



HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

A HISTORY OF
THE ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM



38683

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

MTR-6623

NATIONAL-LEVEL EVALUATION
A HISTORY OF
THE ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM

by

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NOV 1975

JAN 1 1977

THE MITRE CORPORATION

DECEMBER 1975

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice


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ABSTRACT

This document reconstructs the history of the LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program in Atlanta and represents one element of an overall, eight-city, program history. The effort is being undertaken by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and The MITRE Corporation as part of a nation-wide evaluation of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program presently in operation. The document provides a narrative of key issues, events and decisions which shaped the program in Atlanta.

MITRE Department
and Project Approval:



PREFACE

Scope and Purpose

This is one among a series of case studies describing key events which took place and decisions which were made in each of the eight Impact cities and in Washington, D. C. during the course of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The case studies, together with a report viewing the program from a national perspective, will comprise Task 8 of the national-level evaluation of the Impact program; they are intended to help answer the three questions which form the basis of the national-level evaluation effort, namely:

- What happened - in terms of planning and implementation processes - when the LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-specific planning and evaluation?
- What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?
- What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

This case study focuses on key program-level, rather than project-level, events. The word "key" is deserving of special emphasis here. In no way does this report pretend to stand as a day-by-day chronology of events; rather, it attempts to describe those decisions and events which have seemed most significant during the time period which has passed since the Atlanta Impact program was begun.

General Research Procedures for the History Task

Visits were made to each of the main agencies of the Impact program structure - the Regional Office of the LEAA, the State Planning Agency, and the city organization known as the Crime Analysis Team - to obtain information relevant to the task. The files of each agency were searched, and memoranda and correspondence concerning meetings held, decisions made, and progress achieved or problems encountered in the course of the program were selected. Documents were also obtained from relevant offices of the Washington headquarters of the LEAA.

Interviews were held with key members of the Impact program bureaucracy. Depending upon the respondent, one of two techniques was used. In the first case, a semi-structured interview schedule had been constructed to obtain from the respondent a chronological description

of Impact program events. The questions also included certain functional areas such as "interagency coordination" which encompass a continuous series of discrete events and seemed likely to be best captured in summary, rather than chronological, form. In some cases, the interview schedule was followed quite closely.

In other cases, the interview was begun with a few background questions about functional areas, such as the organization of the CAT, and led up to a request that the respondent recreate for the interviewer the history of the program as he himself knew it or had heard it from others. The respondent was asked, in effect, to place himself back in time to when he first joined the program and tell how events seemed to him as they unfolded. The role of the interviewer was to use his basic knowledge of the program to keep the narrative on a chronological track and occasionally to ask the respondent to amplify or explain a statement. When the narrative was finished, the interviewer would ask a few questions to fill in gaps which seemed immediately apparent.

Several rules have been followed in the presentation of the findings of this study. Information derived from written records has been attributed to its source. However, in the interests of confidentiality, the sources of quotations drawn from interviews have not been cited. Finally, since the personal identities of the actors are less important than their institutional positions, they are identified, wherever possible, by their organizational titles rather than by name.

Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the case method are well known. In terms of the most generally accepted paradigm of social science research, the case method is open to the charges that it deals with the specific rather than the general, is descriptive rather than analytic, and leaves so much to the discretion and judgment of the researcher that validation of the data and replication of the study are impossible.

There are more specific problems with this particular study which must be recognized. The validity of the information acquired through interviews is open to question because they were conducted at least eighteen months after the program began and the recollections of the respondents may not always have been reliable. On the other hand, too little time may have elapsed before the interviews were conducted. The program was in full operation while the study was being carried out. After an evaluator has come and gone, the participants in a program still need to carry on with very real personal and political relationships to accomplish their jobs. Thus, some of the respondents may have perceived certain information at their disposal as sensitive in nature and some reservation on their part was probably inevitable.

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In the case of written records, three problems are apparent. The tone and degree of selectivity of some documents led to the conclusion that they had as their purpose not only the recording of the "facts" but also the providing of a rationale for a past or future decision. Moreover, some documents were not strictly contemporaneous but rather constituted written summaries of prior events. Thus, the passage of time may well have affected the emphases of the writer. Finally, it is probably a condition of bureaucratic life that the more routine and non-problematic the events, the fewer the memoranda and letters generated by the actors. When conflicts arise and issues are drawn, the formal and informal communications among those responsible for a program will normally increase. Thus, available records are more likely to reflect "problems" or management crises about which decisions are difficult and which tend to be forced upon the organizational hierarchy and thereby generate even more paperwork. The danger here is that the researcher would conclude that a particular program was characterized solely by one problem after another. Yet, there is a routine "everyday life" in any human activity, political and otherwise, which is no less real and important than are conflict and crises.

The Utility of the Case Method

In many ways, however, the very characteristics of the method which weaken it serve as its strengths. While the following report is long on description and short on analysis, its level of detail should be sufficient to permit the reader to draw his own conclusions from what is here presented rather than force him to accept solely the frame of reference of the writers. The study attempts to deal with social and political life on its own terms. To a large extent, the participants were taken at their own written or spoken words. Their definitions of reality, their statements of problems, their qualitative judgments, were reported but not to any significant degree analyzed for their "objective" validity. Eventually, the findings of the case studies will be synthesized and analyzed for their overall significance. In the meantime, it is hoped that the events described in each of the studies can usefully speak for themselves.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The selection of Atlanta, a city not listed among the 38 first given consideration for inclusion in the LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program, was a bitterly contested decision which resulted in a civil action being brought against the LEAA on behalf of Miami, Florida, another eligible city located within the geographic area under the oversight of the Region IV Office of the LEAA. In a subsequent motion to dismiss the action brought against it, the LEAA presented a full complement of data to indicate that its choice of Atlanta over Miami had been the product of considerable analysis and had not been arrived at in either an arbitrary or capricious manner.

Very shortly after the public announcement of Atlanta's selection as an Impact city, there developed a misunderstanding over the definition of the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government involved in the administration of the Impact program. The major dimensions around which the role issue revolved were four in number and are stated as follows:

- (1) whether the mayor had the primary authority to determine how Impact funds would be spent;
- (2) whether Fulton County, in particular, would have a formal role in the Impact decision-making structure;
- (3) whether the role of the state was to review individual Impact plans and projects on the basis of their merits or merely to ensure their compatibility with the state's comprehensive criminal justice plan; and
- (4) whether the Region IV Office or the Washington Office of the LEAA would have the primary responsibility for resolving these conflicts.

Despite numerous communications among policy-level officials involved in the Atlanta Impact program, the issue of "who had the power to do what" was left unresolved for some time. Clearly, some of the problems which developed in the early months of the Atlanta program were due to the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. Moreover, there were "objective" circumstances in the environment of Impact program planners which increased the probability that individual personality characteristics would have some effect upon the management of the program. The major contributory circumstances were three in number and may be stated as follows: First, the Impact program was unprecedented in form and content. Second, Impact was an action-oriented, demonstration program; the planning process had an emergency quality to it and time was in too short supply. Finally, Impact was viewed as having been formulated in a highly non-structured context. Thus, key Impact participants found themselves in a totally unfamiliar setting in which

they could not depend upon prior experience or institutional norms to define their individual roles.

It was precisely due to the problems just enumerated that the Region IV Administrator of the LEAA found it necessary to make a series of key policy decisions, by August 15, 1972, to salvage the Atlanta Impact effort, at that time floundering because of "differences of approach, communications problems and hostilities at all levels."

Much of the early Atlanta Impact difficulty centered on the locus of the Crime Analysis Team. As originally constituted within the Atlanta Regional Commission's organizational structure, the CAT was to have responsibility for developing, administering, evaluating and coordinating Atlanta's Impact program. As such, it was agreed that the CAT would be a distinct entity within the ARC structure. This agreement, in the view of the Regional Office of the LEAA, was never adequately adhered to by the ARC. By the end of the first two years of the Atlanta program, the ARC-CAT had lost much of its credibility because of "inadequate work" being done and "information [being] withheld" and an inability to trace accountability to any one individual in the ARC structure. This dissatisfaction led to a move, during July 1974, to transfer the CAT functions wholly to the City of Atlanta. This transfer was accomplished as of January 1, 1975.

Under Impact, Atlanta implemented 22 projects and received LEAA funds totalling \$18,049,471. The police, only criminal justice system component over which the city maintains sole jurisdiction, received awards amounting to \$11,325,213 or 63 percent. Juvenile and adult corrections received \$5,175,151 or 28 percent of all awarded funds. Atlanta's five planning grants amounted to \$1,192,879 or seven percent of the total Impact awards. This means that Atlanta expended less than two percent of Impact monies on projects which the city functionally classified as either courts (\$135,585) or the community (\$220,643).

One of the areas where the Atlanta program received consistently good marks from all governmental levels reviewing the Crime Analysis Team's efforts was that of evaluation. The Georgia Institute of Technology performed all of the project-level evaluation work done by Atlanta until June 1975 when the second of its two evaluation contracts expired. The decision to contract for rather than develop an in-house evaluation capability was made by the ARC because of its perception of the nature of its commitment to Impact (i.e., a short-term, one-time commitment to a program which would be phased out after a three-year period).

On October 30, 1974 the Crime Analysis Team was incorporated into the City of Atlanta governmental structure by Special Ordinance. The new CAT, housed in the Office of the Mayor, was to serve the chief

administrative officials and the City Council as an omnibus criminal justice planning and evaluation unit. The new Team became fully staffed in April 1975, and as presently constituted has 18 staff members, making it the largest Crime Analysis Team currently in existence across the Impact cities. The new agency has been institutionalized as a full fledged staff to the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

As this program history is brought to a conclusion, the Atlanta CAT is bustling with activity, and relationships between the CAT and the SPA/RO appear to be markedly improved. Atlanta, although having successfully institutionalized what is presently the largest criminal justice planning and evaluation capability in the entire Impact program, faces yet another problem. The final Impact projects awarded in Atlanta did not become operational until August 1975 and those projects, according to the CAT director, "will come nowhere near spending all the money by the September 1976 cutoff date." Consequently, negotiations are now underway with the LEAA to extend the cutoff date, wholly for the purpose of expenditure.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The High Impact Anti-Crime Program

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program, announced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in January 1972, represented a noticeable departure from prior agency policy in at least two ways. First, previous LEAA programs had generally been directed toward improvement of the criminal justice system. Grant monies had been spent mainly on modernizing equipment, training personnel and refining the operational techniques of criminal justice agencies. The Impact program defined its goals in terms of crime rather than of the criminal justice system. It had dual purposes: the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary in the Impact cities by 5 percent in two years and 20 percent in five years, and the demonstration of the utility of the comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process. This process includes an analysis of the victims, offenders, and environment of the Impact target crimes; an elaboration of the cities' crime problems in quantified terms; the development of a set of programs and projects to address them; and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects and programs implemented. Second, the program represented a marked change in the character of the administration of LEAA discretionary funds which previously had been parceled out in small amounts but would now be concentrated largely in a single program thrust.

The Impact program was carried out in the cities of Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and St. Louis. The criteria for their selection were as follows:

- (a) Since it was assumed that the funds available would have little measurable effect upon the largest cities and because the target crimes were less frequent in cities with populations below 250,000, only cities with populations between 250,000 and 1,000,000 were considered for inclusion in the program.
- (b) The overall crime rate and statistics for robbery and burglary of each city in this population category were examined.

- (c) To assure geographic distribution no more than one city was to be selected for each LEAA region.
- (d) In those regions where the above criteria resulted in more than one eligible city, the final selection was based on an assessment of the city's ability to manage the program.

Time would show that each of the eight Impact cities would respond in its own way to the policy guidelines established by the LEAA for the management of the program. However, there were a number of activities which were expected of all the cities and these serve as a convenient means to organize their program histories. Each city was expected to:

- (a) Distribute and analyze a questionnaire which had been devised by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to provide a basic store of information upon which to build its crime-oriented plan.
- (b) Establish a Crime Analysis Team (CAT) as the organizational mechanism for the coordination of the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the Impact program.
- (c) Develop an application for the funds made available by the National Institute to carry out the planning and evaluation functions. The application was to include a "plan of operation" for the CAT which would describe how it intended to develop a master plan and organize its evaluation function.
- (d) Gather data for and carry out program evaluation at the local level.
- (e) Develop a master plan for the program within a crime-oriented planning framework.
- (f) Coordinate the development of projects, monitor their implementation, and evaluate their effectiveness.

In a policy sense, decision-making authority was to be shared by the appropriate representatives of the President of the United States, the Governor of the state, and the mayor of the city. The Regional Administrator, the SPA director, and the CAT director or the mayor were personally to form a "partnership" responsible for program policy in their Impact city. A "Policy Decision Group" composed of three

high-level officials in the LEAA Washington headquarters would serve to oversee the consistency of the program nationally.

At the operational level, the decision-making apparatus directly concerned with the Impact program included the Crime Analysis Team (CAT), the State Planning Agency (SPA), and the Regional Office (RO) of the LEAA. The actual roles of each would vary in style and substance. The SPA's role in discretionary grant programs had been to serve as a conduit for grant funds from the Regional Office to local agencies and as a financial monitor. They could not, as it were, veto discretionary grant proposals. Under the Impact program, many SPAs would be asked to assume a role in the decision-making process that would prove to be more active and influential than had traditionally been the case under the discretionary grant program. Finally, the Regional Office of the LEAA had been delegated the final authority to approve Impact plans and projects.

Initially, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) was designated as the locus for the Crime Analysis Team and would continue in that role until June 1974. The ARC had been established in 1971 and combined four existing local planning units into an "umbrella" agency responsible for comprehensive regional planning in a variety of program areas. In the field of criminal justice, the ARC was responsible for carrying out regional planning for the LEAA's block grant program. By the summer of 1974, when the Atlanta program would be in its third year of operation, a crisis would develop relative to the continuation of the CAT function in Atlanta. This crisis would be resolved by the transfer of the Team to the Mayor's Office as a city agency, by greater ensuing cooperation among the key actors involved (i.e., the Mayor of Atlanta, the Regional Administrator of the LEAA, and the RO and SPA coordinators) and by the successful institutionalization of a city-sponsored Crime Analysis Team.

At the state level, the organizational title of the SPA is the Georgia State Crime Commission. While the Commission's role might easily have been limited to the provision of overall policy guidance to its professional staff through its executive director, this was not the case for at least two reasons. First, when Impact began, the chairman of the Commission also served as executive director of a powerful citizens group, called the Metropolitan Atlanta Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency, and he would opt to take an active, personal role in the early management of Atlanta's Impact program. And second, the Commission, principally through its current executive director and Impact coordinator, would take its Impact responsibilities very seriously, performing detailed monitoring reviews, and often rejecting proffered ideas for funding when these did not meet with the agreed programmatic framework for Impact. The SPA's voice, however, could have been effectively muted had there not been backing for its recommendations at the Regional Office level. This would result in a vastly more active Impact role for the SPA than occurred in the city programs where the state role was basically fiscal monitoring and the nearly automatic certification of grants for approval.

1.2 The Context of the Atlanta Impact Program

Throughout the 1960s, Atlanta was successful in cultivating an image both as a thriving commercial center of unlimited opportunity and as a community with a progressive, pragmatic record in race relations. These phenomena appear to have been at least partially related to the manner in which the city allegedly made public policy decisions. Atlanta had served as the basis for "Regional City" in the study by Floyd Hunter which had made the term "power structure" briefly respectable in the mainstream of orthodoxy in the social sciences. Although the concept would eventually be discredited by many academicians, there were residents of Atlanta--especially those who would have been participants in such a system--who remained convinced that the

decisions which counted were indeed within the province of the few rather than the many. Thus, former Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., could remember how it was in the sixties:

We were the presidents of the five major banks, the heads of the Atlanta headquartered industries like Coca-Cola, the presidents of the three utilities, the heads of the three or four top retail establishments, the managers of the leading national firm branches in the Southeast....

Banker Mills Lane got the stadium project rolling...banker Ed Smith made it possible for my second bond issue to be understood by the public and passed. Robert Woodruff of Coca-Cola endorsed with anonymous gifts nearly every critical fund-raising drive to come up...bank President Billy Sterne made Economic Opportunity Atlanta the strongest anti-poverty program in America...department store executive Dick Rich spear-headed attempts at rapid transit....

In every case, all I had to do was suggest that Atlanta had a need, ask a member of the "power" structure to look after it, and merely sit back and wait until it was done...whether we were sincerely liberal is inconsequential. We succeeded in Atlanta because we were realistic.(1)

As Atlanta entered the 1970s, however, the situation would begin to change. For the first time, blacks would comprise the largest segment of the population, and almost immediately, the effect of their majority status could be felt in Atlanta politics. For example, the winning mayoral candidate in the 1969 election, had successfully wooed Atlanta's black electorate. Significantly, he was not known to have especially strong established ties with the business community. Then, in 1973, Atlanta became the first major southern city to elect a black mayor. The rules of the game of local decision-making seemed no longer to hold,⁽²⁾ and if evidence of the influence of the Atlanta business community upon the Impact program were to be sought, it would be hard indeed to find.

There was, however, at least one factor in the larger political environment of Atlanta which seems to have had some bearing upon the

program and its management. 1973 was a local election year in which crime was an ever-present issue. The incumbent mayor was a candidate for reelection. At various times during 1972 and 1973, he pointed to the Impact program as an example of his ability to bring resources to bear upon a grave public problem. He also expressed impatience with delays in the implementation of the program.⁽³⁾ As electoral politics intensified, he would be accused by his opponents of having failed to act quickly enough to address the crime problem.⁽⁴⁾ These circumstances, reinforced by the media in their editorial role, created pressures which did not escape the Impact program bureaucracy.

In the more immediate environment of the Atlanta Impact program, that is, within the criminal justice system itself, there were a number of noteworthy factors which would appear to have shaped the program. In the first place, as in most municipalities, the only element of the system entirely within the jurisdiction of the city was the police department. All other functions were carried out or shared by Fulton County and the State of Georgia. Second, the police department was in the midst of change. A new chief would assume command in March 1972. His predecessor had, in the words of one observer, "run the department out of his back pocket" for many years and the new chief would be faced with the need to modernize the department at the same time that he had to develop an institutional response to the Impact program. It should also be noted that the Atlanta police chief did not serve at the pleasure of the mayor. He held office for a fixed term and could only be removed by an extraordinary majority of the Board of Aldermen. The formal position of the police chief in the local governmental structure, when combined with the personality and style of the incumbent, was to make the police chief a relatively independent and occasionally controversial political figure as the Impact program was being carried out.

The prior personal and political relationships of those involved in the management of the Atlanta Impact program also had no small effect upon its management. For example, the executive director of the Atlanta Regional Commission and the chairman of the State Crime Commission (SCC) were said to have had a history of personal and political conflict. When the Impact program began in Atlanta, the SCC chairman had only recently failed to obtain an expected appointment to an ARC criminal justice advisory body. The expressed reason was that for the latter official to serve in an advisory capacity at this point in the decision-making process while continuing to maintain final authority over LEAA block grant plans and programs in his office as chairman of the State Crime Commission, appeared to constitute a conflict of interest. The relationship between the two officials was not improved by this decision, however. Those interviewed believed that there also existed a certain institutional and professional rivalry between the two agencies. One local observer suggested that such a problem is common in the relationship between any regional agency--which is likely to see itself as "closer" to local problems--with a state agency. A further conflict existed between the City of Atlanta and Fulton County, which were said to have a tradition of political conflict; recent efforts by the city to annex portions of the county had only added to the atmosphere of city/county hostility.

In sum, linkages between the larger socio-economic and political environment and the shape and direction of the Atlanta Impact program were not immediately apparent. This is to say that the larger social and political cleavages which divided the community as a whole were not obviously reflected in the policy and program choices of the Impact program bureaucracy. In the main, the political conflicts which underlay the program in Atlanta were fought out within a more narrow framework. The heavy involvement of the county and state, the history of city/county conflict, the absence of a single authoritative

focal point for the one criminal justice system function carried out in its entirety by the city itself, and the problematic relationships between the Atlanta Regional Commission and the State Crime Commission, all combined to make the politics of the Atlanta Impact program the politics of inter-governmental relations.

2.0 THE PROGRAM BEGINS

2.1 Atlanta is Selected

Atlanta, the eventual Impact city choice for Region IV, was not listed among the 38 cities given prime consideration for the High Impact Anti-Crime Program. As Table I demonstrates, Miami, Jacksonville, and Tampa, three Florida cities also nominated as possible Impact choices, along with three other Region IV cities (i.e., Louisville, Kentucky, Birmingham, Alabama and Memphis, Tennessee) can all be found among the 38, with Miami having a total Index crime rate ranking of 7, placing it ahead of all other final Impact selections except Newark, St. Louis and Denver. Despite Atlanta's absence from the list, LEAA headquarters, by December 1971, had narrowed the field (in Region IV) to Atlanta and Miami. A month earlier, the director of the LEAA's statistics division had suggested a choice between Atlanta and Tampa. He perceived Miami, despite its having satisfied the Impact crime rate requirements, as a less than good choice for two reasons. First, he believed that Miami's metropolitan governmental structure would make it politically difficult to limit the Impact program to the city proper. Second, he believed that implementation of the program in Miami would require funding the Miami Beach and Dade County police as well as the Miami municipal police.⁽⁵⁾ The Regional Administrator, though, on November 23, "strongly recommended" against Tampa and suggested that Jacksonville or Miami become the Region IV choice. Regarding Miami, the RA stated his belief that his office could overcome both the political and administrative impediments in Miami foreseen by the LEAA headquarters. Washington's response was to rule out Jacksonville, ostensibly because of its relatively low ranking on the robbery and burglary selection criteria and to recommend that "if we do not go with Atlanta, still the first choice...we should go along with Miami."⁽⁶⁾

The task of the Regional Office now was to make exploratory visits to both cities to ascertain their willingness and ability to administer

TABLE I
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR IMPACT CITIES *

CITY AND STATE	TOTAL INDEX CRIME		ROBBERY	BURGLARY	POPULATION
	RATE	RANK	RATE	RATE	RANK
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY (2**)	1		2	3	24
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA(9)	2		6	7	7
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA(9)	3		8	1	25
WASHINGTON, D. C. (3)	4		1	4	3
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI(7)	5		4	2	12
DENVER, COLORADO(8)	6		15	5	19
MIAMI, FLORIDA(4)	7		5	9	28
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND(3)	8		3	18	1
PORTLAND, OREGON(10)	9		13	10	23
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS(1)	10		11	28	10
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA(3)	11		19	8	38
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA(6)	12		9	20	13
CLEVELAND, OHIO(5)	13		7	32	5
DALLAS, TEXAS(6)	14		20	12	2
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON(10)	15		16	6	16
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI(7)	16		10	13	20
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA(3)	17		12	26	18
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY(4)	18		18	29	26
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA(5)	19		14	16	21
TAMPA, FLORIDA(4)	20		24	14	34
PHOENIX, ARIZONA(9)	21		29	11	14
HONOLULU, HAWAII(9)	22		36	17	31
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA(3)	23		22	27	36
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA(4)	24		25	15	17
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA(5)	25		17	19	32
AKRON, OHIO(5)	26		27	30	35
COLUMBUS, OHIO(5)	27		23	25	15
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA(9)	28		31	24	37
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA(9)	29		21	22	27
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA(4)	30		37	31	33
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS(6)	31		32	23	9
FORT WORTH, TEXAS(6)	32		28	21	22
TULSA, OKLAHOMA(6)	33		35	34	29
OMAHA, NEBRASKA(7)	34		30	36	30
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE(4)	35		33	33	11
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA(9)	36		34	37	8
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA(5)	37		26	35	4
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN(5)	38		38	38	6

* 1970 RANKINGS OF TOTAL INDEX CRIME RATE, ROBBERY RATE, BURGLARY RATE AND POPULATION FOR 38 CITIES 250,000 TO 1,000,000 POPULATION

**THE NUMBER IN PARENTHESES DENOTES THE LEAA REGION IN WHICH EACH CITY IS LOCATED.

(SOURCE: STATISTICS DIVISION, LEAA, SEPTEMBER 1971.)

the Impact program. On December 21, Regional Office officials met with the Mayor of Atlanta, the SPA director, the executive director of the Atlanta Regional Commission, and other city and state officials to discuss the program. The mayor agreed that the program would be carried out within the framework of the state criminal justice planning system and that the city would make matching funds available. The mayor proposed that the Atlanta Regional Commission carry out the Crime Analysis Team functions required by the ground rules of the program because the City of Atlanta did not possess the necessary planning and evaluation capability. Besides, he reasoned, the ARC was already responsible for LEAA block grant planning for the Atlanta metropolitan region; and it possessed in-house resources, such as a data center, which tied in with the requirements of the Impact crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process.⁽⁷⁾ A formal expression of interest in the Impact program came from the mayor to the Regional Administrator on December 23, 1971.⁽⁸⁾

On January 7, 1972, the Regional Administrator informed the LEAA headquarters that a similar visit to Miami had confirmed his earlier belief that Miami/Dade County had the highest probability of successfully implementing the program and that Miami was still the "overwhelming choice" of the Regional Office. He further recommended that the program area include all of Dade County, an alternative which had been ruled out a month previously by the LEAA because the county did not meet the statistical criteria for the selection of Impact cities and because of potential administrative difficulties in dealing with the 18 separate police agencies within the county.⁽⁹⁾ However, the LEAA headquarters staff appear to have remained unconvinced that the program could be made to work in Miami/Dade County, and the final list of Impact cities included Atlanta rather than Miami.⁽¹⁰⁾

The selection of Atlanta over Miami would continue to be bitterly contested for some time, and did, in fact, result in a civil action being brought against the LEAA on behalf of Miami. In the suit, filed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, a nonprofit corporation, called The Police Civil Action Association of Florida Inc., requested that federal assistance to the City of Atlanta under the Impact program be enjoined and the LEAA be ordered "to grant such funds as have been allocated for the LEAA Region IV to the City of Miami, Florida." The plaintiff alleged that Miami had been denied participation in the program because of an "arbitrary and capricious decision" of the LEAA to grant federal assistance to Atlanta.

In its subsequent motion to dismiss the action brought against it, the LEAA would provide additional data to explain its selection of Atlanta, and would ask that the suit be dismissed, principally, because the action it had taken was implicit in the discretionary authority of then LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard. In part, the LEAA statement contained the following additional data regarding the selection of Atlanta over Miami:

Four cities were tentatively considered for federal assistance in LEAA Region IV: Atlanta, Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville. All of the cities initially considered suffered serious crime problems, defined as more than 3500 index crimes per 100,000 population...As previously announced by the Administration, only one city of the four could be finally selected for federal assistance. In the exercise of his discretionary authority, the Administrator determined that the City of Atlanta should be awarded grants under the program. This determination was based upon the judgement of the Administrator that the program would be most effectively implemented, if Atlanta were chosen as the demonstration area in LEAA Region IV....Several factors led to this determination. While the crime rate present in Miami...exceeded that of Atlanta, both were confronted with serious crime problems. In terms of measuring the results of the program, once implemented, Atlanta seemed the more desirable of the two candidates. At one level of analysis, serious crime appeared to be contained in Atlanta proper, whereas in Miami serious crime was evident not only in the city, but in

surrounding communities. In effect, serious crime "spilled-over" from the metropolitan Miami area into adjacent localities. If crime (i.e., robbery and burglary) were to be substantially reduced in incidences, any program which addressed the City of Miami would also have to consider the crime problems of the surrounding area....Since serious crime was not contained within the city, federal assistance would have also been required for the neighboring communities: Dade County, North Miami, North Miami Beach, and Miami Beach. On the other hand, serious crime was isolated in the City of Atlanta. The "spill-over" effect of serious crime did not appear evident in Atlanta's surrounding localities. Federal assistance could be concentrated on the City of Atlanta, and the results of the program more easily discerned. As a demonstration project, the program, if implemented in Atlanta, would have a more visible effect, because the metropolitan crime problem appeared isolated and, therefore, less subject to influence by factors beyond the control of the city. Greater program effectiveness could be expected, as a consequence, in the City of Atlanta than would have been the case, had Miami been chosen as the grantee....

In addition, the jurisdictional capability of Atlanta's law enforcement system appeared greater than that of Miami. The City of Atlanta provided the police administration for Fulton County, whereas no similar grant of jurisdictional and administrative authority appeared to be the case in Miami....Even were there to be a serious crime problem in the adjacent community, Atlanta might then adequately deal with the contingency without the necessity of federal assistance for other communities. In Miami, where the "spill-over" effect of serious crime was evident, no such jurisdictional authority existed. To deal with the serious crime problem in Miami, other communities would have to be granted federal assistance. However, the Administration had previously announced that no more than one city would be selected for federal grants in any one LEAA Region. Assistance could not be granted other communities, then, without changing the program's basic premise. Moreover, if more than one community or city were chosen for federal assistance, this would require increased administrative efforts in obtaining a coordinated and cooperative implementation of the program.

It was, therefore, the Administrator's determination that the City of Atlanta receive federal assistance under the program to "ensure the most effective implementation of the program," for federal aid would then be concentrated "in an urban area with a comparatively isolated serious crime problem avoiding the scattered, spill-over effect" of the crime present in such cities as Miami....(11)

In sum, it appeared that the LEAA Administrator's choice of Atlanta over Miami was the product of some analysis and had not been arrived at in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The Florida court would eventually rule in favor of the LEAA, indicating, too, that the LEAA Administrator's decision had been made in accordance with the law as well as the previously announced Impact program guidelines.

2.2 The "Role Issue" Surfaces

Very shortly after the public announcement of the selection of Atlanta as an Impact city, there developed a misunderstanding over the definition of the roles and responsibilities of the various levels of government involved in the administration of the Impact program. What came to be called the "role issue" by the Regional Office had several dimensions. These included, first, whether the mayor had the primary authority vis-a-vis Fulton County and the State of Georgia to determine how Impact funds would be spent. From the mayor's point of view, the issue was whether he possessed a "veto" power over Impact policies and programs. Conversely, the controversy could be stated in terms of whether Fulton County, in particular, would have a formal role in the Impact decision-making structure. (Atlanta is almost wholly in Fulton County; however, a small portion of the city lies within Dekalb County.) Another question was whether the role of the state was to review individual Impact plans and projects on the basis of their merits or merely to ensure their compatibility with the state's comprehensive criminal justice plan. The second issue revolved around whether the Regional Office or the Washington Office of the LEAA would have the primary responsibility for resolving these conflicts.

Many of those interviewed recall that, at the very beginning of the program, the city's role was believed to be paramount. The public was said to believe that "the mayor had gone to Washington to get a big green bag full of money." Further, "...the city caught certain catchwords--within corporate limits, 20 million dollars, reduce crime,

and then inferred it was 'our' program. The mayor thought he was the boss." Again, "There was a lot of publicity about the program and an immediate hassle. The mayor said it was the city's money...." The mayor, in effect, imagined that he would receive a check for \$20 million "payable to (himself)." (12)

One of those interviewed suggested that this impression came about because the mayor attended only the promotional session announcing the program where little was said about its detailed implementation. As a result, "he came away with the impression that the cities were getting \$20 million each....Only later did he understand there were guidelines and restrictions. This led to some disillusionment."

A second explanation would refer to some "misimpressions" that had been made at the time of the announcement because "the announcement was made prior to all details being worked out and some top-level federal statements concerning the program were inaccurate." One such misunderstanding was the mayor's belief that "the city government would receive all the program funds and spend them completely as the city thought fit." (13)

A third factor may have been the play given the program by the Atlanta press. One respondent suggested that "the press played a big role in giving the impression that the mayor had \$20 million to do whatever he wanted with. The mayor thought he had a God-given right to it. The paperwork was purely incidental." One circumstance, in particular, appears to have contributed mightily to the media's belief that Impact was the "mayor's program." This was the extent to which the mayor pointed to the importance of his own intervention in the Impact city selection process. The press package released by the Office of the Mayor on the day the Impact program was officially launched claimed that:

In the initial announcement a month-and-a-half ago, Atlanta was not included in the cities to be considered. This prompted an energetic appeal from the Mayor's Office to the local office of LEAA for consideration. In addition, support was obtained from the Atlanta Regional Commission and the Metropolitan Atlanta Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency.

Mayor Massell, who had just been elected president of the National League of Cities, personally urged that Atlanta be included, pointing out that this city was in a unique position--not in having a crime problem, which is common to all urban areas--but in having recently made a solid commitment to upgrading the city's law enforcement.

This theme was picked up by the media. As a television editorial noted a week later:

Mayor Massell deserves great credit for going after and getting the money after Atlanta was written off in the early phases of this federal program that will be applied in eight cities. He gave Washington convincing evidence that the city is serious about reducing crime, and came home with \$20 million in federal funds to be spent over the next two years. (14)

The record would not seem to support the mayor's conclusion that his personal representations had a significant effect upon the selection process. As already discussed, Atlanta was under serious consideration by the LEAA's Washington headquarters for several weeks before the initial mention of the program to the press by the LEAA in late November 1971. Nevertheless, the impression that Atlanta owed its selection as an Impact city to the personal influence of the mayor would remain and would continue to be given credence by the local media until as late as September 1972.

While the mayor appeared to believe that the city or he personally would be principally responsible for setting the direction of the Impact program, the commissioners of Fulton County believed that the

make-up of the local criminal justice system required the county to play a substantial role in Impact program policy-making. Their position would later be expressed to the National Association of Counties when that organization formally protested to the LEAA Administrator the lack of involvement by counties in the planning and implementation of the Impact program. The county commissioners were "proud" of Atlanta's selection but "gravely concerned that Fulton County was not from the beginning included in the preliminary consideration or designated as a full and active partner in the program. Fulton County has always played and will continue to play, a major role in Atlanta's criminal justice system." The commission chairman went on to say, "Generally speaking, it is appalling to note how little consideration is given to counties by the federal government. Federal funds are always channeled to the cities to assist them in resolving their problems." (15) This position was reinforced by the comments of an ARC respondent who said, "The mistake in Washington is that they talk about 'cities' and not 'urban areas.' They forget that, in the South and West, counties are a very strong force constitutionally."

Although a formal statement from the Administrator of the LEAA, giving his Regional Administrators "primary cognizance" over the administration of the Impact program, would not be issued until February, the Regional Offices had already been given the authority to determine how the Impact program within their regions should be structured. At a December 23, 1971 meeting of Regional Administrators and the LEAA headquarters staff which included the LEAA Administrator, it was decided that "responsibility and authority for implementation, awards and grantee relations...are vested in the Regional Administrators..." The ROs, SPAs and cities would be responsible for "structuring the program." However, because there was "a great diversity of talent, stability and organization," it was understood that approaches would "differ among the cities." A discussion of "operations strategy"

resulted in the conclusion that "diversity is the premise, flexibility the general guide, within the announced goal."⁽¹⁶⁾ While overall "review and policy control" would be maintained in the LEAA's Policy Decision Group, the Regional Administrator in Atlanta appears to have believed that the rules of the game were such that he would be given the time and authority to work out a long-term solution to the growing inter-governmental political problems in Atlanta.

The Regional Administrator's strategy was based on the premise that the successful implementation of the Impact program in Atlanta would require the close cooperation of Fulton County and its formal participation in the Impact program structure, because many Impact projects would, in all probability, be carried out by county agencies and because traditional animosities between the city and county could, if not properly handled, seriously jeopardize the viability of the program. Thus, on January 24, the Regional Administrator addressed a letter to the mayor which, as he informed Washington headquarters, came about as a result of a "misunderstanding of relative roles in the Impact city program." On its face, the communication appears to be a formal letter of congratulations from the Regional Administrator to the mayor on the occasion of the city's selection as an Impact city and an outline of the steps which would be taken next to begin to implement the program. However, it seems significant that the very first step would be for the mayor to meet with the chairman of the Fulton County Commission "to lay the basis for the extensive staff work (which would) be necessary to create the...focal point for the crime analysis and evaluation..." within the Atlanta Regional Commission. Furthermore, after reminding the mayor that the State Planning Agency would subgrant and monitor all Impact grants, the Regional Administrator noted that Atlanta's selection for this "partnership effort" had been based upon the mayor's "recognition that the Atlanta Police Department's improvement alone (would not) result in a significant crime reduction. As we all know, there are other units of the

system involved in impacting crime and this approach to reduction of crime necessarily includes courts, prosecution, corrections, probation, juvenile court, treatment, public liaison, prevention and other, as yet unknown, items." Most of these "other units" of the system, of course, were under the jurisdiction of the county and state. Two days later, the Regional Administrator forwarded to the LEAA headquarters a copy of his letter to the mayor and a memorandum attesting to the need for a "cooperative effort" by the city and Fulton County since the county performed the major share of every local criminal justice function with the sole exception of the police department. He went on to "predict total failure in Atlanta if such an arrangement should not be feasible" and recommended that "if we cannot iron it out with the mayor (which I truly feel that we can, but only with strong backing), we then consider moving on to another city."⁽¹⁷⁾

Circumstances prevented the Regional Administrator from receiving the "strong backing" that he had requested. The following day, no doubt after the mayor received the Regional Administrator's letter (and probably before the LEAA headquarters received his memorandum asking for support in his efforts to work out a solution to the local political problems which seemed to threaten the success of the program), the mayor telephoned the Administrator of the LEAA to discuss the issue. That same day the LEAA Administrator informed all Regional Administrators of his understanding of the outcome of the call.

The LEAA Administrator stated the following:

[The Mayor of Atlanta] says the mayors have a veto. I refuse to proceed on a veto concept, but rather to proceed on the more affirmative partnership concept. This program is a partnership between the city, state and federal government. These three entities, represented by the appropriate appointees of the chief executives of each...form the partnership. They, in the end, must be responsible for obtaining the objective sought and responsive to program and project designs coming from the planning group which address the objectives.

Obviously, other agencies and levels of government--courts, corrections and county, etc., must be involved in the planning process because in many situations they will execute tactics and techniques required to obtain the objective.

It is appropriate, therefore, to advise the police chief, the sheriff, the county board or county commission chairman, the regional criminal justice chairman, etc., that although their comments and interest are not only welcome and necessary at the planning, program and coordination levels, they are not a member of the policy group [partnership] which must approve the overall program and its project components. (18)

On February 2, the mayor wrote to the LEAA Administrator to confirm his understanding of the telephone conversation, namely, that "we agreed that all programs and projects to be conducted under the Atlanta High Impact Anti-Crime Program must have the approval of each of the following:

- (a) The President of the United States or his representative;
- (b) The Governor of Georgia or his representative;
- (c) The Mayor of Atlanta or his representative." (19)

On February 4, the Regional Administrator passed on to the mayor the substance of the LEAA Administrator's memorandum. The mayor's response was that his conversation with the LEAA Administrator had been "much less complicated and more to the point," and he attached to the statement received from the RA a copy of his letter "confirming that conversation" which in the mayor's view, set out in a "straightforward fashion" the agreement made between the LEAA Administrator and himself. (20)

The outcome of the conflict was summarized on February 3 by the Regional Administrator as follows:

The response of the mayor to his conversation with the LEAA Administrator was one of "positive acceptance."

Now that the mayor had "won his position" he might make a "peace offering" by conceding a non-voting membership on the Impact policy committee to the county commission

chairman, although this was doubted. In any event, the mayor would chair the Impact Task Force and the county commission chairman would be a member of it.

The Regional Administrator recognized that the peace was an "uneasy one at best" since the mayor was attempting to annex portions of Fulton County without a referendum, a move opposed by the county commission chairman and the residents of the county. He recommended that in the future, "flexibility be afforded as to the overall policy board composition" since the make-up of the criminal justice system in Atlanta required that the chairman of the county commission be part of the overall policy committee. (21)

Despite the numerous communications among policy-level officials involved in the Impact program during the first month of its existence, the issue of "who had the power to do what" was left unresolved and would surface again. It is true that the LEAA Administrator's intervention did nominally resolve the question of county participation in Impact policy decisions. As a practical matter, however, the Regional Office staff felt that the Administrator's decision left them with a situation which continued to "fester from day-to-day." Three months later, the RO coordinator could still speak of the "hostility between Fulton County and the City of Atlanta in matters regarding annexation and other administrative issues" as providing a "potential source of problems in the Impact program." (22) As of mid-June, the mayor still had not appointed the chairman of the county commissioners to the Task Force. The Regional Administrator perceived his failure to do so as a problem which needed to be addressed at a meeting of Impact program officials. (23) However, at this time, state and city officials indicated that no adverse word had been received from county officials regarding the mayor's lack of action. Perhaps the participation by county criminal justice officials on the Task Force, to some extent, may have assuaged whatever hostile feelings the county may have possessed toward the Impact program.

Although the LEAA Administrator's memorandum settled the issue of the manner of county participation in the program, it did not directly address the question of federal/state/city relationships in the Impact program. In fact, it circumvented entirely the other dimension to the mayor's claim to supremacy, namely, that since he, by virtue of his position as mayor, had to give his assent to Impact policies and programs, conversely, he would have a "veto" power over the Impact program. The LEAA Administrator had not addressed the question of what would happen if any one of the "three entities" which formed the "partnership" and which were "responsible for obtaining the objective sought and responsive to program and project designs coming from the planning group which address the objectives," did not agree with the other two "entities." The LEAA Administrator appears to have believed that a consensus would arise eventually if everyone proceeded on the basis of "the more affirmative partnership concept." From the point of view of the Regional Office, this belief was not well-grounded in political reality. Indeed, as early as mid-February it was clear to the Regional Administrator that the mayor still felt he had "a veto power by virtue of his comment that any program funded...must have the 'approval' of each of the three members of the policy committee." (24) In fact, the issue was resolved only temporarily by the mayor apparently having felt that he had "won his position" on his definition of his relationship to county, state, and federal officials involved in the program. The role issue would arise again six months later, albeit briefly and in another form.

There can be no denial of the significance of the "role issue," especially in the earlier stages of Atlanta Impact program planning and implementation. However, it can be reported that Impact program planners differed in their assessment of its importance. Some respondents at the state and local levels recall having felt that the


"saber rattling" of the mayor "would never come to much because decision-making in the program would be spread out over time so that any problems could be gradually worked out." From the point of view of the Regional Administrator, however, there was a possibility at the time that the conflict between the city and the county and the mayor's brandishing of his "veto power" would threaten the existence of the program.

The final test of the significance of the inter-governmental problems which surfaced in Atlanta in January 1972 would be whether they could be said to have had a discernible effect upon program implementation and administration; whether, for example, as a result of the friction between the mayor and county commissioners, county criminal justice officials refused outright or were reluctant to cooperate with Impact program planners. Concrete evidence, in answer to these major programmatic issues, would likely be forthcoming in the months ahead.

2.3 Preliminary Steps Are Taken: A Crime Analysis Team and an Impact Task Force Are Established


As these larger political problems temporarily receded in importance, a number of preliminary steps were taken during the months of February and March to begin the Impact program. On February 2, the mayor formally asked the Atlanta Regional Commission to house the Crime Analysis Team and carry out its functions. As originally constituted within ARC's organizational structure, the Crime Analysis Team would have responsibility for developing, administering, evaluating and coordinating Atlanta's Impact program, prescribed largely by the LEAA guidelines. Table II, Impact Program Relationships, and Table III, Crime Analysis Team Relationships, are attempts to reflect the large number of organizations and components of the criminal justice system with which the CAT was required to interface. It was hypothesized that the central role accorded the Crime Analysis Team would encourage

TABLE II
ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM RELATIONSHIPS



(SOURCE: ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM: PLAN OF OPERATION, AUGUST 1972.)

TABLE III
ATLANTA CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM RELATIONSHIPS



(SOURCE: ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM: PLAN OF OPERATION, AUGUST 1972.)

informational flow among and between the agencies it was to serve as an across-system coordinator. Reinforcing such a hypothesis was the fact that all the units of government responsible for the administration of the Atlanta Impact program were located in the city (a phenomenon which occurred in only one other Impact city: Denver, Colorado); this clearly should have facilitated information flow as well as inter-agency coordination. In point of fact, however, the very opposite appears to have occurred.

Atlanta's mayor had asked the ARC in early February to set up the framework for a Task Force to provide policy guidance to the program.⁽²⁵⁾ Regional Office, SPA, ARC, and city officials met five days later, on February 7, to discuss procedural approaches to the administration of the program and the data categories needed to define the robbery/burglary problem in Atlanta. The Regional Administrator reiterated the availability of \$25,000 for immediate drawdown by the ARC for start-up expenses and said the ARC would be informed of the procedures for applying for those funds as soon as they were developed. (Eventually the ARC would be asked to use the "short-form" application to obtain the funds. The application would be submitted to the Regional Office on March 3, and approved on April 3.) The ARC director indicated that the Crime Analysis Team would be a distinct entity within the ARC organization, separate from but coordinated with the existing regional criminal justice planning unit.⁽²⁶⁾ Other Impact-related activities during the month of February included the designation of a program coordinator by the SPA on February 16,⁽²⁷⁾ and the initial allocation of \$50,000 to the ARC and \$25,000 to the SPA for planning and evaluation of the Impact program on February 24.⁽²⁸⁾

The RO and SPA coordinators spent the first week of March in extensive discussions concerning an appropriate format for the Impact master plan. They based their conversations upon the State of

Georgia's guidelines for comprehensive plans, a privately prepared document on long-range criminal justice system planning, the Performance Management System guidelines developed by the Office of Management and Budget, and a summary of problems associated with prior LEAA planning. The result was a draft format of the master plan which was based largely upon SPA comprehensive plan guidelines.⁽²⁹⁾


In the meantime, the Atlanta Regional Commission management had recruited a potential CAT director. Its nominee had previous experience as the director of the Department of Public Safety in Lakewood, Colorado, and as the assistant director of the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina with responsibility for police administration programs. With the mayor's approval, he assumed his duties as CAT director on April 3.

That same day saw a number of orientation meetings among the Impact program personnel of the RO, SPA, and CAT.⁽³⁰⁾ The next day the RO coordinator wrote the CAT director to outline "a number of items which needed to be addressed on a priority basis." These included the selection of an Impact Task Force, the completion of the questionnaire developed by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and the implementation of the Performance Management System. The RO coordinator also felt that there was a need for a "game plan" to map out the efforts of the RO/SPA/CAT staffs over the coming months. The schedule would be best developed "in partnership to eliminate any unnecessary duplication of effort or possible neglect of some vital area." Finally, it was felt that a formal memorandum of agreement needed to be developed to "formalize the various roles and functions" of the agencies involved in the Impact program.⁽³¹⁾

The roles and responsibilities of Impact program participants became the subject of an all-day conference among the RO, SPA and CAT staffs on April 21. According to a Regional Office participant, the meeting "delineated and strengthened...the coordinating functions and decision-making authority of the SPA and RO coordinators....In effect, the absolute necessity for maintaining the regular SPA-LEAA communications channels was confirmed." The CAT director, though, had anticipated a more direct relationship with the RO. He expected "preliminary decisions to be made between the ARC and the SPA, with final decisions being generated directly between the ARC and the LEAA. This approach was completely rejected by the LEAA as contrary to the initial condition it had imposed that the Impact program be administered according to regular channels. ARC accepted this position." (32) The National Impact Coordinator also attended the meeting and concluded that it was "helpful in defining the working relationships" between the RO, SPA and CAT. In his words, "The CAT director...initially felt that he should deal directly with the Regional Office concerning Impact. It was explained that this type of circumvention was not compatible with LEAA/SPA tradition and policy." (33) The meeting also resulted in acceptance of the draft format of the Impact master plan which had been prepared by the RO and SPA coordinators.

Table IV depicts the organization of the Crime Analysis Team in Atlanta when Impact began. Thirteen full-time positions are accounted for in Table IV. Additionally, the narrative of the 1972 master plan indicates that the ARC was budgeting 1/6 of the time of its director of governmental services and of his secretary to Impact. Table V is the original budget proposed by the ARC to perform program planning and evaluation of Atlanta's Impact program. It sought support from the LEAA in the amount of \$970,010 for a 27 month period. Under professional services, the ARC budgeted a total of \$407,101. These funds would be used primarily to pay for professional consultants in

TABLE IV
ATLANTA CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM ORGANIZATION



(SOURCE: ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM: PLAN OF OPERATION, AUGUST 1972.)

TABLE V
ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM BUDGET

	<u>CAT</u>	<u>SPA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
PERSONNEL, FULL TIME PART TIME	\$327,320 5,000	\$ 90,638	\$422,958
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES			
INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANTS	4,185	2,916	7,101
GENERAL CONTRACTS	400,000		400,000
TRAVEL	22,040	7,500	29,540
EQUIPMENT	18,137	3,182	21,319
SUPPLIES & OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	68,328	20,764	89,092
TOTAL	<u>\$845,010</u>	<u>\$125,000</u>	<u>\$970,010</u>

(SOURCE: ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM: PLAN OF OPERATION, AUGUST 1972.)

the following areas: (a) information system development; (b) development of evaluation tools and techniques; (c) data analysis; and (d) public information. Interestingly, nowhere in the CAT organizational structure is anyone listed as having a direct association with program evaluation although it is listed among the program elements. In explanation, the revised master plan states:

The Model Cities Evaluation Institute suggests a minimum evaluation staff of seven persons for one large city. In addition, they suggest a minimum of four persons for computer support. The smallest [evaluation] staff suggested for a city is three to four persons plus survey-takers.

The necessity for additional...professional complementation will be accomplished through the use of consultants in predetermined areas as well as when circumstances and needs warrant their assistance....(34)

It was the ARC's intent to use the University of Georgia's Institute of Government to perform its overall program evaluation. As matters would develop, however, the Georgia Institute of Technology would become the principal evaluator of the Atlanta Impact program with one of the four original CAT assistant directors, a sociologist, serving as liaison between Georgia Tech and the ARC.

A final major step in creating the Impact program structure was the establishment of a Task Force to give policy guidance to the Impact program staff. On April 4, the Regional Office coordinator had reminded the CAT director that selection of a Task Force was a "top priority." Citing the example set by other Impact cities, which had designated sub-groups in the Task Force membership for police, courts and corrections, she informed the CAT director that prior to his arrival, it had been agreed that the mayor would appoint and chair the Task Force. Except for the selection of the CAT staff, the RO coordinator considered designation of the Task Force to be perhaps

the most important decision facing Atlanta and asked that the LEAA and the SPA be permitted to review the Task Force nominations and suggest additional types of representatives prior to the public announcement of its selection.

The Task Force membership was announced on May 11, and it met for the first time on May 15. Table VI contains the names and affiliations of each person named to the Task Force's executive committee and four sub-groups. With Mayor Sam Massell as chairman, the Task Force membership totaled 29 persons. Only Atlanta Chief of Police John Inman was appointed both to the Task Force and to its executive committee. Since the executive committee of the Task Force was to be responsible for providing "advisory counsel and assistance in arriving at the strategy and programs to be employed in reaching [Impact] goals," this dual appointment accorded the police chief could be interpreted as giving his agency an unfair advantage in the coming battle for Impact funds. The mayor, too, emphasized that the Impact program was an "Atlanta program," and that it was "essential not to lose sight of the fact that our specific goal is the reduction of crime in Atlanta." He referred to the LEAA Administrator's confirmation of the policy that "each program" funded under Impact must be approved by the President, the Governor of Georgia and the Mayor of Atlanta, or their representatives. It was, however, "absolutely necessary" that those concerned approach the problem "as a community of interest and as partners." (35)

The Task Force met again on May 25. The Regional Office coordinator described the Impact program and the functions of the Regional Office, which in addition to review authority, would include that of working closely with the CAT on a daily basis. The SPA coordinator described his role as that of a reviewer who would have a close daily working relationship with the CAT and provide liaison and technical

TABLE VI
ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM TASK FORCE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	
MAYOR SAM MASSELL, CHAIRMAN, CITY OF ATLANTA	
MR. GEORGE BERRY, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, CITY OF ATLANTA	
MR. RONALD G. LYNCH, DIRECTOR, ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM	
MR. LOYD K. HALL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR	
CHIEF JOHN INMAN, ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT	
SUB-GROUPS	
POLICE	COURTS
CHIEF F. D. HAND, JR. DEKALB COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT	JUDGE LUTHER ALVERSON SUPERIOR COURT ATLANTA
CHIEF JOHN INMAN ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT	JUDICIAL COURT
MR. IRA L. JACKSON CHAIRMAN, ALDERMANIC POLICE COMMITTEE	MR. K. BYRON ATRIDGE PRESIDENT, ATLANTA BAR ASSOCIATION
MR. C. C. MITCHELL PAST PRESIDENT, AFRO-AMERICAN PATROLMEN'S LEAGUE	MR. M. COOK BARWICK SOCIETY OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI
COL. RAY POPE COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY	MR. BERNARD PARKS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, METRO ATLANTA COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUGS
MR. K. LYNN TAYLOR PAST VICE PRESIDENT, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE	MR. HINSON MCAULIFFE SOLICITOR GENERAL, CRIMINAL COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
COL. W. F. BEARDSLEY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY	MR. LEWIS R. SLATON DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
	JUDGE ROBERT WALLING SUPERIOR COURT STONE MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CORRECTIONS	COMMUNITY SECURITY
MRS. GENEVIEVE HILL DEAN, ATLANTA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK	CHIEF HERBERT JENKINS CHIEF EMERITUS, ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT
MR. J. D. HUDSON DIRECTOR, CITY OF ATLANTA PRISON FARM	MR. JAMES R. LEIDGEN PRESIDENT, WELLS FARGO ARMORED SERVICE CORP.
MR. ELLIS MACDUGGALL COMMISSIONER, OFFENDER REHABILITATION	MR. DILLARD MURFORD TRUSTEE, METRO ATLANTA COMMISSION ON CRIME & JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
MRS. ROMAEE POWELL PAST PRESIDENT, GATE CITY BAR ASSOCIATION	MRS. EMILY B. GRIGSBY VICE PRESIDENT, GRAND JURORS ASSOCIATION OF FULTON COUNTY
MR. LEROY STYNCHOMBE SHERIFF, FULTON COUNTY	MR. ANDREW YOUNG CHAIRMAN, ATLANTA COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMMISSION
	MR. STEVE J. VAN CLEAVE VICE PRESIDENT ADVANCE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY INC.

(SOURCE: ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM: PLAN OF OPERATION, AUGUST 1972.)

assistance as necessary to the Regional Office and the CAT. The CAT director then outlined the contribution expected of the Task Force, that is, to provide "policy guidance in an advisory capacity" at each stage of the development of the program plan. The Task Force was also informed that it would be divided into four sub-Task Forces: police, corrections, courts and community security.⁽³⁶⁾ The meeting also saw the public information grant proposal passed by a voice vote.

At a CAT staff meeting on May 30, the Task Force was further defined as functioning on two levels: it would determine broad objectives, and to a lesser extent, review projects. The sub-Task Force members would act as advisors to develop the plan. An executive committee of the Task Force would approve grant requests.⁽³⁷⁾

Records indicate that the sub-Task Forces met with some frequency. However, the Task Force was described by some program participants as generally a "weak" group whose meetings were marked by poor attendance.

2.4 Data Problems Develop

During the month of April, the Impact program bureaucracy began to contend with what were perceived as serious deficiencies in the data available in Atlanta to perform crime-specific analysis. It was clear to the Regional Office staff that carrying out the Impact program would require changes in the reporting and records systems of all local criminal justice agencies involved in the program.⁽³⁸⁾

However, both the Regional Office and the ARC staff recognized that the police department information system remained the key element because its crime reports would be used both to define the crime problem and to measure whether Impact program goals had been reached.

A survey completed a year previously by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) had pointed out a number of deficiencies in what it called an "out-dated" information system in the Atlanta Police Department. Although the new police chief had publicly committed himself to following the IACP recommendations, it appeared that he had not yet acted on his promise.⁽³⁹⁾ The Regional Office believed that the implementation of the IACP recommendations had to be addressed at the "earliest possible date."⁽⁴⁰⁾

On April 20, the RO staff and the CAT director met with police department planners and on April 24, with the chief of police himself, to discuss the problem, the chief was said to have made a "complete commitment" to make the necessary changes in the department's reporting system. The Regional Office's position was that while LEAA had provided, and would continue to provide technical assistance, neither it nor the CAT could change the system. The burden of responsibility for action rested upon the chief of police who had to communicate to his supervisory staff the need for speedy resolution of the reporting problems of the department.⁽⁴¹⁾

As a result of a number of meetings over the next month, the police department agreed to submit an application for Impact funds to modify its field reporting system. The grant application was submitted in early June to the CAT, which found it to be in too rudimentary a form for approval. There was a delay in its resubmission because the planning and research department placed a higher priority upon completion of a grant application for funds to support an overtime patrol project. Further discussions, following a trip to Baltimore to review the police field reporting system there, eventually resulted in the submission of a grant application in early September and approval by the Regional Office on November 5.

The records of the Crime Analysis Team indicate that a substantial portion of its staff's activities during the period of April and May were devoted to attempts to determine the extent and validity of available data. Agencies contacted included the Superior Court, Juvenile Court, District Attorney's office, the Data Processing Center of Fulton County, the DeKalb County Juvenile Court, and the Atlanta Police Department.

Although it was impossible to determine from the preliminary work done by the CAT staff just how receptive these agencies would be to satisfying the data needs of the Impact program, certain facts seemed imminently clear. The "courts" had "very little data available." "Corrections" had accumulated "many data elements but (their) accuracy (was) questionable due to (the) collection process." At the "jail," CAT staff found an "inefficient use of print-outs and little data usable for Impact."⁽⁴²⁾ At the very foundation of the crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation (COPIE) cycle¹ was the need for a reliable data base. Atlanta, it seemed, had very little usable data to perform the crime-specific analysis Impact required. The program's planners would use this opportunity to develop a comprehensive data base, whose need had been rendered apparent by the CAT's preliminary survey of the key components of the criminal justice system in Atlanta.

¹The COPIE-cycle is an instrument for increasing knowledge, developing research capabilities and improving program and agency effectiveness. It targets the integration of the criminal justice function with planning and evaluative research and its goal is an improved system capability for comprehensive and iterative planning, implementation and evaluation at the local level. The model contains seven steps (i.e., basic data analysis, problem identification and prioritization, strategic planning, tactical planning, evaluation planning, project implementation and data collection and evaluation). For a more complete description of the Impact COPIE-cycle, the reader is referred to MTR-6645 (Greenfeld, Lawrence A., Analysis of Crime-Oriented Planning in the Eight Cities of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program).

3.0 THE CAT DIRECTOR ASKS FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE FOR THE PLAN OF OPERATION

Under the terms of the original grant award dated February 24, the "plan for a plan" or "plan of operation" of the Crime Analysis Team was due to be submitted to the Regional Office on May 24. However, during the time in which the plan of operation was to have been prepared, there were few staff resources available at the CAT to perform the task. The director himself had arrived on the job on April 3. The community specialist was hired on April 17, the courts specialist on May 8, and the police specialist on May 15. As the May 24 deadline approached, the CAT director made two key decisions. He would seek an extension of the deadline for the plan and he would obtain the services of a consulting firm to analyze existing criminal justice data systems and recommend an overall information system for the Impact program. In the words of a report by an SPA official, the consultants were to "analyze the existing data system, determine the minimum level of acceptable data elements, develop the data elements and a system for their collection, develop an interim system for immediate valid data retrieval, prepare the means to implement the optimum system, and develop an evaluation plan."⁽⁴³⁾

The Regional Office informed the CAT director on May 18 that an extension would be approved if he documented the need for the extension, outlined the steps to be taken to meet the new deadline, and submitted a revised budget for the extended time period.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In a letter dated May 22, the CAT director formally asked that the RO extend the deadline for submission of the plan of operation from May 24 to July 15 because there had been a delay in the hiring of the CAT staff and director; the consultants for the crime analysis had been chosen only within the past week; and the initial analysis of information systems took more time than expected.⁽⁴⁵⁾

That day, the RO, SPA, and CAT staffs met to consider the CAT director's request. The Regional Office position was that further details would need to be provided before the request could be approved. The CAT director responded that he could not "communicate" with LEAA and asked that the RO and SPA coordinators work with a designated member of the CAT staff to develop the detailed rationale desired by the RO. While the Regional Office appeared particularly concerned with receiving from the CAT a detailed outline of how the "plan for a plan" would be developed within the new time frame, the task became an impossible one to perform without input from the CAT director. On May 25, the Regional Administrator recommended to the SPA director that he authorize an extension until May 30 to permit the CAT director to work up his justification for the July 15 deadline. This extension was verbally changed the next day to June 2, when a meeting would be held at which the CAT would discuss the progress of the program and plans for its future. The CAT formally renewed its request on May 31 and included a series of work schedules for its staff and consultants.

The ARC reply was written by its executive director. The rationale read as follows:

1. Delay in hiring the director and staff to the program (all personnel were not available until May 15, 1972).
2. Initial analysis of information systems presently available required greater time than was originally anticipated; compounding this delay was the fact that data surveyed could not be verified as to quality, usability, and scope. Since the entire foundation of the Impact program is basically dependent upon a sound, reliable data base, it was obvious that to accomplish this requirement technical assistance was needed.
3. Consultants were interviewed (May 17-19, 1972) for the crime analysis (data analysis) and a firm was chosen May 22. Their time schedule includes initiating their

analysis by June 9, completing an outline by June 16 for review by the Impact team, and submitting their final report by June 30.(46)

From the point of view of the SPA coordinator, the major reason for the need for an extension was the "emergence of a major problem... in the area of crime data." In a report to the State Crime Commission, he noted that no significant portion of Impact funds would be released before the completion of a comprehensive crime analysis based upon extensive and valid data, and went on to point out that a "...preliminary survey of criminal justice data sources for Atlanta confirmed that which had been suspected on the basis of earlier studies...Much of the data necessary to do crime analysis was not present and little of what was available was verifiable." It was due to the "magnitude and immediacy" of the problem that the CAT felt obliged to hire consultants and seek an extension of the deadline for the plan of operation. (47)

In an internal memorandum to his superiors at the Atlanta Regional Commission, the CAT director on May 30 outlined a more complete set of factors which, in his view, had contributed to the delay. In addition to slippage in hiring the staff and problems with the existing data systems, the delay came about because "a great deal of time was spent in developing a Task Force through the Mayor's Office" which the director had originally thought to be required, but which later turned out to be optional. Furthermore, the director had also understood originally that he would have a significant degree of flexibility, but had later learned from the LEAA that this was not to be the case. Considerable time had been spent "trying to appease LEAA, the state, and the Mayor's Office." Finally, the major factor, from his point of view, was a lack of understanding shown by the SPA and the LEAA. (48)

The meeting held on June 2 proved a watershed in RO/CAT relations. The CAT director justified the delay in submitting the plan of operation by pointing to staffing delays, data problems, difficulties in the selection of Task Force members, and difficulties in understanding LEAA requirements, especially those concerning the degree of detail and sophistication needed for the plan of operation. An ARC official claimed that LEAA required so much red tape and detail that the CAT had been prevented from performing its task. According to an RO account of the meeting, ARC representatives could not, or would not, "be specific" about this contention.

The RO coordinator responded by noting that the LEAA had attempted to serve in a partnership with the ARC and the SPA. Problems had developed when the CAT director did not provide a "management plan" and when both the RO and the SPA could not discern any progress toward development of the plan for a plan or the overall program plan. The RO had then asked for a detailed justification for the request for the extension because it was the considered judgment of both that such detail was needed to insure completion by July 15.⁽⁴⁹⁾

As a result of the meeting, the Regional Administrator on June 5 recommended to the SPA director, first, that the extension be granted. The plan of operation was to be submitted on July 15, and discussed by all parties on July 21. Second, the Regional Administrator recommended that all requests from the CAT to the LEAA for technical assistance be submitted in writing to the SPA. During the meeting, CAT and ARC staff had claimed that it was difficult to distinguish between the roles of SPA and RO staff as informal advisors and authoritative reviewers. To avoid further misunderstandings, the Regional Administrator reverted to standard procedures whereby all communications between the Regional Office and CAT would be conducted through the SPA.⁽⁵⁰⁾

4.0 PUBLIC AND OTHER PRESSURES TO MOVE THE PROGRAM MOUNT

Throughout the short life of the Atlanta Impact program, there had been pressures from a number of quarters to show results. There was a certain impatience with and, perhaps, misunderstanding about the whole COPIE-cycle concept (see the footnote, page 36 above) as it related to program development. A consensus appeared to be developing by mid-summer that the pace of the program was too slow and that research needed to be replaced by action. First, the chairman of the State Crime Commission, in his capacity as director of a group called the Atlanta Metropolitan Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency, criticized the lack of progress in the program. In the organization's June newsletter he had asked the following:

Why has there been a delay of three months in putting together the components of the Crime Analysis Team in the Atlanta Regional Commission? Why was the 90-day deadline for completion of the plan of operation to qualify for the two-year planning grant missed? Why has the City of Atlanta failed to take advantage of the opportunity to fund overtime pay of police and probation officers for a three-month period? Is this program, in fact, aimed at reducing crime over a short-term period (as originally described), or is it another research and evaluation effort?...We are interested in action now which will result in the immediate reduction of crime.

A local columnist commented on the Commission's report and on the situation by claiming, "Certainly, we've had enough of a 'research and evaluation effort' by now....This sort of thing can go on forever. Report can succeed report as the criminals enjoy themselves on the sidewalk."⁽⁵¹⁾

While the CAT and the rest of the Impact program structure were still struggling to develop a master plan, there was also enormous pressure to develop projects that could be funded on an interim basis. As early as January 24, the city had been informed that several action grants could be funded prior to completion of the master plan. These could include a three-month overtime authorization for police personnel.

The Regional Administrator had also pointed out the need to fund immediately a public information program to let the public know what Impact was about and to gain support for it as a program.⁽⁵²⁾

Despite the pressure from every quarter, neither grant application was ready for submission until late-June.⁽⁵³⁾ The ARC executive director privately informed the mayor that many of the delays encountered were "those over which the ARC [had] no control."⁽⁵⁴⁾ In his view, much of the burden of responsibility for the absence of progress in project development rested with the operating agencies of the city. The CAT could not develop an application for high-intensity street lighting in high crime areas without information from the City Traffic Engineer and the City Data Processing Division, and these data, so far, had not been forthcoming. A field reporting system grant application was to have been submitted by the police department on June 1 but was not completed until mid-July. The police overtime grant application was submitted on June 14 and forwarded to the SPA on June 15. However, as of July 17, all that had been received from the SPA was an acknowledgment of its receipt. The ARC director informed the mayor that the police department was "doing everything requested," but its work required a "great deal of time and assistance from the CAT." Finally, he noted that the LEAA had imposed strict planning requirements on the Impact program because, in his view, that agency had received much criticism from both Congress and the national media for "funding programs without adequate planning." The Impact planning process required the collection of "sufficient amounts of reliable data upon which to base the planning effort...."⁽⁵⁵⁾

By mid-July, the situation seemed sufficiently grave to the Regional Administrator that he sought the assistance of the LEAA headquarters. He reported to Washington that the public and the city government were experiencing frustration because of the delay in

action funds, and that the program would face "serious public disclaim" if steps were not taken to implement it. He asked, therefore, for the immediate release of \$1 million to his office so that it could be readily available for the development and approval of "high impact, high visibility" projects in the prosecution, judicial, and corrections area, with the understanding that the projects would be directly related to existing crime statistics and specifically applicable to Impact program objectives. Washington headquarters approved the request the very next day.⁽⁵⁶⁾

Shortly thereafter, the police overtime grant was approved. Its major objective was to increase preventive patrol in two high-crime areas of Atlanta. The Crime Analysis Team would later state that the project had been selected because it could be easily designed to conform with Impact guidelines and could be quickly implemented to meet the need for a "visible operational project 'on the streets'" to offset mounting criticism of program delay. The "underlying motivation" of the police department, however, was said to be that of a desire "to provide salary supplements for personnel who [would] participate." The project became operational in mid-August and employed 18 overtime patrolmen engaged in operations out of nine marked police cars.

5.0 THE PLAN OF OPERATION IS SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW

The plan of operation was submitted to the SPA on July 18 and was reviewed by four members of the State Crime Commission Staff. The SPA fiscal specialist, in reviewing the rather large budget request of \$970,010, identified certain fiscal and budgetary deficiencies. Its planning director concluded that the methodology for data analysis was unclear and although the problem statement was clear, it was, nevertheless, non-specific; the operational structure he found to be clear and thorough; and the allowance for flexibility he viewed as a positive aspect of the plan. Yet another staff member, commenting on the approach to data collection outlined in the plan, found it to be solid and reasonable. The SPA coordinator was the last of the four SPA staff members to review the plan. Given his relatively close association with the program, he spoke from a unique vantage point. He found that the program management section read "somewhat like a theoretical text book, definitional, expository, and normative in nature with little application to the matter at hand." On the other hand, he thought the general approach and "methodology" chapters were clear, but non-specific. The "task areas" chapter was thorough and clear, but would have to be revised to take into account a recent SCC resolution requiring that the ARC Criminal Justice Board and SCC Executive Committee act on each Impact project application, and that the SPA director and Commission chairman co-sign each SPA certification. The SPA coordinator agreed with a position taken by the CAT that the original sum of \$500,000 would be insufficient for planning, administration and evaluation of the Impact program, and that a single action grant for supplemental evaluation funds would be feasible, although the plan failed to provide adequate justification for this approach. He then recommended approval of the plan, provided that the most serious deficiencies were resolved. (57)

The RO coordinator completed her review on July 21. She found the plan to be "rife with philosophical discussion, redundancies, inconsistencies and inferences with limited specific delineation of methodology. On the other hand,...a high premium is placed on development and implementation of reliable data systems, analytical techniques, and evaluation." The timetable for accomplishment of certain tasks outlined in the plan was questioned as being unrealistic. Moreover, the plan made no provision for funding interim projects on the basis of existing data and "informed judgments." The evaluation section was found to be "totally inadequate" although the grant administration process proposed in the plan was found to be "concise, comprehensive, but unrealistic in terms of the number of manhours which would be required to administer the Impact program." In general, the RO coordinator believed that the plan lacked a necessary level of detail regarding exactly how the CAT proposed to accomplish its objectives. She nevertheless recommended approval of the plan with special conditions, since to reject it outright or approve it after extensive negotiations, would only cause further delay in implementation of the program. In any event, although the plan did not meet the "standards of specificity" which the Regional Office had hoped to achieve, "the concepts, overall approach, and the general methodology" appeared sound. (58)

On July 24-25, all the program participants, representing the various levels of government and agencies involved, took part in a series of meetings to discuss the plan of operation and the status of the program. As matters developed, a dichotomy emerged separating meeting participants into two factions: those interested in "action now" and those committed to the value of planning in general and crime-oriented planning in particular. The executive committee of the State Crime Commission met first on the morning of the 24th in the presence of RO and ARC staffs. One committee member stated the

opinion that the plan's data system would allow the program to "crank up" at a relatively early date, using existing data while building toward more reliable data. The chairman agreed, but expressed his concern over the projected timetable which called for little action until after November 1. An ARC official then responded by pointing out that the CAT was looking for projects which could be implemented sooner. The SCC chairman questioned whether the data being sought were needed by the line criminal justice agencies themselves, or whether they would be primarily of use to the CAT for its own crime analysis. In response, an ARC official insisted that the "information was needed by the agencies themselves, if the program was to build into those agencies a sound management and planning capability to carry forward after the Impact team was long gone."⁽⁵⁹⁾ When one committee member expressed the opinion that enough need could be demonstrated to take action now, and that he would "rather see mistakes made as the result of hasty activity than see mistakes made from inactivity,"⁽⁶⁰⁾ others present pointed to the difficulty in transferring successful projects without good data to reliably justify recommendations for transfer and expressed a strong hope that an intelligent analysis of the data would prevail over the "gut reaction" approach. One member countered with the thought that he did not support studies for the sake of studies, but only to obtain such basic and vital information as who was committing target crimes, and where. The committee then approved the plan, subject to the conditions outlined by the SPA staff, and the meeting was adjourned with a commitment to support the Impact program and to act quickly on Impact matters so as not to further impede its progress.⁽⁶¹⁾

The afternoon of the 24th found the SPA and the LEAA Regional and Washington Office staffs in a meeting at the Regional Office to accomplish three tasks germane to Atlanta Impact program implementation: (a) to summarize SPA/RO reviews of the plan of operation;

(b) to discuss the State Crime Commission action of that morning; and (c) to determine the reactions of Washington headquarters to the plan of operation. This meeting led to a consensus view that the "plan was poorly conceived, that forward movement was difficult to discern, and that the timetables for implementation of the program were excessively distant."⁽⁶²⁾

The next day city representatives again joined the meetings with SPA, RO and LEAA headquarters staff members. The entire morning was occupied with a general discussion of the status of the program. The Regional Administrator outlined the problems perceived by the LEAA: the delays, data deficiencies, funding timeframe, the inadequacies in the plan of operation and the dubious quality of the input of the consultants retained by the CAT. The National Impact Coordinator verbalized his concern over the slow start-up of projects. The ARC director responded by stating his willingness to move to fund projects immediately on the basis of existing data; however, he also pointed out the difficulties arising from the need to develop a data base while withstanding official and public pressure to move the program. The afternoon was spent in a detailed discussion of the Atlanta plan of operation.

The National Impact Coordinator would later state that the meeting indicated first, that the CAT, as presently constituted, did not have a sufficient grasp of the Impact program, and he doubted seriously the ability of the CAT to conduct the program. Second, it was clear to him that there was a "communications problem" with the CAT. Regardless of the accuracy of an assertion by the CAT that the LEAA had "changed the signals," the fact remained that the CAT had "failed to respond to documented RO guidance and offers of continued technical assistance."⁽⁶³⁾ He, nevertheless, was able to see two positive results of the conferences. First, agreement had been

reached on a strategy that would allow the CAT to begin an analysis of existing data to generate projects for speedy implementation. Second, the meetings appeared to have "buried the hatchet" on a "number of personality issues."⁽⁶⁴⁾ However, the Regional Office coordinator assessed the personality issue as having culminated in a vastly different way. She reported that the chairman of the ARC extended his hand "symbolically and actually" to the chairman of the State Crime Commission who, in effect, refused to accept it.⁽⁶⁵⁾

6.0 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CAT IS CALLED INTO QUESTION AND THE PLAN OF OPERATION IS APPROVED

During the month of August, as the CAT staff worked to revise the plan of operation, SPA and RO officials moved to counter what they considered to be deficiencies in the management of the program by the Crime Analysis Team. At the regular meeting of the State Crime Commission in early August, several members voiced concern over the lack of progress of the Impact program under its current leadership. The consensus of the group was that the problems which had been encountered thus far had not been insurmountable and that decisive action could have moved the program more quickly. After one member pointed out that it was the State Crime Commission which was the grantee for Impact funds and that it was time for it to assert its supervision over the Impact program, another member moved that the Commission act to assume supervision of the program on a day-to-day rather than on a general basis and that it do so through the person of the Commission chairman. Although the chairman expressed some hesitation about his assuming this role, the motion carried unanimously.⁽⁶⁶⁾

Two weeks later, the Commission member who offered the motion to have its chairman assume supervision of the program was said to have told the CAT director he had done so because he had received inconsistent information about the program and wanted to make sure that the policy making board governing the SPA had one person advising it of "exactly what was going on."⁽⁶⁷⁾ However, after the director of the ARC protested the Commission action in an August 18th letter to the SCC chairman, the latter informed the Governor of another rationale for the Commission's decision. In part, he wrote the following:

The Board's recommendation...demonstrated its concern over the lack of progress of the Impact cities program as of that date and recognition of the Board's responsibility for supervisory oversight of all criminal justice programs funded through the use of LEAA funds in the State of Georgia.⁽⁶⁸⁾

In the meantime, the management style of the CAT director had become an issue which divided the Regional Office and the CAT. In retrospect, Regional Office and CAT staff appear to have had differing perceptions of the nature and consequences of the CAT director's approach to management. From the RO point of view, the latter's approach was interpreted as being "participatory" in nature and "indecisive" in its consequences with the result that an alleged failure of the program to assume a "well-defined course of action" was associated with the "management philosophy and practices of the CAT director."⁽⁶⁹⁾

From the Regional Office perspective, the CAT director's managerial style appears to have assumed two forms. First, the CAT director appeared to view the CAT, SPA and RO staffs as a "team" which was collectively responsible for the management of the Impact program. No single agency would occupy the pivotal role. Consequently, the CAT director saw himself as a member of the team rather than an initiator of plans and programs. Second, within the CAT itself, decision-making authority was to be substantially, if not totally, delegated to the staff. Here, too, the CAT director would function simply as a member of a "team." His approach to management of the program differed drastically from that of the Regional Office. The Region IV Office fully expected that the CAT director would assume responsibility for setting the direction of the program and that his decisions would be subject to the review of the SPA and RO. In this context, the Regional Office saw the need for a hierarchy within the CAT and among the three levels of government involved in the management of the program. One respondent at the SPA believes that the "LEAA's position was that you could talk about participatory management, but that eventually decisions had to be made. Eventually, you had to have, in effect, a hierarchical, decision-making structure. You could all be together in a boat but eventually someone had to take the oars."

CAT staff believed that the differences between the Regional Office and the CAT arose from the CAT director's emphasis upon management by objectives and results. His approach was incompatible with what the CAT perceived as an undue emphasis by the Regional Office upon means and process which, in their view, resulted in losing sight of the larger goals of the program.

Throughout this period, the RA believed that the plan of operation should amount to a detailed formal written statement of what exactly the CAT director planned to do to implement the program. He had been informed by the LEAA that the CAT must develop a "work plan" for management of the program and achievement of the goals for crime reduction. The LEAA would provide assistance when requested but that assistance would come only when the CAT assumed a leadership role in the program.⁽⁷⁰⁾

One negative result of the CAT director's management style reported by a CAT staff member was that while "LEAA wanted [the CAT director] to lay it out, to articulate it himself, he, in turn, would tell the staff to do it but they didn't know what was on his mind and thus couldn't tell the Regional Office." A second type of response received by the RO from the CAT director was that the "team" of RO/SPA/CAT staff would produce the required plans. By early June, the RO coordinator, in apparent frustration over the laissez faire leadership style of the CAT director, reported that "contacts with [the CAT] have reached the point [at] which the lack of specific plans has become the major topic of conversation resulting in hostility at all levels."⁽⁷¹⁾

This narrative, as reported thus far, would be incomplete were mention not made of the feeling, among those interviewed, that at least some of the problems which developed in the early months of the Atlanta program were due to the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. It is reported, for example, that "there were some real

personality clashes, no doubt about that. We had a \$20 million program and...real strong personalities [at the RO, SPA, and CAT]." Again, "Some [of the problem] was due to [the strong] personalities at the Regional Office and State Crime Commission." It is impossible to determine (and it would be inappropriate to speculate) whether the "hostility at all levels" reported by the RO coordinator in early June had developed because differences in approach to the management of the program had been difficult to reconcile because of "personality clashes," or whether the personality clashes themselves arose from differences in management philosophies. It does seem reasonable, though, to suggest that there were "objective" circumstances in the environment of Impact program planners which increased the probability that individual personality characteristics would have some effect upon the management of the program. In retrospect, the circumstances might be recreated as follows: First, the Impact program was unprecedented in form and content. The COPIE-cycle concept was virtually untried. Second, Impact was an action-oriented, demonstration program. The planning process had an emergency quality to it and time was in too short supply. Third, Impact was viewed as having been formulated in a highly unstructured context. Several key actors recall feeling that the program had been announced without a great deal of forethought, as representing a good idea conceptually but as lacking specific guidance for implementation. There were, in the words of one, "lots of unknowns. It was an unstructured program that gradually became structured. [But] at the time, the program was so new that everyone was still having a hard time defining what it was all about." Fourth, in what may have objectively been a pressured and uncertain situation, staff members of the Regional Office, SPA, and CAT spent the first several weeks of the program in close, informal, and intense interaction for substantial periods of time. One participant recalls having "met day after day into the night," to discuss how to proceed with the program.

In sum, the actors found themselves in a totally unfamiliar situation in which they could not depend upon prior experience or institutional norms to define their individual roles. It is in precisely such circumstances that individual personalities are more than likely to have a strong effect upon the decision-making process. In this context, it might be expected that, as one early Atlanta Impact planner stated, the meetings "got into differences of approach, there were communications problems," and eventually, as already noted, hostility developed "at all levels."

By early August, "continuing staff input" from the RO and SPA claiming that the competence of the CAT was questionable, and that the original version of the plan for a plan was unacceptable, had caused the Regional Administrator to begin a series of attempts to resolve the situation. It was his belief that the Atlanta program could be salvaged if the executive director of the Atlanta Regional Commission took a personal hand in its management. On August 2, he informed the director and deputy director of the ARC of the criticism which had been leveled at the CAT director, gave them his recommendation, and was told by the ARC director two days later that there were problems but none which he himself could not solve with immediate action. On August 8, the Regional Administrator met with the mayor and the City Administrator and repeated his concerns, telling the mayor that any decision on the matter would be his because of his responsibility for the program. The mayor also expressed his belief that the program could be salvaged if the ARC director gave it his personal attention.

On August 15, following a series of meetings between the RO and SPA, a conference was held at the Mayor's Office and was attended by the directors of the ARC and SPA, the mayor, the chief of police and the Regional Administrator. The ARC director said that he was in the

process of correcting the problems associated with the management of the program. The participants agreed that the state would assume the principal role in all future relations with the CAT.

The conferees also agreed that it would be appropriate to move certain action grants on the basis of a sampling of existing data. After the mayor stated that a street lighting project was still his first priority, an ARC representative stated that there were sufficient data to justify funding of such a project. The participants also agreed that funding of initial projects would be balanced among several program areas. In addition to the police overtime project, and the initial phase of the street lighting project, there would be funding for police stake-out squads. A corrections and possibly a courts project would also be funded initially. The Regional Administrator agreed to expedite the release to the CAT of the remainder of the planning funds for the development of the master plan. When the master plan was submitted, a final decision as to whether the ARC was capable of handling the Impact program and whether the program should remain in Atlanta would be made on the basis of that document and the performance of city and county agencies in the management of action grants approved by that time.

Despite these decisions, by the latter part of August it still seemed to the Regional Administrator that "there was no way to win in the situation at hand" although he was not yet "ready to admit surrender on the program for Atlanta." The alternative to "staggering along" with the staff at hand would be to move the CAT from the ARC where it was situated, to another entity within the city. In the RA's view, such a move would be even more "disast'ous."⁽⁷²⁾

The chairman of the State Crime Commission seemed satisfied by the promise of the executive director of the ARC to involve himself

personally in the management of the program. On August 21, the SCC chairman informed the mayor of his conviction that the August 15 meeting would result in a "much better understanding" among the various levels of government concerned with Impact and that he had been reassured by the statements of the ARC director concerning the qualifications of the CAT staff and his personal commitment to the program.⁽⁷³⁾ Several days later, when he wrote the Governor to inform him of the rationale behind the decision to allow the State Crime Commission to directly manage the Impact program, he indicated that the ARC director's personal interest in the program coupled with his statement that he would personally vouch for the performance of the Crime Analysis Team had been "reassuring and in response to the concern of the Crime Commission Board as expressed in the action which it had taken on August 2."⁽⁷⁴⁾

In the meantime, the CAT had resubmitted the plan of operation to the SPA. An SPA staff review indicated that, with but one exception, all conditions proposed by the previous review had been met. In the view of the SPA staff, the plan did not incorporate State Crime Commission policy on regional planning agency review which required that the regional Criminal Justice Board review all local Impact applications on the basis of merit and of conformity to the state plan. The staff therefore recommended that approval be totally conditioned upon ARC's acceptance of this policy.

The ARC director was informed of the decision by telephone on August 18. His written response, dated August 21, was one of disappointment that the SPA had failed to accept what he called ARC's established policy and procedures for project review. He requested that the SPA ask the Governor to sign the plan using the SCC language with the understanding that the LEAA would make the final determination.

The Governor, though, had submitted the plan to the Regional Office on August 21, the same day the ARC director had written his response to the SPA. The Region IV Office of the LEAA approved it on August 24. In accordance with Regional Office instructions to submit a budget which would reflect estimated costs to administer the program, even though they might exceed the \$625,000 originally allocated, the application had requested a grant of \$970,010. The Regional Office reduced the budget to \$625,000 and asked the SPA to have the CAT submit a more detailed justification for the additional funds since its review of the plan itself did not provide sufficient rationale for the overage. (75)

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7.0 THE "ROLE ISSUE" RESURFACES

Of the several projects suggested for early funding under the Impact program, as stated previously, the mayor had attached the highest priority to the street lighting project. Serious discussion of the project had started in June; however (as discussed above, page 42), the CAT director experienced a great deal of difficulty as he attempted to coordinate the responses of the various city agencies which would have to be involved in developing and implementing it. The project application did not reach the SPA until August 29, nearly two months after the initial work on the project had begun.

It took the SPA but two days to reject the grant application outright, because of cost/benefit considerations which arose from the proposed location for the project. Given the crime patterns in the area, the SPA concluded that if the city met its goals of reducing robberies by ten percent and burglaries by five percent, it would have prevented only six Impact crimes at a cost of nearly one million dollars. On that basis, the SPA staff could not recommend endorsement of the project. (76)

On September 13, the mayor resubmitted the application and asked for its approval on the grounds that the state had no authority to reject it. The mayor perceived the SPA action as having raised "serious questions as to jurisdiction and authority which must be resolved if the Impact program is to continue under the jurisdiction of my office." In a letter to the SPA executive director, the mayor's position was stated as follows:

It is my understanding that the role of the State Crime Commission with regard to the Impact program is to review grant applications to ascertain compliance with the State of Georgia's Comprehensive Criminal Plan. Since your review does not indicate any inconsistency with the state plan, I must, therefore, assume that you found it not to

be inconsistent. It should be further noted that the project was not deemed to be inconsistent with the regional plan. Consequently, your action in reviewing the details and merit of a particular project beyond that necessary to insure compliance with the state plan appears to me to be an exercise of authority beyond the jurisdiction of the State Crime Commission. (77)

Two days later, the mayor followed up his letter to the SPA executive director with an "updated analysis" of the data contained in the street lighting grant application with the hope that the additional information would allow the SPA to give a favorable recommendation to the project. (78) The SPA interpreted the mayor's letter as evidence of his backing away from a confrontation. Its Impact coordinator viewed the updated analysis as an "apparent attempt to rescind the appeal" forwarded two days previously. The SPA, however, believed that the questions raised by the mayor concerning its authority to approve or reject applications were "serious" and should be resolved regardless of the city's new posture. At the same time this policy decision was being disputed, the SPA decided that it would use its normal procedure to review the application in terms of the additional data provided by the mayor and transmitted that information to the Region IV Office in a memorandum. (79)

A staff review of the updated analysis found it "confusing, contradictory, and erroneous." The staff extrapolated from data contained in the plan of operation and concluded that the "cost benefits derived from this project remain questionable and the goals of the project appear understated." The project would cost \$966,000 to satisfy goals that would only reduce robbery and burglary by eleven incidents in six months. (80) Again, the SPA staff could not recommend endorsement of the project.

On September 22, the mayor wrote to the chairman of the State Crime Commission asking for his support of the project. The mayor saw the street lighting project as having "critical importance" for the following reasons:

Among other things, it will convey to our citizens that the Impact program is, in fact, doing at least something to combat crime in Atlanta. Some visible evidence of the Impact program is critically needed at this point to combat the average Atlantian's opinion that the presently ongoing planning process is nothing more than bureaucratic red tape and governmental foot dragging. The confidence of the people generally in the Impact program is literally at stake. (81)

However, both the Governor and the Regional Office backed the SPA in its right to make the decision and in the soundness of that decision. (82)

The street lighting episode had several dimensions, and for each key participant in the program, it appears to have had a different meaning. The mayor saw the project, itself, as a way to show results to a press and public which had become disenchanted by a lack of visible results from the Impact program. The SPA's initial rejection of the project on technical grounds caused the mayor and the state to impose another layer of significance to the grant application in that its rejection or approval would define in operational terms the authority of the state with respect to the city in the decision-making process. Finally, although CAT staff members would later claim that the ARC had little real choice in the matter because of the intense personal interest of the mayor in the project, from the point of view of the Regional Administrator, the city's submission and resubmission of a project which appeared to be completely without merit meant that the ARC director was not taking the personal hand in the management of the program which he had promised and that the competence of the CAT was again being called into question.

8.0 THE LEAA ADMINISTRATOR MAKES A DECISION

A visit to Atlanta was planned for late September by the Administrator of the LEAA to announce "good news" about LEAA programs. By mid-September the Regional Office had begun to believe that his visit would provide an opportunity to make key decisions concerning the future of the Impact program in Atlanta. The RO coordinator, in particular, saw the "role issue" as the major priority which would face the Administrator during his visit.⁽⁸³⁾

The LEAA Administrator met with the Governor on September 26. At the meeting, he stressed the importance of the role of the state in the program and expressed confidence in the performance of the SPA director and his staff. The Governor, in turn, pledged his continuing support for the Impact program. That same day, the mayor held a press conference and told reporters that he was "very disappointed" that the street lighting grant had been turned down. "This was my top priority," the mayor said. "It has worked in Washington, D.C., and in Wilmington, Delaware, and the mayors there said this is the greatest thing that they ever had. We will have to reapply and re-design our application."⁽⁸⁴⁾

The very next day, the LEAA Administrator met with the mayor. "Informed sources" were quoted by the local press as saying that the Administrator informed the mayor that "Atlanta was in danger of losing its \$20 million High Impact crime-fighting grant from [the LEAA] unless the city comes up with a suitable plan for spending the money within 30 days." For the moment, however, the mayor would only describe the conference as a "soul-searching session" during which "some personalities and policies" were discussed.⁽⁸⁵⁾

The local response to the visit of the Administrator was one of concern. One columnist explained "Washington's" problem with the

Impact program in Atlanta as having to do with the lack of "the sort of data Washington wants" and that "Washington isn't going to grant us money to be used for various projects to reduce the crime rate until Washington is satisfied we know what we are doing," but still found it "hard to understand the delay here [in Atlanta] unless it's the old bureaucratic story, lots of talk, lots of memoranda, lots of waiting on other people. In the meanwhile, people are being robbed and people are being shot on the streets."⁽⁸⁶⁾ Editorially, The Atlanta Constitution hoped that "despite panicky suggestions to the contrary,...Atlanta is well on its way toward qualifying for the \$20 million High Impact crime fighting grant promised by the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration."⁽⁸⁷⁾ The Finance Committee of the Board of Aldermen was reported to be "concerned over reports that Atlanta is in danger of losing" Impact funds and as having instructed its chairman to investigate the situation to seek ways to expedite implementation of the project.⁽⁸⁸⁾

On September 29 and October 3 the state, local and federal officials involved with the Impact program met to formulate a plan of action on the basis of the LEAA Administrator's suggestions. The City Administrator, heretofore not involved in Impact policy making except in a peripheral way, was a key participant at these meetings. The executive director of the ARC, in particular, as well as the City Administrator had strong reservations about placing the CAT director under the direct supervision of the mayor. Their objections were based upon the feeling that having the CAT director as a member of the mayor's staff would be unwise in view of the hostilities between the city and county; conflicting demands on the mayor's time would not allow him to direct the program; the city lacked responsibility for criminal justice programs, except for the police; the city's management of other federal programs had been inadequate; there would be management

problems with respect to lines of communication and authority among the CAT director and staff, the mayor, the ARC, and the state; and the role/veto conflict could be reactivated at all levels.⁽⁸⁹⁾

On another level, the executive director of the ARC was concerned about the future of the CAT director and was reluctant to seek his resignation. On October 2, "reliable sources" were quoted in the press as saying that the CAT director had met with the ARC director that day and offered his resignation. Following the meeting, the ARC director was quoted as saying, "We discussed a number of possibilities. For [the CAT director] to resign is not the answer. [He] has not resigned and I'm not going to fire him."⁽⁹⁰⁾

Nevertheless, on October 3 a committee of federal, state and local officials were able to reach a consensus opinion, covering five major points, which they believed to be consistent with the LEAA Administrator's concerns:

- The current CAT director would resign effective November 1.
- The SPA would take a more active role in the Impact program and would physically locate its Impact coordination unit within the ARC.
- The CAT staff would be merged with the ARC criminal justice block grant planning staff under the direction of the ARC regional criminal justice planner who would, in effect, become the Impact CAT director.
- The current CAT staff would be reviewed by the new CAT director.
- An administrative assistant, with police expertise, would be employed at the upper levels of the Atlanta police department to coordinate the Impact program within the city.

When informed of the five-point plan the following day, the LEAA Administrator rejected it outright because the CAT director would not be responsible directly to the mayor. On October 5, the Regional Administrator wrote the LEAA Administrator of the genuine concerns

of those involved in the discussions. He also said that the mayor had indicated that the CAT director would have direct access to him. Both the ARC director and City Administrator had reached an agreement that the CAT director, although continuing to report to the ARC director in administrative matters, would in program and policy matters have a direct line to the mayor, who was in full agreement with this arrangement and fully understood that the new CAT director was to be "his man."⁽⁹¹⁾ Following this explanation, the LEAA Administrator accepted the five-point plan and so informed the mayor on October 11.

9.0 A SECOND CAT DIRECTOR IS CHOSEN AND THE MASTER AND EVALUATION PLANS ARE APPROVED

Data collection, to provide baseline information and to identify target crime problems in Atlanta, had begun in late August. Only burglary and robbery data were then available. Once the modified police field reporting system, a project funded by Impact, became operational, the CAT fully expected it would be able to retrieve stranger-to-stranger data for the other three crimes (i.e., homicide, forcible rape and aggravated assault) targeted by the Impact program. In the meantime, the CAT staff, with the assistance of some student part-time employees were manually sampling the records of the Atlanta Police Department, Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation and the Juvenile and Superior Courts of Fulton County.⁽⁹²⁾ By September 8, the data collection and subsequent analysis were completed. The findings were then submitted to the Task Force, which scheduled a meeting during the week of September 11 to establish the sub-goals and objectives that were to be incorporated into the master plan.

By September 29, a first draft of the master plan was completed. In rapid-fire order, the Task Force reviewed the plan and reported its recommendations by October 3. It had found the plan acceptable, subject to certain revisions, particularly in the area of community security.⁽⁹³⁾ The mayor, who was also Task Force chairman, then forwarded copies of the plan to all key actors involved in the program's operation. He did, however, strongly urge the RO, SPA and CAT to discuss the plan informally prior to getting together formally to review it as a final version.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Clearly, though, time was a prime factor, and in an effort to speed up the review process, the SPA asked the RO to conduct its own review of the plan concurrently with that of their agency.⁽⁹⁵⁾

The new CAT director took charge of the Impact program on November 1. He was not, however, new to the ARC structure but had, in fact, been hired by the Commission at the same time as the outgoing CAT director. Commenting on the circumstances which brought him the director's post, while shedding some light on the historical development of ARC/CAT relationships, he has since stated the following:

The Atlanta Regional Commission was only founded at the end of 1971. Before that, one of the four entities that joined to form the ARC administered the block grant program. So, in reality, the block program for the Atlanta region was initiated under the ARC at the same time as the Impact program...And, although it's true that the block program was running three or four months before Impact, we really put it together administratively at the same time Impact came along.

The block program was administered by me on a regional basis and I joined the ARC at the same time the first director of the Atlanta Impact program was brought on board...And the two programs ran parallel with each other from February/March 1972 through October 1972, at which time they were consolidated....So, I ran [that portion of the Atlanta Regional Commission] from November 1972 through March 1974 [when I left the agency] as one planning entity--Impact and block....⁽⁹⁶⁾

What had really occurred, then, was that one CAT director who had been responsible solely for Impact program administration, was now replaced by another ARC employee who would have to divide his time administratively between Impact and the regional block program. Unsurprisingly, the new director opted for action. Rather than "re-invent the wheel" and further delay implementation of the program, he decided to endorse the plan in principle despite what he termed certain recognizable "inadequacies." He added some data relative to objectives and sub-goals which he considered germane, and formally endorsed the plan on November 21.

On November 28, the Regional Office, SPA and CAT staffs met to discuss the plan. The consensus of state officials was that the quality of the plan was questionable but that revising it would mean further delay in the program. The state group further agreed that in any event program objectives could still be met by emphasizing the review of individual project applications. The plan and these sentiments were officially transmitted to the Regional Office by the Governor on December 7.

The formal SPA staff review of the plan was not favorable. The staff questioned the plan's reliance on existing data, although the document was flexible enough to allow revision as better data became available. In addition, programs and projects were not specifically related to problems identified in the plan. Finally, the plan was found to be so flexible that it often was noncommittal, subject to much interpretation and, therefore, offered little utility as a functional plan.

Nevertheless the SPA believed its hands were tied and it felt duty bound to accept the plan. After all, rejection of the plan might mean termination of the program by the LEAA or, at the very least, the loss of fiscal year 1972 funds. Since the plan was flexible enough to allow the new CAT director to provide inputs and not to limit the numbers of types of potential projects, and in view of the consequences of further delay, the staff recommended acceptance of the plan. Their recommendation was made with the understanding that updates of the plan "must" address the five-year, 20 percent program goal which was not handled in the plan and with the understanding that the SPA would review each project not for its relationship to the master plan but on its own merits. (97)

The Regional Office staff review found similar limitations in the plan. The failure to respond to the five-year, 20 percent program goal, the limited scope of the data, and the overly broad and rudimentary identification of problems, were considered to be serious limitations. However, its recommendation was that the plan be approved with certain reservations. It was felt that prolonged negotiation to get a "quality document" would only further delay for many months implementation of the program. The conditions that would be attached to the approval of the plan were as follows:

1. Its limitations should be corrected in quarterly updates.
2. The five-year 20% goal should be addressed.
3. A group of projects should be developed for the review process with LEAA/SPA technical assistance to facilitate their approval at the same time as the master plan. The applications would serve as further evidence of program direction lacking in the master plan. (98)

For the next several weeks the CAT worked to develop this project package for review by the RO and the LEAA's Impact Policy Decision Group. The strategy was to present the plan of operation, the master plan, and individual grant applications as a "unified package." This package was eventually approved by the Policy Decision Group on January 17, 1973.

A MITRE analysis of the crime-oriented planning process in the eight Impact cities found that the Atlanta plan fell within the crime-oriented "victim/offender/environment" planning framework devised by the National Institute. In part, the analysis stated the following:

[The Atlanta] planning documents provided a detailed analysis of the two Impact crimes of robbery and burglary within the victim/offender/environment framework....

Within the environment or crime-setting category, burglary and robbery were analyzed separately. For burglary, the following factors were considered: residential versus non-residential, day and time of occurrence, and geographical location. Open space, commercial, and residential robberies were analyzed by day and time of occurrence and geographical area.

Robbery and burglary offenders were characterized by sex, age, race, and socio-economic background. In addition, the census tract of residence was compared to the census tract of offense for robbery and burglary offenders.

Limited information was available to characterize the robbery victim. The type of business victimized in commercial robberies was further analyzed according to broad types of businesses (i.e., commercial house, chain store, bank). Victims of open-space robberies were characterized by race, sex, and proximity to place of residence, when the offense occurred.(99)

In addition, the plan related descriptions of four major areas of the existing criminal justice system to the victim/offender/environment analysis in order to identify problems within each of these functional areas. As a result of this analysis, the following priority problems were identified within the Atlanta master plan:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High incidence of residential high crime areas • Open-space robberies in identified high crime areas |
| Courts | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Excessive case processing time • Inadequate treatment of jurors and witnesses • Inadequate capability for the management and processing of criminal court cases |
| Corrections | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Excessive recidivism • High rate of staff turnover |
| Juvenile Rehabilitation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in severity of crime among juveniles • Inadequate referral resources to be used as alternatives to the juvenile court • Excessive number of school drop-outs • Inadequate staffing at the intake and supervision and treatment stages in the juvenile justice system • Lack of adequate information systems |

Five program goals were then established which defined the broad strategies to be adopted in addressing the stated problems. These were:

- Reduce the number of high crime census tracts by 20 percent.
- Reduce the number of persons becoming victims of crimes by 10 percent.
- Increase the apprehension rate by 5 percent.
- Decrease court processing time by 25 percent.
- Reduce the number of arrested offenders by 20 percent.

The plan also defined program sub-goals, or more specific strategies to be used in reducing crime. Table VII shows the relationships among program goals and projects proposed for implementation in the Atlanta plan. In addition, it contains the names of 29 possible project ideas. Several proposed projects (i.e., Team Police, Street Lights, Helicopters, Overtime Police, and Command and Control) cross more than one of the 14 stated program objectives. Table VIII lists possible projects, cites the aggregate number for those projects crossing more than one program objective, and includes the estimated cost for implementation. The \$28 million estimated cost for projects was, except for Cleveland's and Newark's, the largest dollar figure initially requested by any Impact city. For several reasons, the seemingly "out-of-line" budget request shown in the Atlanta master plan was not disturbing. First, the master plan itself only contained suggested types of projects for implementation under Impact, and it stipulated no priorities for the selection of individual projects. Second, there was an understanding among key members of the CAT, SPA and RO staffs that projects would be approved on an individual basis and according to merit, based upon the Impact guidelines. Finally, only one Impact project, the Police Overtime Patrol, had been implemented by the time the master plan received regional LEAA approval in December 1972. Atlanta's problems of interagency coordination eventually culminated in a very slow pace of implementation with the average project

TABLE VII
ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS FOR THE ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM

A. GOAL		B. SUB-GOAL		C. OBJECTIVE		D. ESTIMATED COST (MILLIONS)	E. POSSIBLE PRODUCTS	
REDUCE STRAIGHT-TO-STEADY CRIME AND BURDEN BY 27%	REDUCE NUMBER OF HIGH CRIME ZONES FROM 204 BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF BURGLARIES IN HIGH CRIME ZONES FROM 153 BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF OPEN SPACES IN HIGH CRIME ZONES FROM 153 BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF VISITORS AS VICTIMS OF OPEN SPACES FROM 153 BY 20%	2.6	SPECIAL SECURITY UNIT (1.2)	LOCKS (1.2)	PROPERTY I.D. (1.1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF PER-SONS CONTAINING VICTIMS OF CRIMES BY 10%	REDUCE NUMBER OF VISITORS AS VICTIMS OF OPEN SPACES FROM 153 BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF VISITORS AS VICTIMS OF OPEN SPACES FROM 153 BY 20%	1.2	STREET LIGHTS (1)	ENCLAVE PROGRAM (1)	BELL-TELEPHONE (1)	OTHER-TIME POLICE (1)
	INCREASE APPEARANCE RATE BY 5%	INCREASE FOLLOW-UP APPEARANCE RATE BY 5%	INCREASE FOLLOW-UP APPEARANCE RATE BY 5%	7.3	STREET LIGHTS (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	STREET LIGHTS (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	DECREASE COURT PRO-CESSING TIME BY 25%	DECREASE COURT PRO-CESSING TIME BY 25%	DECREASE COURT PRO-CESSING TIME BY 25%	1.5	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	1.7	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	1.7	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	1.7	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	1.7	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	REDUCE NUMBER OF JUVENILE OFFENSES BY 20%	1.7	TEAM POLICE (1)	TEAM POLICE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)	TELEPHONE (1)
	TOTAL				28.0			

TABLE VIII
LIST OF ATLANTA PROJECT IDEAS PROPOSED FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND ESTIMATED COSTS IN LEAA FUNDS

Project Ideas	Estimated Cost
1. Special Security Units	\$500,000
2. Hours	200,000
3. Property Ident.	100,000
4. Team Police (4)*	6,000,000
5. Street Lights (3)*	4,000,000
6. Education Program	100,000
7. Helicopters (4)*	40,000
8. Overtime Police (2)*	800,000
9. Interagency Communication	100,000
10. Command and Control (2)*	1,700,000
11. Closed Circuit TV	1,000,000
12. Stake Out	2,000,000
13. Management Information System	400,000
14. Increase Deterrence Ability	100,000
15. Special Felony Squad	400,000
16. Prosecutors Management Information System	1,200,000
17. Judges/Public Defenders	200,000
18. Video Tape	200,000
19. Court Reporter	100,000
20. Automated Transcripts	100,000
21. School Board	1,500,000
22. Police Athletic League	500,000
23. Overtime Probation	300,000
24. Special Parole Treatment	3,500,000
25. Outreach	200,000
26. Alternatives to Treatment	1,500,000
27. Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes	200,000
28. Police Narcotics Unit	600,000
29. Education	100,000
Total	28,000,000

* The number in parentheses reflects the number of program objectives this project idea crosses.

(Source: Atlanta Impact Program Master Plan, November 1972.)

beginning operations as late as 21.4 months from program inception.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Thus it turned out that long before the Atlanta program could become fully operational, the LEAA headquarters would notify all Impact cities that each would be constrained to a \$20 million ceiling, including funds for planning and evaluation.

The final formal milestone in the Impact planning process was reached with the approval of the evaluation plan by LEAA on April 24, 1973. The evaluation plan had been completed in December and forwarded with a budget request of \$99,000 with the implication that additional funds would be needed in the future.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ The CAT was asked to budget for total required costs rather than ask for partial funding. The plan itself was found by the SPA to be an "excellent document" which clearly met its stated purpose. A revised budget was formulated and submitted with the explanation that "experience has demonstrated that the manhours required for evaluation were underestimated in the original budget. The increased time required is also due to an increase in the number of projects." The final evaluation figure approved was \$331,790.⁽¹⁰²⁾

10.0 IMPACT PROJECTS ARE DEVELOPED, IMPLEMENTED AND EVALUATED

10.1 Projects are Developed

With the approval of the master plan, the Impact program structure in Atlanta moved into what might be termed its project development phase. The 29 different project ideas included in the plan were merely a beginning. It was the process of project development which was key to the operation of the program; in Atlanta, this process took several forms. In some cases, the CAT gave master plan data and problem analyses contained therein to operating agencies and asked them to construct solutions. In other cases, the CAT itself developed solutions and sought agencies to carry them out, although there is said to have been no "hard-sell" approach to line agencies. In still other cases, public and community agencies "floated through the door" of the CAT seeking Impact funds to support projects. Active solicitation by the CAT, though, was less important than word of mouth and general news coverage of the Impact program in causing community and public agencies to seek out Impact program funds.⁽¹⁰³⁾

Prior to submission of a formal grant application, agencies interested in obtaining Impact program support for projects were asked to fill out a "problem-solving statement," which served as a preliminary statement of how they proposed to solve a particular problem. Where the proposed project did not appear to fall within Impact program guidelines, the CAT staff would work with the agencies to redesign project ideas so that Impact program goals might be met through their implementation. In general, in the early stages of the program, operating agencies were more likely to initiate project proposals. However, as the program progressed, the CAT found it necessary to take a more active role in initiating project ideas. There was some tendency for agencies to balk, once they were involved in the process because they were used to the block grant approach which, unlike Impact, had not

called for detailed and specific quantification of objectives, evaluation components and other requirements. Line agencies found they had to "document and justify more than usual."

The SPA staff described their role during this phase of the program as one of grants management. As of the summer of 1973, the SPA coordinator reported that his agency felt obliged to return every grant application submitted "for one reason or another." One communication from the SPA to the CAT in early May indicates the kinds of questions raised by the SPA about projects submitted for review. The SPA coordinator wrote as follows:

....It is becoming apparent that many of the same issues and questions raised by the state staff are appearing in several application reviews....The following issues are consistently being raised by staff reviews:

1. What are the criteria for selection of project participants?
2. Who applies the criteria and makes the schedule? (104)

All participants in the Impact program structure reported that there had been significant or noticeable delays in the review process. In the first place, the formal review system was complex. Within the City of Atlanta alone, there were numerous offices (such as that of the City Administrator) which were required to sign off on grant applications. When the municipal governmental review structure was added to that of the regional planning review requirements, the SPA, and finally the Regional Office of the LEAA, it became quickly apparent that the three and one-half month review period anticipated by the master plan was totally unrealistic. Indeed, one participant believed that the review cycle was so belabored that an individual grant application came out of it "looking like a dead snake, beaten to death by all the reviewers."

Second, grant applications returned to operating agencies for revision by the CAT or SPA staffs would often be delayed by the failure of the line agency to take action on the revisions which had been suggested. On the other hand, it was suggested by CAT staff that the project-level personnel found the revisions required by the SPA to be excessively detailed and misguided since, in their view, "making a program on paper doesn't necessarily make it work."

Third, program participants were generally unanimous in their belief that the problematic working relationships between the CAT and the SPA had had some negative effect upon the management of the Impact program, particularly in terms of the grant application review process. The CAT staff felt that the SPA staff were not competent to review, in substantive terms, the grant applications submitted to them. The SPA staff, in turn, appeared less willing to "take things for granted" with project applications submitted by the CAT and seem to have engaged in more "nit-picking" than might otherwise have been the case. As a result, project applications were caught up and delayed in the cross-fire between the two agencies.

Finally, at least one observer perceived a "definite philosophical difference" between the chairman of the State Crime Commission, who favored "police-oriented" projects, and the CAT director, who supported a "more comprehensive approach to the total problem." (105)

Although key participants differed in their assessment of the degree to which the relationship between the CAT and SPA was affecting the program, they were, nevertheless, agreed that there had been at least "some" negative effect. As the program was well into the second year of its operation, there were attempts by the staffs of both agencies to regularize contact and share concerns to improve the

communications channels between them. Regular monthly meetings between the staffs and agency heads were suggested as ways to improve relationships and the management of the program.

It was in the context of what were seen as delays in developing and implementing projects and in the midst of an impending mayoral election that the mayor took action on his own. On July 9, he asked the chairman of the State Crime Commission to serve as his "personal representative in a concentrated effort to expedite the implementation" of the Impact program. By way of explanation for having asked the SCC chairman to assume these Impact oversight responsibilities he then added:

The Impact program has made considerable progress over the past six months, during which time some \$6 million has been committed to various projects. Nevertheless, there is still some concern that the progress of the program could be speeded up and I am anxious to do whatever is necessary to fully utilize this program to cut crime in Atlanta....[The State Crime Commission chairman] will be especially valuable in dealing with the complicated intergovernmental relationships involved....(106)

10.2 Atlanta Implements 22 Projects as Part of Its Impact Program

As stated earlier, only the Overtime Patrol, an Atlanta Police Department project, became operational during the first year of the Impact program. However, by the end of June 1973, 13 projects had received Impact awards amounting to approximately \$6.3 million in federal funds. Of this total, \$3.5 million was awarded to juvenile and adult corrections projects, with the remainder being disbursed among the police, courts and the community. Eventually, Atlanta would implement 22 different projects as part of its Impact program. Table IX is a list of implemented Atlanta Impact projects, the total federal dollars awarded to each and the percentages by functional area of all awarded funds. (The functional breakout shown in

TABLE IX
LIST OF IMPLEMENTED ATLANTA IMPACT PROJECTS

PROJECT	AWARDS	PERCENTAGE OF FUNDS
<u>COMMUNITY:</u>		
1. Street Lighting	\$ 220,643	13%
	<u>220,643</u>	
<u>POLICE</u>		
1. Overtime Patrol	93,491	
2. Modified Field Reporting System	72,750	
3. Anti-Robbery/Burglary	795,449	
4. Administrative Assistant	38,246	
5. Expansion of Helicopter Patrol	1,504,461	
6. Data Processing Improvement	48,960	
7. Target Hardening through Opportunity Reduction (THOR)	3,646,249	
8. Model Cities Crime Control Team	450,046	
9. Anti-Robbery	1,828,371	
10. High-Crime Foot Patrol	503,972	
11. Anti-Burglary	2,023,662	
12. Anti-Rape	319,556	
	<u>\$11,325,213</u>	63%
<u>COURTS</u>		
1. Special Prosecutor's Squad	\$ 135,585	1%
	<u>135,585</u>	
<u>JUVENILE CORRECTIONS</u>		
1. High Risk Juvenile Parole	204,062	
2. Atlanta Street Academy	636,000	
3. Coordinated Juvenile Work Release	170,964	
4. Intensified Outreach Probation	1,000,934	
	<u>\$ 2,011,960</u>	11%
<u>ADULT CORRECTIONS</u>		
1. Therapeutic Community Rehabilitation Program	2,354,260	
2. Intensive Probation Counselling	344,327	
3. Intensive Employment	131,267	
4. Manpower Training Services for Ex-Offenders	333,337	
	<u>\$ 3,163,191</u>	17%
<u>TOTAL PROJECT FUNDS</u>		
	<u>\$16,365,592</u>	
1. Impact Planning	625,000	
2. Impact Evaluation	331,790	
3. Victimization Survey Analysis	29,905	
4. Crime Analysis Team	194,267	
5. State Impact Coordination Unit	11,917	
	<u>\$ 1,192,879</u>	7%
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		
	<u>\$18,049,471</u>	

(SOURCE: Atlanta Crime Analysis Team, October 1975)

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Table IX was supplied by the Atlanta CAT and differs in some respects from other breakouts supplied to MITRE.) Of \$18,049,371 in total awards, \$11,325,213 or 63 percent, went to the police, the only criminal justice component over which the City of Atlanta maintains sole jurisdiction. Juvenile and adult corrections received \$5,175,151 or 28 percent of all awarded funds. Atlanta's five planning grants amounted to \$1,192,879 or seven percent of the total Impact awards. This means that Atlanta expended less than two percent of Impact awards on projects which it functionally classified as either courts (\$135,585) or the community (\$220,643). It should be noted, however, that the Atlanta Police Department's Target Hardening through Opportunity Reduction (THOR) project is a community-focused project accounting for \$3,646,249 of the funds awarded to the police. Atlanta's Impact projects are described below.

10.2.1 Community Projects

10.2.1.1 Street Lighting

Implemented by the City of Atlanta, this project provided for the addition of 137 400-watt high pressure sodium vapor lights and the conversion of 45 400-watt mercury lights to 45 100-watt high pressure sodium vapor lights. The lights were placed in the highest nighttime robbery and burglary census tracts. The project ran from January - December 1974 and had as its quantifiable goals the reduction of nighttime robberies by 15 percent in the project area and the reduction of the total of other nighttime Impact crimes by 5 percent.

10.2.2 Police Projects

10.2.2.1 Overtime Patrol

This project was designed to increase preventive patrol manpower in two high crime areas of Atlanta. Operated from July 15, 1972 to January 14, 1973, the project assigned sworn Atlanta Police Department personnel to preventive patrol units on an overtime basis. The patrol units were used for prevention, interception and apprehension only and were comprised of two-man patrol cars.

10.2.2.2 Modified Field Reporting System

When the Impact program began, the Atlanta Police Department's existing field reporting forms were felt to be inadequate and to exacerbate the problem of incomplete and inaccurate data collection by uniformed officers. Impact funds were used to modify the forms to include more data elements and less narrative entry. The revised forms were reviewed by trained personnel within the reporting division for final review, coding and categorizing of the data. It was hoped that the reporting modification would enable those concerned with planning, evaluation and manpower allocation to better utilize data input, predict high crime areas and trends, and plan for resource and manpower allocations.

10.2.2.3 Anti-Robbery/Burglary

This project established a plain clothes Anti-Robbery/Burglary (ARB) Division within the Atlanta Police Department. Stake-out teams of two or more officers were assigned to observe businesses which were likely to be robbed or burglarized. The division also included a civilian-clothes (or disguised) patrol of officers in high burglary and robbery areas who served as both stake-out and information gathering elements as well as an anti-receiver of stolen property unit. The project's quantified objectives were the reduction of robbery by 30 percent and burglary by 10 percent throughout the city within one year of implementation.

10.2.2.4 Administrative Assistant

This project provided an administrative assistant for the Atlanta chief of police. Duties performed by the administrative assistant included the following: (a) maintaining continuous liaison with other law enforcement agencies; (b) conducting research, staff studies and gathering statistical data relating to the operation of the Atlanta Police Department; and (c) planning, recording and disseminating departmental policies and procedures. This project was funded from April 1, 1973 through December 30, 1974.

10.2.2.5 Expansion of Helicopter Patrol

This project added four new helicopters and 27 additional personnel to the helicopter section of the Atlanta Police Department. The project's overall goal was to make the patrol capability of the police more effective by increasing their observation ability and the visibility of police on patrol, and by providing rapid response time of police to the scene of a crime. As its quantifiable goal, the project expected to reduce burglaries and robberies in four zones

(i.e., 1, 2, 3 and 4) of the city by 15 percent within 24 months from the time the expanded helicopter patrol became operational. In 1972, there were 12,469 burglaries in zones 1, 2, 3, and 4 and 2,182 stranger-to-stranger commercial and open-space robberies. Therefore, the projected reductions were: (a) burglaries - 1870 and (b) robberies - 327. The helicopter patrol became operational on January 1, 1974.

10.2.2.6 Data Processing Improvement

The Modified Field Reporting System was implemented as a part of Atlanta's Impact program to improve the quality and increase the quantity of police reports. The Data Processing Improvement project provided funds to hire additional personnel needed during the data preparation phase, as a result of a reported 420 percent increase in computer coded documents.

10.2.2.7 Target Hardening through Opportunity Reduction

Funded in the amount of \$3,646,249, the Target Hardening through Opportunity Reduction (THOR) project became operational in January 1975. THOR is a community-focused crime prevention project to reduce burglary, rape and robbery. The project includes security survey programs, property identification, public education and awareness programs, citizen involvement, police training and legislative reform.

10.2.2.8 Model Cities Crime Control Team

This project, which provided a 17-man unit to patrol the "Model Cities" area of Atlanta, became operational on September 16, 1974. The team consists of community service officers and sworn police officers. The overall project goal is the reduction of Impact crimes in the Model Cities area by 10 percent within the first year and 20 percent by the end of the grant period. Specific (though not stated in quantifiable terms) objectives are: (a) to reduce police response time to reports of Impact crimes; (b) to foster community involvement in crime prevention and increased cooperation with the police department; (c) to reduce incidence and fear of Impact crimes in the Model Cities area; and (d) to secure citizen cooperation and involvement in two other Impact projects (i.e., the Helicopter Patrol and THOR).

10.2.2.9 Anti-Robbery

This project is a modification of the Anti-Robbery/Burglary project discussed earlier in this chapter. Two primary approaches are

being used. They are: (a) police officers are placed in the street disguised to portray various social and economic character roles, i.e., decoys, and (b) police officers are concealed in commercial settings to increase detection and apprehension of crime perpetrators. The revamped robbery unit became operational on May 1, 1974 and will run through May 1976.

10.2.2.10 High Crime Foot Patrol

This project, funded in January 1975, provides for a foot patrol unit to reduce open-space robbery by 25 percent, commercial robbery by 10 percent, residential burglary by 10 percent and non-residential burglary by 15 percent in the City of Atlanta. Forty uniformed police officers are being employed in areas where robberies, burglaries, and aggravated assaults most often occur. Patrol areas are selected based on crime data analysis and assigned officers are trained to look for particular situations which may likely lead to the commitment of Impact target crimes.

10.2.2.11 Anti-Burglary

Funded in January 1975, this project's overall goal is the reduction of non-residential burglary by 10 percent. It includes an anti-burglary patrol assigned to areas identified as high in the incidence of burglary; anti-receivers, to identify and arrest 500 fences of stolen goods; and property management to ensure identification of stolen goods. The project will continue in its present form through September 30, 1976.

10.2.2.12 Anti-Rape

This unit has been designed to improve services to and treatment of rape victims, in an effort to increase the number of rapes reported and the rape conviction rate by 25 percent. Investigation and treatment of rape victims has been improved because of this project. Activities include: (a) training of investigators in counselling techniques; (b) maintaining equipment and office space away from police headquarters to greatly decrease embarrassment of victims; and (c) operating a mobile crime scene unit (van) to be used to talk with witnesses and collect evidence at the crime scene. The entire unit was created with the idea of increasing "sensitivity in handling rape victims and to provide an atmosphere more conducive to reporting the crime."

10.2.3 Courts Projects

Atlanta implemented a single courts project as part of its Impact program. Funded at the level of \$135,585 in federal dollars, it is described below.

10.2.3.1 Special Prosecutor's Squad

This project added four assistant district attorneys to the staff of the Fulton County District Attorney's Office. Specifically, these lawyers were hired to screen, prosecute and handle appeals on all Impact crime cases. The project's revised intermediate objectives were: (a) to reduce court processing time for Impact offenders from an average of 78 days within 12 months from project implementation and (b) to increase the conviction rate for Impact defendants from 79.4 percent to 84.4 percent.

10.2.4 Juvenile Corrections Projects

10.2.4.1 High Risk Juvenile Parole

Funded from July 1, 1973 through June 30, 1975, this project was designed to reduce the incidence of Impact crimes committed by 200 juvenile parolees over a two year period. The project provided intensive supervision and counselling, both individually and in small groups. The project focused on interrupting criminal careers, based on prior experience with offenders exhibiting similar behavioral patterns, and on preventing the offender's return to a youth institution or his entry into the adult criminal justice system. The project's one outcome objective was the reduction of recidivism of clients to 20 percent. The three activity objectives were: (a) to provide the 200 client populace with more intensive parole supervision services than routinely offered, (b) to restrict caseloads of project team members to 20 per court service worker and (c) to provide intensive aftercare services to 200 juvenile offenders over a two-year period.

10.2.4.2 Atlanta Street Academy

This project was in operation from July 1, 1973 through June 30, 1975 and was designed to provide alternative education for target offenders or potential offenders who had dropped out of the public school system. The sources of referral to the project were the Juvenile Court, street workers, and the youths themselves. It was anticipated that youths who attended the Street Academy would have a lower incidence of delinquent behavior than other youths with similar backgrounds.

Although the project was operational prior to Impact funding, Impact caused a shift in project focus from provision of alternative education to prevention of target crimes being committed by clients.

An innovative feature of the project for Atlanta was the provision of education to public school dropouts in a non-traditional setting.

The project's outcome objective was to prevent 50 percent of 325 youths enrolled in the Street Academy from committing an Impact crime within one year after the completion of six months of enrollment in the project. Two intermediate objectives were: (a) to have 15 percent of project enrollees pass the GED examination within one year and (b) to increase the number of enrollees demonstrating improved self-esteem, awareness of career opportunities, etc. Finally, the project had two activity objectives, namely: (a) an average daily attendance rate of 75 percent for the first six months of project operation for students not passing the GED, and (b) academic services to local juvenile probation and parole departments.

10.2.4.3 Coordinated Juvenile Work Release

Operated by the Atlanta Business League, Inc., this project was designed to reduce recidivism among juvenile offenders by providing part-time and full-time employment with businesses belonging to the Atlanta Business League. The project also provided for an intensive informational and educational program aimed at acquainting target area businessmen and residents with crime prevention strategies and methods. As a result of these efforts, the project anticipated an improved spirit of cooperation among community residents, businessmen, and juveniles.

This project had two outcome objectives as follows: (a) reduce the rate of recidivism of project enrollees (60 juveniles, aged 13 to 17) to 13 percent per year, and (b) reduce the number of robberies and burglaries committed against high-crime area businessmen by 10 percent during the first 12 months of project life. The project's single intermediate objective called for 60 percent of all project enrollees, who had ever been employed during the project, to retain that employment for a minimum of six months. The activity objectives were: (a) provide each enrollee with a job and (b) conduct workshops and seminars for target area businessmen and residents.

10.2.4.4 Intensified Outreach Probation

Implemented by the Fulton County Juvenile Court, the major focus of this project was to contribute to target crime reduction by providing intensive probation and processing services to approximately 200 potential target and actual target offenders identified by the Fulton County Juvenile Court. The reduction in crime was to occur as

reduction in recidivism was also achieved. This project's treatment approach differed from regular treatment in two ways: it maintained lower caseloads than normally expected and was community-based.

The project's outcome objectives were: (a) to reduce the recidivism rate among the selected group of 200 juveniles by one-third, (b) to reduce the number of juvenile cases of target offenses by 10 percent by July 1974 and 14 percent by November 1974, (c) to reduce the number of burglaries and street crimes by juveniles in selected high delinquency areas by one-third. As an intermediate objective the project planned to reduce the time between initial detention and disposition hearings from 43 to 26 days. Finally, its activity objectives were two in number and are stated as follows: (a) to identify, within a one-month time frame, 620 youths, 420 to serve as controls and 200 to enter the project and (b) to complete the hiring of all staff.

10.2.5 Adult Corrections Projects

10.2.5.1 Therapeutic Community Rehabilitation Program (Project DOOR)

The Department of Offender Rehabilitation (DOOR) Therapeutic Community combines the concepts of counselling and work release to provide a community-based offender treatment program designed to reduce recidivism among ex-offenders. Operating two therapeutic treatment facilities, one for parolees and probationers and the other for inmates serving the last 8 to 12 months of their sentence, the project relies upon a variety of different counselling approaches (e.g., directional counselling, transactional analysis, reality therapy, etc.) to assess offenders in their reintegration into society.

An innovative feature of the project is the combining of counselling and a work release program in a fashion which radically departs from previous treatment approaches in Georgia.

Project DOOR became operational on September 15, 1973 and is funded through June 30, 1976. The project's outcome objectives are: (a) to achieve a 20 percent reduction in the recidivism rate among Impact target offenders participating in the Wheeler House project component, when compared to a control group, and (b) to achieve a 20 percent reduction in the recidivism rate among Impact target probationers and parolees participating in the Gateway House project component, when compared to a control group. The intermediate objectives were to graduate 220 and 180 men from Wheeler House and Gateway House respectively by April 30, 1975. The activity objectives called for the implementation of four community treatment centers in Atlanta and the thorough investigation of recidivism and the behavioral characteristics of the recidivist.

10.2.5.2 Intensive Probation Counselling

This project was to provide one hour weekly of intensive counselling to 300 persons on probation in Fulton County for robbery and/or burglary. Each group of 300 were to receive six months of such counselling. The total amount of counselling time is approximately 18 months (3 groups with 6 months each). Additionally, the project planned a control group of 330 probationers as well as another test group of probationers who would receive testing and no counselling. These latter two groups were non-repeating; that is, they were to be observed for the entire 18 months.

Counselling was provided in the main Fulton County Adult Probation Offices as well as three neighborhood counselling centers. Ten "new" probation officers were to be hired for this project, each of whom would be assigned to work under and be advised by a "veteran" probation officer. Each "veteran" officer was to work ten hours weekly in addition to the regular 40-hour week.

The goal of this project was to demonstrate a reduced recidivism rate for the probationers receiving counselling when compared with those in the other two groups receiving no intensive counselling. Monitoring of the group receiving testing only, and the group receiving neither testing nor intensive counselling were also to be accomplished. The reduced recidivism of those counselled should occur because of (a) an increased amount of time spent with each probationer; (b) increased accessibility of counselling due to the establishment of three neighborhood centers; (c) an increased counselling ability of probation officers due to training and expertise gained through practice. This project expected a decrease in recidivism of 20 percent for those receiving counselling as compared with those not receiving such counselling.

This project initially began to provide services in July 1974 and December 1974.

10.2.5.3 Intensive Employment

This project seeks to reduce recidivism (as measured by arrests for Impact offenses) among clients both during project enrollment and during the first year after they have left the project. To this end, it aims to provide its clients with meaningful employment which pays an adequate wage and to educate businessmen and the public regarding the potential benefits of hiring ex-offenders.

The project's two outcome objectives are stated as follows: (a) to reduce Type I recidivism (i.e., rearrest of an offender during project enrollment) to 10 percent on an annualized basis by September 30, 1975, and (b) to reduce Type II recidivism (i.e., rearrest of an offender within one year of completion of the project enrollment) by eight percent by September 30, 1976. In addition, the project has two

activity objectives: (a) to provide 120 clients with jobs within two weeks of enrollment, and (b) to meet with 15 new business owners per month to discuss with them the employment needs of ex-offenders.

10.2.5.4 Manpower Training Services for Ex-Offenders

Implemented by the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) of Atlanta, Inc., this project provides skill training to 150 adult Impact offenders and hopes to reduce recidivism among project clientele by six percent over a one year period. Specifically, the project is focusing the services of 10 instructors and five counsellors on the provision of work skills for Impact trainees. Services include counselling (e.g., vocational, job development, job placement, special studies, etc.) and training (e.g., secretarial, auto mechanic, electrical repair, graphic arts, etc.). Some of the equipment to be used in vocational training was purchased by OIC with funds provided through this grant.

11.0 THE LEAA TASK FORCE VISITS ATLANTA: PROGRAMMATIC DIRECTION AND AGENCY ROLES ARE REFOCUSED

The LEAA, on October 18 and 19, 1973, performed a Task Force visit to review constructively Atlanta's Impact program as it related to the roles and responsibilities of the ARC, SPA and RO. The subsequent report of Task Force findings, in the opinion of the RO coordinator, was "especially helpful" in placing Atlanta's Impact program into a realistic perspective. The eight-member team, comprised of individuals from the National Institute and the Region IV Office of the LEAA, looked at the Atlanta program from six key vantage points: (a) Administration and Grants Management, (b) Financial Management, (c) Data Collection and Analysis, (d) Planning and Evaluation, (e) Technical Assistance and (f) the Courts Role in Impact. After presenting its major findings across the six areas, the Task Force summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the program and offered recommendations for improving upon the noted deficiencies.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ The more interesting findings relate to the roles of principal agencies involved in the decision-making process and inter-governmental relationships, data collection and analysis, and planning and evaluation. These are cited below:

I. ADMINISTRATION AND GRANTS MANAGEMENT

A. Tripartite Role and Inter-Governmental Relationships

Due to past conflicts, "affirmative partnership" roles between ARC and SCC have become uncooperative roles. SCC is not involved in the program, other than review of applications. ARC does not communicate fully to SCC, feeling that the more information it provides to the state, the more questions the state will raise. ARC's position has prompted a negative attitude of non-involvement on the part of the state.

The poor intergovernmental relationships have been coupled with a lack of mutual expectation of each party's responsibilities. The key needs in Impact administration are:

1. Improved communication and relationships.
2. Reclarification of an agreement to roles as outlined in the plan of operations, and,
3. Cooperative carrying out of role responsibilities.

B. Accountability - Five Levels of Government

The city, county, region, state, and federal governments/planning bodies review Impact applications. The ARC is not directly accountable to the city (Office of the Mayor). This hampers the "delivery system" of the program. When responsibility is distributed to several different levels, who takes the final responsibility? Who is finally accountable for the Impact program?

It is true that placing the Impact program with ARC removes it from local politics to a certain extent. The program is not directly a political vehicle for the mayor, and is not directly affected by city elections. This has been pointed out by ARC as an advantage. However, though ARC does provide a buffer against city politics, it does not provide direct accountability for the Impact program.

In summary, the delivery system and accountability for Impact is inadequate because there are five levels of government involved, and ARC is a [regional] planning commission, not a governmental unit.

C. Plan of Operation

The plan of operation established a Task Force (policy group) including representatives from the city criminal justice agencies and the Mayor's Office. Presently, it is virtually non-existent, except for occasional input from individual members of the sub-Task Force.

At the state level, the participation by the executive committee is virtually non-existent, with the exception of application review and endorsement by the SCC chairman.

II. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

A. ARC Competence

ARC is currently collecting and analyzing data in a thorough, statistically sound manner. Data work has expanded beyond the original Atlanta Police Department grant to modify records to a comprehensive unified system to be applied on a regional basis. Data are being collected from all criminal justice agencies in the Atlanta area. ARC has expertise in collection and analysis and does not seem to need technical assistance from the state or LEAA.

B. Delay in Master Plan Update

The need to collect data from the "universe" instead of from a sample has delayed the collection and analysis for the update, which was due in October.

III. PLANNING AND EVALUATION

A. Master Plan Updates

ARC has not complied with the update requirement, due to a delay in data collection. Originally due by October, it won't be in until the end of December.

There seem to be two planning processes in use. The first one is in use now and consists of funding individual projects based on present data from the original master plan. About \$13 million in projects are to be funded in an initial planning phase of Impact. These projects, after implementation, are then to be evaluated. At evaluation, determinations are made for re-funding of successful projects (re-funding with the possible remaining \$7 million). This is a trial and error method based somewhat on current data.

The second process is described in a paper on crime-specific planning. It appears that ARC has been trying to use the crime-specific approach but lacks valid data, so it is delaying writing any plan at all.

If the planning does initially involve a trial and error method until the valid data are collected and analyzed, then this should have been stated in a master plan update months ago. It would at least provide some insight as to how projects are selected. SCC is concerned about project selection and project-by-project reviews without an

overview of Impact planning processes or goals. ARC has repeatedly expressed the inadequacy of the original master plan, yet this plan is all SCC or LEAA have to depend on.

When asked to prioritize project applications being sent to SCC and LEAA for the remainder of the program, ARC was reluctant. Priority setting requires Task Force (policy group) input, which the CAT seems to want to avoid.

Because there is no priority structure or overall plan showing the ideal complete program, the state review of projects is hampered. Some means of phasing out Impact at the end of funding must be established, either by a deadline date, a definitive list of projects to be funded, or a master plan update submitted forthwith.

B. ARC Rapport with Operational Agencies

ARC has developed close communication and good rapport with local agencies, which has facilitated publicity of the Impact program and attracted many potential sub-grantees.

C. Evaluation Component

ARC's Impact evaluation plan is considered one of the more sophisticated components in the national Impact program. ARC and Georgia Tech seem to be learning this relatively new area of criminal justice evaluation as the program progresses. Though project goals are sometimes set unrealistically high, the evaluation appears to be honest and objective....(108)

Thus Atlanta's Impact program was viewed as having much to recommend it, in particular the extensive and sound data collection and analysis planned, the level of sophistication of the evaluation effort and the program's apparent good rapport with local agencies. There were, however, some major problems with the program as it was then developing. For one thing, there was the quality of relationships between the CAT and the SPA. This situation had, in turn, triggered another problem: the shift of state responsibility back to the Regional Office. But there were other problems, too. There was the seeming lack of plans to institutionalize Impact planning techniques,

and as yet, there was no master plan update. The Task Force recommendations called for, as first order strategies, a master plan update before more discretionary funds were awarded, the establishment of regularly scheduled weekly meetings to be attended by the CAT, SPA and RO, and the ending of the recognized shift of SPA responsibilities to the RO. It seemed likely that the Atlanta Regional Office would address the third and final objective by increasing its support of the SPA as the latter attempted to carry out its duties in the partnership arrangement.

12.0 THE MASTER PLAN UPDATE IS COMPLETED AS OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING IMPACT DEVELOP

Serious work on the master plan update had begun as early as April 1973 and documents reviewed for this program history provide a useful record of the day-to-day planning activities from April through September.

During April, the CAT had developed data collection instruments for 1972 Impact crimes and anticipated that these data would be collected during May - July and analyzed during June - August. The CAT also made liaison contacts with the police department to coordinate the data collection and hired five temporary employees to help the permanent CAT staff collect the data.

A consultant advised the CAT that a sample size yielding a 99% confidence level would appear as follows:

<u>CRIME</u>	<u>TOTAL REPORTED 1972</u>	<u>SAMPLE SIZE</u>
Homicide	255	185
Rape	256	185
Robbery	3,074	550
Aggravated Assault	2,143	510
Burglary	14,542	640

On the basis of these data, the CAT decided to collect the entire universe of homicide and rape offenses and the suggested sample for the three other crimes. The CAT also planned to establish the victim/offender relationship for the universe of robbery and assault incidents in order to establish a baseline from which to measure the change in stranger-to-stranger crimes. Data on all five crime categories had been collected by mid-May.

During the week of May 14, a major effort began, tallying the victim/offender relationship for the universe of robberies and

assaults, after which another effort would be directed toward finding the correct census tract for each offense in the original sample and collecting offender-based transaction system (OBTS) information on persons arrested for offenses included in the original sample. In the meantime, CAT staff continued to work on the development of matrices for the analysis of the data.

During the week of May 21, offenses in the original samples cleared by arrest were separated, and information on each offender was transferred to the offender-based tracking form to prepare for searching the police department's ID records for other data elements. The offense sample was reintegrated and sorted by street address to permit the search for the census tract in which the offense occurred. Simultaneously, the offender sample was being sorted alphabetically by last name to allow searching the police department's ID section master name index.

During the last week of May, census tract numbers were linked to the location of each offense and the CAT then began the process of linking census tract numbers to the addresses of offenders in the sample. After the latter exercise was completed, the police department ID number was entered on the OBTS form and the criminal history jackets of each offender were reviewed for arrest and commitment data. The next step was to record information on prosecutor, grand jury, and Superior Court actions found in the files of the Superior Court. In the meantime, the breakdown of target crimes by census tract was being tabulated to allow analysis at various levels of detail.

By June 20, a problem had developed in that the police department's computer software for analysis of 1973 target crimes would not be ready until November or December. The CAT decided that it would not wait; the data would thus have to be collected manually and the Team

would collect the universe instead of a sample. Two part-time staff members were put to work collecting robbery data covering the first six months of 1973, after which they would begin to collect data on the other Impact crimes. By July 27, the CAT had completed its tallying of the 1972 offense data and had finished the collection of 1973 robbery data. Since the City Data Processing Division now believed it could furnish a printout of offenses by census tract by November 1973, the CAT decided to end its manual collection of 1973 data. Since the robbery sample had already been collected, it was decided to reduce the data to census tracts manually to provide a cross-validation check of the computerized data.

The week of August 10 saw a further problem develop. An initial analysis of 1972 high-crime census tracts was made and compared to those in the original master plan. Only 50 percent were similar. The CAT consultant concluded that both samples were valid on a city-wide basis but not when broken down by census tract. Consequently, the CAT would need to collect, reduce and analyze the universe of all 1972 target crimes in order to identify high-crime census tracts accurately, with a consequent major effect on the cost and schedule for the master plan update.

During the week of August 13, the staff prepared an outline of selected demographic information for profiles of census tracts and an outline of graphs and charts for the plan update. The staff also designed and printed abbreviated forms for collecting the universe of 1972 target crimes. These data were begun to be collected and were expected to be completed by mid-September. By October, the CAT was in a position to write chapters on individual target crimes and by January 1974, the updated master plan had made its way through the review cycle to the SPA. Thus the CAT, in a period of slightly less than eight months, had completed the master plan update. Although

significant hurdles (i.e., review and approval by the SPA and the Region IV Office of the LEAA) were immediately ahead, a general feeling among CAT members was voiced by the director, who has since stated that "for a first-time effort, it worked real well."⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

There had been occurring, simultaneously with its work on the master plan update, other events that were exogenous to Impact but which were bound to have some repercussions on the program's administration. In the first case, the incumbent mayor of Atlanta had been enmeshed in a "nip and tuck" battle for his political life commencing with the October 3rd primary. His chief opponent, the incumbent vice mayor, had in the primary, defeated the mayor by a 2.5 to 1 margin. The mayor, meanwhile, had just managed to salvage the second runoff spot, after a fight with a former U.S. Congressman that had not been decided until the early hours of the following morning. In the October 16 runoff, the mayor had been defeated as his black opponent polled 59.2 percent of the vote. The winning candidate's constituency, according to The Atlanta Constitution had included, not only a "crushing black majority," but also "a surprisingly strong showing among white voters," enabling him to become the first black mayor ever of a major southern city. Atlanta's continually rising crime rates had been the No. 1 issue in the mayoral race. The incumbent mayor, who had been closely associated with the Impact program, was now out. Yet, the issue of "improved law enforcement" remained a significant concern for a majority of Atlantans.

On another level, some problems had developed which directly involved the Atlanta Police Department. The police issue contained at least three critical areas. First, the media and some political candidates appeared concerned over the matter termed "policemen and pistols and shooting" which focused on policemen involved in the controversial deaths of several suspected offenders and numerous allegations of

police brutality. Second, the Justice Department's Office of Civil Rights Compliance had warned the Atlanta Police Department that it was out of compliance with federal hiring practices in respect to blacks and women. (This matter, if not settled rapidly, could directly affect the flow of Impact funds to Atlanta.) Third, there was the locus of the police department in the total city structure and the relationship between the chief of police and the mayor-elect. The police function, while controlled entirely by the city, was, nevertheless, somewhat independent because it was not under the city's civil service system. This situation, in the view of the mayor-elect, encouraged an "unprecedented degree of cronyism" in promotional practices. He was on record, both for "a system of accountability" in the police department and as having been "vigorously opposed" to the appointment of the chief of police. Even before the election, there had been a movement, led principally by black leaders, asking for the chief's departure because of alleged "insensitivity to racial problems." A confrontation thus appeared imminent in the months ahead; yet large amounts of Atlanta's Impact funds were locked into police projects. And in the third and final case, there was the issue of crime displacement to the suburbs. In increasing numbers, suburban Atlantans in Clayton, DeKalb, and Cobb Counties were complaining that Impact was forcing "criminals to give up the city for the suburbs." The ARC, where the CAT was located, was a regional planning unit and was responsible to these suburban jurisdictions as well as to the City of Atlanta. How would the city perceive the ARC role, in the light of new pressures from suburban members to whom the regional planning unit was also responsible? "Some black residents of Atlanta" according to a member of the RO staff, "perceive the Atlanta Regional Commission as a body which dilutes political power of city residents and increases suburban political power. This is symptomatic of the black-white, city-suburb problem...[and] ARC is under scrutiny by some elements of the city power structure."⁽¹¹⁰⁾

13.0 THE ARC DECISION TO CONTRACT FOR EVALUATION AND THE EVALUATION PROCESS IN ATLANTA

13.1 The ARC Decision to Contract for Evaluation

One of the few areas where Atlanta's Impact program received consistently good marks from all governmental levels reviewing the CAT's efforts was evaluation. This success appears linked to the decision to let a contract for technical assistance with the Georgia Institute of Technology's School of Industrial and Systems Engineering (hereinafter referred to as Georgia Tech). Although the first of two Impact evaluation contracts with Georgia Tech began on August 1, 1973, the school's association with the CAT had begun much earlier. Georgia Tech's chief evaluator for Impact has since explained the situation:

There were only a couple of projects on the street...and the evaluation of them had been handled by ARC under the guidance of a couple of the Georgia Tech professors acting as consultants. I think this made ARC aware of the fact that once a large number of projects were implemented they were going to need more [evaluation] help than they had in-house...more capability...so they turned to Georgia Tech to provide that assistance.

I guess one point to clarify here is the role of Georgia Tech versus the ARC role. Overall evaluation of the Impact program was ARC's responsibility and they maintained that responsibility throughout....And within ARC there were people assigned to individual projects to perform monitoring activities....Periodically, the Georgia Tech people performing the evaluation would meet with the project people....[We] didn't live with them daily but as a result of the analysis we did, typically we would go down, present our analysis to the project people, talk about the results and conclusions...and get their comments and incorporate them into any fixed analysis we turned out.(111)

Thus, Georgia Tech had been involved with the Atlanta CAT as a project-level evaluation consultant as early as the latter part of 1972, having assisted in the analysis of Atlanta's Overtime Patrol which ended in January 1973 and was not refunded based upon the evaluation results. Prior to its first contract with Georgia Tech, the CAT

had let contracts to two California-based consulting firms (INTASA, Inc., and Public Systems, inc.) to assist with the development of the Atlanta plan of operation and to develop a unified computer system for the Atlanta Police Department. In particular, the contract with PSi had been fraught with problems, centering on delays in meeting contractual obligations and PSi's use of a subcontractor to "perform certain computer programming."⁽¹¹²⁾ Despite these problems, which were eventually settled equitably, the CAT nonetheless preferred to contract for evaluation services rather than develop an in-house capability. From the standpoint of the ARC, a regional planning unit, Impact was a one-time, short-term commitment which was a source of "some problems" of a jurisdictional nature. The ARC executive director explains his agency's position this way:

We, as a regional planning agency, were required to do planning for one jurisdiction, the City of Atlanta. It had some of the same problems that would have occurred if a regional zoning agency tried to do zoning for a local city...We knew our role in the Impact program was one of short duration, in terms of agency life span, and it was not my intention to build up an enormous staff for such a short period of time.⁽¹¹³⁾

The ARC, then, saw Impact as a program that would be phased out after a three-year period and its commitment was for that period of time. Further, Impact was a city program placed in an agency whose functions were regional in nature and which lacked direct political accountability for the program. There was yet another reason why the decision to contract for evaluation seemed the more reasonable course to the ARC. In a recent interview, the second CAT director stated the following:

When I came on board, we had to make the decision either to roll with Georgia Tech or develop our own in-house capability. At that point in time, evaluation, not to mention the crime-specific approach was new. Evaluation hadn't been fully transferred to the criminal justice system...Evaluation expertise just didn't exist, period, and you couldn't pay the salaries to attract evaluators on an in-house staff unless you totally put the salary structure for them out of line with the rest of your staff...It was the cost...and the time...We needed that expertise immediately. It's not something

we could develop....So from a cost basis and a time basis, we had no choice but to contract with these people who had evaluation expertise.⁽¹¹⁴⁾


Thus, it appears that two major factors contributed to the ARC's decision to contract for evaluation: (a) the ARC view of its commitment to Impact as short-term, coupled with its diffuse regional responsibilities and (b) the cost and time elements, coupled with the availability of local evaluation expertise, within the university setting. Overriding these factors, however, was the issue of role perception, based on the ARC's normal regional duties. It is possible that the matter might have been resolved differently had the decision been made initially to place the CAT under the jurisdiction of the city. The ARC executive director now believes that two layers of the bureaucracy involved in Atlanta's Impact program initially were unnecessary. "If I had it to do over again, I would probably eliminate the SPA and ARC because," said he, "there were too many cooks spoiling the broth."⁽¹¹⁵⁾

Georgia Tech's two evaluation contracts covered the time period from August 1, 1973, through June 30, 1975, and were funded in the amount of \$271,843. During this 23 month period, the contractor produced evaluations for 14 of Atlanta's 22 operational Impact projects.

13.2 The Evaluation Process in Atlanta

For the Atlanta program, evaluation was defined as "the process of determining the amount of success in achieving predetermined goals and objectives."⁽¹¹⁶⁾ The evaluation process consisted of three major elements: (a) planning for the evaluation of projects and programs, (b) monitoring the on-going projects and the program, and (c) determining the degree of and reasons for success of the projects and the program. Thus, the evaluation process in Atlanta may be broken down into three basic components: evaluation planning, evaluation monitoring and evaluation analysis (see Table X below).

TABLE X
THE COMPONENTS OF THE ATLANTA EVALUATION PROCESS



(SOURCE: GEORGIA TECH INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE ATLANTA HIGH IMPACT PROGRAM, JUNE 1975.)

13.2.1 Evaluation Planning

The evaluation plan provided a structure for the analytical input to be used in assessing the potential value of the projects and programs, and detailed the project/program evaluation efforts and requirements. Seven activities or steps were included in the planning effort. These were:

- Formulation of measurable goals and objectives to include (1) the identification of desired end results and (2) the identification of any important limits under which the results were to occur.
- Identification of the criteria to be used in measuring the amount of success in achieving the goals and objectives.
- Identification of the performance measures for each criterion.
- Selection of an evaluation design that was practical, given existing resources and conditions.
- After thorough consideration of data necessity, availability, reliability, validity and cost, determination of (1) the data elements necessary for each performance measure, (2) where the data were to be found, (3) how and when the data were to be collected, and (4) how the data would be managed.
- Determination of the analytical techniques that would be applied to the data to yield (1) information regarding accomplishment and (2) information to aid in developing cause and effect relationships explaining the results obtained, and,
- Establishment of the mechanism necessary to report analytical results to decision-makers and others needing this information.

Performance of the above activities was used by the evaluation analysts to produce the evaluation component for the various projects in the program. A flow chart of the evaluation planning process is shown as Figure 1 below.

13.2.2 Evaluation Monitoring

The monitoring process, which ensures that the projects and programs are implemented as described in grant applications and evaluation




FIGURE 1
THE ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM
EVALUATION PLANNING PROCESS

(SOURCE: GEORGIA TECH INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM, JUNE 1975.)

plans respectively, requires obtaining the data necessary for deciding whether to continue, modify, or stop on-going projects and programs. Four major monitoring categories were established by Georgia Tech evaluators:

- (a) Project/program implementation monitoring to ensure that the project or program was being carried out as planned and that goals and objectives were being met.
- (b) Evaluation component implementation monitoring to determine if the evaluation plan was being carried out as specified.
- (c) Monitoring project/program scope to ensure that the project/program design and expected success levels remained reasonable and realistic as project experience was gained and changes in environmental conditions occurred, and,
- (d) Monitoring the scope of the evaluation plan to ensure that the evaluation plan remained an effective tool in analyzing the success of a project.

13.2.3 Evaluation Analysis

The analysis process provided inputs for the project/program monitoring process, and at the conclusion, was to have provided measures of the degree of success and was to have helped explain the reasons for such success. The four essential evaluation analysis activities were:

- (a) Success-level determination to obtain the degree of success of a project/program in achieving its interim and final goals and objectives.
- (b) Statistical analysis to determine if the level of project/program performance being achieved was significant in a statistical sense.
- (c) Assessment of contribution to higher level goals and objectives to assist in program planning and control and in interim evaluation. (The planning effort resulted in the establishment of four sets of achievements designed as goals, sub-goals, objectives and sub-objectives. At the highest level, the analysis took into consideration the LEAA goals and at the lowest level, the project outcome goals. In between, two levels were established to logically relate the possible projects to the LEAA goal in such a way as to guide the selection of projects with the highest expected impact and to assist in interim evaluation.)

- (d) Determination of reasons for the degree of success achieved (to be performed at both project and program levels). This analysis was to provide insights into activities, cause-effect and other relationships to assist in the design and implementation of other crime control projects.

13.3 The Link Between the Evaluation Process and the Program Structure


In Atlanta, in order to tie together the key steps of the COPIE-cycle, an overall program structure was developed. The objectives were to develop a structure which: (a) was explicit in its intention to reduce target crimes, (b) was consistent with the LEAA goals, (c) would convey to all participants exactly what the program was expected to accomplish, (d) would keep the program on course during execution, (e) would aid in reporting progress to others, and (f) would facilitate evaluation of projects and the program. It was through its program structure, then, that Atlanta ensured that a crime-oriented approach was used during its Impact program. That original structure is shown as part of Table VII on page 70. In the perception of Atlanta's evaluation contractors the Impact program would require a structure which both specified the needs and facilitated the evaluation of the various projects and the overall program. Additionally, to meet the overall Impact goal, the evaluation analysts felt the structure should provide aid in selecting projects. Needs were to be identified through the data analysis. Next, a program structure was to be developed to link the problems to possible actions so as to guide the selection of projects with the highest expected impact. Sub-goals would be used to identify general action needs. These, in turn, would divide the program into parts requiring significantly different project types. Performance measures and quantitative targets were established for each sub-goal; however, these sub-goals, generally, were not specific enough to relate needs to agency projects. Consequently, to achieve this level of detail, Atlanta evaluators developed a third level in the program structure. At this third level, distinct objectives which were felt to be feasible within each sub-goal component were identified and

performance measures and quantitative targets established for each objective. Because of the way the sub-goals were established, the evaluators believed that if they could be met, then the major program goal would be met as well.

Although this basic program structure remained static over time, the specific content would undergo change. Thus, as new data became available, and knowledge of the crime problem increased, the evaluators would review and update the program structure. The first revision occurred in January 1973. Table XI, below, depicts that revision. Interestingly, a comparison of Table XI with that of the original program structure, shown as part of Table VII on page 70, reveals a number of significant changes. For example, Sub-goal 1 became "Reduce the Number of Reported Burglaries by 6 percent below the level of Reported Burglaries in 1972" instead of "Reduce the Number of High Crime Census Tracts by 20 percent." As Atlanta's Impact evaluation contractors explained it, revising the sub-goal in this manner permitted the full impact of those projects on a city-wide basis to be accounted for in the program structure. Additionally, the revised sub-goal would avoid the double counting that could have occurred with sub-goals 1 and 2 as originally defined. Another revision to the program structure occurred in April 1974. This revision deleted the sub-goal centering upon the increase in the apprehension rate of target offenders because, at that time, there wasn't a single Atlanta Impact project directed at either of the objectives under this sub-goal. Thus, the final revision to the program structure, submitted during the summer of 1974, eliminated and added an objective. The additional objective dealt with the crime of rape, corresponding to an Atlanta decision to fund a rape program.

In addition to its analysis of project-level contributions, Georgia Tech also completed two models for forecasting 1974 crime-levels, a study of crime displacement and a model for cost analysis.

TABLE XI
THE REVISED ATLANTA IMPACT PROGRAM STRUCTURE



(SOURCE: GEORGIA TECH INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT FOR THE ATLANTA POLICE IMPACT PROGRAM, JUNE 1974)

Since its contract expired on June 30, 1975, and Atlanta's Impact program would continue through the end of 1976, it was not possible for Georgia Tech to perform more than an interim evaluation; conclusions and recommendations were therefore tentative. Among these were the following remarks:

The concept of crime-specific planning and its performance-oriented demands was relatively new. Rather than building upon a base of experience, the Impact program was perhaps the first large-scale implementation of this approach within the system. Local agencies and governmental organizations were not experienced in the generation, conceptualization, and development of mission-oriented projects, nor were they experienced in the complexities of project management. This resulted in delays in both the development of project proposals and in the time required to achieve effective project operations once grants had been initiated. At higher administrative levels, there is a need to keep mission-oriented programs apart from normal bureaucratic operations. There must be a dedication and commitment to accomplishing the overall program mission and when required positive action must be forthcoming so that the program does not flounder. In the Impact program many proposed projects were new in concept and were originated by agencies inexperienced in dealing with bureaucratic complexities. In such instances, if the basic approach is sound the project should be initiated and greater reliance placed on project monitoring activities to assure that anticipated results are achieved.

In spite of these problems, it is remarkable how much has been accomplished by the Impact program. On a crime reduction basis, although the Impact goal has not been achieved, there were successes in reducing historical trends in burglaries and in the reduction of commercial robberies. Experience has been gained throughout the local criminal justice system with performance-oriented projects. There is a learning effect involved in project operations and already some projects have exhibited improvement in performance over time. Unquestionably experience will be required at all levels of the criminal justice system to obtain effective results from the crime-specific planning approach. The Impact program has provided a start, the initial inertia associated with any innovation has been overcome, successes have been achieved, experience gained, and knowledge obtained from the failures. It now remains to build constructively upon this foundation provided by the Impact program...(117)

Georgia Tech's evaluation work on the Atlanta program ended at a critical point in the life of Impact. The decision to phase out Georgia Tech's effort was directly linked to a series of events which had occurred during the winter of 1974 relating to the locus of the Crime Analysis Team.

14.0 THE DEMISE AND REBIRTH OF THE ATLANTA CAT: A CASE FOR POSITIVE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Although the master plan update submitted in January 1974 would not be approved until July 1974, the problems which both the SPA and RO perceived with the update (and there were many), took on the aspects of a second-order priority because of a major crisis which developed over the Crime Analysis Team itself. There was an expressed feeling on the part of several key participants in the Impact process that the program was at such loose ends during this period that it seemed likely to die due to problems of leadership. For example, from the RO coordinator:

I don't know how it [the CAT] managed to continue... The main focus at that period of time was on what was going to happen to the CAT. Was it going to stay at ARC? Was it going to dissolve completely? Were we going to lose Impact totally in Atlanta? Were we going to just forget about the rest of the program? Were we going to get further funding? Was there a chance that the CAT could survive in some way? (114)

From the SPA coordinator:

[The CAT] organization [was] untenable because...it perpetuated the troublesome confusion regarding roles and responsibilities both within ARC and among the different levels of government involved. (115)

And finally, the Region IV Administrator:

The ARC Crime Analysis Team [had] virtually dissolved. (120)

The demise of the Atlanta CAT, then, was the major issue facing the Impact bureaucracy. The problem seems traceable to at least three factors: agency relationships, personnel turnover, and final Impact funding deadlines.

14.1 The ARC Loses Its Credibility With the SPA and RO

In the first place, relationships between the ARC and the SPA had always been strained. When the current SPA coordinator took over the state's responsibilities for Impact in March 1974, relationships

between the LEAA RO and SPA, which were never poor, improved markedly. Indeed, the two Impact coordinators worked so closely together that they were perceived by some city participants in the program as speaking with "one voice," and allowing "little room for negotiation."⁽¹²¹⁾

In the second place, there were major changes in administration of the Impact program at all three levels. On March 8, the second CAT director resigned to become the director of the Atlanta Crime Commission. There was also turnover at the Regional Office of the LEAA. As the RO coordinator explains it, "We had an Acting Administrator who was anticipating a new Regional Administrator coming on....We had a bad period of time in our office without definite leadership [and] there was also a turnover at the state level."⁽¹²²⁾ Where the ARC was concerned, it was also experiencing some additional staff problems. With the resignation of the CAT director, the ARC director of Governmental Services assumed the role of interim CAT director. However, wholesale staff defections were expected because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of the CAT within the ARC.

In the third place, all applications for final funding were to be submitted to the LEAA by September 30, 1974, and Atlanta had, as of March 1, 1974, approximately \$13,000,000 remaining in unobligated funds. The drawdown of their funds could not begin until Atlanta's master plan update was approved and the CAT within ARC was being perceived as "dragging its feet." On April 9, the Acting RA wrote the SPA director the following:

Given sufficient lead time, it was envisioned that a Crime Analysis Team would be able to demonstrate that its range of activities would prove of such benefit to the city in planning and evaluating criminal justice programs that, in some fashion, institutionalization could be accomplished. For example, the CAT could be picked up in its entirety as a permanent part of the city government structure, or particular activities could be singled out for continuation with city or state support.

Thus, the LEAA remained keenly interested in the institutionalization of the CAT and even suggested that it "could be picked up in its entirety as a permanent part of the city structure." There was no question but that the LEAA was committed to continuation of support to the CAT through FY '75. However, there were other matters the CAT would need to address with respect to planning, program management, and evaluation. Given the time constraints the CAT and SPA were under, work needed to begin immediately on a grant proposal for continuation funding. It was already April 9, and the Acting RA expected that his office would receive a formal proposal for CAT/SPA continuation support "no later than April 30, 1974."⁽¹²³⁾ Immediately upon receipt of the RA's communique, the SPA director transmitted the essential data to the interim CAT director. On April 15, he followed up with a letter outlining the specifics of the draft continuation proposal he expected to see by April 18. As a minimum, the draft document was to include the following:

- (a) Justification of each staff position requested, with delineation of the specific responsibilities and qualifications assigned to each.
- (b) A description of where the CAT will fit into the ARC organization structure, including what decision has been made concerning the formal naming of a new project director.
- (c) A complete and detailed description of all activities to be carried out by the CAT, and the procedures to be utilized relative to its remaining planning functions, the review of applications, program administration and phase-out, monitoring and evaluation. Of particular importance during the continuation phase will be definition of CAT-SCC-LEAA roles in monitoring and correcting project deviations or problems.
- (d) The efforts made to institutionalize the CAT's planning and evaluation capabilities. Indices of local support, in the form of matching funds if available, should be included, as well as plans for the CAT beyond the end of federal support.⁽¹²⁴⁾

Working under enormous pressure, the ARC managed to submit a CAT continuation application on April 26, just four days before the announced deadline. They were asking for funds in the amount of \$269,882 to cover the equivalent of 8.39 staff members. All CAT members were to be funded through June 1975 and the evaluator through November 1975. In reviewing the grant application, the SPA coordinator found it to be "confusingly written" with "much overlapping information." In her view, the application was no more than a justification for continuing the present CAT staff for another year. (125) The decision was made to return the application to the ARC for substantial revisions.

On May 10, a meeting was held to discuss the future of the CAT. The ARC, SPA and RO were all in attendance. The decision was reached to continue the CAT in the ARC through FY '75 for purposes of monitoring and evaluation. Institutionalization would now take a secondary role to phasing out of the Impact program. On May 17, the ARC application for continuation of the CAT was resubmitted to the SPA. Again, it was rejected as unacceptable. On May 30, in a memorandum to her superiors at the Region IV Office, the RO coordinator would articulate the problems with continuing the CAT within the ARC as follows:

There are some problems among the key agencies involved in Impact administration. The CAT lost much of its credibility during the first two years of Impact in which inadequate work was done, information withheld, and changes made by the CAT without grant adjustment requests.

Now ARC has submitted an application for continuation of the CAT for another year. The state has reviewed the application and notes two alternatives:

- 1) rejection, or 2), substantial reduction of the award to fund half of the staff proposed. The crux of the CAT functions will be evaluation and monitoring, which amounts to a phase-out of the Impact functions and the CAT by June 30, 1975. The mayor has endorsed this application.

One fact which gnaws at the decision to continue the CAT for another year is the handling of the current CAT grant. Substantial changes occurred under the present grant, such as changes in staff positions, turnover in staff members, dissolution of the Task Force, unilateral extensions of deadlines, and budget category transfers. All of these changes took place without requests for prior approval from the state or LEAA.

A budget revision request, which has been in the mill since November 1973, has still not reached the Regional Office. The state has reviewed several submissions but has bounced them back to ARC for rewrites.

In light of the problems with the current grant, a continuation grant may be just a continuation of previous problems. (126)

In a nutshell, the problem was one of the ARC's credibility with the RO/SPA, and of its future viability, both already damaged by staff defections, and by the inability to trace accountability to any one individual within the ARC structure. This latter problem had prompted the SPA coordinator to write the following in a memorandum addressing the issue of the ARC-CAT continuation application:

Responsibility for performance is diffused among all the CAT members. I think one control point for information and accountability must be established. Under the current and proposed arrangement, correspondence is initiated by each CAT member, so that often the members are unaware of each other's actions and no one person has an overview of the entire operation. In addition, [the interim CAT director] is almost never available by telephone and the other members, to whom the calls are referred, are frequently unable to answer the questions asked. (127)

Consequently, the meeting of July 22, where representatives of all four governmental agencies came together to decide the fate of the Atlanta CAT within the ARC was really something of a fait accompli. The ARC would withdraw its application for continuation of the Crime Analysis Team and the application would be resubmitted by the City of Atlanta. The implications of this move, viewed by the SPA and the RO as essential, were many. Most importantly, though, it meant further delays in revitalizing the Team, and with the ARC serving only in a

lame duck capacity, the situation was likely to worsen before getting better. In effect, "day-to-day administration got left by the wayside at that point," the RA coordinator has since explained. "There wasn't much monitoring of the projects either. So, that whole period was one of negotiation....The focus became the future of the CAT."(128)

14.2 Further Political Developments

In the City of Atlanta, where the CAT would be housed, three events of a political nature had occurred which were liable to affect the Impact program. These events were interrelated, having all grown out of the continuing conflict between the mayor and the chief of police. First, there was the matter of the mayor's attempt to fire the police chief. As the Atlanta news media report the circumstances, it was in mid-April that the police chief won a restraining order from a Fulton County Superior Court judge, preventing the city from appointing a public safety commissioner at a higher level in the municipal organizational hierarchy than the police chief's own position. On May 3, the mayor had fired the police chief; however, the dismissal was ruled illegal by a neighboring DeKalb County Superior Court judge. The case was to go before the Georgia Court of Appeals in September. The appellate review process had been begun by the police chief and, in effect, served to prevent the mayor from appointing a public safety commissioner until such time as the appeals court rendered a decision. Second, the legal struggle between the mayor and police chief spilled over into the police department. It seems that during the mayor's abortive attempt at firing the police chief, he had appointed an acting chief. Consequently, two factions developed within the police department, one camp loyal to the chief and one camp supporting the acting chief. During the debacle, it was unclear who was in charge. When the decision was reached that the chief could not be ousted, those officers supporting the mayor were immediately demoted and transferred. According to The Atlanta Constitution, the chief emerged from the struggle "in a stronger position than ever."(129) Despite the apparent victory

gained by the police chief, it could be reported by the RO coordinator that during this period, "the police department [was] in a state of confusion and low morale." Finally, there was a third incident involving the police chief and the City Council. The Council had subpoenaed information from the police on its spying activities in respect to a local paper, The Atlanta Voice. The police chief had defied the subpoenas and faced impeachment by the City Council. These problems could have serious repercussions for Atlanta's Impact program since the outgoing CAT had advocated awarding another \$5,000,000 in Impact funds to the police. In the opinion of the RO coordinator, this may have constituted "a source of conflict due to the mayor's dispute with the police department and his [avowed] interest in social programs."(130)

14.3 The CAT Function is Transferred to the City of Atlanta

Once it had been decided where the CAT would be located, the steps necessary to transfer its functions to the city moved along fairly rapidly. The city submitted its CAT continuation application to the SPA on August 24, slightly more than four weeks from the July 22 meeting where the decision had been reached to transfer the CAT function to the city. The application was found unacceptable due to a proposed grant period of 22 months, and surprisingly, a stated intent to place the CAT in the Bureau of Police Services. On September 6, the SPA director informed the mayor of the deficiencies of the grant application, and the RA, in a letter on September 9, informed the mayor of his agency's concerns. Because of the virtual dissolution of the CAT within the ARC, he pointed out that there were three basic points which, from the LEAA's perspective, the city would have to accommodate:

- (a) All applications must be received by the LEAA Regional Office with the State Crime Commission's certification no later than September 30, 1974.
- (b) All action project applications must be consistent with the Atlanta Impact program master plan update.

- (c) There must be a Crime Analysis Team in operation in order for the funding of the Impact program to continue. The CAT is an integral, critical part of the Impact program, and without it there can be no action programs funded with LEAA Impact funds.

Addressing the problem of no operational CAT within the ARC, he then proposed the following strategy:

One solution which you may wish to consider is the immediate designation of a Task Force to form an "interim" CAT in order that immediate deadlines can be met. This "interim" CAT could exist as an instrument whereby continuity can be maintained until the City's "final" CAT is fully operational. Such an "interim" Team is vital, as it will be the point with which the Regional Office will coordinate its review and negotiation of action projects.

The RA then made it clear that no action monies could be awarded without the existence of an operational CAT. He concluded as follows:

....Assuming that an acceptable CAT application is received in this office by the September 30th deadline, and further assuming that action projects consistent with the master plan update are also received in this office (both with certification from the State Crime Commission), the following schedule will govern:

- (a) By October 15, 1974, LEAA will have either approved or disapproved the CAT application.
- (b) If the CAT application is approved and awarded on October 15, 1974, the CAT will be expected to be operational by December 1, 1974.
- (c) No action projects will be awarded until the CAT is operational.
- (d) All awards must be made by this office no later than December 31, 1974, or the money will revert to other programs. (131)

What it all came down to was this: No functional CAT meant no money, and since Steps (b) through (d) above hinged upon the

completion of Step (a) the city would have to act hurriedly. It was now September 9 and in just six more days, the LEAA was to have "either approved or disapproved the CAT application."

On September 11, the mayor met with SPA and RO officials and ironed out all major issues concerning the CAT. On September 13, the city submitted a revised application to the SPA, which was then reviewed and submitted to the RO with the state's endorsement. The Region IV Office's initial endorsement of the CAT continuation grant then occurred on October 8, 1974. Two major steps were immediately ahead: the now defunct CAT must be operational by December 1, and all Impact funds had to be awarded by December 31, or they would be lost to the City of Atlanta. Correspondence covering the months of October-November 1974 reveal that this was a period of unprecedented cooperation among the various governmental levels responsible for Impact administration. By November 20, the SPA coordinator could notify all Impact project directors of the transfer of the CAT from the ARC to the City of Atlanta. Thus, Atlanta had succeeded in transferring the CAT functions to the city under difficult conditions. In retrospect, the transfer appeared to have been successfully made for at least three reasons, two of which are addressed in the following comment made by the RO coordinator:

First, I think the mayor realized he was going to lose a tremendous opportunity for Atlanta if he allowed the Crime Analysis Team to go down the drain. Also, he had traditionally been interested in crime reduction programs....Now, if the press had gotten wind of the fact that Atlanta might lose millions of dollars by not continuing the Crime Analysis Team, it would have looked very bad for him, politically.

Second, the Regional Office was very interested in keeping the Impact program and there was a mandate. We said that they could not receive any more Impact money unless the Crime Analysis Team got started up again. So....it was two things really. They had \$13 million at stake and the mayor's interest [in getting that money for Atlanta]. (132)

Additionally, the level of serious professional commitment to the program exhibited by both the SPA and RO staffs, and in particular, the numerous hours of extra effort by their then Impact coordinators, appears to have made the CAT transfer possible. And contrary to what is believed by some persons associated with the Atlanta program, the evidence does indicate that the principle of decision-making decentralization was indeed adhered to by the Region IV RO/SPA staffs. The New Year, 1975, would bring with it a new Crime Analysis Team to be headed by a Harvard-trained attorney who had been, for seven years, the director of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society.


15.0 THE CITY OF ATLANTA INSTITUTIONALIZES THE CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM AS STAFF TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

15.1 The Functions and Structure of the CAT/CJCC are Delineated

The Crime Analysis Team was awarded a grant of \$194,267 in LEAA funds on October 30, 1974. It was incorporated into the City of Atlanta governmental structure by Special Ordinance at the same time, becoming operational in January 1975. The CAT, housed in the Office of the Mayor, was to serve the chief administrative officials and the City Council as an omnibus criminal justice planning and evaluation unit and was expected to build upon the COPIE-cycle concepts begun under the prior Impact planning unit. The new CAT, then, would serve two basic purposes. It would administer LEAA money provided to the City of Atlanta (by obtaining, overseeing, monitoring and evaluating grants) and would serve as staff to the newly created Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC), the local criminal justice planning unit for the metropolitan Atlanta area (i.e., Atlanta and Fulton and DeKalb counties). This was different from the ARC, which planned for a seven-county region, although, technically, the new CAT, too, qualified as a regional planning unit and was to receive Part B funds from the SPA. Since the City of Atlanta was located in both DeKalb and Fulton counties, it was reasonable for DeKalb County to be included in the area for which the CAT would plan.

The Crime Analysis Team became fully staffed in April 1975. As presently constituted, the CAT has 18 staff members. Table XII, which summarizes the organization of the CAT, is also an attempt to reflect its various functions (i.e. planning, evaluation, and grants management). The Bureau of Police Services' small planning and research unit was reassigned to the Crime Analysis Team and this relationship is also reflected in Table XII. As already discussed, the CAT serves as staff to the CJCC, and the CAT director is the executive director of the CJCC and a permanent member, as is the mayor of Atlanta, who serves as chairman of the CJCC. The CJCC, then, is the policymaking body and,

TABLE XVII
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE ATLANTA CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM



ACRONYMS USED:

- CJCC: Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
- CJP: Criminal Justice Planner
- RA: Research Analyst
- F/A: Financial Analyst
- QMA: Quantitative Methods Analyst
- BPS P & R: Bureau of Police Services Planning and Research

(SOURCE: ATLANTA CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM, OCTOBER 1975.)

in addition, holds responsibility for establishing a master plan for criminal justice, approving all grant applications, and coordinating planning and problem areas which cross agency and political jurisdictional lines. Table XIII lists the names and organizational affiliations of the various members of the CJCC. As presently constituted, there are 29 members, six of whom are without obvious ties to a unit of government. Omitted from the list of CJCC members is the name of Atlanta's chief of police.

The Impact program having surfaced the inadequacy of regularized community involvement in Atlanta, a CJCC citizen's advisory group was also established. Called the Atlanta Task Force on Crime, all but two of its 25 members were private citizens. The name and committee assignments of Task Force members are shown in Table XIV below. The combined membership of the CJCC and the Task Force thus totals 54 persons. Based on their experience with the original Task Force, both the SPA and RO coordinators expressed some concern that the new group would be "much too large and unwieldy."⁽¹³³⁾ However, both the mayor and the CAT director remained committed to the ideal of involving individuals representing every strata of the metropolitan Atlanta area in the criminal justice decision-making process and this commitment, in their view, called for a CJCC and Task Force that were truly representative of all Atlantans. The CAT director has explained their position as follows:

The mayor is absolutely committed to more community involvement in all of his administration...and the CJCC expands the scope of concern and involvement beyond the traditional actions within the criminal justice system....I served, for some short period of time a year ago last spring, on the Citizens' Advisory Task Force on Impact for the mayor. We were attempting to get the last grants developed...and we became very aware that there had been virtually no community-level involvement over the prior three years of Impact. The CJCC, I feel, is crucial to getting the community input, and the development of the Citizens' Advisory Council to the CJCC is going to mean even more involvement of the community.⁽¹³⁴⁾

TABLE XIII
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL
OF THE METROPOLITAN ATLANTA AREA

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| 1. THE HONORABLE MAYNARD JACKSON,
CHAIRMAN OF CJCC AND
MAYOR, CITY OF ATLANTA | 11. THE HONORABLE RICHARD GUTMAN, JR.,
COUNCILMAN, DISTRICT #8,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 21. THE HONORABLE DAVID SCOTT,
REPRESENTATIVE, GEORGIA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY |
| 2. MR. MICHAEL H. TERRY,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CJCC, AND
DIRECTOR,
CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 12. THE HONORABLE PIERRE HOWARD, JR.,
SENATOR, GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY | 22. THE HONORABLE LEWIS R. SLATON,
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FULTON COUNTY |
| 3. DR. ALLEN L. AULT,
COMMISSIONER
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER
REHABILITATION/CORRECTIONS | 13. MR. J. D. HUDSON,
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 23. MR. GREGORY STALLS
CITIZEN MEMBER |
| 4. THE HONORABLE RICHARD BELL
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
COUNTY OF DEKALB | 14. MR. HERBERT T. JENKINS, SR.,
CITIZEN MEMBER | 24. THE HONORABLE LEROY N. STYNCHCOMBE,
SHERIFF, FULTON COUNTY |
| 5. THE HONORABLE GOODSIN "SHAG" GATES
CHAIRMAN, FULTON COUNTY COMMISSION | 15. THE HONORABLE R. E. JONES,
CHIEF JUDGE,
MUNICIPAL COURT, GENERAL
DIVISION, CITY OF ATLANTA | 25. ALBERT L. THOMPSON, ESQ.,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
CITIZEN MEMBER |
| 6. THE HONORABLE DANIEL DUKE
SENIOR JUDGE
CRIMINAL COURT OF FULTON COUNTY | 16. MS. PORTIA LASONDE,
CITIZEN MEMBER | 26. MR. JACK E. THOMPSON,
COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
FULTON COUNTY |
| 7. THE HONORABLE A. REGINALD EAVES
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 17. DR. GEORGE NAPPER
CITIZEN MEMBER | 27. MS. LOUISE W. WIENER,
CITIZEN MEMBER |
| 8. THE HONORABLE LEON S. EPLAN,
COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND PLANNING,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 18. MR. JAMES H. PACE,
AID TO OFFENDERS | 28. MR. D. E. WILKINSON,
YOUTH SERVICES, METRO ATLANTA
PROGRAM DIRECTOR,
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES |
| 9. THE HONORABLE DAVEY L. GIBSON,
COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT,
CITY OF ATLANTA | 19. MR. INMAN C. PHILLIPS, DIRECTOR OF
COURT SERVICES, FULTON COUNTY
ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT | 29. THE HONORABLE Q. V. WILLIAMSON,
COUNCILMAN-AT-LARGE, POST 17,
CITY OF ATLANTA |
| 10. THE HONORABLE MILDRED CLOVER,
REPRESENTATIVE, GEORGIA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY | 20. THE HONORABLE ROMAEE T. POWELL,
JUDGE, FULTON COUNTY JUVENILE
COURT | |

(SOURCE: ATLANTA CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM, OCTOBER 1975)

TABLE XIV
THE ATLANTA TASK FORCE ON CRIME
(CJCC CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Committee</u>
1. Allison, Mr. William	Corrections, Juvenile, Social
2. Campion, Ms. Jane	Condition, Unemployment
3. Croom, Dr. Robert	Alcoholism/Drug Addiction
4. Crumbley, R. Alex, Esq.	Juvenile
5. Drucker, Dr. Melvin	Courts, Legislation
6. Fryer, Judge Joel J.	Alcoholism/Drug Addiction
7. Hill, Mr. Robert H.	any
8. Howard, Dr. G. LaMarr	Planning
9. Lane, Mr. Bob	Corrections, Juvenile, Education, others
10. Long, Rev. Byron D.	Economics
11. Lydecker, Ms. Nancy	any
12. Marcus, Hon. Sidney	Planning, Evaluation, Handguns
13. Mayfield, Mr. Terry	any
14. Moore, Dr. Charles	Alcoholism/Drug Addiction, Community Prevention
15. Oxedine, Mr. James R.	Planning, Evaluation
16. Parks, Bernard, Esq.	Corrections
17. Peterson, Hugh, Esq.	Alcoholism/Drug Addiction, Unemployment
18. Priddy, Ms. Judith E.	Courts, Corrections, Juveniles
19. Rubin, S. Richard, Esq.	Rape, Courts
20. Skeleton, Dr. W Douglas	Courts, Law Enforcement, Corrections
21. Smith, Mr. Frank	Handguns, Alcoholism/Drug Addiction
22. Starnes, Mr. Danny	any
23. Talbott, Dr. Douglas	Corrections, Juveniles
24. Tidwell, Judge G. Ernest	Alcoholism/Drug Addiction
25. Wilson, Mr. Ronald W.	Courts
	Housing, Planning, Community Involvement

(Source: Atlanta Crime Analysis Team, October 10, 1975)

By late March, the new CAT had developed what it perceived as an approach to criminal justice planning that was well suited for Atlanta. Their planning approach was based on three assumptions:

- (a) The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, employing CAT as its staff, will assume the mandate for all criminal justice planning for Atlanta....
- (b) We [the CJCC] have adopted two planning vehicles: system improvement and specific crime reduction.... We believe that the positing of crime reduction goals common to the system as a whole will encourage the coordinated implementation of change within individual facets of the system. CAT assumes, in turn, that changes in system components can be initiated and coordinated with a successful result of specific crime reduction....
- (c) Because planning recommendations of the CAT will be constantly wedded to the decision-making and implementation functions of the CJCC, this planning approach sets a process in motion rather than outlining an eventual research product.

Given the aforesaid approach, the CJCC/CAT envisioned ten planning steps. Briefly stated, these involved the following activities:

- (a) The CAT will assess all currently available criminal justice data and will establish procedures to collect the data.
- (b) Using all data sources, i.e., quantitative and qualitative, the CAT will tentatively select crimes to be targeted for reduction.
- (c) The CAT will then analyze all facets of the system in terms of services available, manpower allocation, etc.
- (d) The CAT will next identify the major problems and set reasonable goals for treating those problems.
- (e) The CAT will draft prioritized position papers on goals for use by the CJCC in decision-making.
- (f) The CAT will suggest objectives and aims for system components, where aims refer to particular changes to be implemented in the system.
- (g) The CAT will identify all variables essential to the implementation of solutions to a given goal.

- (h) The CAT will draw together a complete set of recommendations for objectives and aims for all components of the system.
- (i) After the CJCC acts on its recommendations, the CAT will both implement and evaluate the chosen crime strategies.
- (j) The CAT will work for intercomponent cooperation in implementing aims or objectives. (135)

The CAT was to have initiated its planning process by April 1975, and it was expected that the analysis of data, interviews with CJCC members and research of the criminal justice system would lead to the formulation of measurable goals for crime reduction and system improvements by July 1975. Three months beyond that point in time, October 1975, it was expected that the CAT would have developed a planning structure to guide its activities from October 1975 to October 1976. The 1975 plan was to have three components: a statistical abstract, research papers, and an initial one-year, comprehensive plan. Section one, the statistical abstract section, would present an analysis of the data gathered from the records of criminal justice agencies and would serve as an update of the 1972 and 1973 Atlanta master plans. The research "issue" section (i.e., section two) would analyze the data in the first section, draw on other data sources and would then present problems needing solutions. Section three would be devoted to developing recommendations to address the problems identified in section two. The largest portion of Atlanta's initial effort, then, was to be devoted to the development of the statistical abstract. As the CAT envisioned the abstract, it would consist of three parts: crime analysis, data from the Offender Based Transaction System (OBTS) and recidivism data.

Crime Analysis, OBTS, and Recidivism. Crime analysis, will assess and evaluate eight major crimes: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, handgun violation, and narcotics and dangerous drug abuse. The analysis will develop three sets of profiles. The first will describe the offense: place of occurrence, time of occurrence,

type of offense, and other characteristics of the offense, such as weapon used, extent of injuries, and property taken. We will develop profiles on victims: age, sex, race, census tract of residence, education, employment, victim/perpetrator relationship. A third set of profiles will describe the offender: age, sex, race, census tract of residence, education and employment.

This crime-specific analysis will be useful in several ways. First, it will give criminal justice decision-makers a better idea of what is occurring around them in crime. Second, detailed knowledge of a particular crime aids in planning manpower deployment and new programs to deal with that crime.... Third, follow-up analysis of specific crimes (will) allow evaluation of currently employed crime-specific strategies.

OBTS statistics will deal with the major decisions made about each offender as he passes through the system. The decision points include arrest, commitment hearing, prosecutive action, grand jury, prosecutive action again prior to trial, the trial court experience, etc. Relative to juveniles the process is as follows: arrest, intake, petition, investigation, preliminary hearing, court hearing, etc. We will look not only at the decisions made but also at the amount of time that passes between decision points.

Information developed in the OBTS section will also be valuable to criminal justice personnel. 1) It will aid in identifying those points in the system where suspects or offenders "fall out" of the system; if this fallout is judged to be too heavy, remedial action can be taken. Also, this feature allows an agency to know where its clients come from, where they go, and what happens to them after they leave. 2) OBTS facilitates the consideration of time as a variable, allowing the determination of the average time required to process a defendant between two decision points. 3) It identifies the number of people at each decision point at a given time, so that workloads and bottlenecks can be identified. 4) It promotes a uniform unit of analysis so that the flow of clients can be better understood....5) OBTS promotes the consideration of the criminal justice system as a system, encouraging cross-component analysis of criminal justice problems.

The third part of the statistical abstract, recidivism,... will study felonies that occur within a three-year period after the offenders' release from the criminal justice system. Recidivism is important to know about, if only because much crime is committed by repeat offenders. However, if the goal of corrections is to reduce crime, then recidivism is an essential indicator of success in the rehabilitation of offenders.(136)

Even if the new CAT were to rely, in large measure, on the work of its predecessor at the ARC, it still seemed an ambitious undertaking. But there were other problems which were directly traceable to the rapidity with which the new team had been implemented, that were bound to lead to further difficulties.

It was April 24 when the SPA coordinator delivered, in writing, a statement to her agency's executive director indicating all was not well with the new CAT and further, that a problem of role perception appeared to be developing in which CJCC and block activities were upstaging Impact. "CJCC and block are important but not more important than Impact," she wrote.(137) In addition, every penny being used to run the CAT, except for a small SPA grant in Part B funds, was Impact money. Although she recognized the CAT was putting in an enormous amount of work on special conditions, she was still concerned with such matters as Impact monitoring because better than four months had passed and nothing had materialized in the way of a serious effort at monitoring by the CAT. That very same day, representatives from the SPA and RO met with the CAT to discuss its planning process and grants management responsibilities. As a follow-up to that meeting, the SPA director, on April 28, wrote a letter to the CAT director stating the terms of the agreement reached in the April 24 meeting. Regarding the planning process, he expected the CAT to submit justifications, in writing, addressing the following areas:

- (a) How the city's plan will fit into both ARC's regional plan and the SCC state plan. Please describe specific steps which have or will be taken to coordinate the CAT's effort with ARC's, and to insure that the CAT's timeframes are consistent with those of the other two agencies.
- (b) What is meant by "data bank." This should include assurances that the CAT does not intend to reprogram and store all available data from operational agencies but will only do so on an as-needed, cost-justified basis.
- (c) Briefly, how the three plan components, the statistical abstract, research papers, and initial plan, will fit together into a whole.

In relation to Impact grants management, it was agreed that the CAT would submit the following:

- (a) A formal monitoring format and time schedule. These will be open to SCC and LEAA comments and suggestions.
- (b) The names of the CAT staff members to whom monitoring and grants management responsibilities for specific Impact grants have been assigned.
- (c) CAT staff reviews of all Impact applications and grant adjustment requests. CAT reviews should screen out all computational errors, unallowable costs, and unjustified expenditures. (138)

Problems between the new CAT and the SPA/RO were not solved, however. Writing (May 9) to the Region IV Administrator, the RO coordinator saw the situation thusly:

The Crime Analysis Team is not fulfilling its Impact responsibilities. There is more emphasis placed on the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council than on Impact projects. Specifically, the CAT is deficient in the following Impact areas:

- (a) Monitoring - On January 24 and February 5, [the SPA coordinator] and I met with the CAT and emphasized the monitoring responsibility. The only monitoring that has taken place since then has been initiated by SCC and LEAA.
- (b) Evaluation - We have received no evaluation reports since the new CAT started. The CAT wants to change Georgia Tech's evaluation methodology. The CAT has hired fiscal specialists as evaluators.
- (c) Grants Management - One person has been assigned to do grants management activities. The project directors have been contacted by a particular CAT member as a liaison. Grant adjustments have arrived at the State Crime Commission with unnecessary errors. Most of the grant adjustment requests have had to be returned to the CAT for corrections and additional information.

In general, the CAT is poorly managed. There is no follow-up work done, apparently because assignments get shuffled and lost among the staff. Each time a new member is hired, the assignments get shifted....

In addition to lack of specific assignments and responsibilities, there has been no one appointed to act in [the CAT director's] absence. We have discussed this numerous times with him, and he has stated he will not appoint a "deputy" director.

In summary, the failure of the CAT to fulfill its Impact responsibilities satisfactorily is apparently due to:

- (a) a poorly managed staff in which assignments are constantly transferred and responsibilities are neither well-defined nor delegated.
- (b) making CJCC-related matters the first priority and a de-emphasis of Impact responsibilities.

This is a violation of the intent of our grant. I refer you to two specific statements in the grant:

"The CAT at Atlanta will incorporate into one unit all activities performed under the Impact program's CAT."

"Impact projects will be given greater weight and will therefore necessitate quarterly monitoring." (139)

It was certainly the most serious indictment of the new Crime Analysis Team thus far. The RO coordinator's memorandum, however, failed to address an issue which appeared to be largely responsible for the dilemma the CAT was facing: that is, the countless special conditions attached to the final group of Impact grants that had been awarded prior to the September 1974 cutoff date. The CAT director has since explained the situation as follows:

I think that the thing that has probably caused almost a division of philosophy, at some point along the way, was the last group of grants awarded under the Impact program that were prepared by ARC and by some interim people at the city. I think there was an interim Crime Analysis Team from the time ARC actually stopped functioning to the time that I came on board.... What happened there is that the RO and SPA got those grants from ARC and found them fairly objectionable. They were faced, I think, with a very difficult decision. The question was: do you reject these grants--I think there was a September cutoff date for new grants to be awarded in '74. So do you reject those grants and let the City of Atlanta lose another \$5 million or so of Impact programs, or do you

award them and encumber them with significant special conditions and rely on the new Crime Analysis Team to respond to them? Unfortunately and fortunately, they chose the latter course. This meant that we came into a situation where, in fact, the grants that we were responding to, by way of special conditions, should have been totally rewritten, totally reworked--never should have been awarded the way they were--and all of that. So, we were dealing with 20 to 25 special conditions on three or four grants. Major special conditions--total budget narrative rewrites, total new budgets for the Bureau of Police Services, standard operating procedures manual, an EEO Affirmation Action Manual that had never been written. Things that aren't produced in a matter of weeks but are rather substantial undertakings. I think that it's very easy for friendships to get frayed in a situation like that where grants had been awarded as of January 6, 1975 but with special conditions--prior-to-expenditure special conditions--that made it terribly frustrating because here you were with the money but the grants could not operate until you did these things, and these particular things could take two to three months to respond to. Basically, we had to rework the whole planning process in developing some of these grants. I think that's where it began and although I'm totally sympathetic and totally in agreement and very pleased that they chose that procedure rather than rejecting the grants, it did get us off to a very bad start....(140)

Despite these problems, the CAT was able to clear enough of the special conditions attached to the final grants awarded to satisfy the Region IV Office of the LEAA. By July 15, the RO coordinator would, in addition, recommend the awarding of funds to assist the CAT toward institutionalization:

I am submitting a request to consider the awarding of capacity building to the Atlanta Crime Analysis Team/Criminal Justice Coordinating Council....

LEAA priorities clearly support improvement of state and local ability to plan, manage, and evaluate [criminal justice programs]. The Atlanta CAT/CJCC is an example of an entity attempting to build the needed capacity....The CAT/CJCC gets to the heart of LEAA's purpose: comprehensive planning and coordination of the criminal justice system.

Therefore, it is recommended that we seriously consider funding the Atlanta CAT/CJCC....(141)

On August 4, 1975, the CAT presented a tentative outline for its 1975 comprehensive plan to the CJCC planning committee. On August 12, the Region IV Administrator wrote the LEAA Administrator, recommending 50 percent support in FY 1976 for the CAT/CJCC because of his staff's belief that the institutionalization of a viable Criminal Justice Coordinating Council was "a good faith effort to constructively and independently deal with Atlanta's crime problems."(142) By mid-October, the CJCC had met five times and seemed well on the way to developing a comprehensive criminal justice plan. By November 1, monitoring visits had been conducted or were scheduled to be conducted on all Impact projects, and by November 8, the CAT had completed its first in-house evaluation of an Impact project.

The Atlanta CAT, as this history concludes, is bustling with activity, and relationships between the CAT and the SPA/RO appear to be decidedly less strained. Atlanta, although having successfully institutionalized what is presently the largest criminal justice planning and evaluation capability in the entire Impact program, faces yet another problem. The final Impact projects awarded in Atlanta did not become operational until August 1975 and those projects, according to the CAT director, "will come nowhere near spending all the money by the September 1976 cutoff date." Consequently, negotiations are now underway with the LEAA to extend the cutoff date, wholly for the purpose of expenditure.

16.0 EPILOGUE: AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MAYOR OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA

As a final (albeit necessarily subjective) overview of the Impact program experience in Atlanta, the following interview with the Honorable Maynard Jackson, Mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, was taped on September 29, 1975 at the Atlanta City Hall.

Q: Mayor Jackson, the Impact program was seen as an experiment in New Federalism with the cities given a major say in the planning and implementation of a large-scale federal program. In your view, how effectively did inter-governmental relations function in the case of Impact, and how well did the partnership between LEAA-Washington, the Regional Office, State Planning Agency and your office work?

A: I honestly am unable to assess how effectively the relations were established and pursued between LEAA locally and the State Crime Commission and the City of Atlanta, except to say that generally my impression is: relations were effective, open--communications were open. Ultimately, of course, we established a city Crime Analysis Team and a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. The Crime Analysis Team is the agency which officially pursues all these inter-governmental relations on behalf of the Impact program. My impression is that the only possible area in which we might have had some problems might have been on the state-level because of the way the State Crime Commission itself was established at the time. I think, however, those matters have been resolved, and Governor Busbee has strengthened the State Crime Commission from several different points of view. One concern some people had, as they expressed it to me, was related to the former chairman of the State Crime Commission, who was also engaged in consulting for the

(A CONT):

State of Georgia in the area of criminal justice. Many felt, under his chairmanship, that there were too few black Georgians on the State Crime Commission; therefore, there was some question about the credibility of the decisions rendered. I'm not sure how accurate those concerns are. I simply relay them because they were discussed openly, even in the newspapers. But I am confident the relations we have now are probably as good as can be expected by anybody, under the circumstances, and I think the relations are adequate.

Q: Mayor Jackson, the Atlanta Impact program attempted to maintain an open-door policy toward citizen groups. What has been the city's policy toward community involvement in Impact during your administration?

A: Well, the city's policy, it seems to me, is one to which the Public Safety Commissioner, I think, can speak more directly than I--and the Crime Analysis Team director as well. The policies were established originally, as you well know, under my predecessor. I honestly don't know what the policies were at that time. Now, the official policy of this administration, on the question of community involvement in every aspect of city life, is that: number one, it is necessary; number two, it must be far more than token, and therefore, must be structured; and number three, there ought to be some monitoring mechanism which will ensure that the structure designed to guarantee the participation of citizens is working.

(A CONT):

Now, one manifestation of citizen involvement, which has occurred only during my administration, and which has clearly had a beneficial effect on the Impact program and on the coordination of the criminal justice system, as a whole, has been the establishment, within the past several months, of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. There are persons on the CJCC who are elected officials--a few local and state. There are others who are public officials by appointment. But the largest single group, when you include the Task Force, are private citizens. Their involvement, I think, has been extremely helpful.

Q:

What about the newspapers in Atlanta, Mayor Jackson. We read, almost on a daily basis, something about Impact in the Atlanta papers. Do you feel that their contribution overall has been a positive one or has it been somewhat negative?

A:

I would say, by and large, there was an inadequate appreciation of the program's goals and especially of its operation. The result was that in some cases there was criticism about an apparent lack of movement and criticism of the city's role when, in fact, it was the state that already had the city's package and was reviewing it before giving it a decision. This meant, therefore, that the city had discharged its obligations and was awaiting the state's reaction. All in all, I would have to say that I suspect the vast majority of people in the city probably have not been negatively influenced by what they read, are aware that there is a \$20 million program, probably have some modicum of understanding about what

(A CONT):

it's designed to do, but not a real appreciation of what it's designed to do, and if that is true, then the predictable opinion, by and large, would be that they, referring to the city, would say, "they've got a lot of money and I don't see anything that's happening with it." Now, we have been able in this administration, I think, to overcome a great deal of that through a lot of publicity surrounding THOR, the Target Hardening Opportunity Reduction project, which has had, I think, the single most positive influence of all the Impact projects. Our worry, of course, now, and the real potential for bad publicity might be coming out of what happens when the money does run out. If the money runs out we are projecting now that in 1976, there are several programs presently operational, such as the helicopter squad which will have expired in 1976, and a few others that are scheduled for some phased out posture. We're going to need about \$6 million if the federal dollars are not continued. Now if the money runs out and if Atlanta is incapable of filling the gaps, I think there's going to be a very negative reaction by citizens as a whole; probably on the theory that we had a program and we knew or at least the city officially knew that it was a program for five years, designed to achieve specific limited goals, but now we've geared up for it and the money is no longer there. I think we're going to hear some of that if the money runs out and if it is not replaced. I sincerely hope that we're going to find some way to be able to continue these programs with federal help.

Q:

Of course, LEAA's original plan was for cities to pick up successful programs with local funds.

A: I fully understand. Now, my bottom line on this question, therefore, is this: I think that there has been inadequate publicity prior to this administration--there was a lack of positive publicity. I think that the present opinion of the general public is favorable. I would say, therefore, that the publicity generally has been favorable during this administration.

Now, in addition, let me add one other thing: Through certain policies of this administration, we have been able to take police brutality which was a major issue, especially in the black community, and deal with it to the point where it is now no issue at all--anywhere. That's been my policy. While not related to the Impact program, I suspect that Impact will be judged in a more favorable light because the general climate between the community and the police bureau has improved.

Q: Since you are discussing the police bureau, Mayor Jackson, may I ask how matters have been going with Atlanta's Decoy and SWAT squads?

A: What I think we did was to take a very firm straightforward position favoring the Decoy Squad; I personally did. On the other hand, I took a position indicating that the SWAT Squad also was a favorable operation provided--and then I named specific conditions. Any condition not being met, however, would in my opinion, justify its discontinuance. The SWAT Squad had been virtually uncontrolled and, therefore, was viewed in an extremely negative way. We confronted the problem and I took a position favoring continuation of it provided certain

(A CONT): conditions were met. Now, we set those conditions into place and there is firm control of the squad now. It is operating effectively. We believe there is no place in an urban police operation for specialists who sit around doing nothing--just waiting for a highly inflammable situation to break out. The SWAT Squad, therefore, has been given broader utilization while continuing its special training and special uses, but under very highly controlled situations. Decoy, we felt was identical, that it was useful; it was desirable; but it must be controlled. Those conditions have been met and we are satisfied with the operation of it.

Q: Impact was aimed at all elements of the criminal justice system in Atlanta. How would you characterize the role of the police, courts and corrections in Impact, and which of these functions would you deem most successful in relating to Impact in terms of its goals, and which the least successful?

A: Well, I think this raises the whole question of the coordination of the criminal justice system in the Atlanta area with Impact and generally with police activities. I would say that before the formation of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council there was grossly inadequate coordination of the criminal justice system in this area. There is, now, greatly improved coordination. I think that Impact, insofar as the cooperation of the other elements, i.e., the non-police elements of the criminal justice system are concerned, was viewed, not as a broad program, but probably viewed as it affected the opinion of people because of specific components of the program,

(A CONT): i.e., Impact was viewed favorably or negatively depending on how one viewed THOR or another program, the Helicopter Squad, or Decoy, or Anti-Robbery, or one of the others. I honestly don't believe that there is a widespread appreciation for what Impact generally, as an overall program, has attempted to do. There has been, to my knowledge, absolutely no official posture of opposing Impact, no official posture of declining to cooperate with its elements. Impact, though, really got coordination moving when we kind of took the bull by the horns in this administration and began to bring some coordination to it.

Q: What really does the city have directly under its jurisdiction, other than the police function?

A: Also under our jurisdiction, we have municipal courts. One is clearly strictly a municipal court and it's called the Municipal Court General Division. There is something else called the City Court of Atlanta. It also has state jurisdiction over traffic-related matters. The mayor, by law, makes appointments of the judges on the Municipal Court. As for penal institutions, we have a City Prison Farm that we took out of the police jurisdiction and put into a new Department of Community and Human Development on the theory that it really should be about rehabilitation and, therefore, was more in line with human development than strictly penal affairs. That arrangement is working extremely well. So we do have the basics of the criminal justice system generally under city jurisdiction.

Q: One of the original purposes of Impact was to bring about improvement in criminal justice planning capability at the

(Q CONT): local level. Could you give your assessment of the changes in criminal justice planning and program evaluation in Atlanta as a result of the Impact program?

A: For the very first time, all the elements of the criminal justice system are talking to each other. People now understand that ideas on criminal justice planning in Atlanta are going to come through the CJCC. It is fully staffed by the Crime Analysis Team, of course, which operates directly out of my office. Now, we discussed where that team should operate and, as I recall, the word kind of filtered down from the state that the state would prefer that it have direct access to me. We went along with that. At the very next CJCC meeting, we expect to have action taken on the first proposed major plan that has been put together. It's now being analyzed by the members of CJCC and I think it's going to be a landmark step. At least we'll know what the goals are on a coordinated basis. We'll know what the major approaches ought to be to achieve those goals--the supporting policies and the projects and how those projects carry out the policies which lead to goal achievement. I think that's a tremendous step forward. So, to give you probably what is a very premature analysis or premature assessment of how the coordination is going in the criminal justice system, preliminarily, it is working extremely well. Attendance is good. Actions have been substantial, and the level of appreciation by the participants is much higher than before. We have Superior Court judges who themselves come. I think that's rather significant. Now, let me mention one other thing to you: Atlanta has now undertaken the program called TASC which is the Treatment Alternatives

(A CONT): to Street Crime. In fact, they were here just before you got here and I now have a brochure giving a very preliminary evaluation of where they stand; they just began in June.

Q: TASC was, of course, implemented in several Impact cities but it was not implemented in Atlanta as a part of the Impact program, was it?

A: That's correct. Atlanta declined TASC under my predecessor. We decided to put it together. It was a painful process because there were so many elements involved, so many groups, so many people, and trying to achieve agreement on what crimes would permit diversion. It was more than just a notion. We did achieve that. It took a great deal of personal involvement by me because I kind of think people wanted to look me in the eye and hear from me that we were not going to divert heroin dealers, we were not going to divert muggers and rapists, and wanted to be sure they understood. We got our agreement in writing. Out of that experience came, I think, a level of the appreciation of the potential for cooperation in this city in the criminal justice system. And that's why we're very, very optimistic about the level of cooperation we can expect on a continuing basis through CJCC.

Q: What about program evaluation, Mayor Jackson? Formerly, the evaluation of the Impact program was done on contract to Georgia Tech. How do you feel evaluations ought to be done in the future: in-house or with the continued use of consultants?

A: I intend for us to develop our own capacity to evaluate. I think that in far too many cases, government abuses consultancy by not exploiting its in-house capabilities. So my approach to evaluation is this: number one, we must exhaust our capacities in-house. Now, where we absolutely cannot do the job in-house, then we hire someone out-of-house to assist us; but that we ought to ask and demand of the consultant that he or she have as one of their functions helping us to develop in-house that capacity. It is my intention that we shall see the ability to analyze and to evaluate what we're doing--what the criminal justice system generally is doing--what Impact is doing--resting in the Crime Analysis Team of the CJCC.

Q: Looking back over the past three and one-half years of Impact, Mayor Jackson, what has impressed you most about the program?

A: Well, quite aside from the money which, of course, always helps, what has impressed me most? I would say that, programmatically, I would have to say THOR has been the number one star. We have THOR operations throughout the city. They are like precinct operations. We urge community organizations to use the facilities there, including the meeting rooms. That encourages support by the community. It enhances community-police relations which, by the way, are at their highest point in the history of Atlanta--at least in my lifetime. Now, aside from a specific program, what has impressed me most of all about Impact has been that it did commit the local government to decide which way it could best move in achieving national goals that were locally adopted goals.

(A CONT):

I believe, more and more, that there is a great deal of merit in the approach that is generally or generically called New Federalism. That is not a blanket endorsement of the concept but I endorse the idea that locally, especially in certain areas, there are ends that can be achieved very effectively and far more so, I think, than if they were to be pursued nationally. One of those areas is, of course, the battle against crime. However, I think that one of the things we're going to see coming out of the whole Impact program is that it really depends on the leadership in the city ultimately. The money is very important, but if there is not the overriding local policy direction, the program probably will not succeed. Now what I mean by that is this: there has got to be the capacity in the elected leadership to set policies and to enforce those policies which, above all else, will make sure that the people come to see the police as friends and not as enemies. If there is not an appreciation of that fact by local officialdom and if there is not, therefore, the implementation of that broad goal and a daily vigilant enforcement of that idea, the Impact program, in my opinion, could not succeed no matter how much money was poured into it.

Q: The last question, Mayor Jackson, is this: If you had it to do over again, that is, Impact, what would you do differently?

A: I would set up a CJCC on day one. CJCC came on board kind of far down the road, I think, as far as Atlanta's Impact program is concerned. It is essential, in my opinion, to maximizing the success of the program. Now, the next

(A CONT):

thing I would do would be to clarify the local goals and the national Impact goals from the very beginning.

I think that number three there would have to be a far better public information program which, I am convinced, could only be achieved by doing number four and that is: have a citizen involvement program that reaches as high and as low as one possibly could go. I think there's a better chance to achieve those ends--the ends of the Impact program--when citizens understand what they are and trust the people who are trying to implement them. This brings me to point number five and I've really already touched on this so I won't expand. I would revamp the entire police approach insofar as training is concerned. When I became Mayor, training for recruits lasted six weeks. Now, twenty months later, it is eighteen weeks, and we've done this by phases. There was no retraining program annually. There now is. Community relations now are viewed as one of the most important functions of police activities. I can't really tell you how important it is that there be broad police direction from the very top on general police matters in order for a program like Impact to have a good effect and to have a fair chance to work. You could put \$50 million into a city with a rotten police department and it won't amount to a damn--to a tinker's damn. So I would say therefore, that the other thing the federal government ought to do from the very beginning is to assess its police departments, where it's going to invest the money and look at these community relations issues and demand, from the very beginning, that certain conditions be met.

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- 14.0 THE DEMISE AND REBIRTH OF THE ATLANTA CAT: A CASE FOR POSITIVE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
118. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Karen Weyandt, October 3, 1975.
119. Kathleen Quinn, SPA Coordinator, to Jim Higdon Memorandum, May 24, 1974.
120. Charles F. Rinkevich, Region IV Administrator, LEAA, to Maynard Jackson Letter, September 9, 1974.
121. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Michael Terry, CAT Director, October 2, 1975.
122. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Karen Weyandt, October 3, 1975.
123. Fred N. Graffney, Acting Region IV Administrator, to Jim Higdon Letter, April 9, 1974.
124. Jim Higdon to Robert Kutas Letter, April 16, 1974.
125. Kathleen Quinn to Jim Higdon Memorandum, April 30, 1974.
126. Karen Weyandt to Charles Rinkevich Memorandum, May 30, 1974.
127. Kathleen Quinn to Jim Higdon Memorandum, May 24, 1974.
128. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Karen Weyandt, October 3, 1975.
129. The Atlanta Constitution, May 17 and 20, 1974.
130. Karen Weyandt to Charles Rinkevich Memorandum, May 30, 1974.
131. Charles Rinkevich to Maynard Jackson Letter, September 9, 1974.
132. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Karen Weyandt, October 3, 1975.
- 15.0 THE CITY OF ATLANTA INSTITUTIONALIZES THE CRIME ANALYSIS TEAM AS STAFF TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL
133. Kathleen Quinn to Jim Higdon Memorandum, September 17, 1974 and Karen Weyandt to Charles Rinkevich Memorandum, October 8, 1974.

134. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Michael Terry, October 2, 1975.
135. Excerpted from "Criminal Justice Planning Approach," prepared by the Atlanta Crime Analysis Team, March 24, 1975.
136. Larry Dingle Memorandum to the CJCC Planning Committee, August 4, 1975.
137. Kathleen Quinn to Jim Higdon Memorandum, April 24, 1975.
138. Jim Higdon to Michael Terry Letter, April 28, 1975.
139. Karen Weyandt to Charles Rinkevich Letter, May 9, 1975.
140. F. C. Jordan, Jr. interview with Michael Terry, October 2, 1975.
141. Karen Weyandt to J. Price Foster Memorandum, July 15, 1975.
142. Charles Rinkevich to Richard Velde, LEAA Administrator, Memorandum, August 12, 1975.

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