires, 1989; Fainstein, 1994; Wagner et. al, 1995; Meir, 1995). BIDs, however, represent an interesting twist on the public-private partnership model as traditionally employed. In contrast to traditional public/private partnerships -- where the public sector subsidizes private development (see Bartelt, 1989) -- funds used for BID services are derived through private contributions, with the public sector providing the administrative oversight and political legitimization (Briffault, 1999). Further differences between more traditional partnership arrangements and the BID model relate to BIDs focus on service delivery over capital subsidies. The existence of fragmented and insufficient public services forms the basis for the public/private interaction in the BID model. With private actors provide funding, political impetus, technical expertise and information in an effort to create a more efficient public sector service delivery model in commercial areas.

In holding public service providers to a specific and logically meaningful place, and coordinating public and private service provision, BIDs approximate the place driven model effectively employed by suburban malls and office parks (Houstoun, 1997). Performing place management and promotional campaigns long typical of malls, and sharing the cost of place promotion, security, and upkeep of common areas, BIDs realize efficiencies while avoiding the free rider problem associated with volunteer efforts long typical of business associations.

The growth in BIDs around the country has been impressive. Table 1 below describes the 23 U.S. cities with populations above one-half million (500,000) and their efforts in terms of creating BIDs. Most of these organizations are charged with providing private planning and services for place management and safety provision. Some of the smaller BIDs are less ambitious and merely provide some common advertising and place

promotion budgets, as well as providing a small amount of funding for part-time staff. Larger BIDs, such as those in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Los Angeles, provide full-scale place management services, including fairly elaborate safety planning and crime prevention services.

**Table 1: Big City BIDs Nationally**

<b>City</b>	<b>Total BIDs (as of 8-99)</b>	<b>Budget Range</b>
<b>New York</b>	40	\$93,000-10 million
<b>Los Angeles</b>	20 (15 proposed)	\$40,000-3.2 million
<b>Chicago</b>	1	\$10 million
<b>Houston</b>	1	\$2.5 million
<b>Philadelphia</b>	8 (2 proposed)	\$50,000-9.6 million
<b>San Diego</b>	13	\$55,000-\$306,000
<b>Detroit</b>	1	\$300,000
<b>Dallas</b>	5	*
<b>Phoenix</b>	1	\$1.46 million
<b>San Antonio</b>	1	\$1 million
<b>San Jose</b>	1	\$1.87 million
<b>Baltimore</b>	2	\$2.7 million
<b>Indianapolis</b>	1	*
<b>San Francisco</b>	1	\$1 million
<b>Jacksonville</b>	1	\$1 million
<b>Columbus</b>	1	*
<b>Milwaukee</b>	16	\$4,400-\$1.8 million
<b>Memphis</b>	1	\$4.3 million
<b>Washington</b>	2	\$2.7-6.6 million
<b>Boston</b>	1	\$3.2 million
<b>Seattle</b>	4	\$260,000-\$375,000
<b>Cleveland</b>	1 (7 proposed)	\$330,000
<b>New Orleans</b>	2 (1 residential district)	\$3.6 million

\* Budget information was not available at time of report

One clear trend in BID creation is that larger cities with a successful downtown BID organization have attempted to replicate these organizations in neighborhood commercial areas. Although much smaller in scale, these organizations have tried to utilize similar programming than their downtown counterparts. Moreover, they have also strengthened established relationships with city agencies such as sanitation and police. This is especially true of older former industrial cities that have long established, but under performing neighborhood retail districts. Here, BIDs are being used—mostly by

established community development corporations (CDCs)--for the purpose of redevelopment; often with retail redevelopment fitting into a more comprehensive community revitalization plan that includes housing rehabilitation, employment creation and public space reclamation. This is the case in such cities as New York, Philadelphia and Milwaukee. Other cities such as Cleveland, Baltimore, and Chicago will soon join these cities in having multiple BIDs located in both downtown districts, as well as neighborhood retail concentrations. California cities such as Los Angeles and San Diego have been hamstrung by state property tax limitations from developing full scale BIDs; instead, these cities have utilized a comparatively large number of BIDs with the main purpose of promoting commercial activity in clearly defined districts.

The increasing role of BIDs in urban service delivery and place management has not come without controversy. Critical issues surrounding BIDs has tended to reside in three general areas: the privatization of public space and criminal justice services; the undemocratic and unaccountable nature of their operations; and lastly, whether they follow equitable models of economic growth and public service delivery patterns.

### **Privatization of Public Space and Criminal Justice Services**

“Clean and safe” is the virtual mantra of most BIDs. While their efforts at creating cleaner common areas in urban public spaces have not resulted in much controversy, the same cannot be said for their safety programming efforts. BID services are based on a public safety model focused on the reduction of public disorder. By focusing on more frequently committed, less serious offenses, it is theorized that enforcement efforts will have a concomitant impact on more serious criminal acts (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Livingston, 1997). Efforts to implement wide-scale policing efforts in commercial areas, however, often face local political opposition -- especially when a focus on downtown means less attention to neighborhood concerns (Greene and Stokes, 1998). Moreover, the high cost of this labor intensive policing model, with its attendant need for extensive street-level foot patrol, is problematic for strained urban police budgets (see Davis, 1991).

While some BIDs have responded to policing shortages by financially supporting additional police officers (Polner and Morrison, 1998), bike and scooter patrols, and buildings – more resourceful BIDs have augmented the police’s ability to patrol public areas within commercial areas by implementing their own security personnel. Typically adorned in brightly colored uniforms meant to convey place ownership without the authoritative overtones of public policing uniforms, BID security personnel go by such benign monikers as “customer service representative”; “ambassadors”; or “rangers”. Their advertised services go beyond simple guardianship duties typically ascribed to security guards. This broader role is characterized by such services as “on-the-street concierge,” providing directions to sites of interest, and making informed recommendations for restaurants and retail outlets (Houstoun, 1997).

**The Times Square BID:**

Times Square BID employs 47 unarmed public safety officers who patrol the district on foot and in vehicles, who also staff a security booth seven days a week. Linked by radio to the NYPD the impact of their collaboration with public police has been dramatic. Since 1993: Overall crime is down by 58%. Three-card Monte games (a particularly vexing problem historically for the area) are down by 80%. Illegal peddling was down by 83%. Pick pocketing declined by 38%. Pornographic shops decreased from 47 to 19. Once defined by these activities, the Times Square BID has helped in redefining the area as a prime tourist spot.

The BID is also an active supporter of and participant in the much-heralded Midtown Community Court. Unique in the nation, this court handles only quality-of-life defendants: turnstile jumpers, graffiti artists, illegal peddlers, prostitutes and some small-time drug dealers. In addition to providing social services, the Court immediately assigns offenders to community service in Times Square and the neighboring residential community. The BID supervised more than 1,100 offenders in 1998. These offenders have typically been sentenced to drug and alcohol treatment and community service. Often, this service includes supplementing its sanitation crews.

### **Downtown Baltimore**

Public Safety Ambassadors: The city has 45 PSAs who patrol the streets every day and serve as goodwill ambassadors to help citizens and visitors feel comfortable and welcome in Downtown Baltimore. Trained by the police to spot and report suspicious behavior, PSAs serve as additional "eyes and ears" looking out for public safety. PSAs are also trained by the hospitality industry to answer questions, give directions and help make the overall Downtown experience a pleasant one.

### **Atlanta Downtown Improvement District --**

The Atlanta Downtown Improvement District, Inc. (ADID) manages the Ambassador Force® of Downtown Atlanta. The A-Force® is a 54-person team that walks beats throughout the 120-block Downtown Improvement District providing directions, information and smiles for Downtown visitors, workers and residents. Ambassadors are trained personnel who carry radios that link directly to the Atlanta Police Department. Having begun its fourth year in January 1999, The A-Force's ® solid record of success is based on the simple notion that a visible, authoritative, yet friendly, group of people assigned to patrol Downtown can make the District safer, cleaner and more hospitable. ADID works - crime is down for the third straight year, the sidewalks are cleaner, and people who live, work and visit Downtown feel better about their neighborhood. ADID is a private, nonprofit 501(c) (3) charitable corporation created by Downtown property owners to operate the community improvement district established by the City of Atlanta under Georgia law.

## **Downtown D.C. District**

Downtown SAM. The most visible presence of Downtown DC is the team of specially trained hospitality and maintenance workers known as Downtown SAM, recognizable by their bright red attire. Since first stepping out onto the street as a roving concierge service, the Downtown SAM teams have assisted many visitors by providing directions, walking people to their cars and helping them to find area attractions including restaurants, hotels and shops. Each Downtown SAM has radio access to a central dispatch office that is equipped with *Compcierge DC*, an electronic city guide that provides information about everything from restaurants to retail, tours to taxis or museums to money machines

From November 17, 1997 through November 17, 1998 Downtown SAM Assisted 86,029 people.

Crime decreased by 46.3 percent since 1995

Crimes against persons were reduced by 19.5 percent

Crimes against property dropped by 13.5 percent

Total Index Crime declined 14.1 percent since the Downtown DC BID began services on November 17, 1997

The presence of BID security, however, has given rise to criticisms that BIDs use security for the purpose of privatizing public space (see Mallet 1995; Zukin, 1995). This criticism is often directed at BID efforts to remove homeless individuals from public space. Moreover, their monitoring of public areas, using both human and electronic means, has other implications; namely, the imposition of a politically non-controversial and pro-consumption value system that oppresses non-mainstream social and political expression. This is thought by some critics to have a deleterious effect on the protected constitutional rights to free speech and movement (Mallet, 1995).

In addition to privately funded security services, BIDs also sponsor and promote "community" courts which are intended to accelerate the judicial process for non-serious "quality-of-life" offenses committed within the business district (Mallet, 1995; Zukin, 1994). One such court, the Midtown Community Court near New York City's Times Square Improvement District, deals with minor "quality-of-life" offenders and links the issue of criminal offending and homeless status with community service and drug rehabilitation. The Times Square BID sanitation department provides the "community" supervision for individuals sentenced to perform community services such as street cleaning and graffiti abatement details (Times Square District Annual Report, 1997). Nationally, other cities are trying to replicate the court, considered by citizens and politicians to be highly successful (International Downtown Association, 1997).

The critique of privatized crime prevention programming comes at a time when the growth in private security expenditures and personnel have resulted in a private security system that now dwarfs the public policing system (Chaiken and Chaiken, 1987; Dart, 1992). The recent explosion in the use of private security in the U.S. comes on the heels of larger demographic and geographic trends along with a growing public cynicism over the effectiveness of urban police bureaucracies.

Tools employed by BIDs to ensure secure public spaces in some cities include use of human and electronic surveillance systems (Eck, 1997). Critics of such systems have associated BID security activities with the all-knowing "big brother" of futuristic fiction. Although many criminologists have questioned the efficacy of such measures, they continue to be used as a relatively inexpensive means of providing a sense of place ownership (Eck, 1997). A study by the New York ACLU points to a need for more control of video surveillance systems as they continue to proliferate throughout public space in New York (New York Times, 1998).

Conflict over these surveillance methods arises in situations where users of urban space are "profiled" with status cues, instead of unlawful or uncivil behavior. Proponents of these techniques point to the behavior of individuals as cause for restriction, not their

status (Kelling and Coles, 1997; Livingston, 1997). However, opponents argue that the problematic nature of disentangling behavior from status makes the assessment of sanctions based on status unavoidable. This debate has been pursued most vigorously over the removal of homeless from public places and the stigmatizing influence of race and gender on criminal profiling. A lawsuit filed in late 1999 by a consortium of Los Angeles civil rights organizations accuses private security firms contracted by three city BIDs of harassing and abusing homeless citizens for the purposes of removing them from their boundaries (Los Angeles Times, 1999)

The political support for additional crime prevention and policing efforts in commercial areas arises out of an acknowledgement that commercial areas and individual businesses serve a broader public purpose through job creation and tax revenue (Felson and Clark, 1997; Porter, 1997); and the difficulty in policing commercial districts, where there are greater opportunities for criminal activity due to uneven surveillance (Reiss, 1984; Greene and Stokes, 1998).

### **Accountability and Privatization**

Critics argue that BIDs, like public authority special district government forms, are undemocratic entities not accountable to the public. Like many quasi-governmental entities, BIDs often operate outside of the direct control of elected leaders. Economic development practitioners often minimize the problems associated with accountability (see Berkowitz, 1988; Houstoun, 1995). Indeed, many elected officials are willing to trade off accountability lacking in the special district model for increased flexibility, both fiscal and operational.

While BID leaders are comprised of private citizens with a clear self-interest, proponents of special purpose governments point to the direct control exerted over their selection and retention by popularly elected officials (Berkowitz, 1988). Supervision of these entities, however, varies from city to city, with some cities exhibiting little or no control over their local BIDs (Mallet, 1995; Briffault, 1999). In response to recent problems in New York

the city has demanded more accountability from BIDs. The city's council has charged the Department of Business Services with the task of supervising BIDs closely (Lambert, 1995; New York City Council, 1995, 1997).

Present in all discussions of BID accountability is the underlying question of to who are BIDs accountable? Since BIDs collect assessments from commercial landowners and return them in the form of services to these very same properties, many believe that BIDs should be held accountable to the local business community that they serve (Lueck, 1998). Others suggest that BIDs affect the larger community and should therefore be held accountable to the public and local political leaders. One supporter of BIDs has posited that they actually endure greater levels of scrutiny than public agencies because of the sensitivity of their operations and the market-driven environment in which they operate (Houstoun, 1994).

### **Class Bias in BID Services**

Criticisms of BID operations around the subject of class bias typically revolve around two primary areas: their focus on serving a middle and upper class population within their boundaries (Zukin, 1994); and their contribution to inter-local service level inequities (Briffault, 1999).

The first point is related to a class and racial bias exhibited by BIDs in their service orientation. They focus on providing an environment that approximates the areas frequented by middle and upper class consumers, while excluding the poor and especially the homeless. This orientation is made manifest through their efforts to curb panhandlers, non-traditional street performers, vendors and loiterers from their service areas. Most BIDs have endeavored to reduce the number of homeless on downtown streets and sidewalks. These efforts have been both programmatic and legal in their orientation. While lacking the regulatory authority of the state, BIDs use their extensive lobbying capacity to support legislation intended to abate such activities (Philadelphia City Council, 1998).

In response to criticisms that they exclude the homeless from public spaces BIDs have crafted social service and outreach efforts for the homeless designed to get them into shelters and outplacement programs. Moreover, BID leaders have lobbied public officials to invest more in shelters and alternative treatment strategies (Center City District, 1992).

The following two examples are descriptions of programs sponsored by BIDs in Portland and New York City to address the homelessness issue in their downtowns. Many other BIDs are endeavoring to provide or coordinate public services to the homeless as surveyed users of BID areas continue to identify homelessness as the biggest problem facing the district. A more detailed description of BIDs homeless services can be found below in the section on the Center City District.

**Portland Project Respond:** Project Respond is a unique partnership between Downtown Clean Safe and Mental Health Services West that employs humane, holistic approaches to resolving chronic mental health problems on the streets of the downtown core. Specially trained counselors assist mentally ill individuals at street-level to access available treatment services and housing options.

**The Times Square Consortium for the Homeless:** (TSC), established by the BID with local social service organizations, works to find more effective and humane ways to deal with the problems of homeless people. The TSC outreach teams, on the streets 16 hours a day seven days a week, provides treatment to mentally ill substance-abusing people who have refused services in the past and live permanently on the street. Since its inception three years ago, the TSC has placed over 70 of these hard-to-reach homeless individuals in housing.

## RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

### Research Questions

It is clear from a review of the literature that our knowledge of policing efforts in commercial districts is in its infancy. There is also a need for more research that examines the emerging relationships between public and private policing efforts within BIDs. It is equally clear that the issue of crime against business may have a substantial negative economic impact, particularly in the context of highly urbanized areas. By studying this problem, it is hoped that issues of commercial victimization, as well as the organizational and situational context in which collaborative crime prevention efforts between business leaders and police prove most effective will be addressed more comprehensively.

The ultimate goal of this research was to attain a better understanding of the dynamics of victimization on commercial establishments, and how community and problem-oriented policing efforts can best address the problems posed by crime, fear, and incivilities in commercial districts. This research also addressed the impact of community context, type of business, organizational structure of the district, market mix, and community policing impacts on crime prevention and order maintenance efforts within commercial areas.

The specific research questions to be addressed by this research are:

- 1) How does crime and disorder impact the economic vitality of commercial districts?
- 2) How are crime prevention and safety services produced in commercial districts in Philadelphia? What do businesses and the police bring to the co-production of these services?
- 3) How do businesses within our selected case districts perceive issues of crime, disorder, community vitality and economic development outcomes?
- 4) What security measures do businesses take to assure their safety?

- 5) How do Business Improvement Districts identify and address crime and disorder problems and with what impacts? How do these BIDs articulate needs to local police, and with what perceived success?

### **Research Design**


This research examined the issue of crime, policing and security efforts in commercial areas at three different levels of analysis: (1) The system as a whole (e.g., the interactions of crime, police and business-based crime prevention strategies within Philadelphia); (2) Intermediate units (our 5 specific commercial sites); and, (3) Individual-level programs and actors. Each level of analysis will be nested within the other so that the analysis can move up and down the scale of units of analysis, thereby providing for a more robust analysis of crime, community policing, and the co-production of safety services within a commercial sector frame of reference. The study has three levels -- macro, intermediate and micro, each of which is discussed below.

### **Macro-level Analysis**


At the macro level of analysis we have focused on examining crime against business in the largest commercial corridors in Philadelphia. These corridors have been identified as having more than 100 businesses operating in them (see Figures 1 and 2). These areas will be examined on several criminogenic and economic dimensions. Using data from the city's Planning Commission, which provides information on business storefront counts, vacancy rates, and total square footage, we have tracked business activity from 1988 to 1995 (the last year of available data).

All economic data will be analyzed in relation to data provided by the Philadelphia Police Department on: calls for service (in the most current year, 1998), reported crime and arrests; with these data being geo-coded to chosen commercial districts. Data on offenses and arrests provide useful information on crime - place dynamics in the selected sites as well as for the neighborhoods adjacent or co-mingled within these commercial areas. Calls for service data, once analyzed, can provide useful information on both the range of crime, but more importantly, order demands placed on the police in commercial areas.

Figure 1: Commercial Areas of Philadelphia, PA



**Figure 2: Business Improvement Districts; Philadelphia, PA**



By examining these over time (1994-1998) we can begin to better understand these dynamics in Philadelphia's largest commercial areas.

Nested within these commercial districts is Philadelphia's Center City District, the first Business Improvement District in the city. The Center City District has been collecting data on commercial usage and perceptions of the social and physical environment (see data sources below). These data have been collected since 1992, and will be analyzed with data on reported crime and arrests for the period 1992 through 1997.

Finally we analyze data from a survey to capture information from the police districts that provide services to the selected business corridors as well as to business Associations in these areas, so as to assess the range of police and business interventions being attempted in these business communities. This information will be used to categorize the level of co-production evident in each area.

#### *Economic and Business Data*

Economic data used in our macro analysis come from a data set collected by the Philadelphia Planning Commission. These data relate to retail growth, occupancy rates, and total square footage of retail space on commercial areas. These data are for two years -- 1988 and 1995. In our case districts, we also add this information for 1999. These economic data are then linked with crime data to gauge crime impacts on commercial activity within business districts.

#### *Police Data*

We have compiled and analyzed police data relating to, arrests and offenses from the geographic areas where the commercial districts are located for the period 1994 through 1997. Calls for service data have been geocoded to commercial concentrations for the year 1998. We have used a geographic mapping system to analyze these data for geographic and temporal patterns.

An analysis of these data can also reveal any differences in the volume and types of calls received by police in these areas. This type of analysis affords general statements about the effects that a range of community policing activities have on a community's awareness of criminal activity, and more specifically, to certain types of crime. Moreover, by expanding the size of the site of our analysis to include the residential neighborhoods immediately adjacent to these commercial areas, we can examine the crime and order interactions between these differing communities (commercial and residential) as well as any potential displacement effects of BID and police department crime prevention efforts.

#### *Customer Satisfaction Survey*

This survey within the Center City District (see description below) has been conducted annually since 1992. The survey is focused on the three primary stakeholders of the CCD: 1) Center City residents; 2) commercial property owners and; 3) visitors to the district. It is administered to 3300 individuals yearly, with 1500 being dropped off at selected apartment buildings within the city; 900 mailed to property owners and commercial tenants; and 900 on-the-street interviews being conducted by a local marketing firm.

#### *Economic Indicators*

The CCD compiles economic data from a number of different sources relating to retail sales, office supply and occupancy rates; number of retail establishments and occupancy rates; convention attendance; total available hotel rooms and occupancy rates; numbers of visitors; and median housing values in the district. These data sets are integrated and presented below.

#### **Case-level Analysis**

At the intermediate level, we have examined 44 commercial sites other than the Center City District in more detail, using survey instruments to collect data on perceptions of safety and order, relationships with the police department, current security arrangements

provided for by business, and current crime prevention efforts (see Appendix A for the survey instrument). These data provide a description on the dynamics of crime, as well as police and business efforts to co-produce safety in these commercial districts. This level of analysis facilitates an examination of displacement (either positive or negative) of crime and prevention efforts.

### *Business Survey*

Our business survey was informed by past efforts in measuring commercial victimization (U.S. SBA, 1969; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1983; McDevitt et al, 1990; Fisher, 1991) and fear of victimization (Skogan, 1985; McDevitt et al., 1990; Center City District, 1992-96). This survey was improved through consultation with business persons participating in focus groups within each selected site (see below), police officials, representatives from the private security industry and other social researchers from the university community.

A letter of support and introduction for this research project was mailed to every business address in each district announcing the dates and times we would be visiting the commercial district for interviews. An attempt was made to survey every commercial establishment. The method employed was a personal interview. If the owner, manager or assistant manager were unavailable, two efforts were made to reschedule. At last resort, interviewers would drop off a mail-in version of the survey instrument with a stamped envelope. Lastly, every business that did not respond was mailed another survey with a stamped return address envelope.

The content of the survey (see Appendix A) focused on capturing levels and costs of victimization, crime reporting practices, police contacts, perceptions of safety, crime prevention efforts, insurance coverage, perceptions of the extent of other problems within the district, type of business, and number of employees. In addition, demographic, business tenure and other related control variables were collected. These data were aggregated within each district, and compared across districts to assess how the co-

production of policing and crime prevention impacted upon victimization levels, perceptions of fear, perception of community problems and commercial viability.

### *Focus Groups*

Focus groups were held in five commercial areas. These groups consisted of BID leaders in each site, police personnel, interested business leaders, and local resident leaders. These sessions allowed for the collection of qualitative information about crime, safety and police responsibilities for security in these commercial corridors. Importantly, these sessions also provided an in-depth view of the social milieu of the districts, which assisted in triangulating our survey and observational data.

Focus group sessions concentrated on establishing general themes of community and problem oriented policing and crime prevention practices in commercial settings. These discussions led to the development of our business survey instrumentation. Group discussions progressed into more refined discussions of specific crime prevention and community policing practices such as information sharing, perceptions of community, strategic planning and evaluation of effort (see Appendix A for focus group questions).

### *Interviews*

In-depth interviews were conducted with key personnel within the BIDs, business organizations and the police department with regard to their efforts to organize and coordinate community and problem-oriented policing efforts within the commercial district they serve. As the Center City District has led in the development of BIDs within the City--and has acted as both consultant and model to other, smaller BIDs--an examination of their plans and practices through interviews of key personnel was an important element of our study. Moreover, interviews with police personnel allowed us to gain a better understanding of how they work with BIDs in their community policing efforts.

### *Observations*

In addition to interviews, we observed police in five districts and BID security personnel in three case districts where they were employed. The utility and importance of observational research has long been recognized. Our observation framework (see Appendix A) was driven by themes relating to policing practice in commercial areas, as well as coordination of efforts with BID personnel. In short, we posed the research questions, how do police and BID security personnel do their jobs, what are their tools, and how are they deployed, managed, and trained?

We devoted 150 hours of observation to the Center City District and 50 hours to the Frankford site (25 for police, 25 for security); we also spent 25 hours in each of the other three selected sites with police. Observational scope varied with the level and range of co-production activities undertaken in each of these sites. In Center City, an observational sample was devised to ensure coverage over the total of the District's geography as well as the two different shifts generally worked by BID security personnel.

## PHILADELPHIA COMMERCIAL DISTRICTS

The assessment of crime in the Philadelphia commercial districts required the construction of five map coverages. These coverages were constructed in ArcView, as ArcView shapefiles. The following five coverages allow for the aggregation, organization and description of the data:

1. Philadelphia Streets
2. Philadelphia Census Tract Block Groups
3. Philadelphia Census Tract Block Groups, Aggregated
4. Philadelphia Commercial Districts
5. Philadelphia Commercial District Buffers

The Philadelphia Streets file was originally a TIGER file. It was converted into a shapefile using ArcView. The file was used as a template for constructing several of the other coverages, as well as a reference map for the research team. The Philadelphia Census Tract Block Group coverage was also a TIGER file, and was converted to a shapefile using the same software. The Census data were attached, providing the socio-economic characteristics of each block group. Once the information was attached to the polygons, the census block group coverage was intersected with the commercial district coverage. All block groups that intersect or fall within the commercial district boundaries were selected. Block groups were aggregated to the size of the commercial districts, providing the socio-economic data for each commercial district and its surrounding area.

The polygons formed by the merged census block groups for each area did not equal the area of each commercial district and its buffer. Since the block group boundaries are not aligned with the boundaries of the commercial areas, the census block group data would need to be apportioned to the commercial district areas. While a GIS provides the ability to attribute data aggregated to one polygon to different shaped polygons through the techniques of splitting or merging, this process reduces the accuracy of the data for the

new polygons. Therefore, the research team chose to retain the block group boundaries and create a new geography for purposes of describing each commercial district. This geography is used only for census information, and is referred to the area in which the commercial district is located. Once the block groups for each area were selected, the census block groups were merged into a single polygon for each area. This process provided the socio-demographic characteristics of each area.

The research team constructed a coverage containing all Philadelphia commercial districts with over 100 units. The Philadelphia City Planning Commission provided descriptions of the boundaries for each of the 45 commercial districts. Using the Philadelphia Streets map as a reference, we created a polygon coverage depicting the commercial areas. This Philadelphia Commercial District coverage was then used to create a coverage containing two-block (900 feet) buffers of the commercial district. The buffer coverage enables the research team to examine crime in the area immediately surrounding the commercial districts.

## **Data**

### *Economic Data*

The Philadelphia Planning Commission provided economic data for all commercial districts in the city. These data include information about the total number of commercial units within each area as well as the number of units occupied or vacant. These data were provided for 1988 and 1995. The research team collected the same information for five of the commercial areas for 1998. These numbers were compared to compute a percent change in vacancy between 1988 and 1995. The 1998 economic information provides a supplementary description for the five business improvement districts.

### *Census Data*

The socio-demographic characteristics of each of the areas were obtained from the 1990 Census. Data provide information about the race/ethnicity, family economic status, housing units and household economic status in each of the areas.

## **Business Improvement District Characteristics**

The current study focuses on five business improvement districts in the city of Philadelphia. These districts are located in Center City, Manayunk, Frankford, Germantown and South Street commercial areas. However, in order to examine these five districts, it is important to look at other commercial areas in the city. Philadelphia houses forty-five commercial areas with over 100 units (including the five business improvement districts.) These districts scattered throughout the city, range in area from .08 to 1.61 square miles with an average of .25 square miles, while ranging in commercial retail size from 90 to 3420 square feet, averaging 413 square feet of retail space. The smallest commercial district contained 100 units in 1995, while the largest housed 1149. Vacancy rates ranged from almost just over zero (two percent in 1988 and 1.7 percent in 1995) to over fifty percent (54.4 percent in 1988 and 56.4 percent in 1995). The average change in vacancy rate from 1988 to 1995 was -.56 percent.

### *Center City District*

Located in the heart of downtown, the Center City Business District is the largest of the business improvement districts. The Center City District held 1965 retail units in 1988. This number increased to 2272 in 1995. The District's business vacancy rate increased from just fewer than 14 percent (13.8) in 1988 to 16.2 percent in 1995.

The population density in the surrounding area is 49,754 persons per square mile. The area is predominately White (84 percent). Nine percent of the population is Black and four percent Asian. Three percent of the population is Hispanic, and only one percent does not speak English.

The area holds 16,786 housing units, with a 12 percent vacancy rate. Thirty-one percent of housing is renter occupied. Over 14,500 households reside in Center City. Approximately 40 percent (38) of the households had a yearly income of less than \$20,000 in 1990. About the same percent of households earned between \$20,000 and

\$60,000, while under twenty (19) percent earned above \$60,000 in 1990. Center City housed the lowest percentage of single-mother households (less than one percent.) Yet, the area had among the highest percentage of population living in poverty. The low income in this area is partly due to the large numbers of college students living in the area. The area suffers an unemployment rate of ten percent, while 63 percent of the population over age 24 has earned at least a college degree.

### *South Street*

The South Street Commercial District contained 365 businesses in 1988 and 341 in 1995. The commercial vacancy rate fell significantly in the seven-year period from 36 percent in 1988 to 10.6 percent in 1995.

Over 2400 housing units stand in the surrounding neighborhood, providing housing for over 5200 households. Fifteen percent of residential units are vacant, with just under 80 percent of the occupied units renter occupied. The area has a population density of 24,288 persons per square mile. Eighty-nine percent of the area's residents are White; ten percent are Black, and the remainder Asian. Two percent of the population is of Hispanic descent. Ten percent of the population failed to complete high school, while 64 percent of the population over age 24 has earned at least a college degree. The South Street neighborhood is the wealthiest of the five commercial districts. Fifty percent of households have an income of over \$40,000. Twenty-three percent of households earn under \$20,000, and a similar percentage earns between \$20,000 and \$40,000. Eight percent of the population lives under the poverty level.

### *Manayunk*

Manayunk is the smallest of the five commercial districts. With just over 100 retail units (113) in 1988, the district increased to 173 in 1995. The business vacancy rate fell over eight percent from 1988 to 1995 (13.3 percent in 1988 and 5.2 percent in 1995.)

The area houses 2854 persons per square mile. Over 90 percent of the population is White, and the remaining nine percent Black. Over one thousand households reside in

the area. Six percent of households are single mother households. Less than ten percent of the neighborhood's population lives in poverty. Thirty-seven percent of the households have an income of less than \$20,000, while less than ten percent earn over \$60,000. Over one-half of all households earn between \$20,000 and \$60,000. One quarter of the residents age 24 and older failed to complete high school. Eighteen percent of the area's 1448 housing units are vacant. Forty percent of the occupied units are renter occupied.

### *Germantown*

Germantown's commercial district held 255 retail units in 1988 and 270 in 1995. The increase in retail units was accompanied by a drop in the vacancy rate from 17.7 in 1988 to 11.9 in 1995.

The surrounding neighborhood contains 1235 housing units, 18 percent of which are vacant. Twenty-eight percent of the occupied structures are renter occupied. These units house just under one thousand (988) households. Single mother households constitute six percent of Germantown's households. The area is among the lowest income neighborhoods, with 52 percent of the households earning less than \$20,000. Eleven percent of the households received over \$60,000 in yearly income. A poverty rate of 29 percent makes Germantown the poorest of the neighborhoods among the five commercial districts. Thirty-one percent of the population over age 24 has not earned a high school degree, and 28 percent has obtained at least a college degree. The neighborhood has a ten percent unemployment rate.

Germantown is also the least densely populated neighborhood. The area has a population density of 7,970 persons per square mile. Seventy percent of the neighborhood's residents are Black, 29 percent are White and the remaining one percent is Asian. Two percent of the population is Hispanic.

## *Frankford*

The Frankford commercial district decreased from 227 retail units in 1988 to 208 retail units in 1995. In addition to losing retail space, the district suffered an increase in retail vacancy of over 25 percent. Frankford's neighborhood contains 2325 residential units which house 1962 households and 5090 people. The residential vacancy rate is 15 percent. Forty-five percent of occupied housing is renter occupied.

The population density in the area is 16,855 persons per square miles. Seventy-nine percent of the residents are White, 16 percent Black and one percent Asian. Nine percent of the population is Hispanic.

Just under three-quarters (72 percent) of Frankford households have yearly incomes of under \$30,000. Twenty-five percent earn between \$30,000 and \$60,000, and only four percent of the neighborhood households earn \$60,000 or above. Eleven percent of all households are headed by a single mother and 20 percent of the population lives in poverty. While only six percent of residents age 24 and above have earned at least a college degree, Frankford's unemployment rate remains under ten percent.

### **Crime in Commercial Districts**

#### *Crime Data*

Data used for the crime analysis include official Philadelphia police offense and arrest data for the five-year period of time from 1994 through 1998 and police calls for service data for 1998. All offense and arrest data were divided into five categories of crimes—violent crime, disorder offenses, business related property crime, personal property crime and illicit market offenses. Violent crimes include all homicides, rapes, street robbery, assaults and sex offenses. Disorder offenses consist of vandalism, driving while intoxicated, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, indecent exposure and acts of open lewdness. Offenses committed in the illicit market include receipt or sales of stolen property, prostitution, drug sales or possession, gambling and illegal sales of alcohol.

Property crimes were divided into two categories—business and personal. Business related property crime include robbery of a business, burglary of a business, retail theft, forgery, fraud and liquor law violations committed by consumers. Finally, personal property offenses include theft and auto theft.

Calls for service data were divided into categories according to the priority of the call. The Philadelphia Police Department has all calls for service data ranked according to the urgency of the call. Priority codes range from 1 to 6. Calls given a priority of one include calls to assist another officer, crime in progress (i.e. burglary, abduction, or robbery), report of an explosion and a person with a gun. Priority 2 calls include calls for burglary alarms, car pursuit, disturbance in hospital or school, person with a weapon and report of burglary, theft or abduction. Calls for automobile accidents, bomb threats, fire alarm, missing person and a local fire receive a priority rating of 3. Those calls receiving a priority of 4 include calls about a disorderly crowd, SEPTA check (check on transit system), money escort, school crossing and transporting a prisoner. Finally, calls concerning abandoned automobiles, barking dogs, graffiti or open fire hydrants receive a priority of 6.

All data were geocoded using Map Marker address matching software. Geocoding success rates varied according to the types of crime. We were able to obtain over a 93 percent hit rate on the Part 1 arrest and offense data. However, due to incomplete or missing addresses in the Part 2 arrest and offense data, we were unable to geocode approximately 50 percent of the data. In order to improve the accuracy of our description, we excluded the Part 2 offenses with lower than a 70 percent hit rate. Calls for service data were geocoded to the address to which the officer was dispatched. We were able to obtain above an 85 percent hit rate for the calls for service data.

Once the data were geolocated, they were aggregated to the commercial district and surrounding buffer area. The crime numbers for each area were used to compute the rates for offenses and arrests per square miles. Area rates were computed instead of population rates because of the inaccurate estimates available for population in the commercial districts and their surrounding areas. Not only is it impossible to accurately

divide census tract block group-level data (see discussion above), but the examination of commercial districts presents specific problems when dealing with population. Census data provide population data for those who live within certain boundaries. Commercial districts attract populations who do not live in the area.

### **Crime in Philadelphia**

Crime in the City of Philadelphia rose slightly throughout the five-year period from 1994 through 1998. Property crimes constitute the highest number of reported offenses rising from just over 600 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 760 offenses in 1998. Violent offenses also increased from 235 in 1994 to 325 per square mile in 1998. The illicit market offense rate experienced a slight increase from 77 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 106 in 1998, while disorder offenses remained stable through out the four years (260 per square mile in 1994 and 256 per square mile in 1998).

The city saw similar trends in the arrests occurring during the five years. The arrest rate for property crime remained the highest rate through out the time period, decreasing slightly from 141 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 120 arrests in 1998. Arrests for disorder offenses also decreased from 1994 to 1998 (105 in 1994 and 37 in 1998.) Arrests for violent crime remained stable, with only a slight increase from 69 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 75 in 1998. Finally, arrests for illicit market offenses saw the largest increase, rising from 104 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 153 in 1998.

### **Crime in Commercial Districts -Collectively**

Philadelphia's commercial districts experienced increases in violent, disorder and illicit market offenses from 1994 to 1998. Violent offenses rose on average from nine offenses per square mile in 1994 to almost 16 offenses per square mile in 1998. Similarly, disorder offenses increased on average from nine offenses in 1994 to almost 18 offenses per square mile in 1998. Illicit market offenses saw the greatest increase during the five years, growing from an average of only one reported offense per square mile to over 20

offenses in 1998. It is important to note that this increase may be due to reporting practices by both citizens and police rather than an actual increase in offenses. While we are unable to ascertain whether, and to what degree, reporting practices may have affected the data, we suspect that this is the case in this circumstance. Interestingly, on average, property offenses in the commercial districts remained stable through out the time period. Business property offenses remained over 22 offenses per square mile, as personal property offenses decreased only slightly from 35 property offenses per square mile in 1994 to 33 offenses in 1998.

Arrest rates in the commercial districts follow a different trend than the offense rates. The average arrest rate for violent crime decreased slightly from six arrests in 1994 to almost five arrests in 1998. Arrests for disorder offenses saw, on average, a larger decrease. The average rate dropped from 9.5 arrests for disorder crimes in 1994 to less than two in 1998. Arrest rates for illicit market offenses remained stable, with the average arrest rate in 1994 of 2.8 in 1994 and 3.3 in 1998. Arrests for property crime decreased for both business property arrests (an average of 16 in 1994 and 11 in 1998) and personal property arrests (an average of six in 1994 and 4.5 in 1998.)

### **Crime in Business Improvement Districts**

#### *Center City*

In order to examine crime in the five business improvement districts, we examined arrest and offense rates for the districts and surrounding areas as well as calls for service data for the five districts and their neighborhoods. The Center City District is unique in its criminogenic environment. The district suffers significantly higher offense and arrest rates than the other districts. This is in part due to its unique location in the heart of downtown Philadelphia. The district holds tourist, healthcare and consumer opportunities not common to other districts. While the other districts suffer lower offense rates than their immediate surrounding area, the Center City District experiences higher offense rates than the surrounding two-block buffer. Business and personal property offense rates are the highest among crime categories in Center City. In 1994, the district

experienced a business property offense rate of 423 offenses per square mile. While the rate dropped throughout the time period, it rose back up to 414 in 1998. The district's personal property offense rate also fell slightly from 545 offenses per square mile to 528 in 1998. The violent offense rate increased from 153 in 1994 to 240 offenses per square mile in 1998. Disorder offenses provided a crime rate of 145 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 294 in 1998. The illicit market offense rate very low 1994 through 1997 (ranging from one offense to 31 offenses per square mile), however the number of reported offenses increased the crime rate to 246 crimes per square mile in 1998. As discussed above, we suspect that this increase is due to changes in reporting procedures rather than in an actual increase in this category of offense.

The area immediately surrounding the Center City District experienced significantly lower offense rates. With the exception of personal property offenses, offense rates are less than half of what they are in the district. The offense rates for personal property remain high. This rate may be due to the location of residences and the paths between commercial and entertainment areas throughout Center City.

The Center City District arrest rates fell throughout the five-year period. The combined property arrest rates make up the largest percentage of arrests in the district. Arrests for business property offenses fell from 309 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 207 arrests in 1998. Personal property arrests also dropped from 109 in 1994 to 74 arrests per square mile in 1998. Arrests for violent crime went from 171 arrests in 1994 to 70 arrests per square mile in 1998. The disorder arrest rate fell dramatically from 148 arrests in 1994 to 29 in 1998. Finally, arrests for illicit offenses remained relatively stable, decreasing only from 33 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 29 in 1998. As with the offense rates, the arrest rates in the Center City District were significantly greater than in the two-block buffer area. All arrest rates were at least six times greater within the district.

Calls for service in the Center City District are also disproportionately high in comparison to the four other districts. Of the 90,891 calls for service that fell within the five commercial districts, 72.8 percent originated from the Center City District. In 1998,

the district created 71 percent of priority 1 calls, 74 percent of priority 2 calls and 77 percent of priority 3 calls for service. While the Center City District has the largest area, when calls for service per square mile are examined, the district remains the second highest in overall calls.

### *Frankford*

Offense rates in Frankford's Commercial District decreased from 1994 to 1997, but then rose again in 1998. Violent offenses dropped from seven to four offenses per square mile until 1998, when the rate increased to 10.8 offenses. Similarly, the offense rate for disorder crimes dipped from 4.5 offenses per square mile down to under two offenses in 1997. The rate then spiked up to over 14 offenses per square mile in 1998. The illicit market offense rate fell from 2.5 offenses in 1994 to under one offense per square mile in 1997, and then climbs back up to almost 12 offenses in 1998. Both business and personal property offense rates decreased through out the five-year period. Business property offenses decreased from 8.6 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 7.6 in 1998. Personal property offenses also fell, dropping from 14 offenses in 1994 to just over 10 offenses per square miles in 1998.

The area immediately surrounding the Frankford District experienced a significantly higher offense rate during the five-year period. Located in an economically deprived area, the neighborhood also houses the Frankford rail line. Pedestrians traveling to and from the district, as well as to and from the rail are susceptible to victimization. Furthermore, the area holds several public transportation stops, bars and liquor stores, as well as other establishments that promote various types of offending.

Arrest rates in the Frankford District decreased from 1994 through 1998. Arrests for violent crime dropped slightly from 4.3 arrests in 1994 to 3.8 arrests per square mile in 1998. The disorder arrest rate experienced more of a decrease, falling from 11.5 in 1994 to 3.8 in 1998. Arrests for illicit market crimes also fell from eight arrests per square mile to 5.9 arrests five years later. Business and personal property arrest rates remained relatively stable, with the business arrest rate decreasing from 3.2 arrests per square mile

in 1994 to 3.05 arrests in 1998 and personal property arrest rate lowering from three arrests in 1994 to 2.6 arrests in 1998.

Frankford's surrounding area experienced lower arrest rates for disorder, illicit market and business property crimes, while suffering higher violent crime and personal property arrest rates. As discussed above, the arrest rates in the surrounding area may be due to the characteristics of the neighborhood as well as use of space within the neighborhood. Furthermore, as indicated later in the discussion of the Frankford District, the differences in how the police patrol the neighborhood and district affect the arrest rates within each area.

Calls for service originating out of the Frankford District constitute 5.4 percent of the calls examined. The majority of calls for service in the area were priority 3 and priority 4, with priority 1 calls make up less than five percent of the district's calls for service.

#### *Germantown*

Like Frankford, Germantown experienced fluctuating offense rates from 1994 through 1998. Property offenses present the largest problem within the district, with violent crime earning a close second. The Germantown District's personal property crime rate increased from 23 in 1994 to 38 offenses per square mile in 1998. Likewise, the business offense rate in the district rose from 19 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 27 offenses five years later. While the violent crime rate fell and rose throughout the time period, it ultimately rose significantly from 15 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 29.7 offenses in 1998. Disorder offenses in the district decreased from 6 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 2.5 offenses in 1997 before the rate jumped to almost 20 offenses per square mile in 1998. Finally, the district's illicit offense rate remains low (2 offenses or lower per square mile) from 1994 through 1997. In 1998, the rate spiked to over 38 offenses per square mile.

The two-block area surrounding the Germantown District suffered higher offense rates than the district, with the exception of business property crime. Personal property offense rates followed by violent offense rates were highest in the area.

Arrest rates for violent, disorder and illicit market crimes fell through out the five years, while arrests for property crimes increased. The Germantown District experienced a slight drop in arrests for violent crime (6.9 in 1994 and 6.5 in 1998.) Arrests for disorder crimes also decreased from eight arrests per square mile in 1994 to 3.5 arrests in 1998. Arrests for illicit market offenses declined from five arrests in 1994 to 3.7 arrests per square mile in 1998. The district's arrest rate for business property crime increased from 10.9 in 1994 to 11.7 in 1998, after dipping significantly throughout 1995, 1996 and 1997. Finally, arrests for personal property crime rose from three arrests per square mile in 1994 to just over five arrests in 1998. The surrounding area experienced fewer arrests than the district across all categories of crime.

Calls for service rates in the Germantown District were among the lowest of the five districts. Eight percent of the calls for service originated out of the district. The majority of calls for service were priority 2, 3 and 4. As with the other districts, the priority 1 calls constituted only a small percentage of the calls in Germantown.

#### *Manayunk*

The Manayunk District experienced the lowest overall crime rates through out the five-year period. The upscale retail opportunities in the district as well as the "suburban" residential community located immediately surrounding the district are likely influences on the crime rate. Personal property offenses present the largest problem in the area, increasing from 4.5 offenses per square mile to five in 1998. The district's violent offense rate went from no offenses per square mile in 1994 to over three offenses in 1998. Disorder offenses increased from slightly fewer than four in 1994 to 5.5 offenses per square mile in 1998. Illicit market offenses increased from under one offense per square mile in 1994 to slightly fewer than six in 1998, and the business property offense rate increased from under one offense in 1994 to over five in 1998.

The district's surrounding area experienced higher offense rates than in the district. Traffic to and from the district to parking and housing may serve as an explanation for the increased crime rate on the outer edges of the district. Little parking is available in the district, forcing patrons to find parking on side alleys, streets and offset parking lots. Also, university students occupy a large percentage of housing immediately surrounding the district. After frequenting the bars and restaurants in the district, residents travel home by foot, susceptible to victimization.

As expected, arrest rates in the Manayunk District are extremely low. The district experienced the lowest overall arrest rate among the districts. Only arrests for disorder crimes (1994 through 1997) and property crimes (1997 through 1998) reach one arrest per square mile. Arrest rates in all other crime rates remain below one arrest per square mile for both the district and the surrounding area.

Manayunk experienced the lowest calls for service rate of the five districts. Just over two percent of all of the calls for service examined originated in the district. Manayunk produced fewer than 1,000 priority 1 calls per square mile, with the majority of calls being priority 2, 3 and 4.

#### *South Street*

The South Street District experienced the lowest offense rate, second to the Manayunk District. Offense rates for all categories of crime increased throughout the five-year period. The personal property offense rate is the highest crime rate for the district, increasing from 4.5 offenses in 1994 to over five offenses per square mile in 1998, with spikes in 1995 and 1996. Business property offenses increased from seven offenses per square miles in 1994 to over 13 offenses in 1998. Disorder offenses are also among South Street's problems, increasing from three offenses per square mile in 1994 to 9.6 offenses in 1998. The violent offense rate increased from one offense in 1994 to 3.7 offenses per square mile in 1998. Illicit market offenses also increased from less than one offense per square mile in 1994 to almost 28 offenses in 1998.

Similarly to the Manayunk District, the South Street District experienced lower offense rates than its surrounding neighborhood. The offense rates in the South Street area are as high as 35 times greater than those in the district. As in Manayunk, these rates may be due to the travel to and from the district to parking, public transportation or residences.

The South Street District experienced the highest arrest rates for disorder and business property arrests. Arrests for disorder violations decreased from seven arrests per square mile to six in 1997 and less than one in 1998, while arrests for business property crimes increased from five arrests per square mile in 1994 to 8.10 in 1998. The district's personal property arrest rate decreased from 1.4 in 1994 to 1.2 arrests per square mile in 1998. Violent crime arrests also decreased from 1.6 in 1994 to less than one arrest per square mile in 1998. Finally, arrests for illicit market offenses increased slightly, but remained below one arrest per square mile through out the five-year period. Arrest rates in the South Street District's surrounding neighborhood are higher than in the district, with the exception of business property arrests.

The South Street District produced the highest calls for service rates of the five commercial districts. The district's calls for service make up almost 12 percent of the total calls for the five districts. Priority 3 and 4 calls for service rates are the district's highest. Approximately 200,000 priority 3 and 4 calls originated in the district. Included in these categories of calls are the disorder complaints that are associated with the South Street's nightlife.

## **Captain's Survey**

In the spring of 1999, the Center for Public Policy distributed a survey to the captains of each of the 23 police districts within Philadelphia. The purpose of the survey was to catalogue the community and problem-oriented policing efforts being pursued within the city's commercial districts. The respondents were assured that the results of the survey would be kept confidential and anonymous.

The survey included questions concerning the severity of problems within the district and whether the captain felt that the severity of the problem had fluctuated from the previous year. There were also questions of comparison between the residential and commercial areas of a district. The respondents were also asked about their precinct's tactics associated with community policing, what efforts were being utilized and to what extent in the commercial districts of the city. Further, the Captains were asked about their association with other agencies, both state and other, in addressing these issues and others that they felt were relevant.

## **Problems in the Commercial Districts Over Time**

The captains of the fifteen responding police districts were asked about the police districts ability to respond to particular problems over the past year. Five of the problems concerned incivilities in the district. These five are "quality of life" concerns and not necessarily criminal, or were, at the very least, victim-less crimes. One problem was concerned with illegal businesses while the final four focused on criminal acts within the commercial districts.

The five incivilities focused on were loitering, trash on the streets and sidewalks, panhandling and begging, parking and traffic and public consumption of alcohol and drugs. The captains felt that the largest gains were in the areas of public consumption of alcohol and drugs (60.0%), while the largest decrease was in the same category (26.7%).

What we find is that with the other four incivilities a majority of responding captains (45% or more) felt that the problem stayed the same.

The four criminal issues identified were shoplifting/theft, drug selling, robbery and burglary. Approximately half (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that all of the criminal problems listed had improved substantially, except burglary, which showed a slightly lower improvement as compared to the other crimes (40.0%). A third of the captains surveyed felt that drug selling was the criminal act that had actually gotten the worse.

Another issue addressed in the course of the survey was the presence of illegal or unlicensed businesses. This, however, seemed to be a constant problem with only a small proportion of captains feeling that the presence of illegal businesses in the district had either gotten better (6.7%), or worse (13.3%).

What is interesting in assessing the captains' responses is that across the ten problems as listed we see that the largest decline in the area of drug selling. This could be the result of the efforts by commercial districts to "clean their streets", or a byproduct of displacement, which moves the problem from the areas frequented by shoppers or tourists to surrounding areas.

### **Role of the Police within the District: Commercial vs. Residential**

A majority (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that the problems they dealt with were worse in the commercial districts in comparison to the residential districts. Only approximately a quarter (26.7%) of the respondents felt that the problems in the residential districts were worse than the commercial districts. Approximately a quarter (26.7%) felt that there was no difference between the problems in the residential districts versus the commercial districts.

The captains were asked which problems they felt had a larger impact on commercial districts in comparison to residential districts. The most frequently reported problems were retail theft, panhandling, robberies and loitering. The question then is do policing styles differ between the residential and commercial districts to address these problems?

The reported efforts made to police different type of districts varied in over three-quarters (80%) of the responses. The most common (60%) difference is simply the use of foot patrol in commercial districts, which is not found in the residential districts. A smaller group (13.3%) reported the use of a combination of both bike and foot patrol.

A number of questions focused on tactics associated with community policing. The captains were asked to indicate which efforts were utilized in the commercial districts. Several of the districts (26.7) reported the use of mobile mini stations, while a smaller number (13.3%) reported the use of stationary mini stations. All of the districts reported the use of bicycle patrols in the commercial districts.

### **Services to the Commercial District**

The captains also reported on services offered to businesses in commercial districts. A majority of the districts (80%) reported offering crime prevention training for retailers. A similar majority (80%) reported providing escorts for cash drops for local businesses. Only roughly a quarter (26.7%) of the districts provided police located within the commercial establishments. Finally, two-thirds (66.7%) of the responding captains reported offering special seasonal details designed to increase police presence in the districts.

The captains were asked about the amount of police effort dedicated to problems associated with the commercial district. Captains felt that over half of the time (60%) their Crime Prevention officer dedicated "a lot" of time to the commercial district. Over a third of the time (40.0%) both Sanitation Officers and Abandoned Auto Units were also reported to spend "a lot" of time in the commercial district.

The final questions posed to the captains concerned the Department's policies when dealing with retailers in the commercial districts. The captains reported that they dealt with incidents such as shoplifting, employee theft, credit or check fraud, or suspicious loitering in a variety of ways. They reported using a number of methods in handling these problems that would normally be primarily associated only with commercial areas as opposed to residential areas.

Some of the captains' responses included, creating partnerships between the police and private security where the police would provide transportation while private security was responsible for the apprehension of the suspects. Another reported intervention was to dispatch police detectives to the store who would act undercover and attempt to apprehend suspects identified by local security agents. In some cases private security personnel were allowed to fill out necessary paperwork to file charges, and at times plainclothes or patrol officers were dispatched to search for suspects.

Finally the captains were asked about efforts or initiatives undertaken for planning or implementing crime prevention strategies and tactics in commercial districts. The most common strategy reported was assignment to foot patrol or increase in foot patrol, however, only approximately half (46.7%) of the captains reported requesting additional manpower for the commercial districts. The other initiative mentioned involved partnerships between the police and other agencies, such as private security, businessmen's associations, and with retailers.

### **The Center City District**

The city's first and largest SSD, the Center City District (CCD) started services in 1991. The inception of the district, planned for five years, followed an era of tremendous development in the city's central business district. In the six-year period between 1984 and 1989, Philadelphia's skyline shot skyward at a rapid rate--nearly doubling the amount of available office space (Beauregard 1989). In addition to office development, the city

invested heavily in the tourism and convention market. With the construction of the Pennsylvania Convention Center, completed in 1994, the city attempted to improve its ability to compete in the lucrative convention and trades show markets. Driving up the cost of the new convention facility -- upwards to \$1 billion after financing costs are factored -- was the decision to place the convention center in a densely populated and built area in the center of the city. This decision was spurred by a desire to link the center with other downtown attractions, and to promote hotel construction within the downtown.

In addition to its direct efforts to bolster its position in the national convention and visitors market, Philadelphia has endeavored to improve its tourist position regionally. To this end, the city has invested in an arts district located in its downtown area. The 'Avenue of the Arts' is a \$300 million project of performing arts facilities and streetscape improvements along the city's main north/south thoroughfare.

Counter to the increased public and private investment in downtown, the city's overall financial health was in deep decline in the early 1990s. The creation of the special district was in part in response to the city's declining share of regional commercial activity in the areas of both employment and retail sales (Adams et. al, 1991). The city's share of total jobs in the Greater Philadelphia region declined from 67 percent to 41 percent from 1950 to 1990; while the growth of suburban shopping centers and malls reduced its share of regional retail sales from 40 to 18 percent in the same time (Levy, 1995).

Covering 100 blocks of the city's central business district, the CCD is funded through a special tax assessment levied to property owners located within the district. This special surcharge resulted in \$6 million of revenue for the CCD in 1991. With current 1998 revenues totaling approximately \$8.2 million, the district has realized a 34% rate of growth since its inception but seven years ago.

The distribution of its expenses in 1998 illustrates the typical mission of a BID, with 37 percent allotted for sanitation, including graffiti removal; public safety programming accounted for 33 percent of the budget; while a streetscape's annual debt service

(\$1,462,000 over 25 years) makes up 17 percent of the annual budget. Of the additional 18 percent of expenses, 11 percent went to marketing and promotion with the remaining 7 percent covering administrative costs. In addition to services provided to its member businesses, the CCD provides technical assistance to neighborhood-based commercial areas. This assistance, funded through outside grants from foundation and state-level agencies, provides staff and resources to assist neighborhood commercial areas establishing an improvement district.

With sanitation its main focus, the CCD contracts out with a sanitation service, placing as many as 50 street sweepers on the streets during the day. The CCD also employs high-pressure washers to steam clean the sidewalks and remove graffiti in the downtown. This aspect of the operation has been successful as evidenced by street interviews commissioned by the CCD which reveal a sense that the downtown is much cleaner (Center City District, 1997-98).

### **Public Safety/Crime Prevention Efforts**

The Center City District has attempted to address crime and public order in its service area on three fronts. Its initial task was to coordinate policing services within the district. Before its inception, the Center City neighborhoods served by the CCD were split into two policing districts. This made crime prevention and community-policing difficult as each district has its own command structure, resources and strategic initiatives. Of the 470 officers assigned to both districts, 69 officers were assigned to foot or bike beats within the district. As part of a coordination effort, these officers were all assigned to a police substation financed and shared by the CCD offices and placed under a single commander (Greene et. al, 1993).

The most extensive crime prevention effort of the CCD is the forty uniformed customer service representatives (CSRs) on the street in two shifts. Serving a multitude of roles, CSRs are hospitality agents, security guards, crime prevention specialists, first aid experts, and social service intervention specialists. In their security role, they act as a

paid townwatch and are linked to a central dispatch radio system located in the CCD security offices. They interact with public police at the CCD offices by sharing a locker room and standing roll call together. They assist officers in problem solving efforts by gathering information and calling the dispatcher if they observe criminal activities (see below for full description of CSR activities)

A subset of CSRs deals with homelessness through the district's homeless outreach team efforts. Two teams of CSRs intercept homeless on the street and coordinate services through established city agencies. The CCD has also done a fair amount of lobbying on the issue of homelessness. A report authored by the CCD in 1992 made recommendations for more state support of shelter programming, and tried to dissuade individuals and institutions from feeding the homeless while they were still on the street (Center City Report, 1992). A further effort to curtail homelessness, or the visibility of it in the city's downtown (see Mallet, 1995), involved the district's support of a sidewalk behavior bill recently passed by the city council. The bill forbids use of the sidewalk for many of the behaviors exhibited by homeless, such as sleeping, sitting, or panhandling. The CCD conducts interviews on the street and in residential buildings in an effort to rank the most critical problems facing the district (Center City District, 1992-97). It used this data, compiled annually, while advocating to address nuisance behavior by the homeless with a community court that will serve lower-level offenders in the district.

A third strategy to reduce crime has been an application of a strategic approach to crime prevention planning. A crime prevention specialist on the CCD staff directs research efforts using official crime and offense data from the police department. In addition, the CCD offers crime prevention training to merchants, office workers and employees of retail establishments. The district has also organized a crime prevention council focused on commercial crime prevention. The council effectively brings together all of the major retail, hotel and office security operators, police officials, federal law enforcement officials and CCD staff for a bi-monthly meeting to discuss crime prevention issues in the district. Credit card and check fraud, burglaries, counterfeiting are among the topics that are addressed at these sessions.

In addition to its service programs, the CCD has also financed infrastructure development in the district. The CCD, with the support of the City Council and Mayor, floated a \$25 million bond issue that went to the installation of more street lighting, tree planting and sidewalk improvements. Backed by the revenues of the CCD, the rating of the 25-year bond was better than the city could have gotten on the municipal bond markets.

The CCD has recently taken on the task of managing a non-profit economic development planning and advocacy agency, the Central Philadelphia Development Corporation (CPDC). The CPDC, initiated in 1957 by local business elites, has historically led many of the redevelopment efforts focused on the downtown. Its efforts at business retention and attraction are improved by its merging with the CCD, with the two organizations now reaping mutual benefits through such shared resources as office space, databases and research and promotional staff.

The CCD engages in a significant amount of place marketing (Mallet, 1995; Houston, 1997), as do most downtown BIDs around the country. Promotional events such as noontime concerts, and the CCD's "Make it a Night" Wednesday evenings are advertised on radio, billboards and newspapers.

### **Customer Service Representatives (CSRs)**

The most extensive public safety effort employed by the CCD is its customer service representative (CSR) program. The CCD employs 40 uniformed CSRs who patrol the district in three shifts over 16 geographic beats. With two shifts during the week and on Saturday (8am-4pm) and (2pm-10pm), as well as one Sunday shift (10am-6pm), CSR's approximate the community policing beats and shifts of the district's public police. During the day shift, CSRs patrol their beats alone. This ensures maximum coverage of the Center City District. CSRs pair up halfway into the evening shift (usually between 5 and 6 pm). This is done to ensure the safety of CSRs during the evening hours.

Adorned in distinctive and colorful uniforms (see image below), CSRs are unarmed and instructed to avoid direct involvement in crime-related events. They serve as a problem-solving resource, with a custodial role that stands in deference to public police. The principal tool utilized by CSRs is a two-way radio. While on patrol, they cannot talk to one another, but are in direct contact with a central dispatcher who acts as a conduit to the police. If a CSR witnesses or is apprised of an event that warrants police intercession, a radio contact is made to the dispatcher who then calls 911. This system can be circumvented in an emergency situation as the CSRs share a district headquarters with the Center City police substation. Thus, the police dispatcher and the CSR dispatch operator can and do frequently share information. CSRs have indicated that this system has had led to quicker response times for many incidents occurring within the district.



Center City District customer service representative (CSR) performing a common task: giving directions to a city visitor.

Training for CSRs is extensive relative to that typically provided to private security operatives, with 125 hours of paid training delivered over the course of a month. The scope of the training curriculum reflects the eclectic role of the CSR; with sessions devoted to marketing and customer service, policing procedures, use of radio, self defense training, nuisance behavior management, first aid training, ethics, and extensive training focused on knowledge of local sites, events and resources. An official job duty list reveals further the varied role of CSRs.

## **Job Duties**

- Patrol designated area in foot as “eyes and ears” of the Philadelphia Police Department, communicating crimes and disturbances via 2-way radio.
- Serve as goodwill ambassadors, information sources and positive welcoming advocates for the Center City District.
- Assist with first aid and emergency situations.
- Communicate Philadelphia resources, sites of interests, and current entertainment, to assist shoppers and visitors throughout the Center City District.
- Interact with Center City business representatives and tenants for communication and support.
- Support the Philadelphia Police Department, Streets Department and Center City maintenance crews.
- Represent the Center City District and Community Representative program in a professional manner at meetings and special events.
- Complete daily activity reports and other assignments as specified by supervisor. Work on special assignments, both individually and with others.

The official qualifications for the job also point to the dual role of the CSR, that of public safety operative, as well as a specialist in public relations and marketing of the city’s downtown area.

## **Qualifications**

The qualifications for the position of CSR exceed the standard for the security industry

- Minimum of two years of college in related training including Public Relations, Tourism, Public Safety, Security or a combination of experience and education.
- Minimum of 21 years old.
- Experience with the public.
- Good interpersonal skills and good physical conditioning.
- Must be able to patrol in extreme weather while carrying up to 10 pounds of equipment.
- Must pass pre-employment screening including a physical examination, drug screening, background and reference check.

## **Observation**

CSRs were observed over the course of a month (November 1998). There were a total of 22 shifts observed. The observations covered each of the 16 beats patrolled by CSRs. As CSRs generally covert two beats per shift, were able to get total coverage of the entire Center City District CSR coverage area. We also made an effort to observe both shifts of the CSRs (we did not observe the Sunday shift), as well as the change in shift as overlapping shifts required an operational planning effort of CSR managers. Two observations of the CCD specialized homeless outreach team were also performed. This unit includes two specially trained CSRs who are focused almost entirely on place management issues relating to the homeless. A discussion of this team, as well the CCD efforts at homeless abatement and treatment is pursued in greater detail below.

The observation of CSRs was informed by some prior knowledge of the goals and operations of the program through examination of official literature, as well as interviews with CCD leaders and supervisors. This prior knowledge led to the formation of observational constructs which became the organizing focus for observers. Observational findings are summarized into four broad categories: (1) organization of work (patrol); (2) nature of encounters with public; (3) relationship with police; (4) relationships with private security operatives.

## **Organization of Work**

The organization of work for CSRs evolved over the seven yeas of the program. Initially, a generalized patrol philosophy dictated the deployment of CSRs. Patrols reflected the use of public space patterns by visitors – with shifts beginning at 10:00 am and ending at midnight. The philosophy behind this deployment strategy was to maximize the visibility of the CSRs to the public at-large. Thus, the constituency of the CCD was initially defined as users of public streets. This strategy also served to familiarize the public with the presence of a non-police security force. This orientation began to shift as CSRs became more specialized into functional areas such as special event security, hospitality,

and retail theft prevention. This shift was caused by the perception that CSRs were not being maximized in a general patrol orientation; that much of their specialized training and individual skills were not being utilized to their maximum potential. Much of their time was spent standing on street corners, or walking a preordained beat that reflected spatial coverage over more strategic needs. CCD planners thought that CSRs would better serve their crime prevention role if they performed such tasks as data collection, security surveys, homeless censuses, crowd patrol at special events and crime prevention training seminars to retailers and office workers; with the CCD creating teams of specially trained CSRs that served these functions.

This move towards specialization of functions was recently reconsidered, however, with CSRs again deployed in street patrols. In interviews, CCD leaders indicated that the program needed to get back to its basic philosophy of a uniformed street presence.

While on patrol, CSRs have three basic daily responsibilities

- Coverage of two beats per shift.
- Response to an hourly radio check.
- Visit two merchants per shift and sign in-store log and have merchant sign their report log.

### **Nature of Encounters with Public**

All other activities of the CSR depend on their respective level of self-initiated activity. Observed activity levels varied widely based on the personality of the CSR as well as the beat and shift worked. Levels of street activity change with the location of the beat, time of the day, daily weather conditions, time of year, and the volume of convention-related activities in the city. Table 2 below illustrates CSR activity frequencies for the first 11 months of 1999.

**Table 2: CSR Program Contacts: January-November 1999**

	<b>CSR Totals (% of total contacts)</b>	<b>Homeless Action Team</b>
<b>Business Contacts</b>	6,261 (8%)	111
<b>First Aid</b>	91 (.1%)	11
<b>Hospitality</b>	65,489 (83%)	1,321
<b>Homeless/Panhandlers</b>	2,062 (3%)	1,575
<b>Public Space</b>	781 (1%)	9
<b>Service to Citizens</b>	2,669 (3%)	97
<b>Safety/Security</b>	1,465 (2%)	13
<b>Total Contacts</b>	<b>78,818</b>	<b>3,137</b>

Using a simple monthly average extrapolation procedure, CSRs made and recorded approximately 86,000 contacts for 1999. With an average staffing level of 30 for the year (due to attrition); and an average workweek of 35 hours, the CCD provided a total of approximately 51,450 person/hours per year in CSR services. This averages out to one and two thirds (1.67) contacts per hour per CSR.

Observations of CSRs offered some confirmation that recorded contact frequencies are fairly accurate. Almost all CSRs logged a contact right after it occurred. These included such benign contacts as someone asking for directions to a local store or the timing of a bus route. At the end of each day these general contacts with citizens made up an overwhelming majority of the CSR contact recording sheet (83%). These contacts were observed also to be the shortest in duration, ranging from a few seconds, to a few minutes if the CSR was required to call into dispatch for an answer to the citizen question. Calling questions into the dispatch is a relatively frequent occurrence especially among unseasoned CSRs. Frequent questions called in involved such things as bus and train schedules; store hours; restaurant locations and the like. More experienced CSRs acquire a prodigious knowledge base of the city's offerings; they are often asked their opinions of where the best ethnic restaurants or shops are located, and they do not shy away from offering such advice.

The second most frequent contact type, business contacts (8%), is in part driven by the requirement that CSRs pay a visit to two merchants per shift. This visit is part public relations, and part problem-oriented safety planning, as the CSR often tries to follow up

with merchant complaints and issues over such things as aggressive panhandling, damaged public property or shoplifting.

Tied for third in frequency of contact is service to citizens and homeless/panhandling issues. Service to citizens is by definition more involved than the hospitality function of the CSR. These include providing escorts, returning lost property and other problems solving issues. Homeless and panhandler contacts are mostly directed by the two outreach teams who specialize in homeless issues. The CCD has two teams of two CSRs who specialize in homeless clients. They are charged with identifying homeless and directing them to social service providers. The two teams made over three quarters (76%) of the 2062 total contacts with homeless in the first 11 months of 1999.

A less frequent responsibility of the CSRs includes the discovery and notation of damage to public property. CSRs are given public damage reports that are filled out and forwarded to the appropriate city agency. Observation of this effort revealed some frustrations by the CSRs, as they often found themselves writing damage reports for the same problems repeatedly. This reflects one of the reasons for the creation of the CCD in the first place; that is, the inability of public agencies to perform proper place management functions.

A total of 764 damage reports were filed for the first 11 months of 1999. The following presents the number (in excess of 25) of public space damage reports submitted by CSRs by affected agency:

Streets Department	335
Streetscape (Streets Department)	124
"Onesource" (General City reports)	111
Water Department	46
Electric Company	45
License and Inspections	26

While specialization of CSRs duties has been reduced, they are still required to go off patrol each night during the theater season to work at specialized posts in front of the

city's live theaters. This post is designed to dissuade panhandlers from descending on theatergoers waiting in line to get into the facility. The tactics used by CSRs to dissuade panhandling included informing theatergoers not to give money; moreover, they will stand next to panhandlers who are not persuaded to cease their activities by their mere presence. They will also call into dispatch if any aggressive panhandling is going on. As aggressive panhandling is illegal, it can warrant an arrest from police.

CSRs are also given the power to write up zoning violations perpetrated by merchants or building owners. These include such offenses as illegal signage, blockage of the sidewalk with merchandise or outdoor seating, fire code violations, improper business licenses, health code violations, improper trash disposal to name a few. CSRs receive training in the matter of identifying code violations and the proper notification procedures. Over the month of observations, however, no code violations were written up by CSRs. A few times this policy was brought up to the CSRs by observers. CSRs indicated a dislike of this power, and infrequently used it; indicating that it put them in an unenviable position vis-à-vis their standing with merchants and building owners who literally pay their salary. Furthermore, the city agency charged with overseeing code compliance and licensure, the Department of Licenses and Inspections (L and I), was seen as a disorganized organization by many in the city's business community -- a fact that clearly lessens the desire of CSRs to be associated with them.



A CSR makes note of an illegal trash dumping violation that will be reported to the City's Streets Department

An examination of public space damage reports for January 1 to November 30, 1999 reveals the following distribution of CSR initiated License and Inspections reports:

Building Damage	8	
Illegal Dumping	2	
Loud Music	12	
Rats	2	
Sidewalk damage	1	
<u>Unlicensed vendor</u>	<u>1</u>	
Total	26	2.3 per month

### **Relationship with Police**

The intent of the CSR patrols is to work hand-in-hand with the city's police. This is accomplished through a number of different policies and procedures. First, the CSRs have no real law enforcement capacity; they are merely additional sets of "eyes and ears". As such, CSRs are trained to avoid dangerous situations, conflict with citizens, and making arrests. Initial skepticism over the security program was voiced by police who were concerned over the scope of duties of the CSRs. Interviews and observation with police and CSRs revealed very little ambiguity in the stated role of the CSRs.

Secondly, CSRs share a police substation (funded by the CCD) where they share locker facilities, radio dispatch facility, and roll call. This has led to a fairly sociable but

professional relationship among CSRs and police. Moreover, on a command level, the importance of maintaining a positive relationship with the CCD and their security program is also well advertised to patrolmen and police leaders from the top down. Namely, the Mayor and the Police Commissioner have been consistent with the message of cooperation.

Thirdly, the Center City Police Substation is used as a training ground for first year police officers. At any given time, half of the substation's patrol forces are recent graduates of the Police Academy. The Central Business District is seen as a good place to give training in community policing and problem-oriented policing techniques. In addition, as many first year foot patrol officers do not bring the negative baggage that often develops in high crime and high stress environments, there is little in the way of preconceived ideas or negative opinions of the CCD or privately funded security services. Thus, the rookie officer sees the reality of this, their first policing situation, as natural. This has contributed to the acceptance of CSRs by police officers, and has led to a fairly productive working relationship.

Some negative aspects to the CSR/police working relationship were noted, however. Some of these problems are related to normal personality differences, but others are more systemic in nature. A frequent complaint of CSRs related to the slow response time of police to their calls. This was especially true of quality-of-life type problems like loitering, skateboarding, littering, and panhandling, for example. This frustrated the CSRs as they have little or no enforcement power; what they do have is the ability to call police. When police are slow to arrive, or sometimes do not arrive at all, CSRs feel that the nature of their somewhat deterrent powers is undermined. Obviously this is not the fault of the CSR, but a problem with the stated goals and accountability checks of community policing by the Department in the business district; as many officers still see their role as a reactive (i.e. arresting) force (see police observation section below for a more detailed description).

## **Relationship with Private Security**

In addition to their relationship with public police, CSRs also must interact and coordinate resources with the many private security operatives that exist in the Central Business District. These relationships take on both formal and informal contours. Formally, CSRs interact with private security through training seminars on theft and crime prevention, mandatory business visits and problem-solving and issue seminars held by the CCD. Informally, CSRs interact in a friendly and professional manner. Through these interactions, relationships are built, and information is shared freely. Much of this information involves issues regarding such issues as chronic shoplifting, illegal vendors outside the business, and most frequently, problems associated with panhandling and homeless encampments.

The formal and informal relationships initiated and sustained by CSRs assist in linking the public police and private security operatives. Oftentimes, this relationship lacks a strategic focus. With the police role being a fairly broad one, and the private security role being narrow in that it is focused on the specific property of its contracted vendor, the CSRs offer a link between these two crime prevention sectors. In short, they offer an institutional resource for strategic crime prevention planning. They do this through their place specific orientation, as well as their theoretical and operational linking of public space --and the police charged with keeping the peace—and private sector actors who possess a wealth of information and resources to solve public problems.

## **Impact of CCD Place Management Activities on Center City**

The CCD has been a forerunner in the area of performance benchmarking. Their effort at linking its programming to external outcomes has been replicated in other organizations around the country. Moreover, public agencies in the city have started to take the lead of the CCD in terms of creating a more outcome-focused approach to service provision. Data collected by the CCDs benchmarking effort are listed in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Retail Establishments in Center City (1992-1999)**

	<b>Occupied Spaces</b>	<b>Vacant Spaces</b>	<b>Vacancy Rate</b>
<b>1992</b>	1,813	348	16.1%
<b>1993</b>	1,991	375	15.8%
<b>1994</b>	2,095	341	13.9%
<b>1995</b>	2,122	311	12.7%
<b>1996</b>	2,122	312	12.8%
<b>1997</b>	2,143	331	13.3%
<b>1998</b>	2,100	365	14.8%
<b>1999</b>	2,100	438	17.2%

### **Public Perceptions of Center City**

Each year the Center City District contracts with an outside professional survey organization to assess the impacts of their efforts as well as assess perceptions of problems in the district. Table 4 illustrates the results of three important survey items in terms of the overall goals of the CCD: safety, atmosphere and cleanliness.

In 1994, less than half (44%) of survey respondents reported feeling safe most or all of the time while in the district. As evidenced by Table 4, this percentage has steadily raised over the past six years, with over 77% of the survey respondents in 1999 responding that they felt safe most or all of the time while in the district.

Interestingly, while safety and a generally positive social atmosphere have risen since 1994, the perceived cleanliness of the districts sidewalks has not. While 78% of respondents reported that the sidewalks were clean or very clean in 1994, this category declined to 69% in 1999 – with just over a half (55%) of respondents reporting clean or very clean sidewalks in 1998. A possible explanation for this can include the possibility that increased pedestrian traffic in the district has made sidewalk maintenance more difficult. Alternately, the CCD, through its maintenance programs, may have increased the expectations for cleanliness among the public, a fact that has tended to dampen subjective perceptions of cleanliness.

Lastly, the perception of the general atmosphere of the district has been improved over the past six years. While two thirds (67%) of respondents reported a somewhat or much improved atmosphere in 1994 from the previous year, this percentage has steadily risen to 87% in 1999. An analysis of this item is fairly straightforward: as the district has gotten cleaner and safer, the general atmosphere will also improve. Another explanation for this increase is tied into the notion of increased perceptions of safety is the CCD's efforts to improve the district's streetscape, most notably in the area of sidewalk lighting.

**Table 4: Public Perceptions in Center City District (1994-1999)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Safety</b>	<b>General atmosphere</b>	<b>Cleanliness</b>
	<b>Feel safe most or all of the time</b>	<b>Somewhat or much improved</b>	<b>Clean or very clean sidewalks</b>
<b>1994</b> (n=1920)	44%	67%	78%
<b>1995</b> (n=1670)	59%	77%	73%
<b>1996</b> (n=1660)	61%	70%	73%
<b>1997</b> (n=1656)	67%	80%	74%
<b>1998</b> (n=1643)	71%	82%	55%
<b>1999</b> (n=1675)	77%	87%	69%
Annual survey performed by Eshelman & Townsend Inc. under contract of CCD. Survey performed of property owners, tenants, retailers and sidewalk pedestrians. Personal interview and mail techniques were used.			

**Center City Special Service District: Conclusions**

The Center City District in Philadelphia is the largest, best financed, and most complicated of all special services districts in the city. The CCD is closely intertwined with the 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> police districts, has its own substation, and commands considerable visibility in the business community. Over its life span it has contributed to improvements in place management and reductions in fear or concern with crime.

## THE FRANKFORD SPECIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

### Frankford Avenue

#### *History*

Perhaps the defining moment in the history of Frankford was the opening of the elevated train line that bears its name in the 1920's. This route of the line from Center City to Frankford Avenue originally led merchants to think that the El (local name for the elevated rail) would damage business because of the expectation that the train would bring more buyers downtown rather than to the area. Results showed that the El had in fact brought more people to Frankford Avenue businesses from other sections of the city. From the El's opening in 1920 up until the beginning of the depression in 1929, the real estate values on Frankford Avenue jumped four-fold.

By the mid 1930's, Frankford Avenue was bustling with thirteen blocks along the street and ten blocks on adjacent Oxford Avenue devoted almost exclusively to commerce. With double trolley tracks, heavy automobile traffic and taxicabs all whisking underneath the roar of the El, the street was kept busy and easily accessible to many areas in the city. During this time the avenue overflowed with specialty shops and restaurants aplenty.

In the 1930's, existing on the noisy street became unbearable to some and quite a few residents and business owners left. Suburbanization in the 1950's also carried many of the merchants away from the area and into the quiet peacefulness of the suburbs, further contributing to the Avenue's decline.

The end of the 1960's brought on increased commitment from the community to identify the problems that the area suffered with and ways to fix and redevelop the district. Area residents and businessmen called for a plan to insert new life into the business district and to tear down the abandoned factories and warehouses that tainted the area.

The Frankford Merchants Group, an organization of businessmen on Frankford Ave., formed a committee to provide advice on the creation of a redevelopment plan for the area. Four major problems were identified: 1) the immense volume of traffic and congested parking, 2) mixed land use (i.e. factories scattered through residential sections), 3) deteriorating housing, and 4) streets and sidewalks in poor repair. At the end of the decade, the City Planning Commission approved a redevelopment plan for the East Frankford triangle which encompasses Frankford and Torresdale Avenues and Bridge St. It is noted, however, that the plan was primarily residential with small industry and vacant lots scattered throughout the site.

The beginning of 1970 was marked with an upsurge in burglaries, window smashing and shoplifting. Several businesses indicated that they would either have to move or be forced to close down because of the extreme crime in some areas. The Frankford Merchants Association agreed that the way to alleviate the problem of crime was to get more foot patrol assigned to the area. Although the police agreed that three or four additional uniformed police officers would provide a deterrent to some would-be criminals, the police Chief Inspector overseeing the area added that it was also up to the business community to aid the police. He suggested that some crimes may be prevented through the installation of additional outdoor lighting, keeping windows clear, prominently displaying address numbers, keeping an eye out for suspicious persons or even installing buzzer systems between adjacent stores to summon help if the need arose.

In an effort to clean up the avenue, the merchants in the area and the Sanitation Division of the Streets Department joined forces to act on an increasing number of complaints of dirty streets and curb lines within the business district. The merchants agreed to follow the regulations more strictly as to how much, in what containers and when garbage may be put on the curb. The Streets Department pledged to sweep the streets more industriously and frequently and also make sure that the trash was picked up on schedule.

In 1974, Frankford business leaders sought ideas in support of a multi-million dollar federal redevelopment package. Tentative plans called for a giant mall to be built along

Frankford Ave., expanded commercial transportation and better housing and recreation opportunities. Leaders of the Frankford Merchants Group, who organized the huge project, petitioned the merchants to take initiative and not let the area fall into more blight and decay. It was noted that this project would need a lot of support by both business and political leaders in order to receive the federal funding, as the area to that date had received little in the way of federal urban renewal funds.

Two months later, the Frankford area was considered to be one of four Philadelphia neighborhood business districts to receive federal allocation to be "stabilized and preserved". Frankford, with its 300 stores, was in better shape, larger and more diversified than any other area in the city, but it still had its weaknesses. Two studies were conducted; one focused on government agencies and their plans for the area and the other was a commercial study on sales volume, building types, evaluation and usages, trends, and vehicular and pedestrian traffic patterns, with five and ten year projections for future use. In addition, local businessmen identified several weaknesses of the area, including: 1) lack of diversity in types of stores, 2) lack of sufficient street lighting, 3) lack of sufficient parking facilities, 4) overhanging signs, which give the avenue a cluttered look, and, 5) lack of moderately-priced family restaurants where shoppers could eat either before or after shopping. The project's leaders, however, remarked that for the project to be successful in the long run, and to become a "sheltered, pleasant environment for pedestrian shoppers", there needed to be greater support from both the public and private sectors.

By the 1980's, grassroots organizations began springing up in order to clean up the mess that plagued what once was a bustling shopping district. Vacant lots, abandoned houses and increased juvenile crime all gave the look and feel of a deteriorating area and its inhabitants wanted to do something about it. But a major detriment to wanting to renew the neighborhood was the on-again, off-again service of the El. When train service was cut off in the evening and on weekends, prime times for retailers, Frankford Avenue suffered major declines in its customer base. It was estimated that a full 30 percent of the stores in Frankford closed due to work along the El.

In 1998, Frankford Avenue still struggles against deteriorating and/or vacant storefronts, drugs and crime, but the renewed interest in turning Frankford Ave. into an artisan community may very well turn the neighborhood around. With the great number of large buildings and the financial assistance of the Community Development Corporation, the artisans can turn their homes into workshops and storefronts, similar to the Renaissance that occurred on South Street in the 1970's. Following Center City's lead, the business owners in Frankford collectively agreed to pay an additional ten percent to their property taxes to create a Special Services District. These funds are used to support yellow-clad crews that sweep the sidewalks and have pledged a "zero tolerance graffiti policy". Furthermore, the district also plans on hiring "safety ambassadors" who will provide some light police work, such as escorting people walking home late at night and coordinating reports of narcotics activity to aid police in cracking down drugs sale locations and dealers. It is also proposed that these ambassadors carry two-way radios communicate with the police. A crime report compiled by the Philadelphia Police Department reported an alarming number of thefts, both to people and property, as well as assaults.

### **Frankford Special Services District**

With the focus of much of its redevelopment attention concentrated on its downtown, many of Philadelphia's neighborhood commercial districts have suffered severe physical and economic erosion over the past three decades (Bartelt, 1989). With increasing suburban competition, stagnant incomes of local residents and continued residential shrinkage, many districts have suffered from disinvestment, blight and high crime rates.

The city's interest in the redevelopment of its neighborhood commercial areas has been inconsistent and historically beholden to racial tensions, the city's urban renewal program, or political pressure applied by local leaders. A crisis mentality has left the city with little or no master plan for its neighborhood commercial areas. Moreover, with declining resources, the city has found it difficult to sustain redevelopment efforts across its many districts all of which are in decline.

The viability of commercial districts has historically been understood in terms of their economic and symbolic importance to the city (see Zukin, 1995). However, the virtual disappearance of the retail sector in many urban communities and the concomitant decline of these communities residentially have led to the notion that these two processes are linked. With neighborhood commercial districts enhancing amenities and providing low to mid-skill level employment and entrepreneurial opportunities for local residents (Porter, 1997). Providing an “inward looking” source of economic development where local dollars circulate among the community, the retail trade is seen as one of the few viable sectors to pursue in a neighborhood economic development strategy (Gottlieb, 1997). Public investment in infrastructure and planning services should reflect the importance of commercial areas to their surrounding residential communities. In Philadelphia, this has not been the case.

The Commerce Department, the city’s primary economic development agency, leads the city’s efforts at local commercial development. Both directly and through an affiliated non-profit development corporation, the Philadelphia Commercial Development Corporation (PCDC), the Commerce Department offers programs designed to augment commercial and retail development.

Created out of the model cities program in 1974, the PCDC does little more than keep updated lists of businesses within each commercial corridor in the city. Programs sponsored by the PCDC include matching grants for façade improvements and security rebate programs. These programs have not been successful in sustaining improvement in local commercial areas, as they are slow in allocating funds.

The PCDC also acts as a district manager through its corridor manager program. Corridor managers provide technical assistance and act as business attraction specialists for thirty-eight of the city’s neighborhood commercial districts. Cutbacks in this program have resulted in increases in the number of corridors for which each manager is responsible. While the city’s BIDs have one or more managers for each site, a PCDC corridor

manager is responsible for ten corridors. This has resulted in ineffective commercial district planning, with little public programming and no research or evaluation capacity. Moreover, former programming efforts in safety and crime prevention have been eliminated, as the Center City District now employs the former crime prevention consultant for the PCDC.

One commercial corridor under the management of the PCDC is in Frankford: a racially diverse, lower-middle class community served by a large and historic commercial district that spans 12 blocks in length along Frankford Avenue. The Avenue itself sits beneath an elevated train line that links the community to Center City and the city's large residential neighborhoods to its northeast.

Local community efforts to revitalize Frankford have been managed by the Frankford Group Ministries (FGM), a religious service organization. In response to frustrations over the El reconstruction, and a perceived lack of support from the city, the FGM called on 300 local citizens to create a strategic plan for the community. With 150 community leaders involved in the actual planning process, a series of nine elements of community improvement were identified. Commercial district improvements were an essential element to the neighborhood's plan for revitalization. Hiring a professional planning firm to transform this document into a funding vehicle, the Pew Charitable Trusts granted the Frankford Plan a \$3.2 million in 1991 for five years through its Neighborhood Preservation Initiative. These funds came to support community development efforts in Frankford, as well as act as leverage for additional resources.

The FGM formed a community development corporation (FGMCDC) which became the organizing force behind many of the community's efforts to improve housing and community services. The FGMCDC also housed a commercial revitalization specialist who was hired to coordinate research and planning efforts in the district. These efforts have included a business incubator feasibility study and a labor market study. In addition, this specialist also coordinates place promotion and marketing activities.

The Main Street program, traditionally associated with shopping districts in small to medium size towns, has recently expanded into inner-city commercial districts. Frankford is one of three Philadelphia communities who receive assistance through this program. Operating on a four-point approach that includes design, organizing, promotion and Economic restructuring, Frankford's Main Street works with the FGMCDC to plan commercial revitalization strategies in the community.



A photograph of the east side of the 4400 block of Frankford Avenue reveals some defining characteristics of the commercial district. These include the ominous elevated train platform, as well as dilapidated facades and overt security screens.

The Frankford Special Services District (FSSD) was formed in 1995. The motivation for the FSSD sprung from frustrations over a lack of police responsiveness to crime and safety in the area, failing public infrastructure, and an under-managed public environment, which led to trash and graffiti building up on the Avenue.

The board of directors of FSSD is comprised of local leaders many of whom were involved in the community planning process that generated the Frankford Plan. The management of the FSSD is through a contract with the FGMCDC who hired a half-time manager.

With an initial budget of \$80,000 FSSD has seen its budget fluctuate over the past two years due to problems with tax delinquent properties. In 1997, the district collected only \$39,000 of its \$85,000 assessment. This shortfall was expected, and the city's Commerce Department pledged to make up for shortfalls in the first five years of the program. The city pledged a \$50,000 subsidy from Philadelphia's federal community development block grant (CBDG) in the first year, with this subsidy to decline \$10,000 a year over five years. The city's pledge, however, was ended prematurely in the second year. With the elimination of the city's subsidy, FSSD has had to seek other sources of income.

Recently, in an effort to raise additional funds, the district has placed liens on delinquent properties; a power vested in it by the state's Municipal Authorities Act. Another source of income has come from the Frankford Hospital, which has pledged \$125,000 over two years to allow the district to expand its services in security and crime prevention. The district has recently contracted out to a private company to supply six "Ambassadors", and one supervisor to the Frankford commercial strip.

### **Frankford's Ambassadors**

Frankford's Ambassadors receive limited training from local police and special service district staff. Their roles are similar to their counterparts in Center City. Unlike the CSRs in Center City, however, the security staff in Frankford is part-time and not represented by a collective-bargaining contract.

The crime prevention role of ambassadors in Frankford is varied. In addition to serving as "eyes and ears" on the street, the Ambassadors intervene in non-crime related incidents, interact with police and private security on the Avenue, and provide everything from directions to first aid.

An observation of the Ambassador's revealed their varied role. The main focus of the Ambassador's role is that of customer service. The customer is defined fairly broadly and includes, local residents, commuters passing through the area, commercial merchants, shoppers, property owners, local institutions such as the local hospital and the transit authority.

Ambassadors work 4 hour shifts, five days a week. There is coverage on the Avenue from 8 am until 7pm, with two Ambassadors always on patrol. They are linked to a central command post by radio. They call in every hour to give the commander their location. Moreover, the radio is used to call in citizen questions, disorder issues, physical environment problems (cracked sidewalks, malfunctioning traffic signals, abandoned autos, and the like). They do not communicate to one another while on patrol. Each call goes through dispatch and, if there is a need to alert another Ambassador, it is done through dispatch.

The district's ability to forge effective relationships with police commanders has not been as successful as the CCD, where political pressure afforded greater latitude to CCD leaders in forging a strategic alliance with police commanders. The district also coordinates policing services in the district, and like many commercial districts in the city, has purchased bicycles for the police in their efforts to establish a bike patrol on the Avenue. Additional police services provided to the district include a mobile-mini station that houses the bike police. The current deployment on the Avenue includes one foot patrol officer, two bike patrol officers, and two sector cars that have some interaction with the commercial area. There is also a fixed mini-station that is staffed by a sergeant.

In addition to community policing officers and Ambassadors, there are also transit police who work for the local transit authority who have a presence along the Avenue. These officers are sworn officers with a jurisdiction that includes transit properties, of which there are many in the Frankford area. Lastly, the security staff of Frankford Hospital, located on the Avenue, augments the public safety network in the area. Two security

officers patrol the perimeter of the hospital on foot, with another security guard patrolling the property perimeter and parking facilities by vehicle. There is also a staffed security kiosk located in front of the hospital and four CCTV cameras that are trained along Frankford Avenue that provide surveillance for a six square block area.

### **Crime and Disorder in Frankford**

The crime problems in Frankford are real, and combine elements of violent personal crime and disorder-related offenses. Results of a focus group discussion with residents, merchants, security operatives, and BID leaders resulted in a fairly grim picture of the Avenue. Focus group discussion revealed a fair amount of prostitution and street-level drug-selling going on in the evening. A resident of the Avenue revealed that his residence had been broken into three times. This resident made the point that the level of abandonment and lack of guardianship along the Avenue has afforded criminals opportunities to break into the remaining viable businesses and residences. These statements were supported by a vignette described by another resident where he described that thieves had broken through a brick wall from an adjacent abandoned building into his residence. The resident pointed out that the fact that such a noisy and time consuming process was not discovered by police was an example of the problems facing the community.

As mentioned above, after dark the area becomes a hot bed for drug selling and prostitution; with the drug buyers coming from other areas by car and by transit, and the sellers typically being youth who work as street sellers for older dealers. The prostitution market along the Avenue is also directly related to the drug trade, with many of the prostitutes being addicted to drugs and accepting payments of drugs for their services. Additional crime problems in the area include car theft, vehicle break-ins and car stripping. It was pointed out in the focus group discussion that Frankford is where many of the city's and surrounding area's stolen autos end up; as the area is home to a number of "chop shops" and auto salvage operations.


### **Frankford Physical Assessment**

In August 1998 researchers from the Center for Public Policy, at Temple University, observed the Frankford commercial district in Philadelphia. The data were collected over a two-day period during the summer, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. The researchers identified a total of four hundred and twenty-two (422) business sites with one hundred and thirty-four (134) of those sites being vacant at the time of the data collection. This gave a total of two hundred and eighty-eight (288) viable businesses within the Frankford commercial district. For the purpose of identifying viable businesses we will focus only on the two hundred and eighty-eight occupied sites. However, for all other observations we will look at the entire district.

Five of forty-one types of business account for over thirty-five percent of the businesses within the district. These types of businesses are medical services (N=24), fast food (N=17), general merchandise (N=18), furnishings (N=17) and beauty (N=22).

The researchers rated the facade of each of the business sites, as observed from the front of the business. The ratings available to the researchers were the options of poor, fair or good. This was intended to be a general measure of the building front to get a better idea of how individual business sites were being maintained. Figure 3 reveals that almost fifty percent (48.8%) of the businesses fall within the fair description, with a relatively high proportion (36%) of the facades along the Avenue being rated as poor.

**Figure 3: Frankford Business Facade Rating**



*Security Measures*

Three of the physical survey items focused on security measures taken by the individual business sites. The first area of interest was to measure the security precautions taken by the individual businesses. The first of these was the presence of a device or devices to protect the front windows of the business (i.e. a screen or grate). Table 5 below reveals that almost half of the businesses (48.1%) in Frankford have taken some measure to protect the windows of their establishment.

The next item of interest concerned the front door of the business, and any precautions taken to make the doors more secure. A similar percentage of businesses protected both their windows and doors with security devices (47.9%).

The final visible security measure that was recorded for the Frankford site focused on the presence of a security notice in the door or window advising individuals not to commit crimes against that establishment (i.e. alarm warnings, guard dog notices, and the like). It was found that almost forty percent of the businesses (39.8%) took this particular safety measure.

**Table 5: Physical Assessment of Frankford Business**

	Type	% Possessing
<b>Security Measures</b>	Protective Devices for Windows	48.1
	Protective devices for door	47.9
	Security notice	39.8
<b>Building rating</b>	Graffiti	22.3
	Broken windows	6.4
<b>Business area</b>	Litter on sidewalk	27.5
	Outdoor seating	0
	Merchandise displays	2
	Sidewalk obstruction	6.4
	Loiterers	7.6
	Vendors	.5
	Panhandlers	0

Table 5, illustrates the variables under "Facade of property" that were focused on several factors that are immediately associated with the appearance of the building. This was also seen as a way of determining the level of proprietorship that is being displayed by the owners of the businesses.

As reported in Table 5, over twenty percent (22.3%) of the businesses had been vandalized by graffiti. Graffiti was distinguished from murals by their presence and placement on the exterior of the building.

Over five percent (6.4%) of the sites displayed broken windows on the front side of the building. However, it should be noted that approximately sixty percent (59.4%) of the business sites that had broken windows were vacant at the time of the study.

Finally, the researchers recorded the presence of litter on the sidewalk. The researchers used their own judgment in distinguishing between the presence of a single piece of trash and a clear lack of efforts in maintaining the exterior of the business site. Table 5 reveals that over a quarter (27.5%) of the business sites in Frankford did not appear to have any individual or individuals showing clear proprietorship for their condition as evidenced by the presence of litter.

### *Area in front of Business*

The previous measures focused on items that addressed the building itself and observations of the site. The measures reported in the subsection "Area in front of Business" was focused more on efforts taken to show ownership for the street directly in front of the building.

The first item recorded was concerned with the presence of seating available to individuals traveling in front of the building. Despite their use in other commercial districts not a single business in the Frankford commercial district made use of outdoor seating.

Table 5 shows that few businesses have taken the opportunity to display their merchandise outside of the business (1.9%). Considering the previous measures of security taken by the businesses it should come as no surprise that the business owners and managers are in no hurry to leave their merchandise outside of the store.

Although the business might not have merchandise displayed outside it was found that over five percent (6.4%) of the businesses had something impeding travel in front of the particular site. This measure did not record items such as panhandlers, vendors, trash or any other item that was recorded as a separate variable. This measure was concerned with other items that might block the sidewalk in front of the business.

Over seven percent (7.6%) of the sites had a loiterer in front of it. A loiterer was identified as an individual or individuals who were present in front of the business for no apparent reason. The researchers did not record individuals engaged in window shopping or awaiting public transportation as a loiterer; only individuals who seemed to have no clear purpose for being present at the location.

Few vendors made use of Frankford to sell their merchandise. Less than one percent (0.5%) of the businesses had a vendor selling his/her wares out front. This does not come

as much of surprise considering the earlier observations concerning security measures and merchandise being displayed outdoors.

Although panhandlers may be present in other commercial districts, none were observed in the Frankford commercial district.

### **Business Survey**

In addition to assessing the physical and social environment of the area, a survey was also administered to businesses along the Avenue. As mentioned above, an effort was made to survey every business on the Avenue. A description of the survey results are provided below.

The address file generated from the physical assessment was used to develop a survey framework for local businesses. In the fall of 1998, trained interviewers made a visit to each of the businesses in the four targeted business areas. An attempt was made to perform an interview at each occupied business. If the merchant refused, an attempt was made to reschedule. If this was not an option, surveys were left with the merchant to be filled out and returned via mail.

In Frankford, this resulted in the completion of 99 surveys. With a base rate of 288 occupied business properties, the response rate for Frankford was 35%. The following report describes the responses of these 99 businesses.

### **Business and Merchant Dynamics**

Items relating to the demographic and geographic orientation of the merchants are addressed in this section. The survey was intended to reflect the collective experience of the business itself. As an individual representative of each establishment was tasked with completing an interview, it was important to address the relationship of the respondent with the establishment. Of the 95 valid responses, 42, or less than half (44.7%) indicated that they owned the business. The remaining 52 were either managers, or assistant managers of the business.

This study was focused on the role of special improvement districts in the co-production of safety services. As special services districts typically gain revenues through assessments to real property, and these districts are typically funded through property assessments, it was also important to address the issue of property ownership. The property ownership rate among respondents (44.2%) was nearly identical to the business ownership rate.

Assessing the relationship among business ownership status and involvement in community safety programming and attachment to the community was also a focus of this effort. A significant majority of respondents indicated that they were single proprietorships (82.5%); this reflects the local flavor of the Frankford business community evidenced by the fact that just over half (58.1%) of those surveyed resided in the 19124 zip code area. The race of survey respondents reflects the overall diversity of the community: 57.4% were white; 18.1% were African-American; 16% were Asian; while 1.4% was Hispanic.

In addition to the relative level of “localness” of the business community, the length of tenure of the merchants can influence their willingness to get involved in community matters. Table 6 illustrates the distribution of the length of tenure among establishments and respondents.

**Table 6: Tenure of Owner and Business Establishment**

	<b>Owner</b>	<b>Business</b>
<b>0-2 years</b>	5.1	6.1
<b>2 to 5 years</b>	15.2	37.8
<b>6 to 10 years</b>	34.2	25.5
<b>11 to 20 years</b>	25.3	19.4
<b>More than 20 years</b>	20.3	11.2

The length of tenure of business operators responding to the survey was high, with just under half (45.6%) indicating that they have operated the business for 10 or more years. Alternately, just over one-fifth (20.3%) have been there for five years or less.

The length of the business at its Frankford location also revealed a mature base of business operations, with nearly a third (30.6%) claiming a tenure in excess of 10 years. New businesses (less than one year) accounted for 6.1 % of the survey, while the modal category (37.8%) of business establishments has been resident in their Frankford location for from 2 to 5 years.

The size of businesses in Frankford in terms of numbers of employees is relatively small (See Table 7 below). A vast majority of respondents indicated employing five or less employees. In fact, 84.9% of the respondents indicating having five or less full-time employees, while nearly 70% employed five or less part-time employees.


**Table 7: Number of Employees**

	<b>Full Time</b>	<b>Part Times</b>
<b>1 to 5 employees</b>	84.9	69.9
<b>6-10</b>	10.8	19.2
<b>11-20</b>	2.2	5.5
<b>20 or more</b>	2.2	5.5

**Business Location**


The next series of items relate to merchants' opinions of the district. The first item queried merchants to rate the quality of Frankford as a business location. As evidenced in Figure 4, a vast majority of those who responded to the survey were somewhat content with Frankford, as 81.8% indicated that Frankford was either a good (44.4%) or fair (37.4%) place for their business. Alternately, 14.2% of respondents thought that Frankford was a poor or very poor place for their operation. On a negative note, few thought that the district offered a very good climate for business, with a mere 4% choosing this category.

**Figure 4: Rating of Location for Business**



The following item addresses recent trends in the local business environment. This item could reflect the impact of the FSSD on the local business climate, as their efforts have been fairly recent. Figure 5 below illustrates the distribution of this item.


**Figure 5: Trend in Business Environment**



The distribution of this item is fairly split, with just over a quarter of the respondents perceiving an improvement in the business climate (27.3%); half felt that things had stayed the same (49.5%); while just under a quarter believe that things have gotten worse in the district (23.2%).


Merchants were then queried as to their level of contact with the FSSD. Figure 6 reflects their responses.

**Figure 6: Level of Contact with SSD**



Those merchants indicating having some knowledge of the FSSD was asked to rate the quality of the services that were being provided. Most thought that the FSSD was providing at least a fair service (50.6%). Just fewer than 30 percent believed the service to be good, while just fewer than 10 percent thought them to be very good. On the other end of the scale, just over ten percent believed that the services provided by the FSSD were either poor or very poor.

**Figure 7: Rating of SSD Services**



**Frankfort Special Services District: Conclusions**

The Frankfort Special Services District struggles to maintain its visibility in a section of the city that has had a challenging history. Nonetheless, the hospital anchor with support from a few businesses has provided an opportunity for the FSSD to begin. Assessments of the District's efforts have been generally positive, but the conditions the FSSD must overcome remain significant.

## THE GERMANTOWN SPECIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

### **Germantown**

#### *History*

Germantown is a diverse community located in the northwest corner of Philadelphia. The community is historically significant, with a number of revolutionary era homes still standing. Originally the home of early German immigrants, the area's residents are now primarily of African-American descent.

Germantown has been a retail center for much of its history. In the 1930's Germantown had nearly three hundred businesses operating with a great diversity of shops that ranged in size from large department stores to hot dog stands. All local utility companies also had operations in the area. Additionally, the area was home to many thriving industries including textile mills, instrument manufacturing plants, and paper products makers.

Like most urban communities, the post-war years were rather unkind to the area, with increasing suburbanization of residents and commerce threatening the viability of the area. Moreover, an influx of poorer populations led to continued erosion of Germantown as a viable center of commerce.

During the 1950s a leading civic organization, the Germantown Business Men's Association, sought improvements in the area; especially in the area of parking – establishing two new lots to hold five hundred cars each. To compete effectively with recently developed suburban shopping centers in an adjacent suburb, they promoted streets and arterial highways improvement, better commercial transportation and a major bus terminal. They also sought state assistance for the development of a supermarket, then a rarity in the city – a market that purported to be the largest in the country at 100,000 square feet.

The early 1950's were marked by plans to redevelop the area around Rittenhouse and Germantown Avenues. Surprisingly, the project funding was proposed from the private sector. In addition to the Men's Association, the Real Estate Board, the Community Council and the 22nd Ward Planning Commission were involved in the proposed development. The project was in response to many problems affecting Germantown, ranging from traffic congestion and a lack of parking facilities to replacing a deteriorating residential section in a predominantly commercial neighborhood, with modern stores. The proposal called for the widening of two Avenues, a separate section developed into a modern shopping district, and an eight hundred car parking lot.

By the end of the decade of the 1950s, the multi-million dollar shopping center, which included a supermarket and a large number of stores, was to change the Germantown business district into one of the largest shopping areas in the entire region. The proposed plan sought to attract a larger customer base as well as national retail chains such as Woolworth's and Sears, who expressed interest in opening up branches in the area.

In the early 1960's, the City Planning Commission released a report aimed at increasing business activity and eliminating blight in Germantown. The study revealed that the greatest market potential for new stores in Germantown was in the apparel, furniture and appliance field. The central areas to be improved were traffic access, general rehabilitation and the ever-present problem of parking. The planners suggested changing traffic patterns to create a pedestrian mall; improving store access; providing more convenient parking; and possibly developing new office buildings and apartments. Additionally, the plan envisioned the restoration of landmarks of the American Revolution within the area, as well as constructing an historical pedestrian mall, like the one at Independence Mall in Center City Philadelphia. The comprehensive nature of these plans suggest that Germantown leaders were acknowledging competition from suburban shopping centers, and planned to compete directly with the new automobile oriented trend in retailing.

A subsequent study by the city's planning commission identified four factors for future growth: 1) Central Germantown needed clustered rather than strip shopping areas; 2) loading areas needed to be provided in the rear of stores to prevent traffic congestion; 3) arterial roads needed improvement and through traffic diverted, and 4) Germantown needed to retain its middle and upper-class families.

In these efforts it is striking to find the community's strong orientation toward participatory politics resulted in the inclusion of subcommittees on socio-economic issues such as juvenile delinquency, race relations, unemployment and poverty as part of the planning process. It was noted that such areas had not been a concern with previous urban renewal efforts around the country, despite the equal importance these subjects shared with the physical planning orientation of this and similar programs. Indeed, the problem of juvenile gangs, a burgeoning problem in the Germantown community, was of equal importance to the future real estate value in the neighborhood as was investment in the built environment.

By the late 1960s, Germantown's dedication to community participation in the renewal process had the unfortunate result of creating inertia. Little had emerged from any of the studies or plans and the community became skeptical about the process. Like the cross-town expressway that vexed those in the South Street area for much of the 1960s, a similarly controversial highway was proposed for Germantown. This highway, the Rittenhouse-Belfield Bypass, proposed in 1967 had the effect of dampening investment in its proposed path. The largest component of this \$10.3 million bypass project was to cut a swath one hundred feet wide across Central Germantown – necessitating the demolition of over one hundred and fifty properties including churches and schools. Intended to relieve traffic congestion in Central Germantown and provide access this bypass was also to provide the best route with a minimum of damage to the residential areas of the community. The Germantown Community Council eventually brought suit against the plan contending that it would be wasteful to spend in excess of \$7 million on the bypass when the area was in critical need of housing, recreation facilities and other community services. In 1971, a judge amended a 1970 order barring the purchase by the

authority of properties in the route of the proposed Rittenhouse-Belfield Bypass.

A renewal plan in the early 1970s echoed past sentiments of local leaders that the area was due for large scale renovation. With the failure of past plans to be carried out due in part to extensive community involvement, the city's Redevelopment Authority tried something new. They were going to impose its vision for the area on the community – this proved even less effective. With twelve stores slated to be razed in order to make room for the new library, local shopkeepers balked, stating they felt that the intrusive revitalization plans were in essence “too much, too late”. The consensus among local businesspeople was that the Redevelopment Authority had failed to build the necessary partnership with the community to gain acceptance of the project.

A plan in the late 1970s to develop a suburban style mall in the area using federal aid brought optimism back to the shopkeepers of Germantown for a while. The renewal project that was started eight years before was finally being realized. While the mall project fell through, the Maplewood pedestrian mall was developed and parking facilities were built. Unfortunately, in the eight years it took to realize the scaled back plans, the retail environment had changed yet again; with additional competition arising in suburban communities, resulting in the continued erosion in the spending power of local residents and increasing crime in and around the shopping district.

One by one, stores left – the major department stores such as Rowell's, Sears, J.C. Penney all ceasing operations. With vacant retail properties lining the formerly bustling Germantown and Chelton Avenues, lower-end retailers took up in their place. The result was an influx in merchants of Korean descent who dealt in lower-end retail.

As in other areas of the country, tensions among Korean merchants and African-American consumers flared. A boycott was called by a local group that believed that suppliers were shutting out African-American merchants, and consumers were not being treated with respect by Korean merchants. These tensions, while still in evidence, have subsided.

Currently, the area continues to struggle to define itself. It currently has a number of non-profit corporations engaging in development and service provision. A business improvement district was established in the area in 1996. After a history of decline in the retail sector, Central Germantown has recently been going through a bit of a renaissance, with the total number of units on the Cheltenham - Germantown Avenue corridor increasing from 255 in 1988 to 270 in 1995. Moreover, vacancy rates have declined over the same period from 17.7% to 11.9%.

Many of the commercial landowners in Germantown now reside outside of the Germantown area, and many outside the state. There has been a lot of controversy surrounding the leadership of the district. It seems that racial politics have played a role in district operations as the commercial property owners are predominately white, while many of the merchants, customers and leaders of the district are African-American. A City councilperson who was an early proponent of the district through her work with the Central Germantown Council has influenced the special services district leadership. Her chief of staff serves as the Vice President of the special service district. In all, there are 14 board members.

Unlike other districts in the city, the board is not overwhelmingly comprised of local commercial interests. The board is comprised of four board members who are retail business owners, three from the local governing association (Central Germantown Council), and three residents of the area -the local high school principal, the local newspaper editor, and a local lawyer. The District has limited resources and has had its assessment augmented with funds from the federally funded, locally administered Community Development Block grant Program (CDBG) program and from the Central Germantown Council (CGC). Its assessment on property is budgeted at \$84,000, which is reduced by a contingency for delinquencies budgeted at 35% of the assessment (\$29,225). The CDBG program has added \$50,000 to the annual budget each year for the first three years, while the CGC has added \$20,000 in the first year, \$15,000 in the second, \$10,000 in the third and \$5,000 in the fourth year. To make up for future

shortfalls when these two subsidies expire, Germantown is currently under-budgeted for the first three years, with surpluses going against the last two years of the five year budget. With its scarce resources, the district has focused the majority of its budget (63%) on its cleaning program, while 24% is expended on the district manager's salary and 10% on office costs. Its marketing program (1.8% of budget) is focused on educating and organizing local students towards litter and graffiti abatement.

Initially, the district had given its cleaning contract to an outside firm that had been successful with other contracts in the city, but found its work lacking. Its sidewalk-cleaning program is now contracted out to a local YMCA. The YMCA has a myriad of other social and community programs that include a 124-bed facility for homeless, and drug and alcohol programming.

Currently the district is struggling to expand its services to include safety and security programs. In the past these efforts have been piecemeal but somewhat successful. For instance, the district removed loiterers, drug sellers and users out a park where its headquarters are located. The park sits right in the middle of the district and includes historic structures that also house other social service agencies. Other efforts to coordinate safety programs include the purchase two bicycles for police and inviting staff from the Center City District to give crime prevention seminars to local merchants. The GSSD also has paid for and provided beepers to the bicycle officers. The merchants are given the beeper number, and are instructed to beep the officer when a problem arises. The types of problems this system was meant to address include robberies, aggressive panhandling, disorderly conduct and assaults (Interview with local captain, 1998).

### **Crime and Disorder in Germantown**

The focus group held in Germantown revealed several themes relating principally to problems of public disorder. Participants noted that serious crime has been on the decline in the area, with a rash of commercial burglaries being the exception. Continual problems in the area include public disorder behaviors within a public park that is located in the middle of the commercial district. This park, which contained structures dating back

revolutionary war times, is the home of the special services district offices. Efforts to clean up the park were noted as being successful. Despite these assertions, on a number of occasions, researchers observed alcohol and drug use going on in the park.

Another problem in the area is related to the new mix of retail in the area, with some community leaders indicating that check cashing, beeper stores, rental stores, and pawn shops had replaced traditional banks and retail establishments. While Germantown is a rather diverse community in terms of income, race and ethnicity, the commercial district customer base is overwhelmingly African American –one focus group participant put it at 99% Black. Whites no longer use the district for shopping, and consequently, the retail mix has both been defined and is reinforcing this customer demographic. Thus, low-end retail has taken over the district. Also keeping with trends around the nation, many of the shop owners in Germantown are Korean. This has also led to some tension and distrust in the area, as black customers sometimes feel disrespected by merchants who neither share their language nor their culture.

A problem also noted in Germantown is that at 3:00PM each school day, an estimated eight thousand children descend on the district; as the area is home to 3 high schools, 2 middle schools, and three elementary schools. After school, many of the older kids loiter in the district and cause tension with merchants who feel threatened by their sheer numbers.

Policing efforts in the district have included the use of a bike patrol officer who is linked to merchants through a beeper paid for by the merchant association. The local police captain has also instituted directive patrol. This is a system where the officer who works a certain sector has to check his location 14 days straight to address identified problems until they have been cleared. If it is not, a report to the captain is required. The captain makes every effort to have the same officer working the same area



Looking east on Cheltenham Avenue, this view of the Central Germantown commercial district illustrates the low-end retail environment that has taken over this once proud district. The district's historical past is also captured in this shot as cobblestone streets and a now unused trolley line appear in the foreground.


### **Germantown physical assessment**

In July 1998 researchers from the Center for Public Policy of Temple University, observed Germantown's commercial district. The observations were recorded during a weekday in the summer between the hours of 9AM and 5PM. A total of two hundred and ninety-three (293) business sites were identified, with fifty-eight (58) of those being vacant and three where the type of business was coded as missing. This gave us a total of two hundred and thirty-two (233) business sites.

Four of the forty-one business categories account for over thirty-five percent of the businesses located in the district. Fast food (N= 17), clothing (N= 22), general

merchandise (N= 21) and beauty (N= 28) account for about thirty-seven and a half percent of the businesses.

**Figure 8: Germantown Business Facade Rating**



The researchers rated the facade of each of the business fronts, regardless of whether or not the business was vacant or occupied. The possible ratings for this variable were poor, fair or good as rated by the researcher. As Figure 8 displays, over seventy-five percent of the businesses were given a rating of either fair or better.

**Table 8: Physical Assessment of Frankford Business**

	Type	% Possessing
<b>Security Measures</b>	Protective Devices for Windows	63.5
	Protective devices for door	67.2
	Security notice	44.7
<b>Building rating</b>	Graffiti	15.4
	Broken windows	3.8
<b>Business area</b>	Litter on sidewalk	16.4
	Outdoor seating	3.1
	Merchandise displays	5.1
	Sidewalk obstruction	13.3
	Loiterers	22.2
	Vendors	7.2
	Panhandlers	1.0

(N= 293)

### *Security Items*

The data collected also included information on specific security precautions taken by the individual businesses. This included precautions taken by the businesses that would be visible to an individual examining the property from the outside. The first of these was the presence of a protective device for the windows of the business (i.e. a screen, a grate, a pull down covering, or other security measures). Over sixty percent (63.5%) of the business sites in Germantown have taken the precaution of equipping their storefront with some form of protective barrier for the window; while just over two thirds of businesses (67.2%) had a protective device (pull down grate, screening, and the like) for the door.

The final measure of visible security precautions recorded by the researchers was the presence of some form of security warning displayed on the storefront (i.e. warning of an alarm system, a security dog, guards, etc.). The researchers found, as seen in Table 8 (above), that just under half (44.7%) displayed some form of warning sign.

### *Facade of Property*

The measures under the "Facade of Property" heading are focused on factors that are immediately associated with the facade of the property. In Germantown fifteen percent of the businesses had been marked by graffiti, while nearly four percent of the sites display broken windows.

Further, over fifteen percent of the businesses within the Germantown commercial district had litter present on the sidewalk. This was fairly substantial, especially considering the presence of paid sidewalk sweepers in the district.

### *Area in front of Business*

The following measures are concerned with the use of the area in front of the business as well as who used that space. These measures reflect the incivilities present in front of the business.

Three measures recorded by the researchers were the presence of panhandlers, loiterers and vendors. Germantown had few incidents of panhandlers less than one percent. There was a greater presence of vendors (7.2%) with the biggest problems being loitering, with over one-fifth (22.2%) of the businesses having at least one loiterer present in front of their business. Lastly, slightly over thirteen percent (13.3%) of the business sites had the sidewalk area in front of their business obstructed.

### **Business Survey Results**

There were 66 surveys completed by businesses within the Germantown Business Improvement District (GBID). With a base rate of 235 occupied business properties, the response rate was 28.1%. The following is a summary of the 66 responses to our survey.

### *Business and merchant dynamics*

Close to half (43.9%) of the merchants responding to our survey in Germantown stated that they were the owner of the business. A third (33.3%) indicated that they were the manager while the remainder, slightly under a quarter (22.7%) stated their role as an assistant manager. The property ownership of the businesses within the Germantown area was about one-fifth (20.0%) of those responding to the survey.

An item of particular interest was the relationship between the ownership of the business and involvement in community safety programming and attachment to the community. One proxy that we used to measure this was whether the store was a single owned business versus part of a chain (either national or regional). Over three-quarters (77.3%)

of the respondents reported that their business was a single proprietorship, while the remainder (22.7%) reported being a branch of a national or regional chain. Further, the racial composition of the merchants was as broad as that of the commercial district that they represent. Slightly over half (50.8%) of the respondents were African-American, approximately a fifth were either Asian or White (19.0% and 20.6% respectively).

Another measure of neighborhood commitment was a measure of the perceived involvement that a merchant feels that he/she has in the commercial district over time. Table 9 lists the length of tenure for both the store and the merchant.

**Table 9: Tenure of Owner and Business Establishment**

	<b>Owner</b>	<b>Business</b>
<b>0-2 years</b>	24.2	11.1
<b>2-5 years</b>	37.9	20.6
<b>6-10 years</b>	21.2	47.6
<b>11-20 years</b>	15.2	15.9
<b>More than 20 years</b>	1.5	4.8

About one third (31.7%) of the businesses have been in the Germantown area for five years or less. Almost half (47.6%) of them have been in existence for six to ten years, while approximately a fifth (20.7%) have been in business for eleven years or longer.

In Table 10 we examine another measure of involvement, or investment, that a business must make within a commercial district. This measure examined the amount of employment provided by the business. Table 10 lists the number of employees, both full and part-time that the businesses employ.


**Table 10: Number of Employees**

	<b>Full Time</b>	<b>Part Time</b>
<b>1-5 Employees</b>	74.6	72.7
<b>6-10 Employees</b>	19	20
<b>11-20 Employees</b>	3.2	7.3
<b>20 or more</b>	3.2	0

*Business Location*

This section of the survey concerns merchants' opinion of the Germantown commercial district. The respondents were asked to rate the quality of the commercial district as a business location. As seen in Figure 9, almost half of the respondents (46.8%) generally were pleased with Germantown as a business location, while almost another half (44.6%) at least felt the location was "fair" for businesses.


**Figure 9: Rating of Location for business**



The second item included to gauge the progress of the area's business climate as perceived by the merchants was to question them on the Special Service District's impact on the local business. The results are seen below in Figure 10. As can be seen in the figure the predominant response indicated that the business environment had stayed about

the same, followed by “gotten better”. Less than 20% of the respondents saw the business environment becoming worse.

**Figure 10: Trend in Business Environment**




*Merchant knowledge of SSD*

The next group of question aimed to assess the level of interaction that the merchants had with the GSSD, and how they perceived those interactions. Looking at Figure 11 below, it would seem that few merchants (3.2%) have frequent contact with the GSSD. What is alarming is that over half (53.5%) report no contact with the GSSD whatsoever.


Considering a merchant tax actually pays for the Germantown Special Services District it seems apparent that the district and its leadership need to focus greater effort on GSSD interactions with the businesses within the commercial district.

**Figure 11: Level of Contact with SSD**



The final item in the series asked merchants to rate the services of the GSSD. As seen below in Figure 12, overall it would seem that the merchants are less than pleased with the services of the GSSD. Of course, considering Figure 11 above, where over half of the businesses have no contact with the GSSD, this comes as no surprise. Less than ten percent (9.3%) of the merchants felt that the GSSD was doing a good or better job, while slightly over half (50.3%) felt that they were doing a poor or very poor job in delivering services to the Germantown business community.


**Figure 12: Rating of GSSD Services**



*Fear and Victimization*


The following section focuses on the level of fear that merchants have of being victimized within the commercial district, along with their knowledge of criminal victimization within the commercial district.

**Figure 13: Fear of Victimization in Germantown (Workday)**



Looking at Figure 13 we see that the merchants seemed to be equally split between afraid and unafraid when measuring level of fear of victimization during the workday. About half (49.2%) of the merchants reported being somewhat afraid or very afraid, while the remainder (50.8%) indicated that they were either not afraid at all or somewhat afraid.

**Figure 14: Fear of Victimization in Germantown (en route)**



*Victimization*

The merchants surveyed were asked two questions regarding their knowledge and experience with victimization; and whether they had considered closing their operation due to fear of crime. Table 11 below shows the results of these inquiries.

**Table 11: Victimization Items**

<b>Considered closing due to fear</b>	24.6%
<b>Aware of other's being victimized</b>	69.5%
<b>Been a victim of crime</b>	30.3%

Well over half (69.5%) of the respondents claimed knowledge of another business's victimization and almost a third (30.3%) reported that they themselves had been the victim of a crime. These numbers more than explain why almost a quarter (24.6%) of the merchants responding to our survey had considered closing due to fear of crime.

The merchants in the Germantown Special Service District were asked to identify how many other merchants they knew had been a crime victim. The responses ranged from

one to nine, with the modal category being four. The survey then asked merchants how they received information concerning victimization within their commercial district. Table 12 shows that most merchants (66.0%) rely on information provided by other merchants within the district. Few rely on the police (12.8%) and even fewer on the resources of the GSSD (2.1%).

**Table 12: Source of Learning of Others' Victimization**

<b>Police</b>	12.8
<b>Merchant</b>	66.0
<b>Special Services District</b>	2.1
<b>Other</b>	19.1

*Problems in the District*

Next we provided the merchants with a list of possible problems might be found in a commercial district within a large city. The merchants were asked to rate the severity of each item within their own commercial district. The results are shown in Table 13.

**Table 13: Perceptions of Problems in the District**

	<b>Big</b>	<b>Somewhat of</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't</b>
	<b>Problem</b>	<b>a Problem</b>	<b>Problem</b>	<b>Know</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Lots filled with trash</b>	33.3	47	15.2	4.5
<b>Vendors</b>	18.5	38.5	23.1	20
<b>Abandoned buildings</b>	28.8	40.9	24.2	6.1
<b>Graffiti on buildings</b>	51.5	16.7	30.3	1.5
<b>Public drinking</b>	19.7	39.4	28.8	12.1
<b>Loitering</b>	39.4	37.9	22.7	0
<b>Drug dealing</b>	29.7	45.3	17.2	7.8
<b>Cars vandalized</b>	62.1	25.8	10.6	1.5
<b>Panhandlers</b>	29.2	49.2	15.4	6.2
<b>Unruly behavior</b>	34.4	48.4	14.1	3.1
<b>Prostitution</b>	33.8	30.8	27.7	7.7
<b>Forcible stealing</b>	41.5	45.2	9.2	3.1
<b>Forcible entry</b>	18.8	34.4	32.8	14.1
<b>Auto theft</b>	42.4	42.4	10.6	4.5

Two items that appear to be the most commonly identified “big problems” in the Germantown commercial district are automobile vandalism and graffiti on buildings. Both of these are quality of life problems that would detract from the appearance of a commercial district, as well as risks posed to individuals traveling to the area. Also rated quite high are forcible stealing (41.5%) and auto theft (42.4%) which again are primary concerns for an area competing for consumer attention.

*Perceptions of City and GSSD Services*

The merchants were then given a list of statements and asked to rate each statement according to their own experiences in the commercial district. These items focused on the quality of public services, the efforts of the Germantown Special Services District, and statements about both crime and safety. Table 14 reports the results of the responses.

**Table 14: Ratings of Services**

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>SSD has improved police/ business relations</b>	1.5	6.2	13.8	72.3	
<b>Outsiders cause problems</b>	0.0	10.6	54.5	13.6	21.2
<b>SSD has improved business district</b>	0.0	10.9	15.6	7.8	65.6
<b>Police keep order</b>	3.1	20.0	43.1	30.8	3.1
<b>Police are highly visible</b>	3.0	25.8	43.9	27.3	0.0
<b>Area is well lit in evening</b>	0.0	9.2	43.1	43.1	4.6
<b>Crime scares visitors away</b>	19.7	30.3	36.4	3.0	0.0
<b>Streets are safer due to SSD</b>	0.0	3.1	18.5	9.2	69.2
<b>City is not responding to needs of business comm.</b>	13.6	40.9	28.8	9.1	7.6
<b>Police encourage business to prevent crime</b>	4.6	47.7	35.4	1.5	10.8
<b>Police concerned with problems</b>	4.6	40.0	32.3	4.6	18.5
<b>Business area is safe</b>	1.5	18.5	63.1	15.4	1.5

Of particular importance in this table are the items that received little or no support. For instance the statement concerning the GSSD's efforts in making the streets safer received almost no agreement, along with the item asking about GSSD improving the business district and the GSSD improving police and business relations. Further, only a fifth

(20.0%) of the respondents felt that the commercial district was safe while most of the remainder (78.5%) felt that it was unsafe. This could be a direct effect of the poor lighting in the area (86.2% disagree that it is well lit). It would also seem that the interactions between the police and the merchants need to be improved upon because approximately half of the merchants responded positively on most of the police statements.

*Security and loss prevention*

The final section of the survey focused on the use of security measures and insurance by the merchants within the commercial district. Table 15 below, reports the security precautions taken by the merchants.

**Table 15: Merchants use of Security Measures**

<b>Merchandise specially arranged</b>	39.4
<b>Additional lighting</b>	24.2
<b>Special locks</b>	69.7
<b>Inventory control system</b>	24.2
<b>Alarm system</b>	39.4
<b>Firearm in store</b>	6.1
<b>Police partnership</b>	6.1
<b>Mirrors</b>	37.9
<b>Business watch participant</b>	0.0
<b>Security guard on site</b>	12.1
<b>Surveillance Camera</b>	43.9

The most popular form of security measure taken by merchants within the Germantown commercial district would seem to be using special locks (69.7%). Surveillance cameras (43.9%), merchandise specially arranged (39.4%); alarm systems (39.4%) and mirrors (37.9%) were also heavily used security measures by the merchants. Most merchants identified more than a single effort undertaken to increase their security.


The merchants were also asked to report whether they possessed insurance to cover losses endured by their business. Almost three-quarters (73.0%) of the respondents

indicated that they owned insurance while a much smaller percent (11.9) reported having needed to use their insurance.

### *Crime Prevention Advice*

The last section of the survey focuses on whether the merchants had been provided with crime prevention advice during their tenure in the Germantown commercial district. Just under half (48.4%) of the merchants acknowledged having receiving some form of crime prevention advice from an outside agency. Figure 15 below, reports who supplied the advice to the business owners.

**Figure 15: Crime Advice Provided to Merchants in the GSSD**



Under a quarter (21.1%) of the merchants stated that the police had provided them with crime prevention advice, while the insurance companies informed slightly more (26.3%). The GSSD did little to provide crime prevention information to the businesses (5.3%), while an unidentified group or groups provided information to slightly under half of the merchants (47.4%). Considering the poor interactions between the police, GSSD and the merchants, and the good communication between merchants it may very well be that their fellow merchants are the best providers of crime prevention advice in Germantown.

## **Germantown Special Service District: Conclusions**

The results of the survey seem to indicate that Germantown SSD has their work cut out for them. They currently have little support within the commercial district and little interaction with the merchants. With a high turnover rate and a high level of fear they will find this obstacle difficult to surmount.

The district has more than it's fair share of problems, however, for the commercial district to survive in any viable form they need to begin addressing some of these problems. With a high level of fear, poor lighting and little access to police support it does not seem likely that the Germantown commercial district will become a hub of nightlife for Philadelphia. These quality of life issues need to be addressed to attract more merchants, which should also be a focus of the GSSD, however, with the minimal knowledge of their existence it doesn't seem likely that they have engaged in this role effectively.

## THE MANAYUNK SPECIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

### **Manayunk**

#### *History*

Manayunk is a small former mill town that sits beside the banks of the Schuylkill River. The area is known for its canal, which used to facilitate the movement of barges downstream from the Schuylkill River to the area's manufacturing plants. The densely populated community is home to closely spaced homes and steep sloping streets. Many of the residents have lived there for generations while others have located into the neighborhood within the last few years. There is a feeling of two different worlds here, one of the insider, the generational resident, and of the outsider, the yuppies and the student population. Its 'old world' charm gives Manayunk an appeal but also contributes much of the problems in the area. The housing is old, deteriorating, and the narrow streets make it a problem for traffic and parking. Furthermore, the proximity of homes to one another gives the area a lack of adequate open space.

In the mid 1960's, the last of Manayunk's deteriorating riverfront commercial space had become an eyesore for everyone. A dilapidated group of commercial buildings, poor accessibility to major highways and a hazardously polluted adjacent river made the area less than attractive. The only thing holding back major demolition of the area was a small number of jobs that some of the local businesses still provided. A study of residents at the time revealed ambivalence toward redevelopment; with the prospect of demolition causing more unemployment in an already depressed area. Poor vehicular traffic circulation was another large problem faced by the area. The narrow, steep streets, its severe lack of parking and numerous trucks serving the few vibrant manufacturing concerns caused these problems. Also cited in this study was the extreme lack of recreation for children, as well as the under use of the area's two commuter rail lines.

At the time city planners prepared a list of seven recommendations to the problems of the area. These included: acquiring one hundred twenty-five acres of the Schuylkill for

recreational use in addition to rebuilding the canal and locks; preserving the industrial uses along the river until other employment needs were met; conducting a commercial-residential renewal study on how to preserve the character of Manayunk and perhaps ways to revitalize Main Street; consolidating the rail lines; improving traffic flow by changing the pattern and increasing lanes; constructing a new playground; and finally, replacing old buildings, particularly an obsolete elementary school.

Moreover, other problems included the inaccessibility of Manayunk from the suburbs and the competition from Ridge Avenue's stores and banks. It was not until the Schuylkill Expressway opened with a ramp going into the area that people really started to set foot in the area.

A study conducted in 1995 by the Philadelphia Planning Commission showed Manayunk added 106 new retail units for a total of 410 since 1988. At the same time, vacancy rates were the lowest in the city, dropping from 6.3% to 4.8%. This burst of growth not only brought more prosperity to the area but also added to its problems. Recently, the Philadelphia City Council placed a five-year ban on new restaurants in the area, which will inevitably slow down the fast paced development. More importantly, this ban does not address the congestion that already scourges the area. Parking has become more of a problem as residents fight with the weekenders for parking spots coupled with the overall rowdiness that comes along with living near a weekend hot spot. At the request of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, an independent engineering firm has come up with preliminary recommendations to ease traffic dilemma.

While the commerce in Manayunk, especially on Main Street, is doing well, the residents are not. They complain that the town has become less resident and more visitor-friendly. In other areas of the city, this idea of bringing in others to help out commerce is fully endorsed by the citizenry, but in Manayunk, this intrusion changes the way life has been functioning since its very beginnings. Fighting with the visitors that come to soak up the nightlife has forced some residents to lock themselves in on the weekend just so that they get parking spots. The residents also cite the lack of diversity in the district as a problem,

stating that there are too many restaurants but not one library, pharmacy or even a video rental store.



A typical view of Main Street in Manayunk reveals the confluence of old and new. The gentrification of the commercial area has resulted in the restoration of old mill buildings for higher-end retail and residential use. The presence of bicyclists foretells the district's signature annual event, the Manayunk Professional bicycle race. This view does not, however, give illustration to the problems faced by the district; with traffic, parking and minor disorder events spilling into adjacent residential areas inhabited mostly by working-class, long-term residents being most notable.

### **Manayunk physical assessment**

In July 1998 two researchers from the Center for Public Policy observed Manayunk's commercial district. The observations were conducted during two weekdays in the summer between the hours of 9 AM and 5 PM. A total of one hundred and ninety-five business sites were identified. Thirteen of these sites were vacant at the time of the

assessment, resulting in a total of one hundred and eighty-two viable businesses to identify. However, for all other variables the full one hundred and ninety-five sites were used.

A total of forty-seven different categories of businesses were identified by the physical assessment. Five of these business types; Restaurant (N=20), Clothing (N=26), Furnishings (N=22), Art/Art Supplies (N=13) and Beauty (N=9) account for approximately half of the businesses (49.4%, N= 90). Twenty-one of these categories had only a single business.

While conducting the physical assessments the researchers rated the facade of each property. This was a general measure to assess the level of maintenance and presentation for each facade. Slightly over eighty-five percent of the businesses in Manayunk rated either fair or good on the measure of the façade maintenance.

#### *Security items*

The observational ratings also included information on specific security precautions taken by the individual businesses. This included precautions taken by the businesses that would be visible to an individual examining the property from the outside. The first of these were protective devices for the windows of the business (i.e. a screen, a grate or a pull down cover). Slightly less than ten percent (9.2%) of the businesses used such devices to protect the windows of their business.

The next item measured was whether or not the business had some form of security device on the door of their establishment. Table 15 reveals slightly less than seven percent of the business sites used some form of security device on the front door.

The final measure of visible security was whether or not the business had a sign or notice warning individuals of security measures (i.e. alarm companies, silent alarms, and the like.) taken by the business. Unlike the previous two forms of security measures we find that over half of the businesses in Manayunk have some form of notice or sign in the

window of their business announcing some security measures. Reasons that might explain why the use of a sign is more commonly adopted than either of the previous two measures might include the aesthetic value that the security notices may offer in lieu of a physical barrier, or it may simply be more cost-effective.

**Table 16: Physical Assessment of District**

	<b>Type</b>	<b>% Possessing</b>
<b>Security Measures</b>	Protective Devices for Windows	9.2
	Protective devices for door	6.7
	Security notice	50.8
<b>Building rating</b>	Graffiti	1.0
	Broken windows	0
<b>Business area</b>	Litter on sidewalk	3.6
	Outdoor seating	9.2
	Merchandise displays	5.6
	Sidewalk obstruction	2.6
	Loiterers	2
	Vendors	0
	Panhandlers	0
N = 195		

*Area in front of the business*

Two measures recorded by the researchers were the presence of panhandlers or vendors in front of or around the target business area. However, within the Special Services District in Manayunk neither of these types of individuals was observed. The existence of loiterers was also noted to be slight in Manayunk, with only 4 of the 195 store fronts (2%) exhibiting some form of loitering. Again, loitering was defined for our purposes as the presence of individuals who were present but without a clear purpose.

The last four variables measured concerned the condition of the area in front of and surrounding the business. Researchers identified businesses that had litter or trash in front of their business. Less than four percent of the 195 business sites observed by the researchers had a noticeable amount of garbage (it should be noted that the researchers

were not concerned with the presence of an individual piece of refuse, but instead with what might demonstrate a clear neglect of the property).

Less than ten percent of the businesses in Manayunk had a display on the street to advertise their business. This is not necessarily considered a detractor of the aesthetic quality of the district; however, it does inhibit the area in front of the business and may be construed as a potential barrier.

### **Business Survey**

There were 79 surveys completed by Manayunk businesses. With a base rate of 179 occupied business properties, the response rate for Manayunk was 44%. The following describes the responses of these 79 businesses.

The initial section of items on the survey addressed ownership status, tenure of location, and business size in terms of number of employees. In addition, items relating to the demographic and geographic orientation of the merchants will be addressed in this section.

The survey was intended to reflect the collective experience of the business itself. As an individual representative of each establishment was tasked with completing an interview, it was important to address the relationship of the respondent with the establishment. Of the 79 respondents, 51, or nearly two-thirds (64.6%) indicated that they owned the business. The remaining 28 were either managers, or assistant managers of the business.

This study was focused on the role of special improvement districts in the co-production of safety services. As special services districts typically gain revenues through assessments to real property, and these districts are typically funded through property assessments, it was also important to address the issue of property ownership. As to be expected the property ownership rate among respondents (32.9%) was less than the business ownership rate. Nonetheless, this rate of property ownership among business

establishment owners was high relative to citywide averages and among our other studied districts.

Assessing the relationship among business ownership status and involvement in community safety programming and attachment to the community was also a focus of this effort. We addressed this concern by asking whether the business is a locally owned single proprietorship or part of a larger national or regional chain. A significant majority of respondents indicated that they were single proprietorships (85.3%); this reflects the local flavor of the Manayunk business community evidenced by the fact that just over three-quarters (76.3%) of those surveyed resided in the 19127 or 19128 zip code areas (those areas most contiguous to the business district). Moreover, the race of survey respondents approximates that of the community, with 93.2% white, 4.1% African-American, and 1.4% Hispanic.

In addition to the level of “local-ness” of the business community, the length of tenure of the merchants is thought to influence their willingness to get involved in community matters. Tables 17 and 18 illustrate the length of tenure among establishments and respondents.

**Table 17: Tenure of Owner and Business Establishment**

	<b>Owner</b>	<b>Business</b>
<b>0-2 years</b>	19.5	13.7
<b>2 to 5 years</b>	32.5	38.4
<b>6 to 10 years</b>	23.4	19.2
<b>11 to 20 years</b>	14.3	12.3
<b>More than 20 years</b>	10.4	16.4

Although the recent growth in business establishments in Manayunk has been impressive, the distribution of tenure lengths evidenced in Tables 17 and 18 reveal that the business community is well represented by long-time owners and establishments. While about half of the establishments are less than 5 years old, about a quarter of establishments and

owners/managers have been in business for over 10 years. Given the intimate quality of many of Manayunk’s shops and restaurants, it is no surprise that the size of surveyed establishments in terms of employees would be small.


**Table 18: Number of Employees**

	<b>Full Time</b>	<b>Part Times</b>
<b>1 to 5 employees</b>	79.1	74.8
<b>6-10</b>	9.9	11.6
<b>11-20</b>	6.0	81
<b>20 or more</b>	5.0	5.5

*Business Location*


The next series of items related to merchants’ opinions of the district. The first item queried merchants to rate the quality of Manayunk as a business location. As evidenced in Figure 16 below, a vast majority of those who responded to the survey were content with Manayunk, as nearly 80% indicated that Manayunk was either a good (38.5%) or very good (38.5%) place for their business. Alternately, 5.1% of respondents thought that Manayunk was a poor or very poor place for their operation.

**Figure 16: Rating of location for business**



A second item was designed to gauge the progress of the area's business climate over the past few years. An ancillary interpretation of this item could be the impact of the MSSD on the local business climate, as their efforts have been fairly recent. Figure 17 illustrates the distribution of the responses.

**Figure 17: Trend in business environment**




Similar to the positive ratings evidenced in Figure 16, a majority of the respondents (55.3%) have perceived an improvement in the business climate over the past few years. Just more than a quarter (27.6%) saw little or no change, while 17% indicated that they believed the business climate had gotten worse.

#### *Merchant knowledge of MSSD*

A third set of questions was designed to assess the level of knowledge and interaction that merchants had with the special services district. Respondents to this item overwhelmingly had some knowledge of the MSSDs existence (83.8%).


**Figure 18: Level of contact with MSSD**



Of those indicating knowledge of the SSD, 23% indicated having frequent contact with the MSSD and its staff; 41% had little contact, while 36% had no contact with the MSSD (see Figure 18).

The last item in this series asked merchants to rate the services of the MSSD. As illustrated in Figure 19, of the merchants that were aware of the MSSD, nearly half (47.3%) rated their activities as excellent or good.

**Figure 19: Rating of MSSD services**




A rating of fair was the modal category (30.9%). This could reflect somewhat of a lack of awareness of the concrete activities of the MSSD (see Table 16 below), or the failure of the district to promote their activities to a broad constituency. Slightly over one-fifth (21.8%) of respondents rated the services of the MSSD as poor or very poor.

### *Fear and Victimization*


The following six survey items assess levels of fear, victimization experience and knowledge of victimization among fellow merchants. Figure 20 represents the distribution of fear levels among respondents during their workday within the district. Figure 21 illustrates fear while traveling to and from work.

**Figure 20: Fear of victimization in Manayunk (workday)**



A majority of respondents (52.6%) indicated not being fearful at all during their workday, while 22.6% were generally unafraid. A quarter of respondents (25%) stated that they were somewhat or very afraid of being victimized during the day.

**Figure 21: Fear of victimization in Manayunk (en route)**



The distribution of fear among merchants during their trip to and from work approximates the distribution during the day. Sixty-percent of respondents responded that they had no fear at all, while 22.1% reported that they were somewhat unafraid, with 18.2% revealing some level of fear.

*Victimization*

Merchants were asked two questions regarding their knowledge and experience with victimization; and whether they had considered closing their operation due to fear of being victimized.

**Table 19: Victimization Items**

<b>Considered closing due to fear</b>	7.7%
<b>Aware of other's being victimized</b>	76%
<b>Been a victim of crime</b>	36.8%

The fact that slightly over three-quarters (76%) of surveyed businesses knew of a fellow merchant that has been victimized -- while nearly 37% have been themselves victimized -- has not deterred many operators from considering discontinuing their business pursuits in Manayunk. This reluctance to close in the face of a high level of victimization reflects

the non-serious and property-related nature of many crimes committed in the district (see below).

The incidence of victimization among survey respondents reflects their experiences over the year prior to the survey administration. As noted above, just over one third of respondents (37%) indicated at least one victimization. While this rate is significant, the raw number (19) is reflective of the problems associated with crime analysis in general: the relative low frequency of victimization. The 19 victimized merchants reported 26 separate incidences. Of these, 11 were for theft or shoplifting; four were for auto break-in or theft; three involved vandalism; three were burglaries; two robberies; two frauds; and one assault.

Merchants were also asked to identify how many other merchants they knew who had fallen victim to a crime. These responses ranged from one (the modal choice), to 10, with a mean of 3.5. When asked how they found out about their fellow merchant's victimization experience (see Table 20), nearly three-quarters (72.9%) found out from another merchant and nearly fourteen percent (13.6%) found out through a police contact; one found out through the MSSD.

**Table 20: Source of Learning of Others' Victimization**

<b>Police</b>	13.6%
<b>Merchant</b>	72.9%
<b>Special Services District</b>	1.7%
<b>Other</b>	11.9%

*Problems in the District*

In order to determine perceptions of problems in the district, merchants were given a series of possible problems typical of commercial areas and asked to rate them in terms of their severity.

**Table 21: Perception of Problems in the MSSD District**

	<b>Big</b>	<b>Somewhat of</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Don't</b>
	<b>Problem</b>	<b>a</b>	<b>Problem</b>	<b>Know</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Lots filled with trash</b>	6.9	30.6	41.7	20.8
<b>Vendors</b>	8.5	25.4	52.1	14.1
<b>Abandoned buildings</b>	6.9	19.4	63.9	9.7
<b>Graffiti on buildings</b>	11.1	31.9	48.6	8.3
<b>Public drinking</b>	13.7	47.9	35.6	2.7
<b>Loitering</b>	16.9	36.6	39.4	7.0
<b>Drug dealing</b>	12.3	35.6	37.0	15.1
<b>Cars vandalized</b>	26.0	38.4	28.8	6.8
<b>Panhandlers</b>	6.9	29.2	43.1	20.8
<b>Unruly behavior</b>	16.7	48.6	30.6	4.2
<b>Prostitution</b>	4.2	20.8	56.9	18.1
<b>Forcible stealing</b>	7.0	35.2	42.3	15.5
<b>Forcible entry</b>	4.2	27.8	44.4	23.6
<b>Auto theft</b>	9.7	33.3	43.1	13.9

As shown in Table 21, merchants found vandalized cars as the district’s most vexing problem, with slightly more than a quarter (26%) of respondents finding it a big problem. Merchants also found unruly behavior a problem in the district, with 16.7% finding it a big problem, and 65.3% indicating it was at least somewhat of a problem. Merchants also found the related problems of public drinking and loitering to be relatively severe within the district, at 60.6% and 53.5% respectively. Another indication of the severity of these problems rests in a reverse ordered interpretation of the table; that is, merchants had little trouble identifying these four problems, with each having the fewest level of “don’t knows” in the survey.

Alternately, merchants in Manayunk took little issue with problems typical to other districts in the city, namely, abandonment, graffiti, and prostitution. In general, Manayunk scored low in terms of merchant perceptions of problem severity.

*Perception of City and SSD Services*

The survey contained a number of items, worded as statements, which required the respondent to agree or disagree and to what extent. These items generally related to the perceived quality of public services, special district efforts, and statements about crime and safety. The distribution of the merchant responses to these statements follows below.

**Table 22: Ratings of Services**

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>SSD has improved police/ business relations</b>	10.4	32.5	10.4	7.8	39.0
<b>Outsiders cause problems</b>	6.4	32.1	25.6	14.1	21.8
<b>SSD has improved business district</b>	9.3	38.7	12.0	5.3	34.7
<b>Police keep order</b>	22.8	64.6	5.1	2.5	5.1
<b>Police are highly visible</b>	34.2	45.6	13.9	3.8	2.5
<b>Area is well lit in evening</b>	24.1	58.2	12.7	1.3	3.8
<b>Crime scares visitors away</b>	1.3	6.3	35.4	51.9	5.1
<b>Streets are safer due to SSD</b>	6.6	22.4	17.1	5.3	48.7
<b>City is not responding to needs of business comm.</b>	9.1	26.0	36.4	10.4	18.2
<b>Police encourage business to prevent crime</b>	3.8	62.0	13.9	2.5	17.7
<b>Police concerned with problems</b>	11.4	55.7	15.2	5.1	12.7
<b>Business area is safe</b>	16.5	69.6	11.4		2.5

Items that received overwhelming support on this section were those associated with the quality of policing services in the area. Nearly 88% of respondents agreed or strongly with the statement that police keep order, while nearly 80% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that police are highly visible. In general, the responses to this section of the survey revealed that merchants thought the area was safe, well lit and well policed. Their perceptions of police visibility and levels of interaction with police further illustrate the overall level of merchant satisfaction with police services. Nearly all (98.7%) of respondents indicated they see police either often (68.4%) or sometime (30.4%). Merchants also reported a high level of interaction with police: with 29.1% often, and 41.8% sometime interacting with police.

This section also revealed that many merchants are unaware of the role of the SSD. This may be due to the limited role of the MSSD in Manayunk, especially in terms of the provision of direct safety services.

*Security, loss prevention*

The final section of the survey queried merchants as to their use of security measures and insurance. Table 23 shows the percentages of the merchants utilizing an assortment of security measures.

**Table 23: Merchants use of Security Measures**

<b>Merchandized specially arranged</b>	48.1%
<b>Additional lighting</b>	53.2%
<b>Special locks</b>	55.7%
<b>Inventory control system</b>	20.3%
<b>Alarm system</b>	74.7%
<b>Firearm in store</b>	3.8%
<b>Police partnership</b>	24.1%
<b>Mirrors</b>	34.2%
<b>CCTV</b>	20.3%
<b>Business watch participant</b>	24.1%
<b>Security guard on site</b>	1.3%

The most popular security efforts in Manayunk involved the use of alarms (74.7%), special locks on windows and doors (55.7%), and lighting (53.2%). Few merchants took


the expensive and drastic measures of hiring a security guard (1.3%) or possessing a firearm within their place of business (3.8%). Many merchants indicated using a multitude of the listed security methods. The modal number of measures was two, while the mean use was 3.6 methods per establishment.

Their use of insurance was also a question posed to Manayunk merchants. Just over four-fifths (81.3%) of respondents carried insurance for loss or theft. Of these, a third had occasion to file a claim for loss or theft.

*Crime Prevention Advice*

A final set of questions related to whether merchants had been given the benefit of crime prevention advice, and by whom. Just under half (47.5%) of respondents had been offered crime prevention advice. Of these, most (68.4%) received advice from the police, 13% indicated it had come from the SSD, while 11% received advice from their insurance company.

**Figure 22: Crime Prevention and Advice By Whom**



### **The Manayunk Special Services District: Conclusions**

This merchant survey bears out that Manayunk is a safe and orderly business environment. It has a responsive and effective police presence in the commercial area. Many of the problems identified by merchants are based, in part, on the district's success at attracting visitors. Many of these visitors come to the district to enjoy its wealth of entertainment offerings. These offerings include to a large extent bars and nightclubs, which unfortunately, promote alcohol consumption and its oftentimes attendant phenomena disorderly conduct.

As opposed to other SSDs in the city that have focused their efforts on the delivery of services, Manayunk's efforts have been primarily promotional, event driven, and focussed on physical development. This fact has led to a failure of many merchants to relate the quality of the business environment to the efforts MSSD; and instead, rightfully attribute the areas successful safety planning to the city's police department.

## THE SOUTH STREET SPECIAL SERVICES DISTRICT

### South Street

#### *History*

The events of the past sixty years have shaped the way South Street, particularly the area east of Broad Street, functions today. From its earliest beginnings, South Street was at a hub of commerce for the city. Initially the city's southern border, South Street became home to many merchants who sold a variety of goods to a burgeoning city. With the Consolidation Act of 1854 defining the current city, South Street maintained its place as the commercial center for Center City and neighboring communities in the city's southern sections. The street started to show some wear and tear in the 1930s, as the depression slowed commerce in the area. During the later part of the decade, plans to rebuild South Street to its former glory were forwarded by a local business civic group, the South Street Boosters Association. The plan called for the removal of older, dilapidated buildings and replacing them with historic replications. In addition, the group sought to mark historical spots with informative tablets and to generally improve the business conditions and enhance property values over the 30-block length of the street extending from the Delaware River to the Schuylkill River. The group also wanted to highlight the architectural of the street through a building restoration and facade improvement program.

Keeping with the city's other primary commercial areas -- Market and Chestnut Street -- the businessmen on South Street sought to promote the street by banning nuisances. Those that were thought to contribute to disorder on the street included barkers, push cart peddlers and saloons.

The South Street Boosters Association also sought help from the federal government through a petition to build the proposed United States Appraisal Stores building on South Street and Delaware Avenue. It was thought that this building would increase foot traffic in the area while increasing property values in the area 25-50%.

In the 1940's, frustrated South Street merchants organized to pay private police officers to patrol their shops at night in order to end a crime wave of burglaries, hold-ups and break-in attempts. This was enacted after fruitless attempts by area businessmen and merchants to get more police to patrol the area. A series of incidents culminated in the murder of a druggist in his shop during a robbery attempt.

Another major theme of the 1950s was the suburbanization of people and commerce. As people moved away from the city, there was a decline of urban shopping districts and eventually decline of the physical environment (i.e. storefronts, sidewalks).

In the early part of the decade, police start enforcing the Blue Laws, which regulate work, commerce, and amusements on Sundays, and consequently the businesses on South Street begin to suffer. Uniformed and under cover police were ordered to deliver summonses to those in violation the law. This strict enforcement led residents and merchants to fight back, stating: "[South] Street has been built on accommodation, staying open late [and] staying open on Sunday."

In 1967, a disagreement between a black man and the son of a white businessman ignited a disturbance that brought approximately five hundred policemen into the neighborhood. This incident sparked NAACP President Cecil B. Moore to ban and picket white businesses on South Street with the goal of putting them out of business. The multi-racial South Street Boosters Association reported a 35-90% drop-off in sales since the beginning of Moore's rallies. Eventually a court order, sought by South Street merchants was issued to suppress the rallies of Moore.

At the end of the decade, the street was wrought with empty storefronts and depressed real estate values. In addition to racial problems and increases in street crime, the street was deteriorating due to a lack of investment. This reluctance to invest in the streets' future was due to the proposed Cross-town Expressway. The Cross-town Expressway was proposed to be a 3-mile low ground level superhighway meant to connect the

Schuylkill Expressway and the Delaware Expressway. First proposed in the 1950's, this federal highway project led to the condemnation of the south side of South Street along with two residential blocks to the south. Citizens in the area, backed by foundation grants, unified to bring business back to South Street and fought to have the plans for the expressway halted. For others, the former glory that used to be South Street had all but turned into a memory. With 23% of all buildings on the street vacant and many of the businessmen living on welfare, some residents and merchants had called the decline irreversible and welcomed the plans for the expressway. Citizen protest, as well as the fact that a study concluded that the highway had high costs and low benefits effectively killed the expressway proposal. Nonetheless, the devastation brought on by disinvestment and abandonment still lingers today on parts of the street.

New life came to South Street in the early 1970's. With the influx of artists into the area, optimistic residents proclaim that this stretch of space is Philadelphia's answer to New York's Greenwich Village. Young artists and craftsman, looking for a place to work and live, revitalized the area from 2nd to 6th streets, bringing with them shops boasting the wonderful and the weird. The neighborhood reanimated with the appearance of a playground reclaimed from a vacant lot, remodeled shops, tree plantings, and community-wide events.

The rapidly declining area with its high visibility of deterioration and graffiti, as well as the abundant amount of drug use and drug dealing on the streets, became a major set of concerns for residents. The lack of police protection from burglaries, in addition to the perception that the police are more concerned with writing parking tickets than getting the pushers off the street, frustrated the residents and merchants alike. In late 1970, the South Street community was shocked with the heinous crime of a furniture store owner being shot and killed, with several others in the store bound, shot and set afire. This crime led to a community uproar over safety on the street. More policemen were promised on the street to increase customers and merchants feeling of safety.

During the 1980's, South Street emerged as a restaurant and entertainment center. In the latter part of the decade, national retailers, such as The Gap and Starbuck's Coffee, were attracted to the area, which to some signaled the end of the street, while to others illustrated growth. Despite the existence of mainstream retailers the street has managed to maintain its alternative bent earned during its transformation in the 1970s -- illustrated by a number of piercing and tattoo shops that remain in the area.

South Street is currently struggling to define itself with conflicts arising between merchants, local residents and city officials over traffic, unruly behavior, and large crowds of people who descend on the street on weekend nights during the summer. This is especially true after large events in the city. With traffic lining up for tens of blocks to get on the street, the police have been forced to reroute traffic and close adjoining streets to all but local traffic. This has led many local residents to leave town during some of these events to avoid the hassles associated with threatening crowds of young people.

A recent site visit to the street during a spring day in May of 1998 revealed that South Street traverses the city; its length runs river to river. The area covered by this study runs east of Broad Street, from 11<sup>th</sup> Street to Front Street (technically 1<sup>st</sup> Street) on South Street, but most of the activity centers on the blocks 7th and east. Here the street mixes commercial and residential space with many of the storefronts having occupied apartments above. Unlike the other commercial districts in the study South Street includes its side streets which also have high commercial occupancy rates. The street and its occupants burst with color. Storefronts and facades boast murals and interesting signs. Each store invites people in to discover. As one moves toward the end of the street, one will inevitably run into the Penn's Landing Pedestrian Bridge. Located at the terminus of South Street this large footbridge brings people to Penn's Landing, another pedestrian mall along the Delaware River waterfront. The area covered by 7th street and west is mostly residential apartment buildings with a small number of operating storefronts. In addition to the trees that frame the street, banners hung on lampposts advertise stores and upcoming events.

Because of the sheer amount of people that are on the street at any given moment, the services utilized in this area try to keep disorder down. The Philadelphia Police maintain a mini sub-station at 9th and South. Used as Headquarters for the South Street area this station deploys foot and vehicle patrol. During the day police locate themselves mostly in cars or vans on every other block. However, during evening and night hours, especially on weekends, foot patrol is assigned to every corner. Since parking is strictly enforced, parking enforcement personnel dutifully write tickets along the street while also creating a presence to help deter crime. Another service that positively favors South Street is that it is very accessible via public transportation. The subway makes a stop at Broad and South and buses will either run eastbound on South during the weekdays, or follow a comparable route along Pine Street on the weekends because of traffic congestion. The Philly Phlash buses, which essentially carry tourists around a loop including City Hall and Independence Mall, also run along South Street. The extensive pedestrian activity and loitering on the sidewalk can make a tremendous mess of newspapers, food wrappers, and beverage bottles, especially on the weekends.

Incivilities are the basis of most of South Street's problems. During the day there is not much observed crime. Some incivilities including loitering, graffiti and panhandling persistently taint the area. Nighttime, however, brings a different story. Many youths loiter on residential stoops as well as on storefronts and street corners. Panhandling among youths is also prevalent on the street. Some street performers scatter the sidewalk mostly in the area of the Theatre of Living Arts, a small venue for musical or stage performers near 4<sup>th</sup> Street. The street is also used for automobile cruising. Young people sit idly backed up for blocks with their car stereos at full volume. Police frequently hand out citations for violation of the city's sound ordinance for those in autos. There is some litter although overall there is not much trash scattered about. BID sanitation personnel, under contract from the CCD in Center City do a full sweep of the sidewalks every morning. Every street corner has trash receptacles. Many of the blank spaces and lampposts have become a haven for graffiti, stickers and playbills. Only a handful of vacant lots stand on South Street. The vacancies concentrate more on the blocks past 7th



Doubling as the city's "boardwalk," South Street possesses a wealth of eclectic retail and entertainment establishments. This photograph touches on some of problems that plague the district, specifically: parking and traffic. Moreover, sidewalk traffic on weekend evenings often necessitates additional police staffing. This is facilitated by the presence of the city's two permanently staffed policing substations.

street toward Broad Street, but that is not to say that a few do not position themselves within the heart of commerce.

Some stores take preventative measures to deter shoplifting, including indoor security cameras and sensor-sensitive gates at the doors. A vast majority of the stores have security gates, and many also have security cameras located within the store.

Parking is one of the major problems that South Street must contend with. Metered parking lines both sides of the street with a two-hour limit in order to achieve a high turnover rate. Most of the side streets also have a two-hour limit, with permit parking for residents. Only a few self-parking lots dot the area with the largest one located at the end of South Street.

The variation of South Streets commercial make-up is quite extensive. Corporate chains, such as The Gap, Starbuck's Coffee, Tower Records, Pizzeria Uno and T.G.I.Friday's, make South Street their home. Other eclectic shops, thrift and craft stores, reminiscent of its renaissance days, line the area. Tattoo and body piercing shops, samples of which find their way onto the bodies of many of South Streets wanderers, cluster on 4th street off South. Fast food, fast service windows sit side-by-side to restaurants with cafe-style outdoor seating. Different types of bars invite those over the legal age to drink and enjoy the atmosphere. Supermarkets conveniently located at 10th and South as well as at 5th and Pine, give people at either ends of the street a place to shop. Additionally, the Chef's Market provides a gourmet food market and cafe. Essentially, South Street tries to create a feeling of "something for everyone."

The population along the street is as varied as its commercial make-up. The population alternates between teenagers who permeate the area and older tourists and residents that come to the street. It does not seem that residents enjoy the rowdiness and noisiness that the street brings, much in the same way as Manayunk.

South Street provides an urbane retail and entertainment mixture similar to such notable areas as Haight-Ashbury in San Francisco, and Greenwich Village in New York. It possesses both an eclectic mix of retailers, as well as many on street residences. The combination of national chain stores and one-of-a-kind shops suits the variety of the

streets' clientele. The street also possesses a fairly large police presence, especially on the weekends. Police keep disturbances and incivilities from escalating, as well as give people the perception of safety. Far from being inaccessible, South Street provides a lively shopping daytime experience and an animated nightlife. Inadequate parking and traffic, and fear of crowds sometimes deter potential customers from coming to the area.


Focus group results in South Street revealed tensions among a number of groups. These conflicts are typically between residents around the street who feel inundated with vehicular traffic and rowdy disrespectful youth who use the street. Moreover, there is a conflict among merchants as to how to manage the street best. The SSSD has made efforts to stem the influx of lower end take-out restaurants that attract a less affluent mix of consumers.

### **Physical Assessment**

A total of forty-one different types of business were identified on South Street. From three hundred and forty-five business sites identified, twenty-four of these business sites had missing data on the type of business. Two categories of business; Clothing (N=35) and Restaurant (N=57) account for over a quarter of the total businesses identified in the South Street commercial district (26.6%, N=92).

The researchers also recorded the overall exterior facade of the business site. They were instructed to rate the outside of the business site on a scale of poor, fair or good. Looking at Figure 23, we find that approximately seventy-eight percent of the businesses (N=409) had a fair to good rating. About six percent of the businesses were unidentified (missing data), and approximately sixteen percent of the businesses had a poor facade rating.

**Figure 23: South Street Facade Rating**



*Security items*

The data collected also included information on specific security precautions taken by the individual businesses. This included precautions taken by the businesses that would be visible to an individual examining the property from the outside. The first of these were protective devices for the windows of the business (i.e. a screen, a grate or a pull down cover). One third (33%) exhibited a window security device.

**Table 24: Physical Assessment of District**

	Type	% Possessing
<b>Security Measures</b>	Protective Devices for Windows	33.0
	Protective devices for door	32.8
	Security notice	42.9
<b>Building rating</b>	Graffiti	16.6
	Broken windows	2.0
<b>Business area</b>	Litter on sidewalk	4.6
	Outdoor seating	3.4
	Merchandise displays	6.4
	Sidewalk obstruction	2.4
	Loiterers	3.4
	Vendors	0
	Panhandlers	0
N = 409		

Nearly a third (32.8%) of the businesses owned some form of security device for the front door of their business establishment.

The final item in the security measures subsection was the presence of a security notice. This could take the form of a notice or warning concerning the presence of alarms, security guards or an alarm company. We found that forty-three percent of the businesses had some form of notice concerning the security measures that they had undertaken.

#### *Facade of the Property*

The subsection Facade of the Property concerned measures outside of the business that were easily identifiable. Just over sixteen percent (16.6%) of businesses had been victimized with some form of graffiti. Graffiti was identified as vandalism that reported names, slurs, or was an apparent eyesore.

Only two percent of the businesses within the South Street commercial district had broken windows on their property. Also, slightly fewer than five percent (4.6%) had a noticeable amount of litter in front of their property

#### *Area in front of the business*

The previous subsections reported on items that were concerned with the exterior of the building itself. The following measures are focused on the area around the business and proprietorship that the businesses and the town show for that area.

Two measures recorded by the researchers were the presence of panhandlers or vendors. However, within the Special Services District on South Street neither of these types of individuals was observed. Another item measured was the presence of loiterers on the street in front of the business. This was defined as the presence of individuals on the street who did not have a clear purpose. This did not include individuals who were window-shopping or awaiting transportation.

The subsection, Area in front of business, also measures the percentage of businesses that were recorded with individuals loitering in front of them. Table 24 shows that approximately three and a half percent of the businesses had one or more individuals loitering in front of them.

### **South Street Survey Results**

There were 128 surveys completed by businesses within the South Street Business Improvement District. With a base rate of 345 occupied business properties, the response rate for South St. was 37%. The following report discusses the results of the 128 respondents of the survey.

#### *Business and merchant dynamics*

The survey focused on a number of topics including the type of business and characteristics of the business. Further, the survey measured items relating to the demographic and geographic orientation of the merchants located within the South Street Business Improvement District.

Of the 128 respondents, approximately one-third (32.8%) reported that they owned the business. The remaining 82 respondents, or approximately two-thirds, indicated that they were managers or assistant managers of the business. The property ownership rate among the respondents within the South Street Business Improvement District was approximately a quarter of the respondents (25.8%)

Of interest was the relationship among business ownership status and involvement in community safety programming and attachment to the community was also a focus of this effort. One way we measured this was by focusing on whether the businesses were a single proprietorship or part of a national or regional chain. A majority of the respondents, approximately two-thirds (68.8%), reported being a single proprietorship.

Further, well over half of the respondents (64.8%) stated their race as White, 10.9% as African-American and less than one percent (.8%) as Hispanic.

As stated in previous survey results it is believed that the level of “proprietorship” shown by the businesses may be a reflection of their self perceived “involvement” in the community. This could be associated with the amount of time that the business has been a part of the community. The following table (Table 25) illustrates the distribution of the length of tenure among establishments and respondents.

**Table 25: Tenure of Owner and Business Establishment**

	<b>Owner</b>	<b>Business</b>
<b>0-2 years</b>	44.5	19.8
<b>2-5 years</b>	21	24.8
<b>6-10 years</b>	17.6	26.7
<b>11-20 years</b>	9.2	16.8
<b>More than 20 years</b>	7.6	11.9

South Street’s high turnover is evidenced that almost half of the businesses (44.6%) have been in business less than 5 years, while over a quarter (27.7%) have been in business over 10 years.

Considering the focus on tourism on South Street, it’s no surprise to find that such a high percent of the businesses (65.3%) employ between 1 and 5 employees. As seen below in Table 26.


**Table 26: Number of Employees**

	<b>Full Time</b>	<b>Part Time</b>
<b>1-5 Employees</b>	78.9	65.3
<b>6-10 Employees</b>	7.9	22.2
<b>11-20 Employees</b>	7	8.3
<b>20 or more</b>	6.1	4.2

*Business Location*


This section of the survey relates to the merchant’s opinions of the district in which they conduct business. The respondents were asked to rate the quality of South Street as a business location. Overall, as seen in Figure 24, a majority of the respondents were pleased with South Street as a business location. Over two-thirds of the respondents rated South Street as either Good (41.0%) or Very Good (28.2%), with only a small percentage (3.8%) rating the site as either poor or very poor.

**Figure 24: Rating of location for business**



The second item included to gauge the progress of the area’s business climate over the past few years was to ask the business proprietors to rate the South Street Special Service District’s impact on the local business. The results are seen below in Figure 25.

**Figure 25: Trend in Business Environment**




Although not as positive as the results we saw above in Figure 24, the results here are marginally positive. Over half of the respondents (52%) felt that the commercial district neither benefited nor suffered from the formation of the SSD. Over a quarter (28.2%) of the respondents felt that the district had improved with the formation while a smaller percent (16.5%) felt that it suffered.

#### *Merchant knowledge of SSSD*


The third set of questions was designed to assess the level of knowledge and interaction that the merchants had with the South Street Special Services District. As seen in Figure 26 below, over three quarters of the respondents registered having either frequent (35.2%) or little (43.6%) contact with the SSD.

**Figure 26: Level of Contact with SSSD**



The final item in the series asked merchants to rate the services of the SSD. As seen below in Figure 27, overall most business owners seemed pleased with the services provided by the SSSD. Only a small proportion (13.4%) rated the services provided as either poor or very poor, while almost half (45.3%) rated the services provided as either good or very good.


**Figure 27: Rating of SSSD Services**



### *Fear and Victimization*

The following six items assess levels of fear, victimization experience and knowledge of victimization among fellow merchants. Figure 28 represents the respondent's level of fear during their workday within the commercial district. Figure 29 represents the fear of victimization that the respondents register while traveling to and from work.

**Figure 28: Fear of Victimization (Workday)**



Almost half of the respondents (48.2%) reported not being fearful at all during their workday, while over a quarter of the respondents (28.3%) were generally unafraid of victimization during the workday. Only about a quarter (23.5%) of the respondents felt either somewhat or very afraid of being victimized during the workday.

**Figure 29: Fear of Victimization (en route)**



The distribution of fear of victimization to and from work approximates the fear of victimization during the workday. Again, we find that almost half (47.6%) of the respondents stated having no fear at all traveling to and from work, while approximately a quarter (23.3%) of the respondents registered generally feeling safe during their travels. We do see a slight increase in both the somewhat and very afraid categories which now total about a third of the responses (30.1%).

*Victimization*

The merchants surveyed were asked two questions regarding their knowledge and experience with victimization; and whether they had considered closing their operation due to fear of being victimized. The results are shown below in Table 27.

**Table 27: Victimization**

<b>Considered closing due to fear</b>	5.70
<b>Aware of other's being victimized</b>	52.50
<b>Been a victim of crime</b>	35.00

While over half (52.5%) of the respondents claimed knowledge of another business's victimization and over a third (35.0%) reported that they themselves had been the victim of a criminal act did little to encourage business owners to either close or relocate their business (5.7%).

Merchants were also asked to identify how many other merchants they knew who had fallen victim to a crime. These responses ranged from one to twenty, with the modal choice being two. The merchants were then queried on how they had learned of the victimization of their fellow businesspersons. Table 28, below, shows the results.

**Table 28: Source of Learning of Others' Victimization**

<b>Police</b>		13.80
<b>Merchant</b>		51.70
<b>Special Services</b>		5.20
<b>Other</b>		29.30

As was to be expected, the most common way for a business person to find out about business victimization was from the other merchants in the commercial district (51.7%). The police provided information in a lesser capacity (13.8%), while the SSSD provided the information in few instances (5.2%).

#### *Problems in the District*

In this section of the survey merchants were given a series of possible problems typical of commercial areas and asked to rate the individual items in terms of their severity. Table 29 reports the perception of problems within the commercial district.

**Table 29: Perceptions of Problems in the District**

	<b>Big Problem</b>	<b>Somewhat of a Problem</b>	<b>No Problem</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Lots filled with trash</b>	8.1	28.2	36.3	27.4
<b>Vendors</b>	12.9	18.5	37.1	31.5
<b>Abandoned buildings</b>	10.5	21.8	57.3	10.5
<b>Graffiti on buildings</b>	21.8	31.5	40.3	6.5
<b>Public Drinking</b>	24.4	28.5	40.7	6.5
<b>Loitering</b>	34.4	43.2	19.2	3.2
<b>Drug Dealing</b>	29	41.1	23.4	6.5
<b>Cars vandalized</b>	37.9	37.1	20.2	4.8
<b>Panhandlers</b>	31.7	29.3	29.3	9.8
<b>Unruly behavior</b>	22.8	36.6	30.1	10.6
<b>Prostitution</b>	34.4	20.5	29.5	15.6
<b>Forcible stealing</b>	29	30.6	28.2	12.1
<b>Forcible entry</b>	8	16	47.2	28.8
<b>Auto theft</b>	14.5	21.8	40.3	23.4

According to Table 29 a number of problems ranked quite high by the businesses. Over a third (34.4%) of the respondents felt that loitering was a big problem in the district. Over a third (34.4%) reported prostitution as another big problem. Finally, the highest ranked problem seems to be that of automobile vandalism with well over a third (37.9%) of the respondents ranking it as such.

*Perceptions of City and SSSD Services*

The survey also contained a number of statements which required the business proprietor to agree or disagree and to what extent. These items focused on the quality of public services, the efforts of the South Street Special Services District, and statements about both crime and safety. Table 30 reports the results of the responses below.

**Table 30: Ratings of Services**

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
		%	%	%	%	%
<b>SSD has improved</b>						
police/business relations		15.7	21.5	9.9	5	47.9
<b>Outsiders cause problems</b>						
		33.9	38.7	16.1	2.4	8.9
<b>SSD has improved</b>						
business district		13.3	29.2	9.2	2.5	45.8
<b>Police keep order</b>						
		21.8	63.7	9.7	1.6	3.2
<b>Police are highly visible</b>						
		28.8	60	8	0.8	2.4
<b>Area is well lit in evening</b>						
		20.8	60	16	1.6	1.6
<b>Crime scares visitors away</b>						
		11.3	29	40.3	8.9	10.5
<b>Streets are safer due</b>						
to SSD		12.1	24.1	8.6	6	49.1
<b>City not responding to</b>						
needs of business comm.		9.7	20.2	45.2	9.7	15.3
<b>Police encourage business</b>						
to prevent crime		13.8	42.3	20.3	4.9	18.7
<b>Police concerned with</b>						
problems		13	52.8	15.4	5.7	13
<b>Business area is safe</b>						
		9.8	74.8	9.8	1.6	4.1

Items that received a great deal of support were items focusing on safety concerns within the commercial district. Over three-quarters (88.8%) of the respondents at least agreed that the police were highly visible in the commercial district. Over three-quarters (80.8%) of the respondents also felt that the commercial district was well lit in the evenings. A large proportion (84.6%) agreed that the business area was safe, while over two-thirds (72.6%) felt that outsiders were responsible for problems within the commercial district. It would seem that most business owners feel secure within the commercial district, and blame any problems that do develop on visitors to the area.

*Security and loss prevention*

The final section of the survey focused on the use of security measures and insurance by the merchants within the commercial district. Table 31, below, reports the security precautions taken by the merchants.

**Table 31: Merchants use of Security Measures**

<b>Merchandise specially arranged</b>	54.70%
<b>Additional lighting</b>	44.50%
<b>Special locks</b>	63.30%
<b>Inventory control system</b>	30.50%
<b>Alarm system</b>	58.60%
<b>Firearm in store</b>	10.90%
<b>Police partnership</b>	24.20%
<b>Mirrors</b>	33.60%
<b>Business watch participant</b>	8.60%
<b>Security guard on site</b>	7.00%


The most popular form of security measures within the South Street commercial district would seem to be special locks (63.3%), alarm systems (58.6%) and arranging the merchandise to limit opportunities for theft (54.7%). Many merchants listed using more than one security measure to protect their business.

The merchants were also asked to report whether they possessed insurance to cover losses endured by their business. Almost three-quarters (74.5%) of the respondents indicated that they owned insurance while a much smaller percent (16.7) reported filing insurance claims for losses.

#### *Crime Prevention Advice*

Finally, the merchants were asked whether they had received crime advice from any agency. Just under half of the respondents (44.1%) stated that they had received crime prevention advice. Figure 30 below reports who supplied the advice to the business owners.

**Figure 30: Crime Advice by whom**



Almost half of the respondents (45.5%) received crime prevention advice from the police, while their insurance companies provided advice in almost a third (30.3%) of the cases. According to the business proprietors the SSSD only provided crime prevention advice in a small proportion of the cases (6.1%).

## **The South Street Special Services District: Conclusions**

After analyzing the results of the survey distributed in the South Street commercial district it would seem that South Street was a relatively stable and safe district in which to run or own a business. The current business proprietors seem, for the most part, content with the work done by the police.

Obviously, this district like any commercial district has many problems, but none that we would not expect to see in any commercial district. And it would appear that the both the police and the current businesses do their part to promote safety and security for both employees and visitors to the area.

## **COMPARISONS ACROSS SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS**

The research team surveyed 372 business proprietors across four commercial districts within Philadelphia. The survey instrument included 49 major questions distributed among 6 sections. These sections were focused on; business/owner history, problems within the commercial district, ratings of police/city services, security measures, personal information and ratings of the commercial district/business improvement district. Each of the six sections are described below.

### **Business/Owner History**

This section was primarily focused on the background information pertaining to the individual business. Questions included the individual's relationship to the business, years of employment, years at the location, number of employees (part or full time), and the type of business (single proprietorship or chain). These questions obtained information about the respondent's tenure at the location and relationship of the respondent to the business and commercial district.

### **Problems within the Commercial District**

The questions in this section measure the respondent's perception of the level of seriousness pertaining to a list of common ailments found in each commercial district. The responses were listed as an ordinal variable giving the respondent the following four choices: big problem, somewhat of a problem, no problem or don't know. The ailments

included a number of incivilities such as public drinking/drunkenness, graffiti or litter, and also a number of serious crimes such as burglary, robbery or auto theft.

### **Ratings of Police/City Services**

This series of questions was included to measure the respondent's evaluation of both police and city services commonly associated with businesses within a commercial district. They included questions concerning the city's responsiveness to the commercial district, police visibility, order maintenance and the level of safety expressed by the business owners or operators. Each question was formed as a statement with the respondent expressing their level of agreement or disagreement in a Likert scale format.

### **Security Measures**

This portion of the survey attempted to identify the security measures taken by the individual businesses. A list of common security measures were provided that each respondent could 'check' whether or not their business was currently using. These included security gates, video cameras, one-way mirrors and security guards. An open ended 'other' question was also included for security measures not listed (generally, these written responses could be categorized into one of our previously defined security measures). It was anticipated that in neighborhoods with higher fears of crime that we would identify a more frequent use of security measures and also more severe measures used (i.e. security gates instead of business watches, etc.).

## **Personal Information**

Several questions were also included focusing on the respondent. These questions included the race of the respondent and also the respondent's zip code. The individual's observations of police patrol and also self-reported victimization were included. These questions were included to measure their correlation with the individual's level of fear or fear of being victimized.

## **Ratings of Commercial District/Business Improvement District Services**

This section of the survey focused on the individual respondent's reactions to the services provided by either the commercial district or the business improvement district. This included questions such as whether the business environment has improved, rating the services provided by the business improvement district, or whether the owner has thought of relocating the business. Also included are two variables measuring the individual's level of fear while in the commercial district.

## **Samples and Methods**

As previously described, the Center for Public Policy conducted the survey by attempting to administer the survey in every business within each of the four commercial districts (Frankford, Germantown, Manayunk and South Street). Staff from the Center for Public Policy returned to sites that were unable to complete a survey previously and finally a survey was mailed to each of the businesses that had not replied.

The Business Improvement District Headquarters in each site had been contacted, and they had assured their cooperation in convincing the business owners to participate in the study. However, the owner/manager who was contacted about completing the survey generally knew little or nothing concerning the survey or its implementation.

Initially the interviewers were asked to conduct the survey by reading the questions and recording the responses of the individuals. However, it was generally found that many of the business owners/managers were alone in the business and were unwilling to sit down and discuss the survey for a long period of time. The surveys were then left with the respondents including pre-addressed and postage paid envelopes to return the survey to the Center.

The overall response rate for each site was about what we anticipated ranging between 28% and 44%. Table 32 displays the results.

**Table 32: Response Rates for Special Service District Business Surveys**

Site	Number of Respondents	Percent Respondents
Frankford	99	35.2%
Germantown	66	28.1%
Manayunk	79	44.0%
South Street	128	37.4%

### Survey Data

The commercial districts surveyed each boast operate independently of the other. Each district supports a business improvement district within its geographic boundaries, however this is the point where the similarities end. Each of the four survey sites have unique histories as we have previously discussed.

Preliminary analysis of the data began with a correlation table (Table 33) focusing on a number of variables of particular interest. Included in the table are two variables from the business/owner history portion of the survey (own vs. rent, and number of years in business), two questions from rating of police/city services (police highly visible and police do a good job keeping order), one question from the personal information portion of the survey (victim of crime) and eight variables from the final portion of the survey Commercial District/Special Services District Relations (rate the BID/SSD, considered closing, streets are safer since SSD, crime scares visitors, the area is safe, SSD has improved police/business relations, fear of victimization traveling to and from work and fear of victimization during the day).

It was felt that a correlation matrix of all variables would be too cumbersome and difficult to interpret. Instead, the previously mentioned items were included in the matrix. The values, on Table 33, refer to the correlation values between the individual items across the four commercial districts. The values on the lower half of the diagram (see Table 33) are the Kendall's tau<sub>b</sub> correlation values, while the values on the upper half are the reported Pearson's correlations values.

The two variables included in our correlation matrix focusing on the history of the owner and the business, were: own vs. rent (own was coded as 0, and rent/lease was coded as 1) and number of years at location. Neither correlates highly with any variables other than themselves (Kendall's tau<sub>b</sub> = -.325;  $p < .05$ ). This simply seems to indicate that individuals who own their businesses are more likely to stay in one storefront, in lieu of relocating.

The two variables selected from the section of the survey focusing on individual rating of police/city services were: the police are highly visible, and the police keep order (both coded so that higher scores correspond to increased support). Again, we find that the two variables are highly correlated with one another (Kendall's tau<sub>b</sub> = .558; p < .01). This would imply that the commercial residents feel a more visible police presence is indicative of a police force handling problems within the commercial district. Both policing variables, police highly visible and police keep order, are also correlated with the variable: the area is safe (coded so that higher values indicate increased support). This marginally strong correlation (Kendall's tau<sub>b</sub> = .408 and .405 respectively; p < .01) implies that many of the proprietors who felt that the police were visible and keeping order felt that the area was safer.

The one variable selected from the personal information portion of the survey was whether or not the business had been a victim of crime. It was hypothesized that the individual victimization of a business site would correlate with a number of other items included in the correlation matrix (i.e. fear of victimization, safety issues, etc.). However, the variable was not correlated (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> > .300) with any of the other variables included in our matrix.

A second correlation matrix was included to determine whether the specific type of business had an effect on the variables included in our correlation matrix. Dummy variables identifying the type of business (i.e. food service, alcohol service, government business, retail business, special services business or professional business) were included in a second correlation matrix run (results available upon request). The type of business did not correlate significantly with any of the other variables.

The remaining seven variables included in the correlation matrix were taken from the Commercial District/Special Services District Relations portion of the survey. These variables were included to examine the relationship between several measures of the services provided by the SSD and the proprietors of the businesses within the district.

The variable crime scares visitors focuses on the individual proprietor's belief that the crime in the commercial district is scaring potential customers from visiting their sites. This variable is only marginally correlated (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.343;  $p < .01$ ) with the variable concerned with the proprietor's feeling that the area is safe. The negative relationship indicates that proprietors who felt that the area was safe were less likely to feel that crime was scaring away potential visitors.

The variable streets are safer is measuring whether the proprietor of the business feels that the streets of the commercial district are safer since the formation of the Special Services District. It comes as no surprise then that the two variables it is correlated with are measuring other efforts of the SSD. The variable is highly correlated with the variable measuring whether the proprietor feels that the SSD has improved the relationship between the police and businesses (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.655;  $p < .01$ ). The negative relationship indicates that individuals who felt that the SSD had improved the relationship between the police and the businesses also felt that the SSD had done the least to make the streets safer. This would seem to indicate that individuals were more likely to feel that either the SSD or the police were making efforts to improve the district and those who felt that the gap between themselves and the police were increasing were more likely to see the SSD as improving the district. The second variable that streets are safer was correlated with was SSD services provided. SSD services provided was a

reserve coded variable which asked the proprietors to indicate their level of satisfaction with the services provided to businesses by the SSD. So it would seem that the correlation between the two (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.333; p < .01) should be understood as the individuals who felt the streets were safer in the commercial district since the formation of the SSD were more pleased with the services provided by the SSD.

The variable area is safe was also found to be marginally correlated (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.301; p < .01) to the variable fear of victimization traveling to and from work. This correlation indicates that business proprietors who reported feeling that the business district was safe were less likely to fear being victimized traveling to and from work.

The variable considered closing was a dichotomous variable questioning whether the proprietor of the business had ever considered closing the business due to fear of crime or victimization (Yes = 1, No = 0). The variable is marginally correlated with both fear of victimization during the workday (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.365; p < .01) and fear of victimization traveling to and from work (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.352; p < .01), respectively. This indicates that individuals who report a high level of fear in either instance are more likely to have considered closing the business.

The variable SSD services provided is a variable measuring the services provided to the commercial district by the SSD. It is not surprising to find that it is marginally correlated (Kendall's Tau<sub>b</sub> = -.351; p < .01) with another measure of the services provided by the SSD; SSD improved relations. This marginally strong negative correlation is due to the reverse coding of the variable SSD services provided. Therefore, it would seem that is a correlation between individuals who felt that SSD improved relations also felt that the SSD had provided positive services to the business district.

The final correlation that is apparent in our table is between the two variables fear of victimization during the workday and fear of victimization traveling to and from work. This strong positive correlation (Kendall's Tau\_b = .676;  $p < .01$ ) reports that individuals who felt fear in either instance were more likely to report fear in the other.

This analysis demonstrates just a few of the associations that are to be found within the complex, symbiotic relationship of a business district and a SSD. It is apparent that both the city services and the SSD service providers have an impact on the relationships that the business proprietors have, not only with one another, but with the commercial district as a whole.

The correlation table has demonstrated the impact that the police have on the business proprietor's view of the district, and also the impact that the SSD can have on the fear of victimization within the commercial district. Clearly, a focus on the business district, without taking into account relationship's with other city services, is ill advised. It is these relationships that require more attention, and need to be addressed.

The creation of a SSD can be an economic burden on the businesses that are suppose to benefit from its' existence. Therefore, since the creation of a SSD has become a highly visible solution to problems of crime and disorder it is of the utmost importance that it is understood who the 'players' are in caring for the commercial district and what roles are expected of them. The SSD cannot afford to become a stopgap measure and attempt to replicate services that the city should be providing. The SSD needs to become an equal partner in the responsibilities of the commercial district and also an arbitrator with the city service providers insuring that the district is receiving its necessary services.

**Table 33: Correlations of Business Survey Items**

	Owned vs. Rented	Years at Location	Police highly visible	Police keep order	Victim of Crime	Crime scares visitors	Streets are safer	Area is safe	Considered closing	SSD improved relations	SSD services provided	Victim during workday	Victim traveling to/from work
Owned vs. Rented		-.385**	.051	.142**	-.106	.133*	.223**	.014	-.058	.202**	-.064	-.069	-.104
Years at Location	-.325**		-.027	-.104	-.059	-.041	-.179**	-.058	.007	-.090	-.018	.102	.034
Police highly visible	.054	-.036		.553**	-.023	-.184**	.319**	.382**	.171**	.296**	-.251**	-.131*	-.109*
Police keep order	.132**	-.038	.558**		-.021	-.046	.277**	.390**	.056	.272**	-.084	-.118**	-.144*
Victim of Crime	-.106	-.041	-.012	.013		-.059	-.077	.057	.035	-.157**	-.047	.136*	.168**
Crime scares visitors	.112*	-.066	-.198**	-.103*	-.052		.159**	-.303**	-.101	.121*	-.088	.047	.096
Streets are safer	.205**	-.165**	.291**	.255**	-.073	.128**		.150**	.006	.702**	-.387**	.046	-.006
Area is safe	.026	.005	.408**	.405**	.049	-.343**	.133**		.233**	.149**	-.204**	-.295**	-.314**
Considered closing	-.058	.071	.175**	.069	.035	-.094*	.000	.263**		-.052	-.164**	-.407**	-.387**
SSD improved relations	.193**	-.122**	.265**	.245**	-.146**	.087*	.655**	.137**	-.046		-.396**	.063	.008
SSD services provided	-.073	.006	-.233**	-.121*	-.026	-.081	-.333***	-.209**	-.155**	-.351**		.136*	.168**
Victim during workday	-.077	.040	-.134**	-.124*	.130*	.045	.039	-.280**	-.365**	.049	.130*		.728**
Victim traveling to/from work	-.118*	-.005	-.114*	-.114	.153*	.096*	-.004	-.301**	-.352**	-.001	.153*	.676**	
Kendall's tau_b are on the lower half of the diagram													
Pearson's correlations are on the upper half													
* = Correlation significant at the 0.05 level													
** = Correlation significant at the 0.01 level													

## **Cross Site Comparison**

Tables 34 through 40 report the results of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests that were run on seven of the survey variables found within the 'Commercial District/Special Services District Relations' section of the survey. The purpose is to show not only the geographic differences and historical differences, which have been previously described, but to also demonstrate the differences as reported by the people who work within the commercial districts and have contact with the SSD and services provided by them. Further, the inclusion of these tables will also demonstrate the differences found between commercial districts that will be readily apparent in the more advanced analysis.

The seven variables analyzed were: 1) rating of the location for business, 2) trend in business environment, 3) contact with the Special Services District, 4) services provided by the Special Services District, 5) Special Services District improved the commercial district, 6) Fear of Victimization during the workday, and 7) Fear of Victimization traveling to and from work.

### **Rating of Location for Business**

Analysis of Rating of Location for Business, in Table 34/Figure 31, reveals a significant difference ( $F = 15.661$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ) between the four sites. Both the Manayunk and South Street commercial districts scored higher, with a significant ( $\text{Sig.} < .05$ ) difference between the Manayunk/South Street Scores and the Germantown/Frankford scores.

Higher ratings on this scale correspond to a higher opinion of the commercial district as a location for a business. Options ranged along a five point Likert scale from 'very good' to 'very poor'.

It is to be expected that both the Manayunk and South Street commercial districts would score higher than Germantown and Frankford. Both the former rely on income generated from people traveling through the commercial districts and during special events that are often held in the areas. Further, both Manayunk and South Street boast a lively nightlife, which encourages a diverse crowd of potential customers to travel through.

### **Rating of Business Environment**

Table 35/Figure 32 display the result of the survey question concerning the respondent's opinion of changes in the business environment over the past few years. There is a significant difference ( $F = 3.732$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .009$ ) between two of the sites. The variable was coded so higher scores correspond to areas where the respondent felt the commercial district had improved over time, while lower scores indicated that the trend in the commercial district was getting worse.

The difference between the Manayunk commercial district and the Frankford commercial district is statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). This is not unexpected considering the changes that have occurred in the two districts over the past several years. Manayunk has continued to prosper and maintain a healthy commercial district that attracts new businesses, while Frankford has suffered from a high vacancy rate and serious crime concerns within the commercial district.

## Contact with the Special Services District

Table 36/Figure 33 reports a great deal of variation in self-reported contact, with the Special Services District, by commercial district ( $F = 7.070$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ). The variable was coded with low values indicating frequent contact and high values indicating no contact with representatives of the Special Services District.

The South Street commercial district and the Frankford commercial district boast the lowest scores on this measure. Both are significantly different than the Germantown district ( $p < .001$ ).

Frankford's low rating, indicating frequent contact, is best explained by the Customer Service Representatives (CSR's) that are employed to patrol the Frankford commercial district. While not as well trained or as numerous as the CSR's found in the Center City commercial district they do provide an artifact of the efforts of the Frankford Special Services District.

South Street boasts an encompassing network of contact with a majority of the businesses within the commercial district. The Special Services District provides a monthly newsletter to keep members up to date, and inform them of joint efforts between the SSD and other city services. Further, the South Street SSD maintains regular meetings where business proprietors are invited to express their concerns, and provides an opportunity for the proprietors to intermingle.

The Germantown commercial district scored significantly higher, indicating less contact with the Special Services providers. Germantown suffers from a great deal of turnover in its SSD representation, further, other organizations have attempted to step in

and fill the void the SSD intended to occupy. Lack of cooperation within the multi-ethnic commercial district also makes it more difficult for the proprietors of the businesses to feel that the SSD is concerned about their well-being.

### **Special Services District Services Provided**

Table 37/Figure 34 bears a striking inverse similarity to Table 36/Figure 33. In Table 37/Figure 34 individual businesses rated the services provided by the Special Services District. Higher scores correspond to increased satisfaction with the services provided by the SSD. There is a significant difference between Germantown and the other three sites of study ( $F = 9.044$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ) on this measure.

The Manayunk, South Street and Frankford commercial district scored significantly higher than the Germantown commercial district ( $p < .001$ ). As previously stated the South Street and Manayunk commercial districts are high-profile districts with well organized SSD's which host events and regularly scheduled meetings. The Frankford SSD, although located in a lower income area and suffering higher vacant rates than Manayunk or South Street, has hired Customer Service Representatives to be their eyes and ears on the street. The significantly higher score that Frankford received over Germantown is surely the product of the CSR's. As was mentioned in the description of the previous table and figure, the Germantown SSD has had limited success 'selling' themselves to the businesses in the area, and convincing the commercial residents to rely on them for services.

## **Special Services District Improved the Commercial District**

Table 38/Figure 35 shows the results of the survey question focusing on how well the individual business proprietors felt the SSD improved the commercial district as a whole. Higher scores correspond to a higher estimate of the success that the individual SSD's have had in improving the individual commercial districts. There is a clear significant difference among the four sites ( $F = 16.177$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ). As with the previous two outcomes reported there is a significant difference between Germantown and the other three sites ( $p < .001$ ).

This result, much like the previous variable, can be credited to the development of the Manayunk, South Street and Frankford commercial districts. The former two have a well-developed SSD with a strong client and financial base to draw upon. The latter, the Frankford SSD, has created a positive image for itself by the inclusion of Customer Service Representatives. Their physical presence is a manifestation of a way in which the SSD has worked to improve the district. The Germantown SSD does not have such a presence. As previously stated, the proprietors residing within the Germantown commercial district have been vocal in their lack of support for the Germantown SSD.

## **Fear of Victimization (During the Course of the Day)**

Table 39/Figure 36 are focused on the level of fear, reported by the individual, over the course of the day, while in the commercial district. Higher scores correspond to increased, self-perceived, safety within the district, while lower scores correspond to decreased, self-perceived, safety within the district. There is a great deal of variance

among the four commercial districts ( $F = 10.206$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ). There also appears to be a clear dichotomy between the sites catering to outside consumers (Manayunk and South Street) and the sites focused on residential clients (Frankford and Germantown)( $p < .001$ ).

The Manayunk SSD and the South Street SSD have strong ties with the local police captains. This strong cooperation includes police representatives at organized meetings, bike patrols within the commercial districts, and meetings focusing on the exchange of knowledge between the police and the proprietors. Neither Germantown nor Frankford have such strong cooperation between the SSD's and the police. Further, both Germantown and Frankford are in declining economic areas with high vacancy rates along the main avenues. This can create a significantly more foreboding atmosphere during the course of the day.

### **Fear of Victimization (Traveling to and from Work)**

Table 40/Figure 37 present individuals' level of fear while traveling through the commercial district. The emphasis between the two victimization variables was the role of the proprietor during the time they measured their own level of fear. In other words, it was felt that proprietors may have a decreased fear of victimization during the course of their day, in comparison to when they are traveling through the district. However, looking at the mean scores between Tables 39 and 40 and Figures 36 and 37 it does not appear that it made a difference (the highest mean difference was .10 in Manayunk).

Similar to Table 39/Figure 36, there appears to be a dichotomous relationship between the four sites ( $F = 10.104$ ;  $\text{Sig.} = .001$ ). Both Manayunk and South Street scored higher indicating lower levels of fear traveling through the commercial district. As stated before, both Manayunk and South Street SSD's have a strong relationship with their respective local police districts. Also, both the Manayunk and South Street commercial districts attract a great deal of 'after hours' customers. The two districts have a great number of establishments for late night alcohol consumption and dancing. The police in these areas have responded by increased patrol during the closing hours of the nightclubs, and increased street presence. Neither Germantown nor Frankford rely on such late night crowds for prosperity. In fact, during the course of an interview with police in the Germantown commercial district, the officer explained that after 6 p.m. the street changed hands, and it was no longer a place for an honest businessperson. Since Frankford's CSR's only patrol during the hours of 9 to 5, the fact that the SSD employs them does not seem to alleviate the individual proprietor's level of fear of victimization.

### **Cross Site Conclusion**

Although we have focused on only a few of the variables collected during the course of our study it seems clear that we must be prepared to use a different ruler to measure the SSD's within our study. The SSD's were created in a similar fashion, however, they vary strongly on time in existence, levels of funding, cooperation with city services, and, maybe most importantly, cooperation with the commercial residents themselves.

The goal of the SSD's should be to become increasingly self-sufficient organizations that partner with the city service providers, and the commercial businesses themselves to create a safer, cleaner, and more prosperous commercial district. Each site has strived toward this goal in its own ways, such as weekly membership meetings, safety meetings, flyers, Customer Service Representatives, etc. However, each has met with varying success.


Both the Manayunk and South Street SSD's seem well on their way to becoming increasingly successful agencies. Through strong leadership they have partnered their organizations with the local police and created a strong supportive community of businessmen and businesswomen.

The Germantown and Frankford SSD's require increased effort to achieve similar goals. Both have had the burden of uncooperative city agencies and high turnover in the upper echelons of their organizations. Frankford has had limited success with the hiring of Customer Service Representatives to patrol the commercial district, interact with the community, and increase police surveillance through the use of two-way radios.

Frankford is also trying to increase pride in the commercial district by purchasing street sweepers to eliminate the reoccurring problem of litter throughout the district.

Germantown's SSD is working towards this goal. Unless the Germantown District can increase the cooperation between themselves and their clients, it is unlikely that they will achieve their desired results.

**Figure 31: Comparison of Sites on Rating of Location for Business**



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**Table 34: Rating of Location for Business**

Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	78	4.09	.91	.100	1	5
South St.	124	3.95	.83	.008	1	5
Germantown	65	3.55	.81	.100	2	5
Frankford	99	3.30	.95	.010	1	5

**TUKEY HSD**

**F = 15.662; Sig. = .001**

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk(1)	2	.14	.13	.699	-.19	.47
	3	.54	.15	.002	.16	.92
	4	.79	.13	.000	.44	1.13
South St.(2)	1	-.14	.13	.699	-.47	.19
	3	.40	.13	.017	.01	.74
	4	.65	.13	.000	.34	.95
Germantown (3)	1	-.54	.15	.002	-.92	-.16
	2	-.40	.13	.017	-.74	-.01
	4	.25	.14	.281	-.11	.61
Frankford (4)	1	-.79	.13	.000	-1.13	-.44
	2	-.65	.12	.000	-.95	-.34
	3	-.25	.14	.281	-.61	.11

**Figure 32: Comparison of Sites on Trend in Business Environment**



**Table 35: Trend in Business Environment**


Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	76	2.38	.77	.009	1	3
South St.	120	2.13	.67	.006	1	3
Germantown	66	2.10	.70	.009	1	3
Frankford	99	2.04	.71	.007	1	3

**TUKEY HSD**

**F = 3.732; Sig. = .012**

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	.26	.10	.065	-1.02E-02	.52
	3	.28	.12	.095	-3.07E-02	.58
	4	.34	.11	.009	6.36E-2	.62
South St. (2)	1	-.26	.10	.065	-5.23	1.02E-02
	3	1.89E-02	.11	.998	-.26	.30
	4	8.46E-02	9.62E-02	.815	-.16	.33
Germantown (3)	1	-.28	.12	.095	-.58	3.07E-02
	2	-1.89E-02	.11	.998	-.30	.26
	4	6.57E-02	.11	.937	-.22	.35
Frankford (4)	1	-.34	.11	.009	-.62	-6.36E-02
	2	-8.46E-02	9.62E-02	.815	-.33	.16
	3	-6.57E-02	.11	.937	-.35	.22

**Figure 33: Comparison of Sites on Contact with Special Services District**




**Table 36: Contact with SSD (Special Services District)**

Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	66	1.14	.76	.009	0	2
South St.	72	.88	.75	.009	0	2
Germantown	30	1.50	.57	.100	0	2
Frankford	93	.89	.68	.007	0	2

**TUKEY HSD**  $F = 7.070$ ;  $Sig. = .001$

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	.26	.12	.136	-5.01E-02	.57
	3	-.36	.16	.093	-.77	3.88E-02
	4	.24	.11	.144	-5.03E-02	.54
South St. (2)	1	-.26	.12	.136	-.57	5.01E-02
	3	-.63	.15	.000	-1.02	-.23
	4	-1.75E-02	.11	.999	-.30	.27
Germantown (3)	1	.36	.16	.093	-3.88E-02	.77
	2	.63	.15	.000	.23	1.02
	4	.61	.15	.000	.22	.99
Frankford (4)	1	-.24	.11	.144	-.54	5.03E-02
	2	1.75E-02	.11	.999	-.27	.30
	3	-.61	.15	.000	-.99	-.22

**Figure 34: Comparison of Sites on SSD(Special Services District) Services Provided**



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**Table 37: SSD (Special Services District) services provided**


Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	55	3.31	1.25	.17	1	5
South St.	78	3.42	1.09	.12	1	5
Germantown	32	2.28	1.11	.20	1	5
Frankford	85	3.31	.95	.10	1	5

**TUKEY HSD**

**F = 9.044; Sig. = .001**

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	-.11	.19	.933	-.60	.38
	3	1.03	.24	.000	.41	1.65
	4	3.21E-03	.19	1.00	-.48	.49
South St. (2)	1	.11	.19	.933	-.38	.60
	3	1.14	.23	.000	.56	1.73
	4	.12	.17	.901	-.32	.55
Germantown (3)	1	-1.03	.24	.000	-1.65	-.41
	2	-1.14	.23	.000	-1.73	-.56
	4	-1.02	.22	.000	-1.60	-.45
Frankford (4)	1	-3.21E-03	.19	1.000	-.49	.48
	2	-.12	.17	.901	-.55	.32
	3	1.02	.22	.000	.45	1.60

**Figure 35: Comparison of Sites on SSD(Special Services District) Improved Commercial District**




**Table 38: SSD (Special Services District) improved commercial district**

Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	75	1.80	.79	.110	0	3
South St.	120	1.98	.78	.010	0	3
Germantown	64	1.09	.75	.160	0	2
Frankford	97	1.80	.63	.007	0	3

**TUKEY HSD F = 16.177; Sig. = .001**

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	-.19	.14	.517	-.54	.16
	3	.71	.19	.001	.23	1.18
	4	-.155E-03	.13	1.000	-.34	.34
South St. (2)	1	.19	.14	.517	-.16	.54
	3	.89	.18	.000	.43	1.35
	4	.19	.12	.415	-.13	.50
Germantown (3)	1	-.71	.19	.001	-1.18	-.23
	2	-.89	.18	.000	-1.35	-.43
	4	-.71	.18	.000	-1.16	-.26
Frankford (4)	1	1.55E-03	.13	1.000	-.34	.34
	2	-.19	.12	.415	-.50	.13
	3	.71	.18	.000	.26	1.16

**Figure 36: Comparison of Sites on Fear of Victimization (Workday)**



IDNEW

**Table 39: Fear of Victimization (Workday)**


Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	76	3.26	.96	.110	1	5
South St.	123	3.18	.93	.008	1	4
Germantown	62	2.58	.98	.130	1	4
Frankford	98	2.64	.98	.010	1	4

**TUKEY HSD**

**F = 10.206; Sig. = .001**

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	8.43E-02	.14	.931	-.28	.44
	3	.68	.16	.000	.26	1.10
	4	.62	.15	.000	.24	1.00
South St. (2)	1	8.43E-02	.14	.931	-.44	.28
	3	.60	.15	.000	.21	.98
	4	.54	.13	.000	.20	.87
Germantown (3)	1	-.68	.16	.000	-1.10	-.26
	2	-.60	.15	.000	-.98	-.21
	4	-6.22E-02	.16	.978	-.46	.34
Frankford (4)	1	-.62	.15	.000	-1.00	-.24
	2	-.54	.13	.000	-.87	-.20
	3	6.22E-02	.16	.978	-.34	.46

**Figure 37: Comparison of Sites on Fear of Victimization (En Route)**



**Table 40: Fear of Victimization (en route)**

Commercial District	N	Mean	SD	SE	Min	Max
Manayunk	77	3.36	.90	.100	1	4
South St.	125	3.09	.99	.009	1	4
Germantown	61	2.59	.99	.130	1	4
Frankford	97	2.71	.97	.010	1	4

**TUKEY HSD**  $F = 10.104$ ;  $Sig. = .001$

(I)	(J)	Mean Difference	SE	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Manayunk (1)	2	.28	.14	.200	-8.41E-02	.64
	3	.77	.17	.000	.35	1.20
	4	.65	.15	.000	.27	1.03
South St. (2)	1	-.28	.14	.200	-.64	8.41E-02
	3	.50	.15	.005	.11	.89
	4	.38	.13	.021	4.07E-02	.71
Germantown (3)	1	-.77	.17	.000	-1.20	-.35
	2	-.50	.15	.005	-.89	-.11
	4	-.12	.16	.869	-.53	.28
Frankford (4)	1	-.65	.15	.000	-1.03	-.27
	2	-.38	.13	.021	-.71	-4.07E-02
	3	.12	.16	.869	-.28	.53

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

After more than a decade of program implementation and related evaluation effort, the concept of community policing has produced a number of themes. One theme stresses the importance of converting community policing from an organizational philosophy to a coherent set of activities with measurable efforts, outputs and results. Another important theme concerns the differential impacts of community and problem-oriented policing efforts in variable social and land use settings. The very idea of "community" can prompt several different and often competing interpretations giving rise to the notion that there may be considerable variation in what is considered a "community" in community policing. Moreover, while "community" most commonly refers to a group of people living together in the same geographic space, and their associated social relationships--others posit that "communities of interest" also exist, be they functional or temporal.

The importance of studying the community policing approach in commercial areas is rather straightforward. Commercial districts offer vastly different social dynamics than residential areas. They often offer high levels of "community" organization through business member organizations, as well as possessing more resources to deal with local community problems. Moreover, the political importance of a promoting commercial activity in urban areas often results in significant public resource allocation to promote a stable basis for commerce. Collectively, businesses located in commercial districts have a strong interest in establishing and maintaining a safe and attractive place in which to attract customers, while individually, business owners have an interest in preserving safety for themselves and their employees.

This research seeks to fill some of the gaps in our current knowledge on the topic of community policing and crime prevention in commercial districts, while at the same time developing a research design for the assessment of efforts aimed at the co-production of safety between private organizations and public agencies. To this end, this study examines 5 commercial districts in Philadelphia, each with a differing attachment to community and problem-oriented policing as implemented by the Philadelphia Police

Department. Such an approach can provide useful information on crime and disorder problems within commercial districts, as well as police and business partnerships aimed at “co-producing” safety services to these areas.

### **Research Questions**

The ultimate goal of this research was to attain a better understanding of the dynamics of victimization on commercial establishments, and how community and problem-oriented policing efforts can best address the problems posed by crime, fear, and incivilities in commercial districts. This research also addressed the impact of community context, type of business, organizational structure of the district, market mix, and community policing impacts on crime prevention and order maintenance efforts within commercial areas.

The specific research questions to be addressed by this research are:

- 1) How does crime and disorder impact the economic vitality of commercial districts?
- 2) How are crime prevention and safety services produced in commercial districts in Philadelphia? What do businesses and the police bring to the co-production of these services?
- 3) How do businesses within our selected case districts perceive issues of crime, disorder, community vitality and economic development outcomes?
- 4) What security measures do businesses take to assure their safety?
- 5) How do Business Improvement Districts identify and address crime and disorder problems and with what impacts? How do these BIDs articulate needs to local police, and with what perceived success?

### **Research Design**

This research examined the issue of crime, policing and security efforts in commercial areas at three different levels of analysis: (1) The system as a whole (e.g., the interactions of crime, police and business-based crime prevention strategies within Philadelphia); (2) Intermediate units (our 5 specific commercial sites); and, (3) Individual-level programs and actors. Each level of analysis will be nested within the other so that the analysis can move up and down the scale of units of analysis, thereby providing for a more robust

analysis of crime, community policing, and the co-production of safety services within a commercial sector frame of reference.

### **Crime in Philadelphia**

Crime in the City of Philadelphia rose slightly throughout the five-year period from 1994 through 1998. Property crimes constitute the highest number of reported offenses rising from just over 600 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 760 offenses in 1998. Violent offenses also increased from 235 in 1994 to 325 per square mile in 1998. The illicit market offense rate experienced a slight increase from 77 offenses per square mile in 1994 to 106 in 1998, while disorder offenses remained stable through out the four years (260 per square mile in 1994 and 256 per square mile in 1998).

The city saw similar trends in the arrests occurring during the five years. The arrest rate for property crime remained the highest rate through out the time period, decreasing slightly from 141 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 120 arrests in 1998. Arrests for disorder offenses also decreased from 1994 to 1998 (105 in 1994 and 37 in 1998.) Arrests for violent crime remained stable, with only a slight increase from 69 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 75 in 1998. Finally, arrests for illicit market offenses saw the largest increase, rising from 104 arrests per square mile in 1994 to 153 in 1998.

### **Crime in Commercial Districts -Collectively**

Philadelphia's commercial districts experienced increases in violent, disorder and illicit market offenses from 1994 to 1998. Violent offenses rose on average from nine offenses per square mile in 1994 to almost 16 offenses per square mile in 1998. Similarly, disorder offenses increased on average from nine offenses in 1994 to almost 18 offenses per square mile in 1998. Illicit market offenses saw the greatest increase during the five years, growing from an average of only one reported offense per square mile to over 20 offenses in 1998. It is important to note that this increase may be due to reporting practices by both citizens and police rather than an actual increase in offenses. While we

are unable to ascertain whether, and to what degree, reporting practices may have affected the data, we suspect that this is the case in this circumstance. Interestingly, on average, property offenses in the commercial districts remained stable through out the time period. Business property offenses remained over 22 offenses per square mile, as personal property offenses decreased only slightly from 35 property offenses per square mile in 1994 to 33 offenses in 1998.

Arrest rates in the commercial districts follow a different trend than the offense rates. The average arrest rate for violent crime decreased slightly from six arrests in 1994 to almost five arrests in 1998. Arrests for disorder offenses saw, on average, a larger decrease. The average rate dropped from 9.5 arrests for disorder crimes in 1994 to less than two in 1998. Arrest rates for illicit market offenses remained stable, with the average arrest rate in 1994 of 2.8 in 1994 and 3.3 in 1998. Arrests for property crime decreased for both business property arrests (an average of 16 in 1994 and 11 in 1998) and personal property arrests (an average of six in 1994 and 4.5 in 1998.)

### **Problems in the Commercial Districts Over Time**

Captains of the fifteen responding police districts were asked about the police districts ability to respond to particular problems over the past year. Five of the problems concerned incivilities in the district. These five are "quality of life" concerns and not necessarily criminal, or were, at the very least, victim-less crimes. One problem was concerned with illegal businesses while the final four focused on criminal acts within the commercial districts.

The five incivilities focused on were loitering, trash on the streets and sidewalks, panhandling and begging, parking and traffic and public consumption of alcohol and drugs. The captains felt that the largest gains were in the areas of public consumption of alcohol and drugs (60.0%), while the largest decrease was in the same category (26.7%). What we find is that with the other four incivilities a majority of responding captains (45% or more) felt that the problem stayed the same.

The four criminal issues identified were shoplifting/theft, drug selling, robbery and burglary. Approximately half (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that all of the criminal problems listed had improved substantially, except burglary, which showed a slightly lower improvement as compared to the other crimes (40.0%). A third of the captains surveyed felt that drug selling was the criminal act that had actually gotten the worse.

Another issue addressed in the course of the survey was the presence of illegal or unlicensed businesses. This, however, seemed to be a constant problem with only a small proportion of captains feeling that the presence of illegal businesses in the district had either gotten better (6.7%), or worse (13.3%).

What is interesting in assessing the captains' responses is that across the ten problems as listed we see that the largest decline in the area of drug selling. This could be the result of the efforts by commercial districts to "clean their streets", or a byproduct of displacement, which moves the problem from the areas frequented by shoppers or tourists to surrounding areas.

### **Role of the Police within the District: Commercial vs. Residential**

A majority (46.7%) of the responding captains felt that the problems they dealt with were worse in the commercial districts in comparison to the residential districts. Only approximately a quarter (26.7%) of the respondents felt that the problems in the residential districts were worse than the commercial districts. Approximately a quarter (26.7%) felt that there was no difference between the problems in the residential districts versus the commercial districts.

The captains were asked which problems they felt had a larger impact on commercial districts in comparison to residential districts. The most frequently reported problems were retail theft, panhandling, robberies and loitering. The question then is do policing styles differ between the residential and commercial districts to address these problems?

The reported efforts made to police different type of districts varied in over three-quarters (80%) of the responses. The most common (60%) difference is simply the use of foot patrol in commercial districts, which is not found in the residential districts. A smaller group (13.3%) reported the use of a combination of both bike and foot patrol.

A number of questions focused on tactics associated with community policing. The captains were asked to indicate which efforts were utilized in the commercial districts. Several of the districts (26.7) reported the use of mobile mini stations, while a smaller number (13.3%) reported the use of stationary mini stations. All of the districts reported the use of bicycle patrols in the commercial districts.

### **Services to the Commercial District**

The captains also reported on services offered to businesses in commercial districts. A majority of the districts (80%) reported offering crime prevention training for retailers. A similar majority (80%) reported providing escorts for cash drops for local businesses. Only roughly a quarter (26.7%) of the districts provided police located within the commercial establishments. Finally, two-thirds (66.7%) of the responding captains reported offering special seasonal details designed to increase police presence in the districts.

The captains were asked about the amount of police effort dedicated to problems associated with the commercial district. Captains felt that over half of the time (60%) their Crime Prevention officer dedicated "a lot" of time to the commercial district. Over a third of the time (40.0%) both Sanitation Officers and Abandoned Auto Units were also reported to spend "a lot" of time in the commercial district.

The final questions posed to the captains concerned the Department's policies when dealing with retailers in the commercial districts. The captains reported that they dealt with incidents such as shoplifting, employee theft, credit or check fraud, or suspicious loitering in a variety of ways. They reported using a number of methods in handling

these problems that would normally be primarily associated only with commercial areas as opposed to residential areas.

Some of the captains' responses included, creating partnerships between the police and private security where the police would provide transportation while private security was responsible for the apprehension of the suspects. Another reported intervention was to dispatch police detectives to the store who would act undercover and attempt to apprehend suspects identified by local security agents. In some cases private security personnel were allowed to fill out necessary paperwork to file charges, and at times plainclothes or patrol officers were dispatched to search for suspects.

Finally the captains were asked about efforts or initiatives undertaken for planning or implementing crime prevention strategies and tactics in commercial districts. The most common strategy reported was assignment to foot patrol or increase in foot patrol, however, only approximately half (46.7%) of the captains reported requesting additional manpower for the commercial districts. The other initiative mentioned involved partnerships between the police and other agencies, such as private security, businessmen's associations, and with retailers.

### **Center City Special Service District**

The Center City District in Philadelphia is the largest, best financed, and most complicated of all special services districts in the city. The CCD is closely intertwined with the 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> police districts, has its own substation, and commands considerable visibility in the business community. Over its life span it has contributed to improvements in place management and reductions in fear or concern with crime.

The Center City District served as a "model" and support system for the migration of new Special Services Districts throughout Philadelphia. The five Special services Districts studies here had a significant connection to the Center City District.

### **Frankfort Special Services District**

The Frankfort Special Services District struggles to maintain its visibility in a section of the city that has had a challenging history. Nonetheless, the hospital anchor with support from a few businesses has provided an opportunity for the FSSD to begin. Assessments of the District's efforts have been generally positive, but the conditions the FSSD much overcome remain significant.

### **Germantown Special Service District**

The results of the survey seem to indicate that Germantown SSD has their work cut out for them. They currently have little support within the commercial district and little interaction with the merchants. With a high turnover rate and a high level of fear they will find this obstacle difficult to surmount.

The district has more than its fair share of problems, however, for the commercial district to survive in any viable form they need to begin addressing some of these problems. With a high level of fear, poor lighting and little access to police support it does not seem likely that the Germantown commercial district will become a hub of nightlife for Philadelphia. These quality of life issues need to be addressed to attract more merchants, which should also be a focus of the GSSD, however, with the minimal knowledge of their existence it doesn't seem likely that they have engaged in this role effectively.

### **The Manayunk Special Services District: Conclusions**

The merchant survey bears out that Manayunk is a safe and orderly business environment. It has a responsive and effective police presence in the commercial area. Many of the problems identified by merchants are based, in part, on the district's success at attracting visitors. Many of these visitors come to the district to enjoy its wealth of entertainment offerings. These offerings include to a large extent bars and nightclubs,

which unfortunately, promote alcohol consumption and its oftentimes attendant phenomena disorderly conduct.

As opposed to other SSDs in the city that have focused their efforts on the delivery of services, Manayunk's efforts have been primarily promotional, event driven, and focussed on physical development. This fact has led to a failure of many merchants to relate the quality of the business environment to the efforts MSSD; and instead, rightfully attribute the areas successful safety planning to the city's police department.

### **The South Street Special Services District**

After analyzing the results of the survey distributed in the South Street commercial district it would seem that South Street was a relatively stable and safe district in which to run or own a business. The current business proprietors seem, for the most part, content with the work done by the police.

Obviously, this district like any commercial district has many problems, but none that we would not expect to see in any commercial district. And it would appear that the both the police and the current businesses do their part to promote safety and security for both employees and visitors to the area.

### **Comparisons Across Special Service Districts**

Although we have focused on only a few of the variables collected during the course of our study it seems clear that we must be prepared to use a different ruler to measure the SSD's within our study. The SSD's were created in a similar fashion, however, they vary strongly on time in existence, levels of funding, cooperation with city services, and, maybe most importantly, cooperation with the commercial residents themselves.

The goal of the SSD's should be to become increasingly self-sufficient organizations that partner with the city service providers, and the commercial businesses themselves to create a safer, cleaner, and more prosperous commercial district. Each site has strived toward this goal in its own ways, such as weekly membership meetings, safety meetings, flyers, Customer Service Representatives, etc. However, each has met with varying success.

Both the Manayunk and South Street SSD's seem well on their way to becoming increasingly successful agencies. Through strong leadership they have partnered their organizations with the local police and created a strong supportive community of businessmen and businesswomen.

The Germantown and Frankford SSD's require increased effort to achieve similar goals. Both have had the burden of uncooperative city agencies and high turnover in the upper echelons of their organizations. Frankford has had limited success with the hiring of Customer Service Representatives to patrol the commercial district, interact with the community, and increase police surveillance through the use of two-way radios.

Frankford is also trying to increase pride in the commercial district by purchasing street sweepers to eliminate the reoccurring problem of litter throughout the district.

Germantown's SSD is working towards this goal. Unless the Germantown District can increase the cooperation between themselves and their clients, it is unlikely that they will achieve their desired results.

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**APPENDIX A**

**Captain's Survey**  
**Focus Group Questions**  
**Physical Assessment Form**  
**Business Survey**  
**Business Survey Frequencies**

# CAPTAIN'S SURVEY

## Policing Efforts in Commercial Districts

This survey is intended to catalogue the community and problem-oriented policing efforts being pursued within the city's commercial districts. It is part of a larger National Institute of Justice-funded study of crime and policing efforts focussed on the city's business improvement districts. Information obtained through this survey will be kept confidential.

(If you'd prefer to type the open ended questions please feel free to do so).

### I. Problems in the Commercial District

The first ten questions are two part questions, please answer both parts.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the best and 10 being the worst, please try to recall the severity of these problems in your commercial district from **one year ago**. Then determine whether as of **today** the problem has gotten better (B), worse (W) or stayed the same (SS)

1. Loitering	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
2. Trash in streets or on sidewalks	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
3. Panhandling or begging	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
4. Public consumption of alcohol or drugs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
5. Illegal or unlicensed businesses	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
6. Drug Selling	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
7. Parking and traffic	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
8. Robbery	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
9. Burglary	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS
10. Shoplifting/theft	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	B W SS

11. How do these problems in the commercial areas in your district generally compare to those in residential areas in, or around, your district?

- a. Better than in the residential areas
- b. Same as the residential areas
- c. Worse than the residential areas

12. Are there any specific problems that have a greater impact on the commercial district in comparison to the residential area?

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13. Can you give an example of a difference between the policing efforts in your commercial districts in comparison to the policing efforts in your residential areas?

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14. Have there been any efforts to coordinate responses to any of these problems through other agencies (e.g., Streets Department, L. & I.) and if so, could you describe these efforts.

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II. The following questions are focussed on tactics associated with community policing. Please indicate which efforts are currently utilized and to what extent in commercial areas in your district. The available choices reflect your current state of deployment, with any additional needs you may be targeting in the near future.

How many officers are assigned to:

- 1. Foot Patrols dedicated to commercial areas \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. Foot Patrols dedicated to residential areas \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Bike patrols \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. Stationary mini station \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. Mobile mini station \_\_\_\_\_

6. Are the following police services offered in the commercial areas in your district?

- a. Crime prevention training for retailers Y    N  
     If Yes; How often? \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Escorted cash drops Y    N  
     If Yes; How often? \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Police located within commercial establishments Y    N  
     If Yes; How often? \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Special seasonal details Y    N  
     If Yes; How often? \_\_\_\_\_

7. Does your staff sponsor or attend community meetings focussed on issues in business areas? Y    N

If Yes; Which organizations are represented at these meetings? And how often do these meetings occur?

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8. Have you requested additional manpower focussed on commercial areas recently? Y N

9. Have you conducted any formal or informal surveys of security in the commercial district? Y N  
If Yes; How often has this been done? \_\_\_\_\_

10. Have you ever hired any outside agency to conduct formal or informal surveys of security in the commercial district? Y N

If Yes; What agency was this? And how often have they conducted the research?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. How much time do the following policing personnel dedicate to problems associated with your district's commercial areas:

	1 = None	2 = Little	3 = Some	4 = A Lot
a. Crime Prevention Officer	1	2	3	4
b. Sanitation Officer	1	2	3	4
c. Community Relations Officer	1	2	3	4
d. Abandoned Autos unit	1	2	3	4
e. Victim Assistance	1	2	3	4

11. Does your district have any special arrangements with stores, in-store security, or common area security providers regarding crime or order maintenance issues? Y N

12. Specifically, how are incidents such as shoplifting, employee theft, credit or check fraud, or suspicious loitering handled?

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13. What efforts or initiative have you taken in terms of planning and implementing crime prevention strategies and tactics in commercial districts?

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## FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

1. Could you identify and rank the problems facing the area.
2. How do these relate to crime and quality of life issues?
3. Who are the stakeholders in the community?
4. How does this diverse group interact over issues of crime and policing?
5. What does the police department do in terms of identifying problems in the area?
6. Is there a specific policing strategy employed in the commercial district? What is it?
7. What kind of information would be useful to the group in terms of developing a survey of local businesses?





Temple University  
Center for Public Policy  
Business Survey

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- Draft
- What is your relationship to the business?  Owner/Part-owner  Manager  Assistant Manager
  - Is the property that this business occupies owned, rented or leased?  Owned  Rented/Leased
  - How many years have you owned or managed this business?
  - How many years have you owned or managed this business?
  - Is this business a single proprietorship or part of a chain?  
If Chain; Is it company owned or franchise owned?  Single Proprietorship  Chain  
 Company Owned  Franchise Owned
  - In the past month, how many people (including yourself) are employed by this business?  
Full Time Part Time
  - How would you rate this area as a location for your business?  
(On a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being the best and 1 being the worst)  
 Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor
  - In the past few years, do you think the overall business environment in this area has changed?  
 Gotten Better  Stayed the same  Gotten Worse
  - Are you aware of the existence of a special services district in your business district?  Yes  No  
If Yes; How much contact do you have with it?  Frequent  
 Little  
 None  
If No; Skip to Question 11
  - How would you rate the services provided by the Special Services District?  
(on a scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being the best and 1 being the worst)  
 Very Good  Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor
  - How afraid are you of being the victim of crime during the workday?  1-Very afraid  
2-Somewhat afraid
  - How afraid are you of being the victim of crime going to and from work?  3-Somewhat unafraid  
4-Not afraid
  - Are you aware of any businesses in this area that have been victimized since October 1997?  Yes  No  
If Yes; Approximately how many businesses?    
If Yes; How did you find out?  
 Police  Merchant  Special Services District  Other
  - Has your business been the victim of a crime in the past year?  
(this includes yourself, employees and company property)  Yes  No

Please indicate whether you think each of the following are currently a big problem, somewhat of a problem or no problem in your business area:  
BIG PROBLEM=1 SOMEWHAT OF A PROBLEM=2 NO PROBLEM=3 DON'T KNOW=9

- |                                                               | 1                     | 2                     | 3                     | 9                     |  | 1                     | 2                     | 3                     | 9                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 15. Abandoned houses or buildings                             | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 17. Public Drinking/drunkenness                               | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 19. Drug dealing                                              | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 21. Panhandlers or Beggars                                    | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 23. Prostitution                                              | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 25. Burglaries and forcible entries into homes and businesses | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 27. Vacant lots filled with trash                             | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 16. Graffiti on buildings or walls                            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 18. Groups of people hanging around loitering                 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 20. Cars being vandalized                                     | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 22. Unruly behavior of individuals                            | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 24. Muggings, purse snatches and of forcible stealing         | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 26. Vendors                                                   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 28. Cars being stolen/ auto theft                             | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |



The following are a series of statements concerning services affecting you. Decide if you strongly disagree or strongly agree with each statement. Don't know is also an option.

29. The formation of the Special Services District has improved the relationship between the police and the businesses.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
30. People from outside the neighborhood cause the majority of the problems in this business area.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
31. The Special Services District has improved this business district.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
32. The police do a good job keeping order on the streets and sidewalk.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
33. The police have a high visibility in this business district.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
34. The business district is well lit in the evening.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
35. Fear of crime has kept customers from visiting this area.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
36. The streets are safer since the formation of the Special Services District.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
37. The city does not respond to the needs of the business community.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
38. Police officers encourage you to play a part in preventing and solving crime.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
39. Police officers are genuinely concerned with business owner's problems.  SA  A  D  SD  DK
40. This business area is safe.  SA  A  D  SD  DK

41. Has your business taken the following security measures to deter crime? (Check all that apply).

- |                                                                                    |                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> a. Merchandise arranged to reduce opportunities for theft | <input type="checkbox"/> b. Additional outdoor lighting      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> c. Special/additional locks for doors or windows          | <input type="checkbox"/> j. Participate in a business watch  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> e. Alarm systems such as panic buttons                    | <input type="checkbox"/> f. Purchased a firearm              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> g. Partnerships with local police                         | <input type="checkbox"/> h. Mirrors located in store         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> k. Hired a security guard                                 | <input type="checkbox"/> i. Surveillance camera inside store |
| <input type="checkbox"/> d. An inventory control system                            | Other _____                                                  |

42. How often do you see a police officer on bike, on foot or in a car?  Often  Sometimes  Never

43. How often do you interact with police officers in this area?  Often  Sometimes  Never

44. Is your business insured for losses occurring from theft?  Yes  No

If Yes; Have you ever filed a claim?  Yes  No

45. Have you ever been offered advice on crime prevention?  Yes  No

If Yes; by whom? (Check all that apply)

Police  
 Insurance Company  
 Special Services District  
 Other

46. Have you ever found it necessary to call the police in the past for incidents unrelated to crime?(car accidents, injuries, etc.).  Yes  No

47. What is your zip code?

48. Please identify your primary racial group.

- Asian  
 African American  
 Hispanic  
 Native American  
 White  
 Other

<b>Business Survey Descriptive Statistics</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
<b>Business/Owner History</b>				
Own Business	0.71	0.72	0	2
Own Property	0.68	0.47	0	1
Years owned	7.96	10.08	0	85
Years at Location	11.19	13.85	0	99
# Full Time Employees	7.22	24.2	0	304
# Part Time Empoloyees	6.81	14.83	0	121
<b>Problems within the Commercial District</b>				
Abandoned Homes	2.42	0.75	1	3
Graffiti	2.18	0.82	1	3
Public Drinking/Drunkeness	2.23	0.77	1	3
Groups loitering	2.01	0.77	1	3
Drug dealing	2.1	0.79	1	3
Cars being vandalized	1.9	0.78	1	3
Panhandlers/Beggars	1.95	0.79	1	3
Unruly behavior	2.11	0.75	1	3
Prostitution	2.19	0.85	1	3
Mugging	2.12	0.77	1	3
Burglaries	2.29	0.73	1	3
Vendors	2.42	0.74	1	3
Trash filled lots	2.35	0.74	1	3
Auto theft	2.21	0.74	1	3
<b>Rating of Police/City Services</b>				
Police do a good job keeping order	1.25	0.9	0	4
Police have a high visibility	1.21	0.88	0	4
City does not respond to community needs	1.8	1.11	0	4
Police officers encourage involvement	1.64	1.15	0	4
Police officers are concerned with businesses	1.62	1.13	0	4
Offered advice on crime prevention	0.54	0.5	0	1

PROPERTY OF

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)

Box 6000

College Park, MD 20740-6000

Business Survey Descriptive Statistics	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Security Measures</b>				
Merchandise specially arranged	0.51	0.5	0	1
Additional outdoor lighting	0.48	0.5	0	1
Special/additional locks	0.63	0.48	0	1
Participate in Business Watch	0.15	0.36	0	1
Alarm Systems	0.56	0.5	0	1
Gun/Firearm	0.09	0.28	0	1
Partnership with police	0.17	0.38	0	1
Mirrors inside business	0.39	0.49	0	1
Security guard	0.15	0.35	0	1
Surveillance cameras	0.38	0.49	0	1
Inventory Control System	0.27	0.45	0	1
<b>Personal Information</b>				
Zip Code	-	-	-	-
Race	-	-	-	-
Victim of Crime	0.33	0.47	0	1
Other businesses victimized	0.33	0.47	0	1
How often do you see a police officer	0.47	0.56	0	2
How often do you interact with a police officer	1	0.71	0	2
Business Insured	0.76	0.43	0	1
Filed a claim	0.21	0.41	0	1
<b>Commercial District/Special Services District Relations</b>				
Rate location for a business	3.74	0.93	1	5
Rate the business environment	1.85	0.72	1	3
Rate the BID/SSD	3.21	1.13	1	5
Considered closing/relocating business	0.16	0.37	0	1
Aware of BID/SSD	0.66	0.48	0	1
BID/SSD well lit	1.5	0.97	0	4
Crime scares visitors	1.78	1.12	0	4
Contact with BID/SSD	1.02	0.74	0	2
Outsiders cause problems	1.78	1.21	0	4
The area is safe	1.44	0.82	0	4
SSD has improved police/business relations	2.45	1.5	0	4
SSD has improved the business district	2.32	1.49	0	4
Fear during the day	2.94	1.01	1	4
Fear traveling to and from work	2.96	1.01	1	4
Streets are safer since SSD	2.6	1.43	0	4