
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JUVENILE AID DIVISION EXPANSION PROJECT AN EVALUATION

PH-288-74A (PH-354-74A) MARC RIEDEL

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3/24/76

Project or Program being Evaluated:
Grant Title: Juvenile Aid Division Expansion Project (include grant number)
PH-288-74C
Grantee: Philadelphia Police Department
Brief Description: An expanded force assigned as liaison to the
(both project and evaluation effort) detective Bureau to concentrate on juvenile and gang crimes.
Scheduled date of final Evaluation Report: October 1, 1974
Porcon to contact concerning the Evaluation.
Person to contact concerning the Evaluation:
Christine A. Fossett, Chief, Evaluation & Monitoring Unit (name)
Governor's Justice Commission, Department of Justice
(address) Box 1167, Harrisburg, PA., 17120
717–787-1422
(telephone)
If completed, is Evaluation Report on file with NCJRS?yes_xno
Please mail completed form to:
Keith Miles Office of Evaluation

LEAA-NILECJ

Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530

## I. INTRODUCTION

To cope with the increasing number of juvenile crimes, particularly gang related crimes, the Police Department of the City of Philadelphia proposed a program which included the addition of 23 officers to the Juvenile Aid Division. Thirteen of the officers are men and ten are women.

In addition to concentrating on juvenile and gang related crimes, it was thought that project personnel could provide better quality patrol and investigation through specialization. In other words, some personnel would be assigned primarily investigative responsibilities while others would perform primarily patrol activities. Such specialization would lead to more patrol activity, higher quality investigation and "subsequently, a higher clearance rate of juvenile crimes" (Proposal, p.1).

## II. METHOD OF EVALUATION

The evaluation of the Juvenile Aid Division Expansion (JADE) project used a twofold approach. First, we interviewed project personnel, including the Director, Inspector Thomas Roselli, to learn how the project operated and was administered. We were particularly concerned not only with problems of coordination within the project, but also with broader problems of coordination with other segments of the police department such as the Juvenile Aid Division and the Detective Bureau. The results of this interview will be reported in the next section.

Second, and this constitutes the bulk of the report, the work logs of project personnel were analyzed to determine the proportion of time devoted to investigation and patrol; the number and types of major gang incidents were examined and weighted by the amount of perceived seriousness; finally, we looked at the number of complaints of juvenile crimes and the proportion of arrests.

To determine whether the efforts of the project had made any difference, we compared the data mentioned above for the months of operation of the project with an identical period of time in 1973. The major reasons for selecting the same months in 1973 as in 1974 was because of seasonal fluctuations in juvenile crime rates; these fluctuations are the result of extrinsic factors such as type of weather and whether school is in session and cannot be controlled by police activity. Thus, the crime rate may drop in January, February, and March, and increase in April, May, and June because juveniles can be out on the streets more frequently in the latter months as compared to the former.

Before presenting the results of the evaluation, a lengthy comment is needed to explain why it was necessary to use a measure of seriousness for the major gang incidents, what the Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness index is, and how it was used.

#### A Measure of Seriousness

In preparing an evaluation to assess the effect of an expansion of police personnel, two related observations must be taken into

account. First, previous research as well as the experience of the police has established that there is much more crime by juveniles and adults than is ever observed or brought to the official notice of the police.

Research carried out for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) indicated that the amount of personal injury is almost twice that reported in the Uniform Crime Reports. Property crime is more than twice as much as reported in the UCR; forcible rapes were more than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  times the reported rate; and robbery was 50 percent greater than the reported rate. The sharp descrepancies between the amount of crime occurring and that reported to the police suggests that reported and observed crimes are a sample of all crimes occurring.

A second observation has to do with the assumption that adding more policemen to a department will lead to a reduction of crime. While the addition of more policemen may have a long term effect of reducing crime, the short term effect may be to <u>increase</u> the volume of crime being observed, reported, and acted upon.

If crimes observed, reported and acted on are a sample of all crimes committed, than the more people there are to observe or report crimes to, the greater the volume of crimes. Where there is an emphasis on crimes occurring in public or quasi-public places, as is true with juvenile and gang related crimes, the visibility of the police may have a pronounced effect on crimes observed and reported. Thus, adding more police to a department may increase the

volume of crime rather than reduce it simply because there are more police to observe and record the crime. The size of the crime "sample" may increase because there are a greater number of "samplers".

It is, of course, possible that the volume of crime may decrease or even remain the same with the addition of more policemen. What is important to note is that measures of the volume of crime are a very insensitive measure to evaluate the success of the project. An alternative possibility was to examine the seriousness of the crimes committed in addition to the volume. To take a simple example, it may be more important to show that there were fewer murders (a more serious offense) during the project period while the number of burglaries (a less serious offense) remained the same or increased in number during the same period.

In selecting a measure of aeriousness of crime which had an objectively, scientifically valid basis, the distinction between index and nonindex crimes used by <u>Uniform Crime Reports</u> was rejected because, among other reasons, it divided crimes into a simple dichotomy of more or less serious. For evaluation purposes, we wanted to assign a seriousness weight to each criminal event which would vary on a continuous dimension from zero to the highest number for the most serious offense. The index developed by Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) met all of our requirements.

The Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness index categorizes each offense according to the amount of injury, theft, or property damage to the victim. Each of these dimensions are assigned a weight which is

summed to constitute the seriousness score for the offenses or ciminal event. The weights for each of these dimensions of injury, theft, and damage were derived by having several hundred Philadelphia police officers, college students, and judges rate the seriousness of offenses. Once the weightings were obtained, they were arranged in a data collection form for convenient use by clerical personnel. (See Appendix A).

For purposes of evaluation, all of the major gang incidents were scored for seriousness for the period March 19 to September 18 for 1973 and 1974.

#### III THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF JADE

The JADE project began on March 19, 1974 with 23 people, all of whom had been working in the Juvenile Aid Division prior to the beginning of the project. Project personnel were selected from existing staff because of experience and demonstrated competence in investigative and patrol work.

The project personnel receive supervision from detectives assigned to each member of the project. Additional supervision is provided by sergeants, lieutenants and captains within the Juvenile Aid Division.

Because supervision is provided within the Juvenile Aid Division and through a liaison with the Detective Bureau, the question arises as to whether project personnel do not receive contradictory and confusing directives from the two supervisors. The project has

avoided this possibility in a twofold way. First, there are boundries drawn as to the kind of supervision provided. The matter of assignments, for example, is the responsibility of officers in the Juvenile Aid Division. Supervision in regard to the investigative process, on the other hand, is the task of detective supervisors.

Second, the Director of the project has instituted weekly meetings between JADE personnel, JAD supervisors and detective supervisors. These large meetings may be broken down into smaller meetings of the project personnel and gang control personnel. These meetings, which last approximately 1½ hours, review the work in progress and resolve problems involving coordination, assignments and related problems.

One of the members of the Juvenile Aid Division has been assigned the task of monitoring assignments, time schedules, etc. This becomes particularly important when, for example, JAD officers have to be assigned because an officer in the project is ill or has the day off. When this occurs, JAD personnel are used with the understanding that equivalent time is given over by project personnel. Conversely, on a few occasions, project personnel are assigned tasks related to other JAD activity. In this case an equivalent amount of time must be given over by JAD to the project. As long as equivalent exchanges of time are made between project and non-project personnel, it seems to the evaluator that the above described strategy represents a good administrative approach to the effective use of skilled personnel.

From interviews with the Director, as well as discussions with other project staff, the mode of administration of the project has presented no problems with other segments of the police department. The evaluation team received excellent cooperation in requesting data from various parts of the department and did not uncover any significant problem in the relationship of the JADE project with other parts of the department.

#### IV. MAJOR GANG INCIDENTS

Because the JADE project placed a major emphasis on gang related crimes, we obtained all available records on major gang incidents for the period March 19, 1974 to September 18, 1974. For purposes of comparison we collected identical information for the same period in 1973. (Table 1).

Table 1 indicates that the number of major gang incidents decreased slightly in the 1974 period as compared to the 1973 period. By contrast, the number of persons injured or threatened increased by three from 1973 to 1974. Because the differences for the two sets of comparisons were not significantly different when statistical tests were applied, there is very little that can be concluded from the comparisons.

However, when the major gang incidents were scored as to their seriousness, as mentioned in the previous section, important differences were found. As Table 1 indicates, the mean seriousness score for the 1973 period was 1008; for the 1974 period, the mean seriousness

score was 678. Using a t-test to ascertain whether the difference was statistically significant, it was found a difference this large could occur by chance less than 3 times out of a hundred. (Dixon & Massey, 1957).

Table 1

Major Gang Incidents Before and during the Project Period

Before Project 3/19/73 to 9/18/73	During Project 3/19/74 to 9/16/7
88	83
101	_104
1008*	678*
	3/19/73 to 9/18/73 88 /:

<sup>\*\*</sup>Significant Difference, p<.025

Substantively, this means that while the volume of major gang incidents and the number injured or threatened did not vary greatly between the 1973 and 1974 periods, the seriousness of the major gang incidents dropped significantly. Much of the change in seriousness scores could be attributable to a reduction of the number of deaths

through gang activity; while there were 15 deaths through gang activity during the 1973 period, there were none during the 1974 period.

The major question is whether the reduction in seriousness of major gang incidents can be attributable to project activities. If the project is viewed as one of simply adding more policemen to an existing force, a reasonable answer would be in the affirmative.

Nowever, for purposes of evaluation, we were interested in determining whether direct relationships could be established between the activity of the project personnel and changes in the measures of gang activities.

Our initial approach was to examine the time logs of project personnel in relation to measures of gang incidents immediately before the project started and compare these measures to the same measures during the project period. However, because gang activity on the streets will fluctuate according to the weather, comparisons between February and August, for example, are not useful. Whether the outdoor temperature permits gang activity would seem to be a variable whose effect must be controlled if we are to assess the effects of the activity of project personnel on major gang incidents.

One possibility would be to examine time logs and gang activity for identical periods in 1973 and 1974. However, time logs for 1973 were difficult to obtain and, once obtained, involved a time-consuming tabulation of activity, dividing it into investigative, patrol, and preventive patrol check activity. While we did this from May to August, 1974, because of time limitations, we did not do it for the 1973 period.

We found, however, that 4f we compared 1974 logs to both 1973 and 1974 measures of gang activities, certain useful consequences follow. If we compare 1974 time logs to 1974 measures of gang activity and find a positive relationship, it is possible that project activity is having an effect on gang activity. Thus, the greater the number of hours of patrol activity, the greater the reduction in seriousness. However, the relationship may be spurious in that the weather became increasingly warm from March through August and September. Supposing, however, that we related the 1974 logs to 1973 measures of gang activity for the same period and found no relationship. Both periods were characterized by increasingly warm weather. This would suggest that the relationships for the 1974 data were attributable to project activity rather than extrinsic factors.

What the latter procedure does not permit us to say is that one type of JAD activity (project work) is better than another. It does allow us to say, given the pattern of relationships described in the preceding paragraph, that there is evidence that project activity is having an effect on gang activity. This approach represents an attempt to "partial out", albeit crudely, the effect of extrinsic factors.

With that rationale in mind, we tabulated number of preventive patrol checks, patrolling hours and investigating hours for May, June, July, and August of 1974. Table 2 gives the comparisons for major gang incidents and preventive patrol checks.

Table 2

Major Gang Incidents for 1973 and 1974 and Number of Preventive Patrol Checks

•	May	June	July	August
Najor Gang Incidents 1973	16	16	14	13
1974	17 -	17	11	8
Number of Preventive Patrol Checks (1974)	0	0	16.	63

Table 2 indicates that the frequency of major gang incidents did not change appreciably over the four month period in 1973 and dropped slightly in 1974. Looking at the number of preventive patrol checks (PPC'S) for men and women for 1974, the number increased for male officers and decreased for female officers. It is possible to point to the increase in the PPC'S by male officers and the decrease in the number of gang incidents for 1974 and infer a relationship; namely, as the number of PPC'S increase the number of gang incidents decrease. By itself, this data makes it doubtful that an increase of 63 hours would have such an effect. It would suggest that female officers, with thousands more hours, were having little or only negative effect on the number of major gang incidents.

A similar pattern is found when patrol hours are examined (Table 3).

Table 3

Najor Gang Incidents for
1973 and 1974 and Hours on Patrol

	May	June	July	August
Major Gang Incidents 1973 1974	16 17	16 17	14 11	. 15
Hours Patrolling (1974)				
Nen Women	3.5 880.	54.5 909.	82.5 641.5	100.5 637.

As in Table 2, we find that as the hours of patrol increase for males, the number of major gang incidents in 1974 drop. For women officers, as the numbers decrease, so do the major gang incidents.

Table 4 suggests a reversal of pattern found in Tables 2 and
Table 3. In Table 4, as the number of major gang incidents drop in
1974 the number of hours of investigation for women officers increase
but the number of hours of investigation for male officers decrease.

One interpretation that is supported by the data is that male officers
may have an effect on major gang incidents through PPC'S, but female
officers have an effect through investigation. However such an

interpretation overlooks the earlier finding that there was no significant difference between major gang incidents for 1973 and 1974.

Table 4

Major Gang Incidents for 1973 and 1974 and Hours of Investigation

	Nay	June	July	August
Major Gang Incidents 1973	16	16	14	15
1974	17	17	11	8
Hours of Investigation Nen	2519	2536.5	2191.5	2016.5
Women	93	132.5	125.5	124

Before examining the seriousness dimension, for which there was a significant difference between 1973 and 1974, we indicate that no seperate tabulation of time logs in relation to number of persons injured or threatened will be given in the text. The pattern of findings for number of persons injured or threatened is similar to number of major gang incidents and is given in Appendix B.

Table 5 gives the seriousness scores for major gang incidents and the number of Preventive Patrol Checks (PPC'S). As in Table 2

seriousness scores do not change much in 1973 but show a substantial decrease in 1974. Along with this decrease in seriousness is an increase in PPC'S by males and a decrease in PPC'S by female officers.

Table 5
Seriousness Scores
for 1973 and 1974 and Number
of Preventive Patrol Checks

		May	June	July	August
Seriousness Scores	• •		•	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
1973		17,200	20,000	15,700	16,800
1974		11,700	11,500	7,900	4,600
PPC S					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(1974) Hen	••	0	. 0	16	63
Women		3,106	3,746	#: 3,174	2,446
					•

A similar pattern is found for seriousness scores and hours of patrol (Table 6).

Finally, in Table 7 we find the reversal of the pattern for seriousness scores and hours of investigation for 1974. Here again the seriousness in 1974 corresponds to a decrease in hours of investigation for males and an increase in hours for females.

Table 6

Seriousness Scores for 1973 and 1974 and Hours of Patrol

15,700 16,800 7,900 4,600
7,900 4,600
4.5 82.5 100.5
9 641.5 637

Table 7

Seriousness Scores
for 1973 and 1974 and
Hours of Investigation

May	June	July	August
17,200	20,000	15,700	16,800
11,700	11,500	7,900	7,600
2,519.	2,536.5	2,191.5	2,016.5
93.	132.5	125.5	124.
	17,200 11,700 2,519.	17,200 20,000 11,700 11,500 2,519. 2,536.5	17,200 20,000 15,700 11,700 11,500 7,900 2,519. 2,536.5 2,191.5

#### Conclusions

Given the nature of the problem and the data, conclusions about the relation of police activity to the frequency and seriousness of police activity to the frequency and seriousness of major gang incidents are hazardous. First, the small number of months for comparison make correlation measures of a statistical nature useless. Second, we had not work logs for 1973 which limits comparisons.

Nevertheless, the available data tends to support the following conclusions.

First, there appears to be no significant differences between the number of major gang incidents and number of persons injured or threatened for 1973 and 1974. There may be patterns among female and male officers, but they correspond only to slight shifts in the number of major gang incidents and number of persons injured.

Second, the patterns of activities by police (hours of patrol and investigation, and number of PPC'S) do not relate consistently to changes in seriousness, number of major gang incidents or number of persons injured.

Finally, looking at the seriousness scores, the data suggests there may be a relationship between an increase in number of male patrol hours, an increase in female hours in investigation and a decrease in seriousness scores. The relationship in our data, however, was not statistically significant. If this finding can be replicated over a longer time perior, it raises the possbility that men engaged in PPC'S and patrol and women engaged in investigation have a positive effect on the seriousness of major gang incidents.

#### V. MAJOR GANG INCIDENTS AND ARRESTS.

Part of the evaluation focused on the proportion of arrests to complaints for major gang incidents. While one of the outcomes of the project is described as a higher clearance by arrest rate for project personnel because of superior investigative and patrol activity, it is questionable whether this is an appropriate criteria for officers working with juvenile offenders.

Law enforcement officials working with juvenile offenders are placed in a precarious position as to the criteria of evaluation which are most appropriate. The abstract goal of apprehending offenders is only a small part of what juvenile officers are expected to do. Largely, by default, juvenile officers are burdened with the additional tasks of prevention, surveillance, some forms of counseling, and establishing an interface with existing social services. From the viewpoint of the organization, juvenile programs have some of the characteristics of welfare agencies: the means and ends of the organization are not clearly prescribed. Like welfare agencies, means are specified and easily measurable, but the relationships to ends are only vaguely indicated. (Thompson, 1967; Backoff, 1971).

Under these conditions those within the organizations tend to look to amounts of activity as a way of measuring performance. However, from the viewpoint of a social referent or a public, the activity is measured by ends assigned to the organization, even though the organization is not entirely clear it can meet those

ends or how it can be done. Frequently this leads to any variety of strategies to make the measure of success imposed on the organization workable. Welfare agency administrators strain to reduce welfare rolls, district attorneys must have a very high rate of convictions and police are expected to have a high clearance by arrest.

This introductory note is presented primarily because in examining the proportion of juveniles arrested, we are presenting material which does not reflect a policy stance of the project director. As Inspector Roselli noted in the interview, project personnel are not "clearance conscious"; he does not see clearance rates as the most effective measure of what the project is doing.

While his point is well taken, and the evaluator hopes he has stated it fairly, the evaluation team feels that such data should be presented. First, clearance rates are unsatisfactory measures of police performance; there are, however, few if any adequate substitutes, and none within the constraints of the evaluation budget. Second, while clearance measures are not completely satisfactory, they do provide some indication of police activity and they do represent information which funding agencies need. Therefore, the following information is presented with the caution that clearance rates are not the best measure of success even when they indicate, as they do in this project, that the project is having a positive effect.

For the March through September period we calculated the proportion of arrests made from complaints or observations of gang activity within a one week period from that complaint. In 1973 the proportion was .56 and in 1974 it was .55; the difference is not statistically significant.

However, in considering comparisons with time logs we looked at the proportion of arrests for two three month periods for 1973 and 1974. (See Table 8).

Table 8

Proportion of Arrests
Before and During Project Period

Proportion of Arrests	1973	1974	
First Three Months (March 19 to June 18)	•56	.37*	
Second Three Months (June 19 to Sept. 18)	.57	<b>.7</b> 8*	

<sup>\*</sup>Statistically Significant, p < .05

It would appear that while the proportion of arrests remained about the same in 1973, they showed a significant increase in 1974. This suggests that the project had little effect initially, but as it began to function effectively, the proportion of arrests increased.

Comparisons for hours of investigation and proportion of arrests, May through August, are given in Table 9. We do not have measures of hourly activity for March and April.

Table 9

Proportion of Arrests for 1973
and 1974 and Hours of Investigation

		•		
	May	June	July	August
Proportion of		•	•	
Arrests			•	
1973	.75	.31	•64	•73
1964	.29	•76	•64	.63
			•	
Hours of				
Investigation				
lien	2,519	2,536.5	2,191.5	2,016.5
Women	93	132.5	. 125.5	124
			•	

Table 9 indicates very little relationship between proportion of arrests in 1973 and hours of investigation, but in 1974, as the number of hours of investigation by women increase, the proportion of arrests increases. There is a decline in the hours of investigation by men, but it does not seem to relate systematically to proportion of arrests.

Because it does not seem to relate directly to the question of proportion arrested, we have not included comparisons with number of PPC's and hours of patrol.

#### VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Although many of the measures used in this evaluation were crude, the results generally suggest the project is having a positive effect in reducing crime. Comparisons with an identical period of time in 1973 suggest that the seriousness of major gang incidents has decreased. The latter reduction may be associated with increases in number of preventive patrol checks and hours of patrol by male officers and increases in hours of investigation by female officers.

The proportion of arrests increased significantly during the second half of the project in comparison with the first half of the project. This increased proportion of clearances is associated with an increase in the hours of investigations by female officers.

The increased proportion of arrests is not associated with hours of investigation for male officers.

## THE SYSTEM ILLUSTRATED

The scoring system can best be described by a form which contains all the elements that are scoreable and which is clarified by definitions of these elements and illustrated by the method of scoring.

#### SCORE SHEET

Identification num	iber(	s):			
	,	-,.		•	•
Effects of Event:	I	T	D	(Circle one or more as required)	

Elements Scored	Number 2	X Weight 3	Total 4
I. Number of victims of bodily harm			
(a) receiving minor injuries (b) treated and discharged (c) hospitalized (d) killed		1 4 7 26	
II. Number of victims of forcible sex intercourse		10	•
(a) Number of such victims intimidated by weapon		2	
III. Intimidation (except II above)	•		•
(a) Physical or verbal only		2 4	
IV. Number of premises forcibly entered		1	
V. Number of motor vehicles stolen		2	
VI. Value of property stolen, damaged, or de- stroyed (in dollars)			
(a) Under 10 dollars (b) 10 - 250 (c) 251 - 2000 (d) 2001 - 9000 (e) 9001 - 30000 (f) 30001 - 80000 (g) Over 80000		1 2 3 4 5 6 7	

TOTAL SCORE

APPENDIX B

Number of Persons Injured or Threatened in Major Gang Incidents, Number of Preventive Patrol Checks, Hours Patrolling, and Hours Investigating

	May	June	July	August
	Nay .	*		
Persons Injured or Threatened			16	17
1973	19	19		10
1974	23	22	13	
•				
Preventive Patrol Checks				63
Nen	0	<b>Q</b>	16	2,446
Women	3;106	3,746	3,174	2,440
			e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
Hours Patrolling			•	100 5
Men	3.5	54.5	82.5 641.5	100.5 637.
Women	880.	909.	04.F.	
Hours				
Investigating Nen	2,519	2,536.5	2,191.5	2,016.5
Women	93	132.5	125.5	1241

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