


21525  
DUP.  
C-13



# pilot cities program



National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
United States Department of Justice

# THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE PILOT CITIES PROGRAM

## A Team Approach to Improving Local Criminal Justice Systems

CHARLES A. MURRAY

ROBERT E. KRUG

November 1975

NCJR  
AUG 3 1976  
ACQUISITIONS

This project was supported by Contract Number J-LEAA-016-74 awarded to the American Institutes for Research by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT  
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE**

Gerald M. Caplan, *Director*

**LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE  
ADMINISTRATION**

Richard W. Velde, *Administrator*

## FOREWORD

As the research center of LEAA, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice tests and evaluates new approaches to improving criminal justice. The results of one such experiment -- the Pilot Cities Program -- are summarized in this evaluation report.

The program selected a group of eight cities to demonstrate and evaluate promising ideas and technologies. A small team of criminal justice experts, independent of specific agencies, was established in each city to stimulate change, provide technical assistance, and conduct research.

A twenty-month evaluation of the program found that the team concept could work well. It proved an effective approach to improving criminal justice that should be applied further. Overall, the evaluators concluded that the process of change need not be seen as wholly dependent on personalities or special circumstances. Successful strategies -- such as the Pilot team approach -- can be developed and transplanted to other localities even though the circumstances and personalities may be different.

The evaluation also uncovered a number of shortcomings in the program. One provocative finding illuminates the tension between "innovation" on the one hand and "improvement" on the other. As the report points out, the two are not mutually reinforcing; indeed, they may actually compete with each other. So much more is known about advanced practices than is ever applied in any single jurisdiction that it can be highly productive to pull together the best available approaches and test them systematically, rather than focus on "new" ways of doing things.

Gerald M. Caplan,  
Director

# CONTENTS

<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>List of Figures</i>	x
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. DESIGN OF THE STUDY	
A. Data Collection Procedures	5
B. Data Analysis	3
III. THE RATIONALE FOR PILOT CITIES	
A. The Evolution of Objectives	11
B. The Rationale for Program Impact	17
IV. SITE SELECTION	
A. The Ten Criteria for Site Selection	24
B. Application of the Quantitative Criteria	26
1. <i>The Rationale Behind Them</i>	26
2. <i>Operationalizing the Criteria with Data</i>	27
3. <i>Immediate Outcomes and the Quantitative Screening</i>	27
a. <i>The selections and the criteria as stated</i>	30
b. <i>The selections and the intent of the criteria</i>	31
C. Application of the Qualitative Criteria	35
1. <i>Application of the Political/Administrative Criteria</i>	35
2. <i>Application of the Grantee Criterion</i>	38
V. THE TEAMS	
A. The Initial Teams	41
1. <i>A Note on Organization of the Teams</i>	41
2. <i>The Ideal Pilot Team Associate</i>	42
3. <i>Overall Qualifications of the Initial Teams</i>	51
4. <i>Qualifications on an Individual Level</i>	52
5. <i>An Index of Team Qualifications</i>	53
B. The Teams Over Time	56
1. <i>Structural Integrity of the Pilot Teams</i>	56
a. <i>Continuity of leadership</i>	57
b. <i>Staff continuity</i>	57

(Chapter V cont'd)

c. Staffing levels	59
d. An index of Team integrity	59
2. Changes in Qualifications	61
VI. THE CLIENTS	
A. The Urban Environments	65
1. Population Characteristics	65
2. Economic Indicators	67
3. Racial Characteristics	71
4. Summary Profile of the Eight Cities	71
B. Local LE/CJ Capabilities	75
1. Overall Structure	76
2. Local Funding Levels	76
3. Federal Support	78
4. Research, Planning, & Evaluation Resources	80
5. LE/CJ Personnel Characteristics	82
VII. THE PROCESS	
A. Team Strategies	90
B. Tactics in Project Development	96
C. The Regional Offices and Process	104
VIII. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES	
A. Demonstration Projects	107
1. Functional Descriptions	107
2. Summary Characteristics	111
3. Immediate Results	113
4. Differences Among the Teams	115
B. Pilot Research	117
1. Functional Descriptions	118
2. Immediate Results	120
3. Differences Among the Teams	121
C. Technical Assistance	122
1. Functional Descriptions	122
2. Immediate Results	125
3. Differences Among the Teams	125
D. Overview of the Immediate Outcomes	127
IX. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE	
A. Institutionalized Improvement of Local Systems	129
1. Impact on Local Agency Operations	129
a. Quantitative results	129
b. The qualitative record	130
2. Impact on the Research, Planning, and Evaluation Capacity of Local Agencies	133
a. Quantitative results	133
b. The qualitative record	135

(Chapter IX cont'd)

3.	<i>Impact on Inter-Agency Communication and Cooperation</i>	138
a.	<i>Quantitative results</i>	138
b.	<i>The qualitative record</i>	139
4.	<i>Summary of Impact on Improving Local Systems</i>	143
B.	<i>Contribution to LE/CJ Theory and Practice</i>	143
1.	<i>Innovation and Advancement</i>	143
2.	<i>Transferability and Dissemination</i>	148
C.	<i>Differences Among the Teams</i>	152
1.	<i>Improving the Local LE/CJ System</i>	153
a.	<i>Impact on operations</i>	153
b.	<i>Impact on RPE capacity</i>	154
c.	<i>Impact on interaction among agencies</i>	155
d.	<i>Summary of comparative Team impact on improving the local system</i>	155
2.	<i>Advancing LE/CJ Theory and Practice</i>	156
3.	<i>A Summary Assessment of the Eight Teams</i>	159

X. SOURCES OF CHANGE

A.	<i>Tradeoffs Between Improvement and Innovation</i>	161
1.	<i>Innovation and Utility Elsewhere</i>	162
2.	<i>National Benefits and Local Improvements</i>	163
B.	<i>The Effectiveness of the Pilot Team Approach in Shaping LE/CJ Change</i>	164
1.	<i>Improvements in the Local System</i>	164
2.	<i>Contribution to LE/CJ Theory and Practice</i>	165
C.	<i>The Roles of Places, Procedures, and Personnel</i>	167
1.	<i>Impact and the Sites</i>	168
2.	<i>Impact and Procedures</i>	169
3.	<i>Impact and the Nature of the Team</i>	172
a.	<i>Structural integrity</i>	173
b.	<i>Personnel qualifications</i>	173

XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.	<i>Improvement or Innovation: Some Problems of Priority</i>	177
B.	<i>Contributions to the LE/CJ State of the Art</i>	180
1.	<i>Improving the State of Knowledge about Current Practices</i>	181
2.	<i>General Evaluation Policy</i>	183
C.	<i>Improving Local Criminal Justice Systems</i>	184
1.	<i>The Director</i>	186
2.	<i>The Team</i>	187
3.	<i>Process</i>	189
4.	<i>Support and Monitoring</i>	190
5.	<i>Selection of Sites and Grantees</i>	191

APPENDIX A: LEAA Guideline for the Pilot Cities Program

APPENDIX B: Abstracts of the Pilot Demonstration Projects

APPENDIX C: Research Instruments and Procedures

## TABLES

2.1	The Interview Sample. . . . .	6
2.2	The Field Research Schedule . . . . .	7
3.1	Approximate Rank of the Major Pilot Objectives. . . . .	17
4.1	Eligible Cities Under the Quantitative Criteria . . . . .	28
4.2	Other Cities Between 200,000 and 500,000 Population . . . . .	29
5.1	Academic Training of the Initial Pilot Teams in the Four Categories of "Expertise" . . . . .	44
5.2	Research Credentials of the Initial Teams . . . . .	47
5.3	Rank Order of the Initial Pilot Teams on the Four Categories of Qualifications. . . . .	54
5.4	Rank Order Position of the Initial Teams for all Combinations of the Four Categories of Qualification. . . . .	56
6.1	Profile of the Pilot Cities on Twelve Indicators of Governability . . . . .	73
6.2	LE/CJ Budgets in the Pilot Cities/Counties (FY72) . . . . .	77
6.3	Per Capita Expenditures on LE/CJ Functions in the Pilot Cities/Counties. . . . .	78
6.4	Existing RPE Capabilities in the Pilot Cities . . . . .	81
6.5	Local Co-Workers by Type of Agency. . . . .	83
6.6	Summary of Local Co-Worker Characteristics. . . . .	87
7.1	The Teams' Stances as Change Agents . . . . .	93
8.1	Functional Summary of Activities Undertaken by the Pilot Teams . . . . .	127
8.2	Team-by-Team Summary of Activities. . . . .	127
9.1	Frequency of Impact on Local Agency Operations. . . . .	130
9.2	Frequency of Impact on RPE Capability of Local Agencies . . . . .	134
9.3	Frequency of Impact on Inter-Agency Communication . . . . .	139
9.4	Summary of Indicators of Impact on the Local LE/CJ System . . . . .	142
9.5	Team-by-Team Results: Innovation in LE/CJ Practices. . . . .	157
9.6	Contribution to the LE/CJ State of the Art. . . . .	158
9.7	Team-by-Team Results, Utility Elsewhere of the Demonstration Projects . . . . .	158
10.1	Intercorrelations Among the Impact Indicators . . . . .	161
10.2	Rank Order of the Teams on Team Variables and Impact Variables . . . . .	172

## FIGURES

3.1	Idealized Rationale for PCT Impact Through Demonstration Projects. . . . .	20
3.2	The Basic Impact Sequence for the Pilot Cities Program . . . . .	21
4.1	Intended Inputs and Processes Under LEAA Contract. . . . .	24
4.2	Crime Rates and City Size. . . . .	32
4.3	Crime Rates in the Pilot Cities Relative to Other Cities of Comparable Size . . . . .	33
5.1	Distribution of the Initial Teams on an Index of Training in the Four Categories of "Expertise". . . . .	45
5.2	Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Research Credentials . . . . .	47
5.3	Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Operational Experience in LE/CJ Agencies. . . . .	49
5.4	Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Local Experience . . . . .	50
5.5	Increases in the Mean Pilot Team Experience over the Life of a Team. . . . .	58
5.6	Staff Turnover Rates for the Teams, Projected for a Five-Year Project . . . . .	59
5.7	Percentage of Associate Months Actually Filled by the Teams. . . . .	60
5.8	Distribution of the Pilot Teams on an Index of Structural Integrity. . . . .	61
5.9	Changes in Mean Pilot Staff Qualifications Over Time . . . . .	62
6.1	Density in the Central City. . . . .	66
6.2	Growth of the Central City, 1960-1970. . . . .	67
6.3	Median Annual Family Income. . . . .	68
6.4	Change in Family Income, 1959-1969 . . . . .	69
6.5	Average Weekly Blue-Collar Wage. . . . .	69
6.6	Mean Unemployment Rate, 1970-1971. . . . .	70
6.7	Percentage of Population at the Poverty Level. . . . .	70
6.8	Combined Black and Hispanic Population in the Central City. . . . .	71
6.9	Distribution of the Eight Cities on an Index of Governability . . . . .	75
6.10	Typical Organization of the City and County LE/CJ Agencies. . . . .	76
7.1	Graphic Characterization of Team Strategies. . . . .	96
8.1	Initial Funding of Pilot Demonstration Projects by Function . . . . .	112
8.2	Distribution of Funding Between Federal and Local Sources . . . . .	113
8.3	Projected Number of Demonstration Projects Per City. . . . .	116
8.4	Projected Total Funding of Demonstration Projects Per City . . . . .	117

8.5	Projected Number of Pilot Research Activities by City. . . . .	121
8.6	Projected Team Totals for Separate Technical Assistance Activities. . . . .	126
9.1	Frequency Distribution for the "Innovativeness" Ratings. . . . .	145
9.2	Frequency Distribution for the "State of the Art" Ratings . . . . .	147
9.3	Frequency Distribution for the "Utility Elsewhere" Ratings . . . . .	150
9.4	Comparative Scores on the "Local Improvement" Indicators . . . . .	156
10.1	Comparative Impact on RPE Capability by Pilot and Non-Pilot Demonstrations . . . . .	165
10.2	Comparative Impact on Inter-Agency Communication by Pilot and Non-Pilot Demonstrations. . . . .	166
10.3	Relationship Between Pilot Participation and the "Theory and Practice" Impact Indicators. . . . .	166

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The preparation of this report required the cooperation of Pilot Team members and local LE/CJ officials in eight cities, plus the support of personnel in NILECJ and LEAA/Washington. The list of those who helped is roughly the length of the list of 388 people who took time to tell us what they knew and thought about the Program.

We must, however, single out two sets of people for special thanks. The first of these is comprised of the Pilot Team members. Their cooperation was exceptional. Second, we wish to thank Dr. Richard Linster and Ms. Vicki Jaycox, the monitors of this evaluation. Whatever shortcomings remain in the final report are despite their support and their patience.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The idea that evolved into Pilot Cities was first expressed this way, in early 1969:

This is a proposal to establish a correctional laboratory at the local government level. The goal is to create, in a generally representative urban area, a laboratory in which the introduction of correctional and related law enforcement and social innovations will lead to optimization of the criminal justice system and where these innovations can be systematically introduced and studied.<sup>1</sup>

It was an ambitious concept for dealing with local criminal justice problems that were (and still are) a high priority concern of the Federal government. Eventually it took the form of eight test cases: "Pilot Cities" which were established in San Jose, California; Dayton, Ohio; Charlotte, North Carolina; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Norfolk, Virginia; Omaha, Nebraska; Des Moines, Iowa; and Rochester, New York.

The mechanics of the program were simple. The Pilot Cities Team was comprised of four senior "Associate Directors" ("Associates," for convenience) and a small supporting staff of research and clerical assistants. It was intended that each of the Associates would have expertise in one of four fields: police, courts, corrections, or systems analysis. Combined, the Team would cover all four fields.

The Teams were to operate for five years, in three 20-month Phases. Each Team would receive operating funds of roughly \$400,000 for each phase, and an annual entitlement for that city/county of \$500,000 in non-competitive Pilot "O" monies. The Teams were to be independent of local agencies, of state agencies, and (except for routine monitoring of the grant conditions), of NILECJ itself.

San Jose, the first site, was funded in May 1970. Five-and-one-half years later, in July 1974, it was announced that the Pilot Cities Program would be phased out ahead of schedule, in view of a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report which concluded that the Program had not been successful and was unlikely to become so.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Preliminary proposal from McGee to Sui, January 22, 1969, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Comptroller General of the United States, *The Pilot Cities Program: Phase-out Needed Due to Limited National Benefits*, GAO, 1974.

This report is thus an evaluation of a program that already has been pronounced a failure and discontinued. A natural question to ask is, why conduct an evaluation at all? Or, once conducted, why read its final report?

One answer is that the GAO report cannot be considered as definitive in any substantive sense. By the nature of its charter, the GAO must highlight any specific failures which it uncovers, and the Pilot Cities Program does include some conspicuous, documentable project failures. But the relevance of a specific failure to the overall program objective is not simple. For the principal goal of the program was to test an imaginative approach to a fundamental problem, and that goal might be met despite some failures along the way. In the individual city reports, the GAO documented some well-managed, apparently successful programs along with the failures. The *overall* report, which summarized the individual reports, concluded that, on balance, the failures outweighed the successes and recommended termination of the entire program. But this leaves open the question of whether the program met its true objective.

What is this "imaginative approach" which the Pilot Cities were to test? The question is dealt with in greater detail in Section III, but the simplest statement of the approach is the following:

To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team with exceptional research and analysis capabilities to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.<sup>3</sup>

And in so doing,

To understand more clearly the process by which change takes place in the criminal justice system so that more effective means can be devised for the nationwide dissemination and possible implementation of well tested innovations.<sup>4</sup>

On both counts, it is the view of this report that the Pilot Cities Program has not failed--yet. The potential of the Team approach *was* demonstrated, and a great deal *can* be learned about how to make the approach work--how to increase the proportion of Norfolks and San Joses and Rochesters; and how to

<sup>3</sup>LEAA Guideline: Pilot Cities/Counties Program, January 2, 1973, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

cut down sharply on the number of Omahas and Albuquerque. The Pilot Cities approach can work; and in some cases it worked very well indeed. The "success" of the Program no longer depends on whether lessons were learned, but whether they will be applied.

It is for this reason that the value of the Pilot Cities Program and its evaluation does not lie in a retrospective analysis of how we could do it all over again, better. A better reason for reading this report is that the problem Pilot Cities was intended to meet has not gone away and will not go away. Even if the label "Pilot Cities Team" is buried forever, LEAA is going to end up trying analogous programs again. If LEAA learns from the Pilot Cities experience, it can avoid many of Pilot Cities' mistakes and design in many of its successes.

There are three assertions in the above paragraph that need explaining.

*The problem has not gone away.* LEAA is in the business of improving the law enforcement/criminal justice (LE/CJ) system. The LE/CJ system is one in which jurisdictions are dispersed. Therefore, LEAA will continue to provide assistance to city and county governments.

It was recognized when Pilot Cities began that these city and county governments, except for the very largest ones, were poorly equipped to develop approaches to LE/CJ problems which were imaginative and at the same time properly structured. This is not an indictment of local government; it is simply a statement that program development increasingly requires a variety of professional skills which an already hard-pressed local government can very seldom afford. But this situation (which did indeed exist in the Pilot Cities) creates severe problems for LEAA as it disburses funds to these jurisdictions. While the local government is usually in an excellent position to identify its own special problems, and often best able to administer and adapt resources once a program has been established, that same local government lacks the essential resources for translating a problem into a workable program for resolving it.

*LEAA will be administering Pilot City analogs in the future.* LEAA by its nature intervenes in local governments. The act of granting funds is in itself an intervention, even if no strings at all are attached. But in reality, LEAA is obligated to attach some strings designed to maximize the impact of the assistance it dispenses. Inevitably, this involves the establishment of some mechanisms for ensuring that the taxpayers' money is being used intelligently. The transfer of "exemplary programs" is one way of approaching the problem and one that appears to be sensible for a substantial range of criminal justice problems. But packaged solutions,

however flexible, have limits. There remains a set of problems that must be resolved in particular ways for particular environments. And if we take as a given that LEAA wants to avoid imposing programs *ex cathedra* from the Federal bureaucracy, then the alternative must be something very like the Pilot Cities concept. Because if local governments are not to be told what to do and how to do it, resources must be provided that will enable them to come up with good ideas and sound implementation plans--and that was the basic mission of a Pilot Cities Team. This does not imply that the Team approach must be resurrected. Instead of financing a team that serves all agencies, LEAA might focus on schemes whereby direct-hire LEAA personnel serve as the resource for local agencies. Alternatively, funds might be provided for individual local agencies to hire planning experts. But any of these variations will encounter choices of personnel and resources, problems of strategy and focus, that were encountered by the Pilot Teams.

*The Pilot Cities experience has a payoff for LEAA program design.* LEAA will continue to face the same problems that Pilot Cities encountered; the Pilot Cities' experience can provide a basis for alleviating some of them. The evaluation data are such that many concrete, implementable recommendations can be made about how to promote the still-relevant objectives of the Pilot Cities Program. Some strategies characteristically worked; some characteristically failed; and future programs can be designed to maximize the use of the former set. In other cases very basic problems of program implementation were at fault; and the evaluation tries to explain why they occurred, why they were not corrected at the time, and how they could be avoided more adroitly in the future.

These values of the evaluation are, of course, conditional upon the report being read. Evaluations have a history of being ignored, and when the program being evaluated has been discontinued, the expectation is that the report will be filed and forgotten. A number of steps have been taken to make it as easy as possible to use this report. Liberal use of underscoring, figures, telegraphic lists of findings and recommendations are some of the format devices. In particular, we recommend that readers begin by reading the Executive Summary, to identify the topics that are of greatest interest.

But the indispensable precondition for encouraging utilization is that the evaluation contain utilizable findings. The analysis of the data and preparation of the report have been conducted with that in mind. The discussion skips lightly over theoretical issues, in favor of immediate explanations of why things went well or badly.

## II. DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The Pilot Cities Program began in May 1970, and ended in June 1975. The evaluation of the Program was carried out from December 1973 to May 1975, by teams at the Washington and Palo Alto offices of the American Institutes for Research.

The Washington office was responsible for data collection and case history preparation for Charlotte, Dayton, Des Moines, Omaha, Rochester, and the Tidewater. The Washington staff was headed by Dr. Robert E. Krug, who was also Principal Investigator for the overall project. Dr. Charles A. Murray served as Assistant Project Director. Ms. Jane Vlachos and Ms. Dana E. Wagner had primary responsibility for collection and preparation of the data.

The Palo Alto office was responsible for data collection and case history preparation for Albuquerque and San Jose. Drs. G. Brian Jones and Steven M. Jung jointly oversaw this work, assisted by Ms. Laurie I. Hopkins.

Data analysis and preparation of the final report were conducted by the Washington staff previously mentioned, with additional support from Ms. Blair B. Bourque, who directed the preparation of the project descriptions and conducted most of the qualitative analysis in Section IX; from Dr. Jung, who prepared much of Section VI; and from Ms. Michele Bektemirian and Ms. Shirley L. Hines.

### A. Data Collection Procedures

Data for the study were collected from five major sources: the Pilot Cities Team members themselves, past and present; officials from the LE/CJ agencies with which they worked; representatives of the Regional Offices of LEAA; city and county political officials; and representatives of the state LE/CJ systems in the State Planning Agency (SPA), and the local Regional Planning Unit (RPU). Additional data on the initiation of the Pilot Cities Program and city and grantee selection were collected from officials in LEAA/Washington and, when appropriate, from administrators in the parent institutions. The interview sample is shown in Table 2.1 below; the field research schedule is shown in Table 2.2 on the following page.

TABLE 2.1  
The Interview Sample

	Grantee or PCT Staff	LE/CJ Agency Staff	City and County Officials	State and Federal Representatives	Social Welfare Agencies, Contractors, other	TOTAL
Albuquerque	13	31	3	4	22	73
Charlotte	6	9	7	7	5	34
Dayton	13	14	7	2	13	49
Des Moines	10	18	2	5	4	39
Omaha	13	14	2	3	7	39
Rochester	9	10	3	2	7	31
San Jose	9	26	5	3	27	70
Tidewater	9	32	7	2	3	53
TOTAL	82	154	36	28	88	388

Three types of data were collected: archival, narrative interview, and questionnaire. A brief description of each type follows.

*Archival Data.* All official Program publications in each city were sought for the evaluation. These included technical reports, project evaluations, progress reports, and end-of-phase reports.

In each city, the evaluation staff examined all correspondence of the Team and all written internal communications, including intra-office memoranda and minutes of staff meetings. The extent and organization of documentation varied widely from Team to Team; all were uniformly cooperative in giving access to what they had. Parallel documentation relating to Team interactions was sought from local LE/CJ agencies, the SPA, the RPU, and from the LEAA Regional and Washington Offices. Each SPA or RPU was also solicited for grant data involving all LEAA activities since the Team was established.

*Narrative Interview Data.* All team members (and former Team members whenever possible), were interviewed on the following topics:

- Personal background
- Personal role on the Team, intended and actual
- Team role and objectives
- Team accomplishments
- Major obstacles to and facilitators of Team success
- Details about each of the nontrivial activities in which the respondent had been involved (see the Activity Profile, Appendix D).

TABLE 2.2  
The Field Research Schedule

	Dates *	Data Collection Staff
Albuquerque/ San Bernalillo	21 January	Jones
	14 May - 21 June	Jones, Hopkins
	16-19 December	Jung, Hopkins, Wagner
Charlotte/ Mecklenburg	4-22 March	Murray, Wagner
	13-23 January, 1975	Wagner
Dayton/ Montgomery	18 January	Krug
	4-22 March	Krug, Vlachos
	13-21 January	Vlachos
Des Moines/ Polk	16 January	Murray
	1-19 April	Murray, Vlachos
	17-22 November	Murray, Vlachos, Wagner
Omaha/ Douglas	15 January	Murray
	29 April - 10 May	Murray, Vlachos
	11-14 December	Murray
Rochester/ Monroe	21 January	Krug
	20 April - 10 May	Krug, Wagner
	6-13 January, 1975	Wagner
San Jose/ Santa Clara	March - June **	Jones, Hopkins
	October - December **	Jung, Jones, Hopkins
Norfolk/the Tidewater area	1-19 April	Krug, Wagner
	9-13 December	Vlachos, Wagner
	12 December, 1973	Krug

\*1974 unless otherwise noted. In addition to the field units, a significant portion of the follow-up data was collected through correspondence and telephone interviews.

\*\*Because San Jose is so close to the AIR Palo Alto Office, no continuous site visit was required.

For each of these topics, we sought both the respondents' perceptions and the specific incidents which had shaped those perceptions. The incidents were later recorded in the "critical incident" format.<sup>1</sup>

*Counterpart personnel with local LE/CJ agencies* were interviewed if they had either (1) played a key role in the implementation of a project in which the Team had participated, or (2) maintained a continuing relationship with the Team apart from specific projects. The inclusiveness of this sample of respondents varied. The scope and number of the San Jose Team's activities posed an especially difficult problem--not everyone could be interviewed. But in the other cities, the list of respondents included essentially all of the major actors in the Teams' activities.

The content of the interview with a local agency informant was determined by the nature of his interaction with the Team. The core topic was always the specifics of the activity or activities in which that person had been involved, using the Activity Profile as a framework.<sup>2</sup> Basic personal background data and a general discussion of the Team's role and impact were also included in the standard interview.

Interviews with senior *SPA and RPU personnel, city and county officials*, and senior *LE/CJ personnel* (e.g., Chief of Police) were conducted on topics almost entirely specific to the local context. Usually these persons were not interviewed until the second round, after first round data had been appraised and the central themes of that city's experience had been identified.

Each Regional Office designated a "Representative" to monitor the Team(s) in that Region. Each of those Representatives was interviewed for the evaluation. The Regional Administrators themselves were not interviewed at length, since their interactions with the Team were limited and were generally conducted through the Representative, Team members, and written memoranda--all of which were available as sources of data.

## B. Data Analysis

The methodological question which persisted throughout the project was, how does one rigorously analyze a sample of eight? Part of the answer is, of course, that certain kinds of rigor

---

<sup>1</sup>John C. Flanagan, "The Critical Incident Technique," *Psychological Bulletin*, 51 (1954), pp. 327-358.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix D for a description and sample of Activity Profiles.

are unavailable, and that at some points in the analysis rigor consists of admitting ignorance. But a number of procedures were developed to make this more than an anecdotal evaluation of the Pilot Cities Program. They are described briefly below.

The preceding description of data collection indicates one major tool: the collection of voluminous qualitative descriptions and documentation. It was assumed from the outset that quantitative measures must grow out of the descriptive record; and, in fact, a massive amount of narrative, correspondence, opinions, and speculation about the Pilot Cities Teams was assembled, from people with widely different vantage points.

But even though this body of information existed, it was not realistic to use it to provide descriptors for this report. Summary, quantitative descriptors were needed. For the most part, they are in the form of simple rating schemes--the 5-point, 4-point, or 7-point scale. The only "natural" numbers we were able to utilize were money figures for the Pilot projects and city/county budgets.

Each scale value was separately defined. The instruments in Appendix C show the wording for the most important scales. Throughout the report, we have interpreted mean scores or variances using exact wording of the scale values.

A second important tool of analysis has been to substitute other units of aggregation for "the Team," whenever possible. The most obvious reason for this is the one already mentioned: samples of eight do not leave much scope for quantitative analysis. But another and equally important reason is that a Pilot Cities Team by no means acted uniformly throughout its history, or even acted uniformly on two different activities which were being undertaken at the same time. Often we observed that a Team would have impressive successes in one area and colossal failures in another. To us, the interesting question was not how the failures and the successes averaged out by Team, but instead whether successes bore resemblances across Teams, and whether failures bore resemblances across Teams.

Therefore, when we came to analyze the accomplishments of the Teams (Sections VIII and IX), our first and primary interest was in the activity as the unit of analysis. When analyzing the variance in the outcomes of activities (Section X), we attempted to combine activity-by-activity and Team-wide explanatory hypotheses. But even when Team-wide variables were involved, we attempted to analyze them in terms of the Teams which existed at the time the outcome occurred. So drastic were the changes in personnel and policy at some sites that it is hardly more reasonable to talk about, say, Dayton in Phase I and Dayton in Phase III as a single Team, than it is to talk about Dayton and Rochester as a single Team.

The statistical approach in the report is not complex. The characteristic sequence we use is: (1) to introduce a variable (or set of variables) with comments about its relevance to the evaluation; (2) to report the frequency distribution and other descriptive statistics for the population as a whole; (3) to interpret the results, incorporating qualitative background; and then (4) to present the Team-by-Team differences as appropriate. Occasionally we have used correlations, analysis of variance, and other analytic statistics.<sup>3</sup> They are used cautiously, however--less often to claim that a relationship exists than to point out the absence of one.

---

<sup>3</sup>We have used parametric measures throughout. This is rapidly becoming standard practice for many types of ordinal data, as the robustness of the parametric tests is documented. Some of the best sources on this topic are C. H. Boneau, "The Effects of Violations of Assumptions Underlying the *t* Test," *Psychological Bulletin*, 57 (1960), pp. 49-64, and George W. Bohrnstedt and T. Michael Carter, "Robustness in Regression Analysis," in Herbert Costner (ed.), *Sociological Methodology* 1971 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), 1971, pp. 118-146.

### III. THE RATIONALE FOR PILOT CITIES

#### A. The Evolution of Objectives<sup>1</sup>

The struggle to reach a consensus on objectives is a continuing theme in the history of the Pilot Cities Program. An answer about what, exactly, were a Pilot Team's priorities was sought repeatedly--by local officials of the Teams; by the Teams of their Regional Offices; by Regional Offices of Washington; and perhaps most often by the Teams of themselves.

The source of the confusion was the Pilots' mandate to accomplish three tasks which were in constant tension with each other: to seek innovative approaches and to apply tough scientific evaluation to those innovations; but also to get things done to improve criminal justice; and to accomplish both of these by working with and through the criminal justice community. The tension arose not because they were totally incompatible tasks, but because they did involve conflicting aspects. Innovation (and especially evaluation of innovation) is vulnerable to compromise in design; compromise is useful for getting along with local agencies; getting along often makes it difficult to be blunt about the changes which the system needs most in order to function better.

Which of these tasks came first if there happened to be a conflict? Ambiguity existed from the outset. The first version of the grant application for what eventually became the first Pilot City proposed a research center "where a relatively intense, sustained research planning and development program effort will be aimed at optimizing the criminal justice system processes."<sup>2</sup> "The goal," it continued, "is to create a...laboratory in the host community in which correctional, law enforcement and social innovations can be introduced and their effects carefully evaluated."<sup>3</sup>

Innovation is already considered to be the central goal. But, the application goes on,

---

<sup>1</sup>Special acknowledgement for material cited in this section is owed to Robert Cushman for his memo on the pre-funding history of the Santa Clara Criminal Justice Pilot Program, 7/20/73.

<sup>2</sup>Grant Application to NILECJ for Santa Clara Community Correctional Laboratory, 5/16/69, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

...where major changes in organization, functions and program activities of the criminal justice system are designed, change cannot be quickly accomplished.... The strategy for change must be incorporated into a much, much broader framework involving political, executive, various professional interests and general citizen participation. Cultural mores, prevailing attitudes, current events, personalities of local leaders, etc., should be reflected in developing a change-making strategy and in the selection of specific tactics.<sup>4</sup>

The clear implication is that no attempt will be made to intervene abruptly in the system, and that a strong element of pragmatism will characterize the strategy for getting the innovations introduced.

The general goal statement in that first application survived to the final, accepted proposal which was submitted on February 6, 1970. Eight specific operational objectives were spelled out:

1. To establish a place equipped for experimental study of the criminal justice system at the local government level.
2. To develop agreements with Santa Clara County and its principal cities to accept various new programs for implementation, study, and evaluation.
3. To develop new methods which promise to make the criminal justice system more effective.
4. To develop or identify the necessary measurement techniques which are needed to assess the impact of these new methods upon the criminal justice system.
5. To develop and test new methods for determining the impact of experimental programs.
6. To learn more about how successful changes can become part of the daily operation of an agency.
7. To learn more about how best to disseminate and introduce these changes in other jurisdictions.
8. To increase the ability of the criminal justice system of Santa Clara County to independently develop and sustain new effective criminal justice system innovations and to carry out research.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Santa Clara Grant Application, 2/6/70, pp. 9-10.

These same goals were used virtually unchanged in the documentation for other applicants. As the Director of the San Jose Pilot Team noted, "It was so hard to move an application through the administrators that once the first one got through, the same application was used for the next two--only the budget, dates and names of cities/counties were different...."<sup>6</sup>

When the Pilot Cities Program was publically announced in May 1970, the head of NILECJ reiterated the goals of innovation and criminal justice improvement. He also emphasized the system-wide aspects of the Program's objectives, stating that a "model criminal justice system" would be the ultimate aim of the program, rather than agency-by-agency improvements.<sup>7</sup> A systematic approach had also been one of the San Jose Pilot's interest, but none of the goals in the San Jose grant application specified "systemization"--nor, consequently, did the next applications.

The objectives were almost imperceptibly modified, out of pressure to bring the Pilot Program into line with the guidelines of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. Explicit statement of crime reduction objectives became an issue, and greater specificity was sought in all of the objectives in line with the widespread interest in management by objectives.<sup>8</sup>

These alterations did not, however, change the basic priorities of the program. The first documented shift in priorities is found in the paper, never officially released, entitled "Guide for the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities." Written in November of 1971 for the guidance of the Regional Offices, it specified the following as the Program's goals: "(1) to assist criminal justice officials in selected communities to implement coordinated improvements that reflect the best of present knowledge and experience; (2) to develop and test new programs which hold promise for a more effective criminal justice system; (3) to increase the ability of local criminal justice system to independently develop and sustain criminal justice system innovations and research; (4) to identify and transfer to other communities those programs demonstrated to have improved effectiveness. *The primary emphasis of the program is on system-wide improvement...*" (emphasis added).<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Cushman, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>7</sup>Henry Ruth, *Corrections Digest*, 5/15/70.

<sup>8</sup>See Cushman, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

<sup>9</sup>Michael Beller and Paul Cascarano, "Guide for the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities," 11/4/71, p. 2.

Two features of that listing are noteworthy. First, it focuses on getting things done. Second, it elevates the importance of institutionalizing research capacity among local LE/CJ agencies--a goal which, coincidentally or not, had been listed eighth out of eight in the standard grant application first written by the San Jose Team.<sup>10</sup> Insofar as the "Guide" was never officially distributed, its different emphases did not directly affect the Program. It can be read, however, as a reflection of the ways in which Washington was starting to alter its thinking about what the Program was supposed to produce.

Independently of Washington, many of the Pilots were becoming concerned about what the goals of the Program really were. Characteristically the contention was between a Pilot Team which felt that it was constrained by political realities to go slow in pushing innovation and a Regional Office staff which was reluctant to approve grants for demonstration projects which, in its mind, were prosaic. In other cases the Regional Office was not at odds with the Team; but the Team itself was vacillating between different concepts of its role.

The increasing restiveness over the lack of clearly specified guidelines led to a three-day meeting in the spring of 1972 at Quails' Roost, North Carolina. Attending were the Project Directors, with representatives from the State Planning Agencies, Regional Offices, and LEAA/Washington. The object of the meeting was to develop an explicit statement about the operation of the Pilot Teams.

The final product was a Guideline (officially distributed nine months later, on January 2, 1973, but agreed upon in principle at the March meeting) which codified a disenchantment with "innovation" which had been expressed by several of the Pilots separately. The three goals of the Program were now said to be:

- (a) To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team with exceptional research and analysis capabilities to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to *contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.*
- (b) To *institutionalize the gains made during the Pilot City Program* by building into the target area's criminal justice system the research and analysis capability necessary for system-wide, problem-oriented planning and program evaluation.

---

<sup>10</sup>See San Jose Grant Application of 2/6/70, pp. 9-10.

- (c) To understand more clearly the process by which change takes place in the criminal justice system so that *more effective means can be devised for the nationwide dissemination and possible implementation of well tested innovations.*<sup>11</sup>

"Getting things done" to improve the criminal justice system was at the top of the list. Institutionalization of research, planning, and evaluation (RPE) skills was officially established as a primary goal. "Innovations" was literally the last word in the statement of goals.

The Guideline, which was subjected to almost talmudic scrutiny during the remainder of the program, characterized the activities of a Pilot Team as falling into three types: Pilot research, "to help diagnose and give needed definition to criminal justice problems"; demonstration projects; and technical assistance, which "can properly be described as a process of community development."

The Guideline dealt with innovation in two contexts. First, Pilot research projects were said to be a vehicle "to develop and test new methods for reducing crime in America." Second, demonstration projects were supposed to be "carefully conceived, pioneering programs that can serve as 'models'." But the statement was diluted immediately by this parenthetical follow-on:

"In appropriate circumstances, a program that seeks to accomplish any of the following purposes may also qualify as a demonstration effort:

- (a) Introduces an approach which is not widely accepted in the area or region.
- (b) Consolidates a number of existing, individually accepted ideas.
- (c) Provides for the first time an evaluation of an existing program or accepted idea.
- (d) Contributes to the foundation for the long-term development of a model criminal justice system."

The innovation criterion had been substantially dropped as a requirement for project approval. Almost any nontrivial project could be squeezed under the umbrella of one or another of the qualifying clauses.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> LEAA Guideline: Pilot Cities/Counties Program 1/2/73, p. 2. Emphasis added. The document is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix A.

<sup>12</sup> This interpretation would be disputed by at least the Kansas City and Dallas Regional Offices.

The Guideline served as the definitive statement of objectives for the operators. When the national evaluation plan was developed in the spring of 1973, the question of objectives was raised once again, this time in terms of choosing appropriate output measures for the Program. In this, NILECJ's final formal statement of what the Program was supposed to accomplish, three output variables were specified.<sup>13</sup>

The first was the one that had been eighth and last in the original grant application: "Improved System Capability for System-Wide, Problem Oriented Research, Planning, and Evaluation."

The second output variable was "development of innovative projects." The discussion begins with an essentially verbatim recitation of the original intention; that "well-qualified research Teams located in medium-sized metropolitan areas around the country would provide something of a laboratory-like setting for testing new approaches to criminal justice management and operations."<sup>14</sup> But, NILECJ's evaluation plan continues, one textbook definition of innovation is an idea, practice, or object *perceived* as new. "It is this definition of innovation," the writer goes on, "that has prompted many to urge that local applications of...ideas developed in other communities be considered innovations as well," and the evaluators are enjoined to apply a category of "locally innovative" as well as "absolutely innovative" (or, as put by others in LEAA, "globally innovative"), when assessing the achievement of this output.

The third of the output variables was dissemination of innovation, stated in the terms which had been used throughout the project.

The successive definitions of goals from those expressed in the pre-funding correspondence to those which were stipulated as the appropriate output measures are shown in Table 3.1 below. The alterations in priorities are substantial. The question arises: What in fact are the appropriate outcomes for assessing the Program's accomplishments? The ones that motivated its funding in 1970? The ones that the assembled Pilot Directors were willing to accept as their charge? Or the ones that seemed most appropriate to NILECJ in 1973? In this report we try to deal with all of them; necessarily with varying degrees of concreteness and detail. But in the summing up we will return to a point that was raised persistently and, we believe, persuasively by several Teams: that the failure to identify a clear mission, and then to design the Teams and their support with that mission clearly in mind, was an important source of confusion and wasted effort.

<sup>13</sup>NILECJ, "A Plan for Evaluating the Pilot Cities Program," 1/73, p. 16 ff.


<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

TABLE 3.1  
Approximate Rank of the Major Pilot Objectives

Goal Label	1969 Pre-funding discussions	1970 Santa Clara Grant Application	1972 Quail's Roost Meeting	1973 NILECJ Evaluation Measures
1. Extend LE/CJ state-of-the-art (thereby also improving the local LE/CJ System)	1	1	3 (?)	2.5
2. Systemization of the LE/CJ Agencies	2	2	--	--
3. Dissemination of results	3	3	3	4
4. Institutionalization of expanded local RPE capacity	?	4	2	1
5. Implement locally innovative improvements	--	--	1	2.5

### B. The Rationale for Program Impact

Any program, including Pilot Cities, can be conceived as a set of programmed inputs designed to produce a sequence of outcomes which lead to some definable ultimate impact. In simplest form, this general program model is as follows.




In these terms, the purposes of any evaluation can be reduced to

- assessing the nature and extent of the impact achieved,
- verifying that the inputs were made as planned, and


- identifying and measuring a sufficient number of intermediate processes or outcomes to demonstrate a linkage between input and ultimate impact.

In this section, the general program model will be transformed into a Pilot Cities Program model which identifies the specific intervening processes which were planned to produce the desired impact.

In laying out a complete rationale, the choice of where to begin is somewhat arbitrary. In the case of the Pilot Cities Program, we might begin with the presence of a Team in one of the cities, but this choice would ignore some important events which occurred prior to the Team being funded. At the other extreme, we might begin when the first germ of the idea was noted in NILECJ, but this choice would involve us in an analysis of bureaucratic processes which are extraneous to the purposes given above. Our choice is to begin with the set of programmed inputs which were managed by NILECJ and which were intended to produce eight well-qualified, well-situated, well-supported Teams. Schematically, these inputs may be represented as follows.




At a more detailed level, the above sequence can be elaborated as



All of the above activities were centrally controlled, or at least were designed to be so. In the evaluation, attention must be given to verifying that these processes occurred as planned.


A second set of inputs consists of the activities of the

Pilot Cities Team. In simplest form, the intended sequence is



RPE: Research, Planning and Evaluation

The complexity of the intervening processes and outcomes is very great. It can be illustrated by considering one class of Team activity of the conduct of demonstration projects. The intended route to impact is presented schematically in Figure 3.1 on the following page. The figure is a simplified representation of a successful demonstration project, one for which everything went right. But every element represented in the figure is an opportunity for things to go wrong rather than right. Consider the element, "LA and PCT jointly design project." (Note: LA = local agency; PCT = Pilot Cities Team) The following elaboration illustrates, but does not begin to exhaust the possibilities. And sequences of this type can be initiated by almost any activity that a Team undertakes.






FIGURE 3.1  
Idealized Rationale for Pilot Team Impact Through Demonstration Projects

Two additional complexities must be noted. First, one outcome of the above sequence is a loss of confidence in the Pilot Cities Team by one or more local agencies. At any given time, the level of confidence invested in the Team is one of a class of *disposing conditions* which affect everything that it does. Other disposing conditions which typically are not controllable by the Team include such factors as elasticity of budgets, history of cooperation (or non-cooperation) among local agencies, and a host of other "local climate" variables which can affect the success or failure of a venture. Second, as an overlay on an already complex program model, variables descriptive of Team *process* are also influential. Teams differ in style. Some are aggressive, some passive in identifying a community's problems; some pitch in to help write grant applications, others keep aloof from this activity; some take no responsibility for project implementation while others are heavily involved. And these stylistic process variables interact with the disposing conditions in influencing outcome. Consequently, the evaluation must attend to both classes of variables if it is to understand how impact was produced.

It is obvious that a program model complete in all detail would present such a myriad of variables, interactions, and feedback loops as to defeat communication. In this section the nature of these complications has been illustrated to illuminate the basic model which will be used throughout the report. That basic model is shown in Figure 3.2 below.





FIGURE 3.2  
The Basic Impact Sequence for the Pilot Cities Program

In effect, the following six sections of the report are organized on the basis of those steps. The next section, The Sites, deals with the first three boxes in the diagram. Section V, The Teams, deals with the second set of programmed inputs. Section VI, The Clients, discusses the disposing conditions and Section VII discusses the process variables. Sections VIII and IX deal with the two-box sequence of accomplishments: first the intermediate outcomes, then the assessment of Team impact.

#### IV. SITE SELECTION

This section deals with the accomplishments of the Pilot Cities Program in fulfilling its most immediate objectives: to deploy eight well-staffed Teams in eight well-chosen cities. In terms of the impact model presented in the preceding section, we will be examining the program inputs and the process variables:



This section focuses on the activities which LEAA/Washington substantially controlled during the pre-funding stage. In the next section we will turn to the selection of staff, which was the responsibility of the grantee.

The Pilot Cities Program is usually seen as a decentralized effort over which Washington (deliberately) kept very little control. This view is essentially correct for Pilot activities once the grant had been approved; but LEAA/Washington in the form of NILECJ did play a key role in determining the environment within which the Team would operate and the principles on which Teams would be established. The specific steps in this sequence as it was supposed to work are shown in Figure 4.1.

This orderly sequence of steps is drawn from the description in the official statement of the site selection process which was cited earlier, "Guide to the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities."<sup>1</sup> It is reported by some to

<sup>1</sup>Beller and Cascarano, op. cit. There is some dispute about the status of this document. Cushman, for example, points out that it was never issued with LEAA's official endorsement. (Cushman, op. cit., p. 35). It was never mentioned during field interviews with the Regional Office staff for whom it was written. But these respondents, it should be added, included almost no one who had been at the office since 1971. Staff at the Technology Transfer office which prepared the document reported that it was in fact distributed to the Regional Offices and to other interested personnel such as Cushman.




FIGURE 4.1  
Intended Inputs and Processes Under LEAA Control

be an accurate description of how the process worked; by others to be an accurate description of how the process was planned to work; by still others to be a *post facto* construction of how it should have worked.

In the following discussion, we will summarize the steps which actually occurred under two broad tasks which comprised the site selection process:

- The *quantitative screening*. What common environmental characteristics are desirable for the set of Pilot Cities?
- The *qualitative screening*. Out of the cities which have a suitable demographic profile, what political and bureaucratic considerations should be used to choose one city over another?

For each of these topics, the discussion deals with the process and the outcomes.

#### A. The Ten Criteria for Site Selection

Ten criteria were developed for application to the site selection process. Four of them were quantitative and objective. They were to be used to delimit the set of cities which warranted further consideration. They were:

1. "200,000 - 500,000 people in the central city."
2. "Substantial minority population (10-20 percent)."
3. "Average or worse crime problem."

4. "Geographic separation from other major urban areas."<sup>1</sup>

"Cities not meeting these criteria were eliminated," it is stated in the "Guide to the Establishment and Management of Pilot Cities."<sup>2</sup>

The set of eligible cities that remained were then to be evaluated on six additional criteria. As phrased in the "Guide," they were:

5. Reasonable stability of local political and governmental management leadership.
6. Political and governmental management leadership disposed to support criminal justice agency development.
7. Law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership with a proven receptivity to change.
8. Compatible relationships among political, management, and criminal justice agency leadership in operations and/or development planning.
9. Degree of unification of law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership.
10. Availability of a university or private non-profit organization with a law enforcement or criminal justice research capacity as a possible applicant for the actual Pilot City grant.<sup>3</sup>

These ten criteria were developed early, during the negotiations with the prospective San Jose Team. Through the process discussed in Section III, the Pilot Cities Program subsequently went through a series of modifications in scope; it is said that an expansion of the Program to the 50 largest cities was still being considered as late as the fall of 1971. But the criteria represent a coherent statement of the environment thought to be most suitable for Pilots in the small-scale, experimental approach that was finally adopted.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

## B. Application of the Quantitative Criteria

1. *The Rationale Behind Them.* These were the reasons behind the delimiting quantitative criteria, insofar as those reasons can be reconstructed:

The criteria of city size (200,000-500,000) and geographic separation were intended to promote the experimental value of the program. A city of the stipulated size was thought to be "large enough to have problems of street crime, drug addiction, drunkenness, and delinquency, yet small enough that a limited investment of LEAA funds could produce a measurable improvement."<sup>4</sup> Separation from other major urban areas was another way of ensuring that the census count of between 200 and 500 thousand reflected the genuine size of the metropolis feeding the crime problem. It would clearly violate the intent of the size criterion to choose, for example, a Long Beach, California, with a population of 349,000 within its city limits, but with a "center cities" population of 3,175,000 in its SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area).

The requirement for an average or worse crime problem had two reasons behind it. The first and obvious one is that, other things being equal, crime reduction resources should go to places where there is the most crime to reduce. A second reason seems to have been based on the tacit assumption that high crime rates mean that there is more room for improvement in the LE/CJ system than in cities with low crime rates. Thus, the argument went, these systems would have more need for the kinds of innovation that a Pilot City Team could stimulate. A third plausible reason was never spelled out but also seems worthy of consideration: that a high crime rate causes a perceived need to "do something different" among both political leaders and LE/CJ managers--in other words, the Program should go to cities where events are driving even a conservative LE/CJ system to look for new solutions.

The reasons behind the requirement for a minority population of ten to twenty percent--also called "a substantial minority population"--are obscure. Why would an all white (or an all black) city with a high crime rate be any less suitable for a Pilot Team than a racially heterogeneous city? One plausible reason is that the racial element introduces a dimension which interacts with the crime environment, and creates a greater need for innovativeness and imagination. But it could be argued just as convincingly that finding new solutions to crime problems is hard enough even without racial complications; why not test out ideas in racially "simple" sites; then elaborate them for application elsewhere?

---

<sup>4</sup>Henry S. Ruth, Jr., quoted in the DOJ press release announcing the first Pilot City, 5/7/70.

A second obscurity about the minority requirement is the 20 percent upper limit. "At least 10 percent" seems to express the intent of the criterion; and for that reason, cities with more than 20 percent minority will be considered to lie within the acceptable limits of the criterion.

2. *Operationalizing the Criteria with Data.* The "Guide" specifies that 1970 census data were used for the population and minority data, and that the F.B.I.'s annual Uniform Crime Report (UCR) was used for the crime criterion. It does not specify what years of UCR data were used, or an operational definition of "average or worse crime problem." Nor, apparently, was an explicit operational definition ever adopted. In view of the crime rates that prevailed in the cities which eventually were selected, "average or worse" must have been construed loosely. As an aid for reconstructing the selection process, let us assume that "average or worse" meant a total crime rate at least equal to the national average, and that the data were no older than those of 1968 (for the first Pilots) nor more recent than 1970 (for the last ones). A city will be said to qualify under the crime criterion if it had a total crime rate at or above the national average for at least two out of the three years 1968, 1969, and 1970.

The list of cities which fit the four criteria (including ones which had a minority population of more than 20 percent) numbered only sixteen.<sup>5</sup> If the minority criterion had been strictly interpreted to mean 10-20 percent, only seven cities would have been eligible. The sixteen and the relevant data are shown in Table 4.1. Twenty-two other cities were within the specified population range of 200,000 to 500,000, but failed one or more of the other three criteria. These cities are shown in Table 4.2.

Failure to meet all four requirements did not mean that a city was eliminated from consideration; and it is to that issue that we now turn.

3. *Immediate Outcomes of the Quantitative Screening.* Two separate issues are involved, of very different levels of importance to the main evaluation questions. They should not be confused. The first and essentially trivial issue is whether

---

<sup>5</sup>Only thirteen, if the U.S. Statistical Abstract data on percent of "Negro and other" are used as the basis for the minority criterion. Apparently Hispanic and American Indian citizens were not counted as minorities. The estimated minorities for Albuquerque, Corpus Christi, Tucson, and (later) San Jose are estimated from percentage of "Negro and Spanish heritage persons" in the school system (SAUS, 1972 edition, Section 33, pp. 837-897).

TABLE 4.1  
Eligible Cities Under the Quantitative Criteria

City	Population (200,000-500,000)	Minority Population (10+%)	Crime Rate (% above nat'l average)			Separation from other urban area
			1968	1969	1970	
Akron, Ohio	275,000	17.8	7.5	5.3	7.8	yes
Albuquerque, N.M.	244,000	20+*	N.A.	103.1	76.8	yes
Atlanta, Georgia	497,000	51.6	8.8	13.5	30.2	yes
Austin, Texas	252,000	12.9	15.1	14.5	1.5	yes
Charlotte, N.C.	241,000	30.6	31.5	39.5	44.9	yes
Corpus Christi,	205,000	20+*	15.3	24.5	42.1	yes
Ft. Worth, Texas	393,000	20.6	15.0	18.5	16.5	yes
Honolulu, Hawaii	325,000	66.1	39.7	32.8	38.6	yes
Louisville, Kentucky	361,000	24.1	48.7	52.1	35.4	yes
Nashville, Tenn.	448,000	19.9	29.8	28.9	27.0	yes
Omaha, Nebr.	347,000	10.6	14.4	7.8	5.4	yes
Richmond, Virginia	250,000	42.4	10.4	28.8	49.8	yes
Sacramento, Calif.	254,000	18.5	53.8	53.5	51.7	yes
Tucson, Ariz.	263,000	20+*	11.9	9.5	10.5	yes
Tulsa, Okla.	322,000	13.4	15.6	14.9	16.2	yes
Wichita, Kansas	277,000	10.7	-3.6	2.5	22.2	yes

\*Estimated, based on figures for "Negro and Spanish heritage persons" in the school systems. Hispanic and American Indian minorities apparently were not included in the calculation of "Negro and other" in the central cities.

TABLE 4.2

## Other Cities Between 200,000 and 500,000 Population

NOTE: Only data demonstrating failure to match a criterion are shown.  
A blank indicates that the city met that criterion.

City	Minority Population*	Crime Rate (% below nat'l average)			Geographic Separation
		1968	1969	1970	
Birmingham, Ala.	+	-1.7	-7.5	-2.3	
Buffalo, N.Y.	+	-12.1	-12.1	-12.3	
Cincinnati, Ohio	+	-29.8	-30.0	-13.6	
Dayton, Ohio	+	-7.3	-3.4		
Des Moines, Iowa	6.2	-11.3	-2.3		
El Paso, Texas	+		-1.7	-2.0	
Jersey City, N.J.	+		-6.9	-5.4	No
Long Beach, Calif.	+				No
Miami, Fla.	+				No
Minneapolis, Minn.	5.7				No
Newark, N.J.	+				No
Norfolk, Va.	+				No
Oklahoma City, Okla.			-5.2	-9.3	
Oakland, Calif.	+				No
Portland, Ore.	7.8				
Rochester, N.Y.		-21.5	-26.3	-17.8	
St. Paul, Minn.	5.7				No
St. Petersburg, Fla.					No
San Jose, Calif.					No
Tampa, Fla.					No
Toledo, Ohio		-20.5	-17.0	-13.0	
Yonkers, N.Y.					No

\*A "+" indicates that the city has more than 20% minority population.

personnel of LEAA/Washington followed the rule book in delimiting the eligible cities. The second and much more meaningful issue is whether the cities which were eventually selected were sensible choices in terms of the rationale behind the quantitative criteria.

a. *The selections and the criteria as stated.* The "Guide for the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities," states unequivocally that "Cities not meeting these criteria were eliminated."<sup>6</sup> Going through each of the four criteria, these comments are in order:

"City of 200,000 to 500,000 population." Source is given as the 1970 Census. *All eight cities met this criterion.*

"Substantial minority population (10-20 percent)." Source is given as the 1970 Census. In the 1970 Census, under the column labeled "Population in Central Cities, Negro and Other, Percent of Total," *only two of the eight cities are shown as having a minority population of 10-20 percent: Omaha with 10.6 percent and Rochester with 17.6 percent.* The Census lists three (Albuquerque, Des Moines, and San Jose) as having less than 10 percent. Other columns in the Census imply that Albuquerque and San Jose have large Chicano and (in the case of Albuquerque) American Indian minorities which would certainly push them over 10 percent and probably over 20 percent. *Only Des Moines has a minority population that clearly fails to meet the lower bound of the criterion.*

"Geographically separate." Source is given as "U.S. Atlas--Other maps." *Six of the eight cities are geographically separate by any reasonable definition. Norfolk and San Jose are not.* Norfolk is contiguous with Portsmouth (population 111,000), Chesapeake (90,000), and Virginia Beach (172,000); and is across the bay from Hampton (121,000). San Jose is contiguous with Santa Clara (population 88,000) and Sunnyvale (95,000). It is at the southern end of a nearly unbroken chain of cities bounded at the north by San Francisco, only 30 miles away.

"Average or worse crime problem." Source is given as FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Without knowing what years of data were used for what city and how "average or worse" was defined, no hard-and-fast statements can be made. *Even based on the very undemanding definition used in the preceding discussion--a total crime rate at least equal to the national average for two out of the three years of 1968-1970--three of the eight cities failed.* Dayton's crime rate was 7.3 percent and 3.1 percent below the national average in 1968 and 1969 respectively, and 9.8 percent above it in 1970 (it fell below the average again

---

<sup>6</sup>"Guide," p. 5.

in 1971). Des Moines' crime rate was 11.3 percent and 2.3 percent below the national average in 1968 and 1969, and 3.3 percent above it in 1970 (like Dayton, Des Moines was again below the average in 1971). Rochester was below the average for all three of the years 1968-1970: 21.5 percent in 1968, 26.3 percent in 1969, and 17.8 percent in 1970. In 1971, it was 29.4 percent below the average.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the best way of summarizing the way the quantitative criteria were applied is this: If someone were shown the list of eight Pilot Cities and asked, "What do these eight cities have in common?", he would find some shared characteristics. He might induce a population characteristic close to the Program's population criterion. *But in no way could he induce geographic separation, a particular level of crime rate, or a particular type of minority population. On each of those dimensions, the Pilot Cities very nearly span the range.*

*b. The selections and the intent of the criteria.* The discussion above takes an almost legalistic approach to the LEAA delimiting criteria and the subsequent actual choices of site. The much more important question is whether the eight were substantially out of line with the logic behind the criteria. The answer is "no" with regard to all but the crime criterion. But that one exception is worth discussing in some detail. For it can be argued that with only two exceptions the Pilot Cities teams were installed in relatively placid crime environments; and that a closer analysis at the outset of the program could have produced a much wider range of high-crime cities from which to choose.

First, consider the relationship between the UCR crime statistics and city size.<sup>8</sup> In Figure 4.2, the distribution of 1970 total crime rates for all U.S. SMSAs is broken down according to the population of the central cities in those SMSAs. The figure illustrates two relevant points about selection of Pilot Cities. One is that what constitutes an "average" crime problem for a city of 200,000 to 500,000 is not the same as for a city of 50,000 or 100,000. The larger cities have much higher crime rates. The other point is that cities in the 500,000 to 600,000 range had a substantially higher average crime rate than the cities between 200,000-500,000 population.

The significance of the first point is that *using the national mean to judge an average or worse crime rate for the*

<sup>7</sup>SAUS reports of the UCR crime data for the years 1968-1970.

<sup>8</sup>We share the widespread reservations about the UCR data. In the discussion, care has been taken to draw conclusions that rely on assumptions of only rough accuracy of comparisons among cities. But the basic problem remains, and the reader should evaluate the discussion with that in mind.




FIGURE 4.2  
Crime Rates and City Size

*larger cities is misleading.* Suppose instead that we ask, "What is the crime rate of candidate city X relative to the sample of cities between 200,000 and 500,000 people?" A scatter plot of the results using the 1970 UCR crime data are shown in Figure 4.3 below. The circled dots are the Pilot Cities.

*Seen in this perspective, only two of the eight Pilot Cities can be said to have a worse-than-average crime problem.* One of the cities--Rochester--has the *lowest* crime rate of any SMSA with a city in the 200,000-500,000 population range. These were the ranks of the eight Pilot Cities among the 35 candidate cities (or pairs of cities, such as Minneapolis/St. Paul) on the crime data in 1970:

Albuquerque	4th
Charlotte	8th
Norfolk	13th
San Jose	21st
Dayton	23rd
Omaha	25th
Des Moines	26th
Rochester	35th ... out of 35.

To this point, we have been discussing "crime problem" exclusively in terms of the rate of incidence. Another useful indicator is the rate of *increase* in crime during the years




FIGURE 4.3  
Crime Rates in the Pilot Cities Relative to Other Cities of Comparable Size

immediately prior to the Pilot Cities Program. It is, of course, true that rate of increase must be seen in conjunction with rate of incidence: a high increase in a city that was low to begin with may still represent a more desirable state of affairs than a low rate of increase in a high-incidence city. But in terms of the rationale for putting Pilot Teams in cities with crime problems, the ideal site would be one in which crime was both high and increasing rapidly. Again, only two Pilot Cities (Charlotte and Albuquerque) fit this description.

One reason that the selection process fell so far short of putting teams in the most prominent problem cities is that no special emphasis was given to the crime criterion. We must stress that the importance we are attaching to the crime criterion is not matched by any statement in the Program's documentation that a candidate city must have, *above all*, an average or worse crime problem. All four criteria were given roughly equal billing--and the net effect was that the number of high-crime cities which also met (more or less) the other three criteria were relatively small. Then, when the qualitative

criteria were considered, several of this already small set had to be discarded. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that several promising candidates for Pilot Cities lurked just above the arbitrary 500,000 population cut-off. Six cities have populations between 500,000 and 540,000: Kansas City, Denver, Pittsburgh, Jacksonville, Seattle, and Columbus. All of them except Pittsburgh meet the other criteria. All have more than 10 percent minority populations. All of them except Pittsburgh are geographically separate from other urban areas. And, most importantly, all of them except Pittsburgh fall in that "ideal" category of high crime and high increases in crime. If the population limit is raised further, to 600,000, two more cities (Phoenix and New Orleans) qualify as well.

To the extent that a serious crime problem was an important factor in defining a "good" site for a Pilot Cities Team, raising the population limit from 500,000 to 600,000 would have dramatically increased the number of suitable candidates: *all of the seven cities which would have been added by raising the population cut-off to 600,000 were reporting crime rates that were higher than the average and rising faster than average*, whether "average" is defined in terms of all U.S. cities or the sample from 200,000 to 500,000 from which the Pilot Cities Program chose its eight sites. Note that the added cities more than double the number of eligible sites which meet that latter and more exacting standard.

The discussion began with the question, "Were the selected Pilot Cities sensible choices in terms of the rationale behind the quantitative criteria?" *Overall, a strong argument can be made that they were not.* The Pilot Cities Program was motivated by LEAA's mission to fight a mushrooming crime problem. But the Teams were not concentrated among cities with mushrooming crime. Pilot Cities was looking for LE/CJ systems which were open to innovation. But Pilot Teams were not concentrated among LE/CJ systems with the greatest clear and present *need* to innovate. Pilot Cities sought laboratory-like environments in which the range of symptoms of the crime epidemic would be present for study and experimental treatments. But the selection process did not effectively seek out the most virulent cases.

### C. Application of the Qualitative Criteria

Once the candidate cities had been delimited through the four quantitative criteria, the next step was to be a final selection based on six qualitative criteria.<sup>9</sup> To review, NILECJ's statement of the six was as follows:

1. Reasonable stability of local political and governmental management leadership.
2. Political and governmental management leadership disposed to support criminal justice agency development.
3. Law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership with a proven receptivity to change.
4. Compatible relationships among political, management and criminal justice agency leadership in operations and/or development planning.
5. Degree of unification of law enforcement and criminal justice agency leadership.
6. Availability of a university or private non-profit organization with a law enforcement or criminal justice research capability as a possible applicant for the actual Pilot City grant.<sup>10</sup>

The sixth--availability of a qualified grantee--is of a different purpose and objectivity than the other five, and we will discuss it separately.

1. *Application of the Political/Administrative Criteria.* Two problems stand in the way of evaluating the match between the cities and the first five qualitative criteria; we believe they were also serious obstacles during the selection process itself.

The first of these problems is a nearly complete *absence of priorities or operational definitions for the criteria.* We have no way of knowing exactly what kinds of evidence, for which criteria, would swing the scales in a city's favor. The problem of priorities is particularly important. Presumably

---

<sup>9</sup>One participant recalls that the process followed exactly the opposite sequence: qualitative receptivity was sought first through site visits, then the quantitative factors were considered. In contrast, several grantees were convinced that the site visits were for *pro forma* ratification of decisions already reached in Washington.

<sup>10</sup>"Guide," p. 5.

one or two highly favorable conditions could result in a city's selection, even if it failed some of the others. But, as in the case of the quantitative criteria, there was no effort to clarify what was absolutely essential to a Pilot site, as opposed to what would be "nice to have if possible."

The second problem is that *pinning down the truth on some of these criteria is exceptionally difficult* no matter how much data are collected. More than once we would hear one official's assessment of his city's match with the criteria, then go next door and hear a thoroughly different one from an equally qualified source. And each of the respondents would be able to back his judgment with accounts of specific events and local conditions. A "preponderance of evidence" approach could seldom be applied, because most of the six criteria are multi-dimensional. They do not go from "very low" to "very high" on a single continuum, but can be "very high" and "very low" simultaneously on the same criterion. An example is criteria three, "LE/CJ leadership with a proven receptivity to change." Does a city pass or fail this test if the county sheriff and the municipal judges are enthusiastic innovators, while the police chief and the county judges are adamantly resistant? As it happened, this kind of contradictory situation recurred frequently in the Pilot Cities.

In the individual case histories we attempt to characterize each city on each of the qualitative criteria. Characterized very roughly, the eight cities fit the criteria as follows:

Three of the eight sites--*Charlotte, Dayton, and Rochester*--came close to meeting the first five of the qualitative criteria. At the time of selection, they could have been called "receptive" sites.

*Des Moines* was not conspicuously suited or unsuited on the basis of the first five criteria.

*San Jose* (which was selected before the criteria were specified) and *Norfolk* both posed serious potential problems if criteria #4 and #5 (organizational compatibility and organizational unity) were to be taken seriously.

Two of the eight cities--*Omaha* and *Albuquerque*--were generally unsuitable, with serious deficiencies relating to all of the first five qualitative criteria.<sup>11</sup>

The germane points about the application of the qualitative criteria are these:

First, as the rough sketches indicate, *the real reasons for selecting the cities were apparently very little related to a systematic application of the criteria.* As we reconstruct the process, it appears that the key consideration (except for *Omaha* and *Albuquerque*) was: how badly does the local political leadership really want this program? The enthusiasm of a mayor or a set of county commissioners was extremely important. Undoubtedly it should have been. Finding cities that clearly met all of the criteria may very well have been an impossible job.

Next, NILECJ staff cannot be faulted for lack of effort. Sixty-six cities of more than 200,000 population (including the ones larger than the 500,000 upper limit which was eventually imposed) were listed as Pilot Cities Program candidates. LEAA records indicate that 55 of these were contacted in one form or another, usually by a personal two- or three-day visit by an NILECJ representative. During these visits, the representative attempted and generally succeeded (at least in the selected cities) to talk to a nearly complete list of local actors who would be important to the success of a Pilot Cities Team. *The Pilot Cities were not selected casually or at random;* at the end of the process, NILECJ had a good understanding of the political and administrative environment of the selected cities.

*The only serious problem about the application of the first five of the qualitative criteria is that finding cities which genuinely met them was critically important to the original conception of the Pilot Cities Team as a system remodeler and innovator.* If a Team were to be successful in the way that the original objectives envisioned, it was necessary to be installed not simply in an adequate environment, but in an

---

<sup>11</sup>To the best of our knowledge, for example, *Omaha* and *Albuquerque* were chosen for political reasons over other candidates which LEAA and NILECJ staff believed to be better qualified. There is no conclusive documentation for this assertion, but the consensus among respondents was universal. The important point is not that political considerations entered into the selection process when candidates were roughly equal otherwise--LEAA probably would be alone among government agencies if political considerations had not entered into it--but that the selection personnel had identified clear, substantive reasons for not selecting them as Pilot Cities, which were overridden. It should be added that in our estimate the selection personnel were right. Many of the very severe problems experienced by *Albuquerque* and *Omaha* were linked to the unfavorable conditions which they had identified.

excellent one. The problem was that *the difficulty of finding such environments was recognized, but the corresponding need to redefine Pilot goals and objectives was not.*

2. *Application of the Grantee Criterion.* The sixth qualitative criterion called for an organization "with a law enforcement or criminal justice research capability." This criterion more than any of the others was honored in the breach. One of the eight grantees (for San Jose) was a research organization--called the American Justice Institute--specializing in topics of law enforcement and criminal justice. Another, the University of Nebraska at Omaha, was a university with an existing department of criminal justice (with very little research capability). *Six of the eight grantees were universities or, in one case, a research organization, which had no specialized credentials in the fields of criminal justice and law enforcement research.* The six were as follows:

- *The Institute of Government* (Charlotte), based at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, had been active in consulting for North Carolina governments at the municipal and state levels, and had provided some technical assistance to LE/CJ agencies.
- *William and Mary* (Tidewater) had a law school, and had in the past provided LE/CJ technical assistance to Virginia municipalities.
- *University of Rochester* (Rochester) had a graduate school of management.
- *Drake University* (Des Moines) had a law school, and no significant history of either research or technical assistance in LE/CJ areas.
- *University of New Mexico* (Albuquerque) had an Institute for Social Research and Development which started a Criminal Justice Program especially to administer the Pilot Cities grant.
- *Community Research, Incorporated* (Dayton). CRI was a local non-profit research organization which had performed research for a variety of governmental units in the Dayton area.

Some of the departments given responsibility for administering the Pilot Grant had distinguished research reputations; some conducted very little research, in any field.

How much the background of LE/CJ credentials in the grantee affected the ultimate success or failure of a Team is impossible to assess directly, because there were only two examples of grantees with LE/CJ credentials. One of these (San Jose) sponsored the program's most conspicuous success; the other (Omaha) sponsored its most conspicuous failure. But it was our consistent impression that the other six Teams, successes and failures alike, operated in an environment of very little substantive support and direction from the parent institution. *One reason for this, we hypothesize, was that the grantee's own institutional interests were not directly engaged.* The Teams often appeared to exist as only line items in the grantee institution's budget, not as carriers of the grantee's good name.

Perhaps even more importantly, there is a strong argument to be made that *the existence of strong institutional interest in the Pilot Team's mission would encourage better selection and backstopping of Team members*, which in turn was probably the single crucial determinant of Team success. The director of the San Jose Team (who was himself part of the parent organization) was referring to this institutional rudder when he wrote,

I think the goals and objectives of the Project Director and as expressed by the American Justice Institute, have remained fairly consistent over time. Officially stated goals and objectives, as they appear in the various grant applications for example, show less consistency.

This is so because establishing goals and objectives has not been entirely the prerogative of the the American Justice Institute or the Project Director. Other external constraints need to be recognized, as a series of program monitors had their own ideas about goals and objectives and in some cases, expressly asked that these be stated and addressed. LEAA emphasis and policy shifted considerably also, especially in the early days of the program; and as the community and its agencies made their wishes known.


*One explanation we offer for the apparent success of this Pilot is that the Pilot Program staff had some consistent internal sense of goals and objectives, and was able to anticipate and deal with these shifts. We did not have to swing radically from one set of goals or methods of operation to another as these instructions changed.*<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup>Cushman, op. cit., pp. 18-19. Emphasis added.

Whether this was an idiosyncratic strength of the American Justice Institute or the staff it assigned to the San Jose Team, or whether more institutional interest in the other cities would have produced more San Joses, remains unknown. In any event it can be concluded that *the Pilot Cities Program fell far short of meeting its own criterion of success in selecting grantee organizations.*

## V. THE TEAMS



The only tangible program inputs that distinguished the Pilot Cities Program from other LEAA funding efforts were the Pilot Team staffs. And of the many variables affecting the success of a Pilot Team, it was assumed from the outset that the Team personnel would be among the most critical. In this section we shall describe the backgrounds of the senior Pilot Team members, the skills and the knowledges they brought to the program, and the utility of these qualifications for achieving the Pilot Cities Program objectives.

### A. The Initial Teams

1. *A Note on Organization of the Teams.* The full-time senior staff of a Pilot Team was originally intended to consist of four persons. Each usually was termed an Associate Director (we shall refer to them as "Associates" for convenience), with some difference in nomenclature among Teams. Each Associate was supposed to have his own special area of responsibility. Three of the areas were LE/CJ specialities: police, corrections, and courts. The fourth area was "systems," embracing the techniques which were intended to enable the Team to apply its efforts across professional and municipal jurisdictions. In practice, there were many variations on this basic organizational scheme.

Some Teams (e.g., Charlotte) recruited their members entirely without regard to the four-area specification. Others (e.g., San Jose) made *pro forma* assignments of the Associates to the areas of specialization, more in order to satisfy their LEAA monitors than out of any conviction that the scheme had merit. Others (e.g., Dayton) initially tried to organize in

accord with the four-area approach.<sup>1</sup>

On some Teams, the four Associates functioned under a part-time Director whose main job was in the grantee organization. On other Teams, the Director was one of the four Associates. On still other Teams, there was both a part-time official Director and an Associate who was designated *primum inter pares*.

On some Teams, the Pilot Cities job was full-time for all four Associates; on other Teams (Rochester is the best example) some of the Associates contemporaneously held university appointments and committed only part of their time to the LEAA contract. On some Teams, a fifth Associate would be carried for brief periods during shifts of personnel; or a fifth senior person would be carried for substantial periods, charging only a small fraction of his time to the program.

None of these variations was so great as to prevent comparisons among the Teams. At any given point in a Team's history, it was possible to determine who were the senior staff doing the day-to-day work of the Team. But the variations have necessitated occasional approximations in the summary ratings. As an illustrative case, the Director of the Des Moines Team in Phase II was charging only 50 percent of his time to the project; in reality, he was spending nearly full-time on the project, and it was so counted when we computed the person-months worked by senior Team staff.

2. *The Ideal Pilot Team Associate.* The planning for Pilot Cities never spelled out what a Pilot Team member was expected to be, except that (1) on each Team would be a person for each of the four areas of police, courts, corrections, and systems; and (2) these persons would be "experts."

There were other qualities implied in the program design. If the Program's intention to generate experimental, innovative approaches were to be realized, Team members would have to be familiar with the theoretical state-of-the-art in their fields. If the Program's intention to evaluate demonstration projects rigorously were to be realized, Team members would have to be able to use a range of data collection and analytic techniques at a professional level of competence. If the Program's intention to work closely with and through local LE/CJ agencies were to be realized, Team members would have to be able to establish rapport with local LE/CJ officials.

The problem with these implicit qualities is that they so seldom come in the same package. The ideal Pilot member for, say, the police area would be a former policeman who grew up and worked in the Pilot City and who then went back to school

---

<sup>1</sup>Cushman, "Prefunding History," p. 11.

for a Ph.D. in a combined course of criminology and advanced research methodology. And who, of course, had genuine ability in all of these disparate pursuits. And who got along well with people.

This person did not exist in enough numbers to staff even one Team, let alone all eight. But the example illustrates four desirable qualities among the principal Program staff members: *strengths in area specialization, research credentials, operational experience, and background knowledge of local conditions.* We shall discuss each in turn, first as they occurred on the initial Teams, then as they changed during the course of the program.

*Area Specialization.* To produce useful innovation, it helps to know what has already been tried and with what results, and this is at the bottom of the rationale for hiring LE/CJ specialists with advanced academic degrees. Because as a practical matter, very few officials with day-to-day operational responsibilities have the time or the energy to stay fully abreast of advancements in the state of the art. In terms of the operations of a Pilot Team, the specialist should ordinarily be better able than the practitioner to put a proposed demonstration design in the context of what is already known in his field.

This rationale was bought, at least in the abstract, by several of the Pilot Teams. The word "expert" was used by both LEAA/Washington and Team organizers in the cities as a descriptor of what to expect in a Team member. Moreover, it was a descriptor which was commonly remembered by local agency officials, particularly in those cities where the Teams had been least successful. "They told us the Team was going to get an expert in law enforcement," was one typical response, "and what we got was [the Pilot Team Associate]. Hell, he's not even out of school yet."

In terms of advanced degrees, without regard to relevance for topics, the 32 initial staff possessed the following:

No college degree	1	( 3.1%)
Bachelor's degree	1	( 3.1%)
Master's degree	12	(37.5%)
ABD <sup>2</sup>	4	(12.5%)

---

<sup>2</sup>This commonly used but unofficial abbreviation stands for All But Dissertation. It means that the possessor has completed all course work for a Ph.D., has passed his General Examination, and has "only" to research and write the thesis. An ABD generally represents more exposure to the literature and practice in advanced methodology than does a Master's; so we designate it separately.

Law Degree <sup>3</sup>	11	(34.3%)
Ph.D.	3	(9.3%)

The relevance of these degrees to the four specialities which the Teams were intended to possess--police, courts, corrections, systems--are shown in Table 5.1 below. In those cases when a Team did not specify which Associate belonged to which slot, we provided the "best fit" which the degrees of the Team members permitted. These characteristics are

TABLE 5.1  
Academic Training of the Initial Teams in the Four Categories of "Expertise"

	Police <sup>1</sup>	Courts <sup>2</sup>	Corrections <sup>2</sup>	Systems <sup>4</sup>
Tidewater	YES	YES	YES	YES
Rochester	related	YES	YES	related
Omaha	NO	YES	YES	YES
Des Moines	YES	YES	YES	NO
Albuquerque	related	YES	related	YES
Dayton	NO	YES	YES	YES
Charlotte	related	YES	related	related
San Jose	NO	YES	related	related

<sup>1</sup> "YES" included degrees in law enforcement and police administration. "Related" included degrees in sociology, law, and public administration. "NO" included communications and no degree beyond a B.A.


<sup>2</sup> "YES" included degrees in law and criminal justice.

<sup>3</sup> "YES" included degrees in criminal justice and social work. "Related" included psychology, sociology, and government administration.

<sup>4</sup> "YES" included degrees in operations research and management, and advanced DOD training in OR and systems analysis. "Related" included economics, quantitative methods in psychology, and advanced statistics and computer training possessed by a lawyer. "NO" included a law degree without such training.

summarized in Figure 5.1 on the following page. It characterizes the eight teams on their overall level of academic training in the four fields which were supposed to be represented on a "qualified" Pilot Team.

<sup>3</sup> Some respondents reported their degree as an LLB; others as a J.D. However, the J.D.s represented a standard three-year law course, and not what has traditionally been defined as a Doctor of Jurisprudence--in effect, a Ph.D. in law in addition to a basic law degree. Two Master's of Law degrees from Harvard were reported, which in fact do represent training beyond the basic law degree.



\*Police, courts, corrections, systems.

**Scale:** The scale values in the figure were calculated by summing the four Associate's individual points, assigned as follows: no graduate training=0, less than Ph.D. in an unrelated field=1, Ph.D. in an unrelated field=2, less than Ph.D. in a related field=3, Ph.D. in a related field=4, less than Ph.D. in that field=5, Ph.D. in that field=6. The total scores were then converted to a 100 unit scale. A score of 100 would indicate that each of the four slots was filled by a Ph.D. in that specialty.

FIGURE 5.1  
Distribution of the Initial Teams on an Index of Training in the Four Categories of "Expertise"

The most remarkable datum about area specialization is that of the 32 original Associates, only one had completed a Ph.D. which directly related to an LE/CJ speciality--the first Corrections Associate on the Omaha Team. His degree was in education, but his dissertation dealt with a police topic, and his course work focused on criminology and corrections.<sup>4</sup>

This is not emphasized because of a presumption that a Ph.D. in an LE/CJ speciality is a decisive qualification in a Team member. The datum stands out because of its improbability: a program is established which at the outset advertised experts in LE/CJ topics as its stock-in-trade and advances in the LE/CJ state of the art as its goal--and only one Ph.D. who had even written his thesis on an LE/CJ speciality is recruited for any of the Teams.

*Research Credentials.* The importance of research credentials depends on how a Pilot's mission is defined. If the accomplishment of demonstration projects is the key element and the evaluations of the projects are to be conducted by contractors, it is only marginally valuable to have sophisticated research skills on the Team. If, in contrast, the Team is supposed to fulfill research, planning and evaluation

<sup>4</sup>And, as it happens, he quit after five months.

functions, with the local agencies being responsible for getting through the demonstration projects, then a high level of skill is essential.

In order to assess the Teams on their research capacity, four levels of credential were defined, as follow:

- Level I. No graduate-level training in social science or systems research methods, and no proven ability to conduct any kind of research competently. Label: "Research Assistant"
- Level II. Some graduate-level training in social science or systems research methods, or proven ability to conduct simple research competently. Label: "Research Associate"
- Level III. Possession of a new Ph.D. (or ABD in a field dealing extensively with social science research or systems research methodology), or proven ability to conduct analytical research of moderate complexity. Label: "Research Scientist"
- Level IV. Qualified to act as the director of a major social science or management systems research project, as demonstrated by possession of a Ph.D. and experience in directing research projects; or as demonstrated by having successfully acted as the director of major research projects, regardless of the degree. Label: "Principal Investigator"

The full-time Associates first hired for the Teams were each assessed in relation to these levels.<sup>5</sup>

The distribution of the 32 persons hired at the initial full-time senior staff was as follows:

Level I:	"Research Assistant"	1	( 3%)
Level II:	"Research Associate"	14	(44%)
Level III:	"Research Scientist"	11	(34%)
Level IV:	"Principal Investigator"	6	(19%)

For purposes of assigning a summary rating for a Team, we adopted a scaling procedure based on the propositions that

<sup>5</sup>Deciding whether a Team member was a I or a II, or a II or a III, rarely was a problem. Deciding whether a Team member was a III (a "Research Scientist") or a IV ("Principal Investigator") was occasionally difficult. The decisions were made strictly on the basis of research credentials, not on the basis of general managerial skills. The rule in questionable cases was: at what level would the research companies with which we are familiar hire this person, based on his resumé?

1. Research skills were rarely additive across people in the Teams. For comparative purposes it is realistic to assume that a Team with even one Associate at level  $x$  has a greater range of research open to it than a Team with all four Associates at level  $(x-1)$ .
2. The number of Associates at the highest level was more important than the level of the least qualified Associate.

The ordering rules produced a fully-ordered scale with 35 values, bounded by the extremes of all four Associates at level IV (4444) and all four at level I (1111).

Table 5.2 shows the level of the initial Pilot Team members. The scale values for each Team were converted to a 100-point range, and are shown in Figure 5.2.

TABLE 5.2  
Research Credentials of the Initial Teams

	Number of			
	Research Assistant (level I)	Research Associate (level II)	Research Analyst (level III)	Principal Investigator (level IV)
Rochester	0	1	1	2
San Jose	0	2	0	2
Charlotte	0	1	2	1
Albuquerque	0	2	1	1
Tidewater	0	2	1	1
Dayton	0	3	0	1
Omaha	1	0	3	0
Des Moines	0	3	1	0




FIGURE 5.2  
Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Research Credentials

It must be reemphasized that these are judgments about a very limited domain of skills. The phrase "research credentials" resonates with attractive meanings that are not meant here. We intend to assess only a set of skills needed to put a problem in researchable language, apply a sensible methodology to it, and adapt that methodology to the situation.

*Operational Expertise.* The rationale for hiring staff with practical LE/CJ experience has two main lines. One argument is that many LE/CJ professions--especially the policeman's--are impenetrable to outsiders. By this reasoning, the realities of being a cop are seen as wholly unlike the outsider's perception of the job, and no amount of theoretical knowledge will compensate for the lack of personal experience, if demonstration projects are to be designed realistically. The second line of argument is the pragmatic one that LE/CJ officials--again, especially the police--are *convinced* that an outsider cannot understand them, whether the conviction is justified or not. So if a Team wishes to establish a working relationship with the local LE/CJ agencies, it should hire some insiders as staff members.

As it happened, the selection process for the initial staff members leaned heavily on this criterion. The 32 original staff members included the following levels of operational experience:

5 or more years in an LE/CJ line agency <sup>6</sup>	9 (28%)
1-4 years in an LE/CJ line agency	3 (9%)
5 or more years in a related agency (e.g., State Crime Commission)	1 (3%)
1-4 years in a related agency	7 (22%)
No LE/CJ operational experience	12 (38%)

Of the twelve who had no operational experience, eight were acting as the "systems" Associate. Excluding these eight (who were not expected to have LE/CJ experience), 83 percent of the 24 remaining Associates had at least some working experience in an agency related to LE/CJ; and more than one in three (37.5 percent) had worked for at least five years in a line agency such as a police department, court, public defender's office, or correctional institution. Compare this last statistic with the one out of those same 24 (4.2 percent) who had a Ph.D. in an LE/CJ speciality.

Again a simple summary scale value has been calculated for each Team, as shown in Figure 5.3 on the following page.

---

<sup>6</sup>"Line agency" is used to denote those agencies which work directly with offenders (or potential offenders) in the LE/CJ system.




FIGURE 5.3  
 Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Operational Experience in LE/CJ Agencies

*Local experience.* The rationale for seeking people with local experience is that operating a Pilot Team effectively is a highly political job, and requires a fine-tuned sensitivity to the workings of the community. A resident of the community is more likely to have this knowledge than a person who has just moved in. He is also more likely to have an established set of contacts with people in the community; and (goes the rationale) they will help provide an initial entree as Team activities get underway.

The distribution of local experience among the 32 initial Associates was as follows:

Just moved in	9	(28%)
Some experience in the area	8	(25%)
Some experience in the city	15	(47%)

As in the case of operational experience, the recruitment procedures produced Teams heavily stocked with this quality. Distribution of the Teams on an index of local experience is shown in Figure 5.4 on the following page.

*Age and Sex Characteristics of the Initial Teams.* A few words about two characteristics of less substantive importance. The initial senior Pilot staff was relatively young in age. The average was 34.7 years. The distribution among the first 32 Associates at the time they were hired was:




FIGURE 5.4  
Distribution of the Initial Pilot Teams on an Index of Local Experience

20-29 years	8	(25%)
30-39 years	17	(53%)
40-49 years	6	(19%)
50-59 years	1	(3%)

This mean ages of the individual Teams showed little variance, with a single exception. For seven of the Teams, the means were clustered between 29.5 years (Rochester) and 36 years (Albuquerque). Only Omaha was well apart from this group, with a mean of 46.0 years and no one on the Team younger than 38.

The initial Pilot staff was overwhelmingly male. Only two of the first 32 Associates--6.3 percent--were women. One of those two was also a Director of a Team (Rochester).

*Intra-Team Diversity.* The four major characteristics we have been examining each had a rationale behind it that made the characteristic a plausibly desirable quality to have on a Pilot Team. Intra-Team diversity could be predicted to be either good or bad: good, in that it is accompanied by a variety of outlooks on the part of Team members; bad, in that it could foster intra-Team divisions.

Measured in terms of variance on the four characteristics, the most diverse Teams were Albuquerque and Omaha. Albuquerque was composed of two experienced systems analysts from out-of-state and two local personnel, a lawyer and a psychologist. Omaha had an ex-policeman, a court administrator, a Ph.D. in

education, and a retired Army colonel who had been working on analyses of nuclear weapons systems. The most homogeneous Team was Rochester, composed of four persons with academic or research backgrounds in Rochester, three of whom shared interests in LE/CJ prior to joining the Team.

3. *Assessment of the Overall Qualifications of the Initial Pilot City Teams.* Because no standards for Pilot personnel qualifications were set, it is impossible to say how many of the initial Pilot Teams came up to standard. In view of what the Program was taking as its objectives, these would seem to have been reasonable guidelines:

- *for expertise in the four PCP specialities*, at least two staff members with non-terminal graduate degrees that directly apply to two of the specified LE/CJ fields, and one with a graduate degree in a field that uses systems methods extensively;
- *for expertise in research*, at least one person at both the "principal investigator" and the "research scientist" levels;
- *for operational experience*, at least one person who has worked in an LE/CJ line agency for five or more more years; another who has worked in one for at least a year; and
- *for local experience*, at least one person who has lived in the Pilot city/county for five years or more, and another who has lived there for at least one year, prior to joining the Team.

*If these had been the standards for a "qualified" Pilot Team--and the requirements taken separately are not stiff ones--none of the original Teams could have met all of them.*

*Four Teams (Dayton, Rochester, Des Moines, Tidewater) would have met three of the four. Rochester and Tidewater were both below the standard in operational experience; Des Moines and Dayton were below it in research credentials.*

*The other four initial Teams could have met only two of those minimums. Omaha was below the standard in both research credentials and local experience; Albuquerque was below it in LE/CJ area specialization and operational experience; and Charlotte and San Jose were below it in area specialization and local experience.*

4. *Qualifications on an Individual Level.* Whether this means that the Teams were "really" underqualified is of course moot, and not only because we have had to manufacture standards after the fact. The variables to which numbers have been put by no means capture all of the important qualifications of the Team members. For that matter, neither do the numbers capture all of the important variation in the categories which *have* been quantified. In the process of rating individuals for this analysis, it was frequently apparent that the numbers we were assigning did not add up to the high "overall score" that our interview data would have justified. And just as often, the numbers added up far too high, in light of the person's performance after joining the Team.

*But this is in many ways comparable to the problem which faced the organizers of the Pilot Teams. The hiring process, even with a personal interview as a part of it, usually boiled down to a rough assessment of a few prominent characteristics such as training, operational experience, research capability, and familiarity with the local area, using the same resumé data which we have used plus some estimates of the elusive factors of character, drive, intelligence, and imagination.*

In practice, judgments about the intangible factors can be used to choose among candidates who all possess the concrete qualifications, or they can be used to justify selecting someone who lacks them. The Pilot Cities recruiters often seemed to do the latter. *If we define as "underqualified" an Associate who lacked a top rating on any of the three criteria of LE/CJ area specialization training, research credentials, or operational experience, then 15 of the original 32--47 percent--were underqualified.*<sup>7</sup>

If the rule were to be relaxed<sup>8</sup> so that a candidate would be considered qualified if he were at the next-to-the-top level on two out of three of the criteria, 10 of the original 32--31 percent--would still fall in the "underqualified" category.<sup>8</sup>

The profile of the initial personnel is no more favorable when we try to identify Team members with outstanding qualifications. *If "outstanding qualifications" is defined as a top rating on two of the three criteria of LE/CJ area*

---

<sup>7</sup>That is, Ph.D. or equivalent in an LE/CJ or systems speciality or research credentials at the Principal Investigator level or five or more years experience in a line LE/CJ agency. Local experience alone is assumed to be insufficient to save a candidate from being underqualified.

<sup>8</sup>This looser requirement asks for two of the following: a less-than-Ph.D. degree in the speciality to which he is assigned (by the "best fit" rule which has been applied); "research analyst" credentials (experience in complex social sciences research, or at least an ABD in a research-oriented field); 1-4 years in a line LE/CJ agency (e.g., police department, public defender's office, correctional institution).

specialization training, research credentials, and operational experience, only 2 of the original 32--6 percent--fall in that category.

If the definition of "outstanding qualifications" is relaxed to include at least one top and one next-to-the-top rating on two of the three criteria, a total of 12 persons--38 percent--would fall in that category.

The overall judgment to be drawn about the calibre of initial Team members depends on expectations. These are the extremes: On the optimistic side, it could be said that the initial 32 Associates were a well-educated group, many of whom were familiar with LE/CJ problems and systems. But with only the barest of exceptions, it could *not* be said that Pilot Cities recruited experts in LE/CJ problems and solutions. On the critical side, it could be said that most of the initial 32 were very marginally qualified for their positions.

5. *An Index of Team Qualifications.* At the outset it was stated that the four qualities being sought are not ordinarily found in the same person. With one predictable exception (the correlation between area specialization and research credentials), this was certainly true of the 32 original staff members. The correlations among the four sets of ratings were as follow:

	Area special- ization	Research creden- tials	Operational experience	Local experience
Area specialization	x			
Research credentials	.39	x		
Operational experience	-.11	-.34	x	
Local experience	.05	-.19	-.23	x

Because the four variables do not "go together" either statistically or conceptually, it makes very little sense to combine them into a simple additive index.<sup>9</sup> To illustrate how uncomplementary the Team qualifications were in the four categories, the ranks for each Team are displayed in Table 5.3 on the following page.

<sup>9</sup>That is, there is not adequate justification for assuming that, say, a Ph.D. and an M.A. in political science (a 4 and a 3 on the LE/CJ training scale) are "equal" to an Associate with 5+ years in a line LE/CJ agency and one with 1-4 years in such an agency (a 4 and a 3 on the LE/CJ operational experience scale).

TABLE 5.3

## Rank Order of the Initial Teams on the Four Categories of Qualification

	rank order on ...			
	area specialization	research credentials	operational experience	local experience
Albuquerque	6	4.5	6.5	5
Charlotte	8	3	3	8
Dayton	4.5	6	4.5	1.5
Des Moines	4.5	8	4.5	3
Omaha	3	7	1.5	7
Rochester	2	1	8	1.5
San Jose	7	2	1.5	6
Tidewater	1	4.5	6.5	4

Was San Jose, ranked near the top on two categories and near the bottom on the other two, more or less "qualified" than Dayton, which was ranked high on one, low on one, and in the middle on the other two? The answer depends on the relative importance of the four types of qualification. If research credentials or operational experience were most important, San Jose was better positioned than Dayton in terms of personnel qualifications. If training in the four areas of specialization or local knowledge were most important, Dayton was on top.

We may extend this type of comparison. In all, there are 75 ways of ordering the four categories, singly and in combinations.<sup>10</sup> For each of these 75 permutations, a fully-ordered ranking of the eight Teams was obtained. The percentage of combinations for which a Team was ranked *first or second* were as follow:

Rochester	65%
San Jose	41%
Tidewater	33%
Dayton	29%
Omaha	21%
Des Moines	5%
Charlotte	4%
Albuquerque	0%

<sup>10</sup> Examples are  $3 > 2 > 1 > 4$ ,  $1 > (2,3) > 4$ ,  $(3,4) > (1,2)$ , with ">" meaning "more important than." Combinations of two or more variables are treated interactively in the following analysis; e.g., if they are of equal value it is better to be ranked in the middle on both of a pair than very high on one and very low on another. The actual algorithm used was to multiply the ranks on the individual categories, with rank 1 being assigned a value of 8, rank 2 a value of 7, etc.

Rochester was clearly the best qualified Team by this measure. While we cannot know what the most effective combination of qualifications is, Rochester's initial Team was the best equipped (ranked first) for 40 percent of all possible combinations, and was one of the two top Teams for almost two out of three of the possible combinations. The plausibility of this approach derives from the reasonable assumptions that (a) all four factors are important, (b) they probably do not differ enormously in relative importance, with the consequence (c) many combinations would be nearly identical in magnitude.

If we then ask for what percentage of combinations would a Team be ranked as conspicuously least qualified (ranked *seventh* or *eighth*) relative to the other Teams, these are the results:

Tidewater	0%
Dayton	0%
San Jose	21%
Albuquerque	24%
Rochester	25%
Des Moines	31%
Omaha	41%
Charlotte	57%

Dayton and Tidewater had the best qualified (or, more accurately, "the never-least-qualified") Teams by this measure.

Taking both of these orderings into account, these observations are appropriate:

- Except for its almost complete lack of operational experience, Rochester was the strongest Team.
- Tidewater had the lowest combined rank on both strengths and balance, and on that basis could be considered the best qualified overall.
- Like the Rochester Team, San Jose, Omaha, and Charlotte had high risk/high gain combinations of qualifications, but with San Jose having much better prospects for "high gain" (41 percent in the top two; 21 percent in the bottom two) than Omaha (21 percent to 41 percent) and Charlotte (4 percent to 57 percent). (It should be added that Charlotte had 26 "third" rankings out of the 75).
- Dayton was well balanced: 83 percent of its ranks were in the top 4; none were 7 or 8.
- Ninety-seven percent of Albuquerque's ranks were 5, 6, or 7. None were 8, but neither were any of them 1, 2, or 3.

The complete breakdown of rankings is shown below in Table 5.4.

TABLE 5.4  
Rank Order Position of the Initial Teams for All Combinations of the  
Four Categories of Qualification

	No. of times that the Team was ranked ...								Total	% of times ranked 1 or 2	% of times ranked 7 or 8
	first	second	third	fourth	fifth	sixth	seventh	eighth			
Rochester	30	19	2	0	2	3	6	13	75	65.3	25.3
San Jose	14	17	4	5	5	14	16	x	75	41.3	21.3
Tidewater	13	12	3	28	6	13	0	0	75	33.3	-0-
Dayton	11	11	9	31	0	13	0	0	75	29.3	-0-
Omaha	7	9	17	4	3	4	28	3	75	21.3	41.3
Des Moines	0	4	14	5	26	3	2	21	75	5.3	30.7
Charlotte	0	3	26	0	0	3	5	38	75	4.0	57.3
Albuquerque	0	0	0	2	33	22	18	0	75	-0-	24.0

## B. The Teams Over Time

The preceding discussion has dealt exclusively with the Associates who were hired at the outset. But at least as important is what happened to the Teams during the course of the Program. The issue is discussed under two headings: the "structural integrity" of the Teams, and changes in personnel qualifications.

1. *Structural Integrity of the Pilot Teams.* The Team concept was central to the initial Pilot Cities approach. A variety of skills applied together was supposed to enable solutions which cut across parochialisms. The structural integrity of the Team thus becomes an important process variable. To what extent did the Pilot Cities Program meet its objective of fielding *units*, as contrasted with collections of individuals?

We shall examine Team integrity on three dimensions: *continuity of leadership, staff continuity, and staffing levels.*

a. *Continuity of leadership.* "Leadership" refers to the designated Director of the Team, regardless of whether that person was a full-time Associate of the Team. The leadership histories of the Teams can be broken down as follows:

No change in leadership	3 Teams	(Charlotte, Rochester, San Jose)
One non-disruptive change in leadership	2 Teams	(Des Moines, Tidewater)
One disruptive change in leadership	1 Team	(Albuquerque)
More than one disruptive change in leadership	2 Teams	(Dayton, Omaha)

Or to put it another way, half of the Teams underwent at least one change in direction which was accompanied by change in policy during the course of their histories.

b. *Staff continuity.* It would have been unrealistic and probably unwise for the Pilot Teams' recruiters to have sought a zero turnover rate in Team personnel. The best candidates are also the ones who are most likely to be drawn away eventually by better opportunities; and, in any event, some infusion of new blood is desirable during the course of a five-year effort. But the Program's turnover rate went beyond the attrition which would ordinarily be expected to occur.

In all, 59 people served as Associates or as working Directors of the eight Pilot Teams during the 349 "Team-months" of the Program. At that rate, during the course of a full five-years-per-Team Program, the typical Team's staff would have been replaced more than one and one-half times. The distribution of length of service among the 59 Associates was as follows:

0- 6 months	7	(12%)
7-12 months	12	(20%)
13-18 months	14	(24%)
19-24 months	6	(10%)
25-30 months	3	( 5%)
31-36 months	11	(19%)
37-42 months	4	( 7%)
43-48 months	1	( 2%)
49-60 months	1	( 2%)

When that frequency distribution of length-of-service is examined, these indications of potential disruption emerge:

- Almost one out of every three Associates served for no more than one year (14 out of 59).

- Almost two out of every three Associates served for no more than two years (39 out of 59).
- Slightly more than one out of ten Associates was with his Team's Program from beginning to end (7 out of 59).
- The median length of service was a year and a half--less than the length of a single Phase of the Program.

This discontinuity inherently worked against Team development, as the case histories of the Dayton, Omaha, Albuquerque, and Des Moines Teams illustrate. The Program relied on close working relationships between Team members and local staff, and turnover often frustrated those relationships.

Another way to look at turnover is its impact on the accumulated wisdom that an organization should gain by virtue of staying in business. With high turnover, the rate of accumulation is decreased. This is shown graphically in Figure 5.5 below. As the figure indicates, the typical Team's staff was




FIGURE 5.5  
Increases in the Mean Pilot Team Experience over the Life of a Team

very little more experienced at the end of forty months than it was at the end of twenty months. In this sense, the Program got older without getting much wiser.

The problem was not equally severe among the eight Teams. Figure 5.6 below shows the comparative rates of staff turnover.




FIGURE 5.6  
Staff Turnover Rates for the Teams, Projected for a Five-Year Project

It will be noted that Albuquerque is off the scale, at a 287 percent turnover rate. Thirteen different persons were classified as having held an "Associate" post between April 1971 and March 1975. But the turnover rates of Omaha and Dayton, though less dramatic, also indicate high degrees of discontinuity in staff.

*c. Staffing levels.* As Associates came and went, gaps in staffing occurred. Sometimes they were short; sometimes they lasted for a year or more. The result was to diminish the overall input of Pilot Team manpower, and to diminish the quality of "being a Team." Overall, the Program record on this dimension was good. By our estimate, only 13.7 percent of the potential number of Associate-months went unfilled. But Team records varied. The range is shown in Figure 5.7 on the following page.

Omaha was conspicuously understaffed. Since the understaffing occurred at the same time that (and was partly caused by) a variety of catastrophes in other aspects of the Team's operations, it is difficult to specify the detriments associated with understaffing. But it should be remembered that even a fully staffed Team was supposed to have only four senior personnel; one missing Associate represented a 25 percent loss.

*d. An index of team integrity.* For purposes of summarizing the three dimensions of leadership continuity, staff continuity, and staffing level, they were combined into an index based on the following scoring:




FIGURE 5.7  
Percentage of Associate Months Actually Filled by the Teams

Staff continuity, projected to a 5-year project	0- 49% turnover	=5
	50- 99% turnover	=4
	100-149% turnover	=3
	150-199% turnover	=2
	200+ turnover	=1
Leadership continuity	no leadership change	=5
	one change, not disruptive	=4
	more than one change, not disruptive	=3
	one change, disruptive	=2
	more than one change, disruptive	=1
Staffing levels	90% Associate/months filled	=5
	80-89% Associate/months filled	=4
	70-79% Associate/months filled	=3
	60-69% Associate/months filled	=2
	50-59% Associate months filled	=1

The Team scores on this basis produced identical orderings whether they were added or multiplied. Rochester and Charlotte were tied for highest (2 fives and a four); Tidewater and San Jose were close behind (2 fours and a five). The overall ordering, using the interactive scores as a basis for the intervals, is displayed in Figure 5.8 on the following page.<sup>11</sup>

It is doubtful whether Omaha, Albuquerque, and Dayton warrant the descriptor "Team." All three were extremely weak on two of the three dimensions. And, as their separate case

<sup>11</sup>We use multiplicative scores under the plausible assumption that the three dimensions do in fact interact in producing the quality of "Team integrity."





FIGURE 5.8  
Distribution of the Pilot Teams on an Index of Structural Integrity

histories make clear, none of them functioned as a cohesive unit for an appreciable period.

2. *Changes in Qualifications.* In the description of the qualifications of Team members, we focused on the initial group of Associates. But as the discussion of staff turnover indicated, these levels of qualification did not necessarily remain constant.

To visualize the changes that took place, refer to Figure 5.9 on the following two pages. The rectangles (as illustrated below) are each 54 months long (starting six months after the first Associate was hired) and a "standard team" high.



"Standard team" is defined in terms of the basic qualifications in the four categories (academic expertise, operational experience, research credentials, local experience) as defined on page 51. Each of these four is assumed to be of equal importance for purposes of this illustration. The scoring procedures for determining the width of each band were based on the Associate rating scales described under the discussion of each of the four categories. Thus, a Pilot Team that lasted for the full five years and met the basic qualifications in all





FIGURE 5.9  
Changes in Mean Pilot Staff Qualifications Over Time



(Figure 5.9 cont'd.)

four categories would exactly fill the entire rectangle. The eight illustrations in Figure 5.9 show how the actual qualifications look when the rating system is applied to its changing staff.

For practical purposes, the Teams may be summarized as follows:

*The Tidewater* started with a qualified, balanced Team (on this rating system) and stayed that way throughout. To a slightly lesser consistency, so did *San Jose* and *Dayton*.


*Rochester* started with strong qualifications in everything but operational experience, then became somewhat more balanced toward the end of its brief history.

*Des Moines* and *Charlotte* were reasonably stable throughout.

*Albuquerque* fluctuated--it was never as strong in qualifications as some other Teams. At times it was conspicuously less qualified than all of the others except...

*Omaha* went from reasonably close to a "standard" Team in Phase I, through a complete disruption between phases, to a weakly qualified Team in Phase II.

## VI. THE CLIENTS



The label "disposing conditions" refers to local causes of success and failure which were beyond the Teams' control. The number of candidate disposing conditions was large. The economic structure of a city, its politics, its demographic characteristics, and, of course, the capabilities of its LE/CJ agencies were all expected to be factors in a Team's productivity. In this section, these conditions are discussed under two headings: the urban environment, and the characteristics of the local LE/CJ system.

### A. The Urban Environments

What kinds of cities did the Pilot Teams work with? The crime environment was characterized in Section III, but that description left open a wide variety of other dimensions which differentiate cities. In the following discussion we shall briefly comment on some of the basic quantitative indicators. All of the comparisons are drawn from the sample of 115 SMSAs with populations of 200,000 to 1,000,000, unless otherwise stated.<sup>1</sup>

1. *Population.* The eight cities are not large in comparison with U.S. urban centers. Of Americans who live in cities, more than half (52.6 percent) live in ones larger than the largest of the Program's cities, San Jose. Fewer than one out of three (31.4 percent) live in cities smaller than the smallest

<sup>1</sup>These population cutoff points represent rounding of the 186,000 to 1,072,000 population range which lies within 1.65 standard deviations (the .9 normal probability limit) of the mean of the SMSA populations of the eight cities.

Pilot City, Des Moines.<sup>2</sup> The 1970 ranks of the Pilot Cities, as cities and as SMSAs, are shown below:

	City Rank	SMSA Rank
San Jose	31	30
Omaha	41	59
Norfolk	47	47
Rochester	49	37
Albuquerque	58	96
Dayton	59	39
Charlotte	60	73
Des Moines	64	109

*Population Density.* Three of the eight cities are relatively uncrowded; one was almost exactly average; four were somewhat more crowded than the average. But the most densely populated of these--Rochester--was still less than half of the maximum density among central cities in SMSAs with 200,000 to 1,000,000 population.




FIGURE 6.1  
Density in the Central City

<sup>2</sup>1970 census data. Unless otherwise noted, all information in this section was taken from the 1970 census data as reported in the *Statistical Abstract*, 1972, or in the *City and County Data Book* for 1970.

*Growth Rates.* The central city population in four of the cities--Dayton, Rochester, Des Moines, and the Tidewater--fell during the decade from 1960 to 1970. Moderate growth characterized Omaha, Charlotte, and Albuquerque. San Jose exploded--or more accurately, continued the growth explosion which started in the late 1940s. Note that the central cities in the San Jose SMSA (which has a population of slightly more than one million) had a higher growth rate than the central cities of *any* SMSA with a population of 200,000 to 1,000,000.




FIGURE 6.2  
Growth of the Central City, 1960-1970

2. *Economic Indicators.* Taken overall, the Pilot Cities were wealthier than the average, with fewer poor and fewer unemployed than the average.

Specifically, *median family income* was above the mean for this subsample of SMSAs in six out of the eight cities. Only the Tidewater and Albuquerque fell below the average.




FIGURE 6.3  
Median Annual Family Income

The *increase in family income* from 1959 to 1969 had been faster than the average in four of the cities, but conspicuously lower in one, Albuquerque.

*Blue-collar wages* were above the average in Dayton, Rochester, San Jose, and Des Moines; below average in Charlotte, Albuquerque, and the Tidewater.

Perhaps the two most significant economic indicators relative to crime are the figures for *unemployment* and for *families at or below the poverty level*. On both counts, most of the Pilot Cities were in enviable positions. Unemployment in 1970-1971 was below the average in six of the eight cities (and less than one percent above it in the other two), and population in the poverty range was below average in five of the eight.




FIGURE 6.4  
Change in Family Income, 1959-1969




FIGURE 6.5  
Average Weekly Blue-Collar Wage




FIGURE 6.6  
Mean Unemployment Rate, 1970-1971




FIGURE 6.7  
Percentage of Population at the Poverty Level

3. *Racial Characteristics.* The minority populations of the eight cities were discussed as one of the quantitative criteria for site selection. To recapitulate, all of the cities except Des Moines had more than 10 percent minority populations in the central cities; five were at or above the mean for central cities of SMSAs with 200,000 to 1,000,000 population.




FIGURE 6.8  
Combined Black and Hispanic Population in the Central City

4. *Summary Profile of the Pilot Cities as Cities.* There is no natural way to add up a city's "score" on indicators of the kind we have been presenting. But if that is kept clearly in mind, it is useful to draw summary patterns from the quantitative characteristics. For in the absence of unusual other circumstances, there is common sense truth in saying that extremes on these quantitative indicators tend to be "good" or "bad" relative to the stresses that our cities are enduring. It is generally "unstressful" to have high median income, few people at the poverty level, low density, a stable population, low unemployment, high blue-collar wages, large income increases, low black/white income differential, low rate of change in the racial composition, high levels of racial homogeneity, low crime

rates, and low increases in crime.<sup>3</sup> And given these non-rigorous assignments of which is the "unstressful" extreme, we can summarize where the eight cities stand on the quantitative dimensions as shown in Table 6.1 on the following page. The pluses (+) indicate that the city's score was favorable on that dimension and the minuses (-) indicate that it was unfavorable, relative to the sample of SMSAs of 200,000-1,000,000. The cut-off points among categories were based on standardized scores, as follows: "++" for the upper 10 percentiles under assumptions of a normal distribution ( $z > 1.28$ ), "+" for the 60th to 89th percentiles ( $.25 < z \leq 1.28$ ); "0" for the 41st to 59th percentiles ( $-.25 < z \leq .25$ ), "-" for the 11th to 40th percentiles ( $-1.28 < z \leq -.25$ ) and "--" for the bottom 10 percentiles ( $z < -1.28$ ).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>It should be obvious that we are not making normative judgments about what a city "should" be like. There is, for example, no normative reason why racial homogeneity is a good thing; on the contrary, it is easy to argue that it makes for blandness in a city's life. But in terms of the conditions which have made problems for city governance in recent years, racial heterogeneity has been bad, and homogeneity has been, at the very least, "not bad."

<sup>4</sup>The characterization of the cities' environments on the "stressful-unstressful" continuum seems to us the most informative way of communicating how the cities differed. During the analysis of demographic data, a much larger number of variables was examined--85, at one time or another. In addition, several factor analyses were completed. Inducing factors from the results was an exercise in imagination, but of marginal value in understanding the environments. A brief summary of these analyses will be presented in order to convey the general flavor of the findings. Two samples of cities were used: one sample consisted of the 148 SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) in the United States with populations greater than 200,000; the second was the sub-sample of 115 SMSAs with populations between 200,000 and 1,000,000. Twenty variables were constructed based on data taken from the Statistical Abstracts for 1972; the variables are appended to this report. Both R (correlations between variables for a population of cities) and Q (correlations between cities for a population of variables) factor analyses were completed (principal components, varimax rotation).

*Results of the R analysis.* Five interpretable factors resulted. These may be described as:

- *Affluence:* composed of high average family income, high blue collar wages, and few poverty-level families.
- *Social service orientation:* composed of above average per capita expenditures on education, health, and welfare, and a low rate of unemployment.
- *Stability:* low population growth rate, low violent crime and property crime rates, and a high percentage of the labor force in manufacturing.
- *Economic equity:* low black/white difference in income and home ownership, and below average income growth rate.
- *Insularity:* low minority population, uncrowded housing, low violent crime rate.

TABLE 6.1

## Profile of the Pilot Cities on Twelve Indicators of Governability

	Des Moines	Dayton	Rochester	Omaha	San Jose	Tidewater	Charlotte	Albuquerque
<u>Population Characteristics</u>								
Dispersion	+	-	-	-	-	0	+	+
Stability	+	+	+	0	--	+	-	-
<u>Economic Characteristics</u>								
Family Income	+	+	++	+	++	-	0	-
Change 1959-1969	-	0	+	-	0	0	++	--
Blue-collar Income	+	++	+	0	+	-	--	-
Distribution	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	-
Employment	+	+	+	+	-	+	++	0
<u>Racial Characteristics</u>								
Homogeneity	+	-	0	+	-	-	-	--
Stability	+	-	-	0	--	0	-	NA
Income Equality	0	++	0	0	++	0	-	-
<u>Crime Characteristics</u>								
Low rate	0	+	+	0	-	-	-	--
Stability or decrease	+	+	+	+	0	0	++	-

(footnote 4 cont'd)

As shown below, the factor scores for the eight cities are summarized as high, average, or low, based on the standing of each city relative to the 115 SMSAs comprising the sample. From these simplified data, we might characterize Rochester, for example, as an affluent, stable, insular city oriented toward social services.

	<u>Aff</u>	<u>Soc Ser</u>	<u>Stable</u>	<u>Ec Eq</u>	<u>Insular</u>
Albuquerque	Low	Average	Low	High	Average
Charlotte	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
Dayton	High	Average	High	High	Low
Des Moines	High	Low	Average	Average	High
Omaha	Average	Low	Average	Average	Average
Rochester	High	High	High	Average	High
San Jose	High	High	Low	Average	High
Tidewater	Low	Low	Low	Average	Low

*Results of the Q analysis.* The principal findings of the Q factor were two in number. First, geography is predominant. Clear factors emerged which can best be labeled California, Upstate New York, Ohio/Michigan industrial, etc. Second, the eight Pilot Cities do not cluster. Consequently,

As the table indicates, Des Moines is consistently positive on these dimensions and Albuquerque is just as consistently negative. They clearly would be located near opposite extremes if the scores on the twelve variables were added for all SMSAs and treated as an index. As Figure 6.9 shows, they nearly bound it. In fact, the eight cities as a set occupy positions spaced evenly along the spectrum, from the presumably stressful configurations that face the municipal governments in Albuquerque, San Jose, and the Tidewater; through middle range occupied by Charlotte and Omaha, to the presumably more placid environments of Dayton, Rochester, and Des Moines. From all that has been documented about the inception of the Pilot Cities Program, we conclude that LEAA did not intend to produce this degree of heterogeneity within the sample of cities, and that in fact, the intent was to select cities which were similar to one another. But after the fact of selection, it must be noted that the eight cities constitute a remarkably representative sample of 115 SMSAs.<sup>5</sup> If the Pilot Cities had been subjected to a rigidly prescribed program which was essentially invariant over the sample, then the sample would be excellent from the standpoint of experimental design. But the program was not intended, nor was it implemented in a Fixed Treatment mode. To an even greater degree than we had anticipated, the uniqueness far outweighed the commonality among the eight cities. Our ability to generalize our findings must therefore rest on some unit of analysis other than the cities.

---


(footnote 4 cont'd)

the simple correlation matrix is more meaningful than the factors. The inter-city correlations are presented below.

	<u>Alb</u>	<u>Char</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>DesM</u>	<u>Omaha</u>	<u>Roch</u>	<u>SJose</u>
Char	.07						
Day	-.22	.04					
DesM	-.07	-.08	.30				
Omaha	.18	.30	.27	.44			
Roch	-.61	-.06	.59	.39	.28		
SJose	.11	-.11	.18	.20	.44	.24	
Tide	.42	.59	.09	-.18	.37	-.32	-.20

A summary of this table is that: (1) Rochester, Dayton, and Des Moines have a modest degree of commonality, (2) Albuquerque, Charlotte, and Tidewater are somewhat similar, (3) these two sets of cities are very different, (4) San Jose is very little like either of them, and (5) Omaha has something in common with all of the others.

<sup>5</sup>For the population of SMSAs between 200,000 and 1,000,000, the mean for the index was +.04 and the standard deviation was .36. For the sample of eight Pilot Cities, the mean was +.01 and the standard deviation was .44.



Scale: percentile, for SMSA's of 200,000-1,000,000 population, based on the mean and standard deviation of the summed standardized scores of the twelve environmental variables.

FIGURE 6.9  
Distribution of the Eight Cities on an Index of Governability

### B. Local LE/CJ Capabilities

At the time a Team was established, every LE/CJ agency in the city and county was a potential client of the Team's services. One of the most highly touted aspects of the Program was its system-wide range. The following discussion picks out a few of the characteristics of the systems which were believed to be indicators of their capabilities or of their resources: structure, funding levels (local and external), research and planning capability, and personnel characteristics.

1. *Overall Structure.* Five of the eight LE/CJ systems which the Pilot Cities Teams encountered followed the familiar divisions of responsibility between city and county. The primary enforcement responsibility lay with the city police department, with comparatively modest police resources in the sheriff's office and other municipalities. The primary corrections facility was usually the county jail, operated by the sheriff's office. The primary court system was the county's. A typical pattern is shown in Figure 6.9. Three of the sites followed different patterns. In Albuquerque and Charlotte, the state operated most of what would otherwise have been the county court system, including the public prosecution and defense functions. The Tidewater had no "county" structure at all. In effect, the Team was working with four replications of a self-contained LE/CJ system (in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach, and Chesapeake), with responsibilities split between city and the Commonwealth, rather than between city and state.




FIGURE 6.10  
Typical Organization of the City and County LE/CJ Agencies

2. *Local Funding Levels.* Funding levels for LE/CJ agencies in the eight cities are shown in Table 6.2 on the following page. The dollar figures are budget totals, as reported to us by members of the agencies in question. Some caution is necessary in interpreting them. Different jurisdictions use very different accounting methods, and the lack of uniformity undoubtedly distorts some of the comparisons among cities.

Not surprisingly, the biggest city/county (San Jose) had the largest budget; the smallest city/county (Des Moines) had the smallest budget; and in general, budgets varied with population. But even per capita expenditures showed large differences among the eight cities, as shown in Table 6.3. Some of the differences are almost certainly artifacts. For example, San Jose's high per capita expenditures on corrections probably is inflated by inclusion of the county police function in the figures for the sheriff's office. The Tidewater's low total probably reflects exclusion of Commonwealth support, which in other cities took the form of county agencies.

But even allowing for these differences, a few extremes appear to represent genuine inter-city differences. Rochester/Monroe ran a very well-financed LE/CJ system relative to the size of the population. San Jose/Santa Clara and Des Moines/Polk put an unusually high proportion of their LE/CJ resources into courts and probation services--31 percent and 28 percent of their total per capita outlays respectively, as opposed to an average of 18 percent among the other four sites for which data are available.

TABLE 6.2  
LE/CJ Budgets in the Pilot Cities/Counties (FY72)

	Albuquerque	Charlotte	Dayton	Des Moines	Omaha	Rochester	San Jose	Tidewater
COUNTY								
Sheriff's Office (inc. county jail)	(1,204) <sup>①</sup>	3,019 <sup>②</sup>		650	1,128	7,994 <sup>②</sup>	11,597	
Courts (inc. probation)	State operated <sup>③</sup>	741	5,592 <sup>④</sup>	1,956	924	5,285	11,620	Not Applicable
County Attorney	State operated <sup>③</sup>	--		234	513	943	2,579	
Public Defender	State operated <sup>③</sup>	--		--	235	436	1,083	
CITY								
Police Department	7,132	7,005	7,184	5,769	8,501	10,384	10,742	12,209
Municipal Courts	229	--	886	664	478	588	--	1,852
City Attorney	200	--	414	212	432	--	470	--
City Jail	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	880
OTHER								
Courts	--	1,914	--	--	--	--	--	485
Commonwealth Attorney	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	204
Total	N.A.	12,679	14,076	9,485	12,211	25,630	38,091	15,631

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> FY73. FY72 not available.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 1,783,000 for county police in Charlotte, 3,578,689 for county police in Rochester.

<sup>3</sup> Figures not available.

<sup>4</sup> Department-by-department figures not available.

TABLE 6.3  
Per Capita Expenditures on LE/CJ Functions in the Pilot Cities/Counties  
(FY 72)

	(1970 Population)		Enforcement	Courts (inc. probation)	Corrections	Total
	City	County				
Albuquerque	243,781	315,774	\$29.26	N.A. <sup>②</sup>	\$3.81	N.A.
Charlotte	241,215	354,656	\$34.07	\$7.49	\$3.49	\$45.05
Dayton	243,459	606,148	\$29.51	N.A.	N.A.	\$44.08
Des Moines	200,772	286,101	\$28.73	\$12.03	\$2.27	\$43.03
Omaha	347,380	389,455	\$24.47	\$6.91	\$2.90	\$34.28
Rochester	296,233	711,917	\$40.08	\$11.35	\$6.20	\$57.63
San Jose	446,504	1,064,714	\$24.06	\$15.41	\$10.89	\$50.36
Tidewater	680,600 <sup>①</sup>	--	\$17.94	\$3.73	\$1.29	\$22.96

<sup>1</sup> The individual city totals are: Norfolk 307,951; Portsmouth 110,963; Virginia Beach 172,106; Chesapeake 89,580.

<sup>2</sup> N.A. = Not available.

Note on procedure: Per capita totals were obtained by dividing all budgets from county LE/CJ agencies into the county population, and all budgets from municipal LE/CJ agencies into the city population.

The one budget characteristic shared by all eight cities is growth. Our calculation of the *average* annual increase in LE/CJ budgets in the eight cities from FY71 to FY74 was 13.6 percent, with Albuquerque showing the most rapid rate of growth (an average annual increase of almost 18 percent over the preceding budget). Even Dayton, with the slowest rate of growth of the eight, showed an average annual increase of over 9 percent. The figures for all eight were as follow:

Albuquerque	17.9%
Des Moines	16.6%
Tidewater	14.4%
Rochester	14.1%
Omaha	13.5%
Charlotte	13.0%
San Jose	10.3%
Dayton	9.3%

3. *Federal Support.* The funds from the Pilot Cities Program were just one part of Federal support for local LE/CJ agencies. During the life of the Program, a total of 53 million dollars from LEAA's block grant and discretionary grant programs was distributed among LE/CJ agencies in the eight Pilot Cities.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> We did not compile totals of outside support to LE/CJ agencies from Federal funding sources other than LEAA. Our inquiries on that subject indicate that LEAA was by far the dominant patron for these agencies.

The figures for each city are as follow:<sup>7</sup>

	LEAA Grants Other Than Pilot "O"	(Figures in Millions) Pilot "O" Funding	Total
San Jose	7.8	4.6	12.4
Rochester	6.1	2.6	8.7
Dayton	4.5	2.5	7.0
Tidewater	4.8	1.5	6.3
Albuquerque	5.6	.7	6.3
Des Moines	4.6	.8	5.4
Omaha	2.7	.9	3.6
Charlotte	2.2	1.2	3.4
Totals :	<u>38.3</u>	<u>14.8</u>	<u>53.1</u>

The relevant point about those figures is the comparatively small proportions contributed by the Program: only 27.9 percent of the total LEAA funding awarded to the eight cities during the periods when the Teams were active. The Program's proportion of total LEAA money for each city was as follows:

San Jose	37%
Dayton	36%
Charlotte	35%
Rochester	30%
Tidewater	24%
Omaha	25%
Des Moines	15%
Albuquerque	11%

It can be argued that some Teams were instrumental in obtaining projects funded from non-Pilot sources. In Section IX, which analyzes demonstration projects influenced by the Teams, it is concluded that \$4.2 million in Federal non-Pilot demonstration funds can be linked to the existence of the Pilot Teams, and added onto the \$14.8 million in Pilot "O" grants for purposes of analyzing Team-sponsored efforts. But even taking this into consideration does not alter the basic conclusion that the Pilot Teams were far from being the only or even the principal point of access to LEAA funds.

The issue just addressed can be extended further by viewing Pilot funds as a proportion of the overall LE/CJ budgets in the eight cities. Overall, the Pilot "O" demonstration funds amounted to only 2.6 percent of the total LE/CJ budgets during that time period. The percentages for the eight city/county sites were as follow:

<sup>7</sup> Figures reflect both initial funding and continuation funding for existing projects.

Dayton	3.9%
Rochester	3.0%
Charlotte	2.8%
San Jose	2.5%
Des Moines	2.2%
Tidewater	2.2%
Omaha	2.1%
Albuquerque	1.6%

It should be remembered, too, that these percentages ranging between 1.6 percent and 3.9 percent are in the context of average annual city/county budget increases of 13.6 percent, which were discussed earlier. During the life of the Program in the eight cities, the annual LE/CJ budget increase averaged a sum almost six times greater than the Pilot "O" demonstration money going to the city/county in that fiscal year. It should cause no surprise that local agencies sometimes spurned the opportunity to engage in Pilot-sponsored research and demonstration efforts. For many agencies, the prospect of Pilot "O" money was simply not a very important factor relative to their overall budgetary situation.

#### 4. *Research, Planning, and Evaluation (RPE) Resources.*

It was hypothesized at the outset that a critical disposing condition would be the availability of research, planning and evaluation (RPE) resources in the local agencies. If a police department already had an active research division, went the logic of the argument, then it should be that much easier for the Team to work collaboratively with that police department--because of the RPE resources themselves, and because the police chief and the force in general would be acclimated to the uses of research.

To examine the hypothesis, each LE/CJ agency and city and county administrative office was characterized in terms of its research, planning, and evaluation (RPE) capability. Did an RPE capability exist at all? Was it a unit, or an individual? Was the capability designated as such, or was it a sideline for the unit or person? Was genuine, future-oriented planning conducted? Or did the "research" consist of logging tabulations and monitoring ongoing activities?

The definitions for each type of RPE capability were as follow:

- *Strong RPE Capability:* An established unit within the agency which conducts analytic research and impact-oriented assessments of agency operations.
- *Moderate RPE Capability:* A single person within the agency that conducts analytic research and

evaluation; or a unit which provides tabulations of agency activities.

- *Nominal RPE Capability*: A single person who is designated for the research/planning function, but who spends only part-time (if any time) conducting tabulations of activities.
- *No RPE Capability*: No one even designated as holding research/planning responsibilities.

Using these definitions, the 84 LE/CJ agencies in the eight Pilot Cities were rated as having the breakdown of RPE capabilities shown in Table 6.4 below.

TABLE 6.4  
Existing RPE Capabilities in the Pilot Cities

	Strong	Moderate	Nominal	No	Total
San Jose	4	0	2	4	10
Tidewater	2	2	6	14	24
Dayton	1	2	4	1	8
Albuquerque	1	1	2	4	8
Rochester	1	0	5	4	10
Des Moines	0	5	1	1	7
Omaha	0	3	2	1	6
Charlotte	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	9	15	25	35	84
(% of the total)	(11%)	(18%)	(30%)	(41%)	(100%)

A second important disposing condition relating to RPE was hypothesized to be the interest of local agencies in developing an RPE capability. So we asked each LE/CJ agency and the city and county managers' offices whether the agency or office had ever requested funds (other than Pilot "O" money) of LEAA or another funding source for RPE purposes. The results were as follow:

Relevant Agencies Requesting RPE Funds  
from Non-Pilot Sources

Charlotte	7 out of 11 (55%)
Tidewater	5 out of 24 (21%)
Omaha	4 out of 6 (67%)
Albuquerque	4 out of 8 (50%)
Des Moines	3 out of 7 (43%)
Dayton	3 out of 8 (38%)
San Jose	3 out of 10 (30%)
Rochester	1 out of 10 (10%)
Total	29 out of 84 (35%)

On an agency-by-agency breakdown, the extent of RPE capability was closely associated with efforts to obtain help. Of the 24 agencies with a strong or moderate RPE capability, fifteen (63 percent) had made special efforts to obtain funds for upgrading that capability. Of the 35 agencies with no RPE capability, only four (11 percent) had made such efforts.<sup>8</sup>

These data lead to two general conclusions about the environments which the Teams entered. First, the Pilot Cities Program was not starting from scratch in trying to generate acceptance of RPE as a tool for improving the local criminal justice system. More than a third of the agencies in the eight cities had made a concrete effort to obtain resources for upgrading their research, planning, and evaluation resources. Second, the strong association between RPE capability and efforts to obtain funding suggests in yet another light the extent to which the Pilot Teams were entering environments in which they were only one of a number of potential funding routes. Other resources were available and were being sought.

5. *LE/CJ Personnel Characteristics.* The nature of the cast of characters with which a Team had to work was undoubtedly a major disposing condition, but one which permits only a limited assessment. The first obstacle is that the most important qualities--interest, personality, ability--are ones which we are not prepared to rate. A further obstacle lies in deciding who comprises the cast. To obtain measures on all staff in the LE/CJ system was beyond the resources of the evaluation. And even if they were obtained, such global measures would be misleading. The Teams did not have to work with everyone in the LE/CJ system; instead, they needed a core of good people to serve as colleagues and patrons within the system. But no *a priori* definition exists of who belongs in the core. We have used instead a determination after the fact: all persons with whom the Team had continuing, substantive work

<sup>8</sup>F = 20.4, using "request" and "no request" as the basis for grouping the four types of RPE capability. Statistical significance is at the .001 level.

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 3**

relationships.<sup>9</sup> The members of the set were identified on the basis of a reconstruction of the activities of the Team, and the main actors in each. For convenience, they will be called "local co-workers."

During the field research, data were collected on a total of 238 non-Team personnel in the eight cities. The breakdown by type of agency is shown in Table 6.5 below.

TABLE 6.5  
Local Co-Workers by Type of Agency

	Police	Courts	Corrections	Social Services	City/County Mgr's Office	Other	Total (Percent)
Albuquerque	4	5	2	3	1	3	18 (7.6)
Charlotte	3	5	1	2	13	4	28 (11.8)
Dayton	12	5	2	7	8	3	37 (15.5)
Des Moines	6	8	2	3	3	4	26 (10.9)
Omaha	7	6	2	3	0	1	19 (8.0)
Rochester	4	6	4	3	4	0	21 (8.8)
San Jose	7	9	9	6	17	2	50 (21.0)
Tidewater	<u>15</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>39</u> (16.4)
Total	58	55	26	27	54	18	238
(%)	(24.4)	(23.1)	(10.9)	(11.3)	(22.7)	(7.6)	(100.0)

Relationships with the non-LE/CJ agencies tended to reflect the special interests of the Teams; not the "core" relationships with LE/CJ personnel that every Team was supposed to develop. In order to maximize the comparability of the samples, and because the LE/CJ agencies were at the center of the Team's interests, the following profiles are limited to the 139 local co-workers who worked in the police, courts, and corrections agencies.

*Age.* The Dayton Team associated with an usually youthful set of LE/CJ personnel (mean age = 33.5 years) and the San Jose Team with an unusually senior set (mean age = 46.4 years). The means for the other six sets of co-workers clustered between 38 and 43 years.

*Years of experience in LE/CJ.* The eight Teams showed remarkable variance on this variable. The Dayton and Rochester sets of local co-workers averaged only 4.4 and 5.7

<sup>9</sup>There is an obvious element of self-selection in this approach. The samples in the eight cities are not representative of the LE/CJ system as a whole, but representative rather of the population of people with whom the Teams worked. The selections say something about the Teams as well as about local resources. But this aspect can easily be overemphasized. The Team members could not seek out anyone who caught their fancy and make that person their in-house co-worker. At any given agency, the options were usually very restricted.

years of experience respectively; the Omaha and San Jose sets had more than triple those averages (14.5 and 18.8 years respectively). The figures for all eight Teams are as follow:

Average years of LE/CJ Experience

San Jose	18.8 years
Omaha	14.5 years
Charlotte	11.7 years
Des Moines	10.5 years
Tidewater	8.7 years
Albuquerque	7.4 years
Rochester	5.7 years
Dayton	4.4 years
Overall	10.5 years

*Education.* Dayton and Tidewater were the extremes on this variable, expressed in terms of percentage of local LE/CJ co-worker personnel with advanced degrees. Almost two-thirds of Dayton co-workers possessed advanced degrees compared to only a little more than one-third of the Tidewater co-workers. The figures for the eight sets were:

Percentage Possessing  
an Advanced Degree

Dayton	63%
Omaha	58%
Rochester	57%
San Jose	56%
Des Moines	50%
Albuquerque	46%
Charlotte	44%
Tidewater	38%
Overall	51%

*Professional training.* Some sets of co-workers (e.g., in Rochester) had almost universally received supplementary professional training; among other sets (e.g., Dayton), very few had obtained such training. The percentages for each set are shown below.

Received Supplementary  
Professional Training

Rochester	93%
San Jose	80%
Tidewater	66%
Albuquerque	55%
Charlotte	44%
Des Moines	31%
Omaha	25%
Dayton	22%
Overall	55%

*Job level.* In four cities--Dayton, Charlotte, the Tidewater, and Rochester--the Teams dealt primarily with department heads, and relatively less with either their superiors (agency heads) or their juniors (staff). In two cities--Omaha and Des Moines--the Teams dealt equally with staff and agency heads, relatively less with the middle-level department heads. And in two cities--Albuquerque and San Jose--interaction occurred (roughly) evenly among all three levels. Overall, 24 percent of the local co-workers were staff, 46 percent were department heads, and 30 percent were agency heads. The distribution for each city was as follows:

	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Dept. Head</u>	<u>Agency Head</u>
Albuquerque	3	4	4
Charlotte	1	5	3
Dayton	2	14	3
Des Moines	5	3	7
Omaha	5	2	7
Rochester	2	9	3
San Jose	5	8	8
Tidewater	9	15	5

*Functional type.* The local co-workers were categorized as belonging to one of three types: operations, administration, and research/planning. For six of the eight cities, the administrator was the most common type of co-worker--almost exclusively so in Des Moines, Omaha, and Charlotte. In Dayton and Rochester, the most common type (by a narrow margin over administrator) was the researcher/planner. At only three sites--the Tidewater, San Jose, and Charlotte--did operations types comprise as much as even one-third of the total. The distribution for each city was as follows:

	<u>Operations</u>	<u>Adminis- tration</u>	<u>Research/ Planning</u>
Albuquerque	0	7	4
Charlotte	3	5	1
Dayton	5	6	8
Des Moines	1	11	3
Omaha	1	10	3
Rochester	2	5	6
San Jose	8	15	1
Tidewater	10	13	6

*Summary of personnel characteristics.* Most of the attributes which have been profiled do not lend themselves to "good" or "bad" characterizations. Are long years of experience in the co-worker pool a positive disposing condition? Clearly some experience is positive, but when does some become too much? Is it better that co-workers consist of department

heads? Agency heads? Or staff? There are hypothetical advantages and disadvantages in any of the alternatives. The cities cannot be ordered on a scale that combines the characteristics. Table 6.6 on the following page does, however, show the six personnel characteristics side-by-side.

Reading Table 6.6, these overall impressions emerge.

The *San Jose* LE/CJ co-worker pool was comprised of old pros--experienced, with special professional training, and an above average number of advanced degrees.

*Dayton's* co-worker pool was at the extremes--youngest, with the highest percentage of advanced degrees, but also the fewest years of LE/CJ experience and lowest incidence of LE/CJ professional training.

*Rochester's* co-worker pool was inexperienced like *Dayton's*, but with one conspicuous difference: 93 percent of its members had received special professional training.

*Omaha's* pool had age and experience, but not much special training--old pros, but perhaps less up-to-date ones than *San Jose's*. *Charlotte* had a similar profile.


There are no obvious descriptors for *Albuquerque* and *Des Moines*. Their co-worker pools were average in age, and near the averages on the other characteristics. *Des Moines* deviated from the norm in its low (31 percent) percentage of persons with professional training.

*Tidewater's* outstanding characteristic was the contrast between a low (38 percent) percentage of persons with advanced degrees and high (66 percent) percentage of persons with professional training.

TABLE 6.6  
Summary of Local Co-Worker Characteristics

	Age	Years of LE/CJ experience	% with Advanced degrees	% with extra professional training	Job level	Functional type
Albuquerque	average (41 yrs)	below average (7.4 yrs)	low (46%)	average (55%)	evenly split	no operations; all research or administration
Charlotte	average (40 yrs)	above average (11.7 yrs)	low (44%)	below average (44%)	all but one dept. and agency heads	all but one operations or administration; one research
Dayton	youngest (34 yrs)	lowest (4.4 yrs)	highest (63%)	lowest (22%)	all but three dept. heads	evenly split
Des Moines	average (40 yrs)	average (10.5 yrs)	average (50%)	low (31%)	heavy on staff and agency heads; only three dept. heads	dominated by administrators
Omaha	above average (43 yrs)	above average (14.5 yrs)	above average (58%)	very low (25%)	the same as Des Moines	the same as Des Moines
Rochester	average (40 yrs)	above average (5.7 yrs)	above average (57%)	highest (93%)	dominated by dept. heads	heavy on research and adminis- tration; only two on operations
San Jose	oldest (46 yrs)	highest (18.8 yrs)	above average (56%)	very high (80%)	evenly split	dominated by administration; almost no research
Tidewater	below average (38 yrs)	below average (7.9 yrs)	lowest (38%)	above average (66%)	dominated by dept. heads	heavy on operations and administration; six research

## VII. THE PROCESS



This section discusses "process"--the way that the Teams went about their mission and the events that intervened. The objective is to draw lessons about the change process. The problem in doing so, as many Associates have pointed out, is that the conditions in the eight cities were so disparate. The Pilot Cities program seemed to have an affinity for situations that were unusual. Certainly the histories of each city and Team do not easily fit into a cookbook description. To understand fully why the Omaha Team fell apart during Phase II, it is essential to know about the administrative infighting at the local university; to understand fully why the Charlotte Team behaved as it did, it is essential to know something of the grantee's relationship with the city of Charlotte and the state of North Carolina. The uniqueness and the complexity of the interactions of each Team with its city and county are undeniable.

But when the Pilot Program started, it was expected that the Teams would follow different patterns, and that comparing the patterns would be a productive source of findings. The patterns (and sometimes the lack of them) are the subject of this section. They are discussed under three headings: *Team Strategies*, dealing with the ways in which the Pilot Cities mission was perceived and acted upon by the Team as a unit; *Tactics of Project Development*, dealing with the Pilot Team's interactions with local agencies in conceiving and pursuing ideas; and *The Regional Offices and Process*, dealing with the effects of Regional Office intervention guidance, or lack of those, on Team activities.

## A. Team Strategies

There were three important issues on which the Teams took a position, deliberately or haphazardly, without uniform policy guidance from LEAA. They were:

1. Should a Pilot City Team focus on trying to improve the state of the art or on helping local agencies solve immediate problems?
2. Should a Pilot City Team actively intervene in a city or serve as an available resource?
3. Should a Pilot Cities Team try to impose structure and discipline on itself, or try to avoid it?

We shall discuss each separately.

The first issue involved priorities in goals:

*Should a Pilot Cities Team focus on improving the state of the art or on helping local agencies solve immediate problems?*

No other single issue was as persistently troublesome to so many of the Teams. It was at the bottom of problems relating to "innovativeness" in the demonstration projects, allocation of Team resources for research and for the development of demonstration projects, and many others. Where a Team stood on this issue also determined much about where they stood on the other two issues we will be discussing. We asked Team members the question:

"Is the principal orientation of the Team toward...

*research* - to expand scientific knowledge about problems of law enforcement and criminal justice;

or

*operations* - to help local agencies implement solutions to current operational problems."<sup>1</sup>

Both we and the Team members rated the Teams on a five-point scale, linking the extremes, for the initial Team and the "current" Team (late 1974).<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Appendix C includes a copy of the instrument used for these and the following ratings.

<sup>2</sup>For Albuquerque, we will mean by "current Team" the one that existed prior to the abrupt and nearly total changeover in August 1974.

There was no consensus whatsoever. The Teams started at different points on the scale, and went in different directions. And there were often marked differences between the Teams' perceptions of themselves on this dimension, and the outsider's perception.

*Dayton* started out in 1970-71 with a Team that clearly preferred to work with operational problems; by 1974, its focus had swung sharply toward a self-perceived emphasis on research. The *Tidewater* made a similar shift, but within a narrower range.

*San Jose* started in 1970 with moderate priority on operational problems and increasingly emphasized these problems until, by the end of the program, three of its four senior members were giving the highest possible rating to operations.

There was a consensus among *Rochester* Team members that the Team occupied middle ground throughout. To outsiders, Rochester appeared to be much further toward the "research" end of the scale--the most research-conscious team of the eight. *Charlotte* was also extremely active in research, with a self-perception of being more operations-oriented than we would estimate.

*Albuquerque* and *Des Moines* had differing viewpoints within the Team, in both phases. No overall self-image existed on this dimension.

*Omaha* was anomalous in this as in so many other ways. In Phase I it was decidedly oriented toward operations. In Phase II, the Team polarized on the issue of who the Team was supposed to help. The Director held the view that local LE/CJ agencies were not really the Team's clients; other members of the Team held that helping agencies solve operational problems was the only realistic means to achieve impact.

The second issue dealt with the Team's stance vis-à-vis local agencies:

*Should a Pilot City Team actively intervene  
in a city or serve as an available resource?*

The fundamental decision that the agent of change must make, explicitly or tacitly, is whether he is willing to intervene actively and to evoke action or whether he will try to maintain a low profile, believing that change is brought about most productively when it stems from the community's own initiative.

To determine the Teams' stance on this issue, we asked

"In regard to problem identification,  
does the Pilot Team...

*accept* the formulation of problems generated by the community,

or

*initiate* - take the lead in assisting the community to identify its problems?"

The differences among Teams were great. *San Jose*, *Rochester*, and the *Tidewater* were consistently strong believers in initiative from the beginning. *Albuquerque* started out that way, then shifted dramatically to a responsive stance. *Omaha* went just as dramatically in the opposite direction, from a responsive to an initiatory stance; to a lesser extent, so did *Dayton* and *Des Moines*. *Charlotte* rated itself as an initiator on this scale, while communicating to us what seemed to be the classical arguments in favor of a non-interventionary strategy.

A parallel question was put to Team members and to ourselves about the role of the Team in decision-making:

"Is the Team's role in regard to possible solutions to local LE/CJ problems one of...

*impartial outside observer* - the Team brings relevant knowledge to bear on issues but leaves decision-making up to the community,

or

*an advocate* - the Team presents and defends a point of view in the decision-making process?"

On this point, the consensus favored detachment at the outset. Only two of the eight Teams--*San Jose* and *Rochester*--began their Pilot Cities work on the assumption that they would play an advocate role. But during the program, four other Teams moved toward advocacy. Again, *Omaha's* Team shifted radically, this time from observer to advocate. Lesser shifts in that direction occurred in *Des Moines*, *Dayton*, and the *Tidewater*. Only *Albuquerque* went from clear advocacy to detachment in decision-making, just as it had become progressively detached in regard to problem identification. *Charlotte* went from "very detached" to "totally detached." The four members of the *Charlotte* Team and the two outside raters from AIR unanimously rated the Team as "1" on the 1-5 scale from "impartial outside observer" to "advocate"--a testimony to the remarkable coherence, consistency, and the extremity of *Charlotte's* position on this dimension.

The summary table on the following page characterizes the Teams on an overall passive-active conception of their role as change agents.

TABLE 7.1  
The Teams' Stances as Change Agents

Team	INITIAL STANCE		CONTINUITY OVER TIME
	Problem definition	Decision making	
San Jose	very active	active	consistent
Rochester	active	active	consistent
Tidewater	very active	moderate	consistent
Charlotte	moderate	very passive	consistent
Dayton	passive	passive	increased activism
Des Moines	passive	passive	increased activism
Albuquerque	very active	moderate	increased activism
Omaha	passive	very passive	increased activism

The third issue dealt with the Teams' internal processes:

*Should a Pilot Cities Team try to impose structure and discipline on itself, or try to avoid it?*

The mission of the Pilot Teams called for some scholarly characteristics and some operational ones. Organizationally, there were two models paralleling these extremes--the loosely structured collection of research colleagues, or the unified, centrally directed unit. We put two questions to the Teams and to ourselves, to summarize where they stood. The first asked about administrative style:

"In terms of administrative style, does the Team operate as...

*individuals* - within broad administrative guidelines, the associates pretty much run their own shows;

or

*a unit* - while there are individual responsibilities, the activities of the Team are centrally directed?"

On this variable there was substantial discrepancy between our assessment and the Team members' self-assessments; and sometimes between the Program Director's assessment and

his or her Team members'--probably because of a natural tendency of subordinates to see themselves as exercising initiative, and of bosses to see themselves as exercising control.

Our assessment was as follows.

*San Jose* and the *Tidewater* started with firm central direction during Phase I and continued that way throughout their histories.

*Charlotte* began with a deliberately decentralized responsibility which was maintained throughout its history. *Charlotte* epitomized a "society of fellows" approach to Pilot Team administration. *Rochester* had a similar feeling about the Team, but the director was (we judge) prepared to use substantial authority if the situation called for it.

*Des Moines* began Phase I with firm central direction which dissolved as the part-time director became distracted by his other tasks. In Phase II, central direction was re-established.

*Omaha* began Phase I with no clearly established lines of authority; *ad hoc* arrangements developed. In Phase II, the new director swung between non-authoritarian and authoritarian approaches. And, as the impact measures will indicate (see Section IX), both arrangements were disastrous.

*Albuquerque* and *Dayton* each went through changes in administrative styles, tending toward decentralized direction more out of circumstances than as a policy choice.

The second question dealt with the extent of formality in intra-office administration:

"Are communications within the Team...

*unstructured* - there is a minimum of formal mechanisms such as staff meetings, memoranda, etc.;

or

*structured* - staff meetings, reading files, or other intra-office communication mechanisms are used extensively?"

Self-assessments of this characteristic varied widely within Teams, particularly on Teams that had extensive formal and informal communication. Very seldom was a consensus apparent. And yet from the outsider's perspective, the differences were substantial. Our judgments are based in large

part on the pragmatic test which was part of the evaluation's data collection: how easy was it to reconstruct the history of the Team through archival data at the Pilot Office?

On this basis, *San Jose*, the *Tidewater*, *Rochester*, and *Des Moines in Phase II* scored high on structure. Each maintained excellent documentation of their activities, and gave evidence that systematic self-monitoring was carried out.

*Albuquerque*, *Dayton*, *Omaha*, and *Des Moines in Phase I* were variable--the materials themselves were abundant on some topics. But there was only spotty evidence that the Team had established a loop between the recording of events and the application of that information to decisions about where the Team stood and what it should do next.

*Charlotte* was again in a class by itself. The Team was a prolific producer of research reports and had more intra-office communications about "where is the Team headed" than did many other Teams; but documentation of what happened from week to week was very sparse.

*Overview of Team Strategies.* The factors which went into a Team's stance toward its mission have an internal coherence. It "makes sense" that a Team which explicitly sees its mission as one of problem-solver for LE/CJ agencies would also tend to favor an active role for itself; and also tend to be disposed toward central direction. Similarly, for the other end of the range, extreme interest in the state of the art and theoretical issues seem to fit better with an "available resource" role vis-à-vis local agencies, and a collegium atmosphere rather than a structured administrative one. This is not to say that they must go together; but that they tend to do so in a conceptual sense.

Lumping together the issues that have been discussed, at one extreme is the unit of LE/CJ system-fixers; at the other end, the collegium of LE/CJ researchers. We have attempted to represent this continuum in Figure 7.1, as a purely qualitative and highly summary expression of the differences we perceived among the Teams' approaches to their task. A second dimension has been included--the extent to which a Team had a coherent, thought-out approach. The best example of the need for this second dimension is provided by *San Jose* and *Charlotte*. They were polar opposites in approach. But they both *had* an approach, which was explicit and shared by all members of the Team.




FIGURE 7.1  
Graphic Characterization of Team Strategies

## B. Tactics in Project Development

In all, we identified and assembled data on 427 Pilot Team efforts that warrant the label "activity." They range from a few days of technical assistance to the development of half-million dollar demonstration projects. But despite their disparities, they possess some common elements which can answer questions about the change process.

Most of these questions have to do with project impact-- what kinds of tactics were most successful in producing projects which contributed to LEAA's objectives? These will be discussed in the section on *Findings About the Change Process* (Section X), after the impact indicators have been analyzed.

There are, however, questions related to the key task of initial project development which have an importance entirely apart from the eventual impact of the activities. For one of the least predictable aspects of the Teams' mission was how ideas would surface and be translated into projects. Would the Teams have to do most of the work? Could ideas generated by the Teams be sold to local agencies? Who would be the Teams' natural allies in the agencies? Senior staff? Young Turks? To what extent could the Teams use the institutions as a source of initiatives? To what extent would the Teams have to seek out the individual with the bright idea?

The Pilot Cities experience informs each of these questions, with occasionally surprising evidence. As before, we shall use summary, quantitative statements. Major themes are illustrated by examples, but the qualitative evidence is presented in much greater detail in the case histories.

When all of the activities of the Pilot Teams are considered, they split nearly evenly between ones which the Pilot Teams themselves initiated, and ones which were initiated by the local agency. Of the 427 activities which we were able to identify, 45 percent were initiated largely or wholly by the Pilot Teams; 41 percent were initiated largely or wholly by the local agency. The initiation of the other 14 percent was too evenly shared to make a judgment.

The degree of Pilot Team initiative did vary according to the type of activity that was involved, as shown below. The Teams clearly tended to take the lead in research activities more than in any other type.

	Initiated by...			<u>Total Number of Activities</u>
	<u>Pilot Team</u>	<u>Local Agency</u>	<u>Evenly</u>	
Research activities	66%	26%	8%	167
Workshops, seminars	37%	47%	16%	19
Evaluations	37%	57%	6%	33
Demonstrations	30%	52%	18%	148
Planning activities	29%	42%	29%	60

This leads to one of the first questions about the Pilot Team's overall approach to their own ideas versus others' ideas:

*Did the Pilot Teams tend to pursue the activities they initiated, to the neglect of activities suggested by the local agencies?*

The answer appears to be no. There was no correlation between the degree of Team involvement in initiating an activity and how far it progressed into implementation ( $r = .09$  between the ratings of Program initiation role and eventual stage of

development). This overall lack of correlation held true for subcategories of activity as well.

A second question relates to the hypothesis that the best way to promote change is to work with ideas proposed by the clients, because those are the ideas to which the clients will be most committed.

The question is,

*Did the demonstration projects initiated by the local agencies enjoy more support from key agency personnel than those initiated by the Pilot Teams?*

The answer is surprising: key agency personnel favored their own ideas only very modestly; and that slight favoritism dissipated quickly.<sup>4</sup> During the initiation phase, *the key actors in the local agencies supported projects initiated by the Pilot Teams nearly as actively as they supported their own.*

The actual correlations between degree of local agency initiation and support from the key agency personnel were never high, and they dropped as the projects progressed:

Correlation between agency involvement in initiation and degree of support during...

...the initiation phase	r = +.18	(n = 142)
...the planning phase	r = +.12	(n = 141)
...the implementation phase	r = +.09	(n = 118)
...the evaluation phase	r = -.15	(n = 67)

The hypothesis that Pilot Teams would enjoy more cooperation on projects proposed by the agencies themselves was not borne out by the overall set of demonstration projects. It should be noted, however, that the histories of the individual projects underline how important it is that the selling job by the Pilot Team members be thoughtfully prepared--a theme to which we shall return.

*What level of support from agency staff did the projects enjoy? Overall, it appears to have been good. For the sample of 148 demonstration efforts, the support by the agency chiefs and staffs was rated as follows:*

---

<sup>4</sup>Note that only demonstration projects (n = 148) are included in this and subsequent statistics, except when specified otherwise.

	Agency Chief (n = 145)	Agency Staff (n = 134)
Highly supportive	66%	31%
Positive	22%	35%
Mixed or acquiescent	12%	32%
Negative	0	2%
Highly resistant	0	0

Note, however, that the *support from agency staff was generally lower than support from agency chiefs*, which leads to questions about the sources of support for change. Law enforcement and judicial institutions have popularly been characterized as change-resistant, particularly in terms of their senior staff. So it is of interest to ask:

*Were the Pilot Teams' resources being sought out because of institutional, upper-echelon interests; or by younger personnel at the lower levels?*

The evidence from the Pilot Cities Program suggests that *the institutions and the supervisors were seeking out the Pilot Teams. The staffs and the individual with the bright idea played a lesser role.* The figures on this topic are as follow.

Of the 170 activities which were initiated predominantly or wholly by the local agency, we judged that *two-thirds of them were also predominantly or wholly the product of institutional procedures.* That is, they emerged from the day-to-day operations sponsored by the institution, and we could not identify an individual as its progenitor.

The same conclusion holds true for the subsample of 148 demonstration projects as well. For the 76 which were initiated predominantly or wholly by the local agency, not by the Pilot Team, the breakdown of our rating was:

An individual's idea, no institutional stimulus	22%
An individual's idea in response to a general institutional request	8%
An individual's idea in response to a specific institutional request	15%
Predominantly a product of institutionalized procedures	42%
Entirely a product of institutionalized procedures	13%

A similar pattern characterized sponsorship by senior and junior staff. Over the whole sample, *82 percent of the activities brought to the Pilot Team by the agencies were predominantly or wholly a product of supervisory initiative.* For the

subsample of 76 agency-initiated demonstration projects, the breakdown was as follows:<sup>5</sup>

Entirely a product of staff initiatives	3%
Predominantly a product of staff initiatives	8%
Evenly a product of staff and supervisory initiatives	10%
Predominantly a product of supervisory initiatives	50%
Entirely a product of supervisory initiatives	30%

The figures on both of the variables just described are probably distorted by the tendency for contributions of the individual and of the junior staff to get lost when project history is reconstructed.<sup>6</sup> But the figures are so lopsided that one can assume a substantial error and still be left with the conclusion that LE/CJ initiatives to the Teams were being developed by "the system."

The statistics just presented reduce to a statement that some widely used hypotheses about who should initiate projects and who would support them were not substantiated by the overall Pilot Cities experience.

What *did* account for the successes and failures in the initiation phase were personal relationships between the Team members and local agency staff. This is not a surprising finding, but it bears emphasis. Because in all the documentation of LEAA/NILECJ guidance to the Pilot Teams, we find very few references to the importance of interpersonal relationships.

One general finding of interest is that development of close working rapport was necessary, but long-standing acquaintance was not. Several routes seemed to work equally well.

*A history of previous acquaintance was of course one useful tool.* We encountered examples of ideas surfacing in conversations between local agency personnel and old friends now working for the Pilot Team, and of Pilot Associates who had immediate entree to an agency, because they had previously worked there. This type of advantage seemed most important for developing relationships with the police.

*But successful initiation of project ideas was as frequently the product of new working relationships as old.* Sometimes these were developed systematically. The Tidewater, for example, retained locally well-connected members of the LE/CJ establishment to introduce the Team to key personnel in

---

<sup>5</sup>Total is more than 100 percent because of rounding.

<sup>6</sup>On the other hand, the histories of the projects on which these ratings were based were obtained from Pilot Team members and lower echelon persons, who would seldom have reason to exaggerate the role of the senior persons.

the system. But whether through formal or informal mechanisms, outsiders could get acquainted. The original San Jose Team was comprised entirely of new arrivals and ended as a thoroughly accepted part of the San Jose/Santa Clara County system.

In all, the reasons that some Associates developed productive working relationships and others did not appear to have been simple and rational. If the Associate had a good track record, he could get an attentive hearing. But "track record" should not be narrowly construed to mean success in bringing in funds (though that was important). Two other crucial elements were, *whether the Pilot Associate was perceived as being supportive; and whether the Pilot Associate was perceived as being competent.* Both are very simple reasons for good relationships; both were lacking in too many instances.

"Being supportive," the first characteristic, meant primarily respect for the agency official as a professional and appreciation of the constraints he works under. As outsiders, Pilot personnel usually had to bear the burden of proof of their readiness to *help* local agencies (and their staffs) rather than *use* them. The billing that preceded the Teams-- "experts in law enforcement and criminal justice"--tended to make agency officials watch very closely for signs of condescension from Pilot personnel. When they perceived it, they generally refused to cooperate with the Team. And it should be added that the Pilot Associates who did look upon the local staffs as being ignorant or incompetent seldom succeeded in hiding their opinions. *Pilot Associates who thought they were being manipulative of local officials were almost never doing it successfully.* The prerequisite for being perceived as supportive was to *be* supportive in fact.

The second characteristic, being perceived as competent, was particularly crucial when new ideas were being proposed. An Associate who was an ex-policeman or an ex-attorney with no other special qualifications could gain acceptance of project ideas if they were familiar ones. But if the project was a departure from ordinary practice, agency officials were very likely to be skeptical. *Local agency personnel did not accept the Pilot Associates as "experts" just because they were supposed to be.* Credentials and subsequent performance were important. Associates who were former "insiders" in line LE/CJ agencies, but no more than that, had the advantage of being accepted as colleagues; but equally the disadvantages of being accepted as colleagues only, not as resources which could contribute other expertise. To be accepted as an expert, it was generally helpful to be one.

We found occasional examples of projects that actually were initiated by the route that had been envisioned at the start of the Program--that is, through a sequence of research to identify problems, then presentation of research results to the agency, and subsequent agreement to use the research as

the basis for a demonstration project. But these instances occurred predominantly in San Jose and the Tidewater, which were having success on several levels. It is not clear whether the key factor in the acceptance of these projects was the baseline data and statistical analysis, or the general aura of reliability that the Teams were developing, or both. Certainly *the overall record does not indicate that strict adherence to the prescribed Pilot Cities process was significantly helpful in itself.* Other Teams, such as Des Moines and Omaha, were much truer to the letter of the Pilot process than San Jose or the Tidewater, and had very little to show for their efforts.

One strategy which we can neither recommend nor reject is propinquity of the Pilot Team and key agencies. In two cases, Teams were located in the same building with the RPU and in one of those cases with other LE/CJ agencies as well. One Team was a prominent success in cooperating with local agencies; the other as prominent a failure.

*Failures.* Failures in the initiation phase occurred for a variety of reasons. No dominant pattern emerged.

*In general, Pilot Team members reported that failures in the initiation phase were caused by bureaucratic and political obstacles, rather than by substantive defects in the project idea.* Often, these accounts appeared to be entirely accurate, as ideas were aborted through circumstances beyond the Pilot City Team's control. Frequent examples were encountered of jurisdictional disputes between agencies, or infighting between "progressives" and "conservatives" which stymied progress. On other occasions, disputes over who would provide the local matching funds were behind the refusal to pursue an idea.

But another pattern was also evident, particularly among the weaker Teams. In discussing an aborted project idea, a substantive problem would be mentioned--the project would be redundant with other services, or would not be affordable after the grant was finished, for example. But, Team members would add, this was not the real reason why the project never got off the ground. Local politics were to blame.

We are not prepared to estimate proportions and means on these points--the reality behind the Pilot Teams' failures was often extremely complex. But it is our judgment that *a number of failures in initiating projects can be traced to faulty Pilot Team calculations about their feasibility.* In interviews with local agency officials, substantive issues that had been downplayed by the Team respondents seemed to us to be both salient and a major factor in the agency's behavior. Often, personnel who had been portrayed as villains by the Team were able to give us alternative accounts which were at least as plausible as the Team's account of their relationship.

The important point is not who was telling the version closer to the truth, but that *an "us versus them" attitude was taken by some Teams, for whatever reasons.* When the adversary relationship really did exist, we would argue that the Team's usefulness was at an end; the Pilot Team had no means for achieving impact without the cooperation of local agencies. *And even when the adversary relationship seemed to exist only in the minds of the Team members, very crippling effects on the Team's effectiveness were apparent.*

These kinds of problems between advisors and officials in line agencies are not new, nor are they peculiar to LE/CJ. They are so common, in fact, that there is good reason to doubt whether describing the problems is of much use. One of the Pilot Cities provides a classic illustration of this.

The problem was to secure the cooperation of more than 20 separate agencies, cutting across LE/CJ jurisdictions and city/county jurisdictions, for the design and implementation of an extremely ambitious information system. Securing agreement would involve mammoth problems of diplomacy and tact, time and patience. But the behavior of the Pilot Team director showed no awareness of the nature of the task. The chiefs of all of those agencies, most of whom had heard nothing about the project, were called together by the Pilot director for a breakfast at the best hotel in town, and were given a briefing on the project, complete with flip-charts and slides. The resulting acquiescence was called consensus of support.

As it turned out, the project was one of Pilot Cities' most expensive failures--in terms of money wasted and its impact on the Team's subsequent history. A main reason for this failure was lack of inter-agency support. But the point is that the Pilot Associate in charge was not making a subtle mistake that should require special training to identify. The mistake was major and obvious. And this seemed to be the pattern for the bulk of the stories of misunderstanding, injured pride and violations of bureaucratic etiquette which we encountered, and which hampered Pilot Team effectiveness. The errors were usually obvious ones.

It is questionable whether findings about "how to be a change agent" are the way to avoid these problems. One alternative is to hire people who are by nature sensitive to the issues. This seems to have been the solution used by the most successful Teams. It is probably a more effective solution than trying to teach a set of rules for being a change agent; and it is certainly a less complicated one.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>See also pp. 169-172 on this subject as it relates to the impact measures.

### C. The Regional Offices and Process

The relationship between the Regional Office and the Pilot Team was a major process factor in Albuquerque, Dayton, Des Moines, and Omaha; much less so in Charlotte, Rochester, San Jose, and the Tidewater.

There is a problem of confounding in trying to draw conclusions on this topic. That is, Regional Offices intervened most frequently and in the most authoritarian style in the cities which already had the most problems. It is clear that sometimes the Regional Office was intervening to solve problems which already existed. It is also clear that sometimes the Regional Office created problems through its intervention. And explaining which is which would require a level of detail that is more appropriate to the case histories than to this report. Here, these summary observations are appropriate.

*Decentralization came at a bad time for the Pilot Cities.* When decentralization occurred in late fall of 1971, four of the Pilot Teams had been in operation for periods of roughly a year to a year-and-a-half; three others had just been awarded their grants; and Rochester was still in the application process. Decentralization gave responsibility for the Pilot Teams to a new office, and one that was eager to prove that decentralization would work. *Insofar as the success or failure of the Pilot Team was seen as a reflection on the newly created Regional Office, there consequently were temptations to try to take control of the Pilot Team, and to make it be a success.* Some of the Pilot Teams were subjected to an overly solicitous first-time parent, and were given very little flexibility in policy matters.

*The proper relationship between a Regional Office and a Pilot Team was never clearly defined by LEAA.* In Section IV of this report, it was noted that a document entitled "Guide for the Establishment and Management of LEAA Pilot Cities" was distributed to the Regional Offices, but without the LEAA imprimatur. Official or not, it did not explicitly try to delimit the role of the Regional Office in the Pilot Cities Program nor, to our knowledge, does there exist any explicit statement on this subject. The "Guide" does contain some statements of desirable things for the Regional Administrator to do, but it points out that "these guidelines should be construed as having maximum flexibility, with considerable discretion being left to the Regional Administrator."<sup>8</sup> In retrospect, *it appears that the most needed statement was one which specified what a Regional Office was not supposed to do for a Pilot Team.* As matters stood, LEAA/Washington was asking for a program of eight loosely-structured, relatively independent Teams, without ever acknowledging to the Regional Administrators that such independence also meant that their success or failure would be mostly the Team's responsibility, not the Regional Office's.

---


<sup>8</sup>"Guide," p. 2.

*The Regional Offices, like the Teams, began with no clear-cut guidance on priorities for the Pilot Cities Program.* The confusion about objectives discussed in Section III was sometimes as much a problem for the Regional Offices as it was for the Teams. A main source of the tension between Dayton and the Chicago Regional Office, Albuquerque and the Dallas Regional Office, and Des Moines and Omaha and the Kansas City Regional Office were conflicting notions of Pilot Team priorities. In all of these cases, it was the Regional Office which emphasized the view that Pilot City Teams were to be innovators. Even after the Quail's Roost meeting (see Appendix A), which ratified a less demanding version of the Pilot Team mandate, these Regional Offices continued to take a tough line on the "innovative" qualities of demonstration proposals.

*Some Regional Offices had seasonal changes in priorities.* Regional Offices tended to become unhappy when it appeared that the discretionary Pilot "O" funds would not be obligated by 30 June. For some of the cities, then, there was a noticeable oscillation of behavior by the Region from season to season. In the fall and winter, proposals would be sent back for revision, sometimes through several iterations, until the wording was exactly the way the Region wanted it. Then toward May and June, proposals would be thrown together in a few days and rushed through the system. This was not true of all Regions or for any Region all of the time. But it happened frequently in some. The disruptions it caused (or exacerbated) in some Teams were severe. In more than one instance, a project proposal which had strong local agency backing would be rejected by the Region, resulting in serious credibility problems for the Team; then, a few months later, the Team would be trying to sell a project, any project, to that same agency in order to meet Region requests for proposals. *This kind of incident always injured the credibility of the Team; occasionally, it was the major factor in loss of cooperation from local agencies.* This was made worse by the Team's role as spokesman for the Regional Office--when proposals were rejected, for example, it often appeared to the community as if the Team itself were responsible.

The preceding discussion has emphasized the negative results of Regional intervention in Pilot Team activities. There were exceptions. The Tidewater Team in particular enjoyed a highly supportive relationship with the Philadelphia Regional Office. Charlotte, Rochester, and San Jose maintained productive relationships. But it is doubtful whether these relationships were critical factors *causing* a Team's success; rather, they *supported* the initiatives taken by the Team. And when a Team was not doing well, it appears that Regional Office intervention more often hurt than helped.

## VIII. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Intermediate Outcomes



This section discusses what have been called "intermediate outcomes" in the impact model: accomplishments of the Teams in carrying out the demonstration projects, Pilot research, and technical assistance that were supposed to be Pilot Teams' stock-in-trade. The discussion in this section focuses on what the Teams did; in the next section we will turn to the impact of these activities.

### A. Demonstration Projects

Each Pilot City was to have access to \$500,000 in Pilot "O" money annually for the five-year life of the Program. This money was to be used for "demonstration projects." The demonstration projects were to be innovative, instructive, and applicable elsewhere. They could be applied to any segment of the LE/CJ system. The only common feature was that they were to have some immediate operational application.

In all, data were collected in 151 demonstration projects with which the Pilot Teams had some connection. They may be categorized as follow.

Funded Pilot "O" grants	84
Funded grants from other sources	19
Unfunded or pending Pilot "O" applications	14
Unfunded or pending other Pilot applications	34

For purposes of the analysis, we shall focus on the funded projects. Included in this subsample are all Pilot "O" grants, and fourteen of the nineteen grants funded from other sources. We have excluded five of the nineteen in which the Pilot Team's role was peripheral.

1. *Functional Descriptions.* In all, then, the sample of Pilot Cities demonstration projects to be discussed has 98 cases.

An abstract of each is included in Appendix B. The projects may be described under four functional areas.

*Policing Functions.* Fifteen projects were devoted to *crime prevention and apprehension strategies*. Crime types treated under these projects were narcotics (3), general burglary (5), commercial burglary (1), rape (1), and crimes (e.g., assaults) stemming from family and personal crisis (3). The other two projects were generalized anti-crime programs, using team policing in one case, and a crime analysis team in another.

Five projects dealt with *police technics*. Two provided computer-based fingerprinting systems; two led to improved criminalistics (laboratory) resources and another implemented an integrated county-wide police records system.

Eleven projects addressed problems of *definition of police roles*. Two involved varieties of sensitivity training and psychological screening. Four others promoted citizen involvement in police activities--in one case by creating joint police and citizen patrols. Two were efforts to increase minority representation on the police force. Two tried to develop more effective ways of using police to reduce juvenile delinquency.

Five projects were broadly-conceived efforts to *upgrade research, planning, and evaluation capacity* of the police. Three established planning offices with professional staff; a fourth used a task force to reorganize the police department according to the national Police Standards and Goals statements; and the fifth combined a computer-based data system with professional analysts, in an effort to close the loop between evaluative data and planning.

The funding associated with these four types of police projects is shown below:

	<u>No. of projects</u>	<u>Initial funding</u> (000's)	<u>Median funding</u> (000's)
Crime prevention and apprehension strategies	15	2738	132
Police technics	5	736	82
Redefinition and re-orientation of police roles	11	1524	140
Development of RPE capacity	5	631	137
	<u>36</u>	<u>5629</u>	(129)

*Courts Functions.* Eight projects were concerned with *administration and planning* for the courts. Three consisted of computer information and management systems and a fourth was a project to improve a non-computerized record-keeping system. Two provided assistance to prosecutors offices; one for charge analysis and administration; the other in the form of a lay administrator/analyst. The other two were planning projects; one to overhaul a large County Attorney's office, and the other to formulate goals and standards for the operation of a county court system.

Eleven projects sought improvements in pre-trial and post-sentence *disposition of offenders*. Five of these were focused on diagnosing juvenile offenders and diverting them from the traditional court process. The other six provided similar services for routing adult offenders.

Four projects were concerned with improving the actual *adjudication of cases*. Two dealt with legal services for indigents; one provided specially trained personnel for prosecution of property crime offenses; and the fourth developed a model clinical internship program for both prosecutor and defender offices.

The funding associated with these three types of court projects is shown below.

	<u>No. of projects</u>	<u>Initial funding</u> (000's)	<u>Median funding</u> (000's)
Administration and planning	8	1232	110
Disposition of offenders	11	3047	219
Adjudication of cases	4	310	79
	<u>23</u>	<u>4589</u>	(144)

*Corrections Functions.* Ten projects dealt with approaches to *probation*. Six were for juveniles, four for adults. Most of them used an accepted counseling or monitoring system for probation. One of them (for adults) also incorporated a "restitution" approach, with face-to-face meetings between the offender and the victim.

Eight projects provided variations on the *community-based corrections* facility. Six were for juveniles. Two were types of half-way houses. Another placed selected status offenders in surrogate homes. The other three were "Youth Service" Bureaus" which provided a broad range of services in youth homes designed to substitute for traditional institutional confinement.

The two projects for adult offenders provided a half-way house in one case and a facility for mentally retarded offenders in the other.

Five projects attempted to provide *improvements in incarceration facilities*. Three provided professional diagnostic and treatment services in jails; another provided a computer model for the management of the jail population; the other assisted a state training school to renovate its program. The funding for these projects was as follows:

	<u>No. of projects</u>	<u>Initial funding</u> (000's)	<u>Median funding</u> (000's)
Probation	10	1355	114
Community-based corrections	8	1556	225
Improvements in incarceration facilities	<u>5</u>	<u>557</u>	85
	23	3468	(121)

*Other Functional Areas.* A number of projects involved more than one sector of the LE/CJ system, or addressed problems which relate to LE/CJ functions without falling clearly into one area. These have been divided into three groups.

Seven projects dealt with drug abuse, alcoholism, and status offenses. These projects of *crime-related social services* included four drug prevention and rehabilitation programs (one exclusively for juveniles), two were programs to divert inebriates into non-penal rehabilitation centers; and one provided a center for runaway youth.

Seven projects sought to develop *improved system-wide research, planning and evaluation capability*. Three of these consisted of computerized information systems which serviced all segments of the LE/CJ community (and in one case, all city and county agencies). Another provided an interdisciplinary training center for LE/CJ agencies. Another established a commission to examine system-wide programs for coping with delinquency. A sixth developed a model for obtaining, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating federally funded LE/CJ programs. And the seventh of these projects provided a technical systems analysis of a county's LE/CJ system.

Two projects fall under *miscellaneous*. One created filmed documentaries on criminal justice issues for use by community groups. The other established a "victimization center," to aid victims of crimes and to encourage the reporting of crimes.

	<u>No. of projects</u>	<u>Initial funding</u> (000's)	<u>Median funding</u> (000's)
Crime-related social services	7	2287	339
Improved system-wide RPE capability	7	1587	215
Miscellaneous	2	252	126
	<u>16</u>	<u>4126</u>	(223)

## 2. Summary Characteristics of the Demonstration Projects.

A few summary statistics may help to convey the overall character of the Pilot demonstration effort.

The initial funding of the 98 projects, from both Federal and local sources, was \$17,812,000. This total gives an average of \$605,508 per city per operating year of the program.<sup>1</sup>

Of this sum, \$13,164,000 came from LEAA, either through Pilot "O" funds, State Block Grants, or the general discretionary fund. This is 74 percent of the total.

Almost one out of four (24 out of 98) of the projects had received additional continuation funding totalling \$8,213,000 by the end of 1974. Of this amount, the Federal share was \$5,879,000, or 72 percent.

Thus the total resources that can be attributed directly to the existence of the Pilot Teams is \$26,025,000; or \$884,702 per city per year.<sup>2</sup>

In terms of their allocation by function, the initial monies were distributed as illustrated in Figure 8.1 on the following page.

<sup>1</sup>We include soft match in this total.

<sup>2</sup>If *only* projects using Pilot "O" funds are counted, the totals are:

	N	Federal	Local	Total
initial	84	10,975,000	4,152,000	15,127,000
continuations	18	3,846,000	1,686,000	5,532,000
Total		<u>14,821,000</u>	<u>5,838,000</u>	<u>20,659,000</u>




FIGURE 8.1  
Initial Funding of Pilot Demonstration Projects by Function

The police got the largest share, but the overall distribution of funds was balanced.

A majority of the projects (55) went to county-level agencies. Forty were conducted for city agencies, and three went to agencies which fell into neither category.

The average Pilot demonstration project was a modest one in terms of dollar resources. Initial funding averaged \$182,000. Almost one-third (31.6 percent) were below \$100,000. Since the average funding period was 15.3 months, the monthly operating budget of a typical project was on the order of \$12,000. The magnitude of the average funding input should be remembered when considering the nature of the projects and, in the next section, their impact.

The distributions of initial grant size for LEAA and local match are shown in Figure 8.2 on the following page.




FIGURE 8.2  
Distribution of Funding Between Federal and Local Sources

### 3. Immediate Results of the Demonstration Projects.

At the time of this evaluation, seventy-seven of the projects were far enough into the implementation phase to permit an assessment of their immediate success or failure. That is, did the project as it was actually implemented do what it was supposed to do--hire the staff, buy the equipment, build the facility, process the clients, and produce the products?

A comparison of the grant applications with reports from Pilot Team members, reports from local agency personnel, and available documentary evidence indicates that many *Pilot demonstrations had serious deficiencies in implementation*. While 18 percent of the demonstrations met or exceeded their targets, and 42 percent were largely successful, 40 percent must be judged as unsuccessful, among the 77 for which judgments can be made.

The distribution was as follows:

	<u>Number of projects</u>
The project surpassed its intentions	7 ( 9%)
All of the intentions were achieved	7 ( 9%)
Most of the intentions were achieved	32 (42%)
A few of the intentions were achieved	28 (36%)
The project was a total failure	3 ( 4%)
Insufficient information, or too soon to judge	21

Funds were not concentrated on the winners; neither were they disproportionately thrown away on the losers. The percentages of funds matched the percentages of projects almost exactly:

	<u>% of pro-jects</u>	<u>% of LEAA funding spent on those projects</u>	<u>% of local match spent on those projects</u>
The project surpassed its intentions	9	8	9
All of the intentions were achieved	9	6	9
Most of the intentions were achieved	42	45	52
A few of the intentions were achieved	36	36	25
The project was a total failure	4	4	6

It is an unfortunate truth that there is no accepted standard against which the Pilot Cities "batting average" can be compared. In absolute terms, a 40 percent failure rate seems high; but what are the comparable figures for other programs? In a study conducted for HEW, more than 1000 programs for the education of the disadvantaged were carefully examined; of this number, 41 met objective criteria of excellence. In a companion study, 25 of 100 programs were judged as unsuccessful. These data are not directly comparable to the Pilot Cities demonstrations, but they do suggest that unsuccessful projects are not rare events. In the absence of national evaluations of truly comparable projects, interpretation must be equivocal; our tentative conclusion is that the batting average is respectable but not outstanding. Several additional observations seem warranted.

First, the Pilot Teams were seldom directly involved in project implementation, this responsibility typically (and appropriately) being fulfilled by the local agencies. Yet, while the Teams therefore had quite limited responsibility, it

must also be noted that no greater success resulted when the Teams were more heavily involved. The correlation between degree of involvement in implementation and achievement of intended goals was effectively zero (.09).

Second, the Teams did typically participate in the planning of demonstration projects often taking the dominate role at this stage. But again, degree of involvement in planning was not related to the success of the implementation ( $r=-.01$ ).

But in reading these comments about achievement of project intention, it should be noted that "achievement of intention" is a variable which rewards simple successes over complex partial successes. This has two implications. First, insofar as the Pilot Teams were explicitly mandated to push their sites beyond the efforts which they were accustomed to making, Teams were supposed to be concentrating on the complex, the untried, and, consequently, the risky. Logically, one would predict that Pilot Cities projects would have a higher failure rate than the average project, in terms of achieving all immediate intentions (even though we do not know that in fact it was higher than the average). Second, while "achievement of immediate intentions" is a worthwhile measure of immediate success, it is not one which measures impact. The measures of Pilot Team impact are improvements in local agency operation, contributions to the LE/CJ state of the art, and applicability for other cities. These factors are discussed in Section IX.

So we are left with this conclusion about the demonstration projects and achievement of immediate project intentions. To the extent that LEAA may have hoped that its grants to projects planned by Pilot Teams would be implemented in just the way that the applications said they would be implemented, its expectations were disappointed. *Pilot Teams did not prove themselves to be a way of ensuring efficient administration of LEAA grants. Neither was this one of their major purposes.*

4. *Differences Among the Cities.* In unweighted "level of activity," the eight cities, listed in rank order, had these numbers of projects:

1	San Jose	21
2	Dayton	17
3	Tidewater	16
4	Albuquerque	15
5	Des Moines	10
6	Rochester	8
7	Omaha	6
8	Charlotte	5

In unweighted initial project funding, the Teams fell into a similar order:<sup>3</sup>

(Figures in millions)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Federal</u>	<u>Match</u>
1 San Jose	5.5	3.7	1.8
2 Dayton	3.3	2.5	.8
3 Tidewater	2.9	2.2	.7
4 Rochester	1.8	1.4	.4
5 Albuquerque	1.4	1.0	.4
6 Omaha	1.1	.9	.2
7 Des Moines	1.0	.8	.2
8 Charlotte	.8	.6	.2

But because the Teams were operational for different periods of time, these orderings do not necessarily reflect comparative levels of *activity*. For comparing the Teams, we have extrapolated the raw figures to ones which reflect the same level over a full five-year program.

This procedure yields the following orders of the Teams on number of projects and total funding, which are shown in figures 8.3 and 8.4.




FIGURE 8.3  
Projected Number of Demonstration Projects Per City

<sup>3</sup>Unless stated otherwise, the statistics throughout the rest of the report include only initial funding, not continuations.




FIGURE 8.4  
Projected Total Funding of Demonstration Projects Per City

*Achievement of Immediate Intention.* Differences among the Teams in mean level of "achievement of intention" for their demonstration projects are represented by assigning scale values running from 0 ("total failure") through 4 ("surpassed intentions"). The means for the cities were as follow:

<u>Rank</u>		<u>Mean</u>	
1	Tidewater	2.2	(11 projects rated)
2.5	San Jose	2.0	(17 projects rated)
2.5	Charlotte	2.0	( 4 projects rated)
4	Albuquerque	1.9	(13 projects rated)
5	Rochester	1.8	( 4 projects rated)
6	Dayton	1.7	(17 projects rated)
7	Des Moines	1.5	( 8 projects rated)
8	Omaha	1.0	( 3 projects rated)

The differences in means taken as a set are not statistically significant ( $F = .61$ ).

### B. Pilot Research

Pilot Teams were supposed to conduct basic research into the nature of the LE/CJ problems in their cities, so that their efforts could be directed toward priority problems, and so that they could develop a strategy based on system-wide considerations. They were also to conduct research that would enable them to monitor and redirect their efforts. Or to put it another way, the Pilot Teams were supposed to carry out for themselves the same kind of systematic research/planning/evaluation activities that they were to encourage in the LE/CJ agencies.

The line between "Pilot research" and "technical assistance" is a thin one, particularly since much of the technical assistance that the Teams provided was in the form of research support. We have classified as Pilot research those projects which were done *predominantly or solely on the Team's initiative*, rather than in response to requests from local agencies.

Data were assembled on 130 completed or nearly completed research activities of this type. Forty of them were the *baseline data* surveys that were supposed to be the first task of each Team after it became operational. Thirty-three could be labeled as *descriptive research*--monographs (or sometimes volumes) which compiled data and presented it, without much analysis. Forty-one of them could be called *analytic research*--papers which in one way or another presented the inferences drawn from a set of data. Seven *planning* studies and nine *evaluations* are included--many other activities of these types were undertaken in collaboration with local agencies and will be considered under the section on technical assistance.

1. *Functional Descriptions.* A summary of the Pilot research categorized by LE/CJ function is presented below.

*Policing Functions.* Fourteen research efforts were devoted to *baseline data* collection about crime. Six of the eight cities are represented in this group. San Jose conducted separate studies of burglary, robbery, and crime and victimization in general. Rochester and Omaha had separate studies of law enforcement in general, and crime trends in particular. Dayton published studies of victimization, crime prevention programs and juvenile crime. Charlotte and Des Moines each published a single volume of baseline data for law enforcement, supplemented in Charlotte by special materials on juvenile offenses.

Nine other police-related studies were mainly *descriptive* (e.g., a catalog of projects to reduce crime, and a description of local methods of marketing stolen goods).

Five Pilot-initiated research efforts could be labeled predominantly *analytic*--a study of deterrence which reformulated the "Chambliss Typology" of deterrence, and one on travel patterns of criminals, for example.

Two *evaluations* were conducted of police management and some delinquency prevention programs, and one *planning study* for deploying police manpower more effectively.

*Courts Functions.* Five cities prepared *baseline data* on the local court system. One of them (Omaha) published separate volumes on the municipal, county, and juvenile courts.

Seven additional *descriptive studies* of local courts issues were conducted, on topics such as the processing of felony defendants, counsel for indigent defendants, and pre-trial release practices.

Two *analytic studies* were conducted on pre-trial disposition of offenders. A concept paper was also prepared by one Team, part descriptive, part analytic, on the utility of a statistical reporting system for analyzing criminal cases.

Three *evaluations* were prepared, on two pre-trial release programs and a juvenile diversion program.

*Corrections Functions.* Four *baseline data* studies of the correctional system were completed, in Dayton, Des Moines, Omaha, and Rochester. Two primarily *descriptive* studies were distributed on release of sentenced prisoners.

Thirteen other *analytic studies*, one *evaluation* and two *planning studies* dealing with correctional issues were undertaken predominantly on the Teams' own initiatives--a more extensive analytic effort than was given to police or courts matters.<sup>4</sup> Seven of them dealt with probation--for example, a cost/benefit analysis of vocational training for probationers, and a study of counseling for juvenile probationers. Two dealt with the effects of community-based corrections. Seven dealt with issues involving traditional incarceration institutions: on commitment procedures, on management of a jail population, on adaptation from the inmate's point of view, and on released prisoners.

*Crime-Related Social Services.* Three predominantly *descriptive studies* were produced: one on availability of youth services and two on drug traffic.

Four *analytic* studies were conducted: two on public intoxicants and their relationship to the criminal justice system, and two on drug abuse. One *evaluation* was conducted, dealing with a drug abuse/alcoholism treatment program.

*System-Wide Research, Planning, and Evaluation.* Thirteen *baseline data* studies on inter-functional topics were conducted. Four were about general demographic profiles of Pilot Cities. The others were varied: descriptions of a juvenile justice system, felony statistics from arrest through adjudication, the overall criminal justice system configuration in one city/county, systems support for the criminal justice community, and a presentation combining environmental and crime indicators, as examples.

---

<sup>4</sup>Note that in terms of function, we have assigned probation to corrections, rather than to the courts.

Nine other predominantly *descriptive studies* were not called "baseline data," but served much the same purpose. They were: two studies of local criminal justice appropriations, a study of local grants during the first five years of the Safe Streets Act, a simulation of the criminal justice system in one city/county, a study of community condition indicators, a study of information exchange within the LE/CJ system, a study of LE/CJ career ladders, and a survey of local prevention and rehabilitation programs for the Black community.

Four studies were explicitly *planning* efforts, undertaken on the Pilot Team's initiative: one for manpower and budget planning, one for an information retrieval system, one for planning-by-objectives, and one for overall projection of system needs in the coming years.

Twelve other inter-functional studies were predominantly *analytic*. Again, they covered such a variety of topics that a sampling is necessary. The topics included application of computer modeling techniques to juvenile justice systems, juvenile recidivism, the state of delinquency theory, an evaluation plan for criminal justice programming, profile of the misdemeanant, a study of an RPU, case histories of five criminal careers, and relationships of social structure and offenders' residences.

*Miscellaneous*. We could find no other label for a paper on the construction of Likert-type attitude scales, and a study of possible dangers in the use of LEAA funds.

2. *Immediate Results of the Pilot Research Activities*. One hundred fifteen of the Pilot research activities were sufficiently completed to ask,

Did the activity achieve its original intention?

For Pilot research activities this was tantamount to asking in most cases whether the research answered the research questions behind the activity. And not surprisingly, the rate of "achievement of intention" for the Pilot research activities was much higher than the rate for demonstration projects. The breakdown was:

	<u>Number of Projects</u>	
The activity surpassed its intention	3	( 3%)
All of the intentions were achieved	29	(25%)
Most of the intentions were achieved	72	(63%)
A few of the intentions were achieved	11	(10%)
The activity was a total failure	0	( 0%)
Insufficient information, or too soon to judge	15	

The high rate of "success" reflects the delimited intentions of most of the Pilot research activities. Just as this outcome measure tended to give too critical an impression of the value of the demonstration projects, which often had intentions that were difficult to meet fully, so also it probably gives too optimistic an impression of Pilot research activities. Nonetheless, it was true that *the Pilot research activities produced results which largely matched the intention in 90 percent of the cases.*

3. *Differences Among the Teams.* The numbers of Pilot research activities recorded for each Team were as follow:

San Jose	24
Charlotte	24
Rochester	18
Omaha	16
Dayton	14
Albuquerque	12
Tidewater	11
Des Moines	11

If these numbers are projected to a full five-year program for each Team, the results are as shown in Figure 8.5 below.




FIGURE 8.5  
Projected Number of Pilot Research Activities by City

Problems of Team-by-Team comparability are greater for the Pilot research activities than for the demonstration projects. We know, from disaggregating funding figures, that the mean magnitudes and variations in magnitude of demonstration efforts were similar across cities. We cannot be so confident about the range of research efforts. Charlotte in particular tended to prepare a finished document on every one of its research efforts, whereas other Teams would more frequently combine them. But overall, the representation in Figure 8.5 matches our general sense of the level of Pilot research effort exerted by the different Teams.

*Achievement of Immediate Intention.* The means on the "achievement of intention" rating varied from a low of 2.00 to 2.41 on the 0-4 scales. But the differences were not statistically significant, nor are minor variations on this dimension substantively significant when Pilot research activities are involved. The "intent" of a Pilot research activity usually had too little specificity to make the comparison meaningful.

### C. Technical Assistance

"Technical assistance" was the third activity prescribed for the Pilot Cities Teams. The Pilot Team members were intended to have special skills which could be put at the disposal of local agencies; and the Teams had approximately \$400,000 of internal budget for each 20-month phase of the Program, which permitted them to fund some in-house efforts.

1. *Functional Descriptions.* Data were assembled on 105 activities which we have put under the catch-all label, "technical assistance." Twenty-four of these were technical assistance as it is usually defined--*consulting services* by Pilot Team members for local agencies. Fifteen of them represented *planning assistance* of a more formal kind. Most of these resulted in finished documents. Eighteen were *evaluations* of projects undertaken by local agencies. An additional 42 activities consisted of *research support*, in which the Teams responded to data or analytic needs raised by the agency (or, often, jointly defined by the agency and the Team). Twenty-four of these were predominantly descriptive data compilations; eighteen were predominantly analytic. The fifth category of technical assistance included *workshops or seminars* sponsored jointly by local agencies and the Teams.

*Policing Functions.* *Consulting services* were provided by the Pilot Cities Teams in Charlotte, Des Moines, and Omaha for six police activities. In all six cases, Program members assisted local police or sheriff's departments in developing or improving training and education programs. Specific projects included a police on-the-job training program and a criminal justice training seminar. Three police-related activities represented *planning assistance*. Two of these were handbooks, one for police-public interaction, and another for police handling of juveniles.

Nineteen activities could be classified as *research support*. Twelve of these efforts were predominantly descriptive, on such topics as firearms, latent fingerprints, prevention policies in controlling the sale of illegal drugs, Civil Rights compliance, and school vandalism. Seven research activities were predominantly analytical. These ranged from management studies of computerized record-keeping to an identification of the factors influencing notification time and apprehension.

Four *evaluations* were undertaken with Pilot Team assistance. Two of these concerned the relationship of police officers to the community. One *seminar* in crime prevention was conducted in Tidewater under SPA, RPU, and Pilot Team sponsorship.

*Courts Functions.* *Consulting services* were provided by Pilot Teams for eleven court-related activities. Five of these related to record-keeping and court planning, and two to improving adjudicative functions (e.g., assisting a Juvenile Justice Committee). Assistance to five pre-trial diversion and work release programs was given.

Pilot Teams gave *research support* for ten activities in the courts systems. Four of these were descriptive studies (e.g., the detention and disposition patterns of female inmates, and the coding of criminal statutes), and six of them were analytical (e.g., studies of "Volunteers in Courts" programs, Youth Hostel support for a juvenile court, and achievements of a criminal justice planning council).

One *evaluation* of a county attorney's office was conducted in Des Moines.

Two *workshops* were sponsored jointly by Pilot Teams and local court systems, one on juvenile justice and one on rape.

*Corrections Functions.* Pilot Teams provided *consulting services* on corrections twice, once to determine adult correctional facility needs, and once to determine medium range program and facility needs.

Seven correctional activities could be labeled *research support*. Four of these were primarily descriptive (e.g., a sampling of the county jail population in 1971 and a survey of adult probationer needs), and three were more analytical (e.g., a study of adult detention and corrections).

Two *evaluations* on correctional issues were conducted with the assistance of Pilot Teams, one on work-release programs and one on a Human Rehabilitation Center.

*Crime-Related Social Services.* Pilot Team members provided *consulting services* to a social service program in only one instance. Area and Field Offices of the State Department of Social Services received assistance in implementing their program. The only social service activity which could be labeled *research support* was an information paper on juvenile group homes in Tidewater.

Six *evaluations* of crime-related social service programs were conducted with the aid of Pilot Teams. All of the evaluations

were of juvenile programs, such as the Student Rights Center project, the Southwest Valley Youth Development Program, the Counselor Assistant Program, and the Rap Groups Project.

*System-Wide Research, Planning, and Evaluation.* Consulting services were provided by Pilot Team members for three inter-functional criminal justice activities. All of them concerned the coordination and planning of system budgets and strategies.

Eleven system-wide activities represented *planning assistance*. Five of these were concerned with developing criminal justice system improvement plans for a one- to five-year time span. Other activities were concerned with such diverse topics as the impact of federal funding policy on local government crime-control expenditures and the extent of city participation in an urban analysis project.

Three *evaluations* of system-wide programs were conducted with the aid of Pilot Team members. Two of the evaluations were related to improvements in record-keeping and information management in the criminal justice system. A third evaluation attempted to analyze all LEAA-funded projects in the city.

One *seminar* on current criminal justice problems was sponsored by Albuquerque LE/CJ agencies and the Pilot Team.

A Pilot City/County *Dissemination Project* in Santa Clara was also accomplished with the aid of the Pilot Team. The scope of this effort ranged beyond Santa Clara County, to other systems in California and out-of-state.

*Drugs and Alcohol: Non-LE/CJ Approaches.* Pilot Team members provided *consulting services* to one local action league in devising means of encouraging drug users to utilize community resources.

*Planning assistance* was also given to one agency, a community methadone withdrawal clinic which needed aid in developing a five-year follow-up plan.

Six activities could be classified as drug and alcohol-related *research support*. Four of these were observational (e.g., determining the availability and usage of drugs among local populations). Two others were analytical, e.g., studying the drug offender and his rehabilitation.

Two *evaluations* of drug/alcohol-related programs were conducted, one on an alcoholism information center and one on a detoxification program.

A *workshop* on alcoholism was co-sponsored by the Pilot Team and a local agency.

2. *Immediate Results of the Technical Assistance Activities.* Ninety-nine of the activities we have grouped under "technical assistance" were sufficiently completed to ask:

Did the activity achieve its immediate intention?

As in the case of Pilot research activities, the question had only limited utility; sometimes a specific programmatic purpose lay behind the activity; more often its intention was simply to provide the information or the advice which was needed by the local agency. The breakdown is shown below.

	<u>Number of</u> <u>Projects</u>
The activity surpassed its intentions	7 ( 7%)
All of the intentions were achieved	25 (25%)
Most of the intentions were achieved	48 (49%)
A few of the intentions were achieved	18 (18%)
The activity was a total failure	1 ( 1%)
Insufficient information, or too soon to judge	6

"Surpassed intentions" were all so rated because the TA led to a productive continuing relationship or to development of demonstration projects. The one "total failure" was so rated (by the Teams' own calculation) because the research in question provided a rationale for *not* funding a project; from another perspective, of course, the fact that the research provided an answer to a live question meant that it met its intention.

3. *Differences Among the Teams.* In unweighted numbers, the technical assistance activities were divided among the Teams as follows:

San Jose	29
Charlotte	24
Tidewater	11
Des Moines	11
Omaha	9
Dayton	9
Rochester	6
Albuquerque	6

We estimate that the inventory of substantive TA accomplishment is nearly complete. In all cases but that of San Jose, certainly our intention was to assemble data on all non-trivial activities. We assume that a few marginal ones have been missed, or that we have aggregated under one label activities which a Team might argue were in fact separate. For San Jose, we know that we have data on all of the TA activities which the Team members considered non-trivial,

but less important ones which would have been included in other cities were omitted.<sup>5</sup>

If a linear projection of TA efforts is made on the basis of full five-year programs, the relative levels of activity for the eight Teams are as shown in Figure 8.6. The figure is only illustrative. Remember that in adding these diverse activities we are adding very different types and levels of effort, counting each as "1." The precision of the comparison is very low.




FIGURE 8.6  
Projected Team Totals for Separate Technical Assistance Activities

*Achievement of Immediate Intention.* The Team-by-Team differences in means on the 0-4 scale of "achievement in immediate intention" means were as follow:

<u>Rank</u>		<u>Mean</u>	
1	Tidewater	2.6	(10 activities rated)
2	San Jose	2.4	(28 activities rated)
3	Charlotte	2.3	(24 activities rated)
4	Dayton	2.1	( 9 activities rated)
5	Omaha	2.0	( 8 activities rated)
6	Des Moines	1.8	( 8 activities rated)
7	Albuquerque	1.7	( 6 activities rated)
8	Rochester	1.5	( 6 activities rated)

Because of the wide disparity in the nature of the activities, no attempt has been made to carry the analysis further.

<sup>5</sup>Even without counting its complete technical assistance effort, San Jose is number one by a wide margin. See pages 152 to 158.

## D. Overview of the Intermediate Outcomes

Two tables are presented below, to summarize the range and magnitude of the activities undertaken by the Pilot Teams.

TABLE 8.1  
Functional Summary of Activities Undertaken by the Pilot Teams

Functional Area	Demonstration projects	Pilot research	Technical assistance	TOTAL
Policing (Law enforcement)	36	38	32	106
Courts	23	20	24	67
Corrections (including probation)	23	22	11	56
Crime-related social services*	7	8	19	34
Multi-functional	7	40	19	66
Other	2	2	0	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>333</b>

\*e.g., drug and alcohol rehabilitation


TABLE 8.2  
Team-by-Team Summary of Activities

Actual				City	Projected			
Demo	Research	TA	Total		Demo	Research	TA	Total
21	24	29	74	San Jose	21.7	24.8	30.0	76.5
5	24	24	53	Charlotte	6.7	32.0	32.0	70.7
8	18	6	32	Rochester	14.5	32.7	10.9	58.1
16	11	11	38	Tidewater	22.8	15.7	15.7	54.2
17	14	9	40	Dayton	18.9	15.6	10.0	44.5
10	11	11	32	Des Moines	13.3	14.7	14.7	42.7
15	12	6	33	Albuquerque	19.1	15.3	7.7	42.1
6	16	9	31	Omaha	8.0	21.3	12.0	41.3
<b>98</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>125.0</b>	<b>172.1</b>	<b>133.0</b>	<b>430.1</b>

In terms of the functional breakdown, the overall conclusion suggested by Table 8.1 is that the Program balanced its efforts among LE/CJ agencies. The police did get the largest number of demonstration projects, research efforts, and technical assistance efforts, but not more than about one-third of the total effort in any of those three categories. And insofar as the police also comprised by far the largest single LE/CJ presence in both budget and manpower, it is not surprising that the police departments also ranked first in the attention received from the Teams.

The Team-by-Team summary of activities must be interpreted with a great deal of caution. For example, the two top-ranked Teams, San Jose and Charlotte, are shown with roughly equivalent number of projected total efforts (76.5 and 70.7 respectively), but the nature of those activities was markedly different. Twenty-eight percent of San Jose's activities consisted of demonstration projects, compared with only nine percent of Charlotte's; 45 percent of Charlotte's activities were research efforts compared with 32 percent of San Jose's. The two Teams were tackling their jobs with very different mixes of activity. Trying to compare them on the basis of total numbers is only marginally useful, and the same type of caution should be applied as well to most of the other inter-Team comparisons of activity level.

## IX. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Impact on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice



The Pilot Cities Teams were expected to contribute to national objectives in law enforcement and criminal justice in two ways. First, they were to *demonstrate that a small, bureaucratically mobile Team in a city/county setting can help improve the local LE/CJ system*, and thereby provide a model for analogues nationwide. Second, the Teams were to *contribute immediately to national objectives, by contributing new ideas and new knowledge to the theory and practice of law enforcement and criminal justice*. In this section, we assess the impact of the Pilot Cities Program on both of these criteria.

### A. Institutionalized Improvement of Local Systems

The Teams' impact on local LE/CJ systems has been measured on three dimensions: *impact on local agency operations, impact on the research/planning/evaluation (RPE) capacity of local agencies, and impact on interagency communication*. For each of these, we shall present the quantitative results, then a description of the qualitative impacts behind the numbers.

#### 1. Impact on Local Agency Operations.

a. *Quantitative results.* The activities of the Pilot Teams had a wide range of specific effects--on processing of juvenile offenders, on probation practices, on court management; effects, in short, across the spectrum of LE/CJ functions. But they were so dispersed and so varied that a measure of specific impacts of the Pilot Teams would be unrealistic. It was possible, however, to ask the more general impact question,

*To what extent did the activities of the Pilot Teams directly affect the way that their clients did their jobs?*

For each activity, we attempted to determine what happened to agency operations as a result of that activity, and to rate

the activity accordingly. The results as we estimated them were as follow. In all cases, note that the ratings refer to institutionalized changes, not ones automatically (and perhaps temporarily) produced by spending demonstration funds.

Of the 89 Pilot demonstration projects for which ratings could be assigned at the time, six were rated as having effectively restructured the way the local agency operated, and another 43 had demonstrably affected the agency's operations. Effects of another 17 of the projects were being reflected into the budgets and plans for the coming fiscal year (1976). In all, then, we estimate that Pilot Cities demonstrations had institutional impact in 74 percent of the 89 cases for which ratings were attempted. This is a high proportion of "successes," but not a surprising one. For many of the demonstrations, a change in agency operations was an inevitable consequence of implementing it.

For nondemonstration activities, the rate of effect on agency operations was much lower. Out of the 228 for which ratings could be made at this time, 64 had already had significant effects on agency operations and the effects of another 14 will show in next year's budget--in all, a "success" rating on this impact dimension of 34 percent, compared with the 74 percent for demonstration projects.

The details of the ratings of operations impact are shown in Table 9.1 below.

TABLE 9.1  
Frequency of Impact on Local Agency Operations

	Demonstration Projects (n= 89)	Pilot Research Activities (n= 127)	TA Activities (n= 101)	Overall (n= 266)
Has effectively restructured the way the agency operates	7%	2%	5%	4%
Has had a demonstrable effect on the agency's operations	48%	13%	40%	32%
Will affect next year's budget and plans	19%	5%	8%	10%
May have effect in future, but not yet	13%	35%	28%	26%
No effect on agency operations	12%	46%	20%	28%

*b. The qualitative record.* To report that a certain number of projects "effectively restructured agency operations" or "have had a demonstrable effect" on agency operations is an unsatisfactory substitute for describing the impact of each separately. But given 98 demonstration projects (and some 200 other Pilot activities which were scored on this variable), the case-by-case description is clearly unrealistic. Some examples may indicate what the numbers represent.

"Effectively restructured agency operations" usually meant dramatic changes. One project, for example, provided a team of specialists on duty seven days a week, 24-hours a day, in a converted trailer outside the police headquarters. The team included a senior police supervisor, a deputy district attorney, a pretrial release specialist, and a crisis intervention worker. The service they provided--a full-scale, expert screening of cases between arrest and booking--was so far removed from the traditional ways of making decisions on arrestees that it was essentially a new system.

In another instance, a team probation approach was instituted. Before the project was implemented, individual probation officers were assigned probationers according to their current caseloads without regard to location, similarities among cases, or any other substantive characteristics. As a result of the program, officers began to operate in teams of six to eight, with different work procedures and different criteria for assigning cases (e.g., according to geographic location). Among the results were more time spent in delivering services rather than traveling to and from appointments, and greater use of probation. In addition, the project trained officers to design treatment plans resulting in more individualized treatment of probationers and more experimentation with non-traditional approaches.

The line between "restructuring" agency operations and "demonstrable effect" on agency operation was often a fine one; but generally activities in this latter category did have narrower areas of impact. The nature of the impacts varied widely. Sometimes impact was as straightforward as a higher clearance rate on latent fingerprints, as a result of a computerized fingerprint access and search technique. Other times it was indirect, as in the case of a project to increase police capability to deal with family crisis calls. The Pilot "O" grant provided for only 20 percent of the department to be trained--but the police chief has arranged on his own initiative for nine members of the department to become proficient as trainers, and they will, in turn, train the rest of the force.

Sometimes the effects spilled over into other agencies and other purposes. For example, one project had the immediate intention of improving minority recruitment in a police department, through an intern program. The hiring of interns was in itself a "demonstrable effect." But it also turned out that four of five minority interns who had proved themselves in performance subsequently failed the standard qualifying examination. The response of the department was to question the validity of the test, and take steps to revise it. And the same experience has since led to an intensive review of the recruiting and selection process for municipal officers throughout the city. So the project has been placed in the category of "demonstrable effect on agency operations"; in fact, the

ramifications of its impact appear to be much more extensive than the rating indicates.

But this is a chronic problem with summary statements of impact. Our approach was a conservative one--to look for changes in behavior and conditions and generally ignore attitudinal outcomes in the ratings. Furthermore, we have tended *not* to give the benefit of the doubt to borderline cases. Often a project was rated at the lower level--"demonstrable effect"--when its effects were substantial. In other cases, we would rate a project as "will affect next year's plans on budget," even though its partial implementation at the time of the rating was already giving evidence of early effects.

An example of both types of conservatism in the ratings is a juvenile justice information system rated "2" on the 0-4 scale. It is only partially operational, and data on effects are fragmentary. But juvenile justice officials, members of the Pilot Team, and an SPA planner independently offered incidents of preliminary impact. Juveniles are less frequently being "lost" in the system; multiple offenders are being identified and adjudicated more rapidly; and juvenile agencies are beginning planning efforts which were not possible before they had access to aggregate, month-by-month data on cases. Similarly, the comparatively low "will affect" rating was applied to a project which in a few months will house psychiatric personnel on the county jail premises, providing fast-response intervention in emergency cases (e.g., suicide attempts) which now has to be summoned from a distant hospital. The odds that this will indeed have a demonstrable effect on operations seem to be very high; but it had not happened at the time that the rating was assigned.

Overall, then, *the ratings of positive impact on agency operations can be read as a lower-bound estimate of the real incidence of substantive, significant change* in the way that these LE/CJ agencies go about performing their functions.

To this point, only positive effects have been discussed. But Pilot projects could have negative effects as well, and respondents reported that seventeen of them did.

Positive and negative effects were not mutually exclusive. For example, the same minority recruitment project discussed above generated hostility among the police, out of resentment at special recruitment of Blacks and suspicion of the college training that most of those Black interns have.

This case highlights another characteristic of several projects that had negative effects: they were upsetting a status quo which was congenial to an established group in the agency. There were other instances involving the police, and also the courts. An example of the latter occurred because an evaluation of a public defender's office demonstrated that it

was more effective than court-appointed attorneys for providing defense services. The logical consequence would appear to be greater use of the public defender's office, and less use of court-appointed attorneys. But for a variety of reasons, the court-appointment system is a comfortable one for some attorneys and some judges; and resistance to the public defender's office has been increased, not diminished, by the evaluation.

There were other cases when problems during implementation had negative effects. These were not dramatic, but rather disruptions in everyday routine. In most cases, unresolved disputes over project organization, managerial personnel, and intra-agency alignments caused waste in time and effort among personnel in the agencies involved. For instance, a court computer information and management system was plagued by disputes between a Program member, the Project Manager, and local agency personnel. Since no definitive plans were established and planning efforts in local agencies were contingent on project policies, local personnel had difficulty planning future operations. Overall, *the negative impacts on operation were neither frequent nor severe*. Most of them also appear to have been temporary. Negative impact was not a significant problem for the Pilot Cities Program.

## 2. *Impact on the Research, Planning, and Evaluation Capacity of Local Agencies*

a. *Quantitative results.* The second of the three questions about impact on the local LE/CJ system was,

*To what extent did the activities of the Pilot Team increase the capacity of local agencies to do their own research, planning, and evaluation work?*

One measure of a Pilot Team's success is its progress in working itself out of one of its jobs, by institutionalizing the RPE capacity that has historically been missing from local LE/CJ agencies. In discussing Pilot activities with Team members and their counterparts, we asked them whether as a result of the Pilot activity,

- a larger proportion of the agency's budget was being devoted to RPE activities;
- existing personnel were being assigned regularly to RPE functions;
- the skills of the person(s) performing RPE functions had been upgraded;
- an RPE position had been upgraded in job status;

- key agency personnel had explicitly expressed their conviction that the agency should take steps to exploit RPE tools;
- changes had occurred in the agency's operations, reflecting better self-monitoring of performance (e.g., changes in reporting forms to provide better outcome data); or
- another outcome had been observed which the respondent would link to RPE capacity.

And we asked for the events behind each instance. On the basis of those accounts, an impact rating was assigned ranging from "has already led to an expansion of budget or personnel for RPE," to "has led to a negative response toward the value of RPE." For summary purposes, these were the results.

Of the 92 demonstration projects for which ratings could be assigned at this time, seventeen had already led to an expansion of budget or of personnel for RPE purposes. Another 21 had produced an explicit statement by the agency head that he would seek to expand his RPE resources. Another 31 had produced positive reaction to the value of RPE. Another 21 produced no reaction, positive or negative, by the key agency personnel. And two produced a negative reaction to the value of RPE.

Of the 168 nondemonstration projects for which ratings could be assigned, the results were 24 cases of increases in budget or personnel for RPE, 24 cases of expressed intent by the agency head to seek increased resources, and 46 cases of positive reaction to the value of RPE tools. There was no perceptible reaction for 72 of the activities, and a negative reaction in six cases. For 54 of these activities (mainly baseline research), no rating was assigned because the activity was so completely removed from contact with local agencies.

The details of the ratings of operations impact are shown in Table 9.2.

TABLE 9.2  
Frequency of Impact on RPE Capability of Local Agencies

	Demonstration Projects (n= 92)	Pilot Research (n= 84)	TA acts (n= 88)	Overall (n= 264)
Has already led to an expansion of budget or personnel for RPE	19%	8%	20%	16%
Has led to expressed intent to expand RPE capacity	23%	10%	18%	17%
Had led to a positive reaction by the key agency personnel	34%	12%	41%	29%
Has not produced noticeable response	23%	63%	22%	35%
Has led to a negative response to the value of RPE	2%	7%	0%	3%

The only genuinely "hard" impact measure on this dimension is the expansion of budget and personnel for RPE functions, which occurred in approximately one out of five of the rated demonstrations. However, in view of the traditionally hostile or indifferent relationship of local LE/CJ agencies to techniques of systematic research, planning, and evaluations, the softer impact measure of "expressed intention to expand RPE resources" is not a trivial one. If both categories are classified as representing significant impact, the Pilot activities can claim a 33 percent "success" rate on this impact dimension.

The intriguing aspect of the percentages in Table 9.2 is the efficiency of TA in comparison with the demonstration projects. The figures for the two types of activity are nearly equal--more than we would have predicted, at a much lower cost per "success" than for a funded demonstration project.

*b. The qualitative record.* As in the case of "impact on agency operations," the number ratings are a conservative reflection of the impact that occurred. The highest rating, "has led to an expansion of budget or personnel for RPE," was given *only if the expansion had already occurred and only if it represented resources beyond those provided by the grant itself.* Some typical examples are these:

A research analyst originally hired for a family court diversion demonstration project was retained on a full-time capacity by the Family Court. Her retention clearly signified a greater interest in self-monitoring among court personnel--her only functions are to manage, analyze, and report data.

In another instance, when funds were awarded for a police planning and analysis unit (PAU) project, the police department and city agreed to institutionalize two civilian research positions once project funding ceased. Prior to project implementation, there had been no one on the force assigned to RPE activities other than one sergeant responsible for writing grants part-time. The two civilian members of the PAU, a planning and crime analyst and a management and systems analyst, perform functions such as collecting baseline data on crime incidence, drafting department profiles for evaluating section performance, and applying the standards set forth in the *National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (Police)* to the department. The increment in RPE capacity is dramatic--"a thousand-fold better," one police official asserted.

Occasionally the Pilot Team itself provided the wherewithal for expanding RPE capability. In one instance a researcher so impressed local officials with a criminal justice trends study utilizing regression analyses that she was hired by the Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board to update the study every two years and to participate in other planning efforts.

Frequently, the personnel hired under Pilot "O" funding were dismissed upon project completion, but their functions were assumed by local agency personnel and the budgets were expanded to accommodate their research, planning, and evaluation efforts. For example, a research analyst working in a probation employment guidance program trained a stenographer to perform the basic statistical calculations necessary to maintain descriptive files in the probation department. Although the research analyst was not retained, his work had interested the director of probation, and the next budget proposed funds for the establishment of a RPE unit within the department. Similarly, a project which established baseline data on burglaries in the city led directly to the creation of a Burglary Operations Unit with responsibility for processing all burglary data. In turn, that unit has tangibly increased the degree to which police officials use crime-specific data to plan operations.

It was mentioned previously that the technical assistance activities were more efficient in eliciting additional research, planning, and evaluation efforts than the demonstration projects--that is, technical assistance produced roughly the same proportions of high ratings as demonstration projects, without incurring the high costs of those projects. It should be noted, however, that almost all of the TA activities with high ratings are by the San Jose Team. It was not a general characteristic of the Pilot Cities Program. Presumably, this type of highly productive TA is most likely to occur where the Team has established a strongly positive reputation.

By far the most outstanding example of how a small technical assistance activity can generate extensive efforts to expand RPE capability was a police records requirements study. A junior-level researcher was hired by the Pilot City Team to describe the existing records system of the police department and to develop means of improving record-keeping. He was assisted by county data processing personnel. It was an insignificant commitment of resources, but the results were far-reaching. First, the city and county acquired the services of a civilian contracting firm to keep police records. In working with the contractor, inhouse personnel upgraded their skills in supervising new records systems. Then, the other law enforcement agencies in the county upgraded their records procedures, to obtain the perceived advantages of the revised system. With better records and procedures, more statistics and more usable statistics on crime were generated, which have led to a number of documentable changes in operations. And finally, the reorganization of the records revealed that one District Attorney had been throwing out cases because he could not read blurred copies of police reports--a final example of the serendipity that characterized the activity from its outset.

"It has led to an expression of need for expansion of RPE capability by the client" is the second measure of research, planning, and evaluation impact. Again, the rating tends to be a conservative estimate of impact. Often, it was assigned to projects which had already resulted in additional RPE resources, but ones which were being bought out of project funds. As long as the proposal to retain these resources had not been approved, the lower rating was assigned.

Further, a rating of "expression of need for RPE expansion" was made only when local agency personnel had made a concentrated effort to expand capabilities in this area. A "concentrated effort" is differentiated from a passing remark on the merits of RPE expansion; such an effort was inferred from explicit statements that attempts were being made to extend RPE resources. These statements were frequently substantiated by grant applications and other requests for additional RPE funds. For example, upon completion of a family court probation demonstration project, the Chief of Police expressed an interest in seeking funding for additional RPE resources from the Regional Office. As a result, a grant providing for the hiring of several police planners was written, and is currently undergoing local review.

In another instance, the position of an Administrative Analyst in a pre-delinquent diversion project was upgraded to include RPE functions. In this same project, a new position was developed in the Juvenile Probation Department to organize departmental research and planning activities. The actual hiring of a Director of Systems, Management and Staff Development is also pending approval by local funding sources.

Occasionally there was not tangible evidence of an intention to expand RPE resources in the form of grant proposals, but the local client was so committed to the idea that it was felt the impact warranted this rating. For example, the Chief Psychologist at a boy's training school was impressed with recommendations made by researchers participating in a youth guidance project in which training school treatment methods were compared. He was vocal and insistent that he needed and would seek more of this kind of research support.

In the above examples, RPE impacts were manifested in the actions of personnel within the LE/CJ agencies directly affected in a project. In at least one instance, the impact was expressed primarily among upper level county officials who control the distribution of funds. Upon completion of a project designed to compare differences in services provided by court-assigned and public defender legal counsel to accused indigents, the County Board of Supervisors stated that further Board-sponsored projects should be accompanied by evaluations. One board member is promoting the establishment of a "Think Tank" of nine men which would be responsible for planning and implementing all county LE/CJ programs (including evaluation).

Twenty-nine percent of all types of activities were rated as having led to an expression of positive reaction toward RPE among their key clients in the agencies. Usually, agency personnel were simply impressed by the RPE efforts incorporated in the project; they may or may not have wished to attempt similar efforts without Pilot City Team assistance. For instance, following a Rehabilitative intervention project for sentenced prisoners, the director of rehabilitation services for the county was interested in soliciting funding for a follow-up project in which recidivism rates of prisoners counseled at a community mental health facility would be compared with a control group. Prior to Team involvement in local corrections, there had been little or no interest in pursuing RPE activities.

Only positive impacts have been discussed so far; occasionally, the impact was negative. For example, a court computer information project had a negative impact on local RPE efforts because it was poorly managed. The Pilot Team, court system, and LEAA never agreed upon the objectives of the project, and the resulting tension among these groups disrupted the routine of both the Team and the courts. Moreover, the project director convinced users of the computer system that it would provide services beyond its capability. As a result, local users were disillusioned with the system and seemed less receptive to other new concepts such as the research and management component module which was to be added to the computer system. Although this component was added to the system, the resistance to it among court staffs was severe enough to warrant rating the RPE impact as negative. But, as in the case of agency operations, only a handful of incidents were uncovered--eight, out of 264 activities which could be rated on this indicator.

### *3. Impact on Inter-Agency Communication and Cooperation*

*a. Quantitative results.* Pilot Teams were not in an independent position to remold local LE/CJ systems into more rational patterns, but they were in a position to establish new lines of communication among agencies; and it is this type of accomplishment that we sought to capture.

*Of the 92 demonstration projects* which could be assigned ratings, 52 led to a continuing relationship with another agency which did not exist before the project. An additional seven led to a new short-term relationship. Twenty-nine resulted in no new contacts, or only a few casual contacts. Four projects created new tensions between local agencies.

*For the 194 nondemonstration activities* for which ratings were assigned, 30 resulted in a continuing new relationship with another agency, and eleven in a new short-term relationship. The vast majority--154--did not result in a significant change. One created new tensions with another agency.

The details of the ratings of system impact are shown in Table 9.3 below.

TABLE 9.3  
Frequency of Impact on Inter-Agency Communication

	Demonstration Projects (n= 92)	Pilot Research Activities (n= 100)	TA Activities (n= 94)	Overall (n= 286)
Has led to a continuing relationship with another agency which did not exist before the project	57%	9%	22%	29%
Has led to a short-term new relationship	8%	2%	10%	6%
Has led to a new but casual contact with another agency	5%	2%	7%	5%
Did not alter existing relationships	26%	86%	61%	58%
Has created new tensions with another agency	4%	1%	0%	2%

*b. The qualitative record.* The phenomenon we have been calling "systemization" and the phenomenon we rated are not the same thing. Major system-wide linkages are typically not apparent immediately; changes which are observed may be temporary. Conclusions at this time about the eventual impact of the Pilot Cities Program on systemization must be speculative. The approach we have taken is to seek a reasonable preliminary indicator of eventual impact: the establishment of regular communications among agencies which previously had not communicated. The assumption is that institutionalized inter-agency communications encourage collaborative planning efforts, which in turn facilitate structural integration within the criminal justice system.

Of the 52 projects which were rated as having "led to a continuing relationship with another LE/CJ agency which did not exist before," there were a few that came very close to representing genuine systemization. Of these, the most striking example is a juvenile justice information center project which linked courts, corrections, police and social service agencies in the development of the system concept. An advisory committee composed of representatives from each of the user agencies planned the specific modules which were incorporated in the system. This committee continues to function as a monitoring unit where each agency's problems in using the system can be discussed and joint solutions proposed.

Another example, this time of inter-jurisdictional cooperation, was a project linking several county police agencies. The "continuing relationship" has as a very tangible aspect a pneumatic tube system for exchanging information.

But of the 52 top-rated projects, few new relationships

were so clearly integrative and permanent. Many of the new relationships were tenuous. To get the rating, they had to survive the life of the initial demonstration grant, but we have no way of knowing how long they will survive it. Examples may serve to indicate the range of relationships included in the rating.

In one Pilot City, the police department and the public school system cooperated on a youth services unit project designed to reduce school crime and racial tension by using patrolmen as counselors in the schools. The project was so successful that the police chief retained the unit after funding ceased, thus insuring that the schools and police will continue to work on juvenile crime problems pertinent to both agencies.

Often, the new relationship was not between two LE/CJ agencies, but between an LE/CJ agency and a local agency not normally associated with LE/CJ. The increased cooperation and communication engendered by these projects was less a sign of a movement toward an integrated LE/CJ system than an indication that the definition of "system" was becoming more comprehensive. A variety of these non-LE/CJ agencies became involved in demonstration projects, but the majority were social service agencies. For instance, in a rehabilitative intervention program for sentenced prisoners, a local community mental health center affiliated with a university hospital was responsible for providing inservice training programs for county jail staff and for providing treatment for both inmates and releasees. Although the formal project is now defunct, the jail and mental health center are maintaining the collaborative effort. Another community mental health center is cooperating with a city police department as a result of a family conflict intervention Team experiment. When the experiment was being conducted, permanent referral forms and procedures were developed that are still providing continuous communication between police and the center's staff.

In addition to social service agencies, lines of communication were frequently established between city and county administrative agencies and an LE/CJ agency. For example, during the operational phase of a crime analysis team project, the police department and the city manager's office drew up a contract stipulating that inputs from both agencies would be incorporated in future planning efforts. In several other projects, less structured channels of communication and cooperation were established between LE/CJ and administrative agencies, as a result of joint efforts requisite to initiating and implementing projects.

One of the clearest proofs of impact on the systemization objective would be the institutionalization of the Team itself. After LEAA money ran out, did any of the cities retain a Pilot analogue out of its own funds? When research for the evaluation

ended, the situation was as follows:

The *Tidewater* Team was to be continued for at least two more years with LEAA discretionary funds. The grant application was accompanied by generally enthusiastic requests for continuation by every major administrative and LE/CJ office in the four cities.

The *Rochester* Team was not continued. The Chief of Police initiated steps to bring the Team director into the Police Department as a Deputy Chief, where she would direct research and planning functions. Action had not yet been taken when the evaluation ended.

No continuation was in sight for *San Jose, Omaha, Albuquerque, Des Moines, Charlotte, or Dayton.*

Taken as a whole, less is known about Pilot Cities achievements on the objective of systemization than on either of the other two objectives, operations impact, and RPE impact. Insofar as some of the 52 new relationships will prove to be temporary, our estimate is inflated. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing what other kinds of systemizing effects are not yet visible. It is a plausible hypothesis that by working under LEAA guidelines, meeting with Regional Office officials, being aware of how an agency's project fits into the Team's other activities, traditionally isolated agencies have been made more receptive to collaborative efforts.

If nothing else, agencies were constantly being told (by most Teams) that they were part of a system, and were being treated as a system. Whether this was accompanied on the agencies' side by an increased *sense* of being part of a system and, if so, whether it will surface in future events, is unknown at this time.

*Demonstration projects clearly proved to be a productive source of increasing communication within the system; much more so than TA activities or Pilot research activities.*

4. *Summary of Impact on Improving Local Systems.* Throughout the discussion, we have considered these to be hard indicators that a Pilot activity had positive impact on the local system of law enforcement and criminal justice:

- a demonstrable change in the agency's line operations;
- a demonstrable change in the agency's RPE operations; and

- a demonstrable change in the agency's relationships with other local agencies.

Whether the achievement of one or more of these impacts is worth the expenditure of Pilot resources can, of course, be answered only in terms of each activity and the specifics of the impact; and even then only as a personal judgment. We have not tried to assign a cost-effectiveness tag to the 333 activities under consideration.

We can, however, ask the simpler summary question: How many of the Pilot activities produced one or more of these hard indicators of impact on the local LE/CJ system? These are the results:

- 21 activities were rated as having achieved all three impacts;
- 52 activities were rated as having achieved two of the three impacts;
- 69 activities achieved one of the three impacts; for a total of
- 142 activities which achieved one or more of the impacts.

These totals include cases for which only one or two of the three indicators could be rated. If we consider those cases for which we could assign ratings to all three impact indicators, the results are as shown in Table 9.4.

TABLE 9.4  
Summary of Indicators of Impact on the Local LE/CJ System

	Evidence of Institutionalized change in...							No hard indication of impact
	All three	Operations and RPE	Operations and System	RPE and System	Operations only	RPE only	Inter-agency Communication only	
Demonstrations (n= 81)	10%	6%	27%	4%	16%	0	15%	22%
Pilot Research (n= 65)	5%	5%	8%	0	12%	0	0	71%
TA (n= 82)	12%	9%	5%	0	26%	0	7%	41%
Total (n= 228)	9%	7%	14%	1%	18%	0	8%	42%

Or in other words, evidence of demonstrable, institutionalized changes in the LE/CJ system was found for 58 percent of the 228 cases which were applicable and far enough along in implementation to assign the three ratings.

There is no unequivocal interpretation of this number. Its significance is lessened by the variability in what constitutes an "impact." The examples in the preceding discussion

have to be applied, in order for the reader to make a personal estimate. But the number's significance is enhanced by the fact that it is limited to *concrete events*, and ones which reflected institutionalization of the change, not simply temporary changes produced by spending the project funds. It does not include the many other positive changes that were reported in receptiveness to research and planning as LE/CJ tools, or the concrete plans for changes that were not yet realized when data collection was ended, or the increased willingness to experiment that was often reported, or the many other types of outcomes that indicated positive but still intangible results. The "58 percent" figure refers only to changed ways of doing LE/CJ functions. It is the visible outcropping of an underlying set of changes of indeterminate size.

## B. Contribution to LE/CJ Theory and Practice

What did the Pilot Cities Team contribute to the theory and practice of law enforcement and criminal justice? From the outset, this was one of the most difficult qualities of Team accomplishments to measure, for the Teams and for the Regional Offices. We have found it no easier.

Two different tasks are at issue. Accomplishing either alone would not produce national benefits. The first task is to add something to what is already known about LE/CJ problems and solutions. We shall discuss this under the heading "Innovation and Advancement." The second task is to learn things which have widespread utility, and disseminating them; and these topics are discussed under the heading of "Transferability and Dissemination."

1. *Innovation and Advancement.* We conceive of innovation as representing two types of contributions. The first of these is *innovation in practices* of law enforcement and criminal justice: the feat of trying something different. The second type of contribution is *advancement of the state of the art*. Here, we are asking whether the accomplishments of the Team are adding to our ability to solve problems of law enforcement and criminal justice--not necessarily by doing new things but by learning new things.

Short of taking an inventory of current LE/CJ practices and theory nationwide, we can suggest no hard measures for these objectives. We did, however, assemble the judgments of several knowledgeable persons about the Pilot Teams' accomplishments on these two goals. Nine persons participated, representing expertise in all of the LE/CJ fields.<sup>1</sup> They were asked

---

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix D for background about the rating exercise and the panel of judges.

to assess abstracts of the 98 demonstration projects which were discussed in the preceding section.

The first question asked of the judges was,

*How innovative is this project,  
relative to practice nationwide?*

They were given five alternative answers:

"As far as I know, this project..."

- ...is virtually unique.....(4)
- ...is one of a few pioneering efforts of its type..(3)
- ...is not new, but does have some innovative aspects.....(2)
- ...is a repeat of well-established approaches.....(1)
- My rating would be too much of a guess to be useful.....(X)

The consensus of these observers was that *almost all of the Pilot Cities demonstration projects were well within the range of established LE/CJ practices*. Pilot Cities did not serve as a proving ground for new ideas. More specifically, the judgments may be divided as follow:

There was a consensus that almost one out of three of the projects (31 of 98) were commonplace, with no unusual aspects (mean rating = 1.00 - 1.49).

The overall judgment on more than half (61) of the projects was that they had some innovative aspects, but were modeled on established patterns (mean rating = 1.50 - 2.49).

Six of the projects were judged to represent one of a few pioneering efforts of their type (mean rating = 2.50 - 3.49).

None had an average rating that put them in the category of "virtually unique" (mean rating = 3.50 - 4.00), but three of the six projects were thought by at least five of the nine judges to be virtually unique: a victimization center, in Dayton, which was designed to provide legal recourse and comfort for victims of violent crimes; a "victim and witness assistance project," in Rochester, with similar types of services based in the police department; and a community-based corrections facility for mentally retarded offenders, in Omaha.

Figure 9.1 shows the shape of the distribution of scores for the "innovativeness" scale.




FIGURE 9.1  
 Frequency Distribution for the "Innovativeness" Ratings

The second measure was contribution to the state of the art. The judges were asked in effect,

Suppose that a competent evaluation is prepared for a given project. *What would it add to what we already know about the problems of law enforcement and criminal justice?*

The options were:

"A competent evaluation or study of this project..."

...should be required reading for any serious student or practitioner in this LE/CJ field..(4)

...will shed some light on important and unresolved issues in this LE/CJ field.....(3)

...will be of marginal interest, mostly confirming what we already know.....(2)

...will be of interest to the contract monitor, and very few others.....(1)

My rating would be too much of a guess to be useful.....(X)

Overall, the ratings of the nine judges indicate that a *substantial proportion of demonstrations have a potential for contributing to important unresolved issues in law enforcement and criminal justice practice.*

No project had a mean rating higher than 3.5. For four projects, there was a consensus of five of the nine judges that a good evaluation should be required reading for any serious student of that field. The four included the two victim assistance projects in Dayton and Rochester, which were cited as outstandingly innovative, and two of the Des Moines Teams' projects: one designed to process all felonies in no more than 60 days (from arrest to beginning of trial), and one that would compare the effectiveness of court-assigned and public defender legal counsel.

An additional 24 projects should, it was judged, produce evaluations which would shed new light on important and unresolved issues in that LE/CJ field (mean = 2.50 - 3.49).

Sixty-six of the projects were judged to be such that a competent evaluation would tend to confirm what we already know, without adding much to our understanding of the issues (mean rating = 1.50 - 2.49).

For two projects, the consensus was that the evaluation would be of interest to the contract monitor, and to almost no one else (mean rating = 1.00 - 1.49).

The shape of the distribution of ratings on this scale is shown in Figure 9.2 on the following page.

There is a close conceptual link between innovativeness and advancement of the state of the art. For this sample of projects, there was a reasonably high statistical relationship as well--the correlation between the two scales was .55. In order to give a sense of what was involved in these measures, the two have been combined into an *index of potential contribution to LE/CJ theory and practice*. The nine top-ranking projects on the combined scales were, in order:

1. *The Victim and Witness Assistance Project* (Rochester), Police Department, Rochester, N.Y., which provides police services for victims and witnesses from the time of the crime to the court proceedings.<sup>2</sup>
2. *Victimization Center* (Dayton), Ombudsman's Office, Dayton/Montgomery County, Ohio. Similar to the Rochester project above, but with a narrower range of services focusing on counseling for victims and public education.

---

<sup>2</sup>More detailed abstracts of these projects may be found in Appendix B.




FIGURE 9.2  
Frequency Distribution for the "State of the Art" Ratings

3. *Comparative Legal Defense Services* (Des Moines), County Courts, Polk County, Iowa. This project systematically compares the effectiveness of court-assigned attorneys, public defenders, and private attorneys, in providing legal defense for accused offenders.
4. *Diversionsary Community-Based Services for Mentally Retarded Offenders* (Omaha), Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, Omaha, Nebraska. As its name indicates, this project establishes three small community-based facilities for housing mentally retarded offenders and provides associated rehabilitation services.
5. *Restitution in Probation Experiment* (Des Moines), County Courts, Polk County, Iowa. The project provides a community-based corrections center and mechanisms for face-to-face negotiations between offender and victim on restitution.
6. *Improved Charge Analysis* (Des Moines), County Courts, Polk County, Iowa. By adding staff and changing procedures, this project seeks to process 80 percent of all contested felony cases from arrest to trial, in no more than 60 days.

7. *Juvenile Court Specialized Services for Behavior Modification* (Tidewater), State Department of Welfare and Institutions, for Portsmouth, Virginia. The project uses job experience, in progressively more complex and responsible positions, as a therapeutic tool for juvenile offenders.
8. *Police and Citizens Together Against Crime* (Rochester) Police Department, Rochester. In this project, civilians and police officers work as two-person teams, patrolling neighborhood beats.
9. *Pre-Delinquent Diversion Program* (San Jose), Juvenile Probation Department, Santa Clara County, California. This project provides for decentralized diversion of pre-delinquents in each of the twelve law enforcement jurisdictions of Santa Clara County, using a combination of Juvenile Probation Department and police resources.

And so that the reader may have an idea of what the *least innovative* and *theoretically least important* projects of the 98 were like, here are the titles of the eight with the lowest scores (average of 1.5 or less on the two 4-point scales), starting with the one ranked 98th out of 98.

Computerized Fingerprints System (San Jose)  
 Improvement of Court Records (Albuquerque)  
 Police Salary Incentives for Educational Achievement  
 (Albuquerque)  
 Norfolk Police Planning and Analysis Office (Tidewater)  
 Police Records Improvement Project (San Jose)  
 Prosecutor/Defender Intern Program (San Jose)  
 Criminalistics Lab Needs Survey (Albuquerque)  
 Portsmouth Police Planning and Analysis Unit (Tidewater)

*There was, it should be added, no relationship between the project scores on this index and their impact on local systems; some of the lowest rated projects listed here also had major positive effects on the three measures for "improvement of local systems."*

2. *Transferability and Dissemination.* The first requirement for technology transfer is that the technology be desirable and needed in places to which it might be transferred. Neither of the previous two ratings dealt with that--innovation and theoretical interest can exist entirely apart from operational utility. So the judges were asked,

*How widely should this project be applied?*

The five options were,

"Judging from the cities with which I am familiar, this project is..."

- ...feasible and needed in half or more of our cities.....(4)
- ...feasible and needed in maybe a third of our cities.....(3)
- ...feasible and needed in maybe one city in five.....(2)
- ...feasible and needed in at most one city in ten.....(1)
- My rating would be too much of a guess to be useful.....(X)

*The average project of the 98 was judged to be feasible and needed in only a fifth to a third of our cities. Or to put it another way: in the judges' combined estimate, the average Pilot Cities demonstration project is either already being done in more than two out of three cities, or is not worth doing in those cities which do not have it. Even allowing for substantial error in the judges' assessment, this is an overall low rating for utility for technology transfer.*

The distribution of scores is shown below.

- feasible and needed in half or more of our cities (mean rating = 3.50 - 4.00)..... 6
- feasible and needed in maybe a third of our cities (mean rating = 2.50 - 3.49).....47
- feasible and needed in one city in five (mean rating = 1.50 - 2.49).....44
- feasible and needed in at most one city in ten (mean rating = 1.00 - 1.49)..... 1

The shape of the distribution is shown in Figure 9.3 on the following page.

The twelve projects rated highest (all had mean ratings of 3.3 or more out of a possible four) were, in order:

1. *Improved Charge Analysis* (Des Moines), which was also in the top nine on the combined innovation and advancement scales.
2. *Alcoholism Detoxification and Rehabilitation Planning Center* (San Jose), to divert inebriates from the criminal justice system.
3. *Community-Based Services for Status Offenders* (Omaha), to decriminalize status offenses.




FIGURE 9.3  
Frequency Distribution for the "Utility Elsewhere" Ratings

4. *Custody Classification Preprocessing Center* (San Jose), which provides a 24-hour-a-day consortium of specialists to screen cases after arrests and before booking.
5. *Victimization Center* (Dayton), also ranked in the top nine on the combined innovation and advancement ratings.
6. *Youth Services Bureau* (Charlotte), to divert juveniles from the CJ system and provide a wide range of counseling and care services to them.
7. *Decriminalization of Public Inebriates* (Charlotte), similar to the San Jose project described above, but with narrower scope.
8. *Victim and Witness Assistance Project* (Rochester), also ranked in the top nine on the combined innovation and advancement ratings.
9. *Offender Reintegration Program* (Albuquerque), which provides vocational, educational, and counseling services to parolees and probationers.
10. *Volunteer Program for the Portsmouth Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court* (Tidewater), provides comprehensive counseling and probationary services to juvenile clients by volunteers, supervised by a full-time coordinator.

11. *Pre-Trial Release Office* (Dayton), provides a pre-adjudication rehabilitation program, including diagnostic and screening services.
12. *Family Conflict Intervention Team Experiment* (Rochester), provides specially trained police teams to handle domestic conflict situations, including referral to associated services.

The projects which were judged to have the narrowest utility elsewhere were as follow, starting with the last-ranked.<sup>3</sup>

Follow-up Survey of State Training Schools (Des Moines)  
 County Narcotics Bureau (San Jose)  
 Rehabilitative Intervention for Sentenced Prisoners  
 (provision of mental health services, Rochester)  
 Police Standards and Goals Review (Tidewater)  
 Community Drug Center (Charlotte)  
 Property Crime Reduction Unit (Albuquerque)  
 Juvenile Court Specialized Services for Behavior  
 Modification (Tidewater)  
 Combating Felonious Crimes by Citizen Involvement (San  
 Jose)  
 Development of Prevention Methods by Burglary Offense  
 Analyses (San Jose)  
 Hit Impact Target Program to Reduce Burglary (Tidewater)  
 Juvenile Property Crime Reduction Unit (Albuquerque)

In most cases, the low ratings appear to be based on the extent to which the program is already in use, rather than intrinsic undesirability of the project design.

*Dissemination of the results.* Of the 98 demonstration projects, only 65 had reached a point where the evaluation had been conducted (or a point when it was clear that none would be).

The breakdown was as follows:

Extensive evaluation already conducted.....	43
A written "memo" evaluation.....	7
No evaluation.....	15
Extensive evaluation planned.....	27
Plans unsure.....	6

But as it turned out, even these evaluations did not necessarily provide an opportunity for the Pilot Teams to disseminate the

<sup>3</sup>Mean scores ranged from 1.50 to 1.83 on the 4-point scale--that is, rated as feasible and needed in less than one city in five.

results. In only twelve instances did the Team have a dominant voice in the conduct and dissemination of the evaluation results; in the rest of the 65 cases, the evaluation was conducted, or monitored by others.

Dissemination of the results of the Pilot demonstrations did occur in 39 cases, to both local agencies and out-of-town ones; but we were not able to assign aggregate measures of impact significance to these activities.

More general dissemination and technology transfer activities occurred among all eight of the Pilot Teams in at least an informal fashion. Review of the correspondence revealed occasional out-of-town inquiries--usually very general--about the activities of the Team; and occasional inquiries from Pilot Associates to an agency in another city, usually inquiring about a specific program.

Other Teams did attempt more systematic technology transfer--the best examples are cited in the case histories of Charlotte, the Tidewater, and Rochester--but there was only one Team which achieved a level of activity that justified extensive analysis. That Team, San Jose, is once more "off the scale" on the standards of impact.

A detailed quantitative analysis is included in the San Jose case history, along with descriptions of individual cases of technology transfer. As on the other impact dimensions, documentation of the Team's impact is ample. The flavor of them is perhaps best conveyed by the case of a senior official in Denver. He heard about San Jose's CAPER information system and requested information. San Jose supplied him with it. He visited San Jose, where the Team supplied him with more information, which was used to develop a comparable system in Denver. His response to a question about the value of San Jose's dissemination activities was brief: "They have done a hell of a service for the criminal justice systems of the nation."

But the San Jose Team probably represents a maximum level of dissemination impact which can be expected from a Pilot Team, not just a "success." And even in San Jose, the extent to which the Team contributed new techniques is arguable. Overall, for even the successful Pilot Cities Teams, impact on national theory and practice was modest.

### C. Differences Among the Teams

To this point, only aggregate figures for the whole program have been discussed. But the Teams did show major differences among themselves, and estimates of those differences are presented here--first, for the indicators of impact on *improving the local LE/CJ system*; then, for indicators of impact on *advancing LE/CJ*

*theory and practice.* The section concludes with a summary comparison of the impact of the eight Teams.

1. *Improving the Local LE/CJ System.* Three quantitative indicators were scored for each activity, and presented in the preceding discussion on overall impact of the Pilot Cities Program. To review, the three were:

- changes in local agency operations: "Operations impact" (scored from 0 to +4)<sup>4</sup>
- enhancement of the RPE capacity of local agencies: "RPE impact" (-1 to +3)
- increases in intra-system communications: "system impact" (-1 to +3).

Two totals are shown for each Team. The first is the raw score obtained by adding the ratings for that Team on that indicator. The second is the projected score, calculated on the assumption that the Team would have maintained the same pace for a full five-year program. The projected score is far from precise, but it is much the more useful of the two for comparing the levels of activity on the eight Teams.

a. *Impact on the operations of local agencies.* The aggregate Team scores for impact on local agency operations are as follow:

Total Score		Team	Proportion contributed by...	
Actual	Projected		Demonstration Activities	TA/Research Activities
171	177	San Jose	26%	74%
66	95	Tidewater	49%	51%
60	90	Charlotte	20%	80%
49	88	Rochester	40%	60%
62	79	Albuquerque	58%	42%
51	56	Dayton	77%	23%
34	53	Des Moines	58%	42%
12	18	Omaha	16%	84%
	82.0	Overall	41%	59%

Note the sharply contrasting proportions: 80 percent of Charlotte's contribution is rated as having come from TA and research. Dayton almost exactly reverses the balance--77 percent of its impact on operations is rated as having been produced by its demonstration activities. Only the Tidewater is evenly balanced.

<sup>4</sup>The negative scores for negative impact and zero scores for neutral or no impact prevent the raw number of projects from inflating a Team's score.

In a case like San Jose's, the imbalance does not make much difference in the comparison with other Teams. Even though demonstration activities contributed only 26 percent of its score, San Jose still had the highest score for demonstration activities. But for some of the Teams, their place in the ordering is sensitive to the type of activity that is included in the scoring, as shown below. Teams are listed in order of their overall rank.

Rank if <u>only</u> demonstration impact is counted		Rank if <u>only</u> TA/Research impact is counted
1	San Jose	1
2.5	Tidewater	4
7	Charlotte	2
5	Rochester	3
2.5	Albuquerque	5
4	Dayton	8
6	Des Moines	6
8	Omaha	7

*b. Impact on the research, planning, and evaluation capacity of local agencies.* We repeat the comparisons used for impact on operations.

Total Score			Proportion contributed by...	
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Team</u>	<u>Demonstration Activities</u>	<u>TA/Research Activities</u>
128	132	San Jose	29%	71%
32	46	Tidewater	50%	50%
23	35	Des Moines	57%	43%
29	32	Dayton	75%	25%
17	31	Rochester	42%	58%
23	29	Albuquerque	59%	41%
17	26	Charlotte	35%	65%
13	20	Omaha	60%	40%

The sensitivity of these total scores to type of activity is represented below, for RPE impact. Again, Teams are listed in order of their overall rank.

Rank if <u>only</u> demonstration impact is counted		Rank if <u>only</u> TA/Research impact is counted
1	San Jose	1
3	Tidewater	2
4	Des Moines	5
2	Dayton	7.5
6	Rochester	3
5	Albuquerque	6
8	Charlotte	4
7	Omaha	7.5

c. *Impact on interaction among local LE/CJ agencies.*  
 Team-by-Team scores on the third of the three impact measures for "improving the local system" are shown below.

Total Score		Proportion contributed by...		
<u>Actual</u>	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Team</u>	<u>Demonstration Activities</u>	<u>TA/Research Activities</u>
121	125	San Jose	42%	58%
42	60	Tidewater	60%	40%
40	44	Dayton	100%	0%
30	38	Albuquerque	68%	32%
24	36	Charlotte	31%	69%
13	20	Des Moines	95%	5%
10	18	Rochester	61%	39%
11	<u>17</u>	Omaha	100%	100%
	44.8			

Sensitivity of these scores to type of activity is shown below.

Rank if <u>only</u> demonstration impact is counted		Rank if <u>only</u> TA/Research impact is counted	
1	San Jose	1	
3	Tidewater	3	
2	Dayton	7.5	
4	Albuquerque	4	
7.5	Charlotte	2	
5	Des Moines	6	
7.5	Rochester	5	
6	Omaha	7.5	

d. *Summary of comparative team impact on improving the local system.* In Figure 9.4 on the following page we have graphically placed the Teams on continua for the three indicators.




FIGURE 9.4  
Comparative Scores on the "Local Improvement" Indicators

2. *Advancing LE/CJ Theory and Practice.* To review, the three indicators which were quantified through a nine-judge rating procedure were,

- innovation in LE/CJ practices;
- contribution to the LE/CJ state of the art; and
- utility of the project elsewhere.

All have been scored on zero-based scales (0-3 points), so that the raw number of projects conducted by a Team does not inflate its score.

The means for each Team, and totals for each Team, projected to a full five-year program, are reported for the demonstration projects only. Teams are listed in rank-order of their projected totals.

First, the Team-by-Team comparisons on *innovation in LE/CJ practices* is shown in Table 9.5.

TABLE 9.5  
Team-by-Team Results: Innovation in LE/CJ Practices

Projected rank	Projected Total	Team	No. of projects	Mean*	(Rank on mean)	No. of projects in the top 20
1	170	San Jose	21	7.8	(4)	6
2	170	Tidewater	16	6.6	(6)	3
3	145	Dayton	17	6.9	(5)	3
4	144	Rochester	8	8.8	(2)	2
5	140	Des Moines	10	8.1	(3)	3
6	111	Albuquerque	15	5.2	(8)	2
7	84	Omaha	6	9.4	(1)	1
8	41	Charlotte	5	5.6	(7)	0

\*Out of a possible 27.

Note that a score of 9.4 on this scale (the highest mean) indicated that it was typically judged as "not new, but does have some innovative aspects." A score of 5.2 (the lowest mean) means it was judged as being about halfway between that scale value and the bottom one; "is a repeat of well-established approaches."

None of the Teams maintained a conspicuously high average on this variable. But in the case of an active program, this seems inevitable. For example, San Jose was involved in 21 demonstration projects. The question arises: Could the Team have been nearly as active if they had been required to devise this many innovative programs and then (an even harder job) sell them to local agencies?

The Team-by-Team comparisons on the second variable, *contribution to the state of the art*, are shown in Table 9.6 on the following page.

A score of 13.7 (the highest mean) indicated that it was typically judged that the project should result in an evaluation which would be half-way between

"Will be of marginal interest, mostly confirming what we already know,"

and

"Will shed light on important and unresolved issues in this LE/CJ field."

TABLE 9.6  
Contribution to the LE/CJ State of the Art

Projected rank	Projected total	Team	No. of projects	Mean *	(Rank on mean)	No. of projects in the top 20
1	273	San Jose	21	11.3	(5)	4
2	266	Tidewater	16	10.4	(6)	3
3	242	Dayton	17	11.5	(4)	1
4	223	Rochester	8	13.7	(1)	3
5	210	Des Moines	10	12.2	(3)	3
6	193	Albuquerque	15	9.0	(8)	3
7	113	Omaha	6	12.7	(2)	3
8	72	Charlotte	5	9.8	(7)	0

\*Out of a possible 27.

A score of 9.0 (the lowest mean) indicates that the project typically was judged as being of marginal interest.

Finally, in Table 9.7 are displayed the inter-Team results for *utility elsewhere* of the demonstration projects.

TABLE 9.7  
Team-by-Team Results, Utility Elsewhere of the Demonstration Projects

Projected rank	Projected total	Team	No. of projects	Mean *	(Rank on mean)	No. of projects in the top 20**
1	334	San Jose	21	13.8	(5)	6
2	325	Dayton	17	15.4	(4)	2
3	316	Tidewater	16	12.5	(7)	2
4	263	Rochester	8	16.3	(1)	4
5	255	Albuquerque	15	12.0	(8)	2
6	234	Des Moines	10	13.7	(6)	2
7	144	Omaha	6	16.2	(2)	2
8	115	Charlotte	5	15.5	(3)	2

\*Out of a possible 27.

\*\*There was a three-way tie for twentieth.

A score of 16.3 (the highest mean) indicates that the project was judged as being "feasible and needed" in roughly a third of U.S. cities. A score of 12.0 (the lowest mean) was not much lower--"feasible and needed in somewhat more than a fifth of our cities" would be a fair interpretation.

3. *A Summary Assessment of the Eight Teams.* The preceding pages have shown how the Team scores varied on the six impact measures. But it must be stressed that they are based on linear projections--"if the Team had continued for 60 months at the same level of effort...." And this produced distortions. For it appears that the decision to cut short the Pilot Cities Program came as some cities were gaining momentum (Tidewater, Rochester, and Des Moines) and others were losing momentum (Dayton, Albuquerque, and, in a different way, Charlotte). Had the Program been continued, San Jose would still have been impressively successful, and probably would have remained the top ranked Team; but it is also probable that other Teams would have closed the gap. Similarly, we are not at all confident that the ordering of the lower-ranked Teams would remain as they have been projected.

The problem in attaching a summary label to a Team's impact is that there is no natural standard of "satisfactory performance." No one knows what a Team "should" be able to accomplish in five years. But we do come away from a prolonged examination of the record with clear impressions, which are as follow.

*San Jose.* By any standard we have been able to devise, the San Jose Team was a success. As a vehicle for improving the local LE/CJ system, it was a brilliant success. The raw and projected numbers which put it so far in front of the other seven are backed by detailed and convincing qualitative evidence of impact.

*Tidewater.* The numbers which put the Tidewater second on five of the six indicators fairly reflect the qualitative record. The Tidewater Team was clearly the second most successful Team in a comparative sense, and a solid, unequivocal success in terms of its absolute impact on the four LE/CJ systems which it served. One good indicator of this is the effort made by those systems to maintain the Team after the Pilot Cities Program phased out. It is also our estimate that as a rule of thumb, rate of impact accelerates for a good Team. Given a full five-year effort, we would project the Tidewater Team as it functioned during the Pilot Cities Program to achieve impact on roughly the same level as the San Jose Team.

*Rochester.* We estimate that the Rochester Team was stronger than the numbers indicate. With a life of only three years, it appeared to be getting into stride just as phaseout was announced. Rochester's style contrasted with that of San Jose and the Tidewater--it tended more toward research than the other two, and was less aggressively oriented toward operational programs. But it did produce important projects, and was being used as a source of advice and assistance by all the major components of the system.

*Charlotte.* Of all the Teams, we are least confident about where to put Charlotte. If the Charlotte Team is measured against its own standards of what it wanted to accomplish, it did very well. If it is measured against LEAA's expectations, Charlotte could best be labeled an underachiever. The Charlotte Team explicitly refused to force the pace; it stood ready to respond when its assistance was sought. And its responses impressed us as being consistently timely, supportive, and competent. Yet, the Team as viewed by LE/CJ agencies seems to have been perceived as overly aloof, too detached, perhaps too piously reticent to take the initiative. A fair overall summary statement about the Charlotte Team is that it performed its self-defined role with integrity and skill and that it could have achieved much more than it did.

*Des Moines.* The Des Moines Team, like Rochester, appeared to be gaining momentum when the phaseout of the Pilot Cities Program was announced. Its achievements during Phase I had been marginal. In Phase II a new director and an improved relationship with the Regional Office were resulting in an accelerated level of achievement; then, activity fell off when it was learned that the Program would be truncated. Overall, the Des Moines Team did not achieve a substantial level of impact during its existence. It was moving in that direction.

*Dayton.* In contrast to Rochester, the numbers probably exaggerate the Dayton Team's level of success relative to the other Teams. The Dayton Team was plagued by disruption and confusion from the start. It survived for nearly the full five years, and in the process managed to implement a number of demonstration projects. In that sense, the numbers indicating impact have a firm foundation. But the Team never was able to establish itself in the role of advisor and "overviewer" of the system.

*Albuquerque.* The Albuquerque experience was different from Dayton's in its specifics, but not in overall effect. Projects which had value were funded; technical assistance was provided; but the concept behind the Pilot Cities Program was not realized.

*Omaha.* The Omaha Team was a failure by every measure of impact. A mediocre performance in Phase I (for which the Regional Office and the city share responsibility with the Team) was followed by disaster in Phase II. It is nearly impossible to point to a positive outcome of the Omaha project which could not have been produced more easily and cheaply by providing the money without the Team.

## X. SOURCES OF CHANGE

In the preceding eight sections of this report we have taken the Pilot Cities Program from inception through estimates of program impact. In this section, we draw together the data on the assorted topics that have been covered, focusing on cause and effect relationships between the contents of the Program and the impact that was achieved: what does the Pilot Cities experience suggest about the change process in law enforcement and criminal justice systems? The discussion is arranged under three topics that seem to us to be of central importance to LEAA:

- tradeoffs between improvement and innovation;
- the effectiveness of the Pilot Team approach in shaping change; and
- the relative importance of places, procedures, and personnel in stimulating change.

In this section, the focus is on the evidence; judgments on these topics are elaborated in the final section, *Conclusions and Recommendations*.

### A. Tradeoffs Between Improvement and Innovation

Throughout the preceding section, Pilot Team impact was discussed in terms of two very distinct categories: *improvement of local LE/CJ systems*, and *advancement of LE/CJ theory and practice in a national context*. Three indicators were used for each category. The question to be discussed now is: What was the relationship between the two types of impact? Were they mutually reinforcing? Independent? Competitive?

The basic statistical relationships are shown by the fifteen correlations in Table 10.1.

TABLE 10.1  
Intercorrelations Among the Impact Indicators

		Operations	RPE	System	Utility	S.O.T.A.	Innovate
<u>Local Improvement</u>	Impact on operations	--					
	Impact on RPE capability	.35	--				
	Impact on system interactions	.25	.26	--			
<u>LE/CJ Theory &amp; Practice</u>	Utility elsewhere	.14	.04	.26	--		
	Contribution to state of the art	.02	.03	.07	.43	--	
	Innovativeness	-.10	.11	-.04	.12	.55	--

These statistical relationships and our reading of the qualitative record support two important findings, as follow.

1. *Innovation and Utility Elsewhere.* It was widely assumed throughout the Pilot Cities Program that innovation was inextricably tied to potential for technology transfer. Enormous energy was expended by some Regional Office representatives, Pilot Teams, and local agency personnel in order to devise novel approaches to law enforcement and criminal justice problems; and almost always the rationale was that only through innovation could we learn things to help other cities. If an approach had already been tried elsewhere, went the argument, what is the point in spending Pilot "O" funds to replicate it? *But in the Pilot Cities experience, the innovativeness of a project and its potential utility elsewhere were independent qualities.*<sup>1</sup>

If "advancement of the state of the art" is substituted for "innovativeness," a different picture emerges. The relationship with potential utility is substantial.<sup>2</sup> But it is important to remember that *projects which were rated highest on contribution to the state of the art were often ones which promised to tell us concrete information about familiar approaches.* The clearest example of this was the Des Moines project to compare effectiveness of court-appointed counsel for indigents with counsel from a public defender's office. The substance of the approach was commonplace. Public defender offices exist throughout the country. But, our judges were telling us, we badly need information on how well they work.

As a more general statement, it should be emphasized that the LE/CJ fields tend to be ones for which "innovation" can take strange forms. To have a policeman walking a beat has been, in the past few years, an innovation. The recent proposal of a minimum three-year prison term for certain repeat offenders was regarded widely as an innovative approach, when it had a respected scholar as author, a prestigious magazine as forum, and, perhaps most significantly, when it tried to treat the subject in a dispassionate, data-based, analytic way.<sup>3</sup> The message seems to be that *in law enforcement and criminal justice, innovation can consist of finding out more about what we already do now or have done in the past.* The data from the ratings of Pilot Cities Projects underscore the appropriateness of this view of innovation.

---

<sup>1</sup>Statistically,  $r = .12$ . If the mutual correlation of innovation and utility with "state of the art" is held constant, the partial correlation between innovation and utility is slightly negative ( $-.15$ ).

<sup>2</sup> $r = .43$  between "contribution to the state of the art" and "utility elsewhere," significant at the .001 level.

<sup>3</sup>James Q. Wilson, "Lock Em Up," *New York Times Magazine*, March 9, 1975.

2. *National Benefits and Local Improvements.* Most of the Pilot Teams were vehement in their view that locally innovative projects which would help their city/county system were not necessarily the ones which would contribute most to nationwide theory or practice. Their view is supported by the statistics. The correlations between the three indicators averaged .06. And, as the individual projects are examined, the point is emphasized repeatedly: *all eight of the Pilot Cities LE/CJ systems could have been significantly improved by projects that were not innovative, not of much value to the state of the art, and not particularly useful for most other cities.* And these eight cities, it should be remembered, were supposed to be among the more progressive ones in their population range.

The preceding discussion has focused on the arguments that *innovation was overstated as a means of achieving improvements in national LE/CJ theory and practice, and that improvements in national LE/CJ theory and practice were not correlates of improvements in the capability of local LE/CJ systems.* It has used statistics as the basis for both arguments. The statistics make explicit the conclusions implied by the nature of the top projects on each impact dimension, as discussed in Section IX.<sup>4</sup>

But the subtitle of the discussion was *tradeoffs* between improvements and innovation, and they cannot be shown with statistics. They stem from the pressure on some Teams, reported to us by Team members and apparent in correspondence and inter-office memos, to develop projects which were globally innovative. In some cases this was accomplished by rejection of grant applications because projects were insufficiently innovative, which, in turn, alienated local agencies which had expected to get the award.<sup>5</sup> In other cases, it led to substantial diversion of Team energies into searches for innovations rather than searches for the projects that would do the local system the most good. Potentially significant local improvements were often set aside in an effort to comply with the Pilot Cities mandate--or what was perceived as a mandate--to be globally innovative. And the pressure was indeed substantial, from outside LEAA as well as within. From the GAO evaluation of the Pilot Cities:

We believe *the key question that the Federal Government must ask* is whether the cumulative effect of the efforts of the Teams is sufficiently innovative to justify the further expenditure of funds directly under LEAA control.<sup>6</sup>

The answer to that "key question" was no, and phaseout of the program was recommended largely on that basis.

<sup>4</sup> See especially the qualitative discussions, pp. 130-133, 135-138, 139-141, 146-148, and 149-151.

<sup>5</sup> The case histories for Des Moines, Omaha, and Albuquerque provide the best examples of this pressure and its distracting effects on Team performance.

<sup>6</sup> Comptroller General of the United States, op. cit., p. 34. Emphasis added.

## B. The Effectiveness of the Pilot Team Approach in Shaping LE/CJ Change

In the discussion of impact in Section IX, a simple criterion was used to link the Pilot Team with achievement of impact: did the Team play a principal role in initiating and planning the activity in question? In effect, the question was whether that specific activity would have happened if the Pilot Team had not been there. Now we turn to a more demanding question:

*To what extent did the Pilot Team affect the course of development of the LE/CJ system?*

The operative phrase is "course of development." For it is plausible that even though a Pilot Team might increase the aggregate number of projects undertaken in a city, much the same effects could have been achieved simply by allocating the \$500,000 per year in Pilot "O" money to a city, without a Team.

The findings on this question must be qualified. There are no experimentally valid results, comparing the course of change in Pilot Cities with the course of change in a set of otherwise identical control cities. But *the available evidence strongly suggests that the Teams themselves were positively intervening in the course of LE/CJ development. Changes were occurring which apparently would not have occurred through the usual grant process.*

The evidence takes a variety of forms. First to be considered is the complete set of 151 demonstration projects with which the Pilot Teams had some involvement, often very minor. Ninety-eight of these comprise the subset of Pilot demonstrations. The remaining 53 (almost all of which also used LEAA funding) were dominantly initiated and planned by the local agency, not by the Pilot Team. They will be called "non-Pilot demonstrations," for convenience. The question is, are there significant differences in the types of impact achieved by the two sets of projects?

1. *Improvements in the local system.* In terms of the first of the three "local improvements" measures, impact on basic agency operations, the answer is no. *Non-Pilot demonstrations and Pilot demonstrations were nearly identical in their average level of impact on agency operations (2.4 for Pilot demonstrations on the 0 - 4 scale, and 2.3 for non-Pilot demonstrations).* This is not surprising; the one aspect that LEAA grants of all types have most in common is the intent to improve Operations, and there is nothing in the Pilot Program's design which ought to make a typical Pilot demonstration have more of this type of impact than other demonstrations.

Rather, *the kinds of local impact which are not "natural" to LEAA grants, and which the Pilot Teams were explicitly mandated to achieve, were RPE impact and systems impact. And the*

mean level of impact on RPE capability and inter-agency communication was significantly higher for Pilot demonstrations than for non-Pilot demonstrations. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 compare the distribution of ratings for the two subsets. In both cases, the proportions are significantly different.<sup>7</sup>




FIGURE 10.1  
Comparative Impact on RPE Capability by Pilot and Non-Pilot Demonstrations

To summarize Figure 10.1, 41 percent of the Pilot Demonstrations had the effect of either actually increasing RPE resources or causing a clear intention to increase them; only 12 percent of the non-Pilot demonstrations had an equivalent effect. For inter-agency communications (Figure 10.2), the contrast is even greater: 56 percent of the Pilot demonstrations resulted in a continuing inter-agency relationship which did not exist previously; only 10 percent of the non-Pilot demonstrations had a similar effect. The conclusion that Pilot participation was influencing the nature of project impact is clearly supported by these data.

2. *Contribution to LE/CJ Theory and Practice.* A parallel comparison on the other three impact indicators--innovation, contribution to the state of the art, and utility elsewhere--is not possible, since the 53 non-Pilot projects were not judged

<sup>7</sup> Statistical significance of the mean differences is at the .001 level for both variables, using the *t* statistic.




FIGURE 10.2  
Comparative Impact on Inter-Agency Communication by Pilot and Non-Pilot Demonstrations

on them. Even within the set of 98 Pilot demonstrations, however, some relationship exists between the degree of Pilot Team participation and these impact variables, as shown in Figure 10.3.




FIGURE 10.3  
Relationship Between Pilot Participation and the "Theory and Practice" Impact Indicators

The relationship is strongest between degree of Pilot Team participation in the initiation and design of a program, and

its innovativeness ( $r = .28$ ).<sup>8</sup> The relationships between Pilot participation and the other two variables are not as regular; statistically, they are weak.<sup>9</sup> This can be seen as being consistent with the finding reported in Section IX that impact on these variables was not the strong point of the Pilot Cities Program. On the other hand, it should be remembered that these relationships exist *within* the set of Pilot demonstrations. This is tantamount to asking whether we can detect differences in a set of projects for which, in the great majority of cases, Pilot participation is already high, as opposed to "very high," and "extremely high." The sample sizes for "low participation" are small. That any relationship exists is unexpected.

In order to supplement this assessment of ways in which Pilot approach shaped "innovation" impacts, the inventory of other LEAA projects going to the eight cities was examined. The number of projects involved (over 600) was too great to permit a detailed analysis. It did appear that the average level of Pilot demonstrations on the "nationwide theory and practice" impact measures was probably higher than the average for LEAA grants as a whole. But this is not particularly meaningful, because a substantial proportion of LEAA's funds are being devoted to hardware and basic systems. If *aggregate* numbers of projects with innovation, potential value to the state of the art, and potential utility elsewhere are considered, we question whether the Pilot Program as a whole added significantly to the total level of impact which would have been achieved otherwise. But this comparison treats the Pilot Cities Program overall; taken city-by-city, the very great differences in Team performance discussed earlier should be considered. For the most successful Teams, it is our estimate that a detailed analysis would reveal that not only average level of impact but also the aggregates were substantially affected by Team activities. But, to reiterate, the Pilot Cities Program's contributions to this set of impacts were generally much less significant than its contribution as a method of improving local systems.

### C. The Roles of Places, Procedures, and Personnel

In establishing the Pilot Cities Program, LEAA put a major effort into finding the right cities and establishing a satisfactory statement of methods to be used in all of the grants, and relatively little effort into selecting the Team personnel. In retrospect, it seems likely that LEAA had its priorities exactly backward. For when the Teams' achievements are analyzed against these variables, the basic findings are that

<sup>8</sup> Significant at the .01 level.

<sup>9</sup> The correlation of Pilot participation with "state of the art" is .10 (sig. = .34) and .16 (sig. = .14) with "utility elsewhere."

- There was a very limited relationship between the characteristics of the site and achievement of impact;
- No relationship existed between strict observation of the prescribed method and achievement of impact; and
- There was a pervasive relationship between the composition of the Team and achievement of impact.

Each of these findings is discussed in turn.

1. *Impact and the Sites.* The existence of a relationship between "receptivity" of the urban and political environments surrounding a Team and the level of its accomplishment cannot be supported by the data. This holds true for the quantitative and qualitative criteria developed by LEAA at the time the sites were selected, and for our own subsequent analyses of the cities. A variety of configurations seemed adequate. For example, the Pilot Cities idea worked in...

*San Jose*--much larger than the other seven, a boom town, mushrooming population, no large ghetto, high wages but high unemployment, close to the major centers of San Francisco and Oakland, with multiple LE/CJ jurisdictions.

*The Tidewater*--not one city but four, with no county government to provide a bureaucratic umbrella; an area that has been sliding economically; stable population; low blue-collar wages but relatively high employment; large Black population but few racial tensions.

*Rochester*--one city, geographically separate, very low crime rate for a city of its size; very wealthy and getting wealthier, low unemployment, average racial situation; not a new city, but a center of new technology; a reputation for being progressive.

We could continue with the further contrasts which Des Moines and Charlotte and Dayton represent, but the point should already be clear. The cities were very different on all kinds of dimensions; yet there is no reason (which we have observed) that Pilot Cities could not have been a success in all of them. All six give evidence to the contrary. And yet to conclude that the varying levels of success which were actually achieved in those six could be attributed to varying degrees of receptiveness is extremely difficult. For every plus that one of these cities had, it is possible to think of a minus.

One possible exception is the apparent utility of a high level of professional training among LE/CJ personnel. Of all the disposing conditions which were examined, only this one yielded a noticeable relationship with impact. Specifically, the three top-rated teams in impact--San Jose, the Tidewater, and Rochester--were also conspicuously higher than the other five Teams on their percentages of the co-worker pool which had received special professional training--80 percent, 66 percent, and 93 percent, respectively. And the relationship is given credibility by the rationale that obviously goes with it: Teams should prosper most easily among LE/CJ personnel who are technically best trained. But the overall rank order correlations of co-worker professional training and the six impact indicators are generally modest and, qualitatively, the role of this variable was at best probably only one of a facilitator.<sup>10</sup>

*Omaha and Albuquerque do offer evidence that the wrong urban environment can have a crippling negative effect. The relationship is confounded. Both the Omaha and Albuquerque Teams made errors (as did all of the Teams), and both were subject to Regional Offices which, in our view, played a generally negative role. There is no shortage of explanations for the problems encountered in these cities. But even after these have been taken into account, there remains a difference between Omaha and Albuquerque as Pilot sites, and the other six. For the others, it seems very probable that the right Team could have been a thorough success (as a few were). For Albuquerque and Omaha, there is a real question whether any Team short of a truly superlative one could have accomplished what was done in a San Jose or a Tidewater. To some extent, failure was built into those cities.*

The overall finding is, then, that *whether the LE/CJ and political systems were "receptive" or "neutral" did not seem to matter, but systems with conditions that were "hostile" could enforce failure on even potentially productive Teams.*

2. *Impact and Procedures.* The Pilot Cities Program adopted an explicit procedure for stimulating change. A statement of the steps was part of every Phase I grant application, based on the principles adopted by the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI) in their report to the

---

<sup>10</sup>The rank order correlation (by city) of professional training with impact on agency operations was .74; but the correlations with the other five impact indicators ranged between .24 and .40.

President's Crime Commission.<sup>11</sup> It was a straightforward set of principles for an orderly identification of needs and solutions. It emphasized the importance of mutual understanding between change agent and the client; of a cumulative data base; of riding with existing local initiatives; of starting with programs that had a high probability of quick impact; and of program continuity.

The most successful Teams generally followed the guidelines; but so did some of the unsuccessful Teams. The most successful Teams simply seemed to follow the spirit of them better than did the less successful ones--which is another way of saying that other explanatory factors must be sought, to explain success.

The experience of the Pilot Cities does support a conclusion that the officially adopted methods worked better than any variant which the Teams attempted on their own. There were two prominent examples of a variant approach--Charlotte, and Omaha in Phase Two--and both led to disappointing results.

In the case of Charlotte, the highly non-interventionary approach outlined in Section VII seems in retrospect to have resulted in under-utilization of Pilot resources. Other Teams demonstrated that it is possible for a Team to take the initiative, to "sell" good programs to agencies which would not otherwise have adopted them; and generally to assume an activist stance once credibility had been established. The Charlotte Team explicitly declined to do so. The Team's reasons for its stance were carefully considered, and they were persuasive ones in many respects. But consistently the responses of local officials indicated to us that they were ready to take greater advantage of the Team than they did, and one reason they did not was the Team's detachment.

The case of Omaha in Phase II is entirely different. Whereas the Charlotte personnel were generally respected and accepted by the local system, some of the Omaha Team were not. In particular, the intense mutual dislike between the Phase II Director and virtually the entire LE/CJ community contaminates any conclusions.<sup>12</sup> But the Omaha Director in Phase II did nonetheless have a distinctive approach. It was based on the view that the true clients of the Pilot Team were the participants (offenders and victims) in the LE/CJ system, not the agencies. Further, it was argued, the only feasible way to stimulate change in a community such as Omaha was to shake it up, spark interest through controversy if necessary. The Omaha experience offers no evidence that this is a usable approach to changing LE/CJ systems, and a great deal of evidence that it is not.

---

<sup>11</sup> OSTI, *Implementation*, 1967.

<sup>12</sup> "Director" refers to the Pilot Associate in charge, not the officially designated but relatively uninvolved co-Directors from the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

We are left then with the minimal finding that *the procedures adopted at the outset of the Pilot Program could work, as proved by the most successful cities, and that it was not demonstrated that any other approach worked as well.*

On the other hand, a *conscientious effort to observe the procedures did not ensure success.* By many standards, the strictest adherence at the outset of the Program was found not in San Jose or the Tidewater or Rochester, but in Dayton, Des Moines, and Omaha, all of which had serious difficulties in getting established during Phase I.

On a more general level, it appears that the limits of utility are quickly reached for rules about how to be a change agent. The extensive anecdotal data, which were collected about the change process, turned out to be more interesting than useful--suitable for a technical article about interactions in the change process, or perhaps for a novel, but they have not added new, unsuspected, and *applicable* knowledge about how to go about stimulating changes in LE/CJ systems. There is no shortage of advice to change agents; and the lessons of the Pilot Cities Program for the behavior at the tactical level reinforce the advice generated by other experiences.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>For example, we were struck by the appropriateness of Bell and Manson's work drawn from the Criminal Justice Project. They cited five common underlying assumptions by LE/CJ change agents, and proposed five alternative working assumptions. They could as easily have been inspired by the Pilot Program--the Teams' experiences supply extensive evidence in support of the thesis that the five "underlying assumptions" were commonly held by ineffective change agents in the Program and that their five "alternative working assumptions" were commonly held by the effective change agents. The pairs are:

Underlying Assumptions

1. Decision-makers do not have any ideas, or the capacity to develop ideas to get themselves out of their dilemmas.
2. The present problems in an agency result in large part from their making bad decisions, and therefore we have to improve the quality of the decisions made, to improve the agency.
3. There is something wrong with a less than whole-hearted response to an offer of help.
4. Seat of the pants decisions are inherently inferior, even undesirable, because they are not backed up by formal objective information.
5. Duplication of effort is wasteful and to be avoided where it does not exist, and stamped out where it does exist.

Alternative Working Assumptions

1. Trust between the helper and the helped is essential to almost all change processes.
2. The line officials worked with have specific ideas about what they can do to change, and are capable of making good decisions.
3. Neutral, passive, or even negative or recalcitrant behavior on the part of line officials is normal in a change encounter.
4. Observed data ought to be used in support of the intuitions of decision-makers at all levels of the hierarchies with which we work.
5. Duplication of effort is an essential ingredient of many change processes and should be designed into new programs.

Quoted from Chauncey F. Bell and Donald B. Manson, "Mythology and the Management of Change: Inconsistencies in the Behavior of Staff" in *The Change Process in Criminal Justice*, NILECJ, 1973.

The question is the extent to which elaboration of these rules or the evidence for them would actually change behavior in the future. For, as was mentioned in the section on process (Section VII), we ordinarily encountered *awareness* of the techniques of change-agentry in persons who did not *practice* them. Overall, the Pilot Cities experience suggests that *procedural guidelines about the change process were sound and helpful, but observation of them was not a decisive or even major factor in determining Team achievements.*

3. *Impact and the Nature of the Team.* It is our overall judgment that the characteristics of the Team members and of the Team as a unit were the most important factors in determining success--more important than the nature of the city, the LE/CJ system, the strategy, or the support from the grantee and LEAA.

In Section V, the characteristics of the Team were discussed under the headings of "structural integrity" of the Team as a unit, and personnel qualifications. Team ranks on these variables and on the impact indicators are shown in Table 10.2.

TABLE 10.2  
Rank Order of the Teams on Team Variables and Impact Variables

City	LE/CJ training	Research credentials	Operational experience	Local experience	Structural integrity	Operations impact	RPE impact	System impact	Innovation	State of the art	Utility elsewhere
Albuquerque	8	6.5	3	6	6.5	5	6	4	6	6	5
Charlotte	6	2	7	8	1.5	3	7	5	8	8	8
Dayton	3	5	6	3	6.5	6	4	3	3	3	2
Des Moines	4	6.5	5	4	5	7	3	6	5	5	6
Omaha	5	8	2	7	8	8	8	8	7	7	7
Rochester	2	1	8	1	1.5	4	5	7	4	4	4
San Jose	7	3	1	5	3.5	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tidewater	1	4	4	2	3.5	2	2	2	2	2	3
	TEAM VARIABLES					IMPACT VARIABLES					

\*Ranks were computed by calculating the average score on each variable for the Teams that existed at 6 months and 26 months into the project.

It was pointed out that these measures only partially captured the qualifications of the Team. Even so, however, it happens that the simplest way of summarizing that table shows a statistical relationship between Team characteristics. If the five ranks characterizing the Team are added, and compared with the combined ranks on the impact indicators, the result is as follows:

Rank on the combined...

	<u>Desirable Team Characteristics</u>	<u>Impact Indicators</u>
Rochester	1	4
Tidewater	2	2
San Jose	3	1
Dayton	4	3
Des Moines	5.5	5.5
Charlotte	5.5	7
Albuquerque	7.5	5.5
Omaha	7.5	8

The Spearman rank order coefficient is .76, significant beyond the .05 level even for a sample of only eight. But the case for a relationship between the Team and impact is not a statistical one; the factors are too complicated and the sample is too small to examine them quantitatively. Rather, we offer these observations, without further mention of statistical significance.

*a. Structural integrity.* "Structural integrity," it will be remembered from Section V, refers to the stability of staffing level, continuity of the staff, and continuity of leadership. The quality of structural integrity in the Team consistently impressed us as being fundamentally important, even though we are not sure whether it is mostly a cause or mostly an effect. Of the four Teams with high scores on this variable, three were ranked in the top four on the impact indicators.

In one sense, these qualities are effects, not causes, of Team accomplishments; a Team that is productive generally will tend to stay together longer than a Team that is foundering. *But it also seems very likely that the fact of continuity and stability played a key role as a cause of accomplishments.* In particular, productivity in relationships with local agency personnel depended crucially on personal relationships--not friendships, necessarily, but establishment of accurate mutual assessments by Team member and agency officials of the other's strengths and weaknesses, preferences, and prejudices. As a Pilot Team kept showing new faces to the local agencies, these relationships became increasingly difficult to develop. And each time a new member joined the Team, some months were spent bringing him or her up to speed on Pilot activities and on the background of the local LE/CJ community. These problems occurred on a much larger scale when the change was not of an Associate, but the Director of the Team.

*b. Personnel qualifications.* The Pilot Cities experience does not positively indicate who are the best change agents. The most impressive Pilot Cities members included people with a wide variety of backgrounds; so did the least impressive

ones. But even though there are many exceptions, the experience of the eight Teams suggests a profile of the effective Team. The main features of that profile are as follow.

*The Directors of the most successful Teams were genuinely expert in law enforcement and criminal justice. This was true of all three of the Teams--San Jose, Tidewater, and Rochester--which had achieved or promised to achieve the greatest impact. Directors who were not expert in LE/CJ sometimes were well-qualified as administrators but the history of the Teams consistently underscores the point that it was not enough that the Director of a Pilot Team be a good manager; the most successful Teams were ones in which he (or she) was also policymaker and formulator of strategy about how to go about the Pilot Team's mission. That task demanded that the Director have an internally coherent view of the law enforcement and criminal justice arena, locally and nationwide. Early in the report the Director of the San Jose Team was quoted as saying that "one explanation for the apparent success of this Pilot is that the Pilot Program staff has some consistent internal sense of goals and objectives..." For "staff," we would substitute "Director" as being the crucial element.*

*The most successful Teams had a high level of research competence. The guidelines for establishing the Teams called for one member to be a systems analyst, to facilitate the development of integrative projects among agencies. Several of the Teams did in fact employ systems experts, some of them with excellent credentials. But there is no indication in the histories of the Teams that system-analytic skills were functional for this task. Instead, in retrospect, it is clear that the much more pressing need was for social science research skills, for the conduct of the Pilot research, for design and evaluation of demonstration projects, and for responding to requests for technical assistance. "Social science research skills" as it is used here means competence in research design and analysis. Among many Teams, there appeared to be an assumption that these are skills which automatically come with a degree, whether it be in law or in social work or in political science. They do not, in all cases. And as a result, several of the Teams had very marginal ability to perform the research tasks which were levied on them.*

This is not to say that the best Teams were comprised largely of research experts. One Director said of his highly trained analyst that of course the analyst was kept in a closet and never allowed to actually meet clients from the LE/CJ agencies--"He would scare them to death," was the Director's assessment, when he started to talk about beta weights and sampling designs. But the capability, however well hidden, was another characteristic of the most successful Teams.

The implications of these personnel characteristics for future applications of a Team approach are detailed in the concluding section, along with the broader policy implications of the tradeoffs between innovation and improvement, and the role of the Teams in shaping local change.

## XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this evaluation have two applications, potentially. Some of the findings imply guidelines for designing and implementing LEAA programs; portions of this section are devoted to recommendations of this type, and they are quite specific. The Pilot Cities Program also illuminates policy issues which are fundamental to the way LEAA goes about its mission. And in this concluding section, it seems appropriate to address such issues in as broad a context as possible.

The conclusions and recommendations are grouped under three headings. The first of these deals with the issue of *improvement* in local systems and in the state of the art, as distinct from *innovation*. We believe that the Pilot Cities experience highlights some important problems of choice among priorities. The second deals more concretely with ways to achieve the goal of *advancement in the state of the art*. The third turns to problems of *improving local LE/CJ systems*.

### A. Improvement or Innovation: Some Problems of Priority

In the design of social action programs, it has generally been taken for granted that the way to make progress is to develop new approaches, test them, and then adopt and disseminate the ones that work. Programs initiated by LEAA have generally followed this model. At the beginning of the Pilot Cities Program, the improvement of local systems through innovation was the stated objective. But as we have indicated throughout the report, a consistent theme of the Pilot Cities experience is that *innovation and improvement are not the mutually reinforcing objectives that they were assumed to be*. Our findings raise serious questions about the necessity of innovation as a vehicle for improvement, and even suggest that *innovation may compete with improvement in an operational setting*.

This conclusion applies most directly to improvement in local LE/CJ practices. Viewing the Pilot Cities Experience as a whole, a central finding of this study has been that

- (1) *Improving local criminal justice systems and innovation in criminal justice techniques are very different tasks calling for different approaches, different types of people and different magnitudes of resources.*

If LEAA asks, "What did the Pilot Cities Program accomplish in finding new solutions to LE/CJ problems?" the answer is, "Very little." If LEAA asks instead, "What did the Pilot

Cities Program accomplish in improving local LE/CJ systems?" the answer is, "Quite a lot, including a sound general approach that can be applied more widely." There is no contradiction in these contrasting results. Given the state of LE/CJ practice in American cities, the fact is that innovation is often unnecessary to improve local systems. This is because

- (2) *What is known about law enforcement and criminal justice far outstrips what is generally practiced.* Most cities can improve their LE/CJ systems dramatically without inventing "new" approaches.

It is common for observers of the LE/CJ disciplines to take a gloomy view of our state of knowledge, because we are so far from having answers to the bedrock questions about preventing crime and rehabilitating criminals. But this should not obscure the vast number of effective ways of doing things, particularly in management, which are not being applied in most cities. As the abstracts of the projects indicate (Appendix B), these are not trivial improvements. Nor are they innovations.

The distinction between "improvement" and "innovation" applies to the state of the art issue as well. The Pilot Cities experience supports the proposition that *innovation is often unnecessary to improve the state of the LE/CJ art*, because

- (3) *What has been tried in law enforcement and criminal justice far outstrips what has been learned from the experience.* The state of the art can be improved dramatically by learning more about what we already do or have done.

How many community-based corrections projects (to take an example) have been tried, in how many variations? Put conservatively, the answer must be in the dozens. How much is really known about which types make economic or correctional sense? Put generously, the state of our knowledge is not commensurate with the extent of the experimentation; in absolute terms, we know very little.

The above are reasons that innovation is often not a necessary condition for improvement, either in operations or in knowledge. In addition, there are two factors which suggest that they may actually be competitive in an operational setting.

First,

- (4) *The conditions that are required to implement and evaluate an innovation tend to be incompatible with the operational interests of a local LE/CJ agency.*

Procedures that are often essential to a valid test of an innovation--control groups, standardization within treatment groups, redundancy of observations, and the rest--tend to be awkward, disruptive, pain-in-the-neck things for an agency to do while it is also trying to get on with its daily operational responsibilities. Sometimes, they can also be professionally disquieting to the LE/CJ official. Innovations in LE/CJ characteristically affect the treatment of human beings. If the innovation looks promising, it appears to be inhumane and unreasonable to deliberately withhold it from a control group. If the innovation looks chancy, it is difficult to rationalize the continued use of people as guinea pigs. For both administrative and functional reasons, innovation can easily clash with the interests of the local agency.

Second,

- (5) *Innovations tend to deal with issues on the periphery of LE/CJ needs, when they take place in a local setting with modest resources.*

And this was the situation in which the Pilot Teams operated. They were given a mandate to "innovate," and they soon found that there are very few projects that (1) can be done with some modest fraction of \$500,000 per year and (2) require no changes in state laws or local ordinances and (3) deal squarely with the central issues of changing criminal behavior and dispensing more equitable justice and (4) have never been tried anywhere. Teams characteristically had to choose between dealing with a central LE/CJ issue or producing a genuine innovation. It is this fact which we believe explains the empirically demonstrated lack of relationship between the "innovativeness" of a project, and the measures of its utility locally and elsewhere. Without exception, the Teams chose to emphasize projects that met the utility criterion, often at sacrifice to the innovation criterion.

In combination, these characteristics of the conflict between innovation and improvement suggest four further conclusions. The first one is specific to the Pilot Cities Program:

- (6) *The emphasis on innovation in the Pilot Cities Program was a mistake that cut deeply into the impact which might have been achieved. A simpler mandate to help modernize and integrate the local LE/CJ system would probably have been more productive.*

The mirror image conclusion, and one which we believe deserves close scrutiny by LEAA, is that

- (7) *The criminal justice systems in the eight Pilot Cities were at a point in development where small increments of technology and expertise were able to produce high payoffs. And the systems in those eight cities do not appear to be atypical of other cities of comparable size.*

The next conclusion, which appears to have been missed in the GAO report, is that

- (8) *The Pilot Team approach can be quite efficient as a means of introducing these highly cost-effective changes. The approach is essentially a good one.*

This is elaborated in part C of this section.

Finally,

- (9) *The Pilot Cities experience suggests that LEAA should reassess how best to stimulate advancement in the state of the art. For this, the Pilot Cities concept is not an efficient approach.*

In this respect, our findings are consistent with the GAO evaluation.

## B. Contributions to the LE/CJ State of the Art

Advancing the state of the art remains one of LEAA's important missions. We have suggested that the Pilot Team approach is not an appropriate vehicle for accomplishing that mission. But beyond the questions specific to the Pilot Cities Program, the record consistently suggested reasons for concluding on a broader basis that

- (10) *Advancing the state of the art by finding "new ways of doing things" may be of low priority as a tool for advancing knowledge about urban criminal justice. "Learning more about what has been tried" is probably more productive at this point.*

Certainly the notion of brand-new, never-before-tried solutions was given too much emphasis by some of the Regional Offices. It also was over-emphasized, we believe, in the GAO assessment of the Pilot Cities Program--and that in turn reflects

the high standing it originally had in LEAA/Washington as a justification for the Pilot Program.

But while the value of the unique innovation was being overemphasized, another equally distracting overemphasis was developing. A second basic conclusion about advancing the state of the art is that

- (11) "Evaluation" is in danger of replacing "innovation" as the magic word for advancing the state of the art. *But across-the-board evaluation is not the answer. The current tendency to evaluate everything is deflative.*

These two general conclusions provide the context for a number of more specific points, as follow.

1. *Improving the State of Knowledge about Current Practices.* In examining the Pilot Cities experience, one clear-cut conclusion is that

- (12) *Authoritative evaluations are still lacking for some fundamental law enforcement and criminal justice practices.*

The ratings of the nine judges who examined the Pilot demonstrations clearly reflect the sad state of our knowledge about current LE/CJ practices. The highest ratings on "potential contribution to the state of the art" went to projects which were entirely prosaic in content (e.g., augmentation of the staff of a prosecutor's office; and establishing a public defender's office), but which promised to provide some fundamental evaluative information about them. It is incredible that these kinds of topics have not already been thoroughly and rigorously explored in the literature. But they have not been, according to people whose work keeps them abreast of that literature.

One operational recommendation is that

- (13) *LEAA should define a few central unresolved issues in LE/CJ practice, and provide the funds and expertise to mount specially designed demonstrations and authoritative evaluations of them.*

Examples of such issues are

**CONTINUED**

**2 OF 3**

- What would mandatory sentences do to crime rates?
- What would happen if plea bargaining were eliminated?
- How does decriminalization of status offenses affect rates for other offenses?

These are not researchable questions, as they are phrased here. But they could be made researchable, given LEAA's resources. We can think of no more dramatic contribution that LEAA could make than to provide answers to a dozen live questions about existing strategies for preventing crime, catching criminals, and reducing recidivism.

It must be stressed that *accomplishing this objective means more than setting aside money for a few large evaluation contracts. The demonstration itself must be designed explicitly as a test case.* Significant advances in the state of the art exact several prices that LEAA should be ready to pay. They apply equally to advances through the authoritative evaluation of current practices, and to evaluation of innovations.

The first cost arises from the nature of an operational setting. To recapitulate the essential point, thorough evaluation means disruption in the established operational routine. Therefore, two typical reactions of a local agency are (1) to resist cooperating with a proposed innovation *unless there are advantages that compensate for the disruption*; or (2) to revise the initial plan--and contaminate its instructive value--in order to make it more compatible with existing procedures. *Both of these responses are sensible ones, in terms of the bureaucratic interests of the operating agency, and should not be seen as evidence of inherent resistance to change.* As we examined problems encountered by Pilot Cities projects, a persistent reaction on our part was one of sympathy for local agency officials who were being perceived as resistant and uncooperative by Pilot Associates. For very often the line between *helping* an agency and *using* it was a thin one.

One conclusion, then, is that

- (14) *If LEAA intends to sponsor and evaluate genuinely innovative approaches, it should be prepared to pay all the bills and take special measures to compensate the agency.*

A second conclusion is that in these instances

- (15) *LEAA should also exercise direct control over design and implementation of the project, to ensure that its instructive value is retained.*

This is, of course, linked to total financing by LEAA, which provides the necessary leverage.

Further, the Pilot Cities experience suggests that

- (16) *The price of advancement typically makes the grant application mechanism inappropriate, as a means for identifying and sponsoring worthwhile innovative projects.*

Perhaps occasionally a local agency will apply on its own for a genuinely innovative program which can be made evaluable with only minor changes; but during the Pilot Cities Program this did not happen. Instead, the local agency would suggest an idea which had the potential for experimental value, but only if the idea were transformed into a design much different than the agency had in mind. When LEAA finds itself in such a situation, and believes that it has found an idea worth developing, we suggest that LEAA do so openly. *If LEAA knows what it wants and is looking for an agency or city to do it, a straightforward bargaining approach is preferable to the charade of "grant applications" that characterized the Phase I grants for the Pilot Cities Program.*

The Phase I grant applications for the last seven Pilot Cities in effect copied the original San Jose application, and that led to one major, avoidable difficulty: *it inhibited a clear statement of what LEAA wanted out of the Program, and papered over the reservations and confusions among the new grantees.* We suggest that LEAA examine the possibility that the same problem characterizes other negotiating situations in which LEAA is not really acting as the respondent to a request for funds, but acting as the initiator of a program. And it is most acute for an innovative experiment, where the controls and limitations may have to be quite stringent.

The sum of these conclusions is that

- (17) *Projects to advance the state of the art characteristically require LEAA to call the shots, with very little room for local improvisation.*

In many respects, this is at odds with LEAA's recent moves toward decentralization. But the conflict exists, and must be recognized.

2. *General Evaluation Policy.* It is also recommended that LEAA cut back sharply on the money it spends evaluating run-of-the-mill projects. For, based on the 151 demonstration projects which were examined in the course of the Pilot Cities

evaluation, we are led to conclude that

- (18) *The great majority of projects funded by LEAA need only simple, inexpensive evaluations. Most of these could be accomplished in-house, using routinely gathered data.*

Almost all of the 151 projects fell in the category of "good things to do." If the grantee completed inputs specified in the application and achieved the immediate outcomes, the projects could safely be called successes in terms of using tax dollars responsibly. Trying to determine whether they were successes in some more ultimate sense is probably *not* a sensible use of tax dollars, because *virtually none of the projects was evaluable in terms of impact. They were generally too short, too uncontrolled, or too small to permit measurement of their ultimate consequences.* The evaluations were also repetitive--one juvenile diversion evaluation tends to read very much like another, in terms of speculation about impact.

In short, it is suggested that unless there is good reason to believe that a full-scale evaluation will help answer important unresolved issues, it should not be conducted. To replace the full scale evaluation,

- (19) *LEAA should develop routinely collected measures into an in-house evaluation process, for projects which do not require a full-scale impact evaluation.*

Much can be done to make "evaluation" a natural part of the management process.

The recommendations for advancing the state of the art have assumed an active, interventionary style for LEAA. We now turn to recommendations for improving the local system, and to a very different set of implications for LEAA's role.

### **C. Improving Local Criminal Justice Systems**

In the process of translation from a concept to an implemented program, the Pilot Cities Team was burdened with an ambiguous definition of role, questionable choices of sites and grantees, underqualified personnel, deflective interference from Regional Offices, and inadequate policy guidance from LEAA--and still managed to prove itself as an approach to *improving local criminal justice systems.* Stripped of specifics, the original hypothesis was that

The quality of local criminal justice agencies can be enhanced by establishing small teams of professionals with competencies in the functional areas of law enforcement and criminal justice in city/county areas for the stated purpose of helping these agencies to identify, develop, carry out, and evaluate solutions for their problems.

And the weight of the evidence is that the hypothesis is correct; that

- (20) *The central concept of an independent team working with agencies throughout the city and county is a sound approach to improving local LE/CJ systems, and one which should be pursued.*

Embedded in the conclusion are two points that need to be emphasized.

First, the Pilot Cities Program was an experiment. Mistakes were made, some avoidable and some not. There were failures. But at some point in the Program, it appears that the experimental nature of the program was forgotten and the failures became the focus of attention. The decision to phase out the Pilot Cities Program was one reflection of this new focus, and one which we believe was unfortunate. *The existence of failures somehow came to be interpreted as proof that the concept was at fault, and this is a specious conclusion.*

The second point which needs emphasis is that in terms of the validity of the concept, *the successful Teams were successful for the right reasons, and the unsuccessful Teams were unsuccessful for the "right" reasons.* The innovative aspect of the Pilot Cities approach was described by Robert Cushman as being its "flea-ism." He was drawing from this passage by Drucker:

Large organizations cannot be versatile. A large organization is effective through its mass rather than through its agility. Fleas can jump many times their own height, but not elephants. Mass enables the organization to put to work a great many more kinds of knowledge and skill than could be possibly combined in any one person or small group, but mass is also a limitation. An organization, no matter what it would like to do, can only do a small number of tasks at any one time. This is not something that better organization or "effective"

communications can cure. The law of organization is concentration.<sup>1</sup>

The successes of Teams in all of the cities repeatedly bear out the value of this kind of bureaucratic mobility and independence. *The Teams were able to do certain things, particularly in the field of inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional cooperation, which the agencies could not do for themselves.* Similarly, the failures were for the "right" reasons. That is, the reasons for failure generally were not related to the concept, but to process variables and disposing conditions which could more readily be identified and then skirted or solved, with the Pilot experience as a guide.

Overall, then, it is the conclusion of this evaluation that *the Team concept should be further applied as a means of improving local systems.* But, as the report has already made clear, *this should not be done using the program design and administrative mechanisms of the Pilot Cities Program.*

In fact, there is no compelling reason why future applications of the Team concept have to be conducted on a programmatic basis at all. It is recommended that

- (21) *LEAA should establish as policy that support of city/county Teams modeled on the Pilot Team is an appropriate use of discretionary funds.*

If this is done, the following guidelines are recommended to avoid and limit the problems faced by the Pilot Teams.

1. *The Director.* The first priority is to hire the right Director. Find him, and many of the other problems will take care of themselves. Some specific recommendations are:

- (22) *The Director of the Team should be genuinely expert in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice.*

All of the Teams with Directors who met the sense of this criterion (San Jose, the Tidewater, Rochester, Charlotte, and Des Moines in Phase II) did at least reasonably well; some did very well indeed. The other Teams all experienced severe problems which were linked to some extent with the Director's lack of expertise in the LE/CJ field. It should also be noted quite explicitly that *"genuinely expert" does not mean operational experience alone.* "Expertise" should apply to LE/CJ

<sup>1</sup>Quoted from Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (1969), in Robert Cushman's "The Pilot Cities Experience," *The Change Process in Criminal Justice*, NILECJ, 1973, p. 46.

theory as well as operations. An ex-police chief or an ex-DA whose record shows no evidence that he has professional interests in theory and practice nationwide and systemwide is probably not a suitable candidate.

- (23) *The Director of the Team should be conversant with social science research techniques.*

Expertise is not required. For example, neither the San Jose nor Tidewater Directors were research scientists in terms of methodological skills. But both of them had job histories which indicated that they knew the language, the capabilities, and the limitations of social science research; and this seems to be the prerequisite.

- (24) *The Director of the Team should have some experience with municipal governments or negotiation procedures in general.*

The recommendation is worded vaguely, because there is such a wide variety of experiences which could have attuned a candidate to the underlying requirement. As we have tried to convey throughout the report, there is little in the Pilot experience to indicate that rule-books for change agents are of help, and much evidence that a generalized receptivity to negotiation situations is essential. *The job of Director is preeminently one of interaction with other human beings with varied interests and varied worries. The expectations of the Pilot Cities Program that systems experts would be appropriate as Directors was especially misguided.* The best systems analysts (and the ones who became Directors of the Teams in Dayton and Omaha) had acquired their skills through working with hardware systems, where systems analysis is an extremely powerful methodology. In the political and bureaucratic arena, systems analysis is still in an early stage of development, and a background as an analyst for hardware systems was more a source of frustration than of help.

One final recommendation about the Director is that

- (25) *The Director should be full-time on the project, for it is clearly a full-time job.*

2. *The Team.* Turning to the issue of Team member qualifications in general, the overall conclusion is that

- (26) *The Pilot Team Associates as a group were only marginally qualified by any standard.*

*Requirements for a few hard, minimum credentials should be defined and followed.*

One of the most mystifying aspects of the Program was why the grantees accepted so many lightly qualified people for good-paying jobs, in an employer's job market.

- (27) *The general importance of expertise in law enforcement and criminal justice applies to the Associates as well as to the Director, but not necessarily through operational experience.*

Whether a Team member could talk to an LE/CJ official often depended on whether the Team member knew the ins and outs of operations in that kind of LE/CJ office. As expected, the agency officials scrutinized Team members for signs of naiveté. But many Team members without operational experience were able to pass this inspection. If a prospective Team member has experience in technical assistance or research efforts performed for line LE/CJ agencies, he or she probably has enough operational knowledge to meet the criterion. *The backgrounds which most often meant trouble were (a) a brand new degree in an LE/CJ specialty, with no operational experience; or (b) experience, but in fields entirely unrelated to LE/CJ.* Each Team, however, should have room for at least one person who is not an expert in some LE/CJ discipline. For, whether he or she knows anything about LE/CJ or not,

- (28) *The Team should possess at least one member with professional social science research credentials.*

Teams which did not have solid research expertise at their disposal were clearly hampered in the range of efforts they could undertake. By "professional research credentials" is meant experience with technically complex social science research efforts, preferably as the director of those efforts. A Ph.D. in a methods-oriented social science specialty would be another desirable credential. Whatever the combination, *it is important to avoid the assumption apparently made by some Teams that an advanced degree in a social science field automatically means expertise in social science research.* It does not.

"Local experience" was thought to be an important credential at the outset of the Program. Experience has indicated that it was overvalued:

- (29) *Local experience should take last priority in selecting Team members.*

Experience in the community appears to fall in the category of "a good thing if it happens to be available," but it is not essential. Very few cities of the size of the Pilot Cities have an abundance of specialists who meet the other qualifications that have been discussed. There should be no hesitation in seeking personnel elsewhere--*the Pilot Cities Program indicates that the best long-term entree to the local system was solid professional qualification, not connection with a local Old-Boy network.*

3. *Process.* Once the Team personnel have been selected and are ready to go to work, they would do well to follow the same general plan which was prescribed for the Pilot Cities program:

- (30) *The basic process sequence specified in the Pilot grant applications was sound and should be retained.*

We suggest three changes in emphasis. First,

- (31) *Greater stress can be put on an activist approach. A good Team can take the lead in suggesting ideas and advocating positions.*

This is recommended cautiously--change experiences around the world have documented the dangers of trying to impose an outsider's concepts of the right way to do things. But the evidence from the Pilot Cities experience is that if the Team is sensitive to the local agency's general perception of its needs, the Team has substantial latitude in initiating and advocating solutions. This should not, of course, be construed as a recommendation that projects be initiated outside of channels, or that they should be pushed despite opposition from key officials.

The second recommended change in emphasis is that

- (32) *The collection and analysis of baseline data should support ongoing planning activities. It should not be a detached compilation of crime statistics and budget data.*

The Pilot Teams which tried to adhere most closely to the injunction to establish a data base before beginning their plans usually found themselves stuck on dead center. In theory, comprehensive baseline data are an excellent thing to have. In practice, *it is more important that a Team move quickly into problem areas that stand out in the minds of local*

officials. Such problems are likely to be the most important ones--we found no evidence that local LE/CJ officials in the eight cities needed to be told what the "real" problems were. And Teams such as those in San Jose and the Tidewater found they could collect the baseline data more efficiently, and with much greater applicability, once it was pegged to a known problem area.

The third recommended change in emphasis is that

- (33) *Finding the right agencies to work with is often more important than finding the most important problems.*

San Jose's initial application for a Pilot grant pointed to "the importance of working downhill" and achieving positive results quickly. We wish to underscore this very practical consideration, which seemed to receive less attention as the Pilot Program continued. *Once credibility was established, doors opened*, including ones leading to bigger and more important problems. Starting with "easy" problems also gave the Pilot Teams valuable experience, which increased the likelihood that they *could* be helpful in solving the tough ones.

4. *Support and Monitoring.* On this topic, the lesson of the Program seems to have been that the right support may not be able to push success on a poor Team, but the wrong support can cause a potentially adequate Team to fail. Our general recommendation is that

- (34) *The city/county Team needs maximum independence from LEAA. Once the personnel have been selected, the useful support that LEAA can provide is very limited.*

A partial exception to this rule is financial support. An annual entitlement of \$500,000 is not necessary, but it is likely that a Team's effectiveness could occasionally be boosted by special consideration on discretionary grant applications. Particularly at the outset of a Team's efforts, it is desirable that a Team have some material resources to point to. *But the Pilot Cities experience provides ample support for the hypothesis that the technical expertise of the Team members should and can be the main asset that provokes change.* The recommendation is that

- (35) *Some demonstration funding should be made available, but it need not be a central component.*

The deemphasis of demonstration funding would also facilitate independence from the Regional Office, which is especially desirable. By far the greatest controversy over Team independence occurred between some Teams and their Regional Offices. And in reviewing the merits of the various cases, we have been strongly persuaded that unless the technical expertise of the Regional Office staff is considerably upgraded,

- (36) The Regional Office's responsibility for Team performance should be *restricted to financial monitoring.*

Regional Offices could not make a bad Pilot Team good; it is unreasonable to expect that they could. They should not be given authority to attempt the impossible.

5. *Selection of Sites and Grantees.* NILECJ devoted a substantial effort to site selection, and the AIR team spent a great deal of time evaluating this effort. After the fact, it seems that both parties spent too much time worrying about details of a matter which is, at best, of secondary importance. For the evidence indicates that

- (37) *There is no apparent demographic or political profile of a good site.*  
A good site is one that really wants a Team.

This conclusion is qualified by the considerable heterogeneity which characterized Pilot Cities sites; it is conceivable that a profile exists which could not be discerned. Still, it is questionable whether any site selection team could determine a site's suitability with sufficient accuracy to rank order all potential candidates. It is an extremely difficult task. Even with the advantages of hindsight and much more data than the site-selection staff could afford to collect, we are unable to rank the eight cities on an inherent structural or political receptivity. And even if we could, it is not at all clear to us that the exercise would be a useful one. *For there is no evidence that the most successful Pilot Teams owed any significant portion of their success to an inherent receptivity of the local environment.* The important "receptivity" was the support which the Teams generated by being helpful. Whether the *environment* was "receptive" or "neutral" did not seem to matter.

What did matter was whether the environment was inherently hostile. It is doubtful, for example, whether it would have been possible for a Team to have been highly productive in Albuquerque or Omaha, at the time they were selected as sites. But in naming those two cities, we are confirming what was

known by LEAA personnel from the beginning--that Albuquerque was not suitable and Omaha was at best marginal. That the site selection teams *did* determine the undesirable characteristics is a positive finding. It suggests that even though LEAA may not be able to pick the best cities, it can avoid the worst ones. The conclusion is that

- (38) In considering a grant application for a city/county Team, *it is more important and much easier to identify unsuitable cities than to rank order cities which appear to be suitable.*

In addition to ascertaining that city and county officials understand the function of the Team and are in support of it, we recommend that

- (39) *It should be determined whether the SPA explicitly endorses the application for a Team, not just whether it is willing to "sign off" on it. If possible, the SPA should know and endorse the prospective Director.*

The Pilot Cities experience indicates that the independent Team and the SPA can coexist. Problems did occasionally arise, however--Des Moines was the most prominent example--because of perceived invasions of SPA jurisdiction. Elaborate measures are not required, but the SPA should be fully aware of what the Team will be doing, know that it will be structurally independent of SPA authority, and approve of its establishment. "Approval" must be genuine, not (as in some Pilot Cities) *pro forma*.

The last recommendation specific to the city/county Team is that

- (40) *The grantee should have an institutional interest related to LE/CJ.*

This recommendation is provisional, because it is based only on negative evidence--most of the grantees had no institutional stake in LE/CJ, and some of them were remarkably indifferent to their Pilot Team's substantive activities or professionalism.

\* \* \* \*

The many specific guidelines for applying the Team approach are based on five years of experience in eight cities. Hind-sight has made many of the guidelines look like "the obvious thing to do" in the first place, when in fact the issues were not at all clear at the outset. But even after recognizing the problems that the program designers faced, it remains our conclusion that *the Pilot Cities' history is one of a good idea that was poorly translated into an action program.* And the fundamental reason for the design failure is one that deserves mention, even though we have no prescriptions for preventing it the next time:

- (41) *LEAA and NILECJ failed to think through exactly why the Program was being established, what it was intended to accomplish, and consequently could not base a program design on those purposes.*

This does not mean that the Program was started casually, or that objectives were not specified. There was no shortage of objectives for the Pilot Cities Program. *The failure was to pare down the list, establish priorities, and, most of all, to adhere to the spirit of the original idea.*

As we have been able to reconstruct the process, the progenitors of the Team approach had a good idea; but one which was ultimately bound up with people, not procedures. Roughly put, the American Justice Institute originally said to LEAA that it had some people who were competent in LE/CJ fields, who had thought carefully about the problems of introducing change, who had tempered those ideas in previous projects, and, as a result of all of these conditions, had developed an approach which would let them do good things in San Jose if LEAA would give them the money. Then came a prolonged series of interactions between the prospective grantee and LEAA. At the end of it, the language of the application had been changed and some cosmetic aspects of the program itself had been changed. But the rationale for *why* the idea would work had been lost in the shuffle of revisions, and along with it had been lost the implications for replicating the project elsewhere.

Instead, the vehicle for replicating the project was a shopping list of objectives and procedures tacked on by a procession of persons who participated in LEAA's end of the negotiations. *Individually*, these persons may have thought very hard indeed about why the Pilot Cities Program was being established and what it was intended to accomplish. But the inconsistencies among these individual visions of the Program were not resolved, and the result was a patchwork of ideas and expectations which could be interpreted in drastically different ways by different people.

Beneath it all was the simple notion that a small team of competent people with bureaucratic mobility and independence can do a lot to improve law enforcement and criminal justice in a city, by helping local officials do certain things and learn certain things that they are not in a position to do and learn alone. Like most simple notions, it was susceptible to complication. The Pilot Cities Program's test of it was a very incomplete one. To the extent that the Program did implement and test it, the soundness of the concept is supported.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix A: LEAA GUIDELINES FOR THE PILOT CITIES PROGRAM

A central document of the Pilot Cities Program is the "Guideline." It was developed at the meeting of personnel from the Pilot Teams, Regional Offices, NILECJ, and LEAA/Washington, which was held at Quail's Roost, North Carolina in late spring, 1972. It reflects the goals and priorities of the program at that time. In its ambiguities, it also reflects the difficulty that the Pilot Cities Program experienced in trying to reach a consensus. And it subsequently served as the key citation in arguments about who was being faithful to the intent of the program. Because of its role in the history of the Program, the Guideline is reprinted here in its entirety.

\* \* \* \* \*

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

GUIDELINE

January 2, 1973

Subject: LEAA Pilot Cities/Counties Program

1. PURPOSE. This Guideline briefly summarizes the purposes and goals of LEAA's Pilot Cities/Counties Program, and states policy with respect to the administration of the program.
2. SCOPE. The provisions of this issuance apply to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), the Office of Criminal Justice Assistance (OCJA) and to those LEAA Regional Offices, state planning agencies (SPA's), and cities within whose jurisdictions Pilot Cities/Counties are designated.

### 3. BACKGROUND

- a. LEAA has now designated eight demonstration sites throughout the nation to participate in an intensive, scientific program which seeks to build within a given metropolitan area a system-wide and community-based research, development and action program. The eight Pilots, along with the date of grant award are:
- (1) San Jose and Santa Clara County, California - 5/70;
  - (2) Dayton and Montgomery County, Ohio - 7/70;
  - (3) Charlotte and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina - 12/70;
  - (4) Albuquerque and Bernalillo County, New Mexico - 2/71;
  - (5) Norfolk Metropolitan Area, Virginia - 9/71;
  - (6) Omaha and Douglas County, Nebraska - 9/71;
  - (7) Des Moines and Polk County, Iowa - 9/71;
  - (8) Rochester, New York - 6/72;
- b. An action-oriented team of professionals experienced in criminal justice research has been established in each demonstration area. With the assistance of federal funds and by application of the most current knowledge and technology, these project teams assist local officials to: (1) identify and assess major criminal justice problems (2) implement coordinated pilot projects that test, demonstrate, evaluate and disseminate methods for the reduction of crime and delinquency.
- c. No two pilots have developed in exactly the same way, but reflect each pilot team's methods of operation within the community and criminal justice milieu. Since the teams are not agencies either of the Federal government or of the state or city/county in which they are situated, they have a unique ability to become intimately involved with problem solving in the criminal justice system while remaining at arm's length in dealing with political and bureaucratic structures. Their ability to respond to unforeseen needs and opportunities is an important aspect of program development.

### 4. GOALS. The goals of the Pilot Program are:

- a. To demonstrate the ability of an interdisciplinary team with exceptional research and analysis capabilities to work with an operating criminal justice system and within a period of five years to contribute significantly to the improved ability of that system to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.

- b. To institutionalize the gains made during the Pilot City Program by building into the target area's criminal justice system the research and analysis capability necessary for system-wide, problem oriented planning and program evaluation.
- c. To understand more clearly the process by which change takes place in the criminal justice system so that more effective means can be devised for the nationwide dissemination and possible implementation of well tested innovations.

5. ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS. Characteristically, there are three basic activities carried on in each pilot city in order to attain program goals:

- a. Pilot Research. To help diagnose and give needed definition to criminal justice problems, pilot research is conducted. The emphasis is to concentrate on common problems in a real life setting and to develop tools, measurement techniques and methodologies which will be transferable to other jurisdictions. In this respect, the pilot city serves as a laboratory site to develop and test new methods for reducing crime in America.
- b. Demonstration Projects.
  - (1) Discretionary LEAA funds are provided to each Pilot City/County to support carefully conceived, pioneering demonstration programs that can serve as "models." (In appropriate circumstances, a program that seeks to accomplish any of the following purposes may also qualify as a demonstration effort:
    - (a) Introduces an approach which is not widely accepted in the area or region.
    - (b) Consolidates a number of existing, individually accepted ideas.
    - (c) Provides for the first time an evaluation of an existing program or accepted idea.
    - (d) Contributes to the foundation for the long-term development of a model criminal justice system).
  - (2) Strong research and evaluation schemes are built into demonstration programs to assure assessment of impact. There is also an attempt to learn more about the process of program implementation.
- c. Technical Assistance.
  - (1) Because it is less visible and does not normally result in a "product," technical assistance is more difficult to measure. It can be properly described as a process of community development:

- (a) To improve criminal justice agency planning skills.
  - (b) To improve criminal justice agency management capabilities.
  - (c) To improve criminal justice research and evaluation capabilities.
- (2) As a result of the five-year pilot program effort, there should be planning, management, and research and evaluation capabilities existing within the criminal justice system and the community far superior to those at the program's inception.

6. PILOT CITIES AS A NATIONAL PROGRAM. The Pilots, as participants in a national research and demonstration program, are not intended only to serve the host city and county or state. Jurisdictions with relatively well-developed criminal justice agency services were sought out deliberately so that they could concentrate on pioneering, on research and on developing program models that hopefully will show the way to others. The Pilot Program will be judged by what the project team can accomplish in the demonstration site, and also by their usefulness in producing research tools and methodologies, and demonstration programs which will be useful in the rest of the nation. There is a danger that a pilot could become too parochial. On the other hand, these communities cannot be expected to serve only as "federal laboratories." There is a need to strike a balance so that the pilot team can assist the host jurisdictions and the nation.

7. ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

- a. National Pilot Program Coordinator. This individual within LEAA Headquarters is designated to be the focal point for region-central relationships. The national coordinator can be consulted by LEAA regional coordinators for interpretation of procedural, substantial or financial policies and guidelines. National pilot program conferences or workshops involving more than one pilot will be convened by the coordinator as he deems appropriate.
- b. Regional Offices. Each LEAA Regional Administrator will be responsible for:
  - (1) Reviewing and monitoring the progress of his Pilot City.
  - (2) Approving project budget.
  - (3) Supplying and monitoring general program directional as defined in the approved grant to the Pilot Cities team.
  - (4) Designating a coordinator on his staff to handle day-to-day contacts with the pilot and other LEAA components as concerns the Pilot Program.

- (5) Assuring the receipt of appropriate and timely reports by the pilot team and grantee as prescribed in the approved grant.

c. The State Planning Agency (SPA) and Regional Planning Unit (RPU).

- (1) Pilot team staff may participate in the conceptualization and design of major demonstrations to be supported from the SPA's "block grant." It is legitimate for the staff to provide this technical assistance when requested by local agency staff and/or the SPA. However, Pilot staff should avoid committing resources to the development of projects which are essentially parochial in nature, or which have limited transferability or merely upgrade services.
- (2) There may be instances in which national objectives and local interests are compatible and pilot team involvement in the design of a "block grant" project may add to the success of the pilot effort. In assessing needs and in planning demonstration programs, the Pilot City team should take into account the plans and priorities of the RPU and SPA. The SPA and appropriate RPU must be kept informed of pilot city planning and program development efforts.

- d. Other States. The LEAA Regional Administrator and Pilot City team may determine that it would prove beneficial to provide specific technical assistance to other jurisdictions within the state and region, providing said technical assistance does not distract from the Pilot's primary efforts. Specific efforts in this regard must be mutually acceptable to the Pilot team and the Regional Office. Standard technical assistance request procedures will be followed. Technical assistance requests concerning any resources from LEAA Headquarters should be placed through the appropriate LEAA regional coordinator to the national coordinator.

e. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ).

The NILECJ is responsible for the development and implementation of appropriate program evaluation criteria and procedures. The evaluation design will be carried out in concert with the national coordinator, the various Pilots, cognizant SPA's, and Regional Offices. The Institute will oversee technology transfer, and the collection and dissemination of new methodology, techniques and knowledge developed by the Pilots. Institute personnel, upon request through the national Pilot program coordinator, may be available to provide technical assistance for research project design and related matters.

8. PILOT PROGRAM FUNDING.

a. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Funds.

- (1) Each Pilot City Staff is supported by NILECJ funds. These

funds, along with any local contributions, provide the support of the Pilot research demonstration project design and technical assistance.

- (2) The NILECJ funds support each Pilot in twenty-month budget phases. These funds will be forwarded to each LEAA Regional Office with jurisdiction over a Pilot for award and grant administration. The NILECJ funds should not be passed through an SPA to the grantee responsible for project administration. LEAA's discretionary grant guidelines and application form may be used for requesting NILECJ funds.

b. Discretionary Grant Monies.

- (1) Agencies of government with criminal justice responsibility in the target area are eligible for non-competitive discretionary funds each fiscal year. Such agencies must receive the endorsement of the target pilot unit of government.
- (2) These discretionary monies are to support pioneering demonstration programs which can serve as models for the rest of the country. Strong research and evaluation components will be required. Demonstration projects which focus on the reduction of crime shall receive particular emphasis.
- (3) Project proposals are to be developed through discussions between the local agency grantee, the cognizant LEAA Regional Office and the grantee administering the pilot project grant. As with any discretionary grant, the SPA and its regional unit, if any, will participate in the review process. These earmarked discretionary funds are independent of other discretionary funds the agencies may apply for in connection with LEAA's annual program.

9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. Each Pilot team director will forward copies of progress reports, final reports, and research reports or studies to (a) the cognizant LEAA Regional Administrator, (b) the LEAA National Pilot Program Coordinator, (c) NILECJ, (d) each SPA in the region, and (e) each Pilot City/County.

## Appendix B: ABSTRACTS OF THE PILOT DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

Ninety-eight demonstration projects were identified in which the Pilot Team played a major role. An abstract of the purpose and content of each of these projects is given below. They are grouped under these headings, in order: crime prevention and apprehension (page B-1), definition of police role (B-7), police technics (B-11), police research, planning, and evaluation (B-14), juvenile court treatment systems (B-16), diversion and disposition (B-18), court administration (B-21), adjudication (B-25), incarceration (B-26), community-based corrections (B-29), probation (B-33), crime-related social services (B-37), systems research, planning, and evaluation (B-42), and miscellaneous (B-45).

### CRIME PREVENTION AND APPREHENSION

#### Property Crime Reduction

Albuquerque

Purpose: To reduce city and county property crimes by:

- establishing a criminal intelligence unit and a warrants unit in the sheriff's office to increase pressure on offenders;
- establishing a special operations section, Crime Analysis Unit and a Legal Services Unit in the City Police Department, to upgrade PD tactical and analytical capabilities in dealing with property crime.

Content: Project funds provided for the establishment of the teams and units mentioned above. In addition Pilot Cities Teams designed evaluation methodologies for the project.

#### Personal Crisis Intervention

Dayton

Purpose: To reduce the number of "crimes-against-persons," resulting from familial or inter-personal disputes, by training policemen to recognize signs of emotional distress which may lead to such crimes.

Content: Under the project contract, mental health professionals on the staff of the Adult Psychiatric Clinic were available to the police department on a 24-hour, 7 days a week crisis basis, to provide professional consultation and assistance. The clinic staff was responsible for training policemen in identifying underlying emotional problems, and for funding local treatment resources for the policemen's referrals. A telephone survey of 2,000 local residents was conducted to evaluate the utility of the project.

Crime Analysis Team (CAT)

Dayton

Purpose: To improve police operations, by collecting and analyzing data on the degree of citizen input into police strategy and policy development, on the number and causes of unexpected burglaries and robberies, and on serious potential crime patterns.

Content: A Task Force Action Team collected and analyzed the following categories of data.

- beat patrol/crime mapping data for improving police management;
- manpower utilization data involving response time, productivity, etc.;
- general management information from police and the community.

A large proportion of the data was used in reallocating patrols, to reduce the previously high response time.

Public Defender Pre-Trial Release Program

Dayton

Purpose: To provide effective legal representation to indigent criminal defendants at pre-indictment stages of processing and to decrease pre-trial detentions and the use of bail money.

Content: The project staff, composed of a public defender, two assistant defenders and several investigators provides the following services:

- legal representation to indigent criminal defendants arrested on felony or misdemeanor charges from arrest to indictment.
- bail related information to the Municipal and County District Courts within Dayton and Montgomery County, to insure that decisions on pre-trial release are based on objective data. The types of information supplied, include an arrestees prior criminal conviction, family ties, employment stability, residential stability, etc.

Small Business Security Program

Dayton

Purpose: To reduce the high incidence of commercial crimes (robbery, burglary, and larceny) among small businesses located in minority areas and to retard the movement of businesses away from these areas, by improving their security programs.

Content: Serving approximately 100 small businesses located in high crime areas of Dayton, the project staff:

1. fosters relationships between community members and law enforcement agencies, in order to increase the cooperation of employers, patrons, and local citizens in providing evidence on details of crimes;
2. assesses which security precautions each business needs in order to comply with standards qualifying them for regular or Federal High Crime Insurance;
3. provides mechanical and/or electrical security devices whose utility has already been evaluated for individual business facilities;
4. provides training on methods of maximizing security to small business owners and employees, in cooperating with existing police department and community education training programs;
5. is developing a manual of security guidelines for all small businesses based on the experience gained from this project.

Task Force on Target Hardening

Dayton

Purpose: To demonstrate the usefulness of action task forces in improving causative and crime specific factors, and therefore establishing a more secure community.

Content: Action task forces, composed of personnel from city, state and federal agencies concerned with fire, housing, health, probation, parole, and welfare, attempted to establish more secure communities in high crime areas by:

- developing a public education program which promotes the use of better security devices and helps create a positive image of the police;
- making available comprehensive insurance coverage to small businesses and low-income families in high crime areas;
- assisting low-income families and small businesses in purchasing security systems;

- providing concentrated attacks on specific problems identified by the City's Task Force on Crime.

Victim Input on Crime Trend by Incident Measures  
(VICTIM)

Des Moines

Purpose: To provide long-term extensive follow-up investigations of both dwelling and commercial breaking and enterings in the Des Moines area.

Content: The project provides 3 Master Patrolmen who are assigned to the Crimes Against Property Section of the Detective Bureau. Each officer in the unit is responsible for making appointments and conducting interviews with victims. In addition, officers in the unit:

1. provide a vehicle for the collection of extensive data on patterns, rates, and methods of both dwelling and commercial breaking and enterings;
2. measure the attitudes of victims toward the Des Moines Police Department, as well as investigational methods;
3. promote citizen reports of crime;
4. personally contact crime victims in order to gain ideas on new prevention techniques and to educate victims in averting future crimes; and
5. encourage citizens to report offenses to the police.

Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad (MANS)

Des Moines

Purpose: To decrease drug and narcotics traffic by establishing a comprehensive drug and narcotics enforcement effort which would ultimately increase the capability of each of the law enforcement jurisdictions within the Metropolitan Polk County/Des Moines area.

Content: The project, in cooperation with all of the law enforcement jurisdictions and authorities in the area, provides:

1. for the transfer of existing trained, qualified narcotics officers and necessary operating equipment and resources from the Des Moines Police Department;
2. extensive training and indoctrination for all personnel assigned to the new metropolitan narcotics squad;

3. county-wide support for the narcotics and dangerous drugs enforcement problem through the use of educational programs; and
4. sophisticated county-wide enforcement techniques in the field of drug law enforcement.

### Family Conflict Intervention Team Experiment

Rochester

Purpose: To provide police with more effective methods for handling family conflict situations in order to:

- reduce the rate of crisis recidivism among families coming to the attention of the police;
- develop skills among police officers in intervening in conflict situations without harming themselves or using force;
- decrease the number of arrests of parties in conflict situations.

Content: The project staff organized police teams who were trained in special techniques for handling conflict situations, and acquainted with relevant programs and resources in the community. In addition, the staff established mechanisms for referral of conflict-situation clients to appropriate programs and agencies. A support team was responsible for providing a link between the policemen's initial identification of the problem and the referral and treatment process.

### Development of Prevention Methodology by Burglary Offense Analysis

San Jose

Purpose: To reduce burglaries in high crime geographic areas, on high risk premises and on specific property targets, by analyzing and refining current burglary reduction processes.

Content: A Burglary Analysis Unit (BAU) was created to analyze the burglary reduction process (prevention, detection, identification, apprehension, prosecution, rehabilitation and the return of stolen property). Proven tactical programs, such as operation SCRIBE, Security Checks in High Risk Areas, operation FENCE (Field Enforcement Neutralizing Conversion Effects), and code enforcement were implemented initially. The BAU recommended, designed and operationalized improvements in these programs.

Purpose: To establish a countywide, interjurisdictional law enforcement program aimed at: 1) reducing the supply and demand for illegal narcotics; 2) establishing a Law Enforcement Drug Council; 3) establishing a specially trained cadre of law enforcement officers; 4) improving operational inter-relationships between agencies; 5) establishing an effective public education and instruction program; 6) increasing the effectiveness of narcotics enforcement of smaller law enforcement agencies; and 7) establishing a central narcotics record system and implement a stricter narcotics and drug abuse enforcement policy countywide.

Content: Using undercover techniques, agents of the narcotics bureau develop relationships with users, suppliers and informants in the drug market. Systematic surveillance is used to obtain sufficient information for a search warrant. A liaison network has been established between the Bureau and all local jurisdictions active in narcotics law enforcement work.

High Impact Target Program: Crime Specific Planning

Tidewater

Purpose: To design a High Impact Target Program, which would reduce the incidence of burglary in the impact area, without displacing it to other areas of the city or region.

Content: The Pilot Cities Team provided technical assistance to the city of Norfolk, in designing the HIT program. In the final plan, it was suggested that the following techniques be used to reduce the incidence of burglary.

- the employment of a planning analyst to collect data on burglary occurrence in the HIT area;
- a variety of police patrol techniques, including surveillance in sections of the area with "high incidences of burglaries;"
- careful follow-up investigations of all burglaries by four special burglary detectives and a police undercover agent;
- the initiation of a city-wide crime prevention program stressing community involvement; and
- the employment of a Legal Advisor to aid enforcement personnel in improving the quality of cases for prosecution and the assignment of two assistant commonwealth attorneys to handle all burglary cases.

Family Crisis Intervention Training

Tidewater

Purpose: To train police officers in methods of dealing effectively with individuals and families in crisis situations (i.e., marital fights, attempted or threatened suicides, runaways, etc.).

Content: The project funds provided for the hiring of consultant clinical psychologists who conducted 40 hours of training sessions for 80 policemen. Crisis intervention counseling skills were taught by role-playing and simulation methods. Skits of actual family crises that policemen experience were videotaped, played back on television screens, and discussed by the participants.

\* \* \* \* \*

DEFINITION OF POLICE ROLE

Psychological Consultation Program

Albuquerque

Purpose: To aid police officers, who experience emotional stress in handling conflict situations, by procuring the services of a consulting psychologist who would, 1) screen recruits for emotional instability; 2) help officers cope with routine pressure; and 3) help officers deal with problems associated with work in a bicultural community.

Content: A consultant psychologist was employed on several occasions for counseling officers. Plans to conduct psychological training for officers involved in special programs, conducting behavioral studies, and maintaining statistics regarding stress factors, were not implemented because an individual with the desired qualifications could not be recruited.

Albuquerque Police Department Youth-Related Property  
Crime Reduction Program

Albuquerque

Purpose: To reduce chronic truancy and vandalism among juveniles by establishing school/police counseling teams to work with predelinquent and delinquent youth identified by police, schools and the courts.

Content: The project staff and the Pilot Cities Team implemented the counseling team project in city schools. Teams held counseling sessions for selected youth, oriented towards helping them understand the effects of deviant behavior on society and themselves. The two major hypotheses tested in an evaluation of

the project were: 1) that chronic truancy is significantly reduced in those schools serviced by school/police teams; and 2) that reported daytime vandalism and property crime rates are reduced in areas immediately surrounding those schools in which the school/police teams operate.

Police Officer's Race and Cultural Relations Training

Albuquerque

Purpose: To sensitize Albuquerque police officers to racial issues in order to enable them to more effectively deal with problems of minority groups (primarily Chicano) in the area.

Content: A local university consultant conducted a series of 3 one-week seminars in race relations for 90 police officers. The seminars incorporated lectures on psychology and criminology, panel discussions with community representatives, books, pamphlets, and films. After three weeks, participants formed small groups to discuss their experiences and to formulate suggestions for approving their image among members of the minority community.

Police Reorientation Survey

Dayton

Purpose: To increase the interface between the police department and the community as a preliminary step in reducing crime through more effective police operations.

Content: Under the project, a contractor aided the police department in accomplishing the following tasks:

- devising a system for community input into the day-to-day functional activities of the police department;
- developing a means for involving the community in crime fighting studies;
- developing a model for decentralizing a major principal police department to the community level;
- outlining a plan for implementing the models mentioned above.

Juvenile Liaison Cadet Project

Des Moines

Purpose: To increase the number of trained sub-professional juveniles assisting in the juvenile operations of the Des Moines Police Force.

Content: The project staff, composed of professionals and non-professionals, is increasing the number of assignments filled by youth police cadets. Its activities are related to the current police-school liaison program in six Des Moines High Schools. Specifically, the staff is:

1. increasing the number of contacts between the police cadets and students in the designated high schools;
2. establishing a police career information center for interested high school students;
3. increasing the number of contacts between cadets and juvenile residents of Des Moines;
4. increasing minority participation on the police force; and
5. providing courses in law enforcement to Juvenile Liaison Cadet personnel at Des Moines Community College.

Police and Citizens Together Against Crime  
(PAC-TAC I, II, III)

Rochester

Purpose: To improve community attitudes toward the police, to deter criminal activity and civilian victimization, and to expand the police manpower base by using a civilian and policeman team to patrol high crime areas.

Content: In this experimental program, civilians and officers work as two-person teams, patrolling fixed "beats" in selected urban neighborhoods. The team responds to service calls, aids regular mobile patrols in their duties and tries to prevent criminal activity and civilian victimization. Crime and service statistics for the neighborhoods involved are being collected for use in evaluating the project. The final evaluation will include a comparison of the experimental teams with control groups.

Victim and Witness Assistance Project

Rochester

Purpose: To establish a Victim and Witness Assistance Center in the police department which would aid in 1) reducing the alienation of victims and witnesses from the criminal justice system by providing them with improved, coordinated and new services; and 2) increasing the proportion of victims

and witnesses assisting in the prosecution of cases.

Content: The Victim and Witness Assistance Center staff provide the following services:

- dissemination of information designed to orient the public to the operation of the court system and acquaint them with services available to victims and witnesses;
- coordination of services available to victims such as assisting them in filing for victim compensation;
- development of a "stand-by" procedure for informing victims and witnesses of their trial schedules;
- development of a special telephone service for answering victim and witness questions on cases;
- improving police sensitivity to victims and witnesses;
- provides services such as transportation to court and referral treatment centers.

Combating Felonious Crimes by Citizen Involvement

San Jose

Purpose: To increase involvement in combating and reporting crime in San Jose by providing a public education program on crime.

Content: Through a Citizens' Anti-Crime Committee, task forces were developed to address specific problems. The project established citizen/police teams who visited neighborhoods with high crime rates in order to distribute crime prevention information and to open lines of communication between the police and the community. A drug abuse center and educational program were created to provide drug information to the community. Radio programming in Spanish was initiated as a vehicle for informing the community's principal minority group of its rights and duties in relation to the criminal justice system.

Chesapeake Police Youth Services Unit

Tidewater

Purpose: To provide previously unavailable training, referral, and coordination resources to those agencies involved in delinquency and predelinquency situations, and to examine the feasibility and effectiveness of using police officers in non-law enforcement roles with juvenile delinquents.

Content: The unit, staffed with six sworn police officers and a secretary, conducted inter-agency training sessions for more than 200 city employees and

developed a curriculum for law enforcement and criminal justice presentations at the junior and senior high school level. Additionally, each Youth Service Officer was assigned to a high school and its feeder junior high school. Since the initial establishment of contacts with school administrators, counselors, and teachers, the officers have been meeting with the students and responding to referrals regarding over 200 youths.

Chesapeake Police Minority Recruitment and Manpower  
Development Project

Tidewater

Purpose: To improve law enforcement in the city by changing police department personnel composition and procedures (i.e., increasing the number of minority and college graduate personnel, reexamining recruitment qualification procedures in terms of job-relatedness, and increasing intra-departmental and inter-work input into training and planning processes).

Content: Following the method of recruitment specified by the project, college minority group juniors and seniors were approached by department personnel and urged to participate in the program. An intensive year-long internship designed to acquaint participants with the various facets of police work and to prepare them for qualification procedures requisite to entering the police force was required of potential recruits. Consequently, personnel from the police department in conjunction with Marguetta University Law School reviewed recruitment and selection processes to determine if they were unintentionally discriminatory.

\* \* \* \* \*

POLICE TECHNICIS

Criminalist Lab Survey

Albuquerque

Purpose: To survey the needs of a crime laboratory to be located in a new Albuquerque Police Department facility.

Content: Project funds provided for the hiring of a criminalist who was responsible for identifying existing crime lab resources in the area and defining needed local support, equipment and personnel. After conducting a series of field trips to neighboring metropolitan areas and conferring with local jurisdictions, the staff concluded that a local crime lab was justified. A lab was finally established through state block grants.

Community-Based Resources for Criminalistics Examination Omaha

Purpose: To expand and coordinate existing, local non-law enforcement laboratory resources in order to make available to area law enforcement agencies all criminalistic examinations necessary in the course of criminal investigation and prosecution.

Content: Implementation of the project was accomplished by:

- hiring a criminalist responsible for
  1. categorizing and coordinating local crime lab capabilities,
  2. training enforcement personnel in means of identifying, collecting and preserving physical evidence,
  3. maintaining statistics on the system and determining the feasibility of multi-examination sequences.
- expanding police department crime laboratory facilities and capabilities; and
- acquiring necessary equipment for ballistics comparison, collection and preservation of evidence, analysis of narcotics and drugs, and analysis of body fluids.

Community-Based Services for Status Offenders Omaha

Purpose: To decriminalize status offenders by establishing community-based services which will provide positive and productive alternatives for youth faced with problems which would otherwise lead to involvement in the juvenile justice system.

Content: The project members will establish the following services for status offenders:

- a 20-bed group home for runaway youth which provides shelter, food, family counseling, advocacy and referral services;
- an adolescent foster care unit for ungovernable youth which recruits and trains foster parents and screens youths for placement;
- a counseling program for truants in which a legal advisor and a counselor attempt to aid the student in solving the problems causing his truancy; and
- a school preparation center for status offenders which provides flexible, individual remedial programs for status offenders with educational difficulties.

Computerized Single Fingerprint Classification System

San Jose

Purpose: To increase police speed and precision in fingerprint identification of burglary and narcotics offenders by implementing a computerized fingerprint classification system that will serve the San Jose police and other law enforcement agencies in the country.

Content: Project funds were awarded to operationalize the computer system. Fingerprint classifier-encoders were hired and trained. They are currently processing burglary and narcotic "known offender" fingerprint records and entering them into a computer index system. Latent prints obtained from crime scenes will be "searched" against the base file by a previously designed computer program.

Police Records Improvement Program

San Jose

Purpose: To develop an integrated and updated archival records system for quick reference by Police Agencies throughout Santa Clara County.

Content: In this cooperative effort between Santa Clara County and the San Jose Police Department, a records system was selected, acquired and prepared for utilization by county sheriffs and police. The system is capable of rapidly storing, updating and retrieving records and identification documents in order to provide accurate information to field and investigative units of police agencies.

Fingerprint Accessing and Scanning Techniques: Norfolk, Va. Tidewater  
FAST

Purpose: To develop a base computer file of fingerprints of known active felons and narcotics addicts in order to: 1) test the worth of the system in solving major crimes; 2) accurately record the benefits from such a system; and 3) record the information necessary for implementation of the program in other jurisdictions.

Content: The project developed and operated a base computer file of fingerprints of known felons and narcotics addicts over a 12 month time span. After three police sergeants had classified and entered existing prints into the system, all latent prints developed at the scene of felonious offenses were classified and compared to the data base. An external evaluation analyzed the effectiveness of the program.

\* \* \* \* \*

## POLICE RESEARCH, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

### San Jose Police Program Planning Project

San Jose

Purpose: To improve the management operations and procedures of the Police Department and thereby increase the department's capability in reducing the incidence of crime by establishing a Police Program Planning Unit staffed by professionals.

Content: A three-man planning group of specialists in operations, fiscal planning and personnel management was hired with project funds. Functioning under the direction of the Police Chief as a special staff unit, the group conducts research and analysis efforts designed to provide the Department with short, intermediate, and long-term plans and implementation schedules. In addition, the unit works closely with line and staff commanders in addressing their day-to-day operational problems.

### Crime Analysis - Project Evaluation - Research (CAPER)

San Jose

Purpose: 1) To implement a countywide system for crime analysis-program development-evaluation; 2) to promote multi-jurisdictional and regional crime reduction planning efforts; and 3) test the utility, flexibility and transportability of the CAPER system.

Content: Project staff will collect, process, and assist the law enforcement agencies in Santa Clara County in the statistical analysis and interpretation of CAPER data. The system will allow specific crimes and related characteristics to be retrieved and plotted in any size geographical configuration. Tables of related data can be produced to provide a basis for development of tactical plans and programs. The data accumulated will provide a "baseline" by which the effectiveness of implemented programs can be measured.

### Portsmouth Police Planning and Analysis Unit

Tidewater

Purpose: To develop strategies for improving decision making in the police department, reconciling community needs and the department provision of services and facilitating maximum utilization of the department's resources.

Content: The project provided funds for two civilian positions, the Planning and Crime Analyst and the Management and Systems Analyst. As a first step, the analysts collected base data regarding crime incidence and drafted a profile of the department which served as the basis for future planning actions. Subsequent activities included application of the standards set forth in the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report on Police, to the Portsmouth Police Department.

Norfolk Police Planning and Analysis Office

Tidewater

Purpose: To improve police management by aiding supervisors in developing means of identifying problem areas and in devising procedures to deal with them. An additional goal was to increase management's awareness of the necessity for changing outdated procedures.

Content: After fulfilling office and personnel requirements, the unit adopted a work plan for improving resource identification and allocation actions in the police department. Subsequently, a five-year plan was developed on the basis of feedback from operating elements of the police department on previous guidelines.

Portsmouth Police Standards and Goals Review

Tidewater

Purpose: To utilize the Police Standards and Goals recommended by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in order to revamp the Portsmouth Police Department.

Content: A comparison of the standards and goals was completed on the recommendations of past departmental management surveys and the current administrative and operational practices of the department. Research and developmental activities for the implementation of the standards and goals have been scheduled, and resource requirements have been met through a discretionary grant from the NILECJ.

\* \* \* \* \*

## JUVENILE COURT TREATMENT SYSTEMS

### Comprehensive Delinquent Youth Program

Dayton

Purpose: To reduce recidivism among juvenile delinquents by increasing the effectiveness of the Montgomery County Juvenile Court's diagnostic and treatment system. An improved individual, behavior-oriented information management system will provide the means for making necessary improvements.

Content: The diagnosis and treatment information system was implemented in the following three stages:

- Stage 1: A systems contractor identified information needs and resources for each of the units within the juvenile court system and designed a system to meet these needs.
- Stage 2: The computer system design was implemented by obtaining necessary programs and filing a sample juvenile population into the computer.
- Stage 3: A demonstration of the system's effectiveness in attaining more accurate diagnosis was carried out by comparing an experimental and control group.

### Target Truant

Rochester

Purpose: To establish a diversion system for status offenders which would reduce status recidivism by improving the juvenile's social adjustment into school, family and society and which would also institutionalize a tracking mechanism for generating demographic and court-related data on participating offenders.

Content: The project staff (Project Director, Research Analyst and Assistants and Youth Crisis Counselor (Advocate's) is responsible for:

- counseling 150 status offenders referred by Intake directing them to appropriate community resources and screening them for emotional and learning disabilities;
- designing and implementing a tracking system model that generates demographic and court-related data on status offenders; and
- evaluating the program by comparing status offender in Target Truant with juveniles who receive the normal Intake service.

Consultants will provide necessary training for counselors in special techniques for handling juveniles in crises.

Pre-Delinquent Diversion Program

San Jose

Purpose: To divert to community resources the pre-delinquents referred to the Juvenile Probation Department by establishing diversion services in each police department in the 12 law enforcement jurisdictions in Santa Clara County.

Content: The Juvenile Probation Department subcontracts with each police agency for diversion services, and the project staff provides administrative consulting and research services. In most police jurisdictions, funds are used to train and pay the salaries of police officers specializing in diversion. These officers screen offenders before booking and refer them to community resources. The decentralized nature of the project allows each agency to develop a program at its own level of sophistication, with its own "cafeteria" of community resources.

Chesapeake/Norfolk/Virginia Beach/Portsmouth Juvenile  
Based Transaction Statistics Information System  
(JJIS)

Tidewater

Purpose: To develop in four phases, a basic automated data processing system that would provide accurate and timely juvenile treatment data to pertinent agencies in the four Tidewater cities and serve as a prototype for other jurisdictions throughout the nation.

Content: The project, initiated in the city of Chesapeake, funded the system concept development, institution of security provisions, and preparation of computer programs necessary for the establishment of an inter-agency data bank. Since the file contains demographic, psychological and treatment data on each case, objective evaluations of treatment programs can be made, and optimal treatment regiments for new offenders determined.

Virginia Beach Juvenile Status Offender Diversion Program

Tidewater

Purpose: To establish a unit in family crisis intervention to substitute for the existing petition and adjudication process.

Content: After a supervisor and 5 counselors were hired and trained in family diagnosis, conjoint therapy, drug recognition, etc. and a house in proximity to the juvenile court rented, status offenders were accepted for treatment. The effect of the counselor's attempts to open up lines of communication between offenders and their families, and to promote the understanding of problems underlying delinquent acting out, is being evaluated by experts in crisis intervention.

\* \* \* \* \*

## DIVERSION AND DISPOSITION

### PASPORT

Dayton

Purpose: To divert offenders from the criminal justice system by providing a pre-adjudication rehabilitation program which would reduce recidivism by minimizing the stigma associated with conviction and the debilitating influences of incarceration. The program would also reduce work-loads for the courts and trial costs.

Content: The project staff was responsible for developing a pre-adjudication treatment program for defendants already participating in the pre-trial release program. Specific project tasks included:

- developing a methodology to screen defendants for program participation;
- developing a network of community services in counseling, job referral, etc.;
- developing a comprehensive diagnostic evaluation and treatment plan for each defendant for whom diversion is recommended.

Follow-up data on program participants was collected for a final evaluation of the program.

Resource Investigative Needs of the Public Defender's Office      Omaha

Purpose: To reduce crime by developing an alternative to incarceration for selected offenders. Specifically, the project would aid the court in making optional dispositions by 1) developing a resource profile for offenders which may be useful in determining the likelihood of their readjustment and 2) developing ways for active participation by organized labor in the recruitment, employment and adjustment of offenders.

Content: Two resource-investigators, working for the Public Defender, developed personal data about selected offenders, located employment opportunities to match their work capabilities, and made this data available to the Court after a finding of guilty, but prior to sentencing. If the recommendations of the resource-investigators were used as an alternative to incarceration by the court, the Public Defender monitored the offender's progress during the probationary period. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association evaluated the project.

Santa Clara County Pre-Trial Release Program

San Jose

Purpose: To increase the proportion of arrestees granted pre-trial release on their own recognizance by providing timely information to pre-trial release decision makers. To demonstrate that people released on well-founded decisions will less often fail to appear in court or engage in criminal acts pending trial than people released on payment of bail.

Content: The project staff of law student interviewers, operates the program around-the-clock to interview all arrestees, except drunks, who are booked into the county jail. Arrestees are evaluated by objective criteria to determine eligibility for pre-trial release. This model program is expected to result in considerable savings both to the accused and the community. An evaluation will assess its effect on criminal justice processes.

Differential Diagnosis and Treatment Program for Adults Offenders

San Jose

Purpose: To reduce adult offender recidivism by restructuring and implementing a cost-effective, comprehensive service delivery system for individualized diagnosis, treatment, and control of adult offenders.

Content: Under the direction of the Adult Corrections Advisory Board, the project personnel are:

redesigning pre-sentence services to increase the quantity and quality of information about offenders available to the courts for sentencing;

evaluating offender classification schemes and developing criteria for correctional programs;

organizing volunteer services for use in correctional programs; and

improving adult probation officer work-loads, and therefore increasing the individualized supervision for each probationer.

Custody Classification Preprocessing Center

San Jose

Purpose: To improve the quality of justice in Santa Clara County by 1) releasing arrested persons who do not require pre-trial detention, and 2) assuring that arrested persons are charged at the appropriate level (felony misdemeanor) with the appropriate charge(s).

Content: Operating 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, a consortium of professionals (including a Senior Police Field Supervisor, a Deputy District Attorney, a Pre-Trial Release Specialist, and a Crisis Intervention Worker) provide multi-dimensional screening of cases after arrest, and before being booked into jail.

Evaluative services include:

1. review and classification of the charge;
2. determination of eligibility for pre-trial release; and
3. diagnosis, referral and follow-up for other social needs.

\* \* \* \* \*

## COURT ADMINISTRATION

### Criminal Justice Agency Management

Albuquerque

Purpose: To provide a basis for identifying problems and making system-wide improvements in the courts, police, and sheriff's functions in San Bernalillo County.

Content: A management consulting firm (Booze-Allan) was given a contract to study work flows and agency interrelationships from a systems analysis perspective and make recommendations for changes.

### Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS)

Charlotte

Purpose: To facilitate improvements in court operations by establishing a court-oriented defendant-in-process computer-based information system which would:

- provide intake information on defendants;
- aid in the scheduling of court resources;
- uncover obstacles in the flow of defendants through the court; and
- improve the criminal justice system by coordinating operations of the agencies involved.

Content: Project consultants drew up a conceptual design of the system and delineated specific plans for implementing it. After presentation to the Mecklenburg Criminal Justice Planning Council for review and recommendations, the CJIS design was submitted to an independent agency for evaluation and specification of computer and manpower needs. Technical personnel are in the process of implementing the system.

## Improved Charge Analysis

Des Moines

Purpose: To dispose promptly of criminal charges by requiring no more than 60 days to process a felony from time of arrest to beginning of trial; and to obtain convictions in 80% of all contested cases.

Content: By adding six additional staff to the County Attorney's office, the project intended to accomplish the following:

- Develop a charge strategy on all individuals within 48 hours of their arrest;
- Ascertain need for a formalized diversion strategy and refer to appropriate noncriminal justice agency if so;
- Complete a large portion of the preliminary work (e.g., all documents required in the case) required to bring a case to trial which had formerly been scattered among other county agencies;
- Represent County Attorney's office in all court appearances through arraignment;
- Assist in evaluating total prosecutorial process based on final disposition made of charges.

## Model for Lay Administrator/Analyst Utilization in a Medium-Size Prosecutor's Office

Des Moines

Purpose: To accurately identify and ameliorate the problems existing within the Polk County Attorney's Office, with the ultimate goal of decreasing case lag and reducing the number of defendants who, after being screened, are brought to trial only to be acquitted.

Content: Project funds provide for a small administrative unit, headed by a skilled administrator/analyst who:

1. analyzes the procedures involved in processing a criminal case from point of arrest to final adjudication;
2. develops and assists in implementing administrative steps that will reduce the time elapsed from arrest to adjudication;
3. analyzes and develops improved management procedures in the County Attorney's office;

4. implements data collection techniques permitting comprehensive analysis of operations and performance;
5. provides analysis of the Prosecutor's office in relation to other agencies, i.e., (a) arrest practices, (b) interrogation procedures, (c) utilization of community resources; and (d) influence on citizen/community resources.

District Court On-Line Information System

Omaha

Purpose: To improve the responsiveness of the District Court to current and projected requirements and to improve the timeliness and accuracy of court records and reports by computerizing court administrative functions.

Content: The project staff is utilizing the resources of a local data processing center (staff and an IBM 340/155 Computer System) to automate selected court functions so that data will be directly available to the District Court and Court Administrator through a duplexed computer terminal. The terminal will provide the primary means of updating, creating, and purging court data in the computer system.

Court Computer Information and Management System  
(PROSPER)

Rochester

Purpose: To design and implement a computer-based court information system which would improve the operation and management of the court by providing information faster, more efficiently, and with greater security.

Content: The project staff was responsible for designing and implementing a system usable by the City and County Courts, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Pre-Trial Release Program, the Adult Probation Department, the Jail and Commissioner of Jurors. The system provides information on offenders from their first arrest through each succeeding agency, performs clerical and record-keeping functions for the agencies involved, and provides data in key decision points throughout the criminal justice system.

Purpose: To formulate goals, standards, and recommendations that will assist the Judiciary in administering the criminal justice system in the county. Specifically to make recommendations that will aid judges in their responsibilities to oversee and set policy for several pre-trial programs, to act as members of various boards and commissions, and to deal with a wide array of rehabilitative programs.

Content: Under the direction and control of a ten-member Joint Judicial Committee representing the Municipal and Superior Courts, a core project staff will: (1) interview Judges to determine their definitions of judicial roles outside the classroom; (2) compile and synthesize this information; (3) strengthen lines of communication among Judges and between the courts and other agencies; (4) define and test new programs; and (5) organize four plenary sessions to assist the county's 45 Judges in setting standards and taking action on specific issues.

Norfolk Commonwealth's Attorney Management  
and Improvement Program

Purpose: To bring the operation of the Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney in Norfolk into compliance with the court standards of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

Content: The program involved four major areas of action. First, a specialized juvenile court unit was established which: (1) tested the utilization of full-time attorneys on the prosecutorial function, (2) worked with the police and juvenile intake section in developing policies and procedures for the screening of juvenile offenders, (3) developed, implemented, and evaluated a prosecutorial training program, (4) participated in the training of police officers in the juvenile bureau, (5) participated in the training of intake officers regarding the preparation and review of petitions, and (6) developed crime-related educational programs for the city's school. Second, improvements in office management were attempted through the establishment of the position of administrative manager and the preparation of an office manual regarding policies and procedures for processing various types of cases. Third, a standard set of jury instructions was developed by the Administrative Manager in cooperation with staff attorneys. And, fourth, statistical procedures were developed for the evaluation of the overall effort.

## ADJUDICATION

### Centro Legal I (Clinical Law Program)

Albuquerque

Purpose: To provide legal assistance and counsel to indigents accused of misdemeanor offenses by establishing a legal services center staffed by university law students.

Content: The project was activated by the University of New Mexico Law School and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and is being implemented through the Public Defender's Office. The project established a legal services center where indigent misdemeanants receive counsel on legal problems. An evaluation of the project attempted to determine whether or not there was any difference in the quality of service provided by supervised law students and members of the bar to indigent defendants accused of misdemeanors.

### Albuquerque Property Crime Prosecution, I & II

Albuquerque

Purpose: To increase the conviction rate of property crime offenders and therefore decrease the occurrence of property crime by hiring and training prosecutors to focus solely on property cases.

Content: Project funds provided salaries for two prosecutors in the District Attorney's Office. Both prosecutors were trained specifically for property crime work, and concentrated their efforts on prosecuting property crime offenders. An independent evaluation of the project was conducted.

### Comparative Legal Defense Services

Des Moines

Purpose: To determine if there is a statistically significant difference between services provided by court-assigned and public defender legal counsel to accused indigents within the Polk County community.

Content: The project provides counsel for 35-45% of all accused indigents through a public defender office, and the remainder receive counsel under the traditional court-assigned system. Although the project is principally concerned with comparing the public defender system with the court-assigned

system, a randomly selected sample of cases utilizing privately retained counsel are also being studied in order to determine whether significant differences exist between publicly provided and privately retained counsel. Information on the personal characteristics of the accused indigents is being collected in order to distinguish between outcomes attributable to idiosyncratic factors and factors related to type of counsel. A full-time staff of approximately five and a part-time staff of law students provides support services for both the public defender staff and court-assigned attorneys.

Prosecutor/Defender Intern Program

San Jose

Purpose: To develop and implement a model clinical internship program for law students that will (1) improve the skills of the students involved; (2) broaden students' understanding of defense and prosecutorial functions; and (3) facilitate the development of professional relationships between practicing attorneys and students.

Content: Project staff designed and implemented a clinical internship program in the Public Defender's and District Attorney's Offices for University of Santa Clara and Stanford University law students. In addition to the practicums, advanced seminars were conducted at both universities under the direction of experienced professors. Students conducted mock trial cases which were videotaped and later criticized by students, the trial judge, supervising attorneys, and professors.

## INCARCERATION

Diagnostic and Treatment Center for Dayton

Dayton

Purpose: To reduce the recidivism rate at the Human Rehabilitation Center (a regional correctional facility for adult male misdemeanants) by providing more extensive professional diagnostic and treatment services to inmates.

Content: The project is staffed by two full-time administrators, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, three counselors, and several part-time staff. They are responsible for conducting diagnostic testing of inmates (e.g., medical exams, psycho-social interviews, psychiatric screening, and psychological, vocational and academic testing), and for providing corrective services (e.g.,

in-house and extramural academic and vocational programs, individual, family, and group counseling; and follow-up programs). Existing community resources were utilized as often as possible to meet program needs.

Follow-up Study of State Training Schools

Des Moines

Purpose: To provide a follow-up evaluation of youths released from Iowa's two State Training Schools in order to determine the success of such institutions.

Content: The project staff of two researchers selected three samples of 40-50 youths admitted to training schools in 1965, 1968, and 1971. A variety of variables were selected, i.e., reconviction, recommitment, the severity of the offenses opposed to the severity of the sentences, in order to provide statistical comparisons of pre-commitment juvenile activity and post-release juvenile or criminal activity. Subjects were personally interviewed, and interviews with local schools were obtained if subjects had returned to school. This research enables the Training School to more accurately identify and assess the youths with whom they deal and more clearly identify their needs.

Rehabilitative Intervention for Sentenced Prisoners (RIP)

Rochester

Purpose: To examine the feasibility of reducing the recidivism of convicted misdemeanants by providing them with mental health services while they are in jail.

Content: The project Treatment Team composed of a psychiatrist, a health educator, and several therapists conducted the following activities:

- psychiatric interviews with inmates to determine the amount and type of psychiatric problems present in that population;
- in-service training programs for the jail staff in means of managing the disturbed, using available mental health services, and cooperating with the Treatment Team;
- group and individual psychotherapy for those inmates who express an interest in the program; and

- follow-up procedures when the inmate is discharged, including arrangements for treatment at community agencies, and with family members, employers, etc.

An experimental design was used to assess the effects of the program on recidivism, job stability, and social functioning of prisoners.

Diagnosis Classification and Treatment for  
Jail Inmates

San Jose

Purpose: To reduce recidivism among adult offenders by restricting and implementing a cost-effective, comprehensive service delivery system for the individual diagnosis, treatment and control of adult offenders.

Content: Project personnel are expanding county capabilities in diagnosing and treating adult offenders by:

- redesigning present services in order to increase the quality and quantity of offender information;
- evaluating current correctional programs;
- coordinating volunteer and other community resources for correctional uses; and
- providing more intensive supervision, treatment, and control services by reducing probation workloads and utilizing other resources more effectively.

Jail Population Management Project

San Jose

Purpose: To produce a jail population management system that will aid the sheriff in alleviating overcrowding in county institutions by (1) identifying alternatives to the present system of incarceration, (2) simulating the process of implementing these alternatives, and (3) forecasting future jail populations.

Content: The project staff implemented a data collection and analysis model in the corrections system that monitors and predicts overcrowding in specific jails. Early efforts focused on collecting data, coding, and keypunching it,

and producing "test" population reports on the computer. In analyzing the data, the staff identified means of alleviating overcrowding by influencing population level changes.

## COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS

### Youth Services Bureau (YSB)

Charlotte

Purpose: To establish a Youth Resources Agency which would divert a substantial number of children from the juvenile court and/or correctional systems to needed services and would promote community responsibility for the identification, development, and delivery of these services.

Content: The Youth Resources Agency staff provides the following services for referred juveniles (all were on the verge of commitment to training school for violating their probation).

- a temporary residential care facility for youth, designed to coordinate the needs of the child and his family with available community resources;
- casework services for children remaining in their own homes;
- individual and group counseling on a 24-hour-a-day-basis; and
- contingency contracting, a behavior modification technique.

The agency has also established a working relationship with the Juvenile Court, schools, police, social service agencies, and colleges.

### Youth Service Bureaus (YSB)

Dayton

Purpose: To mobilize community resources in a coordinated effort to:

1. reduce juvenile delinquency;
2. decrease the workload of juvenile court;
3. provide schools and law enforcement agencies with viable alternatives of service, other than suspension, expulsion, court referral, and detention;
4. upgrade the quality and quantity of youth resources;
5. meet the individual needs of youth offenders.

Content: The project acquired three houses in Dayton, each providing twenty-four-hour emergency counseling service for youth. The Youth Service Bureau staff, composed of four full-time counselors and five full-time youth aides at each location, was responsible for acting as a liaison between the youth and community service agencies to insure that they received existing services. In addition, the YSB staff has helped identify community service needs and participated in the development of alternative programs to meet these needs.

Diversionsary Community-Based Services  
for Mentally Retarded Offenders

Omaha

Purpose: To divert the mentally retarded individual from the criminal justice system by establishing and staffing one group home for six mentally retarded adult offenders, and two staffed apartments, each serving two mentally retarded adult offenders.

Content: The project staff, in cooperation with county criminal justice agencies, is accomplishing the following:

- selecting and training staff and locating facilities for the apartments and group home;
- developing selection criteria for offenders referred to the program;
- placing offenders admitted to the facilities in community day programs and coordinating existing community supportive services -- counseling, recreation, etc. -- for their use;

- establishing programs in the facilities that promote the acquisition of skills necessary for independent living; and
- developing a system of measurable and objective guidelines that can be used by criminal justice personnel in defining training needs of mentally retarded offenders.

Juvenile Behavior Modification in a Group Home Environment

Omaha

Purpose: To reduce recidivism among juveniles by establishing three pre-disposition group homes that will serve as alternatives to institutionalization or straight probation.

Content: The project staff is responsible for establishing and directing the group homes, counseling youth and their families, training group home staffs in behavior modification, and following-up youth who have returned to their families. Specific services provided to the youth are as follows:

- Psychiatric and psychological evaluations of high risk juveniles placed in the evaluation center prior to adjudication;
- short-term counseling and behavior modification for those low-risk youngsters and their families who are placed in group homes prior to adjudication;
- extensive individual and family counseling, supervised peer-group interaction, behavior modification for juveniles placed in group homes after disposition. The staff of these residential centers is composed of counselors, group home directors, teaching couples, and social workers.

The project will be evaluated by the pre-test, post-test, control-group design method.

Ex-Convict Motivation and Recovery Center  
(X-MARC)

San Jose

Purpose: To reduce the recidivism rate of released inmates from local penal institutions by: (1) providing a community-based alternative to incarceration, and (2) facilitating relationships between ex-offenders, parole probation officers, and the community at large.

Content: Releasing inmates from local penal institutions with few resources and poorer than average chances of parole probation success are placed in a residential community-based halfway house staffed by ex-felons. Staff members provide support and assistance in releasees' efforts to secure jobs and to reintegrate into the community.

Juvenile Probation Day Care Center

San Jose

Purpose: To operate day-care treatment centers for male and female high school youth who do not need institutional placement but who need more supervision than provided by normal probation.

Content: Project funds supported the operation of the center for youths referred by the Juvenile Court. The center provides intensive individual and group counseling, remedial training, and family therapy for referred juveniles, in addition to meeting their usual daytime needs, such as food, education, recreation, etc. A cost-benefit analysis of the center, involving comparisons of its cost-benefit ratio with those for institutional care, was completed.

Norfolk Juvenile Pre-Adjudication Non-institutional  
Outreach Detention Project

Tidewater

Purpose: To demonstrate that it is both practical and economical to release alleged juvenile delinquents to their own or surrogate homes prior to the adjudication of their cases, rather than detaining them in a secure facility.

Content: The project funds provided for an indigenous Outreach staff, with responsibility for locating community residents willing to house alleged delinquents, developing definite criteria for making detention decisions, and placing juveniles from the Norfolk Youth Center in private homes. An independent evaluator is assessing the extent to which the project provides better services to juveniles and lowers the cost of detention.

## PROBATION

### Offender Reintegration Program

Albuquerque

Purpose: To provide paroled, probationary and pre-parole juvenile and adult offenders with vocational and on-the-job training, basic education, counseling, and performance monitoring that will reduce recidivism and criminal activity among program participants by helping them secure jobs.

Content: The project staff, in concert with the State Department of Corrections, County Manpower Program, City Public Schools, State University and District Court, is responsible for coordinating existing community resources for offender rehabilitation and reintegration into an integrated program. The juvenile program provides enrollment for offenders in: (1) an alternative education program to the public school; (2) regular school program; (3) pre-vocational training; and (4) a part-time employment program. The project provides individually tailored training, job placement, performance monitoring, counseling, and follow-up services for adult offenders.

### Intensive Probation Supervision

Albuquerque

Purpose: To reduce recidivism and improve the cost-effectiveness of adult probation supervision by implementing and evaluating a team probation and volunteer supervision probation program that stresses the importance of frequent contact and the development of close, personal relationships.

Content: Project personnel organized two teams, each consisting of two para-professionals and two professional probation officers who supervised probationers more intensely over a shorter period of time than is traditional. A team of volunteer probation supervisors was also organized. The effectiveness of the volunteer team approach was assessed according to the criteria of: (1) recidivism rates; (2) length of time involved in achievement of correctional goals; (3) frequency of contact with probationers; and (4) cost per probationer. It was expected that team probation supervision would be more effective than traditional or volunteer supervision and that volunteer supervision would be more effective than traditional.

Community Adjustment for Parolees

Dayton

Purpose: To reduce the recidivism rate among juvenile parolees by providing them with an integrated educational experience, including counseling, job training, guidance, etc.

Content: The project staff in cooperation with the Ohio Youth Commission and eight teachers from the Public School System initiated an educational program that provides:

- stress challenge experience both away from and within the local community;
- job training, job opportunities, in-service training, and group experiences patterned after Junior Achievement;
- individual, group, and family counseling, including family visitations; and
- weekly guidance and/or tutorial sessions.

Youth Guidance Program

Des Moines

Purpose: To divert as many youths as possible from entering or reentering formal adjudicative channels within the Polk County Juvenile Court.

Content: The project provides counseling and guidance as an alternative to formal court procedure in cases in which youths brought to the court's attention have a reasonably stable family situation and who have behavioral problems which do not demand formal court action. The project staff includes a project coordinator, probation officers, volunteers, and a family counselor who conducts sessions with youths and their parents in learning more about the conduct of their children and ways to interact with and control them. A certified teacher helps individual clients with their personal academic problems.

Restitution in Probation Experiment

Des Moines

Purpose: To eliminate the negative side effects of maximum or medium security institutionalization by providing a local direct-contact restitution program for offenders.

Content: The project provides a community-based corrections center, serving both men and women on probation and offenders residing in short-term correctional facilities. The project staff, composed of probation officers and counselors, arranges periodic face-to-face sessions involving both the victims of crimes and their offenders. Traditional counseling is also available to offenders to help them reassess their attitudes towards "crime" and "criminality."

Probation Employment and Guidance Program  
(PEG) I and II

Rochester

Purpose: To reduce recidivism and increase job and family stability among adult probationers by using a panel of counselors and community leaders to increase employment among probationers.

Content: The project staff, in concert with the county probation department, has developed:

- a Review Panel which screens adult probationers for job readiness, and gives them professional diagnosis on employment potentialities and employment-related problems;
- an Employment Guidance Council composed of volunteers from industrial psychology manpower training and personnel fields, which attempts to increase employment rates among adult probationers by means of guidance sessions, supplemented by follow-through assistance from a Community Liaison Officer, a coordinator, and the regular staff of probation officers.

The project was evaluated in terms of its effects in recidivism, employment, and social functioning among probationers.

Family Court Probation Project

Rochester

Purpose: To reduce juvenile recidivism by providing a coherent and coordinated "front" of public and private services relevant to the juvenile offender. Specifically, the project aims at reorganizing the structure of the Family Court Probation staff, developing an allied services system, and investigating the impact of a maximum diversion model on the juvenile.

Content: The project staff improved the delivery of services to juveniles by:

- reorganizing the probation department so that personnel were assigned to geographic catchment areas;
- establishing probation teams in satellite offices in the four catchment areas;
- establishing special teams for drug abuse, institutional placement, and child abuse;
- developing an "allied services" approach to the multi-problem family, by detaching personnel from related criminal justice and social service agencies to work with the probation team in experimental and control catchment areas; and
- training probation staff in methods of improving their performance.

Portsmouth Juvenile Court Specialized  
Services Behavior Modification (SKINNER)

Tidewater

Purpose: To treat adjudicated juvenile delinquents by employing them in progressively more responsible positions.

Content: The project's five-person staff was responsible for implementing the program. Job experience was accepted in place of traditional probation as a therapeutic tool. Participants progressed from relatively simple jobs as subjects in research on delinquent behavior to assistants in that research and then to more complex and responsible jobs.

Norfolk Juvenile Justice Services-  
Juvenile Court of Norfolk

Tidewater

Purpose: To upgrade probation services in the Juvenile Court of Norfolk through improved diagnosis of each child's needs and more adequate supervision of probationers.

Content: The project created a Diagnostic and Evaluation team which, after devising testing instruments and purchasing equipment, conducted all court-ordered investigations of children within the purview of the Juvenile Law. Also established were seven decentralized field probation offices intended to improve supervision of probationers and to stimulate community awareness of and involvement in meeting the needs of juvenile offenders. Three probation officers were assigned to each unit. The average caseload for the six of the offices was approximately 100 cases, while the seventh, which was located in a high delinquency area, averaged approximately 50 cases. Programs of service and interest to the probationers and their families have been instituted, including consumer protection seminars, home economics classes, and recreational teams.

Volunteer Program for the Portsmouth Juvenile  
and Domestic Relations Court

Tidewater

Purpose: To provide comprehensive counseling and probationary services to juvenile clients by volunteers.

Content: The project provided funds for the hiring of a Volunteer Coordinator who was responsible for the recruitment, training, and supervision of volunteers. From an initial recruitment of 18 individuals, the program grew to include 41 volunteers. Of that number, 29 were matched with juveniles from probation caseloads, several performed office clerical duties, and one served as an assistant Intake Officer. The volunteers met on a monthly basis to discuss problems and to learn more about city services available to youth. The size of the client group was not indicated.

CRIME-RELATED SOCIAL SERVICES

Rape Victimization Study

Albuquerque

Purpose: To aid criminal justice agencies in preventing rape and prosecuting offenders once a rape has occurred by conducting a research project that focuses on: (1) factors contributing to an increase in reporting rapes; (2) the real incidence of rape; (3) measures for assisting victims of rape; and (4) revising methods of investigating and prosecuting rape cases.

Content: Project staff, in cooperation with the Rape Crisis Center, at a local university designed and conducted the rape research program. In addition to analyzing and collecting data from police records of reported rape and District Attorney files on rape prosecution (1970-1974), the staff sponsored a series of seminars with the Police Department on the victims of rape. As a result of the interest and efforts of project personnel, a Task Force on Victims of Sex Crimes has been established.

Decriminalization of Public Inebriates

Charlotte

Purpose: To reduce the costs of public inebriates to the police, courts, correctional facilities, hospital emergency rooms, and the community-at-large by providing inebriates with a comprehensive treatment plan outside of the criminal justice system.

Content: A project staff of 13 administrators, counselors, and recovery assistants provides the following services to public inebriates and the community:

- pre-screening for medical problems and crisis counseling at a reception center;
- training for center staff in recognizing medical problems, making correct referrals, and counseling inebriates;
- treatment for inebriates in a voluntary, outpatient, nonmedical detoxication center; and
- rehabilitation and treatment for alcoholics in two 10-person group homes.

Community Drug Education Center  
(CDEC)

Charlotte

Purpose: To lower the incidence of drug abuse in the county by addressing causes, such as disrupted family life, inability to cope with problems, lack of self-esteem, and parental alcoholism. Specifically, the center educates neighborhood groups, parents, and students in means of communicating, solving problems, and alternatives to drugs.

Content: The CDEC staff of 13 conducts the following courses, rap sessions, etc., as part of a general strategy to lower drug abuse:

- teacher and parent effectiveness training in communicating and solving conflicts with youth;
- neighborhood courses in means of helping local families;
- elementary and junior high school classes in methods of promoting mental health;
- training programs for volunteer counselors;
- rap groups drug problems; and
- families anonymous, a self-help group for families of drug abusers.

Comprehensive Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Program (CASP)

Dayton

Purpose: To prevent and control the growth of drug and alcohol addiction throughout the Montgomery County area by: (1) providing a full range of preventative and therapeutic options to the potential and actual drug and alcohol dependent person; (2) insuring that drug and alcohol dependent persons receive continuity of care; and (3) forming a liaison between service and law enforcement agencies.

Content: A Dayton Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse was established to coordinate the seven existing alcohol and drug treatment centers (halfway houses, residential, and nonresidential de-tox and counseling centers, and diagnostic and after-care centers) to manage, evaluate, and plan new alcohol and drug projects, and to increase community involvement in solving drug and alcohol problems. The staff of five succeeded in designing a long-range plan for alcohol and drug abuse services in the country by starting a new residential center and a diversion program for drug dependent youth, and in devising and implementing a course for persons convicted of "driving while intoxicated." A contractor conducted the program evaluation.

Purpose: To control the increasing number of runaways in Iowa while alleviating the demands placed on local and state juvenile criminal justice agencies by establishing a runaway service that includes a temporary shelter for youths.

Content: The runaway service project staff:

1. offers more alternatives to law enforcement agencies in handling runaways, thus reducing by approximately 50 percent the number of referrals to the Juvenile Court;
2. provides youth with emergency shelter, food, supervision, counseling, and basic necessities, thereby reducing the number of serious juvenile offenses precipitated by the runaway episode;
3. provides a housing component, rather than stressing alternative living facilities, thus reducing the number of runaways detained in juvenile detention homes;
4. assists families and youth in developing strengthened home conditions, before and after the runaway's return; and
5. is conducting an extensive evaluation to ascertain the types of youths receiving the services of the IRS.

Alcoholism Detoxification and Rehabilitation  
Planning Center

San Jose

Purpose: To divert inebriates from the criminal justice system as provided for under recent legislation.

Content: Inebriates will be picked up by police without formal arrest and booking and taken to one of five public health centers in the county. At the public health intake center, project personnel will medically screen inebriates for placement in the recovery center, the acute detoxification facility, or appropriate out-patient, residential, and other community services. After detoxification, patients will be routed to voluntary follow-up services provided by existing county alcoholism programs.

## Juvenile Drug Abuse Prevention Program

San Jose

Purpose: To provide an economical alternative to formal adjudication of minor drug cases at no increase in risk to individuals or the community, to free probation resources for work with more serious juvenile offenders, and to test various treatment approaches on juvenile drug offenders.

Content: Project personnel organized three types of counseling programs: Education Counseling (EC), Transactional Analysis (TA), and Psychodrama (PD) for youths arrested on minor drug charges. Eligible arrestees were assigned to EC, TA, PD, or to a control group. After completion, the four groups were compared according to the criteria of feasibility of operation, recidivism, self-reported drug use, attitudes toward drugs, family relations, and costs. The EC treatment method was selected and implemented on the basis of these criteria. In addition, program personnel encouraged community agencies and individuals to develop similar programs outside of the juvenile justice system.

## Methadone Treatment and Rehabilitation Program

San Jose

- Purpose:
- To decrease the incidence of heroin addiction and thereby reduce the number of drug arrests and related criminal justice costs;
  - To reduce the occurrence of property crime believed to be playing an important role in supporting heroin addiction; and
  - To improve the life chances of methadone patients.

Content: The project established five decentralized clinics throughout the county to provide methadone stabilization and maintenance to up to 1,000 opiate addicts. The clinics also provide appropriate referral services to available individual and family-rehabilitation programs. Project staff is researching the effectiveness of methadone withdrawal programs. In addition, the criminal, social, and medical impacts of the program were evaluated.

## SYSTEMS RESEARCH, PLANNING AND EVALUATION

### Improvement of Records

Albuquerque

Purpose: To improve the court's record-keeping system in order to facilitate information retrieval and storage for related criminal justice agencies, and to aid the Pilot Cities Team in obtaining data for monitoring change and improvements in the criminal justice system.

Content: The project provided resources for a variety of noncomputerized information retrieval services, using existing court staff. Some new equipment (e.g., microfilm equipment) was purchased.

### Mecklenburg Grants Management Project

Charlotte

Purpose: To minimize administrative delays in implementing Pilot "O" programs by developing a model administration, implementation, and fiscal management component for the Pilot area.

Content: The planning unit's grant manager and financial officer is responsible for:

- developing regular procedures for monitoring projects, processing submitted grant applications, tabulating fiscal information, and making financial reports;
- insuring that project applications include express criteria for evaluations, project or resources to be used, and a timetable; and
- minimizing lags between requests from project directors and responses between receipt of material for processing and its transmission to the appropriate staff member.

### Dayton/Montgomery County Criminal Justice Center

Dayton

Purpose: To establish an interdisciplinary county training center which would coordinate existing educational resources and develop supplementary

training guides and programs for police, court, prosecution, and corrections personnel.

Content: The center employs a project director, a management specialist, a counselor, and an evaluation specialist who are responsible for assisting local criminal justice agencies in:

- defining job responsibilities for which training and education are needed;
- coordinating existing educational resources in order to provide effective curricula convenient to CJ personnel; and
- developing new job-related training experiences as supplements to the existing curricula.

(YRC) Youth Resources Commission

Dayton

Purpose: To focus the community's attention on the problem of juvenile delinquency and other problems related to youth, to mobilize community resources in a coordinated attack on the problem, to seek resources for new and expanded programs, and to initiate and encourage change in the community's approach when study has indicated this to be necessary.

Content: The Youth Resources Commission, consisting of 50 members, 33 representatives of the participating groups, 12 youth, and 5 members-at-large performs the following functions:

- serving as a clearinghouse for information related to delinquency;
- coordinating, planning, and evaluating youth services agencies;
- educating the community on problems of juvenile delinquency and laws dealing with delinquents;
- serving as a referral resource; and
- planning and conducting training workshops to assure that professionals in the community are aware of new techniques and developments in delinquency prevention.

Concept of Information Retrieval for Crime  
and Law Enforcement (CIRCLE)

Dayton

Purpose: To provide a system whereby information and data necessary to the successful operation of county criminal justice operations may be more effectively collected, more rapidly retrieved, and more efficiently used.

Content: A professional contractor and the project staff designed and implemented a computerized storage and retrieval system which incorporated the following data points:

- crime and criminal information, such as wanted criminals, criminal histories, fingerprints, modus operandi, criminal associates, stolen property, and types, time, area, and patterns of crime, etc.
- planned and actual assignments of resources for accomplishment of organization workloads, such as traffic and criminal case scheduling, police deployment, and jury selection.
- program achievement and cost information.

Center for Urban Analysis

San Jose

Purpose: To improve planning, program evaluation, research, and problem-solving capabilities of local government agencies by establishing a central data service which provides comprehensive computerized information about the urban environment.

Content: Project funds provided the necessary computers, files, and trained personnel to establish the urban information center. The center is capable of providing a variety of services to the agencies. For example, crime addresses can be aggregated into predefined geographic areas, such as census tracts or beats, and compared to property and population characteristics of that area. In addition, computer-produced maps can be made showing the location of crimes in a given area, and displays can be made on a television-type computer terminal.

Purpose: To design an integrated automatic data processing system that would trace the adult offender's progress through all agencies comprising the local criminal justice structure and would assist court management officials in administrative tasks.

Content: The project funded the design and implementation of the program. The specific tasks accomplished were:

- formulation of a documented system design concept which identified module definition and supporting file descriptions;
- developing of computer programs for organizing and retrieving data;
- computer storage of data, including those demographic, treatment, psychological, and crime variables of each adult offender, which had been collected since the first incident report was submitted.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Victimization Center

Dayton

Purpose: To provide a means of recourse and comfort for the victims of violent crimes (i.e., rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary), to reduce the incidence of violent crime and the consequential "high fear" climate, and to increase the number of offenses reported and presented for criminal prosecution.

Content: The specific tasks addressed by the project's central office of complaint and information (Victimization Center) are:

- to provide advice, counseling, and referral services to victims of violent crimes;
- to provide public education as to a victim's legal rights and crime prevention tactics;

- to promote the reporting of crimes by providing an anonymous reporting system;
- to provide a legal advocate for victims of rape;
- to promote the creation of a network of community resources (CJC, medical, legal, etc.) so that better services can be provided to the victim or witness; and
- to provide the local Bar Association with materials demonstrating the merits of civil litigation on behalf of victims of crimes of violence.

### Criminal Justice Center Documentaries

Dayton

Purpose: To film documentaries on criminal justice issues and to present them over commercial and public education television, at community and special interest group meetings, and in informal classes in order to broaden community understanding of and participation in the criminal justice system. Other goals are to develop job skills in film production among inmates in the correctional system and to develop documentaries useful in training correctional staffs.

Content: The project staff, composed of a coordinator, a cameraman, a script writer, and two research assistants, are designing and filming half-hour documentaries for community presentation. The documentaries include a 15-minute community discussion segment of selected groups of citizens. An independent evaluator is assessing the impact of the documentaries on the community and on correctional personnel.

## Appendix C: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES

### 1. The Activity Profile

The "Activity Profile" was the basic instrument for coding information about Pilot Team activities. It was prepared by the data collector, on the basis of all the accounts that the researcher had received about an activity. It was also used as the source of topic headings for the narrative information (recorded and coded using the McBee Keysort system) behind the ratings.

## ACTIVITY PROFILE

01 ID \_\_\_\_\_

to The ID has four digits:

1st: City Code.

04 2nd: Activity type

0. non-funded activity, internal PCT funds
1. funded project LEAA, Pilot "O"
2. funding sought, refused
3. funding sought from LEAA, received elsewhere
4. funding sought and received elsewhere
5. funding to be sought or pending

3rd and 4th: two-digit serially numbered ID by type of activity, for each city.  
Example: The first completed Activity Profile for a funded project in Charlotte will be labeled 2101; the first one completed for a non-funded activity will be 2001.

Activity Title \_\_\_\_\_

Agency Name \_\_\_\_\_

### RATINGS

**Note:** The ratings finally circled should represent your best judgement based on inputs from both Local Agency (LA) and PCT respondents. Critical incidents recorded about this activity should be headed by the same ID no., the number of the heading with which the incident deals, and the name of the respondent (e.g. 1008 - II - Smith means an incident about Design in the eighth non-funded activity in Dayton, related by Smith). For missing data enter "9". For not applicable enter "8".

#### I. INITIATION PHASE

- 05
1. An individual's idea, no institutional stimulus
  2. An individual's idea in response to a general institutional request
  3. An individual's idea in response to a specified institutional request
  4. Predominantly a product of institutional procedures
  5. Entirely a product of institutional procedures
- 06
1. Exclusively initiated by the PCT
  2. Predominantly " " " "
  3. Evenly initiated by the responsible agency and the PCT
  4. Predominantly initiated by the responsible agency
  5. Exclusively " " " " "

- 07
1. Entirely a product of staff initiatives
  2. Predominantly a product of staff initiatives
  3. Evenly a product of staff and supervisory initiative
  4. Predominantly a product of supervisory initiative
  5. Entirely " " " " " " "

	<u>Agency Chief</u>		<u>Agency Staff</u>
08	1	Highly resistant	1
09	2	Negative	2
	3	Mixed, or acquiescent	3
	4	Positive	4
	5	Highly supportive	5

II DESIGN/PLANNING PHASE

		Overall inputs (IA and PCT)			Extent of PCT Role
		Operations Types	"Experts"	Administrative Types	
10	The activity was...	1	1	1	1
11	Not at all planned by	2	2	2	2
12	Insignificantly planned by	3	3	3	3
13	Moderately planned by	4	4	4	4
	Dominantly planned by	5	5	5	5
	Exclusively planned by				
		Operations Types	"Experts"	Administrative Types	PCT Participants
14	The final design/plan was..	1	1	1	1
15	Strongly opposed by	2	2	2	2
16	Moderately opposed by	3	3	3	3
17	Neutrally accepted by	4	4	4	4
	Moderately supported by	5	5	5	5
	Strong supported by				
18	The final design or plan was/was not put in written form.				
19	The final written design/plan...				
	1. Included no consideration of objectives				
	2. Passing reference to objectives				
	3. General statement of objectives				
	4. Some objectives specified in terms of concrete outcomes				
	5. All objectives specified in terms of concrete outcomes				

II IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

- 20
- The PCT had
1. No role in implementation
  2. Minor influence on implementation
  3. Shared control with IA implementation
  4. Dominant control over implementation
  5. Total control over implementation

## IV EVALUATION

- 21
1. No evaluation of any kind
  2. Verbal evaluation, no systematic data collection and analysis
  3. Written "memo" evaluation, no " " "
  4. Written "memo" evaluation, some data collection and analysis
  5. Evaluation report, extensive data collection and analysis
  6. Extensive evaluation planned

## The PCT had...

- 22
1. No role in the evaluation
  2. Minor influence in the evaluation
  3. Mixed control of the evaluation with IA
  4. Dominant control of the evaluation
  5. Exclusive control of the evaluation

## Distribution of evaluation findings

- 23
1. Intra-agency only
  2. To other local agencies
  3. To agencies elsewhere
  4. Both "2" and "3"

24 Summary of distribution list: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

25 Was there any response to the distribution? (Yes/No) (attach description)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>26 The evaluation was...</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Highly critical</li> <li>2. Predominantly critical</li> <li>3. Mixed, or neutral</li> <li>4. Predominantly favorable</li> <li>5. Highly favorable</li> </ol> | <p>As a result of the evaluation, the agency...</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Did not discuss or take any action whatsoever</li> <li>2. Discussed the findings informally, took no action</li> <li>3. Discussed the findings extensively, took no action</li> <li>4. Acted on a few of the recommendations</li> <li>5. Acted on most of the recommendations</li> </ol> |
|--|--|

## V ROLE OF THE KEY CLIENT

Ask the appropriate variant:

"Who is the man within the agency who is going to determine whether this activity will be incorporated into the operations of your agency?"  
 or "Who is the man... who saw to it that....?"  
 or "Who is the man... who could have seen to it that ....?"

KC - IN  
 Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Job Title \_\_\_\_\_

Then ask "was there anyone outside the agency who had a similar role?"

KC - OUT

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Job Title \_\_\_\_\_

	KC - IN					KC - OUT			
	Initiation	Design	Implement.	Evaluation		Initiation	Design	Implementation	Evaluation
28 32	0	0	0	0	Did not take part	0	0	0	0
29 33	1	1	1	1	Was an active opponent	1	1	1	1
30 34	2	2	2	2	Was a passive opponent	2	2	2	2
31 35	3	3	3	3	was neutral	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	was a passive proponent	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	was an active proponent	5	5	5	5

	KC - IN			KC - OUT	
36	1	Did not ever hear about the activity	1		
37	2	Knew vaguely that the activity was being considered	2		
	3	Was briefed on the basic idea	3		
	4	Was informed periodically	4		
	5	Was kept continually up-to-date	5		

38 by PCT/LA/BOTH PCT/LA/BOTH  
 39

- 40 Achievement of Project Intention
1. Total failure
  2. Partial achievement of intention
  3. Most intentions achieved
  4. All intentions achieved
  5. Surpassed intentions

- 41 Project Impact on agency's Operations
1. Has had and will have no discernible effect
  2. May be useful in the future, but not yet
  3. No effect yet, but will affect next year's budget and plans
  4. Has had a noticeable effect on the agency's operations
  5. Has virtually restructured the way the agency operates

42 Any negative impact on operations? (Y/N) \_\_\_\_\_

## Effect on RPE Capacity

- 43
1. Has led to a reduction in the budget or personnel for RPE
  2. Has led to a recommendation that RPE capacities should be reduced
  3. Has led to a negative expression of the value of research by the key client
  4. Has not led to any comment by key client
  5. Has led to an expression of positive reaction by the key client
  6. Has led to expression of need for expansion of RPE capability by the client
  7. Has already led to an expansion of budget and/or personnel for RPE

## Effect on Contacts with Other LE/CJ Agencies

- 44
1. Has created new tensions with another agency
  2. Did not lead to contacts with another agency which were not already part of the system
  3. Led to a few casual contacts with another agency
  4. Led to a short-term relationship with another agency which did not exist before the project
  5. Has led to a continuing relationship with another agency which did not exist before the project.

## 45 Stage of implementation

1. Project completed or near completion
2. Implementation well-along
3. Planning completed, early implementation
4. Still in planning stage
5. Embryonic
6. Still-born

## 46 Nature of the Activity

1. SURV: survey/data collection and presentation, no analysis
2. RESCH: research which starts with an hypothesis to be investigated
3. EVAL: evaluation
4. DEMO: action/demonstration projects
5. GUP: greater understanding projects, mainly descriptive
6. PLAN: planning projects, or presentation of a plan for action
7. WSHOP: workshop/seminar

## 2. Process Variable Ratings

This form was sent to all current and past Pilot Team members who could be located. Its purpose is self-explanatory.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR RATING THE PROCESS VARIABLES

The eight Pilot City Teams vary in literally hundreds of ways, and one of our major goals in the national evaluation has been to decide which are important. With no presumption of a definitive list, we are confident that we have identified a set of variables that deserve closer examination. Some of these are objective and easy to measure -- for example, rate of staff turnover. But the most interesting variables are what we are calling "process variables" -- the team's style, its modus operandi, its assumptions. They are also the least susceptible to hard measures. On the attached sheet, Team Process Variables Definitions, are listed nine of these variables. You are asked to rate your own team on each of them. We also request that you put in the comment space (and on as many more pages as you care to write) any process variable which you feel should be added, or a reformulation that clarifies one which we have included.

The nine variables share several characteristics. Each (by our own estimate) showed wide variance -- the eight teams virtually span the range on all nine. Each is a variable which is in some sense within the "control" of the team -- none is constrained by the local environment. Most importantly, each of the nine tries to express a variable of team style which has no a priori "right" or "wrong" end points in terms of achieving the Pilot Cities Program's objectives. We can think of a plausible rationale for either extreme of all nine process variables. The valence of each, or of different configurations, is a matter to be answered by data.

The ratings are all to range from "1" to "5", with the left-hand extreme scored as "1" and the right-hand extreme as "5". Gradations are as follow:

- 1 or 5: "Very much" like the definition of that extreme, with perhaps trivial qualifications.
- 2 or 4: "Clearly tending in the direction of" that extreme.
- 3: No clear tendency in either direction; or so mixed that no preponderance can be determined.

The format we have used for the variables provides a sentence stem (e.g. "The principal orientation of the team is toward . . .") with two contrasting endings (in the above example, "research" and "operations"). You can think of each of the two endings as pointing to an extreme. At the absolute, off-the-scale ultimate, one extreme in this example would be a team that is exclusively interested in advancing scientific knowledge. Unless a project offers a chance to learn new things of scholarly interest about LE/CJ issues, the team would not support it. At the other off-the-scale extreme would be a team which believes that contributions to the state-of-the-art are irrelevant and that assisting local agencies to solve operational problems is the only criterion of Pilot Cities success.

N.B. Two scoring sheets are enclosed, so that you can rate each variable twice: once based on the team as it was during its first months of operation, and again based on current practice.<sup>\*</sup> If you were not a member of the team at the outset of the program, please do not try to fill out the "Initial Team" scoring sheet. Answer only in terms of current practice.

We know that you will sometimes be unhappy about the wording of the variables or about the construct itself, and that sometimes you will want to put a "2.5" or a "4+" instead of a whole number. But we have all played the rating game. If you get tied up in the wording of the extremes, please go back to the simple labels attached to extremes and ask yourself which one of those fits your team better. Usually, we think, an answer will suggest itself.

Please do not discuss this exercise with other team Associates before you have completed the ratings, so that reliability estimates can be computed. Afterward, by all means compare notes -- and if you reach a consensus set of ratings, please let us know about it. We will naturally appreciate any other comments you wish to make on the rating process. Thank you for your cooperation.

\* When the team became operational is up to you to decide. Presumably it would be no earlier than the grant award date and no later than the day that the final Associate position was filled.

## TEAM PROCESS VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

I. The principal orientation of the team is toward . . .

### Research

Expand scientific knowledge about problems of law enforcement and criminal justice.

### Operations

Help local agencies implement solutions to current operational problems.

II. In regard to problem identification, the PCT . . .

### Accepts

Accepts the formulation of problems generated by the community.

### Initiates

Takes the lead in assisting the community to identify its problems.

III. The team's role in regard to possible solutions to local LE/CJ problems is one of . . .

### Impartial Outside Observer

The team brings relevant knowledge to bear on issues but leaves decision-making up to community.

### An Advocate

The team presents and defends a point of view in the decision-making process.

IV. The team generally prefers to judge the suitability of project ideas on grounds of . . .

### Problem-Specific Criteria

The team is concerned primarily with the individual excellence of each project, relative to the problem it is supposed to address.

### Programmatic Criteria

The team is concerned primarily with programmatic coherence; PCT-sponsored projects must "add up."

V. The primary identification of most team members is with . . .

### Academic Discipline

Team members identify themselves with economics, sociology, etc., and may have little prior experience with applications to LE/CJ.

### LE/CJ Specialization

Team members identify themselves with courts, corrections, police, etc., and have spent (or plan to spend) their professional lives working with some part of the LE/CJ system.

VI. The institutional referent of most team members is . . .

### Pilot Cities Team

Team members see themselves as staff of a temporary (five years) organization called Pilot Cities.

### Parent Organization

Team members consider themselves to be staff of a permanent organization (University or firm) which has the Pilot Cities contract.

VII. In terms of goal orientation, the team operates as . . .

Individuals

Significantly different outlooks on the PCT's goals and role are represented on the team.

A Unit

Team members are in essential agreement concerning the PCT's goals and role.

VIII. In terms of administrative style, the team operates as . . .

Individuals

Within broad administrative guidelines, the Associates pretty much run their own shows.

A Unit

While there are individual responsibilities, the activities of the team are centrally directed.

IX. Communications within the team are . . .

Unstructured

There is a minimum of formal mechanisms such as staff meetings, memoranda, etc.

Structured

Staff meetings, reading files, or other intra-office communication mechanisms are used extensively.

# I

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

## PROCESS VARIABLE RATING SHEET I: THE INITIAL TEAM

research	<u>I Team Orientation</u> 1 2 3 4 5	operations
accepts	<u>II Problem Identification</u> 1 2 3 4 5	initiates
impartial outside observer	<u>III Solution Decision</u> 1 2 3 4 5	an advocate
problem-specific	<u>IV Project Support Criteria</u> 1 2 3 4 5	programmatic
academic discipline	<u>V Professional Identification</u> 1 2 3 4 5	LE/CJ specialization
pilot cities team	<u>VI Institutional Referent</u> 1 2 3 4 5	parent organization
as individuals	<u>VII Goal Orientation</u> 1 2 3 4 5	as a unit
individuals	<u>VIII Administrative Style</u> 1 2 3 4 5	a unit
unstructured	<u>IX Communications</u> 1 2 3 4 5	structured

Circle one number for each variable.

Please put comments on the reverse side. To avoid confusion, identify the number of the variable in question.

### 3. Judged Ratings of Impact

The nine judges who participated in the ratings of the demonstration projects were as follow:

William E. Hemple, Director of the Institute of Correctional Administration, American University; former Juvenile Court probation officer; former U.S. Probation officer.

Dr. Barton L. Ingraham, Assistant Professor, Institute of Criminal Justice & Criminology, University of Maryland; practicing attorney.

Andrea G. Lange, Legal Assistant, Arnold and Porter; Legal Advisor for Ford Foundation Litigation Grant.

Dr. Peter R. Maida, Associate Professor, Institute of Criminology, University of Maryland.

R. Dennis Osterman, Corrections Program Specialist, LEAA National LE/CJ Manpower Survey; former Project Administrator for the D.C. Department of Corrections; former superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Boston.

Louis O. Richardson, Police Program Specialist, LEAA National LE/CJ Manpower Survey; former Postal Inspector; former Law Enforcement Officer.

Dr. David J. Saari, Director, Center for Administration of Justice, American University; former Project Director of several national court programs; former Court Administrator; research attorney for the American Bar Foundation.

Dr. Ray A. Tennyson, Associate Professor of Criminology, University of Maryland; Director of the Minority Prison Community Research Project (NIMH); former Research Director of the University of Maryland component of the National Criminal Justice Educational & Development Consortium (LEAA).

William M. Trencher, Courts Specialist, LEAA National LE/CJ Manpower Survey; former Administrator of the Law & Social Science Research Institute; former Associate Director of the Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project; practicing attorney.

Reliability of the scales was estimated with the alpha statistic:

$$\alpha = \left[ \frac{k}{k-1} \right] \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\sum \sigma_i^2}{\sigma_x^2} \right) \right]$$

This is a generalization of Kuder and Richardson's KR20 internal consistency reliability formula. The coefficient represents the average correlation among all possible split-half subsets of K judges, based on the relationship between the summed variances of the separate judges and the variance of their combined ratings. See L.J. Cronbach, "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests," Psychometrika, 16 (1951), pp. 297-334.

Reliabilities for the three scales were: .61 for the "innovation" scale, .69 for the "state of the art" scale, and .75 for the "utility elsewhere" scale. Given the disparate areas of LE/CJ practice that were represented in the 98 abstracts, plus the requirement that the judges extrapolate to the set of all cities or all experimental projects or all of the literature, the reliabilities were about what we expected: not extremely high, but a much more usable estimate than we could have prepared independently.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR RATING THE PILOT CITIES DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

### The Purpose of the Exercise

In 1970, the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice\* began the Pilot Cities Program. This program established small teams of four senior personnel plus support staff in each of eight medium-sized cities. The Teams were to work with local law enforcement and criminal justice (LE/CJ) agencies, providing a broad range of technical assistance and research support. LEAA monies were earmarked for the cities, on the order of \$400,000 per year per city over the five year life of the Program. These monies were to be used for demonstration projects. The demonstration projects were to be innovative, or at least locally novel, and were to be of potential value to other cities and systems. To this point, a total of 102 demonstration projects have been funded. They are a varied group. It was decided to assemble the judgements of several knowledgeable persons -- there are ten of you, in all -- to help us with some of the important summary measures of the projects.

The results will be reported in terms of collective scores and their reliability. Your name will appear in a list of judges in an appendix to the report, however, and we ask that you take a minute to fill out the biographic form enclosed with the rating materials. Your set of ratings will be kept confidential.

A note about the level of detail in the abstracts. For each project, we included all details which bear on the rating decisions. Nonetheless, some of the abstracts will appear very undetailed. In those cases, assume that the project is as simply structured as the abstract indicates.

### Procedures

1. Read the discussion of all three scales before you start scoring the first one.
2. Begin with the deck labeled "A" (the "utility elsewhere" scale). You should find in that deck five blue cards with the text of the scale values, and 102 numbered white cards, each of which has the abstract for a single project. On the back of each card you will find the scale label and the scale values.

---

\*NILECJ is the research and development arm of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

3. Use the five blue cards as headings for your stacks.
4. Read through the abstracts, putting each onto the stack that you think is appropriate.
5. When you have gone through the entire deck, review the stacks and make changes until you are satisfied that each abstract is where you want it.
6. Turn over each stack in turn, and circle the appropriate number on each card in that stack. Secure the marked deck with a rubber band.
7. Repeat steps 3-6 for deck "B" (the "contribution to the state of the art" scale).
8. Repeat steps 3-6 for deck "C" (the "innovativeness" scale).
9. Call Blair Bourque (686-6949) or Charles Murray when your package is ready to be picked up.

Scale A: Utility Elsewhere

One purpose of the Pilot Cities Program was to develop projects that could be applied elsewhere. In order for a project to be transferable, we assume that at least two minimum conditions must be met: the project must not be so idiosyncratic that its mechanisms would not work anywhere else; and it must be an ordinarily desirable thing to do in LE/CJ systems that do not have it. On the basis of this last requirement, feel free to give low scores to projects that could be applied widely, but which you think should not be applied widely.

The scale values are defined as follows.

"Judging from the cities with which I am familiar, this project is..."

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| ...feasible and needed in half or more of our cities.* | 4 |
| ...feasible and needed in maybe a third of our cities. | 3 |
| ...feasible and needed in maybe one city in five.      | 2 |
| ...feasible and needed in at most one city in ten.     | 1 |
| My rating would be too much of guess to be useful.     | X |

---

\*Think of "city" as being a community of 100,000+.

### Scale B: Contribution to the State of the Art

Another objective of the Pilot Cities Program was to advance the state of the art in LE/CJ fields. The demonstration projects were supposed to contribute by applying ideas to operations, and evaluating the results. The scale values represent answers to the question: What is the contribution that a competent evaluation or study of the project should be expected to produce? We distinguish among four qualitative differences. Note that the project itself need not be successful in order for it to make a contribution to the state of the art.

The scale values are phrased as follow.

"A competent evaluation or study of this project..."

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| ...should be required reading for any serious student or practitioner in this LE/CJ field. | 4 |
| ...will shed some light on important and unresolved issues in this LE/CJ field.            | 3 |
| ...will be of marginal interest, mostly confirming what we already know.                   | 2 |
| ...will be of interest to the contract monitor, and very few others.                       | 1 |
| My rating would be too much of a guess to be useful.                                       | X |

### Scale C: Innovativeness

The third scale asks the degree to which the project represents innovation in its law enforcement/criminal justice (LE/CJ) field. A clear definition of what constitutes an "innovation" is the rating problem, and one which we are not at all sure we have solved. These guidelines might help clarify some of the ambiguous cases.

- The objectives do not have to be innovative in order for a project to be innovative. We anticipate that you will be looking for innovation in the mechanics and the content of the projects.
- The scale values do not ask for differentiation between "big innovations" and "little innovations." We assume that you will ignore innovations which you believe to be trivial. The question embedded in the scale values is, "to what extent is this project distinctive?" This over-all judgement is probably easier to make and certainly more important than whether you can discern some minor feature which makes it a little different than from other

projects of its type.

- We are not asking whether the innovation is desirable or even sensible. Give the same rating to inspired approaches and idiotic ones, if they have the same degree of distinctiveness.

The scale values are as follow.

"As far as I know, this project..."

...is virtually unique.	4
...is one of a few pioneering efforts of its type.	3
...is not new, but does have some innovative aspects.	2
...is a repeat of well-established approaches.	1
My rating would be too much of a guess to be useful.	X

**END**