# NCJRS

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.

1.0	4.5 2.8	2.5
	5.0 3.2	2.2
	5.4 3.6	
1.1	4.0	2.0
		1.8
1.25	1.4	1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

Date filmed, 2/10/76

25201

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

A Comparative Analysis
of The Planning Process
in Eleven Cities

Atlanta, Georgia
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dayton, Ohio
Denver, Colorado
Detroit, Michigan
Gary, Indiana
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Reading, Pennsylvania
Richmond, California
Rochester, New York
San Antonio, Texas

The Model Cities Program

Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Washington, D.C.

A Comparative Analysis
of The Planning Process
in Eleven Cities

Atlanta, Georgia
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dayton, Ohio
Denver, Colorado
Detroit, Michigan
Gary, Indiana
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Reading, Pennsylvania
Richmond, California
Rochester, New York
San Antonio, Texas

The
Model
Cities
Program

CONTENTS

Section I: Model Cities— Introduction

Section II: Model Cities—Alternate Approaches to Planning

Preface

Four years have passed since Congress enacted legislation creating the Model Cities program. During this time over 150 communities have initiated Model Cities planning efforts. Indeed, 115 of these cities have already begun to carry out Model Cities related projects.

It is obviously too early to measure the precise impact of the program on the "quality of life" of Model Neighborhood residents. Yet, it is not too early to describe and evaluate the effects of the planning period on participating cities, on public agencies, on residents, on State Government, and on the Federal Government. To do this, Model Cities, as part of its overall evaluation program, under the direction of Mr. Bernard Russell, Director, Office of Evaluation and Local Management Systems, and Dr. Richard Langendorf, Director, Division of Planning and Evaluation, sought an independent analysis of the planning and project implementation experiences of representative cities. Model Cities contracted with Marshall Kaplan, Gans,' and Kahn (MKGK) of San Francisco to carry out such a study. This report, authored and edited by MKGK, under the direction of Marshall Kaplan, a principal in the firm, presents a comparative evaluation of the planning period in 11 first-round cities. Other reports soon to be completed will offer analyses of planning and project initiation in first and second-round cities. The specific interpretations and conclusions are those of MKGK and not necessarily those of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

This report should be of help to cities now engaged in the Model Cities program. It describes in clear language the challenges and opportunities associated with local participation in the Model Cities effort. It also suggests the real need for a more effective Federal response to local Model Cities plans and projects.

Cities, as indicated in this report, found Model Cities to be a difficult program to undertake. Severe problems in meeting program objectives occurred particularly in those cities in which city government opted out of the program or assumed at best a benign neutrality toward the program. Similarly, delays, duplication and wasted efforts accompanied the program in those cities where resident-city alienation was a continuous fact of life and where time consuming, often abrasive rhetoric became a substitute for meaningful resident involvement in the planning process.

Despite the tall order asked of them, most cities came through the intital planning period quite well. Plans were prepared which for the first time in many cities reflected a comprehensive approach to problem definition and problem solving; working coalitions were developed between City Hall and resident groups in most cities; and local capacity to mount and coordinate programs in Model Neighborhoods were increased in most participating cities. In other words, cities used their planning period to good advantage.

While lending cause for at least cautious optimism, this report also pinpoints some real problems -- problems which must be resolved if Model Cities is to receive a fair test. For example, the interagency Federal response to Model Cities has been less than satisfactory. Consistent with the commitment of the President and the Domestic Council, each and every Federal department will have to re-analyze their delivery system. Earmarking of funds, flexible interpretation of categorical program guidelines, and a more responsive routing system must command priority attention.

HUD/MC, on its part, will continuously try to simplify and shorten rather than complicate and extend Model City guidelines relative to planning and the use of supplemental funds. Already, in part the result of this report, Model Cities has considerably reduced and simplified continuous planning requirements and project amendment procedures. Similarly, every effort will be made to consolidate and shorten Federal reviews of Model City plans and to decentralize all such reviews to the regions except where national policy issues are involved.

Model Cities experience to date confirms the need to mount extensive efforts to involve states in the program. HUD/Model Cities has, over the past year, initiated activities which should increase state participation in the program. Indeed, over 45 governors have designated state Model Cities representatives, while over 30 have provided funds and technical assistance to cities.

Model Cities is still a new approach. Unlike most previous Federal efforts at assisting cities, Model Cities is as much concerned with the process by which cities develop plans and programs as the plans and programs themselves. Model Cities plans must, if they are to receive Federal support, emanate from the ideas of residents as well as the work of professionals; from the involvement of public as well as involvement of private groups. As important, Model Cities plans must reflect city government assumption of final responsibility for their preparation and implementation. In essence, planning processes initiated by cities must generate increased local capacity to respond to the range of Model Neighborhood problems in a coordinated and innovative way -- a way consistent with resident needs and priorities.

Whether or not Model Cities will achieve initially prescribed legislative objectives relative to improving the lives of urban residents is still an unanswered question. Yet, as indicated in this report, given the range of problems facing most cities and the context within which Model Cities plans were prepared, the results of the initial planning period were encouraging. Certainly, for those who saw the Model Cities planning approach as an easy way to resolve local problems, the first year of planning must have been judged disappointing. Yet, for those who saw in Model Cities a better way to resolve urban problems, the first year of planning provides cause for much optimism concerning the future of the program and, more important, the future of urban America.

Floyd H. Hyde, Assistant Secretary
Model Cities and Governmental
Relations, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development

help
PIEASE

SECTION I: MODEL CITIES—INTRODUCTION

Congress, in the fall of 1966, enacted, after lengthy debate, legislation launching a demonstration effort known as the Model Cities program. The program was designed to encourage development of a concerted local attack on the broad range of social, economic, and physical problems observed in many neighborhoods of this nation's cities.

Eligible cities were to receive one-year planning grants with which to prepare comprehensive development plans (CDPs) to improve the quality of life in locally defined neighborhoods. Both implementation and on-going planning would occur over a five-year demonstration period. During that time funding would be available through appropriate Federal categorical aid programs and supplemental Model Cities grants. The latter were to be used for "new and innovative activities, the redirection of existing resources to better use, and the mobilization of additional resources."

Nearly 200 cities submitted applications for the first round of planning grants. This initial response indicated a high degree of determination on the part of cities to attack their tough social, economic, and environmental problems. In late 1967 and early 1968, HUD selected 75 cities for the first round of planning grants.

This report presents a detailed comparative analysis of the initial Model Cities planning period in a number of first round cities. The report illustrates the difficulties cities had in responding to the program's planning requirements, and defines the reasons for these difficulties. As important, the report offers an initial and tentative frame of reference within which choices can be made and their

results predicted by HUD and cities concerning alternate Model Cities planning and action strategies. Future reports will present analyses of second round cities, [1] and comparative studies of first and second round cities.

Study Methodology

Eleven first round cities were selected[2] for study purposes from the 75 first round cities participating in the program. These cities were picked by the joint staffs of HUD's Model Cities Administration and Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn (MKGK). Their choice was not premised on rigorous sampling techniques concerning either the range and diversity of resident characteristics or social pathology. Both staffs assumed, given the broad policy aims and objectives of the Model Cities program and the numerous factors projected as relevant in determining the program's impact on any one locale, that a purposeful selection of cities was preferable to use of random or stratified sampling. Further, both staffs agreed that selection of a limited rather than a large number of cities would permit initiation of a more intensive study process, and result in a more definitive analysis.

Cities selected for study were chosen because they appeared to represent those characteristics essential to an understanding of the impact of the Model Cities on all first round cities. The number of cities picked would, it was thought, "permit generalization to a significant proportion of the class: studies as undertaken would permit the development of typologies or classification schemes, which

---

[1] Cities applying and receiving planning grants after grants for the first 75 cities had been announced by HUD.

[2] Over 75 cities received second round grants; 10 of these cities were included in the evaluation work program. Comparative analyses of these cities have been initiated and will upon completion be included in future reports.

would also fit the structure and functioning of other cases in a significant class, if not in the class as a whole."[3]

Of the eleven first round cities selected for study purposes, three were strong mayor cities, two weak mayor cities, five city manager cities, and one a commission city. All of the studied cities contained several resident groups in their respective Model Neighborhoods which were concerned with planning issues. Most of these groups could not claim to speak for the neighborhood. Their constituencies were quite limited, and their membership inexperienced in negotiating issues relative to resource allocation. More often than not, most were subject to internal dissension and frequent attacks from other groups in and outside of the Model Neighborhood Area. In at least four cities, however, there were resident groups which were internally strong and which contained a sizeable number of residents who had experience in dealing effectively with City Hall in areas analagous to Model Cities.

None of the cities selected for the evaluation could be said to have initiated a planning and allocation approach consistent with HUD's Model Cities requirements prior to the inception of the program (application period). In 8 cities, however, the planning and allocation climate was definitely moving in the direction of HUD's guidelines, while in 3 others qualitative indices suggested that such movement was at best tenuous and at worst non-existent.

Very large, (New York, Chicago, etc.)

[3] The above quotation was taken from a draft of an article prepared by Drs. Robert S. Weiss and Martin Rein. The article is titled "The Evaluation of Broad-Aim Programs: Experimental Design, its Difficulties, and an Alternative." The article has been published in the March, 1970 Administrative Science Quarterly. A slightly revised version of the quotation appears on page 106 of this publication.

and very small cities were excluded from the list of the eleven first round cities as they were viewed as atypical situations. Efforts were attempted, however, to pick some of the "bigger cities" involved in the Model Cities program, and some of the smaller cities. In addition, care was taken to include cities where the Model Neighborhood population included different racial and ethnic compositions.

Study Process

MKGK continuously monitored the planning process during the planning period in each of the eleven studied cities. Cities were visited at least once a month for extended periods of time by highly skilled and trained field staff. In addition, on-site personnel were secured in each city to: (1) "inform" MKGK of pending "crisis" events requiring unscheduled visits of evaluation staff; and (2) record daily events associated with the program for later MKGK staff evaluation.

Field staff were responsible for completing detailed evaluative chronologies of the Model City planning process in their respective cities. These chronologies were to describe and analyze planning related events and issues. They were also asked to present and analyze contextual events —— events which while not directly a part of the planning process affected the outcome of the process.

Several study instruments were completed by field staff in addition to their chronologies. These instruments were directed at providing supplementary data concerning: (1) perceptions of public officials with respect to the program; (2) development of the application and various planning products; (3) the pre-planning environment; and (4) the nature and content of the products submitted to HUD.

Data resulting from the study instruments and the chronologies were then used by field and core staff to

develop case studies for each city. Each case study[4] was in turn used by core staff to prepare this comparative report. Drafts of the comparative evaluation and case studies were reviewed by a team of "outside" noninvolved observers, including Drs. Bernard Frieden, Herbert Gans, Harry Specht, Nathan Glazer and Robert Weiss.[5] This team was asked to comment on the relationship between the case studies and analyses presented in this comparison. They were asked as "independent" observers to verify the presence or absence of linkages between the data as recorded in the case studies and analyses and conclusions as recorded in the comparative evaluation of all eleven cities. They were not asked to record their agreement or disagreement with the study design, methodology, or findings.

Study Boundaries

HUD's prescribed planning requirements provided MKGK with a set of boundaries or a frame of reference within which to observe planning events in the select cities. That is, field teams were asked to record only those events which were related to, or directly affected the cities' response to HUD's guidelines. These guidelines included structure, process, product, and performance components. They are briefly described in the paragraphs below.

STRUCTURE

Although HUD's guidelines did not preclude an existing city agency from assuming responsibility for Model

[4] Chronologies and case studies are on file at HUD as well as MKGK's office.

[5] Drs. Bernard Frieden and Herbert Gans are presently teaching in the Department of City Planning at M.I.T.; Dr. Nathan Glazer is teaching in the Graduate School of Education at Harvard; Dr. Robert Weiss is a professor in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School; and Dr. Harry Specht is on the faculty of the School of Social Welfare at the University of California, Berkeley.

Cities planning, they quite clearly implied preference for a new organization. This organization (a City Demonstration Agency), was to be responsible directly to the chief executive and as a "general rule" was not to be a "special purpose agency with an independent governing board." HUD further specified that the CDA was to have the power, authority, and stature to achieve coordinated administration of the program; to reconcile conflicting plans for the Model Neighborhood; and to link operating programs among contributing agencies.

Cities were to provide residents with a meaningful planning role. No precise criteria, however, were presented translating resident participation into organizational alternatives. HUD simply called for "some form of organizational structure," with leadership acceptable to the neighborhood as representative of their interests.

PROCESS

CDAs interpreted HUD's planning guidelines as prescribing specific requirements concerning the planning process. Not only, for example, did HUD require submittal of a comprehensive development plan, but they appeared to be asking that the internal components of this plan be completed in a certain order, within a certain time frame, and through the use of certain skilled techniques.

Order and Time: Model Neighborhood problems were to be defined prior to definition of goals; objectives were to be stated before articulation of programs. Problems, goals, program approaches were, according to HUD, to be completed by the end of the eighth planning month or two-thirds way through the planning year. The entire plan was to be prepared within a one-year period.

Technique: CDAs were, in developing their plans, expected to quantify problems; establish the underly-

ing causes of these problems; *rank* the importance of problems, goals, and objectives; and *cost* out both objectives and programs. All of these requirements, as well as others, clearly indicated the use of certain techniques endemic to the planning profession. Among those implicitly, if not explicitly, suggested by CDA #4, HUD's basic planning guidelines, were use of surveys; synopses of available secondary data; development and use of means to rate and scale priorities; and methods to translate service-cost ratios to specific program budgets.

PRODUCT

Three specific products were required by HUD as part of local CDPs. The first, appropriately called Part I, was to present a description and an analysis of problems, causes, goals, and program approaches. It, as indicated above, was to be submitted two-thirds way through the planning period.

Part II, a statement of five-year objectives and subsequent costs anticipated to achieve these objectives, and Part III, a statement of precise first year action plans and programs as well as intended administrative arrangements, were to be completed and passed on to HUD at the end of the planning period.

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

Local Model City structures, processes, and products were to be judged by HUD according to how well they met a set of performance criteria — that is, they were to be reviewed on the basis of their success in securing coordination; resident involvement; institutional change; innovation; resource concentration and mobilization.

None of the five basic performance criteria was defined by HUD in operational terms. All were stated more as norms than as tough, precise standards. Cities were ostensibly given much latitude to define locally relevant definitions.

Summary

HUD, in most cities, sought the creation of a new general purpose planning organization administratively responsive to the chief executive. This organization would have responsibility for preparation of the CDP. Model Neighborhood goals stated in the plan were to be based on a clear and comprehensive statement of Model Neighborhood problems and their underlying causes. Program approaches, strategies, and priorities, based on the CDA goal and problem analysis, were to be stated in order to set a framework for development of five year objectives and costs as well as budgeted first year projects.

A city's planning efforts were to be judged not only on the substance of submitted documents, and the processes leading to the creation of these documents, but also on the degree to which initiated planning processes and submitted products reflected loosely defined HUD performance criteria, such as: coordination; institutional change; resident involvement; innovation; and resource concentration and mobilization. HUD assumed that their prescribed planning system, if linked to public and private resources, would serve participating Model Cities as a instrument to improve the lives of local residents.

SECTION II: MODEL CITIES — ALTERNATE PLANNING APPROACHES

Each of the eleven cities studied initiated its own planning system. Each developed locally relevant definitions of the four components of HUD's prescribed system —— structure, process, product and performance. Additionally, each established locally relevant relationships among these components to satisfy HUD's planning requirements. Despite the local character of each city's approach to Model Cities, however, five basic planning systems appeared in the eleven cities. These were: (1) staff dominance; (2) staff influence; (3) staff/resident parity; (4) resident influence; and (5) resident dominance.

Planning Systems

STAFF DOMINANCE

Sustained chief executive interest in, and commitment to, the Atlanta Model Cities program, juxtaposed with a non-cohesive,[6] non-integrated[7] resident base, permitted the CDA staff —— formally responsible to the Mayor ——to assume initially and continuously maintain a dominant position in the city's Model Cities planning system. CDA staff were clearly given the mandate to develop, amend, and implement the planning work program. City Hall, particularly the Mayor's office, was both the cli-

[6]MKGK classified resident groups as cohesive or non-cohesive. Resident groups, interested in Model Cities, which faced many internal problems and divisions were classified as non-cohesive. Each group had many leaders. None seemed to speak for a large constituency in the Model Neighborhood.

[7]MKGK classified resident members of groups as politically integrated or non-integrated. Non-integration referred to those groups whose members had only minimal experience prior to Model Cities, negotiating with City Hall on planning or resource allocation issues.

City of Atlanta and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

City of San Antonio and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

ent[8] and the constituency[9] of the head of the CDA and staff throughout the planning year. Residents, consistent with their involvement in planning efforts prior to Model Cities, functioned primarily to "legitimize" staff-defined processes and products. Their direct input into either process or product was minimal. Most agencies were not vitally concerned with Model Cities. Only a few assigned staff to the CDA on a full- or part-time basis. Agency review and sign-off was a perfunctory activity.

Given Atlanta's relatively non-turbulent environment, the basic ground rules governing the roles assigned to staff, agencies, and residents were easy to define and maintain during the planning period. Their endorsement by the Mayor, and acceptance by other relevant participants, helped the planning system withstand the pressures of potentially threatening non-planning events, such as the assassination of Martin Luther King or the firing of a popular resident-employee in the Model Neighborhood.

Once structural issues, such as the number of residents to be included on advisory groups, and the internal organization of resident groups were resolved, very few issues were observed during the planning period. Staff were rarely confronted by residents or agencies. They could, and indeed did, spend the major portion of their time on substantive planning activities. The processes used to complete the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) reflected considerable staff efforts to meet what was perceived as HUD criteria concerning order, timing and technique. The di-

---

[8]Client in this text refers to any individual or group receiving services under contract, or within the context of a formal relationship.

[9]Constituency in the text refers to a group or a group of individuals offering support or receiving commitments from professional staff or political leaders. No formal contractual relationship is involved between professional and constituent.

versions which did occur, particularly during the final months of the planning period, reflected the felt pressures of time, budget, and staff capacity, rather than competing non-planning related agenda items.

Atlanta's final plan met HUD's requirements in form if not always in content. The problem statement was comprehensive in that it covered most functional areas of concern. Analyses of specific problems were quite detailed, and supported by considerable data. The CDA illustrated attempts to define priorities among problems and objectives. As in most cities, however, the discussion of relationships (linkages) between and among problems received only cursory treatment, and the relationship between five year objectives and cost estimates for the proposed first year projects was not always clear. The final narrative descriptions of first year projects in most functional areas were quite brief, suggesting general intent but not precise strategy, program content, or work program. Total budget estimates for first year action programs, apparently reflecting in part the sustained involvement of only a few agencies with the Model Cities program, minimized the projected use of categorical programs.

Of the five performance criteria, only coordination was given direct attention. Use of on-loan staff allowed the limited number of agencies providing such staff to be kept informed of planning progress while review groups and policy boards provided opportunities for a small number of other agency participants and public officials to be kept apprised of CDA activities. The dialogue at board sessions, however, usually focused on procedural rather than substantive matters.

The involvement of the chief executive in the program facilitated CDA use of central direction (cf. p.57) as

a coordinative technique to define and implement the planning work program. That is, the Mayor's articulated support of the program and his commitment to see Atlanta submit its documents first, encouraged the staff to concentrate on the planning process and supported their seeming conscious decisions to request agency review and sign-off responsibilities.

STAFF INFLUENCE

San Antonio, Pittsburgh, Gary and Detroit illustrated characteristics associated with staff influence systems. The program in these cities, despite the fact that the CDA was formally responsible to City Hall in three cities and to a public agency in the fourth, lacked the continuous interest or the commitment from the chief executive. Indeed, for the most part his involvement was generally limited to the application period and the period just prior to submittal. Tension in the Model Neighborhood in at least three of the four cities clearly made the program a political risk to the chief executive, given what appeared to him to be uncertain Federal commitments and alternative local priorities.

Minimal chief executive involvement was accompanied at the inception of the program, at least, with the presence in the Model Neighborhood area of non-cohesive resident groups whose members were not generally politically integrated. Staff therefore lacked both a client group and/or a constituency. As a result, they were, during the early months of the planning period, unable (or unwilling) to initiate planning events, crystallize planning issues, and establish effective relationships with either residents or agencies concerning the development of planning products. They were limited primarily to providing secretarial type services to supposed relevant participants. As one CDA head put it, "we were confined to securing rooms for meetings; recording minutes; and providing agendas."

City of Pittburgh and Model Neighborhood Area

City of Gary and Model Neighborhood Area

There were, as implied above, very few ground rules concerning planning assignments at the beginning of the planning period. The development of such ground rules occurred in an ad hoc fashion and resulted in most of the issues occurring in the system. Participants changed roles and responsibilities frequently; some left the system entirely, while others entered, not always to assume the same roles. Ground rules were rarely clear or firm.

The absence of firm ground rules made the system vulnerable to considerable environmental turbulence which existed in three of the four cities throughout the year, and in the fourth during the final months of the year. This turbulence —— competitive resident groups, Martin Luther King's death, competitive agencies, etc. —— constantly threatened planning participants, and resulted often in changes in work program objectives and assignments.

Planning efforts when finally underway were subject to numerous shifts in, and amendments to, the work program. Order and technique were frequently left by the wayside. Staff direction of the planning process was at best an intermittent event, and at worst, non-existent. As resident or resident dominated groups grew stronger, a few key CDA staff members began to increasingly assume the role of resident advocates. For most, however, periodic intervention of the chief executive (or his surrogate) permitted City Hall to ultimately be viewed as the primary client. This fact, combined with HUD's deadlines, allowed staff to become the major, although not the primary, influence in the planning process.

Resident groups in all staff influence cities made their most significant contribution to the planning process during the development of the problem statement. Their input came through direct dialogue with staff and agency personnel in task force and board sessions. CDA staff, responsi-

ble for writing all drafts, made an effort to accurately reflect resident needs, priorities, and programs in these drafts. Such conformity would, it was thought, lend sanction to staff prepared products and therefore facilitate their ultimate acceptance by resident or resident dominated review boards.

Agency involvement in staff influence cities was minimal. Where it occurred, it was limited in terms of duration, and usually quite specific in terms of products. The lack of sustained agency commitment was apparently related to the failure of the chief executive in staff influence cities to provide early support to the program. Many agencies, in light of the marginal visible support granted the program by respective mayors and city managers, apparently questioned the program's worth to them. The cost of their participation seemed high,[10] and the benefits marginal. CDA heads, without chief executive support, could not mandate participation on a continuing basis, or even exercise meaningful persuasive powers.

HUD's products generally took longer in staff influence cities to complete than the initially prescribed planning year. Most met HUD's requirements concerning form, but diverged significantly with respect to content. For example, the analysis of different functional problem areas varied in depth and documentation. Priorities among and internal to problem areas were almost always absent. Linkages between and among problem areas were rarely stated in more than a perfunctory fashion. Critiques of the existing delivery systems were tough in some areas but absent in others. Five year objectives and costs were difficult to relate precisely to all problem areas. They were certainly neither clear nor

---

[10]Staff, time and cost, as well as the public airing of resident critique of individual delivery systems.

precise enough to suggest local strategies or provide a frame of reference for development of first year projects. Budgets were quite general and relied on supplemental funds to meet the major share of first year action needs.

Locally relevant definitions of HUD's performance criteria did not come from either conscious direction or substantive planning processes. Rather, they emerged from dialogue between residents and staff, residents and agencies; and were an indirect by-product of the continuous efforts to define and develop roles.

The most visible innovation in all the cities was the apparent emergence during the planning period of resident groups able to conduct continuous discussions with City Hall about resource allocation issues. Evidence of significant coordinative approaches, unusual institutional response patterns, or conscious resource concentration and mobilization was rare. Minimal participation of chief executives, combined with a weak resident base, frustrated serious efforts in these areas of HUD concern. No local mandate apparently existed concerning these performance criteria sufficient to motivate agency response.

PARITY

Denver, Richmond, Cambridge and Reading were classified as parity cities. Continuous chief executive interest in, and support of the program was visible in all cities. Similarly, availability of reasonably cohesive Model Neighborhood resident groups whose members were politically integrated was apparent in at least three of the four cities.[11] Sustained chief executive involvement, a strong resident base and a relatively turbu-

City of Richmond and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

City of Cambridge and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

---

[11]City Hall, at the request of CDA staff in Denver, supported development of a strong Model Cities resident group. Members were quickly involved in non-Model City related planning issues by many city officials.

lence-free environment permitted definition of ground rules early in the planning period. These rules allowed staff and residents alike to share responsibility relative to key planning decisions.[12]

CDA staff in three of the cities were formally responsible to the chief executive. In two of these they perceived themselves, and were seen as, resident advocates for select issues; while in the third a "bona fide" resident advocate, responsible to a resident group, was present and able to work with CDA staff at City Hall. Only in one city was staff formally responsible to a resident dominated group.

Resident groups in parity cities were able, either at the outset or after a short time, to make real planning contributions. All had developed a visible and supportive constituency; and non-ideological leadership was either present or quickly developed during the initial weeks of planning. Resident groups in at least three of the cities were able to secure "independent" staff.

Direct chief executive or surrogate involvement combined with comparatively strong resident groups granted initial ground rules the status of written or unwritten constitutions. City Hall and residents were able to negotiate their differences and as one chief executive stated, "stick to agreements." Existence of such agreements relative to planning assignments helped maintain or support the planning system in the face of sporadic threatening non-Model Cities related events. Most of the issues which occurred, after the ground rules were defined, concerned process or product.

Agency involvement was encouraged by the visible support provided the program by respective chief executives. On-loan staff was provided by some agencies for sustained but varying periods of time in all four cities. A number of agencies participated in "active" resident dominated boards in at least three cities, and on less active agency review boards in two cities. Tasks leading to the completion of specific products were completed under contract by individual agencies in at least one city.

Parity cities were not able to perfectly match the planning order suggested by HUD, nor were they able to include all the different "techniques," implicit as well as explicit, in HUD's guidelines. Departures from the requirements, however, generally reflected the conscious choice of staff and residents. Staff prepared documents in all cities.[13] They were based, to the extent possible, on resident-staff agreements about work program and product priorities.

Products developed in parity cities were generally completed within the initially set one-year planning period, or shortly thereafter. While most contained thorough discussions of problem "linkages," the discussion of underlying causes was often quite ephemeral and did not go beyond conventional wisdoms. At least half the documents contained analyses of priorities among problems and objectives and subsequent strategy statements. Critiques of existing institutions were common; indeed, some were presented in great depth. The statement of objectives and fiscal needs, Part II, while often vague, did seem to relate content to both the problem statement and anticipated projects. Parity cities, perhaps reflecting the participation of local agencies, proposed greater reliance on categorical programs as a proportionate share of total first year budgets than other cities.

No consistent pattern emerged in the way first-year action projects were described. Some cities provided more information and a clearer picture of proposed first-year action efforts than others. Variations, however, existed even internal to documents from the same city.

By and large, parity cities were able to initiate coordinative approaches based on adjustment[14] (cf. p.57) processes rather than central direction. Information sharing and use of on-loan staff, plus sustained resident-staff dialogue led to development of common strategies concerning planning processes and anticipated products. Continuous resident-City Hall dialogue was seen locally as the primary example of innovation and institutional change. A number of agencies in each city, however, responded to the complaints of Model City related resident groups concerning agency provided services. As a result, urban renewal plans were altered and zoning proposals amended in at least two cities. An obnoxious coal heap was removed in one city after participating Model City residents objected; while a health program was redirected in another city for the same reasons. Evidence of resource allocation and mobilization was generally limited to projections in the plan concerning the use of categorical programs.

RESIDENT INFLUENCE

The City of Rochester initiated a resident influence system. Minimal chief executive interest and involvement in the program, in part related to a high level of turbulence in the local environment, combined with a non-cohesive resident organization, impeded early development and assignment of responsibilities. Staff, at the outset, were without a client or a constituency and had to assume a service role. Their initial functions, as

City of Detroit and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

City of Denver and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

[12]Formal administrative responsibility and authority clearly resided with City Hall, however, in at least three of the four cities.

[13]In one city — — Denver — — the resident group prepared the major portion of the problem statement.

[14]Coordination was achieved through discussion, negotiation, bargaining etc. Refer to discussion on page 55 .

in the staff influence cities, were limited to arranging meetings; securing agency attendance; monitoring sessions, etc.

Both residents and staff were constantly threatened by events not directly related to the Model Cities planning process. These threats were constant with respect to residents, and intermittent with respect to staff. They added to the difficulties frustrating development of ground rules pertaining to roles and initiation of substantive planning processes. Sporadic chief executive intervention, resulting from staff pressure, and the results of resident group confrontations with select public agencies over issues related to local services helped establish, after some period of time, roles for relevant participants. A relatively large number of issues related to who would control the planning process were recorded in this system.

Most staff, because of the emergence of an increasingly cohesive and self-directed resident group and the continued assumption, by and large, of a neutral position by the chief executive concerning Model Cities, became "advocate" planners. The resident group became the major, although not the only influence on planning. Staff were clearly junior partners. Their primary role was to structure and extend resident-initiated dialogue concerning planning, pose alternatives, and help clarify ideas. Ultimately, they recorded in HUD's format the results of predominantly resident-initiated planning decisions.

A number of agencies participated on resident dominated boards and task forces, as well as contributed staff, during the planning year. Yet, agency involvement was not generally widespread. Some agencies feared "locking horns" with resident groups. Others saw very few benefits from participating on a sustained basis, and many costs, particularly in terms of staff and postponed agenda items. Absence of continuous chief executive support, particularly early

in the planning period, made it difficult to secure participation from hesitant agencies.

Rochester did not complete its planning documents until well into the second planning year. Order and technique were not primary concerns during most of the planning period. Like most submittals in all cities, problems as stated reflected the familiar urban litany. Substantive causal analyses were missing, as were in-depth statements concerning linkages among problem areas. Critiques of the delivery system were presented in most all functional areas, as were initial attempts to define priorities.

Five-year objectives and fiscal needs seemed consistent with the problem statement and anticipated projects. [15] Resident desire to control anticipated programs was illustrated in the assignment of sponsors to first year projects. Project descriptions varied by functional area. Some were quite detailed and clearly reflected a projected implementation strategy and work program; others suggested little more than an idea in the mind of the author.

The resident influence system was able to achieve visible responses from an array of local institutions concerning local non-Model Cities related planning issues (e.g. zoning changes, etc.). Innovation, as in the other systems, was defined primarily in terms of resident involvement. Resident dominated groups assumed the major role in determining how Model Cities funds would be spent at least until the very end of the planning period. Significant coordinative approaches were not a primary contribution of this system. Where coordinative processes took place, they took the form of adjustment (cf. p.57). Many relevant Model Cities agencies resisted involvement in the

[15]Such consistency was difficult to determine precisely, given the lack of concreteness and supporting rationale.

program because of its rather unstructured quality. Some apparently feared resident confrontation; others resisted involvement because of the tenuous commitment of city officials.

Very little evidence of resource concentration and mobilization was illustrated during the planning period. Supplemental funds composed by far the largest portion of projected first year action budgets.

RESIDENT DOMINANCE

Although not politically integrated, resident groups in Dayton were reasonably cohesive. They were able to "negotiate" a set of ground rules with City Hall which granted them a dominant role in the program. These ground rules, allocating planning responsibilities, were, despite or because of the tense local environment[16], endorsed by the chief executive who remained visibly involved and committed to the program.

Despite many threatening non-Model Cities related events, the working relationship between residents and the city stood up well. Both groups were able to withstand outside pressure without much difficulty. CDA staff were used primarily to service resident groups and act as brokers between such groups and public officials.

Since the resident group secured the dominant policy voice in the program, severe strain was put on the ability of the staff to involve agencies. Continued support by the chief executive of the program, however, permitted staff to gain some agency participation. Several agencies provided staff for resident task forces. Further, some encouraged Model

[16] City Hall's commitment to the program, unlike most cities where tension was visible, was high. The cohesiveness or strength of Model Neighborhood groups, unlike other cities where turbulence was a factor, was one of the primary reasons leading to this commitment.

City of Reading and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

City of Rochester and Model Neighborhood Area

Model Neighborhood Area
Central Business District

Cities resident groups to participate in their respective planning efforts, apart from Model Cities planning. A few even yielded to resident review of their proposed programs affecting the Model Neighborhood.

The resident group was more concerned with issues of control and involvement than with those related to planning processes and products. Substantive planning for them was a part-time activity. HUD's prescribed planning system had little meaning. Logic, order or priority definition were not prominent agenda items. Outside consultants were brought in ultimately, to translate resident statements of problems, goals, etc., into the required Federal format.

Dayton's submittal, like most, met HUD's requirements relative to form. Differences existed, however, with respect to content. Most problem areas received substantive treatment, and the city, unlike most, made a meaningful effort to distinguish between problems and their causes. Further, the local delivery system was subjected to a general critique.

The plan, however, purposely did not distinguish priorities among problem areas. As one resident put it, "everything was a priority." Part II, as in most cities, appeared to relate to the problem statement in only the most general way. It did *not* illustrate in all functional areas a clear relation to anticipated projects. While projects, with some exceptions, were reasonably well developed, budgets, as in many cities, lacked clear rationales or supporting data. Supplemental funds were emphasized in developing the projected pattern of first year expenditures.

The participants were neither deeply concerned with coordination nor resource mobilization and concentration. The primary coordinative technique used was adjustment (cf. p.57). Demands made by residents of agencies were usually arbitrated by the CDA staff and chief executive.

City of Dayton and Model Neighborhood Area

■ Model Neighborhood Area
   Central Business District

Agency willingness to participate directly, as indicated above, varied considerably over the course of the planning period. Usually it took the form of staff contributions to resident task forces. These staff members were able to transmit pertinent information on the program's progress to their parent agencies.

The resident group was clearly dominant. Staff were utilized chiefly to secure participation among recalcitrant agencies and legitimize resident defined products through authorship of formal documents. Resident involvement was the system's most visible innovation, and the changes of behavior of some existing institutions its clearest example of institutional response.

System Determinants

Several related factors appeared to influence if not determine the type of planning systems developed by the eleven studied cities. Some relate to specific components of the pre-Model Cities environment; others to characteristics associated with the role of the chief executive.

Pre-Model Cities — Planning Environment

Many characteristics associated with the pre-Model Cities planning environment in each city were defined during the course of this study. They included: (1) population size; (2) racial indices; (3) range and intensity of problems; (4) form of local government; (5) previous experience with Federal programs; (6) interest in coordinating local officials; (7) level of turbulence in the environment; and (8) nature of resident participation in public decision-making processes. Only the level of turbulence and the nature of resident participation in each city prior to and at the outset of the Model Cities program appeared to affect the type of planning system carried out by each of the eleven studied cities. That is, only these two factors, of those reviewed, helped explain why certain cities adopted one planning approach, and other cities another approach.

Turbulence—Intense and sustained tension among groups within the Model Neighborhood and between various groups and City Hall was a characteristic of the pre-planning environment in all but one of the staff influence cities, and in both the resident dominant and resident influence cities. Only a modest amount of turbulence was observed in parity cities while practically no turbulence was illustrated in the staff dominant city.

Intensive turbulence clearly suggested to most chief executives that they "think twice" about their role during the planning period. The pro-gram's uncertain dimensions and cloudy future when combined with a tense local environment, made the risks of visible and sustained City Hall participation seem to many local officials to be quite high. Conversely, the program's well advertised promise made the risks of complete non-participation also significant.

Most executives in cities where turbulence was a factor opted to "play" it down the middle. Where the residents related to Model Cities were not well organized nor able to speak for a large number of residents they would elect in most instances to maintain only a peripheral interest and involvement in the program (e.g. Gary, Detroit, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, Rochester). Their role when juxtaposed with a relatively weak resident base would lead to the development of a staff or resident influence system.

If the resident or resident dominated Model Cities group (or groups) was strong and reflected obvious community support, the chief executive would, given local tensions, understandably acquiesce in a major if not *dominant* role for this group during the planning period. Such acquiescence would not limit the direct involvement of the chief executive. His involvement, however, would be defined in brokerage terms. That is the chief executive would primarily act to maintain communication linkages between residents and public agencies.

Resident Involvement

There were in at least four of the eleven studied cities resident or resident dominated organizations in the Model Neighborhood prior to the inception of its program which were internally strong and which reflected widespread community support. In effect, they were *cohesive* organizations; their members shared many common objectives relative to the program, thus permitting them an ability to "speak with one voice."

NON-SYSTEM DETERMINANTS
Planning Process

		Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
		Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Characteristics												
Demographic												
Population	City	499,000	587,700	604,332	178,000	1,670,444	493,887	71,860	108,000	98,777	312,000	262,332
	MNA	47,640	114,000	75,745	20,500	169,833	75,000	19,460	16,000	7,947	36,000	42,343
% Nonwhite	City	45%	7%	16.8%	38.9%	29.0%	7.1%	20.2%	7%	4.8%	7.9%	21.8%
	MNA	68.2%	4.2%	52.4%	99.1%	52.7%	I:[1] 37.8% II: 1%	53.7%	NR	13%	33.1%	89.5%
% Spanish Surname	City	–	41.7%	–	–	–	NR	7%	–	NR	13%	–
	MNA	–	85.8%	–	–	–	I: 30.9% II: 19.7%	8.1%	–	2.7%	NR	–
Economic												
Median Income	City	$5,033,	$4,691	$5,605	$6,004	$4,069	$6,361	NR	$5,923	$5,453	$6,361	$6,099
	MNA	$3,564	$2,900	$4,000	NR	$3,873	NR	NR	NR	Min $3,000	NR	$3,167
% Unemployed	City	3.4%	5.3%	8.1%	3%	10.2%	4%	Wht 8% Blk 16%	4.1%	5.9%	5.4%	5.8%
	MNA	15%	(Orig. MNA) 8.8%	12.9%	6%	19.6%	8.1%	Wht 19% Blk 23%	5.7%	8.9%	14%	10.5%
Physical												
Substandard Housing	City	30.2%	22.1% (Orig. MNA)	31.0%	19%	6.4%	12.4%	11%	19.7%	14.4%	19.1%	14.4%
	MNA	71.8%	39.8%	43.8%	26%	26%	28.2%	25%	27.2%	27%	38.9%	28.5%
Social												
Infant Mortality	City	NR	2.6%	28/1000	3%	2.9%	28.2/1000	(County) 2.2%	3%	2.1%	16.2/1000	26.8/1000
	MNA	42/1000	(Orig. MNA) 2.7%	63/1000	3%	4.3%	NR	(Orig. MNA) 3%	4.4%	NR	18.1/1000	45.7/1000
Education	City	9%	51.1%	NR	22%	24%	12.9%	18%	15.6%	32%	41%	20.1%
	MNA	10.6%	83.2%	NR	41%	38%	27.5%	32%	27.2%	44.9%	73%	33.7%
Institutional												
Form of Government		Weak Mayor Council	City Manager	Weak Mayor Council	Strong Mayor Council	Strong Mayor Council	Strong Mayor Council	City Manager	City Manager	Commission	City Manager	City Manager
Citizen Participation												
Involvement of Residents Pre-Model Cities[2]		Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Weak	Strong
Pre-Model Cities Climate												
Movement towards Model Cities Objectives[3]		Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Negative	Positive

[1] Denver has two model neighborhoods.

[2] Field staff rated resident involvement prior to Model Cities as "strong" if there were visible resident groups in the Model Neighborhood Area, concerned with planning issues, which were cohesive and/or integrated. The terms "cohesive" and "integrated" are defined on page 11.

[3] Field staff rated cities as having a positive climate prior to the inception of Model Cities program if the chief executive in the city had articulated publicly and constantly a desire to establish "a coordinated planning framework, one involving agencies and residents, and one including environmental, social, and economic issues." Further, in order to be ranked as having a positive climate, the chief executive would have had to state publicly his commitment to and strong support of the new Model Cities program.

Their support in the Model Neighborhood permitted them to act without constant fear of attack from other organizations in the Model Neighborhood.

Presence of a cohesive organization allowed residents to negotiate with City Hall from a position of relative strength. Demands could be and were made by residents which required a response. Because resident cohesion generally occurred[17]in those cities where chief executives were involved from the outset on a sustained basis in the program, it was possible to discuss and agree on ground rules concerning HUD's planning criteria early in the planning period. Continued resident cohesion permitted these ground rules to be maintained until submittal of the plan to HUD.

A cohesive resident base led to development of either a parity or resident dominant planning system. If resident members of Model City related organizations were, or became, politically integrated, the city would achieve a parity planning system. Conversely, if residents were not prior to Model Cities and did not become during the early months of the program politically integrated, the city would establish a resident dominant system.

Where participating residents did not either prior to or during the Model Cities program, have easy access to City Hall on issues related to

[17]Generally those chief executives who assumed an active posture with respect to Model Cities were seen locally as "activists" with respect to programs apart from Model Cities. There appeared to be a coincidence in some cities between such activism and the strength of resident groups. That is, in several of the cities where chief executives were characterized as activists, resident groups were considered to be internally strong. Evidence exists to at least speculate that chief executive activism was a necessary but not sufficient condition for resident cohesion to exist in certain cities. As one resident suggested, "before the Mayor was elected we had no one at City Hall to talk to. Now we can negotiate with City Hall, . . . our organization can do something . . . ."

or apart from Model Cities, neither their experiences nor those of involved public officials lent support for parity ground rules. Residents in these cities sought primacy in Model Cities decision-making. City Hall granted their demands because of their visible strength (cohesiveness) and the turbulence of the environment.

Political integration of residents involved in Model Cities encouraged City Hall to look upon the sharing of decision-making in Model Cities as only an extension and not a major departure from pre-Model City decision-making processes. "After all," reported one chief executive, "residents were involved in select planning issues before Model Cities . . . Our Model Cities organization is not really that new." By the same token, political integration made it easier for residents to trust City Hall, and to see the value of their involvement as a partner in the program. Discussions with City Hall were reasonably free of abrasive rhetoric and quite direct. It was not an uncommon phenomenon to find that some public officials were residents of the Model Neighborhood.

While residents didn't "get all they wanted," in discussions with City Hall on non-Model City related issues, many at least felt that some of their requests met with a positive response. They apparently welcomed access to City Hall. "We needed," as one resident reported, "to keep City Hall in . . . so we can get needed funds. We have done it before, we can do it again . . . ."

A number of resident groups illustrated very little cohesion; and their members exhibited very little political integration. Staff or resident influence systems resulted when these two characteristics were coupled with minor or negligible chief executive interest in Model Cities. Planning ground rules concerning role assignments were difficult to develop since

Planning Systems	Degree of Turbulence	Chief Executive Involvement	Resident Characteristics
Staff Dominance	Low	Sustained	Non-cohesive Non-integrated
Staff Influence	High	Minimal	Non-cohesive[1] Non-integrated
Parity	Low	Sustained	Cohesive Integrated
Resident Influence	High	Minimal	Non-cohesive[2] Non-integrated
Resident Dominance	High	Sustained	Cohesive

[1]Chief executive involvement prior to resident cohesion.
[2]Resident cohesion prior to chief executive involvement.

neither City Hall nor residents were able or willing to set, or negotiate, them at the outset. If the residents became stronger and more assertive (characteristics associated with cohesion) faster than the chief executive became visibly involved and committed to the program, a resident influence system developed in the city. Staff, in these instances, served primarily to sanction resident articulated views concerning planning products. If the chief executive became involved earlier than residents became cohesive, or if neither resident cohesion nor chief executive involvement became a fact, then a staff influence system resulted in the city. Residents, in these instances, were primarily used to lend sanction to staff efforts.

A staff dominant system resulted when the resident group was not cohesive and the participating residents were not politically integrated. Sustained chief executive involvement, given the characteristics of the resident base, led to the creation and maintenance of ground rules providing staff with the major decision-making role. Residents were primarily used to legitimize decisions made by staff.

Role of Chief Executive

The role assumed by the chief executive[18]and/or his surrogate[19] was, as indicated above, related to the level of turbulence and the pre-Model City nature of resident participation. In turn, his role was a key system determinant. It, perhaps more so than any other factor, helped define the basic character of the planning process, the roles of staff, residents and agencies.

Table 3 suggests that the level of chief executive involvement varied over the course of the planning period in many cities. Only in staff dominant, resident dominant, and parity cities was there evidence of sustained chief executive participation in the program throughout the planning period. Mayors and/or managers in staff and resident influence cities became involved in the program only during select "crises," and specific time periods, or not at all. For example, in Detroit and Gary, both staff influence cities, the Mayors

[18]The term as used in this report refers to the chief political or administrative officer in the city.

[19]A senior aide to the chief executive who in effect is able to speak for the executive.

Planning Process

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Planning Period											
Application	O	O	O	●	O	△	O	△	O	O	O
Revision	O	O	●	●	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Initial Organization Period	O	●	●	●	O	O	O	O	△	O	△
Part I	O	●	●	●	●	O	O	O	O	●	O
Part II	O	●	●	●	●	●	●	O	O	●	O
Part III	O	●	●	O	O	O	O	O	△	△	O

KEY: ● Passive O Intermittant △ Sustained
The table illustrates the intensity of the Chief Executives' (or surrogates) involvement in the program. Classification is based on the number of events illustrating executive involvement in meeting various HUD planning requirements. A "passive" classification means minimal or no involvement; "intermittent" suggests episodic but frequent involvement; "sustained" portrays rather continuous involvement.

while obviously sympathetic to the program, were only visibly involved when resident-staff relationships became particularly sensitive; when internal problems associated with the resident group appeared to threaten the program; or when apparent HUD deadlines with respect to the *final* submittal were in danger of falling by the wayside. Similarly, in Rochester, the city manager played a very marginal role in the program. He became involved only when staff directly sought his intervention during a crisis period and near the very end of the planning period prior to submittal of the plan to HUD. In San Antonio there is no record that the chief executive (mayor or manager) was involved at all during the planning period.

There were also substantial differences in the nature of the roles assumed by chief executives. For example, in staff dominant cities, chief executives periodically directed CDA staff to act on issues related to Model City planning processes and product. Such executive orders were an uncommon occurrence in all other systems. It was much more common, particularly in resident and staff in-

fluence cities, for the chief executive to serve as an arbitrator. Only near the end of the planning period did he become a partisan on issues related to process or product. The chief executive in the resident dominant system chose to act primarily as a broker linking residents and city agencies. He was able to reduce the potential for friction between residents and City Hall inherent in this system. Chief executives in parity cities were, perhaps more than in any other system, direct and frequent participants in the planning process.

The chief executives of parity, resident dominant, and staff dominant systems were able to provide visible public support to the program immediately upon initiation of the planning period. They helped to validate early CDA activities; to in effect grant the *new* organization status at City Hall and in the community. Further, their continuous interest and participation in the program facilitated the establishment and maintenance of ground rules with respect to different planning roles assigned residents, staff, and agencies. In parity cities, rules

and subsequent roles, as indicated earlier, assured the residents of equality with respect to decision-making; in resident dominant cities they allowed residents to assume the major planning voice; and in staff dominant cities, they provided staff with the primary planning role.

Mayors and city managers did not in staff and resident influence systems lend the program the mantle of official respectability. Absence of a firm and willing client at City Hall limited the ability of the staff to define relevant relationships with agencies and residents. Subsequently, ground rules concerning roles of CDA staff, agency personnel, and residents were at best open-ended, and at worst non-existent during most of the planning period. Efforts to develop and implement a planning work program were viewed as residual activities by most participants. Negotiations concerning roles continuously took precedence over substantive planning efforts.

System Characteristics and Non-Characteristics

DEFINITION OF ROLES — A SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC

Alternate roles played by the chief executive when combined with varying characteristics associated with residents were among the primary factors determining the different ways CDA heads, staff, and residents functioned during the planning period.

CDA Head:

Four roles were assumed by heads of CDAs, sometimes together, sometimes singularly or in various combinations during the planning period. They include the role of: (1) director; (2) manager; (3) broker; (4) secretariat. Each is operationally defined below:

Director (Staff Dominant System) — CDA heads were able in some cities to mandate, or prescribe with reasonable expectancy of response, select work program and product components for sustained periods of time.

Manager (Parity System) — CDA heads were able to manipulate relevant Model Cities participants in some cities for sustained periods of time in order to secure definition and implementation of process and product components.

Broker (Resident Dominant System) — CDA heads were able to function for sustained periods of time as an intermediary between various Model Cities relevant groups or individuals.

Secretariat (Staff and Resident Influence System) — CDA heads were able to act as service agents for Model Cities related groups for sustained periods of time. Their prime function was not a substantive one. Rather, they would provide related groups space for meetings, secretaries, and resource people, etc.

ROLE OF CDA HEAD
the Planning Process

Planning Period	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Organization	◆	○	○	○	◆	○	●	○	◆	○	◆
Part I	△	○	○	○	○	●	●	△	△	○	◆
Part II	△	○	○	○	○	●	●	△	△	○	◆
Part III	△	△	●	●	△	●	●	●	△	●	◆

KEY: ○ Service   △ Director   ● Manager   ◆ Broker

INVOLVEMENT OF THE CDA HEAD
Planning Process

Planning Period	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Organization	○	●	●	●	●	○	△	●	△	●	○
Part I	○	●	●	●	●	○	△	○	△	●	●
Part II	△	○	○	○	○	△	△	△	△	○	○
Part III	△	○	○	△	△	△	△	△	△	△	○

KEY: ● Passive   ○ Intermittant   △ Sustained

ROLE OF STAFF
Planning Process

Planning Period	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Organization	●	○	○	○	○	▲	▲	○	●	○	◆
Part I	●	○	○	○	○	▲	▲	●	●	○	◆
Part II	●	●	○	●	●	▲	▲	●	●	▲	◆
Part III	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲	▲	▲¹	●¹	▲	◆

KEY: ○ Service   ▲ Technician Advocate   ◆ Broker   ● Technician

¹Staff in Cambridge were responsible to a Resident Dominated Board. During Part III, agency staff were involved and in effect became advocates for their own agencies. Staff in Reading were, throughout the planning process, able to function as technicians. The citizens had their own staff.

While, as indicated, all CDA heads played all four roles, one role was primary in each city. Only the roles of director and manager permitted the heads of the CDA to guide the planning process for lengthy periods of time and to contribute significantly to its content.

Minimal chief executive involvement combined with a weak resident base impeded assignment of ground rules defining planning responsibilities. CDA heads by necessity were required to play a service role during at least the initial months of the planning period. As one head put it, "I could not go out in front of my Mayor or the residents . . . . Why should I get my head chopped off?" Conversely, chief executive support of and involvement in the program combined with a strong resident base, permitted development of ground rules allocating to CDA heads, broker or manager functions. He became a broker where residents after negotiating with City Hall were granted the dominant role in planning; he became a manager where residents after negotiating with City Hall were granted a parity role in planning. His role as broker was dictated partly by resident distrust of City Hall and partly by the desire of the chief executive to assure at least minimal participation in the program by public agencies. His role as manager was premised on the fact that he had two clients -- City Hall and the resident group.

Only where the lack of a strong resident group was combined with continuous chief executive involvement in and support of the program were ground rules developed permitting the CDA head to function primarily as a director and order select segments of the planning process and product. Lack of a cohesive or politically integrated resident group granted the head a relatively free hand; presence of chief executive support gave him discretionary options relative to the use of his own staff and involvement of other personnel besides his staff.

His planning environment was a controlled and limited one.

Staff:

The role assumed by the staff was directly related to the role played by the head of the CDA. If the CDA head functioned primarily as a director, staff were able to act primarily as technicians; on the other hand, if the CDA head was primarily a manager, staff were able to add resident advocacy to their technical role. Finally, staff were confined to a broker or service role where the heads of their respective CDAs were also limited to fulfilling primarily these same roles.

Technicians (Staff Dominant System) — Ground rules which permitted the head of the CDA to function as a director also permitted staff to function primarily as technicians. They had a firm client in the chief executive, who supported their activities. They dealt with a resident group which accepted legitimization as their primary role. Very few events, given the support of the chief executive and the type of resident involvement, interfered with the ability of CDA staff to respond to HUD's process and product requirements using previously acquired technical skills.

Technician-Advocates (Parity System) — Ground rules in at least four cities allocated to the heads of CDA the role of manager. They also required staff to assume an advocacy role in addition to their technical or professional role. Advocacy was premised on the fact that staff like the CDA head served in these cities two clients -- City Hall and resident groups. While the presence of firm clients permitted staff to function in part as technicians, acknowledgement of a resident or resident groups as one of these clients necessitated staff assumption at times of resident views where these views differed with public agencies. It also required staff to "share" decisions with resi-

dents concerning process and product. Advocacy was necessary in order to retain credibility with residents. It was endorsed by the heads of the CDA to help develop consensus with respect to substantive planning activities; by chief executives in order to maintain agreed upon planning ground rules.

Broker (Resident Dominant System) — If the head of the CDA, because of ground rules providing a cohesive resident group with a dominant planning role, served primarily as a broker, his staff was required to play the same role. Staff functioned primarily as intermediaries between resident groups and public agencies. They helped legitimize resident efforts.

Service (Staff Influence or Resident Influence Systems) — Absence of firm ground rules, emanating as indicated above, out of minimal chief executive support and a weak resident base forced both the staff and the head of the CDA to function primarily as a secretariat during the early months of the planning period in several cities. Only when the pressure of HUD's deadlines were seen as threatening or when the signals from either the chief executive or residents became stronger could the staff and/or head of the CDA actively enter the planning process in any other role.

CDA staff, fulfilling primarily a service or broker function, were unable to initiate planning events (on other than an ad hoc basis) during most of the planning period. They were also unable to maintain a continuously high level of involvement in the planning process during all but the final phases of the planning period.

Conversely, CDA staff assuming a technician or technician-advocate role were able to initiate planning activities early in the planning period and maintain a high level of involvement throughout the planning period.

Professionals were ultimately responsible for completion of Parts II and III in all cities, and Part I in most cities. This was to be expected, given the complexities associated with HUD requirements. Yet, generally, the roles assigned staff governed the nature of their impact on submitted products. For example, if the staff were able to function primarily as technicians, they provided the major content contributions. Conversely, if the staff were technician-advocates serving, in effect, two client groups (resident and city), resident impact on the final plan was more in evidence.

Residents:

Substantive planning efforts could receive only residual attention in most cities until negotiations between residents and City Hall led to at least an initial definition of the role residents were to play in planning. Sometimes these negotiations were free of long periods of contention (e.g. Atlanta, Richmond, Denver, Reading, Cambridge); other times they continued on an intermittent basis over many months and were interspersed with abrasive rhetoric (Pittsburgh, Detroit, Rochester). More often than not, they involved primarily issues of form (e.g. how many residents would sit on a board) rather than issues of content (the functions residents would fulfill with respect to precise planning assignments). In many cities, issues important to but not directly related to Model Cities planning activities became the battleground upon which resident-city officials fought over respective roles (e.g. Concentrated Employment Program program in Denver and Dayton; staffing the General Neighborhood Renewal Program in Rochester, etc.).

Where the chief executive was involved at the outset of the program and remained involved during the initial months, the negotiating period was noticeably shorter and the dialogue noticeably less contaminated with non-essentials. The chief executive was able to speak for the city or

PRIMARY ROLES IN DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence	Parity							Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Planning Period											
Writing of Draft											
Part I	◇	◇	◇	◇	△ [2]	●	△	◇	◇	△	◇
Part II	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇
Part III	◇	◇	◇ [1]	◇	◇	◇	◇	△	◇	◇	◇
Development of Content											
Part I	◇	△	●	●	●	●	△	●	△	●	●
Part II	◇	◇	◇ [3]	◇	◇	◇	◇	◇	△	◇	◇
Part III	◇	△	◇ [3]	△	△	△	△	△	△	△	●

KEY: ◇ Staff   △ Shared   ● Residents

[1] Agencies provided primary staff input.
[2] The "shared" classification indicates generally equal contributions from CDA staff and residents.
[3] Agencies heavily involved in development of programs.

permit his surrogate to speak for the city. Commitments could be made and were made sufficient to assign roles.

Where the chief executive was only minimally involved, the dialogue in most instances took longer; and in some instances remained a constant throughout the planning period. Similarly, where the chief executive was only minimally involved, the dialogue was often punctured more frequently by strident tones. No one at City Hall would accept the responsibility for making and maintaining an agreement. Neither, since chief executive non-involvement often coincided with resident weakness, could anyone in the neighborhood apparently easily speak for and bind the residents. As a result, no boundaries were placed on city-resident dialogue.

Resident participation in decision-making varied in all cities over the course of the planning period. Among the eleven cities, several role patterns emerged, however. They include:

Legitimization (Staff Dominant System) — Lack of cohesion and political

integration among residents in Atlanta when combined with continuous and visible chief executive involvement produced a set of ground rules, supported by the chief and acceptable to the residents; limiting the role of residents primarily to that of endorsing city submittals.

Negotiations between the city and the residents relative to role assignments were brief and reasonably free of tension. Their substance primarily concerned representation on boards and not what the boards would do. Residents generally served to legitimize staff work throughout the planning period.

Sanction (Staff Influence System) — Lack of cohesion and political integration among the residents juxtaposed with minimal chief executive involvement denied some cities the ability to forge ground rules relative to planning. "No one was able to commit anyone to anything . . . . ." Resident leaders were constantly challenged inside their groups; public officials or community leaders rarely knew the negotiating position of City Hall. Discussions relative to roles were always lengthy and many time abrasive.

They were rarely conclusive. Firm planning assignments were not present for most of the year. Neither residents nor staff were able early in the planning period to initiate substantive planning events, nor control the response to HUD's planning process.

Resident cohesion in these cities was ephemeral during most of the year. Only when clear supportive signals emanated from the chief executive, or HUD's deadlines seemed to compel action, were staff able to develop and complete a work program. Yet, absence of a firm client at City Hall encouraged staff to record to the extent possible resident views in written submittals. [20]

Staff, even though they ultimately played the most "influential" role in defining the planning process and product, felt it necessary to at least attempt to secure resident review of interim and final products. They wanted to secure resident sanction of their efforts with respect to planning. In a very real respect, residents in these cities became the staff's client group.

Shared (Parity System) — Visible and continuous chief executive support when combined with a cohesive and politically integrated resident base permitted negotiations between City Hall and residents concerning the role of each to be relatively free of tension, brief and conclusive. Agreed upon ground rules granted residents the right to assume a shared role *equal* to staff with respect to planning. That they exercised this right was clear. Staff served two clients — — City Hall[1] and the resident group.

---

[20] HUD's guidelines as defined by leadmen and the general turbulence in the environment also supported staff efforts to conform planning products to resident views.

[1] Reading provided a unique situation. Here CDA staff clearly saw City Hall as the client. Parity developed, however, because a strong resident group was able to hire its own advocate staff.

Influence (Resident Influence System) — A cohesive resident base developed in Rochester before chief executive support became visible. Because of this, residents provided the major influence on planning processes and products. Staff in turn, without chief executive support, were confined to a service role during the early months of the planning period. Only when residents in effect became the staff's de facto client could the staff assume the role of technician or technician-advocate. Even then, however, their prime efforts were related to translating resident views into language consistent with Federal language. They sanctioned the efforts of residents.

Dominance (Resident Dominance System) — Residents in Dayton clearly dominated on-going planning processes. They were able to define work program components and control the implementation of these components. Their role resulted primarily from the fact that they were able to negotiate with City Hall, in a very turbulent environment, from a position of strength. Although only a few members of their organization had experience prior to Model Cities in dealing with City Hall, their organization was internally strong and reflected considerable support in the neighborhood. Continued chief executive support of the program combined with resident distrust of CDA staff led that staff to assume the role of broker. They were used chiefly to link a suspicious resident group with suspicious agencies.

Agencies:

Agencies' representatives on resident dominated boards generally "took a back seat" during the planning period. Most preferred to "let the residents" run the show. Hesitance to actively participate in policy discussions or content reviews was, on the part of most, a strategic or conscious decision. Many assumed that active participation would increase resident

Planning System	Defining Factors Leading to Resident Role	Resident Role	Definition of Role
Staff Dominance Atlanta	Chief Executive Involvement Non-cohesive, non-integrated resident base Non-turbulent environment	Legitimization	Resident endorsement of plan
Staff Influence Pittsburgh Gary Detroit San Antonio	Evolving chief executive involvement Non-cohesive, non-integrated resident base Turbulent environment	Sanction	Resident review of plan; staff efforts at conformance
Parity Denver Reading Cambridge Richmond	Chief executive involvement Cohesive, integrated resident base Non-turbulent environment	Shared	Shared responsibilities relative to plan
Resident Influence Rochester	Minimal chief executive involvement Evolving resident group cohesion Turbulent environment	Influence	Residents primary voice in developing plan
Resident Dominance Dayton	Chief executive involvement Cohesive resident base Turbulent environment	Dominance	Residents controlling voice in developing plan

distrust, in that "residents would feel pros were dominating the process." Others feared that active participation would "increase the chances" of resident-agency confrontation concerning supposed agency delivery system problems. Some preferred to exercise their influence through other vehicles (e.g. "on-loan staff," the chief executive or city council) rather than in a public arena.

Generally, agency or agency dominated boards were used to review already completed documents. As indicated earlier, the fact that members sitting on these boards had been involved peripherally in the planning process made their reviews perfunctory. Indeed, in at least two cities, Denver and Reading, inter-agency structures created at the beginning of the year withered away by the end of the year.

On-loan staff provided the most meaningful agency contribution to the program. In most cities, roles assumed by on-loan staff were no different from roles assumed by the permanent, newly-hired staff. In all cities, they were able to extend the capacity of core staff.

Several cities were able to secure sustained staff assistance from more than one agency. These were all cities in which chief executive support for the program helped grant the CDA staff early status. Agency assistance in all the other studied cities was selective and intermittent. In most, chief executive support for the program was minimal. Consequently, staff leverage in negotiating with agencies relative to the use of their personnel was minimal.

No consistent pattern emerged when comparing which agencies were involved in all eleven cities. Indeed, the only agency that was consistently involved in most cities was the City Planning Department. Reasons given for agency non-involvement were similar. Staff shortages and related budget limitations were listed by many. Perhaps as important, some agencies apparently refused to participate because they viewed Model Cities as not particularly relevant to their interests. They saw the program as: (1) a "threat" to established operating procedures and client relationship; and (2) leading to unnecessary resident critique.

Consultants:

No pattern emerged among the eleven studied cities with respect to the use of consultants. They played a major role in at least four of the eleven studied cities. These cities each had different characteristics with respect to the role of the mayor, nature of resident group, role of staff and residents.

To the extent that there was any general direction to the planning program in San Antonio, it came from the consultant who was able to spend a few days a month in the city. Atlanta used consultants primarily to help conceptualize the work program and provide data in several relevant functional areas. They were also involved indirectly in producing a study of economic development needs. In Denver, consultants were used to "organize" the resident component of the program. They were also used for evaluation purposes and to provide assistance to resident task forces. In Dayton, consultants were used to translate resident ideas into HUD's prescribed format.

Consultant contributions to many CDA programs were limited because of: (1) the inability of CDA staffs to "direct" their work program; (2) the "in and out" nature of consultant assignments; and (3) the apparently endemic problems faced by professionals in relating well to resident groups.

Federal Government:

The Federal government was supposed to carry out several specific roles. First and foremost, HUD, being the administrative agency, was to provide the overall planning guidelines, monitor each city's progress, and provide technical assistance through leadmen. [2] Groups like the RICC[3] and Federal city teams were created to broker and provide technical assistance. They were also to review CDA planning processes, as well as products. Individual Federal agencies were in turn going to extend relevant technical assistance; make traditional ways of reviewing grant applications more flexible and responsive to local needs; identify (and allocate) fund resources; and join in the review and monitoring effort.

Technical Assistance—Federal technical assistance was not a significant factor in cities. Because of their extended responsibilities, RICC members, with some notable exceptions, spent little time in most of the studied cities. Their lack of knowledge of the context within which cities were initiating planning processes combined with their generalist skills limited their usefulness.

City teams showed up as events in only two cities (San Antonio and Richmond). In both instances their role was primarily ceremonial. Their members could not, primarily because of their backgrounds, really help cities with respect to planning process problems.

Only HUD's leadmen were able to offer assistance on more than a limited basis for long periods of time. Generally, they were often the most visible if not the only symbol of "continued Federal interest in the city." Their direct ties to HUD per-

---

[2] Staff assigned to HUD's Regional office, responsible for maintaining liaison with participating Model Cities.

[3] Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee.

mitted them to at least offer what appeared to CDAs to be knowledgeable interpretations of guidelines. Their ability to visit cities frequently seemed to make their "advice" in most instances relevant to local needs. Many were able to criticize, prod and cajole the "locals" with respect to various aspects of the planning process. Most of their efforts, however, were limited to form rather than content; to timing rather than technique.

Many CDA heads felt that the leadman was an "extended member" of their staff. He was, in the words of one, "our advocate in the Federal government"; in the words of another "co-opted . . . ."

RICC members and HUD's leadmen were able to from time to time "broker" technical assistance. That is, they were able to secure assistance from various Federal agencies in specific areas of concern at specific times. For example, two HUD specialists were sent into Atlanta to help that city define priorities among problems and objectives. Likewise, various functional specialists were "sent in" to many cities during the last months of the planning period in order to assist CDAs to develop projects and link projects to categorical programs.

Although not uniform, many CDA heads viewed functional technical assistance with mixed feelings. Those who were sent in generally arrived, according to many CDA heads, with little understanding of HUD's planning requirements, never mind the local context within which cities were responding to these requirements. Further, and perhaps more important, those who were sent in seemed at times more prone to "protecting" their respective department's relationship with traditional client groups than working with the CDA. As one CDA head put it, "we get an ounce of technical assistance . . . but a . . . lot of subversion." Finally, most CDA heads reacted negatively

to what they thought was the apparent unwillingness of Federal agencies to amend administrative criteria adhering to categorical programs in order to accommodate locally developed first year action projects.

The sporadic nature of Federal intervention often skewed agendas and work programs. The end result of such intervention in some instances left many in the involved communities rather disappointed. Perhaps the best example appeared in Richmond. Here the CDA enthusiastically began to design an income maintenance scheme after being encouraged to do so by one Federal official. Soon after, they were "turned off" by another Federal staff member. In a similar vein, the numerous seemingly unrelated efforts by HUD during the latter months of the planning period to motivate cities to "speed up" the planning process often led CDAs to change direction and modify locally developed planning schedules. To many CDA heads, these modifications disrupted local efforts at meeting HUD's initial planning requirements.

Planning Guidelines—All eleven cities had difficulties in interpreting HUD's many and varied planning requirements. Their tasks were not made easier by the general inability of Federal officials, particularly HUD's, to be "specific" concerning some of the more open-ended planning guidelines. Interpretation of Federal guidelines by Federal officials varied by region, personality and time period. This proved particularly troublesome in such related sensitive areas as resident involvement, use of delegate agencies and submission dates. Federal rhetoric, originally quite general, appeared to several CDAs to grow over the course of the year increasingly directive. Local commitments made to certain groups often had to be amended or in some cases broken to meet new or "refined" guidelines or interpretations of guidelines.

RICC Reviews—Formal RICC reviews of Part I[4] occurred in five out of the eleven cities. CDAs were generally asked to modify or amend their documents subsequent to RICC sessions. RICC sessions during the initial planning period were perceived, in some communities, more as a "hurdle" to overcome than as an exercise in technical assistance. Evidence suggests that this perception was perhaps more right than wrong. RICC participants, as described earlier, were rarely knowledgeable about particular cities.

Product reviews seemed devoid of contextual understanding and were often perfunctory in nature. Equal time was certainly not given to a review by RICC members of structure, process and performance components of HUD's planning system. Indeed, many members concentrated primarily on the review of their "department's" section of the report.

Securing Other Federal Funds — Cities where early chief executive involvement permitted the head of the CDA or his surrogate to initiate planning related events during the initial months of the planning period did better than others in securing additional Federal planning money. Because these funds, however, were often designated for specific functions and routed to select sponsors, the "coordinative task" of the CDA was not made any easier. Further, many times Federal funds promised early in the planning year did not arrive until the planning period was almost over.

Evidence of Federal earmarking or fund reservation during the planning period with respect to most categorical programs was absent. Even HUD did not, to the consternation of many CDAs searching for precise resource definitions, allocate supplemental funds until well into the planning year.

[4]The statement of problems, goals, and program approaches was called Part I.

DEFINITION OF STRUCTURE —
A NON-SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTIC

HUD's guidelines concerning structure were not precise. For example, while HUD clearly favored a new planning organization, the department did not in their written documents mandate such an organization.

Similarly, while HUD sought a planning organization that was both responsible to the chief executive and reflective of resident views, the exact nature of this organization and its relationships to City Hall and the residents were left open to local determination. Finally, while a wide range of relevant agencies were supposed to be involved in Model Cities planning, no specific regulations relative to agency inclusion in or relationships to the planning organization were presented by HUD to the city.

Cities whose planning processes, products and performance achievements were different, undertook quite similar steps to develop their Model Cities structure, and to secure staff. They also illustrated some of the same characteristics with respect to location of the CDA; the CDA's relationship to other groups; the organization and size of resident groups; and the organization of non-resident groups. Conversely, cities whose planning process, products, and performance achievements were similar, illustrated different steps and characteristics with respect to the same factors.

Developing Structure

Cities were permitted to develop a Model Cities structure appropriate to their own needs. That they did so was clear. Local discussion and/or debates pertaining to structural issues were concerned primarily with form and not content. That is, cities more often than not debated representation issues and not issues related to, as one CDA head put it "what the organization or structure would do."

Cities became concerned with their projected Model Cities organization, and its relationship to the chief executive, agencies and residents during the application period. Most issues related to authority and distribution of responsibility, however, were often not raised at this time because the relevant individuals or groups were not involved in the drafting of the application. Those that were raised were generally left unresolved because of a preference on the part of the writers either to "move ahead" in order to meet deadlines, or to leave the "final decisions" up to future participants in the planning process.

In only two of the eleven cities studied, Richmond and Cambridge, were residents able to secure during the application period agreements from the city concerning their projected relationship to the CDA. Neither residents nor agencies in all other cities were able to translate the often explicit organization proposals illustrated in the application into meaningful role assignments.

Cities did not make basic changes in their applications during the waiting period. HUD's grant announcement together with the often all-encompassing discussion paper commenting on local applications, however, led to moves in most cities to amend and "fill in" the organization format. Almost without exception, HUD's discussion papers asked cities to respond to questions concerning coordination and resident participation. HUD's questions, however, rarely were prescriptive as to structure. Their prime impact was to place HUD in the role of advocate for, what up to that time had been in most cities, a rather silent group of agencies and residents.

The specific response of cities to HUD's request for clarification and revisions concerning resident participation issues varied from city to city. No consistent pattern emerged, even among cities ultimately utilizing the same planning system. Denver, a parity city, for example, pleaded for time. That is, the city did not want to define resident relationships to the new CDA structure or the resident structure precisely until "residents themselves could be involved in the process." Reading, also a parity city, however, agreed to increase resident representation on select boards, as well as their proposed interim resident council. Detroit, a staff influence city, and Rochester, a resident influence city, pressured by resident groups, adopted resident initiated or compromise plans for the citizen participation structure. Richmond, a parity city, merely confirmed agreements that had been "in the works" prior to the submission of the application. Gary, a staff influence city, agreed to develop an interim citizen participation group. This group would "participate" in initial planning and develop a permanent structure.

HUD questioned the way the proposed CDA would be related to City Hall in four cities: Rochester, Pittsburgh, Gary and Reading. In the first two, CDA ties to Urban Renewal Agencies were questioned by HUD [5] while in Gary the Department sought to move the CDA out from under the Planning Department and into the Mayor's office. Reading's projected CDA was troublesome to HUD in that it involved two different levels of government — — city and county.

"Negotiations" between HUD and City Hall were initiated in all four cities. HUD's posture in each instance seemed different. Rochester and Pittsburgh were able to persuade HUD that their respective Urban Renewal Agencies would not subvert

---

[5] According to HUD, Urban Renewal Agencies, because they are limited functional groups, would have difficulties initiating proposed comprehensive planning requirements; and, because they are quasi-independent, would not meet HUD's requirements concerning chief executive responsibility and resident involvement.

the planning process. As a result they were able to retain the format described in their application. Reading and Gary were required to amend their proposed structures. In the case of Gary, the CDA was made administratively responsible to the Mayor; in the case of Reading, the county withdrew as a formal partner.

HUD deadlines, combined with a local desire to keep local options open made development of a firm set of ground rules defining authority and responsibility during the revision period quite difficult. As a result, reference to structure in application revisions submitted to HUD were more often than not quite general in nature. In all cities, the level and type of participation of various individual groups and agencies were not described with any degree of precision. Words like "advise," "review," and "initiate" were utilized indiscriminately to describe the powers of various parts of the proposed Model Cities organization. Cities rarely tied specific organizational components to proposed work program tasks, or to specific review and approval requirements projected for the planning period. Only Cambridge utilized a public ordinance to create its CDA. Even here, the ordinance did not describe precise working relationships among the boards, staff and participating agencies.

Securing Staff

CDA's took longer than HUD or local officials anticipated to organize themselves. Although a majority of CDA heads were selected either before or shortly after the HUD grant announcement, at least two were hired only after their city was well into the planning period. Similarly, cities had difficulties securing staff. Personnel promised by several agencies during the application or revision phase were not always provided at the beginning of the planning period. Staff shortages, lack of interest, and/or fear of resident confrontations were identified by agency officials as

the factors limiting their contributions. According to CDA heads, hiring new staff was made difficult because of restrictive civil service regulations, city desire not to "go out in front of residents," low salaries, and a "lack of available talent."

Only one CDA apparently had its full staff by late spring 1968.[6] The majority of the CDAs did not achieve this state until well into the summer of 1968, almost three-quarters of a year after the grant award. At least two CDAs had to wait until the spring of 1969 to bring staff up to initially planned levels.

The Head — Seven CDA heads were directly selected by either the mayor or manager of the cities studied. One was chosen by a resident-dominated policy board. Three were knighted by personnel committees. Two of these committees were dominated by non-residents while the third was dominated by residents.

Several criteria seemed endemic to *all* cities when choosing among different candidates for CDA head. Ability to "get along" with the chief executive was perhaps the primary consideration in all cities — — even those cities which ultimately initiated a resident influence or resident dominant system. Although varying in importance from city to city, other qualifying characteristics included: (1) potential acceptability among residents; (2) potential acceptability internal to City Hall and wider community. All cities attempted to secure as

heads persons whose professional background qualified them to meet what they thought would be Model City demands. City planning degrees, perhaps indicative of the initial perceptions of the program held by many, was the apparent dominant academic qualification sought by most cities.

Four of the eleven heads were black; six, white; and one, Mexican-American. Four had backgrounds[7] in renewal (three of these also had planning training); one came from a planning department; two from administrative and political backgrounds; and one each from management consulting, real estate, and personnel administration. One was a former CAP director. Nine were in their 30's and 40's, one was in his late 20's, and one in his 60's. Five held masters degrees in city planning or urban design; all had bachelor's degrees. Eight of the eleven heads chosen had some experience with the program during the application phase. Three had directed the preparation of the application, and four others were staff members in the application period. One worked on the application as a resident.

The Staff — Staff hiring procedures differed from city to city, but did not appear relevant in distinguishing planning approaches. For example, in Denver and San Antonio, the staff selection process was relatively free of "outside influence." Yet, in Gary and Detroit the mayors selected at least the assistant head without consulting the CDA head. Remaining staff appointees were also subject to the "influence" of City Hall in these cities. A resident personnel board shared the authority of appointment with the head in Pittsburgh; and in Richmond and Atlanta specially created personnel boards composed of public officials and residents screened candidates for most staff

[6]Again, no consistent pattern emerges when examining the timing associated with acquisition of a full complement of staff. For example, while two of the parity cities had hired staff by spring or early summer, the other two had to wait until fall before a full complement of staff was available. It is possible to relate "extreme" hiring conditions to system characteristics. For example, two cities — one a staff and the other a resident influence city — were the only ones whose initial staffing patterns were not complete until more than a year after the award. No ground rules were available at the outset to these cities, permitting decisions to be made relative to staff.

[7]The race or background of heads appeared to have little or no relationship to the method of selection.

TIME TO REACH 50% OF TOTAL CDA STAFF

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Time Period											
Summer 1968	✓	✓				✓	✓		✓		✓
Fall 1968			✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	

SELECTION AND RACE OF DIRECTOR COMPARED TO MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD POPULATION

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Director Chosen By	Personnel Committee	Manager	Personnel Committee	Mayor	Mayor	Mayor	Personnel Committee	R.D.P.B.	Mayor	Mayor	Manager
Race of Director	Black	Mexican-American	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	White Black	White	White
Dominant Minority	Black	Mexican-American	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	NR	Black	Black	Black
Percentage of Dominant Minority	69%	86%	52%	99%	53%	I:[1] 38% II: 20%	54%	NR	14%	33%	90%

NR: Not Recorded
[1]There are two model neighborhoods in Denver.

SIZE OF PROFESSIONAL MODEL CITIES STAFF[1]

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Permanent Newly Hired Staff	9	14	11	5	8	8	6	5	10	7	3
On-loan: Full-time	13	2	-	-	4	-	3	2	2	3	-
Part-time	10	2	2	1	-	18	2	6	8	1	9
Percent Newly-hired of Total Full-time	41%	87%	100%	100%	67%	100%	67%	71%	84%	70%	100%

[1]CDA records concerning staff, particularly on-loan and part-time staff, were often imprecise. This table reflects the "best" estimate of the largest number of CDA personnel at any one point in time during the planning period.

appointments. City managers in both Rochester and Dayton provided the dominant voice in selection of personnel. Policy boards, one resident-dominated and the other public official-dominated, were the ultimate employers in Cambridge and Reading respectively.

Permanent professional staff ranged in number from 3 in Dayton to 14 in San Antonio.

On-loan agency personnel constituted a varying percentage of permanent staff. This percentage ranged from 15% in Pittsburgh to 75% in Dayton.

Most CDAs, reflecting a reading of HUD's guidelines, organized their staff on the basis of functional and/or broad areas of concern. Five of the eleven CDAs, however, never did develop a formal internal structure —— perhaps because they were relatively small. Personnel simply operated as a single core staff.

CDA Location

Four of the CDAs (i.e. the core staff) at the inception of the planning period were administratively responsible to the mayor; three to the city manager; one to a multi-source resident-dominated independent policy board; two to an Urban Renewal agency; and one to a "citizen board" composed of the City Commission. Only in the case of one city did the formal responsibility of the CDA change during the course of the planning year. In Rochester, the CDA, initially responsible to the Urban Renewal agency, was shifted to the manager's office after some few months of the planning period. This was done primarily at the request of CDA staff who felt that closer ties with the manager would lend support to that city's program at a crucial time in its existence.

CDA Relationship to Other Groups

All CDAs, once created, were to formally involve several other groups in the planning process. Generally, they fell into five categories: resident boards; resident-dominated boards, including agency and citizen members; agency boards; agency-dominated boards; and public boards including representatives of agencies, citizens and special interest groups. The specific number of these groups ranged from over eight in Reading, a parity city, to two or three in Cambridge and Richmond, also parity cities.

All eleven cities provided slots for citizen representatives[8] on one or more of their formally structured groups. Further, in at least three cities, some of these slots were assigned to people supposedly reflecting the views of specific interest groups in the city as a whole, such as labor, private industry, and religious groups. No city, however, created an independent organization reflecting only special interest groups.

Resident Organization

Six of the cities studied held elections to select resident members of resident-dominated or resident boards. Other methods were used, including petitions (Reading); mass meetings or conventions (Atlanta, Richmond, Rochester); and staff, group or consultant selected individuals (Denver, San Antonio).

Four of the cities had large resident membership organizations; in Pittsburgh more than 500 people were involved; in Detroit more than 100; and in Denver more than 200. In Atlanta a minimum of 200 residents

[8] Citizens were individuals representing city-wide political or special interest organizations. Residents were individuals living in the Model Neighborhood representing themselves or groups in the Model Neighborhood.

turned out for each of the five Mass Conventions. The other seven cities had much smaller boards or committees. Total membership ranged from 25 in Cambridge, of which 16 were residents, to 60 in Gary, of which 40 were residents.

Many resident boards or resident-dominated boards utilized smaller working committees (variously called steering committees, planning committees, etc.) to maintain "day-to-day" contact with staff and participating city agencies, etc. The function of the large groups was principally limited to review and ultimate approval. They sanctioned the work of their members participating in small working groups. Only in Cambridge, Richmond, Reading and Rochester was there evidence to suggest that the parent bodies participated, directly and fairly constantly, in decisions related to the plan.

The resident-dominated board in Cambridge, once organized, created a limited number of task forces oriented toward broad problem areas[9]. In all other cities, resident or resident-dominated groups, in order to meet what they perceived to be HUD's planning guidelines, developed task forces to undertake planning responsibilities in each defined problem area.[10] Indeed, in Pittsburgh and Atlanta, a set of functional task forces was initially set up for every sub-area within the Model Neighborhood. Area-wide (Model Neighborhood) functional task forces were created to coordinate these decentralized groups.

Attendance varied throughout the year with respect to all task forces in each city. Only, however, when "crisis" issues (i.e. urban renewal, etc.)

[9] Economic, social, and environmental.

[10] Health, manpower, housing, environment, transportation, justice, etc.

were discussed were there really large numbers of residents present.

The decentralized (sub-district) nature of the task forces in Atlanta and Pittsburgh led to spotty staff coverage and little continuity between sessions. In Reading, task force sessions suffered from their "open-endedness." As one official indicated, "Everyone could attend and often they did." Conversely, no one had to attend and often meetings were sparsely populated. Consistency of attendance was rare and agendas often totally absent.

Many task forces in Denver, Rochester, Richmond and Dayton were quite productive, once they were organized and given a defined work program. Professional assistance as well as resident leadership was available, and attendance was formalized at least to the extent of noting membership. Several task forces in each city were able early in the planning period to affect the actions of local departments on relevant problems facing residents. In doing so, they helped to both build their status as planning groups, and retain resident interest while neighborhood problems were being defined.

Task forces in Gary, San Antonio and Detroit met with mixed results. Those groups with sustained technical assistance were able to order their internal priorities and contribute to development of the CDP. Conversely, those without such assistance were not able to make their impact felt.

In most cities, resident participation in the program reflected the racial and ethnic composition of the Model Neighborhoods. They tended, however, to be less representative in terms of age or militancy. Only Denver made a specific effort to recruit militants. Pittsburgh made a special effort to involve the young. Unlike the experience of the poverty program in many communities, the

Model Cities program was not dominated by women; in fact there was a tendency in most cities to involve more men than women. No special efforts appear to have been made in the eleven studied cities to secure the continuous involvement of the aged.

Reading, Cambridge and Dayton provided "independent professional staff" to resident or resident-dominated boards. CDA personnel, or on-loan staff from other agencies, or CDA-contracted staff, were the only sources of assistance to these same boards in the other eight cities.

Non-Resident Boards and Technical Pools

Public, agency, and agency-dominated boards were assigned review responsibilities in a number of cities. Unlike the resident groups, most did not organize themselves initially around functional or broad areas of concern, preferring to meet when they did as a core group.

Difficulties associated with securing continuous agency interest and participation, related in part to agency resistance to the program, reduced the effectiveness of boards which included many agency representatives. Only in Atlanta, Reading and Denver did these agency or agency-dominated boards participate extensively in the program. Only in these three cities did they achieve de facto approval responsibilities relative to the plan.

Several CDAs, among them Denver, Gary and San Antonio, created a formal technical pool of inter-agency representatives as a component part of their Model Cities structure. These groups were to provide technical assistance to residents and/or CDA staff. Difficulties again in assuring full-time participation on the part of agency personnel and professional-resident distrust limited their contribution.

DEFINITION OF PROCESS - A SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC

Cities were asked by HUD to develop their planning submittals according to a certain order, within specific time periods, utilizing specific techniques. These process requirements were perceived locally as being tough ones, given difficulties faced by most cities in operationally defining the roles of, and relationships among Model Cities participants. Indeed, the planning process often became locally relevant, not because it was thought necessary to develop a better plan, but because decisions related to who would do what, when, and how were helpful in defining ground rules and turf.

Order and Timing

Most CDAs, once organized, were unable to spend much time on substantive planning efforts during the early months of the planning period. They had competing agenda items, including as indicated earlier the need to get organized; hire staff; and define locally appropriate linkages with City Hall, agencies and resident groups.

No CDA, if the 45-day revision period is included as part of the planning period, was able to complete its plan or product within a one-year period. Some CDAs, however, did better than others. For example, CDAs whose heads primarily functioned either as a director and/or manager, and whose staff were permitted to function as technicians or technician advocates, were generally able to begin the planning early in the planning period and finish their submittal in 12 - 14 months. Conversely, CDAs whose heads assumed the roles of broker and/or service agents, and whose staff filled similar roles, were not able to begin planning until well into the planning period. Most took longer to finish their documents.

All of the eleven cities began Part I before Parts II and III. Parts II and III, except in Cambridge and Gary, were completed simultaneously, often at the same time revisions were being made to Part I. Cambridge's planners allocated the major amount of their time to Part III. Part II was clearly an afterthought, while Part I received marginal attention. Gary's staff viewed Part II as a residual work program component. As in Cambridge, it was finished after completion of Parts I and III.

Linear Development

No CDA in the eleven city sample was able to develop HUD's product requirements in linear fashion. Even the logic implied in the fact that most cities were able to initiate Part I before Parts II and III was more symbolic than real. For example, problem analyses were rarely followed by studies of causes and the development of objectives. In most cities, resident involvement in problem definition led to the juxtaposition of problems and programs. Identification of causes, goals and program approaches were, with few exceptions, either treated as an afterthought, omitted entirely, or remained the province of staff.

Technique

CDAs, given the varied tasks in front of them, had problems meeting HUD's implicit and explicit technical guidelines. Again, CDAs whose heads were able to function as directors and/or managers and whose staff assumed the role of technician or technician advocates, seemed to be able to do marginally better with respect to meeting the different demands for use of planning techniques than CDAs whose heads and staff were brokers or service agents. They were better able to allocate a significant amount of time and expertise to the development and initiation of alternate planning methods. Further, they were able to mount a controlled planning process, one in which staff could initiate, rather than respond to, most events. Their roles and clients were clear. Ground rules permitted them to spend time on techniques.

Preparation of Part I

HUD's requirement to define problems in a comprehensive manner was perceived by CDAs as necessitating a problem statement in most functional problem areas. Except for a review of already existing studies and use of resident surveys, no special techniques were used to ascertain these problems. All but Cambridge [11] assigned functionally oriented task forces the prime responsibility for problem definition. Development of such task forces later impeded determination of priorities and interrelationships between and among problem areas. Each task force became protective of its assumed turf. "Why,"as one chairman put it,"is health any more important than employment . . . All our needs are important . . . We have been working at this all year long."

Most CDAs felt a need to find a way to elicit a resident response to Model Neighborhood problems. Apart from resident surveys, most techniques initiated were primarily directed at encouraging resident-staff dialogue. They included retreats, one or two day conferences, workshops, task force meetings, and general board sessions.

No specific technique can be said to have worked better than others. For example, while task forces were less than productive in Pittsburgh and Atlanta, they were quite productive in Denver, Richmond, Rochester and Dayton. Similarly, while retreats worked in Denver, they were not too successful when used in other cities. Successful techniques as reported earlier depended on the presence

[11] Cambridge created only three task forces, each covering a broad area of concern.

THE PLANNING PERIOD

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence		Parity						Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Total Months	13	17	19	19	14	14	13	13	13	23	15

Other activities than planning were certainly going on during the time referred in this table. The table records, however, when planning efforts related to HUD requirements began and when they ended.

of: (1) sensitive staff assistance; (2) continuity among resident participants; and (3) strong resident leadership. Substantive results could only be assured if residents felt that they were playing a meaningful role in the planning process. Early development of ground rules acceptable to residents generally made their participation in development of Part I easier to secure and much easier to maintain.

Efforts to achieve linkages between functional problem areas, analyses of causes of problems, and a definition of goals and program approaches were usually made only by staff. Several cities, particularly those illustrating staff dominant and parity characteristics attempted to use a variety of analytical techniques, including: (1) matrix analyses; (2) scalar ratings; and (3) resident surveys. That these cities were able to engage in such efforts on more than an ad hoc basis reflects the fact that their staffs were able to function primarily as technicians or technician advocates.

A few cities made meaningful efforts to quantify goals in more than a limited number of problem areas, and establish precise time limits for achievement of goals. The standard technique used by most, however, was merely to state that a particular "problem" in the Model Neighborhood would be reduced to city-wide levels within the life of the Model Cities program.

Methods related to the development of data varied from city to city. Just under half of the cities conducted resident surveys. The majority relied on existing studies for facts to back up the perceptions of problems, etc. held by staff and resident members of boards and task forces. Only a small number of cities seemed able to succinctly define their data needs, and integrate the collection of data with other work program components. Even fewer cities could make appropriate use of data once secured by staff and/or residents. Only in cities where staff acted as technicians or technician advocates was there evidence of clear strategies concerning the use of data.

A few CDAs merely used staff to "polish up" statements from residents, while others re-wrote and/or freely amended resident perceptions concerning problems, etc. Close coincidence between resident views and final drafts of Part I appeared to occur in cities where staff functioned primarily as technician advocate, brokers or service agents (or, conversely, where residents were assigned parity, dominance or influence roles).

Preparation of Part II

Similar patterns appeared in each city's efforts to develop objectives, and fiscal needs tables. First of all, no city estimated objectives and needs against a realistic understanding of resource and institutional constraints. Techniques were not available to project local resource availability and only the roughest estimates could be made of anticipated Federal funds.

FUND SOURCES FOR PROJECTS:
First Year Action Projects Involving Supplemental Funds

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence		Parity						Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Funds											
Number of Programs	72[1]	38	34	11	41	29	38	22	43	16	18[2]
Supplemental(%)	74.41	55.00	76.40	57.40	61.34	43.47	46.90	15.25	17.44	89.62	72
Categorical(%)	(25.59)[3]	32.51	20.31	(42.60)	(38.66)	54.26	33.30	78.00	55.14	–	28
Other(%)		12.49	3.29			2.27	19.80	6.75	27.42	10.38	.83

[1] Two projects show 2-year budget only.
[2] Five projects involving supplemental funds are alternate budgets.
[3] No differentiation between categorical fund sources and other fund sources.

No city weighed the "benefits and costs" of alternative program approaches before settling on objectives. Objectives were generally defined using a "step down" technique. That is, CDA staff would intuit a five-year objective from a broad statement of a goal. In some cities (e.g. Detroit, Reading, Cambridge, Denver and Atlanta) a more inductive technique was used by the CDA staff. They would build up to a five-year statement from already-accepted first year action programs.

Fiscal needs tables resulted from the combined use of "guesstimates" and, where relevant, service unit cost ratios. No extensive or lengthy analyses were undertaken by any city.

Part II was seen in all cities as primarily an effort to meet HUD's requirements, rather than an essential part of the planning process. In no city did it serve as a framework within which programs could be developed or resources allocated by the CDA. In no city did residents contribute heavily to its preparation.

Preparation of Part III

Linkages between program development, problem, goals, and objective definition in many cities resulted more from after-the-fact editing than before-the-fact scheduling of methodologically oriented planning events. Yet in several cities, particularly those instituting parity systems, where staff were permitted to function as technicians or technician advocates, planned efforts were made to assure coincidence between problem analyses and first year action programs. Techniques used by staff included matrix analysis and problem and priority ratings. In each city where task forces provided appropriate dialogue, resident planners were also able to assist in linking stated problems and goals to programs.

Their intuitive groupings of problems and program approaches provided staff with data, for the most part impressionistic, to support select programs.

Programs and budgets emanated from a number of sources, including agency-City Hall staff, Federal personnel and residents. All CDAs, as indicated earlier, began the process of project identification during the problem definition phase of the planning period. Generally, CDAs were not able to finally decide upon a precise list of projects and/or the precise content of projects until near the end of the planning period.

Generally, resident contributions with respect to programs came during development of the problem statements and/or the final review of the documents prior to submittal to HUD.

Resident proposals were often translated directly into first year action projects in cities like Reading, Richmond, Cambridge, Rochester, Denver, and Dayton. These were cities where residents achieved parity, influence, or dominance.

Staff in Gary, Detroit, and San Antonio tried to have their proposals conform as closely as possible to articulated resident needs. Staff in Atlanta and Pittsburgh tried to express what they felt to be resident priorities.

Program development and budgeting understandably was not a "scientific exercise," given Federal time pressures and uncertainty concerning the availability of Federal and local funds, in most cities. Very rarely were any specific techniques used in program development other than "brainstorming sessions." Resident, agency and chief executive reviews resulted in the addition, revision or dropping of agency, staff, or staff and resident- drafted programs, particularly in Cambridge, Denver, Gary, and Rochester. Budgets in many cities were last minute exercises, unsupported by strategies for implementing them. Only when the program had "been around for some time," or costs were subject to ready unit breakdown, were budgets tight.

Techniques used to allocate supplemental funds varied considerably from city to city. "Cut and fill" processes dominated most local efforts. That is, lack of real Federal technical assistance and certainty with respect to the use of categorical programs often made the division between categoricals and supplementals an exercise in wishful thinking rather than "tough" probabilities.

Only where state and local agencies were enmeshed in program development was extensive use of categorical programs projected in the plan. Several cities, among them Denver, Rochester, Reading, and Atlanta, at-

tempted to develop a systematic approach toward identification of allocation priorities. Most used simple program rating systems. Various criteria were used by staff and/or staff and residents in defining program priorities. For example, one city ranked all projects against such criteria as short-term and long-term impact, area versus city benefits, etc. Symbolic of the feeling of "turf" created in most resident task forces in all cities, the agreed-upon allocation formula in Rochester provided each resident task force with at least a threshold level of funds for "their" programs. Staff in other cities generally made certain that each functional area received some program money. Cambridge and Dayton did not accept priority definition as a legitimate function. In their view, all resident needs had the same priority.

DEFINITION OF PRODUCT —
A SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC

Cities responded to HUD's product requirements in different ways. Yet, certain patterns emerged when comparing the response of all eleven cities. For example, submittals from CDAs whose heads were either directors and/or managers, and whose staff functioned as technicians and technician advocates, came closer to HUD's over-all product requirements than submittals from CDAs whose heads and staff functioned as brokers or service agents. Similarly, only where residents were granted a parity, influence, or dominant role, did submittals contain tough critiques of local institutions.[12]

Part I: Content

Problem Analysis—Most cities, some for the first time, presented what might be called comprehensive problem analyses. That is, they "covered" most, if not all, of the functional areas defined in CDA #4. Cambridge departed somewhat from the functional approach, grouping their discussion of problems under a broader subject area.

Problem areas were not treated alike by all cities. No consistent pattern emerged except that local priority determination was not one of the major factors influencing extent or depth of analysis. More important, it seemed, were either the particular interests of involved individuals (e.g. Dayton), the impact of select agencies (Pittsburgh), and/or the strength of respective task forces (Denver and Rochester).

Many cities had trouble completing a clear statement of the causes of problems. Most submittals did not separate deficiencies of services from other causes. While almost all cities made "passing" reference to delivery system problems, a tough critique of existing institutions was limited primarily to cities where residents were granted parity, influence or dominant roles. Generally, traditional indicators of social problems rather than criticisms of agency services commanded primary attention.

Program Approaches, Goals and Strategies—Local definitions of the phrase "program approaches" varied considerably. All cities found it difficult to separate approaches from strategies and/or programs. A number of cities —— Dayton, Rochester, Detroit, San Antonio and Pittsburgh among them —— presented approaches in terms seemingly more appropriate to goals than basic ways to achieve goals.

Most cities did not translate their goal statement into measurable terms. Those that did generally did so only for some functional areas. Rarely were goals and program approaches presented in terms of discrete strategies and priorities. Reading portrayed, perhaps, the most complicated system in that they developed and described a mathematical model to assist in determining problem and resource allocation priorities.

Linkages Statement—HUD's concern for linkages became an ephemeral agenda item in almost all cities. The use of many task forces and/or time constraints obviated easy analyses of such linkages. A few cities attempted to prepare matrices descriptive of such linkages, but their efforts were more symbolic than analytical. Final products contained general statements concerning probable linkages between and among problem areas rather than "hard" analysis of such linkages.

COMPARISON OF PROJECTS
First Year Action Projects Involving Supplemental Funds

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
Functional Area	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Economics[1]	15	3	7	1	6	1	2	3	3	3	3
Environmental[2]	15	8	5	3	18	8	18	7	28	4	4
Social[3]	42	27	22	7	17	20	18	12	12	9	11

[1] Economic—Projects or activities directed at job training, job development, or business growth.
[2] Environmental—Projects or activities directed at housing, renewal, rehabilitation or improving general amenity.
[3] Social—Projects or activities directed at services to residents.

CDA ASSIGNMENT OF DELEGATE AGENCIES—FIRST YEAR PROJECTS

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
Type of Agency	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Percent Administered by Existing Public Agencies	61	71	32	27	78	59	84	100	95	13	56
Percent Administered by Existing Public and Private Agencies	89	92	85	33	88	72	92	100	98	31	61

EXPENDITURES FOR CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL FACILITIES
(First Year Action Projects Involving Supplemental Funds)

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
Funds	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
(000) Capital Facilities	$5,297	$11,258	$590	$150	$10,355	$5,041	$1,859	$2,222	$5,532	-0-	$1,226
Non-Capital Facilities	$6,270	$10,058	$6,855	$3,779	$14,488	$6,022	$2,737	$4,909	$843	$2,862	$2,266
Capital Facilities % of Total	46	53	8	4	42	45	49	31	87	-0-	35

Part II: Content

Objectives and Fiscal Needs—Tables on fiscal needs and five-year objectives did not supply the deductive framework within which programs could be rationally developed, or serve as links between problem analyses (Part I) and programs (Part III). Tables presented were difficult to comprehend; figures provided were rarely supported with detailed rationales.

Part III: Content

Projects—No consistent pattern emerges when comparing the total number of projects submitted by each of the eleven cities. As indicated in the table on page 48, the number ranged from eleven in Gary to 72 in Atlanta.

Only 17.44 percent of the total amount of funds projected as needed in Reading would come from supplementals, while 76.40 percent of needed funds would come from the same source in Pittsburgh. Apparently those cities which were able to involve more agencies in the planning process for sustained periods of time were cities which anticipated greater use of categorical program funds.

Project program budgets range from $3 1/2 million in Dayton to nearly $25 million in Detroit.

The general character of each city's list of projects was quite similar. For example, social service oriented projects clearly were dominant in all cities except Detroit, Reading and Richmond. Conversely, economic development projects were not, in most cities, prime candidates for attention.

Capital facilities, as opposed to service or transfer payment- directed efforts, consumed over 50 percent of the total budget in only two cities — — Reading and San Antonio. The previous table illustrates the breakdown for all eleven cities.

A number of programs appeared endemic to the majority of the eleven communities. These included, for example: (1) housing development corporations; and (2) health clinics.

Projects submitted in Part III were, in most cities, often presented in outline form. Narrative descriptions of programs often consumed less than two pages; in more than one city less than a few paragraphs. Only in the submittals from cities where staff functioned primarily as technicians or technician advocates was there evidence of consistent linkages between problem analyses and proposed projects. Differences in the level of analyses contained in project descriptions submitted by each city, and the consistency between these project descriptions and HUD's content and format requirements was, however, not a sharp one. For example, all cities were able to meet certain of HUD's content and format requirements, and not others. Some CDAs which presented fairly precise statements of project strategy, neglected to prepare complete definitions of project descriptions. Many cities providing data related to program starting dates and timetables, did not provide information concerning the proposed organization of projects.

Five cities presented information "suggesting" that for at least 90 percent of the programs delegate agencies were either secured or negotiations with such agencies were in process. Yet only three cities submitted planning schedules for more than 50 percent of their programs. Although funding sources were listed for over 75 percent of the proposed programs in six cities, these sources were very often categorical programs. No evidence — — understandably, given the lack of early allocation by Federal agencies for program funds — — was generally presented confirming the availability of such funds. Similarly, while several cities presented completed budgets for over 75 percent of their programs, their

figures were only infrequently supported by an easily understood (and supportable) rationale.

All cities except Gary, Rochester, and Pittsburgh indicated primary reliance on existing public or private agencies rather than new entities as delegate agencies. Indeed, only 26 projects out of the total of 380 proposed by all eleven cities depended on new resident organizations for implementation. Only one city granted to resident groups responsibility for implementation of more than 25% of their defined projects.

DEFINITION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA —
A SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC

Performance criteria made up, as indicated on page 10, the fourth component of HUD's planning system. Cities were asked to develop a coordinated and innovative planning system, one that involved residents in a "meaningful" way; one that induced local institutions to improve their delivery of services (including planning) to the residents of the Model Neighborhood; and one that led to mobilization and concentration of resources. No measurable benchmarks relative to each performance criteria were presented to cities. Neither were they provided with discrete definitions of the various terms. Instead the criteria appeared as normative, open-ended imperatives. Each city was, in effect, left to seek its "own level," its own definition of the various performance criteria. Each did so.

Coordination

Concern[13] for coordination was not pervasive or all-encompassing in most CDAs. In Atlanta, for example, conscious efforts at coordination primarily occurred internal to the CDA, and were reflected in work program strategies. In several cities — — among them Dayton, Rochester, Cambridge, and San Antonio — —

interest and activity in defining coordinative approaches was episodic and primarily limited to functional areas of concern and a few participants. Coordination was a postponable agenda item in several cities, particularly when it was perceived of as interfering with resident involvement (e.g. Gary, Rochester, Pittsburgh), or product development and submission schedules. Indeed, in some cities, coordination never really became a constant agenda item (San Antonio, Gary, Detroit).

In all four staff influence cities — — Gary, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, and Detroit — — coordination was primarily defined in terms of the "absence of inconsistency." Occurrence of this result, whether related to processes or products, was for the most part due to "happenstance." No sustained formal or informal means were utilized to develop purposeful interactions between relevant Model Cities participants. Minimal chief executive involvement and staff direction, combined with a "weak" or divided resident group, provided few opportunities for consistency to occur, or common strategies to develop, except by chance. Participants, more often than not, adapted to the actions of others.

More conscious efforts at developing a "coordinated" framework, one that would involve residents and agencies in producing consistent Model Cities planning processes and products, were observed for lengthy time periods in parity cities like Denver, Reading, and Richmond. In all these cities, the establishment of formal and informal ground rules early in the planning did much to facilitate

---

[13] Coordination efforts were initiated for strategic reasons in several cities. That is, many CDAs wanted to achieve specific objectives — — objectives often not directly related to the Model Cities planning process (e.g. control of CEP in Richmond and Denver; review of non-Model Cities funded projects in Reading, Denver and Richmond; review of public housing practices in Cambridge.)

development of purposeful, and at times sustained, means to achieve interaction among staff, residents, and agencies. These rules defined various roles, allocated planning functions, and established routing systems relative to review and sign-off processes.

Coordinative efforts, no matter how sporadic, were facilitated through acknowledgement of a range of shared purposes or objectives with respect to the program. Dialogue, negotiation, bargaining, and at times contention, were the prime means used to develop conscious interaction between relevant non-staff participants in most cities.

Several specific techniques were used by cities to achieve coordination. All cities, for example, attempted to secure coordination of relevant participants through structure and structural relationships[14]. Agency and residents were joined in single boards in at least six cities, while residents and agencies were accorded independent status in most other cities.

Review processes served as coordinative devices in most cities, particularly during development of Part I. These processes were particularly utilized by resident and resident dominated boards in Reading, Denver, Richmond, Dayton, and Rochester; parity, resident dominant, and resident influence cities. Conversely, they were rarely visible in Atlanta, the staff dominant city, and many of the staff influence cities. In the case of Atlanta, staff assumed strategic planning responsibilities with both residents and agencies used primarily for legitimization; while in the case of Pittsburgh, Detroit, Gary, and San Antonio, staff were unable to

---

[14] Structural relationships would serve to facilitate coordination if the chief executive was committed to, and involved in the program. Structural relationships, no matter how seemingly appropriate, were of marginal import without chief executive commitment and involvement.

provide a sustained framework within which dialogue relative to process and product could take place among relevant participants or would-be participants.

Direct agency participation in review processes was, in most cities, limited. Part II was, in all cities, an inside product and not subject to coordinative devices. Part III was subject to a detailed review of content by non-staff people in only Richmond, Denver, Rochester and Cambridge.

All CDA's staff made an effort to "share" information about the program with other participants. But information channels, except where heads of CDAs were directors or managers, were generally fragmentary and haphazard. They were almost non-existent in cities like Detroit, San Antonio, Gary and Pittsburgh.

Most times information distribution occurred at meetings of Model City boards. Those boards that were playing a major role were kept reasonably well informed; those boards that accepted a peripheral role were not provided with up-to-date information. Generally, resident-dominated or resident boards were in the former category, while agency or agency dominated groups were in the latter category.

On-loan staff were used to "route" information to select agencies and resident groups in several cities, as well as undertake specific assignments. Maximum use (numbers and intensity of use) of on-loan staff occurred in Atlanta, Richmond, Denver and Rochester. Cambridge and Reading used such staff on an intermittent basis. Pittsburgh, Detroit, San Antonio and Gary used on-loan staff on only a limited basis.

On-loan staff participating in the program helped assure that the outlook of their parent agencies would be brought to bear on Model Cities planning. Conversely, their participa-

tion helped at times to facilitate development of a Model Cities perspective in their respective agencies. In other words, co-option was often a two-way street.

No city secured staff from the whole spectrum of relevant agencies.[15] In some cities, specific contracts were used between the CDA and agencies to achieve desired processes and products (e.g. Reading).

Alternative Types—Three coordinative models emerged from a study of the eleven cities. They were: (1) the directive or fiat model; (2) the adjustment model; and (3) the adaptation model. Their basic characteristics are briefly outlined in the table below.

Sustained chief executive involvement appeared particularly important in the adjustment and directive models. This involvement lent support to those involved in coordinative activities. Lack of such support, as was the case in Pittsburgh, Detroit, Gary, or San Antonio, denied legitimacy to the planning process, particularly in the minds of agency participants. As a result, coordinative actions occurred infrequently. When they did, they relied for their success on the often absent goodwill of the participants.

A cohesive resident or resident-dominated group was a requirement of the adjustment model. Availability of such a group when complemented by chief executive involvement, facilitated the use of dialogue as a coordinative device. Planning issues (process or product) could be discussed and agreements made between residents, agencies, and CDA staff.

Mobilization and Concentration of Resources

HUD asked participating cities to mobilize as well as concentrate available resources in the Model Neighborhood. Mobilization was interpreted locally to mean initiation of efforts to secure more funds for the Model Neighborhood; while concentration was generally defined in terms of initiation of efforts to use available resources (new or existing) in a defined geographical area for defined projects.

Federal inability to identify with any degree of specificity available categorical programs impeded city efforts to anticipate aggregation of Federal resources in the Model Neighborhood, apart from supplemental funds. Yet, all four parity cities, perhaps because they were able to involve more agencies than other cities, estimated that a sizable portion of their total budget would come from categorical program sources. All other cities in all other systems projected far less reliance on categorical program fund use.

Cities projecting extensive use of categorical programs also projected either a larger local contribution to total first year action budgets than other cities, or more extensive commingling of supplemental-categorical funds; the former example illustrating evidence of mobilization of resources; the latter possible concentration of resources.

Most cities, reflecting in part what was seen as HUD's initial emphasis on "being comprehensive," proposed a rather large number of projects,[16] covering a rather large number of locally defined functional problem areas. Environmental and social concerns rather than economic development problems, clearly, re-

	Environment	Process	Frame of Reference
Types			
Directive			
Atlanta	Ground rules Agreed upon purposes Chief executive involvement	Mandate or Fiat	Synoptic
Adaption			
San Antonio Pittsburgh Detroit	Minimal ground rules Minimal agreed upon purposes Minimal chief executive involvement Varied resident base	Chance	Ad-hoc Functional
Adjustment			
Denver Richmond Cambridge Reading Rochester Dayton	Some ground rules relative to roles Some agreed upon purposes Chief executive involvement Strong resident base	Review Negotiation Bargaining Contention	Functional

ceived most local attention. Most expenditures, consistent with the statute and law, were projected [17] for use in the Model Neighborhood.

HUD's maintenance of effort criteria restricted local government from projecting diversion of scarce local resources to other areas of the city upon receipt of Federal funds. Although the increase is often imperceptible, estimated local expenditures for the Model Neighborhood constituted in most cities, after the initial planning period, a larger proportion of total city budgets than before Model Cities. Similarly, specific examples existed in most cities of agencies projecting expenditures related to capital or operating budgets which directly resulted from their participation in Model Cities planning efforts.

Although some cities like Atlanta and Richmond were noticeably successful in involving various representatives

of the private sector on specific planning assignments for various periods of time, most cities had minimal success, given competing agenda items and time problems, in securing commitments relative to the use of private resources in the Model Neighborhood. Except for mortgage loan money in a few cities, very little non-public money was projected for use in the Model Neighborhood during the first action year.

Resident Involvement

Resident involvement varied in kind and degree internal to cities and among cities over the course of the planning period. For example, only in three cities (Reading, Richmond and Pittsburgh) were residents actually involved [18] during the development of the application. Only in two of these (Reading and Richmond) were

---

[15] Agency participation varied by city. No consistent pattern emerged among or between cities.

[16] The number, as the table on page 48 illustrates, ranges from 11 to 72. Cities at the lower range often grouped several projects together.

[17] Cities could legally spend money outside the boundaries of the Model Neighborhood if such expenditures benefited residents in the Model Neighborhood.

[18] Involvement is defined in terms of structure and process. That is, residents were classified as being involved if the structure created for preparing the application specifically included residents as members during the process of development, and their roles went beyond service as legitimizers of staff prepared work.

they able to function in other than a review capacity.

Involvement during the waiting and revision period was minimized in most cities. In every city the actual preparation of modifications in the application and responses to HUD's discussion paper rested with staff. Resident participation, when it occurred, primarily concerned questions related to representation and assignment of roles. Issues, such as how many residents would serve on boards, how they would be chosen, and what they would do, occurred between the city (or the application preparation group) and supposed resident spokesmen or groups in Detroit, Cambridge, Richmond, Reading, Pittsburgh, San Antonio and Atlanta. Only in Detroit and Pittsburgh did issues involve lengthy public contention.

De jure veto was granted the policy boards in Cambridge,[19] and the resident board in Detroit [20] at the outset of the planning year. Resident-dominated or resident boards in all other cities began the year with the right to advise but not consent. They ended the year either because of their growing strength, and/or because of the city's felt need to legitimize their submittal, in all instances, with at least the nominal right of approval.

Resident or resident-dominated groups had difficulties in initiating substantive planning activities in all cities. Difficulties were experienced with greatest intensity in cities where staff assumed a passive posture and

[19] Several commentators have defined Model Cities structures in terms of uni-and bi-cameralism. These terms are misleading in that the relationship between resident or resident-dominated groups and city, neither at the outset nor at the end of the planning year, were analogous to a legislature. Roles varied and shifted between and among groups; structured relationships many times did not suggest actual responsibilities.

[20] Agreement between city hall and residents in Detroit came after the application was submitted by the city.

service role with respect to counterpart resident groups, i.e. Atlanta, Rochester, Pittsburgh, Cambridge, San Antonio, Gary and Detroit. Staff withdrawal was understandable, given the level of resident suspicion and hostility towards professionals and City Hall. The net result, however, was slow progress combined with considerable overlap and duplication in work efforts.

Resident interest in attending to their own immediate agenda items, rather than HUD's or the staff, postponed or delayed work on Part I in several cities. These items ranged from removal of coal piles in Rochester and Reading to restrictions on liquor licenses in Gary. They provided to participants the necessary symbols, if not the substance, of power. "Victories," when they occurred, testified to the relevance of respective resident organizations and helped secure neighborhood backing. As important, staff advocacy of resident positions in some cities served to narrow the observed gap in several cities between residents and professionals.

Most of the sustained resident involvement in substantive planning came during development of Part I. But the process was neither linear nor easy. Residents in all cities would jump from a definition of problems to proposed programs. Goals, strategies and program approaches were "fill in" assignments for staff.

Resident-initiated problem analyses were generally highly personalized. Moreover, they were more often than not related to tangible, discrete incidents, events, or individual perceptions. Generally, it was left to staff to generalize from the particulars and to "data-rize" the process. Only in five cities -- Denver, Richmond, Reading, Rochester, and Dayton -- were resident or resident-dominated groups involved at all in precise priority setting relative to resource allocation (supplemental funds). These were all cities in which residents assumed either a parity, influence, or

dominant role.

Resident determination of priorities was a difficult enough task, given the all-encompassing nature of perceived needs. It was made even more difficult by the almost all-pervasive use of functional task forces. These groups developed a sense of "turf" which impeded discussion of priorities among problem areas or programs.

Resident participation in the formal development of Part II was non-existent in all cities. Development of five year objectives and fiscal needs not only appeared to be a technical task but it was considered an irrelevant one by most residents. Their needs were immediate.

Resident contributions to Part III came in most cities during development of Part I. That is, resident discussions concerning problems quickly led into discussion of programs. Staff duly noted resident perceptions concerning progress, and tried in most instances to "record" them.

Pressure to complete Parts II and III obviated direct resident involvement similar to their role in Part I (task forces, dialogue) in almost all the cities. Surprisingly, relatively little tension developed between residents and staff during this period in most cities. Residents' participation was apparently sufficient enough during Part I to allow residents to "acquiesce," although in some cases begrudgingly, to staff requests to speed up the planning process with respect to Parts II and III. Indeed, trust between residents and staff which had developed where resident boards had their own staff or the CDA staff was perceived by residents as technician-advocates, permitted the CDA to move ahead with reasonable alacrity to complete HUD's products in several cities.

Pittsburgh and Rochester were two obvious exceptions to the general set of observations stated in the previous paragraph. Each city was different, however. In the first, Pittsburgh, lack of ground rules let to public airing of even the most minor technical issues. A few CDA staff members used residents as their "troops" in constant battle with other staff. Competing resident groups, a CAA jealous of its prerogatives, and weak CDA direction did not help the situation. Stridency became a necessary strategy for some merely to avoid palace revolutions. Rationality was not easy in this environment.

Rochester did not have as turbulent or complex an environment as Pittsburgh. Like Pittsburgh, however, the resident group had to contend with militant groups not linked to Model Cities, and a CAA not completely tuned into Model Cities. Resident participants were constantly under attack for "selling out" to the city. Only their direct involvement protected their legitimacy.

All resident or resident-dominated groups, as indicated earlier, were able to achieve de facto review and approval powers concerning the final submission to HUD. These powers were exercised in different ways in different cities. Only in Denver, Richmond, Rochester, Cambridge and Dayton, however, were reviews more than perfunctory exercises. These were cities in which residents achieved parity, influence or dominant roles during planning.

Resident or resident-dominated groups were, where they had achieved parity, influence, or dominant roles, able to review on a continuous basis select agency projects proposed for the Model Neighborhood Area. Generally, right of review over non-Model Cities projects was achieved with the acquiescence of the chief executive and the support of the staff. The right of review became part of the ground rules, sometimes written, sometimes not, lending visibility and strength to the resident group. Staff advocacy of resident positions in these instances facilitated bridging the void which existed between staff and residents.

Institutional Change and Innovation:

Cities participating in the Model Cities program were asked to use the planning period to "change" the response of local institutions to the problems of the Model Neighborhood. They were also asked to develop planning processes and products which represented an innovative approach to meeting the same problems.

Both of these requests were identified by HUD as performance criteria. Like coordination and resident involvement, institutional change and innovation were presented as open-ended, undefined criteria. Quantifiable indices with respect to various possible achievement levels were not presented by HUD and were not easily amendable to development by respective cities. Both criteria were difficult to translate into hard strategies and work program components. Implicit in each was a critique of the way cities had conducted their affairs previous to Model Cities.

Basically, the request for institutional change reflected an acknowledgement that cities had not developed effective means to meet the needs of their residents, particularly the poor. Similarly, the quest for innovation implied at least a Federal dissatisfaction with what steps cities were taking in reacting to the range of their economic, social and environmental problems, particularly again, those evident in areas occupied by the poor.

Despite the lack of a measured standard against which to identify and rank approaches to institutional change and innovation, it is possible to describe general "sets of experiences" in the eleven study cities. For this purpose, institutional change was defined in terms of conscious agency departures from pre-Model Cities delivery systems, if these departures were aimed specifically at improving the agency's ability to better meet the needs of the Model Neighborhood. Similarly, innovation was, for the purposes of this analysis, described as that which was new to the city and relevant (based on local perceptions) to local needs in the Model Neighborhood.

Innovation—All cities had difficulty in identifying a locally relevant definition of the term innovation. As one CDA staff member asked, "Was all that was new in a city necessarily innovative?" "If a process or program was new in a city but not the metropolitan area, the nation, was it innovative?" Conversely, "If a process or program had been initiated in the city but not the Model Neighborhood, was it to be considered appropriate to HUD's criteria?" "How was feasibility to be judged given the general thrust to attempt new agenda items? Would an innovative process necessarily lead to an innovative product? Which was preferable?"

One of the most innovative aspects associated with the planning period was the inclusion of residents along with agency staff and city personnel in the planning process. Certainly the kind, degree and extent of participation recorded in each city was considered by local officials, particularly, as a new and relevant event. Indeed, in most instances, resident involvement and the subsequent sustained dialogue among professionals and residents concerning problem and priority definition, were the primary innovations to emanate out of the planning process.

While only two cities provided residents or resident groups with veto power over the Model Cities program at the beginning of the planning period, all cities provided these same groups with de facto veto powers by the end of the period. These powers, while not substantively exercised in all cities, were recognized and ac-

cepted by City Hall as legitimate. Resident sign-off of the documents was seen as necessary, even if only to "get by HUD." In at least four cities, residents or resident-dominated groups appeared to share decision-making with respect to planning throughout the major part of the planning period with city staff, while in at least two cities resident or resident-dominated boards either were the primary or dominant influence in decision-making.

Use of residents on personnel screening boards in Denver and Pittsburgh were innovations in these cities. Significant use of residents as staff in Richmond should be rated as innovative to that city. Similarly, provision of direct technical staff to resident groups in Reading and Cambridge was viewed as innovative in these cities.

Agency involvement in the program, as indicated earlier, varied by city. In at least four cities — — Denver, Reading, Cambridge and Richmond — — the degree of continuous participation by some agencies, whether measured in terms of on-loan staff or continuous membership on resident or resident-dominated boards, suggested an innovative response to most local observers. Further, agency use of resident or resident-dominated groups as "review" bodies for their programs, even if only for legitimization purposes, was innovative in those cities in which this was a visible phenomenon (Gary, Denver, Cambridge, Dayton, Reading, Richmond and Rochester).

Consideration of social, economic and environmental problems as equal planning agenda items was seen in all eleven cities as an innovation. For example, previous CAA experience in most cities was limited to development of socially oriented programs, while previous experience with other Federal planning programs (e.g., 701 and CRP) was either functionally oriented or limited to broad but defined areas of concern.

Apart from the obvious example of proposed innovative programs like the family allowance scheme in Gary, any effort to define individual programs as innovative or non-innovative would be a spurious exercise. Program presentations were global in construct and language. Further, little in the way of precise comparative data was available concerning previously implemented local programs.

Institutional change—No city among the eleven studied had a firm understanding of its own delivery system prior to Model Cities. Only a few could provide "critical" appraisals of local institutions. None had comprehensive and definitive "data" relative to alternative means of providing services to residents or the impact of local projects on constituents. As a result, a base did not exist in any city upon which to readily build alternate strategies relative to institutional change. Cities generally neither knew what specifically to "change" from or "change" to.

Agency participation, in Model Cities planning in at least four cities, Denver, Reading, Cambridge and Richmond, was sufficiently sustained so as to permit local officials to record it as a significant change of institutional behavior. Similarly, inclusion of private sector representatives in a few cities on resident-dominated boards, represented a modification in behavior for these institutions. As one resident observed, "it was the first time they showed up for more than one session . . . and took an interest in our problems."

Chief executives in staff dominant, resident dominant and parity cities became meaningful participants in the program. Further, in most parity cities, CDA staff were used to provide general planning services beyond those connected with Model Cities to the chief executive.

CDA requests of agencies for delivery system changes were, in all cities, selective and not part of any overall grand plan. Generally, they resulted from resident-agency interaction rather than staff-agency dialogue.

Assumption of additional and different program responsibilities by existing agencies was projected in several cities, particularly Richmond, Dayton, Rochester, Cambridge, Denver, and Reading. These agencies were, by and large, limited to software program areas (health, education and welfare).

Surprisingly, given the extent of resident influence and direct involvement in most cities, and perhaps contrary to the expectations of most Federal officials, most city submittals indicated prime reliance on existing public and private agencies to implement programs.

Several agencies responded to resident or resident-dominated requests for action on specific resident agenda items not related to the planning process. In cases where agencies had, prior to Model Cities, refused similar requests, their actions during Model Cities were identified by local observers as examples of institutional change. In one city, a long detested slag pile was removed by the city as a result of Model Neighborhood resident group pressure. In other cities, long sought after zoning and recreation program changes were made, after Model Neighborhood resident groups petitioned previously recalcitrant agencies. "Changes in behavior" were most readily observed in Reading, Rochester and Richmond. More selective examples of such behavior occurred in Denver and Cambridge.

Federal Role and Performance Criteria:

Only in the discussion paper, and at times during the review of Part I, did HUD formally seek to "assist" cities to determine the definition of performance criteria. Intervention in both these instances was limited primarily to the criteria dealing with resident participation and coordination. In the case of the former criteria, HUD's personnel played the role of surrogate of the poor; in the case of the latter criteria, HUD attempted to secure more participation in the planning process. Most times this quest for coordination was limited to specific functional areas. That is, rarely were cities asked "if agencies were participating in the overall planning process." They were, however, asked if "particular agencies were participating in their respective areas of concern." "Were all the manpower programs, for example, being seen by CEP staff; health programs by the health department."

Other Federal agencies played a minimal role in assisting cities to develop approaches to meeting HUD's performance criteria. Federal technical assistance was never delivered on a sustained basis. When in evidence, it was more often than not directed at product development rather than structure, process and/or performance related issues. Direct Federal agency assistance to respective client groups was, in some communities, delivered without "coordination" with CDA. "Protective" Federal client relationships evident in several communities, resulted in narrow interpretations of administrative criteria and Model Cities program objectives. These interpretations were in obvious contrast to HUD's performance criteria relative to innovation and institutional change.

No evidence existed at the local level that anything but an ad hoc Federal monitoring system existed with respect to performance criteria. Indeed, Federal reviews, whether of Part I or the total submittal, were limited almost without exception to only products — one component of HUD's four part planning system. Commentary, when made by Federal agencies with respect to performance criteria, more often than not had no relation to a local "context." Agency personnel rarely visited studied cities. Lack

of personal observation or ready access to appropriate written instruments illustrating performance achievements made Federal critiques seem irrelevant to local CDAs.

DEFINITION OF ISSUES — A SYSTEM CHARACTERISTIC

Nearly three hundred issues were recorded in the eleven cities studied. They involved the following:

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES: The Planning Process

Type of Issue	
Boundaries of Model Neighborhood	4%
Structure of the CDA (Relationship to Agencies)	3%
Structure of the CDA (Relationship to Residents)	41%
CDA Operation	2%
Institutional Response	10%
Planning:	
Process	25%
Products	15%

As may be seen from the table, more than half of the issues related to the roles that residents were to have in planning — — that is, authority and control issues. Most of these issues occurred in cities with minimal chief executive interest and a weak resident base — — a combination that invariably meant vague and limited rules for the establishment of roles. Conversely, less than one fifth of the issues concerned allocation of resources or the planning process. Most of these issues occurred in cities (staff dominant, parity, resident dominant) where assignments were firmly established and roles were fairly clear.

Issue Occurrence

Most of the issues occurred after HUD had announced the planning grant. Here is a breakdown as to time:

Application period	29
Waiting period	12
Planning period	228
	269

NUMBER OF ISSUES IN CITIES

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence	Parity							Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
Issues											
Number	11	18	37	24	25	25	18	20	25	44	22

The character of issues shifted as cities went from one period into the next. The following table relates types of issues to time-phases of the Model Cities program. The end of planning (last three months) was tabulated separately to show an important shift in the character of issues then.

During the application period the issues were largely concerned with the Model Neighborhood boundaries and the role of residents in the anticipated CDA structure. The boundary issue was generally resolved prior to completion of the waiting period; the resident-CDA structure remained, however, unresolved in most cities until the planning period.

During the initial months of the planning period, the prominent issues in most cities were related primarily to resident relationships to structure and the definition of planning roles. Questions relating to institutional change were not very significant in generating issues. Neither were efforts (or non-efforts) at achieving coordination and innovation.

The distribution of issues in the last phase — — the end of planning — — was somewhat different than in the earlier phase of planning. Concern about issues relating to citizen participation and control was reduced except in cities like Rochester and Pittsburgh. In these cities, chief executive non-involvement and resident non-cohesiveness remained a characteristic during most of the planning period and prevented resolution of control issues.

Residents were involved in 188

(about 70%) of the 269 issues. 77 of the 188 issues (approximately 40%) were between residents and agencies[1] other than the CDA. Close to 30% involved residents and the CDA; nearly 30% involved the organized Model Neighborhood residents and other Model Neighborhood individuals or groups; and approximately 10% involved residents and HUD.

Agencies were the participants next most frequently involved in issues; they were involved in 123 issues (or 45% of all issues), and a large proportion of these (approximately 62%) involved them with residents. These issues revolved around questions like who would control the Concentrated Employment Program in the Model Neighborhood? What role would the CAA play in citizen organizing? And questions about allocations of funds to agencies to carry out projects in the Comprehensive Plan.

HUD was a major actor in only 12 percent of all issues. The majority of these issues involved HUD with both residents and the CDA. They primarily concerned questions related to structure (location of CDA) and resident involvement.

Cities and Issues

Several types of issues seemed to emerge in all of the cities while others surfaced in some cities but not others. Structural issues, particularly those related to the role of residents, were apparent in all cities. They were particularly numerous and frequent

---

[1]No clear pattern emerges when comparing agency involvement in each city.

TYPE AND OCCURRENCE OF ISSUES
The Planning Process

	Application Period	Waiting Period	Planning Period	End of Planning Period
Type of Issues				
Boundaries	3.0%	0.5%	0.5%	-
Structure of CDA (Relationship to Agency)	1.0%	0.5%	1.0%	1.0%
Structure (Relationship to Residents)	5.0%	3.0%	29.0%	3.0%
CDA Operation	1.0%	-	1.0%	0.5%
Institutional Response	1.0%	0.5%	9.0%	1.0%
Planning:				
Control/Process	-	-	19.0%	6.0%
Products	-	-	10.0%	5.0%
Total: 269 = 100%	11.0%	4.0%	69.0%	16.0%

PARTICIPANT INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES
The Planning Process

	CDA	Residents	Agencies	HUD
Type of Issue				
Boundaries	1*	4	6	12
Structure of CDA (Relationship to Agencies)	4	2	6	-
Structure of CDA (Relationship to Residents)	28	46	37	31
CDA Operation—Internal	3	3	2	-
Institutional Response	8	12	20	-
Planning:				
Process	40	22	22	38
Product	16	11	7	19
	100	100	100	100
Percentage of Total Issues	23%	42%	28%	7%

* All figures given are percentages.

in staff influence or resident influence cities. Again, minimal chief executive involvement, combined with a weak resident base, obviated easy determination of ground rules. Neither staff nor residents were able to function well. Issues related to the planning process (technique, order) were more visible in cities where chief executive support, together with a strong resident group, permitted staff and residents to function as equal participants in the planning process. Issues related to products (content and allocation) were more prominent in all cities where residents were the dominant or most influential participants in the policy process. Only three cities —— Reading, Richmond, and Rochester —— recorded more than three or four issues related to institutional response.

The lowest number of issues recorded in any city was 11 in Atlanta; the highest, 44 in Rochester. In the former city, ground rules supported by the Mayor and acceptable to residents, sanctioned selective involvement of residents and agencies; while in the latter, absence of ground rules made every planning event a potential major issue.

Conclusion

Model City planning criteria or requirements, some statutorily, others administratively defined, constituted a planning system. Most, if not all, of the eleven studied cities found it difficult, as indicated in this report, to meet the demands of this system. Most, however, made, according to local observers [2], considerable planning progress during the initial planning period. For example, coordinative planning processes, however modest, were set in motion; resident- City Hall dialogue was begun, often in some cities for the first time; and plans attempting to integrate economic, social, and environmental factors were submitted to HUD.

Although local response patterns varied considerably, five basic planning systems were, as indicated in the report, observed among the eleven studied cities.

To recapitulate, sustained chief executive interest and involvement, combined with a non-politically integrated and non-cohesive resident organization, led to the development of a staff-dominant planning system. Early and sustained public support by the mayor and/or the city manager, however, combined with a reasonably cohesive resident group irrespective of city size, social structure, or form of government, would engender either a parity or resident-dominant planning system. Those cities where the Model Neighborhood environment was fairly turbulent and where the members of the resident group were not politically integrated would initiate a resident- dominant system; those cities where the environment was fairly calm and where the members of the resident group were politically integrated would initiate a parity system.

If the mayor or city manager provided only marginal or no support for the program, and if the resident group was neither cohesive nor politically integrated at the outset of the planning year, a staff or resident influence system — — again irrespective of city size, social structure, or form of government — — resulted in the city. In those cities where resident cohesion came early, or earlier than evident signs of chief executive interest, the result was a resident influence system. Conversely, a staff influence system occurred when either chief executive (or surrogate) interest and involvement developed during the planning period earlier than resident cohesion; or when neither chief executive involvement nor resident cohesion occurred.

SYSTEM DETERMINANTS - REAL CHOICES

Three factors were identified as primary systems determinants. They were: (1) turbulence; (2) nature of the resident group; (3) role of the chief executive. While to some extent the degree of turbulence existing in a city, and the nature of the resident base were factors beyond the strategic influence of the Federal or local government at the inception of the program, they were certainly subject to the influence of both entities over the life of the program. Similarly, although the type of role assumed by the chief executive was related to the degree of turbulence in the city and the nature of the pre-Model Cities resident base, it was also related to events which occurred during the planning period. Certainly, the content of the chief executive's role was subject to Federal influence. In essence, the definition of each system determinant was or could be affected by the "conscious" decisions of relevant Model Cities participants. Therefore, to some extent, system development in all cities was not pre-destined or pre-determined, but in fact a matter of "public" choice.

SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS — REAL ALTERNATIVES

Structural differences, surprisingly, did not appear to be a basic system determinant or characteristic; that is, neither the location of the CDA, nor its staffing patterns and formal relationships with agencies or resident boards varied among the 11 studied cities according to any discernible pattern.[3] In turn, little evidence exists that structural factors played a major role in influencing the approach each system took in responding to HUD's process, product and performance requirements.

Each system on the other hand as illustrated in this analysis, illustrated a different response to HUD's process, product and performance criteria. For example, although all systems faced many difficulties in responding to HUD's tough planning process requirements, the staff dominant system was able to more closely conform to these requirements than the others. They were, unlike most cities, able to complete their CDP within the one year planning period. Further, in doing so, they followed with some conscious variations, HUD's orderly planning process; and introduced the use of professionally oriented techniques. Similarly, while all systems had trouble defining and responding to HUD's criteria concerning innovation, institutional response and resident involvement, parity and resident dominant systems illustrated more evidence of these performance criteria than others.

Cities in the parity system, apparently, were able to translate better than others, Federal mandates pertaining to coordination and resource mobilization/concentration. They were, for example, able to involve a greater number of agencies, for more than limited periods of time, in efforts

[3] CDA difficulties in defining priorities resulting in part from use of Task Forces, were an obvious exception to this general statement.

PLANNING SYSTEM DETERMINANTS AND CHARACTERISTICS
A Summary Table

	Staff Dominance	Staff Influence				Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
	Atlanta	San Antonio	Pittsburgh	Gary	Detroit	Denver	Richmond	Cambridge	Reading	Rochester	Dayton
System Determinants											
Pre Model Cities Planning Environment											
Turbulence	Negligible	Negligible	High	High	High	Modest	Modest	Negligible	Modest	High	High
Resident Involvement	N-cohes N-integ	N-cohes N-integ	N-cohes N-integ	N-cohes N-integ	N-cohes N-integ	N-cohes N-integ	Cohesive Integ	Cohesive Integ	Cohesive Integ	N-cohes N-integ	Cohesive N-integ
Role of Chief Executive	Sust	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Sust	Sust	Sust	Sust	Minimal	Sust
System Characteristics											
Primary Roles											
Director	Director	Service	Service	S vice	Service	Manager	Manager	Director	Director	Service	Broker
Staff	Technician	Service	Service	Service	Service	Tech Adv	Tech Adv	Technician	Technician	Service	Broker
Residents	Legit	Sanction	Sanction	Sanction	Sanction	Shared	Shared	Shared	Shared	Influence	Dominance
Process											
Length of Planning Period (Months)	12-14M	14 +	14 +	14 +	12-14M	12-14M	12-14M	12-14M	12-14M	14 +	14 +
Order of Assignment	Contr	Uncontr	Uncontr	Uncontr	Uncontr	Contr	Contr	Contr	Contr	Uncontr	Contr
Use of Planning Technique	Sust	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Minimal	Sust	Sust	Sust	Sust	Minimal	Minimal
Product[1]											
Relationship–Problem Analysis to Programs[2]	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Emphasis Categorical Supplementals	Suppl	Suppl	Suppl	Suppl	Suppl	Categ	Suppl	Categ	Categ	Suppl	Suppl
Agency Critique[3]	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Priorities[4]	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Performance Criteria											
Coordination	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Low	Medium
Innovation	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	High	High	High	High
Resident Involvement	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	High	High	High	High	High	High
Institutional Response	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
Mobilization and Concentration of Resources	No	No	No	No	No	Modest	Modest	Modest	Modest	No	No

to develop common strategies concerning planning processes and products. Subsequently, they were also able to project greater reliance on categorical programs as a proportion of their total budget. Indeed, products submitted by cities in parity and staff dominant systems appeared to come closer in form if not always in content to HUD defined criteria. Finally, the planning program in cities initiating either a staff or resident influence system departed more than all others from HUD's prescribed planning approach.

FEDERAL RESPONSE

Federal Model Cities strategy, called the Federal response, did not by and large reflect real options relative to planning system alternatives. That is, neither HUD nor the other Federal agencies participating in the program consciously premised their actions during the initial planning period on a set of consistent policy objectives relative to the desirability (or non-desirability) of alternate planning systems. This was perhaps understandable given the newness of the program. Yet, the apparent predictability of the results associated with each planning system suggests that the absence of a consistent Federal strategy and complementary plan of action can no longer be acceptable -

particularly if the various component parts of HUD's Model Cities planning approach continue to be seen correctly as only instruments to achieve quality of life improvements in cities.

Federal strategies should, given the analyses of system determinants contained in the preceding pages, clearly emphasize role development rather than structural mandates or criteria. For example, HUD should clearly be more concerned with monitoring and clearly defining the roles of the chief executive and residents than with prescribing the specific form or structural elements of the CDA. Similarly, the way cities define HUD's performance criteria should be deemed as important in measuring local Model City progress as the precise format and content of the submitted plan.

---

[1] Appraisals relative to the quality of individual plans were not made by staff. Analyses concentrated on determining closeness of plans to HUD's criteria. All plans were rated both by field teams responsible for each city and core staff.

[2] All plans made some effort to indicate that programs bore some relationship to problem statements. Some submittals presented more evidence of such a relationship than others. Sometimes, for example, program narratives directed referred to specific problems identified in Part I, the problem statement; other times, programs were preceded by an analysis linking problems defined in Part I to programs.

[3] Most plans contained reference to the fact that local agency delivery systems were not meeting the needs of local residents. In some cities, however, analyses and criticism of local agencies were more intensive than in others. Intensive was defined by field teams and core staff in terms of at least one of the following possibilities: (2) extent of analysis; (b) depth of analysis; (c) development of measurable data concerning performance deficiencies.

[4] Very few cities made evident efforts at defining priorities among programs and problems. In some cities, presentations do indicate cognizance of priorities. That is, either programs and/or problems were rated as to importance; or narratives suggested strategies relative to time, expenditure patterns and complementary priorities.

System Determinants
N-cohes—Non-cohesive
N-integ—Non-integrated
Sust—Sustained
Integ—Integrated

System Characteristics
Tech Adv—Technician Advocate
Legit—Legitimization
12-14M—12-14 months
14 + —More than 14 months
Sust—Sustained
Suppl—Supplemental
Categ—Categorical
Contr—Controlled
Uncontr—Uncontrolled

END