



PRESCRPTIVE PACKAGE

multi-agency narcotics unit manual

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National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
United States Department of Justice

PRESCRIPTIVE PACKAGE

MULTI-AGENCY NARCOTICS UNIT MANUAL

BY

MANUEL R. GARZA

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FOREWORD

This study is the first effort to collect and analyze information about the experience of Multi-Agency Narcotics Units. As such, it offers both a status report and a guide for future programs to bridge jurisdictional boundaries and marshal law enforcement resources against a specific problem such as drug abuse.

The theme that emerges is diversity: a number of creative patterns exist for planning and operating such units. The National Institute hopes that this Prescriptive Package will be useful to other officials in conducting cooperative law enforcement programs, whatever their specific nature and goals.

PAUL CASCARANO,
Assistant Director
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Enforcement and Criminal Justice

ABSTRACT

This Prescriptive Package on the organization, administration, and operation of a multi-agency narcotics (MAN) unit was developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as part of a grant from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA. As part of the year-long project, MAN units throughout the country were identified and queried regarding unit characteristics and local demographic factors. Twelve of the responding MAN units were selected for site visits. Based on the information derived from visiting these units and from conducting additional research, the manual was prepared primarily to assist police administrators who are interested in establishing a MAN unit and those who are currently operating such squads. The manual examines the strengths and weaknesses of the units studied and recommends certain procedures and policies that can be used to facilitate successful MAN unit operations. Variations of practice in the formation, operation, and administration of the units are traced to differences in the perception of the narcotics problem on the part of law enforcement agencies, related governmental institutions, and the general public. Overall, the effectiveness of MAN units was found to be a function of their responsiveness to local needs.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Although this manual was written by one individual, it is the product of literally hundreds of men and women throughout the country who contributed information, interest, and support. To have worked on a project in which previous experience in narcotic enforcement could be so fully utilized has been personally gratifying. The author is grateful to the many police officers who helped to enrich his experience in the narcotics field.

Plaudits are offered to the National Institute for its perception of the need for such a study and its financial support of this activity. Further recognition is given to specific individuals within the National Institute who were directly involved in this project. Lou Biondi, the original project monitor, contributed many useful ideas in defining the scope of the study. His successor, Robert Aserkoff, rendered ongoing assistance—from the early working stages of the project on to its conclusion. Mary Ann Beck and Jay Marshall are thanked for their good counsel throughout the entire project. The external reviewers of the manual deserve mention for their contribution. They are Robert diGrazia, Frank Virgulak, Joe Schwalbach, Emmitt Warner, Victor Strecher, and Todd Taylor. Their comments were highly valued, and their desire to help the author in assuring the quality of this report was much appreciated.

There are others at IACP whose help has been close and constant. Some have given the author the freedom to explore ideas and to incorporate them within this manuscript. Others have given encouragement and reassurance at times when it was much needed. Bob Rottenberg is specifically noted for his patient work in attending to the many details necessary to produce a correct and readable report.

Finally, the author wishes to recognize those who have sought information and advice from the author during the project period. Their interest acted as a continuing reminder that this report is much needed by practitioners. As a consequence, every effort was made by the author to make this report useful to police officers throughout the nation who are working to control and diminish the narcotic problem.

Manuel R. Garza

GOT A MOMENT?

We'd like to know what you think of this Prescriptive Package.

The last page of this publication is a questionnaire.

Will you take a few moments to complete it? The postage is prepaid.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The illegal distribution and use of narcotics has become increasingly difficult to control in the past decade. Although efforts have been made toward control of the drug problem at the federal, state, and local levels, it is clear that a more comprehensive effort must be made. One way of enhancing this effort is through the utilization of Multi-Agency Narcotics (MAN) Units. The use of MAN units allows local police departments and sheriff's offices to apply their combined resources more effectively to the narcotics problem. Utilizing this approach, they can coordinate their investigative efforts, establish uniform enforcement priorities, participate in undercover operations, supplement the narcotic efforts of smaller departments, and conduct trans-jurisdictional investigations.

Traditionally, the jurisdictional independence and desire for autonomy of local police departments have resulted in duplication of effort, haphazard coordination, and sometimes, a lack of cooperation. This situation is often complicated by competition and friction among police departments, jurisdictional limitations, and shortages of manpower and equipment.

Police departments that have desired to consolidate their narcotic control efforts have faced a serious handicap—there is virtually no solid body of knowledge on MAN unit drug enforcement. The usual procedure followed by departments interested in establishing a MAN unit has been to request information from a few departments participating in MAN unit programs. Although there are advantages to receiving first-hand advice, information obtained from only one or two sources is apt to be parochial, reflecting only the local characteristics of a single department or MAN unit.

What has not been available to interested departments is a comprehensive view of MAN units which reflects the full range of variations in their organization and administration. Recognizing the need for information of this scope, the project director, under a LEAA grant, surveyed and visited MAN units across the country to obtain data about their establishment, structure, and operations.

This project was intended to research the tech-

niques and procedures that are used throughout the country to organize, administer, and operate MAN units so that recommended administrative practices for units could be described. This is not an operational manual, the type of document that explains how to conduct a surveillance or how to use a 35 mm camera. Unit operations are discussed, but only insofar as they are affected by general policies. Although it is highly desirable that this manual be an all inclusive document on MAN units, the financial and time constraints that have been placed on the project prohibit this. In spite of these limitations, this manual offers a basic body of knowledge that was heretofore non-existent.

The manual was written with several groups of intended readers in mind. One group consists of police administrators who are contemplating the formation of a MAN unit in their regions. Another group comprises the individuals who are presently involved in the planning and organizing of a unit. The third group consists of those administrators who are currently responsible for the administration and operation of a MAN squad. Although these individuals have already faced and resolved many of the problems usually encountered in the initial planning and organization of a unit, they can still learn much from what other units around the country are doing. A fourth group is the instructors and students in both the police training and academic setting who may find this manual useful in their studies of narcotics enforcement and the consolidation of criminal justice services.

In October, 1974, a survey questionnaire was sent to MAN units throughout the country identified by LEAA, DEA, state criminal justice planning agencies, Impact Cities and Pilot Cities Program Directors, the International Association of Narcotic Officers, and the International Association of College and University Security Directors. Of the 200 questionnaires mailed, 107 responses were received, and, based on information gathered during this project, it is estimated that there are between 115 and 150 MAN units currently operating in the U.S. Appendix A contains a copy of the questionnaire.

One of the earliest findings from the questionnaire

and the subsequent site visits was that units throughout the country operate under a great variety of environmental factors and utilize various practices and procedures. This variance encompasses both the administration and operation of the unit. A unit's method of operation is usually adopted because of its suitability for the local conditions of the area. This allows units to address narcotic problems in terms of the unique character of their respective communities and is the primary reason that the concept of a MAN unit works so effectively within a complex of local governments.

Another measure of the unit's effectiveness is its responsiveness to local needs. State and federal narcotic agencies cannot always assist local police departments for a variety of reasons. A MAN unit, on the other hand, will respond to requests concerning even the lowest level of pushers. It is this type of responsiveness that enhances the support of local departments for the unit:

That the structure and function of MAN units have been designed to reflect local concerns can be inferred from the following descriptions of their characteristics drawn from the nationwide survey.

- The units ranged in size from one agent to 63 agents.
- Some units hire agents while others assign agents from local departments.
- Units operated in rural, metropolitan, industrialized or suburban areas, or any combination of these.
- Some jurisdictional areas encompassed one county, others encompassed as many as six counties; still other units operated in two states.
- The units operated in jurisdictions with populations ranging from 55,000 to 6,000,000.
- Most units handled only narcotics cases while others were additionally entrusted with the investigative responsibility for major crimes.
- Some units had very little contact with federal narcotic agents, while others had federal agents integrated into the unit.
- Many squads detached themselves physically from the local police departments; a few were integrated with vice, intelligence, and/or organized crime sections of the department.
- The majority of units operated autonomously while in a few instances units were coordinated by a statewide coordinating agency.
- Some units selected their agents haphazardly; others used a range of screening techniques that included polygraph examinations.

In sum, the questionnaire was important in gaining a national picture of the character of MAN units in the United States.

Recognizing the great variety of MAN unit operations, the project director selected 12 units to be visited that incorporated major variations within their organizational structures and operational practices. The units chosen for site visits were:

- MAT Narcotic Strike Force
Brookfield, Ohio
- Multi-County Narco Bureau
New Philadelphia, Ohio
- Metropolitan Narcotic Squad
Lansing, Michigan
- Quad City Metropolitan Enforcement Group
Rock Island, Illinois
- Metro Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs
Enforcement Group
Mt. Prospect, Illinois (Cook County)
- San Diego Integrated Task Force
San Diego, California
- Stockton/San Joaquin Metropolitan Task Force
Stockton, California
- Metropolitan Area Narcotic Squad
Tucson, Arizona
- Las Cruces-Dona Ana County
Metropolitan Narcotic Agency
Las Cruces, New Mexico
- Cameron County Organized Task Force
Brownsville, Texas
- Southwest Region Crime Squad
Fairfield, Connecticut
- Broward County MEG/Organized
Crime Division
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

The distinguishing characteristics of the units selected for on-site visits are as follows:

1. Because San Diego is adjacent to the Mexican border and the area is a point of entry for drugs distributed throughout the country, federal DEA agents there are integrated into the local MAN unit. Due to the desire for local autonomy and DEA policy regarding command factors, the unit has two co-directors.

2. The Lansing area unit was selected because its jurisdiction includes a major university with over 40,000 students and several junior colleges.

3. The Quad Cities unit was selected because of the inter-state enforcement problems that prevail among participating agencies that operate in two states.

4. The Cook County unit's jurisdiction, which covers a population base of six million persons, is unusually decentralized, operating out of three offices in the county.

5. Because Stockton is the only large city in its county, the Stockton area unit is integrated with that city's organized crime, intelligence, and vice units.

6. Las Cruces was chosen because the area has a small population and is separated from other metropolitan areas. Therefore, its agents are easily identifiable by the drug population, and the unit must hire civilian agents to assist the assigned agents.

7. The Tucson area squad is near the Mexican border and is, therefore, a distribution point for drugs entering the country. The unit has agents assigned to an airport detail that concentrates on shipment cases.

8. The Cameron County Unit was selected because it has multiple functions which include auto theft, gambling, vice, and loan sharking.

9. The Broward County Unit, due to local problems with organized crime, is integrated with a cooperative, organized crime unit.

It was also determined that an important factor in the organization of a MAN unit is the type of law enforcement cooperation that exists in the regional area. In areas where local agencies had cooperated to a high degree in the past, the establishment of a unit seemed a mere extension of such cooperation. For example, in the Lansing-East Lansing area, the two departments of these cities, as well as several of the local sheriff's offices, had signed a mutual aid agreement in the 1960's because of the racial riots and campus unrest that were prevalent then. During the late 60's and early 70's the local departments, sheriff's offices, and the campus police assisted each other on various occasions. There was little difficulty encountered regarding the things that often present obstacles to cooperative efforts, such as wages, overtime pay, or compensatory time for officers assisting another agency. This past cooperation greatly facilitated the formation of the unit in 1970.

Because the agencies in the Quad Cities (Rock Island, Moline and East Moline in Illinois, and Davenport in Iowa) had for some years been conducting periodic meetings to discuss local problems and to exchange information on criminal activity, the local need and desire to form the unit were strong enough for local officials to induce the attorneys

general of the two states to waive the state requirements that impeded the establishment of the unit. Thus, the formation of a MAN unit in this area was not unusual; rather, it was part of an on-going program of cooperation and coordination among police departments.

The M.A.T. unit in Ohio also benefited from a history of cooperation among the local police officials. For the ten years previous to the unit's formation, local police administrators had held regular meetings to discuss common problems and to facilitate interaction among local agencies. This, in turn, facilitated the formation of the MAN unit. Because the participants of these meetings included police administrators from adjacent jurisdictions in eastern Pennsylvania, the unit enjoys strong cooperation from nearby Pennsylvania jurisdictions.

The lesson of these examples is obvious. A history of cooperation among local agencies is important in facilitating the organization of MAN units. On the other hand, there are usually severe problems encountered in presenting this concept of a cooperative venture where there has been little cooperation among departments in the past. The need to actively try to create a cooperative attitude among participating agencies complicates the task of organizing a MAN unit.


The distribution of MAN units generally follows the distribution of population in the United States. There are concentrations of units on the West Coast, particularly in California; the East Coast, specially around New Jersey and New York; and the Midwest, in Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois. The states with the most MAN units are California with 29, Michigan with 14, and Ohio with 13. The following information, obtained from the survey responses, gives a general picture of MAN units across the country.

It appears that the first unit was formed in Fairfield, Connecticut, in May, 1968. The following year there were five units formed across the country. In 1970, the birthrate of MAN units increased dramatically—17—and subsequently, the rate has been 25 in 1971, 23 in 1972, 24 in 1973, and 19 units during the first 9 months of 1974 (Figure 1).

- The sizes of the units ranged from several one-agent squads to one unit with 63 agents. Figure 2 shows the units by number of personnel. The greatest number of units (29) were in 7-9 agent category. The second highest number (27) in the 4-6 group, and the third (24) in the 10-14 group. All in all, the units with a maximum of 15 agents made up 79 percent of all units. Ap-


FIGURE 1

NUMBER OF UNITS CREATED
PER YEAR SINCE 1969



*For first 9 months of 1974.

FIGURE 2
NUMBER OF UNITS BY SIZE



proximately one-third of all units (30.5 percent) had fewer than seven members.

- There was no correlation between the sizes of the units and their conviction rates for either users or pushers, although as expected, the larger the units, the greater were the number of arrests.
- Generally speaking, the narcotic enforcement experience of MAN unit directors increased with the size of the units. For example, the directors in the 1-3 member units had an average of 4.8 years' experience while those in the 30-39 and 40-49 categories had an average of 11.3 and 11.5 years respectively.
- In every size category, unit directors indicated that the greatest problem encountered in organizing and operating the unit related to the lack of sufficient manpower for the unit to operate effectively.
- Most of the personnel assigned to the units came from the municipal police departments. The next largest group came from county sheriffs' offices, which was followed by agents from state agencies. Federal agents were the

fourth largest group represented by MAN unit personnel.

- According to the survey, offenders in the 18 to 21 age group were most frequently arrested by MAN units. Those individuals in the broader age group of 22-30 were the next most frequently arrested.
- Other information from the survey simply affirmed what one might reasonably expect of MAN units. For example, the size of the unit increases as the jurisdictional population increases. The same is true of unit size and the unit budget.

The generalization that can be made from the survey and the site visits is that the policies, procedures, and methods used by MAN units today are of a wide variety. This variety is based on the necessity of units to meet the special needs of the local communities served. For this reason, the manual does not seek to develop a single model for MAN units, for to do so would be counterproductive, if not futile. The value of this manual lies in its discussion of the variety of methods that units use in their operations, thereby

giving unit planners an overview of how units currently work. Where prudent, the author has made recommendations regarding the adoption of policies and procedures. In many cases, however, only the

director and planners of a MAN unit will know local conditions, restrictions, and limitations and, therefore, only they will be able to make decisions on the adoption of policies.

CHAPTER II. PLANNING

A. The Planners

Although local chiefs provide the impetus for the establishment of a MAN unit, the direct responsibility for its organization is usually vested in others. Typically, one or two command officers with administrative and/or planning experience from the major departments involved are designated as the planners. They are entrusted with the specific responsibility for formulating unit plans. These planners should continuously consult with others who are familiar with narcotic operations, supervision, and administration so that the initial assessment of needs is accurate. Preferably, the individual designated to be the director of the proposed unit should become involved in the planning process at the outset. The unit director, therefore, should be selected concurrently with the planners. Ideally, the director should make a major contribution to the planning process, since the decisions made at this time will have a profound effect on the unit's eventual administration and operation.

When the selection of the director is to be made, as many of the participating chiefs as possible should be consulted and allowed to influence the selection process. This ensures that the unit is started with the maximum participation of local chiefs. The task of planning a MAN unit is complex and difficult, and the chiefs should be encouraged to contribute their planning and administrative experience. This type of input is critical because the planners will have to formulate budgets, fiscal management procedures, formal cooperative agreements, and unit rules and regulations. In addition, these officials are able to point out those aspects of unit operation and administration that, because of local conditions, may cause problems later. The factor of ego involvement is also important. By participating in the planning process, local department officials will have a personal stake in the unit's success or failure.

It should be recognized, however, that all local departments may not desire or be able to actively participate in the planning process. Some department heads may feel that the community does not have an uncontrollable narcotic problem. Consequently, they may be reluctant to become directly involved at the

start. Nevertheless, their advice and general support should be solicited.

The planners should also be held accountable to those local chiefs who are directly interested in creating the unit. The planners should be required to submit periodic progress reports to this group of chiefs throughout the preliminary organizational process. This will allow local administrators to stay abreast of what is being done. Only in this way can these chiefs effectively guide the planning process so as to ensure the creation of a MAN unit shaped to meet their needs.

B. Estimating the Narcotic Problem

One of the initial steps in establishing a MAN unit is to verify that it is needed. The planners must show that the local narcotic problem is of the nature and sufficient in magnitude to warrant the creation of a MAN unit in the area. Unless the problem is found to be prevalent in several interrelated municipal and county jurisdictions, the need for a unit should be questioned.

Planners must be able to obtain the following information from local police departments, drug enforcement agencies, and community organizations:

- Number of narcotic cases investigated by departments within a region.
- Number of local narcotic and drug-related arrests during a particular period.
- Number of complaints related to narcotics received by departments.
- Number of other crimes committed by narcotic and drug users.
- Number of overdoses reported to departments or to local hospitals.
- Number of residents or out-patients at local drug rehabilitation centers.
- Amount and types of drugs police officers have encountered in the communities.
- Estimates by school officials of drug activity in the schools.
- Attitudes of the community toward drug problems, as indicated by newspaper articles, editorials, and expressions of public concern.

- Estimates of addicts and drug abusers in the area made by local rehabilitation centers.

This information should be compiled so as to allow valid inferences to be made about the overall pattern of illicit narcotics sale, distribution, and use throughout the area of immediate concern.

Unreported crime should also be taken into consideration. Because many narcotic violations go unreported, it is very difficult to estimate all the illicit narcotic activity in a region. Consequently, statistical information may be misleading. Another complicating factor is the different priority given to narcotic enforcement by the various departments. In fact, some community members may insist that the problem exists in the larger cities within the local area but not in their towns. Law enforcement officials, therefore, may have to prove that the problem is area-wide. In one particular instance, a county prosecutor and some local chiefs were interested in starting a unit, while members of adjacent smaller communities did not believe that their towns had a narcotic problem. To overcome this problem, the prosecutor's office started making undercover buys throughout the area for several months. After a sizable number of buys were made, the skeptical individuals were shown the cases that had been made against offenders in their respective jurisdictions. By proving that drug abuse was not an isolated problem, widespread agreement was reached on the formation of a unit.

C. Determining Goals and Objectives

In many instances, planners formulate the goals and objectives of a MAN unit while they are preoccupied with the need to obtain a grant to establish the unit. Thus, at the outset, there may be a temptation to justify the creation of their unit by simply adopting the stated goals and objectives of existing MAN units. In spite of the fact that this practice may serve as a convenient shortcut to obtaining funding, the planners should resist this temptation. They should go through the necessary effort to formulate goals that are truly based on local needs. Admittedly, there are similarities in the fundamental objectives of MAN units. However, if a unit is to be responsive to the unique needs of a locality, specific goals and objectives should be formulated on the basis of local realities.

Formulation of unit goals and objectives will center on the resolution of problems which impede effective narcotic enforcement in the local area. The problems that typically have prompted

local departments to establish MAN units are as follows:

- Increased drug activity and the appearance of new sources of supply in the area.
- Increased publicity about the narcotics problem.
- Inability of police officers to actively pursue investigations outside their respective department's jurisdiction.
- Lack of cooperation among local law enforcement agencies.
- Inability of local departments to obtain equipment and material needed in narcotic enforcement.
- Inability of local police officers to undertake undercover assignments because they are too well-known within their own jurisdictions.
- Lack of uniformity in setting narcotic enforcement priorities.
- Inability of small police departments to assign a narcotic specialist to work on narcotic investigations and take advantage of the benefits of specialization.
- Insufficient manpower assigned to the narcotic function even in large departments with narcotic sections.
- Inability to set up an area-wide intelligence system to gather information on narcotic suspects.
- Inability of single police departments to obtain state and federal funds to assist the local narcotic enforcement effort.
- Lack of uniform training of local narcotic officers so that they can undertake effective enforcement efforts.

After the problems are identified, the planners must formulate the action needed to resolve them. For example, the primary goal of the unit will be to reduce the amount of narcotics and narcotic-related activity in the area. To achieve this goal, the following objectives must be attained:

- Allow local narcotic officers assigned to a MAN unit to pursue their investigations throughout the designated jurisdiction regardless of individual (municipal and county) jurisdictions.
- Coordinate the investigative efforts of all departments, including state and federal narcotic agencies, against narcotic suspects in the area.
- Enhance cooperation among the local law enforcement agencies by establishing (1) a unit in which they will invest manpower and resources

and (2) a governing board to supervise the unit and meet on a regular basis.

- Solicit and obtain the funds necessary for purchasing equipment and materials and share such equipment with all local agencies through (1) its use within the unit and (2) its loan to local agencies when needed.
- Enable local narcotic officers to participate in undercover assignments by having an officer who may be too well-known in his own jurisdiction work in adjacent jurisdictions.
- Establish narcotic enforcement priorities in the unit and the participating departments by directing unit efforts against the large-volume sellers while allowing the departments to direct their efforts against street-level pushers and users.
- Provide manpower and equipment to those departments which cannot assign any full-time personnel to narcotic enforcement.
- Supplement the narcotic efforts of those departments that lack adequate manpower to handle the number and types of narcotic cases in their jurisdictions.
- Establish an area-wide intelligence system to actively gather information and intelligence on narcotic activity.
- Facilitate the use of federal and state monies to assist with narcotic enforcement in the local area.
- Facilitate the exchange of information among local police departments by allowing them to channel all information relative to narcotics through the unit.
- Enhance local narcotic enforcement by providing systematic, formal and informal training for local narcotic officers.
- Facilitate the collection and provision of narcotic-related information to appropriate non-police agencies such as county and state health departments and rehabilitative agencies.

Other objectives that unit planners view as part of the goals of the unit should also be incorporated. For example, if it is intended that the unit will provide drug education to the public, this objective should be listed.

D. Determining Costs

Traditionally, planners of a MAN unit have referred to other units of similar size and scope to determine the initial cost factors for the unit. As a matter of expediency this may be very useful. How-

ever, every local situation tends to be different and merely copying another area's operation may (1) perpetuate the mistakes of the other unit, (2) encourage a unit to adopt methods and procedures which are not suitable to it, and (3) hinder the planners from considering and formulating other policies and procedures which other units overlooked or dismissed. In essence, an eclectic approach is needed. While planners should consider functions and procedures that can be adapted to local conditions, they must also think in terms of how they can improve on another unit's methods of doing things, or what new techniques and procedures the unit could use to do a better job in narcotic enforcement. This does not mean that a new unit cannot learn from an established unit. The planners should consider the experience of MAN squads and other multi-agency units such as major crime or intelligence squads. However, accuracy in estimating costs can best be accomplished by determining individual unit needs in terms of manpower, facilities, equipment, and confidential funds.

1. *Manpower.* The cost factor for manpower is not difficult to assess after the anticipated number and ranks of unit personnel are determined. With this information, the planners can take into account the differences in wage scales among the participating departments and the different ranks within any given department. There are many reasons why an accurate cost estimate for wages is needed.

- The wages may be considered an in-kind contribution from local departments.
- Some unit grants that cover part or all of personnel costs require this estimate.
- If funding is ended, the cost for local government funding is known.
- The unit can defend itself publicly on a cost effective basis if challenged.

All things considered, it is sound management to anticipate all cost factors for an organization.

If civilian agents are to be hired to staff the unit, the planners must take that factor into consideration because the costs involved in using civilian agents will probably be lower than those in using agents assigned from participating police departments. Additionally, the cost of clerical and support staff cannot be overlooked.

2. *Facilities.* The planners must decide whether the unit is to be housed within one of the local police departments or in a separate facility. If the unit is located in a police department, the cost to the host department must be fairly evaluated so that it can be

credited with an in-kind contribution. If the unit operates from a separate office, certain other cost factors must be determined. For example, the rent for the facility (including average annual rent increases) and the costs of making modifications must be considered. These costs will depend on the size of the office, the inclusion of security devices and alarm systems, and the cost of utilities. If free parking facilities are unavailable, the cost for private parking must be taken into account.

3. *Equipment.* The types and amounts of equipment and materials that the unit will need to purchase or lease will depend upon things such as the size, structure, operation, and location of the unit. The number of binoculars, cassette recorders, and vehicles, for example, will depend on how many agents are in the unit and the number who are assigned to operational, supervisory, or support positions. Locating a unit in a separate facility means that the unit will have to purchase or lease equipment such as paper shredders, photocopy machines, telephones, and perhaps furniture and general office supplies. If the unit is maintained in a police department, the majority of these items can be borrowed or taken as an in-kind contribution from one of the departments.

Some funding agencies expect a unit to purchase the majority of its equipment during the first year of operation. In such cases it is incumbent upon the planners to determine the equipment which the unit will need over its lifespan before obtaining first year funding. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Unit planners must simply exercise great care in ensuring that their estimates of unit equipment are as accurate as possible.

In initially considering equipment costs, care must be taken to avoid the purchase of unnecessary equipment. Some units may be tempted to buy video tape equipment or movie cameras which will never be used. The possibility of borrowing specialized, infrequently-used equipment from local departments should be considered before a decision is made to purchase such items.

Purchase of equipment with local funds can be accomplished through the pooling of money from the contributing departments or by having each department contribute money designated for the purchase of a specific item. The former is perhaps the better method from the standpoint that it allows the director more flexibility in setting purchasing priorities. However, the latter method allows local departments to determine what they initially purchased so they can retrieve the item if the unit disbands.

The possibility of obtaining needed equipment

through a centralized purchasing procedure of a city or county should be explored. There are several direct benefits in purchasing equipment in this manner: buying in bulk produces price advantages; uniformity in quality is assured through the use of recognized standard specifications; transactions may be better handled by individuals who are familiar with the equipment to be purchased and the purchasing procedures; there is a saving in time and effort on the part of the unit.

It should also be kept in mind that there are times when individual purchasing may be more economical and efficient, such as when items of small value are intermittently purchased from local vendors. Such simplified buying procedures for small purchases may not only reduce administrative costs but may yield advantages which include (1) increasing the vendor's feelings of personal responsibility for providing service for equipment, (2) eliminating the need for the prior purchasing of equipment and its storage, and (3) reducing the lead-time necessary for obtaining equipment.

In summary, a unit may derive many benefits through centralized buying but should determine whether it will actually reduce cost, time, and effort. Advantages of decentralized purchases of certain items should also be recognized.

4. *Confidential funds.* Confidential funds which are used in undercover operations will generally be obtained from three sources: the project grant; local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies; and private groups such as the chamber of commerce or local community service organizations. Whether or not a unit will be able to obtain money from these private sources depends on local community conditions, such as the attitude of these groups toward the narcotics problem, the community's trust in the unit, and the need of the unit for money.

To determine the amount of confidential funds needed during the first fiscal year, the planners of the unit will have to evaluate certain factors. They should examine current drug prices and the size of buys that federal, state, and other local agencies are making in the area. Other MAN units in that general region should be contacted for information. The figures of other agencies, however, should not be readily adopted as the unit's own. These figures may have to be increased or decreased according to local conditions. For example, the size and volume of drug buys will be greater in areas which have a larger population, although drug prices will be lower. A MAN unit serving an area that is a distribution point may be making a greater number of buys of higher quantities

than a unit in another city of equal size. Comparisons therefore should be made cautiously.

Almost all of the units surveyed during the site visits operated with at least \$25,000 in annual confidential funds. This included small units consisting of 6 or 7 agents. In spite of these amounts, units had to be careful about how every dollar was spent. Even units in rural areas making cases of \$20 or \$30 buys had difficulty making confidential funds stretch. For example, one small unit of less than 8 agents spent its \$25,000 and had to request an additional \$16,000 from the participating agencies.

Units are often able to make as many buys as their funds permit. Therefore, encountering a unit which has "too much" confidential money is unimaginable. The amount of confidential money a unit will have is often determined by the granting agencies based on perceived MAN unit needs. The Ohio Administration of Justice Division, for example, originally allotted MAT units in the state an annual allowance of \$5,000. Over a period of two years, the amount was raised to \$10,000 and then \$25,000 because of the increased needs of the units. It is safe to assume that a unit will have to approach the sponsoring agencies for additional funds sometime during its lifespan. This possibility should be thoroughly discussed by the planners and local chiefs to determine if, and how much, additional funds can be counted upon by the unit if it prematurely runs out of confidential funds the first year.

5. *Training.* In considering the training costs for a unit, the amount and type of training to be given unit agents must first be determined. Obviously, the estimates that are made should be reasonable and based on an evaluation of the level of narcotic training of the narcotic officers from local jurisdictions. It may be that they have already received narcotic training and do not need further training to effectively carry out these unit assignments. Other police officers assigned to the unit may not have had any narcotic training and will have to be sent to an appropriate school. This is especially true of civilian agents with no previous police experience. The amount of training they will receive is often determined by the narcotic training programs available in the region or state. Thus, estimates of training costs can also be primarily based on the costs of these schools.

E. Methods of Funding

1. *State and Federal funding.* Funding of MAN units is derived from the following sources: local funds, funding by state planning agencies (SPAs) using federal block grants, and direct funding from

LEAA through discretionary grants. Although the latter category of funding is made directly by LEAA, the grants are monitored jointly by the LEAA Regional Office and the state planning agencies. The majority of the units were funded by two sources—LEAA and local resources. Of 102 units, 83 were funded in part by LEAA; six of these were funded totally by that agency.

Funding by some state planning agencies is based on a step-down plan where a unit will get 90% of its necessary operating monies from the SPA the first year. This percentage then decreases every year until the end of the predetermined funding cycle, when local agencies are expected to furnish all funding.

It appears that the larger cities are able to maintain unit operation after their state or federally funded cycle ends because they can make a substantial contribution toward the support of the unit. Units which service areas containing almost all small departments usually cease operations altogether after the end of the step-down funding because the financial burden to the departments becomes too great. These small departments, however, may have a more urgent need for consolidated services.

If the funding is made through the state planning agency, the period of funding may vary from state to state. Many of the units visited were funded for a 5-year period, while a number were funded for a three year span. The percentage of state funds versus local matching funds may also vary, since a state planning agency may establish any particular formula it wishes.

One of the factors which may facilitate the funding of MAN units at the present time is the emphasis that LEAA places on the consolidation and coordination of local law enforcement efforts.

A weak area in the total administration of MAN units was in foreseeing and preparing for their termination. Directors should be able to determine, after the unit has been operating for a few years, whether or not it will continue to operate under local funding. Certainly a director should know if the local departments are able and willing to support the unit twelve months before federal or state funding ceases. If he determines that the local departments cannot financially support the unit, preparations must be made to phase out the unit during the last 12 or 6 months of its operation. Records, files, and equipment will have to be distributed to the units according to an agreed-upon formula.

Seven of the units in the mail survey reported that they were funded completely by local departments. Some units had an option to use external funding but

did not do so, while a few others used federal or state funds to acquire only additional personnel. Although differences in priorities and policies of state planning agencies had much to do with these policies, often the chief reason for these differences was the preference of local law enforcement officials. Some local departments prefer that a unit operate independent of the external constraints imposed by state or federal fiscal guidelines.

Total local funding of units must be facilitated by the refinement of the unit to the point that it operates with minimal manpower and financial resources. The Lansing Unit, for example, operates with 12 agents and a budget of approximately \$27,000 excluding wages. Since manpower costs are usually the largest expense that units have, a locally funded unit must operate with a minimum number of agents.

Where confidential funds in whole or in part are contributed by the individual police departments, the contributions should be based on the population of the various jurisdictions, since this offers the most equitable method of sharing costs. As an example, if it is determined that a unit will receive \$20,000 in undercover funds and the largest city within the jurisdiction has 40% of the population, then it will provide 40% or \$8,000 of the confidential funds. The sheriff's office will pay for its population in the unincorporated areas of that county and in those towns to which it furnishes police services. Other towns and villages will likewise be asked to pay their portion. Extremely small communities may pay a small, flat rate.

This money should be placed in a special unit account to be drawn as needed. Replenishment of this fund can be done at specified intervals or shortly after an expenditure is made. For example, in the latter case, if a unit makes a buy in a particular city, the police department can reimburse the unit for the expenditure upon verification that that amount was expended for a particular buy in that community. This allows the unit to maintain the account at a sufficiently high level.

Where units are locally funded, wages, including overtime pay, should be paid by the agent's department. The director and the unit should not assume responsibility for any of the administrative aspects of the payroll function except to keep records of the amount of regular and overtime hours that the agents work.

If a local department provides office facilities for the unit as an in-kind contribution, a unit will typically save \$3,000 to \$4,000 a year in rent and utilities. Occasionally, separate facilities for the unit can be

obtained from one of the municipalities or counties in the area. Such facilities may be loaned to a unit on a rent-free basis or rented at a nominal cost. One unit, for example, operated from a participating police agency's sub-station in a rather remote area, while another unit operated out of a local fire station annex.

F. Soliciting Participation of Local Departments

Inducing all local departments to participate in the unit is important for several reasons. Optimal effectiveness in multi-jurisdictional narcotic enforcement necessitates total involvement of local agencies. Since the narcotic problem generally is spread over an entire area, there can be no soft spots in terms of enforcement. The increase in efficiency of operation which is brought about by this type of participation enables units to attack the narcotic problem at the source rather than on the street. Total participation of all departments also reduces the amount of investment that each department must make, thereby reducing the cost for each individual participant.

It should be understood by the planners that not all departments will be able to contribute manpower, material, or funds. This is primarily true of smaller departments. The moral support and assistance in furnishing information and intelligence which small departments can provide will ultimately be important to the success of the unit. To obtain such cooperation and moral support, the planners must be able to sell the MAN unit concept to others. The benefits of a MAN unit should be pointed out to the local chiefs and to community leaders. Any objections regarding its implementation should be discussed openly. For example, a common objection of police administrators toward assigning officers to a unit is that departmental manpower is depleted. The best counter-argument to this objection is that by contributing manpower a department does not really lose an officer, but instead gains the services of the ten or eleven specialized agents who are assigned to the unit. Whenever a department needs assistance, the entire squad will be at its disposal.

Another objection to joining a unit is the desire for departmental autonomy. Traditionally, the American system of law enforcement has been based on the belief that local police departments are more responsive to the local needs of a community. By participating in MAN units, local departments are relinquishing some control of their personnel. However, through representation on the governing board and

participation in decisions regarding how agents are used and how operations are conducted, the local chief maintains adequate control over his assigned officers.

G. Soliciting Participation of Local Colleges and Universities

Local colleges and universities should be encouraged to assist and participate in MAN unit operations. A college can contribute funds, equipment, or manpower from its campus security department. Responses to our questionnaire revealed that seven units had campus security officers serving as agents. The greatest number of campus officers in a unit was three in a unit of over 60 agents, while two other units had two campus officers each. Interestingly, six of the seven units with these types of agents were in the 7 to 14 agent-per-unit range. In the cases of the 12 units visited, one college gives \$10,000 annually; another lends portable radios to a unit; and a third assigns an officer to a squad. In the most ideal situation, the local college will be able to contribute manpower and funds, while at minimum it may only be able to give cooperation and moral support to the unit.

Unit directors in locales with colleges and universities recognize that part of their drug and narcotic problems originate on these campuses. Since a unit may frequently have to go onto the campus to make a buy or to intercept a shipment, cooperation with the university administration can make the unit's task much easier. Whenever possible, units should have local college officials or campus security directors serve as members of the governing board.

Concomitantly, a director must also be aware of the public relations efforts that the unit must make in its relationship with local colleges. Because of their attempts to be responsive to students, college administrators are usually very sensitive to law enforcement efforts, especially covert operations, which are made on campus. This may be the primary reason that some campus officials, although they wish to actively participate, will make financial contributions to the unit instead of involving campus security officers in covert operations. Therefore, a unit should coordinate its activities with a representative or liaison officer from the college in order to avoid claims that the unit is conducting covert operations within the campus without the knowledge of campus officials.

H. Sources of Advice and Technical Assistance

Planners of a MAN unit can obtain assistance from a variety of sources including other MAN units.

They can visit other units to gain an understanding of how they are organized, structured, and operated. The Tucson area squad, for example, has been host to a number of planners who have conducted information gathering visits. In some cases these planners have procured grant money to defray the expense of such visits.

In other cases, directors of established units can be asked to visit locales where units are being organized to provide on-site assistance. This is common practice, for example, in Ohio, where personnel of various units frequently assist each other. The DEA in its 10-week Police Agent's School offers local officers a 6- to 8-hour class, taught by a MAN unit director, on MAN unit concepts and operations. In one particular instance, a police chief was sent throughout the United States to give talks to local law enforcement officials. In this case, Chief Frank Virgulak of the Norwalk, Connecticut, Police Department was instrumental in establishing one of the first MAN units in the country in 1968. During the first several years of the unit's operation, he visited various parts of the country to explain MAN unit operations.

By selecting "professional" MAN unit directors (individuals who have previously served as directors of other units), the planners obtain experienced men who bring with them proven knowledge and capability in the administration and operation of a MAN squad.

Another source of assistance is the state planning agency. In states which have other MAN units, SPA personnel who are familiar with their organizational and planning problems may be able to save a new unit many problems and headaches. A planning agency can help the unit with the establishment of fiscal checks, unit evaluation methods, equipment procurement, and records management.

The planners of a unit might also consider contacting other non-narcotic cooperative squads, such as organized crime and vice units, which operate in the local region. These types of units can be visited to obtain information on how the units were organized, how they operate, and the problems that they have encountered. Local departments served by these units can provide information on local conditions and areas of difficulty that are likely to affect the MAN unit.

State and federal narcotic enforcement agencies are a very helpful source of assistance because they can assist the unit in determining the training needs of its personnel and the schools which are available to the unit. In the area of equipment procurement, these agencies can recommend the types of equip-

ment needed and the manufacturing firms from which to purchase this equipment. Unit planners can also examine other areas such as records systems and the evaluation methods used by these agencies.

I. Pre-Origin Publicity

There are some advantages in the systematic use of pre-origin publicity. For one thing, it will help make the public aware of local narcotic problems and the overall need for establishing a MAN unit. Publicity can help to generate the public support that may be needed by the unit if controversy about its operations develops. Finally, this type of publicity can result in greater active cooperation from individual citizens and local community groups.

Pre-origin publicity should discuss such things as the extent of the local narcotics problem, the number of seizures made by local departments, estimates of

the amount of narcotics coming into the area, the number of arrests and cases of overdoses, the need for cooperation among the local police agencies, jurisdictional restrictions and the diffusion of the narcotic enforcement effort that impede narcotics investigations, and the role of the MAN unit in the solution of these problems. Public attention should be focused on the following specific benefits of MAN unit operations: consolidation of manpower and resources; receipt of federal and state money for funding assistance; the ability to continue investigations from one jurisdiction to another; the setting of realistic priorities such as concentrating on wholesale dealers; and the rendering of assistance to smaller communities to facilitate narcotic enforcement in those locales. Finally, other MAN units which have been established and are functioning well can be pointed out as examples of what a unit can accomplish.

CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATION

A. Types of MAN Units

Multi-agency narcotic units can be classified by organizational make-up into three groups: the "pure" MAN unit, the city/county unit, and the civilian staffed unit.

The most prevalent type of squad, the "pure" unit, is composed of assigned officers representing a relatively large number of local departments. The local departments may also contribute money and equipment. The main strength of this type of unit lies in the number of participating local departments.

In the city/county squads, there are usually two active participants, the county sheriff's office and the major police department in that county. Although another police department, the State Attorney's office, or the state police may contribute an agent, the bulk of unit manpower comes from the sheriff's office and the major police department. The utilization of city/county squads is necessary in some areas, since there may be no other departments with sufficient resources to contribute manpower, money, or equipment. In some regions, the sheriff's office provides services to many small towns and villages that cannot or do not maintain police departments. Thus, the burden for maintaining a MAN unit rests on the two major agencies.

The third type of MAN unit employs civilian or hired agents who do not necessarily have previous police experience. In two of the civilian units visited, one squad hired agents who did not have police experience, while the other used agents with previous law enforcement experience. A third unit, the Las Cruces area squad, had four civilian agents who were hired strictly to make undercover buys and supplement the full-time agents. The fact that agents are hired and, therefore, local departments are not represented on the unit staff by assigned officers is the only major distinction between these units and those with assigned agents. In both types of units, departmental participation is characterized by the following: (1) local departments may contribute money and equipment, (2) the unit director usually comes from one of the local departments, (3) the local chiefs participate on the governing board, and (4) a cooperative relationship in the area of narcotic enforcement

exists between the unit and the police departments. It is recognized, however, that directors of units with hired agents may have a greater problem in obtaining cooperation from local departments than the directors of "pure" MAN units.

B. Legal Basis of Units

The legal basis of MAN units can generally be established through (1) a formal, cooperative agreement signed by the participating departments, (2) the swearing in of officers from various departments as deputies of the counties where the unit will have jurisdiction, and (3) state legislation that authorizes the formation of the units and the agents' operations throughout a region or state.

1. *Formal agreements.* Formal cooperative agreements among departments give a unit a sound, legal basis for its operations. Such agreements formally recognize that MAN unit officers have jurisdictional authority. The agreement also formally provides unit officers with life, health, and liability insurance and other personnel benefits while they are working outside their communities. Further, the use of written documents requires the participating agencies to consider and plan various aspects of unit administration and operation.

It is important that these agreements do not include items that are readily susceptible to change. For example, neither the exact amount of the budget nor the names of the unit personnel should be included in the agreement. Of the units visited, two had formal written agreements—the Las Cruces unit and the Southwest Regional Crime Squad in Connecticut. The latter's agreement was formulated by the Connecticut Statewide Coordinating Council for use by all five regional squads operating in the state (Appendix C contains the Connecticut agreement).

The following are subject areas that should be included in a unit agreement:

- Parties executing the agreement and the date.
- Reasons, justification, and authority for executing the agreement.
- The general purpose of the squad, i.e., narcotic enforcement and related activity in the local area.

- The composition, name, and meetings of the governing board; rotation of members, if applicable.
- Selection of board chairman.
- Purpose and schedule for board meetings.
- Equality of votes of board members.
- Reports to and from the board.
- Appointment of the unit director.
- Appointment of unit personnel from participating agencies.
- Assignment of temporary or short-term personnel.
- Responsibility for payment of salaries of unit personnel and provision of health benefits.
- Indemnification of unit personnel against losses, damages, and liabilities arising from services with the unit.
- Conferring powers, duties, privileges, liabilities, and immunities on unit agents in all municipalities.
- Notification of local departments of pending or accomplished arrests in their respective municipalities.
- Booking of, and responsibility for, arrested persons by the local departments.
- Responsibility for evidence seized by the unit.
- Notification of local departments of search warrants obtained on any local suspects.
- Responsibility for news releases relating to arrests within a participating municipality.
- Assessment of local agencies for monies needed for operating expenses.
- Responsibility for establishing procedures for conduct of financial matters.
- Seizures of vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft by the unit.
- Settlement by the board of disputes between participating departments stemming from operations and activities of the unit.
- Duration of the agreement.
- Recall of agents and equipment.
- Termination of agreement by some or all of the participating departments.

2. *Commissioning of agents in multi-jurisdictions.*

MAN unit agents can also be sworn in by the sheriff's office, permitting them to work throughout the county as commissioned deputies. In cases where unit operations cover several several counties, the agents can be deputized in each county. In the Multi-County Unit, for example, the unit agents are sworn in as county deputies in six counties. In other units, such as the Las Cruces squad, agents may be sworn in as

county deputies in addition to being covered by a cooperative agreement. In the San Diego unit, which was composed of city, county, and federal agents, the city and federal agents were sworn in San Diego County.

3. *State legislation.* A state may enact legislation that authorizes municipalities to form cooperative units. For example, in Connecticut a state act, House Bill No. 5467, allows two or more municipalities to enter into an agreement to form a regional crime squad to combine police investigative services for the enforcement of state narcotic and drug laws and related criminal activity. The bill also authorizes unit agents to perform squad investigations in any municipality, with the same "powers, duties, privileges, and immunities" as the police officers from those municipalities. In addition to this legislation, each of the five regional crime squads which operate in the state has a formal, written agreement.

On occasion, there may be other legislation through which a unit may function. For example, a state may have a statute giving local officers authority to operate anywhere in the state, so long as they are assisting a state police officer. Assignment of one state trooper to a MAN unit, therefore, authorizes the local agents to operate within any jurisdiction in the state. Such legislation should not be relied upon, however, as a legal basis for unit operations because (a) if the state police cease to work with the unit, the legal basis for the unit ceases to exist, and (b) such a weak basis could be challenged by another party.

4. *Units operating in two States.* One of the units visited, the Quad City Unit, operated in two different states—Illinois and Iowa. The unit's jurisdiction included four counties, one in Iowa and three in Illinois. The four main cities in the area are Davenport (Iowa), Moline, East Moline, and Rock Island (Illinois). To enable the unit to operate in both states, the Attorney General's offices of the two states waived the residency requirements for unit agents in each state and ensured that the agents were covered with liability insurance by their respective departments regardless of where they worked. In addition to these actions, every agent was then sworn in as a deputy in the four counties within the two states.

The procedure followed by these two states in neutralizing obstacles to unit operations demonstrates how other units can operate in similar circumstances. The waiving of state requirements is essential because it facilitates the swearing in of agents in two or more states and ensures the legality of unit operations in the two states. The legality of units operating in this way has not been challenged.

C. Governing Boards

Ten of the 12 units visited by the project director had a governing board, while 84 of the 104 units that responded to the survey questionnaire reported that they maintained such boards, an overall rate of 81%. Depending on the units, these boards have been referred to as governing boards, supervisory boards, and boards of chiefs. For the purposes of this manual, the term "governing board" will be used.

Nationally, most unit governing boards are composed of either all police administrators or a combination of police chiefs and court officers, and non-law enforcement professionals such as college administrators and city government officials. For example, the MAT unit in Ohio had several judges and probation officers on the board, while the board of the Las Cruces unit included five city council members.

The primary advantage of placing civilians on the board is that their presence assures the public that a MAN unit is not a *sub rosa*, uncontrolled operation. Accountability by the squad to a higher police and civil authority may allay the fears of some civilians who question the utilization of MAN units. At the same time, having city government officials on the board may be beneficial to the unit by generating support for the unit where it is important—at the executive level of city government. If city officials serve on the board, their enthusiasm and support can be of great benefit to the unit should it encounter adverse publicity or problems in the continuation of funding after its state or federal funding cycle.

The membership of the board should include as many of the local chiefs as practical, recognizing that too many members may make the board unmanageable. Usually, units are able to accommodate most local chiefs in the unit. However, in those units where all area chiefs cannot be included, a rotational system should be implemented. The system should allow the departments that make major contributions of manpower, equipment, and funds to the unit to have constant representation. The participation of other departments should be rotated so that even the smallest ones participate and are represented. Depending on the number of local departments, this rotation could be done every 12 months. A chairman of the board should be selected or elected by the board members. The position of chairman, depending on local preference, can be permanently designated or rotated among the members.

One of the purposes of the governing board is to give advice and guidance to the director. Special

problems that the director encounters, especially those which involve local departments, should be brought up for discussion and resolution. The board should also ensure that the unit is operated and administered as originally intended. Board members must play a major role in the evaluation of the unit by examining unit activities, accomplishments, and failures and by giving advice on how to improve unit performance in specific areas.

The board should be involved in the planning process and the formulation of unit policy when such policy concerns major areas of unit administration and operation. These areas include working relationships of the unit and participating departments, selection of personnel, and the enforcement policy of the unit. The areas which would not be the focus of board action would be those which are operational in nature. The governing board should also be entrusted with the responsibility for discharging a director for appropriate reasons.

Although it is typical for a unit to maintain constant communication with board members during the course of unit operations, regular board meetings should be held. The frequency of the meetings, obviously, is dependent on local factors, although monthly meetings seem to be typical for most units. During these meetings, the unit director should brief the board on pertinent facets of unit operation and administration, such as expenditures, purchases of equipment, arrests and buys, cases initiated, court dispositions, personnel turnovers, disciplinary actions, and any special problems which the unit encounters.

D. Multi-Functional Units

Approximately one quarter of the MAN units responding to the written questionnaire indicated that they had investigative responsibilities in addition to those involving narcotics cases. Twenty-six units (24%) responded that their additional responsibilities were in the following areas:

- All Part I Crimes (10 units)
- Organized Crime (3 units)
- Gambling (3 units)
- Burglary and Theft (2 units)
- Armed Robbery and Burglary (2 units)
- Vice, Organized Crime & Intelligence (1 unit)
- Prostitution and Gambling (1 unit)
- Vice (1 unit)
- Burglary (1 unit)
- Fugitive Apprehension (1 unit)

- Gambling, Auto Theft and Counterfeiting
(1 unit)

Another thirty-eight units indicated that they would investigate non-narcotic violations when requested to do so.

Two of the units visited had additional investigative areas assigned to them. The Stockton/San Joaquin Unit was integrated into the Vice, Organized Crime, and Intelligence sections of the Stockton Police Department. The unit operated under two separate grants. The Cameron County Squad investigated all vice and auto theft cases, although it consisted of only five agents, including the director.

The major problem faced by multi-functional units results from the overextension of effort coupled with unrealistic expectations held by local chiefs. The units suffer from manpower shortages when they are forced to utilize personnel in various types of investigations. In the case of units with the sole responsibility for narcotics investigation, most cases are initiated by the unit; very few are turned over to it. This is in contrast to other investigative units which receive most cases by referral. Therefore, a multi-jurisdictional felony unit will usually be inundated with requests for assistance. Local chiefs will expect the unit to pursue to conclusion each serious case referred to it.

Another problem area for these units is that of priority selection. Because of manpower shortages, a unit director must decide what areas of investigation warrant first consideration. He may decide to concentrate on narcotics, gambling, or burglary, for example. Typically, however, the director's decision will be influenced by the priorities of the local chiefs, and he may find unit priorities changing as the chiefs are subjected to local public pressure.

Clearly, a director and the governing board must initially agree on the areas that will receive top priority in unit enforcement. Failure to do so may create a chaotic situation where unit efforts are expended in too many directions at one time, weakening the advantages of specialization.

E. Statewide Narcotic Intelligence Networks

One organization that can be of major assistance is a statewide narcotic intelligence unit. In states where such a unit exists or where a state narcotic agency has assumed the responsibility for this function, MAN units have been able not only to obtain pertinent information, but also to contribute information that

has proved useful to other units. In states such as Illinois, Michigan, and Texas, state enforcement agencies assist in collecting and disseminating narcotic information and intelligence. In Connecticut, the statewide Coordinating Committee collects all intelligence from each of the five regional units and disseminates it to the others, thus ensuring that there is no duplication of effort in case investigations.

The California Narcotics Information Network (CNIN) was established to collect and disseminate narcotic information and intelligence—its scope of activity does not include general intelligence. The goals that it has prescribed for itself are:

- To promote the exchange of confidential narcotics information and intelligence regarding individuals involved in illicit narcotic traffic, which is not normally obtainable through regular police channels.
- To provide for the collation and correlation of such information and intelligence.
- To place emphasis on enforcement and intelligence relating to criminals and traffickers in large quantities of narcotics and dangerous drugs.
- To provide for the dissemination of information regarding fugitives and narcotic suspects who are considered dangerous.
- To encourage the development of personal relationships and trust among CNIN members, thereby increasing the exchange of confidential narcotics information.
- To increase the number and quality of significant arrests and prosecutions for narcotic violations and related offenses.

In addition to narcotic units in California, CNIN has also accepted units from Nevada and Arizona as network members.

Information on suspects is distributed under restrictions that are imposed by the submitting unit. According to the desire of the submitting agency, the CNIN will:

- Release information on a suspect to all bona fide CNIN members.
- Release the name of the submitting agency only to another CNIN member requesting information on a suspect.
- Notify the submitting agency that another agency has made an inquiry about a particular suspect.
- Release all information from an agency on a suspect only to specific agencies listed by the contributor of that information.

The benefits of such a narcotic intelligence network are obvious. Information regarding drug traffickers can be centralized and disseminated when needed to the participating agencies. At the same time, the network gives an agency the opportunity to check with other units about narcotics operations that may be of mutual interest.

F. Agencies for Coordinating MAN Units

Some states have discerned a need for the coordination of MAN units. In a few cases, new agencies have been formed to coordinate the efforts of units, such as in the case of Connecticut. In others, an existing agency has been entrusted with the responsibility; for example, in Illinois, the State Bureau of Investigation monitors the units. In Ohio, a third alternative is utilized—a non-governmental association has been formed by the units to enhance the exchange of information and cooperation among units.

The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee (SECC), formed in 1971, was recognized by Connecticut General Assembly legislation in 1973. The role of the Committee is to coordinate and monitor the operations of the five regional MAN units that serve the State of Connecticut. The responsibilities of SECC include the following:

- Development of standard operating procedures and policies.
- Allocation of funding and resources for the squads.
- Creation and centralization of an intelligence system.
- Evaluation of squad performance.
- Procurement of federal and state funds and their dissemination to the squads.
- Development of inter-local agreements among the towns within each of the five regions.
- Conduction of in-service training programs for squad agents.
- Conduction of narcotic training programs for police officers to enhance local departmental capability in drug investigation.
- Improvement of coordination and liaison among the squads and other law enforcement agencies.
- Procurement of undercover vehicles and fleet insurance for the vehicles.
- Development of a management information system to provide SECC with information on the operations and general performance of the squads.

- Publication of a monthly newsletter reporting the activities of the squads and SECC.
- Participation of SECC staff on the Connecticut Drug Advisory Council sub-committee to contribute information and expertise.
- Submission of monthly and annual reports to the State Drug Advisory Council on the regional squads' activities.

The Committee is composed of two chiefs of police from each squad region, two chiefs-at-large, two representatives of the state criminal justice planning agency, the Commissioner of the State Police, the State Director of Adult Probation, a DEA special agent, and the University of Connecticut Security Director. The professional staff of SECC includes an Executive Director, an Assistant Director for Intelligence, and the Assistant Director for Planning, Development and Evaluation.

Before the SECC was formed, there were serious difficulties encountered in the coordination of narcotic enforcement efforts among the existing regional squads. Operating procedures and policies, enforcement priorities, financial administration procedures, and public information policies needed to be standardized. An agency was needed that could provide support services, establish an inter-squad intelligence system, and serve as a liaison with external law enforcement agencies. Participating chiefs who were surveyed by the state planning agency reported that the major benefits derived from SECC's role were improved flow of information and communication, more efficient administration and operations, and improved response to requests for service.

An organization such as SECC offers a viable solution to the problems encountered in establishing uniformity and standardization of procedures for organizing, administering, and operating MAN units. Certainly, the concept works very well in Connecticut, a small state. In a large state, an agency like the SECC should be established on a regional basis.

The people involved in the formation of SECC and in getting the appropriate legislation passed were able to agree on objectives. Other states may not be so fortunate. Other chiefs may not wish to lose any local autonomy while participating in a MAN unit program. Loss of autonomy also applies to unit directors. For example, in the Connecticut system, anticipated buys involving large purchases by one of the squads must be approved by SECC since it is concerned with fiscal administration. The SECC concept, however, can be modified to suit the needs of the individual states.

Another approach to the coordination of MAN

units entails statewide evaluation. The MAN units in Illinois are monitored by the Illinois Bureau of Investigation. Although the procedure there involves the evaluation of administrative and operating activities by the Bureau, previous approval to spend confidential funds, make purchases, or coordinate its efforts with other MAN units or law enforcement agencies is not needed.

Most MAN units would benefit from a regional or statewide coordinating and monitoring agency. As the funding of MAN units by state and federal agencies increases, so does the possibility that there will be greater insistence that MAN units work with regional or statewide coordinating agencies.

Still another way of achieving a measure of coordination among units was found in Ohio. Personnel from approximately 13 MAN units in the state organized the Narcotics Association of Regional Coordinating Officers of Ohio (NARCO). The objectives of the Association are to:

- Promote coordination and cooperation in narcotic enforcement.
- Encourage and promote the MAN unit concept of narcotic enforcement.
- Provide exchange of intelligence and successful operational techniques.

Membership in the Association is open to all narcotic investigators and prosecuting attorneys involved in narcotic cases; however, other non-voting police officers are also invited to attend meetings. Association officers consist of a President, Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Meetings, held bi-monthly at different locations throughout the state, typically have an agenda that includes the participation of outside speakers on narcotic subjects, granting awards for local police officers who make outstanding narcotic arrests or investigations, and discussions of topics that are of concern to the state MAN units represented.

The significant achievement of NARCO is its provision of a forum for discussion of problem areas affecting the units and the exchange of information on operational and administrative matters. Not only is there the exchange of intelligence and information through informal conversations before and after the meetings, but also the members remain in contact after they return to their respective units. The Association has done much to enhance positive interaction among the units and in selling the MAN unit concept to others. The NARCO concept is one that other units may consider in the absence of an official vehicle to facilitate interaction among narcotics officers.

G. Unit Facilities

The decision whether to locate a unit within a department or whether to use separate facilities depends on a variety of factors including the amount of funds available, geographical settings of the various departments, and the availability of either type of facility. For this reason, the author makes no recommendations as to which facility best serves the needs of a unit. The advantages and disadvantages of both, however, should be examined.

A major advantage in using departmental facilities is the savings to a unit in cash outlay. The unit is able to accept the use of a facility and various types of equipment and supplies as an in-contribution from a particular department. Another advantage is the enhancement of cooperation and support between unit agents and other officers. There is more personal contact among all officers and the unit's responsibilities will be better understood. When a unit is located within a major department, it has access to the department's records, files, lock-up and communication facilities. Such support factors may still be available when a unit physically separates itself from the department. However, the loss of regular interpersonal contact necessarily detracts from the strength of the relationship between department and unit personnel.

One of the major disadvantages in using departmental facilities, however, is the difficulty encountered in maintaining agents' undercover identities. If agents are seen entering and leaving a police department almost daily, their identities will be known to narcotic suspects within a short period of time. In a separate facility, the movement of unit personnel is less conspicuous.

Where a unit is located in a local police station, there may also be a tendency for departmental administrative officers to interfere with unit operations. When a unit is quartered with other investigative squads, which is typical, the unit director has to answer directly to the chief, who is a board member, while working for the commander of the investigative bureau. This creates a violation of the principle of unity of command since the director now has two bosses. Although the chief's authority is unquestionable, it is the bureau commander to whom the director may go for advice in making everyday decisions. If a unit has separate facilities, however, it is organizationally sound for the director to communicate directly with the chief without going through the bureau commander. In addition, a unit operating out of a department usually has to comply with the

rules, regulations, and policies of the chief and the bureau commander, which may inhibit the operations of the unit.

If a unit must be maintained in a police station, it should consider locating its office in the police station of a small, fairly remote community. This will assist in removing the unit from an area where agents are likely to be seen by drug suspects.

The primary advantage in using a separate facility is the security, in terms of visibility, that it gives to unit operation. There are three main aspects to this security. The first is keeping outside knowledge of the unit's location to a minimum. This means that marked squad cars should not visit the unit office and informants or suspects should not be brought to the office. A post-office box or false mailing address should be used by unit personnel, and the facility should be situated so that agents cannot be readily seen entering and leaving the office by the public, especially during late evening hours when the heavy traffic of unit personnel could arouse curiosity.

Second, a burglar alarm system will have to be installed and connected to the nearest police agency, and, if possible, set to ring the director's and his assistant's home phone with a recorded message. The local department or sheriff's office should be asked to regularly check the premises in an inconspicuous manner.

The layout of the office should also offer security factors such as the following:

- If it is at all possible, there should be only one entrance to the office situated so that no one can inadvertently or intentionally walk into an office.
- The reception area where a secretary can work should be separated from the work areas of the office.
- The records section should be situated so that the files are not the target of an easy daylight burglary.
- There should be a separate room or enclosure which can be locked at night for the storage of records.

The importance of security is exemplified by the experiences of some of the units which were visited. Three units experienced burglary attempts, one of which was successful. In that instance, records and files were taken. In the other two cases, the perpetrators did not know they were breaking into a MAN unit. These incidents demonstrate the need for physical security of unit offices.

An additional security factor that the director will have to consider in using a separate facility is the

character and integrity of office maintenance personnel. Whether maintenance is provided by the owners of the building or by outside contractors, the persons who clean the unit office should be investigated for criminal involvement. The local police agency and the maintenance company can be contacted for information about the employees. Even the investigation of the company's employees, however, may draw unwanted attention to the unit. Maintenance crews should not have keys to the office, and unit personnel should be present when the cleaning crews are in the office.

H. Lock-Up Facilities

Prisoners should never be detained in unit offices or facilities. Arrangements should be made with local departments for the provision of lock-up facilities for suspects arrested by the unit. In an unincorporated area or a town with no detention facility, the arrestee should be taken to the county jail. Where warrants against unit suspects are given to local departments to serve, the issue of lock-up facilities does not arise.

A difficulty that may be encountered in using local departmental facilities is that the unit is often unsuccessful in having local booking or arresting officers collect the necessary data about an arrestee. For example, if the unit needs personal history forms filled out on arrested narcotic suspects, many small departments cannot or may not take the time to get the information for the agents or take special photographs of the suspect for the unit. Thus, units may have to dispatch cover agents to the local departments during the booking of prisoners or shortly thereafter to obtain the information and pictures it desires.

I. Decentralization

Decentralization was found in two units visited—the Cook County and the San Diego units. The experience of the Chicago unit shows some local conditions that justify decentralization for a MAN squad.

This Cook County unit operates in a 1,200 square mile area having a population of more than 6,000,000 persons. To get a team of agents from the north side of the county to the extreme south side may take up to several hours, depending on traffic conditions. Given the size of the population throughout the county, the illicit drug and narcotic activity in the north, central, and south areas of the county is sufficient to warrant maintaining several teams in each area. Moreover, with a personnel complement of 52 agents and 9 clerical employees, it would be rather difficult for the unit to operate sub rosa from one office facility.

Because of these local factors, the unit maintains one central office and two sub-stations. The unit is divided into three groups, each under the command of a group leader. There is one group and several clerical staff members assigned to each office. The main office also maintains an office room for each of the other two groups so that they can operate out of it whenever the need arises. Evidence is kept in the main office only, as are all unit records, excluding arrest records. Although arrest records are kept in the main office, the groups also maintain duplicate arrest records arising from cases in their respective areas.

Decentralization does not necessarily mean that each group has exclusive operational territories. Allowances were made for the fact that a narcotic investigation or even a narcotic buy may be initiated in one place and terminated in another, distant locale.

There are efforts made by the unit director, however, to coordinate unit operations. Weekly meetings of the director, the intelligence officer, and group leaders are held. Afterwards, the group leaders meet with the team leaders. A telecopier is used by all offices to facilitate the interchange of reports, rosters, logs, and forms among all units, thus reducing the need to hand-carry administrative and operational written material from one office to another.

Each unit can best evaluate its particular need for decentralization. Often, geographical and population factors and costs are important determinants. Maintaining sub-units means extra costs for office equipment and supplies, and a substantial loss in time for maintaining communication, contact, and exchange of information. In addition, decentralization can also create problems with regard to operations coordination.

CHAPTER IV. ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

A. Enforcement Policy

A statement of the enforcement policy of a unit is a matter that requires the mutual agreement of all the law enforcement agencies involved. If it is not discussed and agreed upon at the outset, it will cause the unit's director many problems after the unit is in operation. A MAN unit can concentrate on high-volume pushers, street-level pushers, or users. The first two types of offenders should be the targets of MAN unit efforts, although target selection depends on the environment in which the unit operates. Given the amount of drug activity in most parts of the United States, units usually do not have the time to work cases against users. Indeed, the majority of units do not even have time to investigate street-level pushers. In most of the sites visited, the enforcement efforts of the unit were directed against the high-volume pusher.

1. *Classification of narcotic suspects.* The volume of sales that distinguishes one type of pusher from another is hard to quantify and varies from region to region. What may be a "big" pusher in one region may be a relatively small one in another. For example, in one unit visited near the U.S.-Mexican border, a buy attempt would not be made against a marijuana pusher unless he could deliver over several hundred pounds of marijuana. The reason was not that the unit was uninterested in small dealers, but that there were so many marijuana pushers dealing in 500 or 1,000 pounds that the limited manpower of the unit could not be used to investigate "small-time" dealers. In other regions, however, someone pushing several pounds of marijuana a week is regarded as a big dealer.

Another factor that complicates categorizing drug dealers is that, at the street sale level, users are usually pushers and vice versa. A user generally buys more than he uses with the intention of selling the extra portion to support his habit.

To facilitate the collection and dissemination of narcotic information, the California Narcotic Intelligence Network breaks down individuals involved in

narcotics activity into five highly detailed categories. (See Appendix D for a definition of these categories.) The Stockton/San Joaquin unit classifies drug and narcotic offenders into three categories—major narcotic traffickers, street dealers, and addicts. The following represent the criteria for each category:

Major Narcotic Trafficker

- Heroin—25 dime bags or an ounce or more.
- Marijuana—one kilogram or more.
- Cocaine—an ounce or more.
- Any hashish oil or laboratory equipment.

Street Dealer

- Any lesser quantities than those mentioned above offered for sale.
- Any non-user in possession of the above.
- Marijuana in lots of over two-thirds of a pound, but less than two pounds (approximately 300–900 grams).
- Possession of over ten, but less than 25, dime bags of heroin, or any quantity over one-half ounce but less than one ounce.

Addict

- By marks, physical condition, and where necessary, a urine test.
- By admission of the arrestee.

2. *Enforcement priorities.* In larger units or those units that encounter severe drug problems, the primary investigative effort should be directed toward the major pushers, while local departments direct their efforts toward the street-level dealers and users. Depending on local narcotic activity, it is possible for some MAN units to investigate both big pushers and street-level sellers, leaving the users to local agencies. MAN units should also handle those user cases where the users are an important source of information on narcotic activity and where the local departments may be unable to obtain information and cooperation from a defendant. Regardless of whether or not the unit handles cases involving users, local agencies must be constantly encouraged to turn over copies of case reports on arrested users.

Occasionally, there may be instances of duplication of effort in narcotics investigation. Local

departments must be discouraged from working narcotic investigations if it has been agreed that the MAN squad will handle all such cases. And conversely, unless enforcement policy is agreed upon from the very beginning, a MAN unit will be asked by the local chiefs to work cases inappropriately small in scope.

Because the volume and type of drugs used varies among areas, it is important that units set priorities and objectives that they feel are appropriate for their respective locales. This will help to ensure that the units actively pursue cases involving the various types of drugs on some systematic, priority basis. Formulation of priority policy must include the participation of local chiefs. The policy should be reviewed after periodic evaluations as to the drugs that the unit and local departments encounter most frequently in the region. While there is a tendency to make a blanket recommendation about which drugs units should pursue most actively, MAN units must be responsive to local conditions, problems, and preferences.

The survey questionnaire asked the units to name the most prevalent drug in their locales. Of 102 responses, 91 units specified marijuana, 7 units listed narcotics, 3 units named hallucinogens, and 1 unit listed stimulants.

Marijuana, then, appears to be the most frequently encountered controlled substance. While it is difficult to estimate what will happen if many states legalize or decriminalize marijuana possession, it is safe to say that unless the distribution, sale, manufacture of marijuana are legalized, MAN units will continue to be concerned with anti-marijuana enforcement.

B. Participation in Non-Narcotic Operations

Although the majority of MAN units are organized and operated with narcotic enforcement as the sole objective, they are sometimes called upon to assist the local police departments in non-narcotic investigations. In most cases, units comply when asked to assist in conducting such investigations since local departments have nowhere else to turn, and unit directors realize the importance of maintaining good working relationships with these agencies. When asked how they handled the requests of local departments to work non-narcotic cases, most directors responded that they provided assistance but withdrew unit participation as soon as possible. Frequently, units become involved in non-narcotic operations because many pushers are involved in related criminal activity. It is common, for example, for a nar-

cotic user also to be involved in various types of theft. Consequently, an agent working a narcotic case will also find himself investigating other types of crimes.

While units should not go out of their way to initiate non-narcotic investigations, when non-narcotic cases are encountered, units should investigate to the point where valuable information can be obtained and then passed to the appropriate agencies.

C. Manual of Procedure

Agents are confused about what and how they should perform when policy and related directives are not written. An unwritten policy regarding some aspect of unit operation is susceptible to misinterpretation and change on a daily basis, often depending on the supervisor who is issuing orders at the time. A manual of procedure, therefore, is an important item for MAN units.

Of the 107 units that responded to the MAN unit questionnaire, 63 units indicated that they had a written manual of procedure, and 9 of the 12 units visited had such a manual. Most of the units, it seems, appreciate the need for a procedural manual.

A manual of procedure is nothing more than an organized compilation of written directives. When a director and his assistants discuss the nature of information about unit activities and the conditions under which it will be released to the press, they are making policy. When they issue orders or directives on this policy and consolidate these with other directives into a single sourcebook, they are creating a manual of procedure. Of course, not all directives are incorporated into a manual. The directives that should be committed to writing fall into the "General Order" category; that is, those orders that deal with the entire unit or a substantial part of it. The manual should be contained in a loose-leaf binder to facilitate the revision of existing orders and the addition of others.

The director and his staff are not the only ones who should assist in developing the unit manual. Unit planners should also make substantial contributions. Some units have much of their policy detailed in the Joint Powers Agreement, while others have had their manual drafted by the local chiefs who originally planned the unit.

Because unit agents represent different departments and have been exposed to and governed by different rules, a manual of procedure is of great importance to the unit and requires thorough planning. The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Commit-

tee in Connecticut has developed a comprehensive manual because of its need to coordinate the activities of the five MAN units in that state. (See Appendix E for Connecticut's Standard Operating Procedure.)

Units should also incorporate their rules and regulations into the manual of procedure. Like all organizations, MAN units have a need to institute restrictive rules to cover certain situations and areas of agent conduct where violation results in disciplinary action. Units must be careful that, in drawing up their rules and regulations, they do not simply copy those rules and regulations of the local departments. Unit rules must be suited to the particular needs of each MAN squad. At the same time, none of the unit rules should contradict those of the local departments unless they have been cleared by the local chiefs. Local departments that assign agents should review the rules and regulations of the unit so that specific points of conflict can be discussed. This will help avoid misunderstandings after the unit is operational. For example, a unit may not prohibit warning shots where a local department does. Preliminary review of this rule by all agencies will resolve the issue before it becomes a problem.

Superfluous items should be omitted. Placing unnecessary restrictions on personnel inhibits their initiative, discretion, and flexibility. Inclusion of items that are violated daily by all personnel without a sincere attempt to enforce them will only cause unit personnel to formulate negative attitudes toward other rules and regulations that may be worthwhile.

It is also advisable that the rules and regulations be submitted by the unit to the State's Attorney's Office or some other qualified party for legal review. This will ensure that the rules and regulations do not include questionable restrictions that would make them vulnerable to successful challenges by police officers or police unions and associations.

D. Legal Advisors

None of the units visited employed their own legal advisor. They all relied on court officers, state's attorneys, and county prosecutors as a source for legal advice. The Stockton/San Joaquin unit was exceptional in that it had an assistant prosecuting attorney assigned to it on a part-time basis. The reasons that MAN units did not employ their own legal advisors, either part-time or full-time, were (1) the high cost of employing them and (2) the availability of prosecuting attorneys. Realistically, the size of most units does not justify hiring one. The National Advisory

Commission on Standards and Goals¹ and the International Association of Chiefs of Police² respectively recommend that departments of 200 and 250 officers or more have a justifiable need for full-time legal advisors.

The need for legal advice is not in question; it certainly exists. However, when a unit needs a legal opinion, the state's attorney or his assistant is usually consulted since they often are the only ones available, are knowledgeable of local cases, and will be involved in the plea bargaining process. For these reasons directors must strive to maintain a cooperative relationship with the state's attorney and his staff.

Although there is a tendency for a unit and state's attorney to work closely together, a unit should refrain from taking state's attorneys along on raids and arrests unless absolutely necessary. The state's attorney, if present at a raid, can be summoned by the defense attorney as a witness, thereby preventing him from serving as the case prosecutor.

E. Liaison Officers

MAN units should encourage each police department to designate one of their officers as a liaison between the police department and the unit. Any contact between the two agencies for operational purposes, such as the exchange of information and intelligence, can then be conducted through him. This officer should work either in narcotics or some other investigative function within the department. By utilizing a liaison officer, one particular individual is contacted and asked for the information; he ensures that the information is obtained and relayed to the unit. If the unit has any information for the department, it can contact the liaison officer directly, and he will be responsible for relaying it to the appropriate party. By the same token, the departments should be encouraged to go through the same liaison officer when they need information or assistance from the squad.

In small departments, the chief often designates himself as the liaison officer. This is understandable and also advantageous: the chief of a small department knows what is happening in his community; he is aware of all on-going operations within his department; and he is at the level of rank where he can en-

¹ "Police," National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 285.

² "Guidelines for a Police Legal Unit," IACP, Gaithersburg, Maryland, p. 10.

sure that the cooperation or assistance requested by the unit is given. Similarly, in the larger departments, it is advisable that the liaison officer be of sufficient rank to obtain needed information and assistance for

the unit.

It is also advisable that local departments designate a standby or alternate liaison officer to be the contact person during absences of the regular liaison.

CHAPTER V. STAFFING

A. Unit Director

1. *Selection.* When the establishment of a MAN unit is first contemplated, it frequently occurs that the chiefs of the two or three major departments involved meet to select a mutually acceptable director for the organization. This is done so that the selected individual can immediately be charged with the responsibility for unit planning and organization. While this type of selection process is expedient, it ignores the preferences and possible objections of the chiefs of participating smaller departments. Since the ultimate success of the MAN unit invariably depends on the degree of cooperation and coordination possible among these departments, such a relatively narrow and arbitrary selection process for unit director is not recommended.

At the very least, a frank discussion among all of the participating chiefs should precede the selection process. Ideally, the responsibility for the selection of a director should rest upon the decision of all of the participating chiefs, although it is understood that this ideal is not always practical or even possible. For instance, the grants of several MAN units specify that the director be selected from one particular department, usually the largest participating department. The reasons are valid. The large departments furnish the office space and most of the personnel, vehicles, and equipment. In addition, their jurisdictional area usually contains most of the illegal narcotic activity in the region. In most cases, it is necessary for the narcotic enforcement function to be coordinated with other related units (e.g., vice and intelligence) operated by those departments. When such grant requirements exist, it is essential that all participating agency heads know why such conditions are in the grant. This philosophy of cooperation should also apply to the selection of unit supervisors. The director should select unit supervisors or team leaders from different agencies whenever possible.

2. *Local versus external candidates.* The selectors of a unit director may either assign a local officer or bring in an outsider. Where such an option exists, the advantages and disadvantages of each should be considered.

The strongest justification can probably be made for the choice of a local officer. A local candidate usually has better knowledge of local problems and conditions and will be more familiar with criminal activity in the area. Even more important, the local unit director will personally know the chiefs and police officers with whom he will have to work. He is also likely to have personal contacts in the various police departments and within the community who can give him information and general assistance from time to time.

Selecting an outside candidate does have some advantages. First, where the desired level of experience and expertise is not to be found among local personnel, an external search may yield a director with the desired MAN unit experience. An external candidate also tends to have a less parochial outlook since he has worked with different units and under different local conditions. His willingness to move to a new location to command a unit is also a factor to consider. The search for an external candidate should be made by a committee appointed, or at least approved by, all participating chiefs.

In units where MAN unit directors from outside the area have been selected, they have performed successfully. The main consideration, however, is that the chances of success be maximized by the selection committee. In the world of MAN units, cooperation and coordination of effort is one of the most important requisites for success and, personal qualities being equal, a local man may be in a better position to promote cooperation among participating agencies.

3. *Administrative skills.* The ability of a unit director to handle administrative duties is crucial. His responsibilities include: establishing and maintaining record systems, purchasing equipment, budgeting, maintaining fiscal checks, monitoring public relations, and maintaining coordination and communication with participating police departments.

Ideally, candidates for the job of director should have both administrative skills and operational knowledge of narcotics enforcement. Selectors should look for a balance in the two abilities when evaluating candidates. Where no candidate is qualified in both areas, however, administrative ability

must be ranked first because a director cannot function without it. Operational knowledge can be acquired more easily than can management expertise. A director with no previous narcotics experience can minimize his initial involvement in operations, delegating certain duties to experienced subordinates until he learns more about narcotics enforcement.

Notwithstanding this preference for administrative skills, the narcotics enforcement experience of a candidate also should be evaluated. This type of experience is important because of the differences between narcotic investigation and other police functions. Vice investigation is perhaps most closely related to narcotics work since it involves intelligence gathering, surveillances, undercover work, and the use of informants. General investigative experience is also helpful. While patrolmen may be unfamiliar with the work done in case preparation, an investigator or an investigations supervisor knows what constitutes a good case in court. In order of preference, then, what should be sought in a MAN unit director after administrative ability is narcotic, vice, or general investigative experience.

4. *The assistant director.* Regardless of the unit size, someone should be designated as an assistant director. The selection for this position should be made by the director since he will have to depend heavily upon his assistant. The primary function of the assistant, aside from being in charge in the absence of the director, is to assume a large portion of the workload usually done by the director. These activities include: reviewing daily reports and activity sheets, general supervision of agents, making assignments, controlling caseloads, and supervising operational work such as surveillances and buys. Just as important, the assistant acts as a buffer between the agents and the director by handling small problems and answering the everyday questions of agents. In small units, which typically experience manpower shortages, the assistant can occasionally be utilized in an operational capacity by participating in surveillances, interrogations, and the debriefing of informants.

In larger units there may be a need for designating someone to be an administrative assistant. Unlike assistant directors, the administrative assistants have no special rank or supervisory duties. However, because of special abilities, they are given a number of administrative duties, which include bookkeeping, budgeting, monitoring and controlling expenses, writing and monitoring the MAN unit grants, purchasing, and controlling and maintaining equipment.

In addition, these assistants can serve as cover agents on certain operations.

B. Selection of Supervisors

The selection of unit supervisors requires careful consideration. For example, the director must decide whether he will bring into the unit someone who is already a supervisor or "promote" someone who is capable of fulfilling the supervisory function. Ideally, a director should seek permanent supervisors from departmental narcotic sections or those who have had narcotic experience. Where this is not possible, however, it is recommended that unit agents familiar with narcotic enforcement and unit operations be appointed as supervisors. Notwithstanding the problem of having someone supervise people who have been his co-workers, there are several advantages to this policy. First, as we have mentioned, the director is assured that the supervisor has had narcotic experience and is familiar with unit operations. The director can select someone he determines has leadership as well as administrative ability. Because leadership tends to be situational in nature, bringing in an outside supervisor from some other police function does not guarantee supervisory capability in narcotic enforcement. High morale and individual incentive can be maintained by rewarding agents through promotion within the unit. The director, if dissatisfied with an "in-house" supervisor, can reassign him to agent status, thus avoiding a situation where he is stuck with a permanent sergeant who performs inadequately. This is important since sergeants in many small departments are operational personnel and do not have supervisory duties.

A director should also anticipate that a police chief may wish to assign a sergeant to the MAN unit, a situation that would force the director to "make" a position for the sergeant. The director should be firm in his insistence that no sergeants be assigned to the unit unless requested. This policy will also eliminate instances where an individual with the permanent rank of sergeant works as an agent and may even be supervised by someone with a permanent rank of patrolman.

Another problem area in this selection process is the tendency to select the best agent to be a supervisor. Investigative ability is not the same as supervisory ability. A director must look beyond the former in making his selection. A probationary period will reduce the risks inherent in the whole selection process.

CHAPTER VI. ADMINISTRATION

A. The Command Structure

1. *Unity of command.* The principle of unity of command is that each individual is under the direct command of only one superior. Unfortunately, the organizational structure of a MAN unit encourages violation of this principle. A unit's governing board is comprised of not one but a number of members to whom the director may have to respond individually outside of board meetings. In addition, one of the board members is likely to be the director's superior, the chief of his department, and when the unit is located in a police department, the director may have to answer to an investigative bureau commander as well.

Violations of the principle of unity of command notwithstanding, MAN units can and do operate under these potentially adverse circumstances. For example, in the Lansing, Stockton, and Tucson units, the directors are under the command of a Bureau or Division Commander. Yet the directors answer directly to the department chief in many matters. Despite this unorthodox relationship, units are able to operate smoothly and effectively mainly because the directors serve under bureau commanders who understand the difficulty of their position. The commanders understand that there will be times when the directors have to go around them and directly to the chiefs. Concomitantly, the director eliminates many difficulties by going through the commander whenever possible and by keeping the commander well informed, even if only on an unofficial basis.

When a unit operates out of a police department, the director ideally should report directly to the chief. Nonetheless, there should be close coordination between the unit and the other investigative sections of that department because records and equipment must be shared and many narcotic investigations spill over into other enforcement areas such as vice and organized crime.

Internally, a unit will also experience some difficulty in adhering to the principle of unity of command because agents sometimes must answer both to the director and to a chief or sheriff. If an agent is permitted to contact his chief at any time, or if their

discussions lead to unit administrative matters, the authority of the director may be subverted. The easiest way to avoid this problem is for the director to establish a structured chain of command and insist that it be followed by everyone. Thus, if an agent wishes to see his chief, he should notify the director or one of the supervisors and explain the reasons for the desired meeting.

In many units visited, agents were expected to contact their chiefs on a weekly basis and brief them on general activities. Although these units suffered no apparent problems as a result of this practice, the potential for difficulty is there.

2. *Delegation of authority.* The wide scope of duties and tasks for which a director is responsible makes it necessary that he delegate some of his authority. As much as a director may want to be involved in all phases of unit operation and administration, he simply cannot stretch his time and energy far enough to do this. Even in the small units with six or seven agents, such as the Cameron County and MAT units, the directors find it difficult to perform administrative, supervisory, and operational duties as well as maintain inter-agency relationships and public relations for the unit.

Delegation of work by a director depends on (1) the number of his duties, (2) the availability of manpower, and (3) the capability of unit personnel to assume some of the director's duties. Of the three, the first factor is the most important one. For example, in the Lansing and Stockton units, the directors were in charge of investigative sections other than the MAN unit. It was necessary for them to rely heavily on others to manage the unit. If sufficient manpower is available, the director can also delegate a substantial portion of the administrative tasks such as budgeting, bookkeeping, and purchasing.

The leader of a unit must also consider training someone to assume the director's role during any temporary or extended absence. This not only produces continuity in unit operations but also allows subordinates to assume greater duties and gain experience and expertise in various areas.

3. *Titles and rank.* The titles of the officers in charge of the various units have included command-

recorded agent reports, performing bookkeeping tasks, and purchasing various items and supplies. In addition, she may be called upon to glibly give some cover story on the telephone or perhaps search a female informant prior to a controlled informant buy. Because she will be required to do a variety of jobs, flexibility on her part will be very important. Her hours may be irregular, and she will also have to be tight-lipped regarding the information to which she has access. This ability to keep information to oneself must extend to internal matters so that she does not repeat what she overhears in a conversation, for example, between a local chief and the director regarding one of the agents.

Secretaries can be recruited in a variety of ways. An ad placed in local or area newspapers without mention made of the organization can be utilized. Requirements regarding the assortment of duties and irregular hours should be included in the ad to eliminate those secretaries who desire specific duties and hours. Unit personnel can inform the secretaries working in the participating departments or in city government offices of the existing vacancy. A third alternative is to go to the waiting lists of secretaries who are trying to get employment with the various town governments or with participating police departments and sheriff's offices. Often the secretaries on these lists have already been subjected to background checks, particularly if they were considered for sensitive jobs. If a background check of a secretarial candidate has not been made, however, the unit commander will have to conduct his own thorough background investigation.

H. Specialized Personnel

As in general law enforcement, there is also need for specialized personnel in MAN units. In the smaller units, an agent "specializes" when he is assigned certain special functions in addition to his general duties. In the larger units, an agent can be assigned to full-time specialized functions. Some of these specialized tasks are: evidence officer, intelligence officer, intelligence analyst, and canine officer. While there are many advantages to making specialized assignments, the director must remember that there is also a point of diminishing returns. For example, the greater the increase of specialized positions, the greater is the depletion of the main body of general agents. In addition to this, the tasks of coordinating

and supervising all unit functions become more difficult.

In some units an agent is assigned to process all narcotic evidence. Evidence officers can ensure that evidence is securely stored and that all accompanying offense reports are complete so that the cases are ready for court. They can also monitor cases to make certain that evidence will be destroyed after the cases have gone to court.

If someone cannot be assigned full time to the job of intelligence officer, it should be assigned as a part-time function to an agent, supervisor, or even the director if the unit is a small one. Regardless of who performs as the intelligence officer, someone within the unit should process information as it comes in, ensuring that information is checked against existing unit intelligence and logged. This officer should also see to it that pertinent information is disseminated to unit personnel and other appropriate agencies, and that needed additional information is gathered. Although this position is a very important one, the director must make certain that the amount of intelligence work is sufficient to justify a full-time assignment. If not, then the intelligence officer should be given additional duties.

The primary functions of the analyst are to evaluate information which has been gathered, make judgments based on that evaluation, and determine whether further information will be needed. If further information is required, the analyst must be able to determine how the additional information will be gathered: that is, whether it should be obtained through surveillance, an informant, or an undercover agent.

The functions of an intelligence officer or analyst should be entrusted to individuals who possess the personal characteristics to do an effective job. These qualities include the ability to do without the more exciting aspects of narcotic enforcement. In other words, he must be content to handle routine, often tedious work. Simultaneously, however, he must have the initiative to go beyond the obvious and develop alternative solutions to a problem. This requires an analytical and curious mind, the ability to look past unimportant and irrelevant information and focus on the crucial aspects of a problem. A director should be willing to go outside the unit if necessary to hire a capable individual. This person may be a local police officer, or he may be a retired analyst or intelligence specialist from the military or other governmental agencies.

from several police agencies and, in addition, hired civilian agents who volunteer to assist the MAN unit as "special agents" at a salary of \$500 a month. When originally interviewed, an attempt is made to discourage participation by describing the dangers, harassment, and problems they will face as unit agents. If the prospective agents cannot be dissuaded from their original intent, they are then considered for employment after a thorough background check is made. When hired, the civilian agent is assigned to one of the regular agents, who provides training. The new employee meets most of the cover agents, but he is not introduced to undercover agents. Despite the fact that he has arrest powers, a civilian agent is not allowed to make arrests or carry a weapon.

Approval for employment of a civilian agent is made by the governing board of the unit. An arrangement is then made with the financial officer of the project so that the civilian agent can be paid through a fictitious name. The real identity, personal history, and social security information on the agent is kept secure in a safe, and is known only by the financial officer and unit personnel. The agent is hired for four months with the understanding that he will be terminated at the end of that period. It is understood that after termination, he will testify on the cases he has worked. In some instances, where the civilian agent's identity is still secure, he may be rehired for another four months. The agent is responsible for procuring his own insurance and hospitalization.

Some units hire only agents who have had previous police or investigative experience. A unit commander should realize, however, that by hiring experienced officers he will have to pay wages that are comparable to local police departments. Thus, the savings in cost will be substantially reduced. At the same time, the money for wages will have to come from the grant source and the local departments. While many departments will assign an officer to a unit, they are often reluctant to contribute \$8,000 or \$10,000 per year to pay for hiring an agent.

F. Women in MAN Units

Although opinions regarding the utility of females differed among directors, a female agent can be of great value to a unit. For example, in surveillances, a female alone in a car or with a male agent is less conspicuous than one or two male agents in a car. Female officers can be utilized in searching female suspects and informants used in controlled buys. Even in making agent-buys, female agents draw less

suspicion from a pusher than does a male agent. When a female agent posing as a "girl friend" accompanies a male agent in a buy, there is usually less suspicion of the male agent. Size is the major drawback in utilizing females, according to some directors. Most agents, they argue, would rather have a male agent backing them up in case of physical danger. If a male agent needs a female as a companion in a buy, detractors argue, a female informant can be used. A problem with this argument is that (1) female informants are not always available, and (2) the reliability of an informant in a threatening situation is questionable.

Another common criticism of the use of female agents is the potential problem of intimate relationships between male and female agents. Realistically, this objection is not valid. Certainly the same potential for this type of problem exists between male agents and secretaries or female informants, yet these females are not excluded from unit work because of sex. The director and supervisors must set the moral tone for the unit. If they are adamant in prohibiting any intimate relationship between male agents and female agents, the problem may be prevented.

Perhaps the most serious problem in employing female agents is that male agents tend to be overprotective of them. Male agents do not like to babysit female agents, and the females in turn resent paternalism. Overprotectiveness, however, arises from the social norms and attitudes learned by both men and women since childhood. One can safely predict that given current trends, this attitude will change throughout society. In a MAN unit, the attitudinal change is generally very fast. After a period of time, a capable female agent is usually accepted as a regular member of the team. Conversely, women agents tend to overcompensate in their attempts to prove that they can do the work. Therefore, directors and supervisors must make certain that female agents do not unnecessarily place themselves in hazardous situations.

Of the 12 units visited, five employed female agents. Three of the units were those that also used civilian agents. It appears that civilian-staffed units use women more frequently than do officer-staff units for previously stated reasons.

G. Secretarial Personnel

The position of a secretary in a MAN unit is a very important one. The secretary is responsible for regular secretarial duties, such as handling written and telephonic communications, typing written or tape-

with no police experience. The relatively low cost is the most important factor to consider. The two units using these types of individuals paid them \$500 a month. The agents were responsible for obtaining their own life insurance and hospitalization. For its money, the unit theoretically received 20 hours a week from each agent. In practice, however, the agents would voluntarily contribute significantly more time to their duties.

Unlike assigned officers, civilian agents are not known to the drug crowd as police officers. They are especially valuable in a rural or small city regions where the majority of the local police officers are well-known by the population. Another advantage in the use of civilian agents is that they are usually employed with the understanding that their jobs are temporary. When they become known by local pushers, they can be discharged. The director should make an effort to find them a job. It has been found that when an agent is discharged, he has little difficulty finding another job with a different MAN unit in adjacent areas or elsewhere in the state. He is much better equipped than an assigned agent to transfer to another unit because he is usually young, single, and does not lose any seniority or fringe benefits.

Single civilian agents are not hampered by family problems that may arise when a married agent has to work irregular hours or when he must drastically change his lifestyle to fit the role of an undercover agent. At the same time, the single civilian agent is able to participate in temporary transfers or assignments to other units or locations.

The unit director will be able to hire female agents more readily if they are civilian agents. Hired female agents do not have to fulfill certain requirements imposed by most police departments regarding height, weight, and physical agility. Also, the director does not have to compete for a female agent with other departmental units such as juvenile, investigation, and patrol.

2. Disadvantages in the use of civilian agents. There are numerous disadvantages in using civilian agents with no previous police experience in a MAN unit. First, they have to be trained in all facets of police work. Not all police officers are trained in narcotics, but they do have training in other areas of police work which are closely related to narcotic work. Experienced police officers are familiar with criminal law, search and seizure, interviewing, interrogation, report writing, search warrants, and case investigation. These are subject areas in which civilian agents will have to be trained. At the same

time, it is likely that police officers assigned to the MAN unit will be those officers who have had narcotic responsibilities and experience in their own departments, eliminating the need for immediate, intensive training.

Generally, civilian agents do not have the police experience that an officer has acquired in dealing with both the law-abiding public and the criminal element. Police officers may respond to hazardous situations more calmly because they have been exposed to them previously. The regular police officer also has learned to have the proper amount of respect and fear of certain situations.

The civilian agent may be resented by regular police officers, upon whom he must count for information. Civilian agents may not be considered real law enforcement personnel by local police officers, thus hindering cooperation between the unit and local police officers. Civilian agents also will not have friends and personal contacts in the various police departments.

If civilian agents are used, a strong, concerted effort by the director must be made to establish sound rapport with the police agencies in the MAN jurisdiction. Again, it must be pointed out that these comments refer to those units which hire agents who have not had police experience. When hired agents have a law enforcement background, these advantages and disadvantages generally do not apply.

3. Recruitment and selection of civilian agents. Units which hire civilian agents without police experience can recruit through personal contacts of unit personnel and from criminal justice programs in local colleges. An individual who is recommended to the unit can be quietly contacted by the director to see if he is interested in narcotic work. If he expresses interest, the candidate can be interviewed to determine his general interest in narcotic enforcement and his feelings on a variety of things, including the use of drugs and narcotics, their legalization, and his personal use or experimentation with drugs. Before an agent is hired, a thorough background investigation should be conducted. Special attention should be focused on his friends and acquaintances to prevent employing someone whose close friends may be involved in the use or sale of drugs. It must be stressed to the student that his candidacy for the job is to be kept confidential so that, if he is employed, his effectiveness in an undercover capacity will not be affected.

It would be useful to examine the one unit that hired part-time agents to supplement assigned police officers. This particular unit uses assigned officers

in selection. Notwithstanding these examples, there are a number of reasons why married agents are important to a unit. A married agent can be a stabilizing factor in the unit. The fact that he has a family to return to may cut down on extra-curricular activities on his part. Moreover, he may tend to be more cautious, safety conscious, and career conscious than the single agent. In sum, a family can be a source of strength to an agent.

It is sound policy for a unit director to interview the wives of agent-candidates. The most important question to ask the wife of a candidate is that of her feelings toward her husband's becoming a narcotic agent. It must be recognized that, if a wife is strongly against the idea of her husband working in narcotics, his problems at home may affect his work.

The candidate's wife must be advised of some of the problems that she and her husband will encounter after he assumes his role as an agent. When an agent works undercover, he will have to assume a shabby appearance and live the lifestyle of people in that particular sub-culture. In addition, he must pick up the language and develop the "rap" and jargon of the street, he must interact primarily with the people who are involved in the use or sale of drugs, and he must become adept at being devious. All these factors can have a detrimental effect on the agent, his personality, and his family life.

The social life of an undercover agent will be restricted because he may not be able to participate in certain social events associated with his police department. There may be some adverse reaction from an agent's neighbors, friends, and fellow police officers to his new lifestyle. The fact that he is still a police officer working on special assignment does not prevent the transfer of people's views and opinions on the "long hair" segment of society to the agent.

D. Screening Devices

Despite the importance of personnel assessment in selection, no units were found to employ formal selection devices, such as personality tests; however, test utilization is recommended. When tests are not used, too great a burden is placed on the director's interviewing skills. Given the expense and complexity in administering the tests, units should rely on any of the local departments that utilize psychologists in their personnel selection process. The tests would be important in screening out individuals with psychological problems.

Polygraph machines are also useful in the selection of personnel. Two units required polygraph tests for

the selection of its agents: the Broward County unit and the MAT unit in Ohio.

As part of the background checks on candidates seeking positions as civilian agents with MAT, the Ohio State Criminal Investigation Bureau asked the candidates polygraph questions relating to involvement in illegal activities. The Broward County unit has a more complex task. The unit utilizes assigned agents who frequently are selected by the department chief. Before they come to the unit, however, they are informed that they must submit to a polygraph and that, if they fail the test, they will not get the job and their chiefs will be told the reasons for rejection. At that point the agent has the discretion to withdraw from the selection process. A candidate is asked questions in the following areas:

- Biographical and medical data.
- Military history.
- Financial background.
- Reason for applying for the job.
- Previous police service.
- Personal knowledge of narcotics (use or sale by himself or members of his family).
- Use of intoxicants.
- Gambling habits.
- Arrests or convictions relative to himself or members of his family.
- Guilt in undetected crimes.
- Acceptance, receipt, or solicitation of a bribe.
- Reports and testimony as a police officer (false reports, perjury, harsh treatment of prisoners).
- Other acts of misconduct.
- Family approval (of the prospective job with the unit).

By using the polygraph test, the director can simplify portions of the selection process. Much of the guesswork regarding the honesty and integrity of the candidate is eliminated.

E. Civilian Agents

The decision whether or not to utilize civilian agents is a complex one. The question here is not whether civilian agents are useful. Their employment in the past has demonstrated their utility. Instead, the question is whether or not local conditions are conducive to hiring and using civilian agents. For example, it must be determined if the participating chiefs are favorable toward using hired agents and if there are enough qualified candidates locally to guarantee the MAN unit essential personnel.

1. *Advantages in using civilian agents.* There are some very sound advantages in using civilian agents

tion. The point is not that corruption or dishonesty is prevalent, but that it may be unwise to place a heavily indebted individual in a tempting situation.

A candidate whose background check indicates that he is of questionable integrity should be eliminated. There is no room for such persons in a MAN unit. They are a greater risk than the debt-ridden individual. The financially burdened individual may cause the unit problems; the person lacking in integrity will cause problems because he will have numerous opportunities to abuse the system.

4. *Investigative ability.* Another quality to look for in a candidate is sound investigative ability. To do this a unit director should examine the cases that the candidate has investigated and the case reports he has written. Specifically, he evaluates the candidate's capabilities in such investigative requisites as interviewing, interrogating, and report writing.

If the candidate has previously worked as an investigator, it is important to consider his ability in clearing cases, his perseverance in pursuing investigations, and his willingness to participate as a team member. In evaluating his commitment to the police effort in general and the investigative function in particular, attention should be placed on the training programs the candidate has attended and any extension or correspondence courses he has taken.

The communicative ability of a candidate cannot be over-emphasized. An agent spends much time talking to people, not only on official police business, but also in "rapping" with informants. Therefore, the director should pay attention to the candidate's ability to express himself verbally.

The ability to make sound decisions should be expected of the successful candidate. Like any other police officer, a narcotic agent must make split-second decisions based on limited information. An undercover agent inside a house trying to make a buy, for example, is making decisions that not only pertain to the success of a case but also to his own safety. At the same time, his cover agent must also make fast and difficult decisions as unforeseen circumstances arise. Because so many of their operations cannot be minutely planned, agents have a considerable amount of discretion. The probationary period of the agent will further enable the director to assess the agent's ability in decision making.

A discussion of the amount of education required or desired of MAN unit agents opens up the same arguments as it does in the general selection of police officers. In the case of MAN units, the issue is usually resolved by the general educational requirements and assignment policies of the various police depart-

ments contributing manpower. Educational criteria should be balanced with training, general experience, and communicative and investigative abilities. There should be a thorough evaluation of the duties to be performed by the agents and the specific qualities needed to perform these tasks. For example, a general high school education and specialized narcotic training are usually sufficient for narcotic work. However, a specialized position such as intelligence analyst or an administrative assistant who will write grants and perform budgeting duties may necessitate someone with more education.

Because the physical requirements for MAN unit assignments are usually no different from those of an ordinary police agency, the selection of unit personnel from participating police departments poses no difficulty. MAN units will not encounter the problems that police departments do with regard to height, weight, physical agility, or eyesight requirements.

The most important physical aspect to be evaluated is the appearance of the candidate. A candidate should resemble as much as possible the type of character whose role he will play. This will vary with the local drug scene and the enforcement policy of a particular unit. For example, in Tucson where the enforcement efforts of the unit are oriented toward dealers who sell to wholesale buyers, agents must look like buyers coming from other parts of the country to buy multi-kilos of marijuana or multi-ounces of heroin. Conversely, the Lansing unit generally requires agents to look like addicts or small buyers.

Every department or agency has members who do not fit the public's idea of a "police officer." This along with the ability to role play enables a candidate to be a very effective agent. Often, it is not only the appearance of the agent which may give him away, but also his total demeanor and conduct. Many policemen, after a certain number of years on the job behave and act like the public's stereotype of a police officer.

5. *Stability of agent's family life.* Another consideration is the stability of the candidate's family life. Although some people may question the wisdom of considering the candidate's personal life, it is a very important factor, because narcotic work places extreme strain on an agent's family life. If a candidate's family life is unstable, it will probably deteriorate further if he becomes an agent. Some municipal police agencies require that their narcotic agents be single. Other agencies view the stability of the candidate's family life as the first factor to be considered

primary, and sometimes only, advantage in selecting a candidate who has had little or no experience in police work is that he is not known as a police officer by the local community and those involved in drug activity. It should be remembered, however, that a new recruit does not yet know police work and must be taught the basics that an experienced officer already knows. The recruit must be given on-the-job training in general police procedures as well as in narcotic enforcement. Because he is inexperienced, he will require closer supervision. Placing a new police officer in narcotic work may adversely affect his long-term career. In many cases, young officers reassigned from a MAN unit to patrol duties are unable to make the adjustment. The relative flexibility in schedules and methods of operation are antithetic to the regimented work schedules, procedures, and public exposure of patrol operations. An experienced officer knows what is to be encountered when he leaves the MAN unit and recognizes the type of adjustment that he will have to make when he gets reassigned to his department. A young recruit may not be aware of these factors. It is recommended that, if a recruit officer is assigned to the unit, the duration of such assignments should be as short as possible.

Selecting a police officer with too much time on the job can also create problems. For example, such an officer may be too well known by the people in the community or local area to be used as an undercover agent. Because of his age, he may not pass as a user. His primary use might be as a cover agent, or on certain occasions, he may be able to pass himself off as a "businessman" buyer.

2. *Personality.* Versatility in an agent is also important. An agent must be able to shift from one role to another very quickly. He must be able to unlearn certain idiosyncrasies of a police officer and adopt the characteristics of an addict or pusher. An in-depth interview of the candidate and some exercises in role-playing are essential in evaluating if the candidate's personality is compatible with the duties of a unit agent.

A unit agent should preferably be the type of individual who "got around" in his youth, who did a variety of things, who mixed with different crowds. As an agent, he will have to get along and communicate well with people from various backgrounds. If an agent has never worked, played, or lived around Blacks, Chicanos, or college students, for example, it will be very difficult for him to interact with them.

A MAN unit director wants to select those candidates who have shown an interest in drug enforcement, although he should realize that there are candi-

dates who have had little opportunity to demonstrate this interest. During the interview of the candidate, the director should keep the following questions in mind. When the candidate had the opportunity to investigate drug cases, did he simply report what was said to him or did he make some effort to dig a little further to verify the accuracy of the information? Did he take those extra steps in the investigation which would simplify the follow-up investigation for others? What kind of intelligence or information has this officer passed on to the narcotic units or investigators in the past? Has he established a relationship with any of the narcotic officers or investigators in order to pass along or obtain information? What books or other material has he read to familiarize himself with the field? A candidate is not expected to know everything about narcotics before he comes to the unit, but his responses to such questions give an indication of his interest or lack of interest in drug enforcement.

Closely related to the element of interest is the candidate's commitment to his particular job and to law enforcement in general. By talking to a candidate's superiors, a director can determine whether the candidate is willing to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of time and effort to get the job done. This factor may seem insignificant here, but it will become very important later when such sacrifices become an everyday part of the agent's life. While commitment is important, a candidate should not be overzealous. For example, an agent may want to pursue a case further than the team leader or director feels is appropriate. The agent must be objective enough to see that, regardless of his personal feelings, the director has sound reasons for discontinuing the case. In effect, there must be a balance between commitment and dedication and the ability to perceive the job objectively.

3. *Integrity.* Whenever possible, the financial status of candidates should be examined to reveal those individuals who are clearly living beyond the means of a police officer and to determine the indebtedness of candidates. While it is not necessary or desirable to eliminate a candidate who has financial obligations, it is necessary to know the extent of his obligations. Because the potential for corruption exists in narcotics work, it is foolish to place in this situation an agent who may be so financially burdened that even a small amount of money may be tempting to him. Narcotic investigation being what it is, a unit agent has to be constantly trusted with money. He will always have opportunities to cheat on expense reports, undercover buys, or the purchase of informa-

Supervisors must make sure that agents do their work correctly, train new agents in all areas of narcotics, and answer the questions of the agents. The supervisor's own training, therefore, must be thorough. It is advisable that supervisors go to several narcotic schools. This will expose them to more than one philosophy of narcotic enforcement and several techniques for operations. The time allocated for the supervisor's training need not be great. For example, a two-week DEA school and a one- or two-week state narcotic school would give the supervisor the narcotic training exposure he initially needs.

Supervisory training for unit supervisors is also very important, although this should be done by the police department to which the individual belongs. Unit-sponsored, supervisory training places a burden on the unit in terms of money and time, while the police department will be the major beneficiary of such training. If an agent gets promoted within his own department while he is assigned to the unit, his department may want to send him to supervisory training school with its own funds.

C. Agent Selection

Ideally, if a director is to effectively administer a unit and achieve any degree of success in narcotic enforcement, he must be able to select the personnel that he feels are qualified and capable of carrying out their assignments. Realistically, however, directors do not always enjoy full discretion in agent selection. For example, when a unit is initially staffed, it inherits the police officers who have been working narcotics in local departments. This is a common practice that is not necessarily disadvantageous to the director. If a unit had to start out with police officers who had no narcotics experience, the unit would not be able to operate effectively until the agents were trained.

In many of the units visited, the directors did not have the option of selecting all of the agents assigned to the unit. The primary reason is that chiefs in participating departments wanted to make that choice. Therefore, a common occurrence was for the director to have wide discretion in selecting agents from some departments but not from others. In some instances, a local chief would give a director a list of three or four officers and allow him to select one of them for the unit. In very few cases did the units have absolutely no discretion in personnel selection.

Given the limitations the director faces in selecting personnel, he should still exercise as much selectivity as possible. The director should familiarize the chiefs

with the special talents and skills needed in narcotic enforcement and undercover work. When the unit is being organized, there should be thorough discussion and agreement on the need for the unit commander to select his agents. Agreement at that time may save future misunderstanding and conflict.

Where, for one reason or another, the unit is burdened with an unqualified agent, special efforts should be made to train him so that he is able to perform his assigned function effectively. It should be recognized, however, that a substantial amount of time and effort may ultimately be needed to accomplish this. If possible, an agent can be allowed to perform a variety of functions until one is found that he is suited for or until a partner or team is found with whom he can work well. This variety of functions, depending on the size of the unit, may include working as an undercover agent, cover agent, intelligence officer, or evidence man. If the effort to train the agent is unsuccessful, a request that the agent be transferred back to his department should be made. To eliminate hurt feelings at this stage, it is important that ground rules for such actions be originally agreed upon by all departments involved. An essential tool used in agent selection and rejection is the probationary period. A probationary period gives the director a greater opportunity to staff the unit with qualified agents. A three-to six-month probationary period is usually adequate to determine whether or not an agent is suitable.

The procedure in selecting unit personnel should be thorough and equitable. Letters or memoranda should be posted in departments listing information on the open position. Specifically, this information should include the qualifications desired, the duration of assignment, and the method that will be used in selection.

Subsequently, the list of candidates should be screened to eliminate those individuals who do not meet the basic prerequisites. When the number of candidates has been reduced, the personnel jackets of the remaining few can be studied. Simultaneously, their current and previous supervisors should be queried on a candidate's knowledge, ability, and attitudes. Interviews can then be held with the top two or three candidates in order to evaluate the personal qualities which are sought in a narcotic agent.

1. *Amount of time in service as a factor.* One of the initial decisions of a director in the selection process involves the choice between experienced officers or new recruits. Whenever possible, experienced police officers should be assigned to the unit. The

er, agent in charge, director, and supervisor. The most suitable title is director because it minimizes confusion. The title "director" designates an individual as the one who directs the unit regardless of the rank that the officer may hold in his own department. The title director, however, only refers to the officer's position within the MAN unit and should never be classified as a separate rank within a local department.

The same attitude toward titles should apply to agents. The title "agent" seems the most appropriate for the MAN units because it does not connote or suggest any particular rank. For example, calling the unit personnel patrolman, detective, deputy, or officer may present problems because in some jurisdictions patrolmen and detectives are two distinct ranks. An individual referred to as "officer" may be a sergeant in his own department but serve as an operations man in the unit. The title "agent" can be used to neutralize the previous rank or title of the individual.

Unit supervisors can be designated by the term supervisor, group leader, or team leader, depending on their duties within the unit.

4. *Direction.* In the field of police administration, direction is nothing more than the telling or showing of what needs to be done. Direction can be given orally or in writing. Communicating policy and procedure to agents verbally or by short, loosely written memoranda is ineffective and often causes misunderstanding. In a unit, direction can be best accomplished through clearly written orders, staff meetings, and inspections.

Written directions are typically transmitted in one of three forms: general orders that affect the entire unit or a substantial part of it, special orders for specific events or duties that are of short duration, and personnel orders that pertain to particular members of the organization. The majority of units visited wrote all their directions in the form of memoranda. While the expediency of this procedure is appreciated, nevertheless, it increases the difficulty of incorporating the directions into a manual of procedures. By writing directives according to the three categories or orders, and by striving for uniformity of format in each category, the appropriate directives can be added to the procedural manual.

Staff meetings should be held regularly regardless of the size of the unit. With larger units, it may be impossible to have a meeting of all unit personnel; however, even in large units there should be meetings of group and team leaders who can then pass directives and information to their subordinates. When-

ever possible, meetings should include all supervisors and agents.

Staff meetings facilitate personnel participation in the formulation of unit policy, ensure greater acceptance of newly instituted policy, and increase the coordination of activities. Specifically, the purposes of the unit meetings are to:

- Discuss proposals and opinions and formulate policy.
- Report accomplishments of the teams and groups.
- Serve as a morale-building technique.
- Serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas.
- Observe individual and group reaction to new ideas and plans.
- Assist in coordinating activities of groups and teams.
- Prevent isolationism on the part of groups or teams.

An inspectional system should be implemented and regularly employed to help maintain unit control and discipline. The system gives the director an opportunity to make periodic evaluations of personnel, equipment, and operating procedures.

The inspection of reports and files should be constant. The director or his assistant, or both, can review reports at the time that they are submitted. In addition, case files should be examined before cases go to trial. This not only ensures that they are complete and up-to-date, but it also reveals some weak areas in the reporting system.

Units make substantial investments in equipment purchases, and inspections of these items should be made thoroughly and regularly. Inspection of assigned equipment should be conducted regularly to make certain that it can be accounted for and is in working order. Non-assigned equipment should be inspected closely as its use by everyone increases the chances of breakdowns.

Although some police departments have full-time specialized inspectors, the inspectional "staff" in a unit may consist solely of the director. If a director seldom gets involved in operational activities, he should make it a practice to periodically review his staff by accompanying agents on various operations such as buys, surveillances, raids, interrogations, and meetings with informants. Part of his administrative duties is to determine the status of personnel capability, the quality of work of his agents, and the efficiency of unit policies and procedures. Only by constantly obtaining information from agents and supervisors and occasionally going into the field can the

director discern the weak areas of unit organization and operation.

B. Administrative Planning and Budgeting

In the MAN units studied, long-range planning was usually limited to the determination of general goals in proposing annual grant proposals, the budgeting process, and periodic staff meetings. In most units there did not seem to be a regular, systematic effort to develop major programs or goals. When a unit attempts to operate without this type of planning and lets its personnel deal with situations as they evolve, the result may be the failure of the unit to define and coordinate its efforts.

A director must formulate plans for future unit operations and administrations on both long- and short-range bases, with the assistance of as many of the unit personnel as possible. Staff meetings can be used to encourage personnel participation in planning, promote greater acceptance of unit plans, and facilitate the implementation of the plans. The director should present tentative unit goals and then permit participants to criticize, present alternatives, and discuss matters generally. The director needs and should seek the advice of unit agents, supervisors, and intelligence officers. Only then can he be assured that the unit has optimized its planning effort.

The governing boards can also be relied on for assistance. Although the boards do not usually get involved in short-range or operational planning, they should assist in formulating and reviewing major programs. A director should capitalize on the experience and planning expertise of board members and solicit their support by presenting ideas or programs.

One of the most important responsibilities that a director has is budgeting. Yet it is an area in which most directors have little experience. It is imperative, therefore, that a director lacking a budgetary background quickly learn how to prepare a budget and control expenditures.

A budget does three things for a unit. First, through the fiscal process it allows the unit to implement its planned work. Second, it facilitates the control of expenditures by ensuring that funds are used for their specified purpose. Third, the budget also provides some immediate advantages to the unit in the areas of planning, evaluation, and participatory decision-making.

As is the case with many police departments, budgeting is often the only type of administrative planning that a unit does. When the time comes for

the formulation of a budget, the director is forced to plan the operational and administrative programs that he wants to implement during the coming fiscal year. He must decide, for example, what equipment will be needed, the amount of training needed, and whether a public drug education program should be established.

The budget offers an excellent opportunity for a director to evaluate his unit. At the same time that he prepares the budget, he also prepares work programs and a detailed statement about their purpose. If the goals as set forth in the budget are met without expenditure of additional funds, then the unit is operating at an effective fiscal level. If goals are not attained or if expenditures exceed projections without a reasonable cause, then the unit has financially failed in some area.

In determining the budget, a director should encourage staff participation. At the least, he should request the participation of his assistant and/or supervisory staff. This helps to accomplish three things. First, the director obtains the input of those personnel who are most familiar with the operations of the unit. Second, participation in the budgeting process forces supervisors to get involved in the planning function: it makes them think in terms of the progress of current unit goals and future objectives. Third, participation makes them concerned about administrative and operational activities proposed for the following year. The fact that they are committed to certain estimates and predictions may tend to make them more conscientious in adhering to budgetary restrictions and in making programs successful.

In preparing a budget, the director must first review the previous year's budget to get some basic ideas about past operations. He must determine which additional activities the unit should and can get involved in and how much they would cost. Thus, the unit will need to keep accurate records during the fiscal year so that the director can assess all activities, see where the unit efforts have been expended, and determine what has yet to be done. Although a tedious task, accurate-record keeping is a very important part of the director's assessment of the unit, and it will assist him in justifying budget requests.

A director should be constantly looking for ways to reduce costs. He must assess his administrative and operational policies and determine which activities, functions, or programs are operating at high efficiency and which must be improved or dropped. He should evaluate specialized positions, if there are any, on a cost effective basis and determine whether it is worthwhile to maintain them on a full-time basis.

He should keep other factors regarding specialization in mind. For instance, the assignment of personnel to specialized positions can deplete the other important sections of the unit. Furthermore, if there are to be drastic cutbacks in the allocation for manpower, the director will have to consider such things as discontinuing training on non-unit personnel and drug education lectures. He might also consider the utilization of civilian agents to increase his manpower at a lower cost factor.

The director should make everyone in his unit budget-conscious by periodically reviewing with them important aspects of the budget. This will assist in making adherence to fiscal guidelines a total unit effort.

To maintain budgetary control through the year, a minimum of weekly accounting is advisable. The director must constantly compare the current expenditures in a particular area with the total money appropriated for it. Otherwise, the unit will find itself in the unenviable position of running out of funds before the end of the fiscal year.

C. Fiscal Management

The area of fiscal management has often been troublesome to unit directors. Most directors have had little experience in fiscal management, particularly as it applies to state and federal grants. However, few things arouse as much concern as discrepancies in the expenditure of public revenue by public officials. It is imperative, therefore, that directors familiarize themselves with the appropriate guidelines for, and elements of, fiscal administration as well as its purpose, namely to meet statutory requirements, protect public funds, and make possible the efficient administration of a unit.

Useful publications about fiscal administration can be obtained from state criminal justice planning agencies,¹ the State Auditor's office, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Personnel from these agencies are also a good personal source of information. A director should consult with local government fiscal personnel such as a county or city auditor, finance director, purchasing officer, or budget director.

Federal requirements, as they apply to a unit, generally state that special grant records must be kept

in such a manner that they are easily audited. There are also further requirements as to procurement, accounting for, and expending of confidential funds. State and local statutory requirements, however, usually vary among state and local governments. It should be repeated that the director and other persons responsible for administering or supervising a unit's fiscal affairs must be aware of, and adhere to, applicable state and local statutes.

Although the fiscal administration system often varies among units because of local requirements, units may incorporate the following fiscal items:

- A fiscal supervisor from outside the unit should be appointed who will have the power to examine the unit's records, both fiscal and operational. Since this official makes a fiscal check and serves as an advisor in fiscal affairs and unit operations, it would be ideal if he were familiar with both police operations and fiscal administration.
- Billings should be sent to some agency outside the unit and then presented to the director for explanation and approval before payment. Although this cannot be done in all cases, the exceptions should be kept to a minimum.
- Each month the director should receive from the agency or person responsible for the actual payment of bills, a report of all bills paid that month and the budget category to which they were attributed.
- Someone outside the unit should approve all major contracts entered into by the unit. For example, any contract for services rendered over a given amount, except from confidential funds for investigative purposes, should have outside approval.
- Each unit should have a written standard fiscal operating procedure (SOP) which delineates the following:

Who is to authorize expenditures.

Who is responsible for keeping records.

Who is responsible for receiving, authorizing payment of, and paying bills.

A general description of the unit's fiscal system.

This SOP should be written in such a manner that it could be made available to the public without revealing any confidential aspects of the unit's operations.

1. *Internal unit fiscal administration.* The purposes of internal unit fiscal administration are the same as the total system of fiscal administration. To allow the director and other unit members responsi-

¹ The author wishes to acknowledge the following source for providing major assistance in this section. Komaroy, Louis F., *Ohio Fiscal Guidelines*; Department of Economics and Community Development; Administration of Justice Division of Ohio, 1975.

ble for fiscal administration to carry out their duties, the unit should have in its possession the following items:

a. *Reference materials:*

- 1) A copy of the signed grant award with general and special conditions.
- 2) A copy of the approved budget with all approved amendments and changes.
- 3) A copy of the unit's fiscal SOP.
- 4) A copy of the unit's confidential funds SOP.
- 5) A copy of all fiscal guidelines issued by the state planning agency for MAN units, including guidelines on confidential funds.
- 6) A file of all correspondence relating to the fiscal administration of the unit that mentioned allowable and unallowable expenditures, needed changes in unit fiscal administration, and anything else that might be of interest to the director in his management of fiscal affairs.

b. *Fiscal records:*

- 1) Some form of ledger or running record showing the amounts expended and the amounts remaining to be expended in each budget category. The amount of detail depends upon whether or not this is the primary unit record of expenditures and upon the director's personal desires.
- 2) The records relating to confidential funds as explained in another part of this section.
- 3) An inventory record that lists every item owned by the unit including its description, cost, and location. This record can be kept either in list form or on file cards, depending upon the amount of equipment owned, the director's personal desires, and the local situation.
- 4) A list of all equipment purchased by each individual grant and from all other funding sources.
- 5) A file of the quarterly reports, as required by LEAA.

c. *Other Records:*

- 1) Individual agent's files. A file should be maintained within the unit on each agent assigned or formerly assigned to the unit. This file should contain the following:
 - A picture of the agent.
 - A list of all street names used by the agent.
 - A copy of the agent's signature in both his real name and all commonly used street names.
 - A copy of his fingerprints.
 - A statement of familiarity with the unit's confidential funds procedure signed by the agent and the director.
 - If telephone and gasoline credit cards are used by the unit, a list of relevant phone numbers and license numbers.

The agent's file may also include the following:

- A copy of receipt for pocket money, if pocket money is carried.
 - The agent's individual expenditure ledger.
 - Description of all automobiles used by agents.
 - Description of equipment issued or used.
 - Signed statement acknowledging reading and understanding of rules and regulations.
- 2) Informant's file. The director should maintain a file on every informant, which includes the following information:
 - The informant's name and known address.
 - The informant's picture or, if none is available, a statement of reasons for non-availability.
 - A copy of the informant's signature.
 - Receipts of all monies paid to the informant, or a statement by the unit director as to the reasons a receipt was not obtained, countersigned by the supervising fiscal officer.
 - 3) General case records. While the vast majority of this file's contents are of a confidential nature and often decided upon by the director, they should contain the following information relating to fiscal affairs:
 - A complete report of the circumstances surrounding the expenditure of confidential funds. This can be contained in a standard incident report or in a special buy report.
 - A case expenditure ledger showing all expenditures made with regard to the case, with the date and buy money ledger reference number.
 - 4) Record detail. Records needed to maintain an audit trail should be kept in such a manner that their release to outsiders will not compromise the confidential operations of the unit. The additional detail needed for operational matters should be maintained on separate records properly cross-referenced to code names. This information should never be released except when an investigation into misuse of funds or malfeasance in office is in progress.

2. *Fiscal records.* The unit should account for all expenditures of confidential funds by maintaining the following fiscal records:

a. *Expenditure ledger*—A ledger should be maintained showing either the confidential funds left to be spent or the money spent to date (the latter is preferable). The ledger should include an individual reference number for each buy, the date of the buy, and the amount of the buy. It is also suggested that a

reference to the agent making the expenditure and a brief description of the expenditure should be included (see Figure 3).

b. *Recovered money ledger*—A ledger should be kept showing the confidential funds recovered after a significant amount of time has passed since the money was used for a buy. For example, unit money used in a buy/bust operation is usually not considered recovered money by most state planning agencies. The ledger should include a reference to a file containing explanations of each recovery of funds, the date of recovery, from whom recovered, and the date entered into the confidential funds ledger.

c. *Buy card file (Buy report file)*—This is a card file with an individual card made up for each buy. Its purpose is to provide an original record of expenditures which can be audited without going to the confidential case record files. To accomplish this, each card should contain the following information:

- Reference buy number as entered in the expenditure ledger.
- Reference case number to the case for which the expenditure was made, or a reference to the informant file and the informant to whom the money was paid.
- Amount expended.
- Date on which the money was expended.
- Purpose for which money was expended or description of articles purchased.
- Name and signature of agent expending money with statement verifying that he spent the money in the manner described.
- Name and signature of the agent-in-charge or designated representative who has approved the expenditure (see Figure 4).

d. *Receipt file*—Receipts should be on file to account for all monies that are not in the imprest fund, the general fund, the unit cash fund, or accounted for by the confidential fund expenditure ledger.

e. *Individual agent ledgers*—A ledger should be kept on every agent listing the expenditure of confidential funds by each agent broken down into evidence purchases, information purchases, and expenditures for expenses, if any. Each entry should have the date and the buy reference number. This ledger may be kept in the agent's file or in a special file with all agents' ledgers (see Figure 5).

f. *Individual informant ledgers*—A ledger should be kept on each individual informant showing the date and amount he was paid. These entries should be referenced in the confidential fund expenditure ledger, and the receipts, if obtained, should be

filed in the individual informant file or informant receipt file (see Figure 6).

3. *Confidential funds*. In all units subsidized in whole or in part by a federal or SPA grant, confidential funds must be differentiated from other monies used in the operation of a unit. There are restrictions as to the use of these funds; usually, they can be used for the following purposes:

- Payment of confidential informants.
- Purchase of items to be used as evidence, such as drugs and stolen goods.
- Payment of the expenses of covert operations that cannot be paid through normal fiscal channels without compromising operations (these usually include expenses for hotel rooms used in surveillances).

Confidential funds are usually less than abundant but very important to the unit's fiscal ability to operate. Confidential funds should not be used to finance normal unit operations or to pay unit employees or any others employed on a regular basis, except informants. However, informants paid on a regular basis may be considered employees by the state planning agency. The fiscal ramifications of using paid informants should be thoroughly investigated by the director.

4. *Agent assigned funds*. A director should conduct regular inspections of agent pocket funds. Such inspections may or may not be announced beforehand. Where the agents are not notified in advance, they may tend to maintain stricter control of the funds. Sometimes, though, directors announce a few days in advance that such an inspection will be held to allow the agents to separate official and personal monies and to replace any official funds that have been spent on personal items. The fact that agents are given the opportunity to replenish these funds may reinforce the practice of spending official funds for personal items. Therefore, the former practice may be the better of the two.

5. *Imprest funds*. Confidential funds should be paid in pre-designated amounts of the regular fund to a special imprest fund. The size of this fund often depends upon local conditions; however, it should be as small as possible without limiting unit operations. The fund should be maintained in a bank that is easily accessible to the unit. All withdrawals should be made with a double signature check, with one signature belonging to a person not in the unit, such as the fiscal supervisor or a local chief or sheriff.

6. *Standard operating procedure*. A unit should publish a standard operating procedure which fully explains the procedures to be followed by all person-

FIGURE 3

CONFIDENTIAL FUND EXPENDITURES LEDGER

Date	Expenditure	Purchase of Evidence	Payment to Informant	Expenses	Running Total
Jan 1	Buy #75-0001 (Case M75-0001) 2nd Buy on John Jones; 1/2 lb. marijuana-pd. by Agent 16	75.00			75.00
Jan 2	Buy #75-0002 (Case M75-0005) Pd. to C.I. #125 by Agent #25 for information		25.00		100.00

FIGURE 4

BUY CARD

Buy Expenditure - Confidential Funds	
Case No. _____	Expenditure No. _____
Date of expenditure _____	Amount _____
Subject _____	
Description of Material _____	

Agent _____	Date _____
Approved by Unit Commander:	
_____	Date _____

FIGURE 5

INDIVIDUAL AGENT LEDGER

Agent James Jones (or Agent No. 17)

Date	Expenditure No.	Purchase of Evidence	Payments to Informants	Expenses	Running Total
Jan 10	74-0090	100.00	50.00		100.00
Jan 19	74-0101	100.00			250.00
Jan 20	74-0105	50.00			300.00

FIGURE 6

INDIVIDUAL INFORMANT LEDGER

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT No. 38

Date	Expenditure No.	Received for Information	Received for Expenses	Running total
Jan 10	74-0007	20.00		20.00
Feb 15	74-0101	15.00		35.00
Mar 10	74-0210		20.00	55.00
Jun 2	72-0420		30.00	85.00

nel in accounting for and spending confidential funds. When each agent joins the unit, he should be required to read the unit's confidential funds, SOP, and sign a statement to the effect that he has read and understands the SOP. This statement, after a signed verification has been added by the unit director, should be placed in the agent's file at the unit.

7. *Reimbursement of buy monies.* An interesting practice of the MAT unit in Ohio is that of recovering its buy money from a suspect during his trial. In cases where defendants file for probation, the unit asks the court that part of the condition for probation be that the defendant pay back all unrecovered

buy monies that were paid to him. In many cases, the courts go along with the request. A director should ask the state's attorney about the possibility of making such appeals to the courts in cases where defendants plead for probation.

D. Records Management

1. *Report writing.* There were three basic report writing methods used by the MAN units studies: handprinted or handwritten report writing, the typing of reports by the agent, and dictation by the agent through a recorder.

Handprinting of reports is done by agents in the office or out in the field. This method allows the agent to sit down anywhere and complete the report. An advantage of handwritten reports is that they can be written rapidly and be reviewed immediately by the supervisor. In the MAT unit, agents handwrite their reports, which are subsequently typed before being filed. In this way, neatness and correctness are guaranteed.

Typing of reports by agents has become outdated in MAN units for the same reasons that many departments have eliminated the practice. First, many agents lack typing skills. Second, many officers completely handwrite a report before typing it, creating double work for themselves.

The Multi-County unit has its six agents phone in their reports to a recording machine. In the morning or during the day, the reports would then be transcribed. Daily activity reports are processed in the same manner. The director is able to call the recording number and by using a tone transmitter, he can have the entire recording played back over the telephone. At 11:00 at night, for example, he can review what each of his agents has done that day plus hear every report that has been made.

The Tucson unit uses the dictation system utilized by the Tucson Police Department for report writing. While this type of system reduces the amount of report writing that the agents do, it has the disadvantage of not allowing immediate review of the report because most reports are not transcribed until the following morning or at least until a dictation belt has been filled.

In selecting a system of report writing, a director must choose the system that is best suited to his unit's needs. For example, the Multi-County unit utilizes its particular system because the agents cover six large counties and they cannot go to a central location to make the reports. The director utilizes the play-back system because he lives over forty miles from the office. The Tucson unit uses the dictation system because it was the established procedure of the local department in which it was housed.

Before being filed, all reports should be reviewed by the supervisor and, preferably, by the director as well. Review ensures that the reports are complete, correct, and ready to be taken into a court. Review also gives the supervisor or director an opportunity to make certain that the report does not include any extraneous or sensitive material such as information about the identity of an informant or agent.

2. *Security of reports.* Accessibility to reports often depends on whether the unit is situated in a

separate facility or within a police building. In a unit sharing offices with the vice, intelligence, and organized crime sections of a police department, all investigators generally will have access to reports. In a unit with separate facilities, unit personnel are usually the only ones who have access to the records. In either case, it is advisable that non-unit, or at least non-investigative, personnel be restricted in their access to unit reports. Exceptions to this restriction should be entered into a log which indicates the individual, the case report reviewed, the date and time of the inquiry, and its purpose.

3. *Filing procedures.* Most units visited maintain their own records section, even those which are located in a local department. In the units which have separate offices, no attempts are made to make unit record-keeping compatible with the record systems of the local departments. The record systems of units located within a department are maintained in one of two ways. First, the unit may use departmental forms, but their own numbering system is instituted with no regard to the department's procedures and practices. Second, a unit might have to integrate its records to the degree that department report forms are used, utilizing the numbering system of the department. In such cases, however, reports are still maintained by the unit. Because of the sensitivity of on-going cases, no copies are sent to the central records section until a case is completed.

There is little variance in the type of files which are maintained by units. For example, a multi-functional unit might have reports on vice, organized crime, and gambling filed under a subject category rather than in a single ordinal file, but other than this, the files of MAN units include the following:

- Master index file.
- General case file.
- Identification file.
- Information/intelligence file.
- Information dissemination log.
- Agent case log.

4. *Master index file.* A master index file should include a list of all persons who have contact with the unit or have been mentioned in reports. This file usually consists of 3 x 5 index cards arranged in alphabetical order. The cards list the case or intelligence sheet numbers of those reports where the suspect is mentioned and should also indicate, whenever possible, the subject's address, date of birth, physical description, driver's license, and social security number.

5. *General case file.* A general case file should contain copies of reports on narcotic investigations

made by unit agents. These reports should be filed by a control number which is issued when the case is assigned to an agent or at the point when information that has been received or gathered indicates that a case should be started. The designation of the control number may vary, depending on the special needs of the unit. Generally, however, the cases should be given a number which has a letter prefix to indicate that the case belongs to the unit: two digits to designate the year of the case, and then a four digit number to give the report its ordinal position. For example, the Kane County MAN Unit would have as its first case number K75-0001. The second case would be K75-0002. In some instances where several counties may be served by the unit, it can designate the county where the case originated with a code letter. For example, the Metropolitan Area Narcotic Unit would designate its first case, which originated in Frederick County, as M75-F-0001. Thus, by looking at a list of all case numbers, unit personnel could tell where a case originated and where most cases are being made.

This file should be used for unit reports only. Reports sent by a police department should not be given a unit number simply for filing purposes. They should be incorporated as part of a unit case report, treated as incoming information and filed with an attached intelligence/information sheet.

6. *Identification file.* An identification file consists of individual folders on confidential informants and narcotic suspects who have been arrested. Each folder should contain a personal history sheet, a rap sheet, and a photograph or photographs of the suspect or informant. For cross-reference purposes, it should include a list of numbers of those reports and sheets in which the suspect or informant is mentioned. In folders of confidential informants, it is advisable to list the numbers of the cases in which the informant proved reliable, i.e., where arrests and convictions were made. Thus, an agent can simply look at an informant's identification file and determine where the informant has proved his reliability. Search or arrest warrants can then be easily obtained without having to search every individual case in which the informant has provided assistance.

Because the arrests of suspects are more often made by the local departments than by the units, it may be advisable for the unit to modify its personal history sheet to conform to the history sheets of those departments in their jurisdictional areas, keeping in mind, however, its own informational needs.

7. *Information/Intelligence reports.* A file should be maintained containing all the information/

intelligence reports submitted by unit personnel. The reports should have a numbering system that will distinguish them from the case reports. The purpose of information reports is to document information about a suspect or illicit operation for which no case report has been initiated. Thereafter, if a case report is started, a copy of the information report should be included in the case report jacket, and the information report should make reference to the case report number.

In units that do not maintain information/intelligence reports, information that does not initiate a case report is usually lost to the unit. Other units initiate a case report on every substantial piece of information that is received. The result is that many case reports are started but do not result in investigations. Thus, these units ostensibly have many case reports pending which are not cases under active investigation. The potential for statistical misinterpretation is obvious in these instances. Figure 7 shows a suggested information/intelligence report form.

8. *Address file.* An address file is made up of addresses that have been explicitly mentioned in reports or are known informally to be locations of narcotic activity. This type of information is common in narcotic work. For example, police officers, informants, or citizens will report locations of suspected drug trafficking but will provide no names of suspects. In these and similar cases, it is advantageous for the unit to list the address in an address index file that refers the agent to the original case report or intelligence/information sheets. Such a file, however, would not include every address mentioned in all unit reports. To include them would be futile, as many addresses of victims, witnesses, or informants have no intelligence value. A unit should be selective and include only those addresses where user/pusher activity is known or suspected to be occurring.

9. *Information dissemination log.* The information control log is maintained to monitor and control the information disseminated by the unit to other agencies. For example, when a letter or note with intelligence information is sent to another police agency or even when information is given over the telephone, an entry should be made in the log indicating the caller's name, the recipient of information, date and time, the general information given, and the reason for exchange (see Figure 8).

10. *Agent case log.* Some units maintain an agent case log in which every buy made by an agent is listed. By referring to this file, a director can readily see what his agents have been doing. Although a log

FIGURE 7
INFORMATION REPORT

Date _____ Number: I _____

Subject: _____
(person, business, organization)

Alias: _____

Address: _____

Description: sex _____ race _____ age _____ height _____ weight _____ eyes _____ hair _____

Vehicle: _____ Occupation: _____
(year) (make) (license)

Associates: _____ Criminal Activity: _____
(persons & places) (known or suspected)

FBI # _____ State ID # _____ Other ID # _____

Places Frequented: _____

Additional Information:

Received by: _____ Date Received: _____

Received from: _____
(Address)

Actual Name: _____ Assumed Name: _____

Reliability of Source: Reliable _____ Unknown _____ Doubtful _____

FIGURE 8

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION LOG

Date of Inquiry	Time	Requesting Agency	Subject and Reason for Inquiry	Information Source	Information Received Via			Date of Return
					Tele-phone	Personal Contact	Corres-pondence	

of this type creates additional work, the information it furnishes is extremely useful. The only other way of determining an agent's activities would be to check all the case reports during a particular period of time or to study the agent's individual confidential fund ledger.

11. *Other files.* Occasionally there may be a need for units to keep other types of files on hand. For example, units operating near the Mexican and Canadian borders, where private aircraft are used extensively, may wish to keep a file on aircraft numbers. Relevant information from airport employees, ranchers, and so forth would be written and filed under the specific aircraft number.

In contemplating the addition of files, a director must consider that as more files are added, more work must be done to cross-index the additional information. The key to maintaining an efficient records system is simplicity. Therefore, a unit should not add files for telephone numbers or license plate numbers, for example, unless a real need is established.

E. Personnel Administration

1. *Supervision.* Except in the smallest units, directors do not supervise the daily activities of personnel. The number of supervisory personnel, excluding directors, of the units visited ranged from 0 in one unit to 13 in the Cook County Squad, which has a complement of 51 sworn personnel. The next largest unit, in San Diego, had 8 supervisors and a total of 43 sworn officers and DEA agents.

The duties of a supervisor vary according to the size of his unit. For example, in a large squad the supervisor or supervisors will tend to have exclusive functions. In a smaller unit where the manpower shortage is greater, the supervisor will probably have operational duties as well as supervisory ones.

Supervisors should perform supervisory duties only and refrain from participating in operational matters. Supervisors must be free to advise their men. It is very frustrating for an officer to seek out his supervisor for assistance and find that he is busy doing an agent's work.

A non-operational supervisor can also get involved in giving on-the-job training to new agents. He will have the time to participate with them on surveillances, stake-outs, cover assignments, interviews, and interrogations. He also will have the time to handle certain duties that will reduce the workload of the unit director. For instance, the supervisor can do some of the administrative paper work, schedule

work assignments, set up court dates, and inspect equipment. His ability to regularly spot check the work of his agents will also improve his ability to evaluate them. It should be realized, however, that a supervisor will have to get involved in operational matters when manpower is short. He should understand, however, that this is the exception, not the rule.

The following are some of the duties that the supervisors can perform:

- Give work assignments.
- Train new agents.
- Review reports.
- Pass along communications.
- Supervise cases.
- Hold meetings with the agents.
- Inspect equipment.
- Review case files.
- Hold pre-trial conferences.
- Debrief informants.
- Handle expenditures.
- Maintain discipline.
- Initiate commendations.
- Evaluate his agents.
- Serve as a public relations officer.
- Conduct preliminary investigations of external complaints on agents.

It is difficult to determine the appropriate subordinate-supervisor ratio in MAN units. In most units, the normal procedure is to break up into five-agent teams, including the supervisor. Although a patrol division may be able to function smoothly with a span of control of six, seven, or even eight officers, because of the types and complexities of the cases assigned to narcotic agents, it is recommended that MAN units maintain a span of control of only 3 to 4 agents per supervisor.

Supervisors should actively undertake operational planning for the unit or specific teams by developing weekly schedules. For example, they should outline what operations the team will undertake, which suspects they will try to make a buy on, which drug locations they will try to infiltrate, and so forth. Although supervisors cannot be expected to accurately predict everything that will be accomplished each week, this practice forces them to formulate objectives that the team can strive to achieve. At the same time, supervisors should write brief synopses of the activities of their respective teams for the past week. Thus, at the end of every week supervisors can evaluate what they achieved relative to the objectives that had been formulated.

Equitable procedures for assigning work to agents must also be formulated. A non-systematic approach, where the agent who initially receives information or develops an informant automatically investigates the case further, should be avoided. Instead, when information regarding a particular pusher is obtained, one of the cover agents should be assigned to verify the information and, if necessary, to make a case against him.

In assigning an agent to a targeted pusher, a deadline should be set for the development of a substantive case against the suspect. The amount of time which the agent is given will depend on the specific case. In investigating his target, the agent should make an initial intelligence survey to determine the amount of time needed for the case. The Las Cruces unit uses this technique, and portions of weekly unit meetings are devoted to discussing the progress of each case. If an agent is having difficulty making a case against his target, the other agents may be able to assist him with information or advice. An additional agent may also be assigned to the case if it is deemed necessary. By utilizing such procedures, some units have increased their success rate in apprehending targeted pushers.

In making these types of assignments, a potential problem area is that of the over-involvement of agents. When an agent is assigned to a targeted pusher and told to "get him," the supervisor and the director must maintain close supervision over the agent to ensure that he conducts the investigation within the legal and procedural guidelines that have been set down. Agents are human. Like any others who are given a difficult goal to attain, their initiative and resourcefulness may make them step out of bounds. Supervisors should maintain adequate control over the case so that they can stop such behavior before it occurs. No agent should be rewarded or otherwise reinforced when he uses questionable methods.

If a unit chooses to make case assignments, it should devise a system whereby it can monitor and control them. One useful system requires that when an agent is assigned to a case, a case number is issued immediately. The case number should be the same case file number used in the general case file reports. All subsequent reports on this case submitted by the agent or other agents should reflect this number. When the case is assigned to the agent, a case control slip is completed and placed in a two- or three-week suspense file. The control slips should list the case number, agent assigned, and date of assignment. Each agent is then required to submit a progress or

supplementary report within the limit previously set. If additional time is needed by the agent, he can submit a report stating the reason for the time extension. The purpose of maintaining this type of control over case assignments and reports is to ensure that assigned cases receive prompt attention. This system provides an administrative check over the activities of agents while furnishing a procedure for assessing caseload factors. Assignments of an exploratory nature, i.e., those that are not in response to a particular incident, also can be controlled using the same method.

Supervisors must determine the special abilities of their agents and make assignments so that these abilities can be fully utilized. For example, an agent who may be a poor undercover agent because he cannot adapt to the role of a buyer may still be utilized effectively as a cover agent. If it appears that an agent is having difficulty in getting along with his partner or other team members, he can be switched around into different working combinations with the various teams. The supervisors should not automatically give up on an agent; there is probably someone within the team or group who will complement him.

2. Discipline. Discipline in MAN units, like discipline in general, can be thought of in two different forms. The first is positive discipline—the training and direction of an individual which results in his voluntary conformance to the regulations and policies of his organization and his willingness to do assigned work. The second is negative discipline—the punitive measures that a superior may take to effect change in the conduct of his subordinates.

Positive discipline is essential in a MAN unit. A director and supervisors should act as examples for unit personnel to follow. If the supervisors exemplify industry; self-control; and adherence to policy, rules, and regulations; the majority of the agents will likely demonstrate the same characteristics.

Proper narcotic training plays a vital part in developing positive discipline among agents. While a unit cannot be expected to give its agents general police training, it is expected that they receive sufficient formal and on-the-job training to enable them to perform their assigned tasks properly and efficiently. A director should do everything possible to ensure that his agents receive the necessary training from internal and external resources. Unit morale is closely related to training. If unit personnel are capable and efficient at their jobs and they know this, their morale should be high. In turn, high morale will help to give them the self-discipline they need.

3. Accountability. Agents should be made to

understand that they are fully accountable to the unit director for their conduct. Although the director may not be able to fire or suspend them, he certainly has the authority to transfer or place them on report. In some units certain agents have insisted that the director could not hold them accountable for such things as tardiness or failure to properly carry out their assignments. Ultimately, such agents have had to be transferred or made to understand that they are accountable to the director. A director should explain to new agents what he will demand and expect from them. Moreover, the agent's chief should explain to him the expectations of the director, including the agent's adherence to unit policy, rules, and regulations. This means that the director and the chief must frankly discuss what each wants and requires relative to an agent's conduct.

4. *Latitude of director.* The director should have some latitude with regard to administering disciplinary action. Realistically, no one can be given the responsibility for the success of a mission without the authority that is needed to carry it out. This authority should include the power to administer discipline when a situation warrants it. The fact that agents represent various agencies and are not monitored or controlled by departmental superiors may cause some difficulties. The competitiveness and conflict that may exist among the departments may manifest itself in the individual agents, although directors report that agents will cooperate even when their respective departments are experiencing interdepartmental friction. Because of these factors, it is essential that the director be able to take the disciplinary steps that a situation requires. He should be given the authority to give verbal and written reprimands, make transfers, and, in certain emergency situations, suspend an agent.

The verbal reprimand is a very useful tool to the director. Usually, expression of displeasure or disapproval by someone whom the agent respects and enjoys working for is sufficient. Beyond this, the realization that the director can make his complaint a written one is enough to induce most agents to correct their conduct. A written reprimand sent to an agent's department is something to be dreaded, especially if the agent volunteered to serve in the unit. This is not a disciplinary measure that the director should use carelessly. A police chief feels that the agent assigned to the unit represents his department, and the consequences are likely to be severe if he receives a notice regarding the misconduct of one of his officers. The director should carefully consider this factor when he contemplates a written reprimand.

In police work, the transfer of an officer because he cannot be "controlled" is sometimes interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the commander, or at least an indication that he is "giving someone else his problems." This type of reasoning should not inhibit a director from transferring a "problem" agent. He is responsible for a highly specialized unit that has been entrusted with an important role. He must also coordinate the skills of different people and the efforts of different resources. He cannot afford to spend an excessive amount of time or effort in dealing with a "problem individual." To do so is a disservice to the other agents and to the various departments that have entrusted him with the responsibility of narcotic enforcement in the area. When minor corrective action does not solve the problems that the director encounters with an agent, he should not hesitate to transfer the agent.

Suspension of an agent by the director is a drastic step. It should only be done when it is necessary to protect the well-being of the unit, such as during an investigation of the agent's conduct. Suspension itself should not be used as a punishment by a director. That is up to the agent's department and not the director. The main objective is to remove the agent from the unit while the director reports the situation to the appropriate parties.

5. *Internal investigations.* Internal investigations, especially serious ones, should be handled by the director personally. No unit is so large nor is any director so busy that he cannot take charge of a case where one of his agents is being accused of misconduct. A serious complaint should be brought to the attention of the governing board members as they have the right and need to know what occurs within the unit.

In one unit, the director makes it a practice to talk to informants on a random basis regarding their control agents. The director checks with voluntary informants on contacts they have had with agents. Although this practice has potential benefits, a director should be careful that an informant does not intentionally try to malign an agent. No matter how reliable or willing an informant is, he may try to manipulate to his own advantage the relationship between an agent and his superordinates.

6. *External complaints.* A procedure should be established through which external complaints are processed. For example, a director should make certain that he investigates all external complaints before the complaint is taken to the governing board. This is a good policy because in many cases external complaints are unfounded.

Even when allegations have been proved unfounded, the director should bring the incident to the attention of the governing board. This policy may appear questionable; however, the governing board should be notified so that its members will not be surprised should the complainant decide to contact one of them. The question of whether to document an unfounded charge is another matter. Some charges are so ridiculous that no consideration should be given to placing them in an agent's personnel file, although this does not preclude their investigation. In other cases, written records should be kept so that the unit cannot be accused of covering up an incident.

7. *Reporting of minor infractions.* A director should not have to contact an agent's department to report minor incidents. Isolated instances of negligible misconduct can be handled internally by the director. Should such infractions evolve into a general pattern of misconduct, he should contemplate reporting the incidents to the agent's chief. A director should also document minor infractions for his own personal use so that he can refer to them when he evaluates the agent's performance.

8. *Serious and criminal acts by agents.* Serious violations of rules and regulations or criminal acts by an agent should be handled immediately and personally by the director. After determining that such a violation has occurred, the director should report the incident to the agent's department. The matter can then be handled by the agent's department and notification made to the governing board. Any indication that a director has or will procrastinate on the issue of serious infractions may connote to agents that he is not able to maintain unit control and discipline. For this reason, his reporting of serious infractions should be immediate and certain.

None of the units reported that polygraph examinations were conducted on in-service officers who had had charges of misconduct made against them. Few units reported that they had had serious disciplinary problems with their officers. In those few incidents where the charges were founded, the agents were candid enough to admit whatever had transpired.

It is sound practice for a director to forewarn new agents that lie detector tests may be used to prove their guilt or innocence in a case where serious charges have been made against them and there is no other way of resolving the issue. The director should not hesitate in using the lie detector when the situation demands it. However, he should ensure that the use of the polygraph is not indiscriminate.

9. *Performance evaluations.* Most units do not

have a consistent personnel evaluation procedure because the majority of local departments neither require nor request evaluations. Approximately a quarter of the units had an established procedure for the evaluation of their staff, but these were usually units located in a department from which the main body of agents was assigned.

The personal evaluations of unit personnel are important for two major reasons: (1) they give the director some qualitative and quantitative measure of his agents' performances, and (2) they provide a necessary measure when the agent is being considered for promotion in his department or the unit. An evaluation forces a director to look at his agents according to established criteria and make objective judgements about the overall quality of their work.

An agent should be able to compete with the officers in his police department when promotions are being considered. Therefore, when asked by a chief to submit a performance evaluation on an agent, the director should already have evaluations which have been made throughout the agent's assignment in the unit. Evaluating an agent after substantial periods of time have passed is not fair to him. Most supervisors are aware of the hazards in evaluating in this manner. The work an agent has done over the past year will be obscured by what he did in the past month or two. The quality and amount of work that he performed over the major part of the period will have been forgotten.

Another reason for making personal evaluations is that, if a director wishes to justify transferring an agent back to his department because of poor work performance, there will be some documentation of the agent's weak areas. This makes a director's position stronger should his decision be changed.

Ordinarily, an agent will be evaluated by a single supervisor. In instances where an agent has had more than one supervisor during a rating period, his evaluation should reflect the views of all who have shared the responsibility for his supervision. In either event, the supervisor's written evaluation should be reviewed by the unit director. After his final review, the evaluation should be discussed with the agent. At this time, the agent should be given the opportunity to ask general questions about the rating process or specific questions about his ratings.

A variety of factors complicate the evaluation process. First, it is very difficult to evaluate performance in narcotic work. For example, are four marijuana sale arrests better than one arrest for a one-ounce sale of heroin? Are six arrests with four court convictions better than 3 or 4 arrests with no

convictions? In answering such questions, it should be recognized that one agent may have to spend several months to gain the confidence of a pusher while another agent with easier cases may be able to make contact with 4 or 5 suspects during the same period of time.

Clearance rates, which may be used as evaluative criteria in other investigative units, are not valid in narcotic work for obvious reasons. Offense reports based on citizen or victim complaints are not as prevalent as in non-narcotic offenses. Information that comes in, usually incomplete, is often provided anonymously. Informants who want to work off charges are usually turned over to the unit by participating police departments. While an agent is developing informants, he may have a one- or two-month period where the number of buys he makes diminishes. Or perhaps, after a series of raids and arrests, local pushers may not be willing to sell to new people, thereby restricting the opportunity for agents to make buys. All these factors complicate the performance evaluation process.

The criteria used for evaluation by a unit should coincide as much as possible with the criteria used by the local police departments. This ensures some degree of uniformity when a police department wishes to compare the performance of an agent and a police officer. This is not to say, however, that the criteria of the two agencies will be identical. They cannot be. Appearance, for example, applies to a uniformed officer but not to an undercover agent. Officer-citizen contact can be better evaluated as it pertains to a patrol officer than to an agent, who has limited contact with the law-abiding segment of society.

10. *Salaries and hours.* All units in which agents' wages were paid by the local departments had the departments pay the salaries directly to the agents. In some cases, agents went to their departments to pick up their checks, while in others, the checks were brought or mailed to the unit for distribution to prevent agent exposure.

Four of the units visited reported that while differences in the wages of agents from the various departments did not cause open conflict, it did generate grumbling or hearty discussion among the agents occasionally. Although differences in wages are not initially considered when an agent joins a unit, after a matter of time he may come to the realization that he makes \$1,000 or \$2,000 less than another agent for doing the same amount, or perhaps more, work. Although several units took steps to make the salaries of their officers equitable, this is not a common practice. One unit, for example, ob-

tained grant money to equalize the pay of all agents at a wage of \$700 a month. In another unit, several chiefs paid their officers a few hundred dollars more to make their wages comparable to the largest department in the unit.

These two practices may provide a remedy for those directors who face similar situations. In cases where extra money cannot be obtained to make wages equitable, the director may have to resolve the issue by discussing the matter with each agent when he joins the unit, pointing out the fact that salary differences exist for the same type of work, but that these differences should not be allowed to affect an agent's work or attitude.

Except for the instances mentioned in the previous section where a few chiefs increased the wages of the officers to the level of other agents, agents were not compensated with premium pay simply because of assignment to the unit. Although there is a potential conflict between agents and officers of their respective departments over premium pay, there are reasons why such compensation can be justified. A departmental officer is not only able to work overtime, but he may also work extra police-related jobs. He can augment his salary from several hundred to several thousand dollars a year. A unit agent cannot do this. An undercover agent, for example, cannot put on a uniform and direct traffic at a local drive-in bank for several hours to earn extra money. By the same token, the irregularity of working hours also prevents the agent from holding a part-time job as other officers might do.

Assuming that agents do not receive premium pay, they should at least get paid for overtime. Unfortunately, what usually occurs is that the units are able to provide little, if any, overtime pay. In fact, in some units agents were fortunate if they received compensatory time in return for overtime work. To avoid morale problems, there should be agreement among the participating agencies as to unit policy concerning overtime pay for unit personnel.

Regardless of the amount of money provided for overtime, tight control must be maintained over the agents' working time. If a director is not careful, the overtime money allocated for one year can be spent in the first quarter. Reducing overtime expenditures is not only the director's responsibility but also that of the supervisors and the agents. Fiscal problems should be explained to all personnel and conservation of funds should be a team effort. Sacrifices of personal time should be made equitably. In many cases where overtime could not be paid or compensated, unit directors made up for it by allowing agents to

come in a little later or go off duty early.

The director can do a variety of things to decrease the need for overtime work. For example, if agents work on rotating shifts, the director can ensure that they set their court dates for a month when they are working days. He may also have agents work irregular hours according to when meetings with informants, anticipated buys, or raids are supposed to occur.

With the exception of one unit, which had a 20-hour work week for its civilian agents, the units had a standard 40-hour work week, probably because the participating departments also had a 40-hour work week for their personnel. The new Fair Labor Standards Act stipulates that public employees will be paid overtime for any work over 40 hours. There has been a question regarding the Act's enforcement against the states. As of this writing (September, 1975), the Act has been enjoined by the U.S. Chief Supreme Court Justice, so that there is no present enforcement of the Act. Should the Act's legality be affirmed, directors will have to operate in conformity with the stipulations of the Act.

11. *Working shifts.* The nature of the narcotic problem, the enforcement objectives of the unit, and the number of agents assigned to it are the major determinants of the working hours of unit personnel. For example, a small unit may be unable to break up into two shifts, even if it were desired, because of the lack of sufficient manpower. On the other hand, a unit that could assign a five-man team to both morning and afternoon shifts may not do so because of local conditions, such as a low level of drug activity during the morning hours. In this case, it may be best to assign all the agents to work the afternoon shift when more narcotic suspects are active. Moreover, unit agents are usually able to set up buys for times during working hours. There are occasions, of course, when surveillances, either moving or stationary, may have to be conducted at any hour of the day or night.

In two units, the Tucson and Stockton squads, the majority of agents worked the afternoon shift. The Stockton squad had one five-agent team working the day shift and two teams working the evening shift. Each of the two evening shifts had different days off than the other. All members on each team would have the same days off so that the two teams showed up for work together on three days out of the week. When a unit has different shifts working, there should be daily meetings of all supervisors and agents so that general notes and information can be exchanged.

When the unit regularly works only one shift, dealers will tend to conduct their business when the unit is not working. To counteract this, a unit must change shifts periodically. In sum, the units must work whenever the need arises; however, there must be some semblance of structure and routine to give the unit a sense of cohesiveness.

Except for units that have hired agents, the policy on holidays, sick days, and vacation time for each agent generally is the same as that of his department. Thus, these benefits are not the same for each agent. This poses little difficulty for the director except that work schedules have to be arranged to incorporate the different holidays of the agents.

Vacation time, however, requires some consideration. For example, should vacation periods be selected on the basis of seniority in the unit or seniority in the department? It is unfair that schedules for vacation dates be changed for unit personnel because a new member has joined the unit. Yet it is equally unfair that a veteran officer have a poor selection of vacation dates because of an assignment. Vacation date selections are often made on the basis of time in service in an agent's department. This is probably the most equitable way of resolving this issue. It is not only a general policy of most units, but also the policy of most police departments.

12. *Rotation of personnel.* Determining the optimum length of agent assignment to a MAN unit is difficult; however, a 2- to 3-year period seems to have the most advantages. First, it takes considerable experience and much specialized training to make a good narcotics agent. Rotating agents too frequently reduces the benefit a unit derives from its investment in an individual. Second, the criminals involved in illicit narcotic activity in a given area generally are the same people year after year. An agent gets to know who these pushers and users are and can put that knowledge to good use. When a new agent is assigned to a unit, he must learn who these individuals are, how they operate, and how the unit can get an agent in with them. Third, there may be a limited number of personnel who have the qualifications or the capabilities to make good narcotics agents. By rotating personnel too frequently, the unit may ultimately have to change its standards because there are not enough individuals who have the necessary qualities. Fourth, it takes a considerable amount of time to develop contacts and informants not only on the street, but also within other agencies and organizations. When someone is re-assigned from the unit, the contact may be lost temporarily and perhaps permanently. Last, where informants are controlled by

the agents instead of the supervisors, frequent rotation of personnel may tend to "cool off" informants if they are transferred from agent to agent too frequently.

On the other hand, there are good reasons why agents should not be left in narcotic assignments longer than a two- or three-year period. Narcotic agents may lose the perspective of basic police goals because of their exclusive involvement with narcotics. They may become too ego-involved in their work and ultimately feel that narcotic enforcement is the most important police function. This is true of officers working in any specialized function.

Closely akin to this is the tendency of narcotics agents to develop an isolationist attitude after a long association with narcotic enforcement. Agents may feel that others are not concerned about narcotics in the same way that they are. Perhaps this is because other officers do not perceive narcotics as the most important function of the police. The general narcotic enforcement policy of negotiating charges in return for information and cooperation may tend to make an agent feel that negotiating burglary or theft charges, for example, is justified in order to get a pusher. Other police officers, of course, do not share that belief. Disassociation from other police functions can be harmful even when an officer is assigned to a narcotic section within a police department. The problem becomes even more acute when an individual is assigned to a unit that is separated in geography, personnel, and operating policy from his own department.

Everyone connected with narcotic enforcement is familiar with the long and irregular hours that agents have to work. These types of working conditions may be detrimental to an agent's physical health and home life. An agent cannot work long and irregular hours in a demanding job for a prolonged period of time without his social or married life being affected. Further, agents generally associate with pushers, users, prostitutes, pimps, and other people related with illicit narcotic activity. Constant exposure to such persons harms an agent by influencing him to believe that all people are as unscrupulous. This reaction ultimately manifests itself in the agent's general attitude toward others. While it is realized that police officers must have a healthy amount of suspicion and skepticism, a narcotics agent may become too suspicious and skeptical after working narcotics for a long period.

Another reason why it is advantageous to rotate unit personnel frequently is that this policy facilitates narcotic enforcement in the participating police de-

partments. When an agent is transferred back to his department, it is as if the unit had one of its men in that department. The ex-agent is familiar with narcotic work. He can pass along his knowledge and the benefit of his experience to the people with whom he works. There is no reason why, with materials and resources from the MAN unit, he could not conduct short, informal training sessions for his fellow officers.

In view of all these factors, agents should be assigned to a unit for a period of two to three years. Any policy where agents are kept longer than this may be disadvantageous to the agent. A shorter period on the other hand may be disadvantageous for the unit. The police chief's role in determining the duration of assignment, however, should not be overlooked. Because each chief is the ultimate authority in this issue, it is necessary for the director and the chief to maintain lines of communication regarding the performance of an individual so that some degree of mutual accord can be reached on his rotation.

13. *Career development.* The career development of unit agents is often neglected by unit commanders and supervisory staff. Yet it is a subject that deserves serious consideration. Although assignment to a MAN unit may not be detrimental to an officer's career, it is not necessarily a stepping stone either. A police officer may get promoted easier if he is working in his own department than if he is assigned to a unit. This results primarily from the fact that the departmental performance evaluations and proficiency ratings that an officer receives are more consistent with departmental standards than when he is working as an agent. Also, there is some basis to the "out of sight, out of mind" philosophy. The agent's staunchest advocate for his promotion may be the director because he is the agent's present superior. Yet the recommendations of the director may be secondary to those of, for example, the investigations commander of a department who is backing his own officers for promotion. The director should discuss promotional and evaluation issues with the agent's chief from the beginning, and establish the practice of regularly briefing the chief on the quality and quantity of an agent's work.

An officer should have a variety of experiences to enhance his opportunities for promotion, and narcotic enforcement is but one part of this experience. However, it may be detrimental to the agent's career to remain in narcotics work or in the unit for an extended period of time simply because he may become overspecialized. Some agents not only desire to remain in narcotics work indefinitely, but in some

cases may even pass up a promotion to remain in a unit. A director should make a strong effort to convince an agent that he should not pass up a promotion for this reason. Moreover, he should encourage all his personnel to take promotional examinations whenever the opportunity arises, even though he may lose capable agents through promotion.

The director should emphasize and encourage the continuing study and education of his agents through local colleges or correspondence schools. Although their work schedules are usually heavy and irregular, there are many instances where unit agents have managed to continue their education. It is realized that most of the training that a unit can give its agents is narcotic oriented and the resources for sending the agents to other types of training courses do not exist. In spite of this, the director can still take it upon himself to seek and provide them with reading and study materials on different facets of police work. This will be beneficial to the individual, his department, and the unit itself. Expansion of an officer's knowledge in one area of police work naturally spills over into most other areas.

14. *Agent dress, appearance, and demeanor.* Narcotic agents typically do not look like police officers; they cannot because visibility as law enforcement officers defeats their purpose. The first case of a police officer buying narcotics in uniform has yet to be documented. Yet other police officers get upset when they see unit agents in shoddy clothes, with long hair, a beard, and mustache. It does not fit their or the public's concept of what a police officer should look like. But an agent has to look like the person whose role he is assuming. This means that agents have to look, talk, and adopt temporarily the mannerisms of narcotics suspects. The more adept the agents are at this, the better they can do their jobs.

There must be limits, however, as to the appearance and behavior of agents. In some instances, agents actually look more disheveled than do suspects. Restrictions may have to be set on such things as piercing one's ears. The dress of the personnel may have to be restricted too, for it is possible for agents to exceed the boundaries of common sense. Too many patches or clothes that are too dirty, for example, may be points the director should discuss with his agents. If a unit operates out of a police department, the extremism of the mode of the dress and appearance may cause problems and therefore require corrective action by the director. In one department, agents are required to dress a little better on the day shift than they do on the night shift.

Narcotic language is often very colorful. In their

everyday contact with people in the narcotics world, agents must speak glibly using a narcotic jargon. However, to some people, this language may be offensive. Agents should understand that the type of talk that helps them on the street is not appropriate in other situations. The role of the "narc" should not be played when it is not called for.

15. *Insurance.* Hospitalization and life insurance were furnished to unit agents by their respective departments. The exception was civilian agents, who were not provided either form of insurance.

In those units with assigned agents, the director and local chiefs should ensure that there is nothing to exempt a police officer from his hospitalization and insurance benefits if he is injured or killed outside his department's jurisdiction.

What was known in the past as false arrest insurance is now called police professional liability insurance. Both refer to insurance that covers a police officer should he falsely arrest or injure someone while carrying out his duties. Police departments carry this type of insurance to cover their officers. Frequently, when officers are assigned to MAN units, the police departments or sheriff's offices simply extend their insurance to cover them during that period of time. In cases where civilians are hired as unit agents, a sheriff's office can simply add them to the list of deputies who are already insured. The cost for making additions to an existing policy is small.

A director will have to determine if the liability insurance that presently covers an officer in his department will also cover him after he is assigned to the MAN unit. Such policies sometimes cover an officer only while he is working within the city or county jurisdiction. If an inquiry reveals that officers assigned to the unit are only insured in their departmental jurisdictions, their insurance may have to be extended to cover them while working elsewhere. Again, an option may be to get them covered under the policies of the sheriff. When they work in several counties, the agents may be insured under the policies of each county.

In cases where the unit must furnish such insurance, the director can contact those companies which are presently insuring local police agencies. Or if he wishes, he can contact the state government insurance commission and obtain a list of those companies which furnish such insurance.

The amount of insurance that a director should obtain may depend on the cost of the policy. Generally, the amount of liability coverage that is added to a basic amount is relatively small, much like auto lia-

bility insurance. For example, increasing the amount of coverage from \$5,000 or \$10,000 to \$25,000 or \$50,000 is not very costly.

A special consideration for the director is that of providing insurance for his governing board when they do not have liability insurance of their own. In recent years, there have been law suits not only against the officer involved in an incident, but also against the head of an agency and city government officials. It is advisable, therefore, that a unit director also procure insurance for his governing board in case they become involved in a law suit. Adding them to an existing policy is not costly, and it may prove to be a wise investment.

F. Training

The content of any training program, whether it is internal or external, should be formulated to suit the training needs of the unit. Therefore, it must be determined beforehand what exactly is expected from unit agents insofar as their duties and expected level of performance are concerned. A director must also know the kinds and depth of narcotic training and experience that his agents have to determine what training they still need. For example, it may be wasteful to give search and seizure training to a new agent who had several years' investigative experience, or informant-handling training to an ex-vice officer. When training is required for an agent who has been a unit member for some time, the director or supervisor must be able to evaluate the type of school that would be most beneficial to the agent. For example, a three-day narcotic seminar may be deemed sufficient to round out a capable agent whose performance is basically satisfactory.

There are usually three training options open to a unit commander: on-the-job training, formal internal training by the unit, and external training programs.

1. *Training by the unit.* On-the-job training (OJT) of agents by supervisors is perhaps the most important, certainly the most prevalent, type of training that agents receive. Sometimes it is the only type to which they are exposed. One of the primary advantages of OJT is the fact that it takes place during a "real" situation where there is an immediate necessity to learn and the agent presumably has the interest and incentive to learn.

Using the services of regular operating supervisors is usually the most feasible and economical method to train agents. The unit is able to utilize its agents while they are learning, and the supervisors are able

to evaluate the rate and quality of learning by the trainees. Supervisors can readily discern if an agent has difficulty with some particular task. Moreover, the supervisor or senior agent can teach the new agent about local narcotic conditions, such as the identities of the suspects who are operating in the area. The director and his supervisors should devise a check list of training subjects to be covered to ensure that on-the-job training is done systematically and that it is not used to hide the fact that no training is being offered.

On-the-job training should be done by the supervisor whenever possible. However, there is no reason why a unit cannot use senior agents who have a proven ability to perform required tasks; a comprehensive knowledge of unit operations, policies, and procedures; and the ability to impart knowledge and skills.

The duties that a "trainee" agent should be assigned will depend on (1) the capabilities of the agent, (2) the needs of the unit at that time, and (3) whether the agent is to serve as a cover or undercover agent. If the agent is to be used in a cover capacity, he should be allowed to immediately assist other agents with assignments such as surveillances, interviews, interrogations, raids, and report-writing. In fact, the more varied the initial experience of the agent, the faster he will become a productive member of the unit.

Units should also contemplate establishing formal, in-service training classes for their agents, especially where a number of new agents have been assigned to the unit at the same time. The amount of training and the subject areas to be covered will depend in part on the prior training of the agents. Certainly these programs should be integrated with on-the-job training. The director should make certain that all essential topics are covered by either in-service or external programs, or both.

2. *External training.* In the area of external training, narcotic training programs include everything from one-day seminars to the ten-week narcotic officers school offered by the Drug Enforcement Administration. These training schools are provided at the local, state, and federal levels. At the local level, some of the larger cities have their own training academies that provide training in narcotics. More frequently, however, it is the state that provides training through regional narcotics schools.

At the federal level, the DEA offers short seminars, a two-week regional school, and a ten-week school conducted at the National Training Institute in Washington, D.C. The DEA conducts short seminars and two-week schools in various regions of the country, usually upon the request of local agencies.

Local agencies are also able to select as instructors a number of individuals from the area who have the capability to instruct classes on local subjects, such as state law or regional narcotic conditions. The DEA, in furnishing instructors for portions of the school, also attempts to use DEA agents assigned to the general area since they are familiar with local problems, conditions, and law enforcement officials.

Many states conduct narcotic training schools that have developed strong, structured programs. Many of the directors interviewed during the project pointed out that, in their attempts to provide formal training for every agent, they relied heavily on the state schools. Although schools will vary in quality, a good, basic narcotic school, with capable instructors, covers the essential subjects of narcotic investigation and adequately prepares a new agent for a productive career in the unit.

3. *Other narcotic and narcotic-related schools.* There are a variety of schools that offer narcotics or narcotic-related training. In the area of intelligence, a data collector's school and analyst's school are highly recommended by unit personnel who have attended them. There are also schools on surveillance conducted by private manufacturers of electronic equipment. Other schools sponsored by public and private agencies specialize in areas such as criminal law, search and seizure, and rehabilitation. Whatever training program is selected by a director for his agents, he should examine the amount and type of training furnished by that program in light of the formal in-service training or OJT available in the unit. The director should expect that his agents will have to obtain additional training about narcotics work in general and become familiar with local narcotic conditions and the unit work methodology.

Normally, a director should expect his agents to be trained in a number of narcotic subjects including the following:

- Drug identification.
- Symptoms of drug abuse.
- Drug laws, including search and seizure.
- Undercover techniques.
- Use and handling of informants.
- Surveillance techniques.
- Drug concealment.
- Gathering and utilizing information and intelligence.
- Use and care of equipment.
- Unit policies and procedures.

- Role of the MAN unit.
- Court procedure and demeanor.

4. *Advanced training.* One of the concerns of directors is that most training available to their agents is usually of a rudimentary type. There are few schools to which they can send unit personnel for advanced training. Often, an agent with several years' experience will be sent to a school only to find out that he is being taught basic subjects learned during his first few months with the unit. There is insufficient differentiation, for class purposes, between the new agent who does not know what a "roach" looks like and the experienced agents. The general feeling is that these schools should emphasize such things as practical exercises in surveillance, handling informants, new developments in equipment technology and the utilization of such equipment, and supervision of narcotics personnel and investigations. Should a unit or units sponsor a training school for regional officers, the planners should differentiate advanced training from basic training.

One way of meeting these two distinct training needs simultaneously is through the design of a two-level program. One part of the program would be designed for both experienced and inexperienced officers while other portions of the program could be divided according to the specific needs of the two groups. For example, the inexperienced officers could be given classes on drug identification, the experienced officers instructed on investigative supervision, and both groups given a class on new types of hallucinogens. In conducting practical exercises, such as in surveillance, the senior agents could act as team leaders. Thus, while subjects of mutual interest could be presented to both groups, each group could still be given classes that were more or less tailored for it. Although this type of program would entail a considerable amount of work and planning, it is a sound approach to designing an effective program for a frequently neglected group, experienced agents.

A special consideration for a unit is the amount of training that it is willing to undertake for its agents in view of the frequency of their rotation in assignment. In one unit visited, for example, it was not uncommon for a police chief to recall an officer to the department after having been assigned to the unit from three to six months. Although the training of frequently-rotated officers will still benefit the unit, first priority in training should go to those agents who will be on long-term assignment to the unit.

CHAPTER VII. EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. Cooperation With Local Departments

Ideally, a unit director should strive to create and maintain a strong cooperative relationship with all departments within his jurisdiction. In reality, however, positive support for the unit cannot always be attained. For one thing, a local police administrator may give a relatively low priority to the narcotic problem. To overcome this problem, a director should routinely pass along information about local narcotic activity to the administrator. At the same time, the interrelationship of narcotics and other crimes should be pointed out and constantly stressed.

The following are some common causes of friction between MAN units and local departments.

- There is a lack of adequate knowledge of unit operations and effectiveness.
- The unit fails to notify the department of investigations started or buys made in its jurisdiction.
- Unit personnel seek publicity which aggrandizes the unit and understates the contribution of the department.
- Departments feel that they are constantly giving information but receiving none in return.
- Equipment and manpower are continually being borrowed by the unit.
- Unit personnel may believe and exhibit an attitude that the smaller departments are not capable of making sound investigations and know very little about narcotics.
- The unit refuses to handle requests for assistance made by the departments because the cases are too small.
- Local departments feel that the unit wants easy narcotic cases handed to it because an informant may be required before the unit will take a case.
- Patrol shifts are not notified when several teams of agents enter local jurisdictions to conduct surveillances or make buys.
- Agents are led to believe that their unit assignment is relatively permanent and they need not maintain their allegiance to their home department.
- The department may feel that many of its ar-

ests are being neutralized when the unit waives or negotiates charges with a suspect.

- The largest department participating in a unit tends to dominate it.
- Local officers are not rewarded, commended, or informed when their information or investigation proves valuable to the unit.
- Local departments feel that agents are "getting away with murder" because they work under loose supervision and not held accountable to their department's rules and regulations.

Lack of cooperation may also stem from the fact that some departments do not fully recognize the function of a MAN unit. This was found to be the case where little publicity was given to the initiation of the unit, and all the departments were not included in its organization. In one instance, this type of problem was handled by having unit personnel visit all the towns and villages in the area to discuss with the chiefs current unit activities and seek information on the specific wants and needs of the departments.

A director frequently decides that he should not work particular cases because the amounts of drugs involved are relatively small and not in keeping with the unit's goals of investigating big pushers. On the other hand, he may have to respond, for example, to a call from a local chief regarding a youngster selling marijuana cigarettes to other youths at school. The conflict here is apparent. While it is true that only selected cases should be pursued, the director must bear in mind that the maintenance of good working relationships with local chiefs is very important. To a local chief, a youth selling marijuana cigarettes at a local high school is a very real problem, as he undoubtedly receives pressure from the community in these cases. In a situation like this, the director usually should pursue the case. However, the director must also make certain that his agents do not repeatedly become involved in these types of cases to the extent that the big pusher is allowed to operate freely. He must strike a balance in the way he deploys his manpower. This type of problem can be avoided if the goals, objectives, and enforcement priorities of a unit are clarified when it is first organized.

Other inter-agency problems occur when a police administrator attempts to deal directly with the agent assigned from his department instead of contacting the agent through his director or supervisor. Direct contact with the agents is frequent because the chief feels that the agent is one of his own officers and can be approached directly. For instance, if the chief has information on a local narcotic suspect whom he wants investigated, he may call the agent directly and ask him to look into the matter. The agent may then feel obligated to investigate the case, thereby causing problems to the director or supervisor who is responsible for distributing case assignments, setting priorities, and coordinating the unit's investigative efforts. A director should recognize the potential problem in such situations and handle them as tactfully as possible. Nevertheless, he should be firm in his policy that requests for assistance emanating from local departments should be directed to him or his supervisor. Concomitantly, the director should insist that all agents notify him or their supervisor immediately whenever they receive a request from a chief.

Some agents may resent using the facilities of a "strange" police department, being under the direct command of its chief or a bureau commander, and having to abide by departmental rules and regulations different than those of his department. This resentment can be reduced, however, if the director encourages the personal participation of agents in unit decision-making. Though the real or imagined dominance of a major department may be unavoidable, agents from smaller departments may not be as resentful if they feel their complaints are heard and their opinions are given some consideration.

A director should request local chiefs to notify him immediately if his agents and local officers are involved in disputes or altercations. The potential for these types of problems is great when undercover agents are involved in certain types of operations, such as surveillances, where their appearance and behavior may draw the attention of local officers. Encounters such as these can fester and ultimately cause severe damage to the relationships between the two agencies. It is important, therefore, that the director be aware of these encounters so that he can take straightforward corrective action.

In many cases, local departments may be asked by a unit to waive or reduce the charges against a suspect because he is willing to assist the unit in making a case against a dealer. This is a sensitive area in law enforcement. Few things antagonize officers more than having their arrest nullified because someone else wants to make the defendant his "informant."

The unit director should prohibit his personnel from contacting local departments to make this type of request. Whenever possible, such contacts should be handled personally by the director. Local departments and the state's attorney should also be informed that if any agent makes a request to waive or reduce charges against an informant, the unit director should be notified immediately.

Local police officers frequently get upset when they contribute information on illicit narcotic activities to the unit, find that the information led to the successful investigation of the case, and yet are never thanked, commended, or even informed by unit personnel that the information proved to be valuable. Because everyone likes to be commended when he does something well, their feelings are understandable. The same thing is true of police officers who make an arrest or a street stop that leads to a successful narcotic investigation by the unit. To enhance cooperation and flow of information to the unit from police officers in local departments, unit personnel should ensure that those officers who contributed to the narcotic enforcement effort are commended for their assistance.

B. Coordination With State and Federal Agencies

In those unit jurisdictions where state and federal narcotic agencies are actively operating, a unit should coordinate its activities with such agencies. For example, when initiating a case against a suspect, the unit should check with these other agencies to determine whether they are currently investigating him. If this is the case, a determination should be made as to who will proceed with the investigation or if it will be a cooperative venture.

Another area of cooperation for units is notification of state and federal agencies when a large series of arrests or raids are to be made and vice versa. This procedure ensures that the raids of one agency will not adversely affect the cases of other agencies by forcing suspects to go underground. If such a possibility exists, the agencies can work together in delaying the raids or in having the second agency move up their anticipated arrests. A two- or three-day notice of pending raids would probably be ample time for the other unit to evaluate the status of its cases.

It would also be advantageous for the unit to designate one of its members as a liaison officer in contacts not only with outside narcotic agencies but also with all other outside organizations. LEAA, in its Discretionary Fund Guide, requires that a liaison officer be designated in units that serve jurisdictions

with 250,000 or more in population. This type of assignment is important because the unit establishes one central point of communication with outside individuals and organizations such as the DEA, departments of public safety, judges, rehabilitation clinics, and the like.

C. Unit Publicity

There are several advantages in publicizing the efforts of a MAN unit. It demonstrates that the unit is actively engaged in narcotic enforcement and helps focus public attention on the problem of narcotics in the local region. This in turn is valuable in obtaining greater public support for the unit and in facilitating narcotic enforcement in the area.

The primary disadvantage in publicizing unit activities is the possibility that some police chiefs may interpret such publicity as an attempt by the unit to glorify itself. Therefore, in their press releases, directors must ensure that participating departments are credited for their general participation in the unit's mission and in the particular investigation that is being publicized. In addition, directors might contemplate adopting a policy where chiefs make their own public statements. Despite the fact that this publicity focuses on the local departments, in the long run the unit benefits by an enhanced cooperative relationship with the local agency.

An important reason why a director might wish to maintain a high degree of publicity is the intention of keeping the unit operational after its funding cycle is completed. In cases where the cost of the unit will be borne by local agencies, it may be necessary to show the need for the unit and to point out its accomplishments in the past to obtain public support.

Regardless of its policy toward publicity, someone in the unit should be designated as a press relations officer whose duties are prescribed in explicit, written directives. All members of the unit should know and abide by these directives. Designating one individual and perhaps an alternate ensures that press releases are uniform and that the information given is accurate and appropriate.

Information given to the press should be as concise as possible. The more that is said in a press release, the greater is the likelihood of inaccuracy, conflict, and misinterpretation of the statements made. A press release should simply give the dates and times of arrests, number and names of persons arrested (excluding juveniles), the charges filed, narcotics confiscated, and the agencies which participated in the arrests. Certain specific details about a case

should not be revealed to the news media. How the case was made, the number of buys on each suspect, the amount of time the agents have been working on the case, the number of police officers participating in the arrests, or the "size" of the dealer arrested are all items that should be excluded from the news release. This type of information can adversely affect prosecutorial efforts. A defense attorney can claim that such information creates prejudicial pre-trial publicity against the defendant. In addition, the information may be useful to the illicit drug community.

On occasion, several of the units visited allowed news media personnel to accompany agents on a raid. According to the directors, most of these experiences were beneficial to the unit in focusing public attention on unit enforcement efforts against the narcotic problem, thus gaining public support.

There are some major disadvantages, however, in allowing news media personnel to observe ongoing raids. First, if the operation is not carried out smoothly or if reporting is not objective, adverse publicity may result. One incident of adverse publicity may be enough to offset months or years of good work by the unit. Second, the initial moments in executing a raid can be complex. Having reporters and cameramen along at the time that the agents are conducting a raid may increase confusion and leave reporters with a poor impression of the unit. The coordination of personnel assigned to positions and duties becomes more complex, and the risk of injury is increased when persons not essential to the operation are permitted to accompany a raiding party. Another factor to consider is that although a camera may not lie, it can distort. Thus, an agent trying to cover two or three suspects at gunpoint while trying to protect himself and other agents may be projected by the camera as an hysterical, gun waving officer. Again, the whole incident may also cause the defense attorney to claim that there has been unnecessary prejudicial publicity against his client. All in all, allowing news media personnel to participate in unit operations such as raids may be unwise. Such participation should be allowed only when all of the factors previously discussed can be controlled. As an alternative source of publicity, perhaps news coverages of unit operations could be focused on some of the more peaceful and less hazardous aspects of unit operations such as court supervised destruction of drugs seized by the unit.

D. Training of Non-Narcotics Officers

A unit should consider conducting basic narcotics training programs for local non-narcotics officers.

Such programs should be supported fully by the unit and extended to all local departments regardless of size. Where such training is lacking among local officers, a unit commander can establish a program where unit agents conduct short, roll-call training sessions, or even formal, area-wide courses for local officers. The program can focus on narcotics subjects which will assist officers in their own duties and in the enhancement of narcotic enforcement. For example, the program may include the following subjects:

- Drug identification: Local officers should be given some training in the identification of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and the common barbituates, amphetamines, and hallucinogens found in the local region.
- Identification of the abuser: Police officers should be aware of the physiological and psychological symptoms of drug abuse.
- Drug concealment: Methods in which drugs and narcotics are concealed in vehicles, homes, or on the person and how to search for them should be covered.
- Evidence handling: How particular drugs should be handled, collected, stored, and marked should be discussed.
- Conditions and indications of narcotic activity: This topic can cover environmental conditions which indicate narcotic activity, such as narcotic paraphernalia, clandestine lab equipment or vehicular and pedestrian traffic patterns around the place where narcotics are sold.
- The role of the MAN unit: Local officers should be told why the unit was formed, how it functions, how it can contribute to all facets of law enforcement in the area, and why it needs the support of local officers.

Whenever possible, short training classes can be video-taped to allow departments to present the program to a number of shifts and divisions without tying up agents for considerable lengths of time. Temporary, two or three-week assignments of non-narcotic officers to the unit should also be considered.

There are numerous benefits derived from conducting these programs. First, they enhance the support of the unit's function. Patrol officers and investigators of the participating departments get a good understanding of what the unit does and what it is trying to accomplish. It also makes the local departments aware of some of the problems that the unit faces in trying to gather information and in making cases against narcotics suspects. Second, the knowl-

edge of narcotic investigation imparted to other police officers enables them to discover more violations and to do a better job in investigating narcotic or narcotic-related offenses. This, in essence, makes the job of the unit much easier. Third, lines of communication are opened up and a rapport is established between the unit and the local officers. This in turn increases the willingness of local officers to pass along information to the unit on narcotic activities. Fourth, during the training sessions agents may be able to spot those officers who they feel would make good narcotics agents.

Such training should involve as many of the agents as possible who are capable of conducting short training sessions. The involvement in training by an agent is helpful to him because (1) it expands his own knowledge of the subject matter, (2) it forces him to become aware of and responsive to the external relationships of the unit, and (3) it gives him the opportunity to make personal contact with police officers from all departments.

Another phase of narcotic training where MAN units can participate is the narcotic training offered to recruit officers at police academies in the local area. Such training offers the same advantages as those conducted by the unit during roll-call training sessions for in-service officers. In addition to these advantages, training at the academy means that the unit is able to reach police officers when they are being given their initial training and can be readily impressed with the need for total police cooperation in narcotic enforcement. Furthermore, a director can set time aside for a 2- to 4-hour block of instruction on the subject. Academy training is regular; that is, the director knows that one of his agents will give a certain block of instruction for every recruit class. One lesson plan can be developed to be used by anyone from the unit who is designated to instruct the class. In addition, qualified academy instructors can be called upon to assist the unit with visual aids and displays to be used in its presentation.

E. Public Education

The decision to participate in drug education programs for the public depends on the availability of unit manpower, the discerned need for such a program in controlling the drug problem, and the interest in these programs as demonstrated by local groups and schools. Through participation in these programs, the unit is able to take its case to the public, make the public aware of local narcotic problems, explain its purpose and function, and make a direct appeal for citizen cooperation and support.

On the other hand, there are some problems that may be encountered in conducting public education programs. The depletion of unit manpower is certainly a factor. A director must take one of his agents off the street and give him sufficient time to prepare and present the lecture. For most units, such a loss of manpower even for short periods of time is a strain on their resources. Another current problem is that speakers in the local high schools sometimes experience difficulty in communicating with the students. The problem is that the students often feel that they know just as much or more about drugs as the speaker. Therefore, the speaker loses much of his credibility before he even starts. Finding qualified speakers to give effective presentations may also be a problem. Because of the need to keep the majority of unit agents from being exposed to the public, the director limits himself to a few individuals who can be allowed to give such talks, and to even fewer who can give such talks well. An agent who is very capable as an investigator may not be a good speaker.

If the director decides that his unit will participate in a public education program, he should designate one or two individuals as speakers to minimize exposing his other agents and to maintain some uniformity and quality control in the program.

F. Role of the Unit in Drug Rehabilitation

There are two main opposing views regarding the participation of MAN units in drug rehabilitation. One view is that drug enforcement and drug rehabilitation are two different things. Since units have enough problems in the enforcement area they should, therefore, not become involved in rehabilitation. The contrary view is that rehabilitation is part of the solution to the narcotic problem, that history teaches us that enforcement alone is not the entire answer, and that MAN units should make whatever contribution they can in the area of rehabilitation.

Units can become involved in rehabilitation in several ways. First, unit directors may serve as members of drug abuse boards in their local areas and assist through the contribution of their own knowledge and experience. Second, during the plea bargaining or

sentencing of a defendant, agents are often asked for recommendations or objections about probation because they possess knowledge of a suspect's activities and involvement in drugs.

A director should seek to learn what efforts are being made in drug rehabilitation in his area. If he can make some contribution, he should attempt to get involved in on-going programs. At a minimum, he can learn something about rehabilitation in general and thus be able to form opinions and policies based on this knowledge. In addition, he will be familiar with what needs to be done locally in the area of rehabilitation.

G. Civil Liberties Issues

Occasionally, a unit will have a confrontation with a civil libertarian group over an arrest or raid that the unit has conducted. Under our system of justice and redress, this type of confrontation is impossible to avoid. Some of the problems encountered in this area are exemplified by the experiences of two units. One squad had a suit filed against it for violation of a resident's civil rights because an officer kicked in the door to the wrong apartment or house. As it turned out, the incident was not caused by unit agents, but by a local officer on the same raid. As a consequence, the suit was dropped.

The Tucson unit experienced problems with a so-called "underground" group from a local university who broadcast on a local radio station the names and descriptions of unit agents. The unit was unconcerned about this practice since, more often than not, the names and descriptions were mismatched and the radio gave information about people who were not agents.

To minimize potential confrontations with civil libertarian groups, unit personnel should operate strictly within the legal bounds that have been set. Unit agents should be properly trained and otherwise made aware of the types of activities that are within and without the confines of the law. The unit command must also insist on the strictest adherence to the laws, policies, and guidelines that have been set in law enforcement in general and narcotic enforcement in particular.

CHAPTER VIII. OPERATIONAL POLICIES

A. Information Gathering and the Intelligence Function

The difference between information and intelligence has often confused police officers. Indeed, the whole subject of intelligence seems to have a mystique about it. It may be useful, therefore, to establish a working definition of intelligence as it applies to MAN units. Information gathering within a unit is clearly and simply what it seems to be—the gathering of information pertinent to the operation of a unit. Intelligence is information that has been collected, collated, and analyzed in some systematic manner to allow for its utilization. For our purposes, then, information is virtually anything relevant that comes to the attention of the unit. After such information has been collated and analyzed, it is referred to here as intelligence.

A MAN unit survives on information. Informants, citizens, arrested individuals, and law enforcement officials supply the information that enables a unit to enforce drug laws. If only a half-hearted attempt is made to gather information, or if the unit is unsystematic in recording, collating, and evaluating information, its effectiveness is reduced. For example, the unit may miss many opportunities to develop a realistic picture of a suspect of his operation because it has not developed a methodology for turning information into intelligence.

There are a variety of problems encountered in collecting and processing information. In the collection phase, a unit receives information from many sources, and often at very inopportune times. Anonymous callers, citizens, informants, pushers trying to eliminate other pushers, police officers, and the observations of agents are all potential sources of information. The circumstances and physical surroundings when information is received are often not conducive to the agent's filling out an information report on the spot. There is no reason, however, why an agent cannot jot down the information and document it on the proper form as soon as possible.

Someone within the unit should be designated as an analyst. Sometimes this designation is formal, as when an agent is assigned to perform that function

and nothing else. In other cases, it may be an incidental activity for the director and his assistant in a small unit. They would informally evaluate reported information and draw conclusions about meaning and potential usefulness. Of the 12 units visited, four of them had an agent assigned as analyst. Some units, such as the ones in the Tucson and Stockton areas, have sent one or two individuals to a collector's school and/or analyst school in preparation for their assignment. The schools have reportedly been very helpful.

While it is recognized that the lack of sufficient manpower prohibits making such an assignment in a small unit, it should not preclude the director or his assistant from assuming that role. It should be cautioned that information that is merely filed away has little value.

1. *Control of information to external agencies.* Channels of communication between the unit and local departments should be constantly maintained. Operational information should be exchanged through the individuals designated by local departments as liaison officers. Administrative matters should be discussed by the chief and director, while matters relating to the governing board should be handled by the director and the board members. Whenever possible, communication between the unit and other narcotic agencies can be made by the command personnel, even at the operational level.

The flow of information should be controlled. If an agent must pass along confidential information to a liaison officer in a police department, his supervisor should be aware of it. In the larger units, or in units where communications are frequent, an exception can be made so that a group or team leader, or even an agent, may have the latitude of contacting participating departments. In the Cook County unit, for example, the director allows his agents to handle most, if not all, of the non-administrative contacts between the unit and the police departments. This is done principally because the great number of participating departments prohibits the director or his assistant from maintaining personal contact themselves.

The Cook County unit has approximately 51 municipalities within the jurisdiction, and the unit

agents alone represent over 25 different departments. Thus, the agents are allowed to keep their chiefs informed on important unit activities and make contacts with their own departments. In effect, the agents perform as liaison officers between the unit and their respective departments. Those departments which do not have an officer assigned to the unit are given the name and telephone number of an agent who lives in the general area and can be contacted by the department. All cases where assistance is required by the department, day or night, are referred to these agents.

When unit agents initiate a case in small communities, a unit director must decide whether it is advantageous to notify the local police department. The policy that he follows often depends on the type of relationship that exists between the unit and the small departments and the degree to which the director feels the information will be kept confidential. In some instances, units have experienced information leaks, while in most units no problems of this sort have been encountered. Some local chiefs give the unit a carte blanche in operating within their communities, while other chiefs desire that they be notified of any local operations. If a director of a new unit is uncertain as to which policy to follow, he should inform department chiefs of unit investigations taking place in their community. In instances where information leaks are encountered, it is incumbent upon the director to bring the situation to the attention of the chief of the department concerned. If such leaks persist, the director must then re-assess his policy.

Maintaining confidentiality of information within a local police department is important to the success of the investigation and to the safety of the officers involved in the case. Fortunately, these questions of trust arise infrequently. Often, in order for the unit to undertake a buy in a community, the chief or the patrol shift commander will have to be informed ahead of time so that support can be provided and patrol officers do not inadvertently interfere with an operation. If a buy takes place before departmental notification can be made, the unit should inform the department as soon as possible after the transaction.

2. Information/intelligence reports. A file consisting of reports documenting all incoming information and intelligence should be maintained. There is no reason why an information form cannot be developed that unit personnel can use to document all information or intelligence that they gather.

The alternative to conscientious record-keeping is informational chaos. Unless a systematic procedure

for maintaining and retrieving information is developed, a unit will not know the original information source, when it was obtained, by whom, or whether it is complete. Information will be lost or forgotten. Units, therefore, should develop and utilize a form to record all incoming information and intelligence. Figure 8 in Chapter VI shows a general form for an Information/Intelligence Report.

The Stockton/San Joaquin County unit maintains a daily log book which lists all pertinent information obtained during each day's activities, including license numbers and addresses in the log book. They are also expected to read the log of preceding shifts when they come to work. Because the unit works very closely with intelligence, organized crime, and vice sections of the major department, copies of the daily log sheets are given to the commanders of those sections. This practice ensures that the other commanders are kept up-to-date not only on the daily activities of the unit but also on any information which might be pertinent to their own operations.

3. Regional intelligence meetings. In some jurisdictions, MAN units and participating departments hold regular meetings for command and supervisory personnel to exchange information and intelligence. These types of meetings are commonplace at many law enforcement agencies, but the benefits of these meetings to a MAN unit are particularly great. First, the unit manages to exchange information with police officers from many of the local agencies in the area, information which might otherwise not be obtained. Second, this type of interaction allows the unit to help solidify its relationships with other police officers in the area and enhance cooperation among all agencies. Third, the unit is able to show others what its role and general activities are by discussing its cases. Fourth, the unit is able to give other agencies information that may be useful to them in investigating narcotic and non-narcotic activities.

The San Diego unit, for example, holds bi-weekly meetings of police agencies in the area to discuss individuals dealing in narcotics. These agencies include three federal agencies, one military investigative unit, a state investigative bureau, and investigative people from local departments. In addition, each team of the unit is represented. During these meetings, each participant summarizes cases his group is currently investigating and relates information which is of mutual interest.

B. Informants

There are basically two types of informants with whom MAN units usually work. The first is the vol-

untary informant, who passes along information or otherwise cooperates with the unit; the second is the defendant-informant, who helps the unit in order to obtain special consideration from the trial judge when his case is heard. The defendant-informant will give only enough information to negotiate a deal on the charges that have been placed against him, and will volunteer very little else. It is up to the interviewers to elicit as much further information as possible.

Informants will also use their relationships with the MAN unit to extricate themselves from situations where they are susceptible to arrest by other police officers. For instance, when arrested by a local department, an informant may claim that he is on a unit assignment or he may mention his relationship with the unit to avoid being charged. For this reason, there should be initial agreement among local law enforcement agencies that all persons claiming to be working for the unit as confidential informants should be processed like other suspects. The director of the unit—not a particular agent mentioned by the informant—should be contacted immediately when an informant is arrested. These situations are sore points with local officers, who may feel that informants are given too much consideration. By discussing this policy with all department chiefs, the director avoids conflict. By insisting that he or his assistant be contacted personally, the director eliminates the possibility of an agent interceding on behalf of an informant who has been arrested.

1. *Control of informants.* Policies on who will be the controlling agent over informants differ among units. As a matter of policy, a director may decide that an informant "belongs" either to the unit or to a particular agent. For example, when an informant is assigned to an agent, it is the agent who will contact and control the informant. When an informant belongs to the unit, anyone designated by the director or supervisor may then work with or control the informant. The latter method is, in many cases, the best method for controlling informants. The director and/or supervisors are in a better position to evaluate the usefulness of the informant. If, for instance, they judge that an agent is not getting adequate cooperation from an informant, they might want to assign another agent who is more effective in working with him. If the director wants to distribute the case load equitably among the agents, he may assign any particular agent to work with the informant. This may also be helpful when an agent is getting too close, or chummy, with an informant.

There may be times, however, when the director/

supervisor may decide to have one agent work with an informant exclusively in order to enhance rapport or because the informant is afraid to work with a different agent. In such an instance, the director will have to make an evaluation and, if necessary, an exception. Another alternative is to let every informant be controlled by a team of two agents. Should the unit lose one agent, the other can still work with the informant.

Interestingly enough, in some small units all informants are controlled by the director and his assistant. In these units, all contact with an informant and all payments of money to him are made by the director and his assistant. By utilizing this procedure, strict control of all informants is maintained. There is much merit to this system, but there are also some disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that the agents, especially assigned officers, may feel that they are not trusted to control the informant that they developed. In addition, this procedure can increase the workload for the director and unit supervisors, depending on the number of informants. One useful aspect of this procedure, however, is that the supervisor attends all debriefings of informants. This gives the supervisor an opportunity to ask hard questions which the agent, in his enthusiasm to get the informant to cooperate, may be reluctant to ask. The supervisor can also probe into areas that the agent overlooks, such as general crime activity. After the debriefing, the supervisor is in a better position to determine how reliable the informant is, his future potential, and the value of cases the informant can make.

Local conditions usually dictate how informants are utilized by the various units. In some units, controlled-informant buys are not used because the local courts may feel that the testimony of informants is unreliable. In most units, a confidential informant is used to introduce an agent, the informant is then cut out of further buys, and great pains are taken to introduce a second agent to protect the identity of the informant. In exceptional cases, some units may use the informant as a witness to the original buy or in a buy/bust situation, but normally every attempt is made to preclude the informant from being used as a witness.

The availability of informants is a determining factor in how far a unit will go to protect them. A second factor is the ability of the informant to get "lost" after he serves as a witness. For example, in cities near the Mexican border, many buyers come from all over the country and are not known well, if at all, by the local pushers. An informant may give

testimony in court and then leave the area. He does not need the protection of identity that would be required by a local informant who is well-known by those who sell to him.

A strict policy regarding payments to informants should be established. One major guideline is to minimize the amount of money paid for information or cooperation. If a director makes a large payment to an informant initially, it will be extremely difficult for him to decrease payments at a later time. It is also inadvisable to make a payment to an informant in full. Giving half of it at one time and the remainder at a later date may be a better method. Payments to an informant should not be made until after he has done his work or his information has been checked out. If the informant is going to be needed in court, payment or part of the payment should be withheld until he testifies. Whenever such payments are made, however, signed and witnessed receipts should be obtained in compliance with guidelines for confidential expenditures. The amount to be paid is arbitrary. One unit, for example, may pay an informant up to ten percent of the value of the narcotics purchased.

2. *Identification of informants.* For identification purposes, the fingerprints, pictures, and signatures, including aliases, of informants should be obtained. Most units do not require the standard three sets of fingerprints that are commonly needed for police arrests. The purpose of fingerprinting is primarily for identification, and some squads only require thumb prints. A head and shoulders Polaroid picture of the informant is usually adequate. The pictures can be taken anywhere and their clarity can be instantly evaluated. The need for the signatures is obvious: the unit may have to prove later that money was actually paid to the informant.

The director should establish procedures to keep an informant's identity confidential. For example, once an informant's identity is documented in the informant file, the director should issue an identification number. In every subsequent report, the informant should be referred to by the identification number only, for example, S.E. (special employee) 39 or T.E. (temporary employee) 39. This procedure helps to ensure the confidentiality of the informant's identity.

Another security procedure is that of designating locations for meetings with informants away from the unit office or police department. Confidential informants should be met in secluded places where the chances of being seen by the wrong people are minimal. These places may include motel rooms where the agents can meet with the informant and have fin-

gerprints and pictures taken, forms filled out, and payments made in private. Some units have special agreements with local motel owners where agents use a room for several hours for a small fee. Regardless of where such meetings are held, it is wise to change their location periodically.

In some units, the identity of informants is known only to the director and supervisors. One potential problem with this practice, however, is that unit agents may inadvertently "burn" or reveal the identity of an informant simply because they are unaware of his status.

Access to the records of confidential informants should be restricted. A director can vary the procedure for security maintenance and the number of people with file access on a trial basis. If the system of allowing all agents access to the files works well, the director may want to keep that procedure. If he encounters difficulties with this procedure, he may want to further restrict accessibility. For example, if some informant cards or pictures are lost, he may still allow the agents into the files, but only after they have notified their supervisors. Regardless of whether the unit is housed in a police department or its own facility, non-unit individuals should not have access to the informant files.

Along with the informant's fingerprint card, pictures, and copies of his real and alias signatures, a personal history form and a sheet detailing all money paid to the informant should be included in his file. A sheet listing all of the informant's cases and their disposition may also be included. This procedure provides the unit with information on the informant's reliability. There is no need to include such information in the informant's file, however, if it is listed in his master index card.

Informants who are "burned" in a MAN unit's jurisdiction and have lost their utility may sometimes be relocated to another region for their own safety. The amount of effort and expenditures that a unit is willing to expend in relocating informants should be made clear to them when they first begin to work with the unit. If all the unit can provide is a one-way bus ticket elsewhere, informants should be aware of this so that there is no misunderstanding at a later time.

If an informant who is to be relocated is still willing to cooperate, other MAN units, state narcotic units, or federal narcotic agencies should be notified of his availability. If one of these agencies is willing to work with him, they may be able to assist with expenses and perhaps help him to obtain a job. This was found to be a common practice among many of

the units visited. If such transfers are made, it is important that the new agency receive complete information on the informant's reliability.

3. *Special problems.* In some units, the defense attorney and prosecuting attorney participate in meetings to negotiate charges against an informant who wishes to cooperate. The general policy is that a defendant's cooperation will be mentioned in court if he pleads guilty to the original or reduced charges, and if he assists the unit in making a case against either the informant's "source" of drugs or a bigger dealer. In many cases, informants cannot make a case against their own sources because knowledge of their arrest is widespread. In these instances, the informant may be able to assist in making a case against another pusher, one who is a bigger dealer than the informant. Units must be careful in such cases because informants often try to make a case against a smaller dealer or more specifically one of the pushers that they supply.

The terms agreed upon during the negotiation should be made explicit and, if possible, written and signed by all parties. The practice in some units is to have the defendant's attorney present so that a defendant cannot later claim that any agreement was violated. Unless these agreements are clarified beforehand, they tend to be questioned at the time of trial. For example, a defendant may claim that the agreement was to attempt to introduce an agent to a pusher and not necessarily to successfully do so. In addition, if the agreement is documented, it will not appear as if the unit is blackmailing the defendant into cooperating. Figure 9 is a sample form for a cooperation agreement.

Deciding what charges against a defendant-informant will be negotiated through the plea bargaining process should never be the responsibility of the agent. The director and his supervisors should make this decision. They should confer with the state's attorney or his assistant so that he may evaluate what can and should be negotiated. The state's attorney should also be informed that the director or designated supervisors are the only ones who decide what charges in a case are to be negotiated. Any agent who intercedes in such negotiations should be reported to the director immediately.

The use of female informants presents special problems to a director and his agents. There should be no meetings between agents and female informants unless they are official and only if a supervisor has been notified. At every meeting with a female informant, there should be two agents. Informants always try to befriend agents, and female informants

may try to develop friendships by using sex. The director should have strict guidelines prohibiting close relationships or socializing between agents and female informants. Social activity between an agent and a female informant should be considered as dangerous to the unit's security. Indeed, restrictions should also be imposed on the fraternization between an agent and an informant. Although development of voluntary informants necessitates a certain amount of personal contact, conversation, flattery, and the like, this necessary fraternization between agents and informants should be controlled by the supervisors.

The use of paroled informants should be avoided as much as possible. Parolees are usually not allowed to associate with other ex-convicts or to become involved with anyone associated with illicit activity. In addition, they are usually restricted by curfews. Therefore, cooperation with a MAN unit, even with the consent of parole officers, is antithetic to a parolee's restrictions. A possible exception to this policy may be if the parolee is already involved in illegal activity and is about to have his parole revoked. In this instance, however, his assistance should be voluntary, and the permission of his parole officer must be obtained. The Stockton Unit has a parole officer assigned to it, thus involving the unit to some degree with parolees. In California, a condition of parole is that the parolee waives his constitutional rights regarding searches. Thus, he or his dwelling may be searched at any time. In view of this, the parole officer works closely with the unit when he believes that a parolee is selling or using drugs.

C. Undercover Work

Most units distinguish between the agents who make undercover buys and those who do everything except work undercover. The former are called undercover agents and the latter are known as cover agents. It is interesting to note that all the agents in some units may work undercover, while in other units there may be only two or three undercover agents who are used exclusively for making buys. For example, in the MAT and Multi-Agency Squads, both of which use hired agents, all agents are undercover agents. This also means, of course, that they will have to serve as cover agents on surveillances and the like. On the other hand, the Tucson unit with 19 field agents, has four undercover agents; Stockton, with 12 field agents, has two undercover agents. Their policies, however, do not preclude the cover agents from making buys when necessary and possible.

Figure 9
Conduct of Confidential Informant

I, _____ the undersigned understand that while I am cooperating with and assisting the _____, I am forbidden to do any of the following:

- A. Sell or deliver any controlled substance, dangerous drug, marijuana, or any substance purported to be same, to any one.
- B. Never sell or deliver or cause to be sold or delivered any controlled substance, dangerous drug, marijuana, or any substance purported to be same, to any person who would then in turn sell or deliver said controlled substance, dangerous drug, marijuana, or any substance purported to be same, to any member of the unit or any other person.
- C. Never use my sex, sexuality, or sexual activity to induce or persuade any individual to sell or deliver a controlled substance, dangerous drug, marijuana, or any other substance purported to be same to any member of the unit.
- D. I further understand that I may never search any suspect, person, house, papers, or personal effects.
- E. I may never become involved in any activities that would constitute entrapment.
- F. I further understand that I may not engage in any illegal or improper conduct so long as I am working with the _____ unit.
- G. Further, I understand that any violations arising from my actions in violation of the above circumstance will result in an investigation of matters and if the charges are substantiated, appropriate action (including the possibility of criminal prosecution) will be taken.
- H. I am agreeing to cooperate with the _____ unit of my own free will and accord, and not as a result of any intimidation or threats.

In agreeing to work with the _____ unit, I understand that no unit agent may make any explicit or implicit promises or predictions regarding the likely disposition of any criminal proceedings that are pending against me, but that unit agents will make their best efforts to arrange a meeting with prosecutorial authorities at which time such matters can be discussed.

SIGNED: _____

WITNESSES: _____
TIME: _____
DATE: _____
PLACE: _____

The number of undercover agents in a unit is determined by two factors. The first is the type of unit, i.e., civilian-staffed or assigned-officer staffed, and the second is the size and population of the jurisdictional area. In civilian-staffed units, the agents have never worked as police officers and therefore will not be known to those involved in illicit drug activities. Each agent can make buys from anyone without fear of being identified as a police officer. If the identity of an agent is discovered by too many narcotic dealers, he may simply be discharged and another civilian hired. In a unit using assigned officers, the agents may be recognized quickly as being police officers. Therefore, these units may have to rely on two or three specialized undercover agents to make their buys.

To illustrate the size-population factor, we can compare the Lansing MAN unit to the one serving Cook County, both of which use assigned officers. In the Lansing Unit, an agent who has been a uniformed police officer for five years will be known by many of the local people. On the other hand, a Cook County officer, regardless of the number of years he has worked there, is unlikely to be recognized on the street. Even where the Cook County agent is known as a police officer, he can be reassigned to a different part of the county. This is not true of the Lansing area agent. He can only be assigned to work a limited number of areas before he will be recognized by most dealers. His utility would then be in working as a cover agent, handling informants, and setting up buys for the undercover agent.

1. *Productivity of undercover agents.* There are few instances when the usefulness of an undercover agent is completely lost because his identity is known. An agent can usually be transferred from one part of a unit's jurisdiction to another and resume productive activity.

Agent productivity seems to be related negatively to length of service in the unit. The demands of the job and the necessity for working at a very active pace for a prolonged period wears out many agents. Motivation is sometimes lost when agents are informed that they will soon be transferred back to their local department.

There are no definite answers to the latter problem, although some suggestions may be helpful. For example, the director and department chief should stress to agents that their unit assignments are temporary. The unit should also have a uniform policy wherein everyone is rotated back to his department after a specified tour of duty. The director can discuss problem cases with the chiefs and attempt to get

agents reassigned to positions where their narcotic enforcement experience can be effectively utilized. Finally, the director and the agent can discuss his career in general and his reassignment specifically. A director should point out the career disadvantages of staying too long in one assignment; i.e., over-specialization and the value of a variety of experiences to one's career.

Occasionally, an investigation may require an agent to work undercover at a private business. There are some factors involved in this type of operation which a director should take under consideration. An agent may have to devote 8 hours' working time in the undercover job and then return to the office to perform some regular duties such as meeting informants and writing reports. Compensatory time may have to be given to him and a decision regarding outside wages that he earns will have to be made. In many instances units allow an agent to keep the wages because, in spite of the fact that he is still drawing his regular pay, he is putting in more working time than the other agents. Providing false identification, such as social security numbers, for these types of assignments may also be a problem. For example, at the end of the year the agent must report his additional income, yet the Internal Revenue Service may have taxed a fictitious party at a fictitious address unless the director first cleared the matter with the IRS. Moreover, a director will have to ensure that the true identity of the agent will be known by as few of the company officers as possible.

So long as the agent is drawing paychecks under a fictitious name from a private business, it may be advantageous to have him cash the checks in various taverns around town to get known by his alias. This type of cover may prove useful at a later date.

2. *Protection of undercover agents.* Protection of the undercover agent during undercover assignments also calls for establishing guidelines and procedures. The director must determine policy on the type of backup the undercover agent will have, the number of cover agents to be used, and the type of buy locations that should be avoided. The director must also decide who runs the operation, i.e., the undercover agent, the cover agent, or the team leader. He must ensure that all the men involved in a buy participate in the decision-making process and have an opportunity to contribute their opinions. At the same time, alternative plans and the latitude of the undercover agent must be clearly defined. For example, can the buy agent leave the area? What is his time frame for making the buy? Will the undercover agent allow the suspects to handle or count the buy money? Restrict-

tions must be set beforehand or the agent may become too ego-involved in the case to make rational decisions.

The unit director and supervisors must also make certain that the informant does not take control of a buy situation. Often because of their knowledge regarding the pusher and the situational factors, informants might want to make decisions such as changing the target or to make other changes in the game plan. This cannot be allowed. The informant must be made to understand that he will be under the control of the undercover agent. This is essential for the agent's protection.

In any undercover buy, the undercover agent should know the capabilities of the team covering him. He must think of the number of agents backing him up, the number of unit vehicles involved, and their ability to observe what is transpiring, before he leaves the buy location with a suspect or splits up with his undercover partner or informant. Supervisors should constantly stress these types of considerations to the undercover agents.

Any unit buy involving large amounts of money should be considered as a potential "rip-off," that is, a situation where the pusher attempts to rob the buyer of his money. Cases of rip-offs are becoming more frequent. In some areas, there has developed a class of rip-off suspects who specialize in robbing narcotic purchasers. While narcotic officers may take pleasure in seeing a potential buyer separated from his money, the rip-off violator also poses a threat to the undercover agent. There are numerous incidents of shoot-outs between agents and the suspects who are trying to rob them. For the protection of the agents, then, formulation of plans for an undercover buy should automatically include provision for a robbery attempt.

Some MAN units maintain a rip-off suspect file containing information on individuals who are known or suspected of having been involved in such robbery attempts. The purpose of maintaining this file is to facilitate the exchange of information on these suspects and the methods of operation among the MAN units and other interested agencies.

There should be discussion among unit personnel of whether or not an agent should identify himself as a police officer as a last resort when his own life is in danger, such as in the case of a rip-off. There have been instances where an agent has prevented certain death by identifying himself as a police officer.

Agents should carry police identification except possibly when they are making an undercover buy. Agents may need such identification if they are

stopped by local police officers or they have to prove their identity to a citizen for their own safety or to obtain assistance. Even in units where agents were allowed to operate on their own and make buys at their own discretion, unit badges and identification cards were carried by agents on their person or in their vehicles.

In most states, body transmitting and recording devices can be legally used by agents for their personal safety. In some states, the monitored information can be used in court. Several units record agent-suspect conversations for this purpose, although none has yet been used in court. The primary advantage of this device is that it allows cover agents to hear and know what is occurring at the scene of a buy or meeting. For example, they can determine if the undercover agent's cover story has been broken, or if a robbery attempt is being made by the suspects.

The carrying of guns while on an undercover assignment is usually left to the discretion of the agent. It is dependent on (1) the hazards existing for the agent and (2) its appropriateness to the cover story the agent gives.

The first point concerning gun carrying is clear. The likelihood of a rip-off, the type of suspect one is dealing with, the number of suspects expected to be participating—all these factors will dictate whether the agent should carry a weapon. The second point is less clear. In years past, finding a gun on a buyer was an indication that he was a police officer. Today, a purchaser of large amounts of narcotics is expected to carry a gun for his own protection. Therefore, detecting a handgun would not necessarily arouse the suspicions of drug dealers, assuming the agent is not carrying a .38 caliber revolver, which is usually identified with police officers.

3. *Shipment cases.* Shipment cases are usually made by those units working at locations which serve as points of entry for narcotics and as narcotic distribution centers for other parts of the country. These points are located along both coasts, the Gulf of Mexico, and the international borders. A shipment case may be initiated when a unit agent working at an airport discovers that a suitcase contains narcotics. A sample of the narcotics is confiscated from the bag and maintained as evidence. Usually the suitcase and its contents are then allowed to be sent out to the original destination. The appropriate agency at the destination of the suitcase is informed of what has occurred and given a description of the suitcase and suspect, along with the claim-check number. Members of the alerted agency can then either arrest the suspect when he picks up the suitcase or they can

follow him to his destination and arrest him and his associates there.

The Tucson unit maintains two pairs of agents as a full-time airport detail. In investigating a shipment case, the Tucson agents and alerted ticket agents at the airport watch for passengers who fit the smuggler's profile. Typically, this profile consists of a young, modish-looking male, with heavy, expensive luggage, who arrives at the last possible moment before plane departure and pays cash for his ticket. In the past, there was sufficient probable cause to inspect the suitcase of persons matching the profile. Recent court rulings now prohibit this procedure. The Tucson unit is currently training canines to detect narcotics so that probable cause under similar circumstances can be established.

4. *Use of flashrolls.* A very essential part of unit operations is the use of the "flashroll," a bundle of money used by agents making undercover buys to "flash" to the dealer and induce him to make the sale. The appropriate size of the flashroll needed by a unit depends on local sales and distribution patterns. Flashrolls kept on hand by the units visited range up to \$50,000.

The source for flashroll money also varies. In some units, the money is obtained on a loan basis from one or more local police departments. In others, the money is borrowed from the city treasury or from banking institutions that lend the money interest-free on the signature of city and/or police officials. Occasionally, when the money to be flashed is too large a sum for one unit to provide, state and federal narcotic agencies may be called upon to assist in obtaining it. A director should be aware that, if other agencies are asked to provide some of the flash money, they will automatically become involved in the operation. At the very least, since they are responsible for the money and want to protect it, they will want to impose situational controls which are in keeping with their own policies and procedures.

When a flashroll is used in a buy, protection of the money during the operation is essential. All possible exits from the buy location should be covered. Any suspects leaving the premises while the money is inside should be intercepted, away from the buy-spot if necessary. More importantly, undercover personnel must fully understand that the money must not leave their possession. In no circumstances should an agent "front" the money; that is, turn over the money in anticipation of a narcotic delivery. The reluctance of any buyer to put his money out front is only natural. The undercover "buyer" is being understandably cautious when he refuses to pay until he receives the

narcotics. Failing to make a purchase because the agent refuses to front the flashroll money is better than taking a chance and losing \$20,000. This fact should be constantly emphasized to the undercover agent.

Some units make it a policy to flash their money in places which can be watched by cover agents, but will not allow the flashroll inside any building or dwelling where surveillance is restricted.

The flashroll should be kept in a place which affords around-the-clock security, yet allows accessibility. A local bank provides the security that is needed; however, accessibility is limited since the money can be obtained only when the bank is open.

One unit keeps a flashroll of \$50,000 in a safe which is located in the communications center of a large police department. Thus, the safe can be watched 24 hours a day by several people. Storing the money in an external unit office, even if the money is kept in a safe and the offices have a burglar alarm, is inadvisable. The possibility of being burglarized is just too great. If a sizeable sum of money were stolen, it would be extremely embarrassing and costly to the unit.

The serial numbers of buy money should be recorded. All money confiscated in an operation can then be checked for confidential funds stemming from that buy and from previous buys. Any bills that were part of unit funds can be retrieved after court disposition of the case.

D. Undercover Buys

In all buy cases, there should be as much surveillance and information-gathering on the suspect, his accomplices, and the location of the buys as possible. This helps to protect all agents involved. The identity of the pusher should be established before a buy takes place. If there are any buy problems, if a rip-off takes place, or an agent gets injured in the operation, the identity of suspects will be known.

The number of buys that are needed for a particular case will depend on such things as local courts' attitudes toward the illicit sale volume of the narcotics sellers, the size of the buys, the likelihood that the seller may move away, the desire of the unit to remove the informant from the arresting agent, and the possibility of catching the seller with a large cache. A unit must also consider the span of time between the last buy and the arrest of the pusher. If too much time has elapsed between the last buy and the arrest (for example, 6 months), the court may feel that the suspect cannot be expected to remember details of

the incident. A jury may also misplace its sympathies by feeling that the pusher may have reformed in the intervening six or nine months. They will not have this problem if the unit can show that agents made buys two weeks before the arrest was made or a warrant was issued. Therefore, the unit may consider making an additional buy shortly before warrants are obtained to keep the case "current." Even if a unit decides that two or three buys will be made on a pusher, a preliminary buy where an informant was used may occasionally have to be taken to court. Therefore, the planning, conduct, analysis of evidence, and the report writing should be conducted with the intention of going to court with that buy.

The buy/bust operation is a very useful procedure for MAN units. By using a buy/bust, the unit does not have to lose buy money in arresting a suspect. After several small preliminary buys have been made from a suspect, the agent can negotiate a purchase for a much larger quantity and then arrest the dealer at the time of sale without turning over the buy money. The greatest advantage of the buy/bust is that it is economical. It allows the unit to arrest the pusher for a major sale while expending funds for only one or two preliminary buys.

There are really no set guidelines for how much a unit should spend on "walk away" narcotic buys where an arrest is not made immediately. If the unit, however, wishes to have a big buy on a suspect when they go to court, it should consider proceeding with a buy/bust where an arrest is made at the time of the buy. The unit must think about making confidential expenditures stretch as far as possible. It will run out of buy funds long before it runs out of pushers. The unit with the \$50,000 flashroll, for example, made it a policy to never lose more than \$600 on a walk-away buy—\$1,200 if another agency was sharing the cost. If a unit wishes to make a large walk-away buy to get to the pusher's source and the amount of money involved is too large, it might consider going to a state or federal narcotic agency for assistance in sharing the costs for the buy money.

In a controlled-informant buy situation, an informant and his vehicle, if one is used, are searched thoroughly, and then he is sent with marked money to make a buy. The informant's activities are closely watched by agents, and he is searched again after turning over the drugs. This procedure ensures that he has not kept any of the purchased drugs or the buy money. Based on the probable cause of the informant's testimony and the agents' observations, either a search warrant can be obtained, or, if this is not possible, an immediate arrest made. The controlled-

informant buy was used regularly by some units. Others did not use it at all because local courts do not consider informants to be reliable witnesses.

E. Arrest Policies

Arrest policies varied from unit to unit. A policy which was common in one area was considered unsuitable in another. Typically, the arrest procedures used are the buy/bust arrest and the arrest warrant.

The use of the buy/bust arrests by units varies. Some units make a majority of their arrests with buy/busts, while others only make five or six arrests of this type a year, relying instead, on arrest warrants which are issued sometime after the buy has been made. The variance in policy is due to the varying amounts of confidential funds available to the unit and the differences among the local communities. In a rural setting a unit can make three small buys (with little investment), obtain arrest warrants based on the sales, and generally get a court conviction. A conviction for sales, even small ones, may get the dealer a five- or ten-year sentence in rural areas. A similar case involving \$20 or \$25 sums would be reduced to simple possession in a major metropolitan city. Therefore, city agents have to increase the size of the buy. By increasing the size of the buy, though, the unit increases the amount of money that will be lost with little chance of recovery. In the larger cities, or where the buy money fund is small, the unit has to utilize the flashroll and buy/bust techniques. In cases where a large walk-away buy must be made, the unit should attempt to obtain the financial participation of state and federal narcotic enforcement agencies.

An alternative to the buy/bust is an arrest by warrant. After a series of buys have been made from a dealer, and the informant has been sufficiently removed from the buys, the unit obtains warrants and either serves them itself or turns them over to the local police department for service.

There are three major advantages to using arrest warrants: (1) the identity of the agent and informant is not given away by making the arrest at the time of the buy, (2) all arrests in an area can be delayed until a simultaneous series of raids can be conducted, and (3) if a unit has made several buys from a suspect and learns that a major shipment is arriving it may be able to synchronize the service of the warrant with the receipt, manicuring, cutting, or distribution of such a shipment.

Probable cause for search warrants usually stems either from the observations of an agent or from information furnished by an informant. In the latter

case, the unit will have to establish an informant's reliability, either through the fact that previous information he has given has led to convictions, or through corroboration of the informant's information. Therefore, units should make efforts to establish reliability by obtaining convictions even if they are for reduced charges. It is incumbent upon the unit to familiarize itself with the requisites of local courts on corroboration of information and reliability of informants and in making out the affidavit for a search warrant.

The main disadvantage of utilizing the arrest warrant in connection with undercover buys, beside the fact that the buys will have to be small to minimize the loss of unit funds in such transactions, is that the use of simultaneous arrests in the execution of arrest warrants is expensive in terms of manpower and unit resources utilized. Secondly, many drug traffickers are highly transient and may be difficult to locate after a buy has been made.

The arrest powers of agents in any part of the unit jurisdiction are usually vested in them through the authority of the sheriff or sheriffs of that area. By swearing in an agent as a county deputy, the agent is free to investigate cases and make arrests within that county. The use of arrest powers is a matter of policy. For example, in several civilian-staffed units, the hired agents were not allowed by unit policy to make arrests. Only in rare instances, such as when local officers could not be called in to make the arrest, did a civilian agent make an arrest. This is not the case with assigned agents, who are usually given the autonomy and discretionary power with which police officers regularly operate. Interestingly, two units in Ohio utilize agents who legally have no arrest powers. The only way an agent could possibly arrest a suspect is through a citizen's arrest.

F. Raids

Raids are frequently used by MAN units. They are necessary because after a unit has made a number of buys from various suspects, arrests should be made simultaneously to prevent suspects from going underground or disposing of their caches.

As a matter of policy, raid-planning and execution should have total unit involvement. Unit personnel should get together to formulate plans and make preparations. To protect their real identity, undercover agents should not participate in the actual execution of raids, although they should participate in the planning. Their knowledge of the suspects and the interior of a house or building is important. An

issue the director must resolve is whether the case agent or the team supervisor will lead a particular raid. In most cases, it should be the team supervisor. He is the one held accountable if anything goes wrong, and therefore he should have the authority to carry out the operation. In many instances, local departments make their own raids and arrests of suspects from whom the unit has made purchases. Unit personnel may accompany the departments to furnish additional manpower, give advice, or identify the suspects involved. Most police officers who have been involved in raids realize that they usually do not go the way they are planned. Alternate plans, therefore, should always be made.

When a raid is planned, it is necessary to inform the local department or departments of the impending operation. In most cases, personnel from the local police department will have to accompany unit agents. The presence of uniformed officers will be required, and the booking and jailing facilities of the local department will be needed. The involvement of local agencies in the actual planning and preparation of a raid will depend on the complexity of the raid. Frequently, local departments have access to information regarding local residents, buildings, and local conditions which will be useful to the unit.

The equipment needed for the raid should include some type of clothing that will identify agents as police officials. It is always wise to utilize uniformed officers from the local department in a raid. However, the agents should also have "police" insignia, emblems, or lettering for their protection and to prevent a suspect from shooting an agent and later claiming he did not know the victim was a police officer. A light, nylon jacket (or vest) with "police" lettering in the front and back and a baseball-type cap with the same lettering would suffice. These items could either be issued to the agent as assigned property or the team supervisor could maintain control of them until they are used.

G. Evidence

The subject of evidence is one that has received relatively little attention from unit directors, supervisory board members, and planners involved in organizing a unit. While a director and his supervisory staff may take precautions to prevent agents from unjustifiably claiming \$3 in expenses, the system for storing and securing several thousand dollars' worth of narcotic evidence may be loose and highly susceptible to abuse. Incidents where evidence has been kept on the agent's person or in an unlocked drawer

before being tagged and stored are too frequent. Procedures for the processing of evidence should be specifically defined, understood, and adhered to by all unit personnel.

Evidence collection and storage have been problems in narcotic enforcement for two reasons. First, the chain of evidence is frequently overlooked, causing problems in court; second, in recent years there have been accounts of substantial amounts of narcotics being lost from evidence storage areas, especially in large metropolitan police departments. These two problems should cause the director to consider three main areas relating to evidence: collection, storage, and destruction.

Evidence seized as a result of a search should be photographed as it was found by the agent. Photographing the evidence accomplishes the following:

- Aids in strengthening the chain of custody.
- Provides a graphic substantiation to written reports.
- Represents evidence which, because of its bulk or some other reason, has not been brought to court (if a stipulation has been made concerning its authenticity as part of the material being introduced as evidence).
- Depicts the circumstances or the location in which the evidence was seized.¹

Where possible, one agent should function as an evidence collector. The designation of a collector ensures that all evidence gets recorded and processed at the scene in a uniform and correct manner. It also ensures that a piece of evidence will not be removed until the collector decides that it can be moved and collected. In court, the collector and the agent who initially discovered the evidence are the ones who may have to testify regarding the evidence. The greatest benefit of using such a specialist is that a uniform procedure of evidence collection is applied and other agents are freed from having to take time to process the evidence back in the office. After the evidence is brought back to the office, the collector can weigh and inventory the evidence, seal it in appropriate containers, and make out the necessary evidence sheets and laboratory analysis reports.

The weighing of the evidence should be done in two ways. The first method is to weigh the actual drug or narcotic content seized so that the appropriate charge against the suspect can be filed. The

second is to weigh the evidence in its storage container, i.e., box, envelope, bag, or bottle to facilitate inspection and inventory later.

Secure storage facilities must be provided for narcotic evidence. Many units simply provide a storage locker to which all unit personnel have access. This is not satisfactory. A facility used to store evidence should be accessible to only one or two individuals. Use of this procedure does not imply that unit personnel generally cannot be trusted, but is meant to reduce the potential for encountering difficulties with evidence integrity in the courtroom.

Evidence such as heroin and cocaine should be kept in a locked cabinet within the storage facility. The cabinet should have a different lock than the one for the storage room door. To reduce access to the area, the number of squad members with keys to the room and/or cabinet should be limited. This will assist in controlling the persons going into the storage area. If deemed necessary, drop boxes can be used to facilitate the turning in of evidence by agents at any time of the day or night.

If the storage facility of one of the local departments is being used by the unit for storing its evidence, the director should ensure that the security is adequate. For example, if a large property room is used by the department to store all evidence, the director and the central services commander, or any appropriate officer, should discuss the possibility of maintaining a storage cabinet within the property room to store the unit's evidence. Even though the local department may be responsible for the security of the evidence, these precautions are justified. Loss of unit evidence, regardless of the circumstances, reflects poorly on the unit.

An inherent part of the procedure for evidence storage is the inspection or inventory of the evidence. There should be some type of periodic inspection of the evidence that has been seized and stored by the unit. While the adoption and adherence to such a policy may seem like a troublesome and time-consuming task, the prevention of a scandal where narcotic evidence has been lost or stolen is well worth the effort. Unit agents should understand that inspection policies reflect the need to maintain security. By adopting an inspectional policy such as this, the director is simply protecting the integrity of the agents.

The destruction of evidence poses difficulties because current seizures, especially those of marijuana, are getting larger. Most units make arrangements with representatives of local municipal incinerators or trash dumps to burn evidence. Thus,

¹ "Guidelines for Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Evidence Handling and Security Procedures," Drug Enforcement Administration and International Association of Chiefs of Police; IACP, 1974.

supervised destruction can be easily achieved. Before this is done, however, the unit should establish procedures that guarantee that (1) only the evidence from cases which have been tried in court are destroyed and (2) the destruction of each piece of evidence is witnessed and adequate safeguards are provided.

Most units require a supervisor and several agents to be present when evidence is destroyed. In one unit, a local judge witnesses the destruction of every evidence item after he checks it off an inventory sheet. Afterward, the judge keeps a copy of the itemized list and enters it into the court record. Another unit turns over all evidence to a state crime laboratory for destruction.

Confiscated narcotics are usually analyzed by local or regional-state laboratories. In some instances, units have paid for independent chemists to analyze and report on results and to give court testimony. The Multi-County Unit, for instance, retains a civilian chemist on a flat yearly rate to do all narcotic analyses. The reason for utilizing an independent chemist is the distance of the unit from the state laboratory. Thus far, there have been no problems in having the chemist give court testimony.

The problems that are commonly encountered in using a state lab are the proximity of the lab to the unit and the time it takes for lab results. A crime lab may be situated a considerable distance from the unit, forcing the unit to make one delivery and pick-up a week. This is often an inconvenience to units which make large numbers of buys. Another problem is the length of time it takes a laboratory to analyze and return results. Laboratories frequently operate under heavy work loads, but they will process some items rapidly if an emergency for obtaining the results exists. Units should ensure that such requests for "emergency" analysis are not abused.

Confiscated narcotics should be field-tested by unit personnel before being sent to a laboratory. Courts have held that field tests may be used to establish probable cause for arrests and issuances of arrest and search warrants.

H. Wiretapping

Electronic eavesdropping can be classified into three categories. First, there is the unofficial, illegal eavesdropping that occurs when a third party eavesdrops and relays information about a conversation to a law enforcement official. A switchboard operator at a hotel may overhear a telephone conversation and pass the information to a unit. Perhaps a unit may re-

quest such an operator to get information regarding a meet spot for two pushers. This is strictly illegal and cannot be condoned in any case.

Second, there is consensual eavesdropping, where one of the parties in a conversation records the conversation or grants permission for a law enforcement agency to record the conversation. A unit may place a body microphone and transmitter on an agent or an informant when a buy is being made or negotiated, record conversations over a unit "undercover" telephone, or intercept an informant's telephone with his permission in order to gather information or evidence on a suspect.

Units should check with their own prosecuting attorneys or the State Attorney General's office as to the legality or limitations on consensual wiretapping in their respective states as there are constantly new court decisions which may invalidate or limit consensual eavesdropping statutes. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court recently placed additional restrictions on consensual searches when it decided that such searches could be used in court only if a conversation was recorded and not simply when witnessed by a third party (i.e., the agent) who monitored the conversation [*People v. Beavers*, 227 N.W. 2d, 511 (Mich 75)]. A New Jersey statute also provides that law enforcement agencies need to obtain permission from the County Prosecutor or the State Attorney General, or his designee, to perform a consensual search. As a further example, Pennsylvania has completely prohibited consensual searches.

The third form of wiretapping is direct interception of wire or oral communications between two parties by a third. Many people believe that this type of wiretapping is done almost entirely by federal law enforcement agencies. In 1974, however, there were 607 wiretaps performed by state agencies and only 121 by federal agencies.¹ Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia authorized this form of wiretap as indicated in Figure 10.

The controversy of eavesdropping centers on Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968. Title III pre-empts all state statutes regarding eavesdropping. A state law can conform to or can institute more limitations than the federal law, but it cannot make legal anything prohibited by Title III. Further complicating this issue is the fact that some states may prohibit the use of evidence obtain-

¹ *Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications*, for the period January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1974; Administrative Office of The United States Courts, Washington, D.C., p. III.

FIGURE 10. *Jurisdictions with Statutes Authorizing the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications Effective During the Period January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1974*²

Jurisdiction	Statutory Citation*
Federal	18:2510 to 2520
Arizona	13:1051 to 13:1059
Colorado	40-4-26 to 40-4-33
Connecticut	Public Act No. 68
Delaware	11:XLII. 757
District of Columbia	23:541 to 556
Florida	934.01 to 934.10
Georgia	26-3001 to 26-3010
Kansas	22-2513
Maryland	35-92 to 35-99
Massachusetts	272-99
Minnesota	626A.01 to 626A.23
Nebraska	86-701 to 86-707
Nevada	200.610 to 200.690
New Hampshire	570-A:1 to 570-A:11
New Jersey	2A:156A-1 to 2A:156A-26
New York	813-J to 813-M; 814 to 825
Oregon	133.723, 725, 727
Rhode Island	12-5.1 to 12-5.1-16
South Dakota	23-13A-1 to 23-13A-11
Virginia	19.1-89.1
Washington	9.73.030 to 9.73.080
Wisconsin	968.27 to 968.33

*Excludes jurisdictions which enacted legislation in 1973.

ed through a federal wiretap in a state court. In California, for example, a state court has made such a ruling (*People v. Jones*, 106 Cal Rptr 749, 73).

The use of wiretaps has been decreasing since 1971. The number of federal wiretaps decreased from 130 in 1973 to 121 in 1974. The number of intercepts for state agencies declined from 734 in 1973 to 607 in 1974.³

Consensual eavesdropping was the only type of wiretapping done by most of the units visited, generally through the use of body microphones and transmitters when making undercover buys. With these body sets, cover agents can control a buy situation and assess the relative safety of the undercover agent. In some cases, the conversations have been

recorded, but there were no incidents reported where recorded conversations were introduced as evidence in court.

Of the 12 units visited, there was only one unit which reported using third party intercepts. This unit also handled organized crime cases and directed much of its enforcement effort against this type of criminal activity.

Cost is a very important factor in electronic eavesdropping. Depending on the information required, an extended wiretap can be costly even if the expense of the necessary equipment is excluded. Several unit staff members would be needed to monitor a tap and this represents a considerable cost in salary and manpower. As an example, the average cost of an intercept by state agencies in 1974 was \$8,084.

I. Radio Communications

As in any other police function, radio communication is crucial to narcotic enforcement. The coordination needed to provide support for an undercover agent or to conduct a moving surveillance, for example, is often dependent on the use of portable radios. One aspect of radio equipment that MAN units have to consider is concealment. In many cases, a portable radio cannot be used conspicuously. In these instances, a small portable with a hidden microphone and ear-piece attachment is necessary. Units must also consider the concealment of car radios. In most instances, the radio is placed in the glove compartment; occasionally it may be located in the trunk with a speaker and microphone attachment somewhere in the interior of the car, perhaps under the front seat.

Often the issue of obtaining radio frequencies for a unit does not arise. Most units handle all radio communication through one of the participating departments, sheriff's offices, or even a state agency. The choice of whose communication system should be used depends on where the unit is operating, which system is most convenient to use, and the amount of normal radio traffic on the frequencies of the various agencies. Where departments have two or more channels, the unit may be able to use the least congested one. Also, police agencies are authorized to use low power transmitters, i.e., portable radios with less than 3 watts output, on any regularly assigned police frequency, on a non-interference basis, without specific FCC authority.

In certain instances, a unit may wish to obtain its own frequency. This is sometimes difficult to do and in the long run may prove rather expensive. The di-

² *Ibid*, p. II.

³ *Ibid*, p. III.

rector first has to determine whether there are any available frequencies in his area. A local radio engineer can furnish this information. To obtain a frequency, the director has to contact the State Frequency Coordinator. The Federal Communications Commission or a local member of the Associated Public Safety Communications Officers, Inc. should be able to provide the director with the name and telephone number of the coordinator. If a particular frequency is available and suitable for unit radio equipment, the coordinator will then issue a letter of authorization for submission with the application to the FCC, which will issue the license authorizing the use of the frequency.

With its own frequency, the unit may either have a base radio to transmit and receive or make the communications system "mobile" only. Even when a unit has its own frequency, a number of its vehicles should have an additional radio on the same frequency as a local agency so that the agents can readily communicate with an external party.

The security of unit radio communications, i.e., their susceptibility to monitoring should also be considered. Most units maintained such security simply by being attentive to what was said over the air and how it was said. For unit purposes, these safeguards are often adequate. Where a unit is more concerned about communications security, however, it may consider applying for an Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) instead of a low or high band frequency, although this only diminishes the likelihood of monitoring and does not completely prevent it. For a unit director to be reasonably certain that he is not being monitored, he should utilize a quality scrambler system.

J. Firearms

The carrying and use of firearms should be strictly controlled by unit policy. In most police departments, such control is strict; it should be even more stringent with a MAN unit. Incidents where police officers used their firearms indiscriminately are quickly pointed out by certain sectors of the public. A director cannot permit the effectiveness or the existence of his unit to be threatened by such incidents.

The problem of firearm use is complex because police departments within an area may have different weapons policies. For example, there may be a difference regarding the use of warning shots. In one unit, there were two incidents in which agents fired warning shots. Because of the difference in departmental policy, nothing was said to one agent, while

the other officer received a suspension from his own department. This example indicates that any differences in firearms policy must be resolved by the unit as soon as possible. If departments lack a uniform policy, the best approach may be for a unit to persuade the departments to waive their respective policies for officers on unit assignment in lieu of a more practical policy the unit may suggest.

The Tucson unit has adopted a policy agreed upon by all local agency heads. Any incident where a weapon has been fired is brought before the Tucson P.D. Review Board. The agent, regardless of the agency he is from, must abide by the board's decision.

Unit policy is needed regarding four main areas in the use of firearms:

- When a weapon may or may not be used, e.g., in protecting an officer's life or in arresting a fleeing felon.
- The use of warning shots.
- Carrying a gun off-duty.
- The type of weapon and ammunition that an officer may carry.
- If non-standard police weapons are carried, the agents should be proficient in their use.

An undercover agent should carry whatever type of weapon is deemed appropriate, but cover agents should adhere to general police department regulations. If possible, a director should encourage standardization so that if the need arises, ammunition can be exchanged among the agents. In units where civilian agents are hired, there should be sufficient firearms training before an agent is allowed to carry a weapon.

K. Vehicles

One of the first decisions that must be made concerning unit vehicles is whether to lease or buy them. In some jurisdictions, the policy of the funding agency may require that vehicles be leased. A director should remember that leasing companies usually have restrictions against making permanent alterations to their vehicles, such as putting on an outside antennae or brackets for radios and toggle-switch panels. On the other hand, leasing allows the unit to exchange vehicles should they be identified as unit cars.

If automobiles are leased, the director must decide how long to keep them. Most of the units leased vehicles for one year to cut down on maintenance problems that would probably be incurred if the cars were kept longer.

1. *Assignment of cars.* In some units, agents are allowed to take assigned cars home and to use them for personal purposes. By doing this, agents have radio communication with other members even when off-duty and have instant accessibility to a police equipped vehicle. Other squads restrict use of the vehicles to driving to and from work. Policy in this area is dependent on the number of unit vehicles, the availability of secure places where the vehicles can be parked during off-duty hours, and whether the unit shares its vehicles with other investigative divisions. If the MAN unit has enough cars to assign to individual agents and has separate office facilities, the best policy may be to allow agents to use the cars for home-work transportation. Where units are merged with vice, intelligence, or organized crime divisions, however, ill feelings among other officers may result if agents are the only officers allowed to take their cars home.

Vehicles should be assigned to individual unit agents whenever possible to enable the director to maintain accountability for vehicle care and service. Each agent can be responsible for ensuring that lubrication, oil changes, tune-ups, and tire rotation and changes are made when called for.

Where vehicles cannot be assigned to particular individuals, forms and procedures should be formulated which will assist in controlling the use of vehicles. For example, an agent's daily activity sheet could indicate the car or cars that a particular agent used that day along with the mileage. This practice ensures that vehicles are used for official business only and can assist supervisory personnel in verifying the daily work of the agents as reported on daily activity reports.

2. *Service and insurance.* Where unit vehicles should be serviced depends on whether they are leased or owned by the unit or local departments, the amount of money available for servicing, and, most important, whether the undercover status of the cars will be threatened by having them repaired at city or departmental garages. In units which utilize vehicles owned by local departments, there may be no choice as to where the cars will be serviced. If the departments are paying for repairs and service, they will probably want the cars to be taken to department or city garages. Units whose cars are part of a grant, on the other hand, usually take the cars to a mechanic of their choice or perhaps someone designated by the leasing company. If unit cars are serviced in city garages where civilians work, or even in private garages where all police vehicles are serviced, the identity of the agents driving the undercover cars may be

given away. If security becomes a problem, it may be worthwhile to spend extra money to have the cars serviced elsewhere.

Insurance for unit vehicles is generally paid for by the unit, and the cost is incorporated into the grant. In units that are locally funded, the cars usually belong to the participating departments, which typically pay all insurance costs.

The license plates on unit vehicles are usually issued to the unit or to the individual agents, in either their real or cover names. In cases where the plates are issued to the unit or under the agent's real identity, an agreement should be made with the state motor vehicle bureau to have all inquiries returned as "not yet in file," and a notification made to the director regarding who made the inquiry. Therefore, if a citizen requests a license number check, as is legal in many states, the director can then find out who is inquiring about the unit vehicle. If a police department runs the check, the director can contact the agency directly to determine the reasons for it.

The best policy to pursue in the selection of unit vehicles is to use commonplace vehicles. Use of cars with modifications that make them conspicuous, such as "mag" wheels, bright colors, decals or stickers, should also be avoided. All these things tend to make the cars easily recognizable by street people. An unusual car, such as a metallic green Corvette with mag wheels that is burned in one case may become useless in all other buys in that general region. Despite these considerations, the style of the vehicle should "match" the status or character of the person whom the agents purport to be; e.g., a college student buyer typically would not drive a big, expensive car.

Obviously, police radios and antennae should not be conspicuously placed on the vehicle. In most cases, radios can be hidden in the glove compartment, and the regular radio antennae can be connected to the police radio. In cars that have the radio antennae built into the windshield, regular car antennae can be placed on the cars and then connected to the police radio. A technique used by one unit to conceal radio equipment was that of placing the radio in the glove compartment, the microphone inside the overhead interior covering above the sun visor and the transmitter button underneath the carpeting just below the dimmer switch.

The exclusive use of either new or old cars or the same models as those currently utilized by local police departments should be avoided. For example, if a major local department uses Oldsmobiles, the unit should not use that particular make of car

because local violators will be suspicious of them.

Often a new paint job on undercover vehicles which may have been identified as unit cars may be enough to make them useful again. This is helpful where only two or three undercover cars are used by a squad. A unit should also have an agreement with one or several local car dealers from whom it can borrow an old car or a van for a few hours during a particular undercover operation. The cost factor for this is often low. In many cases, dealers do not charge the units. In a case where such vehicles are borrowed, however, the individuals involved should discuss details such as vehicle insurance and the license plates for the car. A director should also make certain that this type of relationship with friendly car dealers is not abused.

In most narcotic cases where an undercover agent purports to be a buyer from another state, conspicuous rental cars must be used to reinforce the agent's cover. Therefore, units should attempt to have a good working relationship with car rental companies. An alternative to renting cars may be to place out-of-state license plates on the undercover car. Some state motor vehicle bureaus send license plates from their respective states to a requesting unit in another state. One unit received plates from approximately 20 states. To obtain plates, a unit should send the bureau a letter, typed on official letterhead, that states the type of unit making the request, the reason for the request, and the pertinent information of each car including the agent's real or cover name to which each set of plates are to be issued. Requests for relaying information about inquiries about the registration of such plates should also be covered in the letter of request.

Units should also consider utilizing vans, campers, and motorcycles in their operations. These types of vehicles are frequently used by narcotic suspects and have great value in conducting surveillances. Vans and campers are particularly useful in prolonged surveillances. Units reported that agents who used motorcycles drew very little suspicion when making undercover buys.

3. *Seized vehicles.* Although some states allow local law enforcement agencies to keep and use confiscated vehicles for official business, many departments do not do so because of the complexities involved. For example, if there is a lien against the vehicle, the unit must pay the balance of the lien to keep the vehicle. Where the lien is large, most units are reluctant to pay it, although in many cases pushers pay cash for vehicles or perhaps make substantial down payments. In some states, a vehicle confiscated

a second time from the same offender may be kept by a police agency regardless of the lien, so long as the mortgaging institution returned it to the suspect after the first seizure.

Some states, such as New Mexico, require that confiscated vehicles be turned over to a state controlling agency. These and other confiscated vehicles may then be temporarily lent back to police departments or MAN units by the agency. Such an arrangement is of great benefit to a unit because when one of its own vehicles becomes too well known by local pushers, it can simply be returned and another obtained.

L. Unit Equipment

Determining priorities for the purchase of equipment that the unit will need for field operations and administrative activities is one of the difficult determinations that a new director must make. This section discusses the equipment that a unit may reasonably need, excluding items such as office supplies and forms. Unit equipment is divided into five main categories: office, issued, special, raid and surveillance, and vehicle equipment. The number of items, of course, will be determined by the unit's methods of utility and its size. A list of basic equipment is given in Figure 11.

1. *Office equipment.* For administrative purposes, a photocopying machine is probably one of the most important items that a unit will need and should be included in the initial grant or budget request. The exchange of information with outside agencies and the interchange of memoranda, orders, and forms among unit personnel makes it mandatory that a unit have either a machine of its own or ready access to one. For unit purposes, of course, these machines are leased.

A paper shredder should be included among office equipment, especially in those units with separate office facilities. It is a very useful item for maintaining information and report confidentiality by ensuring that discarded materials are destroyed.

The unit should maintain a safe for the safekeeping of money, sensitive material, and special documents. The safe, although it need not be new, must be in proper working order, sturdy enough to give adequate security, and large enough so that it cannot be picked up and carried away. Large amounts of money should not be kept in the safe unless the safe can be kept in one of the major departments where there is adequate security.

Some units maintain recorders that can be used to

FIGURE 11. *Unit Equipment*

OFFICE EQUIPMENT

- Copying Machine
- Paper Shredder
- Phone-Tape Recorder
- Evidence Lockers
- Time and Date Stamp
- Telecopier

EQUIPMENT ISSUED TO AGENTS

- Drug Testing Kits
- Binoculars
- Cassette Recorders
- Drivers License—under fictitious name
- Gasoline Credit Cards

SPECIAL UNIT EQUIPMENT

- Body Recorder and Transmitter Set
- Night Telescope
- Regular Telescope
- Field Equipment Case or Bag Containing:
 - Evidence bags and container
 - Several copies of all unit forms
 - Blank copies of search warrants and warrant affidavits
- Portable Radios with Charger
- Portable Scales—for weighing narcotic evidence
- Vehicle-Following Transmitters with Receivers

RAID AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

- Flexible Handcuffs
- Sledge Hammer
- Raid Jackets and Hats with "Police" Lettering
- Flashlights
- Construction Hard Hats (for surveillance)
- Portable Light (to be plugged into any outlet)
- Cameras—moving or still picture
- Extra Light Bulbs
- Light-weight Body Armor

VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

- Shotguns
- First Aid Kits
- Area/City Maps
- License Plates—under fictitious name
- Police Radio Transmitter and Receiver

tape incoming telephone calls of an operational nature. This allows agents to go over phone calls made to the unit by informants or suspects. Recording of phone calls on a party's own phone is considered legal by federal courts and by most state courts; however, the procedure should be checked

out by each unit to ensure that it is not prohibited or restricted by state statute.

A time and date stamp machine can assist a unit in maintaining a chronological account of general correspondence and reports from external sources. It can also assist by setting chronological priorities for answering correspondence. The utility of this item depends on the size of the unit.

A telecopier may be considered by those units which are large enough to be decentralized. These devices are used to transmit electronically letters, forms, or any other type of document through the telephone system. They can be extremely useful to units by helping decentralized groups to coordinate their activities and keep each other briefed on unit activity.

2. *Equipment issued to agents.* Drug test kits are sometimes issued as standard equipment to individual agents, although in most cases they are retained by the unit until needed. The most advisable procedure may be for the unit to maintain these test kits and have the agents conduct field tests of their evidence at the office when it is turned in. In special cases, such as controlled-agent buy situations, the kits can be taken out in the field to assist in establishing probable cause. Units have the option of purchasing commercial kits where the chemicals are pre-mixed, purchasing their own chemicals, or obtaining the chemicals by crime labs.

Binoculars are one piece of equipment that units cannot do without. In deciding how many binoculars a unit should purchase, a director should consider that his agents frequently encounter unexpected situations where binoculars are needed, for example, to read the license plate of a car or watch a narcotic suspect who has been spotted on the street. Because binoculars are items which may be needed at any time, each agent should be issued a pair.

Voice recorders have become an integral part of the reporting system for many units. Light, relatively inexpensive recorders can be utilized in most field operations to keep a running account of events, descriptions or impressions for transcribing at a later time by the agent or a secretary. These devices should be issued to agents whenever possible; although, if this is not possible, a unit should still possess a number of them to be checked out as needed by unit personnel.

Credit cards from the major gasoline companies can be obtained under a real or fictitious name; some units obtained one or two credit cards under the fictitious names of agents and left the cards unsigned. Thus, any unit agent could use the cards by signing

the gas receipt with a fictitious name. When an agent uses such a card in front of a suspect, however, a point to remember is that cards under centralized billing are coded differently and may endanger the identification of unit agents.

3. *Special unit equipment.* Although body recording and transmitting devices are very useful to undercover operations, they are also very expensive. The cost factor must be weighed against the added safety factor it gives the undercover agent and the anxiety it saves the director and the cover agents. The purchase of this item is highly recommended. The body recorder should be one of the first items for consideration when purchasing equipment.

Telescopes, like binoculars, are useful in certain operations such as surveillances and buy situations. However, they are not used as frequently as binoculars. Since telescopes must be mounted on a tripod for effective use, their applicability is generally restricted to stationary surveillances. Because they may not be used as regularly as some other items, telescopes may not rate very high in priority on a unit's shopping list.

Night scopes are used even less frequently than regular telescopes. At night, agents are usually able to get close enough to a targeted area to use a good, strong pair of standard binoculars. Although night scopes may be used occasionally, the financial soundness of purchasing this equipment is debatable. When needed, night scope equipment may possibly be borrowed from a neighboring law enforcement agency or, perhaps, a military unit.

A vehicle-following transmitter and receiver, or "bumper beepers," as they are sometimes called, are very expensive items, the price ranging between \$6,000 and \$8,000. The site visits revealed that most units either already had one or were contemplating buying one. Those units that did have the devices were well satisfied with their use; however, the units that lacked them seemed to be able to operate effectively without them.

Although vehicle-following devices can be quite useful to a unit, especially in a situation where an undercover agent is traveling with a suspect to an unknown locality, it is not recommended that all units purchase these devices. First, there are many other items that a unit may need more than the vehicle monitor. It will have to be determined if there are enough funds to purchase one without depriving the unit of other necessary equipment. Second, a consideration is that the use of these devices has been found to be illegal without a search warrant. According to a recent case in Oregon (*U.S. vs. Mar-*

tyniuk, May 20, 1975), the use of these devices was found to be a violation of a person's right to privacy. Third, retrieval of the device may at times present a difficult problem.

A set of portable scales for weighing small quantities of drugs and narcotics is indispensable to a MAN unit because under federal and most state codes, the charges on suspects depend on the amounts of drugs or narcotics they sold or had in their possession. The weight capabilities need not be large; most drugs and narcotics can be broken up into packages of several pounds or kilograms. In cases where large amounts of drugs are confiscated, such as in marijuana seizures, the seizure may have to be broken up and placed in large plastic bags, for example, and different types of scales used. The scales purchased by the unit should allow for regular calibration to guarantee accuracy.

Units may consider maintaining briefcases with the equipment and supplies that it will need for various types of operations such as raids. For example, such a case could contain the necessary forms for intelligence/information reports, case reports, personal history forms for suspects and informants, search waivers, statements, search warrant and affidavits; in addition, it could include test kits, flexible handcuffs, and any other equipment which may be used in the field. It is not always possible for agents to carry their own cases with this equipment. If all necessary items are placed in a case, the supervisor can simply take the case with him on a raid and be assured that the team has what it needs.

4. *Raid and surveillance equipment.* Units need a variety of items for raid and surveillance situations. The need for most of these items, such as flexible handcuffs, flashlights, and sledge hammers, is self-evident; the raid jackets and hats with "Police" lettering are discussed in the section on raids. As for the other items, a few brief comments are in order.

Some units possess construction hard hats and utility tool belts worn by utility company employees for use during surveillance operations where agents must be placed out in the open or where they must enter a building without arousing suspicion. The purchase of several pieces of lightweight body-armor clothing apparel for the protection of agents during raids should also be considered.

Lighting equipment, such as portable lights which can be plugged into most electrical outlets and high-intensity light bulbs, were also recommended by some units. They were found useful when the unit conducted searches in dimly lit apartments or houses.

The use of the portable light and the substitution of colored or dim light bulbs with a larger-watt bulb facilitated the searches.

The utility of still-picture cameras was common among all units. This type of camera is used occasionally for taking long-range shots of suspects, vehicles, and buildings. More frequently, though, they were used for photographing informants or confiscated evidence. Polaroid cameras are very useful and relatively inexpensive for this purpose. Thirty-five millimeter cameras are more suitable for long-range, covert photographs. A good camera with a zoom lens is often desired, but it is expensive.

Movie cameras were owned by relatively few units and used by even fewer. Covert picture-taking for identification purposes can best be done with a still picture camera. Although a movie camera could be used effectively where a running visual account of an illicit operation is desired, most units do not get involved in these types of cases. Even if they did, a suitable camera could perhaps be borrowed from a department or individual, or it could be leased from a visual aid store or supplier. In fact, there are difficulties in using films for court purposes because 8 mm or Super 8 mm film, which is the type used in most non-commercial cameras, cannot be enlarged sufficiently to bring out details in a particular frame. The image and general quality of the enlarged picture would be poor.

5. *Vehicle equipment.* Some items that should be

issued with every vehicle, such as license plates and police radios, have already been discussed. The need for some other items is obvious. For example, first-aid kits and detailed maps of cities and the general area are needed for each vehicle. The maps are specially useful in view of the fact that agents, unless they are sheriff's deputies, may not be familiar with their entire jurisdictional area.

Shotguns are items that a few units issue as part of vehicular equipment. Generally, however, this is only true of units which are located in a police department where vehicles are parked in a secure area when not in use, or where vehicles are shared with other investigative units. It would be very dangerous to store shotguns in trunks of unit cars if the agents, as a matter of policy, take the cars home with them or if the cars are parked in an unsecured area.

While it is helpful for a unit to borrow some of its equipment from participating departments or other investigative agencies, the unit should bear in mind that it can abuse this professional courtesy by constantly borrowing from others. On the other hand, MAN units can increase the support and cooperation of participating departments and other agencies by lending them unit equipment. Through such loans, these departments and agencies come to depend on the unit not only for equipment, but also for assistance. Gaining favor from these departments, of course, assists the units in their narcotic enforcement efforts.

CHAPTER IX. UNIT EVALUATION

A. Major Considerations

The evaluation of unit performance over a given period of time is important for several reasons. First, through evaluation, the director is able to determine what has been accomplished by the unit in terms of meeting the goals of its overall mission. Second, it gives direction to the unit by focusing on the gap between what has been accomplished and what yet needs to be done. Third, it allows the unit to justify its existence and efforts to others. Fourth, the unit is able to comply with the evaluative reports required by the state planning agencies.

In looking at the methodology for evaluation of units, there were eight areas in which the evaluation processes of many units were weak. Although the following are not indicative of any one particular unit, they were generally true of many. These problems were:

- Evaluations tended to rely on several basic statistical indices, e.g., arrests, seizures, ongoing cases, etc., which may be easily misinterpreted.
- Specific goals toward which the unit could strive were set.
- Evaluations in most units were done internally by unit personnel.
- There was no measure of the unit's impact on the local region.
- There was no justification of unit activities on a cost-effective basis.
- There was no classification of offenders so that enforcement efforts in each classification could be measured.
- There was an over-reliance on highlights of unit activity in the evaluation process.
- There were no standards for comparing unit efforts.

Ideally, a true evaluation of a unit's narcotic enforcement efforts should reflect its impact; that is, the degree to which it has diminished narcotic activity in a particular region. However, because of the nature of the narcotic problem it is almost impossible to obtain a realistic picture of narcotic activity before or after the unit's inception.

Often, evaluation of a unit's impact on the narcotic problem must include subjective information. While the unit can measure much of its effort objectively through the collection of data on such activities as arrests, seizures, and the like, the overall results of these activities may better be expressed in descriptive terms. The fact that the narcotic problem has significantly increased in objective terms does not necessarily mean that the unit is not achieving some measure of success.

Part of the evaluation made by units is a determination of the degree to which the unit has achieved its goals. It has been previously stated that a unit must establish those goals which will assist it in its overall mission of effectively diminishing narcotic activity. The activities of the unit should be measured in terms of what the unit has accomplished relative to these goals. There must be an evaluation, for example, of how successful the unit has been in pursuing cases against the large-volume pushers while assisting small departments with their cases.

B. Evaluators

With the exception of four units visited, evaluation of unit operations and administration consisted of (1) quarterly reports to the state planning agency, (2) a periodic audit of the unit's financial records by the SPA, and (3) monthly reports to the governing board on unit operations, including problems and successes. The units in Connecticut were monitored by a statewide coordinating committee. The San Diego squad was integrated with a DEA unit and, therefore, fell under the auspices of the DEA inspections system. The other two units, in Illinois, were evaluated by a state law enforcement agency.

The type of evaluation carried out in Illinois bears closer scrutiny. In Illinois, the state investigative agency which, among other things, is concerned with narcotic enforcement statewide, is entrusted with monitoring MAN units throughout the state. The Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI) furnishes two monitors who visit all units at least once a month to evaluate their performance. The authority for doing this is granted to the Bureau by the Illinois Law En-

forcement Commission, the state planning agency. The IBI has been working closely with local agencies in the past, but it had never had the role of monitor until 1974.

The following are some of the areas that are covered during on-site evaluations by IBI:

- Number and age of persons arrested.
- Kind and amount of narcotics or drugs involved in each arrest (including lab analysis results).
- Procedure, such as serving warrants, or assistance from local agencies.
- Current status of each case.
- Amount, by type, of narcotics seized.
- Inventory of all contraband held by the unit.
- Evidence procedures, including:
 - adequacy of procedures
 - compliance with procedures
 - storage of evidence
 - recording of evidence
- Number of locations searched with and without warrants.
- Number and types of unrelated seizures.
- Amount and kind of drugs purchased.
- The cost per purchase.
- Type of information obtained.
- Detailed statement relative to the disposition of all arrests and all incidents in which a person is arrested but released without charges being filed.
- Summary regarding the number, age, and sex of confidential informants.

There are several other activities undertaken by the monitors. First, they review a substantial number of case files selected randomly to ensure that (1) the data reported are correct, and (2) the investigation has been conducted according to professional and legal standards. Second, liaison between the unit and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies is reviewed to ensure that the efforts of the unit are integrated with those of other agencies. This entails contact interviews with members of these other agencies. Third, there is also a review of liaison between the unit and rehabilitation programs to determine if the appropriate use of these resources is made by the unit.

The monitors also report on any activities that raise issues relating to the professional or legal standards of the operation. Such matters are reported to the superintendent of the IBI or his designee.

It is obvious that the evaluation of the unit goes far beyond the gathering of statistical data on the units. There is an in-depth evaluation of all aspects of unit

operation and the impact that it is making in the area. The monitors are asked to make suggestions as to how the unit effectiveness may be improved. Moreover, the monitors must make quarterly and annual reports which summarize their activities and findings on each unit.

The Illinois program suggests a viable evaluation procedure. What is important about the IBI-MAN unit relationship is that (1) the units have a systematic evaluation of their efforts, (2) this system is more effective than the quarterly reports that are usually made by many units, and (3) these units are evaluated by narcotic enforcement practitioners.

C. Misinterpretation of Statistics

A weakness in the evaluation of a unit may be that it relies too heavily on statistics. The variance in figures from year to year can be very misleading and easily misinterpreted. Various categories that may be used for evaluations and some of the difficulties that may be incurred are discussed below.

General arrest figures can be misleading because the unit may, for example, shift from an enforcement priority against wholesale dealers to street level pushers or even users/pushers. The final statistics would merely show an increase in arrests for sale or distribution and would not indicate a shift in unit enforcement policies.

Another factor to consider is that many units "cause" arrests rather than make them. Thus, when local departments are allowed to obtain or serve warrants based on unit case files, those arrests really belong to, and should be claimed by, the unit. However, when a unit merely supplies a local department with information and does not investigate the case operationally, the unit should not claim the arrest.

Conviction rates can also be misleading. For example, a unit may allow all arrested suspects to plea bargain their charges on sale to lesser charges of possession. The records, unless they provide otherwise, would only show a given number of arrests for sale and almost the same number for convictions, although the convictions would be for lesser charges.

Clearance rates are difficult to use in a MAN unit. First, most clearance rates are based on the number of arrests made in proportion to the number of reported cases of Part I crimes. The problem is that, in narcotics, most cases that result in arrest are not reported as are other cases. For example, there are very few citizens coming to the unit to file a complaint or to report some particular incident involving narcotics. In only rare cases will the "victim" in a

narcotic transaction make a complaint and cooperate with the police. Therefore, there is an exceptionally small number of reported cases which could be used as a basis for determining the clearance rate. Even when a unit gets information on a suspect, it may not initiate a case, that is, give it a case number, until the first buy has been made.

Focusing enforcement efforts on a specific drug will itself increase the number of reported incidents related to that substance. For example, if a unit concentrates on cocaine buys, the number of cases and arrests and the amount of seizures pertaining to cocaine will probably increase.

By concentrating on narcotics suspects operating in one particular geographical area, the unit can also increase the number of cases, arrests, and seizures, inducing an "increase" in drug activity in that area, which again causes a misrepresentation of facts.

The volume of drug-related crimes can also be used to qualify the reported productivity of the unit. For instance, where there is a sizable reduction in the number of robberies, burglaries, purse snatchings, shopliftings, and thefts in general, a unit can claim that its narcotic enforcement efforts have been effective. At the same time, an increase in these narcotic-related crimes can be dismissed by a unit as indicative that other law enforcement agencies are less effective in their missions.

The purpose of pointing out the weaknesses of evaluative areas is not to condemn any particular unit. Instead, it is to emphasize the fact that statistical figures and data should not be overly relied upon. A director should not base the success or failure of his unit on the figures for any one of these categories. He should rely upon overall data on all unit activity as a reliable indicator of unit accomplishments. It is important that the unit maintain maximum accuracy in its record-keeping so that it does not mislead itself and others in its reporting. For example, when a unit arrests a suspect who is incarcerated in a local jail, frequently the department also claims the arrest, especially if it assisted the unit in making it. Thus, in quoting total narcotic arrests by all agencies, the unit may be counting some arrests twice. Such inaccuracies are self-defeating. When questionable procedures in record-keeping are finally corrected, the records will automatically indicate a substantial drop in arrests, confiscations, and the like.

D. Evaluative Areas

To conduct a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of a unit, the following areas should be in-

cluded:

- Unit cases.
- Use of confidential funds.
- Number of informants.
- Indictments or warrants.
- Total arrests.
- Confiscated drugs and narcotics.
- Disposition of cases—general.
- Disposition of cases referred for adjudication.
- Non-narcotic seizures.
- Taxes levied.
- Jurisdictional breakdown of arrests and cases.
- Searches.
- Training of unit personnel.
- Number of complaints received.
- Information disseminated.
- Age of offenders.
- Cooperation with drug-related agencies.
- Training of non-narcotic police officers.
- Number of hours expended per case.
- Cost factor analysis of confidential funds.
- Highlights of unit operations.

These evaluations are discussed individually below:

1. *Unit cases.* The unit has to classify its cases according to two categories: drug cases—cases which specifically relate to drug and narcotic activity, and general cases—cases which are non-narcotic in nature. Both of these categories have to be further divided into two phases, active and inactive. The number of active cases carried over from the previous evaluation period will also have to be noted.

2. *Use of confidential funds.* This section should include the amount of confidential funds involved in the following activities:

- Buys: including totals, average buys per case, and average buys per case for each category of pusher.
- Informant payments.
- Non-drug expenditures.
- Recovery of confidential funds.

3. *Number of informants.* The number of informants currently working for the unit should be listed. The main problem that normally arises in this area is that of determining who should and should not be listed as an informant. For example, should the citizen who calls on one occasion with information or a police officer who passes information to the unit be considered as informants? Clearly, some definition and criteria will have to be established for statistical purposes. The following definition is a start. Informants, for evaluation purposes, are those non-law enforcement individuals who are actively engaged in

assisting the unit in making buys or intercepting shipments of narcotics, or who supply information on a continuing basis on specific illicit operations.

4. *Indictments or warrants.* The number of indictments and warrants for specific types of narcotics and violations should be reported. The exact violations to be incorporated in the report will depend on the statutes of each state, although there are a number which are common to most states. Generally, the following categories of violations are included:

- Possession.
- Possession for sale.
- Sale.
- Transporting, manufacturing, producing.
- Instruments.
- Smuggling.
- Keeping a house.
- Others—these should be explained in the narrative portion of an evaluation report.

5. *Total arrests.* The number of arrests for drug and narcotic cases and for other non-narcotic cases should be reported. Normally, the same offense categories as in the "Indictment and Warrant" section can be used. In addition, a category of "Non-drug Arrests" will have to be included.

6. *Quantity of confiscated drugs.* The amounts of drugs which have been confiscated by the unit should be broken down according to the type of drug. Those drugs and narcotics that come in capsules or pills should be measured in dosage units (d.u.); others should be measured in ounces.

7. *Disposition of cases.* This section should incorporate all the possible methods of disposition, judiciary and non-judiciary, of unit cases. It can help the director and the monitoring agency get a true picture of what the results of unit efforts are.

The categories for cases worked on are:

- Cases still active.
- Cases referred to other agencies.
- Cases referred for adjudication.
- Cases rendered inactive.

8. *Disposition of cases referred for adjudication.* The number and the method of disposition of unit cases after referral for adjudication should be listed. The possible categories for these cases are:

- Cases referred no bill.
- Cases pending in court.
- Cases adjudicated not guilty.
- Cases adjudicated guilty as originally charged.
- Cases plea bargained to lesser charge.
- Cases receiving probation.
- Cases resulting in incarceration and length of sentence.

- Cases receiving suspended sentence.
- Cases adjudicated guilty but reversed through appeal.

9. *Non-Narcotic seizures.* The total monetary value of non-narcotic seizures should also be included. Generally, the categories for these types of seizures are: cars, weapons, cash, and stolen property.

10. *Taxes levied.* Some units report the total amount of taxes levied by the IRS on suspects who are arrested by the unit while in possession of substantial amounts of money (usually over \$1,000), for which the suspect cannot account. These figures can be useful to a unit in measuring relative progress in this area from year to year.

11. *Jurisdictional Breakdown of Arrests and Cases.* The unit should be able to show where its cases were initiated and its arrests occurred relative to each particular town, city, or county. Thus, the unit can accurately report to each jurisdiction the amount and types of activity within its boundaries. This record-keeping can be facilitated by coding each report or case according to where the complaint, the buy, or the arrest occurred.

12. *Searches.* The number of search warrants obtained and searches actually conducted may also be useful in indicating how this activity has differed in volume from previous years.

13. *Training of unit personnel.* The unit should be able to show the amount and the types of training that it was able to furnish to its personnel. On-the-job training as well as external training should be included.

14. *Number of complaints received.* The unit should show how many complaints it has received and the source of such complaints. For example, it can indicate the total number of narcotic complaints in a given year and break them down into categories of citizen, local department, and external agency (state and federal) complaints. Thus, the unit is able to show where much of its information comes from and to what degree citizens, local departments, and other agencies rely on the unit. Producing this type of information, of course, requires the maintenance of thorough information logs.

15. *Information disseminated.* The unit should also maintain records on the types of information and intelligence it gives to local departments and other agencies. This is important if the unit is to demonstrate that not all unit activity can be reflected in its arrest figures. In its communication with other agencies, the unit should emphasize that it would like to be informed when any information it disseminates leads to a successful arrest or solution of a case. By

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the same token, the unit should also advise others when their information leads to the successful conclusion of an investigation.

16. *Age of offenders.* Reporting the age of offenders involved in the various areas of illicit narcotic activity enables the unit to identify emerging trends in the use and sale of various drugs and narcotics and to counter any arguments that the unit simply seeks to investigate adolescents or that most of the youngsters arrested are involved with "soft drugs."

17. *Cooperation with drug-related agencies.* Any cooperative endeavors which the unit undertakes with drug-related health care or referral projects should be listed. This shows unit commitment to the overall solution of the drug problem in the local area.

18. *Training of non-narcotic police officers.* The number of unit-sponsored training programs and the law enforcement officers who have participated should be indicated to show (1) the unit's concern with the narcotic-enforcement capability of the entire law enforcement community in the local area, and (2) where the unit's staff time and effort are being directed.

19. *Number of hours expended per case.* Determining the number of hours per case generally involves extensive record-keeping. However, by maintaining thorough daily activity reports, a breakdown of the amount of time expended on cases can be accomplished. Investigations should be given a case number as soon as they are begun, not when the first buy is made, as is regularly done. Thus, a unit will be able to accurately monitor the time spent on a case from the point that a suspect came to the attention of the unit. The resulting information is useful in several ways. The unit will be able to determine how much time its agents and staff devote to the average unit case, to those cases which result in buys, and to

those for which no arrest is made. The director can also determine how much of his agents' time is being expended by administrative duties, such as report writing, court time, and so forth. Finally, the director will be able to compare time spent on average cases in the past with those in the present. He must be careful, however, not to draw wrong conclusions. A series of difficult cases could increase the time utilized in the average case. For example, a buy that leads to the arrest of eight or ten persons in a house or a series of relatively easy buys leading to the arrest of a number of suspects could be difficult to gauge on a time-value basis.

20. *Cost analysis of confidential funds expended.* In maintaining a record of all confidential fund expenditures, it is relatively easy for the unit to compile figures on the total amount of confidential funds that were expended on each case. With this information the unit can determine what the average cost is per case where an arrest has been made. Thus a director can tell, for example, that too much of its confidential funds are being expended in walk-away buys, or in cases against street-level pushers. Again, a director must be careful that he and others are not misled by figures. For example, several cases against major pushers may in the long run be more beneficial to the overall narcotic enforcement goals of the unit than a greater number of cases against small pushers.

21. *Highlights of major unit operations.* If possible, evaluation reports should also include highlights or brief descriptions of major cases undertaken by the unit. The highlights show the cases in which a considerable amount of time or money were expended. This is helpful in demonstrating that unit operations are not simple cases, that many are complex, time-consuming, and expensive. In addition, narration can tell the reader certain things that statistics alone cannot relate.

CHAPTER X. CONCLUSION—LOOKING BEYOND THE UNIT

Unlike permanent law enforcement bodies, most MAN units are relatively short-lived agencies that, like shooting stars, appear brightly but only briefly. The expectation of federal funding programs for MAN units is that participating departments will eventually assume the cost for unit operations; however, the reality is that most units expire at the end of their federal funding cycle because local departments cannot or will not support them. Since the majority of MAN units operate for 5 years or less, it is reasonable to question their value, to ask whether they make any lasting contribution to narcotics law enforcement efforts at the local level.

One objective of MAN units is to train local officers, both agents and non-agents, in narcotics investigation. The value of this training does not depend on the permanent existence of a unit. When a MAN unit folds, it leaves behind a cadre of trained officers and agents who are capable of assuming control of local narcotics investigation and who can train others in narcotics work.

By their organizational structure, MAN units compel local agencies to communicate and cooperate with one another. The coordinated police effort required to establish and operate a MAN unit is only an extension of existing working relationships in some areas. In many cases, however, the development of MAN units brings together local departments for the first time, fostering mutual cooperation and respect.

MAN units serve an experimental as well as a pragmatic function. They are attempts to coordinate and consolidate police services, and the lessons learned from their operation may be applicable to law en-

forcement efforts other than narcotics investigation.

But the legacy of MAN units is not so important as what they can accomplish while in operation. A MAN unit is definitely worth more alive than it is dead, and how to sustain a MAN unit after its federal funding cycle has expired is the crucial point.

To obtain local funding, MAN units should undertake a well-planned, yet low-keyed campaign to generate support. A unit can include city officials on its governing board to familiarize them with the unit's importance. Units should not be hesitant to furnish information to elected officials who desire to point out the unit's accomplishments. Units should not fail to make the participating departments and the public aware of their efforts against the local narcotics problem. Interagency contacts and talks given before community service groups can help to create this awareness.

During a visit to a meeting of MAN directors in one state, an individual remarked that, excluding equipment costs and wages, a unit can operate on a budget of \$35,000 per year. His estimate is reasonably accurate when one considers the Lansing unit. This MAN unit, which has the necessary equipment, spends about \$27,000 a year, excluding wages. The unit is located at a local department, and its vehicles are furnished to agents by their own departments. The Lansing unit case helps underline the point that, if a unit has been operating under a grant which has furnished it with the necessary equipment, training, and institutional identity, the unit can be maintained with a relatively small sum for cash expenditures. It is a small price to pay to combat crimes whose cost to society cannot be measured.

APPENDIX A

**IACP MULTI-AGENCY NARCOTIC
(MAN) UNIT QUESTIONNAIRE**

APPENDIX A

IACP MULTI-AGENCY NARCOTIC
(MAN) UNIT QUESTIONNAIRE

PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS

NAME OF UNIT _____

Street Address _____

City _____ County _____ State _____ Zip _____

Name of Commanding officer _____

_____ Tel. No. _____

1. When was the multi-agency narcotic unit formally created? _____

Is it still in operation? _____ Yes _____ No

2. Do you plan to continue the existence of your unit? _____ Yes _____ No

a. If yes, will the number of unit personnel be: _____ Increased?

_____ Decreased? _____ Maintained at present level?

b. If your answer is no, why is it being discontinued? _____

3. Check mark the reason(s) your MAN unit was formed.

- _____ new personnel with new faces needed
- _____ insufficient manpower in each individual agency
- _____ multi-jurisdictional problems
- _____ strong public opinion
- _____ need for specially-trained personnel
- _____ other--explain _____

4. How many MAN Unit personnel are currently assigned from the following agencies?

_____ municipal _____ county _____ state _____ federal _____ campus police
_____ other-specify _____

5. What was the original total number of personnel in your unit? _____

6. How many of the present unit personnel are:

_____ Full time sworn _____ Full time civilian (non-clerical)
_____ Part time sworn _____ Part time civilian (non-clerical)

7. How many of the present unit personnel are:

_____ Command personnel _____ Field (operational) personnel
_____ Supervisory personnel _____ Clerical/office personnel

8. Does your unit have a governing board? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, indicate the number of governing board members who are:

_____ local police personnel _____ federal narcotic personnel
_____ state law enforcement personnel _____ college representatives
_____ city, county, or state government officials (non-law enforcement) _____ industry representatives
_____ other --describe _____

9. What is your current annual operating budget? \$ _____

10. What percentage of your funding is provided by the following sources? Please make sure the total is 100%.

_____ LEAA Grant _____ Local Funds _____ State Funds
_____ Other--describe _____

11. Do all the police agencies represented by your MAN unit contribute:

(A) MANPOWER? _____ Yes _____ No (B) EQUIPMENT? _____ Yes _____ No
(C) DIRECT FUNDS? _____ Yes _____ No

12. Does your MAN unit have a police legal advisor assigned to the unit?

_____ Yes _____ No If no, where do you obtain legal advice? _____

13. Has there ever been a formal evaluation of your unit?

_____ Yes _____ No If yes, who performed the evaluation and when was it performed? _____

14. How many police agencies are now active participants in your unit?

_____ municipal agencies _____ county agencies _____ state agencies

_____ campus police _____ other (specify) _____

15. What is the total population within the jurisdictions served by your unit? _____

16. Write the number of towns or cities being served by the unit that fall into the following population categories.

_____	0 to 10,000	_____	100,000 to 250,000
_____	10,000 to 25,000	_____	250,000 to 500,000
_____	25,000 to 50,000	_____	500,000 to 1,000,000
_____	50,000 to 100,000	_____	1,000,000 and above

17. Check the category or categories which characterize the nature of the area in which your multi-agency enforcement unit serves.

_____ rural	_____ suburban
_____ a college or university setting	_____ metropolitan
_____ industrial	

18. What is the size of the jurisdictional area of your MAN unit in square miles?

_____ square miles

19. Does your unit's jurisdictional area include parts of another state?

_____ Yes _____ No

20. Check the activities your MAN Unit participates in:

_____ Gathers intelligence

_____ Makes arrests

_____ Participates in covert (undercover) operations

_____ Participates in drug education programs

_____ Participates in non-narcotic investigations. Please describe _____

21. Does your multi-agency enforcement unit coordinate its functions with a federal narcotic agency?

_____ Never _____ Occasionally _____ Regularly

With a state narcotic unit?

_____ Never _____ Occasionally _____ Regularly

22. According to your investigations and arrests, which drugs and narcotics are presently the most prevalent in your jurisdictions? Rank-order the following from 1 to 5, with No. 1 being the most prevalent and No. 5 the least prevalent.

_____ Marijuana	_____ Stimulants
_____ Hallucinogens (excluding marijuana)	_____ Depressants
_____ Narcotics (heroin, morphine, cocaine)	

23. What age groups are the most frequently arrested by your unit? Rank-order the following from 1 to 5, with No. 1 being the most frequently arrested and No. 5 being the least frequently arrested.

_____ 17 and under	_____ 22 - 30	_____ 40 and above
_____ 18 - 21	_____ 30 - 40	

24. What is the average number of monthly narcotic arrests made by your MAN unit? _____

25. What is the conviction rate for users arrested by your unit? _____
For sellers arrested by your unit? _____

26. Is the unit director temporarily assigned to the MAN Unit from another agency?
_____ Yes _____ No

If yes, what is his permanent assignment and title? _____

27. What is the narcotic enforcement experience of the unit director? _____

28. Does your unit have a written manual of procedure?
_____ Yes _____ No

29. Briefly describe the most serious problems encountered in organizing and operating your MAN unit.

APPENDIX B
UNITS VISITED

**APPENDIX B
UNITS VISITED**

Name of Unit	Date Created	Law Enforcement Affiliation of Personnel	Number of Personnel	Original Personnel	Represented by Personnel
MAF Narcotic Strike Force Brookfield, Ohio	January 1971	None - agents hired	1 command 1 supervisor 6 agents	14	None - agents hired
Multi-County Narco. Bureau; New Philadelphia, Ohio	1972	None - agents hired	1 command 1 supervisor 5 agents	8	None - agents hired
Metropolitan Narcotic Squad Lansing, Michigan	1970	5 police officers 4 deputies 1 campus p.o.	1 supervisor 9 agents	6	2 police dept. 1 sheriff's office
Quad City Metro. Enforcement Group; Rock Island, Illinois	March 1974	5 police officers 1 deputy	1 command 5 agents	6	4 police dept. 1 sheriff's office
Metro. Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group; Mt. Prospect, Illinois	July 1971	26 police officers 25 deputies 2 state officers	4 command 9 supervisors 39 agents	21	26 police dept. 1 sheriff's off. 1 prosec. off. 1 state l.e.
San Diego Integrated Task Force San Diego, Calif.	Oct. 1973	18 police officers 16 deputies 9 DEA agents	2 command 9 supervisors 32 agents	43	1 police dept. 1 sheriff's off. 1 federal agency
Stockton/San Joaquin Metro. Task Force Stockton, Calif.	1972	12 police officers 4 deputies 1 state tax officer 1 probation officer	1 command 6 supervisors 12 agents	8	1 police dept. 1 sheriff's off. 1 state agency 1 prob. agency
Metro. Area Narcotics Squad Tucson, Arizona	1970	21 police officers 3 deputies	1 command 2 supervisors 19 field	11	2 police dept. 1 sheriff's off.
Las Cruces - Dona Ana Co. Metro. Narcotic Agency Las Cruces, New Mex.	Nov. 1970	3 police officers 1 deputy 1 state officer	1 command 1 supervisor 4 agents	5	1 police dept. 1 sheriff's off. 1 state police agency
Cameron Co. Organized Task Force Brownsville, Texas	Oct. 1973	4 police officers 1 state officer	1 command 4 agents	3	2 police dept. 1 D.A. Invest.
Southwest Region Crime Squad Fairfield, Conn.	July 1969	12 police officers	1 command 1 supervisor 10 agents	-	7 police dept. 1 county 1 D.A.'s Office
Broward County MEG/ Organized Crime Div. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	Oct. 1971	8 police officers 17 deputies 1 state officer	3 command 6 supervisors 18 agents	17	7 police dept. 1 county 1 D.A. Office

Governing Board Members	Method of Funding	Population/ Area Size	Number of Towns Served	Unit Director
1 coroner 11 chiefs/sheriffs, 2 pro- bation officers, 2 judges	75% LEAA 20% Local 5% State	750,000 pop. 1,600 sq. mi.	62 municipal. 4 counties	Captain, Sheriff's Office
1 chiefs, sheriffs and prosecutors	75% LEAA 24% Local 1% State	221,179 pop 3,970 sq. mi.	24 municipal. 6 counties	Former police officer for 30 years
6 chiefs/sheriffs	100% Local	(3 counties)	-	Lieutenant, Lansing P.D.
5 chiefs/sheriffs 1 prosecutor	70% LEAA 24% Local 6% State	400,000 pop. 3,900 sq. mi.	49 municipal. 3 counties	Sergeant, Rock Island P.D.
6 chiefs 1 sheriff 1 prosecutor	50% LEAA 40% Local 10% State	6,000,000 pop. 1,200 sq. mi.	51 municipal. 1 county	Lieutenant, Chicago P.D.
1 chief 1 sheriff 1 Reg. Dir. - DEA	26% LEAA 58% Local 16% DEA	1,500,000 pop. 4,300 sq. mi.	10 municipal. 1 county	1 capt., San Diego P.D., 1 AIC, DEA
No formal board	68% LEAA 30% Local 2% State	315,000 pop. 1,440 sq. mi.	6 municipal. 1 county	Lieutenant, Stockton P.D.
2 chiefs 1 sheriff	31% LEAA 69% Local	435,000 pop. 9,240 sq. mi.	4 towns 1 county	Lieutenant, Tucson P.D.
1 chief, 1 sheriff, 1 state police com., 1 D.A. 3 city official	50% LEAA 40% Local 10% State	55,000 pop. 4,600 sq. mi.	3 towns 1 county	Captain, Las Cruces P.D.
2 chiefs 1 district attorney	70% LEAA 20% Local 10% State	150,000 pop. 1,114 sq. mi.	17 municipal. 1 county	Sergeant, Browns- ville P.D.
18 chiefs	77% LEAA 19% Local 4% State	508 sq. mi.	18 municipal.	Sergeant, Norwalk P.D.
None	25% LEAA 75% Local	1,200 sq. mi.	31 municipal. 1 county	Former Super- visor with state l.e.

APPENDIX C

FORMAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

FORMAT OF INTERLOCAL AGREEMENTS FOR ENACTMENT BY MUNICIPALITIES FOR PARTICIPATION IN A REGIONAL CRIME SQUAD

The following is the agreement prepared by the Connecticut Police Legal Advisors Association for the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee. The document is utilized to formalize the cooperative agreements among the local agencies in each of the five regions that comprise the jurisdiction of the Regional Crime Squads.

Interlocal Agreement

For

Regional Crime Squad

This agreement made and executed this _____
day of _____, 19____ by and between _____
_____, and _____
_____, and _____
_____, and _____

WITNESSETH:

Whereas Connecticut law provides for the formation by any two or more towns, cities or boroughs having an organized police department of a regional crime squad, and

Whereas said regional crime squad must be established by express written agreement containing required covenants and responsibilities as per Connecticut law, and

Whereas the signatories herein are desirous of establishing said regional crime squad by combining their investigative services for the enforcement of narcotics and controlled drug laws of the state and the investigation of related criminal activity, and

Whereas the authorized chief executive officer or elected official of the herein involved towns, cities, or boroughs, having secured the approval of their governing bodies where required by charter or ordinance, and being desirous to sign and execute this Interlocal Agreement on behalf of said town, city or borough:

Now Therefore, in consideration of the mutual promises and obligations herein contained, and in consideration of the participation in and benefit from the _____ Regional Crime Squad, the parties hereto agree as follows:

Section 1. The aforementioned towns, cities, and boroughs having organized police departments enter into this agreement to create the _____ Regional Crime Squad for the purpose of combining their police investigative services for the enforcement of narcotics and controlled drug laws of the State of Connecticut and the investigation of related criminal activity, pursuant to Public Act No. 73-592 and its provisions.

Section 2. The Chief of Police from each participating municipality shall serve on a supervisory board who shall be responsible for the operation and activities of the Regional Crime Squad. The supervisory board shall be known as the _____ Regional Crime Squad Supervisory Board.

Section 3. The Supervisory Board shall meet on a regular basis for purposes of overseeing the operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad. At least six such meetings should be held during a calendar year.

Section 4. Each member of the Supervisory Board shall have an equal vote in the conduct of its business.

Section 5. The Supervisory Board shall annually submit a written report to the chief executive officer or chief elected official of the participating municipalities. Such report shall include all information necessary to appraise the participating municipalities of the activities and accomplishments of the Regional Crime Squad, providing that all necessary precautions have been taken by the Supervisory Board to maintain security and to preserve and protect confidential information and sources.

Section 6. A Commanding Officer for the Regional Crime Squad shall be appointed by and work under the direction and guidance of the Supervisory Board and shall serve at the pleasure of the Supervisory Board. The Commanding Officer shall be a police officer from among the participating municipalities.

Section 7. Each participating municipality shall assign such police personnel of its police department assigned by the chief of police to temporarily full-time duty with the Regional Crime Squad as in the opinion of the supervisory board is consistent with the objectives of this agreement and in relation to the size of each municipality, the size of its police force and the amount of squad activity within each municipality. Any such person so assigned shall work under the immediate supervision and direction of the squad commander and shall adhere to the rules and regulations of the Regional Crime Squad.

Section 8. Each participating municipality shall be responsible for the full payment of the salary of the personnel temporarily assigned to the Regional Crime Squad and such salary shall be deemed to be the full salary due and payable to such assigned personnel while on duty with the Regional Squad.

Section 9. For purposes of indemnification of Regional Crime Squad personnel and their participating municipalities against any losses, damages, or liabilities arising out of the services and activities of the Regional Crime Squad, the personnel so assigned by any municipality shall be deemed to be continuing under the employment of the municipality and its police department.

Section 10. Any duly sworn police officer, while assigned to duty with the Regional Crime Squad as herein provided and working at the direction of the commanding officer of the Regional Crime Squad and pursuant to the purposes and activities of the Regional Crime Squad, shall have the same powers, duties, privileges and immunities as are conferred upon him as a police officer in his own municipality, in any municipality participating in a Regional Crime Squad.

Section 11. Said powers, duties, privileges and immunities of police officers assigned to Regional Crime Squads may be extended to other towns at the discretion of the Commissioner of State Police according to procedures established by him and pursuant to an investigation whose origin is within a municipality participating in a Regional Crime Squad.

Section 12. If arrests are to be made within a participating municipality, sufficient notification shall be made to the Police Department to allow for the assignment of Police Department personnel who shall effect the arrest. Regional Crime Squad personnel may be present and accompany Police Department personnel during the execution of such arrests.

Section 13. In the event of an emergency situation where an arrest has to be made for an on sight violation, the Police Department shall be notified immediately of such arrest.

Section 14. All arrested persons shall be brought to such Police Department for proper booking.

Section 15. Any arrested persons shall be the responsibility of the Police Department in regard to any presentment in court or temporary confinement.

Section 16. Whenever the Regional Crime Squad obtains evidence sufficient to obtain a search warrant for property within a participating municipality, sufficient notice shall be given to the Police Department to allow the proper allocation of manpower to conduct such search. Regional Crime Squad personnel may be present and accompany Police Department personnel during the execution of such searches.

Section 17. All evidence seized during such arrest and/or search shall be retained by the Police Department.

Section 18. All news releases pertaining to such arrests within a participating municipality shall be formulated by its Police Department.

Section 19. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as imposing a mandatory duty upon any participating municipality to provide Regional Crime Squad personnel with authority for powers of arrest and police jurisdiction in matters other than activities conducted by the Regional Crime Squad in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

Section 20. Supervisory Board shall select two Chiefs of Police from their membership to serve as representatives to the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee as hereinafter provided.

Section 21. The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall coordinate the formulation of policies and operating procedures, investigation and enforcement activities and manpower usage among the various Regional Crime Squads and shall coordinate the activities of the Regional Crime Squads with other law enforcement agencies within and without the state.

Section 22. Pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut State Law as made and provided, the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall be composed of up to fifteen persons for the coordination of regional crime squads and their activities, consisting of the Commissioner of State Police; two persons appointed by the Planning Committee on Criminal Administration; two Chiefs of Police representing each Regional Crime Squad appointed from among its membership by the Supervisory Board of such Regional Crime Squad, and such other Chiefs of Police as may be designated as members by these persons. Each member shall have an equal vote in the conduct of its business.

Section 23. The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee may apply for and receive, and shall administer, any federal, state, local or private appropriations or grant funds made available for operations of the Regional Crime Squads.

Section 24. Said committee shall employ such staff as may be required to assist it in the conduct of its business.

Section 25. The operations and activities of Regional Crime Squad and the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall be financed by assessments to the participating municipalities. Such assessments shall be based upon a reasonable formula as agreed upon by the Supervisory Board of the Regional Crime Squad which formula shall consist of a per capita share of necessary operating expenses and shall utilize the most recent and valid census data. In no event shall said assessment exceed a six (\$0.06) cents per capita cost for each of the participating cities, towns and boroughs.

Section 26. The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the Regional Crime Squad shall be responsible for establishing procedures for the proper conduct of financial affairs, including whatever procedures are necessary to insure that any special conditions and regulations for use of funds of the participating municipalities, are adhered to.

Section 27. The participating municipalities shall have access for purposes of audit and examinations to papers, documents and records of the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating

Committee and the Regional Crime Squad providing that such access maintains the security of the operations and protects confidential information and sources.

Section 28. Any motor vehicle, boat or aircraft which shall be seized by a participating municipality in connection with the arrest of any individual as a result of a Regional Crime Squad investigation in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes, may become the property of the Regional Crime Squad for its use, at the discretion of the Chief of Police of the municipality.

Section 29. All disputes between participating municipalities arising from the operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad shall be settled by the Supervisory Board.

Section 30. All disputes between Regional Crime Squads arising from their operations and activities shall be settled by the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.

Section 31. This agreement shall remain in effect for a duration of two years.

Section 32. Any municipality desiring to terminate its participation in this agreement shall indicate such intent in writing by its chief executive officer or elected official to the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the other participating municipalities of the Regional Crime Squad,

and stating therein its reasons for termination of the agreement. Termination of participation in the agreement by such municipality shall be deemed to take effect in sixty (60) days upon receipt and acknowledgement of the written communication of intent by the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the other participating municipalities of the Regional Crime Squad.

In Witness Whereof, We have set our hand and seal

this _____ day of _____,
19 _____

_____	Name _____ (L. S.)
Witness _____	Authority _____ (L. S.)
_____	Name _____ (L. S.)
Witness _____	Authority _____ (L. S.)
_____	Name _____ (L. S.)
Witness _____	Authority _____ (L. S.)
_____	Name _____ (L. S.)
Witness _____	Authority _____ (L. S.)

APPENDIX D

**CALIFORNIA'S CLASSIFICATION OF
NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS**

APPENDIX D

FIVE CATEGORIES USED BY THE CALIFORNIA NARCOTIC INTELLIGENCE NETWORK FOR CLASSIFICATION OF NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS

Class 1 - A person who is a member of a group of at least two persons working together to acquire profit by engaging in the illicit trafficking of narcotics and/or dangerous drugs (distribution, smuggling, manufacturing, sales, financing, or possession) to willing customers; and whose members attempt to achieve immunity from the law by either (1) corrupting public officials, or (2) intimidating their opposition through the use of violence or its threat, and (3) organizing in such a way as to achieve a self-perpetuating organizational existence. NOTE: Self-perpetuating means that the organization itself will continue to exist and operate successfully, even if its leader or several of its members are arrested.

Class 2 - A person or organization engaged in the illicit distribution, smuggling, manufacturing, sales, financing, or possession of the following quantities of narcotics or dangerous drugs.

1. Three or more pounds of heroin or cocaine.
2. One or more tons of marijuana.
3. 100 or more pounds of hashish.
4. 100,000 or more units of LSD.
5. 500,000 or more amphetamine tablets.
6. 250,000 or more barbituate tablets or capsules.
7. Ten or more pounds of PCP, THC, or methamphetamine.
8. Five or more gallons of hashish oil.

Class 3 - A person or organization engaged in the illicit distribution, smuggling, manufacturing, sales, financing, or possession of quantities less

than in Class 2, but not less than:

1. Eight ounces of heroin or cocaine.
2. 500 pounds of marijuana.
3. Five pounds of hashish.
4. 5,000 units of LSD.
5. 50,000 amphetamine tablets.
6. 25,000 barbituate tablets or capsules.
7. Eight ounces of PCP, THC, or methamphetamine.
8. One-half gallon of hashish oil.

Class 4 - A person or organization engaged in the illicit distribution, smuggling, manufacturing, sales, financing, or possession of narcotics or dangerous drugs in quantities less than Class 3, but not less than:

1. One or more ounces of heroin or cocaine.
2. Ten pounds of marijuana.
3. One ounce or more of hashish.
4. Gram quantities of LSD.
5. 1,000 or more units of amphetamines or barbituates.
6. One ounce or more of PCP, THC, or methamphetamines.
7. Any quantity of hashish oil or other substances which may have statewide interest.

Class 5 - Other individuals involved in narcotics activity not in the first four categories.

APPENDIX E

CONNECTICUT REGIONAL CRIME SQUADS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND RULES AND REGULATIONS

This Appendix contains the standard operating procedures and rules and regulations prepared by the Connecticut Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee for the five regional crime (MAN) squads operating in the state. This concise, yet thorough, document is presented for consideration by other MAN units.

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1.0 REGIONAL CRIME SQUADS

- 1.1 Regional Crime Squads may be created in defined geographic regions by two or more towns, cities or boroughs having organized police departments for purposes of cooperatively combining police investigative services for the enforcement of narcotics and controlled drug laws of the state and the investigation of related criminal activity.
- 1.2 The Regional Crime Squads must be established by express written interlocal agreements containing required covenants and responsibilities as per Connecticut law.
- 1.3 The authorized chief executive officer or elected official of the concerned towns, cities or boroughs shall sign and execute the interlocal agreement and shall have secured the approval of their governing bodies where required by charter or ordinance.
- 1.4 A Commanding Officer for the Regional Crime Squad shall be appointed by and work under the direction and guidance of the Supervisory Board and shall serve at the pleasure of the Supervisory Board. The Commanding Officer shall be a police officer from among the participating municipalities.
- 1.5 Each participating municipality may have one or more police officers of their police departments assigned by the Chief of Police to temporary full-time duty with the Regional Crime Squad. Any such person so assigned shall work under the immediate supervision and direction of the Squad Commander and shall adhere to the rules and regulations of the Regional Crime Squad.
- 1.6 Each participating municipality shall be responsible for the full payment of the salary of the personnel temporarily assigned to the Regional Crime Squad and such salary shall be deemed to be the full salary due and payable to such assigned personnel while on duty with the Regional Squad.
- 1.7 For purposes of indemnification of Regional Crime Squad personnel and their participating municipalities against any losses, damages, or liabilities arising out of the services and activities of the Regional Crime Squad, the personnel so assigned by any municipality shall be deemed to be continuing under the employment of the municipality and its police department.
- 1.8 Any duly sworn police officer, while assigned to duty with the Regional Crime Squad as herein provided and working at the direction of the commanding officer of the Regional Crime Squad and adhering to the established operating procedures of the Region Crime Squad, and pursuant to the purposes and activities of the Regional Crime Squad, shall have the same powers, duties, privileges and immunities as are conferred upon him as a police officer in his own municipality, in any municipality participating in the Regional Crime Squad.
- 1.9 Said powers, duties, privileges and immunities of police officers assigned to Regional Crime Squads may be extended to other towns at the discretion of the Commissioner of State Police according to procedures established by him (Sec. 5.17) and pursuant to an investigation whose origin is within a municipality participating in a Regional Crime Squad.

- 1.10 Nothing contained herein shall be construed as imposing a mandatory duty upon any participating municipality to provide Regional Crime Squad personnel with authority for powers of arrest and police jurisdiction in matters other than activities conducted by the Regional Crime Squad in accordance with the provisions of the interlocal agreement and the established operating procedures of the Regional Crime Squad.
- 1.11 The participating municipalities shall have access for purposes of audit and examinations to papers, documents and records of the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the Regional Crime Squad providing that such access maintains the security of the operations and protects confidential information and sources.
- 1.12 Any motor vehicle, boat or aircraft which shall be seized by a participating municipality in connection with the arrest of any individual as a result of a Regional Crime Squad investigation in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes, may become the property of the Regional Crime Squad for its use, at the discretion of the Chief of Police of the municipality.
- 1.13 All disputes between participating municipalities arising from the operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad shall be settled by the Supervisory Board.
- 1.14 The operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad shall be financed by assessments to the participating municipalities and shall be based upon a per capita share of necessary operating expenses and shall utilize the most recent and valid census data.
- 1.15 Any municipality desiring to terminate its participation in the interlocal agreement shall indicate such intent in writing by its chief executive officer or elected official to the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the other participating municipalities of the Regional Crime Squad, and stating therein its reasons for termination of the agreement. Termination of participation in the agreement by such municipality shall be deemed to take effect in sixty (60) days upon receipt and acknowledgement of the written communication of intent by the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the other participating municipalities of the Regional Crime Squad.

2.0 SUPERVISORY BOARDS

- 2.1 The Chief of Police from each participating municipality shall serve on a supervisory board who shall be responsible for the operation and activities of the Regional Crime Squad.
- 2.2 The Supervisory Board shall meet on a regular basis for purposes of overseeing the operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad. At least six such meetings should be held during a calendar year.
- 2.3 Each member of the Supervisory Board shall have an equal vote in the conduct of its business.
- 2.4 The Supervisory Board shall annually submit a written report to the chief executive officer or chief elected official of the participating municipalities. Such report shall include all information necessary to appraise the participating municipalities of the activities and accomplishments of the Regional Crime Squad, providing that all necessary precautions have been taken by the Supervisory Board to maintain security and to preserve and protect confidential information and sources.
- 2.5 A Commanding Officer for the Regional Crime Squad shall be appointed by and work under the direction and guidance of the Supervisory Board and shall serve at the pleasure of the Supervisory Board. The Commanding Officer shall be a police officer from among the participating municipalities.
- 2.6 Supervisory Board shall select two Chiefs of Police from their membership to serve as representatives to the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee as hereinafter provided in Section 3.0.
- 2.7 All disputes between participating municipalities arising from the operations and activities of the Regional Crime Squad shall be settled by the Supervisory Board.

3.0 STATEWIDE ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

- 3.1 The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall coordinate the formulation of policies and operating procedures, investigation and enforcement activities and manpower usage among the various Regional Crime Squads and shall coordinate the activities of the Regional Crime Squads with other law enforcement agencies within and without the state.
- 3.2 Pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut State Law as made and provided, the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall be composed of up to fifteen persons for the coordination of regional crime squads and their activities, consisting of the Commissioner of State Police; two persons appointed by the Planning Committee on Criminal Administration; two Chiefs of Police representing each Regional Crime Squad appointed from among its membership by the Supervisory Board of such Regional Crime Squad, and such other Chiefs of Police as may be designated as members by these persons.
- 3.3 The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee and the Regional Crime Squad shall be responsible for establishing procedures for the proper conduct of financial affairs, including whatever procedures are necessary to insure that any special conditions and regulations for use of funds of the participating municipalities, are adhered to.
- 3.4 The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee may apply for and receive, and shall administer, any federal, state, local or private appropriations or grant funds made available for operations of the Regional Crime Squads.
- 3.5 All disputes between Regional Crime Squads arising from their operations and activities shall be settled by the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.
- 3.6 All members shall serve a term of one year on the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.
- 3.7 Members may serve any number of consecutive terms provided that their appointment is annually reaffirmed by their designating bodies.
- 3.8 A member may be removed from membership at the discretion of the member's designating body at any time, and they reserve the right to appointment of a new member to serve for the removed member.
- 3.9 The Committee shall select by simple majority vote a chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary-treasurer as officers of the Committee on an annual basis.
- 3.10 An officer may serve any number of consecutive terms, provided the officer's selection is annually reaffirmed by the Committee.
- 3.11 The Chairman shall serve as the presiding member at all meetings of the Committee, shall act as arbiter in all disputes, and shall be responsible for interpreting and implementing policy enacted by the Committee.
- 3.12 The Vice-Chairman shall serve as the Chairman in the absence of the Chairman, and shall assume all powers of the Chairman when doing so.
- 3.13 The Secretary-Treasurer shall serve as the interpreter of all matters of record of Committee business, and shall be responsible for all financial affairs and business of the Committee.

STATEWIDE ENFORCEMENT AND COORDINATING COMMITTEE

- 3.14 The Committee shall meet for the purpose of conducting business on at least six occasions during the calendar year.
- 3.15 There shall be a total of fifteen votes for the conduct of business of the Committee. Each member shall exercise one vote.
- 3.16 Eight votes shall be present to constitute a quorum for the conduct of business of the Committee.
- 3.17 A simple majority of votes present shall be required to carry all motions offered for consideration of the Committee.
- 3.18 The Committee shall follow accepted rules of parliamentary procedure in the conduct of business.
- 3.19 Members may designate representatives to attend meetings, but the representative shall not vote in place of the member.
- 3.20 The Committee shall employ an appropriate staff of persons to assist them in the conduct of their business. Such staff shall consist at the minimum of an Executive Director, Assistant Director of Intelligence and Assistant Director for Planning.
- 3.21 The Executive Director shall be responsible for implementing policy enacted by the Committee and keeping the Committee apprised of activities of the Regional Crime Squads.
- 3.22 The Executive Director shall be responsible for obtaining and administering all funds for operation of the Committee and the Regional Crime Squads; establishing proper accounting procedures and records for the administration of funds; rendering financial and operational reports to the Committee; preparing monthly financial operating statements for the Secretary-Treasurer of the Committee.
- 3.23 The Assistant Director for Intelligence shall be responsible for analyzing weekly squad activity and intelligence reports, dissemination of intelligence to the squads; maintenance of a central Defendant Index; coordination of logistical and enforcement activities of the squads; approval of large confidential expenditures of the squads.
- 3.24 The Assistant Director for Planning shall be responsible for collecting and analyzing data relating to the performance of the squads; rendering statistical reports; preparing monthly and annual reports; preparing a monthly newsletter on activities of the squads.

4.0 SQUAD COMMANDERS AND SUPERVISORS

- 4.1 The Squad Commander and Supervisors shall be appointed by and work under the direction and guidance of the Regional Crime Squad Supervisory Board of Chiefs of Police and shall serve at the pleasure of the Supervisory Board. The Squad Commander and Supervisors shall be police officers from among the participating municipalities in the Squad region.
- 4.2 The Squad Commander shall prepare and submit a monthly and a yearly report of Squad activities to the Supervisory Board.
- 4.3 Superior Officers shall comply with the Standard Operating Procedures established by the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee (SECC) and other such directives as may be promulgated by SECC and the Supervisory Board.
- 4.4 Superior Officers should avoid whenever possible censuring those under their supervision in the presence of others and shall not injure or discredit those under their authority by oppressive conduct or abusive language.
- 4.5 Superior Officers shall normally allow investigations to be conducted in towns within their defined squad regions. The Superior Officers shall notify the SECC Director of Intelligence as soon as is practical if any Agent is to initiate an investigation outside of his respective region, and shall so advise a Superior Officer in that squad region.
- 4.6 If any Agent is dismissed from duty or returns to duty with his police department, the Squad Commander shall obtain from him all Squad property, a completion of all outstanding reports, and a reconciliation of all squad funds advanced to the Agent.
- 4.7 Squad Agents may be returned to their respective police department by the Squad Commander when, in his opinion, such action is necessary. A report of such action, with the reason therefore, will be made to the Squad Agent's Chief.
- 4.8 The Squad Commander maintains liaison with other enforcement agencies, oversees effectiveness of the unit, renders necessary reports, issues general orders, and keeps SECC regularly informed of the progress of the unit. He also assumes overall direction of field operations and evaluates performance of the Agents and renders reports to their chiefs.
- 4.9 The Squad Supervisor is in direct contact with the Agents, oversees field operations and investigations, assigns investigations to agents, occasionally participates in field activities and investigations, prepares weekly intelligence reports for SECC, and keeps a running account of man hours.
- 4.10 The Squad Supervisor will interview new Agents to determine the Agent's qualifications and motivation to participate in undercover work. The supervisor will be responsible for insuring that the new Agent receives proper training before being allowed to work as an undercover Agent. After proper preparation, Agents will be assigned to work undercover investigations with experienced Agents.
- 4.11 The Squad Supervisor shall exact proper performance of police duty and compliance with Standard Operating Procedures and orders of the Commanding Officer or higher authority from Squad Agents.
- 4.12 Any Superior Officer of the Regional Crime Squad who observes any subordinate violating any rule or regulation and fails to take corrective action shall be in violation of these Standard Operating Procedures.

5.0 INVESTIGATIONS

- 5.1 No Agent shall initiate an investigation in any town without the direction of a Superior Officer.
- 5.2 An investigation shall normally be initiated by a Superior Officer at the request of the Chief of Police or his designee when acting upon information received from the police department.
- 5.3 In the event that the Regional Crime Squad receives or develops information of its own, an investigation may be initiated in a town, providing that a Superior Officer informs the Chief of Police of the town or his designee as soon as is feasible after initiation of the investigation.
- 5.4 The Chief of Police or his designee shall be apprised of the progress of any investigative activities of the Regional Crime Squad in his town by the Squad Commander or a Superior Officer.
- 5.5 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not be assigned to work as an undercover drug investigator without first receiving proper training in such investigations and being familiar with these Standard Operating Procedures.
- 5.6 The Squad Commander shall have all purchases of evidence supported by surveillance, to provide protection of the Agent and the confidential funds and for corroboration of the purchasing Agent's testimony.
- 5.7 The Squad Commander shall insure that adequate prior background investigations are conducted to identify those suspects from whom purchases of evidence are to be made. If a field situation arises which does not allow for a prior background investigation, care shall be exercised by Agents not to purchase evidence from persons whom there is no likelihood of identifying or arresting.
- 5.8 The Squad Agent, the covering officer and a supervisor shall beforehand agree as much as possible on a method of procedure for each undercover assignment. The method of procedure should consider: that the covering officer knows the identity of the informant with whom the squad Agent is working; agreement on the places and times the undercover Agent will be working; planning in advance a final meeting place; the Squad Agent and the surveillance meeting after each purchase or attempted purchase; that every effort will be made to insure that the Squad Agent is in view at all times.
- 5.9 Drug investigations shall provide adequate documentation that the suspect is trafficking in narcotics or controlled drugs for profit.
- 5.10 Prior to application for a warrant for arrest of a suspect or search of a suspect's premises the Agent shall provide an identification and description of the suspect and/or address and premises.
- 5.11 All affidavits completed by an Agent shall contain a true and accurate statement of the investigation conducted by the Agent, and shall be reviewed by a Superior Officer.
- 5.12 If arrests are to be made within a municipality with an organized police department, sufficient notice shall be made to that department to allow for the assignment of municipal police personnel who shall effect the arrest. Squad personnel may be present and accompany municipal personnel during the execution of such arrests.

INVESTIGATIONS

- 5.13 In the event of an emergency situation, where an arrest has to be made for an on-sight violation, the municipal police shall be notified immediately.
- 5.14 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall use only the necessary force while making an arrest. They shall treat all persons fairly and humanely and shall not use physical force except when necessary to prevent escape, in self-defense, or to prevent violence to another person.
- 5.15 All arrested persons shall be brought to the municipal police department for booking.
- 5.16 Any arrested persons shall be the responsibility of the municipal police in regard to any presentation in court or temporary confinement.
- 5.17 Whenever any Squad Agent obtains evidence sufficient to obtain a search warrant, sufficient notice shall be given to the municipal police department to allow for the proper allocation of manpower to conduct such search. Squad personnel may be present and accompany municipal personnel during the execution of such searches.
- 5.18 Squad personnel shall abide by applicable rules and procedures established by procedural and criminal law, and exercise due regard for the rights of persons arrested and the property of premises searched, when conducting an arrest or search.
- 5.19 All evidence seized during such search shall be retained by the municipal police, unless other arrangements have been made with the police department.
- 5.20 Each investigation shall be assigned to a case number and entered in the CASE LOG. Information which is transmitted to a police department or other law enforcement agency shall be entered in the AGENCY ASSISTANCE FILE.
- 5.21 Whenever any member of any Regional Crime Squad finds it necessary to enter a town which is under the sole jurisdiction of the Connecticut State Police Department to further an investigation being conducted within their region, the following procedures shall be followed:
 - 1) The Squad Commander or Supervisor shall notify the Commanding Officer of the State Police Detective Division, or his representative of the necessity to enter a town serviced by the State Police Department.
 - 2) The Squad Commander or Supervisor shall advise the Commanding Officer of the Detective Division of the circumstances surrounding the investigation which shall be conducted within the State Police Jurisdiction.
 - 3) Such notification shall be made prior to entry into the town or as soon thereafter as is possible under the circumstances if prior notification is not feasible.
 - 4) The Commanding Officer of the State Police Detective Division shall notify the Commanding Officer of the troop involved. The Commanding Officer of the troop shall assign the number of men he deems necessary to provide liaison with the squad.
 - 5) If arrests are to be made within a State Police town, sufficient notification shall be made to the Commanding Officer of Detective Division to allow for the assignment of State Police personnel who shall effect the arrest. Regional Squad personnel may be present and accompany State Police personnel during the execution of such arrests.

INVESTIGATIONS

- 6) In the event of an emergency situation, where an arrest has to be made for an on-sight violation, the Commanding Officer of the troop shall be notified immediately of such arrests. In such situations, Regional Squad personnel shall provide a statement of the circumstances to the Commanding Officer of the troop if so requested by him.
- 7) All arrested persons shall be brought to the State Police troop for proper booking.
- 8) Any arrested persons shall be the responsibility of the State Police in regard to any presentment in court or temporary confinement.
- 9) Whenever any Regional Squad obtains evidence sufficient to obtain a search warrant for property within a State Police town, sufficient notice shall be given to the Commanding Officer of the Detective Division to allow the proper allocation of manpower to conduct such search. The Troop Commander shall assign a supervisor to be in overall charge of any search and shall determine the number of men necessary to properly conduct such search. Regional Squad Personnel may be present and accompany State Police personnel during the execution of such searches.
- 10) All evidence seized during such arrest and/or search warrant shall be retained by the State Police.
- 11) Whenever any situation arises, which is not covered by this directive, the Commanding Officer of the Detective Division and the Executive Director of the Regional Crime Squads shall be notified immediately, who shall confer with the Commissioner of State Police or his representative, who shall determine the procedure to be followed to cover such situation.
- 12) All news releases pertaining to any investigation conducted within a State Police town shall be formulated jointly.

6.0 EVIDENCE

- 6.1 When a member of the Regional Crime Squad wishes to initiate a case involving purchases of evidence, he shall notify his Supervisor of his intentions and request authority to proceed with the investigation.
- 6.2 A Squad Agent shall be assigned surveillance by the Supervisor. An Agent shall not operate without a surveillance, except with permission of the Commanding Officer.
- 6.3 Every effort will be made to secure two or more purchases on separate days from each suspect. Arrests for single purchases will not be made unless absolutely necessary.
- 6.4 Whenever practical, all narcotics or controlled drugs are to be "field tested". The CASE LOG will reflect the fact that such items were or were not field tested and the results.
- 6.5 Whenever practical, all narcotics or controlled drugs are to be weighed. The CASE LOG will reflect the fact that such items were or were not weighed and the results.
- 6.6 All narcotics or dangerous drugs purchased by Squad Agents shall be delivered as soon as possible to the surveillance or Superior Officer. Narcotics or dangerous drugs shall be kept in possession of a Squad Agent for a minimum amount of time and shall be either locked in the Squad evidence room or delivered to an authorized laboratory as soon as possible. Under no circumstances shall a Squad Agent take narcotics or dangerous drugs to his home or other place.
- 6.7 Whenever there is a discrepancy in either the weight or count of narcotics or dangerous drugs, such information shall be brought immediately to the attention of the Squad Commander. The Squad Commander shall cause an investigation to be initiated at once to determine the reason for the discrepancy.
- 6.8 State or Federal Laboratory receipts are to be obtained for all narcotics and controlled drugs delivered to the respective laboratory or picked up by an agent of the above laboratories.
- 6.9 Laboratory analysis receipts shall become a part of the CASE FILE and the results of the analysis will be entered in the CASE LOG.
- 6.10 As soon as possible after final court disposition, the State or Federal Laboratory destruction permission report shall be signed by the Agent's Superior and returned to the laboratory.
- 6.11 Requests to the laboratories to expedite the analysis of items submitted shall be kept to a minimum and shall only be made in urgent situations.
- 6.12 Squad Agents who obtain evidence shall place his initials and the date directly on all glassine envelopes, packets, and other containers at the time they come into his possession.
- 6.13 Individual glassine envelopes and other packets of narcotics or controlled drugs shall be sealed by affixing gummed tape along one edge so as to prevent the contents from spilling out and to facilitate the opening and removal of contents for analysis. The Agent shall place his initials and the date across the seal.

EVIDENCE

- 6.14 If loose capsules, tablets, needles, bottlecaps, eyedroppers, saturated cotton, marihuana or cigarettes suspected of containing marihuana are involved, they shall be placed in clean envelopes in such a manner to prevent mixture or contamination. Points of hypodermic needles and other sharp instruments shall be covered before placing in envelopes to prevent accidental injury. The envelopes shall be sealed with gummed tape and the Agent's initials and date placed across the seal.
- 6.15 The individual glassine envelopes, packets, and other items shall be placed in an appropriate sized evidence envelope. The case number shall be indicated on the envelope.
- 6.16 When U.S. Currency or other valuable property is seized as evidence or impounded, the arresting officer shall prepare and sign a receipt for the property which shall be given to the prisoner. If possible, it shall also be signed by a prisoner and a witness. When currency is seized, it shall be immediately counted in the presence of the prisoner and at least one witness. The denomination and serial and series number of each bill shall be listed on the receipt.

7.0 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

- 7.1 An Agent who wishes to use a person as confidential informant shall first obtain permission of his Supervisor. If the prospective informer is a defendant in a criminal case, the Supervisor shall obtain permission from the States Attorney concerned, and the defendant's legal counsel.
- 7.2 The Commanding Officer shall maintain the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX, which shall contain the individual's name, C.S.B.I. number, aliases, address, date of birth, physical description, and associates. Each card will be numbered; and thereafter, the individual will be referred to by that number in case reports or other correspondence. The information will be considered confidential and will not be released to any persons outside the Regional Crime Squad office. With the authority of the Commanding Officer, information may be released to other enforcement agencies who are then working on related cases but only when necessary for effective enforcement.
- 7.3 The Commanding Officer shall further maintain in the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX the date of each case the individual worked on, the case number, and the amount the individual was paid. The confidential informant's reliability will also be maintained on his index card.
- 7.4 All confidential informants shall be interviewed by the Supervisor before being allowed to work with an undercover Agent. The interview will determine the advisability of working with the individual. The interview date and name of the interviewer should be entered on the confidential informant card.
- 7.5 Confidential informants shall not be introduced to more than a minimum number of undercover Agents. Care shall be taken to insure that confidential informants gain as little information about the undercover Agent as possible. They shall not be given complete names of undercover Agents, or home telephone numbers or addresses. All contact by individuals shall be through Regional Crime Squad telephones and not home phones (exceptions may be made in cases where need is clearly warranted).
- 7.6 No Regional Crime Squad Agent shall socialize with any violator individual or any individual that is not of known good character. Association with confidential informants shall be kept to a minimum and only when necessary for effective police procedures.
- 7.7 Confidential informants are not to report to Regional Crime Squad offices.
- 7.8 If a confidential informant is unsatisfactory for any reason, was of no value, or gave false or misleading information, the Agent shall submit a report in writing to the Commanding Officer specifically stating why the individual has proved unsatisfactory. An unsatisfactory informer is one who:
 - a. fails to keep appointments
 - b. does not give reliable information
 - c. does not give information on narcotic trade at the level of which he has knowledge
 - d. is unsatisfactory for any other reason (must be stated)
- 7.9 A check shall be made of the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX before using the services of any person.

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

- 7.10 When using a confidential informant and funds are paid out to same, the Agent will obtain a receipt from the individual which will include the following:
- a. amount paid
 - b. date
 - c. confidential informant code number and case number
 - d. signature of Agent
 - e. signature of Superior Officer
 - f. confidential informant's signature
- 7.11 This receipt will consist of an original and one copy; the original to be attached to the agent's daily activity report, be placed in the confidential informant's confidential file.
- 7.12 An entry for the amount of payment shall be posted in the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT PAYMENT JOURNAL indicating the date, informant code number, case number, the amount, the Agent involved, and the fact that a receipt was obtained. An entry shall be posted in the AGENT CASH EXPENSE JOURNAL indicating the date, amount, and case number. An entry shall be made to the CASE LOG indicating the informant code number and the amount for the case number.
- 7.13 Before a confidential informant is permitted to purchase evidence, he must be identified and assigned a code number. He must be thoroughly searched and kept under surveillance to the extent practical before he meets with the suspect from whom he is to purchase evidence. He must again be searched upon his return. Under no circumstances may a confidential informant retain for himself any of the evidence he is instructed to purchase with confidential expenditure funds.
- 7.14 Each confidential informant who, by prior arrangement, purchases evidence with confidential expenditure funds must sign a statement which accurately describes the circumstances surrounding the purchases he made. This statement will include the date, time, and location of the transaction and the description of the defendants.
- 7.15 Whenever it becomes necessary or desirable to protect the identity of the confidential informant and the Agent is not able to make the initial purchase of drugs, it will be permissible to make an "Informant Buy" as outlined in 7.13 and 7.14 above. The first "buy" may then be followed by an undercover Agent purchase based on the information or introduction gained during the time of the first "informant buy". With the knowledge and cooperation of the prosecutor or States Attorney, arrest and prosecution may then proceed on the Agent's buy only. In this manner, the testimony of the cooperating individual will not be necessary and his identity will be protected.

8.0 CODE OF CONDUCT

- 8.1 No member of the Regional Crime Squads shall deliver public addresses, or disseminate written material concerning the work of the Regional Crime Squad or, under any circumstances, make statements for publication concerning the plans, policies, or affairs of the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee, unless duly authorized to do so by the Executive Director.
- 8.2 Members shall not destructively criticize the Squads, S.E.C.C., or its policies, programs, actions, or officers, or make any written or oral statements which tend to bring them into dispute or ridicule, or which tend to interfere with reasonable procedures, supervision or discipline of the Squad.
- 8.3 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall relay any information which may enable persons guilty of any criminal or quasi-criminal act to escape arrest or punishment, or which may permit such persons to dispose of or secret any money, goods, or other valuables unlawfully obtained.
- 8.4 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall recommend to any person the employment of any specific attorney or bondsman with the intent of aiding in the defense or obtaining the release of any prisoner on bond.
- 8.5 Members of the Regional Crime Squad concerned in all cases before the courts shall be punctual in attendance and shall appear neatly attired in civilian clothes. Squad members shall testify with strictest accuracy, confining themselves to cases before the court, and neither suppress nor overstate the slightest circumstance with the intent of favoring or discrediting any person.
- 8.6 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not make any promises or guarantees to either defendants or informants.
- 8.7 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall apply for or execute any warrant without the knowledge and approval of a Superior Officer.
- 8.8 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall complete and submit all required written reports from the previous day's activity prior to starting a new working day unless express permission to do otherwise is granted by a Superior Officer.
- 8.9 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall leave his respective region to conduct any investigation or to perform any act within the purview of his duties, without the express permission of a Superior Officer, except when in pursuit of a fugitive, criminal, or suspected criminal, who is part of an on-going investigation.
- 8.10 Every Agent shall, without unnecessary delay, transmit to his Superior Officer any information concerning serious crimes, or information or requests received from other enforcement agencies, or significant information received from informants.
- 8.11 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not attend to personal business while on duty.
- 8.12 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall drink any intoxicating beverage while on duty except under circumstances when not to drink intoxicants would jeopardize the performance of an assigned police duty.

CODE OF CONDUCT

- 8.13 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall use, consume or administer to himself or any other person any narcotic or dangerous drug unless under the supervision and/or authority of a medical doctor.
- 8.14 Members shall treat the official business of the Squad as confidential and shall not impart it to anyone, except those for whom it is intended. They shall not make known to any person, whether or not a member of the Squad, any special or confidential order which they may receive, unless required by the nature of the order.
- 8.15 Members of the Regional Crime Squad are forbidden, at any time, to be notoriously intoxicated, disorderly, or act in a manner not becoming to a police officer.
- 8.16 No member of the Regional Crime Squad, while on duty, shall enter a place where intoxicating liquor is sold, furnished, or manufactured, or house of ill repute or gambling establishment, except in the performance of duty. If it shall become necessary for a Squad Agent to enter any such place for police reasons, he shall, as soon as possible, notify his Superior Officer of the facts.
- 8.17 Members shall not receive any article whatsoever as a gift or as the result of purchase or trade, from suspects, prisoners, persons recently arrested, or known gamblers, prostitutes or other persons of bad character or ill repute, or other persons whose vocations may profit from information obtained from the police.
- 8.18 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not engage in sexual relations with either defendants or confidential informants. Such relations will result in the squad member's immediate dismissal from the Regional Crime Squad.
- 8.19 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not be operatives of, or receive any funds from any private investigative or security agency, nor shall the Squad or any of its members contract with any private investigative or security agency.
- 8.20 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall not rent or purchase for use any electronic, mechanical or other device for surveillance purposes that is in violation of the provisions of TITLE III, P.L. 90-351, as amended, and applicable state statute, relating to wire tapping and surveillance.
- 8.21 When members of the Regional Crime Squad use electronic surveillance equipment, the following conditions must be met:
- a. prior written permission from the Squad Commander
 - b. limited to:
 1. provisions of TITLE III, P.L. 90-351
 2. applicable state statute
 3. protection of the wearer
 4. corroboration purposes
 - c. all tapes must be treated as evidence and remain on file until the case has been adjudicated and all appeal dates have expired
 - d. use must be recorded in log book showing date, time and case number

CODE OF CONDUCT

- 8.22 All members of the Squad shall be subject to and shall obey all rules and regulations, orders, instructions, or requirements, whether emanating from the Standard Operating Procedures, or S.E.C.C., or the Supervisory Board.
- 8.23 These Standard Operating Procedures are a basis for action and are not meant to be all-inclusive. No member of the Regional Crime Squad will be excused from action in accordance with sound judgement merely because the situation is not covered by a rule.

9.0 EXPENDITURES

9.1 Funds shall be advanced to the Squad by deposits to a checking account held in the name of the Squad.

9.2 The Squad Commander will be responsible for the safekeeping of all expenditure funds under his control; he will be bonded for the maximum amount of funds under his control for any single period in time.

9.3 Cash drawdowns for expenses shall be made with a check signed on both sides by the Squad Commander or Supervisor and presented by him to the bank. The checking account monthly statement shall be reconciled with the checkbook and the CASH ON HAND JOURNAL at the end of each month.

9.4 The Squad Commander will be responsible for maintaining six separate accounting records. The records will be balanced at the end of each month and a monthly summary report will be submitted to the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.

9.5 The following accounting records shall be maintained:

1. Cash in bank
2. Agent's log
3. Safe log
4. Daily expenditure summary worksheet
5. Cash on hand
6. Monthly expenditure summary

9.6 The accounting records will be maintained in accordance with procedures outlined below.

1. Cash in bank. All funds transferred or deposited into the Squad bank account and all drawdowns or transfers out made against the account are posted here. An up-to-date bank balance is kept on a current basis.
2. Agent's log. A separate log will be maintained for each agent. Daily entries will be made for each agent based on information from the Daily Activity Reports. Each line of entries represents one case. Use separate columns provided for each category of expenditures and add across each line to be sure that the individual entries for each column equal the amount recorded in the total expenditures columns. Obtain daily totals for each column and compute a new end-of-day on hand balance. Total expenditures for each agent for the day must equal total expenditures claimed on the Daily Activity Report. Totals of each column for the day are recorded on the Daily Expenditures Summary Worksheet.
3. Safe log. All funds drawn down from the bank, all advances to agents and other minor expenditures are recorded here. This log also records the Commander's signature authorizing an advance and the agent's signature indicating receipt

of the advance. One line is used for each transaction. Daily totals are computed for all columns. The "NET" column consists of deposits less advances. Column totals are posted to the Daily Expenditure Summary Worksheet as follows:

<u>SAFE LOG COL.</u>	<u>POST TO</u>	<u>WORKSHEET COL.</u>
Cash In Safe - Begin	-	Cash On Hand - Begin
Net	-	Advances
Other Expenditures	-	Total Expenditures
Other Expenditures	-	Other
Cash In Safe - End	-	Cash On Hand - End

4. Daily expenditure summary worksheet. Each agent's daily expenditures in total and by category are taken from the agent's log and recorded on this summary worksheet. One line is used for each agent and one line for the safe. Daily totals of expenditures for the entire Squad are computed for all columns and then posted to the Cash On Hand Book.
5. Cash on hand. Total squad expenditures are posted daily to the Cash on hand book. One line is used for each day. Weekly and monthly totals of each column are computed and used in preparing the Monthly expenditure summary.
6. Monthly expenditure summary. Each month Squad expenditures by category and in total are posted from the Cash on hand book to the Monthly expenditure summary.
- 9.7 The Daily activity report of each Squad agent shall list the balance of prior funds advances, funds advanced for the day, and an itemization of all expenses incurred for the day. All expenses will be approved and verified by a Superior Officer and shall then be posted to the Agent's log. All Daily activity reports are to be signed by the agent and the Commander or in his absence the Field Supervisor.
- 9.8 The Daily activity report shall serve as an official record of all advanced funds to personnel and their cash on hand balance.
- 9.9 Allowable expenses shall include purchase of evidence and information, per diem expenses of personnel, rental of vehicles, rooms, and equipment as required, consumable office supplies, and other such investigative expenses which may be necessary.
- 9.10 All cash drawdowns by the Squad shall be deposited in a suitable locked safe in the Squad office. The Safe log shall accurately reflect the balance of cash in the safe at all times.
- 9.11 A trial balance of all accounting records shall be conducted on a weekly basis.
- 9.12 Prior to termination of an agent's tour of duty with the Squad, there shall be a reconciliation of his accounting records.
- 9.13 All payments from the confidential expenditures account must be

authorized by the Squad Commander or his designee. All payments in excess of \$500 must be approved by the Executive Director of SECC or his designee. The serial numbers of all U.S. currency used in confidential expenditures will be recorded and placed in the Case file in such circumstances.

- 9.14 Accounts for purchases of evidence, or confidential information and/or services, must be kept separate from accounts for expenses incurred by Agents participating in the investigation.

9.15 The following Purchasing Process shall be followed by all Squads and by SECC.

1. All Squad expenses other than those related to the purchase of evidence and information or consumable office supplies shall be submitted to SECC for payment on an authorized voucher. In requesting payment for an item purchased by the squad and under \$100, the Squad shall complete the following information on the voucher.

- * Vendor No. (if known)
- * Crime Squad name
- * Vendor name
- * Purpose of request
- * Received by
- * Date received
- * Budget category
- * Dollar amount
- * Signature of Squad commander

2. For items purchased by SECC for the Squad and for items exceeding \$100 the following procedures are in effect:

A. PURCHASE REQUISITION

1. All purchases of consumable supplies, goods and equipment to be made for the Squad by SECC will require the submission by the Squad to SECC of a voucher indicating
 - * Crime Squad name
 - * Purpose of request
 - * Requisitioned by and date
 - * Squad commander's signature
2. Routine vehicle maintenance is excluded from the purchase requisition requirement, but an invoice and voucher must be submitted for vendor payment.
3. Major vehicle maintenance or repair will require the submission by the Squad to SECC of a voucher indicating the above listed requisition information.
4. A copy of the voucher form will be retained for the Squad files and the original sent to SECC for further action and processing.

B. QUOTATION REQUESTS

1. All purchase requisitions for items exceeding \$100 will require a request for quotation by SECC of prices from at least three (3) vendors. Where formal written

competitive bids are not obtained, written documentation of three verbal quotations is necessary - see below.

2. Purchase of routine consumable supplies from a regularly utilized vendor do not require a request for quotation if items are under \$100.
3. The written quotations shall be obtained by SECC on a Request for Quotation form which shall indicate the quantity, unit number, description of item, list price, discounts, trade-ins, net price, total price, terms of payment, shipping terms, vendor name and address, and date of quotation.
4. Quotations shall be filed by SECC.

C. QUOTATION/BID TABULATION

1. All written quotations and bids received from vendors shall be recorded by SECC on a Summary of Quotations form which facilitates comparison of vendors by items, quantity and unit price.
2. Where verbal quotations are obtained, they shall be documented on a Summary of Quotations form which shall indicate the vendor name, date of quotation, description of items, dollar bid verbally received and signature of person receiving the quotation information. An authorized signature indicating approval of vendor and bid chosen is also recorded here. The lowest bid must be chosen unless highly unusual circumstances are involved such as quotes for essentially non-comparable quality items. In such a case, a detailed explanation must accompany the chosen bid presenting the reasons for choosing other than the lowest bid.
3. Purchase Orders shall be issued for all items exceeding \$100 to the lowest responsible bidder or quotation, taking into consideration quality, time of performance, and probability of performance.
4. The Summary of Quotations form shall be filed by SECC along with all other documentation with the voucher requisition.

D. PURCHASE ORDERS

1. Upon approval by SECC of a Squad's requisition for goods, a purchase order shall be issued to the selected vendor, following the prescribed process for vendor selection.
2. The Purchase Order shall contain specific information on goods and instruct the vendor to deliver the goods to the Squad.

3. A proper invoice shall accompany the goods upon delivery.

E. REPORT OF GOODS RECEIVED

1. Notification of receipt of goods shall be supplied to SECC by the Squad upon receipt of a delivery. This may be accomplished either by signing the "Received by" and "Date" line on the voucher before sending it to SECC or by signing and dating a vendor receiving slip and forwarding it to SECC.
2. The Notification of receipt shall indicate the date of receipt of delivery, the quantity, description, and condition of the commodities received (if other than acceptable conditions).
3. The Squad shall retain a copy of the voucher indicating receipt or the receiving slip for their files.
4. The Notification of receipt of goods shall be retained by SECC and filed with the voucher package.

F. VOUCHER

1. The invoice if received by the Squad shall be forwarded to SECC for payment with a voucher.
2. The voucher shall not be approved by SECC for payment until the "Received by" and "Date" lines have been completed or until a signed receiving slip has been obtained from the Squad.
3. The voucher shall include information from the invoice.
4. The appropriate budget category and total dollar amount for that category shall be indicated on the voucher. This information should be entered onto the voucher by the Squad and verified by SECC.
5. The voucher and invoice shall be retained by SECC and filed with the voucher package.

G. ACCOUNTS PAYABLE

1. Upon approval of the voucher by SECC, the voucher shall be submitted to accounts payable for vendor payment.
2. The accounts payable statement (part of the carbon copy of the computerized check) shall indicate the vendor name and number, the invoice date and number, and amount paid.
3. The accounts payable statement shall be attached to the voucher and filed.
4. The Squad shall monthly receive from SECC a listing of all accounts payable by vendor and amount.

10.0 FIREARMS

- 10.1 Agents may carry weapons in the performance of their duties provided that 1) the weapon type and caliber have been approved for his use by his Chief of Police, the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee, and the Squad Commander, 2) the Agent has qualified with the weapon in an approved police firearms training course, and 3) the weapon has been inspected and approved for use by a qualified ballistics examiner or inspector.
- 10.2 Sidearms shall remain holstered at all times, except when necessary to remove them for the purpose of emergency use in the line of duty, for cleaning same, for authorized inspections or instructions.
- 10.3 Agents firing a gun accidentally or intentionally, except on a target range, shall report the circumstances to their Supervising Officer immediately and shall file a written report of the incident within 24 hours.
- 10.4 Agents shall not discharge firearms in the performance of their police duties except:
- a. for target practice
 - b. to defend himself from death or serious injury
 - c. to defend another person unlawfully attacked from death or serious injury
 - d. to effect the arrest or to prevent the escape, when other means are insufficient, of a convicted felon or of a person who has committed a felony
- 10.5 When not being worn by undercover Agents, weapons shall not be left in areas where they may be exposed to or come into the possession of other police officers who may have stopped the undercover Agent for a routine check.
- 10.6 In all other situations and circumstances personnel shall follow the directives of their police departments pertaining to the possession and use of firearms.

11.0 PROPERTY

- 11.1 Members of the Regional Crime Squad shall be responsible for the care of the Squad's property assigned to their use or keeping, and shall promptly report to their Commanding Officer the loss of or damage to any such property.
- 11.2 The furniture, files, and other equipment of the Squad in the Squad offices shall remain there and not be moved without the approval of the Executive Director of SECC.
- 11.3 The loaning of any equipment to other enforcement agencies shall be recorded in the AGENCY ASSISTANCE FILE with the date and operating condition of the equipment and with approval of the Squad Commander. Other enforcement agencies will be made aware that they will be responsible for repairing or replacing any equipment damaged or lost while on loan. The date of return and the condition of the equipment will also be recorded in the AGENCY ASSISTANCE FILE. A receipt shall be obtained from the borrowing party.
- 11.4 Each member of the Regional Crime Squad who is the operator of any motor vehicle shall, at all times, exercise the best of judgement and care with due regard for the safety of life and property.
- 11.5 All motor vehicles used by the Regional Crime Squad in the performance of their duties shall be registered and insured by SECC; a suppressed registration shall be obtained by SECC from the Department of Motor Vehicles for the protection of Squad personnel.
- 11.6 Any member of the Regional Crime Squad who is involved in a motor vehicle accident while on duty shall provide the police officer at the accident scene the true registration of the motor vehicle.
- 11.7 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall operate a motor vehicle of the Regional Crime Squad for purposes other than the conduct of his official business on a tour of duty or travel to and from a tour of duty.
- 11.8 Major repairs of Squad motor vehicles other than normal and routine maintenance and servicing of the vehicle shall be approved by the Executive Director of SECC.
- 11.9 No member of the Regional Crime Squad shall purchase or commit the squad or SECC to purchase in any manner whatsoever, services, supplies, or other items of equipment needed for the squad unless such purchase has first been properly authorized.
- 11.10 Any member who willfully or negligently loses, damages, or destroys Squad property shall pay the cost of repair or replacement. Strict economy shall be observed in the use of fuel and supplies and Squad property shall be neither wasted nor destroyed.
- 11.11 The Squad office shall be situated so as to provide maximum protection for property and the office shall have installed an electronic security system for detection of unauthorized entry into the premises.

- 11.12 Fixed assets include all tangible property with a useful life of three (3) years or more. For SECC and Squad purposes only, property with a cost of \$25.00 or more will be considered a fixed asset.
- 11.13 All fixed assets which SECC and each Crime Squad has must be tagged. The tags are to be consecutively numbered.
- 11.14 All fixed assets are to be recorded in the Fixed Asset Log Book. Record in the Log Book the vendor's name, purchase date, check number (if the asset was purchased for cash), and amount of the check or the fair market value of the asset if it was donated. Also record a description of the fixed asset and a serial number if applicable, the source of funds used for purchasing the asset and the tag number. Finally, under the last column labeled "Disposition", record the exchange, transfer or sale of the asset, the date and person who authorized its disposal.
- 11.15 Disposal, sale, transfer or exchange of fixed assets must be approved by the Executive Director of SECC. Such approval must be in writing and be kept with SECC and the Squad's permanent correspondence.
- 11.16 Fixed assets purchased or acquired by other means prior to instituting this new accounting system must also be recorded in the Log Book.
- 11.17 All fixed assets purchased wholly or partially with federal funds belongs wholly or partially to the Federal Government and must therefore be properly tagged. Federal Assets will not be sold, traded or disposed of until so advised by SECC in writing.
- 11.18 A yearly physical inventory will be taken of all fixed assets at each squad and at SECC.

12.0 SECRETARIES

- 12.1 Secretaries shall be employed by SECC to assist the Squads in the performance of their duties.
- 12.2 Secretaries shall adhere to the personnel policies established by SECC as to working hours, sick and vacation leave, holidays, and other leave time.
- 12.3 Secretaries shall work under the immediate direction and supervision of the Squad Commander and Supervisor.
- 12.4 Secretaries shall be responsible for preparation and maintenance of reports and records of the Squad, and other such reports as may be designated by the Squad Commander.
- 12.5 Secretaries' duties shall include typing of reports and affidavits; assisting in maintenance of accounting records; receiving and distributing incoming and outgoing mail; acting as receptionist and answering telephone; arranging, compiling and tabulating data; preparing invoices for voucher payment; operating office machines.
- 12.6 Secretaries shall obey all rules contained in Section 8.0, Code of Conduct, which pertain to the conduct of themselves and their business in the interest of maintaining the confidentiality of the activities of the Regional Crime Squad.
- 12.7 A time sheet listing the hours worked for each day shall be submitted to SECC by the Squad Commander at the end of each week.
- 12.8 Requests for leave time shall be made by Secretaries to the Squad Commander and be approved by him and SECC.

13.0 RECORDS AND REPORTS

In addition to the accounting records (section 9.0) the following records, files, and forms shall be maintained by the Regional Crime Squad.

- 13.1 CASE LOG BOOK in which all pertinent controlling and management information shall be recorded concerning investigations undertaken by the Squad. The CASE LOG BOOK should contain these entries: case number, defendant name & address, buy number, date, item purchased or activity, quantity, purchase price, location, results of field test, date taken to lab, by whom taken, lab number, lab results, informant code number and payment amount, name of buy and cover agents, completion of case reports and affidavits, date of warrant and arrest, photograph and summary criminal history of defendant, date of arrest worksheet return, and disposition of the case in court.
- 13.2 CASE FILE in which case reports, affidavits, lab reports and receipts, arrest worksheets, photographs and summary criminal histories shall be placed for each case. Case documents should be contained in a file folder and filed consecutively for each calendar year.
- 13.3 DEFENDANT INDEX shall contain a list of all persons for whom squad investigations were completed or initiated. The following entries shall be made for each defendant: name, aliases, CSBI number, date of birth, address, physical description of vehicles operated by defendant, drugs sold or used, case number, purchase amount and price, date and location of purchase, name of investigating agent. Upon arrest of a subject, a copy of the DEFENDANT INDEX CARD shall be provided to SECC.
- 13.4 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT INDEX shall contain a list of all persons to whom confidential funds were paid for information or services. A code number shall be assigned to each confidential informant. The date and amount of payment, case number, known reliability of the subject, interview date, and the same descriptive information of Section 13.3 shall be entered. Also a copy of the informant's signature (taken from the first signed receipt obtained from the informant) is to be affixed to the Informant Index Card.
- 13.5 AGENCY ASSISTANCE FILE shall contain all confidential information disseminated to police departments and law enforcement agencies. The amount of time and cases investigated in each town in the Squad region for the month.
- 13.6 AGENT INDEX shall contain a list of all active and non-active Squad personnel. The tour of duty dates with the squad, police department, and daily activity reports of each Agent shall be placed in a file folder.

- 13.7 TELEPHONE INDEX shall contain a listing of all telephone numbers obtained in the course of investigation.
- 13.8 AGENT TIMESHEETS shall contain the duty hours worked by personnel for each working day.
- 13.9 DAILY ACTIVITY REPORTS shall be completed by each Agent prior to the commencement of a new working date. The DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT shall contain the Agent's name, date, hours worked, towns worked and time spent in them, amount of funds advanced and cash on hand balance, itemized list of expenditures, a narrative chronological account of activity and new intelligence and information gathered, Agent's signature. The DAILY ACTIVITY REPORT shall be approved and signed by a Superior Officer.
- 13.10 CASE REPORTS shall be completed for each investigation of the Squad by the investigating Agents. The CASE REPORT shall contain the case number, investigating Agent's name, date of report, nature of the case, Connecticut General Statute number; location, town, date and time of crime; subject's name, aliases, address, date of birth, physical description, and vehicle description; means used to identify subject; description of purchased evidence for quantitative analysis. A signed narrative chronological report of the investigating Agent shall follow this information and shall be approved by a Superior Officer.
- 13.11 ARREST WORKSHEETS shall be attached to all arrest warrants, listing pertinent information of the case report to assist police departments in locating and apprehending the subject. The Squad Commander shall request that the police department return the ARREST WORKSHEET indicating the date and place of arrest, arresting officers, any evidence seized and other pertinent information.
- 13.12 WEEKLY ACTIVITY REPORT shall be completed by the Squad Commander and submitted to SECC. The report shall list all Squad activity for the week including case numbers, defendant names, towns, type of evidence, quantity and purchase price, projected arrest dates, and problems encountered.
- 13.13 WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT shall be completed by the Supervisor and submitted to SECC. The report shall contain an analysis of cases being made and their interrelationship, the identification of major target areas and violators, and an analysis of trends and patterns in the Squad region.

APPENDIX F
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- Task Force Report, Narcotics and Drug Abuse, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office.
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To help LEAA better evaluate the usefulness of Prescriptive Packages, the reader is requested to answer and return the following questions.

1. What is your general reaction to this Prescriptive Package?
 Excellent Above Average Average Poor Useless
2. Does this package represent best available knowledge and experience?
 No better single document available
 Excellent, but some changes required (please comment)
 Satisfactory, but changes required (please comment)
 Does not represent best knowledge or experience (please comment)

3. To what extent do you see the package as being useful in terms of:
 (check one box on each line)

	Highly Useful	Of Some Use	Not Useful
Modifying existing projects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Training personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Administering on-going projects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Providing new or important information	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Developing or implementing new projects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. To what specific use, if any, have you put or do you plan to put this particular package?
 Modifying existing projects Training personnel
 Administering on-going projects Developing or implementing new projects
 Others:

5. In what ways, if any, could the package be improved: (please specify), e.g. structure/organization; content/coverage; objectivity; writing style; other)

6. Do you feel that further training or technical assistance is needed and desired on this topic? If so, please specify needs.

7. In what other specific areas of the criminal justice system do you think a Prescriptive Package is most needed?

8. How did this package come to your attention? (check one or more)
 LEAA mailing of package Your organization's library
 Contact with LEAA staff National Criminal Justice Reference Service
 LEAA Newsletter
 Other (please specify)

(CUT ALONG THIS LINE)

9. Check ONE item below which best describes your affiliation with law enforcement or criminal justice. If the item checked has an asterisk (*), please also check the related level, i.e.

- | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Headquarters, LEAA | <input type="checkbox"/> Police * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> LEAA Regional Office | <input type="checkbox"/> Court * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State Planning Agency | <input type="checkbox"/> Correctional Agency * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Regional SPA Office | <input type="checkbox"/> Legislative Body * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> College/University | <input type="checkbox"/> Other Government Agency * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Commercial/Industrial Firm | <input type="checkbox"/> Professional Association * | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Citizen Group | <input type="checkbox"/> Crime Prevention Group * | | |

10. Your Name _____
Your Position _____
Organization or Agency _____
Address _____

Telephone Number _____ Area Code: _____ Number: _____
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11. If you are not currently registered with NCJRS and would like to be placed on their mailing list, check here.

END