

**LOUISIANA  
STATE  
POLICE**



NEW ORLEANS


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
NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA  
JUNE 8 thru 11, 1975

NATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE  
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA  
1975

The Louisiana State Police mission for this conference is two-fold:

- (1) to furnish security protection for each governor, his immediate family and certain other very important persons; and
- (2) to furnish physical circulation control security for official and semi-official functions, to include domicile protection for the governors, their families and certain other very important persons.

  
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## INTRODUCTION

This section outlines the mission and general concepts for the Louisiana State Police personnel and physical security program during the 1975 National Governors' Conference.

GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE

1975

INTRODUCTION---

The basic personnel and physical security concept for the Governors' Conference is: (1) to prevent an assassination, hostage or kidnapping attempt against any governor or higher governmental official and their immediate families; (2) to control such an incident should it occur; and (3) to prevent or control any dissident or other group of society from disrupting or harassing any official or unofficial functions of the conference.


The most vulnerable times for an incident to occur is during movement of the individual(s) and while those individuals are in their respective quarters (suites in hotel). Incidents can also occur during (to and from) the scheduled official and unofficial events-- many of which will be held within the Fairmont Hotel. Unfortunately, one or more of these elements will be present during the entire conference and from the time of arrival until actual departure of the distinguished guests.

The personnel and physical program must be designed primarily to counteract and preempt/prevent the analyzed (known) threat as well as the unknown myriad possibilities. In this particular case, the security prerequisite is that which can operate without disrupting the normal business and recreational activities of the Fairmont Hotel and that of the normal daily routines of the citizens and visitors of New Orleans. Indispensable elements of this particular mission are meaningful and timely intelligence information, a police omnipresence (low key and unobtrusive), and a coordinated effort among the local police and other interested governmental agencies.

Hence, the protective concept will be within the framework that the professional law enforcement officer understands; i.e., a definite assurance of absolute protection can seldom be offered public figures. The task, therefore, is to reduce the chance of assassination as far as legal and sociological restraints will allow.

The principal operational concept in establishing any protective screen is in-depth deployment of security officers. A potential assassin must never have just one protective shell to penetrate in order to reach the dignitary. The philosophy is that a single security ring no matter how strong resembles a plate of glass. Struck with sufficient force it will shatter eliminating all the protection it formerly offered. Instead, security should provide more frequent and more difficult obstacles for the attacker as he moves inward toward the target.

A pattern of concentric rings is normally established radiating out from the public figure. At the minimum, two cordons, commonly known as the inner and outer rings, usually are established.



Since most of the time only one trooper will be accompanying the dignitary during this conference, the "ring" concept will not always be possible, therefore, an immediate "close-in" protection will be utilized in order that a capability exists of swiftly moving the dignitary to a position of safety. Our system will, then, generally operate under the following guidelines:

The security commander is seldom free to deploy his personnel entirely as his analysis indicates he should. Some of the major restrictions that limit him are:

- a. The degree to which the public figure will allow protective personnel to intrude into his privacy.
- b. The degree to which he will allow interference in his normal business and social schedule.
- c. The degree to which the public figure's image necessitates a low security profile.
- d. The degree to which the subject is willing to abide by security directives.
- e. The degree of access the dignitary allows the public.
- f. The legal right of the public to move freely in public areas.
- g. Legal restrictions on search of suspicious people or objects.

The exact configuration of the personnel and physical security force will depend a great deal on the nature of the anticipated threats. The more substantial the danger is, the more extensive the protective arrangements must be.

The commander, supervisor, and the individual trooper assigned a duty must always begin his task by looking at the target from the assassin's point of view. He must literally plot the crime he is charged with preventing. Once he has defined and examined all possibilities open to the attacker, including those that first appear improbable, he sets about developing a defense to thwart him. In this way he designs the protective screen so that the limited resources are applied against the most immediate threat.

Entry to and movement within the screened area (hotel in this case) is regulated by pass systems, such as distinctive visible badges. The success of any set of controls is directly dependent upon the difficulty of duplicating or compromising each control and most importantly, the vigor with which security personnel systematically employ each control. Again, in this instance, such systems must consider that this conference takes place where the public cannot be unduly restricted.

The duties of all personnel and physical security personnel must be clearly defined.

Only carefully selected supervisory personnel should be authorized to deviate from published routine. All other personnel, when faced with an unusual request or situation will defer to these supervisors. Since a well planned attack is based on surprise, diversion

or bluff to capitalize on security weaknesses, failure to observe procedure will do much to insure the success of the attack.

To make security as palatable as possible, each member of the protective force should be able to clearly explain the need for any particular procedure. As a last resort, one method of dealing with unwilling subjects is to mask security directives as privileges reserved for the VIP, safety requirements or performance assests. For example-- the protector could inform the political figure that a personal elevator is a VIP privilege, or that a new portable rostrum (with carefully camouflaged armor) is needed to provide an adequate sound system.

Contingency plans should be developed to deal with all predictable possibilities, such as illness, unexpected itinerary changes, inclement weather, etc. Each member of the protective team must clearly understand his role in the overall operation in each of these optional plans.


Overlapping the surveillance areas assigned each individual security post further insures that an attacker cannot penetrate. A precise demarcation of supervisory responsibilities is needed.

Finally, the effectiveness of the security system must be measured. Some responsible individual must insure that established procedures are complied with, that these procedures accomplish their goal and do not become compromised or outdated. His mission is to determine how the system can be defeated and to recommend modifications to overcome weaknesses. Each member must realize that this criticism is a vital quality control mechanism and not a disciplinary measure.



ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

This section contains an organizational chart and functional explanation for the Louisiana State Police Security Detail.



## COMMAND POST

There will be a State Police Command Post in the Fairmont Hotel which will be manned twenty-four hours per day. It's many responsibilities cannot be outlined here. However, personnel assigned to the CP will handle all supervisory functions to include but not limited to:

- Assignment of Personnel
- Duty Assignments
- Special Details
- Intelligence Functions
- Liaison Duties
- Administrative Actions
- Logistics Requirements
- Explosives Control
- Policy, Procedures and Orders
- Command Decisions
- Emergency Actions
- Others

The CP will have radio and landline communications, status boards, assignment boards, bulletin boards, etc.

## INTELLIGENCE

When properly gathered and utilized, intelligence data will enable the command section of this detail to anticipate danger. This severely limits the alternatives available to a potential assassin or troublemaker. Intuition and guesswork, on the other hand, are the principal inhabitants of an intelligence vacuum and success is a trophy awarded the side displaying the most imagination.

It will be the responsibility of the State Police Intelligence Organization to gather, analyze and disseminate appropriate basic intelligence, current intelligence, subversive intelligence, domestic intelligence, and counter-intelligence with regard to this detail.

A twenty-four hour capability is a requirement. Intelligence personnel will be an integral part of the command section.

#### EXPLOSIVES

The Explosives Control activity is responsible for insuring to the best of their ability that explosives are not introduced into Governors suites, official meeting rooms, and other gathering places where such individuals are required to attend.

Searches and sweeps within the electronics state of the act will be employed as deemed appropriate.

All items, packages, gifts, etc., destined for a Governor or a member of his immediate family will be searched or checked, as may be appropriate.

#### ADMINISTRATION

This activity will be primarily responsible for furnishing the necessary administrative and support activities.

#### PERSONNEL SECURITY DETAIL

This activity will be primarily responsible for providing security and other services to each Governor, his immediate family to include other specified VIP's, and other duties as may be assigned.

#### PHYSICAL SECURITY DETAIL

This activity will be primarily responsible for providing hotel security, official and semi-official function(s) security, emergency response, and other duties as may be assigned.

#### READY ROOMS

There will be a PERSONNEL SECURITY READY ROOM in the same vicinity as the Command Post. This will be a place where additional on-duty personnel security troopers will be stationed.

There will be an additional PERSONNEL SECURITY READY ROOM in the GOVERNORS HOUSE. This will be a place where stand-by personnel security troopers are stationed.

#### PHYSICAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

There will be a room near the Command Post which will be used for the Lieutenant in charge of the physical security detail and other necessary personnel.

#### INTELLIGENCE/EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS

There will be a room near the Command Post which will be used by Intelligence and Explosives personnel.

PERSONNEL ITEMS

This section sets forth items of policy, procedure and other information of interest to each individual assigned to the detail.

NOTE

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In the event you are faced with an ambush, sniper or hostage situation DO SOMETHING IMMEDIATELY! DO NOT worry too much about doing something WRONG, THERE IS ONLY ONE INSTANT RESPONSE THAT IS A FATAL MISTAKE! TO DO NOTHING! Remember, most successful ambush attacks are completed within a few seconds.

GENERAL GUIDELINES--

PERSONNEL ITEMS

1. Accomodations:
  - a. All personnel assigned to the Personnel Security Section will be billeted at the Governor's House Hotel.
  - b. All personnel assigned to the Physical Security Unit will be billeted at the Braniff Hotel.
  - c. Official room charges will be handled by the State. ALL OTHER charges will be paid by the individual prior to his departure from the detail.
2. Uniform: Summer Campaign Hat, winter long-sleeve shirt, tie, regulation footwear, raincoat, leather gear. Strict compliance required.
3. Civilian type clothing (suitable) sport coats, suits, sport shirts and slacks should be available. EVERY TROOPER will bring at least one sport coat or suit suitable to be worn with dress shirt and tie while on official duty. Some Governors do not desire their assigned security personnel to be in uniform.
4. Duty-type weapons and non-duty weapons will be required. You will be armed at all times. (SEE ITEM NO. 31)
5. Individual Tactical Unit equipment will be required for those assigned who are members of a Tactical Unit. This equipment will be retained in a safe place where it will be readily available.
6. At least two troopers will be required to drive in a State Police Unit to the conference. Special permission will be required for any exception.
7. A special daily subsistence allowance will be authorized for this detail. You will contact Mrs. Thomas, Headquarters Payroll Section (telephone: 389-7257) FOR ANY ADVANCE PAYMENTS that you may require for this detail.



8. Marked State Police Units will be parked in a designated area at Jackson Barracks. Special permission will be required for any exception. Special instructions will be issued on this subject. Headquarters lot (Baton Rouge) will also be used.
9. You may expect to spend six or seven days in New Orleans on this detail. Certain personnel will spend additional time.
10. Uniforms will be clean and pressed at all times. All leather and "brass" will be highly shined.
11. This is a twenty-four hour type duty assignment. Your whereabouts will always be made known to appropriate supervisors. Hence, you are "on-call" for the duration of detail.
12. Mandatory items when on shift: weapons, notebook, flashlight, etc.
13. Strict discipline while on duty is mandatory. Courtesy and service are a requirement. You will undoubtedly be asked to accomplish tasks not normally required of you. This just happens to be the nature of this detail.
14. You will attend any and all briefings, roll calls, etc. Reporting time is 15 minutes prior to formation time.
15. You will be required to furnish an emergency telephone number, address, and person to be notified in the event of an emergency.
16. State Police identification card and badge(s) required to be "on person" during entire detail.
17. No days off will be authorized while on this detail except in cases of extreme emergency.
18. You will not leave your post or duty assignment without specific permission of your supervisor.
19. Only those individuals actually assigned to the Command Post will be authorized entry-- except for official business transactions which may require your presence in the Command Post or immediate area.
20. The consumption of low or high content alcoholic beverages will be kept to a minimum when technically off-duty. You may be required to respond in an emergency at any time.
21. You will not be permitted to leave the general urban New Orleans area while on this detail without specific authority.

22. You will be held accountable and responsible for any and all items of equipment and materiel issued to you during this detail.
23. You will be furnished daily work card forms. These will contain, among other items, your regular and overtime worked. You will turn in a card for the previous date at the beginning of your normal shift, each working day, to your supervisor.
24. Individuals assigned to Governors for security and transportation will be furnished an automobile. Please take care of this vehicle as if you owned it. ANY ACCIDENT-- NO MATTER HOW SLIGHT-- WILL IMMEDIATELY BE REPORTED TO THE COMMAND POST.
25. Any assignment or location change of plans due to a Governor's request or other than posted and detailed from the Command Post must be reported to the Command Post as soon as possible via radio or public service.
26. Any individuals, groups or gatherings which appear to possibly be a danger to the conference or individual members will be immediately reported to the Command Post. This should be accomplished no matter how innocent the incident may appear.
27. You may be required to tip doormen or parking lot attendants when waiting for a Governor or member of his immediate family. YOU WILL maintain a record of such tips to include date, time, place, and amount.
28. This conference will be visited by members of the national and international news agencies. Members of the press will be issued a Press Badge. These individuals have almost unlimited access to all official and unofficial functions. They may take pictures, TV coverage, etc. Should you have any particular problem or become suspicious of the actions of a member of the press, you will immediately report same to the Command Post.
29. SPECIAL OFFICER Commissions will be issued to enforcement members of the various Governors' staffs. This allows such individuals to carry a concealed weapon and perform police functions normally afforded them in their own jurisdictions. Certain other individuals will be issued such credentials and you can assume they have police powers for the duration of the conference.
30. You will find that everyone who has a conference badge is a Very Important Person within his own State. Each such person must be treated as a VIP. Any difficulties or suspicions on your part will be immediately reported to the Command Post.

31. (SEE ITEM NO. 4) The following weapons are authorized for this detail: .357 or .38 cal. service revolver, 9mm automatic; 380 PPKS; Snub-nose .38 cal. and off-duty derringer.

NOTE: YOU WILL BE ISSUED AT LEAST SIX ROUNDS OF "SPECIAL" AMMUNITION. THIS AMMUNITION WILL BE LOADED IN THE WEAPON YOU ARE CARRYING WHILE ON DUTY.

32. Louisiana State Police personnel will NOT congregate or visit at Fairmont Hotel when NOT on official duty. Any personal problems should first be processed through your immediate detail supervisors for permission to contact the Command Post, OIC or Assistant OIC.
33. Be sure you have sufficient "change" at all times in order that you can use the public telephones, as may be necessary.
34. IF YOU ARE ASSIGNED TO A GOVERNOR, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP THE COMMAND POST INFORMED OF YOUR WHEREABOUTS BOTH ON AND OFF DUTY. WHEN TRAVELLING WITH THE GOVERNOR OR HIS FAMILY YOU WILL REPORT YOUR DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL TIMES AND ANY UNUSUAL INCIDENTS.
35. Sign-Out Registers will be a requirement and will be maintained. You will be notified of the procedure to be used.
36. All official and unofficial functions will not take place until a "sweep" prior to its starting time is completed.
37. WHILE THERE WILL BE EXPLOSIVES CONTROL EXPERTS ON-DUTY, EACH TROOPER ASSIGNED TO THIS DETAIL IS EXPECTED TO BE ESPECIALLY WATCHFUL FOR SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES AND ACTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL IN AND AROUND THE HOTEL.
38. REMEMBER, IT ONLY TAKES ONE SMOKE GRENADE TO BE EXPLODED INTO THE CENTRAL AIR CONDITIONER SYSTEM TO DISRUPT THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE AND EMBARRASS SECURITY PERSONNEL.
39. YOU WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY PACKAGE, LETTER, FLOWERS, PRESENT, ETC., FOR A GOVERNOR OR HIS FAMILY AND DELIVER IT. YOU WILL DIRECT THE INDIVIDUAL TO DELIVER SAME TO THE CENTRAL PICKUP POINT.
40. You will NOT wear your security pin on outer clothing when not on official duty. Your State Police identification is sufficient for this purpose.

41. MANY OF US WILL BE WORKING LONG HOURS AND SOME OF YOU MAY BE ON POST FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME. THIS IS NORMALLY WHEN YOU ARE NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED TO REACT TO A SUDDEN ATTACK FROM UNEXPECTED QUARTER. THIS GIVES THE AMBUSH OR ASSASSIN ASSAILANT AN UNSURPASSED OPPORTUNITY TO CARRY OUT A CLOSE RANGE SURPRISE ATTACK WITH HIGH PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS.
42. Gasoline. All State Police vehicles will use Troop "B" gasoline pumps. If you are required to park your vehicle at Jackson Barracks parking area, fill your tank before proceeding to Jackson Barracks.
  - a. Governors vehicles will use Troop "B" for gasoline, etc. Special instructions will also be issued.
43. Jackson Barracks parking area is to be inside of a building. Your normal gear should be safe in this area. Lock Your Vehicle.

GENERAL GUIDELINES---

USE OF DEADLY FORCE

1. Use of deadly force-- The use of deadly force is not authorized except when all other means have failed. The power of summary execution is involved in the use of physical force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
  - a. Use of deadly force may be authorized only where all three of the following circumstances are present:
    - (1) Lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable.
    - (2) The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not increased by its use.
    - (3) The purpose of its use is one or more of the following:
      - (a) Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm.
      - (b) Prevention of a crime which involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, to silence sniping, murder, serious injury to another, etc.).
      - (c) Prevention of the destruction of the Fairmont Hotel, other public or municipal buildings by explosives or some means which could cause the loss of life inside or in the immediate building area.
      - (d) Detention or prevention of the escape of persons against who the use of deadly force is authorized in (a), (b), and (c) above.
      - (e) The use of deadly force can only be condoned as a defensive means under circumstances constituting justifiable homicide.
  - b. Firepower will never be directed at a crowd or group. It will only be directed at a particular target. The avoidance of death by firepower is accomplished by restraint and caution:

hold fire. Except to stop snipers, assassins, etc., shooting to kill can rarely be justified. Even then, first take cover; locate the source of the sniper or other types of fire, and return it only by the pinpoint, one shot-at-a-time marksmanship.

- c. Firepower will not be authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death or serious bodily harm.

#### USE OF IRRITANT CHEMICAL AGENTS

1. Irritant chemical agents CN or CS will only be used in those instances where life, or physical well-being is endangered. Also in those instances due to the inability of the use of the baton or other such means, short of deadly force, in the subduing and arrest of combative persons.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTIES

No law enforcement officer will handle an individual or incident in such a manner as to nullify U.S. Constitutional Guaranties. No action on the part of a law enforcement officer will be condoned which is not reasonable; thus preserving the democratic process and procedures. "Due process" will be afforded to each and every individual.

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL

This section contains the general procedure and explains the system which will be utilized for personnel identification and security control during the conference.

GENERAL GUIDELINES--

PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL

1. To insure that the Governors and their families are protected while they are in the Fairmont Hotel (on official or non-official business)-- to include those many times when they will be in their suites. A positive personnel identification and security control system must be established and maintained in order to achieve required protection and privacy, preclude unauthorized entry to official sessions, non-official gatherings and to Governors suites, and to facilitate authorized entry to officially posted areas (meeting rooms, etc.).
2. We will be using a combination of fixed and roving security personnel; access lists and badges; personal recognition, personnel escorts, and special law enforcement identification systems. While all these may sound complicated, the system will be designed to be simple, understandable, and have workable identification and control measures. This to achieve security objectives without inefficient operations and unduly restrictive procedures in view of the necessary public access to the Fairmont Hotel.
3. A simple and direct movement control system provides a means not only of positively identifying those who have a right and need to enter or leave an area, but also of detecting unauthorized personnel who attempt to gain entry. To accomplish this end our procedures will include:
  - a. Designation of the various areas where passes and badges are required.
  - b. Description of the various identification media in use and the authorization and limitations placed upon the holder.
  - c. Mechanics of identification at times of entering and leaving each area, including nonoperational hours.
  - d. Details of where, when, and how badge should be worn.
  - e. Procedures to be followed in case of loss or damage to identification media.



- f. Procedures for the identification media for employees of the hotel.
- g. A procedure to reissue new identification media when a badge has been lost or is unaccountable.

NOTE: WE WILL HAVE SEVERAL IDENTIFICATION PASSES AND BADGES IN EFFECT-- IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND SHOWING OF THE "TIN"

- a. All official state and other law enforcement personnel will be issued a special security pin to be worn on lapel or other conspicuous location on outer clothing. These pins will be issued by the Louisiana State Police-- by number, and individuals displaying same can be assumed to be armed.
- b. Each Governor's personal security force member, who will accompany him, possesses a special pin issued by the National Governor's Security Council to bonafide personnel. These individuals most likely display it instead of our "security" pin-- or wear both!
- c. A series of large paper identification cards (passes or badges) to be worn on outer clothing will be utilized. These identify by colorcode the Governors, their families, their official party, host couples, news media and other persons authorized full or limited access to conference official and unofficial sessions. The color determines the official status of the wearer.
- d. Hotel employee identification cards to be worn on outer clothing will be utilized.
- e. In the event the President or Vice-President visit the conference, the Secret Service will issue special identification.

NOTE: REMEMBER THE GENERAL PUBLIC CANNOT BE BARRED FROM STAYING IN OR VISITING THE HOTEL FACILITIES. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE UNLESS VOUCHERED FOR AND ACCOMPANIED BY HOST COMMITTEE MEMBERS.

- f. Our responsibility with regard to authority for and issuance of Special Identification badges is for Security Pins only. Control and issuance will be accomplished at the State Police Command Post in the Fairmont Hotel. Strict control will be exercised for the issuance of these special pins.

4. Enforcement Measures:

- a. The most vulnerable link in any identification system is its enforcement.
- b. By the time the security system is implemented, the following will have been considered:
  - (1) A uniform method of wearing security and other identification pins and badges. Normally, the identification will be worn in a conspicuous position to expedite inspection and recognition.
  - (2) Entrances and exits to official conference areas and unofficial gatherings will be so arranged that arriving and departing personnel are forced to pass in front of security personnel.
  - (3) There will be maintained a written record of all identification issued, lost, destroyed, etc.
  - (4) A prompt invalidation of lost or withdrawn identification will be in effect.
  - (5) Controls will be established to enable security personnel on duty to function about the hotel, hallways, elevator entrances and exits, fire exits and stairways, all hotel exits and entryways to include freight and food entrances, air conditionings systems, employee rooms, kitchens, storage areas, restrooms, etc., ALL SUCH ACTIONS MUST TAKE IN CONSIDERATION THAT THE GENERAL PUBLIC WILL BE ALLOWED TO UTILIZE THE HOTEL AND ITS SERVICES.
- c. Enforcement of these access control systems rests primarily on the troopers selected for such duty.
- d. Nationwide news coverage will be a continual occurrence during the entire conference. Authorized media people will have their identification and will be admitted to all functions UNLESS denied access by a member of the Conference Committee or the State Police OIC.
- e. No group of occupations has been used as successfully and as often as a "COVER" for unauthorized entry as that of service and maintenance personnel. Appropriate clothing, a tool box, and a smattering of technical knowledge are the only requirements to pose as a telephone repairman, an

electrician, a plumber, or a business machine maintenance-  
man. Cleaning personnel make excellent "covers" for thefts,  
assassinations, etc. Legitimate hotel employees will have  
identification-- even they should be checked if acting  
suspiciously. All other repairmen, etc., will have to be  
checked and approved before they will be allowed to operate  
within your post perimeter.

f. We will operate with a special duress system.

ELECTRONIC SEARCHES, EXPLOSIVES CONTROL,  
PACKAGE AND MATERIEL CONTROL

1. The conference rooms, Governor's suites, official motor vehicles, packages, mail-- almost anything, space or item-- can be used for sabotage, assassination, theft or other purposes by those desiring to so so!
2. A positive control system must be established to insure NO package or item is allowed to be forwarded to a Governor, his family, a conference room, etc., without an inspection.
3. All official and unofficial functions will not take place until a "sweep" prior to its starting time has **been** accomplished.

PROVIDING PROTECTION DURING  
MOVEMENT BY VEHICLE

This section contains general procedures and concepts for protecting dignitaries during movement by vehicle-- an especially vulnerable time. In order to furnish personnel with a better understanding of the mission, background planning information and techniques have also been included.

GENERAL GUIDELINES--

PROVIDING PROTECTION DURING  
MOVEMENT BY VEHICLE

Movement of the Governors, their immediate families or other high dignitaries during the conference presents an entirely different set of protective problems than does providing security at a fixed location. MOST OF THE TIME ONLY ONE VEHICLE AND ONE TROOPER (driver) WILL BE INVOLVED. This requires an especial alertness on the part of the trooper.

Movement by vehicle will be for arrival and departure from airport; hotel to official or unofficial destination; all hours of day or night could be involved; emergency runs to hospital; and others.

Some considerations for the individual personal security trooper are:

- a. When confronted with the task of protecting a public figure under conditions of movement, security personnel should recognize that a decided advantage lies with the attacker both in his timing (a surprise attack) and in his initial thrust at a thinly stretched or porous security ring.
- b. The old axiom that it is hard to hit a moving target is a true one and may be employed to frustrate attackers. Once the attackers have made their initial move they have certain preconceived movements of action and target reaction in mind and the element of surprise is up for grabs. If the public figure vehicle can perform in some unexpected way, a definite increase in survival chances should result.

1. The Route:

You will be furnished with detailed road maps of the New Orleans area. Also, exact and alternate routes will be furnished for travel from airports to Fairmont hotel; police sub-stations, hospitals, etc. These routes will have been coordinated with local enforcement agencies.

Information as to existing road conditions, repairs in progress, traffic light locations and timing sequence, as well as normal

traffic volume and flow should be incorporated in the initial route planning. Quite often the shortest route in actual miles traveled will turn out to be the longest route in travel time due to traffic flow conditions. In general, the "best" route to select is one which allows the public figure's vehicle to maintain a constant rate of travel, preferably at posted speeds. Travel at these speeds reduces the potential attacker's timing capability and improves overall security.

You will be expected to conduct your own preliminary (or practice) driving survey of the recommended routes at the same time of day and under the same traffic conditions that most likely will be encountered when you have official passengers. A driving time should be established for these routes.

2. The Danger Zone Log:

During the preliminary route survey, a danger zone log should also be developed by noting, during the preliminary route travel, those specific areas which could afford an attacker concealment or tactical advantage. Areas such as underpasses, bridges, under-the-road culverts, wooded areas bordering the roadway, traffic constriction and/or slowdown zones, potential sniper locations, and so forth.

Finally, the danger zone log should include the specific type of defensive reaction you anticipate employing at each possible attack point. Then, should a threat materialize, you can react immediately, shortcutting the normal decision making process. The time you save will diminish the effect of the surprise factor that initially offers the attacker his greatest advantage.

3. Safe Havens:

At strategic points, located near the planned route and accessible via the planned emergency routes, there will be locations designated as safe havens. A safe haven is defined as an area into which potential attackers will be reluctant to follow and where the public figure may acquire additional protection in the event of emergency. Areas such as police station parking lots, fire stations, garage areas or military bases are examples of normally employed safe havens. You will be furnished such locations. Should emergency situations develop, the public figure's driver should proceed directly to the nearest safe haven.

4. Security For The Vehicles:

The vehicles to be utilized by each Governor and/or his immediate family will be furnished by the Conference.

- a. You will be responsible for the overall security of this vehicle from the time you pick it up until it is returned after the conference.
- b. When you are off-duty there will be a specially designated parking place near your hotel where the vehicle will be parked. This designated location will be under guard by the physical security detail.
- c. The vehicle assigned to you should never remain unguarded even for a few minutes time. Magnetically attached automobile bombs require only seconds to affix to the steel underbody of a vehicle, and an underworld bomber can place a bomb against the vehicle fire wall and connect the wires to the ignition system in less than 15 seconds. The time it takes the driver to buy a pack of cigarettes is more than enough time to place several explosive charges on an unguarded vehicle.

When not in use, the vehicle should not be parked on a public street even though the driver remains in the vehicle as a security guard. The automobile under these conditions still has rear vision blind spots, enabling an attacker on foot to approach the vehicle unobserved and attach a bomb to the underside of the gasoline tank. You may also be momentarily distracted by a person who asks for directions, enabling a second attacker to approach from the street side of the vehicle and attach a bomb.

The vehicle doors should remain locked at all times whether the vehicle is occupied or unoccupied. The vehicle windows should be tightly closed.

All maintenance, routine servicing or cleaning of the vehicle should be conducted in a secured installation or by a previously cleared commercial firm. All work should be observed by the trooper driving the vehicle.

- d. YOUR VEHICLE WILL ONLY BE EQUIPPED WITH A HAND HELD TYPE RADIO WITH A DETACHABLE ANTENNA. TRANSMISSIONS WILL NOT BE OF THE QUALITY OF AN INSTALLED POLICE RADIO.

5. Defensive Driving Techniques:

Presented below are the basic rules of defensive driving, the observance of which often make the difference between the attacker's success or failure. Only by constantly observing these basic rules can you insure that your function does not prove to be the weak link in the security ring, leading to death or injury of a public figure and possibly yourself. Defensive driving techniques require you to:

NOTE: You will be referred to as the "driver", frequently in this section as you are fulfilling both roles.

a. Stay alert at all times.

b. Know what is going on around you.

Do not daydream, sightsee, hold conversations or listen to the music radio. To be even partly distracted is to reduce your potential warning time.

c. Know who is in front, behind and on the sides of your vehicle at all times, particularly if not in convoy.

d. Be suspicious of any type of vehicle which seems to be leading or following your vehicle or which attempts to pass your vehicle.

This includes buses, trucks, motorcycles (especially carrying two people), motorscooters, taxis and other automobiles. Motorcycle make an effective, highly maneuverable assassination team, particularly when equipped with a small automatic weapon.

e. Use the rear vision mirrors to full advantage.

Most vehicle attacks originate from a rearward angle or position on the part of the attackers (the driver's blind spot). The few seconds warning provided by a rear vision mirror allows the driver to react defensively or offensively to the threat while, at the same time, warns the public figure to position himself below window level. If the attackers are alongside before they are seen, it is usually too late for effective defensive actions by the driver.



f. Drive ahead.

The driver should be alert as to what is happening two or three blocks ahead in normal city driving (or as far as he can see). In open driving conditions, he should constantly check ahead to the limits of vision as well as checking side roads, access ramps, underpasses, service roads and so forth. Parked vehicles, traffic obstructions, vehicle accidents, traffic flow slowdowns, lane constructions, should be viewed with caution. Mental pre-planning of defensive actions should become second nature when such apparently normal events occur ahead of the driver's vehicle.

g. Maintain adequate maneuver distance between your vehicle and those moving in traffic ahead of you.

The driver should always leave himself enough room to execute defensive or evasive vehicle maneuvers in case of attack. Be particularly careful not to become trapped closely behind a slow moving truck or bus. When coming up behind a slow moving vehicle, the driver should keep his vehicle an adequate maneuvering distance behind until an opportunity to pass presents itself.

h. Whenever possible drive the vehicle in the lane nearest the center of the roadway.

Driving in this position tends to put potential attackers at a maneuvering disadvantage. Driving in this position on an undivided highway, however, requires an extra degree of caution in relation to vehicles approaching from the opposite direction. Because of the limiting time factor (seconds) and danger associated with launching an attack from one vehicle moving head-on toward another, the head-on attack is rarely employed.

i. Keep the vehicle under control at all times.

The driver should maintain normal traffic speed while driving. Driving at slow speed invites attack. Driving with excessive speed invites vehicle accident.

j. The driver and all passengers, including the public figure, should wear seat belts at all times while in the vehicle.

With seat belts in position, the driver and passengers are in a much safer condition should defensive, evasive or offensive vehicle maneuvers become necessary due to attack.

- k. The driver should strive to be systematically unsystematic in relation to all his driving habits and duties.

Do not depart or arrive at the same time each day. Do not follow the same route, park in the same place or gas the vehicle at the same station. Do not become a creature of habit; do not operate on a fixed schedule. Constantly review past driving actions, routes and time schedules for patterns or habits of movement and take steps to eliminate them. Never return to the public figure's residence or office by the same route used on the preceding outward journey.

- l. Insure that the vehicle windows are rolled up (less than a 2-inch gap if ventilation is required), and the doors locked at all times when the public figure is in the vehicle.

Closed vehicle windows provide a protective shield against rocks, bricks, fire bombs and hand grenades. Bullets fired through vehicle window cause the glass to craze and spall, limiting the view of the attackers as to the position of the public figure inside the vehicle. This small factor alone could make the difference between life or death for the public figure.

- m. Do Not Try to be a Hero.

If the driver receives any indication that he is being followed, he should take defensive evasive action prior to the possibility of attack. A relatively high speed unsignaled turn to the right or left and a circling action around the block should be sufficient to determine if the vehicle is being followed. If the vehicle is not being followed, only a few minutes have been lost in travel time. If the vehicle is being followed, the driver should immediately seek a safe haven and alert safe haven protective personnel by radio as soon as is practical.

- n. Avoid excessive speed as a defensive maneuver.

Speed, as a defensive tactic, is functional only to gain precious seconds so that other defensive maneuvers such as turns, placing other vehicles between your vehicle and the attacker's, or timing the change of traffic signals may be employed. Excessive speed invites vehicle accidents.

- o. Constantly study and plan what possible defensive, evasive, or offensive vehicle actions could be employed should an attack be launched along the travel route.

The driver's specific action or actions will depend entirely upon the situation and conditions at the moment of attack. By constantly anticipating and planning for an attack, the driver's reaction should an attack occur will tend to follow these preplanned actions increasing the probability of evasion or escape.

- p. At the first sign of attack or danger, tell the passenger to get down below the window level of the vehicle.

If it becomes apparent that the vehicle will be forced to a stop, tell the passenger to take cover by lying on the floor of the vehicle.

- q. Do Not overload the vehicle.

An overloaded vehicle cannot be effectively driven defensively or offensively. Overloading a vehicle changes the steering performance, engine capability and braking action of the vehicle radically. Most vehicles drive best when loaded with two or three people. A six-passenger automobile loaded with six passengers is not the same vehicle as it is loaded with three passengers.

- r. The driver must insure that the vehicle is in top notch operating condition.

Particular attention should be paid to the following:

- (1) Inside and outside rear vision mirrors properly adjusted and clean.
- (2) Tires in good condition and properly inflated for the vehicle load factor (steel belted radial tires).
- (3) Motor tuned and in optimum condition.
- (4) Gas tank full at all times and locked.
- (5) Steering, horn, lights and brake system in excellent condition.
- (6) Cooling system clean and properly filled with coolant.

- (7) Battery clean, filled and properly charged.
  - (8) Radio equipment operating (frequent radio checks).
  - (9) Protective equipment serviceable and in position for use.
  - (10) Weapon loaded and ready for use.
  - (11) Vehicle locked at all times.
  - (12) Vehicle remains guarded at all times.
  - (13) Driver's personal habits do not place public figure in danger (lunch at the same place each day; vehicle left unguarded during lubrication or maintenance).
- s. The driver must be totally familiar with all driving routes and must have knowledge of where side streets lead so that under conditions of attack, he does not attempt evasive or escape actions which lead him into deadend streets or isolated areas.

#### VEHICLE ASSASSINATION ATTACK TACTICS

##### 1. The Moving Attack:

In order to discuss with you the offensive driving techniques associated with protection of public figures, it is first necessary to become acquainted with the modus operandi of the attackers. A cross-section of vehicle assassination attacks, ranging from the gangland killings to South American terrorist group assassinations, were studied to determine the pattern of the typical attack and the specific vehicle tactics employed. A summary of key points identified in these case studies appears below:

- a. In most cases studied, the attack was carried out by employing two vehicles. One vehicle was employed to impede or cut off the target vehicle, the other vehicle was employed to launch the attack itself. For example, in one instance an attractive girl in a Volkswagen passed the target vehicle and, when in front of it, suddenly slowed down to impede the

target vehicle's progress. As the second attack car moved into position alongside the target vehicle and the firing began, the girl accelerated away and turned into a side street.

- b. In general, the attack vehicle held three persons; a driver, a man in front with the driver, and a man in the right rear seat. Both passengers usually brought weapons to bear on the target vehicle during the attack. The impeding vehicle frequently held only the driver.
- c. All successful attacks were carried out from the left-hand or driver's side of the target vehicle. Firing started as the attackers reached the rear blind spot in the driver's vision and firing continued as the attackers passed the target vehicle until they reached a position where they could no longer bring their guns to bear.
- d. Attacks generally took place where cross streets or turn offs were available to allow the attackers a quick, easy escape after the attack.
- e. Estimated time duration of the studied attacks was from 10 to 15 seconds with about 10 to 15 rounds being fired at point blank range by each gunner.
- f. When a single vehicle was used, the same blind spot attack pattern was employed. However, because of more maneuvering options available to the target vehicle, the attacks were usually somewhat shorter in duration and, in general, less effective.
- g. Surprise appears to be the key factor in all vehicle attack techniques. In cases where the driver was alert and suspicious of vehicles behind him and reacted defensively, the evasive actions of the target vehicle frequently frustrated the attackers by denying them the element of surprise and preventing their movement into effective attack position.
- h. In almost every case, the confusion caused by the attack resulted in no reliable description or license number of the attacker's vehicle being obtained. Most vehicles were stolen or rented for the attack.
- i. Target vehicle driver errors. Information provided by survivors of attacks and or from studies of the site of the attacks tends to indicate the following driver errors:

- (1) "The attack was completely unexpected." (The driver was not alert.)
- (2) The driver suddenly found himself "boxed in" and unable to take defensive or evasive action. (The driver was not alert, observant, or driving defensively.)
- (3) When the attack was launched, the driver attempted to veer to the right, away from the attacking vehicle, and in so doing, trapped his vehicle against the curb line of parked cars. This action gave the attackers more maneuvering room and enabled them to more effectively bring their guns to bear on the target vehicle. (Driver not alert; driver reacted to induced panic caused by the attacker's actions instead of reacting defensively or offensively.)
- (4) In one case, the driver attached no significance to or saw no danger in a vehicle full of young men following him. He thought they were "just young smart alecks out for a joy ride." (Driver not alert or trained.)

In summation, it should be noted that the driver's constant alertness to conditions around him and suspicion of other vehicles maneuvering in the traffic flow often enabled him to reduce the surprise element of the attack and hence the effectiveness of the attack. In some cases, driver alertness and suspicion foiled the attackers by denying them attack position. When attacked, some drivers were able to effectively break off the attack or shorten attack duration by employing offensive driving tactics.

## 2. The Ambush Attack:

Another type of attack is possible. This is the prepared ambush sprung from carefully selected positions along the road. By definition, the action will take place at a time and location chosen by the attacker. He will probably have calculated firing angles and blocked the road. His aim is to halt the subject's vehicle within a killing zone and destroy him there. The driver's emergency reaction will be determined by the position of the attacker relative to the vehicle's position. If the ambush is launched from an area directly adjacent to the road:

- a. The driver applies full power and attempts to drive out of the killing zone.

- b. If his way is blocked and he cannot reverse or ram his way clear, he should drive into the ambush. This will disrupt firing angles and place the least vulnerable part of the car between the subject and the attackers. This will also disconcert the attackers who will probably have assumed the driver would go to the opposite side. It should be noted that when such prepared ambushes were employed in Southeast Asia the opposite side of the road was frequently booby trapped to prevent escape.
- c. Even if the attacker's firing position is some distance from the roadway, the public figure driver initially reacts the same. He must try to escape the killing zone.
- d. The driver of the public figure vehicle which has been stopped by an ambush situation should first attempt to reverse his direction and break contact with the attackers. Reversal of direction will not only remove the public figure from the killing zone, but represents movement toward protective reserve forces positioned along the previously traveled route.
- e. Failing to escape through reversal of direction, the driver should attempt to position his vehicle in such a way as to take best advantage of the protection it offers. When the attacker is over 100 yards from his intended victim, chances of his target's survival are improved and the room for his maneuver increased. At this distance, exiting the stopped or stalled vehicle may be considered but only if vastly improved cover is available a short distance away. Prior to making such a move, however, security personnel should know exactly where and how they are going to move and must insure they have covering fire before moving. The protective team, again, must quickly flank the ambush position.
- f. In either type of prepared ambush immediate reaction is the key. The first few minutes are the most critical. If the public figure is unhurt two minutes after the ambush is sprung, his chances of survival begin to increase almost geometrically. A study of post-assassination attacks makes it clear that in most cases where individuals exited the vehicle they were killed when the attackers were positioned less than 100 yards distance. A well-prepared static ambush that succeeds in isolating its victim away from all protective cover inside the killing zone will inevitably be successful. The only real hope of survival is to utilize the available protection and attempt to suppress incoming fire until the flanking security forces drive the ambushers away.

### 3. Unescorted Vehicle Travel:

You will be operating in this manner during the conference. THE RISK IS HIGH. For this reason, this section deals with conditions wherein the public figure may find himself alone with his driver or is driving himself. The offensive driving actions described in this section may well be the only protective options available to him under conditions of attack when not accompanied by an escort vehicle.

Offensive driving actions are effective only in that they may serve to keep the attackers "off balance" preventing them from initially getting their vehicle into the blind spot attack position or limiting somewhat their ability to bring their guns to bear on the target vehicle during attack. Offensive driving actions are intended to transfer the element of surprise from the attackers to their target and hopefully facilitate his escape.

In an attack situation, initial offensive driving actions must be performed in those seconds after the attackers swing out to pass but before the attack vehicle reaches the blind spot position. When being attacked by a single vehicle approaching from the blind spot, if the driver of the target vehicle makes a slight and sudden movement to the left, the attackers will usually respond defensively to avoid vehicle contact while, at the same time, slowing and then speeding up so as to get back into attack position. If the driver of the target vehicle, after completing his slight movement to the left (and return) stays in his lane and brings his vehicle to a controlled panic stop (disc brakes are invaluable here), the combined effect usually causes the attacking vehicle to "override" the target vehicle's position, limiting attack time and presenting a more difficult firing angle for the gunners. The necessary abrupt defensive maneuvers of the attacking vehicle also serve to upset the gunners' aiming patterns. This "in lane" panic stop appears to be the single most effective offensive maneuver which may be employed when under attack from another vehicle.

If the attack has taken place on a city street, the vehicle occupants should quickly get below the vehicle window level. The driver should get as low as possible while maintaining visual contact with the attackers. The attackers will probably fire their weapons. However, in a city situation it is doubtful if they will back their vehicle up during the attack to obtain a better firing position.

Should this type of attack occur under non-city conditions, offensive driver actions remain essentially the same except that the driver should immediately attempt to reverse his direction of travel ("U" or "Y" turn) or turn into a side road to escape from the attacking vehicle. In non-city situations, the attacking vehicle which has



overshot its target, may back up toward the target vehicle or the gunmen may exit from the attack vehicle to "finish off" the target.

While caliber .45 or 9mm jacketed machine gun and other jacketed bullets will certainly penetrate the automobile body, the possibility of bullet deflection due to firing angle and/or bullet slowing afforded by the vehicle body serves to improve the survival chances of those inside. Improvised or professional armoring of the vehicle serves to further increase survival factors.

A second attack tactic involving the use of a single vehicle employs a cut-off and stop maneuver by the attackers. This tactic has been employed in both assassination and kidnapping attacks, usually under non-city conditions. In this maneuver the attackers, in passing the target vehicle, employ the rear of their vehicle to force the target vehicle off the roadway and to a halt. In this situation, the driver of the target vehicle should stay in his lane and quickly come to a controlled panic stop. If the target vehicle is equipped with four-wheel disc brakes, this action should open up some measure of maneuvering room between the two vehicles. The attackers are usually prepared to exit their vehicle as soon as the target vehicle has been halted by their cut-off maneuver. By stopping short and staying in his lane, the driver of the target vehicle may be able to suddenly accelerate forward, swing around the attackers and escape the attack. If sufficient maneuvering room is not available to entirely clear the attacker's vehicle and escape, the driver of the target vehicle can usually effect a ramming and escape action.

One of the basic laws of physics states that "mass in motion tends to remain in motion." Police officers with roadblock experience know that frequently, in attempting to halt a vehicle by blocking the roadway with another vehicle, they are unsuccessful because the driver of the vehicle they are trying to halt rams the roadblock vehicle, pushing it out of position to escape. The key points of the ram and escape maneuver may be simply stated:

- a. Ram the blocking vehicle at the end opposite the engine location causing it to swing or rotate around the engine weight.
- b. Ram the vehicle at approximately a 45 degree angle.
- c. Ram the vehicle with sufficient speed and power to push or swing the blocking vehicle out of position. Do not bump it, ram it!
- d. Always aim the ramming vehicle at the rear portion of the rear fenders on the blocking vehicle. Do Not ram the blocking vehicle in its mid-body length or directly (head on) into the front or rear.

- e. Once acceleration for ramming has started there should be no decrease of applied power. The driver of the ramming vehicle should concentrate on driving through the blocking vehicle not just impacting it.
- f. The ramming vehicle should be driven in a straight line through the blocking vehicle. Turning impact or sideswiping decreases impact momentum and often fails to move the blocking vehicle far enough out of position to effect escape. Sideswiping may also result in the vehicle bodies locking together, preventing escape.

Deliberately and quickly ramming and driving through the attacker's vehicle swings the odds somewhat toward the side of the target. Once the target vehicle has been stopped, the attackers feel confident that they control the situation. Offensive ramming of their vehicle to effect escape is usually a totally unexpected maneuver which tends to catch them off guard.

The impact of the ramming action will be more heavily felt in the blocking vehicle than it is in the ramming vehicle (mass in motion), serving to upset the gunner's aiming patterns. Ramming the blocking vehicle will tend to push or swing it toward the curb, parked cars or the roadside ditch and may place it out of operating condition. The ramming action successfully carried out, leaves the blocking vehicle in poor position for pursuit.

Once past the attacker's vehicle, the driver should break visual contact as quickly as possible and notify the command post of the attack. The ramming action will naturally cause damage to the target vehicle, however, even under severe conditions, the vehicle will probably be capable of travel for a mile or more before engine failure.

Offensive driving actions may also include driving the vehicle over curbs, traffic islands and lane dividers during escape maneuvers. Impact with curbs and so forth should be performed at reasonable velocity (down shifting to second gear and maintaining acceleration). Impact with the curb should occur at an angle of attack of not less than 30 degrees and not more than 40 degrees. Impact at less than 30 degrees will tend to take the wheel away from the driver while impact at more than 40 degrees increases the probability of blowing tires at the time of impact. It is realized that this angle of attack is narrow but a proficient driver is normally able to attain

the correct angle in most cases. Needless to say, solid objects such as fire hydrants, light poles, and telephone poles must be avoided. Attackers on foot, trash cans and so forth should not concern the driver of the target vehicle as they are easily swept away by impact.

The third and most commonly encountered method of attack involves the employment of two vehicles. One vehicle cuts off or impedes the target vehicle's movement while the second vehicle attacks using the blind spot approach and fires into the target vehicle.

Once again the driver should stay in his lane, get low in his seat and effect a controlled panic stop. Any of the previously mentioned evasive or offensive actions may be employed to effect escape from this "attack box." In city conditions, it is probably best to simply seek cover below the window level of the vehicle and "sweat out" the attack. If special protective equipment has been installed on the vehicle, now is the time to hit all the switches.

The driver should be prepared to return fire if necessary. In non-city attack situations where the attackers have time to approach the vehicle to finish off the target, some offensive maneuvers coupled with activation of vehicle protective equipment would appear to be the best course of action.

## BODYGUARDING

This section sets forth general concepts for providing "bodyguard" protection to dignitaries, such as Governors. In order to furnish personnel with a better understanding of the mission, background planning information and techniques have also been included.

GENERAL GUIDELINES---

BODYGUARDING

Each of you assigned to this detail will perform one or more of the bodyguard responsibilities during the conference. There are some general guidelines which should assist you in this task.

The bodyguard represents the innermost protective or defensive zone of the inner security ring. He is generally only a few feet away from the public figure and in that position, he provides the last possible physical barrier between the attacker and his target. Because he occupies this key final position in the security ring concept, he is subjected to a great deal of pressure and stress.

The bodyguard must constantly scan people surrounding the public figure, must recognize and allow those who are "safe" to approach without incident while, at the same time, effectively and discreetly preventing all others from making a similar approach. This is difficult even when the public figure is stationary. When he is moving forward or changing position to speak to or greet others, it can become a nightmare of blurred faces and moving hands. If the public figure suddenly changes course, moves into the crowd, or unexpectedly stops moving and is surrounded by other persons, the bodyguard may suddenly find that he is cut off from the public figure.

If the bodyguard were a machine he would need to be equipped with radar to constantly gauge the position of the subject relative to his own, superb optics capable of scanning 360 degrees, X-ray for the detection of potential or actual weapons under clothing and behind other human bodies, a computerized friend-or-foe-hostile-action-recognition system, a variable speed transmission ranging from stop to leap, an audio pickup system capable of detecting the muted click of a concealed weapon against the background sounds of an excited crowd, a communications system capable of sending and receiving sight or sound signals on all frequencies, a sixth sense danger alerting system, and an adequate number of different appendages enabling him to open doors, clear crowds, intercept thrown objects, make signals, stop bullets, provide a shield, attack weapons, provide fire support and guide the public figure to safety. Such a machine would no doubt be painted blue, be equipped with a flowing cape and have a large red "S" painted on its forward section. Even after construction, it is quite possible that it would not replace the human bodyguard entirely.

1. Basic Rules for Bodyguards:

The following ten rules for bodyguards are not intended to be all inclusive, but rather serve to illustrate the basic considerations and actions which should be associated with the function of close-in protection.

- a. Stay alert, plan ahead by anticipating threats and take actions to avoid them.
- b. Continually assess the situation and mentally pre-plan the proper actions to take in order to defend the public figure from attack.
- c. Watch the hands of anyone near the public figure. Regard with suspicion anyone whose hands are hidden and mentally plan defensive actions in advance.
- d. Should a threat materialize, attack the weapon rather than the individual employing the weapon.
- e. Develop the technique of looking beyond a questionable individual so as not to alarm him by direct surveillance. Direct or "eyes on" surveillance may cause an attack to be prematurely launched from a distance too great for the bodyguard to effectively neutralize the weapon.
- f. If a threatening situation appears to be developing, bodyguards should immediately remove the public figure from the area and keep him out of sight until the situation stabilizes.
- g. If two bodyguards are accompanying the public figure and a threat appears, one man immediately removes the public figure while the other intercepts or attacks the threat.
- h. Any action or disturbance which appears to divert the attention of other assigned protective personnel or draws them away from their positions should be regarded as a danger signal requiring the bodyguard to be more vigilant and/or to remove the public figure.
- i. Bodyguards should establish and maintain the secure area around the public figure without unnecessarily offending the public.
- j. Bodyguards and other protective team members should develop and employ a system of voice signals which clearly identify the type and location of a threat. These signals should be employed throughout the protective operation.

2. Protective Positioning:

Public figure assassins usually plan, to some extent, their actions; mercenary assassins always plan their actions. Public figure assassins usually follow their targets around, often for a considerable length of time; mercenary assassins always perform detailed surveillance and develop a plan of attack.

What obstacles now stand in the way of the assassin? Only one; the assigned body guard.

If the word "bodyguard" had never been coined; if instead the words "single protective element" were employed to describe the function the man actually performs, perhaps the tendency to make this type of assignment would cease and a more realistic approach to protection would result.

Each governor will have his own security team with him. Manytimes you will be working as a team with them. There follows some general rules for one or more bodyguards which should assist you in the performance of your duties. (From IACP Public Security Center)

In performing the function of the bodyguard, certain actions and/or position relationships between bodyguards and the public figure are highly desirable.

- a. The recommended minimum number of bodyguards is two men. Four bodyguards offer more than twice the protective capability of two bodyguards.
- b. The left side of the public figure is generally considered to be the most vulnerable area to attack because of the normal heart location (slightly left of center). One bodyguard should normally be positioned to the left and slightly to the rear. (Wedge Formation)
- c. The public figure should remain in the peripheral vision of the lead bodyguard at least 50 percent of the time so that his exact relationship to the bodyguard is known.
- d. The bodyguards should remember that it is easier to move forward to intercept an attacker or potential attacker than it is to move rearward and should position themselves accordingly in threat situations.
- e. In threatening situations, the bodyguard should attempt to block the attacker's path or the line of vision (thrown coat in Wallace assassination attempt) toward the public figure's body with his own body if such actions are consistent with anticipated disarming methods.

- f. The public figure should not pass through any doorway ahead of the bodyguards. One bodyguard should pass through the doorway and determine that no threat exists in the space before the public figure enters.
- g. The public figure should walk in the center of hallways, sidewalks, stairs and so forth so as not to pass closely to doorways, alcoves, alleyways or other potential places of concealment. Such positioning additionally allows more freedom of movement and maneuvering room for both the bodyguards and the public figure.
- h. If three bodyguards are to be employed, two should be positioned to the right and left, slightly forward of the public figure, with the third to the rear. (Modified Wedge Formation)
- i. If four bodyguards are to be employed, two should be positioned forward and two to the rear with the public figure in the center. (Box Formation)
- j. If five bodyguards are to be employed, the fifth man should assume a position at center forward of two leading bodyguards. (Box-Wedge Formation)




Figure 1  
 NORMAL BODYGUARD POSITIONING  
 AROUND THE PUBLIC FIGURE



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

3. Voice Signals For Bodyguards:

When an attack is launched against the public figure, the bodyguards must have a system for vocal communication which alerts those not directly in the path of the attack. Ideally, these voice signals should identify the nature of the threat as well as its direction and should be brief as possible without sacrificing clarity. Without such signals the bodyguards not directly involved in blocking the threat or in visual contact with the threat will be unaware as to which direction to move the public figure.

An effective method of vocal signaling consists simply of identifying the weapon and its bearing or angle in relation to the public figure. The clock system of angle identification is recommended for use due to its simplicity and clarity. The clock system involves visualizing the public figure as walking on a large clock dial. The forward direction of movement is always toward 12 o'clock. Three o'clock is to his right side, 9 o'clock to his left side and 6 o'clock is directly behind him, as is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2  
CLOCK SYSTEM OF ANGLE IDENTIFICATION

If a threat presents itself from an elevated position above the body height of the public figure, that elevation is identified as "high;" if a threat is located below the level of the public figure's body height, it is identified as "low." Threats presenting themselves within the body height zone of the public figure may be identified as "level," although this designation is not commonly voiced, but simply understood.

When this system of vocal communications is employed descriptive and locative threat information may be transmitted in short crisp phrases such as those illustrated in Figure 3,

If the nature of the threat is not a weapon, communications such as "Man, 3 o'clock" or "Camera, 11 o'clock" may be given alerting the bodyguards for possible action.

The "clock system" is also applicable during movement by vehicle and may be utilized to inform the driver of the public figure vehicle or protective personnel in the escort vehicles of unnatural occurrences or threats present along the route of travel; "Man on roof, 10 o'clock high" or "Three men in car at 5 o'clock."




Figure 3  
EXAMPLES OF VOCAL THREAT COMMUNICATIONS

4. Common Problems Associated With Bodyguard Duties:

The following examples present some of the problems commonly encountered in performing bodyguard duties. The majority of these problems usually related directly to the personality of the public figure, the image he wishes to project to the public and his personal feelings about security actions in general.

In dealing with problems of this nature quite often the bodyguards have no choice but to concede to the wishes of the public figure, even if it means reducing the degree of protection provided or limiting its effectiveness. The unwritten cardinal rule governing all bodyguard actions is "Do not interfere with the public figure's actions in any way which may cause him embarrassment or may create hostility." In essence, this means that protection may be scaled back in some cases to the point where vulnerability is greatly increased. This "calculated risk" method of operation is certainly not desirable, but nevertheless exists as a real fact of life.

- a. The public figure informs protective personnel that no one is to walk in front of him.
  - (1) This is a fairly common occurrence especially when providing protection for political public figures. The bodyguards will simply have to move positions at the sides and rear of the public figure and provide protection from those positions.
- b. The public figure does not want any protective personnel in sight but still desires to be protected.
  - (1) This type of request usually occurs in relation to social or family functions. The protective team can only assume protective coloration (dress) and attempt to mingle with the other guests or pedestrians. The bodyguards will probably be at distances of 15 to 50 feet from the public figure in these cases. In cases where the public figure is shopping in stores, visiting an art gallery or walking on city streets very serious problems must be overcome.
- c. The public figure decides to move into the friendly crowd or moves to crowd barriers and then along its length, shaking hands and greeting people.
  - (1) If the public figure moves to a barrier and begins to greet the public, two bodyguards (1 and 2) should remain at his side and one bodyguard (3) should assume a position behind him. As the public figure moves along the crowd barrier toward his

left, the bodyguard (1) on that side should watch the hands of the crowd. A fourth bodyguard (4) should be at the back of the first bodyguard (1) and should observe the section of the crowd which they are approaching.

If the public figure presses into the friendly crowd, the bodyguards should attempt to maintain a relatively clear space around him and hold their positions. Bodyguard actions should be firm but polite.

- a. Should the public figure request a bodyguard to get him a newspaper, a pack of gum or a sandwich, the bodyguard should politely inform him that he cannot leave his post to obtain the item but will have it picked up as soon as possible by other non-security support personnel.
- b. The public figure will often fix on one bodyguard and follow him to act as a route guide. Should this occur, the bodyguard should be informed that the public figure is following his lead and the bodyguard group should allow him to lead the entire party along the travel route. If possible and practical under threat conditions, this bodyguard should take the public figure to a position of safety while others engage or block the threat.
- c. Bodyguards are prone to loose personal articles through contact with the public. A dropped pencil or pen, set of keys, tie bar, and so forth, more often than not, cannot be recovered during bodyguard actions. The bodyguard who stops to pick up a dropped object breaks the security ring around the public figure by being out of position. A large number of bodyguards will carry only bare essentials while on duty; their weapon, their identification and some dimes for the telephone in case they are left behind in a threat situation.
- d. Bodyguard clothing should certainly be neat and clean, but should not be in the top quality, custom tailored suit category. Any bodyguard who wears such a suit while on duty is asking to have it torn, stained or damaged during his tour of duty. During movement with the public figure, pockets may be torn away by door handles and it is not uncommon to loose a shoe when working in crowd conditions. Wear serviceable clothing which is easily replaceable.

# NATURE OF THE ATTACK

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		SHORT RANGE				MEDIUM/LONG RANGE
		Handheld Clubs, Knives, etc.	Deadly Missiles And Incendiary Devices	Explosive Devices	Firearms	Firearms
A C T I O N	O N F O O T	Avoid hand-to-hand combat Secure defensive space Use obstacles or escape routes Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first	Clear impact area Seek cover and concealment Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first	Drop to ground shelter behind object or in structure If attack continues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crawl or roll away</li> <li>• Seek cover and concealment</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>	Drop to ground or evade to one side Seek cover/immediate counterattack Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first	Drop to ground or evade to one side Determine direction of fire Seek cover and concealment Prepare to defend Request assistance Counter most dangerous attacker first
	I N V E H I C L E	Drive away Be alert to opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protect vulnerable body areas</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>	Drive away Be alert to opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remain temporarily within the vehicle</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Exit vehicle and clear impact area</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>	Drive away Be alert for opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crouch in seat or lay across floor</li> <li>• If device does not explode, exit vehicle using automobile as shield</li> <li>• Crawl or roll away</li> <li>• Seek cover and concealment</li> </ul> If attack continues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do not abandon vehicle except as last resort</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>	Drive away Assume low profile Do not drive in straight line Escape attacker's line-of-sight Be alert for opportunity to use vehicle as weapon If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exit vehicle</li> <li>• Use engine area for cover or</li> <li>• Seek nearby cover and concealment</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>	Drive away If vehicle is immobilized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remain in vehicle</li> <li>• Determine direction of fire</li> <li>• Exit vehicle</li> <li>• Use engine area for cover or seek nearby cover and concealment</li> <li>• Prepare to defend</li> <li>• Request assistance</li> <li>• Counter most dangerous attacker first</li> </ul>

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**END**