
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
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VICTIMIZATION ANALYSIS DALLAS, FEXAS

September, 1974

DALLAS AREA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL

Summary



AN ANALYSIS OF PERSONAL, HOUSEHOLD,

AND COMMERCIAL VICTIMIZATION IN DALLAS, TEXAS

for the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council

Wes Wise, Mayor, City of Dallas, Chairman Don Cleveland, Executive Director

Funding provided by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration U.S. Department of Justice

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A Report Prepared By INTERGOVERNMENTAL ADVISORS

Thomas J. Mikulecky, Principal Consultant Robert Bogomolny, Consultant Andre Inn, Consultant Cynthia Sparling, Consultant

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VICTIMIZATION STUDY

Introduction and Purpose

A primary concern of local policy makers and administrators is ascertaining the real effectiveness or impact of public services on the problems of the community and citizens being served. Data on service impact is difficult to find in most criminal justice program areas, and evaluation of a particular program or budgetary allocation is often made on the basis of the amount of activity generated by the organization rather than success in solving a particular problem or attaining a specific goal. For example, in the area of housing code enforcement, information usually available includes data on the number of inspections made, violations found and cases filed, but rarely any data on the number of housing units actually brought up to code standards as compared with the total actual problem of housing deterioration. The same is true in law enforcement and the overall criminal justice system. As citizens and public officials, we tend to appraise our police force on the number of arrests made or whether the reported crime rate has gone up or down. Once again, we are measuring only the activity of either the police or other persons in relation ot the police function. Courts are quite incorrectly evaluated on the size of their conviction rate on the severity of sentences given. Local policy makers have failed to define an agreed function and determine and establish goals for the components of the criminal justice system; they have further failed to establish quantifiable criteria by which success in actually performing these functions and attaining these goals can be evaluated. The criminal justice system is highly complex to the citizen and to the practitioner. The system therefore requires that several forms of evaluation measurements be built into the various phases of the system's operation,

including studies of victimization by crime measured against reported crime and compared with demographic, social and economic data of the community. Teh 1974 Crime Victimization Study of Dallas is the first step in such an overall approach to analysis of the effectiveness and the productivity of the criminal justice system. The primary purpose of this first step is to establish an accurate picture of who is victimized by crime, by whom, and to what extent. Second, some observations can be made on the experiences in receiving reports of crimes committed as opposed to those crime's committed and not reported.

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The study has been funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice, pursuant to its authority to provide timely data on crime and its impact on society, the survey having been performed in Dallas and seve other "Impact" cities. The study was based on surveys conducted in Dallas during 1972 by the Bureau of the Census of approximately 12,000 housing units (the National Crime Survey (NCS)). It has been limited in its scope and value by limitations in the data available, The overall National Crime Survey data used in the report are derived from 1971-1972 census surveys, thereby being somewhat outdated when compared with 1973 and 1974 data. Increases in the occurrences of most index crimes between 1971 and 1973 can therefore not be substantiated as a follow-up survey has not been conducted.

Second, NCS and Commercial Victimization Survey data was available on a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area basis only; smaller area data such as by cities or neighborhoods, indicating different patterns of crime and their relationships to the characteristics of neighborhoods or communities within the city were not available. Such generalized are-wide data can only provide

general conclusions and contribute minimally to such administrative decisions as deployment of patrols to high crime areas.

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Third, only limited comparisions were possible between Uniform Crime Reports and NCS or CVS survey data, due to the fact that different types of information are involved covering different geographical areas. Thus, the NCS and CVS surveys include a number of business burglaries, business robberies, and business thefts from surrounding communities as well as the central city of Dallas, and thereby inflate the difference between police statistics and the community samples.

There is one other source of possible inconsistency between police Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) statistics and the NCS results. For the NCS, a complete description of a criminal victimization was computer coded and classified into certain NCS crime categories based upon the presence or absence of certain elements in the incident. Since this description identifies various aspects of information, the NCS classified scheme is able to utilize this information to show combinations of events, e.g. when a person is assaulted and robbed at the same time. On the other hand, the UCR classification scheme depends on a hierarchy of seriousness to select only one aspect of a combination event for classification; e.g., an assault and robbery are classified as robbery only. Therefore, the indeterminate number of combinations of events again will tend to inflate the amount of crime reported to the census officials and distort the difference between police UCR statistics and the NCS results.

Finally, any complete comparisons of crime reporting behavior among various ethnic groups was hindered by the inclusion of Mexican-American with the white population in the Bureau of the Census statistics. While such combinations might not alter significantly the value of the crimeculture analysis in many northern or eastern cities, it does significantly

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
lessen the quality of such analysis in Dallas where a significant minority of the population is Mexican-American and a strictly black-white victimoffender analysis is incomplete.

The Crime Reporting System in Dallas

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The majority of reported crimes in Dallas enter the criminal-justice system through the Dallas Police Department. Either a direct report of a crime committed or a request for service is channeled to the department's Report Divison. A service number is assigned to each suspected offense, and a record of the incident is created in the "call file"; all such incidents which reach the status of a reported offense or crime are provided with a Crime Classification Code number. The crime then moves through a process of coding and classification concurrently with police investigative, apprehension and arrest work. This entire process is outlined in Figure 1:



It is speculated that there are a number of crimes which are not reported by persons and businesses which have been victimized. Their reasons are either based on their perception of what will happen to these reports once they have been received (for example, whether it is worth the effort), the nature of the crime (the greater the financial loss, the more often reported), and the extent of personal involvement in that crime and possible personal consequences involved in reporting. The summary of the victimization study which follows can only be considered a beginning in the process of intelligent data gathering and analysis before such efforts can have any useful impact on the most effective utilization of personnel within the criminal justice system.

The responsiveness of the Dallas Police Department to crime reports and, therefore, to calls for service by the citizenry, will be governed to a significant degree by the speed and efficiency of the report disposition process. Citizens will report crimes based on their anticipated or past experience with what the outcomes will be from the report in terms of recovery of stolen articles, the possibilities of an arrest, the prospect of having to become personally involved in prosecution, etc. The accuracy and validity of crime reports may therefore be a partial means by which the effectiveness of the department's system for receiving and disposing of crime reports may be evaluated. This study did not call for such an internal management analysis of any of the organizations within the system of their effectiveness; it did call for some presumptions to be made on the basis of divergencies between presumed actual crime data and reported crime. Divergencies in the data can at least in this way lead to directions for further organizational-management study and inquiry into citizen behavioral patterns. This is, therefore, an initial study into the actual extent of crime and victimization,

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as opposed to the presumed problem based on misleading data. It is expected to lead to additional studies into the manner in which the police, prosecution, courts, and correction subsystems receive their crime information, and how it might be managed in order to provide more expeditious and effective service.

Summary of Findings:

Estimated Rate per


100,000 Persons

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The Nature and Extent of Personal Victimization


Crimes subject to the survey were generalized by the data into three categories: assault with theft, assault without theft, and personal theft withoutassault. The extent of victimization experienced by Dallas is outlined in Table 1:



Assaultive Violence With Theft

TABLE 1 Extent of Personal Victimization in Dallas

The specific index crimes areas in these categories are murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, theft over \$50 and auto theft. Some of the highlights of the findings discussed in detail in the full report include the following:




Assaultive Violence Without Theft

Personal Theft Without Assault

Fully 70 percent of all personal victimizations involved assault, but without the motive of theft. The report relates this data to the extent of injury, the race of the offender and victim, the time of day of occurrence, whether or not a report of the crime was made by the victim.

It was found that the majority of such crimes required emergency room treatment but little or no hospitalization. The extent of injury was not great judging from the minimum loss of employment time on the part of the victim. When property was stolen it was generally less than \$100. Males were victimized more frequently than females and white males were the recipients of most offenses committed by both black and white offenders, although white and black females were victimized about equally. Young persons in Dallas were more frequently victimized. Table 2 indicates that as age increased likelihood of victimization decreased.



100,000 Persons

12-15 16-19 20-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65+

TABLE 2 Extent of Personal Victimization By Age of Victim

Unmarried and unemployed persons were also more likely to be victims of such crimes. Vulnerability of such persons to crime, and accessibility of such persons to criminals might be the speculative explanation. A further

YEARS

explanation lies in part in the observation that the offender tended to choose a victim of generally his own age group, meaning that crimes against persons were largely perpetrated by and against persons in the younger (12-30) age group. The locations seem to point to school areas and grounds as a likely place for such personal assaults. It was also observed that the home was a location for a large percentage of assaults, and also where the reporting rate was particularly low.

Crimes were shown to occur fairly equally day and ght, although the largest number occurring at night did occur between 6:00 p.m. and midnight within the home. Of those personal victimizations that did not occur in the home, the majority occurred in parks and on streets. Offenders frequently acted alone and committed a crime against another person also alone, and would most often be a stranger to the victim. The amount of stranger crime in Dallas appears to be substantial, as indicated in Table 3.


3500 +	
3000 -	
Estimated 2500-	
Rate per 100,000 2000	
Persons 1500	
1000	
500-	

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TABLE 3 Extent of Personal Victimization By Strangers or Not Strangers

Both white and black offenders committed most of their crimes against white citizens. The white offender would in the majority of cases be older than the black offender (over 21 as compared to the black being under 21).

page 8



Not Stranger Stranger

There was also an affinity for a young offender to commit a crime against a person near his own age. Males were more likely to try to protect themselves against offenders, although younger males and females resisted and protected themselves approximately equally.

Table 4 indicates that the majority of personal victimizations were not reported to police. Approximately 59.4 percent of total incidents occurring were not reported. This was especially true of younger males and females. Racial comparisons showed blacks more likely to report crime than whites. Male victims reported only 37.2 percent of the crimes in which they were involved, although when theft was involved in an assault their reporting rate was greater. Assault without theft or theft without assault alone went unreported in the majority of cases.





TABLE 4 Personal Incidents Reported or Not Reported to Police

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Assaultive Violence Without Theft

Personal Theft Without Assault

Young males and females between the ages of twelve and nineteen were more likely to let crimes go unreported. Other male age groups showed that crimes went unreported about as often as they were reported. That same observation is true for females. Older females were far more likely to report personal victimization. Generally the failure of young persons to report crime accounts largely for the trend toward under reporting. The racial breakdown of these statistics reveals that white victims of all age groups were slightly less likely to report crimes than black victims. When a white person was assaulted without theft, he would choose not to report more often (65.7 percent) than any other kind of incident.

The Nature and Extent of Household and Commercial Victimization Included here are crimes against property with effects upon an entire

household or business rather than any and auto theft.


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
The crime of larceny or theft from Dallas households dominated these statistics as seen in Table 5. Table 6 shows the majority of such crimes to be under reported. Burglaries involving actual breaking and entering, and auto thefts, were of lesser importance. No significant relationships could be drawn between the character of crimes and the number of housing units in a given structure. No statistical difference was apparent between owner and renter-occupied households, the extent of victimization being approximately equal. Non-household crimes of larceny took place largely in street and park locations. And auto theft tended to affect younger persons more frequently than older persons.

Losses from larceny victimizations were for the most part of less than \$100.00 value, and most of these property losses went unrecovered. The more

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Included here are crimes against property with effects upon an entire household or business rather than any one person, such as burglary, larceny








TABLE 6 Household Incidents Reported or Not Reported to Police

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valuable the loss, however, the greater the likelihood of recovery. Larceny was primarily a problem against white households, while burglary and auto theft was directed against black bouseholds producing an overall higher rate for blacks. Regardless of race, however, the higher the income level of the household, the higher the crime rate as shown in Table 7. And the favored time of day for all of these categories of crimes against all victimized properties was at night.


	60,000	
	55,000	
	50,000	
	45,000	
Estimated Rate per 100,000 Persons	40,000	
	35,000	
	30,000	
	25,000	
	20,000	
	15,000	
	10,000	
	5,000	
		under

\$3,000 \$3,000 7,499


TABLE 10 Extent of Household Victimization By Income of Head of Household

A study was also made of crimes occurring in commercial establishments. Businesses were victimized in a somewhat different pattern. The survey data indicates that approximately 20 percent of all Dallas businesses were victimized by burglary, larceny, or auto theft during the reporting period. Burglaries dominated these statistics among retail, wholesale, real estate,

page 12



service, and manufacturing businesses as seen by comparing Tables 8 and 9. Retail businesses were especially vulnerable. Losses to burglary usually resulted in losses over \$250 in victimizations which occurred during night hours.



Retail Wholesale Real Estate Service Manufacturing

TABLE 9 Burglary Rate in Dallas Among Businesses

Robberies, on the other hand, usually occurred during the day and were committed by a person acting alone. Profile data describes the likely offender to be black, 21 years of age or older, and probably armed. Many of the businesses victimized once by burglary or robbery were likely to be victimized again.

It can be speculated that with the majority of non-reporting rationalizations in the "nothing could be done", "not important", and "report to someone else" categories, that the responsible victims held a cynical or lack of faith attitude toward what could be accomplished through the criminal justice system by a reporting action.


Further examination of the non-reporting phenomena reveals that white households fail to report larceny victimizations more frequently than black households. However, burglaries were reported about 50 percent of the time and auto thefts more frequently. Black households reflected similar behavior, although renting households in this group reported burglary more often than not. Auto thefts were also reported well by black rentors while significantly more larcenies went unreported.

Reported business victimizations in all crime categories discussed here were higher at 77 percent. Reasons cited for the 23 percent of non-reporting were the "lack of proof" and "the unimportance of the crime." Once again, the greater the loss, the more faithful the reporting. In contrast to household victimizations, most business victimizations were reported as indicated in Table 10, and the likelihood of a report being filed increased with the value of the loss.

When crimes in these categories were not reported, the reasons for not reporting usually contend that nothing could be done to make a recovery,

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although such attitudes prevailed in categories of loss below \$100.00 The rate of non-reporting of all househood victimizations was 35.3 percent. After the non-reporting reason of "nothing could be done", the next most frequent explanation was the lack of importance of the incident. Fear of reprisal was given infrequently as a reason for not reporting crime.



Burglaries and Robberies Reported or Not Reported to Police

Despite the limitations of the survey, the information gathered provides a way of looking at crime in Dallas that's not available from other sources. This survey "opens the door". It is not exhaustive and in some areas leaves many questions unanswered. The greatest benefit from the work which has been undertaken may be the direction which it provides for the performance of future inquiries. Placed in the hands of criminal justice administrators, new insights may be gained into the real causes of crime and the relationshps to life in the Dallas community.

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