


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## HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM A HISTORY OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

MTR-6946

**NATIONAL IMPACT PROGRAM EVALUATION  
A HISTORY OF  
THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM**

BY  
**F.C. JORDAN, JR.**  
THE MITRE CORPORATION

OCTOBER 1975

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ACQUISITION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
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ABSTRACT

This document reconstructs the history of LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program in Cleveland and represents one element of an overall, eight-city, program history. The effort is being undertaken by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and The MITRE Corporation as part of a nation-wide evaluation of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program presently in operation. The document provides a narrative of key issues, events and decisions which shaped the first three years of the program in Cleveland.

MITRE Department  
and Project Approval:

Edwin Chelms

## PREFACE

### Scope and Purpose

This is one among a series of case studies describing key events which took place and decisions which were made in each of the eight Impact cities and in Washington, D. C. during the course of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The case studies, together with a report viewing the program from a national perspective will comprise Task 8 of the national-level evaluation of the Impact program; they are intended to help answer the three questions which form the basis of the national-level evaluation effort, namely:

What happened - in terms of planning and implementation process - when the LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-specific planning and evaluation?

What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?

What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

This case study focuses on key program-level, rather than project-level, events. The word "key" is deserving of special emphasis here. In no way does this report pretend to stand as a day-by-day chronology of events; rather, it attempts to describe those decisions and events which have seemed most significant during the time period which has passed since the Cleveland Impact program was begun.

### General Research Procedures for the History Task

Visits were made to each of the main agencies of the Impact program structure - the Regional Office of the LEAA, the State Planning Agency, and the city organization known as the Crime Analysis Team - to obtain information relevant to the task. The files of each agency were searched, and memoranda and correspondence concerning meetings held, decisions made, and progress achieved or problems encountered in the course of the program were selected. Documents were also obtained from relevant offices of the Washington headquarters of the LEAA.

Interviews were held with key members of the Impact program bureaucracy. Depending upon the respondent, one of two techniques was used. In the first case, a semi-structured interview schedule had been constructed to obtain from the respondent a chronological description of Impact program events. The questions also included certain functional

areas such as "interagency coordination" which encompass a continuous series of discrete events and seemed likely to be best captured in summary, rather than chronological, form. In some cases, the interview schedule was followed quite closely.

In other cases, the interview was begun with a few background questions about functional areas, such as the organization of the CAT, and led up to a request that the respondent recreate for the interviewer the history of the program as he himself knew it or had heard it from others. The respondent was asked, in effect, to place himself back in time to when he first joined the program and tell how events seemed to him as they unfolded. The role of the interviewer was to use his basic knowledge of the program to keep the narrative on a chronological track and occasionally to ask the respondent to amplify or explain a statement. When the narrative was finished, the interviewer would ask a few questions to fill in gaps which seemed immediately apparent.

Several rules have been followed in the presentation of the findings of this study. Information derived from written records has been attributed to its source. However, in the interests of confidentiality, the sources of quotations drawn from interviews have not been cited. Finally, since the personal identities of the actors are less important than their institutional positions, they are identified, wherever possible, by their organizational titles rather than by name.

### Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the case method are well known. In terms of the most generally accepted paradigm of social science research, the case method is open to the charges that it deals with the specific rather than the general, is descriptive rather than analytic, and leaves so much to the discretion and judgment of the researcher that validation of the data and replication of the study are impossible.

There are more specific problems with this particular study which must be recognized. The validity of the information acquired through interviews is open to question because they were conducted at least eighteen months after the program began and the recollections of the respondents may not always have been reliable. On the other hand, too little time may have elapsed before the interviews were conducted. The program was in full operation while the study was being carried out. After an evaluator has come and gone, the participants in a program still need to carry on with very real personal and political relationships to accomplish their jobs. Thus, some of the respondents may have perceived certain information at their disposal as sensitive in nature and some reservation on their part was probably inevitable.

In the case of written records three problems are apparent. The tone, and degree of selectivity of some documents led to the conclusion that they had as their purpose not only the recording of the "facts" but also the providing of a rationale for a past or future decision. Moreover, some documents were not strictly contemporaneous but rather constituted written summaries of prior events. Thus, the passage of time may well have effected the emphases of the writer. Finally, it is probably a condition of bureaucratic life that the more routine and non-problematic the events, the fewer the memoranda and letters generated by the actors. When conflicts arise and issues are drawn, the formal and informal communications among those responsible for a program will normally increase. Thus, available records are more likely to reflect "problems" or management crises about which decisions are difficult and which tend to be forced upon the organizational hierarchy and thereby generate even more paperwork. The danger here is that the researcher would conclude that a particular program was characterized solely by one problem after another. Yet, there is a routine "everyday life" in any human activity, political and otherwise, which is no less real and important than are conflict and crises.

The Utility of the Case Method

In many ways, however, the very characteristics of the method which weaken it serve as its strengths. While the following report is long on description and short on analysis, its level of detail should be sufficient to permit the reader to draw his own conclusions from what is here presented rather than force him to accept solely the frame of reference of the writer. The study attempts to deal with social and political life on its own terms. To a large extent, the participants were taken at their own written or spoken words. Their definitions of reality, their statements of problems, their qualitative judgments, were reported but not to any significant degree analyzed for their "objective" validity. Eventually, the findings of the case studies will be synthesized and analyzed for their overall significance. In the meantime, it is hoped that the events described in each of the studies can usefully speak for themselves.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xiii
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The High Impact Anti-Crime Program	1
2.0 THE CONTEXT OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM	6
3.0 THE PROGRAM BEGINS	12
3.1 Cleveland is Selected	12
3.1.1 The National Institute Recommends Cleveland: Reactions of the SPA and RO	12
3.2 Problems Develop Amid Attempts to Implement the New Federalism	17
3.3 The Memorandum of Agreement	21
3.4 The Cleveland CAT Is Established and a Program Director is Named	24
3.5 The SPA Role in Cleveland's Impact Program is Delineated	27
4.0 THE MASTER PLAN IS WRITTEN AND REVIEWED BY THE REGIONAL OFFICE	32
4.1 Pivotal Roles Are Played by the RO Coordinator and CAT Director	32
4.2 The Master Plan Employs the Performance Management System (PMS) Approach	34
4.3 A Federal Regional Council Task Force is Formed with the ROC as Chairman	45
4.4 The Master Plan Outlines Three of Cleveland's Proposed Programs in Greater Detail	47
4.4.1 The Cleveland Drug Abuse Program (CDAP)	47
4.4.2 The Cleveland Youth Services Program (CYSP)	48
4.4.3 The Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP)	48
4.5 The Regional Office Reviews the Master Plan	50
5.0 THE MASTER PLAN IS FORMALLY APPROVED	53
5.1 A Nixon Letter: Special Commendations for Cleveland	54
5.2 The LEAA Administrator's Press Conference: Civil Rights Non-Compliance in Police Hiring Policies Emerges as a Problem	54
5.3 Reactions and Counter-Reactions to the Master Plan	59
5.3.1 HEW's Region V Commission Cites Weaknesses in the Plan	59
5.3.2 The CAT responds to the Commissioner's Review	60
5.3.3 The Chicago Regional Office responds to the Commissioner's Review	60

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
6.0 CLEVELAND IMPACT ACTIVITIES SHAPED BY SPA ATTITUDE AND A CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT	63
6.1 The SPA reviews a Cleveland Police Grant: the Reaction of Cleveland Planners	63
6.2 An NAACP Lawsuit: Cause of Program Delay	64
7.0 CLEVELAND SUBMITS A PLANNING AND EVALUATION GRANT: \$1.1 MILLION IN INSTITUTE FUNDS ARE REQUESTED	67
7.1 The Impact Planning and Evaluation Grant Application	68
7.2 The Impact Planning and Evaluation Manual: How Does It Differ from the Grant Application?	72
7.3 Reactions of the National Institute and the National Impact Coordinator to the Cleveland Evaluation Plan	76
7.3.1 The National Institute Visits Cleveland	83
7.3.2 The National Impact Coordinator Re-Visits Cleveland	84
7.4 The Cleveland Evaluation Component	84
7.5 The National Institute/MITRE Review The Evaluation Component and the Cleveland CAT's Response	91
8.0 CLEVELAND'S IMPACT PROGRAM REMAINS ACTIVITY FOCUSED	94
8.1 Cleveland Awards Funds to 37 Projects Under 5 Program Areas	95
8.1.1 The Addiction Treatment Operating Program	95
8.1.2 The Employment Operating Program	97
8.1.3 The Diversion and Rehabilitation Operating Program	97
8.1.3.1 Group Homes	97
8.1.3.2 Alternative Education (Street Academy)	97
8.1.3.3 Youth Neighborhood Coordinators	97
8.1.3.4 Youth Outreach	98
8.1.3.5 Intervention and Developmental Centers	98
8.1.3.6 Police Athletic League	98
8.1.3.7 Comprehensive Corrections Unit	99
8.1.3.8 Community Based Probation	99
8.1.3.9 Post-Release Follow-Up	99
8.1.3.10 Community Based Supplemental Service	100
8.1.3.11 Juvenile Court Development	100
8.1.3.12 Juvenile Delinquency Treatment Project	100
8.1.3.13 Pre-Trial Rehabilitation Project	101
8.1.3.14 Big Brothers Project	101
8.1.3.15 Cleveland Youth Assistance Program (CYAP)	101
8.1.3.16 Boy's Club	101
8.1.4 The Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Operating Program	102

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	<u>Page</u>
8.1.4.1 Concentrated Crime Patrol	102
8.1.4.2 Upgrading Narcotics Related and Felony Investigative Procedures	102
8.1.4.3 Auxiliary Police Training	102
8.1.4.4 Expansion and Upgrading of Cleveland Police Outreach Centers	102
8.1.4.5 Police Organization, Management and Operation Study	103
8.1.4.6 Patrol Allocation Study	103
8.1.4.7 Public Information	103
8.1.4.8 Response Time Reduction Project	103
8.1.4.9 Impact Security Patrol	103
8.1.4.10 Street Lighting	103
8.1.4.11 Impact Awareness	104
8.1.4.12 Neighborhood Patrol	104
8.1.5 The adjudication Operating Program	104
8.1.5.1 Court Offender Rehabilitation Project (CORP)	104
8.1.5.2 Pre-Trial Delay Component	104
8.1.5.3 Post-Adjudication Delay Component	105
8.2 The Grant Award and Fund Flow Processes: Steps Toward Speedy Implementation	105
9.0 PROJECT MONITORING: A LOOK AT THE OPERATIONAL PHASE OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM	111
9.1 The Monitoring of the Community-Based Probation Project	113
10.0 CLEVELAND EVALUATES ALL 5 PROGRAM AREAS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY REVISES ITS MASTER PLAN BY APRIL 1974	117
10.1 The Contents of the Revised Master Plan	118
10.2 Twenty-One Cleveland Evaluation Reports Are Reviewed By The National Institute	120
10.2.1 The National Institute Reviews the Initial Package of Ten Project-Level Evaluations	120
10.2.2 The Cleveland CAT Replies to the Technical Review of Its First Set of Evaluation Reports	126
10.2.3 The National Institute Reviews Eleven Additional Project-Level Evaluations under Cleveland's Diversion/Rehabilitation Program	128
10.3 The National Institute Visits Cleveland	130
11.0 THE NEW CLEVELAND GAME PLAN: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CAT FUNCTION	134
11.1 Cleveland Projects Are Institutionalized	134
11.2 Specific CAT Functions are Recommended for Institutionalization	135
11.3 The Chicago Regional Office Replies to Cleveland's Institutionalization Plan	136

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Concluded)

	<u>Page</u>
12.0 EPILOGUE: RESPONSES TO A QUESTIONNAIRE BY THE MAYOR OF CLEVELAND, OHIO	139
References	143

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>Figure Number</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Cleveland Impact Master Plan: The PMS Approach	37
2	Performance Management System Methodology	38
3	Cleveland Impact Cities Program Overall Milestone Schedule - March, 1972- March, 1973	85
4	Cleveland Impact Cities Program Overall Milestone Schedule - April, 1973- September, 1973	87

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table Number</u>		<u>Page</u>
I	Selection Criteria for Impact Cities	15
II	Cleveland Impact Program Organizational Structure	26
III	Cleveland Impact Program: Goals and Objectives	36
IV	Cleveland Impact Program - List of Proposed Activities and Level of LEAA Funding	41
V	Cleveland Youth Services Program Organizational Chart	49
VI	Cleveland Impact Cities Program Structure	75
VII	Revised Cleveland Impact Cities Program Structure	89
VIII	Cleveland Impact Program Funding History	96
IX	Grant Application and Award Process for the Cleveland Impact Program	107
X	Fund Flow Process in the Cleveland Impact Program	109
XI	Project Aborts in Cleveland	112
XII	Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Operating Program Overview	121
XIII	Impact City-Generated Project-Level Evaluation Reports as of April 1975	132

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program came to Cleveland in 1972 amid charges and countercharges of high-level political maneuvering. Close scrutiny of the available data indicates that the recommendation of Cleveland was arrived at in a rational, objective way and was a decision made without innuendo or political pressure. These apparent facts notwithstanding, there were several principals--the directors of the Crime Analysis Team and State Planning Agency and the Regional Office Coordinator for Impact--who believed the selection of Cleveland had been made solely on a political basis. What becomes plain, then, is that there was a communications gap among and between the various levels of bureaucracy involved in the early planning for Cleveland's program, and that this problem was at least partly linked to the time pressures under which key decisions were being made.

Despite the fact that Cleveland's selection as an Impact city appears to have not been expertly handled, the evidence indicates that Cleveland, a city which had little in the way of a centralized planning capability when Impact began, would respond to what it perceived as "tremendous pressure" to get programs operational before the Presidential elections in November 1972. It became one of the first Impact cities to write and receive approval of its master plan, and by June 28, 1972, a request had been initiated to transfer \$3 million in Impact funds to the Chicago Regional Office. Cleveland would become the fastest implementors of Impact projects as well as the fastest expenders of Impact funds.

Cleveland's Impact program was always activity or project-focused. And, in their rush to implement programs, Cleveland planners would neglect the development of a data base. Instead, they would use available burglary, robbery and street assault data as surrogates for all stranger-to-stranger crime. With these data, plus intuitive feelings, the decision was made to focus on the unemployed and addicted young adult offender as well as the juvenile offender in predominantly black neighborhoods. However, commenting on the data analysis presented in the Cleveland master plan in support of the aforementioned strategy, a National Institute/MITRE analysis of crime-oriented planning concludes that the linkages between proposed activities and crime problems identified through Cleveland's data analysis "range from fairly strong to tenuous" and that "the ambiguous and differential links between the data and proposed projects suggest that a crime-oriented approach" could only have been employed "in a cursory and non-systematic fashion."

Eventually, Cleveland would complete evaluation reports for most of its Impact projects. In fact, as of April 15, 1975, Cleveland had produced forty-seven evaluation reports on thirty-two different projects. Despite the large number of evaluation reports completed by the Cleveland Crime Analysis Team, problems identified by reviewers of Cleveland's evaluation documents would remain unresolved, and the

reports would continue to be plagued by a variety of data- and design-related problems. Data would continue to be presented in the aggregate rather than in a client-specific form, and in particular, baseline data would continue to be virtually non-existent. Without such data, it remained an extremely arduous task to assess project effectiveness or to reach informed judgments relative to how successful a given project had been in meeting its stated objectives.

Originally, Cleveland proposed 55 projects for implementation under the Impact program and requested LEAA funding in the amount of \$29,131,000 over a two-year time period. However, the LEAA would impose a \$20 million ceiling on each of the Impact cities, thereby stymieing Cleveland's concerted quest for a larger slice of the federal monies. Eventually, Impact project awards to Cleveland would total \$18,288,552, covering 37 projects. In addition, the State Planning Agency would receive a single Impact grant for \$70,000 and the city Crime Analysis Team three planning and evaluation grants totalling \$1,455,300. This would bring the total funds awarded to Cleveland's Impact program up to \$19,810,852.

Regarding the important area of institutionalization of the Crime Analysis Team, it is interesting to note that the city of Cleveland has institutionalized some of the team's key functions. The staff, which at the peak of Impact activity in Cleveland numbered 28 persons, has been reduced to four persons. Its last staffing grant has been extended through December 1975. A "Block" grant to fund this group, and thereby continue a minimal criminal justice planning capability in Cleveland, has been applied for and was awarded as of January 1, 1976.

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 The High Impact Anti-Crime Program

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program, announced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in January 1972, represented a noticeable departure from prior agency policy in at least two ways. First, previous LEAA programs had generally been directed toward improvement of the criminal justice system. Grant monies had been spent mainly on modernizing equipment, training personnel and refining the operational techniques of criminal justice agencies. The Impact program defined its goals in terms of crime rather than of the criminal justice system. It had dual purposes: the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary in the Impact cities by 5 percent in two years and 20 percent in five years, and the demonstration of the utility of the comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation (COPIE-cycle) process. This process includes an analysis of the victims, offenders and environment of the Impact target crimes; an elaboration of the cities' crime problems in quantified terms; the development of a set of programs and projects to address them; and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects and programs implemented. Second, the program represented a marked change in the character of the administration of LEAA discretionary funds which previously had been parceled out in small amounts but would now be concentrated largely in a single program thrust.

The Impact program was carried out in the cities of Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and St. Louis. The criteria for their selection were as follows:

- Since it was assumed that the funds available would have little measurable effect upon the largest cities and because the target crimes were less frequent in cities with populations below 250,000, only cities with populations between 250,000 and 1,000,000 were considered for inclusion in the program.
- The overall crime rate and statistics for robbery and burglary of each city in this population category were examined.

- To assure geographic distribution no more than one city was to be selected for each LEAA region.
- In those regions where the above criteria resulted in more than one eligible city, the final selection was based on an assessment of the city's ability to manage the program.

Time would show that each of the eight Impact cities would respond in its own way to the policy guidelines established by the LEAA for the management of the program. However, there were a number of activities which were expected of all the cities and these serve as a convenient means to organize their program histories. Each city was expected to:

- Distribute and analyze a questionnaire which had been devised by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to provide a basic store of information upon which to build its crime-oriented plan.
- Establish a Crime Analysis Team (CAT) as the organizational mechanism for the coordination of the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the Impact program.
- Develop an application for the funds made available by the National Institute to carry out the planning and evaluation functions. The application was to include a "plan of operation" for the CAT which would describe how it intended to develop a master program plan and organize its evaluation function.
- Gather data for and carry out program evaluation at the local level.
- Develop a master plan for the program within a crime-oriented planning framework.
- Coordinate the development of projects, monitor their implementation, and evaluate their effectiveness.

In a policy sense, decision-making authority was to be shared by the appropriate representatives of the President of the United States, the governor of the state, and the mayor of the city. The regional administrator, the SPA director, and the CAT director or the mayor were personally to form a "partnership" responsible for program policy in their Impact city. A "Policy Decision Group" composed of three high-level officials in the LEAA Washington headquarters would serve to

oversee the consistency of the program nationally.

At the operational level, the decision-making apparatus directly concerned with the Impact program included the Crime Analysis Team (CAT), the State Planning Agency (SPA), and the Regional Office of the LEAA (RO). The actual roles of each would vary in style and substance. The SPA's role in discretionary grant programs had been to serve as a conduit for grant funds from the Regional Office to local agencies and as a financial monitor. They could not, as it were, veto discretionary grant proposals. Under the Impact program, many SPA's would be asked to assume a role in the decision-making process that would prove to be more active and influential than had traditionally been the case under the discretionary grant program. Finally, the Regional Office of the LEAA had been delegated the final authority to approve Impact plans and projects.

In the case of Cleveland, the organizational title of the CAT is Cleveland Impact Cities Program or Impact Cities. The staff operates under the aegis of the offices of the mayor of Cleveland, and its director serves as a member of the mayor's cabinet. At the state level, the organization title of the SPA is the Ohio Department of Economic and Community Development, Administration of Justice Division.

The Regional Office for the LEAA Region V, based in Des Plaines, Illinois<sup>1</sup>, was charged with the overall responsibility for the Impact program in Cleveland. James Bain, Jr. was assigned the task of coordinating the Cleveland effort at the regional level; his role of Regional Office coordinator (ROC), as he perceived it, was to provide pivotal direction to the Cleveland program.

<sup>1</sup>Throughout this report the Region V office of the LEAA will be referred to as the Chicago Office. This is being done in the name of consistency since all respondents spoken to used the term Chicago rather than Des Plaines when interviewed.

According to the former and present directors of the Cleveland CAT, the RO coordinator was a principal architect of their city's Impact program and provided invaluable technical assistance to them throughout the earliest stages of programmatic start up. Commenting on his own role during this critical time period, the former RO coordinator would say in a recent interview: "I ran that program with an iron fist. [The Regional Administrator] gave me the authority to run the program and I made the decisions."<sup>(1)</sup> In addition to having earned an engineering degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a master's degree in Business Administration from the University of Syracuse, the RO coordinator was a graduate of, and later an instructor at, the Defense Department's Defense Management School where many of the management techniques which came into popular vogue in the mid-sixties were developed. These qualifications were useful in providing guidance to a Cleveland CAT comprised largely of talented young people with specific skills in law, corrections and police but with no practical experience to speak of and minimal training in managerial concepts. In the first year of the Cleveland program, in particular, he would be looked to for continual guidance and he would respond always with a decision.

Among the decisions directly attributable to the RO coordinator was Cleveland's long term use of contractors for their evaluation. According to the RO coordinator, "You cannot, in these programs, hire qualified people fast enough to satisfy the requirements of the federal government to get the program underway . . . Hire a skeleton staff - maybe five people . . . All the rest can be done on contract."<sup>(2)</sup>

As the program would develop in Cleveland, the decision to let contracts for evaluation would become one of the more unusual features of the city's efforts. At best, however, such an arrangement could not

provide for an in-house evaluation capability in Cleveland which might remain after the Impact program would have terminated.

## 2.0 THE CONTEXT OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM

Cleveland, in the summer of 1972, eight months after the announcement of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program, was a city rife with the problems traditionally believed to influence the incidence of crime - poor housing, unemployment, etc. It was a city besieged by robberies and burglaries at an unprecedented rate, and terrorized by muggings, rapes, assaults, and homicides. Indeed, the number of burglaries and robberies in the city of Cleveland doubled between 1966 and 1970, even though the population of the central city was declining. In 1970, 44,564 of a total of 58,887 serious crimes reported in Cuyahoga County were committed in Cleveland. That year the city was also the scene of 271 of the 292 murders in the county, 307 of the 369 rapes and 5,475 of the 5,884 reported robberies. In sum, violence in Cleveland was a major concern as the decade of the 70s was ushered in and a pivotal question, in the summer of 72, would center on whether or not Cleveland, a city strong in ethnic ties, would be able to meet the Impact challenge successfully.

To better understand a city's problems, it is helpful to look at its historical origins. In the early years of the United States as a nation, Cleveland, founded in 1796, was little more than a small inland port settled largely by New Englanders who had journeyed westward. Additionally there were a few German and Irish immigrants living along the docks of Lake Erie's southern shore. Cleveland maintained these basic cultural lines well into the 19th century.

Once the Civil War had been fought, Cleveland underwent drastic changes with an influx of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe who had been attracted by the surging commercial growth and industrialization Cleveland was then experiencing. When the second decade of the 20th century began, these European immigrants and their families comprised 75 percent of Cleveland's population. They were,

however, separated from the older inhabitants through language, customs and religion and the doors to power and social acceptance were closed to them. Ethnic enclaves evolved which would serve eventually for the development of a political power base and for the maintenance of an intricate set of ethnic linkages and loyalties. In the fifth decade of the 20th century, Cleveland was to experience an influx of blacks from the South and Appalachia. These blacks grew in numbers so that by the early 1960s, they would comprise a sizable but powerless and excluded minority in Cleveland.

The struggle of blacks for equality all over America parallels the struggle in Cleveland, where civil rights groups formed in the early 60s with integrated memberships comprised largely of inner-city ministers, Jews and blacks. Such an alliance also included militant young black men who struggled to leave behind them all vestiges of what they viewed as a racially oppressive society. Hence, the alliance formed was, at best, tenuous and would depend on how well it could assure harmony among its many diverse factions.

The year 1965 brought with it an ever increasing cry for black solidarity as typified in the "Black Power" movement, and the summer of 1965 saw racial disturbances in American cities, including the riot in Watts, a suburb of Los Angeles, California. As the fall of '65 approached, several organizations of black militants rose to prominence in Cleveland. The whites of Cleveland's enclaves grew more anxious and even the more liberal whites began to decrease their support of more traditionally-oriented black groups such as the NAACP. Tensions between whites and blacks culminated with the Hough riots of the summer of 1966. This disturbance was a massive civil disorder which saw by the time the violence had been spent, four blacks dead, many others injured, and whole city blocks leveled. A biracial review panel, commenting on the Hough riots, would conclude that the social conditions existing in

Cleveland's ghetto areas had been the underlying causes of the riots.<sup>(3)</sup>

The summer of 1967 would see disorders in several major American cities, among them Detroit, Newark, Atlanta and Cincinnati but none in Cleveland. Although there are several possible explanations for Cleveland's relative calm during 1967, one stands out clearly as a contributing factor. Cleveland's charismatic black leader, Carl Stokes, who had come within 2100 votes of becoming the city's mayor in 1965, was again challenging the incumbent, Ralph Locher in 1967. Stokes won his party's primary, and in the general election, defeated Seth Taft, a prominent Cleveland Republican and the grandson of President Taft. Stokes thus became the first black mayor of a major American city. He had been elected by a largely black constituency where he received 98% of the ballots cast in predominantly black wards. He received only 19.3 percent of the vote in predominantly white wards, however, and he received his lowest level of support in the three wards of the city with the highest concentration of white ethnic groups. His victory, then, was not a triumph over racial bigotry nor was it the clear indication of more liberal race relations, as it had been touted in the news media.

Carl Stokes began the first of two tumultuous terms as Cleveland's mayor on January 1, 1968. He was the subject of much scrutiny and was expected to solve all the ills of the machine administrations that had come before him. His early tenure in office was marred by minor political scandals involving some of his early appointees, and public bickering among others of his administration. Ironically, opportunity would come to Stokes through a great American tragedy. When James Earl Ray assassinated Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968, violence erupted in black-dominated ghettos throughout America but not in Cleveland. Mayor Stokes took to the streets, with Cleveland's black militants at his side, and kept the peace. Whites were grateful; they now believed Stokes to be an asset to their city and an effective guarantee against

further racial disorders. The seeming harmony of Cleveland's ghettos, however, was short-lived. In less than four months, on July 23, 1968, violence would strike Glenville, a predominantly black area of Cleveland. When the rioting and looting ended five days later, seven men were dead, fifteen others were wounded and countless millions of dollars in property losses had been suffered due to lootings and burnings. Clearly, the violence which erupted in Glenville, while falling into an established pattern of blacks destroying property in the ghetto, had begun as violence aimed primarily at inflicting personal injury. It was black-dominated throughout, and there were more white casualties than black. It appears that the tensions, misunderstandings and long-standing inequities which were at the root of racial problems in Cleveland had burst forth and that no single individual could have prevented the disaster which followed.

Although Stokes would regain enough of his lost stature to win a second term as Cleveland's mayor, his influence would never reach the peak of solidarity enjoyed before the Glenville riots. Citizen morale declined to a low ebb, and the Stokes administration was increasingly attacked for allegedly favoring blacks over other ethnic groups. By November 1971, relationships among the city of Cleveland, its City Council, and its various suburbs had reached such an impasse that seemingly very little progress was being made toward revitalizing the city.

With the election of Ralph J. Perk, a Republican mayor in a Democratic city running on a platform of what the new mayor termed "ethnic power," the effort was made to mobilize Cleveland's huge ethnic population for a united old-world voice in modern big-city politics. Regarding this time period and the political setting in Cleveland, the former CAT director noted the following:

. . . If you talk strictly political environment, you have essentially a county and a city that are predominantly Democratic . . . Then, in 1971, you had the first Republican mayor that had been elected in many, many moons. A City Council made up of 33 members, 32 of whom are Democrats . . . [Cleveland] has been essentially Democratically controlled . . . The mayor was the first to change that . . . [He] and Seth Taft and George Boynavitch . . . are the only really strong Republicans in a sense in the county. So, from a political standpoint, strictly political party, it was a very tough setting. (4)

Despite the apparent difficulties facing Republican Mayor Perk, he was, after 1 and 1/2 years in office, considered an overwhelming favorite to win re-election. According to the news media, he had achieved this remarkable status by appealing to the ethnic sentiments of Cleveland. Describing the mayor's surprising rise to power in Cleveland, an article under a Washington Post byline (reprinted in the Cleveland Plain Dealer) reported the following:

In his first 19 months as mayor of this traditionally Democratic stronghold, Ralph J. Perk has presided over a dramatic revival of old politics in a city that was clearly receptive to the beguiling Perkisms . . .

The 59-year old Perk, the son of first generation Czech parents, has cast himself as the chief theoretician of what he calls "Ethnic Power" . . . In this respect he has maintained an impeccable image as "The Ethnic Mayor" . . .

Perk is proud of the fact that he has never moved out of his old neighborhood, not during his many years as County Auditor, and not now that he is the City's chief executive, an office he reached in 1971 with only 38 percent of the vote in a three-way race. (5)

The mayor's satisfied constituency did not, however, include much of Cleveland's growing black minority, by 1971 comprising nearly 40% of the city's population. Yet blacks were clearly a force to be reckoned with, as evidenced by the fact that the School Board president, the president of City Council and one of the city's congressmen were black.

They were ethnics, too, perhaps, but ethnics apart from the groups for which Mayor Perk had appeal. This fact, if not acknowledged by the mayor, was at least articulated by some of his staff, as the following excerpt from a Plain Dealer article indicates:

Perk is merely doing for the ethnics what Stokes did for the blacks. You can't criticize that, now, can you? (6)

Blacks, in large numbers, did criticize the mayor, however, and they came to view his ethnic "perkisms" as signs of overt racism. The riots of Hough and Glenville continued to linger in the memories of blacks and whites in Cleveland where racial divisions still run deep. This back-drop of on-going racial unrest, coupled with high unemployment, fiscal problems and the continual bickering and lack of cooperation among the business and governmental communities, was Cleveland's situation in September 1972 when then LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard came to the city to formally announce the approval of the Cleveland Impact program's master plan. Behind the scenes work on Impact had been in progress for months, and Cleveland's mayor in July 1972, had commented publicly on its growing crime problem saying:

One of the most precious freedoms of all is the freedom to move about in one's community safely and without fear. Impact . . . is designed to restore that freedom in Cleveland. (7)

In sum, the expectation ran high in Cleveland that Impact could solve some of the city's burgeoning crime problems. Given the enormity of the difficulty, however, both newspapers and citizens alike were certain that if Impact were to attack the problems within the community which appeared to be causing that crime, then much more money would need to be expended than the \$20 million being allocated by the LEAA.

3.0 THE PROGRAM BEGINS

3.1 Cleveland is Selected

The selection of Cleveland for the Impact program is a decision shrouded in controversy and charges of high-level political maneuvering. Although the facts are somewhat sparse in this area, the problem appears to have been basically one of poor communication among and between the various levels of city, state and federal government.

3.1.1 The National Institute Recommends Cleveland: Reactions of SPA and RO

When a list of candidate cities was prepared by LEAA's Statistics Division in November 1971, Cleveland was the only city from LEAA Region V recommended to the National Institute for inclusion in the Impact program. Indeed, the only other Region V city mentioned in correspondence between the Institute and LEAA's Statistics Division was Minneapolis. Statistical data comparing Cleveland and Minneapolis are presented below:

City and State	1970 Population (000's)	1970 Rate per 100,000		
		Total Index	Robbery	Burglary
Cleveland, Ohio	739	6030	741	1457
Minneapolis, Minn.	432	5539	421	2251

The above data reflect total index, robbery and burglary rates per 100,000 population for 1970. The data below are the ranks for the two cities across the same categories and are excerpted from a Table of 38 cities with populations between 250,000 and 1,000,000.

City and State	Total Index Crime Rate Rank	Robbery Rate Rank	Burglary Rate Rank	Population Rank
Cleveland, Ohio	13	7	32	5
Minneapolis, Minn.	19	14	16	21

Cleveland, with a total index crime rate ranking of 13, seems better suited for the Impact program overall than does Minneapolis with a rank of 19. Cleveland ranks seventh on robbery rates while Minneapolis ranks fourteenth. On the other hand, Minneapolis' burglary rate rank is sixteenth while Cleveland's is thirty-second. The Institute, however, was more interested in robbery rates than in those for burglary because "robbery is most reflective of street crime since most kinds of street assaultive behavior (e.g., murder, aggravated assault) occur in robbery situations."<sup>(8)</sup> Additionally, and as 1970 Uniform Crime Report data presented below will attest, when one looks at the total number of murders, rapes and aggravated assaults per every 100,000 in population for Cleveland and Minneapolis, it becomes even more evident that Minneapolis was experiencing a far less serious Impact crime problem than was Cleveland.

City & State	No. of Murders	Murder Rate	No. of Rapes	Rape Rate	No. of Ag. Assaults	Ag. Assault Rate
Cleveland, Ohio	271	36.7	307	41.5	1909	258.3
Minneapolis, Minn.	28	6.5	160	37.0	760	175.9

There was still another problem with Minneapolis which the following excerpt from a National Institute Memorandum indicates:

[Minneapolis-St. Paul] are compound cities of a single metropolitan area; it would be unrealistic to choose only one and geographically unfair to choose both . . . We cannot choose just Minneapolis because of crime spillover.<sup>(9)</sup>

The Institute's recommendation of Cleveland, then was arrived at in a rational, objective way and appears to have been made without innuendo or political pressure. These apparent facts notwithstanding, there were several individuals, integrally involved in the Cleveland program, who believe the selection of Cleveland was made solely on a political basis. The RO coordinator stated bluntly: "We had no choice in the city. It was a political decision."<sup>(10)</sup> In a later interview, he would speak of the ramifications of that decision saying:

We [Region V] had six states and there were many cities that should have been examined in detail and talked to . . . to assure them that the selection was fair and without political bias . . . It took us a long time to soothe this down . . . Every time we mentioned Cleveland's Impact program, a lot of the cities would just shut us off . . . every time we made a speech or a presentation on what the Cleveland Impact program was doing, I found that most people shut us off . . . They believed the only reason Cleveland was selected was because Mayor Perk could swing the Cleveland vote toward Nixon . . . That political thing kept creeping in, and in Democratic cities, they just shut us off.<sup>(11)</sup>

Table I, below, reveals that there were, in addition to Cleveland, six cities from Region V on the list of thirty-eight given primary considerations for the Impact program. These are Minneapolis and St. Paul (Minnesota), Akron and Columbus (Ohio), Indianapolis (Indiana), and Milwaukee (Wisconsin). While it can be successfully argued that the two cities given real consideration from Region V, Cleveland and Minneapolis, had the highest crime rates among its seven cities, it is interesting to note that Atlanta, the Region IV choice, does not appear among the list of thirty-eight.

One of the major reasons for the bitterness felt by the RO coordinator over the handling of the Region V choice centers on the way in which he learned of Cleveland's selection. In a recent interview with former SPA director, Joseph L. White, the matter came into clearer focus.

TABLE I  
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR IMPACT CITIES

CITY AND STATE	TOTAL INDEX CRIME RATE RANK	ROBBERY RATE RANK	BURGLARY RATE RANK	POPULATION RANK
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY(2*)	1	2	3	24
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA(9)	2	6	7	7
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA(9)	3	8	1	25
WASHINGTON, D. C.(3)	4	1	4	3
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI(7)	5	4	2	12
DENVER, COLORADO(8)	6	15	5	19
MIAMI, FLORIDA(4)	7	5	9	28
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND(3)	8	3	18	1
PORTLAND, OREGON(10)	9	13	10	23
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS(1)	10	11	28	10
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA(3)	11	19	8	38
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA(6)	12	9	20	13
CLEVELAND, OHIO(5)	13	7	32	5
DALLAS, TEXAS(6)	14	20	12	2
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON(10)	15	16	6	16
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI(7)	16	10	13	20
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA(3)	17	12	26	18
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY(4)	18	18	29	26
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA(5)	19	14	16	21
TAMPA, FLORIDA(4)	20	24	14	34
PHOENIX, ARIZONA(9)	21	29	11	14
HONOLULU, HAWAII(9)	22	36	17	31
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA(3)	23	22	27	36
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA(4)	24	25	15	17
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA(5)	25	17	19	32
AKRON, OHIO(5)	26	27	30	35
COLUMBUS, OHIO(5)	27	23	25	15
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA(9)	28	31	24	37
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA(9)	29	21	22	27
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA(4)	30	37	31	33
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS(6)	31	32	23	9
FORT WORTH, TEXAS(6)	32	28	21	22
TULSA, OKLAHOMA(6)	33	35	34	29
OMAHA, NEBRASKA(7)	34	30	36	30
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE(4)	35	33	33	11
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA(9)	36	34	37	8
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA(5)	37	26	35	4
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN(5)	38	38	38	6

\*The number in parentheses denotes the LEAA Region in which each city is located.

1970 RANKINGS OF TOTAL INDEX CRIME RATE, ROBBERY RATE, BURGLARY RATE AND POPULATION FOR 38 CITIES 250,000 TO 1,000,000 POPULATION

(Source: Statistics Division, LEAA, September 1971.)

The Chicago Regional Office contacted me to say that they would like to come in and talk to me about setting up a round of meetings in major cities in Ohio to see which cities would be receptive to a new High Impact program that was being contemplated in Washington.

One day, I believe it was early January 1972 . . . three people came in from Chicago. Jim Bain was a principal; the Ohio representative from the LEAA office was with him, and one other person from the Chicago office. The purpose of that meeting was to explore in advance some of the characteristics they were looking for in communities, some of the levels of assurances or endorsements that they would require from local officials, and so on.

We were going to go to Cleveland the next day and Akron the day after, and then the next week we were going to Cincinnati and Columbus and then Toledo . . . We had been talking about an hour and a half about the various characteristics we were looking for in the five cities -- only one of which was to be selected. There was no predisposition toward any city. While we were sitting there talking, I received a call from the Governor's office . . . saying that the Governor had just received a telegram from Spiro Agnew announcing . . . that Cleveland had been selected as a High Impact city, and I had to tell the Chicago Regional Office what their boss had done . . . The Chicago people were horrified. They felt double-crossed and they had every reason to.

It was Cleveland. Now, the fact that Cleveland was one of the few major cities in America with a Republican mayor, I'm sure had something to do with its selection but Danziger\* protested vigorously that the cities were selected on the basis of crime statistics, population and some other factors . . . (12)

While the available data do not support the former RO coordinator and SPA director in their view that political pressure was applied to achieve the Region V Impact slot for Cleveland, it is relatively

\*Martin L. Danziger was the Director of the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice when the High Impact Anti-Crime Program was launched.

easy, when looking at the sequence of events as they unfolded, to see why they maintain their point of view. What is plain is that a communications gap existed among and between the various levels of bureaucracy involved in the early planning for Impact. This communications problem seems as least partly linked to the time pressures under which all these key decisions were being made. Mistakes were bound to occur and the selection of Cleveland does not appear to have been expertly handled; it made for bitter feelings on the part of some. Hopefully, Cleveland's Impact program could survive such a rocky start. With respect to political overtones, the RO coordinator was right about one matter at least. 1972 was a presidential election year and Cleveland's mayor was a Republican. The pressure would be on to demonstrate results by November. In that sense, Impact did represent a significant political issue.

### 3.2 Problems Develop Amid Attempts to Implement the New Federalism

The concept of New Federalism, a philosophy of national government espoused by former President Richard M. Nixon, consists of certain key precepts:

- (a) Decentralization of decision-making from the federal government to state and local governments;
- (b) Decategorization of federal programs through grant consolidation, joint funding, and integrated delivery systems;
- (c) Reduction of federal administrative red tape and unnecessary processing requirements in the grant-in-aid system;
- (d) Increased public accountability and responsibility for program and expenditure decisions at state and local levels; and
- (e) Stronger planning and management capacity for state and local general purpose units of government. (13)

While the New Federalist philosophy does not necessarily imply a state role, the data indicate that the federal planners of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program had always intended that there be close

coordination among and between the three levels of government involved in the program's administration. In Cleveland, there was, from the outset, some dissidence among key individuals associated with the program. This was evident especially at the city and state levels. Cleveland's mayor, for example, believed firmly that there was no role for the state in the Impact program except as a funding agency. "The money," said he, "would come directly to Cleveland and the State would exercise no veto power."<sup>(14)</sup> Mayor Perk had been present in Washington, D. C. for the announcement of the Impact program as had Ohio's Governor John J. Gilligan (a Democrat) on January 13, 1972. Then LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard, as part of his remarks on that day, had noted that:

This planning effort...gives us another opportunity to work within the framework of the New Federalism because we have the opportunity to put all elements, both vertical and horizontal, in this system together.

Referring to the vertical integration of the program specifically, he added:

LEAA at the Federal level has a role to play. The State Planning Agency...the local groups and our Regional Offices have roles to play. The success of the program, I will point out to you is, in my view, contingent upon integrating these four factors.<sup>(15)</sup>

Thus, it was clear, from the standpoint of LEAA headquarters, that Impact was to be a coordinated effort with roles for each of the levels of government involved in the three-way partnership. Administrator Leonard later singled out the eight city mayors for a signal role, indicating that the program could not be expected to achieve its objectives unless they each made a personal commitment to seeing it work. Perhaps this strong advocacy for mayoral commitment to the high ideals of the Impact program led Cleveland's mayor to view the program as Cleveland's exclusively to administer; perhaps not. The fact remained that the states were envisioned as having a role in Impact, and the Ohio SPA and more specifically, its administrator Joseph L.

White, fully expected to participate in the Impact program. Although the former SPA director was "leery of promises" made by the "federal establishment," he had been assured initially by the Chicago Regional Office that the SPA would have a strong role in the program. As he recalled it, the following interchange took place between the Region V representatives and himself:

There is a meaningful and significant role to be played by the State Planning Agency in the Impact cities program. Obviously, we can't run it from Chicago...but you can run it from Columbus. And I said, 'I don't trust you.' And they said, 'Look, we will write up an agreement. You will have programmatic control, you will have fiscal control of the program.'<sup>(16)</sup>

The former SPA director was interested in the degree of responsibility and authority contemplated for his agency because he believed the "concept of block grants had as one of its principal merits some sense of accountability, managerial accountability."<sup>(17)</sup> It was his desire, then, that this innovative feature of the LEAA planning structure not be circumvented. The city of Cleveland, however, saw Impact as a city program, was doubtless aware that the state had voiced no advocacy on its behalf, and strongly resisted all attempts to fund fiscal monitoring by the SPA which it perceived as the state's normal duty anyway. The RO coordinator was the man in the middle, feeling heat from both sides. Recalling the initial controversy, he said the following:

I found Joe White fairly reasonable in all this...why should he take on the administration of a \$20 million program in his state with no money? We had to negotiate the money so he could buy a staff. Then I got into a problem with Cleveland. Cleveland saw that money coming out of their \$20 million, and then the arguments started to break between Cleveland, the State and the Regional Office, on how much money the State could have to administer this program... We wanted the State in this thing because if we were going to learn anything from this program, both the State and the locals had to learn it. <sup>(18)</sup>

The RO coordinator, then, saw himself as a man with a mission to fulfill, and he wanted to see the partnership concept work, especially at the local and the state levels where, he felt, the real benefits from the total Impact experience were to take place. However, overriding his desire to effect a meaningful partnership between city and state were two more immediate pressures emanating from Impact's federal planners and from the political climate in Cleveland. Regarding the former situation, he stated:

They [LEAA headquarters] seemed to have almost required a master plan within two or three months after the program got underway. My experience tells me that with a program of this magnitude, you need about a year to hire the staff and get the management fundamentals down before you start.... Planning precedes action and you need quite an extensive amount of planning, data gathering and evaluation before you get under way.

From the city's standpoint, there was a pressure to demonstrate results by November. "The political situation" said the RO coordinator, "was a driving force from the day that the Cleveland Impact program started. Constantly we were faced with the political reality of Nixon's re-election....There was tremendous pressure from Washington...to get this program underway and to make some impact....The political reality was that they wanted to have a successful program to show that they were reducing crime."<sup>(19)</sup>

Out of this highly stressful environment, the Region V office sought to bring some semblance of order to Cleveland's fledgling Impact program. Perhaps an agreement could be reached, among the three levels of government agencies involved in Impact, which would ease the tensions and reduce the frictions to such an extent that the program in Cleveland could move forward with some degree of smoothness, if not harmony.

### 3.3 The Memorandum of Agreement

With the RO coordinator as its principal advocate, a Memorandum of Agreement was drafted to lay out the roles of all three partners to the Cleveland Impact program, i.e., the city, the state and the Regional Office. Hopefully, this agreement, signed by the mayor of Cleveland, the SPA director and the Region V administrator, would head off and abate the controversy over the role to be played by the SPA in the Impact program.

Under the Memorandum of Agreement, an Impact policy board was formed with the responsibility for "approving the program policies, personnel actions, plans, contracts and grant applications." Whenever a vote of the policy board was less than unanimous, the issue in question would be referred to an appellate policy board group consisting of the mayor, SPA director, and the regional administrator. A major assignment, outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement, fell to the Impact Cities office. That group, and in particular its director, was given initial responsibility for preparing the planning, analysis and data collection questionnaires, the Impact planning and evaluation as well as project-level grant applications. Although the Cleveland CAT director was to be recommended by the mayor, he would be appointed by and responsible to the policy board. Consequently, it would be the policy board, and not the CAT director, who would make appointments of full-time staff. Similarly, consultants and contractors would be merely recommended by the CAT director; the policy board would have to approve any such recommendations.

Addressing the SPA role in Impact, the Memorandum of Agreement called for an unspecified number of "SPA members of the Crime Analysis Team," with skills as grant managers and fiscal specialists, to provide services "as needed for program assistance, processing of grant applications and auditing for the Cleveland Impact program."

No projects were to be funded prior to completion of three major products by the Cleveland CAT--the LEAA Questionnaire, Impact program planning and evaluation plans and the master plan. They were to be completed by March 1, March 22 and April 14, 1972 respectively. As to the important question of grant administration, the Memorandum of Agreement provided that discretionary funding procedures be employed. All monies would flow from the RO to the SPA and they would then be made available to the city of Cleveland immediately for program start-up. Remaining planning funds would be made available as needed, subject to review and approval by the Impact policy board. (20)

It would seem, then, that the Memorandum of Agreement clearly delineated the responsibilities of the city and the state toward a coordinated Impact effort. Unfortunately, the Memorandum was not followed and tensions began once again to build. Commenting on the way matters did develop, the former SPA director stated the following:

In the Memorandum of Agreement, I was agreeable to playing the role that had been outlined for Ohio by Chicago. Well, there were supposed to be regular meetings of a group of people, one from Chicago, one from Cleveland, one from Columbus or, in other words, either the mayor or his representative, me or my representative, and so on. The first major program problem that arose, where we felt Cleveland could not do a certain thing under the LEAA guidelines as we understood them and had been administering them for two and a half years in Ohio, we were told explicitly that the program was not our concern. And I pointed to the Agreement and I was told that I couldn't read. I pointed to the fact that we had hired a man from Texas and moved him and relocated him to Ohio for the purpose of monitoring that program programmatically, and that they had approved his appointment, and I was told that that was unfortunate but there really wasn't any need for that kind of person in this kind of scheme of things. It became increasingly obvious that there really wasn't much for us to do except handle the money and that was fine. So, over a short period of time, six months to a year, the Memorandum of Agreement was pragmatically discarded... (21)

While there appears to be little doubt of the occurrence of those events which, in the view of the SPA director, led to the practical cancellation of the Memorandum of Agreement, it is equally important to understand what was behind the course taken by the RO coordinator. As previously noted he perceived himself as "the man in the middle", standing between the city and the state. As he would later phrase it, "I had to stay with Cleveland because the program's success at the local level was the key. If Cleveland was constrained by the state, especially constrained irrationally, then the program would be a failure...Any policy the state imposed upon Cleveland that would be detrimental to their success, I voted against." (22)

Thus it appears that the RO coordinator's desire to see the program in Cleveland implemented quickly overrode his concern for the state. That he was concerned about the state, and had, in fact, even considered, for a time, the possibility of its running the program entirely, is indicated by the following comment:

The decision I was going to make was to let the state run the program and funnel it down, but what would have happened would have been a constant fight between the state and Cleveland, and the program never would have gotten underway. So I had to say, "I will make the ruling", and I sometimes overruled the state simply by my vote. But I had to do it--not from a political standpoint, but...to make sure that the program was free of any irrational constraints." (23)

It was in this manner that the SPA role came to be greatly reduced in the Cleveland Impact program, and, as the Chicago RO coordinator viewed it, this had to be done for the greater good of the program. Although controversy over the SPA role would resurface later in the program, the Memorandum of Agreement, signed in an effort to unite the forces of the city, state and federal government, did not accomplish its goal. The Memorandum of Agreement was signed on February 14, 1972, with the Impact program less than two months old,

and already one partner, the state, had been systematically eliminated from the program. Immediately ahead were the deadlines for three major products, due in March and early April. In addition, the Cleveland Crime Analysis Team was still without a permanent director. The Chicago RO coordinator waited for the mayor's selection of a candidate, conscious of the impending deadlines and determined to meet them, although it seemed impossible at the time.

#### 3.4 The Cleveland CAT Is Established and a Program Director is Named

Richard L. Boylan, a former Assistant U. S. Attorney at the Department of Justice, was appointed CAT director on March 3, 1972. A native of Canton, Ohio, he had been a classmate of Mayor Perk's executive secretary at Ohio State University, and according to the Cleveland Press, the new CAT director had been persuaded to come to Cleveland by his former classmate.

As CAT director, he was made a member of the mayor's cabinet. This appointment and the relationship it fostered had clear-cut advantages for the program's early implementation as the following comment indicates:

I was made, when I came here, a member of the cabinet and had direct input on a daily basis with the mayor. And we had a great deal of latitude with his approval. I think that was critical and probably the key element to our success in being able to move the program. (24)

At the outset, they were a handful of men under the general leadership of the RO coordinator. In addition to the newly appointed CAT director, the principals included Jack Oliver, community involvement specialist, and Robert Sommerfeld, manager of evaluation. In the view of the RO coordinator, the task confronting them was a nearly impossible one.


Now this was March and we were faced with turning in our master plan at the end of April. Now that was only two months! With three men, none of them completely familiar with the criminal justice system; none of them completely familiar with Cleveland and not a bit of data. The obvious thing to do was go contractor. (25)

In response to the RO coordinator's suggestion, the CAT director released a Request For Proposal (RFP), which was circulated to as many consulting firms in the Cleveland area as could be notified in a very short time. A general meeting was then scheduled in the mayor's conference room at which time the prospective contractors were apprised of the Impact program's objectives and the scope of work Cleveland planners hoped to address in their master plan. After first narrowing the larger group of prospective contractors to three, the General Research Corporation was selected to write the master plan. "That group came in", said the RO coordinator, "and started to work with data--started to gather the data that were necessary. They did very well."

The RO coordinator, because of his military training in project management and his experience as a Pilot Cities program director, was strongly in favor of using consultant help. As he saw it, Cleveland should hire "a very skeletal staff" with "the bulk formulated by contractual help". This strategy, he believed, had two advantages. First, "the contractors know they are only temporarily in the area", and second, you get "highly qualified people."

The Cleveland CAT would follow the RO coordinator's recommendation only in the area of evaluation but not fully even in that area. For while they would contract for technical assistance in writing evaluation components and reports, they would vigorously resist any effort to restrict staffing to a minimal level. As Table II indicates, Cleveland's CAT would become the largest in the High Impact program, totalling some

TABLE II  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



28 staff positions when fully operational. These were permanent staff positions and did not include personnel under contract to provide technical assistance.

Because he was a member of the mayor's cabinet, the CAT director had the weight of that office behind him when called upon to interface with members of the City Council. Thirty-one of the thirty-three-member Council were Democrats; and the CAT director, no matter what his political persuasion, was naturally viewed as an extension of the Republican mayor. Commenting on the situation, the CAT's former community involvement specialist, himself a black man, stated "The Council president is black and the council had opposed the mayor in the election last year. The Council was not exactly friendly but Boylan was good with them... He invited agencies and Council members to come in while the master plan was being written and to say what they wanted. They did have inputs and these were incorporated." (26)

As matters would turn out, the Council would prove to be a strong ally of the Impact Cities program and of its director. This seems to have been, in large part, due to the personal strengths of the CAT director and to his open door policy.

### 3.5 The SPA Role in Cleveland's Impact Program is Delineated

The issue of the SPA role in Cleveland's Impact program was hotly contested until the late summer of 1972. It was an issue which had confronted a number of cities during the early months of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program. In Cleveland, the local position had perhaps been best articulated by a Plain Dealer editorial in early January 1972 where it was said that one of the "ifs" associated with the Impact program was "the degree of state control, a factor that has clogged LEAA's arteries from the beginning. The mayor is confident that the state will not have much say. We'll believe it when the cash arrives." (27)

In the meantime, SPA officials had spent the first several weeks attempting to obtain information about the role of their agency in the program. On February 8, the assistant SPA director had reported to his superior about an "unbelievable amount of confusion being generated" by the Impact program within the Regional Office centering around two distinct roles for the SPA. In the first instance, the SPA was viewed as playing the role it usually took in the discretionary grant process; that is, proposals would be originated at the local level, passed through the SPA for "coordination and pertinent comments" and transmitted to the Regional Office for funding. In the second instance, Impact would be administered much like the block grant program. If this were the case, the SPA would have the "final say so" in the management of the program, and there would be a need for a Regional Planning Unit. The RO coordinator was reported to have admitted that the "discretionary approach" was in basic conflict with his original instructions regarding the program but could now see that the program was, indeed, assuming that form. The assistant SPA director wondered, then, about two things. First, was Impact "just another discretionary grant program with the state playing largely the role of rubber stamp?" Or second, would the state "have a role, as the guidelines would suggest, of some substance?"<sup>(28)</sup>

The SPA belief that it was intended to enjoy a substantial role in the Impact program was predicated on more than the January 13 statement of then LEAA administrator Jerris Leonard. For example, at a meeting of SPA officials concerned with the Impact program held in New York City on February 1, Ohio's SPA director reported hearing it stated that a "significant role" was contemplated for the SPAs, that the "money was to be administered by the SPAs; that mayors had no veto; and that no city could begin a program that contravened as an approved state plan."<sup>(29)</sup> The Chicago Regional Office attendees also reported hearing the statement made that SPAs would be the grantees for Impact grant awards, that the mayors would have no unilateral veto power, and that Impact programs "should not be inconsistent with state plans."<sup>(30)</sup>

It was at this point that the Memorandum of Agreement, discussed previously, had been drafted. City, state and Regional Office officials had met on February 11 to discuss the draft agreement. At this meeting the most hostile questions had come from a city attendee, Cleveland's law director<sup>2</sup>, who inquired why it was necessary for the SPA to be represented on the policy board. The only changes said to have been made in the draft document dealt with the staff of the SPA. Although the RO coordinator asked if two SPA staff members would be sufficient to administer the program, the number had been left unspecified.<sup>(31)</sup>

An opportunity for the city and the Regional Office to define the role of the SPA in operational terms came with the submission by the SPA of a proposed budget to support its Impact program activities. On April 26, the SPA requested the policy board to approve a budget of \$165,000 to support two grant managers and one fiscal specialist for the two years of the program. The city and RO representatives voted to limit SPA Impact staff to one grant manager and one fiscal specialist.<sup>(32)</sup> This decision was protested by the SPA director on May 8<sup>(33)</sup> and a revised budget of \$140,000 was submitted to and rejected by the policy board representatives on May 10. In a response to the SPA director, the regional administrator informed him that the Regional Office would be "assuming the programmatic responsibility for the discretionary grants of the Impact program." This would include the "processing and awards of the discretionary grants as well as the processing and approval of all deviations from those grants." The SPA's role would be to certify the grants in accordance with the LEAA regulations, assure the proper fiscal administration of the grants, which would be from five to eight in number, and provide a representative

<sup>2</sup>This is a cabinet-level appointment of the mayor. The individual holding this position acts as the city's attorney and, is responsible for interpreting and handling all legal decision-making involving the city of Cleveland.

to the policy board. The mayor and regional administrator had determined that a budget of \$70,000, which would support a full time fiscal specialist and a program coordinator and secretary 10% of the time, would be adequate to support the SPA's Impact program activities.<sup>(34)</sup>

Following this exchange, the SPA director had his staff poll other SPAs involved in the Impact program and discovered that most SPAs would have liked to receive no more than \$50 to \$60,000 annually to administer Impact and that almost all of them expected to have responsibility for programmatic monitoring.<sup>(35)</sup> On June 5, the RO coordinator informed the SPA coordinator that the SPA had two options: "(1) to take the \$70,000 and operate as best we could, or (2) turn down the \$70,000 and get out of the Impact Cities program."<sup>(36)</sup> The SPA director perceived the situation as grave enough to require a meeting of the supervisory board of the SPA. The results of the meeting were communicated to the regional administrator by the SPA director on July 25. In essence, the board agreed to carry out the fiscal responsibilities outlined by the regional administrator on May 17, and conveyed to the RO that "the decision to limit the role of the SPA to that of fiscal administration is regrettable and that, under these circumstances, it is impossible for the agency to accept responsibility for insuring the success of the program in Ohio. However, now that the decision has been made, please be advised that I will not be receptive to an expansion of our responsibilities in this program."<sup>(37)</sup>

Thus the SPA role in Impact was reduced to the automatic certification of grants "with exceptions noted, should there be any, and then off to Chicago!"<sup>(38)</sup> In the SPA director's perception, the policy board had been an unqualified disaster. The Cleveland CAT director, on the other hand, had a decidedly different view. "In a sense," he has stated "two members of the partnership could make a program go. It didn't require unanimity from the board to bring about action, and had

it required unanimity we would never have had a program. I think the policy board concept was the smartest and best thing we did."<sup>(39)</sup>

Program implementation had always been a top priority of the Chicago Regional Office. Although relationships among the SPA, and RO, and the city of Cleveland would remain strained for some time, a major barrier had been hurdled. The SPA role was clarified; it would perform grant certifications and fiscal monitoring. Speedy programmatic start-up seemed assured, and as the RO coordinator put it, "Cleveland was raring to go."<sup>(40)</sup>

#### 4.0 THE MASTER PLAN IS WRITTEN AND REVIEWED BY THE REGIONAL OFFICE

##### 4.1 Pivotal Roles Are Played by the RO Coordinator and CAT Director

There was "tremendous pressure" in Cleveland to get programs in operation before the November elections.<sup>(41)</sup> The issue of staffing up to get the master plan written, however, was clouded in uncertainty because of funds. The Regional Office, rather than have the Crime Analysis Team come in with a grant for \$625,000, urged them to apply for what they needed in anticipation of additional funds. But the flow of funds which had been expected to begin, at the latest, by the summer of 1972, did not materialize until the fall. This circumstance produced a decidedly negative effect on the program's management. "Boylan" said the RO coordinator, "wouldn't hire anybody. He hired slowly until fall, 1972." Since the decision had now been reached to develop a rather sizable in-house capability, the Regional Office wanted a full staff by summer. The CAT director's response had been "But I don't know how much money I'm going to get."<sup>(42)</sup>

The RO coordinator was not given to indecision, and he fully understood that the delay in fund flow to the CAT would be relatively short-lived. These were National Institute funds that were to be disbursed, but they seemed to be momentarily immersed in a sea of paper. The RO coordinator looked to several Institute sources for guidance but the responses varied. "The Institute didn't realize the problem it was creating. The program was slowed down tremendously. Boylan felt he couldn't do anything."<sup>(43)</sup>

The master plan was under development, however. Eleven people from the General Research Corporation (GRC) came on board to help develop it. The funds to hire the GRC group were allocated from the initial \$50,000 provided the CAT for planning purposes. It would be the RO coordinator, however, who continued to be the driving force behind the early Cleveland effort. Recalling that period and the

pivotal role played by the RO coordinator, the then assistant CAT director stated:

Jim Bain was unique in that Impact was his baby, and he believed in it and he was going to make it work. Jim had a unique ability to get things off dead center....From the very beginning, Jim sat down with Dick and said let's get this thing moving. I'll give you all the technical support you need from the Region--the Region is committed to the program and we want to see Cleveland move forward on it. In the initial stages of the program Jim would come down here and spend 4 days with us at a time--working until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning on different types of approaches. He actually sat down and helped us write. He would review everything down here, before we actually submitted it to the Region, and really I can't emphasize more the relationship of the city and the Regional Office and its great importance in getting this thing off the ground.<sup>(44)</sup>

Under the general guidance of the RO coordinator and the CAT director, serious work began on the master plan. The CAT director, who has described himself as a "political director"<sup>(45)</sup> became engrossed in the political environment in an effort to get projects approved by the City Council while the RO coordinator worked hand-in-hand with the small in-house staff and the consultant firm. "I started to provide instructions on what a work breakdown structure was," said the RO coordinator, "what planning was involved and how you analyze the data to come up with the projects that fit within that work breakdown structure....Most of my time was spent on developing a rational master plan."<sup>(46)</sup> The CAT director, on the other hand, spent countless hours with the numerous individuals who had project ideas to discuss. "In the early stages," the CAT director has since stated, "every do-gooder, every rip-off and every legitimate person came to our doors and we sat down with the rip-offs as well as the legitimates and gave them their chance to give an input."<sup>(47)</sup>

Thus, as work proceeded on the master plan, all elements of the criminal justice system and community groups were invited to come into the Impact offices, on an individual basis, "to provide inputs on program needs and the state of the system."<sup>(48)</sup> "We had good cooperation with agencies", said the CAT's first evaluation chief, "but the data were not always in consumable form. For example, data on offenders, on conditions and causes of crime, on recidivism. Not everybody was breaking down data by census tract."<sup>(49)</sup> The Cleveland Police Department was in the midst of automating but still was without an automated capability. And stranger-to-stranger data, essential to Impact crime-specific planning, were not being systematically reported. Despite numerous data problems, Cleveland would complete a draft version of its master plan in May 1972. "The master plan," said the RO coordinator, "followed exactly what I asked."<sup>(50)</sup>

#### 4.2 The Master Plan Employs the Performance Management System (PMS) Approach

While the draft master plan may have followed exactly what the RO coordinator had asked, it had a serious flaw of which both he and the Cleveland CAT were aware. "Cleveland never had a data base",<sup>(51)</sup> admits the former assistant CAT director. Nevertheless, Cleveland used available burglary, robbery and street assault data as surrogates for all stranger-to-stranger crime. With these data, plus intuitive feelings, the decision was made to focus on the unemployed and addicted young adult offender as well as the juvenile offender in predominantly black neighborhoods. These areas were also the high density, high poverty and low standard of living areas in Cleveland. The analysis of these conditions identified those needs of the community and of the criminal justice system which would become the focus of Cleveland's Impact program. As the master plan states, "the economic, social and psychological conditions that exist in the inner core community" were in need of improvement and the "capacity of the criminal justice system to deliver public safety services" was in need of upgrading.<sup>(52)</sup>


This strategy, then, dictated a dual-focus Impact program structure oriented towards (1) improving the community conditions that give rise to crime, and (2) upgrading the capability of the criminal justice system to prevent and control the actual incidences of crime. The three operating Impact program objectives listed under the goal of improving community conditions were: (1) improving family conditions (e.g., bad housing) that cause crime; (2) improving individual conditions (e.g., drug addiction) that lead to crime; and (3) altering the environment so as to increase the risk of apprehension while in the act of committing a crime. Similarly, there were three areas marked for system improvements: courts, corrections and police. Thus all projects or activities would fall under one of six operating program objectives. These are shown in Table III below.

In developing its master plan, the Cleveland CAT used the Performance Management System (PMS), a system developed by the Office of Management and Budget whose concept is based upon management by objectives. Commenting on PMS' potential advantages to the program, the Cleveland master plan states the following:

The System utilizes quantitative measures of effectiveness and measures of efficiency as a method of assigning priorities and allocating resources. The Performance Management System thus will provide a continuous flow of information to management during the entire program and this information, coupled with a continued assessment of the needs of the community, the individual, and the criminal justice system will allow for a rational reevaluation of priorities.<sup>(53)</sup>


Figure 1 demonstrates how PMS was used by Cleveland to develop their master plan; and outlines, in graphic form, the sequence of events as they are discussed in the plan, commencing with Section 3, Impact Program Structure, through Section 7, Analysis of Budgets. Figure 2 is a graphic presentation of the flow and interactions within the step-by-step process of PMS as Cleveland has identified them.

TABLE III  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES



(Source: Cleveland Impact Program Master Plan, June 1972.)


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(Source: Cleveland Impact Program Master Plan, June 1972.)

FIGURE 1  
CLEVELAND IMPACT MASTER PLAN: THE PMS APPROACH

37



(Source: Cleveland Impact Program Master Plan, June 1972.)

FIGURE 2  
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM METHODOLOGY

First, the specific program goal is defined. Called the ultimate program goal in Figure 2, this goal is really a summary statement of the desired end result of the entire Cleveland program. At the next level, and directly inputting to the ultimate program goal may be several more explicit goals. These goals, termed sub-level program goals, begin to define the structure of the subsidiary components of the program by explaining what is to be done if the ultimate program goal is to be accomplished. Next, operating program objectives are established and these address the problem of how to achieve the ultimate program goal.

The validation of PMS goals and objectives involves the development of what are termed effectiveness measures to determine the success or failure with which program goals are achieved, and efficiency measures, to determine the ability of operating program objectives to serve program goals, to be followed by the collection of data required for these measures.

The next step is to design activities to be implemented in support of each operating program objective. These activities are, then, further analyzed to identify constraints and uncertainties, examine further implications, develop multi-year predictions, assign priorities to activities and allocate resources.

Section 4 of the Cleveland master plan discusses the existing data, data requirements, tools to be used in capturing the data and the efficiency measures. Section 5 develops the needs derived from the program goals and the operating program objectives. Section 6 describes the activities selected by Cleveland to meet the objectives, and finally, Section 7 details the budget requirements for the various activities developed under Section 6 of the master plan.

Table IV lists the 55 activities originally proposed by the Cleveland CAT for implementation under the Impact program, and the level of funding requested from the LEAA, \$29,131,000 over a two-year time frame. Under a discussion of preliminary budgets in the master plan, the Cleveland CAT notes that the proposed budget exceeded the recommended funding level. It states:

Initial LEAA guidelines committed \$20 million to the Cleveland Impact program for fiscal years 1972, 1973 and 1974. To provide a comprehensive crime-specific program for Cleveland the final budget requires \$29,131,000. The LEAA budget guidance is exceeded by \$9,131,000 in order to provide the necessary activities to meet the needs. In the event that LEAA does not allocate the full amount of funds hereby requested, a number of activities will have to be reduced or eliminated. (54)

Despite having written in their master plan that they were aware of a \$20 million ceiling having been imposed by the LEAA, Cleveland was requesting more than \$9 million additional dollars in federal funding. In explanation of their position, the former assistant CAT director has stated the following:

Cleveland was not under the impression that there was a \$20 million dollar ceiling at that time. Certainly we understood that LEAA had allocated \$160 million dollars for the eight cities....We certainly were able to document in our master plan the need for these additional dollars up and beyond the \$20 million and we felt it was important to tell LEAA that Cleveland needed \$29.1 million to do the full job. (55)

Although the remark of the former assistant CAT director is in some conflict with the earlier quoted statement from the master plan, the fact remains that other cities, although not submitting budgets in excess of the \$20 million ceiling, were equally confused as to how much money each city would have to implement its program. Eventually, it would require a letter to all city CATs from former LEAA Administrator

TABLE IV  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM

LIST OF PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND LEVEL OF LEAA FUNDING

Category I: Improve The Family Conditions That Cause Crime

<u>Planned Activities</u>	<u>Planned Funding Sources</u>	<u>Funding Estimate *</u>
1. Family Attitudinal Survey	LEAA	90,000
2. IMPACT - Crime Family Services	LEAA	300,000
3. Cleveland Housing Assistance Study	LEAA/HUD	25,000
4. Family Health Services	HEW	
		Sub Total 415,000

Category II: Improve The Individual Conditions That Cause Crime

1. Cleveland Drug Abuse Program (CDAP)	LEAA/NIMH/HUD/DEO/VA	3,000,000
2. Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP)		
a) Job Development and Placement	LEAA	980,000
b) Vocational/Educational Training	LEAA	340,000
c) Industry/Occupation Matrix	LEAA	60,000
d) Work Creation	DOL	
		Sub Total 4,380,000
3. Cleveland Youth Survives Program		
a) Group Homes as Alternatives to Institutionalization	LEAA	750,000
b) Group Homes for Post-Institutional Youth	LEAA	750,000
c) Youth Centers	LEAA	900,000
d) School Based Behavioral Unit	LEAA	1,000,000
e) Summer Employment for Ex-Offenders	LEAA	400,000
f) Junior Leaders	LEAA	300,000
g) Street Outreach Workers	LEAA	450,000
h) Alternative Education	LEAA	400,000
i) Emergency Shelters	LEAA	300,000
j) Role Model Identification	LEAA	500,000
k) Organizational Structure	HEW	
l) Community Relations	LEAA/HEW	250,000
		Sub Total 6,000,000

Category III: Improve The Target/Victim Environmental Conditions That Cause Crime

1. Crime/Criminality and Demographic Profile	LEAA	90,000
2. IMPACT Information Program	LEAA	170,000

\* The Funding Estimate shown reflects only LEAA dollars.

TABLE IV  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM (Continued)

<u>Planned Activities</u>	<u>Planned Funding Sources</u>	<u>Funding Estimate</u>
3. Personal Property Identification	LEAA	5,000
4. High-Intensity Lighting	HUD	
	Sub	265,000
	Total	
Category IV: Improve Police Operations		
1. Police Patrols for Concentrated Crime Prevention	LEAA	3,570,000
2. IMPACT Crime Investigation Procedures	LEAA	1,696,000
3. Auxiliary Police	LEAA	376,000
4. Police Organization, Management and Operations	LEAA	132,000
5. Police Patrol Allocation	LEAA	209,000
6. Police Command and Control	LEAA	468,000
7. Police Community Centers	LEAA	376,000
8. Data Utilization	LEAA	35,000
9. Police Order	LEAA	376,000
10. Police Cadet Program	LEAA	386,000
11. IMPACT Roll Call Training	LEAA	44,000
12. Juvenile Investigation and Training Unit	LEAA	49,000
13. Crisis Intervention Training	LEAA	32,000
14. Planning and Research Organization	LEAA	78,000
15. Police Communications Service	Ohio SPA	
16. Forensic Laboratory	Ohio SPA	
17. Narcotics Control and Investigation	Ohio SPA	
18. Professional Training by Correspondence	Ohio SPA	
	Sub	7,857,000
	Total	
Category V. Improve the Court Process		
1. Visiting Judges	LEAA	4,600,000
2. Court Diversion	LEAA	990,000
3. Municipal Court Electronic Recording Equipment	LEAA	25,000
4. Pre-Sentence Investigation	LEAA	330,000
5. Criminal Justice Information System	LEAA	319,000
	Sub	6,264,000
	Total	
Category VI. Improve The Corrections Process		
<u>Institution-Based Activities</u>		
1. Comprehensive Screening and Diagnosis	LEAA	250,000
2. Corrections Work Release	LEAA	500,000
3. Remedial Education and Education-Release	LEAA	100,000
4. Correctional Training Program	LEAA	200,000
	Sub	1,050,000
	Total	

TABLE IV  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM (Concluded)

<u>Community Based Activities</u>		
1. Community-Based Probation	LEAA	1,200,000
2. Community Center	LEAA	500,000
3. Community-Based Supplemental Services	LEAA	600,000
4. Halfway Houses for Ex-Offenders	LEAA	600,000
	Sub Total	2,900,000
	Grand Total	\$29,131,000

(Source: Cleveland Impact Program Master Plan, June 1972.)

\*The Funding estimate shown reflects only LEAA dollars.

Donald Santarelli to establish unequivocally that the ceiling was \$20 million per city, including support to the CAT.

A major step in the use of PMS for program planning is the availability of data, and Cleveland, as previously stated (see page 34) was never able to develop an adequate data base. Commenting on the data analysis within the master plan, MITRE's analysis of crime-oriented planning states "the Cleveland master plan documents no victim data and presents limited offender data." Speaking later to the matter of linkages between proposed activities and crime problems identified through Cleveland's data analysis, it is stated that such linkages "range from fairly strong to tenuous" and that "inferences which can neither be supported nor refuted by the available data apparently were made in selecting some of the tactics proposed." It concludes that "the ambiguous and differential links between the data and proposed projects [activities] suggest that a crime-oriented approach may have been used, but in a cursory and non-systematic fashion."<sup>(56)</sup>

Significantly, the former RO coordinator has subsequently made a quite similar statement, and points to the short turnabout time given to the city to produce the plan as a contributing reason for the problem with data. "I do think we needed a lot more data than we had, but the time span of two or three months to put away a master plan--there just wasn't sufficient time to gather up reliable data which you could use to make good judgments about different programs....I would have liked more time to collect data so as to select those projects that would have the most pay-off...reduce crime the most."<sup>(57)</sup>

#### 4.3 A Federal Regional Council Task Force is Formed with the ROC as Chairman

In the budget analysis section of their master plan, Cleveland planners had made some attempt to identify potential funding sources other than the LEAA. Earlier, in the needs analysis section, they had identified among the target offenders three basic types: (1) the unemployed, (2) the drug addicted and (3) the juvenile. To achieve success with this group, the RO coordinator felt Cleveland would need "the full cooperation and participation of other federal agencies."<sup>(58)</sup>

The group of activities in the Cleveland plan for which joint funding was being sought included the Cleveland Drug Abuse Program, and the Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program. In writing to his superior at the Chicago office, the RO coordinator called attention to the "unemployment problem" and the "high density, high poverty, low standard of living areas" where most of the target offenses occurred. "The Department of Labor could train offenders, and the Environmental Protection Agency could employ some of these very same people." He presented his ideas to the Region V Federal Regional Council. Not long thereafter, an Impact Task Force was organized with its membership drawn from the Regional Offices of HEW, DOL, HUD, EPA and OEO. With the RO coordinator as its chairman, the Task Force was directed to "develop a coordinated federal program agency input designed to facilitate" the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crimes.

The Task Force met on May 30, 1972. The RO coordinator discussed the range of services to be funded under Impact and then requested immediate assistance from Task Force members in funding a summer recreation program for youths. The dollar figure, \$150,000, while high for one group would not be nearly so costly when divided up among five to six agencies. Nevertheless, the Task Force membership indicated that their agencies could be of no assistance to the Impact effort because

most, if not all, of their fiscal year 1972 funds had been spent and their fiscal year 1973 funds were already committed to other projects. "Whenever it came down to actually funding joint ventures," said the RO coordinator, "other agencies never would come through." Although it was largely a discouraging effort from the outset, Cleveland planners "focused on getting advice from [member] agencies." Even this strategy would have limited value for Cleveland because in the view of the RO coordinator, Task Force members began to attempt to exert their influence in a manner not constructive for the program, in fact, almost divisive in nature. The RO coordinator summed it up in the following way:

We used the FRC Task Force as a "coordinating" mechanism but after a while, they wanted to use Impact as a lever with the city. HUD would say "you shouldn't give Impact grants to the city until it comes up with a plan to use the open space for parks we gave it" or "until they fix up their sewers." Now I'm protective of Impact so I walked into the RA and said, "They're not going to let you have an Impact program until the whole of Lake Erie is cleaned up." And I said, "we should stop this foolishness" and he agreed. (59)

It had been less than three months since the first meeting with the FRC Task Force when, in the perception of the Chicago RO, the group had become more of a liability than an asset and it was discarded as a possible tool for achieving interagency coordination. Cleveland, however, became the fastest implementer of new projects under Impact, and it seems that the city owed much of its speedy implementation time to its adept by-passing of any groups, no matter how well meaning, which tended to impede the rush to make Impact a visible force in Cleveland by election time in November.

#### 4.4 The Master Plan Outlines Three of Cleveland's Proposed Programs in Greater Detail

The Cleveland master plan, in its appendices, contained detailed discussions of three of its proposed programs: (1) the Cleveland Drug Abuse Program (CDAP), (2) the Cleveland Youth Services Program (CYSP) and (3) the Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP). Because of the high priority placed on these activities by Cleveland planners, and the amount of LEAA dollars, \$10,380,000, initially proposed for commitment to their implementation, they are being briefly reviewed here.

##### 4.4.1 The Cleveland Drug Abuse Program (CDAP)

CDAP, a comprehensive drug treatment and rehabilitation program, would be Cleveland's attempt at implementing a multi-modality network of services for Cleveland's identified addict population. Modeled loosely after the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention's Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program; CDAP would have as its major goal the decreasing of "the incidence of drug-related crime with its attendant costs to the community by interrupting the drug-driven cycle of jail to street crime to jail" while providing the "possibility of treatment for drug addicted arrestees."<sup>(60)</sup>

CDAP, which was scheduled for LEAA funding at the level of \$3 million in the master plan, would make use of existing resources (e.g., in-patient detoxification units of local hospitals, outpatient drug drop-in centers, diagnostic services of the free clinic, methadone programs, etc.) as well as creating new services endemic to the CDAP process (e.g., overall monitoring of urinalysis, emergency medical services and dental treatment, etc.)

4.4.2 The Cleveland Youth Services Program (CYSP)


Because of the "fragmentation of programs and services" directed at meeting the needs of youths in the city, the Cleveland Youth Services Program (CYSP), a systems approach to the development of integrated youth services within a community, was proposed by Cleveland planners. A relatively recent innovation in the provision of services for juveniles, such a system of coordinated services had been recommended nationally both by the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and HEW. The CYSP system would not, itself, operate any direct service programs but would "stimulate, help develop and contract for project services with new or existing agencies." (61)

CYSP was to operate under the aegis of the CAT director as a special project of the Office of the Mayor. Table V is the proposed organizational chart of CYSP, which was scheduled to have a ten-person staff to carry out its numerous liaison and coordinating functions. In addition, eleven of the twelve proposed activities under the CYSP umbrella were to be funded with Impact dollars. The proposed funding level, over a two-year time frame, totalled \$6 million. While the titles of some of the activities, e.g., Role-Model Identification, School-Based Behavioral Unit and Organizational Structure, appear to be fairly innovative, a careful look at the actual services to be provided did not reflect very innovative concepts but did provide for a large number of overlapping services.

4.4.3 The Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP)

From available crime data, Cleveland planners had been able to determine that a large percentage of Impact crimes in their city were committed by "male young adults and juveniles, non-white, uneducated and unemployed." CVEP, an attempt to strengthen job development activities in Cleveland and to generate adequate jobs for the socially disadvantaged and economically deprived, would set about to accomplish

TABLE V  
CLEVELAND YOUTH SERVICES PROGRAM  
ORGANIZATION CHART



(Source: Cleveland Impact Program Master Plan,  
June 1972.)

four basic objectives: (1) to provide vigorous vocational/educational rehabilitation for referred offenders; (2) to provide economic rehabilitation for the untrained and under- or unemployed; (3) to provide the machinery for a comprehensive manpower program; and (4) to increase the level of community involvement in the problems of the identified target group.

In addition to the provision of a battery of services to meet the needs of the program's target population, it planned to provide follow-up services for a long enough time period following training and job placement to determine whether offenders had acquired "adequate momentum and stability" in their employment situations.

CVPEP was to be funded at a level of \$1,380,000 over a two-year time frame, and would consist of four activities or projects. (62)

#### 4.5 The Regional Office Reviews the Master Plan

On May 24, 1972, the master plan was submitted to the Chicago Regional Office for review. There were, of course, no major surprises in the plan since the RO coordinator had served as one of its principal architects. Nevertheless, two issues were to surface and both pertained to funding. First, the Regional Office believed the proposed budget of \$29.1 million to be excessive, and second, there was a problem with the manner in which Cleveland was proposing to allocate C and E funds.

In addressing the issue of budget, the Regional Office recommended eliminating or reducing program activities to bring the total funds being requested more in line with the preliminary guidance figure of \$20 million per Impact city. Stated simply, Cleveland "wanted to fund too many activities." To eliminate what it perceived as program excesses, the Chicago Regional Office settled on proposed system

improvements, across the criminal justice spectrum, for reductions. Cuts in police, courts, and in community-based corrections activities brought the total budget request down to slightly under \$22 million, still nearly two million over the \$20 million ceiling, but a dollar figure which the Regional Office strongly recommended be treated as a minimum funding commitment by the LEAA headquarters and its National Institute. In explaining his own stance relative to the budget, the RO coordinator later said "We felt the federal government had to play the heavy, instead of the CAT, in cutting police programs in particular. The Region permitted overbudgeting because we preferred to cut back programs rather than add them later. And we always knew some programs would be cut." (63)

The fund mix issue was clearly the more complex of the two problems raised by the Regional Office. "There was the issue," the RO coordinator would later explain, "of never knowing what kind of money we were getting.... There was confusion about what you could use E and C money for. We decided 'When in doubt, use C!'" (64) Consequently, in its budget request, Cleveland had planned a mix of 38 percent Part E (Correctional Institutions) and 62 percent Part C (police, courts, community-based corrections.) The LEAA, on the other hand, was making available \$2 million in Part E and \$1 million in Part C monies from fiscal year 1972 funds. The Regional Office recommended, then, that Cleveland should reallocate certain program activities "to satisfy the statutory requirements for the use of Part E funds." (65)

It was now June 1, 1972 and events relating to Cleveland's Impact program would proceed in rapid-fire order. By June 9, 1972, the CAT director had hand-delivered copies of the Cleveland master plan to the National Institute and these were immediately distributed to members of the Policy Decision Group. By June 16, the Regional Office review of the Cleveland plan had been received by the

office of the National Impact Program Coordinator. By June 28, a request had been initiated to transfer \$3 million in Impact funds to the Chicago RO, and on the following day, June 29, the LEAA Policy Decision Group met with city, state and federal planners on the Cleveland master plan. "The meeting," according to the National Impact Program Coordinator, "went well....[It] seems like this is a good approach for open discussion and clarification of issues."<sup>(66)</sup> The Cleveland Impact machinery, then, was moving steadily forward, and the relationship between Cleveland planners and the LEAA headquarters group seemed, if anything, improved. In fact, just two weeks prior to the Policy Decision Group meeting with Cleveland, the RO had sought and received approval from LEAA headquarters for the use of Impact dollars to fund a summer recreation project. This made Cleveland one of the first Impact cities to be awarded funds for a crime-reduction project. It was also the first city to appear successfully before the Policy Decision Group, and it would be the first city to have a formal announcement made of the approval of its master plan.

#### 5.0 THE MASTER PLAN IS FORMALLY APPROVED

From the first public announcement of Cleveland's selection as an Impact city, its program enjoyed excellent coverage from the news media. July was fast approaching and approval of the Cleveland master plan was imminent. Very likely, Impact would again garner banner headlines from the press. Because Cleveland's plan was the first to be approved by the LEAA, its Administrator was scheduled to visit Cleveland to participate in the formal ceremonies attending that approval. During mid-July, Cleveland newspapers carried the headline "City Begins War on Crime". The accompanying article noted that violent crimes were on the rise in Cleveland and that Impact, a program to reduce drastically the number of stranger-to-stranger crimes which had built a wall of fear around the city, would put "between \$20 million and \$29 million in federal money" into the fight. The article also announced the tentative approval of the Cleveland master plan by the LEAA.<sup>(67)</sup>

A second article in the Cleveland Press of July 19 introduced the CAT director to all of Cleveland. The article stated that the CAT director had been appointed by the mayor four months earlier in March 1972, and that he and five staff members had completed the writing of the complete master plan in a three-month time period. Noting that Cleveland, in the opinion of the CAT director, was far ahead of the other seven cities the article continued:

Because it is ahead of other cities, Cleveland may get more than the \$20 million originally allocated. The master plan calls for spending \$29 million.<sup>(68)</sup>

As discussed above, it had appeared very early in the development of Cleveland's Impact program that a major reason for speedy implementation was the desire to see results by election time in November. From the Cleveland Press interview with the CAT director a second reason emerges: the belief that if the program got off the

ground rapidly, the city might increase the amount of its share of Impact by nearly 50%.<sup>(69)</sup> Interestingly, this statement had been given to the news media on July 19, more than a full month after the Chicago Regional Office had recommended eliminating a number of Cleveland's proposed activities to achieve a total expected funding level not to exceed \$22 million.<sup>(70)</sup>

#### 5.1 A Nixon Letter: Special Commendations for Cleveland

On July 21, the CAT director appeared in the Washington offices of the National Impact Coordinator with an unusual request. "Mayor Perk wants to work out an arrangement for a mutual press release on Impact with Mr. Leonard and President Nixon", was the message conveyed by the CAT director. In repeating that statement in a memorandum to his immediate supervisor at the LEAA, the National Impact Coordinator would add that the CAT director had stated "that the request to include President Nixon may seem unusual but the mayor has reasons for being optimistic re the request".<sup>(71)</sup> Although the mayor's "reasons for being optimistic" are not known, the fact is that a letter dated September 6, 1972, was received by the mayor from the Nixon White House. This was one day before a scheduled press conference with LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard in Cleveland. The letter from President Nixon (reproduced on page 55 of this document), is unusual not because of its contents but rather, because it is the only such letter to have been received by any mayor of the eight Impact cities.

#### 5.2 The LEAA Administrator's Press Conference: Civil Rights Non-Compliance in Police Hiring Policies Emerges as a Problem

The Impact press conference on September 7 began with Mayor Perk's reading of the Nixon letter. The LEAA Administrator's announcement of the approval of the Cleveland master plan followed.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1972


Dear Ralph:

Cleveland's high impact crime reduction plan is an excellent example of the kind of intergovernmental cooperation required to come to grips with the problems in our cities. Law enforcement is primarily a state and local matter, but through financial assistance -- which has increased substantially in this Administration -- the Federal Government can help you carry out this responsibility.

The Cleveland plan is the result of extensive and careful preparation, and I congratulate you on its approval. It is an undertaking I fully support, and I have asked Jerris Leonard to keep me informed of the progress I am confident we will make.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Honorable Ralph J. Perk  
Mayor of Cleveland  
City Hall  
Cleveland, Ohio 44114

...The Cleveland Impact program, in my opinion, ... is one of the best, most comprehensive efforts that I've seen to assure every citizen of this community that Mayor Perk, that the state government, that the federal government are deadly serious in their efforts to reduce crime and delinquency.

This is a comprehensive plan; it's a good plan, it's a "make-sense" plan; it's a plan that's going to bring about, I'm certain, the goals of crime reduction... in the rate of crime in this city. (72)

He next signed three grants, totaling some \$1.4 million to be used to attack specific street crimes. All three were police projects. He also committed an additional \$11.6 million in Impact monies to fund 22 more projects through July 1, 1974, bringing the total Impact program allocations to Cleveland to approximately \$13.6 million for fiscal year 1973.

With the LEAA Administrator's planned remarks concluded, the mayor asked if there were any questions from the audience. A member of the audience, identified on the typed transcript of the proceedings only as a "voice", was the first questioner.

Mr. Leonard, as I understand it, as a condition for getting these federal funds, your office has instituted an investigation of the Cleveland police with regards to compliance with civil rights. And I'd like to ask you whether that investigation is complete? (73)

The LEAA Administrator's reply indicated that it was not an investigation but "a routine civil rights compliance survey" being completed "in all eight of the Impact cities." But he hastened to add that the "granting of the funds" was not conditioned upon the results of that survey "and if there were deficiencies in civil rights compliance areas in the Cleveland Police Department", recommendations would be made to the police chief "as to how those deficiencies might be overcome."

"What if", the voice next asked, "the deficiencies are not overcome?"

When the LEAA Administrator seemed uncertain of his reply, the Voice interrupted with a more forceful reading of the same question. The reply was, "Well, they will be overcome." Obviously dissatisfied with the responses received thus far, the Voice pressed further saying:

Mr. Leonard, let me ask you this. You've said twice now that the grant is not conditioned on compliance, if I understood you. However, in Title VI of the [1964] Federal Civil Rights Act, and specifically as it refers to the Justice Department, the Act very specifically says that if a governmental body is found to be not in compliance, and after remedies such as discussions and judicial cases, do not remedy it, that the funds will be cut off. Isn't that correct? (74)

The LEAA Administrator's response indicated again that deficiencies when found, would be noted and the proper agency departmental authorities would be notified of any civil rights non-compliance. Recommendations would also be made, and in due time, reviews of the situation would take place. If the previously noted deficiencies were to continue to occur, then the matter would be referred to Justice's Civil Rights Division for handling. Such measures, however, were taken in cases of very blatant wrongdoing, and "We have not," said the LEAA Administrator, "had that kind of situation yet come to my knowledge." (75)

What next followed was a long and often heated exchange between the LEAA Administrator and this unidentified member of the audience. The issue in contention was whether Cleveland's Police Department was guilty of blatant racist practices in its recruiting and hiring policies. What charged the air of that conference room, then, was a feeling of outrage, as expressed by the unidentified voice, that the LEAA was ignoring the police's failures in the area of civil rights compliance, and beyond that, was rewarding that agency for its

failures by pumping close to \$1.5 million into its program at the outset of Impact. Finally, the unidentified voice would say the following:

"This department, of the top twenty large city police departments in the country, currently has six black sergeants and one black lieutenant. The population of this city is about 40 percent black, and yet the population on the police department that's black is about 7 percent. And so, it's common knowledge to be gleaned by an average citizen out of the paper that the immediate past record of this department seems to leave something to be desired in the area of civil rights representation, and that is really the thrust of these questions."(76)

Clearly, the issue of non-compliance with civil rights laws centered on black/white relations in Cleveland. Relations, which despite the political inroads made by blacks in Cleveland during the mid-sixties and early seventies, were still troubled by the scars of Hough and Glenville. Only once, however, would those civil disturbances affect Impact programmatically. Cleveland's proposed helicopter unit would be immediately held unacceptable for funding as an Impact project by the black president of the City Council. The story of that project's demise, according to the assistant CAT director, is briefly accounted below:

When they had the Glenville riots here in Cleveland, they used helicopters to control that type of thing...there was some gunfire exchange between the ground and the helicopters and it was primarily in black communities...The black councilmen said never again will we give the city the capability to do something of that nature. So, it went down very quickly. It got shot right out of the sky.(77)

Thus, the passage of time had not yet healed the wounds of Hough and Glenville. The occasion of the LEAA Administrator's public appearance had provided an opportunity to give vent to feelings in the black community of unrest and dissatisfaction with a system which, in their

view, aided and abetted the very injustices against which they were struggling. The press conference at which these issues were raised took up only a small portion of one day but the issue of racial discrimination against blacks, in the area of police hiring practices, would reoccur often during the life of Cleveland's Impact program.

### 5.3 Reactions and Counter-Reactions to the Master Plan

#### 5.3.1 HEW's Region V Commissioner Cites Weaknesses in the Plan

Although the Cleveland master plan had been formally approved by the LEAA, the Region V HEW Commissioner, himself a member of the Federal Regional Council Task Force and unaware of the Chicago Regional Office's disenchantment with that body, forwarded, on September 21, 1972, a review of the master plan which was focused on the youth services system section of the document. In his view, there were two major weaknesses in the plan which he recommended be rectified in a revised edition: (1) there was no comprehensive description of the "existing system (or non-system) in which juveniles engaged in crime" and (2) there was no way of determining from the plan how many juveniles under 18 are involved "at any given time and at any given point in the juvenile justice system." The commissioner's memorandum pointed once again to data inadequacies and explicitly suggested that a comprehensive data base, in addition to a complete picture of the juvenile justice system, would facilitate identifying the gaps in the system as well as those points at which intervention would be most effective.<sup>(78)</sup> If Cleveland planners were to follow the suggestions of the HEW Commissioner, however, it would have required some effort on their parts and would probably have created program delays. On the other hand, their plan had identified the unemployed and addicted juvenile and the young male as their primary target offender. If effective crime-oriented planning, implementation and subsequent evaluation were to take place, they would need a comprehensive, system-wide data base. The juvenile area, then,

might well have been a good point at which to begin if Cleveland's Impact planners were serious about the evaluation goal of Impact.

### 5.3.2 The CAT responds to the Commissioner's Review

The Cleveland CAT director, in replying to the Commissioner's review of the master plan, focused on the high priority his staff placed "on creating a Youth Service System" to serve the greater Cleveland community. Consequently, he stated he did not believe it important to have an in-depth description of the total juvenile justice system since such reports were already in published form and since he viewed Impact as primarily a catalyst for a Youth Services System which the city of Cleveland would have to further develop and build upon. "We hope", he wrote, "to use the Impact monies as a carrot to both public and private agencies to create a Youth Service System." As to the matter of an adequate data base, he agreed that there was such a need and stated that a director for research and evaluation was being hired by the CAT, and under his leadership, the needed data base would be developed. (79)

### 5.3.3 The Chicago Regional Office responds to the Commissioner's Review

The Chicago Regional Office's response was not written until November 28, more than two full months after the HEW Commissioner's review had been forwarded. In explaining the time lag, the RA wrote "My reply was delayed in order to collect and analyze the Impact crime data necessary to determine if your suggested improvements should be incorporated into the next revision of the master plan." After mentioning the "considerable effort" such revisions would require, he cited statistical data to indicate that "77 percent of Impact crimes were committed by young adults and 23 percent by juveniles," despite the fact that there was near equality in absolute number of offenders. Thus, "the number of different crimes committed by young adults is three times those committed by juveniles", and "young adult recidivists commit

twice as many Impact crimes as juveniles". (80)

After reviewing the data on Impact crimes in Cleveland, the RA next wrote:

We reaffirm our belief that the main thrust of the Cleveland Impact program should be the treatment of young adult recidivists who are probationers, parolees and ex-offenders.

On the issue of a data base, he next stated:

There is a need for additional statistical and descriptive planning data to justify and select the most cost-effective projects for the Cleveland Impact program. The suggested improvements contained in your memorandum...have been studied and examined extensively in the light of the conclusions to date. As the Cleveland Impact staff continues to collect and analyze data, hopefully, some of your suggestions will contribute to the selection and design of new projects for Cleveland Youth.

In replying to the HEW Commissioner's statement on the effectiveness of delinquency prevention programs, he stated the following:

While we recognize the benefits of delinquency prevention programs in the schools, this type of prevention effort is outside of the criminal justice system. Thus, we see no compelling reason why LEAA should use Impact funds for such prevention programs. HEW is the federal expert in education, and HEW has its own delinquency prevention authority, therefore, the Cleveland Impact staff must seek and coordinate funds and expertise of HEW in pre-system youth services in the schools.

After laying out the strategy Cleveland Impact would employ in coordinating youth services, he concluded:

A large part of the success of the Cleveland Impact program will depend upon cooperation between the agencies. LEAA money alone cannot sufficiently solve the problems of crime and delinquency in Cleveland... (81)

The replies of both the CAT director and the regional administrator addressed adequately the issue of needed interagency coordination but neither clearly came to grips with the major issue raised by HEW's Regional Commissioner, i.e., the need to develop a comprehensive data base. The RA had stated that, as Cleveland proceeded in their collection and analysis of data, "hopefully, some of your suggestions" will be used, and the CAT director had stated that his staff had acquired a director for research and evaluation who would give attention to data base development. Time would determine whether they were serious or merely appearing to incorporate this important step in the planning and evaluation cycle.

## 6.0 CLEVELAND IMPACT ACTIVITIES SHAPED BY SPA ATTITUDES AND A CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT

### 6.1 The SPA reviews a Cleveland Police Grant: the Reaction of Cleveland Planners

It will be remembered that, except in the area of fiscal administration, the Ohio SPA had chosen to eschew any further involvement in the Cleveland Impact program. This decision had been conveyed in a July 25 letter from the SPA director to the Region V administrator, discussed above (see page 30). Consequently, it was as the program's fiscal administrator that the SPA transmitted, on July 31, its review of certain Cleveland Impact police activities. The three projects in question--high visibility patrols, special felony squads and auxiliary police--were the very ones that would place 188 new policemen on the streets of Cleveland. The SPA fiscal review of the police grant found it to be in violation of the Ohio State Comprehensive Plan in at least two respects. First, it called for the funding of the salaries of regular policemen, and second, it called for reinforcing of police auxiliary units without providing adequate training. Additionally, the SPA director wanted to know who would pay the salaries of these 188 men beyond the life of the six-month Impact grant, and expressed the belief that two of the three proposed police activities, high visibility patrols and special felony squads, would prove to be useless as long-term crime control measures. They "would appear to be good only to drive criminals either to other areas of the city or underground for the duration, and then permit a resumption of normal criminal activity." He, therefore, forwarded the grant to the Chicago Regional Office without SPA approval. (82)

The SPA director's position aroused the ire of both Cleveland's mayor and its Impact program director. Once again, the RO coordinator was the man caught in the middle. In an August 4 report to the Region V administrator, he wrote that the SPA director's two letters had "produced a larger 'cooperation gap' between the SPA and the city

of Cleveland....Indications are that Mayor Perk will recommend by-passing the Ohio SPA because of demonstrated resistance and uncooperative efforts on the part of the Ohio SPA."<sup>(83)</sup>

Cleveland, then, saw the SPA's director's tactics as a stumbling block to program implementation. Rather than allow the SPA stance to cause "unnecessary" program delays, the Chicago Regional Office opted to make the decisions themselves based on the RO coordinator's first-hand knowledge of the Cleveland Impact activities. Later, in explanation of this approach, the RO coordinator would say "The SPA was constantly trying to slow down the program. It was a constant running battle, and it came down to the question, do we really need the SPA to make the program successful?"<sup>(84)</sup> The actions of the Regional Office indicated that their answer to that question was an unequivocal "No". These events all occurred by August 4. There was still time to get activities implemented by November as Cleveland planners moved ahead. Unknown to them, however, other factors, external to the program's organizational structure, were at work which would slow down the Cleveland Impact effort, if not altogether bring it to a halt.

#### 6.2 An NAACP Lawsuit: Cause of Program Delay

Prior to the formal announcement of the approval of the Cleveland Impact master plan, in August 1972, a civil rights compliance review was conducted on Cleveland's civil service police entry examination. The investigation determined that the examination, which had been taken by all applicants for the 188 slots included in the three police activities awarded by the LEAA Administrator at the September 7 press conference, was indeed, discriminatory. As soon as this fact became known, the LEAA Administrator ordered all hiring of patrolmen for the Cleveland Impact program to stop.

On October 12, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a class action suit in U. S. District Court charging the police department with racial discrimination in its hiring and promotion practices. Specifically, the suit named as defendants, the mayor, the CAT director, the city's safety director, the police chief, and the five members of the civil service commission. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, in commenting on the nature of the suit, stated:

The suit charges that the written, medical and psychological exams, the polygraph test and the background investigation are designed and administered to weed out minorities.

Much discretion is allowed in hiring and promotion.... In addition, black policemen traditionally are assigned to basic patrol in predominantly black sections of the city, denying them the broad experience needed for advancement, the suit contends.<sup>(85)</sup>

The NAACP law suit, whatever its merits, could not have come at a worse time for Cleveland planners. In a memorandum to his administrative superior, the RO coordinator noted that the lawsuit was pending, not resolved. Consequently, he urged that the LEAA should step out of the picture while the city and the courts decided the issue. In the meantime, the 188 policemen could be hired for the police activities and the crime war in Cleveland would not be sacrificed "because of some technical matters having to do with validation of the entry examination for patrolmen."<sup>(86)</sup>

This same strategy was urged upon the mayor by the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association who, through their president, publicly stated that the "mayor could hire the policemen and later fight the action in court." The mayor, though, refused to employ such a strategy. Instead, he ordered overtime for 954 Cleveland policemen saying his order was "a result of slow response to police calls and a lawsuit by the NAACP that has delayed the hiring of 188 new policemen."<sup>(87)</sup>

The NAACP reacted with outrage at the mayor's remark and told a Plain Dealer reporter that the mayor was "looking for a convenient reason for the city's crime problems and chose their organization as a scapegoat."

We don't believe that to have good law enforcement you have to discriminate against blacks and that's what the mayor is saying, the NAACP's executive director said.(88)

At a meeting of the City Council, later in the same day in which the mayor made his statement, a bitter exchange took place between the mayor and the black president of the City Council. The Plain Dealer's account of events as they unfolded follows:

A shouting match erupted on the floor of Cleveland City Council last night as Mayor Ralph J. Perk and George L. Forbes, the Council's majority leader, sparred over blame for the city's crime problem.

Forbes termed Perk's accusation "totally unfair". He said the real problem was "an inadequate administration."

Perk jumped to the microphone and reiterated his earlier statement about the NAACP law suit.(89)

On December 22, the issue came before U. S. District Judge William K. Thomas who ruled that 18% of 188 policemen hired must be black or Spanish-American. At the hearing, NAACP and Legal Aid lawyers argued that at least 38% of the new policemen should be black because that is the percentage of blacks in Cleveland. The judge arrived at the 18 percent quota because that percentage of minority persons had passed the entrance exam. This hearing did not, however, address the more volatile issue, i.e., police applicant screening procedures. That matter would await another trial. Mayor Perk, when contacted, stated he thought the decision was "fair and equitable" and the city would abide by it. The mayor expected that one-third of the policemen could be on the streets of Cleveland by mid-January, 1973.(90)

#### 7.0 CLEVELAND SUBMITS A PLANNING AND EVALUATION GRANT: \$1.2 MILLION IN INSTITUTE FUNDS ARE REQUESTED

It is apparent that the focus of the Cleveland program was always activity or project-oriented. Perhaps this explains the city's decision to ignore the suggestion of the National Institute to develop a separate evaluation plan which would provide the Institute "with necessary information as input to our national level evaluation..."(91) The Cleveland CAT, with the concurrence of the Chicago Regional Office, presented a plan covering both planning and evaluation. The grant application was first submitted on June 2, 1972 and asked for funding in the amount of \$728,000 to cover AT planning, program management and evaluation activities.(92) Originally, the Institute had allocated \$625,000 to each Impact city for these activities but in August 1972, advertised and availability of \$4 million in supplemental funds which the 8 cities could apply for as their needs justified additional monies.

When news of these increased funding possibilities reached Cleveland, the CAT responded by changing the amount of monies requested several times over, and each of these changes seemed to be a response to the city's own evolving concepts of the nature of its planning and evaluation needs. A major contributor to this evolution seems to have been the city's use of several outside contractors. Originally, the CAT contracted with General Research Corporation (GRC) to prepare an evaluation plan and supporting procedures. The GRC effort, however, fell short of providing an adequate framework for evaluating Cleveland's Impact program because of GRC's intention to combine project indicators into program indicators using, as weights, the proportion of the program budget devoted to each project. This meant that a marginally successful project, with a large sum of money allocated to it, could look better than a totally successful project with a small budget allocation.(93) Subsequently, Westinghouse Public Management Services was asked to modify the procedures developed by GRC.

With the assistance of Westinghouse, the Cleveland CAT planned to complete a first draft of its planning and evaluation manual by late September 1972. This document would set forth the CAT structure, full procedures for planning and evaluation activities, and modify and correct the GRC effort. To the dismay of Cleveland Impact planners, the Westinghouse contractors, perhaps due to the extremely short turnaround time, also failed to measure up to their expectations. Consequently, the RA, in an October 24 memorandum to the National Institute, would write that Westinghouse had "failed to deliver an acceptable Program Administration Manual."<sup>(94)</sup> The CAT and the Chicago Regional Office would have to complete the revision of the manual themselves. This decision was reached during the last week of October 1972. A little more than a month later, on November 29, 1972, the Chicago Regional Office submitted both the Planning and Evaluation Manual and the Planning and Evaluation Grant to the National Institute. The grant application covered a 28 month period, and requested LEAA funding support in the amount of \$1,204,029, exceeding the original Institute allocation per city by \$579,029. The proposed grantee contribution of \$87,747 brings the total dollars the Cleveland CAT expected to expend to \$1,291,776 for planning and evaluation activities.

#### 7.1 The Impact Planning and Evaluation Grant Application:

The 184-page "Impact Planning and Evaluation Project" grant application contains, in addition to a detailed budget description at the front, the same material as the Planning and Evaluation Manual, except that the five sections of the manual have been reorganized into nine tasks in the grant application. The nine tasks are:

1. Develop Initial Impact Program Master Plan (completed May 1972)
2. Refine the Program Structure
3. Refine Organizational Structure
4. Internal Office Procedure

5. Develop On-Going Planning Procedures
6. Develop Evaluation Procedure
7. Develop Operations Procedure
8. Prepare Grant Application Requests and Revisions
9. Revise and Update the Impact Program Master Plan

The tasks which are directly related to evaluation are Task 2, which describes Cleveland's new Impact program structure; Task 3, which describes their Impact staff organization; Task 6, which describes their evaluation plan; and Task 7, which describes their monitoring plan. In addition, several of the appendices to the Planning and Evaluation Manual are directly relevant.

Task 2 defines the program structure for Cleveland's Impact program. In the Planning and Evaluation grant application, the program structure is changed from that which appears in their master plan, and is summarized below. Cleveland now defined four "sub-level programs", which indicate at a very general level how the overall crime reduction goal is to be addressed. These sub-level program goals are:

1. Minimize the need for the target population to commit target crimes;
2. Minimize the desire for the target population to commit target crimes;
3. Minimize the opportunity for the target population to commit target crimes; and
4. Maximize the risk for target offenders.

The specific program areas which are being implemented within this structure are as follows:

Under sub-level program 1:

Addiction Treatment Program  
Employment Program

Under sub-level program 2:

Diversion and Rehabilitation Program

Under sub-level program 3:

Deterrence Program

Under sub-level program 4:

Detection and Apprehension Program  
Adjudication Program

The Planning and Evaluation grant application states that the Cleveland CAT altered their program structure to facilitate the quantification of program goals and their relationship to the overall crime-reduction goal.

Cleveland's evaluation plan per se, is presented under Task 6, "Develop Evaluation Procedures". As presented, two shortcomings immediately become apparent. First, although descriptions of proposed Cleveland activities were made available in its master plan of May 1972, the evaluation plan made no attempt to relate evaluation activities to planned projects and programs. Second, the discussions of data collection and analysis remained general and unspecific.

The grant application details Cleveland's plans to perform their project/program evaluations in-house. However, it also details their intent to perform several research studies. These were eight in number, and as cited in the grant application, are as follows:

1. Design and construction of research instruments;
2. Descriptive analysis and data interpretation by local specialists;
3. The development of a weighting scale to identify assumptions which contribute most to program goals;
4. Comprehensive profile study of the many characteristics of ex-offenders as they relate to causes of criminality;
5. Study on the relationship of client need, desire, opportunity and risk to commit crime;

6. Profile study of the staffing characteristics of the Criminal Justice System;
7. Orientation and training of project managers of the Criminal Justice System and community personnel in data collection and reporting procedures;
8. Tracking system (follow-up study on the client flow through the Criminal Justice System and future behavior relating to recidivism).

Appendix D of the Appendices to the Planning and Evaluation Manual describes these studies in further detail, and groups them into five separate efforts, as follows:

<u>Effort</u>	<u>Study Number from Above List</u>
I	1 and 2
II	3
III	4 and 5
IV	6 and 7
V	8

In the budget section, where these efforts have dollar figures attached to them, the effort under number IV above, dealing with staffing characteristics in the criminal justice system and training of staff for data collection, seems to have been omitted. Estimated costs for the other efforts are as shown:

<u>Effort</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u>
I	\$ 45,000
II	50,000
III	80,000
V	<u>45,000</u>
Total	\$220,000

As matters would develop in Cleveland, only research studies 1 and 2 would come reasonably close to being completed as described in the grant application. They became, in the case of the first study, Cleveland's data collection instruments and performance status reports, and in the case of the second study, Cleveland's project-level evaluation reports. Some data relating to research studies 4 and 5 can be found in the 1974 master plan revision and the Cleveland victimization survey. Research studies 3, 6, 7 and 8 were never completed although the functions to be carried out following the completion of research study 7 were, nevertheless, performed.

#### 7.2 The Impact Planning and Evaluation Manual: How Does It Differ from the Grant Application?

A careful examination of Cleveland's Planning and Evaluation Manual reveals that the text of the volume is quite similar in content to the text of the grant application. Since the appendices to the volume are what contain essentially new data only these will be described briefly here. The six appendices, by subject heading are listed below:

- Appendix A - Project Activities
- Appendix B - Fiscal Forms and Requirements
- Appendix C - Collection Instruments
- Appendix D - Studies for External Data
- Appendix E - Applicant's Guideline Brochure
- Appendix F - Project Performance Guidelines

Appendix A provides important evaluation-related data for all projects proposed for implementation by Cleveland. It contains a one-page summary for each program, and the following information for each project:

- Summary - Program Area, Project Title, Project Director, Agency Address, Telephone Number and Project Duration

Basic Assumptions - A brief discussion of the rationale underlying the project

Target Population - Total population eligible for service, total capacity of project, and demographic profile of target population

Objectives - List of the project objectives

Expected Outcome or Performance Standards - Minimum acceptable, desired, and optimum

Measures - Measure of efficiency and measure of effectiveness

Activities - A list of project activities

Special Constraints - A list of special constraints bearing on the project

Milestone Chart - A chart tracking percent of target population served, percent of activities to be implemented, percent of expected outcome, and percent of money, all on a monthly basis.

Appendix B defines the policies for the fiscal management of funds based on requirements of the LEAA and the city of Cleveland. Appendix C contains the forms which Cleveland planners intended to use for collecting needed project data. Interestingly, all the forms seem oriented toward corrections projects while ignoring data collection instruments for police and courts projects. Appendix E contains guidance to prospective applicants, i.e., host agencies, on how to prepare the paperwork required for a grant application. Appendix F consists of a number of blank forms which almost completely duplicate those contained in Appendix A. (The contents of Appendix D, titled "Studies for External Data", were discussed previously on page 71 of this document.)

Perhaps the most significant task undertaken by Cleveland Impact planners in their planning and evaluation documents was their attempt



and provided. Most significantly, the 351-page two-volume set called for both a large in-house CAT staff and wide use of contractor services at a budgeted figure of \$1,204,029 in Institute funds. Likely, there would be strong reaction to the budget request as well as to the lack of a strong schedule of evaluation activities in the plan itself.

### 7.3 Reactions of the National Institute and the National Impact Coordinator to the Cleveland Evaluation Plan

On December 14, the program manager for the National Level Evaluation wrote a memorandum to the Institute director providing his overview assessment of the plan which was, rather than being substantive in nature, "aimed more at supplying you with information on which to base a decision concerning their request for funds." As background, he mentioned that "in addition to the \$625,000 already given to the Region, this application requests \$579,029." The new figure, \$579,029, included the \$70,000 the Regional Office had reluctantly agreed to provide to the SPA for its fiscal monitoring of the Cleveland program. "In general," he next wrote, "the Cleveland program for planning and evaluating their Impact program reflects a major effort on the part of the CAT." After describing the plan's basic format, he discussed some of the components of the plan. Regarding the data collection and analysis for further project planning and development, he expressed concern that the effort was both "overly large and possibly duplicative." Continuing, he wrote:

On the one hand, the plan calls for several contracts to be let over the next few months to gather and analyze crime and offender data on which to make decisions. But, on the other hand, the staffing requests for the CAT itself would appear to be of such a magnitude that much of this task probably could be carried on largely in-house... It is difficult to judge where one can draw the line with respect to planning for a crime-oriented program, but I think they have gone further than necessary and perhaps to the point of diminishing returns. (96)

It was clear from the tone of the National Level Evaluation program manager's memorandum that he was making every effort to understand the city's point of view, and yet his questioning of the city's apparently duplicative strategy was in order. His recommendation to the Institute's director called for a maximum of \$400,000 of Institute Impact funds to be transferred to the Chicago Regional Office. "It is felt", he concluded, "that a careful assessment by the Cleveland CAT will identify what curtailments can be made without significantly affecting the success of their Impact program." (97)

The reaction of the National Impact Coordinator to Cleveland's evaluation plan also centered on the level of Institute funding requested and the seeming duplication of services. In a response directed to the Institute's National Level Evaluation program manager, he expressed concern over the inability "to break out the evaluation requirements and tasks needed to justify the request for \$1,204,029..." (98) but did identify CAT personnel compensation and contractor services as consuming a large percentage of the overage.

After stating that Cleveland's personnel allocation alone consumed \$580,263 of the proposed budget, he next pointed to the CAT's staff size as being inconsistent with the amount allocated for consulting services.

A crime analysis team of 28 (23 professionals and 5 secretaries) is envisioned, making Cleveland's staff the largest of the Impact Cities and larger than many SPAs. Considering staff size, it is interesting to note that \$268,100 is allocated for supporting consultant services. Although the staff will include 8 planners/evaluators and one statistician, much of the \$220,000 in new contracts is designed to undertake functions for which the CATs originally were established.

After quoting directly from the Cleveland plan as to its rationale for proposing both a large staff and widespread use of contractor services, he wrote:

Cleveland need not depend both upon an enormous staff and substantial contractor efforts to produce essential basic data such as offender characteristics, crime setting and victim characteristics. We favor a reduction in that city's reliance on contractors. In so doing, we recognize the need for adequate staffing but still believe Cleveland's personnel allocation to be excessive.(99)

He concluded by suggesting that the Institute request "a formal substantive and financial review of the Cleveland application by the RO coordinator." In the opinion of the National Impact Coordinator, the RO coordinator's "active participation in the presentation of the planning/evaluation manual and application" would not suffice as "a substitute for the critical review the RO, as technical awarding office, must make." Recalling that the RO coordinator had been from the beginning, "deeply involved in Cleveland's program planning and development" he felt "his critique should offer much assistance to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) in its decision to release additional funds for award to the CAT."(100)

On January 10, 1973, the Chicago Regional Office would submit its "formal substantive" review of the plan. It was two pages in length and was addressed to the Institute's program manager for the National Level Evaluation. In addition to restating the budget overage, it contained five paragraphs in the body of the memorandum, one each devoted to the five sections of the manual, and a concluding paragraph, with recommendations included.

The program structure, it stated, contained "a very logical division"; the Impact office had "an excellent organization structure"; the program planning section integrated "overall program planning with operations program/project planning"; the evaluation section, in addition to describing the complete evaluation plan for each

project, provided "the target population, objectives, expected outcome, measures, and milestone chart" for each project; and the monitoring section "well described" how a project was to be managed. The review ended with a recommendation "that the additional Institute funds of \$579,029 be provided to the Cleveland Impact program ..."(101)

From the standpoint of both the Institute and the office of the National Impact Coordinator, the review of the Chicago Regional Office was disappointing. Commenting on the review's substantive quality, the National Impact Coordinator would write to the Institute's Program Manager for the National Level Evaluation the following:

Unfortunately, the memorandum fails to review critically and in detail the justification for additional planning and evaluation funds in this largest supplemental request to date. Our concerns regarding staff size, consultant services, and the seemingly inflated budget remain.(102)

Although noting the concerns of the office of the National Impact Coordinator, the Institute approved the award and transfer of \$400,000 out of its 1973 funds to the Chicago RO for release to the Cleveland Impact program. This amount was only \$179,029 shy of the Cleveland budget request. It was now January 19, 1973 and Cleveland's share of Institute planning and evaluation funds totaled \$1,025,000.

Suddenly, Cleveland was in receipt of awards for better than \$1,000,000 with nothing concretized as to its real intentions in the evaluation area. The Institute, cognizant of the city's almost total concentration on program implementation up to the present time, became concerned that the city might not demonstrate a serious commitment to evaluation. On January 24, the Institute's director wrote of these concerns to the other members of the LEAA Policy Decision Group. He reminded them that the original \$625,000 was fully intended to include the costs of a city-level evaluation effort, but "because of the amount

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

of evaluation that may be required, it was felt that some additional support could be provided if justification was made for it."<sup>(103)</sup> And, despite the fact that Cleveland and the Chicago RO had failed to honor its suggestion to prepare a separate evaluation plan, the Institute had transferred \$400,000 to the RO. "And it is our intent," the Institute director continued, "that this money be used to carry out all the evaluation responsibilities and activities as they were incorporated in the overall plan." Since the transferred monies were well below the Cleveland request, he was fully aware that this would occasion cuts and he wanted to be certain that "any cuts this will require should not be in the area of city-level evaluation."

He wanted the Institute's concerns to be made clear because "information has reached us indicating that, in fact, the Regional Office will allow all cuts to be in the evaluation area" because "they feel this is the least important of the Impact program activities."

In concluding, he made three recommendations as follows:

- a) The Regional Office review the revised Cleveland plan and budget, and document that the appropriate level of evaluation has been maintained. None of the \$400,000 should be allocated prior to this review.
- b) The Regional Office also supply the Policy Group with the revised Cleveland plan and budget as soon as it is completed by the CAT.
- c) Mr. Jemilo and Mr. Bain arrange to meet with the Policy Group within two weeks to resolve this problem.<sup>(104)</sup>

The National Institute's concern over the Cleveland attitude toward evaluation was evidently well founded, as the following paragraphs from a Cleveland report reflects.

The permanent staff of the program will be held to 18. The staff should concentrate primarily upon program implementation until June 30, 1973. After June 30, 1973, the staff should concentrate primarily upon evaluation.

Contractual technical assistance will be used until June 30, 1973 to accomplish the supplemental planning required to develop new projects by May 1, 1973, and to develop the data collection storage and analysis procedures for evaluation of projects.<sup>(105)</sup>

Cleveland had thus succeeded in getting an endorsement from the National Institute for \$13,600,000 in funds to be used by June 30, 1973, and it was their intent that until that date, most of these monies be concentrated "primarily upon program implementation." And, although some mention was made of the use of contractor technical assistance "to develop the data collection, storage and analysis procedures" for project evaluation, this was as a backdrop to the supplemental program planning effort to which Cleveland was devoting its primary attention.<sup>(106)</sup> Both the National Institute and the National Impact Coordinator found Chicago's proposed plan unacceptable. The National Impact Coordinator, on February 14, wrote the RA a reaffirmation of the Institute's three-point recommendation of January 24, 1973, urging that he contact LEAA headquarters at his "earliest convenience" to arrange a meeting with the Policy Decision Group.

On March 8, the Chicago RA wrote to the National Impact Coordinator concerning Cleveland's revised application for the use of discretionary funds for planning, implementation and evaluation. The RA's major recommendations to the Institute are stated below:

- 1) That the proposed changes in the grant application be approved because the level of evaluation has not only been maintained but increased.

- 2) That the need for a meeting with the Policy Group be reconsidered in the light of background data supplied and the current RO workload created by the processing of State plans.
- 3) That the RO be given the approval to award the additional \$400,000 of Institute funds as soon as possible. (107)

In responding to the Chicago RA, the National Impact Coordinator wrote of his concurrence with points 1) and 3) above, with the following stipulations:

- 1) Vacant CAT evaluation positions should be filled as soon as possible.
- 2) The National Institute must be kept apprised of detailed evaluation activities as they are developed for each Impact project.
- 3) Inadequacies noted during review of Cleveland's evaluation plan cited by MITRE letter of January 29, 1973 should be addressed. (108)

As to point 2) of the RA's memorandum, he wrote:

The National Institute would like to reserve judgment on a recommendation for a meeting with the Policy Group until after their Cleveland site visit of March 29, 1973. (109)

#### 7.3.1 The National Institute Visits Cleveland

On March 29-30, the Institute's program manager for the National Level Evaluation, two representatives of the National Level Evaluation contractor (i.e., MITRE), and the National Impact Coordinator visited Cleveland to discuss the CAT's evaluation plan, evaluation components and evaluation capability.

Despite having experienced problems with consultants on two prior occasions, the CAT had recently contracted with JRB Associates for technical support. This latest contractor would assist the CAT

in preparing timely evaluation components and in developing an "Offender Tracking and Information System". The system, if implemented, would provide great potential as a data source for Impact evaluation efforts. The cost estimate for the proposed system was revised upward from \$45,000 to \$75,000. (However, this study, previously referred to on page 71 of this document, was never completed.) During the first day's meeting, the LEAA visitors attempted to determine how the remainder of the \$189,700 allocated for contractor services would be spent. Already, close to \$52,000 had been spent for various program and evaluation planning tasks. Additionally, \$33,000 was being estimated for a crime displacement study and possible future contractor assistance. It appeared that the CAT was working on the deficiencies noted in an earlier review of their plan by the Institute's National Level Evaluation contractor. It seemed, then, that Cleveland was really beginning to devote some attention to the important evaluation area, was in the process of developing an acceptable set of evaluation components and had plans for the development of a comprehensive data base (essential parts of the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation cycle). "Cleveland seems to be in much better shape" the trip report of this visit would conclude. However, one thing continued to bother the Institute about Cleveland: "They do not have a full, in-house evaluation capability and seem to be leaning too heavily on contractor support." (110)

#### 7.3.2 The National Impact Coordinator Re-Visits Cleveland


On June 20, 1973, a little more than two months after the first technical assistance visit, the National Impact Coordinator returned to Cleveland. He found the Cleveland Impact office, not surprisingly, bustling with activity. The CAT was now publishing a newsletter for widespread dissemination and this would "help gain the visibility needed for the Impact program." More importantly, though, the CAT had now developed "an aggressive monitoring effort for on-going projects" and

a "formal monitoring report for each grantee" was to be submitted weekly, with a monthly consolidation. "I spot-checked some of the reports," he would later say, "and they appear to be an excellent vehicle for maintaining progress and problems with projects."<sup>(111)</sup> His words were favorable but the major deficiencies pointed out to Cleveland during the March 29 visit of the National Institute/OCJA representatives had to do with the quality of its evaluation components and the lack of a schedule of project activities. These deficiencies had, however, been addressed in a document which had been forwarded earlier to the National Institute on June 4. Called Cleveland Evaluation Component, it comprised one section of a four-part Planning and Evaluation Manual to be developed by the Impact program staff.

#### 7.4 The Cleveland Evaluation Component

The body of the 263-page Evaluation Component is itself divided into four sections. Section I, Introduction and Background, briefly scans the evolution of the Impact program in Cleveland since early 1972. Of particular interest are two flow charts (Figures 3 and 4 below) which highlight key milestones in the development of projects and evaluation components. The flow charts also extend the milestone schedule six months into 1973. Of significance here are the "monthly project evaluation reports," the "monthly monitoring reports," and the monthly Impact Offender Information System reports which were scheduled to begin being submitted in July 1973.

Section II presents an overview of the entire Cleveland Impact Program in terms of hierarchical structure of the operating programs and specific projects and activities subsumed under them. As shown in Table VII below, there are only 21 projects or activities under the program areas as compared to the 55 such activities listed in the master plan and shown in Table IV of this document. The section also notes the special problems facing evaluation, namely, the number and



(Source: Cleveland Evaluation Component, May 1973)






FIGURE 3  
CLEVELAND IMPACT CITIES PROGRAM OVERALL MILESTONE SCHEDULE  
MARCH, 1972-MARCH, 1973



(Source: Cleveland Evaluation Component, May 1973)

FIGURE 4  
CLEVELAND IMPACT CITIES PROGRAM OVERALL MILESTONE SCHEDULE  
APRIL, 1973-SEPTEMBER, 1973

TABLE VII  
REVISED CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM STRUCTURE



variety of city agencies and organizations participating and the fact that much of the evaluation data is manually maintained.

The third section examines (in 18 pages) the approach to evaluation by Cleveland. Beginning with a definition of "effectiveness" and "efficiency" measures, Cleveland then describes an Impact Data Base with three subsystems: a Data Collection Subsystem, a Data Analysis Subsystem, and an Interpretive Reporting Subsystem.

Cleveland's Impact Data Base and its component parts of collection, analysis, and interpretive reporting was, as set forth in Section III, for the use of Impact program planners and evaluators at the city, regional, and national levels. The two basic categories of data are the "statistical-quantitative" and the "nonstatistical-qualitative."

The last section, Project Evaluation (Section IV) is the largest part of the document. Here Cleveland's nine-step methodology for developing project evaluation data collection instruments is set forth, followed by the 21 individual evaluation components. Each component runs 2 to 3 pages in length (exclusive of the data forms) and contains the following headings: the problem, the approach, effectiveness and efficiency measures, data elements, and project assessment questions (qualitative inputs).

Completing the volume are four appendices as follows:

A--Impact Offender Information System (Offender and Document Flow Chart)

B--Impact Offender Information System (Adult Data Elements)

C--Concept Paper Proposing a Crime Displacement study

D--Impact Cities Program Planning and Evaluation System--  
Development and Implementation (Statement of Work)

#### 7.5 The National Institute/MITRE Reviews The Evaluation Component And The Cleveland CAT's Response

The National Institute, through its National Level Evaluation contractor, reviewed the evaluation component in terms of the basic deficiencies found in the earlier version of the evaluation plan. "Cleveland's evaluation component," the review began, "contains most of the elements for a successful evaluation." After citing the plan's strengths, it continued: "There remain, however, basic shortcomings...."

The National Level Evaluation contractor stated a belief that Cleveland's evaluators would have "a difficult time producing meaningful evaluations without a clearly stated set of objectives as a point of reference," and while markedly improved, the evaluation plan still appeared "somewhat fragmented". It was suggested that Cleveland, in particular in its measures section, might want to direct more attention to "the inter-relationship between measures, data and analytical techniques for the individual projects."

As to the individual evaluation components, the review found that "the major remaining deficiency is that the...components...now in operation are not fully developed according to Cleveland's own evaluation concept." It concluded with the following recommendations:

- 1) That specific project objectives be included in each evaluation component.
- 2) That project objectives be quantified (where feasible) and rigorous goal/objective relationships be defined and established.
- 3) That the probable analytical techniques to be used in the individual evaluations be identified.
- 4) That the relationship between the objectives and measures and project data collection be specified in each component. (112)

Cleveland's written response to the review of its second evaluation document was finally received by the National Level Evaluation contractor four months after receipt of its critique by Cleveland. Written by the Cleveland CAT director, it contained a statement differentiating between the planning and evaluation manual and the evaluation component in their addressing of "different although related aspects of planning/evaluation problems and issues...written at different times by different authors." And, although the CAT had intended to use the summer months to merge the two documents into a revision which would satisfy the deficiencies noted in the critique of the National Level Evaluation contractor, the CAT director reported "the [evaluation] staff has found this job to be more complex than they anticipated, particularly insofar as meeting the problem of better specifying project objectives, quantifying them, and relating them to higher goals."<sup>(113)</sup>

After explaining that part of their difficulty lay in the fact that the linkages which exist principally at the project level were difficult to account for, the CAT director stated "the staff chose to get projects underway...."

"During the summer and early fall months," he continued, "the staff has concentrated on implementation of the Data Collection Subsystem of the Planning and Evaluation System....The utilization of the Data Collection Instruments in the field during that period has required a number of modifications which in turn have affected implementation of the Data Analysis Subsystem. The operation of these two subsystems was intended to remedy the problems described in [your] Technical Guidance Letter...."

The CAT director believed all such problems could be better addressed within the context of the master plan revision, scheduled

for publication during early 1974. "The master plan revision", he concluded, "will explain not only how we have attempted to meet the problems described...but will also include actual performance data from many of the operating programs and projects."<sup>(114)</sup>

It was now November 1973. The monthly project evaluation and monitoring reports scheduled to have started in July 1973 did not really get into use much before September 1973 and, even then, there were countless problems with getting project personnel to accurately complete the data collection instruments and performance status reports. No CAT-generated evaluation reports would be forthcoming until March 1974 and, the National Institute, while concerned over the evaluation situation in Cleveland, had, itself, undergone some changes in key policymaking positions which meant that the Impact program at the national level was, for a time, not as closely monitored as it had been formerly. The Policy Decision Group, with then Institute Director Martin E. Danziger as its pivotal member, passed off the scene as a viable body during this time period with the transfers and resignations of all three members of the group. Danziger had left the Institute in June 1973. Gerald Emmer would leave the LEAA soon thereafter and James Devine, in the reorganization which took place, would be transferred from the Office of Criminal Justice Administration. Their departures signified the demise of the Policy Decision Group and it was never again to be reconstituted as part of the Impact hierarchy.

## 8.0 CLEVELAND'S IMPACT PROGRAM REMAINS ACTIVITY-FOCUSED

In a report to the CAT director following an Impact coordinator's meeting held in Denver during April 1973, the first chief of evaluation for the CAT observed "we are more project-activity oriented in our thrust, and we should capitalize on this in that this is what Impact is all about." Earlier, he had noted the apparent differences between Cleveland's program and that of many other Impact cities, most notably Denver, who were "placing greater emphasis...on...material relating to crime data." He added "this gives the good appearance of professionalism." And evidently, for the sake of good appearance, if for no other reason, Cleveland ought to increase its "data information system and develop such capability."<sup>(115)</sup>

It would be unfair, however, to characterize the Cleveland Impact effort as one totally lacking in interest in evaluation but rather, it seems a program wherein evaluation was not accorded a very high priority. The commitment to evaluation could not be as serious as was the commitment to program activities because of several factors. First, the new Republican administration in the city of Cleveland applied real pressure to Cleveland Impact planners to get a program operational which could produce a visible reduction in stranger-to-stranger crime before the presidential elections in November 1972. Second, the position of the mayor of Cleveland was an extremely delicate one. He had built his political base on a strong appeal to Cleveland's ethnic groups but had failed to include the city's blacks among his constituency. He considered Impact "his baby" and wanted the program implemented quickly, perhaps as a monument to help solidify his somewhat tenuous political base. Third, the black community, which had lost its own chief advocate in the former mayor, Carl Stokes, had become alienated and remained distrustful of both Mayor Perk and his constituency. Especially was the black community hostile to the Cleveland police department, which they had long perceived as racist

and whose actions during the Hough riots and Glenville shootouts, were seen as confirming those perceptions. A quickly implemented program, focused on helping young adult male recidivist offenders, most of whom were black, might well serve to reduce some of these tensions. Finally, key participants in the Impact planning, implementation and evaluation process, such as the RO coordinator, were well aware of the political realities in Cleveland, and believed that "the political pressures overrode any rational approach to the program." The CAT director, who was the pivotal actor in the day-to-day shaping of the Cleveland effort, as previously stated, saw himself functioning essentially as "a political director." Both men, therefore, responded to perceived "political realities" which, in their view, clearly superseded the acquisition of knowledge through evaluation.

With the exception of three projects (i.e., Pre-Trial Rehabilitation, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment and Computer Display Terminals), Cleveland's total Impact program was funded by October 1, 1973. Three months earlier, 31 of its 37 projects had been awarded funding, and at that time, the city could say it had "received the most funds - some \$14 million...." (116) Eventually, Impact project awards would amount to \$18,288,552 as Table VIII reflects. In addition, the SPA would receive a single Impact grant for \$70,000 and the CAT three planning and evaluation grants totalling \$1,455,300. This would bring the total funds awarded to Cleveland's Impact program up to \$19,810,852. The projects awarded funding are described below, broken out under their respective operating programs.

## 8.1 Cleveland Awards Funds to 37 Projects Under 5 Program Areas

### 8.1.1 The Addiction Treatment Operating Program

This program area consists of only one activity: the Cleveland Drug Abuse Program (CDAP) and is described in Section 4.4.1 of this document. CDAP's goal is to minimize the need for drug addicted individuals to commit Impact crimes by treating and rehabilitating

TABLE VIII  
CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM FUNDING HISTORY

OPERATING PROGRAM AND PROJECT	AWARD PERIOD	FY72	FY73	FY74	TOTAL AWARDED
ADDICTION TREATMENT PROGRAM CLEVELAND DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM	11/01/72-04/30/75	\$ 1,276,000			\$ 1,276,000
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM CVEP SUMMER RECREATION	03/15/73-05/14/75 08/15/72-09/30/73	150,000	926,061		1,076,061
DIVERSION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAM GROUP HOMES ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION YOUTH NEIGHBORHOOD COORDINATORS YOUTH OUTREACH INTERVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS POLICE ATHLETIC LEAGUE COMPREHENSIVE CORRECTIONS UNIT COMMUNITY BASED PROBATION POST-RELEASE FOLLOW-UP COMMUNITY BASED SUPPLEMENTAL SERVICE JUVENILE COURT DEVELOPMENT BIG BROTHERS BOYS CLUB YOUTH ASSISTANCE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TREATMENT PRE-TRIAL REHABILITATION PROJECT	02/15/73-12/31/74 02/15/73-06/30/74 02/15/73-01/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 02/15/73-01/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 02/15/73-03/31/75 07/01/73-05/30/75 10/01/73-03/31/75 10/01/73-12/31/74 10/01/73-11/30/74 05/15/74-03/14/75 04/01/74-03/31/75	223,644  315,256 117,211  306,529 739,989 208,049   21,789	132,290 205,710 306,000 553,596 151,150 67,133 422,369 160,939 178,268 85,144 86,000 102,908 324,525 13,039 101,893	520,000 71,541	5,414,972
DETERRENCE, DETECTION AND APPREHENSION PROGRAM CONCENTRATED CRIME PATROL UPGRADING NARCOTIC AND FELONY INVESTIGATIONS AUXILIARY POLICE POLICE OUTREACH CENTERS PUBLIC INFORMATION COMPUTER DISPLAY TERMINALS RESPONSE TIME REDUCTION IMPACT SECURITY IMPACT STREETLIGHTING IMPACT AWARENESS NEIGHBORHOOD PATROL	09/15/72-04/15/75 09/15/72-04/15/75 09/15/72-04/15/75 12/15/72-03/31/74 02/15/73-02/14/74 09/01/74-09/14/74 07/01/73-05/30/75 07/01/73-05/31/75 07/01/73-05/31/75 07/01/73-05/31/75 10/01/73-12/31/73	861,340 445,058 105,570 122,821 85,000 46,426	1,094,792 531,628 231,545 120,785	1,815,996 905,752 353,252	8,617,830
ADJUDICATION PROGRAM CORP COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE VISITING JUDGES PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION DIAGNOSTIC TREATMENT CENTER	03/15/73-03/14/75 03/15/73-12/31/74 03/15/73-12/31/74 03/15/73-05/31/75 03/15/73-08/31/74 03/15/73-03/14/74	324,000	347,938 182,484 116,240 411,213 58,314 9,020	92,007 54,070 308,403	1,903,689
TOTAL		\$ 5,348,682	\$ 8,818,849	\$ 4,121,021	\$18,288,552

(SOURCE: CLEVELAND REVISED MASTER PLAN, APRIL 1974.)

approximately 1000 drug addicted arrestees per year. CDAP received \$1,276,000 in LEAA funds.

### 8.1.2 The Employment Operating Program

Cleveland's employment operating program consists of the Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP), described in Section 4.4.2 of this document, and the Cleveland Summer Recreation Program. CVEP's overall program goal is to minimize the need for unemployed persons to commit impact crimes by providing vocational and educational training and employment for approximately 1800 high rise recidivists.

Summer Recreation, a project to enable city parks and swimming pools to remain open for use of city youth by retaining instructional and supervisory personnel at city facilities, was the first Cleveland activity to be funded under Impact.

### 8.1.3 The Diversion and Rehabilitation Operating Program

A total of 16 projects are subsumed under this operating program which was established by Cleveland Impact planners "to minimize the desire to commit crimes among key groups within the overall Impact target population." These projects are described below.

#### 8.1.3.1 Group Homes

This project provides youths alternatives to institutionalization by providing them with suitable home environments and assists in the reintegration of post-release youths into the accepted lifestyle of their communities. The project established four new group homes and upgraded two existing ones.

#### 8.1.3.2 Alternative Education (Street Academy)

This activity was directed at the potential and actual school dropout who has exhibited considerable difficulty in functioning within the traditional academic setting. Each student was allowed to continue his or her education in an informal environment where he or she could receive frequent counselling and individual instruction.

#### 8.1.3.3 Youth Neighborhood Coordinators

In Cleveland there are over 200 youth serving agencies. The city is divided into a number of neighborhoods based on a close community identification between citizens and agencies. These agencies have

their own philosophy, unique organization and administrative structures, modus operandi, target population, nature and capacity for service, funding and staff priorities. The immediate results of the individual project orientation described above are a lack of articulation in working relationship, duplication in the kind of services rendered, and a lack of proper identification of service gaps.

The Youth Neighborhood Coordinators project was proposed to promote a more systematic provision of services to 7450 high-risk potential Impact crime offenders.

#### 8.1.3.4 Youth Outreach

This program provided youths in trouble, ages 13-19, assistance in controlling delinquent behavior and in alleviating the causes of such behavior. This would be done by placing 35 outreach workers in six high-delinquency areas to function as counselors, advocates and resource brokers in their contacts with youth. Also a support, supervision and training mechanism would be established for these workers. The outreach worker would address the problems of youth by providing counselling to both youth and parents, advocacy service brokerage, and socialization activities. It was projected that by providing the above services to troubled youth the need, desire, and opportunity to commit Impact crime would be significantly reduced.

#### 8.1.3.5 Intervention and Developmental Centers

When high-risk, high-potential Impact youth offenders have unstructured, uncontrolled leisure time on their hands, the chances of their committing Impact crimes are decidedly increased.

This project offered such 12 to 17-year-old youths legitimate recreational activities in an effort to reduce their desire and need to commit Impact crime. This program expanded the hours of the 15 existing city recreational centers and opened an additional six centers in high-crime areas. A total of 95 recreational workers were hired to staff the 21 centers.

#### 8.1.3.6 Police Athletic League

The project's major goal was reducing the need and opportunity for youthful delinquent behavior by providing increased recreational opportunities during prime crime hours as vehicles for behavior modification and role-model influence. The Police Athletic League

increased its hours of operation, administrative and line staffing, and added youth leaders.

#### 8.1.3.7 Comprehensive Corrections Unit

This project improves the problem assessment capabilities and treatment modalities of the institution in order to improve the rehabilitation potential of institutional commitments, representing the "hard-core" recidivist. Functions:

1. Ingress (Intake) Unit - to develop a functional profile.
2. Egress Unit - to develop participant awareness and a degree of realistic readiness to address the problem.
3. Program Activity - to expand and design program activity based on the needs identified by the Ingress and Egress Units, i.e., drug, alcohol, educational and vocational.

In addition to regular commitments, the project offers the courts sentencing alternatives, which are rehabilitation-oriented to deal with those populations the courts feel require greater degrees of control than offered by probation.

#### 8.1.3.8 Community-Based Probation

This program's goal was to reduce recidivism among probationers and parolees who either committed stranger-to-stranger crimes or were identified as potential Impact crime offenders. It (1) established satellite offices in three neighborhoods in Cleveland where a larger number of probationers and parolees reside; (2) reduced the size of officer caseloads; and (3) assigned cases on the bases of the degree and type of need of the probationers and parolees, so that clients with difficult problems would be assigned to smaller caseloads. The program allowed officers to more intensively supervise probationers and parolees than formerly and increased the number of client and collateral contacts, made on behalf of these offenders.

#### 8.1.3.9 Post-Release Follow-up

The three components incorporated within this project all deal with an aspect of recidivism reduction which has seldom been addressed by project activity: the past offender being released from probation, parole, or directly from commitment. Traditionally, the potential

for recidivism increases after the individual is released from incarceration without the means for meeting his own basic needs. All three program activities require that the initial contact with identified offenders be made prior to release and that such contacts continue both as supportive service and adjustment counseling.

(1) Post-Institutional Release: Serving those participants being directly released from the Cleveland House of Corrections.

(2) Seven-Step Program - Post-Parolee: Serving parolees released from State penal institutions.

(3) Post-Release Probationer Program: Serving those probationers released from Common Pleas Probation with Impact offense records.

#### 8.1.3.10 Community-Based Supplemental Service

Successful reintegration of youthful Impact offenders into society was the central goal of this project. To achieve this objective, the project provided services to deal with the clients' internal conflicts as well as external obstacles faced by the clients. In addition, the project provided supplemental services beyond those provided by referral agencies (Juvenile, Municipal, and Common Pleas Courts, Ohio Youth Commission, Ohio Adult Parole Commission, and the Impact Post-Release Projects).

#### 8.1.3.11 Juvenile Court Development

This project provides the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court with a capability for improving Impact offender screening and referrals, the court processing of over 2100 cases per year and the case classification by service needs for 9000 delinquent "unruly" cases per year, of which 37 percent are Impact offenders.

#### 8.1.3.12 Juvenile Delinquency Treatment Project

This project identified first offenders and potential Impact offenders through juvenile court referrals from the southeastern area of Cleveland. To be implemented by the Catholic Counselling Center, the project treats all referred juveniles through intensive and group counselling.

#### 8.1.3.13 Pre-Trial Rehabilitation Project

This project supervises 250 individuals on release on their own recognizance (ROR) pending trial through (1) monitoring of each defendant's activities to assure that a minimum of 90% of the released group will appear for trial, (2) using project resources to provide needed medical, psychological, legal or other services to defendants, and (3) assisting the Common Pleas Court Probation Department in the preparation of pre-sentence reports for those members of the target population referred for such investigations.

#### 8.1.3.14 Big Brothers Project

This project and its activities are directed at reducing recidivism of 200 juvenile Impact offenders who are under jurisdiction of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, or who are near the point of release from legal sanction (either through release from juvenile court probation or from parole by the Ohio Youth Commission).

The project provides individual treatment for those post-adjudicated Impact offenders through the establishment of one-to-one relationships with big brothers/big sisters who are responsible members of the community.

#### 8.1.3.15 Cleveland Youth Assistance Program (CYAP)

The project aims to reduce recidivism rates of its clients through the provision of counseling and remedial education for them in nine Regional Planning Commission social planning areas. It addresses the needs of delinquent and potentially delinquent youths, between the ages of 11 and 19 years who are experiencing school-related problems such as truancy, scholastic failure, destructive behavior, etc. The fundamental hypothesis of this project is that if school-related problems of these youths are alleviated, a reduction in the incidence of delinquent activity can be expected.

#### 8.1.3.16 Boy's Club

The Boy's Club of Cleveland Post-Release Project serves 375 male youths between the ages of 15 and 19 who reside in the Mt. Pleasant, Corlett, North and South Broadway areas of the City of Cleveland (areas of Cleveland with large numbers of male juvenile Impact offenders). The target population are individuals who are either currently under the supervision of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court and the Ohio Youth Commission or who have been recently discharged from the Juvenile Court, the Ohio Youth Commission, or the Cleveland Boys School.

The Project provides outreach workers who function as role models, counselors, advocates, and resource brokers. In addition, the Boys' Club of Cleveland provides comprehensive evaluative and treatment services for project participants.

#### 8.1.4 The Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Operating Program

This program has as its overall goal minimizing the opportunity and maximizing the risk for offenders who commit Impact crimes. The approach is to prevent and deter criminal behavior by target hardening, to respond rapidly to citizen complaints, and to enable the apprehension of Impact offenders at or near the scene of their crimes. The 12 project activities, with combined LEAA funding in the amount of \$5,798,103, are described below.

##### 8.1.4.1 Concentrated Crime Patrol

This project provided an additional 120 officers and 18 patrol cars to 18 High Impact crime areas in the City of Cleveland. Their priority assignment was the deterrence of Impact crimes.

##### 8.1.4.2 Upgrading Narcotics-Related and Felony Investigative Procedures

This project provided an additional 60 detectives and 10 cars to upgrade the detection and apprehension capability in the 18 High Impact crime areas in Cleveland.

##### 8.1.4.3 Auxiliary Police Training

This project provided the equipment, uniforms and training for 1200 volunteer and unarmed citizens who patrolled the 18 High Impact crime areas in Cleveland and who supplemented the normal police patrols.

##### 8.1.4.4 Expansion and Upgrading of Cleveland Police Outreach Centers

This project sought to improve police-community relations in high crime areas by enlarging the number of police Outreach Centers from eight to sixteen. A full-time police officer is assigned to each Center to develop rapport with the citizenry, provide lay-legal advice, give advice to youths and recruit applicants for police examinations.

##### 8.1.4.5 Police Organization, Management and Operation Study

This project consisted of a study to be performed by an outside contractual agency to identify weaknesses and to formulate plans for improvement of the organization, management, operations and resources of the Cleveland Police Department. The project was to also involve Police Department personnel in the evaluation and planning process, through the Planning and Research Unit of the Cleveland Police Department.

##### 8.1.4.6 Patrol Allocation Study

The purpose of this activity was to develop techniques to obtain optimal allocation of existing and future resources (i.e., men and equipment) to maximize the probability of criminal apprehension.

##### 8.1.4.7 Public Information

This project was established to support the entire Impact program in Cleveland through implementing a Public Information Program. This program would supplement other Impact activities by working to make the Cleveland community both better informed and more cooperative in the attempt to reduce crime.

##### 8.1.4.8 Response Time Reduction Project

In an effort to increase apprehensions via a reduction in police response time to both emergency and non-emergency complaints, this project provided for the purchase of 100 computerized terminals for installation in police patrol cars.

##### 8.1.4.9 Impact Security Patrol

Implemented by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Association, this project supplemented the regular security forces of the Housing Authority. Nine guards were hired and trained to become private policemen. Although the project had numerous delays in implementation because of difficulties providing matching funds, it finally became operational in October 1974 for a six-month period.

##### 8.1.4.10 Street Lighting

This project sought to provide better streetlighting in selected East Side, Downtown and West Side high crime areas, and in the areas surrounding the 21 Intervention and Development Centers in the city, to reduce the number of Impact offenses committed in those areas. To this end, project plans included the purchase and installation of 850 mercury vapor floodlights, 500 mercury vapor streetlights and 600 light poles.

#### 8.1.4.11 Impact Awareness

This project involved the design and implementation of a city-wide mass media campaign to (1) acquaint the general public with the goals of Cleveland Impact, (2) acquaint the public with cost-effective counter measures to minimize their chances of being victimized and (3) outline simple, easy-to-implement crime prevention techniques of which citizens could avail themselves.

#### 8.1.4.12 Neighborhood Patrol

A three-month experiment in Cleveland, this project's goals were (1) to increase the number of patrol personnel available during the traditionally (in Cleveland) high crime months of October-December and (2) to supplement the activities of the Cleveland auxiliary police and the police outreach centers.

#### 8.1.5 The Adjudication Operating Program

The overall goal of this program is to maximize the risk for offenders who commit Impact crimes by reducing court delays and efficiently processing offenders into appropriate corrective programs. It contains two projects, the Pre-Trial and Post-Adjudication Delay Reduction Project and the Cleveland Offender Rehabilitation Project (CORP). The former project consists of five separate activities, and with CORP, comprises six project activities under two grant awards totalling \$1,155,209 in LEAA funds. The projects are described below.

##### 8.1.5.1 Court Offender Rehabilitation Project (CORP)

This project's overall goal is to reduce Impact crimes by returning productive citizens to the community, who have been placed in CORP by the court in lieu of adjudication. Rehabilitation of those individuals diverted from the criminal justice system and referred to CORP is being accomplished via the following services: Vocational/Educational Training; Job Development and Placement; Counseling; and any other service determined to be a need of the CORP participant.

##### 8.1.5.2 Pre-Trial Delay Component

The goal of this program is to move the Impact crime offender through the court system and into appropriate corrective programs by reducing delay, but with due regard for basic offender rights.

#### Activity I: Visiting Judges

This project created six additional courts in Cuyahoga County to hear Impact cases. It provided six judges assigned from less populated counties by the Ohio Supreme Court and also provided the necessary supportive court personnel such as bailiffs and deputy sheriffs.

#### Activity II: Prosecutor's Office

Nine attorneys were hired in this project and added to the staff of the County Prosecutor's Office. Each was assigned to the Impact courts.

#### Activity III: Counsel for Indigents

This project provided attorneys for arrestees charged with Impact crimes and who had no funds to engage private counsel.

#### 8.1.5.3 Post-Adjudication Delay Component

##### Activity I: Pre-sentence Investigation

This project provided the courts with pre-sentence investigation reports within a short period after adjudication to aid in the achievement of a median reduction of 25 days per case for individuals charged with Impact crimes, from initial booking to final disposition.

##### Activity II: Diagnostic Treatment Center

Working closely with the Common Pleas Probation Department, this project supplemented the case histories of the Probation Department with a more in-depth background report to be considered by the sentencing judge in meting out the final disposition.

#### 8.2 The Grant Award and Fund Flow Processes: Steps Toward Speedy Implementation


Table VIII on page 96 contains funding data for all projects described above except two activities under the Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Program. These two activities, Police Organization, Management and Operation Study and Patrol Allocation study, were cancellations and will be discussed under project aborts. What is extremely unique about the funding process in Cleveland, however,

is the RO coordinator's use of a mini-blocking procedure which allowed the CAT greater discretion in channeling funds into project activities. "I wanted to fund by program area and allow the CAT to move money between projects and extend grant periods", the RO coordinator would state later. This way "the CAT would manage projects and the RO [would manage programs] on the basis of management by exception within a certain framework."<sup>(117)</sup> Despite the supposed merits of such an arrangement, it seemed improper to the SPA coordinator who stated that as long as his agency remained "fiscally responsible for the Impact cities money, I would be extremely reluctant to fund the program on the basis of 5--6, \$1--2 million grants."<sup>(118)</sup> And, when the matter was presented to LEAA's then Administrator Donald E. Santarelli, in a request for approval to redelegate certain program authority to the CAT, it was turned down on legal grounds.

This was a disappointment to the RO coordinator but not one he proved entirely unable to circumvent. As it turned out, he retained those structural features of the plan he had proposed to the LEAA Administrator which did not involve the actual delegation of programmatic review authority. This meant that the city would forward a total program, comprised of a series of projects, to the RO for approval at any one time, thereby retaining the spirit of mini-blocking.

Forwarding Impact projects to the RO in clusters represented the final stage of the grant award process. Table IX illustrates that process in Cleveland. Perhaps its most unusual feature is the role of the first-level policy board, comprised of the RO and SPA coordinators and the CAT director. It performed three basic functions. First, by virtue of the organizational affiliations of its members, it guaranteed regular communication among and between the three levels of government. Second, it served as a mechanism for reviewing grant applications prior to formal submission to the City Council. This both identified

TABLE IX  
GRANT APPLICATION AND AWARD PROCESS FOR THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM



(Source: Cleveland Impact Cities Office, Cleveland, Ohio.)


problems and expedited their resolution. And third, the board again (by virtue of agency affiliations), was able to greatly speed up the time required for formal approval, award and project start-up. Initially, however, a grant application would be drafted by a host agency and then passed on by the Cleveland CAT and the mayor. If the mayor chose to exercise his right of veto, a project idea would be dead. Once a project was approved by the mayor, the first-level policy board would formally approve it and send it before the City Council. Although the Council agreed initially to give its blanket approval to the Impact program, it later renegotiated that decision with the CAT director, choosing "to approve each individual project."<sup>(119)</sup> Once City Council approval was achieved, a process which required the CAT to work closely with each City Council committee which maintained jurisdiction over a project, the grant application, clustered with others in its program area, went simultaneously to the RO for programmatic review and to the SPA for fiscal certification.

The fund flow process is described in Table X. Although this process turned out to have worked adequately well in Cleveland, some delay problems were encountered by the CAT. These are articulated in the following statement:

...Delays of up to ninety days in receiving the initial drawdown have been experienced by projects. The apparent reason for this lag is the lengthy processing time required by the SPA to process awards. Part of the reason for this lag may also relate to the fact that drawdown requests are processed by the SPA on an "as needed" basis rather than on a regular schedule... As a result, fiscal requests may be largely unanticipated and easily delayed.<sup>(120)</sup>

Despite the delay problems noted above, the Cleveland CAT managed to complete the cycle from grant planning to actual project start-up in a range of four to seven months, significantly better

TABLE X  
FUND FLOW PROCESS IN THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM



(Source: Cleveland Impact Cities Office, Cleveland, Ohio.)

than all other Impact cities except Dallas. This is verified by the following comment:

Cleveland projects...reflected a rapid implementation pace after grant application submission, 4.8 months. The bulk of this period, 3.3 months, was spent in grant application review, and the issuance of awards. Only 1.5 months were, on the average, needed by projects to begin their operations after award was received.

The average grant application for Cleveland projects was submitted 11.1 months into the program. Award was normally made at 14.4 months and start-up generally occurred 15.9 months into the program...Cleveland projects started providing services approximately 4.5 months ahead of the average date across cities.(121)

Cleveland awarded \$8,617,830 or 47 percent of the total amount of dollars expended to project activities to its Detection, Deterrence and Apprehension (police) program area. Commenting on Cleveland's strong police component, the preliminary MITRE analysis of Impact implementation states the following:

Cleveland has...funded a program relying primarily upon police strategies for addressing the Impact crime reduction goal. It is noteworthy that this funding arrangement differs from the fiscal distribution anticipated in the master plan....Police projects now occupy a higher percentage priority than originally planned....(122)

To its Diversion and Rehabilitation (juvenile and adult corrections) program, Cleveland allocated \$5,414,972 or 29 percent of all LEAA Impact funds awarded to projects. Another \$1,903,689, representing 11 per cent of LEAA funds, was awarded to the Adjudication (courts) program. The remaining 13 percent was almost equally divided between the Addiction (drug) program, which received \$1,276,000 or 7 per cent funds, and the Employment program, which received \$1,076,061 or 6 percent of the total funds allocated.

#### 9.0 PROJECT MONITORING: A LOOK AT THE OPERATIONAL PHASE OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM

Project monitoring enjoyed a very high priority in Cleveland. Through this process, the CAT was able to identify areas of weakness early in the life of certain projects, and where possible, such projects were aided to make adjustments so as to meet their stated performance objectives. In other cases, however, projects proved to be unsalvageable, and the decision was made to either abort or terminate the particular project under scrutiny. This total process, while involving project-level evaluations, worked mainly because of the very close contact the Cleveland monitoring staff maintained with projects. The former deputy CAT director recalls that period thusly:

We were very much concerned about the performance of the projects and we identified some projects which, in effect, hadn't been doing the things we had expected them to do... We tried---we worked with everyone of our projects--we, in a sense, held their hands--we spent umpteen hours going through what we expected from a grant application--we helped in the negotiations to get activities implemented. If there was a barrier some place, we assisted in getting cooperative efforts with other Impact projects. We did not abort projects or attempt to abort projects without giving them a full opportunity to get underway.(123)

Interestingly, 75 per cent of all aborted Impact projects (N=12) occurred in Cleveland. Table XI is a list of all eight Cleveland aborts and is based on data supplied by the Region V Chicago office. In the case of the two police projects cited, the management study was never implemented and the patrol allocation implementation depended upon that of the management study. Four of the six other project aborts are said to have "requested an early termination because they were unable to meet the goals and objectives" stated in their grant applications. The two remaining projects in the sample of eight are listed by the RO as having been terminated by the Impact staff.

TABLE XI  
PROJECT ABORTS IN CLEVELAND

PROJECT TITLE	DATE OF CANCELLATION	REASONS FOR CANCELLATION
Police Organization, Management and Operation Study	September, 1974	Never implemented with Impact funds. Later picked up with block grant funding.
Patrol Allocation Study	Never Implemented	Dependent on the completion of the Police Organization, Management, and Operation Study and consequently, the Patrol Allocation Study was never implemented.
Center for Human Services	November, 1974	Insufficient number of clients because referrals were from 2 unimplemented group home projects and 1 partially implemented group home project.
Juvenile Court Component - Group Homes	November, 1974	Same as above.
Institutional Post Release Project	March, 1974	Personnel turnover, untrained staff, and a lack of meaningful employment opportunities led to project termination.
Comprehensive Corrections Unit--Phase II	August, 1974	The building where treatment services were to be provided was in need of renovation.
Diagnostic and Treatment Component of Pre-Trial Delay	March, 1974	Insufficient number of clients and personnel turnover led to project termination.
Big Brothers Post Release Project	December, 1974	Inability to attract volunteers to work with project clients.

(Source: Region V Office of the LEAA, Des Plaines, Illinois.)

The Cleveland monitoring process can be best demonstrated by looking at an example of the steps taken in the life of a project, Community-based Probation.

9.1 Monitoring of the Community-Based Probation Project

This project is a probation/parole rehabilitative effort in which three separate agencies (i.e., the Adult Parole Authority of the State of Ohio, the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Probation Department and the Cleveland Municipal Court Probation Department) were brought together in common satellite or community-based offices and were intended to work together in providing client-oriented services.

Upon award of this grant (February 15, 1973), the monitor scheduled an initial orientation meeting with all project directors and key members of the client-serving staff. This is merely an overview, get-acquainted meeting.

The following week the monitor again met with the three project directors to further "define and outline the objectives and goals, methods and [expected] results" as stipulated in the grant. What follows is a greatly shortened version of the month-by-month monitoring support to this three-activity project over the first year of project life written by the Cleveland CAT's monitoring director.

February - March 1973

- Held meeting with project directors to discuss project milestones.
- Held meeting to discuss project facilities and geographic location of same.
- Participated in discussions relative to staffing of the three activities.
- Held meeting to discuss personnel training based on grant activities.

April 1973

- Assisted in facilities leasing process.
- Reviewed qualifications of all client counselors to be hired and orientation training being provided.
- Held coordination meeting with project directors and key personnel of CDAP and CVEP to increase rapport among and between agencies.

May - June 1973

- Reviewed all Performance Status Reports (PSR) and Data Collection Instruments (DCIs) with projects as these were being developed.

July 1973

- Because of numerous difficulties (e.g., strong community resistance to site) encountered in getting the third satellite facility operational, a large block of time was spent in meetings with community people and the ward councilmen to get location okayed.

August 1973

- Reviewed all program activities with project directors. These meetings included discussions of the data base required as a part of grant activity and a review of PSRs, based on discrepancies noted by the monitor.

September - October 1973

- All finalized DCIs were reviewed.

November 1973

- All PSRs and DCIs were again reviewed in four meetings held with supervisors and project directors.
- Reviewed all data required for evaluation of grant activities. This became necessary because all project activities were having great difficulty responding to the data requirements the CAT had levied upon them.

December 1973

- Several meetings held with project staff to clarify, modify and sometimes completely restructure the PSRs and DCIs.

Summarizing the project's first year, the Cleveland CAT's monitoring director has since stated the following:

In conclusion, during the year 1973, the project encountered a great deal of difficulty. Treatment services and the goals and objectives defined in the grant were not addressed in their full complement until September 1973. Prior to that month, the project had spent a great deal of time in establishing and developing and implementing the program with respect to the grant application. A great many obstacles were encountered in obtaining facilities and in providing the intensified services as required by the grant. In addition, the project did not implement the data base and the classification system until the latter part of December, 1973....As seen from the monthly monitoring activities, the project encountered a great deal of difficulty in responding to the Performance Status Report as well as the Data Collection Instrument. This consumed a great deal of the monitor's time in meeting with personnel, supervisors and project directors and defining, explaining and correcting data received in this office.

Realizing the many constraints and problems that the Cleveland Community-Based Probation Project encountered during the year 1973, the monitor was instructed to provide intensive supervision to this project, as well as assisting and working closely with the supervisors in order to adequately implement the objectives and goals stated in the grant.(124)

The frequency of monitoring contacts with this project, as with all activities of the Cleveland Impact program, would continue at a very high rate well into calendar year 1975 when many Impact efforts would be closing out their services. Clearly, the monitoring procedures implemented by the Cleveland Impact program brought something entirely new to that city: an established capability to maintain programmatic and fiscal accountability. According to the Chicago RO, such procedures "were the foundation for the Cleveland Impact program" in

that they served as a catalyst for "project management at the designated governmental or community implementing agency level."<sup>(125)</sup>

As 1973 drew to its close, virtually all of the Cleveland program was operational. FBI statistics indicated that serious crime in Cleveland had been significantly reduced and the Chicago RA could report that the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals had referred to the Cleveland master plan as "one of the best plans developed by American cities."<sup>(126)</sup> Despite these achievements, the Chicago RA expressed some concern as to the future direction of the Cleveland program. He wrote:

First, this office has received no evaluation reports to date. Some deliverables, such as the Revised Master Plan...have not been received according to schedule. Second, many key officials in the LEAA Washington office are totally unaware of the future plans and successful progress of the Cleveland Impact program.

In concluding, he requested of Cleveland two things: (1) timely deliverables (in particular, evaluation reports and the revised master plan) and (2) increased visibility of the program in Washington "to insure continued funding support."<sup>(127)</sup>

#### 10.0 CLEVELAND EVALUATES ALL 5 PROGRAM AREAS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY REVISES ITS MASTER PLAN BY APRIL 1974

When I came to Cleveland in July 1973, most of the programs were already approved and implemented. Some very preliminary evaluation plans were also approved but there was very little actual data collection going on....Probably, data collection didn't begin in earnest till the end of summer.

By the end of the year, and in the first part of 1974, we had the evaluation data collected and the evaluations done on anywhere from 3 to 6 to 9 months--whatever [data] were available on each of the different projects.

It was our task to collect the data and to evaluate it. And we found that there were a fair amount of problems in that the different host agencies were not used to collecting the kind of data to be used for evaluation--they didn't know how to record the data and they didn't take it seriously....

As far as the Impact planning staff was concerned, they recognized that evaluation was important but they didn't take any real responsibility for it other than saying that it was our task to get it going....The planning staff, in general, was not concerned with the details of the evaluation....<sup>(128)</sup>

The comments quoted above were made, by a former member of the Cleveland technical evaluation contractor, in an interview taped during the summer of 1975. They are being interposed here, at the outset of the discussion of Cleveland's evaluation reports, to provide a context for better understanding the series of events which occurred both prior to and following the release of those reports by Cleveland. At least four points from the aforesaid quote seem noteworthy. First, although "some very preliminary evaluation plans" were approved, there was "very little actual data collection going on" in Cleveland prior to the end of summer 1973. Second, the evaluation contractor, by the end of the first quarter of 1974, supervised the collection of virtually all data used in writing Cleveland's first series of evaluation reports. Third,

the evaluation contractors encountered "a fair amount of problems" with host agencies either not knowing "how to record data" or not approaching the data collection task in a serious manner. And finally, the Impact planning staff, although recognizing the importance of evaluation, failed to take any responsibility for it themselves, other than to view evaluation as falling within the purview of its contractor.

On March 21, 1974, the CAT director wrote an Impact progress report to the Chicago RA stating that by April 1, the Regional Office would be in receipt of "evaluations for all 5 of the Cleveland Impact Operating Programs" and the "master plan revision".<sup>(129)</sup> Thus Cleveland, having never developed a data base, had, over a relatively short span of nine months (July 1973-March 1974), designed data collection instruments, interfaced with project data collectors, supervised actual data collection, performed analyses and written evaluation reports for ten project/activities, covering all five program areas. And, in addition to this rather large evaluation effort, the CAT also produced, during this time period, its revised master plan.

#### 10.1 The Contents of the Revised Master Plan

The revised master plan contained 171 pages and was divided into five sections. Section I, Summary, beyond presenting an update of crime statistics for the city of Cleveland, was a repetition of information to be found in earlier Cleveland planning and evaluation documents. Section II, Impact Crime in Cleveland Today, presented a citywide statistical profile of Impact crime and a discussion of Impact offenders based upon data collected as part of Cleveland's proposed Impact planning and evaluation system. Section III, Evaluation Approach and Performance Results, besides explaining the analysis techniques used by Cleveland evaluators, presented the performance analyses for the five operating programs up to January 1974. Section IV, Analysis of Needs, contained the justifications for those projects and programs for which

Cleveland planners desired continuation funding and Section V, Analysis of Budgets, described the programs funding history, current allocation of funds and expected funding requirements.

Of the five Cleveland operating programs, the revised master plan reported that the performance results of the drug and employment programs were the most disappointing. These comparatively poor results were attributed to the receipt of fewer than the expected number of clients by both projects. The plan found the diversion and rehabilitation program to have "reported an impressive level of activity" although data were not yet sufficient to pin down concretely the program's success. "Successful minimization of the desire to commit Impact crimes," the revised plan stated, "means comparisons between baseline recidivism counts and project-specific, client-specific recidivism counts supported by follow-up studies. The results are still too preliminary and in too aggregate a form to permit this kind of analysis."<sup>(130)</sup> The police program was treated by the plan as having been particularly successful with two of its activities having "undoubtedly contributed significantly to the 13 percent reduction in Impact crime in Cleveland between 1972 and 1973." The final program area, courts, was declared to be "functioning effectively".<sup>(131)</sup>

In sum, the revised master plan was repetitious in parts, and self-congratulatory in tone, though perhaps not excessively so. After all, the 13 percent reported reduction in Impact crimes between 1972 and 1973 was a dramatic achievement. The revised master plan, however, did not contain the data needed to validate this figure. It would require an examination of the evaluation reports for Cleveland's operating programs to determine on just how solid a base lay this figure as well as other achievements reported by Cleveland.

10.2 Twenty-One Cleveland Evaluation Reports Are Reviewed by the National Institute

The Cleveland evaluation reports submitted to the National Institute during April 1974 were for four projects under the Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension (DDA) program; three projects under the Adjudication Operating program; and one project for each of the three remaining areas: Vocational/Educational, Diversion/Rehabilitation and Addiction Operating programs. The Institute, through its National Level Evaluation contractor, provided Cleveland's CAT with technical reviews of the ten evaluations contained in that first set of reports. During May 1974, Cleveland was to submit evaluation reports for eleven additional projects under the rubric Diversion/Rehabilitation Operating program. These reports were also reviewed by the Institute, through a member of the National Impact Advisory Group. Both sets of reviews, covering a total of 21 project-level evaluations, found similar problems with Cleveland's evaluation reports.

10.2.1 The National Institute Reviews the Initial Package of Ten Project-level Evaluations

Table XII lists the objectives and methods for the four projects of the DDA program contained in the initial package of Cleveland evaluation reports. Although the evaluation report indicated that there was a linkage between DDA projects and reported crime reductions, the National Level Evaluation reviewers found that such linkages were not substantiated by the data used in the analysis since "long term crime data" were needed "to validly attribute 1973 crime reductions to DDA projects."

Commenting specifically on the 13 percent reduction which the Cleveland evaluation report was attempting to attribute to DDA projects, the reviewers stated the following:

TABLE XII  
DETERRENCE, DETECTION, AND APPREHENSION  
OPERATING PROGRAM OVERVIEW

PROJECT GRANT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	METHODS
Concentrated Crime Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease IMPACT street crime</li> <li>• Increase apprehensions</li> <li>• Increase clearances</li> <li>• Decrease response time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer 120 experienced patrolmen to CCP</li> <li>• Recruit 120 new patrolmen for regular patrol</li> <li>• 18 patrol zones cars on two eight-hour shifts on East side</li> <li>• High priority to IMPACT crimes</li> <li>• Encourage investigative follow-up</li> <li>• Redeploy Tactical Unit to West Side</li> </ul>
Felony and Narcotic Investigative Units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decrease IMPACT Crimes</li> <li>• Increase clearances</li> <li>• Decrease drug-related crimes</li> <li>• Increase investigative efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer 60 experienced patrolmen to reach 1200</li> <li>• Recruit 60 new patrolmen to replace the transferred manpower</li> </ul>
Auxiliary Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relieve regular police</li> <li>• Reduce crime</li> <li>• Report crimes and potential crimes</li> <li>• Improve community relations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acquire enough new volunteers to reach 1200</li> <li>• Train volunteers</li> <li>• Purchase special uniforms</li> <li>• Patrol in own neighborhoods at own discretion</li> <li>• Establish 10 new centers of operation</li> </ul>
Police Outreach Center	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Offer lay-legal advice</li> <li>• Offer advice to youth</li> <li>• Recruit police exam applicants</li> <li>• Establish rapport with community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish nine new centers of operation</li> <li>• Staff with trained police officers</li> <li>• Offer space to other agencies</li> <li>• Offer solicited advice to any citizen or police officer</li> </ul>

(Source: Cleveland Impact Cities Program, Deterrence, Detection, and Apprehension Operating Program Evaluation Report, March 1974, p. S-2.)

The report attributes a 13% decrease in city-wide Impact crime levels to the DDA projects. However, the real impact of the DDA projects on target crimes is not directly addressed in the Cleveland report and, therefore, is open to question.

The report points out that in 1972, one year prior to the Impact Program, there was an 8% decrease in Impact crime. The 13% decrease reported for 1973 may be an extension, at least in part, of a downward crime trend which began in 1972 rather than an effect of the DDA projects. (132)

Interestingly, this very point had been mentioned to the CAT staff by a member of the evaluation contractor's team as the following statement will attest:

I definitely observed a decrease in the Impact crimes....This decrease, however, had started prior to the implementation of any of these programs and in my evaluation I wanted to make a note of that. I did in my draft reports note that the trend was already there but the planning staff...wanted to argue that maybe the very fact that you are announcing a program would have an effect but there was really no evidence of that....We also found in our evaluations other problems such as different projects going on in the same area....Such problems made it very difficult to attribute success to anything. (133)

The foregoing statement indicates that the Cleveland CAT was aware of the problems pointed out in the National-level review. However, no mention was made of them in Cleveland evaluations nor were these evaluation issues addressed in Cleveland's reports.

Turning next to Cleveland's Adjudication Operating program, comprised of three components (i.e., Pre-Trial Delay Reduction, Post-Adjudication Delay Reduction, and Offender Rehabilitation) the National-level reviewers found that the Pre-Trial Delay Reduction evaluation report provided "a good historical picture of court operations" as well as "a breakdown of the court processing times for each type of Impact

offense", allowing a commenter to obtain a sense of "the composite picture of effects". (134) There were, however, three major evaluative problems which they believed worthy of mention. First, the lack of information on the subset of cases selected for analysis precluded acceptance of results as representative of the court system as a whole. Second, the report did not allow for the attribution of observed outcome results to the activities of individual projects. And finally, a large amount of data collected for evaluative purposes was not utilized in the evaluation analysis.

The second activity in the Adjudication Operating program area to be reviewed was the Post-Adjudication Delay Reduction component which sought to reduce processing time for defendants appearing in the Common Pleas Court via two activities: Presentence Investigation (PSI) and Diagnostic Treatment Profiles.

After describing the basic objectives of the PSI component, the reviewers stated the evaluation report's claim of a reduction in the delay between conviction and sentencing during the last six months of 1973. They found, though, that the report failed to indicate what the average time between conviction and sentencing was prior to project implementation, making it "impossible to evaluate the project's effectiveness."

The National-level reviewers found the evaluation of the third activity, Offender Rehabilitation Project, to be particularly problematic since data on client screening criteria and data on what basis clients may receive favorable recommendation for dismissal of charges, were not provided. And, although the evaluation report stated that data on the education and employment of former clients were being collected, these data sources were not used in the evaluation. "In short," the reviewers concluded, "there is insufficient information

available in the document to substantiate the claim of success for the project."<sup>(135)</sup>

The evaluation of the Cleveland Vocational/Educational Program (CVEP) stated that performance data were incomplete and project-provided documentation was of questionable reliability since precise records on client services and administrative staff activities were not always available.

Since no extensive analysis was conducted, the reviewers looked at CVEP with two general questions in mind. First, would the evaluation approach outlined in the report have provided the range of information needed to assess CVEP's effectiveness had the data been available? This question was based on the assumption that a more detailed and in-depth analysis would be conducted once client data were available. Second, did the evaluation report provide the type of information needed for program improvement?<sup>(136)</sup>

Additionally, three questions, more specific to the evaluation itself, were used to guide the reviewers' assessment of CVEP's evaluation approach. First, what information regarding the program's objectives was presented in the report? Second, what information did the report say it would provide? And third, were discrepancies between the type of information proposed and provided apparently a consequence of a lack of data?

In general, the reviewers cited unavailable data due to major management and operational problems as a major cause of analysis shortcomings. Similarly, the lack of recidivism data seemed linked to poor record-keeping procedures during the initial phase of the project.

However, the CVEP evaluation approach had "the potential to provide useful information for decision-makers." To provide this information, major problems delineated in the report would have to be resolved. This would necessitate "not only a re-organization of the management and implementation structure, but a clear conceptualization of the type of information and analysis needed to assess project outcomes."

The reviewers saw the CVEP evaluation as a "good example of the use of evaluative information for problem identification." And while there were no outcome results available in the report, the evaluation could, nevertheless, function "effectively as a management tool, delineating the important areas for project improvement."<sup>(137)</sup>

Only one evaluation report for the Diversion/Rehabilitation program area was submitted to the National Institute in April 1974. This project, Alternative Education or Street Academy (SA), was evaluated for activities implemented during its first operational phase, January 1 - September 1973, and in terms of a series of effectiveness and efficiency measures. As Cleveland's evaluators operationally define the terms, effectiveness measures basically assess the results of a project in terms of how much of the expected objective was obtained, and efficiency measures, aimed at assessing how well resources were utilized, are based on the assumption that if more than the expected number of clients achieved the specific objective, then project funds must have been used more efficiently.

Using the aforesaid definitions, the Cleveland evaluation presented percent change figures for those objectives which were said to be quantified. These figures were to indicate "by what percent the effectiveness or efficiency of the project is over or under the expected figure for these measures." This method of analysis, using

percent change figures, the reviewers found to be "inadequate in the absence of additional information." (138)

The reviewers found the SA evaluation to be "problematic both in terms of the analysis approach and the type of information addressed." In addition to the problem they had cited earlier in their review with respect to the "emphasis on percent change figures" they also noted that "key activities and expected outcomes" had not been "converted into criteria amenable to quantification and detailed analysis." (139)

CDAP, the city's attempt to implement the Treatment Alternative to Street Crime (TASC) concept, was evaluated for the time period of November 1972 through December 1973. CDAP had seven first-year objectives, one (i.e., reduce client recidivism) being client outcome focused, and the remaining six being focused on program activities and operations.

"This emphasis on activity measures," the reviewers noted, "is understandable" since "data needed to assess project outcomes are generally unavailable or meaningless for short term evaluations." What was really germane, however, was for the Cleveland staff to make a serious effort "to insure the collection and analysis of outcome data for subsequent evaluations." (140)

#### 10.2.2 The Cleveland CAT Replies To The Technical Review Of Its First Set Evaluation Reports

On July 22, 1974, approximately six weeks after having received the National Level Evaluation contractor's technical reviews of its evaluation reports, the Cleveland CAT director forwarded an 18-page response to the Chicago RO. Divided into six sections, the memorandum addressed "a number of relevant background considerations" and the five areas of substantive comment based on the five program areas evaluated. Critical to an understanding of this response, is an admission made

early-on in the first section that the Cleveland Impact staff had from the inception of the program, "grappled" with (1) "the absence of a comprehensive criminal justice data base to support planning, monitoring and evaluation functions" and (2) the "necessary strictures of security and privacy." Later, in this same section, the statement is made that "no Impact funding was to be committed to the development and implementation of criminal justice data bases per se", according to Cleveland's understanding of Impact guidelines. And, as to Cleveland's in-house attempts to implement what it terms a "substitute system" the Impact staff "encountered unanticipated and serious information gaps or incommensurability problems". "Where these difficulties arose, "the CAT director stated, "the planning and evaluation staff attempted to develop alternative means to recapture the required data for evaluation." "These attempts" he stated further "were not always successful, particularly where baseline data were concerned."

Turning to the area of security and privacy, he made the following statement:

The extent of the impact of security and privacy strictures upon the activities of the planning and evaluation staff did not become fully apparent until the closing months of 1973. During November of last year, the staff began work on a security and privacy plan in order to (1) meet the legal restrictions of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, as they applied to the Cleveland Drug Abuse Program evaluation, (2) meet the legal restrictions imbedded in federal and Ohio legislation governing confidentiality of criminal history records for both adults and juveniles, (3) effectuate assurances of the confidentiality of client-specific data to the various projects, and (4) answer questions and resolve issues raised by the Cleveland Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.

The publication of the Impact Security and Privacy Plan in December 1973, while satisfying applicable federal and state legal requirements, the legitimate confidentiality concerns of individual projects, and the ACLU, did not resolve all of the data collection and data availability issues associated with baseline and operational data requirements for evaluation. (141)

The body of the memorandum contained large amounts of information which were not provided in the evaluation reports themselves, and therefore, this lack of detailed information did appear to have precipitated many of the comments made by the reviewers of Cleveland's evaluation reports. Despite this additional information, a basic problem which plagued the Cleveland evaluation effort still remained. The Impact staff had begun the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation cycle without an adequate data base to perform crime-specific analysis, and in it's great hurry to implement a program, was required to gather data in an ex post facto manner. Further, Cleveland planners apparently felt constrained by Impact guidelines from developing a "criminal justice data base per se." Consequently, it would seem that the major issue was whether or not Cleveland, after having devoted nearly two full years and most of its resources to program implementation, could be expected to do quality evaluation reports. Since the COPIE cycle has at its foundation basic data analysis, with the evaluative process a phased activity occurring throughout the life of the cycle, it would be difficult, at best, for Cleveland to perform good evaluation after so late a start. Dissatisfied with the Cleveland response, the National Institute remained keenly interested in the Cleveland evaluation effort. A meeting was scheduled in Cleveland for August 8 to discuss the evaluation situation in Cleveland, and to promote better communication on the subject between the Impact staff and the Institute and its National Level Evaluation contractor.

#### 10.2.3 The National Institute Reviews Eleven Additional Project-Level Evaluations Under Cleveland's Diversion/Rehabilitation Program

At the request of the National Level Evaluation program manager, Gordon Misner, University of Missouri professor and a member of the National Impact Advisory Group, reviewed eleven project-level evaluation reports for Cleveland's Diversion/Rehabilitation program.

These reports were submitted to the Institute by Cleveland during May 1974. Dr. Misner had received them at a briefing of the National Impact Advisory Group held at LEAA headquarters in June 1974. On August 4, 1974, just three days before the Institute was scheduled to meet with the Cleveland team, he had forwarded his review of the eleven evaluation reports to LEAA headquarters. The review, in addition to critiquing all eleven projects, provided an overview section which addressed problems and issues common to all the reports. Of the six categories of common problems, the comments relative to baseline data, data instruments and evaluation timing seemed particularly noteworthy.

In the introduction to all eleven evaluation reports, Cleveland stated that no baseline data were available prior to the implementation of the program, and therefore, no rigorous evaluations could be conducted to determine program effectiveness. What they could do, Cleveland evaluators claimed, was simply to assess whether projects had made any progress toward meeting their stated objectives. Their rejection of a more rigorous evaluation design, then, was based on two assumptions: (1) lack of baseline data and (2) the lack of useful analysis strategies, other than "before - after" comparisons. In finding both assumptions incorrect, the reviewer stated the following:

With adequate investment of time, effort, and funds, a much more substantial evaluation could be conducted. Short of insisting on perfect or ideal types of criminal justice data, one can insist that there are some useful data available. The availability and nature of services provided to offenders by the grantee agencies prior to the program implementation should have been available. Schools must have at least some dropout records, truancy records, etc. Courts and correctional institutions maintain some data on offenders; that should be available. Even more important, control groups could have been developed simultaneously with the project implementation. That is, one does not have to get "before" and "after" data on the population that is to be serviced by the projects, as the evaluators imply. (142)

The Misner review also found the data collection instruments designed by Cleveland to have serious limitations in that they failed to determine either "the quality of services" or "the actual impact of these services in long-term adjustments." Continuing, he stated:

The data collection instruments are geared to produce information only on the population that the individual projects service. Considering the amount of funds invested in these projects, some funds should be allocated for the collection of data on individuals not serviced. Implementation of this alternative would produce better evaluation products and eventually be a better investment of LEAA funds.(143)

Finally, he would address the important area of evaluation time frame, i.e., the shortness of the time span projects being evaluated had been implemented, saying:

Most of the eleven projects experienced difficulties in hiring staff, in establishing facilities, and in getting the project started. For this reason, some operated only for a 6-9 months time period. The impact of projects cannot be properly assessed in such short project life terms. In fact, the most crucial questions are not suitable for evaluation for a period of 2-3 years. Social adjustments, recidivism, etc. cannot be judged adequately in a 6-9 months period. Although the evaluators were generally cautious in avoiding success "claims" without proper justifications, there are some exceptions and consequently, there are some false claims.(144)

### 10.3 The National Institute Visits Cleveland

The day long meeting held with the Cleveland CAT on August 8, 1974 was attended by representatives from the Institute, its National Level Evaluation contractor, the Office of Regional Operations (ORO) and the Chicago RO. The discussions focused on data needs and problems with Cleveland's analysis-strategy. In reference to evaluation reports, it was made clear that explanatory material should be included in the reports themselves since the audience for the documents may include, in addition to the LEAA, other planners and evaluators. The Institute's National Level Evaluation contractor suggested a format

for evaluation documents which Cleveland planners agreed to incorporate into future reports generated by their staff.

All attendees found the meeting to be both worthwhile and constructive. Upon returning to LEAA headquarters, ORO's special program planner would write the following communique to his immediate superior:

On August 8, 1974, I attended a meeting of [the] Cleveland Impact Program...to discuss...Cleveland's progress to date in evaluation. Our concerns regarding certain data collection, methodological, and analysis deficiencies with respect to individual program evaluations were largely mitigated by a careful and detailed description of problems encountered by the CAT in past efforts. The recognition of existing difficulties, and subsequent plans and strategies which were presented by the evaluators to improve future products, was welcome and encouraging.

Substantial effort was devoted toward developing a format for evaluation reporting that would bridge the gap between the evaluator, with his knowledge of what was possible and what was not, and the researcher or outside reader, who without this knowledge, might question or misunderstand the application of particular methodologies or the development of certain conclusions based on apparently incomplete analysis...

"I retain my earlier concern," he concluded, "over the dominance of contractors in the...evaluation of the Cleveland program; it appears to be their complete province."(145)

Eventually, Cleveland would complete evaluation reports for most of the activities funded under five operating programs. In fact, as of April 15, 1975, Cleveland had produced forty-seven evaluation reports on thirty-two different projects. As Table XIII reflects, Cleveland has produced nearly one and one-half times as many reports as Denver, the next city in terms of quantity of evaluation

TABLE XIII

IMPACT CITY-GENERATED PROJECT-LEVEL EVALUATION REPORTS  
AS OF APRIL 1975

CITY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS WITH REPORTS	NUMBER OF REPORTS
Atlanta	9	19
Baltimore	23	24
Cleveland	32	47
Dallas	13	18
Denver	16	31
Newark	11	12
Portland	2	4
St. Louis	24	30
TOTALS	130	185

(Source: Impact City Crime Analysis Teams)

reports. Despite the large number of evaluations completed by the Cleveland team, the problems referred to by reviewers of Cleveland's evaluation documents would remain unresolved, and the reports would continue to be plagued by a variety of data- and design-related problems. Data would continue to be presented in the aggregate rather than in a client-specific form, and in particular, baseline data would continue to be virtually non-existent. Without such data, it remained an extremely arduous task to assess project effectiveness or to reach informed judgments relative to how successful a given project had been in meeting its stated objectives.

#### 11.0 THE NEW CLEVELAND GAME PLAN: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CAT FUNCTION

As 1974 ended, Cleveland had expended 88 percent of its Impact project-level funds. The city was also fully aware that LEAA support to its Crime Analysis Team was due to end on June 30, 1975. Consequently, the Impact staff drafted a plan to institutionalize the CAT into the city government. The 18-page report, after describing Impact's background and program structure in Cleveland, addressed the issue of interagency coordination and its failure under Impact. Under the Crime Analysis Team accomplishments, the report cited project-level evaluations and successful attempts to communicate and maintain a dialogue with all agencies of the Cleveland criminal justice system as well as with other agencies of the local government. Significantly, the Impact staff had been successful in getting a number of its project activities institutionalized. These efforts are cited below.

##### 11.1 Cleveland Projects Are Institutionalized

Through the local regional planning unit, three Impact projects were funded for calendar year 1975: (1) the Augustine Society Group Home at \$25,216, (2) the Adult-Parole Post-Release Project at \$100,000, and the High-Intensive Probation Supervision Project (derived from the Community-Based Probation Project) at \$175,000.

Cuyahoga County absorbed most of the personnel associated with the Visiting Judges, Counsel for the Indigent and Prosecutor's Office Projects in its court budget for 1975.

The City of Cleveland Human Resources and Economic Development Department's manpower program took over funding of the Street Academy for 1975.

The Cuyahoga County Adult Probation Department incorporated into its regular operations the staff of the Presentence Investigation Project.

##### 11.2 Specific CAT Functions are Recommended for Institutionalization

The plan next recommended that the Impact staff be placed within the City's Office of Budget and Management because that office already maintained responsibility for, in addition to the city's budget, the coordination of federal grants and the operation of the City's data processing unit. The new group would be called Crime Analysis Office (CAO) and is described generally in the excerpt from the plan that is cited below:

An institutionalized Crime Analysis Office within the Office of Budget and Management would allow the city to coordinate its programmatic efforts directed at crime reduction, and would provide those city agencies, dealing with criminal justice activities, with the professional support necessary to plan and manage their resources....The office would provide a focal point in assisting other city departments in coordinating their programmatic efforts and in enhancing their planning and administrative effectiveness. (146)

CAO's specific functions would include the following:

- (a) The collection of crime and system data;
- (b) The analysis of these data;
- (c) The identification of priorities;
- (d) The determination of means to address the problem;
- (e) The allocation of resources to prioritize needs; and
- (f) The assessment of results of this effort.

Additionally, it would provide assistance in project management and evaluation and coordinate the efforts of all city agencies involved in criminal justice system activities.

The plan called for a minimum of five professional staff level positions and the institutionalization of all outlined functions into the Office of Budget and Management as of July 1, 1975 through December 31, 1976 with federal funding requested on a 90 percent LEAA/10% Grantee hard match basis.

### 11.3 The Chicago Regional Office Replies to Cleveland's Institutionalization Plan

The institutionalization plan was hand delivered to the Chicago RO on December 26, 1974 by a member of the Cleveland Impact staff. On January 14, 1975, the acting regional administrator wrote the CAT director the following response.

While we find that the general concepts contained in the plan up to paragraph F are acceptable, we must reject the remainder -and hence the plan as a whole- as being irrelevant to meeting the special condition on your grant...

Therefore, ... you must address the following issues:

1. What has already been done toward institutionalizing Impact concepts?
2. References to future funding for the Crime Analysis Team (CAT) should be deleted from the institutionalization plan since it is not the purpose of the special condition.
3. Reference should be made to how city funds will be used to fund projects selected for continuation.

RO V has at your request provided extensive assistance to you in the development of your institutionalization plan. Jim Bain and Bob Sommerfeld were both active with you toward the development of an institutionalization plan over the past year.

Sommerfeld late last summer was requested in a personal phone call from you to me, to be allowed to spend a couple days with your staff, in formal development of the plan, to satisfy the special condition. Your submission does not reflect this effort.

Since time is of essence, this letter will serve to authorize an extension to February 15, 1975 to meet the special condition deadline.(147)

The acting Chicago regional administrator's letter was not well received by the Cleveland CAT director. On January 16, he forwarded a reply to Chicago and asked for a meeting with key officials of the National Institute and the LEAA headquarters prior to the February 15 deadline quoted in the RA's letter.

"The tone and attitude reflected in your letter", the CAT director wrote, "totally defies logic as well as any insight into previous discussions with your staff." He surmised that this communications gap was caused by the fact that during his tenure as Impact director he had seen two regional administrators, two acting regional administrators, and "no less than three [regional] Impact coordinators".

After having cited several points wherein he disagreed with the contents of the acting RA's letter, he gave as a reason for his somewhat impassioned response "your decision to reject, out-of-hand, our submission, by way of a one-and-one quarter-page letter."<sup>(148)</sup>

On January 23 and 24, 1975, the Region V staff met with Cleveland Impact planners at Chicago where all issues raised by the institutionalization plan could be addressed, and the major problems reconciled. The Cleveland CAT director considered the meetings to have been highly successful, and by February 7, he would write more amicably to the acting Chicago RA of his staff's willingness to supply essential data on Impact project institutionalization and of his agreement with the position taken by Chicago that future Impact staff funding was a separate item from the institutionalization plan and should, therefore, be treated as such.

The Cleveland CAT director would submit his resignation to the mayor, effective March 7, 1975, one month exactly from the date of his letter to the acting Chicago RA. In his next to last act as CAT director, he would write LEAA headquarters to inform the Office of Regional Operations of his decision, and to recapitulate what were, in his view, the major achievements of the Cleveland Impact program. In part, he wrote:

During the period...I served as director, Impact planned and funded comprehensive and diversified projects at every level of the criminal justice system, all designed to reduce stranger-to-stranger street crimes....The net result of our efforts was a twenty-six percent decrease in major crimes from 1971-1973, the largest and most significant reduction for a major city in the nation. Even with the increase experienced last year all major crimes are down eight percent since we began in 1971.(149)

Between March 7 and July 1, 1975, the Cleveland CAT would be reduced to its present level of four staff people and would be transferred to City Hall. Its last staffing grant has been extended through December 1975. A "Block" grant to fund this group, and thereby continue a minimal criminal justice planning capability in Cleveland, has been applied for and was awarded as of January 1, 1976.

## 12.0 EPILOGUE: RESPONSES TO A QUESTIONNAIRE BY THE MAYOR OF CLEVELAND, OHIO

As a final (albeit necessarily subjective) overview of the Impact program experience in Cleveland, the following questions were responded to by the Honorable Ralph J. Perk, Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio.

- Q. Impact was seen as an experiment in the New Federalism with the cities given a major say in the planning and implementation of a federal program. How effectively did intergovernmental relations function in the case of Impact? How well did the partnership between the LEAA Washington, Regional Office, the State Planning Agency, and Mayor work?
- A. Yes, the Impact program was an experiment in New Federalism. The question raised was whether the federal government could ask a major urban city directly to conduct a massive program with very rigid guidelines and have them held accountable while achieving their goals and objectives. The city of Cleveland has responded in the affirmative.
- The Impact program established itself immediately as a constructive force against crime in Cleveland. One of the major reasons for its success was the close working relationship Impact and my office developed with the LEAA Washington Office, the Regional Office in Chicago, and Administration of Justice Division in Columbus, Ohio, and our local criminal justice related agencies. This rapport and open communication has helped Cleveland in its efforts to reduce crime, and hopefully, will continue to do so.
- Q. The Cleveland Impact program maintained an open door policy towards citizen groups. What was the city's policy toward community involvement in Impact? What was the contribution of the City and County Councils, and of the Cleveland newspapers to the program?

- A. The concept of community-based involvement, interacting with Impact, was probably one of our major goals. These community agencies were encouraged to participate and play an active role in the early development stages of Impact-funded programs. The community, as a whole, accepted the Impact program's goals and worked diligently to assist in any way possible.

The City and County Councils were highly receptive to the program, and their assistance was of great value to the overall goals of the Impact concept.

The Cleveland media recognized Impact as a viable force in combating crime, encouraging citizens to become aware of the crime problems in our community and to do whatever possible to rectify the crime situation.

- Q. Impact was aimed at all elements of the criminal justice system in Cleveland. How would you characterize the role of the police, courts, and corrections in Impact? Which function was the most successful in relating to Impact? The least successful?

- A. Within the city, Impact was regarded very highly. The police, courts, and correctional officials often looked to Impact for not only financial assistance, but also its expertise in the criminal justice field. Impact served to pull the various criminal justice agencies closer together, and with this in mind, communication lines were opened that were not open previously.

The police functions were probably the most successful in relating to Impact in that this was Impact's first line of defense against crime. As far as the least successful, it would be most difficult to pinpoint any one area as all the various agencies were so vitally important to the overall scheme of the criminal justice system and contributed substantially to the Impact goals.

- Q. A great deal of attention has been directed at Impact's crime reduction goals of 5% in two years and 20% in five years. How effective has Impact been in reducing crime in Cleveland?

- A. The city of Cleveland experienced a general decline in Impact crimes in 1972 when the program began. In 1973, the city experienced a dramatic 13 percent reduction, doubling the federal government's two-year goal. However, in 1974, crime began an upward trend.

Although crime went up in 1974, let me say that this fact alone cannot determine the true effectiveness of the Impact program. Local crime statistics were based upon "known offenses" listed in the Uniform Crime Reports, submitted by the Cleveland Police Department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Since these reports were based solely on the number of "known offenses," I personally feel it cannot alone serve as an indicator of the success or failure of the Impact program.

- Q. One of the original purposes of Impact was to bring about improvement in criminal justice planning capability at the local level. Could you give your assessment of the changes in criminal justice planning and program evaluation in Cleveland as a result of Impact?

- A. Let me say that, while it is important to determine crime levels and trends, the Impact program should not be judged solely on this basis. As you (MITRE) are aware, it is very important to monitor and evaluate a project's performance in meeting its objectives. Paramount is the ability of a project to serve its clientele in the most effective and efficient manner. The Impact program, pursuant to LEAA regulations, provided these monitoring and evaluation functions, and these roles are now serving as baseline models for similar criminal justice activities in the Cleveland area.

- Q. Looking back over the past three and one-half years of Impact, what has impressed you most (least) about the program? What (permanent) changes have been brought about by Impact?
- A. What has impressed me the most is the professionalism and administrative capabilities Impact has displayed in its short existence. When Cleveland was selected as a participant in the High Impact Anti-Crime Program, the city was provided with the opportunity to serve as a catalyst in the development of coordinated, effective programs for community crime prevention. The Impact Crime Analysis Team (CAT) developed and implemented a crime-specific planning format which considered the social, demographic, and institutional factors related to crime in Cleveland.

The Cleveland Impact program served as the focal point for coordinated planning and direction which I feel were the primary ingredients assuring the successful implementation of crime-prevention activities.

The Cleveland Impact program has proven to me and the citizens of Cleveland that soundly planned and properly managed anti-crime projects operating in an atmosphere of cooperative, intergovernmental and interjurisdictional relationships are indeed the valuable legacies of Cleveland's Impact Cities program.

- Q. If you had to do it over again, what would you do differently?
- A. Possibly, I would have done things differently if I would have been aware of the early termination of the Impact concept, but since we were not, I would honestly say, NO, I would not do anything differently.

## REFERENCES

Except for newspaper articles, in-person and telephone interviews with pivotal actors involved in the Cleveland Impact program, references are from unpublished sources which can be located in the files of the LEAA Region V at Des Plaines, Illinois, the Ohio Department of Economic and Community Development, Administration of Justice Division, at Columbus, Ohio, the Impact Cities staff at Cleveland, Ohio, and the LEAA headquarters at Washington, D. C. Full bibliographic information on each primary source is provided with the first citation.

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

1. Interview with James Bain, Jr., former Regional Office Impact Coordinator, LEAA Region V, Des Plaines, Illinois, April 28, 1975.

2. Ibid.

### 2.0 THE CONTEXT OF THE CLEVELAND IMPACT PROGRAM

3. See Louis H. Masotti and Jerome P. Corsi, Shoot-Out in Cleveland: Black Militants and the Police, U. S. Government Printing Office, May 1969, p. 37.
4. Interview with Richard Boylan, former director, Cleveland Crime Analysis Team, April 17, 1975.
5. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 13, 1972.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., July 19, 1972.

### 3.0 THE PROGRAM BEGINS

8. George Hall, former Director, LEAA Statistics Division, to Martin Danziger, former Director, NILE & CJ, Memorandum, September 22, 1971.
9. George Hall to Martin Danziger, Memorandum, November 2, 1971.
10. R. E. Brown interview with James Bain, Jr., December 3, 1973.
11. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with James Bain, Jr., April 28, 1975.
12. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Joseph L. White, former Director, Ohio SPA, April 18, 1975.

13. Michael A. Carroll, "The Impact Of General Revenue Sharing On The Urban Planning Process - An Assessment", Public Administration Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, March/April 1975.
14. The Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 14, 1972.
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17. Ibid.
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26. R. E. Brown interview with Jack Oliver, Community Involvement Specialist, Cleveland CAT, December 4, 1973.
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**END**

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