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

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ORGANIZED CRIME: ACTIONS IN CONTROL PROCEDURES

Report of an Interregional Seminar on Use of Scientific Aids in Obtaining Best Scientific Evidence, Profiles and Planning

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20-30 August 1973

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Department of Economic and Social Affairs

RESEARCH FOR ACTION IN CRIME PREVENTION

Report of an Interregional Seminar on Use of Research as a Basis for Social Defence Policy and Planning,

RUNGSTEDGAARD, DENMARK,

20-30 August 1973

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ACQUISITIONS

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New York, 1975

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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

1. Man is inventing his future now. This means that he is producing his own brands of crime and, at the same time, developing - or crippling - his own ability to deal with them. In this light, the Interregional Seminar on the Use of Research as a Basis for Social Defence Policy and Planning, held at Rungstedgaard, Denmark, from 20 to 30 August 1973, believed that crime could be reduced, but only if policy-makers, planners and research workers alike were prepared to face honestly their own biases and past failures, their own institutional, professional and personal limitations and their own need for a reorientation and a closer integration of their activities.

2. Crime in its modern dimensions and ramifications in so many countries, including some of the most technologically advanced, left no room for complacently maintaining that prevention and control would flow naturally from simply relating current research to current policy-making. The Seminar believed that there was ample scope for improvements in research, policy-making, planning and administration; but, above all, that this complex of study and action would have to be moulded into an organic whole, thus promoting the application of knowledge and more effective prevention and control of crime.

3. Between the Scylla of repression, in the name of law and order; and the Charybdis of permissiveness, in the name of contemporary imperatives, there appeared to the Seminar to be a negotiable channel of rationality if only the right questions were asked and the answers were systematically obtained and programmed for action. The meaning of crime and the limits of the capacity of society for dealing with it were cases in point. The volume of legislation in most countries was conducive to illegality, unreported crime, the exercise of discriminatory discretion and an overloaded criminal justice system, a condition which could often be remedied with little recourse to complicated research. If the purely political and the inconsequential were to be distinguished from the real social dangers, if laws and regulations were to become more functional, there appeared to the Seminar to be an obvious need to define crime in terms of relevant value systems. Decriminalization and the study of how much less a country needed to do in the control of human behaviour might sometimes release valuable resources for other pursuits and permit, inter alia, their more efficient deployment in crime prevention and control.

4. The Seminar observed that criteria had often been set in terms of desired and vaguely expressed goals, or even conflicting objectives, without regard for future probable states. It took note of the fact that modern technology had been relied upon to provide easy solutions to difficult problems without adequate concern for the delicate balance of social obligation and personal autonomy. Expediency and pseudo-science had been substituted for rigorous analysis and sound methodology. Conversely, rigorous analysis and sound methodology had often been applied to inappropriate questions or had been used to mask a questionable advocacy of doubtful causes.

5. The problem of crime could not, in the opinion of the Seminar, be separated from the matrix of political, economic and social issues which confronted any society, so that a first task was to place it in national perspective. That task, however, involved comparisons for which the data were not usually available. This did not mean that crime as a problem could not be assessed. Apart from some of the simpler and cheaper approaches, there were opportunities to study collateral phenomena, such as changes in property values or life-styles, which relatively quickly reflected the significance of crime in a society.

6. A first priority for better research or better policy-making, planning or administration, according to the Seminar, was to obtain sufficient information for adequate measures to be taken. This usually involved a call for more statistics. But the Seminar could find no value in the unnecessary elegance of many modern systems for the compilation of information and wished to draw attention to the rationality and usefulness of an economy of effort. The purpose of collecting information was generally for use. With the developing countries especially in mind, the Seminar underlined the fact that proposals for the collection of data should be assessed for convenience against the acid test of their relevance for decision-making.

7. Data-collection had to be considered at the same time in terms of local convenience. The Seminar took account of all the criticism currently levelled at the assessment of crime on the basis of data compiled by the police, the courts and the prisons. It acknowledged that this information frequently served more as a measure of the measurers and had been used for political or budgetary purposes. None the less, where statistical by-products of such records were kept as a matter of administrative routine, those data could be used with appropriate caution. Such data might be supplemented by, and checked against, information derived from sample surveys, case studies and certain other approaches of varying degrees of rigour.

8. In most developing countries, sufficient time-series data did not exist for the identification of trends by the use of conventional statistical methods such as curve-fitting. In those circumstances, there could be recourse to a variety of relatively inexpensive techniques listed in this report, which permitted the collection of data specific to the forecast required.

9. The Seminar observed that personal and professional, as well as structural and institutional, restraints were operating to hamper the flow of research into decision-making in crime prevention. Rationality was vulnerable to jealousy; need could be distorted to serve the quest for qualifications or advancement,

while both in public office and in research insecurity of tenure sometimes militated against the logic of honest appraisal. The Seminar could not overlook the way in which that had been aggravated, in some countries, by fostering the mystique of research as something reserved for an élite, by the issues of status generated by the educational explosion, by the effects of the "brain-drain" on the hierarchy of appointments and by the commerce of project-selling or financing, which had sometimes tended to waste valuable resources or had served purposes which might be no more than incidentally connected with the public interest in preventing or controlling crime. All that indicated that the organization of research for policy-making required more than special committees or detailed functions; it required, in fact, more than a reliance on structure. It depended upon a change of attitudes.

10. In current circumstances, it appeared to the Seminar that action-oriented or operational research had certain advantages. Making use of classical concepts and scientific method, action research was conducted in conjunction with line operation so that, of necessity, it had to be a form of partnership between research workers and decision-makers. The fact that in appropriately designed action research neither could function without the other gave it a special role in developing better relationships between those doing the work and those who were required to study it.

11. At least equally important was the need for evaluation, which meant evaluation, not only of existing programmes in crime prevention and criminal justice, but of research itself. While much remained to be done on developing the criteria of evaluation and while the evaluation of values inevitably raised its own special problems, the Seminar considered that the scope for evaluative research in this field was unquestionable. However, research had sometimes begun by criticizing administration or policy-making and evaluation had sometimes been used to criticize research. It was important, therefore, that such assessments were constructive and not always entrusted to persons untouched by the events. Evaluation of evaluators should not be overlooked.

12. On the utilization of research, the Seminar was of the opinion that different levels had to be taken into account. If research was broadly construed to include all fact-finding boards, committees of inquiry and local studies, it could be argued that no Government proceeded without research, i.e., some attempt to examine its own effectiveness or to test the relevance of its policies in terms of public interest. In that sense, research was indeed being utilized. In the strict sense of scientific procedures applied to reduce bias, however, it was clear that there was no regular flow of operational contact and information between the decision-makers and the researchers. The impact of research on policy needed constant monitoring if the two were to be more closely related.

13. The Seminar thought that training, like research, lent itself either to broad or specialized construction. Most countries were inadequately supplied with well-educated workers, trained in methodology, who could study the problems of crime or fill the various administrative posts at levels where policy-making was articulated and carried into action. The problem of modern training in research methods was not really one of every researcher gaining as much knowledge as possible from all the other fields of sciences in order to be able to apply it.

The problem lay, rather, in administrators acquiring enough information to be able to understand his colleague with a different basic training, to be able successfully to communicate with him and, with his help, to achieve results and reach conclusions at a higher level than would be possible working alone. The problem of modern training in administration was that of developing a critical attitude and the understanding to recognize action and research as different sides of an identical approach to crime prevention. That need was relative, however, and should not be invoked to postpone the linking of research with decision-making.

14. At quite simple levels of sophistication and training, it was possible to arrange for descriptive studies, broad surveys or general appraisals, and for case studies, all of which would better inform decision-making and all of which could be carried out with a minimum of specialized preparation. At other levels, there were well-educated and experienced policy-makers, planners or administrators who were capable of making greater contributions to crime prevention if only they could be exposed, in relatively inexpensive ways, to the special requirements and problems in meeting the need of society for crime prevention and criminal justice.

15. Those were devices for making the best use of existing resources. However, they could not be construed in any way as detracting from the issues being created in many countries by the widespread neglect of criminological training and research; they could not substitute in developed countries for action to change the marked insularity of much work being done in the established research institutes.

16. Considering the prospects of improved international co-operation, the Seminar expressed concern at the inadequacy of the international machinery available to take advantage of modern potential for international co-operation in crime prevention. In no part of the world had the problem of crime attracted the attention which its wastage and diversion of scarce and valuable resources deserved. Being in a leadership position, the United Nations could and should provide a world-wide forum for crime prevention interests in law enforcement, judicial practice, corrections and academic studies. That, in turn, required Member States to use the United Nations in that way. The fact that the existing regional institutes at Fuchu and Cairo had been successful made it difficult to understand why the resources of technical aid were not being used to improve their contribution and to develop similar institutes in other regions. Similarly, the system of national correspondents could be better used than it had been to date, and the development of clearing-house or data-bank facilities within the Secretariat was overdue.

17. Lastly, it was important to provide further opportunities for bringing together decision-makers and researchers in the field of crime prevention for joint study and discussion of problems they were both expected to solve. The value of such endeavours had been demonstrated by the Seminar and it was hoped that similar initiatives at the regional and national levels would be forthcoming.

BACKGROUND OF THE SEMINAR

18. The lack of success, nationally and internationally, in preventing crime while at the same time promoting justice for all has been reflected in higher crime rates or a resort to harsher penalties. In the swing between law and order and permissiveness, the research worker finds it difficult to relate to the current situation, if only because of the inevitable time-lag between studies and practice. No less embarrassed is the policy-maker concerned with the need to respond quickly and effectively to new conditions.

19. Though it is dangerous to oversimplify and discount the variety of factors responsible for this state of affairs, it may be ventured that the primary reason for it is perhaps, that policy formulation and research in the field of crime prevention have followed their separate, sometimes parallel, courses, with insufficient interchange between them. While much remains to be studied and explored, it is also true that much more is already known than is actually being applied. It is disturbingly clear that there has been inadequate communication between those engaged, respectively, in research and in actual decision-making. This situation has not been improved by Government grants aiding research institutions in the more affluent countries or by research institutions there competing for available public funds. In the process, there has been either a sub-ordination of policy requirements to special research interests or an unhappy compromise which has resulted neither in useful research nor effective policy-making. The problem not only is how to bridge this gap and ensure a more organic and reciprocal relationship between research and practice in the field of crime, but how to devise better quality modalities for the relationship needed. This is a question which has been commanding increasing attention in recent years.1/

20. In its discussion on this subject, the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders focused on the question of how criminological research should be organized in order to render maximum assistance to policy-makers in their task of formulating, and to administrators in carrying

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1/ See, for example, Report of the Sixth International Congress on Criminology (Madrid, 1970); and Council of Europe, Report of Eighth Conference of Directors of Criminological Research Institutes, Strasbourg, 1 - 3 December 1970.

out, the most effective criminal policy.2/ In considering the kind of framework and mechanisms which would help to achieve that goal, special emphasis was placed on:

(a) Establishing the channels of communication that would permit research results to be understood and utilized in social defence policy-formulation and planning; and

(b) Developing procedures by which policy-makers, planners and administrators might articulate and pass on to researchers their requirements for information upon which their decisions could be based. If properly conceived and executed, policy-making and research might thus be the facets of a single process. Indeed, research had a significant part to play in each of the steps involved in developing crime prevention policy, in planning, in programme development and implementation and in evaluation. And it was policies and planning which provided the opportunities and the scope which research needed for its growth and improvement.

21. The United Nations Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, at its session following the Congress, suggested that the United Nations should assume a more vigorous role in promoting national research and in encouraging cross-cultural comparative studies.3/ That view was endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1584 (L), which requested the Secretary-General to implement to the fullest extent possible the conclusions and recommendations of the Fourth United Nations Congress and called, inter alia, for "the encouragement and promotion of research of an action-oriented character into all aspects of crime prevention and control". The General Assembly had endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Congress and the resolution of the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 3021 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972. The above-mentioned policy decisions have also stressed the value of regional and interregional meetings and seminars in providing a fruitful interchange of expertise and experience in this and related areas, and urged that they be convened under United Nations auspices.

22. This Interregional seminar on the use of Research as a Basis for Social Defence Policy and Planning was designed to follow up the deliberations of the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of offenders and to implement the resolutions cited above. The United Nations, in co-operation with the Government of Denmark, provided for an interregional meeting to bring together some of the most outstanding criminological research workers and some of the most influential administrators, policy-makers and planners in countries representative of several regions of the world. The intention was to achieve more

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2/ Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Kyoto, Japan, 17 - 26 August 1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 71.IV.8), paras. 200-239.

3/ "Report of the Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders on its Fifth Session held from 19 to 26 July 1971" (E/CN.5/474).

effective crime prevention, with justice, by finding the most efficient methods of integrating research and action in this field. This volume contains the final report of the Seminar.

Crime as a problem for research in a developmental perspective

23. Crime is often the price of freedom and one of the costs of economic and social development. The prevention of crime has thus far made little headway, in part because the real costs are too hidden to attract planning attention and in part because such concepts as the price of freedom or the levels of socialization are too intangible for social calculation.

24. It is significant that criminological research has been as little attracted to macro-concepts of this kind as have been the economic and social planners. Even the recent emphasis on the environment and the problems of ecology has elicited little concern with the fundamental issues of man in society. The researcher in this field has been too preoccupied with the cracks in the pavement to keep his eyes on the road, and there are signs that public insecurity might become as much the price of the planner's blind spot for crime prevention as of the criminological research worker's neglect of many of the planning problems.

25. The Seminar reflected some difference of opinion and judgement which extended far beyond the confines of the meeting. There were those prepared to accept the fact that inefficiency (including perhaps a measure of uncontrolled crime) could be a buffer of liberty, or the price of other changes in the older and more comfortable patterns of living; there, the problem might be to redefine the issues rather than to assume their undesirability. At the other extreme were those for whom crime outweighed the benefits conferred by the social changes by which it was generated. The fact that crime might be correlated with development could be accepted as either normal or unfortunate, according to those different points of view. Most participants were uneasy with such extremes, however, and they found themselves spaced along a continuum between them.

26. There was in every such situation a trade-off of benefits and costs. Society bargained for much of the crime it suffered because of its preference for other types of investment than in crime prevention: it preferred shop-lifting to the amount it would cost to prevent it; it preferred fraud to forgoing the benefits of easy credit. Many countries appeared prepared to tolerate rising crime rather than accept the amount of expenditure required for the necessary services for fear that they migh curtail freedom and reduce economic growth. Those were choices that could be made, but they were currently being made unconsciously and frequently without the public being made aware by planners, policy-makers or crime specialists of the existing options. Moreover, although most Seminar participants were unwilling to make categorical judgements about all illegal conduct, they found no problem in specifying the particular types of crime they found tolerable or unacceptable at the different levels of economic and social growth.

27. There was a consensus that both developed and developing countries had been left by policy-makers, planners and research workers alike in a state of gross under-development where crime prevention and control were concerned. That was not only the opinion of the Seminar. The Attorney General of one of the richest

countries, with vast technological development and the most elaborate and expensive data-gathering machinery, had recently admitted that, with all that equipment, his country had no machinery yet for adequately calculating the amount of its crime. Again, the pace of modern change had overtaken criminology itself, so that one European expert had recently asserted that criminology had reached point zero.4/ There was a paradox in countries with more crime (and more research) sending experts to countries with less crime to show them what to do; although the negative experiences of the former might well serve as a lesson for the latter.

28. The Seminar traced that failure of crime prevention to the division which had been allowed to develop between the policy-makers and the proponents of research in this field. Not only have the concepts not been grasped, but professionalism or concern with independence had created gulfs of interest and a series of personal and institutional obstacles to effective communication at the level of reality in crime prevention.5/

4/ Beryl Kutschinsky, "Changing conceptions of deviance", paper presented to the Ninth European Conference of Directors of Criminological Research Institutes, Strasbourg, 30 November - 2 December 1972.

5/ For a cogent analysis of the limitations of academic social science and requirements of policy research, see Herbert J. Gans, "Social science and social policy", in I.L. Horowitz, ed., The Use and Abuse of Social Science, (New York, Rutgers University/Dutton, 1971), pp. 196-211. For an analysis of some of the factors impeding the usefulness of criminological research, see Denis Szabo, "Applied criminology and government policy: future perspectives and conditions of collaboration", report to the Sixth International Congress of Criminology, Madrid, 1970; and "Organization of research for policy development in social defence". Prepared for the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Kyoto, Japan, 17 - 26 August 1970, A/CONF 43/4, pp. 9-13.

One of the main problems arises from the inaccessibility of the relevant data. Policy-makers usually have to work with available data, and these are usually limited (particularly in the developing countries) to basic, not very refined types, for example, census statistics or raw crime data. Thus, the highly developed conceptual virtuosity of the academic sociologist who has for example, studied a delinquent subculture is of little relevance to the policy-maker who may know no more about delinquents than he can find in police records. This is not the fault of the academic criminologist, but the policy-maker needs to know what he can make of the data he has.

29. The task before the Seminar was that of devising a more constructive and productive organizational partnership between research and planning, a more functional relationship which could be useful to both developing and developed countries. The problem was how to reorganize and reorient research so that it would not be hampered by conventional academic preoccupations or constrained by a continuing attachment to descriptive hindsight or limited by the straitjacket of an over-strict positivism from contributing to the current practices of planners and administrators in the field of crime prevention.

Crime as a problem - the global pattern

30. Viewing the situation from a world-wide perspective, the Seminar observed that the gradations in the levels of development had their own implications for the relationship between research and policy, which was affected by a country's own conception of the seriousness of its crime rates. A first task was, therefore, to determine the extent to which crime was regarded as a problem in a given country and to decide how that should be, or could be, measured. Clearly, the emphasis and the perceptions, as well as the levels and the priorities, would differ around the world.

31. There were some developing countries that, whatever the trends elsewhere, still had relatively small crime problems, whether those be measured by police returns, public insecurity or the losses due to crime. There were also some developed countries that either did not believe they had a crime problem or were inclined to regard it as a transitional phenomenon. In other areas, the disproportionate amounts of crime would not only be measured by statistics but by the changes in social and individual life-styles imposed by the prevalence of fear of crime.

32. Allowing for all that, it appeared to the Seminar that there might well be an irreducible minimum of commonly recognized crimes, perhaps not far from Garofalo's concept of "natural" crimes. Thus, murder, arson, robbery (with violence or in gangs), black-market activities or corruption appeared to be recognized everywhere as intolerable forms of deviation. There might be cultural variations on these themes, but the common concern with their effects was unmistakable.

Measuring crime as a problem

33. There was unanimity of dissatisfaction with the conventional methods of data-gathering on crime by means of the usual police, prison or court services which often had a labelling effect and might give misleading impressions of the crime problem. Those statistics maintained by the subsystems of the criminal justice system were characteristically over-lapping, often confused attempts with completed offences and frequently reflected the policies of the agencies rather than the practical situation. In fact, the official data might be only the tip of the iceberg of the crime rate of a society, and the usual method of collecting statistics by the criminal justice system could be a measure of human behaviour which in itself constituted a measure of the behaviour of the measurers. There was a recognition, however, that if the collection of information could be a simple by-product of the administrative process of compiling files and records (which would go on anyway), then it was not only justifiable but a relatively cheap way of measuring some aspects of the crime problem.

34. The Seminar took note of all the criticisms being levelled against such data-compilations of the criminal justice system in Europe and in the United States of America 6/ and took full account of the ways in which these compilations frequently served the interests of politics or claims for budget allocations as well as the interest of truth; but participants concluded that there ought to be no circumventing of the gathering of such base-line data, in developing countries especially, if only because a too-hasty recourse to a more sophisticated but less comprehensive alternative might:

(a) Set back the more general movement towards improving the compilation of basic statistics in countries where perhaps even births, marriages and deaths were not yet being registered;

(b) Detract from the training of statisticians, if only in the shortcomings, biases and limitations of their own data-collection; or

(c) Overreach, by at least one generation, the levels of improved basic information systems which many of the developing countries were currently in the process of achieving.

35. For all those reasons, the Seminar felt that the developing countries should continue with efforts to improve their collection of data as was currently done, through the available channels provided by the police, courts and corrections. Wherever possible, countries might seek to attain an interfaced system of basic data-collection on crime, providing that did not involve establishing an overlay system requiring police officers, court officials or correctional personnel laboriously to fill in cards or questionnaires unrelated to the routine of their daily work.7/

36. Such duplication of functions for the sake of statistical independence could well be costly. Census-type studies, which did not happen to be consequential to the daily routine, or which were not logically and perhaps inevitably related as by-products to ordinary case-registering and file-maintenance, could be unjustifiably expensive and, in the conditions of under-development, could well be more profitably replaced by a series of cheaper approaches designed to produce information about the criminal event or about the processing of persons through the criminal justice system, instead of simply counting the numbers of offenders and the types of their offences.

37. Alongside this observation, the Seminar wished to specify the value of other types of data-collection methods which would usually be cheaper and more efficient than the census approach that was confined to the offender and his

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6/ "Organization of research for policy development in social defence..." loc. cit., pp. 9-13.

7/ For example, the statistics-gathering organization in some countries is separated from the criminal justice services or, even within the criminal justice services, an independent flow of information is expected which increases the burden on line personnel.

characteristics. Crime took place in a setting. There was an offender, a victim, a setting for the event of crime and an environment. In the past, the researcher like the criminal, had made use of his opportunities by taking the easiest way out of the need to obtain data. For example, he had concentrated on the places where research was easiest to conduct, e.g., on the prison populations in the early days; on student groups later. All that recourse to the most convenient forms of research had managed to distort the priorities, but there were other ways of obtaining vital information on crime relatively easily and cheaply.8/ Those ways were:

(a) Descriptive studies and case studies;

(b) Sample surveys;

(c) Cohort studies (where feasible);

(d) Victimization studies (counting victims might give a more accurate picture of crime than counting offenders);

(e) Self-reported crime;

(f) The study of collateral phenomena or events which might provide a more accurate account of what crime really meant to the citizens. Even where there were no figures for crime - or no reliable figures - there were observable and sometimes calculable changes in the life-styles of the public which might indicate the fear (real or imagined) of criminal attack. A change in land values or a study of areas from which people moved would sometimes provide a kind of measure of burglary and robbery. Similarly, a study of changes in the rates of life- and household-assurance or of the freedom with which people used their restaurants, parks and theatres etc. would reflect facets of the crime situation in any country which might not be evident from the figures for the cases reported to the police or for the figures for cases forwarded for prosecution. There could be measurements of the quality of life (lack of fear), measurements of police activities and measurements of the co-operation of the public in those aspects;

(g) Studies of opportunities. Because crime was related to opportunities, attempts to measure them should be made. For example, the modus operandi index which most police forces employed could be used to provide information on vulnerable targets and opportunities;

(h) Studies of alternative ways of people obtaining legally the advantages which they now sought illegally by crime, for example, decriminalization of some offences, provision of "adventure playgrounds", "joy-riding" facilities for delinquents prone to stealing motor-cars and sport outlets for aggressive offenders.

8/ Qualified staff will be required, especially for the major tasks (e.g., project design, sample selection, development and refinement of questionnaires etc.), though some routine functions could be delegated to auxiliaries (under supervision) and the work itself would serve as a form of training. (See also para. 203.)

38. However that was done, the collection of data would ideally be separate from the stage of, or procedure for, processing and interpreting the data. In fact, several participants invited attention to the need for a "bridge" to span the distance between the administrator and the researcher. That could be a separate office within a ministry or agency charged with the task of processing and analysing information; or it could be only one person, depending upon the size of the job. That person or that office would interpret the administrator's needs to the research worker in sufficient detail and with sufficient clarity for a research design to be considered, and he would be able to advise the research worker on the precise needs of the ministry. Conversely, he would interpret the research worker's needs to the ministry and would explain how the research worker was setting about his task, when he might be expected to report and in what way.

39. At one stage, the Seminar considered the importance of crime in a given society by thinking in terms of broken homes, unemployment and slums; but it quickly realized that all of those factors had such broad economic and social contexts that they could not be considered alone. Broken homes, for example, were related to changes in family structure, in commuter life-styles, in the status of women etc.; and even the word "slums" begged certain questions which new housing programmes were not always able to answer because of the factors best summed up as "defensible space".9/

40. Certainly, it appeared obvious that no studies should be undertaken which did not have relevance to the total economic and social environment within which crime occurred. There was no point in collecting data if it could not be related to other data. To carry that further, there was a need to avoid the isolation of the person planning crime prevention, if only because of the complexity of the political, economic or social interrelationships in crime prevention. Such interrelationships should be further explored. For example, designs of supermarkets could well reduce shop-lifting, if indeed it was desired that they should; but it appeared that the stimuli for impulse buying (from which the seller made profits) were the same as the stimuli for shop-lifting. Preventing one could sometimes mean preventing the other. Town planning, location of industry and the migration generated by such investments could be explored for ways of preventing the criminal by-products.

41. All that underlined the need for crime prevention research to be related to economic and social planning by multidisciplinary research groups, and it was considered that the United Nations might be able to encourage and sponsor such groups through meetings on selected problems and by means of special training at the United Nations training and research institutes for crime prevention at Fuchu and Cairo and in Rome. There were some difficult questions to decide concerning the significance of the crime problem in any country. To what extent, for example, should the machinery of the criminal justice system be used for the purpose of assessing such significance. Unfortunately, a problem could be used to perpetuate the interests of problem-solvers as bureaucracies displaced goal-fulfilment. One participant from a developing country drew attention to the

9/ Oscar Newman, Defensible Space (New York, Macmillan, 1972).

possible use of crime statistics to justify increases in police, prison, court or even research establishments.

42. In determining the significance of a crime problem, it was also necessary to ascertain who should decide on the local or national significance of crime. This decision could be made by the police, the courts, the public or the research worker (e.g., by studying changes in life-styles, values of property, population movements etc.). Value systems differed and even the amount of money being spent by the country for crime prevention did not necessarily indicate the relative significance of the crime problem in that country.10/ Nor could it be readily assumed that the traditional academic approaches to research would solve such problems. New departures were needed, and even research workers should examine critically the methods which they were using in relation to the nature and extent of the crime problem in a particular society.

43. One of the issues facing societies moving from traditional to modern conditions was what should be done about crime, which in previous periods could be tolerated by the society or contained within the community, but which could no longer be assimilated or tolerated because of the changes in life-styles within the urban setting or within the larger communal groupings. The question might be asked to what extent that type of behaviour had relevance as a crime "problem". The unintentional role there of the legislator as a "crime creator" was important, i.e., making laws to meet new conditions without taking sufficient care to avoid the creation of new crimes and the labelling of new offenders. Moreover, laws were sometimes made without the machinery being provided for their implementation or made in general rather than specific terms. That role of the legislator had come under closest scrutiny, and the prospect of reducing crime through the different forms of decriminalization currently under discussion was an important part of crime control and crime prevention policy. It was apposite that there were no courses yet on legal drafting and the procedures for drafting and processing legislation had not yet attracted research attention in criminology.

44. In assessing problems of crime in relation to development, the Seminar considered it important to invite attention to the way in which, in so many discussions of that type, there had been a tendency to assume that development must mean development according to the model of the so-called "developed" countries. Development could not be intepreted purely in terms of maximizing economic growth. In many countries, there was a need for administrators and policy-makers to be made aware in material terms of the enormous and largely hidden costs of crime and of the losses which had to be taken into account when the victim, the offender, his family and the community were all considered in

10/ Developed countries allocate a median of 3 per cent of their budget for crime prevention; developing countries allocate a median of 9 per cent. See "Crime prevention and control: note by the Secretary-General" (A/8844), p. 20.

the total costs of crime.11/ But there was also the issue of moral and spiritual development. The techniques of crime measurement would relate to the moral principles accepted in a society and in turn would condition the gauging of the significance of crime as a problem for a country.

45. Moreover, in any such discussions it was essential to sift out for special attention the question concerning which group in the society had the right to specify the problems which should be dealt with by public policy without prior research or which problems should be a matter for more detailed research before policy decisions were taken.

46. Lastly, the observation was made that in dealing with crime and with the allocation of resources to its prevention, there should be a certain trade-off at every stage. The criminal justice system could not be treated as a purely moral system, with the simple dichotomy of good and bad, desirable and undesirable. That was permissible in terms of guilt or innocence; but both administrators and researchers, concerned with the total system and its efficient working, were looking for the limits of behaviour control which were desirable and feasible, trading-off in the process one value against another, with a view to maintaining a minimal position on either side of the scale of social development. That process of trading-off, that process of selection and allocation of resources was itself a legitimate area for research design.

11/ For a useful schema of ways of minimizing the cost and suffering caused by crime and crime control, see H. Tskala, "European social welfare programme", paper prepared for Seminar on Nordic Approaches to Social Planning, Rungstedgaard Denmark, 19 - 25 November 1972, p. 51.

I. IDENTIFYING POLICY NEEDS AND RESEARCH RESOURCES

47. There were obvious complications in identifying and stating policy needs and relating those to research resources. Sometimes the policy might not be stated and, if stated, might obscure rather than clarify the goals. For example, the objective of law enforcement might be a diversion from the need of society to reduce the impact of crime on the victims. Policy-making was basically a political decision, which often meant that simplifications affected the hierarchies of priorities competing for adequate research attention. Conversely, the research worker was often enmeshed in his own system of needs and obligations, which did not relate to the organization upon which he depended for proper funding. All that was further complicated by the conflicts of goals and between goals and methods in this field.

48. In the case of developing countries, the original criminal codes were imported by the colonial Powers and often bore a closer relationship to the culture of the country of origin than to the situation of the country concerned. That was not to criticize the importation of codes, which had a long history in most countries, or to imply that penal codes did not have some common denominators: but there was a need for a constant review of criminal codes to remove alien residues or events defined as crimes in the past but which contemporary society did not perceive as warranting that level of societal disapproval and sanction. And the effect of that review in the identifying of policy needs and relating those to research resources could be considerable.

49. In other words, it appeared necessary to identify current operating policy in relation to the goals of the organization. In turn, the goals of an organization in the field of criminal justice should relate to the basic principles of human rights and to the legislation of the country; and through these levels to the society, community or cultural setting.

50. That reasoning appeared to fellow from the fact that the purpose of social defence policy was, in general, seen in functional rather than symbolic terms. However, it was noted that while decisions and processes might be seen as relating to a functional perspective, much of the language used in the field

could best be classified as "highly coded" or symbolic.1/ Although in some circumstances and at certain times it might be reasonable or even desirable to use "symbolic" terms or euphemisms, care must be exercised that the very expression of policy formulations did not lead into inappropriate action. A frank, honest and carefully phrased descriptive language was equally essential as a basis for policy as it was for research.

Identifying implicit policy

51. There were two ways of considering the policies implicit in the action of executing agencies. On the one hand, there was the policy not expressed but which could be identified by a study of the decisions actually taken. On the other hand, initial interpretations of policies that were similar might imply different operational strategies so that the choice of language might be extremely significant.

52. Apart from the many examples of policy-making and planning which took no account of crime prevention (but which had profound effect upon the incidence and prevention of crime), there was the corresponding phenomena of ill-conceived goals and operations. In industrial safety, for example, the first emphasis on the carelessness of the worker had to be supplemented by a concern with the design of the machine; industrial safety had eventually to be developed in relation both to man and his instrument. Similarly, in public safety, the current emphasis was on crime prevention services (the machine), which might eventually need to be reconceived in terms of people and services, because issues of public tolerance and public involvement in crime prevention had to be taken into account.

53. The Seminar studied a particular case in which the research team in a police-research project found it necessary first to identify the "implicit policy" of the decision-making agency. The team began by showing the agency that by analysis of the information in the files used by the agency in its decision-making, they could predict the decisions with considerable accuracy utilizing only four basic factors. The items that made the prediction of the decision possible, in turn could be considered as defined by the de facto policy.

54. Having discovered the implicit policy of the decision-makers by the use of research methods, it was then possible to move to the next stage of policy research, namely, discussions with the decision-makers after feedback of the "discovery". In effect, the research by a study of the impact of the latent policy, as revealed at the decision points of the organization, was able to "hold up a mirror" to the policy-makers which reflected their policy. The next question, to continue the analogy, was for the decision-makers to consider whether

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1/ For example, the punishment cells in at least one State are called "adjustment centres", and an offender is classified in another State as a "habitual offender" when he is found guilty of three offences, although the term "habitual" in any other connexion is reserved for more than three experiences, as for example, in the case of the "habitual drunkard".

they found the image of their policy desirable. If not, they could consider changing it. But it had already become apparent that any change in the phrasing of the "policy" (e.g., a new statement of objectives) would be inadequate because by application of the same research methods which "discovered" the implicit policy the divergence between the statement and the implementation could be detected. If the policy was to be changed, so must the nature and quality of the decisions. Furthermore, the "mirror" revealed some ways in which that was possible.

The language of stated policy

55. As indicated above, semantic issues and semiotics were involved in statements of explicit policy. Statements of policy in crime prevention were susceptible to over-simplification. They might have a simple causal model as their point of reference or they were derived from outmoded concepts of human institutions. Crime control might be made easier by reducing variety in the system to be controlled. On the other hand, human behaviour and technological development in a system proliferate variety and that could only be controlled by increasing the flow of information. The fact that crime was not being prevented and controlled was related to the failure to provide and make effective use of a greater flow of information in both developed and developing countries.

56. It was apposite that the police did far more than operate within the confines of the criminal law: police forces might talk about law and order as defining their task when, in fact, in many countries a very small proportion of the actual time spent by police on duty could be directly related to law and order. They were mainly concerned with a variety of other public duties of no less importance. Incentive systems tended to be related, however, to the law and order policy and, therefore, the one function was disproportionately promoted. Indexes of performance other than the number of arrests might be needed to develop incentive systems in keeping with more refined statements of policy; but the statement of goals in many countries currently left arrests and seniority in a post as the main criteria for rewarding performance.

57. It was observed that in many areas of the field of criminal justice a stated policy could be a rationalization or even escape from deeper conflicts. In corrections, for instance, the proclivity to use the medical model of "diagnosis and treatment" had frequently disguised the unresolved conflict of purposes in dealing with offenders. In courts, the formalism and technicalities, and the attendant costs enshrined in public policies to ensure fair trial, sometimes diverted attention from the injustices which the system engendered. Even the stated objective of a speedy trial could mask the pressures behind the use of custody or bail to obtain convenient pleas.

58. Stated policies were as legitimate subject for research as the policies implicit in decision-making. Effective policies depended upon rewards and incentives or status-providing systems. However identified, policies would state the behaviour or situation required and the effectiveness could only be gauged by devising appropriate measures of performance.

Research resources

Data

59. The administrative process generated paper-work as a record of decisions and activities. But measurement of activity was not necessarily an adequate measure of performance. Nevertheless, the data obtained by those means could serve more than their initial purpose. The role of other agencies in providing useful crime-related data should not be overlooked. For example, it was possible that school teachers could collect certain data relating to juveniles or provide basic individual reports in suitable situations and cases. It was also possible that volunteers or voluntary organizations could be recruited to help in the task. The most obvious means for obtaining data was not necessarily the best; by thoroughly searching other areas it might be possible to find unexpected sources which could provide both cheap and effective assistance. There was considerable experience, as a result of national censuses, in the use of a wide variety of personnel to obtain basic population data.

Research results versus research methods

60. It was emphasized that, while research methods might be broadly applied, the results of any particular criminological research study might or might not be applicable in another country, or even in another part of the same country. Research into technological matters was expected to have world-wide relevance, and results of medical research were not usually expected to differ very often from one country or area to another. However, as one moved further towards mental and social processes, the differences between cultures and the influence of different environments made the results more and more specific to the area studied. The findings of the research in one country might suggest useful hypotheses for others, but there was a necessity to test hypotheses thoroughly before basing decisions on the conclusions. That fact made the research into social problems more difficult and more expensive, and had the effect of social research falling further and further behind research in other areas of knowledge.

61. Of course, certain methods, although of general use in principle, were not usually useful in practice because the facilities to employ them did not exist, or because the assumptions upon which the methods rested did not apply. Statistical methods relied upon data of sufficient accuracy and sufficient coverage. There might be no point in seeking a level of precision and coverage beyond that which was usable in the decision-making process. Not only was it possible that sample data could be more useful than census data, but in a sense they could be more accurate for the immediate situation. There was no value in collecting data beyond those which could be analyzed.

Gauging future trends

62. In the technological, medical and economic areas of research, there was a current interest in "futuristics", the prediction of probable states of knowledge and activities in those areas in the future. Considerable attention had been given to the expected conditions in the year 2000 and to shorter range projections.

The Seminar was asked to consider the possible relevance of "futuristics" to the problems of policy and research in social defence in the developing countries. The questions might be asked whether the focus for research should be solely upon the pressing and serious problems of today, and whether "futuristic" research was feasible, as it was desirable.

Purpose of forecasting methods

63. It was noted that the purpose of using research methods to forecast or predict the future was not that the future might be known, but rather that two or more probable future states might be identified and choices made concerning the course of action most likely to bring about the outcome most strongly desired. In a word, forecasting methods could indicate not the future, but altenative futures; and thus facilitate the forestalling of undesirable states. If no forecasting was carried out, the action to remedy the undesired future could only begin when its effects were already felt. That might be too late. Forecasting provided a "lead time" in which to think and act.

64. The lack of forecasting in crime prevention probably has direct relevance to the predicament in which most countries find themselves. The risk of crime, with the expansion of towns and industries, as well as the consequent problems for the police, the courts and the correctional systems, could well have been foreseen.

Feasibility of forecasting

65. While it was true that the main developments in forecasting techniques had been in the field of technology and the more exact sciences, that was not to say that no methods were appropriate to the field of crime prevention. Some 40 different methods and variations were already known. The success rates for many of the methods had been high. If there was any general problem with the results, it was that the events predicted tended to take place somewhat before the most likely expected date.

66. It would be noted, of course, that there were two parameters of future events, one relating to qualitative change and the other to quantitative change. Where a current situation existed and might be described in numerical terms (e.g., prison population, arrests, costs of any kind), projections were much more frequently made. Such projections relied upon the assumption that the future would be very much like the present, except that there would be more of the same. It might be that when projections were made on the assumption of "more-of-the-same", it would be clear that this was not going to be possible and speculations with regard to qualitative change might then be stimulated, or, of course, action might be taken to break the "more-of-the-same" policy.

67. The two kinds of forecasting might be typified by two simple methods, namely, linear projections (curve-fitting) and the subjective estimations of probabilities by an iterative process known as the "Delphi method".

68. Linear projections and curve-fitting could be very simple or quite complex; however, there was a basic requirement of data over a period of time. The Delphi method, or consensus of expert opinion, on the other hand, required no

external data because it was usually applied in areas where data did not exist, events of a sufficiently similar kind had not taken place in the past and hence direct trend analysis could not be performed. There were other methods which fitted into those two categories and several books were available giving details of the known techniques.2/

Some ethical issues in forecasting

69. One objection to the idea that research in developing countries might use some of the relatively cheap and feasible forecasting techniques was that time and money spent on that kind of research could only result in diversion of effort from pressing current problems. It was also argued that because it took time to conduct research, if attention were devoted to current problems the findings concerning them might be out of date by the time they became known, unless it was assumed (an implicit forecast) that the situation seen as serious was a continuing one.

70. Another objection which, it appeared had moral or political roots, might be summarized as "forecasting the future provided power to influence the future and that future might fall into the wrong hands". In principle, that objection might be raised against any research method that was in any way effective. However, that did not appear to be the most significant element of the objection; rather, the objection might relate to a problem external to the method as such. The projections or forecasts, which indicated possible alternative futures, made it simpler for those who had that knowledge to make the choices; moreover, their choices were the more powerful because they were better informed. Thus, an élite would gain power through choice of futures and such choices might not accord with the philosophy of a society.

71. In response to that objection, it was noted that the Delphi method could be used either to ascertain the estimates of probability or the estimates of desirability of future events, but that the two dimensions were, in that method, dealt with separately in the data collection and analysis. The data formed the raw material for planning decisions but did not determine their nature. It would be possible to seek public, political or other views about the desirability of the alternatives, but the estimates of probability should be operationally detached from value judgements. Of course, beliefs about probability might influence ratings of desirability, and beliefs about desirability might influence ratings of probability; but the method ensured that the two dimensions were "uncoupled" in so far as possible; much more so than for less rigorous methods.

72. It was suggested that at least one of the topics for the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (1975) might be subjected to a Delphi study prior to the Congress and the results discussed by delegates at the meeting. The area that appeared most suited for the

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2/ Certain kinds of simulation, especially "decision games" and other expert group procedures such as those used in market research, would appear to be equally feasible and almost as cheap as the Delphi.

application of the Delphi method was that of trasnational crime. There appeared to be no serious objection to providing a base of information to an international body such as the United Nations concerning social defence at the transnational level.

Some policy issues

73. It was noted that in developing countries there were commercial or industrial "developers" who, it was assumed had made forecasts of the future with respect to their special interests. The problems arose from the fact that those forecasts did not extend to crime issues or to the quality of the life of the population concerned.

74. It did not appear unreasonable that when concessions were granted to multinational companies to explore development projects, they should be required in their research to consider social, cultural, quality-of-life and social defence issues involved, and to report their findings to the appropriate body in the country concerned. It was recalled that in the Aswan Dam project, action was taken to preserve relics of past civilizations; and, by analogy, it would appear necessary to seek to protect the currently living civilization from damaging consequences of development. No one could know with reasonable accuracy the concomitant social damage of certain kinds of technical development, although in one country (Japan) a research project was specifically concerned with this question.

75. More attention was currently being paid to attendant ecological damage than to social defence. It might not be irrelevant to note that it was forecasting techniques, applied by the ecologists, that frightened decision-makers, the press and the public into taking notice of ecological issues. No one would suggest that fear was a good basis for policy or that frightened decision-makers acted most intelligently. Nevertheless, similar forecasting techniques applied to the problems of crime might induce action. Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the use of forecasting methods was a consideration of the past. There were many instances where it would have been possible to use forecasting methods and to suggest action to prevent certain undesired outcomes. Instead, larger sums of money very often had to be spent on remedial measures. It was easy to be wise after the event. The idea of forecasting was to be wise before events. Forecasting alone was not enough; however, wise choices were still necessary and the increased information which forecasts could supply, at little extra cost, could add much to the probability of wise choices. That seemed to be particularly the case in crime prevention and criminal justice.

II. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH

76. The structural context for research, its links with traditional university or governmental approaches to research and the ways in which interpersonal relationships could be fostered or hindered by the systems involved, formed the basis for the discussion of the organization of research. The Seminar focused upon organization as working machinery, on the adoption of organizational forms and arrangements that would promote a more scientific approach to action for crime prevention and control, and on the need to bridge the gap generally existing between researchers, on the one hand; and administrators, policy-makers and planners, on the other.

77. The main problems were held to be:

(a) Shortage of economic means;

(b) Shortage of trained personnel;

(c) Shortage of research facilities;

(d) Low priority given in parliamentary discussions and the like to social defence policies among Governmental policies in general;

(e) That research in that field was often carried out by isolated researchers with little support and encouragement.

78. However, the Seminar took note that there were extremes of neglect and waste in that field. At one pole could be found countries with no research at all and, unfortunately, sometimes with little interest in developing it. At the opposite pole could be found areas in which funds were being devoted to research without much effect, where a new business of doubtful productivity had been developed by the echelons of new bureaucracies in Governments, private foundations and research establishments. That forced some of the best and most able research workers to spend disproportionate amounts of their time in preparing applications or negotiating for funds. A situation was being created in which the ability to write up a project successfully might be valued more than the procedures for formulating and answering research questions. A parallel could be drawn with the criticism made of the organization or research at the recent meeting of the

British Association. There, the Government and the research councils had been accused of promoting waste by imposing patterns of team-work and administration on research personnel.3/

79. Further problems were mentioned, among them the problem of utilizing information already existing for applied research purposes, and not for pure research only. Policy-makers or planners did not always know how to utilize research results and sometimes they simply did not want to use them, perhaps because sometimes they might appear in some way threatening to established interests.

80. Most of the troubles could be reduced to:

(a) problems of communication and co-operation between researchers and policy-makers; and

(b) the development of institutional brakes on initiative and productivity.

81. There are certainly difficulties of financing, but the Seminar thought that personnel resources were much more of a problem, although, of course, those two issues could not be completely separated. In fact, the role of the research worker in society was differently conceived in different countries. In some systems the research worker considered it his task to promote change by studying existing programmes and arousing public concern. If not against the Government, the research worker considered himself to be independent of it and free to criticize in the best way in order to establish his own name and obtain effective change. At the other end of the scale were research workers inside Government systems who were prepared to promote change by memorandum, which perhaps no one outside the Government system would ever see, but which might be more effective in obtaining action than a public statement. In between, one could conceive of models of organization in which research workers could be divided; some serving established interests, others striving to obtain public support for change. The Seminar thought that it would be unwise to select any one of those models as superior to the others but that it would be useful to subject all of them to scrutiny for their effectiveness and relevance for policy, planning and administration in particular societies.

Theory and research

82. Both theory and research were important prerequisites of the diagnostic work involved in any identification of a social problem, so was a sound knowledge of practice in the area concerned. The Seminar refused to be drawn into the making of invidious comparisons between "pure" and "applied" research. It believed that the quality and usefulness of a study were far more important than anything else for the prevention of crime. The Seminar was prepared to agree

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3/ See account of paper by K. Mellanby, Director of the Monks Wood Experimental Station, as reported in The Guardian (Manchester), 23 August 1973, p. 7.

with the famous adage that "there is nothing as practical as a good theory". If good, it may be used directly for guidance of action and it could economize on early research efforts for a later follow-up on the results of the application of the theory. However, such an application of the theory required "translation" of the theoretical formulation into concrete elements for application. The practical translation of a theory into action was the final test of the validity of the theory in so far as its generalizations were tested in society and not in a laboratory.

83. Some of the implications of a systemic approach to the organization of crime-related research were considered and some questions raised which were of particular relevance to policy-making and planning in that field.4/

84. The Seminar reviewed some of the practical problems of organizing research for policy-making. It looked at the possibilities for:

(a) Research as an integral part of the system of administration in the country (e.g., within the Government);

(b) Research that was completely independent (e.g., within universities); and

(c) Combinations of those by the contracting out of work by the Government or the authority responsible for the service, or by projects parallel to those being conducted by the universities, and by amalgamations of administrators and research workers under some kind of voluntary organization, such as a National Association for Crime Prevention to which all could belong, whether they were officials or non-officials.

85. The Seminar was well aware of the defects of having research units within a ministry subject to official guidance and perhaps even being controlled by the system; but there were situations which required ministries to have their own facilities for data-gathering and analysis. Moreover, as a bridge between the Government and the outside research institutes or outside research interests, such a ministry research unit had a definite role to play. It should not be imagined that the pressures and constraints on a ministry research unit could not be repeated (though perhaps in different form) within some of the university bureaucracies.

4/ For example, these questions may be asked (a) how many different ways and how many different forms of activity could be displaced by the system during a given period of time; and (b) how many of these forms of activity (adaptions) could the system eliminate or exclude of its own accord. These questions clearly concern the degree of independence of the system. For further discussion on this and related aspects, see annex I.

86. The developing countries, with their relatively recent explosions in education and expectations, and with the effects of the "brain-drain" bringing relatively inexperienced administrators to high positions, had special problems of attitudes, status and interpersonal relationships between administrators and research personnel.

87. The developed countries, with larger numbers of personnel having come into research in a relatively short period of time and with less flexible professional traditions, had other problems. Sometimes the research workers had no appreciation of the responsibilities carried by administrators. On the other hand, policy-makers and planners were prone to impatience with research which showed no practical impact in the short run.

88. There was a need to be frank about the immodesty of certain research workers who might not be humble enough for the conditions - in developing countries especially - but who would also cause personnel problems if they adopted the same attitudes too obviously prevailing in the developed countries. It was equally necessary to be honest about the defensiveness and the insecurity of certain policy-makers, planners and administrators. Moreover, that was reversible in some situations; with the research units being over-defensive about their professional positions and the policy-makers, planners or administrators operating over-confidently on certain assumptions (implicit or explicit), without any reference to the advice being tendered. Tiresome though it might be, it had to be acknowledged that that situation might be only because of the persons who were tendering it. Such interpersonal difficulties could not be ignored in either developed or developing countries. In fact, these difficulties represented a research field for social scientists concerned with human behaviour.

89. It was considered that the problem was a complex one which could only be approached by developing facilities for administrators and research workers to shift jobs periodically in order to obtain the necessary understanding of each other's problems. It was thought that there were situations in which an independent voluntary body could possibly act as a pressure group to bring a variety of such conflicting interests together and promote the accommodation necessary for action.

Formal Organization of co-operation

90. In developing countries, the relationships of research workers to policy-makers, planners and administrators were likely to be more important than the administrative structure. In any case, there might be little sophisticated research work being done in these countries. Yet, even in such conditions the question of whether research should be done by the ministry itself or by a university was quite important. There, as elsewhere, not only the personal liaisons but the interrelationships between the institutional structures behind decision-makers and research workers were likely to be significant. The formal communication links, the distribution of funds or technical assistance for research and the ways in which demands for research were interpreted were all matters of concern for those interested in translating study into action.

91. It was noted in passing, for example, that some planning departments had preferred to use the scarce resources for research in a possessive (even if logical) way by deploying these resources not to support outside research or ministry research efforts but to set up a special research unit within the planning department. That policy had obvious implications for the type of information being sought.

92. Some centralization and regionalization of information and research findings would obviously be necessary. It would also appear that there should be some kind of service for data-processing and analysis, for the diffusion of information and for the interpretation of research results. That service could be operating at some central jurisdictional level. It was noted that various types of advisory boards or committees were typically set up to formulate social defence policies with representation from the major groups in a community. The composition of such committees, which might be permanent or ad hoc, would naturally depend upon the tasks which they were expected to perform. There might be a general council working more or less through a variety of sub-committees.

93. Other common organizational possibilities were research sections within governmental departments, governmental research institutes, universities and university institutes, scientific academies etc., and non-academic research organizations and commercial research insitutes. Each of those units had its advantages and its drawbacks which were related to the setting within which it was used, and each country would have its own preferences for the styles of organization. The important thing was whether it was available and competent. The Seminar observed that a factor frequently overlooked in making such a choice was the prevalence of occupational subcultures. For effectiveness not only in getting research done but in communicating its results or obtaining action on the results, it was wise to bear in mind that policemen, judges, lawyers and medical personnel found it easier to accept advice from their own. Moreover, each profession (including research) had its own vernacular within which the messages for action had to be conveyed.

94. The functions of a national or regional Social Defence Research Council might be the following:

(a) The collection and dissemination of information concerning research and the registering and monitoring of research areas and projects;

(b) The diagnosis of the current state of crime and crime prevention and research for it;

(c) Study of the state of knowledge in a particular area of crime prevention and criminal justice. Examination and evaluation, area by area, of the significance and application of research;

(d) Initiation of research in neglected or new areas;

(e) Co-ordination of interdisciplinary research, long-range programmes involving several types of research institutions;

(f) Liaison with decision-making bodies, possibly:

(i) As the spokesman of crime prevention and criminal justice experts not only vis-à-vis policy-makers, planners and administrators but vis-à-vis the public;

(ii) In undertaking or contracting for certain types of research sought by the administration, or making administrators and other aware of the research possibilities;

(iii) In defining the needs of administration in terms of research;

(g) The co-ordination of existing research by administering the funds available and/or by pooling resources:

(i) For the carrying out of a common project or for the interrelating of existing projects;

(ii) For the exchange of experience concerning overlapping in different fields of research;

(iii) For the evaluation of research undertaken in a particular field;

(h) Administrative activities:

(i) Provision of facilities, administrators, research institutes or professional associations;

(ii) Allocation of available funds and provision of research grants, one application of that being co-ordination (see (g) above). However, the control of funds had value for promoting research or encouraging action as well as co-ordinating the effort already being made (see (i) below);

(i) Professional activities:

(i) Establishment of research units, training of research workers, financing of research which could not appropriately be carried out within the existing Government or university framework;

(ii) Promotion of career opportunities in research.

95. A council of that kind, whether national (in a small country) or provincial (in a larger state), or a combination of both, could provide the bridge between research policy and planning, but could also itself provide valuable data for the preparation of budgets, assessment of need and the rational distribution of funds available for research. At the same time, a full council, consisting of both research workers and those on the policy-planning and administration side of the system, might not be needed in a small society with limited resources. The task could be performed by a small unit or even by one person.

III. ACTION RESEARCH IN CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

96. The extension of research thinking and methodology to fields such as public health, public education and crime prevention and control services in the current generation was developing at an exponential rate. By its very nature, such research must be incorporated into action.

Action research

97. Research in the social sciences, just as in the physical sciences, was carried on for the purpose of developing knowledge that was based on a carefully controlled and systematic observation of facts with a view to extracting general principles, theories, laws or guidelines to assist in the improvement of practice. Action research (also termed "policy-related research", "problem-solving research" or "operational research" 1/ made use of the classical concepts and logic of scientific method, but was carried on in conjunction with line operations involving a complex array of human beings, social systems, philosophical concepts, political constraints, legal barriers, moral biases and economic limitations. It lay somewhere along the continuum between pure and applied research, seeking either to test certain theoretical assumptions in concrete situations for the purpose of future policy-making, or to monitor systems in operation with a view to improving their performance. Perhaps the distinction between that and other kinds of research was logically challengeable, but action research denoted an approach to research which, if not different in kind, was different in the degree of its association with current events.

98. Action research must be a partnership in which neither the actors nor the researchers could function without each other. The "laboratory" in which action research must function was a live, identifiable part of a social system, i.e., a criminal court, a prison, a police agency or even a total community. Research of that kind depended upon the subtle interplay of administration, data compilation and rigorous analysis for its own special characteristics.

1/ Although operational research has a more specific meaning, referring to systematic studies of processes and procedures.

Baseline data systems

99. Aside from statistical support for special research projects, base-line data were essential for the purpose of forecasting future trends in order to make both short-term and long-term judgements in planning budgets, capital construction, statutory changes and similar administrative and policy matters.

100. In the absence of an institutionalized system of crime statistics, some meaningful action research projects requiring qualitative and quantitative information could still be carried on by periodic ad hoc samplings of the respective phenomena. Action research projects did not have to wait for the development of a sophisticated base-line information system, but such a basic system would provide the greatest single factual resource for new and continuing research programmes.2/

Objective of action research in criminal justice

101. Regardless of the subject area of any proposed project, the overriding objective of any research in the world of practice was a reasonable expectation of findings which would be useful to the policy-formulators and decision-makers.

102. One of the more common applications was the testing of the effectiveness of small pilot demonstration projects. To experiment with a new programme or procedure was not enough in and of itself. The action or demonstration must be monitored, tested and evaluated by impartial, scientifically trained observers. Only by those means could decision-makers determine with confidence whether to adopt the new programme on a wider scale.

103. Another common usage was the evaluation of an existing programme in order to furnish the basis for deciding to continue it, change it or discontinue it.

104. The research mentality would be constantly on the alert to re-examine outworn programmes and practices and ask such questions as whether it served a useful purpose; whether it was worth the cost; or the alternatives which could be proposed and tested.

105. It had been suggested that to be most productive, operational research called for the execution of clusters of projects selected jointly by specially convened groups of policy-makers and research workers, concentrating on sensitive areas or weak points in the machinery of criminal justice and determining points of optimal application.3/

2/ See para. 37.

3/ Philippe Robert, "Operational research", paper prepared for the Eighth Conference of Directors of Criminological Research Institutes, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1971.

106. The selection of projects for action research in crime prevention and control was of greatest moment where high-priority needs competed for very limited resources, as in the developing areas of the world. There, action research offered the greatest opportunity for developing research out of action needs, for further "backfeeding" into future policy and planning. With so little to work with, however, the very small resources available needed to be husbanded and concentrated where they were likely to have maximum effect. That could be in developing pilot or demonstration projects for crime prevention work among the young; for following up and assessing the value of the more expensive programmes or for studying the implications for existing services of certain new types of crime or new investments in industry and urban development.

107. Obviously, the choice rested on balancing need against the likelihood of benefit. The variables used in selecting the target population must be readily measureable. In the process of developing an impact model and identifying the target population, the action researcher must become familiar with the practices that were being envisaged in the proposed programme or that had been used elsewhere, and must maintain a questioning posture towards the changes proposed.

108. A variety of methods could be used in carrying out action research; models; simulation; games theory; Markov process; queuing; and mathematical programming, both linear/non-linear and dynamic. Further refinements and new techniques were being developed that represented methodological advances allowing for greater quantification and minimizing experimental error. These refinements could serve to improve the conditions under which policy decisions were made. For maximum benefit, in the multifaceted and complex field of crime prevention, there was scope for interdisciplinary approaches which could employ a battery of methods and techniques.

109. Action research usually relied heavily on field investigations. Those were particularly useful in evaluative research and provided insights into the practitioner's methods.4/ They made it possible to judge the extent to which he deviated from the formal outlines of his role and to identify hitherto uncharted and unidentified activities. What policy-makers thought professionals and line personnel in a service did might be quite different from the actual situation (that had been revealed in recent years, especially with respect to prisons, police and even the courts). The use of field studies had been severely curtailed by their identification with specialized academic preparation. Increasingly, however, the feasibility of using research assistants to perform auxiliary tasks had expanded the scope for that kind of research. Moreover, when the personnel could be involved, the research became a valuable training experience.

4/ Field studies of the police, for example, have revealed many instances in which the police act as judge and jury, making decisions about illegal and unlawful behaviour as they control crime, and bringing together their own backgrounds, education and ideological orientation of their particular force.

110. Experimental changes of systems, if worked out as research experiments, could be more efficient as a means of testing different hypotheses than studies of static systems and would permit the introduction and monitoring of experimental changes with the desirable degree of research control.5/

Planning and organizing for a research strategy in an operational agency

111. The lazy or fearful administrator would assume a negative stance, saying in effect that someone else should do it. The progressive and enlightened agency head would say that research was so important that he would take the initiative and seek both the talent and resources to address the problems in his organization which needed to be examined in a systematic and analytic manner.

112. The latter type of administrator would look upon research and development as a function of his organization on a par with personnel training, fiscal management and programme development. He would appreciate that the research efforts of his agency must be planned, financed and implemented in a manner similar to that used in all the other functions of administration. At first, he might have to depend upon partially qualified personnel, with volunteer consultation from university-based specialists, but should as soon as possible employ a qualified director of research as a member of his immediate staff.

Research planning

113. The administrator would then confer with his research director and his other division chiefs for purposes of determining which subjects in his operation could and ought to be addressed by research methods. It might be that he would also wish to engage some outside consultants to assist in the thinking and planning phases of the effort. A list of subjects to be studied and questions to be answered would be relatively easy to develop. The important idea there was that the policy-makers, administrators, practitioners and researchers must do research planning at that level as a joint enterprise. The researcher might pose questions which were of no interest to the administrator, and the administrator might raise questions which could not be answered by research.

114. Having developed such a list of possible research questions, it then became necessary to place them in some kind of priority order for the obvious reason that they could not all be handled simultaneously. The priority of an item on such a list would be determined by a number of practical factors. Among those factors were the promise of pay-off, feasibility, cost, timing, availability of personnel, permissiveness of the political climate and perhaps many others. Growing out of that kind of an effort would come a gradually developing framework for research policy. Within that framework plans would emerge, research designs would be devised and projects initiated and carried out in a systematic way. Because action research with human subjects usually raised additional

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5/ For some suggestions in this respect, see G.W. Fairweather, Methods for Experimental Social Innovation (London and New York, Wiley, 1967).

questions, any list of research proposals might be reviewed and revised frequently.

115. When a project was proposed, the first test to be applied before tentative approval was granted was whether it fitted into the over-all research strategy of the agency. Following that, an administrative decision must be made either to drop the matter, to postpone it or to proceed as rapidly as circumstances permitted.

116. The next step in developing the project was the preparation of a clear and precise statement of the problem or question to be addressed. That was the point at which exact definitions and limiting statements must be agreed upon.

117. Without pursuing that matter further, the point must be made that one could not perform systematic scientific research if the goals and purposes were stated in terms that were too general. Terms must be defined with the greatest possible precision and, wherever possible, values should be reducible to quantitative terms.

118. Once having reached the point of deciding that the project was to move forward, and having a clear written statement describing exactly the question to be investigated, a decision about how the project was to be carried out must be made. In the language of the researcher, that was the methodology.

119. The method or methods would be selected and designed to fit the problem at hand. The experimental/control group method might be the most adaptable to the hypothesis previously discussed. Other methods, such as questionnaires, structured interviews, analysis of records and factor analysis might be appropriate in other situations.

120. The stipulation of the methodology, which included a description of the data to be collected from what sources, what measurements were to be applied etc., must be explicit, precise, agreed upon in advance and strictly adhered to during the course of the study. Many action-research projects went awry and failed completely because the preliminary steps of research design were carelessly made or not followed consistently throughout the project.

121. Up to that point, all of the effort would have been essentially intellectual. Next came the more exacting task of describing each of the tasks the researchers must perform, assigning each task, when it was to be done in relationship to other tasks, and how the time each task was expected to take was to be budgeted. Often clerks and even prison inmates could be used to carry out certain of the functions.

122. Growing out of the exact statement of work to be performed, it was now possible to translate man-hours into monetary costs. From that the project budget would be developed.

123. After the planned tasks were performed, and sometimes concurrently with that process, the data collected must be analysed and evaluated by the researcher and his associates.

124. At that point, the findings must be summarized and a determination made jointly by the researcher and the administrator concerned whether the findings justified recommendations for any changes in policy or procedure.

125. It was evident that negative findings were still findings and sometimes just as valuable to the policy-maker and administrator as positive findings might be.

126. Lastly, there was always a professional responsibility for writing a report at the conclusion of a research project. It might be of sufficient importance to be published in a professional journal; or, if not, it should be kept at the agency involved for the use of future policy-makers and researchers.

Organization and financing of action-research: some emerging models

127. With increasing amounts of Government and private foundation funds being made available for research and systematic studies in criminal justice, a number of models had been emerging in some countries (e.g., the United States), which might be of relevant interest elsewhere.

(a) University-based models;

(b) The independent institute organized as a non-profit corporation;

(c) The research bureau within a governmental operating agency;

(d) The central governmental contracting research agency;

(e) Management consulting corporations.

Constraints and special problems

128. The development of knowledge through research in the "social laboratory" was fraught with an extraordinary array of difficulties. The first of those grew out of the fact that the subjects involved in most social research were themselves human beings and groups of human being whom the researcher was far from free to manipulate or sometimes even to observe. One must always be aware of the laws intended to protect the rights of individual human beings.

129. Since most intervention strategies were applications of the behavioral sciences, one must also be aware of the relative recency of those disciplines and that many influential public figures were inclined to assign relatively less credibility to the findings of a behavioural scientist than they were to those of a researcher in one of the physical sciences. In large-scale research projects in which there was a heavy investment of resources it was a good practice to appoint advisory committees made up of eminent, highly respected persons in the field. Those advisory councils not only served to make available the knowledge and experience of such persons, but lent credibility to the findings and recommendations which might result from the project.

130. Another type of difficulty arose from the excessive number of variables in studies of human subjects and their environments, which, for all practical purposes, were uncontrollable. The classical method of dealing with that problem was the experimental/control-group research design. In the experimental group, the factor to be tested was controlled and the comparison or control group was matched in so far as possible with the experimental group. The basic assumption was that the uncontrolled individual variables in both groups cancelled each other out. The assumption might turn out to be inaccurate in a given experiment; and, consequently, when encouraging findings resulted from a single experiment it was wise to repeat the same experiment at another time with other individuals and in another environment. Important as replication was, it was often difficult to convince administrators that it was worth-while to spend money and resources in what appeared on the surface to be a repetitious effort.

131. Even descriptive research intended to assess the quality and the magnitude of some problem, might be questioned on the grounds that the data were gathered from a unique group of subjects and in an atypical environment. Replication, again, was the indicated procedure for the verification of results.

132. Public agencies, and particularly those providing services to the powerless poor and the disenfranchised criminal, were almost invariably operating with limited staff and budgets. Similar constraints applied to areas or countries deprived of basic resources. In those situations, the administrator and the researcher were faced with the necessity of determining the optimal uses of their limited resources. The least expensive project which held some expectation of a useful outcome must almost inevitably be preferred over more costly, though more promising efforts. That was not always a deficiency. Necessity being the progenitor of invention, great ingenuity had been shown in the past and the cheapest projects had often proved to be the best and most effective. It was significant that some of the earliest and most influential studies in criminology were done by persons personally interested in the subject but not financed in their work. A finding in California (United States of America) of significant differences in two groups of parolees, which was cited at the Seminar, had been obtained by research carried out at no cost through the voluntary efforts of two employees. That was not to underestimate the need for proper financing of research, but only to indicate that poverty need not paralyse action and intellectual exercise.

133. Related to cost and hope for useful results was the temptation on the part of a promoter of a research effort to promise too much, and to raise unrealistic expectations in the minds of those who provided the funds. If scientific truth came easily, elaborate research efforts would not be required. Furthermore, the history of all research, even in the physical sciences, had been that countless failures preceded a single success. The researcher or the administrator who promised too much would find that his well of resources would soon run dry.

134. At their conclusion, action research projects very often raised more questions than were answered. Indeed, such projects had been criticized because of that. But raising more questions was not necessarily bad, nor was it unexpected. Too much should not be expected from a "first-cut" or a "one-shot" effort. The long-term strategy in the development of knowledge should be analogous to building a wall with many articulated blocks.

135. An important point made in the Seminar discussion was that traditional practices of half a century in California had been questioned and changed by a series of action-research projects. The resulting programmes were currently considered by many to have gone too far, and there were demands by politicians on both the right and the left to again re-evaluate the entire programme. The interesting point, however, was that the critics of the programme were demanding new research, not merely retrograde reform.

136. Another factor of considerable moment was that of time. In dealing with the behaviour of human subjects, there was a need to be conscious of the fact that there were no instant miracles. It was rare that any worth-while experiment could be conducted in less than a year and a half, and more often than not there would be a lapse of five years or more before one really knew what the outcome of a changed strategy might be.

137. The Seminar also noted that the various elements of the administration of criminal justice were bureaucracies. In order for them to work at all, their procedures were routinized and institutionalized. The workers in these bureaucracies learned to feel secure and comfortable with things as they were. They were very unlikely to institute significant changes on their own initiative. It followed, then, that no matter what new direction was indicated by action research, it would not take place without strong leadership and a high quality of professionalism both among administrators and practitioners. As a corollary to that, it was apposite that well-trained, qualified researchers willing to operate in a difficult arena, which was sometimes uncomfortable, if not hostile, were difficult to recruit and retain.

138. Since the administrators and decision-makers in the field of criminal justice were employees or agents of Government, they were justified in asking another question, to the effect that they would very much like to know the answer to the question posed, but would want to know the risks incurred in permitting the research to be done.

139. The problem of risk-taking by the policy-makers and administrators represented one of the more serious obstacles to addressing many of the kinds of questions that could be studied by action-research methods. Apprehension that the study might be looked upon with disfavour by the public or by relevant power-figures was an ever-present hazard. In short, an action-research project should represent as little risk as possible, and must hold some promise of producing a useful result either in terms of effectiveness or efficiency. Since administrators tended to be judged in terms both of effectiveness and efficiency, any study which tended to enhance either of these objectives should normally be looked upon with some favour by an intelligent administrator, provided the risk involved falls within allowable limits.

140. Professional researchers, and especially those of university orientation, were often insensitive to the needs of the other actors in the arena surrounding a project. All parties to the action must clearly understand the practical limitations of the situation and adhere meticulously to the requirements of the terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.

141. Another obstacle, too often ignored, was the resistance of lower-level workers in the action programme in which the research was to take place. Apart from a natural apprehension about anything which appeared to be a check on, or surveillance of, the performance, each trade and occupation had its own peculiar in-group character in terms of which "outsiders" were classified, their importance graded and their contribution, perhaps, rejected. They must be informed and made to feel part of the effort, or their subtle and even more overt behaviour may so contaminate the environment of the project as to ensure its failure.

Research dissemination

142. Another important issue relating to the findings of action research in the prevention of crime and the administration of criminal justice was that of finding ways to transfer new knowledge and new applications thereof to other jurisdictions and other practitioners. A new medical treatment, a new method of manufacturing synthetic fibers or a new method of sewage disposal, are all spread across the face of the earth in a relatively short period of time, ranging from hours to a few years. By contrast it was paradoxical that although prison riots or dramatic criminal behaviour had its own special appeal for the mass media, that appeal rarely extended to any constructive attempts to deal with such problems. A new and demonstrably better method or system for dealing with a certain class of juvenile delinquents might take years to be applied across a country or county line 25 miles away.

143. The usual channels for the transference of new knowledge in most technical fields were professional journals, formal training of practitioners and conferences among specialists.

144. The Seminar noted, however, that those often developed a kind of intellectual or professional in-breeding, with experts writing for each other rather than for the policy-makers, planners and administrators.

145. In so far as crime rates were concerned, there was a spread beyond professionalism which could not be ignored. Public dissatisfaction with the high incidence of crime and delinquency was often accompanied by emotional responses based on fear, economics and political opportunism. A few seeds of intelligent rationality did not easily take root in that kind of a climate. Consequently, action research in the field of criminal justice not only disseminated or exported technical knowledge and scientific method, but a complexity of philosphical concepts, political strategies and administrative skills. What was needed in the field of crime prevention and control were administrators and policy-makers who had the optimism of the reformer tempered by the skepticism of the scientist.

Expectations from action research in criminal justice

146. Public administrators who were both politicians and scientists were not likely to become very numerous in the near future. There were grounds for hope, however. The judge, the prosecutor, the policeman and the correctional worker were becoming increasingly uncomfortable in a technological world in which crime was sometimes growing as fast, if not faster, than progress itself. These facets of modern civilization were beginning to pose unanswerable questions to precedent-bound officials who had tended too often to walk backwards into the future.

147. The goal of a better society with less crime would come slowly enough in any event; it would come faster if one learned to employ the tools of science to promote change; while, at the same time, using these tools to test the results of change.

148. No absolute answers could be expected from action research in criminal justice. On the other hand, the Seminar believed that action research could reduce the degree of uncertainty and narrow the gap between chance and certitude in decision-making.

IV. EVALUATIVE RESEARCH AS A GUIDE TO SOCIAL DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING

149. The Seminar called for critical evaluations of prevention or treatment measures as an essential precondition for rational and effective policy formulation and planning in crime control. To know what policies to pursue and what plans to make, it was necessary to know what prevention strategies, what sanctions and what treatments had worked and to what extent, in relation to different types of crime and juvenile delinquency and with different categories of adult and young offenders.

150. It was recognized, however, that though there was universal agreement on the need for evaluative research, that agreement often stopped short of action. There was little methodologically rigorous evaluative research available to guide the efforts to prevent and treat crime and delinquency. That was particularly true in developing countries, where the basic demographic data against which crime control programmes could be tested were so often lacking, and where financial resources and research personnel trained in evaluative research were in such short supply.

151. In one sense, evaluative research was unavoidable. If social defence programmes were rational efforts to prevent crime and treat offenders, the goals and underlying assumptions of such programmes could be stated. If so, those purposes and the rationale of the programmes should be set out so that there might be a critical assessment of the success of a programme in reaching those goals. That process broadly defined the field of evaluative research. For greater precision, however, the Seminar accepted the definition of evaluative research offered at the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Kyoto, Japan, in 1970, namely: "Evaluative research... means the application of scientific research methods and techniques to test the results of a process, technique or system against such criteria as: (a) its purpose, objectives or original plan; (b) the efficiency of its operation; (c) its unintended effects; (d) its significance in its context".1/

1/ "Organization of research for policy development in social defence" (A/CONF.43/4), p. 21.

152. There were different levels of evaluative research, varying from precise descriptions of the operation of a programme, with clear statements of its goals and underlying assumptions (descriptive evaluative research), to complex experimental, empirical evaluative designs (experimental evaluative research). The difference between long-term and short-term methodologies were considered and the influences of excluded time sequences or of replicated evaluations at different stages of a proposal were taken into account. A strategy of evaluative research appropriate to local conditions, the periods of time, to different social defence problems and to the resources available in each country for such research must be developed. It was by no means always necessary to strive for empirically precise methodologies; often clear statements of objectives and careful descriptions of the actual operation of programmes were of great and immediate use to social defence planners.

Levels of evaluation

153. It was agreed that evaluative research covered a range of assessments and measurements, the criteria for many of which awaited further elaboration. In its most simple form, it would involve:

(a) A careful statement of the goals or objectives of the programme;

(b) A statement of the underlying assumptions of the programme; why it was thought the programme would meet the goals or objectives specified in (a);

(c) The financial control of the programme, the control of personnel and the over-all costs of the programme;

(d) The number of subjects treated and what was done for each;

(e) A description of the ways in which the new programme fitted into the administrative structure;

(f) Examination of the later careers of the subjects of the programme after the treatment was completed;

(g) An appraisal of the progress made towards the stated goals;

(h) An account of results achieved but not planned for or intended (side-effects);

(i) The significance of the project in a wider perspective, e.g., in relation to the total criminal justice system.

154. Many evaluations stopped short at those assessments. In some cases, it was appropriate to confine evaluation from (a) to (d) treating less exhaustively results from (e) to (i). The Seminar recognized that this type of descriptive evaluative research was useful, particularly in developing countries, even if it furnished little insight into comparisons between the programme studied and other existing or alternative programmes, and in fact if it furnished little insight into the processes that led to the changes reported.

155. Such descriptive evaluations fell short, however, of much that was necessary for certain types of crime prevention and criminal justice planning. Sometimes one needed to know more. One might need to know in what respects the effects of this programme, both on those working in it and on the subjects of the programme, would have occurred if no such programme had been run, or if the practices obtaining before the new programme was introduced had merely been continued. Sometimes one had to move from descriptive evaluations - which was all that was involved in (a) to (i) above - to the measurement of systems change.

156. The Seminar recognized that in those cases where it was desirable to move beyond descriptive evaluation to effect, efficiency and process evaluation,2/ more sophisticated research methodologies were necessary. Control and treatment groups randomly selected and differently treated might be appropriate. Baseline data and base-expectancy tables concerning existing programmes might be required. What was important was that evaluative research strategies were devised, related to existing base-line data, available research resources and the needs of each country for the planning of crime prevention and criminal justice.

Framework for evaluation

157. The Seminar was of the view that social defence planning would be assisted by the provision of reasonably precise frameworks or check-lists of evaluative research designs. To this end, two such check-lists were discussed. Their purpose was not to be definitive, not to be applied as routine requirements of all research designs, but instead to help administrators and researchers be confident that the major headings of a evaluative research design had been considered when they were involved in or passing upon any such research project. (See Annex II for an over-all framework for evaluative research).

158. A check-list of that kind did not require an affirmative answer or a high score on every rating before the project could be regarded as critically evaluated. Few would qualify. The purpose of the check-list was instead to draw the planner's attention to those aspects of the evaluation of a typical criminal justice system programme which merited his consideration concerning its effective evaluation.

General caveats concerning evaluative research

159. Though there was unanimous acceptance by participants in the Seminar of the appropriateness of evaluative research in crime prevention and criminal justice policy and planning in developing countries, several qualifications or caveats were expressed concerning any simplistic acceptance of such research as a quick solution to entrenched problems.

2/ Benjamin Paul, "Social science in public health", American Journal of Public Health, vol. 46 (November 1956), pp. 1390 - 1396; Edward Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programmes (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1967) pp. 60 - 68.

160. Evaluation of crime prevention and criminal justice programmes was often rendered peculiarly difficult because of the multiplicity of purposes, and sometimes the ambiguity of purposes, being served by such programmes. A comparison with evaluative research in the field of public health was made to illustrate this point. The effectiveness of a malaria prevention programme could be measured by ascertaining the mortality and morbidity rates in the region or population served by the programme before and after its introduction and by comparison with other regions and other populations having similar rates of illness and death from malaria. The benefit could be quantified; as could the cost in terms of personnel, facilities and drugs required for the programme. A cost/benefit ratio could be established. The policy-maker and the planner could then balance the short-term and long-term advantages of allocating scarce resources of funds and personnel to that type of public health programme as distinct from others which completed for these resources. That was over-simplified, of course; there were other complicating considerations; but, broadly, that was the frame of reference.

161. By contrast, the Seminar considered the more complex competing considerations in a crime control programme, e.g., a new community-based treatment programme in lieu of institutional placement for defined categories of offenders. The cost of such a new treatment programme in terms of personnel and resources could be calculated, as they were for the new malaria project, but the offsetting benefits were much more difficult to assess. Even if it could be rigorously demonstrated that those treated in the new programme committed less crime, or less serious crime, than those sent to the institution; even if one were satisfied that the two groups (community treatment and institutional placement) were randomly selected and their later conduct equally critically evaluated, the question of social benefit from the new treatment remained uncertain.

162. Other values might also be served by crime prevention programmes, and hence other questions would be relevant. The questions might be asked whether there had been a diminution of general deterrence of crime or of certain types of crime or certain categories of criminals by the introduction of this new programme; whether there had been an increase of fear in the community by the earlier placement of these criminals in the community; and whether the particular areas where the community treatment programmes had been concentrated were adversely affected. Crime and the fear of crime might not be directly connected phenomena; a few crimes concentrated in a small area might have much more damaging social effects than many more crimes dispersed more widely in the community.

163. The legal sanction was of a multipurpose nature, looking to community cohesion and stability, to social values and a sense of security, at the same time as it looked to the effects of the sanction on the individual criminal and on other potential criminals. Only the thoughtless planner would overlook this complexity of purposes in crime control. But that did not mean that evaluative research was irrelevant to policy and planning; quite the contrary. Indeed, because of the very complexity of the cost/benefit ratio in this field, precise evaluation to render known what could be known was of particular importance. The speculative and the known could then be more intelligently related to the costs, for planning purposes, than if all was speculation.

164. A second general caveat on the immediate likely return from evaluative research was then discussed. Much had been submitted as evaluative research in the field of crime control, in developed and developing countries alike, which did not merit such a classification. An imprecise and eulogistic description embellished with a sprinkling of success stories, is too frequently offered as an evaluation of a programme. There were many reasons for this. If the continuation of funding of a new programme depended upon a satisfactory report to a funding agency, those in charge of the programme would be tempted to submit a blend of description and praise as an evaluation. Another pressure bore heavily on most people; they tended to look kindly on their colleagues. When a person planned and launched a programme, he was not in the best position to evaluate it. There was much to be said for substantial independence of the evaluators from the administrators and organizers of the programme. Similarly, it was the view of the Seminar that funding of new crime prevention and criminal justice programmes should not be made to depend upon one-year evaluations of their effects; such budgetary pressures for prompt and unrealistic results led only to indiscriminate approbation rather than serious assessments.

165. A third general qualification or caveat on the utility of evaluation research was of a different order from the first two; it turned on the errors in research flow, sometimes from too simple an analogy being drawn between medical research and research in the field of social defence. The use of the word "treatment" in relation to the evaluation of treatment programmes in crime prevention attracted discussion. Too often "treatment" carried implications of medical, psychological and psychiatric treatments which were quite inapplicable to crime prevention programmes. Evaluative research studies in a programme to prevent crime and promote criminal justice was the efficacy of interventions in the lives of criminals and potential criminals, and any simplistic analogy with medical treatments might confuse analysis. Again, in medical research, particularly research into the efficacy of new drugs, neither the patient nor the medical staff might know which patients were receiving the new drug being tested; which patients were receiving the usual drug; and, possibly which were receiving placebos. In more technical terms, the "double-blind" clinical trial avoided the Hawthorne effect. That is to say, it avoided the patients' and the doctor's higher expectations of the new drug, favourably skewing the results. In programmes for crime prevention that technique of avoiding the favourable consequences of the enthusiasm of innovators for their innovation demanded more complex controls.

Selected issues in evaluative research

166. The participants in the Seminar then turned their attention to six basic issues in evaluative research as applied to crime prevention:

Ethics of experimentation

167. The issue with respect to ethics of experimentation was whether criminals should be used as research subjects. It was noted that much had been written on the ethical problems involved, particularly concerning medical research. Where there was genuine doubt about the choice between two or more treatments for a given illness, efficient experimentation required that the competing treatments be tested on matched groups of patients. Of course, the analogy between the doctors' "treatment" and the courts' or correctional administrators'

"treatment" was imperfect. Both the subjects of medical diagnosis and the criteria of successful treatment were better defined, and the patient could consent to treatment while the criminal rarely did so. Participants were forced, therefore, to pose the issue: whether it was justifiable to impose a criminal sanction guided by the necessities of research and not the felt necessities of the case.

168. There was a respectable and reasonable ethical argument against clinical trials of correctional treatment methods which must not be burked in the enthusiasm for the acquisition of knowledge. Man is an end in himself; he must never be sacrificed to some self-appointed superman's belief that knowledge about man's behaviour was of greater value than respect for his human rights. This was particularly true if the sacrifice was to be made without his uncoerced and fully informed choice. The explorer might, choosing freely, risk his life in the pursuit of knowledge. The citizen might under certain controlled conditions, risk his life and physical well-being in furtherance of medical experiments. But when coercion, or restraining or unduly influencing pressures appeared, it was unethical and socially unwise to permit such sacrifice of the individual to the supposed collective good.

169. Given that one's knowledge was exiguous, nevertheless, one must at all times act in the way, within that knowledge, that was thought best for the individual one was treating. When the problem of his treatment raised (as it usually did in relation to criminal sanctions) the issue of the proper balance between the need of the community for protection from the criminal and those like him, and his treatment needs (if he was to be re-established as a member of society, conforming sufficiently to avoid criminal conduct), the same principle held true; one was never justified in applying other than one's best judgement concerning that balance for the sake of experimentation.

170. Though the ethical arguments against clinical trials were strong, it had been suggested, nevertheless, that given certain safeguards, it might be entirely appropriate, and indeed essential, for evaluative research schemes of that type to be built into all new correctional developments.

171. If the new treatment being studied was not one that was regarded by the offender subjected to it, or the people imposing the new punishment, or the community at large as being more severe than the traditional treatment against which it was being compared, then it might be permitted. To take a group of offenders who otherwise would be put on probation and to select some at random for institutional treatment would be unjust; conversely, to select at random a group who would otherwise be incarcerated and to treat them on probation or in a probation hostel would seem to involve no abuse of human rights. Applying that principle, it was agreed that it was possible to pursue many decades of ethically justified evaluative research.

Differential treatment

172. With respect to the "treatment" of offenders, a central problem in the evaluation of a new crime prevention programme is to define precisely the characteristics of that programme for research purposes. For example, the

existence of a probation system was assumed where the supervision case-load of each probation officer exceeded 100 and where each probation officer also had substantial pre-sentence advisory duties.

173. Suppose that it was desired to test a new programme of intensive community supervision of, and assistance to, certain defined categories of offenders. A target group would therefore be randomly selected and provided counselling, job placements, educational assistance and generally closer support and supervision. Whatever the results, and however assessed, the nature of the treatment would remain uncertain. The question might be asked which action among all that had been taken; and which of the services that had been provided, worked well and for which categories of offenders. It was as if the doctor prescribed six or seven drugs packed in a single huge pill. The pill was swallowed and some patients recovered and some died. But one would still have no idea of the effectiveness which drug had for which patient.

174. It was, therefore, of central importance in evaluative research to try to isolate from the beginning of the project those specific interventions which were intended to have specific outcomes and to structure the programme and its evaluation so that there might be some hope of understanding the processes in the "black box" of every new treatment programme.

Cost-benefit analysis in social defence

175. The Seminar accepted, with some reservations, the value of cost/benefit analysis in evaluating social defence programmes. Obviously, the policy-maker and planner would guide social policy more wisely and plan more effectively if they knew the costs of allocating resources to one or another programme and the benefits likely to accrue from each. But there were dangers inherent in any simplistic application of the economic model. There were social values which were difficult to measure in fiscal terms. For example, a sense of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary might have to be purchased by the release of some criminals who should, for their own and society's sake, be treated. The question might be asked how it was possible to trade off such costs and benefits. The protection of confidence in justice would in some situations be of greater importance than reducing the crime rate, but the judgement went beyond any purely economic cost/benefit analysis.

176. Crime and the fear of crime were not always directly related. A large amount of scattered crime might cause less anxiety than a small amount concentrated in one area. The question might be asked how these two benefits could be quantified: the reduction of crime and the reduction of fear of crime if trade-offs must be made between them. Furthermore, most programmes for crime prevention were of small scope in relation to social policy-making and planning, and the costs involved in crime prevention programmes might be slight compared with the vast resources wasted by inefficient and unjust housing, education, transport, employment, family welfare and similar macro-societal programmes. No economic arguments of the cost/benefit ratio of particular social defence programmes should be permitted to distract attention from the necessity for crime prevention of the allocation of a greater proportion of national resources in most countries to social justice and equality of opportunity as the most powerful mechanisms for reducing crime and the fear of crime.

177. In view of the above, the cost/benefit approach could not be totally excluded from crime prevention research and planning. Changes could be made in crime prevention programmes which clearly would not adversely affect the benefits accruing from the existing programme, but which would cost less or be more human. In such circumstances, if the outcome could be shown by evaluative research to be uninfluenced by the change, but if the "costs" were reduced, then cost/benefit analysis was a compelling tool for deciding between alternative policies and prospectives.

Resources for evaluative research

178. Though planners and policy-makers often preach the virtues of evaluative research, participants in the Seminar noted that there was sometimes also the belief that such research could be done cheaply. There was a tendency to add a small sum and an inadequate staff to any new project as its research component. Bad research was peculiarly unhelpful; good research was often expensive. Rules of thumb were imprecise, but for the evaluation of the first year of a new programme in the criminal justice system, the Seminar was of the view that one should think in terms of from 25 to 33 per cent of the total budget being allocated to research. Base-line data did not collect themselves. Research must begin before the programme began. And it must begin with an adequate staff, adequate resources and a well-defined research plan. (See check-list in annex II).

Treatment nosology

179. A final issue addressed by the Seminar under this agenda item was the following: in the longer run, rational crime prevention involved the launching of prevention and treatment programmes suited to the specific needs of different categories of offenders. It was only through careful and continuing evaluative research that each country could gradually move in the light of its own culture and social organization to the development of such differentiated, humane and effective crime prevention policies and programmes. While there was acceptance of the basic principle involved, there were differences of opinions about the usefulness of typologies as a key to treatment.

180. The Seminar agreed, however, that evaluative research wisely applied in the light of resources and social defence purposes of each country could be the method by which knowledge was transferred between countries and at the same time the pitfall avoided of each developing country repeating the errors of the developed countries.

V. THE UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL DEFENCE POLICY FORMULATION AND PLANNING

181. The Seminar was fully aware of all the complications inherent in any attempt to track the use of research in decision-making; it knew that it could expect no clear picture of persons, agencies or organizations at the different levels of society using, rejecting or partially employing the results of research. It appreciated the fact that the identification of research and its different applications raised innumerable considerations far beyond the scope of an exploratory meeting of that kind. Nevertheless, the Seminar had the advantage of a preliminary report 1/ of a study of the impact of research on policy-making being carried out in the Netherlands, and it derived from that report sufficient material which it felt might be of some value. It noted that the "art of knowledge-utilization" had emerged only in the 1960s and that perhaps it was unreasonable to speak already of a "science of knowledge-utilization". The Seminar took note that although criminology had a reputation for lagging behind in this respect, the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders had recommended steps to promote the application of action-research of that nature. Moreover, at the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg in December 1970, that question had also been on the agenda. The utilization of research in criminal justice, however, was always difficult, if not impossible, to track.

182. Apart from the deeper problems of relating knowledge to use, there was the complication of unravelling the threads which linked research to policy decisions or judgements within the criminal justice and wider social systems. Apart from the fact that the user of research might never have a complete picture of the data and its relevance to all the surrounding circumstances and other studies in the same field, it was also true that the crime picture never became fully visible to the researcher. Manifest changes were brought about through a number of components, such as the legislator, the victim, the police, the prosecuting official and the judge; and, of course, there was a distortion of the picture deriving from the fact that crime went unnoticed in many cases as, for example,

1/ The Impact of Criminological Research, interim report of the universities of Leiden and Nijmengen, May 1972.

a homicide being mistaken for an accident. For all these reasons, a complete and scientific account of the ways in which research was being fed into, and applied at, the different levels of policy-making awaited much fuller documentation and a much more intensive study of the many facets of society and, in particular, the many variations within the criminal justice system.

183. If research was regarded as the pursuit of truth and relevance, then it seemed possible to incorporate under that heading all the activities of a Government designed to inquire into its own performance and to assess the wishes and the desires of the persons whom the Government served. In that sense, boards of inquiry, investigatory commissions, surveys and specially commissioned studies would have to be regarded as efforts by the Government to discover the best ways of fulfilling its functions and of discharging its obligations to the people. If all those activities were subsumed under the title of research, then it would be quite impossible to allege that research was not being used in the formulation of policy. There were probably few Governments that did not use such techniques as public opinion surveys, public inquiry boards or special surveys by selected experts in order to reach the conclusions about future policy which would enable better planning to be undertaken.

184. The Seminar could not accept, however, that "research" as a term could be so broadly interpreted and it was far more concerned with research as described in the working paper 2/ of the Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. There, research had been described as the pursuit of truth through the application of scientific procedures designed to reduce bias. In the second sense, research was a much more narrowly conceived operation and there were grounds for considerable concern about the extent to which that kind of information was being put to practical use in policy formulation.

Problems of communication between researchers and practitioners

185. A system of communication could both retard and promote the use of research by policy-makers. Almost no empirical criminological study was possible without the co-operation of practitioners. But practitioners and research workers had their own vernaculars. Apart from the differences in terminology and the variety of constructions of terms according to professional needs and orientation, there were personal considerations which could not be excluded from any objective appraisal of the communication system. Not only did each profession have ways in which it could prevent messages from destroying or upsetting its internal consistency, but the research workers themselves might be selective about information feedback, preferring those items which supported the particular hypothesis. The results of the work of the gamma researches performed with data techniques were presented in a language and form not clear enough to the user who was neither a scholar nor who was most likely to be an "auto-scholar". Sometimes researchers tended to keep a considerable distance between themselves and those clients who had not had their scientific training. However, this

2/ "Organization of research for policy development in social defence", loc. cit.

expression of feeling of belonging to a higher scientific élite elicited the response which originated from "data jealousy" on the part of jurists and others and which, in turn, led to disavowing the value of sophisticated research. Moreover, many research reports concluded with a statement that further study was necessary and was now being undertaken. Such a conclusion led the consumer to wait until further information was available; and often the subsequent information never appeared so that the confidence in research was undermined.

186. If there was going to be more effective use of the research being done, then the report presenting the research results must be written primarily with the user in mind. Conversely, the user needed to be open-minded. He must believe that change might be desirable and possible, and that his own preconceptions were not the only ways of approaching a given problem. He must be willing and ready to accept outside help. Fortunately, the number of practitioners who could handle the basics of scientific research was increasing, and this was enabling them to serve as middlemen. That could not detract, however, from the need for more joint seminars where researchers and those who were to use the research could be brought together for a better understanding of each other and of each other's language and needs.

Confidentiality of information

187. Another problem in ensuring the effective use of research derived from a kind of confidentiality which surrounded the collection of data for particular purposes. One Government participant in a meeting held by the Council of Europe in 1970 pointed out that in his country it was an established tradition that information collected for a certain purpose by one Government department would not be given, in principle, to other Government departments for other purposes. There, questions of privacy and confidentiality arose which could not be underestimated in considering the ways in which information obtained by research could be put to more general use.

188. It was important that private individuals usually did not receive all the particulars concerning applicants whom they might be considering for job openings. Furthermore, not all authorities were the same. It might be that if the computer could be used to supply information concerning the integrity of the population, it should also be used to check the integrity of the Government and its officials. Many countries have enacted special laws to protect the privacy of citizens; and, as far back as 1753, at the time of a census in the United Kingdom, there was a discussion of the dangers which might result from the interference of the Government with the private lives of its citizens.

189. It might be concluded that not only was it likely that the results of research would not be as widely used as they could be; but, indeed, it might be better that they should not be, if only because of the need to protect the interests of those who had been subjects in the research.

Forging a more organic relationship between research and practice

190. The seminar observed that simply to list the amount of research being done in the criminological field, apart from tracking its use, would be a formidable

task. Also, simply to list the possible ways in which research results could be used by practitioners would also mean a volume of considerable size. For these reasons, it would not be possible to devise a project intended to survey the use of any kind of research by any kind of practitioner or to give any real perspective of the dimensions of that procedure. Nevertheless, it should be perfectly possible for the decisions which were taken by the judges, by the police officers and by the correctional workers to be analyzed periodically to show to what extent these were consistent with the information that was flowing from current research on the particular problems with which these officials were now dealing. There would still be many complications, but the information derived from a study of the actual decisions taken by people working in the field would have considerable value.

191. The Seminar wished to make the point that, in the current conditions of rising crime and social change, with so many societies finding themselves in difficulties in their efforts to prevent and control crime, the concept of research-for-use was neither unscientific nor inappropriate to the conditions of the times. Only in recent years, with the growth of research as a separate and independent profession within a number of other wider specializations, had the idea of research as unrelated to practice become popular. Previously, research had generally grown out of the events or necessities of daily life.

192. Research was a reflection of life. It sought truth by specialized methods, and in that sense could be applied to the practical problems of daily life. If research could help to encourage rationality in ordinary daily affairs, this would be particularly helpful. In dealing with crime, it was even more important that rationality be applied and that research be used as far as possible to ensure the balance which was necessary between the rights of the individual and the rights of society, and between the rights of the offender and the rights of his victim.

193. In the field of criminal justice there were a large number of issues the resolution of which had traditionally invoked the use of a priori reasoning and sometimes considerable cruelty towards other human beings. The prevention of crime meant, in effect, the reduction of harm and the lessening of suffering within a society. In this sense, research could be used not only in pursuit of the longer-term goals of social improvement by providing better foundations of values and principles on which society could be built; but could be used to enlighten daily decision-making and to ensure the better and more effective application of the knowledge which was already acquired. Therefore, the Seminar concluded that the use of research for policy-making was a legitimate and indeed a highly desirable, part of the general development of research within a society; and that in relation to the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, and particularly in relation to the ideal of obtaining justice within a society, research workers should give more attention to making certain that their work was available to, and usable by, those charged with the obligation of making day-to-day decisions.

194. Conversely, the Seminar wished to stress that decision-makers at all levels - whether they were politicians who were charged with legislation, legal draftsmen charged with the responsibility for designing the instruments of law, planners

charged with the responsibility for determining the immediate future by allocations of resources to the best possible uses, or administrators entrusted with the task of carrying out the decisions of policy-makers and planners - should not feel that their work was unscientific, that it was not entirely pragmatic or empirical or completely divorced from rationality. All should subscribe to the concept of being part of a larger research programme for better administration, for a happier, more just society. This would entail the widespread use by decision-makers at all levels of the available results of research, and it would impose an obligation on them to ensure that key decisions were not made without adequate research.

VI. TRAINING IN ACTION RESEARCH RELATING TO CRIME

195. The Seminar, in addressing the question of training in policy-related research in the field of crime, considered it first in relation to the expressed or felt need for such research and its personnel requirements. The Seminar came to the conclusion that, while the degree of priority attached to that area varied with the countries, it usually elicited relatively low priority, necessitating special long-term strategy being developed to train research workers and to sensitize the consumers, i.e., the policy-makers, planners and administrators. To that end, it was very important to establish a good relationship between the researchers and lower-level officers, as well as with the top officers and policy-makers. In the long-run, the lower-level officers would be promoted to higher posts and be able to participate in making policy decisions.

196. One possible channel for gaining the interest of young civil servants in research was through teaching at the university or college levels. Good contacts between lecturers and students and critical attitudes towards present inadequacies might enable future civil servants or judges to search for additional information with the help of research workers.

197. Some participants expressed a certain mistrust of sophisticated research and researchers and of training of this kind. But, at the same time, they reported that in many departments inquiries were being used and data collected. The development, through training, of certain kinds of expertise, e.g., in the use of mathematical and statistical methods and their application to problems of social defence, might arouse some controversy, particularly where these techniques were self-taught. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that much research relating to crime had to be an interdisciplinary undertaking, which also included mathematicians or statisticians on the research teams, with status and roles equal to other team members, and preferably participating from the beginning of a project, thereby facilitating the common task and increasing the accuracy of the results.

198. One of the prerequisites for successful training in research was motivation; and, for that reason, the courses dealing with the methodology of research should form an optional group of subjects taken by those undergraduates or graduates who were really interested in this field.

199. It was believed that the best way of training workers in research in the field of crime prevention and control would be through post-graduate courses in criminology; where lawyers, clinical workers, sociologists and mathematicians, working side by side in equally respected positions, would derive maximum benefit from their studies. Even if an insufficient number of students were interested in special courses in research methodology, individuals could still participate in the research programme of a university or other research centre under the supervision of a tutor. They could undertake individual study in research methodology or continue with a course in applied mathematics in the mathematics department. This method of training would also be possible to organize in a country which did not yet have researchers capable of teaching at the university level. It might be that developing countries had more inner reserves for training in the methodology of research in their different faculties and departments than was usually realized. From that standpoint, training in logical reasoning seemed to be almost more problematic than the methodology of research itself. To help solve that dilemma, there were many centres of study (complete with grants) available in some developed countries. It had also been recommended that United Nations bodies, such as the regional and research institutes, should provide research training fellowships; and, in their work programmes, provide research training courses, seminars and workshops with the goal of utilizing research for policy development in social defence.1/

200. In different schools, students could be involved in research under the tutorship of a good researcher and so prepare their seminar papers or theses. However, it would be advisable that the subject of research be determined (at least partially) in accordance with the needs of the administration and that the results of the research be at the disposal of the administrators.

201. It was felt that individual initiatives of university staff should be encouraged concerning both the development and inclusion of special courses and the help that they might provide to capable students who wished to study in other countries.

202. The observation was made that professionals with different backgrounds were available in many of the developing countries, but in different departments or universities. The potential for teaching or for research within these countries had not yet been ascertained. In different developing countries, also, there was either a shortage or an excess of professionals with different backgrounds, and it would be advisable to provide for mutual professional help between these countries.

203. The Seminar considered certain special training requirements, for example, the training of middlemen who would promote the utilization of research results in actual practice, the training of trainers, the training of subprofessionals

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1/ Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders..., p. 18.

for routine research functions, the provision of suitable training materials drawing on indigenous resources and traditions etc. Special attention was also given to the introduction of crash programmes to provide a nucleus of expertise which could be further extended through a "multiplier" effect.

204. The help given by developed countries to the developing countries through research experts was usually appreciated, but it was stressed that the results of research by such experts should be available to the country where the research was conducted for its own purposes and uses.

205. It was suggested that training in research should be organized at the sub-regional level, if possible with United Nations assistance. Most developing countries had other priorities so urgent that they would need financial support, at least at the outset, for training in research relating to crime.

VII. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN RESEARCH AND PLANNING FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

206. Near the conclusion of its discussions, the Seminar considered ways of strengthening international co-operation in research and planning for crime prevention and criminal justice. Some of the problems facing efforts at co-operation in these areas were taken up and ways of resolving them suggested. There was a consensus among the participants on the vital importance of the United Nations taking the initiative in promoting a more scientific approach to policy-making and programming in the field of crime, and supporting the kinds of activity that would make it possible.

207. The participants felt strongly that the United Nations was as yet not doing enough to meet the requirements of their respective countries. Vigorous and imaginative leadership was needed to give impetus and effect to the need of many developing countries to deal more rationally and economically with escalating problems of crime, particularly because a substantially greater measure of national resources was devoted to measures for crime prevention and control than was usually assumed.

208. The fact, unfortunately, was that in spite of proclaimed intentions, the level of international technical assistance in that field was shockingly low, a situation fostered by the low priority which crime prevention occupied in the face of the competing demands of national development, and which was also reflected in the hierarchy of aid-giving. Although there were substantial funds available for technical co-operation, and other possibilities could be realized through the Social Defence Trust Fund, the amount of resources actually being devoted to help action-research and planning for crime prevention was minimal. Serious concern was felt by the participants about the gap between the requirements existing in this respect and the actual situation.

209. The basic problem seemed to lie in the inadequacy of attention paid, both at the national and international levels, to crime in its many ramifications, and the failure to recognize the close link between dysfunctional kinds of development and mounting rates of crime, which acted as a sieve through which some of the gains obtained by the development process were dissipated. The Seminar recognized the close link between certain unplanned kinds of development and the widening extent and increasing severity of forms of crime, and it suggested that some of the aspects of this relationship might be further investigated as a prelude to more informed and efficient action.

210. One of the most productive ways of pooling knowledge and resources transnationally for crime prevention was through co-operation at the regional level. It was agreed that among the most successful ventures of the United Nations in the field of social defence had been the experience with the Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, whose research programme was now being further expanded. It was only regrettable that the useful work which the Institute was carrying out could not be further strengthened through continuing United Nations support, and the hope was expressed that some means of doing so would be found. The establishment of a de facto Institute for the Arab States at the National Center for Social and Criminological Research at Cairo was welcomed, but regret was expressed that similar progress had not been achieved in setting up regional social defence research and training institutes for Latin America and Africa south of the Sahara; the hope was voiced that their establishment would soon be forthcoming.

211. There was also scope for collaboration at the sub-regional level; and, where possible, efforts in that direction might be made. The similarity of problems and potential solutions was a binding force that could contribute significantly to the success of co-operative efforts of this kind. There were other means of utilizing common ground for mutually profitable problem-solving, though the model would vary with the circumstances. Where regional institutes might not be feasible, for instance, it would be useful to employ travelling teaching teams, perhaps rotating courses at the academic institutions of a group of collaborating countries. Sub-regional technical assistance schemes involving pre-investment studies, interdisciplinary teams, pilot schemes etc. could profitably incorporate; also, inter alia, relevant social defence action-research elements. That was also true, in fact, of other kinds of technical assistance projects, and the example of the World Health Organization (WHO) was given as a model of the kinds of pilot studies carried out in different countries that might profitably include a research and training-in-research component.

212. The work of the interregional advisers in social defence was considered of basic importance in generating greater awareness in Governments of the need for research and planning for crime prevention as part of national development planning. The short-period of time which the advisers were sometimes able to spend in a particular country could present a problem; a sufficient length of stay was one of the requisites of a successful mission. One of the basic functions of the advisers was to help Governments to formulate requests for more extensive assistance, which could profitably seek to strengthen national research and planning capacity through the establishment of research units and institutes, through the evaluation of existing services and proposed reforms etc.

213. The great usefulness of seminars such as the one currently held was underlined by a number of participants who called for follow-up meetings at the regional, subregional and national levels. In addition to gatherings at a higher level, there was need for seminars, workshops, etc. at a lower level, possibly of longer duration, comprising more people and using case studies as working material. In such meetings, the problem of the kind of participation arose; it was necessary to maintain some kind of balance between meetings of technicians and of policy-makers, in different combinations. Special attention should also be given to organizing future meetings for groups not adequately provided for heretofore, e.g., the French-speaking countries of Africa and other developing regions.

214. Fellowship opportunities constituted one of the most accessible internationally supported means of increasing research and planning capacity, but these opportunities should be judiciously utilized so that the experience acquired is adapted and properly related to national requirements and realities; special forms might be considered, such as the granting of co-ordinated fellowships for the study of particular problems.

215. Some of the participants also suggested certain areas of social defence which, they felt, merited greater international research and planning attention, such as the needs of the criminal justice system, and research and training opportunities for judges etc.

216. The role of the United Nations Social Defence Research Institute was considered in relation to meeting some of the existing needs, and information provided about its programme and methods of work. These, also, were constrained by the level of resources available for the Institute's work. Possible ways were mentioned of raising the level of international assistance to countries in research and planning for crime prevention and control, one of which was through bilateral aid. In that connexion, mention was made of possibilities for follow-up through joint United Nations-Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) initiatives, such as the current Seminar, the experience of which had been found exceptional in many respects and worth being replicated and further extended.

Annex I

ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH

A model for co-operation

1. To the extent that policy-makers are willing to use research, they must also be able to say what they want from research, and what they would like researchers to do for them. But it is not enough to know what policy-makers and planners want from research or what researchers want from policy-makers. All too often nothing more happens after the two parties have made known what they would like from each other, and both become mutually disappointed. This deplorable situation may simply be because neither of the two is sufficiently able or willing to realize that essentially theirs should be a symbiotic exchange relationship. Both parties must give as well as take, and that does not refer to money.

2. The term "researchers" as used here should be understood in its wider meaning, including those researchers in the fields of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, statistics, demography, biology, law, criminology etc., whose contributions may be of interest to those whose job it is to somehow realize the basic functions of society in daily practice (e.g., establishing comparatively conflict-free institutions, reducing social tensions etc.). Theoreticians and researchers have something to offer which may be of direct use to the practical man. It can be summarized as follows:

(a) General information and guidance in the form of teaching, lecturing, writing books and articles etc.;

(b) Technical assistance with research projects: drawing up research plans; preparing or working out of subjects for research; interpretation of results etc.;

(c) Advice with respect to the consequences of following a particular practice compared with other practices; especially advice based on current theory and general knowledge in the field. Answers to questions concerning the likely outcomes of alternative courses of action and under what specified conditions such probabilities are expected to hold.

3. Researchers should not do all this, and more, for nothing (and this does not refer to salaries). In exchange, policy-makers and other practitioners will have to contribute the following, as a minimum:

(a) Information of a practical kind, including statements of aims and goals;

(b) Access to material required by researchers, also making it available to them in cases where the researcher bring their own formulations of problems, differing perhaps from the formulations cherished by the practitioners;

(c) Follow up of results of the application of advice and assistance given by researchers to determine whether it has had any effect, and communication of the findings back to the researchers. Sometimes other researchers will have to be called in to do the follow up, but its results should, whenever possible, be fed back to the researchers who did the original piece of research.

4. There is, of course, an interdependence as well as interaction between the contributions of researchers and the contributions of the practitioners in this exchange relationship. An illustration is given in the figure, which represents a simple model of co-operation between theory (research) and practice (policy-making, planning).a/ An important problem in this co-operative relationship, not specified above, is the question of who shall be allowed to publish and otherwise utilize what findings at which stage of the project.

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a/ Preben Wolf, "Sociologiske Grundbegreber" /Some Basic Concepts of Sociology/, in Erik Manniche, ed., Social Struktur og Sociale Relationer /Social Structure and Social Relations/ (Copenhagen, Fremads Fobusboger, 1969).



Model of co-operation among social scientists, researchers and policy-makers in the field of social defence policy.

Annex II

EVALUATIVE RESEARCH AS A GUIDE TO SOCIAL DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING

1. An over-all framework for evaluative research has recently been suggested,a/ including the following basic steps:

(a) Develop the programme rationale;

(b) Select the evaluation team;

(c) Select areas for implementing the programmes and for control;

(d) Choose external and internal measures of effectiveness;

(e) Determine data requirements (with quality-control checks) for the measures of effectiveness and the displacement effects, compensating for the inadequacies of official crime data;

(f) Develop baseline data and information for the experimental, control and boundary areas;

(g) Collect and analyze data after a short period of operation and develop preliminary results;

(h) Modify the programme, the assumptions and rationale, the data-collection procedures, and the measures of effectiveness, as necessary;

(i) Complete the collection and analysis of data and information, and develop and interpret the results;

(j) Verify the programme rationale in the light of the findings;

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a/ D.M. Maltz, Evaluation of Crime Control Program (Washington, D.C., National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Research Operations Division, 1972), pp. 47 - 48.

(k) Describe the permanent changes that have resulted from the programme;

(l) Determine the transferability of the programme and recommend the best means to effect the transfer.

2. Another path to critical evaluation of evaluative research, which is merely another way of saying to planning effective evaluative research, is the check-list. The following check-list for the assessment of policy-related research is a modified version of one prepared by Stuart Adams to evaluate various pre-trial diversion programmes.b/ This check-list should prove to be of general value in turning the policy-maker's and planner's mind to the range of data and judgements necessary for effective evaluation of any reasonably complex criminal justice programme.

(a) Programme concepts:

(i) Goals clearly defined;
(ii) Assumptions made explicit;
(iii) Terms, concepts and constructs defined;
(iv) Scope and limits of the programme clear;

(b) Operational procedures:

(i) Detailed description of what is done;
(ii) Types of service specified;
(iii) Frequencies of service specified;
(iv) Staff work-loads;
(v) Criteria of admission to the programme;
(vi) Basis for favourable termination specified;
(vii) Basis for removal from programme;
(viii) Duration of service specified;
(ix) Population sub-types identified;

(c) Research procedures:

(i) Research design clearly described;
(ii) Basis for comparative measurements clear;
(iii) Data sources specified;
(iv) Research staff described;
(v) Data-processing methods explained;
(vi) Methods of data analysis specified;
(vii) Basis for intepretation of data is clear;

(d) Internal validity of the project:

(i) No bias from historic events;
(ii) No bias from subpopulation maturation;
(iii) No bias from testing effects;
(iv) No bias from regression;
(v) Selection not otherwise biasing;

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b/ This material is used with Mr. Adams' permission.

(e) Exportability (general applicability) of project:

(i) Uniqueness of setting of programme;
(ii) Limits on acceptability of programme in other areas and in which areas;

(f) Measurement of project:

(i) Criteria for all objectives are relevant and valid;
(ii) Criteria are quantifiable;
(iii) Criteria are continuous (not dichotomous);
(iv) Criteria for major objectives are multiple;

(g) Programme efficiency:

(i) Monetary costs of actions and service units ascertained;
(ii) All significant costs specified;
(iii) All significant benefits specified;
(iv) Per-person costs and benefits calculated;
(v) Later benefit-cost ratio estimated;

(h) Follow up:

(i) Period clients followed up stated;
(ii) Method clients followed up stated;
(iii) Differences follow up processes;
(iv) Test (T) and control (C) groups stated;
(v) Any samples T or C groups intensively followed are defined and procedures described;

(i) Programme effectiveness:

(i) Comparative data on client adjustment;
(ii) Comparative data on agency reaction;
(iii) Comparative data on agency work-load;
(iv) Comparative data on intervention process;

(j) Comparison (or control) group characteristics:

(i) Characteristics of both T and C groups in adequate detail;
(ii) Kinds of T and C differences described;
(iii) Kinds of T and C differences interpreted;

(k) Data processing and analysis:

(i) Number of cases adequate for reliable analysis;
(ii) Analysis is appropriate for types of data used;
(iii) Interpretations are valid.

3. Some of the items on this check-list are subject to a "yes" or "no" answer; others can be rated from "excellent" to "very poor".

Annex III

ATTENDANCE

A. Participants

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B. Group leaders

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Ole Ingstrup, Prison Governor, State Prison, Kragskovhede, Denmark.

Preben Wolf, Professor of Criminal Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Erik Svenningsen, Assistant Head of Department, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Copenhagen, Denmark.

E. Secretariat of the Seminar

Co-Directors

William Clifford, Assistant Director-in-charge, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section, Social Development Division, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New York.

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Ole Ingstrup*, Prison Governor, State Prison, Kragskovhede, Denmark.

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* In the absence of Mr. Paludan-Müller, Mr. Ingstrup served as Co-director of the Seminar.

Annex IV

PAPERS AND REPORTS

United Nations Secretariat papers

Crime as a problem for research in a developmental perspective

International co-operation in research and planning for crime and criminal justice

Supplementary discussion guide

Group leaders' reports

Action research in crime prevention and the administration of criminal justice	Richard A. McGee
Evaluative research as a guide to social defence	Norval Morris
The utilization of research in social defence policy formulation and planning	W.H. Nagel
Training in action research relating to crime	Katja Vodopivec
Identifying social defence policy needs for research: A. present; B. gauging future trends	Leslie T. Wilkins
Organization of research for social defence policy and planning	Preben Wolf

Participants' reports

Some of Jamaica's needs in the field of social policy and planning	Dudley C. Allen
The difficulty of research in developing countries	Tolani Asuni

Participants' reports (continued)

Research in the field of social defence in Egypt	Adel M. Azer
Some comments on particular aspects of the agenda in the Chilean context	Marco A. Gonzáles Berendique
The use of research as a basis for social defence policy and planning in Thailand	Pradit Bhanichkarn
Criminological research and social defence planning in developing countries	Mustafa El Augi
Social defence policy needs and research facilities in Somalia	Ismail A. Ismail
The use of research as a basis for social defence policy and planning, with special reference to Sri Lanka	D.C. Jayalath
Policy-related criminological research in Uganda	Eric P. Kibuka
Research organization for social defence in Indonesia	A. Koesnoen
Policy needs and prospects for crime-related research in Zambia	Robert H. Mataka
Crime as a research problem within Venezuela's development perspective	Juan M. Mayorca
Identifying social defence policy and research resources in Guyana. A. present; B. gauging future trends	Cecil Murray
Action-research basis of the treatment of offenders in Kenya	James M. Muturi
Certain research aspects of social defence problems in Poland	Krzysztof Poklewski-Koziell
Present status, future needs and potential uses of correctional research in India	Jyotsna H. Shah
Indian workshop on the contribution of research for policy development in the social defence field	Council for Social Development
Social defence in Thailand, with special reference to research needs and resources	Chuan Sriprasitdh
An example of policy-related research in Japan: the Kashima project	Zen Tokoi

Other papers presented to the Seminar

On psychopathy, diagnosis and treatment	Georg K. Stürup
Treating "untreatable" criminals	Georg K. Stürup
UNSDRI, SIDA and informal control in developing countries	United Nations Social Defence Research Institute
Excerpts from unpublished studies on the impact of criminological research and on public participation	United Nations Social Defence Research Institute
Excerpts from Seppo Leppa's contribution to the UNSDRI study, "The significance of criminological research for criminal policy: three case studies", Institute of Criminology, Helsinki, August 1973	United Nations Social Defence Research Institute
Terttu Luukkonen-Gronow's contribution to the above UNSDRI study, "Some problems of applied research: a case study of criminological research in Finland", Institute of Criminology, Helsinki	United Nations Social Defence Research Institute
Crime and criminal justice at the turn of the century	Leslie T. Wilkins
Crime in the world of 1990	Leslie T. Wilkins

END