JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS

A Preliminary Report of the Center for Criminal Justice of the Harvard Law School

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Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Department of Justice.
In 1970 Massachusetts embarked on a series of reforms in its juvenile correctional system that culminated in 1972 with the closing of its training schools. The Center for Criminal Justice of the Harvard Law School has been evaluating the process and results of the reforms since the beginning. Now in its sixth year, the statewide evaluation includes five interrelated studies: 1) an evaluation of how programs are set up and function, 2) an organizational and political analysis of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) and its regional offices and their work in designing and implementing programs, 3) the political processes at the State level as they relate to the activities of (DYS), 4) a study of youth subcultures within the previous training schools and new community-based programs, and 5) long-term tracking of a sample of nearly 400 youth who have been served by and discharged from the programs.

This monograph is a collection of reports and articles written during the course of the first four years of the evaluation. It constitutes an interim response on a variety of topics, including the history of the reforms, the research design of the project, an analysis of what happens in communities that are establishing and operating the new programs, and a number of other areas.

These are important pieces about a reform that has the potential for changing juvenile corrections in the United States. The evaluation warrants the close attention of everyone concerned about youth and delinquency, and particularly community-based correctional programming.

Sincerely,

Milton Luger
Assistant Administrator
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
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In 1970 the Center for Criminal Justice of Harvard Law School began a study following the course of reform then taking place in Massachusetts youth corrections. The study included both a retrospective component and a proposal to follow the reforms for a number of years into the future. Directed by Lloyd Ohlin, Alden Miller, and Robert Coates, the project has typically operated with a full-time staff of about 12 or 13 persons, with additional full-time staff during some summers, and some part-time staff year round. Data collection staff were broken into groups: one group specialized in the collection of data in the central administrative office of the youth corrections agency and in the surrounding state-level political environment; a second group specialized in the collection of data in the actual programs serving youth and in the regional administrations; a third and fourth group specialized in intensive data collection on the day-to-day processes, or subcultures, in selected programs.

The Center undertook to evaluate the reforms in the Massachusetts youth correctional system and to study the process of reform itself in order to shed some light not only on the impact of the new versus the old, but also on the administrative, organizational, and political problems of instituting new programs. The seven-year project has had three major goals: (1) to study the process and progress of reform; (2) to evaluate the various treatment programs for juveniles; and (3) to develop a more effective methodology for evaluating new programs.

The Center for Criminal Justice and the Department of Youth Services agreed at the beginning of the project that the Center would have free, continuing access to all aspects of the department’s operations. In return, the Center would provide to the department periodic evaluations and reports of the department’s policies and programs. Thus the department has had the advantage of continuing counsel from a large-scale research project geared specifically to its long-term needs, and the project has had full access to its research subject.

The project is now, at the end of 1976, about to begin its seventh and final year. Data collection is nearly finished and more effort is being turned to serve as the project’s final reports. The present volume is a preliminary assembly of selected reports, providing a sampling of most aspects of the research. The several sides of the project are most easily described in terms of the following five types of evaluation studies.

1. A Cohort Analysis. The cohort study consists of a sample of youth in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. The study utilizes a panel design with four successive interviews for data collection. The members of the cohort are successive admissions to DYS during designated periods for the seven regions of the state. The four interviews establish a baseline as youth enter the department through the courts and the detention process and follow them as they progress through the department’s program to the point of discharge. The use of panel analysis will bring to bear on the questions of departmental effectiveness a special methodological and analytical power that is not available elsewhere in the larger study. The Center for Criminal Justice regards the cohort analysis as one of the most important components in the larger research project. From the cohort analysis the Center hopes to be able to develop the most persuasive and powerful data on the effectiveness of new programs for the reincorporation of the department’s clients. This part of the study will represent the crucial evaluation of the end product of the reorganization and program reformulation monitored in the rest of the study. It will thus make the results of the study as a whole more immediately accessible and useful to agencies interested in reform in other parts of the country.

2. Evaluations of Program Organization and Function. This type of evaluation relies on observation,
study concentrates on the DYS organization and programs, although in describing DYS works at the regional level it must also deal with community groups. The monthly survey reveals the range and concentration of types of programs in each region and the community relationship to these programs. It covers planning and implementation of programs on the regional level and documents the effects of organizational and political efforts by the Boston Office at the state level.

2. Organizational and Efforts in the Boston Office and Political Efforts at the State Level. The project collects data from observation and interviews concerning operations in the central office of DYS and political efforts at the state level. This work monitors planning, operations, and decision-making in crisis situations. It also describes the operation of specific units in the Boston Office, including the planning and administration units financed by the Governor's Committee, to the larger process that led to the initial stages of departmental reform, the enactment of the reform legislation, the appointment of a new commissioner committed to a reform program, and the securing of federal funding, including LEAA and Governor's Committee funds. This kind of evaluation study locates the project in the context of problems that were pending in changes and also makes it possible to understand the organizational and political processes of reform.

The five types of evaluation studies that make up the overall project use a wide range of methods, such as participatory observation, informal and structured interviewing, survey work, and records and documents. Together, the five types of study provide a variety of data for needs to make an adequate valid representation of change and program development in DYS. They furnish a rich and interrelated set of facts and observations for analyzing how change comes about and what it means for the general public, special interest groups, staff, and the juvenile offenders committed to the system.

This Report

The first article in this volume, "Radical Correctional Reform: The Case Study of the Massachusetts Youth and Regional Solutions," was written almost two years after the closing of the training schools, and tells the story of the reform up to that point, in late 1972. It identifies and describes what went wrong and what is to be the major changes.

More specifically, the article describes the investigations and political issues leading to the passage of reform legislation and the hiring of a new commissioner in the fall of 1969, and goes on to describe the initial attempts to reform the institutions themselves. It also describes how the change became disengaged with the program of the reform and resolved to close the training schools entirely and replace them with programs in the community. In the years since the article was written the diversified system of programs described in the article has been built up and is now included in its range of alternative placements for youth.

Of 1,012 youths being served by the Department of Youth Services in June 1975, for example, 95 percent were on traditional parole, 56 were being served in community settings, treatment at the state level.

In 1968, there were 347 youth awaiting court disposition in adult jails, and 29 were in temporary custody, while in 1973 these numbers decreased to 68 and 24, and in 1974 they decreased further to 44 and 12. The number of youth not on parole, 19 percent were in foster care arrangements, 23 were in group care settings, and 10 percent were living in a treatment program. The reforms have also involved changes in detention practices prior to adjudication. Under the old system all delinquents were in secure settings. Under the new system, 75 percent of youths were detained in secure settings, while 89 were detained in shelter care settings, typically in YMCA's, and 68 were detained in foster care placements. A small number of youth are being seen at program reception status after adjudication prior to placement. Twelve youths were on reception status in secure settings, while 27 were in shelter care settings and 16 were in foster care arrangements. The new system has been designed to be "community based." This is in contrast to many common definitions of community-based programs that refer to such things as the client, the community, or the role of the program. It describes the new system in the context with which it has been described as "community based."
whether the program differences are due to selection or program effect. Third, there are regional differences in the new system. In particular, the region that appears to have implemented the range of new programs most aggressively has cut its recidivism rate virtually in half.

The same article also treats such issues as how placement decisions are arrived at and the consequences of those decisions on later relationships and recidivism. One particularly intriguing preliminary finding is the importance of the detention decision as an influence on later decisions and outcomes for the youth. Whether or not a youth is detained prior to his appearance in court hearing even influences his likelihood of reentering after release from a program, months later, holding constant his personal characteristics and the program intervention itself.

The fifth part of this volume, "Neutralizing Community Resistance to Group Homes," was written early in the project but has emerged as a piece of considerable practical value to persons attempting to set up programs in community settings, not only in corrections but also in such areas as mental health. It is a detailed discussion of the practical problems of six group homes as they attempted to move into various communities. Three failed and three succeeded. The comparison in the article makes it clear that the difference between success and failure is for the most part not a matter of luck, but rather a matter of common sense and hard work. It is interesting to note that in following the group homes in this small study as they later operated their programs, it became clear that the people who were best at dealing with the community in setting up a group home were not necessarily the most skilled at running a group home once it was set up. The three group homes that failed to get set up, and whose failures are documented in the article, later tried again and succeeded. Some of them ultimately operated much better group homes than some of the agencies that succeeded in getting set up the first time.

The sixth article, "Some Observations on the Conceptualization and Replicability of the Massachusetts Reform," draws the line, first, "Radical Correctional Reform," on all of the data of the project, but with more formal intent. The article was written in late 1975. It reports that conceptual work begun in 1971 as part of the DYS project, which culminated in a mathematical simulation of the reform process in 1974. It includes compact interviewing instruments for generating summary or overview data on critical variables in 1975 and 1976.

The mathematical simulations included a projection through 1976, which has proved accurate in pinpointing what are indeed now issues of great concern in 1976. The importance of the article lies both in its suggestion that there is something systematic and predictable about what has appeared to many as a chaotic process of reform and counter-reform and in its presentation of a method of interviewing to measure the critical variables in those processes in many different settings. The interview form reported on in the article usually takes about two hours. The project has since developed a closed ended interview that takes a little more than half an hour. The two interviews, one-open ended and the other closed ended, work well together. In a current survey we are using the open ended form for one-sixth of the respondents and the closed ended form for the other five-sixths of the sample.

The full article, "Preliminary Thoughts on Generalizing from the Massachusetts Experience," was written in late 1975, and represents the project's first work in analyzing data relating to the question of whether Massachusetts as a setting for reform is sufficiently similar to other states for the assumption to be made that what took place in Massachusetts might also take place elsewhere. While much work remains to be done on the question, it is clear that Massachusetts is far from unique in its crime profile and in its basic socio-demographic characteristics. It seems likely indeed that necessary preconditions for reform could occur elsewhere.

Past and Future

The past two years, 1975 and 1976, have been a period of difficulty and consolidation for the Department of Youth Services. A new Democratic administration replaced the Republican one as a result of the gubernatorial election of 1974. The Commissioner of the Department of Youth Services, Joseph Leavy, was retained in an acting capacity throughout 1975 while the new state administration wrestled with a severe fiscal crisis in state services.

The change in the executive branch produced much anxiety within the department over policy direction and the security of jobs. These worries at times crept through the entire system and created a sense of paralysis. Many months during 1975 were devoted to the closing of Roslindale, the last major symbolic vestige of the institutional system. Owing to a number of pressures it was not entirely closed, although the number of youth were reduced to about 20. Whether that number will remain constant is a major question. Considerable work was achieved in planning programs for girls, and these efforts have been rewarded with a sizable federal grant.

In terms of secure care, the past two years have been frustrating. New programs were established and other new programs closed. That the department should have difficulty establishing secure care programs is not surprising. No state seems to have the answer to the problem of dealing with the most difficult youth. This problem continues to plague the new commissions, John Calhoun, who took office in January 1976. To cope with it more successfully he requested the Governor of the Commonwealth to appoint a special task force, which is now preparing its report.

The final reports of the project, to which attention is turning in the past two years, will be comprehensive. Two of the books report subculture studies - one based on data before the closing of the institutions, the other after, showing the new community-based programming. A third book will treat the conceptualization and theoretical analysis of the change process, while a fourth will report analysis and implications from the cohort data. The fifth book will combine a case analysis of the Massachusetts experience with a description and analysis of the ideological currents, both local and national, which came together to form the positions that became embroiled in conflict in Massachusetts. All five books will stress policy implications of the analysis.

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The most fundamental assumptions in the field of youth corrections are under attack, and since 1969 the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services has been the most visible national symbol of a new philosophy of corrections through its repudiation of the public training school approach and its advocacy of therapeutic communities and alternative community-based services. The radical symbol of the Massachusetts reforms is heightened by the fact that the first public training school for boys in the United States was established at Westboro, Massachusetts, in 1846, and the first public training school for girls at Lancaster, Massachusetts, in 1854. Since then the public training school has become the last resort for dealing with delinquent youth, though a small number may face adult criminal court and confinement in adult prisons.

Punishment is a key organizing principle of traditional training schools. There are efforts at vocational and general education in the training schools, but the institutions are basically custodial and authoritarian. Resocialization efforts are commonly reduced to instruments for creating conformity, deference to adult authority, and obedience to rules. Regimented marching formations, shaved heads and close haircuts, omnipresent officials, and punishments of privileges, such as cigarette smoking, television viewing, home visits, or release to reward compliance.

Criticism of the traditional training school has come from three major sources. For many years the documentation of high rates of recidivism among training school graduates has created pressure for new solutions. For example, the pioneering studies of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck offered painstakingly assembled evidence of the high rates of arrest and conviction of new offenses among those exposed to training school experiences. The classic studies by Shaw and McKay in the Chicago area project and the Illinois Institute of Juvenile Research documented the role of traditional training schools as agencies for socializing young people into adult criminal careers. They showed how exposure to these institutions labeled young people as "delinquent" or "criminal," and how family, school, neighborhood, job market, and criminal justice agencies reinforced the stigma, resulting in high rates of recidivism. These early studies have been supported by more recent work.

A second source of criticism has come from the development of new ideologies of treatment in the human services. These approaches argue that individual and group counseling and therapy will lead to personal insight and better social adjustment. They urge that the problems of youth offenders be considered in the context of family and communal relations where preparation for law-abiding adulthood ordinarily occurs. This search for community-
based treatment resources has de-
dereved support from research studies
that document the pervasiveness of
delinquent conduct through all social
classes. These studies have under-
scored the bias involved in em-
ploying public training schools as a prin-
cipal means of control and treatment
for primarily lower class offenders.
Practitioners have accordingly been
to stress the efficacy of bespoke
intervention, diversion to non-
criminal-justice treatment programs,
or privately purchased services for
the poor as more constructive and
less stigmatizing solutions to the
authority problems of lower class
youthful offenders, and more nearly
equivalent to solutions employed
tensively in the middle class for
similar problems.

A third major source of challenge
to the traditional training school
has come from those concerned with
protecting the civil rights of chil-
dren. The U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision in re Gault in 1967 stimulated
test cases exploring the constitu-
tionally protected rights of children.
These cases are beginning to focus
on what due process means for
children's rights and to raise issues relating
to a "right to treatment" as well as
"a right to be left alone." They
have called greater attention to
whether treatment programs ade-
quately take account of the best in-
terests of the child. Given this new
critical exploration of the rights of
children, it is understandable that
the concepts and practices of the
traditional training school have
come under increasing attack.
These challenges to training
school programs have pointed to
Massachusetts and many other states.
What new system of services or
intervention criteria should replace
the existing system? How is it possible to change the system
into one which relies primarily on
community-based treatment? What
programs should be created? How
should resources be reallocated,
staff developed, and appropriate
distributions of private and public
responsibilities for services be ar-
ranged? Finally, how can we be
sure that the new system produces
better results than the one it sup-
plants?
The response in Massachusetts to
these questions is discussed in the
following account. It draws freely
on the evaluation studies of the Mass-
achusetts Department of Youth
Services conducted by the Center for
Criminal Justice at the Harvard Law
School between 1969 and 1973. A
final appraisal must await more com-
plete analysis, but the widespread
interest in the Massachusetts exper-
iment justifies a review of the re-
form effort and some of the prob-
lems it encountered.

Phase I: Emergence of a
Mandate for Reform

A series of crises in youth corre-
correctional services in Massachusetts
culminated in March 1969 with the
resignation of the director of Youth
Services, which prepared the way
for reform. Prior to 1948 Massa-
chusetts judges committed children
directly to individual institutions
for the care of delinquent boys and
girls. New legislation in 1948 and
1952 created a Youth Service Board
and a Division of Youth Services
(DYS) nominally within the Depart-
ment of Education but administrat-
evily autonomous. The Youth
Service Board, whose chairman was
also director of DYS, made deci-
dions concerning the placement of
youth within the institutions, their
transfer, parole, and discharge.
The director from 1952 to 1969,
Dr. John D. Coughlin, was an articu-
late and vigorous advocate of the
philosophy of youth training schools.
Over these years the rhetoric of re-
habilitation and conspicuous successes
in such programs as the forensic
camp and other helpful enterprises
obscured the basically custodial and
authoritarian grounding of this sys-
tem. The available results of earlier
studies are fragmentary but the rates
of recidivism varied from 40 to 70
percent depending upon the age
group, length of follow-up, and cri-
teria of recidivism employed. At
the time of Coughlin's resignation
in 1969 the DYS included a unit for
delinquency prevention, an office for
the supervision of parole for boys and
one for girls, and ten institutions in-
cluding four detention and reception
centers, a forestry camp, a school for
preadolescent boys at Oakdale, a
school for younger male adolescents
at Lyman, an industrial school for
older boys at Shirley, the Institution
for Juvenile Guidance for trouble-
some and emotionally disturbed boys
at Bridgewater, and an industrial
school for girls at Lancaster.
From 1965 to 1968 the DYS was
the subject of six major critical
studies. The initial investigations
were stimulated by reports of brutal
and punitive treatment of youth at
the Institution for Juvenile Guidance
at Bridgewater. The publicity attend-
ing these charges led Governor John
A. Volpe to request a study and
recommendations from technical
experts in the Children's Bureau of
the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.

The HEW study found many de-
ficiencies in the Massachusetts sys-
tem: it pointed to the dominance
of custodial goals and practices over
those of treatment, the lack of ef-

erve centralized supervision and direc-
tion of child care, the absence of an
diagnostic and classification
system, the failure to de-
volve flexible and professional per-
nonal practices, and the ineffec-
tiveness of parole supervision.
These findings were confirmed by a
blue ribbon committee of local experts
appointed by Governor Volpe in
1967 under the sponsorship of
Dr. Martha Eliot, chairman of the
Massachusetts Committee on Chi-

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11 U.S. Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, Welfare Administration,
Children's Bureau, "A Study of the Di-
vision of Youth Service and Youth Service
Board, Commonwealth of Massachusetts"
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1946).

12 The exploitation of crises for the
formation of coalitions of concern in
defense of public agencies in the process
of reform is described more fully in
Lloyd E. Ohlin, "Organizational Reform in
Correctional Agencies" in Donnél Glaser,
ed., A Handbook on Criminality (New
York: Rand McNally, 1974).

13 For a more detailed discussion of
these events see Yitzhak Balot, ed.,
Closing Correctional Institutions (Lexing-
pp. 151-180.
In January 1969 Governor Francis Sargent was inaugurated to complete the unexpired term of Governor Volpe. Governor Sargent expressed his strong support for the reform legislation. He secured the resignation of the director, appointed an interim one and a blue ribbon committee to undertake a national search for a new commissioner, signed into law new legislation reorganizing the DYS in September 1969, and appointed Dr. Jerome Miller as commissioner of the reorganized Department of Youth Services in October 1969, on the recommendation of the search committee.

Commissioner Miller took charge of the new department with a mandate from the legislative and executive branches of the state government and the liberal reform groups to initiate more progressive policies and treatment of delinquent youth. Though some specific recommendations for change in the goals of the department had been proposed in the earlier investigations, primarily in the direction of more effective clinical and diagnostic services and community supervision, the mandate was in the main broad and undefined.

Phase II: Reforming Institutional Treatment

Commissioner Miller had earned his doctorate in social work while in military service, and subsequently had organized a new institution for the disturbed or delinquent children of American Air Force personnel in England. For a brief period following his service discharge he served as training officer in the Department of Youth Corrections in Maryland. He then taught in the School of Social Work at Ohio State University where he helped develop training and treatment programs in both the juvenile and adult correctional services in Ohio.

The search committee was especially impressed with Miller’s deep concern for youth in trouble and his sense of urgency, as well as confidence, that better ways could be developed to help them. He expressed special attraction to a post as commissioner where a commitment to youth was implicit and he expected to make a significant impact. He thought that the effectiveness of institutional services for youth could be greatly increased by applying the treatment principles developed in therapeutic communities for adults by Maxwell Jones in England and Scotland. 14 These strengths overcame the search committee’s two major hesitations over his administrative and political competence. First, his professional career had not tested his capacity to administer a human service agency of this size and scope. Second, he had not had experience dealing with the political considerations that deeply penetrate the organization and operation of state bureaus of youth services.

During the first two years of his administration, Miller sought to humanize services for delinquent children, and to build a more therapeutic climate within the institutions. Throughout this period, his efforts were severely hampered by financial and personnel constraints. First, it was almost a year before he obtained appropriations to staff the new positions and services authorized by the reform legislation. Appropriations were still allocated, within the line budget of the DYS, to prior institutional assignments, staff positions, and services. To reallocate funds was a very cumbersome and lengthy process that wound its way through the state administration and Finance Office and the legislative appropriations committee. Second, the rigidity of the civil service system made it virtually impossible to transfer personnel between institutions and services except on a voluntary basis.

Massachusetts personnel practices mix political patronage with civil service procedures for recruiting and protecting employees in the positions to which they are certified. With new staff vacancies and without new or transferable funds, it was impossible to affect major reforms during the first year appeared remote indeed. Even with additional funds during the second year the pervasive wait-and-see attitude of entrenched staff promised little change. The challenge confronting Miller was to mobilize and release energy for change.

Articulation of Goals

Shortly after his appointment as the new commissioner, Miller began to define the goals of his administration. He stated to the staff, the press, and civic and professional and religious groups that he intended to humanize the treatment of offenders and to build therapeutic communities within existing institutional facilities. This model of treatment would require a democratic relationship between staff and youth in small units. A social climate had to be created in which both staff and youth were encouraged to express their feelings and concerns freely and honestly. Decisions relating to housekeeping problems, discipline, privileges, home visits, and release were to be made in cottage meetings after full discussion.

This treatment model challenged the basic features of the training school system. Little change could be expected until the differences in philosophy, goals, staff and youth roles, and the processes of decision making could be dramatized, justified, and enforced.

One of the first directives, issued by the new commissioner in November 1969, ordered that henceforth youth in the institutions would be allowed to wear their hair as they chose. The “haircut edict” raised a storm of protest and cries of perf­ missionism among staff long accustomed to shaving boys’ heads on admission, regulating length, and using haircuts as punishment. It is doubtful that Miller fully recognized at first the sensitivity of this issue. In the emerging youth style of the thirty-eight-year-old Miller in the mid-sixties, more than most state officials. Hair style and length were hotly contested in many families, schools, and business establishments as a visible symbol of the revolt of youth against adult regulations. Miller vigorously defended the edict to dramatize the new administration’s desire to accord committed youth greater freedom than staff expected to give it.

Other directives tried to eliminate the stylizing routines of enforced idleness and silence in the punishment units and the use of strip cells and other measures of extreme isolation. An effort was made to introduce more constructive activities. Greater controls were imposed on assigning and transfer of staff to the units and the duration of stay. Frequent, unannounced inspection visits were used to discourage evasions of the new directives. Even these measures did not seem sufficient. By midsummer of 1970 the commissioner had paroled or transferred the youth committed to Bridgewater and then closed the institution.

The practice of marching in silent formation from one activity to another was discontinued. Staff pro­ tested: greater freedom of movement made running away easier and street clothes made committed youth more difficult to identify if they had run away. The edicts signaled to staff that custodial concerns would increasingly be subordinated to treatment objectives.

Miller became convinced that he could not successfully establish the therapeutic community model until he had removed the basic supports of the traditional system. He looked especially to the fear of greater punishment, deprivation, or personal degradation that constituted the keystones of the authority system throughout the institutions. He immediately turned, then, to the Institute for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater and Cottage 9 at Shirley, reserved for those youngsters seen as most disturbed or rebellious. These institutions represented the final sanctions in a graded system of punishment. Miller was determined to induce conformity by restrictions that would incite greater fear of punishment, denial of privileges, physical abuse, enforced idleness, silence, and gestures of deference toward adult authorities.

Miller initiated measures to humanize both sites. A general order forbade any staff member to strike or physically abuse youth. Other directives tried to eliminate the stylizing routines of enforced idleness and silence in the punishment units and the use of strip cells and other measures of extreme isolation. An effort was made to introduce more constructive activities. Greater controls were imposed on assigning and transfer of staff to the units and the duration of stay. Frequent, unannounced inspection visits were used to discourage evasions of the new directives. Even these measures did not seem sufficient. By midsummer of 1970 the commissioner had paroled or transferred the youth committed to Bridgewater and then closed the institution.

At Shirley remained in some sense a symbol of what had happened until the winter of 1971-72 it was, too, closed.

The difficulty the commission encountered in changing procedure in these facilities testified to the tenacity of the principles of punishment and enforced adult authority. Cottage and program staff over the years had become accustomed to shaving boys’ heads on admission, regulating length, and using haircuts as punishment. The new administration sought to encourage more of this as demanding forms of authority relationships with youth. To achieve this, however, they felt convenient resort to traditional punishment measures had to be removed or made more difficult.

The new administration took other steps to alter the control system. For example, a new directive allowed committed youth eligible to smoke the own cigarettes. Previously, youth had surrendered their cigarettes to staff members who issued them as a reward for doing chores or withheld them as punishment. Doling out cigarettes or denying access to them constituted for staff’s simple but very useful way of enforcing authority. Like the “hairstyle edict,” the “cigarette edict” both dramatized a change in goals and allowed control alternatives available to staff.

All of these administrative actions led to protests by line staff members, to criticism superior­ ity and friends in the legislature. For a time resistant staff members or their friends appeared regularly when Miller gave speeches to community groups to raise questions about the loss of control and the threat of mass runaways to local communities. To the extent that staff capacity to control youth relied on these traditional
New Treatment Programs and Policies

The new administration sought to demonstrate the value and feasibility of new models of treatment. As funds became available staff was recruited and assigned to the newly created bureaus of institutions, education, clinical services, and after-care. Assistant commissioners were appointed to direct each of the four bureaus. By the end of Miller's first year, the central office staff exercised a more definitive role in the development of programs to implement the new philosophy of treatment. Despite the hostility of conservative staff members, many youth and especially younger professional staff members expressed a desire to experiment with a therapeutic community model. No one except Miller, however, seemed to know how such a treatment program should be operated and what it would require of staff and youth.

To help answer some of these questions the commissioner persuaded Dr. Maxwell Jones, whose methods he had observed in England, to lead a three-day conference of staff and youth at the Shirley Institution. Jones explained the principles of a therapeutic community and directed a series of demonstrations involving real youth and staff. The demonstration groups created an open climate for staff and youth to express feelings and concerns and to direct them toward constructive goals. Staff personal skill and warmth during these demonstrations drew applause from many staff and youth, but it was clear that for many staff members the shift from traditional staff roles would not only be difficult and slow but in many cases impossible to achieve.

The conference reinforced the new policy of decentralization at Shirley so that not only cottage life experiences but also educational, vocational, and other forms of counseling or therapy would be self-contained within each cottage unit. The pressure from the new administration at the Boston Office to adopt the new group treatment policies spread from Shirley to Lyman and Lancaster during the next year and a half, reinforced by dramatic changes in staff assignments, described below. Many cottages continued to operate in the traditional manner, but others experimented, sometimes with remarkable success, in establishing a therapeutic community.

In the summer and fall of 1971 the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard University conducted studies in cottages at Shirley, Lyman, Lancaster, and Topsfield. These studies compared the attitudes of staff and youth in traditional cottages to those trying the therapeutic model. Table 1.1 shows differences in youth reactions to the social climate of experimental and traditional cottages just prior to the closing of the major institutions in the late fall of 1971 and early 1972. These, and results of related studies, demonstrate consistently that decentralized cottage treatment and group therapy could lead to remarkably better reactions and experiences even for youth within the same institution. The reactions of the youth reveal significance differences between the therapeutic community and the traditional custodial model. The idea of the therapeutic community is to restructure the authority system of the cottage, with youth taking new responsibilities for decisions affecting themselves and each other on matters ranging from privileges in the cottage to home visits and ultimately release on parole. It seeks to cultivate a sense of group cohesion to offset the tendency for the cottage to splinter into "tough," "punk," "good kid," and staff cliques, which achieve control by allowing the toughest youth to dominate the others.

Several attempts were made to create programs for girls and boys in the same institution and even the same cottage. The first such program set up a cottage at the Lyman School for Boys for girls transferred from Lancaster. A cottage was also created at Lancaster for young boys from Foxdale for whom home placements were difficult to find. This made it possible to train older girls in the care and management of younger children. After a serious failure at the girls' detention and reception center in Boston, girls were housed in the same building as boys in Boston and later at a new detention and reception cottage for girls at Lyman. Cottages were established on the grounds of the Shirley Institution and later at Lancaster and Topsfield. It was expected that if boys and girls shared the same institution or cottage, their demeanor, grooming, speech, and conduct would improve. Stereotypic sex role beliefs and attitudes on the part of both boys and girls might be changed. Comparative data on youth reactions in coed and non-coed settings are not yet available but staff reports suggest that many of these expectations were realized and a high level of staff acceptance emerged despite initial fears of sexual promiscuity and lack of discipline.

When Miller came into office the average length of stay for youth in the institutions was eight months. Since he had become convinced that the traditional training school programs ordinarily did more harm than good, he began to encourage a more rapid turnover. By the end of the first year, the more liberal parole policies had begun to create tension with the courts, probation, and police departments in a number of communities, especially urban ones. Many staff members in these agencies felt that confinement for less than nine months was too short to realize the benefits of re-education or community protection for which commitment had been ordered. To deal with these concerns, while the new treatment program was being developed, the commissioner ordered that committed youth be kept in the institutions a minimum of three months before being eligible for parole, except in unusual cases. Youth and staff rather quickly interpreted the three-month minimum as a maximum, and so the average institutional confinement dropped to around three months.

The more rapid turnover meant that educational and vocational training programs patterned on an academic year had to be redefined and reorganized. The emphasis shifted to tutorial programs involving community volunteers and professionals. The former vocational training programs that continued were used for basic maintenance services within the institution or for the occupation of younger children. The former vocational training programs included were used for basic maintenance services within the institution or for the occupation of younger children. The former vocational training programs that continued were used for basic maintenance services within the institution or for the occupation of younger children. The former vocational training programs that continued were used for basic maintenance services within the institution or for the occupation of younger children.

### Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Climate Item</th>
<th>Experimental (%)</th>
<th>Traditional (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;If the kids really want to, they can share in decisions about how this cottage is run.&quot;</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;If a kid messes up, the staff will punish him/her.&quot;</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Most kids here are just interested in doing their time.&quot;</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;If a kid does well, other kids will tell him so personally.&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other kids will reward a kid for good behavior.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other kids here give you a bad name if you insist on being different.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The kids in this cottage have their own set of rules on how to behave that are different from those of the staff.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are a few kids here who run everything.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many kids here who push other kids around.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This cottage is more concerned with keeping kids under control than with helping them with their problems.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real friends are hard to find in this cottage.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This cottage is pretty much split into two different groups, with staff in one and kids in the other.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cottage Type</th>
<th>Experimental (%)</th>
<th>Traditional (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3 The items in this table differ between the experimental and traditional cottages more strongly than one would expect by chance at the .05 level. In the experimental cottages, the number of youth responding to each question varies from 85 to 89; and in the traditional cottages, from 82 to 86.
The Problem of Staff Development

The new program ideas could not be realized without the help of staff committed to the new philosophy of treatment and competent to develop programs to implement it. Miller's problem of recruiting or retaining staff for this purpose was formidable. The civil service system in Massachusetts was grafted onto a system of political patronage grounded in an ethically based structure of political power. The legal requirement to give absolute preference to veterans, in addition to the tradition of political sponsorship, had served on the whole to subordinate merit as a qualification for state employment. Once the probationary period, employees obtained virtually absolute security in their civil service positions. Miller could not bring in many new staff members unless he secured new funds and created new positions or unless voluntary retirement and resignation became widespread.

Miller's options were limited. He could fill job vacancies with new staff members of his own choosing while searching for loyal adherents of the existing philosophy within the state staff; he could reassign authority and responsibility without regard to civil service classification; or, he could retrain and educate older staff members to the new philosophies of treatment. He pursued all three options, tentatively during the first year, and more vigorously during the second year as new funds became available. A survey of staff members of the Department of Youth Services during the summer of 1970 showed that many of them, especially those in academic, clinical, or Boston Office assignments, wanted to give the new policies and philosophy of treatment a chance.

Table 1.2 shows the percentage among various staff groups and committed youth who strongly approved of new or proposed policies and programs in the department. The vocational staff was least approving, followed by general staff (i.e., cottage parents or supervisors) and field administrators of the institutions. The parole staff members usually had little contact with the institutions. Predictably, therefore, they were least approving in general, since it pointed to institutional reforms primarily, but did not approve of cottage groups making decisions, especially about release on parole, furlough, or work in the community, which would affect the normal range of the parole officer's responsibilities. Youth responses were most enthusiastic about policies allowing personal discretion about hair style, clothing, smoking, and educational programs.

These responses positively reflect the new directions of DYS and the resulting internal distributions of power, responsibility, and reward.15 Later, for example, one institution's barber reminisced about the days he taught his trade to a few boys well enough so they could obtain certification, because they stayed long enough to learn and short hair styles were mandatory. A printing shop instructor felt the same way. The general staff and field administrators also sensed the emerging challenge to their authority by program innovators from the Boston Office and the greater familiarity that academic and clinical staff seemed to have with the new cottage-based treatment programs. Parole staff were reluctant to share decision making with youth—a «essential requirement for negotiating successful placements in new community-based programs. Most of the...
parole staff defined themselves as much like juvenile bureau police officers: their job was to keep paralyzed youth out of trouble by advice, surveillance, and threats of official sanctions. The new image of the parole officer was as a youth advocate and organizer of community services and opportunities for youth represented a radical and threatening change.

The commissioner relied on members of the existing staff able to relate to the new philosophy of treatment. At the same time he recruited new top aides among youth workers in Ohio and Massachusetts who had both professional credentials and enthusiasm for the job. As appropriated funds became available in the second year Miller appointed these aides to posts with program and policy development responsibilities.

It would also have to be undertaken within ex-suit treatment for all staff members to have lasting effect.

The Development of Fiscal Resources

Money was a constant problem. Unequal funds could be freed from the support of traditional institutional programs, practices, and facilities. The chance to develop alternate treatment measures would be severely limited. The appropriation process in Massachusetts for all state agencies relies on supplemental and deficiency budgets to pick up and support commitments not adequately covered in the initial appropriation. This process is deeply immersed in political considerations and bargaining; whether a state department or subunit gets the funds it wants rests on its own capacity to influence the legislative process. For a newcomer like Miller, despite public support from the governor and his staff, acquiring these skills took time.

The commissioner did not rely exclusively on the state but requested federal support. He secured grants from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the U.S. Department of Justice both directly and through the Massachusetts Governor's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, from Title I of the Federal Education Act, and Title IV of the Office of Manpower Development and Training in the U.S. Department of Labor. This federal funding permitted Miller to bring in top staff committed to his philosophy, without the restrictions of the civil service system, and to establish new types of community-based treatment services and supportive summertime educational, recreational, and training services in the institution. The new funds underwrote a planning unit directed by a vigorous advocate of community-based treatment for youth. This unit grew rapidly as a cadre of sensitive and dedicated people. In the spring of 1971 it worked with the key departmental administrators to produce a seven-point plan setting out the direction of reform. It called for: (1) re-serialization; (2) community-based treatment centers; (3) expansion of the forestry program; (4) relocation of detention; (5) increased placement alternatives; (6) grants-in-aid to cities and towns; and (7) an intensive care security unit. These became the chief goals of DYS during the third year of the new administration. The planning unit and the top staff dealt with constant crises in the progress toward those goals. They also carried major responsibility for procuring new federal funds. Without this articulation of new thought and ideas, the funds they procured and the crises they helped to solve, the rapid transition from the training school structure to noninstitutional alternatives would have been most difficult to achieve.

The Results of Phase II

The first two years of the new administration were a period of constant crisis, confrontation, and confusion. The commissioner possessed neither a blueprint, nor the staff and financial resources to impose a new model of treatment services. The only stable guidelines were the broad goals of the new system, i.e., that confinement of children should be as humane as possible and their treatment as diaphoretic and responsive as staff could devise. The needs of children rather than administrative orderliness or staff prerogatives and prerogatives were to be given top priority.

The commissioner regarded most of the existing administrative rules and staff protections as major obstacles to change and believed the new philosophy of treatment could not be effectively established until the punitive aspects of the older system had been fully exposed and the system for distributing responsibility, authority, and rewards reconstituted. For twenty years under the previous administration, staff had acquired a set of beliefs about deficient youth, conceptions of appropriate staff and youth relationships, and career expectations consistent with the traditional training school philosophy. Many felt rejected and threatened by the new philosophy of treatment and of the increased hostility, acts of sabotage, passivity, or apathetic compliance. They magnified the conclusion resulting from many of the new directions, passively endured or even encouraged runaway ways, and complained constantly of permissiveness and loss of authority. Although some older staff members were excited by the new philosophy and joined in with the new recruits, the first two years of the new administration were characterized by a progressive intensification of conflict and polarization of views.
During the first year the new commissioner was largely dependent on con
verts to his philosophy among older staff members to implement his directives. The fiscal and civil service constraints gradually produced a chaotic pattern for the assignment of administrative responsibility and au
thority. Former administrators placed on leave-status were replaced in ef
fective authority by adherents to the new philosophy without much regard for rank or civil service status. A fluid pattern of staff assignment developed. Staff from the Boston Office and from the institutions were reassigned to new positions as crises developed.

The frequent shift of staff members to new administrative positions under mined expectations and created insecurity about career advancement, based on traditional criteria of promotion. Deposed and alienated adherents of the older philosophy were not without resources for fighting back. Most of them had long periods of service in the DYS, relatives or friends in the legislature, and influential associations in the small towns in which they resided close to the institutions. They also had long established working relationships with many judges, probation officers, and public officials who shared their views about the function and organization of training schools. Stories about policies and case decisions that documented the permissive and chaotic state of administrative practices were magnified and circulated. Many judges, probation officers, and police officials, even those initially sympathetic to the idea of reform, began to oppose the new administration. And by the fall of 1971, two legislative investigations of DYS were underway.

The results of this phase of the reform movement were difficult to assess apart from a longer range evaluation of the total movement toward community-based treatment services. It is clear, however, that the concept of small group therapeutic community had some success. This experiment showed that traditional training schools environments based on a cottage system could be decentralized. One could organize within some cottages a group therapy approach creating both for youth and staff a new set of rules, expectations, and practices. The data revealed reactions from youth and staff that justified such efforts elsewhere and were consistent with previous studies in other settings.

The extent to which the favorable responses of youth to the group approach were translated into better adjustment in the home, school, or neighborhood cannot yet be fully determined. The data on recidivism rates and community adjustment of youth in these different programs are still being assembled.

**Table 3.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools of Institutions</th>
<th>Custody-Oriented Cottages</th>
<th>Treatment-Oriented Cottages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cottage Nine</td>
<td>Cottage Eight</td>
<td>Elms Cottage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westview Cottage</td>
<td>Sunset Cottage</td>
<td>Shirley Cottage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of staff choosing three custodial purposes</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of staff choosing three treatment purposes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Barry Field, "Subcultures of Selected Boys' Cottages in Massachusetts Department of Youth Services Institutions in 1971," Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, October, 1972. Subcultures were chosen from three of a list of 11 institutions of possible goals commonly associated with institutions for delinquents.

**Table 3.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase III: From Institutions to Community Corrections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The new administration found itself unable to change staff attitudes and beliefs or to impose a therapeutic community in all of the cottages. Table 3.4 provides some evidence of this: it shows a consistent pattern of differences in staff response to the items on custody and treatment as one moves from the most traditional to the most treatment-oriented cottages. Miller was aware of the entrenched resistance thus reflected in many traditional cottages, and was impatient with the slow pace of change. He suggested late in 1970 that, despite the slowness of the preceding year and the feeling of traditional staff that DYS was being turned completely upside down, there had really been little or no fundamental change. He felt the same way a year later, even after some of the therapeutically community-oriented cottages began to achieve conspicuous success. Finally, he concluded that therapeutically oriented facilities could be run successfully in only a few cottages within the institutions. However, he felt they might be much more successful outside of the existing institutions. In community settings greater professional resources would be available to provide volunteer and purchased services in relation to which traditional expectations about juvenile prisons might no longer have force. The successful treatment cottages could then be rede fined as staging cottages which could later be moved off the institutional grounds to become community-based facilities.

**Deinstitutionalization**

In the winter of 1971-72 DYS closed two major institutions, Shirley and Lyman. Lancaster was converted partly to privately run programs on the institutional grounds later in 1972. Ockolde, originally an institution for very young boys, and then a reception center, was finally closed in late 1972. No strong public reaction immediately appeared in response to the closing of the institutions. The commissioner had succeeded in ex posing these facilities as brutalizing environments for youth and staff alike. When Shirley closed, the press featured stories and pictures of Miller, members of the legislature, staff, and youth formerly confined at Shirley sledge-hammering the bars and locks of the segregation cells of Cottage 9. The commissioner emerged as an advocate in the public eye of new opportunities for youth, his opponents as advocates of punishment and repression. The staff and supporters of the now "evil" institutions reacted with stunned disbelief and feelings of betrayal for their years of work. The public's shift in correctional philosophy seemed too swift and uncompromising to accord them their due. How could the new approach suddenly be so right and the older one, on which they had staked their careers and future, so wrong? Closing the institutions involved finding alternative placements for the youth and readjustment for the staff. The University of Massachusetts Conference on Placement was organized to transfer a large number of youth out of the institutions into the community quickly enough to avoid excessive disruption and to get the job done before crimping opposition could develop.

Ninety-nine boys and girls from Ly

man, Lancaster, and two detention centers were taken to the University of Massachusetts for a month in January-February 1972. College stud
ents served as advocates for the DYS youths while placement for them was worked out at the conference. The college students were selected from three colleges and universities in the area by members of the Juvenile Opportunities Extension, a University of Massachusetts student organization that had been participating extensively in the program at the Westfield insti	ution. Arrangements for future placement of youth, e.g., sending them home, placing youth in a foster home or in a group home, were worked out in a collaborative manner between the DYS staff, the advocate, and the youth themselves by considering the range of possible goals commonly associated with institutions for delinquents.

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The move was accompanied with much fanfare involving a caravan of cars from Lynn to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. At the University, a large group of officials appeared later at the conference to lend his support. The conference, through the student advocates, succeeded in providing a youth forum.

The drama of the conference as a way of quickly closing institutions is suggested by reactions of staff members at the Lyman Institute. Staff there had been told months before that the institution would be closed but simply could not believe it. A cottage which had burned was painstakingly rebuilt by staff who were standing at the door waiting for youth to be assigned the day the announcement to close Lyman Institute was made. A youth suggested by reactions of staff members at the conference to consolidate the new policies. In addition, the Lancaster Training School is still in use although over half its population is in privately administered programs. The use of this institution probably constitutes a more serious threat to the reform of the more continuing existence of other facilities.

Rehabilitation

The shift from a custodial to a treatment orientation had already abridged institutional autonomy, lodging greater control in the central office; while the movement toward highly decentralized community-based services, control had to be relocalized to the new regional offices.

Each of these regional units consists of a small suite of business offices to serve the administrative need to coordinate and implement services for youth in each region. Unlike an institution, a regional office cannot house youth in the premises. Youth must be referred quickly to appropriate residential or nonresidential programs.

With support from the Boston office, the seven regional offices have developed placement opportunities for youth referred or sentenced to the DYS by the courts. They make contractual arrangements, usually within the region, for these services. They also take the position that a youth’s contact with DYS now is always at least nominally through some regional office. DYS is also trying to organize the budget by regions, somewhat as it was organized around institutional boundaries in the past, but with less stringent controls over interdepartmental transfers.

For the youth in the DYS, region, although it has not been one of the major regional program, it is now one of the major regional programs. DYS regards this as unnecessary for most youth and even destructive for those who are not

Alternatives have been developed with the help of private agencies.

In the past, detention programs have become more constructive within the limits of the court’s orders. Local YMCAs have proved to be the most productive private resource for such facilities. The units are staffed with a combination of YMCA and DYS personnel to involve youth in constructive activities and to discharge DYS' custodial responsibilities to the courts.

The court liaison role takes on a more effective role with youth who are still in the care of the court. The court liaison officer recommends placement possibilities within the DYS system and sometimes, as well, other alternatives to detention. Thus, if a youth is referred or committed to the Department of Youth Services, the system is able to consider the time between such action and placement is minimized, and the reception phase in many instances is no longer distinct from detention. In seeking other options to commitment and to reduce labeling effects, DYS has encouraged the courts to refer youth on a voluntary basis to better suited, more effective programs.

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The development of nonresidential programs has stepped up its focus on problems in Massachusetts youth, particularly those who have been involved in the foster care system. The group homes represent an alternative to the overuse of foster homes, and by about 1960, youth might be stranded as the number of nonresidential programs grew. The legislature has been reluctant to appropriate funds for programs that might replace foster care with alternatives that require greater expense. Even where funds are available, payments are delayed by a complicated system for setting rates, sympathizing with whether regional directors really have the authority to contract for the DYS services. One consequence of some smaller agencies is that they are worked out, the legislature has been willing to fund new programs, and the federal grants have been significant in the case of the DYS system. The provision of secure settings has been a significant issue, and the federal government has been a major source of funding.

As Table 1.4 shows, the number of commitments to state correctional institutions has declined over the years. The number of commitments to county correctional institutions has also declined, with a slight rise in the percentage of all commitments represented by federal facilities. The number of commitments to state correctional institutions for the years 1966 and 1969 is not available. The number of commitments to county correctional institutions for the years 1966 and 1969 is also not available.

Table 1.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Program</th>
<th>Cost per Youth per Week</th>
<th>Cost of Program Types per Youth per Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Care</td>
<td>$145 - $250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Homes</td>
<td>$145 - $150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster Care</td>
<td>$30 - $40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonresidential</td>
<td>$50</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Table 1.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Commitments</th>
<th>17 and Younger</th>
<th>Percent 17 and Younger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Correctional System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,571</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

County Correctional System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Commitments</th>
<th>17 and Younger</th>
<th>Percent 17 and Younger</th>
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<td>284</td>
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</table>

The number of commitments to state correctional institutions has declined over the years. The number of commitments to county correctional institutions has also declined, with a slight rise in the percentage of all commitments represented by state commitments. The number of commitments to county correctional institutions for the years 1966 and 1969 is not available. DYS DYS distinguishes youths who have behavior problems from those who need psychiatric care. For both sorts of agencies, the need for new programs is being reflected in the number of commitments. The low percentage of commitments to state correctional institutions is still 3.0%.

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recommend program changes, and in some instances program termination.

The Boston Office staff acknowledged that methods of control have not been developed fully, but the fact that some programs have been terminated on the basis of evaluations has encouraged staff in their belief that DYS can collect evaluative data and make decisions on the basis of it. Regional directors, a number of whom were at first skeptical of the evaluation and information system, are now calling for more evaluation to improve their own placement decisions.

The development of a fully operational quality control unit is the most essential requirement of a system that relies primarily on the purchase of services from private vendors. The latter are free from the rigid constraints of public civil service and line budgets dependent on the political process of legislative approval. However, this freedom does not in itself guarantee quality programs. DYS terminated placement at several group homes. In one case the facility was found to be structurally unsound and the treatment of youth inhuman: i.e., the building had broken windows which were not being replaced and youth were being fed only once a day to cut costs. In a second instance a project was terminated because the promised services, counseling, education, and work experiences, were not being provided. In yet another case the project was stopped because the program was administered in an overly regimented, institutional manner.

The experience of other states also justifies vigorous and powerful quality control procedures. The professional or sectarian orthodoxy of private agencies may prove as inflexible and ultimately as harmful to youth as the regimen of the traditional training school. Furthermore, their tendency to admit only those youth most amenable and acceptable for treatment leaves the public agency responsible ultimately for the care of the most difficult and most economically and socially disadvantaged youth. Great care must be taken in drawing up contract requirements for the purchase of private services to guarantee access for the quality control unit. DYS seems cognizant of these problems and has demonstrated its ability to evaluate programs and eliminate those that do not perform adequately. However, it has not allocated enough resources to build a quality control system capable of monitoring all programs regularly.

The Problem of Personnel Development

Early statewide attempts at staff retraining programs were not very successful. With regionalization and deinstitutionalization, staff training programs changed and are now handled regionally. Deinstitutionalization and the new practice of purchasing services have put old staff members in positions where they have had to learn new skills on the job. The Boston Office has attempted to provide displaced staff with opportunities to transfer to different work, including new outwork and other alternatives under the regional offices, or to join private nonprofit treatment agencies that contract services to DYS. The problem nonetheless remains serious: half or more of the staff of DYS could be transferred out of the department without impairing its functioning since most of the services provided by staff in the past are now purchased from the private sector. DYS records for 1969 show that 531 employees were assigned to the major institutions that have since been closed or converted partly to private programs. The number currently assigned to these institutions is 120; of these, 61 provide maintenance services and care for 25 youth in two cottages at Lancaster, while 59 simply maintain the facilities of two other institutions. Forty-four of the 59 will be transferred to other departments in state government destined to take over those institutions in the near future. Many of the original institutional staff not thus accounted for are associated with regional offices, which did not exist in 1969, and now employ 269 persons. The central administration in Boston has dropped from 160 to 94 employees.

Many staff members who have involved themselves in the new system have been satisfied with it. Others who have been unable or unwilling to break with past traditions have found the experience distressing. Still, the staff union leadership, with increased understanding of what is being done and why, has not opposed the changes as it did in earlier years.

The staff development problem has also been hindered by the organization of the budget. The majority of the staff that actually operates programs for youth are now in private agencies contracting services to the state; this should be reflected in the budget if staff development is to continue successfully.

The Results of Phase III

Data on youth adjustment to the new community settings are being collected through cross-sectional surveys of youth in programs and by longitudinal cohort analysis involving periodic interviews with a sample of youth as they pass through programs of the DYS. Preliminary data from the cross-sectional survey of youth in representative residential settings in two regions compared with data obtained from youth in traditional and experimental cottages before the institutions were closed suggest progress in creating better environments.

Probably one of the more salient concerns in socialization, whether in the context of the family, the school, or a program designed to aid youth in trouble, is the distribution of rewards and punishments. The development of a reward-based system is documented in Table 1.6. Youth in the three types of cottage environments agreed that they would be rewarded by staff for good behavior. The initial cohort data shows specifically how they think they will be rewarded in the community-based programs. The most frequently mentioned response was "staff will make me feel good about what I am doing." The second most frequently mentioned response was "staff will give me additional privileges." The role of youth themselves in the distribution of rewards provides some of the most striking contrasts across the three cottage environments. Only 37 percent of the youth in the traditional cottages believed that other youth would reward them for good behavior. In the experimental cottages the figure was 60 percent. This is a dramatic change which suggests that youth in community-based programs are learning how to support others in a positive manner, and are in turn being supported by their peers. If this contrast between the cottage types is supported by data we are

Table 1.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Traditional Institutional Cottages (%)</th>
<th>Experimental Cottages in Community-Based Institutions (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Include me in things</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree or DK</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other kids will reward a kid for good behavior</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree or DK</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you screw up, will staff punish me/him/her?
No
Separate from group
Take away privileges
Hit
Embarrass in front of others
Make me feel guilty
If you screw up, will staff punish you?
No
If you screw up, will staff punish me/him/her?
Yes
If you screw up, will staff punish me/him/her?
No

Source: Cross-sectional survey of youth in programs
Source: Cohort Analysis
still collecting, it will be a strong indication that the new programs are producing some important, positive, and immediate effects.

While reward patterns are important in any context of socialization, punishment patterns are equally important. Again, there are contrasts across the various environments, here in the perceived frequency of staff punishing kids who "mess up." In the traditional cottages, 81 percent of the youth believed that staff would punish. Sixty-six percent of youth in the experimental cottages indicated that the staff would punish. And 44 percent of the youth in the community-based programs reported that staff would punish. Punishment was one less sobering in the community-based programs than in the other cottage environments; discipline relies more on reward. It is also possible that punishment in the newer programs is more sophisticated and less likely to be perceived as punishment per se by the youth. This may often be the case in more "caring" situations. On the basis of the preliminary cohort data the type of punishment most often perceived by youth in the community-based programs is the taking away of privileges.

Youth in the experimental and traditional cottages and in the community-based programs ranked their different purposes in their respective programs (see Table 1.7). Sixty-one percent of the youth in traditional cottages believed that the cottage staff were more concerned with keeping kids under control than with helping them with their problems. Only 30 percent of the youth in the experimental cottages reported that that was the case, and only 14 percent of the youth in the community-based programs believed that control is a greater concern of the staff than helping to solve problems.

Youth in the cohort study were asked how staff in the community-based programs try to help them get out of trouble. The majority of respondents indicated that the staff encouraged them by telling them that they could make it. Over 20 percent of the youth reported that staff helped them find jobs, join youth groups, obtain placement in new school programs, and the like. We will be able to say more about the relative impact of moral support or encouragement and concrete support such as finding jobs as the cohort analysis proceeds.

In order to know how youth in the cohort analysis perceive relationships with others after they have been through a program, we have solicited responses from the semantic differential test on two items, good-bad and fair-unfair, with respect to the youth's perceptions of each of nine categories of personnel (parents, school, and staff). We have concluded that they are strongly related and are reliable indicators of a generally positive evaluation of a category. We have ordered the objects of evaluation in Table 1.8 by the ratings given them by our cohort youth on the good-bad item, and presented the average scale response to the good-bad item and the fair-unfair item. The scale range possible on each item was one to seven. Higher scores mean ratings indicating better or fairer.

"Mother" and "Program Staff" received the highest evaluations, while the "Department of Youth Services" and the "Police" receive the lowest, both on goodness and fairness. "Male" and "My Friends" are in the middle, along with "School Teacher." "My Friends" would rank higher in the ordering if the ordering were based on fairness instead of goodness. Particularly noteworthy is the difference in evaluation given Program Staff and the DYS. Program Staff are, of course, the direct personal contact between DYS and the youth, so the concept of DYS which is rated so negatively must signify something to the youth other than their immediate experiences in programs. The similarity of DYS and police evaluations suggests that youth see the DYS in general, as opposed to program staff, as linked with the police and the courts as agents of the youths' loss of freedom. It is also possible that the youth simply associate DYS with the old, unreformed system. The youths' ranking of categories of persons corresponds loosely to what we might expect a ranking of cleanness and personalization of relationships to look like. In this context it is significant that Program Staff in the community-based programs are ranked second from the top, after Mother, on both goodness and fairness.

Conclusion

The traditional training school system that existed in Massachusetts prior to the recent reforms is still the dominant pattern for youth corrections throughout the country. In fact, preliminary results of a national survey of juvenile correctional practices reveal that there are as many states increasing the number of delinquent youth confined in institutions as there are showing decreases. For many of these states the Massachusetts experience will provide useful guidance to the problems major reforms must confront. The Massachusetts reforms have closed the traditional training schools and developed a variety of alternative residential and nonresidential services based on the new realities. Our research on these reforms, however, is not yet complete. There has not yet been sufficient exposure time in the community for those in the new programs to provide a valid, follow-up comparison with those treated in institutions. In addition, the collection of recidivism information has been delayed pending the development of approved regulations for access by researchers to criminal history information of juvenile and adult offenders. These arrangements have just been completed.

Additional issues need further analysis and study. One is whether the same broad changes could have been pursued as successfully more gradually. Miller and his aides have expressed the view that gradual implementation of such major changes would permit the mobilization of conservative groups inside and outside the agency to block changes. This view is not easily discounted, given other states' experiences in reform efforts.

Another issue concerns administration and the conflict and neglect of staff development in the transitional period. The rapid changes in staff assignment and responsibilities created a highly fluid administrative situation. It provided greater freedom to experiment with new treatment methods, stimulated staff members to considerable creativity and initiative, and enabled the administration to avoid premature commitment and consolidation of insufficiently tested programs. However, it has been charged that this approach unnecessarily alienated both old and new staff members.

Commissioner Miller has also been criticized for leaving Massachusetts in January 1973 to become the new director of Family and Children's Services in Illinois. He left before financial and personnel problems had been resolved and before a new alternative system of residential and nonresidential services had fully replaced the old. He believed that reform commissions are inevitably expendable since the hostility aroused by major changes becomes too great a barrier to further progress. He thinks that the consolidation of the Massachusetts community-based services will now proceed faster with his successor. Commissioner Joseph Lewy, in charge, is too soon yet to know...
II. Community-Based Corrections: Concept, Impact, Dangers

Robert B. Crites

During the past decade, the field of human services, including correctional services, has gradually moved away from institution-based programs to community programs. Some observers would probably describe the trend as a "bandwagon" effect. Although nearly every state now has superfluous showcase programs to publicize its progressive approach to serving human needs, many states are genuinely moving at a fairly rapid pace to reduce the numbers of persons housed in institutions.

Community-based services remain, however, an ill defined and heterogeneous collection of strategies for handling juvenile and adult offenders. For example, a halfway house can mean halfway in or halfway out. In what ways does a halfway house differ from a group home, a shelter care facility, a camp, or a ranch? What dimensions discriminate between community-based and institution-based programs? Is it location, level of control, public versus private administration, or range of services? There is little agreement among those who work in the field about the appropriate answers to these questions, and this probably hinders public acceptance and the effectiveness of community-based policies. It also makes systematic research, planning, and implementation difficult.

This chapter seeks to clarify some of the issues raised by community-based programs. First, a concept of the community and more effective help for troubled youth is still to be determined.

This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Massachusetts Standards and Goals Conference, November 18, 1974.

Key variables that sharply focus on this reality are those that provide a basis for differentiating among programs are the extent and quality of community involvement, the nature of the service staff, and the community. Those actions can be directed toward at least four levels of community intervention. First, actions can be directed at private non-profit agencies to encourage support for a client and his family. This might entail efforts, for example, to persuade a Neighborhood Youth Corps or a State Employ-

ment Agency to supply jobs, a YWCA of the local area to provide a group residence, or a public welfare agency to provide financial assistance to a family. Second, actions can be directed to persuade community institutions such as schools and churches that individual residents of the community residents participating in "in-house" activities, but a higher priority should be placed on the need for residents to develop relationships that permit exchange within the larger community. The quality of relationships can also be measured. They can be evaluated as helpful or harmful. Consider, for example, job training programs that offer only job training could be compared to those programs that offer job placement along with training. Those who offer placement are likely to reflect a greater emphasis on generating supportive links between the client and the community. The continuum could be used specifically to differentiate between more "concentric" group homes or probation departments. More generally, data might be collected to compare broad strategies of treatment, ranging from maximum security institutions to nonresi-
dential services. A data base could also be developed to allow comparison of systems from state to state. Thus, the third level which focuses on relationships, has considerable import for research, quality control, and systematic policy making.

The continuum, with its emphasis on community relationships, also helps the practitioner identify those aspects of a program that make it uniquely community based. Knowing the program model being used does not neces-
sarily tell us whether it is community based. For example, if we know that program A employs guided group interaction, that it tells us nothing about the program's relationship to the community. In short, the concept of a continuum underscores the idea that even a "humanistic" group program that is residents is not enough unless it af-
fects relationships with the larger community. Pinpointing community relationships as the key set of vari-
able, what the specific treatment model may be, readers most critical the consideration of two staff respon-
sibilities: (1) matching clients with existing "humanistic" community groups and (2) working with the community to generate resources where they are lacking.

This concept of "community based" differs in some important ways from other commonly encountered concepts of community-based corrections. Five misconceptions will be outlined in order to clarify the impor-
tance of focusing on emerging relationships as the key set of variables in identifying to which degree a pro-
gram is community based. 1. It is community based because it is so labeled. Frequently, when ad-
ministrators are asked to define a community-based program, they will respond by saying, "Program A is a community-based program." Yet, in another system a similar program is not regarded as community based. Simply labeling programs as community based provides no set of criteria that can be generalized from one system to another. 2. It is community based because others are not. Some administrators define community-based programs by describing others that are not commu-
nity based. Most commonly they will describe the "home" as a closed setting that attempts to provide its clients a complete range of services that community-based programs ordi-
narily do not offer. In addition, some program might offer a variety of services, but it should be noted that a total institution shares many of the same characteristics as a community. In fact, it does not, except for staff, allow free passage of residents or outsiders across its bounda-
ries. This manner of conceptualizing is somewhat helpful since it serves to remind people what it is they do not allow. However, the more realistic institutional mode of dealing with people. It fails, however, to analyze the specific characteristics of community-based programs and, in-
stead, merely describes what a community-based program is not. 3. If it is located in a community, then it is community based. Location is probably the most common error. The common belief in the field is that a community-based program means little supervision and therefore reduced community protection. Certainly some community-based facilities are not under much supervision, but it is a little over supervision, and participation is quite voluntary. But even insti-
tutionally based programs can have outreach components that generate relatively extensive, unspecified client participation in community schools, jobs, and recreational services. On the other hand, some community-based pro-
gress more control over clients. For example, intensive track-
ing programs that provide one coun-
selor or advocate for two clients permit the staff person to be involved very directly in the daily life of the client. Thus, levels of control and security do not discriminate well across the continuum of correctional systems. Moreover, if a definition of community-based programs rested on the degree of control, we would probably impede development and experi-
ment. A more useful concept is the atten-
dential attempts at handling those youth or adults defined as "more dif-

cult to handle." 5. Programs operated by private agen-
cies rather than by the state are commu-
nity based. This need not be the case. Private agency programs can be just as isolated from community groups and services as state-operated programs.

These several misconceptions about location, level of control, public or private administration, and range of services overlook the importance of examining the programming of community-based services. Looking at the frequency, duration, and quality of the relationships of program staff, clients, and local community provides a basis for differentiation. The concept of "relationship" is concrete and measurable. It can be dealt with on a broad or narrow basis depending on the breadth of the program or on a broad or narrow basis depending on the breadth of the program or on a broad or narrow basis depending on the breadth of the program.
The mid-nineteenth century also marked the beginning of public training schools and of greater efforts to separate juvenile and adult offenders by maintaining separate facilities. By the end of the century the practice of sending convicts out into the community to work on farms, in mines, and on road construction was diminished because of increased concern from labor unions, who complained of the unfair competition. In 1913 the Wisconsin state legislature passed the Huber Law, which permitted a certain number of convicts to work at their regular jobs during the day while staying in prison at night and during the weekend. This was the germination of the idea of work release and furlough, but the practice was not commonly adopted in other states until the 1950s and 1960s. The fact that prison labor had been used outside the institution does not provide a significant step toward community-based corrections as conceived here. Most of the workers were quite isolated from local community residents and they were not paid. In short, such prison labor was slave labor, which provided income for the institution. The Huber Law, on the other hand, represents a precedent that was expanded to include other classes of offenders.

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed experiments in the same neighborhood-based efforts of large cities to increase participation in the prevention of delinquency: these experiments were influenced by the work of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay on delinquency rates in Chicago. The experience with community organization in the Chicago Area Project, which emphasized the involvement of indigenous residents, is a direct antecedent of our current interest in reintegration and advocacy programs. In the 1940s the emphasis shifted away from community programs back to a stronger focus on individual solutions, with interest centered on psychoanalytic treatment. This movement was also influenced by developments in psychological testing during World War II and by the belief that clients could be helped by various forms of individual counseling. Experience with the re-socialization of World War II veterans in the late 1940s was to become a motivating influence on the development of halfway houses and parole centers. Experimental halfway models were developed during the 1950s and early 1960s. Even as this move toward individually oriented programs was maturing, Albert Cohen's 1955 work on Delinquent Boys was supporting corrective reform again in the direction of community-based efforts. Cohen had indicated that lower class boys were becoming delinquents because they could not succeed in middle class schools and with middle class standards. In response more attention became directed at the role of the school and the community in generating and maintaining deviance or conformity. The 1960s were further influenced by the differential opportunity theory developed by Cloward and Ohlin and by the availability of new federal funds for preventing and controlling crime and delinquency. Greater emphasis was placed on community work, more broadly conceived than it had been during the 1920s and 1930s, and it was greatly enhanced by the federal funding. Concurrently, throughout the 1950s and on, the individual treatment model had begun to lose support. From a very practical point of view there were too many offenders to be handled efficiently.

Group models began to emerge. Guided group interaction stemmed in part from the differential association theories of Sutherland, and from contributions made by the subcultural theorists. The 1950s and particularly the 1960s were marked by a push toward the development of a few pilot community-based programs. The bulk of these experiments took place in the juvenile field, spurred on by high-field, especially in the California Treatment Project. But the adult field had its own counterparts in work release, furloughs, pre-release centers and halfway houses.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s labeling theory became a principal justification for further correctional reform and for removing more offenders from institutional settings. Quite possibly reaction to the "law and order" political campaigns heightened concerns with how particular acts become defined as deviant, how discretion is differentially utilized within the criminal justice system, and how the system, through its use of definitions, contributes to the solidification of delinquent careers. Perhaps more than other theoretical perspectives the labeling school has been preoccupied with the effects of the structure of social control rather than with the development of specific treatment strategies. This concern with structure and process has resulted in encouraging more use of community-based services to reduce
on the assumption that offenders find themselves in trouble with the law because of situational factors at home, at school, or in the larger community, focuses directly on both the individual and his or her environment. Pronouncements of the reintegration strategy believe that adults and youth must be supported in their attempts to cope with the realities of their situation. The inability to cope, however, is not equated with stigmatization or with sickness of the community. Rather it is perceived as a problem shared by the offender with others in his environment. This strategy tries to bring to bear on the offender and his situation appropriate community resources: e.g., experimental schools, counseling, jobs, and recreation—resources that provide the necessary link for the offender to discover a legitimate role in the community and forestall further delinquency. 12

The strategy, advocacy, is distinctly different from these four and merits attention as part of a comprehensive approach. While reintegration focuses about the client and the community while trying to link the client with existing community resources, proponents of the advocacy strategy place less stress on the need for the client to change as compared to the community. In the context of an advocacy strategy, it may not be enough to attach a client to existing resources. If resources are not available, appropriate agencies, service groups, or informal groups must be encouraged to develop them. If resources exist but are unavailable to the client, then action must be taken to make them available. Examples of such advocacy include generating public concern for a class of clients such as drug users suffering from addiction on behalf of a youngster with a vice principal in a school, and mobilizing appropriate pressures and inducements for employers to permit hiring of offenders. 13

In correctional systems in the United States, some or all of these five strategies are frequently pursued simultaneously, although the underlying philosophy and method of implementation often conflict with one another. The priority given to any one strategy will of course vary from state to state. Incapacitation and rehabilitation are perhaps the most frequently used combination of strategies. It is difficult to obtain reliable national data on rates of institutionalization because the quality and type of data reported vary greatly from state to state, and some states do not fully report to national sources. But conservative estimates show that the rate for adults imprisoned in state and federal prisons per 100,000 of the estimated civilian population has decreased over the last three decades. In 1948 there were 132.0; by 1970 the rate had dropped to 96.2.14 In addition to the 196,428 men and women that the latter figure represents, there were another 160,883 fishermen, women, and juveniles housed in jails.15 Data from another source indicate that 57,171 juveniles, as of June 30, 1971, were held in state and local jurisdictions.16

The 96.7 rate referred to above is quite high when compared to rates of other countries. In England the rate was 72 and in Holland it was 19 prisoners a day per 100,000.17 A factor affecting this low rate in Holland is the length of sentences: 90 percent of all prison sentences are for five months or less. In addition, an extensive system of restitution is used. Yet another indication of the schizophrenic pattern of prison reform in America is the fact that there are about as many state juvenile systems building or contemplating construction of new institutions as there are states. Programs purporting to have focused their efforts at desinstitutionalization.19 Thus, correctional services in the United States are mired in a variety of different directions. Those who favor community-based corrections generally do so self-consciously as part of a continuing policy debate in the field. They generally make use of some or all of the following distinctive policy assumptions as the basis for their position: 20

1. Community-based settings will be humane and include such activities as housing, employment, library, or field hockey. 21 When we compare the results of experimental group studies of young adults in community-based settings with control or comparison groups, we select the most successful and repeat the treatment—whether a closed institution or an open community setting. One of the more extensive analyses of correctional research was undertaken by Robert Martinson for the state of New York.22 His findings were originally suppressed by the state, but are now being made available to the public. Martinson, over a two-year period, reviewed the evaluation research literature from this country and abroad. For an evaluation study to be included in his final analysis it had to have a clear independent measure of the desired improvement, and the study had to use a control or comparison group. In the end, 231 studies completed between 1945-1967 were analyzed with the build of the programs best described as institution based. They would for the most part make a weak showing on our continuum for how to high community relationships.

Although additional outcome criteria were compared, Martinson’s published work to date focuses on only recidivism because it is "the phenomenon which reflects most directly how well our present treatment programs are performing the task of rehabilitation."23 Programs and policies evaluated by research studies include education and vocational training, individual counseling, group counseling, humanizing the institutional environment, medical treatment, effects of sentencing, decarceration, psychotherapy in community settings, parole or parole versus prison-intensive supervision, and community treatment. Martinson summarized his findings: "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."24 While the community treatment programs did not yield significant differences in terms of recidivism, they did show that clients did no worse than if they had been incarcerated. Clients did not pose an unacceptable threat to the community.
Mental health treatment of parolees has been a focus of research on community correctional programs, less comprehensive than the Martinson study but with more focus on community-based programs, arrived essentially at the same conclusion. It demonstrated that community-based programs do vary in their effectiveness, as well as among prisons.

A large number of offenders who are candidates for incarceration may instead be retained in the community on probation or parole. This has been demonstrated by numerous studies, many of which cite evidence to support the belief that these offenders do not belong in a prison environment but rather should be treated in the community. The Martinson study, for example, among other things, found that offenders who were retained in prison for longer periods of time had a higher recidivism rate than those who were released on parole. This suggests that the effectiveness of prison treatment is not as high as that of community-based programs.

In the context of community-based programs, it is important to consider the quality and frequency of community resources. For example, having access to basic services, such as food and shelter, is essential for parolees to successfully reintegrate into society. If parolees do not have access to these services, they may be forced to return to prison. This highlights the importance of community-based programs in providing parolees with the necessary resources to successfully reintegrate into society.

However, it is important to note that community-based programs are not a panacea for all parolees. Some parolees may require more intensive treatment and may benefit from more specialized programs. This underscores the need for a flexible and individualized approach to community-based programs. In conclusion, while community-based programs have demonstrated effectiveness in reducing recidivism, it is important to continue to evaluate and improve these programs to ensure that they are meeting the needs of all parolees.
Holding the Extremes of the Client Spectrum

One of the subtle advantages of viewing

community corrections as a continuum and recognizing that a system must have programs at more than one point on the continuum is that the "difficult to handle, hard core, aggressive offender" is not forgotten. Providing a secure setting while max-

imizing community resources can be done by allowing clients to leave the setting under close supervision or by per-

mitting community groups and resi-

dents entry to the setting is imper-

ative. To think that all offenders can be handled in the same kind of open community settings is naive, and this type of thinking can be the Achilles heel of a community correctional system. To focus only on the youth or adult who can be easily handled in the open community and ignore the needs of the more difficult individuals is irresponsible and paves the way for the creation of small maximum security prisons. Although these individuals make up a very small percentage of the total population served, they ought not to be forgotten.

On the other end of the client spectrum, a different sort of danger exists. Community corrections as part of a broader diversion effort, become viewed as benign and poten-
da. They are held to develop in each local community. Second, while al-

lowing for community participation, the links also permit exertion of power from outside, local community. Thus, these links are both a potential and actual conduit to the community. This process is potentially quite dangerous, for once again in our desire to help we have identified and urged more individuals to penetrate and be a part of the larger community. This is just one of the possible un-

intended consequences of community-based reform efforts. These other related consequences may occur.

First, we must come to realize that what we have to offer is benefi-

cial that we are willing to coerce the

Some Dangers Facing Community-Based Corrections

Significant Change or Window Dressing

Nearly every state system in the country has a model community-based program, at least for juveniles. In addi-
tion to the more traditional probation and parole programs, these "model programs" are viewed as these model programs represent sin-
cere efforts to develop alternatives to incarceration. In many cases, however, the model programs are merely window-

dressing, with many of the participat-
ing clients screened so selectively that they would probably do equally well without any services, including parole. These programs have a negligible im-

pact on the system. The danger with such window dressing is that we may convince ourselves that a great deal

has been accomplished when, in fact, nothing has changed. A wide range of program alternatives, including severe disrup-
tive measures, underscores the importance of developing a variety of ways to meet the needs of offenders. For ex-

ample, it is unrealistic at this point to expect that all offenders will function well or be accepted in entirely open situations. Some offenders require a residential placement that provides shelter but permits free access to the larger community. A few offenders, for whatever reason of their own needs or for rea-
sons of community politics, will be un-

able to participate in programs within the larger community. These persons will need a secure setting — one that is humane and en-

courages community participation. In any kind of program, a community cor-

rectional system must do its best to encourage such relationships. It is only then that systems will be significantly influ-

enced.

Community Participation or Community Control?

Given the concept of community-based corrections developed in this chapter, with its emphasis on the extent and quality of community relationships, genuine community control can depend upon active community par-

ticipation. To improve substantially upon the record of institutions one must do a better job at developing a more legitimate community ties for offend-

ers. These links will to a considerable extent depend upon the responsi-

bility of local community groups and residents. Thus participation of local community (professionals and lay persons) in the development, im-

plementation, and monitoring of a community-based program is imperative — this should not really surprise anyone. Let us turn, then, to the more thorny issues of local community control.

Local community control poses a potentially dangerous situation for community-based corrections. When one listens to debates about commu-
nity control it is clear that proponents of community control frequently argue that it is good for "them" but not for "us." In order to build a case for community services, one must be able to convince powerful community groups that certain needs exist and that they must be met. One of the richest coun­

ties in the country, for example, failed to act because that a large proportion of its teenagers were in-

volved in drug abuse. Some people in the county wanted to construct a combination live-in and outpatient

drug rehabilitation center. Many fami-

lies in the country could afford private care. The plan for the rehabilitation center was defeated. In its place a brand new jail was built to protect the community from "drug addicts" of the lower class. Local community control in this case meant blocking services from those who could not afford to purchase them privately. On a much larger scale this is one of the apparent problems with the California Probation Subsidy programs, where state moneys are channelled to the counties. While the state system isn't institutional population is decreasing, new county jails are being built and filled. Shared community participation with a statewide public agency offers two distinct advantages. First, links with the statewide agency permit access to special services that it may not be practical to provide in each local community. Second, while allowing for community participation, the links also permit exertion of power from outside, local community. Thus, these links are both a potential and actual conduit to the community. This process is potentially quite dangerous, for once again in our desire to help we have identified and urged more individuals to penetrate and be a part of the larger community. This is just one of the possible un-

intended consequences of community-based reform efforts. These other related consequences may occur.

First, we must come to realize that what we have to offer is benefi-

cial that we are willing to coerce the

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Agency does not involve local com-

munity groups and residents, then the institutionalized client is simply being transformed into an "agency client," possibly an improvement over co-operationalization, but quite removed from the concept of community-based services advanced here.

Maintaining a Creative Tension Among the Agencies

One of the problems confronting a sys-
tem that seeks to advance toward com-

munity-based corrections is that of maintaining for a long time a creative tension among the concerned agen-
cies.16 Agencies here include the prin-
cipal agency groupings: the statewide correctional agencies, the courts, and the community correctional agencies. These groups are all involved in the delicate balance of power. If any one group were to emerge with all the power, the reform would probably rigidify in some manner related to the orientation of that group. If the state correctional agency had all the power, it is possible that its reform urge would subside, and that clients and service concerns would take second place to bureau-

ocratic concerns. If the courts were to have all the power, there would be no checks and balances on their decisions. If private vending agencies had all the power, they would tend to adopt what-

ever treatment modality was thus in vogue; or they could decide that they were only going to serve the un-

changeable 2.5 percent of the client population; or the larger vendors could eliminate their competition, thereby reducing possibilities for innovation. Although less comfortable, perhaps, for many participants, this system of checks and balances provides flexi-
bility for continued innovation and provides each group with a forum for advocacy.

ty to encourage innovation is further documentated in Solicitor General, Canada, Report of the Task Force on Community-Based Residential Centers (Ottawa: Informa-
tion Canada, 1973).
Evaluating the Quality of Service

Evaluating the viability of a system that utilizes be
happens prior to chased clearly if the bulk of services t
control arc the two private vendors. The state for maintaining control over what
happens quickly, long before recidivism min
administrators cannot wait two
program are feasible. Responsible
of a (ost-per-client basis.
community-based programs may
be viewed as so benign that
the current use of final
measures.

Conclusions
Several reasonable conclusions emerge from this review of the concept of community-based corrections. In theoretical underpinnings, and its imple
mentation:
1. Rethinking the concept of community-based corrections in terms of a continuum of the extent and quality of program staff and client relationships with a local community should help to more sharply focus needs for further research, practice, and policy making.
2. Research has failed to show dramatic differences between matched comparison groups participating in community and institutional programs. Yet it is fairly clear that clients do no worst in the community programs. Many in the research community have tended to support the community-based process for humanitarian reasons. Some have shown that community-based programs are less expensive on a cost-per-client basis.
3. It is clear that reintegration and advocacy strategies have not been adequately implemented and studied.
4. Research designs should be developed to evaluate program processes. A greater range of goals should be developed to provide a broader assessment of programs than is provided by the current use of final recidivism measures.
5. Successful implementation of community-based programs may require extensive modification of existing systems rather than the patchwork repairs characteristic of pilot programs.
6. Community-based corrections are not without their own potential dangers. The client is a need for intensive care can easily be forgotten and the community-based programming can be viewed as so benign that community-based systems may be pressured, internally and externally, to work with a part of the population that has not previously been labeled as needing services.
7. It is unlikely that community-based corrections will be rejected as a plausible strategy for handling juvenile and adult offenders. But the debate will certainly continue, focusing on such issues as the need to define a community-based program: the proportion and type of client population to be served by community programs; and participation in the operation and monitoring of the program.

III. Subcultures In Community-Based Programs
Craig A. McEwen

Programs for youth in trouble can be evaluated from either a long- or a short-term perspective. Because the widely accepted long-run goal of corrective programs for youth is the reintegration of their clients in the community as law-abiding citizens, the recidivism rate of former participants is generally used as an index of the "effectiveness" of a program. Unfortunately, such measures of success with past clients are too remote and unrelied to guide practitioners in making day-to-day decisions about their current program members. Rates of recidivism do not furnish administrators with the information about what happens in the course of a program to prevent or foster violations of the law by former clients. Both practitioners and administrators are likely, therefore, to develop a set of implicit standards of short-term, in-program success or failure to use in making operational decisions.

Unlike recidivism, however, which is a widely accepted long-term measure of effectiveness, the several criteria of short-term success generate less consensus. Most of these criteria reflect in one way or another the achievement of four general and overlapping objectives in youth correctional services: (1) to provide a humane and livable program environment that does not alienate, embitter, or harm youth; (2) to alter in a "constructive" fashion the self-image, values, attitudes, skills, knowledge, or habits of youth (rehabilitation); (3) to establish or re-establish "positive" and supportive relationships between youth and relevant persons in the free community such as parents, teachers, employers, police, and peers (reintegration); and (4) to maintain direct control over the behavior of youth during the period they are under agency jurisdiction.

While each of these goals appears laudatory and essential to any correctional effort, the operation of a program for youth in trouble requires an ongoing series of choices in an awk
ward world where not all goals can be achieved at the same time. Some short-term goals must be fostered in order to facilitate the accomplishment of others with higher priority. If one defines success only as the full achievement of the panoply of short-term correctional goals, it is easy to point out short-run failures in any correctional program. On the other hand, recognition that, of necessity, all correctional programs must fail to do some things in the short run if they are to succeed in doing others does not preclude criticism of such programs. Some of them may succeed too infrequently, and some failures may be worse than others. Corrective practitioners and administrators face the following formidable tasks: (1) sorting out the "tolerable" short-run failures from the "unacceptable" ones, (2) organizing programs so as to maximize desirable forms of short-term success, (3) both diversifying and balancing the correctional system so that its constituent programs complement another, and (4) developing a method for matching clients with programs so that the needs of each youth are met by the unique strengths of individual programs.

The data and analysis in this report on the 1973 subculture study are specifically organized so as to address these problems of policy and practice. We shall examine the ways in which the choice of particular methods of organizing programs facilitate the achievement of some short-term goals but reduces the likelihood of stigmatizing others, and, where possible, we will point out some of the characteristics that make different clients more responsive to one kind of program emphasis than to another. Clearly this is not the only way to organize or present the data—nor is this report an exhaustive survey or
summary of the results of the subculture study. During the summer of 1973, six people collected data for the subculture study through extensive field observation and interviewing in thirteen programs serving youth under the direction of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Of the six observers studied two programs each and one studied three. They spent four to five weeks in each program observing and collecting detailed field notes its day-to-day operation, interviewing youthful participants, and securing completed questionnaires from staff. Because of the particular focus on subcultures in this part of the larger research project, programs were selected for study only if they involved enough group activity and interaction among clients to make the investigation of subculture and group structure feasible. These programs cannot, therefore, be considered a "representative sample of the approximately 200 programs serving DYS youths." Nevertheless, the lesson that we can learn from examining our limited sample are broadly applicable because they point to fundamental conflicts and inconsistencies in the short-term goals of correctional programs and to general techniques for achieving these goals.

Programs and persons are not identified in this report, and the names that do appear have been altered to respect the confidentiality. In addition, since it is virtually impossible to provide a detailed description of each of the 13 programs and still preserve the privacy of confidentiality, we shall present only a general indication of the types of programs we studied. Two programs were nonresidential: In both, some group recreational activities were undertaken for the 20 or so members, and staff visited families, went to court, talked with school officials and located jobs for the youth. Two programs provided short-term shelter care for youth prior to their court appearance or placement. The remainder of the programs were "residential " groups, accommodating anywhere from 10 to 70 youth. Four of these had high education staffs and provided a wide range of services and activities for 25 to 60 youths. Teachers, child care workers, recreational staff, and social workers sought to provide individual counseling and educational and recreational activities. In addition, some staff members in each program devoted more or less time to establishing or re-establishing links between youth and parents, public schools, and jobs. Four other programs, ranging in accommodation from eight to 60 youths, were organized to provide more or less intensive group counseling to their residents and through that medium to develop positive peer group pressures. This group work was carried on in relative isolation from community contact in two of the four programs. The two other peer group programs worked slowly to move in and out of the community as they pleased. Finally, one program with about 10 residents utilized an individual counseling approach in an open setting.

Each of these 13 programs was organized to achieve the particular short-term goals established by the program staff. Staff members then reached decisions about how to organize relationships within the program between staff, staff and youth, and the youth themselves. They also decided how much contact to allow between youth and persons in the community and how many and what types of youth to include in or exclude from the program. These choices led to direct parallels among programs toward the achievement of some short-term goals and away from the accomplishment of others. In the next three sections of this report we shall examine how these decisions affected the achievement of the short-term human environment, rehabilitation, and reintegration goals for the 1.176 youths. The report of this study is subsidiary yet pervasive, it will be examined in the context of discussing each of the other three goals. The final section of the report will draw out the contradictions among goals and their implications for policy.

Some of the incidents which are described in the course of this analysis may appear as a first reader. It should be noted, however, that all descriptions and quotes have been revised and are the author's own. Although the observer did not observe, and data were collected independently and with the observer's knowledge, and examine their implications for corrective policy.

Robert J. Lipsett, Gwendolyn Kinkle, Christian Schley and Mary Strickland served as observers, as did the author of this paper.

Humble Program Environment as a Goal

Program staff and outside evaluators derive much of their sense of a program's environment from the responses of program youth: "If the kids like it, it must not be too bad a place." In this section we draw on our reasoning, although recognizing its limitations. Obvious are the program's problems that are in some sense "bad" for them, or, dislike settings that are "good." Nevertheless if we focus for the moment on whether or not providing a humane program environment, we must take youth evaluations seriously. Our analysis will be, therefore, with the overall assessments by youth of the quality of life and activity in a program.

When youths from DYS were asked whether the programs they were present in was "one of the better places to be in DYS." over two-thirds of the youth aged 11 in the 13 programs (range: 67 percent to 100 percent in the remaining two programs, 41 percent and 60 percent of the youth asserted the relative "goodness" of their programs. For many youths, particularly inexperienced ones, the detention units, especially Roslindale, set the low DYS standard against which other programs were judged. Program staff were alert to this comparison and frequently confronted it. They kept alive stories about detention units and circulate implicit threats that youth might be transferred to them if the comparison continued or if they liked their current program, many youth said they did become the program seemed so free to them or because their rooms had no locks. The reporting of opportunities also revealed that program was relatively "high" or "low" on this scale the mid-point of possible value scales. The cutting point between programs is related to the size of the client population. From 86 percent to 100 percent of the residents in the four programs with programs of about 10 had high scores compared to 18 percent to 75 percent of the residents in the seven residential programs with populations of over 20. So severe seem to evade the evidence that they use because it affects the case with which staff can control and supervise relationships among youth. In a program of 10 residents, there are 45 possible pairings among youths at any one time, but when the number of youth grows to 20, there are 190 possible two-person relationships. This rapid escalation of possible relationships as programs size increases soon makes it impossible for staff members to keep track of and control over what is going on between each pair of program members. The likelihood then increases with programs size that some of those relationships will make a youth's experience in that program a disagreeable one.

Staff, do, however, develop ways of reducing the occurrence of harmful contacts by structuring their activities and by introducing mechanisms for making antagonistic relationships public, thus subjecting them to some degree of control. Four large programs with highly structured activities were better liked than other large programs; in the four structured programs from 41 percent to 75 percent of the youth showed high program preference compared to 18 percent to 52 percent of the youth in the three less structured programs.

That control over relationships among youth is indeed the underlying factor that distinguishes large structured programs from more open programs is made clear by the relative frequency of youth agreement with the statement: "Some kids here really push others around." However, we have found that 89 percent to 100 percent of the youth in the

Program Preference and Size of Residence

The meaning of "program environment" and the nature of the judgment by youth of program preference differ so much between residential and nonresidential programs that these two kinds of programs will be examined separately. Generally, program preference among youths in the four nonresidential programs is related to the size of the client population. From 86 percent to 100 percent of the residents in the four programs with programs of about 10 had high scores compared to 18 percent to 75 percent of the residents in the seven residential programs with populations of over 20. Small programs imply larger size in which case because it affects the ease with which staff can control and supervise relationships among youth. In a program of 10 residents, there are 45 possible pairings among youths at any one time, but when the number of youth grows to 20, there are 190 possible two-person relationships. This rapid escalation of possible relationships as programs size increases soon makes it impossible for staff members to keep track of and control over what is going on between each pair of program members. The likelihood then increases with programs size that some of those relationships will make a youth's experience in that program a disagreeable one.

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The task of keeping track of youth and maintaining some control over their relationships was far less demanding in small programs. Since staff could maintain control over re-lationships, they were free to develop the group or program rather than to focus on the development of activities evident in the large, structured programs. Most of the residents in the four small programs were middle-aged and the average between the two programs much of this free time was spent in the program's closing. In all the small programs periodic "community meetings," informal consultation between youth and staff, and the interaction of the setting combined to create a sense of shared involvement in the program.

**Impact of Staff Decisions on Program Environment**

With this general analysis of the impact of program size as a basis, we now turn to more detailed evaluation of the impact of different kinds of staff decisions on the nature of the program environment. These "house" vs. "house" vs. "house" programs are understood to mean that the youth were least positive to both level (over 25 residents), the patterns of residential programs for boys. As noted earlier a major reason for negative evaluations of a program by its residents is the characteristic of the relationships among the youth themselves. A scale derived from the semantic differences between youth made of the peers shows that the youth of these two programs were far more negative toward their peers than was the case for the other nine residential programs. Of the boys in these two programs, 65 percent and 74 percent compared to an average of 9 percent in the other nine residential programs (range: zero percent to 29 percent) were highly negative toward their peers. Not surprisingly, of all the placements (excluding detention units where the transient nature of the population made friendships difficult to establish), these two programs had the highest proportion of youths indicating that they had no close friend in the unit—33 percent and 25 percent respectively compared to an average of 10 percent in the other programs (range: zero percent to 23 percent). These high levels of mutual distrust and alienation were evident from our observation.

In one of these two least-liked programs there was frequent fighting, and, in the other, intimidation resulted from age differences between sixteen and thirteen year olds had the same consequence. One boy aptly summarized the nature of this dominance with the cold assertion "You respect your elders. Remember that or I'll kick your ass." Relations between youth were, of necessity, constrained in these settings because the potential for conflict was ever present. Thus, when they were asked to advise "Lowest to get along with other kids," youth in these programs typically responded with "be cool" or "don't cause no trouble."

The nature of the population appears to influence the program and manner of control by staff to foster such physical violence and its accompanying distrust and anxiety. A collection of twelve- to seventeen-year-old boys are likely to be a volatile mix to work within any setting because these boys are experiencing transitional chaos in their lives, with all the implications of strength, toughness, and aggression. Although staff were concerned about the problems of these boys, many of them recognized, perhaps grudgingly, that most boys would return to a social setting where pressures were very different. Many of these youth in these two programs spent considerable time in the free community on weekends and on individual passes and sign-outs during the week. As a consequence, it was difficult for staff in these programs to draw a sharp line between those behaviors and attitudes that were possible by permission of the staff or on the streets and those that were tolerable in the program. The staff in one of these programs were clearly concerned about community standards of masculinity in their discussion of one boy whose high intelligence was disdained by the staff in the program. The student, together with the sharply divided staff responsibilities and large staff size, reduced communication among staff in these cases, making it more difficult to coordinate supervision and control of youth by staff members. Boys could and did play one staff member off against another under the circumstances.

"But John says I don't have to go . . ."

The high levels of freedom and choice given to the youth in these two least-liked programs appeared to increase the problem of controlling relationships among boys. Staff allowed the boys choice about when and how they could become involved in group activities; a substantial portion of their time was free. In addition, the boys were given the opportunity and the responsibility to go into the community on their own or with individual supervision. As a consequence of this freedom as well as the large size, it was impossible for staff to keep close tabs on everyone all the time—whether or not the youth were relatively confined. Staff members would sometimes move from one unstructured program to another in a week. The only four of the seven larger programs.
one pair of boys to another only to find trouble breaking out elsewhere. Only in these two programs did we observe serious relations among boys or youth in anger. The single incident in each case was inconsistent with the generally positive tenor of relationships between youth and staff, but it was consistent with the emphasis on toughness and aggressive masculinity in these programs.

In contrast, the two small boys' programs with slightly smaller youth populations maintained much closer watch on its residents by requiring universal participation in group activities, by drastically limiting the free time allowed each boy, and by preventing any individual community contact. Staff members also stepped in to prevent even the preliminaries of a fight: such as slapping or playfully wrestling and refused to engage in time with the two boys' small programs.

The differences in the nature of peer relationships in these two programs for girls were clearly, however, in the varying amount of pressure exerted by peers to run away and to drink or use drugs. In the more structured and closely supervised program, such pressures were not evident and runs were far more infrequent. But in the less structured and less well-liked program the pressures were great, with the result that runs were frequent and typically involved two or more girls out for these runs to take place on Friday or Saturday nights so that girls could attend parties in a nearby town. Almost inevitably the girls returned from such events drunk from alcohol or "stoned" from drugs. In the less liked boys' programs, one had sensed that many boys wanted to externalize their own physical aggressiveness because they could not advocate or impose their own limits without losing face. Similarly, in the less liked girls' program one could see that the girls faced a dilemma of running away, drinking, and using drugs. Many did not want to do these things, but they could not afford not to do them if they were to maintain standing with their peers. The staff willingness to forgive and forget reinforced this run to such girls a mixed blessing, because it prevented the establishment of clear external limits.

On the one hand, therefore, the girls lauded the freedom and the supportiveness of the staff in describing what they liked about the program: for example, one girl claimed, "I wouldn't like to be free somewhere here with freedom here alone at home. They still trust me even when I fill [another resident] told everything you can get away with." On the other hand, the girls seemed to push this freedom in the hope of having limits placed on them.

The degree of staff control over youth relationships in these two large girls' programs was, as in the large boys' programs, mainly as function of staff coordination and the level of the girls. Considerable coordination among staff was achieved through the regular forum for communication about youth and program policy, the staff in this program exhibited the lowest level of conflict of any of the programs. It was much more difficult for youth to manipulate staff under these circumstances than in the less liked large girls' program where staff ranked second among the 13 programs on the scale of staff conflict.

Despite differences between "constructive" and "non-constructive" boys or girls, the degree of control over youth relationships was generally high in both boys' and girls' programs. In one of these programs, for example, several youth who either took some pills or failed to report the taking of them to staff had their food shaved (the boys) or had to wear signs around their necks (the girls). In another program, a boy who was caught trying to look at the girls' shower room was subjected to a confrontation with the girls: "Billy did really break down at the encounter with the women. A staff member ran it, and the woman 'hit below the belt,' as Catherine [an other staff member] put it, insulting him into reservations and talking down in sobs. He talked to Catherine about it after that his problems with girls, his insecurity, his great fear of rejection. 'I just didn't get them. I've probably had more rejection than any youth in the program.' One of these programs was described by a girl as being the most "constructive" criticism more than hostile encounters. While this difference in style was the product of different
staff orientation, training, and experience, it may also have reflected the size difference in the programs as well. There were more than 10 residents compared to 30 to 60 in the more intense programs. Greater intensity may be required in larger programs if staff are to maintain the same degree of therapeutic involvement, control, and supervision over relationships among youths as is possible in smaller and milder programs. The better-structured "program group" programs ran the daily routine was far less structured, and more contact with members of the community was allowed than in the more intense group programs. In this generally more relaxed atmosphere, youths complained about boredom and the lack of program activities. This lack of structured activity, however, also made it possible for several residents of each small program to go to school or work at outside jobs and for other youths to hang out on their own to see friends in the community. The difference between the heavily structured and the less structured group programs is illustrated by the differing responses of staff to a hypothetical program participant who wants to take a trade school course out in the community. In the two less structured programs 88 percent and 100 percent of the staff endorsed Brown's plan, but in the two highly structured programs only 50 percent and 45 percent did.

Nonresidential Program Environments

The quality of life in nonresidential programs has a different meaning than it does in residential programs because of the vastly different amounts of contact among the program participants. In nonresidential programs, peer relationships are less likely to be of overriding importance in determining the attractiveness of a program for a youth because peer contact is more limited than in most residential programs; it is one thing to go fishing for a few hours a week with someone you do not like but quite another to live with him for several years. However, the activities in nonresidential programs take on greater importance than in residential programs because they may come to replace the activities of the "street." Thus, when 88 percent of the youth in one nonresidential program give high ratings on the program; parents and the scale (a) is 61 percent in the other, it appears to reflect the greater attractiveness of the activities rather than better peer relationships.

The participants in the better-structured nonresidential program were, in fact, far less positive toward their peers than they did toward the program. In the better-structured programs, 38 percent compared to 23 percent were highly negative toward their peers on the more structured scale. As opposed to 31 percent felt that some kids "really push others around." The male composition and considerable range in age and experience of the participants in the nevertheless better-structured nonresidential program account in part for the relatively negative evaluation of peers; the older and bigger boys tended to dominate and intimidate the younger and smaller youth. The less-structured program was coeducational and evidenced little of this "malevolent" aggressiveness.

On the other hand, the all-male population may have allowed the staff in the better-structured program to specialize in placating the more particular interest to boys. Finding appealing coeducational activities in the other nonresidential program was difficult.

Putting up with some disliked peers for a few hours was fairly easy in the better-structured nonresidential program because the staff arranged a number of activities--generally, playing on a boat, going fishing or boating, and building bicycles--which were attractive and otherwise unavailable to boys. Staff in the less-structured programs, however, were harder pressed to come up with attractive activities appealing to all boys. This especially was true for several weeks later in the program when more community resources were available to them. Exacerbating this difficulty was the broad flexibility of the self-motivated participants and not which staff allowed the youth. Several meetings to involve youth in planning activities were attempted in the less-structured program but with little success, and when the staff compared it to the community, they frequently found that few youth showed up, forcing cancellation or change of plans. In the better-structured program, youth were picked up by prearrangement and taken to activities planned by the staff; this procedure allowed for greater certainty in planning but less initiative on the part of the youth.

Summary of Factors Contributing to a Homene Environment

The preceding analysis of the degree to which youth programs achieve the goal of a "homene environment" (as indexed by the expressed preferences of youth for the program) identifies a number of organizational factors that appear to increase youth satisfaction with their program experience. Before listing those conditions, we should note that the programs we studied and analyzed are probably all at the high end of a scale measuring "homene living environments." In none of the 13 programs we observed was there any evidence of physical brutality by staff; living conditions, though varied, were generally clean and the food was at least adequate and often good; most staff were extremely knowledgeable and worked hard to help them although they chose to do so in differing ways. These conditions must, thus, be assumed in addition to the following.

1. There must be sufficient staff supervision over youth relationships to prevent peer pressures toward physical aggression, running away, and drug and alcohol use. This supervision seems to be a constant in a number of programs.

2. By having small programs (about 10 participants) in homelike surroundings.

b) By organizing large programs (over 20 participants) so that they have a full schedule of supervised and mandatory group activities that may be educational, recreational, or therapeutic in nature.

Some of the more disturbing peer pressures may be moderated by having coeducational programs. Masculine and feminine identities can then be affirmed in day-to-day interaction with members of the other sex rather than through exclusive aggressiveness on the part of the boys or the running away of the girls. A number of indirect measures of rehabilitation are available and lead us to an interesting and useful analysis.

Relation between Youth and Staff

The most significant indicator of progress for staff in training or rehabilitation is whether the youth think or not the staff members has a "good relationship" with the youth as indicated by the youth's willingness to "open up," and talk with him about problems and feelings. One plausible indication that "rehabilitation" is or is not taking place in a program can thus be gauged from the perception by youth of the staff and of youth-staff relations. In the youth interview we asked "Is there someone on the staff with whom you can talk about your problems?" Most youth in all programs had such relationships: from 62 percent to 100 percent answered yes to our question. In the five programs with the lowest percentage (range: 62 percent to 75 percent) include the two nonresidential programs where irregular and fleeting contact between staff and youths answering this question had no involvement with the attractive staff. She had, however, arrived only five days previously and had not had time to establish close ties with a counselor. The proportion of youth indicating a close counseling relationship with at least one staff member was higher in the other eight programs (range: 81 percent to 100 percent). Of these eight programs, four had group therapy sessions, which exposed youth to most or all of the staff members and gave them considerable chances to select a trusted confident. The four remaining programs were all fairly large, with over 15 staff members in each program. In each of these programs the contact placed between youth and a variety of staff in different informal contexts; thus again it was possible for youth to find worthy confidants from these large organizations.
pool. One problem with such an approach, however, is that it may overlook a load of staff to leave out more recidivist youth. Two of these programs therefore instituted similar and administratively changes during our observation:

In youth was now formally assigned a staff member for counseling purposes. This had been done informally before, but it was usually the youths who sought out a sympathetic staff member. In this setting neither general trust of staff nor the highest frequency of confidential youth-staff relationships were fostered. The sixth program was an apparent anomaly because it was a small open group therapy program in which 87 percent of the residents felt they had confidants among the staff. Nevertheless only 62 percent of the youth had general faith in the trustworthiness of the staff as a whole. It was probably the lack of interaction among staff and youth over changes in staff leadership during our observation that caused the relatively low level of trust.

The other three residential group homes—all group therapy programs showed high levels of youth trust of staff (range: 82 percent to 100 percent). So also did both detention centers and both nonresidential programs (range: 83 percent to 100 percent). These three of these detention and nonresidential programs were among the lowest in the frequency of close relationship between staff and youth.

By contrast, the high standing of the nonresidential and detention programs in the general level of trust of staff makes clear that relationships of trust or respect between staff and youth need not involve revelations of personal secrets or problems. They may indeed be a product of the warmth of the staff and their ability to handle the youth in a meaningful way—as youth advocates, for example, in conflicts with school, family, and court; and nonresidential programs and in the relationship to techniques of social control.

Using a number of questionnaire items, we developed a scale measuring youth approval of the idea of informing or "dime-dropping," on peers. From zero percent to 46 percent of the youth in the 13 programs highly approved of informing. This huge variation is a function of two very different factors, both of which relate to the nature of the control within the program. Where staff do not exert pressure on group members to confront one another about rule violations and where little likelihood of interpersonal exploitation among youth exists to make informing a requisite for self-protection, anti-"talking" sentiment is strong.

One characteristic of the youth-staff relationships among the program was the large number of the youth who had at least one staff member who was particularly trusted. Analysis of variations in the general level of trust of staff makes clear that relationships or respect between staff and youth in these six programs advanced for agreeing or disagreeing with the action of an imaginary Dooley who refused to tell staff the name of the person who attacked him with a knife. For some youths in these programs Dooley's refusal was justifiable because "If he dimes [tells], the other kid will have to go to court." For others Dooley's refusal was foolishly because of the danger of a further incident: "I'd tell on him—he might come back and try to cut me again." Peer pressure to inform is strong in youth who are remote fear that informing would bring violent reprisals or contempt from one's peers is weighed in these programs against the need to protect oneself from other youth or from staff anger at complicity in rule violation.

Finally, the three programs where most support exists for informing (range: 61 percent to 96 percent) are, like those with the most resistance to it, staff intensive, and in which there are also programs with much staff pressure to confront other youths with their wrongdoing. These are the three programs with the highest proportion in which youth are most isolated from contact with the community. Because of the pattern of rewards and punishments distributed by staff and peers, self-interest in these programs dictates against informing.

There are few if any rewards for keeping silent and many sanctions for not doing so. For example, in one program, for example, two male inmates broke into a locked medicine cabinet late at night and stole some pills which they used to get high. When the staff later learned of the incident:

Staff gave them both a haircut [literally] for breaking their trust with the house. Phil also got one because he said they got the pills without the nuns' permission.

The anti-informing scale was construed by summing the several responses to three short form anti-informing programs for youth which asked youths to rate whether they approved or disapproved of the action of an imaginary youth in a particular situation. Respondents were asked to approve or disapprove of the actions of Dooley who refuses to tell staff the name of the person who attacked him with a knife. For others Dooley's refusal was justifiable because "If he dimes [tells], the other kid will have to go to court." For others Dooley's refusal was foolishly because of the danger of a further incident: "I'd tell on him—he might come back and try to cut me again." Peer pressure to inform is strong in youth who are remote fear that informing would bring violent reprisals or contempt from one's peers is weighed in these programs against the need to protect oneself from other youth or from staff anger at complicity in rule violation.

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of such a prohibition is illustrated by an incident that generated major concern in one program. One boy threw an ice cube at another boy in anger and, as a consequence, provoked the moral outrage of the staff and several other youths in an immediate group environment. Earlier we indicated that this firm regulation of violence was reinforced by the processes of selection and removal which needed youth who seemed unable to contain or channel their aggression.

Several other values or attitudes of the youths in these three fairly isolated group programs differed from the views expressed by youth in all the other programs. For example, the attitude toward privacy was distinctive in the three isolated group programs. On a scale measuring the degree of youth support for the idea that personal problems were private, only zero to 15 percent of the youths in three of these programs endorsed the idea of privacy compared to 43 percent to 88 percent in the other ten programs. On the other hand, at least 40 percent of the youths in all the programs displayed their willingness to share personal information. Youth who throw ice cubes at others may not be so willing.

Finally, the youths in these isolated group treatment programs stand apart, not only by much, from the youths in the other 10 programs by their implicit acceptance of responsibility for their plight. This sense of personal responsibility is exhibited by disagreement with the following statement: "I don't have to change myself so much, what I mostly need is for people to stop hassling me and give me a chance." From 10 percent to 89 percent of the youths in the various programs disagreed with this statement. In the three isolated group programs 65, 75 and 89 percent disagreed, and 68 percent disagreed in the one nonisolated group treatment program. In two other programs—one the only large program with highly differentiated staff that heavily emphasized individual psychological treatment and the other the small girls' detention facility which did the same thing—disagreement was at least what less common—56 percent and 60 percent respectively. In the remaining programs, none of which were heavily psychologically inclined or group therapy approaches, disagreement ranged from only 10 percent to 38 percent. The staff in all the programs with a fairly well developed psychological approach emphasized that everybody had problems that could benefit from individual or group discussion. Staff pressure to be introspective and find problems galvanized many of these programs to at least a short-term effect on self-conception particularly in programs using group treatment approaches.

A further question arises from this analysis of differences in attitudes and values among the members of the 13 DYS youth in the various programs. In the three programs that provided the worst living conditions, the youths were less likely to have been involved in criminal activities or at least to have been charged with only a week to start. At the extreme, that choice provided a regular "congregation." Going on an outing to a beach meant selecting the location with the fewest beer drinkers and pot smokers. In one program runs were frequent on nights when parties were being given in nearby towns. From the perspective of the staff in some programs, this reduction in the open community was simply too great to risk if values were to be challenged and overcome. From the perspective of others, however, this was the reality of community life with which youth had to learn to cope on a day-to-day basis without getting into trouble. When the choice of isolation was made, community contact was sacrificed in order to make it possible to control all relationships in which programs (or staff) could become involved. The three "isolated" group programs had made that choice. At the extreme, that meant little or no supervised individual contact with people outside the program. In one isolated group program, mail and phone calls were censored. That came with parents or girlfriends could have "negative" effects on a resident is illustrated by the case of a boy in another program who had gotten permission to talk by telephone with a girlfriend. Learning of some problems she was having, he learned to say that he was going to make efficient operation of the system of re retribution and punishments that creates the changes in others. Second, staff may try to cut off any "bad" influences coming from outside the program.

As the contacts between youth and community increase, the control of staff over the whole range of re are relaxed and staff become more sensitive to the behavior of youth in their programs. The staff run the risk of losing the trust or respect of youth by pushing them too hard to reject beliefs or practices for which the youth receive support elsewhere. To some degree, staff in such circumstances may place their trust in youth rather than vice versa. Thus staff must repeatedly decide when intervention is worth the risk of alienating youth. In general there is less leverage available to staff to bring about value changes when youth are firmly embedded in community relationships than when youth are isolated from the community. The fact is also illustrated by the one group therapy program, which encouraged free movement of its residents in and out of the community. Such an arrangement not only made possible unsupervised relationships outside of the program but made it more difficult to structure and guide internal relationships. In large part, the openness of this program explains the difference between the attitudes of its youth and those of youth in the other three isolated group therapy programs on the privacy and anti-informing scales.

Not all contacts with the free
community bring youth under pressure to behave or believe in ways inconsistent with those of the program staff. In the one small, relatively isolated residential program we carefully planned and supervised community contact was allowed; three students attended classes at a local high school and a fourth at a trade school, but all were expected to be absent from the program only for the duration of the classes. Another reason for an unstructured pace and lack of schedule was also checked. Even visits home were circumscribed by conditions limiting who the youth could see and where he could go; acceptance of these conditions by the youth and his parents was required before permission for the visit was granted. We saw instances of this kind of supervised contact in other programs too. In a fairly isolated, individual therapy program, dates were allowed for some residents, for example, but only after the prospective escort had visited the program and talked with the staff.

The preceding analysis should make clear that from the perspective of achieving the goal of short-term value change, the decisions that staff make about the degree and kind of community contact to allow their members are vital ones. Limited contact appears to facilitate change, but one might argue that the permanence of value changes is limited if it occur in a too closely controlled context where competing influences are not allowed. Values and attitudes necessarily expressed in the context of a program that controls all relationships may not be applied in different contexts where other powerful rewards and punishments operate. The short-term model of change in value systems depends upon the frequent exposure of youth to a variety of staff. These conditions were most likely to be met in large residential programs where youth had many staff to choose from and in residential programs using group therapy techniques which allowed youth to get to know all the staff members well.

3. Short-term change of attitudes and values appears to be facilitated by isolation of youth from the community, the use of group therapy techniques, and, in large programs, a heavily structured routine of activities.

4. Short-term efforts by program staff to provide education and training to youth seem to require considerable program size and differentiation among staff members.

A number of conflicts among the short-term goals and between some of those goals and organizational factors also become clearer in this analysis:

1. Education and group treatment orientations seem to be in conflict.

2. Value change is inconsistent with allowing youth considerable freedom of choice and association within and outside programs.

Reintegration as a Short-Term Goal

As defined at the beginning of the report, reintegration as a short-term strategy or goal involves the adjustment or formation of relationships between youth in a program and community members. The ultimate aim of short-term success in reintegration is the proportion of the program population that has some regular contact with members of the community. Obviously community contact is not the same as reintegration, but it is an essential step if reintegration is to occur. Because of the nature of our role as observers within the program, however, we were not observers of all community contact; in fact, we were most aware of group rather than individual exposure to the community. Group activities were almost universally recreational, and, under such circumstances, interaction between youth and community members was usually minimal. When it did occur, it was typically along the lines of male-female relationships. In the treatment and coming and going of staff and youth and listening to them talk of their activities, we learned something about their individual community contacts as well.

The two programs with the lowest level of contact between youth and community were the two detention units. Contact in both instances was largely confined to closely supervised recreational activities such as trips to a movie or public museum. The efforts in these programs, however, were not directed solely toward providing a benign program environment and limited effective efforts at these contacts. In both programs, the lack of opportunities to train the youth in community roles tended to be detrimental. In both programs the adults were high on the list of male-female relationships. In the first program almost all youth and community members were female, while the second program was male-female contact was the norm. The staff in these programs did try to get youth to identify with local community, but they tended not to be fully successful in their efforts.

In one program the staff were most successful at making the youth feel a part of the program. This was achieved through a variety of contacts with both the school and community staff. The program devoted considerable effort to organizing groups in the community for adult participation in the educational process. This was successful to the extent that a number of adults participated in the educational sessions.

In the small group therapy program, the program devoted considerable effort to preparing youth for their future. This was achieved through a variety of contacts with both the school and community staff. The program devoted considerable effort to organizing groups in the community for adult participation in the educational process. This was successful to the extent that a number of adults participated in the educational sessions.

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Policy Implications of the Subcultures

The preceding analysis makes clear some of the dilemmas faced by correctional administrators and practitioners. In this report we have identified major conflicts between: (1) allowing youth in large programs freedom of movement and choice in activities and effectively controlling relations among them; (2) allowing youth freedom to maintain community contacts and bringing about changes in the values of youth; (3) closely supervising relations among program participants and reintegrating individual youth into the community; and (4) isolating youth from community contacts and reintegrating them into the community. Because of these conflicts, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for any one correctional program to achieve simultaneously and fully the short-term correctional goals of a humane program environment, re habilitation, and reintegration. The organizational techniques most appropriate for achieving one of these sets of goals often make it more difficult to achieve the others. In the context of these conflicts and the inevitability of some short-term failures within programs, people who work with youth in trouble must make operational choices about individual programs and the system of programs as a whole.

In the introduction to this report we noted that the data of the subculture study are particularly relevant to four areas of operational decision making. First, correctional workers are faced with the question of whether some kinds of short-term failures are acceptable. For the people working in individual programs these choices are very real because they must decide in what areas to maximize success and in which ones to tolerate "failure." Program personnel are likely, however, to be most committed and effective when they have chosen to emphasize short-term goals and program techniques with which they are comfortable. Yet some may be plagued by a sense of inadequacy because they are not "doing more." While the data reported here cannot make these choices for practitioners, they may help increase their awareness of the necessity of trade-offs involved in these decisions about goals and means. For the administrator concerned with a system of programs, the problem of choice may be less acute. Rather than choosing one particular set of goals and techniques to emphasize, such an administrator may instead try to ensure that available programs offer a variety of techniques and emphases. Clearly, some programs may not have suffered successes to outweigh their failures, and decisions must be made to reorganize or eliminate such programs.

Second, both practitioners and administrators may be faced with more detailed, tactical decisions while trying to maximize success in achieving any particular short-term goal. A number of conditions for attaining specific goals have been tentatively identified in this report and summarized at the conclusion of each section. Generally, these conditions make clear that decisions about whether a program will be residential or nonresidential, how many participants it will have, the ages and sex of those participants will be, how the staff will be organized, and what ideology should guide the staff are important factors in differentiating the degree of program success in achieving the various short-term goals. Unfortunately, because of the small numbers of programs which we have analyzed, it is not possible always to untangle all these variables from one another. Thus, for example, it is not clear that reducing the size of a large, unstructured boys' program with highly differentiated staff would by itself reduce the amount of fighting among residents. Our data do not allow us to conclude precisely which changes will have the greatest impact on the achievement of a particular goal. Nevertheless, the data do identify important sets of variables that might be manipulated to achieve particular results with youth.

A third major task for administrators, as noted above, is to diversify and balance the set of programs providing service within a correctional system. When one looks at the system as a whole rather than concentrating on the individual programs which compose it, resolution of many of the program and policy conflicts becomes possible. While no one program can do everything, an entire system of programs could accomplish a variety of goals at the same time. Youth with multiple needs that no one program can meet may be provided services by moving them through two or more programs either simultaneously or in sequence. For example, a youth in a close staff isolated therapeutic program might later be moved into a nonresidential program to ease the transition back to a open community or to a program emphasizing education and training rather than psychological therapy. One danger of a policy of sequencing should be anticipated. It could serve to increase the time during which the correctional system has jurisdiction over youth by subjecting them to a lengthy series of programs. Clearly such an unbalanced sequencing policy could be very expensive in both human and monetary terms. Fourthly, both system administrators and practitioners are faced with deciding which youth should go to which program. In one sense our data have provided little help in identifying what types of youth are most suited to particular kinds of programs. The individual characteristics for which we have measures simply do not predict which youth will respond best to a particular program. This inability to identify predictor variables may be a consequence of the small sample size and absence of longitudinal data in the subculture study. It also appears, however, that so many idiosyncratic features of youth and programs interact to produce each youth's response that prediction using a standard set of general measures is unlikely to succeed very well. If this is, in fact, the case, the present method of giving youth periods of trial in a program and closely monitoring their adjustment and responsiveness makes more sense than an elaborate system for classification and placement.

The first placement in a program may be guided by a rough identification of the strengths and weaknesses of programs and an analysis of their correspondence to the needs of the individual youth. If the initial placement is not satisfactory, an examination of the situation and characteristics of youth and program which led to the failure could lead to a more knowledgeable second placement. It would also suggest the importance of utilizing detention center personnel to help provide placement advice to the youth since detention provides an initial program experience from which to learn about youth responses. This report may prove helpful in this process by calling attention to some of the features of programs and persons which are important to understand in making placement recommendations.

This report has examined short-term correctional objectives, methods of achieving these goals, and conflicts among them. It has only touched on the question of long-term successes in achieving humane environments, rehabilitation, and reintegration, and the long-run consequences of adjusting youth will be one of the important problems for subsequent analysis.
Since 1972 the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services has operated a service delivery system without the backup of the traditional training schools. This new approach has created a fairly extensive community-based system that relies for the most part on the private sector to provide a range of services for youth in trouble. Those services are purchased and monitored by the department. That youthful offenders in the care of DYS are more widely dispersed across the state and exposed to a wider range of program alternatives is obvious. However, the questions about the impact of the new system on youth in the program and after they leave the system are largely unanswered.

In the years since 1970, when the Center for Criminal Justice at Harvard Law School first began its extensive studies of the reform efforts, a wealth of material has been collected on the experiences of youth in different group settings. Comparative subculture studies have involved observation and interviewing of youth under the old and new systems. Cross-sectional surveys of the major programs used by the department have been conducted periodically to furnish an overview of the variation in social climate among different programs, the diversity of program strategies across the system, and assessments by youth of what is happening to them within the programs. In addition to these efforts, the Center has undertaken a major longitudinal study of the new system since 1973. Youth are interviewed at a number of points as they are processed through the system until they have been in the community for six months. This longitudinal study provides data for evaluating the immediate and long-run impact of the programs. It focuses especially on the changing relationships between youngsters and significant others such as parents, employers, police, and program staff; on changes in the self-image of youth; and on the ability of programs to link youth with positive, supportive opportunities in the community. In later analyses the subculture, cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies will be merged to provide a comprehensive account of youth in the new programs.

In this report we will present the most recent data available on recidivism to allow at least a partial comparison between the recidivism rates of the old training school system in the late 1960s and the new community-based system of the 1970s. This will be followed by a more detailed analysis of completed longitudinal data gathered on the youth cohort over the past two years.
Recidivism Based on Official Record Checks

In this section we will present some preliminary comparisons of official records for a sample of youth paroled during the fiscal year 1967-68 with youth in the first four regions sampled during the 1973-74 longitudinal study.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has a centralized criminal record system administered by the Department of Probation. A single record will indicate both juvenile and adult court appearances and dispositions. Access to such a centralized record system is a great asset to evaluation research, but like most official record systems in constant daily use for making individual decisions it also poses special problems. The value of the system depends on the recording of essential data by each of 72 juvenile courts in the state, and it is subject to any errors arising from lack of uniformity or completeness in court reporting to the central file.

In addition, the centralized system is not yet computerized, and the sheer volume of the records makes human error likely. We discovered several cases of youth in our samples for whom no records could be found, and other youth in DYS at a particular time who had no record of a court appearance prior to their entry into DYS for a six-to-twelve-month period. Also, our comparison of two samples six years apart is potentially biased by any significant change in reporting or recording procedures used by the courts or the Department of Probation over that period. Even with these reservations, however, it is clear that the centralized system will yield the best estimates of criminal history available.

The 1968 sample constitutes a representative sample of 308 youth paroled from the DYS institutions between July 1, 1967 and June 30, 1968. The sample includes 72 girls from the Lancaster School for Girls, 25 boys from the forestry program, 27 boys from Oakdale (an institution for young boys), 39 boys from the Lyman School for Boys, 102 boys from the Shirley Industrial School for Boys, and 43 boys from the Bridgewater Institute for Juvenile Guidance. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of this sample by paroling institution and region to which paroled.

The 1974 sample is made up of those youth included in the longitudinal cohort study. For comparison purposes we can only use those regions that were completed first in our study: i.e., those regions where the youth have been released to the community from treatment programs for a long enough period of exposure to allow for official recording of new delinquent activity. The sample consists of 48 youth from Region I, 61 from Region II, 49 from Region III, and 50 from Region IV. Regions V, VI, and VII are not represented because not enough time has passed to allow for a six-month official record check for any sizable proportion of the samples in those regions.

Figure 4.1 gives a schematic view of the location of the regions throughout the state. Region I consists of the western part of the state, with the Springfield area being its most populous center. Region II is composed of the middle of the state, including the Worcester area. Region III includes Cambridge and Somerville and extends northward and westward, including such towns as

Table 4.1
Distribution of 1968 Sample of Boys, by Region and Institution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Region I</th>
<th>Region II</th>
<th>Region III</th>
<th>Region IV</th>
<th>Region V</th>
<th>Region VI</th>
<th>Region VII</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakdale</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgewater</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reappeared in juvenile or adult court on any charge excluding traffic offenses, reappeared in court for a delinquent or criminal offense, excluding traffic offenses, will thus be treated as an index of recidivism. Second, we will look at the disposition by the court. Youth who are either placed on probation or committed to the Department of Youth Services or an adult institution will be classified as recidivists. The latter index, while more consecutive than the former, is probably a better estimate of the number of youth who continue to engage in the unlawful behavior that the courts respond to by restricting the freedom of the offenders. Six-month and twelve-month periods of time will be considered.

For the 1968 sample, the period will begin from the date of parole; for the 1974 sample, the period begins when a youngster completes a residential program and is released to the community, or after he has been in a foster home or nonresidential program in the community for three months. Rates for boys and girls will be analyzed separately.

Table 4.2 records the number of youths reappearing by institution in the 1968 sample. Using the criterion of reapparance in court during the initial six-month period, the Forestry and Oakdale youth reappear at a slower rate than do youths from the other institutions. Bridgewater has the highest rate. A similar pattern of court reapparance is obtained during the initial 12 months, with the exception that the number of forestry program youth reappearing nearly doubles, making their record more like that of the youth from Shirley and Lyman than the youth from Oakdale. When we examine the disposition index—those placed on probation or recommitted to either DYS or adult institutions—the pattern remains the same for the six-month period, with Oakdale and Forestry youth less likely to reappear and Bridgewater youths most likely. In this case, however, the Oakdale and Forestry rates remain similar for the six-month period as well. Table 4.3 contains court appearance and disposition data for boys in the 1968 and 1974 samples. The data are subdivided by region in order to permit comparisons. These data suggest that the reform efforts have had a differential impact on recidivism across the regions. During the initial six months, rates of reapparance in court are about the same or lower for boys in Regions I, II, and IV in the 1974 sample as compared to the 1968 sample. In Region III the rate was lower in 1968 than in 1974. For the twelve-month period, the rate is similar in both samples for Regions I and II, slightly higher for Region III in 1974, and substantially higher for Region IV in 1974.

Turning to the disposition index in Table 4.3, the probation and commitment rates for Region I remain very similar in the two samples while Region II shows a considerable drop from 1968 to 1974 as measured by both the six-month and twelve-month periods. In contrast, Regions III and IV indicate a substantial increase in recidivism rates from 1968 to 1974 for both exposure periods. We would project, on the basis of our unofficial recidivism data, gathered by following youth in the longitudinal sample, that Region V and VI will also experience an increase from 1968 to 1974 while Region VII will show a decrease. We are not yet, however, in a position to determine what the relative size of these differences is likely to be when the full comparisons of official record data for the 1968 and 1974 samples are available. It is also too early to tell what factors may account for these increases or decreases in recidivism rates between 1968 and 1974. Before one can attribute these differences to the effect of changes in the DYS system, a number of other factors may have a potential impact on these rates and must be considered. For example, there were substantial increases in juvenile arrest rates in the intervening period. The likelihood of recidivism may have been affected by the same factors that influenced these arrest rates. Density populated areas, such as Regions III, IV, V, and VI, may have experienced a sharper increase in crime rates than less densely populated areas. Other criminal justice agencies may also have significantly altered their policies or resources for handling juvenile crime. Furthermore, changes in the characteristics of youth committed to DYS may have greatly influenced the rates. Further analysis of the recidivism data on boys must therefore await the availability of the additional information that will permit such factors to be taken into account.

Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recidivism Rates for Boys in the 1968 Sample, by Institution.</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reappearance in court</td>
<td>Oakdale Forestry (2%)</td>
<td>Lyman (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation or recommitment</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reappearance in court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 12 months |
| 1974 | 74 (39) (71) (35) (53) (38) (71) (38) (68) (150) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probation or recommitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 12 months |
| 1968 | 40 (37) (67) (39) (24) (33) (36) (33) (42) (14) |
| 1974 | 41 (39) (43) (35) (37) (38) (42) (38) (41) (250) |
boys. Only 17 percent of the total sample of girls in 1968 reappeared in court during the first six months after parole and 24 percent during the initial 12 months. Similarly, only eight percent of this sample was picked up during the most critical six-month period.

The goals of these interviews and on individual background, current the rates are serious offenses than they were a These data were collected during the girls in this group were then interviewed again prior to the Department of Youth Services in the longitudinal, or cohort, analysis. Smith, Lyman, and the child welfare system was the cohort interview, and their records checked at this point, as were the youth who were committed and referred and who had gone through the DYS programs.

Youth who were either committed or referred to DYS were then interviewed at this stage of the longitudinal data. The interview at this stage dealt with the court and detention experiences and, again, relationships, aspirations, and self-image. It was supplemented by information from DYS staff and by official records of court appearances and dispositional outcomes.

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two days in detention were inter­
viewed, and all youth committed or
referred to the program were then
followed through the complete
sequence of interviewing. This pro­
cess was continued until we reached
the point of having approximately
70 committed or referred youth
in each region, and twice that number
in the very populous region. The
70 committed or referred youth
from each region were the con­
tribution of a set of regions to the
projected sample of 400 committed
or referred youth across the states
for the cohort, allowing for attrition
of the sample over time. Thus the
youth constituting the contribution
of a set of regions to the comparison
sample were youth not committed
or referred but going through deten­
tion were represented by 12 such youth in each region.24 In the very populous region, thus the comparison sample for the entire state
will reach approximately 80 after
attrition. The result of all this will yield
samples of predetermined size of
committed or referred youth and of
commitment youth, plus a very large
sample of detained youth who were
not followed up because they did not
continue under the care of the
department. These detained youth
must be interviewed because we cannot
predict which detained youth will
continue and become part of the sample of committed or referred youth. As a side benefit we will know a great deal about young who are
detained but then not placed under the
care of the department.

Since the longitudinal study is still
incarnate, the results presented here must be regarded as preliminary and tentative. Data are available, however, for a large number
of cases on the entire process from
detention to post-program experiences
in the community, and we can begin to address five basic issues: (1) the factors affecting the detention decision; (2) the factors affecting initial program placement
within DYS; (3) the immediate effects of program experiences; (4) how program experiences and other factors relate to longer run,
post-program experiences; and (5) the impact that decisions made early in the process have on deci­
sions made at later stages.

Given the overall rationale of the
DYS reform effort to develop a
more humane and more effective
way to facilitate youth reintegration
into the community, relationships
provide the key concepts around
which the longitudinal study revol­
tues. It is assumed that any suc­
cessful attempt to make the correc­
tional process more humane must involve altering relationships between staff and youth and be­
 tween the youth themselves. For
example, the early reform effort
sought to inform youth more ade­
quately about what was happening
to them as they moved through the
“treatment process,” and to involve them more fully in decisions about
their future. The nature of punish­
ment and rewards for good or bad
behavior were also altered, de­
emphasis of physical punishment
and involving youth to a greater
certain in rewarding others for good
behavior. The longitudinal study
provides data on these changes in
relationships.

Facilitating reintegration depends in part on shaping relationships between youth and significant adults such
as parents, schoolteachers, employers, and police. Here also, the longitudinal study focuses on task-oriented relationships con­
cerning information flow, decision­
making, punishment, and rewards.
As discussed at greater length in
an earlier chapter of this volume,
the focus on relationships also en­
sures us to assess the degree to which
programs are actually based in the
community. The field of corrections
has been characterized by confusion
over the definitions and conceptuali­
ation of community-based pro­
game. It is common to hear the
term used to identify any alterna­
tive to institutional confinement,
but it is clear that a group home can be
as isolated from the larger com­
community as a large prison or training
school. The words community based focus attention on the nature of the
links between programs and the
community. A key set of variables
differentiates among programs on
the basis of the extent and quality of
relationships between staff and
clients, on the one hand, and the
community in which the program is
located on the other. If clients come
from outside the community in
which the program itself is located relationships need to be considered with both the community in which the
program is located and the home
community to which the client will
return.

The nature of these client and
staff relationships with the com­
mitment provides a continuum of
services ranging from the least
to the most community based. As
the frequency, duration, and quality of
community relationships increase
the program is categorized as more
community based. The range ex­

dents from an isolated institutional
environment to residential or non­
residential programs where relation­
ships with the community are
essentially normalized—where youth have access to the full array of
resources available in the larger
community. This continuum of
variable dimensions of community
relationships adds more realism to
the concept of community correc­
tions. Because of the varying needs
of specific offenders and commu­
nities no system can afford to have
all of its programs lodged at either
doors of the continuum.

The longitudinal data, while per­
mitting discrimination among pro­
grams in terms of community link­
dge, do not by themselves provide
the most comprehensive basis for
making that assessment. We can,
however, make rough distinctions
sufficient for this preliminary analy­
sis. As the cross-sectional program
data survey are completed and
merged with the longitudinal data
we will be in a better position to
address the issue of community
linkage.

The long-run impact of the new
system is measured in the longitu­
dinal study by looking at the kinds of
relationships youth have with other
significant persons six months after
their principal experience with DYS.
Such relationships should pro­
vide a partial explanation of why
some youth recidivate and others
do not. Recidivism will also be ana­
lyzed by considering the influ­
cence of the characteristics of youth
and the types of programs they
experienced in DYS.

The emphasis on relationships among significant actors in the
system highlights another major
concern of the longitudinal study.
That is, how are youth perceived by
decision makers and how do these
perceptions affect their immediate
decisions? What effect do these early
decisions have on later decisions as
the youth proceed further into the
juvenile justice system? In other
words, to what extent are decision
makers influenced by the labeling
effect of prior official actions rather
than by personal characteristics,
needs, conduct, or circumstances of
youth?

From Detention to the Community:
Analyzing the Cohort Data

This report presents data on youth
who have been administered the full
set of interviews of March 30,
1975. There are a few youth in each
of the regions who have not yet
completed their DYS experience;
Region VI, the last region sampled,
has approximately 10 who are younger
yet not "graduated" and therefore
not in this analysis. Table 4.5 depicts
the number of completed and un­
completed youth by the seven DYS
administrative regions.2 It is ex­
pected that we will follow some of
the remaining youth through the
summer of 1976 since a fairly sub­
stantial number of them stay in
programs for a year or longer.

The completion of the interviewing
sequence marks the beginning of
our record-check follow-up for those
youth invited to participate in the
longitudinal study. We would like a mini­
num of a one-year follow-up on each
youth in that cohort sample, which
means that record checking and data
analysis in general will extend into 1977.

Much of the data analysis in this
chapter has been accomplished by
means of stepwise multiple re­
gression techniques.6 These tech­
niques enable us to predict an in­
dividual’s score on one variable,
called the dependent variable, from

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5 Robert B. Costes, “Community­
based Corrections: Concept, Impact, Dan­
ger” in this volume.

6 Some readers will be surprised that we use these techniques even with dichot­
omean dependent variables. However, it
happens that multiple discriminant function
analysis reduces in the case of a dichotomy
to the multiple regression, and that what
we are actually doing in the case of the
dichotomously defined variables is a multi­
ple regression in a discriminant function
analysis.

---

Table 4.5
Number of Cohort Youth Completed and Remaining to be Interviewed as of March 30, 1975, by Region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number Youth Completed</th>
<th>Number Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 The term region throughout this report, will refer to the regions through
which a youth entered the sample. A given youth may use programs beyond its own
boundaries, but the youth remains the ad­
mulative responsibility of that region.
Regression analysis produces for each dependent variable a number called the regression constant, which is the average value of the dependent variable when all the independent variables equal zero, and a series of numbers called regression coefficients, each of which represents the increase or decrease in the dependent variable when one of the independent variables increases by one unit, without the other independent variables changing at the same time. The regression coefficients are the most important results, for they represent the effect of each independent variable, controlling, or holding constant, all the rest.

In the presentation that follows we will frequently represent these results in tables. Each column of a table will represent the results for a dependent variable. The dependent variable will be indicated at the head of the column, the row labels will be the names of the independent variables, and the numbers in the cells will be the regression coefficients. At the foot of each column we will indicate in addition the regression constant and also the multiple correlation coefficient. The multiple correlation coefficient is a number varying between 0 and 1 that indicates the degree to which the independent variables in combination predict accurately the dependent variable. A value of 0 means that the independent variables are of no help in predicting the dependent variable. A high value means the prediction of the dependent variable is good.

When a variable consists of several unordered categories, like the seven administrative regions of the state in the youth correctional system, we represent each category as a separate variable, scored 1 if a person is in that category, 0 otherwise. Thus a person who was in Region I would have a score of 1 on the Region I dichotomous variable, and a score of 0 on the other region variables.

Consider the following hypothetical results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Placement</th>
<th>Region I</th>
<th>Region II</th>
<th>Region VII</th>
<th>Years of schooling</th>
<th>Regression constant</th>
<th>Multiple correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Notice that Regions I, II, and VII are included and the other regions are omitted. The omission means that the regression coefficients of the omitted regions are not significantly different from 0. The regression constant gives the predicted value of the dependent variable school placement, when a youth has no schooling and is not in Regions I, II, or VII (i.e., scores of 0 on all these variables) or in other words has no schooling and is in Region III, IV, V, or VI. The regression coefficient for years of schooling indicates how much the predicted value for school placement increases for each year of schooling the youth has. The negative regression coefficient for Region VII indicates how much the predicted value for school placement decreases if the youth were in Region VII, compared to what it would be if the youth were in Region III, IV, V, or VI. Similarly the positive regression coefficients for Regions I and II indicates how much the predicted value for school placement would increase if the youth were in Region I or II, compared to Regions III, IV, V, or VI. The higher the predicted value for school placement the more likely the youth will be put into a school placement. The multiple correlation of .76 indicates that the independent variables region and years of schooling predict school placement rather well.

We will indicate the degree of statistical significance of the regression coefficients and the multiple correlation coefficients by asterisks. One asterisk indicates the .05 level, two the .01 level, and three the .001 level.

Thus, the more asterisks, the more significantly the coefficient is different from 0. Within a column representing a particular dependent variable the number of asterisks can be taken as a rough indication of the degree to which an independent variable contributes to the predictability of the dependent variable. The more asterisks the more the variable contributes to predictability.

Detention

Before moving to a discussion of detention decisions, we will present a few selected background characteristics of the youth in the cohort sample. Thirty-five percent of the 372 youths in the completed sample reported that they were committed or referred to the department because they had been charged with property offenses (e.g., breaking and entering and larceny). Twenty-one percent had been charged with stealing cars, 20 percent for juvenile or status offenses (e.g., runaway, stubborn child), 8 percent for property and person offenses (e.g., armed robbery, robbery), 7 percent for criminal attempts against persons (e.g., homicide, rape, assault), 3 percent for drug use, 2 percent for public mischief (e.g., drunkenness, loudness), and 5 percent for other miscellaneous offenses.

Males constitute 83 percent of the sample. They are most likely to be in DYS for stealing cars or for property offenses, while females are more likely to be in DYS for juvenile status offenses. Fourteen percent of the sample are black, 80 percent white, and 2 percent other. Blacks tend to be in DYS for property and person offenses and not for juvenile offenses. On the other hand, being white is strongly and positively correlated with juvenile offenses, somewhat positively related to drug offenses and stealing cars, but negatively correlated with property and person or person offenses. While 82 percent are 16 years of age or over, there is no significant relationship between age and type of offense.

Forty-one percent of the sample attended school regularly prior to being placed in DYS; 12 percent attended infrequently, and 45 percent had dropped out of school. Youth attending school regularly are most likely to be in DYS for juvenile or status offenses. These youth are also somewhat associated with drug offenses and property offenses and status offenses. Women who have dropped out are more likely to be in for stealing cars. Leaving school is also somewhat related to crimes against property and crimes against persons.

Forty-one percent of the sample came from intact families; this is, both natural parents were living together. Thirty-five percent of the 372 youths in the completed sample reported that they were committed or referred to the department because they had been charged with property offenses (e.g., breaking and entering and larceny). Twenty-one percent had been charged with stealing cars, 20 percent for juvenile or status offenses (e.g., runaway, stubborn child), 8 percent for property and person offenses (e.g., armed robbery, robbery), 7 percent for criminal attempts against persons (e.g., homicide, rape, assault), 3 percent for drug use, 2 percent for public mischief (e.g., drunkenness, loudness), and 5 percent for other miscellaneous offenses.

Further, since this is not a study of the actual court proceeding, we are unable to rule out the possibility that interpersonal interactions within the hearing process might tend to influence the decision in some systematic, reasonable manner. For the sample being analyzed here, we sought to realize the detainment decision, this time with the more

Table 4.6

Multiple Regression of "NDetailed" on Background Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother in white-collar employment</th>
<th>.237***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of schooling (grade)</td>
<td>.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region V</td>
<td>.197**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VI</td>
<td>.181***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression constant</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.313***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7
Multiple Regression of Place of Detention on Background Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Custody</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Sheltercare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
<td>.243***</td>
<td>.865***</td>
<td>.674***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
<td>.278***</td>
<td>.887***</td>
<td>.620***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV</td>
<td>.263***</td>
<td>.356***</td>
<td>.1976***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar father</td>
<td>.1976***</td>
<td>.2267*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current charge-person</td>
<td>.2707**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported past crimes</td>
<td>.1620**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts alone</td>
<td>.1225**</td>
<td>.1205**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run from DYS unit</td>
<td>.1860**</td>
<td>.2438**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends smoke marijuana</td>
<td>.3320**</td>
<td>.1712**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not &quot;hang out&quot; with DYS kids</td>
<td>.2090</td>
<td>.1225**</td>
<td>.1205**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.1454**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.643***</td>
<td>.977***</td>
<td>.735***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision where to detain is also shaped in part by the experience that DYS has had with each category of youth in the past. Youth who have previously run from DYS are more likely to be detained in custodial units than those who have not, and those who have run are not as likely to be held in sheltercare units. Youth whose friends use marijuana or are not generally former DYS charges are more likely to be held in the shelter care units. Youth who believe that their friends want to become part of society are more apt to be held in custodial units. Younger youth tend to be more often represented in the shelter care units than older youth, and females are more likely to be placed in treatment units than males.

While the sample thus displays little logic for the decision to detain, more justification appears for the decision about place of detention, particularly in terms of youth charged with person offenses and youth who have previously run from DYS detention. Still the overriding factor determining where youth are detained appears to be where they reside; in other words, where the youth are detained may be largely influenced by the availability of detention places.

**Note:**

The decision where to detain is also shaped in part by the experience that DYS has had with each category of youth in the past. Youth who have previously run from DYS are more likely to be detained in custodial units than those who have not, and those who have run are not as likely to be held in sheltercare units. Youth whose friends use marijuana or are not generally former DYS charges are more likely to be held in the shelter care units. Youth who believe that their friends want to become part of society are more apt to be held in custodial units. Younger youth tend to be more often represented in the shelter care units than older youth, and females are more likely to be placed in treatment units than males.

While the sample thus displays little logic for the decision to detain, more justification appears for the decision about place of detention, particularly in terms of youth charged with person offenses and youth who have previously run from DYS detention. Still the overriding factor determining where youth are detained appears to be where they reside; in other words, where the youth are detained may be largely influenced by the availability of detention places.

**Initial Placement**

We have classified programs in which DYS youth can be placed into four categories: secure care, a group home, foster care, and nonresidential care. Secure care consists of those programs which provide a high level of security and supervision. The placement of program types on the continuum may be much refined in later analyses. We intend to sub-classify the group homes into several categories that reflect the principal characteristics of the programs. In this preliminary analysis, we have created a new variable, "Females in the sample correlate somewhat with secure care while males correlate strongly with group homes and nonresidential alternatives. This may in part reflect the less diverse range of programs available to pids than boys as well as their differing responses to the various types of programs. Blacks and younger youth are associated with nonresidential placements. Youth who are included in the analyses are somewhat related to initial placement. Youth living with both natural parents are not likely to be placed in custodial detention. Youth who are placed in custodial detention are more likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Youth who are committed to residential programs are more likely to be placed in nonresidential programs. Youth who are attending school regularly prior to being committed or referred to DYS are more likely to be committed to residential programs.
Table 4.8
Multiple Regression of Initial Placement on Background Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Secure Care</th>
<th>Group Home</th>
<th>Foster Home</th>
<th>Nonresidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
<td>2.095***</td>
<td>.273***</td>
<td>.294***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
<td>.223**</td>
<td>.279**</td>
<td>.278**</td>
<td>.335***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV</td>
<td>.160***</td>
<td>.175**</td>
<td>.177**</td>
<td>.2577***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region V</td>
<td>.775***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VII</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.1720**</td>
<td>.2978**</td>
<td>.3918**</td>
<td>.0446**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother only</td>
<td>.2644***</td>
<td>.579***</td>
<td>.1423**</td>
<td>.0819***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father only</td>
<td>.597***</td>
<td>.1423**</td>
<td>.5087***</td>
<td>.3152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father unskilled</td>
<td>.729**</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td>.340***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother single</td>
<td>.2546**</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother sample</td>
<td>.3358***</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother unemployed</td>
<td>.1193*</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to school regularly</td>
<td>.0241*</td>
<td>.0164*</td>
<td>.1647**</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not &quot;hang out&quot; with DYS kids</td>
<td>.4434***</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends younger</td>
<td>.0942*</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends use marijuana</td>
<td>.0942*</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonresident</td>
<td>.1976***</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
<td>.5246***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detained in custody</td>
<td>.3358***</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
<td>.3132**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detained in treatment</td>
<td>.1193*</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
<td>.1115**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends want to be part of society</td>
<td>.1490*</td>
<td>.4010**</td>
<td>.3129***</td>
<td>.3129***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends want to get away from society</td>
<td>.0942*</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current charge</td>
<td>.0942*</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile</td>
<td>.0164*</td>
<td>.1647**</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person</td>
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<td>.0164*</td>
<td>.1647**</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported past crimes</td>
<td>.0164*</td>
<td>.1647**</td>
<td>.1151*</td>
<td>.3781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs with others</td>
<td>.2345**</td>
<td>.2345**</td>
<td>.2345**</td>
<td>.2345**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property with others</td>
<td>.1697***</td>
<td>.1697***</td>
<td>.1697***</td>
<td>.1697***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property and person with others</td>
<td>.1623***</td>
<td>.1623***</td>
<td>.1623***</td>
<td>.1623***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars with others</td>
<td>.1716**</td>
<td>.1716**</td>
<td>.1716**</td>
<td>.1716**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars alone</td>
<td>.2307**</td>
<td>.2307**</td>
<td>.2307**</td>
<td>.2307**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property alone</td>
<td>.2633*</td>
<td>.2253*</td>
<td>.2253*</td>
<td>.2253*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile alone</td>
<td>.4002***</td>
<td>.4002***</td>
<td>.4002***</td>
<td>.4002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antagonists</td>
<td>.6398**</td>
<td>.6398**</td>
<td>.6398**</td>
<td>.6398**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-skilled</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job white-collar</td>
<td>.2872*</td>
<td>.2872*</td>
<td>.2872*</td>
<td>.2872*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran from 1 YS</td>
<td>.1666***</td>
<td>.1528***</td>
<td>.1528***</td>
<td>.1528***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression constant</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to obtain a general assessment of experiences in the various programs, youth were questioned about the kinds of relationships they had with program staff. For this analysis, we treated each program staff experience as a case; because some youth experience more than one program as they move through the DYS system, the total number of program experiences exceeds the number of youth samples. Of particular interest were relationships involving communication, decision-making, providing help, and the punishing or rewarding of behavior. Responses to these questions in Table 4.9 indicate that youth have different experiences depending on the type of program with which they are involved. For example, 81 percent of the youth in nonresidential programs said that staff tried to explain to them what was happening in the program, as compared to 73 percent in group homes, 68 percent in foster care, and 56 percent in secure care. Nonresidential programs and foster care consistently received more favorable assessments than did group homes or secure care. Forty-seven percent in nonresidential and 44 percent in foster care indicated that they had opportunities to participate in decision making by actually making choices, while only 33 percent of youth in group homes and 26 percent in secure care said that they were able to make choices. To determine to what extent program staff were actually trying to advocate for youth in the community or trying to reintegrate the youth by linking them with positive supports in the community, youth were asked how program staff tried to help. They were asked to decide whether staff were merely providing encouragement or whether they were actually trying to find jobs for them, place them in alternative school, or introduce them to youth-oriented programs. Fifty-one percent of youth in nonresidential programs and 43
Table 4.9
Staff Relationships by Type of Program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Secure Care</th>
<th>Group Home</th>
<th>Foster Home</th>
<th>Nonresidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do staff try to make you understand what is happening?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Yes</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Sometimes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) No</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do staff let you share in decisions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) No</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Yes, ask youth</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Yes, let youth make choices</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(255)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do staff help you stay out of trouble?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) No</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Yes, encourage youth</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Yes, help you get jobs, into alternative programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(250)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Will staff punish youth?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Yes, separate from group</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Take away privileges</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Yes, hit youth</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Yes, embarrasses youth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Yes, make you feel guilty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(253)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do staff punish youth for what other kids do?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Regularly</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Sometimes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Never or hardly ever</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(216)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9 (continued)
Staff Relationships by Type of Program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Secure Care</th>
<th>Group Home</th>
<th>Foster Home</th>
<th>Nonresidential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Do staff reward you if you do well?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) No</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Yes, include me</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Yes, additional privileges</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Yes, make me look good in front of others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Yes, make me feel good</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>(251)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do staff reward you for what other kids do?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Regularly</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Sometimes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Never or hardly ever</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(201)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent in foster care indicated that staff tried to develop such linkages while 29 percent of youth in group homes and, somewhat surprisingly, 35 percent in secure care facilities felt this way. Over half the youth in group homes felt that staff tried to help by providing encouragement. While these data do not comprise an adequate test of how a program is linked with the larger community, it is clear that the group homes are not regarded by youth in nonresidential programs as helping them become re-established in the community to a significantly greater extent than the secure care facilities.

The cross-sectional data and additional responses, except for secure care, is "making the individual feel good." Few programs reward the entire group for what one person has done. Some interesting response patterns not indicated in Table 4.9 occur when youth are asked to assess their chances of not getting into trouble again. Sixty percent of the foster care youth felt that they had an excellent chance, compared to 47 percent in secure programs. These responses represent what turns out to be a fairly realistic assessment of their chances, as will be seen in later sections of this report.
The Community: Long-Run Impact

Relationships with Significant Others

The long-run impact of program experiences in DYS can be measured in part by the quality of the linkages or relationships with various significant others in the community, but a full analysis of these linkages will have to await more comprehensive analysis of the data. Program experience is but one of many variables that influence relationships in the community. In Table 4.10, we explore one of these related variables. When we asked youth whether their "bosses" at work tended to help them or not in finding links to the community, we discovered that nonresidential placement or detention in a treatment unit are the only program variables related to this variable. We have cooled the "help" variable if bosses were not helpful and 0 if they were helpful or if they were not in contact with the youth. The variable thus represents unhelpful contact. Participation in a nonresidential program is associated with bosses either helping or having no contact with the youth, while being detained in a treatment unit prior to court is associated with bosses not helping. This latter relationship is the strongest of all the variables related to bosses helping. Youth who did not attend school are more likely to report that bosses do not help than youth who did. The detention relationships are indicative of a trend for early decisions in the juvenile justice process to contribute greatly to not only immediate but long-range consequences.

Regions I, II, and VI are related to bosses helping, while in other regions youth are more likely to believe that bosses do not help. Males are more likely than females to view bosses as not helping. Blacks are not likely to consider bosses helpful. Youth living with both parents are less likely to find bosses not helpful than youth living with their fathers only. Youth with a history of participating with others in car theft, property and person offenses, or drugs are likely to find bosses helpful, while youth with a current charge of a crime against a person or a history of property or status offenses alone are more likely to find bosses not helpful.

Another very crucial relationship for juveniles in trouble is their relationship with police. As noted in Table 4.11, youths in the sample who are status offenders, who have been detained in a treatment unit or who do not "hang out" with other DYS youth indicate that they either have rewarding experiences with the police or little contact at all. Generally youth who have been detained and youth initially placed in secure care indicate that police do not reward them for good behavior.

Table 4.10
Multiple Regression of "Unhelpful Contact with Supervisor at Work" on Background and Program Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final nonresidential</td>
<td>-3.187**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention treatment*</td>
<td>-2.834***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondetained</td>
<td>-5.548***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run from DYS unit</td>
<td>-2.907**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
<td>-4.597***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
<td>-5.120***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VI</td>
<td>-1.030***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.667***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.450***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother and father</td>
<td>-0.396***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father only</td>
<td>-0.876***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father unemployed</td>
<td>-1.070***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother white-collar</td>
<td>-0.458***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reported past crimes</td>
<td>-0.415***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cars with others</td>
<td>-0.480**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property and person with others</td>
<td>-0.389***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs with others</td>
<td>-0.377**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile alone</td>
<td>-0.587***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current charge-person</td>
<td>-0.496**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends smoke marijuana</td>
<td>-0.639***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations: job-skilled</td>
<td>.994***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends want to get away from society</td>
<td>.593***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends want to be part of society</td>
<td>.650***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends want to get back at society</td>
<td>.325***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not &quot;hang out&quot; with DYS kids</td>
<td>.340***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression constant</td>
<td>-0.670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.954***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The extraordinarily large absolute values of regression coefficients for detention treatment and regions I and II in columns of this and other tables where these variables appear together are probably contributed to by rounding error in the computer because of the high correlation of detention treatment with these two regional variables.

Table 4.11
Multiple Regression of "Unrewarding Contact with the Police" on Background and Program Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current charge-juvenile</td>
<td>-2.943***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention treatment</td>
<td>-1.692**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not &quot;hang out&quot; with DYS kids</td>
<td>-1.051*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondetained</td>
<td>-0.095*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial secure</td>
<td>.1465**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression constant</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple correlation</td>
<td>.418***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another key relationship for many youth is their association with a community service program once they leave DYS. Youth were asked to recall what they considered to be the best community program in which they participated. They were then asked whether this program evaluated them as "good kids." Youth in Regions I, II, and VI, as shown in Table 4.12, are less likely to perceive themselves as being considered "good kids" than are youth in other regions. Youth who were not detained and those detained in treatment units are likely to sense that the community service program regards them as "good kids." Males are more likely to have a positive perception than females, and blacks believe that they are viewed positively. Youth whose fathers are in unskilled employment or whose mothers have white-collar employment do not see themselves regarded as "good kids." On the other hand, youth who live with their fathers only or whose mothers are unemployed are less likely to feel that the program considers them "good kids." Youngsters who have a history of stealing cars or committing status or property offenses alone are likely to view their program service as a "good kids."
to believe that they are regarded as good kids. Youth with a history of participating with others in drug use or property offenses do not believe that community service programs treat them as good kids. In terms of placement program, youth who begin and end their sequence of program assignments in a secure or nonresidential program and youth placed initially in group home programs do not share positive perceptions.

In addition to direct questions about relationships between youth and significant others, the longitudinal study relies on the more indirect semantic differential technique to probe those relationships. The semantic differential consists of having youth indicate on a seven-point scale bipolar adjective list, composed of such adjectives as good-bad and fair-unfair, their rating of several significant others such as mother, father, police, and program staff. Youth are first asked to indicate how they feel about the significant other in question and then to indicate how the significant other would rate them. In later analyses, responses will be scrutinized to provide a basis for assessing self-image and any change in self-image as the youth move through the juvenile justice process. At this time we will only look at the evaluation dimension of the semantic differential for a few significant others in order to indicate how the data will describe the nature of the relationships and thereby provide us with a description of the youth's links with the community.

Among the significant others are the police. Table 4.13 lists the variables that influence how youth evaluate police. Youths charged with status offenses are more likely to believe toward the police than youth charged with other offenses. Youth who do not hang around with other DYS youth, who come from white-collar families, and who attend school regularly are also more likely to perceive police positively. And youth in Region II (middle of state) tend to be more favorably disposed toward the police than youth living in other regions. On the other hand, youth who expect to hang around with the same youth they did before getting into trouble, and who have a history of either property or property and person offenses are more likely to be negatively disposed toward the police. These youths are more frequently cast in an adversary role with the police and this probably explains their differential response.

Youth were also asked how they think their friends feel about them. As noted in Table 4.14, if they were black, male, young, had not been previously detained, or, if detained, held in a treatment unit, they tended to believe that their friends saw them favorably. This image was also favorable if they came from families where the mother was unemployed, or where there was only a father as head of household. A favorable image was also associated with a history of acting alone, particularly in status and property offenses, and having friends who use pot but are not former DYS charges and who want to either be part of or get away from society. Youth did not feel that their friends evaluated them favorably if they were from families with either both natural parents or the mother only, with a father engaged in unskilled employment or a mother engaged in white-collar employment. Unfavorable images were also associated with being previously committed to DYS and having run from hospital or having committed crimes with other youngsters, particularly property, property and person, car theft, and drug offenses. In terms of DYS programing, youth whose final program experience was a nonresidential program were more likely to feel that their friends evaluated them less favorably than youth in other programs. This may have been because nonresidential program youth are more clearly identified to their friends as youth in trouble and receiving services. Youth from Regions III and V were more likely to believe that their friends viewed them favorably than did youth from other regions.

Finally we will look at those variables which tend to be associated with a positive self-image. Youth were asked to evaluate themselves, with the results shown in Table 4.15. Youth had more favorable self-images if they had been detained, and those detained in shelter care and custodial units were more apt to have positive self-images than youth detained in treatment units. Youth who had fathers employed in white-collar jobs and youth charged with status offenses were associated with positive self-images. Youth who indicated that their friends wanted to get away from society tended to think less favorably of themselves. Again we discover that the easy experiences with detention have a stronger impact on long-run results than the more immediate program experiences. It is clear that caution must be exercised in the decision to detain since some youths apparently gain coveted reputations or enhanced self-images because they are detained; it would appear that those youth detention fosters a delinquent state in a delinquent career.
Recidivism

The most prominent question for many interested policy makers is whether the new DYYS system has any appreciable effect on recidivism. In the beginning section of this report we compared current recidivism rates with those of the institution-based system in fiscal year 1968, as fully as presently available data permitted. In that analysis recidivism was determined on the basis of official records. Since those data are not yet available for all regions, however, our analysis in the final section of this report will employ a measure of recidivism based on a follow-up of youth by "cans of our own network of contacts with the youth correctional system. Reappearance in court is the criterion of recidivism but this method picks up those court appearances specifically that come to the attention of personnel in the youth correctional system, ordinarily because the youth were detained by DYS for appearance in court on a new offense. This method thus tends to underestimate those court appearances that involve less serious charges, for which court appearances were not preceded by detention. Such court appearances frequently end in dismissal. Consequently the rates of recidivism obtained by using this method are more like those based on official records, where the criterion of recidivism is a court disposition involving probation or recommitment, as reported in the first section. To obtain these rates we followed the youths for six months beyond completion of a residential program, or for nine months from the beginning of a nonresidential program. We counted recidivism occurring during program contact as well as during the follow-up period. We reported preliminary results of this measure of recidivism on incomplete samples of the first four regions two years ago.19


\[
\begin{array}{l|l|l}
\text{Table 4.15} & \text{Multiple Regression of "Self-Evaluation" on Background and Program Variables.} \\
\hline
\text{Nondetained} & -2.1013^{***} & -2.0103^{**} \\
\text{Detention treatment} & -2.1013^{***} & -2.0103^{**} \\
\text{Father white-collar} & 1.6586^{*} & 1.6586^{*} \\
\text{Current charge-juvenile} & 2.2223^{*} & 2.2223^{*} \\
\text{Friends want to get away from society} & -1.9159^{**} & -1.9159^{**} \\
\text{Regression constant} & 29.515 & 29.515 \\
\text{Multiple correlation} & -302^{***} & -302^{***} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{l|l|l|l|l|l}
\text{Recidivism Rates by Selected Background Characteristics,} & \text{Percent Recidivating} & \text{Number} \\
\hline
\text{Background Characteristic} & \text{Region I} & \text{Region II} & \text{Region III} & \text{Region IV} & \text{Region V} \\
\hline
\text{Black} & 61 & 31 & 28 & 28 & 31 \\
\text{White} & 24 & 37 & 62 & 24 & 26 \\
\text{Sex} & & & & & & \\
\text{/Female} & 39 & 61 & 43 & 43 & 19 \\
\text{/Male} & 20 & 63 & 20 & 20 & 117 \\
\text{Prior commitment or referral} & & & & & & \\
\text{/Yes} & 66 & 135 & 43 & 43 & 117 \\
\text{/No} & 26 & 191 & 19 & 19 & 326 \\
\text{Detained/Nondetained} & & & & & & \\
\text{/Detained} & 209 & 209 & 209 & 209 & 209 \\
\text{/Nondetained} & & & & & & \\
\text{Where detained} & & & & & & \\
\text{/Custodial} & 59 & 61 & 59 & 59 & 197 \\
\text{Treatment} & 32 & 63 & 32 & 32 & 63 \\
\text{Shelter care} & 40 & 85 & 40 & 40 & 85 \\
\text{Final placement} & & & & & & \\
\text{/Secure care} & 60 & 63 & 60 & 60 & 60 \\
\text{Group home} & 27 & 157 & 27 & 27 & 27 \\
\text{Foster care} & 19 & 41 & 19 & 19 & 41 \\
\text{Nonresidential} & 23 & 34 & 23 & 23 & 34 \\
\text{No program} & 48 & 31 & 48 & 48 & 31 \\
\text{Multiple correlation} & 551^{***} & 551^{***} & 551^{***} & 551^{***} & 551^{***} \\
\end{array}
\]

Taking all of the background and relationship variables in a regression equation with recidivism as dependent, shown in Table 4.17, we can assess the differential impact of those variables that tend to be most associated with recidivism while controlling for all other variables. The variable most strongly related to recidivism is Region VI, indicating a high probability of recidivating for youth in the region. While this is the case for the sample represented here, the reader should remember that Region VI is underrepresented in the completed sample, in that of March 30, 1975. Subsequent but still incomplete return (indicate that the final recidivism rate for the full sample will be somewhat lower for this six-month exposure period in Region VI. Region V is also associated with recidivism. In this region almost all of
the youth in our sample are completed cases and consequently we do not expect any significant change in the rate (see Table 4.5). A possible explanation for the high rate of recidivism in Region V is the relative lack of program diversity in that region. Most youth there are either in secure or group home programs with little utilization of either foster homes or nonresidential programs. Region VII is also slightly associated with the likelihood of recidivism, which has considerable implications for policy and future research analysis. Clearly, the type of program placement is related to a youth's chances of recidivating within the first six months of exposure to the community. Although youth in foster care do best, followed by youth in nonresidential programs and youth in group homes, the differences among these program types are not particularly significant. But youth in these programs do far better than youth in secure care programs. That the youth in secure care are most likely to recidivate seems reasonable because of the tendency for the secure care units to work with higher risk youth. Given the analysis to date, however, it seems likely that the higher recidivism of secure care youth is not solely related to youth characteristics. Instead, their failure appears partially a result of experiences they have within the secure care programs and the attached negative labels which restrict their program alternatives and influence future decision makers.

Further analysis will incorporate relationship, aspiration, and semantic differential measures not included in the present exploratory analysis—especially measures based on initial interviews. These measures will be important in distinguishing the effects of selection from the efficacy of programs. We will also employ analytical techniques borrowed from econometrics in seeking to make this distinction. Even without such a distinction, however, it is clear from the present analysis that the great majority of DYS youth do not do so successfully in settings without presenting an immediate danger to the public. Some critics claim that the new nonsecure programs have constituted a revolving door. That happens to be true of the secure programs, which have high recidivism rates and are much like the.

more secure among the old institutions in this respect. It is clearly not true of the more open programs. At this point it seems reasonable both to restrict secure care only to those youth who cannot be handled in a less secure program and to improve the quality of secure care. During 1975 the department, in fact, generated several new secure care programs to replace some of those in this sample, and it continues to wrestle with the difficulties of monitoring intake into secure care programs.

Another implication is that the regions with a more fully implemented broad range of program alternatives for youth are-increasing the chances of youth succeeding in the community. The data also display the considerable variability among group home programs in terms of their ability to build linkages for youth in the community. In future analyses, we will subclassify this category in order to determine the characteristics of the groups that are best able to establish the proper linkages.

The inordinate long-term impact of early decisions on particularly detention decisions, is very suggestive. Decisions made early in the process tend to restrict a youth's program options. For some youth this may be justifiable, but long-term consequences are so significant that the decisions to detain and where to detain require careful monitoring. These findings on the impact of detention have implications for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. In Massachusetts youth who fall into the category of children of supervision have been officially removed from the authority of the Department of Youth Services, but they continue to be detained in DYS detention centers. The data reported here certainly indicate that detention in units that are part of the juvenile justice system should be avoided whenever possible. The data would also tend to support the notion of developing outside the criminal justice system short-term emergency shelter care programs or youth hostels as alternatives to the customary detention units with their implicit and explicit stigmatization.

Finally, while the less secure programs seem to work out better for youth, it is probably unwise to assume that they are so benign that youth who would otherwise not be placed in DYS should now be adjudicated and exposed to those programs. It is possible that youth who minimally penetrate the formal juvenile system do better. Whether minimal penetration means avoiding DYS as much as possible or taking part in a minimal program of some nature is still very much in question. At the analysis continues we will be looking at a comparison group of youth who were detained but not placed in DYS. That analysis may go further in addressing this issue.
CONTINUED

1 OF 2
V. Neutralizing Community Resistance To Group Homes

Robert B. Coates and Alden J. Miller

Part of the effort to reform the treatment of juvenile offenders in recent years has focused on changing the treatment setting. Attempts have been made to handle more youth within community residential centers or group homes in order to reduce the numbers of youth served by traditional reform schools and exposed to the degrading effects that are so often part of such institutional experiences. While the group home concept for troubled youth is often philosophically accepted in both professional and nonprofessional circles, the actual establishment of group homes in local communities is often vehemently resisted by residents. Thus a very pragmatic issue confronting both state and privately operated agencies is how to handle community resistance to group homes. How can community resistance be avoided or neutralized when it arises?

This chapter describes the first results of a continuing investigation into the dynamics of locating a group home in a community setting. We are concerned here with the political aspects of coping with community resistance to the initial establishment of the group home. We will not, in this report, deal with community reaction to the program of the group home once it is in operation, nor with the effect of the program on the youth residing in the group home. We will deal with the program only as it is represented as a proposal in the process of gaining entry into the community. Our analysis of resistance and strategies for neutralizing resistance will focus on the community level.

Analysis at the state-wide and governmental levels is not included here. The data supporting this study were gathered within the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Massachusetts ranks in the forefront of states seeking to discover viable community-based alternatives to the institutionalization of juvenile delinquents.

As part of the deinstitutionalization process during the spring and summer of 1972, the DYS sought to establish several group homes throughout the state under a purchase of service arrangement. That is, the DYS proposed to buy group home services from private agencies. This arrangement was adopted for several reasons: (1) it was believed that the closer the "treatment" program to the community and the more involvement of private agencies and private citizens, the greater the likelihood of successful reintegration of program clients; (2) it was also believed that private agencies, particularly the more experienced agencies, were better prepared to handle group residential homes than most DYS line staff who had only worked with youth in an institutional context; and (3) it was considered to be an easier task for existing or even newly created private agencies to work with communities in establishing group homes than it would be for DYS with its controversial image. The DYS had been strongly opposed by some interest groups in the state because they felt that the DYS deinstitutionalization effort was moving too quickly, and that the department's treatment approach was too permissive.

This chapter was first published in slightly different form under the title "Neutralization of Community Resistance to Group Homes." In Ylzak Bakal, Choice Correctional Institutions (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., 1973), pp. 67-84. The authors wish to express appreciation to Lloyd E. Ohlin, and to Elmer Halprin for her helpful editorial assistance. Thanks are due also to Judy Caldwell, Robert Fitzgerald, and David Gaywood who labored hard to gather data for this analysis.

1 For example, a study conducted by Louis Harris and Associates for the Joint Commission on Correctional Maneuvers found that 77 percent of a representative sample favored the idea of a halfway house, 50 percent would personally favor a halfway house in their neighborhood, and only 22 percent believed that most people in the neighborhood would favor a halfway house in the area. Joint Commission on Correctional Maneuver and Training, The Public Views on Crime and Corrections (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 16-17.
In order to isolate those issues that are most sensitive to community resistance and to identify the various strategies for handling resistance, we focused on several groups of homes that failed primarily because of community resistance, and at several other homes that were able to neutralize resistance and establish ongoing residences. Three homes were selected within each of the two categories. Two of the agencies that failed had previously operated similar homes and had therefore been confronted with some of the same problems before, while one agency that failed had never before operated such a program. Two of the successful agencies had previously operated similar programs; the third agency had a parent structure with some prior experience, but the specific people involved in setting up the group home had had no prior experience.

The homes were located in six of the seven DYS regions. The study was not conducted because there was at the time considerable political turmoil within the region over other issues related to corrections. Although the selected group homes do not necessarily represent the full range of all probable conflict situations, they do present a range sufficient to identify at least some of the key issues of strategy.

The data collection strategy focused on extensive interviewing of key actors. To learn most about the plans for each home, the first person contacted was the executive director of the sponsoring agency or the director of the proposed home. During this initial discussion the interviewer identified other significant actors or interest groups to be interviewed at a later time. This snowball technique was followed until it became apparent that little additional, useful information could be gained by further interviewing. Typically the interviewing included agency representatives, police, clergy, neighbors, and city officials. In two cases the snowball technique was modified to accommodate the wishes of the group being studied. One involved an agency that failed and the other an agency that succeeded. The research team respected the intricacies of the ongoing political processes and tried not to endanger an operating program or the chances of any proposed home.

The interviews, although structured, were also quite flexible. During the course of an interview with a representative of the social service agency, the interviewer obtained the following information: (1) the goals of the program and strategies for implementing the program; (2) the process of communication of goals to interest groups; (3) the kinds of people who agreed or disagreed with agency goals and strategies; (4) the communications from vested interest groups; (5) the strategies for handling opposition and support; and (6) the expected outcome. When interviewing representatives of interest groups outside the agency, the major blocks of information included: (1) perceptions of the private agency and DYS goals; (2) the source of information about the group home; (3) interest group goals for home; (4) the strategies for attaining these goals; (5) the communication of goals and strategies to whom, how, and why; (6) the kinds of people or groups that agreed or disagreed with goals and strategies; (7) the strategies for handling opposition and support; and (8) expected outcome. Three interviewers were involved in the data collection process. Each covered one group home that failed and one that succeeded.

In addition to interviewing the key actors, researchers analyzed local newspapers as well as letters of support or opposition and minutes of planning meetings and hearings where available. Together the data project a fairly good picture of the process and problems of placing a residential home in a community.

Throughout this paper we will refer to group homes and their community as the fictitious names. Many persons cooperated with us in our data collection efforts in order to contribute to the understanding of the process of establishing or reestablishing a group home, with the express understanding that we would respect certain confidentiality about the information and not identify our sources. Fortunately this need for confidentiality does not interfere with our purposes in this analysis, since the actual identity of the communities and group homes is not important for the kinds of inferences we are seeking to make and support.

### Results

The major variables and strategies included in the process of establishing the group homes in this study are summarized in Table 5.1. Data from the individual case studies will be compared and contrasted in order to develop at least tentative responses to a number of policy and strategy issues. The nine critical variables include such items as selection of community, strategy for entering community, and resolution of conflict. These nine variables provide the "backbone" of our analysis. Before proceeding with a detailed comparative analysis of the six homes in the study, it will be helpful for the reader to have an understanding of the general flow of the processes involved in setting up group homes and the kinds of opposition encountered. We will therefore present two brief hypothetical case studies: one representing failure, Clarion, and one representing success, Kimberly. The nine critical variables will emerge in these hypothetical case studies, as they did in the six real case studies, as the major steps in the flow of action, resistance, and effort to neutralize resistance.

### Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Group Homes</th>
<th>Laurel</th>
<th>Palmyra</th>
<th>Whitewater</th>
<th>Eagle Grove</th>
<th>Sullivan</th>
<th>Hebrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who established it?</td>
<td>An &quot;established&quot; agency with experience in group homes for drug cases</td>
<td>A sectarian religious group new to this sort of work</td>
<td>An established agency treating children with physical disabilities</td>
<td>&quot;Ex-con&quot; group new to this sort of work</td>
<td>An established agency with experience in group homes for welfare youth</td>
<td>An established agency with experience in group homes for delinquents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of community</td>
<td>Did not know neighborhood community</td>
<td>Knew community but not with respect to reaction to delinquents</td>
<td>Knew community well</td>
<td>Knew community well</td>
<td>Transient community, disorganized</td>
<td>Learned community well after site selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy for entering community</td>
<td>Talk to &quot;significant few&quot; and then campaign</td>
<td>Talk to &quot;significant few&quot;</td>
<td>Talk to &quot;significant few&quot;</td>
<td>Talk to &quot;significant few&quot;</td>
<td>Talk to &quot;significant few&quot; and then campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection site</td>
<td>Across from school and no space for recreation</td>
<td>Residential area working and middle class</td>
<td>Residential middle to upper class</td>
<td>Residential middle to upper class</td>
<td>Transient working and middle or upper class</td>
<td>Residual working and middle or upper class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection name of program</td>
<td>Name designed to challenge youth</td>
<td>Name or label emphasized community's responsibility</td>
<td>Name or label emphasized community's responsibility</td>
<td>Name or label emphasized community's responsibility</td>
<td>Name or label emphasized community's responsibility</td>
<td>Name or label emphasized community's responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of program content</td>
<td>Presented as related to DYS-plan for a kind of problem-kid community did not have</td>
<td>No clear presentation or conception</td>
<td>Vague and too technical presentation</td>
<td>Presentation through youths' activity</td>
<td>Presentation through youths' and house parents' activity</td>
<td>Presentation in direct, informative style in meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

82

83
Table 5.1 (Continued)

Successful and Unsuccessful Group Homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Group Homes</th>
<th>F Hours</th>
<th>E Hours</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>F Hours</th>
<th>E Hours</th>
<th>Successes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Client and staff residence food</td>
<td>Staff and</td>
<td>did not live</td>
<td>in neighborhood</td>
<td>Palmyra</td>
<td>did not have a delinquency problem in the nearby community</td>
<td>Whitewater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving the youth</td>
<td>Home an unwanted service to community</td>
<td>Home an unwanted service to community</td>
<td>Youth serve community</td>
<td>Youth serve community</td>
<td>Youth serve community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution of conflict</td>
<td>Looking for the ground</td>
<td>&quot;Holy War&quot;</td>
<td>Avoidance of conflict issues</td>
<td>Avoidance of conflict issues</td>
<td>Straightforward meeting of issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clarion

A long-established social agency, BURN (Boys United: Resources, Neighbors), attempted to set up a small group home for juvenile delinquents in the middle-sized city of Clarion. BURN had been operating a program designed to address learning disabilities in the city for six years. Its reputation was thought to be quite good, and on the basis of that reputation little opposition to the program's expansion was anticipated. The actual program was to consist of a "free school" environment and provision of work experiences within the community. The group home would house eight to twelve boys ranging in age from thirteen to seventeen.

The initial strategy for setting up the home involved talking to a few key people in the community—people who were generally considered to be friendly toward the agency. These people included the mayor, the two of the five selectmen, and other wealthy backers of the agency. Response from the mayor was noncommittal; the two selectmen and the financial backers were quite supportive. After these initial conversations a site was selected. The selected neighborhood was primarily residential in character, with one gasoline station and a small store. Although unknown to the agency administrators, the neighborhood had in the recent past taken two actions to maintain its residential atmosphere. The residents had organized to prevent a light industrial plant from moving into the area, and they had also closed a teenage drop-in center that had operated for a brief period of time. This lack of knowledge about the neighborhood's capacity for organizing was to be a major factor in the failure of BURN.

Before the purchase arrangements were completed, it was necessary for BURN to go before the town zoning committee to request modification of the zoning regulations in the case of the group home. Upon hearing of the group home for juveniles, abutters were incensed and alarmed. They were incensed because no one had told them about the plans previously, and they were alarmed because they believed that "gangsters were moving in next door." After the next two-week period the abutters held a number of informal meetings to determine how the group home could be stopped. Neighbors indicated that their primary motivation for keeping the halfway house out of their neighborhood was to protect their own children. In addition it was pointed out that the neighborhood did not have any delinquency problem and did not want to be an "experimental lab for other neighborhoods who could not solve their own problems."

By the time of the zoning hearing, BURN was aware that it would encounter a little opposition. But it believed that the support of various public officials would outweigh a few "strident antagonists." This did not prove to be the case. The hearing was undersubscribed by a very well thought out confrontation on the part of the influential citizens' group. They listed three reasons why the group home should not be allowed: (1) the site selected was inadequate for 10 to 12 teenagers because of its small size and tiny yard (the lack of space would also cause an unclean appearance for the nearby neighborhood); (2) children and elderly persons would be endangered by the "criminal types" who would be associated with the halfway house; and (3) the agency had no experience working with juvenile delinquents. One woman suggested that much of the fear expressed by residents was related to the acronym, "BURN." She said, "Why couldn't they simply call it AIDF or something like that?"

Rather than attempting to deal with this opposition group, BURN decided to rely on the support of the citizens' group. BURN administrators suggested that the citizens did not care about children, but only cared about property values. This righteous stance on the part of BURN only served to strengthen the bond among the citizens. Seeing the rift between the citizens and BURN, the town selectmen had "no other choice" but to reject the home.

Kimberly

Several individuals who had previously worked with juvenile delinquents decided to set up a group home in the town of Kimberly. Eight to twelve boys would reside in the home; in addition another eight boys would participate in the program on a non-residential basis. The program would focus on informal counseling and getting the youth into activities occurring in the community. These would include work, school, and recreation. According to the staff the program was to project the image of a "large but dispersed family," concerned about its members and the community. Youth would typically stay in the residential program for three to four months. After their residential stay, program staff would maintain contact in order to support the youth as they returned to their own or foster homes.

The program staff selected an area of Kimberly they believed best fitted their needs. The locality had a junior high school and a senior high school nearby; a number of small businesses were also within walking distance. The strategy for setting up the home operated on two levels. Program staff were talking with various influential town officials about their proposal, and concurrently they were talking with local residents and leaders of civic organizations functioning in the target area. Initially some of the neighbors expressed fear and concern for their own welfare. However, the program staff handled this situation well. They explained that dangerous youth would not be participating in the group home and that if youth did serious out put they would be transferred elsewhere. At the same time it was said that the community could expect some minor incidents but that any consequences would be balanced by the service to the community that the home offered. First, the home obviously offered a service to area youth who may be beginning a delinquent career, and second, youth would repair the house used for the group home and would hire out their own work to improve the neighborhood. This concern for property values handled some of the more subtle objection to the proposed home. Moreover, many residents were concerned about the occurrence of delinquent acts in their neighborhood and saw the group home as one means for dealing with the problem.

Town officials were for the most part supportive of the proposed home. This was particularly the case once it became apparent that the bulk of opposition had already been mollified. The police chief had been contacted by the program staff. He did not anticipate problems, but was taking a "wait and see" attitude.

A zoning hearing was called to pass the proposed home. The four or five residents living in the area voiced opposition. They indicated their fear for the children's safety and did not believe the program staff to be particularly qualified to work with troubled youth. The program staff responded very straightforwardly. They acknowledged that there were minimal risks but argued that the value of the home for the community outweighed the risks. They also described the program in detail, thereby answering any question about their competency to work with youth. In addition to the defense put forth by the program staff, other community residents spoke on the group home's behalf. Preparation of the community and cooperation with the community had paid off; the group home passed the zoning hearing and was established. These two brief vignettes in hand and a feeling for the general thrust of the processes involved in setting up community-based group homes, we can now turn to a more detailed analysis of the data summarized in Table 1.

Discussion

The usefulness of studying the community resistance process comes from comparing those proposed homes that failed and those that were successfully established. This analysis should yield results which directly relate to policy and strategy considerations.

One of the questions administrators within the DYS raised as they closed the institutions and became involved in setting up community residences was whether the staff should set up the homes, or whether it should contract this task to private agencies. DYS opted for the latter strategy for the following reasons: (1) the DYS image was hurt by past controversy, and the private agencies were seen as potentially the easier way of obtaining the group homes; (2) privately run group homes appeared to offer better prospects for...
real community involvement in the youth corrections process; and
(3) private agencies were viewed as a source of help that were expected to have a greater level of expertise about moving into communities and operating community-based programs than DYS had at that time.

Because there are no state-operated group homes within this study we cannot speak directly to this issue, but we can say something about the use of private agencies. There is no guarantee that the well-established private agency has the capacity to set up a new residence without meeting the same opposition that a Catholic church or any other group to function well as a sponsor in a community where no other church exists or where the religious inclinations of the community are predominate in that direction, and for that church to use religious arguments. But where there is much religious diversity, religiously-oriented groups may be more successful in setting up homes. The agency in Hebron took ample preparatory time to study the area, the needs of the region, and the interests of the community. Here the primary problem involved the matter of timing. The agency took so long to complete the first phase of the construction plan (that is, gaining support of religious professionals) that the second phase (talking with community leaders and abutters) was then more difficult by new leaks. Information gleaned by surveying the community, its appearance and concerns, can be used for devising the appropriate strategies for the future. As we will see, some strategies are appropriate for some communities but not for others.

Strategy for Entering the Community

Once one knows something about the context of the community in which the proposed home will reside is requisite for the sort of planning that is demanded. It seems reasonable to attempt some community resistance to any group home: the question is where will that resistance come from and how can it be neutralized. The form the resistance will take can be anticipated if enough information is known about how the community has reacted in similar situations. Has the community recently organized to defend a drug program or an alcoholism center? What sort of people live in the area—are they professionals or day laborers? Is the community an integrated area? Do people in the community recognize a crime or delinquency problem in their area? Who has power and how do they exercise it?

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The lack of such knowledge was detrimental for agencies in Laurel and Palmyra. In Laurel, particularly, the proposed home ran into a very well organized community that had already gotten into making a "passive park" and to object to college dormitories. This information perhaps should have suggested that the agency look elsewhere for the site or at least suggest potential problems which would have to be handled if the community were to be approached and that it should set up the home. The agency in Hebron took ample preparatory time to study the area, the needs of the region, and the interests of the community. Here the primary problem involved the matter of timing. The agency took so long to complete the first phase of the construction plan (that is, gaining support of religious professionals) that the second phase (talking with community leaders and abutters) was then more difficult by new leaks. Information gleaned by surveying the community, its appearance and concerns, can be used for devising the appropriate strategies for the future. As we will see, some strategies are appropriate for some communities but not for others.

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residents of the community and began receiving complaints about noise directed at the press and at the local residents. This intensive communication with the grass roots seems to have stabilized the situation a great deal. Although the proposed site will be forgotten and the proposed home may be established in another community, the ongoing programs of the agency do not reflect to the immediate danger. In Hebron, the agency sponsoring the group home had developed a strategy which included emphases on both the significant regional leaders and the community residents. However, the strategy was seen as sequential: first the significant leaders would be connected and then the community would follow. The time lag and the almost inevitable news leaks nearly proved to be the end of the proposed home. Again, a falsely concerted effort to communicate with concerned residents was institution and the proposal was saved. Although initial groundwork may be necessary, requiring communication with the regional leaders in a community or a region, contact with the local residents cannot lag far behind or once again one will be open to the charge that the program does not care about the residents' concerns and that someone is trying to sneak a halfway house into the community.

This discussion suggests that specific approaches for entering a community with a group home can be tailored to the contextual makeup of the community. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in defining group homes. This may be an appropriate strategy for mobile, pluralistic communities. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in defining group homes. This may be an appropriate strategy for mobile, pluralistic communities. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in defining group homes. This may be an appropriate strategy for mobile, pluralistic communities. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in defining group homes. This may be an appropriate strategy for mobile, pluralistic communities. The "significant few" approach may be adaptable in a residential community where the local residents are not particularly capable of organized opposition, but where the town and civic leaders are playing an active role in defining group homes. This may be an appropriate strategy for mobile, pluralistic communities.
jobs. Youth in the Eagle Grove resi-
dence are becoming active in a defi-
ency prevention program.

Resolution of Conflict

We must reiterate that in most
instances, with the possible excep-
tion of the very low profile ap-
proaches, any attempt to establish
a group home in a community will
incur some form of resistance. Even
if the issues discussed above have been
well handled, some conflict will still
probably arise over such issues as
"we don't need a halfway house in
this area," "this is not the kind of
issue with which this organization
should be involved," or "halfway
houses are needed but in the next
county." For successful entry into
a community, it seems imperative for
the social agency to develop strategies
for resolving conflicts. In general,
an all-out fight will work against the
interests of the social service agency
and the youth whom the agency
wants to serve. The administration
in Laurel recognized this when they
said that it would be better for the
youths to be located in a business-
zonal area than to be in a residential
community which simply did not want
them. If all attempts to resolve
conflict fail, this backing off may be
one of the preferable alternative
choices. Let us then turn our atten-
tion to ways and means of conflict
resolution that may hold open the opportunity
for establishing the proposed home.

With this goal in mind, it is important
to recognize that those conflict reso-
rati on strategies that make continued
relationships of cooperation between
the conflicting parties difficult or
impossible are inappropriate in this
case, although they may be helpful in
other situations.

Any conflict will have at least two
disagreeing parties. If such has a level
of power sufficient to thwart the de-
sires of the other, a situation where
there can be no outright winner will
probably result, even if the social
agency can "beat" the opposition on
a particular issue, if its tactics are un-
just, the opposition may simply
regroup and become an even more
intense enemy. It is desirable there-
to have available face-saving devices.
The opposition should be given the
sense that it has had some impact on
the outcome. In Laurel, when the
agency sponsoring the group home
realized that its whole program could be
lost, it withdrew from direct con-
frontation to begin a massive educa-
tion campaign. In a sense the educa-
tion effort was a face-saving device; it
provided a reason for avoiding direct
confrontation and was a strategy
which may reestablish the agency in
the minds of the residents as a viable,
worthwhile organization. Palmyra
exhibited quite the opposite extreme.
There, emotional invectives such as
"unchristian" and "property-con-
scious" and "de-gendered" and "pro-
testant" were used to escalate the conflict and to make
dissolution that much more difficult. In Hebron conflict
was neutralized by confronting it,
letting all the questions come, and
dealing with them on the spot. There
was no particular effort to "know"
the residents, but rather to be honest
about the strengths and weaknesses of
the program. The style that one uses
to handle conflict can have con-
siderable impact on its resolution.

A classic distinction in the study
of conflict and conflict resolution is
between realistic and nonrealistic
conflict. A basic principle that un-
derlies this discussion is that of
generating and rising to only realistic
conflict. Realistic conflict is over
an actual difference of interest clearly
and accurately defined. Nonrealistic
conflict is over something other than
an actual difference of interest and
is therefore not susceptible to resolu-
tion. Nonrealistic conflicts tend to
be impersonal, couched in terms of
ideas rather than actual personal
interest. Such abstractly defined con-
licts can be pursued with greater fury
than can personal conflicts. This truth
is represented in the common recogni-
tion that holy wars are more bloody
than others, in the fact that "lynnch
law has frequently been activated
by couching a personal economic
interest in terms of some widely held
ideal, such as the saving of Southern
white womanhood, and in the fact
that when the federal government
has been involved, it has been sensibly
involved in differences of interest
rather than real issues, of which
there can be no outright winner will
be done by focusing conflict on
genuine economic and social inter-
ests, not on symbols. The role of the
mediator in labor-management rela-
tions is also to focus the conflict on
realistic issues and to get rid of un-
realistic ones.

The direct identification of the
real issues and frank discussion of
them by the group entering Hebron
is a good example of focusing on
realistic conflict with good results.
So is the strategy of representing the
interests of the neighbors in terms of
what one is doing, and in terms of
who the youth actually are, instead
of as a halfway house, or an abstract
idea with nonrealistic connotations,
or representing oneself by a highly
symbolic name. The strategy of the
Protestant Church Council in Palmyra
is a good example of failure because
of stubbornness generating and rising
to nonrealistic conflict. Allinsky was
fond of pointing out that when he
approached church groups, he did it
on pragmatic grounds of economics,
power, and the like, not on the
grounds of religious belief. The con-
lict in Palmyra had clear realistic
content, relating to property
value, possible danger to residents,
and the intrusion of an outside group.
The Protestant Council, instead of
meeting these problems and resolving
them, chose to generate a nonreal-
istic conflict over the practice of
religious values, a conflict which
could never win. Realistic conflict, prob-
ably susceptible to solution by com-
promise, since many of the objec-
tions of the community were prob-
ably quite valid, was escalated by the
Protestant Council into a "holy war,"
perhaps either out of naivete or
because of a need for martyrdom.
They had been fortunate for DVS as
well. If the community that the
Protestant group was decisively de-
fended, because their tendency to
make a holy war would have had a
generally alienating effect in the
community.

To summarize, one must know the
other side, its power and interests, be
clear on the difference between one's own interests and the other side's,
do everything possible to focus
the conflict on those realistic issues,
avoiding nonrealistic conflict over
loaded symbols. The voice of a group
in determining the course of the
community in which it lives should
always be considered as one of the
issues over which realistic conflict
can arise. Thus one must consider
the importance of face-saving. The
possibility of escalating nonrealistic
conflict by using a symbolic name,
or by using a loaded shorthand de-
scription, such as halfway house,
should also be considered, as should
the danger of creating a holy war.
Also much of the conflict about
technical issues, such as the program
name, selection procedures, and site
selection can simply be avoided
if one plans well and anticipates the
consequences of decisions related
to these technical issues. It is absurd
as well as unfortunate to have a pro-
posed home rejected because the
sponsoring agency did not carefully
do its homework. Debates over
technical problems and nonrealistic
concerns allow for proponents and
opponents to engage in conflict over
the real issues while altogether avoiding
discussion of the real issues. On the
other hand, once the technical
issues are out of the way, the pos-
sible value of forthrightly dealing
with the real, unavoidable issues
involved in differences of interest
should not be underestimated,
and meetings and educational campaigns
designed to focus and resolve real-
is tic conflict should be seriously
considered.

4 This is not to say that a certain level of conflict does not merit efforts to
establish group homes. Conflict does clearly become a problem for one group for
example. The function of social conflict has been discussed in numerous works,
for example George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe,
Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), p. 122; and Coser, Functions of Social Conflict,
p. 38.

5 Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict: In order to regulate conflict "both parties
to a conflict have to recognize the necessity and mutual advantage of conflict
situation, in this sense, the fundamental justice of the cause of the opponent," p. 252.

6 Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 48-55; and Simmel, Conflict and the

Saul D. Allinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Radical Radicals
VI. Some Observations
On The Conceptualization
And Replicability Of
The Massachusetts
Youth Correctional Reforms

Alden D. Miller,
Lloyd E. Olden,
and Robert B. Costes

To many observers, the history of
the reforms in the Massachusetts
Department of Youth Services ap-
ppears to be a collection of bewilderingly accidental, crisis-filled events, impossible to replicate. We have
found, however, that the reforms
followed what seems to be a clear,
replicable pattern common to many
other conflict and change situa-
tions. We believe an effective strategy
for change requires an understanding,
explicit or intuitive, of the system-
wide ramifications of specific
actions. The framework presented
here is designed to facilitate the
consideration of these ramifications.
It employs an interview guide
as a structure for describing a key
phase of the reform—the period of
transition from the training schools—and continues with a brief summary
of the results of a more formal
analysis of this period and other
phases of the reform process.

In the late 1960s repeated investi-
gations of youth corrections in
Massachusetts led to the enactment
of legislation to reform the Division
of Youth Services.1 The new, reform-
minded commissioner tried to change
the institutions, following the
Maxwell Jones model, by converting
the cottages into relatively autonom-
ous therapeutic communities. This
conversion effort was given up late in
1971 because of the difficulties un-
gneered by much of the institu-
tional staff’s resistance to change.
Instead, the commissioner decided to
bypass the structure by purchasing
services from the private sector. At
first the services were envisioned as
privately run group homes, or half-
way houses, but they later included a
much wider variety of services,
such as secure care programs, group
homes of various sorts, foster homes,
and nonresidential services ranging
from recreation to education, job
help, and counseling.

The history of the reforms demon-
strates that their implementation in-
volves far more than the passing of
reform legislation. Clearly, many
other processes are involved. This
lesson comes through on three levels.
First, the reform legislation that
passed in 1969 by an overwhelmingly
favorable vote was supported by
legislators who apparently hoped
that this show of action and concern
would come to nothing more than a
way to resolve the current embar-
raiments in youth corrections. In
addition, constituents within the
agency were confident that they
would not be disturbed by reforms.
Second, concerted administrative
efforts by the new commissioner and
a powerful coalition of interest
groups failed to effect change during
the first year. And third, the changes
in 1972 that implemented the re-
form mandate had to surpass the
specific intent of the reformers of
1969 in order to achieve the kind of
basic change called for in the handling
of youth, and had to be based on
guerrilla administrative tactics far
beyond any legislative mandate. We
are concerned here with a means of
analyzing these processes and
processes like them elsewhere so
that these experiences can con-
structively contribute to future
efforts at reform.

The question-and-answer format
we use to describe a particular pe-
riod of the reform movement is
derived from an interview guide
developed for use as a final survey of
key participants in the Massachusetts
correctional reform process. Developed
in 1971 and gradually refined over the
next four years, the questions have been
used to organize data and analysis for
the entire DYS project. This heuristic
framework has supported much of
the theoretical analysis of the project
data and has constituted the structure
of standardized observation forms

1 See Chapter I, “Radical Correctional
Reform: A Case Study of the Massachu-
esta Youth Correctional System,” in this
volume, which provides the historical
background of the reforms.
used to record the results of observation and informal and semiformal interviewing. On the basis of these successful experiences the questions have recently been refined to the point where they can serve as self-explanatory interview questions. They are also used as a framework for organizing data drawn from many sources, such as observation, informal, semiformal, and formal interviews, and official records check.

As used in this chapter, the question-and-answer format provides brief analytical answers that highlight the events of early 1972. This period defines a pivotal point during which one can observe the interaction of two very different systems. We then show how a formal analysis in terms of certain variables, logical principles, and empirical principles grows out of the questions, and we will briefly indicate the character of simulation analysis based on these variables and principles. Finally we discuss the issue of replication.

Massachusetts Youth Corrections in Early 1972

1. Let's talk first about who is concerned with youth corrections. We will be asking about three broad categories of people. It may be that some people belong to more than one category.

a. What people or groups of people are in favor of the changes, for example deinstitutionalization, deinstitutionalization, instituted by Jerome Miller and Joseph Leavey? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

In early 1972 this category was principally composed of the new commissioners, Jerome Miller, and the progressive staff members of DYS. It also included previously prominent groups, such as the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth. Another group, the Committee for Youth in Trouble, an informal and semiformal organization, had uncovered a scandal among the youth corrections institutions with small, private ownership and informal and semiformal administration of services. We label this group the Liberal Interest Coalition.

b. What people or groups of people were against changes such as deinstitutionalization directed by Jerome Miller and Joseph Leavey? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

This category included some legislators and many DYS staff members who had a vested interest in the old conservative system. Although they would assume a more important role later on, some judges belonged in this group. We label this group the Conservative Interest Coalition.

c. What people or groups of people in state or local agencies or in government were opposed or seemed with the question of who really decided things like budgets, appointments and jobs, contracts, changes in fiscal authority, and the like that relate to youth corrections? If you had to attach a label to this group, what would it be?

In early 1972, the most important members of this group were probably the legislature, acting as a whole, the governor's office, central coordinating units in state government concerned with administration and finance, for example, and political parties. We label this group the Formal Decision-Making Group.

d. How would you characterize yourself? Do you belong to any of these groups? Which ones? Why?

In conducting the study, the Center for Criminal Justice took the role of a concerned group sympathetic to the reform, but avoided an active political or organizational role. Rather, it emphasized its interest in understanding the period from the points of view of each interest group. The Center supplied policy-relevant feedback from program evaluation research throughout the study, and made this available to all interested persons and groups.

2. What actions did the Liberals take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Liberals as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

The Conservative tactic was to discredit the Liberals, largely by foot dragging in the implementation of new programs, by encouraging escapes, and by publicizing these escapes as the effect of the new liberal programs.

3. Did some Liberals have higher standing than others? Which ones?

The commissioner and the liberal DYS staff members were most prominent within the Liberal Interest Coalition; outside groups took a sideline position except when they were called upon to interfere with the legislature. Among the more active members, the distribution of power, responsibilities, and reward was more mercurially to meet the tasks at hand; e.g., in finding placements for youth or stabilizing a regional administration of services.

4. What actions did some Liberals take that affected these differences in standing?

Supporting the fluid internal structure of the coalition, members of the coalition tended to ignore titles in assigning work, so that the distribution of power and responsibility would never become fixed.

5. What actions did the Conservatives take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Conservatives as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

The Conservative tactic was to discredit the Liberals, largely by foot dragging in the implementation of new programs, by encouraging escapes, and by publicizing these escapes as the effect of the new liberal programs.

6. Did some Conservatives have higher standing than others? Which ones?

Among the Conservatives, institutional staff occupied the most prominent position. Judges later achieved greater prominence when youth were transferred from institutions to community placements, and judges could exercise more authority.

7. What actions did some Conservatives take that affected these differences in standing?

Those Conservatives who were in a position to control youth used them as pawns in the political struggle. To these Conservatives, the youth were an important resource, whose placement in institutions or in the community, more so than the action of the Conservatives, determined differential standing among the Conservative Interest Coalition. The youth were considered an important resource because their behavior was conspicuous and an issue for the larger community.

8. What actions did the Formal Decision Makers take to influence the policies, programs, or organization of youth corrections—or the standing of the Formal Decision Makers as against other groups? That is, what were their tactics?

In early 1972 the Formal Decision-Making Group pursued liberalizing tactics, such as support of the liberal commissioner. This served to ally them with the more powerful coalition and ensured that some of their recommendations would be heeded. It also provided a basis for maintaining a reform-oriented constituency, which is frequently built up more rapidly than in a patronage-based constituency.

9. Did some Formal Decision Makers have higher standing than others? Which ones?

During this period, the continued collectivecourting of constituents supported a centralized group structure. Individual courting of constituents through patronage, however, steadily gained, and thereby fostered the new, more decentralized group structure.

10. What actions did some Formal Decision Makers take that affected these differences in standing?

During this period, the continued collectivecourting of constituents supported a centralized group structure. Individual courting of constituents through patronage, however, steadily gained, and thereby fostered the new, more decentralized group structure.

11. Thinking back over the actions or tactics of the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers, can you say how they all combined or intersected to affect controversial policies, programs, or organizations? Have the actions of some groups been more important than those of others?

The tactics of replace, liberalize, and discredit resulted in a balance of the forces of action that distinctly favored the liberal impetus, and therefore helped to replace the old correctional system with a new one.

12. Let's talk about the way the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers stood in relation to each other.

a. Did some of these three groups stand higher than others? Which ones?

Early in this period the Liberals, who previously shared power with the
Formal Decision-Making Group, held power alone. The Conservatives remained relatively powerless.

b. What was each group’s most important goal or reward, and how well did each group do, compared to the others, in achieving its goal?

The Formal Decision-Making Group aimed to further a consistent liberal policy rather than patronizing the actors (this later became the goal as a result of decentralization). Developing new programs was the goal of the Liberals, while the Conservatives sought to maintain conservative programming. Of the three groups, the Liberals were most successful.

13. How did the actions or tactics of the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Formal Decision Makers combine or interact to affect which of the three groups stood higher than others? Were the actions of some groups more important in this respect than those of others?

The tactics of the interest groups created a new balance of the forces of action, which served to shift power drastically to the left, leaving the Liberals in power without having to share it with the Formal Decision Makers. This radicalization, which occurred while the Formal Decision-Making Group was led by liberal leaders who supported the Liberal Interest Coalition, caused the decentralization of the Formal Decision-Making Group.

14. Let’s shift now and talk about the relationship between youth and the community during and after a youth’s stay in a program. What is the standing of youth in the community?

Youth held a rather low standing in the community during this period. Both lack of linkages with community institutions and a high rate of residential reflected their low position.

15. a. What actions by staff or youth affected relations between youth and the community?

Staff implemented new advocacy procedures designed to develop and maintain ties for the youth in the community, such as the University of Massachusetts Placement Conference, and separate regional administrations. In some cases, these new procedures later improved the standing of youth in the community.

b. Which of the following factors prevented DYS youth from succeeding in the community?

1. the state of the economy
2. lack of cooperation from schools
3. fear or hostility on the part of employers
4. haste by the police
5. lack of cooperation from the youths themselves
6. lack of support from DYS or its programs
7. bad family situations
8. other

Staff of DYS and its programs have always stressed how family situations as the key to many of the problems of DYS youth. During the active transition from institutional to community placement, however, staff became extremely conscious of handling by the police as a problem in reintegrating youth. On the positive side, youth themselves have consistently tried to stress their own determination and the help they received from people in the community. Realism studies suggest that help from DYS programs is also important.

16. What about relationships among people within youth correctional system and the programs that serve its youth? How was standing divided?

- a. among youth, between youth and program staff, or among program staff?

In early 1972 the therapeutic community orientation, which was developed in the institutions during the first part of the reform, prevailed. As a result, staff and youth shared responsibility and even a considerable amount of power. While there was still inequality in power, youth had more in relation to staff than was true in the old programs, and among youth the most physically strong were no longer automatically the most powerful.

- b. among regional and state level staff?

The newly created regional offices took on the responsibilities for youth placement and tracking from the central office. Although the regions were given considerable responsibility for the development of new placement options for youth, the central office retained control of policy.

- c. between regional and/or state level staff on the one hand and youth and/or program staff on the other?

At first, placement of youth in a given region, without notification (particularly during the closing of the institutions), aggregated the regional office staff; a regular pattern emerged as a significant strategy; indeed, somewhat later, half the youth not on traditional parole were in nonresidential programs.

- d. the nature of the actions of youth in response to the program?

Youth responded to the new programs with more consistently positive cultures than in the institutions. An interesting complication arose in what constituted a positive response—some of the most striking ones where therapeutic community turned out to be anathetical to even the outside programs in the "straitl" community. For example, the therapeutic community encouraged a form of responsibility for the behavior of others known in other settings as "linking" or titling. The new, more community-based programs, on the other hand, supported the anti-informing norms of the larger community into which they reintegrated their clients.

17. Thinking of all staff and youth in the entire youth correctional system and its programs, could you describe:

- a. the nature and rate of the youth intake process?

The courts directed youth into the system. Into intake individual programs, however, was now allotted by trial and error—sometimes with formal trial periods, sometimes by virtue of the youths' running from programs they did not like. An intake of youth was possible for a two-to-three month period in one region.

- b. in general terms, the nature, size, and setting of program strategies?

Secure programming and therapeutic communities continued in this period, but an emphasis on support without heavy therapeutic intervention replaced the dominant emphasis of previous periods on therapy. Foster homes became important. At the same time, nonresidential programming emerged as a significant strategy; indeed, somewhat later, half the youth not on traditional parole were in nonresidential programs.

- c. the nature of the actions of youth in response to the program?

Staff periodically reviewed youth in temporary residential placements, and frequently released them after three months. Youth in foster homes, schools, and nonresidential programs stayed longer. The degree of follow-up after release varied greatly.

e. actions by youth or staff affecting staff relations and organization?

A great many staff members were frequently transferred or retrained in less specialized jobs, which affected staff relationships and organization. The placement of youth also had a major effect, because transferring youth from institutions to private programs deprived the institutional staff of much of their power over the system. Similarly, when regions were notified of the delivery of youth to regional offices those offices had to assume their new responsibilities quickly and effectively.

Conceptualization and Theory

We have just described a crucial six-month period of the reform process by answering 17 questions. The first of these questions identified the actors, and the remaining 16 described the process in which these actors were involved. It is the process that we wish to analyze now.

The sequence of questions develops in blocks that correspond to different relationships. Questions 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the Liberal Interest Coalition (i.e., the relations among members of the collectivity of liberals). Questions 5, 6, and 7 concern the Conservative Interest Coalition (i.e., the relations among its members). Questions 8, 9, and 10 concern the Formal Decision-Making Group (i.e., the relations among the collectivity of formal decision makers). Questions 11, 12, and 13 concern more generally the Relationship Among Interest Groups. Thus the questions shift the focus from how people relate within the interest groups to how the interest groups as a whole relate to each other. Questions 14, 15, 16, and 17, finally, concern what we will call the People-Processing Relationship, the actual correctional process, or the relationship between clients and staff and its effect on the relationship of youth to the community.

We can think of each of the five relationships as a connection among its members. The connection has an indirect aspect, which concerns the external relations of a given group, and a direct aspect, which is internal to the group. These two aspects can be described by means of four variables, and by cross-classifying these with the five relationships in Table 6.1 we can quickly uncover the basic structure of the 16 questions used to describe the first half of 1972.

External Variables

1. The focal properties of the environment of the group; i.e., the arrangement and functioning of whatever the
The underlying structure identified in Table 6.2 serves as a basis for analyzing the relationships among variables - the key to describing the process of reform andcounting reform. The first step calls for the identification of logical principles and their implications, which flow from the underlying structure of the set of variables. We are then in a position to consider some empirically based principles that will allow us to make more specific predictions. The four logical principles are:

1. **Externally oriented process and structure.** Actions affecting focal properties of the environment causally influence those focal properties and are causally influenced by them.
2. **Externally oriented process and structure.** Actions affecting internal distributions causally influence those internal distributions and are causally influenced by them.
3. **Focal properties of the environment and internal structure.** Focal properties of the environment and internal distributions causally influence each other.
4. **External and internal process.** A single concrete behavior may contribute to both of the more abstract categories, actions affecting focal properties of the environment and actions affecting internal distributions.

If the actions affecting the internal distributions and the actions affecting the focal properties of the environment are thought of as process variables and if the focal properties and internal distributions are thought of as structural variables, then principles 1 and 2 are concerned with the interrelationship of process and structure, while principle 3 concerns the interrelationship of aspects of structure. Principle 4 concerns the interaction of relationships of process.

These four principles, when applied to the structure in Table 6.2, produce the possible relationships among variables that are specified in Figure 6.1.

In using 16 variables describing three or four aspects of five relationships, we find it convenient to conceive code names for the variables. We use three letters in parentheses to identify the relationship, followed by a letter or two to identify which of the four "aspect" variables we are referring to. For the People-Processing Relationship we use PPR, for the Relationship Among Interest Groups, RIG, for Liberal Interest Coalition, LIC, for Conservative Interest Coalition, CIC, and for Formal Decision-Making Group, FDMG. E signifies focal properties of the environment, and AE stands for actions affecting them. For internal distribution of responsibility, power, and reward, we use R, while AI represents actions affecting them.

Note that each of the 16 resultant variables directly or indirectly affects each other variable. The rows of Figure 6.1 indicate which other variables are direct causes of any given variable. The columns designate which other variables are directly caused by any given variable. By examining sequences of direct effects, one obtains indirect effects. For example, (LJC) affects three RIG variables which in turn affect many other variables. All the variables appearing in this expanding chain are indirect effects of (LJC). Note also that, by its very nature, the Relationship Among Interest Groups is an abstract representation of combined effects of the interest groups and, therefore, serves as a set of intervening variables between the interest group variables and the People-Processing Relationship variables. Hence Figure 6.1 does not show direct effects of interest group variables on the People-Processing Relationship, since these duplicate the effects of the interest group on the Relationship Among Interest Groups and the effects of the Relationship among Interest Groups on the People-Processing Relationship. We conceptualize each of the variables in Figure 6.1 as a simple nominal scale consisting of a few categories, or a multidimensional property space, or something in between.

To Figure 6.1, which represents possible effects, we add empirical principles that hypothetically apply to the specific situation with which we are concerned. The object is to specify the nature of each relationship between two variables indicated by an x in Figure 6.1. Some of these relationships may be null, but there can be no "new" relationships added that are not represented by x's in Figure 6.1. The added "empirical" principles are based on observation of the struggle over reform in Massachusetts from the mid-1960s to the present. While it is difficult to delineate fully all such principles, we summarize the main ones under the following five headings:

1. **Sequencing.** Promoting change in a relationship other than an interest in...
library distributions
actions affecting internal distributions.
Interest groups may not follow
properties.
production begins by moving to change
taneous effects both environment and

Specificatiof Variables
Liberal Interest
Coalition
(LIC) AE
(LIC) AI

Formal Decision-Making Group
(FDG) AE
(FDG) I
(FDG) AI

Conservative Interest
Coalition
(CIC) AE
(CIC) AI

Relationship Among Interest Groups
(RIG) 1
(RIG) AI
(RIG) AE

People-Processing
Relationship
(PPR) E
(PPR) I
(PPR) AI

staff and youth. With smaller groups of
youth, more personal relationships developed. Similar relationships de-
veloped in the community as the new programs capitalized on community
resources in order to survive. Less immediately obvious, but equally
important, however, was the relationship of the replacement tactic to
actions affecting the internal distributions of the Relationship Among Inter-
test Groups. Taking the youth out of the institutions and placing them in
new settings had the effect of removing them away from one set of staff
and handing them to another. As the youth were both prize and resource in
the struggle among interest groups, much like territory in war, the move
took away crucial resources from the institutional staff and gave them
instead to the new community-based staff. The institutional staff
lost the ability to sabotage reform by using its control over the youth to
encourage escapes or to provide them with "mixed messages," confounding
outsiders to established policy but tacitly supporting its subversion.
The staff of the community-based pro-
gress, on the other hand, gained the
ability to demonstrate that youth could be kept safely and sometimes
productively in the community.

The early part of 1972 also marked
a transition between two fundamen-
tally different sequence patterns in
the People-Processing Relationship.
Actions that centered around the
variable Actions Affecting Internal
Distributions characterized both the
custodial and reform-oriented institu-
tional programs. In stressing obedi-
ce and respect for authority on one
hand, and teaching new skills to youth
on the other, the custodial programs took actions to affect the distribu-
tion of responsibility, power, and
reward between youth and staff. The
staff hoped that the newly formed re-
lation between youth and staff
would have a constructive, almost
magical effect on the relationship of
the youth to the community. Simi-
larly, the therapeutic programs took
actions to affect the distribution of
responsibility, power, and reward
between youth and staff—emphasiz-
ing youth power in social skills and
understanding. Once again, the hope
was that these somewhat different,
newly formed relationships between
youth and staff would have a con-
structive effect on the relationship of
the youth to the community.

The new programs that emerged in
1972 were visible in the new actions
affecting both the focal properties of
the environment and the internal
distributions, although they did not
yet have visible consequences in the
form of new focal properties or new
internal distributions. These programs
differed from the old ones in that
they depended on developing such
actions simultaneously rather than
devoting almost solely those affect-
ing internal distributions alone,
as the old program had done. In addi-
tion to affecting the distributions of
responsibility, power and reward
between youth and the staff, the new
programs, unlike the old ones, served
as advocates for the youth in the com-
community. Thus staff members affected
the focal properties of the environ-
ment by working to get youth into
schools, jobs, and general community
programs—and to keep
them conformed to the rules of the sys-
stem itself, constituted actions af-
flecting the behavior of the youth and
rendered them powerless to
change either of these variables. Yet
such change was essential to produc-
ing change, by interest group action, in
the People-Processing Relationship.
However, the People-Processing Re-
lationship and its self-protective
influence over the other variables of
the Relationship Among Interest Groups are prone to weaken under
public investigation.

Our picture of early 1972 shows the
results of processes described by this
principle rather than the full proc-
ceses themselves. The investigations
of the Department of Youth Services and
the scandals of the late 1960s that
culminated in the so-called 1969 in a major public
expose mobilized the public and
government officials and led them to
take remedial action. The public
investigations of that period, aimed at
the functioning of the correctional
system itself, constituted actions af-
flecting the behavior of the youth and
the Relationship Among Interest Groups
and the People-Processing Relationship.
In effect, they thoroughly disrupted the People-
Processing Relationship and rendered
it and the Relationship Among Interest
Groups liable to change.

3. The Formal Decision-Making
Group as a ruling power. The Formal
Decision-Making Group is an essen-
tial ally for either the liberals or the
conservatives to win and it is not

Group is usually difficult unless one
begins by moving to change simulta-
neously both actions affecting focal
properties of the environment and
actions affecting internal distributions.
Internal distributions and focal prop-
erties affect each other, and, if atten-
tion is directed only to one, the other
may neutralize the intended changes.
Interest groups may not follow this
rule because they are less likely to con-
tain internal opposition to change in
the course of pursuing a line of action.

The replacement tactic of the Liberal
Interest Coalition, in affecting the
Relationship Among Interest Groups,
dramatically illustrated this principle.
Taking the youth from the training
schools and placing them in altern-
tive settings in the community was,
during the first part of 1972, the
dominant force both in actions af-
fecting the focal properties of the
environment and actions affecting the
internal distributions of the Relation-
ship Among Interest Groups. A con-
tributor to the actions affecting the focal properties of the environment,
it led to new relationships between

100
much affected by the characteristics of the People-Procesing Relationship per se since it is interested in the decision-making process, not in substantive issues.

Members of this group pursue liberal or conservative interests by means of their simultaneous membership in their own group and in either the Liberal Interest Coalition or the Conservative Interest Coalition.

The changes that occurred in early 1972 were made possible by a shift of alliances in the late 1960s. At that time, the Formal Decision-Making Group decided that continued support of the Conservative Interest Coalition constituted a liability and began, instead, to support the liberals in their attempt to implement change.

Alliances shifted once more during the early part of 1972. This time, the Liberal Interest Coalition had alienated the Formal Decision-Making Group. As a result the internal distributions of the Formal Decision-Making Group changed, with the members taking over control of the youth corrections issue as the group became decentralized (i.e., lacked a consistent policy on this issue). The consequence was that after 1972 a conservative backlash grew steadily behind the scenes, rendering Liberal control tenuous at best.

4. Responsiveness of the Liberal Interest Coalition to the People-Procesing Relationship. Liberal and conservative groups are both affected by the People-Procesing Relationship per se, since both are interested in substance. Both are likely to use extreme tactics when they are in danger of losing control or cannot quickly change that relationship as they want when they do have control. Both tend to stop pushing when they get what they want, and in doing become more vulnerable to attack.

In early 1972, both the Liberal Interest Coalition and the Conservative Interest Coalition responded to the state of the People-Procesing Relationship. The Conservatives tried to discredit the Liberals. Responding to their failure to completely reform the old institutional system, the Liberals adopted the extreme tactic of replacing the entire system. With the establishment of a new system, the Liberals, after 1972, relaxed their efforts and became more vulnerable to the growing possibility of a Conservative backlash.

5. Short and long-run effects of extreme tactics. Extreme tactics by Liberals or Conservatives that push the Formal Decision-Making Group to alienate that group by upsetting its internal distributions, leading to changes in its goals. At the same time these tactics may achieve their immediate objectives, while risking long-run defeat.

Such a process began in early 1972 when the Formal Decision-Making Group shifted sides because of its own loss of power while supporting the Liberals. The process was slow enough so that the new system could be implemented and functioning before the Conservative backlash, supported by the Formal Decision-Making Group, became a real threat.

Having established and defined our variables and postulated the logical principles by which they are manipulated and the empirical principles of their interactions, we move to a summary analysis that uses these tools simultaneously. If we establish an extremely simplified list of possible values for each variable and set up equations representing the relationships among the variables according to the principles indicated, we are struck by the degree to which the resulting simulation reproduces the history of the reforms. Such a simulation tells the story of a Liberal group attacking a conservatively run corrections system by investigating it publicly, thus provoking the Conservatives to respond by dismissing their critics, including the members of the Formal Decision-Making Group. This dismissal alludes the crucial support of the Formal Decision-Making Group from the Conservatives so that the Liberals can then resume their investigations and topple the Conservative administration, replacing it with their own reform administration, which they subsequently replace in turn with a new community-based regime. In the process of shifting from reforming the old system to replacing it with the new system, the liberals, acting as the Formal Decision-Making Group, as the Conservatives had done earlier, by rejecting its right to criticize. While the Liberals were able to complete the implementation of their new programs, the possibility of backlash and restoration of the old, Conservative regime grows behind the scenes.

The story told by the simulation, which was calculated in early 1974, is indeed the story of the Massachusetts youth correctional reform, and the logical character of the process generating the simulation dispels much of the mystery that has been thought to shroud the reform process. The warning with which the simulation ends echoes an actual concern of observers and key actors in Massachusetts today, in 1976, although observations in our study suggest that additional factors may be indeed intervening so that the new liberal system will not collapse in the next few years.

These new factors can be summarized as the tendency for the political system to move on to new issues without waiting to see whether old issues are really resolved. Such a long-run tendency saves a specific issue area like juvenile corrections from being caught in a perpetual cycle of rapid, virtually identical revolutions. Nonetheless, as of 1976 the future remains in doubt. Consolidation has meant inactivity, rather than the tidying up of loose ends like secure care—the Achilles heel of many correctional systems. Failure to deal with what to do with a minority of "hard to handle" youth, about 125 out of 2,000 under the care of the DYS, has allowed pressure to build up around the issue. At the same time the department, although confronted by a court case and a mandate from the governor, has failed to close the last and most oppressive institution in the system, the detention center at Roslindale. Thus, even though the forces of the Conservative Interest Coalition are weaker than that suggested in the simulation, the defenses of the Liberal Interest Coalition are also very weak, and tangentially related disturbances in budget and other legislative problems may have erratically favorable effects for the Conservatives.

Implications for Replicability

The study described in these pages needs to be replicated not only in a wide variety of correctional settings, but also in other people-processing systems. It is important that the more general subject of study, the political process of reform, be a viable alternative in situations other than Massachusetts youth corrections. But a seven-year study using a large staff and a wide variety of data-gathering and analysis techniques, raises difficult questions of replicability—not only whether or not the techniques are explicit and clear, but whether it is practical to repeat such a long-term commitment of resources. On a practical level, such studies are not being directly, and probably should not be. Therefore, one of the objectives of the DYS study has been the development of compact, readily transferable methodologies and techniques, so that the large-scale, diffuse work can underlie more compact methods in later projects and that the need for repetition on the same scale. An important fruit of this endeavor is the act of questions from our key participant interview, which we used as the framework for the first section of this article. These questions represent the refinement of a set of definitions that we have employed in the codification and analysis of data since the beginning of the project, and which we have subjected to repeated revision and improvement. Only recently have we come to believe that the process has been sufficiently refined to stand alone as interview items. Our initial interviews indicate that the questions do work quite well and can be administered in an interview lasting less than an hour and a half or, if the interviewer chooses to exhaust all answers from the respondent, up to five hours. We have been amazed and gratified at the interest respondents have shown in the interview.

The interview provides a means of expensively collecting data in a variety of settings. Its questions can also be used as a guide in participant observation and in other data collection techniques. Finally, as indicated here, the formal structure underlying the interview permits an extensive analysis that is powerfully predictive and of great practical value in making policy decisions and in developing strategies to implement those policy decisions. People involved in setting up correctional and mental health group homes in specific neighborhood programs and developers, and a variety of activists with whom we have discussed the interview find it a useful tool.\footnote{\textcopyright{} Robert B. Coxes and Alan D. Miller, "Evaluating Large Scale Social Service Systems in Changing Environments: The Case of Commonwealth Agencies," in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency (July 1975), pp. 92-106.} We now have a tool for doing comparative analyses of the change process in different settings. This comparison type of analysis is essential if the insights of case studies are not to be brought to bear on practical efforts to reform in diverse settings. But what about the political process that has been the object of this study—can that be replicated? We believe it can, and that it is not a unique or new process, Massachusetts, in which we find a mixture of conservative and liberal groups, is not a particularly unique place; the basic shaping of interest coalitions, liberal, conservative and swing power, appears to be a common to many conflict situations. The importance of the dynamics of the relationship of the other groups to the swing power has been present in a variety of other settings, notably in the civil rights movement of the early 1960s. Then, nonviolent tactics were used to provoke an opposing response that alienated support in the federal
government and in the rest of the country. One finds the sequencing principle—the simultaneous promotion of new actions affecting internal distributions and new actions affecting focal properties—in major instances of correctional reform, such as the Wisconsin reforms of the late 1940s and early 1950s and Hawaiian reforms of the same period. What happened in Massachusetts was neither an accident of forces nor the result of one person's personality. Rather, it evolved as a concerted, systematic movement that followed principles observable in other examples of major change. While it is true that some personalities are better suited for the leadership of change efforts, the basic principles of reform can be identified, learned, and taught.

Lloyd E. Ohlin, unpublished manuscript.

VII. Preliminary Thoughts On Generalizing From The Massachusetts Experience

The possibility that the experience of one state might shed light on the problems encountered elsewhere has been a key motivation behind the Center for Criminal Justice investigation of juvenile corrections in Massachusetts. While the present study cannot fully evaluate the generalizability of its findings to other situations and other states, and the Center plans future research to address such questions, it is important to approach the question now with the data that are available. The results suggest that what has been learned in Massachusetts probably applies to developments in other states.

We will first describe in summary form some comparisons of the reformed system in Massachusetts with those of other states. We will then consider data drawn largely from the Uniform Crime Reports and the U.S. Census to determine whether Massachusetts is unusual in ways that are relevant to the possibility of reform.

Some Comparisons of the Reformed System in Massachusetts with Other State Systems

Table 7.1 shows that as of 1974 Massachusetts had as low a rate of institutionalization of juvenile offenders per 100,000 population as any state in the nation, and had ties with one other state. Among 48 states measured it ranked first in the percentage of juvenile offenders in state programs who were placed in community-based residential programs, and as high as any other state in the percentage of its juvenile corrections budget allocated to community-based residential programs. In addition, LEAA's Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facility Census of 1972-73 reported Massachusetts as having the largest percentage decrease in the number of juveniles in public detention and correctional facilities of any state.

Table 7.2 demonstrates that Massachusetts has been ordinary in the number of its offenders in state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs per 100,000 population, but ranked fourth out of 48 states in the number of offenders in state-released community-based residential programs per 100,000.

1 The comparative data presented in this section have been provided by the National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections from a forthcoming report: see Robert D. Winter, George Down, and John Hall, "Juvenile Corrections in the States: Residential Programs on Deinstitutionalization, A Preliminary Report" (Ann Arbor, Mich.: National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, 1976).

Table 7.1
Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of institutionalization of juvenile offenders per 100,000 total population (1974)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.8 (50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deinstitutionalization: percentage of all offenders in state juvenile programs who are in community-based residential programs (1974)</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.7% (48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>9.4% (42)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3% (48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2
Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of offenders in state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs per 100,000 total population (1974)</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.4 (42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3
Selected Statistics on State-Related Juvenile Corrections, Part C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Massachusetts</th>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita expenditures for state institutions, camps, community-based residential programs, and foster care programs (1974)</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2.09 (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Problems of Generalizing

"Could these reforms occur elsewhere?" The answer to this requires formidable difficulties. Generalizations that call for more than simple comparisons of Massachusetts and other states. The question requires an assessment of the particular conditions that seem critically necessary for reform to take place, and the prevalence of these conditions. In this report we can only begin the task.

We will compare three types of data from Massachusetts before the closing of its institutions with similar data from other states. First, there are data on admissions and detention rates, supplied by Vinter and Sarri's National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections, which are relevant because we must know whether correctional practices in Massachusetts were already unusual before the state began to close its institutions. Second, data from the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI are relevant because we need to know if the crime problems of Massachusetts were unusual before the closing of the institutions. Usually heavy crime rates raise the possibility that deinstitutionalization might be impractical or politically unfeasible. We have seen from the summary provided in the first chapter of this volume that the process of deinstitutionalization is a highly political one, subject to much uncertainty. How serious people perceive the crime problem to be may crucially affect their willingness to undertake liberal reforms.

Third, there are census data, which provide a minimal profile of the constituency of the political actors in the process of reform. Posed briefly: Is the population of Massachusetts an unusual collection of people, and, therefore, more likely to tolerate or support reform?

Admissions and Detention

Table 7.4 shows that, according to Vinter and Sarri, Massachusetts was already below the national mean in rate of admissions to public institutions per 100,000 youths, but that it was also already lowering that rate substantially faster than average. In other words, in 1971, for which we have data, Massachusetts was already beginning to deinstitutionalize. Even so, Massachusetts was admitting youth to institutions in 1971 at a considerably higher rate than the minimum found in fifty states. In 1971 we also find Massachusetts about average in its rate of detention of juveniles, per 100,000 youths.

Uniform Crime Reports

Table 7.5 displays data on Massachusetts, selected other states, and the United States as a whole. Table 7.5 at once suggests that Massachusetts was not unusual at the turn of the decade in its crime rates and casts doubt on the relevance of crime rates as a precondition of reform in the first place. Massachusetts had a slightly higher than average total crime rate per 100,000 population. This total crime rate was made up of a considerably lower than average violent crime rate and a somewhat higher than average property crime rate. It might be tempting to conclude that the lower violent crime rate might have been a critical factor in allowing Massachusetts to begin reform, but two circumstances suggest caution. First, much of the rhetoric about crime and about troublesome youth concern property crime; e.g., car theft. Second, it is clear from Table 7.5 that California, long known for its continual efforts at youth correctional reform, has one of the highest rates of Violent Crime, and Wisconsin, known specifically for its tendencies toward deinstitutionalization, has one of the lowest.

We are forced to conclude that nothing in the Massachusetts crime

Table 7.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rate of admissions to public institutions per 100,000 youths (1971)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>2,740.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>2,334.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>2,703.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>3,666.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>1,400.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>2,228.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky</td>
<td>1,662.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>2,022.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis.</td>
<td>1,382.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fla.</td>
<td>3,165.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>4,137.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2,476.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state institutions, camps, and community-based residential programs (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$3,323.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$2,740.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state institutions and camps (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$1,167.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$1,167.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state-related community-based residential programs (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$2,570.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$2,570.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rate of admissions to public institutions per 100,000 youths (1971)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>2,334.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>2,703.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,662.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>2,022.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis.</td>
<td>1,382.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fla.</td>
<td>3,165.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>4,137.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2,476.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state institutions, camps, and community-based residential programs (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$3,323.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$2,740.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state institutions and camps (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$1,167.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$1,167.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Per capita expenditures for state-related community-based residential programs (1974)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>$2,570.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>$2,570.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
profile uniquely predisposes the state toward reform at the beginning of the decade. The rate for violent crime was indeed low, but Massachusetts shares its reform orientation with at least one major state with an unusually high rate of violence. The Center is currently making arrangements to secure more detailed data than is normally published in the Uniform Crime Reports; these will allow a much more exacting comparison and a fuller search for the special characteristics of Massachusetts that might be relevant to reform.

For the present, our results suggest that if anything in the crime picture contributes to the likelihood of reform, it is the uncertainty of the relevance of a particular crime profile. This may be no small contribution. The picture of the reform process in Massachusetts is one in which political forces predominate over certain technical knowledge. In general, uncertainty exists about what will work, and certainty exists about what will not work, the political nature of reform where the political nature of the decision not to reform probably contributes to the political nature of reform where reform occurs, and to the political nature of the decision not to reform where reform does not occur. In other words, a crime profile can be used to justify reform depending upon the power of the relevant groups. A state cannot simply look around at other states and decide on the basis of its crime statistics compared to theirs whether it should be engaging in reform. The decision is left to internal political forces.

**Crime Data**

The people of Massachusetts are the constituency behind the political process. Are they different from the people of other states?

Table 7.6 shows that the population of Massachusetts is not unusual in median age, percent between ages 10 and 17, or percent male. Massachusetts is one of the states with a very high percentage of white population, and this might be a factor in whatever correctional reform, except that the white percentage is not unusual among the New England states, and California, known for its reform orientation, has a substantially lower percentage. Massachusetts again has an unusually high percentage of foreign stock, but this is also true of other northeastern states that have not pursued such drastic reforms. Massachusetts is slightly above average in median years of school completed, although not quite as high as California.

In Table 7.7 Massachusetts emerges as high in its percentage of white-collar workers, but again, it shares this distinction with other states—Connecticut, New York, Florida, and California, among others. It is also high in the percentage of its workforce involved in manufacturing, but so are Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin. It is low in the percentage of workers who drive their own car to work, and, notably, Massachusetts has been the scene of some successful political battles to cut down on investment in highway construction in favor of mass transportation. However, Massachusetts shares its low percentage of drivers with Pennsylvania, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and it is radically outstripped by New York.

Finally, Table 7.7 demonstrates that there is nothing spectacular in either direction about the median income of Massachussetts residents. The median income for households of six or more persons, however, does look a little better than that of many other states.

Table 7.8 pursues that point further and shows that Massachusetts is low in the percentage of its families below the poverty line. Connecticut is even lower, however, and Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin are close. In the percentage of families with six or more children below the poverty line, Massachusetts is more spectacularly below average, but, again, the distinction is shared with several other states. It is worth noting that Kentucky and Florida, two states with high percentages of large families below the poverty line, have also become known for some efforts at correctional reform. Massachusetts is more spectacularly below average, but, again, the distinction is shared with several other states. It is worth noting that Kentucky and Florida, two states with high percentages of large families below the poverty line, have also become known for some efforts at correctional reform.

Table 7.8 also shows Massachusetts low in percentage of owner-occupied housing with more than one person per room and also low in owner-occupied housing with more than one person per room. In neither case, however, is the low percentage unique. In owner-occupied housing, other states with low percentages are Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and Pennsylvania, while in renter-occupied housing, other low states are Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.

Massachusetts is also low in the percentage of housing with simultaneously more than one person per room and less than complete plumbing. However, again, it is not atypical of the southern New England states.

It is quite urban, but so are Rhode Island, New York, Illinois, Florida, and California. In the days before the current economic slump, Massachusetts had a rather ordinary unemployment rate for all males over 16 years of age, but an unusually low unemployment rate for females, a distinction shared with Connecticut, although several other states came close.

Table 7.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Median age</th>
<th>Percent 10-17</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisc.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percent white-collar (male)</th>
<th>Percent experienced civilian labor force 14 and over in manufacturing</th>
<th>Percent workers driving to work in their own car</th>
<th>Median income all households</th>
<th>Median income households of 6 or more persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>$ 9,563</td>
<td>$12,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>10,877</td>
<td>13,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>6,722</td>
<td>11,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>9,268</td>
<td>11,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>8,548</td>
<td>11,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>9,706</td>
<td>12,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>6,537</td>
<td>8,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>8,753</td>
<td>11,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisc.</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>8,997</td>
<td>11,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fl.</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>7,168</td>
<td>9,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>9,302</td>
<td>11,813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.9 shows that Massachusetts is low in the percentage of families below the poverty line. Connecticut is even lower, however, and Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin are close. It is worth noting that Kentucky and Florida, two states with high percentages of large families below the poverty line, have also become known for some efforts at correctional reform.

Table 7.8 also shows Massachusetts low in percentage of owner-occupied housing with more than one person per room and also low in owner-occupied housing with more than one person per room. In neither case, however, is the low percentage unique. In owner-occupied housing, other states with low percentages are California, Arizona, and Florida.
**Table 7.8**
Consr Characteristics, Part C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percent of families below poverty line, in areas of 250,000 or more</th>
<th>Percent of owner occupied housing with more than 1 person/room</th>
<th>Percent of renter occupied housing with more than 1 person/room</th>
<th>Percent of urban housing with more than 1 person/room and lacking same plumbing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisc.</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fla.</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.9**
Consr Characteristics, Part D.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population per square mile</th>
<th>Percent of civilian labor force, 16 and over employed</th>
<th>Percent of 14 and 15 year olds in unemployed civilian labor force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.I.</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>85.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisc.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fla.</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cal.</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

exactly average, but is far from unique. We have not systematically addressed through more sophisticated multivariate techniques the question of whether variations such as those we have looked at may be mildly conducive to reform. The National Assessment study will include analysis of to that point. What we have established is that Massachusetts, unique in its correctional reform, is far from unique in its general profile. There are two implications: (1) what happened in Massachusetts probably could happen elsewhere; and (2) the critical enabling factors were probably the vagaries of internal politics and not of general demographic profiles.

**Generalizing about the Practical Process**

If Massachusetts is not unique in its general statistical profile and if it appears that the key to its unusual reform lies in its political process, the question arises, "How generalizable is the pattern of the political process found in the Massachusetts reform?"

Our preliminary analysis of such other data on reform processes as are available suggests that while some details of the Massachusetts experience are specific to Massachusetts, the broad outlines of the political process described in the beginning of this volume are widely applicable outside. Conflict situations frequently contain a "pro" group, an "anti" group, and some sort of formal decision-making group that operates as a swing power. That much is almost axiomatic in correctional and governmental politics. It is also strikingly evident in other major struggles for change, such as the civil rights movement of the 1960s, where much of the country, including the federal government, was mobilized as a swing power to affect the struggle between blacks and whites in the south. The dynamics of manipulating this situation also appear to be generalizable. In Massachusetts the liberal group, out of power, provoked the conservatives, who were in power, to repudiate the authority of the formal decision-making group, thus alienating that group’s support from the conservatives and making it available to the liberals. This kind of tactic was central to the nonviolent campaigns of the civil rights movement, where the southern whites were provoked into publicly alienating the support of much of the rest of the country. Analysis of other correctional reforms also suggests the general importance of this tactic. When Wisconsin succeeded in implementing major correctional reforms in the 1950s the former head of the system joined in the investigation and became second in command in the new system at the same salary. The press was moved to comment that in the stormy history of correctional reform in Wisconsin this man’s reaction to investigation was unique. Almost all officials could be provoked to repudiate the formal decision-making groups, and hence to contribute to their own downfall. The Wisconsin administrator, who simply joined in the new movement instead, was truly unusual.

Most important, one can clearly generalize about the broad strategy of combining change efforts with the simultaneous development of new actions that affect the internal distribution of responsibility, power, and reward and new actions that affect the focal properties of the environment in any one of the five relationships we identified as critical. Other analyses of reform in the Hawaiian correctional system by McKinsey and the in the Wisconsin system by Ollin and others show dramatic use of this strategy of “change on all fronts at once.”

These issues will be explored at greater length in books forthcoming from the research project. In the interim we can point out that there is also another basis for evaluating generalizability. Quite apart from noting similar processes outside Massachusetts, we can point to similar processes at other levels of analysis within Massachusetts. The same principles of change strategy that are evident in the state level reform efforts in Massachusetts are also evident in the local community level (for example, when the issue is whether local residents will accept a group home in their neighborhood). We have also found that the same principles apply whether the group home is a correctional one or one for the mentally retarded. Additionally, in conferences with programs evulators in Massachusetts and across the country, we have found that re-creating the same principles facilitates the evaluation of programs in corrections and in other fields where there are multiple interest groups and multiple goals associated with change. Finally, in consultation with program developers we have similarly found that the principles observed in the Massachusetts reform consistently re-emerge. They can prove helpful, when recognized, in identifying desired directions of program development, such as the analysis of community linkages for program clients, and the relationship of those linkages to other aspects of the program.

In conclusion, the reform that has taken place in Massachusetts youth corrections are clearly not replicable. They were brought about by common political means in a state that displays no statistical uniqueness. They can be replicated in other areas within Massachusetts and in other states.
Publications of the
Juvenile Correctional Reform
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2. Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Evaluating Large Scale Social Service Systems in Changing Environments: The Case of Correctional Agencies," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 12 (July 1975), pp. 92-106. Identifies problems confronting research on changing systems and specifies strategies for looking at systems undergoing change. Stresses the importance of looking at entire systems rather than focusing on specific programs. Represents the project's early effort at coping with the ever changing DYS system and coordinating the project's organizational and evaluation interests.

3. Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Neutralization of Community Resistance to Group Homes," in Yitzhak Bakal, Closing Correctional Institutions. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973. Analysis of the process of setting up a group home. Three successful and three unsuccessful attempts were studied. Results underscore the importance of knowing the community and developing appropriate strategies for the type of community. Experience shows that an informed group using appropriate strategies can establish a program in a relatively short time period.

4. Coates, Robert B., Miller, Alden D., and Ohlin, Lloyd E. "The Labeling Perspective and Innovation in Juvenile Correctional Systems," in Nicholas Hobbs, ed., Issues in the Classification of Children: A Sourcebook on Categories, Labels, and Their Consequences. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1975. The underlying ideas of the DYS reform effort rest, in part, on the labeling perspective. This article looks at the labeling perspective as it relates to reform in juvenile corrections around the country but most specifically in Massachusetts. It identifies key decision points in the correctional process and describes attempts to reduce the negative consequences of labeling at those points.


This paper adapts material from other reports to address an audience of applied sociologists on the subject of strategies and conceptualization of change.


9. Ohlin, Lloyd E. "Organizational Reform in Correctional Agencies," in Daniel Glaser, ed., Handbook of Criminology, Rand McNally, 1974. A discussion of organizational reform in correctional agencies. Identifies sources of support for change, specifies the importance of considering the dynamics of reform, particularly in terms of vested interest groups and crisis resolution. This article provided the orientation for formulating the original objectives of the research project.


12. Ohlin, Lloyd E., Coates, Robert B., and Miller, Alden D. "Radical Correctional Reform: A Case Study of the Massachusetts Youth Correctional System," in Harvard Educational Review, 44 (February 1974). Represents the project's first effort at describing in some detail the reform process from the mid-1960s through 1973. Includes fragmentary comparisons of youth responses concerning the new system with institutional baseline data. While problems are identified, data tend to support the direction of the reform effort.