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

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Ten Model Cities:
A Comparative Analysis
of Second Round
Planning Years

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
Cleveland, Ohio
Houston, Texas
Indianapolis, Indiana
Los Angeles, California
Los Angeles County, California
New London, Connecticut
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Wilmington, Delaware
Youngstown, Ohio

The Model Cities Program

25204
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Office of Community Development
Evaluation Division

Department of Housing
and Urban Development
Washington, D.C.

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Section I: Introduction

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Chapter Three: General Summary

Chapter One: Model Cities: A Brief Overview



The Model Cities Program

The Demonstration Cities Act was passed by the Congress in the late fall of 1966 with high expectations. The bill's sponsors anticipated that the new program, soon to be known as Model Cities, would be highly effective in treating a wide range of urban problems in selected cities. The program would concentrate Federal and other resources on locally-designated Model Neighborhood Areas (MNAs), thereby permitting a more visible and measurable demonstration of the impact of comprehensive Federal assistance.

Model Cities was to have a life span of six years, the first of which would be devoted exclusively to planning. The end product of this Planning Year would be a Comprehensive Demonstration Plan (CDP). The CDP — including a problem analysis of the Model Neighborhood Area, a statement of program goals and objectives, a list of projects to be implemented, and non-programmatic sections on citizen participation, administration, and continuous planning and evaluation — was to indicate fairly precisely what the program intended to accomplish in the following Action Year. Eventually there would be five Action Years, the CDP being continuously revised and up-dated to meet changing conditions and requirements.

The role of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in Model Cities was a varied one. According to the enabling legislation, HUD was assigned the overriding administrative responsibility for the program within the Federal Government. Towards this end, a Model Cities Administration was created within the Department and charged with direct responsibility for the new program. As part of its mandate, HUD was also expected to supervise the distribution and spending of "supplemental funds," the principal Federal support monies for Model Cities. Finally, HUD would provide assistance to Model Cities in various technical fields, including internal program management, continuous planning and evaluation, and other areas related to the program. Where HUD itself could not directly provide needed services, it would make available to appropriate communities the necessary consultant assistance.

In line with the program's emphasis on comprehensive planning — that is, planning that would include economic, social, and physical concerns — Model Cities was to bring to bear on the designated neighborhoods the full range of Federal urban programs. HUD was to be the principal agent inducing cooperation from other Federal departments and agencies. The primary Federal vehicles for this concentration of resources were (1) the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committees and (2) the Washington Interagency Coordinating Committee, to which the former reported. These committees were to review local plans, make appropriate critiques and recommendations, and provide various forms of technical and financial assistance. It was also expected that Model Cities would receive priority in departmental allocation of federal categorical program funds.

A central Model Cities actor was the HUD Leadman or Leadwoman. Stationed in the regional offices of HUD, the leadmen were assigned specific Model Cities and charged with responsibility for monitoring local program activities, interpreting HUD requirements and guidelines, and providing various forms of assistance to cities in the process of preparing their plans. The principal written vehicle for HUD influence over local programs was a series of "CDA Letters" covering such areas as planning procedures, citizen participation, and employment of residents in Model Cities-assisted projects.

There were two principal forms of direct HUD financial assistance to Model Cities. The first was a planning grant award, made by HUD after review and approval of an application. This award was to underwrite the preparation of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan, in conjunction with what other Federal and local assistance could be found.

The second form of financial support was the supplemental entitlement, based on a certain percentage of existing Federal funding directed to the Model Neighborhood Area at the time the application was made. The supplemental entitlement was to be forthcoming after acceptance and approval by HUD of the CDP, and would be renewed at the same level for each of the ensuing Action Years. Neither planning grant nor supplemental funds would be freed until the city had made appropriate revisions, requested by HUD through the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee, in their application and CDP, respectively.

The supplemental monies were to be used for a variety of purposes, including funding the administrative component of the program, providing support for new and innovative projects, and serving as matching funds for appropriate Federal categorical programs.

There were ultimately two rounds of Model Cities planning grant awards: the first round of seventy-five grants was announced in November, 1967, and the second round, also of seventy-five cities, followed in the period September through November of the succeeding year.

To qualify for designation as a Model City, communities were asked by HUD to meet several related requirements and performance criteria. These included:

1. Establishment of a comprehensive planning organization to administer the program
2. Implementation of a complex set of sequential planning processes
3. Submission of carefully drafted and detailed plans and analyses
4. Responding in locally relevant fashion to certain undefined Federal objectives concerning coordination of local planning activities, mobilization and concentration of resources, citizen participation, innovation, and institutional change — all focused on the Model Neighborhood Area.

These requirements and performance criteria formed what has come to be known as the HUD planning model. And to a great degree, the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 became a vehicle, sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit, used by HUD to introduce this model into cities, replacing more traditional and often less analytical planning and allocation processes.

The significance of the HUD planning model lay both in its complexity and comprehensiveness. Not only was the model a highly rationalized one, with specific structural, procedural, and product requirements, but it also sought to

integrate social, physical, and economic elements into a linked set of goals and objectives. In this sense, Model Cities stood out from such more or less single-focused modes of Federal intervention as the Community Action Program (social planning) or Urban Renewal (physical planning).

Chapter Two: HUD's Planning Model

As noted earlier, the HUD planning model encompassed four principal elements, summarized here as structure, process, product, and performance critieria or objectives. These elements are discussed below.

Structure

In requiring cities to develop a comprehensive planning structure to implement preparation of the CDP, HUD was from the first wary of earlier OEO efforts which painstakingly prescribed through Congressional legislation and agency guidelines the form, board composition, and operating procedures of local community action agencies. Attempts to impose this Federally-determined organizational structure on local communities had in many instances, because of an unreceptive or even hostile political environment, proved unsuccessful and even detrimental to the broader goals of the War on Poverty.

The HUD planning model, as reflected in the various guidelines and memoranda issued by that department, called for the Model Cities organization to be essentially locally-determined. The principal HUD caveat or restriction was basically that ultimate administration and fiscal responsibility for the program would have to rest with the local chief executive; that is, the mayor or his surrogate. Although HUD guidelines were careful not to prescribe the specific ties which would link the Model Cities Program to other local organizations and programs, it was nonetheless made clear by HUD that effective linkages would have to be established with local resident groups and organizations in the Model Neighborhood Area, and with relevant public and private agencies servicing that area. This was expected to include Federal, state and regional organizations as well as those whose geographic jurisdiction was specifically limited to the city and/or Model Neighborhood Area.

HUD anticipated that the new program would have a governing board or other key unit whose composition would reflect resident, local public agency, city hall, and private civic interests. HUD did not attempt to specify the precise composition of this board. Nor did it seek to influence the membership composition of any subcommittee arrangement a local program might form.

The local agency, usually referred to as a City Demonstration Agency, which was to be formed to administer the new program was to have direct access to the local chief executive. This, according to HUD, would provide the program with more influence in city decisions than it would have had as simply another line agency. HUD further indicated that the CDA was to have the power, authority, and stature to achieve coordinated administration of the program; to reconcile conflicting plans for the Model Neighborhood; and to link operating programs among contributing agencies. This approach was in keeping with HUD's expectation that the CDA, through its potential ability to offer supplemental monies and technical assistance, would be able to induce other local agencies to cooperate in both planning and project implementation activities for the Model Neighborhood Area.

The Model Cities structure, including the CDA, its governing board and appropriate subcommittees, was expected to develop formal and informal ties with other local organizations, such as housing and renewal authorities, police departments, and private organizations active in the Model Neighborhood Area. Again, HUD did not specify the precise nature of such linkages, although participation on the governing board, sharing of relevant information with the CDA, and the provision of on-loan staff were among the approaches which ought to be considered.

A citizen participation structure was also anticipated, with locally-appropriate linkages to Model Cities planning and organizational activities. HUD was deliberately vague on this subject, however, calling only for "some form of organization structure," with leadership acceptable to the neighborhood as representative of their interests. This structure was to be distinct from the overall policy or governing board noted above.

The CDA was also expected in its planning activity to respond to shifts in the focus of the program. Thus, HUD anticipated that the structure of the program, including internal CDA organization, would probably differ in the Action Years from that operable during the Planning Year. These shifts in program organization were to be reflected in the administrative component of the CDP.

Process

The second element in the HUD planning model was a sequential planning process intended to produce a Comprehensive Demonstration Plan and related products. Several periods of planning activity are discernible in this process.

1. *The Application Period*

For a community to be chosen as a Model City, an application had to be submitted to HUD prior to the commencement of the Planning Year. The application required cities to define and analyze social, physical, and economic problems affecting the Model Neighborhood Area; implicitly, the problem analysis was to examine existing organizations and procedures delivering various public and private services to the MNA. In addition, the application was to specify how the city proposed to approach its prospective Planning Year. Each application was to include an anticipated Model Cities structure, work program for producing the CDP, projected staff needs, consultants, and procedures for linking local agencies, private organizations, civic groups, and residents' interests.

The process of putting the application together was expected by HUD to lead to an initial effort at local interagency cooperation. In addition, it was anticipated that the problem analysis might, for the first time in many communities, present a comprehensive overview, supported by statistical data, of neighborhood needs, and of the problems inherent in existing, fragmented public and private efforts to meet these needs. The application process was also expected to involve local residents, although the applicable HUD guidelines were quite vague in this regard. The application was essentially a "plan to plan," and would indicate to HUD a city's potential for meeting the more extensive and intensive requirements of the Planning Year, the first major period of planning activity.

2. *Waiting and Revision Periods*

Following submission of the applications, HUD would review and compare the documents, and then designate a number of cities to receive Model Cities planning grants. During this waiting period, cities could, if they chose, clarify agency relations with the prospective program, initiate steps to involve residents, and solicit assistance to ensure that the application would be well received.

Upon announcement of the planning grant award, HUD would issue a discussion paper containing several criticisms of the application and calling for appropriate revisions prior to commencement of the Planning Year or release of the planning grant monies. These comments and criticisms were to cover such issues as citizen participation, linkages between the CDA and local public and private agencies, revision of budgets and planning work programs, and the relationship of the CDA to City Hall and to the mayor's office.

3. *The Planning Year: Starting Up*

Following development of the application revisions (sometimes even before those revisions were finished or formally accepted by HUD) planning grant funds were to be released and the Planning Year could officially begin. In this interim period, however, it was possible for cities to initiate a search for a CDA director and staff, develop linkages with resident groups and local agencies concerned with the program, and generally establish an organizational framework for the program.

4. *The Planning Year: Mid-Term Planning Statement*

During the Planning Year, HUD expected the city to engage in a rational and sequential process aimed at completion of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. In short, not only would HUD require a CDP, but it also asked that the internal components of the plan be completed in a certain order, within set periods of time, and through the use of various techniques involving a diversity of actors, public and private.

This approach to completing the CDP initially called for a three-part plan consisting of the following:

Part I, a description and analysis of problems, causes of problems, priorities, objectives, program approaches, and strategy; Part I was to be submitted to HUD two-thirds of the way through the Planning Year, and be reviewed by the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee at that time, in order for appropriate feedback to be given to the CDA in time to be related to completion of Parts II and III.

Part II, a statement of projected five-year objectives and related fiscal needs;

Part III, a statement of the specific projects and related costs proposed as the action package to implement the program approaches outlined in Part I. Part III was also to include a number of statements on such non-programmatic components as program administration, relocation, continuous planning, evaluation, and citizen participation.

The HUD planning approach held that these three parts of the CDP followed, both internally and in relation to one another, a desirable and logical sequence. Thus, problem definition and analysis would rationally precede a statement of goals and objectives; the latter in turn would precede the delineation of specific program approaches, which, again logically, would come before development of specific projects for an Action Year program. The establishment of priorities — for problems, goals, objectives, and program approaches — was also perceived as an integral and eminently rational approach to Model Cities planning.

In late 1969, this three-part CDP framework was simplified by HUD to a two-part plan. Part II, the five-year forecast of costs and objectives, was dropped entirely as a requirement, and Part I was reorganized into a Mid-Term Planning Statement (MPS), which was to be submitted to HUD half-way through the Planning Year. The MPS was in effect a shortened (not to exceed 75 pages) version of Part I, containing a summary analysis of program planning activities to date, a problem analysis of the Model Neighborhood Area, and an outline of proposed project implementation strategy, including a statement on program objectives and priorities.

HUD was to review the MPS, together with the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee, and make appropriate recommendations for its revision. The revised MPS would then be incorporated at the end of the Planning Year into the CDP as submitted to HUD. Part III, which dealt with project development and various non-programmatic elements of the program, was simply merged into the final documents, its separate designation as a specific part dropped.

These changes reflected HUD's growing realization that its initial CDP requirements were too complex and demanding for most local and CDA planners. The changes also represented an understanding among HUD officials that such an overly theoretical planning model was not likely to be followed. CDA staff and MNA residents had difficulty distinguishing the definitions of problems from their causes, goals from objectives, and overall program strategy from specific program approaches. Tables required in the original Part II were difficult to determine or comprehend, and the figures provided were rarely supported with detailed rationales. Neither CDA staff nor MNA residents placed more than perfunctory emphasis on Part II, since it did not appear to them to bear direct relevance to existing Model Neighborhood needs and priorities.

Despite HUD's attempt to simplify the product requirements by instituting the Mid-Term Planning Statement, the process element of the planning model continued to stress the use by CDAs of relatively sophisticated methodology in the preparation of their plans. Thus, CDAs were expected to: (1) quantify problems; (2) establish the underlying causes of these problems; (3) rank the importance of problems, goals, and objectives; and (4) cost out both objectives and projects. All of these requirements clearly indicated the use of certain techniques characteristic of the planning profession. Among these, implicitly if not explicitly suggested by HUD guidelines, were (1) surveys; (2) synopses of available primary and secondary data; (3) development and use of means to rate and scale priorities; and (4) methods to translate service/cost ratios to specific program and project budgets.

5. *The Planning Year: Completing the Plan*

The closing months of the Planning Year were to focus on preparation of project descriptions linked to both problem analyses and priority-ranked objectives. They were to reflect the overall strategy which had ostensibly been spelled out in the MPS. Budget allocations to the various projects were to suggest this set of priorities and objectives as well. Finally, the sequence of planning events would be closed with general components relating to such non-programmatic subjects as program administration, continuous planning and evaluation, and relocation.

6. *Continuous Planning and Evaluation*

A second phase of the planning process, as outlined by HUD guidelines, began with the start of the Action Year.* It was anticipated that each city would implement continuous planning and evaluation activities directed towards producing a revised and updated CDA at the end of each Action Year but the fifth. Monitoring and analysis of projects, undertaken by the CDA or local agencies, would begin concurrently with project implementation, and the results of this evaluation would be fed into the continuous planning process and eventually reflected in the revised CDP. A continuous planning and evaluation statement was therefore to be a prescribed and important element of the CDP, at least in HUD's eyes. A Management Information system (MIS), often called the CDAIS, was to be the vehicle providing data for this ongoing process of evaluation and plan revision.

Product

The third element of the HUD planning model included the development of specific plans and related documents. The principal planning product was the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan, the outlines of which were discussed in the previous section. As noted, in late 1969 HUD dropped Parts I and II of the original CDP framework, replacing them with the Mid-Term Planning Statement.

As reorganized, the CDP consisted of several distinct sections or components, including a revised MPS, a continuous planning and evaluation statement, a relocation program, an outline of the proposed Model Cities program structure, and a resident employment statement. The plan was also to delineate specific project proposals, including budget summaries, for such functional areas as housing, social services, education, health, manpower training and employment, transportation, recreation, and economic development. These project descriptions were to include relatively exact information on the proposed sponsoring agency, citizen participation, work program, linkages with related agencies and programs, and provisions for continuous monitoring and evaluation activities. Funding sources other than supplemental monies were also to be carefully delineated, including Federal categorical programs, state funds, and local contributions. A statement on non-Federal spending was to be appended at the end of the plan.

Performance Criteria

To gauge the effectiveness of its planning model, HUD developed several performance criteria by which the progress of a city's program could be determined.

*As it had following submission of the application, HUD conducted a review of the CDP before permitting a city to implement its Action Year program. This review often criticized and asked for changes in structure, budgets, delegate agencies and other plan elements.

These criteria included: (1) innovation in structures, processes, and planning products; (2) shifts in the local mobilization and concentration of resources, technical and financial; (3) coordination among local, State, and Federal agencies with regard to Model Cities planning activities; (4) institutional change; and (5) resident participation. None of these five performance criteria were defined by HUD in quantitative or explicitly operational terms. All were stated more as norms than as tough, precise standards. Cities were ostensibly to be given much latitude to determine locally relevant definitions of these criteria or objectives.

1. Innovation

Although never precisely defined, innovation was generally perceived by HUD as that which was new to a specific city in its traditional planning and resource allocation approach to the Model Neighborhood Area. Innovation was perceived by HUD as relevant to such areas as planning techniques, projects proposed in the CDP, organizational structures used to implement the planning process, and the relationship between the CDA, residents, and local agencies in the planning process.

2. Mobilization/Concentration of Resources

This criterion referred to shifts or increases in the traditional local pattern of resource allocation, local or external, with regard to the MNA. Through the inducement of supplemental funds, this criterion focused on the Model Cities Program's potential to divert a larger portion of local fiscal and technical resources to meet MNA problems than had been the case prior to the program. Apart from the increasing commitment of locally-generated funds to the MNA, mobilization of resources also referred to greater local agency and city hall staff time and attention devoted to MNA problems, as well as to increased city hall efforts to attract outside sources of funding for full or partial allocation to the Model Neighborhood.

3. Coordination

This objective was generally defined as involving several different techniques, processes, and actors. The techniques included sharing of information among relevant actors, provision of on-loan staff and needed technical assistance, and sharing of decision-making with concerned actors. The processes by which these coordinative devices were implemented ranged from chief executive fiat or mandate to various forms of adaptation (chance, ad hoc policy) and mutual adjustment (bargaining, negotiation, compromise). Coordination could be manifested through several different actors and structures, including the CDA director and staff, local public and private agencies, CDA boards and subcommittees, resident organizations, Federal representatives, and other related groups.

4. Institutional Change

Within the context of Model Cities, institutional change generally referred to increased public or private agency sensitivity and responsiveness to the problems and concerns of the Model Neighborhood Area. It could include such developments as a greater involvement of MNA residents in public agency decision-making, affecting their area; specific project initiatives directed to important MNA needs; increased hiring of MNA residents; more local agency and city hall staff contact with the Model Neighborhood Area; and agency participation on CDA boards, subcommittees, and task forces. In essence, institutional change meant substantive alterations in the pattern of behavior manifested towards the MNA by established community organizations and actors. It meant, in short, recognition of the MNA as a legitimate area of the city needing special attention and, to a considerable extent, recognition of Model Cities resident structures as legitimate spokesmen for MNA interests, along with the CDA.

5. Citizen Participation

Resident involvement was perceived by HUD as encompassing such areas as membership on Model Cities program boards and subcommittees; employment on the CDA staff and in other program-assisted projects; and involvement in the planning and project implementation activities of local agencies. Citizen participation was also to include involvement in the writing and review of various CDP components, as well

as their eventual implementation and evaluation. Definition and analysis of problems, assignments of priorities and budgets, and formulation of overall program administrative structure were among these aspects of the planning process where residents were expected to play an active role.

Summary

HUD, in most cities, sought the creation of a new general purpose planning organization which was accountable to the chief executive. This organization would have responsibility for preparation of the CDP. Model Neighborhood Area goals and objectives, as stated in the plan, were to be based on a clear and comprehensive statement of Model Neighborhood problems and their underlying causes. Program approaches, strategies, and priorities, based on the CDP problem analysis, were to be stated in order to set, first, a framework for development of five-year objectives and costs, and later, solely for budgeted first-year projects. Most cities were required to substantially alter their plans in the midst of the Planning Year in order to conform to new HUD guidelines relative to CDP content.

A city's planning efforts were to be judged not only on the substance of submitted documents, and the processes leading to the creation of these documents, but also on the degree to which initiated planning processes and submitted products reflected loosely-defined HUD performance criteria such as innovation, resource mobilization, institutional change, coordination, and citizen participation. HUD assumed that their prescribed planning system if linked to public and private resources, would serve participating Model Cities as an instrument to improve the lives of local residents. And this planning system, closely tied to evaluation techniques, was to continue through the five Action Years which were to follow the Planning Year.

Chapter Three: General Summary

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a summary overview of the findings presented throughout this report. Emphasis has been placed on those findings which bear some policy relevance to current national urban policy, in particular the enhanced role of the chief executive and revenue sharing, general and special.

The Eleven-City Study

An earlier MKGK report, the *Eleven-City Study,* sought to examine the approaches taken by various first round cities to respond to the requirements, general and detailed, outlined by the HUD planning model.

In summary, this early study found that there were five identifiable planning systems or approaches taken by cities in response to HUD's guidelines and directives. These were characterized as:

1. Staff-dominant
2. Staff-influence
3. Staff/resident parity
4. Resident-influence
5. Resident-dominant

The study then proceeded to identify the key determinants or influencing factors leading to formation of these planning systems. These determinants were identified as:

1. Pre-Model Cities level of turbulence
2. Pre-Model Cities level of resident cohesion and political integration
3. Initial role of the chief executive

Each planning system was then examined to determine relevant and consistent internal characteristics. These were found to be manifested in:

1. *Alternate Roles:* assumed by various actors, local and Federal
2. *Planning Process:* order, timing and techniques used to produce key

planning documents

3. *Planning Products:* the relative quality of Part I, Part II, and Part III of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan
4. *Performance Criteria:* degree of coordination in planning with local agencies; of citizen participation; mobilization of resources; of innovation; and of achieved institutional change
5. *Issues:* the number, intensity, and timing of public disagreements over alternative choices on a given decision involving two or more actors

Aspects of program structure — including the characteristics of the CDA director, securing CDA staff, establishing linkages with city hall, with local agencies and with resident organizations, technical interagency pools, and other program organizational concerns — were found *not* to relate to planning systems in a consistent pattern.

The basic conclusion of the *Eleven-City Study* was that it was possible to identify planning systems, system determinants, and system characteristics. This provided an opportunity for HUD to make real choices directed at influencing the formation of alternative planning systems, and would in turn permit HUD to influence the manner and degree of city response to its planning model.

Ten-City Study Approach

The methodology and general approach of this ten-city analysis follows closely that of the *Eleven-City Study.* It is an effort both to verify or amend the findings of that earlier analysis, as well as to extend those conclusions where possible and appropriate. The ten second-round cities were selected on the basis of their geographic and demographic diversity, and for the disparity in their pre-Model Cities planning environments.

Alternative Planning Systems and Their Determinants

Four alternative planning systems were found in the *Ten-City Study:* (1) staff dominant; (2) staff-influence; (3) parity; (4) resident influence. Each planning system is discussed below in terms of its key determinants as these existed prior to or at the outset of the Planning Year.

Staff-Dominant

Chief Executive Role: sustained involvement in initial program planning, either directly or through a surrogate; often convenes application writing team, mandates local agency participation, and selects CDA director.
Turbulence: low level of civil unrest or challenge to chief executive authority in proposed Model Neighborhood Area (MNA).
Resident Base: little organizational cohesion among residents or resident groups in the proposed MNA and no accepted local leadership capable of speaking for the area; little political integration, that is, experience in negotiating with city hall on matters relating to the MNA.
Timing: groundrules relative to program control, timing, review authority, and planning procedures are established early because of clear role of chief executive.

Staff-Influence

Chief Executive Role: low involvement in program; hesitant support of program at its outset; concern over potential for civil unrest.
Turbulence: high level of civil unrest of challenge to city hall authority prior to or at outset of Model Cities program; perceived as political risk by chief executive.
Resident Base: non-cohesive and politically non-integrated; no single focus of resident leadership; no group able to speak for a large constituency in the Model Neighborhood Area.
Timing: intermittent involvement of chief executive permits, over time, the development of a system in which staff play a major role, although not necessarily a dominant one relative to resident groups; groundrules relative to planning are slow to form, with jousting over program control and

acceptance of roles by various actors.

Staff/Resident Parity

Chief Executive Role: early and sustained involvement; supportive of program objectives at outset of program, including citizen participation.
Turbulence: little or no turbulence in proposed MNA prior to or at outset of program.
Resident Base: a cohesive and politically integrated resident group(s) exists in the MNA at the outset of the program; there is relative agreement among the residents in the MNA as to representative spokesmen.
Timing: the above conditions permit early development of groundrules relative to program control, planning activities, and review rights for various actors; the chief executive is able and willing to make commitments; his sustained involvement coupled with a cohesive and integrated resident group, permits these rules to be maintained.

Resident-Influence

Chief Executive Role: minimal involvement and interest at outset of program, related in part to the level of turbulence.
Turbulence: high level of turbulence in proposed MNA.
Resident Base: non-cohesive and politically non-integrated at outset of program.
Timing: these conditions prevent early establishment of groundrules covering control, planning activity, review rights, staff hiring, and the like; gradually, the residents evolve a relatively cohesive organization focused on Model Cities; chief executive in turn assumes an increasingly neutral role; staff frequently become resident-advocates.

HUD's principal role with regard to influencing the formation of alternate planning systems was basically that of setting a context which tended to favor the establishment of staff-oriented and parity systems. In particular, HUD's insistence on a leading role for the chief executive, a strong but *non-veto* power of review for resident groups related to Model Cities, and local agency sponsorship of supplementally-assisted projects all contributed to a climate in which staff-oriented and parity systems could develop.

The absence among the ten cities of any manifesting resident-dominant planning systems may be perceived as resulting in part from HUD's stance on the above issues. A resident-dominant planning system was defined in the *Eleven-City Study* by sustained chief executive involvement, a high level of turbulence and cohesive resident organization related to Model Cities; groundrules giving residents primary program influence were set early in the program adhered to by the chief executive throughout the Planning Year. None of the cities surveyed in this analysis was able to develop such a planning system; in those cases where such a resident-dominant system showed signs of appearing, HUD's intervention tended to influence the retention of a resident-influence system.

System Characteristics

Each of the four planning systems identified in this study manifested a set of characteristics; that is, each system demonstrated a consistent set of responses to HUD's planning model. These characteristics were manifested in: *Alternative Roles; Planning Process Approaches; Comprehensive Demonstration Plan Content; Performance Criteria;* and *Issues.* Program structure, however, did not manifest patterns consistent with the planning systems and is treated separately.

Alternate Roles

The roles assumed by several key Model Cities actors were examined for each of the ten cities. These actors and their characteristic responses included:

Chief Executives:

Their early and sustained participation was an important factor in the establishment and maintenance of program groundrules. In the staff-dominant and parity cities, the chief executive tended to occupy a central

role in the direction or management of the program. In staff- and resident-influence cities, his role was more that of an intermediary and broker and focused largely on crisis situations.

Where the chief executive (mayor or city manager) did not exercise a central directing role, his lack of sustained interest in or enthusiasm for Model Cities was quickly communicated to both CDA staff and residents. This relatively minimal role made it difficult for other program actors to assume firm roles and generally to set program groundrules. Hesitant and intermittent involvement by the chief executive diminished whatever status the program may have had. In particular, it tended to minimize the active participation of local agencies and especially of line departments.

CDA Directors:

In staff-dominant cities, the CDA director generally occupied a directive role; that is, he was able to control the planning work program, assign responsibilities, and determine CDP content. In the parity city his was essentially a managerial role, cognizant of the interests of both city hall and residents yet capable of controlling program actors in such a way as to maintain work schedules and regulate the content of various planning documents.

In staff- and resident-influence cities, where a lack of program groundrules prevailed, the CDA directors tended to adopt largely service or secretarial roles — that is, providing non-interpretive or policy-forming services to various Model Cities groups. On occasion, they would act as a broker between various groups seeking to influence program decisions. Theirs was essentially a neutral role. In particular, the absence of strong chief executive support made it difficult for CDA directors to assert themselves.

CDA Staff:

Their roles largely paralleled those of the CDA director, although in the parity city, and to some extent in resident-influence cities as well, they served as technicians and often as advocates of the resident community. In staff-influence cities there was also a tendency on the part of CDA staff to attempt to reflect the views of residents in various planning documents. In staff-dominant cities, on the other hand, CDA staff tended to mirror the views of the chief executive and rarely saw themselves as resident advocates.

Residents:

Roles occupied by resident groups ranged from that of legitimization (cursory review and approval of staff-initiated planning documents) to strong influence; the former role was characteristic of staff-dominant cities, the latter of resident-influence communities. In the parity city, residents held a shared role with that of the CDA staff, while in the staff-influence planning systems, residents essentially sanctioned the planning products produced by staff; these products, it must be added, generally reflected the views expressed by residents in various subcommittees and other planning work gatherings.

Resident concerns in most cities centered around questions of control and form rather than planning process. Membership composition on various program boards and committees was a particularly critical issue since it often appeared to determine the degree of influence a resident group would have over program affairs. Residents were also quite concerned over CDA staff hiring practices and over budgetary matters; employment of residents, resident training programs, and stipends for resident participation on governing boards were often singled out by residents as critical issues.

Resident concern with regard to planning tended to be much less

intense. Indeed, residents often questioned the value of sequential planning and analytical techniques, preferring to focus quickly on such visible activities as developing project ideas and descriptions.

Local Agencies:

Agency participation in most cities was intermittent and uneven. Even in staff-dominant communities, where the chief executive might have been expected to command substantial participation, it often proved difficult to gain agency involvement on a sustained basis. Numerous factors governed the scope and intensity of agency commitment to Model Cities, including the potential for hostile resident critique of current practices and institutions, the perceived likelihood of some kind of reward at the end of the Planning Year, and the degree of sympathy towards the problems of MNA residents. In addition, where the Model Cities program was a relatively minor activity in terms of an agency's overall scope of geographic responsibility, it was difficult for agency heads to see the value of extended involvement in a program that often appeared to have a dubious or uncertain future. In this sample, the greatest agency participation was exhibited in the parity city, the least involvement in resident influence and staff-influence communities.

Agency involvement took place at various program levels, including service by agency representatives on governing boards and other program committees. Agencies in several cities provided on-loan staff to the CDA for varying periods of time and for disparate assignments. Often, agency participation appeared to be most effective at the functionally-focused subcommittee level of program planning activities (e.g. health, housing, transportation, social services).* At that level resident criticism was often muted, assistance was genuinely needed and desired, and issues could be dealt with in a more or less technical manner. Agency representatives often became resident advocates at the subcommittee level and were occasionally able to translate resident perceptions into institutional responses and changes in policy. Again, this was more likely to occur in parity and staff/resident influence cities than in staff-dominant cases.

Consultants:

No particular pattern emerged relative to the use of consultants in the ten studied cities. In Santa Fe and Wilmington, as examples, consultants made substantive contributions to both planning process and products. In other cities with extensive reliance on outside consulting assistance, there was little evidence that this aid had resulted in a quality planning document; in two cities, it could even be argued that it was actually dysfunctional to producing a useful product, besides hindering the ability of CDA staff to develop an increased capacity to plan.

In general, the value of consultant assistance was diminished by such factors as the inability of CDA staff to manage consultant work programs, failure to fit consultant findings into a comprehensive plan, the intermittent comings and goings of consultants, and occasional resident hostility to "outsiders," particularly when it seemed to the former that the consultants were allied to city hall and/or to rival resident groups.

Federal Government:

Federal assistance was manifested in a diversity of ways. Thus, HUD was to provide overall planning guidelines, monitor program developments in each city, and furnish technical assistance through its leadmen and other representatives. Regional Interagency Coordinating Committees were to

*The functional area subcommittee will hereafter be referred to as the task force. See Task Force in Glossary.

review CDA planning products and provide technical assistance. Various Federal departments and agencies were to provide technical assistance and make funds available through categorical programs for Model Cities, offer timely information with regard to revenue sources to cities, and join in reviewing and critiquing local planning efforts in their areas of competence.

HUD's participation varied substantially from city to city. In several of the cities studied, notably those with resident-influence and staff-influence planning systems, HUD intervened to push the program toward the desirable middle ground (parity). In resident-influence cities, for example, HUD's intervention was focused on reinforcing chief executive authority, preventing de jure establishment of a resident veto over program planning decisions, and seeing to it that local agencies were assigned project sponsorship responsibilities. In staff-influence cities, on the other hand, HUD's intervention focused on such areas as expanding MNA boundaries to include a more balanced poverty neighborhood and ensuring a greater resident involvement in program decision-making than appeared likely from the application and its initial revisions. In two cities, HUD sought actively to have an incompetent CDA director replaced.

The principal vehicle for HUD intervention was the leadman or leadwoman based in the Regional Office. Their interpretation of responsibilities appeared to vary with the Regional Office and, for that matter, with the individual himself. A leadman could choose to involve himself heavily with planning activities in his assigned cities if he perceived it necessary, and in at least two of the cities studied here did in fact play a major role in assisting CDAs to complete their plans.

In addition to the activities of its leadmen, HUD also played a major role with regard to second-round cities by simplifying the content of its required planning documents. Specifically, HUD replaced the Part I/Part II sections of the CDP with a Mid-Term Planning Statement which was considerably shorter and easier to follow than the original requirements. Most of the cities covered here perceived the change as a boost to their planning efforts, although at least one community resented the change as detrimental to their planning process.

The most pervasive impact HUD exerted, however, was on the timing of the planning process through its imposition of deadlines for the submission of planning products. HUD used to the full its wide discretionary power in providing incentives for speeding up the process or in granting extensions, but all CDAs and resident groups were impressed with the seriousness of meeting these terminal dates. Without them, many cities may never have completed their CDP.

The RICC reviews were perceived in most cities as of little value. The critiques tended to be late in the planning process and often bore comments which appeared to have little relevance to local needs or conditions. RICC members were reported to have spent little time in their assigned cities. Their recommendations focused on the relationship of individual agencies to local programs, rather than on the overall planning process.

There was little evidence of early commitments of Federal categorical funding for local Model Cities programs. In most cases, CDAs were forced to make "guesstimates" of the amount and likelihood of Federal funds. Technical assistance from individual agencies was intermittent in nature and often perceived as of limited value. There was little evidence of Federal agencies simplifying their program requirements to facilitate development of first Action Year projects. In short, Federal assistance was often perceived as "too little and too late."

Planning Process

Process was defined as the order of sequence of planning events; the time taken by CDAs to produce documents, and the techniques utilized by CDA planners and other related actors to produce the CDP.

Order:

Most cities in this sample managed to follow the sequence of planning events recommended by HUD in its guidelines. Thus, objectives followed the problem analysis and project descriptions followed the ranking of objectives.

However, despite the formal ability of most CDAs to observe a logical sequence of planning activities, there was much evidence to suggest that this sequence was not perceived as a serious or particularly helpful exercise by the majority of CDAs. In the staff or resident influence cities, in particular, residents were impatient with a sequence of events that slowed down the opportunity to move quickly to a discussion of projects.

Statements of objectives and their ranking were seen as needless paper exercises designed to please HUD and not much else. Even though replacement of the original Part I/Part II approach to the CDP by the much simpler MPS had been designed by HUD to make planning less complex and faster, the new procedure was still difficult for most CDAs to follow. Staff-dominant and parity cities were better to respond to the planning sequence, although even in those communities there was a tendency on the part of both staff and residents to move to project descriptions soon after completion of the problem analysis.

Timing:

None of the cities examined here was able to complete its Planning Year within the 12-month period alloted for that purpose. Most cities, particularly those with staff- or resident-influence planning systems, spent much more time than had been anticipated in hiring staff, getting cooperation and assistance from local agencies, and in establishing roles for residents and CDA staff. Again, there was a much greater tendency for cities with staff-dominant and parity planning systems to meet HUD deadlines than in the other cases. Because of the considerable time spent in trying to establish program groundrules relative to control, review procedures, and roles, the period for developing projects, finding sponsors, and securing funding was compressed into a shorter time period — one to two months — than had been expected. In most cities, regardless of planning system, final review of planning documents tended to be hurry-up affairs; in at least two staff-dominant cities, resident groups were asked to review plans after they had already been submitted to HUD.

Techniques:

A diversity of approaches were used in the ten cities to prepare planning documents. They included all-day planning conferences, planning workshops, less structured "brainstorming" sessions, retreats for staff and residents, and scalar ranking and matrix analysis in staff-dominant and parity cities (which generally tended to utilize more complex techniques than staff or resident-influence cities). "Retreats" — planning weekends at country hotels — were more common in the latter programs, largely because friction was higher than in staff-dominant or parity cities. The use of such sophisticated analytical techniques as matrix analyses was varied in impact. In one city it was part of a complex but generally understood approach to produce a CDP. In another city, these techniques were utilized primarily by consultants, with little evidence that CDA staff or the CDP was much improved by the process.

All cities relied on functionally-focused subcommittees (task forces) for problem analysis, identification and ranking of objectives, and genera-

tion of projects. While in most cities the task-force approach provided a relatively contention-free planning environment, it not infrequently tended to foster a sense of vested interest among participants, narrowing their range of interest to the special area of their planning activity (e.g. health, housing, education).

The actual writing of CDP components in all cities was generally left to one or two specialists in each area — that is, to CDA staff, on-loan professionals, or outside consultants. Residents rarely wrote the actual planning documents, and when this did in fact occur, CDA staff or other professionals usually had to rewrite the documents in language felt by them to be more acceptable to HUD.

Planning Products

There were three principal elements to the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan: (1) an updated Mid-Term Planning Statement; (2) a set of project descriptions, including budget statements for each; (3) non-programmatic components in such areas as program administration, continuous planning and evaluation, relocation, and resident employment.

MPS:

This planning document was to be revised and updated following its submission to HUD and the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee halfway through the Planning Year. Both HUD and the RICC were expected to critique the MPS, and their comments were to be reflected in an updated Statement included with the CDP.

The problem analysis varied in scope, statistical documentation, and degree of critique from city to city, and from area to area within each MPS. There was a greater tendency in staff-dominant cities for their problem analyses to be comprehensive in scope and extensive in documentation than in staff or resident-influence cities. At the same time, the latter cities manifested a much greater tendency to examine — and occasionally to attack strongly — the practices of local agencies as these related to delivering services to the Model Neighborhood Area. All cities had difficulty distinguishing causes of problems from the problems themselves; the causes tended to be generic ("a lack of income") and non-agency focused.

The objectives statements similarly varied from city to city and within integral statement elements in the MPS. Staff-dominant cities tended to be more comprehensive in their listing of objectives, more precise in their quantitative content for each objective, and more consistent in linking objectives with the earlier problem analysis than staff- or resident-influence cities. Most communities, however, had difficulty in distinguishing objectives from the more general concept of goals. Most cities sought to rank objectives in an order of priority, although, again, staff-dominant and parity cities tended to be more precise in this task than staff- or resident-influence cities where residents often found it "improper" to sort out problems and objectives in such a way as to suggest that some deserved more immediate attention than others.

The strategy statement in a majority of the cities discussed in this report tended to be a highly general proposal of how the city intended to go about implementing its project ideas. Staff-dominant cities usually emphasized the importance of the CDA as the key implementing factor during the forthcoming Action Year, with resident input important but clearly subordinate to staff initiatives and direction. The parity, staff- and resident-influence cities all placed greater weight on the resident role, although in at least two resident-influence cities, the strategy statement indicated that CDA staff and city hall (city council) would seek to play a stronger role in the program than they had during the Planning Year. The

importance of resident employment in supplementally-assisted projects was emphasized in several of the resident-influence cities' statements. Most cities sought to link their strategy statements to the priorities indicated in the problem and/or objectives components.

Project Descriptions:

The degree of completeness of these, too, tended to vary substantially from plan to plan, and from project to project within CDPs. The amount of detail available for each project proposal depended on such factors as the source of the idea (e.g. some local agencies merely offered old projects which had been fully drafted but turned down for one reason or another in the past), the availability of non-supplemental funding (Federal categorical or various local matching resources), the ability of the CDA staff and residents to agree on project sponsors, and the competence of the individual project drafter(s).

The majority of projects fell into social areas such as health, social services, police-community relations, and recreation programs. Environmental (housing, urban renewal, streets, facilities) projects came second, with economic development (job training, creation, placement) projects third in terms of numbers of projects among the 342 proposed in ten cities. Staff-dominant cities were more likely than the other cities to propose capital improvement projects, with some 40-41% of their proposals falling into that category.

The great majority of projects proposed were essentially maintenance or augmentation of existing programs directed to meet Model Neighborhood problems. Resident-influence cities were more likely than others to propose projects that were new to the MNA. Staff-dominant and parity cities demonstrated the highest levels of federal categorical or other non-supplemental sources of project funding. Because these cities were able to initiate their planning processes earlier than most resident-influence cities, it appears that they were also able to initiate earlier negotiations with Federal and other agencies for assistance in project funding. Most important was the superior grantsmanship of the actively engaged professionals in these systems.

Only 4 of the 342 projects were described as having a resident organization tied to Model Cities as sponsors. This undoubtedly reflected HUD insistence that existing local agencies be the operating agencies for Model Cities assisted projects.

Non-Programmatic Components:

This category included such elements as program administration, relocation, continuous planning and evaluation, and resident employment.

Projects of the administrative structure required for the first Action Year varied in degree of detail from city to city, although staff-dominant systems tended to be the most precise. All cities indicated that they would rely more on in-house full-time CDA staff than they had during the Planning Year. Both staff- and resident-influence cities tended to avoid an over-specific statement of program organization for the Action Year, indicating that the state of flux which had prevailed during the Planning Year was still unresolved.

The relocation statement was in all cities, except Indianapolis, prepared with little resident input. It was perceived by both CDA staff and residents as a technical document which would have little relevance until projects requiring relocation were actually underway. Detailed plans for relocation were prepared; therefore in only two cities, one parity and the other resident-influence.

Continuous planning and evaluation was similarly perceived as a residual CDP component by both staff and residents in practically all cities.

Most plans lacked statements indicating precisely how continuous planning would be carried on, by which staff, or when. It was generally contended that continuous planning would commence at some point after project implementation was actually underway. Similarly, the statements generally did not indicate precisely how project evaluation would be linked to continuous planning. To the extent that these statements were elaborated in the various CDPs, the staff-dominant and parity cities evidenced more understanding of HUD's requirements in this area.

Resident employment was seen in most cities as an element that could not be covered in detail until funding for projects had been firmed up and activity actually begun. Resident-influence cities evidenced more concern with this statement in terms of detail and emphasis than did staff-dominant systems.

Performance Criteria

Five general criteria or objectives were posited by HUD to which cities were expected to respond in a locally relevant fashion during the Planning Year. These criteria were: (1) coordination of planning activities between the program (CDA) and local agencies/city hall; (2) citizen participation; (3) mobilization and concentration of resources on the MNA; (4) innovation; (5) institutional change.

Coordination:

Linkages with those local agencies whose interests or activities were related to the Model Cities program, that is, to the MNA and its problems, were rarely seen as a pressing agenda item for CDAs or chief executives. The principal periods when relatively special efforts were made to involve local agencies were during writing of the application, when letters of endorsement were needed, or later, when project descriptions had to be prepared and the number of ideas for projects was limited. In addition, HUD's emphasis on utilizing local agencies as project sponsors stimulated an effort to solicit the participation of those entities.

A number of different techniques were employed by which local agencies participated in Model Cities. These included sharing or lending of professional staff to the CDA and/or to resident groups, sharing of information necessary to preparation of discrete CDP components, such as the problem analysis or project descriptions, participation in various CDA boards and subcommittees dealing with both general program review and specific functional area concerns, and solicitation of CDA staff and/or resident views on proposed agency plans or activities relating to the Model Neighborhood Area. This last function was sometimes formalized into a required sign-off by the CDA Board on any agency undertaking within the MN. This development was most common in resident-influence systems and was more productive of turbulence than of institutional change.

In all cities, the lending of agency staff to Model Cities programs was an essentially ad hoc affair, usually focused on specific functional areas for intermittent periods of time. As suggested earlier, the more productive area of agency cooperation, apart from the lending of staff, was the participation of agency representatives on task forces.

The reasons for local agency reticence in linking closely with CDAs or Model Cities in general were diverse and included a shortage of staff and funds, fear of a hostile reception from resident participants, limited ability on the part of CDA staff to manage agency involvement, lack of visible chief executive support for the program, and little evidence in the agency's view that Model Cities had a particularly promising future or offered any advantage to the agency if it were to succeed. Conversely, of course, the most effective stimulus to agency involvement was the incentive of ready funding for agency programs.

Three modes of processes of coordination were found to apply to

the ten cities examined here: (1) directive; (2) adaptation; and (3) adjustment. The *directive* mode was found to apply principally to staff-dominant cities and involved direct orders from the chief executive to local agencies requesting their participation in the program. The *adaptation* mode, which involved primarily the workings of chance and happenstance, and was ad hoc and functional in focus, was particularly relevant to staff- and resident-influence cities (especially where turbulence was quite high and sustained throughout the Planning Year). The *adjustment* mode applied principally to parity and the less turbulent staff- and resident-influence cities. It was characterized by such processes as negotiation, compromise and, occasionally, contention.

Citizen Participation:

Each planning system virtually by definition developed different responses to this criterion. In staff-dominant cities, the residents' role was essentially confined to that of legitimizing the initiatives taken by CDA staff and city hall officials. In the parity city, residents were given an equal voice to that of the CDA staff in defining the work program, preparing and reviewing plan content, and eventually acquiring a strong role in CDA administrative processes. Resident involvement in staff-influence cities was a major element in program decision-making, although the major initiatives came principally from staff with regard to planning work activity. Finally, in resident-influence cities, resident participation was clearly the predominant influence over program decision-making, although this degree of influence would vary throughout the Planning Year; in essence, there was a failure to establish groundrules governing assignment of roles to residents and to staff during that year in both staff- or resident-influence cities.

Concentration/Mobilization of Resources:

Few if any of the cities examined here evidenced much ability or inclination to mobilize financial or technical resources on the MNA beyond that called for initially in the application for a planning grant. For most cities, it was difficult enough to justify even the degree of attention on the MNA the program itself called for. In both staff-dominant and resident-influence cities there were instances where local political leaders came under pressure to explain why the Model Neighborhood Area merited any more attention than other economically hard-pressed neighborhoods in their city or county.

Although most cities attempted to induce Federal categorical assistance focused on their Model Neighborhood Areas, there was little evidence to indicate that Federal agencies responded to local requests in any particularly relevant manner. HUD would appear not to have achieved at the Federal level that agency coordination which at the local level was the responsibility of the CDA. It failed to create a climate of responsiveness among the Federal agencies involved or to inspire them to a necessary flexibility in application of their guidelines.

In nearly all cities there were instances of financial or technical commitment to the MNA by local organizations, and these were construed locally as fulfilling the 'mobilization and concentration of resources' criterion. But it would be difficult to legitimize these instances as a significant community response to MN problems in any comprehensive sense. Still, even these ad hoc and limited efforts did represent observable shift in the way city hall and/or local agencies perceived and dealt with the target area.

Innovation and Institutional Change:

Innovation was a difficult concept for many cities, but it was usually interpreted to mean something new to the city, new to the MNA, or new to the manner in which existing agencies dealt with problems of the Model

Neighborhood Area.

For most cities, the very fact of having established more or less sustained linkages between city hall and resident organizations in the MNA was an innovation. Even in the staff-dominant cities, where citizen participation had been defined in relatively limited terms, it was often possible to perceive what linkages had been established as innovative change. For many resident groups, Model Cities represented the first real opportunity to share, however minimally, in the making of plans and the allocating of resources which directly affected their lives.

There were relatively few innovations in the kind of projects proposed in the Comprehensive Demonstration Plans, although virtually each city was able to manifest a number of projects which, in their view, were highly innovative, particularly when compared with the traditional types of programs and projects experienced in the MNA.

Similarly, for many cities the comprehensive approach to planning, however limited, and the use of relatively sophisticated analytical techniques represented a degree of innovation in their concept of planning per se. In virtually all cities, planning had been confined to single-sector activity (e.g. physical planning, social planning, economic planning) with little cooperation among agencies. The program represented the first opportunity most local agencies had had to work on a concerted basis, focusing on a particular geographic area. That they responded with less than full commitment is not surprising.

In short, if few instances of dramatic or visible innovative change took place as a result of Model Cities, the history of each city's Planning Year does suggest a certain incremental shift in approach which may well have positively affected the manner in which local agencies, city hall, and the residents of the MNA themselves perceive and deal with the problems of the Model Neighborhood.

Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to suggest that these changes in agency behavior represented a substantial alteration in traditional agency or city hall practices. There were occasional cases in each city where transportation plans, housing and renewal projects, location of physical facilities, and decision-making affecting the MNA were changed to reflect either a new perception of MNA problems or the influence of resident pressure and/or participation in policy. Such changes were generally ad hoc, relatively specific in focus, and often contentious in their nature. Parity and resident-influence cities tended to manifest more such shifts in policy and institutional response to MNA problems than did staff-dominant cities.

HUD itself, or the RICCs, generally focused on questions of program structure (form) and the production of planning products rather than on the performance criteria as such. Federal intervention was rarely premised on issues concerning mobilization/concentration of local resources, innovation, or institutional change. RICC reviews often made note of coordination, but principally in the sense of individual agency linkages with the program rather than with comprehensive planning and coordination as a total approach. Citizen participation was an initial HUD concern in several cities; but was neglected as the Planning Year wore on and the failure to deliver products on schedule became of paramount concern. In several resident-influence cities, HUD intervened to restrict the degree of resident control over the program. Similarly, it acted in these cities to curb or eliminate resident control or sponsorship of projects that were — to the residents — innovative because of their sponsorship.

Issues

Issues were defined as conflict involving alternative choices over Model Cities-related questions between two or more actors. They were listed and examined in order to determine their relationship to planning systems.

The greatest number of issues revolved around questions of authority and power, the least over determination of Model Neighborhood Area boundaries. The majority of issues arose during the initial three months of the Planning Year, a time when various program actors were attempting to set groundrules and assign roles. Staff- and resident-influence cities manifested the greatest number of issues, parity and staff-dominant cities the least. Predictably, staff- and resident-influence cities tended to focus most on issues involving the setting of program-control/groundrules — that is, distribution and definition of roles for the chief executive, CDA staff, and residents. Questions dealing with planning work program and CDA structure were more common to staff-dominant cities. The parity city manifested the least number of issues overall, reflecting the early establishment of groundrules in that city and the apparent flexibility with which each actor approached potential issues.

Program Structure

Matters relating to program organization, including the securing of CDA staff, forming linkages with local agencies, city hall, interagency technical pools, and resident organizations were found not to bear consistent patterns relative to the four planning systems outlined in the previous sections.

CDA directors were in most cities selected by the chief executive with little involvement of MNA resident groups. The most common background characteristics of the CDA directors were close association with the chief executive, a backbround in a community action or social service agency, and an educational background in the social sciences. Most were in their thirties and forties. In a few cities, the CDA director was clearly chosen on the basis of his race or ethnic/language group, but in most there was no correlation between the dominant MNA racial or ethnic group and selection of a CDA director.

CDA staff sizes ranged from three to five in some cities to more than 30 in the larger metropolitan communities. Smaller cities evidenced a reluctance to build large staffs which might at some point in the future have to be supported out of general revenues rather than Model Cities funds. The educational background and professional experience of these staffs varied greatly, although larger cities tended to hire CDA staff with specialist responsibilities in mind, while smaller CDA's conferred a more general scope of responsibility on their staff.

A diverse array of governing boards, review boards, functional area committees and task forces, advisory councils, and other entities were formed in the various cities, again without apparent relationship to the type of planning system which obtained. Local agencies generally had appointed representatives on advisory and policy boards, and also lent professionals to serve at the task force subcommittee level. Representatives of the local legislative body served on a majority of the governing boards of CDAs, although they appear to have played a minimal role in all but one or two cities. Chief executives in two cities — one staff-dominant, one resident-influence — served as chairmen of key policy and advisory boards to the program. In essence, there was no pattern to the organizational arrangement developed in the ten cities, with the principal exception that all cities formed task forces to initiate most planning activities in the area of problem analysis and the development of project proposals.

Resident groups were also disparately formed in the ten cities. Most had a central organization with representatives elected from neighborhood areas. No effort was made in any city to attract the involvement of such groups as the militant young or the elderly. The relationship of the central resident board to the Model Cities planning process varied from de jure veto power in some resident-influence cities to the weakest kind of advice-giving in two staff-dominant communities. By the end of the Planning Year, HUD had effectively acted in virtually all cities to seek an end to resident-only veto power over planning or CDA administrative decisions. Planning-grant funds provided support for technical assistance hired independently by

residents in several cities, all of them either parity or resident-influence.

Interagency technical pools or committees were to be formed in practically all cities at the beginning of the Planning Year. In most cities, however, these ad hoc groups played a minimal role in planning activities. The intermittent nature of their convening, the potential for resident criticism and suspicion, local inability to use the skills they offered or to relate them to the planning program were all factors which served to limit the effectiveness of these technical pools. Instead, as has been noted, agency professionals worked more effectively at the task force level.

Conclusion

Of the four planning systems summarized here, the parity planning model appeared to have followed most closely the full range of HUD's planning requirements, particularly those expressed by the performance criteria summarized above. The staff-dominant planning system cities appeared to have come closest to meeting HUD's requirements with regard to planning process — that is, the formal sequence of planning events and the introduction of relatively sophisticated analytical techniques. Staff- and resident-influence planning systems, on the other hand, illustrated a considerable ability to follow HUD's performance requirements with regard to citizen participation, innovation, and to a lesser degree, institutional change. The parity city dealt successfully with each of the five performance criteria and, by comparison with the submissions from the other nine second-round cities, developed the best plan, both in comprehensiveness and in quality of component analysis.

The staff- and resident-influence cities evidenced the greatest departure from the orderly planning model initially posited by HUD at the outset of the Planning Year. These cities, because of the absence of firm, early and sustained chief-executive commitment, coupled with resident groups in the MNA that were neither cohesive nor politically integrated, proved unable to establish a set of accepted groundrules covering program control, assignment of planning roles, and relationship to city hall and local agencies. They were unstable, almost existential planning modes relative to HUD's model. More time was spent in these cities attempting to define roles and relationships than on substantive planning.

Staff-dominant cities, while evidencing an ability to follow the formal outlines of HUD planning process requirements, clearly fell short in meeting HUD performance criteria with regard to citizen participation, innovation, and institutional change. Early chief executive involvement, coupled with a non-cohesive and politically ineffectual resident base, created a planning system in which city hall and the CDA staff initiated and wrote most of the CDP components, with mere legislating input from residents, although in at least one city there was an effort on the part of CDA staff to translate resident interests into the plan.

The parity planning system, on the other hand, evidenced a sustained pattern of chief-executive involvement and support for the program and — perhaps most important — for citizen participation. Resident groups were cohesive and politically integrated prior to Model Cities, with leadership apparently representative or able to speak for the Model Neighborhood Area and to make commitments on its behalf — and to stick to them. There was sustained local agency participation in the parity city, a high level (compared with the other cities in the sample) of categorical Federal assistance manifested in the CDP project descriptions, and several instances of local agencies making changes in established practices to meet articulated resident demands, backed by the intervention of the CDA staff and of the mayor.

There is evidence to suggest that HUD's role during the second-round cities' Planning Year was focused in large part in setting a context in which a staff-oriented or parity planning system could develop. HUD emphasized the responsibility of the chief executive for the program, the need to rely on local agencies to administer projects, and downplayed the right of residents to assert veto power over program decisions. Since the development of specific planning systems clearly affected the degree to which HUD's program goals would be met, this context-setting approach could be considered quite appropriate in terms of those goals. In short, the individual planning systems represent real alternatives, with somewhat predictable outcomes. HUD would appear to have made its choice.

Model Cities and Revenue Sharing

There has been considerable concern expressed recently in Administration circles dealing with urban policy that general and special revenue-sharing programs should not be surrounded by the same precision of Federal guidelines and regulations as currently characterize many if not most categorical programs directed at urban areas.

In this context, the Model Cities Program represented a significant step in the shift in Federal philosophy away from narrow, prescriptive categorical programs and toward open-ended bloc grants. Model Cities contained elements of both categorical and revenue sharing programs. HUD requirements in the areas of structure, process, and product were prescriptive — a City had to respond to these requirements in order to obtain first a planning grant, and then five supplemental grants. Performance criteria, however, were presented in the form of standards of achievement against which cities would be measured over time after they had already received funds.

These performance or planning-process criteria, such as reliance on the chief executive, coordination of planning efforts, and involvement of residents in local planning and resource allocation efforts, should not be interpreted as representing the much more stringent approach of detailed administrative criteria. In fact, while focusing the attention of local communities and leaders on specified national objectives, the performance-criteria approach avoided development of "onerous and detailed categorical program criteria." Each city was encouraged to work out its own response to local problems, without the heavy hand of Federal interposition.

During the Planning Year of second-round Model Cities Programs, HUD slowly shifted its emphasis in several of its performance criteria, in response to information available on the experience of first-round cities, and in light of changing priorities in the new Administration. Specifically, citizen participation was clarified to exclude, in most cases, the degree of resident control extant in resident-dominant cities. On the other hand, HUD increasingly emphasized the importance of the involvement of the chief executive. These shifts in focus resulted in a shift *toward* parity situations in second-round cities. The presence of only one parity city — Indianapolis — is not indicative of a failure on HUD's part, but rather indicates that Federal intervention into local affairs through the use of performance criteria requires more time than does the use of prescriptions in advance of program implementation.

The Ten-City Study indicates, however, that performance criteria are a more suitable and productive means of influencing local results. If the Federal Government expects to achieve certain national goals through the implementation of its revenue sharing programs, such as a strengthening of the role of the local chief executive, performance criteria are a useful means toward this end. The point to be made is that the determination of planning systems is very much a matter of policymaking. In particular, the key role of the chief executive and the role of the residents was and is extremely susceptible to the intervention of a Federal agency. While turbulence is beyond the ability of local or Federal authorities to change in a short period of time, there remain real choices which can be made at the outset of the program to determine the type of planning system to be formed and the probable outcome of the action period.

Section II: Methodology

Chapter Four: Ten Cities
Chapter Five: Methodology

Chapter Four: Ten Cities

This report presents a comparative analysis of ten cities that received Model Cities planning grants in the second round of those awards. The cities and counties studied are:

1. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania
2. Cleveland, Ohio
3. Houston, Texas
4. Indianapolis, Indiana
5. Los Angeles City, California
6. Los Angeles County, California
7. New London, Connecticut
8. Santa Fe, New Mexico
9. Wilmington, Delaware
10. Youngstown, Ohio

These cases were selected from the 75 second-round communities on the basis of informed judgments by the contractors and HUD Community Development Division staff. Among those factors influencing the choice of cities were: (a) broad geographical representation; (b) form of local government; (c) racial and ethnic population mix in the Model Neighborhood Area; (d) city and MNA population size. Clearly, city selection was not premised on methodologically rigorous sampling techniques concerning either the range and diversity of resident characteristics or social pathology.

Both staffs assumed, granted the broad policy aims and objectives of Model Cities and the numerous factors projected as relevant in determining the program's impact on any one locale, that a purposeful selection of cities was preferable to use of random or stratified sampling. Further, both staffs agreed that selection of a limited rather than a large number of cities would permit initiation of a more intensive study process, and result in a more definitive analysis. As in the eleven-city study, the cities selected were chosen because they appeared to represent those characteristics essential to an understanding of the impact of Model Cities on all second-round communities. The number of cities picked would, it was felt, allow the development of appropriate typologies or classification schemes to guide future HUD program aims in this field.

As Table 1 indicates, the population of the ten cities, and of their Model Neighborhood Areas, varies considerably, from Los Angeles County's 7 million inhabitants to New London's 33,100 residents, with MNAs of 87,919 and 8,100, respectively. The sample also included one of the largest Model Neighborhood Areas in the country, Los Angeles City, with approximately 280,000 MNA residents located in two distinct areas: East Northeast and Watts.

Racial and ethnic differences are also marked in the populations of the selected cities/MNAs. Thus, of the 46,000 residents in Cleveland's Model Neighborhood Area, 90 percent are black, while of Santa Fe's MNA population of 9,926, more than 90 percent are Spanish-speaking. Similar divergencies occur in the Los Angeles City program, where 55 percent of the ENE MNA is Spanish-speaking, and 77 percent of the Watts MNA is black.

Unemployment rates in the ten cities studied range from a high of 17 percent in Santa Fe to only six percent in Houston. The percentage of MNA families with incomes under $3,000 per annum ranges from a low of 19.2 percent in Allegheny County to 46 percent in both Houston and Indianapolis. The percentage of substandard housing among dwelling units in the Model Neighborhood Area runs from a low of 15 percent in Youngstown to 44 percent in Cleveland. Infant mortality rates (deaths per thousand births) ranged from a low of 16 per thousand in Indianapolis to a high of 75 per thousand in New London. The percentage of MNA residents receiving AFCD went from a low of 1.6 percent in Youngstown, to a high of 35 percent in Santa Fe.

TABLE 1

TEN CITIES DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS*

		Allegheny	Cleveland	Houston	Indianapolis	Los Angeles**	L.A. County	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington	Youngstown
Total Population	City	1,024,255	850,000	1,187,000	476,258	2,479,015	7,000,000	33,100	48,413	85,690	166,689
	MNA	60,129	46,000	140,567	56,668	W 118,615 E 161,746	87,919	8,100	9,926	14,994	18,010
% Non-White	City	3.3%	40.0%	20.0%	22.6%		16.8%	16.0%	1.7%	39.1%	21.5%
	MNA	10.1%	90.0%	64.0%	45.0%	W 77.1% E 8.8%	70.0%	33.0%	2.5%	58.7%	52.4%
% Spanish Surname	City	N/A	1.5%	5.3%	N/A		10.5%	5.0%	50.0%	N/A	N/A
	MNA	N/A	2.5%	13.5%	N/A	W 9.9% E 53.1%	20.0%	10.0%	97.0%	68.0%	N/A
Economic:											
% Unemployed	City	5.7%	7.6%	4.2%	4.5%		6.3%	3.1%	4.6%	10.3%	5.8%
	MNA	6.7%	15.6%	6.0%	8.0%	W 12.1% E 6.6%	11.5%	6.5%	17.0%	12.5%	8.3%
% of Families with Annual Income Less than $3,000	City	11.1%	17.2%	19.0%	19.0%		14.4%	14.5%	23.0%	36.6%	16.2%
	MNA	19.2%	36.1%	46.4%	46.4%	W 27.9% E 29.6%	24.0%	23.0%	28.0%	42.0%	21.1%
Physical:											
% Substandard Housing	City	7.9%	17.8%	16.0%	15.0%		8.9%	13.0%	20.3%	10.5%	14.6%
	MNA	24.4%	43.8%	43.0%	31.5%	W 16.3% E 22.8%	22.8%	41.0%	41.0%	23.0%	15.2%
% Overcrowded	City	7.8%	3.2%	12.7%	11.3%		7.7%	7.0%	N/A	7.4%	N/A
	MNA	12.2%	7.8%	20.0%	16.7%	W 21.0% E 17.7%	27.7%	14.3%	N/A	10.4%	N/A
Social:											
Infant Mortality Per 1000 Live Births	City	20	27	22	N/A		20	49	22	24	14
	MNA	26	38	N/A	16	W 33 E 23	17	75	39	28	N/A
Welfare AFDC	City	3.6%	4.6%	6.0%	N/A		3.1%	2.8%	9.0%	28.4%	1.4%
	MNA	11.7%	14.6%	7.4%	N/A	W 13.7% E 11.9%	8.0% 27.0%	5.2%	35.0%	30.7%	1.6%

*Characteristics are given for County MNAs in Allegheny and Los Angeles Counties
**L.A. City has two Model Neighborhoods Watts (W) and East Northeast (E)

In selecting the cities, several factors were examined which preceded the Model Cities Program. These factors included a form of government, nature of resident involvement in MNA-focused decision-making, general public agency interest in social action programs, level of turbulence and the role of the chief executive. Here, too, the selected cities show a considerable diversity. As Table 2 indicates, six cities had strong mayor/council forms of government (including Allegheny County, in which the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners was the predominant figure), three had effective city manager systems (including Los Angeles County with a Chief Administrative Officer), and one city functioned under a weak mayor/council system.

The degree of resident influence in community decision-making affecting the Model Neighborhood Area also varied from city to city, although in the majority of cities resident organizations had minimal influence.* Only in Indianapolis did an internally cohesive and politically integrated citizen organization evince substantive impact on community decision prior to Model Cities. In Watts (Los Angeles City), Wilmington, New London, Santa Fe, and Youngstown resident structures were becoming moderately cohesive, albeit still lacking any meaningful degree of political integration.

All of the cities included in this analysis contained several resident groups in their respective Model Neighborhood Areas which were concerned with public planning and resource allocation. Most of these groups could not claim to speak fully for the MNA. Their constituencies were quite limited and their membership inexperienced and/or ineffective in influencing those public and private planning decisions affecting their neighborhood. In many instances — Cleveland and Youngstown, for example — these resident groups were subject to considerable internal dissension and frequent attacks from other resident groups in and outside the Model Neighborhood Area. In Allegheny County, Houston, Los Angeles County, and Cleveland resident groups tended to be both non-cohesive and politically non-integrated.

The level of turbulence (civil unrest or community tension linked to the MNA) was also examined for the ten cities as a pre-Model Cities characteristic. Relatively high levels of turbulence were found in Cleveland, New London, Wilmington, Youngstown (South Side), and Los Angeles City (Watts). Moderate levels were said to prevail in Los Angeles County and Santa Fe, and low turbulence in Indianapolis, Allegheny County, and Houston. These indices would prove to have a marked effect, through chief executive involvement, on formation of planning systems.

Finally, the ten cities' pre-Model Cities planning environment was also examined to determine the degree of demonstrated and sustained interest by local public officials in various Federally-assisted social action programs as well as programs initiated locally in recognition of severe social, physical or economic problems. In at least four of the ten cities — New London, Indianapolis, Youngstown, and Wilmington — a concerted effort was underway prior to Model Cities to attract Federal assistance to help resolve pressing local problems. In the remaining six cities, no attack of any kind had been made on critical problems. Indeed, for several cities, Model Cities represented the first significant public admission of the existence of major urban problems and the desire to use Federal funds in their resolution. This is not to indicate that the use of federal monies in these cities was non-existent, but rather that sustained city interest in these funds and problems had not been demonstrated.

In this connection, the attitude of the chief executive or the city manager in relating to comprehensive planning was crucial. This commitment prior to Model Cities was rated in the analysis presented here, and included public statements of

*Assessment of resident influence was based on both internal cohesion (organization stability and accepted resident leadership) and political integration (the degree to which established community leaders accepted resident proposals, critiques, and other inputs into decisions affecting the MNA).

TABLE 2
PLANNING ENVIRONMENT: PRE-MODEL CITIES FACTORS

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence			Parity	Resident Influence				
	Allegheny	Houston	L.A. County	Los Angeles	Youngstown		Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Institutional											
Form of Government	Strong Chairman-Board of Commissioners	Strong Mayor-Council	County Administrative Officer-Board of Supervisors	Weak Mayor-Council	Strong Mayor-Council		Strong Mayor-Council	Strong Mayor-Council	City Manager-Council	City Manager-Council	Strong Mayor-Council
Citizen Participation											
Pre MC Involvement of Residents – Degree of Community Organization	Non-cohesive Non-integrated	Non-cohesive Non-integrated	Non-cohesive Non-integrated	Watts: Cohesive; Non-integrated ENE:[2] Non-cohesive Non-integrated	McGuffey Heights: Cohesive Integrated Southside: Non-cohesive Non-integrated		Cohesive Integrated	Non-cohesive[1] Non-integrated	Cohesive Non-integrated	Cohesive Non-integrated	Cohesive Non-integrated
Pre-Model Cities Climate											
Movement Towards Model Cities Objectives	Moderate[3]	Minimal	Moderate	Minimal	Minimal		High	Minimal	Moderate	Minimal	High
Chief Executive Support for Model Cities Objectives	Moderate	Minimal	Moderate	Minimal	Minimal		High	Minimal	Moderate	Minimal	Moderate
Turbulence	Low	Low	Moderate	High	Moderate		Low	High	High	Moderate	High

[1] Cohesive — resident group that is united internally and has recognized and representative leaders.
Integrated — resident group that has a meaningful degree of influence and experience in dealing with public agencies.
[2] East Northeast
[3] Qualification: While the pervasive attitude was non-supportive generally for federal programs, specific individuals in Allegheny County assumed the responsibility of applying for Model Cities grant and lobbying for its approval.

support for the new Model Cities program. Table 2 indicates the relative standing of these officials in this context.

The ten-city sample represented then, great diversity in pre-Model Cities characteristics, several of which — notably the role of the chief executive, the level of turbulence, and the nature of resident involvement — would prove to be of determinative importance in the later formation of planning systems in these communities' approach to the new program.

Chapter Five: Methodology

Following the systematic procedures developed for the first-round eleven cities study, data for this second-round analysis were collected by field staff who monitored and continuously analyzed the planning process in each of the ten cities, making extended monthly visits to evaluate issues and events as they took place. Interim visits were made as events warranted. Principal areas covered included the following:

1. Involvement of chief executives, CDA directors, resident groups, local agency representatives, HUD field staff, civic organizations
2. Contextual events, such as civil unrest, local elections, and Federal activity not related directly to Model Cities
3. Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee (RICC) sessions
4. Resident and staff reviews of CDA planning products
5. Technical assistance activities
6. Activities related to production of a given Model Cities planning product and its specific intent

The data collected from these field team visits were then compiled in the form of evaluative chronologies for each city.

The techniques utilized to gather information included:

1. Systematic review of primary data, such as internal memoranda, applications, MPS and CDP drafts, minutes of CDA Board and Task Force meetings
2. Newspaper coverage
3. Extended interviews — usually on a monthly basis — with CDA staff and a local panel of interviewees
4. HUD regional and area office files
5. Attendance at appropriate RICC, CDA, and resident meetings

Data collection was augmented by central office staff research, including compilation of field data, continuous analysis of chronologies, issuance of special requests for data to field staff, and preparation of preliminary comparative analyses of select data in response to HUD requests. In addition, the contractor distributed a detailed survey instrument to all 150 Model Cities; this questionnaire sought to gather extensive, computer-quantifiable data in order to:

1. Validate the findings of both first- and second-round comparative analyses
2. Prepare a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the full program effort (forthcoming shortly as a separate project report).*

The evaluative chronologies were then used to develop case studies for each city, distilling the bulk of raw data into a manageable narrative form.

*The contractor is currently preparing a comprehensive analysis of the full range of 150 Model Cities, based on the survey cited above. The survey data will be tested along the lines of the planning systems examined to provide a fully quantitative assessment of city responses to HUD planning requirements for Model Cities without the detailed precision of the present study.

As sources for the present report, however, the researchers went back to the raw data of the chronologies and product content analyses in order to develop a more extensive and accurate study, refining the comparative techniques developed for the earlier eleven-city study.

Data Analysis

Detailed content analysis of the sources cited above were conducted by five research assistants under the supervision of the project director. The linkages and other findings reported by these assistants were then further checked by the core writing staff for this study.

For the review of chronologies and other primary data, a guide was developed by core staff delineating specific factors and events to be identified and categorized for each city. The data sheets were organized around seven discrete planning periods:

1. Application period
2. Waiting period
3. Revision period
4. Starting up
5. Mid-Term Planning Statement
6. Completing the plan
7. Final review

Each of these planning periods was then related, within each city experience, to overall achievement of the HUD planning model. Starting-up, MPS, and plan completion time periods were further divided into precise component elements, thereby permitting an analysis linked to performance criteria and planning process requirements set by HUD. Particular focus was placed on the role individual actors occupied during preparation of the various plan elements.

The Comprehensive Demonstration Plans for each city were examined by a review procedure which: (1) outlined HUD's specific requirements for each component; (2) set up a rating system for each component based on the degree to which these requirements were met in each plan.

In order to establish comparability with the earlier eleven-city analysis, the remaining chapters are divided into three key sections:

Section III deals with a summary of the alternative planning systems found in this analysis (Chapter Seven). This Chapter is followed by an examination of the key factors more or less determinative of these planning systems.

Section IV seeks to elaborate on the five principal characteristics which appear to form patterns consistent with the planning systems. Each of the chapters in this section deals with one characteristic: alternative roles; planning process; planning products; performance criteria; and issues.

Section V examines program structure, an element which does not appear to bear strong relation to planning systems.

A final Section VI presents abbreviated accounts — in effect, highly condensed case studies — of each of the ten cities.

Section III: Alternate Planning Systems and Determinants

Chapter Six: Alternate Planning Systems
Chapter Seven: System Determinants

Chapter Six: Alternate Planning Systems

Each of the ten cities covered in this report developed a distinct planning system in which key actors dominated or influenced various planning periods, as well as the Planning Year generally. Factors principally associated with a turbulent civil/political environment, the role of the local chief executive, and the context-setting involvement of HUD relative to citizen participation were instrumental in forming these planning systems.

Each city followed locally relevant approaches to meeting the four major elements of the HUD planning model: structure, process, product, and performance criteria. Despite these different and often highly individualistic approaches, it is possible to discern four basic patterns characteristic of the ten cities:

1. Staff-dominance
2. Staff-influence
3. Staff/Resident Parity
4. Resident-influence

This listing does not include a resident-dominant planning system for the principal reason (as will be brought out in a following chapter on system determinants) that a changed HUD role sought to create a local context favorable to chief executive control and leadership. With second-round cities, HUD insisted that mayors and/or city managers should retain sustained program administrative and policy control, that existing local agencies should have priority in sponsoring projects assisted by Model Cities supplemental monies, and that a resident de jure vetos over program policy and planning decisions would not be allowed to develop. Even where de facto resident veto power was obtained, as in Cleveland, New London, and Wilmington, HUD would intervene to negate the results of that situation if it ran contrary in their view to the new emphases on chief executive control, fiscal accountability, and local agency project sponsorship. In short, HUD created an environment in which it was extremely difficult for a resident-dominant planning system to become established.

TABLE 3
SYSTEMS AND THEIR DETERMINANTS

Planning Systems	Degree of Turbulence	Chief Executive Involvement	Resident Characteristics
Staff Dominance	Low	Sustained	Non-Cohesive Non-Integrated
Staff Influence	High	Minimal	Non-Cohesive[1] Non-Integrated
Parity	Low	Sustained	Cohesive Integrated
Resident Influence	High	Minimal	Non-Cohesive[2] Non-Integrated

[1] Chief executive involvement prior to resident cohesion.
[2] Resident cohesion prior to chief executive involvement.

Staff-Dominance

In contrast to the eleven-city study, where only one city developed a staff-dominant planning system, three communities fell into this category in the ten-city analysis: Allegheny County, Los Angeles County, and Houston. Part of the explanation for this contrast between the two groups may lie in the pre-Model Cities characteristics of these communities. The three cities all had strong chief executives,

weak resident cohesion and political integration, and a relatively low level of turbulence prior to Model Cities.

In addition, the strong HUD emphasis on the administrative and fiscal responsibility of the chief executive was undoubtedly a key factor. Where HUD's focus during the first-round of Model Cities planning grants had to some extent stressed resident planning, the second-round planning period was more oriented to a strong voice for city hall. This focus was not lost on Model Cities political leaders, particularly where there was predilection to strong centralized authority. This was precisely the case in the three staff-dominant cities examined here.

Early and strong involvement of the chief executive or his surrogate in these three cities was essential to the development of staff-dominant planning systems. In Los Angeles and Allegheny counties, this official (through a surrogate) offered sustained support to the program in its early stages. In Allegheny County, the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners was content to work through the county planning director concerning development of the program, although important policy and personnel decisions were cleared by him. Similarly, in Los Angeles County a close aide to the MN district supervisor played a vital role in forming the program. Both chief executives evinced a sustained interest in Model Cities progress through their surrogates.

Only in Houston, where the mayor by city charter also functions as city manager, did the chief executive become directly involved on a sustained basis in the program. The highly centralized nature of Houston city government (including strong budget controls by the mayor) encouraged his continuous interest in Model Cities and here, as in the other two staff-dominant cities, the CDA director was appointed by the chief executive without any effort at confirmation by MN residents.

Eventually, all three chief executives were content to leave day-to-day management to their appointed CDA directors. But their initial involvement, coupled with a general planning structure and environment essentially inimical to any real sharing of power, was sufficient to retain ultimate program direction in their hands.

In these three cities, moreover, the resident base in the MNA was internally fragmented, geographically dispersed, and politically estranged from public (and often private) decisions affecting their area. In Allegheny County, elected officials of eleven separate municipalities within the MNA dealt individually and independently with the County Board of Commissioners. In none of the eleven communities was there any organized resident structure in the contemporary sense of a power group. Geographic dispersion throughout a large area added to the sense of community isolation and fragmentation. There was no history of citizen agitation.

Houston and Los Angeles County had also experienced little racial or poverty-focused turbulence. Resident groups tended to be internally fragmented and had minimal impact on public decisions concerning the Model Neighborhood Area. The geographically-extended MNAs in Los Angeles County and Houston also contributed to the dilution of resident influence.

In these staff-dominant cities, professionals took the CDA prime responsibility for putting together the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. They were generally able to follow both the timing and sequence of the HUD planning model, although in Allegheny County it was much more the form than the substance that was followed.* Resident involvement, as will be discussed in a later section, was perceived as relevant only in a legitimizing or sanction capacity.

While staff sought to follow the form of the HUD planning model, and engaged in such exercises as problem analysis, definition of objectives, and ranking of objectives, city commitment to this logical approach was limited. In Allegheny County, for example, funding priorities for supplemental monies were altered in at

*Allegheny County relied to an extensive degree on the assistance of an aerospace consulting firm whose overly-complex charts and analytical approaches were clearly not grasped by most local officials.

least two instances — employment and land-use — to meet objectives which had not rated high in early priority ranking by consultants, CDA staff, and the resident representatives.*

In all cities, projects irrelevant to the planning process were inserted into the CDP. In Los Angeles and Allegheny counties, HUD's planning model was perceived as a paper exercise. In the end it was felt that many if not all of the projects could have been developed without recourse to the model, particularly since a good many of the projects had been on "back burners, eagerly awaiting funding." Political considerations, availability of matching funds; or an "exciting idea," all justified improvisational project selection.

Coordination between Model Cities and local agencies in the three staff-dominant cities was sporadic and uneven. Initial agency cooperation in putting together the planning grant application tended to evaporate once that document was submitted to HUD. The reasons for this are diverse, but paramount was a concern over having to work within a structure that involved sharing power with the chief executive, residents, or CDA staff.

Although the strong role of chief executives in staff-dominant cities would be expected to mandate agency cooperation with Model Cities, in fact their powers in this regard, as in most cities, were limited. In the first place, the enthusiasm over Model Cities had diminished somewhat by the time the announcement of the planning grant was made and sizeable reductions in the amount of funding anticipated did nothing to revive it. Thus, the impetus for the chief executive to compel agency cooperation had to an extent evaporated. Moreover, even strong executives were restricted in the number of agencies they could influence. The mayor of Houston, easily the most powerful of the three chief executives, had very little leverage over the Houston Independent School District or key Harris County agencies. Again, the sheer size of Allegheny and Los Angeles counties robbed the Model Cities program of the grand focus its proponents might have desired.

Agency involvement, therefore, was more of an ad hoc occurrence than a full fledged program of active cooperation with Model Cities in the three communities. Some staff were provided on-loan to the CDA, information was offered when readily available and agency representatives in all three cities did sit on key advisory and/or CDA governing boards. Local agencies also participated on task forces. Coordination tended to reflect both chief executive directive and such adjustment processes as bargaining, negotiation, and review.

Resident involvement in the three staff-dominant cities was limited to review of CDA staff-prepared documents, often at the last minute, and some involvement in problem analysis and project initiation activities. In all three cities, but particularly in Los Angeles County, it was not uncommon for the CDA staff to submit planning drafts to residents for approval after the documents had already been sent off to HUD. This was particularly true in Los Angeles County.

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that resident views were not given serious consideration by CDA staff. Indeed, CDA staff in Allegheny County and Houston, for example, appeared to be sufficiently secure in their control over the program to permit a certain degree of endorsement to resident project proposals. In short, given the established groundrules in staff-dominant cities, CDA staffs felt they could afford some flexibility in meeting resident requests.

In comparison with the efforts of the other Model Cities examined here, the staff-dominant cities were much more effective in linking project descriptions to MPS-stated program priorities. Interestingly, they even appeared to evidence a greater ability to promote new projects, not operated by existing agencies, than did other cities. This again suggests that early establishment of program-control groundrules

*Senior political leaders in the County, sensitive to the needs of industries in the Valley – and to workers dependent on those industries — felt that initial priorities set by CDA staff and consultants did not sufficiently reflect these needs.

permits, at least for staff-dominant planning systems, some degree of flexibility and innovation in developing the CDP.

It would clearly be futile to expect any real degree of innovation or institutional change in staff-dominant cities since the system itself implies an accommodation (if not a total identification) with the establishment. But the fact remains that residents were at least involved in some of the planning and resource allocation decisions affecting their lives. And there is some evidence to indicate that their articulated concerns and project preferences were given more credence and action than had Model Cities not existed. Existing institutions and powerful political leaders were also perhaps made a little more aware than they had been of the problems and concerns of Model Neighborhood Area residents. There was no evidence to indicate that local resources had been unusually mobilized or concentrated on the MNA. "We've got lots of poor people," was the remark of one senior county official.

Staff-Influence

Two of the ten cities covered here manifested the characteristics of staff-influence planning systems: Youngstown and Los Angeles City. Both communities evidenced a moderate to high level of pre-Model Cities turbulence, and both had chief executives whose interest in the program was essentially transitory and to a large extent governed by impending local elections. Both Model Cities were characterized by non-cohesive and politically non-integrated resident groups in the Model Neighborhood Area. In essence, the staff-influence cities were characterized by an absence of accepted groundrules governing program direction and control; both cities required continued deadline extensions from HUD concerning submission of products and were among the last cities to finish their Planning Years.

Youngstown and Los Angeles obtained their planning grants under similar circumstances. In both cities, HUD was not at all satisfied with the quality of the application (it was the second time around for Los Angeles), and would have preferred to refuse the grant. However, a combination of political pressure on HUD (both mayors were up for re-election) and the ever-present threat of civil disturbance overruled the application quality issue. In both cases, it must be noted, HUD's apprehension, based on the merits, was later to be borne out by the planning process in the clients.

Initial mayoral interest, given pending elections and high turbulence, focused strongly on getting a planning grant award for the cities. After its receipt, however, this interest waned. In Los Angeles, the Mayor had a large number of concerns, of which Model Cities was only a small part. He appointed his executive aide to get the program moving and then withdrew from any active involvement. In Youngstown, the Mayor appointed a young, labor-allied non-professional to run the CDA almost single-handedly, and similarly withdrew from daily program concern. In addition, HUD's quick intervention in Youngstown to insist on expansion of the MNA (in the direction of the potentially-troublesome South Side) further diluted the Mayor's interest; there could be little benefit to be gained, in his view, from extending the program into an area dominated by his critics. A change-over in mayors shortly after submission of the MPS further complicated Youngstown's planning progress.

In short, chief executive involvement in both cities was uneven, sometimes disruptive, and restricted to crisis situations. The groundrules were shifting and uncertain, and the disputes over them successfully delayed substantive planning activities for a considerable period of time. In contrast to the staff-dominant cities, mayoral support for the CDA directors was hesitant and at times withheld.

The resident base in Youngstown and Los Angeles was fragmented and disorganized. In Los Angeles, the problem was exacerbated by the existence of two georgraphically distant and demographically distinct Model Neighborhood Areas. East Northeast was essentially Spanish-speaking, while Watts was largely populated by black residents. No single organization accepted by the majority of residents existed in either area — in fact, conflict was rife over who could legitimately speak for what community. As a result, the residents had little political clout in city hall, save for such

politically astute but small groups as the Watts Labor Community Action Committee. In Youngstown, the Model Neighborhood Area was similarly divided into two geographically distinct areas. And although the Northeast area was politically well-organized, its influence over program affairs was greatly over-shadowed by the very militancy of the politically disorganized Southside. The Youngstown Leadership Conference did claim to speak for the Southside, but it was perceived by many as an essentially militant organization, and its representativeness was open to question. Its political acceptance to city hall prior to Model Cities was quite limited.

In both staff-influence cities, CDA personnel and on-loan professionals prepared most of the planning documents — application revisions, MPS, project development, non-programmatic elements — but were generally careful to obtain the approval of resident groups involved in the program. Resident participation was actively solicited, particularly for the problem analysis and project initiation components of the Plan; the revisions were basically a CDA staff exercise, save for the important resident-participation element, on which HUD still placed a modicum of emphasis (more in Youngstown than in Los Angeles City). CDA staff and professionals dominated planning sessions and conferences. At the same time, the staff were careful to observe and respect resident views when articulated.

As noted earlier, in each of the cities the timing of submissions to HUD was delayed by the lateness of organizing the CDA and initiating formal planning. And although the HUD-proposed planning sequence was followed, neither city hesitated to reorder their priority objectives to accord with favored project proposals. The absence of accepted groundrules made the planning systems in these two cities sensitive to the threat of turbulence, with the result that permissive changes in work program objectives, staff assignments, and timing of activities often resulted.

In Youngstown, the CDA staff perceived itself as a militant advocate for the residents, particularly staff attached to the South Side MNA whose stance tended to reflect the views of a militant resident element. As a result there was a large faction of moderate residents which frequently sided with city hall against the CDA. This led to periodic intervention by the mayor, the eventual dismissal of the CDA director, and generally permitted city hall to be viewed ultimately as the primary client of the program.

Resident groups in both staff-influence cities were essentially involved in planning largely through task forces, but also as members of overall planning review boards. In Los Angeles City, the long process of forming the structural elements of the program had the effect of minimizing resident involvement; essentially, the resident task forces and MNA boards sanctioned the findings and recommendations placed before them, often at the last minute, by CDA staff and consultants. There were several workshops held to produce both the MPS and the final plan, but these tended to be dominated by CDA staff and agency professionals; and although the final projects did represent a fairly accurate picture of resident perceptions of need, the actual projects represented staff and agency consensus of the best method of dealing with particular problem areas.

In Youngstown, task force sessions and all-day planning conferences were held periodically and provided an opportunity for resident views to be presented. The CDA staff tended to dominate the proceedings, albeit perceiving themselves as resident advocates; later staff rewrites of conference findings and proceedings had in several instances the effect of substantially revising resident ideas, although the basic anti-establishment tenor of the conferences did remain, particularly in the MPS. In essence, staff efforts at conforming their drafts more or less to resident concerns would, it was hoped, lend sanction to staff-prepared products and therefore facilitate their ultimate acceptance by residents or resident-dominated review boards.

Local agency involvement in both Youngstown and Los Angeles City was minimal up to the point of preparing specific project proposals. At that point, particularly in Los Angeles City, agency interest increased dramatically given the potential of substantial supplemental funding. The general absence of sustained agency

support for Model Cities can be accounted for in several ways, including the lack of strong chief executive support, the turbulence suffusing the planning process, and the real costs involved in providing staff time and facilities. The cost of participation seemed high and the benefits marginal. The relative weakness of the CDA directors — as compared with those in staff-dominant cities — was another factor which worked against persuading local agencies to become fully involved in the program. This is not to say that agency participation did not occur in earlier planning periods, for it did, but only for limited periods and for quite specific products.

HUD's planning products generally took longer to complete in the staff-influence cities than the anticipated one year. The lengthy delays in staffing and in responding to HUD's Discussion Papers had the effect of substantially lengthening the Planning Year in these two cities. The actual planning products, while meeting HUD requirements concerning form, diverged significantly with respect to content. Thus, the analyses of problem areas varied in documentation and depth; some were supported by substantial data, others proved to be general statements of MNA perceptions. Critiques of existing delivery systems also tended to vary, although in both communities existing agencies came in for much criticism. Despite the long delay, Los Angeles City's CDP proved — because of its comprehensiveness, organization, and detail — to be one of the better plans (of the ten cities examined here). Youngstown, on the other hand, was considered by HUD to have produced a much less acceptable document. The different quality of staff is the principal explanation of this divergence. Both cities relied heavily on supplemental funds to meet the major share of first year action needs.

As in the staff-dominant cities, there appears to have been little apparent conscious effort to meet HUD's performance criteria. What changes did emerge — and they were relatively few — came from dialogue and bargaining between residents and staff or residents and local agencies, and were essentially indirect by-products of the continuous efforts to define roles and develop acceptable groundrules. In both cities, a citizen participation component gradually developed and had much influence on the planning process. Such existing resident organizations as the Watts Labor Community Action Council and the Youngstown Leadership Conference developed a substantial degree of legitimacy in their dealings with city hall, although the former's influence waned as the Planning Year wore on and elected neighborhood boards developed their own sense of cohesion. These developments, by strengthening the role of residents in public decision-making in their respective cities, represented a meaningful change, particularly in Youngstown.

Agency coordination was largely ad hoc, relying as much on chance for its occurence as on such adjustment processes as bargaining and compromise. Neither city made any real effort at coordination, soliciting agency participation only for specific technical problems or project development. For their part, agencies did not solicit CDA or resident comments on their plans for the MNA.

Similarly, there was no evidence that either city made an effort to mobilize or concentrate resources on the MNA. In both, the Model Cities program by itself was regarded as sufficient largesse. In Los Angeles the Watts area had already been the recipient of substantial community assistance following the riots. In Youngstown the South Side, though increasingly restive, had been included in the MNA only at HUD's insistence.

Innovation in both cities was limited almost solely to the bare fact of resident participation in the decision process. The Youngstown CDP generated some new projects, but they were eliminated either at the level of City Council review or, later, by HUD. In Los Angeles City the fact that most projects were initiated by agencies precluded innovation.

The protracted delay in producing acceptable plans in both cities was directly related to continuing HUD intervention — although it may be argued that the planning system itself made intervention inevitable. In Los Angeles, HUD repeatedly insisted on changes in program structure to conform to the desired city hall

orientation, while in Youngstown HUD sought the reverse, a greater degree of citizen participation and an extension of the MNA to include a by-passed poverty area.

Staff/Resident Parity

Of the ten cities covered in this analysis only one, Indianapolis, exhibited the characteristics of a parity planning system — a low level of turbulence, sustained chie. executive involvement, and a highly articulated resident structure. By contrast, four of the eleven first round cities previously studied were identified as parity systems, and the apparent shift in policy must be explained by the HUD emphasis during the second-round Planning Year on chief executive responsibility for Model Cities administration and policy-making.

The principal difference between Idianapolis and the five staff-oriented cities discussed above focuses planning and administration held by the resident structure. Whereas in the staff-oriented cities, the control of CDA staff over program planning was clear and generally unchallenged, the relationship between CDA staff and residents in Indianapolis was much more discretely drawn. Although the CDA had the power, given the mayor's sustained support, to minimize resident input into planning, it chose deliberately not to do so, but instead paid considerable attention to resident concerns. At an early stage in the program, for example, the mayor pledged to the resident-dominated CDA board that he would respect their recommendations concerning planning matters; this constituted a de facto resident veto power over planning issues. He also approved funding for independent staff support for the five neighborhood planning councils which were to be part of the overall resident structure providing input to the program. In other cities, resident groups had to engage in vehement argument to secure similar concessions or rights. Similarly, although the Mayor had early named the CDA director without seeking confirmation of his appointment from the residents, he agreed later, when the CDA director resigned, to share decision-making on appointment of a successor.

The early and continued support for the Indianapolis Model Cities program by the Mayor was a vital element in developing a parity planning system, since he had an initial commitment to a strong resident role. As in most cities, the chief executive's involvement was marked during the application period, and diminished gradually throughout the Planning Year. However, he was continuously informed of CDA activities and his appointment of a close aide to direct the CDA meant to most local observers that the Mayor "intended to keep his hand in."

While the mayor's policy was one of accommodation on citizen participation matters, the residents, for their part, never seriously challenged the Mayor's authority in the program; this, too, was not the pattern in many other Model Cities. In essence, the Mayor was able to preserve a delicate balance of power in the program — an approach which eventually resulted in two of the best MPS and CDP planning documents received by HUD. It should be added that resident input was sought at the application stage of the program, sufficiently early to establish mutually acceptable groundrules over control issues.

The resident base in Indianapolis was cohesive and moderately integrated into city decision processes at the time the program was applied for. There existed a viable Community Action Program resident network in the proposed Model Neighborhood Area (albeit one with a certain degree of local notoriety). Moreover, the MNA was geographically cohesive, a sharp contrast to those in Allegheny County and Los Angeles City and County. It is, however, legitimate to question whether the organized groups in the MNA were representative of the area. In any case, there were virtually no issues during the Planning Year which focused on the representativeness of the resident component — again a contrast to other Model Cities where battles over representativeness often dominated program affairs.

The establishment of acceptable groundrules early in the game permitted the city to focus early on planning. It was agreed that while final drafting of plans would rest with the CDA staff, resident input would be constant at all stages of production. Joint task forces would prepare problem analyses, objectives, and

proposals for projects. The CDA board would review and approve all products before submission to HUD.

This agreed-upon model was not always easy to follow, but there was sufficient flexibility in the system that conflict did not erupt into confrontation. Instead, a mutually acceptable compromise was sought and adopted. Residents were given a much more substantive and active role than in either staff-dominant or staff-influence cities. They acquired this position by pressure, compromise, and bargaining, whereas, in the staff-oriented cities they participated more on the sufferance of CDA staff and city hall. The difference was subtle, but it was real.

CDA staff sometimes became resident advocates on issues of direct concern to the MNA, such as urban renewal and street construction, in opposition to other city agencies. CDA staff were also careful to follow the groundrules over planning matters, and to seek resident approval for products prior to submission to HUD.

The only major issue relating to the CDA staff came over the right of the CDA director to control personnel and budget matters. Although a continuing concern to residents, it was not resolved until late in the Planning Year, when a HUD official indicated that the CDA board did in fact have authority over these issues. The CDA staff then deferred to the HUD ruling.

Resident groups in Indianapolis were able to make substantive contributions in most phases of the planning process. Product review, for example, took place at three resident-dominated levels — the task forces, neighborhood planning councils, and the CDA board itself. The content of most CDP components was reached by negotiation between staff and residents.

Local agency involvement in the planning process was much more visible than in staff- or resident-oriented planning systems. In essence, the establishment of firm control groundrules early in the program, coupled with sustained and visible mayoral support, provided the necessary impetus to induce local agencies to become involved. Evidence of a cooperative resident attitude towards local agencies was also helpful in inducing agency participation.

The principal focus of local agency participation was at the subcommittee level and in planning conferences and workshops. Agency representatives operated largely as technicians and resident advocates, that is, in a supportive role consistent with the overall approach of Indianapolis Model Cities. Local agencies were also active on the CDA board in a review capacity.

Indianapolis was generally able to follow the timing and sequence of HUD's planning model. In fact, the major difficulty between HUD and the city arose over HUD's desire to substitute the Mid-Term Planning Statement for Part I of the original CDP approach. Replacement of Part I by the MPS was viewed as requiring the dumping of much work that had already been done, and was also seen as methodologically much less effective. CDA staff even flew to HUD's regional office in Chicago to argue (unsuccessfully) for retention of their Part I.

A diverse set of techniques was used to prepare the Indianapolis CDP, including matrix analysis, planning conferences and workshops, task forces, and an education "charrette" to assist in planning for a new school in the MNA. The CDP itself was completed fourteen months after signing of the planning grant contract with HUD.

The Indianapolis CDP was considered by HUD to be one of the better plans produced in the region, if not nationally. It contained all of the elements required by HUD, linked problems to objectives and priorities to projects. Sponsorship of projects was principally left to existing local agencies; the CDA would operate at least two of the projects, while others would manifest a strong resident influence in governing board membership and resident employment. The critique of existing service delivery practices and agencies was factual, and while it did not minimize problems in delivery, it was moderate in tone. Considerable quantitative material supported most problem analyses. The strategy statement was detailed and represented the substantive

input of residents and staff. Eventual selection of projects mirrored the strategy statement. In short, the CDP was internally consistent.

The continuous planning and evaluation component, while imprecise, was more detailed than in most cities. The relocation statement on the other hand, a neglected element in most CDPs, was the work of a 26-member task force composed of residents, agency professionals, and CDA staff. It was quite detailed, with appropriate work programs and schedules listed, reflecting the considerable MNA concern over urban renewal or "clearance versus rehabilitation." Indianapolis placed greater reliance on categorical programs as a proportionate share of its total first Action Year budget than did other cities in this sample; perhaps as a result of the greater participation of local agencies.

The process of adjustment characterized coordinative efforts in Indianapolis' Planning Year. Sharing of information, provision to the CDA of on-loan staff from local agencies, and continuous and productive dialogue between residents, agency representatives, and CDA staff resulted in the development of an implicit team to produce the CDP. This continuous dialogue, it must be added, was perceived locally as the most productive innovation to come out of Model Cities.

It also produced substantial changes in plans affecting the MNA. Thus, an urban renewal clearance program was altered to reflect resident desires for housing rehabilitation. A freeway, slated to cut thru the MNA, was dropped from a regional highway plan, and study for alternatives instituted. The city school district provided active support to CDA-initiated efforts at planning new school facilities for the MNA.

Local agencies indicated a willingness to mobilize and concentrate their resources on the Model Neighborhood Area to a greater extent than in the past. City hall did not accept, however, a resident desire for decentralized administration of Model Cities, preferring to weld the Model Cities program into metropolitan-wide programs, feeling that this would eventually be the most productive way to concentrate resources where most needed.

Resident-Influence

New London, Wilmington, Cleveland, and Santa Fe are considered to have developed resident-influence planning systems. This approach is characterized by a high degree of turbulence between residents and city hall, residents and CDA staff (at times), and between resident groups themselves. There is an absence of accepted groundrules over program control and role assignments relative to the planning process. The involvement of the chief executive is minimal, hesitant and usually prompted solely by crises events. The resident group, prior to Model Cities, was neither cohesive nor politically integrated. Ultimately, however, because the residents become organized and involved in the program prior to any sustained interest by the chief executive, a resident-influence system evolves.

Support for Model Cities in the four resident-influence cities came initially from senior city officials: the city managers in New London and Santa Fe, the city planner in Wilmington, and the director of community development in Cleveland. These individuals convinced their chief executives that the city should apply for a Model Cities planning grant. Motives for applying varied from desire for a large urban renewal grant in New London to an effort at dampening potential violence in Wilmington. In Santa Fe, Model Cities was perceived as an opportunity to attract Federal monies to an area where the Federal presence – and comprehensive planning – had been minimal. In Cleveland, it was seen as a way for the mayor to reward his supportors for their assistance in his recent election.

City hall support for Model Cities waned, however, as turbulence grew over questions of program control or organization. In essence, Model Cities soon came to be viewed, in New London, Wilmington, and Cleveland as a distinct liability. In Santa Fe, the situation was complicated by the fact that the chief executive functioned as a weak mayor, at odds with a city council majority to which the city manager was allied. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the city council majority did in fact have great suspicion of the program, if for no other reason that

that the mayor was in favor of it. As a result, there was no effective city hall support of Model Cities in Santa Fe for most of the Planning Year. In this vacuum of authority, the city manager played the key city hall role.

The chief executive in Cleveland had intially indicated his strong support of the program and of an effective resident role in it. But as the program became increasingly embroiled in control issues, his interest waned to be activated only in crises situations he could not ignore. The residents were able early in the program to acquire a power of veto over program decisions, planning and administration.

The level of turbulence in all four cities was high throughout the Planning Year and the pattern by which it developed was quite similar. The application period was dominated by city hall. Very little resident participation was involved, although in Cleveland, during a brief "honeymoon," more resident involvement was present during the waiting periods than in the other cities. Then, resident groups in the MN soon raised serious questions over the content of the application, particularly with respect to program organization, citizen participation, and program review. These issues prevailed throughout the ensuing planning periods. Resident groups were in constant confrontation over planning and organization issues, with city hall gradually giving way on some matters and "hanging tough" on others.

Essentially, program control groundrules were never established in the resident-influence cities. The rules of the game continuously shifted, depending on the issue, the role of HUD, and the imminence of increased turbulence.

As a result, CDA staff in these cities had to assume a service role or rely strongly on outside consultants for some direction in planning matters. In Wilmington and New London, CDA staff generally perceived themselves as resident advocates, but were hindered by sporadic chief executive or HUD intervention resulting from political pressures or resident confrontation with local public agencies. In Santa Fe, the CDA director was closely allied to the majority, conservative city council faction, while his principal staff developed an allegiance of sorts with the resident structure.

The CDA staff principals in Cleveland operated throughout the Planning Year in a service capacity, weakened by high turnover in CDA directors and by the limited competence of those directors and of the remaining staff. Only the occasional intercession of an acting CDA director trusted by both residents and the chief executive permitted the program to move ahead. The residents held a power of veto and frequently exercised it.

In all four cities, the CDA staff were also hampered in their ability to initiate planning activities by their small size – three to five full-time staff – and by the very limited professional planning ability of most staff members, particularly in Wilmington, New London and Cleveland. In essence, these shortcomings reduced the ability of the CDA staff to direct planning, thereby creating a vacuum which only consultants, and occasionally HUD, could fill.

When staff or consultants took more than a service role, resident groups did not hesitate to overturn or disagree vehemently with their recommendations and in most instances succeeded in altering them substantially. Only when HUD would intervene to support city hall for example, on project sponsorship – did the resident groups have to back down.

Agency involvement in these four cities was low-profile, sporadic and uneven in quality. The risk of public criticism from resident groups and the staff costs of program involvement caused agencies to shy away from active participation. The lack of sustained chief executive support also did not encourage continuous agency participation and it occurred only at the low-visibility level of the Task Forces.

In Cleveland, for example, the strife-torn resident role played havoc with the staff's ability to involve local agencies in substantive planning. By and large, only those agencies sympathetic to resident interests, such as the Community Development Department and the Housing Authority, were able to commit themselves effectively to the planning process.

Wilmington, New London, and Cleveland did not complete their planning

documents until well into the second Planning Year. Santa Fe managed to submit its CDP earlier because of the considerable competence of its senior planner and an outside consultant. In Cleveland, HUD continuously extended deadlines, hoping that the program would eventually settle its control problems. But since that issue was as much *within* the resident group as between residents and staff/city hall, HUD's hope was not to be realized. Neither the timing nor the order of HUD's planning model was followed in Cleveland.

In all four communities, resident-dominated committees jumped from problem analysis to specific project proposals for the first Action Year. Definition of goals and objectives, priority rankings, and preparation of a strategy statement became last-minute staff products with relatively little bearing on the problem analyses. Whereas problem analyses substitutes in these cities were sharply critical of existing delivery of services within the MNA, there was little follow-through in the program itself; because of HUD's emphasis on utilizing existing agencies, project sponsorship fell, in the end, to the very agencies criticized. The project proposals themselves varied considerably in quality: some were quite detailed and clearly reflected a well thought-out implementation strategy; others were just as clearly off-the-shoulder, with little substantiation.

HUD intervention was extensive in both Wilmington and New London where resident-dominated boards had insisted on substantial resident control of projects, to the exclusion of local agencies. HUD insisted that such approaches be dropped and also intervened in the description of program administration, insisting that the local chief executive retain direct control. In both cases, HUD's position was much stricter in interpretation of its guidelines than that of local officials, who had been willing, however hestitantly, to cede to resident demands.

Still, the resident-influence planning system was able to achieve visible response from several local agencies concerning problems in the MNA. Housing and renewal plans in Wilmington and New London were altered as a result of resident pressures emanating from Model Cities and health planning in Santa Fe reflected resident concerns. In these cities, resident problems certainly gained more agency attention than had been the case prior to Model Cities. In Cleveland, the Housing Authority evidenced the greatest degree of responsiveness to resident concerns.

Very little evidence of resource concentration and mobilization was indicated during the Planning Year. Supplemental funds composed by far the greatest portion of projected first Action Year budgets. This again reflects the lack of local agency commitment, the disorganization of the planning process, and the weakness of CDA staffs.

Project development in Cleveland, like other CDP components, became quickly embroiled in political conflict. Two groups of residents, one supporting the chief executive and the other inimical, struggled throughout much of the Planning Year to have their projects accepted to the exclusion of the others. At one point, three different CDPs were circulating in the city. Only last-minute city hall intervention was able to work out a compromise plan to be submitted to HUD, almost one year after the original due date. The quality of Cleveland's CDP was among the lowest of the ten cities reviewed here although it did reflect the principal resident priorities. The CDP was decidedly a resident-product, yet sponsorhsip of projects by existing institutions was the highest of all cities examined here. Similarly, the number of new projects was the lowest of all cities. In essence, the incessant squabbling among resident groups resulted in compromises supporting the service-delivery status quo; and local agencies benefitted most from the protracted debate.

Innovation, then, was largely confined to modes of citizen participation, except for Santa Fe, where *any* agency involvement in projects could be considered a significant breakthrough. Generally, resident involvement in municipal decision-making was the system's most visible innovation. If local agencies did not particularly like to deal with the residents, they certainly could not ignore them, and that was considered by many as a positive accomplishment. If there was no major institutional change, there was increased institutional awareness of the MNA.

Chapter Seven: System Determinants

In the eleven-city analysis, three factors were found to be highly influential in forming a Model Cities planning system: turbulence, resident cohesiveness and political integration, and the level and timing of chief executive involvement.

These three factors proved to be important determinants in the ten-city study as well. In addition, the increasingly prescriptive role of HUD was found to be a critical element influencing the development of planning systems in these cities.

Planning Environment: Prior To Model Cities

Several characteristics of a city's planning environment prior to preparation of the application for a Model Cities planning grant were defined and examined in the course of this study. These characteristics were:

1. Population size
2. Racial and ethnic indices
3. Range and intensity of problems
4. Form of local government
5. Level of interagency coordination
6. Attitude of chief executive to comprehensive planning and Federal assistance
7. Level and kind of turbulence in the planning environment
8. Nature of resident participation in public decision-making processes

Of these eight characteristics, only three — the level of turbulence, the nature of resident participation, and the role of the chief executive — appeared to affect the type of planning system developed by each of the ten cities. The three factors are all mutually reinforcing; in particular, the first two (representing the socio-political makeup of the MN) clearly had large impact in determining the third — the degree of chief executive participation — while the chief executive's role was found, in turn, to be the single most important factor in determining what kind of planning approach developed within any particular city.

Where the chief executive or his surrogate took a sustained active part in the Model Cities program, especially in the early stages of development, a staff-dominant or parity system was indicated. Conversely, where chief-executive involvement was low-level or intermittent, the less stable approaches were adopted — that is, staff- or resident-influence systems. Thus, the level of turbulence and the nature of resident participation may be regarded as dependent variables, but of an uncommonly forceful kind: they not only combined with the major factor to determine precisely which system would obtain, but they were themselves highly determinative of that factor, namely the chief executive role.

This circularity is not difficult to understand, and in fact is all but implicit in the very set of terms. Turbulence — a pre-existing state of conflict between rival MN groups and/or between such groups and city hall — inevitably predisposed the chief executive to remain aloof until 1) the structure had stabilized or 2) a crisis situation developed requiring his intervention. Turbulence, in turn, often resulted from (and always contributed to) a failure of the resident base to achieve either a common voice (cohesiveness) or a position of acknowledged legitimacy in municipal affairs (political integration), and this lack of an identifiable constituency with which he could parley on a rational basis also inhibited the chief executive from involving himself centrally in the program. Again, his involvement tended to be postponed until the condition had either significantly improved or had reached a point of confrontation.

Finally, in each non-parity city, the planning system adopted was a direct reflection of which — the resident base or the chief executive — first developed a strong role, and the primacy of the chief executive in this determination resulted from the fact that he alone exercised an option for unilateral action: the *decision* rested with him, while the characteristics of the Model Neighborhood were merely factors affecting that decision. Thus, where low-level turbulence was combined with a

non-cohesive resident base, the chief executive saw no danger in asserting a strong early role for city hall, and absence of a unified resident voice made a staff-dominant system almost inevitable. In all three cities exemplifying this system — Houston, and Los Angeles and Allegheny counties — the fragmentation and political impotence of the resident base was enhanced by the sheer size and scattered boundaries of the Model Neighborhood, while in all three a highly centralized bureaucracy was ready to exert control at the beck of the chief executive. Even where these intensifying factors did not obtain, however, the mere coupling of low turbulence with non-cohesiveness in the Model Neighborhood produced a staff-dominant situation: this was true at Santa Fe in the earliest stages of the program.

In Santa Fe, however, the resident base, while it had never experienced either turbulence or politicization, was geographically, ethnically and economically unified and hence highly susceptible to organization, which was achieved by VISTA volunteers soon after the MC program began. As a result, a very strong resident role quickly developed *before* the chief executive had asserted full administrative control and consequently a resident-influence system was established. In the other cities exhibiting this system — New London, Wilmington and Cleveland — early chief-executive involvement was doubly inhibited: a high level of turbulence prior to Model Cities indicated a wary hesitant city hall approach, while a non-cohesive resident base made the negotiation of groundrules impossible. In these cities, as at Santa Fe, the residents achieved cohesiveness relative to the program — that is, established their Model Cities turf — before the chief executive chose to act decisively. In Cleveland, where a newly elected black mayor assumed that he in fact represented the MNA, the early stages of the program were staff-dominated, as in Santa Fe; but the chief executive soon yielded to strong resident demands, partly out of this identification with the MN and partly out of a perceived threat of violence. In all of these cities, ground-rules were never clearly established, but the CDA staff role became largely one of servicing resident-articulated views on components of the CDP.

Staff-influence planning systems appeared to evolve more gradually. They developed in those cities where high-level turbulence and a politically inchoate resident base limited the chief executive to a peripheral involvement which was not countered by any developing cohesiveness within the Model Neighborhood. In Los Angeles City and in Youngstown, a staff-influence system came into being virtually by default, simply because of the inherently more structured and more dominant position of city hall. In Los Angeles, neither of the two distinct Model Neighborhoods was able to surmount internal divisiveness, while the Youngstown residents never overcame a curious apathy regarding the program. Continuing contention on the one hand and listlessness on the other, coupled with a lack of meaningful chief executive involvement, precluded the establishment of satisfactory groundrules and the program drifted into a staff-influenced mode of planning.

The parity system developed because an involved chief executive, sympathetic to citizen participation, had available to him within the Model Neighborhood a fully cohesive resident structure, developed prior to the Planning Year, with which to negotiate. He was able to perceive Model Cities as an extension of previously established planning procedures focused on acknowledged goals rather than as something new and potentially threatening. Since the resident component had developed an organized consensus, political legitimacy, and experience in dealing with local agencies, groundrules could be quickly agreed upon and generally adhered to. In a parity situation, by definition, it is difficult to assess a primary role. The mere existence of so rare a bird as a cohesive and politically integrated Model Neighborhood would seem to make this the prime determinant; but the decision to seize this opportunity and to make best use of it remained with the chief executive. A parity planning system would not have developed at Indianapolis had the chief executive not been motivated both toward comprehensive planning and negotiation with a citizen component recognized as a valid political force. Indianapolis was not without conflict over issues — both internally within the resident group and between that body and city

hall — but the climate of mutually acknowledged legitimacy of the various actors and its articulation into an organizational structure permitted rational discussion and negotiation of these issues.

The HUD Role

The validity of this schema of system determinants is best demonstrated by the nature of HUD's intervention during the Planning Year of these ten cities, as graphically charted in Chart A. The Federal effort in this regard has been largely misinterpreted, particularly by participants in Model Cities programs, but sometimes by HUD personnel themselves. Under analysis it becomes clear that HUD's intention was not, as commonly thought, to strengthen the chief executive role per se but to shift the emphasis of any existing planning system to the maximum possible approximation of the parity model. The most contentious and least productive systems, however, we have seen to be those which developed upon the failure of the chief executive to assert a sustained, active and supportive role — that is, the staff- or resident-influence systems.

Both through the promulgation of guidelines, then, and through direct intervention into local programs HUD sought to correct this primary deficiency where it existed. As corollary policy, it also sought to emphasize the use of established local agencies for project development and implementation. But HUD's prescriptive efforts scarcely stopped at these measures to center the program on city hall, for it moved with equal force to correct the imbalance evident in both staff-influence and resident-influence systems. In Youngstown and Los Angeles City HUD interceded quite early (CDA staff selection and program organization) to redress the application's inadequate citizen participation. In Youngstown, HUD went so far as to insist that the application revision include a new MNA representing the urban ghetto while at the same time reducing the boundaries of the original MNA, a quiescent and sparsely populated rural slum. The new MNA, more vocal and militant in character, would clearly require a more flexible city hall attitude toward program control. Similarly in Los Angeles, HUD would repeatedly prod the city to organize its program to meet citizen participation criteria — although the slow pace of planning led HUD to shift its focus toward mere completion of the product. On balance, HUD's effort was not fully successful in either city, since both remained essentially staff-influence systems, but it exerted what pressure it could on local conditions to redress the imbalance.

All of the resident-influence cities began, paradoxically, with heavy staff orientation and in these cases — Santa Fe, New London, Wilmington, and Cleveland — HUD's initial pressure for more citizen involvement, coupled with the chief executive's failure to take an assertive role, may be said to have backfired to produce a resident-influence system. HUD's intervention then shifted to an effort at reducing the degree of citizen control. In New London, a resident assumption of veto power over program planning — acceded to by the city manager — was rejected by the HUD leadman, who openly recommended a parity or "partnership" model. In Wilmington, the HUD leadman repeatedly intervened to prevent proposed projects from being sponsored by resident-dominated entities. In Santa Fe, after the Planning Year, HUD rejected a citizen participation project which would have operated outside CDA or city hall control. In these resident-influence cities also HUD's attempt to shift the planning system toward parity was clearly less than fully successful; but it did, in these second-round cities, prevent any resident-dominant systems from developing.

This focus of HUD activity on achieving the nearest approximation of parity is graphically evident in Chart A, where significantly lower levels of HUD intervention are evident in those staff-dominant and parity cities that exhibited strong chief executive involvement and early establishment of clear groundrules, with the least intervention in Houston and Indianapolis. A staff-dominant planning system is, of course, as far removed from the parity ideal, but HUD was all but powerless to inspire in the residents themselves a stronger, more cohesive role. Nevertheless, in Los Angeles and Allegheny counties HUD did make a strenuous effort to increase, at least, the structural capability for greater ciizen involvement. But HUD was reluctant to

CHART A

THE HUD ROLE: BY PLANNING PERIOD/CDP COMPONENT

STAFF DOMINANCE STAFF INFLUENCE PARITY RESIDENT INFLUENCE

intervene where groundrules were firm, while the officials of both counties politely affirmed that they were operating within HUD's guidelines for chief-executive administration and that they knew best how to run their programs. In the staff-dominant and parity cities, HUD's active role focused on more narrowly technical issues -- a relocation plan in Los Angeles County, for example -- or on essentially procedural matters.

Since, however, there was an inevitable HUD emphasis on an assertive and sustained chief-executive role as the sine qua non of a parity system, undeniably a general consequence of HUD intervention was the creation of a planning environment in which staff-oriented systems could flourish.

Section IV: System Characteristics

Chapter Eight: Alternate Roles
Chapter Nine: Planning Process
Chapter Ten: Planning Products
Chapter Eleven: Performance Criteria
Chapter Twelve: Program Issues

The purpose of this section is to examine those elements which, in some coherent and discernible pattern, characterize the planning systems outlined in the previous two chapters. Such system characteristics, derived from extensive review of the cities in the various planning systems, provide a set of real policy alternatives for Federal urban actors. The characteristics surveyed here include these categories:

1. Roles
2. Process
3. Product
4. Performance criteria
5. Issues

Model Cities organizational matters — such as developing a program structure, securing CDA staff, establishing linkages between the CDA, city hall, and local agencies, and forming resident organizations — were not found to describe consistent patterns relative to the five planning systems. Variations in the way local programs dealt with these questions did not appear characteristically the approach followed in individual planning systems in dealing with HUD's process, product, or performance requirements. Structure is; therefore, dealt with separately in Chapter Thirteen of this report.

Chapter Eight: Alternate Roles

Although in each city such actors as the CDA director, CDA staff, local agencies, and MNA residents played a number of different roles during various planning periods, primary roles emerged for each actor which were characteristic of each planning system taken as a whole. The nature and impact of the chief executive's role has been dealt with in the preceding chapter.

CDA Director

Five roles were found to have been assumed by CDA directors during the various planning periods. These roles, it should be added, were not mutually exclusive; CDA directors could and often did combine a number of roles during a given planning activity, depending on the focus of their efforts. These roles were:

1. *Directive:*
CDA directors were able to mandate the pace and outcome of certain specific work programs and products for sustained periods of time; theirs was the preponderant influence. This role was largely associated with a *staff-dominant* planning system.
2. *Managerial:*
This role was principally associated with a *parity* planning system and to a lesser degree with a *staff-influence* approach. The CDA director as manager was able to manipulate relevant program participants for sustained periods of time in order to attain desired process and product outcomes.
3. *Brokerage:*
In this role, CDA directors were able to function largely as intermediaries between various groups and individuals. This role was sometimes found in *resident-influence* systems. The broker CDA head operated as if he had two clients to serve: city hall and the residents.
4. *Technical:*
Largely associated with *staff-* or *resident-influence* planning systems, the CDA director as technician generally provided assistance as to products, HUD guidelines and requirements. This role often involved rewriting of drafts prepared by residents or local agencies, but without basic change of content.

TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF CDA DIRECTOR

	Staff Dominance		Staff Influence		Parity	Resident Influence			
	Allegheny	Houston	L.A. County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Indianapolis	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington	Cleveland
Ethnic Affiliation	1-White 2-White	White	Black	White	1-White 2-Black	White	Black	Spanish-Speaking	Black	1-White 2-Black 3-Black 4-White*
Dominant MNA Minority Group	1-White 2-White	Black	Black; Mexican-American	Black; Mexican-American	1-Black 2-Black	Black	Black	Spanish-Speaking	Black	1-Black 2-Black 3-Black 4-Black
Director Selected By	1-Chairman of County Commission; 2-Same	Mayor	County Supervisor	CDA Board Appt. by Mayor	1-Mayor 2-Same	Mayor	City Council/ Resident Personnel Committee	City Council	Mayor/ Residents	1-Mayor/ Residents 2-Same 3-Same 4-Same
Background	1-Planning Director; 2-CAA Staffer Master's in Social Work	Humble Oil Executive	Supervisor's Aide	OEO, Social Work, Former Priest	1-CAA, M. in Educ. 2-MNA Resident, H.S. Teacher	MNA Resident; High School Teacher	Director, CAA	Educator; County Welfare Director	MNA Resident, Social Rehabilitation Specialist	1-Grad Student 2-CAA Director 3-Deputy Dept. Head C.A.** 4-Director, Dept. C.A.
Director Reports To	1-County Commission; 2-Same	Mayor	Director, Dept. of Urban Affairs	Deputy Mayor	1-Mayor 2-Same	Mayor	City Manager	City Manager	Mayor	1-Mayor 2-Same 3-Same 4-Same

*CDA Director formerly Acting Director on two occasions.
**C.A. Department of Community Affairs.

5. *Service:*
The CDA director here acted only to provide necessary documents, physical facilities and housekeeping efforts. This role was primarily characteristic or *resident-influence* planning systems; it reduced the role to that of an office manager, with little interpretive or technical involvement.

In Houston, Allegheny County and Los Angeles County, the absence of resident effectiveness, coupled with continuous chief executive support of the program, placed the CDA director in a directive position early in the program. Only in Allegheny County did the CDA director shift at times to a managerial or brokerage role, through his lack of political influence or planning experience. Attention to resident-articulated interests, was due more to official willingness to accede than to the residents' ability to command.

In Indianapolis, both CDA directors assumed the role of manager throughout the Planning Year. They treated the resident groups as clients more or less equal to city hall, albeit the CDA clearly retained the backing of the mayor. This perception by the residents of a parity relationship with city hall, coupled with their acceptance of mayoral fiscal and administrative responsibility for the program, was sufficient to permit the CDA director managerial authority. In addition, the political and administrative scope of the first CDA director, in office for most of the Planning Year, added stature to the role.

In the staff-influence and resident-influence cities, minimal chief executive involvement, coupled with a weak resident base, at least initially, tended to impede a clear assignment of roles regarding planning responsibilities. As a result, CDA directors in these cities often played a service and occasionally a technical role. In both New London and Wilmington, for example, the CDA directors were reluctant to "put our necks in a noose," since it was unclear just what was expected of the program by either residents or the chief executive. In Santa Fe and to some extent in Wilmington, the simple lack of technical expertise by the CDA directors had the effect of casting them in a service role for sustained periods of time.

The brokerage role, as noted, was particularly characteristic of Cleveland, largely as a result of resident distrust of city hall, coupled with a city hall desire to "know what's happening" and to ensure that public agencies have at least minimal participation in the program. In Cleveland, all of the CDA directors perceived their role as specifically that of brokering between the demands of the residents and the priorities and interests of Mayor Stokes. In fact, it was when a CDA director dropped the brokerage role for one more sympathetic to city hall (i.e. one more managerial or directive) that resident pressure would build to have him dismissed. Under the tumultuous circumstances of Cleveland Model Cities, any role larger than brokerage, service, or technical would have been doomed to failure. In any event, both a strong resident base and significant chief executive support were important to development of brokerage or, for that matter, managerial functions.

CDA Staff

Similar to a finding in the eleven-city analysis, the role of CDA staff members was closely linked to the role assumed by CDA directors. Thus, if the CDA head operated in a directive capacity, CDA staff functioned largely as technicians. If the CDA director operated in a managerial role, CDA staff served not only as technicians, but also added a resident-advocacy function. Finally, where a CDA director served in a brokerage or service capacity, the CDA staff tended to occupy a similar role, although resident advocacy was not uncommon for CDA staff under these conditions also.

Technicians:
In the staff-dominant cities, firm groundrules permitted a directive role for the CDA chief, who had total chief-executive support. Staff reported solely to the director and there were no demands on them for advocacy from an acquiescing citizen component. When, in these cities, a staff member sought to advocate on behalf of resident interests he was persuaded to drop his advocacy. In Allegheny County, he was fired.

Technician/Advocates:
In a parity city, the CDA served two clients: city hall and relevant resident groups (the CDA Board, Neighborhood Planning Councils, etc.). This meant that CDA staff would on occasion advocate resident views to public agencies and political actors, and in Indianapolis they successfully did so in such areas as housing, urban renewal, transportation and education. This double staff role contributed greatly to program stability; specifically, it did much to establish resident/professional consensus on substantive planning activities.

To a much lesser degree — more clandestinely and on an individual basis — staff sometimes took the technician/advocate role in both staff- and resident-influence systems. In these cities, advocacy took place mostly at the task force level, rarely in open meeting. The latter represented a crisis event, a confrontation.

Brokers:
In contentious environments such as Cleveland, both CDA Director and staff were frequently cast into a brokerage role, although staff most often was relegated to a service function. Caught in the middle, staff served as intermediaries between contending city hall and resident groups: at one point in Cleveland, when residents and consultants had produced rival CDPs, the CDA staff developed a third plan combining the two.

Service:
In the absence of groundrules governing program control and planning process, a low-key role of technical service was the norm for both CDA Director and staff in such staff-influence cities as Youngstown and Los Angeles and in the resident-influence cities. They could take a more forceful role in the planning process only when prodded by HUD intervention (a common occurrence in both types of systems, as noted) or when either the chief executive or the residents assumed a predominent role. The technical function of staff in these cities tended to concentrate on non-programmatic elements, such as relocation and evaluation, and the use of outside consultants was common.

In general, where CDA staff assumed largely a service or broker role, their involvement in the planning process was erratic and became sustained only when faced with HUD deadlines, while planning events were most often improvisational and ad hoc in nature. By contrast, in those cities where CDA staff assumed a technical or technician/advocate role, staff involvement was continuous and intensive throughout the Planning Year. Ultimately, the role assigned to or assumed by CDA staff became of prime importance in formulation of the CDP, since residents were rarely capable of producing, by themselves, acceptable components of the planning product. Inevitably the CDP reflected the orientation of the staff. In staff-dominant systems, the CDA as technicians echoed the concerns and priorities of city hall, with an occasional gesture to resident interests. If, however, the staff took a technician/advocate stance, the products were much more likely to reflect resident positions. The key appeared to be the recognition by CDA staff that they had in effect two clients of equal legitimacy: but this recognition could come only under certain circumstances. Thus, the determinants of the planning system were pervasive and fairly consistent in their effect: they set the roles, they set the nature of the planning process, and they set the tenor of the products.

Residents

In eight of the cities examined in this study, much of the Planning Year was spent developing groundrules over program control and procedures. Completion of the CDP was a hurry-up, last-minute affair, prompted by peremptory intervention by

HUD. In such cases as Indianapolis, Los Angeles County, and Houston, this setting-in period of negotiation between residents and city hall was brief and relatively free of abrasive rhetoric for delaying tactics. But Cleveland, Wilmington, New London, Santa Fe, and Youngstown, experienced various kinds of turbulence and conflict during negotiations over control groundrules. At times there were no negotiations at all, both sides adopting a wait-and-see attidude, or a deliberately obstructionist one. In staff-influence and resident-influence cities, the bargaining never really ended; at best, an uneasy truce was established.

These struggles between city hall and residents sometimes with HUD as a third protagonist — were focused on issues of form, such as governing board composition or the degree of resident review, rather than on the substance of planning process of product. In short, program control was the key issue, resolution of which was seen as the determining factor governing program content. The issues of control was more susceptible to residents than such technical concerns as ranking objectives or linking projects to the problem analyses. Finally, the general environment in many MNAs was much more disposed to distrust of city hall than to harmonious cooperation.

In several cities (notably New London, Indianapolis, and Wilmington), issues not directly related to Model Cities became the arena — e.g. urban renewal programs and transportation planning. Where Model Cities was seen as merely an extension of urban renewal, as in New London, the struggle for control became intensified.

Generally, where the chief executive or his surrogate took an active role at an early stage and during the initial months, the period of structural shakedown was notably shorter and less contentious. He was able to make lasting role assignments and as a rule he dominated organization of the program and hiring of the CDA director. This alone circumscribed the arena of negotiations over groundrules.

But, where the chief executive was at the outset only minimally involved, the negotiation over structure was protracted, lasting in some cases beyond the end of the Planning Year. Sometimes (Wilmington, Cleveland, Youngstown), the dialogue was punctuated by confrontation and often no one at city hall would take responsibility for making a firm commitment, let alone maintaining an agreement. In several cities this situation coincided with divided or weak resident organizations. The outcome was that there was no locus of program decision; no boundaries to city-resident negotiation and contention.

Five primary role patterns for resident participants were identified and related to the planning systems outlined in this report:

1. *Directive:*
Residents in Cleveland, Wilmington, and New London, at times dominated the planning process. They defined work program components, proposed specific planning techniques, and generally controlled the timing of planning activity — in particular, the implementation of the work program. Finally, the residents were able to dominate much of the content of submissions to HUD, even hiring their own outside consultants when they found CDA project descriptions unacceptable.

This directive role resulted principally from the fact that the residents were often able to negotiate with city hall from a position of great strength. In Cleveland, they represented the Mayor's critical political constituency, as they continuously reminded him. The MNA was cohesive in terms of its desire to control the program, and despite resident infighting throughout the Planning Year, the determination to remain in control remained a unifying constant. Residents distrusted the CDA staff, particularly the three "permanent" directors, and reduced them to a strict brokerage or service role, mediating between residents and city hall or consultants.

2. *Influential:*
This role, by definition, was associated with resident-influence planning systems in New London, Wilmington, Santa Fe, and Cleveland. In these cities, the resident group coalesced over Model Cities issues of control before city hall had managed to articulate its own position. In Santa Fe, the mayor, in fact, supported a resident-influence system but was overruled by a City Council majority which favored staff dominance, as did the city manager and CDA director.

The result of early resident coalescence over structural groundrules and to some extent over substantive planning, helped establish continuing major resident influence over planning processes and products. The chief executive, faced with an increasingly stronger resident group and the threat of turbulence in the MNA (or elsewhere, as in Wilmington), maintained a low profile in the program and offered limited support to a hard-pressed CDA eager to initiate planning. Both in Wilmington and New London, resident groups played a major role in selection of the CDA director, who was initially perceived as a resident advocate, even by himself.

The staff in turn, without strong chief executive support, were largely confined to a service role, which later changed to that of a technician/advocate as resident preeminence became solidified. Then, however, staff was essentially translating resident inputs into language acceptable to Federal requirements, save where HUD demanded a different content approach. In short, the CDA staff sanctioned resident views which, in turn, were atriculated in resident-dominated CDA boards, task forces and independent resident agencies linked to Model Cities.

3. *Sharing:*
Indianapolis' parity system, characterized by both continuous chief executive support and a cohesive and politically-integrated resident base, permitted the formation of a resident role which shared decision-making with city hall. Residents occupied a position equal to that of the CDA staff relative to planning, held a majority position on both the CDA board and task forces and even secured program funding and review responsibilities for the five Neighborhood Planning Councils (NPCs).

Staff rewriting of the resident-initiated drafts clearly sought to present the resident views, not to modify them. When time restraints required, residents accepted prodding from staff or even a limiting of their review of products to a pro forma signoff.

4. *Sanction:*
This lesser resident role is associated with staff-influence cities (Youngstown, Los Angeles City) where lack of cohesion combined with minimal chief executive involvement inhibited the setting of firm groundrules at the outset of the Planning Year. This situation was exacerbated in Youngstown — where the original MNA had been picked because it was cohesive and politically integrated — by HUD's addition of a highly turbulent area to the Model Neighborhood. Similarly, HUD's sequence of demands in Los Angeles — first that citizen participation be increased, second that the criterion of mayoral control and responsibility be met — made it all but impossible for firm, accepted roles to be assigned early in the Planning Year.

In both cities, the resident struggle for program preeminence was exacerbated by the geographical separation of the two areas of the MNA. Racial and language differences further divided the Los Angeles program. The stance of city hall on role assignments was also fractionated, a diversity of public actors claiming responsibility for the program, from the head of the Community Redevelopment Agency to the mayor's Executive Assis-

tant to an outside consulting agency. The chief executive's role was vague and diffuse. In Youngstown, the debate was MNA expansion, coupled with a less than effective CDA director (appointed by the mayor), produced a lack of policy direction from city hall. An impending election further deterred the mayor from becoming embroiled in a program that now involved a potentially "hot" neighborhood.

In these cities, discussions of roles were lengthy, abrasive, and seldom conclusive. Appointment of a supposed resident-advocate to the CDA directorship in Youngstown was initially thought to be a resident victory, but the residents were so divided internally that most of them soon realized that the new director no more represented their views than had the former one.

In Youngstown and Los Angeles, the continuing absence of clear city hall direction, while it placed initiative in the hands of CDA staff, also made that staff quite sensitive to the views of resident groups and present those concerns in their written submissions. CDA staff also sought resident review of key planning products and sanction of staff planning efforts. Residents in effect became the principal client group in these cities for the CDA staff, despite the influential role of the latter.

5. Legitimization:

In the staff-dominant communities of Allegheny County, Houston and Los Angeles County, the residents' role was largely limited to cursory, often last-minute review of products prepared primarily if not entirely by CDA staff and consultants. In several instances, particularly in Allegheny and Los Angeles counties, resident review took place after submission to HUD, staff contending either that deadlines did not allow prior resident review (Los Angeles County) or that residents had had sufficient review at the subcommittee level (Allegheny County).

The residents docilely accepted a role limited to task forces and governing boards. The city initiated the groundrules; the CDA initiated the planning process and content: the residents. divided and without political identity, were content to endorse.

Local Agencies

There were no distinct patterns of local agency participation by planning system. In most cities, local agencies were active in preparing the problem analysis sections of the application. Their contributions were at best uneven, depending on the amount of available data and the degree of self-scrutiny felt to be appropriate. Agencies then adopted a wait-and-see attitude, their interest visibly diminishing during the waiting and revision periods. In high-turbulence cities such as Wilmington and Cleveland, local agencies were put off by an atmosphere of suspicion and open hostility. In Houston, Allegheny County, and Los Angeles County, the range of agency concerns in a large metropolitan area made participation in this relatively minor program an essentially residual affair. In general, planning departments, community action agencies, housing and renewal authorities were among the most active in working with Model Cities programs. Their scope of work and experience with resident groups fostered their involvement.

Local agency representatives were generally appointed to serve on CDA governing boards, interagency advisory boards, and task forces. Their participation on these bodies was largely dependent on such factors as the level of tension, their sympathy to resident views, flexibility on the part of their directors to resident demands on non-Model Cities issues, and the degree of technical assistance required. In all cities there were examples — public health in Santa Fe, housing in Cleveland, police in Los Angeles City — of successful and sustained participation by agency officials on resident-dominated task forces. The products of these bodies, usually project descriptions or problem analyses, were of high quality while dialogue was cool and non-contentious.

With the exception of Allegheny County, Indianapolis, and Houston, agency representatives were reluctant to participate in policy discussions or content reviews. There was a tendency to let residents "run the show," for fear of increasing existent resident distrust of established agencies and of attracting unfavorable publicity. Again, there were in each city individual agency spokesmen who did in fact speak up at policy sessions, but these were the exception. There was a continuing fear that active agency participation might increase the chance of confrontation over delivery of services. The broad policy boards were used primarily to review documents already completed; the review was cursory, prior intensive review having been conducted either by resident- or staff-dominated boards and committees.

In all cities, various local agencies made on-loan staff available to CDAs for varying periods of time and this was clearly the most meaningful agency contribution, apart from participation in task force work. On-loan personnel extended CDA staff capacity to prepare CDP components. Only on one occasion, in Cleveland, did an on-loan staff group arouse the antagonism of the permanent CDA staff; in essence, this group sought to outdo the permanent staff in their support of resident interests, and thereby succeeded in further fractionating a program already greatly divided.

Not surprisingly, CDA ability to obtain agency participation was closely linked to the degree of chief executive support and was highest in staff-dominant and parity cities where the CDA enjoyed superior status. Conversely, where city hall support was low, or where the level of turbulence was high, local agencies were reluctant to involve themselves in the program.

On-loan staff were normally utilized to prepare select CDP components: for example, the renewal agency in Youngstown prepared that program's relocation statement. But at the other extreme, local agencies dominated the project selection process in Los Angeles City. In general, local agencies rarely dominated preparation of CDP components, but limited technical assistance and review were not at all uncommon, particularly in staff-oriented cities.

No consistent pattern emerged when comparing the kind of agencies involved in the ten cities, although planning departments, community action agencies, and renewal authorities were clearly among the more prevalent, as were representatives of school and public health districts.

In summary, local agencies' involvement in Model Cities was limited and uneven, and focused on specific, often narrowly technical responsibilities. The reasons for this minor role include: (1) staff shortages; (2) budget limitations; (3) the potential of unnecessary and hostile resident criticism; (4) lack of incentive; (5) potential or real threat to established practices and client relations; and (6) limited evidence of real chief-executive interest in or support for the program.

Consultants

The use of consultants was extensive in Allegheny County (staff-dominant), Cleveland (resident-dominant), Santa Fe, Wilmington, New London (resident-influence) and Youngstown (staff-influence). This suggests that there was no particular pattern with respect to the involvement of consultants in the second-round cities studied. Each had different characteristics relative to the role of the chief executive, the nature of the resident group, the role of staff and of the residents.

Consultants were put to diverse uses in the above cities. In Santa Fe, for example, the Westinghouse consultant, recommended by HUD, actually took over the substantive planning effort for most of the year. Allegheny County, which had a superfluity of planning funds, made extensive use of multiple (and competing) consultants for most of the CDP components. Youngstown made extensive use of one consultant to prepare project descriptions and a management information system. Eventually, this consultant loomed so large in the writing of the CDP that HUD had him removed for doing work well outside his contract. In Cleveland, consultants were utilized to prepare virtually the entire CDP, including the earlier MPS draft. The resident group in that city also hired its own consultant towards the end of the Planning Year on the premise that the former consultant was allied with the CDA staff

and city hall. New London used two consultants on virtually every plan component, including MPS and project selection. Wilmington had its consultant principally for the plan-completion phase, having written the MPS originally in-house.

The orientation of consultants relative to staff and residents appeared to vary greatly. In New London and Allegheny County, for example, each city utilized two primary consultants, one of which leaned towards resident advocacy and the other clearly identified with the CDA staff. In Cleveland, following the role assumed by the CDA director, the consultant sought to occupy a neutral position, insisting that she would not establish policy and would only put into planning language those views and ideas coming from the program's policy-making bodies. In Santa Fe, the outside consultant appeared to adopt a position of advocacy relative to the resident group. In defining his role, much would rely on the individual orientation and/or ideology of the consultant.

The quality of consultant work also varied greatly. The New London and Allegheny County CDPs were among the less competent submissions received by HUD from the cities discussed here. Santa Fe's CDP, on the other hand, was well received by the regional HUD office.

Consultant contributions to most programs were limited for several reasons: (1) the inability of CDA staffs to set up and enforce a clear planning work program; (2) the lack of professional competence on CDA staffs to provide back-up support; (3) consultant/staff frictions over planning process and content; (4) the intermittent involvement of consultants; and (5) the occasionally limited lack of consultant competence or relevance (as in Allegheny County).

Federal Agencies

As outlined in Chapter Three on the HUD planning model, the Federal government was expected to implement several specific tasks. HUD in particular, since it was the lead Federal agency for Model Cities, was to provide overall planning guidelines, monitor each city's planning progress, and provide technical assistance through leadmen assigned to each city. HUD was also supposed to provide independent consultant assistance to cities needing or requesting such aid in a number of areas, such as management information systems, program administration, and various technical planning activities.

In addition to this HUD activity, interagency groups such as the Regional Interagency Coordination Committees and Federal Local Working Groups (RICCs and LWGs) were formed early in the program's history to broker and provide technical assistance. They were also expected to review both CDA planning processes and products, such as Mid-Term Planning Statements and the final Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. Individual Federal agencies were in turn expected to provide needed technical assistance, make their grant review processes more responsive to Model Cities needs, identify and allocate fund resources for cities in the program, and join in the planning review and monitoring effort.

Technical Assistance:

Federal aid in this area was generally of limited value to most cities covered in the study. There is little evidence to indicate that members of RICCs, with few exceptions, were able to spend any significant amount of time in their assigned cities. Their extended range of responsibilities, lack of specific knowledge of the city context, and often limited expertise seriously affected their value to cities.

Federal Local Working Groups (City Teams) were prominent in only one city (Santa Fe) and their role there was so ineffective that the local CDA professionals repeatedly requested that they be discontinued. The contact was too sporadic to provide any continuity; Federal members had seldom read the planning products; and their responses regularly lacked relevance to the local situation.

The HUD leadmen or leadwomen were the most visible symbol of Federal presence in each city, and their contributions varied extensively.

In Wilmington, for example, the leadman took an assertive role in development of project descriptions and project sponsors. He urged the HUD view that existing local agencies should sponsor supplementally-funded projects and forced this view on a reluctant resident group.

In Allegheny County, the HUD leadwoman (who had recommended rejection of the County's application) sought early in the program to have the County adopt a more open posture towards resident participation. She was continuously rebuffed or sidetracked, and eventually found herself accepting a product which clearly did not meet the substance of her objections.

In Santa Fe, after protracted effort on his part to get planning underway, the HUD leadman strongly recommended hiring an outside consultant he felt would be able to facilitate planning activities. The succeeding HUD leadman sought assiduously to have the incumbent CDA director replaced by a more effective leader.

In New London, the HUD leadman pressured city hall and the residents to reduce first the veto power, and later the power of review of a purely resident-dominant neighborhood group. For this he earned the distrust of the residents, and to some extent the ire of city hall for changing groundrules which had been worked out with the residents.

These examples serve to illustrate the varying roles adopted by HUD leadmen. Their role changed in the period between the eleven-city analysis and this study. Leadmen in the former study were often perceived as pro-resident advocates because of their strong support of citizen participation. In the second-round cities there was a shift in this attitude, towards a more neutral or even pro-CDA staff position on the part of leadmen. This is explained in large part by the shift in HUD emphasis to chief-executive responsibility for Model Cities, and by an equal HUD insistence that existing local agencies be the sponsors of supplementally-aided projects. This cast the HUD leadmen as "bad guys" to many resident groups eager to control the program or individual projects. Finally, as noted earlier, there was a greater tendency for leadmen to play an active role in staff-influence and resident-influence cities, where groundrules were in flux, resulting in greater flexibility by staff or residents in acceding to HUD suggestions.

The intermittent nature of Federal intervention was often perceived locally as entirely dysfunctional or subversive of program intent. Youngstown's experience, where HUD added an area to the MN which completely skewed local (mis)conceptions of a clear example of this. In part, of course, it depended on whose ox was gored. HUD intervention in New London and Wilmington was perceived as highly negative to program objectives by the residents. HUD's repeated demand for clarification of program structure in Los Angeles City had the effect of substantially delaying that city's ability to meet HUD deadlines for plan submission. In Cleveland, HUD's apparent inflexibility in demanding that a highly competent acting CDA director be replaced by a permanent appointment, was locally construed as having been a major factor in the many delays experienced by that city. HUD was felt by city hall in Cleveland to be focusing only on form, rather than on the need to deliver a competent product; this view was reinforced by the otherwise scarce presence of HUD officials, including the leadman.

Planning Guidelines:

As outlined elsewhere in this analysis, HUD's planning guidelines were substantially altered mid-way through the Planning Year. The MPS was the basic outcome of this change, along with a simplification of product requirements. For some cities, such as Allegheny County and Los Angeles, the change in guidelines did not have much effect, since planning had been

progressing rather slowly anyway, For other cities, notably Indianapolis, the HUD changes were regarded as a sell-out by the CDA staff, which had been well along the way to completing the original Part I/Part II submission. These changes were perceived as having done substantial harm to the overall program planning intent, that is, to the planning conceptualization which ostensibly underlay Model Cities. Indianapolis' view was apparently unique; all other CDAs studied were pleased with the changes.

Interpretation of the new HUD guidelines was uneven, varying from region to region, and from official to official. In Wilmington, for example, regional HUD officials came to the city to explain the new planning guidelines. CDA staff felt themsleves more confused after the visit than before; it took several trips by the leadman before some understanding of the guidelines was established. The impact of shifting HUD emphases on chief executive program responsibility and sponsorship of projects by local agencies has already been indicated elsewhere; it was the cause of substantial debate in many cities.

Chapter Nine: Planning Process

An overriding HUD goal in the Model Cities Program was a substantive improvement in the technical planning procedures by which cities allocated resources. Towards this end, HUD required that cities receiving planning grants develop their products — including the initial application itself — in a specified order, within ostensibly tight time deadlines, and utilize relatively sophisticated analytical planning techniques.

This increase in planning efficiency was also to include the active participation of a diverse set of actors through a variety of organizational units, such as the CDA, functional task forces, and boards of review.

HUD's process requirements, whether focused on questions of order, timing, technique or participation, were often perceived by key local actors as difficult to understand, contradictory in goals (e.g. citizen participation and methodological professionalism), unrealistic with respect to political or organizational problems in the city, and often tenuous and fluctuating with regard to HUD's own intentions. Indeed, HUD's emphasis on planning efficiency was at times regarded as inimical to the preparation of a good plan.

A basic HUD premise was that local planning capacity prior to Model Cities had been incapable of dealing effectively with the multiplicity of urban problems. HUD proposed to augment local planning capacity accordingly. Planning grant funds were to be used to attract competent planners for the CDAs and to hire private consultants where necessary.

In addition, HUD proposed to offer participating cities technical assitance in two forms: (1) Washington and regional HUD technical staff would be made available to CDAs when requested, and (2) the services of private consulting firms under contract to HUD* would be offered to those CDAs requesting aid. Review and comment of the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committees (RICCs) were expected to assist CDAs in their planning work. Finally, HUD leadmen, operating from regional HUD offices, were to provide assistance concerning departmental guidelines, citizen participation, CDP content, interpretation of planning requirements, and linkages with other Federal agencies.

*HUD's contracts with private consultants were generally quite specific and narrowly prescribed. There was an emphasis by HUD on developing local planning capacity, and a correlative reluctance to permit CDAs to rely too heavily on outside assistance.

CHART B
SEQUENCE OF PLANNING EVENTS



Order:
A Logical Sequence

As perceived by HUD, planning efficiency was in part defined by a logical (and hence presumably rational) sequence of planning activities, each more or less directed to the development of a particular product. This sequence is presented graphically above (Chart B).

However, apart from this set of planning activities, cities and CDAs were also expected to engage in a series of essentially administrative actions, such as hiring CDA staff, defining linkages with city hall, resident groups, and local agencies, and generally "getting organized."

As the program unfolded in most of the cities examined here, these administrative matters often came to represent a highly competitive agenda relative to planning concerns.

The simplification by HUD of the planning process through substitution of the Mid-Term Planning Statement (MPS) for Part I of the CDP, had the general effect of improving the ability of staff and residents to follow the prescribed sequence of planning events.

In contrast to the experience of CDAs in the eleven-city study, the majority of cities in this sample, evidenced an ability to follow (often haltingly) the logical sequence posited by HUD. The sequence was disrupted principally in Wilmington, New London, Cleveland and Youngstown — resident-influence cities — with residents moving immediately to a discussion of project development soon after work on the problem analysis. In these cities, the residents either did not understand or were not interested in following HUD's rational model. In Los Angeles City and Allegheny County, problem analyses were significantly altered long after they had been drafted to meet new situations. Thus, in Los Angeles, the arrival from local agencies of a "shopping list" of prospective and potentially implementable projects led the CDA to artificial revision of its problem statement to accommodate favored projects. In Allegheny County, an initial problem analysis draft, in which a considerable degree of resident involvement was involved, was altered by the CDA and consultants to present a view much less critical of existing agencies and practices.

Although the studied cities generally followed the formal order of planning activities, the treatment of product elements was unequal. For most cities, although objectives followed the problem analysis, and strategy came after objectives, this approach was seen more as necessary to please HUD, than as a logical planning activity. The strategy statement per se was felt to be a paper task to satisfy HUD, although in Indianapolis and, to a certain degree in Houston and Santa Fe, much thought went into the development of this component. Only in Santa Fe and Cleveland — resident-influence cities — did residents participate actively in preparation of the strategy statement.

One aspect of the HUD-prescribed planning sequence was generally not followed — on occasion with HUD concurrence. After submission of the Mid-Term Planning Statement to HUD, the RICC was to convene and review the document. The ensuing RICC critique of the MPS was then to be given to the CDA, which would in turn make the appropriate revisions. Logically, the revisions would be completed and submitted to HUD before the next planning period would begin. In the cities covered here, MPS revision was conducted concurrently with work on completing the plan, that is, with project development and writing of the non-programmatic CDP elements. In several instances, HUD or RICC review of the MPS was cursory at best (Santa Fe, Indianapolis, Los Angeles County), reflecting both time constraints on HUD and a desire not to hinder planning activity.

Completion of the CDP was an erratic process in most cities, an exception being Houston, where a particularly competent CDA director held sway in a strongly staff-dominant planning system. Project development was the focus of this planning period. Preparation of the CDA structure, continuous planning and evaluation, relocation statement, and resident employment statement were largely residual activities, considered by CDA staff and residents alike as quite secondary to the urgency of project initiation and selection. Indeed, in most cities, project development preceded or was concurrent with the establishment of budget priorities. This meant in several cases (Indianapolis, Santa Fe, Allegheny County, Los Angeles City) that priorities were shifted to meet projects — the reverse of process.

In summary, it would appear that staff-dominant systems were somewhat more capable of meeting HUD's order of planning and at the same time had greater flexibility in changing or adapting elements of the plan to altered circumstance. Precisely because they were in a staff-dominant situation, such places as Allegheny County and Houston had little difficulty making such changes as inserting new projects or rearranging budgets. In other cities, notably those in the resident-influence category, such changes evoked considerable controversy.

Timing

Similar to findings in the eleven-city study, no city in this sample was able to complete its CDP within one year, if the 45-day revision period is included as part of the Planning Year. There were, however, significant differences in timing among the various cities. As indicated, those cities manifesting a staff-dominant, staff-influence, or parity planning system required much less time to complete their plans than cities with resident-influence planning systems. Generally, cities that completed their plans in 12-15 months had settled the issues of authority and control early on and were able to turn to actual planning much sooner.

Strong chief executive involvement, coupled with competent and often politically influential CDA directors, permitted such staff-dominant and parity cities as Houston, Los Angeles County, Allegheny County and Indianapolis to focus quickly on planning activities. Very competent consultant assistance accounted for Santa Fe's relatively early completion and submission of its CDP

Techniques

A diversity of data gathering and analytical techniques were expected by HUD to be used in preparing the various Planning Year products. Cities were encouraged to be innovative in their planning, particularly since it was necessary to pull together a considerable array of views and facts in a relatively short period of time (which may well have made planning more difficult). Planning workshops, staff-resident retreats, all-day planning conferences, and such relatively sophisticated devices as matrix analysis and scalar ratings, were among the techniques proposed or encouraged by HUD through guidelines and field representatives.

Most CDAs had considerable difficulty comprehending — let alone employing — many of these techniques. Often a low level of staff expertise, intense time constraints, obscure or complex HUD guidelines, and varying degrees of political turbulence all contributed to limit CDA capacity to apply the suggested planning techniques.

Staff-influence CDAs, of course, made greater use of the more sophisticated procedures, and followed a more structured planning process than resident-dominant and resident-influence communities.

Not uncommonly, planning workshops in staff-dominant cities were held merely to satisfy HUD requirements and to secure after-the-fact resident acceptance of already-prepared planning products, than to gather true resident input.

Preparation of the Application

In most cities, the chief executive or his surrogate convened a group of public and private agency officials and assigned preparation of elements of the application such as data collection, problem analysis, selection of the Model Neighborhood, and general writing of the document. The basic source of data for most cities was the 1960 Census, sometimes supplemented by later studies. There was little effort to conduct new studies or surveys specifically for the application. The data content for the problem analysis section in all applications was diverse in comprehensiveness and quality, let alone depth of analysis regarding modes of service delivery — e.g. practices of existing programs and institutions.

Chief executives involved a great range of individuals and agencies in this effort. In Los Angeles City, for example, the mayor's executive assistant, the new director of the Community Redevelopment Agency, and the Technical Services Corporation (a private consultant group) were each given responsibility to produce or supervise production of the document: the result was that no one held full responsibility for coordinating the documents that emerged.

In most cities where a single individual put the application together with assistance from many groups and agencies, as in Allegheny County or Youngstown, it proved extremely difficult to secure consistency in report format and quality, let alone comparability of data and depth of agency and problem critiques. The application was rarely rewritten in uniform style. Lack of both time and staff precluded this approach. In Youngstown, Allegheny County, and Cleveland, senior staff in the local planning department — usually with a decidedly physical planning background — were to

coordinate agency participation in the application process. Their single-focus background restricted their ability to collate the submissions of the different agencies with judicious emphasis. In virtually all cities, the physical planning department played a leading role in preparing the application for this effort at comprehensive planning.

In summary, the application writing process was characterized by uneven, often scant participation from local public and private agencies, limited data collection and little resident input (often mere legitimizing sessions). The selection of the Model Neighborhood Area, a key decision in the application process, was an in-house process: in no city was it thrown open for general public discussion and debate. Political considerations were particularly relevant in the selection process; in Cleveland and Youngstown, for example, MNAs were carefully selected in part to avoid areas of volatile civil unrest.

Similarly, where task forces played an important role, participation was weighted by the chief executive in favor of public agencies. In short, the application writing process was perceived in such cities as Houston, Cleveland, and Los Angeles City as an in-house technical effort.

Waiting and Revision Periods

Almost by definition, the Waiting Period was one in which little or no substantive planning activity took place, since all cities were waiting to see whether their application would be approved by HUD. In this sense, the Waiting Period was largely HUD-dominated. What activity did take place on the part of applicant cities was a certain degree of lobbying by the chief executive, local congressmen, and other officials with varying degrees of influence in Washington.

Following HUD's announcement of cities to be awarded planning grants – that is, to become Model Cities – local effort was expected to focus on two areas: answering HUD's critique of the application (known as the Discussion Paper) and taking steps to create the overall program structure, including the resident organization and the CDA staff and directorate.

Discussion Paper

To the extent that HUD's critique dealt with such issues as reducing Planning Year budgets to reflect a lower HUD contribution than had been expected, establishing better contacts with local public agencies, and clarifying the relationship of the CDA to City Hall, relatively little local discussion developed. The reply to HUD in these areas was usually handled by the same core staff that had prepared the application. In short, the techniques by which replies were prepared were essentially in-house rewriting, requests for more data from certain agencies, and "brainstorming" sessions among key agency personnel.

A more public matter, however, was HUD's concern, expressed in most Discussion Papers, regarding citizen participation. In Allegheny County, Los Angeles County, and Cleveland, HUD placed strong emphasis on increasing the level of resident involvement in program decision-making. In the staff-dominant and staff-influence cities, HUD's pressure in this regard went largely unanswered. In such cities as Cleveland, Youngstown, and Wilmington, however, HUD's critique served, at least in part, as a stimulus to resident groups to demand a greater voice in the direction of the program, including a hand in the application revisions.

In these cities, the techniques used for revision of the citizen participation component of the application were public meetings between city staff and residents and the creation of resident-led task forces charged with preparing the citizen participation response for HUD. These techniques, and the general commotion surrounding what was clearly a controversial subject, prolonged the city's preparation of an acceptable reply and delayed setting up the CDA, the search for a director and staff, and the definition of relationships – between the CDA, the program in general, and City Hall.

Starting-Up

Cities varied in their timing and approach to hiring CDA staff, with staff-dominant or staff-influence systems showing greater dispatch in bringing staff on

board and initiating the Mid-Term Planning Statement. Techniques used to recruit staff varied from city to city, but there was no verifiable relationship between the type of planning system and the method by which the CDA director was hired. In both Cleveland and Houston (cities with totally disparate planning systems) CDA directors were chosen by mayoral fiat and did not necessarily reflect the support of the resident element in the program. Generally, staff-dominant and staff-influence cities paid substantially less attention to resident views on hiring.*

Mid-Term Planning Statement

HUD's replacement of Parts I and II of the CDP with the Mid-Term Planning Statement (MPS) was intended to simplify local planning tasks and to produce earlier feedback to HUD on city progress: submission was set at six months rather than at the ninth month of the Planning Year. The MPS was to contain four elements: a summary of planning process to date, a problem analysis, and statements on objectives and strategy.

Production of these elements varied somewhat from city to city, but the basic approach was quite similar. All ten cities formed task forces or subcommittees to elicit problem analysis and objectives statements. These task forces served as a major outlet for resident involvement and the statement of local problems was more critical of local agencies where resident-influence planning systems prevailed during this period (Wilmington, Youngstown).

Data for the problem analysis were derived from a number of sources, including existing primary and secondary agency records and statistics, special resident surveys, information from the 1960 Census and more recent studies conducted in the city or MNA. Few cities went to the effort to conduct special neighborhood surveys to produce up-to-the-moment demographic and economic data. Cleveland and Santa Fe conducted the most extensive neighborhood surveys, relying heavily on MNA residents to do the door-to-door interviewing.

Once the task forces had concluded their problem identification and analysis, one of two approaches was taken. In some cities (Allegheny and Houston) the findings were then elaborated and often revised by CDA staff and consultants. In others (Indianapolis and Cleveland), the findings of the subcommittees were submitted to the public at open meetings in the MNA.

The staff-dominant and staff-influence cities rapidly converted the initial work of the resident task forces into a document to be submitted forthwith to HUD. Where resident influence was more evident, the need to subject the problem analysis to additional public debate was perceived and followed. In all cities, however, the end process was much the same: after varying degrees of resident discussion, CDA staff or consultants reworked the statement, although usually careful to maintain resident views, to ensure its acceptability to HUD – and sometimes its acceptability in a local political context.

The MPS section on objectives tended in most cities to be much more of a staff function than had the problem analysis, from which it was derived. Techniques included continued reliance on task-force discussions, employment of consultants, and in some cities the use of sophisticated analytical techniques for the ranking of problems, objectives, and budget priorities.

Allegheny County's objectives statement, produced by erstwhile aerospace consultants, was the most technically obtruse: most local actors (and some candid HUD personnel) pronounced it to be "gobbledegook."

Writing of the planning process summary and the statement of overall strategy was in all cities strictly an exercise for CDA staff, and for them a largely perfunctory one. Neither of these MPS elements was regarded as contributory in any significant way and their drafting was assigned to one or two persons, who produced them without staff or resident interaction.

The strategy statement was almost standardly weak, since cities had

*See Chapter Thirteen for a discussion of CDA staff hiring practices.

difficulty translating problem analyses and rankings of objectives into specific wo programs and training efforts. The statement of strategy was usually brief and qui general in nature.

Apart from resident surveys and task forces, other planning techniqu included retreats, where residents and staff would "let it all hang out" (usuall unsuccessfully), all-day planning conferences, and regularly scheduled CDA boa review sessions. Retreats were more common in resident-influence cities, b conferences and workshops were common to all.

No one of these techniques can be said to have been demonstrably bett than others. The effectiveness of task forces varied considerably in Indianapolis an Wilmington, their recommendations were given substantive weight, but in Clevela and Youngstown they became an arena for the acting out of rivalries. A commo problem with task forces was that their membership tended to identify closely wi their functional area and to become over-protective of their assumed turf.

The crucial variable governing the effectiveness of staff-resident planni techniques was the acceptance by both elements of groundrules covering the roles each and the procedures by which resident inputs would be translated into submittab documents. The findings of the eleven-city study in this regard are clearly appropria here; sensitive staff assistance, continuity among resident participants, and stro resident leadership were key elements in making joint staff/resident efforts effecti and workable. Early development of a working relationship acceptable to residen made their involvement in preparing the MPS (and in completing the plan) easier t secure and to maintain.

In summary, the most common techniques used in preparation of the MP were functional task forces (problem analysis and, in some cities, objectiv statements), planning conferences and workshops, solitary CDA staff or consulta work (strategy statement, summary of planning process), and an occasional retreat iron out difficulties on a less formal basis. Staff-dominant cities relied most heavily the use of CDA staff to prepare the MPS and to guide planning conferences a workshops. Resident-influence cities relied strongly on their task forces and reside planning conferences and workshops. Staff-dominant and parity cities were mo likely to utilize complex analytical techniques to prepare such MPS elements as t problem and objectives ranking statements.

Completing the Plan

Following submission of the MPS to HUD, cities were expected to proce to completion of the CDP, defining specific projects and clearly linking them to ea other and to the problem analysis/objectives statements of the MPS. Conceptually, t MPS would be critiqued by HUD and the RICC, cities would revise their statemen accordingly, and then project development would begin. (Actually, HUD's comme on the MPS were generally of a technical nature, with little impact on the eventu content of the CDP). Concurrently the CDA would prepare the remaining CD elements: CDA administrative structure for the Action Year and statements o resident employment, relocation, citizen participation, and continuing planning a evaluation.

There was, however, a common tendency for residents and staff to mo more or less directly from preparation of the problem analysis to project developme Particularly in high-turbulence cities (Cleveland and Youngstown) there was lit interest in the orderly planning procedure espoused by HUD. Once a problem w stated, it appeared much more logical to residents in these cities, and often to staff well, to move directly to the projects which would alleviate the conditions uncover Ranking of problems, clarificaton and ranking of objectives, and setting both of th within an overall program strategy, appeared to many program participants essentially wasteful, makework exercises designed to please HUD theoreticians, rat than to deal with the problems ostensibly to be addressed by Model Cities.

Staff-dominant and staff-influence cities were not altogether immune fr this view. In Allegheny County, there was an effort, even prior to the probl

analysis, to create immediate "impact" projects to produce visibility and credibility for the program. Funds provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's "Partner Cities Program" — a state counterpart of Model Cities — financed the impact projects. Efforts to stimulate similar early-impact projects were visible in Indianapolis and Santa Fe, as well.

Project ideas were generated by task forces, by brainstorming sessions of both staff and resident groups, from solicitation of "dusted-off" projects submitted by local agencies and private organizations, and by individual citizens.

HUD representatives also contributed ideas or suggested projects eligible for funds from other Federal agencies, provided matching funds were allocated in the CDP. Although resident-influence cities preferred to develop projects that did not emanate from established local agencies, HUD's strongly articulated emphasis on utilizing existing agencies to administer projects gave the latter's proposals special consideration.

Generally, CDAs found it difficult to settle on a precise list of projects (or the precise content of projects) until the very end of the planning period. As a rule, the more resident-oriented the planning system, the longer it took to conclude a list of projects acceptable to both the residents and city hall. In at least two cities — Wilmington and Santa Fe -- the city council drastically revised the project list presented in the CDPs as representing the desires of the resident-dominated CDA board. Staff in Indianapolis, Houston, and Los Angeles City sought to have their proposals conform as closely as possible to articulated resident needs, a finding also made in the eleven-city study with regard to staff-dominant and staff-influence cities. Only in Los Angeles and Allegheny counties did CDA staff, prompted by locally-perceived political priorities, simply insert their own priorities and projects into the CDP without apparent regard for resident wishes.

The assignment of budgets to specific projects and general program areas was in all cities a rather unscientific exercise. In several cities, budgets were in part predicated on hoped-for Federal matching monies. In others, although the relative sums allocated to major program areas — housing, education, health, transportation — tended to match problem rankings or objectives statements, the precise assignment of funds by projects was very much a "cut and fill" affair. In most cases, lack of effective federal technical assistance or uncertainty with respect to the use of categorical programs often made the division between categorical and supplemental monies an exercise in wishful thinking.

There was no correlation between the sophistication of the analytical techniques used to prepare objectives statements or priorities among program areas and the actual assignment of budgets. In the end, budget allocations for specific projects often depended on such intangibles as local political considerations, the influence of articulate resident groups, the anticipated availability of Federal matching funds, and an effort by CDAs to achieve what they perceived as HUD's desire for comprehensiveness, regardless of priorities. Finally, the intensive and prolonged single-focus effort of the task forces had the effect in virtually all communities of creating vested-interest groups who were insistent that some monies be allocated to their area of concern.

Because of the pressure of time, the complexity of HUD guidelines (or their vagueness, depending on staff perceptions), and the apparent lack of resident interest, such non-programmatic components of the CDP as administrative structure, continuous planning and evaluation, relocation, and resident employment tended to be written by CDA staff, with minimal resident input. As a rule, these sections were assigned by the CDA director to his staff or to a consultant; then, depending on the role played by various resident and resident/city hall review committees, these components were given a cursory review and included in the CDP. There were, of course, variations in this approach (e.g. Cleveland's residents contributed several ideas to preparation of the relocation and continuous planning and evaluation statements). Use of local renewal agencies to assist in the preparation of relocation statements was

common (e.g. Wilmington, Youngstown). Resident employment statements were prepared by staff based on a "guess-timate" of jobs to be created by the projects; the uncertainty of Federal funding for many proposed projects made it difficult to estimate clearly how many jobs would be created. Program administration was rarely defined clearly, although in such resident-influence cities as Santa Fe, Youngstown, and Cleveland, city hall, CDA staff, or city councils did seek, at the last minute, to make alterations which would ensure them a greater role in policy-making than had been evidenced during the Planning Year.

In essence, Federal guidelines were found to be increasingly directive in such select areas as resident veto and sponsorship of projects. HUD leadmen were asserting themselves more strongly into local planning processes, particularly where CDAs appeared to be moving contrary to HUD preference. HUD did not hesitate in several cities where planning was lagging behind, to intercede in implementing — and taking part in — substantive planning activities.

RICC reviews: The efforts by RICCs to review the Mid-Term Planning Statements were often cursory, sometimes last-minute activities which left little impression on the CDA. The focus of the RICC review was on citizen involvement, program administration, and linkages with local agencies. There was some effort by the CDA to meet the RICC critique, but it was clearly not perceived as having a high priority, not when compared with the need to submit the plan on time. RICC participants were seen locally as lacking awareness of local conditions. In short, the RICC review was perceived as more of a hurdle than a help.

The individual RICC team members' reviews were almost solely focused on concerns specific to their own departments, rather than on broad aspects of the overall HUD planning model, and this pervasive parochialism scarcely made them exemplary of a comprehensive planning approach. The reviews were uneven within each RICC; that is, one member would offer a detailed critique of a product while another had clearly not read the submission. Finally, at times the RICC review gave the distinct impression of a group internally at odds. In one city, the majority of RICC members indicated their approval of the approach being taken in the MPS, while the OEO representative took the view that the approach was all wrong. There were also occasional instances of RICC members siding with dissident resident groups in certain cities and, in essence, playing a political role.

Securing Federal funds: It was anticipated that Federal departments and agencies would make additional planning monies available to cities, and also give Model Cities priority in funding by earmarking or reserving categorical program monies. There was little evidence in the ten cities surveyed in this analysis of additional Federal funds being made available for planning purposes; nor, for that matter, was there evidence to substantiate an earlier eleven-city finding that cities in which the chief executive involvement permitted early planning activity were better able to attract additional Federal planning funds. Most cities made do with their planning grant award, supplemented by local funds and occasional State or minor Federal grants.

There was almost no evidence of Federal earmarking in time to facilitate preparation of most CDPs. Indeed, as in the eleven-city sample, HUD itself delayed notification of precise city allocations of supplemental monies until well into the Planning Year. The Federal response to Model Cities planning was erratic, often ill-timed, and, from the city perspective, uncertain in the extreme.

Chapter Ten: Planning Products

Given the different approaches cities took to produce the planning documents required by HUD, it is not surprising that each CDP reflected in microcosm the particular characteristics of these communities. Despite the individualistic nature of the CDPs, however, certain patterns relevant to the five planning systems did emerge in this analysis.

For example, criticism of local public agencies — school system, welfare department, police department — was much more evident in those Mid-Term Planning Statements produced by parity and resident-oriented planning systems than in other planning modes. Similarly, comprehensive plans submitted by staff-oriented cities such as Los Angeles County tended to contain more of the required HUD components than did those plans developed in resident-oriented communities. More specifically, CDPs of staff-oriented cities demonstrated a much closer relationship between prioritized objectives and selection of projects than those of other cities.

The Mid-Term Planning Statement

HUD attempted in CDA Letter No. 4 to provide concise and clear guidelines to Model Cities regarding the approach to be taken in preparing Comprehensive Demonstration Plans; the guidelines stressed the importance and logic of a timed, orderly, and analytically sophisticated approach to planning.

Despite their efforts, the seventy-five cities participating in the first round of planning grant awards proved unable or unwilling to follow the relatively complex, if rational, HUD guidelines. As a result, HUD revised CDA Letter No. 4 in December, 1969. The new guidelines eliminated the requirements for a five-year forecast of objectives and associated costs, instituted a Mid-Term Planning Statement (MPS), and sharpened definitions of such required MPS elements as problem analysis, goals and objectives, and priorities.

1. *Problem Analysis:*

All of the cities submitted analyses covering the full range of local concerns outlined by HUD guidelines. These ranged from a series of qualitative and emotional statements in Youngstown to a calmer assessment of local problems in Indianapolis and Houston, backed in both instances by considerable statistical documentation. Santa Fe's analysis of problems was among the most extensive, reflecting the considerable input of the outside consultant. Each city developed its own format for discussing problems, with individual functional areas clearly reflecting a disparate authorship.

The staff-dominant cities produced the least critical problem analyses, and focused more on developing documentation of problems. Resident-influence cities, conversely, presented the most critical analyses of existing agencies and their delivery systems. Indianapolis' presentations were an essentially balanced assessment of problems and their causes.

Causal analysis of problems was difficult for most cities. Thus, Cleveland's problem statement focused on three broad causal factors: lack of money; lack of power; lack of knowledge and information. While these may have been accurate summations of the causes of poverty in the Cleveland MNA, they scarcely reflected the depth of analysis desired by HUD. Few cities focused on the practices of existing local delivery as key causal factors influencing problems in the MNA. There was a tendency to invoke traditional indicators of poverty and social ills rather define deficiencies in agency services. Cities found it difficult to differentiate causes from problems.

2. *Planning Process:*

The MPS required cities to summarize the process by which they were developing their CDP. These descriptions of planning process also varied widely. Santa Fe, for example, omitted all reference to the rather substantive issues of program control and plan content that had seriously disrupt-

ed the planning process at various stages: this sanitized account took 14 pages. In contrast, the Allegheny County process summary took close to thirty pages and included complicated flow diagrams which purported to specify how the CDP was put together over the Planning Year. The Youngstown planning process description, three pages long, dealt solely with overall program goals and a summary of the Congressional preamble to the Model Cities program. New London's discussion was a bit longer but consisted mostly of a summary of participants in the initial MPS review sessions. None of the process descriptions were self-critical, none dealt in any depth with problems of program control and procedures that had been encountered. In Cleveland, perhaps the most turbulent of all the cities surveyed, there was literally no reference to the prolonged disputes over CDA staff, review functions, and CDP content which continuously characterized that program.

All cities, it would appear, were eager to present a "good face" to HUD with regard to their ability to follow an orderly planning process. In any case, it would probably have been impossible for such cities as Cleveland or Wilmington to come up with an analysis of difficulties acceptable to all. A neutral assessment was clearly the most political approach.

3. *Objectives:*

The third element of the MPS was to be a summary of objectives to be attained by the end of the First Action Year. The objectives were expected to be closely linked with the problem analyses and, where possible, put in quantitative terms. Objectives were also to be prioritized or ranked where possible.

The ability of cities to meet this requirement varied considerably, but all clearly had difficulty quantifying objectives, several were unable or unwilling to rank these, and linkages between the problem analysis and objectives statements were at best tenuous. Santa Fe, for example, devoted a single page to a discussion of objectives, most of which read more like overall goals than precise objectives: "Increase median family income in the MNA from the 1969 level to 90 percent of the county-wide median in 1977." A short-range objective was defined as reducing the percentage of substandard housing from the 1969 level of 43% to less than 35% in the first Action Year.

Houston, on the other hand, had an elaborate discussion of goals and objectives, linking each to the appropriate statement in the problem analysis. Both problems and objectives were ranked in order of priority, but there was no effort to quantify objectives, although they were relatively precise: "Assist HHDC in establishing a program for neighborhood counseling and technical assistance."

Allegheny County, to cite another example, presented both long- and short-range objectives (as did several other cities). Of the 17 long-range objectives, six were slated for implementation during the first Action Year and were defined as short-range only because of their quick implementation time. Specific quantified targets were assigned to each of the six objectives, and their relationship to previously-ranked problem analyses was demonstrated. A specific work program was presented in bar graph form for each objective; three of the objectives were ranked as "most important."

New London presented a one-page statement of five- and one-year objectives: "establish an industrial zone east of the railroad tracks by 1975" (long-range); "establish new business to provide 200 jobs" (short-range). A statement on first-year priorities was only vaguely related to the objective statements.

Several cities had difficulty linking objectives to problem analyses.

Houston and Allegheny County presented the most elaborate approach to objectives; New London, Santa Fe, and Youngstown, the least sophisticated approach. Residents in the latter cities, who clearly had major influence over planning decisions, often expressed their dissatisfaction with the "non-relevant" (e.g. not focused on projects and jobs) elements of the plan, such as objectives statements. CDPs of these cities reflected this resident feeling by a lack of depth (quantitative indices, time framework) in the statements.

4. *Strategy Statement:*

The final section of the updated MPS (revised after RICC review) was to be an overall program strategy statement indicating the general outlines of how the CDA proposed to implement its CDP.

Wilmington's strategy statement was easily the weakest of those examined here, a one-paragraph summary emphasizing the CDA's concerns for employment, decentralization of public services to the MNA, and extensive citizen participation.

Houston, Youngstown, and Santa Fe presented more elaborate strategy statements, focusing both on overall and component-level strategies. Allegheny County chose to combine its discussion of objectives with a strategy statement, while Cleveland made an effort to merge strategy with specific program approaches focused on an increase in information to residents on local programs, sensitizing local agencies to MNA needs, and bringing MNA residents into closer contact with local agencies.

In several of these statements, it was difficult to distinguish component strategy approaches from the earlier discussions of goals and objectives. Strategy statements in Cleveland and New London were so vague as to be meaningless. Staff-influence and resident-influence cities stressed to a much greater extent than other cases, an intention to rely on strong resident inputs; staff-dominant cities tended to emphasize in their strategy statements the importance of good management practices, centralized CDA leadership, and reliance on existing agencies to a greater degree than did the other cities. The Indianapolis MPS strategy, focused on both managerial and resident participation approaches, was the most articulate and consistent of the statements.

In short, the strategy statements exhibited a focus of program control for the coming First Action Year according to the planning system which had predominated in development of the plan. Thus, staff-dominant cities strongly emphasized in their strategy statements the need for central authority, clear lines of communication and responsibility within the CDA as well as between the CDA and resident and agency groups. Citizen participation was seen as an integral element of project implementation but was clearly secondary. Resident-influence cities, in their strategy statements, indicated a strong reliance on citizen participation as a guiding force in the coming Action Year. There was less apparent emphasis on the importance of CDA management and linkages with local agencies.

In summary, there was great range in quality, length, and comprehensiveness of Mid-Term Planning Statements as included in the CDP. By and large, the staff dominant and parity cities come much closer to meeting HUD's requirements for that section than staff-influence or resident-influence communities. It was plainly difficult for cities to distinguish between problems and causal explanations, and between goals, objectives, and strategy statements.

Several cities, it would appear, merged segments of the original Part I, Part II submission with the MPS. This meant that a number of cities, such as Indianapolis and Houston, had sufficiently advanced by the time the new guidelines emerged that; incorporating into the new format what they had done so far was preferable to starting over, even on a simpler basis. Compared with first-round CDPs, there is little evidence

that this round of comprehensive plans, where their introductory sections were concerned, were significantly improved. While plan requirements may have changed for the better in terms of HUD's perceptions of local planning capacity, it does not appear that substantive improvement in that capacity took place.

Project Descriptions

The number of projects proposed by the ten cities varied from 66 in Los Angeles City to only 10 in Youngstown. Generally, there were more projects proposed in staff-dominant and parity cities than in staff- or resident-influence communities. There was also a correlation between the size of cities and the number of projects proposed for the first Action Year. Apparently, the larger amount of money made available to big cities influenced the number of projects.

The majority of projects in every city fell into the social service category, compared with projects in economic or environmental areas (see Table 5). Only in Houston and Cleveland did projects in the economic category outnumber those in environmental fields; the emphasis in those two cities reflected the concerns of residents, as well as the need to accommodate the demands of disparate resident groups with projects in the same area (Cleveland).

The range in expectation of non-supplemental money for funding of projects was also extreme (see Table 7, following). Thus, while New London anticipated that all of its projects would be assisted by non-MCA money, Houston expected that only 29 percent would be so assisted and Cleveland only 12 percent. The New London projection can only be seen as wishful thinking. The low Houston estimate may reflect that city's traditional disinclination for involvement in Federal programs. The very low Cleveland figure for non-supplemental funding reflects resident disaffection with established public agencies through which such funds are channeled.

None of the cities examined here projected more than 41% of their first Action Year projects for capital development activities, (see Table 6), although there was a tendency for staff-dominant and staff-influence cities to stress this area to a greater extent than resident-influence cities. Conversely, the resident-influence cities and the parity city placed much greater emphasis on service-oriented projects.

A number of project types were common to over half the CDPs; these included housing development corporations, public health clinics within the MNA, experimental schools, vocational training, and mini-park purchases. Santa Fe and New London recorded the highest percentage of projects completely new to the MNA (50% and 48%, respectively), with Cleveland (12%) and Allegheny County (19%) manifesting the greatest emphasis on maintenance of existing efforts.

Project descriptions in most cities were accompanied by HUD forms summarizing the project and budgeting costs. These standard descriptions covered:

1. Delineation of purpose
2. Prospective beneficiaries
3. Content and operation of the project
4. Timetable for implementation
5. Funding, including amount and source of monies
6. Coordination with pertinent local agencies
7. Continuous monitoring and evaluation plan
8. Citizen participation
9. Resident employment

The depth to which project descriptions filled this outline varied within each CDP, as well as among cities. As a rule, the plans for staff-dominant and parity cities proved to be much more consistent in both format and content than those of other cities. Thus, the project descriptions in Wilmington, New London, and Youngstown tended to be cursory, while the projects themselves were often inconsistent with identified objectives. By and large, cities that had produced a detailed MPS also developed relatively extensive project descriptions; but even in those cities the range in quality was wide.

TABLE 5
NUMBER OF PROJECTS BY MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREA

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence	Parity	Resident Influence				
Functional Area	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Economic	2	9	5	9	1	2	12	2	2	2
Environmental	15	8	11	17	3	5	7	5	5	3
Social	25	40	16	40	6	28	23	12	16	10
Total	42	57	32	66	10	35	42	19	24	15

1. Economic — Projects or activities directed at job training, job development, or business growth.
2. Environmental — Projects or activities directed at housing, renewal, rehabilitation or improving general amenity.
3. Social — Projects or activities directed at service to residents.

TABLE 6
PROJECTS: BY TYPE
(SERVICE/CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT)

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence	Parity	Resident Influence				
	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Service	59%	60%	75%	78%	60%	82%	76%	79%	79%	80%
Capital Development	41%	40%	25%	22%	40%	18%	29%	21%	21%	20%

TABLE 7
PROJECTS: PERCENTAGE UTILIZING NON-SUPPLEMENTAL MONIES
(FEDERAL CATEGORICAL, LOCAL MATCHING)

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence	Parity	Resident Influence				
	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Percent of Total Projects	59%	29%	34%	83%	50%	51%	12%	100%	66%	73%

All ten cities claimed that delegate agencies for more than 75 percent of their projects had been firmed up or were being negotiated prior to project operation. But it was often apparent from the language, that this project sponsorship was tenuous, or contingent on some CDA-set requirements, such as linkages with the resident structure, development of an evaluation plan, or employment of MNA residents. Staff-dominant and parity cities made more confident assignment of sponsors.

A weakness in most CDPs was the evident unreliability of anticipated non-supplemental funds. In virtually all cities, these funds were rarely confirmed prior to the start of the Action Year; Federal agencies were slow to allocate or to confirm reservations of funds for projects. Only in Indianapolis – which retained something of a "favorite son" status in Federal eyes – did this pattern vary somewhat.

Of the total number of projects proposed in the ten cities – 342 – only four were permitted by HUD to be sponsored by newly-created resident organizations tied to the Model Cities program. This clearly reflects the stronger HUD emphasis on using existing local agencies to carry out supplementally-funded projects.*

Existing public entities preponderated among delegate agencies. Only in Houston and Los Angeles City did private organizations sponsoring projects exceed fifty percent. Thus, of the 342 projects proposed for the ten cities, 219 were to be administered by local public agencies, 119 by private. Similarly, only 86 of the 342 projects were presented in the CDPs as completely new activities to the MNA, while 286 augmented existing services or continued existing efforts. Santa Fe and New London had the highest percentage of new programs, Cleveland and Allegheny County the lowest.

Non-Programmatic Components

HUD required cities to include a number of non-programmatic components in their plans. These included the following: program administration, relocation, resident employment, and continuous planning and evaluation statements. The CDPs were evaluated here in terms of the degree to which these components met the requirements set by HUD in guidelines detailing them. Table 10 on page 83 summarizes the findings of this analysis, and is briefly discussed below:

Program Administration:

HUD required that CDPs discuss (1) overall administrative organization; (2) staffing pattern of the CDA for the Action Year; (3) city capacity to undertake the program of action; (4) fiscal and project monitoring systems; (5) relationship and access of the CDA to the chief executive; (6) linkages with local agencies (public and private); (7) resident employment and training in Model Cities program administration.

Again, staff-dominant and parity cities presented much more substantial answers to these elements than cities with staff- or resident-influence planning systems. Essentially, it would appear that the problems over control and policy groundrules which had characterized these cities for much of the Planning Year were carried over into this rather sensitive section of the CDP: there was much more emphasis on form of involvement than on content. All of the cities projected technical interagency advisory committees to assist in implementation, continuous planning, and evaluation, despite the fact that few such committees functioned effectively during the Planning Year.

Continuous Planning and Evaluation:

HUD in this component asked cities to indicate the projects to be evaluated, the staff to carry out both evaluation and continuous planning functions, and the work schedule for evaluation and continuous planning. Cities were expected to indicate how they intended to link the results of

*26 of some 380 project proposals were found to be proposed for implementation by resident organizations in the eleven-city analysis.

TABLE 8
PROJECTS: PERCENTAGE WITH PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SPONSORS

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence				Parity	Resident Influence			
	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Akron	Pittsburgh	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Percent Public	67%	48%	88%	49%	50%	60%	50%	58%	93%	79%	80%	67%
Percent Private	33%	52%	12%	51%	50%	40%	50%	42%	7%	21%	20%	33%

TABLE 9
PROJECTS: PERCENTAGE NEW OR AUGMENTATION/MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence				Parity	Resident Influence			
	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Akron	Pittsburgh	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Percent New	19%	23%	31%	27%	20%	20%	20%	31%	12%	48%	50%	27%
Percent Augmentation	71%	77%	69%	63%	80%	80%	80%	69%	88%	52%	50%	73%

evaluation to continuous planning.

In general, the continuous planning and evaluation statements attempted to design a system of information-gathering and dissemination and they varied greatly in content and quality. None of the cities fully met HUD's requirements, while there was no relationship between planning systems and the quality of this component. This reflected the fact that several cities hired outside consultants to prepare the component, so that a city like Wilmington, with a generally mediocre plan, was able to include a relatively acceptable continuous planning and evaluation statement. None of these statements, however, was able to link the timing of evaluation efforts with project implementation, or carefully define the relationship between evaluation and continuous planning. Allegheny County relied heavily on a systems-oriented aerospace firm yet produced a section that failed completely to link evaluation with either on-going projects or planning. New London's component was even less detailed.

For most cities, the continuous planning and evaluation statement was necessary after-thought. Several CDPs, notably those of New London and Allegheny County, candidly stated a belief that implementation had a higher priority than continuous planning and evaluation, and that these functions "would have to wait" until projects were actually underway. The chronologies for the ten cities indicate that some measure of this feeling was present in all of the programs.

Relocation:

HUD here required a statement of purpose; a discussion of relocation assistance and payments; a five-year relocation forecast, and a one-year relocation action program.

This component was usually written by CDA staff in close conjunction with professionals from the local housing or renewal authorities. Its component; therefore, reflected less the impact of a given planning system than the competence of the individuals involved. Thus Youngstown produced one of the most elaborate relocation plans, although its CDP fell short of HUD's requirements in the other component areas. Indianapolis also produced a plan highly acceptable to HUD, while Cleveland and Santa Fe were at the low end of the spectrum in terms of relocation plan detail and timing. New London did not produce any plan at all.

Resident Employment:

HUD meant this component to guarantee that each CDA would achieve a high level of employment of MNA residents in various occupational categories of Model Cities programs and activities. HUD also required that CDAs indicate the training programs to be instituted to facilitate resident employment.

Paradoxically, programs with marked resident-influence planning systems produced resident employment statements no more detailed than staff-dominant, staff-influence or parity cities. All of the CDPs had components in this area, but none presented a project-by-project total of positions to be filled by residents. All affirmed their intention to give MNA residents priority in hiring and to follow the full range of Federal Equal Opportunity requirements. Estimates of potential resident employment ranged from 74 percent in New London to no figures at all in Houston, Indianapolis or Youngstown.

As a rule, it was felt that the resident employment component could not be fully elaborated until projects were actually underway. Moreover, in several resident-oriented cities, the question of jobs, job training, and selection of project sponsors for training activities was a highly controversial issue, whose resolution was to be left to the Action Year (Cleveland, Wilmington).

TABLE 10

CDPs: RATING ON NON-PROGRAMMATIC COMPONENTS RELATIVE TO HUD CRITERIA

	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence	Parity	Resident Influence				
	Allegheny	Houston	Los Angeles County	Los Angeles	Youngstown	Indianapolis	Cleveland	New London	Santa Fe	Wilmington
Program Administration	3	2	3	2	2	3	1	1	2	1
Continuous Planning and Evaluation	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2
Relocation	2	2	2	2	3	3	1	0	1	2
Resident Employment	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	3	2	1
Total	7	8	9	8	7	10	4	5	7	7

Ten sections of each of the CDPs were separately rated on a 0 to 3 numerical scale as follows, based on HUD's own criteria as expressed in relevant guidelines and memoranda:

3 Information is well constructed, comprehensive and presented in-depth beyond the standard HUD requirements.
2 Information, process and description adequately presented as to meet the basic HUD requirements.
1 Information, process and description is of minimal quality, barely acceptable by HUD's criteria.
0 Information is not presented and/or is completely inadequate.

Chapter Eleven: Performance Criteria

As indicated in the discussion of the HUD planning model (Chapter Four) a number of performance criteria were set forth to serve as bench-marks of program operation. Specifically, HUD asked that cities, in implementing their Planning Year, develop a structure that could:

1. *Coordinate* involvement in the program or relevant local agencies, public and private
2. Achieve genuine *citizen participation* in almost all facets of the program;
3. *Mobilize and concentrate local resources* on the Model Neighborhood;
4. Effect *institutional change,* an increased sensitivity to needs and concerns of the MNA; and
5. Demonstrate *innovation,* both in process and in product.

The ability of cities to meet these criteria was found to be closely linked to the type of planning system developed.

Coordination

This criterion was generally interpreted as refering to the several types of interaction between the Model Cities program and local agencies — participation of local agencies on program boards and committees (task forces), provision of on-loan staff to CDAs or task forces, agency review of CDA or task force products, and sharing by local agencies either of information regarding their programs within the MNA or, at the highest level, of decision-making in regard to those programs. The first three of these coordinative techniques were considered in some detail in Chapter Eight (Alternate Roles). It was concluded there that CDA ability to obtain agency participation was closely linked to chief executive support and was highest in staff-oriented and parity cities, where the CDA enjoyed superior status. Conversely, local agencies were reluctant to involve themselves in Model Cities where city hall support was low or the level of turbulence high. These strictures were found to apply to all three types or coordination, and in general agency participation was found to be limited, uneven and narrowly focused. Agencies were sparing of their staff time and would contribute only within their functional area. No planning system was able to call into being that harmonious concert of comprehensive planners envisioned by HUD, although the more stable systems managed to advance a few steps further in its direction than the contentious resident-influence systems.

Had the very cogent reasons for agency reluctance not obtained, it is doubtful if much greater coordination would have been realized, for the CDAs themselves did not perceive it as an important, sustaining aspect of the program. They tended to call on local agencies only at certain time periods and for assistance with specific components, with the result that coordination was at best sporadic, almost ad hoc in nature. This had a seriously inhibiting impact on those aspects of coordination not considered earlier — that is the sharing of information and decision-making. Because contact with agencies was not sustained, communication channels were haphazard and there was no regularly-scheduled forum for exchange of information. Presentation of an agency's program within the MNA had to be arranged, as a special event. Even in such staff-dominated cities as Houston and Allegheny County, communications between the CDA and local agencies were not ongoing or easy: usually they were in fact non-existent except as special need arose.

As for shared decision-making, there was no instance among the ten cities comparable to Cambridge and other first-round cities of the earlier study where residents were invited to serve on agency boards allocating resources and delivering services to the MNA. Residents and CDAs of the ten cities under study here were on occasion able to influence non-MCA decisions affecting their neighborhoods, but not through such continuing techniques of formal coordination. The influence, unruly — the technique of confrontation.

In general, the level of achieved coordination appeared to have dropped

between the first-round and second-round cities, and in part this is thought to have resulted from HUD emphasis on greater in-house staff capability with the second-round CDAs. This would seem to account, at least, for the much higher use of on-loan staff in the eleven-city study than in the ten cities studied here. As a result, the modes of coordination enunciated in the eleven-city analysis were found to have only random and partial application with the ten second-round cities. Thus, Houston and, to a lesser extent, Los Angeles and Allegheny counties provided some instances of *directive* coordination, typical of staff-dominant systems and characterized by chief-executive mandate. In Houston and Allegheny County, chief executives issued memos requiring agencies to provide membership on Model Cities boards and, in Houston, to share information. The chief administrative officer of Los Angeles County made similar efforts, but with less effect. The *adjustive* mode of coordination is identified with a strong resident base, a moderate to high degree of chief executive involvement, and some acceptance of groundrules, and it is characterized by review, negotiation, bargaining and contention on an item-by-item basis. All ten cities manifested this approach at times, but Indianapolis, Santa Fe, and to a lesser degree Youngstown and New London were more consistently adjustive. *Adaptive* coordination, the least effective mode, occurred when the interests of Model Cities bodies and those of local agencies chanced to coincide or when crisis situations required ad hoc resolution. It is identified with planning systems where minimal groundrules obtain, chief executive involvement is intermittent and the resident base diffuse. Wilmington, Los Angeles City and Cleveland most manifested this pattern.

Mobilization and Concentration of Resources

HUD anticipated that Model Cities would seek both to mobilize new funds and to concentrate existing resources on the Model Neighborhood Areas. In short, it expected cities to single out the MNA for particular attention relative to public investment in programs and projects.

There is little evidence that this expectation was even seriously entertained by most cities. A general shortage of funds, jealousy on the part of other neighborhoods over the special attention being given the MNA, and problems of coordinating local agency involvement in the MNA all contributed to the difficulty experienced by most communities with regard to this performance criterion. In addition, the slowness with which Federal agencies identified, or reserved categorical program monies for select Model Neighborhood Areas further limited city initiative. Some cities, such as Indianapolis and New London, were able to identify available Federal resources and to plug these into their CDPs, along with sizeable local contributions; but these were clearly in the minority. HUD itself was perceived in most cities as "slow to come across" with regard to concentrating its monies on Model Cities programs, apart from the supplemental funds.

As noted earlier, most cities posited a large number of projects for the MNA, reflecting in part HUD's emphasis on comprehensiveness. As with the eleven first-round cities, the bulk of projects fell into the social categories rather than economic development or job training, partly because HEW allocated its categorical funds with relative despatch and open-handedness. (DOL which would have funded a great many job creation/training projects, was perceived as one of the slowest agencies to accept Model Cities priority areas.)

If the cities failed to divert sizeable sums to the MNA, at least none attempted to reduce its allocation to the area -- a backhand acknowledgement of the "mobilization of resources" criterion. It also indicated the seriousness with which cities viewed HUD's stricture that supplemental funds not be used to divert city funds from the MNA (the "maintenance of effort" requirement). Actually most cities did increase the local budget allocation to the MNA, but on a substantial scale only where large capital investment projects were anticipated as at Indianapolis, New London, Wilmington and Allegheny County.

Few cities were able to attract sizeable investment from private organizations or groups for their Model Neighborhood Areas. In the ten cities studied

here, there were only two notable private contributions – for job training in Houston and for land-use planning/industrial expansion in Allegheny County (where industry leaders tended to see Model Cities as a program to provide the infrastructure for factory expansion). Only minimal success was recorded in other cities with regard to participation by the private sector in housing development projects, mortgage insurance programs, and a few training activities.

Citizen Participation

The kind and degree of resident involvement varied considerably from city to city and from one planning period to another during the year. Only four cities (Cleveland, New London, Wilmington, Santa Fe) manifested consistently high resident participation and only in Cleveland and Wilmington did the residents attain and keep de jure veto power over program planning decisions. Veto was granted to the resident group in New London, but as a result of HUD intervention residents were reduced to an advisory role.

The factors influencing development of the resident component have been discussed at some length in Chapters Eight through Ten and need not be elaborated here. Also noted earlier was the low degree of resident involvement during the application period, when HUD deadlines and elaborate requirements put professional expertise at a premium. Only in Cleveland, where resident advocates were brought into the drafting process by the mayor and a shared role existed between residents and local staff, was there any true resident involvement. In the other nine cities, residents generally played no greater role than to legitimatize staff efforts.

In seven of the ten Planning Year cities, the waiting and revision period was characterized by a low level of citizen participation. Three cities (New London, Cleveland, and Wilmington) developed high levels of resident involvement, while in the other seven cities there was mere sanction of staff decisions.

The decisions made at this time were often crucial since the city was revising its application to meet the criticisms contained in the HUD discussion paper. For instance, Los Angeles City, after much prodding from HUD, decided to formalize its citizen participation structure, and to centralize the program's administrative authority in one rather than two CDAs. Resident input into these decisions was quite limited, given the divided character of the Los Angeles resident base. In New London, by way of contrast, a high level of turbulence and a cohesive, politically integrated resident organization resulted in a situation where residents and their advocates locked horns with city officials in an attempt to create an independent citizen participation organization. A compromise was eventually reached in which resident control, after HUD intervention, was substantially diluted; nonetheless, residents (along with HUD) had played a significant role in determining future program structure and process, one which would ultimately give them considerable influence throughout the life of the program.

Most cities relied heavily on staff to modify the application relative to HUD's discussion paper. Resident involvement, when it occurred, as in Wilmington, Cleveland, and New London, largely revolved around questions of citizen roles in review processes, on committees and boards, and in CDA participation. Although resident groups in most cities raised these issues at this time, lengthy public confrontation occurred only in the three cities noted above. In Youngstown a similar struggle would break out, but the question of MNA boundaries arose first.

Few resident groups were involved in initial selection of CDA directors. Even in Cleveland, the appointment was made by the mayor, subject to approval by the resident board. In New London, a resident-dominated personnel committee selected the CDA director but only after extensive debate between residents and city hall. A similar struggle occurred in Wilmington, where the initial choice of the resident group was unacceptable to the city. In Youngstown, the initial CDA director was directly appointed by the mayor without consulting residents, but extension of the MNA to include a black neighborhood soon resulted in a new appointment being made. The new CDA director was a member of the resident group and although

appointed by the mayor, saw himself as a resident-advocate. In Allegheny County, Houston, Los Angeles County, Santa Fe, and initially in Indianapolis, the CDA director was appointed by the local chief executive without consulting resident groups. In Los Angeles City, the CDA director was appointed by the mayor on the advice of resident-oriented neighborhood boards; he was expected to be a neutral figure between the two highly disparate neighborhood organizations. With the exception of Los Angeles City, the appointment process for CDA directors was a relatively clear reflection of the planning system that was obtained at any one point in the program; in several cities it presaged the tenor of the program for the remainder of the Planning Year.

Resident groups had considerable difficulty in initiating substantive planning efforts with regard to most CDP components. Their lact of technical skills, their predilection for issues of power as opposed to those of process and product, and the time constraints for submittals all operated against a fully effective role in the planning process for residents. This situation was exacerbated in those cities where staff determined – or was forced – to adopt a relatively passive posture vis a vis the residents; that is, to act in an essentially service role. However, understandable in terms of real or potential resident hostility, the effect of staff withdrawal was to delay completion of vital plan elements. Needless overlap of components, flights into verbose fantasy, and unrealistic proposals were among the problems generated by this situation, observable at Wilmington, Cleveland, and New London.

The principal resident involvement in preparation of the MPS came in the writing of the problem analysis. Residents were quick to list and relate grievances in highly personal and often emotional terms which CDA staff usually had to rewrite into "calmer" language, acceptable to HUD. Ranking of problems was more difficult, since residents generally saw all problems as equally serious. Further, the members of task forces often developed a strong attachment to their particular problem area, and this made ranking a touchy business.

Preparation of program objectives, establishing their priorities, and development of a strategy statement were staff exercises in most cities, although Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Wilmington sought to involve residents in the process. As noted earlier, residents preferred to move directly to discussion of specific projects once problem analysis was completed. Again in these components, CDA staff restated the resident views in more formal or technical language. In some cities (Houston, Youngstown) the rewriting had the effect of substantially altering what the residents had in mind. In general, however, staff sought to reflect faithfully the resident views developed in subcommittee sessions. There was little deliberate effort in any city by staff to "subvert" resident views; they were altered more by inadvertence through the choice of phrasing, than by intention.

As with the definition of problems, residents in all cities had a major say in the development of projects and often in their final selection and budget assignments as well. In the end, local agencies were the principal source of project ideas only because the residents' capacity to generate ideas proved limited, not because their contributions were deliberately excluded. Elimination of resident projects in such cities as Cleveland, Youngstown and Wilmington resulted more from the effect of competing resident factions than from action by the CDA or city hall. Even in Allegheny County and Houston, the dominant staff made a clear effort to include resident ideas they considered feasible.

As noted, the non-programmatic elements of the CDP were almost exclusively the work of staff professionals and what resident involvement occurred was focused on administrative structure (notable in Indianapolis) and the citizen participation component. In Wilmington, formulation of both those components was dominated by residents; that city and Indianapolis were the only instances where staff sought to reflect citizen views in drafting the evaluation/continuous planning section. In Santa Fe, resident advocates drafted the citizen participation plan. In Houston, Allegheny County, Los Angeles City and County, residents exercised at most mere

legitimization of these parts of the CDP. Resident employment and relocation were by definition elements designed to protect resident interests, but both components were so technically structured that direct resident involvement was unfeasible and never developed in any contributory way.

As with the first-round cities, HUD pressures to complete the CDP tended to limit direct resident participation at that stage. In cities such as Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Santa Fe, and New London, a sufficient degree of trust had apparently developed between residents and staff that the latter were able to "speed up" the planning process by minimizing resident participation. But in Cleveland, Wilmington, and Youngstown, a growing sense of distrust between residents and CDA staff made acceleration of planning more difficult.

Resident ability to conduct a thorough review of the CDP (or MPS) prior to submission to HUD varied extensively. In Houston, for example, the CDA director gave the resident troup enough time for an item-by-item review of the CDP. In Allegheny and Los Angeles counties, residents were able to review the MPS and CDP only after it had already been submitted to HUD or concurrently. In Youngstown, the MPS was submitted directly to HUD without resident review but the CDP was subjected to intensive resident scrutiny. As a rule, resident-oriented boards and committees were able to exercise de facto review and approval powers before submission of the CDP to HUD, but review of the MPS, usually regarded as a "paper exercise," was not considered important. The CDP, on the other hand, with its statement of projects, citizen participation component, and budget allocations, was a much more serious affair.

Expectedly, the ability of resident groups to review non-Model Cities projects proposed by local agencies for the MNA occurred mostly in parity and resident-influence cities and even here it focused on select agencies (housing or renewal authorities, to cite common examples). As a rule, this right of review developed gradually and became part of the overall program groundrules. Acquiescence of the chief executive and CDA staff was implicit in this arrangement; indeed, in several cities, such as Indianapolis and New London, CDA staff was active in securing resident review over agencies' projects. This advocacy proved to be an important factor in building resident trust of the staff and, as noted in an earlier paragraph, permitted a speed-up in planning — with a consequent diminution of the resident role — without excessive resident protest.

Finally, in both Cleveland and Santa Fe, city councils critical of the Model Cities planning process in their communities took advantage of their final power of approval to make substantive changes in both projects and program administration, drastically reducing the resident role. HUD's emphasis on chief executive control was cited as a defense and explanation of this action. Later elections would reverse the city council action in Sante Fe, sustain it in Cleveland.

HUD's role in dealing directly with the ability of residents to control Model Cities programs and to operate supplementally-funded projects has been discussed at various points throughout this report. In Wilmington, Youngstown, and New London, HUD representatives emphasized the ultimate responsibility of city hall for the program, particularly its administrative and fiscal elements. In Wilmington and New London, HUD also emphasized that projects would have to be implemented by existing local public and private agencies. While this intervention did not shift the planning process to a parity, staff-influence or staff-dominant model, it appeared to prevent formation of resident-dominant planning systems in those cities. Certainly it helped to stiffen the backbone of chief executives who were prone to sustain a heightened resident role (Santa Fe, Cleveland, and Youngstown). In Youngstown, HUD essentially played two roles: resident advocacy at the beginning, and city hall advocacy towards the end. HUD also sought greater resident participation in the three staff-dominant cities, with no particular success.

Institutional Change and Innovation

Model Cities proposed that the planning Year be used by participating cities to induce local institutions — particularly through the considered use of supplemental monies and technical assistance — to make changes in their traditional approaches to the Model Neighborhood's problems. In addition, cities were asked to develop innovative approaches to local planning and in the design of projects assisted by supplemental funds.

Neither institutional change nor innovation was defined by HUD in terms of quantitative outputs. In fact, both criteria were proposed to cities as being open to local definition, relevant to existing conditions and circumstances. This was in line with HUD's generally non-prescriptive guidelines (although the Department became more prescriptive in other areas as the second-round cities initiated their Planning Years), and with a clear realization that institutional change and innovation could not, in fact, be defined in statistical terms. The criteria did of course imply that the way in which cities had been dealing with Model Neighborhoods was less than ideal.

In this study, as in the earlier eleven-city analysis, it is possible to describe general "sets of experience" as tentative definitions of institutional change and innovation. Thus, the former was examined in terms of conscious agency departures from pre-Model Cities delivery of services to the Model Neighborhood Area, to the extent that these departures reflected a decision to improve the agency's ability to serve the MNA. Innovation was essentially defined as that which was new to the city and relevant, given local perceptions, to the local needs in the MNA.

Institutional Change:

A number of problems initially impeded the ability of cities to bring about changes in the way local agencies — including city hall — related to the problems of the Model Neighborhood. First, cities simply had no clear concept of the extent of services delivered to the MNA. None of the ten cities had amassed adequate data from which to assess existing practices, and local criteria by which to judge such data were ad hoc (e.g. when confrontations arose) rather than comprehensive. In most cities, there had been no in-depth critical appraisal of local delivery systems, and even where this had been accomplished there was scant record of resultant change. In short, there was little local awareness, most particularly in city hall, of what composed local delivery systems and of what was wrong with them or right with them. Specific knowledge of changes needed or of strategies to accomplish change simply did not exist. City hall in most instances lacked the power, let alone the time and staff capacity, to implement such strategies had the will existed. In most cities, the influence of resident organizations was limited, such groups were often fragmented internally, and political integration of poverty sections was a relatively new phenomenon in those cities where it was evidenced. There was a little sense of strategy for institutional change on the part of resident groups, as in city hall. In the end, this would be evidenced by the fact that resident-oriented Model Cities tended to have fewer innovative projects and to rely more on existing public organizations than more parity or staff-oriented cities.

There were nonetheless increments of institutional change in several of the cities examined in this report. Agency representatives in Santa Fe, Indianapolis, Wilmington, and New London came into sustained contact with Model Neighborhood groups and became resident advocates, to the extent that this contact in itself represented institutional change. Existing programs were modified — clearance plans for housing changed to rehabilitation; medical services decentralized to the MNA rather than added to central facilities; experimental educational programs supported by school districts — and agencies became more attuned to problems of the poor. For some agency heads, Model Cities was the first time they had come directly in touch with residents of areas like the Model Neighborhood. "We had to take another look at our traditional approaches," said a housing official in one city.

Increased city sensitivity to the MNA also came with the sustained

involvement of the chief executive in several Model Cities programs. In cities such as Indianapolis and Houston, this involvement eventually led to occasional intervention by the chief executive on behalf of MNA residents against the position of a line agency or independent commission. This, too, was recorded locally as representing a significant change in the traditional pattern of city hall relations with the Model Neighborhood Area.

There did not appear to be a pattern in the type of agencies manifesting institutional change. Thus, "hardware" departments such as public works or parks were recorded as changing their approaches to the MNA along with such "software" agencies as the school district, health departments, and employment services. Basically, the impetus for institutional change appears to have depended on such chance factors as:

1. The nature of resident/agency contact
2. The individual receptiveness of agency heads and representatives to program boards and subcommittees
3. Chief executive intercession or pressures
4. Federal influences
5. Contextual or environmental factors — elections, civil unrest, civic pressures
6. Desire for supplemental monies or technical assistance from the CDA

In Indianapolis, Wilmington, and New London, local agencies at times made responses to MNA concerns which were not specifically related to CDA planning. Elimination of a scheduled freeway, improvement of a recreation area, and a shift in police patrol activities fell into this category of change.

Innovation:

This criterion was variously interpreted in the ten cities: local officials were not sure just what HUD meant by innovation. Most cities, however, judged the degree of resident participation in Model Cities planning activities to be a substantial innovation in the traditional way the city had dealt with the MNA. Thus, the granting of de facto veto powers to resident groups in New London, Wilmington, and to a lesser extent, in Indianapolis and Los Angeles City, was construed locally as innovation. Since there were relatively few innovative projects to emanate from these Model Cities, the continuous dialogue, negotiation, and bargaining with residents could be interpreted as a major and new event. Even in staff-dominant Houston, Allegheny County and Los Angeles County, the very fact that residents were given some say in the planning process — if not very much — represented a significant, new development.

Agency participation on CDA task forces in Indianapolis, Santa Fe, Houston, and Wilmington was recorded as a new event in those organizations' relations with the MNA. Similarly, the willingness of some agencies in Indianapolis and Wilmington to permit MNA residents to review their activities on a sustained basis was perceived as an innovative response.

The involvement of agency actors from social, physical, and economic fields of interest was a new approach to planning in all cities studied. Prior to Model Cities, non-physical planning had been largely limited to specialized functional areas (health, manpower) or to a collection of activities in one area — social planning through the efforts of the local community action agency. For cities such as Houston and Wilmington, the comingling of agencies from a diverse number of fields was perceived to be one of the program's major accomplishments. "Maybe we didn't accomplish everything we first thought we could," commented one Houston staffer, "but for this city, getting everyone together on a program like this was a signal accomplishment."

Virtually every Model Cities program had projects which were considered to be highly innovative in terms of a city's particular needs and traditional approaches to neighborhood problems. In Allegheny County, the formation, no matter how embryonic, of a mini-Council of Governments for the Turtle Creek Valley area, funded in large part by supplemental monies, was perceived throughout the area as a new and even controversial development. For that matter, comprehensive planning in the Turtle Creek area was quite innovative for a neighborhood which had in the past received only the residual attention of County authorities. In Santa Fe, the establishment of a mental health outreach center in the MNA, with a resident-dominated board of directors was received as a considerable innovation in a mental health system that was — or had been — extremely centralized and perceived as unresponsive to the needs of the poor in Santa Fe's barrios. Similar instances of new and innovative projects can be recorded for all cities, but often the language in which a project description was couched precluded a clear understanding of just how innovative it would really be; at times a new-sounding project was to be administered by long-established local agencies: the degree of innovation would remain to be seen. Perhaps what was really important in considering innovation or newness was the perception of local actors, staff and residents, of a project proposal; if they thought it was an innovation, perhaps that in itself was a major accomplishment regardless of its actual merits.

The Federal Role

There was relatively little evidence of extensive Federal agency activity centered on a critique of how well CDAs were responding to the five performance criteria summarized above. HUD assisted local programs to define these criteria principally through the initial vehicle of the Discussion Paper, HUD's response to the application for a planning grant. There, the Federal focus was on degree of citizen participation — a criterion which steadily became of lesser importance to HUD as the Planning Year wore on — and coordination with local agencies, that is, their involvement in the Model Cities program. Agency involvement, it must be added, was generally reveiwed by Federal agencies on a functional, non-comprehensive basis. That is, there was concern by Federal agencies -- OEO, DOL, HEW, HUD — that client local departments and agencies were not involved in CDA or Model Cities activities. The concern, however, focused more on protection of turf, of local agency interests, than on the overall criterion of comprehensive planning, of coordination as a key element of the Model Cities planning process. Emphasis often appeared to be placed on agency review of proposals, rather than on ongoing participation in a planning process.

There was little conscious Federal agency intervention to bring about local institutional change and innovation — with the principal exception of OEO representatives in such cities as Los Angeles City and New London, and there the focus was primarily on citizen participation. In fact, Federal intervention was most often perceived by CDAs and residents as moves to protect established agency interests and practices, rather than to initiate new and innovative responses to MNA problems. HUD itself came to insist that projects be implemented by existing local agencies to a much more marked degree than had occurred during the first round of Model Cities Planning Years. There was little evidence of federal intervention aimed at developing innovative local projects; the concern was more over the form of implementation than over what was to be implemented. There were few recorded instances of HUD intervention dealing with local mobilization and concentration of resources, other than an insistence that funds not be diverted from the MNA. In fact, the federal response to cities in terms of reserving or allocating categorical funds was quite low.

In summary, the federal monitoring approach to performance criteria was largely ad hoc, functional, and focused largely on key products — MPS, CDP — rather than on the overall planning process. Federal intervention was sporadic and uneven; technical assistance, when it was forthcoming, focused more on development of specific projects or other products, than on the performance criteria per se. And often, when federal agencies did in fact seek to deal with such criteria, their comments

indicated a lack of understanding of the local environment, and made their contributions of limited value to hard-pressed CDA staffs.

Chapter Twelve: Program Issues

In the eleven-city analysis, the number and range of issues — conflicts over various Model Cities-related subjects — were examined in order to determine whether certain issues characterized various of the five planning systems. A similar examination of issues was conducted for this study.

Over one hundred forty issues were recorded in the ten cities studied.* They involved the following:

Types of Issues	Number	Percentage
Roles, responsibility, authority and power	63	43%
Planning process, techniques and procedures	25	17%
Development of projects	15	10%
MNA boundaries	5	3%
Budget assignments	9	6%
Other	29	20%

As this Table suggests, issues concerning authority and control constitute by far the largest category. This is similar to the findings of the first-round study. There is a clear association between the types of planning system as outlined in this study and the number and type of issues generated. Specifically, cities in which staff played the principal role (staff-dominance; staff-influence) tended to have fewer disputes over questions of authority and control than cities in which resident input to the planning system was more pronounced. Indianapolis, the parity city, was also low in this area.

Planning System	Study City	Issues of Authority & Control
Staff-Dominance	Allegheny County	2
	Los Angeles County	5
	Houston	6
Staff-Influence	Los Angeles City	5
	Youngstown	7
Parity	Indianapolis	4
Resident Influence	New London	7
	Santa Fe	10
	Wilmington	7
	Cleveland	10

This suggests that where resident organizations were neither cohesive nor politically integrated, the chief executive and the CDA staff were able to impose a definition of roles, responsibilities, authority, and control with relatively less negotiation and with fewer questions asked than in situations where the MNA residents were organized and had experience in dealing with the local political structure prior to initiation of Model Cities. This pattern is consistent with the overall distribution of issues for the various planning systems. As indicated in the following

*An issue was defined as a public disagreement over alternative choices on a given decision involving two or more actors.

Table, on the whole there tended to be few issues generated in cities where staff played the major roles. This, too, is similar to findings of the eleven-city study.

Planning System	Study City	Number of Issues
Staff-Dominance	Allegheny County	3
	Los Angeles County	14
	Houston	15
Staff-Influence	Youngstown	14
	Los Angeles City	7
Parity	Indianapolis	10
Resident-Influence	New London	18
	Santa Fe	22
	Wilmington	23
	Cleveland	20

The types of issues which occurred varied considerably over the Planning Year. As shown by the distribution in the Table below, issues of authority and control occurred throughout that year but arose most frequently in the first three months and tended to taper off after twelve months. The few questions pertaining to MNA boundaries were also raised in the early period. Issues relating to the general planning process were distributed fairly evenly throughout the planning period, while questions about the specifics of the plan (development of CDP projects and allocation of funds) tended to develop after the first six months, as might have been expected since few cities initiated project development activities until that time.

Issues	Planning Period (months)					
	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	12+	Total
Authority & Power	23	11	10	12	7	63
MNA Boundaries	5	0	0	0	0	5
Planning Process	4	5	2	8	6	25
Project Development	0	0	6	2	7	15
Budget Assignments	1	1	2	3	2	9
Other	4	4	8	7	6	29
						146

While there was much similarity noted in the distribution of issues in the cities studied in the first and second rounds of the Model Cities program, there is also clearly a significant difference between these two rounds in terms of the absolute number of issues that developed. That is, overall, the second-round cities experienced approximately half the number of issues found in first-round cities. This substantial drop can be accounted for by several factors, including the increased role of HUD in stepping in and resolving potential conflicts, the early establishment of groundrules in at least five cities, and the simplified guidelines issued by HUD.

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1 OF 2

Section V: Program Structure

Chapter Thirteen: Program Structure

Chapter Thirteen: Program Structure

HUD's guidelines concerning the organization of Model Cities programs were designedly vague: the Department felt that cities should define their own structural approaches. HUD did, however, require that CDAs be made responsible to city hall, and that resident views be somehow integrated into both the program's structure and formal planning processes. HUD also indicated a distinct Model Cities planning organization, yet one linked more or less directly with the chief executive's office, rather than having it subsumed under existing line agencies where it would presumably be less capable of innovation and of attracting resident participation. Still, although this approach was clearly favored by HUD, it did not in its guidelines specify the organizational details of such an agency.

HUD also indicated that local agencies in social, physical, and economic fields were to be structurally integrated into the program, but did not specify how cities might encourage such participation. Here too, the cities were to devise their own locally relevant definitions of agency involvement.

Program structure was therefore initially examined to determine its relevance — or non-relevance — to planning systems as these have been defined elsewhere in this analysis. As in the eleven-city analysis, structure was found to be unrelated to planning systems; that is, it was a non-system characteristic. Cities with similar planning systems took quite different approaches to structure. Similarly, cities with markedly different approaches to planning process, products, and performance criteria manifested like characteristics in developing program structure and securing staff, in relating the CDA to the chief executive or to local agencies, and with regard to organization and size of resident structures related to the program.

Developing Program Structure

Cities clearly took HUD's emphasis on self-determination relative to program structure seriously; that is, they developed initial program structures that reflected local conceptions of what would work. The initial period of discussion over program structure, its linkages to city hall and to residents, came during preparation of the application. Resident involvement, however, was generally minimal at this period, as we have noted. Resident and agency linkages with the program were considered items that could be dealt with more effectively after the planning grant was in fact awarded.

Structure was loosely defined in most applications. HUD's requirements, themselves imprecise, were not clear to many application writers and this was often reflected in a vaguely worded product. Only in Houston, and to a lesser extent in Indianapolis, did the application document actually indicate the relationship which residents were to have with the CDA during the Planning Year; and even in these cities, the description was not detailed.

In Cleveland and Wilmington, the waiting period was utilized by resident groups to demand a greater voice in Model Cities activities. These demands were supported in other cities by HUD's issuance of a Discussion Paper, shortly after grant announcement, calling upon cities to clarify their administrative structures, particularly with reference to relationship with the chief executive (city hall), linkages with local agencies, the integration of residents into decision-making. The Discussion Papers rarely prescribed *how* programs should be changed relative to the issues raised, although their effect was to make HUD something of an advocate for resident and local and agency participation.

The response of cities to HUD's requests for clarification of program structure varied considerably. In Los Angeles County, for example, where HUD asked that the CDA be made an independent agency reporting to the Chief Administrative Officer, if not to the County Supervisor, the CAO insisted that it remain a division of the Department of Urban Affairs, maintaining that the CDA was to that department, as Model Cities nationally was to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Los Angeles refused to budge from this position throughout the Planning Year, despite repeated HUD admonitions for change. It did, however, establish a more visible resident structure than had been anticipated in the initial application. Allegheny County similarly, after considerable prodding from HUD, developed a program structure that somewhat clarified resident and agency roles for both initiation and review. Youngstown, New London, and Wilmington grudgingly developed roles for local agencies, while seeking to accommodate growing resident pressures for program control. Los Angeles City painstakingly clarified its program structure by creating a centralized CDA structure with two more or less autonomous neighborhood administrative structures and boards.

HUD questioned the linkages between the CDA and city hall in both Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City, as has been noted above, and in Wilmington and New London as well. In all cases, HUD's concern focused on the seemingly tenuous relationship between the chief executive and the CDA. There were no instances of cities seeking to place the CDA under an urban renewal authority although in Los Angeles City, HUD did question the role of the Community Renewal Authority (CRA) head as chairman of the CDA board. Eventually this official was replaced in favor of the city's Deputy Mayor, a move defined as bringing the program closer to the Mayor's Office than it had been under the CRA. In Wilmington, HUD insisted that the CDA be closely linked to the mayor's office, although the latter had actually preferred to place it under the authority of the Planning Department.

In summary, each city defined a unique approach to program structure. The rush to prepare and submit the application, coupled with the lack of prescription in HUD guidelines, put cities in a position where they preferred vague statements of organization and process to a definitive elaboration of structure. Citizen participation, often perceived as a "hot potato" in the ten cities, was an issue best left for future resolution. The unfamiliarity of most cities with comprehensive planning was another element which caused cities and application writers to be indeterminate in describing their program organization for the Planning Year. Role assignments for these actors were often couched in general terms, thereby permitting a later elaboration under less hectic conditions. Cities rarely linked specific organizational components to select work tasks and planning product responsibilities. Initiation of plan ideas, review, and approval roles were, when mentioned at all, put into a general framework that would clearly allow significant alteration at a more appropriate time. HUD's response was consistent with its general ideal of structure: where the citizen component was deficient, it stressed that element; where city authority or agency involvement was weak, it made the appropriate criticisms.

Securing Staff

In the first round of Model Cities, much more time was taken by local programs to hire CDA staff than HUD anticipated. A similar phenomenon occurred with the second-round cities examined here, and was apparently unrelated to the type of planning system which developed. Thus, Allegheny County named an acting CDA Director (the County Planner) to initiate program organization and planning activities, on the grounds that someone with his political clout and savvy was necessary to generate cooperation from the various local agencies and the communities composing the MNA. He was not replaced by a permanent director until well into the Planning Year, and then only after considerable pressure from HUD. In New London, Wilmington, Cleveland, and Santa Fe, a combination of resident pressures over program control, desire for a small permanent CDA staff, and an intention to rely on outside consultants resulted in substantial delays in hiring staff. CDA directors were brought on board early in Los Angeles County, Youngstown, Santa Fe, and Indianapolis — virtually the full spectrum of planning systems. In Los Angeles City, a protracted debate over program organizations and a desire to please two MNA resident organizations, resulted in a lengthy delay in that city before staff could be hired, including the CDA director. Delays also occurred with regard to securing on-loan staff from local agencies. Such factors as turbulence over program control, staff shortages, civil service problems, and low salaries all contributed to this situation.

CDA Directors:

Numerous factors were at work in the selection of this official. In Los Angeles County and Youngstown, the CDA director was a close associate of the chief executive. In Santa Fe, a knowledge of Spanish-speaking minorities was a prime consideration for the post. In Los Angeles City, the CDA director had to be neither black nor Chicano, yet have a degree of planning competence. In Wilmington, New London, and Cleveland, CDA directors were initially taken from the ranks of local residents or resident-advocates. In short, the reasons for selection of the CDA director appeared to vary greatly with the city. Political loyalty to the chief executive was a factor in most cities, but not in all. In New London and Youngstown (the second CDA director) a CDA head was chosen who was not perceived locally as being supportive of the chief executive. In Houston, the CDA director, a Humble Oil executive, was clearly loyal to the mayor.

The appointing official of CDA directors varied greatly. In Youngstown, Allegheny County, Indianapolis, Houston, and Los Angeles County, the mayor operating alone made the appointment. In Wilmington, Cleveland, Los Angeles City, and New London, the mayor or city council made the appointment, subject to the approval of a resident-dominated board or personnel committee. In Sante Fe, the city council made the selection. The general criteria for selection, although clearly different for each city, included:

1. Political loyality or ties to chief executive
2. Acceptability to resident groups
3. Managerial and/or planning competence
4. Acceptability to existing institutions

Backgrounds in various social planning activities appeared to characterize the majority of CDA directors. There was no meaningful correlation between his race and that of the MNA population. The majority of CDA directors were in their thirties and forties; several had master's degrees in the social sciences.

Overall, a minority of those to become CDA directors had participated in preparation of the application — a distinct difference from the finding of the eleven-city analysis, where the great majority of directors had worked on the initial application. Also unlike the eleven-city analysis, city planning degrees did not appear to be a consideration for appointment as CDA director; not one of the permanent directors had a master's in planning.

CDA Staff:

The procedures for hiring staff varied considerably from city to city. In Allegheny County, the chief County Commissioner and his Planning Director both participated extensively in making staff appointments; political loyalty was a factor in the selection process, as well as competence. In short, the process was not at all free of "outside influence." In Indianapolis, the CDA director made his own appointments without considering resident views. A similar practice was followed in most CDAs, although resident or resident-dominated personnel committees did come to play a central role in New London, Cleveland, and Youngstown, and eventually in Indianapolis (with the agreement of the chief executive). In Los Angeles City, the CDA director filled his 29 central CDA staff positions, but with the advice and consent of his board. The City Manager in Santa Fe played a major role in selection of staff in that city.

Permanent professional staff ranged from three in Santa Fe to 29 in Los Angeles City. On-loan staff constituted an ever-changing proportion of CDA staff personnel, since much of this assistance was on an ad hoc functional basis during specific planning periods.

The majority of CDAs organized their staff along functional lines of concern, usually into three major divisions — social, physical, and economic planning. An administrative component — bookkeeping, personnel — was also present in most CDAs, although reliance on city hall assistance in these areas was common in the smaller cities. In Santa Fe, New London and Wilmington, the CDA staff, because of its small size, functioned largely as a single core staff, with responsibilities divided as they arose.

CDA Location

At the beginning of the Planning Year, CDA core staff in Santa Fe and Los Angeles County reported to the city manager and chief administrative officer, respectively. In Houston, Youngstown, Indianapolis, and Wilmington, they reported to the Mayor, while in Allegheny County the CDA staff was responsible to the Board of County Commissioners. In Cleveland, the CDA staff reported to a multi-source resident-dominated independent policy board. In New London, although an initial arrangement was to have the CDA staff report to a largely resident board, HUD pressure resulted in the staff reporting to the city manager and also to a broadly-based policy board. In Los Angeles City, the CDA staff initially expected to report to the central policy board composed of residents, local agency representatives, and city hall staff.

Resident Organization

Most of the cities studied held elections to select resident representatives to the various Model Cities boards. In Allegheny County, residents were generally appointed locally by established political leaders. In Wilmington, the resident council was self-appointed from among key resident groups in the MNA.

Resident participation was extensive in most cities at the functional task-force level; to some degree, the informal nature of these sessions tended to facilitate resident dialogue with local agencies and CDA staff where the more formal board level would often hinder negotiations and dialogue. Attendance at these task force sessions varied considerably, depending on the nature of the issue to be discussed; where a "hot" item such as urban renewal or education was involved, resident participation of a rather sustained nature could generally be anticipated. Attendance by professionals regarded by the residents as supportive of their interests tended to increase the effectiveness of these bodies.

In some cities (Indianapolis, Los Angeles County, Los Angeles City, and Youngstown) resident-dominated area boards played initiating and review roles with varying degrees of effectiveness. In Allegheny County, each municipality in the MNA (there were eleven) had its own CDA composed only of local residents, each was given from state funds a small amount of money ($4,000) to spend on local impact projects during the Planning Year as an inducement to form the CDAs, and each was expected to initiate project proposals and to review elements of the CDP. In fact, this review activity was basically legitimization of already established decisions. In Cleveland, District Planning Councils were each, at one point, allocated $100,000 by the CDA director to develop project proposals for inclusion in the CDP.

Independent staff assistance from planning grant monies was made available to resident groups and sub-committees in Indianapolis, Cleveland, New London, and Wilmington. VISTA workers provided considerable assistance to resident groups in Santa Fe. CDA staff and on-loan assistance were made available to resident groups in other cities. In Allegheny County, field workers paid by planning monies were assigned to the local CDAs to assist in linking their activities to those of the central CDA staff.

There was little effort in any of the studied cities to ensure representativeness or proportionality among the resident groups participating in the program except on the numerical population-base. As in the eleven-city analysis, there was virtually no effort to include representatives of the elderly or of the young among resident participants. Militants were strong voices in the New London, Wilmington, Cleveland, and Youngstown programs. They were notably absent in the Indianapolis,

Los Angeles County, and Houston programs. With the exception of Cleveland, there were no instances of programs whose resident components were dominated by women. This, too, was a finding in the first-round analysis, and provides an interesting comparison with many CAP programs. The great majority of resident participants on boards and committees tended to be in their thirties, forties, and fifties; no effort was recorded in the cities studied to attract youth.

Non-Resident Boards and Technical Pools

Most cities in submitting their applications noted an intention to convene technical panels to provide professional and/or agency inputs into planning processes. In the actual implementation of the Planning Year, however, these bodies played minimal roles in virtually all cities. The press of time, the potential of resident hostility, lack of agency interest, difficulties in preparing a relevant agenda, and the non-functional internal organization of such bodies all acted to severely limit the effectiveness of these units. Although Houston, Los Angeles County, and New London made use of such technical pools, there is little evidence to indicate that their role was contributory. As noted elsewhere in this study, local agency involvement appears to have been most useful at the task force level, where the focus is on expertise in a specific functional area. Residents in Cleveland and Wilmington voiced specific distrust of non-resident boards, perceiving them as hostile to resident interests.

Section VI: City Briefs

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania



The Setting

Allegheny County, the ninth most populous county in the country, lies in a highly industrialized and urbanized area with the City of Pittsburgh at its core. The Model Neighborhood area occupies the banks along Turtle Creek, which empties into the Monongahela River a few miles southeast of Pittsburgh. Turtle Creek Valley is typical of the many aging industrial areas in the County. The steel mills and other factories were built on the flat lands along the rivers where they had access to railroads and to the water for industrial transport. The many immigrants who came from all parts of Europe to the promise of better jobs in the burgeoning industries clustered along the riverways near the sources of employment. In later years, increasing affluence and an improved highway system led many residents to flee the valley floor for higher ground, moving away from the industrial pollution. Businesses in the valley soon suffered from the exodus of wage earners and competition from shopping centers built near the new residential areas. The youth fled to better opportunities and less rigorous work. Left behind were the elderly and the poor. Businesses closed; no new houses were built; and the tax base deteriorated. Municipalities were beset with increasing costs of services and decreasing revenues.

Until the late '50's little was being done to reverse the decline in the fortunes of Turtle Creek Valley. Then work was begun on a series of small urban renewal projects followed by major flood control and highway development programs. But, most of the activity was directed at improving conditions for the three major industries in the Valley — U.S. Steel, Westinghouse Electric, and Westinghouse Air Brake (WABCO). The departure of any one of these "Big Three" would have been a severe blow to the area's economy, so flood damage had to be prevented, parking areas provided through renewal programs, and highways improved to make the plants more accessible to commuting workers. While not improving conditions greatly for the residents of the Valley, the projects did lead to commitments of the Big Three, through expansion or renovation of facilities, to remain.

A major obstacle to large-scale programs aimed at revitalizing the Valley was the proliferation of local governmental units. The county contains 129 separate municipalities, plus numerous commissions and authorities. Each of the eleven municipalities in Turtle Creek Valley zealously guarded its independence and vigilantly resisted any suggestion of consolidation. In this environment, programs cutting across jurisdictions were far from commonplace; even county projects frequently became entangled in political wrangles.

The Application Period

Initial interest in the Model Cities program for the county was expressed by department heads, who thought the program might be useful as a means of achieving some coordination among the myriad political and administrative entities in the county. Led by County Planning Department Director LeRoy Little, they persuaded the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners to permit them to go ahead with an application. Parts of the application were then prepared by staff members in various county departments and in several of the "establishment" social agencies that had taken part in the Pittsburgh rennaissance. These disparate sections were slapped together and the application, albeit lacking either cohesiveness or substance, was completed. At a mass meeting, the application was approved by various governmental and agency officials in the Valley who were assured that the program had "nothing to do with metropolitan government." HUD did not find that the application merited funding, and Allegheny County was not included in the first-round cities awarded grants in November 1967.

The County's failure to win a Model Cities planning grant was an injury to pride, but the simultaneous award of a grant to Pittsburgh was an affront not to be endured. The competition with Pittsburgh and continuing interest in the program as a possible means toward some degree of inter-municipal coordination led to the preparation of a second application. Again the County Planning Department took the lead in developing the document. The agencies that had contributed to the original application were called upon once more for assistance, with perhaps a tacit understanding that they would receive consultant contracts during the planning period should the application be successful. To eliminate problems caused by the diverse authorships of sections of the application, professional editors were hired to integrate the segments and bring some continuity to the document.

Reflecting the view of the Valley's problems held by county officials and local politicians, the application identified needs largely in terms of physical dilapidation of housing and transportation, paying limited attention to problems of racial discrimination, health, and education. To ensure the cooperation in the program of the politicians, the citizen participation structure anticipated the formation of a citizen advisory committee which the political leaders could fairly well control. The county asked for a planning grant of $348,000 and also sought the same amount from the state through the "Partner Cities" program.

With the second application county officials concentrated on obtaining the political clout in Washington they deemed essential to winning a planning grant. In May 1968, a delegation of Congressmen, and local governmental, business, and civic leaders (including representation from the "Big Three" industries) traveled aboard a U.S. Steel company plane to Washington to meet with HUD officials about Allegheny County's application. The manoeuver was well advised, for in the Philadelphia Regional office of HUD, Allegheny County's second application was considered as seriously deficient as the first. According to HUD staff, "it lacked basic information, failed to discuss local problems coherently and to analyze causes, and did not present an

effective, governmentally integrated plan for attacking the neighborhood's problems."

The support marshalled by the county paid dividends, however, when in September Allegheny County was among six cities in the region awarded Model Cities planning grants. The amount of the grant was $236,000, but in August the County had received the full $348,000 requested from the State's Partner Cities program. Those grants, plus $90,000 the county was contributing to meet its share of the costs, would provide some $674,000 to the CDA for the planning year.

Revision Period

HUD's comments on and requests for revisions of the Allegheny County application were presented to the County Commissioners and other officials by Yvonne Perry, the HUD leadwoman, and members of the RICC on October 10, 1968. HUD had four main areas of concern: (1) the planning budget, which had to be reduced; (2) the planning work program, which lacked the definition of a logical planning process; (3) the citizen participation structure, which had to be amended to demonstrate "the manner in which meaningful citizen participation (would) be achieved;" and (4) the administrative structure, which needed to be simplified to "accommodate itself to meaningful citizen participation."

Election-year politics were occupying the attention of County Planning Director LeRoy Little, so the revisions were not immediately attended to. Later, a few minor changes to the application were hastily thrown together and the "revisions" presented to Ms. Perry for approval. The amended document was not acceptable to HUD since by and large it simply promised to make the corrections requested. As months went by and the county still had taken no further steps to respond to HUD's request, the leadwoman was growing impatient with what she viewed as the county's "cavalier approach" to HUD's planning requirements.

In the meantime the receipt of the first $100,000 of the Partner Cities money gave the county a feeling of independence. Contracts for planning assistance from the "establishment" organizations, such as ACTION-Housing, and the Health and Welfare Association, were awarded and the staffing-up process for the CDA got underway. LeRoy Little, while retaining his full-time position as County Planning Director, was named Acting Director of the CDA. Two Associate Directors, John Milberger and Frank Bunda, also joined the staff, Milberger leaving his position as Deputy Director of the CAA and Bunda coming from a senior planner's post with the County Redevelopment Authority. Although Little was ostensibly in control, the responsibility for direct administration of the CDA was assumed by Milberger.

An immediate task of the new staff was to prepare revisions to the application that would satisfy the leadwoman and others in the HUD regional office. Milberger's commitment to widespread citizen participation was greater than Little's, but he too was fully cognizant of the delicate political balances that existed in a multi-municipal program. Consequently, he had to devise a structure that would be acceptable to the County Commission Chairman and the Valley politicians. On the other hand, he had to satisfy the leadwoman that the structure provided for meaningful citizen involvement.

A 36-member citizen advisory committee (CDAAC) was developed which would include the three County Commissioners, a member chosen by the governing body in each of the 11 communities, a member chosen by the local CAA committee or Human Relations committee in each community, and a representative chosen by the local CDA's (which would be open to all residents). It was anticipated that the politicians would likely dominate the advisory committee.

The revisions were prepared by the CDA staff in April and presented to HUD. The leadwoman found the amended application in general "not particularly strong," but "reasonable." Pressed by many responsibilities, she agreed to accept it and by the end of the month the first installment of the planning grant was sent to the County.

The Planning Year: Starting Up

May – July, 1969

After a "Kick-off Rally" on May 2 which Floyd Hyde, Assistant Secretary for the Model Cities Administration, attended, the CDA addressed the task of building up the citizen organization for the program. Jack Milberger was fortunate in having available a magnificent organizing tool – money. The State Partner Cities grant enabled the CDA to set aside $4,000 for each community for use on "Impact Projects" to be selected by the local CDA's and the CDAAC. The money very effectively generated interest in the program and brought a good number of residents out to the meetings. Interest in the "impact projects" turned to pre-occupation; however, and later drew attention away from important planning tasks.

No significant problems cropped up during the organizational phase. One CDA staff member who was concerned about the lack of representation of poor blacks encouraged participation by minorities in Braddock and Rankin, but the political leaders in those communities soon had him fired. The politicians were prominent at the local CDA meetings and on the whole the citizens involved were older and more conservative than the general populace. Leonard C. Staisey, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, elected in November 1967, was chosen Chairman of the CDAAC. The presence of Staisey at the head of the citizen organization was something that the CDA staff had worked for because they expected his political muscle would be needed to keep the borough politicians in line and to gain cooperation from other county departments. The citizens liked the idea since it gave them direct access to the county government power structure. And Staisey accepted it because he wanted the program to work and wanted to reap the political benefits from Federal largesse in the Valley.

Some attention in the early months was given to eliciting the concerns of the industries which had played such an important role in securing the planning grant for the county. On July 17 Milberger met with representatives of the "Big Three." The industries made a fairly clear presentation of the types of projects (entirely physical in nature) they would like to see undertaken. Having expressed their interests, they withdrew from involvement in the program until late in the fall.

Besides organizing the local CDAs and the CDAAC, the CDA staff was busy setting up task forces to carry out planning activities in six functional areas – Physical Environment, Manpower and Economic Development, Education, Health and Welfare, Housing, and Municipal Services. Each of the eleven local CDAs was to select one person for each task force and by the end of July most of the positions were filled.

Little headway was made during this period on planning tasks despite the availability of consultant assistance from four organizations. Milberger found that the consultants had little understanding either of their roles in the program or of HUD's planning requirements. To bring some order out of chaos and to provide some overall direction to the planning process, Milberger decided to hire yet more consultants to provide the general assistance to the CDA.

Two companies were selected – Urban Design Associates, who had experience in Model Cities, and North American Rockwell.

The Planning Year: Mid-Planning Statement

July – December, 1969

Because of their supposed knowledge about Model Cities planning guidelines, Urban Design Associates (UDA) was given the lead role in defining the planning process. They set a schedule which called for the initial effort to be directed toward analysis of service delivery systems. They immediately encountered difficulty getting the staff and other consultants to understand their concept of the planning process and were unable to get the desired reports either on time or in the proper format. They pressed Milberger and the staff to carry out the work assigned and Milberger in turn pressed the UDA to produce concrete results. Milberger grew disenchanted with UDA and turned to his other general consultant – North American Rockwell (NAR) – for guidance.

NAR was eager to expand its role in the program and to gain experience in the "urban field." NAR was given an additional $10,000 contract for work on the

Mid-Planning Statement (MPS), providing staff members a further excuse not to follow UDA's planning approach. The result was a gradual change in emphasis from the identification of gaps in existing services (from which an action program was logically to emerge) to a broader, less institution-oriented system approach which focused on overall program development and avoided specific criticism of existing organizations and services.

By the end of August the various consultants and CDA staff specialists had produced analytical reports in the six functional areas widely varied in style, content and quality. The citizen task forces, dominated by the staff and consultants, had no measurable influence over the reports.

UDA was critical of the reports, citing their failure to provide "tough critiques" of existing delivery systems, but by this time Milberger was relying on NAR and little heed was paid the UDA comments. In August the revised second round submission requirements were released by HUD and the change in guidelines was a good reason for pushing UDA aside in favor of NAR. NAR was then asked to write the Mid-Planning Statement. The reports and problem statements developed by the staff and consultants were approved with little comment by the task forces and then by the local CDAs and the CDAAC, which were much more concerned with the impact projects than discussions of problems.

In September pressure from HUD on the county forced Commission Chairman Staisey to remove LeRoy Little from the post of CDA Director in favor of a full-time agency head. Jack Milberger was the logical choice to succeed him and he was elevated to the top position.

The pace of work on the Mid-Planning Statement heightened in September. The 60-problem statements (10 per component) were rewritten to make them consistent in content and format as they had been prepared independently by different authors. The Task Forces were asked to rank the problems in order of importance, and from these lists goals were drafted by the CDA which were in essence the converse of the problems. The goals were reviewed and approved, largely without comment, by the local CDAs and the CDAAC.

A remaining task was to attend to linkages and priorities among functional areas. Some 23 key problems were identified by the number of other problems relating to them, and the list was further reduced by simple consolidation to 8 problems. NAR then led the CDA staff through a "goal-prioritization process" which ranked the problems based upon six objective criteria and "special consideration" and produced 17 "most important" objectives. Putting it all together and finishing the writing were tasks performed by NAR.

About the time the MPS was completed, Milberger again met with representatives of the Big Three industries. They were unhappy with the MPS, feeling that not enough attention was devoted to the physical problems that most concerned them. To placate them, Milberger had UDA prepare a Physical Environment Report which included land-use plans reflecting the industry viewpoint. For the time, industry was satisfied.

The Planning Year: Completion of the CDP
Dec, 1969 – May, 1970

After the basic material for the MPS was turned over to NAR, the CDA staff directed its attention to developing projects for the first year CDP. In December the CDA was given a target figure for first year supplemental funds of $6.725 million. The money was arbitrarily allocated among the components by Milberger who "kept in mind" the program priorities.

Staff and consultants met with the various task forces to present for discussion project ideas they had developed. In some cases, other projects were suggested by task force members. Staff then filled out forms developed by NAR, after which they went back to the task forces and to a special Citizen Review Committee appointed by Commissioner Staisey, for final approval. In the end, however, it was the consultants and the various component specialists on the CDA staff who worked up the final project summaries. Milberger took responsibility, along with NAR, for

writing Part III, the administrative plan. Program budgets were prepared by the staff or consultant specialists. Emphasis in the program was given to Employment, not as a result of the problem identification process, but more because it was the view of HUD and Staisey that Employment should be a priority area.

Although work on the CDP progressed, much time and energy of the CDA staff was diverted to continual revision. Particularly difficult to please was the regional Model Cities planning specialist, who time and again demanded revisions to the objectives. Some six weeks were occupied with the revision process, consuming time that could have been devoted to project development.

On May 6 Milberger presented Staisey one of the first completed copies of the plan but, did not expect the Commissioners to act on the plan until after the CDAAC reviewed the document on May 13. Staisey, however, wanted to move as rapidly as possible on the program and approval of the document was given on May 7. In keeping with the thorough dominance by the CDA, approval of the plan by the citizen advisory board was not given until May 13, a week after the CDP was submitted to HUD.



The Setting

Until the mid-1960's Cleveland was an unusual example of a strong-mayor form of government, with a two-year mayor whose powers included appointment of all department heads, preparation of the budget and power of veto over decisions of the 33-member City Council (with a two-thirds vote required for override). There was virtually no social or economic planning, and apart from education, all social programs were conducted by private charitable organizations. The urban renewal program, in any case limited to the CBD, was a recognized failure, accomplishing little and increasing ghetto congestion through poor management of relocation.

Cleveland shared the postwar problems common to U.S. cities: heavy in-migration of low-income blacks coupled with flight of middle-income whites to the suburbs, resulting in a loss of tax base even as city services mounted in scale and cost. These problems were exacerbated in Cleveland by fractioning of the population into contending enclaves: the remnant white middle class occupied the west side of the river; the blacks were on the east side, but deeply split into the rival Hough and Central districts; while a mix of ethnic minorities, without mobility and fearful of black encroachment, occupied the south and southeast areas.

Following the Hough riots of 1966, an effort was made to modernize the city government and two new city departments were created — Community Development (supplanting the urban renewal effort) and Human Resources and Economic Development (to assume welfare and manpower functions). As a last-ditch attempt at civic achievement, the Locher administration submitted a Model City application (prepared *in camera*, with token resident participation) for HUD's approval.

But the electorate — middle class as well as poor — had had enough of Mayor Locher. Carl Stokes, the nation's first black mayor of a major city, was elected and took office on November 15, 1967. Two days later HUD rejected the Locher

Model Cities application, but within less than a year the Model Cities application of the Stokes regime had been approved.

Through Stokes' election, the black constituency, then about 35 percent of the city population, had achieved its first real measure of power in the city's history. The *de facto* disenfranchisement of decades was overturned, and politically Cleveland was an open city. In the normal course, this event would have been followed by a long adjustment in which a new power balance would evolve, sorting out not only the relative weights of white and black constituencies but also of rival black groups. The effect of Model Cities was to force a quick determination of power structure on the divided black community, since the major area of the Model Neighborhood was comprised of the rival Hough and Central districts. In all cities where it has operated, the Model Cities program has imposed, if not a new political alignment, at least a new element in the decision process; but in Cleveland the difficulties inherent in this formulation were greatly compounded because it coincided with a general upset of the traditional structure, at a time of greatly heightened black militancy and aspiration, and with all political alliances in flux.

The Application Period

Stokes had staff and on-loan agency people at work on a Model Cities application within six weeks of taking office, but he lacked real personal commitment to the program since there could be no political pay-off from it during his term. Generally low-level staff were assigned to the drafting, which was essentially an expanded revision of the Locher application. The Model Neighborhood was enlarged to include the West Central district, whose residents had felt left out. Again the application was an in-house product but with rather larger inner-city representation than before, notably in the person of Mrs. Lois Dupree, a literate spokesman for prominent Hough elements. Other actors were Joyce Whitley, a Cleveland consultant who had worked for HUD in Washington, Hank Doll, a white student on the mayor's staff, and Richard Green, the Stokes appointee to head the new Department of Community Development. All — but especially Green and Whitely — were to be centrally involved with the Model Cities program in Cleveland on and off for the next three years. Green presented the completed application to a "citizen's convention" of Model Neighborhood residents in early April, stressing the resident role as the leading factor in the plan. The only significant resident input at this single public meeting was a request for extension of the Model Neighborhood to the south. The application went to the City Council on April 9 and was approved; submittal to HUD followed on April 15.

The application stressed resident control and involvement, even noting that the work program (12 "milestones" were identified) would change in substance as well as degree once resident inputs began coming in. A city-wide Executive Planning Committee, chaired by the mayor and balancing citizen and agency representation, would review and "coordinate" plans and programs to be initiated by a resident-dominated Policy Committee working with the CDA. A special City Council committee would review all Model Cities plans prior to submittal for Council approval. A planning budget of $507,233 was proposed, of which $110,570 represented the city's contribution of facilities and on-loan agency staff.

The Waiting Period

With an interim CDA staff headed by the inexperienced Doll, the next five months were spent in groundwork, building support for the program within the Model Neighborhood. Mrs. Dupree functioned as Coordinator for Hough and Mrs. Mabel Meyers for Central, while Joyce Whitely provided expertise. A series of block meetings was held, and problem-area workshops brought citizens into unaccustomed exchange with the city officials. Major events were two meetings of a Residents Drafting Committee, set up by Dupree and Meyers with 30 Model Neighborhood representatives. At the first, a motion to include the Garden Valley area in the Model Neighborhood passed without strife, but the thornier problem of resident organization — whether to form an association or a corporation — immediately brought to surface

the Hough/Central rivalry and was tabled. The second was addressed by Mayor Stokes, who urged an association, but indicated that either form was acceptable. After some emotionalism, the association form was adopted; but the corporation issue was not dead. The Model Cities grant was announced by HUD on September 6, 1968 and although it was $130,000 less than the amount requested, it was hailed locally as a major Stokes achievement. The honeymoon, however, had ended. Revision was to occupy a stormy six months, and the working harmony of the pre-grant period would never be restored.

Revision Period

HUD asked for clarifications of the resident role in the structure and for a fuller exposition of the work program and its relation to local agencies. Stokes' basic disinterest in the Model Cities program now became apparent, as he again appointed the low-level Doll — who lacked status both at City Hall and with the Model Neighborhood — as interim chief to resolve these difficult matters. Sid Spector, Stokes' advisor on urban affairs, moved into the vacuum and, in his urgency to return the revised plan for HUD approval, alienated the citizen groups. Two procedural matters faced the Residents Drafting Committee and City Hall: a "constitutional convention," to formulate the organization, to be followed by a Model Neighborhood election of district members of the Policy Board. To Spector, this sequence put the chicken before the egg, and he persuaded Stokes to schedule the election first. The Drafting Committee brought suit against City Hall, and Stokes promptly backed down — but not before Spector had disbanded the Drafting Committee. Spector was withdrawn from all resident contact and the Drafting Committee was reconstituted, with a heightened sense of power.

Meanwhile, City Council members from the Model Neighborhood, fearful of political rivals arising in their own districts from the Model Cities elections, had delayed approval of the Model Cities ordinances. They shared their position by voting approval with the proviso that the seven Model Neighborhood Councilmen be seated on the Executive Committee.

In retaliation, the Drafting Committee wrote into the constitution that all 29 of the elected district members to the Board of Trustees (as the resident Policy Committee was finally called) would sit on the Executive Committee, thereby retaining resident dominance.

In this form the constitution was adopted by the resident convention on March 1, 1969. The Board of Trustees was given responsibility for developing Model Cities policy, programs, projects, and budget, while the Executive Committee was accorded right of final approval. The resident Board was also given extensive authority over staff hiring and firing and budget expenditures. Finally, the constitution called for establishing District Planning Councils (DPCs) in the 29 Model Neighborhood election districts to serve as liaison between residents and their Board representatives.

Adoption of the constitution completed the organizational revision. The work-program revision was largely carried through by Green and Whitely (on consultant fee) and it mirrored their strong orientation toward professionalism: the revised budget showed this most clearly, with $210,523 allocated to salaries, $52,237 to consultants, and $24,812 to resident participation. But because they so poorly reflected the main thrust of the Cleveland Model Cities — citizen organization and participation — the work-program and budget would prove totally irrelevant to the city's planning effort in this area.

The revisions were forwarded to HUD on March 14.

The Planning Year: Starting Up

With a nominal deadline of November 15 for the Mid-Year Planning Statement, major CDA efforts in this period were to elicit resident inputs and to marshal on-loan agency assistance in the technical translation of these into the programmatic aspects of the plan. These efforts were delayed and largely frustrated by ceaseless opposition from the resident Board of Trustees, elected on March 28 and headed by Mrs. Fannie Lewis, a very strong Hough leader. She distrusted Doll, who

remained as acting CDA Director until Albert Barringer, a California black and Stokes' choice for permanent Director, arrived on June 14. Mrs. Lewis, on first encounter, began a running feud with Barringer which developed into a vendetta. His initial effort to organize the DPCs as an essential vehicle for Model Neighborhood input was delayed by Board obstructivism until August 21, when an election was held in most of the 29 districts.

Barringer's continuing attempts to complete his staff and to obtain free assistance from HUD and from on-loan agency writers were similarly blocked by the Board, which wanted to hire Consultants BLACK, a local firm. Fiscal and accounting problems further exacerbated the strife between the Board and CDA, and it was this issue which finally enabled the Board to fire Barringer on December 19, when a Board-hired CPA found a putative "irregularity" in the books (the CDA account was overdrawn because of the Board's own delay in requesting HUD funds).

Nevertheless, in the six months of Barringer's tenure some progress had been made. The DPCs were established and, in their responses to a questionnaire, had provided material for a statement of 24 "basic conditions" in the Model Neighborhood, ranked by importance and linked to their causes. Housing and unemployment emerged as the key Model Neighborhood issues. A mass organizational meeting on October 16 had formed itself into three Task Forces (social, economic, physical) with subcommittees that continued to meet with CDA staff to prepare goal statements, establish linkages and generally firm up the plan's strategy. Groundwork for inputs of data and resources from some 15 local agencies was laid at a session on October 15, and arrangements made for technical assistance from the HUD-funded OSTI-MKGK consulting team. Once the impasse between the Board (in the person of Mrs. Lewis and the CDA (Barringer) was resolved, planning could proceed. In fact, the same Board session which fired Barringer approved a contract for the OSTI-MKGK assistance.

The Planning Year: Mid-Planning Statement

Green now returned as Acting Director and in a six-week respite from contention the Mid-Planning Statement was completed. A Planning Festival has held on the weekend of January 20-22 and its workshops elicited a new list of projects and priorities. These were incorporated in a Mid-Planning Statement written by a task force from Green's department (CDIP), but its technical language caused it to be rejected when it came before the resident board for approval. The small CDA staff then rewrote the statement reflecting the new priorities (unemployment, economic development, with housing now third) and the Board made only minor changes before approving it. On February 16, 1970, the Mid-Planning Statement went to HUD, which responded by announcing a supplemental funding of $9.3 million for the First Action Year.

The rebuff of CDIP had caused a split between Green and Mrs. Lewis, however, and he engineered her removal as Board chairman on February 17 — an action which allowed genuine work to begin in the Board's committees and in the DPCs (whose interest was also stimulated by a promise from Green that each DPC would receive $100,000 of supplemental money for district improvements). The Proposal Review Committee became the principal project review body in the following months, the Board itself stepping down to a role of final approval.

Mayor Stokes, reluctantly acceding to HUD demands, appointed a new, permanent, CDA Director, choosing Green's deputy, Charles Morton, a former HUD leadman. Morton's single objective was to submit a CDP to the City Council before its June 19 summer recess. Almost his first act was to hire Joyce Whitely as consultant, ostensibly to effect the revision called for in the RICC review of the Mid-Planning Statement. Actually, she was to draft the CDP. The extensive RICC recommendations were summarized by Leadman Watson as programmatic (focusing on projects) and administrative (requiring the plan to make clear that the Mayor and City Council would be responsible for overall control).

With resident input coming through the Board's Policy Committee (Rose

Ross), Whitely and her staff proceeded to draft the Projects component, leaving unchanged only the Board-drafted education section, its single project a Model Neighborhood experimental school. The most questionable inclusion was "Pride, Inc." a $3.25 million skills-center proposal that overlapped other manpower projects in the top-priority economic development section, but which had very strong Model Neighborhood support, and was too "hot" to omit.

Whitely completed the work for which she had contracted by June 16, but opposition had been building to the CDA timetable and Morton's procedures. Focusing on the Pride proposal (its support was from Mrs. Ross' district), Fannie Lewis began to organize a dissident voice in the DPCs, who were disgruntled because no more had been heard of the $100,000 promised them. She gathered enough strength to challenge the entire Projects component as drafted by Whitely and to persuade the DPCs to hire a Toledo attorney, James Auerwater, to draft alternative projects. These were thrown into the hopper at a week of work sessions held from June 15 to 19, but they were subsequently discovered by Leadman Watson to be verbatim duplicates of First Action Year projects for the Columbus Model Cities. Still, they had been legitimately submitted by Model Neighborhood delegates and were vocally supported by Mrs. Lewis and her allies. Morton and staff, who had to take the list seriously, drafted a compromise Projects component, working closely with local agency people. There were then three project lists, all revisions of each other and of earlier drafts, and nobody concerned any longer had a clear idea of which was what. In the meantime, June 29 had arrived and the City Council adjourned for the summer.

During the recess Mrs. Lewis mounted her attack. On August 20 she set the ground with a petition to the Mayor and Council criticizing the Whitely projects and asking Council support of the Auerwater alternatives. Morton responded by asking the Council to schedule hearings on the CDP, but unfortunately these fell under jurisdiction of the Council's Subcommittee on Community Development, chaired by the Mayor's chief opponent on the Council, Leo Jackson. Hearings were held on September 16 and became a televised forum for Mrs. Lewis to air large charges of misuse of program funds and abuse of citizen participation. Chairman Jackson cut short CDA Director Morton's rebuttal and halted committee review until "... the program is moving the way the residents want it to go." This event brought a forceful response from Mayor Stokes for the first time, and his resultant firmness made it possible to complete the CDP.

The Planning Year: Completion of the CDP

On November 15, Morton, in turn, was fired as CDA Director, also as a result of actions taken in a fiscal crisis. Green again returned as Acting Director, determined to demonstrate to HUD that he could complete the plans and faced with a warning from Regional Model Cities Administrator Goldfarb in December that he would recommend dropping the program unless some achievement was forthcoming. Green's primary job was to gain approval of the resident Board of Trustees, which had to be satisfied on the central issue of the resident role.

While Model Neighborhood interest had focused on money-spending projects in the preceding months, Morton and Whitely had proceeded to reshape the administrative structure to RICC's requirement that "responsibility for control rests with the Mayor and City Council." The CDA Director was given extensive power and staff and was to answer directly to the Executive Committee (rather than the entire Board). A seven-member Advisory Panel (to which the Board of Trustees would nominate 3) would be chosen by the Executive Committee and was given a mediator role. The resident role was set up as a separate "Citizen Participation Project" and was submitted as such to the Policy Review Committee, along with other project components, but the PRC did not see the new administrative sections.

This subterfuge could no longer be maintained, and Green's problem was to get Board approval of a role which had become largely one of advocacy. He did so by persuading the Mayor to sign a "Letter of Agreement" promising independent status to The Board over its own budget and programs. At a public meeting called by

the Executive Committee on January 16, Mrs. Lewis openly challenged the Mayor on the legitimacy of this document. Stokes passionately rebuffed her and stalked out of the meeting, an event which galvanized moderate members of the Board into support of the Mayor and the Plan. Mrs. Lewis was at last discredited and the Plan approved.

There remained the problem of City Council approval. Subcommittee hearings were held in closed sessions over two days, but Model Neighborhood Councilmen and selected resource agency personnel were urged to attend. The full Council approved a resolution authorizing the Mayor to submit the Plan to HUD on February 22, 1971, but in two paragraphs (1) withheld granting of authority to execute *any* contract with *any* supporting agencies without prior Council approval, and (2) specifically withheld "approval or disapproval of the citizen participation section, which will be implemented by further Council action." The CDP did not return to the Board of Trustees for final approval but was forwarded to HUD.

Houston, Texas



The Setting

Houston is the sixth largest city in the United States, with a 1970 population of 1,250,000. It is headquarters for major petro-chemical companies, has a major seaport and several refineries, and is rapidly developing as a center for tourism in the Southwest.

City government is dominated by the mayor, who combines much of the authority of both a city manager and a strong mayor in other cities. The city council is structurally weak, with no staff and only small stipends for its members. Houston has had little experience in dealing with Federal programs because of the widespread distrust among the electorate against government, be it local, state, or Federal. The downtown area has been renewed by private initiative, but there remain an estimated 50,000 substandard housing units in the city.

Houston had at the outset of Model Cities no housing code, no zoning ordinance, and, consequently, no Workable Program for Community Improvement, which is a prerequisite for many HUD programs. In more affluent areas, residential areas are protected through the use of deed restrictions, but in poorer areas there is often a mix of residential and industrial uses. Physical planning is largely limited to the approval of subdivision development plans by the city Planning Department. Social planning is fragmented among a school board that has resisted integration since 1955, a County Welfare Department that is severely constrained by state constitutional limitations on welfare expenditures, and a Community Action Agency torn by internal strife and perceived by many local observers as generally ineffective.

Roughly, one-fifth of the total population of the city is black, and one-tenth is Chicano. These two minority groups, along with elderly whites, comprise most of the 20 percent of the residents who live in poverty. They are generally confined to deteriorating neighborhoods rimming the central business district.

The Application Period: January — April, 1968

Houston did not submit a first-round Model Cities application, being one of the few major cities in the country not to do so. Without a Workable Program, and with the strong local bias against Federal programs, Mayor Louis Welch felt that it was not worth the effort. In late 1966 and 1967, however, two citizen task forces released reports documenting the serious housing situation facing the poorer residents of the city. One report recommended, among other things, that the Mayor establish a Citizens Advisory Committee on Housing, and that the city apply for Model Cities. The presence of businessmen and professionals on these task forces gave their recommendations greater credibility than would otherwise have been the case.

Mayor Welch established the Citizens Advisory Committee on Housing, and in the fall of 1967 he formed a task force as part of this group to study the Model Cities program. By December, the task force recommended that the city apply for the program, primarily because it had fewer Federal "strings" and required a smaller local matching share than other programs.

In January, 1968, Mayor Welch approved the task force recommendation and asked them to prepare an application. They gathered data on housing conditions, family income, and amount of education, and based on these chose two areas adjacent to the central business district as the Model Neighborhood. The areas totaled slightly more than 14 square miles and had a population of 116,000 people. The proposed Model Neighborhood has two-thirds black and one-seventh Chicano, and 38 percent of its families had incomes below $3,000 per year.

The task force then recruited a total of 68 people from various local agencies to participate in writing the application. The expanded group divided itself into eight component areas, with each group meeting from two to four times in early February. By February 22, a draft of the application was ready for review. No issues arose in writing it because the emphasis was on getting it into HUD by the April 15 deadline.

Based on a recommendation from a HUD official in Washington, the chairman of the task force involved area residents in the process at this point. He visited 13 neighborhood organizations and asked them to send two representatives each to a review meeting. Although many of the groups were apathetic, enough people were interested for three review meetings to be held. At each, residents divided themselves into functional areas identical to those established by the task force to review individual components. Few substantive issues arose over the content of the plan, except for the proposed administrative structure. Residents demanded that they have a majority of the program policy board and of the planning committees. Faced with the HUD deadline, the task force acquiesced.

The application varied in quality. Few criticisms were made of existing agencies, and the emphasis was on providing better services for the Model Neighborhood. A resident committee and a joint resident-professional committee were both vaguely described, but it was made clear that the Mayor would be in charge. A total of $270,260 in planning funds was requested, mostly for consultants to do the substantive planning work.

Following resident review of the application, the task force chairman sent out standard endorsement forms to local agencies, most of which agreed to sign them. On April 3, the application was submitted to the City Council for review. One week

later, Mayor Welch asked the Council to authorize submission to HUD. The Council protested that the program would place too much power in the hands of the Mayor, and they demanded assurances that they would not have to implement any of the projects proposed by the program. After protesting that the "Feds" wouldn't deliver on their promises, the Council approved submission. On April 12, 1968, the application was sent to HUD.

The Waiting Period:
May – December, 1968

The city's lack of a Workable Program led HUD reviewers to believe that Model Cities would not be able to achieve its goals, because of the city's ineligibility for other HUD programs. After numerous cities were announced as "second round" Model Cities, Houston was informed on November 26 that their application had been rejected. Mayor Welch had already been strenuously lobbying for approval through the city's Congressional delegation. Now he went to the White House. His arguments were apparently persuasive, for a few days later he was informed that HUD was willing to approve the application with conditions.

The Mayor met with HUD officials and agreed that his city would submit an acceptable Workable Program to HUD prior to the end of the Model Cities planning year, and that they would pass a housing code acceptable to HUD within six months. In return, HUD would try to fund a study of the feasibility of using deed restrictions in lieu of a zoning ordinance. The Mayor was taking a chance in agreeing to these stipulations, because of the resounding defeats two previous attempts to establish a housing code in Houston had received. The agreement was not made public when HUD announced on December 12, 1968 that Houston's application had been approved.

The Revision Period:
January – June, 1968

Mayor Welch had originally hoped to contract with a newly formed local university research consortium for the administration of the Model Cities program. The City Council criticized the use of "fuzzy minded university theorists" and the Mayor instead appointed George McGonigle as CDA Director. In his early forties, McGonigle was a senior executive with Humble Oil Corp. and had been actively involved in local civic affairs for several years. He would take a one-year leave of absence, and his firm would supplement his CDA salary so he would not take a cut in pay.

HUD's Discussion Paper sent to the city in response to their application called for few substantive changes. HUD was granting the city $2,000 more in planning funds than they had requested, so there was no need to revise the budget. Over the next two months, McGonigle prepared the revisions and provided the additional details requested by HUD. He realized that the resident desire for 51 percent control of all planning and policy bodies in the program would upset the City Council, so he dropped it. He proposed a 56-member Resident Commission, elected from nine neighborhood subareas, and a 38-member Model Cities Advisory Board, with eleven residents and the remainder officials from local agencies. The former would have no veto power over program plans and policies, while the latter, which could easily be controlled by City Hall, would. All revisions were complete and submitted to HUD by April 15.

While McGonigle was easily complying with HUD's requests for more information, Mayor Welch was encountering serious difficulty in getting the City Council to pass a housing code. The first code he submitted for their review in February was rejected by HUD because it did not include owner-occupied dwellings. Mayor Welch withdrew it and submitted a revised code in April which covered all dwellings, but the active opposition to it by homeowners and Councilmen led the Mayor to withdraw it as well. He then attempted to convince HUD that Houston's Dangerous Building Ordinance, which provided for the condemnation of dilapidated structures, could serve in lieu of a housing code. The HUD Regional Counsel ruled that this was not allowable, but Mayor Welch flew to Washington to try and convince Secretary Romney that it would suffice. The Secretary refused to budge, and only after the Mayor pledged again to have a housing code adopted during the Planning Year did HUD authorize planning to begin.

On July 8, the City Council approved signing the planning grant contract, and on July 18, it was executed by HUD.

The Planning Period – Starting Up:
July – November, 1969

During the first four months of Houston's Planning Year, three significant events occurred, all of which were essential before the CDA could commence developing its Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. The City finally adopted a housing code acceptable to HUD, the Resident Commission was established, and the CDA staffed up.

Throughout the summer, Mayor Welch continued to ponder the best method for meeting HUD's demand that Houston adopt a housing code. He sensed that the City Council would defeat the code if he pushed them to come to a decision. The Council, meanwhile, was urging him to subject the issue to a popular referendum. He made one last attempt to convince HUD of the suitability of the Dangerous Buildings Ordinance, but to no avail. On September 25, he finally decided to hold a referendum. It was scheduled for the November 15 municipal election, in which the Mayor was seeking re-election to his fourth consecutive term. He organized a group called Citizens for Decent Housing, consisting of many of the same people on his Citizens Adivsory Committee for Housing. This group met frequently with the Mayor and his aides, including George McGonigle, to develop strategy. They mounted an intensive public relations campaign, appealing to poor blacks on the basis of self interest, and middle and upper-class whites on the basis of conscience. The League of Women Voters, church groups, the local chapter of the American Institute of Architects, the Chamber of Commerce, and the local Homebuilders and Apartment Associations all endorsed the code. Only a loosely knit, underfinanced ad hoc citizens group opposed it.

While the citizens group conducted their campaign, Mayor Welch campaigned for re-election. His main opponent was State Representative Curtis Graves, a black who enjoyed the active support of most residents involved in Model Cities. Neither of these men identified themselves closely with the housing code referendum, seeing little to gain and much to lose in doing so.

On November 15, the housing code passed easily by a vote of 94,220 to 55,213. Mayor Welch won easily as well, capturing 53 percent of the vote in a field of six candidates. Representative Graves received 32 percent of the vote. Unhappy that he received only 5 percent of the black vote, the Mayor pledged to work harder to solve the problems of the ghetto.

Although the housing code referendum was not binding, the Council passed the code with a few amendments on December 10. The major precondition placed on Houston's Planning Year was satisfied.

Organizing the Resident Commission proved to be a more difficult task than passing the housing code. Resident elections were scheduled for August 3, with everyone over 18 eligible to vote and hold office. At the recommendation of the Community Action Agency, George McGonigle agreed that the 56-member Commission (one representative for every 2,500 residents) should be divided up between poverty and non-poverty residents, because the poorer residents would otherwise be inhibited by their relatively more affluent neighbors. The CAA estimated that there should be 35 poverty representatives and 21 non-poverty representatives.

Because of internal difficulties, the CAA did a rather poor job of publicizing the elections. Despite the efforts of two public relations firms hired by the CDA, and a group of VISTA workers enlisted by McGonigle for the effort, the turnout amounted to only 0.5 percent of the eligible voters, or 746 people out of a population of almost 140,000. They elected a commission of 45 blacks, 10 Chicanos, and one white priest. The group had an average age of 40, and the women outnumbered the men.

The Commission met for the first time in late August, and elected Moses Leroy as its chairman. In his late sixties, Leroy was a long time resident of the city and had been active in the NAACP for decades. His chief opponent had been Oscar Mason, a younger, more militant black. Throughout the year the rivalry that began in the

election of the chairman would continue, with Leroy and the majority of the Commission being concerned primarily with substantive planning issues, while Mason and a small group of "young turks" were pushing for control of the administration of the program. Each faction would jockey back and forth over the various issues. The first issue arose over the method for selecting resident planning task forces, with Leroy trying to comply with the CDA Director's request that they be appointed quickly, while Mason argued that the process should be voluntary.

Mason established a power base of his own when he convinced the Commission to form a Steering Committee consisting of one representative from each of the nine neighborhood subareas, which would serve as the executive committee of the much larger Commission. Mason succeeded in being elected chairman of the Steering Committee. In the course of developing Commission by-laws, the Steering Committee began pressing for more control over the program. George McGonigle squelched this by bringing an opinion from the City Attorney stating that the Mayor and City Council had ultimate control over the program. McGonigle promised that residents would have the right to review and comment on all CDA proposals, with appeals going through the Model Cities Advisory Council, to the Mayor, and ultimately to the City Council. Realizing they could get no further, the Steering Committee dropped the issue.

After another abortive attempt to organize the task forces, all members of the Resident Commission spent the month of November receiving training in organizational theory from a popular black psychology professor at Texas Southern University, and it was not until December that the task forces were finally permanently established.

The selection of CDA staff was a easy task, for McGonigle had complete control over it. He hired six professionals, all in their late twenties and early thirties. He had an administrative and fiscal manager, a community relations specialist, and four planning coordinators. Two of his staff had business backgrounds, two had previously worked for local social planning agencies, and two were affiliated with universities, including an intern from Texas A and M University who was participating in a HUD-funded program to provide assistance to Model Cities programs in Texas. The coordinators were expected to serve as executive secretaries to the appropriate task forces, provide liaison between the CDA and State, Federal, and local agencies, and supervisors of the preparation of planning components.

The Planning Period — The Mid-Planning Statement:

December—February, 1970

Continuing turbulence within the Resident Commission, and the difficulties involved in establishing eleven task forces which hoped to meet at least once in each of the nine neighbornood subareas, convinced George McGonigle that he would have to prepare the Mid-Planning Statement himself in order to submit it to HUD on time. In October and November, he had asked his staff to prepare reports on what they thought residents wanted. Using these, plus the minutes of task force meetings, comments from his staff at weekly staff meetings, and his own knowledge of the Model Neighborhood's problems, McGonigle spent the entire month of December writing the Mid-Planning Statement. Indeed, he became so involved that he finally ended up collating part of the document himself.

The Mid-Planning Statement was 83 pages long. It consisted of a process essay which described the planning process as the CDA Director had hoped it would occur, rather than what actually happened. McGonigle had planned for resident task forces to identify basic problems, with his staff taking these and developing goals, objectives, and strategy. The CDA was ostensibly a "broker" between residents (who in reality had been too embroiled in internal problems to play a substantive role) and agencies (who in fact had yet to be involved at all). McGonigle avoided describing the reality of the process in order to avoid raising the hackles of either the City Council or HUD. The main emphasis in the document was the improvement of the delivery of services. A list of 38 tentative projects was appended because HUD had requested it.

During the month of January, the Mid-Planning Statement was reviewed by residents, local agencies, the Mayor and City Council. Once again, the emphasis was on getting it into HUD. McGonigle emphasized that it was merely a draft status report, and the Mid-Planning Statement was liberally sprinkled with editorial remarks and corrections to buttress this impression. Although the residents were briefed, the City Council was not; nor was the latter asked for permission to submit the document to HUD. By mid-February the document was sent to HUD. The Federal review of it at the end of the month was just as cursory as the local review.

Completing The Plan:

March — May, 1970

After reviewing the Mid-Planning Statement, HUD urged McGonigle to submit the complete plan within two months so that it could be reviewed and approved before the end of the Federal fiscal year. They informed the CDA that it could expect roughly $13 million in supplemental funds for the first action year.

In order to obtain more substantial resident inputs into the development of the remainder of the CDP, McGonigle consolidated the task forces to coincide with the areas covered by his four staff coordinators. For the next month, his coordinators met with agencies to flesh out CDA-initiated project ideas, with task forces to review the projects, and with Federal and State administrators to determine possible categorical funding. McGonigle and his staff sensed that the resident priorities were in the areas of education, housing, and employment, so these were the areas to which they allocated the most funds.

While CDA staff, residents, and agency personnel deliberated over project content, a consultant hired by the CDA in February rewrote the Mid-Planning statement to respond to the few comments made by Federal and local officials and Model Neighborhood residents, and prepared the various non-programmatic elements of the CDP (continuous planning and evaluation statement, relocation plan, etc.). The CDA was also offered assistance by a HUD-funded consultant in the area of civil service reform, but this consultant was told to leave the city when he accused it of discrimination in hiring.

By the middle of March, the CDP was completed. The Resident Commission met to review it, and they were stunned by its complexity. No resident had seen the entire plan, for all were involved in specific component areas through their task forces. After spending two meetings trying to review it, the Commission decided to caucus privately, with CDA staff, to review the document in depth. At the end of the month, the Commission met three times, and reviewed every project. Their main concerns covered resident employment and the choice of project sponsors. They rejected wherever appropriate a sponsor who they felt had not been sympathetic to their problems in the past, such as the School Board. When they were done, McGonigle met with them and convinced them to reinsert most of the original sponsors, and to tone down one controversial proposal they had suggested in the area of policy community relations.

The review of the final CDP proceeded quickly and without controversy. George McGonigle had personally eliminated any projects which would cause the city council to scrap the program, so he never saw any reason to activate the proposed Model Cities Advisory Council. At this late date, it would have been a waste of time to establish it. Once the Resident Commission approved the CDP, it was sent directly to the Mayor and City Council. McGonigle also escalated the CDA's visibility, which had previously been kept at a low level to avoid any adverse publicity, by briefing both major daily newspapers on the content of the CDP. Just as it had done with the Mid-Planning Statement, however, the City Council paid little attention to the content of the CDP. They asked the same questions they had asked almost two years earlier, when the application for a Model Cities program had first been presented to them. They wanted to know how much money the city would have to put up, whether they were committing themselves to implement all projects described in the plan, and whether the city would retain control of the program. The only change they made was to delete the compromise police-community relations program, which the Chief of Police feared might be the distant modest precursor of a civilian review board. On May 5, they approved the CDP, and it was submitted to HUD.

Indianapolis, Indiana



The Setting

Indianapolis is the state capital and the largest city in Indiana. With a 1968 population of 540,000, it is located in the heart of the midwestern manufacturing and farm belts, and the city's numerous rail and highway connections make it a key transportation hub for the region.

Indianapolis was the last major city to implement the Federally-funded school lunch program, was similarly slow in utilizing food stamps, and during the first two post-War decades, made little use of the numerous physical redevelopment funds available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Downtown renewal was financed by the business sector, while the few social service programs in the city were generally funded by the Lilly Foundation, a local endowment funding solely non-federal projects.

Continuing flight to the suburbs and the pressing needs of the city's blacks, who comprised 18% of the population, finally led local leaders to seek Federal funds in the 1960's. In 1964, the Public Housing Authority was revived after 15 years of dormancy, and in 1965, Community Action against Poverty was formed with funds from OEO. Between 1965 and 1968, the city obtained three times as much Federal urban renewal and housing funds as had been spent through private investment during the preceding two decades. The renewal program slowly shifted from clearance and commercial development to residential rehabilitation.

In 1969, state legislation was passed merging separate boards, commissions, and departments in the city and surrounding Marion County into a city/county government with six cabinet-level departments. The most powerful of these was the Department of Metropolitan Development, which combined the county-wide control of planning, zoning, and capital improvements of its predecessor, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, with the city's public housing and urban renewal programs. The reorganization dramatically strengthened the authority of Indianapolis' recently elected young Republican mayor, Richard Lugar, although the independent school districts, the Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the County Welfare Department remained outside the reorganized government (except for review of their annual budgets).

The Application Period
January — April, 1968

Indianapolis did not seek a Model Cities planning grant during the first round of applications in late 1966. The ingrained local opposition to Federal programs and the limited staff capability of Mayor Barton led him to conclude that preparing an application would be futile. In January, 1968, Richard Lugar took office as Mayor. He had campaigned on a theme of getting Indianapolis moving forward, and Model Cities seemed to combine the promise of a sufficient amount of Federal funds with the flexibility to adapt to local needs to help Lugar fulfill his pledge.

Utilizing a strategy of his predecessor to gain wide support for new projects, Mayor Lugar appointed a task force of civic and business leaders under the auspices of the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee to look into the Model Cities Program. He soon expanded the group to include local agency representatives and three neighborhood organizations representing the city's poorer residents.

In one month the task force chose the area of the Model Neighborhood, prepared written analyses of Model Neighborhood problems, and again expanded its membership by including more agency representatives and residents from the target area. The resident members were chosen at three open meetings held to brief the community on the proposed program. By the time the application was completed, the task force numbered 56 people, 24 of them residents of the Model Neighborhood. No controversies arose during this period because everyone agreed that it was essential to complete the application by the April 15 deadline.

The chosen Model Neighborhood was located on the northeast side of the downtown. Half its 1965 population of 52,000 was black. It was chosen on the basis of severity of problems and the presence of well established community organizations. The housing was largely older, single-family dwellings, many of which had been converted to multi-family use. One-third were sub-standard and 17% were overcrowded. Roughly 30% of the families in the area had incomes below $3,000 per year, and 25% of all welfare recipients in the county were located in the Model Neighborhood. The area faced a future even more bleak than its present, since two new interstate highways were scheduled to intersect within it.

The application requested a planning grant of $235,000, most of which would go for staff to be located in the mayor's office. The use of existing neighborhood organizations was proposed for the vaguely defined resident component. The basic theme of the application was that the area's problems were caused by poverty and that their solution lay in obtaining funds for improved and additional services.

The Waiting Period
May — August, 1968

Because of the city's past record, Mayor Lugar feared the Model Cities application might be looked upon with disfavor by HUD. In addition to the paucity of previous experience with HUD, the local anti-poverty agency was currently facing a cut-off in its funds because of internal difficulties. Thus, the Mayor and several of his key aides, along with representatives from local universities and the Lilly Foundation, visited Washington several times to lobby for approval. The Mayor's basic argument was that HUD needed Indianapolis just as much as the latter needed Model Cities, since a presidential election was coming up that could go either way. As the largest city in the nation with a Republican mayor, Indianapolis' participation in Model Cities

would make a Republican administration more favorable to the program.

On September 9, 1968, HUD informed Indianapolis that the application had been approved: the mayor's lobbying had overcome both the city's past record and an undistinguished application.

The Revision Period
Sept, 1968 — Feb, 1969

Soon after approval, Mayor Lugar appointed David Meeker as CDA Director. In his early forties, Meeker was a resident of the Model Neighborhood and had been one of the most active members of the task force that developed the Model Cities applicaiton. A New Englander by birth and a Yale graduate, Meeker was a highly respected local architect, and a board member of the Metropolitan Planning Commission. Hesitant to leave his firm and take a substantial cut in pay, Meeker was hired on a consultant basis.

Before announcing his selection, Mayor Lugar met quietly with several black Model Neighborhood leaders to inform them of his decision. As a result, when he publicly announced Meeker as CDA Director on September 26, numerous Model Neighborhood leaders voiced their satisfaction. Soon after, Meeker chose a fellow member of the task force and an employee of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, Michael Carroll, as his Assistant Director.

HUD sent Indianapolis a Discussion Paper soon after the application approval, containing Federal review comments and requirements for additional information. The document was fairly standard in its requests, and requiring little revision. The city received a planning grant of $225,000, only $10,000 less than requested.

Meeker decided that the best way to respond to the Discussion Paper was to reactivate the task force, since he had worked well with its members earlier and knew that they had familiarity with HUD guidelines. After he and Carroll spent several weeks in a study of HUD's many requirements for the program, they reconvened the task force in late October, dividing it into three committees to work on revision. One would prepare a more detailed planning work program and budget; another would develop the citizen participation component; and the last was concerned with public relations. They began meeting in mid-November, with a deadline of January 31.

Of the three committees, only the one concerned with citizen participation encountered any problems. Independent of their deliberations, the new director of CAAP, the local anti-poverty agency, had decided to reorganize his agency's resident organizations in the Model Neighborhood so that they would be able to better participate in the Model Cities efforts. Throughout November, he met with area residents. Meeker was finally invited to one of the meetings, but he feared that the CAAP was attempting to take over the Model Cities Program. At Meeker's request, Mayor Lugar summoned the CAAP director to his office for a discussion. Meeker and the director agreed to work closely together, and the latter joined the citizen participation committee.

The citizen structure that finally emerged provided for five Neighborhood Planning Committees to be elected in defined sub-areas of the MN. Each NPC would have one representative for every 1,000 residents. They in turn would select a total of 11 representatives to the CDA Board. Five additional members would be appointed to the Board by the Mayor, and three by the City Council. While the Board would exercise policy control over the program, the NPCs would be responsible for insuring resident involvement. Each would have one or two staff persons to assist them in this effort.

The election for the NPCs was held on February 15, with 17% of the eligible voters participating. The victors generally were lower middle-class blacks in their late thirties or older. The few elected whites were even older.

By the middle of January, the committee working on the planning work program had finished a draft and submitted it to HUD, hoping for substantive comments. Instead, HUD merely accepted it, awarding the planning grant to the CDA. The Planning Year began on March 6, 1969.

The Planning Year Starting Up:
March — July, 1969

During the first two months of the CDA's Planning Year, Dave Meeker hired the remainder of the CDA staff. He had complete authority from Mayor Lugar to do so and did not involve residents in his decisions. The CDA was organized into four divisions, the most important of them Planning and Research. Directed by Mike Carroll, this division was responsible for coordinating development of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. Functional components (housing, education, etc.) were grouped into three basic sections — physical, social, and economic. In addition to planning and research, the CDA's other divisions were Administration, Communications, and a section responsible for maintaining liaison with community groups. The Communications Division — in effect a little City Hall operated out of the Mayor's Office — was an attempt on Meeker's part to provide services during the Planning Year so that the CDA would have more credibility in the MN. The professional staff included nine blacks and six whites, all with backgrounds in local social planning agencies and private business.

While Meeker was hiring staff, the CDA Board was getting itself organized. On April 25, the Neighborhood Planning Councils met with Meeker and Mayor Lugar's special assistant, who announced the Mayoral and City Council appointees to the CDA Board and informed the gathering that Mayor Lugar would not exercise any veto power over plans prepared by the CDA Board. By this time, the NPCs had already selected their representatives to the CDA Board as well. The Mayoral and City Council appointees included a diverse group of ward politicians, representatives from business and labor, a city councilman, and the Mayor's special assistant.

Beginning in early May, the CDA Board began meeting on a regular basis. In June, the Board elected its officers. The Rev. William Dennis, a black MN minister and City Council appointee, was elected chairman. Dennis had been responsible earlier in the year for assisting Dave Meeker in convincing dissident MN blacks that Meeker would be a good CDA Director. Also during this period, the CDA staff conducted a series of three training sessions to acquaint the NPCs and CDA Board with HUD's Model Cities guidelines.

During the next few months, the CDA Board became embroiled in a dispute with Meeker over control of the planning budget and personnel selection. The resident members wanted a monthly stipend for their participation and they wanted to control, or at least influence, hiring for the CDA staff. Meeker resisted on both issues, believing that as volunteer participants in the program they should not be paid, and insisting that he had absulute control over hiring and firing of his staff. The dispute over payment was resolved in August, when Meeker agreed that all resident CDA Board and NPC members should receive a stipend smaller than originally requested. The issue of personnel selection, however, was to continue until Mayor Lugar met with the Board in October, repeating his earlier pledge not to veto any plans which they developed. He insisted, however, that program administration was his responsibility, and chastised the resident members for not concerning themselves more with encouraging resident participation in the program. He further pledged that residents would be involved in the selection of a new CDA Director (Meeker was to leave at the end of the Planning Year), and the Board was appeased.

Despite the acrimony arising from these disputes, the CDA continued to gear up for preparing the CDP. Dave Meeker during this period achieved several significant victories in obtaining cooperation from local and Federal agencies. He convinced the parks department to meet with residents to re-plan a long-delayed park in the MN; he began meeting with the local CAMPS manpower planning committee; he succeeded in getting one designated interstate highway route removed from the MN so that improvements could be made in that deteriorating corridor strip; he worked with the HUD leadman in establishing a Federal/local resource committee. He also persuaded the redevelopment authority to abandon an urban renewal plan calling for total clearance of all area in the MN and revising the plan in conjunction with the residents.

The CDA Board and Neighborhood Planning Councils also worked to

prepare for planning. The NPCs hired nine assistants, eight of them black, and recruited residents to sit on the Joint Citizen-Technical Committees, one of which was set up for each of eleven component areas: These would be the basic planning entities. Meeker and Carroll recruited local agency personnel, many of whom had also been on the original Model Cities task force, to serve on these committees. By the beginning of August, substantive planning was ready to begin.

The Mid-Planning Statement: August – December, 1969

Throughout August, the Joint Citizen-Technical Committees met to identify problems facing the MN in each of their functional areas. Attendance varied, with residents demonstrating most interest in housing and crime and delinquency issues. In some instances, resident criticism of city agencies was countered by appointed representatives of the agencies who were in attendance. While CDA staff tried to channel the discussions into the elaborate planning process mandated by HUD, both residents and agency staff tended to jump from problems to projects.

In late August, the CDA received new planning guidelines from HUD, shortening and simplifying the CDP. Both Meeker and Carroll were disturbed by this change, for they believed the original planning process was superior. They flew to the Chicago Regional Office of HUD to protest, but were persuaded to submit a Mid-Planning Statement in lieu of Parts I and II. A deadline of November 15 was set for the MPS.

The Joint Committee meetings continued, but by October CDA staff realized some way had to be found to coordinate the deliberations of the 11 separate committees. Staff members in each of the three basic program areas – physical, social, economic – first coordinated the materials prepared by the committees within each basic division, and then between the divisions. The process was rushed to meet the November deadline and the staff had insufficient time to set priorities among components or to develop a strategy statement.

By October 27, a draft of the completed portions of the MPS was ready for review by the CDA Board and the NPCs. Both groups delayed their approval for two weeks, and the deadline was missed. They were able, however, to thoroughly review the entire document, making few changes. Priorities were established, based on a categorizing by each of the components as representing high, medium, or low priority. The result, then, was a consensus. The strategy statement, prepared by an ad hoc resident committee, established eight basic causes for the MN problems, all relating to poverty and discrimination.

By late November the MPS was complete, but for the next few weeks the entire CDA Board was involved in an HEW-funded educational charrette. With over 200 people participating, MN residents were able to plan for construction of a new neighborhood school that would provide services both to students and to the larger community. Meeker and Carroll had helped the School Board obtain the grant. Thus, the CDA Board had no time to review the MPS, so Mike Carroll finally convinced Board chairman Dennis to review the document personally on the Board's behalf. On December 29, it was submitted to HUD.

The completed MPS consisted of two sections. The first contained an overview of the MN, a description of the process leading to preparation of the MPS, and the priorities and strategy for the program. The second section contained the eleven individual component reports. Statistical documentation varied, with great detail in the sections on physical and economic development, and much "softer" data in the area of social development.

On January 17, Federal regional officials reviewed the plan, finding it satisfactory.

Completing the Plan: January – April, 1970

As anticipated, Meeker resigned as CDA Director, effective January 1, 1970. Mayor Lugar had already appointed him Director of the Department of Metropolitan Development, which was part of Unigov and would officially come into existence at the beginning of 1970. Meeker had hoped to stay on as CDA Director until the end of the Planning Year, feeling that the two tasks could be complementary. As it turned out, however, he was able to spend increasingly less time on Model Cities. Two weeks prior to his resignation, Mayor Lugar, as he had earlier promised, formed a five-man CDA Board committee to find a new director. Two MN residents were among the five. But there was no time to engage in an intensive search and the committee made the obvious choice, designating Mike Carroll, who had been assuming most of the Director's duties in any case. Carroll was named Acting Director until the end of 1970, when he, too, would be leaving the CDA to go to DMD.

In early January, Carroll sent a memo to all CDA Board and NPC members describing the process for completing the CDP. Carroll now merged the Citizen-Technical committees into three basic task forces, consisting of the co-chairman of each of the Committees and appropriate CDA staff, for the development of the social, physical, and economic sections of the first-year action plan. Special, ad hoc task forces of residents and agency personnel would be formed for the non-programmatic elements of the Plan, (relocation, continuous planning and evaluation, etc.).

Due to the success of the charrette and the intensive review of the MPS, resident involvement was greatly enhanced during this period. Each Neighborhood Planning Council and each task force prepared a list of first-year projects. Work proceeded quickly, and by February 25 the two groups of project descriptions were ready for CDA Board review. (Carroll had hoped the NPC recommendations would be channeled through the task forces, but the CDA Board demanded to review them itself and decide which it wanted to keep). Since the lists turned out to be quite similar, there was no conflict except over the content of a health project, but the review of so much material caused a delay of six weeks beyond the original submission date of March 1.

Through March, the special CDA Board committee reviewed all elements of the CDP. By the end of the month, they had finished, but their first-year supplemental fund budget was $1 million over the $6.4 million grant they were to receive from HUD. A second special committee then met with Mike Carroll to make the appropriate cuts. On March 31, the Board gave its final approval to the Plan, and the City Council approved it without discussion on April 6. After final refinement and printing, it was submitted to HUD on April 22.

The Plan called for 53 projects to be implemented during the first year, 36 of which were supplementally funded. The highest priority areas were housing, economic development, education, and health. Project sponsorship was left intentionally vague, since Carroll and the Board could not agree on whether existing agencies or resident-controlled groups should be used.

Los Angeles, California



The Setting

The Los Angeles SMSA (including Long Beach) is the nation's second most populous. The city itself houses two and one-half million people who reside in some 60 separate neighborhoods linked by numerous freeways and superhighways. The growth of Los Angeles as well as the Southern California region since the 1940s had been explosive. The development of wartime and aerospace industries, plus the attraction of an equable climate, drew millions to the city from all over the nation.

Yet, in recent years, this veneer of prosperity has been penetrated by declining employment in aerospace and electronic industries, urban sprawl, increasing unemployment, persistent smog, and the emergence of distinct racial and ethnic ghettos in the black and Mexican-American communities. Residents of the barrio and the ghetto have suffered inordinately from most of these problems as racial discrimination and the absence of viable public transportation have retarded their social and physical mobility. The 1965 riot in Watts, the black ghetto, thrust Los Angeles into the nation consciousness as a center of urban unrest.

Both administrative and planning responsibilities in Los Angeles have traditionally been fragmented. The Mayor derives most of his influence from his appointments, subject to review and approval by the City Council, which ultimately has a veto power over these mayoral decisions. The City Administrative Officer is, in effect, more powerful than the Mayor. He functions as a city manager and is hired by the Council to make most budgetary and programmatic recommendations, and these — despite his lack of formal authority — are traditionally accepted. Thus, local government in Los Angeles is essentially a strong city manager-strong city council type, mitigating the mayor's power to commit or apply for Federal programs.

Effective planning and delivery of social services are obstructed by a conflicting hodge-podge of administrative bodies. Because Los Angeles County is responsible for planning numerous social services for the City of Los Angeles, workable administrative linkages are often difficult to achieve. County priorities are frequently out of harmony with city needs and priorities.

Los Angeles' major experience with Federal social programs prior to Model Cities came with the inception of OEO's Community Action Program in 1965. The Economic and Youth Opportunity Agency (EYOA) was designated as the community action agency for Los Angeles. Unfortunately, the program became a platform for confrontation politics and generated little positive social change. The City Planning Department, while experienced and well-staffed, continues to embrace physical development goals to the exclusion of social planning considerations. Most important was Los Angeles' abysmal failure with urban renewal. The Bunker Hill Project, begun in the early 1950s as California's first urban renewal project, became the testing ground for nearly every suit contesting the legality of the urban renewal process and the ethics of not providing replacement housing for relocatees. The project, as a result, was never completed.

Application Period:
Nov, 1966 — April, 1968

Los Angeles failed to receive a planning grant after submitting a first-round application in May of 1967. With HUD's criticism ringing in his ears (HUD had said the application had ignored all major guidelines for citizen participation and administrative coordination), Mayor Yorty was eager to "save face," and so a second-round application was spearheaded by Robert Goe, the Mayor's Executive Secretary, in December of 1967.

While an interagency task force under Goe's auspices had written and developed the first-round application, the mayor decided a more technically competent second-round document could be produced by the Los Angeles Technical Services Corporation (LATSC), a semi-private city brain trust composed mostly of systems technicians. However, LATSC consented to undertake only the technical aspects of the application. Goe, who had experienced difficulty eliciting agency support for developing the first application, had similar difficulties trying to find a cooperative city agency to administer and coordinate the second effort. However, he was able finally to convince the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), headed by Richard Mitchell, to accept this responsibility.

Unlike the city's first application, the second strictly followed HUD guidelines and included the required statistical and descriptive analyses. HUD had been dissatisfied with the first application's choice of a Model Neighborhood, Green Meadows, because it was too small. Watts and Green Meadows, contiguous black neighborhoods, and East/Northeast, the Mexican-American sector composed of four smaller neighborhoods, were eventually selected as the twin target areas in the second application.

Although there was little substantive citizen involvement in the application process, a well established community organization in Watts, the Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC), had worked closely with the city in

preparing and reviewing the application. No significant community participation occurred in the Mexican-American neighborhood.

The proposed Model Cities structure offered two CDAs, one in each neighborhood, controlled by a six-member board. The Executive Director of the CRA, Mitchell, was to chair each board separately. Neither Mitchell nor the boards were responsible to the Mayor. Thus, the essentials of a formal application were met, and it was submitted to HUD on May 10, 1968.

The Waiting Period:
May – November, 1968

The waiting period found a growing resentment among various community interests of the "behind-closed-doors" nature of the application process. Both the State Assemblyman and U.S. Congressman representing South Central Los Angeles were piqued at not having been informed of the application's development until it was a *fait accompli.* Community groups in the Mexican-American neighborhood, fearful that Model Cities might become another insensitive urban renewal program, lodged major complaints with HUD about the lack of citizen representation in the entire application process. During this six-month period, the Mayor's primary Model Cities function was to answer these complaints, which had been referred back to him by HUD. Nonetheless, on November 22, 1968, HUD awarded the city a planning grant of $284,000, less than one-third the amount the city had requested.

Revision Period:
Nov, 1968 – June, 1969

Receipt of the grant was, however, contingent upon the city's establishing a coordinating mechanism with the two other newly designated Model Cities in Southern California – one in Los Angeles County, the other in nearby Compton. All three communities quickly moved to establish a permanent Model Cities Coordinating Committee which was approved by HUD in March, 1969, although, in retrospect, the body never became functional because of a perceived lack of common interests and problems.

Meanwhile the city had been trying to respond to the HUD Discussion Paper which had arrived in mid-December. The city's response to the HUD demands – (1) preparation of a revised budget; (2) revision of the citizen participation component to reflect the requirements of CDA Letter No. 3; and (3) the creation of one CDA for both Model Neighborhoods – was equivocal. In effect, the city submitted a mere promise to provide residents access to the decision-making process and somewhat diluted the autonomy of the two neighborhood CDAs by agreeing to appoint a single director, administrative staff, and chief accountant to act for both neighborhoods; each neighborhood, however, was to retain separate planning staffs. At the end of March, HUD, feeling that the revisions could be refined as the program developed, tendered a temporary letter to proceed.

The Planning Year - Starting Up:
July, 1969 – March, 1970

Although the Planning Year technically began on July 1, 1969 – after the CDA Boards had approved the application revisions – the official start was not until four months later on November 1, 1969, when the newly appointed CDA Director, Laurence Whitehead, was officially placed on the payroll.

Whitehead, a white, one-time priest, and formerly with the Community Action Program (CAP) in Pasadena, was selected largely because he was the least offensive yet qualified candidate of the 65 applicants for the job. Neither MN would have tolerated a CDA director of the opposite cultural group, so Whitehead's appointment was relatively acceptable to the members of the neighborhood boards.

Simultaneously, in Watts, the CDA Board and WLCAC were beginning to create a resident structure. By the end of 1969, the MNA had been divided into five districts from which 15 representatives were to be elected to a 75-member Combined Neighborhood Council. Three members from each district were to be selected to comprise the Executive Committee, which would advise the CDA Board. Elections were held in late February of 1970.

Development of a resident structure in East/Northeast was somewhat slower and did not begin until late January of 1970 because there had been

disagreement between the Neighborhood Board and some community organizations as to who should have responsibility for establishing the initial resident structure. By February, the neighborhood office had decided to invite all East/Northeast residents to a series of public meetings where an interim group of 40 was selected to formulate the resident structure. They ultimately decided that each of the four neighborhoods should elect seven representatives to the Resident's Council. In April elections were held for the 28 seats.

Meanwhile, two months after Whitehead had been officially placed on the city payroll, two deputy directors, William Jones in Watts and Arturo Bastidos in East/Northeast, were appointed by the Mayor. Although Whitehead was expected to coordinate their activities from the central office in downtown Los Angeles, he had no real authority over either deputy, since he could neither hire nor fire them. Real coordination gradually proved to be impossible as separate "empires" developed, and communication among the three officials dwindled as the Planning Year progressed. HUD continued to insist that there was only one program in Los Angeles, but the poor interface between the two neighborhoods and the central office belied this perception.

As Whitehead was just becoming absorbed in his new job, the HUD Regional Office, in mid-December, insisted on further changes in the revised administrative structure which had been submitted to them in May. HUD wanted (1) the two CDA Boards combined into one administrative unit in the city structure; (2) the mayor to have more extensive involvement; and (3) more City Council involvement and responsibility in the program. By April, the city had responded satisfactorily to each of the HUD criticisms: the two CDA Boards were merged into one, with the addition of two city councilmen; Deputy Mayor Quinn, representing the Mayor, would replace CRA Director Mitchell as CDA Board Chairman; and the CDA itself was established as a unit of the Mayor's executive department.

Three and one-half years after the first application had been submitted, it appeared that Los Angeles had finally developed an acceptable and workable program structure from which substantive planning could take place.

Mid-Term Planning Statement:
Jan, 1970 – July, 1970

HUD granted the CDA a four-month extension for submission of the CDP to August 31, 1970, but this was conditional on submission of an acceptable Mid-Term Planning Statement no later than June 15, 1970. The Problem Analysis had been submitted in mid-January and was largely an updated version of similar information in the application. It was prepared by a consultant from the Community Analysis Bureau, a city agency with date analysis capability. Whitehead, with several of his key staff, worked partially with joint neighborhood staff and CDA Board members in developing the preliminary Objectives and Strategy Statement which was due in HUD Regional Headquarters on February 1, 1970. However, work on the revised administrative structure had been unanticipated and consequently consumed so much of the CDA's time that work on the Statement did not begin until several days after the original deadline had passed. The Objectives and Strategy Statement was submitted to HUD for preliminary review in early April, some two months after the original deadline.

The prime purpose of this preliminary submission – to give CDAs like Los Angeles the benefit of Federal feedback on planning documents before undertaking production of the CDP – had been lost. In fact, the regional office was in the midst of a reorganization and probably would have been unable to respond to the submission anyway. Los Angeles thus embarked on the preparation of its MPS without any specific guidelines from the Regional Office on its basic approach.

During the six weeks that remained before the MPS was to be submitted in final form, CDA staff was under heavy pressure. Whitehead had decided that expediting the production of the MPS would require increasing staff responsibility and minimizing resident involvement. Few meetings with resident bodies took place, the major convocation being a perfunctory review of the MPS after its completion by a handful of CDA staff and resident Board members. Despite the feverish pace, the MPS

was submitted to HUD one week late — on June 22, 1970. The MPS received a favorable reaction at the RICC review in mid-July.

Completing The Plan: June, 1970 — Sept 30, 1970

As with all their submissions, Los Angeles was faced with another tight time schedule, having agreed to submit the CDP to HUD on August 31. Given their situation, Whitehead decided in mid-June that the best strategy for completing the CDP on time was to ask public agencies who were interested to submit project proposals based on the problem analysis in the MPS. Within two weeks, the same agencies who had been indifferent to helping the CDA prepare submissions, now responded with overwhelming eagerness. Some $60 million in projects were submitted to the CDA by the end of June, even though Los Angeles knew it could expect a grant of only $26 million. Few of these projects were resident-generated.

These proposals were first reviewed by professional staff at both neighborhood offices, and those that bore little relevance to alleviating stated problems were discarded. Those that remained were refined and then brought before the appropriate resident task forces in East/Northeast and the five Neighborhood Councils in Watts. It became their job to pare down the projects to an agreed-upon $12 million per neighborhood.

The final review and selection of projects was made by the Executive Committee in Watts at a series of workshops. The priorities set by the Neighborhood Councils were generally followed in the 41 projects selected. In East/Northeast, the Residents' Council often ignored task force priorities in a dispute over which delegate agencies, community-based or city-wide, should be given project sponsorship. A two-day workshop which included CDA staff resulted in the triumph of the Resident Councils' priorities despite vehement protests from task force members.

The CDA staff, with resident sanction, had worked feverishly to collate and complete the CDP on time, but (as if to foreshadow future problems) the tortuous Los Angeles approval process — requiring the approval of the CDA Board, Mayor, State, County and Federal Affairs Committee, (Council Subcommittee), City Administrative Officer and City Council — was sufficient to delay the plan's submission to HUD until September 30, exactly one month after the August 31, 1970 submission date.

Los Angeles County, California



The Setting

Los Angeles County epitomizes much of the American Dream: rapid growth, quick affluence, sun and surf. During the past 30 years, millions of Americans moved to southern California, drawn by the magnificent climate and the promise of an expanding economy. From 2.8 million people in 1940, Los Angeles County mushroomed to over 7 million by 1970. Unfortunately, not everyone shared in the prevalent affluence. The ethnic minorities found employment difficult and settled in contiguous poverty enclaves in the central section of the county. Blacks represented over 20% of the population (over 70% in the Model Neighborhood). The unemployment rate among blacks was double that of the county. A disproportionate number were undereducated, in poor health, and poorly housed. Social discrepancies contributed to the city and county riots of 1965, most notably in Watts.

Consistent with the county's reputation as municipality of unwieldy size, the county government represents a bureaucratic labyrinth of over 66,000 employees and an annual budget of $2.3 billion. This governmental complex is presided over by a five-man Board of Supervisors invested with extensive legislative and executive powers. Under their auspices, the county must provide all health and welfare services to the 77 incorporated municipalities as well as all municipal services to the more than 1.5 million people living in the unincorporated areas.

Social, economic and physical planning are extremely fragmented. Over 2,000 planning districts, most of which are totally autonomous, operate with little

regard for area-wide concerns. The sheer scale of Los Angeles County and the number of operating agencies precludes close coordination and rational planning. It is a constant source of amazement to observers (and the parties involved) that the county government functions as effectively as it does.

Application Period:
January – April, 1968

Los Angeles County had little involvement with HUD development programs prior to 1965 when Roy Hoover, Chief of Special Services in the County's Administrative Office (the overall managing office of county government operations), organised a Citizens Committee on Community Affairs which recommended that the County undertake a HUD-sponsored Community Revewal Program to analyze physical conditions in neighborhoods with potential need for renewal action. HUD persuaded the Ccunty to focus a survey on two major locations characterized by deteriorating housing and low-income population – east and south central Los Angeles. The HUD-funded survey was called the Community Analysis Program (CAP), and began in April 1967. HUD recommended (and the two most active county supervisors, Ernest Debs and Kenneth Hahn, agreed) to postpone any further activity with HUD until the CAP was completed. Consequently, Los Angeles County did not consider applying for the first round of the Model Cities Program.

In late 1967 and early 1968, the Cities of Los Angeles and Compton applied for a model cities planning grant which in turn stimulated various county officials, most notably Adam Burton (Supervisor Kenneth Hahn's black field deputy since 1964), Roy Hoover, and Gene Davis (both in the CAO), to urge the Supervisors to submit an application. Supervisor Hahn, whose district seemed a logical choice for the program, was reluctant to apply as he feared the model cities program would be misinterpreted by his constituents as "urban removal." However, in early March, 1968, after a careful appraisal of the residents' possible reaction, Hahn decided that it would be politically expedient to submit an application.

Originally the Federal Aid Coordinating Unit was to prepare the application, but did not have the manpower necessary to meet the April 15 deadline. The task was then passed by Hahn to the CAP staff, who grudgingly agreed to Hahn's desires.

The application was quickly assembled. No residents participated as the CAP staff felt that such involvement would consume too much time. Ten major county departments were asked to prepare, in one week, a problem analysis and program approach for their respective areas of responsibility.

The CAP staff made no attempt to develop linkages among the various programs and neither goals nor priorities were established. The only area of controversy was citizen participation, since residents were virtually being ignored in the preparation of the application. The Human Relations Commission of the County withdrew from the application effort and Watts labor leader Ted Watkins continually voiced concern regarding the absence of any citizen input. Undaunted, the CAP staff submitted the application sans resident participation on April 15, 1968.

Hahn selected the original model neighborhood (later expanded to meet HUD regulations) to be coterminus with the CAP survey boundaries, with the hope that this would expedite a more efficient utilization of collected data in the preparation of the planning document.

The MNA is an irregularly shaped area, wedged between the cities of Los Angeles (Watts District) and Compton. The MNA's 88,000 people (70% black, 20% Mexican-American) do not inhabit an identifiable neighborhood; two named sections exist in the MNA, Florence-Firestone and Willowbrook. Community identity is low and public services, including education, have districts that transcend the city-county boundaries and divide the neighborhoods even further.

The application designated the Board of Supervisors as the County Demonstration Agency and established the Model Neighborhood Department with a professional staff of 33 to be responsible for the day-to-day management of the program. An additional 113 positions to be assigned to 15 County Agencies to

maintaining "close and continuous" liaison with the Model Neighborhood Department were also set forth in the submission.

The Department would be organized into four divisions: administrative services, socio-economic development, environmental development, and technical services. The total budget called for $1,140,798 of which the planning grant was to contribute $912,638.

Waiting Period:
April 15 – Nov 21, 1968

The application was forgotten by the county until October 22, when Supervisor Hahn introduced a motion to the Board of Supervisors to prepare an ordinance to create a County Model Neighborhood Agency. The County Administrative Office (CAO) objected, arguing that the activity of the Model Cities Program rightfully belonged in the newly created Department of Urban Affairs (DUA). Hahn and the other Supervisors accepted the CAO's recommendations, and the CDA was officially established in the DUA in January 1969.

On November 21, 1968, HUD notified the county that it had been awarded a planning grant of $269,000, less than one third of the sum requested. It was subject to one major condition: a coordinating committee must be formed with the two other model cities programs in Los Angeles and Compton.

Revision Period:
Nov, 1968 – May, 1969

The Coordinating Committee was duly created. It met once with HUD officials to discuss the specific aspects of the planning grant condition, and in April met for its first and last "work" session. The three CDA programs had so little in common and HUD's expectations were so vague that the whole concept was allowed to slide into limbo – not to be resurrected.

In the meantime, HUD placed three substantive revision requirements on the county: scaling the budget and work program down to meet the grant level, clarifying the citizen participation component, and elaborating the administrative structure, particularly a mechanism for coordinating the various agencies in the CDA's planning efforts.

Adam Burton was appointed the CDA Director by the Board of Supervisors (on Hahn's recommendation) February 11, 1969, and he immediately set to work to make the necessary revisions. Meanwhile, the county which had "originally wanted to start the Planning Year with a staff of over 25," had been persuaded by HUD to proceed with a skeleton staff. HUD thereby issued a letter to proceed on March 5.

The citizen participation structure was developed by Burton, who: (1) initially contacted residents listed on the voter registration rolls, (2) mailed a questionnaire which asked if the residents would be interested in participating in a Model Cities Program to assess the quality of 13 services with facilities in the "neighborhood," (3) randomly selected the names of 80 residents who responded (the replies were grouped into blocks so that the sample would represent a cross-section of the community) to attend a community council meeting to ratify the revised organizational structure prepared by Burton and the CDA staff, and (4) implemented the organizational structure which called for "Town Hall" meetings in 16 geographical units of the MNA, each to elect five representatives; two to serve on the Willowbrook Council, two on the Florence-Firestone Council, and one to officiate on the Executive Committee. This last body, the ruling arm of the citizen component, thus comprised 16 elected members, to which six others with voting rights were added – two youth representatives and four from community organizations.

The Executive Committee would meet monthly in the downtown CDA offices (not in the MNA) to "review reports and recommendations to the CDA staff and give final citizen approval to all plans and formal submissions to the Board of Supervisors and HUD. The Community Councils had no representation on the Executive Committee and the groups virtually acted independently of each other throughout the Planning Year.

The budget and work program for the Planning Year were tailored to meet the reduced funding of the planning grant. In lieu of the CDA's funding 133 new

positions in other county departments to support the CDA planning effort, the revision provided for an Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee whose agency members would serve as consultants to the Executive Committee, Community Councils and planning task forces. The Committee met only once, however, as the CDA staff found it easier to deal unilaterally with the coordinator designated by each county department.

On May 25, HUD notified the county that although citizen participation in the Model Cities program appeared perfunctory, the planning contract would be approved.

Planning Period: Starting Up:
May, 1969 — August, 1969

As the planning contract was being signed, the county submitted a request to enlarge the MNA to include the community of Westmont. HUD felt that to authorize any additional funds for such an annexation, even though the area was very similar to the MNA, would be tantamount to initiating a third-round program and rejected the proposal.

In the fall of 1969, HUD submitted a tight timetable for the county based on a revised version of the CDA Letter No. 4. The Mid-Planning Statement was to be due in November 1969 and the CDP in April 1970.

The CDA staff commenced the Planning Year posthaste with a problem analysis workshop. The workshop was attended only by residents, although the CDA staff tried with no avail to involve the business community, church leaders, and the neighborhood youth. The results of the workshop were uneven, producing everything from detailed analysis of specific county programs, to casual glimpses of long-range problems.

Utilizing the material generated by the workshop, the CDA staff organized task forces to help draft the problem analysis for the MPS. Because resident criticisms tended to be non-systematic, two staff members persuaded Burton's chief planner, Ted Lumpkin, to develop a common format for each component in the problem analysis: analyze the MNA problems in terms of the institutions, the community, the home, and the individual. Professional task forces were never formed, as the CDA staff performed the technical work and when necessary dealt with the county professionals on a one-to-one basis.

Planning Period: Writing the Mid-Year Planning Statement:
Sept, 1969 — Nov, 1969

Herman Fogata, a former leadman with HUD, was hired as Burton's deputy CDA Director in August. He was in charge of producing the problem analysis and instructed his staff to underplay any type of agency criticisms. Although the CDA staff resented this soft pedaling, the problem analysis was submitted on schedule to HUD on September 12. The document identified no priorities among the problems, and causal linkages were not specifically developed. More serious in the eye's of HUD was the fact that the residents first reviewed the document two weeks after it had been submitted.

The Objectives and Strategy Statement was developed in similar fashion to the problem analysis: residents had little input and did not review the document until after it was sent to HUD; no priorities were established among problems or objectives; and the objectives lacked a sense of consistency, reflecting the fact that each CDA staff coordinator operated independently.

The Citizen Participation advisory for HUD, William Brown, criticized the county for the lack of "meaningful" citizen participation, but the county made no response and Brown received no support from other HUD officials. The residents continued to remain inactive except when the CDA staff took the initiative to involve them in the planning process.

Burton, Lumpkin and Fogata reworked the problem analysis, the objectives and strategy statement, and the description of the planning process into the final Mid-Planning Statement in early November.

The MPS was a brief document that attempted to speak to all the questions in the HUD guidelines. The problem analysis was quite limited and provided

no data to indicate the extent of MNA problems.

The residents' Executive Committee did have an opportunity for cursory review of the MPS a week prior to the submission to HUD, but made no comment other than to approve the statement unanimously and change the length of their term in office from one year to three.

The RICC reviewed the MPS in early December, and their critique was generally favorable. Yet HUD's comments reflected a disappointment with the county's orientation toward Model Cities as a quick source of funds for community development rather than as an experimental program in changing governmental process. Andrew Bell summed up the matter succinctly, "... the areas of decision making, program objectives and strategy approaches are not sufficiently expanded to show clearly your intent or process."

The Planning Period: Completing the Plan:
Nov, 1969 — March, 1970

Even prior to the submission of the MPA, the coordinators of the CDA staff had discussed possible projects with the resident task forces. The residents however, were never involved in project discussion with the agencies involved. On December 17, Deputy CDA Director, Fogata met with the Executive Committee to present and describe 68 project ideas. The residents proposed 4 additional programs in housing and employment, for a total of 72. At the end of the calendar year, brief descriptions of the 72 projects were submitted to HUD. The draft contained no strategy statement with any specifics on attacking problems in the MNA in the short or long run. Connections between project descriptions and statements of objectives were at best rather vague.

In January 1970, HUD told the CDA that the list of 72 projects had to be pared down. In less than a month the CDA staff reduced the list to 30 projects. The Executive Committee approved the revised list since their own top priorities of housing and employment projects had been retained. No budgets were included in the list.

On February 10, HUD announced the target figure for the Action Grant as $8,181,000, and a week later the CDA staff tentatively completed the resource allocation process. The Executive Committee discussed the supplemental fund distribution at their meeting, February 18, but no residents participated in the actual process of allocating funds.

The county's strategy was to fund the majority of projects through the supplemental grant unless categorical funds were certain, and hope that the CDA could attract funds from other state, local, and Federal programs in the subsequent Action Years.

Most county departments responded favorably to the supplemental carrot and cooperated fully with the CDA. The one exception was the Los Angeles School District which had been so successful in obtaining Federal funds that it was not interested in participating in the model cities program. Moreover, they regarded the CDA education coordinators as inept. The California State Department of Human Resources was the only agency sponsor outside the County.

The CDA staff developed information and evaluation systems marginally complying with HUD requirements. Fry Consultants were able to provide technical assistance to the CDA evaluation specialist in developing an information system, but the CDA specialist was almost solely responsible for the evaluation plan.

The relocation plan presented some difficulty to the CDA since Los Angeles County had no relocation department. A scheme was agreed to by HUD in which the City of Los Angeles' Community Redevelopment Agency would provide training to the County's Department of Real Estate Management to develop expertise in relocation. As a result, the plan would not be implemented until the second Action Year.

The major issue impeding successful preparation of the CDP was the position of the CDA in the county administrative structure. HUD continually insisted that the CDA be established as an independent department and not be placed in the

Department of Urban Affairs. The issue was never resolved as the county felt access to the "Chief Executive" (Supervisor Hahn) presented no problem since Department Chief Hoover maintained a low profile and CDA Director Burton was previously Hahn's field deputy implying that the "door was always open". HUD did not press the issue after January, but promised to "review the matter in six months."

The residents' Executive Committee did not review any of the non-programmatic sections of the CDP, and only examined a 12-page abbreviated list of projects together with proposed budgets at a meeting on March 25. Nevertheless, the residents unanimously approved the CDP and heartily gave the CDA staff a round of applause for their efforts.

The CDP was routinely approved by the Board of Supervisors on April 7 and sent to HUD April 17, 1970, thus ending a rather efficient and conflict-free Planning Year in Los Angeles County's Model City Program.

New London, Connecticut



The Setting

New London is an old New England seafaring community between New York and Boston on Long Island Sound. Unlike many of its neighbors, the City has twice been able to shift its economic base — from whaling to textiles in the late nineteenth century, and from textiles to defense-related industry after World War Two — so that is has enjoyed a sustained, relatively comfortable level of prosperity.

For the last decade New London has maintained a population of approximately 33,000 people, although its black and Spanish-speaking minorities have almost doubled to 18% of the total over the same period. As its minority population increased, with all the attendant problems, the city's ruling Democratic Irish-Italian-Jewish coalition gradually shifted its focus away from patronage concerns and toward a more active interest in coordinated planning and resource allocation. In 1959, the city hired a full-time renewal director and entered into its first urban renewal project, while in 1961 its first professionally trained City Manager was hired. Throughout the ensuing decade, these two men worked closely together in coordinating almost all physical planning and development activities, relying on a local consulting firm for many of the staff services required.

Planning specifically to meet the needs of the poor minorities was not begun until the mid-60's, when a regional Community Action Agency was formed under the auspices of OEO. By 1967, this regional CAA had formed a delegate agency in New London to which focused on organizing the poor. In addition to whatever social planning is done by these OEO-funded agencies, however, only the School Board possesses the staff and the capability for long-range planning and coordination of services. Most city and county agencies are small and have no staff either trained or with the time to provide more than a minimum of uncoordinated services.

The Application Period: January – April, 1968

New London did not seek a first-round Model Cities planning grant because the Urban Renewal Agency and its planning consultant were too busy completing a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan for the Shaw's Cove area. In addition, both the Urban Renewal Director and the City Manager felt that so small a city as New London would stand little chance of being approved.

When a second round of Model Cities planning grants was made available in December, 1967, the city's planning consultant recommended that New London submit an application. The city was by now ready to submit an urban renewal application for the Shaw's Cove area, and the consultant felt that the submission of a Model Cities application would enhance the chances for approval of the renewal grant. All of the larger cities in Connecticut had already received Model Cities grants as well, leading the consultant to conclude that New London would be one of the most appropriate cities in the State for a second-round grant.

After conferring with leading citizens, the City Manager decided to prepare an application. He formed a working group consisting of himself, the Urban Renewal Director, the local consulting firm, and the director of the regional Community Action Agency. The Urban Renewal Director was assigned the task of preparing the components of the application dealing with physical planning and development, while the CAA Director was assigned areas of social concern. The consultant would provide overall coordination of the process. On February 4, the City Council agreed to submit an application, and on February 28, they allocated $9,000 in funds to retain the local consultant.

With the application due on April 15, the working group felt there was not time to involve other local agencies or residents in the process, although they did hold briefing sessions with both groups. They met with the two organized neighborhood associations in the Shaw's Cove area, which the group had from the beginning identified as the Model Neighborhood. Each of these associations feared that Model Cities would be too closely allied with urban renewal and would displace them from their homes. Nevertheless, they did not try to block the application and provided a few comments, most of which were incorporated into the application. The agencies also provided a few suggestions which were similarly incorporated. (The working group tried to mask the lack of involvement of local agencies by including letters of endorsement from the Urban Renewal and regional Community Action Agencies along with the application.)

On April 11, the application was quickly reviewed and approved by the City Council, and on April 15 it was submitted to HUD.

The application consisted of a detailed description of the history of the City and the proposed MN, followed by an analysis of ten functional areas. Much of the information included in the application was inadequately detailed or out of date, with the 1960 Census and a few sketchy agency reports serving as the only sources available. The application stated that the paucity of data precluded a comprehensive analysis of the target area's problems or the establishment of priorities among problems. In addition to suggesting ways of solving identified problems, the application emphasized that additional information must be gathered.

The application contemplated a small CDA of only two people, which would primarily coordinate the planning undertaken by local agencies and a consultant. Citizen involvement would occur through the presence of four MN residents on the nine-man CDA Board, with the remaining five members appointed from agencies by the Mayor and City Council.

The Waiting Period: May – August, 1968

Following submission of the Model Cities application, the City Manager, Urban Renewal director, and the Director of the regional Community Action Agency travelled to Washington to lobby for approval. They made an excellent impression on HUD officials, and they managed as well to get their Congressional delegation to put pressure on HUD for approval of the application.

On July 12, their enthusiasm was dampened somewhat when they

attended a meeting with the two neighborhood associations in the proposed Model Neighborhood. Robert Williams, a community organizer with the local delegate Community Action Agency, had been circulating among residents in the area and informing them that the City had not included them in the development of the application as HUD required. The leaders of the two neighborhood associations also obtained a copy of the application and discovered that it did not contain all of the suggestions they had made at the meetings earlier in the year. When the city representatives arrived at the meeting, they found a hostile crowd awaiting them. Despite their pleas that there had just not been enough time to further involve the residents, they were accused by the residents of being dishonest. Model Cities was perceived as just another form of urban renewal, with no citizen involvement and maximum citizen clearance. While no specific actions were taken by either side following the meeting, the city officials were now aware that the MN was not satisfied with what was being proposed.

The Revision Period: Sept, 1968 – June, 1969

On August 23, New London's City Manager jubilantly announced that the City's Model Cities application had been approved by HUD. Official announcement came several weeks later, on September 15. The City would receive a $93,000 planning grant. Although this was about $30,000 below the amount requested, the working group had anticipated that this might happen and no one was overly disappointed.

On September 27, New London received a Discussion Paper from HUD asking the City to revise its proposed planning work program and budget and to further define its proposed citizen participation structure. What exactly was meant by this latter request was clarified at the meeting of the Federal Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee in New London on October 14. At that meeting, the representative from OEO severely criticized city officials for not providing a more significant role for residents in the program, and objected particularly to the minority status proposed for MN residents on the CDA Board. When HUD representatives added neither affirmation nor criticism of the OEO remarks, the city officials assumed that HUD agreed with them.

As a result of the criticisms voiced at the RICC review, the working group that had prepared the Model Cities application met with the local delegate Community Action Agency and reluctantly agreed to let it organize the resident structure for the program – under direction of the same Robert Williams who had aroused MN residents to criticize the working group for not involving residents in the application process.

Williams arranged a meeting in the MN for mid-November, which was attended by roughly 40 people, including minority residents and white MN businessmen. Out of the meeting emerged four committees. Three were concerned with largely procedural matters, but the fourth was assigned the task of organizing the citizen structure for the program. This committee sought assistance from State Department of Community Affairs officials and from a national consulting firm retained by OEO for providing assistance to residents in New England Model Cities Programs. Out of the deliberations of this committee came a clear preference for a citizen advocacy structure, with residents in control of the program – the committee members, however, were reluctant to make any recommendations until they had determined the sentiments of the full Model Neighborhood.

On December 19, January 7, and January 12, mass meetings were held in the MN to discuss the citizen structure that should be developed. Between 200 and 300 residents and city officials attended each meeting. Out of these meetings emerged a resident-controlled program structure that included a CDA Board of 8 residents and 5 agency representatives and MN Corporation governed by a 50-resident Board which would be responsible for the development and implementation of the program. All residents over 16 years of age, all property owners, and all operators of businesses in the MN would be eligible to vote. In response to fears expressed by the City Manager and Urban Renewal Director, as well as the HUD leadman, that the City Council and HUD would not accept a structure that provided such total resident dominance, the

third mass meeting chose a 12-man Negotiating Committee that reflected the diverse racial, class, and ethnic interests of the MN to negotiate with the City Council over the structure. By creating a balanced committee, rather than one dominated by minority residents, the participants at the meeting hoped to gain more credibility with the City Council.

After spending several days consolidating its bargaining position, the Negotiating Committee began meeting with the City Council, City Manager, and HUD Leadman. Over the next two months, the Negotiating Committee and the City Council would reach agreement several times only to be informed by HUD that each compromise solution was either unacceptable or needed further clarification. Constantly protesting that he did not want to tell the City what to do, the Leadman nevertheless would tell them what not to do – primarily not to allow resident dominance of the Program. The structure that emerged from this process provided for a 17-man CDA Board, with 10 MN residents; a CDA staff that would report to the Board; and a 40-member Neighborhood Review Board of MN residents with the power to review proposals developed during the course of the planning year. If the NRB rejected any proposal, it could be overruled by a two-thirds vote of the CDA Board.

This last compromise solution was not approved by HUD until June, while requests for further, clarification arrived periodically. HUD at least sent the city a Letter to Proceed at the end of March so that staff hiring could begin and MN elections organized. The long delay, however, had been erosive. In frustration, and convinced that the City Manager was in league with the Leadman, Robert Williams resigned from the Negotiating Committee, wrote an angry letter to HUD Secretary Romney, and tried to bypass the city entirely in seeking a training grant for MN residents from OEO. Williams' actions angered the City Council, and their criticism of him in turn led the presidents of the two MN neighborhood associations to resign from the Negotiating Committee. When another mass meeting was held on May 17 to provide a status report, only four MN residents, five members of the Negotiating Committee, and a few City Councilmen and agency officals showed up. The only decision that emerged from the meeting was the formation of a Steering Committee out of the Negotiating Committee members present which would have the responsibility of organizing MN election.

The constant delay on the part of HUD was finally brought to an end when New London's City Manager for a decade resigned for reasons of health. His replacement, Francis Driscoll, had been a former director of the city's Urban Renewal Authority who had gone to work for HUD. When he learned of the situation a few weeks after assuming office, he went over the heads of the HUD Regional Office and appealed directly to Washington. On June 30, HUD announced that New London's revisions had been accepted and their planning year could begin. On the same day, 16% of the eligible voters in the MN turned out after an uneventful campaign to elect their 10 representatives on the CDA Board and the 40 members of the Neighborhood Review Board. Roughly half of each group consisted of black and Spanish-speaking residents of the MN.

The Planning Year – Starting Up:
July – August, 1970

The primary activity that dominated the first three months of New London's Model Cities planning year was the search for a CDA Director. On July 1, the remaining representatives were appointed to the CDA Board by the City Council. Representatives from the City Council, Board of Education, Urban Renewal Authority, Public Housing Authority, Chamber of Commerce, the local delegate Community Action Agency, and the Planning Board were added to the Board. On July 9, the CDA Board and the Neighborhood Review Board were sworn into office. Present at the ceremonies was a new Leadman, replacing a man who would not be missed by either city officials or residents.

The CDA Board rapidly elected MN residents as chairman and vice chairman. The chairman appointed a five-man director search committee, four of them MN residents. The residents on the committee, particularly the vice chairman of the

Board, were in favor of selecting Bob Williams as CDA Director, but the CDA Board as a whole opposed this because of the strenuous opposition that would be voiced by the City Council, which had not forgotten Williams' actions earlier in the year after resigning from the Negotiating Committee. The search committee considered several professionals from outside the city, but they once again recommended Williams. On August 9, the Board chairman disbanded the original commiteee, and a new one was chosen which omitted Williams' major supporter, the Board's vice chairman. This new committee at first agreed on a white MN resident, an insurance salesman who served on the CDA Board. When the City Council received this recommendation, however, their galleries were packed by black opponents of the choice and they were presented with a petition signed by 7 CDA Board members opposing the recommendation. Consequently, the Council told the committee to keep looking. After one more abortive attempt to select a qualified professional from out of town, and one more effort to hire Williams, the Board agreed on another black MN resident.

On September 8, the CDA Board selected Richard Gittens as its CDA Director, and the City Council approved. Gittens had been president of one of the two MN neighborhood associations active in the program since its inception. Several months previously, he had been chosen as the new director of the local delegate Community Action Agency – also in preference then to Robert Williams because of the latter's unpopularity with the City Council. Now, once again, Gittens was the compromise choice in lieu of Williams. The two men were friends, however, and the selection was well received.

While the CDA Board was searching for a Director, HUD finally approved the $14.5 million Shaw's Cove urban renewal application, which included most of the MN. Some of the funds from this grant were used to create a new position in the City Manager's Office, Development Coordinator. The incumbent Urban Renewal Director, Wilbur Klatsky, was named to this position, and would henceforth be responsible for coordinating both urban renewal and Model Cities activities. This action did not result in any particularly significant change in the program since Klatsky had been continuously involved in it since the development of the original application, but it did add a new element to the program structure. Henceforth, Gittens would confer with Klatsky frequently on Model Cities affairs. The Shaw's Cove project would require 18 months of planning before implementation could begin, so it was expected to lag somewhat behind Model Cities.

The Mid-Planning Statement:
Sept – December, 1970

Beginning in early September, the Neighborhood Review Board, under the leadership of its chairwomen, Janet Smith, began preparing for development of the Mid-Planning Statement. Miss Smith organized 8 planning task forces and prepared an attitudinal survey which members of the Board themselves conducted in the MNA. Without any direction from the CDA Board or staff, however, the NRB found itself floundering. In mid-September, Miss Smith, Wilbur Klatsky, and Richard Gittens met and agreed that the number of task forces should be limited to five in order to simplify the planning structure, and that membership on them should be open to all MN residents. In addition, Gittens got permission from the CDA Board to begin looking for a planning consultant to assist in the preparation of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. By early October, all five tasks forces were organized and began meeting on a semi-monthly basis. CDA Director Gittens met with each task force and explained the HUD guidelines to the NRB members and agency staff present. Since the program had engendered little publicity up to this time, few residents not directly involved were in attendance.

In late October, based on recommendations from the State Department of Community Affairs and Director Gittens, the CDA Board agreed to hire KOBA, Inc., of Washington, D.C. This predominantly black consulting firm had extensive experience in other Model Cities Programs. Purcell Associates, the long-time consultant to the Renewal Authority, was not considered because it was generally felt that they were too oriented toward physical planning and they were fully occupied with Shaw's

Cove renewal project.

From early November until late December, KOBA provided sustained, on-site consulting assistance in preparation of the Mid-Planning Statement, which was originally due into HUD on December 15. Sensing that residents and agency staff alike were far more interested in discussing specific projects, the consultant directed each task force to prepare a list of tentative projects for the First Action Year. In the meantime, he prepared most of the Mid-Planning Statement, including problem analyses, objective, strategy, etc. In developing the MPS, the consultant relied on a socio-economic survey conducted the previous winter by the regional Community Action Agency and on a plan prepared by Purcell Associates under the auspices of a state community development grant. Consequently, many of the data gaps in the original application were filled.

In late November, as the preparation of the MPS was almost complete, Richard Gittens recommended to the CDA Board that Robert Williams, the man whom many residents had originally favored for CDA Director, be named Deputy CDA Director in charge of citizen participation. Two other candidates had been considered, and both the Board and the City Manager would have preferred someone with more planning experience, but they went along with the request.

By December 8, a draft of the MPS was ready for CDA and Neighborhood Review Board approval. The Boards wanted longer than one week, and the HUD leadman gave them until December 24. The only controversy during the review period arose over the proposed projects, which HUD did not regard as part of the MPS. Several task forces protested that some of their project suggestions had not been included. The consultant accepted full blame for this, explaining that he did not consider them feasible. He agreed to restore them, and promised that all resident groups in the program would be able to review the final MPS before submission to HUD. Because of delays in printing the plan at KOBA's offices in Washington, however, there was no time for this review to take place before submission. Nevertheless, the MPS was submitted to HUD on December 24, with the two Program Boards and the City Council approving the action as a vote of confidence for the CDA Director.

The MPS consisted of seven functional analyses and a strategy statement. Although an abundance of data was included, the objectives were vaguely worded so that it was difficult to translate the problem analyses into specific action programs. In addition, the analyses were not especially related to project ideas since they had been prepared separately. Despite these faults, the State and Federal reviews of the MPS in mid-January were positive but rather superficial.

Completion of the Plan: January — June, 1971

Following the State and Federal reviews of the MPS, the task forces resumed meeting at the end of January. The deadline for completion of the entire plan was March 31. KOBA would work with the task forces on preparing the first-year projects and non-programmatic elements (continuous planning and evaluation statement, relocation plan, etc.), while the CDA staff would work with the task forces in developing categorically funded projects. Throughout February the task forces met frequently, and their deliberations, as well as their level of attendance, were enhanced by the presence of five VISTA workers who provided community organizational and clerical assistance. From February 16 to 20, State and Federal staff visited the CDA to provide technical assistance in seeking categorical grants. By the end of the month, drafts of all First-Year projects were completed, and KOBA sat down to rewrite them to conform to the language of the overall plan.

From mid-March until mid-May, the CDA Board, Neighborhood Review Board, CDA staff, and consultants argued over the contents of the CDP. The controversy began when KOBA once again deleted several of the projects, either because they exceeded the CDA's supplemental budget of $2.1 million, or because they seemed to be of lower priority. The Neighborhood Review Board and the task forces objected to these deletions, and several revised drafts of the plan were prepared.

There were also objections to several projects inserted by the City Manager which related to the Shaw's Cove urban renewal project and the construction of a hurricane dike, but these were resolved in a compromise which lowered the budget for the projects while at the same time promising that MN residents would be employed on them. Once these arguments were resolved, a new issue arose over the role to be played by the Neighborhood Review Board during the First Action Year. Board chariman Janet Smith prepared a revised administrative structure, which made the NRB solely responsible for citizen participation and provided it with a staff of planners who would be able to work with the task forces in preparing the new plans. The CDA Board, at the urging of the HUD leadman and Director Gittens, agreed to table this suggestion until the First Action Year began. By May 18, all parties had agreed on the final version of the CDP, and it was submitted to HUD on June 5.

The completed Plan placed highest priority on employment and economic development and housing projects. Its non-programmatic elements were only vaguely developed, its objectives continued to be rather undefined, and the project descriptions were less than adequate. In many projects, several sponsors were listed, with no indication of who would be in charge. In general, the document followed HUD's format, but its content was weak. HUD would require the CDA to spend many months revising the CDP before they would allow the First Action Year to begin.

Santa Fe, New Mexico



The Setting

Santa Fe is a city of 45,000 in transition to an urban configuration, but with little manufacturing. Although tourism is the major industry, one-third of the employment is in government, and in the absence of a municipal civil service, patronage has a long-accepted importance which was a heavy, if covert, factor in the struggle for control of the CDA.

Fifty percent of the population is of Spanish heritage, while less than two percent are black. A twenty-year dominance of city government by Anglo businessmen was partially upset in the spring of 1968 when George Gonzales, 30, who operated a local radio station, was elected Mayor along with two Councilmen closely aligned with him. The incumbent coalition, however, retained six of the eight Council seats (the Mayor could vote only to break a tie). The distinction between the two political groups was not drawn sharply on ethnic or party lines: the Gonzales faction claimed the city was run by a small clique to its own advantage, ignoring the general good. As "outs," the Gonzales faction minority came to identify with the Model Neighborhood over the course of the Planning Year, and the conduct of the Model Cities program became the prime political issue of the 1970 elections.

The city had a well-developed physical planning capacity, and had had considerable working experience with HUD through a Housing Authority and an independent renewal agency appointed by the Mayor. Social and economic planning, in contrast, were fragmentary or non-existent: an independent school district was under strain from inadequate planning; public welfare and employment were ignored at the city level; and comprehensive health planning did not begin until 1969. The Santa Fe CAA was a small-scale program with a part-time director, providing services with OEO funds and a single delegate agency, Young Citizens for Action (YCFA). Economic planning, too, was only incipient at the onset of the Planning Year: Santa Fe was included in a North Central New Mexico EDA district, but no development grant had as yet been made.

Application Period

Santa Fe declined a first-round application due to shortness of time and staff, plus the fact that a Neighborhood Analysis was just getting underway in January of 1967 with HUD funds. It was felt that this study would supply valuable data for a later Model Cities application. By January 1968, the Model Cities experience of nearby Albuquerque had awakened genuine local interest and an application was initiated by City Hall under the aegis of the City Planner. On March 14, one month before application deadline, 70 community representatives, selected by the Planner, met and were briefed by him on the Model Cities program. They then formed themselves into subcommittees addressed to the functional areas of the application. The group was comprised of agency professionals, city officials and community leaders: resident representation was limited to a parish priest from the Model Neighborhood, a VISTA volunteer who had worked in the Model Neighborhood, and a member of Los Amigos, a barrio group recently formed by the VISTA worker.

Within two weeks the subcommittees submitted problem analyses based on guidelines prepared by the city Planning Department, which compiled the application. No issues of substance or process arose, and the application was approved by the City Council and forwarded to HUD on April 10, 1968, immediately after the city elections. Both slates had endorsed the program.

The proposed Model Cities structure set up a CDA modeled on a city commission, with jurisdiction over its own planning but with final authority vested in the City Council. A nine-member, "city appointed" CDA Board, with heavy City Hall and agency representation, was given sketchily defined authority to review and coordinate planning policy. An Inter-Agency Advisory Team, to review CDA proposals for the City Council, was made up of city, county and State officials with fiscal responsibility in programs.

The physical environment component, prepared by the Planning Department, was the most factual, while the health and crime/delinquency sections, also prepared by professionals, were adequate. Weakest in information and analysis were the sections on education, resident participation, social services, transportation and economic development. There was no attempt to establish priorities among problems: all were presented equally as characteristics of "a blighted area." Still, with all its inperfections, the Model Cities application was the first concerted look the community had taken at its poorest neighborhood.

The Waiting Period

The Santa Fe application was circulated for review and was approved at the subsequent RICC meeting without critical comment except for a reservation on the part of OEO regarding the inadequacy of the citizen participation structure, since it would be city-appointed. During these five months all Model Cities activity ceased at Santa Fe, which made no effort to exert pressure for approval. The planning grant, announced by HUD on September 26, was for $94,000, which exceeded Santa Fe's request by $6,000: an additional $22,000 in city funds and facilities were stipulated in the application.

The Revision Period

A HUD Discussion Paper, with 60 days given for response, was received by the city within a few days of the grant announcement. Five of the seven points of required revision dealt with CDA coordination — with CAA, CAMPS, the private sector, agencies, and data resource groups. But the initial two points required detailing of resident participation, both in work tasks and in administrative structure. At a RICC meeting in Santa Fe to explain the revisions, a HUD regional official stipulated that the CDA Director be Spanish speaking. This led to hiring of the least qualified of the applicants, Facundo Rodriguez, a onetime welfare administrator with no planning experience, who was the Mayor's choice. Rodriguez proved unable to prepare competent responses to HUD's Discussion Paper, and his submissions were repeatedly

returned. But the citizen Board was expanded to 13 members, nine of whom were Spanish-speaking. Most of these had volunteered at public meetings, but two had been nominated by the barrio organizations, Los Amigos and the YCFA. All were accepted by the City Council. The HUD leadman, who worked closely with Santa Fe, hoped the Board's by-laws, when adopted, would provide a stronger resident role. These expectations, however, were disappointed.

The Planning Year: Starting Up

The Planning Year began with the first meeting of the Citizens Board on January 15, at which the Mayor allowed the Board to elect its own officers. The chosen chairman never took more than a parliamentary role and regarded the Board as strictly advisory to the City Countil — a view fully shared by the CDA Director. The latter compounded his incompetency by hiring, in concert with the Mayor, four union staff members, all local people without planning experience or training. In the following months, the CDA Director ineptly attempted to secure on-loan technical staff from federal and state agencies and, although closely coached by the HUD leadman, continued to make inadequate revision efforts.

Frustrated in his search for on-loan assistance, the CDA Director decided to try for an OEO grant from Training and Technical Assistance Funds (T&TA). Here, because this program was tied in with the existent CAA effort in the Model Neighborhood, the CDA Director encountered his first resident training (the YCFA), and whether the CDA or the barrio group should administer them. Administratively, the CDA Director won out and the OEO organizers did in fact activate the planning task forces (appointed in March), arranging meetings of the planning committees with professionals. But their own view of their function, with strong VISTA influence, was in barrio organizing, and eventually the CDA Director cancelled the OEO contract and dismissed the workers. At the same time, he sought dismissal of VISTA volunteer Gilbert Lucero, who had arrived in Santa Fe in April and proceeded to organize a Federation of Barrios, coordinating the six Model Neighborhood districts and seeking resident control of the Model Cities planning. A citizen petition thwarted the effort to oust Lucero, and the control issue came to a head at a Board meeting on June 18. The Board voted 11 to 9 (agency personnel dissenting) to have the CDA Director responsible to the Board rather than to the City Council. Both the City Manager and City Attorney, however, ruled this action unacceptable by HUD directive.

The Planning Year: Mid-Term Planning Statement

An urban planner, William Flanery, was hired by the CDA in July and for the first time genuine planning began. Flanery simplified the planning committees by consolidation and during July, August and September guided these groups, each chaired by a resident through the process of defining problems and program approaches. Their discussions then formed the basis for components of the Mid-Term Planning Statement prepared by agency professionals. Housing and education were high-priority areas. By mid-September, the Mid-Term Planning Statement was ready in preliminary form.

At this juncture, a young Westinghouse consultant with HUD expertise, Lee White, came on the scene and assumed overall direction of the CDA planning effort, while Flanery concentrated on physical development and housing. An on-loan planner from Comprehensive Health also became available to the CDA at this time. In a lengthy session on October 10, the Board worked out its program priorities and a rough allocation of supplemental funds. On October 15, the Board was presented with a completed Mid-Term Planning Statement by the CDA staff and, under stress of deadline, was persuaded to approve it with the assurance of new HUD leadman Elloriaga that it was in no way a final planning document. The Mid-Term Planning Statement went to HUD the next day, but in the following week VISTA worker Lucero met with dissident residents and drew up a list of 60 proposed changes, the general thrust of which was to strengthen the resident component, both in participation and in programs. With only minor amendments, these proposals were adopted by the Citizens Board on November 5.

The Planning Year: Completing the Plan

At the same time as the Mid-Term Planning Statement was being completed, a significant victory in a battle with the Housing Authority had greatly enhanced the political self-awareness of the Model Neighborhood. At issue was the use of a sawmill site acquired by the city: the school district, seconded by the Citizens Board, wanted to use the property for an elementary school, while the Housing Authority wanted to use it for public housing. Despite a hostile City Council majority, the Citizens Board won out through sheer strength of its presentation; the episode also confirmed the anti-resident stand of the CDA Director.

A strong professional movement to oust the CDA Director was mounted at this time. The Council, evenly split on the matter, sought the opinion of the HUD regional official, who refused to take a stand on "city affairs." Thus the CDA was burdened with its Director through completion of the CDP.

The struggle for resident control of the CDA now took a curious turn. The Federation of Barrios, with approval of a majority of the Citizens Board, moved to carry out the citizen participation project in the First Action Year. Actually, the Federation — since it represented the same unified area as the Model Neighborhood — was a parallel organization to the Board in respect to residents, but without the non-resident members of the Board. These latter, officially represented by the CDA Director, opposed the plan, of course. The Mayor, however, favored the Federation bid, as did the prominent resident spokesman. On December 30 the Board approved the Federation project, an action the City Attorney then ruled invalid (a quorum was lacking).

During December and January project descriptions for the CDP were developed with heavy CDA staff dominance but with large inputs from agencies and residents. Lucero (VISTA) wrote up a proposal for a legal aid service, while a particularly innovative project — a Social and Mental Health Outreach Program, employing Model Neighborhood residents as "identifiers" of neighborhood social and/or mental problems — was developed outside the Model Cities planning by a Spanish-speaking NIMH consultant. Because it had State agency endorsement, the Council never challenged this unique program, whose basic intention was to promote community organizing. A Policy/Community Relations project, drawn up by the Police Department, was rejected by the Citizens Board when it reviewed the CDP on January 5, as was a project for making a film of the Model Cities program. Otherwise — the residents having faith in the competence and motivation of Flanery and White — the CDP was approved by the Citizens Board.

When the CDP went to the City Council for review on January 13, 1970, it was referred to the three-man Finance Committee, chaired by Councilman Murphy, the Council's most bitter opponent of the Federation of Barrios, of Mayor Gonzales and of resident control. The Committee first acted to trim the CDA budget, eliminating eight staff positions and paring the remaining salaries down to conform to city government levels. Murphy then prepared a list of guidelines which served to: reduce the number of projects, eliminate all reference to the Federation of Barrios, knock out enlargement of the Citizens Board as proposed, require Council approval for all appointments to the Board and changes in the CDP, and require the CDA Director to continue reporting to the City Manager instead of to the Board. One of the two Mayor Gonzales supporters being absent, all of these proposals passed by a vote of 5 to 1 when presented to the full Council on January 21. Finally, the Council rearranged project priorities (putting resident projects in the lowest category), and attempted to remove the Legal Aid proposal (unsuccessfully, since lawyers present spoke in its favor). In a single evening full City Council control over the entire program was reasserted.

Board members had spoken against these actions and were bitterly resentful. Rather than register their dissatisfaction with HUD, however, the Board members decided to wait until the city elections less than a month away. The Model Cities program was the leading issue of the campaign. The Council version of the CDP was sent off to HUD on February 12, 1970.

Aftermath: The City Elections

Of the six Councilmen who were generally unified on Model Cities issues and backed the CDA Director, four were up for re-election. Three of these decided not to run again, while the fourth did run and was defeated. Mayor Gonzales, now vocally advocating resident control, was returned to office and the new Council was split 4-4 behind and in opposition to him. With his tie-breaking vote he now had a majority. The new alignment was quickly apparent in staff changes.

The CDA Director resigned, as did his Assistant Director. William Flanery became Director effective April 1. The Citizens Board was granted authority to re-study the CDP, with an implicit reordering of project priorities and reinstatement of the Federation of Barrios. The Mayor also made a clean sweep of City Hall. The City Attorney, Police Chief and City Clerk/Treasurer were removed. The City Planner resigned — against the Mayor's desire — and the City Planning Commission was removed.

Wilmington, Delaware



The Setting

Wilmington is the largest and wealthiest city of Delaware, with a 1967 population of 85,960. As the state's main financial, retail, and manufacturing center, it provides stable employment for unskilled and semi-skilled labor, drawing large numbers of Irish, Italians, and blacks over the fifty-year period leading up to 1960.

This racial mix and Delaware's past history of strict racial segregation combined during the early 1960s to create great tensions as young, militant blacks pressed for equality. Their discontent was nowhere more evident than in the West Center City area of Wilmington, which eventually comprised most of the Model Neighborhood.

Within its limited area, West Center City had twice the number of blighted dwelling units as the city as a whole, 50 percent more people earning under $3,000 in annual income, and 20 percent more unemployment (at a level of 12.5 percent).

Over 20 percent of the city's blacks, aged 25 and above, had less than a seventh grade education, while 15 percent of the whites were in the same situation. Adding to these problems was extensive discrimination against the neighborhood's black residents in housing, public accommodations, and hiring practices.

Wilmington's neighborhood and city leadership made a belated response to these problems in the early 1960s with the establishment of neighborhood associations in West Center City and the adjoining Hilltop area, while a City Planning and Development Department was created in 1962.

The power of Mayor Barbiaz in Wilmington's strong-mayor system and the capability of the city's chief planner, Peter Larson, served to develop the first major changes in civic policy responding to these critical problems. By 1967, over $18 million in Federal programs had been implemented in the city, mostly concentrated on physical development, while 1966 had marked the beginning of comprehensive social planning with the establishment of Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. The capable Larson, with the support of the mayor and the strategic position of his department as the prime source of initiative for physical development, was easily able to coordinate the city's various physical planning activities. Resident input was minimal in these programs, but more important, the foundation of comprehensive planning opened the way for Wilmington's Model Cities program.

The Application Period
Feb, 1967 – April, 1968

Wilmington's first efforts at preparing a Model Cities application came at the urging of Mayor Barbiaz in late February, 1967. Enticed by conversations with Federal officials, the mayor asked Peter Larson to assume responsibility for the application. The deadline of April 25th, however, was too close at hand to finish the job and Wilmington could not apply until the second round.

In that initial application effort, Larson had selected West-Side Wilmington with its core of West Central City as the Model Neighborhood – a choice dramatically validated on the night of July 28, 1967, when that area became the site of the city's first race riot. In response, the Mayor imposed a curfew on the city until August 8; but until September, the city remained under a state of emergency proclaimed by Governor Terry.

The July disturbance acted as a powerful stimulus for the city to apply for the second round of Model Cities grants. With a planning committee selected by Larson and appointed by the Mayor, the application began to take shape. Questionnaires were prepared for local agencies, and two public meetings were held to gain input from the residents. As a result of these sessions, the planning committee acceded to a demand that the citizen participation structure be based on the two major community organizations in the area, the Hilltop Neighborhood Association and the West Center City Neighborhood Association. A third public meeting to discuss the application was never held due to riots on April 8 and 9, following the assassination of Martin Luther King. Given the nearness of the deadline for submittal, no public review of the application was held.

The application, submitted April 15th, stressed three themes: individual and family dignity, neighborhood status, and economic and social freedom. All problem analyses and strategies for change were oriented around these values. The application's major flaw was that it lacked statistical support and the delineation of a planning work program. The documentation was primarily qualitative; little effort was made to analyze the extensive data available or to recommend new solutions to problems identified as endemic. The total planning budget was $415,000, with HUD requested to grant $332,000 (80%).

The Waiting Period
April – September, 1968

Wilmington waited six months for a reply to its application. During that time, the attention of the city's political leaders and the black community focused on the consequences of the April riot. Model Cities activities were virtually at a standstill. On September 3, 1968, HUD announced the award of Planning Grants to thirty-three second round cities, including Wilmington. The amount of the grant was $117,000. This reduction below the amount requested was not unexpected.

Shortly thereafter, a HUD Discussion Paper was received requesting changes to the application. HUD was concerned primarily with the city's conformance to the new budget and the development of a detailed administrative structure. The creators of the application stated their compliance and promised to organize their planning and participation structure by January 1, 1969.

The Revision Period

During the revision period, the dominant issue was program control. The initial planning structure proposed in the application would have given the City Hall

control over the program through a small CDA staff dependent on the Mayor and a Public Advisory Group divided between citizen representatives, business groups, and professionals. However, the white leader of the West Center City Neighborhood Association, Rev. Luce, and his supporters perceived Model Cities not as a city-dominated program for solving problems, but rather as a means of organizing the black community in the Model Neighborhood to give them political and economic power. The resident executive body, the Model Neighborhood Council, gradually followed the strong leadership of Rev. Luce, who was intent on preventing the CDA from becoming an arm of City Hall.

The Council accordingly demanded veto power and the right to approve the technical staff for the planning task forces. The new administration acquiesced, feeling that it could not easily deny the request, given the program's requirements for citizen participation and its own need to conciliate the black population. The result, ultimately, was a partnership structure in which no focus of power was clearly dominant and in which the issue of program control was only temporarily settled, although this period found the program structure evolving toward a resident-dominant model.

The Council and the city first locked horns over the selection of a CDA director. The Council's first candidate was rejected by City Hall. William Myers, who was reluctantly proposed as a second candidate, was approved by the Mayor. Myers, although a mayor's man, was caught midway in the conflict between the city and the resident Council and ultimately, he had neither the community support nor the technical expertise to control the program.

The Mid-Planning Statement
Aug 2, 1968–Feb 16, 1969

The planning year began amidst this atmosphere of racial and political tension. The program was behind schedule from the beginning and the task forces, under their recently appointed coordinators, were concerned neither with HUD's requirements nor with deadlines.

By November 15, the date set by the work program for submission of "sketch plans," only two of the task forces had submitted the required materials. The sketch plans were to consist of problem analyses, goals, objectives, and strategies, but when finally completed in January, they were heavily project-oriented and thus virtually unusable for the Mid-Planning Statement.

The Model Neighborhood Council, which had recently been reorganized to bring in more representative and energetic people, was little help to the frustrated HUD leadman in his efforts to push the plan through to completion. In addition, the city provided little help while requesting additional technical assistance from HUD.

As a last resort, CDA director Myers asked a member of the City Planning staff, Don Devine, to prepare the Mid-Planning Statement from task force submissions and any other available sources. The document, 26 pages long, was developed in January and February, 1970 after meetings with HUD, the Council, and task force members. The process by which the MPS was prepared did not correspond to HUD's model. Devine had to reconstruct the HUD-advocated planning steps from the projects given to him by the task forces. It was clear that the residents had taken little interest in the planning process. The final product, submitted to HUD in mid-February, caused little controversy among the Council or resident task force members, because it did not deal with the projects themselves – their only real area of concern.

The Planning Year: Completing the Plan
Feb 16 – May 29, 1969

The RICC response to the MPS was generally favorable. The long and short-term objectives noted in the plan were well received. In the review, however, the issue of program control again surfaced. HUD leadman, Mike Cook, warned the Model Neighborhood Council that the two projected community-controlled projects would not be approved. Although several militant Council members resigned as a result of this stance, neither the program nor the Council were gravely affected.

After the RICC review, Devine again directed development of the plan. The aid of HUD consultants and more frequent task force meetings expedited the development of specific projects included in the plan. At the same time, the CDA and

the Council were being extensively reorganized. To promote clear lines of authority, the CDA was divided into four units, Planning, Evaluation, Administration, and Training/Employment; but it remained a definite part of the Mayor's office. The Council, on the other hand, established further independence, with the Mayor's approval, by establishing its own staff, independent of the CDA. With eleven full-time and seventeen part-time members, it intended to stress community organization.

Under the pressure of a new and revised work schedule calling for submission of the Plan to HUD by April 23, the task forces consulted extensively with local agencies during early March. The problem, at this point, was arranging for reliable project sponsors as well as possible categorical funding sources.

As the task forces developed their projects, each was reviewed by the Council within the context of the problem priorities established in the MPS. The only project creating a significant amount of controversy, a community controlled Street Academy proposal submitted by the education task force, violated HUD's warnings about citizen control. Nevertheless, the task force decided to retain control of the project, while changing its name to the "school storefront" proposal.

The Council review of the projects took until May 25, long after the April 15 deadline, because the Council was determined that adequate citizen participation and review be assured for future project administration. The plan was approved virtually as written, and it was forwarded to HUD on May 28. Several days later, the Model Neighborhood Council President resigned, protesting that Model Cities was wrong to direct the energies of citizens away from community organization and toward the strengthening of existing agencies which had clearly neglected the needs of minority in the populations in the past.

Youngstown, Ohio



The Setting

Youngstown is located in northeastern Ohio, in one of the nation's major steel producing areas, seven miles from the Pennsylvania border and approximately 65 miles from Cleveland and Pittsburgh. The city once grew at a spectacular pace, spurred by the fabulous growth of the local iron and steel industries. Between 1890-1930, Youngstown's population soared from 15,435 to 170,002 and immigrants from all over Europe settled in the city.

Today, however, Youngstown is no longer thriving. The steel industry is no longer booming and whatever new industry is coming into the Youngstown vicinity is settling outside the city. Thus, the city's tax base is shrinking and it is having trouble maintaining its present services. It is rapidly losing population, especially its wealthier residents, to the surrounding suburbs. Between 1960 and 1970, the population dropped from 166,000 to 139,000. Its percentage of black residents increased from 14% to 25% in this decade.

The city, under Hunter, manifests a strong-mayor form of government. He works closely with the Planning Commission, which because of the City's financial problems has decreased its professional staff from nine to seven, and its salary structure to a less competitive level. Consequently, the Commission has been unable to venture beyond its routine physical planning tasks into either social or economic

planning. Whatever planning has occurred has been totally fragmented, as little cooperation exists among the city's private and public agencies.

The Application Period:
Feb 14 — April 15, 1968

On February 14, 1968, the Youngstown City Council approved a resolution authorizing the Planning Commission to apply for a Model Cities grant for the Northeast Side. In 1966, then Mayor Flask had considered applying for a grant for this area, but had declined because the city engineer had persuaded him that a physical rather than a social renewal program was what that neighborhood needed. By 1967, however, the Mayor had reversed his stand. The lack of development on the Northeast Side — which was actually rural in character — had been a significant issue in the mayoral election, and to assuage his critics, Flask decided to apply for a second round grant after his re-election victory.

Tony Ma, head of the City Planning Commission, worked full-time to prepare the Model Cities application. Sympathetic to resident involvement, he personally organized an advisory committee which included residents and spent considerable time attending community meetings to generate interest in the program.

By April 10, 1968, due date for the application, Ma had completed his groundwork, and during the next four days he and his staff wrote the entire application. On April 15, HUD received the document. City Council approval following two days later.

The application was not well written. Ma's sustained efforts at citizen involvement permitted too little time for the writing of a consistent and readable document. The application was only a rough agglomeration of sections, obviously written by different individuals, and often internally inconsistent and redundant.

The Waiting Period:
April 15 — Oct 14, 1968

From submission of the application to announcement of the award of a $145,000 planning grant to Youngstown on October 14, 1968, there was little Model Cities activity in Youngstown.

The Federal reviews of the application were generally critical and Youngstown might not have received a planning grant but for two events. First, Youngstown had a race riot in April, 1968. Though contained and outside the Model Neighborhood, the incident caused anxiety among city officials who feared increased racial polarization if some positive action, like the Model Cities Program, was not taken. Second, Mike Kirwan, a powerful Congressman, at the behest of Mayor Flask, interceded in the Model Cities selection process after Youngstown had not been included on the first list of Second Round Cities.

The Revision Period:
Oct 14, 1968–June 26, 1969

The Revision Period opened with a modification in the Model Neighborhood Area. The included area of the more stable Northeast Side neighborhood, at HUD's insistence, was reduced and a second, more extensive and socially unstable neighborhood, the South Side, was included in the target area. It had been a highly organized activist neighborhood under the CAP. Mayor Flask announced these changes to Youngstown residents on January 7, 1969, but before these changes were made public, the Mayor, on September 18, had announced the appointment of Robert Shipka as CDA Director. This raised a furor among Model Neighborhood black residents, who believed that Shipka, the son of a prominent Youngstown labor leader, was selected by the Mayor on a political basis alone. More important the appointment was made without consulting neighborhood leaders. The local black leaders perceived this action as an illustration of the city's contempt for them, thereby leaving Shipka with the burden of rebuilding "bridges" with many of the residents.

Shipka began to organize the neighborhoods for planning and by late January had set up a neighborhood meeting in each area.

This task of organizing and generating trust proved extremely difficult. While the Northeast Side residents responded well (by April it had an elected Planning Council ready to operate), organizing the South Side was painfully slow and chaotic. Finally, in early April, Shipka relinquished organizing the South Side to South Side residents themselves, since the meetings he attended had all been disrupted by residents alleging "City Hall management" of the program. On May 4, at a mass meeting planned by South Side residents, cooperation and calmness prevailed and a thirty-two member South Side Steering Committee was established to plan an election for a Resident Planning Council.

In early April, Shipka set to work producing what HUD had been requesting since January — a city ordinance approving the new target area boundaries and the revisions to the application. The latter involved detailing the proposed planning structure of the CDA. HUD prodded Shipka in late April. A letter from Secretary Hyde warned that if the required materials were not sent to HUD by May 15, the city might have its grant revoked.

Shipka finished the revisions on May 1. The planning structure he submitted was only slightly more coherent than the original one. He proposed a resident component directed by a Policy Commission, one half of which would be composed of representatives from the public and private sector, the other half from the two neighborhood Planning Councils. Each council would have planning task forces in seven functional areas. He also proposed a 33-member Technical Advisory Committee, which would consist of a representative from almost every agency in Youngstown.

One day before the deadline, Shipka's revisions and a copy of the City Council's MN boundary ordinance were sent to HUD.

The Planning Period — Starting Up:
June 27 — Dec 31, 1969

Shipka's revisions were approved by HUD and on June 27, 1969 Youngstown entered into a Model Cities contract.

No planning took place during the summer for two reasons. First, Mayor Flask would not permit Shipka to hire any staff, not even a secretary, until the first installment of the planning grant arrived on August 5, 1969. Second, the South Side was still organizing itself. The Planning Council members were not elected until August 16th. Once selected, the group was surprisingly moderate, given the activist orientation of the South Side organization.

CDA's activities became embroiled in the fall mayoral race. In an effort to discredit Mayor Flask, opposed by Republican councilman Jack Hunter, whose ward included part of the South Side, the neighborhood activists took every possible opportunity to disrupt the South Side. With strong black support Hunter defeated Flask in an astonishing upset.

After his defeat, Flask gave Shipka the impossible task of completing the Model Cities Plan by January 1st. Shipka then reminded the Mayor that he had no staff since the recommendations sent to the Mayor for approval had not been acted upon. On November 14, Flask appointed eight people to the CDA staff, all MN residents from the "moderate" faction — an affront to the South Side activists, who protested vociferously.

Shipka tried to move ahead, but couldn't. The South Side activists disrupted meetings and held rump sessions in an effort to gain control of the South Side Council. When it appeared that he would not be reappointed by the mayor-elect, Shipka resigned on December 2.

When Jack Hunter became Mayor on January 1, 1970, he knew that HUD was threatening to terminate the Model Cities Program in Youngstown because of lack of progress. Wasting no time, on January 2 he appointed as CDA Director Thaxton King, the activist head of the South Side Steering Committee. Ken Carpenter, Hunter's trusted friend and moderate South Side resident, was named Deputy Director. Hunter apparently believed that only someone in the activist South Side faction could bring peace and progress to the program. To ensure that he didn't lose complete control of the program, however, he made Carpenter King's Deputy.

King's major task was to produce a Mid-Planning Statement. Now, however, the Northeast Side became unruly and began to fight for more control of the program. Most of the Northeast Side Council members were upset that both the CDA

Director and Deputy Director were from the South Side and that the director was a "militant". During the next few months, the Northeast Side Council members boycotted meetings and cut off communication. King, however, was a strong enough administrator to minimize the Northeast Side's disruptive actions, which in any case were not so debilitating to the program as the South Side's had been during Shipka's time.

In an effort to speed the process of defining and ranking problems and causes and to coordinate the two neighborhoods, King held a three-day Model Cities Planning Conference which met evenings from February 9-11. While the planning process here was not precise and most of the problems and causes that emerged were stereotypes, the CDA did determine that residents perceived their top five problem areas as employment, housing, lack of representation on leadership bodies, education and health.

On April 2, the CDA sent its Mid-Planning Statement to HUD. The statement had been approved by both Councils, though reluctantly by some of the moderate members who were antagonized by its heavy rhetoric on the subject of racism.

The Federal RICC review of the MPS held in Chicago on April 23, generated surprisingly little criticism of the document. The chief critique centered on the poorly defined Objectives and Strategy Statement, and one reviewer suggested that a change in the militant tone of the problem analyses might elicit more resources and support from established agencies.

Completing the Plan: April 24 – Dec 29, 1970

The HUD Regional Office had given Youngstown a June 15, 1970 date of submittal for the CDP. King's first move was to collect project proposals. Citizen participation requirements were to be met by resurrecting the three planning component groups – physical, social and economic – used at the February conference. Each met weekly for four weeks in May and early June. The project proposals which emerged after these sessions, however, were largely the efforts of CDA staff or Youngstown agencies.

Meanwhile, the residents had become embroiled over whether the Policy Commission members should be selected separately by the two sections of the Model Neighborhood or by overall population. HUD ruled that there was really one Model Neighborhood and the criteria of overall population had to be used. For months the Northeast Side flatly and heatedly refused to agree to HUD's demand and the South Side Planning Council's determination that the commission have a 2-1 South Side to Northeast Side representation ratio. Finally in July, largely as a result of frustration, the Northeast Side agreed to this ratio, with the provision that it could be renegotiated every six months.

By June however, King and the Mayor were at odds over the extent of the Administration's involvement in planning. The Mayor, now that funds were ready for allocation, wanted more control of the planning process. King, who had worked independently from City Hall sought to counter this possibility. When he realized that he needed new staff assistance in preparing the plan, he obtained it from an outsider named Bill Proctor, who had originally been hired to develop the CDA information system.

The HUD deadline of June 15 passed by, and a later date, August 31, was established. By mid-August Proctor and Carpenter were writing at a feverish pace to meet this deadline. Then, however, HUD intervened on behalf of City Hall. Belatedly deciding that Proctor's work with the CDA did not fit within the provisions of his firm's contract, HUD pulled Proctor out of Youngstown.

Hunter now moved to regain City Hall control of the program. In early September, offering the cooperation of all city staff, he ordered King to have the CDP prepared by September 23.

This deadline, too, was never met. King's problems escalated in late September when, in a bold move against his leadership, Deputy Carpenter and

disenchanted moderate blacks and whites confronted King, at a public meeting with the Mayor and other City officials in attendance and harshly criticized King's failure to encourage citizen participation in the determination of projects. Therefore, during the second and third weeks of October, at the insistence of the Mayor, who was backed by HUD, another round of project planning meetings was held. These meetings were well attended by King's activist supporters and in the end they successfully lobbied for most of the projects that King had developed without their participation.

On November 30, the completed Plan was approved by the Planning Councils. Despite some members' anxiety about a "racial" Street Academy Project, King submitted the Plan to HUD, promoting that projects could be changed at a later date.

On December 16, the Plan was passed by the City Council, except for the Street Academy. Opposition to this project had become so strong that the activists were able to muster only one vote for it.

Hunter then moved to establish firm control of the program. First, King was fired and Carpenter was made Acting Director. Second, at the Mayor's behest, the plan was changed to show that the CDA was not the Mayor's equal, but a line agency; the Planning Council's "final authority" was changed to "review and comment." The Mayor thus had final authority in the program. With these changes, the Plan finally went to HUD amidst speculation on whether the activists would accept defeat or attempt to disrupt and discredit the Model Cities Program.

Glossary

Actors	Actors were defined as individuals, groups or entities that had some degree of influence in the planning process in the Model Cities Program. They included: (1) chief executive; (2) chief executive surrogate; (3) residents; (4) HUD; (5) CDA director; (6) CDA planning staff; (7) consultants; (8) local agencies (public); (9) private agencies; and (10) city council majority.
Advocate Planners	Professional planners representing and working on behalf of specific interest groups by providing technical assistance to further their client's objectives.
Application Period	This period refers to the time taken by cities to prepare their application for a planning grant award.
Broker	A role in which an actor serves as an intermediary between groups, e.g. between residents and local agencies.
Categorical Funds	Federal funds designated for programs in specific problem or functional areas. Projects financed by categorical funds are individually approved by the respective Federal agency dispensing the money. Examples of categorically funded programs in a CDA are a Neighborhood Development Program (NDP), Federally Assisted Code Enforcement (FACE) and Neighborhood Facilities.
Chief Executive	The term as used in this report refers to the chief political or administrative officer in a community.
Chronology	A compilation of detailed reports on events in either the Planning or Action Year in the 21 Model Cities designated for field monitoring in this series of studies. These journals were used as raw data for case studies and comparative analyses.
Citizen Participation	An integral part of any Model Cities Program is the role of the Model Neighborhood Citizens. HUD requires that a structure be developed in order that "the residents' views are incorporated into CDA's policies, and that the citizens are constructively involved in planning and implementing the Model Cities program."
CDA	*City (or County) Demonstration Agency.* The organization officially delegated the authority to administer the local Model Cities program. The CDA is responsible for the overall direction of the program.
CDA Director	Chief administrator of the CDA. He oversees all aspects of the Model Cities program, normally reports to the CDA Board and the local chief executive and deals directly with the HUD Leadman.
CDA Letters	Guidelines in the form of periodic correspondence from HUD MCA concerning policies, procedures and aspects of the MC Program. Eleven CDA Letters exist covering such items as Citizen Participation (CDA #3) and Accounting and Record Procedures (CDA #8).
Client	Any individual or group receiving services under contract or within the context of a formal relationship.
Cohesive	In these studies, resident groups involved in MC programs are classified as cohesive and non-cohesive. A cohesive resident group is one with an acknowledged leadership able to speak for a consensus. A non-cohesive group is divided internally, with several leaders representing rival factions.

Completing the Plan	This period normally involved such activities as preparing project descriptions and such non-programmatic elements of the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan as administrative statements, and continuous planning and evaluation statements. It could follow submission of the MPS or run concurrently with that activity.
Comprehensive Demonstration Plan (CDP)	A plan to be submitted to HUD for review and approval by each Model City before an Action Year may begin. The CDP was divided into three parts for first-round cities and simplified to two for second-round cities. (See Parts I, II, III and First and Second-Round Cities). These parts primarily describe the Model Neighborhood problems and causes, goals and objectives of the local MC Program, and implementation strategies which include a description of upcoming Action Year projects. At the end of each Action Year a revised CDP is submitted to HUD for the following year.
Continuous Planning	Continuous planning activities were expected to be carried on during each Action Year, leading to revision and updating of CDPs. Evaluation findings were to be part of continuous planning activities.
Demonstration Cities Act of 1966	Original legislation establishing the Model Cities Program, to be administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
DOL	Department of Labor.
Discussion Paper	A critique of applications for a planning grant award. Usually issued at time of grant announcement and contained recommendations for revisions in such areas as planning work program, role of chief executive and residents, linkages with local agencies and resident groups, and Planning Year budgets.
Evaluation System	The methods by which information is gathered by the Model Cities staff, residents and project personnel and analyzed to help determine the success or failure of a project. A complete Evaluation System according to HUD guidelines includes the monitoring of projects and activities and interpreting information to provide a basis for alternative courses of action.
First-Round Cities	The first seventy-five Model Cities Programs funded by HUD prior to Spring of 1968.
Functional Areas Subcommittees or Task Forces	Committees of residents, staff and agency representatives which focused on specific areas, such as health, housing or employment, for purposes of problem analysis, project development and implementation.
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development. HUD is the Federal department responsible for managing the Model Cities Program.
HUD Planning Model	The Model Cities planning process as prescribed by HUD's CDA Letters in which guidelines, procedures and policies are provided for project and program planning. The HUD Planning Model encompasses four principal elements: structure, process, product, and performance criteria (or objectives).
Leadman/ Leadwoman	Regional Office-based HUD representatives responsible for dealing directly with local Model Cities programs. The leadmen interpreted HUD guidelines, provided technical assistance, sought to develop federal interagency assistance for local programs, and generally acted as a source of information and assistance. Their roles varied with the individual and with Regional Office practices.

Management Information System (MIS)	A system for the periodic collection of data on project performance and on social indices of the MN population providing the basis both for ongoing evaluation and for continuous planning. Monthly reports from implemented project sponsors were a common device of the MIS for project evaluation, while sample surveys were a common device for measuring program impact on a target population.
Mid-Term Planning Statement (MPS)	A planning document to be submitted to HUD by CDAs halfway through the Planning Year. It contains statements on planning process, problem analysis, goals and objectives, and an overall strategy statement indicating the community's intended approach to First Action Year activities. The MPS replaced the Part I component of the original Comprehensive Demonstration Plan in December, 1969.
MCA	The Model Cities Administration. Prior to the 1971 HUD reorganization, MCA was the division of HUD responsible for administering the Model Cities Program. The program is now part of the Office of Community Development.
Model Cities Board (CDA Board)	The local policy-making group in the Model Cities Program. The board, often referred to as the CDA Board, is usually composed of residents plus elected and appointed officials, and is responsible for CDA activities in the Model Neighborhood Area.
Model Neighborhood Area (MNA)	The specific geographical area designated for the Model Cities program. All CDA projects are designed to focus on problems in the target Model Neighborhood Area (often shortened to Model Neighborhood or MN). Initially restricted to ten percent of a city's or county's population, in February 1970 HUD allowed CDAs to expand their programs up to 50 percent of the original area.
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity; oversees War on Poverty (Community Action Programs)
Order	The sequence of planning events to be followed by cities during the Planning Year, e.g. application, application revision, starting-up, problem analysis, objectives, strategy, project descriptions.
Parity Planning System	Staff and residents share decision-making powers during preparation of planning documents; sustained chief executive involvement; low turbulence; cohesive and integrated resident base prior to Model Cities.
Parts I, II, and III of the CDP	For the seventy-five first round Model Cities, HUD required that the Comprehensive Demonstration Plan be submitted in three separate parts: Part I was to define and analyze problems and specify long-range goals, objectives, program approaches, and the overall strategy to be used by the CDA in pursuing these goals. Part II was a five-year forecast derived from the statement of Part I which outlined specific projects with estimated costs. Part III specified how the city intended to move toward the objectives of the five-year forecast during the first year. Detailed descriptions of individual projects, budgets, administrative structure and planning and evaluation systems was also provided in this section. Requirements for the seventy-five Second Round Cities were substantially simplified in December 1969. Part I took the form of a Mid-Term Planning Statement which included an explanation of how the plan was being developed, a summary of MN problems and their causes and a statement of overall objectives and strategies. Part II, the five-year forecast, was dropped as a requirement.
Performance Criteria	To measure the effectiveness of the Model Cities process, HUD developed several performance criteria by which the progress of the city's program could be determined. These criteria included: (1) innovation in structures; (2) mobilization and concentration among local, state and Federal agencies with regard to Model Cities planning activities; (4) institutional change; (5) resident participation.
Planning Grant Award	A sum of money awarded by HUD to Model Cities for the purpose of preparing a Comprehensive Demonstration Plan. Included sums for administration, resident assistance, consultants, and other permitted planning activities. Usually matched to some degree by local funds.
Political Integration	Resident groups are classified in these studies as politically integrated or non-integrated. A politically integrated group is one which has attained legitimacy and influence on the local scene in planning and allocation of resources, one whose voice is listened to.
Process	Refers to order, timing, and technique of planning activity.
Product	Used here to refer to planning documents to be submitted to HUD by CDAs, such as Mid-Term Planning Statement and final Comprehensive Demonstration Plan.
RICC	Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee. The Federal committee which oversees, reviews, and makes recommendations about the design of Model Cities programs. The RICC also assists in helping CDA's solve administrative and programmatic problems. Regional and area officials of all Federal agencies participating in a Model Cities program (HEW, DOL, OEO, HUD, EDA) compose the membership of the RICC.
Resident-Dominant Planning System	Residents have principal voice in preparation of planning documents; high turbulence; sustained chief executive involvement; cohesive resident base.
Resident-Influence Planning System	Residents have major influence in preparation of planning documents; high turbulence; minimal chief executive involvement; non-cohesive and politically non-integrated resident base prior to Model Cities.
Revision Period	Following announcement by HUD that an applicant city had been designated to receive a planning grant award, a period followed in which cities were expected to revise their applications to meet HUD criticisms expressed in a Discussion Paper. This period was to last 45 days, although it was not uncommon for a much longer period to prevail.
Roles	The degree and mode of involvement of actors in Model Cities, e.g. broker, directive, managerial.
Sanction	Residents approve planning documents prepared by staff which reflect earlier resident-articulated views and positions. Common to staff-influence planning systems.
Second Round Cities	The seventy-five Model Cities Programs approved by HUD between September and November 1968, slightly less than one year after the initial seventy-five programs were funded.
Staff-Dominant	A planning system in which CDA staff prevail in decision-making affecting planning during the Planning Year. Low turbulence; sustained chief executive involvement, low resident cohesion and political integration.
Staff-Influence Planning System	CDA staff has principal influence during Planning Year, although generally sanctions resident ideas; low or minimal chief executive involvement; non-cohesive and politically non-integrated resident base; high level of turbulence prior to or at outset of Model Cities.

Starting Up Period	Following announcement of a planning grant award, cities began to hire CDA staff, initiate contacts with local agencies for various kinds of assistance, and negotiate with residents for their participation in the program. This period was devoted to program organization and could overlap with preparation of the revisions to the application demanded by HUD in its Discussion Paper.
Structure	Refers to program organization, securing CDA staff, establishing linkages with local agencies, city hall, and resident groups; relationship to chief executive, formation of technical interagency pools.
Supplemental Funds	Monies made available to Model Cities upon approval of the CDP. Funds can be used to finance experimental projects, to fill gaps not met by other Federal, State or local resources, or to pay for non-Federal programs. Supplemental funds cannot be used to replace local funds that would normally have benefited Model Neighborhood residents.
Surrogate	A representative of the local chief executive, perceived by CDA staff and residents to act on the former's behalf.
Task Force	In this study the term "task force" refers to a subcommittee of a CDA Board concerning itself with planning and project development within a single functional area — e.g. social services, health, physical development. The term "functional area subcommittee" is thus synonymous with task force.
Technique	Planning tools and approaches followed by CDAs in producing their various planning documents; e.g. matrix analysis, all-day conferences; retreats; workshops; surveys; scalar rankings.
Timing	The time to be taken by CDAs to complete various planning events and to submit documents to HUD; e.g. the MPS was due halfway through the Planning Year; the CDP was due one year after commencement of the Planning Year.
Turbulence	Intense, sustained, and sometimes violent conflict among groups in the Model Neighborhood Area, and between resident groups and public agencies or city hall. Often expressed in the form of resident demands for a voice in public decision-making affecting their neighborhood.
Waiting Period	This period was the time between submission of an application for a planning grant to HUD and HUD's announcement of a city's success or failure in getting the grant. A waiting period of 5 or 6 months was not unusual.

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