


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
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
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LAPD



ADVANCE PLANNING DIVISION



PREPARED BY PLANNING SECTION
OF
ADVANCE PLANNING DIVISION

*Crime Specific Team Policing
Los Angeles Police Department*

FINAL EVALUATION OF TEAM 28

April
1974

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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1971, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) formed a Crime Control Committee. This Committee was composed of Police Commanders from the various Bureaus throughout the Department. The mission of this Committee was to explore new methods of crime reduction. One of the first items considered by this Committee after its formation was the team policing concept.

The concept was studied extensively by the Crime Control Committee to ascertain if it would be a viable crime reduction and community involvement program adaptable for Departmental use. After lengthy consideration, it was suggested by the Committee that team policing be implemented on an experimental basis in one Basic Car area within the Venice Area. For comparison purposes, they also advised the establishment of an adjacent Basic Car area as an experimental control area.

Team policing is not a new concept in law enforcement. It has been tried in several other cities and countries, but its principles of operation and effectiveness have only been partially documented. The first printed reference concerning a team concept in the United States was found in the 1967 Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

When the experiment was formalized for the Venice Area, the word "TEAM" became an acronym for "Team Experiment in Area Mobilization," and where seen in this report in upper case letters, it refers to the experiment in Venice Area. When seen in lower case letters, it refers to the concept.

The experiment was originally planned to commence at the beginning of the second quarter of 1972. The TEAM was deployed at that time; however, a California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ) grant was applied for and received June 1, 1972, to augment the TEAM Policing experiment. This provided for continuation of the experiment through June 30, 1973. Although the official experiment ended June 30, 1973, the TEAM is still operational and the entire Venice Area is organized as a Team Policing Area. Additional team operations have commenced in the City and more are planned.

This report is an extensive review and analysis of all the programs of both the grant-funded and the pure team policing aspects of the experiment. It includes an analysis of the statistical performance of the TEAM with respect to crime reduction.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL FINDINGS

The general findings, based on the analysis presented in this final evaluation report, indicate that the TEAM Policing experiment conducted by the LAPD was essentially successful. When compared to expectations, burglaries were reduced 31.69 percent as part of the Crime Specific emphasis of the experiment. Community attitudes in the test area were positively influenced by the community involvement programs of the experiment, and police attitudes also reflected a more positive attitude toward the community.

Management By Participation (MBP) appears to have limitations and should be applied cautiously as a Department management technique.

The evaluation indicates that the introduction of grant funds distorted the experiment to a degree. Any results achieved by, or failings attributed to, the experiment must be jointly shared by team policing and the grant funds.

It was determined that the type of police facility for future team expansion Department-wide would require further study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Management Considerations:

- A. It is recommended that future team policing activities be given the same degree of operational flexibility that was afforded to TEAM-28. This is the ability to instantly adapt deployment and field techniques to changing situations and was one of the major advantages observed.
- B. It is recommended that any future team policing experiments not make use of control areas for evaluative purposes, but be contrasted to City-wide data.
- C. It is recommended that the Department be cautious about adopting participative management techniques where they might infringe upon the authority structure required for proper functioning of a police department.
- D. It is recommended that all individuals give a one-year commitment to any new team that is established, with the exception that personnel may transfer for pay-grade advancements or promotions.

E. It is recommended that Advance Planning Division initiate a study to determine the adequacy of the existing ideal station concept in light of the needs of a complete team policing Area operation.

F. It is recommended that programs or concepts which rely on overtime activities of Department personnel be adopted only on an emergency basis as currently provided for in the Department Manual. Overtime for team policing operations should be used on the same basis as overtime for all other Department activities.

G. It is recommended that the close interaction between uniformed and investigative personnel, which was a salient feature of TEAM-28, be adopted in all of the Department's geographic Areas. The effectiveness of this technique on crime reduction was readily apparent to all members of TEAM-28.

2. Training:

A. It is recommended that a study be conducted by Technical Services Bureau to determine if it is economically feasible to have fingerprint kits in every patrol vehicle. If feasible, it

is recommended that the Department adopt a policy of giving recruits at Training Division adequate training in the taking of fingerprints so that as field officers they can complete this portion of an investigation.

B. It is recommended that Personnel and Training Bureau study the possible use of Training Division for initial seminars for Area personnel to be trained in team policing.

C. It is recommended, should team policing become the Department's Area-wide organizational mode, that Personnel and Training Bureau design and implement extensive training at the recruit level in team policing, with increased emphasis on public speaking.

D. It is recommended that Personnel and Training Bureau study and develop a school at Training Division for supervisors who will work on new team projects. Sufficient background on the concept and execution should be provided for adequate leadership and to assure smooth implementation of the team concept.

E. It is recommended that any future training on team policing stress the point that team

policing is not a campaign against any one specific crime, but is principally an organizational concept which generalizes the abilities of the police officers, maximizes their effectiveness by the use of the team environment, and thus reduces overall crime. This clarification is necessary to illustrate to those not intimately associated with team policing, that the concept is not simply an anti-burglary or anti-auto theft program combined with a community relations program. This inferred status was brought about by Departmental use of grant funds from the Crime Specific program.

3. Community Relations:

A. It is recommended that many of the community involvement programs, specifically associated with Crime Specific grant funding, such as security inspections, the community center, coffee klatches, and block captains, be regarded as optional items. It was possible to implement them during the TEAM-28 experiment due to the large amount of overtime funding available. Some of these programs, such as the community center and security inspections, may not be cost effective.

- B. It is recommended that smaller community meetings similar to the TEAM's coffee klatches continue to be phased into the Department's Basic Car-Community Relations effort, due to their demonstrated effectiveness.
- C. It is recommended that the block captain program be expanded in other experimental areas to ascertain whether it can be an effective mobilization tool. These efforts should be measured by Community Relations Section.
- D. It is recommended that residential and business security inspections be recognized as very labor intensive community relations activities with undemonstrated effectiveness as "target hardening" tools.

4. Grant Considerations:

- A. It is recommended that, in future Area and Department applications of the team concept, ongoing City funding should be sought. Grant funds can be useful for the initial training, equipment purchases and evaluative personnel.
- B. It is recommended that any future experiments of an operational nature involving uniformed personnel be done using only available Department resources, subject to the above

recommendation. This will help assure that similar results can be achieved if the programs are adopted on a City-wide basis.

TEAM EXPERIMENT

OVERVIEW

TEAM Conception

In August of 1971, the Departmental Crime Control Committee recommended the restructuring of Venice Area into six Basic Car Plan areas rather than the five in operation at the time. Two of the areas were selected for use in a team policing experiment. One was the actual experimental area 14A28, and the other was designated a control area for comparison, 14A34. The areas were approximately homogeneous in size, demography, and crime problems. The TEAM area was composed of three square miles and had a population of 26,256. The ethnic make up of the test area was approximately 78.1 percent Caucasian, 2.5 percent Negro, and 19.4 percent Other: including Mexican-American, Indian and Oriental. Approximately 56.9 percent of the area was residential, of which half was occupied by multi-unit dwellings. The area was primarily middle to lower-middle income families.

Crime Performance

Four repressible crimes--burglary, auto theft, robbery, burglary/theft from motor vehicle--as well as traffic accidents involving injury were selected as a basis for comparison between the two areas. A five-year data base

was gathered for each area and used to project the number of incidents expected in the test and control areas during the experimental period. The projections appeared desirable because crime had been increasing throughout the City rather steadily during the period previous to the inception of the TEAM. It was thought that projecting this increase would provide the most accurate measure of the expected crime problem in the TEAM and control areas. This was subsequently proven false because City-wide crime decreased. Therefore, the projections were used only for goal setting, and different measures were adopted to assess the performance of the TEAM.

Attitude Surveys

Concurrently, a series of attitude surveys were developed after consultations with psychologists. These surveys served the dual purpose of measuring police officers' attitudes toward their jobs and citizens' attitudes toward the police and law enforcement. It was originally determined that the surveys would be used to select the TEAM for the test area. It was planned to select a representative sample of policemen for the TEAM with a normal range of attitudes. This procedure was modified by the Departmental Crime Control Committee, and actual TEAM members were selected based on their work history records.

In late January 1972, the surveys were administered to Venice officers. They were again administered to TEAM officers at their first seminar and a third time near the conclusion of the experiment during June 1973. The purpose of these surveys was to determine how the TEAM working environment influenced the officers' work attitudes. This is discussed in the survey analysis portion of the report.

In March of 1972 it was decided to initiate the community attitude survey. Initially, administrators were gathered from the local community as an alternative to using police personnel. It was felt that this would prevent citizens from feeling pressured into giving favorable responses to the police. The surveys had to be completed prior to opening the Community Center. This was done to prevent experimental programs from influencing the citizens' answers on the survey. Near the end of the program, citizens were resurveyed in order to determine how the experiment had influenced their attitudes. Results indicate that their attitudes were affected positively by the TEAM.

Grant Introduction

In the midst of the above activities, grant funds in the amount of \$259,834 were obtained from the CCCJ to combat burglary as part of the Crime Specific-Burglary program. With the approval of the Departmental Crime

Control Committee, this money was applied to the TEAM Policing experiment. The funds were used for salaries, overtime, rental of the Community Center, and various items such as radios, office equipment, and an extra vehicle.

Selection of Personnel

The TEAM members selected were a cross section of Area personnel and included uniformed, traffic and investigative officers. They were introduced to the team policing concept at a three-day seminar and presented with a management by participation concept which was to be tested during the experiment.

Additionally, they set goals for themselves and agreed on methods of achieving them. Shortly after this seminar the TEAM was deployed.

All TEAM personnel were committed to the project for its one-year term. Effective evaluation of the overall experiment was dependent upon the stability and integrity of the group for that period. One probationary officer who resigned from the Department was replaced by another probationer. A narcotics investigator returned to his pre-TEAM assignment when it was found that his speciality was best handled in the previous centralized manner. No other changes were made between February 1972 and April 1973.

Deployment

Deployment studies were conducted based on the workload of the total Area, and one-sixth of the Area personnel, 38 sworn personnel, were assigned to the experimental program in the Basic Car area of TEAM-28. The constraints upon the officers were that they remain in their area unless required to respond to emergency calls outside their area. A goal of this program was to achieve a generalist rather than a specialist police officer. It was hoped that officers having patrol, investigative and traffic expertise would influence and cross-train each other by working in a team environment. Officers would train each other in their functional specialities; thereby increasing the overall competence of each officer and the quality of his police work. In addition, officers received special training in the taking of fingerprints, an important task in assisting investigative personnel.

Community Involvement Programs

To create an environment conducive to the maximum effectiveness of the experiment, community involvement and crime prevention activities were initiated on a wide scale. A Community Center was opened on June 29, 1972. It contained lock and alarm displays as well as brochures on various law enforcement topics. For a variety of reasons discussed in the report, this

particular aspect of community involvement was not effective. It was not determined from this experiment whether other community centers in general are not effective.

A block captain program was initiated. The purpose of this program was to create a cadre of citizen volunteers who would coordinate community activities on their blocks for the TEAM. They were recruited to perform such functions as arranging coffee klatches, security inspections, and other community involvement activities. It was envisioned that a cadre of 200 block captains would be sufficient to coordinate the community involvement programs of the TEAM. Ultimately, 350 block captains were active at one time.

The coffee klatch was instituted. This was a meeting in a citizen's home, usually arranged by block captains. A relatively small number of citizens met with one or two police officers to discuss crime and the crime prevention problems related to their specific area or block. This approach to community involvement is substantially different from the Basic Car Plan meeting where citizens meet with an entire team of officers at a public facility. Normally, Basic Car Plan meetings accommodate between 100 and 300 persons, and the environment and the degree of intimacy between the public and the police is considerably different

from a coffee klatch. Because of its success, Basic Car programs throughout the City are adopting the coffee klatch format and using it extensively.

The above programs were supplemented by more conventional programs such as plain car patrolling, adjacent area coordination, juvenile coordination, and traffic enforcement. Other programs such as home security inspections, property marking, and bicycle rider education were included in the community involvement and crime prevention activities of the TEAM. They were implemented by the TEAM on a planned basis; some were continuous throughout the experimental period, and others were of shorter duration. Each program was subject to periodic evaluation and alteration based on feedback, and a few unsuccessful programs, such as the Community Center, were discontinued.

SEMINARS

Two seminars involving all of the TEAM members were conducted. The first seminar, in February 1972, was an orientation, objective setting, and participative management exercise. When reviewed after 11 months of operation, many ideas proposed at the first seminar had not been implemented. Rather, as was effectively demonstrated at the second seminar in January 1973, realistic programs and techniques were reviewed and refined.

The February 1972 seminar was a new experience for most personnel involved. They were asked how they felt regarding many established Department policies, and how such policies could be used or modified to best suit the TEAM's needs. At that point the TEAM members had no concept of TEAM needs, so a "shot gun" method was used. Any idea which could possibly be used was discussed, and many were scheduled for field testing. The results of the field testing are reported elsewhere.

At the second seminar, the TEAM members were aware of TEAM needs and discussions were more focused. There were relatively few new ideas, but many refinements to existing programs were proposed.

Introductory Seminar

As a team building exercise, the three-day introductory seminar was successful. The personnel involved were generally unfamiliar with each other, the team policing concept, and participative management theory. At the end of the seminar, officers attained familiarity with one another, gained some idea of what was expected of them, had an initial exposure to operating within a new management structure and set objectives for the TEAM.

The desirability of initial team building activities is apparent from interviews and attitude surveys; however, City-wide funding for them could present insurmountable

difficulties. This assumes an approximate \$3,000 expenditure for food, lodging and meeting rooms per TEAM, per Area, for a three-day seminar. At an average of five TEAMS per Area and 17 Areas, a sum in excess of \$250,000 would be required to conduct City-wide seminars for all TEAMS. Since the Department has a Training Division, the cost effectiveness of such an expenditure could not be justified. Therefore, unless grant funds are obtained, other ways of achieving team building will have to be found, such as conducting seminars at Training Division.

The presentation of team policing theory lends itself to a classroom situation perhaps more than a seminar. Many of the officers who attended the seminar stated when interviewed that they would have preferred a more formal presentation of the concept. Since team policing requires the adoption of new attitudes toward police work, the acquisition of these necessary attitudes cannot be left to chance as it is in the informal atmosphere of a seminar. In a formal situation, the presentation of information is structured to assure that all important concepts are adequately covered.

Officers expressed mixed attitudes when responding to questions about the seminars. Most officers felt the first seminar was beneficial. They became familiar with one another and received some idea of what was

expected of them in the ensuing months. However, officers questioned the value of some aspects, especially the MBP portion of the seminar. The desirability and feasibility of incorporating a MBP concept into police activities is discussed in the section of this report entitled Management Techniques. They felt that experimental programs were not thoroughly explained to them. Generally, they felt the seminar was a worthwhile part of the TEAM experiment.

Follow-Up Seminar

There were two major benefits which accrued from the second seminar. The morale of the men was raised significantly, and many potentially valuable programs were polished into more effective TEAM tools while ineffective ones were discarded.

A number of men had been experiencing reduced morale for many reasons prior to the second seminar. Several did not fully understand the emphasis on community programs which seemed to them to be overshadowing their perceived primary function of crime reduction. The second seminar gave the TEAM staff an opportunity to probe this problem and explain the community program goals and their desired ultimate effect on crime. These discussions were instrumental in restoring the officers' motivation to the levels which existed at the beginning of the of the experiment.

Personality conflicts were another negative morale factor. Few of the TEAM members had any previous experience working closely with the same small group of men for an extended period of time. As the personal strengths and weaknesses of the officers became known to the group, favorites and problem officers began to emerge. Since the supervisors had little experience with this type of problem, they were not well prepared to respond to this situation. The discussions regarding this problem at the seminar allowed the men to purge their feelings about one another and reduced their differences.

Overtime was another area of contention. Many officers stated during interviews that they felt they were being rated on the amount of community program overtime they worked. This topic was pursued at length during the seminar, and TEAM supervisors noted that officers' attitudes on this matter improved in the ensuing weeks.

Programs such as the Community Center and parallel patrol (see page 39 for the details of this technique) were tested by the TEAM previous to the second seminar and discarded due to critical evaluations of the personnel involved. At the second seminar, flaws in these programs were reviewed in depth and action to officially terminate them was initiated.

Conversely, the coffee klatches, block captains, security inspections and other programs received almost unanimous support. A great deal of time was devoted to streamlining and refining these programs to further increase their effectiveness.

The value of the second seminar to the TEAM was recognized by all involved personnel; however, the same fiscal drawbacks exist for follow-up seminars that exist for introductory seminars.

Regarding the value of the second seminar, the opinions of some officers were less favorable. The experiment was past the halfway point, and officers had a very good working knowledge of what they were supposed to do. Some officers felt that this seminar was more geared toward a management review of what TEAM Policing was doing rather than anything from which line personnel could profit. When the administration of the TEAM was questioned about the seminar, they had very favorable views about its value. It is therefore possible that the impressions of the men are correct. If a follow-up seminar is to be held, consideration should be given to having only supervisors and administrators attend to discuss specific problems that are occurring within the TEAM and to evaluate the success of ongoing programs. The value to the TEAM officer of the second seminar did not seem as substantial as that of the first seminar.

MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

Management By Objectives

Management By Objectives (MBO) is a management style that appears well suited for team policing. A functional application of the principle involves all levels of management defining goals in the context of individual and common areas of responsibility. The projected results assist in establishing guidelines for assessment of member contribution.

Working in concert with participative management, MBO provides the framework to assure a deeper commitment and ultimately more effectiveness.

MBO motivates subordinates to higher performance because subordinates play an active role in the formulation of their own objectives. They assist in establishing criteria for objective measurement and are afforded the opportunity to structure the job toward the goal. The effect is a natural increase in commitment and motivation.

It is a fact that when well implemented, MBO leads to major changes. When attention has focused away from sub-goals and work patterns and is directed toward objective accomplishment, employees quite naturally begin reestablishing priorities. They spend their time

doing things that are effective, rather than being preoccupied with maintaining efficiency in tasks that may have little to do with the organization's objective.

Officer Ratings and MBO

The criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the TEAM was based on the absence of repressible crimes, injury accidents and the commitment to meet TEAM objectives.

Traditional means of measuring individual officer performance were eliminated. Arrest rates and other recap indices were no longer important. After agreement was achieved on the TEAM's overall responsibility, six-month, short-range measurable goals were established. Officers were informed that their regular six-month performance rating reports would be based on achievement of these goals.

This so-called "contract approach" of MBO was utilized wherein individuals on the entire TEAM were allowed to set their own short-range measurable goals and then devise programs that would achieve them. This was based on the concept that acceptance of responsibility is directly related to commitment to objectives, and genuine commitment is seldom achieved when objectives are externally imposed.

Management By Participation

Management By Participation (MBP) is a system of management based upon the idea that men perform to a higher standard when they have an opportunity to participate in decision-making.

MBP is on the opposite end of the management spectrum from authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is characterized by decision-making being reserved for management. Communications flow mostly downward. Supervisors set performance standards for subordinates along with selecting the methods of operation. Employees are motivated by financial rewards and threat of punishment. People are molded into the organization.

MBP is different. Line personnel participate actively in decision-making. They are called upon to set their own goals and to assist in selecting methods of operation. Communications are wide open vertically and horizontally. The theoretical result is that the employee is positively motivated because he is committed to the job. He feels himself a part of the organization, capable of making an impact on productivity and decision-making. The organization is built on the people. The basic philosophy is that no one knows the job better than the people doing it daily.

The impact MBP has had on employees has been beneficial to organizations using the system. People respond positively when their needs are considered. Their participation creates a self-respect and a sense of responsibility for the activities and goals they help to construct. Absenteeism and turnover rate have decreased in organizations where MBP has been applied, a sure indicator of employee commitment.

Obstacles to Success

Whenever an organization makes a commitment in a certain direction, the commitment necessarily limits the future adaptability of the organization. These commitments are called "sunk costs." The Department has been committed to police facilities planning that was somewhat contrary to team policing, to functional specialization, to rank and position structuring, and to rigid field policies and procedures. With the exception of the facilities planning which is discussed at length elsewhere, it is felt that the Department is very adaptable to team policing in regard to the other sunk cost aspects. Should a decision be made to effect a Department-wide adoption of team policing, the sunk cost matters should not be a serious problem.

Rank Structure and Participative Management

Those who have achieved the status of investigator sometimes believe themselves to have achieved a plateau that entitles them to special consideration. This attitude has been reinforced in the past with the added salary increments for investigative personnel. However, in the TEAM, investigative personnel did not attempt to assume superior status by virtue of their investigative assignment; rather, the characteristically higher level of experience differentiated the investigative personnel. They blended in very well with the TEAM.

Police agencies tend to be quasi-military organizations. Policemen are trained to respond to rank. In field situations there is often the need for someone to give instructions which must be instantly obeyed. There are situations which must be dealt with in a rapid manner. There is no time for discussion; rank directs. There is a basic inconsistency between this authoritarianism and MBP. There is evidence from other team policing experiments that policemen have a difficult time breaking out of the authoritarian mold. This tendency was also experienced on the TEAM. Detailed interviews with officers of the TEAM made it clear that MBP had only limited application to a police organization. It was determined that officers were often encouraged by the participative management aspects of the TEAM Crime Control

Committee. They, however, found that participative management should be totally absent from any influence in field situations where the military authority structure is necessary. To the extent that team experiments are successful in creating cross-trained, generalist police officers, MBP can increase their effectiveness in making deployment and problem-solving decisions in a committee atmosphere. Once these decisions are made, however, authoritarianism in police operations is necessary for proper functioning of a police organization even with a team concept.

The Role of Supervisors

When considering the role of supervisors of the TEAM and the application of MBP, it was noted that MBP created strains between both supervisors and officers. Neither were comfortable with MBP, and it was used very sparingly, most often only in a Crime Control Committee or at TEAM meetings where the group could discuss and resolve issues of importance to the entire TEAM.

Before the TEAM went into operation, a Position Paper was prepared outlining the goals and objectives of the TEAM Policing experiment in the LAPD. In this Position Paper the expectations of MBP were presented in detail, based on experiences obtained in other team policing experiments and the desire that it might have

some adaptability to this Department. This Position Paper is included in this report as Addendum C.

Officer Attitudes

It was found that field officers assigned to the TEAM felt responsible for the area and its policing needs, but that this was less due to the success of MBP and more attributable to the success of the teaming concept. At the seminars, officers were able to discuss innovative tactics and programs as well as set their own standards and goals. These aspects of MBP and MBO did contribute to the success of the TEAM experiment.

During interviews, officers stated that, with limitations, MBP could be a viable technique for the Police Department. However, they unanimously felt that on a day-to-day basis, it was not a technique that should be employed by the Police Department.

Many of the original problems that the TEAM encountered in its first month of operation could be traced to officers' resistance to MBP. An example of this phenomenon was in the roll call situation. Both the administration of the TEAM and the TEAM members decided at the first seminar that roll calls were not necessary due to the small number in the group. TEAM personnel felt that MBP would cause an information exchange about problems, wanted suspects, and routine

administrative matters. The officers were to do this on their own initiative, and roll calls would therefore not be necessary. Very shortly after the TEAM began operation, many complaints were received from the officers and supervisors regarding the roll call situation. Roll calls were quickly restored assuring a more thorough and timely information flow.

Another problem arose at the first seminar. One of the techniques used to break down the rigid structure at the seminar was the adoption of calling people by their first names. This may be a good MBP tool, but it caused some significant difficulties with policemen who are used to referring to a supervisor as Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, or Commander. When first names were used, the officers were quite uncomfortable. When they returned to the business of police work, there was some carry over. Officers were not sure what degree of familiarity to use with the supervisors and vice versa. Eventually, things began to stabilize when the officers and supervisors reverted to previous formality in dealing with one another.

Aspects of MBP that officers thought highly of were: meetings with the TEAM Crime Control Committee, seminars, and group TEAM meetings where the entire TEAM was present to discuss a situation.

In Crime Control Committee situations where the views of all individuals concerned are looked upon as important, MBP is effective. The officers, sergeants, and investigators meeting in a Crime Control Committee situation were interested in solving problems and did not mind relinquishing some badges of authority to make the Committee effective.

It was discovered that MBP can be effective for team building and problem solving. Beyond these two factors the authority structure of a police organization should remain intact. Officers can then function most effectively in the field free from any implication that they can participate in a command field decision.

CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANT

In the fall of 1971, the Department applied for grant funds available under the California Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ) Crime Specific-Burglary Program. A grant was received and funding commenced for a Crime Specific-Burglary project on June 1, 1972, augmenting the TEAM Policing experiment. The TEAM project started officially on April 1, 1972 and the merger of the TEAM Policing project and Crime Specific-Burglary took place June 1, 1972. Due to delays in starting the grant program, both programs continued until June 30, 1973.

The original grant award to the City was \$259,843. Of this amount, \$208,073 had been expended by the time the grant expired. The remaining \$51,770 was returned to CCCJ. The bulk of the \$208,073 was spent on community involvement and overtime programs. The remaining amounts were spent on equipment and operational items. A breakdown of the use of overtime hours is included in Addendum E.

Crime Specific overtime, was one of the most disliked aspects of TEAM Policing. There were a few policemen who did appreciate receiving the money. However,

most objected to only receiving money and not compensatory time off. The Crime Specific overtime was almost entirely used to further community programs to which many of the officers were only partially committed. Therefore, it was a type of double jeopardy. Officers were asked, if not urged very strongly, to participate in these activities. The overtime was a type of coercion to which officers were subjected. If they did not avail themselves of it, they were subject to criticism in their rating reports by supervisors. Crime Specific overtime probably generated more morale problems and officer disenchantment with TEAM Policing than any other portion of the project. Almost every officer felt that Crime Specific overtime could be discontinued and every other aspect of TEAM Policing would continue to function well without it. It was the recommendation of almost everyone concerned that any future team policing programs be designed with little or no overtime.

The programs for TEAM operation and community involvement incorporated in the Crime Specific-Burglary grant are discussed in the report.

TEAM OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

A major element of team policing which appears to be desirable is that of flexibility. This flexibility was designed into the experiment by the LAPD's Crime Control Committee in mid-1971. It was intended that deployment procedures, patrol techniques and equipment utilization would, wherever possible, be decided upon by the TEAM administration and the TEAM members. The only constraint placed upon the TEAM was that all efforts generally remain within established Department policy. Within this loose framework, the TEAM was very successful in adjusting their deployment to handle any particular problem. For example, if there was a night watch burglary problem, a very heavy night watch was deployed. This type of deployment, although it is possible in a geographic Area, is not as likely to occur as it is in a small team group where spontaneous decisions can be made and implemented.

The men themselves were responsible for many of the techniques used. When they observed a problem, they would take it to the Crime Control Committee within the TEAM. This Committee was made up of an investigative supervisor, a uniformed supervisor, and one or more of the

policemen in the TEAM. They would discuss the problem and endeavor to formulate the best solution. Many times they utilized stake-outs, and frequently they were successful in apprehending the suspect involved. They experimented with other patrol techniques, some of which were not useful in their particular area, such as tandem or parallel policing.

There was moderate flexibility concerning equipment used by the TEAM. They were given new 1972 American Motors Corporation Matadors with two radio receivers and in some cases three receivers. They were also given walkie-talkie units through the CCCJ grant which the officers used very effectively on many of their stake-outs. They were the rechargeable type and were kept in the TEAM office in a charger ready for use when needed. Honda motorbikes were purchased with grant funds but were seldom used, again due to the relatively low frequency of burglaries where the officers felt this type of patrol would be effective.

Interviews with TEAM personnel on the general topic of team policing determined that from their viewpoint the technique as a police tool was a useful one. They felt that it enabled them to achieve many things that a more formal patrol approach would not allow.

One major complaint of the officers was their impression of being over deployed in the TEAM area. In discussions with the administration of the TEAM, it was felt that this was not so. However, many of the men who had previously worked the area stated that it was often patrolled only by the assigned Basic Car, and almost no assigned "X" cars or Traffic units stayed in the TEAM area since it had such a low crime rate. The area deserved a certain number of units but prior to the TEAM experiment, they were not remaining in the area. There were areas within Venice Area that had a much higher crime rate, and officers tended to go to those areas to improve their arrest recap and satisfy their supervisors. The over-deployment problem, as interpreted by the officers, created some morale problems, especially at the inception of the program. Many of the men involved were aggressive young officers who were not used to having to work hard to come up with an arrest. This problem abated somewhat toward the end of the experiment when the community relations activities were fully developed and the officer's time was spent in these activities as well as in crime repression.

In contrast to the above problems was the officers' very positive attitude regarding being forced to remain in an area. Although paradoxical, they felt that having

"TEAM-28" stencilled on the side of the cars and being required to remain within the TEAM area was an advantage for this type of program. They would have preferred to have been required to remain in a more active area, but felt that the TEAM program definitely caused officers to take interest and pride in the work they were performing within a small area.

The assignment of relatively large groups of men to an area previously less policed resulted in other problems. Officers stated that there were personality clashes that caused some degree of internal friction within the TEAM. Reasons for this were rather hard to ascertain. One possible reason could have been that officers' shortcomings or advantages were relatively obscured when not working in a TEAM environment. Problem officers were often assigned to the jail or desk duties and thus eliminated as Area problems. The TEAM required very close association among all of its officers. Personality traits were readily apparent to everyone involved. Cliques formed, and there was some polarization separating those officers who were community relations oriented from those who were more aggressive and arrest oriented. Toward the end of the experiment this dichotomy diminished as officers became aware of some of the positive benefits that arose from community activity.

The officers involved in the experiment were restricted to the TEAM for its duration. Several officers who were eligible for advancement to Policeman III were therefore unable to promote. This generated some morale problems; however, if TEAM Policing were expanded to an Area-wide or City-wide basis, promotion mobility would be returned to the teams.

A communications problem developed during the experiment between Venice Area officers and the TEAM. TEAM officers' felt that the men of the Area had a low view of their activities and that Area officers had little understanding of what the TEAM was actually trying to accomplish. There was a physical separation between the TEAM and Venice Area. The TEAM was housed in a building adjacent to the Area station. TEAM and Area officers did not share the same locker rooms or the same roll calls. When team policing is expanded this problem should not occur since the entire station will be operating on a TEAM basis. Good communication between officers and supervisors should be emphasized in new TEAM operations to assure that such problems do not arise.

Training Needs

The TEAM experience impressed upon many of the TEAM members the need for a continuing thorough training

program in all areas. There are many areas where the activities of the Training Division could be changed to produce a policeman more suited to team policing.

The investigative personnel stated that the patrol supervisors, who were required to give booking approvals on the PM and AM watches, when the investigative personnel were not present, were not adequately knowledgeable to handle this task. At Sergeant's School more attention could be paid to this role of patrol supervisors, especially if TEAM Policing is expanded.

The cross training should be expanded at the Training Division level. This could be done during an in-service school.

Another area involved was that of public speaking. In the Basic Car Plan not every officer in the division is required to speak at a Basic Car meeting, but when coffee klatches are held, essentially every officer on the TEAM becomes a public speaker at one time or another. Many officers felt that their training in this area was weak and felt that Training Division could improve the public speaking ability of officers in the Department.

SPECIALIZED PATROL EXPERIMENTS

Tandem and Parallel Patrol

Tandem and parallel patrol techniques were employed during a two-month trial period. Officers involved complained that both methods were awkward and an inefficient use of manpower. Too many continuing problems were encountered to warrant further experimentation.

Parallel policing basically involved splitting an "A" car (2-man unit) into two one-man units. Units patrolled either one behind the other with a slight gap or on parallel streets going in the same direction. The men felt that this program was unacceptable for technical reasons. Radio communications were restricted to tactical frequencies for this type of operation, and the use of these frequencies was often unavailable to them. They felt this jeopardized their safety and also made the program unwieldy. There was often not enough activity to keep the two separate cars occupied and officers felt this was a waste of their time. Further, it required borrowing cars from the rest of the Area and would not be a feasible use of equipment if expanded. The program was discontinued after approximately two months.

Bicycle Patrol

Bicycles were used to patrol high frequency burglary areas. The bicycles were quiet and allowed officers to cover a large area without experiencing fatigue; however no arrests were made as a result of their use.

Motorbike Patrol

TEAM-28 experimented with plainclothes motorbike patrol as a method of burglary suppression. Two Honda motorbikes (50 c.c.) were used on approximately 30 occasions by patrol and investigative personnel to patrol high frequency burglary areas.

The officers reported several advantages. The area patrolled consisted mainly of apartment units with alleys in the rear. The officers, using tandem patrolling methods were able to cover the entire area thoroughly for several hours with little fatigue.

The motorbike was extremely quiet, allowing officers to patrol at the rear of apartment houses without disturbing the occupants or alerting possible suspects of their presence. The officers reported that visibility was much improved over automobile patrol.

The Honda motorbike is extremely maneuverable and easy to ride. Little expertise is required to ride the vehicle. A maximum speed of 25-30 miles per hour

is attainable. The motorbike is economical to operate. One gallon of gasoline is enough fuel to operate the vehicle for approximately 100 miles. No injuries or mechanical difficulties were encountered.

One disadvantage was also reported. The officers found that area residents were able to identify them as the police after several hours of patrol.

No arrests were made as a result of this patrol. However, this method might be a good tactic when a very definite burglary problem manifests itself. Further testing of bicycle and motorbike patrols will be necessary to determine their effectiveness.

Decoy Black and White Vehicles

Another patrol technique which was discussed, but never utilized, was a decoy black and white. Its designed use was for traffic problems in a small area. It was planned to park an old black and white police vehicle from Motor Transport Division on a block and move it occasionally so that it would appear it was an active unit. This technique was never used since there were no observable traffic problems in the area.

SPECIAL SURVEILLANCE

"Bird Dog"

"Bird dog" surveillance of known suspects and receivers involved a special team of plainclothes officers who

were deployed to develop up-to-date intelligence files through surveillance of addicts and burglars. Much of this information retained its value through the term of the project.

The surveillance of one known burglar led a TEAM investigator trainee, working in liaison with Santa Monica Police, to the arrest of a suspect who had committed 37 burglaries. His "fence" was also arrested.

Surveillance

The TEAM periodically redeployed to conduct undercover stake-outs for targeted suspects. Two such stake-outs netted five cat burglars who had been operating in two separate groups in the area. TEAM administrators stated surveillance techniques would have been more productive in the early stages of the experiment if the officers had received special training in surveillance activities.

Truancy Patrol

Due to manpower restrictions the TEAM did not deploy special truancy patrols. However, day and night watch patrol officers maintained close liaison with TEAM area junior high and grammar school officials. Procedures for truant subjects included the completion of a Field Interview Card on each subject who was released

after interview. The information as to the truant's identification and the time and location of the field interview was subsequently forwarded to the subject's school for disposition. Unless an aggravated situation existed, no physical arrests were made for truancy violations. The majority of truancy violations occurred among junior high school students who were bussed in from other sections of the City. An officer from the TEAM was also assigned as school liaison officer for truancy problems. This program was enthusiastically received and appears worthy of further consideration.

IMPROVED INVESTIGATION

Use of Uniform Personnel for Investigative Support

Sufficient investigative personnel (5) were available to handle investigation case loads. Investigative support was provided by uniform officers.

The TEAM initiated an ongoing program that provided each uniform and motor officer training within the investigative section for at least one week. This program was required by the TEAM in order to increase the field officer's awareness of and proficiency in investigative functions.

The cross training between investigative and the uniform personnel was considered a very positive part of the TEAM effort. The men felt that by spending a week with

an investigator and performing his duties, they were better able to understand the specific needs of investigators. When they returned to their normal uniform patrol duties, their efforts at report writing, follow-up investigations, and more thorough preliminary investigations generally provided the investigator with a more usable report. Officers also received an understanding of the judicial process from initial filings through preliminary hearings and trials, and understood the significance of thorough initial investigations and report writing.

Investigative supervisors noted that report writing among field officers had improved in quality, due in part to the physical proximity of the two groups.

Fingerprint Training

Another type of training that officers received at the beginning of the program was latent print training by Scientific Investigation Division (SID). The entire TEAM was trained in lifting latent prints, and each unit carried a SID print kit within the vehicle. When the officers first started taking prints, it took considerable time. However, very shortly they were able to have one man doing the interviewing and investigation, while the other officer was lifting latent prints.

They found it did not increase the overall time required to take a report more than five to ten minutes. Several good latent prints were lifted by TEAM members which resulted in arrests. Every officer and supervisor interviewed felt that this program was a very good technique and recommended training of this nature be commenced at the Training Division recruit level and be adopted on a City-wide basis. They suggested that SID experts be retained not only for teaching, but to handle high grade felonies, officer-involved shootings, and anything beyond a routine nature. They felt that any officer with a minimum amount of training could be taught to lift quality latent prints.

Intensified latent print training of all TEAM uniform, investigative and motor officer personnel increased the quantity and quality of latent print lifts during preliminary investigations. An audit of the Latent Print Section revealed that TEAM officers were gradually becoming more selective in lifting prints and their aptitude had increased. An average of only seven extra minutes were used when prints were taken during preliminary investigation of a burglary crime scene. Earlier in the program, officers averaged an additional 12 minutes per investigation.

SID has indicated its pleasure in the increased proficiency of TEAM officers in fingerprinting noting that fewer worthless "lifts" meant less time and labor for their employees. Even though TEAM officers remained public relations conscious, they had become discretionary in submitting prints to SID, explaining to crime victims that questionable or worthless prints were not helpful nor were they in anyone's best interest. At least eight suspects were identified as a result of prints taken by TEAM officers.

LIAISON WITH PROBATION AND PAROLE DEPARTMENTS

Numerous positive contacts with correctional authorities resulted in good working relationships between them and TEAM-28.

One example of this liaison was the California Youth Authority's reassignment of all cases in the TEAM area to a single parole officer who maintained constant contact with TEAM-28. He made information regarding the activity of his charges available to officers, who in turn, notified him of any arrests or pertinent contacts with parolees.

TRAFFIC PROGRAMS

The position of traffic coordinator was created in order to assure high-quality traffic reports and to

provide centralized training of all TEAM personnel. Since all TEAM-28 members took reports and investigated accidents, it was felt that an internal, ongoing training program was vital.

Traffic Accident Investigations

The quality of traffic accident reports completed by TEAM officers was improved. This can be related to two different factors.

1. Training: There was a unique and workable method of officer training employed in the TEAM project. When a traffic accident report was completed by an officer, it was taken directly to the traffic coordinator for correction. If necessary at that time, the officer received personalized training directed towards his individual shortcomings. Therefore, the need for formal roll call training on traffic was almost totally absent.

Officers assigned to the PM or AM watches left their traffic accident reports for the traffic coordinator to correct the following morning. If a correction was necessary, the report was returned to the officer with a written explanation of his error and the corrective steps required.

2. Report Auditing: The above activity was not only good for training purposes, but allowed the coordinator to make an "audit" of all traffic accident reports to better understand the TEAM's traffic problems.

The traffic auditing function of the TEAM resulted in a less than one percent return rate on all traffic accident reports. The overall City return was over four percent.

FOLLOW-UP FUNCTION

The traffic coordinator conducted follow-up on 40 traffic accidents reports. Ninety-eight percent of these were for hit-and-run. The coordinator was able to identify the hit-and-run driver in 62 percent of the cases, about ten percent higher than the City-wide average.

Out of a total of approximately 500 traffic accident reports completed between April 1, 1972 and May 15, 1973, the TEAM averaged a 25 percent filing rate, including follow-up filings. This contrasts favorably to the 1972 City-wide filing rate average of 17 percent.

DEPLOYMENT

The deployment of TEAM officers for traffic enforcement purposes was unnecessary. TEAM traffic accident statistics showed no specific problems regarding traffic

accident locations. Therefore, there was no need for specific traffic deployment.

Motorcycle officers were deployed on various thoroughfares. Few complaints were received; consequently motorcycle officers were seldom deployed to specific locations.

CITATIONS

The number of citations written by TEAM officers was similar to the number written by officers in the remainder of the City. TEAM citations were written at various locations and times with no specific emphasis on a particular violation.

TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT LIAISON

The coordinator established liaison with the West Los Angeles traffic engineers. In the past, requests for engineering improvements were forwarded through Police Department channels. It was usually difficult for the officers to learn whether their suggestions were acted upon.

When officers made reports regarding engineering defects, the coordinator hand-carried them to the traffic engineers to assure adequate explanation. This approach was accepted by the engineers.

The coordinator gave the engineers ten requests for corrections. He was advised by engineers that they would make their study of the problem and then act accordingly. There was no communication from the engineers to TEAM-28. Unless officers observed improvement, they were totally unaware of any dispositions. There is a need for better communication between the lower echelons of these two departments.

SCHOOL PROGRAMS

A school program was developed by the TEAM traffic coordinator which eventually touched every elementary school-age youngster in the area. Traffic safety was stressed during initial rounds of visits to nursery schools, elementary schools, and junior high schools. Next, an anti-crime program was added which explained to youngsters how they could assist TEAM-28 in crime prevention efforts. Numerous parents first became aware of the TEAM project in this manner.

Discussions were held on "How to Spot a Burglar," "What to Do in the Event the Student Observes a Burglary in Progress," and "How to Call the Police and What to Say to the Policeman on the Phone in the Event of Emergencies."

This program was presented to the students of all the elementary schools, public and private, in the TEAM area.

It is estimated that the TEAM coordinator spoke with approximately 2,400 children between the ages of three and one-half and twelve.

A different program was developed for the students of the junior high schools in the area. Meetings were held with the student governments of these schools. It was proposed that a "bicycle rodeo" be created as a positive approach to traffic safety. This "bicycle rodeo" would also include aspects of burglary and theft prevention. The coordinator established the basic guidelines for these programs.

The students of the junior high scheduled a day for licensing all bicycles on campus. Students were trained on LAPD bicycle licensing procedures. When this training was completed, the students licensed approximately 100 bicycles without making a single error.

Next they were taught how to examine a bicycle for safety features. These students conducted bicycle safety inspections and a written examination for students wishing to enter the "bicycle rodeo".

Students who passed the written examination and had their bicycles inspected as safe and licensed were allowed to enter the rodeo. Over 400 students participated in this rodeo; ribbons were donated by

TEAM-28, and prizes were given out by the Parent/Teacher Association (PTA). A display of security devices was set up at the rodeo. TEAM-28 and burglary prevention literature was passed out to the student body. Approximately 800 students were contacted at this one particular event.

The coordinator was involved in the PTAs and School Advisory Councils within the TEAM area. He remained available to these schools for appearances as a speaker and as a police advisor.

When patrol officers observed a juvenile commit a traffic violation, the violator was stopped, admonished, and identifying information obtained. This information was turned over to the traffic coordinator who then wrote a letter to the juvenile violator's parents as well as his school.

This program could be a valuable tool in the area of police-juvenile relations, overall reduction of juvenile violator-involved traffic accidents, as well as a positive community relations effort. However, it failed because officers were unwilling to stop juvenile traffic violators merely for a verbal warning.

ATTITUDINAL SURVEYS

DEVELOPMENT OF ATTITUDINAL SURVEYS

A multipurpose attitudinal survey was developed to assess the community position on their concern over crime, their willingness to get involved and call the police, the amount of confidence they have in law enforcement, and their perception of their role in law enforcement. In addition, a survey was designed to assess the officers' involvement and commitment to their job. One survey was designed to be given both to the police and the community, with the exception that two additional sections concerning management practices and officer pride were included in the police section of the survey.

A seven-point scale (four being neutral) was selected rather than the more common five-point Likert scale because the seven-point scale was more responsive to subtle changes of attitude. The mean and standard deviation were the statistical measures used to analyze and compare responses to questions. The management section of the police survey was the only part of the survey instrument that did not use a Likert-type scale, but listed five answers to the questions ranging from "authoritarian" to "participative management."

The questions themselves were generated in brainstorming sessions involving police officers, some of whom had worked Venice Area, and civilian employees of the Department, using a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and a book entitled The Human Organization by Rensis Likert, as the main source material.

The entire range of police activity from service calls to major felonies was covered in the survey questions. Generally there were only one or two questions on any particular topic since interest was of a general nature. The survey instruments are included in Addendum B.

TEST MARKETING THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The test marketing was carried out in order to refine or eliminate questions in the survey. The statistical tools utilized for this task were the mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficient. Questions which showed a very small range of response, as determined by examination of their means and standard deviations, were reviewed to make sure the questions were not channeling responses in a particular direction. Questions that had an abnormally high frequency of "don't know" or "have no opinion" answers were eliminated as providing little or no useful information. Finally, where several questions on the same topic showed a high correlation between their answers, some of the questions were dropped to reduce the overall length of the survey.

The actual test marketing was conducted with several hundred sworn personnel from Central Area and West Los Angeles Area. Uniform, traffic, and investigative personnel were involved. The administration of the test took approximately two weeks.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE FINAL FORM OF THE SURVEY

The police and community surveys were given at the beginning of the project and again near its end. The first police survey was given before the officers were selected for the TEAM, and the first community survey was given prior to public announcement of the project. One other survey was given to the TEAM members shortly after they knew of their selection. This was done to examine any "Hawthorne" or "halo" effect resulting merely from the fact that these men knew they were selected and under evaluative examination.

The initial community survey was administered by a group of TEAM officers and citizens of the community. The final task before administration of the survey was to assign administrators in such a way as to maximize the chances for a representative sample of respondents. In preparation for this, both the 14A28 TEAM and the 14A34 Basic Car areas were examined block by block. From this a precise picture of the area was developed relative to types of structures, economic levels, and modes of living. Using this first-hand information and census tract data, survey administrators were assigned areas to canvass.

The answers on the individual surveys were coded on punch cards and then analyzed for the average answer to each question and the standard deviation for that answer. This enabled two statements to be made about the responses to each question: where the average community member stood regarding the particular issue being questioned, and the degree of grouping around the average response. See Addendum B.

Effectiveness of Surveys

The design, test marketing, administration, and analysis of the surveys was quite labor intensive and time consuming. When viewed in light of the results obtained, the surveys were probably not cost effective.

In the future, if attitude measurement is deemed necessary, it appears advisable to use commercially available survey instruments and hire outside administrators. This would be a desirable use of grant funds.

COMMUNITY ATTITUDE SURVEYS

Community attitude surveys were administered in the test and control area prior to the inception of the TEAM and then again during the last month of TEAM operation. The survey had three major parts. The first part dealt with the citizen's conception of the problems in his area. There were 14 questions ranging from pornography to narcotics; from lack of community support for law enforcement to citizen involvement in community problems.

In the first section of the test, there was little change from the first survey to the second survey. Within the control group, a change in the respondents' attitudes on robbery was observed. Citizens in the control area seemed to feel that they were experiencing a robbery problem to a significantly greater degree than they indicated when the first survey was given.

For the first section of the survey in the TEAM area, most answers correspond from the first survey to the second. However, in the two key areas of community support for law enforcement and citizen involvement in law enforcement, citizens indicated that there was more community support for law enforcement and more citizen involvement in community problems after the experiment than prior to it. The TEAM area consistently rated burglary as its greatest problem, followed in importance

by speeding cars. Citizens of the control area rated burglary and speeding cars highly, but robbery exceeded both.

The second section of the survey concerned the degree to which the citizen would be willing to become involved in crime prevention. In this section of the test, the responses from the control area for the final test were essentially identical with those of the first survey. The deviation was very slight. They, in almost all cases, indicated that they were willing to participate if called upon.

In the TEAM area, there were some shifts from the first survey to the second survey. Most notable was citizen awareness of crime problems that affected the immediate community. They not only felt they were significantly more aware of their problems, but there was more agreement on the awareness. They also acknowledged that it was important to attend Basic Car Plan or coffee klatch meetings. In another part of the second section a positive change was noted; the citizens' willingness to summon the police if they observed something suspicious. The shift was fairly small, but agreement on this subject was significantly greater than the first survey.

The third section surveyed citizens' attitudes towards the police themselves and how the police and citizens

interact. A typical question was, "Has public support for the police been on the increase?".

In the third section of the survey, the control area showed no significant changes. Apparently there was some spillover of the community awareness because citizens indicated they knew better how to protect their property than they did when they were surveyed a year and one-half earlier. They also felt that the police were receiving more backing from the community. Another follow-up response in the control area indicated that the police were generally more willing to try all methods available to find solutions to the citizens' problems.

In the TEAM area, for the third section of the survey, many changes were noted. Most significantly, in response to the question concerning whether public support for the police was increasing or decreasing, citizens felt that it was increasing, and they were in strong agreement on this particular issue. The increase here was very significant. The TEAM area felt its support for the police was definitely on the increase.

Another very favorable indication of the TEAM experiment's success was shown in the question concerning police fairness and impartiality in enforcing the law. There was a definite rise in the citizens' perception of the fairness and impartiality used by policemen, and again a corresponding increase in the amount of agreement.

Probably the most dramatic change in any question on the survey occurs in the 20th question in the third section of the TEAM area survey. The statement reads, "Community Assistance is important in law enforcement and should be actively sought." In the first survey, this question was rated highly, between "I moderately agree" and "I strongly agree." However, the deviation on this particular question was moderate. In the second survey, the answer was almost identical for the citizens. They again said that they were in moderate to strong agreement with that statement. Fluctuation of the responses was almost nonexistent. The standard deviation was .09 as opposed to the previous one of 1.31. This is probably the greatest indicator that community attitudes in the TEAM area have changed that can be found anywhere in the surveys.

In summation, the results from the control area for the second survey corresponded almost exactly with the first. In a few previously mentioned areas, the people indicated a favorable attitude change toward the Police Department although this was probably due to a spillover effect to TEAM efforts.

In the TEAM area itself, there were several indicators that the TEAM was successful in reaching the community and in changing the attitude of the community toward a more favorable position regarding law enforcement.

In every area of response in the TEAM area, if there was any change, it was a positive change in attitudes. In the control area, the same was true but to a much lesser degree.

POLICE ATTITUDE SURVEYS

The police attitude survey was given three times: once prior to the selection of any TEAM members, once at the first TEAM seminar, and finally during the last month of TEAM operation.

The police questionnaire differed only slightly from the community questionnaire. There were two additional portions added to the police questionnaire. The first portion surveyed the pride that an officer had in performing various tasks, such as arresting a burglar, or writing a moving violation. The second additional portion for police officers included questions concerning management techniques. The goal of that portion of the survey was to find out what form of management the line officers perceived the Department was using.

The portion of the officer survey concerning management presented some surprises. There was a tendency of officers, at the time of their first test, to feel that police management was authoritarian with relatively little room for employee input. In questions surveying their perceptions of supervisors, officers did not portray them as being unfair but just stern disciplinarians. At the first seminar, probably due to a "Hawthorne" effect, they indicated that everything that police management did was good. There was

relatively little room for improvement in any area. Officers indicated that supervisors always listened to employees, lateral communications between investigative and uniformed personnel were outstanding, and goals were set by all levels. However, after the final survey given in June of 1973, it appears that the officers have modified their opinions of police management since the first seminar. Their latest feeling is that management is slightly less responsive and goals are being formulated at higher levels. It appears that the initial test of Venice Area in its entirety provided a good indication of what the average policeman perceives of the Department management. On the survey administered at the first seminar, there was an indication of the "Hawthorne" effect, meaning that officers tended to respond as they thought they were expected to respond. When the TEAM members had finished the experiment, their attitudes toward management again reflected their perception of authoritarianism. This is probably not critical of TEAM Policing as a whole, because the other portions of the surveys, where community interaction was explored, showed improved attitudes.

It should also be noted that attitude changes occurring as a result of experiments involving new methods of management are often imperceptible for long periods of time. This phenomenon was documented in Rensis Likert's

book, The Human Organization. It is quite likely that the TEAM was not in operation long enough prior to the final attitude survey to reflect significant attitude changes toward management.

In the section of the police survey that was identical to the community survey, officers indicated little change from any previous testing. A major difference in this section was their rating of the significance of burglary lower than in any previous survey. This is undoubtedly due to the effect they had on burglary.

Another area of importance was the police attitude toward community involvement. Officers indicated that there was an increase in community involvement and commitment to assisting law enforcement. The officer attitudes at the culmination of the TEAM Policing experiment were surprisingly similar to those of test area citizens. This was a desired goal at the inception of the TEAM, and it was achieved.

Further supportive evidence of a positive Police-Community interaction was a marked increase in citizen originated letters of commendation. Conversely, a marked decrease in personnel complaints was experienced. See Addendum F.

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS

BACKGROUND

Basic Car Plan programs, in many of the geographic Areas of the Department not yet involved with team policing, currently use a block captain to arrange their home meetings and quarterly Basic Car meetings. This use of the concept, however, does not involve a formal creation of a block captain. Persons are simply asked if they would like to be a block captain and then told what to do without being given any identification or official status other than as a concerned citizen. This seems to be successful, although it is too early to evaluate the program. Basic Car Plan evaluators are allowing as much flexibility as possible in this program to learn more about its long-term effectiveness. It may be an alternative to the kind of block captain program that was utilized by TEAM-28.

The TEAM can take credit for the rapid spread of the somewhat modified block captain concept to many other Basic Car programs throughout the City. Word of its success has spread rapidly and the extent to which it is used is testimony to the merit of the program. In the future, citizen volunteers, whom we now call block captains, will probably figure prominently in the police/citizen relationship.

Citizens of Palms-Mar Vista placed their good faith and trust in TEAM-28 and seemed to be convinced that the TEAM was not a one-shot community relations effort. They accepted the TEAM's presence and took pride in referring to "our TEAM-28." Residents became more than just observers. They became "doers."

The Bureau of Criminal Statistics reports that 50 out of 1,000 crimes in the TEAM area were cleared by citizen assistance. The State average was seven in 1,000. Residents were quick to respond to any crisis. They have disseminated crime information and have come forth with various donations of goods and services.

Most of all they put a new trust in their police and believed what they said. One citizen was so impressed by TEAM-28's program that he remodeled his home, removing louvered windows, hollow-core doors, and numerous substandard locks. During follow-up inspections he was asked by a TEAM officer if the remodeling was a result of the home inspections. "Absolutely," the resident replied, "you guys said to do it, so I did."

Block captain and coffee klatch programs are characteristic of a new approach to police/community relations. Chief Davis has referred to the five "frontiers" of law enforcement which include the Basic Car Plan as a people-to-police program, the Neighborhood Watch as a

people-to-people program, TEAM Policing as a police-with-the-police program, the participative management concept to improve the relationship of police-to-their-supervisors, and the joining of the criminal justice principals in police-to-the-criminal justice system.

The first three items integrally involve Basic Car meetings, coffee klatches, the neighborhood watch, block captains, and the team policing concept with its participative management aspect. These new frontiers in police work were interwoven throughout the operation of the TEAM Policing experiment in Venice Area. Clearly, these programs are the police management concepts of the future and will be modified to exist in some form for a very long time to come. See Addendum D.

SECURITY TECHNIQUES

Residential Inspections

In compliance with its grant contract commitment, the TEAM conducted a massive home security inspection program, visiting each of the approximately 9,000 residences in the TEAM area.

Originally, it was thought that results similar to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department would be experienced, i.e., less than a five percent compliance rate with security improvement recommendations.

However, an audit showed a much higher rate. Locksmiths have indicated as much as a 50 percent increase in security hardware sales since the program began. Over 1,000 homes (approximately 11 percent of all those inspected) were randomly surveyed to test resident compliance with security recommendations. Nearly 53 percent complied in some degree, and another three percent indicated they intend to comply. The following chart gives a breakdown of citizen compliance with the home security inspection program.

<u>Complied to Some Degree</u>	<u>No Compliance</u>	<u>Intend to Comply</u>	<u>Money Spent</u>
550	423	39	\$18,735

The opinions of the TEAM officers and the TEAM administration about security inspections varied a great deal. Most of the policemen seemed to feel that the security inspections were of limited value. Coordinators for the various sectors, where the security inspections were conducted, felt that from a hardening of the target point view, the security inspections did not significantly affect the burglary problem. However, they felt that door-to-door contact with almost all the citizens in the area was beneficial to community relations, whether or not it resulted in a reduction of burglaries. This conflict of opinion does not necessarily have to be resolved on a program basis. If reviewed on

a cost benefit basis, it appears to be a very expensive program weighed against the achievement of dubious results. The Police Department certainly must concern itself with community relations, but by the same token it appears that many other programs involved in TEAM Policing are most cost effective than security inspections.

Business Security

In compliance with pre-stated Crime Specific project goals, anti-burglary security inspections were made by the TEAM of all area businesses. The business inspections were conducted by an officer assigned to a foot beat within the commercial area. A total of 492 businesses were originally contacted by the inspecting officer with most accepting advice and recommendations.

During the last two weeks of April 1973, a compliance survey of 125 businesses was undertaken. It revealed the following:

1. Eight percent complied with all recommendations. (Recommendations included all lock installations, window modifications, landscape alterations, procedural changes, etc.).
2. Twenty-two percent indicated they were in the process of complying or intended to comply.
3. Seventy percent of those surveyed had not complied, and gave no indication that they would.

Most persons in the latter group stated they were content with their current security devices and since their insurance would compensate them for any loss, security precautions represented only an additional expense. However, many were concerned about residential safeguards and expressed interest in applying recommendations to their homes.

Security Hardware Training

All TEAM personnel were trained to evaluate and recommend security devices. Special training days were held early in the program to familiarize personnel with various locks, alarms, building hardware, and other devices. "Practice" house inspections were held to familiarize officers with all aspects of residential security (e.g., shrubbery too near windows, poor lighting, and poor visibility of neighboring houses, etc.).

Hardware Displays

Business and residential security displays were placed in the Community Center. TEAM personnel were also equipped with portable kits containing security devices which they displayed at community meetings.

It is suggested that the development of a trailer containing security devices, which could serve the entire City, would be more beneficial than a permanent display location such as the Community Center.

An audit of all locksmiths and hardware stores in the area established that the security program was paying unexpected dividends. Nearly all purchasers specifically mentioned the TEAM when purchasing their new locks, alarms, doors, etc.

Insurance Reduction Plan

Several attempts were made to gain insurance rate reductions for homeowners complying with security recommendations. Insurance companies were approached with burglary reduction crime statistics indicating that the TEAM area was more secure and therefore less expensive to insure. Executives balked, however, stating that it would be necessary to provide at least a five-year data base for them to offer rate reductions.

Security Legislation

The TEAM and Public Affairs Division have been instrumental in promoting a City security ordinance which would require new buildings to incorporate better security measures. One TEAM officer established liaison with City Councilmen which resulted in a legislative proposal embodying many desirable features. The draft proposal is included as Addendum H.

Improved Street Lighting

A program was developed through the Los Angeles City Department of Water and Power through which citizens and businesses could have "snap on" lights placed on existing power poles for \$4.00 per month. Citizens were frequently advised of this opportunity to inexpensively gain added security. The Department of Water and Power noted a sharp increase in the number of these installations in the TEAM area.

Alley Marking Program

With the assistance of local Boy Scout troops, an address-marking program was initiated in a densely populated, high-crime section of the TEAM area. Designed to aid officers responding to the rear of residences, the program was credited with arrests of burglary suspects on two separate occasions.

Favorable comments from officers and citizens alike were received, but the program was discontinued due to manpower constraints.

Property Marking Program

An objective of the TEAM was the abatement of burglary by cutting into the receivers' market through marking of all easily sold property.

A program was developed through which volunteer block captains performed the majority of work. TEAM officers planned and implemented a program involving the etching of an owner's California Operator's License number on all of his valuable property. Participants were given window and door stickers stating, "All property in this residence has been permanently marked for identification by the LAPD's TEAM-28."

Over one-quarter of the area residences availed themselves of the opportunity to mark their property. A problem in implementation of this program was a shortage of marking tools. Only 20 tools were requested in the Crime Specific grant. Since each resident was allowed a 24-hour loan, many willing participants were excluded due to the shortage. Public Affairs Division should study Department-wide use of this technique.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Community Center

The TEAM Community Center was located at 10458 National Boulevard, in the experimental area. It was established as a focal point for the Crime Specific-TEAM Policing Project in June 1972.

The facility was rented by the City of Los Angeles' Bureau of Right of Way and Land with grant funds. TEAM personnel completed internal construction on the 40' X 20' structure and designed and built numerous security displays. Areas were provided to accommodate TEAM meetings and community gatherings.

The Center's opening was given press coverage in eight newspapers and most major television stations. Many local residents and nearly all community groups (e.g., chambers of commerce and homeowner associations) were active in welcoming the TEAM to the area.

Initial response from the community was enthusiastic. Visitor attendance averaged over 60 per day for the first six weeks. Thousands of inquiries regarding home security were answered, and the TEAM's community mobilization efforts were enhanced by the presence of the Center.

In the fall of 1972 an attendance drop was noted. An audit of visitors by time of day resulted in shortening the hours of operation to 1600-2000 hours daily. Officers who staffed the Center worked on a volunteer basis and were paid from Crime Specific overtime funds. The monotony of "Community Center duty" was relieved by shortening duty hours and introducing the incentive of paid overtime.

A publicity decline, while detrimental, was not the sole reason for disuse. During the period when the facility was enjoying popularity, TEAM personnel were engaged in other programs designed to mobilize area residents through continuous personal contact. As more and more residents were reached in their homes, their desire to visit the Center dwindled.

Coffee klatches, specialized anti-crime programs, and home and business security inspections served to publicize the TEAM. Attendance at the Center suffered because citizens were more responsive to other TEAM community involvement programs.

Other factors which contributed to the lack of use were the location of the Center on the perimeter of the TEAM area and the lack of parking near the Center.

Operations at the Community Center were discontinued in mid-April 1973, two weeks prior to termination of the lease period.

BLOCK CAPTAIN PROGRAM

Integral to the development of a community involvement program associated with the Crime Specific-TEAM Policing project was the development of a Block Captain Program. It was considered of utmost importance to develop a cadre of volunteers from the community to assist the

TEAM. The basic functions of the block captain were envisioned as follows:

1. The block captain was to be a liaison between the community and TEAM. He was to disseminate crime information from the TEAM to each block. This was done by TEAM mailings and by calling the TEAM's Ansaphone to obtain the latest crime incident reports for the area. Daily updates regarding community meetings and other community news of interest were made available.
2. Block captains coordinated appointments for the home security inspection program which TEAM personnel conducted. Homes and apartments were inspected, and residents were informed how they could best protect their homes, families, and property from the crime of burglary.
3. Neighborhood action was crucial to the program. Rapport had to be established between TEAM personnel and the residents of each block. Block captains on each block organized block meetings, coffee klatches, and seminars at the TEAM Community Center which helped achieve interaction between the police and the public.

4. The qualifications for block captains were simple:
 - a. An indication of desire to protect one's home and to help the neighborhood, and
 - b. That the person be a resident of the area and at least 21 years of age.

Block captains were expected to route questions of a police nature to the TEAM. It was emphasized that block captains were not policemen and should never endanger themselves by attempting to act as such. Although not policemen, they were the TEAM's representatives in the community.

Selection of Block Captains

It was envisioned from the outset of the program that block captains would be selected from the Basic Car Plan cadre, by word of mouth, or canvassing. Whenever members of the TEAM met with the community in any capacity, an effort was made to recruit block captains.

Reliability of Block Captains

Incident to selecting block captains, warrant checks and criminal records checks were customarily run on all individuals who applied. Isolated incidents were recorded where block captains, who were stopped for traffic violations, attempted to use their identification cards to "badge" themselves out of citations. Also, there were individuals who were overzealous in their

role as block captains, assuming perhaps that they were more official members of the Department than their association with the program indicated. On the other hand, there were many documented instances where the observations of block captains contributed in some way to the apprehension of a criminal.

TEAM members were not as favorably inclined toward the block captain program as they were towards coffee klatches. They felt that coffee klatches could be organized and conducted throughout the TEAM area without the block captains.

The block captains in many cases did perform a worthwhile service, but the administration of the program was rather time-consuming. Generally, it took one officer out of the field full-time. TEAM members had mixed impressions of block captains.

Recruiting over 400 block captains was time consuming. At one point in time, 350 were active. There was a moderate drop-out rate, which involved scarce police manpower in the replacement process.

The mailings were successful in communicating with block captains, but the Ansaphone was plagued with technical difficulties and was not used very often. Undoubtedly the program has merit and is being used as a community relations device in several Areas which

do not as yet have a team policing operation. Officers had mixed feelings concerning the benefits that accrued to the operation from the Block Captain Program. A few officers felt that giving citizens a quasi-police status, and allowing them to represent the Department, created a problem that was not worth the benefits derived. However, it is unquestionably true that many of the mundane tasks of organizing coffee klatches, distributing flyers, and arranging for home inspections were greatly aided by block captains. Were they not available, members of the TEAM would have had to perform these tasks.

The ultimate question as to their value probably turns on the long-term stability of such a program. In the long run, if the Block Captain Program is one which will require constant recruitment to replace those who either move or become disenchanted, then the overhead cost of administering such a program would outweigh its benefits. It is still much too early, in a one-year test, to accurately predict what kind of a realistic drop-out and turnover rate will occur in this type of program. Community meetings conducted in the TEAM experimental area during the test period did not exhaust the tolerance of the community. Future programs involving block captains would have to stand the test of public saturation with this kind of activity.

COFFEE KLATCH PROGRAM

During the development of the community involvement meetings to be used by TEAM-28, an alternative to the traditional Basic Car meeting was sought. The format of Basic Car meetings could tend to reinforce the authority figure of policemen, thus not closing the gap between citizens and police officers. Some meetings tended to be repetitive and boring. The coffee klatch was developed as a more personal, needs-oriented meeting in a citizen's home. Typically, at Basic Car meetings, the police discuss a subject of their choice. In coffee klatches the subject of discussion can be whatever the citizens were concerned about. People are more responsive in small groups and tend to get more involved. Coffee klatches reach people who might not go to Basic Car meetings, and the coffee klatch format is more flexible. The policemen face a much smaller group and tend to relax and do a more effective job of communicating. The coffee klatch format was adopted because it was geared to the more immediate problems of the area. Coffee klatches are generally more personal and could be held as frequently as every three months with the same individuals.

Citizens attending neighborhood coffee klatches became more knowledgeable and sophisticated in their approach

to crime awareness and prevention. TEAM officers had to alter their coffee klatch format in response to this change.

After a year of heavy exposure to TEAM Policing, Palms-Mar Vista residents became well versed regarding the problems confronting their community and the fact that the TEAM was coping with these problems. An awareness was created, and more citizens became anxious to push onward into more active and far-reaching police assistance programs.

New, more detailed programs should be developed. Visual aids, including slides, mobile displays, and a variety of specific, crime prevention programs could be effective. Homes of crime victims could also be used as neighborhood models of "how not to prevent crime."

The officers and investigators who were involved in the Coffee Klatch Program felt that this was a definite improvement over the former Basic Car meetings.

The attendance figures generally indicated that approximately four times as many people were reached through coffee klatches than were reached in the monthly Basic Car meetings. Another benefit of coffee klatches is that they are specifically geared to the area or block in which they are held. If there was a crime problem or traffic problem, that would be the topic of discussion.

Coffee klatch, citizen meetings are being extensively adopted by geographic Areas as their alternative to Basic Car meetings. This attests to the success attained with this program by the TEAM.

Coffee Klatch Attendance

Total Number of Meetings	316
Total Number Attending	5,683
Average Per Meeting	17.3
Average Per Month	473.6

Business Coffee Klatch

Total Number of Meetings	56
Total Number Attending	705
Average Per Meeting	12.6

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AWARENESS

Posters

Large posters with a photo of the TEAM and a message urging citizens to "Team up with TEAM-28" were distributed to all businesses and public buildings in the area. They were eye-catching and further familiarized local residents with the TEAM experiment.

Mailing and Flyers

Bi-weekly mailings to all block captains were initiated to promote and maintain their interest. A "Daily Occurrence" sheet noting all crimes in a particular area was included with pertinent messages from TEAM Sector Leaders and the TEAM Officer-In-Charge. Block captains, in turn, disseminated pertinent information through neighborhoods.

Special crime bulletins and flyers were distributed when the situation dictated. This citizen mobilization paid off on several occasions. Persons who had seen the flyers called police with information which led to arrests.

News Media

The news media gave excellent coverage to the TEAM program. The major, as well as neighborhood, newspapers covered both the project's inauguration and the opening of the Community Center. Television and radio stations aired feature stories, and national law enforcement publications carried in-depth stories.

Local media provided periodic updates on the TEAM's progress. One newspaper ran a series of articles in conjunction with the block captain recruitment program urging citizens to participate in helping TEAM-28 prevent crime.

On every occasion when assistance was requested in publicizing the program, the media was responsive. There is no doubt that this assistance saved a tremendous amount of time and effort in "getting the word out" to local residents. Further, many crime suspects and known criminals indicated that they were aware of the TEAM's presence.

Public Appearances

Public speeches were made to business groups, civic organizations, schools, churches, PTAs and local citizens at neighborhood meetings.

Special Events

A TEAM-Up Fair was conducted in June 1972 to acquaint the community with TEAM-28. Displays and demonstrations were presented, and the TEAM was able to interact with citizens of the Area. Three-thousand-five-hundred persons attended. A potluck picnic was held in October 1972 for block captains and their families.

Additionally, interested citizens were taken on tours of Los Angeles Police Department facilities such as the Police Administration Building and the Police Academy. Such tours, however, required a considerable expenditure of manpower.

Merchant Associations

Liaison was established with merchant associations in the experimental area. Many assisted the TEAM by preparing advertising material, organizing crime prevention programs in the business community, and providing channels of communications to insurance companies and other businesses.

Civic Clubs/Chamber of Commerce

Liaison was established with all civic clubs within the TEAM area. They assisted the TEAM in the development and organization of community programs and were generous in allowing the TEAM use of their facilities.

All of these methods of communicating with the public contributed to the success of the TEAM. None can be singled out as specially effective, and all of them should be considered for inclusion in the activities of new teams. Grant funds enabled TEAM-28 to try them all, whereas operational teams would probably have to narrow their choice depending on their problems.

POLICE FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION AND TEAM POLICING

With the success that has been achieved by the Team and the favorable response by the Department's command staff to the program, consideration should be given to the long-term need for a different kind of police facility built with team policing in mind.

This particular matter raises a serious question because the Department currently has an ideal station concept used as the model for police stations which are presently under construction. This plan was developed prior to the evolution of the team concept. A team policing operation should ideally have its own central headquarters area within an Area station for all personnel so that there could be close interaction between assigned investigators, uniform, and traffic officers as well as the administrative staff and supervisors. Only in this way can the maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the team organizational concept be achieved. A typical division might have six teams rather than simply two distinct functional areas: one for uniformed and one for investigative personnel. It would be ideal, under the team concept, to have between four and six areas within the station where teams could have headquarters, which would be somewhat different than the current ideal station indicates.

It is understood from discussions with the Department personnel involved in the monitoring of construction of new facilities, that they are designed with a degree of flexibility; namely, that only the administrative areas are built so that they are relatively unchangeable. Most of the other portions of the building are built with moveable partitions so that a great deal of flexibility can be introduced as changes in organization are encountered. Whether or not this kind of flexibility is sufficient for maximum effectiveness of future team operations is presently an open question. It is estimated that to properly evaluate this question would require an in-depth study of the adequacy of the current ideal station versus a building designed with team policing in mind.

Team policing could be adopted for the entire Department in a very short time, and yet it is not certain that it will continue in the future in its current form. With the present uncertainty as to Departmental adoption of team policing, it is difficult to presently contemplate a change in the ideal station concept.

To the extent that team policing shows future promise, consideration must be given to both the facilities now under construction and those contemplated to replace outdated facilities. Therefore, it is recommended that

this matter should be studied at some length so that proper facilities can be planned. They should, for the foreseeable future, meet all contingencies and allow the Department to operate in the most effective manner.

STATISTICAL EVALUATION

BACKGROUND

Before the TEAM experiment began, methods of evaluating the TEAM's performance and predicting the crime rates in the TEAM area were considered. A decision was made by the Departmental Crime Control Committee to utilize the "least-squares-trend-line" method of prediction, computed on a five-year data base of crimes from the TEAM area. Basic Car 14A28 was chosen as the TEAM or test area and Basic Car 14A34 as the control area, contiguous with 14A28. These two Basic Cars were chosen because of their similarities in their geography, demography, and crime statistics.

CONTROL AREA

At the time of the TEAM's inception, it was planned to contrast the control area to the TEAM area to assess TEAM performance. However, the control area was of extremely limited value as a comparative tool to evaluate TEAM-28. Crime in the control area dropped to a level in between the City-wide crime decrease and the TEAM crime decrease. If the crime decrease in the control area was attributed to a City-wide drop, then it must be assumed that at least a portion of the TEAM crime reduction was attributable to an overall lessening of crime. If the control area crime decrease was looked

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upon as a spillover effect of TEAM-28 efforts, then the TEAM-28 crime performance appeared greater. A logical assumption was that control area crime had dropped due to a combination of the above effects. The control area's comparative value was minimal. Establishing a control area as a means of measuring the test was envisioned as a viable technique. However, experience gained during the evaluation of TEAM-28 suggests that for an evaluation of this type of experimental program, too many exogenous factors are involved to make a control area useful.

To obviate the problem involved with the control area, a more uniform standard of measure was needed to complete the statistical evaluation. City-wide crime provides the most accurate analytical standard against which to measure crime reduction performance.

More importantly, it provides a common denominator for evaluation of future experiments and for those conducted at the same time in other areas. Different experiments compared to the same standard most accurately reflect relative performance and obviate the problem of constructing a control area with similar crime patterns, demography, and economic conditions. The entire City of Los Angeles is a macrocosm of all these and therefore a better analytical standard.

In October 1971, a five-year data base was collected from the test and control areas. Utilizing this data base, which indicated a steady increase in crime, and computing it with the "least-squares-trend-line" method, it should have been possible to predict the crime rates of the area without the TEAM's influence. The difference between the predicted crime rate and the actual crime rate should have been the effect the TEAM had on the area.

Repeating the same process in the control area and arriving at a figure which represented the difference between the predicted and the actual crime rates, it should have been possible to determine the TEAM's performance by comparing the two figures.

While, theoretically, using the "least-squares-trend-line" method was, and is, the best tool available for general predictive purposes, it is only effective if there are no major changes in the trends. Significant change in City-wide crime for approximately the past two years has been noted. This overall drop in crime, beginning in 1971, minimized the usefulness of the TEAM area five-year data base.

There exists a significant difference between crime trend predictions for the TEAM-28 area, calculated in October 1971, based on the five-year data base, and the actual data collected since that time. To continue to

use these same "least-squares-trend-line" five-year data base predictions as a measure of the TEAM's performance would distort the facts.

REVISED STATISTICAL APPROACH

Other statistical measures were sought to provide the analytical base upon which the TEAM would be evaluated. Several methods were considered; it was thought that equations of a higher order could be used to plot curves which would accurately fit the City-wide data discontinuity. LEAA-funded, systems engineering analysts from the Mitre Corporation, who are assisting the Department, were consulted. They indicated that the most effective statistical measure was either to calculate trends from the point of discontinuity or to eliminate the effect of the down trend by normalizing the data and then trending it. The latter method was the one selected because it is the most accurate statistical assessment of the true crime reduction performance of TEAM-28.

TEAM area crime data was normalized by computing a ratio of TEAM area crimes to City-wide crimes. The number of crime occurrences in the TEAM area was made a percentage of the number of crime occurrences City-wide for the time period extending from the first quarter of 1966 until the TEAM began in the second quarter of 1972. This ratio showed what percentage of overall City-wide crime was produced in the TEAM area.

It was expected that this relationship between TEAM area crime and City-wide crime would remain relatively constant and not reflect City-wide fluctuations of high and low crime levels. Theoretically, when the City experienced a decrease in crime, a corresponding decrease would be seen in the TEAM area. Therefore, the ratio of TEAM crime to City-wide crime should not change.

These ratios were plotted by quarter for the six years preceding the TEAM experiment, and then a trend line was computed using the previously discussed least squares method. Another set of percentage ratios were computed for the TEAM area compared to the City for the period during which the TEAM experiment was conducted. These ratios were plotted by quarter and least-squares-trend-lines were derived for this time frame.

By comparing the trend line derived for the pre-TEAM years to the trend line derived from the period of the TEAM experiment, the difference in the trend lines was then measured and expressed as the crime reduction or increase achieved by the TEAM. It was noted that when the six-year data base was expressed as a trend line, it did not remain a relatively constant ratio but was slowly increasing for the four repressible crimes being studied. In other words, the percentage of City-wide crimes that the TEAM area was producing had been increasing in the past six years. When the TEAM began.

a reversal of that trend was noted, and the four repressible crimes have been decreasing as a percentage of City-wide crime since the TEAM inception.

An example of this computation may help to clarify the process. In the first quarter of 1966 there were 91 burglaries in the TEAM area. In the first quarter of 1966 there were 13,132 burglaries in the City. The 91 burglaries in the TEAM area were divided by the 13,132 burglaries which occurred in the TEAM area in the first quarter of 1966. This same computation was carried out for the next 24 quarters and these numbers were then plotted on a graph.

The individual percentage numbers for the 25 quarters were computed using the least squares method, and a trend line was drawn which expressed the most representative line through the 25 data points of quarterly crime data. This line was then extended for another five quarters so that it terminated when the TEAM experiment terminated. This line ended with the percentage of .998; or, in other words, it could be expected that at the end of the TEAM experiment, if the TEAM had not been in operation, the TEAM area would have produced about one percent of the burglaries that occurred throughout the City in the second quarter of 1973.

The same computations were carried out using the data from the second quarter of 1972 to the second quarter

of 1973 and trend lines computed. The trend line end point indicated a .681 percentage. When subtracted from .998 it yielded a difference of .316 percent. This difference was then divided by the expected percentage of burglaries resulting in a 31.69 percentage reduction of burglaries from that which could have been expected had the TEAM not been in operation.

The same computations were carried out for the other repressible crimes and the injury/fatal traffic accidents for both the TEAM area and the control area.

RESULTS OF STATISTICAL EVALUATION

The TEAM crime performance measured against City-wide crime performance indicates that the TEAM was responsible for:

- (1) a 31.69 percent reduction in burglaries,
- (2) a 14.26 percent reduction in robberies,
- (3) a 12.47 percent reduction in grand theft auto,
- (4) a 20.90 percent reduction in burglary/theft from vehicle, and
- (5) a 6.35 percent increase in injury/fatal traffic accidents.

The control area was responsible for:

- (1) a 22.74 percent reduction in burglaries,
- (2) a 30.43 percent reduction in robberies,
- (3) a 13.22 percent reduction in grand theft auto,

- (4) a 3.45 percent increase in burglary/theft from vehicle, and
(5) a 31.55 percent increase in injury/fatal traffic accidents.

See Addendum A.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- "A" UNIT - A two man patrol unit, specifically assigned to police a particular geographic area (Basic Car district). Personnel assigned to "A" units are responsible for basic police services and the development of community involvement programs in the Basic Car district.
- AREA - Describes a geographic subdivision of an operations bureau. (There are seventeen city-wide.)
- AREA COMMANDING OFFICER - Police Captain III, or his designated representative, exercises line command over all personnel including patrol, investigative, traffic and civilians assigned to his Area.
- BASIC CAR - One car permanently assigned to a specific geographic district within an Area (Basic Car district). Personnel composition of the Basic Car is as follows:
- 1 Police officer III+I (Senior Lead Officer)
 - 5 Police officer III (Training Officers), and
 - 3 Police officer I (Probationary officers)
- BASIC CAR DISTRICT - A subdivision of an Area, of which there are 135 in the City. Each Basic Car district averages approximately 30,000 people.
- BASIC CAR PLAN (BCP) - A concept introduced to police operations in an effort to prevent crime and improve police/community relations. The Basic Car Plan is a means of establishing an improved relationship between the police and the community with programs of formal and informal meetings between officers and community members.

BLOCK CAPTAINS - Citizens who volunteer to represent a certain subsection of the district in which they live. These volunteers assist the team officers in establishing liaison between the neighborhood and the Basic Car or team. Other duties assigned vary with needs of each Area.

BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS - Head of the Department; five citizens appointed by the Mayor to a non-salaried, four-year term of office. This Board meets one afternoon a week to discuss police matters.

BUREAU - A major segregation, either functional or geographical, of kindred phases of activities within an office.

BUREAU COMMANDING OFFICER - Deputy Chief of Police; exercises line command over the employees of his assigned bureau.

COFFEE KLATCHES - Small, informal neighborhood gatherings evolving from the Basic Car Plan.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICER (CRO) - Lieutenant of Police whose duties include establishing, organizing and coordinating community involvement programs including booster/support groups and youth group activities.

DEPARTMENT - Describes the Los Angeles Police Department as created in section 70 of the City Charter.

DETAIL - A specific assignment of duty.

DISTRICT - Describes a portion of the Geographic Area in which a team leader accepts officer-in-charge responsibilities.

DIVISION - A functional subdivision of activities within an office, bureau, group, or Area.

DIVISION COMMANDING OFFICER - Police Captain I or his designated representative. Exercises line command over the employees of his assigned division. The terms Operations Division Commanding Officer and Headquarters or Support Division Commanding Officer, have recently been applied in Areas organized for team policing, e.g., Venice Operations Division Commanding Officer commands all geographic teams. The Venice Headquarters Commanding Officer commands specialized or centralized functions such as narcotics, homicide, desk and jail.

FIVE FRONTIERS - Established by Chief of Police, E. M. Davis, regarding the Department's goals to improve community interaction, police services, employee relations, and functions of the entire criminal justice system. (Refer to Addenda)

MILE - Multi-Media instruction for Law Enforcement. Training of police personnel through the computerized use of audio-visual equipment. (Refer to Addenda)

MOTORS - A term indicating motorcycle officers. The primary mission of these officers is traffic enforcement.

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM - Established within the Basic Car Plan structure; citizen volunteers assisting officers by maintaining a surveillance of their home, and surrounding homes, while using information and techniques provided by police officers.

OFFICE - The major functional segregation of kindred phases of activities within the Department.

SUBJECT - A term used for reporting purposes to indicate a juvenile arrestee.

SUSPECT - A term used to indicate an adult who is suspected of committing a crime.

TEAM LEADER - Lieutenant of Police. The officer-in-charge of a team.

UNIT - Used to describe a specific activity within an Area, division or section.

"X" UNIT - A two man unit, generally assigned to a
Basic Car district to assist the "A" unit.

ADDENDUM A
STATISTICS

TEAM

Crime as a Percentage of City-Wide

	<u>6-Year Trend Line</u>		<u>5-Quarter Trend Line</u>		<u>Difference</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>Begin</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Begin</u>	<u>End</u>		
459 - 28	738.05538	998.34140	755.76191	681.90481	316.43659	-31.6
211 - 28	375.58153	498.29590	392.09523	427.23808	71.05710	-14.26
GTA - 28	591.60615	742.87450	643.09523	650.23808	92.63642	-12.46
BTFV - 28	1014.98461	1044.98830	1096.42857	826.57147	218.41683	-20.901
Injury/Fatal T/A - 28	813.30153	691.25619	587.85714	738.14284	- 46.88655	+ 6.351

CONTROL
Crime as a Percentage of City-Wide

459 - 34	855.31076	1050.50280	897.04762	811.61907	238.88373	-22.739
211 - 34	258.55692	492.78760	543.52381	342.80956	149.97804	-30.434
GTA - 34	627.72000	743.14000	857.76191	644.90481	98.23519	-13.218
BTFV - 34	971.58461	1057.26830	1070.23808	1095.09518	- 37.82688	+ 3.454
Injury/Fatal T/A - 34	718.45846	444.07409	603.28571	648.71426	-204.64017	+31.545

TEAM/ALL CITY PERCENTAGE


<u>Year and Quarter</u>	<u>BURG</u>	<u>ROBB</u>	<u>GTA</u>	<u>BTMV</u>	<u>Injury Involved TAs</u>
66.1	.00692	.00260	.00634	.01071	.00992
66.2	.00711	.00440	.00611	.01230	.00980
66.3	.00860	.00438	.00696	.00959	.00708
66.4	.00654	.00251	.00745	.01044	.00756
67.1	.00913	.00739	.00589	.00965	.00927
67.2	.00722	.00312	.00785	.01257	.00671
67.3	.00787	.00126	.00251	.00774	.00643
67.4	.00786	.00359	.00580	.00976	.00929
68.1	.00814	.00510	.00487	.00903	.00743
68.2	.00761	.00370	.00586	.01115	.00598
68.3	.00904	.00492	.00668	.01160	.00798
68.4	.00772	.00363	.00553	.00673	.00675
69.1	.01047	.00379	.00514	.00984	.00704
69.2	.00732	.00362	.00575	.00825	.00607
69.3	.00885	.00567	.00971	.01087	.00945
69.4	.00863	.00441	.00809	.01125	.00806
70.1	.00738	.00492	.00651	.01112	.00653
70.2	.01033	.00737	.00654	.01008	.00704
70.3	.01066	.00680	.00749	.01106	.00654
70.4	.00747	.00272	.00720	.01024	.00663
71.1	.00941	.00319	.00799	.00854	.00738
71.2	.00952	.00394	.00833	.01275	.00602
71.3	.00863	.00559	.00698	.01081	.01014
71.4	.00963	.00464	.00602	.01001	.01044
72.1	.00938	.00333	.00595	.01076	.00516
72.2	.00515	.00492	.00733	.00921	.00633
72.3	.00616	.00400	.00709	.01096	.00854
72.4	.00776	.00308	.00455	.01062	.00669
73.1	.00891	.00573	.00731	.00891	.00407
73.2	.00577	.00352	.00657	.00723	.00899

CONTROL/ALL CITY PERCENTAGE

<u>Year and Quarter</u>	<u>BURG</u>	<u>ROBB</u>	<u>GTA</u>	<u>BTFV</u>	<u>Injury Involved TAs</u>
66.1	.00898	.00312	.00705	.00707	.00713
66.2	.00837	.00220	.00716	.01409	.00626
66.3	.00640	.00383	.00695	.00959	.00599
66.4	.00819	.00251	.00570	.01044	.00630
67.1	.00965	.00194	.00698	.00746	.00780
67.2	.00758	.00222	.00785	.01006	.00880
67.3	.00969	.00168	.00533	.00912	.00543
67.4	.00829	.00359	.00608	.01071	.00788
68.1	.01378	.00328	.00632	.01211	.00814
68.2	.01081	.00592	.00752	.01078	.00642
68.3	.00935	.00211	.00768	.01113	.00584
68.4	.00980	.00430	.00445	.00969	.00558
69.1	.00970	.00253	.00562	.00690	.00479
69.2	.00745	.00253	.00562	.00949	.00414
69.3	.00761	.00638	.00564	.00956	.00764
69.4	.00881	.00315	.00703	.00869	.00504
70.1	.00965	.00338	.00639	.01180	.00565
70.2	.01039	.00386	.00754	.01036	.00404
70.3	.00970	.00680	.00725	.00905	.00467
70.4	.00864	.00245	.00720	.00762	.00425
71.1	.00977	.00399	.00628	.01303	.00553
71.2	.00979	.00506	.00713	.01011	.00511
71.3	.01101	.00383	.00665	.01102	.00641
71.4	.01108	.00377	.00852	.01011	.00704
72.1	.00953	.00444	.00892	.01177	.00435
72.2	.00784	.00707	.00854	.00911	.00646
72.3	.00786	.00371	.00660	.01166	.00879
72.4	.00948	.00308	.00701	.00969	.00694
73.1	.00959	.00573	.00757	.01188	.00447
73.2	.00696	.00256	.00644	.01085	.00655


BURGLARY

TEAM BURGLARIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE BURGLARIES



BURGLARY


CONTROL AREA BURGLARIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE BURGLARIES



BURGLARIES


TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE

QUARTERLY 1966 THRU 2nd QUARTER 1973




ROBBERY

TEAM ROBBERIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE ROBBERIES




ROBBERY

CONTROL AREA ROBBERIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE ROBBERIES




GRAND THEFT AUTO


TEAM GRAND THEFT AUTO AS A
PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE GRAND THEFT AUTO




GRAND THEFT AUTO

CONTROL AREA GRAND THEFT AUTO AS A
PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE GRAND THEFT AUTO






**BURGLARY & THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLES
TEAM BURGLARY & THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLES
AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE
BURGLARY & THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLES**




INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

TEAM INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS





INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

CONTROL AREA INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF CITY-WIDE INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS



BURGLARIES
TEAM AREA AND CONTROL AREA



BURGLARY
TEAM AND CONTROL

QUARTERLY

YEAR	TEAM				CONTROL			
	Quarter				Quarter			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
66	91	97	121	99	118	110	90	124
67	140	100	117	126	148	105	144	133
68	133	119	146	119	225	169	151	151
69	176	115	143	146	163	117	123	149
70	127	164	179	140	166	165	163	162
71	183	182	156	180	190	187	199	207
72	183	90	109	140	186	137	139	171
73	158	92	125*	125*	170	111	140*	141*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		CONTROL	
Year		Year	
1966	408	1966	442
1967	483	1967	530
1968	517	1968	696
1969	580	1969	552
1970	610	1970	656
1971	701	1971	783
1972	552	1972	633
1973	500*	1973	562*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

BURGLARIES TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE



BURGLARY TEAM AND ALL CITY QUARTERLY

Year	TEAM				ALL CITY				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	91	97	121	99	66	13,132	13,641	14,062	15,124
67	140	100	117	126	67	15,327	13,838	14,858	16,029
68	133	119	146	119	68	16,325	15,633	16,133	15,396
69	176	115	143	146	69	16,794	15,693	16,152	16,907
70	127	164	179	140	70	17,191	15,869	16,787	18,736
71	183	182	156	180	71	19,434	19,099	18,066	18,675
72	183	90	109	140	72	19,497	17,463	17,667	18,020
73	158	92	125*	125*	73	17,718	15,942	16,830	16,830



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		ALL CITY	
Year		Year	
1966	408	1966	55,959
1967	483	1967	60,052
1968	517	1968	63,487
1969	580	1969	65,546
1970	610	1970	68,583
1971	701	1971	75,274
1972	522	1972	72,647
1973	500*	1973	67,320

*Estimated From Half Year Data

ROBBERIES
TEAM AREA AND CONTROL AREA



ROBBERY
TEAM AND CONTROL

QUARTERLY

Y E A R	TEAM				CONTROL				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	5	8	8	6	66	6	4	7	6
67	19	7	3	10	67	5	5	4	10
68	14	10	14	11	68	9	16	6	13
69	12	10	16	14	69	8	7	18	10
70	16	21	20	10	70	11	11	20	9
71	12	14	19	16	71	15	18	13	13
72	12	16	14	12	72	16	23	13	12
73	20	11	15*	16*	73	20	8	14*	14*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		CONTROL	
Year		Year	
1966	27	1966	23
1967	39	1967	24
1968	49	1968	44
1969	52	1969	43
1970	67	1970	51
1971	61	1971	59
1972	54	1972	64
1973	62*	1973	56*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

ROBBERIES TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE



ROBBERY TEAM AND ALL CITY QUARTERLY

Year	TEAM				ALL CITY			
	Quarter				Quarter			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
66	5	8	8	6	1,918	1,815	1,826	2,382
67	19	7	3	10	2,569	2,243	2,373	2,781
68	14	10	14	11	2,740	2,700	2,841	3,023
69	12	10	16	14	3,160	2,758	2,819	3,172
70	16	21	20	10	3,247	2,847	2,940	3,667
71	12	14	19	16	3,754	3,552	3,394	3,447
72	12	16	14	12	3,602	3,249	3,500	3,887
73	20	11	15*	16*	3,485	3,117	3,301*	3,301*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		ALL CITY	
Year		Year	
1966	27	1966	7,941
1967	39	1967	9,966
1968	49	1968	11,304
1969	52	1969	11,909
1970	67	1970	12,701
1971	61	1971	14,147
1972	54	1972	14,238
1973	62*	1973	13,204*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

GRAND THEFT AUTO TEAM AREA AND CONTROL AREA



GRAND THEFT AUTO TEAM AND CONTROL

QUARTERLY

Y E A R	TEAM				CONTROL				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	36	35	38	47	66	40	41	38	36
67	38	43	16	41	67	45	43	34	43
68	37	46	54	46	68	48	59	62	37
69	43	44	74	69	69	47	43	43	60
70	54	52	62	68	70	53	60	60	68
71	75	76	62	53	71	59	65	59	75
72	54	61	58	37	72	81	71	54	57
73	55	48	51*	52*	73	57	47	52*	52*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		CONTROL	
Year		Year	
1966	156	1966	155
1967	138	1967	165
1968	183	1968	206
1969	230	1969	193
1970	236	1970	241
1971	266	1971	258
1972	210	1972	263
1973	206*	1973	208*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

GRAND THEFT AUTO TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE



GRAND THEFT AUTO TEAM AND ALL CITY

QUARTERLY

Year	Team				All City				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	36	35	38	47	66	5,673	5,720	5,452	6,307
67	38	43	16	41	67	6,446	5,477	6,374	7,061
68	37	46	54	46	68	7,586	7,840	8,072	8,311
69	43	44	74	69	69	8,356	7,646	7,619	8,528
70	54	52	62	68	70	8,283	7,948	8,274	9,441
71	75	76	62	53	71	9,384	9,114	8,870	8,802
72	54	61	58	37	72	9,072	8,312	8,177	8,128
73	55	48	51*	52*	73	7,522	7,296	7,409*	7,409*



*Estimated from Half Year Data

YEARLY

Year	Team	Year	All City
1966	156	1966	23,152
1967	138	1967	25,358
1968	183	1968	31,809
1969	230	1969	32,149
1970	236	1970	33,946
1971	266	1971	36,170
1972	210	1972	33,689
1973	206*	1973	29,636*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

BURGLARY THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLES TEAM AREA AND CONTROL AREA



BURGLARY THEFT FROM VEHICLE TEAM AND CONTROL

QUARTERLY

YEAR	TEAM				CONTROL				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	100	110	98	132	66	66	126	87	98
67	106	120	73	102	67	82	96	86	112
68	103	121	124	73	68	138	117	119	105
69	114	93	116	123	69	80	107	102	95
70	131	107	110	117	70	139	110	90	87
71	97	140	101	101	71	148	111	103	102
72	117	89	94	92	72	128	99	100	84
73	75	60	67*	68*	73	100	90	95*	95*

*Estimated From Half Year Data



YEARLY

TEAM		CONTROL	
Year		Year	
1966	440	1966	377
1967	401	1967	376
1968	421	1968	479
1969	446	1969	384
1970	465	1970	426
1971	439	1971	464
1972	392	1972	400
1973	270*	1973	380*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

BURGLARY & THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLES

TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE



BURGLARY THEFT FROM VEHICLE TEAM AND ALL CITY QUARTERLY

Year	TEAM				ALL CITY				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	100	110	98	132	66	9,335	8,937	9,070	9,384
67	106	120	73	102	67	10,979	9,542	9,424	10,450
68	103	121	124	73	68	11,395	10,247	10,683	10,831
69	114	93	116	123	69	11,581	11,269	10,663	10,929
70	131	107	110	117	70	11,771	10,608	8,942	11,415
71	97	140	101	101	71	11,357	10,975	9,339	10,083
72	117	89	94	92	72	10,873	9,653	8,509	8,661
73	75	60	67*	68*	73	8,413	8,290	8,351*	8,352*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

Year	TEAM	ALL CITY
1966	440	36,726
1967	401	40,395
1968	421	43,756
1969	446	44,442
1970	465	43,736
1971	439	36,170
1972	392	33,689
1973	270*	33,406*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

INJURY/FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS TEAM AREA AND CITY-WIDE



INJURY/FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS TEAM AND ALL CITY

QUARTERLY

YEAR	TEAM				ALL CITY				
	Quarter				Quarter				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
66	64	61	52	54	66	6,448	6,222	7,344	7,140
67	63	45	43	66	67	6,790	6,702	6,686	7,100
68	53	41	56	52	68	7,124	6,848	7,011	7,694
69	50	44	73	64	69	7,094	7,242	7,719	7,936
70	52	54	49	53	70	7,953	7,661	7,488	7,989
71	52	46	79	89	71	7,045	7,631	7,789	8,520
72	38	50	67	53	72	7,355	7,889	7,845	7,920
73	30	59	44*	45*	73	7,369	6,556	6,962*	6,963*



*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		ALL CITY	
Year		Year	
1966	231	1966	27,154
1967	217	1967	27,688
1968	202	1968	28,677
1969	231	1969	29,991
1970	208	1970	31,091
1971	266	1971	30,985
1972	208	1972	31,009
1973	178*	1973	27,850*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

INJURY / FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS TEAM AREA AND CONTROL AREA



INJURY/FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS TEAM AND CONTROL

QUARTERLY

TEAM					CONTROL				
Y E A R	Quarter				Y E A R	Quarter			
	1	2	3	4		1	2	3	4
66	64	61	52	54	66	46	39	44	45
67	63	45	43	66	67	53	59	43	56
68	53	41	56	52	68	58	44	41	43
69	50	44	73	64	69	34	30	59	40
70	52	54	49	53	70	45	31	35	34
71	52	46	79	89	71	39	39	50	60
72	38	50	67	53	72	32	51	69	55
73	30	59	44*	45*	73	33	43	38*	38*

*Estimated From Half Year Data

YEARLY

TEAM		CONTROL	
Year		Year	
1966	231	1966	174
1967	217	1967	211
1968	202	1968	186
1969	231	1969	163
1970	208	1970	145
1971	266	1971	188
1972	208	1972	207
1973	178*	1973	152*


*Estimated From Half Year Data

A TWO-YEAR COMPARISON OF PART I CRIMES IN THE AREAS OF
SANTA MONICA, WEST LOS ANGELES AND VENICE

PART I CRIMES	SANTA MONICA			W. LOS ANGELES			VENICE		
	1971	1972	%	1971	1972	%	1971	1972	%
HOMICIDE	6	9	+50.0	9	4	-55.6	8	18	+125.0
FORCIBLE RAPE	69	49	-28.9	48	48	0	76	104	+ 36.8
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	267	316	+18.3	178	177	- 0.6	555	532	- 4.1
ROBBERY	281	305	+ 8.5	344	384	+11.6	519	540	+ 4.0
BURGLARY	1868	1919	+ 2.7	3648	3427	- 6.1	4470	4059	- 9.2
LARCENY	4426	3955	-10.6	6291	5600	-11.0	6795	6278	- 7.6
AUTO THEFT	818	745	- 8.9	1306	1064	-18.5	2199	2071	- 5.8
TOTAL	7734	7298	- 5.6	11824	10704	- 9.5	14622	13602	- 7.0

A35

A SIX YEAR COMPARISON OF PART I CRIMES
SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE OR DECREASE



INVESTIGATION AND ARREST SUMMARY

TEAM-28

April 2, 1972 through June 30, 1973

Charge	ADULTS			JUVENILES (Not Contacts)				CONTACT				
	Total Assigned	Fel. Comp	Misd Comp	Total Comp	% Comp	Total Assign	Fel. Pet.	Misd Other Pet.	Total Pet.	% Pet.	Cont Rpt	Hand
459-496	87	42	23	65	75	30	14	0	5	19	63	6
666-667	11	5	5	10	91	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
211-GTP	21	12	3	15	71	8	3	0	0	3	38	
GTA	19	10	3	13	68	16	14	0	0	14	88	
BFV-TFV	5	0	3	3	60	4	4	0	0	4	100	
ADW-KIDNAP	30	7	21	28	93	1	0	0	1	1	100	
WEAPONS	7	0	4	4	57	6	3	0	2	5	83	
SEX CRIMES	11	4	5	9	82	4	1	0	3	4	100	36
OTHER MISD	86	0	84	84	98	105	1	24	33	58	55	
TOTALS	277	80	151	231	83	174	40	24	44	108	62	42

A37

INVESTIGATION AND ARREST SUMMARY

TEAM-28

April 2, 1972 through June 30, 1973

Type	Total Assigned	Clear by Arrest	Clear Other Unfounded	Outside Crimes Cleared	Total Crimes Clear	% Crime Clear
BURG	591	94	146	14	254	43
ALL THEFT-MAL MISC	466	80	39	1	120	26
211>P	85	19	3	7	29	34
STLN VEH	241	15	5	2	22	9
BFV-TFV	406	16	14	9	39	9.6
242-415	101	53	17	0	70	69
SEX CRIMES	45	12	3	1	16	36
ADW-KIDNAP	52	24	11	0	35	67
MIS JUVS.	18	7	11	0	18	100
TOTALS	2,005	320	249	34	603	30
OTHER REPORTS	224					

TOTAL PROPERTY RECOVERED = \$21,728.26

% Crime clear = Total crimes clear, divided by total assigned

A38

459 CLEARANCE RATE

April 2, 1972 to June 3, 1972 14.7 percent were cleared.

	<u>Burglaries Cleared</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
By Arrest	10	100
Other	0	0
Unfounded	0	0
Reclassified	0	0
TOTAL	10	100

June 4, 1972 to June 30, 1973, 43.8 percent were cleared.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	By Arrest	47
Other	133	67.5
Unfounded	11	5.6
Reclassified	6	3.1
TOTAL	197	100

April 2, 1972 to June 30, 1973, 39.96 percent were cleared.

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	By Arrest	57
Other	133	64.3
Unfounded	11	5.3
Reclassified	6	2.9
TOTAL	207	100

459 Clearance Rate For:

Venice Division	14.8%
City-wide	19.7%

FELONY FILING RATE (ADULT)

Out of the 326 felony complaints filed with the District Attorney's Office, 38 percent received felony complaints; 35 percent were reduced to misdemeanor complaints; and 27 percent were District Attorney rejects.

Thirty-one additional felony arrestee's were handled by other jurisdictions and divisions.

	<u>Felony</u>	<u>Misdemeanor</u>	<u>D.A. Reject</u>	<u>Other</u>
April	8	10	12	1
May	12	11	7	5
June	14	14	11	0
July	18	6	11	4
August	18	10	7	3
September	7	3	2	2
October	1	11	5	2
November	5	5	1	1
December	5	1	1	2
January	4	7	10	3
February	9	5	6	4
March	20	4	3	2
April	6	8	3	0
May	5	12	4	1
June	2	7	5	1
TOTALS	124	114	88	31

FIELD ACTIVITIES OF TEAM-28

	ACTIVITIES				FIELD INTERVIEWS				REPORTS			VEH. REC.	
	Radio	Obs.	Other	Traf.	ADULT		JUV.		Crime	Traf.	Other	Call	Obs.
					Auto	Ped	Auto	Ped					
A.M.	1,480	1,195	911	53	283	176	38	52	183	49	832	5	6
DAY	2,710	3,137	2,780	323	452	187	79	131	769	264	1,604	14	9
P.M.	4,953	3,360	3,384	345	647	304	140	143	872	281	2,510	11	5
TOTAL	9,143	7,692	7,075	721	1,382	667	257	326	1,824	594	4,946	29	20
AVER/ MONTH	609.5	512.8	471.7	48.1	92.1	44.5	17.1	21.7	121.6	39.6	329.7	1.9	1.3
AVER/ WEEK	152.4	128.2	117.9	12.0	23.0	11.1	4.3	5.4	30.4	9.9	82.4	.5	.3
AVER/ DAY	21.8	18.3	16.8	1.7	3.3	1.6	.6	.8	4.3	1.4	11.8	.1	.1

A41

FIELD ACTIVITIES OF TEAM-28

	ARRESTS							WARRANTS			CITATIONS		
	Fel.	Misd.	Drk.	Fel. Traf.	Misd. Traf.	Mis. Dk. Drv.		JUV. Arr.	Arr.	Cks.	Mov.	Non- Mov.	Pkg.
						Call	Obs.						
A.M.	92	75	14	0	89	7	33	41	115	1,233	265	75	192
DAY	160	187	8	1	130	8	9	82	226	2,377	1,157	206	462
P.M.	241	264	45	2	169	26	69	102	248	2,902	1,026	265	567
TOTAL	493	526	67	3	268	41	111	225	589	6,512	2,448	546	1,221
AVER/ MONTH	32.9	35.1	4.5	.2	17.9	2.7	7.4	15	32.3	434.1	163.2	36.4	81.4
AVER/ WEEK	8.2	8.8	1.1	.1	4.5	.7	1.9	3.8	9.8	108.5	40.8	9.1	20.4
AVER/ DAY	1.2	1.3	.2	.0	.6	.1	.3	.5	1.4	15.5	5.8	1.3	2.9

A42

ADDENDUM B
ATTITUDE SURVEYS

COMMUNITY SURVEY PART I

Please give your opinion on each statement by circling the appropriate number to the right of the statement.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1. Policemen are justified in questioning suspicious looking persons. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 2. Most citizens know how to protect their property from theft. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 3. There are many community problems that are not crimes but the police assist in their solution. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 4. Public support for the police seems to be on the increase. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 5. The police only concern themselves with the major crimes (robbery, murder, larceny, auto theft, rape, burglary, assault). | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 6. The establishment of a community intelligence network (citizens providing information to the police) would take too much time and is not worth the effort. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 7. Information relative to crime problems and their prevention is not readily available to citizens. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 8. An officer's efficiency should be judged on arrests made and/or tickets issued. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 9. The police are not receiving the backing from the community that they should be getting. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 10. Policemen generally enforce the law fairly and impartially. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |

COMMUNITY SURVEY PART II

- 11. Minor community problems (e.g. disturbing the peace, loitering) are treated with a minimum of concern by the police. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 12. The police are concerned with the causes of crime as well as its consequences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 13. Minority group members are viewed with greater suspicion by the police. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 14. It is generally felt that the Basic Car Plan meetings have not been effective in involving citizens in law enforcement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 15. Citizen backing of the police department is strong and should not be considered a problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 16. Citizens who have observed a crime or accident are usually willing to testify in court. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 17. Most citizens feel it is not worth calling the police for minor problems (juvenile disturbances, abandoned vehicles, etc.). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 18. There are such things as criminal stereotypes that help police identify potential law breakers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 19. Police generally try all methods available to find solutions to citizens' problems and inquiries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 20. Community assistance is important in law enforcement and should be actively sought. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 21. Citizens only call for police assistance when there is a serious problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 22. Basic Car Plan meetings have been effective in informing citizens of crime problems in their area. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 23. Community support for police is insufficient and should be increased. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 24. The job of crime prevention concerns only the police. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Please give your opinion on each item by circling the appropriate number to the right of the item.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

- 1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
- 3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
- 5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

A major problem in my area is _____.

- 1. Pornography. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 2. Burglary. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 3. Speeding cars. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 4. Thefts from parked cars. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 5. Hippies. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 6. Robbery. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 7. Prowlers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 8. Abandoned vehicles. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 9. Lack of community support for law enforcement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 10. Lack of citizen involvement in community problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 11. Illegally parked cars. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 12. Malicious mischief by juveniles. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 13. People disturbing the peace. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 14. Narcotics. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

COMMUNITY SURVEY PART III

Please give your opinion on each item by circling the appropriate number to the right of the item.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
 3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
 5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

1. I would be willing to expend time and/or money to see that my property is burglar-proof (For example: purchase better locks, install outdoor lighting). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I am involved in my immediate community. (For example: knowing my neighbors, participating in local organizations). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. I would be willing to call the police if I observed suspicious persons and/or situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I would be willing to help my neighbor when he is in need (For example: scaring away a prowler, helping my neighbor if he is being attacked). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I would be willing to appear in court as a witness to a criminal act. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. I am aware of the crime problems that affect my immediate community. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. I believe it is important to attend the Basic Car Plan meetings in my area. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

TEAM AREA COMMUNITY SURVEYS

PART I

Question	Mean		Standard Deviation	
	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM
1.	5.69	6.08	1.82	1.61
2.	2.84	3.13	1.80	1.87
3.	5.25	5.58	1.57	1.44
4.	4.29	5.50	1.81	1.50
5.	2.77	2.60	2.01	1.87
6.	2.92	2.71	2.07	2.71
7.	3.85	3.80	2.01	1.95
8.	1.45	1.65	1.30	1.51
9.	5.15	4.86	1.84	1.80
10.	4.85	5.46	1.95	1.69
11.	3.82	3.87	1.85	1.82
12.	5.17	5.63	1.95	1.60
13.	4.75	4.69	2.07	1.90
14.	3.85	3.38	1.30	1.74
15.	3.13	3.65	1.79	1.85
16.	2.71	3.33	1.72	1.90
17.	4.60	4.80	1.80	1.71
18.	4.11	4.46	1.86	1.83
19.	4.52	4.95	1.84	1.79
20.	6.34	6.53	1.31	0.90
21.	4.41	4.78	1.91	1.91
22.	4.57	5.00	1.27	1.63
23.	5.87	5.58	1.32	1.58
24.	1.57	1.64	1.28	1.44

TEAM AREA COMMUNITY SURVEYS

PART II

Question	Mean		Standard Deviation	
	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM
1.	2.92	2.51	1.65	1.68
2.	5.54	5.05	1.54	2.06
3.	5.13	5.08	1.73	2.03
4.	4.61	4.09	1.63	1.88
5.	2.71	2.56	1.67	1.63
6.	4.79	4.37	1.62	2.03
7.	4.55	4.26	1.54	1.79
8.	3.39	3.01	1.66	1.65
9.	4.37	3.64	1.53	2.00
10.	4.64	3.97	1.56	2.03
11.	3.60	3.55	1.87	2.03
12.	3.75	4.11	1.76	2.03
13.	3.18	3.40	1.67	1.94
14.	3.75	3.99	1.69	1.87

PART III

1.	5.79	5.97	1.66	1.55
2.	4.45	4.72	1.87	1.97
3.	6.17	6.62	1.39	1.00
4.	6.36	6.34	1.25	1.42
5.	6.21	6.17	1.38	1.46
6.	4.71	5.29	1.64	1.48
7.	4.94	5.33	1.43	1.58

CONTROL AREA COMMUNITY SURVEYS

PART I

Question	Mean		Standard Deviation	
	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM
1.	5.86	6.04	1.79	1.59
2.	2.74	3.63	1.87	1.99
3.	5.19	5.32	1.65	1.45
4.	4.41	4.87	1.88	1.64
5.	2.71	3.07	2.06	2.09
6.	3.01	3.10	2.16	2.13
7.	4.01	4.01	2.08	1.94
8.	1.51	2.10	1.49	1.92
9.	5.43	4.88	1.74	1.84
10.	5.15	5.19	1.94	1.87
11.	4.11	4.07	2.00	1.88
12.	5.04	5.07	1.97	1.88
13.	4.50	4.44	2.12	2.05
14.	3.93	3.77	1.22	1.50
15.	3.41	3.96	1.97	1.86
16.	2.88	3.60	1.92	1.90
17.	4.63	4.56	1.99	1.83
18.	4.16	4.18	1.98	1.91
19.	4.60	5.06	1.81	1.56
20.	6.29	5.92	1.44	1.54
21.	4.44	4.77	2.00	1.79
22.	4.36	4.63	1.25	1.41
23.	5.97	5.47	1.40	1.56
24.	1.74	2.12	1.60	1.88

CONTROL AREA COMMUNITY SURVEYS

PART II

Question	Mean		Standard Deviation	
	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	Post-TEAM
1.	3.20	3.08	1.59	1.73
2.	5.21	5.24	1.74	1.73
3.	5.28	4.97	1.81	1.99
4.	4.59	4.36	1.67	1.88
5.	3.16	3.13	1.84	1.88
6.	4.84	5.57	1.65	1.19
7.	4.44	4.63	1.48	1.77
8.	3.67	3.29	1.51	1.79
9.	4.58	4.16	1.60	1.89
10.	4.95	4.52	1.53	1.89
11.	4.06	3.70	1.86	2.02
12.	4.38	4.33	1.80	1.92
13.	3.90	4.10	1.85	1.94
14.	4.13	4.07	1.73	2.01

PART III

1.	5.63	5.46	1.79	1.80
2.	4.43	4.44	1.81	2.09
3.	6.27	6.37	1.37	1.23
4.	6.34	6.13	1.32	1.47
5.	6.02	5.91	1.57	1.71
6.	4.86	4.57	1.68	1.83
7.	4.86	4.64	1.41	1.80

B8

POLICE SURVEY PART I

After reading the statement on the left, please circle the number below the item on the right which, in your experience, best describes your organization.

1. At what level(s) are review and evaluation functions performed?	Review and evaluation done at all levels.	Mainly high and medium levels with occasional lower level involvement.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Mostly high levels with some medium level involvement.	High levels only.
	1	2	3	4	5
2. What approach is used to motivate subordinates?	Threat of punishment	Threat of punishment and occasional recognition.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Rewards and occasional threat of punishment.	Recognition
	1	2	3	4	5
3. How much confidence do subordinates have in supervisors?	Practically no confidence.	Small amount of confidence.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Medium amount of confidence.	Practically complete confidence.
	1	2	3	4	5
4. How are suggestions from subordinates received?	Not taken seriously.	Sometimes accepted.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Usually accepted.	Almost always accepted.
	1	2	3	4	5
5. What direction does information flow within the Department?	Down, up, and laterally (between specialized units) in approximately equivalent amounts	Down and up in approximately equivalent amounts.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Downward with occasional upward flow.	Mostly downward from supervisors to subordinates
	1	2	3	4	5

6. What responsibility is felt by the individual for Department goals?	Little, if any.	Occasional responsibility.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Medium amount of responsibility.	Large amount of responsibility.
	1	2	3	4	5
7. Who enforces Department policy?	Responsibility for enforcement shared by all levels.	Mostly high and medium levels with some lower level responsibility.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Largely high levels.	Only high levels.
	1	2	3	4	5
8. Are communications from subordinates changed while being sent up the chain of command?	Largely accurate communication with little, if any, distortion.	Accurate communications are more frequent than distorted communications.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Distorted communications are more frequent than accurate communications.	Large amount of change.
	1	2	3	4	5
9. How important is cooperation between Patrol and Detectives?	Cooperation is essential if effective solutions are to be found.	Cooperation is valuable in many instances.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Cooperation is helpful only in extreme uses or when all other alternatives fail.	It's best to stay in your own unit and not do another unit's work.
	1	2	3	4	5
10. How effective are communications between Patrol and Detectives?	Ineffective because there is no communication.	Somewhat effective but usually only on high priority matters.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Generally effective with occasional lack of communication.	Highly effective with all specialized units participating.
	1	2	3	4	5

B10

11. What are the attitudes of subordinates toward supervisors?	Negative and unfriendly.	More negative and unfriendly than positive and friendly.	Don't know or have no opinion.	More positive and friendly than negative and unfriendly.	Positive and friendly.
	1	2	3	4	5
12. What are the attitudes between co-workers?	Negative and unfriendly.	More negative and unfriendly than positive and friendly.	Don't know or have no opinion.	More positive and friendly than negative and unfriendly.	Positive and friendly.
	1	2	3	4	5
13. Are supervisors aware and understanding of job-related problems of subordinates?	Very little knowledge of subordinates' problems.	Some but not a sufficient amount of knowledge of subordinates' problems.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Good deal of knowledge of subordinates' problems.	Extremely perceptive of subordinates' problems.
	1	2	3	4	5
14. Are subordinates actively involved in problems related to their work?	Fully involved.	Usually involved but sometimes only consulted.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Sometimes, but usually only consulted.	Very rarely.
	1	2	3	4	5
15. How valuable are the suggestions made by subordinates?	Of no value.	Only the information supervisors want to hear is transmitted.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Usually valuable.	Of great value.
	1	2	3	4	5

16.	What levels of the Department strive for high performance.	Only high levels.	Mainly high levels with some medium levels.	Don't know or have no opinion.	High, medium, and occasionally lower levels.	4. All levels.
		1	2	3	4	5
17.	What are the attitudes of supervisors towards subordinates?	Negative and unfriendly.	More negative and unfriendly than positive and friendly.	Don't know or have no opinion.	More positive and friendly than negative and unfriendly.	Positive and friendly.
		1	2	3	4	5
18.	How much cooperation is present between Patrol and Detectives?	None present.	Small amount.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Medium amount.	Large amount.
		1	2	3	4	5
19.	How are communications from supervisors received?	Not taken seriously.	Sometimes accepted but with many reservations.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Frequently accepted but usually not open to criticism.	Mostly accepted and open to constructive criticism.
		1	2	3	4	5
20.	Who establishes Department goals?	Goals set by way of group agreement and approval.	Goals set after discussion with all concerned personnel regardless of rank.	Don't know or have no opinion.	High and medium levels of command.	High levels of command only.
		1	2	3	4	5
21.	How much confidence do supervisors have in subordinates?	Practically no confidence.	Small amount of confidence.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Medium amount of confidence.	Practically complete confidence.
		1	2	3	4	5

B12

22.	Does decision making involve individuals or group participation?	Group participation only.	Mostly group participation with some individual.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Mostly individual with some group participation.	5. Individual only.
		1	2	3	4	5
23.	How often do supervisors use suggestions made by subordinates?	Rarely.	Occasionally.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Regularly.	Almost always.
		1	2	3	4	5
24.	Do decision makers know problems at lower levels?	Unaware of problems at lower levels.	Somewhat aware of problems.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Usually aware of problems.	Well aware of problems.
		1	2	3	4	5
25.	How much information do supervisors share with subordinates?	All possible information that is relevant to the situation at hand.	Substantial amount.	Don't know or have no opinion.	Small to medium amount.	Very little.
		1	2	3	4	5

B13

POLICE SURVEY PART II

Please give your opinion on each statement by circling the appropriate number to the right of the statement.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

1. Policemen are justified in questioning suspicious looking persons. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Most citizens know how to protect their property from theft. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. There are many community problems that are not crimes but the police assist in their solution. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Public support for the police seems to be on the increase. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. The police only concern themselves with the major crimes (robbery, murder, larceny, auto theft, rape, burglary, assault). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. The establishment of a community intelligence network (citizens providing information to the police) would take too much time and is not worth the effort. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Information relative to crime problems and their prevention is not readily available to citizens. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. An officer's efficiency should be judged mainly on arrests made and/or tickets issued. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Policemen generally enforce the law fairly and impartially. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Minor community problems (e.g., disturbing the peace, loitering) are treated with a minimum of concern by the police. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. The police are concerned with the causes of crime as well as its consequences. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Minority group members are viewed with greater suspicion by the police. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. It is generally felt that the Basic Car Plan meetings have not been effective in involving citizens in law enforcement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Citizen backing of the police department is strong and should not be considered a problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Citizens who have observed a crime or accident are usually willing to testify in court. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Most citizens feel it is not worth calling the police for minor problems (juvenile disturbances, abandoned vehicles, etc.). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. There are such things as criminal stereotypes that help police identify potential law breakers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Police generally try all methods available to find solutions to citizens' problems and inquiries. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Community assistance is important in law enforcement and should be actively sought. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Citizens only call for police assistance when there is a serious problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Basic Car Plan meetings have been effective in informing citizens of crime problems in their area. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Community support for the police is insufficient and should be increased. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

POLICE SURVEY PART III

Please give your opinion on each item by circling the appropriate number to the right of the item.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

As a policeman, I take personal pride in _____.

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 1. Settling a family dispute. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 2. Remaining emotionally calm during stress. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 3. Making a drunk driver arrest. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 4. Arresting a burglar. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 5. Clearing a crime. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 6. Returning stolen property to the rightful owner. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 7. Informing a citizen of crime preventive measures he can use. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 8. Answering a parking violation call. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 9. Stopping a robbery in progress. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 10. Engaging in crime repressive patrol. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 11. Seeing that an abandoned vehicle is towed away. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 12. Making a thorough preliminary investigation. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 13. Sharing good police information with other officers. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |

- | | |
|---|---------------|
| 14. Giving a "Policeman Bill" talk in a school. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 15. Making a narcotics arrest. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 16. Informing a citizen of action taken on his call for police service. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 17. Writing a moving traffic violation. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |

POLICE SURVEY PART IV

Please give your opinion on each item by circling the appropriate number to the right of the item.

Here are the meanings of the numbers:

1. I strongly disagree 2. I moderately disagree
3. I weakly disagree 4. Don't know or have no opinion
5. I weakly agree 6. I moderately agree 7. I strongly agree

A major problem in my area is _____.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| 1. Pornography. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 2. Burglary. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 3. Speeding cars. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 4. Thefts from parked cars. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 5. Hippies. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 6. Robbery. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 7. Prowlers. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 8. Abandoned vehicles. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 9. Lack of community support for law enforcement. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 10. Lack of citizen involvement in community problems. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 11. Prostitution. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 12. Illegally parked cars. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 13. Malicious mischief by juveniles. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 14. People disturbing the peace. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 15. Bookmaking. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| 16. Narcotics. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 17. Grand theft auto. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |

POLICE ATTITUDE SURVEY

PART I

Question	Mean			Standard Deviation		
	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM
1.	2.50	1.75	2.44	1.27	1.08	1.22
2.	3.80	4.13	3.04	1.32	1.04	1.48
3.	4.40	4.56	3.21	0.52	0.50	1.44
4.	3.10	3.88	2.86	0.99	1.03	1.25
5.	3.60	2.41	3.41	1.58	1.58	1.44
6.	3.70	4.63	3.62	1.26	0.66	1.20
7.	2.50	2.06	2.33	1.18	1.19	1.16
8.	3.00	1.81	2.91	1.05	0.90	1.13
9.	1.70	1.09	1.33	0.82	0.53	0.76
10.	3.30	4.50	3.41	1.06	1.02	1.50
11.	3.90	4.63	3.37	0.99	0.49	1.05
12.	4.30	4.72	3.91	0.82	0.46	1.17
13.	3.00	4.09	2.91	1.33	0.73	1.44
14.	2.20	1.22	2.29	0.92	0.42	1.12
15.	3.50	4.43	3.33	1.18	0.80	1.23
16.	4.20	4.84	4.16	1.03	0.45	1.09
17.	4.10	4.44	3.66	0.88	0.91	1.00
18.	4.00	4.88	4.29	0.94	.034	1.16
19.	3.90	4.69	3.95	0.88	0.34	0.95
20.	3.90	1.60	3.25	1.20	0.91	1.64
21.	4.30	4.63	3.75	0.48	0.49	1.07
22.	3.40	1.81	2.95	1.26	0.78	0.99
23.	2.70	3.88	2.82	1.25	0.94	1.19
24.	2.90	4.03	2.82	1.45	0.90	0.93
25.	2.60	1.56	2.75	1.35	0.84	1.32

POLICE ATTITUDE SURVEY

PART II

Question	Mean			Standard Deviation		
	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM
1.	7.00	6.94	7.00	0.00	0.25	1.30
2.	2.20	2.19	2.14	1.81	1.38	2.00
3.	6.00	6.44	5.92	0.67	0.72	1.03
4.	4.00	4.76	5.88	1.63	1.57	1.42
5.	1.90	2.34	2.40	1.60	1.86	1.73
6.	2.60	1.53	2.72	2.01	1.50	2.18
7.	3.60	4.03	3.20	1.78	2.15	1.93
8.	1.10	1.22	2.00	0.32	0.75	1.47
9.	5.80	6.13	6.04	0.63	1.29	1.42
10.	3.20	3.44	3.32	1.55	1.90	1.62
11.	5.30	6.29	5.52	2.16	1.17	1.96
12.	5.20	4.94	5.12	1.32	1.81	1.56
13.	3.30	3.22	4.68	1.70	2.07	2.15
14.	3.20	2.76	3.88	1.40	1.63	1.56
15.	3.40	2.88	3.04	2.07	1.64	1.61
16.	3.50	4.13	3.08	2.07	2.03	1.77
17.	4.50	4.18	4.96	1.96	2.29	2.18
18.	4.80	5.53	5.60	1.62	1.59	0.91
19.	6.00	6.84	6.28	1.89	0.37	0.89
20.	2.90	3.22	3.56	1.66	2.07	1.75
21.	5.20	1.19	3.44	1.87	1.64	2.08
22.	5.50	6.44	5.08	2.07	0.95	1.63

POLICE ATTITUDE SURVEY

PART III

Question	Mean			Standard Deviation		
	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM
1.	2.10	3.43	2.24	1.29	1.55	1.47
2.	7.00	6.80	6.44	0.00	1.10	0.96
3.	5.00	5.45	4.88	1.56	1.01	1.61
4.	6.60	6.30	6.08	0.52	1.26	0.99
5.	3.50	3.40	3.32	2.12	1.22	1.72
6.	5.60	4.80	4.40	1.26	1.52	1.84
7.	5.30	6.03	5.32	1.83	0.96	1.62
8.	4.10	4.03	3.56	1.20	1.35	1.95
9.	5.00	4.83	1.84	2.11	1.72	1.17
10.	4.10	5.30	2.28	1.85	1.51	1.54
11.	3.00	3.10	2.00	1.49	1.37	1.29
12.	4.20	4.97	4.36	2.10	1.30	1.86
13.	5.40	5.17	4.96	0.52	0.99	1.42
14.	4.80	4.67	4.04	1.62	1.12	1.54
15.	3.00	3.43	2.60	1.76	1.30	1.44
16.	6.50	5.87	5.96	0.71	1.01	0.93
17.	6.10	6.30	5.40	0.74	1.09	1.22

POLICE ATTITUDE SURVEY

PART IV

Question	Mean			Standard Deviation		
	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM	Pre-TEAM	First Seminar	Post-TEAM
1.	4.10	5.32	4.29	2.47	1.54	1.75
2.	6.40	6.54	6.70	0.52	1.18	0.46
3.	5.30	5.64	5.12	2.00	1.39	1.53
4.	6.80	6.86	6.96	0.63	0.76	0.20
5.	6.70	6.79	6.84	0.67	0.63	0.47
6.	5.20	4.64	6.64	1.48	0.84	0.48
7.	5.60	6.36	5.88	0.70	0.73	0.97
8.	2.50	3.50	2.92	1.96	1.60	2.92
9.	6.90	6.89	6.96	0.32	0.57	0.20
10.	5.80	6.29	5.44	0.79	0.98	1.47
11.	2.40	4.00	3.20	1.58	1.63	1.73
12.	6.40	6.71	6.72	1.26	0.66	0.54
13.	6.30	6.61	6.72	0.95	0.74	0.45
14.	4.20	5.50	4.60	2.10	1.17	1.52
15.	6.90	6.57	6.44	0.32	0.84	0.71
16.	5.10	6.04	5.44	1.10	0.74	0.96
17.	5.40	5.82	5.40	1.84	1.33	1.75

ADDENDUM C
POSITION PAPER

ADDENDUM C
POSITION PAPER
TEAM POLICING
IN THE
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

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THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Los Angeles Police Department has been organized along functional lines since 1929.¹ Each basic area of police work is the responsibility of a separate organizational unit. There is a separate chain of command for each major function.

There are rational reasons for the existence of this organizational structure. Many diverse specialties are required in a major metropolitan police department. Organization along the lines of functional specialties allows for the development and perpetuation of these specialties. It also allows for control over specialists, insuring that uniform policy and standards of service can be preserved City-wide.² Division commanders can be held responsible for the quality of service provided by their specialized personnel. Nearly all major police departments have a similar organizational structure.

Although this organizational structure has served to provide the police agency with adequate expertise to meet service needs, a wide variety of major problems now face law enforcement with which the functional organizational structure has not been able to cope.

¹ Los Angeles Police Department, The Territorial Imperative, Decentralization Task Force Report, November 16, 1970, p. 1.

² Ibid.

Lack of Individual Responsibility

The closest thing to an individual responsible for stopping crime is the patrol officer. Yet he, at most, works an area 40 hours a week. The policeman drives patrol cars, makes arrests and provides a multitude of services to the community. The detective investigates crimes, and clears them. The same type of restricted scope of activities is delegated to the narcotics officer, traffic officer, vice officer and others. Each man has a very small portion of responsibility. Responsibility is never discharged until it is assigned to an individual.³ Organizational specialization has not allowed police officers to be delegated the direct responsibility for repressing crime.

Reaction Oriented

The war against crime today is a defensive battle. As soon as a crime occurs, the police agency reacts. Depending on the type of crime, a specialist is called in to investigate. The vast majority of police programs are geared to react to a crime after it happens. The police are unsuccessful in this reaction, clearing only 25 percent of the known offenses by arrest.⁴

³Elliot and Sardino, Crime Control Team, p. 9.

⁴Ibid, p. 5.

The police must find a path of action which will cut off a greater portion of crime before it happens. Investigation, the major form of police reaction to crime, is a losing battle.⁵

Evaluation by Recap

It is very difficult to judge an individual police officer's capability to repress crime and measure each officer's contribution to the law enforcement goal of deterring those who would commit offenses. The task has proven too difficult for police management. An easier way had to be found to measure an individual officer's productivity. The answer has been found in the individual officer's recap.

If you ask the traffic officer what he has to do to keep his job, he will tell you he must write "X" number of tickets and make "Y" number of drunk driving arrests. For the detective it is caseload and clearance rate. For the field patrolman it is arrests.⁶ All these statistics are used by supervisors to evaluate subordinates. These statistics are maintained on a monthly recap sheet. An officer is informed by his

⁵Davis, "Professional Police Principles," p. 4.

⁶Ibid, p. 7.

superior if he is low in tickets or arrests so he can work on those areas where he has been adjudged weak.

An actual incident may explain how the recap works in practice. A divisional supervisor of traffic enforcement was reprimanded by the Division Commanding Officer when his nineteen subordinates gathered only twenty drunk driving arrests in one month. Twenty was below their average. In response to this criticism, the supervisor deployed all his men to a small area of the division where many bars were located. As a result of this deployment, drunk driving arrests increased greatly. However, during this time of special effort, the remainder of the division went without traffic enforcement and the repressive patrol the traffic officers provide by virtue of their presence in an area.

This story is an example of the wrongs that can be generated by an evaluation based on statistics. The assumption supporting the recap is that the value of a traffic officer can be measured by the quantitative readouts of tickets produced or drunk arrests made. The natural tendency for the traffic officer, as with all subordinates, is to gauge his activity in such a manner as to please the supervisor. The end result is that field patrolmen are focusing on the numbers involved in their specialty, to the detriment of the overall goal of suppressing crime and disorder.

Competition for Resources

In the public sector there is an ever-increasing struggle for the tax dollar. Budgeting is becoming more and more political, as various governmental agencies vie for the tax dollar. The question of priority has not been answered.

Within the police department the various bureaus vie for the money the legislative body provides. The tendency is for the specialists to become preoccupied with the value of their specialty. The end result is competition for financial resources based upon functional lines. The competition is a symptom of the separatist tendency resulting from preoccupation with the limited scope of the function rather than the total goal of the agency.

Lack of Coordination and Communication

A difficulty arises when a program requires the concerted effort of manpower from two or more organizational units across functional organizational lines. The separatist tendency mentioned earlier prevents cohesion.⁷

⁷John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Administration (New York, New York: Ronald Press Company, 1967), p. 106.

The Los Angeles Police Department is divided into seventeen geographic Areas. Each Area has a patrol and a detective division. There is little communication between the two. During an interview, a detective investigator admitted minimal communication with radio car officers working his area.⁸ The radio car officer who wants to really be up on the latest facts will initiate communication with the Area detectives. One officer interviewed stated that the information the detective possessed was invaluable. He had made several "good arrests" because of information he had gathered from detectives.⁹ The interviews held with field officers left the impression of a great need to open lateral communication between field policemen and detectives working the same geographic Area. The existing system has deterred rather than encouraged this communication.

⁸ This detective had eight years experience as a detective. The interview was held in November, 1971.

⁹ This officer had worked a radio car for four years. The interview was held in November, 1971.

POLICE ISOLATION FROM THE COMMUNITY

It is generally acknowledged that a serious problem facing the police agency today is isolation from the community. Three factors have caused this isolation. First is the automobile. The local "cop-on-the-beat" is gone. He is now an unknown, often faceless uniform behind the door in the black and white vehicle. Gone are the friendly conversations as he makes his rounds. You only talk to him now if you are in trouble, or if you cause trouble.

The second factor causing police isolation is the police agency itself. Size breeds red tape, and red tape breeds inflexibility and impersonalization. The functional structure has left a multitude of people dealing with the public whose duty is to serve the public in only one small, well-defined way.

A difficult factor to deal with in attempting to overcome police isolation is the attitude of the police officer himself. Policemen feel isolated from the community they are sworn to serve. Policemen feel isolated because of interaction with the public and interaction with other elements in the judicial system.

Police and the Public

The average policeman is isolated from the public socially. As soon as he puts on the uniform and begins enforcing the law, he is a man set apart. There is a natural tendency for a man to make his friendships among fellow workers. This tendency is particularly acute in law enforcement. During his first few months on the job, police officers are generally assigned to night or morning watch. This will cause an isolation from former friends.¹⁰

There is, however, something more basic which causes a social break with the non-police world. The policeman does not feel at ease with outsiders. Many policemen hide their profession socially.

Police officers are, by training, suspicious. They are trained to and make their living at ferreting out the different, the unusual, the deviation from the norm.¹¹ Most people perceive and resent this suspicious attitude.

"Because of his job, the policeman cannot take part in the ordinary social relations with quite the freedom allowed to members of most occupational groups."¹²

¹⁰ Jameson, W. Doig, "The Police in a Democratic Society." Public Administration Review, Sept./Oct., 1968, p. 394.

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 44, 48.

¹² Michael Banton, The Policeman and the Community (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 267.

CONTINUED

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With regard to the public as a whole, policeman believe that the public is generally apathetic to law enforcement and that police do not receive the support from the public that they should.¹³ The affluent look down on the policeman, considering him to be one of the lower level public servants. The middle class ignores the policeman as best it can. The racial minority or ghetto dweller fears and resents the policeman as an instrument of the "white man's law."¹⁴

Police are constantly dealing with the citizen with a problem. Police deal with the offender, whether traffic law or penal code. Few offenders graciously accept the police officer's attempt to do his job. Policemen naturally come to regard opinions expressed during their negative encounters with the public as typical and as a result generally believe the public is against them.¹⁵

The recent increase in civil disorders has had an impact on police isolation. Citizens who have a gripe against society or against society's mores or laws often violate statutory law while seeking to express their dissatisfaction. Invariably these violations lead to encounters with the

¹³ Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, p. 53

¹⁴ Peter Goldman, "Justice on Trial", Newsweek, March 8, 1971, p. 24.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 62

police who are sworn to enforce these laws. During these encounters, widespread hostility is expressed. This hostility is directed at the policeman.¹⁶ This hostility serves to solidify police perception of public opinion.

The recent upturn in violence expressed toward policemen also reinforces police opinion relative to their isolation.

The Police and Other Members of the Judicial System

Policemen as a whole are interested in "factual guilt." The policeman, because of his training and experience, is often able to interpret a given set of facts which may lead him to believe a suspect is guilty when he is arrested. Policemen believe that they do not charge innocent men with crimes.¹⁷ Whether or not this "factual guilt" ultimately culminates in a conviction is quite another matter.

The police resent the decision of a district attorney not to file a charge when a "factually guilty" man has been arrested. Even more, he resents the judge who turns people free, not because the judge believes the defendant is innocent, but because the police may have taken more notice of the crime than of the offender's rights. The result is that the police believe the courts are against them.¹⁸

¹⁶ Herman Goldstein, "Police Response to Urban Crisis", Public Administration Review, Sept./Oct., 1968, p. 419

¹⁷ Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, pp. 197, 203

¹⁸ Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p.2

The trend of U. S. Supreme Court decisions in favor of "guilty" defendants is particularly abhorrent to the police.

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The police believe that the Supreme Court decisions have tended to interfere with their ability to do what they perceive as their job.

BASIC CAR PLAN

The Basic Car Plan (BCP) was implemented by Chief of Police E. M. Davis in Los Angeles in late 1969. The BCP is an attempt to make police officers responsible for repressing crime in specific geographic areas and to break down police isolation. The basics of the plan are these:

- 1) Each geographic division was divided into smaller areas called basic car areas.
- 2) Each area has a complement of nine men assigned from the division's patrol force (nine men are required to man a two-man car on a twenty-four hours basis 365 days a year).
- 3) The nine men of the Basic Car are responsible for crime in their area.
- 4) The Basic Car has monthly meetings with citizens in their area.

The BCP has succeeded in creating a greater feeling of identity and responsibility of officers for their areas. Interviews held with participants indicated policemen appreciate being able to focus their attention on a plot of ground of a few square miles they can call their own.

A weakness of the BCP is that it includes only patrol personnel. Detectives and traffic enforcement are not

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Ibid, p. 2

assigned to BCP areas and seldom participate in BCP activities, including the community meetings. Several of the seventeen police divisions have recently assigned detective and traffic enforcement personnel to areas coterminous with the BCP areas. This development has promise but is too new to rate.

As a tool for decreasing police isolation, the BCP has been less successful. Although there have been some outstanding individual successes at promoting the monthly community meetings, the trend has been otherwise. One officer interviewed noted that the meetings in his BCP area average 100 in attendance. The officer noted the population of 28,000 in his area, and the 100 average attendance was a reinforcement to his belief of citizen apathy.

TEAM POLICING

"Police Departments should commence experimentation with a team policing concept that envisions those with patrol and investigative duties combining under unified command with flexible assignments to deal with the crime problems in a defined area."²⁰

The Los Angeles Police Department is conducting an experiment in team policing. The experiment came into being as a result of the efforts of the Department's Crime Control Committee. The Committee selected one division as a testing ground for various experiments in deployment practices. Venice Division, a microcosm of the City of Los Angeles, was the division selected. The Committee selected team policing as the first major experiment.

Team policing is a logical extension of the Basic Car Plan. Instead of giving only patrol officers an area in which they are to fight crime and enlist community support; patrol, detective and traffic officers working the same area will be drawn together as a team.

²⁰United States Government, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 117-118.

The Venice team policing experiment is an innovation in law enforcement in a major metropolitan area. Although there have been notable team policing experiments in other jurisdictions, the Venice experiment is unique because it represents an effort of a major metropolitan police department, and because of its strong emphasis on management by participation. One Basic Car Plan area out of the six in Venice Division was selected as the test area. The test area has approximately one-sixth of the division's geographic area and population. An adjacent area with similar statistics was selected as the control area. The test and control areas are largely homogeneous.

A Lieutenant of Police is the officer in charge of the team. He has been given one-sixth of the division's patrol, detective, and traffic enforcement complement of men. The team has the authority to use whatever tactics it desires within the bounds of Department policy and fiscal constraints. The team, as a whole, is responsible for repressing crime in the test area. Each man is judged by his contribution to the team effort.

Once the policeman is made responsible for repressing crime, it is anticipated that he will make the maximum use of available resources. The great untapped resource is public support.

"It is the job of every policeman to seek the willing cooperation of individuals on his beat in helping to attain the police objectives of the absence of crime and disorder. In the same tradition, it is the responsibility of every police officer to seek the voluntary observance of laws in his community. His mission is to 'turn on' that community, regardless of ethnic makeup, to get the police job done."²¹

Management By Participation

Management By Participation (MBP) is a relatively new system of management based upon the idea that men are more committed to goals when they have an opportunity to participate in setting those goals. MBP is on the opposite end of the management spectrum from authoritarianism.²²

Authoritarianism is characterized by decision making being reserved for management. Communications flow mostly downward. Supervisors set performance standards for subordinates, along with selecting the methods of operation. Employees are motivated by financial rewards

²¹Davis, "Professional Police Principles," p. 4.

²²Alfred J. Morrow, David G. Bowers, and Stanley E. Seashore, Management By Participation, (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 31.

and threat of punishment. People are molded into the organization.

MBP is vastly different. Line personnel participate actively in decision making. They are called upon to set their own goals, and to assist in selecting methods of operation. Communications are open, vertically and horizontally. The theoretical result is that the employee is positively motivated because he is committed to the job. He feels himself a part of the organization, capable of making an impact on productivity and decision making. The organization is built on the people. The basic philosophy is that no one knows the job better than the people doing it daily.²³

The impact MBP has had on employees has been beneficial to organizations using the system. People respond positively when their needs are considered. Their participation creates a self-respect and a sense of responsibility for the activities and goals they help construct.²⁴ Absenteeism and employee turnover have decreased in organizations where MBP has been applied, a sure indicator of employee commitment.²⁵

²³Ibid., p. 27

²⁴Ibid., p. 26

²⁵Ibid., p. 58.

The beneficial results of MBP are particularly desirable when applied in conjunction with a team policing experiment. Field officers, assigned to a specific area, will get to know that area and its policing needs. If these policemen can be allowed to work out their own tactics and programs, their standards and goals, they will feel responsible for achieving those goals. They will experience an increase in commitment to those goals they have helped set.

Obstacles to Success

Experience in police management in general and in applications of MBP has made management aware of certain difficulties which must be overcome if the experiment is to prove successful. There are three possible obstacles: 1) sunk costs in the existing system; 2) the authoritarian mold of police agencies; 3) the hesitancy of supervisors to relinquish the right to make decisions.

Whenever an organization makes a commitment in a certain direction, the commitment necessarily limits the future adaptability of the organization. These commitments are called sunk costs.²⁶ The Los Angeles Police Department has committed itself to specialization. There is a prevalent attitude that a patrol officer can promote to be a detective.²⁷

²⁶Pfiffner, Public Administration, p. 113

²⁷The interviews held with policemen revealed this attitude clearly.

From the other side, those who have already achieved the status of detective believe themselves to have achieved a plateau that entitles them to special consideration.²⁸

This attitude was reinforced with added salary increments for investigative personnel within the last two years. The team may not be able to work together if some in the group claim superior status by virtue of their investigative assignment. There is a danger that specialization will be a dividing factor on the team.

Police agencies are quasi-military organizations. Policemen are trained to respond to rank. In field situations, as in war, there is often the need for someone to give instructions which must be instantly obeyed. There are life and death situations which must be dealt with in a rapid manner. There is no time for discussion; rank directs. There is a basic inconsistency between this authoritarianism and MBP. There is evidence from other team policing experiments that policemen have a difficult time breaking out of the authoritarian mold. They were asked to participate, but they waited for instructions as they had been trained to do. Even after months of team policing, there has been a real hesitancy about taking the lead.²⁹ It is possible the same

²⁸ One detective interviewed in Nov. of 1971, was asked if he could use his expertise to solve traffic problems if he were assigned to the team policing experiment. He replied, "I have worked too hard to get there I am to waste my time on traffic."

²⁹ Elliot, Crime Control Team, p. 107.

tendency will be experienced in Venice. A man who has studied and struggled for years through a battery of civil service tests to achieve rank and the right to supervise may not be willing to share his decision-making responsibility with subordinates. This tendency of supervisors to hold on to the reins has impaired MBP wherever it has been implemented.³⁰

In spite of the obstacles, team policing may, if successful, be the trend of the future in law enforcement engendering a motivated officer, committed to Department objectives, and concerned with his area and its citizens.

³⁰ Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 153.

EVALUATING TEAM POLICING

Obstacles to Evaluation

There are several factors which make the evaluation of any law enforcement program difficult. The first factor is the nature of police work. The police goal is to prevent crime. It is impossible to measure crimes that are prevented. The service-oriented agency has the problem of measuring output, as has been discussed.

The second factor is the unreliability of crime statistics. Crime statistics do not relate directly to police efforts.

Police can only deter crimes that occur in a place where the police have a right to be. Many crimes are not repressible. The crime statistics do not reflect which crimes are and which are not repressible. The statistics do not discriminate finely enough.

Crime statistics are also vulnerable because they reflect only the crimes that are reported. A recent study has revealed that up to 50 percent of all crimes may go unreported because the victim did not believe the police would be effective or the victim did not believe the offense was a police matter. The reality of this is striking. If a new police program were effective at informing the public about police duties and increasing

public confidence in the police, it would result in an increase in reported offenses.³¹ The program would look like a failure because of the "increased" crime.

Another obstacle to any evaluation of team policing is the possibility that crime will be displaced rather than deterred. If the team earns a good reputation in its area, the burglars might go somewhere else. For this reason, the evaluation must include a reading on crimes in adjacent areas.

When a successful MBP system is implemented, a predictable series of events takes place. Line personnel do not react immediately in favorable manner. For that matter initial reaction may be negative, and production may drop as employees feel out what they perceive as a management trick to get more out of the workers. Then the employees become oriented. They get in the spirit of the thing, so to speak. The more involved they become, the more responsible they feel and the more committed they become. Only then does increased productivity result. In actual field experiences, MBP has not produced the expected results until it had been operational for a year and a half.³²

³¹Elliot, Crime Control Team, p. 71.

³²Rensis Likert, The Human Organization: Its Management and Value, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 80.

Evaluation Design

Because of the obstacles to a thorough evaluation listed above, the evaluation of the experiment was designed to take into consideration as many factors as would be of assistance. The design settled upon is threefold, consisting of 1) crime statistics; 2) police attitude survey; and, 3) citizen attitude survey.

Crime statistics are almost a necessary evil when discussing police effectiveness. The crime statistics to be evaluated for the experiment are those crimes which are generally agreed upon as being repressible. They are: 1) burglary; 2) robbery; 3) auto theft; and, 4) burglary/theft from motor vehicle. Another statistic to be used for evaluation is injury traffic accidents. A five-year data base was gathered for these statistics in both test and control areas. Trend lines were computed.

An instrument has been developed to measure police attitudes. The factors measured were: 1) perception of the organization's management system; 2) attitude towards his job; 3) perception of organization goals; 4) attitude towards citizen participation in law enforcement; 5) perception of police problems indigenous to his area; and, 6) commitment to the goals of the organization.

An attitude survey has also been given to a stratified random sample of the community. Factors measured were; 1) perception of citizen's role in law enforcement;

2) attitudes toward stereotypes of policemen; 3) perception of the police role in the community; 4) knowledge of police problems indigenous to the area; and, 5) attitude toward effectiveness of the local police agency.

Both attitude surveys were given before the experiment and will be given again at the end of the test in both the test and control areas.

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ADDENDUM D
SPEECH BY CHIEF DAVIS
"Five Frontiers of Law Enforcement"

"FIVE FRONTIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT"

BY

CHIEF OF POLICE
EDWARD M. DAVIS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Since the mid-1960's a new era has begun for the law enforcement community in America. Born of the tragic urban riots of that era, some of the proposals to reshape the police role in our society were admittedly revolutionary. In many instances a whole reworking of our governmental process would have been required to satisfy some elements demanding change. However, much good came out of those troubled years. After a period of defensiveness, the police have come to recognize a need for openness with the communities they serve. And change has come. Under my command the Los Angeles Police Department has embarked upon a course designed to cross "five frontiers" which I believe it must confront if it is to provide the kind of police service which Americans expect and which is consistent with the governmental process in a free society.

Our premise today is that we do have urban problems, mainly the crime problem, and that we must better define that problem if we are going to solve it. Defining that problem means looking at every dimension and facet of it. I believe strongly that once you have thoroughly defined a problem the

solution really isn't so important. There can be many different solutions that will probably solve the problem. We have to look at crime and its causes as best we can perceive that. We must look at how crime happens; its effect on the victims; its perpetrators and what they're like. All of its subsequent etiology must be examined for this clear definition.

To get this done, really, we in law enforcement must seek to put into motion an interaction; really five different interactions, some of which are related. We have to get the people and the police together. We have to get the people together with the people. We need to get the police officers, the true line professionals, working with their superiors. We have to get the police together with the police as a team and we must get the police working with the rest of the criminal justice system.

None of these things have ever really been done well on the American police scene, particularly in larger departments. That's an unspoken but much needed realization we must accept.

PEOPLE AND THE POLICE TOGETHER

Almost four years ago now, the Basic Car Plan was begun in Los Angeles. It was essentially an attempt to tie policemen down to a certain geographical responsibility; in other words, to employ the "Territorial Imperative" concept of author Robert Ardrey. Out of it we hoped would come a new

relationship between each policeman and not only the destructive people in that area, but the constructive people in that area. That concept has expanded from simple meetings in school houses to neighborhood meetings, to coffee klatches in individual homes, and to apartments within housing projects.

Every month I debrief some of these policemen and they tell me about some of their successes. As just an example, they told me of a big heroin seizure resulting from Basic Car Plan contacts.

The businessmen in all of our 17 divisions are working to support the policemen in the Basic Car Plan in areas where financial assistance and community support are needed. That can really only be done by people in a particular community who are not only taking something out of it but putting something back in. They've got a stake in that community. The police are important, but these businessmen are smart enough to see that their stake in that community is going to be better insured if the people in the community are living in peace and harmony. As an added bonus we have even had a reduction in crime.

Local women's groups have just been beautiful in this City. Every division has created a support group. At a luncheon recently in the San Fernando Valley I watched women--black women, Mexican-American women, as well as whites--from all over the City getting together to have lunch with the officers

in their area. They had invited their local Police Captain and their Councilman and the policemen in the radio cars.

The lunch itself didn't really do anything. It's not just the idea of feeding policemen. It's all the work they do helping get the police and the rest of that community together. That's what was really wonderful. They were there not just for lunch. They were there to talk about their respective crime problems. And it has worked toward cutting down crime.

PEOPLE AND OTHER PEOPLE WORKING TOGETHER

The idea of people working with others is well-illustrated by our local anti-burglary, "Neighborhood Watch" program. The need seems obvious. It certainly involves more than just burglary because it means people being their neighbors' keeper in a great many ways. And as a result, we have observed the development of a friendliness between people who quite often never talked to one another.

In addition to helping one citizen protect himself from crime because of the help of another. "Neighborhood Watch" has also generated a new social atmosphere; a social organization in our communities which has been generally lacking in large metropolitan areas. It is one of the vital things we have always known had to be done in our cities but whoever thought the police would be the catalytic agent in getting it done?

THE POLICE WORKING WITH THEIR SUPERIORS

If you were to look at the way the average large American police department has been organized decade after decade, you would find its Chief of Detectives and its Chief of Patrol and so forth. In the large urban cities that is generally the case. Years ago I observed that Chief Parker was always alone in his office after 5:30 or 6:00 at night and all of his top brass were gone. I said then, if I ever became Chief, those men who made almost as much money as the Chief were going to earn that pay.

What we have done in Los Angeles is to take the Deputy Chiefs out of their swivel chairs in Parker Center and put them out where the action is so that when they go into that area they can get a feeling for the needs and attitudes of the people in that area.

We have a Chief in the South end, essentially the black areas of Los Angeles. There is one in the Valley, one on the West side, and one for the Central and East portion of town-- essentially the Latin-American portion of the City.

We have changed from the functional organization, where we had the myth of a Chief of Detectives, who was supposed to be supervising all of the detectives all over Los Angeles, and we have gone to a decentralized organization. By putting Chiefs in charge of all of the day-to-day police work in their area, and physically putting them out where it's at,

they love it. They have a truly significant feeling about their job.

One Chief expressed it very well; he said, "When I was in charge of Patrol, I was an administrator in the worst sense of the word. I was dealing with pieces of paper. Now under decentralization, I am dealing with people. I can feel like I might get something done." That's what it means to have the police working with their superiors.

THE POLICE WORKING TOGETHER AS A TEAM

Team policing is another manifestation of police officers working together.

I think of a police organization chart today with policemen and investigators on top. They are the professionals. If you looked at a medical organization, it would be the doctors. Below them you would have support people, the para-professionals, the civilian employees or the "brass" who perform certain necessary functions. It amounts to the kind of thing we are doing with the "TEAM-28" program in an area of our Venice Division. Recently I watched a television show where one of our officers was describing "TEAM-28" to a panel. He described how the "TEAM-28" idea had really worked because the working policemen had gotten together. The uniformed men and the investigators worked together and identified various programs. And then they determined specific solutions. Before that time, a sergeant or lieutenant told them what to do.

I think that's very significant. It's the thing people have talked about for a long while--participation in management--though we are really just getting around to putting it into practice.

We still have a degree of specialization but we know we had too much of it in the past. In the TEAM-28 program, where we have teamed investigators with uniformed officers, we have found that we truly have the police working with the police for the first time.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The last frontier we must confront, though not the least important, is bringing together the police and the criminal justice system. We have never had in this country, in any major metropolitan area, a true, ongoing, organized or deliberate attempt by the criminal justice principals to join forces or to serve the public together. More than a year ago a small informal organization, sometimes described as the "criminal justice group," was formed in Los Angeles. As principals only, our D.A., our Sheriff, the presiding judges of the various courts, the president of the County Bar Association, the top correctional people from Sacramento, our Chief Probation Officer and I all sat down together to discuss matters of mutual concern.

We asked, "What can we do to make this system work better?" It was really the first constructive dialogue we had ever had.

Before that we had to get feedback from one another individually, or from a newspaper, or from a dark alley somewhere. The dialogue that is going on now is much more open and very constructive.

The participants all believe that in this area we haven't really done a bad job. We just haven't done a complete job before. At least now we are attempting to work at it together.

It is my considered opinion in this regard, that, regardless of how well we bring the work of the people and the police together, or the police working with the police or whatever, that without the rest of the criminal justice system doing its job, everything will be for naught. That is what we must strive to resolve.

A demonstration of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system working together grew out of the serious juvenile gang violence problem which erupted last year in Los Angeles. To combat it the criminal justice group organized an ad hoc juvenile justice group. All of us brought pressure to bear on the system. The D.A. had been totally outmatched by the Public Defender in the Juvenile Court for example. We found that the taxpayer's dollar had been put up to have the Public Defender defend all the young burglars and thieves and murderers, but we only had a handful of prosecutors to represent the people. Now, that staff has been increased.

The presiding judge helped, too. He put some new judges into the Juvenile Court, the commitments to the Youth Authority have increased since and juvenile crime is decreasing. That is just a small manifestation of what can happen when we work in concert.

Unfortunately, we haven't really had a significant behavioral change in the judges who sentence adults. They just haven't made the turn-around that the Juvenile Court has. But I would predict that when the judges who handle adult cases begin to feel the same sense of responsibility as those Juvenile Court judges do, crime will go down even more.

I am honestly convinced that we can cut crime in half if we approach these five frontiers actively and effectively, and we can do it in five years. That's the potential and we can do it without spending too much more money.

Four of the five frontiers are directly within my control as Chief of Police. The fifth is between all of us in the system. My colleagues and I have the responsibility to work on that.

Those five frontiers can spell success for the police in our major cities today. They can spell reduced crime, less violence, and a more peaceful existence for the people we serve. If we work at those areas diligently and earnestly, we will bring it off. I think we can do that.

ADDENDUM E
OVERTIME HOURS

CRIME SPECIFIC OVERTIME

	<u>Hours</u>
1. Coffee Klatches	2,507.5
2. Home Inspections	2,008.5
3. Administration (Audits and Reports)	1,104.0
4. TEAM Meetings	1,074.0
5. Community Center	983.0
6. Crime Repression (Planned)	911.8
7. Block Captain (Administration and Recuritment)	698.0
8. Home Security Evaluations	374.0
9. Citizen Survey	357.0
10. Block Captain Functions	251.5
11. Crime Repression (Non-Planned)	183.0
12. Property Marking	167.0
13. TEAM Fair	152.0
14. School Meetings	93.0
15. Crime Control Committee	93.0
16. Alley Marking	71.0
17. TEAM Information (Visiting PD's)	51.0
18. Press Information	<u>6.0</u>
TOTAL HOURS	11,029.3

ADDENDUM F
LETTERS OF COMMENDATIONS AND PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS

COMMENDATORY LETTERS

The entire Venice Area received a total of 182 commendatory letters. Of these, the TEAM received 123 for approximately 67 percent of the letters, while the remainder of Venice Area received approximately 33 percent. It would have been expected that the TEAM personnel, being only one-sixth of the Area, would have received approximately 16 percent of the letters.

The member officers of the TEAM, before the start of the project, received a total of 26 commendatory letters for the previous years they had on the Department, compared to the 123 letters they received in the one year of the TEAM project. This is a 79 percent increase over previous years.

PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS

The total number of personnel complaints for the entire Venice Area for the period of April 1, 1972 to April 1, 1973 was 99. The TEAM accounted for nine percent of the complaints. The TEAM received about half the complaints expected.

ADDENDUM G
DIVISION-WIDE TEAM POLICING PROPOSAL

PROPOSAL TO EXPAND TEAM POLICING
DIVISION-WIDE IN VENICE DIVISION

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that TEAM Policing plan be expanded Division-wide in Venice Division.

BACKGROUND

The last decade has produced a period of change in our society to a degree never before witnessed in the history of the United States. Advances in technology, economics and human development have all contributed to the changing mood of our society with criminal justice agencies feeling the influence of this change probably more than any other segment. Crime has increased at an astronomical rate, and police are faced with problems and situations never before conceived in law enforcement circles.

Traditionally, police have responded to new problems with increases in manpower and installation of new tactics designed to augment their striking force. The changes in our society today mandate totally new concepts of policing be developed that allow the police to work more efficiently among themselves and with community they serve.

In April 1970, in an effort to meet this challenge, the Los Angeles Police Department instituted the Basic Car Plan City-wide. This program was aimed toward an

increased police-community cooperation in order to reduce crime. The plan was a good beginning, but was limited. Investigators were not assigned to teams, and territorial integrity was not maintained. Basic Cars, contrary to program guidelines, were often sent out of their area, and other units frequently worked in the Basic Car districts. Interaction with the community was limited mainly to monthly community meetings and the supervisory structure remained unchanged, with no Sergeant or Lieutenant having a geographical area responsibility on a 24-hour basis.

The Venice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department began its experiment with TEAM Policing in "TEAM-28" in April 1972. The TEAM Policing experiment extended the concept of the Basic Car Plan to include extensive decentralization of both responsibility and authority in a selected Basic Car Plan area. It was hypothesized that TEAM Policing would increase responsibility, authority, and accountability which, in turn, would result in high job interest and, therefore, more commitment toward Department objectives.

The area was selected for the experiment because it was representative, geographically and sociologically, of many areas in Los Angeles. The area is 85 percent white, middle-to-low income, with a mixture of business, industrial and residential areas. The area covers three square miles and has a population of about 36,000.

In the expanded team concept, known as TEAM-28, a Lieutenant commands four Sergeants, six Investigators, 22 Police Officers, three traffic enforcement officers and two accident investigators. In addition, one civilian Administrative Assistant and two Clerk Typists are assigned to the TEAM. This allocation represents about one-sixth of the Division's available manpower. TEAM members were selected from volunteers in the Division but were intended to be a representative cross section (based on rating reports).

The TEAM has 24-hour responsibility for the area, and its Commander assumes all duties normally performed by the patrol and investigative captains at the division level. He has wide latitude to use his men and equipment as he sees fit. No operational help is provided by the Department except for civil disorders or crimes requiring special expertise (i.e., homicide, worthless documents, etc.).

The TEAM patrolmen's duties have been expanded to include handling traffic accidents. Their accident reports are reviewed by one officer, and he "trains" others when there is a need. Although the patrol officers do not have responsibility for investigations, they have been working more closely with the investigators in the TEAM. Previously, after a preliminary investigation they might never see the case again. Now they have

daily contact with investigators and at times assist an investigator in an investigation or an arrest. As they gain expertise through this informal training (an investigator also meets with the men as a group at least once weekly), they begin to take on more responsibility (e.g., patrol officers now handle juvenile cases, interviewing parents and making court referrals).

DISPATCH

The dispatching of TEAM cars out of the TEAM area is not a serious problem in TEAM-28 (only about six percent of radio runs are out of the TEAM area). Calls are screened by Communications Division, and low priority calls are relayed by phone to the Division, where they are handled by calling the party involved and following-up with a run when necessary.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of TEAM-28 is its extensive program obtaining the cooperation of the community. A system of "block captains" (325 in the TEAM area) is established at the beginning of the TEAM operation. They are extremely valuable in transmitting information from the police to the community.

Police may provide information to block captains regarding the modus operandi of a burglar operating in the TEAM area. Block captains alert the residents, and they, in

turn, notify block captains or police if they see anything suspicious. In addition, block captains help residents mark their property for identification with etching tools provided by the TEAM. Every two months, block captains meet with the police and discuss what information to circulate to their neighbors.

In addition, TEAM members meet at least once a year with residents of a block at the block captains' homes. These informal "coffee klatches" (one is held in the area almost every night) enable the police and community to establish a rapport and discuss crime problems and possible solutions.

The TEAM has also made security inspections of over 9,000 homes, providing each resident with a detailed report on how his home could be made more secure (a follow-up audit revealed that 54 percent of area residents had adopted the TEAM's security recommendations).

Other community programs include rap sessions in schools, a "potluck picnic" for block captains and their spouses, block captains' trips to police facilities, and meetings with community groups.

For community mobilization purposes, the TEAM area is subdivided into four sectors. Each sector has a leader and about eight men who are responsible for all community relations activities in their sector.

CRIME CONTROL

The TEAM has experimented with many tactics (aimed primarily at reducing burglaries), including tandem patrol (two cars patrolling parallel streets simultaneously), plainclothes patrol and stakeouts.

Crime analysis is performed by a "crime control committee" made up of an investigative coordinator, a Sergeant and one officer from each watch. They meet weekly to plan and evaluate an approach (tactics and deployment) to crime in the area. The flexibility of the TEAM allows it to meet the deployment recommendations of the crime control committee.

SUPERVISION

Four Sergeants supervise both the day and night watch, Venice Division supervises the morning watch.

Evaluations of patrol officers and investigators are performed by TEAM Sergeants and the investigative coordinator and are based on officers' attitudes, their contribution to developing innovative programs and their contribution to meeting TEAM objectives.

PUBLICITY

The TEAM made use of the traditional media, including television, radio, newspapers, flyers, posters, and even a filmstrip in local movie theaters. The only outward physical changes in the uniform or cars is the "TEAM-28"

symbol on cars. The initial recruitment of block captains by TEAM members also provided good "out-of-car" publicity for the program.

RESULTS

The program appears to have been successful. It has met the objective as well as subjective goals set by participating personnel and has fulfilled federal contractual requirements. Repressible crimes and injury traffic accidents have decreased. Community response has been positive - at times overwhelming. The California average of seven in 1,000 crimes solved through citizen assistance has been dwarfed by the TEAM's 50-70 in 1,000 thus solved.

Most officers have demonstrated heretofore undisclosed positive qualities and have achieved good results through the exercise of individual initiative. All officers involved have become convinced of the value of TEAM Policing with most becoming active disciples in "selling" the TEAM concept. But while TEAM Policing has demonstrated its intrinsic worth on a limited, prescribed scale, a more valid test of the plan would, necessarily include the following:

(1) A Divisional Experimental Base

Problems of inter-TEAM communication and coordination between members of a 300-man divisional team might mitigate the success,

experienced by the 41-man TEAM-28. A larger scale team experiment would afford evaluators the opportunity to note deficiencies.

(2) Microcosmic Area for Experimentation

Venice Division is often referred to as a microcosm of the City of Los Angeles. It embraces nearly every form of sociological group indigenous to the City. Several distinct communities are representative of larger socio-economic counterparts in the greater Los Angeles area.

The Westchester area is representative of the upper middle and upper income areas of Los Angeles. The Palms-Mar Vista area represents the middle and lower middle classes with a high emphasis here on multi-unit residences.

The Oakwood district is a microcosm of the larger black ghetto and Mexican-American barrios. The beachfront area is typically Bohemian populated by the free-swinging, "hippie oriented" group which includes politically radical, homosexual and drug-oriented cultures.

Venice Division appears to be ideal for an experiment, the results of which are to be evaluated for possible City-wide expansion. It is representative of the City both statistically and socio-economically. Distinct communities offer the variables necessary to confront each TEAM with a test of its flexibility. Finally,

attainability in Venice would realistically reflect Los Angeles Police Department capabilities.

IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of TEAM Policing is dependent upon the imagination, resourcefulness and group dynamism of the individual teams.

This conceptual outline of TEAM-28's program is merely a listing of possibilities. Each TEAM should enjoy the flexibility and autonomy to establish its own programs and methods. Those techniques developed by TEAM-28 might prove unworkable or undesirable in other areas. Only the broadest, general guidelines should govern each TEAMS's operation. Those guidelines should reflect the essence of professional police service and might include:

- (1) An impact on crime.
- (2) An effect on crime clearance rates.
- (3) An effect on community attitudes.
- (4) An effect on police attitudes.
- (5) An effect on the quality of police service.

One of the few requirements for implementation is an organization capable of supporting the overall concept. An organizational table complete with individual position requirements is attached. This table is by no means a complete recounting of all duties and responsibilities but is intended only as a planning guide. The proposed organization utilizes only existing personnel and resources.

The existence of pre-training or "team building" cannot be overstressed. It is recommended that at least three days of seminar-type sessions be devoted to launching each team. Even prior to pre-project seminars, smaller conferences, including only supervisory personnel, should be presented. Such pre-team planning was found to eliminate most officer recalcitrance toward becoming an active team participant and, in the instance of TEAM-28, was responsible for overcoming many barriers between patrol-investigative-traffic specialists.

Pre-seminar sessions, as well as the actual training seminars, would expose participants to such concepts as the territorial imperative, participative management and management by objectives. Teams would not be required to install these systems, but would be familiarized with positive and negative aspects of each.

Under the present organizational structure, five teams will assume almost total policing responsibility for Venice Division. Each team has tentatively been allocated a geographical area which embraces a homogeneously distinct community.

While Venice Division logically divides itself into these five areas, each is not representative of an equal policing problem. Workload studies are currently underway to determine project manpower allocation.

It is felt that the maintenance of community identity far exceeds the value of attempting to establish equal (but gerrymandered) team areas. It is recognized that certain investigations could further burden effected teams. For these reasons, specialized investigative sections are established. Experts assigned to these units (Vice, Narcotics, Homicide, major crimes and forgery) would further assist teams by performing training and auditing functions. They would serve as ad hoc inspection and control personnel to assure team conformance to reporting and investigatory standards.

HEADQUARTERS CONCEPT

A headquarters concept has been installed to man the station, fulfill all fixed post requirements and generally provide all support services necessary to operate the division's physical plant. No unplanned drain would be placed on any team and all teams would have the advantage of being purely operational.

COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM

A possible problem of inter-TEAM communications has been recognized and answered in the form of "TEAM's collator," or analytical officer. The collator's duties are outlined in another section of this proposal.

CHIEF
OFFICE
OPERATIONS
S WEST
J
VISION
III
MMANDER

ADJUTANT SGT. II
SR. CLK. STENO - SEC.

INSPECTION AND CONTROL
ADMIN. ASSISTANT

OPERATIONS DIVISION
CAPTAIN I OIC

ADJUTANT SGT. II
SR. CLK. STENO - SEC.

INTERNAL INVESTIGATION
SGT. I

HQ
LT.

ANALYTICAL

AM WATCH
SGT. II W/C

DAY
SGT

TION
OIC

COMMUNITY RELATIONS
SUPPORT UNIT
SGT. I

SPECIAL INVEST. DIVISION
CAPTAIN I OIC

TEAM #1
LT. I - OIC

REC
PRIN.

TCH
I W/C

PM WATCH
SGT. II W/C

ADJUTANT SGT. II
SR. CLK. STENO - SEC.

TEAM #2
LT. I - OIC

DS
K. OIC

INVESTIGATIVE AUDIT
UNIT

TEAM #3
LT. I - OIC

MAINT
STA. OF

K

VICE UNIT
SGT. II - OIC

TEAM #4
LT. I - OIC

PROP

ANCE
OIC

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
LT. I OIC

LAX
LT. I - OIC

GAR

TY

NARCOTICS UNIT

HOMICIDE AND MAJOR
CRIME UNIT

FORGERY UNIT

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF VENICE AREA

I. OFFICE OF THE AREA COMMANDER

Commander, Venice Area - Responsibility of Command

The Commander of Venice Area exercises line command over the employees assigned to Venice Area. He exercises staff responsibility over all matters relating to, or concerned with, the fulfillment of the function of the Operations-West Bureau in Venice Area.

Adjutant to the Area Commander - Function

The adjutant to the Area Commander serves as liaison officer between the Captain and the Department, general public, the press and other government agencies.

Inspection and Control Unit - Function

The Inspection and Control Unit shall assist the Area Commander in systems control, operations inspection, budgetary planning and control, and other staff responsibilities as required.

The Inspection and Control Unit shall also be responsible for assisting the Area Commander evaluate the effectiveness of TEAM Policing in Venice Division.

II. HEADQUARTERS SECTION, VENICE AREA

Headquarters Section - Functions

The Headquarters Section, Venice Area shall be responsible for the following functions:

- A. Command of Venice Division station on a 24-hour basis.
- B. Providing pre-booking advice, counselling, report approval, and assistance to TEAM officers when TEAM supervisors are not available.
- C. Maintenance and operation of the Venice Area jail.
- D. Operation of the Venice Area desk on a 24-hour basis.
- E. Maintenance of the Venice Area facility.
- F. Functional supervision over property and garage operations within Venice Area.
- G. Providing the bail auditing function for Venice Area.

O.I.C. Headquarters Section, Venice Area

Under the direction of the Area Commander, the O.I.C. of the Headquarters Section shall provide line command over all personnel and functions of that section.

The O.I.C. of the Headquarters Section will be responsible for the following special duties:

- A. Supervision of personnel complaint investigations conducted by the Internal Investigation Officer.

B. Supervision of the operations of the Community Relations Unit and assisting the Area Commander in meeting his community responsibilities.

Internal Investigation Unit - Headquarters Section - Functions

The officer assigned to the Internal Investigation Section shall be responsible for the investigation of area personnel complaints as assigned by the Area Commander.

Community Relations Unit - Functions

The Community Relations Unit shall be responsible for the coordination of Divisional youth programs, dissemination of crime prevention information to the public, assisting groups and individuals interested in crime prevention and TEAM Policing, providing staff assistance to the TEAMS as required and coordinating the police reserve program.

Watch Commanders, Headquarters Section - Function

Under the direction of the O.I.C. Headquarters Section, the A.M., Day, and P.M. Watch Commanders shall have line command over all station personnel and operations including Jail, Desk and Records, and for maintenance operations on their watch. In addition, the watch commanders shall provide pre-booking advice, counselling, report approval and assistance to TEAM officers when TEAM supervisors are not available. They shall maintain

functional supervision over Property and Garage operations, and supervise the Bail Auditing function.

Records Unit - Headquarters Section - Function

Under the direction of the Headquarters Section O.I.C., the Records Unit shall be responsible for the coordination of the records-keeping function in Venice Area.

Headquarters Desk, Headquarters Section - Functions

Under the direction of the Headquarters Section Watch Commander, the desk shall provide standard desk operational support for all TEAMS, 24 hours a day, including the handling of citizen requests and reports, issuance of equipment, and operation of the Gamewell system.

Jail, Headquarters Section - Functions

Under the direction of the Headquarters Section Watch Commander, the jail shall provide standard jail service to all area TEAMS 24 hours a day.

Maintenance Unit, Headquarters Section - Functions

Under the direction of the Headquarters Section Watch Commander, the maintenance unit shall provide for proper maintenance of station facilities and equipment 24 hours a day in accordance with current policy and regulations.

III. OPERATIONS DIVISION

Operations Division - Functions

The Operations Division has primary responsibility for performing the patrol, investigative and traffic functions of Venice Area.

Commanding Officer, Operations Division, Responsibility of Command

Under the direction of the Area Commander, the Commanding Officer of the Operations Division exercises line command over the Division TEAM Leaders. He will be responsible for coordinating and controlling TEAM operations to insure they meet Department objectives.

Adjutant to the Commanding Officer, Operations Section - Functions

The adjutant to the Operations Division Commanding Officer serves as liaison officer between the Captain and the Department, general public, the press, and other governmental agencies.

Analytical Section - Functions

The Operations Division Analytical Unit shall be responsible for stimulating coordination and cooperation between TEAMS by performing the intelligence, information gathering and dissemination functions. The Analytical Unit shall form a central repository for information coming to the attention of TEAM personnel concerning persons, vehicles, places, incidents, and crimes. He

will further gather relevant data of this and other types from other sections of the Police Department and outside agencies. The unit shall review, evaluate, and disseminate this information to all concerned personnel.

TEAM Leader, Operations Division

A TEAM Leader, under the direction of the Commanding Officer, Operations Division, shall be responsible for exercising line command over the operations of a specified geographic section within Venice Area on a 24-hour basis. The TEAM leader shall have jurisdiction over patrol, traffic, investigation, community relations, and parking control activities within his assigned area except those special duties assigned to the Support Headquarters Section of Venice Area. He will be responsible for directing TEAM personnel toward TEAM and Department objectives.

Geographic TEAM Unit - Functions

Under the direction of the TEAM leader, the Geographic TEAM Unit shall be responsible for providing the following service in its assigned area.

1. Uniformed patrol services.
2. Traffic - including traffic enforcement and accident investigation.
3. Investigation of all crimes involving adults and juveniles except those assigned to the Special Investigation Division.

4. The development and maintenance of crime prevention and community mobilization programs which are responsive to the needs of the community.
5. Parking control.

IV. SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION

The Special Investigation Division is responsible for the investigation of felonies and misdemeanors which come within its jurisdiction, for apprehending, interrogating, and prosecuting offenders, and for effecting the recovery of stolen property. The Division will also be responsible for the investigative administrative analysis function within Venice Area.

Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division, Responsibility of Command

Under the direction of the Area Commander, the Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division, exercises line command over Division personnel. He is responsible for the investigation of offenses which fall within the jurisdiction of his command. He also is responsible for apprising the Area Commander of vice conditions within Venice Area.

The Commanding Officer will have the special duty of maintaining liaison between probation and parole personnel.

Adjutant to the Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division - Functions

The adjutant to the Operations Division Commanding Officer serves as liaison officer between the Captain and the Department, general public, the press, and other government agencies.

INVESTIGATIVE AUDIT UNIT - FUNCTIONS

Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division, the Investigative Audit Unit shall be responsible for analysis of crime trend patterns throughout the Division, auditing of reports investigated or completed by TEAM investigators, notification to the concerned TEAMS of errors, omissions, or deficiencies in written reports.

The unit shall also be responsible for coordinating the release of impounded vehicles.

Vice Section - Functions

Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division, the Vice Unit shall be responsible for the investigation of divisional vice complaints and vice problem locations. The unit shall be responsible for the completion of related reports and for keeping the Division Commanding Officer apprised of vice conditions within Venice Area and other intelligence information.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION SECTION - FUNCTIONS

The Special Investigation Section shall be responsible for the Area-wide investigation of homicide, forgery, and other major crimes occurring within Venice Area.

Officer-In-Charge - Special Investigation Section

Under the command of the Commanding Officer, Special Investigation Division, the Officer-in-Charge of the Special Investigation Section shall be responsible for the line command over all personnel assigned to his section.

Narcotics Unit - Functions

Under the direction of the Officer-in-Charge of the Special Investigation Section, the Narcotics Unit will be responsible for the investigation of area narcotic complaints and apprehension of division narcotic offenders. He shall also be responsible for completion of related reports and for keeping the Area Commander apprised of Divisional narcotic problems.

Homicide and Major Crime Unit - Functions

Under the direction of the Officer-in-Charge, Special Investigation Section, the Homicide and Major Crime Section will have Area-wide responsibility for the investigation of all homicides and major crimes.

Forgery Unit - Functions

Under the direction of the Officer-in-Charge, Special Investigation Section, the Forgery Unit will have Division-wide responsibility for the investigation of forgery violations.

PROPOSED SECURITY ORDINANCE

THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES

DO ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

Division 67 of Article 1 of Chapter IX of the Los Angeles Municipal Code is hereby added to read:

SEC. 91.6701 - PURPOSE

The purpose of this Division is to provide a nominal level of resistance to unlawful entry of buildings by establishing minimum standards of construction and hardware for the closure of openings regulated by this Division.

This ordinance shall become effective 120 days after the date of publication.

SEC. 91.6702 - GENERAL

In every Group G, H and R Occupancy, the openings regulated by this Division shall be completely secured in accordance with the provisions specified herein.

EXCEPTION: The requirements of this Division shall not apply to:

1. Detached buildings which are accessory to Group R-1 Occupancies.
2. Group G Occupancies which, by the nature of their operation, are unenclosed.

ADDENDUM H
PROPOSED SECURITY ORDINANCE

3. Group G Occupancies where the owner submits written notice to the Department of intent to substitute security personnel and/or site security installations in lieu of the requirements of this Division. Such exemption shall be subject to the concurrence of the Department and shall be one of the conditions upon which the Certificate of Occupancy is issued.

SEC. 91.6703 - LIMITATIONS

The provisions of this Division shall not be applicable to latching or locking devices on exit doors which would be contrary to the provisions of Division 33 or Division 49, nor shall the regulations of this Division be construed to waive any other provision of this Code.

SEC. 91.6704 - ALTERNATE SECURITY PROVISIONS

The provisions of this Division are not intended to prevent the use of any device, hardware, or method of construction, not specifically prescribed in this Division, when such alternate provides equivalent security and is approved by the Department.

SEC. 91.6705 - DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Division, certain terms are defined as follows:

CYLINDER GUARD. A ring surrounding the exposed portion of the lock cylinder, or any other device which is so fastened as to protect the cylinder from wrenching, prying, cutting, or pulling by attack tools. The ring shall be made from steel or brass and shall have a minimum taper of 15 degrees.

DEADLOCKING LATCH. A latch in which the latch bolt is positively held in the projected position by a guard bolt, a plunger or an auxiliary mechanism.

DEADBOLT. A bolt which has no automatic spring action and which is operated by a key cylinder, thumbturn, or lever, and is held fast when in the projected position.

LATCH. A device for automatically retaining a door, upon its closing, in a closed position.

SECURITY OPENING. An opening in a wall, partition, or roof when such opening occurs in any of the following locations:

1. In an exterior wall and less than 16 feet above the grade of any adjoining yard, court, passageway, public way, walk, breezeway, patio, planter, porch or similar area.
2. In an exterior wall and less than 16 feet above the surface of any adjoining roof, balcony, landing, stairtread, platform, or similar structure when that surface is accessible to the public or another tenant or when any portion of such surface is itself less than 16 feet above an accessible grade.
3. In the enclosing partitions of a dwelling unit, private garage, guestroom or single-tenant non-residential area.

4. In a roof when any portion of such roof is less than 16 feet above an accessible grade or surface accessible by another tenant or the public.

SEC. 91.6706 - ENTRY VISION

In residential occupancies, all entry doors to dwelling units or guest rooms shall be arranged so that the occupant has a view of the area immediately outside the door without opening the door. Such view may be provided by a door viewer, through windows located in the vicinity of the door, or through view ports in the door or adjoining wall. View ports shall be small so as to prevent a person outside the door from reaching the required locking devices or the windows and view ports shall be located more than 40 inches from such locks when the door is in the closed position.

SEC. 91.6707 - APPURTENANT ACCESS

Buildings located within 8 feet of utility poles or similar structures which could otherwise be used to gain access to the building's roof, balcony or similar surfaces shall have access to such building surfaces protected by screens, barricades or fences made of materials which preclude human climbing. Such protection shall extend to where the surfaces are more than 8 feet from the pole or access structure.

SEC. 91.6710 - DOORS - GENERAL

Every door in a security opening shall be constructed, installed, and secured as set forth in Sections 91.6711, 91.6712, 91.6713 and 91.6714.

SEC. 91.6711 - SWINGING DOORS

(a) Swinging doors shall conform to one of the following types of construction:

1. Wood flush-type door 1 3/8 inches thick minimum with a solid core of wood, or particle board of 25 pcf density.

2. Wood panel-type door 1 3/8 inches thick minimum with all panels fabricated from material not less than 3/8 inch in thickness provided all shaped portions of the panels are not less than 1/4 inch thick.

3. Ferrous metal doors with surfaces not less than 16 gage in thickness.

4. Unframed glass doors of not less than 1/2 inch, fully tempered glass.

5. Narrow-framed glass doors having a single pane of 1/4 inch fully tempered glass in metal frames.

Glazing in doors shall comply with Section 91.6720.

(b) A single-swinging door, the active leaf of a pair of doors, and the bottom leaf of Dutch doors shall be equipped with a deadbolt and deadlocking latch. The deadbolt and latch may be activated by one lock or by individual locks. Deadbolts shall contain hardened inserts to repel cutting tools. The lock or locks shall be key-operated from the exterior side of the door and openable from the interior side by a device which

does not require a key, special knowledge, or special effort to operate.

EXCEPTION:

1. The latch may be omitted from doors in Group G Occupancies.

2. In other than residential buildings, locks may be key operated on the inside when not prohibited by the provisions of Division 33.

3. A swinging door greater than 5 feet in width may be secured as set forth in Section 91.6713.

A straight deadbolt shall have a minimum throw of one inch and an embedment of not less than 5/8 inch into the holding device receiving the projected bolt. A hook-shaped or an expanding-lug deadbolt shall have a minimum throw of 3/4 inch. All deadbolts of locks which automatically activate two or more deadbolts shall embed at least 1/2 inch into the holding devices receiving the projected bolts.

(c) The inactive leaf of a pair of doors and the upper leaf of Dutch doors shall be equipped with a deadbolt or deadbolts as set forth in Subsection (b).

EXCEPTION:

1. The deadbolt or bolts need not be key operated, but shall not be otherwise activated from the exterior side of the door.

2. The deadbolt or bolts may be engaged or disengaged automatically with the deadbolt or by another device on either the active leaf or the lower leaf.

3. Manually-operated hardened bolts at the top and bottom of the leaf which embed a minimum of 1/2 inch into the receiving device may be used when not prohibited by Division 33.

(d) Door stops of in-swinging doors shall be of one-piece construction with the jamb, or joined by a rabbet to the jamb.

(e) All pin-type hinges which are accessible from outside the secured area when the door is closed shall have non-removable hinge pins. In addition, such hinges shall have jamb studs which project through both hinge leaves and prevent removal of the door if the pin is removed from the hinge. Jamb studs shall be not less than 1/4 inch diameter steel and shall project into the door and jamb not less than 1/4 inch.

EXCEPTION:

Jamb studs are not required for hinges which are shaped to prevent removal of the door if the hinge pin is removed.

(f) Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

(g) The strike plate for latches and the holding device for projecting deadbolts in wood construction shall be secured to the jamb and wall framing with screws not less than 2 1/2 inches in length and in aluminum construction shall be secured in an area of reinforced or heavy gauge jamb material.

SEC. 91.6712 - SLIDING GLASS DOORS

Sliding glass doors shall be equipped with locking devices and shall be so constructed and installed that they remain intact and engaged when subjected to the tests specified in Section 91.6731. Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools. A device shall be installed in the upper channel of the moving panel to prohibit raising and removal of the moving panel from the track while in the closed or partially open position.

SEC. 91.6713 - OVERHEAD AND SLIDING DOORS

Metal or wooden overhead and sliding doors shall be secured with a cylinder lock, padlock with a minimum 9/32" diameter hardened steel shackle and bolted, hardened steel hasps, metal slide board, bolt or equivalent device unless secured by an electrical power operation.

Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise type cylinder locks whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SEC. 91.6714 - METAL ACCORDION-GRATE OR GRILLE-TYPE DOORS

Metal accordion-grate or grille-type doors shall be equipped with metal guides at the top and bottom and cylinder locks or padlocks having minimum 9/32" hardened steel shackles with hardened steel hasps, bolted in place. Cylinder guards shall be installed on all mortise or rim-type cylinder locks whenever the cylinder projects beyond the face of the door or is otherwise accessible to gripping tools.

SEC. 91.6720 - GLAZED OPENINGS - GENERAL

All windows, skylights, glazing in doors, or other glazing in security openings shall conform to the applicable requirements of Section 91.6721, 91.6722 and 91.6723.

Glazed openings are prohibited within 40 inches of the required locking device of the door in the closed and locked position when the door is openable from the inside without the use of a key.

EXCEPTION:

The provisions of this section shall not apply to the tempered glass in the glass doors specified in 91.6711, or in the sliding glass doors in 91.6712.

SEC. 91.6721 - GLAZING

In Group G Occupancies, panes of glazing with a least dimension greater than six inches, but less than 48 inches shall be constructed of fully tempered glass or approved burglary

resistant material or shall be protected by metal bars or grilles which are constructed to preclude human entry.

SEC. 91.6722 - WINDOWS

(a) Sliding glass windows shall be provided with locking devices and shall be so constructed and installed that they remain intact and engaged when subjected to the tests specified in Section 91.6732. A device shall be installed in the upper channel of the moving panel to prohibit the raising and removal of the moving panel from the track while in the closed or partially open position.

(b) Other openable windows shall be provided with substantial locking devices which render the building as secure as the devices required by this section. In G Occupancies, such devices shall be glide bars, bolts, cross bars, and/or padlocks with minimum 9/32" hardened steel shackles and bolted, hardened steel hasps.

(c) Special. Louvered windows shall be protected by metal bars or grilles which are constructed to preclude human entry.

SEC. 91.6723 - OPENINGS OTHER THAN DOORS OR GLAZED OPENINGS

(a) Security openings other than doors or glazed openings shall be protected in accordance with the requirements of this Section.

(b) Hatchway covers of less than 1 3/4-inch thick solid wood construction shall be covered on the inside with 16 gauge

sheet metal attached by screws around the perimeter spaced at 6-inch maximum centers.

(c) Hatchway covers shall be secured from the inside with slide bars, slide bolts, and/or padlocks with hardened steel shackles. Hasps shall be hardened steel and bolted.

(d) Outside pin-type hinges shall be provided with non-removable pins.

(e) Other openings exceeding 96 square inches in area with a least dimension exceeding six inches shall be guarded by metal bars or grilles which are constructed to preclude human entry. Such openings are prohibited where glazed openings are prohibited.

SEC. 91.6730 - TESTS - GENERAL

Doors, windows, and similar closures of security openings regulated by the provisions of this Division, including the frames, jambs, hardware and locking devices of such closures, shall be shown to satisfactorily pass the tests specified in this Division. The tests shall be performed by an approved testing laboratory on the units as installed at the job site or installed in test assemblies constructed according to the manufacturer's details. Each typical job installation shall be tested or the units shall be constructed and installed in conformance to a General Approval issued by the Department.

SEC. 91.6731 - TESTS - SLIDING GLASS DOORS

Panels shall be closed and locked. Tests shall be performed in the following order:

(a) Test A. With the panels in the normal position, a concentrated load of 300 pounds shall be applied separately to each vertical pull stile incorporating a locking device at a point on the stile within 6 inches of the locking device in the direction parallel to the plane of glass that would tend to open the door.

(b) Test B. Repeat Test A while simultaneously adding a concentrated load of 150 pounds to the same area of the same stile in a direction perpendicular to the plane of glass toward the interior side of the door.

(c) Test C. Repeat Test B with 150 pound force in the reverse direction towards the exterior side of the door.

(d) Tests D, E, and F. Repeat Tests A, B, and C with the movable panel lifted upwards to its full limit within the confines of the door frame.

(e) Movable panels shall not be rendered easily openable or removable from the frame during or after the tests or the panel shall have failed the test.

SEC. 91.6732 - TESTS - SLIDING GLASS WINDOWS

Sash shall be closed and locked. Tests shall be performed in the following order:

(a) Test A. With the sliding sash in the normal position, a concentrated load of 150 pounds shall be applied separately to each sash member incorporating a locking device at a point on the sash member within six inches of the locking device in the direction parallel to the plane of glass that would tend to open the window.

(b) Test B. Repeat Test A while simultaneously adding a concentrated load of 75 pounds to the same area of the same sash member in the direction perpendicular to the plane of glass toward the interior side of the window.

(c) Test C. Repeat Test B with the 75 pounds force in the reversed direction towards the exterior side of the window.

(d) Tests D, E, and F. Repeat Tests A, B, and C with the movable sash lifted upwards to its full limit within the confines of the window frame.

(e) Movable panels shall not be rendered easily openable or removable from the frame during or after the tests or the panel shall have failed the test.

ADDENDUM I
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

- 1 Lieutenant I Officer-In-Charge
- 1 Sergeant II Assistant Officer-In-Charge
- 3 Sergeant I Field Supervisors
- 28 Policemen
- 4 Investigators
- 1 Administrative Assistant
- 2 Clerk Typists

END