INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT

In Response to a Request for Technical Assistance

by the

Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau

#160

August 8, 1973

Prepared by:

Public Administration Service
1313 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

(Per Contract J–LEAA–015–72)

I. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

A. Consultants Assigned:

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B. Date Assignment Received:

April 4, 1973

C. Date of Contact with LEAA Regional Coordinator:

April 6, 1973

D. Dates of On–Site Consultation:

McCabe: April 10–12 and 23–24, 1973
Arenberg: May 1–3, 1973

E. Individuals Contacted:

McCabe: Not available.
Arenberg: Mr. Edward R. Cooper
Oregon Law Enforcement Council

Mr. Norman W. Duncan
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Portland Crime Prevention Bureau

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Multnomah County Department of Public Safety

Mr. Michael D. Letter
Office of Justice Coordination and Planning

Mr. Joe Andrus
Office of Justice Coordination and Planning

Ms. Patricia Bridge
Office of Justice Coordination and Planning

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. **Problem as per Request for Technical Assistance:**

Evaluation of the CRISS crime file system and design of a training program for intelligence activities of the Impact Strike Force.

B. **Problem Actually Observed:**

As stated.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

See attached Consultants' Reports.

IV. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

See attached Consultants' Reports.

V. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

See attached Consultants' Reports.

CONSULTANT'S REPORT:

LEROY B. MCCABE

Introduction

The consulting activities described herein were directed at the following tasks:

1. Evaluation of the CRISS (Columbia Region Information Sharing System) crime file system in terms of its adequacy for target crime analysis by the Portland Police Bureau Strike Force staff, Tactical Planning Section.

2. Recommendations for tools, techniques, and methodology to be used in tactical planning operations.

3. Recommendations for Tactical Planning Section visits to other operational crime analysis units.

4. Recommendations for an "interim" system of data collection to be used until CRISS crime file is operational.

5. Recommendations as to any possible methods to accelerate further the CRISS crime file development.

Ten days were allotted to the task, two of which were reserved for a follow-up visit about 60 days after the completion of the initial study. The recommendations and comments presented below are based on visits and discussions with the Portland Police Bureau, the Oregon Office of Law Enforcement Planning, and CRISS personnel.

CRISS Crime File

The data elements currently identified for the CRISS crime file appear to be adequate for target crime analysis, insofar as providing historical (current and longer term) pictures of crime activity. It is doubtful that any significant "predictive" capability can be realized without incorporating data from other sources (informants, etc.). However, the CRISS crime file should provide a good capability for making modus operandi searches and correlations as well as for producing traditional reports (required and otherwise) such as Uniform Crime, Crimes by Hour and Day, Crimes by Radio District, Census Tract, Grid, etc. *Should CRISS not become operational until a significant period of time after the initiation of the Strike Force Project, it will have considerable impact on any "interim" system established* (see comments below under that section). Comments on the CRISS crime file are based on the stated objectives and capabilities presented through currently available documentation and discussions and *not* on an intensive analysis of the system itself.

Tactical Planning Operations

Current plans for presenting crime data and preliminary analysis information should provide the maximum possible information under a manual mode of operation (as envisioned in the "interim" system discussed below). If the information from all other sources (e.g., informants) can be correlated and presented in the same timely fashion, a significantly increased targetting capability (resource allocation) should be achieved. The display of this correlated material must be protected from inadvertant disclosure to unauthorized personnel. Whenever possible, new information on existing crime activities should be flagged to alert Strike Force personnel.

Visits to Other Operational Crime Analysis Units

The following units were recommended as potentially valuable sources of information about operational systems and problems in the area of crime analysis. Selections were based on apparent similarities in crime targets (rather than size of city, area, etc.) and geographic proximity to Portland, Oregon. It was not anticipated that any specific solution(s) could be found for Portland's Strike Force, but rather an opportunity would be available to confront (and discuss with the people concerned) units involved with similar objectives and needs in criminal justice information systems.

1. California Department of Justice
   Bureau of Criminal Statistics

2. California Council on Criminal Justice
   Crime Specific Program

3. Oakland Police Department
   Crime Specific Program

4. Long Beach Police Department
   Public Safety Subsystem

5. Orange County
   Crime Specific Program

6. Los Angeles Police Department
   PATRIC Project

CONSULTANT'S REPORT:

SHELDON I. ARENBERG

Introduction

On May 1, 2, and 3, 1973, this writer met, discussed, and consulted with various groups and individuals associated with the Portland—LEAA High Impact Program. The meetings were held in Salem and Portland, Oregon.

Two topics were specifically covered: the role of criminal intelligence in the Portland—LEAA High Impact Program and evaluation techniques applicable to the overall program. The results of these discussions were initially reported in a draft document which was sent to the Oregon Law Enforcement Council for review and comments. No substantial changes were suggested. However, the Council did forward additional documentation which was germane to the discussions. A review of these documents as well as the initial draft is contained in this final report.

Intelligence

Theory

Criminal intelligence is the end product of a complex process; sometimes physical, always intellectual. The end product is most often an informed judgment. However, it may also simply be a thoughtful description of a state of affairs or a single fact or a best guess. The process which generates these judgments, descriptions, or facts is called the intelligence process. When applied to law enforcement, the term is modified to criminal intelligence.

The process includes the collection of data, the collation (or combining and storage) of data, the evaluation and analysis of the collected and stored data, and the dissemination of the analyzed and evaluated material. Collection and storage are traditional pursuits of law enforcement agencies; the other parts of the intelligence process tend to be less well understood and consequently in some cases hardly practiced at all. A basic premise of criminal intelligence theory is that the systematic exploitation of raw data through the operation of the intelligence process can provide law enforcement with a high-quality end product. The process turns information into intelligence.

The criminal intelligence process is comprised of a series of interconnected functions or activities: collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, reporting, dissemination, and reevaluation. The products of each, beginning with collection, feed into and are essential to the operation of the adjoining function. At the same time there is continuous feedback as the performance of functions further down the process indicates that something should be done in one or more of the prior functions back up the line. For example, should a clear need for more information develop while a report is being prepared, a request can be made for the collection of additional data to the investigator, informant, or whatever source is available. This information, when received, would go through all steps of the process, through collation and analysis, and be inserted into the report being drafted. The process is ordinarily thought to be completed when the report is disseminated.

However, from the point of view of managing the process, the function of reevaluation must still be performed. This function involves continuous review of the operation of the process in order to detect any weak points before they cause major problems. Part of this function is the determination of how well the products of the process are serving the consumer(s); this is known as feedback and is the final act that in fact closes the loop of the intelligence process.

This discussion should not create a misconception that an intelligence unit in operation should be rigid and highly compartmentalized. The intelligence process is dynamic, and in most units personnel involved will perform more than one function. It is often difficult to separate neatly one function from another. Finally, the commander of the unit, who is the manager of the process, will be making daily decisions regarding one or more elements of the process. The decisions could call for a shift in collection efforts, a change in the filing system, a different focus in analysis, a modification of reporting, or perhaps only changes in dissemination.

Many who are involved in criminal intelligence tend to forget the components that make up the total process. As each person focuses on his own part of the process or as several parts or functions are performed by one person, the distinctions between the elements tend to blur. An individual may be aware that he is performing several particular functions, but he may not be able to discern where one component in the process ends and another begins. It is vital to understand each specific function in order to design the most effective system for the total process. This is not to say that there need be a separate office, much less a separate person, to do each function; but it is important that an intelligence unit be aware of all specific activities to be performed and, therefore, confident that each is being performed as efficiently as possible. It is equally important that the criminal intelligence process be viewed and operated as a systematic integration of each of the functions.

Given this admittedly elementary description of the criminal intelligence process, the question arises "Why have it within a law enforcement agency?" Essentially, criminal intelligence is a planning aid for law enforcement management. It provides informed alternative actions from which the manager may pick and choose. An effective intelligence operation can advise on various types of patrol deployments, recommend fruitful investigations, and suggest prudent expenditures of time, manpower, and material resources. Perhaps most importantly, an effective criminal intelligence unit can recognize trends and therefore advise on actions rather than reactions. Criminal intelligence can assist management in the utilization of the entire law enforcement agency, particularly in terms of crime specific issues.

Observations

From a review of the available documentation pertaining to the Portland—LEAA High Impact Program and discussion with various Portland Police Bureau personnel, it is apparent that the utility of criminal intelligence is fully appreciated. This appreciation is manifested in various types of equipment that are to be procured, the disbursement and

management of confidential funds, and various action programs requiring discrete surveillance and undercover operations. Furthermore, the utilization of criminal intelligence is implicit in much of the planning regarding the deployment of Portland law enforcement personnel under their Strike Force concept.

Such concern for criminal intelligence, explicitly as well as implicitly, is to be commended. It indicates an acute awareness that the abatement of burglary and many stranger-to-stranger crimes require more than classic preventive patrolling, apprehension, and/or clearance. For example, burglary abatement programs throughout the United States have shown that the correlation between narcotics and burglary is definitely positive. Furthermore, there is growing statistical evidence that organized crime is providing the principal conduit for the movement of burgled items to the market place.

However, it appeared to this consultant that the Portland Police Bureau's criminal intelligence efforts are fragmented throughout the agency. That is, it appeared that the burglary unit undertakes its own intelligence operations as does the narcotics unit with regard to the interdiction of narcotics operations in the Portland area. Furthermore, it appeared that the Portland intelligence unit restricted itself to specific aspects of commercial enterprises, militants and revolutionaries, and bomb activities, real and hoax. This writer presumes that intelligence related to gambling, prostitution, labor racketeering, loan sharking, etc., are handled by those organic units within the Portland Police Bureau responsible for their suppression.

If this writer's supposition regarding the fragmentation of Portland's criminal intelligence is valid, it is recommended that the Portland Police Bureau give careful consideration (as part of their Reorganization Plan) to the development and implementation of a centralized intelligence unit. Many of Portland's criminal problems are the result of or influenced by the existence of organized crime. The relationship between burglary or robbery and narcotics is one example. The relationship between gambling, loan sharking, hijacking, and warehouse thefts has long been accepted among urban law enforcement agencies.

Special weapons are needed to combat organized crime. Unlike the street gang or the single hoodlum, criminal syndicates have, as their name suggests, an organization behind them. To successfully combat these and many other crimes implicit in Portland–LEAA High Impact Program, an effective criminal intelligence organization is required. Such an organization will present the targets for an integrated law enforcement agency. The result should be the abatement of crime. A fragmented intelligence process will have little effect on the problems being addressed by the Impact Program.

For these reasons, and many more, all law enforcement agencies are presented with a special and difficult challenge. A single arrest, or even a series of arrests, although providing impressive statistics, may not seriously impair the effectiveness of a self-perpetuating criminal process. Indeed, picking off individuals as the opportunities arise may amount to nothing more than officially sponsored career development for a criminal syndicate. Great numbers of impatient young men have been waiting a long time on the organizational ladder for the older superiors to move on. If the Portland Police Bureau is to abate successfully the street crimes that it has set as its objectives, it will require a tightly organized, efficient intelligence process to assist in the development and implementation of operational tactics and strategies.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the Portland Police Bureau, as part of its reorganization plan, establish an integrated intelligence function. It is further recommended that the planning of this function should include the following considerations:

- Establishment of a centralized criminal intelligence information system which will support the primary elements of the intelligence process. In this connection utilization of CRISS as a supplemental data source is recommended.

- Integrated management of confidential funds to assure effective disbursement as well as compliance with LEAA regulations.

- Integration of the management, maintenance, and scheduling of criminal intelligence-oriented equipment.

- A close working liaison with the Multnomah County Sheriff's Department and the District Attorney's Office.

- A clearly defined separation between criminal intelligence and internal affairs.

- Location within the organizational structure of the Portland Police Bureau which will facilitate reporting to the office of the Chief of Police and interfacing with the various operational units of the Bureau.

- Criteria for the selection and rotation of personnel assigned to the intelligence unit.

- A clearly defined set of procedures for working with other elements in the criminal justice system.

- An internal means for providing pertinent, factual material for a well-orchestrated public information program.

Evaluation

Theory

Currently, the term "evaluation," despite its widespread popularity, is poorly defined and often improperly used. For the most part, its meaning is taken for granted and very few attempts have been made, even by those most concerned, to formulate any conceptually rigorous definition or to analyze the main principles of its use. The result is wide disagreement, with many other terms such as "assessment," "appraisal," and "judgment" often being used interchangeably with evaluation.

More serious than this looseness of definition is the absence of any clear-cut understanding of the basic requirements of evaluation. One finds a wide variety of statistical records, inventories, surveys, testimonials, and experiments all classified as evaluation studies. Such studies vary from the "Is everyone happy?" approach to complex experimental designs. They include highly subjective assessments and detailed statistical analyses. As a consequence the field of evaluation research is notable for its lack of comparability and cumulativeness of findings. Different results obtained for different purposes by different methods and based on different criteria lead to a confusion which is doubly difficult to resolve in the frequent absence of any explicit statement of objectives or methods of procedures by the evaluator.

The purpose of this brief section is not to resolve these issues. Books have been written on them and the verdict is yet to be delivered. Rather, a series of definitions will be put forward which hopefully will help this writer put his observations and recommendations forward in a clear fashion and, concomitantly, reflect the requirements of Portland—LEAA High Impact Program as understood by the author.

To begin with, the term "evaluation" will be defined as:

> The process of determining the value or amount of success in achieving a predetermined objective. It includes at least the following steps: formulation of the objective, identification of the proper criteria to be used in measuring success, determination and explanation of the degree of success, recommendations for further program activity.

The key conceptual elements in this definition are "the value or amount of success" and "predetermined objective," while the significant operational terms are "objective," "criteria," and "determination and explanation of the degree of success." Thus, inherent in evaluation is the process of assigning value to some objective and then determining the degree of success in attaining this valued objective.

While few discussions of evaluation in the literature attempt to formulate conceptual definitions, almost all do offer some operational definitions in terms of either what evaluation tries to do or how it proceeds. According to this approach, one recognizes a study as being evaluative by its purpose or its method. In general, whenever one asks such questions as "How good is the program?" "What effects are we having?" "Is the program working as we expected?" and uses such instruments as rating sheets, appraisal forms,

evaluation guides, or research designs which involve comparing accomplishment before or after or in the presence or the absence of a particular action, one may be said to be conducting an evaluation. Thus, evaluation is a process which enables the administrator to describe the effects of his program and thereby to make progressive adjustments in order to reach his goals more effectively. Conceptually, therefore, evaluation should be directed to meet the following management uses:

- To discover whether and how well objectives are being fulfilled.
- To determine the reasons for specific successes and failures.
- To uncover the principles underlying a successful program.
- To direct the course of experiments with techniques for increasing effectiveness.
- To lay the basis for subsequent operations research on the reasons for the relative success of alternative techniques.
- To redefine the means to be used for attaining objectives and even to redefine subgoals in light of research findings.

These concepts point up the kinds of methodological issues that are essential for an effective evaluation. These are:

- Identification of the goals to be evaluated.
- Analysis of the problems with which the activity must cope.
- Description and standardization of the activity.
- Determination of whether the observed change is due to the activity or some other cause.
- Some indication of the durability of the effects.

The foregoing description of the conceptual and methodological facets of the evaluation process strongly underscores the close interrelationship between evaluation and program planning and operation. This is as it should be. Evaluation is a powerful tool for the effective management of a program as innovative as the Portland—LEAA High Impact Program. Evaluation should never be perceived as simply an after-the-fact audit.

Observations

As a consequence of reviewing the existing Portland—LEAA High Impact Program documentation and discussing evaluation requirements with various project personnel, it appears to this writer than an overall evaluation plan is yet to be developed. This writer's search of the available documentation for quantitative measures of performance, cost gathering procedures, or cost-effective analysis procedures indicated that these basic steps remain to be accomplished.

The documentation did contain two characteristics that demand comment:

1. The documentation was abundant with competent descriptions of statistical techniques. However, there appeared to be a noticeable absence of any discussion on the actual measures of effectiveness of a specific crime or recidivism abatement program. Experience has shown that before a discussion of techniques for data processing is presented, it is prudent to identify the programs to be undertaken and the measures that will be employed to establish their success or failure. A set of burglary abatement programs and associated measures are appended to this report to exemplify this point.

2. Considerable attention was placed on percent reductions or improvements as goals for the Portland Police Bureau. However, no supporting data was provided. Therefore, a reader must assume that a degree of arbitrariness was employed. If this assumption is valid, a careful reconsideration is recommended. For example, which base line are the goals to be measured from, pre-impact or post-impact? Victimization studies have shown that crime appears to increase with the onset of a new law enforcement abatement effort, particularly one having a strong public involvement segment. This phenomenon is a result of more people reporting crimes because they feel something is going to be done about them. If the goals were set without considering this social phenomenon, then the resulting statistics will show failure even though the actual, reported plus unreported, crime has diminished.

Of particular concern is the necessity for developing an evaluation interface between the Portland Police Bureau and the Portland Crime Prevention Bureau. Whereas each of these agencies are responsible for identifiable programs in burglary and stranger-to-stranger crime abatement, no exchange of information has yet been planned. However, the nature of these crimes suggests that each Bureau is ideally situated to capture essential evaluative data for the other. For example, the Crime Prevention Bureau appears to be responsible for the improved effectiveness of residential security. But the evaluative measures would include rates of changes in aborted burglaries, rates of change in minor

and/or no-force entries, rates of change in the corrections of visibility obstructions, rates of change in unlighted entry points, and rates of change in burglary alarm detections. These data are most easily collected by the Police Bureau; however, they do not plan to collect these items of information. This example is not meant to be critical of the Police Bureau. It is perfectly understandable that, since these data are not operationally oriented, no need has ever existed to collect them. An overall plan, including the utilization of CRISS, should quickly rectify those problem areas.

Recommendations

On the basis of the theoretical characteristics described previously, the brief observations, and a review of the available documentation, the following are recommended:

- Development of an evaluation plan should begin as soon as possible. Primary responsibility for this plan should reside with the Office of Justice Coordination and Planning inasmuch as evaluation should be viewed as a major tool for High Impact Program planning, coordination, and management.

- Whereas it is recommended that primary responsibility for the evaluation plan reside with the above-named office, it is also recommended that personnel from the Law Enforcement Council, its Data Analysis Center, and the CRISS staff be directly involved. Furthermore, the agencies and bureaus whose programs are to be evaluated should be deeply involved as well as the Multnomah County Department of Public Safety.

- It is recommended that an initial draft of the evaluation plan include as a minimum a description of each of the planned programs to be undertaken under the Portland—LEAA High Impact Program, quantitative measures of effectiveness, quantitative measures of performance, a cost data format, and the identification of the appropriate data source.

- It is recommended that careful attention be given to base line data inasmuch as the data available prior to the impact program will probably not be as sophisticated or complete as that which will be collected during the program.

- It is recommended that the plan contain a detailed outline for an on-going evaluation throughout the impact program, a procedure for interfacing with interested agencies and bureaus, and a plan for continuing evaluation subsequent to the impact program.

Appendix A
SUGGESTED PROGRAMS TO ABATE BURGLARY

Improved Investigations:

- Use of patrol personnel to support investigation
- Use of investigation aides
- Team approaches to investigation
- Special training for investigation staff
- Use of computer-based MO profiles
- Use of computer-based suspect files
- Use of computer-based pawn/property files
- Undercover investigation charges
- Closer work with the DA and courts, parole and probation
- Case linking through MO comparison
- Increased emphasis on latent prints
- Increased use of "lie-detector"
- Increased use of crime lab

Improved Patrol:

- Target area saturation
- Dynamic patrol scheduling
- Tandem or team patrol
- Bicycle patrol
- Helicopter patrol
- "Bird-dog" surveillance of suspects
- Undercover activity
- Receiver stake-outs
- Truancy patrol
- Increased field interrogations

Improved Security:

- Residential inspections
- Commercial inspections
- Follow-up inspections
- Post-burglary security inspections
- Evaluate and recommend specific hardware devices/services
- Display security hardware and devices
- Promote insurance deductions
- Promote security ordinances
- Promote improved street lighting

Public Education/Awareness/Involvement:

- Pamphlets and literature
- News releases
- TV and radio coverage
- Speeches and talks
- Public information center
- Signs, posters, decals
- Block or neighbor citizen groups
- House-owner groups
- Merchants associations
- Insurance underwriters
- Civic clubs/chambers of commerce
- School programs
- Citizen recognition/reward

Decreasing the Receiver Market and Improving Property Recovery:

- Sponsor property "ID" program
- Increased pawn surveillance
- Used-appliance dealer checks
- Rental dealer checks
- Garage sale and swap-meet checks
- Publicizing stolen property lists

Appendix B

SUGGESTED MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Investigation Programs:

- Rates of change of clearances
- Rates of change of arrests by warrant
- Rates of change of complaint filings

Patrol Programs:

- Rates of change in burglary detection
- Rates of change in visible-to-patrol entries
- Rates of change of on-the-scene apprehensions
- Rates of change of burglary-related field interviews

Security Programs:

- Rates of change in aborted burglaries
- Rates of change of minor-force entries
- Rates of change in the corrections of visibility obstructions
- Rates of change in unlighted entry points
- Rates of change in burglary alarm detections

Public Education/Awareness/Involvement Programs:

- Attendance at meetings, presentations, events, etc.
- Requests for and acceptances of inspections
- Requests for more information
- Participation in "ID" programs
- Coverage by public media
- Decreases in "no-force" entries
- Increases in nonvictim reporting

Decreased Receiver Market and Improved Recovery Programs:

- Rates of change of property recovery (general)
- Rates of change of "ID'd" property recovery
- Rates of change of arrests for possession

END