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EVALUATION OF THE PORTLAND NEIGHBORHOOD-
BASED ANTI-BURGLARY PROGRAM

by

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Information contained in this report of the effectiveness of the Portland Crime Prevention Bureau anti-burglary program is based on the 1974 Portland victimization survey of 1,909 persons living within the city limits of Portland.

The major conclusions are:

1. Homes which display anti-burglary stickers tend to have lower burglary rates than homes which do not. The burglary reduction is most marked in areas of highest CPB activity and highest participation. For the city as a whole, slightly less than 7 percent of the participating homes were burglarized whereas slightly more than 10 percent of the non-participating homes were burglarized. In the highest participation areas of northeast Portland, about 8 percent of the participating homes were burglarized compared with more than 20 percent of the non-participating homes.

2. Persons who participate in anti-burglary activities such as property marking, sticker display, and neighborhood meetings are more apt to report burglaries to the police than are persons who do not participate in any of the programs. More than 80 percent of the program participants who are burglary victims report the incidents to the police compared with about 65 percent of the victims who are not participants.

3. The fact that participation increases a person's inclination to report burglaries to the police will make it virtually impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of CPB efforts in the future from official crime statistics. Official statistics will show an increase in burglaries in areas with a higher proportion of persons participating in the program. This increase may be entirely the product of increased reporting of crimes by victims.

4. The engraving program probably increases the recovery rate for bicycles, and probably does not increase the recovery rate for small household items such as clocks and radios. However, the recovery rate for all items is so low and the number of engraved items stolen is so low that no thorough test of the relationship between engraving and recovery rates is possible.

5. Participation in the engraving activity had reached an estimated 27 percent of the Portland households during the year from June 1973 through June 1974, although much of the participation was self-initiated rather than done through the Crime Prevention Bureau Program. Participation in the sticker program had reached an estimated 12 percent of the households during the year and about two-thirds of this was done in relation to the Crime Prevention Bureau program. Approximately 10 percent of the households had been represented at a meeting sponsored either by the CPB, the police, another agency, or one initiated by persons in the neighborhood.

6. The major reason for non-participation, as stated by persons who had not engaged in any of the activities, was that they had not heard about the burglary prevention program. Eighteen percent said that engraving and sticker display would not help deter crime and 16 percent said that these activities were not necessary (e.g., they already had sufficient protection or there is not much crime in the area). On the other hand, only 8 percent said that they failed to attend a block meeting because they thought it would not help. Most who had the opportunity to attend a block meeting, but did not, said that they were busy at the time the meeting was held.

The evaluation is based on the effectiveness of the program for participating households (in comparison with non-participating) and, therefore, is confined to an assessment of the "private" benefits. It should be pointed out that a program of this type may redistribute burglaries rather than reduce them. If burglaries are reduced for participating households, but increased by an equal amount for non-participating ones, then the net "collective" benefits to the residents of the city is zero. On the other hand, if the participation acts as a permanent deterrent to at least some percentage of the potential burglaries, then the "collective" benefits to the city could include a reduction in the overall number of burglaries. No evaluation of the latter type is possible until follow-up data are obtained.

7. Although data are not yet available to test the propositions, it is quite possible that the private and collective benefits of the program will change as participation levels increase. Further analysis, and follow-up data, are needed in order to examine whether the program has a permanent deterrent effect on burglars and/or the extent of local and area-based displacement.

PREFACE

The research reported in this document is the fifth in a series of reports on Crime and Victimization in the Portland metropolitan area for the period of May 1973 through April 1974. The victimization information was collected from a randomly selected sample of 3950 households in the Portland Metropolitan area. The research was conducted by the Oregon Research Institute, Eugene, Oregon, under a contract from the Oregon Law Enforcement Council and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Full details about the sample design questionnaire construction, interviewing procedures, coding reliability, and other pertinent aspects of the survey research effort are contained in "The 1974 Portland Victimization Survey: A Report on Procedures."

Other reports in this series are:

"Methodological Approaches to Measuring Short-Term Victimization Trends"

"Description and Preliminary Analysis of Victimization Rates and Probabilities in the Portland Metropolitan Area."

"Crime and Victimization in Portland: Analysis of Trends, 1971-1974."

Additional reports and documents are in preparation, and scheduled for publication by March or April, 1975.

INTRODUCTION.

Victim-Oriented Crime Prevention

There are two major approaches to crime prevention. One is to develop programs designed to prevent persons from becoming engaged in criminal activities and, for those already undertaking such activities, to retrain them, modify their behavior, or in some other way convince the potential offender that he/she should not engage in illegal activities. The second major approach focuses on the potential victim of crime. Programs are designed to educate residents of an area in the techniques of crime prevention and to supply potential victims with the training and equipment which would reduce the probability of them being victimized. If the first approach were successful and if the number of persons engaging in criminal behavior were reduced, the crime rates would decline. This approach, however, requires considerable time and funds. It is difficult to identify a high-risk child and/or juvenile in time to steer them away from crime. Even if such persons are identified, there are serious ethical and legal problems in requiring such persons to undertake "treatment," especially if they have never committed a crime. A further complication is the fact that a child or juvenile who is told that he/she has "criminal tendencies" may develop them due to the suggestion that such tendencies exist. If the treatments are postponed until after the person commits a serious crime and is incarcerated, much of the available evidence suggests that, for many of these persons, it is too late to successfully modify their behavior.

The victim-oriented prevention approach is subject to a different type of problem and to different types of criticisms. If some residents in an area undertake self-protection activities and successfully reduce the probability that they will be victimized, the offenders may select other residents in the area as their victims. Thus, the total volume of crime may not be reduced. It is possible that crime will be shifted from one victim to another, from one area to another, from the inner city to the suburbs, or even from the urban areas to the rural areas of the nation. At this time, there is no scientific evidence supporting these contentions. When a city government supplies funds for a program that successfully reduces the criminal activities of offenders or potential offenders, few would criticize the expenditures since the benefits

of crime reduction are, for the most part, distributed in accordance with the likelihood that crimes would have been committed without the program. On the other hand, if a city government supplies funds to a victim-oriented program, and if that program shifts the monetary and social costs of crime from one set of people (participants) to another (non-participants), then one might legitimately question the fairness of the program. The victim-oriented approach to crime prevention is relatively new and only a few scientific evaluations of such programs have been undertaken. The most common and wide-spread victim-oriented program is the property-marking, anti-burglary program, one of which is the subject of this evaluation.

Residents are asked to mark their valuables with identification numbers and to display a decal warning the burglar that valuables have been marked. An evaluation of the effectiveness of this type of program must distinguish between the private and the collective benefits of the program. The private benefits are those which accrue to participating households. The collective benefits must be measured in terms of a reduction in the burglary rates and/or the monetary and social costs of burglaries not only for participating households, but also for non-participants in the neighborhood, city, or metropolitan area.

To assess the effectiveness of anti-burglary programs for participating households, one must ascertain what the burglary rate for participants would have been if they had not participated in the program. For reasons that will be explained in the methodology section, the best available method for determining what the burglary rate would have been for participants if they had not participated (the "expected" burglary rate) is to use the actual burglary rate for non-participating households located in the same general area of the city as the participants. Data from the 1974 Portland victimization survey can be used to estimate the private benefits of the anti-burglary program.

In relation to displacement effects and collective benefits, any one of the following outcomes is possible. Each assumes that the program is effective for participating households.

1. Some burglars and potential burglars abandon crime entirely within the area due to the deterrent effects of the program. The burglary rate for participating and non-participating households in the area decline at approximately the same rate. In this instance, no displacement has occurred

within the area being considered, and the program has positive private effects and positive collective effects as well.

2. Some burglars and potential burglars abandon crime due to the program and the burglary rate for participating households declines markedly. The rate for non-participants declines some or remains the same as before the program. In this example, the benefits to participating households are greater than the benefits to non-participating households, but the overall effect of the program is positive both for participants and non-participants.

3. No burglars or potential burglars abandon crime or the area. The rate for participating households declines and the rate for non-participants increases because the latter households are selected as victims instead of the participating ones. Displacement has occurred in this situation and the program has positive private benefits, but negative (or no) collective benefits. The cost of the entire volume of burglaries has been shifted to the non-participants. If the program had not existed, this cost would have been shared more equitably among households in the area.

Which of these outcomes occurs may depend on the proportion of residents who are participating. As the percentage of participants increases, outcomes number one or two (above) may become more likely, but no research has been done to determine this. If participation reaches close to 100 percent within an entire urbanized area, then the burglars either must move to another city, abandon crime, or begin burglarizing the participating households. If the latter choice is made by a substantial number of burglars, then the private benefits of participating (as well as the collective benefits) may decline as a function of exceptionally high participation.

In order to measure the displacement effects and the collective benefits for all persons in an area, one must know what the burglary rate would have been for participating and non-participating households if no one (or very few) were involved in the program. Thus, baseline data are needed to establish the expected burglary rate and follow-up data are needed to assess the change for participating and non-participating households. Because pre-program victimization data within areas of the city are not available, this type of analysis cannot be undertaken now. If follow-up victimization data concerning

burglaries within sections of the metropolitan area are obtained for 1975-76, an analysis of collective benefits and crime displacement could be conducted.

The Portland Program

The Portland Crime Prevention Bureau implemented a neighborhood-based burglary prevention program during the summer of 1973. The major components of the program include:

1. Meetings of residents in a small area of the city are held in the home of a private citizen or in a neighborhood facility, such as a school or church. Those who attend are informed about the things they can do to prevent burglaries and the things which they can do with their neighbors which would help make their neighborhood less attractive to a potential burglar. These meetings are sometimes initiated by members of the Crime Prevention Bureau in that they contact a resident in an area and encourage the person to bring the neighbors together for a meeting. In other instances, volunteers will contact the Crime Prevention Bureau to obtain the materials needed for a meeting which the person has scheduled on his/her own initiative.

2. Residents are encouraged to mark their property with an engraver supplied by the Crime Prevention Bureau. These engravers can be obtained at the meeting, directly from the Crime Prevention Bureau headquarters, and from public libraries.

3. A warning decal informing a potential burglar that items in the household have been engraved and can be traced is given to the citizen to be posted in a conspicuous place on a door or window of the home.

In the early phases of the program, the Crime Prevention Bureau designated certain areas of the city for high-priority efforts on the part of CPB personnel. Two census tracts (36.02 and 19), both of which had high burglary rates, were designated for major work in terms of block meetings, door-to-door coverage with the engraving equipment, and the dissemination of information. In addition, the entire northeast section of the city (which has the highest burglary rates in Portland) was designated as an area of special activity.

Several months after the program began, the CPB altered its strategy and began implementing the program city-wide on the basis of requests received from residents throughout the city.

Logic of the Program

The rationale underlying this type of neighborhood burglary prevention program is that burglars wish to incur the smallest possible risk when selecting a home to be burglarized. Thus, the burglar will avoid homes with burglar alarms (if he knows they exist), dogs which may bark and disclose his presence, homes in which the neighbors can easily see the entrances, homes with lights around the entrances, and so on. In addition, property which has been marked with an identification number is presumed to be more difficult to fence, more easily recovered, and more apt to be traced back to the burglar. A burglar, however, does not know from the entrance whether the valuables are marked or not and the warning decal is designed to deter the potential burglar from entering the home at all. Neighborhoods in which most of the residents know each other and in which residents have been sensitized to the usual patterns of behavior of the neighbors should be less attractive to a potential burglar since his presence, as a stranger, is more apt to be noticed. In an area in which the residents are all strangers to each other, the burglar is simply one more stranger and not as apt to be noticed.

Purposes of This Evaluation

The major purposes of the evaluation are to assess the extent of burglary reduction for participating households and to examine some of the other consequences of the program. The motivations and reasons for participating and not participating in the program will also be examined. As explained above, it is not possible to thoroughly analyze displacement effects or the collective benefits of the program at this time.

METHODOLOGY

Problems in Use of Official Statistics

Some evaluations of property-marking programs and other household-oriented anti-burglary programs have used before and after research designs in which the official burglary statistics for experimental and control areas are compared before and after implementation of the program. There are two problems with the use of official burglary statistics for evaluating the effectiveness of victim-oriented crime prevention programs.

The first problem is that official statistics characterize the burglary rate of an aggregate group of households within a specific geographic area. The program, however, focuses on the households within the area and not all households are participating in the program. An offender may be dissuaded from burglarizing a particular house which has an anti-burglary sticker, but may simply select the house next door that does not have a decal on the window or door. Whether programs aimed at victims decrease the total volume of crime depends on the incentives and perceptions of the potential offender. If the burglar is persistent and intent on committing a burglary within a specific area of the city, then he/she almost certainly can find a non-participating household. If participation in an anti-burglary program reaches a fairly high level, then the burglar may abandon the area--but the extent of participation needed before this occurs is not known. Suppose that half of the homes in a census tract are participating in the program and none of them is burglarized. If the burglars selected their victims from the non-participating half of the homes, the burglary rate in the census tract would not decline at all, even though the program is 100 percent effective for participating homes. Evaluations which use official statistics may show the program to be ineffective for participating households when, in fact, it is quite effective.

To measure displacement and to determine whether non-participants are receiving more than their share of the burglaries, one must have information on the change in burglary rates for non-participants. Thus, the burglary rate for an entire census tract is not suitable for this analysis.

A second problem is that anti-crime programs which involve the residents in crime prevention activities may increase the persons' inclination to notify the authorities if they know (or suspect) that a burglary has occurred. Evidence from the 1974 victimization survey is presented later in this report that participants in the Portland anti-burglary program are considerably more inclined to report burglaries to the police than are non-participants. The percentage of non-participants who reported burglaries to the police is about 60 to 65 percent (depending on the area of the city), whereas the percentage of participants who report burglaries is 80 percent or above. A change of this magnitude in residents' inclination to report burglaries has a substantial effect on the official burglary rates.

As shown in Table 1, an increase from 50 percent reporting to 60 percent (a 10 percent increase) will result in a 20 percent increase in the official burglary rate. If the total number of reported and unreported burglaries, per 1,000 persons, is 150 and half are reported to the police, the official burglary rate will be 75 per 1,000. If the percentage reported increases to 60 percent, the official rate will increase to 90 per 1,000. In both cases, the percentage increase is 20 percent. As demonstrated in the table, no matter what the total volume of burglaries is, a percentage increase in reporting will be followed by a percentage increase of equal magnitude in the official statistics.

The type of bias introduced with the use of official statistics to evaluate the programs tends to result in a conclusion that the programs are not effective. Thus, evaluations which have found the programs to be effective have probably under-estimated the extent of effectiveness. Evaluations based on official statistics which conclude that the programs are not effective are of almost no use because the failure to find significant differences could be due to an increased reporting rate by victims.

Use of Victimization Surveys

Victimization surveys in which residents are interviewed and asked questions about their previous experiences as victims of crime provide data more suitable for evaluating victim-oriented crime prevention programs.

Since the data are available at the household level, there is no reason

Table 1

Effect and Change in Percentage of Burglaries Told to Police on Official Rates

"Real" burglary rate ¹	Before program: Told to police %	After program: Told to police %	Official rate		Increase in reporting %	Increase in official rate %
			Before	After		
150 per 1,000	50%	60%	75	90	20%	20%
	50%	70%	75	105	40%	40%
	50%	80%	75	120	60%	60%
	50%	90%	75	135	80%	80%
200 per 1,000	50%	60%	100	120	20%	20%
	60%	70%	120	140	17%	17%
	70%	90%	140	180	28%	28%
	80%	90%	160	180	12%	12%

¹ Reported and unreported burglaries

to compare areas of the city and, therefore, the problem of using aggregate statistics can be avoided. Likewise, since the survey determines both reported and unreported incidents, differences in reporting percentages among participants and non-participants will not confound the analysis.

A victimization survey was conducted in the summer of 1974 (covering a recall period from May 1973 through April 1974) in the Portland metropolitan area. Of the approximately 4,000 interviews, 1,909 were within the city limits of Portland and the remainder were in the suburban areas. All of the interviews were face-to-face with a randomly drawn sample of residents. The victimization survey instrument that was used is the same one used in the LEAA-sponsored surveys and had been extensively pretested prior to its use. Most of the analysis in this report is based on the interviews taken within the city limits of Portland since that is where the Crime Prevention Bureau Anti-Burglary Program was located. If follow-up victimization data become available for the suburban areas, these can be included in an analysis of displacement effects.

Research Design

One problem in selecting a research design for use with victimization survey data is that participants are not randomly selected from the population as a whole. This could bias an analysis in which participants are compared to non-participants if the participants are systematically different from the non-participants on one of the dependent variables. More precisely, the analysis would be biased if the participants would have been different from non-participants even if the former had not engaged in any of the anti-burglary programs. The most likely source of bias, when analyzing burglary reduction, is that most participants might come primarily from areas in which the probability of being a burglary victim is either substantially higher or substantially lower than in other areas of the city. This is a very probable source of bias in Portland because the initial CPB efforts to contact residents and implement the program were concentrated in the high-burglary sections of the city. After the shift in strategy by the CPB to a city-wide program, residents were more apt to be self-selected volunteers. Whether they were predominantly from high burglary areas of the city or low

burglary areas is not known. There is no perfect solution to this problem of research design, but some (perhaps most) of the bias can be removed by comparing participants with non-participants who live in the same general section of the city. Thus, we must assume that the burglary rate for participants within Area X of the city would have been the same as the rate for non-participants in Area X if the former had not participated in the program.

With this assumption, the effectiveness of the program in relation to burglary reduction can be examined by comparing participating and non-participating households within a particular part of the city.

It should be pointed out that a random assignment of persons to be participants (and non-participants) is not feasible and would be contrary to the general principles of individual freedom and choice. Thus, a true experimental design, with random assignment, will never be achieved for this type of program and we cannot wait upon such a happening to assess the effectiveness of the program.

Another complication in the research design is that displacement of crime (rather than actual reduction) may take place within a very localized area. Burglars may not abandon a neighborhood but may select non-participating households (presuming that the program is effective). Thus, the total volume of burglaries in a neighborhood or in the city may not be reduced, but the burden may be shifted disproportionately to non-participants. If this happens, then the private objectives of participating residents may be achieved in that they avoid bearing the costs of burglaries. But the social and political objectives of the city may not be achieved in that the total volume of burglaries may not be reduced.

In order to evaluate the collective benefits of the program, one must not only ascertain the effectiveness of the program for participants (the private benefits), but one must also measure the change in burglary rates for non-participants. The evaluation, therefore, requires data from more than one time point. And, given the strong possibility that participants are more apt to report crimes to the police than non-participants, the official burglary statistics should not be used.

In a previous report, we reported that the volume of burglaries in

Portland city declined from approximately 151 per 1,000 in 1971-72 to approximately 127 per 1,000 in 1973-74 (Schneider, 1975a). It is difficult to ascertain, however, how much of this reduction should be attributed to the anti-burglary program and how much is due to other factors. The data for 1971-72 were obtained from the LEAA-sponsored victimization survey and the location of the crime was not coded. Thus, we cannot ascertain how much of the burglary reduction occurred in participating households and/or areas. Only if, or when, follow-up victimization data are obtained for 1975 and 1976 (with the location of the crime coded) will it be feasible to thoroughly examine the displacement effects of the program.

Due to these problems, the first year evaluation will focus mainly on the effectiveness of the program in reducing burglaries for participating households and on other individual-level effects of the program.

Previous Research

Only a few scientific studies of property-marking programs have been undertaken. In a recent report prepared by Dr. Hans W. Mattick (Mattick, 1974) the major conclusion was:

The only general conclusion that can be drawn from this evaluation is that Operation Identification, as implemented in Illinois, did not reduce the kinds of crime it was designed to reduce, in Illinois.

In the Illinois study, no differences were found between communities designated as "high success" areas (e.g., high participation areas) and low success areas. The study used official crime statistics for time periods before and after implementation of the program. No data were available to determine whether the program increased the tendency of participants to report crimes to the police. In addition, the participation rate within the communities was quite low. If property-marking programs result in localized displacement of crime, then the program could be effective for participating households even though the burglary rate in the community would not change. The pre-program burglary rate for communities that later implemented the program was approximately 28 per 1,000 households and it was approximately 35 per 1,000 households after implementation. This increase of 25 percent

in the burglaries known to the police could be the result of an increase in the total volume of burglaries, but as noted in Table 1, an increase of 25 percent in the reporting tendencies of victims (such as from 50 to 62 percent) could also produce this change in the official statistics. There is no way to know whether the observed change in official statistics is attributable to real change in burglaries or to an increased reporting percentage.

In Seattle, a research group headed by Kenneth E. Mathews determined that a statistically significant reduction in burglaries had occurred in one of three experimental areas (Mathews, 1975). In addition, the study indicates that a significant reduction occurred in participating households after their participation when compared to their pre-program burglary rates. The authors discuss the problem of bias introduced by self-selection of participants, but conclude that the pre-program rates for persons who later become involved did not differ significantly from the burglary rates for the population as a whole prior to the beginning of the program.

Other evaluations have been undertaken, but most are based on somewhat inadequate research designs and/or inadequate data. Mattick states that most of the other evaluations have been published in the context of promotional activities for the programs and, therefore, it is not surprising that negative reports are virtually non-existent.

None of the evaluations has been able to test a localized displacement effect and none has examined the effect of the program on recovery of stolen property. The motivations of participants also have not been studied.

EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAM

The effects of the program on burglary rates for participating compared to non-participating households will be examined in this section as well as the differences in reporting burglaries to the police between participants and non-participants. The other types of burglary prevention activities undertaken by participants, compared to non-participants, will also be assessed.

Burglary Reduction

Homes which display anti-burglary decals tend to have lower burglary rates than homes which do not (Table 2). For the entire city, the difference between participants and non-participants is about 30 burglaries per 1,000 households. If it is assumed that participating households would have had the same rate as non-participants in the absence of the program, then the "reduction" in burglaries is about 32 percent. This figure is almost identical to the percentage reduction reported in the Seattle study (Mathews, 1975) and in the study in St. Louis (Mattick, 1974).

The most marked differences are in the two census tracts designated as high priority areas for the Crime Prevention Bureau and in the Street Lighting Area of Portland. These areas have the highest levels of participation. In the CPB area, 30 percent of the residents reported that they had attended a meeting and in the Street Lighting Area, 16 percent said they had attended a meeting on how to reduce burglaries in the area.

The information in Table 2 was obtained by calculating the percentage of homes with stickers which were burglarized one or more times after the sticker was displayed. The number of months of opportunity for burglaries to occur was calculated (based on the date when the sticker was displayed). The rate was then adjusted to a yearly equivalent.

The lower burglary rates for participating households could be attributed to the anti-burglary program, but other factors must be considered. First, it is possible that a self-selection process is operative and that persons less apt to be burglarized are more apt to participate in the program. The logic of this is not self-evident and it is just as likely that

Table 2
Effect of Anti-Burglary Stickers on Burglary Frequency¹

Area	Homes with stickers: % of homes, per year, with one or more burglaries after display of sticker	Homes without stickers: % of homes, per year, with one or more burglaries	All homes: % with one or more burglaries
	%	%	%
Portland (totals)	6.87*	10.1*	9.65
Street Lighting Area	8.4*	24.0*	21
CPB High Priority Area	7.7*	21.0*	17.3
N.E. Portland	7.9	11.3	10.8
Remainder of City	6.6	9.4	9
CPB block and participants	(only three homes burglarized, too few for analysis)		

¹ For homes with stickers, the number of burglaries after display of the sticker was used to calculate the percentage. The date of display was used to correct (adjust) the figures to a yearly percentage. The rate per 1,000 households can be computed by moving the decimal one place to the right. Asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference at the .05 level.

persons who have been burglarized recently are more apt to participate in the program. In addition, the Seattle study found no evidence of a consistent bias introduced by self-selection of participants (Matthews, 1975).

Second, homes which have displayed stickers are also more apt to have done other things to prevent burglaries and are more apt to have increased their efforts during the past year. Thus, not all of the credit for burglary reduction should go to the decal program, since the other activities may help.

Third, the difference between participating and non-participating homes cannot necessarily be interpreted as a "decline" in burglaries for those who participate. If this is done, an assumption is being made that the participating homes would have had the same burglary rate as the non-participating ones if the program had not been implemented. Although this might be true, it is also possible that localized displacement has occurred and the non-participating homes are receiving a disproportionate share of the burglaries.

Speculation About Displacement Within the City

No baseline victimization data are available for specific areas within the city nor for the suburban areas. However, the LEAA-sponsored survey of 1972 can be used to speculate about the collective benefits of the anti-burglary program for city residents as a whole. The discussion is speculative because precise information about the percentage of homes in 1971-72 which had one or more burglaries is not available. And, the 1974 data are not easily converted to total number of burglaries occurring after a sticker was displayed (rather than the "one or more" designation which has been used here).

In 1974, the total burglary rate for the city was 127 per 1,000 households if second and third burglaries at the same house are counted. The rate is 96.5 if based on one or more burglaries per 1,000 households. In 1974, therefore, 79 percent of the total rate is contributed by households with only one burglary and if this percentage were the same for 1972, the number of households per 1,000 with one or more burglaries would be approximately 115. Using this figure, and assuming that the anti-burglary program

is the only important factor contributing to a change in burglaries since 1972, the expected burglary rate for the city in 1974, if the program had not been implemented, would be 115 per 1,000.

The decline for all city residents since 1972 is 16 percent, the decrease for participants is 40 percent, and the decrease for non-participants is 12 percent. Thus, if these figures are reliable, the program produced not only significant private benefits, but also benefitted the non-participants, even though they did not receive as many advantages as the participants in the program.

Within smaller areas of the city which have higher participation, such as the CPB area, there is no way to know whether the non-participants realized an increased burglary rate as an unintended consequence of the program. There also is no way to determine whether the crime was displaced into the suburban areas. It should be noted, however, that the usual assumption about displacement is that it is most apt to occur in areas close to the ones with the experimental program. Some very tentative and speculative evidence has been presented here that if displacement occurred within the city, it did not increase the burglary rate of non-participating households above the expected rate and, in fact, the program may have provided some benefits even to non-participants. If this is true, then it is not likely that displacement into the suburban areas took place to any great extent.

Effect on Residents' Inclination to Report the Burglary

Persons who have participated in one or more of the anti-burglary activities (attending a meeting, marking property, or displaying a decal) are considerably more apt to report burglaries to the police than are persons who have not participated (Table 3). In the entire city, the percentage increases from 65 percent (for persons with no information and no involvement) to 80 percent and above for participants. The same pattern is apparent within each section selected for special analysis although the smallest effect is in the Street Lighting Area of northeast Portland. The figures for small areas are based on very small numbers of participants and very few

Table 3

Effect of Involvement in CPB Activities on Willingness of Victims
to Report Burglaries to the Police¹

Area	No involvement, no information	Information only	One activity	Two activities	Three activities
	(Percent of burglary victims who said they reported the crime to the police)				
<u>N</u> =	1,024	484	188	101	64
Portland (total)	65%	67%	79%	83%	87%
(Percentages below are based on very small numbers)					
Street Lighting Area	55	60	63	66	75
CPB High Priority Areas	50	100	100	100	--(too few burglaries)
N.E. Portland, excluding above	45	80	71	100	100
Remainder of city	68	66	80	83	100

¹ Percentages represent the percent of burglary victims who said that they reported the incident to the police. The headings are defined in this way:

No involvement, no information: Person has not heard of any special crime prevention programs and has not participated in any activities.

Information only: Person has heard of one or more special crime prevention programs, but has not participated in any activities.

One activity: Engraved property or displayed sticker or attended a meeting.

Two activities: Any two of the three activities.

Three activities: All three (engraved, sticker, attended meeting)

burglaries, but the pattern is consistent enough to justify some confidence in the conclusion.

An increase in the residents' willingness to report crimes to the police may have some effects on the crime rate itself. First, a potential burglar who believes that a victim definitely will report the incident to the police should perceive that there is a greater risk involved in burglarizing the home. Higher rates of reporting could serve as deterrents and thereby either reduce the burglary rate or displace the burglaries to non-participating victims or to low participation areas of the city. If a burglar or other offender believes that the victim will not report the incident, there is very little chance of him being caught.

Engraving and Recovery Rates

The recovery rate for items which are stolen is extremely low (Table 4). Less than 5 percent of the stolen television sets and auto accessories (such as tape decks) are recovered. It is quite difficult, with these data, to test the proposition that engraved property is more apt to be recovered than property which was not engraved because of the low frequency with which engraved items were stolen. For example, only six engraved television sets were stolen. The recovery rate for marked television sets is only 5 percent and, therefore, the expected recovery rate for engraved television sets is zero. In fact, 20 engraved televisions would have to be stolen before one would even expect that a single one would be recovered--given the recovery rate for unmarked televisions.

If engraved radios and clocks have a higher recovery rate than unengraved ones, then at least one of the 12 engraved radios or clocks should have been recovered. Thus, engraving probably makes no difference for these types of small household items.

Bicycles seem to be considerably more apt to be recovered if they have been engraved since 40 percent of the engraved ones were recovered compared to 15 percent of the unmarked bicycles. It should be noted that the recovery rate referred to here is measured by whether the stolen item was returned to the owner -- regardless of whether it was recovered by the

Table 4
Recovery Rates of Engraved Property¹

Type of item	Percent recovered, all items	Percent recovered, unmarked items	Percent recovered, engraved items	Number of engraved items stolen
Televisions	4%	5%	0%	6
Radios, clocks, etc.	7	8	0	12
Bicycles	17	15	40	15
Sporting goods	6	6	0	9
Tools	8	6	14	7
Auto accessories	3	3	14	7

¹ For most types of items, the recovery rate is so low and the number of engraved items stolen so low that one would not expect any of the engraved ones to be recovered.

owner personally, by the police, by a neighbor, and so on.

Tools and auto accessories belonging to persons interviewed are slightly more apt to be recovered if they were engraved, but the differences are not great enough to be statistically significant.

Educational Value of Neighborhood Meetings

In Table 5 data from the entire metropolitan area has been displayed to show the types of burglary prevention activities undertaken by persons who have attended neighborhood meetings sponsored by various groups and agencies. For example, of those who attended a meeting which (according to the respondent) was sponsored by the Portland Crime Prevention Bureau, 89 percent said that they had engraved their property. (The table does not show that 11 percent of those attending such a meeting did not engrave their property. This item was omitted because it is self-evident and to increase the amount of information in the table.) One cautionary note should be used in reading the table: respondents may not have known who sponsored a meeting and may have been confused about the sponsorship. For example, many of the meetings which respondents said were sponsored by neighbors probably were CPB meetings but the respondent was contacted by a neighbor.

The main conclusions from the table are these:

1. Persons who had not attended meetings of any type (last column of the table) are considerably less apt to have engraved their property, displayed stickers, improved their locks, and organized citizen watches for the neighborhood.

2. Persons who attended meetings are no more apt than those not attending to have purchased alarms, bought a weapon, added outside lighting, or cut their trees and shrubs.

Locking Doors and Windows

As shown in Table 6, most persons in Portland lock their doors at night and most say they lock their doors even if they leave for only a short time. By comparing the percentages shown in the last column of the table with those

Table 5

Educational Value of Neighborhood Meetings

% of those attending who engaged in activity	Attended meeting sponsored by:					No attendance, no knowledge meeting held
	Portland CPB	Other agency	Police	Neighbors	D.K.	
<u>N</u> =	59	30	34	86	27	3,467
Engraved	89%	43%	70%	62%	40%	23%
Stickers	67%	30%	41%	33%	23%	6%
Improved/added locks	39%	49%	24%	52%	51%	30%
Purchased alarm	4%	0%	1%	5%	1%	3%
Bought weapon	7%	0%	1%	3%	12%	4%
Increased insurance	26%	40%	28%	19%	27%	20%
Added lights	8%	13%	13%	14%	15%	8%
Cut trees, shrubs	21%	11%	11%	28%	27%	13%
Organized citizens' watch	30%	17%	27%	32%	16%	6%

Table 6

Educational Value of Neighborhood Meetings (Continued)

% who engage in activity	Attended meeting sponsored by:					No attendance, no knowledge
	Portland CPB	Other agency	Police	Neighbors	D.K.	
Always lock doors, night	97	100	99	98	80	93
Always lock doors if leave short time	78	77	87	84	89	76
Always lock doors while at home	45	27	44	36	50	40
Always lock win- dows and screens at night	76	83	75	79	55	78
Always lock win- dows and screens short time	62	56	74	77	45	71
Indoor lights on if gone	74	74	72	83	73	68
Outdoor lights on if gone at night	38	36	45	55	52	44

in the other columns, one can ascertain whether persons who attend meetings differ from those who do not.

Although there are some slight differences on some of the activities, the main conclusion is that attending meetings does not increase the likelihood that a person will lock the doors or windows. Nor does it increase the chance that the person will turn on outdoor lights if he is gone at night. Those who have attended meetings are somewhat more apt to leave indoor lights on when they are gone, but the differences are not very great.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANTI-BURGLARY PROGRAM

This section includes a discussion of the amount of participation, characteristics of participants, and a preliminary analysis of the motivations of persons who choose to participate.

Level of Participation

Within the city of Portland, an estimated 27 percent have engraved some of their household property, 12 percent have displayed an anti-burglary sticker, 19 percent live in an area where a block meeting (sponsored by the CPB or other group) has been held and an estimated 10 percent attended such a meeting. The participation levels are highest in those sections of the city which were designated as high priority areas. The level of participation in the one area where door-to-door canvassing was used (the CPB area) is almost twice as high as participation in other parts of the city.

Even without CPB intensive activity, however, there is a substantial proportion of the citizens who apparently are willing to invest their own time and effort to obtain the property markers and stickers.

People are more inclined to engrave their property than they are to display stickers. Notice that only about half of those who engrave property say that they have put the sticker on the door or window. Many persons who engraved but had not displayed stickers said they did not have a sticker and others said they just had not gotten around to it. In either case, there is a possibility that people do not fully understand the rationale of the program--e.g., that the sticker acts as a deterrent. A burglar has no idea whether the property is marked or not until he gets inside. It is the sticker which has to act as the initial deterrent.

A substantial percentage of persons live in areas where some type of neighborhood meeting has been held. And, if the data are reliable, about half of the households in an area are represented at these meetings. The lowest attendance area is in northeast Portland (defined here as the area surrounding the street lighting area. See the 1974 Portland Victimization Survey: A Report on Procedures, for maps and tract listings.) People in

in the sample were asked whose equipment they used and the responses in Table 8 indicate that a lot of the equipment either belonged to someone other than the CPB or, more likely, people simply did not know whose equipment it was. Those who have displayed stickers are most apt to know that they were from the Crime Prevention Bureau.

It seems possible that people pass the property markers around to their neighbors, friends, and relatives, but do not have extra stickers to give them.

Socio-Economic Characteristics

The educational and racial characteristics of persons who have participated in different aspects of the anti-burglary program are shown in Table 9. Participants have slightly higher education than 12.7 years' average for all persons in the sample, but none of the differences are statistically significant. The standard deviation for education is about three years for the sample and is about three years for participants in each aspect of the program. On the other hand, participants are more apt to be non-white than non-participants and this is especially true for persons who have attended neighborhood meetings.

The main conclusion is that during the initial phases of the program, from July 1973 through July 1974, the CPB program was not dominated by white, middle-class participants.

Reasons for Participating

Respondents were asked if anything specific had happened which prompted them to engrave their valuables and/or display the anti-burglary sticker. As shown in Table 10, most of the reasons given pertained to crimes which had occurred in the home (or to a member of the household) or to crimes in the area. These two categories combined account for more than 60 percent of the reasons given. Contact by the Crime Prevention Bureau accounted for a fairly low percentage of the reasons given and almost no one cited radio or television ads as a reason for participating in the program.

Table 7
Participation in Anti-Burglary Activities

Area	Program participation levels ¹			Attended meeting %
	Engraving %	Stickers %	Meeting held in neighborhood %	
Portland (totals)	27	12	19	10
Street Lighting Project Area	30	17	31	16
CPB High Priority Areas ²	51	27	41	30
N.E. Portland, ex- cluding above areas	23	12	20	8
Remainder of city	26.5	10	18	9
CPB List of blocks and participants ²	53	47	57	40

¹ All information in the table is obtained from the 1974 Victimization survey. The survey included 1,909 persons in the city of Portland and about 2,000 in the metropolitan area outside Portland. The analysis here is based only on persons living in the city.

² The CPB high priority areas in which extensive interviewing took place were tracts 19 and 36.02. The CPB list of blocks and participants is a special sample of 87 persons. Some of these were participants and some lived in blocks where block meetings had been held. Because of the confidentiality of names, we did not distinguish between the two types of persons in the special CPB sample.

Table 8
Use of Crime Prevention Bureau Equipment¹

Area	Property markers %	Sticker %	Percent of participants who named CPB as source of equipment	
			Markers %	Stickers %
Portland (totals)	7	8	26	67
Street Lighting Project Area	14	15	47	91
CPB high priority areas	26	22	51	81
N.E. Portland, ex- cluding above	6	8	28	67
Remainder of city	6.5	7	25	26
CPB list and block sample	29	39	55	83

¹ Information about source of equipment is based on the respondents' statement about where they obtained the equipment.

Table 9

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Participants

	Education \bar{x} years	Race % non-white
SMSA Sample	12.7	4.4
Engraved property	13.1	5.1
Displayed sticker	12.8	8.5
Attended meeting sponsored by:		
Portland CPB	13.8	6.3
Other agency	13.7	4.0
Police	12.7	8.0
Neighbors	13.2	12.7
Sponsor unknown	12.5	10.9

Persons who had not participated in either of these activities were asked why they had not and the distribution of responses is shown in Table 11. Approximately 40 percent of the non-participants said that they had not heard about the program. This was by far the most common reason given for not participating. Another 16 percent said that they had not had time or had not taken the time to obtain the equipment or use it. Two other responses are of some interest. Sixteen percent said that the program was not necessary and 18 percent said that it would not help prevent burglaries. These responses are distinct since the first one was coded if the respondent meant that they already had sufficient protection or that there was not much crime in the area. The response that the program would not help was coded if the respondent meant that the program would be ineffective. Only one person said that he had failed to participate because he distrusted or disliked the police, the Crime Prevention Bureau, or anyone else associated with the program. Also, only a smattering of respondents said that the program would encourage, rather than prevent, crime.

In the questionnaire, persons were asked whether a meeting concerning burglary prevention had been held in their neighborhood and, if one had been held, respondents were asked if they (or someone from their household) had attended. We were interested in knowing why persons would fail to attend a meeting if one had been held, and responses to this question are shown in Table 12. The question was asked only of those persons who said that a meeting had been held but no one from their household had attended.

Most of the persons said they did not attend because they were too busy at the time the meeting was held. Twenty-four percent said that they learned about the meeting after it was held. A small percentage said that there was not enough crime in the area to make it worthwhile and 8 percent said that they did not think the meeting would help prevent crime. Two percent said they failed to attend because of antagonism toward the individuals who were holding the meeting. This response is separate from antagonism toward the police and/or the Crime Prevention Bureau. No one said that he stayed away from the meeting for either of the latter two reasons. A few persons did not attend because they had not been invited by the persons in whose home the meeting was held.

Table 10
Stated Reasons for Engraving Valuables¹

		City totals (weighted figures)	.2 Street lighting area	.3565 CPB high priority area	.4 N.E. Portland	1.56 Remainder of city	Special CPB sample
No reason	N %	92 22%	(15) 13%	(12) 22%	(28) 31%	(47) 21%	(10) 22%
Recent crime in home	N %	70 17%	(24) 21%	(7) 13%	(13) 14%	(37) 17%	(5) 11%
Crime in area or city	N %	191 46%	(67) 58%	(22) 41%	(35) 38%	(100) 46%	(16) 35%
Contact by CPB	N %	38 9%	(6) 5%	(7) 13%	(8) 9%	(26) 9%	(13) 28%
Urging of friends	N %	22 5%	(4) 3%	(5) 9%	(5) 5%	(11) 5%	(2) 4%
Radio/ TV ads	N %	4 1%	0 0	0 0	(2) 2%	(2) 1%	
Totals		417	(116) 100%	(53) 100%	(91)	(217)	(46)

¹ The question was: "Did something specific happen which made you decide to engrave your valuables (and display the sticker), such as a crime in the area, reading or hearing about crime, information from the Crime Prevention Bureau, or anything else like this?"

Table 11
Reasons for Not Participating

	City totals (weighted N)%	SLA %	CPB %	ADJ %	City %	Special CPB %
No information about it	40	39	36	40	40	26
Haven't had time	16	16	9	18	16	21
Would not help	18	20	22	22	17	14
Is not necessary	16	16	21	13	16	24
"Just haven't," lazy, other general excuses	5	5	5	6	5	7
Distrust police, CPB	-	.4	0	0	0	0
It would encourage crime	1	.4	2	0	1	0
Other	5	3	5	1	5	8

Table 12

Reasons for Not Attending Meeting Given by Persons
Who Knew Meeting Had Been Held

	City totals (weighted N)	SLA %	CPB %	N.E. Portland %	Remainder of city %	Special CPB sample %
Did not know at the time	24	24	18	19	25	10
Busy	53	48	36	47	54	60
No crime here	3	0	0	5	3	
Would not help	8	15	27	16	5	10
Antagonism toward neighbor calling the meeting	2	3	0	3	2	
Not invited	4	3	0		5	
Other	6	7	19	10	6	20

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