IOWA’S RISING PRISON POPULATION

Volume I

Tentative Projections of Inmate Population To The Year 2000

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531
Volume I, financed by the Iowa Crime Commission through grant #702-73-00-0470-43-01.
Prepared for the Iowa Department of Social Services, the Iowa Crime Commission, administrators and researchers in corrections, and significant others with the purpose of stimulating further communication, and expanded research on a major topic of yesterday, today, and tomorrow.
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MAR 1 1977
INTRODUCTION

The population of Iowa's male prisons at Anamosa and Fort Madison decreased steadily and substantially from fiscal 1962 until fiscal 1973. Many observers began to believe that the number of inmates would continue at relatively low levels indefinitely, especially since the Sixties had exhibited the aforementioned and there were increasing efforts to place offenders on probation or to sentence them to residential treatment facilities instead of prison.

Since fiscal 1973 something has happened. The number of inmates entering the prisons has risen at an ever-increasing pace. Presently, many observers believe that the prison populations will exceed the physical capacity of the prisons before another half-year has passed.

It appears that a major decision regarding what to do about the rising prison populations will be made shortly, with the hope that such a decision is not made in an atmosphere of anxiety, haste, and misunderstanding. The purpose of this study is to give preliminary answers to these questions:

*What has caused the increase?

*What is the true nature and relative weight of each separate cause or trend?

*What is the probable future shape of each trend?

The answers to these questions may not prove to be immediately popular, as the information we have obtained and analyzed may sometimes be in direct conflict with often expressed pre-existing beliefs.
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HIGHLIGHTS

The tide of new admissions to prison results primarily from an increased crime rate among young males and from an increase in the number of young males in the population.

This phenomenon is not temporary, and it is not caused by the recession.

We forecast that prison populations will exceed the currently-planned physical capacity of the existing men's prison system by at least 600, when they reach their peak in about 1982.

Even in our most optimistic projection, the number of male prisoners will not return to the fiscal 1975 level until about 1990.

I--ANALYSIS OF CAUSES

This chapter attempts to identify, describe, and weigh a number of separate factors or trends which seem to underlie the recent increase in the population of prisoners in Iowa. One should be aware at the outset that:

'No one cause can account for the increase by itself.

'While some trends are moving in the direction of increased prison populations, others are moving in the direction of reducing the number of prisoners.

'It is difficult to translate a particular trend into projections for the future with any degree of accuracy.

A. Summary

1. Primary Causes: Two distinct phenomena, which appeared at about the same time and which reinforce each other strongly, account for most of the recent and projected surge in prison admissions. These are:

'a long-term increase in the crime rate for young males

'an increase in the number of young males in Iowa's population.
THIS ANALYSIS CONCENTRATES UPON MALE OFFENDERS AND THE POPULATIONS AT THE MEN'S PRISONS. All data used are for men only unless noted otherwise. The decision to concentrate upon men was made because, in the limited time available, we could not do an adequate analysis of both men and women, because men represent a much greater impact upon the system than women, and because statistical trends are more discernible with larger numbers of subjects. However, we recognize that women are committing more crimes than before and that their problems and prospects are worthy of a separate study.

1. has not been possible to determine the relative weights of these phenomena with precision. The increase in the number of young males can account for less than half the difference in prison admissions. However, the crime rate has risen sharply among males age 15-29, particularly the younger ones in this group, while the rate among the rest of the population seems to be going down.* Not only are there more young males to commit crimes, but each is more likely to commit crimes than earlier. The combined increase in the number of young males and their crime rate is—and will be—responsible for the bulk of the recent and future increases in prison admissions.

2. Contributing Factors: We cannot identify all the reasons behind the increased crime rate. The recession accounts for only a small, temporary increase at this time. However, the recession does worsen the difficulty young men already have establishing themselves in the workforce permanently... Stepped-up police activity may have produced more arrests per capita than formerly... Otherwise, it is necessary to attribute the increased crime rate to unknown factors or to speculate that several general social trends have combined to produce an especially troubled generation.

3. The Recent Surge: While the primary causes of increased prison admissions have existed in the form of known upward trends for a number of years, we believe the recent rapid rise in admissions was produced only when the following factors came together at about the same time.


b. Children from the "baby boom" began entering the prime age for crime in large numbers only a few years ago.

c. Many of these young men soon were convicted for the first time and placed on probation. Since then, a number have been revoked. In addition, many have been convicted for the second time and sent to prison. In either case, entry into prison was delayed until more recently.

d. For several years, as court cases increased in number, the proportion of those convicted and sent to prison slid downward. But by 1975, these proportions had ceased to descend. This meant that an increase in court cases would create an increase in prison admissions.

B. Changes In Criminal Activity—Youths

1. The "Boom" Baby Is Growing Up: The growth in Iowa's total population has been rather small. However, groups within the total have grown at quite different rates. The most important group in this analysis is that of males age 15-29. This group will be about 49 percent larger in 1980 than it was in 1960. The proportion of males age 15-29 to all males in Iowa reached an all-time low at 18 percent in 1960; but we estimate that it will reach 28 percent by 1980. After 1980, the size of this group will begin to fall, but it will fall more slowly than it rose.

*Extrapolated from FBI data for arrests through 1974. These show that in 1963, 1,601,913 men and women age 15-29 were arrested, compared to 2,705,764 others. In 1974, the comparable figures were 3,648,936 and 2,522,492.
Those males who make up the Iowa "baby boom" were born during an approximate 20-year period, from the late Forties to the late Sixties. A substantial number of them eventually left the state, more often than not while age 20-24. Of those remaining, the number who will be 29 in 1976 is noticeably larger than the number who will be 30. At the other end, the baby population seems to reach a temporary low point in the group of boys who will be 8 in 1976. In between the 8-year-olds and 29-year-olds is a large population bulge, the peak of which is occupied by those who will be 16 in 1976. This last fact is of interest because, nationally, more arrests are made of 16-year-olds than of any other age.

The age range 15-29 was chosen for consistency with several statistical series. The analyses and conclusions found here would approximate limits of 12 to 29.

2. The Criminality of Male Youths: According to FBI reports, the overall rate of crime in Iowa increased from 5.17 crimes per 1,000 inhabitants per year in 1960 to an estimated 26 per 1,000 in calendar 1975.* During the same period, the number of males age 15-29 increased by 40 per cent, and the total population of the state rose by an estimated 3.8 per cent. National data on arrests give us reason to believe that virtually all the increase in the total crime rate can be attributed to young males.**

*The latter rate is lower than that released by the FBI. The FBI changed its definition of one index crime in 1973, and this created a large immediate increase in the crime rate. To preserve continuity in the statistical series, we have disregarded that change. It is possible that a small portion of that increase is due to better reporting by law enforcement personnel, but an official of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation assured us that such a portion would not be significant.

**From 1960 through 1975, "violent" crimes increased by an estimated 495.6 per cent, while "property" crimes increased by an estimated 418.6 per cent.

The "Baby Boom", along with several other statistical trends described here, is illustrated graphically in the center insert section.

From 1960 through 1974, the number of all males arrested (for selected crimes, in a large sample of U.S. jurisdictions) increased by 23.7 per cent. But the number of males under 18 who were arrested increased by 119.4 per cent. Most of this difference came about before 1970, but the past year or two has seen another upward spurt in the apparent relative criminality of young men (and women). The number of arrests of all persons 16 and over increased by .9 per cent from 1973 to 1974, while arrests for all persons under 18 increased by 8.7 per cent. Arrests for all persons under 15 increased by 8.9 per cent in that year.

In calendar 1975, Des Moines police made 7,605 arrests. Males age 15-29 made up 55 per cent of those arrested. Similarly, the FBI reports that in calendar 1974, persons under 15 accounted for 10 per cent of all arrested in the nation; under 18, 27 per cent; under 21, 43 per cent; and under 25, 58 per cent. (The FBI figures include both sexes. There were about five times as many arrests of males as of females.) Committing a crime and being arrested are not the same, but it seems reasonable to believe that trends in the two are roughly parallel.

Additional evidence on the increased criminality of young people is found in the fact that "official" juvenile delinquency cases in Iowa's courts show a 28 per cent increase over the period 1970-1974, while the population of males age 14-18 rose only about 8.5 per cent during the same period.*

3. Residence Patterns and Crime: It has been suggested that "urbanization" and the growth in slums lead to increased crime. In Iowa's case, the evidence points in a somewhat different direction. A comparison of census data for 1960 and 1970 shows that

*Statements have been made that the change in the age of majority (to age 18, effective in 1973) has meant that more youths who would have been handled otherwise before are entering prison now. We were unable to find any documented evidence that the change in the age of majority could or did make any significant change in this direction.
the percentage of all males who lived in rural areas decreased from 48.2 to 43.9, while the percentage of males living in central cities went up only from 21.4 to 21.8. The "urban fringe" areas and "other places" (basically, small towns) took up the slack. The proportion of all males age 15-19 living in these two areas increased from 30.2 to 36.7 per cent, and the number of males age 20-24 who called those areas home increased from 36.5 to 44.3 per cent of their total. Comparing FBI data for 1960 and 1974 (unadjusted), we find that the number of crimes in rural areas increased by 375 per cent, in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas by 697 per cent--and in "other cities" by 978 per cent.*

C. Economic Factors

The current recession often is mentioned as an explanation for the recent increase in imprisonments. It is true that the increases in crimes, prison admissions, and unemployment rates have roughly similar shapes for the past two or three years. But the rise in unemployment also has come just as we approach a peak in the number of youths trying to enter the labor force. Although we have been unable to find data that would permit a definitive conclusion, the evidence suggests that:

The degree of change in unemployment rates which Iowa has experienced recently is not sufficient to send to prison large numbers of people who would not be there otherwise.

On the other hand, young people always have more trouble obtaining and holding jobs than older people.

To the extent that unemployment is a contributing factor in crime, we believe the major problem does not lie in recent economic cycles; rather, it lies in the basic structure of the labor market, exacerbated now by the baby boom.

*Note that the Census and FBI use somewhat different definitions for the components of the three areas listed here.

1. The Effect of Cycles: The relationship between unemployment and specific crimes is so hard to pin down, and the numbers of prisoners and unemployed people are so small, compared to the total population, that a substantial increase in the state's unemployment rate probably has only a limited effect upon the prison population in the short run.

EXAMPLE: If we assume that men who lost their jobs during 1973-1975 were four times as likely to be committed to prison as all males were in 1973, then the increase in unemployment in that period resulted in approximately 26 men entering prison during that period who would not have been committed to prison otherwise.

We wish to emphasize that the end of the recession will not produce a major drop in commitments to prison, and that a rise in the unemployment rate by one or two percentage points is not likely to produce a sudden influx of significant proportions.

2. Change In Expectations: Increases in property crimes have been sustained over a long period of continuing progress in the coverage for and benefits from unemployment compensation, welfare, food stamps, college aid, and other programs. This phenomenon, plus limited evidence from other research, indicates that perhaps only a tiny share of the crimes committed by youths are for the purpose of meeting genuine needs for food, shelter, or clothing.

3. Structure of The Labor Market: One of the facts of life about America's labor market is that young people under 25 have two or three times as high rates of non-participation and unemployment. In 1960, for example, the rate of unemployment for all Iowa males was only 3.3 per cent; but for 16 year-old boys, it was 7.1 per cent, and for 19 year-olds, 8.3 per cent. The labor market for young people, especially for part-time and beginning jobs, is more personal and informal than it is for the older people. This means, for good or ill, that the "nice kids", or the children of citizens known by employers, are more likely to get a good start in the labor market than others. To this normal situation, three new factors have been added: the baby boom, a change in young women's participation, and a mild recession.
The section, Notes on Methods and Sources, found at the end of this volume, contains most of the documentation usually placed in footnotes.

In 1960, 110,603 Iowa men age 16-24 were in the civilian labor force; by 1970, this number had risen by only 20 per cent, to 133,231. During the decade, more than 50,000 Iowa men age 16-24 left the state. It is probable that a search for better job prospects motivated a major share of these men to some degree. It also is likely, though it cannot be proven with available data, that those youths who were good prospects for future citizenship were more likely to leave the state than other youths. Largely because of this out-migration, the number of males in Iowa's civilian labor force actually declined slightly from 1960 to 1970. Young men who are not accounted for by out-migration, the limited increase of their numbers in the labor force, or death, must have withdrawn from the labor market. While the total number of males "not in the labor force" has increased only slightly, the proportion who are age 15-29 has risen. In 1960, 42,762 males 16-29 were not in the labor force. By 1970, the figure had risen to 72,637. This is an increase of 70 per cent, versus an increase of 40 per cent in the population of those age 15-29 during the same decade.*

If there is competition between youths and adults for jobs, there also is competition within the youth population. From 1960 to 1970, while the number of males age 16-24 in the labor force increased by only 20 per cent, the number of females of the same age rose by 58 per cent. The decision by greater numbers of women to enter the labor market may have contributed to the greater difficulty male youths experienced in 1970.** In that year, the unemployment rates of males 16-19 climbed to more than three times the rate for all males--even after a significant number of their friends had dropped out of the competition.

All these figures depict one trend that has direct significance for the future populations of Iowa's prisons: More and more young men are either dropping out of the labor market or experiencing unemployment at a critical point in their lives. While there are many crimes and many reasons for crime, one objective factor probably stands out above the others as a predictor of criminality: failure to become satisfactorily and permanently established in the working world early in life.

D. Police Activity

During the period 1965-1974, the number of full-time law enforcement personnel counted by the FBI in Iowa's cities increased from 1,666 to 2,751. During the period 1969-1973, expenditures for law enforcement and courts in Iowa rose from an estimated $46.6 million to $91.3 million. These increases of 65 and 96 per cent may account for part of the increase in the number of crimes reported. Many observers believe that the increase in funds and personnel was matched by an increase in the efficiency of policy and courts, but we cannot document whether this was so.

E. Changes in Courts and Corrections

If crime has increased so rapidly since 1960, why have the prison populations just begun to show a major surge upward? The answer is, in part, that the pattern of events that occur after a crime has changed significantly since 1960. In short, society's response to crime seems to have become less certain and less punitive.

1. Fewer Crimes Are Acted Upon In Court?: The proportion of court cases to crimes reported has gone down. In fiscal 1960, the number of criminal cases taken to court for adjudication of guilt or innocence represented 40.4 per cent of the number of crimes reported in calendar 1960. In 1974, the ratio had fallen to 17 per cent. We are not sure which of these explanations, if any, is appropriate:

*In the time available, we were unable to estimate the possible effect of increased college attendance upon these figures.

**We are just as concerned with the problems of young females as males. In fact, both their involvement with the law and their rates of unemployment may be rising faster than is the case with males. However, as stated earlier, this paper focuses upon the number of males who may enter Fort Madison or Anamosa.
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crimes have risen too fast for the police to keep up; there is a
trend to a longer series of crimes by the same offenders; offenders
are having greater success in avoiding adjudication once arrested;
the public is reporting a higher proportion of crimes that are
difficult to clear; or courts and prosecutors are handling certain
categories of crime differently.

2. Convictions Have Dropped: From fiscal 1960 to fiscal
1975, the proportion of convictions to total criminal cases in
Iowa fell from 84.5 to 60.7 per cent. We speculate that this trend
could be attributable to an increase in the availability and quality
of public defenders, to changes in trial law, or to the presenta­
tion of a larger number of cases that were not "open-and-shut".

3. Prison Sentences: Over the same period, the proportion
of those convicted who received a formal sentence to prison vacill­
ated between 21.5 and 29.5 per cent. In fiscal 1975, the figure
was 26.6 per cent.

4. More Offenders Are Placed On Probation: Of the 1,047 men
sentenced to prison in fiscal 1960, 22.8 per cent were placed on
probation. In contrast, in fiscal 1975, 53.9 per cent of all those
sentenced to prison were placed on probation. It is not necessarily
true that judges are more than twice as lenient as formerly. We
suspect that part of the change is a result of the fact that a
higher proportion of all those sentenced are youths and first­
termers than was true before the "boom" babies began to show up
in court. Also, we suspect that more offenders have been placed
on probation since the passage of legislation (S.F. 482 and 511)
in 1973, which expanded probation services through the use of both
L.E.A.A. and state monies in the development and implementation of
various programs related to community-based corrections throughout
the state.

5. Are Prison Sentences Longer?: For those actually admitted
to prison in fiscal 1961, the mean length of sentence was 7.4 years.
By fiscal 1975, this figure had risen to 10.1 years. This does not
necessarily mean that the average sentence given all those con­
victed is growing longer. It probably means only that those with
shorter sentences are more likely to receive probation. As

probation is used more widely, the ones left over for prison are
those who have longer sentences. If this trend continues, there
will be upward pressure again on the average time served by those
in prison.

6. The Time Served Has Grown Shorter: The amount of time
actually served in prison has declined unsteadily from fiscal 1961
through fiscal 1975. In 1961, the mean time served before parole
was 32.6 months and before expiration of sentence, 32.3 months.
In fiscal 1974 and 1975 combined, the comparable figures are about
25.1 and 27.4 months, respectively.

7. Revocations: We have not found major trends in the pro­
portion of probationers and parolees who are revoked and sent to
prison or in the amount of time served before revocation. However,
two other trends are of interest: First, the number of parole re­
vocations has been dropping unsteadily. In 1965, 188 parolees were
revoked for either rule violations or new offenses. In 1975, the
comparable figure was 105. Second, the proportion of new inmates
who enter prison after probation is revoked rose from 18.2 per
cent in 1973 to 29.6 per cent in 1975, and the increase appears
to be continuing for FY 1976. It is probable that a substantial
share of the projected increase in prison admissions will be fueled
by broken probation. This does not mean that probation is fail­
ing. When probation is used more widely, and when the number con­
victed is growing, then the number of broken probation is bound
to be larger than before, even if the rate of broken probation
stays the same.

F. The Net Difference Between 1960 and 1975

This table shows the net result of the trends described above,
when 1960 and 1975 are compared. Please note that these figures
do not show the total number of cases for each year. Rather, they
show the number per 100,000 inhabitants.
The number of months projected to be served from 1975 convictions (693) represents 73 per cent of the months that would have been served in 1960-1961. This is consistent with the fact that the average daily population of all adult penal institutions in 1975 was 69 per cent of the average daily population in fiscal 1961.

The point that this analysis makes is that if the crime rate had increased as it did, and the pattern of activity in courts and corrections had not changed, then Iowa would be operating at least three prisons at capacity today instead of two.

*Includes a small number who appealed their convictions successfully.

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G. Long-Range Phenomena

1. The Rhythm of Admissions and Separations: Historically, the years in which admissions to prison exceeded releases from prison, and vice versa, have not alternated as rapidly as one would imagine. Since 1900, there have been four lengthy periods during which either admissions or separations continued to exceed the other. There seems to be a natural rhythm by which the prisons alternately fill and empty. This rhythm probably reflects, in part, the accumulation of subtle changes in the policies or practices of those involved in sentencing, paroling, and revoking.

While the existence of this cycle is not predictive in itself, it may be legitimate to consider it in the context of all other changes. Since 1900, there has been only one period during which separations exceeded admissions for more than six consecutive years. That period lasted from fiscal 1963 through fiscal 1973. If the history of the cycle was to hold true, the tide had to turn. Judging by the sharp angle at which admissions and separations are drawing apart now, it is likely that we have entered a period of several years during which admissions will exceed separations each year.

2. A Steady Level of Punishment In Society: Some researchers believe that a society tends to maintain a steady level of punishment—that prison admissions as a percentage of population will fluctuate within a relatively narrow zone, regardless of the crime rate or other social phenomena. Since 1900, male prison admissions in Iowa have fluctuated between .014 of one per cent (1907 and 1910) and .039 of one per cent (1931) of the total population. Matched against today's total population, this would translate to a range of from 402 to 1,119 prison admissions in fiscal 1976. This phenomenon is only suggestive, of course, but it does indicate that we should not project future prison admissions that would exceed the .014-.039 per cent range unless conditions are exceptional compared to the past 75 years.
H. Reductions In Prison Capacity

To answer questions about crowding in the prisons, we must consider both sides of the question: How many offenders will be sent to prison? How many can the prisons hold?

While the number of prisoners at Fort Madison and Anamosa is nearing the combined capacity of those two institutions, the number of prisoners is significantly lower than the number housed there during the last peak population in the early Sixties.

In 1965, the total physical capacity of Iowa's penal system for men was 2,704. At the end of 1976, if current plans for expansion are carried out, the maximum physical capacity will be 2,161.

A program of modernizing and renovating, with the dual aim of better treatment of prisoners and better management of the institutions, has resulted in a number of facilities improvements and a corresponding reduction in the number of cells. In addition, a major cell block at Anamosa was condemned and closed because of physical deterioration. The center insert shows past and current inmate spaces at each facility.

It is important to emphasize that the number of physical cells or beds is larger than the number that can be used as a practical matter. The relative locations of cells, security needs, staffing, logistics, and the grouping of prisoners of similar types—all these factors must be considered. Even if these factors permitted the use of every cell or bed, whether the institution's support facilities and programs could cope with the resultant number of prisoners would be another question.

Since this analysis did not include a facilities-use study, we are unable to say what the maximum practical capacity of the prison system is today or what changes in program or staffing might be required to function safely at that capacity.

II -- THE INMATE POPULATION

Chapter I contained our primary analysis of the causes of the surge in prison admissions. This chapter explores secondary factors to see whether they support the conclusion of Chapter I. The data given here also may be relevant to the consideration of alternative approaches that would ameliorate the pressure against the prisons.

A. Changes In Inmate Characteristics, 1961-1975

1. Age: The proportion of younger inmates has increased slowly during this period. In 1962, the proportion under 30 was 56.7 per cent, and in 1975 it was 78.1 per cent. The major change has been in the proportion of those age 17-25; in 1961, it was 46 per cent; in 1975, it was 60 per cent; and in the first five months of fiscal 1976, it rose to 67 per cent. The percentage of the newly-admitted inmates who are 20 or under held steady at around 27 from 1968 through 1974, but it has climbed since then to an estimated 36.4 per cent.

2. Race: In 1961, 5.8 per cent of the inmates were other than white. By 1970, the percentage of non-whites had risen to 17.5. The proportion of non-whites among male prisoners peaked in fiscal 1973, at 24.4 per cent. In fiscal 1975, the figure was 19.3 per cent.

3. Education: The mean number of grades completed has risen from about 9.3 in 1961 to about 10.5 in 1975. Part of this increase may be due to a change in the proportion of new inmates reporting "some college". Between 1961 and 1971, the number with "some college" varied from 3.3 to 4.4 per cent. It has risen steadily since then, and in 1975, 7.9 per cent of those entering prison had had some college education. Even so, only 43.9 per cent of those admitted in 1975 had gone as far as completing high school.
4. Prior Imprisonment: The proportion of inmates serving their first prison sentence has risen rather steadily, from 51.4 per cent in 1961 to 67.5 per cent in 1975.

5. Type of Offense, Long-Term: There has been a relatively small, but definite, shift in the distribution of types of offense for which convicted. In no case has there been a trend gone consistently up or down from year to year. Over the entire period of 1961-1975, however, we find that:

- Murders are up (from 2.2% of all admissions in 1961 to 15.9% in 1974, then down again to 8.9% in 1975).
- Property crimes are up very slightly (55.8% in 1975).
- Forgery is down (from 27.6% in 1967 to 10.3% in 1975).
- Sex crimes show no real trend.
- OMVUI has gone up and down, but new admissions for OMVUI have been at 3% or less since 1970.
- "Miscellaneous" crimes show no real trend.

The most important shift probably has been in the reduction in forgery crimes and the fact that drug crimes have come into their own as a separate major category. The above trends do not, by themselves, add up to a major change in the average time we can expect offenders to remain in prison.

6. Type of Offense, Short-Term: Commitments to prison (not including revocations of probation or parole) increased from 375 in fiscal 1974 to 471 in 1975. Two crimes accounted for 60 of the 96 additional commitments. These were robbery and drug felonies. These crimes made up almost 63 per cent of the increase, though they represented only 22 per cent of the commitments in fiscal 1974. Data for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 also show that over 60 per cent of all those convicted of robberies and drug felonies are men under 25, while exactly 50 per cent of all other felonies leading to prison sentences are committed by men under 25.

7. Length of Sentence: The mean length of sentence has increased nearly every year. In 1961, it was 7.4 years; in 1975, the mean sentence for those admitted to Fort Madison or Anamosa was approximately 10.1 years. While this increase has not been translated into longer stays yet, the potential of longer stays is there, especially for those who become disciplinary problems or who are revoked from parole.

8. Summary: The above changes show that today's prisoners are more likely to be under 30 and serving their first sentence in prison than was true earlier. This is consistent with the idea that youthful criminality is the primary factor in raising the number of prisoners. In addition, it is significant that the proportion of non-white prisoners has risen sharply.

B. A Comparison of Prisoners and Probationers

As the pressure upon the physical confines of the prisons grow, decisions as to which offenders go to prison and which are placed on (or remain on) probation or parole have an ever greater relevance to the state's plans for programs or facilities. If sentencing, parole, or revocation decision were inconsistent, or if they did not reflect actual risk experience, then offenders who could be handled adequately outside prison might be sent to prison instead. To review this possibility, we assembled the entry data on prisoners and prepared it for a new computer program. We also re-programmed the data gathered by this Bureau earlier as part of its ongoing research into the characteristics of those placed on probation.

Between July 1, 1973, and June 30, 1975, 840 men who were not already on probation or parole were convicted and sent to prison; and 2,390 men were recorded as entering probation.* These two

---

*"Deferred" sentences and felony convictions resulting in jail terms were not included. Those on probation included about three hundred men who were sent to the Fort Des Moines residential corrections facility as a condition of probation.
groups were compared on combinations of six traits, each of which was split as follows:

- **Type Offense**: violent, or against persons (V); vs. against property, or other (NV)
- **Race**: white (W), vs. non-white (NW)
- **Length of Sentence**: less than 10 years (S), vs. 10 years or longer (L)
- **Age**: under 25 (Y), vs. 25 or older (0)
- **Problem With Alcohol or Drugs**: yes (P), vs. no (NP)
- **Prior Record**: any prior juvenile or adult incarceration (R), vs. none (NR)

1. General Results: Over all, the record and length of sentence were the most important predictors of commitment to prison, with the fact of a violent offense next most important. The other traits listed did not prove nearly as important as record, length of sentence, or type of offense.

   For those convicted of crimes of violence or against persons, the length of sentence and record were about equally important predictors. For men convicted of non-violent offenses, the record of a prior commitment was more critical than the length of sentence.

2. Consistency in Sentencing: This table summarizes the detailed results of the special study. The percentage of commitments for those in the first column are in contrast to the 26 percent rate of commitment for the total group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likely To Go</th>
<th>Likely To Be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Prison</td>
<td>Placed On Probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N %To Prison</td>
<td>N %To Probation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R, L, V</td>
<td>115 71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R, S, V</td>
<td>113 43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R, L, NV, 0</td>
<td>141 53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A question can be raised about the cases in the first two lines on the right. Since such large percentages are placed on probation already, would greater consistency in criminal law or sentencing raise the percentage still higher? If the percentage of non-violent, shorter-term, no-record offenders sent to prison had been reduced from 16 to 8, then 74 fewer men would have been sent to prison during this two-year period. If the percentage of non-violent, longer-term, no-record offenders sent to prison had been cut from 12.4 to 6.2, then 51 additional men would not have been placed behind walls during this period.

The Bureau hopes to pursue the question of consistency in sentencing to greater depth and publish a more extensive analysis later.

3. The Effect of A Record: It is apparent that judges tend to view the existence of a prior record as a strong indication that probation might be violated. Since the number of crimes and convictions is rising, a larger number of those convicted in the future (though not necessarily a larger percentage) will have prior commitments.

   The extent to which prison populations increase in the future will depend, to a significant degree, upon the extent to which a prior record helps disqualify offenders for a program less costly than prison. Here is a list of crimes, which may be considered non-violent and not against persons or homes, for which a prior record made a major difference during the period of the study.
If those with records had been sent to prison at the same rate as those without records after conviction for the same crimes, 120 more than expected men would have entered an alternative program instead of prison cells, during the two-year period. (Note that this figure largely duplicates the figures of 74 and 51 produced above.)
**End-of-Year Population of Males in Iowa's Prison System**

Each graph shows actual counts for 1960-1975. After 1975, the graphs show tentative projections that are consistent with the assumptions stated in the text.

The upper limit of each graph depicts a "pessimistic" model. The lower limit of the shaded area depicts an "optimistic" model. The broad white line inside the shaded area reflects an intermediate model.

The upper graph shows the number of offenders who enter prison after conviction. The lower graph shows the approximate number who remain in custody at any one time.
RISE AND FALL OF THE "BABY BOOM"

which may underlie the surge in prison admissions.

These graphs are drawn so they would look the same if their rates of increase were the same.
### The Capacity of Iowa's Prison System

#### PENITENTIARY at FORT MADISON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>At Start of Year</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>At End of Year</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>Conversion of 4' wide cells to 8' in cellhouse 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>Conversion from central institutional shower facility to centrally-located showers in cellhouses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>-49</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>Conversion of cells to group rooms, showers on ranges, and officer toilet area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>-55</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>+60</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>Ditto. Total includes 18 empty cells in a security building no longer used for security cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum-Security Areas</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 160 +100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 250 - 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 180 - 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 100 -100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 8 + 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 50 + 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFORMATORY at ANAMOSA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luster Heights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 1100 -376 724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 724 -22 702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 702*</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clive Farm</th>
<th>Riverview</th>
<th>Halfway Houses</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962 50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 --</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 --</td>
<td>120 (1)15</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970 --</td>
<td>112 (1)15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 --</td>
<td>112 (3)62</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 --</td>
<td>112 (3)59</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973 --</td>
<td>112 (4)63</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 --</td>
<td>93 (4)70</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 --</td>
<td>93 (5)93</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY MEDICAL FACILITY AT OAKDALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969 81 patients + 30 inmate aides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 81 patients + 16 inmate aides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### III--PROJECTIONS

This chapter takes the data and trends described above and attempts to project them into the future so as to achieve rough estimates of the numbers of male prison inmates for each year from 1976 through 2000. The center insert contains graphs illustrating the projections given here.

#### A. Background Assumptions

1. **The Age Bulge**: The bulge resulting from the last baby boom will turn downward after 1980, though the proportion of all inhabitants in the most likely age for crime will not drop back to the 1967 level until the year 2000. It may not be realistic to anticipate an immediate drop in crime after 1980, because we do not know just how the size of the population of young males is related to their crime rate.

   The birth rate has been dropping steadily for several years, and we assume that new practices in contraception and family formation will persist long enough to prevent another major baby boom from affecting the crime picture before 2000. Conversely, a flattened, minor baby boom probably began about 1968 and will be in evidence until around 1990 or so. This secondary effect results from the fact that there are so many more young people of baby-creating age than earlier. Children from the second boom may begin to reach the crime-prone age in significant numbers by about 1990.

2. **Pools of Potential Offenders**: Certain groups of people are more likely to commit crimes than others. Chief among these are the offenders who have been convicted previously, especially those who have been sent to prison. It strikes us that in some periods, the degree of crime and imprisonment in society may be determined nearly as much by the number of prior offenders available to repeat as by the proclivities of others in society. This is especially so
for imprisonment, since repeaters are much more likely to be sent to prison than first offenders. If Iowa is interested in forecasting future criminality, or in taking steps to ameliorate future increases in prison populations, then it may be extremely helpful to know the approximate size of Iowa's pool of potential recidivists.

Since this concept has not been pursued in Iowa previously, it is impossible to reconstruct the size of the pool at this time. It will be necessary to compile statistics on the number of ex-offenders over a period of decades before we can achieve accuracy. In the meantime, some preliminary and very rough estimates may be of value.

a. Former inmates--it is likely that around one-third of all those who satisfactorily complete their prison sentences will be back in prison within approximately 3 to 5 years. As the number of new admissions to prison rises, the number of people released from prison must rise also--meaning an increase in the number of people out in society who have a 1-in-3 chance of returning to prison. (If they can stay out of prison for 3 to 5 years, then their chances of ever returning begin to drop rapidly with the passage of time.)

We made a small analysis of the numbers released from Anamosa or Fort Madison from 1960-1975, following them statistically to 1980, with allowances for mortality. In 1974, the number of those released from 1960 on had accumulated to more than 12,000, and it will remain at more than 12,000 through 1980. This analysis was neither conclusive nor inclusive, in that it was unable to consider those already in the pool in 1960, to identify those who left prison, returned, and left again during the period, or to identify those who have been "clean" so long that their chances of ever returning are small. Nonetheless, it does indicate that Iowa society already may contain a pool of ex-inmates equal in size to several county-seat towns. Secondly, the analysis indicates that a period of admissions at much higher levels than those of 1960-1975--and we do predict much higher levels--will build up a pool of potential recidivists even more quickly.

b. Probationers and former probationers--Earlier research by this Bureau found that of Iowans on probation, nearly 10 per cent were revoked and returned to prison instead of completing probation. We do not know what proportion of those who are convicted and complete probation successfully are sent to prison for a new offense later, but it is undoubtedly higher than for those who are never convicted.

During a period when both crime and the use of probation are increasing, the number of probationers and former probationers will build up much more rapidly than before. During the next decade or so, it is likely that a substantial share of those admitted to prison will be revoked probationers or former probationers.

c. The children of inmates--Although research has not shown whether the children of inmates are more likely to enter prison than the children of others, it has found that: "Delinquency-prone families as a group have a greater proportion of rejecting or harsh parents, parents who impress their sons as indifferent to their welfare, parents who are erratic or lax in discipline, or who offer little for the sons to admire or emulate." Such families are more likely to be broken or to have a female head. As the average age of the inmates becomes lower, it is possible that the average number of children per inmate will be smaller. However, any children they do have are likely to be younger also and even more in need of stability at home. It is likely that thousands of children growing up in Iowa in 1976 have been subjected to the uncertainty, stigma, and deprivations resulting from the incarceration of a parent. In reviewing our projections for future prison populations, readers will want to keep in mind that each increase in the number of inmates also represents an increase in the number of children who will have a hard struggle to avoid repeating the mistakes of their fathers and mothers.

d. Effect of these pools--The result of releasing large numbers of inmates between 1970 and 1980, and of placing large numbers of people on probation during those periods, may be a series of ripples--created by recidivists--just after the general crime wave has turned downward. These ripples could
result in a jagged plateau on the graph, lasting perhaps three years, instead of a smooth, one-year transition from an up-slope in admissions to a down-turn. In addition, the ripple phenomenon probably would act to prevent the down-turn from being as steep as it might otherwise be during the first few years following the plateau.

We also wonder whether the 1981-1983 peak in the number of children whose fathers are in prison could reverberate 10-20 years later. As those children grow up, they may begin to exert a new upward influence upon the crime rate. At about the same time, the crime rate is likely to be pushed upward by the secondary baby boom noted above. If these two factors reinforce each other, we probably can expect another upturn in prison admissions toward the end of this century.

A word of caution is in order: We are not aware of prior research on the concept of pools of potential offenders, and we have not had time to explore this concept with any rigor. It is possible, therefore, that we have either stated the obvious or overemphasized special factors that would be included fully in routine extrapolations of the general crime rate.

3. The Economy: We assume that the basic structure of the labor market, in which young people are at a distinct disadvantage, will remain basically as it is today, and that the cyclical fluctuations in Iowa's overall employment rate will not be large enough to impel large numbers of offenders into prison.

4. The General Crime Rate: We assume that the general crime rate will begin to level off and recede after 1980. This assumption is made in part because: (a) the age bulge will level off at this time, (b) most social phenomena have a natural rhythm, and the rate of increase in the crime rate was smaller from 1974 to 1975 than from 1973 to 1974; and (c) if the crime rate continues to rise rapidly, it will be only a few years before society either becomes so alarmed that it changes its crime-related attitudes and responses or takes a quantum leap into revolution. If the latter happens, none of today's projections will be useful, in any case. Thus, for all practical purposes, the question is not whether the crime rate will turn down again, but when.

5. Police Activity: We assume that law enforcement expenditures and personnel will continue to grow. It would be reasonable to project this growth to be of a shape consistent with the growth in the population of males 15-29. However, it is likely that law enforcement personnel will be kept at about the same level even after this age group begins to decrease. This feature will tend to keep prison admissions higher for each level of crime than they are today.

6. Criminal Law: Unforeseen changes in criminal law could result in either increased or diminished pressure upon the prisons. However, at this time, we are not aware of any likely changes in criminal law that would have a major, one-direction impact upon prison populations over the next 25 years.

7. Courts and Corrections: Observers in some states believe their judges have begun to back off from the practices of recent years and are more reluctant to use probation now. We have tried to document whether this is so in Iowa. However, the recent upsurge in prison admissions could have occurred in the absence of a change in sentencing practices. First, more crimes are being committed in the current crime wave have accumulated rapidly into a pool of offenders with a greater-than-normal risk of new crimes. These men are returning to court in significant numbers now, and they are more likely to be sentenced to prison the second time around. It is difficult to make assumptions about judicial behavior in the future. On one side, judges may be tempted to respond to the crime wave by being less lenient. On the other, they will be reluctant to lock men up if the prisons are bursting.

In the absence of new alternative programs, or expansion of a probation program that is perceived as effective for most offenders, it is likely that additional prison facilities will be opened. If this occurs, the tension in the minds of some can be resolved temporarily by locking offenders up in new and improved facilities that are not crowded. In fact, it is likely that the size of the prison facilities available will be the controlling factor during the next decade or so. That is, so long as the crime rate remains higher than
it was in, say, 1970-1972, the number of prisoners will expand to fill the available cells or beds, and the number placed on probation will more or less follow as the remainder. If this is true, then we assume there will be no major changes in the ratios of crimes to court cases, of convictions to cases or formal prison sentences to convictions, or in the lengths of sentences for those admitted. Each of these assumptions is debatable, of course, but we have no particular reason to make different ones. While the mean length of time actually served in prison may dip below the current figure temporarily, at least while prison facilities are at a premium, it is more likely to remain at about today's level until new facilities are ready, then increase, and turn downward only after 1983 or so, when new admissions begin to slow down.

8. Models For Projections

Any particular model for projections is composed of consistent, mutually-exclusive choices among numerous alternatives on each of the detailed points grouped below.

* crime rate for each point in time: The rate used will depend upon one's assumptions about: the size of various groups in the population, the degree of general social change or dislocation, the economy and its affect upon specific groups, changes in criminal law, and law-enforcement activity.

* prosecution and court practices: The connection between the crime rate and prison admissions is determined by: the ratios of crimes to arrests, arrests to adjudications, adjudications to convictions, and convictions to actual prison admissions. These ratios are affected by the criminal law, the quality of enforcement and prosecution, the nature and number of the offenses and offenders, the quality of the defense, the sentencing practices of the judges. Most of these, in turn, are influenced by public opinion, which is extremely difficult to estimate in advance.

corrections: The degree to which alternatives to prison are developed, the speed and effectiveness of corrections in redirecting prisoners, policies in paroling and revoking... all these affect the use of prisons and the amount of time offenders may spend in prison.

Several alternative assumptions can be made for each of these ingredients. We suggest that the reader jot down his or her own forecasts for each, combine them into plausible and complete models, make projections consistent with those models, and compare the results with the tentative projections given here.

1. Basic Methods: First, we assumed that the number of crimes reported would continue rising until the 15-29 age group peaked in 1980, and that the number would fall afterward in such a way that the number of crimes in any year would be the same as in the year before 1980 in which the population of those 15-29 was the same. In other words, we plotted a curve for the age bulge, and a smoothed upward curve for the number of crimes, and then we tied them together on the down slope the same way they were tied together on the up slope. This provided a plausible basis, in reasonably good statistics, for predicting the number of crimes for each year after 1980.

Having set 1980 as the peak year for crime, it was necessary to forecast crimes and prison admissions for the peak and the four years between then and now. To do this, we projected the current trend line for the crime rate into the future and also compared the upward trends for: crime rate, vs. prison admissions, and prison admissions vs. the age bulge. Each projection resulted in different estimates for the number of prison admissions at the peak (which is 1981 when translated into a fiscal year). These estimates ranged from 1,073 to 1,526, with 1,320 being the average. So the figure 1,320 was chosen as the peak for admissions. This permitted a realistic-looking curve between fiscal 1976 and 1981. A figure much lower could be reached only by assuming that the rate of increase in admissions would undergo a sharp reversal in the near future; and we hesitated to consider a larger figure, because 1,320 already represents a much higher percentage of prisoners to population than at any time since 1900. The number of crimes required to produce 1,320 prison admissions in fiscal 1981 represents a 50 per cent increase in the crime rate from calendar 1975 to 1980.
It was decided that the projected number of prison admissions would not drop below 550, even though the method described would produce lower numbers eventually. During the past 15 years, even with extensive use of parole and probation, the low marks for admissions have been in the 550 range. With an ever-increasing total population, it did not seem realistic to assume a future drop below 550.

Note that two projections are made for each of the three models: one for admissions to prison and a second for end-of-year populations in prison. The second is more important when considering day-to-day pressure upon physical facilities.

2. Intermediate Model: After reaching 1,320 admissions in fiscal 1981, admissions turn steadily downward until they reach 550, then head upward again at half the rate of climb that is true to the current upsurge in admissions. The current practices in courts and corrections were assumed to continue until the end of the century—that is, 1 of 6 reported crimes becomes a court case, 7 per cent of the court cases result in imprisonment, and an average of 26 months is served in prison before parole or expiration of sentence.

3. Moderate-Optimism Model: The down-curve after fiscal 1981 is drawn arbitrarily to show a sharper rate of decline, and the average time in prison is reduced arbitrarily to 24 months. Otherwise, this model is the same as the Intermediate model.

4. Pessimism Model: Beginning in fiscal 1981, there is a 3-year plateau before admissions to prison turn downward again. The total decline, from 1983 to 2000, is arbitrarily established as only half the decline seen in the Intermediate model. The average time in prison rises arbitrarily to 28 months. Otherwise, this model is the same as the Intermediate model.

C. Specific Projections

Please see the center insert for greater detail. While seemingly exact numbers are given here, and can be derived from the graphs, we must emphasize that exact numbers should be used only to indicate ballpark estimates. In these projections, exact numbers

represent approximate total-year figures for arbitrary points along artificially-smoothed graphs.

1. Admissions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Moderate Optimism</th>
<th>Pessimism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY1976*</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1981</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1986</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1991</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1996</td>
<td>550</td>
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<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2000</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>800</td>
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2. End-of-Year Populations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Moderate Optimism</th>
<th>Pessimism</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY1980</td>
<td>2,648</td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td>2,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1982</td>
<td>2,893#</td>
<td>2,754#</td>
<td>3,016</td>
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<td>FY1983</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>3,050#</td>
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<td>FY1985</td>
<td>2,656</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY1990</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>2,618</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY1995</td>
<td>1,370</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2000</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*denotes peak)

*The figure 920 is an estimate based upon original admissions for the first half of fiscal 1976. Parole violators who are re­turned with new sentences were omitted by mistake. This means that the appropriate estimate for admissions in 1976 should be 960 in­stead of 920. The mistake was discovered too late to revise the graphs. However, the estimates beyond 1976 or 1977 are not affected.*
IV—POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Behind The Statistics

The people who will fill Iowa's prisons and overflow them are not, by and large, organized racketeers, white-collar embezzlers, or psychotic wife-killers. Instead, they tend to be young men with poor educations, few skills, marginal attachment to the work force, little self discipline, little or no religious foundation, and hostile or weak relationships with their parents—young men whose worlds may be encompassed by past run-ins with the law, pressure from peers who are no more mature than they, many easy opportunities for crime, and consumer desires or habits that exceed their means.

In short, the offenders who are entering prisons in growing numbers now tend to be people for whom a healthy child-rearing process has never been completed. It is not a question of re-habilitating them, because it appears that most of them never were habilitated to society in the first place.

While it may or may not be true, as is often claimed, that today's youths generally are smarter and more idealistic than any past generation, there is little doubt that this harvest of young men also contains more stubble than ever before. The generation now in its teens and early twenties seems destined to produce more social problems, more crimes, more convicted felons, and more prison inmates than any generation since 1900 or before.

Iowa's youths are overrepresented among the users of many dangerous drugs. Almost half of the Iowans who are worried about their drinking are age 14-24, and a national study has found that 28 per cent of the nation's teenagers may be problem drinkers. In 1969, when the legal drinking age was 21, 520 persons age 15-24 were convicted of traffic offenses involving alcohol. In 1974, when the drinking age was 18, the total rose to 1,171. In addition, we estimate that the number of youths who drop out of school in grades 9-12 in Iowa will be about 54 per cent higher in the 1975-1976 term than it was in the 1968-1969 term.

We were unable, in the time available, to evaluate the way in which official agencies have responded to the increased number of problem youths. However, we are aware of certain isolated facts that suggest the need for a more thorough inventory of need.

The population at Iowa's juvenile institutions has been dropping. The Annie Wittenmyer Home at Davenport went from an average daily population of 276 in fiscal 1964 to 28 in 1975, and the State no longer operates the home. The average daily population at the State Juvenile Home at Toledo went from 176 in fiscal 1966 to 62 in 1975. The average daily population of the "reform schools" at Eldora and Mitchellville was reduced from a combined 377 in fiscal 1965 to 247 in 1975.

There has been no substantial change in the small number of 17- and 18-year olds sent to these institutions and no substantial increase in the number of people of this age sent to prison.

The Department of Social Service's policy in dealing with "neglected and dependent" children, and with delinquents, has been to keep children in their own homes if possible, or to use small, private facilities in preference to large, state institutions. However, the capacity of Iowa's licensed, residential facilities that care for non-handicapped children has increased only from about 579 in 1965 to 958 in 1975.

These facts, coupled with the recent and projected admissions of young people to prison, raise the question whether all those in the expanding group of delinquent youths are receiving vigorous help designed to keep them out of prison, or whether the number of delinquents has outraced our resources.

If we are to reduce the crime rate in the future and ameliorate the pressure upon the prisons, we will have to focus upon certain groups which represent the most likelihood of success for the investment. First among these is the youth who is delinquent or "pre-delinquent". Since the crest of the baby boom is at age 16 now, it is likely that many thousands of boys and girls need preventive, habilitative services immediately. Second is the group of young men who have been convicted of felonies and who are on probation or parole. While probation and parole have been relatively
successful in the past, we are dealing with such large numbers of first-timers now that a higher degree of success in these programs may be critical in preventing the return to prison of large numbers of recidivists throughout the remainder of the century. Thirdly, the children of convicted offenders, especially the children of inmates, make up a growing group, many of whom will be in trouble at an early age if nothing is done now.

The overriding policy implication of this analysis translates not into cells and walls, but into human lives—our lives no less than the offenders'. The problem of rising crime and crowded prisons results largely from the inadequate maturation of a suddenly-expanded population of young men in their teens and twenties. The age bulge, recent child-rearing practices, the turbulence of the Sixties and Seventies, current social policies, and a mild recession, have combined to create greater trauma for today's youth than the Great Depression inflicted upon its generation.

B. A Continuum of Correctional Efforts

The vast majority of convicted felons, and even of juvenile delinquents, are dealt with in one or another of two rather extreme ways. If they are not locked up inside stone walls, they are released to the community and given almost as much freedom as anyone else.

When crime rises to a level as high as it is today, the wide use of probation and parole means that many more offenders are out on the streets and that their expanded group will commit more repeat crimes while on probation or parole. But the percentage of convicted felons who are sent to prison initially cannot be increased substantially, because prison is too expensive an alternative to use freely. Besides, it would be difficult for either supervised release or prison—as we know them today—to become substantially more effective overnight.

As the number of offenders increases, we will find that groups having special combinations of problems may grow large enough, for the first time, to justify special programs that we do not have today.

Instead of a set of correctional efforts consisting of traditional incarceration at one end and supervised release at the other, with only a small number of offenders in between, we envision a continuum of correctional efforts, embracing a wide range of different security/habilitation/correctional programs, with individualized planning for the progress of offenders through whatever sequence is most likely to reduce their future criminality. There are, in both theory and practice, a wide range of possibilities between traditional incarceration and supervised release, whether the dimension considered is cost, degree of freedom, length of term, type of treatment, intensity of treatment, involvement of peers or parent, nature of the facility, means of supervision, criteria for discharge, etc.

Although "community corrections" is in vogue, there really is no such entity. Rather, there are a number of programs, most of them rather small and experimental, each with a somewhat different approach to the idea of "community", none of which has been properly evaluated as to its real effectiveness compared to the alternatives.

One of the basic challenges to officials and professionals in corrections is to quickly and systematically test a wide range of imaginative alternative program models, so as to achieve a "continuum of correctional efforts" able to cope with the custody/habilitation/corrections needs of individual offenders, with greater preventive results than are achieved today, at a lower average cost than imprisonment.

It is important to note that the degree to which a "correctional continuum" can be a viable functional process is strongly dependent upon present and potential legislation. To this effect, such a process requires not only the type of research referred to in section II-B, but also, the type of legislation which would afford correctional administrators increased input into decisions regarding the placement of offenders to correctional and related criminal justice programs.
C. The Nature And Effects of Crowding In Prisons

To both corrections personnel and the public, rising prison admissions mean three things, none of them pleasant: an increase in crime and suffering, the need for new or expanded programs and expenses, and the fear that prisoners may rebel or riot if too many are jammed into inadequate facilities.

This section explores the nature of crowding in prisons and its possible dangers. Fear of the effects of crowding is likely to exert a large influence upon short-term policy decisions. Those decisions are likely to produce better results if they recognize that the formula "Crowded prisons = unrest and riots" gives an oversimplified view.

It is important to recognize the prison as a community or social setting in which there exist norms, roles, social controls, and other features analogous to those of the free community. Considering all the stresses and strains of daily interaction in the free community, it is reasonable to conclude that the same stresses and strains must exist, in enlarged form, within a community of "the kept" and "the keepers".

Now let us identify some continuing problems in the administration of penal institutions, regardless of their size, and outline ways in which operation at full capacity will make these problems grow worse.

1. Living Space: Living space in prisons is always a major concern of administrators. Cells normally are too small and confining; and the space for recreation, work, and training is hardly ideal in the best of times. As inmate populations increase, the problem of living space becomes paramount. Institutions are designed to have a maximum number of beds available for a maximum number of people. Naturally, as institutions reach the point of effective capacity and then go beyond that, administrators must place ever more inmates in the same restricted space. In consequence, privacy and mobility are reduced; and support, recreation, or work areas may have to be given over to living space.

2. Security: Supervision and security always have been major institutional problems. Prisons are designed to protect the free public. Yet, it is important to remember that community safety is an extremely important factor within the institution itself, for offenders and staff alike. In most cases, the number of bodies to be secured grows faster than security personnel. Gresham Sykes, a leading sociologist, points out that one of the "pains of imprisonment" is the deprivation of security. That is, inmates (and staff) cannot enjoy peace of mind about their own safety.

3. Medical Services: One of the most serious problems facing prison administration is the provision of adequate medical services. A report completed by the American Correctional Association (ACA), submitted January 28, 1975, on conditions at the Iowa State Penitentiary, pointed this out quite vividly. The report said the prison hospital was poorly designed and located. It also pointed out the difficulties in recruiting staff to fill authorized medical positions.

Naturally, if the availability of medical staff within the institution was a serious concern at that time—when the population at Fort Madison was 558—this problem has increased significantly with the increase in the offender population. The report identified medical services as "one of the penitentiary's most critical problems but that it could be one that could be solved if the institution's administration would receive the support from the Department of Social Services, Division of Corrections, the Legislature, and significant others in the elimination of this major area of concern."

The ACA consultants also said that the Penitentiary does not have sufficient psychiatric or psychological services available inside the walls.

4. Idleness: Idleness has been tagged by many of the nation's leading criminologists as the major problem within the institutions. There never are enough jobs or activities to keep inmates constructively active. The ACA consultants cited the "phasing down of the prison's industrial program during the last five years without adequate planning for the placement of work activities" as one of the major factors in the widespread idleness existing at Fort Madison a year ago. It is reasonable to say that this problem has
intensified, as the population at the Penitentiary has grown from 558 to nearly 900 since their survey.

An increase in admissions strains budgets for all programs in the prison. It is doubtful whether educational, vocational, recreational, and other treatment-related programs can keep up with the increased demand.

5. Other Concerns: Increased numbers of inmates means changes in: food service, the caseloads of counselors, the availability of legal services for inmates, the ability to choose the best cell block or assignment for each inmate, and other matters. In addition, the increased population has a significant influence upon relationships between inmates, between staff members, and between inmates and staff members.

6. Crowding and Disturbances: Earlier research concluded that disturbances in prisons result from too many people living in too little space. More recent research has clarified the effect of crowding in terms of it tending to intensify the effects of pre-existing social situations. Increased numbers of inmates means intensification of the existing stresses and strains in the prison community.

Research on disturbances has reviewed, as possible contributing factors, not only physical crowding, but also: the demands of inmates, the inability of the prison to meet the psychological and social needs of those being kept, and the "powder keg" concept, racism, prison philosophy and administration, idleness, and shifting balances of power within the prison community. We suspect that these factors combine in different patterns at different times to exert greater influence than one factor would by itself.

We must recognize that human beings are highly adaptable. Crowding tends to have its maximum impact when the crowding reaches a saturation point or when the group in question no longer adapts willingly to changes in administration, program, services, or living conditions. The question is not so much the number of people who occupy a particular spot, but whether the degree of negative effects which can result from crowding can be ameliorated sufficiently to permit the inmates to adapt willingly to crowding as such.

Prisons are volatile societies of caged individuals, where disturbances, erupting spontaneously in various degrees of severity, are practically inevitable whether the prison is half full or over capacity. Crowding may increase the likelihood of such disturbances, but it does not necessarily create disturbances.

We believe that these implications for future penal policy in Iowa follow from the above:

- The possibility of disturbances can be reduced if the negative side effects of crowding, outlined in this section, can be reduced.

- The true physical capacity of a prison is whatever number of prisoners can be handled humanely without sacrifices in necessary living space, security, medical services, activities, and treatment. It is probably that a diminished amount of living space can be tolerated, at least temporarily, if high standards can be maintained for the other aspects of prison life.

- The physical size of an existing or future facility, or the number of people it can hold, has no independent influence upon the likelihood of disturbances.

D. A Capacity For Foresight

The current situation in the prisons caught us with a serious imbalance between physical capacity and projected admissions largely because the state did not have a continuing program of research and planning that embraced periodic predictions of a high quality.

If such a program were established, it would be possible to revise and improve upon the data and techniques used here and to build a computer model with which to simulate the entire crime-courts-corrections system. Using such a model, one could routinely investigate the effect of possible changes in one parameter upon all other parameters. Such simulations would enhance the state's ability to spot upcoming difficulties, create contingency plans, make budget projections, and plan for future manpower needs.
Finally, a word about projections. The fold-out graphs do not--cannot--tell us what the prison populations will be. Instead, they show us what the direction and momentum of past and current statistics will lead to, if the forces we have identified and measured remain relatively the same in the future. But, of course, those forces never do remain the same. In fact, the very act of publishing this paper may have some small effect upon the trends we have plotted. In this sense, the best prediction is the one that can be discarded soonest, the one whose warning becomes obsolete quickly because its readers respond in time.

V-NOTES ON METHODS AND SOURCES

These notes are keyed to specific sections of the text.

I-Analysis Of Causes

B. Changes In Criminal Activity - Youths

1. The "Boom" Baby Is Growing Up: No up-to-date estimates for the number of Iowans of different ages beyond 1974 were available. We used age cohort data from the 1960 and 1970 censuses. Net out-migration data were obtained from: State Department of Health and Office for Planning and Programming, Net Migration By Age And Sex, 1960-1970. The DOH also gave us an estimate for the total net out-migration from 1970 to 1974. The proportions that each age group contributed to migration during 1960-1970 were applied throughout the period. Total net out-migration was estimated by constructing a curve, the three points of which were 1970, 1974, and 2000, by which point (according to DOH) we should assume zero net out-migration. As the age cohorts were projected forward, decrements for both out-migration and expected mortality were applied. Age cohorts not yet born in 1970 were constructed to be similar in size to those born in 1960-1970. . . Estimates for the total populations in Iowa were made in this way: the census' 1974 estimate for total population showed a 30,000 increase, which we projected to 75,000 for the decade, half of which would be males. Due to the declining birth rate, we assumed that the per-decade increase would drop to 50,000 after 1980. This process gave a total population of 2,999,376 in 2000, of whom 1,460,000 would be males . . . A number of detailed estimates were made consistent with the above procedures . . . Contributions included: Steve Boal, DOH, Ronald Sagraves, OPP, and The Bureau of The Census, Des Moines Office . . Recommended reading: Flanagan, John J., "Imminent Crisis in Prison Populations," Journal of Corrections, November-December, 1975.
2. The Criminality of Male Youths: "FBI reports" refers to the Annual Uniform Crime Reports. Through 1972, the index crime of "larceny-theft" applied only to thefts of items valued at $50 or more. Beginning in 1973, the category was used for all thefts regardless of value. To maintain continuity in the series, we disregarded the change by applying the percentage of increase in all other crimes to larceny-theft, using the 1972 figure for larceny-theft as the original base. Larceny-theft accounted for a substantial share of the total, even before the change. If the proportion of all crimes accounted for by larceny-theft over $50 changed significantly from 1972-1975, then our estimates for total crimes in Iowa are off to an unknown degree. Data on arrests in Des Moines were taken from a computer print-out prepared by the City of Des Moines and loaned to us by Charles Wood, Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Information on juvenile delinquency cases was taken from annual reports of the Department of Social Services, titled "Juvenile Court Cases Reported". Lola Baldwin, DSS, assisted us in obtaining and understanding this information. Emmet Rathbun, Bureau of Criminal Investigation, answered questions about nation and state statistics on crime.

C. Economic Factors

Recommended Reading: "Unemployment and Crime" by Ralph Swisher of LEAA, September, 1975, a review of relevant research and concepts. Sent to us by Fred Heinzelmann, LEAA.

1. The Effect of Cycles: We spent some time obtaining figures on the male claimants for Unemployment Compensation in Iowa, broken down by: total, those under 25, and those age 25-34. Applying these figures against estimates for the labor force, we obtained unemployment rates by age. The graph of these rates was similar in shape to the graphs for national rates and the official total Iowa rates. However, the absolute number of young males in "covered" employment who apply for UC is so small that our figures would not have been useful in making projections of the total numbers of males in defined age groups that were unemployed at several points in time. We received assistance and advice from Christine Brown, Gerbert Boyd, and others at the Employment Security Commission.

3. Structure of The Labor Market: These unemployment and labor force figures are from 1960 and 1970 Census reports.

D. Police Activity

The figures on law-enforcement personnel were taken from The Uniform Crime Reports. The figures on expenditures were taken from a summary prepared by the Iowa Crime Commission from other sources which we did not have time to check independently.

E. Changes In Courts and Corrections

The figures for subsections 1-4 were obtained from biennial reports of the Board of Parole. Most of these were prepared by Raymond Taylor, Division of Correctional Institutions, DSS, who also advised us on the best use of those figures. As background material, we also reviewed annual documents labelled "Report Relating to the Courts of The State of Iowa". We were assisted in this by Jerry Beaty, office of the Court Administrator. Statistics on courts are compiled by each county. The quality and completeness of the statistics vary from year to year. All 99 counties reported in 1974 and 1975. Court statistics used here do not include "deferred" sentences, which accounted for about 1,000 additional cases in fiscal 1975.

1. Fewer Crimes Are Acted Upon In Court?: The comparison of crimes to court cases depended upon the UCR, which show the number of crimes reported to police, and court statistics on the number of criminal proceedings that involve adjudication.

5. Are Prison Sentences Longer?: In computing mean lengths of sentence, we had available only summaries by intervals of years. It was necessary to assume a mid-point for each interval.
6. The Time Served Has Grown Shorter: The problem and procedure were similar to those for 5.

7. Revocations: When the number of parole revocations in one fiscal year is compared to the number of men paroled during the same year, the proportion of revocations decreased considerably from 1965 through 1972. However, there is no persistent change since then.

F. The Net Difference Between 1960 and 1975

In item 5, the number of man-months served before parole equals 29 times the mean number of months served in prison by those who are paroled. In item 6, the figures were obtained by dividing item 5 by item 1.

G. Long-Range Phenomena

1. The Rhythm of Admissions and Separations: Board of Control reports from 1900 on were reviewed; and data on court convictions, paroles, and expired sentences were extracted. We tried to maintain similar categories and definitions throughout the period, even though some changes were made in the report format. A graph of admissions and separations revealed two lengthy periods during which admissions exceeded separations each year: 1908-1916, and 1920-1933. Separations exceeded admissions during 1940-1946, 1963-1973, and possibly 1933-1940 (data for two years are missing).

2. A Steady Level Of Punishment in Society: Reference, Blumstein and Cohen, "A Theory of The Stability of Punishment," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 64 (1973), 198-207. Decennial census figures for Iowa's total population were used, with the intermediate years estimated by linear interpolation. Population figures were compared against prison admission figures for men. Note that this theory easily translates into the idea that, within a certain range, "Arrests expand as the police expand, even if crime remains the same," or "Imprisonments will expand to meet the number of cells, even if crime remains the same."

II-THE INMATE POPULATION

A. Changes In Inmate Characteristics, 1961-1975

The data in this section are based upon statistics in the annual reports of the Board of Control and the Department of Social Services. Raymond Taylor compiled most of those statistics originally. He contributed several other statistical series to this report and advised us on their use.

1. Age: The last figure given, 36.4 per cent, is the actual figure for the first 5 months of fiscal 1976.

3. Education: The prisons have not used tests of educational development uniformly for all new inmates, so we cannot estimate whether the rise from 9.3 to 10.5 grades reflects an increase in actual knowledge and skill.

5. Type of Offense, Long-Term: Criminals of different ages have somewhat different patterns of crime. Younger men are more likely to commit muggings, certain armed robberies, rapes, and other crimes which carry longer sentences. A continual monitoring of the phenomena explored in 5 and 6 would help in protecting whether the average time served in prison was likely to increase.

7. Length of Sentence: This refers to the length of sentence for those actually admitted. We cannot assume that the average length of all formal sentences to prison, including sentences then suspended, has changed from 7.4 to 10.1 years.

B. A Comparison of Prisoners and Probationers

The programming exercise mentioned means that we now have the ability to make much more complex analyses of data on prisoners than formerly, and that we can make comparisons among prisoners, probationers, and parolees that were not possible earlier.
2. Consistency in Sentencing: The reductions from 16 to 8 per cent, and from 12.4 to 6.2 per cent, were made arbitrarily to illustrate a point.

3. The Effect of a Record: With the additional analytic ability noted above, it would be possible to construct a computer program that would compare, for each configuration of prisoner, probationer, and parolee characteristics, not only the judges' sentencing behavior but also actual risk experience when each configuration is not imprisoned.

III-PROJECTIONS

A. Background Assumptions

2. Pools of Potential Offenders:

a. Former inmates - To estimate the ages of those released from prison in each year from 1960-1975, we identified the average term for those released in that year, moved back two or three years accordingly, determined the proportion in each of several age categories upon admission in that year, and then applied those proportions against the number released in the subject year. Those in each age category were projected forward from each subject year to 1980, and mortality decrements were applied against the age category, using the mid-point as the age for all. (The mortality table used in this and other exercises was labelled "Numbers of Survivors at Single Years of Age, Out of 100,000 Born Alive ... ".)

B. Models For Projections

1. Basic Methods: The number of crimes in Iowa in calendar 1975 was estimated to be 12 per cent higher than in 1974, based upon the summary UCR for the first 9 months of 1975, in which the North Central States had experienced 10 per cent more crime to date.

C. Specific Projections

1. Admissions: The figure 920 for 1976 was obtained from a series of four half-years, the last of which was the first half of fiscal 1976. Two different series were made, and 920 was their average. Such an exercise is complicated by the fact that the second half nearly always sees significantly more admissions. The inclusion of parole violators who return with new sentences - resulting in a figure of 960 - would have been more consistent with both the earlier figures and the projections for later years.

IV-POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Behind The Statistics

Figures on drug use of Iowa youths and their concern over drinking were taken from: Resource Planning Corporation, The Prevalence and Current Use of Drugs and Alcohol Within The State of Iowa, September, 1974, contributed by Sheran Matson of the Drug Abuse Authority ... The national study, reported in a newspaper story in 1975, was done for the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism by The Research Triangle Institute ... Statistics on traffic offenses involving alcohol were found in a recent newspaper article and were confirmed by a spokesman for the Department of Public Safety.

Information on juvenile institutions was taken from DSS annual reports and from a special summary prepared for us by Raymond Sundberg, DSS. Mr. Sundberg and Tom Irwin, Chief of Bureau of Youth Services, DSS, also provided information on juvenile court and related procedures ... Relevant data also is available in: Iowa Crime Commission and Office for Planning and Programming, A Directory of Child Care Facilities, 1974, about which Philip Smith, OPP, provided further information ...
Prof. Martin Miller, of Iowa State University, volunteered useful information about the current treatment of juveniles in court. Stephen O'Meara, Attorney General's Office, responded to several legal questions concerning youths and courts.

The estimate of drop-outs was based upon figures for drop-out rates in fiscal 1969-1974, and projection for public school enrollment through fiscal 1980, supplied by John Vermilyea, Department of Public Instruction. To make the estimate, we assumed that the drop-out rate for each grade would increase in the future as in recent years until the peak enrollment was reached. Note that if the projections made by DPI eliminated expected drop-outs, then the increase in number of drop-outs would be larger than 54 per cent.

Other Contributors

We spoke by phone with the following specialists, while attempting to identify similar research. In several cases, they followed up by sending documents from their own agencies. Their help is appreciated.

Federal - Mr. Diffenbaucher, Federal Bureau of Prisons; Fred Heinzelmann and others, LEAA; Ken Wright, Census (Kansas City).


Other - Marilyn Piety, American Correctional Association, and Prof. John Flanagan, University of Wisconsin.

Libraries

Morris Lotte and Lila Feitler, DSS Library, assisted several times, as did the State Library. We also used the Capitol Law Library and the Des Moines City Library.
Bureau Correctional Evaluation

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