


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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531**

12/14/76
Date filmed

INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT

In Response to a Request for Technical Assistance

By the

Taunton, Massachusetts, Police Department

FEB 14 1976

February 14, 1973

35202

Prepared by:
Public Administration Service
1313 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
(Per Contract J-LEAA-015-72)

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

Introduction

This report summarizes recommendations for strengthening police services in the City of Taunton. It is necessary in a management report of this kind to stress opportunities for improvements and to ignore the achievements and day-to-day positive services rendered by the City's police management and officers. This must be borne in mind when reading this report.

The recommendations made in this report have been discussed in detail during the formative stages with local officials. During the course of the survey, various meetings and discussions were held with the Mayor, the President of the City Council, the Police and License Committee of the City Council, the Police Chief, and the President of the Police Association; and community views were discussed in a meeting with the Executive Committee of the City's Chamber of Commerce. Numerous interviews were held with police officers on all reliefs and in specialized units; performance was observed, and records were assembled and examined. Views were exchanged and observations were shared.

The police service in Taunton is beset by significant difficulties which are impeding provision of the level and character of police protection that the community needs, and there is a need to address the problems in a determined and orderly fashion. Implementation of the recommendations summarized in this report will permit the required upgrading in service.

Current Police Services: Survey Findings

The difficulties hindering the provision of appropriate police service in the City of Taunton must be attacked vigorously at all levels of administration—by the Mayor, the City Council, the Police and License Committee of the City Council, the Police Chief, the Police Association, and the officers and men in the Police Department. Unless a determined and significant improvement program is undertaken, the required level of improvement cannot be anticipated. A policy of drift is inappropriate.

This section, summarizing the principal conclusions made during the on-site assistance survey, indicates the major administrative problems requiring attention. Discussed are the crime problem, the effectiveness of the Police Department, police manpower, management, organization, operations, internal support capability, and personnel. Later sections offer recommendations for coping with the problems.

The Crime Problem

Local interest in "the crime problem" in Taunton was increased during the past year by the publication of the FBI statistical report for 1971, *Crime in the United States*. The report showed that Taunton had the highest crime index for cities in the State in its population category. The October 7, 1971, headline in the local newspaper read, "We're No. One — On Crime List." City officials and the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce indicated their concern during the course of this study.

While concern at such figures is warranted, an unduly pessimistic reaction is unreasonable. First, such statistics must be interpreted in the light of the Introduction which the FBI writes at the beginning of its report: "Since the factors which cause crime are many and vary from place to place, readers are cautioned against drawing conclusions from direct comparisons of crime figures between individual communities without first considering the factors involved." As the FBI Introduction notes, "the degree of adherence to crime reporting standards" is an element among the numerous variables. Second, it is desirable to look beyond the crime totals and to examine the composition of criminal activity in Taunton.

The nature of the crime problem in Taunton is suggested in Table 1, showing the number of Part I (or more serious) crimes known to the police. The figures are taken from the City's reports prepared for submission to the FBI. On the positive side, Taunton cannot be described as "unsafe." The number of major crimes of violence against the person (such as aggravated assault) is relatively small. The highest incidences are in the property crimes of burglary, larceny, and auto theft. On the negative side, the number of these serious crimes is increasing, twice as many having occurred in 1972 compared with 1968. (The statistics in the table do not include lesser crimes—there were 95 nonaggravated assaults in 1972, for example. They also do not reflect the large amount of noncriminal work which any police department does—traffic enforcement, for instance.)

Table 1
 NUMBER OF PART I OFFENSES
 CITY OF TAUNTON, MASSACHUSETTS
 1968-1972

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Homicide	0	0	0	2	2
Rape	2	3	2	1	0
Robbery	13	9	16	24	21
Aggravated Assault	30	30	29	28	13
Burglary	404	543	796	728	639
Larceny (\$50 and over in value)	142	201	267	538	609
Auto Theft	471	520	493	451	1,034
Total	1,062	1,306	1,603	1,772	2,318

Source: City of Taunton Police Department reports prepared for submission to the FBI.

There is need for neither alarm nor complacency. But, there is a need for a fully effective police service to combat crime problems.

Police Effectiveness

The Taunton Police Department could do more in combating crime. This was clear in observing operations, and it is realized by the Police Chief and by a number of the officers interviewed. There is an opportunity for increasing effectiveness and productivity—and management should take the initiative in securing them.

This need for improved performance is reflected in the crime clearance and traffic enforcement record of the Department. It is also suggested by the rising crime rates.

Taunton has low clearance rates for Part I offenses. The national average in 1971 (the latest year for which data is available) for United States cities in the 25,000 to 50,000 population category for burglaries is 16.4. In Taunton, it was 6 percent in 1971; in 1968, it was 10 percent; in 1969, 8 percent; and in 1970, it was 9 percent. During the past year, it is reported to have been even lower—5 percent. Because of the small number of cases reported, the clearance data for crimes against the person in Taunton is not statistically significant. The clearance data for the other property crimes (larceny and auto theft) is also relatively low in the City. Some of this can certainly be explained by reference to the statistical problems inherent in intercity comparisons of crime and clearance data.

A traffic enforcement index is the ratio of the number of moving hazardous violations resulting in a conviction with penalty, to the number of vehicle accidents in which persons have been either killed or injured. Taunton's traffic enforcement index in 1972 was well below the commonly accepted rule-of-thumb ratio for urban areas—20 such citations per accidents involving death or personal injury. During the past year, in Taunton, 449 moving citations were issued. There were 373 personal injury and 4 fatal accidents. There were almost as many personal injury accidents as there were moving citations issued. Common sense also indicates the need to strengthen efforts in this area. The entire Department does not, at that rate, issue two tickets per day.

Manpower

The current complement of the Taunton Police Department is shown in Table 2. The growth over the past five years has been slight.

In seeking to upgrade the level of service, the City of Taunton should, as a first priority, seek to increase the productivity of the present complement—particularly in the patrol area. Opportunities do exist within the Department for increasing productivity, and they are indicated later in this report. Limited increases in manpower are required, however, for specific purposes. Recommendations are made later for augmentation of certain specialized positions—three detectives, one female officer, and up to four civilian clerks.

Table 2
 NUMBER OF POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES
 BY RANK
 IN THE SPECIFIED YEARS
 TAUNTON, MASSACHUSETTS

Year	Chief	Captains	Lieutenants	Sergeants	Detectives (Inspectors)	Other		Total
						Patrolmen	Civilians	
1973	1	3	4	5	3	56	2	74
1972	1	3	4	4	2	56	2	72
1971	1	3	3	3	2	57	2	72
1970	1	3	3	3	2	57	2	72
1969	1	3	3	3	2	57	2	72

Source: City of Taunton Police Department.

Intercity comparisons of manpower in relation to population are often made, and they are of extremely dubious and limited value. Other variables account for this limited value, e.g., variations in crime rates and in the geographic coverages required. It will be noted, however, that the current ratio in Taunton, calculated by utilizing the current population as estimated by the Chamber of Commerce, is 1.5. The ratio for the median police department in the same population group in the northeastern United States is 1.58.

Organization

Reshaping the administrative structure of the Police Department in accordance with modern police management principles should be a high priority in a plan to increase police productivity. The current arrangement constitutes a serious impediment to effective performance. The present structure is depicted in schematic form in Charts I and II. Three major needs are apparent.

First, the organizational structure is not designed to provide the Chief with the staff services capability he needs. Below the Chief, no officer has responsibility for planning, for training, or for community relations. Auxiliary services such as communications and records management are mixed with line operations. A result is that these functions are not carried out effectively. Until they are, Taunton will not have an adequate police service.

Second, the Department is divided into three permanent reliefs—apart from the Chief, clerical personnel, the safety officer, and detectives. No line commander (apart from the Chief) has responsibility outside his tour of duty. Thus, the Department is now fragmented into what is virtually a loose federation of three reliefs.

Third, the rank structure in the Department lacks the meaning it should have. The responsibilities of sergeants and lieutenants (assuming that the shift captain is on duty) are virtually those of patrolmen. Sergeants patrol beats in the same manner as patrolmen, for example, and the required supervisory element is absent. Captains, too, should exercise greater command responsibility.

The administrative structure of the Police Department should be recognized as archaic and ineffective.

Management

Energetic and creative management is needed at all levels in the Police Department, and the City should insist that it is provided.

A serious gulf, which must be bridged, exists between the Police Chief and much of the Department. Various explanations are offered for this fact. The Chief indicates that the increased activity of the Police Association (Taunton Branch) has curtailed his authority to a debilitating extent, for example.

Chart I
PRESENT ORGANIZATION
CITY OF TAUNTON, MASSACHUSETTS, POLICE DEPARTMENT
(As It Actually Operates)





Chart II
PRESENT ORGANIZATION
CITY OF TAUNTON, MASSACHUSETTS, POLICE DEPARTMENT
(As Depicted in the Department's Annual Report)



Source: Annual Report of the Taunton Police Department to the City Council.

Below the level of Chief, arrangements must be made to encourage—and to require—captains to exercise the command initiatives that their ranks imply. Within defined limits, the captain in command of a relief should be a "Chief of Police" for the period of his command. He should be given appropriate authority, and he should be held accountable for crime problems during the period of his command. Captains have a leadership responsibility as well as the Chief. But increased authority and accountability must go hand in hand.

Lieutenants and sergeants, no less, must be more than patrolmen. They must also be leaders, required to show initiative and held accountable for conditions in their command.

It is tempting for cities to concede management rights to associations in order to conclude difficult negotiations. Undoubtedly, the authority of the Police Chief has been limited to some extent by the current contract. This issue has been discussed with local officials. The inclusion of superior officers (all except the Police Chief) in such active roles in the Police Association presents problems, because the primary responsibility of a superior officer is to manage. The City should now attempt to improve this situation through negotiation, giving the men the necessary guarantees against arbitrary management actions while reserving management's prerogatives.

Meanwhile, the present arrangement is no bar to effective management and leadership. Like management in private enterprise, police managers must now live within the limitations of police associations and labor contracts. The Police Association and the contract are now realities in Taunton, and they must not be allowed to lessen the City's insistence that managers at all levels (from Chief to sergeant) show appropriate initiative and drive.

Operations

The effectiveness of police operations in the City is severely reduced by the present method of utilizing police manpower.

First, the City relies far too heavily on walking beats. Walking officers do have uses—for example, in undertaking public contact work and in facilitating familiarity with beat conditions, but Taunton is overinvesting in this form of patrol. Such a heavy reliance is wasteful of manpower and constitutes a dangerous lack of effective police protection. On the First Relief (12:45 a.m. to 8:15 a.m.) during the period of this survey, for example, the City utilized as many men on foot as it did in cruisers. Responsible local officials, if they doubt the waste, should spend a tour with these officers and see how inappropriate this form of patrol is. The same number of footmen were on duty during the other tours.

Second, the City has never conducted a beat study. This should be a standard periodic exercise in a modern police agency, with the objective of distributing manpower geographically and by time of day in accordance with the need for service. The indications are that Taunton does not have an effective distribution of men—either geographically or

by time of day. For example, 22 men are assigned to the First Relief (0045 to 0815), 28 to the Second Relief (0800–1715), and 24 to the Third Relief (1715 to 0045). It is not likely that the work load is similarly distributed. But no one really knows, because a beat study has not been undertaken.

Third, the investigative capability of the Police Department is not strong. This is partly the result of insufficient detective manpower and the use of detectives only during the day shift. This weakness may be a principal cause of the low clearance results.

Fourth, men on patrol lack effective supervision. The relief commander usually spends his time in the station house, and the other superior officers act essentially as patrolmen when on the street. The result is that patrolmen are basically unsupervised. This system encourages abuses.

Fifth, the Department lacks sound standard operating procedures. Patrolmen do not prepare field reports to the extent desirable, for example. The handling of field situations is essentially done on an *ad hoc* and individual basis.

Internal Support Capability

Effective field operations require sound staff support activities such as planning, training, and community relations.

Operational planning is an essential in modern police operations. Crime activity should be analyzed, problems identified, and appropriate strategies and tactics developed. Reactive policing in response to calls for service is not effective enough in reducing crime. In the area of traffic, an effective selective enforcement program is needed—more than is now done in Taunton. Managerial planning is required—for example, in developing operating procedures, in conducting beat studies, and in researching outside funding opportunities (such as LEAA).

Training and educational development require careful staff work, and in-service training should be directed by someone subordinate to the Chief. Taunton has a critical need in this area.

Community relations is a function so significant that it should not be left to chance: planning is required. Preventive police activities, whether for children or in such areas as traffic or drugs, require analysis and preparation.

The Department's records system needs an overhaul. Responsibility for records should be centralized. The central index (arranged by name) should be supplemented by cross-reference cards established by type of crime and by location. Field reporting practice and forms also require modernizing.

Personnel

Some Taunton police officers have received no training whatsoever. A police officer in contemporary society needs more than a badge and a gun. This situation requires urgent attention.

The absence of supervisory training is no less serious. If the City expects sergeants and other superior officers to be "managers" (as they should be), it must invest in training for this purpose. In-service and specialist training are also inadequate in the Department.

IV. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Improving Police Services: Organization, Management, and Manpower

Basic changes are required in the organizational structure and management of the Taunton Police Department. These items and manpower needs are outlined in this section.

Organization

A strengthened and modernized administrative structure for the Taunton Police Department is depicted in Chart III.


The Department should be strengthened by establishing two basic elements—a Field Services Division and a Staff and Auxiliary Services Division. The Field Services Division should include all field personnel—both patrol and detectives. Patrolmen and investigators (or inspectors) should work in close coordination. The division would be commanded by a captain. Each relief and the detective unit (under the captain) would be headed by a lieutenant, who would be a field commander spending most of his time in the field. The relief lieutenants would be assisted by sergeants (two on a shift).

The Staff and Auxiliary Services Division would provide the Department with the internal support resources it now lacks, and it would strengthen the auxiliary services. Two sergeants could divide between them the planning, training, community relations, and traffic analysis functions: an appropriate split is suggested in the chart. Communications and Records should be recognized as an auxiliary function and located under this division. The present fragmented approach to records management is counter-productive.

Currently the Department has three captains. Rather than distort the organization because of this, an appropriate step might be to assign the third captain, as commander of Relief 3. This is in the evening when the other ranking officers will be absent, and it is a higher activity period. When the incumbent retires, the position could be replaced at the lieutenant rank.

The practice of steady tours for the men is sound and should be continued. But some movement of superiors between shifts is desirable in order to facilitate greater unity in the Department, to expose the men and officers to different work relations, to prepare superiors better for higher commands, and to encourage new ideas and methods. The lieutenants should be rotated under the proposed arrangement every six months, and one of the lieutenants should serve in a swing capacity. (Even in the present organization, it would help if the captains were rotated every half year.)

Chart III
 PROPOSED ORGANIZATION
 CITY OF TAUNTON, MASSACHUSETTS, POLICE DEPARTMENT



^a Could be commanded by a captain, because there are now three captains in the Department.

Management

The proposed organization should be supplemented by the appropriate delegation of authority to the respective commanders at all levels. The relief commander, for example, should be free (within limits) to redeploy manpower or to utilize civilian clothes (anticrime) patrols. He should also be held responsible for crime activity on his relief.

The City may also wish to consider the advantages of establishing a Police Commissioner position. This would be a civilian noncivil service appointment, established specifically to introduce the required rate of change into the police service. The relative advantages of this innovation have been discussed with local officials. In a department with a budget of approximately \$825,000, it would not be a relatively large investment; it should yield substantial and compensating benefits. The possibility of creating a Deputy Chief position has also been discussed with local officials; it is not recommended.

Manpower

Readjustments in assignments would be necessary to effect the proposed restructuring of the Department. Accompanying this, an increase in the specialized manpower—three more detectives, up to four clerks, and one female officer—would permit a significant improvement in service.

The need for the additional three detectives is partly reflected in the City's clearance record, and is discussed further later in this report. It is also indicated by a review of the crime record of the City. The City cannot afford to shortchange the investigative function.

A decision has already been made to begin establishing the female officer position. It should be pursued. The incumbent should be a full police officer, required to operate in both uniform and civilian clothes. Women have a vital role to play in police work, and she could make a substantial contribution in Taunton. Priority should be given to employing women in the future.

Currently, the Department is relying on a patrolman and an EEA employee for their clerical needs. (The Safety Officer is not included in this calculation.) The incumbents appear to be doing good work, but more help is needed. Four permanent clerical positions are recommended, absorbing the duties of the two current positions. During the breaking-in period, it might be desirable to retain the clerical patrolman in his present capacity.

The changes recommended are summarized in the following table:

	<i>Present Staffing</i>	<i>Proposed Staffing</i>
Chief	1	1
Captains	3	3
Lieutenants	4	4
Sergeants	5	8
Detectives	3	6
Patrolmen	56	53
Policewoman	0	1
Civilians	2 ^a	5
Total	74	81

^a Includes one Janitor and one EEA employee.

The City should also develop a program for using women (e.g., housewives) as school crossing guards on a spare-time basis. This would relieve police officers for more professional police work and maintain this important traffic service.

Improving Police Services: Operations

Police effectiveness in Taunton can be improved by streamlining field operations in accordance with the community's needs. Opportunities are outlined here under the headings of manpower utilization, detectives, supervision, and procedures.

Manpower Utilization

Foot beats do have their merits. But they also have severe limitations, resulting from the lack of mobility of such a form of police coverage. Taunton is overusing foot patrols, and this is both costly and ineffective. Foot beats are now employed in Taunton on every shift. At the time of the study, four footmen were used on each relief. Three of these were patrolling in downtown areas on the second and third reliefs, while two were downtown on the first relief.

Except in special circumstances, the number of footmen patrolling near the center of the City could be reduced from three to two during the second and third reliefs (i.e., from 0800 to 1715 and from 1715 to 0045 hours). Large crowds on Taunton Green would constitute an appropriate exception and more footmen could be utilized effectively in this case. Foot patrols should be discontinued in the areas outside downtown. At the same time, the three substations should be closed. In fact, they should be shut even if the foot patrols are continued. They are hangovers from the past, fulfilling no valid police purpose and only serving to encourage undesirable and unproductive police behavior. Foot patrols should not be utilized during the bulk of the first relief (0045 to 0815 hours) except perhaps during the last two hours of the tour.

Patrol personnel should be encouraged, however, to leave their cars periodically and to do limited foot patrol where it is necessary. They should only do this, however, if they are provided with the necessary walkie-talkies: the Department currently only has eight.

The Police Department should undertake a beat study to redeploy the men appropriately geographically and by time of day in accordance with need. It was not possible to do so within the time limitations of the present assistance program. Initiating such a study should be one of the first tasks of the new planning position. Indications are that the manpower could be better distributed. The number of men on the first relief (0045 to 0815 hours) seems relatively high in relation to the number used on the third relief (1715 to 0045 hours)—22 men compared with 24.

Taunton does make use of the 2-man car. On the first relief, there is a 2-man car. Other cruisers are double-manned when personnel are available. Thus, during the period of study, the first and second reliefs had one 2-man car and three 1-man cars. The third relief had two 2-man cars and two 1-man units. It should be recognized that in a city like Taunton, 2-man cars are justifiable only in special circumstances. Used appropriately, 1-man

cars are more effective. This is now an accepted fact among police managers, as is indicated in *Training Key 73*, (see attachment) prepared by and available from the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Except in special circumstances, Taunton should discontinue its use of 2-man patrol cars. (The emergency vehicle would constitute a justifiable exception.)

The shortage of cars in the Department should be rectified at the earliest opportunity. Leasing is presently under review as a method for doing this, as small departments have found this to be an acceptable method of providing police vehicles.

The Department now maintains an emergency vehicle (and a police chauffeur) in headquarters waiting to make ambulance and other runs, in the manner of a fire department. The excessive drain on manpower should be corrected. The emergency vehicle (which resembles a paddy wagon in appearance) could well be used for patrol purposes. Alternately, its manning could be adjusted. The position of chauffeur could be abolished, at least during the second and third reliefs; car washing being done at a car wash and gassing and oiling (with an appropriate system, as discussed with the Chief) being the responsibility of each driver. The houseman could then drive the emergency vehicle. With a cruiser also responding to the scene for accident investigation purposes, it is unnecessary for the emergency vehicle to operate with three men.

The problem of limited coverage during the lunch periods (11:45 a.m. to 2:15 p.m.) requires careful attention. A method of resolving this is to shorten the policemen's lunch break—possibly also adjusting the work pattern to three 8-hour shifts. But this has contract implications and, thus, no recommendation is offered at this point beyond pointing out the need to examine the issue. From the police management viewpoint, a shorter lunch break seems appropriate.

The redistribution of field forces should be made following a thorough beat study or work load analysis. It was recommended earlier that this should be done as soon as possible. It will be noted that (with the adjustments recommended) a significant improvement in coverage will be possible. It should be possible to make a deployment such as the following: five patrol vehicles during the First Relief, six during the Second Relief, and seven during the Third Relief. It would permit two foot posts to be covered during the Second and Third Reliefs, and it would allow the emergency vehicle (if it were used on patrol) to be double-manned. Additional coverage would be provided by the supervisors in the field. An adequate number of cars would be a basic essential for such an option. Nine patrol cruisers would permit the maximum manning on the Third Relief (assuming the use on patrol of the emergency vehicle) including cars for the three superior officers. To the extent that double-manning is used, fewer patrol cruisers would be required.

Detectives

More effective field services could be provided in Taunton if more manpower were invested in detective work. Currently there are three detectives, and the indications are that this is an inadequate number. Six working detectives would be appropriate—rather than the present three. A general rule-of-thumb in police management holds that 10 percent of a force should be assigned to investigative work.

Detectives should work on a two-shift basis, permitting coverage in the evenings as well as during the day.

Investigative work in Taunton would also be facilitated if a first-line supervisor (e.g., a lieutenant) were appointed to direct investigative activities. Thus, the Detective Bureau would have a total complement of seven—six detectives (or inspectors) and a supervisor.

Taunton detectives should cease serving as collection agents for creditors presented checks with insufficient funds. Fraudulent check activity is a genuine police concern; insufficient check work should be handled by other means. Merchants and others receiving checks drawn on accounts with insufficient funds now have adequate remedies under the law for signing complaints—without involving the police. The present practice in Taunton should be recognized as an unwarranted drain on police resources.

Supervision

Effective supervision is basic to sound police field work. The current practice, whereby relief commanders rarely exit from the station house, should be revised because adequate supervision cannot be attained solely by radio. Sergeants should be used as genuine first-line supervisors rather than as higher paid patrolmen.

Supervisors should be expected to identify and attack problems on their reliefs. They must assume responsibility for directing operations (e.g., establishing special-purpose civilian clothes patrols to cope with particular antiburglary needs) rather than just relying on responsive uniform patrol and traditional practices. The supervisors must become commanders.

Procedures

The Department should update its Rules and Regulations and, as part of this, turn its attention to developing standard operating procedures. Individual effort must be supplemented by guidance and an anticipation of problems.

Field reporting is an area which should receive critical attention. Standard textbooks are available on police records. They should be examined, and the Taunton field reporting and records system revised accordingly. Present forms used are not good, and the records system requires streamlining on the lines discussed with the Police Chief.

**Improving Police Services:
Staff and Auxiliary Services**

Lack of internal staff capability is a major weakness in the Taunton Police Department. No significant progress can be anticipated unless the City is willing to invest in full-time staffing in this area.

At another level, the Department lacks an adequate number of civilian clerical employees. A police officer and an EEA employee are now being utilized. Up to four clerks would be appropriate, and two should have secretarial skills. Policemen are being used for civilian work, e.g., repairing parking meters as well as undertaking clerical work.

Adequate equipment constitutes a necessary support for field and other operations. Undoubtedly, economy is desirable. But false economies should be avoided.

**Improving Police Services:
Personnel Management**

More attention should be paid to police personnel management, because it is significant for effective performance. Personnel procedures, training, and morale are areas meriting particular concern.

Personnel Procedures

A periodic evaluation and activity reporting system should be established in the Department. Samples of such forms can be obtained from many departments or from the appropriate textbooks. Every six months (or less) supervisors should be required to evaluate their subordinates and to review these evaluations face-to-face with the men concerned. Supervisors submitting bland and noncommittal evaluations should be required to do better. Introduced with appropriate training and preparation, such an evaluation system can be an effective management tool. It should be tied in with a method for recording activity, as discussed with the Police Chief.

Training

Taunton must invest more in police training. The untrained or undertrained police officer must be recognized for what he is—a menace to himself, his colleagues, and the public.

State law requires basic training for the recruit. Fulfilling the letter and the spirit of this law should be the first training priority in Taunton.

Supervisors cannot be expected to know how to supervise unless they are trained. Taunton should allocate funds so that all supervisors receive appropriate supervisory training on a staggered basis within a reasonable period—12 months might be appropriate.

In-service training is necessary in any police agency, and the training officer should develop plans in this area. The City should accept the cost as a prudent investment. Roll-call training, utilizing the *Training Keys*, published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, should also be introduced.

Morale

The Taunton Police Department does have a morale problem. The Police Chief and the City must address this issue by positive measures. Staff meetings should be used, and avenues of communication should be established.

Beyond this, the improvements recommended in this report will go far toward alleviating the morale problem. Well-operating organizations tend to have good morale. The Taunton Police Department should pursue with vigor its opportunities for improving service to the City.

V. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

1. The Commission on the Status of Women should continue to monitor the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

UNITED NATIONS



1995

CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND GENDERS



One-man car patrol allows a department to reduce the size of a patrol area. By minimizing the distances a vehicle must travel, calls for police services may be more quickly answered. The rapidity of the police response also deters the would-be offender by removing the opportunity to successfully commit a crime. When additional one-man cars are assigned to a major incident, they provide immediate assistance to the officers in need of help. Furthermore, other motorized units directed to such a location can furnish the mobility and manpower to either cut off possible escape routes or to conduct a search for any fleeing suspect.

MORE EFFECTIVE POLICE OBSERVATION: A patrol officer should devote the majority of his time on duty to the observation of streets, sidewalks, alleys, premises and people and to acquaint himself with the conditions of his beat. He is more likely to do this if he is alone and is given the responsibility. If there is a second man in the vehicle, a great portion of the time is likely spent in idle conversation. There is also a tendency for the officer who is not driving to be less observant than he normally would be if he were in physical control of the vehicle. Then, if both men are not equally motivated, the one with lesser ambitions is likely to constitute a drag on the other. One-man car operations capitalize on individual incentive and competitive drives.

MORE ECONOMICAL: Local government expenditures have soared in the last decade with the cost of maintaining a police force generally accounting for the greater portion of the tax dollars. It has become necessary for police administrators to make the most effective use of their resources. "More men and more money," while frequently the correct response to certain police problems, is not always proper and more likely not attainable. Every effort must be made to obtain satisfactory levels of performance at minimal cost. The use of the one-man car not only increases the extent and effectiveness of patrol coverage, but provides a greater return in productive service from tax dollars so invested than other forms of patrol. The economy lies in that more police service can be provided to the citizens without the need of employing additional officers.

OPINION vs. FACTS

The one man motorized patrol has proved its value in modern law enforcement. Yet, there are still some well intended opinions presented in opposition to this type of patrol. Though these arguments are sincere, they are too frequently more emotional than factual in nature. Let us examine some of the more common arguments directed against the one-man motorized patrol.

ONE-MAN CAR OPERATION IS DANGEROUS:

OPINION:—A man patrolling by himself in a motorized unit is exposed to hazards and situations which may lead to serious injury or death. A two-man car doubles the manpower availability and the display of authority which, in turn, lessens the likelihood of a suspect assaulting or resisting the officers. Also, if one of the officers meets resistance, his partner is available to give immediate assistance and to summon help.

THE FACTS:—There is no evidence to support the contention that police officers operating in two-man cars are safer or less subject to physical attack. On the contrary, *The Uniform Crime Report*, compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicates that in a six year period (1959-1965), 87 police officers were reported killed in 69 cities that were known to use one-man patrol cars, two-man motorized patrols or a combination of one and two-man motorized units. *It was found that 52% of those officers killed in the line of duty were assigned to a two-man car, while 48% were assigned to a one-man car operation.* However, a closer analysis of these figures shows a greater differential. *In 52% of the incidents involving the one-man car operation, the lone officer was being assisted by fellow officers when he was slain. This then signified that a police officer was actually alone in only 23% of the cases.*² The conclusion we can draw from this survey is that the presence of two men in a patrol car does not guarantee personal safety. There is, on the other hand, growing speculation that the presence of two men in a police vehicle may lead to carelessness in a dangerous situation because of the false notion that resistance is not likely to occur.

ONE-MAN CAR NOT AGGRESSIVE

OPINION:—A lone police officer will not unnecessarily assume the risk presented by stopping suspicious persons or motorists for fear that he may be attacked or become involved in a situation which is beyond his ability to handle. The reluctance to make such field inquiries or actual arrests reduces the effectiveness and value of the officer during the time devoted to patrol activities. An officer riding with a partner will not be as hesitant to act as he knows assistance is present.

THE FACTS:—The alleged ineffectiveness of the one-man car patrol is more fancied than real. One frequently finds officers walking alone in those localities in which there is a reluctance to allow an officer to ride in a radio equipped car alone. But, it is proper that the officer's personal safety should be everyone's concern. Police activities in the field must be governed by this vital responsibility. Two officers assigned to a two-man patrol would normally request assistance from other units before attempting to stop an automobile containing a number of occupants suspected of having committed a crime. Ten officers would surely hesitate to attempt subduing a rioting mob of several hundreds. They would, however, call for assistance and take action after the arrival of adequate forces. By the same token, an officer in a one-man unit must recognize potentially dangerous situations and summon assistance before taking action. He should never hesitate to call for help before he becomes involved in a situation. This is not an indication of cowardice, but rather good common sense.

Traffic enforcement officers have generally worked alone in areas ranging from the country side to high crime neighborhoods. They stop a great number of vehicles at all hours of the day or night and regularly account for many felony arrests. If these officers were to react in the manner implied by the opponents of the one-man car operation, the level of performance of traffic enforcement would reflect decreasing efficiency. Yet, all records indicate that the efforts and the productivity of traffic enforcement officers are continuously increasing.

NOT ENOUGH MANPOWER

OPINION: When there are two men assigned to a car, they can handle most of the incidents assigned to them. This, in turn, eliminates the need to send additional vehicles to the scene of an incident. Besides, two men can handle a situation quicker and more efficiently than one.

² CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES. Uniform Crime Reports 1965, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., July 28, 1966, p. 36.

THE FACTS: Surveys of requests for police services refute this argument. The vast majority of calls for the police that are received each day are of a miscellaneous, non-criminal nature—*Children playing in the street, barking dogs, backyard squabbles, noisy radio or television set, illegal parking, lost child and the like.* Most of the crime calls are received after the offense has already occurred and the criminals have left the scene—*shopkeeper reporting a burglary, an assault victim at the hospital, a reported stolen auto, a victim of a pick-pocket or purse snatcher, etc.* Contrary to some views, an overwhelming number of assignments a police officer receives, even in large cities, involve situations that can be effectively handled by one officer. A back-up car or additional assistance is sent only on those occasions the dispatcher knows from past experience and training that a second or third car should also be assigned or when the responding officer requests additional assistance.

TOO MANY CARS AT SCENE

OPINION: Whenever a call is received of a felony-in-progress or other major incident, so many cars arrive at the scene that they cause a traffic jam or hamper the investigating officers.

THE FACTS: This contention is, first of all, inconsistent with the opinion of those who state the one-man car is too dangerous because the officer is deprived of the assistance he would receive if he were to have a partner. However, the presence of too many vehicles at the scene of a major incident does not reflect the inadequacies of the one-man car, but rather the shortcomings of the administration and supervision of the patrol operation. Proper administrative measures identify the dispatcher as the controlling factor in assigning vehicles to the scene of an incident. While supervisory personnel should promptly evaluate the conditions at the scene and inform the communications center to recall any units that are not required.

Generally a dispatcher will assign two or three vehicles to an incident he recognizes as having a high risk potential—*disturbance, a crime in progress, man with a gun, a prowler, etc.* However, the officer assigned has a secondary responsibility to either request additional manpower or to inform the dispatcher the situation is in hand and no additional units are needed.

ONE-MAN CANNOT DRIVE AND OBSERVE

OPINION: When one officer is operating a patrol vehicle, the other can concentrate on observation and be on the alert for conditions requiring police attention. An officer operating a one-man car must concentrate on driving and is, therefore, unable to divert his attention to activities that may be occurring on the sidewalk, side of the road, etc.

THE FACTS: Driving an automobile in heavy traffic requires considerable alertness and concentration. But, periods of congestion occur for only a relatively few hours each day and not on every street or highway. There is no support for the contention that two men in one car are more observant. On the contrary, the driver due to his activity and responsibility to control the vehicle, will be extremely alert and aware of incidents or movements on the fringes of his field of vision—*driving demands that he be observant.* The second officer too frequently becomes a relaxed passenger especially if he has full confidence in the driving ability of his partner.

Performance evaluation of patrol methods have, on the other hand, given considerable weight to the argument that one man in a police vehicle is actually more observant because, first of all, he must do the job himself and secondly, he does not have a companion to divert his attention.

GENERAL OPERATIONS

The safety of the police officer is the deep concern of a department. It is with this objective in mind that operating procedures have been devised for the one-man patrol unit. Maintaining a communications link between the motorized unit and the dispatcher is vital for the protection and assistance of an officer in the field.

Whenever an officer assigned to a one man patrol car leaves his vehicle to conduct an inspection, foot patrol, issue a citation, conduct a field inquiry or to answer a citizen's complaint, he must inform the dispatcher. He must let the communications center know he will be out of service, the type of activity he is conducting and the location. When he is preparing to stop a vehicle, he should write the license number in a pad or in his memo book and leave it in a conspicuous place in the patrol car and or transmit the license number to the dispatcher. This information may be of value if the suspect vehicle is lost in a chase or the officer is injured.

The dispatcher must share the burden of protecting the officer in the motorized unit. He must be kept fully informed of any situation affecting an assignment or of any action initiated by a motorized unit. Any misunderstanding or oversight on his part in an emergency situation may affect the safety of an officer. He must, upon receiving a transmission from a one-man car, record the time, the location, the type of activity and a license number of a suspect car if one is given.

When handling a situation requiring special or additional units, the officer must specify the type of assistance he needs to prevent the assignment of unnecessary units. It is also important for the patrol officer to distinguish between "help" and "assistance" when he is requesting additional units.

The dispatcher is the partner of the officer in a one-man car. When he receives a telephone call for police service, he must keep the caller on the line until he obtains all the facts he possibly can. This, in turn, allows him to form a judgment on the conditions that are likely to exist at the scene of the reported incident so that he may send enough units to cope with the situation.

An effective and safe one-man car patrol operation must adopt standards of procedures specifically designed for this type of patrol operation. It was never intended that the one-man car patrol should be conducted in the same manner as the two-man motorized patrol. Yet, there are general police procedures that gain in importance when they are applied to the one-man car.

An officer working a one-man car must immediately acknowledge all his calls and report back in service as soon as he has completed the assignment. Assisting units should return into service as soon as they are no longer needed at the scene.

The dispatcher must allow time for a one-man unit to return into service after being given an assignment. If he does not hear from the unit within a reasonable length of time (generally about 10 minutes) he must react to the situation. He may call the unit to determine if the assignment is completed. If he does not receive a reply, he may either dispatch another unit to the scene or a field supervisor to determine the reason for the radio silence.


One-man cars, as any motorized unit, should not respond to calls assigned to other vehicles. It is, however, considered aggressive police work for an officer in a patrol area adjoining the one receiving a call, to proceed towards the location of the assignment. This places the unassigned unit in a better position to assist in an emergency.

QUESTIONS . . .

The following questions are based upon material in this Training Key. Select the best answer.

- 1. The technological advance which made the growth and effectiveness of the one-man motorized patrol possible:**
 - a. the adoption of the automobile for police patrol
 - b. the improvement in radio communications
 - c. the improvement of the patrol call box system
 - d. the improvement of street lighting systems
 - 2. The acceptance of the one-man car as an effective and safe method of conducting motorized patrol is demonstrated by the following:**
 - a. there are no objections raised against this form of motorized patrol
 - b. 90% of American cities over 10,000 population report various applications of one-man patrol cars
 - c. slightly less than 75% of American cities over 10,000 population employ some variation of the one-man patrol cars
 - d. all cities over 10,000 population use a variation of the one-man patrol car
 - 3. The built in safety factors in one-man car operations tend to make this method of patrol:**
 - a. not quite as effective but much safer than the two-man car operation
 - b. not quite as safe as the two-man car operation but much more efficient
 - c. generally safer and more efficient than the two-man car operation if properly employed
 - d. less economical and efficient than the two-man car operation
- 1. Although some quarters still regard the one-man patrol car as a subject of controversy, the facts still indicate:**
 - a. one-man car operation is highly hazardous to the personal safety of the officer
 - b. the greatest majority of calls for police services may be handled by a one-man patrol unit
 - c. the ability to observe is reduced in a one-man car operation
 - d. a one-man car does not provide sufficient manpower to handle most assignments

HAVE YOU READ . . .



ONE MAN CAR PROCEDURES. Prepared by the Hamilton Police Department, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, 1959. Abstract No. 65-2, 75pp. (The Center for Law Enforcement Research Information, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. Cost for reproduction and handling—10¢ per page.)

A compilation of general orders relating to the operation of police vehicles under the one-man patrol system. It may well be adopted as a procedural guide for a law enforcement agency considering adopting a one-man patrol system.

ONE MAN PATROL CARS. Prepared by the Chicago Police Department, 1963. Abstract No. 65-21, 6p. (The Center for Law Enforcement Research Information, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. Cost for reproduction and handling—10¢ per page.)

This paper discusses the advantages offered by the one-man car patrol operation. It also states the department's position regarding the arguments against one-man patrol. It concludes that the one-man car has application even in a large city and that the patrol efforts are enhanced by integrating the one-man car with the two-man car operation.

DAILY TRAINING BULLETIN OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT. Vol. 2, Charles Thomas Publishers, Springfield, Illinois, 1958, 287 pp.

Chapter X, "One Man Patrol," of this bound issue discusses operational procedures to be followed by the one-man motorized unit. It points out the advantages of this type of police operation stressing that officers must follow particular procedural techniques to insure their safety and the effectiveness of the operation.

THE POLICE CHIEF, "1-MAN MOTOR PATROL," Vol. XXXII, No. 2, Samuel Chapman and Robert Mitchell, February, 1965, pp. 12-28.

This article is a reprint of a manual released by the Multnomah County (Oregon) Sheriff's Department. It is a thorough and concise directive establishing procedural guidelines for the 1-man motor patrol operation.

ANSWERS . . .

by the F.B.I. shows it to be also a safer operation.
4. b. The facts indicate the majority of police calls may be safely and efficiently handled by the one-man car. This refutes arguments that this type of patrol does not provide sufficient manpower to handle most assignments.

- 1. b.** Improvement in radio communications gave the patrol officer a direct link to the dispatcher and reduced the personal risk of the one-man car operation. This development was instrumental in the growth of the one-man car patrol.
- 2. b.** 90% of the American cities over 10,000 population report various applications of one-man patrol cars. These figures indicate this type of patrol is safe and efficient and has a definite place in modern law enforcement.
- 3. c.** The one-man car operation has many advantages over the two-man car. A survey conducted

END