


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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531

6/28/77
Date filmed

39817

 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION		DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRESS REPORT	
GRANTEE Division of Criminal Justice Colorado State Planning Agency	LEAA GRANT NO. 73-1C0029-(1)-18	DATE OF REPORT 1 July 1975	REPORT NO. 7
IMPLEMENTING SUBGRANTEE City and County of Denver, State of Colorado. Denver-Police Department	TYPE OF REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR QUARTERLY <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL REQUEST <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FINAL REPORT		
SHORT TITLE OF PROJECT Operation Identification	GRANT AMOUNT (Federal) \$344,930.00		
REPORT IS SUBMITTED FOR THE PERIOD	THROUGH		
SIGNATURE OF PROJECT DIRECTOR <i>Captn T.R. Branch</i>	TYPED NAME & TITLE OF PROJECT DIRECTOR Captain T.R. Branch		
COMMENCE REPORT HERE (Add continuation pages as required.)		101-303 1 July 75	
I. Introduction. This is the final report on LEAA grant No 73-1C-0029-(1) 18. Six reports have been filed for the period 15 August 1973 through 15 April 1975.			
RECEIVED BY GRANTEE STATE PLANNING AGENCY (Official)		DATE	

NCJRS

MAR 8 1977

ACQUISITIONS

SECTION A - PROJECT ABSTRACT

Operation Identification (LEAA Grant no. 73-100029-(1)-18) has been a continuation grant of the original grant, being funded from 15 August 1973 to 15 August 1974. Further extensions projected the final date first to 14 November 1974 then to 14 May 1975. This closing date was terminated as of 31 March 1975 by order of J.L. Mulvey regional director, LEAA.

Objectives of the program follow:

OBJECTIVE I

Reduce the number of burglaries in Districts I, II, and IV by 10% in a 12 month period.

Based on an analysis of reported burglaries for the first quarter of 1973, data indicate an overall reduction of 2.86% in District I, II and IV over the first quarter of 1972, or a decrease of 110 cases. While this fact is encouraging, it is also misleading as some precincts have increased significantly. More importantly, the major shift in burglaries is by type -- from commercial to residential. This fact is supported with the following data: There was an overall increase of 5.79% in residential burglaries in the three districts, or an increase of 127 cases. The overall reduction was obtained from a drop in non-residential burglaries of 14.37% in the 1973 quarter of 1972, or a decrease of 237 cases. Thus, while the burglary rate appears to be going down, the rate of residential burglary is rising.

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OBJECTIVE II

Enroll at least 25% of the residential dwellings in Districts I, II, and IV.

The 1970 census indicated that a total of 333,812 persons live in police Districts I, II, and IV. The breakdown by district is as follows:

	OCCUPIED HOUS- ING UNITS	PER CENT OF TOTAL
DISTRICT I	32,853	17.7%
DISTRICT II	35,705	19.3%
DISTRICT IV	43,910	23.7%

There are approximately 112,470 occupied housing units in the combined districts and 25% of this number equals 28,118 housing units. This objective will be met as follows:

LOCATION	ENROLLMENT GOAL
DISTRICT I	8214
DISTRICT II	8926
DISTRICT IV	10978
	28118

OBJECTIVE III

Increase by 20% the value of stolen property returned to the rightful owner in Districts I, II and IV.

The projected property returned dollar value in the combined districts, based on 1972 estimates, is \$350,477. The inscription program is expected to increase this dollar return value by 20% or \$70,095 for a total returned property value of \$420,572.

SECONDARY OBJECTIVE I

Increase the clearance rate of burglary in the operational area by 5% over the 1972 rate and 10% over the 1973 city-wide rate for the Operation I.D. homes.

It is our assumption that the rate of clearance for burglary offenses should increase with a greater number of persons enrolled in the program. Furthermore, recovery and clearance rates for those offenses committed against persons in the program should be greater than those not enrolled. An increase in clearance of 5% would amount to an increase 212 offenses cleared for a city-wide clearance rate of at least 30%. It is anticipated that the clearance rate for the Operation I.D. homes that are burglarized will be 40%.

SECONDARY OBJECTIVE II


Decrease citizen apprehension over being burglarized.

The concern of citizens is a paramount factor in burglary. Although burglary is generally a crime of stealth and opportunity committed by skilled and unskilled criminals, and does not generally involve violence, the average citizen has a greater fear of a burglar confronting him in the privacy of his home than of an armed stick-up man robbing him in the street.

The methods of Operation Identification follow:

V. Methods and Timetable

The intent of "Operation Identification" is to make available lightweight portable electric engraving or etching tools to citizens so they can mark their own household equipment.



without any problems encountered. From a realistic view-point, one could expect about 700-1000 enrollments per week.

The results of Operation Identification follow:

Objective I: Reduction of burglary

The impact of Operation I.D. on the total burglary rate cannot accurately be assessed due to two factors:

(A) The program can and does affect the burglary rate within itself. To assess what influence the 1.2% rate of Operation I.D. has in reducing a possibly higher rate than the present 29.9% burglary rate for the city as a whole is impossible.

(B) Operation I.D. has enrolled 37,035 locations to date. This represents 17.5% of the total locations in Denver. I.D.'s influence on burglary can be assessed more accurately only when the percentage reaches 33% to 50%.

Objective II: Enrollment goals.

The grant calls for enrollment only in Districts I, II, and IV. The set policy of Operation I.D. is service upon request anywhere in the city. It quite naturally would be inimical to the program to refuse service to any location. The following graph explains these goals and completed figures.

	<u>GRANT</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>ALL LOCATION ACTUAL COUNT</u>
DISTRICT I	8214	5681	7929
DISTRICT II	8926	3639	4333
DISTRICT III			17856
DISTRICT IV	10978	6276	6917
TOTAL	28118	16817	37035

The final figure indicates the program was successfully completed with surplus of 8917 actual locations or 31.7%.

Objective III: Returned property.

No information on recovered or returned I.D. property is available for this period. We are attempting to establish a base for this information at this time.

Secondary Objective I: Increasing clearance rate.

No information or breakdown is available for clearance rates at this time.

Secondary Objective II: Citizen Apprehension.

This subject explained fully in Section B.

Burglary has been one of the most prevalent crimes in the present upsurge in criminal activity. The crime of burglary has other facets, as it is often accompanied by a second and sometimes pre-eminent crime such as rape, assault, and murder. Vandalism and destruction of property is often found.

The public is informed by the media of these crimes and adopts an attitude of fear and apprehension they will be the next target. The threatened loss of valuables, irreplaceable antiques, family treasures, cash, destruction of household items and personal attack presented a challenge to law enforcement to provide every safeguard possible to the citizenry. Many programs evolved, one of which was Operation Identification. Proposal design is direct and clear and should not be confused with other crime fighting activities. Operation I.D. is basically designed as a preventative measure. It does not attack crime, it moves to prevent it and with this goal in mind the objectives are set forth.

Objective I: Burglary reduction.

When we speak of burglary reduction we imply a personal attack. I.D. is the opposite. It is impersonal. It is stickers placed in prominent locations as a warning not to enter. It denies ready information to the burglar on what he can safely steal and what he cannot. It provides ready identification of items on the street by patrol officers. It does all these things and provides security to the location by static measures which assure the risk of burglary is reduced to that location by many times the city average.

Objective II: Enroll 25% of the locations.

When the grant was written the wrong classification was used as this objective. The words "residential dwelling" and "housing units" are not applicable as Operation I.D. cannot refuse service to a location anywhere within the city limits. This requirement automatically guarantees service to all and to any location. Thus business houses, and government establishments are entitled to the service equally with homes.

If we compare home units only we show 28,118 households required by grant and 16,817 accomplished. The true figure is 28,118 locations by grant and 37,035 homes, businesses, and government entities completed. The total inventory figure is far greater, at 65,639 inventories filed, and gives a true representation of the work output of the project to date.

Operation I.D. has at present reached 17.5% of the total locations in the City & County of Denver. This figure is less than the 25% called for in the grant, but at the time the grant was written the policy was to count total inventories rather than total locations. As large enterprises often produce from 1 to 10 locations but 500 to 700 inventories the discrepancy in count can readily be recognized. Were Operation I.D. still using the inventory count our percentage of completion would be 231%.

Objective III: 20% increase in value & returned property.

It is impossible for Operation I.D. to meet this requirement simply because the incidence of I.D. burglaries to city burglaries is 1.7% making a 20% factor in any area beyond computation.

Secondary Objective I: Clearance rate increase.

Clearance rates are affected to the same exact measure as in objective III due to the small number of I.D. burglaries.

Secondary Objective II: Citizen Apprehension.

Numerous examples of citizen apprehension over burglary have come to our attention. A few are cited below.

1. The Patterson Building in Denver was marked a short time ago. The building caters to individual businesses. A week after the marking five offices were broken into, all were I.D. locations, but nothing was stolen including available cash. The agent called in gratitude for I.D. protection.

2. Fifteen offices in a large building at 1660 So. Albion St., Denver were not in I.D. The other offices were. Burglars broke into all fifteen offices not members. No member location was disturbed. The 15 subsequently demanded immediate service.

3. Apartment managers sponsor our efforts to obtain 100% membership in I.D. so we will place stickers on the main and rear doors as well as each apartment. They find the stickers tend to keep hall prowlers out.

4. Hundreds of home owner have called after being burglarized. They want the assurance and protection I.D. can give them to prevent recurrence.

5. Evidence from statements made by burglars they avoid I.D. Marked locations. One burglar stated he never entered a marked home because due to the police badge on the sticker he felt a police officer lived there. He even ranked I.D. as a deterrent above dead bolt locks.

Operation I.D. and its objectives where such objective are attainable is successful and enjoys a cordial acceptance from the public. The grant was generally directed properly to the operation, and the inability to meet objectives was due to success in the program rather than failure.

This project was originally set up in grant for the use of Reserve Police as employees. It was found this system could not be utilized so the hiring of employees was taken over by Career Service Authority of the City. Problems in moving, leasing new quarters, equipping same, and obtaining supplies delayed the moving and hiring until late November, 1973. Staff was employed as quickly as possible but the complete staff was not available until after January 1, 1974. At that time, full street operations began, and bad weather influenced capability to move about the City. Public response to advertising was good and teams were used to solicit areas to test operations procedures. This period was one of testing and devising new methods of obtaining inventories.

The staff was trained in utmost accuracy on inventories, and efficient handling of inventories was stressed. The engraver marks the items in a prominent location, makes out the inventory form, gives a copy and the stickers to the location. The amount of stickers is one or two to an apartment, four to a residence, and a necessary amount to business or Government locations. The engraver turns in his copies of the original inventories upon his return to the office and they are checked then for police district, legibility, neatness, and detail. They are then dated. The maker of the inventory signs his number at the bottom of the form to provide check information if needed later. They then go to the file room where cards are typed for reference to number used for identity and also the address. The inventory itself is placed in the alphabetical file. In this manner a location can be checked by identity number address, or name. Those inventories done voluntarily by the owner are processed in the same manner when they

reach the office. Thirty loan stations where a citizen may obtain the marking material and instructions are maintained in 26 fire stations and 4 police substations.

Interaction between this agency and other City agencies has involved the following units:

- The Denver Police Department.
- The Denver Fire Department.
- The Denver Housing Authority.
- Police Community Relations-Storefronts.
- The Denver Police Academy.
- The Denver Public School System.
- The Majority of Churches of all faiths.
- Numerous Social and Business Clubs and Associations.
- Homeowner Associations.
- Realtor Groups.

Staff limitations do not allow follow-ups on burglary and other problems.

Public reaction to advertising is monitored.

This program uses the most detailed breakdown of any similar activity in the United States to our knowledge. We have been monitored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Institute for Public Program Analysis, and have furnished information to numerous police administrations across the country. The systems developed and employed by us have been detailed for information whenever requested. Operation Identification depends heavily upon solicitation of locations by expert experienced solicitors. Each employee is trained in the most pleasant method of obtaining further locations and inventories. The result of our aggressive program is that most large business buildings, hotels, motels, large business enterprises, and government establishments have enrolled in Operation I.D. Thousands of small businesses, doctors, dentists, and technical firms are listed. The program is very well known and well received.

Aggressive prosecution of this type of program is imperative for success. Waiting for the public to jam your doorway is useless. We find the voluntary joining by the public to be only about 16% of our program. Public apathy is the usual excuse, but with the problems of simply existing in these times, we must consider the public is receptive, but must be prodded to give the time needed to join Operation I.D., not from apathy, but from a crowded life schedule and the human desire to have some time for their private pursuits. Data collection is accumulated by daily check of all items being listed for research, weekly totalling of diverse factors, and monthly final accounting for publication such as quarterly reports. Section D reflects this accumulated information in tables and graphs.

The most efficient numbering system found was the social security number for individuals and the Internal Revenue Service number for businesses. Operation I.D. accepts any type of identification numbers when submitted through the loan system or upon insistence of the citizen, but most have no value for identification. Church registry, liquor stamp, and other license numbers have been acceptable in the absence of an IRS number.

Operation Identification maintains its own files, so contact with Social Security Administration or IRS has been nil. A further identifier is now in use which is the abbreviation for Colorado (CO) followed by a square which contains the County number, and the town or City number. Denver is 1 due to the fact it is a City and County combined. This system allows a breakdown to any needed level by State, by County, and by area, or town. It is readily adaptable on a nation wide scale.

SECTION D - RESULTS AND EVALUATION

The final results are outlined in the accompanying charts:

Chart #1, Program Statistics, demonstrates the total results of the program to 1 April 1975, in relation to burglary loss.

Objective I, of the grant precludes a residential reduction in burglary of 10%. This objective was not met. Operation I.D. can and does affect burglary within the program, reducing it by large factors, but there is no criterion as to whether the burglary may not still occur to an unmarked location. In addition, the burglary rate by comparison (see Chart #2) Burglary Analysis is so minor 1.7% it would be impossible for Operation I.D. to meet a 10% objective.

The following graph reflect the success of Operation I.D. in relationship to Objective II.

	<u>GRANT</u>	<u>COMPLETED HOMEOWNERS</u>	<u>ACTUALLY COMPLETED</u>
DISTRICT #1	8214	5681	7929
DISTRICT #2	8926	3639	4333
DISTRICT #3			17856
DISTRICT #4	10978	6276	6917
TOTALS	28,118	16,817	37,035

Operation I.D. did not meet the grant requirement in these categories of 28,118 homeowners or 25% of the combined living units, as shown by the 16,817 column of 14.9%. The "actually completed" column reflects the totals of District 3, homeowners, businesses, and government.

Objective III was not met simply because losses were 1.7% of the total burglary loss making a 20% return impossible.

Secondary Objective I was not met as solid information on clearance rates of I.D. burglaries is not available at this time.

Second Objective II was met in large scale by demands for early service to prevent burglary or a recurrence of same.

EVALUATION:

The original objectives of the grant were largely not met for the following reasons:

1. The grant was written and based on homeowners only.
2. The figures assigned each district were called "homeowner" or home, which designates one location. Those figures were actually based on total number of filed inventories from our sources. This requirement placed a different concept on computations and responsibilities.
3. District 3 was left out of the computations entirely, ignoring the responsibility of Operation I.D. to provide service where requested.
4. The success of the program in reducing burglary within itself made other objectives impossible to attain. We are at this time attempting to establish recovery and clearance rates.
5. The emphasis on "homeowners" or locations as against total inventories is not favorable to Operation I.D. In completing demands by business over the City, we found multiple inventory counts were common, and were the only means of validly accounting for two or more employees being engaged in marking in one location for two or four days. During this period of total commitment, Operation I.D. filed 65,038 inventories, which is the only compatible measure of work load and grant activity.

SECTION E - COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Denver Police Department actually served as a pilot program in Operation Identification. The program and policies developed through a trial and error system. The grant was not accurately applicable as no form of activity, prosecution of efforts, or methodology was available. The Monterrey program was useless for reference, as were other cited programs in the beginning as they were geared to small cities and not a metropolitan area.

2. The Denver program began in approximately one fourth of the city. It was expanded to the entire City later. Experience now dictates that such a program should be inaugurated in an area, with strict guide lines as to system and operation. Denver has many satellite towns and cities where service is not available, poorly set up if in operation, or operating under methods inimical to the Denver system. This can only be detrimental in the wide scope of operation.

3. The changes brought about in administration and funding which were beyond the control of the staff both in planning this project and inaugurating it brought changes in personnel and funding to prominence. Careful budgeting and management created surplus funds which in turn provided the opportunity to continue this grant beyond the one year phase. It was planned to operate this program on available funds until 30 August 1975. The fact management was able through careful funding and application of personnel to operate and plan over this long period (15 August 1973 - 30 August 1975) brought allegations of poor grant planning and padded budget. We reject these allegations out

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7. Loss of I.D. marked items (\$67,846.50) against I.D. marked items not stolen in the same locations (\$442,456.65) is 15.3%.
8. Loss of I.D. marked items (\$67,846.50) against loss of non-marked items (\$128,475.38) in the same locations is 52.8%.
9. In 90 of 486 I.D. burglaries no loss was sustained. This is 18.5% of the total burglaries in I.D.
10. Further information on the program can be gleaned from the attached charts.

This program has been geared to standardize the operation so it may be applied elsewhere. A brief summary of how this is accomplished follows:

1. Marking is standardized.
 - A. Use of electric pen.
 - B. Marking if possible in upper right hand corner on back of item.
 - C. Diamond tipped stylus for delicate items.
 - D. Photographs of items likely to be damaged by marking.
2. Inventory filled out and copy left with location.
3. Stickers issued after marking.
4. Loan out stations for convenience of public.
5. Re-check and processing of inventories when submitted in office.
 - A. Each inventory is signed by employee making same.
 - B. Inventories submitted by citizens on loan program are marked "Done by owner."
 - C. Inventories are separated by police districts, counted and date stamped.
 - D. Two cards (3x5) are typed and filed. One card is filed under address, the other under social security, IRS, or other number. The inventory is filed alphabetically. This permits three search methods.
 - E. Computerizing is not done at this time but is highly recommended in the future.
 - F. All information relative to I.D. burglaries is taken from the weekly computer read-out sheet from the Denver Police Department.

- G. Item loss values are computed from values estimated by homeowners and Police Officers, as reflected in burglary criminal complaints.
 - H. Computing figures, averages, and percentages is ruled by objective information and no supposition or estimating is allowed.
 - I. Cooperation from the Denver Anti-Crime Council has been excellent and understanding in most areas. Problems have been encountered at State and regional levels. It is strongly felt by this office that all levels of chain of command should obtain first hand knowledge of what a project is engaged in, what the particular problem areas may be, what reasonable alternatives exist, instead of either the "you handle it" attitude, or criticism or censure over matters in which that authority has no knowledge. The simple answer would be one administratively responsible agency who would understand and cooperate with the project in program and have the decisions concurred in by echelon.
7. In relationship to objective attainment, Operation Identification has not been highly successful for reasons explained before. The total program has been outstandingly successful in the following areas:
- A. Minimal cash and item loss.
 - B. Prevention of burglary by use of sticker.
 - C. Careful selection of items by the burglar to avoid marked items.
 - D. Reluctance of fences to accept marked items or items damaged by removal of markings.
8. Operation Identification is well known in the City of Denver, but automatic response is not what might be desired nor does it appear it will be. Our findings reflect a 16% intake from voluntary markings. The other 84% is the result of aggressive solicitation and constant changing of methods to attempt to reach every possible location. A program which has been piloted and has very good potential is the setting up of a project for school children to solicit locations for Operation Identification with prizes awarded for the best results. The one supposition which cannot be afforded is that Operation Identification will be a success through voluntary participation. This is not necessarily true of the small community, as other Colorado agencies we have helped and advised have found it has varying degrees of success.

This project has furnished advice and counseling to the following agencies:

C&C	Jefferson County, Colo.
C&C	Pagosa Springs, Colo.
CIVIC	Parker, Colo.
CIVIC	San Antonio, Texas
CIVIC	Seattle, Wash.
P.D.	Boulder, Colo.
P.D.	Castle Rock, Colo.
P.D.	Crested Butte, Colo.
P.D.	Ft. Collins, Colo.
P.D.	Golden, Colo.
P.D.	Longmont, Colo.
P.D.	Wheatridge, Colo.
P.D.	Elizabethtown, Ky.
P.D.	Kansas City, Mo.
P.D.	Cheyenne, Wyo.
SHERIFF	Adams County, Colo.
SHERIFF	Boulder County, Colo.
SHERIFF	Littleton, Colo.
SHERIFF	Moffat County, Colo.
SHERIFF	Park County, Colo.
	and others.

The final report for in-kind contribution to 101-303 (Operation I.D. follows.

These figures contemplate total in kind from 15 August 1974 to 1 April 1975.

Capt. T. R. Branch has contributed in-kind during the above full period for a total of 302 days at \$80.00 per day and 63 days at \$88.00 per day for a total of \$29,704.00.


The Denver Fire Department contributed through 6 fire stations from 15 August 1973 to 1 December 1973 a total of 642 hours at \$5.75 per hour for a total \$3691.50. From 1 December 1973 to 1 January 1975, 25 fire stations contributed 10,225 hours at \$5.75 per hours for a total of \$58,793.75. From 1 January 1975 to 1 March 1975 the 26 Denver Fire Station contributed 2340 hours of \$6.74 per hour for a total of \$15,771.60. The total in put of the Denver Fire Department to 1 April 1975 is \$78,256.85.

The Denver police Department has contributed through 4 sub-Stations a total of 2012 hours at \$5.75 per hour for a total of \$11,569.50 during the period 15 August 1973 to 1 January 1975. From 1 January 1975 to 1 April 1975. The sub-stations contributed a total of 720 hours at \$6.74 per hour for a total of \$9852.80. The total input of the Police Departmen to 1 April 1975 is \$16,422.30.

Total breakdown and total:

Captain T. R. Branch	\$29,704.00
Denver Fire Department	\$78,256.85
Denver Police Department	\$16,422.30
Total	<u>\$124,383.15</u>
Grant Requirement	\$85,120.00
In-kind surplus to date	\$39,263.15

Submitted


Captain T. R. Branch

Operation Identification
Project Director

ANALYSIS OF CHART ONE

OPERATION TOTALS

A study of 1,024 inventories revealed the average number of items marked at any one location was 9. A further study of 400 criminal complaints established the value of those nine items at \$1431.00, using the valuations on items as set by police officers and owners. These nine items consist of TV's, radios, clocks, clock radios, stereos and speakers, record players, tape decks, cassettes, typewriters, adding machines, calculators, projectors, and sewing machines along with such other items the owner insists upon marking. Items whose value may be injured by marking or damaged by vibration of the pen are recommended to be marked by stylus or photographed. The photographs are the owners property and it is recommended further that one copy be given to the insurance company of the member. This system has been accepted by the public and allows a much shorter time interval per house per marking. Request for information on security of premises is a low factor but when requested the owner is advised on locks and lights and advised to contact a good locksmith of their own choice.

GRANT REQUIREMENTS

Total residence and business markings indicate the requirement set forth in the continuation grant. This goal is applicable 30 June 1976. The individual inventory figure is not required in the Grant requirements but is included to indicate the total number of inventories or total production effort. The preparation of inventories in multiple locations further emphasizes the ability of Operation I.D. to prove an item belonged to the member, it was in a specific location in a building or room on a certain date, and provides if necessary a witness for testimony.

BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT LOCATIONS IN I.D.

This graph indicates the number of businesses required in the total 76,000 figure and are further broken down into District level to aid as a guide in assuring coverage to the entire city. The percentage of enrollment to requirement is 46.6 %.

Effective date of information on this chart is 1 APRIL 1975.

CHART ONE

OPERATIONS TOTALS

ITEMS MARKED PER LOCATION (AV) 9 TOTAL I D MARKED ITEMS 590,751
VALUE PER I D MARKING \$1431. TOTAL VALUE OF I D MARKINGS \$93,929,409

GRANT REQUIREMENTS

TOTAL HOME AND BUSINESS LOCATIONS 76,000 I D COMPLETED 37,035
INDIVIDUAL INVENTORIES 109,958 I D COMPLETED 65,639

BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT LOCATIONS IN ID

DIST 1	GRANT REQUIREMENT	<u>1611</u>	I D ENROLLED	<u>2248</u>
DIST 2	GRANT REQUIREMENT	<u>1756</u>	I D ENROLLED	<u>671</u>
DIST 3	GRANT REQUIREMENT	<u>3577</u>	I D ENROLLED	<u>729</u>
DIST 4	GRANT REQUIREMENT	<u>2157</u>	I D ENROLLED	<u>632</u>
TOTAL	GRANT REQUIREMENT	<u>9101</u>	I D ENROLLED	<u>4280</u>

ANALYSIS OF CHART TWO

PROGRAM STATISTICS

This Chart indicates the success of Operation I.D. in reducing loss from burglary for those locations participating in the program.

1. TOTAL I.D. ITEMS STOLEN.

This figure indicates the total number of I.D. marked items stolen in I.D. burglaries during the life of the program. Burglary losses for District 3 are computed from 1 January 1973 and for Districts 1, 2, & 4 from 1 December 1973. The original Grant began on that date in District 3 as noted.

2. VALUE OF STOLEN I.D. ITEMS.

Value is estimated by owner, police, or average loss value from study. (See OPERATION TOTALS, CHART ONE)

3. TOTAL NON-I.D. ITEMS.

These are unmarked items contained at the same location of an I.D. burglary and stolen.

4. VALUE OF STOLEN NON-I.D. ITEMS.

Value estimates are those on criminal complaint or from average loss value study.

5. CASH STOLEN IN ALL I.D. BURGLARIES.

Actual cash stolen in I.D. burglaries. Coin collections are entered with owners evaluation if possible.

6. TOTAL I.D. ITEMS NOT STOLEN.

These are marked items in the same burglaries which have been undisturbed and are thus a no loss factor. This entry provides proof the burglar has a tendency to ignore items he feels are marked.

7. VALUE OF I.D. ITEMS NOT STOLEN.

The same value criteria is used here as in other value totals. This total is however most impressive and one which indicates most fully the success of Operation I.D. to save loss by burglary. The savings here is 6.5 times greater than the loss from burglary.

ANALYSIS OF CHART TWO

(Page 2)

8. TOTAL I.D. LOSS TO BURGLARY.

This figure reflects the total loss of I.D. to burglary. The I.D. loss of marked items is 32.7% of this figure. This loss is 1.8% of City loss to burglary and represents only .22% of risk to total value of all marked items.

(See CHART ONE, OPERATION TOTALS)

9. TOTAL CITY LOSS TO BURGLARY.

This total reflects the total loss in the City to burglary after the subtraction of I.D. losses. All burglary loss figures have been compiled from Denver Police Department Monthly Reports.

Effective date of information on this Chart is 1 APRIL 1975.

CHART TWO

PROGRAM STATISTICS

1. TOTAL I D ITEMS STOLEN	<u>370</u>
2. VALUE OF STOLEN I D ITEMS	<u># 67,846.50</u>
3. TOTAL <u>NON</u> -I D ITEMS STOLEN	<u>2195</u>
4. VALUE OF STOLEN <u>NON</u> -I D ITEMS	<u># 128,475.38</u>
5. CASH STOLEN IN ALL I D BURGLARIES	<u># 10,711.14</u>
6 TOTAL I D ITEMS NOT STOLEN	<u>3523</u>
7. VALUE I D ITEMS NOT STOLEN	<u># 442,456.65</u>
8. TOTAL I D LOSS TO BURGLARY	<u># 207,033.02</u>
9. TOTAL CITY LOSS TO BURGLARY	<u># 11,241,567.00</u>

ANALYSIS OF CHART THREE

BURGLARY ANALYSIS

This Chart analyzes the further breakdown of the crime of burglary as it is affected by Operation I.D.

1. TOTAL I.D. BURGLARY LOSSES reflect the total number of burglaries to Operation I.D. locations to date.
2. TOTAL NON-I.D. BURGLARY LOSSES are the burglaries which occurred in the City during the same period with Operation I.D. burglaries deleted.
3. TOTAL I.D. HOME BURGLARIES reflects the total of residence losses to I.D. and the City figure with I.D. deleted.
4. TOTAL I.D. BUSINESS BURGLARIES reflects the same comparison as home burglaries.
5. AVERAGE I.D. BURGLARY LOSS is the total number of I.D. burglaries divided into the total cash value loss of I.D. burglaries. This provides an average cash loss for comparison.
6. AVERAGE NON-I.D. BURGLARY LOSS is the same system applied to the remaining burglaries and cash value loss for the non-member locations in the city.
7. BURGLARY RISK TO I.D. LOCATIONS is arrived at by dividing total number of I.D. burglaries into total I.D. locations.
8. BURGLARY RISK TO NON-I.D. LOCATIONS is computed in the same manner after deletion of I.D. burglaries and locations from the total.

Two salient facts emerge in this analysis Chart, one that the average I.D. burglary is 413.76 in cash loss or +3.3 % and the fact that the risk of burglary to I.D. locations is 12.0 times less than NON-I.D. locations.

A further spin-off of this program is that in 90 burglaries or 18.5 % no loss was suffered to I.D. members beyond physical damage in entry.

It is further noted that I.D. has joined 17.5 % of the total locations in Denver, but 486 I.D. burglaries against 27279 City burglaries provides a factor of 1.7 %. This extremely low percentage in comparison to risk further emphasizes the efficiency of I.D. as a burglary preventative.

Effective date of information on this Chart is 1 APRIL 1975.

CHART, THREE

BURGLARY ANALYSIS

1. TOTAL I D BURGLARY LOSSES	<u>486</u>
2. TOTAL <u>NON</u> I D BURGLARY LOSSES	<u>27,270</u>
3. TOTAL I D HOME BURGLARIES	<u>393 CITY 17,375</u>
4. TOTAL I D BUSINESS BURGLARIES	<u>93 CITY 9,895</u>
5. AVERAGE I D BURGLARY LOSS	<u>\$ 425.99</u>
6. AVERAGE <u>NON</u> I D BURGLARY LOSS	<u>\$ 419.82</u>
7. BURGLARY RISK TO I D LOCATIONS	<u>1 TO 76.2</u>
8. BURGLARY RISK TO <u>NON</u> I D LOCATIONS	<u>1 TO 6.3</u>

ANALYSIS OF CHART FOUR

BURGLARY RATE is computed from data furnished by the Denver Police Department computer. A special indicator is assigned I.D. on the readout computer sheets to indicate an I.D. burglary. This office then obtains a copy of the criminal complaint, verifies the burglary as I.D. or not I.D., computes the losses, and completes the inclusion of information on our charts.

All breakdown information is done on a District basis. It will be noted District Three is the largest due to eleven months added experience and the fact District 3 is most attractive to burglars due to exclusive areas of expensive homes and large and small shopping areas.

Government totals are added into business totals and are shown to indicate the large numbers of Government facilities in Denver at all levels which are members of I.D.

Factor percentages in each block are the ratio of I.D. to City burglaries.

Operation I.D. has enrolled 37,035 locations in the City and those locations have suffered 486 burglaries for a risk percentage of 1.3%.

The NON-I.D. locations in the City are 173,703 with a burglary total of 27270 for a risk percentage of 15.6%.

This further indicates a risk of burglary 12.0 times greater for a NON-I.D. member.

Effective date of information on this chart 1 APRIL 1975.

CHART FOUR

BURGLARY RATE

		HOMES	%	BUSINESSES	%	GOVERNMENT	%
DIST 1	CITY	3372	X	2637	X	No DATA	X
	I D	24		9		3	
DIST 2	CITY	4816	X	2158	X	No DATA	X
	I D	35		13		9	
DIST 3	CITY	5664	X	3535	X	No DATA	X
	I D	297		30		19	
DIST 4	CITY	3523	X	1565	X	No DATA	X
	I D	37		6		4	
TOTAL	CITY	17,375	X	9,895	X	No DATA	X
	I D	393		58		35	

ANALYSIS OF CHART FIVE

THE LOCATION INVENTORY CHART reflects the total single inventories. The percentages reflect the stage of completion of each requirement.

Business and Government are again totaled for use in these calculations.

The numbers behind I.D. in the Homes column reflect a double count, one as inventories and the other as locations as these figures constitute a single inventory to location and not a multiple inventory to location count. Businesses and Government in this Chart reflect multiple inventories. See Chart One for business, and the single location figures.

Effective date of information on this Chart is 1 APRIL 1975.

CHART FIVE

LOCATION INVENTORY COUNT

		HOMES	%
DIST 1	GRANT	17229	X
	I D	5681	32.9
DIST 2	GRANT	18786	X
	I D	3662	19.5
DIST 3	GRANT	38254	X
	I D	17133	44.7
DIST 4	GRANT	23069	X
	I D	6285	27.2
TOTAL	GRANT	97338	X
	I D	32761	33.6

BUSINESSES	GOVERNMENT	%
2234	NO DATA	X
10767	3349	631
2435	NO DATA	X
7125	1144	339
4960	NO DATA	X
4405	916	107
2991	NO DATA	X
3864	707	152
12,620	NO DATA	X
26161	6116	25.5

END