


# NCJRS

This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

*Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a title or reference number, which is mostly illegible due to blurring and high contrast.*



30875

4

*strategies for restructuring the  
state department of youth services*

Yitzhak Bakal

Joint Correctional Planning Commission  
Boston, Massachusetts

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  
Office of Human Development  
Office of Youth Development

(SRS) 73-26034

## Foreword

Experts, for a number of years, have felt that most correctional institutions emphasize control of youth rather than treatment and that many youth, particularly those incarcerated for status offenses, are wrongfully confined. It is evident from statistics on recidivism that correctional institutions have fulfilled neither their philosophy nor potential in the rehabilitation of youth.

Today many changes are occurring in the juvenile justice system. This article presents an example of one State's almost revolutionary effort to better serve youth in trouble, by closing large training schools and using the community as the site for the processes necessary to effective rehabilitation.

JAMES A. HART  
*Commissioner*  
*Office of Youth Development*

# Strategies for Restructuring the State Department of Youth Services —

THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE

YITZHAK BAKAL

The large correctional institution has failed to achieve its goals. Placing people who do not follow the established rules of our society—especially the young—into environments set apart from society has served neither the public nor the person confined. Whether the intent has been to punish or to rehabilitate, the experience of over a hundred years has shown that institutionalization is not the answer. The learning process has been expensive not only in monetary terms, but in human cost as well.

Even as larger institutions are being built, more and more professionals in youth services, mental health, and the correctional field in general have come to believe that society can be better served by alternatives that include a setting *within* the society to which the person in trouble must ultimately return.

Over the past decade, the nature and dimension of the juvenile delinquency problem in the United States and around the world have been changing rapidly. Crime and recidivism rates have been rising alarmingly, especially among juveniles. Public concern that developed over this problem resulted in greater expenditures of money and resources on the already-existing, traditional youth service operations. But this did not achieve the desired effect of improving services or reducing the crime and recidivism rates.

A radical transformation in the nature and quality of service delivery has taken place in the Department of Youth Services of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Between 1969-1972 the role of the Department has changed from that of custodian to that of advocate. Large

---

Much of the material presented here is based on material in my forthcoming book of articles *Closing Correctional Institutions: New Strategies for Youth Services*. The book will be available in June 1973 from Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Mass. 02367, \$10.

training schools were closed, and the community became the site for the processes necessary for effective rehabilitation. Services were increased in number, nature, and quality, while costs were actually reduced.

The significance of this move away from institutionalization can be best illustrated by briefly reviewing the four stages that the institutionalization of young people has undergone. The first stage was based on a belief in the value of placing offenders or disturbed young people in a wholesome setting, away from the negative influences of their home and community environments. The plan was to cultivate proper values, attitudes, and behaviors through a regiment of discipline and inspirational character-building. To that end, the first public reform school in the U.S., the Lyman School for Boys, was established in Massachusetts in 1846.

The next stage was the introduction of clinical services, within existing institutions, providing individualized attention to motivational and psychological aspects of the residents.

The third stage followed from the introduction of therapeutic community concepts into the large institution. Groups of doctors, social workers, attendants, and inmates openly discussed their problems and grievances. This was intended to create a more responsive climate for the joint working out of differences.

The fourth stage developed when many practitioners in the corrections field began to see that rehabilitation consists not of therapists "curing" offenders, but rather of worker and resident creating an atmosphere of trust and problem-solving where all grow, or regress, together. It was quickly found that this type of treatment simply could not be successfully administered in institutions that were cut off from society, having a tradition of custodial or punitive rather than rehabilitative treatment, and generally staffed with people tied directly to an entrenched bureaucracy having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

Research and decades of experience in youth services also demonstrate why correctional programs involving institutional confinement are not only ineffective, but are all too often destructive.<sup>1</sup> Training schools are described—often quite accurately—as poorhouses for neglected children. They are essentially custodial in nature, and if they teach anything, it is crime. They tend to increase the alienation and crystalize the criminal self-concept of the committed offender.<sup>2</sup> Upon his or her release, the

<sup>1</sup> This point is repeatedly documented in the careful and objective studies by the research teams of the California Department of Corrections and the California Youth Authority.

<sup>2</sup> Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career* (Chicago: Institute of Juvenile Research, 1931); or see studies on prison socialization and experiences of inmates in, Donald R. Cressey, ed., *The Prison* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

readjustment to society is extremely difficult,<sup>3</sup> and recidivism rates range as high as 80 percent. This rate tends to increase, furthermore, in proportion to the length of confinement in an institution.<sup>4</sup> Thus the youthful offender who has experienced failure in his school and his community faces yet another failure when he is exposed to such an inept and destructive system. This system reinforces the stigma of the delinquent, deprives the youth of a legitimate identity, and perpetuates the cycle of failure.<sup>5</sup>

Life in the closed institutionalized setting is prey to powerful influence of peer-group processes on residents and staff members as well. At the level of the basic living unit, untrained, underpaid, immobile personnel are isolated from the administrators and professionals in charge of the institution. They make deals with residents, with whom they have to find some kind of underground *modus vivendi*. Thus the whole institutional enterprise becomes manipulative, encouraging self-serving anti-system behavior.<sup>6</sup>

Public bureaucracies administering youth programs lack the autonomy to give adequate service delivery for youth. A department of youth services is usually controlled by many groups, which exert strong pressures to resist change. First, within state governments there is the legislature, which controls the budget, and the governors' executive office, which exerts bureaucratic controls. There are also other agencies of the criminal justice system: the police, the courts, and probation. Internally a department is comprised of staff who can exert controls through their unions or political influences. Because a public bureaucracy is essentially dependent on maintaining the status quo for its very existence (in this case, the system of institutions), change is exceedingly difficult. Even some of the most high-minded administrators and professionals may succumb to a rationale of "that innovation is a good idea, but. . . ." In this way progressive solutions are stillborn, and the punitive system of institutionalization of troubled young people perpetuates itself. This was the situation in Massachusetts in 1969, when a new Commissioner of Youth Services, Jerome G. Miller, was appointed.

## THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE

It was under Miller's direction that the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) began a unique experiment that has radically

<sup>3</sup> Reuben S. Horlick, "Inmate Perception of Obstacles to Readjustment in the Community," *Proceedings of the American Correctional Association*, 1961, pp. 200-205.

<sup>4</sup> David A. Ward, "Evaluations of Correctional Treatment: Some Implications of Negative Findings," in *Law Enforcement Science and Technology*, S. A. Yerskey, ed. (New York: Thompson Book Co., 1967), p. 205.

<sup>5</sup> Don C. Gibbons, *Society, Crime and Criminal Career* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

<sup>6</sup> For a thorough study of this subject see Howard Polsky, *Cottage Six: The Social System of Delinquent Boys in Residential Treatment* (New York, 1962).

departed from traditional approaches in two significant ways. *It was the first state to close its correctional institutions for youth; and it has developed many innovative and promising community-based alternatives for its troubled youth, without a major increase in its budget or personnel.* As state youth service departments across the country begin to experiment with alternative methods of service delivery, the Massachusetts experience is relevant.

### *Background*

The closing of institutions by the Massachusetts DYS was an almost totally unforeseeable event. It was not a gradual process that was planned over a period of many years. It was, rather, the climax of a series of events that continued to broaden the base of support for change, while narrowing the number of possible alternatives.

The climate for change began to develop in the 1960s when the quality of care in the institutions had reached an all-time low. Both the public and the legislature were concerned. The system had been failing children for years. Many staff members, lacking professional skill, had turned to excessive use of punishment in order to control their young charges. This situation was brought to the attention of the public through the media, and criticism came to a boiling point with the release of several investigative reports (especially a study made by HEW). With the public and the legislature alarmed, the time was ripe for the governor and the legislature to act. Political pressure was exerted on the then-director of the division, and he resigned in 1969.

The legislature passed a reorganization bill elevating the Division of Youth Services into full Department status and moved it from under the Department of Education to a super-agency consisting of Welfare, Health, Mental Health, and Correction. The Reorganization Act provided for the appointment of a new commissioner and four assistant commissioners of his choosing. The act also set a new professional tone for the agency, using key words such as therapy, prevention, community services, purchase of services, and research.

Finally, the Act broadly empowered the new department to "establish necessary facilities for detention, diagnosis, treatment and training of its charges, including post-release care." While these powers in themselves did not mark a major new thrust, the language of the Act later proved sufficient grounds for Commissioner Miller and his assistants to implement a noninstitutional system, although this was not its specific intention.

The positive intent of the Act was clearly reflected in the search for a director. The search panel consisted of well-reputed professionals such as Dr. Lloyd Ohlin, head of the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, and Dr. Harold Demone, director of the Mass. Bay United Fund. Miller was chosen because of his training at the Ohio State University School

of Social Work and his experience in the military, developing a youth services agency for U.S. Air Force dependents. He had experience in both theory and practice of youth service operation.

The appointment of Miller in turn led to further upgrading of the staff of DYS, for he chose highly qualified assistants from the education and social work professions. These professionals in turn hired many young and progressive people to work for them. So there was a significant injection of new people and ideas.

The personnel and ideological changes within DYS, coupled with continued publicity in the media and growing public concern over the quality of care for children, increased and reinforced the climate for change that had begun in the 1960s. During his first year as commissioner, Miller and his assistants tried many new programs within the existing system.

There was increased staff training, made possible by Federal funds. One institution was closed, others were decentralized into a cottage-based system. Some group homes began to develop as alternative placements for youth. A productive liaison was established between the University of Massachusetts and the Westfield Detention Center. And the process of regionalization within the State began.

### *Opening the System*

Miller's first year in office is noted for his effort to "open" the system, that is, loosening the existing rigid structure in order to make it more amenable to change. In approaching this task, the new commissioner had several liabilities and obstacles: (1) he was an outsider to the system and lacked support within DYS; (2) his resources were limited by lack of funds; (3) years of institutional autonomy almost precluded any central authority's intervention.

Several important strategies were employed toward this end. The first of these was to increase public relations through mass media. During this early period Miller made many local television and radio broadcasts and made himself available to the press. He continually cast himself in the role of outside change agent. He exposed and criticized the wrongs of the system explicitly: "We must eliminate the little totalitarian societies which dominated the juvenile institutions in the past. Most of the units were set up so that their successful kids could only function in a dictatorship." At the same time he was vague about the changes he was planning to implement. In this way he gathered support for himself while depriving his opponents of a focus for opposition, thus keeping himself on the offensive. His image developed as one of a reformer and a sensitive advocate for the needs of youth.

He also exposed the internal conflicts and staff sabotage to the press and public. In this way he made the inner workings of the Department publicly visible, and he made it clear to the press and the public that he

was as concerned as they were with exposing the problems that existed in his Department.

The result of this continuing dialogue with the public through the media was a general increase in understanding and support of the new commissioner and his philosophy. It helped make the public more aware of DYS and its functions, and it improved immensely the image of the Department in the public eye. It also changed somewhat the image of a juvenile delinquent from a criminal to a victim. By exposing the injustices and brutality inherent in the system, more people became aware of these institutions, and more people were made to realize that children were being victimized, instead of rehabilitated. The public was made to feel responsible for allowing this sort of treatment to exist. "You can control runaways, you can 'produce model institutional' kids by brute force and fear if that's what you want, to reassure legislators, the police or the community. Lock doors, handcuff kids to their beds—and you'll have no runs. But they will react when they get out; they have learned to con the adults."

Thus a new voice was heard at DYS, the voice of the concerned public. And once the commissioner exposed the injustices of the system he oversaw, he was obligated to correct them. He had gained the support of the public to do just this.

Whereas the institutions were previously autonomous, they were now becoming accountable to the central administration. The commissioner began to ask for written reports of any cases involving force or brutality. In a newspaper report in March 1970, he complained of the existing system, "A staff member alone was often judge, jury, and prosecutor in regard to particular incidents, with facts often grossly distorted to protect the staff. From now on, I will ask for State Police investigation in cases of obvious brutality." In this way, using his authority, more actors became involved in transactions between staff and youth.

Another useful strategy employed by Commissioner Miller was the involvement of the youths themselves in decisions affecting their lives. He toured the institutions, often appearing unexpectedly. He went directly to the young people and listened to their grievances. In this way he found what was really going on rather than what the staff wanted him to know. And he gave youngsters the feeling that they had an important advocate. He encouraged them to call him or come to his office. The institutionalized youngsters in his charge became an important source of information to him and his staff.

By making himself accessible to the resident of the institution he was in fact breaking down the hierarchy in these institutions. The youngsters began to realize they had some recourse if they were mistreated, and the staffs realized they were accountable for their actions.

One of the costs of this change was the insecurity it wrought among the staff. Without any feeling of support from the administration, they

lost their former means of discipline. This at times caused conflict, resistance, and even sabotage. It also presented problems to the middle-management personnel who had to deal with disgruntled staff at the institutions, and to try to implement all the new policies. So in terms of staff unrest, the costs of this change were great.

However, all of these strategies—the use of public relations, divesting the institutions of their autonomy, the breakdown of the hierarchy, listening to the grievances of the young people—had the result of opening the system. The staff at the institutions were now accountable to many segments of the population—the young people, the public, and the central administration.

### *Implementing Institutional Alternatives*

In 1969 the Division operated five large training schools: the Lyman School for Boys (ages 12-15), the Shirley Industrial School for Boys (ages 15-17), the Oakdale Residential Treatment Unit for boys (ages 9-11), the Lancaster Industrial School for Girls (all ages), and the Bridgewater Guidance Center, a maximum-security unit. The Division also operated four regional detention centers: two in the Boston area, one for girls at South Huntington Avenue and one for boys in Roslindale; the third was a co-educational center in Worcester; and a fourth in the western part of the State, Westfield. These facilities, with the exception of two detention centers, Worcester and Westfield, operated on a custodial, training school model for the treatment of the children in their custody. They were mostly outmoded, uncoordinated with their idiosyncratic management and sporadic links to other social services, and the Department in general. Their communication with the Division at large was almost nonexistent. The institutions themselves were hidden either in suburban or rural locations and were isolated from outsiders, and very often were subject to local patronage influences.

The new commissioner made many attempts to introduce alternative treatment methods within these existing institutions; however, these innovations proved mostly unsuccessful. The training sessions introduced in early 1970 and run by Dr. Maxwell Jones<sup>7</sup> created staff polarization and resulted in mass runaways. It is important to note that these concepts proved to have many limitations for application within antiquated institutions that lacked backup programs, resources, and progressive staff.

In mid-1970, another attempt at change was made at the Shirley facility. The "guided group interaction" approach was introduced by Harry Vorath from Minnesota. A modified version of the Maxwell Jones

<sup>7</sup>Dr. Maxwell Jones is a British psychiatrist, famous for introducing therapeutic community concepts into the mental hospital setting. Therapeutic community concepts are intended to alter the traditional passive role of the "inmate" through a process of active resocialization in which roles are broken down and relationships become more equalized among staff and between staff and residents.

approach, it is more structured and geared to institutional settings. This approach was adopted by a group of staff from Shirley School, and was used in running an intensive-security unit at Oakdale.

Another approach tried in collaboration with Dr. Mathew Demont from the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health was the self-help group. DYS explored these self-help programs as an alternative that would provide massive change inside the institutions. The idea was to turn over several institutions to private self-help groups that needed space for their own operations. They would in turn accept DYS youngsters into their programs. This idea held high promise for radically altering service delivery practices in DYS for several reasons: (1) the private groups had a high degree of success in terms of their acceptance by the community, the public, and the legislature; (2) they provide a therapeutic environment for those residents interested in introspection and change; and (3) they maintain themselves on a minimal budget because of the strong demands exerted on the residents.

Despite these high hopes, however, the outcome actually proved to be very limited for two reasons. First, all of these groups were able to work with only a limited number of DYS youngsters. Such groups have high expectations and exert tremendous pressure on the residents. In order to continue they had to work with motivated children, and thus the attrition rate was very high.

Second, these programs have an authoritarian approach that proved to be at odds with DYS's emerging approach of humanism, permissiveness, and equalitarianism. Further, because of the high visibility of DYS and its many detractors, it was difficult to support new programs before they proved themselves viable. Although all of these new programs had only limited practical success, they were useful inasmuch as they challenged the old system and demonstrated that many possibilities exist in the treatment of youth.

The gains made by implementing these initial changes were therefore outweighed by the problems caused. The institutional system was so deeply entrenched that any change had to be massive in order for its effects to be significantly felt. In one sense the changes were not great enough. Yet every new measure introduced was resisted by the older staff, who were fearful of their positions or of changing their long-accepted roles. So for them the changes were too great.

There was also a certain degree of loss of control caused by the newness of the programs. Runaways temporarily increased, causing a reaction from local communities and the legislature. There was a basic contradiction between the closed institutional setting and the new style of open meetings. This contradiction resulted in tension that could not be satisfactorily resolved. To sustain trust between worker and inmate during those hours not spent in open encounters proved difficult. It became apparent that polarized subcultures invariably resulted from plac-

ing trained personnel in authority over residents who lived under severe restrictions. This polarization prevented the emergence of a common transcending atmosphere of mutual caring and aid. And the larger the institution, the more pronounced the polarity. Thus all of the changes within the institutional context brought about opposition from the staff, the legislature, and the public, while only minimally improving services rendered by DYS.

The climate had been ripe for change. Many changes and alternatives were attempted within the institutional system, but these were not successful in any meaningful way. Believing there were no viable alternatives left, Miller concluded that the system of institutionalization was so inherently bad that *the only solution available was to close the institutions entirely and provide new programs and alternatives outside the system.*

During the January 1972 legislative recess, Miller used his discretionary powers as commissioner to officially close the institutions. Youngsters who could not be immediately paroled, placed, or referred to community programs were housed temporarily on the campus of the University of Massachusetts.

This operation was called the JOE II conference, and was essentially planned and executed by a core group of the university's volunteers and regional DYS staff. The operation, in spite of many administrative problems, was successful in that it made the closing of the largest institution, the Lyman School for Boys, relatively painless for the youngsters involved, because this method eliminated staff opposition and sabotage. The 100 youths, who stayed for about a month on the university campus, were matched with youth advocates while arrangements were made for them to be placed in community based programs, preferably in their home regions.

The closing of institutions was an act that overshadowed all other accomplishments and incremental changes. It had a very important psychological impact. First, it set the tone and clearly defined the task for the year 1972. After initial staff bewilderment and surprise, energies were released in the direction of the creation of alternatives. Groups began to come up with proposals; resources were found; and children filled these placements at an accelerated rate. There was a new goal, a new task, and a new hope.

Second, it gave the Department national recognition. Newspaper articles and television networks covered the closings, and the Department was described as a bold, action-oriented agency willing to take risks to ameliorate the deplorable conditions of training schools for youthful offenders. In professional circles, this action was described as a breakthrough in providing services for youths in trouble.

Third, the drama involved in the closing of the oldest training school in the country, Lyman, effectively attracted significant public attention.

Finally, the closing of Lyman symbolized the end of punitive and repressive institutions, even though other facilities in the state remained open waiting to be phased out in the near future. It was as if all the institutions had been closed.

In retrospect, this move succeeded for several reasons:

1. The University of Massachusetts and the western region of the DYS provided a good cushion to absorb youngsters, and moreover, proved to be a rich resource for program alternatives.
2. Forestry camps and Outward Bound type programs were very effective in handling and providing alternative programs.
3. Detention centers were still available to accommodate youngsters who were awaiting placements.
4. An intensive care unit, Andros, was immediately opened at Roslindale. This unit, which later was staffed almost entirely by ex-offenders, was able to work effectively with hard-core youngsters, and gave the court the assurance that the dangerous youngsters were *not* in the streets.
5. The publicity, which the closing of institutions generated, caught the attention of many groups who proved to be resources for DYS, and the developers of its alternatives later on.

Once the training schools were closed, it was necessary to develop quickly the services to fill the vacuum. There were three major elements in the new DYS approach: (1) nonresidential alternative, rather than old-style residential institutions; (2) small community-based residential homes instead of the large institutions; and (3) purchase of services from private community groups rather than state operation of all programs. As programs developed they could be categorized into the following areas: (1) prevention; (2) pre-commitment; (3) post-commitment; and (4) special programs.

Those needs and programs, which are explained in detail in another report,<sup>8</sup> include: prevention grants-in-aid to cities and towns; youth advocates to work directly with youths in trouble; legal advocates to assist in case preparation; court liaison officers; parole volunteers to give increased attention to the young offender and decrease caseload burdens; group homes (Federally and State financed); halfway houses for drug and other kinds of offenders; intensive-treatment facilities for those requiring secure settings; foster homes; forestry camps; Outward Bound programs; and a series of detention alternatives to minimize the negative effects of the pre-adjudication period.

<sup>8</sup> See *The Massachusetts Experience: A Model of Deinstitutionalized, Community-Based, Privately Run Programs for Delinquent Youth* (Washington: HEW, 1973).

### *Prevention Programs*

DYS annually awards grants to local community agencies which are operating or will be establishing programs for the prevention, treatment, and control of juvenile delinquency. State monies must be 50 percent matched by either local or private funds. Program goals generally fall into two categories: establishment of better communication and coordination among public and private agencies, and furnishing new services where there are gaps in existing services within the community.

### *Pre-Commitment Programs*

DYS seeks to operate a system of treatment programs which is sensitive to the individual child, from the first moment the child comes under the jurisdiction of DYS. The first task is to maintain a system of differentiated detention units which hold youth both on a pre-arraignment and on a post-adjudication status.

The pre-arraignment period is quite brief, sometimes only overnight, during which Department personnel at a secure detention center help youth make family contacts, apprise them of legal needs, and make a preliminary classification of treatment needs. At the court arraignment the next day the child might be bailed or detained, and if the latter, placed by the Department in a maximum security unit or one of the smaller detention alternatives. The detention period before adjudication provides the opportunity for pre-judicial planning, initial screening of the child, and development of treatment alternatives to present to the court at the time of disposition. It is at this time that the court liaison officer, armed with diagnostic and case material gathered during the detention period, is able to explain to the court the alternatives to commitment which could be most beneficial to the child.

**Court Liaison Program:** DYS began to place liaison personnel in a number of courts to help develop community remedies for children in trouble and assure the most suitable care available for those youth placed in the custody of DYS. Concerning himself with court-acquainted youth and youth awaiting trial, the Court Liaison Officer provides counselling and casework services to youth at the point of court intake. After discussing placement options with the youth, the CLO explores alternatives to commitment and provides recommendations to the court on case disposition. Whenever possible, the CLO encourages the court to divert children away from the juvenile justice system and into community sponsored programs.

### *Shelter Care Facilities*

The DYS has established small detention facilities in the seven regions in which detainees can be placed prior to trial, with the assurance that

they will receive close interim attention. These small detention facilities are low-security, small group programs designed to minimize the alienation characteristically suffered by children in detention, and maximize the youth's willing participation in treatment services.

These small shelter care facilities support a staff of about 10 and a youth population of 12-15. Regionalized detention centers replace traditional detention units with small therapeutically-oriented homes where the detained child receives counseling services while awaiting trial. Emphasis is placed upon vocational and educational counseling and testing in conjunction with pre-placement planning. The aim of the DYS is to reduce the population of detainees in maximum security settings to an appropriate minimum and find more treatment-oriented open community settings for the balance of the detained population.

**Detained-Youth Advocate Program:** A Detained-Youth Advocate provides temporary foster homes and one-to-one advocacy for youth who are awaiting trial. During the youth's stay with an advocate he may enroll at a local public school, or any specialized or vocational school in the community, and may take part in community-sponsored programs.

#### *Post-Commitment Programs*

While DYS continues to run a number of programs in its own facilities, the major emphasis is on the purchase of care for committed and referred youth. In fiscal year 1971 DYS had a purchase-of-care budget of about \$500,000. In fiscal year 1972 the purchase-of-service budget amounted to \$1,850,000 of regular and supplemental funding. This money was applied to three categories of care: foster home placements (\$25-50 per week), group home placements (\$150 per week), and intensive residential treatment (\$200 per week). Also purchased are such specialized services as vocational counseling, family counseling, and special educational services.

Since the closing of the state training schools heightened the need for residential placement options, DYS embarked on expansion of group home resources for both short-term and long-term placements. This was accomplished by doubling the use of state-funded group homes, funding a number of new private groups homes with money from the U.S. Dept. of Justice's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, creating a new program to expand foster care resources available to the Department, and developing ways to increase conventional foster care families throughout the State.

**Parole Youth Advocate Program:** This program has been designed to augment foster care. Funded through the Emergency Employment Act, the advocates are trained counselors who provide foster homes, intensive counseling, and referral services to 1-3 youth in their homes. The advocate is responsible for the youth's successful readjustment into his

community through the provision of all services needed by the youth and his family. The program operates much the same as the detained-youth advocate program.

#### *Group Homes*

DYS is purchasing care from more than 200 group homes, both for short-term and long-term placement. Most homes have the capacity of 10-15 youngsters. Most of them offer individual group and family counseling. It is too early to assess how effective these programs are in dealing with their youth. However, since all these programs are voluntary, they are forced to develop motivational methods that are not coercive or repressive in nature in order to keep the youth in the program. Thus if youth do not feel a sense of belonging and involvement, they drop the program and then it is up to the regional director to find a new one for them.

#### *After Care Services*

In addition to residential placement, DYS post-commitment programs include parole after-care services. Parole services begin at the time of commitment to DYS and continue until the youth has completed his parole term. Regional officers of after-care, following training, provide extensive counseling and casework services to each youth. Major emphasis is placed upon reintegration of the child into his community through utilization of local resources.

**Parole Volunteer Program:** Additionally, to increase the parole care resources, DYS has designed a parole volunteer program and contracted for additional parole work from a private agency. Studies have shown that parole volunteers can substantially lighten the workload of professional parole workers and provide the kind of vital, one-to-one support many youth desperately need. Not only does this foster the needed self-reliance among the youth, but it is the most direct, personal, and least expensive method of providing counseling and supervision. The Parole Volunteer Program provides youth with a trained volunteer to lend guidance and supportive counseling services during the parole period.

#### *Special Programs*

**Intensive Care Programs:** These programs are designed to care for the most violent, disturbed youth or those committed on serious charges. The first program, Andros, more than one year in operation, is attempting, quite successfully, to substitute staff and program for security or repressive methods used at the training schools. Even though the cost for such a program is high (approximately \$280 per child per week), DYS con-

tends that only a small fraction of youth committed to the Department (5 percent) needs intensive care.

**Homeward Bound and Forestry Camp Program:** This is an intensive outdoor experience designed to increase confidence through exceeding one's own expectations. Serving court referred and first commitments, youth in good physical health are involved in an eight week program of forestry, camping, and counseling periods, concluding with a solo survival component where the youth makes use of his newly acquired skills.

#### *Involvement of New Groups*

As mentioned earlier, it is too soon to determine how effective these programs are in the prevention and control of delinquency. However, because these alternatives are so diversified, they have a better potential to meet the individual needs of youth than the institutional system ever had. Most important, these programs had the effect of further opening the system by introducing new people into it.

First, the young people in the institutions also began to play a new, more active role. As more democratic settings developed after the institutions were closed, youngsters were consulted before they were placed into a particular program. A joint decision is made between the youth and a program, with DYS acting as an agent. Thus these young people could now clearly affect the workings of DYS, and thus their own lives. It is hoped that these young people will eventually be a source of support for the new community-based system. As Commissioner Miller puts it, "If we can stay in the community settings for a generation, then the beginning of a democratic process within corrections may guarantee some elements of enduring reform because the clientele, the residents, will be a part of the body politic." To some extent, the youths have already begun to operate as a source of support. Many of them have given talks to groups concerning their experiences in the institutions. Their stories of brutality and repression present a very convincing case against the old system.

Other groups both interested in and capable of helping the DYS reform movement emerged. Most notable among these are the groups of ex-offenders. Since the closing of the institutions, several groups of former offenders have become involved in providing services. First among these is Libra Inc., a self-help group. Andros, a program geared to deal with the hard-core delinquent, is primarily staffed with ex-offenders. It has been in operation for over a year and has proved to be very successful in working with the most violent and aggressive youths in the Department's care.

Two other groups, Self-Development Group, Inc., and the Medfield-Norfolk Project have worked very closely with the department, since its policy has been to encourage such groups to provide leadership in these

areas. The relationship has proven to be mutually beneficial to the department and to the groups. They have provided good services because of their prior experience and their ability to relate to young people. The benefits for the groups have been an opportunity to prove their ability, and the opening a new job market for ex-offenders. This policy has extended to DYS graduates who have been hired by the Department for a variety of roles and are providing meaningful insight and a source of help.

Self-help drug groups have come to assume a more important role since the closing of the institutions. Two programs, Transition House and Spectrum House, are operating on DYS grounds. Many more self-help groups have been receiving financial support from the Department by the placement of DYS youngsters in their programs.

Another segment of the public that has become actively interested in DYS are colleges and college students. Several universities and colleges have developed associations with DYS. First and foremost is the University of Massachusetts School of Education, which has developed three different programs, JOE I, JOE II, and MARY. These programs have involved many students as volunteers, work-study students, and some have been hired as regular Department personnel. North Shore Community College, AIC, Springfield College, and others have developed nonresidential summer programs for Department youth. Thus, students have been instrumental in developing innovative programs for the youngsters, while creating new roles for themselves.

Several of the residential and nonresidential programs affiliated with DYS are using work-study students as well as student volunteers. Most notable among these is the CAP program, which uses mainly students for their operation. Various students are using DYS as a field assignment. Most recent is the use of student volunteers to evaluate programs from which the Department is purchasing care.

Among the traditional agencies, some have been willing and able to revise their practices and develop new intake policies in order to accept placements from DYS, while others have not. The Family Service Agency and YMCA, for example, have traditionally excluded DYS juveniles from their intake on the grounds that they are "unworkable," "psychopaths" or "in need of institutional confinement." However, recently their willingness to experiment has resulted in a change in their policy to accept DYS referrals.

Some traditional programs, such as McClean Hospital and the Judge Baker Clinic, have been unable to work out an agreement with DYS because their traditional approaches and practices stood in the way. They were also turned off by DYS's lack of "professional standards." On the other hand, HRI, a new and aggressive psychiatric private hospital, was able to change its practices in order to accommodate the Department's needs, and thus has developed a working relationship

with the Department. In opening its system, DYS has helped others to open up theirs.

Another way that new people have been introduced to the Department is through a tremendous turnover of staff. A recent look at staff statistics shows that 62% of the current staff members were hired after Miller took office. Many of the older employees left because the old machinery had no hold and no power to resist the changes being introduced. The new staff members generally were attracted to the Department because they were interested in its liberal outlook, and thus they tended to agree with the central administration. The process of change has attracted more progressive people who will want to continue this process. Hopefully new staff will continue to be a source of change.

### *Insights Gained from the Massachusetts Experience*

In Massachusetts the changeover was made. The institutions were closed and new alternative solutions had to be found. The following is a summary of how this came about.

1. A broadly perceived crisis in youth services helped to trigger fundamental changes in the system.
2. The Massachusetts DYS and its commissioner were given the administrative power to set in motion fundamental changes in service delivery, without legislative review and approval, by the Reorganization Act.
3. A transitional neutral setting was needed as a bridge between the closing of institutions and the development of community alternatives. While the youngsters were housed on a university campus for two months, community settings were readied for them.
4. Radical alternatives to institutions began to emerge only after the decision to close the institutions and to move youngsters into the community.
5. Once the institutions were closed, new options based on nontraditional premises and concepts emerged quickly.
6. Deinstitutionalization was a demanding experience for veteran institution staff, required intensive efforts at reorienting, retraining, and placing staff in suitable new roles. Some could not adjust.
7. To a large measure, these new options were developed and sponsored by community groups with little prior experience or history of involvement in the care of delinquents.
8. The decision to deinstitutionalize led DYS to focus on the precommitment phase of youth's contact with the system—detention, court referral, and diversion—in an attempt to reduce the need for residential care and to avoid stigmatizing youngsters as delinquents.
9. Many youngsters who had been labeled dangerous or security risks were in fact successfully placed in community settings.

10. However, special attention had to be devoted to developing community-based intensive-care and secure units for approximately 5 to 8 percent of the institutionalized youths. These secure units had a dual purpose: (a) to reassure the community; and (b) to care for those who either came on severe charges or could not handle an open setting.

11. Institutional facilities and grounds did not have to be abandoned entirely; new uses for them were found. At one training school, for example, the operation of several residential cottages was contracted out to private self-help groups.

12. Purchase of services from private groups, as opposed to government operation of projects, proved feasible on a statewide basis. In coming years, DYS plans to allocate fully 75 percent of its budget to purchase of services.

13. Deinstitutionalization was so fundamentally and disturbing a change that, in retrospect, careful presentation to the legislature, the media, and the public was needed. Yet, no amount of public relations could have substituted for swift and decisive execution of the decision once it was reached.

14. At first, lack of community understanding and support for deinstitutionalization presented a serious obstacle. It was nourished by staff and legislative resistance to change. Developing community support is a prime task of a commissioner and his immediate staff. In order to bring about change it was important for the commissioner not to fall into the role of defending the old programs; instead he had to put himself in the role of a change agent.

15. Involvement of communities in the development of programs in their area is important. However, the process of involvement might in some cases increase rather than decrease opposition by the neighborhood. The experience in Massachusetts shows that sometimes programs can successfully begin with little public attention, although once established public and community support is necessary to maintain it.

### *New Organizational and Management Function for DYS*

The Department of Youth Services has moved from operating one-dimensional institutional programs to a multi-dimensional approach. This makes the administrative management and operation of the department more complex and thus in need of a more sophisticated management and business organization. The purchase-of-care model changes the department's main function from one which delivered services, to one which evaluates and monitors programs. As such, the research evaluation component of the department is increased to meet the need and insure quality control. The department's role as monitors and evaluators of the contracted services can afford the department to move from the position of being the defender of the system to the position of advocate for children and promoter of social change in the community.

As the department's role changed it became obvious that there was increased planning necessary to provide backup support to service delivery. A segment of the program planning includes emphasis on management and administration. Assistance is necessary for DYS to improve its fiscal and administrative functions in support of its developing viable community-based treatment programs. The Office of Management has been directing the overall business management affairs of the department, analyzing budget requests, and preparing recommendations for final decisions by the commissioner.

Another project is underway to develop an Information Support and Program Management Information System for DYS. Under this project, the department began to develop information management capabilities, to support centralized management, planning, research, and evaluation teams are doing extensive evaluations on all DYS funded programs to augment the information into the system. And finally as the role of the department is changing there must be increased efforts to strengthen the plans for regionalization. Support is being provided for the recently created seven regions headed by regional directors who will implement community-based programs. Regional directors function as administrators at the local level, organizers, and conduits of information up and down the vertical chain of command. They are also charged with involving community leaders in prevention programs through regional youth councils, which are being developed in each area. The councils will provide support for the regional director in the mobilization of community-based resident and non-residential services for youth. The membership in the councils represents each of the principal sectors of service the department must tap in order to provide the broadest set of alternatives for treatment.

### *Conclusions and Implications*

Many lessons can be learned from the Massachusetts experience. The changes brought about in DYS would have been impossible without a leadership that combined real commitment to change, the skill to discriminate between positive and destructive programs for youth, and an essential ability to gather political and community support for the change. The leader must be a person who owes few political debts, and is willing to implement changes even if it means the elimination of his own job. Such a person in all probability must come from outside the system requiring change, yet able to rely on those individuals in the system who have been committed to the change.

Using the media both to get public attention to injustice and to build personal support is essential. When radical changes are undertaken, the person making them must have a broad power base in order to insure that they are not reversed. This power base is built not only through the media, but by constantly educating and informing the pub-

lic, the different professional groups and other interested citizen groups seeking causes to rally behind.

Introducing new concepts, ideas and people into DYS caused the loosening of the rigid structures, and the creation of a more favorable environment for change. However, "opening the system" alone could not account for the massive deinstitutionalization and the creation of new and humane alternatives in the three years following the Reorganization Act. One has to look at the different processes and strategies that brought about the changes in the system.

The changes introduced in DYS have been massive and dramatic, and especially unusual for a state bureaucracy. This holds true despite the many elements present that made such change possible, i.e., the mandate for change as expressed in the Reorganization Act, support of vocal interest groups, and the definite commitment of a governor who frequently expressed his support.

Opponents of reform were put in a defensive position, and forced to explain and defend indefensible situations. The commissioner and DYS were continually broadening their base of support, thus moving into a less defensive, more powerful position. This power was gained by depriving guards and institutions of their autonomy, cutting into the power of the bureaucracy and patronage systems with the government, and building upon the growing relationships with outside forces. Similar strategies were also used with the police, the courts, and the communities. This realignment meant involvement of youngsters, staff, ex-offender groups, and private groups from whom the department was purchasing care.

[ It is more accurate to describe the change process in DYS as *emergent*, rather than *planned*. Changes were often determined by chance, imagination, opportunity, and personal style, this style being mainly that of the commissioner. The strategies used depended largely upon options and solutions that arose spontaneously, and which DYS was flexible enough to try. These options increased with the opening of the system and the introduction of new actors into it. ]

Frequently the department would adopt a new approach as soon as it proved useful or successful. In the same way, if a program was tried and proved unfeasible it was immediately abandoned or modified. Two examples will illustrate this technique.

There was an early policy decision to open group homes, which would be run by DYS. However, in the process of establishing these homes it became evident that the department's flexibility would be enhanced by contracting these services to private groups rather than operating them directly. The policy was changed. This change from the department's traditional role of providing services exempted DYS from bureaucratic entanglement and the intricacies of staff training and retraining. While

this change in policy created a certain amount of staff alienation, it insured quick and efficient movement toward meaningful alternatives.

A second example of the department's flexibility is shown in the case of the CAP program. A nonresidential after-care program, CAP began as a small operation with the closing of the institutions, and proved to be extremely successful in working with groups of youngsters in store-front operations in the community—providing jobs, counseling, and recreational activities. The success of the program encouraged DYS to increase the number of referrals from 20 to 175 in only one year.

Another approach used by the commissioner was to initiate a multitude of programs, knowing that at least some projects would be successful. Such a shotgun approach to change gave DYS the flexibility to try out a number of options (in many different directions), with a limited amount of resources. This approach was also consistent with Commissioner Miller's belief that the old system was destructive and "insane," and that "any new alternative will be better than what we have."

Thus, the department's lack of plan ultimately proved to be helpful, in that it made it flexible enough to find opportunities and use them when they arose. Different approaches were tried, each with limited success. When the therapeutic-community concept failed, "directed group interaction" was tried. When this showed a limited success, the department introduced the "self-help group" concept into the institutions. Cottages were closed when the occasion arose and staff members were constantly rotated, some for the purpose of training and others for the purpose of starting new programs or assuming new responsibilities. Programs that proved themselves were claimed as new and innovative; and those which did not work were terminated. In this manner, there were always a few good programs that met the criteria of being humane, and were ones DYS could point to as successes.

This shotgun method also explains to a great extent the diversity of the new alternatives. The programs covered a broad scope, and were developed by a wide range of agencies—traditional and nontraditional—including educational institutions, and even recreational programs such as YMCA's.

By espousing a direction rather than a program, the commissioner was able to avoid confrontations on specific issues with staff, communities, and the legislature. Thus, he could gather followers and maintain the department's visibility to the press, the rest of the bureaucracy, and the public, without confronting the most rigid and untractable forces in the system. By denouncing in general terms the institutional failures, Miller was never forced to explain specifically his plans to ameliorate these conditions; neither was he compelled to specify the cost of these changes to staff and other vested interest groups.

In effect, the commissioner's ability to articulate institutional failures forced the defenders of the old system into an impotent position. Who

could argue, for example, with a call to "open up" institutions and "make them responsive to new ideas?" Who could attack his practice of visiting institutions spontaneously and talking with youngsters? Or how could anyone counter the argument, "If you continue to turn out more criminals after treatment, something is obviously wrong?" By placing himself on the side of justice and humaneness, he made it difficult for detractors to criticize him publicly for fear of placing themselves on the side of injustice and inhumanity.

The lobby for change was present even before Commissioner Miller came to DYS. It consisted of the media, professional associations, the legislature, and other interest groups. How did the new commissioner and his core staff utilize, maintain and coordinate this support?

Lacking control over the institutions, the commissioner's first efforts were to broaden the base of decision-making by bringing the public and the press into the debate. An example of this technique is illustrated by his policy decision to eliminate the "lock-up."

The new commissioner recognized that a memo to this effect would not make the change. So, he publicized the decision with a series of press conferences. In a surprise visit to the institutions, he discovered that lock-ups were still used. A series of discussion and negotiations with individual superintendents at the institutions produced a modified policy statement—lock-up would be used only in extreme cases, and then only with the expressed permission of the commissioner. Policy was thus clarified, modified, centralized, and adjusted, but became the clear responsibility of the central office.

The press was also used to document the failures of the institutions and to dramatize the changes introduced by DYS. For example, long after Bridgewater was closed, the physical facility was used as a show-place for the press, to dramatize the plight of the youngsters who had been incarcerated there. When the Shirley facility had already ceased to be used as an institution, the press and the public were invited to a ceremony to destroy the "tombs" or solitary confinement cells, which were a symbol of the old, punitive system. But most dramatic was the closing of Lyman. Attention was drawn to the fact that Lyman was the first training school to open in the U.S. and the first to close. The impressive scene of moving all the youngsters in one day hid the fact that several programs continued on institutional grounds for many more months, that the Lancaster School for Girls was still in operation six months later, and that other institutions had been phased out prior to Lyman.

The practice of dramatizing the changes served several purposes. It maintained the momentum for internal changes, and it attracted outside resources to make the changes possible. But foremost, the drama kept the press interested and thus the public informed. In fact it created in the public mind the image of an aggressive, active, forward-moving

public agency, and made the closing of institutions seem consistent with success and progress.

Outside groups such as ex-offenders, universities, and child welfare agencies provide indispensable in the development of new alternatives because they had no stake in maintaining the old system. These groups were willing and able to make decisions to take actions that DYS staff were unable and unwilling to make because of their vested interest. A notable example is the University of Massachusetts involvement through the JOE II program, which made possible the closing of Lyman School. DYS staff, and especially workers from Lyman, were incapable of making a commitment to close the institution in which they were working. They were interested in developing a rationale for keeping the school open and thus maintaining the status quo.

It is important to note that the University of Massachusetts and other agencies provided the temporary structures necessary for the changeover from institutions to community-based programs. On the regional front, many groups—some new private as well as some public agencies—became a vital resource for the department's new community-based operations. Most of these agencies needed this new venture partly because of their dwindling resources and partly because of their desire to become involved in a new field. DYS ultimately signed contracts with only a small portion of the agencies that submitted proposals for the provision of care to youngsters. However, the interaction with these agencies served to orient them to the functions and needs of the department, and to significantly increase the consideration given to the problems of youth in trouble throughout the State.

The commissioner's main fear was always that a series of critical incidents, radical change in the political climate, or a temporary loss of public support could negate the changes DYS accomplished. To insure that a different administration could not retreat into the institutions several steps were taken to discard them. Some institutional properties were made available to correction, mental health, and private groups. However, most of them are still under DYS's administrative control. The department's plan for the future calls for converting a large number of staff positions into monies for purchase of care, a step that would insure adequate staffing for the maintenance of large institutions. The commissioner also attempted to organize the private sector, now providing care for DYS youth, into an aggressive advocacy lobby for children. However, this lobby can also become self-serving and interested primarily in maintaining their status quo.

Finally, the question that most reform-minded people are concerned with is whether the changes in DYS are here to stay, and if so, whether the process of experimentation and change in the department will continue on a less dramatic scale.

It is too early to answer these questions. However, Commissioner

Miller's departure before the changes have taken hold and while DYS is still struggling with fiscal and administrative problems, could definitely cause the department to revert to a defensive posture, rendering it unable to maintain an advocacy role for the youth in its charge.

[There is no doubt, however, that insights gained from the Massachusetts experience and the movement it started will continue to provide example for other states ready for change. DYS in Massachusetts had a binding message to others: Humanize the system of youth correction now, without needless delay, because without risk taking and forcing one's options there is little hope that fundamental change necessary and needed in the juvenile system will ever occur.]

**END**

7 ables/10000