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ABSTRACT

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHANGES  
ACCOMPANYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A  
COMMUNITY-BASED, PARTICIPATORY  
TEAM POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

By

John E. Angell

This exploratory research examined the attitudes of (1) citizens, (2) police clientele, and (3) police in an area where a decentralized, participatory (collegial) Team Police operation was implemented, and compared these attitudes with those in a similar neighborhood policed by a Classical organizational structure and traditional procedures.

The Team Police Model of this study consisted basically of 15 generalist police officers who, with the participation of local citizens, were responsible for defining police goals, priorities and procedures and providing all police services in a precisely defined, low-economic, minority, residential area of Holyoke, Massachusetts for a test period of approximately nine months. The Team used collegial methods for decision

John E. Angell

making and task forces for performing management functions. The Team followed a "service", rather than "law enforcement" operational philosophy.

The control neighborhood was policed by an organization arrangement which was in general consistent with Classical tenets as stated by Max Weber. A traditional "law enforcement" philosophy was used in the Classical neighborhood.

The basic assumption underlying this study was police effectiveness in crime prevention and order maintenance is dependent on a supportive public. The primary problem researched was whether public and clientele attitudes toward the police were more supportive in the Team Police than a Classical Police area. Of secondary concern was the impact of the Team Police experiment on police officers attitudes.

The data for the study was obtained by specially prepared questionnaires and standardized personality tests administered to "experimental" and "control" samples. Pre and post-test administrations with citizens and police officers were accomplished. Police clients received only post tests.

Among the findings and conclusions related to the general research questions were the following:

1. The attitudes of citizens in the Team neighborhood tended to be more favorable toward the Team Police than were those of citizens in the Classically Policed neighborhood toward their police.
2. Citizen attitudes toward Team Police officers tended to either remain stable or change in a positive (supportive) direction between the pre and post-tests.
3. Citizen attitudes toward Classical police either remained stable or changed in a negative direction.
4. The attitudes of police clientele in the Team Police neighborhood tended to be more favorable toward the Team Police than were the attitudes of clientele, who received services from Classically organized police, toward their officers.
5. As a result of the police attention they received, police clients who received services from Team police officers reported only positive attitude changes, whereas clients in the Classical neighborhood reported both positive and negative changes.
6. Team Police officers (volunteers) reported a preference for involving themselves in a wider range of activities than did police officers in the Classical area.
7. Team Police officers reported a preference to use less formal methods than arrest or standard operating procedures for resolving clientele problems than did police officers in the Classical area.
8. Ethnocentrism scores indicated Team Police

officers were significantly less prejudiced than police officers in the Classically organized area.

9. Although Team Police officers' scores tended to reflect lower authoritarianism, more tolerance for ambiguity, and more flexibility, the difference between Team Police and Classical Police mean scores were not significant at a  $p < .05$ .

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be derived from this study is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the collegial Team Police Model as implemented in this project did not have a negative impact on any variable investigated. The positive impact of the project on most variables supports the value of further research with a community-based, collegial team organizational structure for police services.

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OF CHANGES ACCOMPANYING THE IMPLEMENTATION  
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In fact, several of the above mentioned people may not support the opinions I express in this study.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . .	iii
LIST OF TABLES. . . . .	vi
Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . .	1
The Problem . . . . .	2
Purpose of Study . . . . .	6
Methods of Study . . . . .	7
Limitations of Study . . . . .	8
Definition of Terms . . . . .	9
Organization of Study. . . . .	12
Footnotes -- Chapter I . . . . .	14
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . .	17
General Criticisms of Bureaucratic Theory. . . . .	19
Criticisms of Police Application of Classical Theory . . . . .	22
Bureaucracy and Police Community Relations. . . . .	24
Bureaucracy and Police Attitudes and Behavior. . . . .	27
Police Modifications in Bureaucratic Model . . . . .	32
Aberdeen Team Police . . . . .	34
Salford Team Police . . . . .	36
Tucson Fluid Patrol . . . . .	40
President's Commission Report . . . . .	43
Richmond Team Patrol System. . . . .	44
Syracuse Crime Control Team. . . . .	46
Issue of Community Control . . . . .	50

Chapter	Page
II. continued	
Dutch Neighborhood Policing. . . . .	53
British Unit Beat Policing . . . . .	56
Detroit Beat Commander . . . . .	60
Democratic Team Police Model . . . . .	66
Dayton Community Centered Team Police. . . . .	70
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	73
III. DESIGN OF STUDY . . . . .	86
Description of Holyoke Democratic Team Approach. . . . .	92
Research Questions and Hypotheses . . . . .	94
Citizen Attitudes Toward the Police . . . . .	94
Clientele Attitudes Toward the Police. . . . .	95
Police Officer Attitudes . . . . .	96
Research Design . . . . .	96
Citizen Attitudes . . . . .	99
Clientele Attitudes. . . . .	101
Officer Attitudes . . . . .	102
Conclusions . . . . .	103
Footnotes -- Chapter II . . . . .	104
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS . . . . .	105
Team Selection . . . . .	105
Team Training. . . . .	107
Team Self-Organization. . . . .	109
Citizen and Clientele Pre-test Problems . . . . .	114
Team Implementation. . . . .	115
Administrative and Political Environment . . . . .	123
Citizen Attitude Results . . . . .	128
Clientele Attitude Results . . . . .	148
Police Officer Attitude Results. . . . .	159
Conclusion. . . . .	170

Chapter	Page
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	171
Background of Study. . . . .	171
Summary of Research Design and Problems . . . . .	172
Problems Encountered in Implementing Research . . . . .	173
Conclusions About Research Problems . . . . .	174
Findings and Conclusions: . . . . .	175
Citizen Attitudes . . . . .	176
Clientele Attitudes. . . . .	178
Police Attitudes. . . . .	181
Conclusions . . . . .	185
Recommendations . . . . .	187
 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	 193
 APPENDIX . . . . .	 204

## LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
III-1.	Selected Demographic Characteristics of Wards I & II and Holyoke . . . . .	87
III-2.	Research Design Summary . . . . .	97
IV-1.	Modified Research Design Summary . . . . .	116
IV-2.	The Police in Our Ward Like People . . . . .	131
IV-3.	Police in Our Ward Are Polite . . . . .	133
IV-4.	Police in My Ward Tend to "Look Down" on People. . . . .	135
IV-5.	Police in My Ward Are Anxious to Help People . . . . .	138
IV-6.	Police in My Ward Do Not Use More Force Than They Have To . . . . .	140
IV-7.	The Police in Our Ward Get a Lot of Help from Citizens . . . . .	142
IV-8.	The Police in Our Ward Are Honest. . . . .	144
IV-9.	The Police in Our Ward Are Better Than Police in Other Wards . . . . .	146
IV-10.	Estimated Response Time . . . . .	150
IV-11.	What Was Officer Attitude . . . . .	153

List of Tables.--Cont.

Table	Page
IV-12. How Would You Characterize the Treatment You Received from the Police? . . . . .	154
IV-13. Clients' Attitudes Toward Police Officers Before * After Police Service . . . . .	156
IV-14. Clients' Attitudes Toward Overall Quality of Service Rendered by Police . . . . .	158
IV-15. Police Activity Preference . . . . .	161
IV-16. Police Formalism Preference . . . . .	163
IV-17. General Authoritarian . . . . .	164
IV-18. Ethnocentrism. . . . .	166
IV-19. Intolerance of Ambiguity . . . . .	168
IV-20. Rigidity . . . . .	169
V-1. Summary of Comparison of Citizen Attitudes . . . . .	176
V-2. Summary of Comparison of Clientele Attitudes . . . . .	180
V-3. Summary of Police Test Comparisons. . . . .	182

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

During the past century changes in society have been both rapid and extensive. They range from technological developments such as the automobile and electronic data processing to modifications of values concerning "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong."

In the area of social relations, some scholars have expressed a belief that changes have been and are in the direction of democratization.<sup>1</sup> They claim the changing environment of organizations from competitive to interdependent, stable to turbulent, and simple to complex ensure the inevitability of organizational designs more conducive to democracy.<sup>2</sup> The consequences predicted for organizations which resist internal democratization include high employee cynicism, low productivity, organizational ineffectiveness and possible organizational death.<sup>3</sup>

Although the validity of such observations and contentions still lacks conformation, organizations

throughout the United States and the world have undergone extensive democratization in recent years.<sup>4</sup> Some school systems have been redesigned to facilitate increased student, teacher, and citizen influence. A number of manufacturing concerns such as General Motors and Texas Instruments have undergone organizational changes which give employees greater influence and decision making power. Most governmental agencies, including the armed forces, are more open and less autocratic than was formerly the situation. While evaluations of the impact of such democratization on these organizations are far from conclusive, some reports have reflected favorable results.

#### The Problem

As amply illustrated in literature, police agencies in the United States have been ineffective regardless of the criteria used for evaluation.<sup>5</sup> Police contend their major responsibility is to prevent crime, yet the Uniform Crime Reports indicated that reported index crimes increased 157.6% between 1960 and 1973.<sup>6</sup> Police frequently take pride in being responsible for apprehending law violators and providing evidence for

their convictions. However, the police overall clearance rate for reported index crimes in major cities was approximately 21%\* in 1973.

Police effectiveness in maintaining order and protecting constitutional rights is more difficult to assess. However, if one considers the civil disorders in recent years that have occurred at the point of some police intervention and the accounts of police opposition to constitutionally guaranteed rights there is room for reasonable doubt about police effectiveness in these areas.<sup>8</sup>

Some scholars believe that given contemporary attitudes and limitations on governmental agencies, improvements in police effectiveness are directly related to the police ability to secure citizen cooperation. For the past twenty years, Professor Louis Radelet of Michigan State University has contended the effectiveness of police in a democratic society is heavily dependent on police being "... a part of, rather than

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\*If estimated unreported crimes were added to the reported the apprehension rate would drop to approximately 10% since approximately 50% of the major crime goes unreported. In addition, if instead of "clearance rate", one were to consider the true apprehension rate (total crimes/number of apprehensions) the effectiveness of police agencies would appear even worse.

apart from their community." Recently Professor Albert Reiss has been more specific in pointing out "... the capacity of the police to solve crime is severely limited by citizens, partly owing to the fact that there is no feasible way to solve most crimes except by securing the cooperation of citizens to link a person to a crime."<sup>9</sup> If the contentions of these authorities are valid, police organizations should be designed to facilitate communication and cooperation among police officers and citizens. In other words, the structure of a police agency should ensure citizen access and influence in decision making about police goals, procedures, operations, and actions.

In spite of the social changes and tendencies of other social organizations toward more flexible, participatory structures,<sup>10</sup> police agencies have resisted changes which would further democratize their operations.<sup>11</sup> Except for adoption of technology such as radio communications, automobiles, and electronic data processing, there have been few changes in the basic approach to police organization and management since Sir Robert Peel reorganized the London Police in 1829.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to 1970, Holyoke, Massachusetts had severe police and community relations problems in a low economic, minority area of the city.<sup>13</sup> Police officers were reluctant to enter the area except in compliance to a specific dispatch. Citizens in the heavily Puerto Rican area at times would not communicate with police officers and even more frequently they refused to provide information concerning matters of interest to the police. According to police reports, assaults on police officers and resisting arrest incidents in the area were unusually high. Nearly any police attempt to regulate citizens in this area attracted a hostile crowd.

The assumption underlying this study is that a supportive public is essential to maximizing police effectiveness in crime prevention and order maintenance. In Holyoke, the traditional organizational arrangements, based on Classical Theory, did not appear to be effective in reducing tension between police officers and citizens.<sup>14</sup> A community-based, participatory, Democratic Team Police organizational model was developed and funded in an experimental effort to improve police and community relations. The basic problem researched in this study is whether improvements in public attitudes toward the police occurred as a result of this

experiment. Of secondary concern is the impact of this model on selected attitudes of the officers who were part of the Team.

#### Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to investigate changes which occurred after the implementation of a community-based, participatory Democratic Team Police organizational model in Holyoke, and assess the potential value of this arrangement as an alternative to the Classical bureaucratic approach to organizing for the delivery of police services. This study will evaluate three general research questions.

1. What changes in citizen attitudes toward the police appear to occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?
2. What changes in clientele attitudes toward the police appear to occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?
3. What changes in attitudes of police officers appear to occur when these officers are members of a Democratic Team Police arrangement?

The conclusions from this study should provide information concerning the potential value of continued experimentation with participatory team police organizational arrangements. Further, the study should identify organizational changes and research and that might prove

fruitful in the future.

#### Methods of Study

This study involves two similar communities in Holyoke, Massachusetts. The police organization in one of these communities (Ward II) will be maintained as a Classical bureaucracy, while the organizational structure and management procedures of the police in the second community (Ward I) will be changed to a community-based, participatory, Democratic Team Police Model.

Pre and post project data for the evaluation of the experiment will be collected in both areas. The assessment of citizen attitudes will be based on a comparison of answers to structured interviews of citizens selected randomly from both communities. The assessment of police clientele attitudes will be based on a comparison of police clientele responses to a structured questionnaire. Several standardized instruments will be used to obtain information concerning police attitudes in both the experimental and control areas.

In addition, unstructured observations and interviews will be used during the course of the experiment to obtain qualitative and illustrative data to supplement

the quantitative findings.

#### Limitations of Study

This is an exploratory study of an action program. In spite of a need to maintain control over an experiment so as to ensure the integrity of a research design, in action programs decision-making officials frequently place a higher priority on political and administrative considerations than on research.<sup>15</sup> In the final analysis, the research of this study is considered a lower priority by decision makers than the action component of the project. Therefore, the action emphasis of the project may result in a less than perfect implementation of the experimental organization model and the research design.

In addition, the research project is too broad and complex for high confidence levels in statements about precise cause and effect relationships. While it should be possible to make accurate statements about changes which occur as a result of the overall experiment, it will not be possible to identify with confidence the precise variable that produced the change. In addition to the organizational structure itself other

variables that might produce significant changes include special training, increased training, publicity, the "Hawthorne" effect, changes in equipment, use of volunteers, increased support of police by other social service agencies, increased information resources, and increased clerical and para-professional support for the Democratic Team Police Unit.

In respect for these limitations, the interpretation of the results will be highly subjective and tenuous. Any findings should be subjected to more precise and rigorous research before they are accepted as factual. The greatest value of the study may be the identification of areas where further research appears worthwhile.

#### Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this study operational definitions have been developed for a number of terms. The following are the unique definitions of terms which will be used most frequently.

Beat Commander. A form of team police developed by the Detroit Police Department and based on the Unit Beat Police Model. The Beat Commander, a police sergeant, is responsible for organizing and managing police services in a specific

geographic area.<sup>16</sup>

British Team Policing. A decentralized, team organizational plan which was used in Aberdeen, Scotland, and Salford, England, in the late 1940's and 1950's. This approach was discontinued in the early 1960's.<sup>17</sup>

Bureaucrat. An employee of a bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy. An organization based on Classical Theory.<sup>18</sup>

Classical or Bureaucratic Organization Theory. Organizational theory based on an assumption of universally, good characteristics which apparently were first described by Max Weber and further refined by such scholars as Urwick,<sup>19</sup> White,<sup>20</sup> and Wilson.<sup>21</sup> Its basic characteristics are (a) an organization arrangement based on high specialization, (b) a monocratically controlled hierarchy of personnel with authority increasing as closeness to the top decreases, (c) well defined, written functions and procedures which members of the organization must follow, (d) separation of lower levels of organization from politics, and (e) an established career system ranging from a bottom level entry point to the top organizational positions with selection and promotion based on job performance.

Citizen. Any member of the public regardless of nationality who lives in an area served by the specific police under consideration.

Collegial Organization. An organization characterized by group or colleague, as opposed to autocratic, authority and decision making.

Community-based Organization Structure. An organizational design characterized by decentralization of policy and procedure development to a neighborhood level. The operations of the

organization is normally restricted to within defined neighborhood boundaries.

Community Centered Team Police. A form of Team Police based on the Democratic Model as modified by the Dayton, Ohio, Police Department. It differs from the Democratic Model in that it retains formal supervisors with authority to manage the team.<sup>22</sup>

Crime Control Team. A form of team policing developed in Syracuse, New York. It was relieved of community service responsibilities and assigned exclusive responsibility for crime in a well-defined geographic area.<sup>23</sup>

Democratic Team Police. An organizational design (Model) which is characterized by Team Police operations, citizen and police officer participation in the establishment of priorities, operational procedures, and management, and flexible, situational leadership.<sup>24</sup>

Decentralized. Refers to lodging responsibility and authority at a low level in the organization. In this study it is used in reference to authority to make decisions normally about policy, management, procedures and actions of police.

Fluid Patrol. A police patrol strategy developed and first utilized by the Tucson, Arizona, Police Department in an effort to more effectively integrate data processing and personnel to reduce crime. It places the responsibility and authority for shifting patrol officers with crime problem changes on the sergeant. The sergeant has at his disposal increased information and a team of 5 to 8 police patrol officers.<sup>25</sup>

Generalist-Specialist. A police officer who performs all police responsibilities but also

is a highly competent specialist in a single aspect of police work.<sup>26</sup>

Police Client. Any person who seeks service from the police.

Situational Leadership or Supervision. A form of flexible leadership, as opposed to formally appointed permanent leadership, where the leader is designated by his peers for a situation. Normally, a collegial group has the authority to appoint such a leader, formally or by consensus, and the leadership responsibility is flexible enough to facilitate changes as the group needs a leader with different skills or knowledge.

Team Police. Any police organizational design which consists of 6 to 50 officers as a group assigned the responsibility of providing all or nearly all police services in a specifically designated geographic area.

Unit Beat Policing. A form of Team Policing developed in 1965 by the British which consists of two beat constables, an investigator, a motorized beat officer and a collator.<sup>27</sup>

### Organization of Study

The general plan is to present this study in five chapters. Chapter two is a review of the literature related to team police organizations and the reported effects of such organizational design. The third chapter describes the urban environment of the Holyoke Team Police experiment, characteristics of the Democratic Team Police organizational design, specific

hypotheses to be tested, and the research design of the study. Chapter four will both review the implementation of the project and report the research results. The summary, conclusions, and implications for further research appear in the final chapter.

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CHAPTER II  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The structural model most frequently utilized by American police departments is a rational, hierarchical arrangement patterned on the Classical Bureaucratic deial type as promulgated by Max Weber.<sup>1</sup> The most salient characteristics of an organization based on this typology are:<sup>2</sup>

1. A formal structure defined by a hierarchy with centralized authority.
2. A division of labor into functional specialities.
3. Written standardized operating procedures for the conduct of organizational activity.
4. A formally defined career system with a common entry point for employees, career routes which follow the organizational hierarchy, and promotions based on impersonal evaluations of employees by superiors.
5. Management conducted through a formal, monocratic system of routinized superior-subordinate relationships.
6. A system of employee status which is directly related to their positions (jobs) and ranks rather than birthrights or family status.

Proponents of the Classical or Universalist School of Management believe an organization with these characteristics is the most effective possible structure.<sup>3</sup> They believe such an organization design will result in well integrated employee efforts which make a maximum contribution to the achievement of the purposes of the organization. They feel the well-defined, and stable nature of a bureaucratically arranged organization enables employees to concentrate almost exclusively on assigned tasks. They support those aspects of the design that facilitate the impersonal treatment of clients and employees. They view the handling of similar problems in a similar fashion as desirable and fair.

Prescriptive authors of the police field have been among those who have lauded this Bureaucratic approach to organization and afforded it high esteem.<sup>4</sup> However, in recent years an increasing number of people have questioned the utility of this organizational approach for police.<sup>5</sup>

### General Criticisms of Bureaucratic Theory

Criticisms of the Bureaucratic approach to police organization include the general criticisms of Classical Organization Theory as well as some criticisms which are specifically related to problems accompanying the application of Bureaucratic Theory to police operations. Modern literature is filled with general criticisms of bureaucratic theory.<sup>6</sup> The most frequent general criticisms fall into one of four categories.<sup>7</sup>

1. The Cultural Bound Nature of Classical Bureaucratic Theory. Weber's normative conclusions about organizations were founded on his observations and studies on early military organizations, the Catholic Church, and the Prussian army. Therefore, his theoretical concepts quite naturally reflect the authoritarian biases of such systems.
2. Classical Bureaucratic Theory Mandates Attitudes Toward Employees and Clients be Inconsistent with the Humanistic Democratic Values of the United States. Managers in organizations adhering to Classical philosophy are expected to view employees and clients of the organization as "cogs" that can be relatively easily replaced. The individual value of each person, a fundamental assumption of American culture is foreign to such Classical Organization concepts.
3. Bureaucratically Structured Organizations Demand and Support Employees who Demonstrate Immature Personality Traits. Employees of Classical Bureaucratic Organizations are analogous to children in a family--they are expected to obey orders and carry out assignments.

This situation is best illustrated by traditionalists among military officers who are fond of telling their enlisted subordinates, "You're not paid to think, you're to do as you're ordered." Employees who do not question, but blindly obey every regulation and order are rewarded, whereas mature persons who raise legitimate questions about the organization and its activities are often ostracized and punished. Such behavior discourages attitudes of independence that are characteristic of a more adult personality.

4. Classical Bureaucratic Organizations are Unable to Cope with Environmental Changes; therefore, They Eventually Become Obsolete and Dysfunctional.

The hierarchical organizational structure and related Classical Theory power arrangements stifle communications and restrict information about both the internal and external environments of the organization; therefore, such organizations find it difficult to detect and respond to changes. In addition, the emphasis upon routinization of organizational activities creates inflexibility in employee and organizational behavior and reduces the organization's ability to adapt to change.

One of the most comprehensive summaries of the early research findings concerning the requirements for effective management is offered by Rensis Likert:<sup>8</sup>

1. Supervisors and managers who are "employee-centered" rather than exclusively "job centered" tend to get better results.
2. Employees working under strong pressure for higher productivity, or strong pressure for acceptance of specific tasks, tend to perform less well.
3. Close supervision tends to accompany poor performance rather than good performance.

4. Freedom to set one's own work methods and work pace, within broad limits, is connected with good performance.
5. A high degree of mutual rather than one-way influence is associated with good performance.
6. Organizations with greater diffusion downward of control and influence, and wider participation in decisions, tend to show better results.
7. Better and poorer supervisors and managers are relatively undifferentiated with respect to fulfilling the task-centered aspects of their responsibilities but are differentiated a great deal with respect to activities representing concern for subordinates' well-being, training and development, self-confidence, security, encouragement of free communication.
8. Supervisors and managers who are aware of and utilize group processes tend to achieve better results.

In reaction to these findings, Likert concluded:

Research findings, such as referred to briefly in (the preceding) statements, show that there are important inadequacies in the organizational managerial theories upon which most American business organizations and governmental agencies base their present operating procedures. These inadequacies are clearly evident when the procedures used by the highest producing managers and supervisors are compared with the procedures called for by the standard practices of their organization. When this comparison is made, it becomes clear that the high producing managers and supervisors are deviating in important and systematic ways from those advocated by their company and from the underlying theory upon which these procedures are based.

Douglas McGregor contended<sup>10</sup> that Classical Theory is based on a wholly inaccurate assumption about human nature and human behavior which in turn results in unproductive managerial strategies. This set of assumptions, which he called Theory X are:

1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if possible.
2. Most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all.

He predicted,<sup>11</sup> "... so long as the assumptions of Theory X continue to influence managerial strategy, we will fail to discover, let alone utilize, the potentials of the average human being."

#### Criticisms of Police Application of Classical Theory

Criticism of the bureaucratic model for police organizations is not restricted to contemporary literature. William Tallock was critical of the police of Paris even before the start of the 20th century. He noted that the Parisian police were, by military (or Classical) standards, nearly a "perfect" system.<sup>12</sup>

... The Parisian Police system has been ostentatiously held up, in some quarters, as a piece of executive machinery worthy of the admiration of the world. But, with all of this marvelous elaboration, it has resembled a beautiful piece of clockwork, lacking in its chief function of keeping time. ... The murders, robberies, and other evils of Paris, which take place without detection, or punishment, are notorious throughout Europe.

Tallock suggested the inadequacies of the Parisian Police could be attributed to the over reliance on the military model of organization:<sup>13</sup>

... it is that mere military police, in Paris and other Continental cities, fail in the highest functions of first class organizations. Their antecedents, as a body, have not qualified them for the lively independent exercise of their own intellects, in the double work of detection and prevention, but have positively unfitted them for such important service. In other words, the very foundation of military efficiency (the tendency to rely on rules and commands rather than think out and devise for oneself) is one of the chief sources of incompetency, as respects the highest of police functions.

Modern critics of the police reliance on bureaucratic theory frequently focus their attention on problems, supposedly attributable to Classical Theory, in the areas of police and community relations and police morale and behavior.<sup>14</sup> Possible relationships between Bureaucratic Theory and problems in these two areas merit further discussion.

Bureaucracy and Police-Community Relations

In a democracy it is assumed that governmental agencies, including the police, will reflect the priorities and preferences of the citizens being served.<sup>15</sup> However, the very features of bureaucracy that facilitate stability, consistency, and predictability; and ensure impersonal, universal treatment for employees and clients may have a detrimental impact on the relationship between citizens and police.<sup>16</sup>

Consider, for example, the impact of consolidating small police organizations and raising the level of ultimate control over them in a manner consistent with the tenets of Bureaucratic Theory. Theoretically such action should result in efficiencies of scale and increase organizational efficiency. In reality, it results in the development of a standard operating procedure and the application of this procedure to a broader segment of the population. The possible consequences of such action is explained in the following illustration.<sup>17</sup>

Assume that those who have the greatest economic advantage and the most political influence feel a need to eliminate inoperable vehicles from the city. Since they are politically powerful they have no difficulty impressing upon the equally

middle class police management the importance of strictly enforcing (a law to eliminate the inoperable vehicles). In accordance with Classical Theory a uniform policy is developed for implementing the law and officers throughout the city are instructed to enforce the law in a "non-discriminatory" fashion (that is, they cannot make exceptions to the enforcement policy), and they carry out the policy in a highly impersonal manner.

Although not blatantly apparent, this kind of enforcement is highly discriminatory. First, the lower income citizens are generally the only people who have inoperable vehicles where the police can detect them; second, lower income people cannot afford to maintain their cars in as good a state of repair as higher income people; and third, lower income people need the parts from their inoperable autos to repair the ones they are currently driving. In addition, an abandoned vehicle law has no social utility for people with lower incomes if they are not disturbed by the presence of inoperable cars. The value of having a vehicle may be of greater utility to them than a tidy backyard.

Hence, while a policy may reflect the desires of many people in the community, it may also bring the police into conflict with a sizeable minority of the citizens who are less powerful. Therefore, rather than following the Bureaucratic typology, an organizational arrangement which would permit policy differentials so as to more closely reflect the preferences and needs of citizens from all socio-economic groups may create fewer tensions and better serve the needs of a broader range

of citizens.

Classical Bureaucratic Theory supports centralization of police decision making. As the police operations become more centralized, they move further away from the basic goal of democracy---guaranteeing every citizen access to and influence with governmental agencies.<sup>18</sup> Under a highly developed police bureaucracy, many citizens, particularly minorities, view their police as essentially beyond their understanding and control. Often both the police and minority group members reduce their interaction and view each other with distrust and suspicion. Jeffrey Freund described the consequences:<sup>19</sup>

The mutual isolation and fear of the symbolic assailant by both blacks and the police can hardly help but lead to conflict between the two groups. Police in many black neighborhoods, in an effort to maintain "law and order" while at the same time protecting themselves from danger, often abuse their discretion when dealing with blacks. In return for this abuse, the urban black often manifests his hate and fear of the police, reinforcing the police belief that their actions are justified.

Highly centralized police organizations may be too inflexible to provide personalized attention to the problems of subgroups. The larger and more centralized a police agency becomes the more impersonally its agents behave toward citizens. The more heterogenous the society

served by a centralized police agency, the more subgroups that will be irritated by any single policy. The more highly centralized the police structure, the greater the probability of reduced communications between police officers and citizens. These situations appear to impede the establishment of either a role consensus or mutual trust between minority groups and the police. Without the existence of such agreement and trust, the relationship between police and the public is likely to be strained.

#### Bureaucracy and Police Attitudes and Behavior

If employees in a democratic environment are to be satisfied, they must view themselves as valuable and making worthwhile contributions to society.<sup>20</sup> Their jobs must be challenging and rewarding enough that they can have a sense of pride and self-importance from performing them.<sup>21</sup> In some respects the Classical Bureaucratic theory creates a machine-like organizational model in that it encourages one to view employees as easily replaceable cogs.<sup>22</sup> Even Max Weber has been quoted as condemning this aspect of bureaucracy.<sup>23</sup>

...it is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing but these little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving toward bigger ones - a state of affairs which is to be seen once more, as in Egyptian records, playing an ever-increasing part in the spirit of our present administrative system, and especially of its offspring the students. This passion for bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if in politics we were deliberately to become men who need "order" and nothing but order, and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporate in it. That the world should know men but these, it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and the great question is therefore not how we can promote and hasten, but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parcelling out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of bureaucratic way of life.

One of the factors which influence the attitudes of police employees is the promotion system. In accordance with Bureaucratic Theory, entry level police officers have to obtain promotions to supervisory level positions in order to receive increases in pay or status. Police employees are hired for one type of job but they are expected to strive for promotions to completely different kinds of jobs in supervisory positions. Police agencies train an employee to a high level of competency in job performance and then frequently the employee is promoted to a supervisory position where an entirely different set of skills and aptitudes are needed. The fact

that a good police officer and a police manager may be equally important to an organization is not reflected in the salary or status arrangements of Classical concepts which make it improper to reward a patrol officer with a salary or status equal to a top administrator.

A second factor which may contribute to negative attitudes among police employees is the conflict between generalists and specialists.<sup>24</sup> Specialization in police organizations has resulted in the most important people in the organizations, the generalists or patrol officers, becoming report takers and servants for more specialized officers such as investigators, juvenile officers, and traffic officers. This situation causes tension between police generalists and specialists, and results in a lack of cooperation toward the accomplishment of common goals. The uniformed officer's duties mandate high skill and knowledge in handling a wide range of human behavior. However, the uniformed officer is accorded low status and pay in comparison with the specialist.

Finally, some feel negative attitudes among police officers are caused by their frustration over an inability to affect their own working conditions. As the educational level of police employees rises, they

insist on recognition of their "right" to be involved in decision making processes of the police organization.<sup>25</sup> Educated police officers seem to believe they have the ability to make sound decisions about their jobs. Consequently, police activism has increased and a number of jurisdictions have recognized the legitimacy of police employee groups and unions. Such activity is contrary to the tenets of monocratic, Classical Bureaucratic Theory, which rations decision making to top level administrators and managers.

In regard to employee behavior, the Classical Bureaucratic arrangements should logically ensure observance of limitations on behavior by employees. Superiors are theoretically given adequate authority to ensure that subordinates stay within established rules and guide lines. However, in reality such has not been the case. Nearly every major study of American police in recent years has referred to police deviancy as a major problem.<sup>26</sup>

One hypothesis concerning the reason for this situation is that the hierarchy of authority through which communications travel distorts and filters information. The modification of information is both

deliberate and unintentional.<sup>27</sup> The top administrators seldom get a true picture of how closely bottom level subordinates are following the expectations established for them.<sup>28</sup> The Bureaucratic arrangement is such that when a top official issues a directive to correct a situation, which because of earlier information distortion has already been perceived inaccurately, the communication will most likely be changed as it travels down through the hierarchy; therefore, it will not have the intended impact. Even with improved communication, the assumption that formal authority to command is sufficient to obtain compliance from subordinates appears to be questionable. Years ago Chester Barnard<sup>29</sup> speculated that authority actually rests with subordinates rather than supervisors. Therefore, if the subordinates are not disposed to accept and comply with orders from superiors, these orders will have scant impact.

The attempts at correcting this situation to ensure managerial control usually involve the establishment of organizational devices which operate outside the chain of command.<sup>30</sup> These units are usually

referred to as Internal Affairs or Citizen Complaint Units. However, in spite of such mechanisms, in certain types of situations deviancy among lower level police officers is wide-spread. This has caused some people to question whether in this society, traditional Bureaucratic principles can be used to achieve the objective of adequate control of police behavior.

#### Police Modifications in Bureaucratic Model

In the police field, the most substantial organizational modifications intended to address the preceding problems have been made under an organizational typology called "Team Policing." The general characteristics of Team Police are:

1. The concept is an open socio-technical systems model as described by Trist.<sup>31</sup> This means the organization is designed to facilitate a "fit" between citizen needs, the police officers and the technology available. The responsibilities of police officers are expanded and they are organized in teams to facilitate the formation of natural social groups. Police officers are placed in closer contact with citizens through decentralization of the organization and the use of neighborhood meetings. The communications, records and data processing technology is modified to better support the team.
2. The concept involves a small group (15-50)

of police officers who are expected to form a cohesive social-work group. The police officers assigned to a police team are given relatively permanent, or at least long term assignments together in anticipation of their forming a natural social group which will have an efficient communications network, establish behavioral norms, and utilize peer-pressure for norm maintenance.

3. The Police Team is assigned the responsibility for providing all police service in a well-defined geographic area-normally defined as a neighborhood or community. This means that responsibility for decisions about goals, priorities, procedures, and practices of the police are usually decentralized to the team leader or the entire team. Usually a team is assured of territorial integrity (i.e., no other police officers are permitted to work inside the team's boundaries without approval of the team leader or the team).
4. The Team members are given the authority to participate in decisions about the best way to carry out their responsibilities. This usually takes the form of team meetings. In some cases team members are given the latitude to select their own leaders and develop operational policies.

The literature contains information about a number of different Team Police organizational experiments that have been conducted since 1946. The following is a review of the literature which describes, advocates, or evaluates Team Policing.

Aberdeen Team Police

Apparently, the first experiment with Team Policing was initiated in 1946 in the Aberdeen, Scotland, Police Department.<sup>32</sup> Samuel Chapman describes this first project in Municipal Police Administration.<sup>33</sup>

Team policing called for the dissolution of traditional individual beats, and the areas covered by them were organized into large districts. A team of from three to nine constables (the number of men depending on time of day) was assigned to patrol each district. The sergeant in charge of each team was given great discretion in choosing the method of patrol as well as deciding where the available men were to be posted. It was a highly fluid, flexible patrol scheme whose success seemed linked to team spirit, the evaluation of data from police reports of the recent past, and the sergeant's imagination and ability to assess current needs for police service.

In essence, this experiment was designed to give sergeants greater responsibility. It also modified the organization structure to facilitate more effective use of the radio and automobile. Although cars and wireless radios had great potential for improving police efficiency, police officials in the British Isles were reluctant to abandon walking patrols. This technique provided a method for maintaining limited foot patrols and increased use of the radio and automobile.<sup>34</sup>

The Oaksey Committee which evaluated this operation reported,<sup>35</sup>

The 'Aberdeen' system is not a rival to the beat system but a variant development of it. The 'Aberdeen' system differs from the beat system in the fundamental respect that it abolishes the individual responsibility for a definite area and substitutes team responsibility of a group of men for a larger area.

The Oaksey Committee made the following conclusions about the approach:<sup>36</sup>

1. The changes in the Sergeants responsibility ... should increase his own and his men's work and therefore improve efficiency.
2. We agree with the opinion expressed that the psychological effect of being a member of a team is inclined to increase the efficiency of weaker members, as an officer is unlikely to shirk any of his responsibilities because of the possible reactions of other members of the team.
3. Despite the removal of officers from walking beats, the constables knowledge of an area and its inhabitants was not diminished because (1) constables were instructed to take every opportunity to talk with members of the public, (2) the constables pooled their knowledge about the area at each change of shift, (3) constables were dispatched by "wireless" and transported by automobile to attend citizen complaints.

The Committee in evaluating this approach failed to find sufficient evidence to justify strongly endorsing it. It concluded:<sup>37</sup>

From our enquiries on the spot, we consider that the efficiency of policing in Aberdeen has not been impaired by the scheme which may prove suitable in the circumstance existing in that city - a good testing-ground because of its topograph. Aberdeen is a comparatively isolated city in a rural district; there is only a limited amount of industry and there are widespread residential areas.

The literature does not contain sufficient information for any evaluation of the experiment. According to Sherman the experiment was discontinued in 1962.<sup>38</sup>

#### Salford Team Police

Within a year of the release of the Oaksey Report on Aberdeen, Chief Constable Alex J. Patterson, who was in command in Aberdeen when the first team operation was initiated, had implemented a similar arrangement in Salford, England. In a report<sup>39</sup> dated on November 13, 1950, Patterson, while not mentioning the Oaksey Report, concerned himself with proving that Team Policing would also improve police operations in a highly industrial urban area equally as well as in rural Aberdeen. In his report he points out:<sup>40</sup>

Salford is a highly industrialized, its industry ranging from heavy engineering to making of precision tools and scientific instruments and from weaving of all classes to garment making on the largest scale. The City is heavily built up, and

it contains important railway marshalling yards and canals which criss-cross the City. It is also an inland port as the principle docks of the Manchester Ship Canal lie within the City boundaries... within a radius of 10 miles from Salford, there are 8 separate Police Forces.

Patterson claimed Team Policing was implemented in Salford in an effort to overcome personnel shortages. In 1946 Salford would have needed an additional 148 constables to maintain its traditional foot patrol beat structure. Patrol cars were superimposed over the walking beat system in 1947. Patterson felt this arrangement was ineffective and replaced it in one area of the City with a Team system of policing.<sup>41</sup>

His stated "principles" of this Team Policing were:

1. To deploy or distribute personnel to the best advantage and with the greatest possible effect, i.e., to have constables available or posted in those positions or areas where their services are most likely to be required;
2. To ensure, so far as practicable, that constables get sufficient work to maintain their interest and eliminate any danger of boredom;
3. To broaden the experience of the constables by giving them a wide variety of duties;
4. To avoid routine unimaginative methods and to introduce an element of surprise so that wrongdoers cannot foretell when or where they may be confronted by a police officer or caught red handed;

5. To instill the ideals of team work and cooperation among all personnel of the Division as a whole and not merely his responsibility for some part of it;
6. To give the best and most expeditious service possible to the general public.

As in Aberdeen, the sergeant's responsibilities were increased. The sergeant was given a team of approximately 9 constables for an 8 hour shift. Each Team was assigned to a designated section. It had one police vehicle equipped with "wireless." The Sergeant, who was the Team-leader or "Commander in the field," was responsible for deploying the Team members, assigning tasks, maintaining close contact with each constable, relaying communications between the constables, and assisting them in the performance of their jobs. A Sergeant was provided a variety of information about the crime situation in the area to increase his ability to perform his functions.

Uniformed constables and Criminal Investigation Division (C.I.D.) officers were instructed to cooperate closely. C.I.D. officers would give informal "chatty" talks to constables about current crime problems, persons suspected, the hazardous crime areas and ways constables could apprehend deviates. Uniformed constables

who detected a crime or apprehended a criminal were permitted to work with C.I.D. officers until the final disposition of the case.

Patterson describes the affect of this team system:<sup>42</sup>

As happens with many other innovations the system was not an immediate success, and it did not get properly into 'gear' until May, 1949, by which time many operational difficulties had been mastered and the underlying principles assimilated. Experienced officers, bred in the tradition of the (foot) beat, who were strongly sceptical of new methods of policing became converts and enthusiasts, and from that moment the scheme gathered momentum guaranteeing its permanent adoption. Comradeship began to manifest itself and team spirit, coupled with friendly rivalry between the teams and resultant pride of achievement, became real. From this point efficient operation was assured...

In his 1951 report on the Salford Police, Patterson attempted to document his previous claims of increased efficiency by comparing crime statistics for a three year period (1946-47-48) before the Team System was implemented with the first three years of the Team System (1949-50-51). In spite of the fact that the Department had 12% fewer uniformed constables in the latter period, Patterson claimed that under the Team System "breaking in" offenses went down 23%; arrests by uniformed officers increased 109%; and

road fatalities went down 25%.

Patterson attributes the changes in "productivity" to improvements in the willingness of officers to increase their efforts under the Team System. He writes:<sup>44</sup>

... this (improved productivity) is due in large measure to the whole-hearted cooperation, keenness and tenacity of the officers and men without which no system, however theoretically sound, could operate properly. The never-failing interest and enthusiasm of the operating personnel have evoked very favorable comments from nearly all of the many police officers from other forces who have visited Salford to inspect the system. Our resources may be depleted, but this spirit and the effective crutch which the team system provides are more than compensatory.

In spite of Patterson's glowing description of the Salford Team System, Chapman reports that system was discontinued in 1962 when Salford authorities believed there were too many miscellaneous service details and fixed duties cutting into a patrol officer's time to permit further effective use of the system.<sup>45</sup>

#### Tucson Fluid Patrol

In 1962 the Tucson, Arizona, Police Department began what appears to have been the first Team Police operation in the United States. In an article<sup>46</sup> entitled "Will the Aberdeen Patrol Plan Work in America,"

Breglia explains that Tucson adopted the Aberdeen plan in an effort to meet the increasing crime problem. He describes the purpose of the plans as:<sup>47</sup>

... a procedure by which we use selective enforcement for patrol the same way we do for traffic. Under this system we scrap the regular beat patrol system. ...It is designed to use selective enforcement by taking advantage of massive and rapid compilations of crime data through the use of modern business machines. A flexible or fluid patrol system is then utilized to concentrate the deployment of manpower wherever the latest data indicates the police can do the most good.

An intent to improve police effectiveness by a better integration of police officers and technology is also reflected in Breglia's summary of the reason for using Fluid Patrol:<sup>48</sup>

The possibility of out-engineering the criminal and providing better police service at cheaper cost would be a monumental break-through for law enforcement. The trick is to harness the new computers in a way that will service police needs better.

Therefore, it appears the "Fluid Patrol Plan" of Tucson was basically designed to reduce crime through (1) more extensive use of electronic data processing, (2) fluid patrol boundaries, and (3) decentralization of responsibility for personnel deployment to the team leader, a sergeant. The literature does not reflect

any intent to use fluid patrol to improve police and community relations nor the behavior of uniformed officers. The literature about Tucson does not mention any notion of team responsibility rather than individual responsibility. It makes only brief reference to the fact that the concept might result in improvements in officers attitudes toward their jobs.

Even though the officers were organized into a team under a single sergeant, there is no indication of special efforts to increase patrol officers involvement in job related decisions. However, the increased responsibility and authority given to first line supervisors was evaluated as having a positive impact on the work attitudes of sergeants. One sergeant is quoted as saying, "I now feel like a supervisor with a great responsibility and also with wide authority and trust."

The literature contains no reports of the impact of the Tucson experiment. Perhaps its most significant impact was the stimulation of further experimentation and research with the team approach in other North American cities.

President's Commission Report

The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,<sup>49</sup> a report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, provided the first major support for the implementation of the concept of team policing in the United States by recommending its own version of the idea. The recommendation involved placing three levels of police officers-Agent, Officer, and Community Service Officer-in a community area of an urban police jurisdiction under the command of one supervisor and charging the supervisor with responsibility for providing police services in the area. The Report states:<sup>50</sup>

The agent-officer-community service officer recommendation made in this chapter has not only the improvement of the quality of police personnel as its objective, but also a change in the way the police work in the field. The concept, which might be called "team policing," is that all police work, both patrol and criminal investigation, in a given number of city blocks should be under unified command. A "field supervisor" would have under his command a team of agents, officers, and community service officers. The team would meet at the beginning of a tour of duty and receive a briefing on the current situation in the neighborhood--what crimes were unsolved, what suspects were wanted for questioning, what kinds of stolen goods to look out for, what situations were potentially troublesome and so forth. On this basis the members would be assigned to specific areas or duties.

If conditions warranted it, agents might be assigned to investigation. Community service officers might be delegated to help either. In specific investigations or incidents, agents would be given authority over the actions of CSOs and officers. If the conditions in the area changed during the tour, if a major crime was committed or a major disorder erupted, the assignments could be promptly changed by the field supervisor.

This Report resulted in the decision of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance to provide funds as an incentive for local police agencies to experiment with Team Policing. However, the logic of Team Policing would probably have been sufficient to persuade police officials to experiment with the approach even if no federal funds had been committed to this end.

#### Richmond Team Patrol System

In 1968 Richmond, California, a city with approximately 82,000 population and problems between its 142 sworn officers and its substantial minority community, initiated a jurisdiction-wide team policing system.<sup>51</sup> This team police effort appears to have been based more on research into police organizational problems than any previous team police experiment. In contrast to the Tucson Fluid Patrol, the Richmond plan also incorporated "contributions and suggestions" from uniform patrol

officers. The objectives of the Richmond Team Patrol System were broader than Tucson's simple objective of increasing arrests. Richmond police managers expressed an intent to improve both work attitudes of uniformed police officers and police and community relations.

In regard to police and community relations, Phelps and Murphy wrote:<sup>52</sup>

Municipal police have been recently criticized for not maintaining more citizen-police contact. We hope to achieve increased contact by having one team member attend neighborhood council meetings. Our area and zone borders do not cut across neighborhood Group Council boundaries.

The plan not only expanded the responsibility of supervisors, perhaps more importantly, it also initiated an expansion of the job of uniformed officers to include the responsibility for follow-up investigations. This function had traditionally been the exclusive responsibility of specialized investigators. In addition, taking the advice of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement, so called "para-professional" Community Service Officers were assigned to each team to assist the team members.<sup>53</sup>

Unfortunately Richmond did not initiate any systematic research to assess the impact of this system.

However, Phelps reports a subjective assessment of the effectiveness of the approach indicates it has substantially improved officer work attitudes and police community relations.<sup>54</sup> In addition, it had, at the worst, no negative impact on the criminal apprehension ability of the Department.

#### Syracuse Crime Control Team

The Syracuse, New York, Police Department, supported by LEAA funds, initiated an experiment in Team Policing in the summer of 1968.<sup>55</sup> It was labeled the "Crime Control Team" (CCT) and consisted of a Captain and eight uniformed police officers with the total responsibility for reducing crime in a specifically designated area of Syracuse. Perhaps the most important feature of this experiment was the removal of all previously established procedural rules and the allocation of broad discretionary authority for operational decisions to members of the Team. This appears to be the first time such latitude was given to operational Team Police officers.

The formulator of this experiment, James F. Elliott, describes it as differing in four ways from

the traditional approach to policing:<sup>56</sup>

1. The CCT officer is concerned only with crime and he is completely trusted to do his job.
2. The CCT is principally concerned with the future, not the past.
3. Investigations are carried to completion by the CCT officer.
4. The CCT is deployed to match the temporal variations of the occurrence of crime.

The basic goals of the CCT were (1) crime prevention, (2) crime interception and (3) criminal investigations and apprehension. The organizational modification for achieving these goals was decentralization of responsibility for crime to the CCT. Team members were relieved of responsibility for all citizen services, public intoxication and automobile problems (traffic violations and accident processing) in the area. These responsibilities were left with other patrol officers who also worked in the same area.

The CCT was responsible only for answering crime related dispatches. In another first, the Team Leader was made responsible for twenty-four hour a day deployment of Team officers and he had authority to exercise discretion over the way officers handle investigative

matters. In addition, the Team Leader had a budget of \$1,500 to spend in any manner he deemed appropriate. Further, the Department obligated itself to supply all vehicles requested by the Team Leader. Officers of the CCT were given the authority to exercise their own initiative and judgment in achieving the CCT goals. All of these features were innovations which had never previously been operationalized.

The Team's performance was gauged by (1) the extent to which it reduced crime and (2) the proportion of crimes cleared as compared to crimes reported.<sup>57</sup> An assessment of the reduction of crime was made simply by comparing the number of crimes reported for a period of time immediately preceding the experiment with a post experiment period of the same length in both experimental and control areas.

After evaluation, Elliott and Sardino concluded:<sup>58</sup> "...the experiment demonstrated that the Crime Control Team's mode of operation is superior to the conventional mode." However, they admitted an inability to determine what aspects of the CCT caused it to be superior. Their observations stress

the apparent value of the increased police and community interaction to the overall improvement of police operations.

The evaluators admitted the influence of improved community relations was something they had not seriously anticipated at the outset of the experiment:<sup>59</sup>

Although the importance of community relations was recognized during the planning stages of the experiment, it was essentially viewed as a means of informing the beat population of the plans of the police. The possibility of obtaining the active cooperation of the citizens was not seriously considered...

They seem to leave no doubt that the conclusion of others before them concerning the value of police and community cooperation was accurate:<sup>60</sup>

One of the reasons the Team became a part of the community was because the Team members could see how their community relations efforts were paying off in the very real sense of clearing crimes...

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the researchers in the Syracuse project was their failure to recognize that the community service activities, which they removed from CCT responsibilities, can be extremely important to police and community relations. The limitation of the CCT officers to criminal responsibilities may have reduced the ability of the Team to accrue

citizen support and further improve its overall effectiveness.

### The Issue of Community Control

The potential of a decentralized police operation to improving the ability of citizens in urban areas to influence the priorities and operational techniques of police did not go unnoticed by citizens concerned with police behavior. In 1968 The Center for Emergency Support in Washington, D.C., released a paper,<sup>61</sup> "The Police in Crises in Washington: Is Community Control the Answer?" This paper concluded that decentralization of police operations in Washington, D.C. could be expected to substantially reduce police misconduct and render the police operations more responsible to the preferences of local neighborhood people. It states:<sup>62</sup>

Under community control the police would presumably identify with the community and could become advocates of community causes, instead of unsympathetic or hostile to them as the Kerner Commission study indicates they now are. ...not only could the police function and the police attitudes be changed by community control, but also the manner of enforcing laws. There is no reason why in areas where residents have backyards and air-conditioned living rooms for socializing the disorderly conduct statute must be enforced in exactly the same

manner as in poor black communities where housing conditions are crowded and such socializing is necessarily done on the front steps. There is no reason why residents of these respective areas should not have a formal means of making their wishes known as to how they would like policemen to exercise their discretion.

In 1969 a discussion conference co-sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies and the Center for the Study of Law and Society of the University of California at Berkeley focused on community control of the Police.<sup>63</sup> This conference concluded that improved mechanisms for citizen influence of police operations are in the best interest of a democratic society and suggested three models for proceeding:<sup>64</sup>

1. Neighborhood political control over on-the-beat policemen through elections, etc., of neighborhood commissions with full or considerable power over the police, or the creation of new neighborhood based police.
2. Creation of counter-police organizations (in effect, unions of those policed) with a political base and an ability to hear grievances and force change.
3. Transformation of the police "profession" and role so as to end isolation of the police from the rest of the community, and thus to establish de facto community control by informed, rather than formal, means.

Although the participants did not agree on the precise course of action which they would endorse, they

observed:<sup>65</sup>

Any of these approaches would require great energy and political support to create, almost certainly against the wishes of police departments. Two approaches to creating this support seem possible: Urging decentralization and community control as valuable to all American communities for the sake of their own direct relations with the police; and urging community control in black neighborhoods, either on the ground that black communities, as a result of the emergence of black people, are morally and politically entitled to that control or on the ground that achieving it will be the only way to protect the peace and order of the whole city.

Perhaps as a result of this conference an alliance of students and minority people in Berkeley began an ultimately unsuccessful movement to decentralize Berkeley police.<sup>66</sup> Their plan, which was rejected by the voters, was to decentralize the Berkeley Police Department under elected Community Police Boards in three "communities" of the city.

The legality and rationality of such an approach had been argued in the prestigious California Law Review in October, 1969. The author of the article had concluded:<sup>67</sup>

The only satisfactory method of assuring equal and satisfactory police protection in the ghetto is to establish a black police force, responsive to the problems and needs of the ghetto and ghetto residents. It is only after this has been done that economic and educational programs can have the impact and results contemplated by their framers.

Such pressures for decentralization of police brought a vigorous response from no less than the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, who in an editorial in the FBI Bulletin wrote:<sup>68</sup>

Groups have been established to gain "community control" over police departments. Some, receiving financial support from well-meaning but misled organizations, have set up 'police watching' programs. Some spokesmen advocate that each city ghetto be given public funds and authorized to form its own racially segregated police force. Others say college youths should not be subjected to contacts by police officers, and that only specially trained, highly paid, unarmed, elite police forces should be used to handle civil demonstrations. If these ideas and techniques seem half-baked, it is because they are.

#### Dutch Neighborhood Policing

The Dutch, having traditionally utilized a policing system based primarily on walking beats staffed by uniformed police officers, enjoyed a close relationship between police and citizens. However, in the 1950's, pressures for increased operational efficiency motivated police officials in Arnheim to increase their utilization of motorized patrols.<sup>69</sup> After initiating these patrols, the officials observed a reduction in police-citizen communications and they became concerned that this situation was reducing citizen confidence in the

police and overall police effectiveness.

Mark Rand summarized the situation and the resulting changes.<sup>70</sup>

In some of the Dutch municipalities it was felt, as long ago as 1960, that owing to the increased use of police motor cars, the officers were losing touch with the public and, consequently efficiency was falling off and morale was low. Moreover, it was felt that petty offences were not being properly dealt with and it was pointed out that it was upon the efficient detection of petty offences that the confidence of the public largely depended. It was noticed that different officers were on the same beat on different days and this led to a lack of uniformity of police action in given circumstances. It was therefore decided to try a scheme whereby, one officer would reside in an area and be free to decide how he policed it - he would be, in effect, "Chief Constable" of his area. The municipality of Arnheim was divided into areas of 5,500 to 10,000 inhabitants and of between 237 and 1,284 acres. Every officer was supplied with a powerful Moped, a typewriter and a telephone at his home. He was expected to keep a modest card index. In general the more mature man was selected for the post of area officer.

According to one source, the instructions to area officers were verbal and simple:<sup>71</sup>

See to it that you are master in your area; if you wish to caution offenders that is up to you, but keep the situation in hand.

The first-line supervisors, sergeants, were instructed to use "group theory" and hold weekly discussions with their immediate subordinates. In addition, they were expected to:<sup>72</sup>

... make good contacts with various municipal officers such as those concerned with parks and public gardens, the cleansing service, and social and housing; wherever possible, good contacts were to be made between police officers and equal ranking local officials; further, contact was sought with school principals, district associations, management committees of play areas, and with church authorities.

According to Mark Rand, this experiment produced positive results:<sup>73</sup>

It was found that the public were getting far better service in the matters of petty crimes and complaints. The area officer was able to identify the trouble-some teenagers on his beat and so, it was thought, there was a drop in such offenses as theft from automatic vending machines and hooliganism generally. The officers were seen to be well identified with their task and they seemed to adopt a more paternalistic attitude towards their resident populations as they became known as familiar local figures. Information began to flow from quarters where previously there had been none. The conclusion drawn from the experiment was that, for most municipalities the area officer scheme is the only effective method of making up for the disadvantages of motorisation.

As with nearly all the previous Team Police experiments, this Dutch effort lacked hard data on its impact. However, the subjective appraisals of the operation seem to have been sufficient to convince the top management of the British Police of the value of the basic approach.<sup>74</sup>

British Unit Beat Policing

Although the Team Police arrangement of Aberdeen and Salford received a great deal of publicity in the 1950's, it was never given more than lukewarm support from high level British police officials. After the original projects were discontinued, police agencies in England used traditional walking beats almost precisely as they were organized in the early 1800's. However, the increased cost of policing brought on by higher police salaries, reductions in the length of the work week, and the worsening economic situation in England was reducing the ability of the police to staff this policing structure. Further, improvements in communication and transportation presented an obvious potential for increasing police efficiency. The rationality of using this technology to improve police mobility and productivity was increasingly hard to ignore. Police officials appear to have been practically forced to experiment with new structures which would integrate this personnel and technology.

Reluctant to reject the philosophy of citizen contact with police officers, officials prepared plans

which would maintain the walking beat structure and yet provide for the increased utilization of the automobile and radio communications for rapid response to citizen requests. The English periodical, Police, reported on the resulting plan for Unit Beat Policing:<sup>75</sup>

It was in 1966 that the Research and Development Branch of the Police Department at the Home Office secured the cooperation of the Lancashire Constabulary in mounting the first experiment in Unit Beat Policing in Accrington. The force had already been operating an experiment in the new town of Kirby using motorized patrols. This arose from the interest shown by the former Chief Constable, Sir Eric St. Johnston (now her majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary) in the success of a similar (motorized patrol) scheme introduced by Mr. Orlando Wilson when he was in command of the Chicago police. At the suggestion of the R. and D. Branch, Lancashire agreed to introduce the original idea of the Unit Beat Policing in one division. This embodied the principle of the residential policeman wholly responsible for one beat, with a "panda" car superimposed on two adjoining beats to make up each area team. The Accrington division was the one chosen for the experiment. An additional advantage determining the choice of Lancashire as the first force to try out Unit Beat Policing was the plentiful supply of personal radios which had been developed by the force's own radio unit.

Thus, while ignoring their own British experience with Team Police, the Unit Beat Police scheme appears to have been based on both the Dutch Team Police experience, and O.W. Wilson's notion of conspicuous motorized "preventive" patrol. The expressed objectives of Unit Beat

Policing were:<sup>76</sup>

- a. Cultivate a better understanding with members of the public, by having a closer contact with the man on the beat,
- b. provide a better immediate service by a swifter response to calls for assistance and complaints,
- c. raise detection rates by increasing and improving the information flow,
- d. overcome the shortage of police officers by combining resources, and
- e. create a new challenge for the younger man by the introduction of a new method of beat working.

Several new British innovations were also introduced in the Unit Beat Policing scheme. For instance, two beat constables were assigned each in one half of the unit area. These foot officers were given twenty-four hour responsibility for their beats and the discretion to determine their own working hours. They had the authority to decide which eight hours out of twenty-four they would spend walking in their area.

A detective was also assigned to each Unit Team. In addition to the traditional investigative role, the investigator was obligated to serve as an advisor on investigations to the uniform constables of the unit.

In addition, a new position called a "collator"

was added to facilitate information dissemination and coordinate the criminal apprehension efforts of the police. This officer was responsible for collecting, indexing, and disseminating information on criminal intelligence matters. Butler outlined the value of this operation to the Unit Beat Police Team:<sup>77</sup>

The advantage of this type of intelligence collecting is that it remains local, but is systematic and can be integrated into larger intelligence indexes. In many instances it is possible to take a street address and retrieve all the incidents that have been recorded against it. The collator is also responsible for publishing a 'daily bulletin.' The bulletin contains details of all the incidents of interest that have occurred in the preceding 24 hours, together with criminal intelligence. The bulletin is issued to all operational personnel and circulated to surrounding divisions.

The evaluations of Unit Beat Policing have been extensive, although generally methodologically weak.<sup>78</sup>

While most of evaluators have been careful to acknowledge that it is too early to reach any final conclusions on the efficiency of Unit Beat Policing, every evaluation reviewed in the course of this study supported the following general conclusions:<sup>79</sup>

1. The arrangement has resulted in an improvement of the morale and of the job interest of police officers.
2. The efficiency of police has increased.

3. There is improved understanding between police officers and citizens (i.e. there is close contact between beat officers and the public and there is swifter response to requests for police assistance).
4. The quality and quantity of information within the police organization has improved; and
5. The police job is more challenging to officers than under the old beat system.

#### Detroit Beat Commander

Several recent Team experiments in the United States appear to have been patterned after the English Unit Beat Policing model. The most notable is a short-term experiment which was implemented in Detroit, Michigan, in mid-1970.<sup>80</sup> This team effort was called "The Beat Commander."

An early monograph describing the Beat Commander idea contains a number of statements about the objectives of the experiment:<sup>81</sup>

1. Our objective is to make more effective use of police manpower.
2. These programs (basically public relations programs included as part of the team responsibilities) should improve community relations. In addition, we hope they achieve the even more important goal of reducing crime.
3. As we stated earlier, all too little is known

about crime control. One objective of this study is to assure that something more will be known in the future.

4. An object of our pilot plot is to use the policeman's wealth of information through regular conferences of the beat team. At these conferences traditional police action or more innovative non-traditional steps may be agreed upon.

Although the initial literature related to this experiment emphasized its operational potential for crime control, the research conducted to evaluate it relied primarily on officer attitudes. In reviewing the research techniques they intended to use to evaluate the experience, Murphy and Bloch said:<sup>82</sup>

During the eight month period, we will conduct before and after interviews of these men (Team members), to ascertain changes in their relationship to their supervisors, their attitudes toward the community and their methods of operation. We will consult with them constantly, so that our idea will be given an effective operational form.

After the initial eight month "demonstration project" the authors indicated they intended to expand the experiment and conduct further research:<sup>83</sup>

To get reasonable measures of the success of our experiment, we intend to interview people in eight squad car beats before, during and after the experiment. Our interviews will determine the frequency of victimization from serious crime, the level of fear of crime, the level of citizen respect and appreciation for their officers. These interviews

will be our principle measure of change because the only alternative would be to use statistics, and these statistics are likely to be affected by the operational changes we will institute and by the motivations of participating police.

The focus of this experiment was on the first line supervisor who was given greater responsibility and authority so he would be the equivalent of a "chief" of his own car beat. The "squad car beat," a high crime, minority residential area with tremendous police community relations problems, was policed by the Beat Commander and a team of approximately 25 patrolmen. Initially, the sergeant was responsible for twenty-four hour a day supervision, including the assignment of officers, but in the midst of the experiment the number of patrolmen was increased to 28. In addition, two more sergeants were added. In defense of the addition of the sergeants, Bloch and Ulberg state:<sup>84</sup>

This led to a ratio of 9.3 patrolmen for sergeant, smaller than the department ratio of about 12 to 1. But without the addition, the ratio would have 14 to 1. Further, for the first time, the Beat Commander could have a sergeant in charge at almost all times of the day all days of the week. (For one month only, a fourth sergeant was assigned but then withdrawn.)

Later in the course of the project, in another move apparently based on the English Unit Beat Police

Model, detectives were assigned to the Beat Commander Team. These investigators were "...to work almost exclusively in the area." They could seek assistance from other centralized investigators, but according to Bloch and Ulberg, they seldom did.<sup>85</sup>

In addition to the facts that the original evaluation plans were lacking in specific design and the experiment was deluted by the addition of more supervisors and police officers, the police commissioner who initially helped develop and supported the project resigned approximately four months after it was initiated.

According to Bloch and Ulberg, even the geographic integrity of the team area was frequently violated, as dispatchers failed to cooperate in observing the team area boundaries when dispatching.<sup>86</sup> They reported 75% of the team assignments were to calls outside their areas. In addition, non-team officers were frequently assigned to handle problems in the Beat Commander area.

Sherman observed:<sup>87</sup>

The major functional change brought about by the program was stability of beat and supervision. Whereas patrolmen could conventionally be assigned to different scout car territories and sergeants

have no fixed geographical or personnel assignments, the beat commander made both consistent and long ranged.

In spite of the problems, the Police Foundation provided funding for the evaluation of the impact of the experiment. One aspect of the evaluation dealt with the impact of the experiment on crime,<sup>88</sup> the reduction of which was a major objective of the project. In a summary of the findings the researchers state:<sup>89</sup>

There is no clear indication that this brief pilot project affected crime rates. The rate of reported crime rose and then declined during the study period.

Later in the report of the findings this conclusion was clarified by more specific information:<sup>90</sup>

The area's crime rose from about 16 percent of the precinct total to 23 percent in the first few months of the project, then leveled off and gradually declined to below 20 percent.

The second area of evaluation was attitudes of the Unit Beat Commander officers as measured by a self-initiated post-test questionnaire. Bloch and Ulberg summarize their findings based on this data:<sup>91</sup>

...the police officers who were surveyed about the experiment agreed:

- By more than 2 to 1 that they were more satisfied with their jobs.
- By 3 to 1 that supervision was better.

- Almost unanimously that their new approach had a positive effect on crime patterns in their beat.
- By a big majority that they spent less time on runs and achieved more effective arrests because of unique aspects of their beat.
- Almost unanimously that they had far more contacts with citizens under the pilot project than in their previous precinct work.
- By 2 to 1 that the Beat Commander approach won more cooperation from the community.

Sherman, who visited the Unit Beat Commander operation late in the program and subjectively evaluated it, appears to be somewhat skeptical of the researchers findings.<sup>92</sup>

The improved supervisory relationship and increased job satisfaction was determined by means of a questionnaire distributed to Beat Command Team members (although this writer heard evidence of great job dissatisfaction when visiting the "dying" Beat Command project in June of 1971.)

The evaluation report concluded:<sup>93</sup>

...the decentralized semi-autonomous Beat Command system as tested in Detroit proved feasible to operate and appeared to bring substantial benefits to the police and to the segments of the community it served.

Given the problems which seem to have rendered the actual organizational changes insignificant, it is reasonable to suspect the favorable reaction to the

operation by Beat Command officers was due to the Hawthorne effect or the officer's desire to show success for their efforts.

Since this experiment was never operationalized in a way that would substantially modify the Classical organizational design, it's major importance lies in the fact that it was the first American police attempt at utilizing the Team features of the British Unit Beat Policing system. Although it fell short of expectations, the idea was later picked up by other cities including New York.

#### Democratic Team Police Model

At a seminar entitled, "Inventing the Future in Police Organization" held at the National Institute on Police and Community Relations, Michigan State University in May of 1959, the author of this study presented "An Alternative to the Classical Police Organizational Arrangements" which attempted to predict how police departments would be structured in 1980.<sup>94</sup> The basic goal of this model was to improve the social utility and effectiveness of police operations. This was to be done through a collegial team organizational

arrangement that will facilitate:<sup>95</sup>

1. Improved police and community inaction and relations so the police actions will reflect the preferences and priorities of citizens.
2. Improved communication and reduced conflicts among police employees.
3. Reductions in police behavior which offends citizens or violates individual rights.

The characteristics of the team and the rationale behind these characteristics can be summarized as follows:

1. Decentralization of operational responsibility to the neighborhood level. The jurisdiction by police would be divided into homogenous neighborhoods and a police team would be assigned to each. Such decentralization would permit variations in priorities, policies and priorities to ensure the police functions are consistent with the preferences of local communities. Police priorities in one neighborhood might be different from those in other team areas.
2. Teams of generalist-specialist police officers with stable assignments to a specific community. The officers assigned to teams would be generalist-specialists with complementary skills that would match community needs. A team would have complete responsibility for providing police services in its neighborhood. Included would be the responsibility for working with the public to define citizen preferences and priorities, developing procedures for the team operations, handling the management functions of the team, and carrying out police operations in the area. The teams were to be limited to no more than 20 to 25 members to provide personnel for four to five on-duty

officers around the clock and at the same time ensure an efficient natural communication network. The limits of effective interpersonal communication appear to be exceeded when the group gets above this figure.

3. Establishment of specialized services. This support unit would include investigators, traffic officers, criminalists and crime prevention specialists who would assist team members upon request. Their relationship to the generalist-specialist police officers would be changed to one of subordination. They would simply perform their specialized function and turn the findings over to the generalist who sought their assistance. This arrangement was designed to increase the status of the generalist police officers and reduce internal organizational communication problems caused by the traditional transfer of responsibilities from field officers to specialists. An expected result was improved self-image, attitudes and morale of generalist police officers.
4. Establishment of an Information and Coordination Section of the Police Organization. This unit would be a depository of information and data processing. It would have the responsibility for defining neighborhoods; developing and assigning teams; establishing broad area-wide policies within which all teams would operate; assigning personnel to the teams; providing technical support such as records, communications, criminalistics services, and training; and evaluating team performance to maintain minimum standards. It would serve to coordinate and support all police efforts.
5. Substitution of participatory, collegial group decision making, situational leadership and functional supervisory arrangements

for the traditional bureaucratic authority hierarchy. Such a leadership arrangement should facilitate citizen influence on police operations, citizen-police cooperation in developing and implementing police operational strategies, and place responsibilities for policing on an entire police team. It was expected to improve both internal and external communications and enhance police commitment to objectives and procedures. The involvement of citizens and police officers in decisions which affected the well-being of both was designed to reduce stereotypes and ensure that everyone would strive to meet mutually accepted behavior patterns. The situational leadership arrangement was planned to ensure that every problem undertaken by the police would have the most capable leadership available on the team. The functional supervision was directed at maximizing quality control over police operations in each area.

While this Model incorporated many of the features of previous Team Police arrangements, it differed from most in several important aspects including:

1. Work orientation. The Democratic Model was designed primarily for the provision of general interpersonal services for citizens rather than improved criminal apprehension. Hopefully, crime reduction would be an eventual outcome, but such reduction would result from the improved conditions in the community rather than increased surveillance of citizens by the police, increased informing by citizens, or higher apprehension and conviction rates.
2. Changes in the organizational control mechanism. The utilization of a rigid organizational hierarchy for autocratic control of

employee behavior would be replaced by an interpersonal collegial system which would use citizen and peer pressures. This informal system would be buttressed by a system of checks and balances with the Information and Communication Section and the Specialized Support Section having a variety of functional supervisory responsibilities.

3. Replacing the heirarchical supervision with a situational arrangement. Other team police arrangements put confidence in the ability of the first line supervisor, the sergeant, to structure, manage and supervise subordinate Team members. In particular, those team experiments in Tucson, Detroit and Syracuse relied heavily on confidence in a formally appointed commander's abilities. The authors of these experiments stressed the fact that higher police officials would now have a single person who they could hold responsible if crime in an area increased. The Democratic Model places responsibility for providing police service on the team as a whole. The leadership chosen by the team under such an arrangement should be more capable because it can vary with the duties being performed and because those people with the most accurate information about the capabilities of the team members are responsible for the selection.

This model was the basis for the Community Centered Police Team experiments in Dayton, Ohio, and Holyoke, Massachusetts.

#### Dayton's Community Centered Team Police

The Democratic Model was presented to the top commanders of the Dayton, Ohio, Police Department at a

management training program in October, 1969, and immediately thereafter Dayton developed a proposal for LEAA discretionary funding of a "Community Centered Team Police (CCTP)" project.<sup>96</sup> The overall objective stated in the Dayton proposal<sup>97</sup> was "...to provide effective police service to a neighborhood while establishing a positive relationship between neighborhood residents and the police." More specific major goals were:<sup>98</sup>

1. Test the effectiveness of a generalist approach to police service as opposed to the specialist approach now utilized by all major police organizations.
2. Produce a community-centered police structure that is responsive to neighborhood concerns and understanding of neighborhood life-styles, and
3. Alter the bureaucratic structure of the police organization away from the militaristic model toward a neighborhood oriented professional model.

In presenting the rationale behind this approach, Chief Robert Igleburger wrote:<sup>99</sup>

The success of the police will depend on development of a satisfactory role by the police; a role that can allow for neighborhood responsiveness while maintaining community respect. If crime is of concern to a neighborhood, so are the methods utilized by police departments to combat crime. While placement of a police officer on every street corner may

drastically reduce street crime, it is neither economically or politically acceptable to do so if for no other reason than the result would be an army of occupation in a democratic society.

Igleburger indicated he expected the model to improve the relationship between the residents and the team police officers and the morale of the police officers in the team community. However, the ultimate result which he wanted involved a far greater change:<sup>100</sup>

...the beat police, having increased stature, will be able to act as citizen advocates in matters of neighborhood concern, as well as be able to effectively manage community conflict. The general overall result of this project should be a demonstration of a new role for the police; that of manager of community conflict.

The Dayton Community Centered Team Police Unit was implemented in November, 1970 almost precisely the same time as the Holyoke Democratic Team Unit which is the subject of this study. Perhaps the weakest component of the Dayton project was the lack of a pre-determined research methodology. In the administrative rush to obtain funding, all action on evaluation was postponed until near the end of the first year of operation.

A few months after the preparation of the proposal, the Administrative Assistant to the Director of Police in Dayton assumed a position with the Governor's

Committee in Massachusetts, and based on his work in Dayton he encouraged the development of Team Policing experiments by Massachusetts Police agencies. The City of Holyoke, with the cooperation of the Police Department and the Model Cities Agency, developed a team policing proposal consistent with the Governor's Committee guidelines.<sup>101</sup> The proposal was approved and financed by both the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Governor's Committee (LEAA). The evaluation of this project is the subject of this study.

#### Summary and Conclusions

Dissatisfaction with police agencies is widespread. Most frequently mentioned as causes of the dissatisfaction are (1) the poor state of the relationships between police and the public, particularly minority peoples, (2) the negative attitudes and misbehavior among operational police officers, and (3) the poor performance and low productivity of police organizations.

The existing situation has been attributed to the police reliance on Classical Organization Theory. Police agencies have been structured and managed in ways

consistent with this theory and its assumptions for nearly a century. While social and technological conditions have undergone significant changes, the police have dogmatically adhered to this traditional administrative approach.

The more general management literature offers suggestions about alternative organizational and management arrangements which might alleviate many of the police problems. Included among these suggestions are (1) decentralization of decision making authority to the people affected by the decisions, (2) use of small work groups to improve communications, (3) increased use of peer pressures rather than autocratic hierarchical arrangements for control, and (4) reduction of specialization and expansion of job responsibilities.

Within the police field, scholars of police management have also made suggestions about alternate organizational approaches which might reduce police problems and criticisms of police. In addition to those changes advocated in the more general organizational literature, the police authorities have suggested, (1) stabilizing the assignments of police officers in well-defined neighborhood areas, (2) involving local citizens

with their police officers in the development of local police policies and procedures, and (3) changing the emphasis in the police role from crime to service functions.

Since 1946, a number of police agencies have implemented a variety of Team Police organizational arrangements which to varying degrees have tested these proposed organizational changes. However, most experiments have been designed simply to decentralize authority in such a way as to place responsibility for crime in a specific geographic area on first level supervisors, normally a sergeant. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that sergeants know what to do and if given broad discretion and held responsible for performing "police work" these supervisors will produce results. To facilitate the sergeants' ability to handle their assignments, they often received additional resources such police officers, technical advice, data processing support, and equipment. In addition, they frequently have been relieved of the responsibility for observing minor departmental rules and regulations. Seldom have they been given guidance on how to perform in their new role—it is assumed they already have sufficient knowledge to

organize and manage to achieve their new responsibilities.

In spite of the shortcomings of these initial experiments, the evaluations, which were basically subjective impressions, seem to support the hypothesis of the scholars. The assessment reports contended that Team Police operations produced:

1. Improved police and community relations;
2. Improved police attitudes; and
3. Increased police productivity and effectiveness.

The Democratic Team Police organizational arrangements, which will be the concern of this study contains proposals that go beyond the more traditional Team Police arrangements. In addition to attaching a small group of police officers to a specific neighborhood and giving them the responsibility for handling the police problems in the area, the Democratic Team Police is designed to:

1. Remove the team from the traditional chain of command and place the responsibilities for operational and management decisions on the entire team.
2. Use informal, situational leadership as an alternative to traditional, formally established and relatively permanent managerial and supervisory arrangements.

These features are based on a broader than usual interpretation of organizational research findings. They resemble the organizational arrangements that have in the past been used by some American Indian Tribes.<sup>102</sup>

Footnotes--Chapter II

1

Examples of the characteristics of the Classical police organization structure are reflected in V.A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1964), and O.W. Wilson and Roy McLaren, Police Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972).

2

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<sup>8</sup>Rensis Likert, "An Emerging Theory of Organization, Leadership, and Management," a paper presented at a Symposium on Leadership and Interpersonal Relations, Louisiana State University, 1959.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>10</sup>McGregor, Op. cit., pp. 33-44.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>William Tallack, Penological and Preventive Principles (London: Pittman and Sons, 1889) p. 329.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 330-331.

<sup>14</sup>Reiss, Op. cit., and Bittner, Op. cit.

<sup>15</sup>Charles Press, The Cities Within a Great City:

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<sup>16</sup> Elinor Ostrom and Gordon Whitaker, "Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference?" a paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Meeting, Albuquerque, April 8, 1971; and Angell, Op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> Angell, Op. cit., pp. 281-2.

<sup>18</sup> Press, Op. cit., pp. 8-10.

<sup>19</sup> Jeffrey Freund, "Neighborhood Police Districts: A Constitutional Analysis," California Law Review, October, 1969, p. 917.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Oaksey Committee, Op. cit., p. 6.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> Lawrence Sherman, Catherine Milton, and Thomas Kelly, Team Policing: Seven Case Studies (Washington, D.C. Police Foundation, 1973), p. xiv.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 233.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 256.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 255

<sup>43</sup> Alex Paterson, Report of the Chief Constable on the Police Establishment for the Year Ended December 31, 1951 (Salford: The Office of Constabulary, 1952), pp. 9-20.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>45</sup> Eastman and Eastman (Editors), Op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>46</sup> John Breglia, "Will the Aberdeen Patrol Plan Work in America," Law and Order, September, 1965.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> President's Commission on Law Enforcement, Op. cit.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Loren Phelps and R. Murphy, "Richmond Team Patrol System," The Police Chief, June, 1969, pp. 48-51.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Loren Phelps and L. Harmon, "Team Policing: Four Years Later," FBI Bulletin, December, 1972.

<sup>55</sup> James Elliott and T.J. Sardino, Crime Control Team (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1972).

<sup>56</sup> James Elliott, "An Experiment in Enforcement: The Crime Control Team," Law and Order, December, 1969.

<sup>57</sup> Elliott and Sardino, Op. cit., pp. 68-86.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 98.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., pp. 99.

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<sup>71</sup>"Appraisal of the New Area Policing Scheme,"  
Op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Rand, Op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>"Accrington," Police, August, 1969, p. 4.

<sup>76</sup>"Unit Beat Policing: An Assessment," A Survey of the Northwest Police Region, Reference No. B (s) p. 12 (London: Police College Library, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>77</sup>A.J.P. Butler, Unit Beat Policing: An Assessment in 1974 (London, Police College Library, June, 1974) p. 1.

<sup>78</sup>For summaries see A.F. Williams and F. Morris, Unit Beat Policing in Cheshire (Chester: Cheshire Constabulary Headquarters, July, 1969); and E. Gregory, Unit Beat Policing: Reflections on the Experiments and Implications of Widespread Adoption of the System, Report No. 11/67 (London: Home Office Planning Branch, July, 1967).

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Patrick Murphy and Peter Bloch, "Beat Commander," The Police Chief, May, 1970, pp. 16-19.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Peter Bloch and Cyrus Ulberg, "The Beat Commander Concept," The Police Chief, September, 1972, p. 56.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>87</sup>Lawrence Sherman, A Comparative Survey of Team

Policing (Unpublished manuscript prepared for The Police Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 13.

<sup>88</sup> Bloch and Ulberg, Op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 62.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>92</sup> Sherman, Op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>93</sup> Bloch and Ulberg, Op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>94</sup> Angell, Op. cit.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., pp. 225-228.

<sup>96</sup> Joseph Fink and Floyd Sealy, The Community and the Police: Conflict or Cooperation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 165-166.

<sup>97</sup> Robert Igleburger, "Team Policing Project," Dayton Police Public Information Bulletins (Dayton, Ohio: Police Department, 1969), p. 2.

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> "Team Police Development Proposal" (Holyoke: An LEAA Discretionary Grant Application, 1970).

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CHAPTER III  
DESIGN OF STUDY

The City of Holyoke, Massachusetts, although not a major population center, has many of the characteristics of larger urban areas. Once a thriving industrial town, Holyoke has been losing both industry and population. In 1960, the United States Census Bureau indicated that there were 54,540 residents of Holyoke. However, in 1970, the Census Bureau reported a population of only 50,112 (See Table III-1). As with many large cities, the complexion of the populous is also changing from middle and upper-low income white to lower income non-white. Even so, the overall ratio of minorities is still relatively low when compared to most urban areas. In 1970, two of the most significant minorities, Spanish speaking and Black citizens, accounted for only about five percent of the population.

Holyoke is a charter city with a strong mayor form of government. The legislative functions of the City are performed by a Board of Aldermen who are

elected by wards. The Aldermen annually select one of their members as Chairman for Aldermatic sessions.

TABLE III-1: Selected Demographic Characteristics of Wards I & II, and Holyoke\*

AREA	WARD I		WARD II		CITYWIDE	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Population	4,666	9	4,184	8	50,112	100
Black	420	9	223	5	1,127	2
Puerto Rican	893	19	287	7	1,496	3
White	3,338	72	3,664	88	47,362	95
Families Below Poverty Level**	235	22	246	25	1,319	11
Average Family Income	\$8,189		6,421		9,963	

\*Source 1970 U.S. Census Reports

\*\*Based on 4.3 people per family

The Mayor is elected at large and has the responsibility for the executive functions of government. In his position as City Executive, he is responsible for the police department. However, his authority is limited to the appointment of the police chief and the promotion of police officers to fill vacancies. Actually he is restricted by charter in the exercise of these powers by three limitations. First, any person appointed Police Chief must have been a resident of Holyoke for two years prior to the appointment, second, the Chief must be given a personal

services contract for one year, and third, vacancies in ranks must be confirmed by the Board of Aldermen. Therefore, while the Mayor is technically responsible for administering police, in reality his authority and ability is very restricted.

The governmental environment in Holyoke is dynamic and highly political. The police department has traditionally been organized as a centralized bureaucracy roughly in accordance with Classical Bureaucratic Theory. However, it has frequently been in the midst of political hassles with elected city officials who are constantly competing for the favor of police officers. Attempts by the mayor to manage the police agency have often been opposed by the police who like to present a public image of being "professional" police officers. Publicly, they claim to be experts at the police business and morally opposed to "political manipulation." Police seemed to view any effort by the Mayor to establish police policies, with which they disagree, as improper. Therefore, in the past, neither citizens nor their elected Mayor have substantially influenced the policies of the Holyoke police.

As with most cities, Holyoke is not well integrated in terms of race, nationality, religion or economic status. Most minority people, primarily Black and first generation Puerto Rican, are residents of one area of the city. Wards I and II contain approximately 20% of the City's total population, but nearly 60% of its Black and Puerto Rican minorities (Table III-1.) One-fourth of the families in this area had incomes below the poverty level in 1970. Most housing was multi-family, three and four story apartment buildings designated by the local people as "flats." Living conditions in these Wards were the worst in the city.

True to the stereotype, the police and public relationship in Wards I and II, particularly Ward I, was worst than any other area of Holyoke. A total of 70 assaults on police officers in Ward I was recorded in 1970. This was the highest assault per population rate of any Ward in the City. Some of these assaults, including the stabbing of one officer, the shooting of a second, and an attempt to strike a third with a flower pot thrown from a third story window, were serious.

As a result of the situation, Ward I was designated a Model Cities neighborhood and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development funded a variety of projects in the Ward. The seriousness of the police problems in 1969 and the spring of 1970 provided the impetus for city officials to authorize Model Cities planners to develop a police project to correct the situation. At the suggestion of the Massachusetts Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement, local planners modified the Dayton, Ohio, Community-Centered Team Police proposal for Holyoke.

The Project was funded with a \$40,000 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice and a \$100,000 grant from Model Cities. The project was scheduled to start in September with Team implementation planned for December 1, 1970.

Both Ward I and Ward II are located in the same part of Holyoke; separated from the rest of the city by a series of canals once used to transport materials to and from the local paper mills. The two Wards are divided by railroad tracks. These separations provided natural boundaries that made the area appear

ideal for social research. The similarities (Table III-1) between Ward I and Ward II also render these two areas suitable for a controlled Democratic Team Police experiment. They had approximately equal population. Ward I had a higher minority population (28%) than Ward II (12%). However, Ward II had a slightly larger proportion of families below the poverty level (Ward I-22%; Ward II-25%). Although no area size and street mileage figures were available, as Table III-2 reflects, these were approximately equal.

Based on the conclusion that Ward I had the most serious police and community relations problems in the City, hence, was the most desparately in need of changes which might improve the situation, Ward I was selected to be an experimental area where the Democratic Team Policing Unit would be implemented. Ward II was designated the control area which would maintain its Classical organizational design and receive the normal priorities and services from the Holyoke Police Department. The control area would, of course, provide comparison data for assessing the effect of the Team Policing Unit.

Description of Holyoke Democratic Team Approach

The Democratic Team Police operation in Ward I was to be independent of the traditional control from the command hierarchy of the Holyoke Police Department. The Team was to be assigned to Ward I for the duration of the Project and given the responsibility of providing all police services in the area. The precise goals it was to pursue and the methods that would be utilized were left to the Team. In arriving at the definition of the goals and the procedures, Team officers were expected to work closely with members of the community and their organizations. The Team structure and operations were to be flexible, insofar as possible, to enable the Team to provide the kind of police service the people of Ward I preferred. The Team Model was to have the following characteristics:

1. Police operations in Ward I were to be decentralized with the police officers working out of a local storefront rather than the central police station.
2. The Team was to be given the authority to make decisions concerning their goals, procedures, duty assignments, training needs, etc. Such authority was not given to regular patrol officers.
3. Traditional formal supervisory assignments

were to be suspended in favor of situational, informal methods.

4. The Team was to be evaluated by total results rather than individual procedures or activities.
5. The concept of autocratic management was to be dropped, and a democratic, collegial method of decision-making within the Team area was implemented.
6. The community was to be involved in policy making through periodic meetings with the Team.
7. If deemed necessary, Holyoke Police staff services and investigative support units could be called upon by the Team and its members.

The structure and approach of the Team was to be arranged to facilitate an interface of police goals and services with the citizen preferences and priorities. Further, it was to extend the police officers' operational responsibilities and discretion to include the development of methods for job performance, acquisition of equipment, selection of leaders, establishment of peer evaluation methods, work assignments and development of work schedules. The limitation of Team size at 15 to 20 members was to ensure an equal number of personnel assigned to each area and to facilitate communication among Team members.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Hyptheses were developed which will provide answers to the following three general research questions.

1. What changes in citizen attitudes toward the police appear to occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?
2. What changes in clientele attitudes toward the police appear to occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?
3. What changes in attitudes of police appear to occur when these officers are members of a Democratic Team Police arrangement?

The following, each arranged by the research question to which it relates, are the specific hypotheses which the study was designed to answer.

Citizen Attitudes Toward the Police (designated "a").

- H<sub>a1</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods like people.
- H<sub>a2</sub>: A higher porportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods are polite.
- H<sub>a3</sub>: A lower proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods tend to look down on most people.

- H<sub>a4</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods are anxious to help people.
- H<sub>a5</sub>: A lower proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods use unnecessary force.
- H<sub>a6</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report a willingness of citizens in their respective neighborhoods to assist police.
- H<sub>a7</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods are honest.
- H<sub>a8</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report the police in their respective neighborhoods are better than the police outside of their Ward.

Clientele Attitudes Toward Police (designated "b").

- H<sub>b1</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report lower police response time.
- H<sub>b2</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report positive police attitudes.
- H<sub>b3</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report they received courteous treatment from the police.

- H<sub>b4</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report more favorable attitudes toward the police after they received police service.
- H<sub>b5</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report satisfaction with the overall quality of service rendered by the police.

Police Officer Attitudes (designated "c").

- H<sub>c1</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will prefer to involve themselves in a wider range of activities than will Classical Police officers.
- H<sub>c2</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will prefer to rely less on formal action for coping with their responsibilities than will Classical Police officers.
- H<sub>c3</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will be less authoritarian and more tolerant than Classical Police officers.
- H<sub>c4</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will be less prejudiced toward minority people than Classical Police officers.
- H<sub>c5</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will have a higher tolerance for ambiguity than Classical Police officers.
- H<sub>c6</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will be more flexible than Classical Police officers.

Research Design

This study is designed (See Table III-2) to compare Experiment (Ward I) and Control (Ward II) areas

at pre and post implementation times. The Control Area (Ward II) will continue to be served by the traditional Classical policing arrangements for the duration of the experiment. The community-based, collegial "Democratic Model" of policing will be implemented in the Experimental Area (Ward I).

Preliminary or base-line (pre-test) data will be obtained from both the Experimental (Ward I) and the Control (Ward II) areas prior to the implementation of the Team Model in Ward I.

Following the collection of pre-test data, the Democratic Team Police Unit will be instituted on December 1, 1970, in Ward I and permitted to function for a period of approximately nine months at which time the post-test data collection will be initiated using instruments identical to those used in the pre-test. Such identical data collection techniques will facilitate an assessment of the degree to which changes in one area are similar to the changes in the other, as well as the difference between the two areas.

This approach, while not sufficient to definitely establish specific cause and effect relationships, will

TABLE III-2: Summary of Research Design

WARD	BASE-LINE DATA COLLECTION (pre-test)	TREATMENT	POST PROJECT DATA COLLECTION (post-test)
I  Experi- mental Area (Team Policing)	A. Public Attitude Survey  B. Client Satis- faction Survey  C. Officer Testing	YES:  Implement Team Police Model	A. Public Attitude Survey  B. Client Satis- faction Sur- vey  C. Officer Test- ing
II  Control Area (Classical Police)	A. Public Attitude Survey  B. Client Satis- faction Survey  C. Officer Testing	NO:  Maintain Current Classical Police Model	A. Public Attitude Survey  B. Client Satis- faction Sur- vey  C. Officer Test- ing

facilitate a degree of preciseness in ascertaining trends which could not be achieved by purely subjective evaluation techniques.

Although this design will govern the overall execution of the evaluation, methods of sampling and data collection will vary. For this reason, each research area will be discussed separately.

#### Citizen Attitudes

To assess the attitudes of the people living within the community, random samples of approximately 100 households will be drawn from each research area for the pre-test and the post-test. The sample of interviewees in each case will be selected by using a table of random numbers to identify the street, address and apartment number. The interviewee will be the first person of sufficient age, in the judgment of the interviewer, to understand and answer the interview questions, who responds to the interviewers knock at the door.

A specially designed, short, highly structured questionnaire will be used by trained interviewers to solicit and record each interviewee's responses. Basically, each interviewee will be asked

to agree or disagree with statements related to the quality of police or police service in the Ward of the residence. Each interview should last no longer than 10 to 15 minutes.

The attitudes of interviewees in the Experimental and Control areas will be compared using a simple chi-square test for significance. The data will be manipulated so as to facilitate the assessment of each hypothesis.

Comments related directly to the questions but considered meaningful by the interviewers will be noted at the end of the structured questionnaire, and may be used for qualitative purposes.

Further qualitative data will be obtained by the use of unstructured discussions with persons such as clergies, social workers, bartenders, and community action workers. These people will be selected on the basis of their apparent ability to furnish informed observations about community changes and attitudes. The data so obtained may be used for interpreting the statistical results.

Clientele Attitudes

The assessment of hypothesis related to clientele attitudes will be based on data obtained from samples of people in Wards I and II who requested or received police service immediately before implementation of the Team and similar size samples of people in both Wards who were police clients during the last month of the experiment.

Police Department records will be used to identify approximately 50 interviewees in each of the four categories (Pre-Experimental; Post-Experimental; Pre-Control; Post-Control.) The clientel samples will be stratified to ensure the inclusion of people who were police clients for services related to auto accidents, people who were clients because of burglaries, others because of domestic disputes, others because of breaches of the peace, a few who received information, etc. Such stratification is to prevent samples from containing people who have received police service for a narrow range of incidents.

Each person in the sample will be interviewed. The interviews will be structured requiring short

responses. Due to the diversity expected in this area, after covering specific questions common to all of the interviews, the questions will become more open-ended allowing each interviewee to indicate possible unique characteristics of the service he received.

Satisfaction with police service will be compared between the Experimental and Control areas, using the simple chi-square test for significance.

#### Officer Attitudes

Police officers working in each area will be tested and interviewed before and after the experiment to obtain data related to a variety of characteristics. All officers working in the Experimental Area will be utilized for this evaluation. A random sample of officers from the Department will be used to represent the Control Area.

Previously developed and standardized scales will be used for this aspect of the evaluation. These tests will be (1) Activity and Formalism Scales,<sup>1</sup> (2) Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism Scales,<sup>2</sup> (3) Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale,<sup>3</sup> (4) Rigidity Scale.<sup>4</sup>

The pre and post-test data obtained from Control

and Experimental officers will be compared. Change registered on each level will also be measured and used to compare the two areas. The t-Test ( $\alpha=.05$ ) will be used to test the difference between the Experimental and Control groups.

In addition, informal discussions and interviews with police officers will be used to obtain subjective, qualitative data related to such areas as officer perceptions of the impact of the project, problems encountered in implementation and officer morale. The information obtained may be used to interpret or qualify the statistical findings or to make other subjective observations.

### Conclusions

The information obtained from the administration of the preceding design will provide data for testing the specific hypotheses, and answering the broader research questions.

Footnotes--Chapter III

<sup>1</sup> See Michael O'Neill, The Role of the Police--Normative Role Expectations in a Metropolitan Police Department (State University of New York, Albany: Doctoral Dissertation, 1974). O'Neill developed the Activism-Formalism instrument to measure police officers preference for "activity" (Extent to which the respondent believes it is appropriate to intervene in situations where police action is discretionary) and "formalism" (degree to which police officers see formal rules and legal sanctions such as arrest, and citations as he sole tools for coping with official police problems.)

<sup>2</sup> See T.W. Adorno, et.al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper-Rowe, 1950). The California F Scale Form 45 was used to obtain general Authoritarianism scores (this will permit as assessment of the respondents inclination to submit to or use authority.) The California PEC Scale Form 45 is to measure ethnocentrism (stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction with ingroups rightly dominate and outgroups subordinate.)

<sup>3</sup> Stanley Budner, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable," Journal of Personality, June, 1963, pp. 109-31. This scale to determine officers' tendencies to interpret ambiguous situations as sources of threat. Ambiguous situations are identified as those characterized by novelty, complexity, or insolubility; and indicators of perception of threat as dislike, repression, avoidance behavior, and destructive behavior.

<sup>4</sup> See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 418-419. The Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale is to obtain data about the resistance of officers to new situations, changing conditions and new circumstances.

CHAPTER IV  
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

This chapter will be devoted to a description of the implementation of the experiment and the results obtained. The presentation of material in both of these areas should facilitate a more complete understanding of the findings.

Team Selection

The initiation of the study was in late August, 1970. The first step involved the acquisition of police officers for the Team. Rather than randomly assign officers to the Team, police officials decided to seek volunteers. This decision, while logical from the viewpoint of managers concerned about avoiding unnecessary conflict and anxious to provide Team police officers who were willing to work in the Ward I area, was the first of several decisions to place a higher priority on political and managerial considerations than research.

To obtain volunteers the police conducted an

intensive internal information program using role call assemblies to explain Democratic Team Policing to all Holyoke police officers. Following these sessions, officers who expressed an interest in the concept--approximately 30% of the force--were ordered to attend several weekend sessions for more details about the experiment. From this group, twenty-five policemen volunteered for the Team.

In early October, all volunteer officers took the pre-test battery of psychological tests. Simultaneously, a control group of twenty officers, randomly selected from those uniformed officers who remained out of the Team, were similarly tested. Since assignment practices of the Department require rotation of all non-team Holyoke police officers into the Control area (Ward II) during the course of the experiment, this sample was used to represent the police of Ward II.

All of the Team volunteers were then exposed to "Team-building" sessions on a one day-a-week basis for three weeks in October. During these three sessions, several of the Team volunteers were de-selected, either at their own request or by the other volunteers,

and the team size was reached. The final team was made up of one captain, two sergeants and twelve patrolmen.

### Team Training

A pre-implementation training program was initiated on an overtime basis, primarily on Saturdays and Sundays, to prepare the Team for operation in December. This program was designed to achieve two goals, (1) to orient Team members to the flexible, participatory approach required by Democratic Team Policing, and (2) to provide Team members with operational skills which they may not have previously needed. Training consultants assisted Team members in identifying their needs and preparing specifics of the training program. The training sessions were built on an assumption that individual members of the Team had different skill strengths and deficiencies. Further, it was assumed the individual members of the Team already possessed knowledge for correcting deficiencies of other members. Therefore, the program was organized in a manner which gave team members a number of opportunities to participate in educating themselves. In addition, since some of the knowledge and skills needed were beyond any of

the Team members, some training sessions were taught by "experts" from outside the group.

The "curriculum" consisted of two major parts; local sessions and site visitations. The local training sessions contained over one hundred hours of classroom work. Included were courses on operational techniques presented by Holyoke Community College faculty and a variety of seminars and work sessions conducted by consultants and members of the team. These sessions continued throughout the project until June 1971.

Consultants from throughout the country conducted short seminars related to organization and management theory and Democratic Team Policing philosophy. In conjunction with these sessions, Team officers worked through budgeting, management, and situational leadership problems which the Team had to solve to operationalize the experiment. The Team officers proceeded in these sessions to develop strategies for purchasing equipment and supplies, organizing Team Police records, planning Team communication system, preparing a Team procedural manual, and handling a variety of other matters critical to the implementation of the Team Operation in Ward I in December, 1970. Once a strategy was agreed to by the

entire Team, it was implemented and the person responsible would report the impact back to the Team.

The site visitations were used to provide the Team members with opportunities to visit other cities where innovative police programs had encountered problems similar to those facing the Holyoke Team. One or more of the Team officers visited and studied relevant police situations in Covina, Los Angeles, Oakland, Richmond, California; Syracuse, New York, New York; Dayton, Ohio; Miami, Florida; Louisville, Kentucky; and Minneapolis, Minnesota. Upon their return to Holyoke, officers who traveled to other cities used group sessions to describe their findings to other Team members.

The secondary emphasis of the training sessions was on the participatory process itself. Team officers seem to concentrate heavily on learning to assume authority and participate in decision-making about the management of their own neighborhood police operations.

#### Team Self-Organization

As previously mentioned, the initial self-organization and planning by the Team Police officers began as part of the training program in late October

and November. The Team officers were told by consultants and local officials that the responsibility for the success or failure of the project was in their hands. They were encouraged to learn and use information about the informal organization of the Police Department and Holyoke City Government to achieve their goals. Working in a collegial arrangement, the Team began to prepare the details for implementing their operation in Ward I.

After a few initial discussions, Team members observed difficulty both in keeping their discussions on the topic under consideration as well as in remembering the precise decisions which they made. Therefore, they decided to adopt Robert's Rules of Order for their meetings. This agreement to formal procedures for meetings facilitated orderly discussions and established a method of recording decisions. Concurrent with this procedural decision, the Team also elected a Team Chairman, an officer of patrolman rank. The Chairman immediately appointed an officer as Team secretary who would record decisions made by the group.

The Team Chairman was empowered to develop agendas, appoint committees, and take actions to control

the meetings. This officer served as chairman for the duration of the experiment, although Team rules provided for his challenge at the end of six months.

Therefore, after some initial insecurity and disorganization, the Team proceeded to identify problems, establish priorities among the problems, and appoint three and four member committees to study the problems and make recommendations back to the entire team (See Appendix for the Team structure established by the officers). One committee worked on communications, another on equipment, a third on relationships with the rest of the police department, and a fourth on community relations. Team members were frequently members of more than one committee to facilitate liaison and communication between committees with closely related responsibilities (e.g. the Communications Committee and the Equipment Committee).

The captain and sergeants informally relinquished their authority and participated as equal Team members. Although it was the consensus of the Team that the captain, who was designated before the start of the project as Project Director, could overrule a Team decision, all Team members were to be involved in decision-making

related to the management of the program, and a consensus was to rule unless the captain was convinced the implementation of a group decision would seriously damage the team, department, or a citizen.

One interesting fact is that in spite of the Team's authority structure, the public and members of mass media usually sought out those Team officers with formal rank rather than the appointed leaders, when dealing with the group or seeking information. In addition, other Holyoke police executives nearly always relied on the captain rather than the Team chairman in communicating with the Team.

After approximately six weeks of planning and preparation, the Team felt prepared to assume responsibility for policing in the Ward I neighborhood. Their headquarters was an abandoned store on the ground floor of a walk-up tenant building. Not only had the officers located this space, they negotiated the rent, prepared the lease papers and processed all of the necessary paperwork through City Hall. In addition, they purchased the necessary materials and equipment and remodeled the building to suit their needs. Their equipment included

vehicles for which they had prepared specifications. To cut red tape and speed delivery, Team officers picked the vehicles up at the factory in Detroit.

They had established a major formal communications link with Ward I citizens through a Model Cities Crime and Delinquency Task Force and a nine member Community Relations Council. Team members decided after a few meetings that by working with local citizens they could better anticipate potential law enforcement problems and prepare to cope with them. The first substantial cooperation had resulted in the preparation of a manual of procedures which the police agreed to follow.

In addition to the police officers who were Team members, four Community Service Officers, who were paid by Model Cities, had been hired to work with the Team. Monies from Model Cities also paid for paraprofessional and professional psychological and psychiatric services supportive of the Team. However, as it turned out, the Team members failed to make extensive use of the mental health workers.

Citizen and Clientele Pre-Test Problems

The Holyoke Model Cities Agency, which funded a significant portion of this study, retained the exclusive right to conduct field interviewing in the Model Cities area. Even though Model Cities committed to completing the pre-test of the citizen and clientele questionnaires before the Team was implemented in Ward I on December 1, 1970, they were unable to meet their commitment. The Team implementation was delayed for almost two weeks to give Model Cities additional time to conduct the pre-test data collection. Finally, the action component of the experiment could be delayed no longer and the Team was implemented in Ward I on December 13, 1970.

The citizen attitude pre-test data collection was not initiated until January 18, 1971, over a month after the Team had been implemented. In this interim period, the pre-test may have been contaminated by situations which will be explained in the next section of this chapter.

Despite previous assurance by police officials that they could provide the names of clients, existing police records were not adequate to produce a sample

TABLE IV-1: Modified Research Design Summary

WARD	PRE-DATA COLLECTION 10/70	TREATMENT 12/13/70	LATE PRE-DATA COLLECTION 1/18/71	TREATMENT	POST DATA COLLECTION 9/71
I Experi- mental Area		<u>Yes</u> Team Implemented	a.Citizen* Attitude	<u>Yes</u> Team Operation	a.Citizen* Attitude b.Clientele** Attitude c.Officer Testing
II Con- trol Area		<u>No</u> Main- tain Classi- cal Police	a.Citizen* Attitude	<u>No</u> Classi- cal Opera- tion	a.Citizen Attitude b.Clientele** Attitude c.Officer Testing

\*Data Collection was one month after Team Implementation.

\*\*Pre-test data in this area was not collected because police records were inadequate for drawing sample.

of people who had received police service immediately prior to the implementation of the Team. Therefore, the clientele pre-test data collection could not be conducted.

As a result of these problems, the implementation of the research design in the areas of citizen and clientele attitudes was not possible. Table IV-1 reflects the research program as it was actually carried out. Because of the delay, the pre-test interviewing for data on citizen attitudes was in essence an interim-test rather than a pre-test. The plan to collect pre-test data on clientele attitudes was completely dropped. However, the pre- and post-testing of police officers was carried out as originally planned.

#### Team Implementation

On Sunday, December 13, 1970, after the two week delay in an effort to obtain pre-test data, the Holyoke Team Policing Unit began operations from their storefront headquarters at 57 Lyman Street. Of the initial twenty-five policemen who had volunteered for the Team, fifteen had selected themselves to be the members of the Ward I Democratic Team Policing Unit.

The citizens of Holyoke were made aware of the Team implementation by widespread publicity arranged by the Model Cities Agency; newspapers as far away as Boston featured the experiment. The local daily paper carried several front page stories. Both radio and television stations in Holyoke featured news stories on the project.

An open house reception was held in the headquarters on the first day of operations, and free refreshments were offered to all visitors. The turn-out was estimated at 300 people. The Team attributed this turn-out primarily to announcements by two large Catholic churches, a Baptist church, and the Model Cities Newsletter in the Ward I neighborhood. All Team members were present and attempted to personally meet and talk to as many of the visitors as possible.

At the outset, according to local citizens who were interviewed, there seemed to be no preponderance of either positive or negative feelings about the new approach to policing. The people who came to the reception seemed to come out of curiosity rather than to welcome the team or to reject it. However, without adequate pre-test data, this impression of citizen attitudes cannot be statistically documented.

One week later on Sunday, December 20, 1970, shortly after 6:00 p.m., a Team police officer on duty in the neighborhood headquarters was notified that the third floor of the building, a tenant area, was on fire. In the absence of their mother, several children had been trying to light the traditional Christmas candles, and had started the fire. The officer determined that none of the occupants was in immediate danger, and used his portable police radio to notify the fire department.

Two more members of the Team arrived on the scene and began efforts to evacuate the residents of the area. The officers encountered some difficulty in communicating the urgency of the situation to some people since many spoke only French or Spanish. The community service officers, who had various language proficiencies, proved to be valuable in this area.

Although the fire consumed the entire building and part of the adjacent apartment building for a total of nearly half a block, no injuries were reported. However, the homes of approximately fifty families (215 people) were destroyed. Since no life was lost in what might have been a disastrous fire, many concluded the Team Police officers had functioned well. News reporters

were quick to spread the word that the Team Police Unit had been responsible for the safe evacuation of residents. Several reporters lauded the fact that the Team turned its attention to evacuating its own files and equipment only after all residents of the burning building had been safely rescued.

The fire may also have resulted in improved cooperation between the Team and youths in the neighborhood. At the request of the police, members of the Outcast Renegade Motorcycle Club, a Spanish-speaking Ward I youth group previously considered "rebels" by the police, assisted in rescue and evacuation efforts. Other club members posted themselves on the roofs of nearby buildings to insure that the fire did not spread. Team members attitudes toward these young people seemed to be much different after the fire.

In addition, although the Team Policing Unit did not take an active part in soliciting money, goods, or services for the victims of the fire, many people volunteered support and delivered food and materials for the victims to the Team Police officers. Several members of the Team took good advantage of the situation by

dressing as Santa Claus and distributing toys to the children dislocated by the fire.

Following the fire, the Team relocated in a new headquarters a few blocks from their original site. This new location placed them closer to the center of Ward I. Non-residents as well as residents began to stop in to seek advice and assistance, or in many instances just to talk.

The young people of Ward I began to use the headquarters as a lounging place. Several of the officers on the Team appeared to encourage this type of behavior. These police officers began to consider themselves the "youth specialists" of the Team, and they started visiting the Ward I schools and talking in the classes.

At the suggestion of these officers, a number of projects involving area children were initiated by the Team. These projects included establishing a contest for local youths to design an emblem to be affixed to the Team's new uniform (blazers and civilian style slacks); organizing baseball teams with the equipment purchased by funds from a coke machine located in the Team headquarters (incidentally, many local children ran a charge account to buy cokes); conducting

neighborhood dances; and designing a neighborhood float for the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Team seemed to take pride in the fact they were providing a variety of unique services to Ward I people. They encouraged the people they served to drop in for a cup of coffee or a coke.

The neighborhood headquarters was equipped with files, typewriters, desks, portable radios, and extension phones. Calls were answered by a Team clerk, who spoke Spanish, or a Team member. When all Team members were out, the Team's communications system was arranged so that by the flip of a switch all telephone calls were automatically diverted to the main Holyoke Police Department communications desk for dispatching to the Team officers. All requests for service or reports of incidents received by Team members were recorded and assigned a control number so that they could be filed and retrieved. Although case records were maintained in the local headquarters, copies were also sent to central police records section.

Team members did the follow-up investigations on all cases. However, due to the small number of

serious incidents, this follow-up did not involve them in many major crime investigations. The officers, newspaper reports, and unstructured interviews with Ward I citizens suggest that the Team members were extremely concerned with assisting people in the area rather than criminal apprehension.

The internal operation of the team was open and participatory throughout the experimental period. Committee of the Whole (entire team) meetings, which were usually attended by local citizens, were held twice monthly. The Team attempted to confine policy decisions to these meetings. Personnel work schedules, disciplinary problems and major policy issues were handled in these sessions. All new rules and procedures which would effect police operations or Ward I citizens were discussed in these meetings. Citizens were given a voice in the discussions, and people attending were also afforded opportunities to raise questions, complain about police, and offer suggestions and advice.

Although the police captain who was Project Director technically maintained the authority to overrule any decision made by the group, the concept of "one person, one vote" prevailed. Both the citizens and police

officers influenced Team decisions.

#### Administrative and Political Environment

An atmosphere of cooperation and good will seemed to prevail within the Team throughout the project, but the Team operation was in the midst of an administrative-political maelstrom throughout the experimental period. At one time or another, the team was involved in a controversy with the Mayor's office, the Aldermanic Board, the Police Department, and the Holyoke Model Cities Agency. Team members spend considerable time simply struggling for existence as a result of this situation.

The earliest major conflict occurred when a top commander of the police department publicly claimed that the Team was not being adequately controlled in a "military" fashion and Team members reacted defensively. In a television interview, a Team member responded that the Team exercised greater discipline and was more productive than any other group in the Holyoke Police Department. This dispute appeared to be the start of polarization between the Team and other Holyoke police officers. Both groups expressed mutual bitterness. Organizational changes were initiated, including the establishment of

weekly meetings of the Project Director and other Holyoke police commanders, in an attempt to improve the communication channels, but in truth, the conflicts and tensions appeared to increase with the age of the project.

Another source of problems between the Team and other police officers was the Team members' disregard for the traditional practices of the Holyoke Police Department. The Team's decision to drop the usual uniform and use blazers and slacks, the adoption of economy police cars by the Team, the reduction of reliance on seniority for assigning Team officers, and the distribution of overtime were all irritants to non-team officers. Extensive favorable publicity given the Team by the mass media seemed to further exasperate non-team officers.

From the outset, some police commanders had privately expressed the opinion that the project would not solve any police problems; rather it would be a source of new problems. As implementation proceeded, these managers claimed Model Cities officials had promised to give the Holyoke Police Department additional resources to fight crime throughout the City as an

inducement to accept the project. They insisted that not only had Model Cities failed to meet the commitment, the Team was actually depriving the rest of the organization of existing resources.

As the favorable publicity about the Team's work increased, these police officials seemed to increase their informal campaign to sabotage the experiment. They put considerable pressure on the Mayor and Aldermen to tighten the chain of command or scrap the project. Since the Mayor had provided the initial support for the concept and was committed to seeing the notion succeed, some Aldermen were very supportive of the police commanders. However, the projects' good press and positive citizen attitudes probably played a role in controlling the level of political outcries.

The Model Cities Agency's relationship with the Team also resulted in friction. The problem seemed to revolve around the question, "Who's in charge here?" The Team expressed the view that the reporting requirements established by the Model Cities Agency were onerous and Team members argued for more autonomy from the Agency. Further, the Team members indicated they felt Model Cities

was not producing the resources and support it had promised. Finally, personal relationships between some individuals in the two groups deteriorated as time passed. These personal frictions can be attributed to personality differences, variations in philosophies and administrative styles, and the competition for credit for the experiment.

Model City Agency officials appeared to consider the Team Police Unit their innovation and a part of their organizational structure. When police executives reacted negatively toward the Team, Model Cities managers construed it to be blatant evidence that the police officials were less than competent managers. This attitude further reduced meaningful communications with the police officials to formal channels and memos.

Midway through the experiment the strained relationship between Model Cities managers and top Holyoke police executives turned into verbal conflict in the press. Police executives told local reporters Model Cities had not only failed to produce on the commitment to provide additional resources for the entire police department, further, Model Cities officials were interfering with the operation of the police department by insulting the

Team Police Unit from centralized police control. They were particularly incensed by Model Cities people who supported a policy decision by the Team to prohibit all non-team Holyoke police officers from entering the Team jurisdictional area on police business without specific authorization of a Team member. To the dismay of the police officials, the Mayor supported Model Cities and the Team decision, and the territorial imperative of the Team to police the Ward I neighborhood was preserved throughout the project. However, the conflict between police and Model Cities managers was to become even more intense after this incident.

One of the most explosive of the situations related to the team was its position in the Holyoke political milieu. The mayor was a major, if not the only local political sponsor of the Team Policing project. Since the Team Model itself had not been subjected to any previous evaluative research, opposition to it was a relatively safe political strategy; particularly in light of the police managers' support of such opposition. Associated issues such as the future expansion possibilities for the Team, the development of the police department,

and fiscal matters required public discussion and debate in the Aldermanic meetings. Add to this the fact that the Team's first year of operation was an election year, and it is easy to surmise the Team's sensitive political position during the period.

Although the preceding description of the human aspects of implementation suffers from brevity and impreciseness, it serves to illustrate the scope and multitude of problems encountered in performing the study. As this review illustrates, the number and complexity of variables which may have contaminated the research defy complete definition, let alone measurement. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the statistical results obtained in each of the three major research areas.

#### Citizen Attitude Results

The question to be answered in the area of citizen attitudes toward the police is, "What changes in citizen attitudes toward the police occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?" The hypotheses related to this question predict an improvement in attitudes will occur under

Team Policing. The interview structure used for data collection was organized so the data for testing each hypothesis could be obtained from a single interview question.

As previously explained, this component of the study was complicated by the failure to collect pre-test data until over a month after the experimental Team was initiated in the Ward I area. Therefore, the initial data collected was actually not pre-test data, but rather interim-experiment data. None-the-less, consistent with the original research plans the experimental (Ward I) area was compared with the control(Ward II) area. Further, the amount of change between pre and post tests in the experimental area was assessed. A simple Chi-square ( $X^2$ ) analysis was used to determine what significance, if any, occurred. An  $\alpha = .05$  was established as the minimum acceptable level of statistical significance.

$H_{a1}$ : A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police Area will report the police in their respective areas like people.

To obtain data for the evaluation of  $H_{a1}$ , interviewers asked each interviewee in the citizen samples to agree or disagree with the statement, "The police in

this Ward like people." Interviewees who responded that they did not know were recorded as giving "neutral" responses. A summary of the responses to this statement is presented in Table IV-2.

Both the pre-test and post-test responses to the first question were consistent--there was no significant change in the proportion of interviewees who agreed or those who disagreed with this statement. In both wards the majority of the interviewees agreed that the police in their respective Ward like people. However, although not statistically significant, both the pre-tests and post-tests reflected a higher proportion of the citizens in the experimental (Ward I) Team Policing area (Pre-test: 70%; Post-test: 77%) who reported they believed the police in their area like people than was the case in the control (Ward II) Classical Police area (Pre-test: 63%; Post-test: 64%).

Since the difference between the citizen attitudes in the two wards is not significant at  $p < .05$   $H_{a1}$  is not accepted.

TABLE IV-2: The Police in our Ward Like People

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test		Post-test		Pre-test		Post-test	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Agree	64	70	72	71	56	63	64	64
Neutral	22	24	28	28	27	30	31	31
Disagree	6	6	2	2	4	4	3	3
No Answer	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
Total	92	100	102	101	89	99	100	100

\*Percentages in this table and all other tables are rounded off to the nearest whole number.

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 2.68$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = .743$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

H<sub>a2</sub>: A higher proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas are polite.

Data concerning how the citizens felt about the politeness of their police was obtained by asking interviewees to indicate agreement or disagreement with the statement, "The Police in my ward are polite." Table IV-3 contains the results.

There was no significant difference between the Ward I interviewees pre-test and post-test attitudes about the politeness of the Democratic Team Police officers. Hence, approximately the same proportion of Ward I citizens interviewed in September (81%) as in February (79%) felt the Team Police officers were polite.

A post-test comparison of Wards I and II produced a significant difference ( $p < .001$ ) between the opinions of interviewees served by the Team Police and those served by Classical Police. Eighty-one percent of the interviewees in the Team Police served Ward I agreed their police were polite whereas only 52% of the interviewees in the Classical Police Ward indicated their police were polite. This difference was partially caused by a substantial drop in the proportion of post-test Ward II

TABLE IV-3: Police in Our Ward are Polite

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	73	79	82	81	63	71	52	52
Neutral	13	14	17	17	14	16	38	38
Disagree	5	5	3	3	7	8	2	2
No Answer	1	1	0	0	5	6	8	8
Total	92	100	102	101	89	101	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 4.60$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = 22.91$$

$$df = 3$$

Significant ( $p < .001, X^2=16.30$ )

interviewees who reported that their police were polite (pre-test:71% vs post-test:52%).

Therefore, while  $H_{a2}$  as stated must be accepted, the experiment has resulted in the reported attitudes of interviewees in the Classical Police (Ward II) area changing in an unanticipated negative direction.

$H_{a3}$ : A lower proportion of citizens in a Democratic Team Police Area than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas tend to look down on people.

It is tempting for a Police officer, who has been trained to maintain an aloof, objective and impersonal attitude, to give citizens the impression he feels himself to be superior to the average person. This is particularly true when the officer is working in an area such as Wards I and II where a large number of the citizens speak Spanish as their primary language. The Team Policing structure was designed to help alleviate the type of police-community insulation that facilitates the development of such attitudes.

In order to evaluate  $H_{a3}$  which is related to this area, interviewees were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "The police in my ward tend to 'look down' on most people." (See Table IV-4).

TABLE IV-4: Police in My Ward Tend to 'Look Down' on Most People

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	14	15	6	6	15	17	17	17
Neutral	25	27	32	31	32	36	36	36
Disagree	52	56	63	63	41	46	45	45
No Answer	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Total	92	99	102	101	89	100	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 3.11$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = 8.45$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant ( $p < .05$ ,  $X^2=5.99$ )

The pre-test results do not show any significant difference in the original attitudes of the interviewees on this question. Approximately 15% of the interviewees served by Team Police and 17% of interviewees served by Classical Police felt their police "tend to look down on most people." The post-test data collected in the Classical Police area is unchanged-- in fact, it shows the interviewees attitudes reported in March are identical to those reported in September.

The Team Police (Ward I) interviewees attitudes were considerably higher, although not enough for statistical significance, in the post-test than in the pre-test. However, this change was sufficient to result in the difference between the post-test citizen attitudes from the Team Police and Classical police areas being significantly different ( $p < .05$ ). A smaller proportion of the interviewees in the Team Police (Ward I) area than in the Classical Police (Ward II) area said their police ... "tend to look down on most people." The reported attitudes of interviewees in the Team Police area were higher in post-test than they were in the pre-test, a change which reflects a positive project impact.

The results support  $H_{a3}$  and it is accepted as valid.

H<sub>a4</sub>: A higher proportion of the citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas are anxious to help people.

To obtain data that would reflect the effect of the Team Policing project on establishing among citizens the feeling that police officers are interested in helping them, interviewers asked interviewees the extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "The police in my ward are anxious to help people." Table IV-5 contains the compiled results of the interviewee responses to this statement.

The pre-test results show interviewee attitudes to have been nearly identical in the two wards in February. The attitudes of interviewees in the Team Police (Ward I) area were slightly more favorable toward Team Police officers in September, however, the changes in Ward I attitudes were not great enough to be statistically significant. However, in the Classical Police area (Ward II), the proportion of interviewees, who reported their police were anxious to help people, was 21% lower than in the pre-test.

Again this data reflects that the project has not significantly affected the attitudes of citizen

TABLE IV-5: Police in My Ward are Anxious to Help People

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	57	62	68	67	55	61	40	40
Neutral	24	26	28	28	20	23	43	43
Disagree	11	12	5	5	14	16	15	15
No Answer	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	2
Total	92	100	102	101	89	100	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 3.11$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD Post-test

$$X^2 = 15.38$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant ( $p < .001$ ,  $X^2 = 13.80$ )

interviewees after the pre-test in Ward I, but has caused a significant drop in the reported citizen attitudes in the area policed by the Classical Police operation.

The post-test comparison of the data from the two areas show the difference to be significant at  $p < .001$ ; therefore,  $H_{a4}$  is accepted.

$H_{a5}$ : A higher proportion of the citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas do not use unnecessary force.

If the police are to cultivate the confidence and support of the public, citizens should be confident police officers do not use more force than is necessary to carry out their legal responsibilities. In an effort to assess the impact of the Team Policing experiment on citizen opinions about the police use of force, interviewees in both wards were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "Police in my ward do not use force any more than they have to." Table IV-6 reflects the results.

Citizen responses in both wards were nearly constant in the pre and post-tests. In both cases the attitudes of interviewees in Ward I were substantially

TABLE IV-6: Police in My Ward Do Not Use More Force Than They Have To

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	57	62	62	61	43	48	44	44
Neutral	21	23	29	28	31	35	43	43
Disagree	14	15	11	11	15	17	12	12
No Answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	92	100	102	100	89	100	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 1.33$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = 5.77$$

$$df = 2$$

ns (For significance  $p < .05, X^2=5.99$ )

although not significantly, more favorable toward the Team Police officers in Ward I than were citizen attitudes in Ward II toward the Classical Police.

A comparison of Ward I with Ward II post-test results also are not significant even though the  $X^2$  score of 5.77 is close to the required  $X^2 = 5.99$ . Therefore, the evidence concerning police willingness to use unnecessary force is inclusive.  $H_{a5}$  is rejected.

$H_{a6}$ : A higher proportion of the citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police area will report a willingness of citizens in their respective areas to assist police.

The questionnaire had only one statement designed to get interviewees impressions about the amount of assistance they felt the police receive from the public. The interviewees in each ward were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement, "The police in our ward get a lot of help from the people living in our ward." See Table IV-7 for a summary of the results.

There are no significant differences, either on the pre-test or the post-test, between the Ward I and Ward II interviewee attitudes about the extent to which

TABLE IV-7: The Police in Our Ward Get A  
Lot of Help From Citizens

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	38	41	40	39	30	33	31	31
Neutral	28	30	39	38	36	40	49	49
Disagree	25	28	20	20	23	26	17	17
No Answer	1	1	3	3	0	0	3	3
Total	92	100	102	100	89	99	100	100

Comparison

Ward I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$x^2 = 2.07$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$x^2 = 2.50$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

citizens help police. Apparently the project had no substantial effect on interviewee attitudes in either the Team or Classical Police area.

Based on these results  $H_{a6}$  must be rejected.

$H_{a7}$ : A higher proportion of the citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas are honest.

Table IV-8 contains a compilation of the data obtained when interviewees were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "The police in our ward are honest." Although the interviewees in the Team Policing (Ward I) area reported more favorable attitudes at both pre-test and post-test than the attitudes reported in Ward II, both wards reflected a negative attitude change between the pre-test and the post-test.

In September the proportion of interviewees in the Team Police area who agreed their police were honest was 8% lower than in the February pre-test. In the Classical police 12% fewer interviewees felt the police in their area were honest. These negative trends in attitude toward police honesty are not distinct enough to be statistically significant. However, the change between the pre-test and post-test is sufficient to

TABLE IV-8: The Police In Our Ward Are Honest

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	70	77	70	69	58	65	53	53
Neutral	18	20	29	28	25	28	40	40
Disagree	4	4	3	3	6	7	5	5
No Answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	92	101	102	100	100	100	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 2.20$$

$$df = 2$$

ns

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = 4.52$$

$$df = 2$$

ns (Significance  $p < .05$ ,  $X^2=5.99$ )

produce a statistical significant difference between the post-test results in the two areas. Therefore,  $H_{a7}$  is accepted.

$H_{a8}$ : A higher proportion of the citizens in a Democratic Team Police area than in a Classical Police area will report the police in their respective areas are better than the police outside of their area.

The basic purpose of the Team Policing experiment was to improve the overall quality of policing in Ward I. In an effort to get data which would reflect on the success of the experiment, the interviewees in both wards were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "The police in our ward are better than police in other wards." These results are reported in Table IV-9.

Although the responses of interviewees were very similar when the pre-test data was collected in February, in September the post-test revealed a substantial difference. In the Team Police area the proportion of interviewees who felt Team Police were better than other police was 14% higher than on the pre-test. At the end of the project, data from Ward II reflected 7% fewer interviewees felt their police to be better than those in other areas.

TABLE IV-9: The Police In Our Ward Are Better  
Than Police In Other Wards

	WARD I				WARD II			
	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%	Pre-test #	%	Post-test #	%
Agree	17	18	32	32	12	13	5	5
Neutral	57	62	61	61	59	66	74	74
Disagree	18	20	9	8	17	19	19	19
No Answer	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Total	92	100	102	101	89	99	100	100

Comparison

WARD I Pre-test vs Post-test

$$X^2 = 7.23$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant ( $p < .05$ ,  $X^2=5.99$ )

WARD I vs WARD II Post-test

$$X^2 = 24.45$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant ( $p < .001$ ,  $X^2=13.80$ )

At the end of the experimental period, citizens who lived in the Team Police area had significantly higher opinions of the quality of their police than citizens who lived in Ward II had of their police ( $p < .001$ ). These results confirm  $H_{a3}$  is valid.

In summary, the preceding results reveal that the most salient trends in citizen attitude changes occurring during this study were:

1. In Ward I when interviewees attitudes toward their (Team) police did not remain stable, they tended to change slightly in a positive direction.
2. In Ward II when interviewees attitudes toward their (Classical) Police did not remain stable, they tended to change sharply in a negative direction.
3. Interviewees attitudes about the quality of Team Police changed in a distinctly positive direction.

Further, it is important to recognize that none of the attitudinal data collected during the course of the study reveals more negative citizen attitudes toward the Team Police than toward the Classical Police. Similarly, only one (Honesty) of the attitudinal changes toward the police in the experimental Team area was in a negative direction.

Clientele Attitude Results

The previously explained problem encountered in drawing a pre-test sample of police clientele forced the cancellation of the pre-test data collection in the area of clientele attitudes. Hence, the data on clientele attitudes are the result of post-tests in the experimental and control areas. This forces reliance on post-test comparisons which, particularly in light of the results from the citizen attitude study, produces less meaningful information than the original pre-test/post-test design. However, since the clientele data collection instrument is designed to obtain specific information--from police clients, who have had personal experience--about the quality of police responses, and services, the results are less likely to have been influenced by the publicity surrounding the experiment than are the results of an opinion survey of citizens who in most instances have not personally received police services. None-the-less, the possibility of distorted data certainly exists.

The data, obtained from clientele who received police services during the last month of the experiment (August, 1971) are summarized in Tables IV-10 through

IV-15. Collectively these results will be utilized to answer the research question, "What changes in Clientele attitudes toward the police appear to occur in a neighborhood where a Democratic Team Police arrangement is implemented?" A simple Chi-square ( $X^2$ ) test will be used to assess the validity of hypotheses related to this research question. The significance level is  $p < .05$ .

$H_{b1}$ : A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report lower police response time.

Clientele impressions of police response time are important in this study for two reasons. First, some people doubt whether a Collegial organization can provide police services as rapidly as a Bureaucratic organization. Second, there is reason to believe that citizen perceptions of police response time influence their opinions concerning police efficiency.

The data for comparing the response times of the Team with Classical Police was obtained by asking the clients served by each group, "How many minutes would you estimate lapsed between the time you called the police and an officer arrived?" The clientele responses are

summarized in Table IV-10.

The proportion of clients served by the Team Police who reported less than a 6 minute time lapse was over twice as large as the proportion in the Classical Police area (Team Police = 54%; Classical Police = 26%). The difference between the reported response times of the two police groups is significant at  $p < .05$ . Since Team Police clients reported a faster response time than Classical clients,  $H_{b1}$  is accepted as valid.

TABLE IV-10: Estimated Response Time

Time Lapse	WARD I		WARD II	
	#	%	#	%
Less than 6 minutes	25	54	13	26
7 - 11 minutes	7	15	12	24
Over 12 minutes	12	26	17	33
No answer	2	4	9	18
Total	46	99	51	101

Comparison

WARD I vs WARD II

$$X^2 = 10.19$$

$$df = 3$$

Significant ( $p < .05$ ,  $X^2 = 7.81$ )

An attempt was made to compare these clientele impressions of police response time with the official time reported on police records. However, police records were inadequate for such a comparison. Therefore, regardless of the actual response time, 28% more clients in Ward I than in Ward II felt that their police responded in less than six minutes.

H<sub>b2</sub>: A higher proportion of police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report positive police attitudes.

Data for testing this hypothesis was obtained by asking police clients in the experimental Team Police and Control Classical Police areas, "What was the attitude of the officer (s) who responded to your request?" The client opinions were recorded in the categories of (1) anxious to do a good job, (2) concerned, (3) indifferent or bored, (4) sarcastic or hostile, and (5) no answer.

Table IV-11 summarized the clients' impressions of responding officers' attitudes. A higher proportion of the Team Police than the Classical Police clients had positive impressions of the attitudes of officers who served them. Specifically, 35% of the Ward I interviewees

felt the police who provided them with service were anxious to do a good job, whereas 18% of the Ward II clients interviewed reported this impression.

On the other hand, 22% of the Classical Police clients, as compared to 9% of the Team Police clients, expressed impressions of negative attitudes on the part of officers who assisted them.

A comparison of the responses of these two clientele groups by use of  $X^2$  shows the differences are significant at  $p < .05$ . Based on this data,  $H_{b2}$  is accepted as valid.

However, even though the clients in Ward I expressed more distinctly positive attitudes than those in Ward II, when the positive attitudes in Ward I are added together and compared with those in Ward II, 83% of the clients in Ward I and 79% of the clients in Ward II expressed positive attitudes about the police in their respective ward. This similarity is grounds for a cautious interpretation of the data.

$H_{b3}$ : A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report they receive courteous treatment from the police.

TABLE IV-11: What Was Officer Attitude?

Officer Attitude	WARD I		WARD II	
	#	%	#	%
Anxious to do a good job	16	36	9	18
Concerned	22	48	31	61
Indifferent; bored	4	9	9	18
Sarcastic; hostile	0	0	2	4
No Answer	4	9	0	0
Total	46	101	51	101

Comparison

WARD I vs WARD II

$$X^2 = 11.18$$

$$df = 4$$

Significant ( $p < .05$ ,  $X^2 = 9.48$ )

Table IV-12 contains the compiled responses to the question, "How would you characterize the treatment you received from the police?"

Twenty-four percent of the Team Police clients, as compared to 6% of the Classical Police clients interviewed, felt the police who contacted them were "exceptionally courteous." Ninety-four percent of the Team

Police clients indicated that the officers who handled their problem were either "courteous" or "extremely courteous." In the Classical Police area the data reflects a more negative impression of the officers' manners. However, the difference between the two wards is not significant at the  $p < .05$  level. Since the  $\chi^2$  is close to the  $p < .05$  level, the Team operation obviously has not caused poorer attitudes or more discourtesy on the part of police officers.

TABLE IV-12: How Would You Characterize the Treatment You Received from the Police?

Treatment	WARD I		WARD II	
	#	%	#	%
Exceptionally courteous	11	24	3	6
Courteous	32	70	41	80
Not courteous; not offensive	2	4	5	10
Discourteously	0	2	1	2
No Answer	1	2	1	2
Total	46	100	51	100

Comparison

WARD I vs WARD II

$$\chi^2 = 7.73$$

$$df = 3$$

ns (For significance at  $p < .05$ ,  $\chi = 7.81$ )

H<sub>b4</sub>: A higher proportion of the police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report more favorable attitudes toward the police after they receive police service.

To obtain data for testing this hypothesis, police clientele in the Ward I and Ward II areas were asked two questions, "What was your attitude toward the police officer before he handled your problem?" and "What was your attitude toward the police officer after he handled your problem?" Table IV-13 summarizes the responses to these two questions.

The data reflects clientele attitudes in both wards moved from indifferent opinions to either more favorable or more unfavorable positions after police provided service. However, Ward II Classical Police clients changed from a neutral position to both more positive and more negative, whereas the Ward I Team Police clients reported consistently positive attitude changes.

The change in Ward I attitudes before and after the provision of police service is significant at  $p < .05$  level. In addition, the difference between the Ward I and Ward II "After" scores are also significant at a

TABLE IV-13: Client's Attitudes Toward the Police Officer  
Before and After Police Service

Clientele attitudes toward the police officer	WARD I				WARD II			
	BEFORE		AFTER		BEFORE		AFTER	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Favorable	23	50	36	79	17	33	29	57
Indifferent	19	42	7	15	30	59	13	26
Unfavorable	2	4	1	2	4	8	9	17
No Answer	2	4	2	4	0	0	0	0
Total	46	100	46	100	51	100	51	100

Comparison

WARD I "Before" vs "After"

$$x^2 = 8.73$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant ( $p < .05$ ,  $x^2 = 5.99$ )

WARD I "After" vs WARD II "After"

$$x^2 = 8.48$$

$$df = 2$$

Significant

$p < .05$ . Therefore,  $H_{b4}$  is accepted as true.

$H_{b5}$ : A higher proportion of police clientele in a Democratic Team Police neighborhood than in a Classical Police neighborhood will report satisfaction with the overall quality of service rendered by the police.

Table IV-14 reflects the clients' reports of their impressions about the overall quality of the service they received from the police. A higher proportion of the clients served by Team Police (61%) than is served by Classical Police (43%) reported that the service they received was good or excellent. Twenty-eight percent of the Team Police clients compared to 16% of the Classical Police clients said they felt they received excellent service. Conversely, 26% of the Team Police clients compared to 6% of the Classical Police clients said they received "bad" or "very bad" service. However, the difference between the attitudes of the two client groups is not sufficient for significance at  $p < .05$ .

Therefore, even though the difference is substantial and close to the required  $p < .05$ , the hypothesis is rejected.

In summary, the results of the data collected in a post-test of police clientele opinions are as follows:

TABLE IV-14: Clients' Attitude Toward Overall Quality of Service Rendered by Police in This Instance

Overall Quality of Service	WARD I		WARD II	
	#	%	#	%
Excellent	13	28	8	16
Good	15	33	14	27
Not good - not bad	13	28	16	31
Bad	3	6	8	16
Very bad	0	0	5	10
No Answer	2	4	0	0
Total	46	99	51	100

Comparison

WARD I vs WARD II

$$\chi^2 = 8.33$$

$$df = 4$$

$$ns \quad (\chi^2 < .05 = 9.48)$$

1. Clients reported the Team Police responded faster than Classical Police to requests from citizens.
2. Team Police officers made a more favorable impression than Classical Police officers on every scale used to compare client attitudes toward the two groups.

Due to the post-test limitation on the data evaluation, it is difficult to compare changes which occurred. However, if one assumes prior to the experiment clientele attitudes in both areas would have been similar, then the Team experiment has been accompanied by positive changes in clientele attitudes.

#### Police Officer Attitudes Results

The way a police officer performs can be influenced by a variety of factors. The hypotheses tested in this section of the study are designed to provide information to answer the research question, "What changes in attitudes of police appear to occur when officers are members of a Democratic Team Police arrangement?" Each of these hypotheses was evaluated by scores on standardized tests administered to officers in the experiment Team and a random sample of 20 non-team officers. A t-test was used to assess differences ( $\alpha = .05$ ).

$H_{c1}$ : Democratic Team Police officers will prefer to involve themselves in a wider range of activities than will Classical Police officers.

The O'Neill Activity Scale<sup>1</sup> was used to obtain data to evaluate  $H_{c1}$ . O'Neill developed this scale to compare the extent to which police officers report their preferences to intervene or take action in situations where they normally have discretion. The higher the score on the scale, the more an officer prefers to initiate discretionary action. Table IV-15 summarized the data obtained from administrations of this instrument.

The results of this test show that at the outset of the experiment the Team Police (Ward I) officers were more willing to involve themselves in a broader range of activities than were the Classical Police (Ward II) officers (Significant:  $p < .05$ ). While both groups changed in the direction of a preference for a broader range of activity performance during the experiment, only the upward shift in the Ward II sample's mean activity scores were statistically significant at  $p < .05$ . The upward change in the scores of the Classical Police sample resulted in no statistical significance between the scores of the groups in the post-test. Hence,  $H_{c1}$  is rejected.

TABLE IV-15: Police Activity Preference

<u>Sample Summary</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I Sample Number	17	13
mean	115.6	118.5
Standard deviation	7.1	7.8
Ward II Sample Number	20	19
mean	109.1	116.0
Standard deviation	10.2	7.6
<u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	2.14	.86
df	35.	32.
P	.05	ns
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		
t-score		1.02
df		28.
P		ns
Ward II		
t-score		2.73
df		37.
P		.05

H<sub>c2</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will prefer to rely less on formal action for coping with their responsibilities than will Classical Police officers.

Data for evaluating the validity of H<sub>c2</sub> was obtained by comparing the mean scores of two groups on an O'Neill Formalism Scale (See Table IV-16). A lower score on this instrument denotes a preference for less formal action.

Both groups maintained stable Formalism scores; there was no statistically significant change between the pre- and post-tests mean score in either group. The Democratic Team Officers' mean score was substantially less on both the pre-test ( $p < .02$ ) and the post-test ( $p < .005$ ). Based on these results H<sub>c2</sub> is accepted as valid.

H<sub>c3</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will be less authoritarian and more tolerant than Classical Police officers.

The California F Scale (Form 45)<sup>2</sup> was used to collect data for the assessment of H<sub>c3</sub>. The lower the score on this test, the less authoritarian the respondent. Table IV-17 contains the results from this test.

The Democratic Team Police officers scored lower than the Ward II officers on both the pre-test and post-test questionnaires. The Team Police mean score dropped

TABLE IV-16: Police Formalism Preference

<u>Sample Summary</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I Sample Number	17.	13.
mean	81.1	81.4
Standard deviation	11.0	8.2
Ward II Sample Number	20.	19.
mean	89.5	91.4
Standard deviation	7.8	8.2
<u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	2.66	3.30
df	35.	32.
p	.02	.005
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		
t-score		.09
df	28.	
p		ns
Ward II		
t-score		.71
df	37.	
p		ns

TABLE IV-17: General Authoritarian

<u>Sample Summaries</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I Sample Number	17.	13.
mean	78.2	77.9
Standard deviation	8.5	9.4
Ward II Sample Number	20.	19.
mean	87.3	92.6
Standard deviation	11.5	12.1
 <u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	2.64	3.46
df	35.	29.
P	.02	.002
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		
t-score		.07
df	27.	
P		ns
Ward II		
t-score		1.35
df	37.	
P		.20

slightly although not enough to be statistically significant on the post-test, and the Classical Police officers mean score increased slightly but also not significantly ( $p < .20$ ). The data analysis requires rejection of  $H_{c3}$ .

$H_{c4}$ : Democratic Team Police officers will be less prejudiced toward minority people than Classical Police officers.

The California E Scale suggested final form<sup>3</sup> was utilized to obtain scores to test  $H_{c4}$ . The lower the score on the Scale, the lower the prejudice. Chart IV-18 summarized the results obtained from administering these instruments.

The mean score of the Democratic Team Police officers were significantly lower than the Classical Police officers on both the pre-test ( $p < .001$ ) and post-test ( $p < .005$ ). The mean score of both groups dropped on the post-test, but in neither case was the drop statistically significant. Therefore,  $H_{c4}$  is accepted.

$H_{c5}$ : Democratic Team Police officers will have a higher tolerance for ambiguity than Classical Police officers.

CHART IV-18: Ethnocentrism

<u>Sample Summaries</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I		
Mean	41.2	38.5
Standard deviation	6.7	4.9
Ward II		
Mean	51.7	48.7
Standard deviation	10.0	10.3
<u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	3.58	3.11
df	35.	29.
p	.001	.005
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		1.16
t-score		27.
df		ns
Ward II		.89
t-score		37.
df		ns
p		

The Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale<sup>4</sup> was used to obtain data about H<sub>C5</sub>. The higher a respondents score on this scale, the higher the tolerance for ambiguity. Table IV-19 reports the results.

The Democratic Team officers scored significantly ( $p < .0005$ ) higher than the Classical Police officers mean score on the pre-test. However, the mean score of the Team Officers' shifted downward and the Classical officers' mean score shifted upward on the post-test cancelled the significance between the two groups at the post-test. Further while the Team officers mean score did not change significantly when the pre-test and post-test means were compared, the Classical police officers scores on the post-test were significantly higher ( $p < .001$ ). Based on this data, H<sub>C5</sub> is rejected.

H<sub>C6</sub>: Democratic Team Police officers will be more flexible than Classical Police officers.

The test of this hypothesis is based on data obtained from administrations of the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale<sup>5</sup>. The lower the score on this scale, the more flexible the respondent. The results are presented in Table IV-20. The pre-test mean score of

TABLE IV-19: Intolerance of Ambiguity

<u>Sample Summaries</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I		
Mean	53.3	51.5
Standard deviation	3.8	5.0
Ward II		
Mean	47.1	50.8
Standard deviation	3.3	2.9
<u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	5.21	.49
df	35.	29.
p	.00005	ns
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		
t-score		1.06
df		27.
p		ns
Ward II		
t-score		3.65
df		37.
p		.001

TABLE IV-20: Rigidity

<u>Sample Summaries</u>	<u>Pre-test</u>	<u>Post-test</u>
Ward I Sample Number		
Mean	64.1	63.5
Standard Deviation	10.0	10.3
Ward II		
Mean	70.3	69.1
Standard Deviation	7.3	5.6
<u>Comparison</u>		
Ward I vs Ward II		
t-score	2.14	1.90
df	35.	29.
p	.05	ns
Pre-test vs Post-test		
Ward I		
t-score		.14
df		27.
p		ns
Ward II		
t-score		.56
df		37.
p		ns

the Team Police officers was significantly lower ( $p < .05$ ) than the Classical Police officers. However, the two group means were less distinct on post-test, where the means are statistically non-significant. Neither the Team Police nor the Classical Police mean score changed significantly from the pre-test mean on the post-test, although the Team mean dropped slightly and the Classical Officers mean increased.

Based on the comparison of post-test means,  $H_{c6}$  must be rejected.

In summary, the data obtained from testing police attitudes reflects the existence of distinct differences between the Team Police officers and the Classical Officers at the outset of the experiment. The post-test scores of both groups are generally in the direction of the mean of a combination of the two groups.

### Conclusion

This chapter has been devoted to a presentation of information related to the implementation of the project and the results obtained from the research. In some instances the results were unexpected. Such findings should increase the value of the final interpretative chapter.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter will be devoted to (1) a review of the study and its problems, (2) a summary of the findings and conclusions, and (3) a discussion of some implications for further research.

#### Background of Study

In a response to severe police and community relations problems in a low economic, minority, residential neighborhood, the City of Holyoke, Massachusetts, replaced the Classical Police arrangement with a Democratic Team Police operation. The Team consisted of 15 police officers and was assigned responsibility for providing all police services in the neighborhood. The Team organization was collegial rather than Bureaucratic, and it operated from a decentralized headquarters near the center of the neighborhood. Both citizens and Team officers participated in the development of the goals, priorities, and procedures used by the Team.

The initial trial period for this experiment was nine

months, during which the program's effectiveness and impact was to be assessed.

#### Summary of Research Design and Problems

Prior to implementation of the community-based, Democratic Team, a research design was developed. The research was to determine the impact of the experiment on (1) citizen attitudes toward the police, (2) clientele attitudes toward the police, and (3) the police officers.

Due to the complex action emphasis of the project, the study was to be exploratory, rather than experimental, in nature. However, to facilitate precision, the research design provided for the comparison of an "experimental" area policed by the Team, with a "control" area policed by traditional methods. In short, although the emphasis was on the action program, the research design provided for a high degree of control.

Identical instruments were used for the collection of comparable data from both areas before and after the experiment. The data collection instruments for citizen and clientele attitudes were specially prepared

questionnaires. Standardized attitude and personality scales were used to obtain information about police officers.

#### Problems Encountered in Implementing Research

The implementation of the study was not entirely consistent with the original design. The most significant deviations were:

1. The pre-test of citizen attitudes was delayed until after implementation of the Team Police unit. Therefore, the pre-test data obtained may have been contaminated.
2. The pre-test of clientele attitudes was not conducted. Therefore, there was no baseline data in this area.
3. Volunteers were used for the Team. Therefore, the accuracy of predictions about future Team Police units may have been effected. Extensive publicity about the Team Police operation may have reduced the value of the controls and created an unnatural situation which may not exist in future experiments with Team Police operations.

Although these problems were not serious enough to render the study meaningless, the recognition of their existence is essential to a fair evaluation of the findings.

#### Conclusions About Causes of Research Problems

A review of the probable causes of the research

problems may be useful to researchers who conduct similar studies in the future. The situations which seemed to have the most substantial impact on the research were:

1. The political environment into which the Team Police project was thrust consisted of numerous persons and groups with conflicting interests, a variety of apprehensions and fears, competing philosophies, different levels of understanding of the project, and unsettled authority.
2. The planners misunderstood the environment and the organization to be changed.
3. The financial support for the project was shared by three separate organizations-- the City of Holyoke, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (under the U.S. Dept. of Justice), and Model Cities (under the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development). Acceptance of funds from each of these agencies required relinquishing some authority over the project. When considered individually, the influence of imposed conditions were usually insignificant, however, collectively they caused substantial modifications in the initial project and research.
4. The fragmentation of administrative responsibility for the project - particularly between the Police Chief and the Model Cities Director. Not only were there differences in philosophy, but also competition for credit for the project.
5. Inaccurate estimates of time requirements and the ability of the various agencies and consultants to prepare for and perform the procedures and tasks required for efficient implementation of the project and the research.

6. The desire of officials, who felt they would be held responsible, to make the project appear successful regardless of its actual impact.

Strategies for eliminating many of these situations can be identified easily by future researchers. The preparation of future research should include consideration of ways to minimize the impact of these problems.

### Findings and Conclusions

The exploratory nature of this study mandates caution in the presentation and interpretation of findings. However, even the most cautious interpretation of the results support the fact that community-based, participatory, Team Police organizational arrangements have potential for improving public attitudes toward the police. Further, such arrangements may have a positive impact on employee work attitudes.

The following section provides a more precise summary of the results of this study.

### Citizen Attitudes

The results of the study of citizen attitudes are summarized in Table V-1. Basically, in the experimental neighborhood, the attitudes of citizens toward the police

TABLE V-1: Summary of Comparison of Citizen Attitudes\*

Summary of Hypotheses	Accepted Hypotheses? **	Direction of Attitude Change ***	
		Ward I (Team Area)	Ward II (Classical Area)
Team is better.	Yes	+	-
Team is most honest.	Yes	-	-
Citizens more likely to help Team.	No	0	0
Team uses less force.	No	0	0
Team more anxious to help.	Yes	+	-
Team more likely to view people as equals.	Yes	+	0
Team is more polite.	Yes	0	-
Team more likely to like people.	No	0	0

\*Based on a comparison of pre-test and post-test.

\*\*  $\alpha = p < .05$ .

\*\*\*Positive change = +; no change = 0; negative change = -.

tended to remain constant or change in a positive direction during the experiment. On the other hand, attitudes of citizens in the area policed by the Classical Police arrangements tended to remain constant or changed in a negative direction. However, a more detailed explanation is essential.

First, it seems reasonable to assume the changes in citizen attitudes toward the Team Police were greater than reflected by the data. The consensus of opinion was that Ward I (where the Team was initiated) citizen attitudes toward the police were more negative than those of citizens in Ward II (the Classical area) prior to the experiment. However, since the pre-test data was not collected until over a month after the implementation of the Team Police unit, this situation was not reflected in the "pre-test" results. The possibility of contamination was enhanced by a fire which destroyed the original Team Police neighborhood headquarters and the homes of many citizens. This fire resulted in the Team Police officers receiving extensive favorable publicity which cast them as both martyrs and "folk heroes."

Second, the intensity of the favorable publicity

surrounding the Team throughout the project seems to have affected citizen attitudes toward the Classical Police in the control area. These attitudes toward the Classical Police tended to shift in a negative direction. In some instances the shifts were too distinct to have been the result of chance. While there is no sure way of establishing the cause of this shift, the publicity surrounding the experiment probably produced the change. Further evidence for this conclusion is reflected in the section on police attitudes.

Although, as indicated in Chapter I, the methodology of this study was not adequate for precise identification of causal variables, the findings seem to support the general conclusions in other Team Police related literature. Even the most conservative interpretation of the citizen attitude results would find that the experiment did not have a negative impact on citizen attitudes.

#### Clientele Attitudes

The cancellation of the pre-test of clientele attitudes forced reliance on comparisons of the post-test clientele attitude results from the two Wards.

Since clientele have first hand experience with the police it is likely their attitudes about the police will be more accurate than those of citizens who have not had personal contact. Therefore, in spite of the lack of pre-test, it is likely the results of the clientele post-test will more accurately reflect actual differences between the Team Police and Classical Police than do the previously reported results of citizen attitude testing.

Table V-2 summarizes the clientele post-test. These results show client attitudes toward the Team Police were more favorable than those toward Classical Police in every test area. In the single instance where it was possible to compare the direction of change in citizen attitudes, the citizens who received service from the Team Police officers reported only positive changes, whereas the Classical clients reported both positive and negative changes.

Therefore, it appears the Team Police officers probably conducted themselves differently than the Classical officers. They seem to have had a more positive impact on their clients attitudes than the regular police had on their clients.

TABLE V-2: Summary of Clientele Attitude Findings\*

Summary of Hypotheses	Accepted Hypotheses? **	Direction of Change ***	
		Ward I (Team Area)	Ward II (Classical Area)
Team responds faster.	Yes	NC	NC
Team attitudes better.	Yes	NC	NC
Team more courteous.	No	NC	NC
Clients more impressed by Team.	Yes	+	From 0 to + and -
Clients more satisfied with Team performance.	No	NC	NC

\*Based on post-test comparison

\*\*  $\alpha = p < .05$ .

\*\*\*Positive change = +; no change = 0; negative change = -;  
no comparison possible = NC.

**CONTINUED**

**2 OF 3**

This difference could be the result of a variety of specific variables ranging from the Hawthorne effect, to training, to the fact that the Team Police officers had distinctly different personality characteristics than the Classical officers.

#### Police Attitudes

To obtain data for the assessment of the impact of the experiment on the attitudes and personality of police officers, a battery of previously validated psychological instruments was administered to the Team members and a control group, both before the actual implementation of the experiment and at the end of the test period. The summary of the basic findings obtained are reflected in Table V-3.

These findings seem to show that the volunteers for the Team Police unit preferred to involve themselves in a wider range of activities than the police officers in the Classical Police control area. The Team Police officers seem to prefer to rely less on the use of arrest and the standard operating procedures of the Holyoke Police Department, preferring instead less formal methods of resolving issues, than the officers in the Classical

TABLE V-3: Summary of Police Test Findings\*

Summary of Hypotheses	Accepted Hypotheses? **	Direction of Change Team Officers	Classical Officers
Team Police will prefer broader activity	No	Broader Activity	Broader Activity
Team Police will rely less on formal methods	Yes	No Change	No Change
Team Police will be less authoritarian	No	Less	More
Team Police will be less prejudice	Yes	Less	Less
Team Police will be more tolerant of ambiguity	No	Less	More
Team Police will be more flexible	No	No Change	No Change

\*Based on a comparison of scores on

(1) O'Neill Activity Scale, (2) O'Neill Formalism Scale, (3) California F Scale form 45, (4) California E Scale final form, (5) Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale, (6) Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale.

\*\*Post-test comparison;  $\alpha = p < .05$ .

area. At the outset of the experiment, the Team officers more than the Controls, felt the arrest to be a drastic course of action for use only when other alternatives have failed.

The Team Police officers appear to conform more to O'Neill's "Social Agent" category of policing in that they reported a preference for according social service responsibilities as much esteem as criminal apprehension activities.<sup>1</sup> The control group tended to prefer to reject service functions in favor of apprehending law violators.

These results are consistent with what one might predict for a group of police officers who would volunteer for a project which had been described as more flexible, less authoritarian, and more service oriented than the traditional approach to policing.

Interpretation of the difference between the pre-test and post-test scores is difficult. Although the mean scores of Team officers changed slightly, by-and-large the changes were not significant. However, on several scales the mean scores of officers in the control area changed significantly in the direction which it was expected the Team officers would change.

There are a number of reasons why such results may have occurred. Primary among them is the fact that the non-team officers may not have constituted an interaction-free control group as originally anticipated. Though they did not participate as Team members, all Holyoke police officers were exposed to the existence of the Team Police philosophy and the Team Police Unit. The control area officers were aware of the increased status which Team officers received by virtue of their unorthodox operational approaches and the initiatives they took in serving their clients. Further, most non-team officers accepted as valid the rumor that because of the Team officers' behavior they received more overtime pay, travel, opportunities, and training.

Therefore, what may have resulted is an experiment in reverse-an observation which is also supported by the previously discussed citizen attitude results. The intended control group's change in the direction of the unrepresentative experimental group may have been caused by their perceptions of the success of the experimental group attitudes and methods.

Conclusions

The research data obtained is inadequate as a basis for judging the success or failure of the Democratic Team Police Model. The precision of the research, which was not originally high, was further reduced by problems encountered in the course of implementing the research design. However, the results of this study support several conclusions which may be useful in future research.

1. Given the intensity of the public and political debate surrounding the experiment, the control area in this experiment probably was not adequately insulated from the experimental area.
2. The approach to obtaining personnel for the experimental area by explaining the experiment and then accepting volunteers likely resulted in participants who are philosophically in agreement with the goals and methods being tested; consequently, the results may not be typical. Future researchers should be aware of the significant differences in the control and experimental officers which was caused by this self selection.
3. The experiment seemed to cause citizens attitudes toward the police to remain the same or change in a positive direction in the Team Police neighborhood and to remain the same or change in a negative direction in the area policed by the Classical organizational arrangement.
4. The most significant variable in this experiment, given the nature and directions of the

changes, may have been the highly favorable publicity generated by the mass media. The planning of future Team experiments should include considerations of the possible dual impact, positive on the experimental group and negative on the control group, which may have occurred in this study.

5. The attitudes of police officers, who volunteered for the Team Police unit, were more supportive of police performing discretionary social service functions and a wider use of discretionary actions than police who did not volunteer.
6. Police officers who volunteered for the Team Police unit were initially and remained (a) less authoritarian, (b) less prejudice, (c) more tolerant of ambiguity, and (d) less rigid than police officers who did not volunteer.
7. When the attitudes of police clients who received services from the Team Police officers are compared to the attitudes of clients who received services from non-team officers, the clients who received service from the Team Police officers were significantly more favorable.
8. None of the data collected could be interpreted as an indication that decentralized, community-based Team Police organizational arrangements with collegial decision making and informal situational leadership is any less effective than the Classical Bureaucratic Police organizational model.
9. The bulk of the evidence supports the concept of decentralized, community-based, participatory Team Police arrangements as a viable approach to urban policing which should be subject to further testings.

The measures of community opinion indicate the people served by the Team were generally pleased with its performance. The officers assigned to the Team appear to respond and handle client requests in a way which satisfied the clients. The reduced reliance on authority did not have a negative impact on the performance of the Team in those areas measured. In fact, if one is to believe the expressions of the Team officers during informal discussions, these men have had marked improvements in their work attitudes as a result of the collegial Team arrangement.

#### Recommendations

Since the completion of the data collection for this study several other studies of Team Police experiments have been initiated. It seems that each of these studies have been plagued by the problems similar to those encountered in this study. For example, Tortoriello and Blatt's study of Community-Centered Team Policing in Dayton is an extreme example of the conflict between an action program and research.<sup>2</sup> They were not hired to design the research until the Team Police project was nearly completed.

Bloch and Specht issued an evaluation report on a New York City Team Police experiment which was reduced in value because of similar problems.<sup>3</sup> Of this study, Sherman says,<sup>4</sup> "The original notion of obtaining objective measures was largely abandoned. ...the action goals of the police department made the research goals unattainable."

In perhaps the most expensive evaluation of a team policing experiment ever undertaken, Schwartz and his colleagues have issued several reports on their continuing evaluation of the Cincinnati police.<sup>5</sup> In spite of a Police Foundation investment of over \$400,000 in research alone, the problems in Cincinnati appear strikingly similar to those encountered in Holyoke. For example, in the first interim evaluation report Schwartz acknowledges,<sup>6</sup>

During the period June 1972 - March 1973 (before Team implementation) the Cincinnati Police Department initiated an intensive ...information campaign through the newspapers, radio and TV. It resulted in several hundred newspaper articles, including eight special features and a substantial number of spot announcements through electronic media plus several interviews with police officers. In addition, during that period, the CPD issued 75,000 flyers, mostly announcing meetings in District I, and 40,000 general information brochures were distributed.

If future research into Team policing is to provide more than reports of contaminated results, the experiments will probably have to be designed as low profile, non-controversial efforts. Administrators will have to avoid the temptation to present themselves as innovative managers at the outset of the experiments and withhold their judgments about the value of the innovation until the research has been completed.

It may be that substantial organizational innovations of a highly controversial nature, such as a Democratic Team Policing, may defy experimental testing. Researchers might reduce the problems by ensuring the political and administrative environment of future Team Police experiments is supportive. Further, the advantages of testing segments of the Team Police Model should reduce conflict and facilitate the research.

As previously stressed, this study was an exploratory assessment. As such, not only was the design inadequate for high precision, the dependent variables evaluated -- citizen attitudes, clientele attitudes, and police attitudes -- were narrow. Future research should explore the impact of Team Police

arrangements on such factors as police morale and productivity, crime and disorder, community fear and the cost of police service.

Aside from Holyoke, there does not appear to have been any previous Team police arrangements which have used a completely collegial model. When one considers the fact that most police agencies are investing 30% to 50% of their resources in management and supervisory overhead, the potential value of a collegial model becomes apparent. If the collegial design could result in even a small reduction in this area it should greatly improve police operations. Therefore, future research should certainly be devoted to testing the value of the collegial organizational arrangement.

A further area which this study reveals as needing research is the impact of the various police roles. The popular notion is that police should be crime fighters, yet the results of this study seem to indicate that the Team Police officers played more of a social agent role. Police officers who view themselves as social agents or community advocates may enjoy more public support and ultimately be more effective in other job areas such

as crime prevention.

Finally, there needs to be further research on the areas explored by this study. In spite of the apparently positive findings, the precise nature and causes of the changes accompanying a decentralized, participatory Democratic Police model have not been determined.

Unless further sound research into team policing, specifically the Democratic Model, is initiated the organizational approach is likely to continue as an ambiguously defined police organizational fad. As such, it will undoubtedly be a subject of controversy for years in the future, and its true potential will not be determined.

Footnotes--Chapter V

<sup>1</sup> See Michael O'Neill, The Role of the Police-- Normative Role Expectations in a Metropolitan Police Department (Albany, New York: SUNY doctoral dissertation, 1974.)

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Tortoriello and Stephen Blatt, Community Centered Team Policing (Dayton: Criminal Justice Center, 1973.)

<sup>3</sup> Lawrence Sherman, "Evaluation," A Comparative Survey of Team Policing (Washington, D.C.: Unpublished research report to Police Foundation, 1972.)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Alfred Schwartz, et al., "Evaluation of Cincinnati's Community Sector Team Policing Program," Working papers 3006-4 (June 30, 1974), 3006-11 (October 8, 1974), and 3006-18 (March 17, 1975). New York: Urban Institute.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, Working paper 3006-4, p. 18.

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APPENDIX

POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL  
MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM PROJECT  
(1970)  
HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

\*This manual was developed by the team members, assisted by consultants, as they organized their 1970 operation.

## PREFACE

Although the Holyoke Model Cities Police Team has been established as an experimental project to test new methods, policies, and procedures; the following policies and procedures have been developed by the Team members to provide a few basic guidelines for the Units operation.

Any situation which is not covered in this policy and procedure manual should be decided in a manner consistent with the philosophy behind the Team Policing concept and the material recorded in this manual.

Changes in or additions to this manual can be initiated by the members of the Team and they will become binding upon their acceptance by the Project Director.

Questions concerning decision making authority should normally be decided in favor of the most decentralized level consistent with the achievement of the objective of effective police service for the Team's jurisdiction.

In cases where provisions of this manual conflict with the general policies and procedures of the Holyoke Police Department, the provisions of this manual will be followed by the Team members except in emergencies when the Team control is returned to the regular departmental chain of command.

December, 1970.

GENERAL ORDERS

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

General Order 70-1

Internal Administrative Organization

- A. The Team Policing Unit (hereafter referred to as the Team) is a subdivision of the Holyoke Police Department that has been assigned the responsibility for providing police service in the area bordered on the North and East by the Connecticut River, on the South by the Boston and Maine Railroad tracks, the Northernmost section of the Second Level Canal, and a line parallel with said Canal to the Connecticut River. It shall consist of fourteen (14) police officers and a Project Director.
- B. The Team will be under the direction of and coordinated by the Team Director, who will be appointed by the Holyoke Chief of Police and responsible through the chain of command to the Chief and the Deputy Chief of Police.
- C. The Project Director will designate in writing a Team member or members who will assume command in the event of the Project Director's absence.
- D. A Police-Community Relations Council, chaired by the Team Director, will be established to assist and advise the Team with personnel selection, police-community relations matters, and such other law enforcement and crime prevention problems as its members deem appropriate. It shall be composed of six neighborhood residents and two regular Team members in addition to the Project Director.
- E. All members of the Team will be voting members of a Committee of the Whole. This Committee will meet at least twice monthly to provide a forum for considering internal Team organization and management matters. It will be chaired by a Team member who will be elected for a three-month term by the Team members. It will provide advice and assistance to the Project Director

and individual members of the Team. It has the authority to evaluate and censor its own members when it deems such action appropriate.

F. Six Standing Committees, consisting of representatives elected by the Team members, will be established to assist the Committee of the Whole with matters of continual importance. The standing Committee that will be designated initially are:

1. State Liaison Committee
2. Department Liaison Committee
3. Personnel Committee
4. Organizational Committee
5. Training Committee
6. Local Liaison Committee

G. Four Community Service Officer, (CSO's) who are residents of the neighborhood area served by the Team, will be appointed to assist the Team with non-enforcement police duties. The CSO's will be responsible to the Project Director or his designated representative. They will be non-voting members of the Committee of the Whole.

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

General Order 70-2

Procedures Related to Police Team Meetings

- A. Committee of the Whole: The Committee of the Whole will normally meet between the hours of 7 and 8 p.m. on the first and third Monday of each month. Special meetings can be called at the discretion of the Project Director.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole will be elected by Team members for a three-month term. The first Chairman will officially assume his office on December 1, 1970.

The Chairman is responsible for developing an agenda of items for consideration and for distributing it prior to each meeting. All meetings shall be conducted in accordance with Roberts Rules of Order.

A secretary for the Committee of the Whole will be appointed by the Chairman to record the minutes of each meeting. After the minutes are recorded and approved, they shall be filed in a specifically designated place for future reference.

Only the sworn police officers who are Team members shall have the authority to vote on issues considered by the Committee of the Whole. CSO's and other persons related to the Team may attend the Committee of the Whole meetings and participate in discussion. Any person except the Project Director can be excluded from a Committee of the Whole meeting by a two-thirds vote of the voting Team members present.

The Committee of the Whole has broad authority to consider both operational and managerial matters related to the Team's activities; however, decisions made by the Committee can be overruled by the Project Director.

- B. Standing Committees: Standing Committee members shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole with the consent of the Project Director. Members of Standing Committees shall serve at the discretion of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and the Project Director. The procedures and practices of Standing Committees shall be left to the discretion of the membership of each Standing Committee.

Each Standing Committee shall have a Chairman who will be responsible for coordinating and reporting on the activities of his Committee.

Any Standing Committee can be created or abolished by a two-thirds vote of the Team members and approval of the Project Director.

- C. Temporary Committees: The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole with the consent of the Project Director can appoint Temporary Committees for dealing with unusual or temporary situations. The membership and procedures of such committees shall be dependent on the circumstances.

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

General Order 70-3

Project Director

The Project Director possesses the authority, duties, and responsibilities of his police rank, in this case those of a police captain. Further, for the purposes of this project, he:

- A. Administers all aspects of the team policing project contract. Of particular importance are his fiscal management and data collection responsibilities.
- B. Serves as principal liaison officer between the team and the remainder of the Police Department.
- C. Possesses the ultimate authority and responsibility for the direction of the team's personnel. Generally, however, the teams activities will be carried out as a group effort extensively employing the techniques of participating management.

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

General Order 70-4

Relationship Between Team and Remainder  
of the Police Department

- A. The Team Policing Unit has been established by the Chief of Police as an experimental division of the Holyoke Police Department. It is under the direction of a Police Captain who has been designated Project Director by the Chief of Police. Although under the supervision of the Chief and the Deputy Chief of Police, the Project Director is responsible for the organization, coordination, and management of the experimental unit so as to, insofar as possible, ensure a cooperative relationship between its members and the remainder of the Police Department.
- B. The Team Policing Unit has the responsibility for providing police service for the area designated as its jurisdiction. (See 70-IA). Except for unusually serious situations, members of the Team Policing Unit shall not be dispatched to handle activities outside of their area of responsibility. Likewise, except in response to serious situations, officers of the Police Department who are not assigned to the Team shall not be dispatched to handle activities or situations occurring within the Team's area of responsibility.
- C. Whenever possible in situations where a dispatcher is considering sending a non-Team member into a Team area, he should get permission from a Team member before proceeding. However, in instances where obtaining such approval is difficult and it is the judgment of the dispatcher that a situation within the Team area needs immediate police attention, he may dispatch a non-Team member into the area. Routine dispatching of non-Team members of the Department into the Team area should never occur. Neither should non-Team patrols routinely enter the Team area.

- D. With the exception of homicide cases, Team members have the authority to decide how far to pursue an investigation and if they need assistance from specialists such as investigators and juvenile officers. In cases of homicide the Team members shall proceed as follows: secure the crime scene, obtain identification of witnesses, notify the Captain of Detectives, and turn the investigation over to the members of the Detective Bureau upon their arrival at the scene; they shall make all necessary reports and if possible arrest the perpetrator if still at the scene.
- E. No officer of the Holyoke Police Department shall refuse when requested to provide assistance to another officer regardless of the area of assignment.
- F. The Project Director will be responsible for making periodic reports, through the Deputy Chief, to the Chief of Police concerning the activities and status of the project.

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

General Order 70-5

General Procedures Related to Team Operations

A. Disciplinary:

1. Complaints about misconduct on the part of Team members are to be recorded and investigated by the Project Director.
2. The Project Director will present cases of officer misconduct to the Committee of the Whole.
3. The Committee of the Whole has the responsibility of reviewing such cases, interviewing witnesses, and making recommendations to the Project Director concerning disposition of case.
4. Consistent complaints against any Team member or a single incident of gross misbehavior on the part of a Team member may be grounds for dismissal from the Team.
5. Except in cases where two-thirds of the voting members of the Committee of the Whole recommends dismissal from the Team, the Project Director has the power to ignore or overrule any advice given him by the Committee of the Whole. In any instance where two-thirds of the Team members recommend dismissal of a Team member the Project Director shall respect their judgment and the officer shall be dropped from the Team.

B. Work Assignment:

1. The authority to develop work schedules that are appropriate to the needs of the community lies with the Team members and the Project Director.
2. Records on the work loads and personnel matters shall be maintained by the Project Director.

3. Twenty-four hour-a-day coverage shall be provided in the area.
4. Team members will work the same number of hours per week required of other police officers on the Holyoke Police Department.
5. Team members will receive the same amount of time for vacations, sick leave, and days off as other Holyoke Police Officers.
6. Community and Team Committee meetings are considered part of the officers on-duty time and spent in these meetings will be considered as part of his police duty.
7. Records and the administration of work, plans, holidays, days off, sick days, vacations, and other personnel matters shall be administered by the Project Director who may delegate this responsibility to any Team member.
8. The Project Director may at his discretion readjust work schedules or obtain alternative Team members to assist the Team in emergencies.
9. Assignments shall be periodically evaluated by the Team or a Team Committee to, insofar as possible, insure that the manpower assignments coincide with the policing needs of the community.

C. Financing:

1. The Project Director with the assistance of Team members shall be responsible for administering the budget of the Team Police Unit.
2. The Team has a responsibility to assist the Project Director in obtaining additional funds for the support of the policing activities in their jurisdiction (e.g. Team members may prepare proposals for obtaining grants to improve their operations from private and governmental agencies).

3. The Team should cooperate with and assist citizens, community groups and governmental agencies in their efforts to obtain financial support for programs related to reducing police problems and improving police services in the Team area.

D. Cooperation with Community:

1. Team members are expected to establish a close relationship with the community within their area.
2. The Team shall organize and attend open community meetings related to police problems.
3. The Team headquarters shall be open to the public for community members use and service.
4. Team members are expected to serve all segments of the Community, protect the rights of people within the Community, and cooperate where ever possible with groups and individuals who are attempting to improve justice, social tranquility, and freedom.
5. Team members have a primary responsibility to perform their duties in a manner that will prevent crime and disorder from occurring.
6. Team members are responsible for exercising wise discretion when they are carrying out their responsibilities.
7. Team members shall use negative law enforcement techniques and force only as a last resort.
8. The Team Policing Unit should concentrate on a philosophy of service and prevention rather than suppression of crime and disorder.

E. Community Service Officers:

1. Community Service Officers (CSO's) are under the control of the Project Director.

2. CSO work schedules and assignments are the responsibility of the Project Director.
3. CSO's will assist Team members in carrying out the policing responsibilities in the Team area.
4. The precise duties of CSO's will be defined by the Team members.
5. CSO's will never be equipped with firearms.
6. CSO's will not be given assignments which are normally hazardous.
7. CSO's shall be permitted to participate in Team meetings; but they shall not have a vote in the Committee of the Whole.

F. Personnel Evaluation: The Team shall establish and assist with the Administration of a system for evaluating the performance of the individual members of the Team.

G. Methods of Performing Duties:

1. The basic methods which will be utilized by Team members in the establishment of work objectives and performance of their policing responsibility shall be left to the discretion of the Team members subject to the approval of the Project Director.
2. Under no circumstance shall a Team member use illegal or unethical methods in carrying out his responsibilities.
3. When Team members are confronted with police problems which they cannot handle they are expected to seek advice and assistance from fellow officers.

H. Communication, Dispatching, and Records:

1. Whenever possible, officers will be dispatched by the local Team dispatcher; however, requests for police assistance which are in the area of the Team's responsibility but made to Police Headquarters shall be dispatched by the Headquarters dispatcher.
2. All requests for police service will be recorded on the Complaint Cards in accordance with the requirements of the Holyoke Police Report Manual.
3. The records and filing procedures shall be under the direction of the Project Director.
4. Daily reports initiated by Team members will be submitted to Police Headquarters prior to the end of the officer's duty tour. Copies of every report will be filed at the Teams substation.
5. All data processing reports shall be kept at the Team's office.
6. Whenever possible, officers who are on duty will be equipped with a personalized portable radio.
7. In the event of an emergency, all dispatching responsibilities will be assumed by the Police Headquarters Dispatcher in order to free all Team members for street duty.

- I. Uniforms: Team members will be permitted at the discretion of the Project Director to wear a variety of uniform and non-uniform clothing.

SPECIAL ORDERS

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

Special Order 70-1

Formal Assignment of Team as Team

A. The following personnel are considered to be permanent members of the Team Policing Unit for this duration of the Team Policing experiment:

1. Capt. George Burns, Project Director
2. Herve Moreau
3. John Griffin
4. Harold Kennedy
5. Randolph Jackson
6. Robert Kotfila
7. Alan Fletcher
8. Stephen Donoghue
9. Armand Chartier
10. Everett Reed
11. Gerald McMullan
12. William Gorham
13. James Sullivan
14. Eugene Meabon
15. Russell Labbe

The following members of the Police Department are considered to be intermittent members of the Team Policing Unit for the duration of the experiment:

1. Daniel McCarthy
2. Paul Cousineau
3. Tomy Maziarz

B. The members of the Team are expected to cooperate and assist their fellow officers in the organization, implementation and operation of efforts in their area of responsibility.

C. Team members are encouraged to offer criticisms and suggestions that may be used to improve the quality of police service and reduce police problems in their jurisdiction.

- D. Problems and procedures related to the Team Policing Unit and its operation are the responsibility of the Project Director and the members of the Team.

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

Special Order 70-2

Assignment to Standing Committees

Organizational Committee:

Donoghue  
Gorham  
Jackson

Personnel Committee:

Cousineau  
Donoghue  
Reed

Department Liaison Committee:

Burns  
Griffin  
Kennedy

Local Liaison Committee:

Burns  
Donoghue  
Griffin

State Liaison Committee:

Donoghue  
Kennedy

Training Committee:

Chartier  
Labbe  
McMullan  
Meabon  
Moreau

MODEL CITIES POLICE TEAM

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

Special Order 70-3

Assignment to Temporary Committees

Communications and Records Committee:

Kotfila  
McMullan  
Maziarz

Uniform Committee:

Griffin  
Kennedy  
Sullivan

Vehicle Committee:

Burns  
Chartier  
Gorham  
Jackson  
McCarthy  
Moreau

Physical Location Committee:

Chartier  
Kotfila  
McCarthy

**END**

*1/20/1944*