


# HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

## NATIONAL LEVEL EVALUATION FINAL REPORT VOLUME II



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INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
CORRECTION ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# **HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM**

**VOL. II**

## **National Level Evaluation FINAL REPORT**

NCJRS

DEC 16 1976

**By  
Eleanor Chelimsky**

ACQUISITIONS

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**National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
U. S. Department of Justice**

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## FOREWORD

This evaluation report details the lessons learned from the High Impact Anti-Crime program, a major Federal initiative to reduce urban street crime. The record of Impact was mixed. The program achieved successes in some areas and fell short of the mark in others. Some of the obstacles that Impact faced are inherent in any new, large-scale social program; others stemmed from the program's framework -- a coalition of Federal, regional, state and local agencies and officials. The evaluation of the Impact experience adds to our knowledge of what can be done to reduce crime and will be useful in designing future programs at both the national and local level.



Gerald M. Caplan  
Director  
National Institute of Law  
Enforcement and Criminal Justice

**CITIES PARTICIPATING IN THE HIGH IMPACT  
ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM**



## PREFACE

Under the sponsorship of the LEAA's National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, MITRE conducted a several-year examination of the High-Impact Anti-Crime Program, which began in eight U.S. cities in January of 1972 and will end in September of 1976. This program was a broad-aim, free-form social action effort, designed to reduce crime and to improve criminal justice capabilities through the demonstration of an iterative process of comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation (the COPIE-cycle). Other objectives of the program included the improvement of agency coordination and of community involvement in the criminal justice planning process, as well as the development of new knowledge about crime, about anti-crime effectiveness, and about the process of innovation within the criminal justice system. The program introduced the concept of a Crime Analysis Team (composed of functional experts and researchers) which would work in each city to produce a master plan, supervise and perform the COPIE-cycle, and act as liaison in the effort to coordinate criminal justice agencies.

The MITRE evaluation identifies what tended to promote good planning, implementation and evaluation, and what did not; what moved agencies toward coordination and what did not; which factors encouraged community involvement and which did not; what stimulated innovation and institutionalization and what did not; and what new knowledge was gained from the program and what failed to be gained (and why). In particular, the evaluation establishes what happened in the development of each city's program, speaks to the feasibility and usefulness of the two program innovations (the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team) and examines anti-crime efforts at the project level. (The evaluation does not, however, address program-wide outcomes; this is to be done by means of a set of victimization surveys being performed in 1972, 1975 and 1978).

A series of MITRE reports furnishes much of the information for this final assessment. A set of eight histories narrates in detail program development and agency/community interactions in each of the Impact cities. The COPIE-cycle is examined in four reports which separately address crime-oriented planning, implementation, evaluation planning and evaluation reporting across the eight cities. Another volume explores the processes of innovation and institutionalization in the program. Various other reports study two anti-crime strategies commonly employed in the Impact program: intensive supervision to reduce recidivism among probationers and parolees, and increases in overt police patrol to reduce crime levels. Finally, a set of papers analyzes specific questions such as the transferability of Impact projects, the implementation difficulties of drug program and data system efforts, the caseload and trial delay problems of Impact city felony courts, and the post-treatment reintegration of juveniles into the school system.

The present document, Volume II of the final report, examines the Impact program in terms of the crime control policy goals which it expresses, and in terms of expectations generated for it at its inception; it summarizes the analyses and findings of all

the other MITRE reports, generates its own information, and attempts to draw the conclusions of the overall evaluation effort for a general audience. In particular, Part I speaks to the program in terms of its likely potential for achievement as it moved toward implementation. Part II analyzes the feasibility and usefulness of the two program innovations (the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team). Part III explores the questions of project outcome and of city-wide changes in crime rates and levels, considering these as correlates rather than as dependent variables. (This was done despite the process rather than outcome nature of this evaluation, because it is evident that if programs are initiated to improve system capability, this is because the assumption exists that such capability will help to reduce crime; it is necessary therefore at least to examine whether improved capability, once established, is accompanied by decreases in crime.) Part IV is devoted to an overall program assessment. It summarizes the baseline information developed in Part I, presents MITRE's general findings and conclusions, and then derives the recommendations which flow from the analysis.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Many people have participated in the studies which provide the basis for this final report. It is their work which has made this work possible and it is hoped that the present volume will lead the reader back to those underlying documents in search of the data and analysis which gave rise to the conclusions.

Among the colleagues and fellow researchers who have contributed their time and effort to this evaluative endeavor, the author would especially like to mention Lawrence L. Holmes (who first directed the evaluation), Warren S. L. Moy (who authored the court report); Gerrie W. Kupersmith, Michael B. Fischel and Adarsh P. Trehan (who worked on the evaluation planning and reporting documents); Pamela A. Miller; Joseph H. Sasfy (who authored the intensive supervision reports); Frank C. Jordan, Jr. and Richard T. Loomis (who wrote the eight city histories); Diana Read; Judith S. Dahmann (who was responsible for the overt police patrol analysis); Mitchel W. Silberbush; Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Connie Weis O'Mara (who worked on planning and implementation); Linda S. Russell; Ellen J. Albright (who wrote the paper on innovation and institutionalization); and Lawrence G. Siegel (who authored the report on transferability and developed crime profiles for the eight cities).

The MITRE effort benefited greatly from the intelligent criticism and insight of Dr. Richard T. Barnes (of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice) who served as program manager for the evaluation. His collaboration was crucial to the overall effort. The author also wishes to thank Dr. Richard L. Linster who worked on the Impact evaluation task force, and who originated the idea of the program histories.



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# **Part I: Program Environment**

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PART I: PROGRAM ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: CRIME CONTROL POLICY GOALS  
AND THE CLIMATE OF THE EARLY SEVENTIES

CHAPTER II THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

CHAPTER III POLICY ALTERNATIVES, PROGRAM CONFLICTS,  
PRIORITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

CHAPTER IV THE NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION

CHAPTER V THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES PRIOR TO PROGRAM  
INITIATION

## Chapter I

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### Introduction: Crime Control Policy Goals and the Climate of the Early Seventies

## CHAPTER I: SUMMARY

This chapter seeks to evoke the context in which the LEAA's High-Impact Anti-Crime Program evolved. The crime control policy climate of the early nineteen-seventies is described in terms of:

- prevailing opinion about social programs in general;
- the recognized need to set attainable policy goals;
- the gradual establishment of three overall crime control policy goals:
  - to improve knowledge about crime, and about strategies and tactics for dealing with it;
  - to increase coordination and system consciousness across agencies of the criminal justice system;
  - to develop mechanisms by which to involve community members more closely in criminal justice planning and in crime control;
- the reasons for the establishment of these goals:
  - the underdevelopment of the criminal justice research function and of the tools for that research;
  - the fragmentation of criminal justice agencies: their rivalry, failure to coordinate, hostility to change;
  - the sophistication of agency techniques for resisting coordination and change;
  - the need to develop effective mechanisms for overcoming agency resistance;
  - the potential of public opinion as a mechanism for overcoming agency resistance;
  - the likely benefits of community and citizen involvement for crime control;
  - the existing obstacles to community support for law enforcement in center-city high-crime neighborhoods; and,
  - the requirement not only to increase public safety and security, but also the public's *perception* of that safety and security.

## Chapter I

### Introduction: Crime Control Policy Goals and the Climate of the Early Seventies

*It is an American fault to insist on extravagant goals--as if to set out to achieve anything less than everything suggests a lack of sincerity, manliness or both--and to be exceedingly busy with other matters when it subsequently develops that little or nothing happens. The social history of the 1960's is already littered with the wreckage of crash programmes than were going to change everything and in fact changed nothing, save possibly to diminish ever so slightly the credibility of those who claimed credit in advance for achievements that never, somehow, came to pass.*

Daniel P. Moynihan (1968)

The end of the nineteen-sixties brought widespread disillusion with the governmental capacity to deal with social problems in urban areas. Over the decade, and amid economic prosperity, city welfare rolls and reported crime rates had risen steadily while morbidity and mortality rates failed to decline, despite increasing amounts of federal funds allocated to addressing these problems. It began to be asked in the early seventies whether urban problems were really amenable to rational solutions, and whether certain policy goals were not based on highly uncertain assumptions.

In the fields of criminal justice and health, for example, the central goals of policy were quite patently crime control and health improvement, and a major assumption of both policies was that an effective and efficient service delivery system was a viable tool for achieving these central policy goals. Yet it was becoming apparent that health resources and medical care are limited in their ability to account for a rising component of morbidity and mortality (they cannot, for example, affect environmental factors like poverty, stress or pollution which engender phenomena such as malnutrition, alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, emphysema, lung cancers, etc.). In the same way the resources of law enforcement and criminal justice are limited in their ability to account for a major portion of crime and delinquency (in that they too cannot influence the social, economic and political factors which appear to produce them). Thus, although crime control and health policy counted on service delivery to control crime rates and improve health statistics, it was not necessarily reasonable to expect health resources alone to ameliorate

overall health levels, any more than it was reasonable to expect criminal justice resources alone to lower overall crime levels. Given the dynamic trends of the nineteen-sixties in both crime and disease--with high growth in just those sectors relevant to the environmental or stress factors which health care delivery and criminal justice systems cannot easily affect--it became commonplace in the early seventies to ascribe failure to both systems (among others), and to question whether more federal funds should be channeled into areas where government policy seemed incapable of achieving its goals.

This view, however, tended to overlook the fact that certain kinds of crime and disease have been and remain eminently accessible to control by criminal justice and health resources. A well-managed, smoothly functioning judicial system deters at least some crimes, prison separates some offenders from their criminal careers, vaccination prevents some illnesses, and antibiotics cure some others. The difficulty was that neither the criminal justice nor the health systems could be said to be functioning smoothly. Simultaneous with the growth in the inaccessible components of disease and crime, there had occurred a decline (due at least in part to system overload) in the capabilities of the criminal justice and health systems to handle those problems which they are well fitted to address. Clearance rates had fallen as trial delay, case backlog and prison overcrowding increased; medical presence in inner city areas thinned (ratios reached lows of one doctor per 5,000 residents or worse), and at least one epidemic (measles, in New York City, June 1971) occurred because of failure to administer available vaccine. Service delivery had consequently been reduced in just those urban areas of overload where it was most needed, but even more importantly, perhaps, deterrence and prevention functions had been weakened.

While it might be true, then, that even optimal system capability could not alone solve the nation's overall crime and health problems, it was also clear that those problems were being significantly worsened by malfunctions in health care delivery and law enforcement systems. The major policy assumption, therefore, seemed to hold good: all things being equal, better urban service delivery systems would result in measurably improved health or crime control; however, the goals set needed to be within reach of the criminal justice or health resources available to carry them out. This more modest formulation, with a new emphasis on goals, became the foundation for crime control policy as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) tried to set it in the early seventies. It was in this sense that the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals addressed itself mainly to reforms and improvements in the criminal justice system as a means for crime reduction at the state and local levels.

What crime control goals, then, could policy realistically set and how could their achievement be measured? Even if it had become clear that an improvement in system capability would necessarily improve crime control, it still would have to be shown that such improvement had effectively occurred, that it had had an impact on crime and not merely on the system, and that it was worth the money expended on it. Yet the LEAA had only been in existence since 1968, it was the first federal initiative to target comprehensively the hitherto exclusively state-and-local government prerogative in the criminal justice area, and the unknowns involved in measuring policy impact on crime remained impressive in their vastness. There emerged, then, from the pages of crime control research and policy documents of the early seventies, a set of urgent and compelling requirements for the acquisition of new knowledge through which program effects could be assessed.

A. The Need for Knowledge Acquisition

The LEAA had been established by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as a response to rising crime, and to rising citizen insecurity and fear of crime. The agency had received a dual mandate from Congress to help the states control crime and to improve the quality and capabilities of the criminal justice system. By 1971 the LEAA had funded many programs, but not much was understood about the effectiveness of that expenditure. In May of 1972, after an investigation, a Congressional committee report<sup>(1)</sup> charged the LEAA with failure "because there had been no visible impact on the incidence of crime after \$1.4 billion had been channeled to states in the last four years." However, the same report established that such an LEAA impact could not really have been ascertained, had it occurred, because of the lack of "standards for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of (LEAA) programs." This, however, was a superficial statement of the problem, a mere hint of the really major difficulties involved for any social-program-funding agency in finding out what is effective and what is not, in demonstrating the relationship between its policies and the quantified indicators by which it must estimate program success or failure.

In the case of LEAA and crime control policy, the program assessment problem was multi-faceted, complicated by: (a) the use of unreliable indicators (reported crime rates) as measures of crime control achievement; (b) the task of determining and substantiating criminal justice needs; (c) the difficulty of defining program objectives and structuring programs which are amenable to evaluation; and (d) the problem of attributing outcomes conclusively to programs.

In the early seventies, the only readily available indicators were reported crime rates, collected nation-wide on a voluntary basis by local police departments, and reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, pilot victimization studies had already shown that crime levels reported by the police were likely to be far below those which would be reported by crime victims (between 1.5 and 3 times lower, it turned out in 1974 when the results of the first nation-wide victimization survey were made public). This disparity was usually attributed either to citizen "apathy," to disinclination to lose workdays and wages by spending time with the police and courts, or to lack of confidence in the criminal justice system in general. This meant not only that the indicators for measuring success or failure were dubious, but also that the federal government thus had no real grasp of the dimensions of the crime problems it had agreed to tackle. Further (and pertinent to the task of tying anti-crime programs to crime rates), if victims were failing to report crime because of a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, or because of system inefficiency, then an improvement in system capability would lead to an increase in victim reporting and an apparent rise in crime rates which would be due to an artifact. In other words, the greater the federal success in this domain, the more likely might be the appearance of failure.

Other problems in tying program impacts to crime rates came from the facts that data were not standardized, that they were often inaccurate and difficult to access (especially across jurisdictional boundaries), and that they were flawed at the source by the police, prosecutorial, judicial and correctional discretion which meant that data bias was inevitable, endemic, and thoroughly diffused across the criminal justice system. This, of course, was not new, nor was it uniquely American. As a British comment made clear in 1929:

The Government are very keen on amassing statistics - they collect them, add them, raise them to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But what you must never forget is that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases. (2)

Data, however, represented only a piece of the assessment problem. To find out something about the effectiveness of a program required a research capability to define objectives so that achievements could be evaluated, to develop research designs allowing attribution of observed changes to programs, to generate analysis approaches permitting confidence in the findings, and so on. Yet the state of criminal justice research was far from healthy in the early seventies. There was little or no research function in the courts or in corrections and some development existed only in the

police sector; even this was very small, however. Less than 1 percent of the approximate \$10 billion spent each year on criminal justice went into research, and there existed in consequence an extreme paucity of trained analysts who could be counted upon to plan, implement and evaluate anti-crime programs. This was a far cry from the health sector (where appropriations of about \$2 billion were going to research each year), from the defense sector (where the Department of Defense spends about 15 percent of its budget annually on research and development) or even from the private sector (where manufacturing industries devote about 3 percent of their annual budgets to research). To assess program effects, however, requires, first and foremost, a solidly developed research function.

There were knowledge requirements, then, which took on high priorities for policy-makers in the early seventies. The focus on program assessment signified a corresponding emphasis on the following needs:

- for criminal justice data which are reliable, comparable, accessible, user-oriented;
- for crime analysis to better assess the dimensions of crime problems in given areas, and to develop projects and programs which specifically address those problems;
- for evaluation to find out which projects and programs have been effective against given crime problems, and to feed back information allowing for improved implementation and management decision-making;
- for research and development which can build upon on-going evaluative findings to generate and test concepts addressing identified crime problems in a new way;
- for technology transfer and for the communication and dissemination of information among all agencies involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of criminal justice programs;
- for technical assistance, given the general shortage of trained people (planners, evaluators, administrators, and auditors, as well as those trained in the various criminal justice functions), and given also the long lead-times required for training and education; and

- for the development of dynamic and continuously redefined standards and goals to assess new problems and possibilities, to set forth short- and long-term objectives, to point up disparities between ideals and practices of the criminal justice system, and to ensure that fairness and equity are maintained despite pressures toward expediency.

In sum, then, the efforts to control crime--and to demonstrate that control--led back once again through the need for knowledge, to the policy goal of improved system capability. Program impacts could not be assessed without it. It would not be an easy matter, however, to obtain such capability within the fragmented, bureaucratic universe of the criminal justice and intergovernmental agencies whose coordination is a necessity for the elaboration of federally-funded anti-crime programs. It was, in fact, precisely their failure to coordinate, to share their information, which had been responsible, in large part, for many of the identified knowledge gaps afflicting policy formation and program assessment in the first place.

#### B. The Problem of Agency Coordination

The failure of the criminal justice system to act like a system had been widely observed and documented by 1970. It was evident, for example, that the different elements of the criminal justice process impact upon each other; that the work of corrections is shaped and determined by the judicial sentence; that the trial conviction rate is sharply influenced by the quality of policy work; that an increase in the police force which drives up rates of arrest impacts both courts and corrections in tangible ways; that prison over-crowding, in turn, affects police and judicial decision-making. Yet components of the system appeared to ignore each other, and data and general information seemed to be in short supply. In New York City, for example, the Plimpton Panel had found after a 16-month study, that many judges were unaware of the functions "and sometimes even of the existence" of various correctional and drug treatment agencies. There was evidence that fragmentation across the components of the criminal justice system had produced outcomes like trial delays, unnecessary incarceration, wasted resources and the failure of judges to maximize their rehabilitative options. Yet effective anti-crime programs could not be achieved without real coordination across interfacing functions, without some professional collaboration among police, prosecutors, courts and corrections. As the National Advisory Commission put it: "If criminal justice professionals cannot reach a consensus on what to do about crime and criminals, it is unrealistic to expect the public and political leaders to do so. The consequences of lack of professional agreement are deadlock, inaction, and confusion in making public policy."<sup>(3)</sup> However, the problem of coordination did

not end there; it extended also to the agencies in the intergovernmental network which act together with the criminal justice system in the planning, funding and implementation of anti-crime programs.

To a considerable degree, the various levels of the intergovernmental (federal/state/county/city) system have conflicting aims and objectives. Counties and cities compete with each other for state and federal funds; issues of race and class, rural versus urban bias (among others), divide them and bring impediments to their collaboration. Instead of coordinated efforts, complex maneuvers have frequently taken place in order to achieve the best residential or industrial mix for one area at the expense of another. Tax policy, zoning, land use, transportation or crime prevention functions have been manipulated by local decision-makers with divisive rather than unifying effects. State and federal agencies remain sensitive to questions of sovereignty and specific prerogatives. Federal administrators tend to view state and local officials as "obstructive" while the latter protest that they are excluded from the decision-making process in federally-funded programs which vitally concern them.<sup>(4)</sup> Local governments are often in conflict with state governments and grumble at the "extra layer of bureaucracy" provided by state intervention in the federal-city relationship, but federal agencies are obliged to reckon with state sovereignty and with state jurisdiction in many functional areas (courts and corrections, for example) and have their own on-going relationships with the states to maintain. On the other hand, local officials recognize that state aid will likely remain after most federal programs have gone, and that state aid is "cheaper" than federal aid, in that it usually requires neither cash, nor "in-kind" matching funds. Thus, units of the intergovernmental network have tended to play rather complicated political games, making and unmaking alliances as their short- or long-term objectives have dictated.

When coordination has taken place, on occasion, across criminal justice and intergovernmental agencies, it has usually been of the coalition variety, with separate unit partnerships tending to reinforce rather than mitigate the overall fragmentation. In general, however, state and local, city and county units remained practically autonomous, and largely failed to coordinate criminal justice programs across jurisdictions. It is in this way that overlapping and duplicative information systems had been procured in the late sixties, and that uncoordinated, separately funded programs continued to breed competition among agencies for the same offender clientele.

## 1. Obstacles to Agency Coordination

The problem was old and it was not straightforward. There are both external and internal pressures which combine to orient organizations away from coordination and toward isolation. Agencies exist in a competitive environment; power and funds for one agency can signify weakness and penury for another. The incrementalism by which agency budgets are examined and assessed, shields them from any anguishing re-examinations of their policies, and thereby contributes to the maintenance of the status quo (to non-coordination). Incentives which could impose new mechanisms for agency cooperation have been hard to find. Further, agency administrators respond to officials who exist in an even more dynamically competitive environment than do the agencies themselves. As Banfield has expressed it:

The important questions are settled ultimately by elected officials (politicians) whose decisions are normally mere by-products of their competitive struggle to get and keep office. No competent politician will sacrifice votes that may be needed in the next election for gains, however large, that may accrue to the public 10, 20, or 30 years hence. (5)

Thus, if the immediate political costs of cooperation across jurisdictional boundaries are seen to be high, there is not much likelihood that cooperation will occur. And these costs are usually seen to be very high. For example, when political parties are in the majority within a particular jurisdiction, they are loath to risk dilution of that majority by multiplying cross-jurisdictional or multi-jurisdictional efforts. The same is true for ethnic or non-white enclaves in center cities. Minorities have been wary of consolidations or reorganizations which might bring about reorientations of urban policy, unfavorable to their interests. Finally, communities at large have been more interested in issues of local autonomy than they have in rational planning, cost/benefit tradeoffs, and the effectiveness or efficiency of urban programs.

Coordination across agencies has thus been difficult to achieve, because of competition, because of incentive failure, or because of both. But it has also been difficult to achieve because non-coordination has been the status quo, because coordination, therefore, implied change, and because it is no simple matter to introduce change into a bureaucratic environment. Change is, in fact, perceived as a sort of threat in the day-to-day activities of an agency. It is not precisely clear why this is so. Perhaps it derives from the agency environment which renders rules and routines so important and time-consuming that they make even small changes complicated and difficult; perhaps it is because organizational discipline and control elicit a sort of self-protective rigidity of behavior, and this rigidity again makes changes hard to

implement; (6) or because bureaucracy engenders specialization, and it is generalists who tend to coordinate, not specialists; or because rigidity, rules, routines and specialization together tend to make bureaucracies insular, to turn the focus of effort inward, to slow the perception of external problems and needs, and to direct attention away from matters of policy and substance to matters of procedure.

Pressures against agency cooperation have thus emerged not only from rivalry with other agencies or from the need to preserve prerogatives and boundaries, but also from the internal workings of the bureaucracies themselves, and from their pronounced hostility to change.

Finally, some agencies have quite properly perceived themselves in a traditional check-and-balance role, a stance which may not make for the greatest efficiency but which is required for the political effectiveness of any democratic system. Such a stance, when it is not merely a bureaucratic technique to avoid coordination, prevents the overgreat concentration of power in the hands of any one agency of government. It also prevents the development of interagency relationships which have as their goal the mutual support of current arrangements that are not necessarily meritorious but in which the agencies have a vested interest.

## 2. Agency Techniques for Resisting Change

For all of these reasons, then, agencies have tended to fight coordination and change, and they have developed ingenious and effective techniques for resisting. These techniques can be implemented at various points in the change process, but seem to occur most frequently: (a) when the change-decision is taken, (b) when information about the change is communicated, and/or (c) when activities related to the change are coordinated. (7) The action taken will then depend upon the type and ramifications of the change, but usually falls into one (or a combination) of four categories:

- absorption (or the strategy of transforming an innovation so that it fits into the existing bureaucratic context while preserving its new name and appearance);
- postponement (or "the time isn't ripe," "the idea is not fully tested," the "drag-your-feet" strategy);

- deflation (or lip-service to an idea while sapping its vitality by failing to delegate manpower and resources or by failing to communicate top-down management commitment): and
- cooptation of personnel (or the strategy of reducing originators of new ideas to docility by moving them into positions of responsibility within the agency).<sup>(8)</sup>

Agencies have thus had a great many reasons to avoid multijurisdictional coordination, and a great many ways in which to do it. Given the importance of such coordination for policy and the difficulty of achieving it, it became a matter of some urgency in the early seventies to look for strategies which could counterbalance agency reluctance and move the criminal justice system into postures of greater functional effectiveness and efficiency.

### 3. Strategies to Combat Agency Resistance

Various techniques for getting agencies to interact with each other had been developed by social workers in the anti-poverty and anti-delinquency programs of the sixties. Among these techniques, there are at least three which were clearly meaningful in terms of crime control policy:<sup>(9)</sup>

- pressure (or the strategy by which one organization influences another through its power to sanction or to reward; mechanisms can include the development of informal personal relationships across agencies, the exchange or barter of resources, regular substantive communication, help with extra or complementary services, or--when necessary and on occasion--coercion);
- cooperation (or an exchange of views across agencies about organizational aims and expectations; this technique is ad hoc, usually requires a mediator, and leans heavily on frequent meetings, the development of functional commitment, and good interagency and interprofessional communication); and
- planning (which tries to match programs to social problems in a rational way, systematically enlisting inputs from all agencies involved; this strategy uses elements of both pressure and cooperation, endeavoring to obtain agency support via benefits in terms of agency efficiency and program effectiveness).

Most of these techniques employ the carrot rather than the stick (coercion tends to be counterproductive, causing precisely the kinds of stalled communications which are likely to worsen cooperation over

the long term); even so, they have not thus far amassed a very convincing record of success. The catch has been that the performance of planning is precluded by the very problem--lack of coordination--that the plan is supposed to solve.<sup>(10)</sup> This means that planning alone has not been a very effective means toward coordination except where it has been supplemented by an additional special incentive, a particular quid pro quo. Furthermore, all of the above strategies have relied on agency consciousness of the overall functional objective to develop coordination. Yet, as discussed earlier, bureaucracies have both external and internal pressures which tend to becloud the view of an overall goal or even of an enlightened self-interest. It is for this reason that all of these strategies have tended not to work unless they occurred within a crisis context: a crisis which could touch the agencies involved, put them in presence of a superior force (such as a full-fledged public outcry), and compel them to respond. Crisis has seemed, in fact, to be indispensable to the public usefulness of bureaucratic organizations: "It is the only means of readjustment and change, it plays an essential role in the development of the bureaucratic system: crisis alone renders that system viable."<sup>(11)</sup> Organizations have communicated with each other in the face of a crisis, of an aroused community, even though they have refused to do so before. It is not surprising, then, in a criminal justice context where non-coordination was the rule rather than the exception and where coordination was the need, that community participation and involvement should have begun to assume increasing importance.

In sum, then, crime control policy research in the early seventies had surfaced pressing needs for new knowledge to bolster system capability, and for intergovernmental and criminal justice agency coordination to improve crime control effectiveness. To achieve either or both of these objectives, however, required the imposition of change upon the network of bureaucratic organizations responsible for crime control and it had been seen that such change, in turn, was likely to arrive only through crisis. But crisis, in democratic societies, usually develops through increasing pressure brought by public opinion, by the media, by lobby groups, and locally by communities. It became an urgent goal of crime control policy, therefore, to involve citizens and communities in the affairs of the criminal justice system.

### C. Community Involvement

Communities, however (and by community is meant both a population and a particular neighborhood), were already involved, explicitly, in a political way, and implicitly, because crime is a social phenomenon which arises and occurs within communities. By the early seventies, as system effectiveness declined, crime had become an important political issue; week in and week out, the press published new and old

"villain" theories exploring who was to blame. Although this was not yet the kind of public crisis which affects bureaucracies enough to change them, it was explicit involvement, and the issue grew steadily with the growth of crime rates. Most polls of the period showed crime as a major concern of populations in both urban and suburban communities. The LEAA had, in fact, been established as a Congressional response to that public insecurity.

Community involvement in the crime problem, however, is integral and implicit, as well as explicit. A community crystallizes and embodies those social, economic and political factors which remain beyond the reach of governmental agencies in a democratic society (see pages 1-3 above). Although trends can be nation-wide, it is in a particular community that lifestyles change, that residents divorce, overwork, lose their jobs, find new ones or don't, go on welfare, drop out of school, drink, take drugs, get sick, commit crimes or become victims. It is a community which distributes informal sanctions and rewards, imposes values and establishes status symbols; it is that basic unit of a community--the family--which first and most profoundly influences the kinds of citizens a community produces through the role-models it furnishes (or does not furnish) for its children, and through the climate of trust and sympathy which it does or does not create. As the National Advisory Commission wrote, "A delinquent child most reflects a family in trouble--a broken family, a family without sufficient financial resources, a family of limited education, and a family with more than one child or parent exhibiting anti-social behavior."(12)

#### 1. Center City and Other Communities

The stability of many American communities (and that of many families) appeared to have undergone serious stresses over the 1960-1970 decade. Numbers of industries and middle-class populations had moved out of center cities, leaving these with fewer jobs and lower revenues, but higher levels of service to provide for the more dependent populations which remained. Housing there was overcrowded, welfare eligibility criteria resulted in more female-headed families (along with a shortage of masculine role-models for boys), infant mortality was high, and educational achievement was generally low.

A rise of crime and delinquency in such a context could not be a surprise. Research findings over three decades had indicated that the overriding factor in social pathology was family disorganization; they also had shown that the causes of such disorganization seemed to come most often from circumstances outside the family--that is, from the dynamic political, social and economic forces of the community.(13) In center cities, the climate had worsened perceptibly throughout the

sixties, with riots occurring between 1965 and 1968, and it was in these socially disorganized communities that the incidence of crime, by the early seventies, had increased most rapidly. These, however, were not the communities producing the loudest outcries about rising crime rates, although--without question--they had the highest levels of victimization. On the contrary, the aroused and involved communities were mainly those which saw crime as a sort of import, a displacement from the center cities. While these suburban or rural communities could bring important political pressure to bear (which is necessary for the improvement of system capability), they nonetheless remained--like the criminal justice system itself--somewhat exogenous to the problem. Yet there were political barriers precluding the explicit involvement of the center city communities which were most implicitly involved, and most needed help.

In effect, center city populations in 1970 perceived suburban communities as white enclaves with obstacles erected against non-white (center-city) encroachment. Many center-city activist leaders blamed the rise in crime on "white flight" (or the middle-class and industrial exodus) in the first place; further, the criminal justice system, in center cities, had tended to remain conspicuously white, constituting a kind of suspect presence to center-city eyes.

Thus, it was in center-city areas that crime rates were highest, in center-city areas, therefore, that anti-crime efforts had to be mounted, and in center-city areas that the involvement, participation and effort of the community were most needed. Yet it was precisely in these areas that the criminal justice system could least count on family and community support, on sympathy, cooperation and trust, or even on that public disapprobation of crime which Tocqueville thought was more effective in coercing transgressors than the law itself. (14)

The need of the criminal justice system for community support, however, for responsible participation and involvement, was not restricted to center cities. Communities everywhere are counted on to provide jobs for ex-offenders, to provide volunteers to serve in youth service or drug programs, to allow the siting of drug treatment centers, halfway houses and correctional facilities in their neighborhoods; citizens are counted on to report crime, to serve as witnesses and jurors, to elect judges, to pay for criminal justice expenditures with their taxes. Yet the cooperation of even explicitly involved communities, in the early seventies, was more token than real.

## 2. Obstacles to Effective Community Involvement

One explanation advanced for this failure was the expressed dissatisfaction of citizens generally with the operation of the criminal justice system: its delays, permissiveness, ineffectiveness,

nonaccountability and imperviousness to citizen dissatisfaction. Another explanation, advanced even more frequently, was the difficulty of obtaining consensus across which to channel community input. The reason for this was that community populations are often apathetic about criminal justice concerns unless they have had to become personally involved, so that criminal justice agencies--instead of working with the public--have found themselves confronted by activists from civic organizations, pressure groups, media, or neighborhood coalitions; consensus, among these groups, has often been an impossibility. This problem is not, of course, unique to criminal justice but has troubled poverty and mental health programs, efforts to upgrade environmental quality and other urban endeavors as well. The continuing issue of where to put unpopular institutions or industries, for example, is a monument to the failure of community consensus. Further, activist feeling can swing rapidly from one pole to another, from one cause to another, in reaction to changing political circumstances; there is a paucity of committed community pressure groups, of stubborn, long-term lobbyists, in the criminal justice area.

This inability to interact well with the criminal justice system, however, combined with rising crime rates and rising citizen insecurity, works powerfully against crime control. Less crime is reported, less help is given to police and prosecutors, suspicion and distrust reduce social interaction, streets and parks are deserted in the evenings. All of this increases criminal opportunity, decreases informal social control and sharply weakens deterrence.

Thus, although it seemed in 1970 that community dissatisfaction, if it became strong enough, could induce change and coordination across the bureaucracies of the criminal justice system, it began to appear also that a real and prolonged community effort could do much more than that: it could provide the basis and context for the long-term control of crime. But for such an effort to be forthcoming, communities would have to be able to regard anti-crime programs as symbols of help, not as proof of the unworthiness of the community, or as part of some "degradation ceremony."<sup>(15)</sup> Research (again) was seen to be needed on effective techniques for recruiting citizen cooperation, for measuring citizen attitudes toward anti-crime programs and their consequences. In the early seventies, crime control policy came to view citizen participation as a major, perhaps the most major, need; but whether such participation could be obtained, whether mechanisms could be found for channeling and measuring citizen attitudes, and whether criminal justice agencies could be counted upon as instruments for obtaining such participation, remained no more than untested assumptions.

### 3. Community Perceptions and Crime Control Benefits

It has always been clear that there were two objectives to any government anti-crime program: to control crime and to increase the public sense of security. It became obvious during the sixties, however, that the one did not necessarily flow from the other, at least over the short term. Thus, it was not only important to achieve success in the anti-crime goal, it was important also to achieve public perception of that success in order to arrive at a decrease in citizen insecurity. As Malraux once remarked, "the phenomenon is not so much that the kite flies, but that everyone stands around looking at it." If it is true that a reduction in crime and an increased community sense of safety can work synergistically toward further crime reduction, then the community perception of anti-crime success might well be as important for future crime control as the success itself.

It was thus hoped that improved citizen participation could:

- remedy or identify those anti-crime programs which have undesirable community aspects or side-effects;
- strengthen social and cultural institutions which work against the development of delinquency (such as home and family, day care, education, etc.);
- increase the efficacy of the community role in the successful re-entry of rehabilitated offenders into the job market;
- widen adolescent opportunities for employment and childhood opportunities for supervised recreation;
- develop a better research understanding of victimization;
- improve the operation of the criminal justice system by more willing victim/witness/juror participation; and
- heighten community awareness of anti-crime efforts and of the community role in their success.

Not much, however, was understood about how to achieve such participation, and the poverty programs of the sixties had not furnished any universally accepted models.

#### D. Summary

In sum, then, crime control policy of the early seventies assumed that there were three major criminal justice needs basic to achieving both crime control and the improvement of criminal justice capability. These were:

- the need to acquire more and better knowledge;
- the need for coordination among criminal justice and intergovernmental agencies; and
- the need to involve the community in the criminal justice process.

These needs were not especially new or even crime-specific (they were equally applicable, for example, to health or welfare policy), but they were based on the obstacles to achievement which had characterized the cumulative federal experience in gearing social programs to urban problems in the sixties, and they had been translated into policy goals which now targeted more modest, incremental and realistic improvements than the policy goals of the past. It was understood now that crime problems were complex, that little was known about how to solve them or even where to begin, and that it might take a long time before even enormous efforts could be reflected in falling crime rates. The interdependence of these efforts was also beginning to be understood (i.e., that public involvement was needed to affect crime rates and to move agencies to coordinate, that coordination was needed to improve system capability, allow the acquisition of knowledge and bolster the public sense of security, and that new knowledge was needed to sharpen the overall national capacity to deal with crime problems).

The decade of the sixties had achieved a significant reduction in the expectations of decision-makers. It was time, in their view, after "sober analysis of the conflicts preventing solution of a problem, to attempt the tasks of designing solutions that might work and of trying to describe what they are."<sup>(16)</sup>

## CHAPTER I

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## **Chapter II**

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### **The High-Impact Anti-Crime Program**

## CHAPTER II: SUMMARY

This chapter relates the High-Impact Anti-Crime Program to the policy context presented in Chapter I. The program is considered as an attempt to impose some rationality—in a limited way—upon the criminal justice systems of eight cities while responding to the political pressures which ordinarily condition any social action program.

The program is discussed in terms of:

- the problems implicit in conciliating political and rational aims:
  - faith versus reasoned expectations;
  - action versus knowledge acquisition;
  - New Federalism versus speed in getting things done;
- the basic structure developed to administer the program and mediate its conflicts;
- the relation of the program thrust to the new goals of crime control policy (presented in Chapter I) as expressed in the program's six objectives:
  - crime reduction;
  - demonstration of the COPIE—cycle (i.e., the comprehensive Crime-Oriented Planning, Implementation and Evaluation process);
  - new knowledge about specific crimes and about strategies for dealing with them;
  - better criminal justice agency coordination and more community involvement through Crime Analysis Team activities;
  - institutionalization of Impact projects and other program innovations;
  - improved system capability via dissemination of the lessons learned;
- the relation of the organizational structure to the new goals of crime control policy;
  - roles of the city Crime Analysis Teams, state planning agencies and federal regional offices;
  - efforts at lateral coordination of federal agencies;
  - failure to develop mechanisms for community input;
  - dependence on state planning agencies for the provision of technical assistance.

## Chapter II

### The High-Impact Anti-Crime Program

*Those who govern, having much business on their hands, do not generally like to take the trouble of considering and carrying into execution new projects. The best public measures are therefore seldom adopted from previous wisdom, but forc'd by the occasion.*

Benjamin Franklin

It took some time before the new wisdom came to be reflected in official pronouncements. Governmental statements of the early seventies continued to be couched in the familiar rhetoric of the "war on crime," while containing, at the same time, some tentative articulations of the more modest aims and assumptions recently derived by crime control policy-makers. The rhetoric thus bowed to perceptions of continuing political realities, while beginning, nonetheless, to reflect the developing philosophical climate of the period. It was an uneasy and typical mixture of the old and the new, fraught with inherent conflicts; these conflicts became a source of serious problems, however, only when the time came to resolve them within a single program context. Such a context was offered by the LEAA's High-Impact Anti-Crime Program, launched with some fanfare by Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Attorney General John Mitchell and LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard on January 13, 1972.

#### A. The Program Context: Political Needs and the New Rationality

##### 1. Program Structure

The announced goals of the Impact program were:

- to reduce the incidence of five specific crimes by 5% in two years and by 20% in five years, and
- to improve criminal justice capabilities via the demonstration of a comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation cycle

in eight American cities: Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon) and St. Louis. Under the program, \$160 million (or approximately \$20 million per city) in LEAA discretionary funds were made available over a two-year period to the

participating locales to assist them in developing, implementing, and evaluating programs which specifically addressed the program's target crimes: stranger-to-stranger person crime (murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery) and the property crime of burglary.

The Impact program was administered within the structure established for LEAA block grant programs, with the federal regional offices (ROs), the state planning agencies (SPAs), and the local governments all playing a role in the Impact effort. Within each Impact city, groups were either identified or created to administer the program at the local level. These groups, called Crime Analysis Teams, worked directly with the local criminal justice agencies which, for the most part, operated the numerous projects comprising the Impact program activities.

The program was conceived as a governmental response to rising urban crime rates, and, as such, faithfully reflected LEAA's dual mandate from Congress to help state and local governments control crime and to improve the quality and capabilities of the criminal justice system. The funds to be provided to the cities were intended to allow them an opportunity to attack their crime problems in their own ways and according to their own priorities, but using a balanced, comprehensive and coordinated approach rather than the unsystematic ad hoc methods which appeared to have characterized much of urban crime-fighting in the past. The program sought to address crime itself, rather than hardware needs, and elaborated an ambitious problem-solving framework to ensure that Impact projects would indeed be crime-oriented. Although Impact was intended to demonstrate the utility of such a problem-solving framework, it was, first and foremost, to be an action program and the program focused, therefore, on short-term, crime-oriented achievement. A stringent time-table was set to furnish motivation for rapid action.

## 2. Conciliating Political and Rational Aims

The Impact program then, was a curious blend of old and new. Press releases surfaced the old superb certainties that federal monies and initiative could "turn the corner" and "do the job," cheek by jowl with a new, much more modest specificity. Reduction was sought in the incidence of five specific crimes, not in all crime, and only the stranger-to-stranger portion of those crimes was targeted. This reflected a clearer policy awareness that crime control measures are more appropriate for some problems than for others and are especially unsuited for affecting "crimes of passion" or crimes "among familiars," which make up a large proportion of murders, assaults and rapes; it followed logically, therefore, that this group should be excluded from the crime totals likely to be impacted.

On the other hand, although the crime-reduction goals of 5% and 20% were quantified and specific, the rationale underlying these numbers appears to have been extremely hazy. Given that little was known about the real potential for crime-reduction afforded by the kinds of system capability sought in the Impact program, it is difficult to see by what precedents these numbers could have been supported. Further, since the cities were to structure their own priorities and determine their own projects, there could be no way of estimating in advance what reductions those projects might be liable to achieve in city crime rates (a project for the pre-trial diversion of 20 juveniles, for example, would not be expected to affect robbery rates in the same way as might a police stake-out operation). Thus, what appeared at first glance to be an obeisance to the new rationality was, in reality, little more than an expression of faith, and the wishful thinking of the political process.

City selection was equally ambiguous. Although the assumptions of the selection process were rational (i.e., the choice was initially based on crime problems and on urban need), there entered into the process a set of political considerations such as geographical situation, prior distribution of LEAA funds, and an apparently quite subjective judgment about the administrative and political abilities of cities to utilize federal funds effectively which seriously constrained the final set of choices.(1)

The use of \$160 million in discretionary funds for one program was certainly new, and reasonable; it responded to widespread prior criticism that existing programs were trying to spread too little money too thin. On the other hand, there was no empirical basis for deciding that \$160 million could do all the things the program was setting out to do, and that, even though the stakes had escalated, too little money was not (once again) being spread too thin. There was no doubt that \$20 million was a sizable addition to the criminal justice budgets of some of the eight cities (see Table XVIII, page 115 below), yet this money would be parcelled out over two years, at least, and it was to accomplish some remarkable prowesses: "an across-the-board attack on street crimes and burglaries, involving every portion of the criminal justice system and the community at-large as well."(2) Moreover, as discussed above in reference to city selection, the basis for determining whether these cities could effectively handle the rapid infusion of federal monies appears to have been subjective. This then resurfaces the important policy question (see page 2 above) of whether the goals to be achieved with the funding were really within reach of the resources available to carry them out. The effort at rationality once again gave way to faith and to political necessity.

The Impact program, in asking cities to analyze their own crime problems, to set their own priorities and initiate their own projects, continued to follow the New Federalist idea that local priorities are best determined by local governments and that the federal role should consist mainly of overall program guidance, financial support, technical aid and careful monitoring (within the context of the Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended). This (again) was a political necessity which had already inspired many federal initiatives before Impact (including revenue sharing, and the LEAA block grant program). It had come about, as the Office of Management and Budget explained it, in reaction to the perception that:

government in the United States is too large and too powerful and must be reduced. There should be greater opportunity for the American people to make for themselves fundamental choices about what is best for them. Where it is essential that government--rather than individuals or private organizations--make decisions or perform functions, these governmental activities should be as close to the people and responsive to the people as possible. (3)

By 1972, New Federalism had become a requisite for LEAA programs because the agency's organization had been structured around it. But if Impact posited a flexible, decentralized (and politically-required) New Federalism, this seemed a rather floating base from which to impose a comprehensive, crime-oriented, coordinated approach to crime control. Given the innovativeness of such an approach, and given also the difficulties of obtaining coordination across involved agencies in any anti-crime program, it appeared that it might be arduous to obtain achievement of the rather elaborate, problem-solving Impact prescriptions using the non-coercive techniques of New Federalist guidelines as a program framework.

Finally, the short-term, rapid action, political goal of crime reduction was juxtaposed with time-consuming, system-rationalizing, capability-improving program goals; it was not clear that these two sets of goals were harmonious, or even conciliable.

Impact, then, was not a totally rational program. Like all federal programs, it was a conjunction of many different needs, and, as such, included aims and objectives emanating from a variety of sources. It was, however, a serious attempt:

- to impose some rationality--in a limited way--upon the criminal justice systems of eight cities;

- to respond to the political imperatives which necessarily condition any social action program; and
- to move toward the new goals of crime control policy.

## B. Impact Objectives in Terms of Crime Control Policy Goals

The objectives articulated by the Impact program targeted major improvements in the crime control capability of the cities involved.

### 1. Program Effectiveness and Knowledge Acquisition

To reinforce the local capacity to spend money effectively toward program goals, Impact instituted two innovations. The first of these was a model for comprehensive Crime-Oriented Planning, Implementation and Evaluation, known as the COPIE-cycle (see Chapter VI: Program Dimensions, below). This was intended to ensure: (a) that the crime problems treated by the eight cities were indeed their major problems, (b) that program plans addressing those problems corresponded to local priorities, and (c) that the means would be available, through evaluation, to learn which projects or strategies had--and had not--worked to reduce crime over the life of the program. The second innovation was the Crime Analysis Team, an organization of researchers and functional specialists to be established in each city, intended to serve as a dynamic liaison among all agencies involved in a city's Impact program, and to perform, monitor and/or supervise the COPIE-cycle in that city.

Monies, then, would not simply be channeled to cities. Awards were contingent upon the preparation of master plans and evaluation plans by the Crime Analysis Teams, and these plans themselves had to show evidence of a rational approach, substantiated by data collection and analysis. All of these efforts were expected to produce significant new information about urban crime and about the strategies and tactics needed to address it. A major emphasis of Impact was thus the acquisition of knowledge and the improvement of criminal justice planning, analysis, research and evaluation capabilities--via the introduction and test of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team.

### 2. Agency Coordination

Another major emphasis of the Impact program, also related to the mission of improving the quality of criminal justice, was agency coordination; this was reflected in the requirement that each city institute a Crime Analysis Team to serve as liaison among involved agencies. In effect, Impact reflected here the policy assumption that the achievement of coordination in anti-crime efforts among

criminal justice and intergovernmental agencies (and between those agencies and the community) was in itself a crucial contribution to the overall goal of crime reduction. In this same system direction, Impact sought a better equilibrium in the breakout of funds among police, courts and corrections than had usually been the case: typically, the police function had garnered the lion's share. To achieve functional balance, Impact relied mostly on the incentive of lower matching requirements for corrections projects and on program guidelines to encourage the cities to fund more non-police projects.

### 3. Demonstration of Crime Reduction Via Evaluation

The basic LEAA goal of helping the states to reduce crime was reflected in the Impact program in two ways. The first was an aggressive action focus, targeting the implementation of projects capable of achieving rapid payoffs in crime reduction. The second was a fairly complex program evaluation component seeking to ensure that project achievements would be rigorously assessed and documented in order: (a) to ascertain whether crime reductions were effectively due to a particular project treatment, and (b) to allow rapid dissemination of this information to other high-crime areas, within or outside Impact, where successful projects might be usefully replicated. The projected evaluation had three parts. The measurement of crime trends was to be made via victimization surveys performed by the Bureau of the Census. The Crime Analysis Teams would perform or supervise project-level evaluation in the cities. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, supported by a contractor, would look across the cities, examine and document the efforts made and the results obtained, and feed this information back iteratively into policy-level decision-making.

### 4. Program Objectives

Finally, the major specific objectives of the Impact program were six:

- to reduce Impact crime (i.e., those crime types making up that segment of overall crime deemed to be both serious and accessible to control by criminal justice resources: as discussed above, this segment was to include stranger-to-stranger murder, aggravated assault, rape and robbery, as well as the property crime of burglary);
- to demonstrate the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process, or COPIE-cycle (this focus of the program targeted the integration of the criminal justice function with planning and evaluative research; its goal

was an improved system capability for comprehensive and iterative planning, implementation and evaluation at the local level);

- to acquire, through the use of the COPIE-cycle, new knowledge about:
  - anti-crime effectiveness;
  - specific crimes, in terms of victims, offenders, and crime-settings;
  - the process of innovation within the criminal justice system; and,
  - the application of evaluation to anti-crime projects and programs;
- to improve coordination across intergovernmental and criminal justice agencies, and to increase community involvement and participation via:
  - incentives toward functional balance (90-10 match for corrections projects under special funding arrangements);
  - the institution of the Crime Analysis Team;
- to institutionalize effective program innovations within the eight Impact cities;
- to encourage improved system capability beyond the confines of the Impact program via dissemination of the knowledge acquired through program implementation, including:
  - the documentation of lessons learned;
  - the identification of useful program innovations; and,
  - the designation of effective projects for transfer.

All of these were clearly noble and useful aims. Given the political context, however, they had to be developed inside the organizational framework of the New Federalism. This circumstance would appear at first glance, to have added significantly to the immediate difficulties of the enterprise by the reliance upon good will, example and mutual endeavor "within a partnership," rather than upon the federal power to enforce or to compel compliance. Yet the long-term results of such

federal compulsion in the past had been discouraging: programs had been ephemeral for the most part, failing to achieve local institutionalization. As one author has noted:


Part of the strength of the American political system derives from our understanding that where men are free it is not always necessary to use direct national action to achieve national goals. Often, they can be as effectively achieved through local or state action, and in such cases the results are almost certain to be more enduring because the decisions are more solidly rooted in public opinion.<sup>(4)</sup>

Thus, if an organizational structure based on the New Federalism made program objectives more difficult to attain over the short term, it was viewed by policy-makers as promising greater and more durable effectiveness of program achievements over the long term.

### C. Program Organization

The Impact program, then, was to be a local crime-reduction effort, structured to include state participation and federal guidance, financial support and technical assistance. The program's organizational relationships were intended to correspond to those established for the LEAA block grant program (see Figure 1, page 27 below). In addition, however, as discussed earlier, Impact proposed the establishment of a new body, the Crime Analysis Team, which would be designated in each city to undertake a crime-oriented planning and action program, and to monitor and evaluate project outcomes. The state criminal justice planning agency (i.e., the SPA)--established under LEAA authorizing legislation to generate state comprehensive plans and handle block grant funding--would participate in the financial and administrative monitoring of Impact program progress, and, "in certain cases," in the evaluation of city efforts.<sup>(5)</sup> The LEAA Regional Offices (ROs) would retain final approval authority for Impact plans, action projects, and evaluation components. At LEAA in Washington, the National Impact Program Coordinator, the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (the National Institute), a Policy Decision Group (made up of three high-ranking LEAA officials) and the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS) would monitor the development and progress of the program.

The cyclical, three-tiered approval and funding process envisaged for Impact is shown in Figure 2, page 28 below. Although various local government and community agencies were counted upon to contribute project ideas, develop grant applications and implement approved projects, the major operational responsibility for the Impact program



SOURCE:  
HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1973,  
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,  
93RD CONGRESS, P. 575.

FIGURE 1  
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION




FIGURE 2  
APPROVAL AND FUNDING IN THE IMPACT PROGRAM

in each city lay with the Crime Analysis Team. Before projects could be proposed, approved or implemented, the basic Impact crime-oriented planning cycle had to be initiated for the city as a whole and this was the job of the Crime Analysis Team.

#### 1. The Role of the Crime Analysis Team

Team planners were expected to begin the COPIE-cycle by collecting data on city crime and on the criminal justice system, so as to pinpoint specifically the "where," "what," "how," "to whom," "by whom," and "how much" of the city's crime problems. Once the data were collected, the Crime Analysis Team would then perform analysis focusing on the specific Impact crimes (murder, aggravated assault, rape, robbery and burglary) and on specific aspects of those crimes (victim, offender and crime-setting); they were then asked, working from these data, to prioritize the crime problems they had identified, propose broad program areas and goals targeting those problems, and develop projects whose objectives (operationally defined and specified quantitatively where possible) would then logically address the crime problems revealed by the first analysis. This crime-oriented planning process had the added advantage of helping to provide the baseline data needed for project and program evaluation.

In pursuit of these planning tasks, it was expected that Crime Analysis Teams would be able to enlist the cooperation and aid of the various criminal justice and intergovernmental agencies, of the community at large (and particularly the populations of high-crime areas), and of the media. It was hoped that this could ensure access by the Team to agency data, that it would promote a system-wide focus for planning and evaluation, facilitate the development of innovative projects, and increase the public sense of security, thereby enhancing the quality of project implementation. This liaison effort, combined with the initiation of the COPIE-cycle, was to establish the basic program thrust in each city, and furnish a framework into which individual project ideas could be inserted according to the targeted objectives.

The program context established, the Impact master plan (including specific projects and explanations of the ways in which these projects were expected to contribute to meeting overall city program goals) was to be submitted by each city to the involved SPA and to the RO for review and approval, after which program implementation could begin. It was hoped that mayors would involve themselves intimately with the city program and with the master plan ("Gentlemen, if you mayors don't make a commitment to this program and take a personal interest in it, it isn't going to work"<sup>(6)</sup>). It was hoped also that regional offices

and state planning agencies would commit themselves wholeheartedly to the program. SPAs and ROs were asked to name an Impact Coordinator in their respective offices to be responsible for the program.

Crime Analysis Team efforts did not, of course, end with program planning and system coordination. The teams were to be responsible, over the life of the Impact program, for the following functions and activities:

- to collect and analyze data relating to specific crimes;
- to establish crime-problem priorities based on the data;
- to develop programs and select projects with quantified, operationally defined goals and objectives, and carefully elaborated (obligatory) evaluation components;
- to develop baseline data for the evaluation;
- to monitor project progress;
- to evaluate projects (or provide for their evaluation) and assure the submission of evaluation reports;
- to develop an Impact master plan;
- to review and update the plan;
- to provide sound fiscal and administrative procedures;
- to maintain liaison with criminal justice agencies and with the community.

## 2. The Role of the SPA

The SPAs had been viewed by national program planners as necessarily being a prime focus of Impact, because of the need to relate city Impact programs to the state comprehensive plans (developed through LEAA funding and initiative) and to the block grant program.<sup>(7)</sup> It was of some importance to LEAA, therefore, that the SPAs maintain involvement with Impact: to pass on to the cities their planning and methodological expertise, to reinforce comprehensive plan development, and to assure continuing SPA interest in Impact fund administration, fiscal monitoring, evaluation, and system coordination.

In brief, the SPA role--less clearly defined than that of the Crime Analysis Team--was essentially one of review, aid and monitoring. The SPA was to:

- provide planning, fiscal accounting and evaluation assistance;
- review projects, applications, evaluation plans and reports;
- act as grantee for approved projects;
- assist in the coordination of Crime Analysis Team efforts; and
- monitor Impact activities.

### 3. The Role of the RO

Because crime problems appeared to be quite different in each Impact city, and because there were varying inputs of talent, stability and organizational expertise likely to inspire each city program, it was assumed that locally-chosen anti-crime strategies would naturally differ across the program. An effort was therefore made to incorporate a certain amount of flexibility in the national planning to account for such diversity. This flexibility was reflected in the considerable latitude allowed the ROs. It was understood that regional office judgment, with Policy Decision Group guidance,<sup>(8)</sup> would be final. In general, authority and responsibility for program compliance with Impact guidelines resided in the RO, which had real power, therefore, to promote or inhibit local initiative. The regional office was to:

- approve grant applications;
- approve master plans and evaluation plans and components;
- make funding awards;
- retain final approval authority for programs and projects;
- monitor city performance and conformity with program guidelines;
- provide technical assistance in substantive and administrative areas; and,
- oversee implementation of the program.

Overall program review and policy control, however, would be maintained in the Policy Decision Group at LEAA in Washington.

In sum, national program planners had structured an effort at rational anti-crime planning and evaluation on a multijurisdictional basis. Organizational objectives were thus:

- horizontal interagency and anti-crime coordination at the city level via the Crime Analysis Team; and
- vertical inter-governmental coordination via the city/SPA/RO/LEAA review and approval cycle.

It was hoped that the various efforts brought to bear in each city could conciliate the complexity of the COPIE-cycle and coordination tasks with the program's action, rapid-payoff focus. With this in mind, national planners believed that Impact could be operational between three and six months from the time the program was announced. (9)

Two other organizational objectives were also targeted, but these were much less well developed and it was unclear how they would be inserted into the Impact context. The first of these was the lateral coordination of federal agencies with programs bearing upon the Impact effort, and the second was the involvement of high-crime area communities in city program planning.

#### 4. Lateral Coordination of Federal Agencies

Since many federal agencies fund programs which target similar anti-crime objectives to those of LEAA, it was hoped that lateral coordination could be achieved among these agencies in the eight Impact cities. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), for example, had funded many tenant security projects, because urban redevelopment success appeared to be dependent in large measure on crime control. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) had a shared responsibility with LEAA for the problem of juvenile delinquency and related aspects of truancy and early school drop-out. Congressional concern about the need for coordination in juvenile programs was reflected in the formation of the Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Juvenile Delinquency Programs, set up in 1971 and chaired by the Attorney General. HEW was further involved in welfare programs for released offenders and their families. The Department of Labor had charge of manpower training programs which served probationers and parolees; Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) programs targeted similar at-risk groups to those of LEAA prevention programs; various drug agencies were devoting resources to the frustration of the "drug-crime" cycle; the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) ministered to the mental illness and alienation of disadvantaged urban populations.

There was clearly a community of interest among all of these agencies and LEAA, yet their programs were unconnected and agencies were often unaware of each other's existence. The General Accounting Office (GAO), in 1971, identified eleven federal departments or agencies that were spending "at least \$193 million" for offender-related programs.

Senator Charles Percy of Illinois reported to Congress that close to \$200 million were being spent annually "in such a totally uncoordinated manner that it took a great deal of effort just to find the programs." (10)

Lateral coordination among federal agencies thus became an important item on the LEAA agenda for Impact. LEAA officials met with representatives from NIMH, HEW, Labor and other agencies, and it was agreed that interrelated programs would be coordinated under the Impact program, that HUD might provide a city's matching funds for tenant security programs, for example, or that a group of federal agencies might jointly fund an appropriate project. In this way, there would be some likelihood of harmony (or at least non-opposition) among agency goals, Impact monies could achieve extended effects, and it was thought also that a cooperative endeavor by these various agencies might be the ideal umbrella for a study of the factors related to criminal behavior.

The Regional Council structure was mentioned as a good organizational context for such interagency coordination. At the beginning of the program, however, efforts remained at the stage of high-level contacts among agency heads. Few details and no mechanisms for working-level coordination had been elaborated, perhaps because past failures in this area had been so extremely numerous (and bureaucratic coordination so rare) that the necessary elan was missing; or perhaps there just wasn't enough time.

#### 5. The Involvement of High-Crime-Area Communities

Successful mechanisms for community input had been even rarer. As discussed earlier, program planners were highly aware of the need to involve the community in the planning of criminal justice programs. One National Institute analyst wrote that Impact must fully consider the workings of "social and political power in the communities where it will be instituted...The failure to recognize and plan for the dynamics of urban power exchange can result in both loss of credibility and the failure of program elements." The dynamics referred to here were "the struggle of the core city population, usually black, for a greater measure of autonomy and control over their lives; and the resistance to that thrust from various groups...In all this, city hall is often caught in the middle." (11) The same analyst suggested that "tension-reducing" efforts should be mounted simultaneously (and interactively) with operational efforts (he did not, however, specify what those tension-reducing efforts should be), and proposed as well that community leaders should have a "strong role" in designing the program. (12) Another idea was that cities should hire specialists in community organization, inner city problems and law enforcement; a further suggestion combined the uncertainties of community participation with those of interagency coordination:

The mass media publicity campaign must be tied in with other federal agencies in their attack on the sociological causes of crime. When you are dealing with cities which are predominantly ghettos, it is very difficult to develop the emotional and economic support of the community. It is difficult because the ghetto dweller himself is the major victim of the crime and he has become disillusioned with his life and with the criminal justice system which seeks to make life safe for him. LEAA must not only concentrate on criminal statistics but must combine with other federal agencies to try to improve housing, employment, medical and psychiatric facilities, etc., and to show the ghetto dweller that this is being done along with the improvement of the criminal justice system. This information must be made part of LEAA's public information campaign or else the community of the ghetto will be apathetic to any crime control program. (13)

Still another suggestion was made to:

include an assessment of the community impact of programs that are implemented in the eight cities. In short, to what extent do these programs lead to significant changes in the attitudes and behavior of citizens in regard to crime and its consequences? ...It is important to assess the effects in these areas and systematic attention needs to be given to these issues. Survey research methods and techniques can be very useful here. (14)

No organizational arrangements were made, finally, for the systematic collection or channelling of community input. As one program planner put it, "In principle, the ideas expressed are fine, but somehow they don't work when actually broached to the public. Again, public apathy takes over." (15) As with interagency coordination, there was a recognition of the need for community input, but little enthusiasm or optimism about the possibility of achieving success.

Finally, some program planners identified two organizational and funding problems as serious and needing attention:

- technical assistance to the cities; and,
- local matching fund requirements.

#### 6. Technical Assistance

In the case of technical assistance, it was felt that it was mainly the SPA role to provide such help, and that the requirement

for it would therefore depend upon state/city interfaces, upon the kind of program implemented, and upon city resources. As of December 17, 1971, the issue of the organization of technical assistance had not been resolved.<sup>(16)</sup> It was not, however, perceived as urgent or crucial at that time, although at least one analyst understood the magnitude of the problem. He wrote:

LEAA must recognize that most cities do not have sufficient staff planning or evaluation capability. In almost every case, a city will have to engage the services of a consultant or a consulting firm to draft the city's approach, project by project. Someone will have to pay for the consultant's services.<sup>(17)</sup>

#### 7. Local Matching Funds

Regional administrators surfaced the problem of local match, wondering about the unknowns involved in pinpointing the ability of states and local governments to come up with the required matching funds. Discreet inquiries were made of prospective Impact cities in this regard "to ascertain their interest in the program and their willingness to commit resources to it."<sup>(18)</sup> Other concerns were raised, however:

- would money from HUD or other agencies really provide hard match without distorting program priorities? (i.e., what quid pro quo would HUD be likely to demand?),<sup>(19)</sup>
- could match problems be a blessing in disguise in that they might force cities to let money flow out to the county or state institutions (courts and corrections, for example), thus facilitating system coordination?<sup>(20)</sup>

Again, the matter was let to stand, with the understanding that the money would somehow have to be found, but without any real resolution of the problem. As the announcement of the program grew near, most National Institute attention focused of necessity on the complex evaluation planned as an integral part of the Impact program. Activity speeded up and there was suddenly no time left to try to reduce conflicts which had been built into the program. Yet it was already evident that these conflicts could have major effects on program operations, and hence, on the achievement of program goals.

## CHAPTER II

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## **Chapter III**

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### **Policy Alternatives, Program Conflicts, Priorities and Constraints**

### CHAPTER III: SUMMARY

This chapter presents an analysis of:

- the initial overall policy trade-offs which tend to influence program content (for example, economic versus social, quantitative versus qualitative, public versus private).
- some major explicit conflicts among Impact program objectives (alluded to in Chapter II):
  - effectiveness versus efficiency;
  - action versus research;
  - New Federalism versus knowledge acquisition, rapid action and agency coordination;
- the priorities likely to emerge from those conflicts:
  - heavy orientation toward the police function;
  - few courts, juvenile prevention and community involvement projects;
  - corrections projects favored by fiscal incentives;
  - city choice required between rapid implementation and an adequate performance of the COPIE-cycle (in the first case, knowledge acquisition would be impaired; in the second, there would be program slippage);
  - planning and evaluation quality dependent upon regional office commitment and expertise, upon recruitment of knowledgeable researchers for the Crime Analysis Team, upon Team acceptability to city/state functional agencies, upon attitudes and agendas of the SPA, and upon adequacy of technical assistance forthcoming;
  - system coordination, innovation, community input and institutionalization dependent upon Team ability to function effectively, given no supplementary incentives reinforcing these objectives; and
- external constraints likely to affect program achievements:
  - nationwide or regional economic and social trends;
  - research findings from other programs;
  - changes in policy direction due to top management turnover.

## Chapter III

# Policy Alternatives, Program Conflicts, Priorities and Constraints

*Since every society is informed by a great variety of ideals and interests competing for expression, it compromises them all and can fully satisfy none. And since the means to resolve any social issue cannot be divorced from the ends they serve, this fundamental incompatibility reappears at every level of discussion. Any policy implies the reasons by which it could be refuted.*

Marris and Rein (1967)

The kinds of conflicts discussed in Chapter II are often unavoidable in social action programs. They spring from the heterogeneity of backgrounds, disciplines and philosophies within any society. Their roots, therefore, do not lie within a single program context, but rather in the larger framework of overall policy options which dictate particular program choices.

### A. Policy Trade-Offs

If a choice is a decision made among competing options, then all choices emerge from some type of conflict, even when there is no awareness that a choice has been made, and no discussion about the conflict. When the choice has occurred in the market place or among social values, there is no debate and a collective decision slowly evolves, but the conflict has not necessarily been resolved. Jouvanel pointed out, for example, that a preference for material values, for economic utility, was a crucial choice which did not simply co-exist with non-material values, but, on the contrary, could not fail to bring about their deprivation. This is to say that all those aspects of social life which transcend the sale, the barter, or the immediately profitable exchange could not fail to suffer, at least over the long term, because of the lower esteem in which they were held. As he wrote:

the individual's value to society does not lie exclusively in the professional services he renders. It would be a sorry society in which men gave nothing to their contemporaries over and above the services for which they are rewarded and which enter into the computation of national income. Culture and civilization, indeed the very existence

of society, depend upon warm hospitality, leisured and far-ranging conversation, friendly advice, voluntary and unrequited services. These are time- and resource-consuming and costly. There seems to be little awareness among us that they have entered upon a precipitous decline. (1)

But if cultural emphases reflect collective choices made among implicitly competing options, this is even more the case for policy goals which are deliberately selected in a political arena where conflicts are explicit. The selection of any policy goal thus implies an alternate goal, and the unpreferred option may not be less important than the preferred one, but merely less feasible, perhaps, or less politically powerful in the decision-making arena, less modish among researchers. Excluded options, however, often have a hidden life of their own which continues to impact chosen goals, operations, and results.

In this way, a program emphasis on quantitative assessment (such as the COPIE-cycle emphasis in Impact, for example) neglects, obscures and eventually deprives qualitative assessment; only that which can be counted or measured becomes of importance. Purposefully choosing to structure a program so as to acquire quantified and specific knowledge of its effects thus implies that many non-quantifiable aspects may be lost. To assume too readily that "nothing at all is known if it is not known by researchers" may mean the loss of intuitive knowledge, of experience, and of educated judgment which may be more meaningful than the research findings. Projects become limited to those for which "valid" (i.e., quantified) information exists to support the project concept. Yet it is highly probable that empirical support might not be available for certain kinds of projects which are urgently needed in criminal justice. (2)

Concentration on quantified measurements in a social program then, tends to distort, and the more measurement there is, the more distortion, since the frequency of the measurement itself tends to encourage over-production of highly measurable items to the detriment of less measurable ones. This has its most serious consequences when it is the central, substantive output of a program which cannot be quantified while, at the same time, some peripheral aspects of the effort lend themselves readily to measurement. (3) In Impact, for example, it would be ridiculous to assert that a reduction in crime rates might be trivial, peripheral or unimportant. But it may well be true that an obsession with these quantified data could produce findings showing that the crime rates had improved without pointing up a real and unwanted deterioration in the crime control situation in a community. A crime prevention project might well deter crime in an area, but also unite the whole community in opposition to the planning, experimenting and evaluating intruders. Or it might

disintegrate what remained of social organization in a declining neighborhood.<sup>(4)</sup> Would the project then have been a success? It would certainly have seemed so, if crime rates were to be the only measures of achievement.

Again, the very fact that a program occurs in the public arena distorts the importance of private sector inputs. In criminal justice, for example, a crucial requirement for the success of any rehabilitation program is the participation of the business community and the possibility of sustained, meaningful employment for ex-offenders. Placement bureaus can find jobs for people just out of prison, but it is the business community which must help to keep them employed. Rehabilitation is judged over the long term, not according to the number of placements made.

In the same sense, all of the public efforts to improve processing and backlogs in the courts will not help if the contribution of the defense bar (i.e., the private sector) to court congestion is not taken into account. Many cases are delayed because of continuances arising from schedule conflicts which were avoidable or because a defense counsel is "trying to locate a missing witness" (whereas in reality, he seeks to get his fee before moving on the case). Public programs tend to include the private sector--if at all--only as an afterthought.

Whatever the goals of a program, then, the process by which they are selected and by which conflicting goals have been weeded out, leaves traces which mark the operational activities and the evaluated outcomes of the program. The selected goals, themselves, however, may be in conflict with each other, and this has usually been the case in social action programs.

B. Explicit Goal Conflicts in Social Action Programs and In The Impact Program

Conflicting goals in social action programs appear to be almost inevitable, arising much less from ignorance than from the need to conciliate the rival political requirements of social problems. It is in this way that programs to provide health care are expected to ensure quality service to all and at the same time encourage an optimal distribution of scarce medical resources; that welfare programs are expected to provide welfare payments to those living in poverty and at the same time maintain work incentives.<sup>(5)</sup> Similarly, criminal justice programs are expected to increase crime control and public security, and at the same time maintain standards of fairness to individuals and of equality before the law. But it is no easy matter to plan programs which can do all of these things.

In the Impact program, as in other social action programs, goal conflicts have appeared. A careful reading of the articulated program objectives (see pages 24-25 above) immediately surfaces a few explicit conflicts and many implicit ones. The major problems, however, appeared to concern the potential competition between program efficiency and effectiveness, between research and action objectives, and finally, between New Federalism and the objectives of knowledge acquisition, rapid action and agency coordination.

#### 1. Program Effectiveness Versus Program Efficiency

Political rhetoric discussed earlier (see pages 19-23 above) which called for rapid crime reduction in specified amounts by a given date meant that all Impact projects would have to be directly justified in terms of crime-reduction effectiveness. Projects targeting improvements in system capability and efficiency (such as the reduction of court delays, or better jail or prison conditions, or greater police productivity, for example), or improvement in community relations with police and courts, however, could not usually be so justified. Yet effectiveness in crime reduction--insofar as it is achievable by any governmental program--clearly depends in large measure on system efficiency (see Chapter I above). Furthermore, Impact specifically addressed objectives of functional balance (among police, courts and corrections), of agency coordination, and of community involvement as well as crime reduction. The effectiveness objective thus contained elements of serious conflict with efficiency and other important objectives of the program.

The problem signified, then, that many projects which might be good things to do in themselves, regardless of any presumption about their effects on crime rates, could be rejected, depending on the interpretations of program priorities by reviewers. The problem, however, also extended deeply into project approaches, techniques and assessment methodologies. Not only would it be difficult to justify certain projects on the basis of likely effects on crime rates, it would be difficult to isolate and exclusively treat Impact (i.e., target crime) offenders in caseloads which normally include all criminal offenses. In the case of court projects, for example, if the five target crimes should constitute 30 percent of the caseload in a particular city, then 70 percent of an effort to reduce trial delay in that city would be irrelevant to the Impact goal. This would inevitably constitute a leakage from the program. Yet the other objective (of improvement in overall court capability) would have been unquestionably enhanced by an improvement in processing time.

The same problem of crime-specificity occurs in corrections. In effect, it would be difficult for recreation centers, counselling or job placement services to turn away non-Impact adult offenders, and

juvenile programs targeting only Impact felons would clearly fail to reach the major part of the juvenile delinquent population. The requirement to deal with people who were target offenders eliminated a whole category of school-based juvenile prevention programs. Yet the problem of juvenile delinquency had been slated for special attention under Impact.

Finally, the program's effectiveness objective (i.e., crime-reduction) relates well to the effectiveness objectives of police and corrections; it is not, however, synonymous with that of the courts. The court input usually hypothesized as affecting crime rates is the deterrence of crime via speedy and sure judicial disposition and/or trial. But this is an efficiency objective of the courts, whose major function is to mete out justice. Even, then, if the reduction of trial delay were admitted to Impact funding on the basis of the assumed relationship between the deterrence furnished by an efficient court system and crime rates, this very objective of court efficiency might well be in conflict with court effectiveness. The problem rejoins that of implicit rivalry discussed earlier (see pages 39-41), that is, the situation of the qualitative omitted in favor of the quantitative, the private in favor of the public, the social in favor of the economic. As one analyst expressed it:

LEAA must reduce the court delay without resorting to assembly-line justice. In an attempt to make the court calendars more workable and less backlogged than they are now, LEAA must be very careful to not just offhandedly reduce any and all cases. This has been the most harmful product of many cities' present efforts to reduce court congestion: judges and prosecutors are reducing almost all cases. This obsession with statistics can be harmful to society, to the offender and to innocent persons charged with serious crimes. (6)

In sum, the problems likely to result from the built-in conflict between effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., the Impact guideline that projects had to focus on specific-crime reduction and could not be justified exclusively on the basis of improved system capability) might well be:

- fewer court projects (because of the difficulty in demonstrating the precise effects of court action on crime rates);
- court projects focused exclusively on trial delay and judicial productivity;
- corrections projects either too small to be evaluated or containing many non-Impact offenders;

- fewer juvenile prevention projects;
- city programs skewed toward the police function (and away from county/state and courts/corrections), thus failing to encourage the targeted agency coordination and functional balance objectives;
- fewer community/courts, community/police, or community/corrections programs (thus failing to encourage community involvement or participation); and
- police projects geared only to crime reduction (thus failing to address other major police problems).

Yet it is clear that impediments brought to system coordination, functional balance and community involvement--in the name of program effectiveness--could not fail to work against the satisfaction of the effectiveness objective itself.

## 2. Action Versus Research

Action is always in conflict with research. As Marris and Rein observed:

Research cannot interpret the present until it knows the answers to its ultimate questions. Action cannot foresee what questions to ask until it has interpreted the present. (7)

But action cannot wait for research answers when (as in Impact) it is the action programs which are to bring the research answers; this therefore would clearly build some tension into the relationships of research (i.e., all of the evaluative research plus whatever basic research might be performed accessorially by the Crime Analysis Teams) and action objectives as they co-existed in the Impact program.

National planners noted early on that there might be some conflict between the short-term action focus of Impact and the evaluative research aspects of the COPIE-cycle focus. Technical assistance had been (rather vaguely) discussed in this context. The consensus was that it should be possible for the Crime Analysis Team to be recruited and installed, to perform its program planning (including data collection, analysis, problem prioritizing and project development) and evaluation planning functions and to move projects into operation within six months; in reality, nothing was less sure, and there were many dissenters to this proposition in the regional offices. This was, however, a crucial problem for both action and knowledge/research objectives, because if rapid implementation could not be achieved,

concentration of anti-crime emphasis within a city would give way to long-drawn out, straggling project implementation and weakened program impact; on the other hand, if the COPIE-cycle effort had to be sacrificed to rapid implementation, this would mean the inability of evaluation to speak to program effects, the uncertainty of whether projects had addressed rationally derived priorities, and the failure to achieve the major program research objective of knowledge about anti-crime projects and their effects.

Another immediately obvious conflict in this area had to do with the program requirement to achieve short-term anti-crime impacts while dealing with problems requiring long-term measurement for the acquisition of any real knowledge. This difficulty would evidently trouble corrections and drug project planners (among others) in the cities, given that freedom from drug use and changes in recidivism patterns/social adjustment, etc., need to be followed up over a rather lengthy time-span. Yet funds were allocated only for a 2-year period of program operations and evaluation, despite the fact that knowledge about drug program effects and recidivism were major Impact priorities.

The research/action conflict therefore appeared to imply:

- the possibility of program slippage (barring major efforts at technical assistance);
  - the possibility that efforts to avoid program slippage could reduce both program impact and the ability to demonstrate that impact via the COPIE-cycle;
  - a paucity of new information about drug and corrections projects without serious follow-up effort; and
  - fewer corrections or drug projects.
3. New Federalism Versus Knowledge Acquisition, Rapid Action and Agency Coordination

New Federalism as discussed earlier (see pages 22 and 25-26 above) was a political axiom of LEAA and hence of Impact, and the concept implied some problems for any new and ambitious program. To begin with, the policy meant that cities (having determined their own priorities based on their analysis, and chosen their projects from an unlimited spectrum) would also have collected what data they saw fit to collect. Whether or not the data were the best available, whether each Impact crime was fully analyzed to the extent possible in each city, whether evaluation planning, project monitoring, and evaluation reporting were adequately performed would depend upon the quality of SPA and RO review.

New Federalism meant, however, that no mandatory evaluation standards had been established for the states, that no requirements existed for comparable and uniform data across the states, and that no routine federal monitoring of the adequacy of state planning and assistance functions had been instituted.

Thus, New Federalism had not only precluded prescriptions to the cities about evaluation designs (Impact cities were being allowed to conduct their own evaluations and no control groups or particular design specifications had been mandated), but even the leverage to insure that some data were being collected, and that some SPAs were checking on that data collection, was also missing. Yet to ensure that funds would not be wasted or misused, or that Impact goals would not be neglected, it seemed an obvious necessity for SPAs and ROs to:

- check carefully on the quality of the data analysis performed;
- see that the projects chosen addressed the crime problems delineated and substantiated by the analysis;
- ensure the possibility of a rapid anti-crime payoff;
- examine the adequacy and feasibility of the evaluation design; and,
- investigate the cost/effectiveness of the organization and methods chosen, etc.

But SPAs could resist these efforts in the name of New Federalism. On the other hand, if they chose to exercise these functions in an autocratic or interfering way, they could seriously slow implementation. The independence granted the SPAs and the cities via the New Federalism, then, was likely to come into conflict either with the program objective of knowledge acquisition or with rapid implementation and anti-crime payoff, depending upon the attitudes, strengths and expertise of the particular SPA, the authority and willingness to use power of the RO, and the Policy Decision Group's prerogative of review. New Federalism, however, enabled the ROs (and SPAs) to fight such an LEAA review, which, of course, they did, prior to program launching. The Policy Decision Group was reminded by RO coordinators that the regional offices were "to have control of the money" and that LEAA review to assure proper data collection and evaluation methodology "was a major shift in policy having a potential for delay in funding."<sup>(8)</sup> Such LEAA review was appealed to the highest level where it was, however, maintained, at least in principle. But New Federalism was thus in conflict both with knowledge acquisition and with agency coordination.

In effect, with everyone free to be "equal partners," it might not always be clear who was in charge, and given the tendencies of bureaucratic agencies not to coordinate, it was unlikely, under New Federalism, that much progress could be made in this direction. The conflict between New Federalism and knowledge acquisition, rapid action and agency coordination thus appeared to signify:

- either COPIE-cycle inadequacy or program delay;
- undiminished interagency competition and rivalry;
- slow approval and funding processes (through failure of interagency harmony);
- tendency toward cheaper, non-controversial (and non-innovative) projects to facilitate project passage through the approval pipeline.

Yet knowledge acquisition, short-term impact, the demonstration of anti-crime effectiveness, system coordination, encouragements to innovation, all of these were objectives of the Impact program, whereas New Federalism was "merely" the political structure under which it would operate. From the beginning, however, the tension between structure and policy objectives was manifest, and there was concern among planners about how such tension, along with the other conflicts among program aims, might affect Impact achievements. But it was also clear from the beginning that the program was intended to deliver services, rather than perform research, and that New Federalism was not going to be negotiable.

#### C. Program Conflicts and Program Priorities

The Impact program's articulated purpose, then, was to reduce crime by applying the tools of research to anti-crime efforts, to bring together disparate intergovernmental and criminal justice agencies into a cohesive and systematic force, to involve the community, to innovate, to institutionalize, to disseminate. Program planners had omitted, however, to provide for elements (like systematic community surveys or the inclusion of private business and bar associations) which could compensate for the program's intrinsic biases toward the quantitative and toward the exclusively governmental (or public) input, and thereby help to ensure greater effectiveness. Further, there was a failure to conciliate explicit and overt conflicts among important objectives of the program:

- between anti-crime effectiveness in specific areas and the overall improvements of criminal justice capabilities;

- between the action needed for short-term impact and the research needed to say something about the impact;
- between the New Federalist operational structure and Impact policy objectives.

Since many of these conflicts were recognized, however, incentives were developed to protect some of the more important program priorities likely to suffer because of the conflicts. In this way, a favorable matching ratio fostered corrections projects (unlikely otherwise to be developed because of time constraints and because of state, rather than city, jurisdiction), and SAODAP (the White House's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention) tried to counter the problems of attitude, confidentiality, accountability and time likely to constrain and inhibit anti-drug efforts by a series of conferences with Impact city planners to promote their drug program known as TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime). Evaluation itself (which probably could not otherwise have survived hasty implementation, the bureaucratic barriers to innovation and accountability, and the paucity of expertise in the area) was federally funded without any matching requirements at all. Crime Analysis Teams were likewise instituted (and totally funded) to protect the COPIE-cycle and the knowledge-acquisition function and to push for interagency coordination, acceptance of innovation and community involvement. Regional offices were empowered to ensure such Crime Analysis Team effort by disapproving plans and projects which did not present evidence of adequate COPIE-cycle performance.

On the negative side, however, efforts like lateral coordination among federal agencies (which could have supported juvenile prevention and employment programs), mechanisms for community inputs (to assure the support of high-crime area populations) and serious technical assistance (to guarantee the quality of planning and evaluation) were never developed. Further the role of the SPA was left quite vague, yet the SPAs were asked to assist, administer and fiscally monitor a program whose priorities they had had no part in determining and which appeared, in some respects, to be in conflict with their already-established 5-year plans. Such a situation seemed to call for some real incentives toward interagency coordination.

Given then, that the program's political parameters (crime reduction, action focus and New Federalism) were fixed, and that accommodations and negotiations would have to take place in the research and functional areas, it seemed likely at the beginning of the program, that:

- there would be a heavy orientation toward the police function (because of readily available quantitative measures, better research expertise, crime-specific possibilities, action focus, and a large share of existing power in the municipal government structure);
- few courts, juvenile prevention and community involvement projects would be justifiable under Impact guidelines;
- corrections projects would not suffer because of the fiscal incentives (90-10 match) provided;
- a city choice would have to be made between rapid implementation and an adequate performance of the COPIE-cycle; in the first case, knowledge acquisition would be impaired, and in the second, there would be program slippage;
- the quality of planning and evaluation would depend upon regional office commitment and expertise, upon the recruitment of knowledgeable researchers for the Crime Analysis Team, upon the Team's acceptability to the city/state functional agencies, upon the attitudes and agendas of the SPA, and upon the adequacy of technical assistance forthcoming;
- system coordination, innovation, community input, and institutionalization would depend upon the Crime Analysis Team's ability to function effectively given the failure to supply incentives, other than the Team's presence, which could reinforce these objectives.

Thus, LEAA's capacity to move toward the overall policy goals of knowledge acquisition, interagency coordination and community input would become, in large part, under Impact, a function of the effectiveness of that rather fragile vessel, the Crime Analysis Team.

In addition to the inconciliables and idiosyncracies of Impact objectives, however, program achievements would also necessarily be affected by the host of external or exogenous factors which are beyond any program's control and which constrain it in ways that are unforeseeable at the program's start. It is true that the dynamic context in which social action programs occur is once again part of the terrain which separates the research need to hold things constant from the action need to move, one step at a time, with an eye to the changing state of surrounding circumstances. Research and action objectives suffer alike, however, from drastic changes in the environment of a social program.

#### D. External Program Constraints

Alterations can occur at any time to the political, social or economic atmosphere in which an action program was generated. Hypotheses differ as to the potential or real effects of tough anti-crime legislation, for example, of economic recession or prosperity, of other political and social forces (like civil rights and women's movements, or changes in urban power structures) on crime itself. Some researchers have shown that inflation and prosperity contribute to increases in property or "economic" crimes;<sup>(9)</sup> others make the point that recession and depression are directly responsible for rate rises in specific crimes. Certain of these factors, however, can directly and clearly affect the criminal justice system and its ability to respond to crime problems or to follow through on a particular anti-crime program.

State legislation providing for speedy trial laws or court reorganization, changed penalties for particular crimes or altered rules of evidence, for example, have powerful effects on agency priorities and coordination. Fiscal problems of cities are aggravated by the swings of the national economy; inflation makes it expensive and difficult for them to borrow money, but recession causes revenues to fall off and brings layoffs in police forces, prison closings, and cutbacks in welfare services. Ex-offenders find it more difficult than ever to locate and hold jobs, racial tensions are exacerbated by disparities of income distribution and of unemployment rates. All of these factors, exogenous to a program, can contribute to its success or failure.

Research in a program can also be affected by nation-wide movements such as the current one toward privacy and confidentiality which restricts access to data and records in new ways. Juvenile and drug project evaluation might well be further constrained by new rulings in these areas. But research is also impacted by the changing nature of public interest, and by the changes brought about by research findings external to the program. While the researcher in a program like Impact is pursuing findings on the effectiveness of community corrections or police patrol, for example, the results of other research may have rendered those findings academic.

Finally, the temporary character of social action program organizations makes them especially vulnerable to the problem of turnover among top management and other personnel. To achieve improvements in agency coordination in a transitory program like Impact with a fragile organizational framework based on New Federalism would seem almost an impossibility even with firm policy direction and continuity. Yet not only was Impact to be a two-year program, the LEAA itself is a transient organization, authorized by Congress for successive five-year periods only. Thus, a basic element auguring success in a federal program

was likely to be missing in Impact: that is, the kind of stability in direction, management and guidance which has not traditionally been available at LEAA, at LEAA regional offices, or in the state planning agencies. A change in SPA director, in RO administrator, in Policy Decision Group membership would be crucial in any program utilizing these units as major resources. In the Crime Analysis Teams, planning, and later evaluation, would clearly be at the mercy of the researchers employed to perform these functions. Furthermore, temporary programs often see a sudden diminution of key personnel about six months before the final program phase-down.

Many or most of the conflicts and constraints discussed above have been the common lot of social action programs implemented multi-jurisdictionally on a national scale. It was therefore incumbent upon the National Institute and MITRE to bear them prominently in mind in designing the national-level evaluation of the Impact program.

### CHAPTER III

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## **Chapter IV**

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### **The National-Level Evaluation**

## CHAPTER IV: SUMMARY

This chapter discusses the national-level evaluation in terms of:

- National Institute evaluation planning (November and December, 1971);
- the original concept for a macroscopic or global evaluation using the victimization surveys (to be performed jointly by LEAA and the Bureau of the Census);
- time pressures vitiating early evaluation planning;
- foreseeable problems related to the three major program conflicts discussed in Chapter III, and especially:
  - the likely effects of program slippages on the national-level evaluation;
  - the uncertainties of data availability and city-level feedback in the New Federalist context;
- constraints on evaluation planning and the question of which evaluation issues to select;
- the development of an evaluation strategy involving nine major tasks;
- the knowledge products to be derived from the effort; and
- the problems, limitations and opportunities implicit in the evaluation.

## Chapter IV

### The National-Level Evaluation

*A proposal to solve all problems and answer all questions would be such a piece of boastful impertinence, such an extravagant conceit, that its author would immediately forfeit all claim to our trust.*

Emmanuel Kant

#### A. Background of the Evaluation: The Original National Institute Concept

As discussed earlier, the Impact evaluation had been conceived during the program planning process at three levels:

- a city-level evaluation (to be performed under the supervision of the Crime Analysis Team) which would produce project-level and program-level findings for each Impact city;
- a national-level evaluation (to be performed by the National Institute assisted by a contractor) which would draw upon the data collected by the cities and use the city-level evaluations as its essential building blocks;
- a set of victimization surveys (to be performed by the Bureau of the Census in 1972, 1975 and 1978) in the eight Impact cities, which would determine the effectiveness of the program in terms of crime reduction.

This idea for a 3-tiered evaluation seems to have been present in National Institute thinking almost from the beginning. It had become a "given" that all local data collection and evaluation would be done by the cities, and a "given," also, that those evaluations would constitute the major data inputs to the national-level evaluation. It was originally intended, however, that the third level of evaluation would be much more than a set of victimization surveys. There was to be a "macroscopic" or global evaluation, establishing crime-reduction achievements and outcomes of the Impact program, to be performed by the Statistics Division of LEAA in concert with the

Bureau of the Census.<sup>(1)</sup> Perhaps because of the difficulties involved in coordinating objectives, approach, data collection and analysis across two federal agencies, perhaps because of the weakness of mechanisms for collaboration at the working level, perhaps because of a simple shortage of staffing capability, the idea of this third evaluation seems to have been gradually dropped, and no more mention of it was heard after the beginning of 1973. But since victimization surveys alone--in the absence of an evaluation design or approach--could not provide a means for attributing observed victimization-level changes in Impact cities to the Impact program, and since the national-level evaluation--scheduled to be completed before the second victimization survey--did not provide for an assessment of Impact crime-reduction outcomes, it was clear that the failure to perform the macroscopic (or global) evaluation would necessarily leave a serious gap in the evaluation of program achievements.

The National Institute did not have very much time in which to plan for the national-level evaluation. All of the effort in this area seems to have occurred during a very short period between November and December of 1971, and no analyst could devote more than a small part of his attention to this task. Despite (or perhaps because of) the pressure and haste, there is a feeling of euphoria and excitement which emerges from the evaluation planning documents produced during this period, and they reveal, as well, some rather optimistic expectations. Analyses assumed, for example:

- the possibility of (at least) quintupling LEAA Washington headquarters staff;
- the existence of a high level of planning and evaluation expertise among the agencies implementing the program;
- the availability of large amounts of data;
- the ability and willingness of reviewing agencies to impose data quality control and evaluation requirements upon planning and implementing units; and
- the feasibility of creating new Crime Analysis Teams which could be staffed, could perform crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning, help criminal justice agencies develop crime-orientedly planned projects, produce a master plan, initiate community mechanisms, coordinate recalcitrant agencies, could--in sum--ensure that Impact projects, addressing Impact crimes, developed through Impact planning techniques, would be "on-the-street" in between 3 and 6 months.

National Institute analysts believed, for example, that sufficient staff would be available to develop a central LEAA responsibility and capacity to advise the Crime Analysis Teams concerning "minimum requirements for data quality control and internal evaluation." They expected that "additional data flows for the purposes of external evaluation" would be necessary and also feasible. A plan for monitoring Impact program progress "specifying a full research design" providing for the data to be used, the schedule for reports and for operational observation was to be generated at LEAA central headquarters.<sup>(2)</sup> Reliance was placed on regional office evaluation expertise "to ensure that city project proposals contain 'good' evaluation components."<sup>(3)</sup> Assessments of "the community impact of programs that are implemented in the eight cities" were to be included in city evaluative efforts.<sup>(4)</sup>

All of the evaluation planning here discussed, however, remained in an embryonic state, sketched rather than designed. At the national-level, finally, no evaluation plan would be established prior to program implementation. Objectives, for example, had not been operationally defined. One analyst would write, over and over: "Five percent of what? Twenty percent of what?"<sup>(5)</sup> "How are we going to verify that the target reductions in crime rates will really have taken place? And when we talk about a 5 percent reduction, are we talking about a reduction from the 1972 rates, the 1974 rates or the 1977 rates? Are we saying that there will be a 45 percent reduction in 1974 from the projected 140 percent of 1973 rates? We certainly ought to decide what we mean and clarify this point."<sup>(6)</sup> The point, however, was not clarified and even if it had been, there was no time left either to lay out national-level evaluation measures, or to formulate an evaluation approach by which to attribute achievements to the program, or to impose the data requirements which would have flowed from the objectives, measures and approach. Finally, although the problem was discussed, no central program-monitoring system which might have helped to tie national-level outcomes (once measured) to program activities, was designed.

Again, an analyst noted at least one of these gaps (that of an evaluation approach) and discussed the problem of control, or comparison cities:

As to the meaningfulness of the control city method, I think we have to face the fact that the experimental paradigm has not been fruitful in most social action research so far. The reasons seem to be that the independent variables never seem to be capable of sufficient definition and consistency to be testable on an experimental basis, and enormous difficulties are encountered in the maintenance of the placebo condition in the control group. Coupling these problems with the obvious stickler we have to handle in demonstrating city-to-city comparability, I am pessimistic about the value of attempting the control group model.<sup>(7)</sup>

This was not to suggest, however, that evaluation planning at the national-level be abandoned, prior to program inauguration, or that no approach was feasible. On the contrary, the same analyst remarked cogently on the failure to recognize the need for evaluation planning "concurrently with the planning of operations." He wrote:

The Institute is in a delicate position. We have suggested a battery of programs for impact on the crime problems in several as yet unspecified cities. We have no idea how acceptable our ideas will be. They may be grudgingly accepted to get the money; after the program is under way, we may find that implementation is far short of our expectations but that the evaluations are so slipshod that we will be unable to identify the elements of the program which did not work or why the program was unsuccessful. We have an important opportunity here to do a kind of action research which has seldom been feasible--if ever. It would be unfortunate if we do not position ourselves to assure that the research is as illuminating as possible. (8)

National Institute analysts did not underestimate the rigors and complexity of the evaluation task and--in face of evidence that more LEAA staff would not be forthcoming--tried to expedite the process of getting outside assistance in national evaluation planning. (9) In fact, however, the design of the national-level evaluation would have to await the hiring of a contractor in July of 1972, 6 months after the program had been initiated. Yet a rigorous evaluation would have required that evaluation criteria be "embedded in the program at its inception," (10) that they be "built into the original design of the experiment." (11) The time pressures resulting from action needs had once again constrained research.

#### B. Program Conflicts and the National-Level Evaluation

The action/research conflict, however, (see pages 44-45 above) was clearly going to have ramifications for the national-level evaluation as well. Slippages in program operations and in city-level evaluation would evidently affect national-level analysis and evaluation potential (given the dependence of the one evaluation level upon the other); long-term follow-up for recidivism-focused projects and programs would not be feasible, and the knowledge yield for such efforts would be diminished in consequence.

The effectiveness/efficiency conflicts of the program (as discussed on pages 42-44 above) would likely have a more diffused impact, given that the program effectiveness objective (crime-reduction) would not be examined by the national-level evaluation. "Efficiency" objectives of the program (such as improved system capability for planning,

implementation and evaluation, for agency coordination, for innovation, or for community input adaptation) would therefore need to be examined on their own terms as intrinsic goods. This is, of course, quite consistent with the program philosophy (see the discussion pages 3 through 16 above) which posited that in order to improve crime control it was first necessary to improve, among other things, the state of knowledge, system coordination and community involvement. While it cannot be denied that such an approach leaves unanswered (indeed, does not even address) the question of what such improved capability can do for crime control, it was intended, in 1972, that this question would be the focus of a "global," third-level evaluation by LEAA and the Census Bureau. Even had this third-level evaluation been pursued, however, it is not clear that many definitive answers to such a question (that of the influence of improved system capability, once achieved, on crime control) could have been forthcoming on the basis of knowledge acquired from a free-form, target-area-focused program like Impact. The question that needed to be asked, therefore (and one which could be usefully examined) was whether or not improved capability of the sort envisaged was achievable through the funding mechanisms, assumptions, guidelines and directions of a program like Impact.

As for the implications of Impact's New Federalist approach for the national-level evaluation, (see the discussion pages 45-47 above), it is not clear from early program documents that the constraints which this New Federalist structure could impose upon knowledge acquisition and upon program organization had been fully understood; not clear, either, that the serious limitations on the evaluative information which could be produced by a national-level evaluation entirely dependent upon city-level efforts in a New Federalist context had been recognized.

In effect, the program philosophy established not only that cities would evaluate their own projects, but also that no designs permitting rigorous evaluation would be imposed and that no requirements for area-specific or baseline data collection would be levied. Hopes were expressed that guidelines, combined with the incentive offered by no-match funds specifically earmarked for evaluation, could spur serious evaluation efforts at the project-level. It was believed, also, that the victimization survey effort in the eight Impact cities could provide evidence of crime rate changes which could compensate for some gaps in city data collection. But firm plans had not been laid for the evaluation and analysis of the victimization surveys, and victimization rates were to be forthcoming only for each city as a whole; census constraints determined that no area breakdowns could be made which would permit the attribution of changes in victimization rates to the effects of particular projects or programs in particular target areas. Further, the assessment and analysis of these data had been

made to depend once again upon the difficult linkages of lateral coordination (see pages 32-33 above) across federal agencies (i.e., between the LEAA and the Bureau of the Census).

In sum, then, the lack of time in which to perform national-level evaluation planning prior to program launching, and the conflicts implicit in Impact program objectives had the combined effect of significantly narrowing the range of options and possibilities open to the national-level evaluation.

### C. Strategy for a National-Level Evaluation

By the time The MITRE Corporation contracted in July of 1972 to assist the National Institute in the performance of the Impact program's national-level evaluation, the program had been under way since January. It was now somewhat clearer what the national-level dependence on city-level efforts might signify in terms of evaluation constraints, but there was still no real certitude as to the data which would effectively be available. It had become obvious, however, that it would be impossible, in the New Federalist context, to change the local data collection process in any significant way. This situation would severely limit both the research field and the selection of strategies open to the national-level evaluation.

Cost constraints also shaped the program-wide strategy. The National Institute had decided that:

- no control or comparison groups in non-Impact cities were to be envisaged for the national-level evaluation due to the size of the data-collection costs involved;
- no area-specific data collection within Impact cities was to be undertaken, for the same reason; and
- no presence was to be established by MITRE in the eight cities, since it was felt by the National Institute that such a cost would be duplicative.

The national-level evaluation, therefore, would depend entirely, for its program information, upon data furnished by the cities (by mail or over the telephone, for the most part, with an occasional exception made for specific, task-oriented visits); further, it would also be largely without the ability to validate that information.

All of these considerations necessarily signified the renunciation of any experimental or quasi-experimental design for the national-level evaluation, and the decision was taken (in December 1972) to concentrate

on process rather than outcome. Although this decision was clearly dictated by the circumstances, it nonetheless presented some real advantages:

- (1) it was feasible under program constraints;
- (2) it responded to the New Federalist priorities of the program by taking its non-standardization and differing, city-specific criteria into account;
- (3) it allowed an informal, flexible approach;
- (4) it permitted the use of all and any data generated by the cities; and
- (5) it corresponded to the kind of management organization and procedures (rough, crude, not overly dependable, and, therefore, not too amenable to rigorous design specifications) typically prevalent in large, complex, social action programs.

Further, it had become increasingly clear that an experimental design would not have provided many definitive answers under the circumstances, given the unreplicated, broad-aim, free-form character of Impact. As Weiss and Rein have written, evaluative research in unstandardized action programs should be qualitative rather than quantitative, historically rather than experimentally oriented. The research should "identify the forces which shaped the program, the nature of the opposition encountered, the reasons for success or failure, and the program's unanticipated consequences... The issue in the evaluation of broad-aim programs is not, 'Does it work?' but 'What happened?'" (12)

#### D. Problems of the Selection Process

It goes almost without saying that all of the possible facets of a program like Impact were not going to be fully examined. Any evaluation is limited by the time, the insight and the energy of the evaluators, by the purpose(s) of the sponsoring agency, by the nature and area of public concern, by the availability of resources. The very fact of choosing (as discussed earlier, see pages 39-40 above) implies a distortion, a set of assumptions about what is important and what is not, about which are the "right" and which are the "wrong" issues. The controversy over Dahl's "Who Governs?" (13) some years ago is an eloquent reminder of the difficulties involved in satisfying all audiences as to the relevance, significance and representativeness of issues selected for study. It seems that no one has found a way to do this; yet, as Frey has pointed out:

One cannot cover every aspect of an enormously multi-dimensional reality. Selection is essential. Some readers may be uninterested in the selections made--the foci chosen--but that engenders no great intellectual or research problem as long as others are interested... (and so long as selections are presented) in terms of whatever their intrinsic interest may be, arguing neither global representativeness nor undeniable importance. (14)

It may even be that worrying about criteria selection is unnecessary, that policy (and program) formation can usefully be studied in a step-by-step, cumulative fashion, issue by issue. (15)

In the evaluation of a program such as Impact, however, the clear specification of program goals is a help in the selection process. (Without such specification, of course, it would always be possible to claim that major objectives had not been examined.) But even so, differing groups within and outside a complex program like Impact will hold differing goals for the program. No claim is made here, therefore, for any universality or ultimate rationality in the selection process. Rather, what has been chosen for study is the result of an examination of the program's objectives, the conflicts apparent in those objectives, resource or programmatic constraints, and the limitations imposed by available levels of talent and imagination. The present evaluation thus emerges from the challenges and opportunities, the strengths and weaknesses of the Impact program, as perceived by the National Institute and MITRE.

#### E. The National-Level Evaluation

Given the six objectives of the Impact program discussed in Chapter II (see pages 24-25 above), and given also that the measurement of the crime-reduction objective was outside the purview of the national-level evaluation, a task force composed of National Institute and MITRE evaluators developed an assessment strategy addressing all the program objectives except that of crime-reduction outcomes. This strategy flowed from three general questions:

- (1) What happened--in terms of planning and implementation processes--when LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-specific planning?
- (2) What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?

- (3) What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

With these questions as their focus, nine discrete assessment tasks were defined:

- Task 1, a study of crime-oriented planning and implementation in the eight cities;
- Task 2, an assessment of project institutionalization in the eight cities;
- Task 3, a study of the TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime) programs which were attempted by Impact cities;
- Task 4, a study of programs undertaken by the cities which are based upon the assumptions that:
  - (a) intensive supervision of parolees/probationers is an effective means of reducing recidivism among these groups; or that
  - (b) an increase in the activity of police in a given area will result in a decrease in crime rates in that area.
- Task 5, an examination of innovation in the Impact program;
- Task 6, the identification of transferable Impact projects;
- Task 7, an assessment of city-level evaluation planning and reporting;
- Task 8, the documentation of the Impact program history in each of the eight cities; and
- Task 9, the present document and final report, which integrates some of the broader program issues, receiving inputs from the eight other tasks and developing its own information as well.

A bibliography of documents published in support of these tasks is attached at Appendix to this final report.

#### F. Problems, Limitations and Opportunities of the National-Level Evaluation

What information, then, would the national-level evaluation produce and how should it be interpreted? An examination of the tasks just outlined (see the discussion above) shows that the evaluation is

basically descriptive and historical (in the Weiss and Rein sense), and that many of the analyses undertaken are of the case study variety. Knowledge obtained would be project-specific, area-specific, population-specific and/or city-specific; findings would be based on data generated by the cities and validated to the degree possible within program constraints.

The major information product of the national-level evaluation, then, would be new knowledge about the capacities of eight U.S. cities in the years 1972-1975:

- to mount a comprehensive anti-crime program;
- to plan and evaluate it rationally;
- to feed back evaluation findings iteratively into program implementation;
- to develop mechanisms for community input into the planning and implementation process;
- to improve interagency coordination via the Crime Analysis Team;
- to create innovative projects and programs despite a complicated review and approval process; and
- to institutionalize effective program innovation.

A second information product, flowing from the first, would be an assessment of LEAA problems in developing and managing the Impact program:

- across the agency's vertical organizational structure (see Chapter II, pages 26-32 above) involving the Crime Analysis Team, state planning agency, regional office and LEAA headquarters, and
- using a New Federalist program philosophy.

A third information product, flowing from the first two, would be a set of recommendations, based on the Impact experience (which would then constitute, in its entirety, a kind of new baseline data set) for use in the formulation of future urban/federal anti-crime programs.

The need for these products and this knowledge sprang from two sources. First, there remained the problem of the inadequacy of

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**1 OF 6**

federal information in the urban context. In effect, federal planning uncertainties have often led to the postulation of unattainable goals and to real or apparent program failure. Impact, like most larger federal action programs, was conceived rapidly, elaborated and launched amid a host of uncertainties about what city anti-crime capabilities and intentions might be. It was unknown, for example, what kind of planning the eight cities might do, and how they would differ from each other; what anti-crime projects they would implement and how rationally those projects would address individual city crime problems and overall policy goals; what capability existed (or could be developed) for evaluation planning and reporting; how many and what kinds of projects could be shown to be effective (via the criteria of the city's own evaluations); what innovations would occur and appear worthy of dissemination; what roles the Crime Analysis Teams would play; how likely were Impact innovations to be institutionalized.

Second, there was the on-going problem of complexity and detail, the "can't-see-the-forest-for-the-trees" syndrome. A program the size of Impact is at constant risk of losing emergent "truths" among the minutiae of projects, programs, persons, problems and processes.

The information to be provided by the national-level evaluation was therefore structured to furnish baseline information which could reinforce future federal anti-crime planning efforts, and to develop a program overview which could usefully order and display the knowledge and experience accrued over time across eight cities in pursuit of the same anti-crime goals. Overall, the evaluation brought a central agent's perspective to the events and occurrences of the Impact program, not in the kind of specific detail which could have resulted from a continued MITRE presence in each of the eight cities, but from a general viewpoint.

Finally, a last major interpretive constraint which needs to be emphasized here, arises from the difficulties of comparison across cities. As discussed earlier, given the nature of Impact--where, by definition, interventions were not imposed and were never replicated--it was not clear that even an infinity of resources could have provided generalizable and conclusive answers. No city's project replicated any other city's project, but further, no Impact city is like any other Impact city. Each began its Impact program from a different base of resources, of problems, of assets and liabilities. Even when treatments are "precisely" replicated across cities, there are problems in aggregating samples, as Rossi has pointed out, because of local variations in administration which mean, in effect, that the treatments administered to experimental groups are not uniform.<sup>(16)</sup> In Impact, however, treatments were not alike for the most part, but also, populations were not alike, crime problems, socioeconomic conditions, racial tensions, budgets, revenues, expenditures and a host of other urban variables were not alike. It must be remembered, therefore, in

thinking about relative achievements of the various Impact cities, that there are problems in ascribing success or failure which arise from the fact that all the cities started their Impact programs from differing points of departure, with differing crime or systemic problems, differing resources, differing urban climates. The outcomes of rehabilitation programs in Portland, for example, are not comparable to those of Newark or Baltimore because (for example) of the differences in populations treated, in terms of the seriousness and number of offenses. Any city rankings, therefore, are subject to the caution that, in real terms, city achievements are not comparable. A sense of the formidable disparities to be found among Impact cities prior to program initiation can be gleaned from the next section (Chapter V), where the eight cities are examined according to a number of crime-correlated and other variables.

In sum, the national-level evaluation did not purport to bring evidence to bear on the crime-reduction effectiveness of Impact, or to make generalized declarations about program impact and the consequences of federal action in the urban arena. As Sartre wrote:

The consequences of our acts always end up by escaping us, since every concerted enterprise, as soon as it is realized, enters into relation with the entire universe, and since this infinite multiplicity of relations goes beyond our intention. (17)

The present evaluation does not aim at universality. It limits itself to describing, as accurately as possible, what happened in each city during that concerted enterprise which is Impact; it asks what the problems were, why they occurred, and how they might be better addressed in a future endeavor.

## CHAPTER IV

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## **Chapter V**

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### **The Eight Impact Cities Prior to Program Initiation**

## CHAPTER V: SUMMARY

This chapter arrays background information on the eight Impact cities prior to program initiation. Readily available 1970 data from conventional sources are employed and cities are examined from the various viewpoints of:

- a general overview (including information on city history, geography, position within the state, economic situation and political system);
- crime-correlated indicators, attempting to measure:
  - demographic distribution;
  - family situation;
  - educational/economic conditions;
  - social cohesion; and,
  - non-white disadvantage;
- crime correlates and reported crime rates;
- revenues, expenditures and resource capabilities; and,
- reported crime rates and the criminal justice system response.

The cities divided into two groups in 1970. Four of them (Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis and Cleveland) were older, more densely populated, more dependent upon manufacturing in their employment mix than the four other cities; in addition, they had undergone heavy losses in their middle-class populations over the 1950-1970 period. The other group (Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, Portland) were all less than 150 years old, with higher per capita incomes, higher educational levels, and greater resource capabilities. All of the cities had serious but different crime problems. Although affluence coexisted with high crime rates in some cities, by far the highest rates of person crime occurred in the older, more economically deprived cities. Given that high crime rates were seen both in "boom" and in "exodus" cities, however, the hypothesis was advanced that it may not be the boom or exodus in itself which is significant in terms of rising crime, but rather a perception of relative deprivation (among disadvantaged persons or groups vis-a-vis other persons or groups) which may influence the marginal propensity to commit crimes; such a perception would be exacerbated in either rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economies.

Examination of city resources, expenditures and resource capabilities again confirmed the split between the two groups of cities; however, only Dallas, Denver and Portland presented evidence of obvious resource capability. It seemed possible, given the differences between the two groups of cities, that "disadvantaged" cities might have more difficulty in mounting the complex set of activities required under Impact than might "advantaged" cities, and a greater need, therefore, of technical assistance.

## Chapter V

### The Eight Impact Cities Prior to Program Initiation

*The city as it exists is very largely the product of tendencies of which we have as yet little knowledge and less control.*

Robert E. Park, 1928

The problems of comparing eight cities have been discussed earlier and are well known. Still, once it has been admitted that the Impact cities are so different as to be incommensurable, it nonetheless remains necessary to know something about those differences in order to understand program processes and outcomes. Further, to gain some idea of what city achievements may have been, it is important to examine at least some of their points of departure.

There is no immediately obvious way to capture, succinctly, in one chapter, the essence of eight cities. Nor will it be possible to evoke Atlanta or Newark as Flaubert evoked Rouen or Paris. Yet crime control programs are necessarily affected by a city's history and age, its geography, political climate, and economic situation, for example, just as they are shaped by the acuity and kind of indigenous crime problems, and by the adequacy of system responses to those problems. It is therefore a matter of necessity to examine at least some of these factors.

#### A. A General Overview of the Eight Impact Cities

The eight Impact cities are dissimilar, then, in a great many ways. Tables I-VIII below display selected data making up thumbnail sketches of the cities in terms of their historical backgrounds, geographies, relationships with their respective states, political systems and economic situations.

#### B. Discussion and Summary, Tables I-VIII

An examination of the maps and the information in Tables I through VIII brings several patterns to the fore. Four of the cities are relatively venerable, ranging in age from 304 (Newark), 241 (Baltimore), and 206 (St. Louis) to 174 (Cleveland); the other four cities (Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland) are all less than 150 years old. This is




FIGURE 3  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE ATLANTA REGION

TABLE I  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT CITIES--ATLANTA

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1836, AS A TERMINUS FOR THE GEORGIA RAILROAD
- RAPID GROWTH: 1847-1861
- SUPPLY CENTER FOR THE CONFEDERACY DURING CIVIL WAR
- ALMOST TOTAL DESTRUCTION BY GENERAL SHERMAN
- RAPID REBUILDING AND GROWTH AFTER 1870
- HEAVY KU KLUX KLAN ACTIVITY (LYNCHING OF 487 BLACKS IN GEORGIA BETWEEN 1882-1946)
- DESEGREGATION OF SCHOOL SYSTEM DURING 1960s

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED AT THE BASE OF THE BLUE RIDGE MOUNTAINS, NEAR THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER
- CITY TRAVERSES BOUNDARY BETWEEN FULTON AND DE KALB COUNTIES
- LAND AREA: 131.5 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 497,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 3,779

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN GEORGIA, STATE CAPITAL SINCE 1878, ATLANTA ACCOUNTS FOR 11% OF GEORGIA POPULATION
- STRONG STATE GOVERNMENT HAND IN CITY AFFAIRS (OVERHAUL OF CITY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN 1953, OVER CITY PROTESTS)
- ILLITERACY AMONG GEORGIA BLACKS IN 1946: HIGHEST RATIO IN U. S. (256:1,000)
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$869, OR \$251 BELOW THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 37TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO ATLANTA: 13% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY: SERVICE SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 33% OF CITY JOBS, MANUFACTURING 17%, VIGOROUS CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
- COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CENTER FOR REGION, HEADQUARTERS CITY, AGRICULTURAL DISTRIBUTION CENTER
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: +10,000; FROM 38% BLACK IN 1960 TO 51% BLACK IN 1970
- STRONG ECONOMIC GROWTH 1960-1970, BUT INFLUX OF RURAL BLACK MIGRANTS AND EMIGRATION OF SOME WHITES TO THE SUBURBS

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (19 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: VETO ALL ACTIONS
- PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

OTHER

- TRADITION OF BUSINESS/GOVERNMENT ENTENTE: "WITHIN THE POLICY-FORMING GROUPS, ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE DOMINANT."(1)
- RACIAL CONCENTRATION (6 AREAS OF THE CITY HAVE NO WHITE RESIDENTS)
- PRESENCE OF AN ESTABLISHED BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS





FIGURE 4  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE BALTIMORE REGION

TABLE II  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT IMPACT CITIES--BALTIMORE

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1729 (NAMED FOR GEORGE CALVERT, 1ST LORD BALTIMORE)  
AFTER PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS (CATHOLIC-PURITAN) STRIFE' (1638-1715)
- CENTER OF ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENT, CIRCA 1770
- DURING NAPOLEONIC WARS, GROWTH OF PROSPERITY WITH INCREASING  
SHARE OF WORLD TRADE
- CENTER OF PRIVATEERING DURING WAR OF 1812
- DIVIDED SENTIMENT DURING CIVIL WAR (MARYLAND A SLAVE-HOLDING STATE)
- SLAVERY ABOLISHED 1864

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- ATLANTIC SEAPORT ON THE PATAPSCO RIVER, NEAR CHESAPEAKE BAY,  
SITUATED WITHIN BALTIMORE COUNTY
- LAND AREA: 78.3 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 906,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 11,568

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN MARYLAND (AND 7TH LARGEST IN U. S.) BALTIMORE  
ACCOUNTS FOR 23% OF MARYLAND POPULATION
- STRONG STATE GOVERNMENT HAND IN CITY AFFAIRS (GOVERNOR APPOINTS  
POLICE COMMISSIONER, ETC.)
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$1,168, OR \$48 ABOVE  
THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 14TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO BALTIMORE: 58% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- STRONG MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTING FOR 26% OF EMPLOYMENT, BUT
- LOSS OF 34,000 MANUFACTURING JOBS (1967-1972)
- INDUSTRIAL CENTER, SHIPPING/TRADE CENTER
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: -33,000; FROM 35% BLACK IN 1960 TO  
46% BLACK IN 1970
- INCREASE IN NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (19 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: VETO ORDINANCES
- PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

OTHER

- ALTHOUGH LOCATED IN BALTIMORE COUNTY, BALTIMORE IS A SEPARATE  
POLITICAL UNIT
- DETERIORATING REMNANTS OF A POLITICAL MACHINE (TRENTON DEMOCRATIC  
CLUB)
- "ETHNIC" POLITICS





FIGURE 5  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE CLEVELAND REGION

TABLE III  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT CITIES--CLEVELAND

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1796 BY MOSES CLEAVELAND FOR THE CONNECTICUT LAND COMPANY, WHICH HAD ACQUIRED TITLE TO PART OF THE WESTERN RESERVE FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
- SLOW INITIAL GROWTH (ONLY 100 PEOPLE BY 1810)
- CLEVELAND ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN VIA CANAL IN 1835; IMMEDIATE PROSPERITY
- STRONG ANTI-SLAVERY SENTIMENT (CITY USED AS LINK IN "UNDERGROUND RAILROAD" FOR RUNAWAY SLAVES)
- POLITICAL CORRUPTION NOTORIOUS IN OHIO UNTIL REFORM MOVEMENTS OF 1890s

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED AT THE MOUTH OF THE CUYAHOGA RIVER ON THE SOUTH SHORE OF LAKE ERIE
- COUNTY SEAT OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY
- LAND AREA: 75.9 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 751,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 9,893

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN OHIO (AND 10TH LARGEST IN THE U. S.), BUT ONLY 7% OF OHIO POPULATION
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$1,009, OR \$111 BELOW THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 24TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO CLEVELAND: 18% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- EMPLOYMENT: HEAVILY ORIENTED TOWARD MANUFACTURING (WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR 38% OF JOBS)
- RELATIVELY UNDERDEVELOPED SERVICE SECTOR (22% OF JOBS)
- REMAINS A STRONG INDUSTRIAL CENTER, BUT
- LOSS OF 40,000 MANUFACTURING JOBS (1967-1972)
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: -125,000; FROM 29% BLACK IN 1960 TO 38% BLACK IN 1970

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (33 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 2 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: VETO ORDINANCES
- PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM (1970)
- RECALL OF OFFICIALS BY PETITION

OTHER

- CARL STOKES, FIRST BLACK MAYOR OF A LARGE U. S. CITY, 1967
- SERIOUS RACIAL TROUBLES (HOUGH RIOT, 1966, AND POLICE SHOOT-OUT WITH BLACK MILITANTS, 1968, ETC.)
- POLITICALLY POWERFUL PRESS
- "CLEVELAND'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE IS ABOUT MID-WAY BETWEEN THE EXTREME DECENTRALIZATION OF DETROIT AND LOS ANGELES AND THE EXTREME CENTRALIZATION OF CHICAGO."(2) (1967)
- "ETHNIC" POLITICS





FIGURE 6  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE DALLAS REGION

TABLE IV  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT CITIES--DALLAS

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1841 BY JOHN N. BRYAN (LAWYER FROM TENNESSEE); NAMED FOR GEORGE MIFFLIN DALLAS, ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT OF U. S. (ON POLK TICKET) IN 1844
- STRONG PRO-CONFEDERACY FEELING, TEXAS (A SLAVE-HOLDING STATE) SECEDED FROM THE UNION IN 1861 (16 YEARS AFTER JOINING IT)
- DIFFICULT RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD IN TEXAS
- DISCOVERY OF OIL IN TEXAS ~ 1900
- RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED IN NORTHEAST TEXAS ON THE TRINITY RIVER
- COUNTY SEAT OF DALLAS COUNTY
- LAND AREA: 265.6 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 844,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 3,179

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- SECOND LARGEST CITY IN TEXAS, BUT ONLY 8% OF TEXAS POPULATION
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$809 OR \$311 BELOW THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 42ND OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO DALLAS: 5% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- WIDELY DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY: MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 20% OF JOBS, SERVICE SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 29%, VIGOROUS CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
- COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, FINANCIAL CENTER
- SITE OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK (11TH DISTRICT): STRONGLY DEVELOPED "FIRE" SECTOR (FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE)
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: +164,000; FROM 19% BLACK IN 1960 TO 25% BLACK IN 1970

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- (10-MEMBER) COUNCIL - MANAGER (AND MAYOR)
- MAYORAL TERM: 2 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: NO VETO
- NON-PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

OTHER

- POWERFUL BUSINESS ROLE IN DALLAS CITY GOVERNMENT, "HIGH DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION IN BOTH THE BUSINESS AND POLITICAL SPHERES, AND THE TWO SPHERES CONTROLLED DIRECTLY BY THE SAME (BUSINESS) ELITE... THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL, MEMBERSHIP IN WHICH IS LIMITED TO PRESIDENTS OR GENERAL MANAGERS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES," (3) SPEAKS FOR BUSINESS.
- THE CIVIC COMMITTEE, AN "ASSOCIATION OF ECONOMIC LEADERS IN THE CITY, RECRUITS AND SUPPORTS CANDIDATES FOR LOCAL OFFICE... POLITICAL PARTIES ARE DORMANT IN LOCAL ELECTIONS." (4)





FIGURE 7  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE DENVER REGION

TABLE V  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT CITIES--DENVER

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1857 BY GOLD PROSPECTORS (GOLD DISCOVERED IN 1858)
- RAPID GROWTH DESPITE FIRE (1863) AND FLOOD (1864)
- COLORADO A STATE IN 1876
- ECONOMIC DEPRESSION 1878 (GOLD DEPOSITS EXHAUSTED)
- SERIOUS LABOR DISPUTES (MINE WORKERS), 1890-1914
- 36% OF COLORADO LAND FEDERALLY OWNED (1970)

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED IN THE FOOTHILLS OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS AT THE JUNCTION OF THE SOUTH PLATTE RIVER AND CHERRY CREEK
- COUNTY SEAT OF DENVER COUNTY
- LAND AREA: 95.2 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 515,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 5,406

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- CAPITAL OF COLORADO, LARGEST CITY IN THE STATE, AND 23% OF STATE POPULATION
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$1,075 OR \$45 BELOW THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 19TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO DENVER: 32% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- HIGHLY DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY: MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 15% OF JOBS, SERVICE SECTOR FOR 33%
- LEADING COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND MANUFACTURING CITY OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION
- WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION POINT FOR 15 STATES
- FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS 150 OFFICES IN THE CITY
- RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH (1960-1970)
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: +21,000; FROM 6% BLACK IN 1960, TO 9% BLACK IN 1970

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (13 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: VETO ORDINANCES
- PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: "DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES PLAY LIMITED AND OCCASIONALLY BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLES IN LOCAL ELECTIONS (REFLECTING) THE GENERAL OPINION THAT THE PARTIES OUGHT NOT TO INTERFERE EITHER IN THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES OR IN THE CONDUCT OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS."(5)

OTHER

- SPECIAL FACT-FINDING RESEARCH AGENCY, MADE UP OF LEGISLATORS REPORTING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CREATED BY STATUTE 1953
- CHICANO TENSIONS (CHICANO GROUP 17% OF DENVER POPULATION IN 1970)





FIGURE 8  
 GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEWARK REGION

TABLE VI  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT IMPACT CITIES--NEWARK

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1666 BY PURITANS FROM CONNECTICUT (NAMED AFTER NEWARK-ON-TRENT, ENGLAND)
- LEATHER INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO REVOLUTIONARY WAR
- AFTER REVOLUTIONARY WAR, RAPID INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
- BY WORLD WAR II, 60% OF CITY POPULATION FOREIGN-BORN OR FIRST GENERATION
- SECOND U. S. CITY (AFTER WASHINGTON, D. C.) TO HAVE A MAJORITY OF BLACKS: 1967
- RACE RIOTS: JULY 1967

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED ON NEWARK BAY AND THE PASSAIC RIVER, 8 MILES WEST OF THE SOUTHERN TIP OF MANHATTAN ISLAND
- COUNTY SEAT OF ESSEX COUNTY
- 33 1/3% OF CITY LAND OCCUPIED BY NEWARK AIRPORT
- LAND AREA: 23.5 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 382,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 16,273

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN NEW JERSEY, BUT ONLY ABOUT 5% OF THE STATE POPULATION
- SEVERE LIMITATIONS BY STATE ON NEWARK TAXING POWER (SALES, INCOME, PAYROLL TAXES PROHIBITED)
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION: \$1,294 OR \$174 ABOVE THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 5TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO NEWARK: 33% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 37% OF JOBS, UNDERDEVELOPED TRADE AND SERVICE SECTORS
- EMIGRATION OF LARGE SECTIONS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY (1960-1970); PROGRESSIVE ALIENATION OF THE CITY'S BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL GROUPS: OVER THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY, "THE CITY'S CORPORATION EXECUTIVES, REALTORS AND EDUCATORS FLED NEWARK FOR SUBURBAN RESIDENCE."<sup>(6)</sup>
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: -23,000; FROM 34% BLACK IN 1960 TO 54% BLACK IN 1970
- LOSS OF 20,000 JOBS IN MANUFACTURING (1967-1972)

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (9 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYOR POWER: VETO ORDINANCES
- NON-PARTISAN ELECTIONS: IN NEWARK THE "POLITICAL PARTY PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PARTISAN CONTESTS FOR THE STATE LEGISLATURE BUT IS DORMANT IN NON-PARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS"<sup>(7)</sup>

OTHER

- "DECENTRALIZED AND PERMISSIVE CHARACTER OF NEWARK POLITICS"<sup>(8)</sup>
- KENNETH GIBSON, BLACK MAYOR, ELECTED 1970
- CONTINUING TENSE RACIAL SITUATION





FIGURE 9  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE PORTLAND REGION

TABLE VII  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT IMPACT CITIES--PORTLAND

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- FOUNDED IN 1845 (NAMED FOR PORTLAND, MAINE)
- "OREGON QUESTION," 1843: U. S. PRESSURE ON BRITISH TO RELINQUISH ALL JURISDICTION SOUTH OF 54° 40' LATITUDE ("54-40 OR FIGHT," JAMES POLK SLOGAN)
- OREGON TREATY OF 1846: 49TH PARALLEL BOUNDARY ESTABLISHED
- EXODUS OF SETTLERS FROM OREGON AFTER 1949 DISCOVERY OF GOLD IN CALIFORNIA
- OREGON STATEHOOD: 1859
- POPULATION GROWTH AFTER COMPLETION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD (1869)

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED ON WILLAMETTE RIVER NEAR ITS CONFLUENCE WITH THE COLUMBIA RIVER
- COUNTY SEAT OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY
- LAND AREA: 89.1 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 383,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 5,780

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN OREGON: POPULATION 18% OF STATE POPULATION
- STATE PLR--PUPIL EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION: \$1,219 OR \$99 MORE THAN THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 11TH OF 50)
- STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO PORTLAND: 23% OF CITY REVENUES

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY, MANUFACTURING SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 17% OF JOBS, SERVICE SECTOR ACCOUNTS FOR 31%
- SHIPPING CENTER, HIGHLY DEVELOPED TRADE SECTOR
- REGIONAL CENTER OF FINANCE, INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORTATION
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: +10,000; FROM 4.2% BLACK IN 1960 TO 5.6% IN 1970

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COMMISSION (4 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: NO VETO
- NON-PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM
- EVERY ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICER SUBJECT TO RECALL BY VOTERS OF HIS DISTRICT

OTHER

- STRONG ENVIRONMENTAL (NO-GROWTH) MOVEMENT (MIGRANTS TO OREGON NOW DISCOURAGED)
- IMPORTANT REFORM MOVEMENT IN OREGON UNDER WILLIAM S. U'REN GIVING RISE IN THE PERIOD 1902-1919 TO A SERIES OF MEASURES KNOWN AS THE OREGON SYSTEM. AMONG THESE MEASURES WERE THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (1902), THE DIRECT PRIMARY (1904), AND THE RECALL (1908). THIS GOVERNMENTAL REFORM WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SOCIAL LEGISLATION. THERE REMAINS TODAY IN OREGON, "A RESISTANCE TO CORRUPTION AND A RECEPIVITY, TO INNOVATION THAT IS RARELY FOUND ELSEWHERE IN THE NATION." (9)





FIGURE 10  
GEOGRAPHY OF THE ST. LOUIS REGION

TABLE VIII  
THUMBNAIL SKETCHES OF EIGHT CITIES--ST. LOUIS

HISTORICAL MILESTONES

- o FOUNDED IN 1764 AS A FUR TRADING STATION (NAMED IN HONOR OF KING LOUIS IX OF FRANCE)
- TERRITORY OF MISSOURI ESTABLISHED: 1812
- MISSOURI ADMITTED TO UNION AS SLAVE STATE: 1821
- o LAND SPECULATION/INFLATION: 1830-1855
- DIVIDED SENTIMENT ON SECESSION IN 1861, FINISHING WITH A FUGITIVE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE, CIVIL WAR (FEDERAL TROOPS AGAINST STATE MILITIA) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW STATE GOVERNMENT
- SLAVERY ABOLISHED IN MISSOURI: 1865

GEOGRAPHY (SEE MAP, FACING PAGE)

- SITUATED ON THE WEST BANK OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, 20 MILES BELOW THE MOUTH OF THE MISSOURI RIVER AND 200 MILES ABOVE THE CONFLUENCE OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND OHIO RIVERS
- NOT A COUNTY SEAT, BUT A DISCRETE UNIT
- LAND AREA: 61.2 SQUARE MILES
- POPULATION (1970): 622,000
- POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE: 10,167

STATE/CITY RELATIONS

- LARGEST CITY IN MISSOURI, POPULATION ABOUT 13% OF STATE TOTAL
- STATE PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION: \$963 OR \$157 BELOW THE STATE AVERAGE (RANK: 29TH OF 50)
- c STATE (INTERGOVERNMENTAL) AID TO ST. LOUIS: 12% OF CITY REVENUES
- STATE GOVERNOR APPOINTS ST. LOUIS POLICE COMMISSIONER AND THE CITY IS REQUIRED BY MISSOURI LAW TO APPROPRIATE WHATEVER FUNDS THE POLICE COMMISSIONER REQUESTS.(10)

ECONOMIC SITUATION (1970)

- EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE SECTORS ABOUT EQUAL IN ST. LOUIS, EACH ACCOUNTING FOR 28% OF CITY JOBS
- LOSS OF 40,000 JOBS IN MANUFACTURING (1967-1972)
- DEPRESSED CONSTRUCTION SECTOR (ONLY 3% OF JOBS)
- REGIONAL CENTER FOR COMMERCE, DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY
- HEADQUARTERS FOR FEDERAL RESERVE BANK (8TH DISTRICT)
- POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970: -128,000; FROM 29% BLACK IN 1960 TO 41% IN 1970

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- MAYOR - COUNCIL (29 MEMBERS)
- MAYORAL TERM: 4 YEARS
- MAYORAL POWER: VETO ORDINANCES
- PARTISAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM (SEE "OTHER" BELOW)

OTHER

- "IN ST. LOUIS, FACTIONAL POLITICS SEEM TO RESULT FROM THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT. THE TWO PRINCIPAL FACTIONS ARE THE 'MAYOR'S OFFICE GROUP' AND THE ALDERMEN, WARD COMMITTEEMEN, AND COUNTY OFFICIALS. THE MAYOR, THE COMPTROLLER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN ARE ELECTED AT LARGE, AND LACK PATRONAGE. ALL THREE MEN TEND TO BE CHOSEN FROM AMONG THE CANDIDATES PUT FORWARD BY THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE GOOD-GOVERNMENT GROUPS. THE ALDERMEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE ELECTED FROM SMALL DISTRICTS AND IN MOST CASES ARE DOMINATED BY THE PARTY LEADERS, AS ARE THE COUNTY OFFICIALS... THESE OFFICIALS...HAVE ABOUT 700 PATRONAGE JOBS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ELECTED ON STILL A DIFFERENT BASIS, ALSO HAVE FAVORS TO GIVE AND THEREFORE AN INDEPENDENT POWER BASE. THUS, IT SEEMS TO BE THE MULTIPLICITY OF JURISDICTIONS AND CONSTITUENCIES THAT PRODUCES THE FACTIONAL SPLITS."(11)

meaningful not only culturally, in terms of increased strength of traditions and resistance to change encountered, but also in terms of fiscal burdens: older cities have older sewerage systems, older installations and facilities and higher maintenance costs. Four cities have slaveholding traditions (Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas and St. Louis); of the remaining four, one (Cleveland) has a strong anti-slavery background. City sizes and shapes are, of course, very different. In addition, some cities have been hemmed in by a ring of suburbs and either have not wanted consolidation (Cleveland),<sup>(11)</sup> or could not obtain suburban support for it (Newark and St. Louis); on the other hand, a city like Dallas could annex surrounding areas at will. Land area ranges from 24 square miles in Newark to 266 in Dallas, and population density in 1970 ranged from 3,179 people per square mile in Dallas, to 16,273 in Newark (see Table IX below). Unsurprisingly, it is the oldest cities which had the highest population densities.

Again, from the information in Tables I-VIII, it is clear that, in 1970, all the Impact cities except Dallas were the largest in their respective states. Their populations, however, had different relative weights depending on the size of the state population. Thus, whereas Newark and Portland had approximately the same population, Newark represented only 5 percent of the New Jersey population while Portland constituted 18 percent of the Oregon total. Similarly, the differing population sizes of Baltimore and Denver composed the same proportion (23 percent) of their state populations.

Cities received varying amounts of help in provision of social services from their respective states; the amount of that assistance or support (in terms of intergovernmental transfers to city budgets) did not always appear to depend upon the general level of affluence (as measured by per capita income) in the particular state (see Table X below). Four of the cities (Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas and St. Louis) had less than 20 percent of their revenues from intergovernmental aid (with a low of 5 percent for Dallas); the others received more, with a high of 58 percent in Baltimore (followed by 33 percent in Newark, 32 percent in Denver and 23 percent in Portland). It is clear from Table X that "Baltimore looms large in Maryland politics;"<sup>(12)</sup> Dallas' 5 percent, however, appears to reflect a different governmental philosophy (perhaps an effect of the business role in Dallas' government discussed in Table IV) as much as the below-average state per capita income. State expenditures for education (chosen as a variable here because there is fairly general consensus across states on the necessity of public funding of education, although not, perhaps, on the quality needed or the amount required) sometimes seem to be related to the general level of state affluence (see Atlanta/Georgia, Baltimore/Maryland, Denver/Colorado, Newark/New Jersey and St. Louis/Missouri), sometimes do not. The expenditures of Ohio and Texas appear to be

TABLE IX  
POPULATION DENSITY IN THE IMPACT CITIES

CITY AGE (YEARS)	POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE	LAND AREA (SQUARE MILES)
NEWARK 304	16,273	24
BALTIMORE 241	11,568	78
ST. LOUIS 206	10,167	61
CLEVELAND 174	9,893	76
PORTLAND 125	5,780	89
DENVER 113	5,406	95
ATLANTA 134	3,779	132
DALLAS 129	3,179	266

SOURCE: U. S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1972)

TABLE X  
THREE MEASURES OF CITY/STATE RELATIONS (1970)

CITY/STATE	POPULATION (th)	AS PERCENT OF STATE POPULATION (%)	INTER- GOVERNMENTAL AID AS PERCENT OF CITY REVENUE (%)	PER CAPITA STATE INCOME (\$)	INCOME RANK AMONG 50 STATES	STATE PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE FOR EDUCATION (\$)	EXPENDITURE RATE AMONG 50 STATES
ATLANTA/GEORGIA	497	11	13	4,243	(36)	869	(37)
BALTIMORE/MARYLAND	906	23	58	5,331	(10)	1,168	(14)
CLEVELAND/OHIO	751	7	18	5,012	(15)	1,009	(24)
DALLAS/TEXAS	844	8	5	4,336	(33)	809	(42)
DENVER/COLORADO	515	23	32	5,046	(14)	1,075	(19)
NEWARK/NEW JERSEY	382	5	33	5,759	( 2)	1,294	( 5)
PORTLAND/OREGON	383	18	23	4,697	(26)	1,219	(11)
ST. LOUIS/MISSOURI	622	13	12	4,672	(27)	963	(29)

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SOURCE: U. S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1972) CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1970-71  
BUREAU OF CENSUS (TABLE 7)

rather low, relative to income, and those of Oregon quite high. Again, the latter situation might mirror a particular political and social tradition in the state (see Table VII) whose strength could be more important in determining levels of funding than might be the current state affluence.

Impact city economies in 1970 appeared to divide into the two groups discussed earlier: the older, population-dense group (Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis) which continued to depend on manufacturing for more than 25 percent of city employment, and the younger, less thickly populated cities (Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland) in which the manufacturing sector accounted for 20 percent (or less) of city jobs (see Table XI below), and where the service and trade sectors had taken on greater importance. Noteworthy in this overview, perhaps, was the small size of the construction sector in St. Louis as opposed to the booming developments of Atlanta and Dallas. Also important was the relative lack of development of the service industry sector in both Cleveland and Newark (this is significant because the service sector is traditionally a major source of employment for unskilled or semi-skilled workers).

In terms of population change, the cities again divided into two groups, the old and the new, the densely populated and less densely populated, the manufacturing economies and the others (see Table XII below). Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis and Cleveland continued to lose population between 1960-1970, and also lost manufacturing jobs. In part this was due to the movement of factories out of the city; in some cases it may have been due also to gains in productivity accruing to manufacturing over time (the latter, however, would reflect national trends in manufacturing productivity, rather than city-specific patterns). Among the younger cities, Atlanta, despite a net population increase (which had, however, been accompanied by some middle-class exodus to the suburbs) was the only one to lose manufacturing jobs. Denver increased its employment markedly in this sector. Dallas, the only Impact city which experienced really sharp growth, saw its population increase by nearly 20 percent over the decade. All the cities saw an increase in both the absolute and relative size of their black populations.

In sum, then, there is a sort of de facto separation which existed among the Impact cities in 1970. The four older cities divided from the others on the basis of heavier population density and employment oriented toward manufacturing (see Table XIII, below). A similar division is found in examining available Impact city data on other variables generally thought to be correlated with crime.

TABLE XI  
IMPACT CITY EMPLOYMENT MIX

	CONSTRUCTION	MANUFACTURING	TRANSPORTATION/ COMMUNICATION	TRADE	SERVICES	GOVERNMENT	MISCELLANEOUS	TOTAL
CITY	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
ATLANTA	6	17	9	22	33	6	7	100
BALTIMORE	5	26	8	19	28	8	6	100
CLEVELAND	4	38	8	17	22	5	6	100
DALLAS	6	20	8	24	29	4	9	100
DENVER	5	15	8	23	33	7	9	100
NEWARK	5	37	8	15	24	5	6	100
PORTLAND	4	17	9	25	31	5	9	100
ST. LOUIS	3	28	8	19	28	7	7	100

SOURCE: GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.  
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (TABLES 86, 87 AND 88).

TABLE XII  
POPULATION CHANGE (1960-1970) AND CHANGE IN NUMBER  
OF MANUFACTURING JOBS (1967-1972)

CITY	POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE	CITY AGE	POPULATION CHANGE	CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING JOBS
NEWARK	16,273	304	- 23,000	- 20,000
BALTIMORE	11,568	241	- 33,000	- 34,000
ST. LOUIS	10,107	206	-128,000	- 40,000
CLEVELAND	9,893	174	-125,000	- 40,000
PORTLAND	5,780	125	+ 10,000	+ 4,000
DENVER	5,406	113	+ 21,000	+ 18,000
ATLANTA	3,779	134	+ 10,000	- 3,000
DALLAS	3,179	129	+164,000	+ 4,000

SOURCE: U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1972)

TABLE XIII  
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY DATA ON THE EIGHT IMPACT  
CITIES IN TERMS OF FIVE VARIABLES\*

	SETTLED		POPULATION DENSITY 1970		POPULATION (1960-1970)		MANUFACTURING		SERVICE AND TRADE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT	
	BEFORE 1800	AFTER 1800	>6,000 PER SQ.MI.	<6,000 PER SQ.MI.	DECLINE	INCREASE	>21% OF JOBS	<21% OF JOBS	<50%	>50%
ATLANTA		X		X		X		X		X
BALTIMORE	X		X		X		X		X	
CLEVELAND	X		X		X		X		X	
DALLAS		X		X		X		X		X
DENVER		X		X		X		X		X
NEWARK	X		X		X		X		X	
PORTLAND		X		X		X		X		X
ST. LOUIS	X		X		X		X		X	

\* DERIVED FROM TABLES I-VIII AND XII.

### C. Comparative Framework According to Crime Correlates

Although the "root causes" of crime are not well established, there is nonetheless some consensus that crime rates have been historically associated with urbanization, and with the sex, age, socioeconomic status and ethnicity of city populations.<sup>(14)</sup> For the purpose of establishing a framework within which to compare those problems of Impact cities widely believed to be correlated with crime rates, a review of the relevant research is briefly summarized below.

#### 1. Research on Crime Correlates

Schmid, in 1960, found high correlations between specific crimes and indicators such as:

a high proportion of women in the labor force...low proportion of married persons, high percentage of older persons and foreign-born...high population mobility, lack of home ownership...low educational status, low median income, a large proportion of unemployed persons, and a comparatively small percentage of proprietors, managers and officials.<sup>(15)</sup>

Schmid also included the suicide rate as an index of low social solidarity and high personal demoralization. Additional indicators were the proportions of laborers, males and blacks in a given population. Schmid then aggregated these indicators into factors which he called low social cohesion, low family status, and low occupational status.

Later research built on Schmid's work and/or developed new models identifying other indicators which were either direct correlates of crime rates, or were related to the low social cohesion (community/family) or status (occupational/educational/social) identified by Schmid as criminogenic factors. Some of these indicators are:

- population size<sup>(16)</sup> and density;<sup>(17)</sup>
- welfare eligibility criteria;<sup>(18)</sup>
- age distribution;<sup>(19)</sup> <sup>(20)</sup>
- economic/<sup>(21)</sup> educational <sup>(22)</sup> deprivation of non-whites.

Although there is disaccord about some of the individual indicators and their particular contributions to rising crime rates, there is some agreement that a combination of weakened family conditions, inadequate education/employment possibilities, and social disorganization create a context within which crime rates are likely to increase.

The strength of the relationships between these indicators and crime, and in some cases, even the direction of these relationships, remain in doubt. Further, social science disciplines appear themselves

to be in disaccord. While Singell (an economist) found that increases in juvenile delinquency were correlated with increases in the percentage of women entering the labor force,<sup>(23)</sup> Cavan (a sociologist) considered it impossible to isolate so precisely the effect that the employment of a mother might have on the development of children. On the one hand, such employment could be part of a general family pattern involving a low economic level and a lack of family cohesion, or on the other hand, it could be a symbol of aspiration and upward social mobility and, as such, an integrative and stabilizing influence.<sup>(24)</sup>

The scope (and even the direction) of economic influences are similarly uncertain (as discussed earlier, see page 50 above). Brown<sup>(25)</sup> (a sociologist), and Harrison<sup>(26)</sup> (an economist) along with many other researchers, have tied higher unemployment rates to higher crime. On the other hand, Wilson (a political scientist) has not found "much of a relationship" between the unemployment rates of the 26 largest cities and their crime rates.<sup>(27)</sup> Yet Harrison would answer that "there is considerable evidence that the conventional unemployment rate does not adequately measure slack in ghetto labor markets."<sup>(28)</sup> Still further (and conversely), other social scientists have noted that "inflation and increasing prosperity contribute to almost certain increases in the amount of crime."<sup>(29)</sup>

It may be, then, that the perceptions of individuals or groups about their relative disadvantage in times of either depression or prosperity may influence crime rates more than do the economic changes themselves. Tocqueville, in his essay on political pauperism, wrote that in a prospering economy, the concept of need is in constant flux: poverty must be continually redefined to keep pace with a changing standard of living. Thus, although most incomes may rise, the perception of disadvantage and deprivation may remain, or even worsen--given the perceived relative advantage of others--bringing with it alienation and the personal demoralization identified earlier. This is not, of course, to assert that unemployment rates and absolute levels of income are unimportant, but rather that rapid changes in affluence (up or down) and shifting perceptions of economic or social disadvantage may well be more significant predictors of the marginal propensity to commit crime. In the high-crime areas of the center cities, where both offenders and victims have been largely black, it is clear that the germane economic and social disadvantage has been that of non-whites.

What then is such disadvantage expected to signify in terms of crime? Whether or not the question of perception is a more significant predictor, economic theory alone would posit that disadvantaged persons are more likely to commit crimes (based on assumptions of rational choice).

The costs of criminal activity to the individual are generally conceded to be the income foregone in the next best alternative legitimate activity. Criminals, if caught, must spend some of their scarce time in prison. Therefore...the lower a person's income, the more likely it is that he choose criminal activity over legitimate activity. Holding the gains to criminal activity constant, the cost-benefit ratio for criminal versus legitimate activity is an increasing function of a person's income in legitimate activity. Consumption activities foregone (if time is spent in prison) are also an increasing function of a person's income.

This argument leads to an economic rationale for racial influence on criminal activity independent of absolute income levels. To the extent that discrimination exists within a labor market, blacks have lower expected future incomes at any given present income. Hence their opportunity costs with respect to alternative employment are lower, and the economic theory of choice predicts that blacks, other things held constant, would be more likely to engage in criminal activity. (30)

The same argument, of course, would apply to groups other than black, which might perceive themselves to be discriminated against in the labor market or in the quality of (and economic returns to) the education they receive.

Although not all of the foregoing hypotheses/assumptions have been shown empirically to be useful in predicting crime rates, there remains a widespread belief that the kinds of crimogenic factors discussed above are important in estimating the nature and seriousness of crime problems in urban places. It is for this reason that they are utilized here to develop a framework for comparing urban problems.

## 2. A Framework for Comparing Urban Problems on the Basis of Crime-Correlate Research

In sum, the research of the past ten years pointed to five major factors as influencing crime rates in urban places:

- demographic distribution;
- family situation;
- educational/economic conditions;
- social cohesion; and
- non-white disadvantage.

Based on these factors, then, indicators have been developed here for comparatively assessing Impact city status in these areas (see

Table XIV below). Conventional data sources were relied upon. There were, therefore, at least two major assumptions implicit in the following examination:

- that crime rates are indeed associated in some way with the five factors developed by the cited research; and
- that a reasonably faithful reflection of these factors can be obtained via data readily available from conventional sources.

D. Impact Cities in Terms of Crime Correlates

Table XV below displays the relative positions of the eight Impact cities in terms of the five factors listed above, and in terms of forty indicators derived from them. As discussed above, this table depends for its value upon data which may have highly varying degrees of accuracy and reliability. Another limitation derives from the fact that the choice of indicators necessarily biases the impression which emerges from the cumulative impact. As stated earlier, however (see pages 61-62 above), no selection method can be foolproof, and this one is no more so than others. On the other hand, the only claim made here is that an examination of these data can give some sense of the relative acuity of urban problems thought to be associated with crime rates, as they existed in Impact cities before the start of the program.

1. Demographic Distribution

Six of the eight Impact cities had a population which was more than 50 percent white in 1970; Atlanta and Newark were the two exceptions. Non-white populations in all eight cities had a much younger median age than did white populations, 12.5 years younger on the average, with the biggest disparities in Newark and St. Louis. (This exceeds the average central city disparity by 5.5 years, and the U.S. average by 6.5 years.)

2. Family Situation

Newark, Atlanta and Baltimore had the largest proportions of female-headed households; Newark, Baltimore and Cleveland had the largest percentages of families below the poverty-level headed by a female; Newark, Atlanta and St. Louis had the highest indices of marital unrest (i.e., divorce and separation rates divided by marriage rates); nearly half of Atlanta's married women (with husbands present and children under 6) were in the labor force; and Newark, Baltimore and St. Louis had the lowest percentages of children under 18 living with both parents. Dallas, Denver and Portland did significantly better on most of these indicators, generally approximating central city averages.

TABLE XIV  
A SET OF INDICATORS FOR COMPARING CITY CRIME PROBLEMS  
ON THE BASIS OF CRIME CORRELATE RESEARCH<sup>(1)</sup>

1. DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION	2. FAMILY SITUATION	3. EDUCATIONAL/ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	4. SOCIAL COHESION	5. NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● POPULATION SIZE (URBANIZATION);</li> <li>● PROPORTION WHITE/NON-WHITE;</li> <li>● MEDIAN AGE (WHITE/NON-WHITE).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● PERCENT OF FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS;<sup>(2)</sup></li> <li>● PERCENT FATHERLESS PERSONS UNDER 18;<sup>(2)</sup></li> <li>● PERCENT PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS;<sup>(2)</sup></li> <li>● ECONOMIC AND ROLE-MODEL DEPRIVATION (PERCENT FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL);</li> <li>● POTENTIAL JUVENILE SURVEILLANCE PROBLEMS (PERCENT MARRIED WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, HUSBANDS PRESENT AND CHILDREN UNDER 6);</li> <li>● POTENTIAL EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS (MARITAL UNREST INDEX, OR DIVORCE AND SEPARATION RATES DIVIDED BY MARRIAGE RATES).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED BY ADULTS;</li> <li>● PERCENT ADULTS COMPLETING HIGH SCHOOL;</li> <li>● PERCENT ADULTS COMPLETING COLLEGE;</li> <li>● MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME;</li> <li>● PER CAPITA INCOME;</li> <li>● CONSUMER PRICE INDEX;</li> <li>● RENT AS PERCENT OF MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME;</li> <li>● PERCENT CITY-WIDE UNEMPLOYMENT;</li> <li>● PERCENT MALES (AGED 18-24) IN THE LABOR FORCE;</li> <li>● PERCENT LABORERS;</li> <li>● PERCENT PROFESSIONALS AND TECHNICAL WORKERS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE (A MEASURE OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS IN THE POPULATION DENSITY OF AN AREA);</li> <li>● OVERCROWDING INDEX (PERCENT OF HOUSING UNITS HAVING 1.01 OR MORE PERSONS PER ROOM);</li> <li>● PERCENT OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS;</li> <li>● PERCENT HOUSING UNITS WITH TELEPHONES;</li> <li>● PARK AND RECREATIONAL ACREAGE PER 10,000 POPULATION;</li> <li>● PERCENT POPULATION RESIDING AT THE SAME ADDRESS 5 YEARS EARLIER;</li> <li>● INDEX OF ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION (I.E., THE DEGREE OF EQUALITY OR INEQUALITY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SEE NOTE I, TABLE XV);</li> <li>● MEASURES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, HEALTH SERVICE AVAILABILITY AND STRESS LEVELS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DEATH RATE;</li> <li>- SUICIDE RATE;</li> <li>- DEATH RATE FROM CIRRHOSIS OF THE LIVER;</li> <li>- DEATH RATE FROM PNEUMONIA/INFLUENZA.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● NON-WHITE MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME AS PERCENT OF WHITE;</li> <li>● NON-WHITE MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS AS PERCENT OF WHITE;</li> <li>● NON-WHITE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AS PERCENT OF WHITE;</li> <li>● WHITE INFANT MORTALITY AS PERCENT OF NON-WHITE;</li> <li>● WHITE UNEMPLOYMENT AS PERCENT OF NON-WHITES;</li> <li>● NON-WHITE JUVENILES LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS AS PERCENT OF WHITES;</li> <li>● WHITE FAMILIES WITH INCOME BELOW POVERTY LEVEL AS PERCENT OF NON-WHITES.</li> </ul>

<sup>(1)</sup> USING MEASURES FOR WHICH DATA ARE READILY AVAILABLE FROM CONVENTIONAL SOURCES.

<sup>(2)</sup> INDICATOR INTENDED TO REFLECT THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF A MASCULINE OR FEMININE ROLE-MODEL.

TABLE XIV  
A SET OF INDICATORS FOR COMPARING CITY CRIME PROBLEMS  
ON THE BASIS OF CRIME CORRELATE RESEARCH<sup>(1)</sup>

TABLE XV  
COMPARATIVE DATA ON IMPACT CITIES (1970) IN  
TERMS OF CRIME CORRELATES

	DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION				FAMILY SITUATION				EDUCATIONAL/ECONOMIC CONDITIONS										SOCIAL COHESION							NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE <sup>(g)</sup>															
	(TH)	(Z)	(YEARS)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)	(Z)						
ATLANTA	477	47	33	24	14	49	22	20	45	66	11.5	47	13	8.4	3.2	14	116.5	4.0	71	13.7	5.7	3.8	41	82	11.0	51	44	.427	119	1.6	28.9	2.0	5.4	61	81	62	51	61	70	30	
BALTIMORE	908	52	37	23	14	58	23	19	38	64	10.0	34	7	8.8	2.9	15	117.0	4.6	73	12.9	6.2	11.6	45	81	8.7	64	56	.365	125	1.2	21.2	3.8	2.8	74	93	75	42	56	64	32	
CLEVELAND	751	59	33	24	13	56	21	17	30	70	10.7	37	4	9.1	2.8	13	119.3	5.2	75	8.9	6.1	9.9	46	86	7.4	22	53	.340	125	1.4	26.3	3.3	3.2	78	98	90	56	56	66	33	
DALLAS	844	66	31	21	9	43	15	15	40	77	12.2	54	14	10.0	3.7	14	117.8	3.1	80	14.7	4.4	3.2	53	85	9.0	179	41	.395	88	1.6	25.6	1.9	2.5	58	79	59	69	61	76	22	
DENVER	515	72	33	21	9	47	15	15	30	78	12.4	62	16	9.7	3.6	13	114.3	4.1	75	18.4	4.1	5.4	50	88	5.5	324	44	.367	102	1.9	20.8	2.1	4.4	69	84	62	-	58	81	27	
NEWARK	382	37	40	21	20	58	31	20	32	59	10.0	33	4	7.7	2.5	18	119.0	6.5	71	8.4	7.1	16.3	21	70	14.6	4	48	.364	115	0.6	35.6	2.6	3.0	69	102	91	53	62	63	39	
PORTLAND	383	91	34	23	8	43	14	16	33	79	12.3	60	12	9.8	3.6	13	113.2	6.6	76	14.9	4.6	4.3	57	91	3.5	199	51	.355	135	2.3	21.7	4.4	3.5	73	91	75	96	67	78	35	
ST. LOUIS	622	58	40	24	13	52	24	19	38	64	9.6	33	6	8.2	2.8	13	115.2	6.2	70	11.0	5.6	10.2	41	83	12.7	43	53	.360	100	0.8	29.8	2.5	5.1	73	103	92	48	51	63	31	
CENTRAL CITY AVERAGE <sup>(c)</sup>		78	31	24	9	47	16	13	30	76	12.0	51	11	9.5	3.3	13	-	4.4	72	15.2	4.5	-	44	-	-	-	1	51	.365	-	-	-	-	-	64	81	66	63 <sup>(h)</sup>	55	74	32
U.S. AVERAGE		88	29	23	6	33	10	8	26	83	12.2	55	11	9.9	3.9	14	116.3	3.9	86	14.2	4.7	6.0 <sup>(d)</sup>	63	92	8.2	-	53	-	94	1.1	19.8	1.6	2.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(a) MARITAL UNREST INDEX: DIVORCE AND SEPARATION RATES DIVIDED BY MARRIAGE RATES.

(b) HUSBANDS PRESENT; CHILDREN UNDER 6.

(c) BASED ON AN AVERAGE OF 408 CITIES WITH A POPULATION OF MORE THAN 50,000, LOCATED WITHIN AN SMSA.

(d) POPULATION/SQUARE MILE IN CITIES WITHIN SMSAs OF 200,000 OR MORE.


(e) OVERCROWDING INDEX: PERCENT OF OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS HAVING 1.01 OR MORE PERSONS PER ROOM.

(f) DATA FOR THE YEAR 1971.

(g) NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHITE AND NON-WHITE STATUS IN TERMS OF 7 VARIABLES.

(h) MEAN OF 25 CITIES WITH POPULATION BETWEEN 300,000-1,000,000.

(i) THE INDEX OF INCOME CONCENTRATION IS OBTAINED VIA THE LORENZ CURVE (PLOTTING THE CUMULATIVE PERCENT OF UNITS--FAMILIES OF UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS--AGAINST THE CUMULATIVE PERCENT OF AGGREGATE INCOME ACCOUNTED FOR BY THESE UNITS). THE INDEX IS THE RATIO OF THE AREA BETWEEN THE DIAGONAL AND THE LORENZ CURVE TO THE TOTAL AREA UNDER THE DIAGONAL  $(\frac{A}{A+B})$ . THE INDEX RANGES FROM 0.0 TO 1.0. AS THE INDEX APPROACHES 1.0, THE GREATER WILL BE THE INEQUALITY OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION.



- SOURCES:
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, 1970.
  2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1970.
  3. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR STATES, CITIES AND COUNTRIES, 1970.
  4. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1972.
  5. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC ATLAS AND YEARBOOK, 1972.
  6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 2, Part B, 1971.
  7. U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969, 1970.

TABLE XV  
COMPARATIVE DATA ON IMPACT CITIES (1970) IN  
TERMS OF CRIME CORRELATES

### 3. Educational/Economic Conditions

Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland were in better posture than the other cities both in terms of median school years completed, and of the percentage of adults completing high school and college (they were, in fact, above the central city and national averages for college graduates). Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis, however, showed significantly lower levels of citizen-years spent in school.

Of all the cities, only Dallas and Portland attained the average U.S. level of median family income. Rents made up a higher proportion of family income, naturally, in those cities where income was lowest. But certain lower-income cities (Baltimore, Cleveland and Newark) had the added disadvantage of a higher consumer price index. The percent of overall city unemployment was high in Cleveland, Newark, St. Louis and Portland. For the first three cities, this average rate (which would be much higher for ghetto area unemployment, taken alone) seems to have been more or less endemic. In Portland, however, higher unemployment was largely the result of the 1970 recession.

In no Impact city was the proportion of males in the labor force equal to the U.S. average of 86 percent. The proportion of laborers and professionals/technical workers in the labor force followed closely the split according to older/younger cities discussed earlier (see pages 69 through 92 above). It is noteworthy, however, that Denver significantly topped the average city and U.S. rates for professional workers, and Dallas, Denver and Portland had either average, or lower than average, numbers of laborers.

### 4. Social Cohesion

Population density was discussed earlier in terms of city geography; it is repeated here because of its relevance to crime problems. (As Eulau and Prewitt have noted, increasing size and density "make for a host of problems stemming from intergroup differences of cultural, social and ethnic kinds. They tend to reduce the effect of informal social controls in favor of laws and regulations enforced by bureaucratic organizations and instrumentalities.")<sup>(31)</sup> Once again it should be remarked that Newark, Baltimore and St. Louis have extremely high population densities; in addition, these cities--plus Atlanta--have the lowest proportions of homeowners. The highest percentages of homeownership are to be found in Dallas, Denver and Portland. The overcrowding index shows that situations in Newark, St. Louis and Atlanta (despite the low population density of this last-named city) are worst, and are best by far in Portland. The two measures of overcrowding (i.e., population density and numbers of individuals in a housing unit) are positively related in six of the eight cities. Only in Baltimore (where the overcrowding index is about average for the

U.S.) and Atlanta (where density is low but overcrowding is high) does this relationship fail to hold. Park and recreational acreage is still another measure of available personal space; Newark's 4 acres per 10,000 people, as opposed to Denver's 324 acres, give some indication of the disparities which can exist between two Impact cities, both of which are effectively precluded from expanding into outer suburban rings of incorporated areas.

Transience (or population mobility) appeared to be greatest in Dallas, Atlanta and Denver, perhaps a feature of their expanding economies; it is about average in the other cities. Economic concentration (i.e., the amount of inequality or equality in a given city's income distribution) seemed to be about normal for six of the cities, compared to the U.S. city average. However, Atlanta and Dallas manifested a greater degree of inequality in their economic distribution breakouts than did the other cities.

Death rates were highest in 1970 for Portland and lowest for Dallas. Portland again led the list (followed by Denver) for highest suicide rates, whereas Newark had the lowest rate of all. (This, however, is probably more a reflection of demographic composition than of anything else; suicide is committed much more frequently by whites than by blacks.) Infant mortality rates were at extremely high levels in Newark, St. Louis and Atlanta. Dallas' rate was also high and only Denver came in sight of the national average. Death rates from cirrhosis of the liver were (like suicide rates) especially high in Portland. Since this disease is often a result of alcoholism, the two indicators seem to reflect a higher ambient stress level in Portland despite the city's levels of economic and educational well-being. All of the Impact city rates for cirrhosis of the liver, however, were higher than the national average.

##### 5. Non-White Disadvantage

This part of Table XV charts the difference between non-white and white attainments in terms of seven crime correlates for which data were available. Dallas and Atlanta made poor showings in terms of non-white disadvantage for income and education; this bears out their rankings for economic concentration (discussed above). On the other hand, in Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis, it seems that non-white juveniles tended to leave home much earlier than whites; it appears also that the non-white disadvantage for infant mortality and for employment was most manifest in Baltimore and in St. Louis.

## 6. Summary

Overall, the severity of Newark's urban problems seem to emerge most clearly from Table XV. Newark was at the bottom of the list for 5 family indicators out of 6, for 7 educational/economic indicators out of 9, for 5 social cohesion indicators out of 9. Portland came out best on the family measures with top place in 4 out of 6 indicators; Denver did best on economic/educational indicators with 5 top places out of 9 (Dallas was first for the other 4); and Dallas and Denver came out equally well with 3 first places, each, out of 9 measures of social cohesion.

For the non-white disadvantage measures, Dallas emerged in last place for 4 out of 5 indicators. According to these measures, non-whites were more consistently disadvantaged in Dallas than in the other Impact cities. In all cities, however, non-white incomes were less than white incomes, infant mortality rates were greater and unemployment rates were higher for non-whites.

In sum, Table XV confirms the sense of division among Impact cities into two groups discussed earlier (see pages 69 through 92 above). It is evident that the four oldest cities (Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis and Cleveland) were often poorly placed on many indicators. Atlanta emerged as a sort of swing city, more often afflicted with serious crime-correlated problems than were Dallas, Denver or Portland. On the other hand, the average figures making up Dallas' overall good showings do not account for the internal disparities reflected in Dallas' ratings for non-white disadvantage and economic concentration.

It must be remembered that the selection of indicators in Table XV was limited by the data available and the table does not, therefore, give a "true" picture of life in any Impact city. It does, however, provide some perspective on the comparative severity of crime-correlated problems as they existed in Impact cities prior to program launching.

### E. Impact Cities in Terms of Crime Rates and Crime Correlates

Data for Impact city crime rates in 1970 are available from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. These are shown in Table XVI below. It is immediately evident from this table that all of the Impact cities, with the exception of Portland, had high levels of reported crime as compared to central city averages.

Baltimore, Newark and St. Louis, joined by Dallas, had the highest overall Impact city rates for violent crime; Denver followed (largely owing to its rates for forcible rape). Atlanta, Cleveland and Portland were all below the central city average for violent crime, however.

TABLE XVI  
 REPORTED CRIME RATES FOR THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES:  
 1970 (IMPACT CRIMES(a))

	MURDER AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER	FORCIBLE RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	SUBTOTAL VIOLENT CRIME	ROBBERY	SUBTOTAL PERSON CRIME (VIOLENT CRIME AND ROBBERY)	BURGLARY	SUBTOTAL PROPERTY CRIMES (ROBBERY AND BURGLARY)	TOTAL REPORTED CRIME
	RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION								
ATLANTA	48.7	40.6	262.4	351.7	427.8	779.5	2319.8	2747.6	3099.3
BALTIMORE	25.5	61.3	790.4	877.2	1210.6	2087.8	2102.2	3312.8	4190.0
CLEVELAND	36.1	40.9	254.2	331.2	729.1	1060.3	1433.7	2162.8	2494.0
DALLAS	28.7	65.4	521.0	615.1	351.0	966.1	2310.5	2661.5	3276.6
DENVER	14.4	92.1	327.4	433.9	384.7	818.6	2936.0	3320.7	3754.6
NEWARK	37.4	66.2	567.4	671.0	1220.1	1891.1	2974.5	4194.6	4865.6
PORTLAND	9.4	33.5	224.2	267.1	427.1	694.2	2476.6	2903.7	3170.8
ST. LOUIS	42.7	87.7	520.5	650.9	851.1	1502.0	3055.3	3906.4	4557.3
CENTRAL CITY AVERAGE (b)	16.3	40.0	298.9	355.2	424.6	779.8	1931.9	2356.5	2711.7

(a) IMPACT CRIMES ARE: MURDER, RAPE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ROBBERY AND BURGLARY.

(b) MEAN OF 42 CITIES WITH POPULATION BETWEEN 300,000 AND 1,000,000.

SOURCE: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1970.

TABLE XVI  
 REPORTED CRIME RATES FOR THE EIGHT  
 IMPACT CITIES:  
 1970 (IMPACT CRIMES (a))

In terms of person crime (i.e., violent crime plus robbery), the Impact cities divided once again into the two groups identified earlier. Baltimore, Newark, St. Louis and Cleveland had the highest rates of person crime, followed by Dallas and Denver. Atlanta rates were about equal to the central city average and only Portland was below.

Property crime presented a somewhat different picture. Although the three oldest cities (Newark, St. Louis and Baltimore) again had the highest crime rates of all the Impact cities, they were joined by Denver (because of high burglary rates) and immediately followed by Portland (also because of burglary rates). Only one city, Cleveland, was below the central city average for property crime; this could, however, be a vagary of the voluntary FBI data reporting system.<sup>1</sup>

Table XVII below groups these observations and reinforces parts of the summary discussion on page 103 above. The three cities with the highest total crime rates in 1970, Newark, St. Louis, and Baltimore, were also characterized (relative to the other five cities), for example, by unstable family situations, low educational levels, poor economic conditions, and high population density. Thus, these cities had the kinds of high crime rates which might have been expected, given the crime-correlated problems discussed above. Similarly, Portland which was characterized (relative to the other cities) by stable family situations, high educational levels, affluent economic conditions and low population density, had the kinds of low crime rates which could have been predicted from Table XV.

The crime problems of Dallas, Atlanta, Denver, and Cleveland, however, seem less readily explained in terms of crime correlates. The favorable economic outlooks and educational levels of Dallas, Atlanta and Denver did not preserve them from high rates of violent, person and property crime; conversely, Cleveland's lower violent and property crime rates are surprising in view of the employment and educational problems reflected in Table XV.

Thus, the data for Impact cities show crime problems affecting both advantaged and disadvantaged cities, and do not appear to support either an "affluence" or "poverty" theory of crime. On the other hand,

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<sup>1</sup>A comparison of Cleveland's UCR data to the 1972 victimization survey reveals a ratio of one UCR-reported crime to 2.4 victimizations reported. Denver, Dallas and St. Louis had much larger disparities, however, (1:2.9, 1:2.6, and 1:2.6, respectively) so that this does not explain why Cleveland should have lower crime rates, relative to the other cities.

**TABLE XVII**  
**COMPARATIVE SUMMARY DATA ON CRIME RATES**  
**FOR THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (a)**

	VIOLENT CRIME		PERSON CRIME		PROPERTY CRIME		TOTAL CRIME	
	RATE > 500 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE < 500 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE > 1,200 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE < 1,200 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE > 3,200 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE < 3,200 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE > 4,000 PER 100,000 POPULATION	RATE < 4,000 PER 100,000 POPULATION
ATLANTA		X		X		X		X
BALTIMORE	X		X		X		X	
CLEVELAND		X		X		X		X
DALLAS	X			X		X		X
DENVER		X		X	X			X
NEWARK	X		X		X		X	
PORTLAND		X		X		X		X
ST. LOUIS	X		X		X		X	
CENTRAL CITY AVERAGE		X		X		X		X

(a) DERIVED FROM TABLE XVI.

**TABLE XVII**  
**COMPARATIVE SUMMARY DATA ON CRIME RATES**  
**FOR THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (a)**

neither poverty nor affluence are universal and absolute. When an exodus occurs (such as that which befell Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis or Cleveland), some people are necessarily left behind; and when a boom develops, some people don't share in it. If then, as discussed earlier (see pages 94-95 above), the perceptions of persons or groups about their deprivation relative to other persons or groups is a crimogenic factor, it follows that either an exodus or a boom could exacerbate such a sense of relative deprivation. Evidence of the existence (although not of the perception) of relative deprivation is furnished in Table XV by the indicators making up the non-white disadvantage factor, and by the index of income concentration. In effect, the crime problems of Dallas, Atlanta and Denver correlate positively with those cities' rankings in terms of the inequality of income distribution and also in terms of their high levels of non-white disadvantage (non-whites were most deprived vis-a-vis whites in Dallas, Atlanta and Denver).

Other evidence is furnished by the fact that Cleveland's lower crime rates also correlate with less non-white disadvantage and with a more equal distribution of income than all of the other cities.

Thus it could well be that it is not a city's affluence or poverty which is especially significant in terms of rising crime rates, but rather a perception of increasing relative deprivation, among already disadvantaged groups, which may influence the marginal propensity to commit crimes. Such a perception would be reinforced and exacerbated in times of either rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economies, and crimes might then be committed not only or necessarily because of economic need, but from a sense of hostility and alienation. Such a hypothesis could account for increased and increasing violence in criminal activities, which purely economic or system-failure hypotheses have not thus far attempted to explain.

It seems likely, however, that such an increased propensity to commit crimes would normally be dampened by social reprobation and by the deterrence of the criminal justice system. A sharp rise in crime rates would therefore imply, not only the perception of relative deprivation by disadvantaged groups, but also a simultaneous change in public attitudes, a lessening of disapproval of crime and criminals, accompanied by increased inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system.

It is, of course, possible that many of the apparent anomalies noted above can be explained in terms of certain methodological problems. The crime correlates identified earlier were derived from a variety of data samples (see Table XV), most of which were more inclusive in range than the sample represented by the eight Impact

cities. Thus it would hardly be surprising if certain significant correlations derived from one sample of data proved non-predictive when applied to a different sample. The alternative explanation for these inconsistencies is that the crime correlates and related factors listed in Table XV are incomplete and that there are other variables or combinations of variables that could yield indicators and theoretical factors more useful in accounting for these inconsistencies. The perception of relative deprivation as discussed above, is one such factor. Research would have to be undertaken, however, in order to derive reliable and valid indicators of relative deprivation and in order to demonstrate the predictive validity of these indicators with respect to crime.

#### F. Impact City Revenues, Expenditures and Resource Capabilities

Another type of insight into urban contexts is furnished by the differing political and fiscal responses which cities make to their social problems, and by their differing potential for dealing with them. As Beard once wrote:

In the purposes for which appropriations are made, the policies of the city government are given concrete form--the culture of the city is reflected. Indeed, the history of urban civilization could be written in terms of appropriations, for they show what the citizens think is worth doing and worth paying for. (32)

An examination of urban problems must therefore include, almost as a matter of course, the budgetary efforts which cities have made to address those problems. It would be useful, as well, to examine not only city expenditures and revenue, (i.e., current city resources), but also city resource capability, which could speak to the question of strategic (or potential) advantage in focusing on urban problems. Such resource capability might be defined as the capacity of a city government to generate resources which could respond to the challenges and problems of its social environment. To examine such capability, however, it would be necessary to measure the total potential amount of funds which could be raised by that city from all sources to implement policy initiatives, and also the forces inhibiting such fund-raising. For example, one measure of resource capability might be the wealth of a city's residents, adjusted for the tax rates those residents would be willing to endure.

Given the research constraints inherent in the present examination, however, it has not been possible to develop the data collection effort implied by such measurement. Instead, the discussion here will focus upon city revenues and expenditure (and upon the size, proportion and direction of that expenditure) as measures of available resources

and city policy intentions. The measurement of resource capability, as defined above, will therefore have to depend, like the other factors, upon readily available surrogate indicators such as the following:

- the difference between revenues and expenditures (i.e., the strain on resources already apparent);
- the Moody bond rating (or an outside assessment of city resource capabilities);
- the annual property tax assessment as a percent of sales price (or the potential taxpayer recalcitrance);
- the dependency load (or the percent of the population which is non-productive--younger than 18 and older than 65--divided by the working population, aged 18-64);
- the percent of city population receiving public assistance; and
- the ability to annex surrounding territory (or the possibility of tapping suburban resources).

This information is given in Table XVIII below.

#### 1. General Revenues and Expenditures

In the comparison of general revenue figures given in Table XVIII, it is immediately noticeable that Baltimore's annual revenues were more than three times those of the other cities (with a total of \$636 million) in 1970. The other cities ranged from a low of \$68 million in Portland to \$191 million in Denver. (Since this revenue was only partially raised through taxation, the city revenue per capita did not seem an especially significant figure and was therefore omitted in Table XVIII). Of all the Impact cities, Newark, Dallas and Portland were most dependent upon the property tax for their revenues. (Baltimore, it will be remembered from Table II, received 58 percent of its revenues in aid from the State of Maryland.)

In terms of general expenditure, only Baltimore paid for a full complement of social services (including education, welfare, housing and urban development, health and hospitals and criminal justice). Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Portland and St. Louis received help with (or did not fund) education; Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, and Portland did not fund welfare, while Newark and St. Louis funded only a small

TABLE XVIII  
IMPACT CITY REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND RESOURCE  
CAPABILITY POTENTIAL, 1970

CITY	GENERAL REVENUE		GENERAL EXPENDITURES							RESOURCE CAPABILITY POTENTIAL					
	GENERAL REVENUE (\$M)	PERCENT GENERAL REVENUE FROM PROPERTY TAX (%)	GENERAL EXPENDITURE (\$M)	EDUCATION AS A PERCENT OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE (%)	WELFARE AS A PERCENT OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE (%)	HOUSING AND URBAN RENEWAL AS A PERCENT OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE (%)	HEALTH AND HOSPITALS AS A PERCENT OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE (%)	CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS A PERCENT OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE (%)	OTHER (%)	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE (\$M)	MOODY'S RATING OF MUNICIPAL BONDS	ANNUAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT AS PERCENT OF SALES PRICE (1966) (%)	PERSONS AGED <18 AND >65 AS PERCENT OF POPULATION (%)	PERCENT OF POPULATION RECEIVING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (%)	PAST ABILITY TO ANNEX SURROUNDING TERRITORY
ATLANTA	108	29	163	25	-	-	-	9	66	-55	AA	1.07	41.2	9	YES
BALTIMORE	636	25	668	34	16	7	7	11	25	-32	A	3.47	44.0	10	NO
CLEVELAND	174	32	179	-	-	7	3	25	65	-5	A	1.75	44.2	9	NO
DALLAS	142	48	164	3	-	-	2	16	79	-22	AA	1.48	42.2	5	YES
DENVER	191	18	176	2	21	7	14	12	44	+15	AA	2.03	40.9	7	NO
NEWARK	172	57	205	52	6	2	6	12	22	-33	BAA	4.06	45.2	19	NO
PORTLAND	68	42	64	-	-	7	2	22	69	+4	AA	2.37	42.6	6	NO
ST. LOUIS	163	22	162	2	1	1	23	26	47	+1	AA	1.70	46.4	10	NO
CENTRAL CITY AVERAGE (a)	158	30	165	18	7	4	8	15	48	-7		1.95	44.1	7	

(a) MEAN OF 42 CITIES WITH POPULATION BETWEEN 300,000 AND 1,000,000.

- SOURCES:
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1970-71.
  2. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1972.
  3. MOODY'S RATING OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, 1970.
  4. THE OFFICIAL ASSOCIATED PRESS ALMANAC, 1973.
  5. U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1970.

TABLE XVIII  
IMPACT CITY REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND  
RESOURCE CAPABILITY POTENTIAL, 1970

part of their welfare expenditures. Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, and Portland all spent more than 50 percent of their budgets on other services:

- Atlanta

Of Atlanta's 66 percent "other" figure, sanitation, the airport, fire protection, highways, parks, and interest on the general debt accounted for 58 percent;

- Cleveland

Of Cleveland's 65 percent "other" figure, sanitation, fire protection, parks, interest on the debt, the airport, highways and "miscellaneous" accounted for 62 percent;

- Dallas

Of Dallas' 79 percent "other" figure, sanitation, fire protection, highways, the airport, interest on the general debt, parks and administration accounted for 73 percent;

- Portland

Of Portland's 69 percent "other" figure, fire protection, parks, miscellaneous, highways, sanitation and administration account for 67 percent.

Impact city budgets in 1970 were thus highly dissimilar, and essentially non-comparable, varying according to sharing patterns of states, counties, cities and special districts. Priorities were certainly different, but it is not easy to see what these may have been, given that the figures in Table XVIII show only city totals and do not give a sense of the total monies available in the different areas. That Newark, Baltimore and Atlanta were spending 52 percent, 34 percent and 25 percent of their funds on education, however, undoubtedly means that education was a priority for those cities, just as expenditures appear to signify that crime control was a priority for Cleveland, Portland and St. Louis.

## 2. Resource Capability Potential

The ability of municipal governments in large American cities to pay for services demanded by their populations had been severely strained:

- by the exodus of middle class families to the suburbs (which reduced the city tax base);

- by the increased demand for services (like education, health, welfare and crime control) generated by the population left behind (usually oriented toward the old and the very young, the unskilled, the underemployed);
- by inflation (which increased the costs of borrowing money); and
- by recession and unemployment which reduced the tax base further and forced city payroll cuts (and hence, cuts in municipal services).

The first indication of strain between the demand for services and the city's ability to supply them is often seen in the shortfall between revenue and expenditure. In the case of the eight Impact cities, Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas and Newark had sizable shortfalls in 1970. While Cleveland, Portland and St. Louis were approximately balanced, only Denver had a comfortable surplus. It can be seen from Table XVIII, however, that the Moody rating for Cleveland was lower than the Impact city average, despite the revenue/expenditure balance. The problem here was that the amount which Cleveland had to pay each year to service its debt (interest plus principal coming due on long-term obligations) exceeded 17 percent of budget expenditures. This, along with the fact that Cleveland's voters had refused to approve an income tax increase in 1970, put Cleveland on the list of cities in serious financial trouble, despite its apparently balanced (or nearly-balanced) budget.

New Jersey laws required Newark to have a balanced budget each year, but (as discussed in Table VI above) did not allow the city any other recourse for accomplishing this beyond raising the property tax and/or selling bonds. Since Moody rated these bonds only BAA, long term rates were high for Newark, and short-term borrowing was even more expensive. Thus the city found itself forced into the position of continually cutting back services and personnel (city workers and teachers).

Baltimore also had financial problems in 1970 and only an A rating by Moody. Property tax rates were already very high in Newark and Baltimore in 1966 (date of these data), but not in Cleveland because of taxpayer refusal to tolerate increases. Although tax rates remained low in Atlanta, Dallas and St. Louis, St. Louis, in 1970, was facing such problems of middle-class exodus, chronic unemployment and poverty that a rise in the property tax--precipitating further movement toward the suburbs--must have seemed unthinkable.

Denver, on the other hand seems to have been in a fairly sound fiscal position in 1970 with an AA rating, a budgetary surplus and a solid tax base. The city's economic situation remained vigorous (see Table V above) despite some middle-class exodus. Further, the mix of productive-age and non-productive age population was the most favorable among the Impact cities (only 40.9 percent of the population was either under 18 or over 65) in 1970.

The effects of the 1960-1970 loss of residents is shown once again in St. Louis' high proportion of dependents (under 18 or over 65) or non-workers composing its population in 1970. Proportions of welfare recipients were highest in "exodus" cities: Newark, St. Louis, Baltimore and Cleveland (joined in this case, by Atlanta).

Finally, only Atlanta and Dallas had been able to annex surrounding territories and tap suburban resources. The other cities were largely or completely ringed by incorporated areas. Further, resistance to consolidation and other metropolitan restructuring was increasing in many suburban areas, and even Atlanta was now encountering difficulties in a projected expansion.

In sum, only three Impact cities appear to have had obvious reserves of resource capability in 1970 (speaking, of course, only from the limited measures and data presented). Without budgetary deficits, with good bond ratings, large productive-age populations, diversified economies and affluent populations, both Denver and Portland seemed to possess the resource capability needed to back up policy initiatives. For Dallas, also, this seems to have been true, despite the budgetary deficit, because the other factors were just as favorable as for Denver or Portland, and because, in addition, Dallas raised about 95 percent of its revenue from its own tax base (leaving considerable room for expansion).

The information developed here on resources and resource capability appears to bear out yet another time the existence of two groups of cities as they emerged from the crime correlates of Table XV. Denver, Dallas and Portland are again in the most favorable positions, followed by Atlanta, with Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis bringing up the rear. It should be noted, however, that just as the high rankings attained by Dallas and Denver on income, education and other indicators shown in Table XV did not exclude serious crime problems, so the presence of a relatively high degree of resource capability in Dallas and Denver coexisted with relatively high rates of reported crime. As discussed above, however, (see page 107), the data do indicate that the highest rates of person crime in 1970 (see Tables XVI and XVII above), occurred in the group of the four oldest Impact cities, where income and education, family life and community stability were least favorable, and where resource capability was lowest.

### G. Reported Crime Rates and the Criminal Justice System Response

On the surface at least, high resource capability would seem to indicate a greater capacity to deal with urban problems and, in particular, with crime problems. It is true that by 1970 the idea that the criminal justice system could single-handedly reduce crime had waned, and expectations had become more modest (see Chapter I above). Still, the assumption was (and remains) that an efficient criminal justice apparatus will have multiple deterrent effects on crime, and that an exemplary system response will result in lower crime rates. Some research, notably that of Ehrlich, found that as the probability of arrest, conviction and sentencing increased, the incidence of crime, especially of violent crime, decreased.<sup>(33)</sup> While the positive deterrent effects of the criminal justice system have not been empirically demonstrated, what was already clear in 1970 was that case backlogs and trial delays work in favor of felons; time buys bargaining power, since it allows memories to blur, witnesses to move away or die, arresting officers to retire and/or leave the area. It seems important, therefore, to look once again at Impact city crime rates and at available information on system responses prior to Impact.

Table XIX displays 1970 Impact city crime rates against a backdrop of resources devoted explicitly to the criminal justice system (shown as expenditures), and against the city's criminal justice system response (expressed in terms of police clearance rates, personnel and vehicles, and in terms of trial delay and conviction rates).

A glance at criminal justice expenditure reveals that it was highest (\$72 million) in Baltimore, followed by St. Louis (\$42 million) and Cleveland (\$40 million). But while Baltimore's \$72 million represents only 17 percent of its total expenditure, St. Louis and Cleveland's relatively smaller sums meant that 26 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of their total expenditures were going to criminal justice. A comparison of Impact city criminal justice expenditures with their reported crime rates (given in Tables XVI and XIX) does not seem to display any particular relationship, however. In fact, reported person crime rates for Baltimore and St. Louis were among the highest, despite their expenditures, while Atlanta's low funding (\$15 million, or 9 percent of total expenditure) is associated with the second lowest person crime rate among the Impact cities (see Table XVI, page 105).

From the viewpoint of the impact likely to be felt in the eight cities due to the infusion of federal funds (i.e., approximately \$20 million for each city over two years), it is evident that the money represented only about one-seventh of Baltimore's annual expenditure, and about one-quarter of St. Louis' and Cleveland's. The new program would therefore be a much less staggering input to the

TABLE XIX  
 REPORTED CRIME RATES FOR THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES  
 AND SELECTED DATA ON SYSTEM RESPONSE: 1970

	REPORTED IMPACT CRIME RATES (a)					CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXPENDITURES								CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE									
	MURDER AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER	FORCIBLE RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	ROBBERY	BURGLARY	EXPENDITURE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM	PERCENT EXPENDITURE FOR POLICE	PERCENT EXPENDITURE FOR COURTS	PERCENT EXPENDITURE FOR CORRECTIONS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM PERSONNEL AS PERCENT OF TOTAL CITY PERSONNEL	POLICE CHIEF'S SALARY	PATROLMAN'S SALARY (ENTRANCE LEVEL)	POLICE					COURTS					
													CLEARANCE RATES					PERSONNEL			CARS	TRIAL DELAY (ARREST TO SENTENCING) 1971	TRIAL CONVICTION RATES
													MURDER	FORCIBLE RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	ROBBERY	BURGLARY	TOTAL PERSONNEL	PERSONNEL PER 1000 POPULATION	PERSONNEL PER SQUARE MILE	MOTOR VEHICLES PER SQUARE MILE		
(RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION)					(\$M)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(\$TH)	(\$TH)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)			
ATLANTA	48.7	40.6	262.4	427.8	2319.8	15	84.9	9.6	5.5	23	26.7	8.3	85	59	-	52	-	1080	2.2	8.2	2.8	62	-
BALTIMORE	25.5	61.3	790.4	1210.6	2102.2	72	80.3	11.1	8.6	15	30.0	7.8	-	-	-	-	-	3913	4.3	50.0	9.5	195	85
CLEVELAND	36.1	40.9	254.2	729.1	1433.7	40	85.7	8.3	6.0	32	28.6	9.1	-	-	-	17	13	2636	3.5	34.7	4.2	282	73
DALLAS	28.7	65.4	521.0	351.0	2310.5	27	94.7	5.3	0	28	23.7	7.8	96	49	67	29	20	2059	2.4	7.8	2.1	330	95
DENVER	14.4	92.1	327.4	384.7	2936.0	20	69.6	18.0	12.4	20	23.9	7.4	-	40	69	35	25	1477	2.9	15.5	3.6	96+	95
NEWARK	37.4	66.2	567.4	1220.1	2974.5	23	96.1	3.9	0	16	19.2	9.5	69	47	62	21	13	1707	4.5	72.6	9.3	315	-
PORTLAND	9.4	33.5	224.2	427.1	2476.6	15	86.4	8.5	5.1	31	25.4	9.2	67 <sup>(c)</sup>	20 <sup>(c)</sup>	30 <sup>(c)</sup>	14	6	903	2.4	10.1	2.3	81+	-
ST. LOUIS	42.7	87.7	520.5	851.1	3055.3	42	78.7	11.7	9.6	37	25.2	8.2	81	45	50	25	36	2912	4.7	47.6	8.6	174	65
CENTRAL CITY AVERAGE <sup>(b)</sup>	16.3	40.0	298.9	424.6	1931.9	23	83.8	9.8	6.3	24	-	8.2	86	56	65	29	19	1453	2.6	24.1	-	-	-

(a) IMPACT CRIMES: MURDER, RAPE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ROBBERY AND BURGLARY.

(b) MEAN OF 42 CITIES WITH POPULATION BETWEEN 300,000 AND 1,000,000.

(c) STRANGER-TO-STRANGER CRIMES ONLY.

- SOURCES: 1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1970-1971.  
 2. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1970.  
 3. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, 1972.  
 4. KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1972.  
 5. MOY, WARREN S.L., "A PRIMARY SOURCE DESCRIPTION OF IMPACT CITY FELONY COURTS PRIOR TO PROGRAM INITIATION," THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6904, JUNE, 1975.

TABLE XIX  
 REPORTED CRIME RATES FOR THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES  
 AND SELECTED DATA ON SYSTEM RESPONSE: 1970

criminal justice budgets of Baltimore, Cleveland and St. Louis than it was to Atlanta or Portland (\$15 million each), Denver (\$20 million), Newark (\$23 million) or even Dallas (\$27 million).

Most cities appeared to be concentrating heavily on the police function, typically the traditional city responsibility. It seems likely, however, from Table XIX, that Denver and St. Louis were already making an effort, as of 1970, to achieve a better balance in component expenditure, prior to Impact initiation.

There is an extreme paucity of system response data available, and none at all extant from the Baltimore Police Department. For those police departments which do furnish clearance rates, at least for some crimes, it was true in 1970 (as always) that clearance rates diminished rapidly in descending order of seriousness (i.e., they were highest for murder and lowest for burglary). Nonetheless, the Cleveland and Portland clearance rates for robbery and burglary were quite a bit lower than the central city average, whereas Denver rates were much higher. St. Louis clearance rates were also higher, almost twice the central city average for burglary. Yet Cleveland has the lowest burglary rate of all the Impact cities, whereas St. Louis and Denver (along with Newark) have the highest rates.

In terms of police personnel, Newark, Baltimore and St. Louis clearly have the most widespread police coverage (with respect to vehicle presence per square mile and per thousand population). But once again, Newark, Baltimore, and St. Louis also have the highest crime rates. This coincides with the finding of a study of 30 cities (using 1971 crime data) which reported that:

- those cities with more police per capita had more crime per capita; and that
- a percentage change in the number of police per capita did not correlate significantly with percentage changes in crime rates a year and two years later. (34)

Trial delay was clearly worst in Dallas and Newark, followed closely, however, by Cleveland, Baltimore and St. Louis. Only Atlanta, Portland and Denver could boast a trial delay period of less than 100 days. But further, Denver had a trial conviction rate of 95 percent. It seems, therefore, that Denver, at least, had presented a relatively good system response to its burglary problem with a comparatively high clearance rate, reasonably rapid case processing, and a high trial conviction rate. Yet, as already noted, Denver had one of the worst burglary rates of any Impact city.

## H. Summary and Conclusions

What then can be said in summary about the eight Impact cities prior to Impact? In order to view simultaneously some of the disparate elements examined in this chapter, information in Tables I-VIII, XII, XV, XVI, XVIII and XIX has been organized in Table XX below, and values assigned by indicator. (The definition of these values is to be found at Appendix to this chapter, Table XXI, pages 130 through 133 below.)

It appears first and foremost, that there was a de facto division of the cities into two groups of four, the young and the old, the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Without trying to establish any rigid set of rankings, it seems that Portland, Denver, Dallas and Atlanta were different from the others because of the diversity of their economies, the education and skills of their inhabitants, their space and their affluence (see Educational Levels and Economic Conditions, Table XX). Yet Portland emerged as separate from the other three because of its pro-environment, anti-economic-growth-and-expansion stance (see Table VII above), and because of its relatively minor crime problems, in comparison with the other Impact cities (see Crime Rates, Table XX). Only burglary seemed to be a serious problem in Portland. These major differences from the other cities, combined with the city's favored demographic, governmental, economic and social situations, tended to set Portland definitively apart from the other cities. Atlanta seems also to have been different, closer in many ways to more disadvantaged cities, with its racial tensions, its majority black population, its welfare rolls, yet rejoining the more privileged cities by virtue of its economic diversity, its well-educated, productive population, its lower violent and person crime rates.

Among the older cities, Newark stands out as having begun the program with the greatest handicaps (see Table XX). St. Louis and Baltimore were in somewhat better positions, but their problems were similar in kind to those of Newark: exodus of people and jobs, aging white populations, poverty and unemployment.

Cleveland also appears as disadvantaged (in relation to Dallas, Denver, or Portland), yet shows up on many scales in a better situation than Newark, St. Louis or Baltimore (less overcrowding, higher family income, more juveniles living with both parents, more owner-occupied housing, less burglary, less violent crime). On the other hand, the problems of middle class exodus (~125,000 people between 1960 and 1970) and an underdiversified economy, the racial tensions between "ethnics" and blacks, all of these characteristics combined to keep Cleveland squarely in the camp of the older, disadvantaged cities.

Crime problems for all of the cities except Portland were acute. Dallas, despite its prosperity, had reported rates for aggravated

TABLE XX  
OVERVIEW OF IMPACT CITY POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS NINE FACTORS AND  
TWENTY-SEVEN INDICATORS EXAMINED IN CHAPTER V<sup>1</sup>

FACTORS/INDICATORS	ATLANTA	BALTIMORE	CLEVELAND	DALLAS	DENVER	NEWARK	PORTLAND	ST. LOUIS
<b>I. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS</b>								
- POPULATION SIZE, 1970	497,000	906,000	751,000	844,000	515,000	382,000	383,000	622,000
- NET POPULATION CHANGE, 1960-1970	STABLE <sup>2</sup>	DECLINING	EXODUS	INFLUX	STABLE <sup>2</sup>	DECLINING	STABLE	EXODUS
- CHANGE IN BLACK POPULATION PROPORTION OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1960-1970	38% - 51%	35% - 46%	29% - 38%	19% - 25%	6% - 9%	34% - 54%	4% - 6%	29% - 41%
<b>II. FAMILY SITUATION</b>								
- PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS	AVERAGE	UNFAVORABLE	AVERAGE	FAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
- PERCENT FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL	AVERAGE	UNFAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	AVERAGE	UNFAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
<b>III. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</b>								
- MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED BY ADULTS	HIGH	LOW	AVERAGE	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW
- PERCENT ADULTS COMPLETING COLLEGE	HIGH	LOW	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW
<b>IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS</b>								
- AGE ( $\leq$ 150 YEARS)	YOUNGER	OLDER	OLDER	YOUNGER	YOUNGER	OLDER	YOUNGER	OLDER
- MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW
- PERCENT PROFESSIONAL WORKERS IN LABOR FORCE	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM
- CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING JOBS	SMALL LOSS	HEAVY LOSS	HEAVY LOSS	SMALL GAIN	HEAVY GAIN	HEAVY LOSS	SMALL GAIN	HEAVY LOSS
<b>V. SOCIAL COHESION</b>								
- PERCENT OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW
- OVERCROWDING INDEX	UNFAVORABLE	AVERAGE	FAVORABLE	AVERAGE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
- INCOME CONCENTRATION	UNFAVORABLE	AVERAGE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	AVERAGE	AVERAGE	FAVORABLE	AVERAGE
<b>VI. NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE</b>								
- NON-WHITE MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME AS PERCENT OF WHITE	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL	LOW DIFFERENTIAL	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL	MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL
- NON-WHITE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AS PERCENT OF WHITE	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL	LOW DIFFERENTIAL	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	HIGH DIFFERENTIAL	LOW DIFFERENTIAL	MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL	LOW DIFFERENTIAL
<b>VII. CRIME RATES</b>								
- VIOLENT CRIME RELATIVE TO CENTRAL-CITY AVERAGE	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
- PERSON CRIME RELATIVE TO CENTRAL-CITY AVERAGE	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
- PROPERTY CRIME RELATIVE TO CENTRAL-CITY AVERAGE	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
<b>VIII. RESOURCE CAPABILITY</b>								
- POSSIBILITY OF SUBURBAN ANNEXATION	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
- MOODY RATING	AA	A	A	AA	AA	BAA	AA	AA
- PERCENT POPULATION RECEIVING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
<b>IX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE</b>								
- CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA	LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH
- POLICE CLEARANCE RATE FOR ROBBERY	HIGH	-	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM
- POLICE CLEARANCE RATE FOR BURGLARY	-	-	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	HIGH
- NUMBER OF POLICE PER 1,000 POPULATION	LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
- TRIAL DELAYS (ARREST TO SENTENCING)	SHORT	MEDIUM	LONG	LONG	SHORT	LONG	SHORT	MEDIUM

<sup>1</sup>VALUES HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE CITY DATA DEVELOPED IN TABLES I-VIII, XII, XV, XVI, XVIII and XIX. THESE VALUES ARE DEFINED IN TABLE XXI, AT APPENDIX TO THIS CHAPTER (SEE PAGES 130 THROUGH 133).

<sup>2</sup>BOTH ATLANTA AND DENVER HAVE HAD OUT-MIGRATION TO THEIR SUBURBS BY MIDDLE-CLASS RESIDENTS AND IN-MIGRATION BY LOWER-CLASS.

TABLE XX  
OVERVIEW OF IMPACT CITY POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS NINE FACTORS AND  
TWENTY-SEVEN INDICATORS EXAMINED IN CHAPTER V<sup>1</sup>

assault higher than those of St. Louis and rates for violent crime nearly twice those of Cleveland. Denver, too, was in trouble, with the highest reported rate of forcible rape for any Impact city, higher than St. Louis, higher than Newark. Given that crime problems of different kinds appeared to spare neither advantaged nor disadvantaged cities, and that consequently, despite the various conventional wisdoms, it seems unlikely that either affluence or poverty, as such, "caused" crime, the hypothesis was advanced here that it may rather be a perception of relative deprivation (on the part of disadvantaged persons or groups) vis-a-vis other persons or groups which influences the marginal propensity to commit crimes, and that such a perception may be exacerbated in either a rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economy. As discussed above (see pages 108 through 111), such a hypothesis would appear to explain reasonably well the coexistence of increasing crime rates and economic expansion in Atlanta, Denver and Dallas, the lesser problems of Portland (given its non-expansionary stance and the small size of its disadvantaged population) and Cleveland (given its lower non-white disadvantage and its greater income equality), as well as the steadily increasing crime rates of the three other "exodus" cities. It appears also, however, that such a propensity to commit crimes would normally be dampened by conventional social disapproval and by criminal justice system deterrence. It may be, therefore, that a conjunction of factors is involved which includes a perception of relative deprivation among disadvantaged groups, a simultaneous lessening of public disapproval of crime and criminals, accompanied by increased inefficiencies within the criminal justice system.

Examination of city resources, expenditures and resource capabilities again confirmed the split between the two groups of cities: only Dallas, Denver and Portland presented evidence of obvious resource capability. Comparison of the data on reported crime rates with crime correlates and resource capability appear to indicate that the highest rates of person crime in 1970 occurred in the group of the four oldest Impact cities, where income and education, family life and community organization were least favorable and where resource capability was lowest.

The sparse data on Impact city criminal justice system responses did not reveal any associations of more funding with less crime, or less police with more crime. On the contrary, more police per capita appeared to be associated with more crime. Higher clearance rates did not seem to be related to fewer crimes; on the contrary higher clearance rates than the central city average for burglary in St. Louis and Denver were associated with the worst rates of burglary among the Impact cities.

In summary, crime was not the only problem, perhaps, for the Impact cities, but it was a major one. The Impact program thus began its operations at a moment when--despite the differing assumptions about "root causes," resource capabilities and system deterrence recapitulated above--it had not been shown empirically that any of these variables could directly affect rates of crime, delinquency or recidivism. It was therefore appropriate and necessary to try a new approach like the one posited by Impact's COPIE-cycle: that is, a careful examination of crime-specific problems followed by a liberal application of federal funds to anti-crime efforts directly addressing those problems. Such an approach did not target "brute force" or hardware types of tactics, but rather an improvement in the quality of anti-crime thinking, services and effectiveness.

Although Impact goals were thus crime-specific, they did not exclude an examination of the urban problems associated with high crime rates; efforts were made at coordination across federal agencies, in the hope that such coordination could bring increased pressure to bear on those problems. However, effective mechanisms for such coordination were never developed (see Chapter II, pages 32 and 33 above), and furthermore, Impact arrived at a moment when funds from the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education and Welfare had been impounded and the Office of Economic Opportunity was phasing out. Thus, if Impact was narrow rather than broad, if it posited the reduction of crime rather than the reduction of other urban ills, it nonetheless offered eight cities a chance to tackle a social program whose goals interacted narrowly with many of their other overall aims. In effect, crime had been a major cause of business and residential moves to the suburbs. It seemed natural for cities to look toward anti-crime interventions to better focus their resources on crime problems in high-crime areas. The older Impact cities hoped that successful crime reduction could stave off further departures and allow the possibility of city revitalization; to the younger cities, the program promised the removal of an impediment which, sooner or later, would jeopardize their prosperity.

There was, therefore, the threat of an implicit divergence between LEAA objectives and those of the cities at program initiation: the agency was concerned that funds might be diverted toward areas which could not directly affect the desired program outcomes; the cities would be tempted--given their fiscal problems and the shortage of other federal funds--to address as many of their urban problems as they could with the new money. To keep this potential conflict within reasonable bounds would constitute a major item on both the day-to-day and the long-term program agenda.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER V

TABLE XXI  
 VALUE FOR IMPACT CITY RANKINGS, OBTAINED FROM INFORMATION  
 IN TABLES I-VIII, XII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XIX

FACTORS AND INDICATORS EXAMINED	DEFINITION OF VALUES ASSIGNED
I. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS	
A. CITY POPULATION	A. STATED AS AN ABSOLUTE NUMBER
B. POPULATION CHANGE 1960-1970	B. 1. <u>INFLUX</u> = POPULATION INCREASE > 100,000 2. <u>STABLE</u> = POPULATION INCREASE BETWEEN 5,000 AND 25,000 3. <u>DECLINING</u> = POPULATION DECREASE BETWEEN 10,000 AND 100,000 4. <u>EXODUS</u> = POPULATION LOSS > 100,000
C. CHANGE IN BLACK POPULATION PROPORTION OF TOTAL POPULATION 1960-1970	C. STATED AS PERCENTAGES
II. FAMILY SITUATION	
A. PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS	A. 1. <u>FAVORABLE</u> = > 75% OF PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 65%-75% OF PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS 3. <u>UNFAVORABLE</u> = < 65% OF PERSONS UNDER 18 LIVING WITH BOTH PARENTS
B. PERCENT FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL	B. 1. <u>FAVORABLE</u> = < 45% FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 45%-50% FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL 3. <u>UNFAVORABLE</u> = > 50% FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL
III. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	
A. MEDIAN SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED BY ADULTS	A. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = 11.5 YEARS COMPLETED AND HIGHER 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 10.5 AND 11.5 YEARS 3. <u>LOW</u> = < 10.5 YEARS COMPLETED
B. PERCENT ADULTS COMPLETING COLLEGE	B. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = 12% OR MORE COMPLETING COLLEGE 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 8% AND 12% COMPLETING COLLEGE 3. <u>LOW</u> = < 8% ADULTS COMPLETING COLLEGE

TABLE XXI (CONTINUED)

FACTORS AND INDICATORS EXAMINED	DEFINITION OF VALUES ASSIGNED
<p>IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS</p> <p>A. AGE OF CITY</p> <p>B. MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME</p> <p>C. PERCENT PROFESSIONAL WORKERS IN LABOR FORCE</p> <p>D. CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING JOBS (1967-1972)</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>OLDER</u> = &gt; 150 YEARS OLD 2. <u>YOUNGER</u> = &lt; 150 YEARS OLD</p> <p>B. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; \$9,500 2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN \$8,500-\$9,500 3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; \$8,500</p> <p>C. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; 13.5% 2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = 11%-13% 3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; 11%</p> <p>D. 1. <u>HEAVY LOSS</u> = BETWEEN 20,000-40,000 JOBS LOST 2. <u>SMALL LOSS</u> = &lt; 5,000 JOBS LOST 3. <u>SMALL GAIN</u> = BETWEEN 3,000 AND 5,000 JOBS GAINED 4. <u>HEAVY GAIN</u> = &gt; 15,000 JOBS GAINED</p>
<p>V. SOCIAL COHESION</p> <p>A. PERCENT OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING</p> <p>B. OVERCROWDING INDEX</p> <p>C. INCOME CONCENTRATION</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = 50% AND OVER 2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 45%-50% 3. <u>LOW</u> = BELOW 45%</p> <p>B. 1. <u>FAVORABLE</u> = &lt; 7.5% 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 7.5% AND 10% 3. <u>UNFAVORABLE</u> = ABOVE 10%</p> <p>C. 1. <u>FAVORABLE</u> = .355 AND UNDER 2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN .355 AND .370 3. <u>UNFAVORABLE</u> = ABOVE .370</p>
<p>VI. NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE</p> <p>A. NON-WHITE MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME AS A PERCENT OF WHITE MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>HIGH DIFFERENTIAL</u> = UNDER 70% OF WHITE INCOME 2. <u>MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL</u> = BETWEEN 70% AND 75% OF WHITE INCOME 3. <u>LOW DIFFERENTIAL</u> = ABOVE 75% OF WHITE INCOME</p>

TABLE XXI (CONTINUED)

FACTORS AND INDICATORS EXAMINED	DEFINITION OF VALUES ASSIGNED
<p>VI. NON-WHITE DISADVANTAGE (CONTINUED)</p> <p>B. NON-WHITE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AS A PERCENT OF WHITES</p>	<p>B. 1. <u>HIGH DIFFERENTIAL</u> = UNDER 70% OF WHITE H.S. GRADUATES</p> <p>2. <u>MEDIUM DIFFERENTIAL</u> = BETWEEN 70-90% OF WHITE H.S. GRADUATES</p> <p>3. <u>LOW DIFFERENTIAL</u> = 90% AND OVER OF WHITE H.S. GRADUATES</p>
<p>VII. CRIME RATES</p> <p>A. VIOLENT CRIME</p> <p>B. PERSON CRIME</p> <p>C. PROPERTY CRIME</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = 455 CRIMES AND OVER PER 100,000</p> <p>2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 350 AND 455 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>3. <u>LOW</u> = BELOW 350 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>B. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = OVER 1,000 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 770 AND 1,000 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>3. <u>LOW</u> = BELOW 770 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>C. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = OVER 2,500 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 2,300 AND 2,500 CRIMES PER 100,000</p> <p>3. <u>LOW</u> = BELOW 2,300 CRIMES PER 100,000</p>
<p>VIII. RESOURCE CAPABILITY</p> <p>A. POSSIBILITY OF ANNEXATION</p> <p>B. MOODY RATING</p> <p>C. PERCENT OF POPULATION RECEIVING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>YES</u></p> <p>2. <u>NO</u></p> <p>3. <u>VOTED DOWN</u></p> <p>B. STATED AS LETTER ASSESSMENTS</p> <p>C. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = 9% OR MORE</p> <p>2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = 7-8%</p> <p>3. <u>LOW</u> = BELOW 7%</p>

TABLE XXI (CONCLUDED)

FACTORS AND INDICATORS EXAMINED	DEFINITION OF VALUES ASSIGNED
<p>IX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE</p> <p>A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA</p> <p>B. POLICE CLEARANCE RATES FOR ROBBERY</p> <p>C. POLICE CLEARANCE RATES FOR BURGLARY</p> <p>D. NUMBER OF POLICE PER CAPITA</p> <p>E. TRIAL DELAY</p>	<p>A. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; \$60            2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN \$35 AND \$55            3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; \$35</p> <p>B. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; 45%            2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 25% AND 35%            3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; 25%</p> <p>C. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; 25%            2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 15% AND 25%            3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; 15%</p> <p>D. 1. <u>HIGH</u> = &gt; 4            2. <u>AVERAGE</u> = BETWEEN 3 AND 4            3. <u>LOW</u> = &lt; 3</p> <p>E. 1. <u>LOW</u> = &gt; 200 DAYS            2. <u>MEDIUM</u> = BETWEEN 100-200 DAYS            3. <u>SHORT</u> = &lt; 100 DAYS</p>

## CHAPTER V

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## **Part II: National-Level Evaluation Findings (Section I)**

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PART II: NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION FINDINGS (SECTION I)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER VI PROGRAM DIMENSIONS: A QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW  
OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND PRODUCTS

CHAPTER VII PROGRAM INNOVATIONS IN EACH CITY

CHAPTER VIII PROGRAM INNOVATIONS FROM AN EIGHT-CITY  
PERSPECTIVE

## INTRODUCTION

Part I of this report analyzed the Impact program in terms of its likely potential for achievement as it moved toward implementation.

The discussion in Chapter I focused on the contrast, in the early seventies, between the continued cheery political prognoses of an "imminent end to the crime problem" and a rather gloom-and-doom research atmosphere. The latter had resulted both from the failures of social action programs in the sixties and from a new awareness (based on experience) of the difficulties involved in solving urban problems with federal initiatives. Among the obstacles to program effectiveness encountered in the sixties had been a prevailing lack of real knowledge about the problems themselves, an inability to achieve interagency coordination, a failure to devise workable mechanisms for communicating with involved populations.

Crime control policy of the seventies therefore came to include, in addition to the overall goal of crime-reduction, an instrumental goal of system capability which recognized the needs for knowledge, for interagency coordination and for effective community involvement in anti-crime programs.

The High-Impact Anti-Crime Program was conceived in this special climate of research modesty and continued political optimism. Chapter II examined the relation between the program's structure, objectives and organization and the context from which it emerged.

The analysis in Chapter III sought to derive the predictable consequences of explicit and implicit conflicts among Impact objectives, and to assess the eventual program priorities which might emerge, given those conflicts and the other constraints likely to affect the program.

The way in which the conflicts built into the Impact program led to the strategy chosen for the national-level evaluation was described in Chapter IV, along with the evaluation's objectives, tasks, expected knowledge products, limitations and opportunities.

Finally, Chapter V studied the eight Impact cities, as they appeared before program initiation, from several perspectives. Historical backgrounds, geographies, economies and political systems were described; a framework for comparatively examining indicators of crime-correlated problems in each city was constructed and the cities compared; crime rates were juxtaposed with crime correlates; city revenue/expenditure balance and resource capability potential

were assessed; the size, direction and nature of city expenditures were examined, and criminal justice expenditures and performance were arrayed in conjunction with crime rates.

It emerged from this set of data that the Impact cities divided into two groups in 1970. Four of them (Newark, Baltimore, St. Louis and Cleveland) were older, more densely populated, more dependent upon manufacturing in their employment mix than the four other cities; in addition they had undergone heavy losses in their middle-class populations over the 1950-1970 period. The other group (Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland) were all less than 150 years old, with higher per capita incomes, higher educational levels, and greater resource capabilities. The crime correlates examined appeared to account for crime rates in only four of the eight cities; they did not explain crime problems in Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas or Denver. Affluence thus coexisted with high crime rates in some cities, but the highest rates of person crime, by far, occurred in the older, more economically deprived cities.

Given that high crime rates were seen both in "boom" and in "exodus" cities, however, the hypothesis was advanced that it may not be the boom or exodus in itself which is significant in terms of rising crime, but rather a perception of relative deprivation (among disadvantaged persons or groups vis-a-vis other persons or groups) which may influence the marginal propensity to commit crimes; such a perception would be exacerbated in either rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economies.

An examination of city revenues and expenditures showed that these were not really comparable, since some cities funded major services like education and welfare while others did not. Information developed on resource capability further reinforced the impression that two groups existed among the Impact cities.

Some general observations emerge from the Part I analysis:

- (1) The Impact program was a natural product of the stresses and strains inherent in the social program environment of the early seventies.
- (2) The program moved toward viable criminal justice goals and professed to insure measurement of the progress attained in reaching them at the same time that the conflicts built into the program threatened both implementation and measurement.

- (3) Political (or action) constraints on research appeared to limit the program's potential for new knowledge.
- (4) The cities began the program from positions of differing relative advantage in terms of political and economic situations, crime problems, population resources and system capability. Denver and Portland were in highly advantageous positions, compared to the other cities, whereas Newark, St. Louis and Baltimore had the most severe urban problems and the highest rates of person crime.
- (5) It appeared likely that the program character emerging from the set of conflicting elements examined in Part I might feature:
  - a heavy orientation toward the police function;
  - few courts, juvenile prevention and community involvement projects;
  - an emphasis on corrections projects (due to fiscal incentives).
- (6) It was not clear, as the program began:
  - whether the complexities of the COPIE-cycle rendered its performance feasible;
  - whether the program would slip its scheduled time frame in order to execute the COPIE-cycle, or whether the latter would fail to be performed, given city and program incentives to get anti-crime efforts implemented;
  - whether enough interagency coordination could be achieved so that programs would function effectively.
- (7) Given the program constraints, the national-level evaluation would focus on three knowledge products:
  - new information about city capabilities to plan, implement and evaluate a comprehensive anti-crime program;
  - an assessment of agency coordination problems experienced during the course of the program;
  - a set of recommendations and conclusions for use in the formulation of future urban/federal anti-crime programs.

Part II of this report presents findings of the national-level evaluation (extending from January 1972 to August 1975) relative to the COPIE-cycle, and to various other aspects of the program (including project innovation, agency coordination, community involvement, and project/Crime Analysis Team institutionalization). These findings will establish (vis-a-vis the baseline of expected orientations and emphases developed in Part I):

- what COPIE-cycle activities and products were, in fact, generated program-wide (Chapter VI);
- what actually happened in each city in terms of the COPIE-cycle (i.e., crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation), in terms of project innovations, project and Crime Analysis Team institutionalization, and in terms of improvements in agency coordination and community input (Chapter VII); and
- what observations can be substantiated, across the cities, relative to the importance and usefulness of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team within the Impact program experience (Chapter VIII).

## **Chapter VI**

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### **Program Dimensions: A Quantitative Overview of Program Activities and Products**

## CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY

This chapter presents an overview of major program activities and products generated by the Impact cities in support of the COPIE-cycle. It speaks to questions of quantity, proportion and kind, rather than quality, and seeks to establish to what degree the cities did, in fact, respond to the federal COPIE-cycle initiative.

Key dimensions of the program are as follows:

- 233 anti-crime projects were developed in the eight cities;
- funding awards totalled about \$140 million;
- police projects received \$47 million (33 percent) and corrections projects received \$42 million (31 percent);
- the primary focus of Impact was on recidivism reduction (\$58 million, or 42 percent) with \$44 million (or 31 percent) going toward a crime reduction focus and \$38 million (or 27 percent) to systems improvement;
- all cities prepared Impact master plans and evaluation plans;
- evaluation plans and reports were developed for over 60 percent of Impact projects; and
- much evaluative attention was concentrated on recidivism-focused projects.

In terms of expected program effects (see Part I), findings are that, as anticipated:

- slippage occurred, resulting in program extensions;
- the orientation toward crime-reduction (or police) projects was dampened by fiscal incentives toward corrections projects;
- rapid implementers ended up with more funding than slower implementers (independent of quality); and
- court projects, research and data handling systems were de-emphasized.

Unanticipated effects are that:

- juvenile and community involvement emphases were maintained (despite conflicts with program goals);
- some cities strayed from their expressed priorities; and
- at least one city's program adhered neither to its own articulated priorities nor to those of the program.

## Chapter VI

# Program Dimensions: A Quantitative Overview of Program Activities and Products

*One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it--you have no certainty, until you try.*

Sophocles

The Impact program began its efforts to reduce crime and to improve system capability through the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team in January of 1972. The promise of up to \$20 million in funds to Impact cities for anti-crime projects and programs had, however, been made contingent upon the ability to show (via the COPIE-cycle) whether or not those projects and programs were effective. Yet the COPIE-cycle was an innovation, calling for efforts in planning, data collection, analysis, evaluation and research management on a scale which had not previously been seen in the criminal justice systems of any of the Impact cities. Certain of the functions (crime-oriented planning or outcome evaluation, for example) had never been performed in many of the cities. It was unknown at the beginning of the program what planning and evaluation capabilities existed in those cities, what learning time would be needed, or even whether the required COPIE-cycle activities and products could, in fact, be generated. The following discussion seeks to establish what COPIE-cycle activities and products were, in fact, generated, in relation to the expectations, orientations and priorities postulated in Part I of this document.

Between January, 1972 and the present time (November 1975) then, the eight Impact cities established Crime Analysis Teams, set up mechanisms for grant application and review, performed crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning, produced Impact program master plans and evaluation plans, implemented projects, evaluated them, and--in some cases--institutionalized them.

At this writing, the program has not yet run its course. Its final phase began in January of 1974, when a cut-off date of December 31, 1974 was established for grant awards, with projects and programs able to continue operational until September 1976. Given, however, that January 1974 was the approximate date at which the program had originally been expected to finish, it is clear that

the program's duration is longer than it was intended to be. This was due to a slippage in implementation resulting largely from the predicted inability of cities to simultaneously execute the COPIE-cycle and achieve program start-up within the six months scheduled for this dual effort. In order to permit the expenditure of Impact monies allocated, therefore, it became necessary to extend program operations into 1976.

LEAA funding of the Crime Analysis Team, however, ended in June of 1975 (with further support possible only on a case-by-case basis); Team functions therefore phased out at this time except where they were continued with municipal or other special funding. Thus, at the present writing, many projects are still on-going and many evaluation findings have yet to be reported; with the end of the Crime Analysis Teams, as such, however, it is not clear how many of the final evaluation reports for on-going projects may actually be produced.

The object of the following discussion is to give the reader a very general overview of program activities and products, speaking to questions of quantity, proportion and kind rather than quality; qualitative assessments of various program aspects are undertaken elsewhere in this document (see, for example, Chapters VII and VIII of Part II). The examination here is limited to the COPIE-cycle and to the various products generated in pursuit of its activities. It is limited also by uncertainties, such as disagreements among the various agencies about how many projects were implemented, how much money was awarded, how much money was expended, and so on. (Even the question of what constitutes a "project" cannot always receive a straightforward answer. For example, in the case of Baltimore's multi-faceted High Impact Court effort, various components are here viewed as elements of a single project, rather than as separate Impact projects. This consolidation reflects the fact that funding decisions and evaluation documentation typically addressed the components in an aggregate fashion. Other decisions regarding what constituted a "project" were made in a similar way, using city documentation.) Finally, this overview of activities and products generated by Impact cities in the course of the program is still further limited by the national-level evaluation time-frame, that is, to the period between January 1972 and August 1975 (June 1975 for award and expenditure data). Examined here first will be the COPIE-cycle model itself, followed by an account of its execution by the eight cities in terms of its three elements: crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation.

#### A. The COPIE-Cycle


All of the Impact cities were expected to follow the model of comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation developed by the National Institute (see Figure 11 below for a schematic representation of the COPIE-cycle concept). The model included seven steps which needed to be executed for satisfactory accomplishment of the process. As shown in Figure 11, the initial input into the cycle was basic data analysis. Data were to be analyzed in terms of offenders, victims and crime-settings for the five specific Impact crimes (i.e., murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery and burglary). System capabilities were also to be surveyed and analyzed to assess the strengths available within the existing criminal justice system for attacking the crime factors identified in the offender/victim/crime-setting analysis.

Once the basic data analysis had been completed, city planners were to proceed to problem identification and prioritization (Step 2 of the model, Figure 11). Problems were to be supported by analysis and centered on specific population groups (victims/offenders) and on target high-crime areas. Priorities were to be chosen in such a way that impact on crime problems might be attained within program time constraints.

The next stage in the process (Step 3 of the model, Figure 11) was the development of broad strategies to attack the problems selected. These strategies were reflected in the program areas and program goals established by each city. In selecting these program areas, alternative strategies and approaches for alleviating the identified problems were to be considered and weighed prior to a final determination of program priorities.

Similarly, for each strategy selected, the city was to choose specific tactics to implement that strategy (Step 4 of the model, Figure 11). The tactics chosen were to be represented by the proposed projects and their objectives. In the same fashion as with program areas, project selection was to follow a careful weighing and consideration of alternative tactics for addressing each strategy.

Evaluation planning (Step 5, Phase II of the model, Figure 11) required cities to design, in advance of project implementation, a component which ideally would allow project evaluators to answer three questions in their final reports:



SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., ANALYSIS OF CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING IN THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6645, AUGUST 1974, PAGE 14.

FIGURE 11  
THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION  
AND EVALUATION (COPIE) CYCLE: A MODEL


- (1) Did the project actually implement the activities/deliver the services which were specified in the grant application?
- (2) Did the crime/recidivism levels that the project was designed to reduce actually decline? Was the system capability targeted actually achieved?
- (3) Is it reasonable to attribute such improvement to the project's activities?

A model describing the key steps in a project-level evaluation planning process designed to provide responses to these questions is given in Figure 12 (see page 148 below). As shown in this model, the real starting point in the Impact evaluation planning process was the identification of a specific crime problem (that is, Step 2 of the COPIE-cycle model, Figure 11). The nature and extent of this problem would necessarily drive the remaining steps in the process. Project activities would develop from the need to implement a particular anti-crime strategy believed to combat the pre-identified crime problem. These activities therefore had to be logically linked to project outcome goals and objectives which, in turn, would reflect the desired changes in the identified crime problem. The remaining interdependent steps in the evaluation planning process, from the delineation of activity, intermediate, and outcome objectives through the specification of measures, data collection and analysis procedures, constituted the basic foundation for assembling evidence needed to address questions about project activities, outcomes and their relationship to one another.

Evaluation planning having been performed, project implementation and data collection (Step 6, or Phase III of the COPIE-cycle model, Figure 11) could take place. A procedural model of implementation as it typically occurred during the Impact program, is shown in Figure 13 (see page 149 below).


Finally, evaluations were to be performed and documented (Step 7, or Phase IV of the COPIE-cycle model, Figure 11, page 146) according to the objectives, measures, modes of analysis, data collection plan, reporting schedules and operational milestones specified in the evaluation components and carried out during project implementation.

As indicated in Figure 11, all of these stages and efforts were to compose an iterative, dynamic process, with evaluation findings feeding back into problem identification and causing modifications to be made in evaluation plans and project implementation.



SOURCE: KUPERSMITH, G., A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6845, FEBRUARY 1975, PAGE 7.

FIGURE 12  
A MODEL DEPICTING KEY STEPS IN THE PROJECT-LEVEL  
EVALUATION PLANNING PROCESS



SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975, PAGE 10.

FIGURE 13  
A PROCEDURAL MODEL FOR IMPACT IMPLEMENTATION

This, in brief, was the COPIE-cycle model which cities were expected to follow in the development of their Impact program. As with all models, it served rather as a guide than as a precise formula. Unsurprisingly, the eight Impact cities executed the steps of the model in varying ways and degrees.

#### B. Dimensions of Crime-Oriented Planning

All of the eight cities prepared master plans and evaluation plans, products which were to be generated after completion of Phases I and II of the COPIE-cycle model (see Figure 11). On the average, it took Impact cities about eight months to turn out their master plans. Variations existed among city documents reflecting differences in the quality and nature of the efforts expended at each step of the process. The range of time varied from 3 months for St. Louis to 13 months for Newark; St. Louis and Denver, however, re-worked and updated their plans later on. Evaluation plans had all been completed by June of 1973.

Overall, the major planning documents produced by each of the Impact cities are as follows:

##### ATLANTA

- Atlanta Impact Program - Plan of Operations - August 14, 1972.
- Atlanta Impact Program - Master Plan - October 18, 1972.
- Atlanta Impact Program - Evaluation Plan - Undated.

##### BALTIMORE

- Baltimore Impact Planning and Evaluation - May, 1972.
- Baltimore High Impact Plan - December, 1972.
- Evaluation Plan for the High Impact Anti-Crime Program - Undated.

##### CLEVELAND

- Master Plan - May, 1972.
- Planning and Evaluation Manual - May, 1973.
- Evaluation Component - Undated.

## DALLAS

- Dallas Impact Action Plan - October, 1972.
- Dallas Impact Plan - November, 1972.
- Dallas High Impact Anti-Crime Program - 1973 Evaluation Plan - January, 1973.

## DENVER

- 1973 High Impact Plan:
  - Volume I - Program Plan
  - Volume II - Crime-Specific Analysis
  - Volume III - Demographic Analysis of 124 High-Risk Census Tracts
  - Volume IV - Evaluation Plan.

## NEWARK

- Newark Impact Action Plan - February, 1973.
- Plan for Evaluation for Newark - Updated.
- Impact Program - June, 1973.

## PORTLAND

- Burglary and Robbery - Portland, Oregon - Undated.
- Robbery and Burglary Victimology Project - November, 1972.
- Portland High Impact Program - December, 1972.
- Portland High Impact Program Evaluation Plan - March, 1973.

## ST. LOUIS

- St. Louis High Impact Anti-Crime Program Plan - April, 1972.
- Impact Evaluation Plan and Evaluation Progress Report - Undated.
- High Impact Plan Update - March, 1973.

**CONTINUED**

**| 2 OF 6**

All of these documents reflect the varying city efforts to carry out Phase I of the COPIE-cycle.

Table XXII below presents an overview of the kinds and amounts of basic data which were collected by each of the cities during the crime-oriented planning process (Step 1 of the model, Figure 11). Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland clearly provided the most complete sets of data among the Impact cities.

Crime problems identified by Impact cities during the planning process (Step 2 of the COPIE-cycle model) are shown in Figure 14 below. The offenses most often targeted across the cities were robbery and burglary (which is unsurprising, given the program goal of reducing stranger-to-stranger crime and given that robbery and burglary are the crimes which are most often assumed to fall into this category); the offender categories considered to constitute the major Impact problems were juveniles and drug users. It is interesting to note that Cleveland, with the lowest burglary rate of any Impact city in 1970<sup>1</sup>--see Table XVI, page 105 above--nonetheless identified it as a major problem, while Newark, Portland, St. Louis and Baltimore, with much higher rates, did not. Functional areas most often chosen as needing priority attention were adult corrections and the courts (see page 160 below for a description of the kinds of projects typically included in a particular functional area). Only one city identified all Impact crimes as major problems (Denver), and only one city (Baltimore) tagged community involvement as a problem requiring improvement.

Program areas selected by the eight cities for Impact funding (Step 3 of the COPIE-cycle model) are shown in Figure 15 below. Once again, the youthful offender received emphasis as a target for program planning across the cities, but less unanimously than in the process of problem identification. Police and courts were now designated to receive priority funding (as opposed to adult corrections and courts, which had emerged as the top problems identified across the cities, see Figure 14). Only one city (Denver) proposed broad program-level strategies focusing on specific offenses.

The proposed projects which emerged from this planning process (Step 4 of the COPIE-cycle model) provide insights regarding the specific approaches cities initially sought to rely upon to solve the problems indicated in Figure 14 above. Table XXIII below shows

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<sup>1</sup>And in 1971 and 1972 (see the FBI's Uniform Crime Report inputs for Cleveland burglaries in those years).

TABLE XXII  
DATA PROVIDED BY THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES IN  
SUPPORT OF THEIR CRIME-ORIENTED  
PLANNING EFFORT

	ENVIRONMENT						OFFENDER							VICTIM						
	SETTING	MONTH (BY QUARTER)	DAY OF WEEK	TIME OF DAY	TYPE OF WEAPON	RELATION OF VICTIM TO OFFENDER	CITY RESIDENT	LOCATION OF OFFENSE	SEX	RACE	AGE	EDUCATION	EMPLOYMENT STATUS	CITY RESIDENT	LOCATION OF OFFENSE	SEX	RACE	AGE	EDUCATION	EMPLOYMENT STATUS
ATLANTA																				
MURDER	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
RAPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
ROBBERY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
BURGLARY	X	X	X	G			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
BALTIMORE																				
MURDER		G	G	G	X	X		X	X	X					X	X	X	X		
RAPE		G	G	G		X		X	X	X					X	X	X	X		
ROBBERY	X	G	G	G				X	X	X					X	X	X	X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT						X														
BURGLARY	X	G						X	X	X					X	X	X	X		
CLEVELAND																				
MURDER						X		X	X	X					G	G	G			
RAPE						X		X	X	X					G	G	G			
ROBBERY						X		X	X	X					G	G	G			
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT						X		X	X	X					G	G	G			
BURGLARY								X	X	X										
DALLAS																				
MURDER	X			G	X	X		X	X	G					X	X	X	G		
RAPE		G		G				X	X	G					X	X	X			
ROBBERY	X				X			G	X	G										
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT				G	X															
BURGLARY	G			G				G	X								X			
DENVER <sup>1</sup>																				
RAPE	X	X	X	X		X				G						X	X	X		
ROBBERY	X		X	X	X				X	X					X	X	X	X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	X	G		X	X	X			X	X					X	X	X	X		
BURGLARY	X	X	X	X					X	X										
NEWARK																				
MURDER	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
RAPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
ROBBERY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X	X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X	X		
BURGLARY	X	X				X	X	X	X	X										
PORTLAND																				
MURDER	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		
RAPE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		
ROBBERY	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X		
BURGLARY	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X										
ST. LOUIS																				
MURDER																				
RAPE																				
ROBBERY																X		X		
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT																				
BURGLARY																X		X		

<sup>1</sup>DENVER COMBINES MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.

NOTE: X = QUANTITATIVE DATA ARE PROVIDED.

G = CATEGORY IS DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS ONLY.

SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G., AND RUSSELL, L. S., CRIME PROFILES: AN EXAMINATION OF DATA COLLECTION SUPPORTING CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7114, DECEMBER 1975.

TABLE XXII  
DATA PROVIDED BY THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES IN  
SUPPORT OF THEIR CRIME-ORIENTED  
PLANNING EFFORT

CITIES	TYPE OF OFFENSE					OFFENDER			VIC-TIM	ENVI-RON-MENT	FUNCTIONAL AREAS								
	BURGLARY	ROBBERY	RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	MURDER	ADULT	YOUTH	DRUG USER			RECIDIVIST	TYPE OF VICTIM	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	PREVENTION	POLICE	COURTS	ADULT CORRECTIONS	JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
ATLANTA		•				•		•		•			•	•	•	•			
BALTIMORE					•	•	•						•					•	
CLEVELAND	•	•				•	•			•	•	•	•	•					
DALLAS	•	•				•	•	•	•			•	•	•					
DENVER	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•					
NEWARK						•		•				•	•	•	•	•			
PORTLAND						•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•		•			•
ST. LOUIS						•	•		•	•									
NUMBER OF CITIES ADDRESSING:	3/8	4/8	1/8	1/8	1/8	2/8	8/8	6/8	4/8	4/8	5/8	2/8	4/8	5/8	5/8	2/8	3/8	1/8	1/8

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., ANALYSIS OF CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING IN THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6645, AUGUST 1974, PAGE 95.

FIGURE 14  
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES

CITIES	TYPE OF OFFENSE				OFFENDER				VIC-TIM	ENVI-RON-MENT	FUNCTIONAL AREAS							
	BURGLARY	ROBBERY	RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	MURDER	ADULT	YOUTH	DRUG USER	RECIDIVIST	TYPE OF VICTIM	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	PREVENTION	POLICE	COURTS	ADULT CORRECTIONS	JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS	COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
ATLANTA					•	•			•	•		•	•					
BALTIMORE						•	•			•	•	•	•	•				•
CLEVELAND					•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•					
DALLAS					•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
DENVER	•	•	•	•	•	•											•	
NEWARK											•	•	•	•	•			
PORTLAND											•	•	•	•	•			
ST. LOUIS					•	•			•	•		•	•	•	•			
NUMBER OF CITIES ADDRESSING:	1/8	1/8	1/8	1/8	5/8	6/8	3/8	2/8	4/8	5/8	4/8	7/8	7/8	5/8	4/8	2/8	1/8	

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., ANALYSIS OF CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING IN THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6645, AUGUST 1974, PAGE 103.

FIGURE 15  
ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM AREAS IDENTIFIED BY THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES

TABLE XXIII  
 NUMBER OF PROPOSED PROJECTS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA FOR  
 THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES

	PREVENTION	POLICE	COURTS	ADULT CORRECTIONS	JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	RESEARCH/ INFORMATION SYSTEMS	DRUG USE	COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	OTHER	TOTAL
ATLANTA	2	9	6	2	2	2	1	4	1	29
BALTIMORE	3	3	2	3	3		4	4	1	23
CLEVELAND	6	3	1	8	1		1	1		21
DALLAS	1	10	3	1	6	6	4	2	1	34
DENVER	2	2		2	1	1		1		9
NEWARK	2	7	1	5	3		2	5	1	26
PORTLAND	2	3	1	5	3	2		1	2	19
ST. LOUIS	4	5	10	7	7		1	2		36
TOTAL CITIES	22	42	24	33	26	11	13	20	6	197

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., ANALYSIS OF CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING IN THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6645, AUGUST 1974, PAGE 110.

that the largest number (42, or 21 percent) of the proposed projects were geared to the police functional area, and that community involvement strategies emerged more frequently (about 10 percent of planned projects) than might have been expected from the problem identification process.

While it is true that monies budgeted or expended constitute a better measure of city priorities than do the number of projects planned, the planning process nonetheless gives evidence here of the terms in which the cities initially saw their crime problems. As expected (see pages 44 and 49 above), the police function was viewed as a logical strategy for affecting high-crime-rate areas or specific crimes like robbery and burglary. Also as expected, the fiscal incentives furnished toward corrections seem to have dampened this anticipated orientation toward police projects and to have maintained the desired emphasis on planned corrections projects (30 percent of the total proposed, if adult and juvenile corrections projects are taken together).

What was less predictable, however, was the emphasis on community involvement projects which surfaced by the end of the planning process. It is possible that this was the result of a national trend, exogenous to the program (see page 50 above), toward concern for crime victims and toward a new importance placed upon community input into the criminal justice planning process. As the movement widened and deepened within the criminal justice system (reinforced by the publications of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and by the launching of a nationwide Citizens' Initiative Program in 1973), a greater emphasis on community involvement and victim assistance projects developed within the Impact program as well. Although Impact had indeed targeted community participation as a program objective (see page 25 above), it is likely that, without external pressure, this objective might well have been sacrificed to more politically pressing goals of the program.

### C. Dimensions of Implementation

#### 1. Program-Wide Implementation

The distribution of Impact projects and funding awards (as of June 1975) is shown in Table XXIV below. St. Louis and Cleveland, which were the cities most concerned with rapid implementation (see Chapter VII, below), had received the largest amounts of money, while the slower cities (Portland, Baltimore and Atlanta, see Chapter VII) ended up with somewhat less. The disparity between the program's fastest and slowest implementers (St. Louis and Portland, respectively) was \$2.8 million, in terms of funds awarded. Thus, the

**TABLE XXIV**  
**DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDING AWARDS BY CITY**

CITY	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT AWARDS (\$)
ATLANTA	9% (20)	12% (\$16, 856, 592)
BALTIMORE	12% (27)	12% (\$16, 739, 045)
CLEVELAND	17% (39)	13% (\$18, 485, 465)
DALLAS	8% (19)	12% (\$17, 039, 548)
DENVER	16% (37)	13% (\$18, 141, 466)
NEWARK	12% (27)	13% (\$17, 776, 946)
PORTLAND	7% (17)	11% (\$16, 067, 117)
ST. LOUIS	20% (47)	14% (\$18, 896, 667)
TOTAL	100% (233)	100% (\$140, 002, 846)

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975, (EXCEPT BALTIMORE AS OF JANUARY 1975).

capacity to get projects "on-the-street," to spend money, to act in an anti-crime sense, seems to have carried with it monetary rewards without reference to the quality of city performance of the COPIE-cycle.

Table XXV below displays the breakout of Impact projects and awarded funds by functional area. The kinds of projects included in each of these areas are described as follows:

- Prevention--This type of project focuses on reducing the probability of crime being committed by high risk non-adjudicated persons, school dropouts, previous offenders, or other persons likely to commit crimes, by providing services aimed at increasing their education, training and employment levels, and through alternative activities, such as recreation and counseling.
- Police--This type of project focuses on enlarging the scope and quality of police services (such as patrol, tactical operations, field reporting and record maintenance), on police response time reduction, and on streamlining police administrative operations.
- Courts--This type of project focuses on streamlining court administration and operations, including (but not limited to) the reduction of case processing time and the provision of expanded services such as defense counsel and pre-trial assistance, assistance with bail determination, and improved prosecution services.
- Adult Corrections--This type of project focuses on rehabilitative treatment modes for adult offenders such as intensive supervision of parolees and probationers, diagnosis of offenders needing mental health treatment, streamlining administration, and expanding the range of services available by parole and probation departments or ancillary service agencies.
- Juvenile Corrections--This type of project focuses on provision of alternatives to institutionalization or upgrading the institutional services available to youthful offenders, including (but not limited to) vocational education, probation counseling, aftercare services, formal schooling, residential care, and employment placement.
- Research/Information Systems--This type of project focuses on crime data collection and maintenance and/or exchange, data analysis, and related planning and evaluation activities.

TABLE XXV  
DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND AWARDED FUNDS  
BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

FUNCTIONAL AREA	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT AWARDS (\$)
PREVENTION	9% (21)	8% (\$11,076,250)
POLICE	16% (37)	33% (\$46,980,529)
COURTS	11% (25)	8% (\$11,048,042)
ADULT CORRECTIONS	21% (48)	19% (\$26,249,132)
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	14% (33)	12% (\$16,133,563)
RESEARCH/INFORMATION	7% (16)	3% (\$ 4,681,749)
DRUG USE	4% (10)	5% (\$ 6,380,803)
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	14% (33)	10% (\$13,948,405)
TARGET HARDENING	4% (9)	2% (\$ 3,426,508)
OTHER	≈ 1% (1)	≈ 1% (\$ 77,865)
TOTAL	100% (233)	100% (\$140,002,846)

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975.

- Drug Use--This type of project focuses on the treatment and rehabilitation of persons using drugs.
- Community Involvement--This type of project focuses on reducing the opportunity or probability of crimes being committed by informing the public via mass media or by involving members of the public in activities such as block watching or identification of personal property, in order to assist police in tracing stolen property.
- Target Hardening--This type of project focuses on preventing crime in a specific geographical area via such equipment as street lights or by increased security for public housing residents.
- Other--This type of project focuses on either providing assistance and training to staff members of Impact projects or increasing security provisions in jails where Impact offenders are located.

(In cases where there may have been more than one functional aspect to a project or program, it was the major orientation of the project which defined its placement in one or another category.)

Table XXV above shows that the final distribution of funds for Impact projects (as of June 1975) bears out the general balance of police and corrections expenditures predicted in Chapter III above; nearly \$47 million of Impact funds were awarded to police projects with a little more than \$42 million going to adult and juvenile corrections. Court projects, also as predicted, emerged with only about \$11 million of Impact funding, perhaps because court problems seemed less important, compared to other, more urgent city priorities, or perhaps because of Impact action objectives (see pages 42-43) and because of the program failure to provide incentives for court projects.

On the other hand, the expected paucity of juvenile and community projects (see page 44 above) did not occur, and the general distribution by functional area across the program shows a reasonable balance, much less police-oriented than is usually the case. In effect, typical breakouts for police, courts and corrections expenditures, nation-wide, have shown a share of 80 percent or more going to the police function, with 20 percent remaining to be split among the other agencies; in Impact, however, police expenditures reached only 33 percent of the total.

A major assumption at the start of Impact was that the largest portion of Impact funding would go toward projects directly addressing

crime-rate reduction. In order to explore this assumption, Table XXVI below examines projects according to the three perspectives from which crime problems were most often approached in the Impact program:

- (1) an area-specific perspective;
- (2) a client or offender perspective; and
- (3) a criminal justice system perspective.

Based on these different approaches, projects were divided into the following three groups:

- (1) Crime Reduction:  
Those projects whose activities deal directly with the prevention and control of crime in specific geographical areas (i.e., street lighting, foot patrol projects).
- (2) Recidivism Reduction:  
Those projects whose activities deal directly with offenders and potential offenders (i.e., rehabilitation projects) in the hope of reducing recidivism levels among offender groups.
- (3) System Improvement:  
Those projects whose activities deal with the crime problem indirectly through improvements in various aspects of the criminal justice system (i.e., court improvements, information systems).

Despite the assumption that most Impact projects would directly target crime-rate reduction, an examination of Table XXVI shows that recidivism reduction turned out to be a more commonly targeted goal than direct crime reduction. In effect, 42 percent of fund awards (and nearly half of all the projects) went toward efforts aimed at recidivism reduction despite a general ignorance as to how such reduction, once achieved, might contribute to overall reductions in crime rates. It seems that a growing awareness in many cities of continuing rehabilitation failures, combined with funding incentives, and the privilege, under New Federalism, for cities to choose their own priorities, had together generated a more irresistible pressure overall, than had the action objectives of the program.

## 2. Implementation in Each City

Each city's spending priorities, according to functional area, are shown in Table XXVII below. It is clear from this chart that

**TABLE XXVI**  
**DISTRIBUTIONS OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDS AWARDED**  
**BY PROJECT FOCUS**

PROJECT FOCUS	PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT PROJECTS (N)		PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPACT AWARDS (\$)	
CRIME REDUCTION	20%	(48)	31%	(\$43,985,055)
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	46%	(106)	42%	(\$58,387,667)
SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT	34%	(79)	27%	(\$37,630,124)
TOTAL	100%	(233)	100%	(\$140,002,846)

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SOURCE: DERIVED FROM FISCHER, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P.,  
AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, MTR-6891, AND  
 GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION  
ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME  
PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975,  
 DATA AS OF JUNE 1975.

TABLE XXVII  
DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDS  
AWARDED BY CITY AND BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

FUNCTIONAL AREA	ATLANTA		BALTIMORE		CLEVELAND		DALLAS		DENVER		NEWARK		PORTLAND		ST. LOUIS	
	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS (N)	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS (\$)
PREVENTION	5% (1)	4% (\$ 636,000)	7% (2)	8% (\$ 1,357,875)	18% (7)	18% (\$ 3,294,472)	5% (1)	7% (\$ 1,267,312)	14% (5)	9% (\$ 1,534,109)	4% (1)	5% (\$ 926,336)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	9% (4)	11% (\$ 2,060,146)
POLICE	35% (7)	45% (\$ 7,630,004)	11% (3)	23% (\$ 3,745,270)	10% (4)	38% (\$ 7,052,431)	42% (8)	45% (\$ 7,654,628)	8% (3)	21% (\$ 3,825,483)	15% (4)	41% (\$ 7,217,944)	6% (1)	23% (\$ 3,699,509)	11% (5)	33% (\$ 6,155,260)
COURTS	5% (1)	1% (\$ 135,585)	4% (1)	15% (\$ 2,559,679)	10% (4)	7% (\$ 1,249,561)	11% (2)	21% (\$ 3,570,989)	5% (2)	2% (\$ 383,997)	7% (2)	6% (\$ 1,107,686)	6% (1)	3% (\$ 437,313)	19% (9)	8% (\$ 1,603,232)
ADULT CORRECTIONS	20% (4)	17% (\$12,818,864)	15% (4)	17% (\$ 2,865,271)	22% (9)	17% (\$ 3,178,564)	11% (2)	16% (\$ 2,683,115)	14% (5)	15% (\$ 2,757,017)	26% (7)	18% (\$ 3,134,192)	35% (6)	34% (\$ 5,433,437)	19% (9)	18% (\$ 3,378,672)
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	15% (3)	10% (\$ 1,720,287)	11% (3)	10% (\$ 1,614,062)	16% (6)	5% (\$ 869,038)	5% (1)	3% (\$ 453,457)	19% (7)	14% (\$ 2,611,569)	15% (4)	10% (\$ 1,752,866)	2% (4)	27% (\$ 4,364,032)	17% (8)	15% (\$ 2,748,152)
RESEARCH/INFORMATION	5% (1)	0.3% (\$ 48,960)	4% (1)	2% (\$ 389,509)	5% (2)	0.2% (\$ 46,426)	21% (4)	4% (\$ 701,563)	16% (6)	11% (\$ 1,988,689)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	6% (1)	7% (\$ 1,058,602)	4% (2)	2% (\$ 448,000)
DRUG USE	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	22% (6)	19% (\$ 3,139,865)	3% (1)	7% (\$ 1,276,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	3% (1)	6% (\$ 996,452)	4% (1)	3% (\$ 568,486)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	2% (1)	2% (\$ 400,000)
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	10% (2)	22% (\$ 3,646,249)	15% (4)	2% (\$ 323,514)	13% (5)	6% (\$ 1,218,973)	5% (1)	4% (\$ 708,484)	19% (7)	19% (\$ 3,522,050)	22% (6)	16% (\$ 2,924,371)	12% (2)	4% (\$ 690,338)	17% (8)	5% (\$ 914,426)
TARGET HARDENING	5% (1)	1% (\$ 220,643)	7% (2)	4% (\$ 704,000)	3% (1)	2% (\$ 300,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	3% (1)	3% (\$ 522,000)	4% (1)	1% (\$ 107,200)	12% (2)	2% (\$ 383,886)	2% (1)	6% (\$ 1,188,779)
OTHER	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	4% (1)	0.2% (\$ 40,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	4% (1)	0.2% (\$ 37,865)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)	0% (0)	0% (\$ 00,000)
TOTAL	100% (20)	100% (\$16,856,592)	100% (27)	100% (\$16,739,045)	100% (39)	100% (\$18,485,465)	100% (19)	100% (\$17,039,548)	100% (37)	100% (\$18,141,466)	100% (27)	100% (\$17,776,946)	100% (17)	100% (\$16,067,117)	100% (47)	100% (\$18,896,667)

SOURCE: GREENFELD, I. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975, (EXCEPT BALTIMORE AS OF JANUARY 1975).

TABLE XXVII  
DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDS  
AWARDED BY CITY AND BY PROJECT

Dallas, Newark and Atlanta put more of their money into police projects (between 41 percent and 45 percent) than did the other cities. Dallas and Baltimore, both with considerable backlog problems (see Table XIX, page 121 above) devoted more funds (21 percent and 15 percent respectively) to their court function than did the other cities. Atlanta and Denver emphasized community involvement (22 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of awarded funds). Cleveland stressed prevention (18 percent of total funds) relatively more than the other cities. Baltimore emphasized drug programs (19 percent) and Portland put an overwhelming amount (61 percent) of its awarded funds into juvenile and adult corrections. Denver had the largest proportion of research/information system projects (11 percent) and St. Louis developed the target hardening strategy (6 percent of funds) more than the other cities.

It is interesting also to note the de-emphasis of certain areas in certain cities. Denver, Baltimore and Portland awarded less than the other cities to police projects (between 21 percent and 23 percent of funds), for example. There was very little effort in the court area in Atlanta (1 percent of funds), in Denver (2 percent) or in Portland (3 percent). Juvenile corrections had low priorities in Dallas (3 percent) and Cleveland (5 percent). Research and information systems were generally de-emphasized: Newark devoted no money at all to this area, Cleveland and Atlanta awarded 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent respectively, of their funds to it, St. Louis and Baltimore 2 percent each. That research and information system projects should not have received a great deal of attention is not too surprising, however, given the program's action/effectiveness goals. It is rather Denver's 11 percent (or nearly \$2 million) and Portland's 7 percent (or more than \$1 million) dedicated to this area which are unusual. Finally, Baltimore seems to have been less interested in community involvement strategies (only 2 percent of awarded funds) than were the other cities, despite a primary problem focus in this area (see Figure 14).

Table XXVIII below shows the distribution of funded projects within cities by project focus. Here it becomes evident that there is a substantive difference in the police emphasis (noted in Table XXVII) subscribed by Atlanta, Dallas and Newark. In Atlanta and Newark where funding went overwhelmingly toward crime reduction projects, it is apparent that the police were relied upon to implement the various anti-crime tactics. In Dallas, however, the orientation moved toward police systems improvement, targeting increases in system capability and productivity, rather than direct crime-reduction payoffs. Portland, Denver and Baltimore put more than half their funds into recidivism reduction; Newark and Atlanta de-emphasized the improvement of system capability (8 percent and

TABLE XXVIII  
DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDS  
AWARDED BY CITY AND PROJECT FOCUS

FOCUS	ATLANTA		BALTIMORE		CLEVELAND		DALLAS		DENVER		NEWARK		PORTLAND		ST. LOUIS	
	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF AWARD DOLLARS
CRIME REDUCTION	40% (8)	66% (\$11,066,344)	26% (7)	24% (\$ 4,017,371)	10% (4)	26% (\$ 4,806,221)	11% (2)	31% (\$ 5,282,260)	14% (5)	27% (\$ 4,959,868)	37% (10)	54% (\$ 9,599,551)	29% (5)	8% (\$ 1,234,115)	15% (7)	27% (\$ 5,102,100)
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	40% (8)	30% (\$ 5,175,151)	48% (13)	51% (\$ 8,536,913)	54% (21)	45% (\$ 8,318,459)	21% (4)	25% (\$ 4,259,887)	57% (21)	52% (\$ 9,383,572)	52% (14)	38% (\$ 6,755,239)	42% (7)	63% (\$10,142,638)	38% (18)	37% (\$ 6,991,767)
SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT	20% (4)	4% (\$ 615,097)	26% (7)	25% (\$ 4,184,761)	36% (14)	29% (\$ 5,360,785)	68% (13)	44% (\$ 7,497,401)	29% (11)	21% (\$ 3,798,026)	11% (3)	8% (\$ 1,422,156)	29% (5)	29% (\$ 4,690,364)	47% (22)	36% (\$ 6,802,800)
TOTAL	100% (20)	100% (\$16,856,592)	100% (27)	100% (\$16,739,045)	100% (39)	100% (\$18,485,465)	100% (19)	100% (\$17,039,548)	100% (37)	100% (\$18,141,466)	100% (27)	100% (\$17,776,946)	100% (17)	100% (\$16,067,117)	100% (47)	100% (\$18,896,667)

SOURCES: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1974, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975.

FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, MTR-6891, THE MITRE CORPORATION.

TABLE XXVIII  
DISTRIBUTION OF IMPACT PROJECTS AND FUNDS  
AWARDED BY CITY AND PROJECT FOCUS

4 percent of funds, respectively). Of all the cities, Atlanta devoted the greatest portion of awarded funds to projects with a crime-reduction focus (66 percent), Portland, Denver and Baltimore (53 percent, 52 percent and 51 percent) allocated the most to projects with a recidivism-reduction focus, and Dallas awarded more than any other city (44 percent of its funds) to systems improvement projects. A glance at Table XXVI, however, shows that the 51 percent-53 percent dedicated to the recidivism focus by the cities most emphasizing that thrust is closer to the 8-city average of 42 percent than is Atlanta's 66 percent to the 8-city average of 33 percent for crime-reduction focused projects, or Dallas' 44 percent to the 8-city average of 25 percent for systems improvement projects. Thus, the high priorities for crime-reduction and systems improvement subscribed by Atlanta and Dallas respectively differed more from the general city priority pattern than did the Portland, Denver and Baltimore recidivism-reduction focus.

A comparison of the problems indicated by cities as their major priorities during the crime-oriented planning process (Figure 14) and the distribution of funding awards by functional area and project focus in each of these cities (Tables XXVII and XXVIII) shows that:

- Atlanta's robbery and geographical area problems were apparently addressed via a police strategy;
- Baltimore's offender and drug use problems were translated into recidivism reduction and drug projects;
- Cleveland's youth problem was addressed by juvenile prevention programs, and burglary, robbery and geographical area problems were reflected in a strong police component (38 percent of total funding awarded);
- Dallas' identified corrections and recidivism problem was hardly addressed by city funding priorities, with only 19 percent of funds oriented toward adult and juvenile corrections combined; on the other hand, offense problems were translated into police projects, and court capability problems into systems improvement efforts.
- Denver's identified crime problems are clearly linked to funding priorities; all of the problems surfaced in the planning process were matched with programs addressing them;

- Newark's main problem focus on youth and recidivism shows up as secondary to police programs and a crime-reduction focus in awarded funds; youth prevention seems therefore to have been underfunded, and research/information systems (the need for which was stressed in Newark's identified problems) received no funds whatever;
- Portland's identification of juvenile and drug use problems is not reflected in funding awards for juvenile prevention or drug programs (no funds awarded); on the other hand, the city's corrections focus was amply translated into juvenile and adult corrections programs;
- St. Louis' problem focus on youth was reflected in the 31 percent of funds devoted to prevention and juvenile aftercare.

#### D. Dimensions of Evaluation

##### 1. Program-Wide Evaluation

A great many evaluation plans and reports were generated during Impact; their quality will be examined in Chapters VII and VIII below. As in the cases of planning and implementation, the discussion will address only certain quantitative aspects of evaluation: the number of plans and reports produced, by city, by functional area, by project focus--in relation to the number of projects implemented.

Table XXIX below shows the distribution of these evaluation plans and reports across the cities, in terms of the number they were expected to produce (i.e., the total number of city projects implemented). Over the program, more than half the projects (60 percent) had developed evaluation plans, and 61 percent were documented by evaluation reports. Denver produced evaluation plans for the largest number of projects (23), but evaluated only 16 of its 37 projects. Cleveland evaluated the greatest number of projects (32), accounting thereby for 82 percent of its 37 projects. Overall, evaluation coverage was most comprehensive in Baltimore, Cleveland and Dallas which documented the highest proportions of their projects.

Table XXIX indicates that there was greater variability across cities with respect to the proportion of evaluations performed and documented (with reports) than was evident in the proportion of evaluation plans produced. This variability may reflect, in part, differences which existed among cities in the operational status of projects, and/or in the differing commitments and capabilities which they held vis-a vis project evaluation.

**TABLE XXIX  
CITY PERFORMANCE IN EVALUATION**

CITY	N	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN CITY WITH PLANS	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN CITY WITH REPORTS
ATLANTA	20	60% (12)	65% (13)
BALTIMORE	27	70% (19)	81% (22)
CLEVELAND	39	54% (21)	82% (32)
DALLAS	19	68% (13)	79% (15)
DENVER	37	62% (23)	43% (16)
NEWARK	27	67% (18)	44% (12)
PORTLAND	17	78% (14)	53% (9)
ST. LOUIS	47	43% (20)	47% (22)
TOTAL	233	60% (140)	61% (141)

**SOURCES:**

DERIVED FROM FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6891, DATED APRIL 1975.

FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION REPORTING, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7076, DECEMBER, 1975.

Since the number and size of projects had to do with city decisions to develop small or inexpensive projects (as opposed to larger, more heavily funded efforts), the significance of the evaluation coverage by city depended more on that decision (only 17 evaluations were thus required in Portland, whereas St. Louis would have needed to supply 47 evaluations to reach the same 100 percent coverage) than on the ability to produce evaluation documentation per se. It is meaningful, however, that across the program (and therefore, across city priorities) as many as 141 out of 233 projects (i.e., 61 percent) were evaluated. This effort was applied to projects accounting for 62 percent of Impact funds awarded (i.e., \$87.7 million).<sup>2</sup>

Table XXX below looks at evaluation by functional area distribution. It is immediately noticeable that both prevention and juvenile corrections were extremely well documented across the cities, from the viewpoint of evaluation plans as well as reports. This seems to reflect the overall Impact city priority in the area of juvenile delinquency (see Figure 14 above), given the large number of juvenile projects in the prevention area. The court area however, does not seem to have received a great deal of evaluative attention (perhaps because of the difficulties of linking court improvement efforts to Impact goals). The same is true for the drug use area, with the difference here that evaluation reporting was also undoubtedly affected by general problems of project development.

Eight of nine target hardening projects were documented in the areas of both evaluation planning and reporting--perhaps because the treatment being offered (e.g., changes in levels of illumination) appeared inherently amenable to evaluation (see, however, Chapter IX page 336 below).

Table XXXI, below, displays evaluation planning and reporting by focus. It is clear from this table that a great deal of research effort was expended in documenting the 106 Impact projects targeting recidivism reduction. Of these 106, 74 (or 70 percent) developed evaluation plans and 71 (or 67 percent) generated reports. Among crime-reduction focused projects 28 of the 48 (or 58 percent) were evaluated. Given the general availability of crime data and the difficulties involved in developing data on recidivism, it appears somewhat surprising that fewer evaluation reports were produced for

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<sup>2</sup>Fischel, M. B., Kupersmith, G. W., and Trehan, A. P., An Assessment of Project-Level Evaluation Reporting, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7076, December 1975.

TABLE XXX  
FUNCTIONAL AREA PERFORMANCE IN EVALUATION

FUNCTIONAL AREA	N	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN AREA WITH PLANS (N)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN AREA WITH REPORTS (N)
PREVENTION	21	81% (17)	71% (15)
POLICE	37	62% (23)	57% (21)
COURTS	25	52% (13)	48% (12)
ADULT CORRECTIONS	48	54% (26)	58% (28)
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	33	76% (25)	82% (27)
RESEARCH/ INFORMATION	16	56% (9)	63% (10)
DRUG USE	10	20% (2)	30% (3)
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	33	48% (16)	48% (16)
TARGET HARDENING	9	89% (8)	89% (8)
OTHER	1	100% (1)	100% (1)
TOTAL	233	60% (140)	61% (141)

SOURCES:

DERIVED FROM FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6891, APRIL 1975.

FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION REPORTING, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7076, DECEMBER 1975.

TABLE XXXI  
EVALUATION PERFORMANCE AMONG PROJECTS OF DIFFERING FOCI

PROJECT FOCUS	N	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN FOCUS WITH PLANS (N)	PERCENT OF PROJECTS IN FOCUS WITH REPORTS (N)
CRIME REDUCTION	48	60% (29)	58% (28)
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	106	70% (74)	67% (71)
SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT	79	47% (37)	54% (42)
TOTAL	233	60% (140)	61% (141)

SOURCES:

DERIVED FROM FISCHER, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6891, APRIL 1975.

FISCHER, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., AN ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION REPORTING, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7076, DECEMBER 1975.

crime-reduction focused projects. Only 42 of 78 systems improvement projects (i.e., 54 percent) were evaluated (perhaps because of operational time-frames or because of a lack of previous evaluative experience in these areas).

## 2. Evaluation in Each City

Table XXXII below breaks out the evaluation planning and reporting picture by city and by functional area, reflecting once again the comprehensiveness of the evaluation reporting documentation in Baltimore, Cleveland, and Dallas.

Table XXXIII examines the city efforts by project focus. As noted earlier, most cities emphasized a recidivism-reduction focus. Exceptions to this are Dallas, which concentrated more on its systems improvement projects (unsurprisingly, given the city thrust in that area), St. Louis which stressed the crime-reduction focus more, and Portland, whose slower implementation of its large corrections package necessarily constrained the evaluation effort observed by August, 1975.

## E. Summary

The overview presented here of program activities and products in support of the COPIE-cycle showed that crime-oriented planning was performed, at least to some degree by all of the Impact cities. All of them produced both master plans and evaluation plans, relying for this on their varying efforts to collect data, prioritize problems, define program areas (strategy) and delineate projects (tactics).

Over 230 projects were developed between January 1972 and August 1975, and funded at a little over \$140 million (as of June 1975). Police projects received the largest share of these anti-crime monies (\$47 million, or about 33 percent of awarded program funds); adult and juvenile corrections projects, however, received nearly as much (\$42 million, or 30 percent of awarded funds).

Looking at project focus, however (which reflects the real thrust or objective of a project, whatever its functional area or strategy), it becomes evident that recidivism reduction was a much greater priority in the program than was crime-rate reduction (42 percent of allocated funds as opposed to 31 percent, see Table XXVI, page 164 above).

TABLE XXXII  
EVALUATION PERFORMANCE BY CITY AND  
BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

FUNCTIONAL AREA	ATLANTA			BALTIMORE			CLEVELAND			DALLAS			DENVER			NEWARK			PORTLAND			ST. LOUIS		
	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS
PREVENTION	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	2	50% (1)	50% (1)	7	100% (7)	100% (7)	1	100% (1)	0% (0)	5	60% (3)	60% (3)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	0	-	-	4	75% (3)	50% (2)
POLICE	7	57% (4)	57% (4)	3	100% (3)	100% (3)	4	50% (2)	50% (2)	8	88% (7)	86% (7)	3	67% (2)	33% (1)	4	25% (1)	0% (0)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	5	60% (3)	60% (3)
COURTS	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	4	75% (3)	50% (2)	2	100% (2)	100% (2)	2	50% (1)	0% (0)	2	50% (1)	50% (1)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	9	33% (3)	44% (4)
ADULT CORRECTIONS	4	50% (2)	75% (3)	4	50% (2)	100% (4)	9	44% (4)	89% (8)	2	100% (2)	100% (2)	5	60% (3)	60% (3)	7	71% (5)	57% (4)	6	83% (5)	0% (0)	9	33% (3)	44% (4)
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	3	100% (3)	100% (3)	3	100% (3)	100% (3)	6	50% (3)	100% (6)	1	0% (0)	0% (0)	7	86% (6)	57% (4)	4	75% (3)	100% (4)	4	75% (3)	75% (3)	8	50% (4)	50% (4)
DRUG USE	0	-	-	6	67% (4)	67% (4)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	4	25% (1)	75% (3)	6	17% (1)	17% (1)	0	-	-	1	0% (0)	0% (0)	2	0% (0)	50% (1)
RESEARCH/INFORMATION	1	0% (0)	0% (0)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	2	0% (0)	0% (0)	0	-	-	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	1	100% (1)	0% (0)	0	-	-	1	100% (1)	100% (1)
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	2	0% (0)	0% (0)	4	25% (1)	50% (2)	5	20% (1)	100% (5)	1	0% (0)	100% (1)	7	71% (5)	43% (3)	6	67% (4)	17% (1)	2	100% (2)	100% (2)	8	25% (2)	25% (2)
TARGET HARDENING	0	-	-	1	100% (2)	100% (2)	1	0% (0)	100% (1)	0	-	-	1	100% (1)	0% (0)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	2	100% (2)	100% (2)	1	100% (1)	100% (1)
OTHER	0	-	-	1	100% (1)	100% (1)	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	1	100% (1)	0% (0)	0	-	-	0	-	-
TOTAL	20	60% (12)	65% (13)	27	70% (19)	81% (22)	39	54% (21)	82% (32)	19	68% (13)	79% (15)	37	62% (23)	43% (16)	27	67% (18)	44% (12)	17	78% (14)	53% (9)	47	43% (20)	47% (22)

TABLE XXXII  
EVALUATION PERFORMANCE BY CITY AND  
BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

TABLE XXXIII  
EVALUATION PERFORMANCE BY IMPACT CITY AND  
PROJECT FOCUS

PROJECT FOCUS	ATLANTA			BALTIMORE			CLEVELAND			DALLAS			DENVER			NEWARK			PORTLAND			ST. LOUIS		
	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IN AREA	PERCENT WITH PLANS	PERCENT WITH REPORTS
CRIME REDUCTION	8	63% (5)	50% (4)	7	57% (4)	63% (5)	4	25% (1)	75% (3)	2	100% (2)	100% (2)	5	60% (3)	40% (2)	10	19% (5)	20% (2)	5	80% (4)	100% (5)	7	71% (5)	57% (5)
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	8	75% (6)	86% (7)	13	62% (8)	85% (11)	21	71% (15)	95% (20)	4	75% (3)	50% (2)	21	71% (15)	57% (12)	14	71% (10)	57% (8)	7	86% (6)	29% (2)	18	61% (11)	50% (9)
SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT	4	25% (1)	25% (1)	7	100% (7)	86% (6)	14	36% (5)	64% (9)	13	62% (8)	87% (11)	11	45% (5)	18% (2)	3	100% (3)	67% (2)	5	80% (4)	40% (2)	22	18% (4)	36% (8)
TOTAL	20	60% (12)	65% (13)	27	70% (19)	81% (22)	39	54% (21)	82% (32)	19	68% (13)	79% (15)	37	62% (23)	43% (16)	27	67% (18)	44% (12)	17	82% (14)	53% (9)	47	43% (20)	47% (22)

TABLE XXXIII  
EVALUATION PERFORMANCE BY IMPACT CITY AND  
PROJECT FOCUS.

City spending priorities emerged as follows:

CITY	PRIORITY FOCUS	AWARDED FUNDS (%)	PRIORITY FUNCTIONAL AREA	AWARDED FUNDS (%)
Atlanta	Crime Reduction	66	Police	45
Baltimore	Recidivism Reduction	51	Adult/ Juvenile Corrections	27
Cleveland	Recidivism Reduction	45	Police	38
Dallas	Systems Improvement	44	Police	45
Denver	Recidivism Reduction	52	Adult/ Juvenile Corrections	29
Newark	Crime Reduction	54	Police	41
Portland	Recidivism Reduction	63	Adult/ Juvenile Corrections	61
St. Louis	Recidivism Reduction/ Systems Improvement	37/36	Police/ Adult/ Juvenile Corrections	33/33

Special emphasis went to some areas in particular cities: community involvement in Atlanta, drug use in Baltimore, prevention in Cleveland, courts in Dallas, research and information systems in Denver, community involvement in Newark, information systems in Portland, target hardening in St. Louis (see Table XXVII above).

Areas of de-emphasis were as follows:

CITY	NON-PRIORITY FUNCTIONAL AREA	AWARDED FUNDS (%)
Atlanta	Drug Use/Research/Information Systems	0/0.3
Baltimore	Community Involvement	2
Cleveland	Research/Information Systems	0.2
Dallas	Juvenile Corrections/Drug Use	3/0
Denver	Courts	2
Newark	Research/Information Systems	0
Portland	Prevention/Drug Use	0
St. Louis	Drug Use	2

Evaluation plans and reports were developed for well over half the Impact projects. Cities ranged in effort from a low of 12 projects with evaluation plans in Atlanta to 23 in Denver, and from a low of 9 projects with evaluation reports in Portland to a high of 32 in Cleveland. Baltimore, Cleveland and Dallas produced the most comprehensive overall evaluation coverage.

Much of Impact evaluation attention was devoted to the recidivism-reduction focus. Not only were there more recidivism-focused projects (106), but a greater proportion of them were evaluated (71 of 106) than in the crime-reduction (28 of 48) or systems improvement areas (42 of 78).

In relation to the expected program priorities discussed in Part I of this report, the information provided here has shown that:

- the slippage predictable because of the action/research conflict embedded in the program did, in fact, occur, and the program's operations had to be extended between one and two years (depending upon the city) to allow completion of initiated anti-crime efforts;
- there was indeed a program-wide tendency toward police project funding, based on the program's "effectiveness" (or crime-reduction) objectives;

- the orientation toward police projects was dampened, as predicted, by a strong emphasis on corrections and on recidivism reduction, as expressed by funding across the program, by project focus, and by evaluation attention;
- there was little emphasis on court projects, as expected, due to the difficulties of rationalizing many court improvements in terms of a direct effect on crime rates, and due also to the failure to provide fiscal incentives in this area;
- research and information systems were also de-emphasized, again because of the program's "effectiveness" or direct crime-reduction goals;
- on the other hand, the program's emphasis on crime-rate reduction goals did not appear to affect corrections programs; quite the contrary, fiscal incentives, New Federalism, and the pressures developed by real city priorities in the areas of juvenile and adult prevention and rehabilitation produced a program-wide focus of unanticipated mentions on recidivism reduction;
- contrary to predictions, juvenile emphases were maintained and the community involvement strategy was well funded in three cities, and a non-priority in only one;
- efforts to adhere to the program's action focus were rewarded by larger funding awards, in toto, to rapid implementers than to slower ones;
- given the final implementation array, it appears that some cities may have abandoned various of their expressed planning priorities as these were originally reflected in their problem statements (e.g., Baltimore's indicated community involvement problem was addressed with only 2 percent of awarded funds, see Figure 14);
- Dallas was somehow able to structure a program which reflected neither the city's own indicated priority problems (of adult and youthful offenders, of drug users and recidivists, of corrections inadequacies, see Figure 14) nor the priorities of the Impact program; the systems improvement focus (44 percent of Dallas funds) appears to have constituted an anomaly within the program.

While it is impossible to say (from the non-qualitative information provided in this chapter) whether or not the COPIE-cycle was performed adequately, it is clear that a large number of the required activities and documents were generated, whatever the difficulties involved for the various cities in mobilizing the needed expertise and in adapting to the complex set of rational procedures explicitly demanded by the process. Chapter VII, below, with its provision of information developed in Tasks 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 of the national-level evaluation (see Chapter IV, pages 62-63 above) will assess the quality of city-specific efforts in executing the COPIE-cycle, and will also examine some other aspects of the program (agency coordination, project innovation and program institutionalization) in each Impact city.

ATLANTA

BALTIMORE

CLEVELAND

DALLAS

DENVER

NEWARK

PORTLAND

ST. LOUIS

## Chapter VII

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### Program Innovations in Each City

## CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY

Chapter VI having examined the quantitative dimensions of the city response, this chapter, along with Chapter VII, turns its attention to the question of the relevance and feasibility of the COPIE-cycle initiative, as measured by the quality of Impact city responses to that initiative. Presented in Chapter VII is a qualitative assessment of the Impact effort in each of the cities. Aspects studied are:

- crime-oriented planning;
- implementation timeliness and completeness, and
- evaluation documentation.

Given that a constraining environment can inhibit or choke a local response (and thereby obscure the determination of COPIE-cycle relevance and feasibility),

- agency coordination, and
- community/intergovernmental

contexts are examined as well, in terms of Crime Analysis Team efforts to improve them. Finally,

- project innovation and
- institutionalization progress

are reviewed.

Key findings for each city, based on MITRE analyses performed during the course of the evaluation, are as follows:

### Atlanta

- very good crime-oriented planning;
- slow but complete implementation;
- very good evaluation planning and reporting;
- inadequate agency coordination, now improving (introduction of a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council);
- CAT effort to involve the community now being upgraded (introduction of a Citizen's Advisory Council);
- innovative projects: 2 (THOR and Anti-Rape);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 11 of 20 projects.

### Baltimore

- crime-oriented planning hampered by data gaps and by consequent failures of data collection and analysis to support 4 of the 7 anti-crime programs selected;
- slow implementation, slow expenditure of funds, long delays between project award and start-up;

- comprehensive evaluation coverage, but sharp variation in the quality of evaluation plans and a general absence of any evaluative approach in documentation received before August 1975 (now much improved, however);
- inadequate agency coordination, skeletal Crime Analysis Team;
- community involvement now beginning to be addressed;
- innovative projects: 2 (Senior Citizens Against Thievery and the Port of Baltimore Sea School);
- present progress toward institutionalization: unclear (likely 85 percent continuance of 27 projects reported by SPA; 22 percent reported by CAT); given the slippage in Baltimore, it is too early to tell, but it appears that at least 6 of 27 projects are candidates for institutionalization.

#### Cleveland

- crime-oriented planning approach not discernibly applied;
- rapid, complete implementation, the fastest rate of expenditure in the program;
- evaluation coverage comprehensive but documentation quality shallow and inadequate;
- agency coordination much improved by the Crime Analysis Team;
- community involvement difficult, despite noteworthy CAT efforts;
- innovative projects: 2 (Council for Indigents and Youth Neighborhood Coordinators);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 13 of 39 projects.

#### Dallas

- initially inadequate crime-oriented planning effort, later considerably upgraded;
- remarkable implementation timeliness and completeness of service;
- evaluation documentation about average for the program: moderate coverage, adequate activity description but failure to operationally define outcome measures leading to subsequent assessment problems;
- agency and intergovernmental coordination much improved by the CAT;
- community involvement not visibly addressed;
- innovative projects: 3 (Youth Services Program, Youth Development and Corrections and Legal Aides for Police);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 11 of 19 projects.

#### Denver

- excellent crime-oriented planning;
- good implementation, somewhat slowed by the rigor of the planning effort;

- evaluation documentation of very good quality: excellent components and reports, but only moderate coverage;
- agency coordination of high caliber achieved by the CAT;
- Task Force mechanism for community input into the criminal justice planning process developed and tested successfully;
- innovative projects: 10 (see Table XXXV, Chapter VIII).
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 22 of 37 projects.

#### Newark

- very good crime-oriented planning;
- long grant application preparation (and other problems) slowed implementation;
- some very good evaluation planning, but staff turnover caused serious problems with evaluation reporting and coverage;
- agency coordination improved through Crime Analysis Team efforts;
- strong effort at community involvement;
- innovative projects: 1 (the Rape Analysis and Investigation Unit);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 8 of 27 projects (however, it is still early to tell, in Newark, because of implementation slippage).

#### Portland

- very good crime-oriented planning;
- extremely slow implementation;
- excellent evaluation planning and reporting;
- little or no progress made in agency coordination;
- great improvement made by the Crime Analysis Team in community input mechanisms and involvement;
- innovative projects: 4 (Case Management Corrections Services, Project PICTURE, Field Services, and Research, Advocacy, Prevention and Education [RAPE]);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 8 of 17 projects (however, it is too early to tell because of implementation slippage).

#### St. Louis

- crime-oriented planning approach not discernibly applied;
- fastest and most complete implementation of any city;
- evaluation planning and reporting highly varied: some excellent documentation and some that was inadequate;
- agency coordination: problematic and not visibly improved;
- community involvement now improving;
- innovative projects: 2 (Providence Education Center and the Court Improvement Project);
- present progress toward institutionalization: about 22 of 47 projects.

## Chapter VII

### Program Innovations in Each City

*Those new ideas requiring little additional learning investment on the part of the receiver will be adopted more rapidly than innovations requiring the adopter to develop new skills and understandings.*

Everett Rogers, 1971

*The city is a political subdivision of the state, created as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to it. . . The state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. . . In the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control of the state.*

Mr. Justice Butler, 1923  
(Trenton v. New Jersey, 262  
U.S. 182)

*Municipal independence in the United States is a natural consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the people.*

Alexis de Tocqueville, 1831

There are two major issues which affect the local response to any federal initiative addressing local problems. The first issue is the character of the initiative (its relevance to the problem, its feasibility); the second is the character of the particular local context into which the initiative is introduced.

The Impact program was conceived in the belief that an infusion of federal resources and a better system capability for allocating and using them could increase the effectiveness of local anti-crime efforts. The relevance of the Impact concept was therefore an assumption rather than a certitude, and the program constituted an effort to test the value of that assumption. The particular

initiative involved then, in the case of Impact, was the proffered award of funds in return for a city/state/regional office commitment to use them in a systematic, rational way by applying special techniques for the planning, implementation and evaluation of anti-crime programs. Yet the feasibility of performing so complex a procedure on so large a scale was also an assumption, rather than a certitude.

Given then, that both the relevance and feasibility of the Impact concept--like most anti-crime concepts--were unknown at the beginning of the program, it became important to assess the city responses carefully so as to gain an insight into the meaningfulness of the initiative. It is here that the issue of the local context takes on its significance. In effect, a constraining environment can inhibit or choke a local response and thereby obscure the issue of the initiative's relevance and feasibility. This is why it is necessary to examine the character of the intergovernmental/community context into which an initiative is thrust.

It is obvious that no Impact city started its program in a vacuum. Although all of them had to adopt a federal innovation beginning in January 1972, some criminal justice systems were better prepared than others, some cities had higher ambient levels of education and affluence, more family stability, less social disorganization (see Chapter V), better interagency and community cooperation than others. The city contexts were different therefore, and it was reasonable to expect that they would be different also in their modes of adopting an innovation.

The activities described in Chapter VI signify that the Impact cities did, in fact, respond to the federal initiative. An assessment of the quality of that response, however, is needed to provide information on the feasibility and relevance of the initiative. The following analysis will therefore address the quality of each city's handling of the COPIE-cycle, and speak, as well, to the nature of the environment which shaped it.

Five of MITRE's nine evaluation tasks (see Chapter IV, pages 62-63 above) were oriented toward an understanding of the COPIE-cycle effort, of the agency coordinating functions of the Crime Analysis Team, of project innovation and institutionalization within the Impact program. The findings which follow are based on MITRE analyses and documents produced in support of these evaluation tasks, and referenced at the end of this chapter. The discussion below focuses on:



- the performance of crime-oriented planning, implementation, and evaluation;
- agency coordination, community involvement, and the role of the Crime Analysis Team; and
- project innovation and institutionalization

in each Impact city. Space permits only a general overview of these specific areas in this final report; for further information, therefore, the reader should consult the particular MITRE analyses or descriptions referenced below (see pages 241-242).

## A. Atlanta

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

In general, the projects proposed in Atlanta's Master Plan were closely linked to the problems identified, providing evidence that a systematic crime-oriented planning approach was used.<sup>(1)</sup> A detailed analysis was made of robbery and burglary within the victim/offender/environment framework. The Master Plan identified problems such as a large number of high-crime census tracts, high incidence of open-space robbery, increasing severity of crime among juveniles, and others. The nature of these problems was clearly delineated as were the program goals and project objectives selected to attack these problems. However, problems were not prioritized, nor was there any indication that alternative strategies for attacking these problems were considered.

### 2. Implementation

As described in Chapter VI above, Atlanta received \$16.9 million in awarded Impact funds by 30 June 1975, and had placed strong emphasis on both the police function and on community involvement (directed toward the prevention or reduction of burglary and robbery).<sup>(2)</sup> Eventually, 66 percent of the city's funds went into these two areas, and Atlanta ended with the largest commitment to community involvement of any Impact city (22 percent).

Atlanta projects were slow to begin operations, according to implementation survey data received, starting one month later than the average across the Impact cities. Typically an Atlanta project submitted its grant application 13.1 months into the program, received funding approval 4.7 months later, and consumed another 3.6 months before starting service delivery (see Figure 16, Chapter VIII below).

Services provided by Atlanta projects were generally complete.<sup>(4)</sup> However, in terms of a calculated expected performance (based on program-wide means for the three project foci described in Chapter VI: crime-reduction, recidivism-reduction and systems improvement), Atlanta's projects were among the least timely in the program.

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

All of the evaluation plans received from Atlanta represent serious attempts to plan for project evaluation.<sup>(6)</sup> These components generally addressed, although in cursory fashion, each of the major steps in the project evaluation process. However, a lack of detailed operational definitions for major outcome measures generally detracted from the overall quality of the planning effort, reflecting a comprehensive though superficial approach to project evaluation planning. An exception here was the component for Atlanta's Anti-Robbery and Burglary project, which qualified as one of the best in the program. Evaluation planning coverage, on the other hand, was somewhat narrow, since only 12 of Atlanta's 20 projects had evaluation plans.

Atlanta's evaluation reports excelled in providing evaluation documentation which included information regarding the extent to which project objectives were being met (90 percent of the reports provided outcome information, compared to 56 percent for all the cities combined.)<sup>(7)</sup> Thus for Atlanta, questions dealing with project outcomes were typically posed and at least partially answered in the evaluation reports. Reports were generally well written; and where applicable, discussed limitations important to a fair interpretation of reported findings. Two projects reviewed provided evaluation documentation considered to be of truly excellent reporting quality (Anti-Robbery/Burglary and Intensive Probation of Robbery/Burglary Offenders).

Atlanta evaluation documentation was among the best in the program with respect to the applicability of the evaluation approach used to gather project outcome information. Atlanta characteristically relied upon evaluation approaches which at least included two comparable data points in their assessment of project success. Four Atlanta projects stood out, however, for having used an evaluation approach considered to be rigorous. These approaches were characterized by the fact that they controlled, explained, or adjusted for the influence of outside factors on observed changes and thus permitted the attribution of these changes to project activities.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>High Risk Juvenile Parole  
Anti-Robbery/Burglary  
Therapeutic Community Rehabilitation (DOOR)  
Intensive Adult Probation Counseling.

As of 31 August 1975, Atlanta had provided evaluation reports for 13 of its 20 projects.

4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

The Crime Analysis Team in Atlanta (physically located within the Atlanta Regional Commission) was initially unsuccessful in achieving increased coordination among the agencies involved in the city's Impact program. A number of factors appear to have interfered with the liaison function of the CAT. First of all, in Atlanta, as in many cities, the only component of the criminal justice system entirely controlled by the city is the Police Department (all other criminal justice functions falling under either county or state jurisdictions). At the time the Impact program was initiated, the Department was in the midst of change: a new chief would assume command in March, 1972. It should be noted, however, that the Atlanta police chief does not serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. He holds office for a fixed term and can only be removed by a majority of the Board of Aldermen. This quasi-independent position in the local governmental structure, combined with the personality and style of the incumbent, would make the police chief a relatively autonomous and occasionally controversial political figure as the Impact program was carried out. Second, the political relationships of those involved in the management of the Atlanta Impact program had a considerable effect upon its process and outcomes. Those interviewed<sup>(8)</sup> believed that there was considerable institutional and professional rivalry between the State Crime Commission and the Atlanta Regional Commission--a problem not uncommon with a regional agency (which often conceives of its own position as being "closer" to local problems) and a state agency. Third, the City of Atlanta and Fulton County have had a tradition of political conflict, and recent efforts by the city to annex portions of the county did not reduce the atmosphere of city/county hostility.

In sum, the Crime Analysis Team in Atlanta inherited a political situation which was complex and difficult. The immediate dimensions of that situation are reflected in the following set of attitudes articulated during the first year of Impact:

- The state felt Atlanta was getting more than its share of funds (Impact plus block grants);
- The city tried to bypass the state (going directly to LEAA for action);

- Since Impact is a discretionary program, the state did not have final approval authority, but did have responsibility;
- Although Impact was supposed to be a city program, state and county agencies did not want to go through the city for action since they were used to going to the federal level.

All of this slowed implementation, and left Atlanta with only \$10.6 million awarded as of September 30, 1974. Finally, the resignation of two Crime Analysis Team directors seemed representative of the troubles encountered by the program in Atlanta.

Thus, the heavy involvement of the county and state, the history of city/county conflict, the absence of a single uncontested authority within the one criminal justice system function carried out by the city itself, and the problematic relationships between the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) and the State Crime Commission, all combined to make the Atlanta Impact program an arena for intergovernmental conflict.<sup>(8)</sup>

This unsatisfactory situation eventually led to a reorganization, early in 1975, which removed the CAT from the ARC and introduced it as a planning, coordinating and evaluating unit within the mayor's office. The Team is expected to continue as staff support to the recently created (December, 1974) Criminal Justice Coordinating Council; this Council came into being in large measure because of the interagency problems encountered in the Impact program. The city currently assumes one-half the cost for the Crime Analysis Team and is expected to assume the full cost in September of 1976. The Team is now much better able (as a city agency) to stimulate coordination among the criminal justice agencies than it was when it was part of the ARC, and now serves as an information clearinghouse for all the agencies. Further, the progress and problems of Impact in Atlanta rendered obvious the lack of mechanisms for community input into the criminal justice planning process; the Crime Analysis Team now recognizes this and is currently developing a Citizens' Advisory Board.

## 5. Project Innovation<sup>2</sup>

Atlanta's coordination problems rendered innovation very difficult under Impact (see Chapter VIII, Section E, below). They signified that communications were not ideal and that merely ordinary efforts were difficult, so that agencies hesitated to submit many new or unusual project ideas for fear they could not obtain approval. Unsurprisingly, as with other Impact cities having problems of agency coordination, many of Atlanta's projects turned out to be of the non-controversial, tried-and-true variety. There are two exceptions, however. One of these is the Anti-Rape project which involved several innovative aspects. This project, implemented by the Police Department, included a mobile unit to collect evidence and talk to witnesses at the scene of the crime. Also involved was the use of equipment and office space away from police headquarters for rape cases, and a civilian worker to assist the police and the victim. The other project is Target Hardening through Opportunity Reduction (THOR), a comprehensive public education program involving decentralized services at nine information centers throughout the city. Innovative were the comprehensive organization of formerly ad hoc activities, and the development of new efforts (such as research on the problems of false alarms, on the need for building security ordinances, on minimum standards for security devices, and the development of insurance company cooperation in reducing rates, given maximum security installations).<sup>(5)</sup>

## 6. Project Institutionalization

Over one-half of the Impact projects (probably 11) are now expected to be institutionalized in Atlanta. These include the Anti-Robbery/Burglary project, the Atlanta Street Academy and Reducing Juvenile Crimes. (It is still too early to make any predictions about the High-Crime Foot Patrol project, or about THOR and the Anti-Rape projects described above.)<sup>(5)</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>A project listed as innovative in this document will conform to one or more of the following definitions:

Type A: Uses a new approach, new procedures, or new technology in solving a problem.

Type B: Uses old procedures, technology or approaches in a new way or in a new context.

Type C: Uses an existing agency to assume a set of new responsibilities.

Type D: Uses a new agency to assume a set of responsibilities not carried out by an existing agency.

## 7. Summary

Overall, it appears that Atlanta performed an excellent job of planning and evaluation, but that the Crime Analysis Team's early inability to coordinate the agencies involved in the program's operation resulted in slow implementation, problematic program management, and a paucity of innovative projects.

The recent reorganization and transfer of the Crime Analysis Team from the ARC to the Mayor's office, however, has enabled the Team to develop more influence with criminal justice and inter-governmental agencies. With the Team now serving as staff to the newly created Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, and with the proposed Citizen's Advisory Council, it appears that, despite initial handicaps, the Team may finish by effecting improvements in the relationships of criminal justice and other agencies in Atlanta, and in the interactions of those agencies with the community.

BALTIMORE

## B. Baltimore

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

The planning effort in Baltimore was hampered by serious gaps in victim/offender/environment data.<sup>(1)</sup> Offender characteristics were not categorized by type of offense; information pinpointing types of targets with high victimization rates was said to be unavailable, and little appeared to be known about the extent and nature of recidivism. Although drug use was considered to be a major factor affecting a large proportion of the serious crime in Baltimore, general estimates and informed judgments of agency administrators (rather than statistics) were provided to indicate the magnitude of the problem. The Master Plan nonetheless identified as key problems:

- (1) juvenile and young adult crimes;
- (2) drug use;
- (3) community-police relations;
- (4) pre-trial detention; and
- (5) court backlogs expected to occur as a result of Impact anti-crime projects.

Seven programs were selected as responses to these problems. Three of these programs (youth crime prevention, drug use treatment, and courts) can be clearly linked back to the data analysis conducted. The other four programs (citizen involvement, intensive community patrol, target hardening, and classification/treatment at the city jail) were not supported by data analysis to show that they would be promising strategies for reducing Impact crimes in Baltimore. Another weakness of the Baltimore planning effort was the failure to provide adequately quantified and time-specific goals.

### 2. Implementation

As discussed earlier (see Table XXVII, page 165), Baltimore had a well balanced program, with 27 percent of awarded funds going to adult/juvenile corrections, 23 percent to the police functional area, and another 19 percent devoted to drug programs.<sup>(2)</sup>

As of 30 September 1974, Baltimore was awarded \$16,739,054 in Impact funds, but only 28 percent of this amount had been expended, reflecting delays in getting projects into full operational status. On the average, Baltimore projects began service delivery 21.3 months

into the program, according to survey information; this was somewhat later than the average for all Impact cities (see Figure 16, Chapter VIII below). One project was aborted because community opposition prevented the project from obtaining a site.

Implementation was not very timely in Baltimore nor were the services provided complete.<sup>(4)</sup> The period between award and start-up (6.1 months) was the longest for any Impact city, exceeding the mean time for the program by some 3 months (see Figure 16, page 248 below).

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

Generally speaking, evaluation was a source of problems in Baltimore from the beginning of the program. No evaluator was assigned to the Crime Analysis Team until some 17 months into the program. Nonetheless, by dint of staff effort and the use of consultants, Baltimore produced a creditable program evaluation plan and at least one very good project-level evaluation component (for the Intensive Differentiated Supervision of Impact Parolees and Probationers). However, the quality of project-level evaluation planning efforts in Baltimore varied sharply among different projects, possibly reflecting the fact that components were developed individually by project directors and/or outside consultants. Generally, these evaluation plans failed to provide enough information regarding proposed comparison bases to permit a critical assessment of the soundness of the proposed approach.<sup>(6)</sup> Evaluation planning coverage per se, however, was among the most comprehensive in the program, with 19 of the 27 projects containing evaluation plans.

Given the overall slippage in Baltimore's program, reports documenting evaluation performed by August 31, 1975 provided little in the way of meaningful outcome information. Furthermore, Baltimore's evaluation submissions consisted of "past progress" reports designed to fulfill the requirements of the Maryland SPA in its project refunding process. Typically, they did not contain enough outcome information to warrant classification as full-fledged evaluation reports. A large majority provided project-level information in the absence of any discernible evaluation approach whatever.

There has been a recent improvement, however, in Baltimore's evaluation documentation. A new set of "past progress" reports was received at the beginning of November. Too late to enter into MITRE's overall assessment of project-level evaluation in the Impact cities,<sup>(7)</sup> these reports nonetheless warrant some discussion here. While these reports still reflected an emphasis on filling the requirements of the SPA's refunding process, they were, however, better transmitters of evaluative information than previous documentation. The reports were more directed to the attainment of objectives, and information was typically organized on an objective-by-objective basis.

The evaluation approaches utilized in the new set of reports showed substantial improvement. First, projects had now been operational for an adequate time-frame to allow the reporting of more than preliminary information, and more than 60 percent of Baltimore's projects can now be classified as full-fledged evaluation efforts. Second, almost all the reports providing sufficient information to be judged as "full-fledged" also have utilized an evaluation approach which allows for the identification of changes in the targeted crime problem. However, these approaches, for the most part, did not control for outside factors, yet such control is necessary before project activities and outcomes can be linked. Of special interest in those projects which were directed at area-specific crime-reductions is the admitted failure to attribute crime-rate changes to the project because individual Impact projects typically were not coordinated. Therefore project activities of one project often overlapped the activities of another project. On the other hand, recidivism-reduction projects, when the project was fortunate enough to have sufficient data, showed vast improvements over the early Baltimore documentation. (Two projects particularly, Intensive Differentiated Supervision of Impact Parolees and Probationers, and Intensive Supervision of High Impact Narcotics Offenders, utilized a quasi-experimental control group design to compare treatment and post-treatment behaviors of Impact offenders,<sup>(7)</sup> [see Chapter IX, page 317 below].)

#### 4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

In the case of Baltimore, the Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement (the SPA) was granted broad authority over both programmatic and fiscal matters by the regional office. In addition to reviewing, approving and monitoring all Impact projects, the SPA maintained overall responsibility for Impact projects run by state agencies. The SPA was to act as liaison between the city and state agencies; was to participate actively in planning, in selection of programs and projects, and in the preparation of grant applications submitted by State agencies; finally, the SPA had authority to review all project applications to assure consistency with Maryland's comprehensive state plan. The City of Baltimore, under whose aegis the Crime Analysis Team would operate, was to be viewed, from an organizational stance, as being at a lower level than the SPA. Additionally, and unlike the SPA, the city had no real ties to the regional office; the Mayor, when Impact began, was newly elected, and the Mayor's Coordinating Council was an unknown quantity. Further, as in Atlanta, the Baltimore Mayor does not choose the Police Commissioner who is appointed by the Governor of Maryland. There is a long history of friction between the Mayor's office and the Police Department. In the Impact program, this was manifest in the incapacity of the Crime

Analysis Team to access police data, and in the difficulty of obtaining reasonable evaluation components and reports for police projects. Thus, it appears that the Crime Analysis Team in Baltimore was cut off from fulfilling the responsibilities normally entrusted to that body under Impact by prior problems with the Police Department, and by the delegation of power by the regional office to the SPA.

Two groups (the Crime Analysis Team and the Baltimore Impact Steering Committee) were used in Baltimore to tie together and maintain the momentum of Impact. The Crime Analysis Team was really the staff arm of the Mayor's Coordinating Council, a relatively young organization which was formed in 1971. Hence, the scope of CAT responsibilities included not only Impact but also all LEAA block grant programs operating in the City of Baltimore. Given the split of responsibilities, however, between the SPA and the Coordinating Council, it is not surprising that some friction developed between the State and Baltimore.<sup>(9)</sup>

It has already been remarked above that projects targeting improved community relations received only 2 percent of Baltimore's Impact funds, despite the designation of community involvement as a priority Baltimore problem during the Impact planning phase (see Figure 14, page 155 above). Perhaps this is because of the fact that mechanisms providing for systematic community involvement in the Baltimore Impact program were never developed. It seems likely that the dominant role played by the Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement (the SPA) and the Baltimore Police Department in program planning and operation tended to preclude local citizen participation. In addition, the 17-man Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice consisted mainly of agency heads and judges, with no representation from the various minority groups and citizen organizations existing in Baltimore.<sup>(9)</sup>

In sum, it appears that a number of factors interfered with Crime Analysis Team capabilities and prevented an effective functioning of the Team in Baltimore:

- a skeletal staff, with no evaluator until May of 1973;
- a failure to collect crime data;
- an inability to access police data or achieve coordination with the Baltimore Police Department;
- an unusually strong SPA role; and
- a change in Crime Analysis Team leadership at a crucial point of program start-up, followed by two other changes in leadership over a 28-month period.

The major functions of the Crime Analysis Team will be continued by a unit within the Baltimore City Mayor's Office. It is expected that this unit will act primarily as a coordinating agency and will perform planning and evaluation activities to aid project and agency directors.

#### 5. Project Innovation

There were only two innovative projects implemented in Baltimore; these two, however, were particularly interesting: Senior Citizens Against Thievery and the Port of Baltimore Sea School. The first project is an educational program to help older residents teach each other to fight crime. It was sponsored by the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice, with the Waxter Center, Baltimore City Police, and the City's Commission on Aging and Retirement. The city agencies are producing 90-minute videotape training programs, booklets, slide shows, etc. Once the materials are ready, teams of elderly citizens, city personnel, and college students will visit "golden age" clubs, health centers, churches, and housing projects for the elderly. The innovative aspect of the Port of Baltimore Sea School is that it involves training for maritime careers and other industries as well as more typical educational and counseling services for juvenile offenders. (5)

#### 6. Project Institutionalization

Because of slippage in Baltimore's program, it is not yet possible to foresee with any clarity what is likely to remain of the Impact effort in Baltimore. According to survey data received from the Crime Analysis Team, it is probable that only a small portion of projects (22 percent) will be institutionalized in Baltimore. The SPA, however, expects 85 percent of on-going projects to be continued, based on prior experience with projects funded under block grants. Projects expected to be institutionalized include the Pre-trial Intervention project and Police Civilians for Supportive Services. The High Impact Courts Program, which involved additional court and related personnel to handle Impact cases may also be continued. (5)

#### 7. Summary

Overall, Baltimore tried to formulate a viable program in the face of some rather formidable obstacles and achieved a good evaluation plan, some solid project-level components, a few innovative projects and some possible anti-crime project successes. However, the Baltimore program was troubled by difficult intergovernmental and interagency relationships and there were many problems involved in performing the COPIE-cycle and in fulfilling the agency-coordinating

role of the Crime Analysis Team. Evaluation reporting at first failed to supply the comparison bases necessary for attributing outcomes to project activities, but there has been a recent improvement in Baltimore's evaluation reports--of such magnitude that it augurs well for the continuation of a seriously improved evaluation capability in Baltimore after the Impact program is over. As of August 1975, however, evaluation had failed to supply the evidence necessary for determining whether or not projects had been successful.

**CLEVELAND**

## C. Cleveland

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

The Cleveland Master Plan failed to provide victim data and presented only limited offender data. On the other hand, there were extensive profiles of those geographical areas with high incidence of burglary and robbery. Four high-crime areas in the city were identified and described in great detail, but statistics regarding the type of robbery (commercial, open space, residential) and type of burglary (residential and non-residential) were not supplied. The problems and needs identified for Impact funding included: youth crime, drug use, school dropout, low clearance rates, court delays as well as the fragmentation of correctional agencies and the lack of community-based correctional facilities. With the exception of correctional problems, all problems were supported by the data analysis. The majority of Cleveland's proposed projects focused on high-risk youthful offenders and emphasized community treatments and services. The relationships between proposed projects and crime problems identified ranged from strong to tenuous, indicating that a crime-oriented approach might have been followed, but in a non-systematic fashion. Finally, the Master Plan omitted to quantify program goals and objectives, which meant that program achievements would be difficult to measure. (1)

### 2. Implementation

As discussed in Chapter VI above, Cleveland's Impact program was comprised of 39 projects. Police projects received about 38 percent of program funds, reflecting a higher priority than that accorded in the Master Plan, and probably, as well, the need to meet Impact crime-reduction goals. Prevention projects ranked second, and adult corrections projects ranked third in funding levels, receiving 18 percent and 17 percent respectively (see Table XXVII, page 165 above). As of June 1975, Cleveland projects spent 99 percent of the city's awarded \$18,485,465 in Impact funds. This constitutes the most rapid rate of expenditure among the Impact cities and reflects the speed of project implementation in Cleveland following grant submission. Over the whole program, Cleveland's implementation speed was about average compared to the other cities; however, Cleveland's projects started providing services, on the average, about 4.5 months earlier on in the program than did the other cities' projects on a program-wide average (2) (see Figure 16, Chapter VIII). In addition, the services provided by Cleveland projects were generally complete in terms of what had been planned. (4)

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

As was probably predictable from the non-quantification of goals and objectives in the Master Plan, Cleveland evaluation components were generally only half-hearted attempts at project evaluation planning. Most of the components conformed to a standard format which did not include operational definitions or clearly specified descriptions of proposed comparison bases.<sup>(6)</sup> This evaluation planning quality reflected the low priority accorded evaluation in Cleveland. Despite a large-sized Crime Analysis Team, evaluation was the province of outside contractors in Cleveland and remained only a secondary concern of Cleveland's CAT.<sup>(10)</sup> Evaluation planning coverage was far from comprehensive, with only 21 of 39 projects including evaluation plans.

Reporting of evaluative information by Cleveland evaluators was also mediocre. Evaluation documentation reviewed had serious shortcomings in terms of providing the reader with an adequate description of project activities, or of reporting and explaining limitations in the evaluation necessary to facilitate the accurate interpretation and use of reported findings. In fact, evaluation documentation from nearly 40 percent of Cleveland's projects were judged as precluding an understanding of the source, purpose, and meaning of the evaluative information presented. Cleveland's reporting efforts typically fell short when it came to providing data needed to critically assess the reliability and validity of reported findings. In fact only one project evaluation reporting effort was considered to be of high quality (the Prosecutor's Office project).

A large majority of Cleveland's projects provided evaluation documentation in which results were presented in the absence of an approach. In these cases either there was no information available (and no quantitative statements regarding objective attainment could be made), or quantitative results were presented without the benefit of any objective comparison to ascertain changes in a measurable variable. Only one Cleveland project reviewed to date, Visiting Judges, utilized an evaluation approach judged to be somewhat rigorous in the Impact context.

Overall, Cleveland's evaluation effort reflected a shallow attempt to perform project-level evaluation. Reports seemed to be formatted for mass production in response to a requirement, rather than for the fulfillment of basic knowledge needs of the Cleveland program and for the provision of a thoughtful contribution to on-going anti-crime efforts. Cleveland's evaluation reporting coverage was the most comprehensive in the program, however, with 32 of the 39 projects having furnished documentation.<sup>(7)</sup>

#### 4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

The Crime Analysis Team had a special character in Cleveland. Problems arising over Cleveland's selection as an Impact city, concern by the regional office for rapid implementation, and poor communications among all concerned led to the quasi-suppression of the SPA role in the Cleveland program, and the establishment of a close, harmonious relationship between the Team and the regional office.<sup>(10)</sup> The interagency friction between the SPA and the Crime Analysis Team which troubled so many Impact cities was therefore absent in Cleveland. There is little doubt that this situation allowed an enhanced coordination which helped greatly in achieving the city's fast program start-up.

Both the Team and the regional office wanted to get the program implemented rapidly; the RO coordinator cited political pressure to make an impact by the November elections as an overriding reason for this stance. (A second matter associated with fast implementation was the feeling on the part of the Team's director, that Cleveland, if it were to implement programs quickly, might be able thereby to increase the total amount of dollars it would receive from the LEAA.)<sup>(10)</sup>

Cleveland's problem of agency coordination, then, seemed somewhat less complex and more limited than did the interagency relationships in some other Impact cities. On the other hand, Cleveland's Crime Analysis Team was confronted by a challenge which few other Teams had to face, arising from the severe polarization existing in the city between its "ethnic" and black communities. This polarization was the major source of political pressures to implement the program quickly, by election time.

In Cleveland, at the beginning of Impact, blacks (about 40 percent of the population) and non-blacks remained troubled by the memory of the Hough and Glenville riots (1966 and 1968), and racial divisions continued to run deep (see Chapter V, Table III, page 75 above). The election of Mayor Perk in 1971, on a platform of "ethnic power" did little to heal the scars between the two communities, and the issue of crime control was perceived by many blacks--especially after shoot-outs between police and black militants--as just another weapon in a white arsenal. In this context, it would be very difficult if not impossible to enlist the kind of support from high-crime area communities which appeared indispensable to improvements in Cleveland's crime problems.

The Crime Analysis Team understood this situation and made serious efforts to deal with it by analyzing "root cause" (or crime-correlated) community and family problems in Cleveland, and by trying

to find funds (within or outside LEAA) with which to address them. The Team's endeavor to get assistance from HUD and HEW within the lateral coordination provisions of the Impact program soon bogged down, however, and the Impact guidelines themselves did not allow much latitude for projects without potential for direct action on specific crime problems.

A great deal of staff time was spent with community members in the effort to achieve some viable mechanisms for citizen input, and there is evidence also that the Crime Analysis Team achieved real improvements in coordination among criminal justice agencies in Cleveland. Their community-based probation program involved the coordination of Municipal Court Probation, Common Pleas Court Probation and the Adult Parole Authority to provide community-based services in satellite offices. This is the first time, in Cleveland, that county and state corrections officials have been located in the same building and have established a close working relationship.

It is not clear, on the other hand, that the COPIE-cycle was performed with any particular rigor. Cleveland planners were activity-oriented, never developed a reasonable data base and viewed evaluation as a second-order priority. (It is, perhaps, for this reason that contractors were hired in the first place to perform planning and evaluation.) Despite the fact that the Team's experiences with contractors were less than successful, no in-house capability was developed. This, plus the lack of commitment at a high level to goals of rational planning and evaluation, can probably account for Cleveland's unconvincing performance in evaluation.

Overall, it seems as if knowledge goals paled, in Cleveland, beside the political exigencies of a racially divided community. Or else, perhaps, the Crime Analysis Team may simply have been lacking in the particular kinds of expertise, guidance and interest needed for the success of a complex, rational enterprise like the COPIE-cycle. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Cleveland Crime Analysis Team opted for action and speedy start-up to the detriment of careful planning and evaluative research.

Crime Analysis Team activities in support of the Impact program ended officially in Cleveland as of June, 1975, but the Team is continuing at a lower staffing level as part of a new umbrella agency to consolidate treatment services within the city. Planning, coordination, and evaluation functions are an on-going part of the new agency's responsibilities.

## 5. Project Innovation

Two of Cleveland's 39 Impact projects appeared innovative.<sup>(5)</sup> The first project, Counsel for Indigents, involved a modified individual assignment method, in which two attorneys appearing at the Municipal Court received a certain number of felony cases, then followed these cases to the Common Pleas Court for a certain period of time. As the bulk of their cases were closed in Common Pleas Court, they returned to Municipal Court assignment and a new cycle began. Such a rotating arrangement appeared to give clients more effective representation, without delaying the disposition process.

The second project, Cleveland Youth Neighborhood Coordinators, again reflected the Crime Analysis Team's preoccupation with inter-agency coordination and community problems. The pattern of youth service delivery in Cleveland at the inception of the Impact program was described as:

- (1) lacking articulation in working relationships;
- (2) duplicating the kinds of services rendered; and
- (3) lacking the proper identification of gaps in services.

The Youth Neighborhood Coordinators project was implemented as a solution to these problems. The City of Cleveland had been divided into nine social planning areas which were subdivided into relatively homogeneous neighborhoods. A youth service coordinator knowledgeable in the local neighborhood problems and needs was located in each of the nine areas. These coordinators brought the youth-serving agencies together, determined available services, and outlined duplications and gaps in service. Where practical, they initiated improvement in youth services by working closely with neighborhood leaders and organizations.

## 6. Project Institutionalization

Thirteen of the projects implemented in Cleveland are expected to be institutionalized, and it is hoped that funding sources will be found for others.<sup>(5)</sup> Included are the Cleveland Youth Neighborhood Coordinators, the Street Academy, and the Adult Parole Component of the Community-Based Probation program. The other components are actively seeking funds, as are many other projects in Cleveland.

## 7. Summary

Overall, Cleveland did a good job of program implementation, made meaningful efforts toward agency coordination in the criminal

justice system, and provided useful and needed services to the Cleveland community in a stressful climate of continuing racial antagonisms. Unfortunately, the Crime Analysis Team's failures to ensure rigorous planning and evaluation signify that--except for the Visiting Judges project--assessment of Impact anti-crime effectiveness, on the basis of project-level evaluation, will be beyond reach in Cleveland.

DALLAS

## D. Dallas

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

Crime data analysis revealed inadequate current knowledge about the characteristics of Impact crime victims in Dallas. Victim data used in the analysis had to be drawn from a 1967 survey of victimization conducted by the National Opinion Research Council rather than based on locally collected data. The need to upgrade the information base on crime in the city has, however, been recognized and specific projects are included in the Impact program to expand or improve the existing data base for more effective crime-oriented planning in the future.

The Dallas Master Plan did not provide clearly defined problem statements. Some notion of what the major concerns were can be inferred from the program areas selected; they include:

- (1) excessive opportunity for burglary and robbery,
- (2) low clearance rates,
- (3) excessive case processing time in the courts,
- (4) high no-bill and dismissal rates for defendants charged with Impact offenses,
- (5) high recidivism rates and excessive probation caseload size, and
- (6) large numbers of Impact crimes committed by youths and addicts.

About one-half of the projects proposed to alleviate these problems were aimed at systems improvement, while the remaining projects attempted to focus on more specific crime targets. Planners in general did not provide insights into their priority-setting process and did not formulate quantified goals and objectives, with a timetable for their achievement. This naturally signified problems, later on, for the measurement of project and program goal attainment. (1)

### 2. Implementation

As discussed in Chapter VI, more than 65 percent of Dallas' Impact funds went into police and court projects. Dallas dedicated a large portion of its Impact funds (45 percent) to the police function, and the smallest portion of all the cities (3 percent) to

juvenile corrections (see Table XXVII, page 165 above). This was especially surprising considering the latter's significance as noted in the city's Master Plan. It appears that courts and juvenile prevention services grew in importance over what was originally planned, while juvenile corrections experienced a marked reduction in priority. Of the \$17,039,548 in Impact funds awarded to Dallas, 69 percent had been expended as of 30 June 1975.<sup>(2)</sup>

The average Dallas project began operations 17.9 months from program inception, two and one-half months sooner than the average across the eight cities (see Figure 16, Chapter VIII). Remarkable implementation timeliness was achieved in Dallas, as well as completeness in the services offered.<sup>(4)</sup>

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

While many of the Dallas project evaluation plans devoted some attention to each of the steps outlined in guidelines established by the LEAA, they generally did not manage to tie these steps together into a logical, coherent approach to project evaluation. Operational definitions were often not provided for major outcome measures, and sound comparison bases were likewise absent from a majority of the evaluation components received.<sup>(6)</sup> Evaluation planning coverage, however, was moderately comprehensive: 13 of 19 projects included evaluation plans.

The quality of evaluation reporting presented in the Dallas documentation was about average when compared to program-wide performance. No project evaluations were seen to be of excellent reporting quality, typically because they failed to provide the necessary data for reader validation of the findings. Generally, however, Dallas evaluators did an adequate job of describing project activities and addressing possible limitations in the interpretation of any reported findings.

More than 50 percent of the Dallas project-evaluation efforts were accomplished in the absence of an evaluation approach. More often than not this was a result of the inability to carry out project evaluation plans, which, as noted previously, typically failed to operationally define intended outcome measures. Only one Dallas project, the Crime Investigation Pilot Study, used an approach considered to be relatively rigorous in that it related observed changes in a measure of performance to project activities.<sup>(7)</sup>

As of 31 August 1975, Dallas had provided evaluation reports for 15 of its 19 projects.

4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

The Dallas Impact program was shaped by four closely interwoven forces. The first was the city/county controversy in which Dallas County, after an extended struggle with the City of Dallas and the federal government, emerged with a major part of the program. In the end, 7 Impact projects (totaling \$8,098,327) were awarded to the county. (11)

Closely linked to the city/county debate and, in fact, a primary cause of it--was fragmentation in the criminal justice system which gave the courts, corrections, and jails in the Dallas area to the county, while the police remained the lone city function. (This explains why all city projects were run by the Police Department.) The fact of system fragmentation became the motivating force for advocating coordination and cooperation among city and county agencies, not only in the Dallas Impact program, but for the benefit of law enforcement and the judicial process throughout the metropolitan area. One of the successes of the Crime Analysis Team (or "policy group") in Dallas was that it provided a forum for city and county criminal justice officials to discuss mutual problems and to seek common solutions. An example of this is the police information system area where the county sheriff's department and the city police department have taken significant steps to integrate data bases and information systems.

A third major program-shaping force was a high degree of sectionalism in the political sphere. The structure and traditions of control inherent in local government in the City and County of Dallas, the strong dislike for what is termed "federal interference," and the equally strong commitment to local independence (as opposed to interdependence), forged a climate in which change could come only by degrees. Suggestions to broaden the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council to include community representatives, for example, were fought on the grounds that it would turn the body into a "police review board." In addition, the relationships between the city, on the one hand, and the state and the regional office, on the other, tended to be quite formal, with little of the free give-and-take necessary for the implementation of a fast-moving program such as Impact. It was this tradition of local autonomy and of resistance to change which prompted the Crime Analysis Team director, when responding to the criticisms over lack of progress, to counsel his critics that the Dallas Impact program should be "allowed to grow with the complete support and cooperation of all concerned."

The fourth factor was the primordial role played by law enforcement throughout Texas history. This penchant for police activities, strong in many regions of the nation, but particularly in the South, militated against a corrections program in the Dallas Impact plan. There is, for example, no community-based corrections program in Dallas nor, for that matter, anywhere in the State of Texas. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the main, the Dallas Impact program was oriented toward an improvement of system capability in the police and court functions.

While the Crime Analysis Team in Dallas can thus be given signal credit for progress in agency coordination there, the failure to achieve community input into the planning process has been patent, even though it was predictable. There is not much doubt that renewed, redoubled efforts are urgently required in this sphere, as well as in the adult and juvenile corrections areas.

In terms of the COPIE-cycle, the planning capability brought to local agencies through the Crime Analysis Team seems to have left its imprint. In the county planning department and in a number of city agencies, the crime-oriented planning approach has been integrated into the planning process. Also the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council, with membership provided by both city and county, will continue to use this approach to plan for system growth on a metropolitan-wide basis.

The Crime Analysis Team will continue in Dallas under LEAA non-Impact funds. Prior to Impact, the Team had performed planning and monitoring functions for LEAA projects; when the program ends, the Team will return to its previous level of 4 or 5.

##### 5. Project Innovation

Three projects implemented in Dallas were selected as innovative; two were youth programs operated by the Police Department: the Youth Services Program, and Youth Development and Corrections. These projects provided the police with a range of alternatives for use in dealing with juveniles, including short-term counseling, recreational programs, one-on-two relationships between officers and youth and the formalized use of contract services. These projects represent a very comprehensive effort undertaken by a police department to handle youth problems. The other project was Legal Aides for Police, which involved the assignment of four Assistant City Attorneys to work with the Dallas Police Department in order to reduce the percent of cases no-billed and cases dismissed by reason of police error. Although the attorneys worked with the police, they remained under the direction of the Dallas City Attorney and could not, therefore, give orders

to police personnel. Instead, project attorneys were expected to accomplish a slow and careful establishment of rapport by going into the field with police to gain first-hand knowledge of problems encountered and by spending many hours building a relationship with them. The development of a trusting relationship and the concomitant increase in interaction between police and attorneys provided police with an in-depth understanding of plea bargaining and of the rationales applied when cases are no-billed or dismissed.<sup>(5)</sup> All three of Dallas' innovative projects thus reflected the city's preoccupation with agency coordination (that of police/juvenile agencies in the first two cases, of police/courts in the third).

#### 6. Project Institutionalization

Over one-half of the Dallas projects are expected to be continued after Impact funding ceases. These include Legal Aides for the Police, to be funded by the city, the Youth Services Program, the Crime Investigation Pilot Study, and the two new District Courts which were initially funded as temporary courts under Impact to lessen the backlog of the local judicial system.<sup>(5)</sup>

#### 7. Summary

Overall, Dallas took a system improvement approach to Impact. Yet it is not clear why this could occur in Dallas when other cities were obliged, by Impact guidelines, to show direct linkages between the likely outcomes of their anti-crime solutions and expected decreases in rates of crime or recidivism. Although all of the cities funded some system improvement projects, the average across the other seven cities was only about 20 percent of awarded funds, whereas Dallas devoted 44 percent of its Impact funds to this area, thereby lowering crime-rate reduction and recidivism reduction projects to the level of second and third priorities. Of Dallas' 19 projects, 13 targeted system improvement; the effectiveness/efficiency conflict, therefore (see Chapter III, pages 42 through 44 above) appears to have received an unanticipated solution in Dallas.

A valid argument can be made for the Dallas approach. No "useless" hardware was bought, no "gimmickry," no gadgets. On the contrary, system improvement in Dallas meant new courts (in the face of a 330-day trial delay), and a search for better data processing, better police productivity. All of these efforts constitute good and useful things to do, in and of themselves. And they have the added advantage of more likely institutionalization after federal funds have disappeared. But although Impact was a program which

targeted improved system capability, it sought--first and foremost--to implement action programs in high-crime neighborhoods or rehabilitation programs for juveniles and adults which would have a potential for directly affecting rates of crime and recidivism in urban areas. Quite clearly, this is not a description of the Dallas program.

In sum, Dallas planners sought to reduce criminal justice fragmentation, and Crime Analysis Team efforts were oriented in a major way toward reducing friction among criminal justice agencies, and between city/county planners. Planning itself improved notably under Impact, and implementation timeliness and completeness were the second best (after St. Louis) in the program. Evaluation remained something less than expert, however, although it improved considerably with multiple reports for certain projects. As discussed above, however, it will be difficult to determine the effectiveness of many anti-crime projects in Dallas, based on the evaluations performed.

Further, given the resistance, in Dallas, to any provision of citizen input into the criminal justice planning process, it is possible that outcome evaluation may also continue to be resisted. Both of these, basically, are forms of accountability, and it may be that it is precisely this which is unwelcome in the two cases. It appears likely, therefore, that it may be some time, in Dallas, before change can begin in these areas, even by very small degrees.

DENVER

## E. Denver

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

Denver completed an extensive analysis of the five Impact crimes. Offender data were provided by type of offense, and a wide range of socio-economic, demographic, and infrastructural data were presented for the high-crime areas. Victim data were detailed and complete. The Denver Master Plan developed problem statements for each offense type and discussed the need for alleviating each problem in relation to crime-setting, offender, and victim. All in all, Denver provided the most complete, well-conceived and well-executed set of planning documents in the Impact program. Program goals, projects and project objectives flowed smoothly and logically from the data provided, and formed a pragmatic framework for understanding project selection. Further, Denver was the only city to document the process by which the prioritization of problems was accomplished and to identify the criteria utilized in selecting and ranking those problems. (1)

### 2. Implementation

An examination of implementation in the Impact program showed that Denver's program had a balanced functional distribution despite adherence to an intended concentration in the juvenile area. Police projects received 21 percent of Denver's Impact funds (the smallest percentage for police in any Impact city), corrections (adult and juvenile) were awarded 29 percent, and the other functional areas were generally well distributed, according to the exigencies of Denver's crime problems (see Table XXVII, page 165 above). This equilibrium across functional areas of the program not only reflects the careful planning effort which preceded specific project implementation, it is also an indicator of the system awareness underlying Denver's program.

All of this attention to detail did mean a slower start for Denver's program than for some cities (the average time for grant submission in Denver was about 16 months into the program, well above the 13-month average across the cities, see Figure 16, page 248 below). Given Denver's planning achievements, however, this probably means that it takes that time to do a good job of crime-oriented planning, starting from scratch. Once the work was done, however, Denver became one of the faster cities in proceeding from grant submission to provision of services (6.5 months or about one month less than the average). Overall, Denver emerged as the only city to have both utilized the crime-oriented planning model correctly and well, and also funded projects which were intimately and precisely linked with the particular priority problems delineated during the planning process. (2)

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

With few exceptions Denver evaluation components provided sound, workable plans for subsequent assessments of project success. Components provided clear statements of project objectives and corresponding measures, in addition to brief discussions of proposed comparison bases. A MITRE analysis of evaluation plans<sup>(6)</sup> across the eight cities shows Denver as having the highest mean quality level of any city, and the only city whose evaluation-plan quality exceeded its calculated expected mean, based on the kinds of projects implemented. Of the eight evaluation plans chosen programwide, which qualified as excellent in the analysis, two came from Denver. Once again, this was the result of the planning and effort of the first 16 months. Denver understood, early in the program, the need for baseline data with which to measure treatment effects and went to great lengths to construct a data base featuring victim, offender, and environment information for the crimes of robbery, burglary, assault, murder and rape (broken out separately by crime) as committed in Denver in the years 1970 and 1971. The Crime Analysis Team arranged to acquire and utilize existing data bases of other agencies, when this was possible; when it was not, team members searched files manually and constructed their own.<sup>(12)</sup>

Finally, evaluation plans were not static in Denver. When actual evaluation proved that plans were infeasible or unrealistic, they were re-worked and re-examined on an iterative basis.

Evaluation planning coverage was about average in Denver: 23 of 37 projects provided evaluation plans.

In terms of evaluation reporting, Denver again made one of the best efforts in the Impact program. Reports from Denver typically included limitations regarding the interpretation of findings as well as a cogent description of project activities. Two Denver projects provided documentation considered to be excellent examples of evaluation reporting (Project Intercept, and TASC). Denver documentation was also noteworthy for the fact that evaluation reports provided more depth to the explanation of evaluative issues and alternative explanations of outcome results than did most other Impact cities. This is particularly true for juvenile corrections and community involvement projects.

The approaches used in Denver's project-level evaluation reflect a reliance upon designs that provide at least two comparable data points to assess change in project outcomes. Four Denver projects used rigorous evaluation approaches that made substantial efforts to control quantitatively for other factors which might have influenced observed changes in indicators of project

success.<sup>3</sup> In sum, Denver's use of applicable evaluation approaches was among the best in Impact (with Portland and Atlanta).

Denver's project-level evaluation effort, overall, reflects a real commitment of resources, as exemplified by good evaluation planning, precise and well planned data collection, and the attention required to produce evaluation reports of high caliber.<sup>(7)</sup>

Evaluation reporting, although of fine quality, did not receive very comprehensive coverage in Denver; evaluation reports were received for only 16 of 37 projects.

#### 4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

The Denver program appears to have been primed by a system awareness which resulted in a directed effort toward the coordination of criminal justice system agencies among themselves and with the Denver community. Two areas of concentration which emerged from this orientation were the coordination of data bases across agencies, and the use of the Task Force as a mechanism for developing both citizen and user input into the planning process. Both of these efforts were begun during the early part of the Impact crime-oriented planning phase.

##### (1) Agency Coordination and baseline Data

Starting in July of 1972, the Denver Crime Analysis Team devoted thousands of man-hours to building and strengthening data bases in various functional areas.<sup>(12)</sup> The approach was to go into the various departments (police, courts, probation, for example), inventory what was available, and get permission to automate portions of it. Then the team members would return to the agency with new formats for aggregating and analyzing data relevant to the agency's activities. The changes were incorporated into agency data processing systems, and in return, the Crime Analysis Team was given access to the data to perform their own studies. The best example is probably the Police Department. The upgrading of the department's automated data processing system enhanced the police operational and research capability, while allowing the Crime Analysis Team to do the large number of special studies on recidivism, rape, and alcoholism which they accomplished

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<sup>3</sup> Northeast Denver YSB  
Youth Recidivist Reduction Program  
Project Intercept  
Southeast Neighborhood Service Bureau

over the past year. The most recent development is the corrections data base, designed for the four Youth Service Bureaus (an effort to coordinate youth services in Denver, see Section E, below). This will provide city administrators with a better picture of the juvenile crime problem in Denver, and it also has the positive effect of reinforcing the juvenile program thrust by bringing the four Youth Service Bureaus closer together, and getting their staff to talk to each other on a regular basis. Another side benefit of the approach has been to "open up" some of the more insular components of the criminal justice system. The Crime Analysis Team, over the past three years, has continued to meet with courts and corrections people (for example) and has built up a relationship of trust which is paying off in many ways: a freer flow of information between agencies, a willingness to discuss problems and possible solutions, and the like.

## (2) Community Involvement and the Crime Analysis Team

At the outset of Denver's Impact program and over the three years of its duration, decision-makers at the highest level were officially committed to a policy of encouraging citizens to express their views in regard to any and all programs proposed in the Denver Anti-Crime Council by the Crime Analysis Team or by others. Although at the beginning, groups such as the Legal Aid Society, the American Indian Movement, and others insisted upon having formal representation on the Council, with the maintenance of an "open door" policy, the demand for official status on the Council gradually receded as it became apparent that the Council was willing to listen to citizen viewpoints, and indeed, actively solicited this participation.

After experimenting with various mechanisms for channeling these viewpoints more directly into municipal crime control policy, the Task Force mechanism was finally retained. Over the three years of Impact, Denver's Neighborhoods Task Force (composed entirely of private citizens) examined every project proposed. They also formed subcommittees outside the formal structure, and went out into the community to solicit citizen reactions. It is clear that this Task Force had a voice in decision-making and an impact upon proposed programs. It is also clear that the group sought, faithfully and actively, to improve Denver's criminal justice system, mobilizing opinion in a way which was very helpful to the Impact effort. (12)

It is expected that the Team's work in support of agency coordination and community involvement will continue in Denver after the end of the Impact program. The Team, somewhat reduced in size, will become a separate City Commission under the auspices of the Office of the Mayor. The Team will be supported in part by the city and in part by LEAA, and will go on performing the same functions it executed under the Impact program.

## 5. Project Innovation

Without question, Denver was the leading innovator among the Impact cities.<sup>(5)</sup> Ten projects, developed and implemented there, were selected as innovative. Three of these projects focused on providing victim services: the Community Health Program for Victim Support, the Rape Prevention Program, and the Southeast Denver Neighborhood Service Bureau. The second of these, the Rape Prevention Program, was the only effort at basic research (built upon the work of Amir<sup>(16)</sup> in Philadelphia) to have been funded under Impact. Two other projects included decentralization of probation services through the utilization of community-based workers: Community Outreach Probation Experiment (COPE) and Intensive Probation and Parole Supervision. The latter also included the coordination of the executive function of parole and the judicial function of probation in providing community-based services.

Four more projects (including the Southeast Denver Neighborhood Service Bureau, already mentioned) make up the new Youth Service Bureau System which has coordinated 400 youth services and groups across Denver's four quadrants.

Two other projects, New Pride and Police-to-Partners integrated volunteers and business groups in unusual ways.<sup>(5)</sup>

Finally, the role of the Denver Crime Analysis Team was itself innovative in that it performed independent research tasks (such as the study of rape and of juvenile and adult recidivism) on its own initiative, and approached the execution of the COPIE-cycle and the agency coordinating function in a thoughtful, comprehensive and knowledge-seeking manner which seems to have been unique in the Impact program.

## 6. Project Institutionalization

Denver achieved some important results, in terms of institutionalization. Of 37 projects, 22 are expected to be institutionalized. These include all of the projects mentioned above, as well as the Special Crime Attack Team, Employ-Ex, New Pride, and the Crime Prevention Training Program.<sup>(5)</sup>

## 7. Summary and Analysis

Overall, it appears that Denver performed a balanced, comprehensive effort in support of the Impact program. The COPIE-cycle was handled well. Agency coordination and citizen/user input were actively pursued and their integration into the planning process was structured. The Crime Analysis Team acted as a change agent in getting the COPIE-cycle performed, in improving communications among agencies, in

fostering innovative projects and research. Of Denver's 37 projects, 10 were innovative, by program standards, and 23 are expected to be institutionalized.

Thus, the Denver Impact program has achieved some major successes and it therefore becomes important to account for them if they are to be replicated elsewhere. There appear to be several reasons for Denver's achievements.

First, from the beginning of the program, there was a thorough-going commitment to improve the criminal justice capability in Denver. When an initial search indicated a city-wide paucity of the kinds of researchers and analysts needed for the Crime Analysis Team, Denver embarked on a nation-wide effort to recruit planners and evaluators. This effort culminated in a team of knowledgeable people whose aggregate expertise was not duplicated elsewhere in the program. Since these researchers were not indigenous to Denver, however, the quality of the Crime Analysis Team there is in no way city-specific; it is, hence, eminently replicable.

Second, good communication mechanisms were instituted in Denver from the beginning. The Impact coordinators for the regional office and for the SPA met with the Crime Analysis Team director every week to discuss on-going problems and options. The Task Forces met and talked, the Mayor maintained a current and everyday interest, the head of the Denver Anti-Crime Council kept watch on program and project progress, on research activities, on the development of new channels for community input into the planning process.

Finally, Impact objectives were internalized in Denver. It seems that they were not subordinated to other goals, that there was no "hidden agenda." The Denver Crime Analysis Team worked hard at planning, implementation and evaluation, as did many other Teams, with the difference that, in Denver, hindrances and interference with the Team's efforts were at a minimum.

Over the program period, it seems that many barriers to communication and coordination were lowered. The Task Force mechanism seems to have worked well to bring together the disparate elements of Denver's criminal justice system (including police, courts and corrections people, prosecutors, public defenders and probation/parole officers) with members of the community, including minority groups. The Director of the Denver Anti-Crime Council feels that much remains to be done to achieve what he calls "grass roots" support in high-crime areas.<sup>(12)</sup> Yet it is true, despite this criticism, that during Council and Task Force meetings, representatives of all these groups debated and discussed, on a regular basis, the wide range of criminal justice issues and challenges confronting Impact. Frequently their discussions spilled

over into the newspapers, enabling the general public to participate. A perusal of Denver's two newspapers, The Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News for the years 1972 (last four months), 1973, and 1974 indicate some 700 articles devoted to the subject of crime and the criminal justice system in Denver. The press in Denver gave crime and the Impact program more coverage and attention than any of the other Impact cities received from their media.

Denver's record of success (in performing the COPIE-cycle, in improving agency coordination and community involvement, in developing innovative projects and institutionalizing them), provides evidence that these things can be done. The Crime Analysis Team's well-planned, well-managed, well-evaluated and well-integrated Impact effort proved to be a viable tool for improving the quality and capability of the criminal justice system in Denver.

NEWARK

## F. Newark

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

The planning effort in Newark produced an extensive and well-developed analysis of the characteristics of Impact offenses. It was supplemented with an overview of existing resources and capabilities. However, the planning documents failed to present detailed problem statements nor were priorities assigned to problem areas. The Master Plan moved directly from the crime data and an analysis of the existing criminal justice system to the proposed programs and projects. Some of the problems confronting Newark could be inferred, however, from the programs proposed:

- (1) inadequate detection and apprehension capabilities of the police,
- (2) increasing numbers of youthful offenders,
- (3) high recidivism rates for both juvenile and adult offenders,
- (4) delays in municipal and felony courts, and
- (5) little opportunity for youths to receive comprehensive rehabilitative services.

The prevention, anti-drug, and corrections projects, as proposed, were supported by the victim/offender/environment profiles, while crime control and court projects were supported by the analysis of deficiencies in the existing system.<sup>(1)</sup>

### 2. Implementation

Newark, as discussed in Chapter IV, ended by putting 41 percent of its funds into the police sector, which was a higher proportion than the average (33 percent) across the cities (see Table XXVII, page 165 above). Although the top three major program areas (identified in Section 1 above) retained the same order of priority in funding, police projects received more than 1½ times their anticipated allotment while the funding commitment for the other two areas was reduced. As of 30 June 1975, only 41 percent of the \$17,776,946 awarded to Newark was spent. This expenditure rate is below the average across the cities.

Overall, Newark projects took longer to submit their grant applications than did those of the other cities. This may have been because, like Denver, Newark was bent upon achieving a very solid effort at

crime-oriented planning. Submission once accomplished, however, the cycle from grant submission to project start-up was only 5.2 months, or 2 months less than the 7.5 month average across the cities<sup>(2)</sup> (see Figure 16, page 248 below). Implementation in Newark was thus timely (measured from application submission, and in terms of the project focus involved), and services were generally complete.<sup>(4)</sup> Other problems in Newark (see Section 4, below), however, slowed implementation there further, ending in some serious slippage over the life of the program.

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

The quality of project evaluation planning efforts varied considerably across projects in Newark. While almost all of the components detailed project outcome and activity objectives, only a subset of these provided operational definitions and details regarding selected comparison bases. Some however, were indeed excellent, and the Public Housing Security component qualified as one of the eight best in the Impact program.<sup>(6)</sup> Evaluation planning coverage was fairly comprehensive, with 18 out of 27 projects including evaluation plans.

Evaluation reporting, on the other hand, was a sore point in the Newark program. Evaluation management problems, especially the turnover of key personnel, caused Newark to fall behind the other cities in the fulfillment of LEAA evaluation requirements. While evaluation documentation for 12 of 27 Impact projects had been received, as of 31 August 1975, only one project provided a report detailing in-depth information regarding project success. This slippage reflects the tremendous evaluation problems experienced by the Newark CAT. Most of the documents reviewed from Newark (7 of 9) are either "status" or "progress" reports, and, as such, provide no information on questions regarding project outcomes. Most of the information contained in the Newark reports concerned project operation (or the lack of it) and explanations of the difficulties which precluded an assessment of project achievements.

Corresponding to the sparseness of Newark's evaluation efforts was the poor quality of its reports. Again this was at least partially the result of the scarcity of full-fledged or even preliminary reports for review. (Given the absence of full-fledged reports in Newark, it is not surprising to find, as well, an absence of acceptable evaluation approaches in the documents reviewed.) Because of the lack of outcome data, none of the projects could measure change in the outcome or intermediate variables.

Some improvement measures are presently underway in Newark to rectify past failures to perform minimally acceptable evaluation. Evaluation designs have been modified to represent a more reasonable approach to evaluation, given time constraints and the city's available evaluation capabilities. Recent reports (since September 1) do, in fact, show some improvement, especially in the reporting quality and the presentation of some outcome information. However, the passage of time and the failure to obtain good baseline data still impede most efforts. (7)

#### 4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

In Newark, at the beginning of the Impact program, there were two major political problems which eventually were responsible in large part for determining the program's course in that city. First, the "scramble for spoils" had been a traditional part of Newark politics. In the past, the city had participated wholeheartedly in a political culture whose criminal corruption was endemic. Modern times would, however, see at least one change in the character of the process: now the rewards were perceived to flow from the control of large federal programs, which meant jobs and power for those who could dispense them. As Sternlieb observed:

The only important competition for power (was) not between racial groups but between the people who control agencies that can attract federal funds--the Italians who control the Housing Authority, say, versus the blacks who control Model Cities or some other blacks who control the poverty program. They're like warring baronial gangs...The peasants till the fields, barely noticing the horses galloping by. (17)

The Impact program, in such a context, could not fail to be viewed as a particularly choice, particularly ripe plum.

Second, competition had become even more ferocious than in the past. The movement of middle-class white groups away from the city, which occurred most massively during the nineteen-fifties, had wrought a radical change in Newark's demographic character. As discussed in Chapter V, the city had a population in 1970 of which blacks were in the majority (54 percent), about 10 percent were Spanish-speaking, and the principal element of the remaining white population was of Italian extraction. Each segment had developed articulate political leaders who engaged in continued and sometimes dramatic political struggles. Little by little, as Newark's black residents gained in numbers and political strength, its white residents were said to perceive themselves as a besieged minority. (13)

Mayor Gibson had been elected in 1970 by a majority of 57 percent, but his hold on events was akin to that of many other big-city mayors--tenuous in the sense that his responsibility was not always commensurate with his authority. The media portrayed him as attempting to balance and accommodate the expectations and demands of activist black leaders, of a substantial business community dominated by large financial institutions, and of a white minority represented by forceful politicians, handicapped all the while by the fiscal powerlessness of modern urban mayors.

There thus existed two broad issues which surfaced from time to time as the Impact program was carried out in Newark, and which affected its management and development. These were:

- the traditional scramble for spoils and struggle for power, and their feared influence upon the program; and
- the program's ability to accommodate the conflicting demands of groups contending within the body politic.

Most of the events which would disrupt Newark's Impact program can be related, simply or in combination, to the basic issues discussed above. The focal point of the controversy within Impact came to revolve around the question of agency and community involvement (and the balance to be struck between them); in consequence, it revolved specifically around the role of the Crime Analysis Team.

Under direct pressure from LEAA and amid charges and counter-charges, the Newark Crime Analysis Team director, an appointee of Mayor Gibson, resigned in November of 1972. The LEAA exerted this pressure after rejecting the master plan developed by the Team. The city's position was to regard LEAA's action as unwarranted interference with program content. The city had stressed efforts to foster community involvement in the development of the plan and in the subsequent implementation of projects, and charged LEAA with trying to impose a "law and order" or "establishment" flavor not in tune with the real needs of Newark. To LEAA, on the other hand, it seemed that the Crime Analysis Team's plan had called for a general by-passing of traditional criminal justice system agencies in Newark, and that this could only lead to a failure to obtain the kinds of improved capabilities targeted by the Impact program. The LEAA drew up a list of major complaints:

- failure to consult and coordinate with criminal justice agencies;
- failure to design programs which responded to the crime problems evident from the data collected;

- failure to develop realistic budgets; and,
- failure to maintain accurate records and control funds adequately.

The conflict was basic, reflecting once again Newark's problems with the polarization and perceptions of its divided communities, with the "baronial" powers of agencies, with the problems of management and interagency coordination in such a climate, and with the fears and suspicions generated by past Newark administrations. Conciliation proved impossible, but the controversy continued for almost two weeks in the pages of local and national newspapers until Mayor Gibson issued a statement in which he acquiesced in LEAA demands "in the interest of the citizens of Newark."

After the departure of the Crime Analysis Team director, a great deal of elan went out of the program in Newark. The Team's evaluator, after producing a very good evaluation plan, soon followed the Team's director (see the discussion of evaluation, Section 3 above) leaving a long evaluation hiatus during which data were not collected, projects went unmonitored and reports failed to be written.

What could a Crime Analysis Team be expected to do in such an atmosphere? It turns out that it was able to do a great deal. In a recent interview with MITRE, Mayor Gibson pointed out that a great improvement in interagency cooperation and coordination was achieved in Newark, despite the handicaps faced by the Crime Analysis Team. Newark's Policy Board was used by the Mayor and the Team as a mechanism for bringing together the department heads of every criminal justice agency in the city:

They all began to work together. We kept them informed. We got over the traditional problem of lack of communication among elements of the system. An important advantage of this program is that it allowed us to pull all of these elements together. They are working better today than they ever worked in the past, simply because of this program. Coordination between city and county is also improved. As you know, we have a city court system and a county court system. Cooperation between the county courts and the city courts, city and county police, city and county prosecuting staff people, probation departments--all of these--this is a great success of the program.

Newark is presently making a considerable effort to keep on the Crime Analysis Team as a central criminal justice planning and coordinating agency. The city has already contributed \$100,000 toward

the maintenance of these Team functions. More money is being sought at the present time, but the concept has been accepted among criminal justice agencies and it seems likely that the Team's functions will continue, "even if we have to fund it out of the city's operating fund." (13) (Continuation funding has now been received from LEAA and from the city.)

#### 5. Project Innovation

There was not much innovation among the anti-crime efforts of Newark's Impact program. Many of the early proposals, if they had been implemented, might have been characterized as innovative. Unfortunately, these were all rejected during the turmoil and interagency conflicts of the first year, and program innovation was affected in consequence, much as it had been in Atlanta. It seems that only one project implemented in Newark can properly be called innovative: this is the Rape Analysis and Investigation Unit. (5) The unit involved the addition of specialized personnel to both the Police Department and the County Prosecutor's Office. A specialized detective unit was added to the Police Department, trained in the most effective investigative methods for identifying rape offenders and in interviewing techniques that are sensitive to the needs and concerns of rape victims. The prosecutor was physically located at the Rape Unit which, although part of the Police Department, was located in a separate building. The prosecutor coordinated with the police on the investigation of the rape, and assisted the victim through the justice process. A hospital component was included in the project, to offer special treatment to the victim, to collect evidence while treating victim injuries, and to preserve that evidence in a manner useful in a judicial prosecution. Women detectives and technicians were utilized to the greatest extent possible in order to put the rape victim at ease and referrals were made for other social services that were useful or needed by the victim.

This project represents a radical change from previous methods of handling rape victims in Newark in which a "police doctor" saw victims during weekdays (9-5) only, and evidence was not collected. The nurse, the doctor and the paraprofessional now testify at the trial, and evidence is preserved in a sealed kit.

#### 6. Project Institutionalization

Less than one-third of Newark's projects are expected to be continued. These include the Rape Unit described above, the Independence High School Alternative School, Public Housing Security Project (24-Hour Security Patrol) and Essex County Probation Department - Special Probation Caseload and Probation Volunteers. Even so, the prognosis for continuation may be over-optimistic given the limited availability of funds in Newark. (5)

## 1. Summary

Overall, the Impact program in Newark was fraught, unsurprisingly, with Newark-specific problems. Chapter V has already shown how profound these problems were, in 1970, in terms of crime correlates, crime rates, fiscal status and resource capability. Newark, therefore, started the program in a less advantageous posture than did the other cities. Thus, although Newark's program slipped, and although the need and means for evaluating projects appear only now to be internalized and to be making headway, it is nonetheless true that the city had managed to bring together a good Crime Analysis Team, that crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning had been well done, and that interagency coordination has been improved under extremely difficult conditions. The city's efforts to keep the Team going, its willingness to pay, out of city funds, for the continuation of Team functions despite the chronic shortage of city revenues are probably better measures of success in Newark than comparison with other cities--given the differing points of departure. If the new evaluation effort materializes in Newark, a serious step will have been taken in better organizing available resources against the city's crime problems.

PORTLAND

## G. Portland

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

Portland performed an in-depth analysis of the crimes of burglary and robbery in terms of the victim/offender/environment. The other three Impact offenses (murder, rape, and aggravated assault, less problematic in Portland) were not addressed. The planning documents included an inventory of available community resources for such services as early intervention, diversion, drug use treatment, remedial education, etc. Instead of stating specific crime problems to be attacked, the planners identified various factors that influence entry into the criminal justice system and classified these factors into three program areas. For example, grouped under the "prevention" area were such factors as learning disabilities, poor school attendance, lack of employability, drug use, vulnerable crime targets, among others. Inadequate manpower and slow response time were some of the factors associated with "justice administration." Inadequate diagnostic resources, lack of continuity in treatment, and coordination with community treatment resources were those listed under the "juvenile and adult corrections" program area. Each factor identified with each of these three program areas was cross-referenced to a project proposed in the Master Plan. On the whole, these projects could be traced back to the original data analysis. The only weakness in the otherwise excellent planning documents was the failure to provide insights into the priority-setting process and the lack of quantified program and project objectives. (1)

### 2. Implementation

As discussed in Chapter VI (see Table XXVII, page 165 above), adult and juvenile corrections projects received more than 60 percent of Portland's Impact funds. This allocation for corrections is the largest of any city. The distribution of funds conformed closely to the funding pattern proposed in the Master Plan. (2) As of 30 June 1975, only 37 percent of the \$16,067,117 in Impact funds awarded to Portland had been expended. This is one of the lowest city expenditure rates in the program, and it reflects a delay in implementation which has been especially pronounced for Portland's adult corrections projects. (Less than 11 percent of the funds awarded to these projects was spent as of the above date.) The average Portland project submitted its grant application 13.3 months into the program, relatively early compared to other cities; however, it was not until 2.5 years from program initiation that projects started providing services, very much later than other cities (see Figure 16, page 248 below). In addition, services appeared to be less complete, on the average, than planned. (4)

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

Project-level evaluation planning in Portland was a comprehensive effort. Revised evaluation components were received for many of the projects, with subsequent components providing greater detail regarding research design considerations and evaluative problems. Of the eight best evaluation components across the cities, three originated in Portland (Case Management Corrections Services, Public School Burglary, and Project PICTURE). (6)

Available project-level evaluations from Portland are the best in the Impact program. Unfortunately, the proportion of projects with documentation from Portland is also the lowest among the eight cities. This perhaps reflects the city's problems in implementing project activities as well as the nature of Portland's evaluation effort. Portland's strategy towards project-level evaluation was apparently to wait until comprehensive information was available before providing documentation on project activities and outcomes. For this reason documentation from 5 of the 6 projects was characterized as full-fledged evaluation: that is, providing in-depth information regarding project success.

Portland evaluators warrant particular attention for the scope and thoroughness of their evaluation reporting efforts. Reports were generally very well written, provided adequate activity information, cited a host of considerations crucial to a fair and unbiased interpretation of reported findings, and included detailed tables containing data upon which reported findings were based. In short, the documents reviewed were judged to be excellent transmitters of evaluative information.

Portland was considered to have used the most applicable evaluation approaches (based on only 6 projects, however) of the Impact cities. Practically all the evaluations made serious attempts to link observed changes in outcome measures of performance to project activities by controlling or adjusting for other factors which might affect observed changes. These attempts were also presented logically and in a format useful for decision-maker needs. If future reports produced in Portland continue in the same vein as those reviewed to date one may categorically label Portland the most successful Impact city in the area of project evaluation. (7)

### 4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

There were serious problems of interagency coordination in Portland. First, the Seattle Regional Office had delegated all of the evaluation responsibilities to the SPA because of its view that Impact was a "state

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**3 OF 6**

program," and because of its belief that the State Planning Agency possessed a proven capability to do project/program evaluation. The state, though, was slow in staffing up to do evaluation, and for many months was viewed by the city as its "absentee evaluator," with no one assigned to assist the state's one evaluator before February 1973. Also, the city smarted from the fact that theirs was the first and only case in the Impact program where a city planning unit was completely stripped of the crucial evaluation function. Relations remained strained between the city and the state well into the second full year of the program. (14)

Second, at the local level, there were problems among and between the city, county and state because of the fragmentation of the criminal justice system. Impact was a city program but, as usual, the city controlled only the police component of the criminal justice system. Given that corrections and courts are controlled jointly by the state and county, the city had to include these agencies in its planning efforts and remained open to sharp criticism, especially from the county, over its handling of Impact.

Third, the project review cycle in Portland, which involved an extraordinary multiplicity of agencies, was again a problem of coordination, relating this time to fragmentation in the intergovernmental system. This was a real source of program delay. The Portland Impact Task Force insisted that each sponsoring governmental agency must first formally approve its proposed project's concept. This procedure was followed by eight additional steps (which included the passing of two city ordinances) before a project could receive any monies to begin the implementation process. It was a lengthy cycle which caused the RO Coordinator to wonder if any projects would ever be implemented out of "this maze of politically-oriented administrative bodies."

The fact that the Crime Analysis Team was bereft of its major input into the program (which was the direction, supervision, and control of the COPIE-cycle) meant that the Team had fewer pretexts and opportunities for exercising its agency-coordinating function. It did not appear, under these circumstances, that interagency coordination could make any particular progress in Portland, and, in fact, it would seem that it did not. On the contrary, a great deal of bitterness and mud-slinging occurred and was reflected in media articles, based upon conflicts between city and county, state and city, and across the functional components of the criminal justice system. Portland's Mayor Goldschmidt, in a recent interview with MITRE, discussed his own disappointment with the program's failure to improve relations between the city and the state and, more specifically, between the city components of the criminal justice system and those operated by the state (especially adult corrections). He thought it was an error for LEAA to have insisted on a major SPA role:

The federal government felt very strongly that we should be involved with the state, because they're the state planning agency. They felt it should be a state/city/county relationship with them, and it was. But in many respects it was very cumbersome, very complicated, and tremendously time consuming, and I'm not sure whether we have built anything of lasting value. (14)

On the other hand, the Crime Analysis Team was successful in securing community involvement, in achieving a very high recruitment rate for its community projects, and an increase in the rates of crime-reporting by victims. Mayor Goldschmidt commented, as well, upon this success, pointing out that the strongest Impact projects in Portland were those that managed to use community resources better. While no usable community-involvement model was developed, the Mayor felt that Portland came out of the program with better planning tools which include the community, and with a program (Neighborhood Block Crime Prevention) that brings Portland closer to having a community-wide criminal justice planning process. The Mayor remarked however, that:

while we had quite a lot of citizen involvement, I think the real difficulty lies in the fact that the Task Force and Impact Staff<sup>4</sup> were not permanent things. They were created for the purpose of staying with the planning process and the monitoring process, but over the long term most people's loyalties or problems or conflicts are tied to the institutions that were already there before Impact came upon the scene. (14)

Yet, it seems that, if such were the case, the city might--like Newark, Denver, Atlanta and others--have taken steps to institutionalize the Crime Analysis Team function. This would, perhaps, have increased its leverage, not only in the community but with other agencies.

Portland's Impact Crime Analysis Team office closed on April 15, 1975. The planning and coordinating functions of the Team, however, are said to be continuing within the Office of Justice Programs which is responsible to the Mayor of Portland.

Finally, it should be noted that there was at least one area of agreement among the agencies involved in Portland's program, and this had to do with the corrections focus of Impact in Portland. There was,

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<sup>4</sup>Term for the Crime Analysis Team in Portland.

in fact, a surprising substantive unanimity of goals and philosophy among all agencies involved: Portland's program was to have a "broader vision" planning approach, and long-term objectives. Unfortunately, these views, although universally espoused in Oregon and Seattle, came into sharp conflict with the short-term payoff, rapid action objectives of Impact (see Chapter III, pages 44 through 45 above).

#### 5. Project Innovation

Several innovative projects were implemented in Portland:<sup>(5)</sup>

- (1) Case Management Corrections Services;
- (2) Project PICTURE;
- (3) Field Services; and
- (4) Research, Advocacy, Prevention and Education (RAPE).

One frequently employed technique was the use of a team approach with a case manager to deliver services and assistance to youthful or adult offenders. Three of the four Portland projects selected as innovative utilized this approach. Case Management Corrections Services, for example, was a decentralized juvenile probation project in which counselors assumed a client advocate role and had the authority to purchase needed services for their clients, to use other community resources available, and to coordinate efforts with the families of clients. Project PICTURE was a juvenile parole<sup>5</sup> project operating within the State Children's Services Division, thus involving the coordination of the institution and parole authority. A typical treatment team consisted of the parole officer, parents, involved relatives, a member of the Project PICTURE staff and employees or school personnel. Field Services was an adult probation and parole project which involved specialized treatment teams to include various combinations of counselors, human resource aides, volunteers, students, and ex-offenders.

The RAPE project, sponsored by the District Attorney's Office, emphasized successful investigation and prosecution of the offender, assistance to the victim, and public education. The innovative features were the position and functions of the victim advocate (a staff member of the DA's office), and coordinated training workshops given to police personnel and deputy district attorneys.

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<sup>5</sup> Oregon's Children's Services Division uses the term parole, rather than aftercare.

## 6. Project Institutionalization

Almost one-half of Portland's projects are expected to be institutionalized, including Field Services, described above, the Portland Police High Impact Project, and the Youth Service Bureau. (5)

## 7. Summary

Overall, it seems that the Portland Impact program was somehow special in many ways, just as Portland's crime correlate position, crime rates and resource capabilities were special and different from the other cities (see Chapter V, page 124). Portland distributed its funds differently (more than 60 percent to corrections), tried to do (and did) a first-rate job of planning and evaluation, sought to be innovative (and was) in its use of services and its applications of evaluation techniques, and produced--far and away--the longest delays in implementation of any city.

Although it appears that depriving the Crime Analysis Team of its evaluative (and hence COPIE-cycle) function may not have harmed evaluation (on the contrary, this seems to have added to evaluation objectivity, and to have generated perhaps the best evaluation effort in the program), it seems that it may have hurt the Team's agency-coordinating function by:

- reducing the Team's usefulness to other agencies, and hence its ability to barter;
- reducing its power and leverage in the community; and
- reducing staff morale.

Even more importantly, however, splitting evaluation from planning and implementation meant inhibiting the iterative process of the COPIE-cycle, which is perhaps its major contribution. In effect, if evaluation results do not find their way back to planners and implementers, useful project modification will fail to occur. Finally, because of the split, the opportunity was lost to develop an in-house, institutionalized evaluation capability in Portland.



## H. St. Louis

### 1. Crime-Oriented Planning

St. Louis planning documents provided only a general overview of the characteristics of the victim, offender, and the environment as they related primarily to burglary and robbery. Problem statements appeared to be only tenuously linked to the data presented. The problems identified, however, did focus on offenders, victims, and the environment. High rates of juvenile crime, drug addiction as a major cause of crime, high incidence of crime in public housing projects, high victimization rates within the black community in certain sectors of the cities, were some of the problems identified. Strategic planning, as represented by the program areas, appeared to be less well developed and, on the surface, seemed as if it might have been imposed after the fact to justify previously selected projects. Projects did not clearly track back to the problem analysis, primarily because of the general nature of the data provided. Further, although an indication was given of different strategies weighed in the planning process, program goals were not furnished and quantified project objectives were not specified.<sup>(1)</sup>

### 2. Implementation

The Impact projects implemented in St. Louis showed a good mix across all functional areas<sup>(2)</sup> (see Table XXVII, page 165 above). Police projects received nearly one-third of the city's Impact funds. Juvenile and adult corrections (combined) were allotted an amount approximately equal to the police allocation. The courts, which had occupied a high priority in the Master Plan, received reduced emphasis in the distribution of funds (8.5 percent) and dropped from first priority to fifth. Examining the distribution of funds from a project focus viewpoint (see Table XXVIII page 169 above), it then appears that St. Louis had the second largest (after Dallas) systems improvement component in the program (36 percent of awarded funds, or \$6.8 million).

The St. Louis Impact program was awarded a total of \$18,896,667, the largest amount awarded any city. About 74 percent of these funds were spent, as of 30 June 1975; this is the second highest expenditure rate (after Cleveland) across the eight cities.<sup>(2)</sup>

St. Louis projects started earlier than projects in other cities. Grant applications were normally submitted 9.6 months into the program, and start-up was achieved by the 16th month, some 5 months ahead of the average for all the cities (see Figure 16, page 248 below). Rapid

project implementation accounts for the high expenditure rate observed in St. Louis. Once award was received, projects started delivery of service 2.5 months later, on the average.

Implementation in St. Louis, was by far the best in the program; both the timeliness and completeness of services provided were excellent.<sup>(4)</sup>

### 3. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

St. Louis project evaluation plans varied in quality, with the bulk of the components providing some idea of how project success would be gauged. Like several of the other cities, St. Louis produced a substantial number of components lacking operational definitions and fully described comparison bases. Additionally, the vast majority of project evaluation plans did not address the question of data validation, an issue deemed essential for comprehensive, sound evaluation planning.<sup>(6)</sup>

Evaluation planning coverage seems low (only 43%), but since St. Louis implemented 47 projects, this means that 20 projects contained evaluation plans. This effort compares favorably with those of the other cities.

Evaluation reports from only 40% (19 of 47) of St. Louis' Impact projects were received and reviewed.<sup>(7)</sup> Of the projects not covered by reports, all were operational for more than a year. This causes serious concerns vis-a-vis St. Louis' efforts to fulfill the LEAA project evaluation requirements. The shortcoming is most probably related to the transfer of the CAT (in July 1974) from MLEAC Region 5 to the Mayor's Crime Commission and the subsequent resignation of the CAT evaluators (see Section 4 immediately below). However, of the projects for which documentation has been received (largely the work of the original CAT personnel), St. Louis had a high proportion of full-fledged evaluations (15 of 19) compared to the program as a whole (79% compared to 56%). Documentation from these projects attempted to answer questions dealing with project outcomes in a quantitative fashion.

Evaluation reporting was considered to be average for the St. Louis projects reviewed. Reporting varied greatly, with some very good documents alongside some poor efforts. Few projects (just 2)<sup>6</sup> provided sufficient data for reader validation in the documentation reviewed.

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<sup>6</sup> Providence Educational Center and Project to Increase School Attendance.

About half of the projects for which evaluation documentation was available were characterized as utilizing no true evaluation approach. For these projects, either no attempt was made to measure change in the project's intended outcome or such attempts were impossible because of the inability to proceed with the planned evaluation design.

4. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

St. Louis' program history is woven through with problems in intergovernmental relations, with fragmentation in the criminal justice system (reinforced by a powerful, capable and aggressive Police Department), and with frustrated community attempts to interact with the other two systems.<sup>7</sup> From the very beginning, with the Impact program barely announced, the leadership of Mayor Cervantes was challenged by various segments of the three systems. The St. Louis Crime Commission, the Police Department, citizen groups, the MLEAC Region 5 Planning Council, the State Planning Agency, and the MLEAC State Council in Jefferson City all desired to be the focal point for the administration of the program, and all took exception, one way or another, to the Mayor's approach. Interestingly, the President of the Board of Police Commissioners (appointed by the Governor) sought to enlist community support for the police bid (and inhibit Mayor Cervantes' early-start strategy) by proposing the formation of a citizen group to study the city's crime problem.

In Jefferson City, Governor Hearnes opposed an early start on the grounds that Impact monies were to be channeled through the state, and that the state would need a great deal more time and information before it could approve the program being proposed by Mayor Cervantes. Over and over, throughout the program, city/state frictions would resurface, sometimes focusing on planning issues, sometimes on people, always, in reality based upon the crucial question of political control of a federal program.

The Missouri Law Enforcement Assistance Council (MLEAC) Region 5, a state agency with offices in St. Louis, rapidly won the battle to control the program and house the Crime Analysis Team in St. Louis. The police and community activities had been less successful, even though they reinforced each other, and even though the Chief of Police

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<sup>7</sup> See also Chapter V, page 85.

in St. Louis and the Chairman of the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners were appointed by the Governor, thus taking some measure of control away from the city. The police chief failed in his bid to play the major role in the Impact program but succeeded, nonetheless, in getting funds for 9 of the 19 police projects proposed. The community effort resulted in at least relative failure. From the beginning, groups such as the Women's Crusade Against Crime, the Federation of Neighborhood Organizations, and the Metropolitan Citizens Crime Committee went on record with a number of projects and proposals. In addition a number of private citizens displayed a lively interest in the program and made early and frequent overtures to the city to become involved. But the difficulty with citizen involvement lay in finding a viable mechanism for dialogue.

From Region 5's point of view, contacting the right communities at the right time was a continual problem, as was instructing citizen groups on the nature and purpose of the Impact program. On the other side, the citizens complained that they could never get through to the right officials or receive timely and acceptable answers.

Mayor Cervantes was replaced by Mayor John Poelker who won election in April of 1973. The Mayor's Office (and the City Crime Commission) felt very keenly that since Impact was a city program, the Crime Analysis Team and its evaluation unit should be housed with the City Crime Commission and not with a state agency. Three strong criticisms were leveled at the CAT and at Region 5: a failure to enlist community support for the program, a penchant for highly sophisticated evaluation reporting which was considered to be neither timely nor useful for decision-making purposes, and an inability (because of Region 5's inappropriate status as a state agency) to do much to improve coordination among city agencies which looked upon Region 5 as an outsider.

Eventually, Region 5 lost its battle, and the Crime Analysis Team, except for its evaluation unit, moved to the City Crime Commission in July 1974. The Team's evaluators had resigned (see Section 3 above).

It seems, overall, that the Crime Analysis Team in St. Louis was never really able to take hold and to function. The pressure toward action programs (as in Cleveland), was overwhelming in St. Louis and the Team had no time to perform crime-oriented planning in a meaningful way (see Section 1, above). The agency coordination function was also inhibited because of the Team's locus within Region 5 (this is somewhat akin to the Atlanta Team's problem within the ARC) and efforts do not appear to have been made prior to July 1974, to enlist community aid in support of Impact programs.

Rivalries have thus continued strong in St. Louis and a great many problems appear to remain, despite the best efforts of the Crime Analysis Team. In June 1975, LEAA discontinued support for the Team and Impact evaluation efforts ceased in St. Louis.

#### 5. Project Innovation

Two of St. Louis' projects appear to have been innovative: one, Providence Education Center offered an alternative approach to education, and the other, the St. Louis Improvement Project, performed research, made recommendations, and lobbied for change within the court system. The Court Improvement project also promoted coordination among criminal justice agencies and published pamphlets on the courts and other city agencies to aid citizens. Providence Education Center offered an alternative educational environment for school dropouts and juveniles with special learning problems. The approach utilized combined an emphasis on counseling and treatment with individualized instruction and supported learning.

#### 6. Project Institutionalization

About 22 of St. Louis' 47 projects are expected to be institutionalized. These include the projects described above, Foot Patrol, Criminal Courts Improvement project, Circuit Attorney Diversionary project, Expand Citizens Reserve and many more. In St. Louis, however, many projects existed prior to Impact, therefore a greater number would be expected to be continued than in other Impact cities.

#### 7. Summary

Overall, St. Louis did an excellent job of implementation, the best in the Impact program, produced two innovative projects and achieved some anti-crime successes (supported by individual evaluation reports, see Table XXXIX page 322 below). However, planning and recent evaluation efforts have left a great deal to be desired and it does not appear that the Crime Analysis Team was successful in its liaison or coordination role. There seem to be several reasons for this: the great push to get projects operational, for one, the fact that many projects had already been funded under other auspices (rendering crime-oriented planning to establish the need for such projects a somewhat academic exercise) for another. Yet the fact that planning was not done rigorously meant that the foundation for the entire COPIE-cycle was undermined, and that the Team lost an important asset in the effort to improve agency coordination and to enlist community support.

## CHAPTER VII

### REFERENCES

The documents on which this chapter is based are as follows:

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5. Albright, E. J., An Examination of Project Innovation and Institutionalization Within the Impact Program, November 1975, MTR-7096.

#### TASK VII

6. Fischel, M. B., Kupersmith, G. W., and Trehan, A. P., An Analysis of Project-Level Evaluation Plans, April 1975, MTR-6891.
7. Fischel, M. B., Kupersmith, G. W., and Trehan, A. P., An Analysis of Project-Level Evaluation Reports, December 1975, MTR-7076.

#### TASK VIII

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10. Jordan, Jr., F. C., A History of the Cleveland Impact Program, October 1975, MTR-6946.

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## **Chapter VIII**

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### **Program Innovations from an Eight-City Perspective**

## CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY

This chapter completes the qualitative assessment of the Impact program's two major innovations: the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team. The findings of Chapters VI and VII are here integrated with program-wide analyses of the seven variables discussed (i.e., crime-oriented planning, implementation, evaluation planning and reporting, agency coordination, community involvement, project innovation, and project institutionalization).

*A first conclusion is that the two program innovations were feasible.* All of the cities were able to install Crime Analysis Teams, perform crime-oriented planning, produce master and evaluation plans, implement anti-crime projects and programs, and evaluate more than 60 percent of them. *In terms of crime-oriented planning:* four of the cities executed the effort successfully; another city recognized data gaps and other problems and improved its planning capabilities over the course of the program. Two other cities possessed the ability to perform sound crime-oriented planning but preferred to concentrate on rapid implementation. Only one city had a feasibility problem in planning and this was in the police area. It was caused by the relative autonomy of the police function in that city, and resulted in the inability of the CAT to access police data. *In terms of implementation:* five of the cities translated funds into operations rapidly and well. The three others were troubled with delays which could, however, have been reduced or eliminated in many cases if problems had been signalled and projects closely monitored and reviewed on an on-going basis. *In terms of evaluation:* project-level evaluation planning and reporting were executed by all cities in various kinds of institutional settings, justifying national program planners' hopes that such evaluation was a realistic expectation within the context of an action-oriented anti-crime program. Although some evaluations of high quality were performed, the uncertain state of evaluative knowledge--and above all the lack of dissemination of that knowledge--were major influences on the caliber of project-level evaluation. Since many of the problems encountered were remediable, it is clear that more technical assistance and training in evaluation (as well as more dissemination of evaluation information) are required.

*A second conclusion is that the two program innovations were relevant and useful for improving criminal justice system capabilities.* Those cities which performed the COPIE-cycle adequately, reaped benefits including a clearer focus on problems and needs, a better basis for justifying funding behavior, a sharp decrease in "off-the-shelf" projects when priority problems were well substantiated by data and analysis. There was certainty that the major crime problems were being addressed. Projects were evaluated, evaluation findings were used for project modification, new knowledge was gained about crime problems and anti-crime approaches, and improvements were registered in community involvement. Among the cities where the COPIE-cycle was not well performed, an initial crime-oriented planning failure to collect data and to substantiate crime problems and priorities rationally, led instead to varying degrees of priority uncertainty, loss of opportunity for interagency coordination, lack of baseline data for evaluation, inadequate evaluation, the impossibility of affecting and modifying projects in a timely way via evaluation feedback, and above all, the inability to identify anti-crime project achievements.

## Chapter VIII

### Program Innovations from an Eight-City Perspective

*The reception given to a new idea is not so fortuitous and unpredictable as it sometimes appears to be. The character of the idea is itself an important determinant.*

H. G. Barnett, 1953

The discussion in Chapter VI, then, showed that the eight cities all responded to the Impact initiative; that of Chapter VII showed that each city stressed different goals and different means for attaining them. Both the COPIE-cycle effort and the anti-crime programs generated in each city consequently reflected those goals and means in the manner and quality of their performance, and in the particular emphases and orientations which emerged. To speak to the questions of COPIE-cycle and Crime Analysis Team feasibility and relevance in terms of improved system capability program-wide, however, requires a search for patterns or regularities discernible across the cities.

The following discussion, therefore, focuses on the seven variables studied in Chapter VII and on the general pattern which emerged for each of them in terms both of feasibility and relevance. It will then be possible to distinguish a set of underlying relationships of reasonable explanatory power for Impact, and of predictive power, as well, for future programs.

#### A. Crime-Oriented Planning

Among the eight Impact cities, four (Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland) furnished well-developed and sound crime-oriented planning documents; the four other cities (Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas and St. Louis) provided plans which conformed less well to the crime-oriented planning model (see Chapter VI, Figure 11, page 146 above). (1)

In general, the first four cities noted above showed good integration of victim, offender, environment and system data into the processes of defining problems, establishing program areas, and selecting projects. Atlanta studied robbery and burglary in a crime-oriented fashion. Problems presented were linked clearly with victim,

offender, environment and systems data to produce relevant and consistent programs and projects. Denver provided an extensive analysis of the victim, offender and crime-setting and presented an entire document devoted to a detailed examination of high-risk census tracts. In addition, Denver defined a goal-objective hierarchy which concentrated on measuring program/project accomplishments linked to the victim, offender, and environment. Newark conducted an extensive analysis of both the victim, offender, and environment structure and of the criminal justice system. In addition, each selected program and project proposed by the Newark planners was cross-referenced to particular data items which supported these selections. Portland, in a like manner, examined the victim, offender, and environment correlates of burglary and robbery, studied portions of the criminal justice system, and integrated the two to produce relevant program areas. These in turn, were utilized to support projects, most of which could be tracked back to the initial data analysis.<sup>(1)</sup>

The remaining four cities (Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, and St. Louis) evidenced lesser degrees of harmony with the crime-oriented planning model. Baltimore was constrained by a lack of readily available data to describe the victim, offender, and environment. This meant that four of the seven program areas proposed were generally unsupported by crime data. The Cleveland planning documents showed only limited analysis of the victim and offender, and concentrated instead upon providing non-specific profiles of high-incident geographic environments (see Table XXII, Chapter VI above).

Dallas' planning documents did provide selected victim, offender, and environment data as well as system characteristics. The information detailed was quite limited, however, and not fully supportive of the problem areas deduced from the text. In addition, nearly half the proposed projects were geared to systems improvement objectives which did not appear to be based upon the initial data provided. St. Louis furnished, for the most part, a rather general description of Impact crimes in terms of the victim, the offender, the environment, and the system. In this sense, much of the data lacked specificity with respect to the five offense types. The program areas proposed, although basically crime-oriented in their construction, led to a number of projects which did not clearly link back to the original data analysis.

The cities varied widely in the scope, thoroughness and level of detail with which they examined and analyzed their crime problems. Although all of the cities determined the specific problems to be attacked, only Denver gave a documented account of its priority-setting process which included such inputs as:

- informed judgments of the potential immediacy of the problem;
- data analysis;
- a record of previous success in dealing with problems of this type;
- compatibility with the Denver urban environment; and
- the extent of true crime reduction likely to be afforded.

In this way, it was expected that only those problems which could be pragmatically addressed in terms of Impact objectives would surface as identified city priorities.

Six of the eight cities did not quantify program-level goals, and few of the cities posited fully quantified project objectives. This was probably due to the difficulties of predicting the likely effects of prevention and crime control programs; yet one of the major goals of crime-oriented planning had been to make evaluation feasible, and the failure to quantify would necessarily affect both project-level and city-wide evaluation. The planning documents produced by Atlanta and Denver, did, however, provide quantified objectives for the majority of the sample projects described. Newark defined quantified objectives for about 20 percent of its detailed projects, but St. Louis and Dallas did so for only a few of their projects, and the remaining cities did not provide quantified objectives at all.

Cities took highly varying amounts of time to submit their master plans (as discussed in Chapter VI, Section B, above). There seem to have been several reasons for this:

- (a) cities differed in their existing capability to perform a crime-oriented data analysis and planning effort;
- (b) difficulties in staffing;
- (c) difficulties in resolving the allocation of planning responsibilities;
- (d) difficulties in operationalizing and implementing a new approach to planning;
- (e) lack of initial enthusiasm on the part of criminal justice agencies or of top city/SPA/RO management for the knowledge goals of Impact or for the agency accountability implied;

- (f) differences in guidance, milestone-setting and monitoring by the various SPAs and ROs; and
- (g) whole-hearted commitment to rapid implementation.

Whatever the specific reasons, a major lesson to be derived from the planning problems and delays described here is that "front-end" planning for a complex federal program like Impact takes time. This is to say that city uniqueness and variability significantly affected the speed with which the planning activity could be brought to fruition program-wide. Thus, conflict foreseen at the beginning of the program between rapid anti-crime action and the production of new knowledge about crime proved inconciliable almost from the start, in terms of the time-frame established. The six-month period scheduled for start-up and planning, with projects to be implemented by July of 1972, was clearly inadequate; it thus became an either/or situation where cities had to choose between crime-oriented planning and rapid implementation. Some cities therefore opted for planning, some for rapid operationalization, and some tried to do both, so that there was a consequent straggling effect and a loss of concentrated program impact across the cities. (The straggle effect, however, was inevitable within each city, in any case, since even the best implementers did not have the capability to move all their projects into operation at the same time, with only 6 months' time for start-up.) More time, therefore, and a more realistic schedule would have been beneficial from several viewpoints: it would have allowed cities to plan and to implement, it would have made a more concentrated impact possible (both within and across cities) and it would have removed the incentive to hurry planning efforts in order to benefit from the financial rewards contingent upon rapid implementation (see Chapter VI, page 158 above).

National program planners, however, should not be accused of unrealism in this regard. It must be remembered that, at the beginning of the Impact program, no one knew how long it might take to perform crime-oriented planning or whether, indeed, it was feasible to perform it at all. It is precisely this knowledge gained from the Impact experience which will allow a more appropriate and reasonable schedule of planning and implementation to be elaborated in future large-scale anti-crime efforts.

Overall, it appears that crime-oriented planning was a useful tool for the achievement of a more rational application of federal resources to local problems. While rationality in planning is always desirable, a crime-oriented planning process had the additional value of pinpointing particular crime characteristics for selective attention (from the perspective of the victim, the offender,

the environment or a combination of these). Although all of the eight cities presented rational approaches to planning, differences were seen in the relative handling of the crime-oriented approach. That is, each city undertook the planning phase of the Impact program with a clear notion of what the final product of planning should be (i.e., proposed projects), but with varying methodological viewpoints, rationales and abilities applied to reaching these final products.

The fact that Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland performed crime-oriented planning soundly, however, means that, in those cities, the priorities arrived at in the planning process were solidly supported by data and analysis. This, in turn, signifies that--in those cities--federal dollars were assured of addressing the most important city crime priorities. Conversely, in those cities where planning was not performed in conformance with the crime-oriented planning model, even though priorities were indeed designated, there is no certitude that they corresponded to overall major city needs. On the contrary, the failure to substantiate problems with data and analysis made it easier to introduce partisan priorities or to substitute new ones for those arrived at through "educated, expert judgment." In Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas and St. Louis, priorities arrived at in the planning documents were not well supported by data and analysis. Thus, whether or not these priorities were adhered to during the implementation process, there is no assurance that these cities' major crime problems were addressed. Indeed, it is clear that in Dallas the crucial (and city-identified) problem of juvenile corrections, and in Baltimore, that of community involvement were almost ignored (see Chapter VII, page 208 and Chapter VI, page 166). Future programs will need to build clearer guidance for the performance and monitoring of the data-collection, analysis, and problem-prioritization steps of the crime-oriented planning model.

#### B. Implementation

As discussed in Chapters VI and VII, St. Louis, Dallas and Cleveland performed the most rapid implementation efforts of the Impact program, whereas Portland and Atlanta were among the last to bring their programs to operational status (see Figure 16 below).<sup>(2)</sup> Although the two slower cities mentioned here did a thorough job of crime-oriented planning, and the faster ones did not, it does not appear that a good effort at crime-oriented planning was the discriminating factor in slow or rapid implementation, except in the case of St. Louis. Here the movement toward implementation (and/or refunding of existing projects) was so fast and projects were so small that anticipated opposition predictable because of factionalism




FIGURE 16  
 AVERAGE TIME REQUIRED FROM GRANT SUBMISSION TO AWARD TO THE  
 INITIAL PROVISION OF SERVICES, MONTH AND YEAR BY CITY

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES  
 ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED),  
 THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, PAGE 103.


and fragmentation in St. Louis (see Chapter V, Table VIII, page above) never had the chance to consolidate or develop in time to impede program operations. In Dallas, rapidly was attributable more to:

- (1) the arrangement by which the state advanced the city's cash match automatically, so that operationalization in Dallas could follow almost immediately upon grant award, and to
- (2) the city/county agreement and harmony (see Chapter VII, Section D, 4. above)

than to any time gained by hurrying through the planning process. In fact, Dallas' average time for grant submission was no earlier than that of Atlanta and Portland, both of which thoroughly examined their crime problems. In the case of Cleveland, rapid implementation seems attributable more to the unanimity of views reigning between the Cleveland CAT and RO and to the early exclusion of the Ohio SPA than to time "saved" in collecting data. In addition, Baltimore, which had the second most lengthy implementation process in Impact (after Portland), did not perform crime-oriented planning with any particular rigor and, as discussed in Chapter VII, was impeded, in the main, by problems of staffing, and of agency coordination and commitment to program goals.

Among the cities having produced a planning effort of high quality, those which had implementation difficulties also had major problems of agency coordination (Atlanta and Portland, see Chapter VII, Sections A, 4. and G, 4). It is these, far more than the planning task, which generated the lag in implementation. Finally, Denver and Newark, both of which planned well, achieved reasonable implementation timeliness (one and two months, respectively, below the 7.5 month average between grant submission and initial provision of services across the cities, see Figure 17 below).

Thus, it would appear not only that the research/action conflict could have been at least partially resolved by a better-specified set of planning milestones and a somewhat longer time period in which to perform them, but also that this conflict may not have been the biggest problem. It seems logical to infer, from the planning and implementation experiences of these eight cities, that the major problem encountered (beyond the important one of staffing) was not the difficulty of imposing rationality upon recalcitrant users, but rather the difficulty of coordination among highly rational, entrenched agencies. This problem--quite independent of a Crime Analysis Team's capability or commitment to the performance of high-quality planning--is reflected in Table XXXIV below. Of all the cities, it is significant



SOURCE: DERIVED FROM GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975.

FIGURE 17  
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS REQUIRED FROM SUBMISSION OF  
 GRANT APPLICATION TO INITIAL PROVISION OF SERVICES  
 FOR IMPACT PROJECTS BY CITY

**TABLE XXXIV**  
**IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS NOTED BY 25 PERCENT OR MORE**  
**OF THE RESPONDING PROJECTS IN EACH CITY**

CITY	IMPLEMENTATION DELAY PROBLEM	PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS
ATLANTA	STAFFING DELAYS	46.2
	EQUIPMENT PURCHASE DELAYS	38.5
	SITE AND OFFICE LOCATION PROBLEMS	38.5
	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	30.8
BALTIMORE	STAFFING DELAYS	58.8
	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	52.9
CLEVELAND	STAFFING DELAYS	35.7
	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	32.1
	LACK OF COORDINATION	28.6
DALLAS	STAFFING DELAYS	44.4
	EQUIPMENT PURCHASE DELAYS	44.4
	SITE & OFFICE LOCATION PROBLEMS	33.3
DENVER	STAFFING DELAYS	44.4
	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	44.4
	FUNDING DELAYS	27.8
NEWARK	FUNDING DELAYS	52.9
	STAFFING DELAYS	47.1
	SITE AND OFFICE LOCATION PROBLEMS	35.3
	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	29.4
PORTLAND	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	57.1
	LACK OF NECESSARY EXTERNAL SERVICES	42.8
	FUNDING DELAYS	28.6
	EQUIPMENT PURCHASE DELAYS	28.6
ST. LOUIS	LENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES	45.0
	FUNDING DELAYS	40.0

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., "A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED)", THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, PAGE 121.

that only Dallas projects failed to stigmatize "lengthy administrative procedures;" this is because of the Dallas agency agreements discussed above (see page 249).

Efforts to examine delays specific to particular types of projects<sup>(4)</sup> yielded the information that:


- drug programs and information system projects (see Figure 18 below),
- equipment-dependent projects, and
- projects sponsored by governmental agencies (as opposed to non-governmental agencies),

were the slowest and longest to implement of any in the program.

It is, of course, unsurprising that equipment-dependent projects or information system projects should take a long time. There are special problems of procurement and expertise involved, and in any case, implementation-times for complex automated information systems typically vary between three and five years; it is therefore normal that they were slow to develop, by Impact standards. (What is surprising is that they were implemented at all under Impact, since there remains a serious question as to whether they constituted "action" programs in the Impact sense.)

Drug programs presented among the most difficult challenges for agency coordination of any functional area in Impact. In effect, implementing a drug program (i.e., simply operationalizing it, without regard to its success) required not one consensus but two: consensus among treatment and law enforcement communities about the drug problem and what it represents, and consensus among criminal justice system authorities on the issue of the advisability (from the viewpoint of general and specific deterrence) of directing drug users away from the criminal justice system. That drug programs should have been arduous to implement was therefore predictable.

The real surprise, however, comes from the slowness of governmental agencies as opposed to other agencies. Many of these non-governmental agencies (such as the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, or various Boys' Clubs) sponsored community involvement projects, and it is clear from Figure 18 that this functional area (along with court projects) was one of the more rapidly implemented functional areas in the program. Given that many of these agencies had not mounted programs of this size or complexity before Impact, these implementation successes, relative to government agencies, were



**FIGURE 18**  
**AVERAGE TIME REQUIRED FROM GRANT SUBMISSION TO THE INITIAL PROVISION OF SERVICES, MONTH AND YEAR BY FUNCTIONAL AREA**

SOURCE: GREENFELD, L. A., AND WEIS, C., A DESCRIPTION OF IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE EIGHT CITIES OF THE HIGH-IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM (UPDATED), THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6881, DECEMBER 1975, DATA AS OF JUNE 1975, PAGE 108.

unanticipated, and speak, once again, to the difficulties of inter-governmental coordination and its importance for the implementation of anti-crime programs.

In sum, certain cities were faster than others, depending mainly upon such things as the number of projects requiring the procurement of equipment or facilities, the rules regulating employment and operations in government-sponsored projects, or project requirements for coordination across intergovernmental agencies. An adequate performance of the COPIE-cycle, however, was not a major factor in slowing down implementation; rather the failure of interagency coordination, administrative problems and the type of project involved were the significant factors.

Implementation findings suggest that future program development and management efforts for short-term programs, such as Impact, need to concentrate initially on developing and streamlining the administrative structure relating to grant application review and approval and the initiation of service provision. Cities such as Dallas, where the necessary relationships and structures were generally developed prior to Impact, reflected rather speedy turnaround time in the processing of grant applications, compared to Portland, for example, where these mechanisms had to be created. Further, it seems clear that more LEAA efforts need to be made in the areas of general technical assistance, greater clarity of guidelines for project selection and SPA/RO monitoring, improved interagency coordination, and sufficient time for administrative pre-planning and for the hiring and training of personnel.

All of these suggestions are closely linked with the implementation delay problems noted earlier. It is evident that fund flow and the large number of administrative decision-making levels have been key areas of concern for project directors. New methods need to be generated for alleviating these problems. Without at least some streamlining, short-term anti-crime programs involving multiple governmental layers will probably continue to experience lengthy grant application and start-up delays, as well as great difficulty in achieving short-term objectives.

Finally, it appears that interagency coordination was the biggest single obstacle toward improved implementation achievements, and the major dilemma encountered remained the one articulated by Mumford in the nineteen-thirties: that is, the difficulty for cities to channel and to spend money effectively. To translate funds rapidly into the provision of anti-crime services which can be meaningfully evaluated to determine their effectiveness is not an easy matter, whether in an urban setting, or anywhere. There is little question, however, that Impact has caused important progress to be made toward

such a goal, through the lessons learned in the attempt by the eight cities involved. Among other things, the need for data (for both evaluative purposes and future planning) has been recognized; this was evidenced by almost unanimous responses of project, CAT, RO and SPA personnel to MITRE surveys. Because of the large number of projects concerned with evaluation activities, it can be expected that future planning and program development efforts undertaken by agencies experienced in the Impact crime-oriented planning and implementation processes will be more attuned to the need for data, more sophisticated in its handling, more aware of its ramifications for evaluation and for project modification. Some of the cities were already able to do a good job. All appear to have increased their capabilities through the effort made.

### C. Evaluation Planning and Reporting

Planning for evaluation and reporting of findings represented a major goal of Impact. It was, in fact, the major program effort targeting the acquisition of new knowledge about crime and about effective strategies for its control.

#### 1. Evaluation Planning

Project-level evaluation planning was required, in Impact, for all anti-crime projects funded under the program. It was not known at the beginning of the program, however, to what degree the expertise required for such evaluation might be available within the Impact cities.

The MITRE analysis of evaluation planning included 130 evaluation components which were designed at the beginning of the program (and which benefited, therefore, only from the knowledge available prior to program experience), and 19 subsequent components which were either revisions of original components or components designed for continuation grants (thus presumably benefiting from knowledge inputs accrued through program experience).<sup>(6)</sup>

Findings of the analysis were that:

- of the 130 initial components reviewed, 108 components (or 83 percent), provided some overall plan for evaluation; significant quality variation, however, existed among these 108 components;
- of the 19 subsequent components, 15 (or 79 percent) provided some overall plan;


- of the initial components, 41 (or nearly 32 percent) failed to achieve higher quality ratings because of inadequate operational definition of measures (i.e., they did not clearly specify which particular events or behaviors were to be observed); and
- only 7 (or 5 percent) of the initial components were judged to have provided rigorous evaluation plans; subsequent components did not improve the proportion of top-rated components (only 1 of 19, or 5 percent, was considered excellent), although the general quality level was much higher.

Figure 19 below illustrates the assessment process and shows how and why evaluation plans dropped out at the various levels of analysis. The approach used in the MITRE study was to define levels of comprehensiveness--and therefore achievement--for evaluation plans. A typology was developed allowing for classification of the components based upon four levels of "quality." Listed in ascending order they were:

- Level 1: provided no overall plan;
- Level 2: answered the question "what";
- Level 3: further answered the question "how";
- Level 4: spoke to the "what" and the "how" and provided linkages.

Components dropping out at Level 1 had failed to present the basic ideas of the project in terms of measurable goals and objectives. Level 2 was achieved when the component was judged to have provided a definitive statement of what the project sought to accomplish. This statement needed to contain a specification of activity and outcome objectives as well as to provide valid corresponding measures. Level 3 labelled components which, in addition to the attributes of Level 2, specified how they intended to collect the data necessary to employ the specified measures. Finally, Level 4 was achieved by further providing a mechanism for logically linking observed changes in measures to project activities.

Those 108 components which achieved a Level 2 ranking (see Figure 19) thus contained a clearly specified plan; only 45 of these, however, continued on to Level 3 (41 of the 108 had failed because they did not operationally define objectives). The 7 components which arrived at Level 4 contained an overall plan, answered the questions of what they were going to do and how they would do it, and specified mechanisms for logically linking observed changes in measures to project activities.



SOURCE: FISCHER, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., TREHAN, A. P., AN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION PLANS, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-6891, APRIL 1975, PAGE 27.

FIGURE 19  
DETERMINANTS OF COMPONENT QUALITY

Analysis of evaluation components by project focus found that:

- crime-reduction focused components fared better than those focused on recidivism reduction, and both achieved much higher quality levels than components of system improvement projects;
- of the 41 initial components (discussed above) which suffered from inadequate operational definition, 36 (or 87 percent) were recidivism-focused;
- while 55 percent of crime-reduction focused components fell into the two highest assessment levels, only 33 percent of the recidivism-focused components did; and
- analysis of the 19 subsequent components revealed that recidivism- and system-focused components showed improvement.

An analysis of evaluation plans by city found that Denver and Portland produced much better components than might have been anticipated (given the kind and focus of projects which they had chosen to implement) and that Cleveland and Dallas did less well than anticipated (using the same basis of comparison). (6)

Thus, differences in component quality were observed among projects of differing focus and city of origin. While it appears overall that differences in component quality are more the result of differences in project foci than of city planning differences, it is also true that some cities did better than others, given an expected quality level. The findings on evaluation planning program-wide, then, are that (as of April, 1975):

- 149 evaluation components had been developed under Impact for 140 projects (of about 200 projects having then been implemented).
- There was a strong relationship across the cities between the quality of the evaluation components and the focus of the project to be evaluated. When viewing the quality level of the evaluation components program-wide, it was found that variation in quality among components in five of the eight cities could be attributed to the type of projects for which evaluations were planned rather than to city differences. This suggests that difficulties encountered by Impact cities in conceptualizing and preparing evaluation components were more related to the state-of-the-art in evaluating different types of criminal justice projects than to the particular context in which the projects were undertaken. In this sense,

the findings of the previous analysis are encouraging, in that many of the problems appear to be clearly remediable. For example, problems in operationally defining measures and establishing logical linkages between activities and outcomes may be resolved through increased familiarity with and utilization of evaluation at the project level. More technical assistance to evaluators is clearly required, however. Like most other endeavors, expertise in evaluation planning is likely to be a function of time and experience.

- Guidelines for evaluation planning which list the elements to be included in project-level components are insufficient to provide the necessary tools for developing adequate and uniformly consistent evaluation plans. Planners need to receive model frameworks for evaluation plan designs that incorporate and address differences in project focus and thereby promote greater project conformity to the criteria in the evaluation planning model. These frameworks should also take into account differences in professional capability among planners so that eventual evaluations of similar activities are both of high quality and of a comparable nature.
- Mechanisms need to be established to provide evaluators with timely feedback regarding the adequacy of their evaluation components as blueprints for evaluation. Such feedback is needed to supplement model frameworks and insure their applicability to specific projects and contexts. In conjunction with one another, feedback mechanisms and model frameworks should favorably affect the quality of future project evaluation efforts.

## 2. Evaluation Reporting

The question of the degree to which evaluation reporting responsibilities would or could be fulfilled in the cities was at least as important an unknown, at the beginning of Impact, as the question of the feasibility of performing crime-oriented planning. Both were essential to improved system capability, both form major and interactive elements of the process known as the COPIE-cycle, both furnish integral and complementary new information about crime problems and anti-crime solutions.

### (a) Evaluation Reporting Coverage

MITRE's analysis of evaluation reporting<sup>(7)</sup> found that, as of 1 July 1975, 140 (or 60 percent) of the 233 Impact-funded projects had forwarded at least one evaluation report. Of these 140 projects,

documentation for 119 projects (51 percent of the 233) was considered suitable to be subjected to technical review. The proportion of projects documented did not vary by the focus of the project (e.g., crime-reduction, recidivism-reduction, systems improvement); approximately 50 percent of the projects funded for each focus had been documented and could be reviewed.

As noted earlier, in Chapters VI and VII, Impact cities varied widely in terms of review coverage; Cleveland and Baltimore had the widest coverage while Newark had the lowest. Approximately 24 percent of the projects for which evaluation documentation was not available had been funded less than one year. Recent project funding (December 1975) then, partially accounted for documentation delays.

(b) Types of Evaluation Reports.

To capture differences and similarities in the amount and type of activity and outcome information presented in reviewed evaluation documentation, documents were classified as either status, progress, preliminary evaluation or full-fledged evaluation reports. Use of this classification scheme provided the following findings:

- 57 percent of the 119 projects reviewed, posed and answered, in relative detail, questions regarding project outcomes (full-fledged evaluation reports); an additional 15 percent of the projects were the subject of preliminary evaluation reports providing only cursory information on project outcomes. Thus, 72 percent (or 85) of the 119 reviewed projects provided documentation containing at least some information regarding project outcomes;
- Documentation reviewed for a majority (70 percent) of crime-reduction focused projects were considered to be full-fledged evaluation reports; a greater proportion of status and progress reports were received and reviewed for recidivism-reduction and systems improvement projects (26 percent and 46 percent respectively, compared to 9 percent for crime-reduction projects);
- For four cities (Atlanta, Denver, Portland and St. Louis) more than 75 percent of the projects subject to review provided documentation considered to be full-fledged evaluation reports. No full-fledged reports were received from Newark.

(c) Report Content and Quality

The manner in which evaluative information was conveyed in project documentation was examined in terms of the following set of criteria: readability, presentation of activity information, specification of limitations, and inclusion of data for face validation. Based on the extent to which these criteria were met, evaluation documents were assigned one of four quality levels. Listed in ascending order they were:

- Level 1: no information;
- Level 2: descriptive information
- Level 3: explanatory information; and
- Level 4: substantiated information.

The findings were that among the 119 projects reviewed, variations in evaluating reporting quality existed.

Specifically:

- Only 42 (or 35 percent) of the 119 projects reviewed provided evaluation documentation with enough information to permit a meaningful interpretation of results;
- The evaluation reporting quality of documentation reviewed for projects of differing foci (i.e., crime-reduction, recidivism-reduction, and systems improvement) did not vary. Mean reporting quality scores calculated for projects in each of the three foci are almost identical--clustering around 2.2 (out of a possible 4.0), indicating the general descriptive rather than explanatory orientation of documents reviewed;
- On the other hand, evaluation reporting quality did vary among the eight Impact cities:
  - Portland and Denver were noteworthy for their good evaluation reporting (with mean reporting quality scores of 3.5 and 2.9 respectively);
  - project evaluation documentation reviewed from Atlanta, Dallas, and St. Louis (with reporting quality scores of 2.5, 2.4, and 2.2 respectively) were of reasonably good quality; in each of these cities, over 40 percent of the projects for which documents were reviewed included limitations important to a fair interpretation of reported findings; and

- the evaluation reporting efforts of Baltimore, Cleveland and Newark were viewed as being the least impressive, with mean reporting quality scores of 2.1, 1.8, and 1.6 respectively;
- Documentation from 80 percent of the reviewed projects provided the reader with a description of the projects' activities. The extent of activity information provided, however, would probably not suffice for use by those interested in project replication or transfer;
- Data needed for face-validation of the findings presented were provided in documentation for only 40 percent (47) of the 119 reviewed projects.

(d) Applicability of Evaluation Approach

Variations existed in the applicability of evaluation approaches used to gauge project outcomes. These evaluation approaches were assessed by examining the extent to which selected approaches permitted the identification of changes in the targeted crime problem and the attribution of such changes to project activities. Three general types of evaluation approaches were thus defined:

- (a) Type 1: No approach - the evaluation did not present any outcome findings or presented absolute figures with no point of comparison.
- (b) Type 2: Change measurement - the evaluation provided for the identification of change but did not attempt to control for the influence of outside factors on observed changes.
- (c) Type 3: Attribution analysis - the evaluation permitted the relation of observed changes in a measure of performance to project activities.

Analysis results based on these classifications led to the following findings:

- Over half (64) of the 119 projects reviewed were documented in the absence of an evaluation approach;
- Only 14 percent (17) of the projects reviewed used what was considered to be a rigorous evaluation approach to assess project outcomes;

- Of the 85 projects explicitly reporting project findings, such findings were viewed as justified and substantiated about 50 percent of the time, regardless of the nature of these findings;
- Of the 55 projects using at least some type of evaluation approach, 42 percent relied solely upon a before/after design; 29 percent combined the key aspects of the before/after approach with some type of comparison base;
- Variations in evaluation approach were observed among projects of differing foci. Specifically:
  - crime-reduction projects were most highly assessed with a mean approach applicability score of 1.87 (out of a possible 3.0). This compares to a mean of 1.63 for recidivism-reduction projects, and a mean of 1.38 for systems improvement projects;
  - crime-reduction projects were more likely to be evaluated using at least some type of evaluation approach than recidivism-reduction projects; both fared better overall than systems improvement projects;
  - rigorous evaluation approaches were distributed about equally among projects of all three foci; and
- Substantial variations in evaluation approach applicability were observed among the eight Impact cities; these variations overrode project focus considerations:
  - three cities were noteworthy for the use of rigorous evaluation approaches: Portland, Atlanta, and Denver;
  - about half of the St. Louis and Dallas documentation utilized no true evaluation approach;
  - projects reviewed from Baltimore and Cleveland consistently relied upon evaluation approaches that were not rigorous; and
  - all projects reviewed from Newark were documented without the use of an evaluation approach.

(e) Reporting of Evaluation Limitations

To gauge the extent to which Impact evaluators sought to encourage the proper interpretation and application of reported findings, the existence and type of limitations cited in reviewed documentation were recorded and analyzed. The results included the following:

- Of the 85 Impact projects providing findings, 87 percent tempered these findings by citing limitations in the interpretation of findings;
- All of the crime-reduction projects with findings specified limitations regarding their interpretation; 89 percent of the systems improvement projects provided such an interpretive context, in contrast to 80 percent of the recidivism-reduction projects;
- Impact cities did not differ significantly in the reporting of limitations. More than 80 percent of the reviewed projects for each city which provided findings included within their evaluation documentation explicit limitations with respect to the interpretation of these findings;
- Data constraints (i.e., unavailability, limited quantity and reliability) were the most frequently reported evaluative limitations, accounting for 54 percent of the 208 limitations recorded;
- Design approach problems (e.g., lack of comparability among control group/area, seasonality, etc.) constituted the second most frequently reported limitation, accounting for 33 percent of the 208 recorded;
- Variations in the type of limitations reported were observed among projects of differing foci:
  - design problems (limitations) were most prevalent among crime-reduction projects (53 percent) and can be largely explained by the fact that projects reviewed of this focus frequently (33 percent) tempered findings with the admission that attribution of changes to project activities was not possible or within the scope of the project evaluation; and
  - data problems predominated among recidivism-reduction (51 percent) and systems improvement projects (54 percent) reflecting the dependency of projects of these foci upon other than established data sources.

(f) Reporting of Operational Problems and Recommendations

Project evaluation documents were reviewed to assess the extent to which they included statements concerning problems encountered in project operations and recommendations for improvement. Findings indicated that:

- Operational problems were cited in the evaluation documentation of 79 percent (94) of the 119 projects reviewed;
- Two cities--Portland and Baltimore--reported operational recommendations significantly less often than other cities;
- The organizational responsibility for project-level evaluation seemed to have no effect upon the extent to which evaluation documentation communicated operational problems;
- Personnel problems (i.e., staffing and training) were the most frequently mentioned difficulty cited in the reviewed documentation, accounting for 35 percent of all problems cited;
- Problems concerning the development of lines of communication essential to project operations (i.e., establishing client referral sources, interagency cooperation, community support) were the second most frequently mentioned concern in the reviewed documentation, accounting for 23 percent of all problems cited;
- Problems regarding project funding were rarely (3 percent) cited in the reviewed project documentation;
- Recommendations for the improvement of project operations were cited in the evaluation documentation of 55 percent of the 119 reviewed projects;
- Project-level evaluations written by project staff presented recommendations more frequently than those prepared by other agencies;
- Recommendations reported in the reviewed project evaluation documentation typically corresponded to reported operational problems or consisted solely of general statements urging project refunding; and
- Recommendations reported by the reviewed projects generally were not logical extensions of evaluation results nor specific enough to adequately inform those responsible for resolving project difficulties.

Based on the above findings, several observations about the Impact evaluation experience can be made. First, outcome-oriented project evaluation is both a realistic expectation and feasible within the context of an action-oriented program such as Impact. Documentation specifically earmarked for evaluative purposes was received for 140 (or 60 percent) of the projects funded with Impact monies as of August 1, 1975. Additionally, questions dealing with project outcomes were posed and at least partially answered for 72 percent of the 119 documented projects that were reviewed.

Second, rigorous evaluation was conducted for only 14 percent of the projects included in this analysis. Weaknesses in the evaluation approaches used to gauge project outcomes necessarily cast doubts upon the credibility of reported findings. Where evaluation documentation explicitly provided findings concerning the attainment of project outcome objectives (85 of 119 projects), the credibility of these claims, regardless of their nature, was viewed as questionable for almost half of the projects. This finding further reflects the tremendous difficulty Impact evaluators had in providing findings about project outcomes based on the type of evaluation approaches used and data presented in reviewed documentation. This lack of face validity suggests that project evaluations performed in the Impact program were typically not powerful enough to permit the attribution of observed outcomes to project activities. (Exceptions to this are constituted, however, by most of the project evaluations which led to the identification of projects in Chapter IX, below.) In light of this, the successes and failures observed among Impact projects must be critically reviewed on a project-by-project basis before applying the results in other contexts.

Third, the heterogeneity observed among evaluation documents produced by the eight Impact cities had implications for evaluation policy. In the absence of standard procedures for organizing, staffing, performing and documenting the evaluation of project-level activities, it is difficult to expect uniformity in either the quantity or quality of project evaluation efforts. While the LEAA provided some guidelines and examples for use in the development of project-level evaluation plans, similar guidelines were not disseminated regarding the actual collection and reporting of evaluative information. As a consequence, opportunities to encourage greater uniformity (and therefore comparability) in the type of project information collected were not used to full advantage in the Impact program.

Fourth, the type of project to be evaluated also appears to have colored several aspects of the Impact project evaluation effort. While the conduct of rigorous evaluation was evidently feasible for all three types of projects examined (i.e., crime-reduction,

recidivism-reduction and systems improvement), the identification and use of bona fide evaluation approaches was less prevalent among projects designed to reduce recidivism or to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system. This finding suggests that in the absence of a standardized, regularly-updated data base such as that available to measure changes in reported crime rates (almost exclusively used in crime-reduction focused project evaluations), project evaluation efforts are less likely to produce information addressing changes occurring in conjunction with and/or due to project activities. Thus it needs to be understood (and integrated into evaluation plans) that recidivism-reduction and systems-improvement focused projects must create their own baseline data (where none exist) or establish a new data base in order to measure project effects.

Fifth, the type of information provided in reviewed documentation also varied by project focus. The majority of crime-reduction focused projects were viewed as having full-fledged evaluation reports (90 percent were either full-fledged or preliminary evaluation reports). Documentation for recidivism-reduction and systems improvement projects was typically less oriented toward the provision of project outcome information, with a greater proportion of reports being status or progress reports. Again, data available and ease of collection may be partly responsible for these differences. In effect (and unsurprisingly), data problems were more frequently cited as limiting the interpretation of findings in reports for recidivism-reduction and systems improvement projects than for crime-reduction projects.

Finally, the majority of evaluation documents reviewed contained essential ingredients for use as an aid to decision-making and to the improvement of project operations. Limitations crucial to the interpretation of reported findings were reported in documentation for a full 62 percent of all the reviewed projects; this includes those projects (34 of 119) for which findings in terms of outcome (or intermediate) objectives were not provided. Additionally, 79 percent of the project documents reviewed discussed at least one project operational problem, while recommendations designed to improve project operations were cited in 54 percent of the reviewed documents. Thus, Impact project evaluations were viewed, and were apparently utilized, as vehicles for the improvement of project operation.

In sum, both evaluation planning and reporting took place in Impact, on a very large scale. It is clear that a great deal more work is needed to upgrade existing evaluative research tools, both through technical assistance and through the generation of data bases relevant to differentially focused anti-crime projects. The fact remains, however, that outcome-oriented project-level evaluation has

been shown to be feasible, and that rigorous evaluation reporting has been demonstrated in a variety of cities and institutional settings. Most importantly, many of the problems which beset evaluation, in Impact, are remediable. Mediocre performance was often due to a failure to hire (or replace) expert staff, or to a failure of top management commitment to evaluation, or--since the two are not mutually exclusive--to both. Lastly, it appears that multiple evaluation reports for the same project seem to get better, over time; that is, there are more data available so that it is possible to interpret results more meaningfully (e.g., Dallas: Legal Aides; St. Louis: Foot Patrol). Thus, Impact has shown that project-level evaluation is feasible, that it can be aided in a variety of manners, and that it can be expected to improve notably, over time, with training and experience.

D. Agency Coordination, Community Involvement and the Role of the Crime Analysis Team

1. Agency Coordination and the CAT

The discussions in Chapter VII established that agency coordination improved, as a result of Impact activities, in Cleveland, in Dallas, in Denver and in Newark. In those four cities, where the Crime Analysis Team was able to exercise its liaison role, Team efforts seriously strengthened criminal justice agency cooperation and coordination. The Cleveland Crime Analysis Team tied youth service delivery together throughout the city by developing a system of youth neighborhood coordinators; the Team also developed a community-based probation program involving the coordination and relocation of Municipal Court Probation, Common Pleas Court Probation and the Adult Parole Authority. County and state corrections officials were thus housed for the first time in the same building and could establish a close working relationship.

Dallas undertook a major effort of coordination across city and county agencies of the criminal justice system. The county sheriff's department and the city police department began the integration of data bases and information systems as part of a region-wide (city and county) effort to control crime. Dallas funded and implemented projects which generally aimed at improved coordination between the police and other components of the system as, for example, in Legal Aides for the Police, or in the Dallas Police Department's Youth Services program. Finally, the successful resolution of the city/county battles which took place at the beginning of the program constitutes a major achievement of the Crime Analysis Team. The issue was handled through the formation of an Executive Committee (within the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council) in which there was city-county-suburban

representation and an understanding that spending for any project would be subject to review and approval by the local governing body (County Commissioners, City Council) responsible for any projects funded through the Council.

In Denver, the Crime Analysis Team used data base development as a mode of entry into relationships with other agencies, and as a way of linking various agencies of the criminal justice system. The Team established a network of four Youth Service Bureaus to coordinate city-wide the referral of juveniles diverted from the criminal justice system. The Task Force mechanism inaugurated in Denver appears to have worked well as a forum for bringing together disparate elements of the criminal justice system (including police, court and corrections people as well as prosecutors, public defenders and probation/parole officers).

In Newark, there were severe problems of agency conflict at the beginning of the program (see Chapter VII). These appear to have been considerably ameliorated through the Policy Board mechanism for bringing the department heads of every criminal justice agency in the city together regularly. City/county court relationships were also improved through the project "Special Case Processing for Impact Offenders" which targeted modifications to the entire adjudication process, reaching from Newark Municipal Court arraignment through Essex County Court sentencing. Other projects, such as the Rape Analysis and Investigative Unit, targeted improved prosecutor/police working relationships.

In those cities where the Team had difficulties, however, results were less felicitous. Impact did not improve agency coordination in Portland, for example. The city and Multnomah County continue to have a highly tumultuous relationship, with the county ending its participation in the joint criminal justice planning agency rather abruptly in July of 1974. City/SPA relationships had not been improved when the evaluation function went to the SPA rather than the Crime Analysis Team (or Impact Staff) in Portland. Further the complexities of the state/county/city partnership were grafted, in Portland, upon a 9-step municipal approval process, which worsened rather than improved the prospects for agency coordination by making it even more cumbersome, complicated and time-consuming than it had been before (see Chapter VII).

In St. Louis, as well, problems between the MLEAC Region 5, the SPA and the City Crime Commission became explosive and resulted in the transfer of the Crime Analysis Team to the Crime Commission and the resignation of the Team evaluators. Even though factionalism is not new in St. Louis (it is, in fact, deeply anchored in city

traditions, see the general overview, Chapter V), and even though it is not clear that any short-term action program could have impacted those traditions in a meaningful way, still, the same can be said of Newark, yet progress was made there under Impact. It seems that, as in Portland, it may have been a mistake--at least from the viewpoints of agency coordination and of long-term system capability--to have moved the locus of program power outside the city (see Chapter VII).

In Baltimore, the dominance of the SPA (see Chapter VII) and the autonomy of the police department did not leave much room for the Crime Analysis Team liaison function. In sum, the inability to access police data or achieve coordination with the Police Department, the delegation of power by the regional office to the SPA, a skeletal Crime Analysis Team and a change in Team leadership at a crucial point of program start-up, had all worked together to make improvements in agency coordination there very difficult.

In Atlanta, interagency relationships were troubled by SPA/city conflicts (see Chapter VII) and city/county conflicts, by the power and autonomy of the police chief, by the location of the Crime Analysis Team outside the city organization within the Atlanta Regional Commission, by turbulence between the Atlanta Regional Commission and the State Crime Commission, and by the successive resignation of two Team directors. Finally, a change in city leadership was accompanied by a reorganization at the end of 1974, creating a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and transferring the Crime Analysis Team to the mayor's office as staff support to the Council. The Team now appears much better able, as a city agency, to stimulate coordination among other city agencies, and has begun clearinghouse and dissemination functions in support of that role.

Thus, four cities clearly improved the coordination of their criminal justice agencies through Crime Analysis Team efforts under Impact. Atlanta also made some progress. Those cities where little or no improvement was visible either were troubled by severe problems of agency power relationships which did not allow the Crime Analysis Team to operate optimally, or else had been unable to invest that Team with the functions and prerogatives it needed to ensure an effective liaison role.

In sum, it seems that the ability of the Crime Analysis Team to improve interagency coordination was largely a function of existing city/state relationships. In effect, most cities maintain a precarious balance of power with state agencies. When the Impact program failed to sustain city bargaining power (by giving an important CAT function to the state, for example, as in Portland and Baltimore, or

by removing the Team from the city organizational structure, as in Atlanta and St. Louis), the CAT itself was weakened: it lost much of its ability to barter with other agencies, to deal with them on an equal footing, to maintain leverage in the criminal justice and intergovernmental systems and in the community.

## 2. Community Involvement and the CAT

As discussed earlier, community involvement was a priority, but not a very major one at the beginning of the program. The "maximum feasible participation" goal of the earlier poverty programs had left planners somewhat hesitant about how to develop effective mechanisms for community input into the planning process and for community support of local anti-crime projects (see Chapter II, pages 33-34, and Chapter I, pages 11-15). Viewing the elaborate incentives developed for the corrections and COPIE-cycle priorities of Impact, it seemed likely at the beginning of the program that community involvement would be more honored in the breach than in the observance. Yet, this did not turn out to be the case. Projects targeting specific types of community involvement ended up with 10 percent, or about \$14 million, of Impact funds: more than the courts, more than drug programs, more than target hardening, more than prevention (see Table XXV, page 161 above).

The slender importance which cities attached to citizen participation and community involvement at the start of Impact can be seen by the scant attention lavished on the collection of victim data (see Table XXII, page 153 above), by the failure to provide systematically for the monitoring of community reaction to anti-crime projects, by the absence of projects to improve citizen interaction with the courts. As the program proceeded, however, and the national awareness of the disadvantaged status of certain victims (vis-a-vis both the offender population and the criminal justice system) increased, Crime Analysis Teams turned their attention to developing victim assistance projects and to finding better ways of achieving community support, especially in high-crime area neighborhoods.

Three cities which were committed to community involvement from the beginning were Denver, Cleveland and Newark. Almost from the initiation of the program, Denver devoted a good deal of effort to developing the Neighborhoods Task Force mechanism (see Chapter VII, page 216). The Cleveland CAT also recognized the importance of this problem and projected regular surveys to measure changes in community attitudes (these, however, never came to pass). In Newark, the first Master Plan focused perhaps its greatest emphasis on achieving community participation (see Chapter VII).

As the trend toward community involvement expanded, Atlanta and Portland reinforced their programs and some innovative projects were developed emphasizing a community focus or strategy (see pages 275-276 below). The July 1974 move of the St. Louis CAT to the City Crime Commission opened the program there for the first time to regular community input through the Commission's Citizens' committees. Public hearings were held during the final Impact funding cycle with extensive community participation.

While Dallas has now implemented a larger community-focused crime prevention program, no mechanism has yet been implemented to introduce a citizen orientation into the criminal justice planning process. Although Baltimore devoted only 2 percent of its Impact funds to community involvement (after having declared it a major priority), part of these funds--in an award coming late in 1974--created a Citizen's Advisory Committee (appointed by the mayor) which is slated to have an opportunity to help determine the selection of Baltimore's criminal justice anti-crime program.

In sum, with the single exception of Dallas, all of the Impact cities made progress in the area of citizen input into the planning process. Crime Analysis Team efforts have been largely responsible for these achievements, as they have been, as well, for many of the innovative projects funded which focused on community involvement.

#### E. Project Innovation

Innovation was a priority under Impact (see Chapter II, pages 24-25), but it was not a focal priority, as in the Pilot Cities program, for example. Pilot City Teams were to select and develop projects aimed at "new" and "innovative" approaches which could increase criminal justice system capabilities to combat crime. In Impact, on the contrary, while it was hoped that there might be innovative approaches and techniques which could develop from the COPIE-cycle and CAT initiatives, this was really a corollary concern. The purposes of Impact were to reduce specific crimes and to improve criminal justice capability, not to test experimental projects. The weight of the Impact effort thus went toward the deliberate imposition of a rather prosaic rationality upon the processes of criminal justice planning and evaluation, with the expressed intention of acquiring some new knowledge along the way about Impact crimes, about victims, offenders and crime-settings, and about which interventions are effective against specific crimes and which are not. Yet paradoxically, this prosaic approach was innovative in that it was applied across eight cities on a scale which was itself new and unusual, in that it was overlaid upon a system fraught with myths, uninvestigated assumptions and opinion but very little data and analysis, and in that the COPIE-cycle was a new technology being demonstrated across the Impact cities.

Within the program, on the other hand, innovation was sought only incidentally, as a desired incremental payoff to other Impact benefits; there was no innovation mystique, per se. In fact, however, given the Impact approval and funding process, given the "lengthy administrative procedures" against which project directors railed (see Table XXXIV, page 251 above), given the general problems of inter-agency coordination, given the pressures toward action and against research, given--above all--the lack of a quid pro quo or incentive for agencies to want to fund innovative ideas, it seemed unlikely, at the beginning of the program that much project-level innovation would emerge.

This did, in fact, turn out to be the case in many cities, and especially in those places where the problems of difficult agency power relationships prevented the CAT from functioning optimally (as in Atlanta, Baltimore and St. Louis). Different techniques were used by agencies in these cities to out-maneuver what they perceived to be the endless revisions of the grant application review process. Projects proposed thus tended variously to be "tried-and-true," non-controversial, and/or short-term, small, inexpensive. An agency in Atlanta actually cut a project budget in half with the explicit goal of facilitating its passage through "the system." Clearly this was not a climate in which the CAT could successfully push for innovation. Yet surprisingly, innovation occurred within the program, in every city, but especially in those urban places where there was unanimity of philosophy (Portland's "broader vision" for example, Dallas' system improvement orientation or Denver's empirical, integrated approach) added to Crime Analysis Team energy and creative expertise.

MITRE's analysis of Impact project-level innovation reviewed the 233 projects of the program and found 26 which could be classified as innovative (according to the four categories given in Chapter VII, page 193 above).<sup>(5)</sup> In addition, various features of other projects contained innovative aspects.

The 26 projects selected as innovative fell into the following general categories:

- (1) youth service delivery;
- (2) alternative schools;
- (3) juvenile programs;
- (4) juvenile probation and parole;
- (5) adult probation and parole;
- (6) court-related projects;

- (7) rape-focused projects;
- (8) assistance to elderly victims and potential victims; and,
- (9) police-community involvement.

These projects are described briefly at Appendix to this chapter (see Table XXXVIII, pages 292 through 299 ).

Table XXXV below groups projects by city and by type of innovation. The preponderance of Denver projects (10 of 26) is striking, the closest contenders being Portland, with 4 and Dallas with 3. The cities, in fact, appear to divide once again here according to lines of age and advantage (as noted in Chapter V above), with the younger, higher-income/higher education level cities originating 19 (or 73 percent) of the 26 innovative projects.

Table XXXVI below displays the set of 26 projects along with innovative features (or component parts) of other projects in terms of their basic thrust toward community involvement, agency coordination, or knowledge acquisition. Most of the projects selected (22 of the 26), involved the community in some manner. In addition, almost half of the project components selected (8 of 18 components) increased community and criminal justice system interaction or awareness. These projects and components focused on community crime prevention, community-based corrections, and victim assistance. The orientation appears to be a result of the community emphasis of the Impact program, of the additional funds that were made available to implement crime prevention and community-oriented projects (frequently considered less important to criminal justice agencies than systems improvement or other types of projects), and of the trend, nationwide, toward victim and community-focused efforts.

Types of community-oriented innovative projects can be summarized as follows: seven projects gave assistance to victims of crime; three projects involved ameliorated police-community relations; twelve projects concerned community-based corrections (including the system of youth service bureaus in Denver); and one project was partially designed to acquaint citizens with the courts. Looking at the project components: one project involved surveying community attitudes prior to project implementation; two attempted partial funding of the project by the business community (Police-to-Partners in Denver succeeded in this effort while Coordinated Juvenile Work Release in Atlanta failed); one involved special training for the police in community crime prevention; and two involved surveys of community acceptance and reaction to the project. Many of the projects selected, either in whole or in part, also involved the participation of volunteers. Police-to-Partners, New Pride and Intercept are of particular interest here, but many other projects also used volunteers extensively.

TABLE XXXV  
INNOVATIVE PROJECTS BY TYPE OF INNOVATION AND BY CITY

CITY	PROJECT/PROGRAM NAME	TYPE OF INNOVATION				TOTAL NUMBER BY CITY
		TYPE A	TYPE B	TYPE C	TYPE D	
ATLANTA	1. ANTI-RAPE UNIT 2. TARGET HARDENING THROUGH OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION (THOR)	X	X			2
BALTIMORE	1. PORT OF BALTIMORE SEA SCHOOL 2. SENIOR CITIZENS AGAINST THEIEVERY	X			X	2
CLEVELAND	1. CLEVELAND YOUTH NEIGHBORHOOD COORDINATORS 2. COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS	X			X	2
DALLAS	1. LEGAL AIDES FOR POLICE 2. YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAM 3. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND CORRECTIONS	X	X	X		3
DENVER	1-4. SYSTEM OF YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS (4 PROJECTS) 5. NEW FRIE 6. PROJECT INTERCEPT 7. COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROBATION EXPERIMENT (COPE) 8. INTENSIVE PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION 9. RAPE PREVENTION PROGRAM 10. COMMUNITY HEALTH VICTIM SUPPORT	X X X X X <sup>1</sup>	X	X <sup>1</sup> X	XXXX	10 <sup>2</sup>
NEWARK	1. RAPE ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION UNIT	X				1
PORTLAND	1. CASE MANAGEMENT CORRECTIONS SERVICES 2. INTENSIVE CARE, TRAINING AND UNIFIED REHABILITATION EFFORT (PROJECT PICTURE) 3. FIELD SERVICES 4. RESEARCH, ADVOCACY, PREVENTION, AND EDUCATION (RAPE)	X X X <sup>1</sup>	X	X <sup>1</sup>		4 <sup>2</sup>
ST. LOUIS	1. PROVIDENCE EDUCATIONAL CENTER 2. ST. LOUIS COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT		X		X	2
TOTAL NUMBER		12	5	2 <sup>3</sup>	7	26

KEY:

TYPE A - USES A NEW APPROACH, NEW PROCEDURES, OR NEW TECHNOLOGY IN SOLVING A PROBLEM.

TYPE B - USES OLD PROCEDURES, TECHNOLOGY, OR APPROACHES IN A NEW WAY OR IN A NEW CONTEXT.

TYPE C - USES AN EXISTING AGENCY TO ASSUME A SET OF NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

TYPE D - USES A NEW AGENCY TO ASSUME A SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES NOT CARRIED OUT BY AN EXISTING AGENCY.

<sup>1</sup> PROJECTS ARE BOTH TYPE A AND TYPE C; COUNTED ONLY ONCE IN TOTAL FOR CITY.

<sup>2</sup> THE PROJECT THAT IS BOTH TYPE A AND TYPE C IS COUNTED ONLY ONCE IN TOTAL FOR CITY.

<sup>3</sup> THE PROJECTS THAT ARE BOTH TYPE A AND TYPE C ARE COUNTED WITHIN THE TOTAL FOR TYPE A ONLY.

SOURCE: ALBRIGHT, E. J., AN EXAMINATION OF PROJECT INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHIN THE IMPACT PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, HTR-7096, DECEMBER 1975, PAGE 31.

CITY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED	INNOVATIONS SELECTED		COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT		AGENCY COORDINATION		KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION	
		PROJECTS	COMPONENT PARTS <sup>1</sup>	PROJECTS	COMPONENT PARTS	PROJECTS	COMPONENT PARTS	PROJECTS	COMPONENT PARTS
ATLANTA	20	2	1	2	1	1		1	
BALTIMORE	27	2	0	1					
CLEVELAND	39	2	1	1	1	2	1		
DALLAS	19	3	2	2	1	1			
DENVER	37	10	7	10	4	7	2	1	1
NEWARK	27	1	0	1		1			
PORTLAND	17	4	3	3		4	2		1
ST. LOUIS	47	2	4	2	1	2			1
TOTAL	233	26 <sup>2</sup>	18	22	8	20	5	2	3

<sup>1</sup>COMPONENT PARTS INVOLVE INNOVATIVE FEATURES CONNECTED WITH: PLANNING, ADMINISTRATION, EVALUATION, TRAINING, IMPLEMENTATION OR SERVICES.

<sup>2</sup>SINCE THE SAME PROJECT MAY ADDRESS VARIOUS OF THESE GENERAL GOALS, TOTALS ARE NOT ADDITIVE.

SOURCE: ALBRIGHT, E. J., AN EXAMINATION OF PROJECT INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHIN THE IMPACT PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7095, DECEMBER 1975, PAGE 141.

TABLE XXXVI  
INNOVATIONS BY CONTRIBUTION TO COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, SYSTEM COORDINATION AND KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION, BY CITY

Over 75 percent of the projects selected as innovative made a contribution to coordination between or among criminal justice and other intergovernmental units (20 out of 26 projects). In addition, several of the project components selected (5 out of 18 components) targeted system effects. The agency coordination impact occurred primarily across criminal justice system units, although in several cases, other social service agencies were involved. In addition, some of the projects included under community involvement had the effect of integrating community groups more closely with criminal justice agencies.

The agency coordination function occurred primarily as a result of Crime Analysis Team interactions with criminal justice agencies in the development of Impact projects. The contributions of innovative projects toward such coordination varied greatly. Five of the selected projects involved the city-wide coordination of services to youths diverted from the criminal justice system, and four targeted the coordination of probation and parole services. Other coordination efforts occurred between police and prosecutors' offices, between corrections projects and schools, and between citizen groups and courts.

Only two of the innovative projects selected made a research or knowledge contribution. These were the Rape Prevention project in Denver, whose first phase involved basic research on rape victims and offenders, and the Target Hardening Through Opportunity Reduction (THOR) project in Atlanta, which designed a study of the problems of false alarms and other issues relating to building security.

The contributions toward knowledge acquisition of projects selected as innovative are thus relatively small. This could hardly have been otherwise, since Impact projects could not target knowledge acquisition as an objective, and it was not expected that much research (basic or applied) could be performed in pursuit of Impact's action or system capability goals.

However, this conclusion is only partial, since it is based uniquely on individual projects, as such. The real knowledge contribution of Impact innovations cannot, of course, be assessed at the project level but needs to be measured, over time, in terms of the COPIE-cycle and its ramifications program-wide.

#### F. Project Institutionalization

Local institutionalization, for all federal programs, is the real, the indubitable sign of success. What usually happens, however, is that programs endure so long as federal monies last, but once these have disappeared, the programs vanish, often without a trace. Although

the Impact program was designed as a short-term action program, it was hoped that many of the projects and programs implemented would be adopted on a permanent basis. This is, in fact, one of the central concepts behind LEAA funding (i.e., that federal funds be made available for local communities to test various ideas and that the local communities then support the project if its continuation is seen as desirable).

Many factors influence institutionalization.<sup>(5)</sup> These include the success of the project, the degree to which it becomes an accepted part of the everyday way of "doing things," the support of key people (including agency personnel and political and community leaders), the attitude of the community, and available funds. The types of influences and the degree to which they affect project institutionalization vary with the type of project. For example, for many projects implemented within criminal justice agencies, the most important factor, in addition to funding availability, is agency acceptance of new concepts, approaches, or procedures. In contrast, for projects involving new agencies, the most important factor, in addition to funding, is credibility. A diversion project, for example, must establish credibility with criminal justice agencies in order to receive referrals. Credibility must also be established with the community, and again with clients, if their participation is voluntary.

Within the context of Impact, some of the factors affecting institutionalization appear to have been weakened and others intensified. The Crime Analysis Team acted as a catalyst stimulating coordination and change across police, courts, and corrections agencies and helped signally to gain community support. Further, Impact, as a city program, received strong support from the mayor's office. But a great deal of rivalry between city and county governments occurred in some places relative to Impact funding, and the mayor now holds the main vested interest in city project continuation from a political point of view. (Although county and state criminal justice agencies have similar vested interests, this is from an effectiveness, rather than a political viewpoint.) When decisions are to be made by county and state governments concerning continuation of project funding, therefore, there is less pressure on them to continue even highly rated and well-accepted projects than there exists for city governments. But city governments are, of course, notoriously "poor," and thus a key factor in municipal institutionalization becomes the availability of funds, just as the existence of political pressure becomes key for state and county agencies, for whom funding may be less of a problem.

Impact involved a large infusion of funds into urban criminal justice budgets over a rather short time-period; therefore, many of the projects implemented were relatively "expensive." Since Impact was a "city program" in a city/county state criminal justice environment, it is now, as the program phases down, the responsibility of

all these three levels of government to continue the funding of projects implemented. Yet it is not clear to many state legislatures or to state and county agencies that they should help to institutionalize projects which they had little or no voice in selecting. This is a crucial factor inhibiting institutionalization of Impact projects.

Another important factor is also a result of the large infusion of funds. These funds enabled the cities to implement many projects that they might not have chosen, given more restrictive funding levels. Examples are the extensive police-community relations efforts involving large scale media campaigns as part of public education programs, additional probation and parole services, and alternative schools. Over the long term, local governments may well view these projects as non-essential and return to the status quo.

Thus, the large influx of Impact funds was a great advantage to the cities over the short term, enabling them to increase criminal justice agency and related capabilities and try new approaches in crime control. Over the long term, however, the fast-implementation aspect of the program combined with the fact that the funds were given for city-specific services may prove a disadvantage. The existence of the CAT as a focal point for coordination and as a stimulator for support was critical during the implementation of the Impact program. After Impact has ended, however, it is up to the local governments to continue funding support. To what degree this support will continue can only be estimated at this time.

MITRE surveys of project and CAT directors, as well as of SPA and RO personnel, have established a current (but shaky) projection that about 43 percent (101 out of 233) of the projects funded as part of the Impact program will be continued, at least in part; the prognosis is unknown for another 25 projects. This projection is almost surely too high. First, some predictions may be over-optimistic. It is natural for persons deeply involved in programs to base their estimates partially on their enthusiasm and to believe projects will be continued simply because they are excellent and provide needed services. This, unfortunately, is not always the case. Second, it is very early to make predictions. Many of the projects for which predictions were made will be funded for another year under Impact. Final project results are not even imminent. Third, the predictions were generally for immediate project continuation rather than long-term adoption. This means that if the projected source of funding identified was a local or state government, long-term adoption is more likely than if the source of funding was a federal government agency or a combination of local and federal sources. (For approximately 10 percent of the projects expected to be continued, funding is to be supplied at least partially by federal sources.) Finally, the projections for 7 of the 101 projects state that these projects

are to be continued in part only. Many other projects may, in fact, also be continued in part or at a reduced level. Also, many of the projects involved initial outlays for equipment and the cost for continuing these projects is considerably less. Thus, the 43 percent projected continuation figure may to a large extent apply to the adoption of concepts and the partial continuation of projects. Viewed from this perspective, the prognosis appears to be more realistic. Relatively inexpensive projects, and projects which involved large one-time costs, are likely to be continued. For projects requiring substantial additional funds, institutionalization, generally speaking, is much less probable.

Table XXXVII below displays estimated institutionalization of projects by city, according to survey responses from Crime Analysis Teams, SPAs, ROs and project directors. Some cities (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, and St. Louis) expected high percentages of projects to be continued. In Denver, the number of projects expected to continue may be attributable to the overall success of the Denver program. In contrast, the large number expected to continue in St. Louis is at least partially due to the fact that many of the projects in St. Louis were expansions of existing activities. Continuation, therefore, may actually indicate a return to the previous state, especially where equipment comprised a large share of the Impact funds. In Dallas, many of the projects were directed toward systems improvement and are therefore perhaps seen as more essential to continue than projects implemented outside the system. Most of the projects expected to continue in Atlanta also involve systems improvement.

Of the 101 projects expected to be institutionalized, 67 percent are in the police, courts, and corrections areas. These areas contain 63 percent of the projects implemented as part of the Impact program. The breakout by particular functional area, however, does not simply reflect emphases within the program. On the contrary, Impact implemented only 25 court projects, yet 17 are expected to continue; this is the highest proportion (68 percent) of projects to be institutionalized of any functional area. In the police area, 37 projects have been implemented and 19 (51 percent) are expected to continue. However, in the juvenile and adult corrections area where 84 projects were implemented, only 31 (37 percent) are expected to continue.

Thus, a higher percentage of projects is likely to be institutionalized in the police and courts areas than in the corrections areas. This may partially reflect the extent to which corrections projects involve costs for additional manpower, and partially, also, the lesser leverage of corrections in resource allocation decisions, and the weakness of the corrections constituency presently mobilizable to affect those decisions.

TABLE XXXVII  
PROJECTED INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PROJECTS BY CITY

CITY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED	UNKNOWN	ENDED OR EXPECTED TO END	FAIR <sup>1</sup>	GOOD OR HAS BEEN CONTINUED	PERCENT EXPECTED TO CONTINUE <sup>2</sup>
ATLANTA	20	3	3	3	11	55%
BALTIMORE	27	6	0	17	6	22% <sup>3</sup>
CLEVELAND	39	1	12	16	13	33%
DALLAS	19	0	3	4	11	58%
DENVER	37	2	2	9	22	59%
NEWARK	27	9	0	8	8	30%
PORTLAND	17	3	1	6	8	47%
ST. LOUIS	47	1	6	14	22	47%
TOTAL	233	25	27	77	101	43%

<sup>1</sup> IF PROJECT TO BE TEMPORARILY CONTINUED UNDER LEAA FUNDING, PROGNOSIS IS GIVEN AS FAIR.

<sup>2</sup> ROUNDED TO NEAREST PERCENT.

<sup>3</sup> SPA GIVES THIS FIGURE AS 85 PERCENT.

SOURCE: ALBRIGHT, E. J., AN EXAMINATION OF PROJECT INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHIN THE IMPACT PROGRAM, THE MITRE CORPORATION, MTR-7096, DECEMBER 1975, PAGE 164.

Of the remaining projects expected to continue, 8 projects are prevention projects which are all directed toward youthful offenders or potential offenders. Combining these with the 15 juvenile corrections projects, 23 projects expected to continue are directed toward the youthful offender, a major focus of the Impact program. In addition, 12 projects expected to be continued are in the community involvement area. These, combined with some of the prevention and other projects reflect the community orientation of the Impact program. Five street lighting projects are also expected to be institutionalized; these projects basically involve a one-time equipment cost, however, which renders them more likely to be institutionalized than other types of projects. The eight information system projects expected to continue also involve substantial one-time costs.

Finally, of the 26 projects selected as innovative, it is interesting to note that nearly two-thirds (17 projects) are expected to be institutionalized. The prognosis is unknown for three projects. None of the innovative projects is expected to end, however, and the prognosis for seven of them is fair (three of these will be continued temporarily under LEAA funding).

The prognosis for the institutionalization of innovative projects (65 percent) is therefore considerably higher than the prognosis for all Impact projects (43 percent). This difference may reflect more careful development of innovative projects, involving agency and community participation. As previously observed, the Crime Analysis Team often played an active role in the planning stages of innovative projects. Also reflected may be a difference in the perceived effectiveness of these projects, or in the interest generated in them because of their novelty.

In sum, while the present view of 43 percent of Impact projects institutionalized may well be optimistic, some lessons do appear from the foregoing findings:

- contrary to the revenue-sharing experience, Impact cities have used federal monies in (useful) ways which they could not otherwise have afforded to do; there is little evidence that Impact monies were substituted for normal criminal justice expenditures;
- institutionalization appears more likely for systems improvement, efficiency-oriented projects which did not target Impact crime-reduction goals than it does for those projects which did;

- institutionalization seems most likely of all for innovative projects;
- given the problem of available funds in urban areas, there is a serious institutionalization argument for heavier state/county involvement in and acceptance of high-crime area programs.

G. Relevance and Feasibility of Program Innovations in Terms of Improved Criminal Justice System Capability: Some Conclusions

What then can now be said about the Impact COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team? What difference did it make in terms of city criminal justice capabilities and in terms of overall crime control policy goals, for example, if the COPIE-cycle was performed well or badly? (Major premises of Impact were that the COPIE-cycle and Team functions were feasible and could be performed readily in U. S. cities, that these tools would allow the measurement of project and program anti-crime effectiveness, that the knowledge of "what works" could be increased and disseminated, and that, over the long term, such improved quality, capability, knowledge and insight would work toward the reduction of crime.) It now appears evident that for those cities which were able to execute the major tasks and functions, the benefits seem to have been considerable.

1. Relevance

The crime-oriented planning process, adequately performed, brought a clearer focus on problems and needs, a better basis for justifying funding behavior, a sharp decrease in "off-the-shelf" projects when priority problems were well substantiated by data and analysis (e.g., in Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland). Even in those cities where the effort to implement the cycle was less than whole-hearted, there is today considerably more data collection and analysis being done by criminal justice planners, by police, courts and corrections people than before Impact (in Baltimore, Dallas and St. Louis, for example).

The crime-oriented planning process brought new tools, then, but also a new kind of professionalism, of breadth in thinking about criminal justice problems. Many agency planners, for example, had to deal with projections, strategies and tactics on a scale they had never experienced before. Further, the COPIE-cycle brought exposure to what other people around the country were doing in planning and evaluation--not only in criminal justice but in other social program areas as well-- and this exposure made them aware of other options and choices which could be applied locally. (This was especially true

in Portland, in Denver, in Dallas and in Atlanta.) An important benefit of the COPIE-cycle/CAT initiative, therefore, was a by-product of the wider dissemination of ideas which accompanied the program.

Evaluation planning acted in a similar way. It forced some new thinking about what a project was supposed to accomplish, an improved understanding of how activities needed to fit together to achieve targeted objectives. (This was evidenced by component revisions and grant application changes--especially in Atlanta, Denver and Portland.) Evaluation planning also helped cities to identify gaps in data and in system information because they were obliged to specify data sources. In this way they came to realize that they needed to follow up on their offenders to know what was happening to them (in terms of rehabilitation, re-arrest and/or re-conviction) in order to have a basis for comparison with project outcomes. Denver and Atlanta both conducted recidivism studies, to be used as baselines for assessing project effects. Portland's victimization study fulfilled a need for data recognized early on in the program.

Management use of evaluation findings as a tool for decision-making (with respect to project refunding, modification, or phase-out) appears to have taken hold at least to some degree in most Impact cities. Between the beginning of the program and the present writing, this use increased progressively and markedly, at top management levels. Evaluation findings now serve routinely in Denver, Atlanta, Dallas and St. Louis as inputs to project refunding decisions. Baltimore's progress reports also are fed back into the SPA refunding process. Experience with this effort, however, has led St. Louis and Portland city decision-makers, among others, to express some dissatisfaction with "over-quantified, over-sophisticated" evaluations as vehicles for decision-making, and to ask their evaluators for "a simpler model" on which to base budgetary and other decisions. This clearly has policy implications for future evaluative efforts. Another problem is that the utilization of evaluation findings has been somewhat confined to top management levels (agency directors or city officials, for example, rather than project directors); it is not clear that adaptation and adoption has been thorough-going at middle management levels. This is due, perhaps, to a feeling among project directors, for example, that they have little to gain from evaluative findings of success, and a great deal to lose from findings of failure. However, the continuously increasing demand by top-level agency and city managers has developed pressure toward evaluation within agencies, and thereby increased administrative receptivity and acceptance at all levels.

Improvement has also been seen in the way that evaluation findings are being iteratively provided to project implementers for their action. Most evaluation reports reviewed to date have specified operational recommendations, and MITRE has noted that projects with multiple reports featuring such recommendations have often been reorganized or changed, to conform to those recommendations (e.g., Denver, St. Louis, Dallas, Atlanta).

In the area of agency coordination, the COPIE-cycle, as executed by the Crime Analysis Team, spurred an awareness (via the sharing of services like data bases or urinalysis testing, for example) of a mutual need for cooperation. Awareness is also increasing of the effect one agency's activities may have on another's, and on the criminal justice system generally. Where the referral system has worked (as in Denver), positive interactions have greatly increased among court, probation, parole, and police agencies. Community input into the criminal justice planning process improved in all Impact cities but one, and Crime Analysis Teams were instrumental in helping to develop innovative projects or project components focusing on community initiatives.

Still further, but from another perspective, the problems experienced by cities where the COPIE-cycle was not well performed, provide more evidence reinforcing the relationships observed. An initial crime-oriented planning failure to collect data, and to substantiate crime problems and priorities rationally, deprived cities of the increased criminal-justice capabilities and benefits found to accompany an adequate COPIE-cycle performance. On the contrary, as implementation proceeded, it became clear that the first planning gaps led, in varying degrees, to:

- priority uncertainties;
- loss of an important opportunity for interagency coordination via sharing and bartering techniques (see Chapter VII);
- lack of baseline data for evaluation;
- inadequate evaluation;
- failure to affect and modify projects in a timely way via evaluation feedback, and above all,
- inability to assess and identify anti-crime project achievements.

While it is true that all the cities which made a serious effort to execute the COPIE-cycle did not have uniformly excellent results, many of their problems were due to factors exogenous to that effort, and many of these problems could have been remedied had they been understood and addressed in time.

In the case of Newark, for example, where crime-oriented planning was very well done, there were special circumstances (see Chapter V, and Chapter VII above). Even with these, it seems likely that if the Crime Analysis Team's evaluator had stayed on, or if another one had been found rapidly, Newark and LEAA would have a much better idea today of the effectiveness of Newark's anti-crime efforts.

In Atlanta and Portland also, there were problems relating to the role of the SPA, which slowed implementation just as they did in Baltimore, with the difference that--in Atlanta and Portland--the COPIE-cycle meant a signal improvement in capabilities, whereas in Baltimore the lack of baseline data and bases of comparison made it impossible to measure the anti-crime achievements of most Baltimore projects. Timely clarifications of the precise limits of SPA authority and responsibility under Impact would have helped matters; such clarification is a requirement for any future program.

Finally Denver, which executed a remarkable performance of the COPIE-cycle and produced from it a considerable array of benefits, managed to achieve its reasonable implementation speed only through large amounts of overtime work by the Denver Team. It seems evident now that more time is required for sound planning and evaluation than was believed necessary at the beginning of Impact.

It thus appears that although some remediation will be necessary for future programs (in the area of technical assistance in evaluation, of clarification of the SPA role, and of time periods specifically allocated for crime-oriented and evaluation planning, for example), the Impact COPIE-cycle and CAT innovations have clearly shown their relevance for improvements in criminal justice capabilities.

## 2. Feasibility

The analyses presented in Chapters VI, VII and VIII show that:

- All of the cities installed Crime Analysis Teams, performed crime-oriented planning, produced master and evaluation plans, implemented anti-crime projects and programs, and evaluated more than half of them.

- Four of the cities (Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland) were capable of sound crime-oriented planning; another city (Dallas) made only a middling effort at first, but soon recognized gaps and omissions and moved both to correct them and to improve planning capabilities generally. It seems likely that Cleveland and St. Louis could have done as well as any of the best planners among the cities had they not opted for ultra-rapid implementation. Baltimore alone appears to have had a real feasibility problem in planning, posed by the autonomy of the police function in that city, and the consequent inability of the CAT to access police data.
- Five of the cities (St. Louis, Dallas, Cleveland, Newark and Denver) were able to translate funds into operational projects rapidly and well. Atlanta, Baltimore and Portland, however, were troubled by delays which could, in many cases, have been reduced or eliminated had problems been signalled in time and projects adequately monitored and reviewed on an on-going basis. Implementation insufficiencies, in Impact, appeared to be more a function of management gaps than of inherent difficulties in the implementation process itself.
- Evaluation, which had been a big question-mark for Impact program planners, turned out to be both a realistic expectation and generally feasible within the context of an action-oriented anti-crime program. The state of knowledge dissemination in the evaluation art was perhaps the biggest influence on the quality of the evaluations executed. This is evidenced by differences in performance according to project focus (showing more evaluation expertise and experience in some areas than in others), by inadequacies (many of them remediable) in the evaluation documents reviewed, and by the steady progress made in almost all the cities over the life of the program.

In sum, given the benefits accruing to those cities which are effectively executing the COPIE-cycle and performing the Crime Analysis Team function, and given also the failure to accrue those benefits when these two elements have been absent or faltering, it seems reasonable to infer not only that these program innovations:

- are relevant, useful and feasible, given technical assistance and systematic monitoring, but also that they;
- provide new and important tools for the measurement of anti-crime effectiveness;

- ensure that federal dollars are addressing real crime problems across locally-determined priorities;
- generate better projects (via feedback from evaluation);
- are generally replicable (again, with technical assistance) in U. S. cities; and
- promise, with their dissemination, notable increases in the capabilities of the criminal justice system to control crime.

CHAPTER VIII

APPENDIX

TABLE XXXVIII  
TWENTY-SIX INNOVATIVE PROJECTS FUNDED  
UNDER THE IMPACT PROGRAM

YOUTH SERVICE DELIVERY

1-4. SYSTEM OF YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS (YSBS) - 4 PROJECTS DENVER

IN EACH QUADRANT OF THE CITY, A YSB WAS ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE REFERRAL OF YOUTH DIVERTED FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM CITY-WIDE. THE YSBS WORK CLOSELY WITH MANY OF THE JUVENILE PROJECTS FUNDED UNDER IMPACT, WHICH RECEIVE THEIR REFERRALS. THE ORGANIZATION (CITY-WIDE) AND THE COORDINATION AMONG THE YSBS ARE INNOVATIVE.

5. CLEVELAND YOUTH NEIGHBORHOOD COORDINATORS CLEVELAND

THE YOUTH NEIGHBORHOOD COORDINATORS PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED AS PART OF CLEVELAND'S DIVERSION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAM TO COORDINATE YOUTH SERVICE DELIVERY THROUGHOUT CLEVELAND. THE INNOVATIVE ASPECT IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH (I.E., CITY-WIDE THROUGH THE UTILIZATION OF 9 SOCIAL SERVICE PLANNING AREAS). THE INTENT IS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF SERVICES AND TO IDENTIFY SERVICE NEEDS IN EACH OF THE PLANNING AREAS.

JUVENILE PROGRAMS

6. YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAM DALLAS

THE YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAM PROVIDES A RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES FOR POLICE TO USE IN HANDLING JUVENILES. THESE INCLUDE POSITIVE CONTACTS BY POLICE OFFICERS, COUNSELING, EDUCATION, DRUG EDUCATION, RECREATION, THE PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE OF PSYCHIATRISTS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS WHEN NEEDED, AND THE UTILIZATION OF COMMUNITY RESOURCES. THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM AND THE FORMALIZED USE OF CONTRACT SERVICES ARE INNOVATIVE.

7. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND CORRECTIONS DALLAS

THIS PROJECT ALSO PROVIDES THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT WITH A RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES FOR USE IN DEALING WITH JUVENILES. IT DIFFERS FROM YOUTH SERVICES IN TWO RESPECTS:

- (A) IT IS DIRECTED TOWARD REPEAT RATHER THAN FIRST OFFENDERS;  
AND

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

7. YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AND CORRECTIONS (CONTINUED) DALLAS

- (B) THE EMPHASIS IS ON ESTABLISHING CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AND ON RECREATION RATHER THAN ON PROVIDING SHORT-TERM COUNSELING AND TAKING ACTIONS TO MEET SPECIFIC NEEDS.

THE INNOVATIVE FEATURES ARE THE ACTIVE RECRUITMENT OF REPEAT OFFENDERS INTO THE PROGRAM AND THE ONE-ON-ONE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND YOUTH IN ONE COMPONENT.

8. PROJECT INTERCEPT DENVER

INTERCEPT IS AN INTERVENTION PROJECT WHICH EMPLOYS TECHNIQUES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION TO CHANGE THE BEHAVIOR PATTERNS OF YOUTH. THE PROGRAM FOCUSES ON THE YOUTH'S FAMILY, THE PEER GROUP, AND THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT. THE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS ARE:

- (A) THE USE OF VIDEO TAPE TO RECORD FAMILY COUNSELING SESSIONS;  
(B) THE INTEGRATION OF THE REMEDIAL EDUCATION PROGRAM INTO THE SCHOOL DAY; AND  
(C) THE TRAINING OF COMMUNITY PARAPROFESSIONALS AS THERAPISTS.

ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS

9. NEW PRIDE DENVER

NEW PRIDE IS A COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECT INVOLVING A WORK-STUDY PROGRAM TO SERVE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS. ONE INNOVATIVE ASPECT OF NEW PRIDE IS THE OFFERING OF INTEGRATED EDUCATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL SERVICES. THE OTHER ASPECT IS THE EXTENSIVE, HIGHLY STRUCTURED VOLUNTEER COMPONENT WHICH HAS BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROJECT.

10. PORT OF BALTIMORE SEA SCHOOL BALTIMORE

THE PORT OF BALTIMORE SEA SCHOOL IS A WORK-STUDY PROGRAM FOR 16 TO 18 YEAR OLD MALES WHO SHOW THE NECESSARY INTEREST AND APTITUDE TO PARTICIPATE IN A PROGRAM ORIENTED TOWARD MARITIME CAREERS. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH, WHICH OFFERS COUNSELING, EDUCATIONAL, AND VOCATIONAL SERVICES, IS ALSO INNOVATIVE.

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

11. PROVIDENCE EDUCATION CENTER ST. LOUIS

PROVIDENCE EDUCATION CENTER IS A NON-RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL AND RESOCIALIZATION CENTER FOR ADJUDICATED DELINQUENTS. BASED ON AN INITIAL DIAGNOSIS, THE CENTER'S TREATMENT TEAM (I.E., SOCIAL WORKER, TEACHER, TEACHING ASSISTANT, AND COUNSELOR) DEVELOPS A COORDINATED PROGRAM DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE CLIENT'S ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT SKILLS. THIS INTEGRATED APPROACH, SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THAT OF NEW PRIDE AND THE PORT OF BALTIMORE SEA SCHOOL, IS INNOVATIVE.

JUVENILE PROBATION AND PAROLE

12. COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROBATION EXPERIMENT (COPE) DENVER

COPE PROVIDES DECENTRALIZED PROBATION SERVICES FOR JUVENILES THROUGH THE MERGER OF THE JUVENILE COURT FIELD PROBATION DIVISION AND THE YOUTH COALITION, A COMMUNITY PROGRAM WITH AN EMPHASIS ON RECREATION AND CHILD ADVOCACY (PREVIOUSLY FUNDED BY HEW). THE EMPHASIS IS ON INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND ON RECREATION AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES. THE INNOVATIVE FEATURES ARE THE TEAM APPROACH, UTILIZING PARAPROFESSIONALS AT OUTREACH CENTERS AND THE "CAREER LADDER" PROVIDED FOR COMMUNITY-RESIDENT PARAPROFESSIONALS TO ENTER THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT.

13. CASE MANAGEMENT CORRECTIONS SERVICES PORTLAND

CASE MANAGEMENT IS A COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECT THAT PROVIDES INTENSIVE PROBATION SUPERVISION AND COUNSELING TO JUVENILES BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 17. THE CASEWORKER NOT ONLY FREQUENTLY SEES THE CLIENTS, BUT ALSO THE PARENTS, EMPLOYERS AND SCHOOL PERSONNEL. THE CASEWORKER IS CONSIDERED A "CASE MANAGER" AND IS GIVEN RELATIVE FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HIS CASELOAD. THE AUTONOMY AND RESULTANT FLEXIBILITY TO RESPOND TO PROGRAM AND INDIVIDUAL CLIENT NEEDS ARE INNOVATIVE, ESPECIALLY REGARDING THE PURCHASE OF SERVICES. CONTRACT SERVICES ARE USED IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- (A) EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND JOB PLACEMENT;
- (B) DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES;
- (C) HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE; AND
- (D) GENERAL EMERGENCIES.

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

14. INTENSIVE CARE, TRAINING, AND UNIFIED REHABILITATION EFFORT (PROJECT PICTURE) PORTLAND

PROJECT PICTURE IS AN AFTER-CARE SERVICE MODEL PROVIDING COMMUNITY PLANNING AND SERVICES FOR YOUTH COMMITTED BY THE JUVENILE COURT TO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DURING AND AFTER THEIR INSTITUTIONAL STAY. A TREATMENT TEAM WORKS TO COORDINATE HEALTH PLANNING, EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND PROGRAMS, EMPLOYMENT TRAINING AND JOB REFERRALS, FAMILY COUNSELING, OUT-OF-HOME CARE AND GROUP HOME PLACEMENT, AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES. A TYPICAL TREATMENT TEAM MIGHT CONSIST OF THE AFTERCARE OFFICER, PARENTS, INVOLVED RELATIVES, A MEMBER OF THE PICTURE RESOURCE STAFF AND EMPLOYERS OR SCHOOL PERSONNEL. THE INNOVATIVE FEATURES ARE THE USE OF THE TREATMENT TEAM APPROACH AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE AFTERCARE WORKER TO THE CLIENT UPON THE CLIENT'S COMMITMENT.

ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE

15. INTENSIVE PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION DENVER

THIS PROJECT IS A COMMUNITY-BASED PROBATION AND PAROLE PROJECT OFFERING SERVICES TO ADULT PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES AT THREE NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS. PROJECT PERSONNEL INTEGRATE THEIR SERVICES CLOSELY WITH NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES AND TREATMENT CENTERS. SERVICES ARE THEREBY PROVIDED ON A MORE TIMELY BASIS THAN IS POSSIBLE IN A CENTRAL OFFICE. THE INNOVATIVE ASPECT IS THE EXTENT OF THE COORDINATION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, WITH JOINT SERVICES PROVIDED FOR BOTH PROBATION AND PAROLE CASELOADS IN A COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENT.

16. FIELD SERVICES PORTLAND

FIELD SERVICES IS A PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION PROJECT THAT PROVIDES INCREASED SERVICES TO ADULT PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES. IT IS ONE OF 6 ADULT CORRECTIONS PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED UNDER IMPACT BY THE OREGON STATE CORRECTIONS DIVISION. THESE PROJECTS ARE HIGHLY INTEGRATED AND REPRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION AND UPGRADING OF ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN PORTLAND. THE CASE MANAGER PARTICIPATES IN A TREATMENT CONSISTING OF SOME COMBINATION OF COUNSELORS, HUMAN RESOURCE AIDES, VOLUNTEERS, STUDENTS, AND EX-OFFENDERS. EACH TEAM HANDLES A CASELOAD. THE INNOVATIVE FEATURES ARE THE CLIENT ADVOCACY ROLE, UTILIZED BY THE TREATMENT TEAM, THE ABILITY TO PURCHASE SERVICES AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE FIELD STAFF WITH THE OTHER CORRECTIONS PROJECTS.

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

COURT-RELATED PROJECTS

17. COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS CLEVELAND

THE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS PROJECT ADDED EIGHT ATTORNEYS AND SEVERAL LAW STUDENTS AND OTHER SUPPORT STAFF TO THE DEFENDER'S OFFICE OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY. THE PURPOSE WAS TO PROVIDE DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS. (COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS WAS ONE PROJECT OF THE PRE-TRIAL DELAY COMPONENT OF THE CLEVELAND ADJUDICATION PROGRAM; THE OTHER PROJECTS WERE VISITING JUDGES AND COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE.) THE INNOVATIVE FEATURE OF THIS PROJECT IS THE METHOD OF ASSIGNMENT OF ATTORNEYS WHICH IS A MODIFICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENT METHOD.

18. LEGAL AIDES FOR POLICE DALLAS

LEGAL AIDES FOR POLICE INVOLVES THE ASSIGNMENT OF FOUR ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEYS TO ADVISE THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE ATTORNEYS WORK CLOSELY WITH POLICE OFFICERS TO ASSIST AND COUNSEL THEM REGARDING COURT-RELATED WORK. ACTIVITIES INCLUDE THE REVIEW OF ALL PROSECUTION REPORTS, IN-SERVICE TRAINING OF POLICE PERSONNEL, AND ASSISTANCE IN THE PREPARATION OF AFFIDAVITS FOR ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANTS. THE ASSIGNMENT OF ATTORNEYS TO ASSIST POLICE OFFICERS ON A DAILY BASIS IS INNOVATIVE.

19. ST. LOUIS COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT ST. LOUIS

THE ST. LOUIS COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT INVOLVES A DIRECTOR AND STAFF THAT WORK WITH THE ST. LOUIS COMMITTEE ON COURTS (A NOT-FOR-PROFIT GROUP COMPRISED OF JUDGES, ATTORNEYS, AND OTHER CITIZENS). THE COMMITTEE SERVES AS A COMMUNICATION CHANNEL FOR VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE COMMITTEE IS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ST. LOUIS. UNDER IMPACT, THE COMMITTEE WAS CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF RESEARCHING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN COURT ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER AREAS AND WITH MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OPERATION OF COURT-RELATED AGENCIES. THE OPERATION OF A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION CLOSELY TIED TO THE COURTS, BUT OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REPRESENTS AN INNOVATIVE MECHANISM FOR CHANGE WITHIN THE COURT SYSTEM.

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

RAPE-FOCUSED PROJECTS

20. RAPE PREVENTION PROGRAM DENVER

THE RAPE PREVENTION PROGRAM, SPONSORED BY THE DIVISION OF PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES OF THE DENVER DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, HAS THE OVERALL GOAL OF REDUCING REPORTED AND UNREPORTED RAPE IN DENVER. THE PROGRAM HAS THREE COMPONENTS:

- (A) RESEARCH ON THE CRIME OF RAPE;
- (B) PUBLIC EDUCATION TO ALERT POTENTIAL OFFENDERS; AND
- (C) EVALUATION AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS.

THE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS ARE THE CITY-INITIATED RESEARCH AND THE SUBSEQUENT EDUCATION EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN, AS WELL AS THE LOCATION OF THE PROJECT WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, FROM WHICH PROJECT PERSONNEL ASSIST AND WORK WITH THE VARIOUS CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES.

21. RESEARCH, ADVOCACY, PREVENTION AND EDUCATION (RAPE) PORTLAND

THE RAPE PROJECT, SPONSORED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, EMPHASIZES SUCCESSFUL INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF THE RAPIST, ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION. THE PRIMARY EMPHASIS, HOWEVER, IS ON HELPING AND WORKING WITH THE VICTIM. THE INNOVATIVE FEATURES ARE:

- (A) THE POSITION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE, A STAFF MEMBER OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, WHO ASSISTS THE RAPE VICTIM THROUGH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS; AND
- (B) COORDINATED TRAINING WORKSHOPS FOR POLICE PERSONNEL AND DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.

22. ANTI-RAPE UNIT ATLANTA

THE ANTI-RAPE UNIT, AS PART OF THE ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE TREATMENT OF RAPE VICTIMS, INCREASE THE NUMBER OF RAPES REPORTED, AND INCREASE THE CONVICTION RATE. COMPONENTS ARE:

- (A) TRAINING INVESTIGATORS IN COUNSELING TECHNIQUES AND INVESTIGATIVE SKILLS;

TABLE XXXVIII (CONTINUED)

22. ANTI-RAPE UNIT (CONTINUED) ATLANTA

- (B) EQUIPMENT AND OFFICE SPACE AWAY FROM POLICE HEADQUARTERS TO ELIMINATE VICTIM EMBARRASSMENT;
- (C) A MOBILE CRIME UNIT USED FOR TALKING WITH WITNESSES AND COLLECTING EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME;
- (D) A PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAM; AND
- (E) A COUNSELING SERVICE.

THE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS ARE THE USE OF OFFICE SPACE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS AND THE UTILIZATION OF AN INVESTIGATION VAN.

23. RAPE ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION UNIT NEWARK

THE RAPE UNIT IN NEWARK, SIMILAR TO THE UNITS IN PORTLAND AND ATLANTA, IS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING AND PROSECUTING RAPE OFFENDERS AS WELL AS PROVIDING SERVICES TO VICTIMS. IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE REPORTING, PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO MAKE REPORTING EASIER FOR THE VICTIM. A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS BEING ADDED TO THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE TO HANDLE RAPE CASES EXCLUSIVELY. OTHER COMPONENTS INCLUDE A PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM AND SPECIAL TRAINING FOR MEMBERS OF THE RAPE UNIT APART FROM THE OFFICIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT FACILITIES.

ASSISTANCE TO ELDERLY AND OTHER CRIME VICTIMS

24. SENIOR CITIZENS AGAINST THIEVERY BALTIMORE

THIS PROJECT WAS DEVELOPED TO HELP OLDER RESIDENTS OF BALTIMORE TEACH EACH OTHER TO FIGHT CRIME; IT WAS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE FEARS OF THE ELDERLY AS WELL AS TO TEACH THEM METHODS OF SELF-PROTECTION. THE MAYOR'S COORDINATING COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM), WITH THE WAXTER CENTER, THE CITY POLICE AND THE CITIES' COMMISSION ON AGING AND RETIREMENT, DEVELOPED THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM. THE INNOVATIVE ASPECT IS THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OLDER RESIDENTS, WHO ACT OUT SIMULATED ROBBERIES AND ASSAULTS WHICH ARE VIDEOTAPED TO BE USED AS PART OF THE TRAINING SESSIONS. TEAMS OF ELDERLY CITIZENS, CITY PERSONNEL AND COLLEGE STUDENTS VISIT "GOLDEN AGE" CLUBS, ETC. TO DEMONSTRATE TECHNIQUES OF SELF-PROTECTION AND DISTRIBUTE MATERIALS.

TABLE XXXVIII (CONCLUDED)

25. COMMUNITY HEALTH VICTIM SUPPORT DENVER

THE VICTIM SUPPORT PROJECT IS AN EXPANSION OF THE VISITING NURSE SERVICE PROGRAM TO OFFER ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP SERVICES TO THE VICTIMS OF RAPE OF ALL AGES AND ELDERLY VICTIMS OF STREET ASSAULT. THE PROJECT ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE VICTIM SUPPORT EFFORTS OF THE POLICE, THE COURTS, AND DENVER GENERAL HOSPITAL, AND NURSES MAKE FOLLOW-UP VISITS TO IDENTIFY AND MEET THE NEEDS OF THE VICTIM AND/OR THE FAMILY BY PROVIDING EMOTIONAL SUPPORT, NURSING CARE, COUNSELING, REFERRAL TO COMMUNITY SERVICES, ETC., AS NEEDED. THIS PROJECT REPRESENTS AN INNOVATIVE EXPANSION OF A SERVICE THAT ALREADY EXISTS IN MANY CITIES.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

26. TARGET HARDENING THROUGH OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION (THOR) ATLANTA

THOR IS A PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM, SPONSORED BY THE ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, AIMED AT THE PREVENTION OF BURGLARY, ROBBERY, AND RAPE. NINE INFORMATION CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT THE CITY FROM WHICH PATROLMEN, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, AND CITIZEN VOLUNTEERS PERFORM VARIOUS CRIME PREVENTION EDUCATION ACTIVITIES. THESE INCLUDE:

- (A) COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL SECURITY SURVEYS;
- (B) PUBLIC EDUCATION AND AWARENESS PROGRAMS; AND
- (C) A PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM.

ALSO PERFORMED IS RESEARCH ON THE PROBLEMS OF FALSE ALARMS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SECURITY DEVICES. THE INNOVATIVE ASPECT IS THE COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIZATION OF FORMERLY AD HOC ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE NEIGHBORHOOD INFORMATION CENTERS.

## CHAPTER VIII

### REFERENCES

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3. Siegel, L. S. and Russell, L. S., Impact City Crime Profiles, December 1975, MTR-7114.
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#### TASKS II AND V (Combined)

5. Albright, E. J., An Examination of Project Innovation and Institutionalization Within the Impact Program, November 1975, MTR-7096.

#### TASK VII

6. Fischel, M. B., Kupersmith, G. W., and Trehan, A. P., An Analysis of Project-Level Evaluation Plans, April 1975, MTR-6891.
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#### TASK VIII

8. Jordan, Jr., F. C., A History of the Atlanta Impact Program, December 1975, MTR-6623.
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13. Jordan, Jr., F. C., A History of the Newark Impact Program, December 1975, MTR-6649.
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**Part III: National-Level Evaluation Findings**  
**(Section II)**

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PART III: NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION FINDINGS  
(SECTION II)

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER IX PROJECT-LEVEL ANTI-CRIME ACHIEVEMENTS

CHAPTER X ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT CITY CRIME-RATE CHANGES

## INTRODUCTION

Part I of this report explored crime control policy contexts, program expectations, conflicts and constraints, as well as city status prior to Impact. The five chapters in that section were thus devoted to the development of general baseline information of various types against which program progress could be measured. The three chapters of Part II then examined the question of the feasibility and relevance of the COPIE-cycle and Crime Analysis Team initiatives for improving criminal justice system capabilities.

Analysis in Chapter VI focused on one aspect of feasibility: the capacity of cities and Crime Analysis Teams to generate the products and activities associated with the COPIE-cycle. This examination of program dimensions established that, in terms of quantity, proportion and kind, cities did, in fact, respond to the Impact initiative in the following ways, program-wide:

- 233 anti-crime projects were developed in the eight cities;
- funding awards totalled about \$140 million;
- largest amounts went to police projects which received \$47 million (33 percent) of the federal funds, and corrections projects which received \$42 million (31 percent);
- the primary focus of Impact, as determined by city funding priorities, was on recidivism reduction (\$58 million, or 42 percent), with \$44 million (or 31 percent) going toward a crime-reduction focus and \$38 million (or 27 percent) to systems improvement;
- all cities prepared Impact master plans and evaluation plans;
- evaluation plans and reports were developed for over 60 percent of Impact projects;
- the larger number of recidivism-focused projects (106 of the 233 total, see page 164) meant that the greatest number of evaluation plans and reports were generated in this area, and that, in consequence, the biggest share of evaluative attention was concentrated on the problem of demonstrating recidivism reduction.

In terms of the expected program effects posited in Part I (see especially Chapter III), the findings of Chapter VI were that, as anticipated:

- program slippage occurred, resulting in program extensions;
- the orientation toward crime-reduction and police projects appeared to be dampened by fiscal incentives toward corrections projects; however, city priorities also played an important role;
- rapid implementers ended up with more total Impact funding than slower implementers (independent of quality); and
- court projects, research and data handling systems had been de-emphasized.

Unanticipated effects were that:

- juvenile prevention/corrections and community involvement emphases were maintained (despite conflicts and program goals);
- some cities strayed from their expressed priorities; and
- at least one city's program adhered neither to its own articulated priorities nor to those of the program.

Chapter VII looked at the feasibility and relevance of the Impact initiative from the perspective of quality, examining the program in each city in terms of seven variables:

- crime-oriented planning,
- implementation,
- evaluation planning and reporting,
- agency coordination,
- community involvement,
- project innovation, and
- project institutionalization.

Key findings of the analysis for each city were given above (see Chapter VII and the chapter summary, pages 186-187). In general, it was found that:

- Atlanta, Denver, Newark, and Portland put strong emphasis on sound crime-oriented planning;

- Cleveland, Dallas and St. Louis concentrated on rapid implementation;
- Portland, Baltimore and Atlanta were slower-than-average implementers;
- Atlanta, Denver, and Portland performed project-level evaluation of high quality;
- Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark notably improved their criminal justice agency coordination;
- most cities increased (or generated new) mechanisms for citizen input into the criminal justice planning process;
- every city developed innovative project features; however, Denver, Portland and Dallas had more of these than the other cities; and
- all of the cities expected to see at least some of their projects continue with municipal funding.

Chapter VIII completed the qualitative assessment of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team, via program-wide analyses of the seven variables and some of their inter-relationships. Two conclusions were reached; first, that the innovations were generally feasible, and second, that they were relevant and useful for improving criminal justice system capabilities. Among the various pieces of evidence supporting these two conclusions are the following:

- All of the cities were able to install Crime Analysis Teams, perform crime-oriented planning, produce master and evaluation plans, implement anti-crime projects and programs, and evaluate more than 60 percent of them.
- In terms of crime-oriented planning: Four of the cities executed the effort successfully; another city recognized data gaps and other problems and improved its planning capabilities over the course of the program. Two other cities possessed the capability to perform sound crime-oriented planning but concentrated instead on rapid implementation. Only one city had a feasibility problem in planning and this was in the police area. It was caused by the relative autonomy of the police function in that city, and resulted in the inability of the CAT to access police data.
- In terms of implementation: Five of the cities translated funds into operations rapidly and well. The three others

were impeded by delays which could, however, have been reduced or eliminated, in many cases, if problems had been signalled and projects closely monitored and reviewed on an on-going basis.

- In terms of evaluation: Project-level evaluation planning and reporting were performed by all cities in various kinds of institutional settings, justifying national program planners' hopes that such evaluation was a realistic expectation within the context of an action-oriented anti-crime program. Some of the evaluations reviewed were of high caliber; many others encountered problems which could have been remedied. Overall, there is a need for more technical assistance, training and information-dissemination in the area of evaluation.
- In sum, those cities which performed the COPIE-cycle adequately experienced benefits including a clearer focus on problems and needs, a better basis for justifying funding behavior, a sharp decrease in "off-the-shelf" projects when priority problems were well substantiated by data and analysis. There was certainty that the major crime problems were being addressed. Projects were evaluated, evaluation findings were often used for project modification, new knowledge was gained about crime problems and anti-crime approaches, and improvements were registered in the effort to involve local communities.
- On the other hand, among the cities where the COPIE-cycle was not well performed, an initial crime-oriented planning failure to collect data and to substantiate crime problems and priorities rationally, led instead to varying degrees of priority uncertainty, loss of opportunity for interagency coordination, lack of baseline data for evaluation, inadequate evaluation, the impossibility of affecting and modifying projects in a timely way via evaluation feedback, and above all, an inability to assess and identify anti-crime project achievements.

Finally, given the benefits accruing to those cities which effectively executed the COPIE-cycle and performed the Crime Analysis Team function, and given also the failure to accrue those benefits when these two elements were absent or faltering, it was not only concluded that these program innovations are relevant, useful and feasible, given technical assistance and systematic monitoring, but also that they:

- provide new and important tools for the measurement of anti-crime effectiveness;
- ensure that federal dollars are addressing real crime problems across locally-determined priorities;
- generate better projects (via feedback from evaluation);
- are generally replicable (again with technical assistance) in U. S. cities; and
- promise, with their dissemination, notable increases in the capabilities of the criminal justice system to control crime.

Part II (i.e., Chapters VI, VII and VIII) thus presented findings from the national-level evaluation relative to the importance of program innovations for improving criminal justice system capabilities. Part III of this report will examine what has been learned about program anti-crime achievements, within the constraints of the national-level evaluation (see Chapter II, pages 24-25, and Chapter IV). Although the current evaluation does not include an assessment of program-wide effectiveness, and it will therefore be impossible to tie changes in crime rates to program activities, it is nonetheless important to ask:

- which anti-crime projects were successful in reducing crime or recidivism, or in meeting their systems improvement objectives? (Chapter IX); and
- what changes in fact occurred among Impact city crime rates and levels during the period of Impact performance? (Chapter X).

Given that no comparison cities were available for this evaluation (see Chapter IV), given that Impact cities were not randomly selected (see Chapter II), and given also that the anti-crime projects in each city were of local inspiration, highly individual and not even nominally replicative, it follows that no cause-effect relationships can be postulated. MITRE has nonetheless made use of available crime data to study official crime trends in Impact cities. Further, an examination of Impact burglary levels was undertaken, applying and broadening a model (the Crime-Correlated Areas Concept) developed by Budnick in 1971 for deriving expected crime levels. Testing this model for the crime of burglary only, MITRE derived crime levels that might have been expected in Impact cities without the Impact intervention and then compared these expected crime levels with the actual (official) 1973 and 1974 crime levels for the eight Impact cities. The results of both of these examinations are presented in Chapter X.

In terms of program expectations (resulting from the analysis developed in Part I of this report), it seems reasonable to anticipate that:

- If the program did improve system capabilities in some cities, then those cities should be able to demonstrate greater project-level anti-crime success than those cities where capabilities were less (or not) improved (given, of course, the accuracy of the basic assumption about the ability of improved system capability to affect crime);
- Those cities which were in the more "advantaged" group (i.e., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland, see Chapter V) would be better able to improve their system capabilities rapidly, and hence, to demonstrate greater project-level anti-crime achievements;
- These achievements might not be ramified, or might not be identifiable, city-wide, because of:
  - factors exogenous to the criminal justice system and to the program which affect crime rates and/or their reporting (see Chapters III and V);
  - program slippage and the consequent inability to concentrate program effects within a short time-period;
  - the New Federalist approach by which cities could choose diverse projects (focused, for example, on recidivism or on systems improvement) whose contributions to city-wide crime-level changes could not generally be estimated;
  - the failure to require area-specific data collection (again, New Federalism: see pages 59 through 65 above) through which certain project effects could be tied to city-wide crime-rate changes.

## **Chapter IX**

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### **Project-Level Anti-Crime Achievements**

## CHAPTER IX: SUMMARY

This chapter assesses anti-crime achievements at the project level from the perspective of the national-level evaluation. Findings are derived from six separate examinations:

- the MITRE technical review process (developed for Task 7);
- a study of 9 successful projects to assess their potential for transfer;
- an analysis of four Impact projects which employed intensive supervision as a strategy to decrease recidivism among probationers (Task 4);
- an analysis of three projects which utilized increased levels of overt police patrol as a strategy to obtain decreases in crime rates (Task 4);
- an examination of project outcomes by functional area (Tasks 3 and 9); and
- a statistical analysis of 71 Impact projects to determine how elements of the COPIE-cycle were related to each other and to the demonstration of project effectiveness.

Key findings from MITRE's technical review process, in combination with the transfer study, were that:

- 33 Impact projects, representing about \$30.5 million in federal funds, can be shown, through city evaluation documentation, to have been effective; these were not, however, the only effective projects in the program, but rather those which could prove their success through evaluation; since anti-crime achievement is assessed here on the basis of evaluation, since evaluation itself was an innovation in some Impact cities, and since the program is still on-going in most cities, it is clear that there may be project success which has not yet been—or could not be—documented;

- 28 of these 33 projects originated in 5 cities, as follows:

Denver	10 projects
Dallas	5 projects
St. Louis	5 projects
Atlanta	4 projects
Portland	4 projects
Baltimore	3 projects
Cleveland	2 projects
Newark	0 projects

- the recidivism-reduction focus dominated, in terms of the number of projects, but the crime-reduction focus dominated in terms of funds expended:

<u>Focus</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>(\$M)</u>	<u>(%)</u>
Crime-reduction	9	27	12.5	41
Recidivism-reduction	14	43	10.1	33
System improvement	10	30	7.9	26
TOTAL	33	100	\$30.5M	100

- project size and distribution meant that 53% of federal funds awarded in Dallas, 49% of those awarded in Denver, 27% of Portland's funds, and 19% of Atlanta's funds could be shown to have been effectively expended; the other four cities had smaller proportions of their funds going to demonstrably successful projects;
- 8 (or about 24 percent) of the 33 effective projects had been selected as innovative (as opposed to only 11 percent program-wide);
- 21 (or about 63 percent) of the 33 were already slated for institutionalization (as opposed to 43 percent program-wide).

Key findings from MITRE's intensive supervision analysis established that:

- all of the four projects appeared to have reduced recidivism, the average reduction being about 50%;
- the assumption that intensive supervision was an effective strategy for reducing recidivism among probationers emerged reinforced, although still unproven;
- Newark's Essex County Specialized Caseloads Project could be added to the list of effective projects (thus lending credence to the belief that there might be many successful projects which had not submitted evaluation reports capable of demonstrating that success).

Findings from MITRE's police patrol analysis determined that, in terms of expected performance;

- two of the three projects were successful in reducing crime levels by virtue of overt police patrol activity; these reductions either had not occurred in untreated portions of the city (Cleveland, Concentrated Crime Patrol) or they were more pronounced in target areas (Denver, Special Crime Attack Team); in the third case, however (St. Louis, Pilot Foot Patrol), crime-level reductions appeared to take place in both treated and untreated portions of the city so that project effectiveness was not clear;

- displacement did not occur in most cases;
- overt police patrol should not be dismissed as an effective, short-term anti-crime strategy;
- Cleveland's Concentrated Crime Patrol could be added to the list of effective projects (still another indication that there might be more successful but undocumented Impact projects).

These first four analyses, taken together, indicated that 35 Impact projects, totalling about \$35.3 million, had been shown to be effective via evaluation tools developed under the program's initiative.

Key functional area findings were that:

- Many more successful projects were implemented and evaluated in the police, community involvement, juvenile and court areas, then in the drug, adult offender, data system or target hardening areas;
- The less successful project areas were troubled by problems of concept, of consensus, or of lead-time which did not allow them to be well implemented or evaluated in the Impact context.

Main findings from MITRE's statistical analysis of COPIE-cycle elements (in terms of the assessment of project outcomes) were that:

- All the COPIE-cycle variables were positively, although moderately, correlated with one another;
- Implementation speed and completeness were positively correlated with project success;
- Projects which were crime-orientedly planned tended also to have good evaluation planning and reporting capability (among other COPIE-cycle elements);
- Good evaluation planning was positively associated with good evaluation reporting and with good evaluation approaches;
- Since the quality of an evaluation approach is essential in determining project success, and since good evaluation reporting was found to be positively correlated with the likelihood of institutionalization, evaluation planning emerged as a highly important element of the COPIE-cycle.

## Chapter IX

### Project-Level Anti-Crime Achievements

*Evaluation of utility is intrinsically interwoven with the development of knowledge.*

Suchman, 1967

If it is useful to improve criminal justice capabilities via such program innovations as the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team, this is surely because of the belief that improving those capabilities will help to reduce or control crime through a better understanding of program effects (see Chapter I above). This is to say that knowledge about outcome achievements should presumably lead to a sharper focus of anti-crime resources upon the areas of highest payoff, and hence to lower crime levels. To generate such knowledge, however, requires pre-existing knowledge: the expertise required to evaluate program effects. This was the realization which led to the initiation of the COPIE-cycle idea, the effort to install a planning and evaluation capability at the local level. Chapters VI through VIII have shown that while evaluation still has far to go in some of the Impact cities, a beginning capability (and much more than that, in certain cases) now exists in all eight cities. What then does this mean in terms of knowledge about crime-control effectiveness?

Although the national-level evaluation is concerned with process rather than outcome (see pages 60-61 above), several of the MITRE tasks (such as the assessment of evaluation reporting<sup>(2)</sup> discussed in Chapter VIII) involved the examination of project-level evaluation findings in some detail. The most comprehensive of these examinations occurred during the technical review process, which served to analyze COPIE-cycle inputs at the project level (see the technical review format at Appendix to this chapter, pages 345 through 360). All of the information contained in these reviews was derived from data furnished to the national-level evaluation by the eight Impact cities; those data were then examined and analyzed from a number of different perspectives (e.g., evaluation approach, reporting quality, etc., see pages 260 through 269 above). In all, 119 Impact projects had provided sufficient evaluation documentation by August, 1975, to allow technical review. By November, however, 16 more could be added to the list, bringing the total to 135.

Two criteria were used, based on the technical review process, to determine project effectiveness:

- the findings reported in the project-level evaluation documentation in combination with the evaluator's conclusions regarding project success in meeting stated objectives; and
- MITRE's assessment of the ability of the evaluation approach utilized (as described in the documents reviewed) to rule out highly plausible alternative explanations for observed project outcomes.

It was not possible, however, either because of substantive constraints (see Chapter IV), or because of resource limitations, to validate most of the project findings or to perform secondary analyses in most cases.

The technical review process established that 33 projects of the 135 reviewed (or about 24 percent) had brought forward adequate evidence to substantiate anti-crime success.

In addition to the technical review process, various other Impact projects were subjected to further scrutiny in connection with:

- an examination of Impact anti-crime projects in terms of their suitability for transfer<sup>(4)</sup> (Task 6 of the national-level evaluation, see page 63 above);
- an examination of intensive supervision as a treatment strategy for probationers<sup>(10)</sup> (Task 4 of the national-level evaluation); and
- an examination of police patrol effectiveness<sup>(8)</sup> (also Task 4).

Findings from the transfer task, which field-validated 9 of the 33 successful projects (documented success was a prerequisite criterion for field-validation), bolstered and expanded the technical review conclusions via more in-depth analysis. Results of both the technical review and transfer examinations are therefore considered together in the discussions immediately following. Project-level findings related to intensive supervision and police patrol strategies will be explored in a later section (see pages 325 through 332 below).

A. Evidence Of Project-Level Anti-Crime Achievements (3) (4)

The evaluations performed for 33 Impact projects provided justification and support for their findings of anti-crime success.

1. Crime Reduction

Nine Impact projects were successful in preventing and/or reducing burglary and robbery.

- Based on an evaluation covering the period June-November, 1973, the Expansion of Tactical Deployment project in Dallas achieved an average offense (all stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary) reduction of 10.9 percent for the 10-day period following team deployment, and a 20.6 percent reduction within 30 days. (This project involved the deployment of 12 crime control teams in high-crime areas of the city. The teams experimented with overt, covert, stake-out and other policing methods to determine which were most effective against specific crimes.)
- The Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT) in Denver reduced burglary in its targeted area by 25 percent during the first year of its operation, and achieved a 21 percent reduction in robbery during a 3-month anti-robbery focus by the team. During the second year of the project, reductions in burglary ranged from 18-22 percent when compared to 1972 baseline rates. A MITRE examination of this project's potential for transfer to other cities found, however, that crime rates in target areas returned to their former levels with the completion of SCAT activities. Although this does not reduce confidence in the short-term effectiveness of the project or of the strategy employed, it does limit transfer potential, given that project effectiveness appears to be only temporary in the face of rather elevated project costs (4) (see Table XXXIX below. (Stressing high visibility and concentrated police patrol, SCAT was a project featuring flexible team-policing designed to combat robbery and burglary in high-crime areas. SCAT units were deployed in areas based on careful crime-rate analysis.)
- Based on the reporting period May 15, 1972 through March 31, 1974, Operation Identification in St. Louis significantly reduced burglary for program participants; these experienced a 31 percent decrease in burglary compared to a 1972 baseline (This project encouraged citizens to engrave an identification number on personal property items of value. People who

participated in the program were to display a warning sign on their homes to discourage theft.)

- St. Louis' Burglary Prevention Unit achieved a 45 percent decrease in the commercial burglary rate compared to the previous yearly rate and compared to the city-wide trend for non-residential burglaries. It is estimated that activities of this unit prevented 755 burglaries over a 21-month period between January 1972 and October 1973. This project expanded the existing BPU of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department which was established to deter burglaries of small and heretofore unprotected businesses through the utilization of various burglary prevention techniques. These techniques included:
  - surveying small businesses and recommending procedures to reduce burglary risk;
  - installing wireless alarms at selected small business locations; and
  - educating business community members.
- After Atlanta's Anti-Robbery/Burglary project had been in operation six months, the city-wide robbery rate had increased only 5 percent as compared to a 99.6 percent increase during the same time-period the previous year. (This project, which utilized stake-outs, decoys and other tools of covert operations, was, however, highly controversial in Atlanta and eventually ran into serious management difficulties.)
- The Anti-Robbery Unit project in Atlanta was an outgrowth of the Anti-Robbery/Burglary project, mentioned above. At the end of one year's operation, the number of commercial robberies decreased 11 percent from the number committed during the previous year. Furthermore, during the same period there was a 13 percent decrease in open space robberies city-wide. A MITRE field-validation to estimate transfer potential confirmed that this project was effectively meeting its objectives and led to a recommendation for transfer with the suggestion that replicative efforts place greater emphasis on the more successful decoy activities (and less on the stake-out operations) than was the case in Atlanta. (4)  
(This project used mobile police officer stake-out methods and disguised police operations in high-crime commercial areas.)

- The Loch Raven Radio Watch in Baltimore was a citizen patrol program designed to reduce crime in three neighborhoods by enlisting citizen volunteers with citizen band radios to patrol their neighborhoods. (Citizens were instructed not to act on their own initiative but rather to report crimes, or suspect activities witnessed, to the police via a base station.) During the 3 months of project operations in the targeted areas, burglaries decreased by approximately 23 percent and auto thefts decreased 96 percent when compared to the same period one year earlier.
- Portland's Crime Prevention Bureau resulted in burglary rates which were 30 percent less for participating citizens than they were for non-participants. (Burglary is Portland's major crime problem; the program was a victim-oriented, neighborhood-based effort which achieved the unusually high recruitment level of 27 percent of the city's households. Information presented in the March 1975 report regarding the effectiveness of this program is based on the 1974 Portland victimization survey of 1,909 persons living within the city limits of Portland.)
- Based on an evaluation report for the period January through July 1974, Denver's Operation Identification resulted in an average burglary rate for participants which was only 20 percent of the average rate experienced by non-participants. (This project provided property-engraving tools to Denver residents along with decals signaling project participation.)

Many other projects across the cities attested to crime-rate reductions; although they may indeed have been successful, their evaluation reports did not allow attribution of such success to the project.

## 2. Recidivism Reduction

### (a) Juvenile Projects

Ten Impact projects achieved varying degrees of success in reducing juvenile recidivism. However, a follow-up of several years is needed before such achievements can be confirmed and these projects were operational much less time than that. Findings, therefore, are encouraging but tentative.

- Portland's Case Management Corrections Services showed a 58 percent reduction in recidivism for juveniles having participated in the program for 6 months, based on a before-after comparison. Three hundred and eighty-four clients were

served. MITRE's field-validation of this project for transfer<sup>(4)</sup> included an analysis of data over two years of project operations which confirmed that outcome objectives were indeed being met. Further, the overall examination underscored the project's impressive approach to juvenile probation services and its eminent suitability for replication in medium-to-large urban areas. (The Case Management project provided intensive probation supervision at four neighborhood-based centers in high-crime areas of Portland. Intensive supervision was accompanied by wide use of community services through contracted, fee-for-service support from other private and public agencies.)

- The Youth Recidivist Reduction project in Denver induced a 65 percent drop in client Impact-crime re-arrests, and a 36 percent reduction in all re-arrests during its first year of operation, compared to expected rates in the City of Denver. (This project was established to extend an increased amount of community-based group home treatment to highly recidivistic juvenile offenders, aged 10-18. The project served 132 clients in one year of operation.)
- Denver's Northeast Youth Service Bureau reduced the recidivism rate of youthful offenders served by more than 60 percent compared to expected rates in Denver. (This project accepted clients and coordinated available community services with youth in need, via referral. The project served 333 youths in ten months of operations.)
- Clients served by Denver's Project Intercept--a juvenile diversion program--had 58 percent fewer re-arrests than a control group of similar clients who received no treatment. (Project Intercept treated youthful first offenders through an intensive counseling program for the clients and their families. The project served 138 youths in 15 months of operation.)
- Denver's Police-to-Partners reduced the rate of recidivism for youthful offenders served from an expected 53 percent to 16 percent. (The project consisted of matching juvenile offenders, aged 10-17, with adult volunteers, or partners, who mutually agreed to spend time together each week for a year. The project depended upon referrals from the Denver Police Department and the four Youth Service Bureaus. During the first year, 197 youths were matched to partners.)

- Based on findings for the period September 1972-December 1973, St. Louis' Providence Education Center reduced recidivism among its clients, as measured by referrals to the courts. Six months after leaving the Center, 71 percent had either no referrals or fewer referrals than they had had prior to joining Providence. For those continuing to attend the Center, 76 percent had either no referrals or fewer than they had had before. (This project offered full-time individualized remedial education with supplemental individual and family counseling to youthful male offenders. The project treated about 118 juveniles per year.)
- Clients of Denver's New Pride probation project, who had a history of recidivism and an average of 5.7 offenses per youth, had re-arrest rates, after one year of project operation, that were between 23 percent and 51 percent lower than baseline groups with equivalent numbers of prior offenses. A MITRE field-validation<sup>(4)</sup> found that New Pride concepts were innovative, workable and transferable to most urban areas. It was suggested that replicative efforts should include experimentation with strategies to incorporate a post-treatment transitional phase designed to slowly decrease support services over a fairly lengthy time frame.<sup>(12)</sup> (New Pride furnished tutorial and cultural education, vocational training and part-time job placements to juvenile probationers in an attempt to assist their reintegration into the school system and the community.)
- The Southeast Denver Neighborhood Service Bureau achieved lower recidivism rates for its clients (34 percent) than could normally have been expected from baseline data (41 percent). (This project acted primarily as a service brokerage agency, working with about 188 youths during the year of its operation.)
- Clients served by Atlanta's High-Risk Juvenile Parole project had approximately 70 percent fewer re-arrests than a comparison group of clients who received treatment through the city's regular juvenile parole system. The project served 60 juveniles in the first year of project operations. (The project provided individualized supervisory and counseling services to high-risk offenders residing in the City of Atlanta whose most recent offense had been an Impact crime.)
- The Juvenile Supervision Assistance/Home Detention Program in St. Louis served as a viable alternative to the secure detention of juveniles. During the first year of project operations, less than 1 percent of the approximately 500 clients

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committed new offenses. This compared favorably to the St. Louis Detention Center in which, during the same period, there were 96 incidents involving 152 different youths. Furthermore 97 percent of the clients attended their court hearings and appointments. (This project sought to keep youths assigned to it trouble-free and as available to the Court as those in the Detention Center. Instead of being placed in the Detention Center, clients selected for this project were returned to their homes/or surrogate homes, and assigned to a Community Youth Leader.)

(b) Adult Recidivism Reduction

Only four projects presented good evidence attesting to early success in adult recidivism reduction. Two of these originated in Denver.

- Based on evaluation findings covering the period December 1972 through June 1974, Denver's Employ-Ex demonstrated significant reductions in recidivism. Re-arrest rates among the project's 646 clients (35 percent) were 17 percent below baseline figures. (This project was staffed primarily with ex-offenders and provided job training, placement and counseling services to adult offenders.)
- Denver's Intensive Probation and Parole Supervision, which used neighborhood satellite offices, achieved lower recidivism rates among its clients than did Central Office supervision. Among project parolees, the re-arrest rate was 3.5 percent, as against a rate of 9.9 percent for Central Office parolees; project probationers had a 3.7 percent re-arrest rate versus 5.2 percent of Central Office clients. MITRE field-validation and analysis for the transfer examination<sup>(4)</sup> confirmed that the project was effectively reducing client recidivism rates. Further, a thorough examination of all facets of the project indicated that it was amenable to replication in medium-to-large urban communities. (This community-based, adult rehabilitation project emphasized small caseloads and intensive supervision of clients, while simultaneously encouraging parole and probation officers to share resources, experience, and expertise. The project reduced caseloads to 39:1 for parole and 44:1 for probation, treated 900 clients during its first year and successfully placed 279 clients in jobs.)
- Based on evaluation findings for the period July-December 1974, the 170 clients served by Atlanta's Intensive Probation Counseling of Robbery/Burglary Offenders project had 30 percent

fewer felony convictions than a group of similar probationers studied for an Atlanta Regional Commission project during the period July-December 1974. (This project provided specialized probation services to offenders convicted on a robbery or burglary charge.)

- Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotics Offenders project sought to reduce the re-arrest and conviction rates of probationers who had prior Impact arrests and were narcotics users. This was done by the provision of intensive supervision services through a specialized Narcotics Unit in the Probation Department. During the period October 1973-September 1974, 5 percent (11 cases) of the clients served by the project were arrested for an Impact offense. During the same period 10.6% of a control group of similar clients receiving regular supervision services were arrested for Impact offenses. Furthermore, only 3.8% of the project clients were involved in drug arrests compared to 15.3% of the control group.

### 3. Systems Improvement

Ten Impact projects made headway in improving the quality and efficiency of both the police and court systems.

- The St. Louis Expand the Evidence Technician Unit project was directed at improving police information-gathering techniques to decrease the number of cases dismissed in the courts for lack of evidence. Project-level evaluation of this project over the period March 1973-July 1974 found that cases handled by the unit resulted in 12 percent more arrests, 24 percent more guilty pleas and a 17 percent higher conviction rate than did cases not processed by the unit. Through the use of a mobile team of trained evidence-collection technicians, the project increased scientific evidence collection by the St. Louis Police Department, while reducing the response time of technicians to the crime scene by 18 percent. Since the expansion of the unit, there was a 31 percent increase in crime scene searches (representing about 25 percent of all Part I offenses). Field-validation and analysis of this project in view of its transfer to other communities found problems with evaluation documentation which would need to be corrected before this project could be recommended for replication, but found also clear evidence of increased productivity and improvements in the quality and quantity of evidence introduced into courtroom proceedings.<sup>(4)</sup>

- Based on evaluation findings for the period October 1973-September 1974, Dallas' Crime Laboratory substantially reduced the time required to report test results to law enforcement agencies for document comparisons, ballistics tests, analyses of soil, fibers, hair, toolmarks, gunshot residues, etc. The project also far exceeded its goals of increases in the number of cases for which evidence was submitted--this for all Impact crimes except burglary. A MITRE field validation for transfer confirmed that this project had achieved success in accomplishing its objectives, and found also that it was a suitable candidate for replication. Project operation had resulted in an increase in laboratory productivity (given a marked decrease in turnaround time for analysis and reporting) and had brought ramified improvements in overall criminal justice system capability.<sup>(4)</sup> (This project was designed to upgrade forensic science support to the Dallas Police Department through personnel training.)
- Dallas' Legal Aides for Police was aimed at strengthening police case preparation. The project improved both police and court productivity through the assignment of attorneys to the Police Department. Attorneys worked closely with police on crime investigation and closely monitored and reviewed case preparation. During the first 12 months of project operation, an absolute 20.7 percent reduction was achieved in the no-bill rate due to police error (this rate had been 33.9 percent and was now 13.2 percent). During the next 6 months, the no-bill rate was further reduced to 6.2 percent. Over the project's period of operations, about 1200 prosecution reports, on the average, were reviewed monthly. Examination of this project for transfer found it highly successful except for some limitations in the evaluation approach, and concluded that it was a strong candidate for replication in other medium-to-large urban places.
- Based on evaluation findings for the period November 1973 through June 1974, Portland's Multnomah County District Attorney's program substantially improved police investigative capacity. By increasing and institutionalizing cooperation between prosecutors and police, 58 percent of the cases handled by this project pleaded to the original charge, as compared to 24 percent of similar cases handled in the normal fashion by the District Attorney's Office. Other comparisons found that this project produced a greater proportion of guilty pleas (50 percent versus 25 percent), and fewer plea bargains (3 percent versus 47 percent). Despite the more intensive nature of casework assistance inherent in this program, the project maintained an average arrest-to-trial

period equal to those cases prosecuted in the traditional manner. (Police and prosecutors worked continuously together in this program throughout the evidence-gathering stage and in the preparation of cases for trial.)

- Based on evaluation findings for the period August 1973 through July 1974, Baltimore's High-Impact Court project decreased court processing time (i.e., the average time from arrest to disposition) by 106 days (from 278 to 172 days) via the provision of 2 new courtrooms and increased judicial manpower (2 judges, 8 prosecutors and various support personnel) to the Baltimore Circuit Court.
- In 3 months, Cleveland's Pre-Sentence Investigation project reduced the average preparation time for all pre-sentence investigation reports to 7 days from an average of 42 days for bail cases. (The project involved the modification of the reporting form, and the hiring of additional manpower. Findings are based on evaluation over a 16-month period, stretching from April 1973 to August 1974.)
- Based on evaluation findings for the period April through December 1973, Cleveland's Visiting Judges project decreased the average delay from arrest to disposition for felony cases from 138 days to 117 days, while at the same time reducing court backlogs by one-third. Field validation for transfer found that progress toward the achievement of project goals was clearly evident, and that the project was a good candidate for replication in cases where short-term demand problems were leading to excessive delays between arrest and disposition and sizeable criminal-case court backlogs. (This project drew judges, both sitting and retired, from the entire State of Ohio to preside on the bench of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, thus providing increased judicial manpower at reasonable cost. The judges used existing courtrooms on a double-shift basis with the regular Common Pleas Court judges.)
- Dallas' Special Court Processing of Impact Cases achieved a dramatic reduction in court processing time (measured by elapsed time between arrest and disposition). The average processing time was 330 days before project implementation. During the second year of project operation, processing time dropped to 86 days for Impact cases and to 90 days for non-Impact cases. The size of the felony case backlog decreased concurrently from 12,000 cases at the end of 1972 to 10,086 cases by the end of the project's second year of operation.

(This project was designed to increase the prosecution of Impact offenders and to strengthen the entire Dallas County court system by providing two new district courts and hiring additional personnel for these courts as well as for the District Attorney's Office, Sheriff's Office, and the District Clerk's Office.)

- Portland's Strike Force project consisted of the coordinated use of Impact-provided resources and the exploration of alternative strategies to improve: (a) collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime incident and suspect information, (b) detection and investigation of target crimes, (c) apprehension, and (d) interdiction of professional activities related to target crimes. Comparing an 8-month period before and after the initiation of the strike force, there was a statistically significant increase (120 percent) in the number of robbery cases considered by the District Attorney, as well as a statistically significant increase (37 percent) in the number of burglary cases considered. Despite the large increase in cases handled, the percentage of cases accepted for prosecution remained constant.
- Dallas's Upgrade Response of the Regional Criminal Justice System project was aimed at reducing the delay in retrieving case/defendant information for criminal justice agencies to less than 5 seconds through the use of a new access and teleprocessing monitor software system. During the first year of operation of the project, transactions processed via this system increased from 7,000 to over 28,000 a day. During this period, response time averaged less than 2 seconds. There also was a reduction in the average time required to obtain data for the book-in of Impact offenders from 10 to 3 minutes. Judges and attorneys accessed the data system approximately 5,000 times a day, with an average response time of less than 5 seconds.

Based on the technical review process results, it was found that 33 of the 135 projects subjected to study had presented adequate substantiation of anti-crime success. Furthermore, field validation and additional analysis of 9 of these 33 projects reinforced the effectiveness findings of the technical review process for the 9 projects validated, and culminated in transfer recommendations for 7 of the 9 projects.

In Impact, then, the evaluation capabilities initiated at the beginning of the program made it possible to show, via evaluation documentation, that 33 projects implemented had been effective. This should not, of course, be understood to signify that these were

the only effective projects in the program. As discussed in Chapter VI, the Impact program is still on-going and final reports cannot yet be provided for many projects implemented since December of 1974. Slower implementers have not yet evaluated large portions of their programs. The fact remains, however, that some cities have been less able (or willing) than others to develop an evaluation capability sufficient to assess project effects adequately, so that many project achievements will necessarily go unmeasured. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the phase-out of funds for Crime Analysis Teams could not properly account for the scheduling of final evaluation reports, given the program's overall slippage. Thus, the end of Crime Analysis Team funding means that production of further Impact evaluation documents may be somewhat problematic.

On the other hand, although evaluation of high quality is needed to demonstrate success, the lack of such evaluation certainly does not demonstrate project failure. (Similarly, the existence of a poor evaluation report does not rule out the possibility that a project was, in fact, successful.) As discussed in Chapter VIII (see pages 241 and 267-269 above), the state of the evaluative art, and--above all--its lack of dissemination, were major factors in limiting the quality of project-level evaluation documentation. Overall, only 135 (or about 58 percent) of all the Impact projects could be reviewed for effectiveness; the others either did not report evaluation findings or did not do so adequately. Therefore, since anti-crime achievement has been assessed here on the basis of evaluation reports, it is clear that there may have been project effectiveness which has not yet been--or could not be--documented.

Given the above programmatic and evaluation considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that:

- There may be many undocumented, yet successful Impact projects;
- More documentation may yet be forthcoming for those cities which have been slow implementers, but are maintaining or developing an evaluation capability;
- Anti-crime achievement will remain essentially undocumented in those cities where evaluation capability was not well developed, or was closed off by Crime Analysis Team phase-down.

Table XXXIX below examines the 33 effective projects in terms of federal funds expended, project focus, innovativeness and institutionalization. The table shows that these projects accounted, in total, for about \$30.5 million in federal funds, or 22 percent of the \$140 million awarded under Impact. Given the wide variation in

TABLE XXXIX  
 COST, FOCUS, INNOVATIVENESS AND LIKELY INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 33 EFFECTIVE IMPACT PROJECTS<sup>1</sup>

CITY (NUMBER OF PROJECTS)	EFFECTIVE IMPACT PROJECTS	TOTAL FEDERAL DOLLARS EXPENDED FOR EFFECTIVE PROJECTS	TOTAL FEDERAL DOLLARS RECEIVED BY CITY	EFFECTIVE PROJECT EXPENDITURE AS PERCENT OF DOLLARS RECEIVED BY CITY	PROJECT FOCUS			PROJECT SELECTED AS INNOVATIVE	LIKELY INSTITUTIONALIZATION
					CRIME-REDUCTION	RECIDIVISM-REDUCTION	SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT		
ATLANTA (4)	SUBTOTAL ATLANTA	\$ 3,172,209	\$ 16,856,592	18.8%					
	ANTI-ROBBERY/BURGLARY	795,449			795,449			-	YES
	ANTI-ROBBERY	1,828,371			1,828,371			-	YES
	INTENSIVE ADULT PROBATION COUNSELING	344,377				344,327		-	-
	HIGH-RISK JUVENILE PAROLE	204,062				204,062		-	YES
BALTIMORE (3)	SUBTOTAL BALTIMORE	\$ 2,161,155	\$ 16,739,045	12.9%					
	HIGH-IMPACT COURTS	1,776,773					1,776,773	-	YES
	INTENSIVE SUPERVISION OF NARCOTICS OFFENDERS	381,510				381,510		-	-
	LOCK RAVEN RADIO WATCH	2,872			2,872			-	-
CLEVELAND (2)	SUBTOTAL CLEVELAND	\$ 777,930	\$ 18,485,465	4.2%					
	VISITING JUDGES	719,616					719,616	-	YES
	PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION	58,314					58,314	-	YES
DALLAS (5)	SUBTOTAL DALLAS	\$ 9,085,933	\$ 17,039,548	53.3%					
	EXPAND CRIME LAB	579,818					579,818	-	-
	LEGAL AIDES FOR POLICE	535,463					535,463	YES	YES
	SPECIAL COURT PROCESSING OF IMPACT CASES	2,214,738					2,214,738	-	YES
	UPGRADE RESPONSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM	93,731					93,731	-	YES
	EXPANSION OF TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT	5,662,183			5,662,183			-	-
DENVER (10)	SUBTOTAL DENVER	\$ 8,828,196	\$ 10,141,466	48.7%					
	NORTHEAST DENVER YSB	406,632				406,632		YES	YES
	POLICE-TO-PARTNERS	491,026				491,026		-	YES
	SPECIAL CRIME ATTACK TEAM	2,517,542			2,517,542			-	-
	EMPLOY-EX	823,499				823,499		-	YES
	INTENSIVE PROBATION AND PAROLE SUPERVISION	1,307,660				1,307,660		YES	YES
	NEW PRIDE	492,945				492,945		YES	YES
	YOUTH RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROJECT	622,722				622,722		-	YES
	OPERATION IDENT	612,385			612,385			-	YES
	PROJECT INTERCEPT	1,159,438				1,159,438		YES	-
	SOUTHEAST NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICE BUREAU	394,347				394,347		YES	YES
NEWARK (0)	SUBTOTAL NEWARK	\$ -	\$ 17,776,946	0%					
PORTLAND (4)	SUBTOTAL PORTLAND	\$ 4,289,031	\$ 16,067,117	26.7%					
	MULTNOMAH COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S PROJECT	394,517					394,517	-	-
	POLICE HIGH-IMPACT STRIKE FORCE	1,366,959					1,366,959	-	YES
	CASE MANAGEMENT CORRECTIONS SERVICES	1,961,349				1,961,349		YES	-
	CRIME PREVENTION BUREAU	566,206			566,206			-	YES
ST. LOUIS (5)	SUBTOTAL ST. LOUIS	\$ 2,170,954	\$ 18,896,667	11.5%					
	PROVIDENCE EDUCATION CENTER	885,993				885,993	180,176	YES	-
	EXPAND EVIDENCE TECHNICIAN'S UNIT	150,176						-	YES
	JUVENILE SUPERVISION ASSISTANCE/HOME DETENTION	585,200				585,200		-	-
	OPERATION IDENT	146,075			146,075			-	YES
	EXPAND BURGLARY PREVENTION UNIT	382,510			382,510			-	YES
TOTAL (33)		\$30,494,408	\$140,002,846	21.8%	12,513,593 (*)	10,060,710 (14)	7,920,105 (10)	(8)	(21)

<sup>1</sup> THESE PROJECTS DO NOT PURPORT TO REPRESENT ALL EFFECTIVE IMPACT ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS, BUT ONLY THOSE WHICH WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVALUATIONS DEMONSTRATING THEIR SUCCESS.

implementation speeds and evaluation capability across the eight cities, it is unsurprising that there should also be wide variation in the proportion of each city's program which can be shown to have been expended effectively.

Newark's evaluation problems (see pages 222-223) signify that no project implemented there was able to substantiate its achievements. Only 2 projects could do so in Cleveland, where evaluation was superficial and had usually been performed in the absence of any discernible evaluation approach (see page 202 above). Baltimore's exclusive use of progress reports was responsible for the dearth of projects able to justify claims of success there; given tardy implementation and recent improvements in evaluation documentation, however, it is conceivable that Baltimore may eventually increase the number of projects which can be shown to have been successful. Atlanta's and Portland's late implementation and excellent evaluation quality make it seem very likely that their project effectiveness performance will improve, given continued evaluation efforts; the heavily funded and innovative project THOR, for example, has not yet been the object of an evaluation report in Atlanta.

Denver's well-planned projects, evaluation caliber and reasonable speed of implementation signified that 10 of Denver's projects could be shown to have been effective. This is the highest number for any Impact city. Dallas and St. Louis were able to substantiate findings of success for 5 projects each.

As discussed in Chapter VII, the number of projects which cities chose to implement, as well as their scope and the size of their funding depended on agency/CAT/city decisions to develop small, inexpensive initiatives or to target heavily-funded, concentrated efforts. The decision (and capability) to fund fewer and bigger projects means that, when the projects are effective, impact is presumably greater, fewer evaluation plans and reports are required, and larger proportions of federal funds can be shown to have been well spent. Such is the case for Dallas, as shown in Table XXXIX: 53% of Dallas' Impact funds were spent in support of the city's 5 successful projects, whereas 49% of Denver's funds (or about \$250,000 less) were spent in Denver to implement 10 projects (or double the Dallas number). Although no other city could match Dallas and Denver for the proportions of federal funds received which could be shown to have been applied to useful and successful projects, it is interesting to note that of the \$30.5 million total, \$25.4 million (or 83%) was expended in Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland (the four younger, "advantaged" cities identified in Chapter V above). This result is similar to the finding that 73 percent of innovative projects (see page 275 above) had originated in this same group of cities.

Table XXXIX shows that the crime-reduction focus accounted for more effective-project funds than did recidivism-reduction or systems improvement. Overall, about 41 percent of the expenditure for effective projects went toward the crime-reduction focus, 33 percent was directed at recidivism, and 26 percent was dedicated to systems improvement (as opposed to program-wide proportions of 31 percent to crime-reduction, 42 percent to recidivism-reduction, and 27 percent to systems improvement, see Table XXVI, page 164 above). This does not, of course, reflect program priorities; rather, it reflects the success of individual project strategies combined with the evaluation capability to demonstrate that success. In this sense, Denver's achievements are a result of the CAT's internalizations of the Impact evaluation goal in the service of some highly complex and difficult-to-measure anti-crime objectives; 8 of Denver's 10 effective projects focused on recidivism reduction, utilizing baseline data constructed by the Denver CAT early in the program (see page 215 above). Dallas' achievements, on the other hand, seem to have sprung more from the special permission to select system objectives (4 of Dallas' 5 successful projects) which may be intrinsically easier to achieve, combined with persistence and tenacity in the generation of multiple and steadily improving evaluation reports (see page 208 above).

A total of 8 (or 24 percent of the 33 projects) had been selected as innovative; this is more than twice the proportion (11 percent) which had been found program-wide. Further, many of the 26 innovative projects selected are of recent vintage and have not yet produced evaluation reports. In terms of institutionalization, 21 (or 63 percent) of the 33 effective projects are expected to be continued. This again is a far higher rate than that for projects generally (43%, see page 282 above). Among the 12 successful projects for which institutionalization prognosis is unknown, 8 were recidivism-focused, as opposed to 2 each for crime-reduction and systems improvement projects. This again reflects the finding that crime-reduction and systems-improvement focused projects are more likely to be institutionalized than recidivism-reduction focused projects (perhaps because of salary cost and other factors discussed above, see page 281).

It thus appears that all cities except Newark were able to apply evaluation techniques sufficiently to substantiate the anti-crime achievements of at least two projects by August, 1975. In places like Atlanta, Denver and Portland, where planning and evaluation were important from the beginning, and in Dallas, where multiple reports generated improved evaluative capabilities, a good proportion of funds expended can be shown to have been well spent. In other cities, progress has been slower but a learning experience has taken place. It seems reasonable to believe that with more technical assistance and with the increased dissemination of evaluation techniques, a much greater proportion of projects will be able to

be evaluated for outcome effectiveness in future programs, with anticipated benefits for the allocation and impact of federal anti-crime resources.

#### B. Other Project-Level Findings

MITRE's fourth evaluation task (see Chapter IV, page 63 above) involved two studies of various Impact projects which examined:

- intensive supervision as a treatment strategy for probationers; and
- overt police patrol as a strategy to reduce specific crimes.

These examinations used project-level achievements as evidence to test two commonly-held assumptions: that intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, and that increases in police patrol will result in decreased crime levels. The analyses performed in pursuit of these efforts also brought new evidence to bear on the assessment of project effectiveness.

##### 1. An Examination of Intensive Supervision as a Treatment Strategy for Probationers

Four probation projects, funded under Impact, were selected for analysis as part of this examination. These were:

- (a) New Pride (Denver),
- (b) Essex County Probation Department's Specialized Caseload Project and Volunteer's Component (Newark),
- (c) Case Management Corrections Services (Portland), and
- (d) Providence Education Center (St. Louis).

All of these projects except the Newark effort have already figured in the discussion of effective juvenile projects (see pages 313 through 316 above).

For the client samples in each of the projects and for the total client sample, five analyses were performed:

- (a) Comparisons of the frequency of offenses based on a one-year baseline period and a one-year service period;
- (b) Comparisons of the severity of offenses based on a one-year baseline period and a one-year service period;

- (c) The prediction of various criminal offense measures by client-descriptive variables such as age, ethnicity, and grade level;
- (d) The prediction of service period criminal offense measures by pre-service and baseline criminal offense measures; and
- (e) The use of stepwise multiple regression analyses to assess the predictability of frequency of new arrests during service from the best set of client-descriptive and criminal offense variables.

Additionally, a comparison of the frequency of recidivism for juvenile offenders in the assumptions research sample and juvenile offenders from Denver (matched on the basis of the number of prior offenses) was conducted.

The most important results of these analyses were as follows:

- All projects achieved significant reductions in frequency of recidivism in terms of baseline to service period comparisons. (The average percentage reduction was 50 percent, reflecting a change from two offenses in baseline to one offense in service.)
- There was almost no difference in the seriousness of offenses committed during baseline and service periods.
- Comparisons of the frequency of recidivism for juvenile offenders under intensive supervision and juvenile offenders from Denver matched in terms of prior number of offenses indicated that intensive supervision clients recidivated less at every level of prior offenses.
- Of the client-descriptive variables, age proved most useful in terms of the prediction of criminal offense measures. (There appeared to be a curvilinear relationship between age and baseline and service frequency such that frequency increased until age sixteen and decreased thereafter.)
- Overall, the criminal offense variables proved more useful in the prediction of service period offense measures than client-descriptive variables. The two best predictors of the frequency of recidivism were frequency in baseline and pre-service number of offenses.
- An analysis of the interaction between baseline frequency and age revealed that the most serious recidivists were clients

under sixteen who had committed three or more previous offenses, and the least serious recidivists were juveniles under sixteen with less than three previous offenses.

Based on the analyses performed, it appeared that intensive supervision, as a general strategy, was effective in terms of reducing recidivism. Both the baseline-to-service comparison and the comparisons with matched groups of juvenile offenders from Denver pointed to the effectiveness of intensive supervision. In addition to the significant reduction in recidivism for each of the projects, reductions were found at every level of pre-service number of offenses and baseline frequency. Also, the analysis of interactions between various client-descriptive variables and baseline frequency indicated that reductions in recidivism occurred for all levels of age group, ethnicity, educational lag, and living situation. In short, intensive supervision seemed to be beneficial for clients with different criminal backgrounds and different demographic characteristics, although some groups appeared to benefit more than others.

While the constraints on the methodology used here have meant that this research cannot provide the kind of unambiguous results which are sorely needed in the correctional treatment area, it is also true that most correctional research has been plagued by many of the same constraints and limitations which have characterized the present analysis. Three of these problems--the lack of control groups, the lack of a longer-term perspective, and the lack of rigorous quantification of treatment variables--have been endemic. It is unlikely, however, that, without a good deal more control over project-level evaluation planning and activities than could be exercised in the Impact program, these problems will be adequately resolved. Further, even with more control, the implementation of true experimental designs will still be difficult in correctional research, at least partly because of the legal and ethical issues involved in the potential denial of services.

Thus, the research described here reinforces the assumption that intensive supervision is an effective strategy for treating probationers; generalized and definitive statements, however, cannot be made. On the other hand, considerably more light has been shed, in the process, on the effectiveness of the four Impact projects analyzed. All appear to have been highly successful in reducing recidivism, according to the quasi-experimental design employed (before-after, and matched comparison groups). The achievements of New Pride, Providence Education Center and Case Management Corrections Services (already presented in the first part of this chapter) are consequently reinforced. The recidivism reductions attained by Newark's Essex County Specialized Caseload project, however, are especially interesting in that this project's success could not have

been substantiated by technical review (due to the lack of evaluation documentation). This supports the belief advanced earlier that there may be other effective projects in Impact whose achievements are not understood because they have not been documented in evaluation reports. In the case of the intensive supervision research, data from the Newark project had been furnished raw to the national-level evaluation for inclusion in the analysis. Yet it seems clear from the foregoing examination that this project--had it been evaluated at the city level--would have been considered an effective project on the basis of technical review.

## 2. An Examination of Police Patrol Effectiveness

In order to explore the effectiveness of increases in overt police patrol, three projects funded under Impact were examined in detail. They were:

- (a) The Special Crime Attack Team (Denver);
- (b) The Concentrated Crime Patrol (Cleveland); and
- (c) The Pilot Foot Patrol (St. Louis).

In this examination, each of the three projects was examined individually, and analysis was presented on a case-by-case basis. In all cases, official crime levels during the time period covered by police patrol project operations were analyzed. This crime-level analysis was conducted using four time-series models developed as part of the research. (The models predict crime levels for the treatment period, based on past crime levels in the area, and the predicted or expected levels are then compared with the actual levels of crime observed during project operations to assess whether the assumed downward effect on crime has been realized. Thus all conclusions about the direction of change in crime levels are stated in terms of these expected levels.)

The empirical evidence available to support the assumption that crime during police patrol treatment would be lower than expected was presented for each case, for a number of crimes (murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery and burglary), and for specific areas: the project target area, the area immediately surrounding the target area (adjacent area), and the untreated portion of the city. (8)

Key results for the three case studies were as follows:

• The Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT):

- Three target area crimes (murder, aggravated assault, and burglary) exhibited a decline during SCAT despite the fact that only burglary was targeted.
- SCAT's greatest impact, however, was observed in burglary levels. Burglary was the target crime problem and the primary focus of SCAT activity. Despite growing trends in burglary preceding the project, decreases were observed for the project operating period.
- In general, the results of the analyses indicate that, during SCAT operation, decreases were observed for certain target area crimes which cannot be explained by either city-wide decreases in crime or by long-term crime trends. On this basis it can be concluded that SCAT activities, as a "package," had an impact on target area crime. (11)

• The Concentrated Crime Patrol (CCP);

- Three target area crimes (murder, robbery and burglary), exhibited a decline during the first 9 months of operations; no such decreases were in evidence for the untreated portion of the city.
- For robbery during the first 9 months of the project, target area decreases were accompanied by a decline in adjacent area robbery. The remainder of the city did not exhibit such decreases during this 9-month period.
- Considering the full 18-month period of CCP treatment, target area decreases in murder and robbery were sustained throughout.
- The decrease in target area burglary observed during the first 9 months of treatment was not sustained over the 18-month treatment period.
- Given that, during CCP operations, decreases were observed for target area crimes which did not occur in untreated portions of the city, it was inferred that CCP had an impact on certain crimes (murder and robbery) over the full 18-month period of operations, and on burglary, in particular, only for the first 9 months. (8)

- The St. Louis Foot Patrol
  - During Foot Patrol operations, target area murder, robbery and burglary all exhibited declines and there was also some evidence of a decrease in aggravated assault in the target area.
  - These target area crime decreases were accompanied by declines in crime in those portions of the city which received no direct attention from Foot Patrol. Since the levels of all five crimes examined appeared to have decreased (in relation to expected crime levels) in the untreated portion of St. Louis for the period of Foot Patrol activity, direct attribution of declines in the target area to project effects was impossible.

Findings for the research as a whole were that:

- In project target areas:
  - For each case at least one of the crimes examined (murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary) was significantly lower during project operations than was expected based on previous crime levels.
  - In no one project were all five crimes lower than expected.
  - No one crime was lower than expected in all three cases.
  - One crime, rape, consistently showed no evidence for declines in target areas across the three cities: in none of the cases was target area rape lower than expected.
- In untreated portions of the city:
  - Target areas appeared to be responsive to city-wide shifts in crime. In almost every instance in which crimes in the untreated portion of the city were lower than expected, the same crimes were lower than expected in the project target area.
  - While city-wide shifts in crime may be a good explanation for some of the relative decreases observed in target area crime, all target area decreases could not be explained in this way. In a number of instances, certain target area crimes were lower than expected during project operations while the same crimes were not found to be lower than expected in the untreated portion of the city.

• In areas adjacent to the project target area:

- In most of the specific analyses (of each crime, of one or more periods of operation, of patrol and non-patrol hours) the adjacent area results followed the pattern of the results of crime-level analysis for the untreated, non-contiguous portion of the city, indicating that the police patrol projects may have had little effect on adjacent area crime.
- In several of the analyses, the adjacent area exhibited relative decreases in crime similar to those observed in the target area, in situations where no such decreases were observed in the untreated portion of the city. This suggests that the positive effects of the patrol may have spread to the target area.
- Finally, in 2 specific analysis results, some crimes were found to be lower than expected in both the target area and in the untreated portion of the city as a whole, but not in the adjacent area, suggesting the possibility of crime displacement in these 2 instances only.

In general, the results suggested that while there may have been no uniform relationship between overt police patrol activity and official crime levels, there was evidence that patrols implemented in high-crime areas were accompanied by crime levels which were lower than would have been expected based on past crime levels in the area. It was therefore concluded that overt police patrol should not be dismissed as an effective, short-term anti-crime strategy.

Thus, among the three police projects analyzed, SCAT, which already figured as one of the 33 effective projects discussed earlier (see page 393), was further supported as successful by the research performed. Cleveland's CCP (like Newark's Specialized Caseload Project discussed earlier, see pages 327-328 above) appears also to have been successful, without, however, having submitted the kinds of evaluation documentation which would have allowed it to qualify as an effective project. In the case of St. Louis, there is evidence that during the project time-period, crime of all types in the untreated portion of the city was lower than expected. While this is not to say that the St. Louis Pilot Foot Patrol had no effect on crime (indeed it is possible that target area crime levels may have been lower during treatment than would be explainable by city-wide crime decreases), the analysis here<sup>(8)</sup> could not treat questions of magnitude as had been done in an earlier analysis of the SCAT

project.<sup>(11)</sup> Thus the success of the St. Louis project is unclear, since it is difficult to isolate possible patrol effects from decreases observed in untreated portions of the city.

In sum, then, given the Impact program's research constraints, neither the intensive supervision nor the police patrol research could conclude definitively about the value of the two strategies. Both strategies were supported, however, by the results of the analyses which could be performed. Among the seven projects studied in some depth for the purpose of the research, it was concluded that six had been successful either in reducing recidivism or in lowering crime rates. Two of the six had failed to submit evaluation reports from which their achievements could be deduced in the technical review process.

It thus appears that both Newark's Specialized Caseload project and Cleveland's Concentrated Crime Patrol should be added to the previous list of 33 successful Impact projects, bringing the total to 35 projects funded at \$35.3 million, and making the average of effective projects funded under Impact about 25 percent.

#### C. Project-Level Achievements by Functional Area

Outcome effectiveness by functional area<sup>1</sup> was also examined, using information provided by the technical review process. (The format used in this process is given at Appendix to this chapter; the methods of analysis used for determining the quality of evaluation reporting, approaches, etc., were discussed in Chapter VIII, pages 260-269 above; the criteria for establishing project effectiveness were elaborated on page 310 of this chapter.) Table XL below shows that (as of November, 1975) 135 projects had been reviewed and that, of these, 33 had furnished convincing evidence of their success. Of the 102 other reviewed projects, 44 were classified as possible successes (i.e., objectives were reported as being met or partially met, but the report--in MITRE's judgment--failed to provide adequate justification for these findings); 58 had presented no evaluative evidence which could lead to presumptions of outcome success.

It is interesting to note that police and community involvement projects together made up 15, or nearly half, of the 33 successful projects, and that community projects had a larger proportion of effective efforts (47 percent) than any other area. When successful, and possibly successful, projects are considered together, it can be

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<sup>1</sup> See pages 160 and 162 for explanations of functional area classifications.

TABLE XI  
PROJECT OUTCOMES BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

FUNCTIONAL AREA	NUMBER OF PROJECTS	PROJECTS SUBMITTING NO REPORTS OR UNREVIEWABLE REPORTS	NON-REPORTING PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL PROJECTS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS REVIEWED	REVIEWED PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL PROJECTS	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE <sup>1</sup> PROJECTS	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE <sup>1</sup> PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF PROJECTS REVIEWED	NUMBER OF POSSIBLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS	NUMBER OF POSSIBLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF PROJECTS REVIEWED	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE AND POSSIBLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PLUS POSSIBLE PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF PROJECTS REVIEWED	PROJECTS PRESENTING NO EVIDENCE OF SUCCESS	UNSUBSTANTIATED PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF PROJECTS REVIEWED
	(N)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)
PREVENTION	21	6	29	15	71	3	20	7	47	10	67	5	33
POLICE	37	15	41	22	59	8	36	7	32	15	68	7	32
COURTS	25	12	48	13	52	4	31	6	46	10	77	3	23
ADULT CORRECTIONS <sup>2</sup>	49	20	41	29	59	4	14	11	38	15	52	14	48
JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	33	10	30	23	70	5	22	6	26	11	48	12	52
RESEARCH/INFORMATION SYSTEMS	16	11	69	5	31	1	20	-	-	1	20	4	80
DRUG USE	10	2	20	8	80	1	13	1	12	2	25	6	45
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	33	18	55	15	45	7	47	5	33	12	80	3	20
TARGET HARDENING	9	4	44	5	56	-	-	1	20	1	20	4	80
TOTAL	233	98	42	135	58	33	24	44	33	77	57	58	43

<sup>1</sup> THESE PROJECTS DO NOT PURPORT TO REPRESENT ALL EFFECTIVE IMPACT ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS, BUT ONLY THOSE WHICH WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVALUATIONS DEMONSTRATING THEIR SUCCESS.

<sup>2</sup> FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ANALYSIS, THE PROJECT PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED UNDER THE CATEGORY "OTHER" (A JAIL PROJECT) WAS INCLUDED IN THE ADULT CORRECTIONS CATEGORY.

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM MITRE'S TECHNICAL REVIEW ANALYSIS (FISCHEL, M. B., KUPERSMITH, G. W., AND TREHAN, A. P., TECHNICAL REVIEWS OF ANTI-CRIME PROJECTS: SUPPORTING DATA FOR A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7089).

seen that the evaluations which most often permitted either demonstrations or inferences of possible success were performed in the areas of community involvement, the courts, police and prevention. Research and information system projects, on the other hand, along with drug programs and target hardening, were generally unable to supply evidence of success.

### 1. Prevention

A large proportion (71 percent, or 15) of the 21 prevention area projects submitted evaluation reports. This coverage was higher than the 58 percent average, program-wide, and probably reflects the enduring juvenile priority of the program (see Figure 14, page 155, and the discussion page 174 above) as expressed in the youth emphasis of the prevention area. Of the 15 projects reviewed, 3 were classified as having reasonably substantiated project achievements; 7 more were possible successes; only 5 provided no evidence of meeting project objectives.

### 2. Police

The police area presented the best evaluation reporting and the best approaches utilized in the Impact program (see the discussion of the technical review analysis employed here, pages 309 through 310 above). Evaluation documentation, however, was available for only 59 percent of all projects (or 22 of 37); 15 projects did not submit adequate (or any) evaluation documentation. Of the 22 reviewed projects, 8 were judged to have justified their achievements in terms of project objectives. This is the largest number of successes attained in any functional area. In all, 68 percent (or 15) of the projects reviewed were either successful or possibly successful; 32 percent (or 7) provided no evidence of project success.

### 3. Courts

The court functional area was characterized by poor evaluation planning (see the discussion of evaluation planning, pages 255 through 260 above). Many components did not indicate adequately what a particular project sought to accomplish. Evaluation reporting was inevitably affected by such planning gaps, as well as by overambitious objectives (especially in the group of projects attempting to reduce trial delay).<sup>(6)</sup> Nearly half of the court projects (48 percent, or 12 of 25) did not provide any evaluation documentation; this was higher than the 42 percent average for all the functional areas. Of the 13 projects reviewed, however, 10 (or 77 percent) were either successful or possibly successful. This is a very good proportion, compared to the other functional areas; only 3 projects were unable to provide any evidence of success.

#### 4. Adult Corrections

Evaluation planning in this area was even more inadequate than for court projects. Components typically failed to attain Level 2 of the evaluation plan rankings (see Figure 19, page 257 above). This, once again, necessarily affected evaluation reporting. More projects (49) were implemented in this functional area than in any other. Of these 49, 20 did not submit evaluation documentation. While this seems to be a very large gap in reporting, proportionally it is the same as the gap in the police area (41 percent) and slightly below the average for all the functional areas (42 percent). Of the 29 documented projects, only 4 (or 14 percent) were judged as having substantiated project success (this is one of the lowest ratios in any functional area). Of the other 25, 11 were considered to be possible successes, and 14 (or 48 percent) did not provide any evidence of achievement in meeting project objectives. (This last figure is somewhat higher than the average of 43 percent program-wide.)

#### 5. Juvenile Corrections

The juvenile area was a targeted priority of the Impact cities (see Figure 14, page 155 above). This is probably reflected in the fact that evaluation planning was considerably better for juvenile corrections than for adult corrections, and in the relatively good evaluation coverage of projects: 70 percent of juvenile corrections projects provided documentation (roughly the same percentage as for prevention projects--also largely a juvenile area), as opposed to 58 percent program-wide. Of the 23 projects reviewed, although 5 were shown to be effective, only 6 emerged as possibly effective; thus, 12 (or 52 percent) of the juvenile corrections projects reviewed could provide no evidence of success (this is considerably higher than the non-success rate of 43 percent for all functional areas).

#### 6. Research and Information Systems

As discussed earlier (see pages 252 and 264 above), the inclusion of research and information systems was something of an anomaly in an action program like Impact. Perhaps it is for this reason that these projects received the lowest program-wide rankings for approach applicability in that they may have been less amenable to outcome evaluations than were other kinds of projects. Project development was generally slow and impeded by difficult implementation problems (so much so that MITRE devoted a special study to three of these projects).<sup>(7)</sup> Evaluation coverage was the worst in the program; 11 of 16 projects (or 69 percent) failed to submit reports. Of the 5 projects providing documentation, 1 was adjudged a success but the 4 others provided no evidence of project achievement.

## 7. Drug Use

This was a severely troubled functional area in Impact (see page 252 above), yet drug use had constituted an important priority problem for nearly all of the Impact cities (see Figure 14, page 155 above). MITRE efforts to analyze the difficulties besetting implementation of the 5 TASC programs<sup>(5)</sup> revealed problems of philosophical disagreement (between treatment and law enforcement agencies), of referral and agency coordination (courts, police, drug agencies), of evaluation planning (no focus on client outcomes, no design mechanisms included which could allow for attribution of client achievements to the program), of data collection (concern over client privacy and information confidentiality), of high dropout rates and of internal management. Drug projects other than TASC did, however, have some success: Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotic Offenders projects featured an evaluation design including control groups and was designated an effective project (see page 317 above). Still another was a possible success. Finally, although documentation coverage was good among drug projects (8 of 10 eventually submitted evaluation reports), 6 of the 8 (or 78 percent) could provide no evaluative evidence attesting to project success.

## 8. Community Involvement

Evaluation planning for community involvement projects was the best for any functional area in the Impact program. Evaluation reporting was also very good, with general utilization of applicable evaluation approaches. Documentation coverage, on the other hand, was not especially comprehensive, with 18 of 33 projects (or 55 percent) failing to submit reports. (This is higher than the 42 percent average program-wide.) Of the 15 projects reviewed, however, 7 were chosen as effective projects and 5 more were possible successes. Only 3, or 20 percent, provided no evidence of success; this was the lowest proportion of failures in any functional area.

## 9. Target Hardening

Although target hardening projects provided generally good evaluation plans, reporting quality was the poorest among all the functional areas. No project provided an adequate demonstration of success, and only one possible success was recognized. Of the 5 projects reviewed, 4 could provide no evidence whatever of meeting project objectives.

## 10. Summary of Project-Level Achievement by Functional Area

Overall, the MITRE technical reviews revealed that the functional areas producing the best evaluative evidence of achievement (including

effective projects and possible successes) were the areas of community involvement (80 percent of the projects reviewed), courts (77 percent), police (68 percent), and prevention (67 percent). The areas presenting the greatest problems of both achievement and evaluation under Impact, were research/information systems (80 percent of projects reviewed failed to report evidence of success), target hardening (also 80 percent) and drug programs (75 percent).

It is clear that the difficulties encountered by TASC programs and target hardening projects, under Impact, are of such magnitude that further research appears to be warranted to determine whether the problems are intrinsic to the projects or have to do rather with the fact that they were implemented in the Impact context. The Impact experience has not thus far furnished evidence reviewed by MITRE which can attest to the usefulness or relevance of these programs for crime control.

The question of research/information systems, on the other hand, seems quite patently to be a problem of time and of the appropriateness of funding such projects in a short-term program. It is evident, for example, that effective data system projects require extensive developmental periods because of the lead-time needed to structure the necessary agency relationships, because of complicated procurement policies and regulations which must be adhered to, and because of the need to educate data system project personnel in the operations of the criminal justice system.

Data system projects are among the most difficult and lengthy to develop and implement.<sup>(7)</sup> The complex relationships which must be structured within and between agencies requires, to some degree, intrusion upon long established customs of agency autonomy. Within the context of a short-term program like Impact, it is perhaps too much to ask that agencies embark upon such a course of program development. Probably a longer-term funding program (extending over the three to five year period usually required) would be more appropriate for data system projects, along with phased funding occurring as implementation benchmarks were achieved.

Looking across all the functional areas, it appears that the documentation of achievement was largely a function of the newness of the enterprise and of the lack of ready-made tools for evaluation in some areas. The greater success of the police and community involvement strategies appears to be imputable to more readily available data and to the more straightforward measurement involved in activities featuring direct, area-specific crime reduction. While corrections projects had difficulties with the measurement of recidivism, and courts projects often posited some unrealistic objectives.

these problems seemed largely due to inexperience; they are, therefore, remediable in most cases and should, logically, improve with time, training and technical assistance.

In sum, then, there were not many surprises in terms of functional area effectiveness. Those areas which required:

- technical assistance unavailable under Impact (recidivism-focused projects, for example);
- more time than could be forthcoming in a 2-year action-oriented program (data system projects, for example);
- hurdling institutional impediments and long-established difficulties inherent in project objectives (adult corrections and especially offender employment projects); or
- sophisticated and finely-tuned agency coordination (drug programs, for example)

were disadvantaged under Impact. On the other hand, those functional areas which benefited from:

- a developed research capability (e.g., police projects);
- private organizational and management capability (community involvement projects);
- more easily achieved objectives (some systems-improvement projects); and
- strongly emphasized city priorities (e.g., juvenile programs)

attained quite impressive relative levels of achievement. In these areas, the evaluation planning and reporting tools initiated via the Impact COPIE-cycle allowed 27 projects to be substantiated as effective. This again points to the relevance of Rogers' remark (cited page above) about the criteria regulating the speed with which innovations are adopted. There is little doubt that the COPIE-cycle required some learning investment on the part of its users, and little doubt either that best performances were achieved when that learning investment could be subscribed. Given expanded dissemination of evaluation information, given technical assistance in evaluation where it is needed, and given streamlining and sharpening of administrative procedures and implementation monitoring, it seems likely that the ability to evaluate and thereby substantiate project effectiveness could be significantly improved in future urban anti-crime programs utilizing the COPIE-cycle.

#### D. The COPIE-Cycle and Project Outcomes

Since project effectiveness is demonstrated through evaluation and since an evaluation capability was initiated in Impact via the COPIE-cycle, it is therefore evident that the COPIE-cycle was instrumental in the demonstration of project effectiveness. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion leads naturally to the question of whether any one particular element (or combination of elements) in the COPIE-cycle was especially influential in the establishment of such a capability. To explore this question, MITRE performed a statistical analysis using two types of variables:

- process variables (measuring either the completeness or the quality achieved by each Impact project in terms of each COPIE-cycle element); and
- outcome variables (indicating the extent to which projects had met these objectives, and were likely to be institutionalized).

Two general questions were posed. First, what relationships could be observed at the project level among the various elements of the COPIE-cycle? Second, what correlations could be found between these elements and project outcomes?

Values for COPIE-cycle variables were generated as by-products of several national-level evaluation tasks (Tasks 1, 2, and 7, see page 63 above) when project documentation (i.e., grant applications, evaluation components, evaluation reports) and implementation data were examined. Table XLI below lists the definitions of these variables and their rating scales.

There are some inherent limitations to this analysis. To begin with, the COPIE-cycle was not intended to be a project-level endeavor, but was rather to be performed on a program-wide basis in each city. While it is true that some aspects of the cycle (such as evaluation components and reports, or implementation completeness) did lend themselves well to assessment at the project level, others did not (crime-oriented planning, for example, was not a project-level activity), and attributions of planning quality at the project level therefore had to be derived.

TABLE XLI  
VALUE DEFINITION OF COPIE-CYCLE PROCESS AND OUTCOME VARIABLES

VARIABLE	RATING SCALE
<p>1. <u>PROCESS VARIABLES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● PRESENCE OF CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING</li> <li>● IMPLEMENTATION SPEED AND COMPLETENESS</li> <li>● EVALUATION PLANNING QUALITY</li> <li>● EVALUATION APPROACH QUALITY</li> <li>● EVALUATION REPORTING QUALITY</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY IN JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR THE PROJECT IN RELATION TO OFFENSE/OFFENDER/VICTIM/CRIME-SETTING DATA</li> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE SPEED AND COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE DELIVERY AND BY CHANGES IN THE SCOPE OF SERVICE</li> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE COMPLETENESS OF THE EVALUATION COMPONENT (i.e. HIGHEST RATING GIVEN TO A PLAN WHICH DELINEATES WHAT OBJECTIVES ARE TO BE EVALUATED, HOW DATA ARE TO BE COLLECTED, AND HOW OUTCOME MEASURES ARE LINKED TO PROJECT ACTIVITIES)</li> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE ADEQUACY OF THE EVALUATION DESIGN IN TERMS OF VALID MEASUREMENTS OF CHANGES AND BASIS FOR ATTRIBUTION</li> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE DEPTH OF THE EVALUATIVE INFORMATION PRESENTED. (i.e., WHETHER THE INFORMATION IS DESCRIPTIVE, EXPLANATORY OR PRESENTED IN THE FORM OF SUBSTANTIATED FINDINGS)</li> </ul>
<p>2. <u>OUTCOME VARIABLES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● OBJECTIVE ATTAINMENT</li> <li>● INSTITUTIONALIZATION</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH PROJECT OBJECTIVES WERE MET</li> <li>● VALUE DETERMINED BY THE DEGREE OF LIKELIHOOD OF PROJECT INSTITUTIONALIZATION</li> </ul>

Another limitation of the analysis is that only 71 projects (or about 30 percent of the Impact total) provided enough information to be included in the analysis; inevitably some cities were better represented in the sample than others (Atlanta and Portland, in particular were under-represented). A further limitation is that projects were assessed by several MITRE staff members; although precautions were taken to promote consistency (for example, through the random assignment of projects to individual evaluators and through frequent group conferences), potential bias on the part of individual evaluators cannot be totally ruled out.

Within these limitations, however, it seemed important nonetheless to examine those data which were available to see what they could reveal about COPIE-cycle variable relationships with project outcomes across the cities.

The main findings of the analysis were that:

- Overall: All the COPIE-cycle variables were positively correlated with one another although the strengths of the relationships, in general, were only moderate.
- Crime-oriented planning: Projects which were crime-orientedly planned tended also to have good evaluation plans, evaluation approaches and evaluation reports.
- Implementation: Implementation speed and completeness were associated with project success.
- Evaluation Planning and Reporting: Good evaluation planning was strongly correlated with applicable evaluation approaches and, somewhat more moderately, with good evaluation reporting.
- Institutionalization: Good evaluation reporting quality was associated with a higher probability of institutionalization.

The results of the analysis thus reinforced some early program assumptions. It was never, of course, expected that crime-oriented planning could ensure the attainment of objectives, but rather that it would better specify the objectives which needed to be attained. That this occurred may be inferred from the finding that good crime-oriented planning was positively correlated with good evaluation planning, evaluation approaches and evaluation reporting. Another assumption driving the COPIE-cycle demonstration was that evaluation planning is instrumental in the ability to assess project success.

This belief was strengthened here in the finding that good evaluation planning was, in fact, associated with good evaluation approaches which are a requirement for assessing project success. The relationship of evaluation planning to evaluation reporting (and the latter's further relationship with project institutionalization) additionally confirmed the importance of evaluation planning for the establishment of project credibility. The finding that implementation speed and completeness were associated with project-level success is unsurprising (in the sense that reduced and untimely services would certainly decrease the power of an intervention), but draws attention once again to the importance of the implementation variable in anti-crime project attainments. Indeed, the achievements of Dallas and St. Louis (excellent implementers among the Impact cities) in terms of project effectiveness (see Table XXXIX above) had already pointed up that importance.

#### E. Project-Level Achievements in Terms of Program Expectations

Overall, the discussion of project-level achievements in this chapter confirmed some program assumptions and some program findings elaborated in Parts I and II of this report. Among other things, it is now clear that:

- a criminal justice system planning and evaluation capability could be developed under Impact constraints, and did indeed result in knowledge payoffs, among which the ability to identify successful anti-crime projects;
- as expected, the four "advantaged" cities did, in fact, produce a majority (23) of the 35 effective projects; however, St. Louis also generated 5 of these projects despite a "disadvantaged" status in terms of age, exodus situation and other factors (see Chapter V);
- lessons were learned about the types of projects and strategies which appear to be amenable to effective implementation and evaluation;
- information was obtained about types of projects which appear to be unsuccessful (such as certain efforts toward the treatment of drug users or toward target hardening);
- good evaluation planning emerged as a crucial element of the COPIE-cycle, affecting both the ability to demonstrate project success (through influence on evaluation approaches), and the likelihood of project institutionalization (through influence on evaluation reporting).

APPENDIX I: CHAPTER IX

PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION TECHNICAL REVIEW  
DATA COLLECTION FORM

PROJECT CODE

PROJECT NAME

CITY

PROJECT OVERVIEW

PROJECT CODE

PROJECT NAME

CITY

PROJECT DATA SHEET

SOURCES

DONE BY

DATE

EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT

EVALUATION COMPONENT REVIEW FORM

CHECKLIST

TRANSFER SHEET

IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

TECHNICAL REVIEW

PROJECT OVERVIEW

CITY

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

PROJECT FOCUS

1 = Crime Reduction

2 = Recidivism

3 = Systems/Other

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Outcome

(1)

(2)

Intermediate

(1)

(2)

Activity

(1)

(2)

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF AREA SERVED

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT CLIENTS

INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY INITIATING PROJECT

AGENCY RESPONSIBLE

PROJECT DIRECTOR

II. FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION

RESOURCES

Requested

Received

Time Period Covered (Months)

Allocation of Resources

% of Personnel

% of Equipment

DATES

Submission of grant application

Hiring of Project Director

Date of award

Initial provision of services (e.g.,  
first client received or first  
deployment of manpower)

Refunding award date

End of refund award period

Suggested changes for improved  
implementation.

Extent and Scope of CAT,  
SPA, RO Assistance

Yes = 1  
No = 0

CAT

SPA

RO

IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

CODE

Primary

Secondary

TURNOVER

Project Director

Yes = 1

No = 0

Supervising Staff

Professional Staff

Support Staff

CRIME-ORIENTED PLANNING

0 = No Data To Support Problem

1 = Data Alluded to But Not Cited

2 = Data Substantiated But is General

3 = Data Specific to Area

4 = Data Links Activities to Problem Solution

III. EVALUATION PLANNING

A. Provisions made for conducting evaluation.

(1) Automated/manual data collection and management system. Yes = 1   
No = 0

(2) Standardized forms.

(3) Reporting periods.

Frequency (Most frequent) Not Specified = 0  
Monthly = 1   
Quarterly = 2  
Semi-Annually = 3  
Annually = 4

(4) Number Evaluation Personnel

(5) Evaluation Responsibility

B. Evaluation Component No Plan = 1 CODE

What = 2

How = 3

Linkages = 4

C. Evaluation Design CODE

IV. PROJECT FINDINGS

JUDGE CODE

Does the Evaluation Report provide findings in the terms of outcome/intermediate objectives?

Yes = 1

No = 0

Did any of the following change from the Evaluation Component Review Form?

Outcome

Yes = 1

(1)

No = 0

N/A = 9

(2)

Intermediate

(1)

(2)

Activity

(1)

(2)

If yes discuss the nature of the change.

What are the major findings?

Does the report indicate either explicitly or implicitly that the project met its outcome objective(s)?

Yes = 2

Partly Met = 1

No = 0

If no, or partly met provide reasons.

P

S

Additional (side) Benefits/Drawbacks

V. EVALUATION REPORTING

Does the Evaluation Report provide activity data (what services the project provided) in specific enough terms to indicate what the project is about? Yes = 1  
No = 0

Are the data upon which the findings are based presented in the report (i.e., is the reader in the position to validate)? Yes = 1  
No = 0

Is the report readable and logically presented? Unacceptable = 1  
Acceptable = 2   
Good = 3  
Excellent = 4

Is this report an: Interim = 1  
Final = 2   
Phased = 3

Does the Evaluation Report account for limitations in the interpretation of findings? Yes = 1  
No = 0

List important limitations.

Mentioned	Accounted For	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	P <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	S <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

List any major limitations which should have been accounted for in the report (if applicable).

P

S

Overall measure of Evaluation Report

VI. EVALUATION APPROACH

What type of research design was used in the Evaluation Report?

CODE

- Before/After = (Time Frame)
- Projection = (Base)
- Comparison Group = (Specify)
- Comparison Area = (Specify)
- Control Group = (Specify Selection)
- Control Area = (Specify)
- Other

Specification

On a scale, rate the design approach in the context of the limitations of this specific project.

1  2  3  4  5

Low

High

In this context, what do you see as the major drawbacks of the approach which prevented you from giving the report a higher rating?

Given the drawbacks, do the findings based on outcome/intermediate objective(s) in the report appear to be justified?

Yes = 1   
No = 0

Operational Problem

P   
S

Recommendations Reported

- Operational Recommendations

P   
S

VII. DOES THE PROJECT APPEAR TO BE INNOVATIVE?

If yes, why?

Yes = 1

No = 0

MITRE Comments

## CHAPTER IX

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## **Chapter X**

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### **Assessment of Impact-City Crime-Rate Changes**

## CHAPTER X: SUMMARY

This chapter, which presents data on Impact city crime rates and levels, first discusses the problems of attributing city-wide crime changes to program effects because of (1) the present inability to estimate the contribution of some anti-crime projects (such as recidivism-focused or system improvement efforts) to city-wide crime rates and (2) the confounding effect of increased or reduced crime-reporting, over time and across cities. Further, Impact-specific attribution problems are examined such as program slippage which weakened concentration and, hence, impact on city-wide rates; lack of correlation between project timing and crime-rate change measurements; and failure to collect area-specific data for crime-reduction focused projects which might have allowed at least these (as, for example, Denver's SCAT) to be linked to city-wide crime rates.

Although attribution is thus ruled out, and it cannot be stated that an improved capability in some city *resulted* in a decrease in crime rates, it is extremely important to examine whether such an improved capability (once established) was *accompanied* by increases or decreases in those rates, because it is an overall effect on crime which is being sought.

The problems related to the use of Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data were discussed in Chapter I; perhaps their major vulnerability is that little evidence exists to support the inference that a change in UCR rates reflects an actual change in crime rates, or that they are related at all in some rational and consistent way. It is for this reason that victimization surveys were chosen to be the tool for measuring Impact outcomes. Nonetheless, UCR rates are generated continuously, they are readily available, and it seemed appropriate to include them in a final review of Impact. This chapter looks at these crime rates and discusses some methods for possible interpretations of these statistics. Two kinds of crime data analyses are made:

- an examination of (UCR) crime rates for the 8 Impact cities and the 5 target crimes over differing periods extending from 1968 through 1974; and
- a comparison of expected Impact burglary levels against actual levels attained by the Impact cities for the years 1973-1974.

Findings of the UCR examination are as follows (see Table XLII):

- Over the 1972-1974 period, city crime rates had:
  - increased for the five crimes, in Portland;
  - increased for four of the five crimes, with one crime either stabilized or decreased, in Atlanta and St. Louis;
  - increased for three crimes, with two crimes either stabilized or decreased, in Baltimore, Cleveland and Dallas;

- increased for two crimes, with three either stabilized or decreased, in Denver;
- decreased for all crimes, in Newark.
- Over the 1968-1974 period, there were:
  - long-term, generally severe crime-rate increases in Atlanta and Portland;
  - declining or generally stabilizing trends in Baltimore and Newark;
  - some increases in St. Louis and Cleveland;
  - declining or stabilizing trends in Dallas and Denver for person crimes (except rape in Dallas); burglary was up, however, especially in Dallas;
  - Dallas was the only city which did not show a rise in murder rates;
  - Baltimore was the only city to show steadily decreasing rates for rape;
  - Portland doubled its burglary rate finishing with the highest rate of any Impact city;
  - Cleveland maintained its relatively low burglary rate;
  - robbery rates increased in every Impact city;
  - Impact violent crime rates had considerably worsened overall: whereas in 1970, four cities had rates under 450 per 100,000, in 1974, all rates were above that figure;
  - Dallas, Denver and Newark showed real improvements in their rankings relative to other cities.

The comparison of expected 1973-1974 monthly burglary levels with actual UCR levels yielded the following findings:

<u>Impact City</u>	<u>Evidence of Burglary-Level Reduction</u>	<u>Level of Confidence</u>
Atlanta	No	-
Baltimore	Yes	99%
Cleveland	Yes	99%
Dallas	Yes	95%
Denver	Yes	99%
Newark	Yes	99%
Portland	No	-
St. Louis	No	-

- Atlanta: no significant difference (1,365 burglaries expected, 1,363 reported);
- Baltimore: down significantly (1,724 expected, 1,433 reported);

- Cleveland: down significantly (1,204 expected, 913 reported);
- Dallas: down significantly (2,239 expected, 2,016 reported);
- Denver: down significantly (1,704 expected, 1,342 reported);
- Newark: down significantly (1,123 expected, 812 reported);
- Portland: down but not significantly (1,142 expected, 1,053 reported);
- St. Louis: down but not significantly (1,674 expected, 1,622 reported).

The MITRE comparison of expected and actual burglary levels employed a method called Sister City Regression Models (developed by Budnick in 1971) to estimate crime levels. It is concluded here that the method has promise and should be validated further.

A final analysis, juxtaposing city performances in Impact with their crime-change experiences, found that:

- the crime changes in Atlanta, Portland, and Baltimore are not likely to have been meaningfully affected by the Impact program because of the slow pace of implementation in these cities;
- in Cleveland, increases may have been moderated, and in Newark, decreases may have been influenced by Impact; evidence for this is derived from MITRE's secondary analysis of Cleveland's CCP and from the burglary-level analysis in each city;
- St. Louis' actual burglary levels were not significantly lower than expected levels, and MITRE has not found other evidence pointing to a moderation of city trends via the Impact program there; it is, however, possible that this may have been the case for crimes other than burglary;
- in Dallas and Denver, it seems likely that Impact was a factor in achieving decreases and in moderating the rates of increase in those cities (based on evaluation reports, a high proportion of demonstrated effectiveness, and the burglary analysis).

## Chapter X

### Assessment of Impact Crime Changes

*Programs have to be designed to produce certain short-term changes on the assumption that they are necessary conditions for achieving long-range ends. As in many other aspects, the evaluation inherits the fallibilities of the program. Often the best that evaluation can do, at least under the usual time constraints and in the absence of better knowledge, is to accept the program's assumptions and find out how well near-term goals are being met. It is left to further research to explore the relationships between short-term goals and long-term consequences.*

C. Weiss, 1975

It would be helpful, once the success of an anti-crime project had been established, to then be able to tie its effects solidly to overall city-wide crime rates in order:

- to obtain better information about the size and ramifications of the project's impact and hence about its wider implications and its cost/effectiveness relative to other projects; and
- to establish, through such information, a better basis for future city-wide crime-oriented planning, in terms of realistic, operationally defined, crime-reduction objectives at the project level.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to do this for several reasons.

First, all anti-crime efforts do not made an immediate or short-term impact on crime rates which is both identifiable and attributable to that effort. For example, projects focusing on recidivism reduction for a small group of offenders may well be able to produce evidence at the project level demonstrating that they are successfully reducing recidivism, despite the fact that it remains impossible to pinpoint the contribution of that reduction to city-wide crime rate changes, nor, conversely, to attribute any specific part of those changes to the recidivism-focused project. Thus, although recidivism reduction achievements will certainly show up in city-wide crime-rate changes (especially over the long term), it is not presently possible

to attribute those achievements to projects. (In Impact, for example, 42 percent of the anti-crime projects were focused on recidivism reduction, see Table XXVI, page 164 above).

Second, attribution of city-wide crime-rate changes to program effects is further complicated by differential crime reporting. Reporting of some crimes in some areas is greater than in others, and appears generally to be increasing over time where authorities have implemented victim-focused services and assistance. This means that it is difficult to isolate program effects either through before-after data or across control cities, given unknown changes in the rates of reporting. (In Impact, this was a recognized problem in Portland--where at least part of the increase in the reported burglary rate from 1971 to 1974 was shown by Portland's victimization survey to have been the result of increases in the number of burglaries reported--and in Denver, where an Impact project specifically targeted increased crime reporting.)

Further, there are attribution difficulties which were specific to the Impact program that resulted from the inadequate amount of planning and start-up time allocated, and from the New Federalist program structure:

- Slippages in the program brought a straggling, diffused implementation, rather than the focused, concentrated thrust (expected by program planners) to which city-wide crime-rate changes might reasonably have been attributed.
- The attribution of yearly changes in city-wide crime rates to project effects would not only have required more concentrated implementation and less recidivism-focused implementation, it would also have required that time periods of project operations and crime-rate change measurements be reasonably correlated. Yet although Impact was on-going in all eight cities from January of 1972, projects, especially those likely to affect crime rates rapidly, were not necessarily implemented (Portland, for example, had spent only about 18.8 percent of awarded Impact funds as of September 30, 1974).
- Impact crime-reduction focused projects (i.e., those which could be tied, at least grossly, to city-wide crime rates) generally targeted particular crimes in particular neighborhoods; area-specific data were therefore crucial for measuring project effects. However, as discussed earlier (see page 46 above) such data collection was not mandated in the Impact program and, in most cases, failed to occur. (The project SCAT, in Denver--see page 311 and pages 328-329 above--was

one Impact effort which did collect before-after data in the specific area of project operation, and it was therefore possible to measure SCAT crime-reduction effects in target areas, displacement effects in adjacent areas, and to connect SCAT results to city-wide burglary rates. It was, in fact, calculated that the single project SCAT, achieving a 25 percent decrease in burglary rates in its area of operation, accounted for a 3 percent decrease in burglary city-wide.)

It thus appears that the New Federalist approach taken by Impact did result in some of the problems predicted in Chapter III. The ability of cities to choose freely among direct and indirect crime-reduction strategies, the laissez-faire stance in matters of implementation, the failure to impose area-specific data collection as a requirement, meant, among other things, that an assessment of program-wide effects on city-wide crime rates would not be feasible.

Therefore, looking at city-wide Uniform Crime Report (UCR)<sup>1</sup> data or victimization surveys cannot provide much information about the effectiveness of the eight Impact programs, especially in the absence of an experimental design. It should be remembered that, as discussed in Chapter IV, funds were provided to eight cities which had been selected because of their crime problems, and no control was built into the program. Thus, with so few cases to examine, with so little standardization among the city programs or treatment interventions, it was impossible to use the traditional experimental method for assessing the effects of the program activities on the designated outcome variable, city-wide crime. The best estimates of program anti-crime achievements, then, must come from project outcomes. Indeed, if all projects had been successful, and the scope of their contributions to crime-reduction known, it would not have been absolutely necessary to examine city-wide crime rates. Given present ignorance, however, and a currently demonstrable success rate of about 25 percent, it remains important to study available crime data, if only to learn whether reported crime levels went up or down, officially, in Impact cities, and, more particularly, in which ones. In effect, if programs are initiated to improve system capability, it is because of the assumption that such capability will help to control crime. Therefore, even if it cannot be stated that an improved capability in some city resulted in a decrease in crime rates, it is extremely important to examine whether such an improved capability (once established, as in the case of Denver for example) was accompanied by increases or decreases in those rates, because it is an overall effect on crime which is being sought.

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<sup>1</sup>Data published annually by the FBI.

Problems related to the use of UCR data were discussed in Chapter I. Perhaps their major vulnerability is that there exists little evidence to support the inference that a change in UCR rates reflects an actual change in crime rates, or that they are related at all in some rational and consistent way. It is for this reason that victimization surveys, rather than UCR data, were chosen to be the tool for measuring Impact outcomes. Nonetheless, UCR rates are generated continuously, they are readily available, and it seemed appropriate to include them in a final review of Impact. They have furnished the basis for the following examination in which crime rates<sup>2</sup> are discussed for the eight Impact cities and the five target crimes:

- for the period 1972-1974; and
- for the period 1968-1974.

The comparison between expected and actual crime levels will be explored in a later section.

A. Impact City Crime Rates

1. Crime Rates for the Years 1972-1974 (Eight Impact Cities, Five Target Crimes)

Table XLII below presents figures for the target Impact crimes in the eight cities for the years 1972 through 1974 (rates per 100,000 population) and computes their percentage change for the 2-year period. Examining the statistics in turn for each city, it is immediately apparent that Atlanta and Portland endured the worst across-the-board increases in target crimes of the eight cities. Only the crime of murder showed a (very small) decrease in Atlanta. On the other hand, Dallas and Denver presented either decreases or stable rates for murder and aggravated assault, and, although there were increases in rates for rape, these were not precipitous as in Atlanta and Portland. All crimes decreased in Newark, and Baltimore's rates indicated some stabilization, except for burglary. While Cleveland showed some rises in crime rates, the dimensions of these rates have been generally much lower than those of the other cities for all crimes except murder and robbery. (It is interesting to note, for example, that Portland's rates for burglary by 1974 were about twice those of Cleveland.) St. Louis saw considerable increases in burglary and robbery rates over the 1972-1974 period; on the other hand, rates of forcible rape declined in St. Louis as they did in Newark: these were the only two Impact cities to present such decreases.

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<sup>2</sup>based on UCR levels and Rand-McNally yearly population estimates

TABLE XLII  
IMPACT CITY CRIME RATES, 1972, 1973, AND 1974  
(RATES PER 100,000 AND PERCENT CHANGES 1972-1974)

CITY	MURDER	RAPE	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	ROBBERY	BURGLARY
<b>ATLANTA</b>					
1972	51.3	51.5	431	618	2,946
1973	52.7	93.8	531	830	3,187
1974	50.5	89.7	687	888	3,424
% CHANGE 72-74	- 3.5%	+74.2%	+59.4%	+43.7%	+16.2%
<b>BALTIMORE</b>					
1972	36.8	51.9	711	1,070	1,896
1973	31.4	55.9	719	965	1,748
1974	33.1	54.9	720	1,153	2,122
% CHANGE 72-74	-10.1%	+ 5.8%	+ 1.3%	+ 7.8%	+11.9%
<b>CLEVELAND</b>					
1972	41.3	62.1	267	758	1,405
1973	38.3	60.7	272	638	1,257
1974	43.3	62.5	387	866	1,812
% CHANGE 72-74	+ 4.8%	+ 0.6%	+44.6%	+14.2%	+29.0%
<b>DALLAS</b>					
1972	22.1	61.3	521	301	2,470
1973	26.1	65.2	549	358	2,511
1974	22.2	71.9	416	356	2,969
% CHANGE 72-74	+ 0.5%	+17.3%	-20.2%	+18.3%	+20.2%
<b>DENVER</b>					
1972	17.0	70.2	368	384	3,195
1973	18.2	87.5	362	457	2,859
1974	14.7	78.0	371	447	3,319
% CHANGE 72-74	-13.5%	+10.0%	+ 1.0%	+16.3%	+ 3.9%
<b>NEWARK</b>					
1972	33.3	84.2	669	1,240	2,860
1973	42.0	84.8	603	1,049	2,416
1974	34.4	76.6	561	1,118	2,675
% CHANGE 72-74	- 9.0%	- 9.0%	-16.1%	- 9.0%	- 6.5%
<b>PORTLAND</b>					
1972	9.6	44.0	350	447	2,873
1973	8.3	49.8	338	385	3,109
1974	11.3	71.7	490	515	3,571
% CHANGE 72-74	+17.7%	+63.0%	+39.9%	+15.3%	+24.3%
<b>ST. LOUIS</b>					
1972	33.4	83.3	523	788	2,860
1973	36.6	96.3	565	882	3,244
1974	35.5	77.9	597	928	3,482
% CHANGE 72-74	+ 6.3%	+ 6.5%	+14.1%	+17.7%	+21.7%

SOURCE: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:  
1972, 1973, 1974

All of these figures are, of course, reported crime rates, subject to all of the reporting inconsistencies and vagaries discussed earlier in this paper. The 1972-1974 time-frame was presented here because it was the period during which Impact was expected to be implemented (although operationalization was far from complete at that time, see page 143 above). A much clearer idea of Impact city reported crime trends, however, can be gained from an examination of data stretching over a longer period.


## 2. Crime Rates for the Years 1968-1974

### (a) The Impact Cities (Five Target Crimes)

Figures 20 through 27 below give a sense of the evolution of Impact city crime rates over a seven-year period (1968-1974). It can immediately be seen from Figure 20 that Atlanta's 1974 crime rates emerged from longer-term trends than those presented in Table XLII above. All five crimes had increased steadily and prodigiously over the 1968-1974 time-period. Portland also endured sharply rising crime rates (see Figure 26), although the increases were generally less precipitous than in the case of Atlanta. Cleveland crime patterns also followed a rising trend; however, rates of increase were lower than those of Atlanta or Portland, and the rates themselves also were generally lower, except for robbery and murder (see Figure 22). St. Louis' trends rose moderately for robbery and more sharply for burglary. Violent crime, however, (murder, rape, assault) appeared to have been somewhat stabilized since 1969, although rates were not low (Figure 27).


Dallas and Denver both presented different patterns for different crimes. In Dallas, all person crimes (i.e., murder, assault, rape and robbery) except rape were either stabilized or decreasing (especially assault); rape and burglary, however, were rising, the latter vigorously (see Figure 23). In Denver, it appears that all person crimes (which were rising between 1968 and 1971) had either stabilized, since 1971, or actually declined (rape); this decline had not been apparent from Table XLII, looking only at 1972-1974 statistics. Burglary, however, was clearly in a rising pattern since 1968, albeit interrupted by a sharp dip in 1973 (Figure 24).

In Newark, burglary, robbery and assault presented clearly declining trends after 1971. Rape and murder appeared to have stabilized (see Figure 25). Baltimore showed a long-term decrease (between 1968 and 1974) for all crimes except robbery and murder. Robbery, however, also declined between 1970 and 1974, and murder, after 1971. The long-term decrease in crimes of rape is perhaps the most interesting since it did not occur in any other city and was not apparent in the 1972-1974 data.




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 20  
ATLANTA  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 21  
BALTIMORE  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 22  
CLEVELAND  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 23  
DALLAS  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 24  
DENVER  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)




SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 25  
NEWARK  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)



SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 26  
 PORTLAND  
 (CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)



SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 27  
ST. LOUIS  
(CRIME RATES, 1968-1974)

(b) The Target Crimes (Eight Impact Cities)


Figures 28 through 32 present the same crime statistics from a different perspective. Target crimes program-wide are the focus here, as they occurred in the eight Impact cities over the same seven-year period (1968-1974). Seven of the eight cities had higher murder rates in 1974 than they did in 1968; only Dallas maintained the same total of 22 per 100,000 (see Figure 28 below). Rape rates showed a long-term rapidly rising trend in Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, and Portland, moderately rising in Denver, Newark and St. Louis. Baltimore was the only city which showed steadily decreasing rates of forcible rape over the seven-year period (Figure 29).

Assault rates rose in some cities, declined in others (see Figure 30 below). Atlanta's rate nearly quadrupled between 1968-1974 and Portland's nearly tripled; St. Louis, Denver and Cleveland rates also rose. Dallas assault rates more than doubled between 1968 and 1971 but afterwards, however, declined rapidly. Although Baltimore, in 1974, still maintained the highest rate for this crime of any city, those rates had decreased nearly 30 percent over the seven-year period, and the disparity between assault rates for the other cities and the rate for Baltimore was no longer so striking. Newark also presented an overall decrease in its assault rate over this period.

Robbery increased in every city between 1968-1974; there is no Impact city example of a decline. Baltimore and Newark maintained the highest rates of robbery of all the cities but it is Atlanta which saw the most vertiginous rise (see Figure 31). St. Louis, Cleveland, and Portland also had rising rates; Denver's and Dallas' increases were more moderate.

Burglary increased everywhere except in Newark and Baltimore over the seven-year period (see Figure 32). Portland more than doubled its rate, reaching the highest one, among the cities, for 1974. Atlanta, Denver and Dallas also endured very rapid burglary increases; rates for this crime doubled in Atlanta, nearly tripled in Dallas. St. Louis and Cleveland also showed considerable rate rises over the seven-year period.



In sum, over the 1968-1974 period, two of the "advantaged" Impact cities (Atlanta and Portland), both of them slow implementers under Impact, were having the most severe increases in crime rates across the cities. Baltimore and Newark, on the other hand, had presented either declining or stabilizing trends for most crimes. Cleveland and St. Louis had seen some rises in their crime rates. Dallas and Denver both showed stabilized or declining crime trends for all person crime (except rape in Dallas); on the other hand, both cities continued to have severe problems of increases in burglary rates.



-----	ATLANTA	-----	DENVER
- . - . -	BALTIMORE	-----	NEWARK
-----	CLEVELAND	.....	PORTLAND
.....	DALLAS	.....	ST. LOUIS



SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 28  
CRIME RATES FOR MURDER IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (1968-1974)





SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 29  
CRIME RATES FOR RAPE IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (1968-1974)





SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 30  
CRIME RATES FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (1968-1974)



SOURCE: SIEGEL, I. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 31  
CRIME RATES FOR ROBBERY IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (1968-1974)



SOURCE: SIEGEL, L. G. AND RUSSELL, L. S., IMPACT CITY CRIME PROFILES, DECEMBER 1975, MTR-7114.

FIGURE 32  
CRIME RATES FOR BURGLARY IN THE EIGHT IMPACT CITIES (1968-1974)

Changes in crime rates represent just one dimension of a city's crime problem, however. The magnitude of the rates themselves constitute another. Table XVI in Chapter V (see page 105 above) had examined city rates of violent crime, person crime and property crime as they were reported to the FBI in 1970. Table XLVIII below extends that information through 1972 and 1974.

In general, it is clear from Table XLVIII that Impact violent crime rates (driven by the Atlanta and Portland increases) had considerably worsened: whereas in 1970, four cities had rates under 450 per 100,000, by 1974, all rates were above that figure. In terms of violent crime, Baltimore, in 1970, had had the highest rates for any Impact city, and Atlanta the third lowest. By 1974, Atlanta's rates had become higher than those of Baltimore. Portland, which had had the lowest rates in 1970, was replaced in that position by Denver: in 1974, Denver had the lowest rates of violent crimes for any Impact city. Other rank order changes are meaningful, as well, reflecting real crime decreases for Dallas (over the 1970-1974 period) and Newark (1972-1974).

In terms of person crime, Baltimore still had the highest rates, in 1974 as in 1970, followed by Newark and (in 1974) by Atlanta. Dallas now had the lowest rates for person crime of any city, followed by Denver. Overall, Impact person-crime rates had clearly worsened, pushed by the general increases in robbery (except for Dallas and Newark): only four cities, in 1970, had had rates of person crime over 1,000 per 100,000; now six did.

In terms of property crime, St. Louis' increases brought it the highest rates of any Impact city, followed closely by Atlanta and by Portland. Cleveland and Baltimore now had the lowest property crime rates among the Impact cities. Again, there was a general worsening: whereas four cities had had property crime rates lower than 3,000 per 100,000 in 1970, only one (Cleveland) did in 1974.

Overall, across the eight cities, during the 1970-1974 period, crime rates had worsened for every kind of crime. However, some cities, such as Dallas and Denver, for example, showed real improvements in their positions vis-a-vis the other cities. While these improvements cannot be tied to Impact (see the discussion at the beginning of this chapter), they are more likely to include some Impact effects (given the approximate 50% effectiveness in spending in those cities, see Table XXXIX, page 322 above) than are the changes in crime rates of extremely slow implementers like Atlanta, Baltimore and Portland. (By the end of 1974, for example, Portland had still failed to spend more than about 20% of Impact funds.)

TABLE XLIII  
 IMPACT CITY CRIME RATES: 1970, 1972, AND 1974 FOR VIOLENT CRIME,  
 PERSON CRIME AND PROPERTY CRIME (RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION)

	VIOLENT CRIME						PERSON CRIME						PROPERTY CRIME					
	1970	RANK ORDER	1972	RANK ORDER	1974	RANK ORDER	1970	RANK ORDER	1972	RANK ORDER	1974	RANK ORDER	1970	RANK ORDER	1972	RANK ORDER	1974	RANK ORDER
ATLANTA	352	3	534	4	827	8	780	2	1,152	5	1,715	6	2,748	3	3,564	5	4,312	7
BALTIMORE	877	8	800	8	808	7	2,088	8	1,870	7	1,961	8	3,313	5	2,966	3	3,275	2
CLEVELAND	331	2	370	1	493	2	1,060	5	1,128	4	1,359	4	2,163	1	2,163	1	2,678	1
DALLAS	615	5	604	5	510	3	966	4	905	3	866	1	2,662	2	2,771	2	3,325	3
DENVER	434	4	455	3	464	1	819	3	839	1	911	2	3,321	6	3,579	6	3,766	4
NEWARK	671	7	792	7	672	5	1,891	7	2,032	8	1,790	7	4,195	8	4,100	8	3,793	5
PORTLAND	267	1	404	2	573	4	694	1	851	2	1,088	3	2,904	4	3,320	4	4,086	6
ST. LOUIS	651	6	640	6	710	6	1,502	6	1,428	6	1,638	5	3,906	7	3,648	7	4,410	8

NOTE: 8 = HIGHEST CRIME RATE, 1 = LOWEST.

SOURCE: FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, 1970, 1972, 1974.

In sum, the heterogeneity of focus, the long straggling implementation, the failure to collect area-specific data--among other things--made it impossible to link Impact successes or failures to city-wide crime rates. Further, those crime rates themselves, as pointed out in Chapter I, reflect many factors other than criminal justice system influence and intervention. Given that this is so, and that it is so for all cities, it appears that the important question to ask, then, is not whether Impact-city crime rates went up or down, but rather, whether something occurred in Impact-city crime which was different from what would have been expected in the absence of the program. While an answer to this question would not provide definitive information on why such differences occurred (if indeed it turned out that they did occur), it would at least establish whether actual reported crime did, in fact, differ from expected crime via an examination of cities where a program had intervened, as well as cities where it had not. It is true that the crime differences observed could then be studied in terms of a process evaluation of the program; however, many attribution questions would still need to be answered. The degree to which differences between actual and expected crime, across cities, could be linked to treatment effects would still be a function of the original city selection process, of differences in crime reporting, and of crime-related and other activities undertaken by each non-treatment city.

Although the determination of Impact anti-crime effectiveness, on a city-wide or program-wide basis, is not a part of the present national-level evaluation (see Chapter IV above), MITRE has nonetheless taken the opportunity offered by this research to examine Impact burglary levels, applying and broadening a model developed by Budnick in 1971 for deriving expected crime levels in urban areas. This effort appears to have been a first step in the direction of measuring these outcome criteria in a reasonable way.

B. An Examination of Impact-City Burglary Via a Comparison of Expected and Actual Crime-Levels

Budnick, in his Examination of the Impact of Intensive Police Patrol Activities, approached the problem of estimating expected levels of crime through a method which he called the Crime-Related Areas Concept. This concept was based on the assumption that:

There exists a set of crime-related factors which operate upon a city as a whole. These factors operate in such a way as to influence general crime levels in a city... (Such) factors might include general economic conditions, community attitudes and spirit, and general relationships between the community and the police, and various socio-economic or demographic factors which collectively

characterize the city as a whole. It was hypothesized that, as a result of the operation of these factors, the levels of crime in two areas might fluctuate in a similar manner. It was thus hypothesized that, given any area in a city, there might be identified another area (perhaps a "sister" area) in which the rate of change in the level of crime might be very similar. If this is so, one might find that the levels of crime in two areas are highly correlated over time. And in an experiment, one might estimate the level of crime in an experimental area, based upon the level which occurs in a non-experimental area.<sup>3</sup>

Budnick, then, was interested in using the crime-correlate concept presented earlier in this paper (see Chapter V above), but unlike this earlier discussion, Budnick focused not on the correlates themselves but rather on their overall presumed "output," crime. In his study of the Washington, D. C. Manpower Experiment, he analyzed monthly index offense levels for several treatment areas within the city using a crime estimation model. This model was based upon the experiences of reporting areas which exhibited, prior to the experiment, high correlations in their patterns of crime fluctuation with those areas receiving the project treatment. These "crime-correlated areas," as the concept's name suggests, thus exhibited similarities in previous crime experience, despite the fact that they were:

- spatially separated by a considerable distance;
- dissimilar with regard to their average levels of crime; and
- dissimilar in terms of their crime-related socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

MITRE applied Budnick's model and techniques to the Impact program, broadening the concept to that of a city (rather than an area within a city), using 30 comparison cities and generating six "sister" cities (instead of Budnick's comparison and "sister" areas).

The eight Impact cities were matched with their appropriate crime-correlated cities from a sample of 30 non-Impact cities by computing simple bivariate correlations between the monthly burglary levels for each of the 30 cities and those for each Impact city over a 36-month period (1970 through 1972). The six comparison cities whose fluctuations in burglary rates best matched those of

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<sup>3</sup>Budnick, Frank, An Examination of the Impact of Intensive Police Patrol Activities, Pilot Grant NI 71-114-PG, 1971.

the Impact city were chosen to be "sister" cities, since each had demonstrated a fundamental positive relationship with the burglary-level changes of the Impact city. Six cities were chosen so that no one city, because of an unusual fluctuation, could unduly influence the expected values to be derived. At this point, data from these six cities were employed in a stepwise multiple regression in order to derive the model for each city.

This sister-city approach to the estimation of expected crime levels for the eight Impact cities accounts for several alternative hypotheses which could have explained changes observed in the above discussion of city crime figures. The first of these, long term trends in crime, is accounted for by the fact that crime estimates are based upon the previous experience in crime of both the treatment and sister cities. This "simulation" aspect of the model also rules out regression to the mean as a plausible explanation for crime changes since this statistical artifact would be as likely to play a role in the predictor cities as in the treatment cities. Finally, comparisons across treatment and non-treatment cities control for nationwide trends affecting all cities.

Comparison of the expected burglary levels established for each city with actual UCR levels reported in the Impact cities in 1973 and in 1974, revealed that burglary was significantly lower in five of the eight cities, relative to past trends.<sup>4</sup>

<u>Impact City</u>	<u>Evidence of Reduction in Burglary Levels</u>	<u>Level of Confidence</u>
Atlanta	No	-
Baltimore	Yes	99%
Cleveland	Yes	99%
Dallas	Yes	95%
Denver	Yes	99%
Newark	Yes	99%
Portland	No	-
St. Louis	No	-

These results are not, of course, surprising after the examination of UCR burglary rates in Section A of this chapter (see

<sup>4</sup>The "goodness of fit" between reported and predicted levels was used as the criterion for determining whether differences were statistically significant.

especially Figure 32 above). What is satisfying here is the statistical evidence thus brought to reinforce intuitively-perceived effects via actual measurement. In sum, the use of the sister-cities model allows the discussion of what really happened to Impact city burglary in a way which the earlier examination of UCR reported crime does not permit. The latter, independent of any evaluation design, cannot account for the usual source of variation in crime levels (e.g., long-term, seasonal, nation-wide trends, regression to the mean) which are implicitly controlled in the sister-cities approach.

Findings of the analysis, by city, were as follows:

- Atlanta's burglary levels in 1973 and 1974 followed the pattern predicted by its sister cities. There was no significant difference between reported and predicted levels. The average monthly level reported was 1,363 burglaries, while the predicted average was 1,365.
- In Baltimore, the average monthly level reported, 1,433 burglaries, was 291 less than the predicted value of 1,724. This reduction was significant at the 99 percent level of confidence.
- In Cleveland, burglary was found to be on the decline. The average reported level for 1973-1974 was 913 per month, compared to a predicted average of 1,204. Additionally, the difference between predicted and reported levels was widening--about 150 during the first quarter of 1973, rising to about 450 in the last quarter of the same year. This reduction was found to be significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
- In Dallas, reported burglary increased steadily from 1,500 to 2,000 per month during 1973, and reached 2,300 to 2,400 per month during 1974. Despite these increases, the average reported monthly level for the two-year period was below the predicted value (2,016 reported as opposed to 2,239 predicted). It can be inferred that, although burglary continued to rise throughout 1973-1974, the rate of increase was moderated, compared to the expected levels. This change was found to be significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
- In Denver, the burglary levels experienced were substantially and consistently less than expected, with the average monthly figure being 362 below the predicted level (1,342 versus 1,704). Differences were most pronounced during the latter half of 1973, but the gap narrowed in 1974, as monthly differences dropped from 500 in late 1973 to 300 in late 1974. This change was found to be significant at the 99% level of confidence.

- In Newark, the year 1973 signaled a decline in burglaries; relative to the predicted pattern and to the experience of the sister-cities comprising the comparison base for Newark. This decline continued into 1974, with the reported burglary level dropping to about 300 crimes less than predicted (1,123 expected versus 812 reported). This reduction was found to be significant at the 99 percent level.
- In Portland the average number of burglaries reported each month during 1973 agreed closely with the average expected (999 burglaries reported per month as opposed to an expected level of 1,021). However, month-by-month differences varied from a low of 291 less than expected to a high of 247 more than expected. The number of reported burglaries in 1974 consistently fell below the expected level. Overall, the average monthly level was 1,053 as compared to a predicted 1,142, but this difference was not statistically significant.
- In St. Louis, reported burglaries closely followed the expected pattern (1,674 predicted versus 1,622 reported). Although there were more variations between reported and predicted data during 1974 than in 1973, there was no statistical evidence indicating a difference in the levels of burglary from the expected levels in the city.

It is evident that none of these figures can be taken as "true." All of them are subject to the reporting vagaries discussed earlier (see page 364 above); Portland, in particular, has presented a convincing case--in an analysis of victimization surveys performed there--for a rise in burglary levels attributable to more crime reporting. However, it is not clear that all of Portland's crime rate increases (see Figure 26 above) may be so explained.

Further, as already discussed, the above analysis does not justify attribution of these effects to the Impact program: the question of bias due to city selection is a problem (i.e., cities were not chosen randomly); other problems have to do with city differences in rates of crime reporting (in all probability, these changed differentially across U.S. cities, depending on the strength of the movement, in a particular city, for increased citizen participation), and with the crucial point that the analysis has not examined crime-related and other activities in sister cities. The use of this model in conjunction with a process evaluation for future programs should include an analysis of program/treatments at work in "sister" (control) cities. However, it should be remembered that the model was not designed to permit attribution to a program but rather to allow better measurement of what happened in terms of crime levels during a period of program operation.

On the other hand, it can be argued that in those cities where funds were known to have been spent effectively (as in Dallas and Denver for example), the decreases in specific crime rates observed (see Figures 23 and 24 above) and in actual burglary levels (as compared to expected levels) may have had something to do with the program. This is especially true given the considerable size of the Impact resource input (between \$16 million and \$19 million per city) compared to the small size of Dallas' and Denver's criminal justice budgets (\$27 million and \$20 million respectively, see Table XIX, page 121 above). Given an effective use of the funds, it is reasonable to believe that the infusion of such a large sum of money into an urban arena should have contributed, at least in part, to observed crime-rate, or crime-level decreases.

It would have been interesting to pursue this analysis across the other four Impact crimes. This could not be done by MITRE, however, in the framework of the present process evaluation, since it was not possible to allocate more resources to what is, in essence, an outcome-oriented endeavor.

The test of the Budnick model performed here is interesting in that it provides a new application of the crime-correlated areas concept. Before further use of the model, it would be important to verify the method by applying the sister-city model to a number of cities not operating sizable anti-crime programs during 1973-1974. For such cities, the model predictions should approximate the reported crime rates during that period. If significant differences were found it could mean that the "similarity" relationship between the sister-cities and a target city had failed to hold, and the validity of the Budnick model would become questionable.

Assuming that the validity of the sister-city model were reinforced by further testing and analysis, it would also be useful to determine whether the method of selecting sister-cities can be improved to yield more precise predictions. For example, sister-cities could be chosen by using the traditional step-wise multiple regression technique instead of the bivariate selection method in the Budnick model. Predictions derived from different sister-city selection methods would need to be compared against reported rates to assess the predictive power of various selection methods.

Budnick's model is a promising innovation in the area of crime rate determination and certainly deserves further examination in terms of its rationale and its predictive power.

Finally, it appears that one of the more significant methodological issues in the area of criminal justice research and evaluation involves the development of quantitative methods for demonstrating the impact of anti-crime programs on crime levels. The issue derives from the simple fact that crime occurs in an uncontrollable universe and, thus, it is critical to have a reliable estimate or expectation of what crime would have been (in this uncontrollable universe) if any particular program or treatment had not taken place. Recently, a number of different regression and stochastic models have been developed which, in different ways, are designed to give projections of crime rates. As the criminal justice area continues to employ and find uses for a variety of quantitative techniques developed in other disciplines, it is likely that the development and use of models for crime rate estimation will proliferate. A central methodological task related to these developments will be the determination of the necessary assumptions and parameters of these models and, most important, the determination of their relative predictive utility. Without reliable estimates of expected crime levels, it is difficult to see how treatment effects on crime rates can be demonstrated. Yet little is known at this point in time about the relative utility of various models and their specific limitations. If the use of these models is to proceed in a manner which can provide the greatest payoff for evaluative purposes then a serious critique and test of these models should be undertaken.

C. Juxtaposition of City Performances Under Impact and City-Wide Crime-Change Experiences

What then can be said about city performance in the Impact program and crime changes experienced between 1972 and 1974? Table XLIV below summarizes city efforts in the area of crime-oriented planning soundness, implementation speed, the quality of evaluation plans and reports, and the number of innovative and/or effective projects produced in each city, and juxtaposes these indicators of city performance with crime-rate and crime-level changes in each city. (Values employed are derived from MITRE analyses and reviews discussed throughout this report.)

As mentioned above, Atlanta and Portland had generally severe crime rate increases, whereas Baltimore's rates were generally declining or stabilized with respect to past trends (see Figures 20, 21 and 26 above). In all these cases, however, the cities' slowness of implementation makes it unlikely that Impact projects had much to do with either the increases or the decrease. Instead, for all 3 cities, there appears to have been a continuation of long-term trends.

TABLE XLIV  
IMPACT PERFORMANCE AND CITY-WIDE CRIME DATA

IMPACT CITY	CRIME ORIENTED PLANNING <sup>1</sup>		IMPLEMENTATION <sup>2</sup>		QUALITY OF EVALUATION PLANS <sup>3</sup>			QUALITY OF EVALUATION REPORTS <sup>4</sup>			NUMBER OF INNOVATIVE PROJECTS <sup>5</sup>	TOTAL NUMBER OF PROJECTS	NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PROJECTS <sup>6</sup>	EXPENDITURE FOR EFFECTIVE <sup>10</sup> PROJECTS AS A PERCENT OF FEDERAL FUNDS AWARDED	VIOLENT CRIMES		PERSON CRIME		PROPERTY CRIME		EVIDENCE OF BURGLARY-LEVEL REDUCTION COMPARED TO EXPECTED LEVELS (1973-1974) <sup>8</sup>	IMPACT EFFECT UNLIKELY OR SMALL DUE TO SLOW IMPLEMENTATION	IMPACT EFFECT POSSIBLE
	ADEQUATE	INADEQUATE	FASTER THAN AVERAGE	SLOWER THAN AVERAGE	HIGH	AVERAGE	LOWER THAN AVERAGE	HIGH	AVERAGE	LOWER THAN AVERAGE					PERCENT CHANGE 1972-1974	RANK ORDER 1974	PERCENT CHANGE 1972-1974	RANK ORDER 1974	PERCENT CHANGE 1972-1974	RANK ORDER 1974			
ATLANTA	•			•	•			•			2	20		19%	+55%	(8)	+49%	(6)	+21%	(7)	NO	•	
BALTIMORE		•		•		•			•		2	27	3	13%	+ 1%	(7)	+ 5%	(8)	+10%	(2)	YES	•	
CLEVELAND		•	•				•			•	2	39	3	25%	+33%	(2)	+20%	(4)	+24%	(1)	YES		•
DALLAS	•		•			•			•		3	19	5	53%	-16%	(3)	- 4%	(1)	+20%	(3)	YES		•
DENVER	•		•		•			•			10	37	10	49%	+ 2%	(1)	+ 9%	(2)	+ 5%	(4)	YES		•
NEWARK	•		•		•					•	1	27	1	5%	-15%	(5)	-12%	(7)	- 7%	(5)	YES		•
PORTLAND	•			•	•			•			4	17	4	27%	+42%	(4)	+28%	(3)	+23%	(6)	NO	•	
ST. LOUIS		•	•			•			•		2	47	5	12%	+11%	(6)	+15%	(5)	+17%	(8)	NO		•

<sup>1</sup>SEE CHAPTER VII ABOVE.

<sup>2</sup>IN TERMS OF THE AVERAGE 7.5 MONTHS LAG BETWEEN GRANT SUBMISSION AND PROVISION OF SERVICES.

<sup>3</sup>IN TERMS OF PROGRAM-WIDE MEANS DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER VIII (SEE PAGES 255 THROUGH 257).

<sup>4</sup>IN TERMS OF PROGRAM-WIDE MEANS DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER VII (SEE PAGES 262 THROUGH 264).

<sup>5</sup>SEE TABLE XXXV, PAGE 276.

<sup>6</sup>SEE TABLE XXXIX, PAGE 322.

<sup>7</sup>HIGHEST CRIME RATES = 8; LOWEST CRIME RATES = 1.

<sup>8</sup>SEE SECTION B OF CHAPTER X.

<sup>9</sup>EFFECTIVE PROJECTS TOTAL 35 HERE INCLUDING CLEVELAND CONCENTRATED CRIME PATROL AND NEWARK SPECIAL CASELOADS PROJECT.

<sup>10</sup>THESE PROJECTS DO NOT PURPORT TO REPRESENT ALL EFFECTIVE IMPACT ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS, BUT ONLY THOSE WHICH WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVALUATIONS DEMONSTRATING THEIR SUCCESS.

TABLE XLIV  
IMPACT PERFORMANCE AND CITY-WIDE CRIME DATA

For the other five cities, it is quite possible--given implementation timing--that the program may have affected city-wide crime rates. In that regard, it is first useful to re-examine the program focus in each of these cities to see how much of the city's thrust was likely to have influenced short-term crime rates (see Table XXVIII, page 169, Chapter VI).

CITY	CRIME REDUCTION FOCUS
Cleveland	26% (or \$4.8M)
Dallas	31% (or \$5.3M)
Denver	27% (or \$5.0M)
Newark	54% (or \$10.0M)
St. Louis	27% (or \$5.1M)

Recapitulating from Table XXVIII, it appears that Newark spent about \$10 million on projects with a crime-reduction focus, and that the other cities spent about \$5 million. These amounts certainly seem sizeable enough to have been able to effect an impact on city-wide crime rates. Unfortunately, the quality of evaluation reports in Cleveland and the dearth of them in Newark make it impossible to tell what results Impact crime-reduction projects may have had there, except for Cleveland's Concentrated Crime Patrol (discussed on page 329 above) which was shown to have been effective via a MITRE secondary analysis. If Impact did have a positive effect in Cleveland, then it is possible that the crime-rate increases experienced there might have been worse without Impact. This, in fact, is what seems to emerge from the burglary analysis which shows that Cleveland's actual burglary levels were not only lower than those expected, but that the difference between predicted and reported levels was widening: 150 burglaries less than expected, rising to 450. In the case of Newark, if some of the \$10 million worth of crime-reduction projects there were (like Cleveland's CCP) successful, although undocumented, then it is possible that these might have influenced at least part of the considerable decreases experienced there. This hypothesis is strengthened by evidence from the burglary analysis which shows, as in Cleveland, continually widening differences between expected and reported monthly burglary levels.

In the case of St. Louis, which now has the highest property crime rates of any city, the situation is somewhat different. As discussed in Chapter VII, St. Louis' evaluation reports were uneven, some very good efforts alongside some poor ones, so that--aside from the 5 effective projects already discussed--not much is known about project-level achievement in St. Louis. Further, St. Louis chose a strategy of implementing a great many (47) small projects rather than concentrating its thrusts more heavily, so that the

two crime-reduction focused projects shown to be effective in St. Louis were limited efforts with limited funding (see Table XXXIX). Thus, while it is at least theoretically possible that St. Louis' crime rate increases might have been worse, without Impact, there is no evidence for this from the burglary-level analysis (no significant difference was found).

In the cases of Dallas and of Denver, where large amounts of federal funds were demonstrably well-spent, it seems reasonable to believe that Impact funds may have helped to achieve the decreases and to moderate rates of increase in both Dallas and Denver. Further evidence to reinforce this hypothesis is brought by the burglary level analysis which shows that for both Dallas' big burglary increase and Denver's small one, levels attained were lower than expected (very much lower, for Denver).

In sum, while city-wide crime changes cannot be attributed to city Impact programs, it seems that:

- the crime changes in Atlanta, Portland, and Baltimore are not likely to have been meaningfully affected by the Impact program because of the slow pace of implementation in these cities;
- in Cleveland, increases may have been moderated, and in Newark, decreases may have been influenced by Impact; evidence for this is derived from MITRE's secondary analysis of Cleveland's CCP and from the burglary-level analysis in each city;
- St. Louis' actual burglary levels were not significantly lower than expected levels, and MITRE has not found other evidence pointing to a moderation of city trends via the Impact program there; it is, however, possible that this may have been the case for crimes other than burglary;
- in Dallas and Denver it seems likely that Impact was a factor in achieving decreases and in moderating the rates of increase in those cities (based on evaluation reports, a high proportion of demonstrated effectiveness, and the burglary analysis).

The relative success of Dallas and Denver--if it had been possible to attribute those successes directly to the Impact program--might have furnished important evidence to support the assumption that improved system capability can reduce or control crime. In effect, although Dallas and Denver had diametrically opposed Impact programs (from the viewpoints of philosophy and of focus), both of them concentrated on system capability (defined broadly, as in Chapter I, to include

increased knowledge, expertise and agency coordination). In Denver, the approach was the difficult one of integration across agencies and with the community, based on a strong empirical thrust; in Dallas the approach centered more narrowly on improving criminal justice agency capabilities.

Both of these approaches may have helped to decrease or moderate crime in these cities. If this could be shown empirically to be true in future programs, convincing evidence would then be available to support the presumed relationship of enhanced system capability and crime reduction: the basic underlying assumption of the Impact program.

## Part IV: Overall Program Assessment

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PART IV: OVERALL PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER XI: GENERAL SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XII: RECOMMENDATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

Part I of this report sought to analyze the Impact program in terms of its likely potential for achievement as it moved toward implementation.

Part II examined the questions of the feasibility and usefulness of program innovations (the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team) for improving criminal justice system capabilities, in terms both of the program objectives and of the overall policy goals discussed in Part I: knowledge acquisition, agency coordination and community involvement. The program was analyzed first in each city (Chapter VII) and then across the cities (Chapter VIII) from the viewpoints of crime-oriented planning, implementation, evaluation planning and reporting, Crime Analysis Team activities in support of agency coordination and community involvement, project innovation and institutionalization. In general, the evidence gathered supported the conclusions that both program innovations were not only relevant and capable of being performed but also that they were replicable (given more thorough-going efforts at technical assistance), and that they promised meaningful advances in system capability.

Part III explored the questions of project outcome and of city-wide changes in crime rates and levels, despite the process rather than outcome nature of this evaluation, and despite the fact that Impact-city crime changes cannot be attributed to the program. In effect, if programs are initiated to improve system capability, it is because the assumption exists that such capability will help to reduce crime. Therefore, even if it cannot be stated that an improved capability in some city resulted in a decrease in crime rates, it is extremely important to examine whether such an improved capability (once established) was accompanied by increases or decreases in those rates, because it is an effect on crime which is being sought. Hence, since it cannot be shown that crime rates or levels constitute the dependent variable of the program, and since the measurement of that variable is far from satisfactory, Part III examined crime rates and levels as a program correlate, made some efforts to improve their measurement, and suggested needed future development of those efforts.

Part IV will be devoted to an overall program assessment. Chapter XI will:

- summarize the baseline information developed in Part I of this report (the crime control environment of the early seventies), and then
- discuss program findings and conclusions from the viewpoints of policy goals, program objectives, and general expectations.

Chapter XII will then present the recommendations which proceed from those findings and conclusions.

## **Chapter XI**

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### **General Summary, Findings, and Conclusions**

## Chapter XI

### General Summary, Findings and Conclusions

*We wanted to provide a framework where we could concentrate a whole series of programs together in the same area. This would show greater impact. We felt that the problem was not just one of providing new services here and there, but of trying to reach a new threshold by an integrated approach.*

Lloyd Ohlin, 1967  
(The President's Committee on  
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth  
Crime)

#### A. The Crime Control Environment of The Early Seventies

##### 1. Crime Control Policy Goals

In the early seventies, a striking contrast existed between political prognoses of an "imminent end to the crime problem," and a gloomy research atmosphere which had resulted from the unsuccessful social programs of the sixties and from a new awareness (based on experience) of the real difficulties involved in solving urban problems through federal initiatives. A basic assumption of crime control policy had been that the modernization of the criminal justice system (i.e., police equipment, new weapon systems, etc.) would lead to reductions in crime. Now, however, that assumption had been challenged by the failure of such modernization to achieve and demonstrate improved crime control, and the assumption was therefore being critically re-examined.

This re-examination led to the unhappy realization that even a highly efficient criminal justice system might not be able to affect problems which originated in changing personal or social attitudes and relationships, in perceived environmental stresses and deprivations, and which appeared somehow to determine the supply of new offenders. In a democratic society, government does not have many options. It cannot, for example, tell parents how to raise their children, nor impose cultural or class values, nor restrict individual mobility, nor constrain divorce, even if any or all of these factors are shown to be related to rising rates of crime and delinquency. The fact is that governmental crime control options are narrowly restricted to a very few strategies and techniques, most of which can target only

people who have already come in contact with the criminal justice system. Government can affect the pool of new offenders only through the general deterrence it can provide via an optimally functioning criminal justice system.

That criminal justice system, however, was hardly functioning optimally. Rising crime rates, increased arrests, the failure to plan and evaluate the adequacy of existing programs and procedures had led to a spreading stultification, based on heavy caseloads in the prosecution, probation and parole areas, large backlogs in the courts, and overcrowded prisons and jails. Modernization of the system, while important, was evidently not enough. Needed were thorough-going improvements to effectiveness (as well as to efficiency) through increased knowledge and expertise, through better organization, agency coordination and management, and through more supportive, cooperative relationships between the public and the criminal justice system.

But even though it was clear that crime control policy did not have many options, clear also that those options it did have were mostly restricted to the criminal justice system, and clear once again that that system needed major improvements, it still remained only an assumption that even thorough-going improvement in system capability could reduce crime, given the multiplicity of other factors influencing crime rates which remained beyond even an optimal deterrent capability in the criminal justice system.

Nonetheless, a new crime control policy was evolving in the early seventies, based on the increasing weakness of that deterrent capability, and on the recognition that there existed:

- important gaps in specific knowledge about crime, offenders and victims which rendered policy initiatives highly uncertain;
- an underdevelopment of the criminal justice research function (and of the tools for that research) which might have been able to provide new knowledge;
- serious fragmentation and resistance to coordination among criminal justice agencies;
- a need to develop effective mechanisms for overcoming agency resistance to coordination;
- significant obstacles to community support for law enforcement, especially in center-city high-crime neighborhoods; and

- major potential benefits to be derived from more effective community and citizen involvement in criminal justice system planning, both in terms of crime control, and in terms of combating agency resistance (see Chapter I, pages 3-16).

The new crime control policy thus embodied three central goals:

- to improve knowledge about crime, and about strategies and tactics for dealing with it;
- to increase coordination and system awareness across agencies of the criminal justice system; and
- to develop mechanisms by which to involve community members more closely in criminal justice planning and in crime control.

The assumption behind these goals was that the expanded leverage developed through such improvements in system capability would eventually reduce crime through a more knowledgeable and effective treatment of offenders, through the stronger deterrent capabilities of an efficient system, and through increased assistance and support from the community.

## 2. Scope and Objectives of the Impact Program

The High-Impact Anti-Crime Program was inaugurated by the LEAA in January of 1972 after about 3 months of program planning. Eight American cities with serious crime problems (Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland and St. Louis) had been chosen as the focus for the program whose announced goals were:

- to reduce the incidence of five specific crimes (i.e., stranger-to-stranger person crime--murder, rape, assault and robbery--along with the property crime of burglary) by 5 percent in two years and by 20 percent in five years; and
- to improve criminal justice capabilities via the demonstration of a comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process (the COPIE-cycle).

Under the program, \$160 million (or approximately \$20 million per city) in LEAA discretionary funds were to be made available over a two-year period to the participating locales to assist them in developing, implementing, and evaluating programs which specifically addressed the program's target crimes. The program would be administered within the structure established for LEAA block grant programs with the federal regional offices (ROs), the state planning agencies

(SPAs), and the local governments all playing a role in the Impact effort. Within each Impact city, groups were either identified or created to administer the program at the local level. These groups, called Crime Analysis Teams, worked directly with the local criminal justice agencies which, for the most part, operated the numerous projects comprising the Impact program activities. The SPAs--established under LEAA authorizing legislation to generate state comprehensive plans and handle block grant funding--would participate in the financial and administrative monitoring of Impact program progress, and, "in certain cases," in the evaluation of city efforts. The LEAA Regional Offices (ROs) would retain final approval authority for Impact plans, action projects, and evaluation components. At LEAA in Washington, the National Impact Program Coordinator, the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, a Policy Decision Group (made up of three high-ranking LEAA officials) and the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service would monitor the development and progress of the program.

The Impact program, conceived as a governmental response to rising urban crime rates, reflected LEAA's mandate from Congress to help state and local governments control crime and improve the quality and capabilities of their criminal justice systems. The funds provided to the cities were intended to allow them an opportunity to attack their crime problems in their own ways and according to their own priorities, but using a balanced, comprehensive and coordinated strategy rather than the fragmented, ad hoc approach which appeared to have characterized much of urban crime-fighting in the past. The program sought to address crime itself, rather than modernization or hardware needs, and elaborated an ambitious problem-solving framework to ensure that Impact projects would indeed be crime-oriented. Although Impact was thus intended to demonstrate the utility of such a problem-solving framework, it was, first and foremost, to be an action program and the program focused, therefore, on short-term, crime-oriented achievement.

The Impact program had six specific objectives. These were:

- (1) To reduce Impact crime (i.e., those crime types making up that segment of overall crime deemed to be both serious and accessible to control by government through criminal justice resources);
- (2) To demonstrate the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process, or COPIE-cycle (this focus of the program targeted the integration of the criminal justice function with planning and evaluative research; its goal was an improved system capability for comprehensive and iterative planning, implementation and evaluation at the local level);

- (3) To acquire, through the use of the COPIE-cycle, new knowledge about:
- anti-crime effectiveness;
  - specific crimes, in terms of victims, offenders, and crime-settings;
  - the process of innovation within the criminal justice system; and,
  - the application of evaluation to anti-crime projects and programs;
- (4) To improve coordination across intergovernmental and criminal justice agencies, and to increase community involvement and participation via:
- incentives toward functional balance (90-10 match for corrections projects under special funding arrangements);
  - the institution of the Crime Analysis Team;
- (5) To institutionalize effective program innovations within the eight Impact cities;
- (6) To encourage improved system capabilities beyond the confines of the Impact program via dissemination of the knowledge acquired through program implementation, including:
- the documentation of lessons learned;
  - the identification of useful program innovations; and,
  - the designation of effective projects for transfer.

The program was thus an expression of the policy goals enunciated earlier, in that the COPIE-cycle was an instrument for increasing knowledge, developing research capabilities and improving program and agency effectiveness, and in that the Crime Analysis Team (or CAT) was an instrument for monitoring and managing the COPIE-cycle, ensuring agency coordination, and developing community involvement in each of the eight cities. The chief tool for the production of new knowledge was to be evaluation, a major focus of the program, intended to take place at three levels:

- at the project or city level (within the COPIE-cycle process);
- at the national level (examining program processes and results across the eight city programs); and
- at a global level (using LEAA/Bureau of the Census victimization surveys as a tool in the determination of overall program effects).

Such evaluation, as part of the COPIE-cycle and outside it, was expected to produce information about criminal justice needs and priorities, about project and program effectiveness, and about the potential of the targeted system capability, once achieved, to reduce crime.

Crime control policy was not alone, however, in generating the Impact program. Like all programs, Impact had to conciliate both political and rational goals. Among the political requirements imposed upon the program from its inception were:

- a highly emphasized action focus;
- quantified objectives for the program (the 5 percent and 20 percent reduction figures) which were neither based upon any empirical evidence that they could be attained, nor even operationally defined (see Chapter IV, page 57);
- a city selection process based upon unclearly specified criteria (see page 21);
- use of the New Federalist philosophy which had become a political requisite for LEAA programs (see pages 22-23); and
- a three-way partnership among federal, state and city authorities without any very clear specification and differentiation of the roles and functions of each (see pages 26-32).

While conciliation of political necessities with the requirements of policy is a fact of life among social action programs, the conciliation usually occurs at the expense of policy. This was especially likely to happen in Impact, because--in addition to the hardness and fastness of political/action goals as compared to research objectives--the inadequate time allocated to national program and evaluation planning left both soft spots and gaps in the procedures laid out for

**CONTINUED**

**5 OF 6**

achieving policy goals. At least three areas, which had been recognized as crucial by program planners, failed to receive adequate definition in terms of organizational mechanisms. These were:

- technical assistance to the cities and criminal justice agencies at all levels to aid them in planning, implementing, evaluating, monitoring and managing their anti-crime projects (see pages 32-35);
- lateral coordination among those federal agencies (such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Department of Labor) which target similar anti-crime objectives to those of LEAA; and
- high-crime area community surveys.

Such gaps and weaknesses could be expected to reduce, at least to some degree, both the power of the program thrust and its potential ability to achieve program objectives, and hence, policy goals.

### 3. Conflicts and Constraints of the Impact Program

The nature of the tradeoffs which must inevitably be made in generating governmental programs means that all of them contain implicit and explicit conflicts or constraints. An emphasis in one area necessarily deprives emphasis in another area (see Chapter III, pages 39-41). Impact's quantified objectives for example, might implicitly deprive qualitative objectives which could turn out to be better (although perhaps harder to measure) indicators of overall program accomplishment. Quantified data might produce findings showing that crime rates had improved, while failing to point up a real unwanted deterioration in the crime control situation or the social organization of a declining neighborhood. Similarly, the fact that a program occurs in the public arena distorts the importance of private sector inputs. In criminal justice, for example, a crucial requirement for the success of any rehabilitation program is the participation of the business community and the possibility of sustained, meaningful employment for ex-offenders. (Governmental placement bureaus may find jobs for people just out of prison, but it is the business community which must help to keep them employed, and rehabilitation can only be judged over the long term, not according to the number of placements made.) In the same way, private bar associations need to coordinate their efforts with governmental efforts to improve processing and reduce backlogs. Yet public programs tend to include the private sector--if at all--only as an afterthought.

In Impact, these implicit conflicts resulted in the failure (already mentioned) to institute community surveys as a part of the program, as well as the failure to enlist the cooperation of private bar associations and business groups.

To these implicit conflicts, however, some very explicit conflicts were joined. Major problems appeared likely to arise, in Impact, from friction between:

- action and research objectives;
- crime-reduction effectiveness and system efficiency;
- New Federalism and the program goals of knowledge acquisition, rapid action, and agency coordination.

(a) Action Versus Research

National planners noted early on that there might be conflict between the short-term action focus of Impact and the planning and evaluative research aspects of the COPIE-cycle focus. Technical assistance had been only vaguely discussed in this context. Although political action requirements had brought forth the 6-month time-frame within which Crime Analysis Teams had to be recruited and installed, program planning (including data collection, analysis, problem prioritizing and project development) and evaluation planning functions had to be performed, and projects had to be operationalized, it was not clear that this could be done. This was, however, a crucial problem for both action and knowledge/research objectives, because if rapid implementation could not be achieved, concentration of anti-crime emphasis within a city would give way to long-drawn out, straggling project implementation and weakened program impact; on the other hand, if the COPIE-cycle had to be sacrificed to rapid implementation, this would mean the inability of evaluation to speak to program effects, the uncertainty of whether projects had addressed priorities rationally derived, and the failure to achieve the major program research objective of knowledge about anti-crime projects and their effects.

Another immediately obvious conflict in this area had to do with the program requirement to achieve short-term anti-crime impacts while dealing with problems requiring long-term measurement for the acquisition of any real knowledge. This difficulty would evidently trouble corrections and drug project planners (among others) in the cities, given that freedom from drug use and changes in recidivism patterns/social adjustment, etc., need to be followed up

over a rather lengthy time-span. Yet the program sought simultaneously to achieve both functional balance (and especially an important emphasis on corrections and recidivism-focused projects) and a 2-year crime-reduction payoff for all projects. Funds were correspondingly allocated only for a 2-year period of program operations and evaluation, despite the fact that knowledge about drug program effects and recidivism were major Impact priorities.

(b) Crime-Reduction Effectiveness Versus System Efficiency

Another conflict arose from the fact that the program objective of rapid crime reduction, in specified amounts by a given date, meant that all Impact projects had to be directly justified in terms of crime-reduction effectiveness. Yet needed projects targeting improvements in system capability and efficiency (such as the reduction of court delays, or better jail conditions, or greater police productivity, for example), or improvements in community relations with police and courts, usually could not be so justified. However, effectiveness in crime reduction--insofar as it is achievable by any governmental program--clearly depends in large measure on system efficiency. Furthermore, Impact specifically addressed objectives of functional balance (among police, courts and corrections), of agency coordination, and of community involvement as well as crime reduction. The effectiveness objective thus contained within it elements of serious conflict with efficiency and with other important objectives of the program.

The problem signified, then, that many projects which might be good things to do in themselves, regardless of their effects on crime rates, could be rejected, depending on the interpretations of program priorities by reviewers. And insofar as the conflict, because of its importance, was highly likely to occur, this increased the possibility that interpretations, via the discretionary authority of regional offices, might differ notably, and give rise to city perceptions of unequal treatment by the LEAA.

(c) New Federalism Versus Program Goals of Knowledge Acquisition, Rapid Action, and Agency Coordination

The New Federalist approach signified, in Impact, that cities (having determined their own priorities based on their analysis, and chosen their own projects) would also have collected the data they saw fit to collect. Whether or not the data were the best available, whether each Impact crime was fully analyzed to the extent possible in each city, whether evaluation planning, project monitoring, and evaluation reporting were adequately performed, would thus depend upon the quality of state planning agency (SPA) and/or regional office (RO) review.

New Federalism meant, however, that no mandatory evaluation standards had been established for states, that no requirements existed for comparable and uniform data across the states, and that no routine federal monitoring of the adequacy of state planning and assistance functions had been instituted.

Thus, New Federalism had not only precluded prescriptions to the cities about evaluation designs (Impact cities were being allowed to conduct their own evaluations and no particular design specifications, no control groups had been mandated), but even the leverage to insure that some data were being collected, and that some SPAs were checking on that data collection, was also missing. Yet it seemed an obvious necessity--to ensure that funds would not be wasted or misused, or that Impact goals would not be neglected--for SPAs and ROs to:

- review carefully the quality of the data analysis performed;
- see that the projects chosen addressed the crime problems delineated and substantiated by the analysis;
- ensure the possibility of a rapid anti-crime payoff;
- examine the adequacy and feasibility of the evaluation design; and,
- investigate the cost/effectiveness of the organization and methods chosen, etc.

SPAs, however, could resist these efforts in the name of New Federalism. On the other hand, if they chose to exercise these functions in an autocratic or interfering way, they could seriously slow implementation. The independence granted the SPAs and the cities via the New Federalism, then, was likely to come into conflict either with the program objective of knowledge acquisition, or with rapid implementation and anti-crime payoff, depending upon the attitudes, strength, and expertise of the particular SPA, the authority (and willingness to use that authority) on the part of the RO, and the LEAA Policy Decision Group's ability to exercise its prerogative of review (see pages 26-32). New Federalism, however, also enabled the ROs (and SPAs) to fight such an LEAA review.

Further, with everyone free to be "equal partners," it might not always be clear who was in charge, and given the tendencies of bureaucratic agencies to resist coordination (see Chapter I), it seemed likely, under New Federalism, that progress might be difficult in this area. Given the innovativeness of the Impact COPIE-cycle and CAT approach (innovations take time and encounter resistances), and given

also the difficulties of obtaining coordination across involved agencies in any anti-crime program, it also appeared that it might be arduous to attain a reasonable program-wide performance of the COPIE-cycle, using the non-coercive techniques of New Federalist guidelines as a program framework.

All of these conflicts clearly had the potential not only to affect program form and substance, but also to change significantly some of the initial expectations of what program achievements were likely to be.

#### 4. Scope and Objectives of the National-Level Evaluation

As already discussed (see page 405 above) the Impact evaluation had been conceived during the program planning process at three levels. It had become a "given" that all local data collection and evaluation would be done by the cities, and a "given," also, that those evaluations would constitute the major data inputs to the national-level evaluation. The idea of the "macroscopic" or global evaluation, establishing crime-reduction achievements and outcomes of the Impact program (which was originally intended to be performed by the Statistics Division of LEAA in concert with the Bureau of the Census), however, was gradually dropped, leaving only the victimization surveys. While these could indeed measure victimization-rate changes, there was, of course, no possibility--without an evaluation design--of attributing these to the program. But since the national-level evaluation--scheduled to be completed before the second victimization survey--did not provide for an assessment of Impact crime-reduction outcomes, it seemed that the failure to perform the macroscopic (or global) evaluation would necessarily leave a serious gap in the evaluation of program achievements.

Evaluation planning at the national-level took place during November and December of 1971. Given the short time-frame, however, it proved impossible to establish an evaluation plan for the national-level evaluation (outcome objectives, for example, were never operationally defined). This is not to say that evaluation planning did not occur; on the contrary, efforts were indeed made, but they remained embryonic because of time constraints and because of the press of other efforts.

In July of 1972, six months after the program had begun, The MITRE Corporation contracted to perform the national-level evaluation. The development of a strategy for this effort was guided by several factors:

- program effectiveness would not be determined by the national-level evaluation but through victimization surveys to be performed in 1972, 1975 and 1978;

- the national-level evaluation would be dependent upon the Impact cities for all of its raw data; it was, however, still uncertain, in July of 1972, what the cities might produce in the way of data;
- while the program called for rigorous city-level evaluation, New Federalism had established that cities would evaluate their own projects, that no rigorous evaluation designs would be imposed and that no requirements for area-specific or base-line data collection would be levied; thus the information likely to be produced by a national-level evaluation which was entirely dependent upon city-level efforts in a New Federalist context, appeared somewhat constrained;
- it would be impossible, in this program context, to change the local data collection process in any significant way; this would severely limit both the research field and the selection of strategies open to the national-level evaluation;
- cost constraints dictated that:
  - no control or comparison groups using non-Impact cities could be envisaged for the national-level evaluation;
  - no area-specific data collection within Impact cities could be undertaken; and,
  - no presence was to be established by MITRE in the eight cities (such a cost was felt by the National Institute to be duplicative);
- the national-level evaluation would therefore not only depend entirely upon data and information furnished by the cities (by mail or over the telephone, for the most part, with an occasional exception made for specific, task-oriented visits), it would also be largely without the ability to validate that information.

All of these considerations necessarily signified the renunciation of any experimental or quasi-experimental design for the national-level evaluation, and the decision was taken to concentrate on process rather than outcome. The evaluation strategy would flow from the three general questions:

- (1) What happened--in terms of planning and implementation processes--when LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-oriented planning and evaluation?

- (2) What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?
- (3) What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

With these questions as their focus, nine discrete assessment tasks were defined:

- Task 1, an analysis of crime-oriented planning and implementation in the eight cities;
- Task 2, an assessment of project institutionalization in the eight cities;
- Task 3, a study of the TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime) programs which were attempted by Impact cities;
- Task 4, an examination of projects undertaken by the cities which were based upon the assumptions that:
  - intensive supervision of parolees/probationers is an effective means of reducing recidivism among these groups; or that
  - an increase in the patrol activity of police in a given area will result in a decrease in crime rates in that area;
- Task 5, an examination of project innovation in the Impact program;
- Task 6, the identification of transferable Impact projects;
- Task 7, an assessment of city-level evaluation planning and reporting;
- Task 8, the documentation of the Impact program history in each of the eight cities; and
- Task 9, the present document and final report, which integrates some of the broader program issues, receiving inputs from the eight other tasks and developing its own information as well.

The objectives of the national-level evaluation were thus:

- (1) to develop new knowledge about the capacities of eight U.S. cities in the years 1972-1975 to plan, implement and evaluate a comprehensive anti-crime program;
- (2) to assess the LEAA problems of monitoring and managing the Impact program across a four-level vertical organizational structure (involving the Crime Analysis Team, state planning agency, regional office and LEAA headquarters), using a New Federalist program philosophy; and
- (3) to formulate a set of recommendations, based on the Impact experience, for use in the elaboration of future urban/state/federal anti-crime programs.

5. The Impact Cities in 1970, Prior to Program Initiation

To provide points of comparison for the eight Impact cities in terms of their relative positions at the start of the program, an analysis of background information was undertaken in Chapter V of this report. Cities were examined from various perspectives including:

- a general overview (with selected data on city history, geography, position within the state, economic situation and political system; see pages 69-92);
- crime-correlated indicators, attempting to measure:
  - demographic distribution;
  - family situation;
  - educational/economic conditions;
  - social cohesion; and,
  - non-white disadvantage (see page 102);
- crime correlates and reported crime rates;
- revenues, expenditures and resource capabilities; and
- reported crime rates and the criminal justice system response (pages 120-123).

It emerged from the analysis that there was a de facto division of the cities into two groups of four, the young and the old, the "advantaged" and the "disadvantaged." Without trying to establish any rigid set of rankings, it seemed that Portland, Denver, Dallas, and Atlanta were different from the other cities (i.e., Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark and St. Louis) because of the diversity of their economies, the education and skills of their inhabitants, their space and their affluence. Among these "advantaged" cities, Portland appeared as distinct from the other three because of its relatively minor crime problems, in comparison with the other Impact cities, combined with its favored demographic, economic and social environment. Atlanta, on the other hand, appeared as a sort of swing city, closer in many ways to more disadvantaged cities, with its racial tensions and majority black population, yet rejoining the more privileged cities by virtue of its economic diversity, its well-educated population, its lower violent and person crime rates (see Table XV, page 99).

Among the older cities, Newark stood out as having begun the program with the greatest handicaps. St. Louis and Baltimore were in somewhat better positions, but their problems were similar in kind to those of Newark: exodus of people and jobs, aging white populations, poverty and unemployment.

Cleveland also appeared as disadvantaged (in relation to Dallas, Denver, or Portland), yet showed up on many scales in a better situation than Newark, St. Louis or Baltimore (less overcrowding, higher family income, more juveniles living with both parents, more owner-occupied housing, less burglary, less violent crime, see again Table XV, page 99). On the other hand, the problems of middle class exodus (an outflow of 125,000 people between 1960 and 1970) and an underdiversified economy, the racial tensions between "ethnics" and blacks, all of these characteristics combined to keep Cleveland squarely in the camp of the older, disadvantaged cities.

Crime problems for all of the cities except Portland were acute. Dallas, despite its prosperity, had reported rates for aggravated assault higher than those of St. Louis and rates for violent crime (murder, rape, aggravated assault) nearly twice those of Cleveland. Denver was troubled with the highest reported rate of forcible rape for any Impact city, higher than St. Louis, higher than Newark.

Given that high crime rates were seen both in "boom" and in "exodus" cities, however, the hypothesis was advanced that it might not be the boom or exodus in itself which is significant in terms of rising crime, but rather a perception of relative deprivation (among disadvantaged persons or groups vis-a-vis other persons or groups) which may influence the marginal propensity to commit crimes; such a perception would be exacerbated in either rapidly expanding or rapidly deteriorating economies.

Examination of city resources, expenditures and resource capabilities again confirmed the split between the two groups of cities; however, only Dallas, Denver and Portland presented evidence of obvious resource capability. It seemed possible, given the differences between the two groups of cities, that "disadvantaged" cities might have more difficulty in mounting the complex set of activities required under Impact than might "advantaged" cities, and a greater need, therefore, of technical assistance.

In summary, crime was not the only problem, perhaps, for the eight cities, but it was a major one. The Impact program thus began its operations at a moment when--despite differing assumptions about "root causes" and system capabilities--it had not been shown empirically that any of these variables directly affected rates of crime, delinquency or recidivism. It was therefore appropriate and necessary to try a new approach like the one posited by Impact's COPIE-cycle: that is, a careful examination of crime-specific problems followed by an application of federal funds to anti-crime efforts directly addressing those problems. Such an approach targeted a serious improvement in the quality of anti-crime thinking, services and effectiveness, and hence, in the overall capability of the criminal justice system.

B. Summary of National-Level Evaluation Findings and Conclusions

MITRE findings and conclusions have been scattered in various places across the length and breadth of this final report, in order to leave intact the natural flow of the analysis. They are now gathered together here in one place, based on the supporting documentation contained in the preceding ten chapters. Findings and conclusions are thus stated with reference to that support, and with reference also to the baseline constructs elaborated in Part I:

- the three crime control policy goals (Chapter I);
- the six Impact objectives (Chapter II); and
- the expectations developed at program start-up (generated from the conflict analysis of Chapter III, the evaluation strategy of Chapter VI and the socioeconomic examination of the eight Impact cities in Chapter V).

The following sections, then, present findings and conclusions of the national-level evaluation in terms both of program objectives (and hence of the policy goals they express) and of program expectations. The first objective to be examined here will be the program's major system capability target and the major emphasis of the national-level evaluation: the demonstration of the COPIE-cycle (discussed integrally in Chapter VI). Evaluation findings will be reported, first, in terms of the COPIE-cycle as a whole, and then in terms of each element of the process.

1. Program Objective: To Demonstrate the Comprehensive Crime-Oriented Planning, Implementation and Evaluation Process (the COPIE-cycle).

(a) Findings and Conclusions on the COPIE-cycle as a Whole

- (1) The COPIE-cycle has been shown to be a feasible and useful tool for improving criminal justice capability.
- (2) All of the cities installed Crime Analysis Teams, performed crime-oriented planning, produced master and evaluation plans, implemented anti-crime projects and programs, and evaluated more than half of them.
- (3) Four of the cities (Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland) performed sound crime-oriented planning; another city (Dallas) made only a middling effort at first, but soon recognized gaps and omissions and moved both to correct them and to improve planning capabilities generally. It seems likely that Cleveland and St. Louis could have done as well as any of the best planners among the cities had they not opted for rapid implementation. Baltimore alone appears to have had a real feasibility problem in planning, posed by the autonomy of the police function in that city, and the consequent inability of the CAT to access police data.
- (4) Five of the cities (St. Louis, Dallas, Cleveland, Newark and Denver) were able to translate funds into operational projects rapidly and well. Atlanta, Baltimore and Portland, however, were troubled by delays which could, in many cases, have been reduced or eliminated had problems been signalled in time and projects adequately monitored and reviewed on an on-going basis. Implementation insufficiencies, in Impact, appeared in most cases to be more a function of the failure to coordinate and of management gaps than of inherent difficulties in the implementation process itself.
- (5) Evaluation, which had been a big question-mark for Impact program planners, turned out to be both a realistic expectation and generally feasible

within the context of an action-oriented anti-crime program. The state of knowledge dissemination in the evaluation art was perhaps the biggest influence on the quality of the evaluation executed. This is evidenced by differences in performance according to project focus (showing more evaluation expertise and experience in some areas than in others), by inadequacies (many of them remediable) in the evaluation documents reviewed, and by the steady progress made in almost all the cities over the life of the program.

- (6) The crime-oriented planning process, adequately performed, brought a clearer focus on problems and needs, a better basis for justifying funding behavior, a sharp decrease in "off-the-shelf" projects when priority problems were well substantiated by data and analysis (e.g., in Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland). Even in those cities where the effort to implement the cycle was less than whole-hearted, there is today considerably more data collection and analysis being done by criminal justice planners, by police, courts and corrections people than before Impact (in Baltimore, Dallas and St. Louis, for example).
- (7) The crime-oriented planning process also brought new breadth in thinking about criminal justice problems. Many agency planners, for example, had to deal with projections, strategies and tactics on a scale they had never experienced before. Further, the COPIE-cycle brought exposure to what other people around the country were doing in planning and evaluation--not only in criminal justice but in other social program areas as well--and this exposure made them aware of other options and choices which could be applied locally. (This was especially true in Portland, in Denver, in Dallas and in Atlanta.) An important benefit of the COPIE-cycle, therefore, was a by-product of the wider dissemination of ideas which accompanied the program.
- (8) Evaluation planning acted in a similar way. It forced some new thinking about what a project was supposed to accomplish, an improved understanding of how activities needed to fit together to achieve targeted objectives. (This was evidenced by component revisions and grant application changes--

especially in Atlanta, Denver and Portland). Evaluation planning also helped cities to identify gaps in data and in system information because they were obliged to specify data sources. In this way they came to realize that they needed to follow up on their offenders to know what was happening to them (in terms of rehabilitation, rearrest and/or reconviction) in order to have a basis for comparison with project outcomes. Denver and Atlanta both conducted recidivism studies, to be used as baselines for assessing project effects. Portland's victimization study fulfilled a need for data recognized early on in the program.

- (9) Management use of evaluation findings as a tool for decision-making (with respect to project refunding, modification, or phase-out) appears to have taken hold at least to some degree in most Impact cities. Between the beginning of the program and the present writing, this use increased progressively and markedly, at top management levels. Evaluation findings now serve routinely in Denver, Atlanta, Dallas and St. Louis as inputs to project refunding decisions. Baltimore's progress reports also are fed back into the SPA refunding process.
- (10) Improvement has also been seen in the way that evaluation findings are being iteratively provided to project implementers for their action. Most evaluation reports reviewed to date have specified operational recommendations, and projects with multiple reports featuring such recommendations have often been reorganized or changed, to conform to those recommendations (e.g., Denver, St. Louis, Dallas, Atlanta).
- (11) Problems experienced by cities where the COPIE-cycle was not well performed reinforce confidence in the relationships observed. An initial crime-oriented planning failure to collect data, and to substantiate crime problems and priorities rationally, deprived cities of the increased criminal-justice capabilities and benefits found to accompany an adequate COPIE-cycle performance. On the contrary, as implementation proceeded, it became clear that the first planning gaps led,

in varying degrees, to priority uncertainties, to lack of baseline data for evaluation, inadequate evaluation, failure to affect and modify projects in a timely way via evaluation feedback, and above all, inability to assess and identify anti-crime project achievements.

- (12) Given the benefits accruing to those cities which effectively executed the COPIE-cycle, and the failure to accrue those benefits among those cities which did not, it is reasonably clear that the effort was feasible, useful in many ways, and generally replicable, with some remediation, in U.S. cities.

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Crime-Oriented Planning

(1) Four of the eight cities (Atlanta, Denver, Newark, and Portland) performed crime-oriented planning soundly; the other four cities evidenced lesser conformity with the crime-oriented planning model.

- The major factors encouraging successful crime-oriented planning were: (1) the capabilities, interests and size of the Crime Analysis Team, (2) the cooperation of city criminal justice agencies, and (3) the lack of any irresistible municipal pressures to operationalize projects rapidly.
- The key factor inhibiting successful performance in Cleveland and St. Louis was precisely this city pressure to implement; in Dallas and Baltimore, the chief problem was the small size of the Crime Analysis Team (however, Baltimore was hampered as well by problems of agency cooperation).
- The quality of data collection and analysis was not adequately monitored in four of the eight cities; crime-oriented planning in these cities could have been significantly improved by such monitoring.
- Dallas recognized various weaknesses in its planning process and took steps to remedy them during the course of the program.

(2) Contrary to program expectations:

- The program conflict between action and research did not result in the expected sacrifice of crime-oriented planning quality except in Cleveland and St. Louis; rather it resulted in program slippage.
- City "disadvantage" relative to other Impact cities (see pages 415-416) was not a factor in planning performance; Newark achieved a rigorous execution of crime-oriented planning.

- The failure to develop continuing technical assistance was not an overwhelming problem for crime-oriented planning because of the adequate dissemination of materials in this instance. Abundant documentation and briefings were made available to the cities by LEAA for use in their planning effort.
- (3) Not enough time was provided for crime-oriented planning, and milestones were not established for the data-collection, analysis, and problem-prioritization steps of the planning model, making timely guidance and monitoring by SPAs and ROs more difficult.
- It was clear, by July 1972, that program planners had been over-optimistic about the activities which could be performed within cities in the space of six months. Eventually, there would be a general program slippage of about a year across the eight cities.
  - An average of 8 months' time was required to prepare city master plans (range: 3 months in St. Louis to 13 months in Newark).
- (4) Crime problems, as prioritized across the cities, showed a general program-wide focus on juvenile crime, on adult recidivism and on drug use.
- (5) An effective mechanism (the Neighborhoods Task Force) for the channeling of community input into the planning process was developed in Denver (see Chapter VII).
- (6) Although high-level promises of lateral coordination across federal agencies had been obtained by the Attorney General (20 December 1971), efforts at cooperation with the Impact program (by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Small Business Administration, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and other federal agencies) all broke down within the first six months of the program; no mechanisms had been developed for joint planning at the working level across federal agencies.

- (7) New Federalism both helped and hindered crime-oriented planning; it allowed those cities which planned seriously to discover and address their own local priorities; it also, however, allowed cities which planned inadequately to proceed, almost unchallenged, to the implementation stage without sufficient analysis of crime problems or solid linkage of anti-crime interventions (projects) to those problems.
- (8) In the four cities where crime-oriented planning was well done, it brought:
- new knowledge about urban crime problems by pinpointing particular crime characteristics for selective attention;
  - more awareness of current planning techniques;
  - certainty that substantiated city crime problems were being addressed;
  - more rational application of federal resources to local problems;
  - better evaluation planning and reporting.
- (9) Where crime-oriented planning was inadequately performed, there was:
- no certitude that identified priorities correspond to city crime problems;
  - no very strong pressure to address the priorities selected;
  - weaker rationale-building for projects;
  - failure to lay the foundation for evaluation planning and reporting.

(c) Findings and Conclusions on Implementation

- (1) 233 anti-crime projects were funded across the 8 cities at about \$140 million in federal funds.
- (2) Growing awareness in many Impact cities of rehabilitation failures, combined with program funding incentives and the New Federalist strengthening of city priorities, together had a greater effect on the shape of the program than did its nationally-set crime-reduction objectives. This meant that, in terms of expectations for the mix of projects included in the program:
  - Contrary to expectations, program-wide funding was shared about equally between police and corrections projects (33 percent and 31 percent, respectively, see Table XLV below). Thus, Impact was not a police program. (This is even clearer when projects are broken out by focus, also in Table XLV. Offender or recidivism-focused projects received the lion's share of the funding (42 percent) while direct crime-reduction projects received only 31 percent.)
  - Also contrary to expectations, juvenile projects were well funded, reflecting the identified eight-city priority in the area of juvenile problems.
  - Community involvement strategies also received much more attention than expected. This may have reflected a national trend (concurrent with the program) toward concern for crime victims and toward increased community input into the criminal justice planning process. Although Impact had targeted community participation as a program objective, it is likely that without external pressure, this objective might have been sacrificed to the program's action focus.
  - As expected, research projects were de-emphasized as were target hardening and simple modernization projects. ("Gimmicks and gadgets" were not a hallmark of Impact.)

TABLE XLV  
DISTRIBUTION OF AWARDED FUNDS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA AND BY PROJECT FOCUS

PROJECT FUNCTIONAL AREA AND PROJECT FOCUS	PROGRAM-WIDE	ATLANTA	BALTIMORE	CLEVELAND	DALLAS	DENVER	NEWARK	PORTLAND	ST. LOUIS
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
FUNCTIONAL AREA (1)									
POLICE	33	45	23	38	45	21	41	23	33
COURTS	8	1	15	7	21	2	6	3	8
CORRECTIONS (JUVENILE AND ADULT)	31	27	27	22	19	29	28	61	33
DRUG USE PREVENTION	5	0	19	7	0	6	3	0	2
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	8	4	8	18	7	9	5	0	11
TARGET HARDENING	10	22	2	6	4	19	16	4	5
RESEARCH/INFORMATION SYSTEMS	2	1	4	2	0	3	1	2	6
OTHER	3	0.3	2	0.2	4	11	0	7	2
	<0.1	0	0.2	0	0	0	0.2	0	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(\$140.0M)	(\$16.9M)	(\$16.7M)	(\$18.5M)	(\$17.0M)	(\$18.1M)	(\$17.8M)	(\$16.1M)	(\$18.9M)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
PROJECT FOCUS (2)									
CRIME REDUCTION	31	66	24	26	31	27	54	8	27
RECIDIVISM REDUCTION	42	30	51	45	25	52	38	63	37
SYSTEMS CAPABILITY	27	4	25	29	44	21	8	29	36
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(\$140.0M)	(\$16.9M)	(\$16.7M)	(\$18.5M)	(\$17.0M)	(\$18.1M)	(\$17.8M)	(\$16.1M)	(\$18.9M)

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(1) FUNCTIONAL AREA CATEGORIES ARE DEFINED IN CHAPTER VI ( PAGES 160 THROUGH 162), VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT. THE POLICE CATEGORY, FOR EXAMPLE, INCLUDES ALL PROJECT FUNDS AWARDED TO POLICE AGENCIES (TARGETING EITHER CRIME-REDUCTION OR SYSTEM CAFABILITY).

(2) PROJECT FOCUS CATEGORIES ARE DEFINED IN CHAPTER VI (PAGE 163), VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT. THIS BREAKOUT, BY OBJECTIVE, CLASSIFIES PROJECTS ACCORDING TO THE KIND OF IMPROVEMENT TARGETED BY THE PROJECT, WHATEVER ITS FUNCTIONAL AREA.

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TABLES XXV, XXVI, XXVII, AND XXVIII, VOLUME II OF THE FINAL REPORT (PAGES 161, 164, 165, AND 169).

- (3) It is difficult to say whether the program target of functional balance was achieved since it is not clear what that balance should be, given that it depends on specific city problems, needs and priorities. However, it is clear that police and corrections functions were roughly balanced in the program and that funding was very different from the usual expenditure breakouts (about 80 percent for police, and about 20 percent for courts and corrections).
- (4) Functional balance was very difficult in each of the cities, showing once again, the ability of the New Federalist approach to bring out local priorities (see Table XLV). Atlanta and Newark emphasized a crime-reduction focus using a police strategy, Dallas a system-capability focus with a police strategy, Portland a strongly pronounced orientation toward recidivism reduction. The four other cities also focused generally on recidivism reduction, although much less overwhelmingly than Portland. Only Baltimore devoted substantial funds to drug use.
- (5) Both the Portland and Dallas programs were major surprises, compared against expectations of heavily-focused crime-reduction strategies. Portland's program, however, unquestionably represented city priorities which had been substantiated, and for which a large consensus (city/county/state/region) had been mobilized (see Chapter VII); on the other hand, Dallas' system focus did not appear to reflect either the city's own identified crime problems (concentrating on corrections inadequacies, recidivism and drug use, see Figure 14, Chapter VI) or the short-term crime-reduction objective of the Impact program (see Chapter VII).
- (6) In terms of the expected effectiveness/efficiency trade-offs:
  - o Table XLV also shows that the program conflict between effectiveness and efficiency did not result, as expected, in a de-emphasis of system capability projects (i.e., projects which could not be directly linked with crime-reduction objectives but were important city priorities nonetheless).

This is evidenced by the fact that 27 percent of the program funds went toward productivity-increasing efforts (such as Dallas' Legal Aides for Police or Baltimore's High Impact Courts).

- The program effectiveness/efficiency conflict did result, as expected, in an apparent underemphasis of court projects. These emerged with only 8 percent of Impact funding, perhaps because court problems were a lower priority compared to more urgent city problems, perhaps because of the difficulty of rationalizing court improvements in terms of crime rates, or perhaps because of the program failure to provide funding incentives for court (as for corrections) projects.
- (7) The major implementation problems noted by Impact project directors were staffing delays and lengthy administrative procedures (often caused by inadequate interagency communications and coordination). Newark and St. Louis were troubled, as well, by funding delays (see Table XXXIV, Chapter VIII).
- (8) St. Louis, Dallas and Cleveland were the most rapid Impact implementers; Portland, Baltimore and Atlanta were the slowest.
- The major factors encouraging rapid implementation in St. Louis were the political push to operationalize and the typically small size and funding of St. Louis projects. In Dallas and Cleveland, the major stimulating factor was interagency coordination: Dallas projects benefited from an arrangement by which the state advanced the city's cash match automatically; in Cleveland, there was harmony between the RO and the CAT, the SPA played no role in the program (see Chapter VII), and also, as in St. Louis, there was strong political impetus toward rapid implementation.
  - The chief factor inhibiting rapid implementation generally was the failure of agency coordination; the 9-step approval process in

Portland (see Chapter VII) and Crime Analysis Team liaison difficulties in Atlanta and Baltimore explained a large part of the delays in these cities. However, some other factors played a role as well.

- (9) Contrary to expectations, crime-oriented planning excellence was not a major factor in slowing implementation speed. Denver and Newark were good planners and better than average implementers, while Baltimore, which did not excel at crime-oriented planning, was also very slow to operationalize. Among the cities having produced a fine planning effort, those which had serious implementation difficulties (Atlanta and Portland) also had major problems of agency coordination. It is these, far more than the planning effort, which generated the lag in implementation.
- (10) The longest, slowest implementation occurred among drug programs and information system projects, among equipment-dependent projects, and among projects sponsored by governmental agencies (as opposed to non-governmental sponsors like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and other private groups). These delays speak to problems of consensus in drug programs (see pages 252 and 337, Chapters VIII and IX), of long-term procurement in information systems and equipment-dependent projects, and of the constraints affecting employment, operations and coordination among governmental agencies.
- (11) Examining implementation priorities in terms of city problem priorities (identified during the crime-oriented planning process), it appears that program-wide priorities in the areas of juvenile problems and adult recidivism were clearly reflected in implemented projects. Efforts addressing drug use (another planning priority), however, were de-emphasized. (This appears to have been more a result of the state-of-the-art in drug programs within the criminal justice system than of any faltering in the implementation of designated priorities.) The New Federalist approach seems here to have been generally successful in eliciting articulation and follow-through of strongly-held local convictions about local crime problems.

- (12) On the other hand, however, and as expected, the New Federalist approach, by strengthening already strong agencies, appears to have been a depressant of agency coordination and, as such, an inhibitor of focused and concentrated program implementation. Although strong LEAA Policy Board direction countered the tendency toward agency independence, this corrective was eliminated in June of 1973 by turnover in top management personnel at LEAA, and the consequent disappearance of the Policy Board.
- (13) In sum, the major implementation problem encountered across the eight cities (beyond the important one of staffing) was not, as expected, the difficulty of imposing rationality upon recalcitrant users, but rather the difficulty of coordination among highly rational, entrenched agencies.

(d) Findings and Conclusions on Evaluation Planning

- (1) The program's action/research conflict did not cripple the development of evaluation plans; these were prepared and reviewed for 140 projects (i.e., about 60 percent of the 233).
- (2) Only 8 evaluation components of the 149 analyzed could qualify as excellent plans (i.e., answering the questions of what the evaluations intended to do, how they would do it, and specifying mechanisms for linking observed changes logically to project activities). It is clear that, as expected, technical assistance could have vastly improved evaluation planning performance since many problems with the reviewed components were remediable (see Chapter VIII).
- (3) The distribution among component quality levels was more or less as expected. In an action program, the primary emphasis is the provision of services. Evaluations must be planned and conducted within constraints imposed by the project. These constraints may hinder the development of carefully planned, rigorous evaluation designs.
- (4) Crime-reduction-focused components were generally superior to recidivism- or system-focused components, perhaps because of the need to construct baseline data for the latter, while crime-reduction projects can usually make use of available police data.
- (5) Differences in component quality across the eight cities were more the result of differences in project focus than in city-specific capability; however, some cities did better than others, given their mix of project foci.
- (6) Denver and Portland produced the best project evaluation plans; their quality was notably superior to what might have been expected, given the kinds of projects which they had chosen to implement.
- (7) The chief factors encouraging good evaluation planning appear to have been the attitudes toward empirical research prevalent among Crime Analysis Team or agency managements, and the early availability of evaluative expertise.

- (8) The key factor limiting evaluation plan performance was the lack of technical assistance (which could have compensated in some measure for at least some gaps in expertise both among evaluators and among administrative reviewers), and the failure to tie evaluation funding to evaluation planning milestones and products (which permitted some cities to postpone evaluation planning until after implementation, rendering the exercise less than optimally useful).
- (9) Atlanta, Denver, Newark and Portland generally did very good jobs of evaluation planning (see Chapter VII for details of city performance), Newark again joining the ranks of the "advantaged" cities, as for crime-oriented planning.
- (10) New Federalism was, as expected, something of an obstacle to the achievement of program-wide evaluation planning. The failure to require baseline data collection and to stipulate certain evaluation design features signifies that some useful information necessarily went uncollected and unanalyzed.
- (11) Dissemination of evaluation planning information to the cities, to the SPAs and to the ROs was much less successfully performed than for crime-oriented planning.
- (12) Despite unavailable technical assistance, evaluation planning was shown to be feasible on a large scale within the context of an action program.
- (13) Benefits accrued when evaluation planning was well done included better evaluation design and reporting, useful modification of projects through evaluative precision and feedback, and a much greater likelihood of being able to demonstrate project effectiveness.

(e) Findings and Conclusions on Evaluation Reporting

- (1) Evaluation reports were received and reviewed for 141 Impact projects (i.e., 61 percent). Documentation for 119 of these projects was sufficiently complete to allow technical review. This was considerably more of a response than had been expected at the start of the program.
- (2) Only 17 of the 119 project evaluations reviewed, however, employed what was considered to be a rigorous evaluation approach to assess project outcomes. Some 55 additional project evaluations did make use of some type of evaluation approach (relying on before/after designs or combining these with some comparison base), this despite the failure of the program to mandate specific evaluation approaches and the failure to provide technical assistance in evaluation.
- (3) Project focus was not the strong discriminator for evaluation approach quality that it was for evaluation planning quality; variations in city quality far overrode project focus considerations in importance. Portland, Denver and Atlanta were noteworthy for their use of rigorous evaluation approaches; about half of the St. Louis and Dallas documentation utilized no true evaluation approach; projects reviewed from Baltimore and Cleveland consistently relied upon evaluation approaches that were not rigorous; all projects reviewed from Newark were documented in the absence of an evaluation approach. On the other hand, as expected, crime-reduction project evaluations were generally the best executed. These projects were more likely to be evaluated using some evaluation approach than were recidivism-reduction or system-focused projects--again, this is believed to reflect the problem of baseline data construction.
- (4) The chief factors contributing to excellence in evaluation appeared to be the same as for evaluation planning: management commitment and available expertise. The "advantaged" cities generally had a better chance to attract expert evaluators than did "disadvantaged" cities. Thus some very good evaluation work in Newark received a severe setback when the Team evaluator resigned, and

although technical assistance would have been meaningful in all cities it was especially needed among Impact's "disadvantaged" cities. On the other hand Dallas' merely average showing (despite its status as an "advantaged" city), reflects a lack of management commitment, and this lack was also a problem in Cleveland and Baltimore.

- (5) Major inhibitors of evaluation quality were the state of existing evaluative research tools, the lack of dissemination of the knowledge which does exist, and the failure of Crime Analysis Teams to hire or replace expert staff and to develop evaluation capability.
- (6) Despite gaps in assistance, evaluation reporting took place in Impact on a vary large scale. Although problems existed (many of them remediable), the fact is that outcome-oriented project-level evaluation was shown to be feasible within an action program like Impact. Rigorous evaluation was demonstrated in a variety of cities and institutional settings. Multiple evaluation reports for the same project improved, over time. It is reasonable to believe that evaluation performance can be vastly improved, given more time, training, and aid.
- (7) The fear, at the beginning of the program, that it was unrealistic to have city evaluators evaluate city programs turned out to be unfounded. Evaluators across the program tended to be objective and professional about evaluation limitations (see page 265 above). Their allegiances appeared to be oriented more toward the world of research and evaluation than toward any parochial agency interests.

2. Program Objective: To Improve Coordination Across Intergovernmental and Criminal Justice Agencies and to Increase Community Involvement Via the Crime Analysis Team

(a) Findings and Conclusions on Agency Coordination

(1) Four cities (Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark) unambiguously improved the coordination of their criminal justice agencies under Impact through Crime Analysis Team activities.

- The Cleveland Crime Analysis Team tied youth service delivery together throughout the city by developing a system of youth neighborhood coordinators; the Team also developed a community-based probation program involving the coordination and relocation of Municipal Court Probation, Common Pleas Court Probation and the Adult Parole Authority. County and state corrections officials were thus housed for the first time in the same building and could establish a close working relationship.
- Dallas undertook a major effort of coordination across city and county agencies of the criminal justice system. The county sheriff's department and the city police department began the integration of data bases and information systems as part of a region-wide (city and county) effort to control crime. Dallas funded and implemented projects which generally aimed at improved coordination between the police and other components of the system as, for example, in Legal Aides for the Police, or in the Dallas Police Department's Youth Services program. Finally, the successful resolution of the city/county battles which took place at the beginning of the program constitutes a major achievement of the Crime Analysis Team. The issue was handled through the formation of an Executive Committee (within the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council) in which there was city-county-suburban representation and an understanding that spending for any project would be subject to review and approval by the local governing body (County Commissioners, City Council) responsible for any projects funded through the Council.
- In Denver, the Crime Analysis Team used data base development as a mode of entry into relationships with other agencies, and as a way of linking various

agencies of the criminal justice system. The Team established a network of four Youth Service Bureaus to coordinate city-wide the referral of juveniles diverted from the criminal justice system. The Task Force mechanism inaugurated in Denver appears to have worked well as a forum for bringing together disparate elements of the criminal justice system (including police, court and corrections people as well as prosecutors, public defenders and probation/parole officers).

- In Newark, there were severe problems of agency conflict at the beginning of the program (see Chapter VII). These appear to have been considerably ameliorated through the Policy Board mechanism for bringing the department heads of every criminal justice agency in the city together regularly. City/county court relationships were also improved through the project "Special Case Processing for Impact Offenders" which targeted modifications to the entire adjudication process, reaching from Newark Municipal Court arraignment through Essex County Court sentencing. Other projects, such as the Rape Analysis and Investigative Unit, targeted improved prosecutor/police working relationships.
- (2) Major agency coordination problems existed in Atlanta, Baltimore, Portland and St. Louis.
- Impact did not improve agency coordination in Portland; the city and Multnomah County continue to have a highly tumultuous relationship, with the county ending its participation in the joint criminal justice planning agency rather abruptly in July of 1974. City/SPA relationships had not been improved when the evaluation function went to the SPA rather than the Crime Analysis Team (or Impact Staff) in Portland. Further the complexities of the state/county/city partnership were grafted, in Portland, upon a 9-step municipal approval process, which worsened rather than improved the prospects for agency coordination by making it even more cumbersome, complicated and time-consuming than it had been before (see Chapter VII).
  - In St. Louis, as well, problems between the MLEAC Region 5, the SPA and the City Crime Commission became explosive and resulted in the transfer of the Crime Analysis Team to the Crime Commission and the resignation of the Team evaluators. Even though factionalism

is not a new in St. Louis (it is, in face, deeply anchored in city traditions, see the general overview, page 85, Chapter V), and even though it is not clear that any short-term action program could have impacted those traditions in any meaningful way, still, the same can be said of Newark, yet progress was made there under Impact. It seems that, as in Portland, it may have been a mistake--at least from the viewpoints of agency coordination and of long-term system capability--to have moved the locus of program power outside the city (see Chapter VII, page 234 and pages 237-239).

- In Baltimore, the dominance of the SPA and the autonomy of the police department did not leave much room for the Crime Analysis Team liaison function (see pages 197-199). In sum, the inability to access police data or achieve coordination with the police department, the delegation of power by the regional office to the SPA, a skeletal Crime Analysis Team and a change in Team leadership at a crucial point of program start-up, had all worked together to make improvements in agency coordination there very difficult.
  - In Atlanta, interagency relationships were troubled by SPA/city conflicts (see pages 232-234) and city/county conflicts, by the power and autonomy of the police chief, by the location of the Crime Analysis Team outside the city organization within the Atlanta Regional Commission, by turbulence between the Atlanta Regional Commission and the State Crime Commission, and by the successive resignation of two Team directors. Finally, a change in city leadership was accompanied by a reorganization at the end of 1974, creating a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and transferring the Crime Analysis Team to the mayor's office as staff support to the Council. The Team now appears much better able, as a city agency, to stimulate coordination among other city agencies, and has begun clearinghouse and dissemination functions in support of that role.
- (3) It seems that the ability of the Crime Analysis Team to improve interagency coordination was largely a function of existing city/state relationships. In effect, most cities maintain a precarious balance of power with state agencies. When the Impact program failed to sustain city bargaining power (by giving an important CAT function to

the state, for example, as in Portland and Baltimore, or by removing the Team from the city organizational structure, as in Atlanta and St. Louis), the CAT itself was weakened: it lost much of its ability to barter with other agencies, to deal with them on an equal footing, to maintain leverage in the criminal justice and intergovernmental systems and in the community.

- (4) Thus, the greatest inhibitor of CAT potential as an agent for coordination was the failure to invest the Team with the functions and prerogatives it needed to ensure an effective liaison role.
- (5) In those cities where interagency coordination improved, the Crime Analysis Teams had been able to keep all of their functions, were ensconced as city agencies, and benefited from the solid support of the mayor (Cleveland, Dallas, Denver and Newark).

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Community Involvement

- (1) All of the Impact cities appear to have made some progress with involving the community in the criminal justice process; most have also increased citizen input into the planning process, largely through the activities of the Crime Analysis Team.
- In Atlanta and Baltimore, citizen's advisory groups were created to help determine the selection of criminal justice anti-crime programs.
  - The Cleveland CAT was resolutely community-oriented (see Chapter VII, pages 203-204). The Team devoted considerable staff time to sessions with community groups, took a "root cause," crime-correlated approach to criminal justice planning, and implemented large numbers of community-oriented corrections and diversion projects.
  - In Dallas, however, a community-involvement focus has been slow in coming. Suggestions to broaden the Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council to include community representatives, for example, were fought on the grounds that it would turn the body into a "police review board." While Dallas has now implemented a larger community-focused crime prevention program, no mechanism has yet been introduced to bring a citizen orientation into the criminal justice planning process (see Chapter VII).
  - Denver developed a viable model (the only one in Impact) for community input into the planning process. Over the three years of Impact, members of Denver's Neighborhoods Task Force (composed entirely of private citizens) examined every project proposed; they also formed subcommittees outside the formal structure, and went out into the community to solicit citizen reactions. It is clear that this Task Force had a voice in decision-making and an impact upon proposed programs. Nearly one-fifth of Denver's Impact funds (\$3.5 million) focused upon community involvement projects.
  - Newark's first master plan focused its greatest emphasis on community involvement; this was, in fact, one of the main points of dissension with the LEAA regional office (see pages 224-225 above); in the end, about 16 percent of Newark's funds went to community involvement projects.

- Portland's Impact Staff was successful in securing community involvement, in achieving a very high recruitment rate for its community projects, and an increase in the rates of crime-reporting by victims. While no usable community-input model was developed, as in Denver, Portland nonetheless emerged from the Impact program with better planning tools which include the community, and with a program (Neighborhood Block Crime Prevention) that brings Portland closer to having a community-wide criminal justice planning process.
  - Efforts of the St. Louis community to become involved in the Impact program met with little success at the beginning of the program. Early in the planning process, groups such as the Women's Crusade Against Crime, the Federation of Neighborhood Organizations, and the Metropolitan Citizens Crime Committee went on record with a number of projects and proposals. In addition a number of private citizens displayed a lively interest in the program and made early and frequent overtures to the city to become involved. Region 5, however, found it difficult to maintain contact with community groups, and citizens complained that they could never get through to the right officials or receive timely and acceptable answers. The July 1974 move of the St. Louis CAT to the City Crime Commission opened the program there for the first time to regular community input through the Commission's Citizens' committees. Public hearings were held during the final Impact funding cycle with extensive community participation (see Chapter VII).
- (2) The major factors inhibiting citizen involvement in Impact appear to have been a strong law enforcement focus within the criminal justice system, such as the one prevalent in Texas (see pages 209-210); and the existence of extremely powerful, independent agencies, well equipped to resist public pressure. Since these agencies were supported (or at least not countered) in their resistance by the New Federalist approach, it was sometimes difficult for Crime Analysis Teams to make progress in this area.
  - (3) Overall, considerable improvements were made in community involvement, program-wide, largely due to Crime Analysis Team efforts, and a model was developed, tested and found to be effective in Denver. It should be remembered, however, that the extent of the effort toward community

involvement in Impact also reflects a nation-wide movement toward better criminal justice system relations with the public, and a deeper consciousness of the problems of victimization; in that sense, Impact achievements are not attributable to Crime Analysis Team efforts alone, but reflect a combination of forces acting together.

3. Program Objective: To Reduce Impact Crime

As discussed earlier, the national-level evaluation did not address the question of program-wide effectiveness. Various MITRE tasks did, however, involve the examination of project-level evaluations, and through those evaluations, of project-level success. Findings of those tasks are presented below. It should be remembered, however, that only those projects which were able to demonstrate their success through evaluation have been included here. Given that evaluation itself was an innovation in some cities, and given also that the program is still on-going in most cities, it is clear that there may be project success which has not yet been--or could not be--documented.

(a) Findings and Conclusions on Project-Level Success, and on Various Anti-Crime Strategies Employed in the Eight Cities

- (1) 33 Impact projects, representing about \$30.5 million in federal funds, were shown through city evaluation documentation to have been effective; 2 more projects, presenting either inadequate documentation or none at all, were shown to have been successful via MITRE secondary analysis, bringing the total to 35 Impact projects and \$35.3 million in federal funds (see Chapter IX, pages 309-325).
- (2) 28 of the 35 projects (80 percent) originated in five cities: Denver, Dallas, St. Louis, Atlanta and Portland.
  - "Advantaged" cities (i.e., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver and Portland) were thus heavily represented in the sample since 23 of the 35 projects (or 67 percent), representing \$25.4 million of the \$35.3 million total (or 72 percent), originated in these cities. Spending for effective projects implemented in Dallas and Denver accounted for about 50 percent of the federal funds awarded in each of those cities.
  - It seems reasonable to believe that the inadequate evaluation performances of Cleveland and Newark caused them to be under-represented in the sample in terms of project effectiveness. (In effect, the two projects whose success was revealed through secondary analysis, based on raw data, originated in Cleveland and Newark.)
  - It also seems reasonable to expect that additional effective projects will continue to be identified

in Atlanta and Portland (and perhaps also in Baltimore, if evaluation there continues to improve), given the late implementation in these cities.

- (3) Effective projects tended to be more innovative and had more likelihood of institutionalization than did projects generally, across the program.
- (4) More federal funds could be shown to have been effectively expended for projects with a crime-reduction focus than for recidivism- or system-focused projects (again a question of evaluation, see page 433 above).
- (5) Findings from MITRE's intensive supervision analysis established that all of the four projects studied appeared to have reduced recidivism, the average reduction being about 50 percent.
  - In addition to significant reductions in recidivism for each of the projects, reductions were found at every level of pre-service number of offenses and baseline frequency. Also, the analysis of interactions between various client-descriptive variables and baseline frequency indicated that reductions in recidivism occurred for all levels of age group, ethnicity, educational lag, and living situation. Intensive supervision seemed to be beneficial for clients with different criminal backgrounds and different demographic characteristics, although some groups appeared to benefit more than others.
  - Within the limits of the analysis performed, intensive supervision emerged reinforced as an effective strategy for reducing recidivism among probationers.
- (6) Findings from the police patrol analysis were that--in terms of expected performance--two of the three projects studied were successful in reducing crime levels by virtue of overt police patrol activity.
  - Again, within the limits of the analysis performed, increases in overt police patrol appeared to be effective in achieving short-term crime decreases which were attributable to the projects in 2 of the 3 cases studied; in these 2 cases, reductions for most crimes either had not occurred in untreated portions of the city (Cleveland, Concentrated Crime Patrol) or they were more pronounced in target areas (Denver, Special Crime Attack Team); in the third

case, however (St. Louis, Pilot Foot Patrol), crime-level reductions appeared to take place in both treated and untreated portions of the city so that project effectiveness was not clear.

- Displacement was a rare phenomenon (see page 331) in the three case studies examined.
  - One crime, rape, consistently showed no evidence for declines across the three cities: in none of the cases was target area rape lower than expected. To what degree this may be due to increased rape reporting, however, is not known. The other three violent crimes (murder, aggravated assault and robbery) decreased generally in target areas.
- (7) Overt police patrol should not be dismissed as an important and useful short-term anti-crime strategy.
- (8) Many more successful projects were implemented and evaluated in the police, community involvement, juvenile and court areas, than in the drug or data system areas (see pages 332 through 339). The less successful project areas were troubled by problems of consensus or of lead-time which did not allow them to be well implemented or evaluated in the Impact context.
- The drug program, TASC<sup>1</sup>, had difficulty, in Impact, in achieving implementation. Problems identified involved philosophical disagreement (between treatment and law enforcement agencies), referral and agency coordination (courts, police, drug agencies), evaluation planning (no focus on client outcomes, no design mechanisms included which could allow for attribution of client achievements to the program), data collection (concern over client privacy and information confidentiality), high dropout rates and internal management difficulties (direction and personnel turnover).
  - One drug project (other than TASC) did, however, have some success: Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotic Offenders project featured an evaluation design including control groups and demonstrated effectiveness in meeting its objectives (see page 404 above).

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<sup>1</sup>Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime.

- It is clear that the difficulties encountered by TASC programs, under Impact, are of such magnitude that further research appears to be warranted to determine whether the problems are intrinsic to the projects or have to do rather with the fact that they were implemented in the Impact context. The Impact experience has not thus far furnished evidence reviewed by MITRE which can attest to the usefulness or relevance of these programs for crime control.
- Problems experienced by data system projects, on the other hand, were mainly a problem of the appropriateness of funding these projects (which require extensive developmental periods) in the context of a short-term rapid action program.

(9) In sum, those functional areas which benefited from:

- a developed research capability (e.g., police projects);
- private organizational and management capability (community involvement projects);
- more easily achieved objectives (some systems-improvement projects); and
- strongly emphasized city priorities (e.g., juvenile programs)

attained quite impressive relative levels of achievement. In these areas, the evaluation planning and reporting tools initiated via the Impact COPIE-cycle allowed 27 projects to be substantiated as effective.

(10) On the other hand, those functional areas which required:

- technical assistance unavailable under Impact (recidivism-focused projects, for example);
- more time than could be forthcoming in a 2-year action-oriented program (data system projects, for example);
- hurdling institutional impediments and long-established difficulties inherent in project objectives (adult corrections and especially offender employment projects); or

- sophisticated and finely-tuned agency coordination (drug programs, for example) were disadvantaged under Impact.
- (11) The COPIE-cycle required some learning investment on the part of its users, but that investment paid off in the capability to substantiate effectiveness for 25 percent of program funding (see Table XXXIX, page 322, and page 332).
  - (12) Anti-crime achievement will remain essentially undocumented in those cities where evaluation capability was not well developed.
  - (13) Evaluation planning, which was a major influence on the quality of both evaluation approaches and evaluation reporting, emerged as a crucial element of the COPIE-cycle in terms of the demonstration of project effectiveness.
  - (14) Given expanded dissemination of evaluation information, given technical assistance in evaluation where it is needed, and given streamlining and sharpening of administrative procedures and implementation monitoring, it seems likely that the ability to evaluate and thereby substantiate project effectiveness could be significantly improved in future urban anti-crime programs utilizing the COPIE-cycle.
  - (15) In terms of program expectations:
    - A criminal justice system planning and evaluation capability was able to be developed under Impact constraints, and did indeed result in knowledge payoffs, among which the ability to identify successful anti-crime projects.
    - While the four "advantaged" cities were, in fact, overrepresented in the sample of effective projects, St. Louis also generated 5 of these projects, despite a "disadvantaged" status in terms of age, exodus situation and other factors (see Chapter V).

(b) Findings and Conclusions on Crime Changes in the Impact Cities

Despite the process character of this evaluation, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data were examined in an effort to observe crime changes concurrent with the program in the eight Impact cities. It must be remembered, however, that city-wide changes in crime levels cannot be attributed to the Impact program because of:

- the lack of a rigorous evaluation design (and the consequent inability to link city-wide crime rates to Impact);
- the problems of measurement using UCR data;
- the number of projects other than crime-reduction-focused projects (offender or recidivism-focused projects and system-focused projects) which could not be linked with city-wide crime changes; and
- the straggling implementation experienced in many of the cities,

Thus, the best present estimates of Impact anti-crime effectiveness had to come from project outcomes (see Chapter IX, pages 311-320 above).

But even if it could not be stated that an improved capability in some city resulted in a decrease in crime rates, it was extremely important to examine whether such an improved capability (once established) was accompanied by increases or decreases in those rates, given that it is an effect on crime which was being sought. Hence since it could not be shown that crime rates or levels constituted the dependent variable of the program, MITRE examined them as a program correlate, made some efforts to improve their measurement, and suggested needed future development of those efforts. Although UCR data are highly fallible as measures of crime (see page 366) they are nonetheless continuously generated, and readily available; they were therefore employed as the tool for this examination. Two analyses were performed. The first looked at UCR crime rates in the years 1968-1974 for the five crimes in the eight cities. The second generated expected levels for burglary using the Sister Cities Regression Model (see pages 385 through 387 above) and compared these expected levels with actual UCR data for burglary in 1973 and 1974.

- (1) Findings for the five crimes in each of the cities showed that, over the 1968-1974 period, there were:
- long-term, generally severe crime-rate increases in Atlanta and Portland;
  - declining or generally stabilizing trends in Dallas and Denver for person crimes (except rape in Dallas); burglary was up, however, especially in Dallas;
  - Dallas was the only city which did not show a rise in murder rates;
  - Baltimore was the only city to show steadily decreasing rates for rape;
  - Portland doubled its burglary rate finishing with the highest rate of any Impact city;
  - Cleveland maintained its relatively low burglary rate;
  - robbery rates increased in every Impact city;
  - Impact violent crime rates had considerably worsened overall: whereas in 1970, four cities had rates under 450 per 100,000, in 1974, all rates were above that figure;
  - Dallas, Denver and Newark showed real improvements in their rankings relative to other cities (see page 384).
- (2) The burglary analysis (which generated expected monthly levels for burglary in the eight cities by means of Sister City Regression Models, and then compared these expected levels against actual UCR monthly data) showed that in 1973 and 1974, burglary was significantly lower than anticipated in five of the eight cities: Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, and Newark (see pages 387 through 389 above).
- (3) A juxtaposition of cities' performances in Impact with their crime-change experiences found that:
- the crime changes in Atlanta, Portland, and Baltimore are not likely to have been meaningfully affected by the Impact program because of the slow pace of implementation in these cities;

- in Cleveland, increases may have been moderated, and in Newark, decreases may have been influenced by Impact; evidence for this was derived from MITRE's secondary analysis of Cleveland's Concentrated Crime Patrol and from the burglary-level analysis in each city;
  - St. Louis' actual burglary levels were not significantly lower than expected levels, and MITRE did not find other evidence pointing to a moderation of city trends via the Impact program there; it is, however, possible that this may have been the case for crimes other than burglary;
  - in Dallas and Denver, it seems likely that Impact was a factor in achieving decreases and in moderating the rates of increase in those cities (based on evaluation reports, on a high proportion of demonstrated effectiveness, and on the burglary analysis).
- (4) Although the Dallas/Denver improvements cannot be directly attributed to Impact, it is important to note that in these cities, where system capability was notably improved and where Impact projects had a high proportion (50 percent) of demonstrated effectiveness, present indicators--fallible though they may be--show meaningful improvements in crime rates and levels which were not the result of long-term trends and which were not seen in the Impact "sister" cities. If attribution had, in fact, been possible, important evidence would have been provided to support the assumption that improved system capability can reduce or control crime: the basic underlying assumption of the Impact program.

4. Program Objective: To Acquire Knowledge

Overall knowledge contributions of the Impact program cannot yet be assessed. There are, however, three areas of knowledge gains and failures which should presently be documented insofar as that is possible because of their implications for policy (i.e., progress toward the policy goal of knowledge acquisition) and for the elaboration of new anti-crime programs. These areas are:

- knowledge increases achieved through the program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team;
- knowledge acquired (and knowledge which failed to be acquired), about anti-crime effectiveness;
- knowledge gained about the process of innovation through project strategies implemented during the program.

(a) Findings and Conclusions on COPIE-cycle and Crime Analysis Team Knowledge Payoffs (see pages 418 through 438 above)

- (1) Eight U.S. cities now possess, in varying degrees, the system capability to rationally plan, implement and evaluate their anti-crime programs.
- (2) This capability became an increasingly iterative process by the end of the program (i.e., evaluation findings were being used as a basis for new planning and project modification).
- (3) All of the agencies involved in the program benefited, in varying degrees, from the dissemination of knowledge which occurred because of the program and because of the research emphasis introduced by the Crime Analysis Team.
- (4) New knowledge about the incidence of specific crimes, about offenders, victims and crime-settings was obtained in all of the cities, and especially in those cities where crime-oriented planning was well executed.
- (5) At the national level, knowledge was acquired about city priorities; about the feasibility of planning, implementation and evaluation using a New Federalist approach; about incentives which worked (favorable funding matches, for example) and incentives which did not work (jawboning and exhortations without a

quid pro quo and without leverage to ensure compliance, for example); about anti-crime effectiveness at the project level (through COPIE-cycle evaluation); about the importance of city/state relationships for the effective functioning of the COPIE-cycle and of the Crime Analysis Team; and about the need for technical assistance in the effort to gain performance of program innovations.

- (6) Research projects having been constrained by the action objectives of the program, and by the failure to provide technical assistance, it is not anticipated that there will be much basic research knowledge to emerge from the Impact program. (It should be noted, however, that while new knowledge from basic research is a policy goal, it was not an objective of the Impact program.)
- (7) A model for regular community input into the criminal justice planning process was implemented and shown to be effective in Denver.
- (8) New knowledge about community attitudes was constrained by the failure to institute regular community surveys.
- (9) In general, it was learned that the program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the CAT were feasible, and that they were relevant for improved system capability; although the capability improvements in Dallas and Denver were associated with crime decreases, or moderations in climbing crime levels, the question of whether improved system capability can reduce or control crime will need to await a rigorous test.

(b) Findings and Conclusions About Knowledge Acquired and Not Acquired) on Anti-Crime Effectiveness

(1) It is impossible to address the question of whether the 5 percent crime reduction was attained or not over the 1972-1974 period. There are three basic problems which cannot be surmounted in this evaluation.

- The problem of attribution: If a program can be said to have "attained" or "achieved" an effect, it must first be shown that program activities were the cause of such an effect. The Impact program had no evaluation design which could have permitted the reasonable attribution of crime level changes to the program. (Even if there had been such a design, however, methodological difficulties--see pages and above, for example--would have constrained definitive attribution. Inferences would nonetheless have been more reasonable, but these would again have been constrained by problems of measurement.) On the other hand, area-specific data collection could have permitted attribution of crime-reduction-focused project effects to the project, and would then have permitted linkage of those effects to overall city-wide "effects" (based on the fact that target areas are nearly always the high-crime areas of the city).
- The problem of tying project effects to city-wide crime changes: All anti-crime efforts do not make an immediate or short-term impact on crime levels which is both identifiable and attributable to that effort. In Impact, for example, 42 percent of the anti-crime projects were focused on recidivism reduction (see Table XXVI, page 164 above). Yet although projects focusing on recidivism reduction for a small group of offenders may well be able to produce evidence at the project level demonstrating that they are successfully reducing recidivism, it remains impossible to pinpoint the contribution of that reduction to city-wide crime changes, nor, conversely, to attribute any specific part of those changes to the recidivism-focused project. Thus, although recidivism reduction achievements will certainly show up eventually in city-wide crime-rate changes, it is not presently possible to attribute those achievements to projects. Further, slippages

in the program brought a straggling, diffused implementation, rather than the focused, concentrated thrust (expected by program planners) to which city-wide crime changes might reasonably have been attributed.

- The problem of measuring city crime changes: Even if city crime changes could be attributed to program interventions, they would still need to be measured reliably, and this cannot presently be done with UCR data (see pages 3-4, and page 366 above). Victimization surveys also have problems (such as differential victim reporting, or uncertain relationships with actual crime levels so that the establishment of trends must presume--as with the use of UCR data--an unlikely constant relationship between reported and unreported crime) but they are not subject to criminal justice system discretion and they are a considerable improvement in many other ways over what was hitherto available. However, only one data point (1972) is currently accessible to researchers, so that these surveys did not constitute a feasible tool for the national-level evaluation of the Impact program.

- (2) Thus, the New Federalist approach taken by Impact, combined with problems of national evaluation planning, severely constrained anti-crime knowledge payoffs from the program. The ability of cities to choose freely among direct and indirect crime-reduction strategies, the gaps in implementation management, the failure to impose area-specific data collection as a requirement, meant, among other things, that the results available at the project level would not allow for assessment of program-wide effects on city-wide crime changes.
- (3) New knowledge about anti-crime effectiveness for individual projects was gained, however, dependent upon evaluation capabilities developed through the COPIE-cycle.
- (4) Thirty-five projects, representing about \$35 million in federal funds, were shown to have been effective via city-level evaluation or via MITRE analysis.

- (5) Given the new understanding of the factors liable to stimulate or discourage COPIE-cycle and CAT activities above, acquired through Impact, it seems likely that the ability to evaluate and thereby substantiate project effectiveness could be vastly improved in a future program, if the necessary remedial efforts were made.

(c) Findings and Conclusions About Innovative Strategies Implemented at the Project-Level

In the Impact program, innovation was sought only incidentally, as a desired incremental payoff to other Impact benefits; there was no innovation mystique, per se. In fact, however, given the Impact approval and funding process, the "lengthy administrative procedures" against which project directors railed (see Table XXXIV, page 251 above), the general problems of interagency coordination, the pressures toward action and against research, given--above all--the lack of a quid pro quo or incentive for agencies to want to fund innovative ideas, it seemed unlikely, at the beginning of the program that much project-level innovation would emerge (see Chapter III, pages 45 through 47 above).

- (1) In all, 26 projects were found to be innovative<sup>1</sup> among the 233 funded under Impact (see the Appendix to Chapter VIII for a listing and brief précis of these 26 innovative projects).
- (2) Most of the projects selected (22 of 26) involved the community in some manner; 20 of the 26 made contributions to coordination between or among criminal justice and other intergovernmental agencies; only 2 of the innovative projects selected made a basic research contribution. (These were the Rape Prevention Project in Denver, whose first phase involved basic research on rape victims and offenders, and the Target Hardening Through Opportunity Reduction (THOR) project in Atlanta, which designed a study of the problems of false alarms and other issues relating to building security.)
- (3) The greatest number of innovative projects originated in Denver (10 to 26), with the closest contenders being Portland (with 4) and Dallas (with 3). The cities, in fact, appeared to divide according to lines of age

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<sup>1</sup>A project listed as innovative in this document conforms to one or more of the following definitions:

- Type A: Uses a new approach, new procedures, or new technology in solving a problem.
- Type B: Uses old procedures, technology or approaches in a new way or in a new context.
- Type C: Uses an existing agency to assume a set of new responsibilities.
- Type D: Uses a new agency to assume a set of responsibilities not carried out by an existing agency.

and advantage (see Chapter V above), with the younger, higher-income/higher education level cities originating 19 (or 73 percent) of the 26 innovative projects.

- (4) The chief factor inhibiting innovation in Impact appeared to be the problem of interagency coordination which prevented the CAT from functioning optimally. Different techniques were used by host agencies in these cities to out-manuever what they perceived to be the endless revisions of the grant application review process. Projects proposed thus tended variously to be "tried-and-true," non-controversial, and/or short-term, small, inexpensive. An agency in Atlanta actually cut a project budget in half with the explicit goal of facilitating its passage through "the system." Clearly this was not a climate in which the CAT could successfully push for innovation.
- (5) Innovative projects, however, occurred in every city; the major stimulators appeared to be unanimity of philosophy (Portland's "broader vision," for example, Dallas' system improvement orientation, or Denver's empirical, integrated approach) added to Crime Analysis Team energy and creative expertise.
- (6) In sum, innovative projects occurred in Impact despite New Federalism, agency independence, and the lack of any incentives to produce such projects; again, innovative projects were more likely also to be effective projects than could have been expected from their small representation in the overall project sample (i.e., only 26 of 233 projects--or 11 percent--were selected as innovative, but 8 of the 33 projects shown to be effective via the technical review process--or 24 percent--had also been selected as innovative); still further (as will be noted below) innovative projects were much more likely to be institutionalized than other projects.
- (7) Despite the fact, therefore, that progress can quite conceivably be made in criminal justice system capability without innovation (given the disparity between current knowledge and current practice) and despite the fact that innovation can sometimes impede efficiency because of agency resistance to it, there appears to be something intrinsically important which is embodied in the innovative idea, technique or approach. Innovative

projects in Impact tended to undergo more careful development (because of the obstacles they had to clear in order to pass successfully through the approval process), tended to receive more media and public attention (because of their novelty), tended to be perceived as more effective (perhaps because of the enthusiasm of their staffs). Further, some innovations, in Impact appeared to have resistance-reducing (rather than resistance-increasing) effects. In Denver, for example, to oppose innovation was really to oppose progress, and it seems clear that innovation was a rallying-cry used as effectively by the Team to link agencies (the Youth Service Bureaus, for example) as was the data base planning and bartering technique referred to earlier (see page 215 above). It is notable as well in this context, that 75 percent of innovative projects targeted some effort at agency coordination.

5. Program Objectives: To Institutionalize Effective Program Innovations and to Disseminate the Knowledge Acquired Through the Impact Experience

For both of these objectives, it is clearly too soon to say much. The Impact experience is not yet over, so that it has not been possible to disseminate a great deal of information about it. MITRE has taken the opportunity, however, to examine (from a current perspective) what is likely to remain of Impact within the eight cities after the program is over.

Findings and Conclusions About the Institutionalization of Projects and of the Crime Analysis Team

- (1) MITRE surveys of project and CAT directors as well as of SPA and RO personnel have established a current projection that about 43 percent (101 out of 233) of the projects funded under Impact will be continued.
- (2) This projection may be over-optimistic given the large number of exogenous factors which affect the continuation of projects, given that it is still very early to make predictions and given the tendency of federally-funded projects and programs to vanish without a trace when the funds have disappeared.
- (3) Of the 101 projects expected to be institutionalized, 67 percent are in the police, courts, and corrections areas. These areas contain 63 percent of the projects implemented as part of the Impact program. The breakout by particular functional areas, however, does not simply reflect emphases within the program. On the contrary, Impact implemented only 25 court projects, yet 17 are expected to continue; this is the highest proportion (68 percent) of projects to be institutionalized of any functional area. In the police area, 37 projects have been implemented and 19 (51 percent) are expected to continue. However, in the juvenile and adult corrections area where 84 projects were implemented, only 31 (37 percent) are expected to continue.
- (4) Thus, a higher percentage of projects is likely to be institutionalized in the police and courts areas than in the corrections areas. This may partially reflect the extent to which corrections projects involve costs for additional manpower, and partially, also, the lesser leverage of corrections in resource allocation decisions, and the weakness of the corrections constituency presently mobilizable to affect those decisions.

- (5) Some cities (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, and St. Louis) expected high percentages of projects to be continued. In Denver, the number of projects expected to continue (22) is attributable to the overall success of the Denver program. In contrast, the large number expected to continue in St. Louis (also 22) is at least partially due to the fact that many of the projects in St. Louis were expansions of existing activities. Continuation, therefore, may actually indicate a return to the previous state, especially where equipment comprised a large share of the Impact funds. In Dallas, many of the projects were directed toward systems improvement and are therefore perhaps seen as more essential to continue than projects implemented outside the system. Most of the projects expected to continue in Atlanta also involve systems improvement.
- (6) Relatively inexpensive projects, and system-focused or target hardening projects which involved large onetime costs, are thus likely to be continued. For projects requiring substantial additional funds, institutionalization, generally speaking, is much less probable.
- (7) Innovative projects were more likely to be institutionalized (65 percent) than were Impact projects in general (43 percent).
- (8) Major factors influencing institutionalization were the success of the project, the degree to which it became an accepted part of the everyday way of "doing things," the support of key people (including agency personnel and political and community leaders), the attitude of the community, and available funds. For projects involving new agencies, the most important factor, in addition to funding, was credibility. A diversion project, for example, had to establish credibility with criminal justice agencies in order to receive referrals. Credibility also needed to be established with the community, and again with clients, if their participation was voluntary.
- (9) Factors inhibiting institutionalization in Impact were city finances and the disparity among city, county and state interests. Impact, as a city program, received strong support from the mayor's office. But a great deal of rivalry between city and county governments occurred in some places relative to Impact funding, and the mayor now holds the main vested interest in city project continuation from a political point of view. (Although county and state criminal justice agencies have similar vested interests,

this is from an effectiveness, rather than a political, viewpoint.) When decisions are to be made by county and state governments concerning continuation of project funding, therefore, there is less pressure on them to continue even highly rated and well-accepted projects than there exists for city governments. But city governments are, of course, notoriously "poor," and thus a key factor in municipal institutionalization becomes the availability of funds, just as the existence of political pressure becomes key for state and county agencies, for whom funding may be less of a problem. Impact involved a large infusion of funds into urban criminal justice budgets over a rather short time-period; therefore, many of the projects implemented were relatively expensive. Since Impact was a "city program" in a city/county/state criminal justice environment, it is now, as the program phases down, the responsibility of all these three levels of government to continue the funding of projects implemented. Yet it is not clear to many state legislatures or to state and county agencies that they should help to institutionalize projects which they had little or no voice in selecting. This is a crucial factor inhibiting institutionalization of Impact projects.

- (10) Overall, institutionalization appears more likely for systems improvement, efficiency-oriented projects which did not target Impact crime-reduction goals than it does for those projects which did; further, given the problem of available funds in urban areas, there is a serious institutionalization argument for heavier state/county involvement in, and acceptance of, high-crime area programs.
- (11) All of the Crime Analysis Teams have been institutionalized in one form or another except that of St. Louis. In Atlanta, Baltimore, Denver, Newark and Portland, the Team will be intimately connected to the mayor's office. In Dallas, the Team will return to its former status, planning and monitoring other LEAA programs. In Cleveland, the Team will be part of an umbrella agency to consolidate treatment services. Almost all of the seven Teams will continue with their Impact functions of planning, agency coordination, and evaluation of anti-crime programs.

## 6. Overall Program Conclusions

- (1) The program innovations of the COPIE-cycle and the Crime Analysis Team were shown to be feasible and allowed major improvements in system capability.
- (2) Anti-crime effectiveness was demonstrated at the project level, via evaluation findings, for 35 Impact projects representing the expenditure of about \$35 million in federal funds. (Other project-level success cannot be ruled out however, since there may be achievements which have not yet been--or could not be--documented.)
- (3) An examination of crime changes in the eight cities showed that in Dallas and Denver--which had the highest proportions of federal funds spent effectively--the increases in system capability were correlated with improvements in crime rates which were not the result of long-term trends, and which were not seen in non-Impact "sister" cities.
- (4) Eight U.S. cities now possess, in varying degrees, the system capability to rationally plan, implement and evaluate their anti-crime programs.
- (5) New Federalism worked well in eliciting local priorities and in resolving the effectiveness/efficiency conflict in some areas (i.e., community involvement, juvenile and system capability projects were not de-emphasized because of the strength of local priorities). On the other hand, New Federalism acted as a depressant to agency coordination, an inhibitor of implementation concentration and speed, an obstacle to data collection, evaluation planning and reporting and a constraint to knowledge payoffs and to innovation.
- (6) The question of "advantage" or "disadvantage" among Impact cities did not appear to be a crucial discriminator, except for innovation and evaluation. Crime-oriented planning was performed as well by Newark as by Portland, St. Louis was a faster implementer than Denver, and agency coordination depended more on the organizational locus and power of the CAT vis-a-vis the city/state relationship, than it did on any resource capabilities of the cities.
- (7) In general, contrary to early expectations (and contrary to the typical revenue-sharing experience), Impact cities used federal monies as they were intended to be used: for worthwhile anti-crime efforts which could not otherwise have been funded.

- (8) A disappointment of the program was the inability to implement effective drug programs (with the single exception of Baltimore's Intensive Supervision of Narcotics Offenders).
- (9) High points of the program were:
- the quality of the Denver Crime Analysis Team, which should serve as a model for future applications of this concept;
  - the excellence of Portland's evaluations;
  - the improvement in juvenile recidivism observed among many Impact projects.
- (10) Evaluation planning emerged as a "fulcrum" element, crucial for the success of anti-crime interventions both at the project and at the national levels.
- (11) Innovation appeared to bring benefits related intrinsically to the quality of freshness and newness. Innovative projects in Impact tended to undergo more careful development, received more media and public attention, were more likely to be effective and more likely to be institutionalized than other projects. Further, the difficulties of opposing innovation (and progress) made it a useful technique in some cases for reducing institutional barriers.

## **Chapter XII**

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### **Recommendations**

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### Recommendations

*Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences. To act, you must assume, and that assumption is faith.*

Cardinal Newman, 1841

It goes without saying that the problems encountered in a particular program are extremely valuable for establishing the lessons learned from the experience. They furnish the basis and opportunity for progress because their precise definition allows new ventures to come closer to the original goals. These problems should not be considered as failures; on the contrary, the research knowledge they produce is the foundation needed for new faith, more accurate assumptions, and acts which are better designed to hit their mark.

In the Impact program lessons have been learned both from achievements and from problems experienced. It seems that so much, in fact, has been learned, that there may be some real difficulties of assimilation. It is therefore important to organize the new information so as to obtain the best possible understanding, use and diffusion of the knowledge acquired. A first effort at triage has been made in this final report and another will now be made here, in the form of recommendations. These recommendations flow, of course, from the form and content of the entire report but will specifically address the objectives of the national-level evaluation through:

- recommendations relative to the still on-going Impact program; and
- recommendations relative to future programs in terms of:
  - the COPIE-cycle;
  - the Crime Analysis Team;
  - national-level planning, evaluation and administration;
  - policy formation at the national level; and
  - priority areas for criminal justice research emerging from the Impact experience.

A. Recommendations Relative to the On-Going Program

1. Capturing the knowledge

- (a) Impact is still on-going in 6 of the 8 cities (Atlanta, Denver, Portland, Dallas, Baltimore, and Newark). The first three of these cities produced the best evaluation reports of the program, and both Dallas and Baltimore made great progress in this area. The LEAA should endeavor to capture the information relating to the success of these final projects and to the quality of their evaluations.
- (b) The verdict on project and Crime Analysis Team institutionalization is still out and follow-up is therefore necessary within the next year, and again in September of 1977 (one year after final program phase-out).
- (c) Victimization survey analysis will need to be performed and no Crime Analysis Teams will be available for that effort; yet it is highly important to capture this information and to contrast it with the UCR data examined in this report, to see whether the inferences derived here are reinforced or not. LEAA should ensure that this analysis is performed.
- (d) A new crime-level analysis (such as the one performed for burglary in this evaluation, see pages 385 through 391 above) should be executed a year from now so as to determine whether the correlation between improved system capability and city crime changes reported here for Dallas and Denver is also observed over the longer term for the slower implementers (Atlanta, Baltimore, and Portland), and to see, as well, whether the Denver and Dallas results obtain over a longer time period.
- (e) For those recidivism-focused projects which were well evaluated, it would be important to follow up and to analyze data on recidivism reduction, so as to reinforce or modify current findings.
- (f) The importance of these final Impact efforts lies in their power to alter the current estimate of the program's overall balance of achievement and hence to have a different impact on crime control policy goals.

## 2. Disseminating the Knowledge

- (a) The dissemination task has not yet really begun. Although the MITRE instrument for reviewing evaluation plans has been widely disseminated, serious efforts will need to be made to ensure diffusion of the lessons learned in evaluation reporting, in implementation, in the iterative aspects of the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process.
- (b) Wide diffusion should be made of the best evaluation plans and reports originated in the Impact cities over the course of the program. Some of these efforts were very good (especially in Portland, Denver and Atlanta) and are worthy of widespread dissemination.
- (c) Documents should be made accessible to researchers which display in convenient form the baseline information generated by the program. This information should be accessible both in synthesis and in the form of primary documentation.

## B. Recommendations for Future Urban Anti-Crime Programs

### 1. Program Goals

- (a) Programs should not posit quantified city-wide crime reductions unless planners have evolved evaluation strategies allowing the development of plausible expectations about the effects of different kinds of anti-crime projects upon city-wide crime rates. These goals, when they have not been rationally determined, tend to raise public expectations and are more than likely to be unattainable, since there is no basis for their postulation.
- (b) Projects, on the other hand, should feature quantified objectives, based on experience, where possible, and in any case, to be updated by the collection of project evaluation data which thus serve as a baseline both for evaluating achievement and for re-assessing project objectives. Further, this reinforces the iterative quality needed in planning, implementation and evaluation.

### 2. The COPIE-Cycle

- (a) The COPIE-cycle, having proved effective for the development of system capability, should be adopted as a tool for rational planning and evaluation, with some modifications.

- (b) Given that many program problems developed because the cities could make a choice between good crime-oriented planning and rapid implementation (sacrificing either one or the other), this choice should be ruled out in future programs. Adequate time should be allowed for Crime Analysis Team start-up and master plan development (perhaps the 16 months required by Denver would be a good amount of time to schedule).
- (c) Implementation should not proceed before completion of the crime-oriented planning and evaluation planning phases.
- (d) The quality of crime data collected and of the analysis performed in cities should be monitored, and the monitoring itself randomly checked by LEAA.
- (e) The data problem in the courts area was a serious impediment to evaluative research at all levels in the Impact program. Data remain difficult to access and it was virtually impossible to compile usable information about court activities for the national-level evaluation. At the project level, complications arose from the myriad ways in which workload data and performance statistics are kept, not only by different courts but also by different agencies within the same court system. It is not always clear what the basic work unit is: indictments, defendants, or cases. Source data provided to the national-level evaluation by Impact court agencies were generally incomplete. Frequently missing were important data such as dismissal rates at different stages of the adjudication process, the reasons for dismissal, the average number of continuances per case, the average recycle time for a new hearing or trial date, the percentage of defendants who pleaded guilty to the original, most serious felony charge, etc. There were virtually no data on public defenders. LEAA should develop new guidelines for court data submission in the context of a future Impact-type program.
- (f) New as well as classical techniques for analyzing data, and for developing evaluation baselines should be routinely disseminated and on-going technical assistance furnished to host agencies where needed.
- (g) Materials to be disseminated to the cities should be ready before the start of the program (in Impact, only crime-oriented planning materials were adequately disseminated). System capability questionnaires (like the one prepared for Impact) are not especially useful, because by the time they are completed by the involved agencies, it is too late for them to be used in the planning process.

(h) LEAA should take steps to ensure that project implementation is more carefully monitored and to investigate, on a random basis, the quality of that monitoring function. MITRE has recommended to the LEAA--based on severe implementation problems encountered--the development of a project implementation status reporting system<sup>1</sup> for the regular and uniform monitoring and assessment of grant project implementation performance. The system suggested evolved from the recognition of four major needs:

- (1) to provide current and consistent implementation status information on each project;
- (2) to identify problem-ridden projects on a rapid and regular basis;
- (3) to insure swift intervention in the life of a project so identified; and,
- (4) to make certain that the intervention has indeed occurred and has expedited the implementation of the project.

One problem of implementation management is that it has been considered the step-child of planning and evaluation, and efforts to improve it have suffered thereby. Both resources and priority attention have been lacking. Implementation is, however, the critical link which lends meaning to the other two activities, and without which they cannot exist.

(i) There is a need to examine, very closely, in each city, the reasons for chronic delays between the grant submission and the beginning of service delivery. The status reporting system described above should be a good mechanism for isolating problems when they exist and correcting the particular factors in each city which are reasonable. It is important to realize that the average delays of 8.3 months in Atlanta, 9.2 months in Baltimore and 15.9 months in Portland experienced in Impact (see Figure 17, page 250) between submission and service signified not only a failure to use resources optimally, but also a frittering away of anti-crime impact and concentration.

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<sup>1</sup>Greenfeld, L. A., Monitoring Project Implementation, Problems and Recommendations to the LEAA, September 1975, The MITRE Corporation, MTR-7056.

- (j) A city's program should not be too heavily oriented toward projects whose scope and funding are too small to allow them to make an impact. Implementation concentration will be weakened and program effects diminished if such "nickel-and-diming" is adopted as a program strategy. (Such a strategy was often indicative, in Impact, of the red-tape and communication difficulties typically caused by interagency problems.)
- (k) On the other hand, excessively large-sized projects are also a problem because they are hard to administer, they risk failure with big sums of money, and they may have great difficulty in achieving institutionalization at the end of the program.
- (l) Unless a project has been crime-orientedly planned, LEAA should not permit the re-funding with LEAA funds of projects already funded under other auspices because this seriously inhibits the COPIE-cycle. In effect, the arduous process of crime-oriented planning appears almost academic if the projects to be funded have already been selected.
- (m) LEAA should not mandate that all projects in a free-form program like Impact be evaluated. Some evaluations are likely to have much more important payoffs than others; some are not worth doing within a short time-frame; some are simply infeasible in a given context.
- (n) Evaluation planners should divide projects on some reasonable basis (such as crime problem priority or feasibility or public concern) into two groups, those which should receive only monitoring, and those for which a full-fledged evaluation permitting attribution to the project is worthwhile. A better basis for dividing between monitoring and full-fledged evaluation is the method suggested by Rossi<sup>2</sup> in which a "soft" Reconnaissance Phase of correlational analysis is implemented for all projects to identify programs likely to have sufficiently sizable effects to warrant further examination; this phase is then followed by an Experimental Phase designed to evaluate rigorously those projects which have shown real promise. Such a method is likely to bring major benefits in evaluative payoffs.

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<sup>2</sup>Rossi, P. H., "Boobytraps and Pitfalls in the Evaluation of Social Action Programs" (in Evaluating Action Programs, ed. C. H. Weiss, Allyn and Bacon, 1972, pages 224-235).

- (o) Evaluation planners in each city should group similar projects (such as those focusing on juvenile recidivism, for example) and plan their evaluations jointly, so that one set of base-line data can serve for all projects. Such a grouping (organized in Denver during Impact) would maximize the creation of new data sources and foster the development of a serious research function and focus.
- (p) The time-frame allowed for evaluation was typically too short, in Impact, except perhaps for area-specific crime-reduction projects. A future urban anti-crime program should provide for more evaluation follow-up to allow for the development of more meaningful information in the area of recidivism reduction (especially since implementation delays further restricted time left for evaluation in Impact).
- (q) It is not enough to allocate no-match funds to evaluation in a general way. LEAA will need, in a future program similar to Impact, to consider the question of evaluation management so as to achieve a maximum production of needed plans and reports. There needs to be simultaneously, enough flexibility to cut off problematic evaluation, but also enough rigor to stimulate the flow of documents. In any case, a final period, after the end of implementation, should be specifically earmarked for the analysis of collected data and for the writing of final reports.
- (r) Many of the problems besetting Impact evaluations could have been remedied through (1) better project implementation, (2) a resolute setting of evaluation milestones and products by LEAA Central, supported by the regional office, (3) technical assistance, (4) better dissemination of evaluation materials and (5) mechanisms for communication, among the eight cities, of problems encountered and problem-solving techniques and strategies generated.
- (s) Technical assistance in evaluation should stress the importance of defining and specifying project activity objectives very clearly. Many Impact projects wrote of the "provision of counseling and rehabilitation services" or talked about achieving "an adequate reintegration into the community." Although this sort of terminology occurred most often in Cleveland, it was sufficiently widespread to account for the number of projects graded low for lack of operational definition of objectives. A major problem in the evaluation of anti-crime programs is the lack of a detailed knowledge of treatment, of the stimulus which is expected to produce the

effect. This is often forgotten in the attention given to the dependent variable. Yet it is crucial, for an understanding of a project's effects to know precisely what happened, what a probation counsellor (for example) did, how much time he spent with his clients, how many clients he reached, what attitudes he had, what help he gave, what precise services he provided, etc.

### 3. The Crime Analysis Team

- (a) The Crime Analysis Team proved to be an effective mechanism in the cities where it was able to exercise its major functions, where it was organizationally located in the mayor's office (or with a city agency) and where it was not cut off from operating by other agencies. To insure greater effectiveness of the Crime Analysis Team, LEAA should stress the importance of an organizational locus in the mayor's office and should require cooperation with the Team by agencies receiving LEAA funds.
- (b) The question of the evaluation responsibility is a delicate one, but it seems that some sacrifice of excellence is not an exorbitant price to pay for a developed in-house city evaluation capability and for a better chance at achieving long-term agency coordination. Evaluation should remain a function of the Crime Analysis Team.
- (c) Team transience was a problem in Impact, both in terms of staffing and in terms of the accumulation of enough power for the Team to be effective. Perhaps the Team should be funded on a more permanent basis, as it was in Dallas, to ensure power with other agencies and the retention of expert staff. Power and loyalty tend to be tied to the more permanent institutions, and the transience of Team activities was a handicap to CAT effectiveness in Impact.
- (d) Crime Analysis Teams should be required to hire at least one professional evaluator at program start-up, so as to ensure: (1) the coordination of crime-oriented planning (and especially project selection) with evaluation planning, (2) timely evaluation planning and reporting, (3) the collection of baseline data, and (4) the feedback of early evaluation findings into on-going planning for new projects.
- (e) Crime Analysis Teams should include some members of local criminal justice agencies; this would ensure better agency coordination and also a greater likelihood of the propagation of planning and evaluation techniques.

- (f) The Denver Crime Analysis Team furnishes a model for future programs. All in all, Denver's was the most effective Team performance from the viewpoints of planning and evaluation, successful implementation, agency coordination, community involvement, innovation and institutionalization. A study of the Team's strategies and efforts, successes and failures should provide an important basis for future endeavors in this area (see MITRE's history of the Impact program in Denver, MTR-6383).

4. National-Level Planning, Evaluation and Administration

- (a) Although program planning did take place at the national level in Impact, there was not enough time to follow through thoroughly, nor to perform the crucial task of evaluation planning. Future programs should make this area an important priority. In brief, expert professional attention needs to be directed toward establishing an overall evaluation plan, answering the questions of what is to be done and how it is to be done, and specifying mechanisms for logically linking observed changes in measures to program activities. This report has addressed, in many different contexts, the difficulties of such an endeavor. Nevertheless, it needs to be done, for future national programs, and it needs to be done concurrently with other program planning so that data collection for this effort can proceed normally and can be scheduled in a coordinated fashion with other data collection activities. Despite the problems of attribution in a national program, such programs should be structured so that the greatest possible confidence can be attained in the linkage of outcomes to program activities.
- (b) A national implementation monitoring system needs to be installed (perhaps the one designed by MITRE and discussed earlier--see page 467 above--might furnish the basis for such a system) to provide national planners and evaluators with an instrument for:
- examining initial implementation results and making adjustments in planning and evaluation objectives;
  - linking program activities to program effects; and
  - establishing an iterative and dynamic planning, implementation and evaluation process at the national level, rather than the current static one of discrete, successive phases.

- (c) Implicit in such an iterative COPIE-cycle at the national level is the need for national evaluators to be able to channel information directly to a national group, such as the original LEAA Policy Board, with power to effect needed implementation changes. The demise of the LEAA Policy Board was a serious loss to Impact in June of 1973. Future programs should ensure the continued existence of such a body throughout the life of the program, with full powers to require the phase-out or modification of obviously unsuccessful projects.
- (d) National evaluation planning should provide for the availability of technical assistance in evaluation not only to project evaluators, but also to various managers and to operational people needing to deal with the various phases of evaluation and with the interpretation of evaluation findings.
- (e) Planners should build into a future program real mechanisms for lateral coordination across federal agencies. These mechanisms need to be developed at the working, planning and evaluation levels; otherwise they will remain only well-meaning utterances of top-level interest which will bog down almost immediately (as in Impact) before any real coordination can take place. Yet a great many federal agencies have programs that relate and combine with LEAA interests: HEW handles most juvenile prevention programs, HUD develops tenant security programs and is directly concerned with matters of environmental design; the Department of Labor operates pre-trial intervention projects and ex-offender rehabilitation projects; NIMH/NIDA is intimately concerned with drug programs which it operates jointly with the LEAA (although very little substantive coordination appears to take place between the two agencies). It appears that this is an important area, promising increased and more effective impact for all of the programs involved. Before embarking on the implementation of a new Impact-type program, the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget and the LEAA should convene a symposium involving all of the agencies with kindred work programs to identify and develop mechanisms for the joint planning, coordination and evaluation of their related efforts.
- (f) There are real dangers for the marshalling of new knowledge about crime and about anti-crime effectiveness if Congress allows new agencies to proliferate, given the existing problems of coordination among all agencies, and among

federal agencies in particular. Steps should be taken immediately to ensure coordination between any newly created agencies (such as the National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape, located within HEW) and LEAA. The current effort to control the drug problem clearly demonstrates the present inability of large bureaucracies to coordinate; it would be highly unfortunate if these failures should begin to spread to other criminal justice areas as well.

- (g) Program evaluation for future programs should strive to avoid at least some of the knowledge pitfalls encountered in Impact. A basic difficulty here is the action/research conflict: action programs are funded and operated to provide services, not to test hypotheses. Research must operate in a fashion which does not interfere with the delivery of services. Program operators cannot be overburdened with data collection tasks. Services have to be offered where needs are greatest and changes in service delivery must be made when operational needs change, despite effects on the research endeavor in progress. Likewise, the research is tied to the delivery of services; delays in project implementation make for delays in the research. Further, New Federalism's effectiveness in eliciting local priorities carried with it, in Impact, the disadvantage of generating a bewildering multiplicity of highly different projects (based on the individual criteria used for selection of problem areas, as well as on the general socio-geographic make-up of each city) which made comparative evaluation very difficult. To develop research knowledge then, in the context of a future social action program, requires some islands, at least, within that program, of specific replicated efforts to be performed in a rigorously experimental fashion.
- (h) New Federalism should be somewhat modified in future programs. LEAA should continue its recent felicitous changes in policy which have included a stronger leadership role, an upsurge of nationally-sponsored demonstration programs, a more powerful research and evaluation focus, and a tendency to begin attaching at least a few strings to its grants. As discussed above in other recommendations, planning and evaluation need to be tied at least nominally to milestones and products, implementation needs to be monitored and agencies need to be coordinated. Progress in criminal justice capability comes at that price. However, New Federalism should not, in any sense, be abandoned; it secured real expression of local priorities in the Impact program. It cannot, however, be allowed to impede both program objectives and the long-term

goals of crime control. While it is necessary to continue to pursue better and more comfortable relations with the states, LEAA should not permit its leadership role to be passed to state planning agencies and local regional planning boards.

- (i) Turnover of high-level program personnel was a serious problem in Impact. Although turnover itself cannot be helped, program administrative structures should be so strengthened that the locus of power remains firmly at the federal level over the duration of any future federal/state/city program.
- (j) Not much has been learned about how citizens feel with respect to criminal justice programs. In Impact, no regular surveys were planned, and in consequence only ad hoc information is now available about community reactions to Impact efforts. Even though a major reason (perhaps the major reason) for the promulgation of national programs is the reduction of citizen fears of crime and victimization, almost nothing is known about how and whether those fears were affected by the program. Since community attitudes are highly important for the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, it is recommended that a future national program include systematic before/after surveys of target area communities for all projects involving community/criminal justice system interaction.

##### 5. Policy Formation at the National Level

- (a) In demonstrating the COPIE-cycle, LEAA asked the Impact cities to go to the sources of their crime problems, substantiate them, prioritize them, address them, and evaluate them. The kinds of benefits which accrued to those cities that did so make it seem that LEAA might fruitfully initiate a similar process at the national level. LEAA should establish, at least for its discretionary fund program, an iterative process of national planning, research, implementation and evaluation which allows a coherent delineation of what needs to be done and formulates reasonable criteria for assessing achievements.
- (b) Such a process should include:
  - an on-going planning, evaluation and priority-setting function which generates policy goals and receives inputs from all LEAA programs;

- a structured research function (addressing determined policy goal priorities) which includes:
    - basic theoretical research on priority crime problems;
    - system research (i.e., applied efforts to improve criminal justice capabilities); and
    - carefully designed experiments to establish a more solid basis for policy;
  - a demonstration function (such as the one which presently exists) to test new ideas which have successfully passed the research and development stage;
  - a crisis-management function which features large-scale urban action programs in the public interest utilizing currently acquired anti-crime knowledge to improve system capability, to reduce crime and public insecurity, and to provide insights into the value and relevance of program and policy goals in the real world; and finally,
  - a cost/benefit and policy analysis function.
- (c) The planning and evaluation capability is needed at the national level to ensure that programs undertaken are in the service of policy goals and that the likely results of such programs will bring knowledge about the progress made in reaching those goals and about the relevance of the goals themselves. Research, demonstration and crisis-management program results should feed back into the planning process where evaluation findings should be related to policy via analysis, and where the various options possible in the pursuit of the same goal should be subjected to cost/benefit study. The policy and cost/benefit analysis functions would thus be the final steps in the on-going revision and updating of policy goals and priorities. In this way, research findings like those of the Pilot City program, or Impact, and knowledge assessments like those of the National Evaluation Program, would have a more prolonged and meaningful impact on the formation of policy and on the delineation of new assumptions, new goals and new actions to achieve those goals.

6. Priority Areas for Criminal Justice Research Emerging from the Impact Program Experience

(a) The Rehabilitation of Offenders

It is commonly argued today that rehabilitation efforts have failed and that incarceration or incapacitation of all serious offenders is the only feasible solution to the problem of rising crime rates. What has, in fact, been stated is that no rehabilitation programs have been able to produce incontrovertible evidence that they were effective for all offenders.<sup>3</sup> The problem, therefore, is as much one of evaluation failure as of rehabilitation failure, and there is, in fact, considerable evidence that some methods are effective for some offenders.<sup>4</sup> MITRE's intensive supervision findings showed that--within the framework of analysis possible in a program like Impact--recidivism was indeed being reduced by some projects.

The problem, however, is that incarceration is not really a feasible alternative to rehabilitative diversion, probation and community corrections programs; it would cost much more than the public is willing to pay. The present situation is one of high and rising prison overcrowding, of cutbacks in public spending, of rejection of bond issues by voters, of refusal by state legislatures to vote appropriations for prison facilities, and of the blocking of prison construction by law suits and community resistance. There is no lobby and no constituency for prison-building. But if the present rate of incarceration were increased by only 10 percent, this would double the number of prisoners committed each year, at an incremental cost of many billions of dollars in new facilities, maintenance, and food and service costs for prisoners. Incarceration would thus be a feasible alternative only if the public were willing to pay for it and it does not presently appear that this is indeed the case. In truth, the only penal reforms likely to find immediate favor are those which do not cost money.

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<sup>3</sup> Martinson, R. "What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," The Public Interest, Number 35, Spring 1974, pages 22-54.

<sup>4</sup> Palmer, T. "Martinson Revisited," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Volume 12, Number 2, July 1975, pages 133-152.

In view of this situation, it seems highly important to improve the effectiveness of those rehabilitative interventions which do work for some offenders in given settings. The first step in such an effort is clearly to perform precisely the kind of rigorous experiment which has not been hitherto available in corrections research and which has led to the new gloom about the possibilities of rehabilitation.

There are numerous assumptions, related to the efficacy of specific treatment modalities (for example, transactional analysis or reality therapy) and general treatment approaches (for example, intensive supervision or community-based supervision) which underlie and determine the nature of correctional projects. If these assumptions are to move toward empirical certitude and thus gain in replicability and generalizability, it will be necessary to specifically address the assumptions in a formal research context rather than in the context of programs reflecting the political and administrative pressures which have molded them. This means, first of all, that the program must be large enough to produce some statistically meaningful results, and also that the shape of the program, its implementation, operations, and evaluation must reflect the kinds of research controls and constraints that are the necessary conditions of sound empirical results. For a correctional program, this means cooperation and commitment to the goals of the evaluative research by the courts (to insure that client selection and assignment conform to the research design), by project management (to insure that the treatment is efficiently implemented in its specified form), and by project personnel (to insure that reliable and detailed data related to the nature and extent of treatment can be gathered on a client-by-client basis).

The LEAA should undertake to fund such research on a priority basis. There are two major reasons why this should be done:

- (1) It is the lack of such research which led to the recent finding that the evaluative results of most rehabilitative interventions are indicative neither of success nor of failure but are simply uninterpretable; and
- (2) The alternative to such research (and to a program developing and increasing the effectiveness of current rehabilitative interventions) is not incarceration (which the public is unwilling to subsidize) but worsening of prison conditions such that incarceration

will constitute cruel and unusual punishment (as it has already been ruled in the prisons of Alabama); the wholesale freeing of offenders will then appear preferable to imprisoning them in such places, and it is this which is liable to be the real alternative to rehabilitation.

(b) Research on Quantitative Methods for Estimating Crime Levels

One of the more significant methodological issues in the area of criminal justice research and evaluation involves the development of quantitative methods for demonstrating the impact of anti-crime programs on crime levels. The issue derives from the simple fact that crime occurs in an uncontrollable universe and, thus, it is critical to have a reliable estimate or expectation of what crime would have been (in this uncontrollable universe) if any particular program or treatment has not taken place. Recently, a number of regression and stochastic models have been developed which are designed to give projections of crime levels. As the criminal justice area continues to employ and find uses for a variety of quantitative techniques developed in other disciplines, it is likely that the development and use of models for crime rate estimation will proliferate. A central methodological task related to these developments will be the determination of the necessary assumptions and parameters of these models and, most important, the determination of their relative predictive utility. Without reliable estimates of expected crime levels, it is difficult to see how treatment effects on crime rates can be demonstrated. This was a major problem in Impact, and it will again be a major problem for future Impact-type urban programs, yet little is known at this point in time about the relative utility of various models and their specific limitations. If the use of these models is to proceed in a manner which can provide the greatest payoff for evaluative purposes in anti-crime programs, LEAA should undertake a serious critique and test of these models.

APPENDIX TO  
VOLUME II  
OF THE FINAL REPORT

#### MITRE TECHNICAL REPORTS

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**END**